because he was not charged with any crimes.” The lock-up officer also told James Woods that
he thought that it was “bullshit,” that he and his wife were being detained.

Only after discovering that the Chicago Police Department had been inquiring into the
validity of plaintiffs’ detention were charges brought against plaintiffs. Clay filed charges
against James Woods for disorderly conduct and obstructing a peace officer and filed charges
against Toi Woods for disorderly conduct. Plaintiffs remained in police custody overnight, more
than eight hours before being released on bond.

On December 5 and 28, 2000, James and Toi Woods, respectively, appeared before the
Circuit Court of Cook County to respond to the charges against them. No complaining witnesses
appeared to testify and the State moved to dismiss the charges. Plaintiffs assert that at no time
did they the commit any illegal act, nor provide the Grill security guards or the City of Harvey
police officers with probable cause to believe that either of them committed any illegal act.
They further assert that at the time of the incident in question the City of Harvey Police
Department had a custom and policy of harassing, without probable cause or suspicion, Chicago
police officers.

Plaintiffs allege, in Count V, that their arrest and imprisonment was without probable
cause and done solely for the purpose of harassment and, as such, constitutes extreme and
outrageous conduct, beyond the bounds of decency. Plaintiffs also allege that defendants
intended that their conduct inflict severe emotional distress or knew that their was a high
probability that their conduct would cause severe emotional distress, and that as a proximate
result of defendants’ conduct of causing plaintiffs to be handcuffed, taken into police custody,

transported in squad cars and physically detained in jail cells for an entire night, plaintiffs lost


eventually convict an innocent person, causing him to endure jail time for no reason.”).! Thus,
the court concludes plaintiffs have adequately alleged extreme and outrageous conduct.

Severe Emotional Distress

Defendants also claim that plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege severe emotional
distress, arguing that plaintiffs’ contention that the conduct resulted in grief, shame, humiliation,
worry or other mental condition is insufficient. Defendants are correct that mere “fright, horror,
grief shame, humiliation, worry . . . alone are not actionable,” Pub. Fin. Corp., 66 Il1.2d 85,

360 N.E.2d at 767 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Comment j), and that “[t]he law
intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable [person] could be
expected to endure it.” Jd. However, the purpose of the resulting severe distress element is to
“prevent fictitious claims.” Doe, 161 Ill.2d 374, 641 N.E.2d at 508. And the Illinois Supreme
Court has recognized that “the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant’s conduct is in
itself important evidence that the distress has existed.” Jd. Moreover, “[t]he intensity and the
duration of the distress are also factors to be considered[.]” Pub. Fin. Corp., 66 Ill.2d 85,

360 N.E.2d at 767. Indeed, physical harm is not a requirement “if the conduct is sufficiently
extreme and outrageous there may be liability for the emotional distress alone[.]” RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TorTs § 46, Comment 4).

‘Doe v. City of Chicago, 39 F. Supp.2d 1106 (N.D. Ill. 1999), is inapposite in that not only was it decided
on summary judgment but the only evidence with respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
against the named defendants (towing company and one of its employees) was that they had been “rude.” The
conduct of the police officer who arrested the plaintiff, handcuffed her in front of her son and took her to the police
station, was not at issue because he was not a party to that claim. See id. at 1114. Briggs v. N. Shore Sanitary Dist.,
914 F. Supp. 245 (N.D, Ill. 1996), a case involving, inter alia, racial slurs against plaintiff, is inapposite because it
deals with emotional distress claims against an employer and courts have held that, in such context, a plaintiff must
allege more than mere discrimination to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 251.

9


relationship in which the defendant has authority over the plaintiff, or (3) the defendant knew of
some peculiar susceptibility of the plaintiff to emotional distress.” Wexler v. Mieszcak, No.

93 C 5942, 1995 WL 453030, *11 (N.D. IIL. July 28, 1995) (Hart, J.) (citing Rudis v. Nat’!
College of Educ., 191 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 548 N.E.2d 474, 476 (1* Dist. 1989)); see also Doe,
161 Ill.2d 374, 641 N.E.2d at 507.

Defendants assert that the conduct alleged in the complaint does not rise to the level of
egregiousness necessary to satisfy the extreme and outrageous element, because merely being
handcuffed, placed into custody, taken to the police station and placed in a cell for a night (even
after James Woods displayed his badge) would not cause a person to utter the word
“Outrageous!” Plaintiffs respond that the conduct alleged in the complaint can be considered
extreme and outrageous in and of itself and also because it involves an abuse of police authority.

The court agrees with plaintiffs. One of the positions of authority specifically named by
the Illinois Supreme Court as giving rise to extreme and outrageous conduct for abuse of that
position is that of a police officer. See Doe, 161 Ill.2d 374, 641 N.E.2d at 507 (“The
Restatement lists police officers, school authorities, landlords and collecting creditors as
examples of types of individuals who in exercising their authority can become liable for extreme
abuses of their positions.”) (citation omitted). When an abuse of position of authority is at issue,
courts examine whether defendant reasonably believed the objective was legitimate. Jd. More
latitude is given a defendant in pursuing legitimate objectives. Jd.

The complaint, contrary to defendants’ suggestion, does not merely allege usual police
conduct, i.e. placing persons into custody for cause, and taking them to the police station.
Reading the complaint in plaintiffs’ favor, a jury could infer an extreme abuse of police authority

in that defendants used excessive force and falsely arrested and imprisoned plaintiffs not because

6


sleep, suffered gross humiliation, shame and embarrassment, physical discomfort, mental
anguish, injury to their reputations, and lost income.
DISCUSSION

Defendants (except the unidentified officers) move to dismiss Count V, the claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Under Illinois law, the following elements are
required to state a claim for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) extreme
and outrageous conduct; (2) intent to cause severe emotional distress or knowledge that there is a
high probability of causing severe emotional distress; (3) the conduct actually caused severe
emotional distress. Pub. Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill.2d 85, 360 N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ill. 1976);
Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374, 641 N.E.2d 498, 506 (Ill. 1994), Defendants contend
plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege the first and third elements.

Extreme and Outrageous Conduct

“Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Pub. Fin. Corp.,
66 Ill.2d 85, 360 N.E.2d at 767 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment d
(1965)). Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is “judged on an objective standard based
on all of the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” Doe, 161 Ill.2d 374, 641 N.E.2d at
507 (citation omitted). “Conduct is of an extreme and outrageous character where recitation of
the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor,
and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” Jd. (quotation omitted). Although “mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities” are insufficient, id.,
conduct may be characterized as extreme and outrageous where “(1) the character of the conduct
itself is extreme and outrageous (2) the conduct arises out of an abuse of a position or

5


bringing allegedly false charges (as an alleged cover-up) against both plaintiffs, which plaintiffs
were forced to defend in court only to have the case dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Such allegations could cause an average member of the community to resent the
defendants and exclaim “Outrageous!” Indeed, several other courts addressing similar police
abuses of power have concluded likewise. See Holder v. Ivanjack, 39 F. Supp. 2d 965, 978
(N.D. Ill. 1999) (denying motion to dismiss where, inter alia, defendants, Chicago police
officers, attacked plaintiff (including beating and kicking him), swore at him, subjected him to
racial slurs and told him he was “going to jail tonight” merely because plaintiff (also a Chicago
patrol officer) who was off-duty tried to identify himself as Chicago police officer by showing
his badge at the scene of a reported shooting incident); Guerra v. Hunger, No. 97 C 8772, 1998
WL 246399, *12 (N.D. Ill. April 30, 1998) (Conlon, J.) (denying motion to dismiss where
defendant, Chicago police officer, responded to plaintiff's query about a parking ticket by
becoming verbally abusive, and with two other officers wrestled plaintiff to the ground,
handcuffed him and placed him under arrest during which he sustained a fractured shoulder and
laceration to his head (all in the presence of plaintiff's nine-year old son), then transported him
to jail where he was detained for several hours and defendants subsequently conducted a
warrantless search of his vehicle and charged him with resisting arrest of which he was later
acquitted); Henry v. Ramos, No. 97 C 4025, 1997 WL 610781, *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1997)

(Kocoras, J.) (denying motion to dismiss where police officers abused their power “to arrest and


Minute Qrder Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Mlinois

Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Joan H. Lefkow than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01C 6618 DATE 4/23/2002
CASE Woods, et al. vs. Clay, et al.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion due
(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) im} Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on___ set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) mi} Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) a (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) im} This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) General Rule21 O FRCP41(a)(1) [ FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) Ml [Otherdocketentry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendants’ motion to dismiss [5-1],
[18-1] is denied. Defendants (if they have not already done so) are required to answer the complaint by
5/6/02. Status hearing is set for 5/30/02 at 9:30 a.m.
a1) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.
UV. | Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone,
Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date docketed,

dockoting deputy initials

4/23/2002

MD

date mailed notice
courtroom
deputy’s n'

Paes MD
initials

Date/time received in
centrat Clerk's Office

mailing deputy initials



CONCLUSION
The court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss [#5] [#18]. Defendants (if they have not

already done so) are required to answer the complaint by May 6, 2002.

Date: April 23, 2002 Enter: = LK fA-fhmn

(AN HUMPHREY LEFKOW
nited States District Judge

11


The court concludes that the complaint sufficiently alleges severe emotional distress in
that it has already found that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged extreme and outrageous conduct,
which when combined with the other allegations, such as suffering physical discomfort, mental
anguish, loss of reputation and income, are enough to indicate that plaintiffs may have suffered
more than a reasonable person should be expected to endure. That the extreme and outrageous
conduct involved plaintiffs being subjected to a series of harassing and abusive behaviors,
including their stay overnight in jail and subsequent allegedly trumped up charges against which
they had to defend, lends further support to their distress allegations. See Burns v. Cineplex
Odeon, Inc., No. 95 C 5280, 1996 WL 501742, *15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1996) (denying motion to
dismiss where, inter alia, complaint alleged “severe emotional harm and emotional injury” as a
result of the following conduct: defendants approached plaintiff, who was with his wife in a
movie theater, and in response to him calmly placing his hands over his head, threw plaintiff to
the ground, handcuffed him, falsely arrested him and charged him with resisting arrest (of which
a jury acquitted him) and plaintiffs wife had been searched without probable cause and search
warrant).” Thus, the court concludes plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they suffered severe

emotional distress.

? Lewis v. Cotton, 932 F Supp. 1116 (N.D. Ill. 1996), is inapposite in that not only did it involve the
employment context, but the court concluded that the complaint failed even to allege any “extreme and outrageous
conduct.” /d. at 1118. Serpico v. Menard, 927 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Iil. 1996), a case involving a store owner and
customer, is inapposite because although it involved a type of harassment (store pursing legal action against
customer for inadvertantly leaving store with $0.70 nut in pocket), it did not involve the abuse of position of a police
officer or other person in a position of authority. See id. at 281.

10


there was probable cause of any crime, but solely to harass and inflict severe emotional distress
on James Woods, a Chicago police officer, and his wife.

After James Woods announced that he was Chicago police officer and displayed his
badge, he was forced to the ground, physically restrained and handcuffed by Clay (a Grill
security guard and a Harvey police officer) and other Grill security guards, despite defendants’
knowledge that Woods was only trying to subdue an altercation. The allegations indicate the
defendants knew that Woods was only trying to help an altercation between a guest and Grill
security guard from escalating. Indeed, Clay’s response was “So what?” and “Nigger, you ain’t
in Chicago anymore, punk.” Similarly, Toi Woods was restrained and handcuffed by defendants
after she reiterated that her husband was a Chicago police officer and requested that he be let go.

Once the other Harvey police officers — Perry, Prince and the John Does — arrived, one or
more of them spoke with Clay, after which plaintiffs continued to be restrained in handcuffs and
were transported to jail without being charged. The defendants’ knowledge that plaintiffs had
engaged in no wrong is evidenced by John Doe 2's inquiry of Perry as to why plaintiffs were
being taken into custody and what should be done with plaintiffs, to which Perry responded,
“He’s a Chicago cop? We’ll just let their asses stay in jail a few hours.”

A jury could infer the abuse of power continued by detaining plaintiffs for no reason in
separate jail cells overnight for eight hours, and in that after Perry found out James Woods was
permitted to make a phone call, Perry told the lock-up officer that Woods was not allowed to
make calls since he had not been charged with an offense. The lock-up officer communicated
that information to James Woods and added that he thought it was “bullshit” that he and his wife

were being detained. The alleged abuse of power died not stop but continued with Clay’s


and excessive force. Although James Woods informed Clay that he was a Chicago Police
Officer and that he was trying to break up a fight, Clay responded, “So what?” Clay further
remarked, “Nigger, you ain’t in Chicago anymore, punk.” Toi Woods, observing the
aforementioned, stated to the guards, “That’s my husband, let him go. He’s a Chicago cop.”
Upon making that statement, Grill security guards physically restrained her and handcuffed her.

Shortly thereafter, officers of the City of Harvey Police Department, including but not
limited to defendants Perry, Prince, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2, arrived at the Grill. One or
more of them spoke with Clay. Within minutes, Clay, Prince, Perry and John Doe 1 took
plaintiffs into custody, continued to restrain them with handcuffs and transported them by
separate squad cars to the City of Harvey Police Department, even though they had not charged
plaintiffs with any criminal offense. Before leaving Grill premises, John Doe 2 inquired of Perry
as to why plaintiffs were being taken into custody. John Doe 2 also asked, “What are we
supposed to do with them?” Perry responded, “He’s a Chicago cop? We’ll just let their asses
stay in jail a few hours.”

Plaintiffs were jailed in separate holding cells at the City of Harvey Police Department.
While in the holding cell, James Woods was permitted to call his commander at the Chicago
Police Department and a Fraternal Order of Police attorney to inform them of the incarceration.
The Chicago Police Department then called the City of Harvey Police Department to determine
why plaintiffs were being detained. Perry then summoned the lock-up officer (the City of
Harvey police officer responsible for watching over the holding cells) and asked him why James
Woods had been allowed to make calls since he had not been charged with an offense. The lock-

up officer then told James Woods that he was not “technically allowed to make any phone calls


MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the
sufficiency of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Gen.
Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7" Cir. 1997). Dismissal is
appropriate only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of its claim that would entitle it to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957);
Kennedy v. Nat'l Juvenile Det. Ass’n, 187 F.3d 690, 695 (7" Cir. 1999). In ruling on the motion,
the court accepts as true all well pleaded facts alleged in the complaint, and it draws all
reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp.,
176 F.3d 971, 977 (7" Cir. 1999); Zemke v. City of Chicago, 100 F.3d 511, 513 (7" Cir. 1996).

FACTS

Plaintiffs James Woods and Toi Woods are residents of Cook County, Illinois, and are
married to each other. James Woods is a City of Chicago police officer and Toi Woods is a
desktop publisher. On or about November 18, 2000, plaintiffs attended a private party at the
Fifty Yard Sports Bar and Grill (“Grill”), a nightclub in Harvey, Illinois. While there, an
altercation arose between a Grill patron and a Grill security guard. James Woods, although
off-duty, intervened. He displayed his City of Chicago police officer badge, verbally announced
that he was a police officer, and then proceeded to restrain the guest involved in order to prevent
the altercation from escalating.

Within moments, Grill security guards, including but not limited to defendant Clay (who
is also a City of Harvey police officer), physically forced James Woods to the ground,
handcuffed him and restrained him, despite their knowledge that he was a police officer only
attempting to subdue the altercation, actions which plaintiffs contend constituted unnecessary

2


Aa tare
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT GUCKETED
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS APR 2 2 2002

EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES W. WOODS and TOI WOODS,
Plaintiffs,

No. 01 C 6618
Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow

Vv.

)

)

)

)

)

)
DAVID CLAY, in both his individual and )
official capacities; OSCAR PERRY, in both )
his individual and official capacities; )
E. PRINCE, in both his individual and )
official capacities; JOHN DOE 1, an )
unidentified police officer for the City of )
Harvey, Illinois, in both his individual and )
official capacities; JOHN DOE 2, an )
unidentified police officer for the City of )
Harvey, Illinois, in both his individual and )
official capacities; CITY OF HARVEY, )
ILLINOIS, a municipal corporation; and )
WILLA JOHNSON-JONES, d/b/a the )
Fifty Yard Line Sports Bar and Grill, )
)

)

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, James W. Woods and Toi Woods, filed an eight-count complaint against
defendants for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I, II, IM), false arrest/imprisonment
(Count IV), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V), battery (Count VJ), malicious
prosecution (Count VII), and violation of the Illinois Constitution (Count VII, stemming from
plaintiffs’ arrest and detention in the City of Harvey. Defendants David Clay (“Clay), Oscar
Perry (“Perry”), E. Prince (“Prince”) and the City of Harvey have moved, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss Count V. Defendant Willa Johnson-Jones has
joined the motion. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1367. For the

reasons stated herein, the court denies defendants’ motion.