alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2019246EN.01004801.xml

| 22.7.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 246/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.7.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 246/48

---

Action brought on 7 June 2019 — Conlance v EUIPO — LG Electronics (SONANCE)

(Case T-343/19)

(2019/C 246/48)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Conlance GmbH (Augsburg, Germany) (represented by: A. Hayn, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: LG Electronics, Inc. (Seoul, South Korea)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU word mark SONANCE — Application for registration No 14 589 907

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5 April 2019 in Case R 1085/2018-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | annul the decision of the Opposition Division of EUIPO of 15 May 2018 in Case No B 2 660 572‘Conlance GmbH v LG ELECTRONICS INC.’; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of the Opposition Division of EUIPO of 15 May 2018 in Case No B 2 660 572‘Conlance GmbH v LG ELECTRONICS INC.’;

| — | uphold Opposition Case No B 2 660 572‘Conlance GmbH v LG ELECTRONICS INC.’ for all the contested goods; |
| --- | --- |

—

uphold Opposition Case No B 2 660 572‘Conlance GmbH v LG ELECTRONICS INC.’ for all the contested goods;

| — | reject the EU trade mark application ‘SONANCE’, No UM 14 589 907; |
| --- | --- |

—

reject the EU trade mark application ‘SONANCE’, No UM 14 589 907;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings, including those incurred in the appeal proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings, including those incurred in the appeal proceedings.

In the event that another party is intervening in support of the defendant:

| — | order the other party to pay the costs of the proceedings, including those incurred in the appeal proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the other party to pay the costs of the proceedings, including those incurred in the appeal proceedings.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

WESTERN DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Respondent 

 v. 

JERMALL E. JOHNSON, 

 Petitioner 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 289 WAL 2016 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 27th day of October, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

and Application for Relief are DENIED.
(February 19, 1986)

#### In the Matter of George Sassower, an Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee for the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts, Petitioner.

—Motion by respondent for a formal public hearing on this matter and for other relief.

Motion granted to the extent of directing that the matter should proceed in a formal public hearing.

In all other respects, motion denied. Mollen, P. J., Lazer, Mangano, Gibbons and Thompson, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION


<PAGE>


                                  Exhibit 32.1

                     CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Liquor Group  Wholesale,  Inc. (the
"Company")  on Form 10-Q for the period  ending  May 31,  2009 as filed with the
Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report") I, C. J.
Eiras, Principal Executive Officer, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company,  certify,  pursuant  to 18 USC  section  1350,  as adopted  pursuant to
section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge
and belief:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


Dated:  July 14, 2009


/s/      C. J. Eiras
     ---------------------
(Principal Executive Officer,
President and Chief Executive Officer)


This  certification  accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  be deemed  filed by the  Company  for  purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
#### Leon Ray, Respondent, v Michael Barnhart, Doing Business as Bert & Ernie’s Tavern, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

—Kane, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Zeller, J.), entered March 18, 1985 in Otsego County, which, *inter alia,*denied defendant Michael Barn-hart’s motion for partial summary judgment.

Defendant Michael Barnhart owns and operates Bert & Ernie’s Tavern in the Village of Unadilla, Otsego County. Plaintiff was injured during the early morning hours of April 1, 1984 in the tavern when he was allegedly assaulted by a fellow patron, defendant Danny Neish. The instant amended complaint asserts three causes of action against Barnhart. The first cause of action alleges a violation of Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65 (2) in that Neish was illegally served intoxicating beverages. Plaintiff claims that such violation resulted in the assault on him by Neish. The second cause of action alleges a violation of Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 106 (6) in that the premises were allowed to become disorderly. The third cause of action alleges common-law negligence.

After discovery, Barnhart moved, *inter alia,*for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action and dismissing "the dramshop aspects of the second cause of action”. Specifically, Barnhart asserted that there was no evidence that Neish was intoxicated when he was served an alcoholic beverage *(see,*Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65; General Obligations Law § 11-101). Special Term denied the motion, finding the existence of triable issues of fact. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Barnhart’s sole argument is centered upon his assertion that plaintiff has failed to "prove * * * the unlawful sale or furnishing of liquor”. While the record contains evidence indicating that Neish was not intoxicated at the time in question, the record also contains evidence from which the jury could conclude otherwise. This being the case, the motion was properly denied and the order should be affirmed *(see,*Siegel, NY Prac § 278, at 333-335).

Order affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Weiss, Mikoll and Levine, JJ., concur.
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular

cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-40383

Conference Calendar

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

FRANCISCO HERMAN,

 Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-94-CR-218-1

- - - - - - - - - -

(October 19, 1995)

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Francisco Herman challenges the district court's finding

that he obstructed justice and its refusal to grant a downward

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. 

The adjustment for obstruction of justice may be appropriate

if the defendant threatens, intimidates, or otherwise unlawfully

influences a co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or

indirectly, or attempts to do so. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment.

(n.3(a)); see United States v. Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th
No. 95-40383

-2-

Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1829 (1994). The evidence

submitted at sentencing amply demonstrated that Herman schemed to

discredit the testimony of his codefendant, Miguel Angel Adame,

in an attempt to exonerate Herman's girlfriend, Kimberly Miles. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that

Herman attempted to obstruct justice. Graves, 5 F.3d at 1555

(district court's finding that a defendant has obstructed justice

under § 3C1.1 is a factual finding reviewed for clear error).

"Conduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 . . .

ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted

responsibility for his criminal conduct." U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 n.4. 

This court applies a very deferential standard of review to a

district court's refusal to credit a defendant's acceptance of

responsibility. See United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1372

& n.39 (5th Cir.) (applying "clearly erroneous" standard and

noting, that there "appear[ed] to be no practical difference"

between that standard and the "without foundation" or "great

deference" standards used in other cases) (internal quotations

and citations omitted), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1861, 2119

(1994).

The evidence demonstrated that Herman not only obstructed

justice by attempting to influence the testimony of others, but

that he also lied about this scheme at sentencing. Accordingly,

the district court did not err in determining that Herman was not

entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
III 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 103 

Providing for members on the part of the Senate of the Joint Committee 

on Printing and the Joint Committee of Congress on the Library. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 16, 2011 

Mr. SCHUMER (for himself and Mr. ALEXANDER) submitted the following 

resolution; which was considered and agreed to 

RESOLUTION 

Providing for members on the part of the Senate of the 

Joint Committee on Printing and the Joint Committee 

of Congress on the Library. 

1 Resolved, That the following named Members be, and 

2 they are hereby, elected members of the following joint 

3 committees of Congress: 

4 JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRINTING: Mr. Schumer, Mrs. 

5 Murray, Mr. Udall of New Mexico, Mr. Alexander, and 

6 Mr. Chambliss. 

7 JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS ON THE LIBRARY: 

8 Mr. Schumer, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Alexander, and 

9 Mr. Cochran. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
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#### Cape Wind Associates, LLC v. John Donelan

Superior Court, Suffolk, SS

No. 040913BLS

Memorandum Dated May 19, 2004

van Gestel, J.

This matter comes before the Court on a motion by the defendant for “reconsideration and/or clarification” of this Court’s April 29, 2004, memorandum and order compelling testimony [17 Conn. L. Rptr. 645). The defendant asks for a hearing on his motion. No hearing is necessary.

The Court offers the following as clarification.

At the time of the motion to compel testimony, the procedural posture of the case was that the defendant, at his deposition, had declined to answer essentially all questions, seeking shelter in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court, therefore, followed the dictates of Mass.R.Civ.P. Rule 37(a)(2) and entered an order that the questions propounded be answered. In doing so, the Court expressed its position that the order “is not intended to interfere with any constitutional rights that [the defendant] may legitimately choose to exercise.”

Thus, the Court recognized the defendant’s right to exercise his Fifth Amendment protections not to answer, while at the same timethis being a civil proceedingsetting the stage for future relief to the plaintiff if no answers were forthcoming. That future stage is found in the dictates of Mass.R.Civ.P. Rule 37(b)(1), providing for a variety of sanctions if “a deponent fails ... to answer a question after being directed to do so by the court . . . the failure may be considered a contempt of that court.”

This Court then volunteered the particular sanction that it would impose if the failure to answer persisted. That sanction “will be an order refusing to allow [the defendant] to oppose the claims brought against him in the complaint, thereby establishing liability and setting the matter down for an assessment of damages.” See Mass.R.Civ.P. Rule 37(b)(2)(B).

By indicating that all that may remain after determining liability against the defendant was an assessment of damages this Court made no determination regarding the defendant’s rights to have those damages assessed by a jury. Indeed, Mass.R.Civ.P. Rule 55(b)(2) seems clearly to provide, under appropriate circumstances, for a juiy trial on this issue, if requested. The pertinent language reads:

> If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages... the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessaiy and proper and *shall accord a right of trial by jury to the parties when and as required by statute.*

(Emphasis added.)

Whether, of course, ajury trial on a damage assessment is required by statute in this case will be a burden on the party requesting it to establish. See, e.g., *Silkey v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Company,*9 Mass.App.Ct. 816, 817 (1980).

ORDER

The forgoing consists of the Court’s “clarification” of its April 29, 2004, memorandum and order. No further clarification seems necessaiy.
EXHIBIT 32.1



CEO/CFO Certification Pursuant to § 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.§1350)



The undersigned, as the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation, respectively, certify that, to the best of their
knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2004, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation and subsidiary at the dates and for the periods indicated.



The foregoing certification is made pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(18 U.S.C. § 1350) and shall not be relied upon for any other purpose. The undersigned expressly disclaim any obligation to update the foregoing certification except as required by law.



|                     |  |                                      
|-------------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|August 11, 2004 Date |  | /s/ Robert H. Gilliam, Jr.           
|                     |  | Robert H. Gilliam, Jr., President and
|                     |  | Chief Executive Officer              
|                     | 
|August 11, 2004 Date |  | /s/ Bryan M. Lemley                  
|                     |  | Bryan M. Lemley, Secretary,          
|                     |  | Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signatures that appear in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to
Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation and will be retained by Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 339 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 339

 To authorize the production of records by the Committee on Commerce, 
                      Science, and Transportation.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 29, 2011

   Mr. Reid (for himself and Mr. McConnell) submitted the following 
             resolution; which was considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 To authorize the production of records by the Committee on Commerce, 
                      Science, and Transportation.

Whereas, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation conducted an 
        investigation in 2009 into aggressive sales tactics on the Internet and 
        their impact on American consumers;
Whereas, the Committee has received a request from a state law enforcement 
        official for access to records of the Committee's investigation;
Whereas, by the privileges of the Senate of the United States and Rule XI of the 
        Standing Rules of the Senate, no evidence under the control or in the 
        possession of the Senate can, by administrative or judicial process, be 
        taken from such control or possession but by permission of the Senate;
Whereas, when it appears that evidence under the control or in the possession of 
        the Senate is needed for the promotion of justice, the Senate will take 
        such action as will promote the ends of justice consistent with the 
        privileges of the Senate: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, acting jointly, are 
authorized to provide to law enforcement officials, regulatory 
agencies, and other entities or individuals duly authorized by federal, 
state, or local governments, records of the Committee's investigation 
into aggressive sales tactics on the Internet and their impact on 
American consumers.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of Aubrey A., an Infant. Erie County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Rebecca B., Appellant.

[945 NYS2d 909]

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Erie County (Patricia A. Maxwell, J.), entered February 24, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b. The order, among other things, terminated respondent’s parental rights with respect to her daughter.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Respondent mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights with respect to her daughter. Contrary to the mother’s contention, Family Court did not err in basing its determination in part upon a psychological report prepared in 2007 in connection with a parental evaluation of the mother at that time. The report concerned the mental fitness of the mother and was therefore relevant to the court’s determination of the best interests of the child *(see generally Matter of Louise D.,*227 AD2d 177, 178 [1996]; *Matter of Robin QQ.,*226 AD2d 805, 806 [1996]). Present — Scudder, P.J., Centra, Peradotto, Carni and Lindley, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Mitchell Martin, Also Known as Mitchell Divine, Appellant.

—Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Gallagher, J.), rendered August 26, 1983, convicting him of attempted murder in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant was guilty, as charged, of attempted murder in the first degree *(see,*Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [i]; § 110.05 [1]; *People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620, 621). We find the defendant’s other contentions to be without merit. Mollen, P. J., Gibbons, Thompson and Brown, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                    MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                          519,402
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   2,870,332
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     835,625
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                4,225,359
<PP&E>                          315,666
<DEPRECIATION>                  34,766
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  5,769,756
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           46,084
<BONDS>                         6,842,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<COMMON>                        1,000
<OTHER-SE>                      0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    5,769,756
<SALES>                         0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                538,973
<CGS>                           0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                528,537
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              205,969
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (195,534)
<INCOME-TAX>                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             (195,534)
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    (195,534)
<EPS-BASIC>                   (195.53)
<EPS-DILUTED>                   (195.53)



</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                              5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the interim
financial statements of American ATM Corp. as at and for the three months ended
September 30, 1998 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                       1
       
<S>                                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                            6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                        JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                             DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                        45,631
<SECURITIES>                                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 10,129
<ALLOWANCES>                                       0
<INVENTORY>                                        0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              81,205
<PP&E>                                       300,225
<DEPRECIATION>                               116,569
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               266,780
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        352,725
<BONDS>                                            0
<COMMON>                                       2,816
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                        0
<OTHER-SE>                                  (179,761)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 266,780
<SALES>                                            0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             191,901
<CGS>                                              0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                129,959
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             181,933
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             6,600
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (125,216)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   2,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (127,216)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                (127,216)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (.05)
        


</TABLE>