# Official Journal L 109I/2023

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 109I |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 6624 April 2023 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 109I

English edition

Legislation

Volume 6624 April 2023

---

| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/844 of 24 April 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria | 1 |
| | * | Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/845 of 24 April 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 imposing additional restrictive measures directed against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them | 13 |
| | * | Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/846 of 24 April 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran | 15 |
| | | DECISIONS |
| | * | Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2023/847 of 24 April 2023 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria | 26 |
| | * | Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/848 of 24 April 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them | 38 |
| | * | Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2023/849 of 24 April 2023 implementing Decision 2011/235/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran | 40 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

REGULATIONS

*

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/844 of 24 April 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria

1

*

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/845 of 24 April 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 imposing additional restrictive measures directed against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them

13

*

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/846 of 24 April 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran

15

DECISIONS

*

Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2023/847 of 24 April 2023 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria

26

*

Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/848 of 24 April 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them

38

*

Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2023/849 of 24 April 2023 implementing Decision 2011/235/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran

40

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.

---

II Non-legislative acts

REGULATIONS

| 24.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | LI 109/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

LI 109/1

---

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/844

of 24 April 2023

implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria and repealing Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 (1), and in particular Article 32(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 18 January 2012, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 36/2012. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 18 January 2012, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 36/2012.

| (2) | The Council remains deeply concerned about the situation in Syria. After more than a decade, the conflict in Syria is far from over and remains a source of suffering and instability. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The Council remains deeply concerned about the situation in Syria. After more than a decade, the conflict in Syria is far from over and remains a source of suffering and instability.

| (3) | The Council notes that the Syrian regime continues to pursue its policy of repression. In view of the gravity of the situation which persists, the Council considers it necessary to maintain and ensure the effectiveness of the restrictive measures in place by further developing them while maintaining their targeted and differentiated approach, and bearing in mind the humanitarian conditions of the Syrian population. The Council considers that certain categories of persons and entities are of particular relevance for the effectiveness of those restrictive measures, given the specific context prevailing in Syria. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Council notes that the Syrian regime continues to pursue its policy of repression. In view of the gravity of the situation which persists, the Council considers it necessary to maintain and ensure the effectiveness of the restrictive measures in place by further developing them while maintaining their targeted and differentiated approach, and bearing in mind the humanitarian conditions of the Syrian population. The Council considers that certain categories of persons and entities are of particular relevance for the effectiveness of those restrictive measures, given the specific context prevailing in Syria.

| (4) | The Council has assessed that regime-affiliated militias support the Syrian regime in its repressive policies, commit abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law on behalf of the Syrian regime, and that their members present a serious risk of further committing such violations. In recent years there has been a rise of private security companies operating in Syria, which act as shell companies for regime-affiliated militias and support them through activities such as the recruitment of members. The Council therefore considers that further restrictive measures are necessary to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by members of Syrian regime-affiliated militias, as well as persons and entities linked to certain private security companies which support such regime-affiliated militias, and to impose restrictions on admission for such persons, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The Council has assessed that regime-affiliated militias support the Syrian regime in its repressive policies, commit abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law on behalf of the Syrian regime, and that their members present a serious risk of further committing such violations. In recent years there has been a rise of private security companies operating in Syria, which act as shell companies for regime-affiliated militias and support them through activities such as the recruitment of members. The Council therefore considers that further restrictive measures are necessary to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by members of Syrian regime-affiliated militias, as well as persons and entities linked to certain private security companies which support such regime-affiliated militias, and to impose restrictions on admission for such persons, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012.

| (5) | The Council is deeply concerned about the rise in narcotics trade originating in Syria. The Council has in particular assessed that the trade in amphetamines has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime, and providing it with revenue that contributes to its ability to maintain its policies of repression. The Council considers that it should provide for restrictive measures to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by certain persons and entities involved in the production or trafficking of narcotics originating in Syria, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012, and to impose restrictions on admission for such persons, in order to prevent them from providing support to the regime and increase pressure on the regime to change its policies of repression. These measures also aim to reduce the risk of undermining the effectiveness of restrictive measures by targeting the regime’s ability to resort to proceeds from narcotics trade to continue its policy of repression. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The Council is deeply concerned about the rise in narcotics trade originating in Syria. The Council has in particular assessed that the trade in amphetamines has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime, and providing it with revenue that contributes to its ability to maintain its policies of repression. The Council considers that it should provide for restrictive measures to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by certain persons and entities involved in the production or trafficking of narcotics originating in Syria, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012, and to impose restrictions on admission for such persons, in order to prevent them from providing support to the regime and increase pressure on the regime to change its policies of repression. These measures also aim to reduce the risk of undermining the effectiveness of restrictive measures by targeting the regime’s ability to resort to proceeds from narcotics trade to continue its policy of repression.

| (6) | In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 25 persons and 8 entities should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities or bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 25 persons and 8 entities should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities or bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012.

| (7) | Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 is amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 April 2023.

For the Council

The President

J. BORRELL FONTELLES

---

(1)  
  OJ L 16, 19.1.2012, p. 1.

1

---

ANNEX

Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 is amended as follows:

| (1) | the following entries are added to the list set out in Section A (Persons): | Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘327. | Wasim Badia AL-ASSAD
  وسيم بديع الأسد | Date of birth: 18.7.1980;
  Place of birth: Qardaha/Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Wasim Badia al-Assad is Bashar al-Assad’s cousin; he is therefore a member of the Assad family.
  Wasim Badia al-Assad is also involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon. In particular, he has been involved in the production of Captagon and is responsible for drug shipments. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 328. | Samer Kamal AL-ASSAD
  a.k.a. ‘Samir’
  سامر كمال الأسد | Date of birth: 19.5.1973;
  Place of birth: Qardaha, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Samer Kamal al-Assad is a member of the Assad family.
  He operates in the context of the narcotics trade, in particular in its production. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 329. | Mudar Rifaat AL-ASSAD
  a.k.a. ‘Rifa’at’
  مضر رفعت الأسد | Date of birth: 1964;
  Place of birth: Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Mudar Rifaat al-Assad is Bashar al-Assad’s cousin; he is therefore a member of the Assad family. | 24.4.2023 |
| 330. | Mohammad SHALISH
  محمد شاليش | Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Mohammad Shalish has close ties to the regime.
  He is linked to drug operations and more specifically to the Captagon trade in the Lattakia region. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 331. | Waseem Omar AL-MASALMA
  وسيم عمر المسالمة | Date of birth: 27.8.1981;
  Place of birth: Bosra Al-Sham/Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Waseem Omar al-Masalma is a leader of a regime-affiliated militia.
  Waseem Omar al-Masalma is involved in the regime-led trade in Captagon in Southern Syria, especially in Deraa. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 332. | Amer Tayseer KHITI
  عامرتيسير خيتي | Date of birth: 31.7.1980;
  Place of birth: Douma/Rif Dimashq Governorate/Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Amer Tayseer Khiti is a leading businessperson operating in Syria with interests in real estate, construction and industry. He has close ties to the Assad family. He is a supporter of president al-Assad and organised rallies for him.
  Amer Tayseer Khiti is also involved in Captagon smuggling operations and bought up real estate in order to invest in packaging facilities used for drug smuggling. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 333. | Abdellatif HAMID
  a.k.a. ‘Hamida’
  عبد اللطيف حميدة | Date of birth: 1.12.1977;
  Place of birth: Aleppo, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Abdellatif Hamid has close ties to the Assad family.
  Abdellatif Hamid owns a factory in Aleppo that has been implicated in Captagon production and trafficking. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 334. | Nouh ZAITER
  Noah ZAITER
  Noah ZAYTAR
  نوح زعيتر | Date of birth: 1977;
  Place of birth: Zahle, Lebanon;
  Nationality: Lebanese;
  Gender: male | Nouh Zaiter is associated with members of the Assad family.
  He is involved in the trafficking of Captagon in Lebanon and Syria. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 335. | Taher AL-KAYALI
  طاهر الكيالي | Date of birth: 13.12.1959;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Taher Al-Kayali is a Syrian businessman who owns several companies including Neptunus LLC.
  Through his companies he is involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon, especially in terms of transportation from the port of Latakia. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 336. | Imad Abu ZUREIQ
  Emad Abu ZURAIQ
  Imad Abu ZREIK
  عماد أبو زريق | Date of birth: 1982;
  Place of birth: Nasib, Daraa (Syria);
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Suspected location: Daraa, Syria;
  Gender: male | Imad Abu Zureiq is a leading member of a regime-affiliated militia in Southwest Syria that reports directly to the Syrian regime’s Military Security branch.
  Currently his militia profits from the war economy, including the trafficking in Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 337. | Mustafa AL-MASALMAH
  a.k.a. Mustafa AL-KASAM/QASIM
  مصطفى المسالمة/الكسم | Nationality: Syrian;
  Suspected location: Daraa al-Balad, Syria;
  Gender: male | Mustafa al-Masalmah leads a regime-affiliated militia that reports directly to the Syrian regime’s Military Security branch.
  Currently his militia profits from the war economy, including the trafficking in the synthetic drug Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline.
  He therefore benefits from and supports the regime, and is associated with it. | 24.4.2023 |
| 338. | Hassan Muhammad DAQQOU
  حسن محمد دقو | Date of birth: 1.2.1985;
  Place of birth: Tfail, Lebanon;
  Nationality: Syrian/Lebanese;
  Gender: male | Hassan Muhammad Daqqou has close ties with the Fourth Division of the Syrian Army. Daqqou has established a wide drug trafficking network in Lebanon and Syria and built Captagon manufacturing plants close to the Syrian-Lebanese border. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 339. | Jihad BARAKAT
  جهاد بركات | Date of birth: 1964;
  Place of birth: Qardahah/Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Jihad Barakat is, through marriage, associated with the Assad family.
  He is also leader of a regime-affiliated militia and continues to hold different military and intelligence functions for the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 340. | Raji FALHOUT
  راجي فلحوط | Date of birth: 3.10.1985;
  Place of birth: Atil, Syria;
  Position: Syrian regime-affiliated militia leader;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Raji Falhout leads a militia that is associated with the Syrian Military Intelligence.
  Raji Falhout is also involved in drug trafficking linked to Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 341. | Muhammad ABDO ASSAAD
  a.k.a. Asa’ad
  محمد عبده أسعد | Date of birth: 19.7.1975;
  Place of birth: Ain Tineh, Damascus Countryside, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Assaad Building, Main Street, Ain Tineh, Damascus Countryside;
  Other identifying information: Father: Abdo Assaad;
  Gender: male | Muhammad Abdo Assaad is the leader of the Hosn al-Watan militia, which fought on behalf of the Syrian regime.
  Most recently, he has founded the Aman for Protection and Security LLC, which offers private security services and operates as a shell company for the Hosn al-Watan militia. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 342. | Samer AL-DIBIS
  سامر الدبس
  (a.k.a. Samer AL-DIBS, Samir) | Date of birth: 30.3.1962;
  Place of birth: Damascus, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Naher Street, Rawda, Damascus, Syria;
  Gender: male | Samer al-Dibis is a leading businessperson operating in Syria, active in several sectors of the economy, especially in the chemical industry and in real estate. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Syrian-Chinese Business Council and the chairman of the Damascus and Rural Damascus Chamber of Industry. He is also a member of Parliament and a close associate of Maher al-Assad. In these functions Samer al-Dibis benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 343. | Ali Najib IBRAHIM
  علي نجيب إبراهيم
  (a.k.a. Ali NajeebIBRAHIM) | Date of birth: 1991;
  Position: businessperson;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Al-Malki, Damascus, Syria;
  Gender: male | Ali Najib Ibrahim is a leading businessperson operating in Syria, active also in the telecommunications sector. He owns several shell companies, which have been linked to the Syrian regime in attempts to circumvent sanctions. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 344. | Jamal ISMAIL
  a.k.a. Ismael
  جمال إسماعيل | Nationality: Syrian;
  Associated entities: Military Intelligence Directorate;
  Gender: male | Jamal al-Ismail was the commander of Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013 when his unit killed at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria. | 24.4.2023 |
| 345. | Jamal AL-KHATIB
  جمال الخطيب | Associated entities: Military Intelligence Directorate | Jamal al-Khatib was a commanding officer in Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013 when he participated in the killing of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria. | 24.4.2023 |
| 346. | Osama AL-MALIKI
  a.k.a. Usama
  أسامة المالكي | Date of birth: 1963;
  Place of birth: Damascus, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Villa 98, Sharqiyyat, Jazira al-Khamisa, Qura al-Assad, Damascus Coutryside, Syria;
  Other identifying information: Father: Mohammad al-Maliki – محمد المالكي
  Gender: male | Osama al-Maliki is majority owner of Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC acts as a shell company to allow for the continuation of activities of the Saraya al-Areen 313 militia, a regime-affiliated militia. Osama al-Maliki therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 347. | Fadi SAQR
  فادي أحمد
  (a.k.a. Fady SAKR, Fadi SAQER, Fadi SAQIR) | Date of birth: 1975
  Place of birth: Jablah, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Fadi Saqr is a leader of the “National Defense Forces” (NDF) militia in Damascus that has fought on behalf of the regime since at least 2012. Fadi Saqr therefore is a member of a regime-affiliated militia.
  Fadi Saqr was part of the chain of command in the massacre of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon on 13 April 2013 (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria. | 24.4.2023 |
| 348. | Ahmad Ali TAHER
  احمد علي طاهر | Date of birth: 1982;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Damascus, Mazze, Western Villas, Saraya 36 Building, 3rd Floor;
  Associated individuals: Brother: Khodr Taher;
  Associated entities: Castle Security and Protection LLC;
  Other identifying information: Father: Ali Taher;
  Gender: male | Ahmad Ali Taher owns shares in Castle Security and Protection LLC, which operates as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, led by Maher al-Assad. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 349. | Amjad YOUSSEF
  a.k.a. Yusuf, Yousef
  أمجد يوسف | Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Amjad Youssef is a Warrant Officer in the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate.
  He was a member of Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013, when he participated in the killing of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria. | 24.4.2023 |
| 350. | Osama RAMADAN
  a.k.a. Usama
  أسامة رمضان | Date of birth: 1973;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Damascus, Mazze, Western Villas, Saraya 36 Building, 3rd Floor;
  Business Associate: Ahmad Ali Taher;
  Associated entities: Castle Security and Protection LLC;
  Other identifying information: Father: Hassan Ramadan;
  Gender: male | Osama Ramadan owns shares in Castle Security and Protection LLC, which operates as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, led by the Maher al-Assad. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 351. | Ali Mhanna SULEIMAN
  علي مهنا سليمان | Date of birth: 1987;
  Place of birth: Al-Raml, Kherbet Maaza, Tartus, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Tartus, Khirbit Maaza, 36th Estate, Ghaya Estate Area;
  National ID Number: 10040018920;
  Father’s Name: Mhanna;
  Mother’s Name: Insaf;
  Gender: male | Ali Suleiman was the leader of the Sahab Regiment of a Syrian Arab Army division known as “Tiger Forces”. He is a close associate of Suhayl Hassan. He has been involved in financing the regime, including through the smuggling of fuel. He also benefits from his association with the regime, such as from opportunities in real estate development. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023’ |

(1)

the following entries are added to the list set out in Section A (Persons):

Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘327.

Wasim Badia AL-ASSAD

وسيم بديع الأسد

Date of birth: 18.7.1980;

Place of birth: Qardaha/Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Wasim Badia al-Assad is Bashar al-Assad’s cousin; he is therefore a member of the Assad family.

Wasim Badia al-Assad is also involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon. In particular, he has been involved in the production of Captagon and is responsible for drug shipments. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

328.

Samer Kamal AL-ASSAD

a.k.a. ‘Samir’

سامر كمال الأسد

Date of birth: 19.5.1973;

Place of birth: Qardaha, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Samer Kamal al-Assad is a member of the Assad family.

He operates in the context of the narcotics trade, in particular in its production. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

329.

Mudar Rifaat AL-ASSAD

a.k.a. ‘Rifa’at’

مضر رفعت الأسد

Date of birth: 1964;

Place of birth: Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Mudar Rifaat al-Assad is Bashar al-Assad’s cousin; he is therefore a member of the Assad family.

24.4.2023

330.

Mohammad SHALISH

محمد شاليش

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Mohammad Shalish has close ties to the regime.

He is linked to drug operations and more specifically to the Captagon trade in the Lattakia region. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

331.

Waseem Omar AL-MASALMA

وسيم عمر المسالمة

Date of birth: 27.8.1981;

Place of birth: Bosra Al-Sham/Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Waseem Omar al-Masalma is a leader of a regime-affiliated militia.

Waseem Omar al-Masalma is involved in the regime-led trade in Captagon in Southern Syria, especially in Deraa. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

332.

Amer Tayseer KHITI

عامرتيسير خيتي

Date of birth: 31.7.1980;

Place of birth: Douma/Rif Dimashq Governorate/Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Amer Tayseer Khiti is a leading businessperson operating in Syria with interests in real estate, construction and industry. He has close ties to the Assad family. He is a supporter of president al-Assad and organised rallies for him.

Amer Tayseer Khiti is also involved in Captagon smuggling operations and bought up real estate in order to invest in packaging facilities used for drug smuggling. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

333.

Abdellatif HAMID

a.k.a. ‘Hamida’

عبد اللطيف حميدة

Date of birth: 1.12.1977;

Place of birth: Aleppo, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Abdellatif Hamid has close ties to the Assad family.

Abdellatif Hamid owns a factory in Aleppo that has been implicated in Captagon production and trafficking. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

334.

Nouh ZAITER

Noah ZAITER

Noah ZAYTAR

نوح زعيتر

Date of birth: 1977;

Place of birth: Zahle, Lebanon;

Nationality: Lebanese;

Gender: male

Nouh Zaiter is associated with members of the Assad family.

He is involved in the trafficking of Captagon in Lebanon and Syria. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

335.

Taher AL-KAYALI

طاهر الكيالي

Date of birth: 13.12.1959;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Taher Al-Kayali is a Syrian businessman who owns several companies including Neptunus LLC.

Through his companies he is involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon, especially in terms of transportation from the port of Latakia. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

336.

Imad Abu ZUREIQ

Emad Abu ZURAIQ

Imad Abu ZREIK

عماد أبو زريق

Date of birth: 1982;

Place of birth: Nasib, Daraa (Syria);

Nationality: Syrian;

Suspected location: Daraa, Syria;

Gender: male

Imad Abu Zureiq is a leading member of a regime-affiliated militia in Southwest Syria that reports directly to the Syrian regime’s Military Security branch.

Currently his militia profits from the war economy, including the trafficking in Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

337.

Mustafa AL-MASALMAH

a.k.a. Mustafa AL-KASAM/QASIM

مصطفى المسالمة/الكسم

Nationality: Syrian;

Suspected location: Daraa al-Balad, Syria;

Gender: male

Mustafa al-Masalmah leads a regime-affiliated militia that reports directly to the Syrian regime’s Military Security branch.

Currently his militia profits from the war economy, including the trafficking in the synthetic drug Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline.

He therefore benefits from and supports the regime, and is associated with it.

24.4.2023

338.

Hassan Muhammad DAQQOU

حسن محمد دقو

Date of birth: 1.2.1985;

Place of birth: Tfail, Lebanon;

Nationality: Syrian/Lebanese;

Gender: male

Hassan Muhammad Daqqou has close ties with the Fourth Division of the Syrian Army. Daqqou has established a wide drug trafficking network in Lebanon and Syria and built Captagon manufacturing plants close to the Syrian-Lebanese border. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

339.

Jihad BARAKAT

جهاد بركات

Date of birth: 1964;

Place of birth: Qardahah/Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Jihad Barakat is, through marriage, associated with the Assad family.

He is also leader of a regime-affiliated militia and continues to hold different military and intelligence functions for the regime.

24.4.2023

340.

Raji FALHOUT

راجي فلحوط

Date of birth: 3.10.1985;

Place of birth: Atil, Syria;

Position: Syrian regime-affiliated militia leader;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Raji Falhout leads a militia that is associated with the Syrian Military Intelligence.

Raji Falhout is also involved in drug trafficking linked to Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

341.

Muhammad ABDO ASSAAD

a.k.a. Asa’ad

محمد عبده أسعد

Date of birth: 19.7.1975;

Place of birth: Ain Tineh, Damascus Countryside, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Assaad Building, Main Street, Ain Tineh, Damascus Countryside;

Other identifying information: Father: Abdo Assaad;

Gender: male

Muhammad Abdo Assaad is the leader of the Hosn al-Watan militia, which fought on behalf of the Syrian regime.

Most recently, he has founded the Aman for Protection and Security LLC, which offers private security services and operates as a shell company for the Hosn al-Watan militia. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

342.

Samer AL-DIBIS

سامر الدبس

(a.k.a. Samer AL-DIBS, Samir)

Date of birth: 30.3.1962;

Place of birth: Damascus, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Naher Street, Rawda, Damascus, Syria;

Gender: male

Samer al-Dibis is a leading businessperson operating in Syria, active in several sectors of the economy, especially in the chemical industry and in real estate. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Syrian-Chinese Business Council and the chairman of the Damascus and Rural Damascus Chamber of Industry. He is also a member of Parliament and a close associate of Maher al-Assad. In these functions Samer al-Dibis benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

343.

Ali Najib IBRAHIM

علي نجيب إبراهيم

(a.k.a. Ali NajeebIBRAHIM)

Date of birth: 1991;

Position: businessperson;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Al-Malki, Damascus, Syria;

Gender: male

Ali Najib Ibrahim is a leading businessperson operating in Syria, active also in the telecommunications sector. He owns several shell companies, which have been linked to the Syrian regime in attempts to circumvent sanctions. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

344.

Jamal ISMAIL

a.k.a. Ismael

جمال إسماعيل

Nationality: Syrian;

Associated entities: Military Intelligence Directorate;

Gender: male

Jamal al-Ismail was the commander of Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013 when his unit killed at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.

24.4.2023

345.

Jamal AL-KHATIB

جمال الخطيب

Associated entities: Military Intelligence Directorate

Jamal al-Khatib was a commanding officer in Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013 when he participated in the killing of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.

24.4.2023

346.

Osama AL-MALIKI

a.k.a. Usama

أسامة المالكي

Date of birth: 1963;

Place of birth: Damascus, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Villa 98, Sharqiyyat, Jazira al-Khamisa, Qura al-Assad, Damascus Coutryside, Syria;

Other identifying information: Father: Mohammad al-Maliki – محمد المالكي

Gender: male

Osama al-Maliki is majority owner of Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC acts as a shell company to allow for the continuation of activities of the Saraya al-Areen 313 militia, a regime-affiliated militia. Osama al-Maliki therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

347.

Fadi SAQR

فادي أحمد

(a.k.a. Fady SAKR, Fadi SAQER, Fadi SAQIR)

Date of birth: 1975

Place of birth: Jablah, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Fadi Saqr is a leader of the “National Defense Forces” (NDF) militia in Damascus that has fought on behalf of the regime since at least 2012. Fadi Saqr therefore is a member of a regime-affiliated militia.

Fadi Saqr was part of the chain of command in the massacre of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon on 13 April 2013 (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.

24.4.2023

348.

Ahmad Ali TAHER

احمد علي طاهر

Date of birth: 1982;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Damascus, Mazze, Western Villas, Saraya 36 Building, 3rd Floor;

Associated individuals: Brother: Khodr Taher;

Associated entities: Castle Security and Protection LLC;

Other identifying information: Father: Ali Taher;

Gender: male

Ahmad Ali Taher owns shares in Castle Security and Protection LLC, which operates as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, led by Maher al-Assad. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

349.

Amjad YOUSSEF

a.k.a. Yusuf, Yousef

أمجد يوسف

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Amjad Youssef is a Warrant Officer in the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate.

He was a member of Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013, when he participated in the killing of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.

24.4.2023

350.

Osama RAMADAN

a.k.a. Usama

أسامة رمضان

Date of birth: 1973;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Damascus, Mazze, Western Villas, Saraya 36 Building, 3rd Floor;

Business Associate: Ahmad Ali Taher;

Associated entities: Castle Security and Protection LLC;

Other identifying information: Father: Hassan Ramadan;

Gender: male

Osama Ramadan owns shares in Castle Security and Protection LLC, which operates as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, led by the Maher al-Assad. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

351.

Ali Mhanna SULEIMAN

علي مهنا سليمان

Date of birth: 1987;

Place of birth: Al-Raml, Kherbet Maaza, Tartus, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Tartus, Khirbit Maaza, 36th Estate, Ghaya Estate Area;

National ID Number: 10040018920;

Father’s Name: Mhanna;

Mother’s Name: Insaf;

Gender: male

Ali Suleiman was the leader of the Sahab Regiment of a Syrian Arab Army division known as “Tiger Forces”. He is a close associate of Suhayl Hassan. He has been involved in financing the regime, including through the smuggling of fuel. He also benefits from his association with the regime, such as from opportunities in real estate development. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023’

| (2) | the following entries are added to the list set out in Section B (entities): | Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘83. | Fourth Armoured Division of the Syrian Army
  الفرقة الرابع | Place of registration: Damascus;
  Principal place of business: Syrian regime territory in Syria;
  Associated individuals: Maher al-Assad, Ghassan Belal | The Fourth Armoured Division is one of the most prominent military units of the Syrian army led by Maher al-Assad and commanded by Ghassan Bilal.
  The Fourth Armoured Division is responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population.
  The Fourth Armoured Division also profits form the war economy, especially the trafficking in Captagon. Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. Therefore, the Fourth Armoured Division benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 84. | Neptunus LLC/Neptune LLC company
  شركة نبتونوس المحدودة المسؤولية
  نبتونس أوفرسيز المحدودة | Place of registration: Lattakia, Syria;
  Date of registration: 2017 | Neptunus LLC is involved in drug operations in the port of Latakia. Neptunus LLC therefore benefits and supports the regime.
  Neptunus LLC was co-founded by Taher Al-Kayali. | 24.4.2023 |
| 85. | Areen foundation/مؤسسة العرين | Place of registration: Syria;
  Date of registration: 1999;
  Principal place of business: Syria;
  Associated individuals: Asma al-Assad (wife of Bashar al-Assad and Director) | The al-Areen foundation poses as a charitable foundation, but is closely affiliated with Syrian regime militias.
  The al-Areen foundation is directed by the president’s wife, Asma Al-Assad.
  The foundation is channelling aid in line with the policies and priorities of the regime, and therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 86. | Stroytransgaz/Стройтрансгаз | Other information:
  Stroytransgaz Group,
  Stroytransgaz (STG) Logistic,
  Stroytransgaz (STG) Engineering,
  STG Engineering | Stroytransgaz is a Russian engineering and construction company operating in Syria, which amongst other things assumed control of Syria’s largest phosphate mines.
  Stroytransgaz therefore benefits from and supports the Syrian regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 87. | Gecopham, the General Company for Phosphate and Mines
  الشركة العامة للفوسفات و المناجم | Address: Palmyra Road, Homs, Syrian Arabic Republic;
  Phone: 00963312751122;
  Email: info@gecopham.sy;
  General Manager: Younes Ramadan | Gecopham is controlled by the Syrian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and provides financial support to the regime. It therefore supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 88. | Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC
  شركة الجبل لخدمات الحماية والحراسة | Address: F6XR+495, Malek Bin Rabeaa, Damascus, Syria;
  Type of entity: Limited Liability Company;
  Place of registration: Damascus;
  Date of registration: 19.10.2017;
  Principal place of business: Damascus, Syria;
  Associated individuals: Osama Mohammad al-Maliki | Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC is owned and managed by Osama al-Maliki.
  Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC acts as a shell company to allow for the continuation of activities of the Saraya al-Areen 313 militia, a regime-affiliated militia. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 89. | Castle for Security and Protection LLC
  شركة القلعة للحماية والحراسة والخدمات الأمني
  a.k.a. Castle Security and Protection LLC, Citadel for Security and Protection | Address: Saraya Roundabout, Western Villas, Mazze, Damascus, Syria;
  Type of entity: Limited Liability Company;
  Place of registration: Damascus, Syria;
  Date of registration: 18.10.2017;
  Registration number:/
  Principal place of business: Damascus, Syria;
  Other information: Sector: Militia turned Security Company;
  Phone Number: +963116119331; +963943800808 | Castle for Security and Protection LLC is a private company, which acts as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, which is led by Maher al-Assad.
  Castle for Security is involved also in the trafficking of narcotics. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. It therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 90. | Aman for Protection and Security LLC
  شركة أمان للحماية والحراسة الأمنية | Address: Damascus Countryside;
  Type of entity: Limited Liability Company;
  Place of registration: Damascus Countryside;
  Date of registration: 10.10.2018;
  Registration number: 2906;
  Principal place of business: Damascus Countryside, Syria;
  Associated individuals: Muhammad Abdo Assad | Aman for Protection and Security LLC is a private security company, which acts as a shell company for the Hosn al-Watan milita, founded by Muhammad Abdo Assaad. It therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023’ |

(2)

the following entries are added to the list set out in Section B (entities):

Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘83.

Fourth Armoured Division of the Syrian Army

الفرقة الرابع

Place of registration: Damascus;

Principal place of business: Syrian regime territory in Syria;

Associated individuals: Maher al-Assad, Ghassan Belal

The Fourth Armoured Division is one of the most prominent military units of the Syrian army led by Maher al-Assad and commanded by Ghassan Bilal.

The Fourth Armoured Division is responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population.

The Fourth Armoured Division also profits form the war economy, especially the trafficking in Captagon. Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. Therefore, the Fourth Armoured Division benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

84.

Neptunus LLC/Neptune LLC company

شركة نبتونوس المحدودة المسؤولية

نبتونس أوفرسيز المحدودة

Place of registration: Lattakia, Syria;

Date of registration: 2017

Neptunus LLC is involved in drug operations in the port of Latakia. Neptunus LLC therefore benefits and supports the regime.

Neptunus LLC was co-founded by Taher Al-Kayali.

24.4.2023

85.

Areen foundation/مؤسسة العرين

Place of registration: Syria;

Date of registration: 1999;

Principal place of business: Syria;

Associated individuals: Asma al-Assad (wife of Bashar al-Assad and Director)

The al-Areen foundation poses as a charitable foundation, but is closely affiliated with Syrian regime militias.

The al-Areen foundation is directed by the president’s wife, Asma Al-Assad.

The foundation is channelling aid in line with the policies and priorities of the regime, and therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

86.

Stroytransgaz/Стройтрансгаз

Other information:

Stroytransgaz Group,

Stroytransgaz (STG) Logistic,

Stroytransgaz (STG) Engineering,

STG Engineering

Stroytransgaz is a Russian engineering and construction company operating in Syria, which amongst other things assumed control of Syria’s largest phosphate mines.

Stroytransgaz therefore benefits from and supports the Syrian regime.

24.4.2023

87.

Gecopham, the General Company for Phosphate and Mines

الشركة العامة للفوسفات و المناجم

Address: Palmyra Road, Homs, Syrian Arabic Republic;

Phone: 00963312751122;

Email: info@gecopham.sy;

General Manager: Younes Ramadan

Gecopham is controlled by the Syrian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and provides financial support to the regime. It therefore supports the regime.

24.4.2023

88.

Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC

شركة الجبل لخدمات الحماية والحراسة

Address: F6XR+495, Malek Bin Rabeaa, Damascus, Syria;

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company;

Place of registration: Damascus;

Date of registration: 19.10.2017;

Principal place of business: Damascus, Syria;

Associated individuals: Osama Mohammad al-Maliki

Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC is owned and managed by Osama al-Maliki.

Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC acts as a shell company to allow for the continuation of activities of the Saraya al-Areen 313 militia, a regime-affiliated militia. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

89.

Castle for Security and Protection LLC

شركة القلعة للحماية والحراسة والخدمات الأمني

a.k.a. Castle Security and Protection LLC, Citadel for Security and Protection

Address: Saraya Roundabout, Western Villas, Mazze, Damascus, Syria;

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company;

Place of registration: Damascus, Syria;

Date of registration: 18.10.2017;

Registration number:/

Principal place of business: Damascus, Syria;

Other information: Sector: Militia turned Security Company;

Phone Number: +963116119331; +963943800808

Castle for Security and Protection LLC is a private company, which acts as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, which is led by Maher al-Assad.

Castle for Security is involved also in the trafficking of narcotics. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. It therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

90.

Aman for Protection and Security LLC

شركة أمان للحماية والحراسة الأمنية

Address: Damascus Countryside;

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company;

Place of registration: Damascus Countryside;

Date of registration: 10.10.2018;

Registration number: 2906;

Principal place of business: Damascus Countryside, Syria;

Associated individuals: Muhammad Abdo Assad

Aman for Protection and Security LLC is a private security company, which acts as a shell company for the Hosn al-Watan milita, founded by Muhammad Abdo Assaad. It therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023’

---

| 24.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | LI 109/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

LI 109/13

---

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/845

of 24 April 2023

implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 imposing additional restrictive measures directed against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 of 20 September 2016 imposing additional restrictive measures directed against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them (1), and in particular Article 4(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 20 September 2016, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2016/1686. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 20 September 2016, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2016/1686.

| (2) | In view of the continued threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, two persons and one group should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2016/1686. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In view of the continued threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, two persons and one group should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2016/1686.

| (3) | Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 April 2023.

For the Council

The President

J. BORRELL FONTELLES

---

(1)  
  OJ L 255, 21.9.2016, p. 1.

1

---

ANNEX

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 is amended as follows:

| (1) | the following entries are added under heading ‘A. Natural persons referred to in Article 3’:






  ‘15. | Abu Yasir HASSAN (a.k.a. Sheikh Hassan, Ahmed Mahmoud Hassan, Yaseer Hassan, Abu Qasim); date of birth: 1981 to 1983; place of birth: Pwani Region, Tanzania; gender: male; nationality: Tanzanian. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1)

the following entries are added under heading ‘A. Natural persons referred to in Article 3’:

‘15.

Abu Yasir HASSAN (a.k.a. Sheikh Hassan, Ahmed Mahmoud Hassan, Yaseer Hassan, Abu Qasim); date of birth: 1981 to 1983; place of birth: Pwani Region, Tanzania; gender: male; nationality: Tanzanian.

| 16. | Bonomade Machude OMAR (a.k.a. Ibn Omar, Abu Sulayfa Muhammad, Abu Sorraca, Abu Surakha, Abu Suraqa Suraqa Filho, Omar Saide, Sheikh Omar); date of birth: 15 June 1988; place of birth: Palma district, Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique; gender: male; nationality: Mozambican.’; |
| --- | --- |

16.

Bonomade Machude OMAR (a.k.a. Ibn Omar, Abu Sulayfa Muhammad, Abu Sorraca, Abu Surakha, Abu Suraqa Suraqa Filho, Omar Saide, Sheikh Omar); date of birth: 15 June 1988; place of birth: Palma district, Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique; gender: male; nationality: Mozambican.’;

| (2) | the following entry is added under heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 3’:






  ‘5. | ISIS-Mozambique (a.k.a. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Mozambique, Islamic State -Mozambique, ISIL-M, Ansar Al-Sunna, Al-Shabaab, Al-Shabaab in Mozambique, Mozambique Wilaya of the Islamic State, Ahlu Sunna wa Jamaah (ASwJ), Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa, Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah, Ahlu Sunnah Wajamo, Swahili Sunna).’. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(2)

the following entry is added under heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 3’:

‘5.

ISIS-Mozambique (a.k.a. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Mozambique, Islamic State -Mozambique, ISIL-M, Ansar Al-Sunna, Al-Shabaab, Al-Shabaab in Mozambique, Mozambique Wilaya of the Islamic State, Ahlu Sunna wa Jamaah (ASwJ), Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa, Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah, Ahlu Sunnah Wajamo, Swahili Sunna).’.

---

| 24.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | LI 109/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

LI 109/15

---

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/846

of 24 April 2023

implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 of 12 April 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran (1), and in particular Article 12(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 12 April 2011, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 12 April 2011, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 359/2011.

| (2) | On 25 September 2022, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a declaration on behalf of the Union deploring the widespread and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian security forces against non-violent protestors, noting that it had resulted in the loss of lives as well as a large number of injuries. The declaration also spelled out that those responsible for the killing of Mahsa Amini must be held accountable, and called on the Iranian authorities to ensure transparent and credible investigations to clarify the number of deaths and arrests, to release all non-violent protestors and to provide due process to all detainees. Furthermore, the declaration stressed that Iran’s decision to severely restrict internet access and block instant messaging platforms blatantly violates freedom of expression. Finally, the declaration stated that the Union will consider all options at its disposal to address the killing of Mahsa Amini and the way Iranian security forces have responded to the ensuing demonstrations. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 25 September 2022, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a declaration on behalf of the Union deploring the widespread and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian security forces against non-violent protestors, noting that it had resulted in the loss of lives as well as a large number of injuries. The declaration also spelled out that those responsible for the killing of Mahsa Amini must be held accountable, and called on the Iranian authorities to ensure transparent and credible investigations to clarify the number of deaths and arrests, to release all non-violent protestors and to provide due process to all detainees. Furthermore, the declaration stressed that Iran’s decision to severely restrict internet access and block instant messaging platforms blatantly violates freedom of expression. Finally, the declaration stated that the Union will consider all options at its disposal to address the killing of Mahsa Amini and the way Iranian security forces have responded to the ensuing demonstrations.

| (3) | In this context, and in line with the Union’s commitment to address all issues of concern with Iran, including the human rights situation, as confirmed in the Council Conclusions of 12 December 2022, eight persons and one entity should be included in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In this context, and in line with the Union’s commitment to address all issues of concern with Iran, including the human rights situation, as confirmed in the Council Conclusions of 12 December 2022, eight persons and one entity should be included in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 359/2011.

| (4) | Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 April 2023.

For the Council

The President

J. BORRELL FONTELLES

---

(1)  
  OJ L 100, 14.4.2011, p. 1.

1

---

ANNEX

The following eight persons and one entity are added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 359/2011:

| | Persons | Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘214. | NOBAVEH VATAN Bijan

  بیژن نوباوه وطن | DOB: 1959/1960
  POB: Tehran, Iran
  Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament | Bijan Nobaveh Vatan is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as the First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament.
  He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as “Muharebeh”, or “enmity against God”.
  Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.
  As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Nobaveh Vatan supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023 |
| 215. | YAZDIKHAH Ali

  علی یزدی خواه | Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; Member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament | Ali Yazdikhah is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as a member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament.
  He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as “Muharebeh”, or “enmity against God”.
  Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.
  As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Yazdikhah supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023 |
| 216. | ALIBABAEI Mehdi
  محدی علی بابایی
  (a.k.a. ALI BABAEI Mehdi, BABAEI Ali Mehdi) | Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Rank: Major
  Function: provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom | Major Mehdi Alibabaei is the provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom. He directs IRGC and Basij forces in the city of Qom.
  Following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, some of the most intense protests have been seen in the city of Qom. Security forces, including the IRGC and the Basij militia were deployed to violently crack down on these protests. Since March 2023, the IRGC and Basij militia have also been instructed to enforce the mandatory hijab law by new methods of oppression.
  Alibabaei revealed a new scheme to deploy members of the Basij militia in each Qom neighbourhood to enforce the hijab law. The new scheme includes installing programs such as “Be a famous leader in our neighbourhood”, ordering IRGC/Basij forces to conduct neighbourhood patrols, the use of intelligence, intimidation, and enforcing accountability of regular citizens (for example by appealing to the responsibility of building and residence managers for “badly veiled” residents). This scheme represents a new level of denunciation and information gathering by the general population to oppress women.
  Under the command of Alibabaei, the local IRGC and Basij forces in Qom are ordered to enforce certain selected laws, by means and methods that intimidate citizens and violate their fundamental rights.
  As provincial deputy of the IRGC in Qom, Major Mehdi Alibabaei is responsible for the acts of oppression committed by the local IRGC and Basij forces and their violations of the rights of freedom of expression and privacy.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023 |
| 217. | NOUROUZI Ali Asghar
  (a.k.a. NOROUZI Ali Asghar) | DOB: 11.11.1962
  POB: Dashtestan, Bushehr province, Iran
  Address: Unit 29, 5th Floor, Talaieh Block- B1, Elahiyeh Complex 1, Number 0, Alley 2-Shahid Sajjad Rushanai, Rabbaninejad Street, Zein Aldin Municipality, Qom 3739144673, Iran
  Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Passport no: Y53914915 (Iran) expires 11.5.2026
  Iranian national ID no: 4591967573
  Function: chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation
  Associated individuals: Seyyed Aminollah; Emami Tabatabai; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi
  Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
  IRGC | Ali Asghar Nourouzi is the chairman of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
  The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
  The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
  As chairman of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ali Asghar Nourouzi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023 |
| 218. | TABATABAI Seyyed Amin Ala Emami
  (a.k.a. TABATBAYI Aminallah Imami) | DOB: 26.8.1963
  POB: Meybod, Iran
  Address: Tehran, Iran
  Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Iranian national ID no: 4489260229
  Function: vice-chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation; managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation
  Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi | Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is the vice-chairman of the board of directors as well as the managing director of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
  The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
  The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
  As vice-chairman of the board of directors and managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out. | 24.4.2023 |
| | | Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
  IRGC | He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | |
| 219. | ALAODDINI Yahya
  (a.k.a. ALA’ODDINI Yahya; ALAEDDINI Yahya) | DOB: 21.5.1965
  POB: Tehran, Iran
  Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Passport no: K47201906 (Iran) expires 19.10.2023
  Iranian national ID no: 0036732958
  Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation | Yahya Alaoddini is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
  The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
  The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression. | 24.4.2023 |
| | | Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi;; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai
  Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
  IRGC | As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Yahya Alaoddini is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | |
| 220. | BABAMORADI Jamal Ali | DOB: 24.5.1960
  POB: Tehran, Iran
  Address: Tehran, Iran
  Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Iranian national ID no: 0036824240
  Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation
  Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Ahmad Karimi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai | Jamal Ali Babamoradi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
  The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
  The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
  As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Jamal Ali Babamoradi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out. | 24.4.2023 |
| | | Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
  IRGC | He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | |
| 221. | KARIMI Ahmad Hasan | DOB: 11.12.1962
  POB: Qom, Iran
  Address: Tehran, Iran
  Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Iranian national ID no: 0382947983
  Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation | Ahmad Hasan Karimi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
  The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
  The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression. | 24.4.2023’ |
| | | Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai; Jamal Ali Babamoradi
  Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
  IRGC | As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ahmad Hasan Karimi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | |

Persons

Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘214.

NOBAVEH VATAN Bijan

بیژن نوباوه وطن

DOB: 1959/1960

POB: Tehran, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament

Bijan Nobaveh Vatan is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as the First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament.

He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as “Muharebeh”, or “enmity against God”.

Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.

As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Nobaveh Vatan supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023

215.

YAZDIKHAH Ali

علی یزدی خواه

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; Member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament

Ali Yazdikhah is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as a member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament.

He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as “Muharebeh”, or “enmity against God”.

Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.

As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Yazdikhah supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023

216.

ALIBABAEI Mehdi

محدی علی بابایی

(a.k.a. ALI BABAEI Mehdi, BABAEI Ali Mehdi)

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Rank: Major

Function: provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom

Major Mehdi Alibabaei is the provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom. He directs IRGC and Basij forces in the city of Qom.

Following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, some of the most intense protests have been seen in the city of Qom. Security forces, including the IRGC and the Basij militia were deployed to violently crack down on these protests. Since March 2023, the IRGC and Basij militia have also been instructed to enforce the mandatory hijab law by new methods of oppression.

Alibabaei revealed a new scheme to deploy members of the Basij militia in each Qom neighbourhood to enforce the hijab law. The new scheme includes installing programs such as “Be a famous leader in our neighbourhood”, ordering IRGC/Basij forces to conduct neighbourhood patrols, the use of intelligence, intimidation, and enforcing accountability of regular citizens (for example by appealing to the responsibility of building and residence managers for “badly veiled” residents). This scheme represents a new level of denunciation and information gathering by the general population to oppress women.

Under the command of Alibabaei, the local IRGC and Basij forces in Qom are ordered to enforce certain selected laws, by means and methods that intimidate citizens and violate their fundamental rights.

As provincial deputy of the IRGC in Qom, Major Mehdi Alibabaei is responsible for the acts of oppression committed by the local IRGC and Basij forces and their violations of the rights of freedom of expression and privacy.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023

217.

NOUROUZI Ali Asghar

(a.k.a. NOROUZI Ali Asghar)

DOB: 11.11.1962

POB: Dashtestan, Bushehr province, Iran

Address: Unit 29, 5th Floor, Talaieh Block- B1, Elahiyeh Complex 1, Number 0, Alley 2-Shahid Sajjad Rushanai, Rabbaninejad Street, Zein Aldin Municipality, Qom 3739144673, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Passport no: Y53914915 (Iran) expires 11.5.2026

Iranian national ID no: 4591967573

Function: chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation

Associated individuals: Seyyed Aminollah; Emami Tabatabai; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi

Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah

IRGC

Ali Asghar Nourouzi is the chairman of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.

The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.

The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.

As chairman of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ali Asghar Nourouzi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023

218.

TABATABAI Seyyed Amin Ala Emami

(a.k.a. TABATBAYI Aminallah Imami)

DOB: 26.8.1963

POB: Meybod, Iran

Address: Tehran, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Iranian national ID no: 4489260229

Function: vice-chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation; managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation

Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi

Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is the vice-chairman of the board of directors as well as the managing director of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.

The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.

The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.

As vice-chairman of the board of directors and managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.

24.4.2023

Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah

IRGC

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

219.

ALAODDINI Yahya

(a.k.a. ALA’ODDINI Yahya; ALAEDDINI Yahya)

DOB: 21.5.1965

POB: Tehran, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Passport no: K47201906 (Iran) expires 19.10.2023

Iranian national ID no: 0036732958

Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation

Yahya Alaoddini is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.

The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.

The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.

24.4.2023

Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi;; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai

Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah

IRGC

As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Yahya Alaoddini is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

220.

BABAMORADI Jamal Ali

DOB: 24.5.1960

POB: Tehran, Iran

Address: Tehran, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Iranian national ID no: 0036824240

Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation

Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Ahmad Karimi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai

Jamal Ali Babamoradi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.

The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.

The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.

As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Jamal Ali Babamoradi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.

24.4.2023

Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah

IRGC

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

221.

KARIMI Ahmad Hasan

DOB: 11.12.1962

POB: Qom, Iran

Address: Tehran, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Iranian national ID no: 0382947983

Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation

Ahmad Hasan Karimi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.

The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.

The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.

24.4.2023’

Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai; Jamal Ali Babamoradi

Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah

IRGC

As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ahmad Hasan Karimi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

| | Entities | Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘35. | Ariantel | Address: Ariantel Head Office, No 15, 15th alley, South Gandhi Street, Tehran, Iran
  Website: http://www.ariantel.ir
  Type of entity: private company | Ariantel is an Iranian mobile service provider which has been at the forefront of rolling-out the comprehensive telecommunications surveillance architecture mapped out by the Iranian Government to quash dissent and critical voices in Iran.
  Ariantel has actively sought, and makes use of, cyberware products used to monitor, geolocate and intercept calls and other mobile communications activities of its users at the request of the Iranian Government. This information has subsequently been used to quash and disrupt protests and to identify, target and arrest peaceful protesters and activists.
  Therefore, Ariantel is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023’ |

Entities

Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘35.

Ariantel

Address: Ariantel Head Office, No 15, 15th alley, South Gandhi Street, Tehran, Iran

Website: http://www.ariantel.ir

Type of entity: private company

Ariantel is an Iranian mobile service provider which has been at the forefront of rolling-out the comprehensive telecommunications surveillance architecture mapped out by the Iranian Government to quash dissent and critical voices in Iran.

Ariantel has actively sought, and makes use of, cyberware products used to monitor, geolocate and intercept calls and other mobile communications activities of its users at the request of the Iranian Government. This information has subsequently been used to quash and disrupt protests and to identify, target and arrest peaceful protesters and activists.

Therefore, Ariantel is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023’

---

DECISIONS

| 24.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | LI 109/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

LI 109/26

---

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2023/847

of 24 April 2023

implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (1), and in particular Article 30(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 31 May 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/255/CFSP. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 31 May 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/255/CFSP.

| (2) | The Council remains deeply concerned about the situation in Syria. After more than a decade, the conflict in Syria is far from over and remains a source of suffering and instability. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The Council remains deeply concerned about the situation in Syria. After more than a decade, the conflict in Syria is far from over and remains a source of suffering and instability.

| (3) | The Council notes that the Syrian regime continues to pursue its policy of repression. In view of the gravity of the situation which persists, the Council considers it necessary to maintain and ensure the effectiveness of the restrictive measures in place by further developing them while maintaining their targeted and differentiated approach, and bearing in mind the humanitarian conditions of the Syrian population. The Council considers that certain categories of persons and entities are of particular relevance for the effectiveness of those restrictive measures, given the specific context prevailing in Syria. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Council notes that the Syrian regime continues to pursue its policy of repression. In view of the gravity of the situation which persists, the Council considers it necessary to maintain and ensure the effectiveness of the restrictive measures in place by further developing them while maintaining their targeted and differentiated approach, and bearing in mind the humanitarian conditions of the Syrian population. The Council considers that certain categories of persons and entities are of particular relevance for the effectiveness of those restrictive measures, given the specific context prevailing in Syria.

| (4) | The Council has assessed that regime-affiliated militias support the Syrian regime in its repressive policies, commit abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law on behalf of the Syrian regime, and that their members present a serious risk of further committing such violations. In recent years there has been a rise of private security companies operating in Syria, which act as shell companies for regime-affiliated militias and support them though activities such as the recruitment of members. The Council therefore considers that further restrictive measures are necessary to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by members of Syrian regime-affiliated militias, as well as persons and entities linked to certain private security companies which support such regime-affiliated militias, and to impose restrictions on admission for such persons, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The Council has assessed that regime-affiliated militias support the Syrian regime in its repressive policies, commit abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law on behalf of the Syrian regime, and that their members present a serious risk of further committing such violations. In recent years there has been a rise of private security companies operating in Syria, which act as shell companies for regime-affiliated militias and support them though activities such as the recruitment of members. The Council therefore considers that further restrictive measures are necessary to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by members of Syrian regime-affiliated militias, as well as persons and entities linked to certain private security companies which support such regime-affiliated militias, and to impose restrictions on admission for such persons, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP.

| (5) | The Council is deeply concerned about the rise in narcotics trade originating in Syria. The Council has in particular assessed that the trade in amphetamines has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and providing it with revenue that contributes to its ability to maintain its policies of repression. The Council considers that it should provide for restrictive measures to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by certain persons and entities involved in the production or trafficking of narcotics originating in Syria, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP, and to impose restrictions on admission for such persons, in order to prevent them from providing support to the regime and increase pressure on the regime to change its policies of repression. These measures also aim to reduce the risk of undermining the effectiveness of restrictive measures by targeting the regime’s ability to resort to proceeds from narcotics trade to continue its policy of repression. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The Council is deeply concerned about the rise in narcotics trade originating in Syria. The Council has in particular assessed that the trade in amphetamines has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and providing it with revenue that contributes to its ability to maintain its policies of repression. The Council considers that it should provide for restrictive measures to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by certain persons and entities involved in the production or trafficking of narcotics originating in Syria, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP, and to impose restrictions on admission for such persons, in order to prevent them from providing support to the regime and increase pressure on the regime to change its policies of repression. These measures also aim to reduce the risk of undermining the effectiveness of restrictive measures by targeting the regime’s ability to resort to proceeds from narcotics trade to continue its policy of repression.

| (6) | In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 25 persons and 8 entities should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities or bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 25 persons and 8 entities should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities or bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP.

| (7) | Decision 2013/255/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Decision 2013/255/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP is amended as set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 April 2023.

For the Council

The President

J. BORRELL FONTELLES

---

(1)  
  OJ L 147, 1.6.2013, p. 14.

1

---

ANNEX

Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP is amended as follows:

| (1) | the following entries are added to the list set out in Section A (Persons): | Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘327. | Wasim Badia AL-ASSAD
  وسيم بديع الأسد | Date of birth: 18.7.1980;
  Place of birth: Qardaha/Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Wasim Badia al-Assad is Bashar al-Assad’s cousin; he is therefore a member of the Assad family.
  Wasim Badia al-Assad is also involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon. In particular, he has been involved in the production of Captagon and is responsible for drug shipments. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 328. | Samer Kamal AL-ASSAD
  a.k.a. ‘Samir’
  سامر كمال الأسد | Date of birth: 19.5.1973;
  Place of birth: Qardaha, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Samer Kamal al-Assad is a member of the Assad family.
  He operates in the context of the narcotics trade, in particular in its production. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 329. | Mudar Rifaat AL-ASSAD
  a.k.a. ‘Rifa’at’
  مضر رفعت الأسد | Date of birth: 1964;
  Place of birth: Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Mudar Rifaat al-Assad is Bashar al-Assad’s cousin; he is therefore a member of the Assad family. | 24.4.2023 |
| 330. | Mohammad SHALISH
  محمد شاليش | Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Mohammad Shalish has close ties to the regime.
  He is linked to drug operations and more specifically to the Captagon trade in the Lattakia region. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 331. | Waseem Omar AL-MASALMA
  وسيم عمر المسالمة | Date of birth: 27.8.1981;
  Place of birth: Bosra Al-Sham/Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Waseem Omar al-Masalma is a leader of a regime-affiliated militia.
  Waseem Omar al-Masalma is involved in the regime-led trade in Captagon in Southern Syria, especially in Deraa. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 332. | Amer Tayseer KHITI
  عامرتيسير خيتي | Date of birth: 31.7.1980;
  Place of birth: Douma/Rif Dimashq Governorate/Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Amer Tayseer Khiti is a leading businessperson operating in Syria with interests in real estate, construction and industry. He has close ties to the Assad family. He is a supporter of president al-Assad and organised rallies for him.
  Amer Tayseer Khiti is also involved in Captagon smuggling operations and bought up real estate in order to invest in packaging facilities used for drug smuggling. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 333. | Abdellatif HAMID
  a.k.a. ‘Hamida’
  عبد اللطيف حميدة | Date of birth: 1.12.1977;
  Place of birth: Aleppo, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Abdellatif Hamid has close ties to the Assad family.
  Abdellatif Hamid owns a factory in Aleppo that has been implicated in Captagon production and trafficking. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 334. | Nouh ZAITER
  Noah ZAITER
  Noah ZAYTAR
  نوح زعيتر | Date of birth: 1977;
  Place of birth: Zahle, Lebanon;
  Nationality: Lebanese;
  Gender: male | Nouh Zaiter is associated with members of the Assad family.
  He is involved in the trafficking of Captagon in Lebanon and Syria. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 335. | Taher AL-KAYALI
  طاهر الكيالي | Date of birth: 13.12.1959;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Taher Al-Kayali is a Syrian businessman who owns several companies including Neptunus LLC.
  Through his companies he is involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon, especially in terms of transportation from the port of Latakia. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 336. | Imad Abu ZUREIQ
  Emad Abu ZURAIQ
  Imad Abu ZREIK
  عماد أبو زريق | Date of birth: 1982;
  Place of birth: Nasib, Daraa (Syria);
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Suspected location: Daraa, Syria;
  Gender: male | Imad Abu Zureiq is a leading member of a regime-affiliated militia in Southwest Syria that reports directly to the Syrian regime’s Military Security branch.
  Currently his militia profits from the war economy, including the trafficking in Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 337. | Mustafa AL-MASALMAH
  a.k.a. Mustafa AL-KASAM/QASIM
  مصطفى المسالمة/الكسم | Nationality: Syrian;
  Suspected location: Daraa al-Balad, Syria;
  Gender: male | Mustafa al-Masalmah leads a regime-affiliated militia that reports directly to the Syrian regime’s Military Security branch.
  Currently his militia profits from the war economy, including the trafficking in the synthetic drug Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline.
  He therefore benefits from and supports the regime, and is associated with it. | 24.4.2023 |
| 338. | Hassan Muhammad DAQQOU
  حسن محمد دقو | Date of birth: 1.2.1985;
  Place of birth: Tfail, Lebanon;
  Nationality: Syrian/Lebanese;
  Gender: male | Hassan Muhammad Daqqou has close ties with the Fourth Division of the Syrian Army. Daqqou has established a wide drug trafficking network in Lebanon and Syria and built Captagon manufacturing plants close to the Syrian-Lebanese border. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 339. | Jihad BARAKAT
  جهاد بركات | Date of birth: 1964;
  Place of birth: Qardahah/Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Jihad Barakat is, through marriage, associated with the Assad family.
  He is also leader of a regime-affiliated militia and continues to hold different military and intelligence functions for the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 340. | Raji FALHOUT
  راجي فلحوط | Date of birth: 3.10.1985;
  Place of birth: Atil, Syria;
  Position: Syrian regime-affiliated militia leader;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Raji Falhout leads a militia that is associated with the Syrian Military Intelligence.
  Raji Falhout is also involved in drug trafficking linked to Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 341. | Muhammad ABDO ASSAAD
  a.k.a. Asa’ad
  محمد عبده أسعد | Date of birth: 19.7.1975;
  Place of birth: Ain Tineh, Damascus Countryside, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Assaad Building, Main Street, Ain Tineh, Damascus Countryside;
  Other identifying information: Father: Abdo Assaad;
  Gender: male | Muhammad Abdo Assaad is the leader of the Hosn al-Watan militia, which fought on behalf of the Syrian regime.
  Most recently, he has founded the Aman for Protection and Security LLC, which offers private security services and operates as a shell company for the Hosn al-Watan militia. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 342. | Samer AL-DIBIS
  سامر الدبس
  (a.k.a. Samer AL-DIBS, Samir) | Date of birth: 30.3.1962;
  Place of birth: Damascus, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Naher Street, Rawda, Damascus, Syria;
  Gender: male | Samer al-Dibis is a leading businessperson operating in Syria, active in several sectors of the economy, especially in the chemical industry and in real estate. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Syrian-Chinese Business Council and the chairman of the Damascus and Rural Damascus Chamber of Industry. He is also a member of Parliament and a close associate of Maher al-Assad. In these functions Samer al-Dibis benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 343. | Ali Najib IBRAHIM
  علي نجيب إبراهيم
  (a.k.a. Ali NajeebIBRAHIM) | Date of birth: 1991;
  Position: businessperson;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Al-Malki, Damascus, Syria;
  Gender: male | Ali Najib Ibrahim is a leading businessperson operating in Syria, active also in the telecommunications sector. He owns several shell companies, which have been linked to the Syrian regime in attempts to circumvent sanctions. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 344. | Jamal ISMAIL
  a.k.a. Ismael
  جمال إسماعيل | Nationality: Syrian;
  Associated entities: Military Intelligence Directorate;
  Gender: male | Jamal al-Ismail was the commander of Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013 when his unit killed at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria. | 24.4.2023 |
| 345. | Jamal AL-KHATIB
  جمال الخطيب | Associated entities: Military Intelligence Directorate | Jamal al-Khatib was a commanding officer in Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013 when he participated in the killing of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria. | 24.4.2023 |
| 346. | Osama AL-MALIKI
  a.k.a. Usama
  أسامة المالكي | Date of birth: 1963;
  Place of birth: Damascus, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Villa 98, Sharqiyyat, Jazira al-Khamisa, Qura al-Assad, Damascus Coutryside, Syria;
  Other identifying information: Father: Mohammad al-Maliki – محمد المالكي
  Gender: male | Osama al-Maliki is majority owner of Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC acts as a shell company to allow for the continuation of activities of the Saraya al-Areen 313 militia, a regime-affiliated militia. Osama al-Maliki therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 347. | Fadi SAQR
  فادي أحمد
  (a.k.a. Fady SAKR, Fadi SAQER, Fadi SAQIR) | Date of birth: 1975
  Place of birth: Jablah, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Fadi Saqr is a leader of the “National Defense Forces” (NDF) militia in Damascus that has fought on behalf of the regime since at least 2012. Fadi Saqr therefore is a member of a regime-affiliated militia.
  Fadi Saqr was part of the chain of command in the massacre of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon on 13 April 2013 (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria. | 24.4.2023 |
| 348. | Ahmad Ali TAHER
  احمد علي طاهر | Date of birth: 1982;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Damascus, Mazze, Western Villas, Saraya 36 Building, 3rd Floor;
  Associated individuals: Brother: Khodr Taher;
  Associated entities: Castle Security and Protection LLC;
  Other identifying information: Father: Ali Taher;
  Gender: male | Ahmad Ali Taher owns shares in Castle Security and Protection LLC, which operates as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, led by Maher al-Assad. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 349. | Amjad YOUSSEF
  a.k.a. Yusuf, Yousef
  أمجد يوسف | Nationality: Syrian;
  Gender: male | Amjad Youssef is a Warrant Officer in the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate.
  He was a member of Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013, when he participated in the killing of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria. | 24.4.2023 |
| 350. | Osama RAMADAN
  a.k.a. Usama
  أسامة رمضان | Date of birth: 1973;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Damascus, Mazze, Western Villas, Saraya 36 Building, 3rd Floor;
  Business Associate: Ahmad Ali Taher;
  Associated entities: Castle Security and Protection LLC;
  Other identifying information: Father: Hassan Ramadan;
  Gender: male | Osama Ramadan owns shares in Castle Security and Protection LLC, which operates as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, led by the Maher al-Assad. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 351. | Ali Mhanna SULEIMAN
  علي مهنا سليمان | Date of birth: 1987;
  Place of birth: Al-Raml, Kherbet Maaza, Tartus, Syria;
  Nationality: Syrian;
  Address: Tartus, Khirbit Maaza, 36th Estate, Ghaya Estate Area;
  National ID Number: 10040018920;
  Father’s Name: Mhanna;
  Mother’s Name: Insaf;
  Gender: male | Ali Suleiman was the leader of the Sahab Regiment of a Syrian Arab Army division known as “Tiger Forces”. He is a close associate of Suhayl Hassan. He has been involved in financing the regime, including through the smuggling of fuel. He also benefits from his association with the regime, such as from opportunities in real estate development. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023’ |

(1)

the following entries are added to the list set out in Section A (Persons):

Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘327.

Wasim Badia AL-ASSAD

وسيم بديع الأسد

Date of birth: 18.7.1980;

Place of birth: Qardaha/Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Wasim Badia al-Assad is Bashar al-Assad’s cousin; he is therefore a member of the Assad family.

Wasim Badia al-Assad is also involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon. In particular, he has been involved in the production of Captagon and is responsible for drug shipments. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

328.

Samer Kamal AL-ASSAD

a.k.a. ‘Samir’

سامر كمال الأسد

Date of birth: 19.5.1973;

Place of birth: Qardaha, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Samer Kamal al-Assad is a member of the Assad family.

He operates in the context of the narcotics trade, in particular in its production. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

329.

Mudar Rifaat AL-ASSAD

a.k.a. ‘Rifa’at’

مضر رفعت الأسد

Date of birth: 1964;

Place of birth: Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Mudar Rifaat al-Assad is Bashar al-Assad’s cousin; he is therefore a member of the Assad family.

24.4.2023

330.

Mohammad SHALISH

محمد شاليش

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Mohammad Shalish has close ties to the regime.

He is linked to drug operations and more specifically to the Captagon trade in the Lattakia region. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

331.

Waseem Omar AL-MASALMA

وسيم عمر المسالمة

Date of birth: 27.8.1981;

Place of birth: Bosra Al-Sham/Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Waseem Omar al-Masalma is a leader of a regime-affiliated militia.

Waseem Omar al-Masalma is involved in the regime-led trade in Captagon in Southern Syria, especially in Deraa. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

332.

Amer Tayseer KHITI

عامرتيسير خيتي

Date of birth: 31.7.1980;

Place of birth: Douma/Rif Dimashq Governorate/Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Amer Tayseer Khiti is a leading businessperson operating in Syria with interests in real estate, construction and industry. He has close ties to the Assad family. He is a supporter of president al-Assad and organised rallies for him.

Amer Tayseer Khiti is also involved in Captagon smuggling operations and bought up real estate in order to invest in packaging facilities used for drug smuggling. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

333.

Abdellatif HAMID

a.k.a. ‘Hamida’

عبد اللطيف حميدة

Date of birth: 1.12.1977;

Place of birth: Aleppo, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Abdellatif Hamid has close ties to the Assad family.

Abdellatif Hamid owns a factory in Aleppo that has been implicated in Captagon production and trafficking. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

334.

Nouh ZAITER

Noah ZAITER

Noah ZAYTAR

نوح زعيتر

Date of birth: 1977;

Place of birth: Zahle, Lebanon;

Nationality: Lebanese;

Gender: male

Nouh Zaiter is associated with members of the Assad family.

He is involved in the trafficking of Captagon in Lebanon and Syria. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

335.

Taher AL-KAYALI

طاهر الكيالي

Date of birth: 13.12.1959;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Taher Al-Kayali is a Syrian businessman who owns several companies including Neptunus LLC.

Through his companies he is involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon, especially in terms of transportation from the port of Latakia. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

336.

Imad Abu ZUREIQ

Emad Abu ZURAIQ

Imad Abu ZREIK

عماد أبو زريق

Date of birth: 1982;

Place of birth: Nasib, Daraa (Syria);

Nationality: Syrian;

Suspected location: Daraa, Syria;

Gender: male

Imad Abu Zureiq is a leading member of a regime-affiliated militia in Southwest Syria that reports directly to the Syrian regime’s Military Security branch.

Currently his militia profits from the war economy, including the trafficking in Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

337.

Mustafa AL-MASALMAH

a.k.a. Mustafa AL-KASAM/QASIM

مصطفى المسالمة/الكسم

Nationality: Syrian;

Suspected location: Daraa al-Balad, Syria;

Gender: male

Mustafa al-Masalmah leads a regime-affiliated militia that reports directly to the Syrian regime’s Military Security branch.

Currently his militia profits from the war economy, including the trafficking in the synthetic drug Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline.

He therefore benefits from and supports the regime, and is associated with it.

24.4.2023

338.

Hassan Muhammad DAQQOU

حسن محمد دقو

Date of birth: 1.2.1985;

Place of birth: Tfail, Lebanon;

Nationality: Syrian/Lebanese;

Gender: male

Hassan Muhammad Daqqou has close ties with the Fourth Division of the Syrian Army. Daqqou has established a wide drug trafficking network in Lebanon and Syria and built Captagon manufacturing plants close to the Syrian-Lebanese border. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

339.

Jihad BARAKAT

جهاد بركات

Date of birth: 1964;

Place of birth: Qardahah/Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Jihad Barakat is, through marriage, associated with the Assad family.

He is also leader of a regime-affiliated militia and continues to hold different military and intelligence functions for the regime.

24.4.2023

340.

Raji FALHOUT

راجي فلحوط

Date of birth: 3.10.1985;

Place of birth: Atil, Syria;

Position: Syrian regime-affiliated militia leader;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Raji Falhout leads a militia that is associated with the Syrian Military Intelligence.

Raji Falhout is also involved in drug trafficking linked to Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

341.

Muhammad ABDO ASSAAD

a.k.a. Asa’ad

محمد عبده أسعد

Date of birth: 19.7.1975;

Place of birth: Ain Tineh, Damascus Countryside, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Assaad Building, Main Street, Ain Tineh, Damascus Countryside;

Other identifying information: Father: Abdo Assaad;

Gender: male

Muhammad Abdo Assaad is the leader of the Hosn al-Watan militia, which fought on behalf of the Syrian regime.

Most recently, he has founded the Aman for Protection and Security LLC, which offers private security services and operates as a shell company for the Hosn al-Watan militia. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

342.

Samer AL-DIBIS

سامر الدبس

(a.k.a. Samer AL-DIBS, Samir)

Date of birth: 30.3.1962;

Place of birth: Damascus, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Naher Street, Rawda, Damascus, Syria;

Gender: male

Samer al-Dibis is a leading businessperson operating in Syria, active in several sectors of the economy, especially in the chemical industry and in real estate. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Syrian-Chinese Business Council and the chairman of the Damascus and Rural Damascus Chamber of Industry. He is also a member of Parliament and a close associate of Maher al-Assad. In these functions Samer al-Dibis benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

343.

Ali Najib IBRAHIM

علي نجيب إبراهيم

(a.k.a. Ali NajeebIBRAHIM)

Date of birth: 1991;

Position: businessperson;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Al-Malki, Damascus, Syria;

Gender: male

Ali Najib Ibrahim is a leading businessperson operating in Syria, active also in the telecommunications sector. He owns several shell companies, which have been linked to the Syrian regime in attempts to circumvent sanctions. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

344.

Jamal ISMAIL

a.k.a. Ismael

جمال إسماعيل

Nationality: Syrian;

Associated entities: Military Intelligence Directorate;

Gender: male

Jamal al-Ismail was the commander of Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013 when his unit killed at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.

24.4.2023

345.

Jamal AL-KHATIB

جمال الخطيب

Associated entities: Military Intelligence Directorate

Jamal al-Khatib was a commanding officer in Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013 when he participated in the killing of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.

24.4.2023

346.

Osama AL-MALIKI

a.k.a. Usama

أسامة المالكي

Date of birth: 1963;

Place of birth: Damascus, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Villa 98, Sharqiyyat, Jazira al-Khamisa, Qura al-Assad, Damascus Coutryside, Syria;

Other identifying information: Father: Mohammad al-Maliki – محمد المالكي

Gender: male

Osama al-Maliki is majority owner of Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC acts as a shell company to allow for the continuation of activities of the Saraya al-Areen 313 militia, a regime-affiliated militia. Osama al-Maliki therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

347.

Fadi SAQR

فادي أحمد

(a.k.a. Fady SAKR, Fadi SAQER, Fadi SAQIR)

Date of birth: 1975

Place of birth: Jablah, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Fadi Saqr is a leader of the “National Defense Forces” (NDF) militia in Damascus that has fought on behalf of the regime since at least 2012. Fadi Saqr therefore is a member of a regime-affiliated militia.

Fadi Saqr was part of the chain of command in the massacre of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon on 13 April 2013 (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.

24.4.2023

348.

Ahmad Ali TAHER

احمد علي طاهر

Date of birth: 1982;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Damascus, Mazze, Western Villas, Saraya 36 Building, 3rd Floor;

Associated individuals: Brother: Khodr Taher;

Associated entities: Castle Security and Protection LLC;

Other identifying information: Father: Ali Taher;

Gender: male

Ahmad Ali Taher owns shares in Castle Security and Protection LLC, which operates as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, led by Maher al-Assad. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

349.

Amjad YOUSSEF

a.k.a. Yusuf, Yousef

أمجد يوسف

Nationality: Syrian;

Gender: male

Amjad Youssef is a Warrant Officer in the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate.

He was a member of Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013, when he participated in the killing of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.

24.4.2023

350.

Osama RAMADAN

a.k.a. Usama

أسامة رمضان

Date of birth: 1973;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Damascus, Mazze, Western Villas, Saraya 36 Building, 3rd Floor;

Business Associate: Ahmad Ali Taher;

Associated entities: Castle Security and Protection LLC;

Other identifying information: Father: Hassan Ramadan;

Gender: male

Osama Ramadan owns shares in Castle Security and Protection LLC, which operates as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, led by the Maher al-Assad. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

351.

Ali Mhanna SULEIMAN

علي مهنا سليمان

Date of birth: 1987;

Place of birth: Al-Raml, Kherbet Maaza, Tartus, Syria;

Nationality: Syrian;

Address: Tartus, Khirbit Maaza, 36th Estate, Ghaya Estate Area;

National ID Number: 10040018920;

Father’s Name: Mhanna;

Mother’s Name: Insaf;

Gender: male

Ali Suleiman was the leader of the Sahab Regiment of a Syrian Arab Army division known as “Tiger Forces”. He is a close associate of Suhayl Hassan. He has been involved in financing the regime, including through the smuggling of fuel. He also benefits from his association with the regime, such as from opportunities in real estate development. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023’

| (2) | the following entries are added to the list set out in Section B (entities): | Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘83. | Fourth Armoured Division of the Syrian Army
  الفرقة الرابع | Place of registration: Damascus;
  Principal place of business: Syrian regime territory in Syria;
  Associated individuals: Maher al-Assad, Ghassan Belal | The Fourth Armoured Division is one of the most prominent military units of the Syrian army led by Maher al-Assad and commanded by Ghassan Bilal.
  The Fourth Armoured Division is responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population.
  The Fourth Armoured Division also profits form the war economy, especially the trafficking in Captagon. Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. Therefore, the Fourth Armoured Division benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 84. | Neptunus LLC/Neptune LLC company
  شركة نبتونوس المحدودة المسؤولية
  نبتونس أوفرسيز المحدودة | Place of registration: Lattakia, Syria;
  Date of registration: 2017 | Neptunus LLC is involved in drug operations in the port of Latakia. Neptunus LLC therefore benefits and supports the regime.
  Neptunus LLC was co-founded by Taher Al-Kayali. | 24.4.2023 |
| 85. | Areen foundation/مؤسسة العرين | Place of registration: Syria;
  Date of registration: 1999;
  Principal place of business: Syria;
  Associated individuals: Asma al-Assad (wife of Bashar al-Assad and Director) | The al-Areen foundation poses as a charitable foundation, but is closely affiliated with Syrian regime militias.
  The al-Areen foundation is directed by the president’s wife, Asma Al-Assad.
  The foundation is channelling aid in line with the policies and priorities of the regime, and therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 86. | Stroytransgaz/Стройтрансгаз | Other information:
  Stroytransgaz Group,
  Stroytransgaz (STG) Logistic,
  Stroytransgaz (STG) Engineering,
  STG Engineering | Stroytransgaz is a Russian engineering and construction company operating in Syria, which amongst other things assumed control of Syria’s largest phosphate mines.
  Stroytransgaz therefore benefits from and supports the Syrian regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 87. | Gecopham, the General Company for Phosphate and Mines
  الشركة العامة للفوسفات و المناجم | Address: Palmyra Road, Homs, Syrian Arabic Republic;
  Phone: 00963312751122;
  Email: info@gecopham.sy;
  General Manager: Younes Ramadan | Gecopham is controlled by the Syrian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and provides financial support to the regime. It therefore supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 88. | Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC
  شركة الجبل لخدمات الحماية والحراسة | Address: F6XR+495, Malek Bin Rabeaa, Damascus, Syria;
  Type of entity: Limited Liability Company;
  Place of registration: Damascus;
  Date of registration: 19.10.2017;
  Principal place of business: Damascus, Syria;
  Associated individuals: Osama Mohammad al-Maliki | Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC is owned and managed by Osama al-Maliki.
  Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC acts as a shell company to allow for the continuation of activities of the Saraya al-Areen 313 militia, a regime-affiliated militia. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 89. | Castle for Security and Protection LLC
  شركة القلعة للحماية والحراسة والخدمات الأمني
  a.k.a. Castle Security and Protection LLC, Citadel for Security and Protection | Address: Saraya Roundabout, Western Villas, Mazze, Damascus, Syria;
  Type of entity: Limited Liability Company;
  Place of registration: Damascus, Syria;
  Date of registration: 18.10.2017;
  Registration number: /
  Principal place of business: Damascus, Syria;
  Other information: Sector: Militia turned Security Company;
  Phone Number: +963116119331; +963943800808 | Castle for Security and Protection LLC is a private company, which acts as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, which is led by Maher al-Assad.
  Castle for Security is involved also in the trafficking of narcotics. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. It therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023 |
| 90. | Aman for Protection and Security LLC
  شركة أمان للحماية والحراسة الأمنية | Address: Damascus Countryside;
  Type of entity: Limited Liability Company;
  Place of registration: Damascus Countryside;
  Date of registration: 10.10.2018;
  Registration number: 2906;
  Principal place of business: Damascus Countryside, Syria;
  Associated individuals: Muhammad Abdo Assad | Aman for Protection and Security LLC is a private security company, which acts as a shell company for the Hosn al-Watan milita, founded by Muhammad Abdo Assaad. It therefore benefits from and supports the regime. | 24.4.2023’ |

(2)

the following entries are added to the list set out in Section B (entities):

Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘83.

Fourth Armoured Division of the Syrian Army

الفرقة الرابع

Place of registration: Damascus;

Principal place of business: Syrian regime territory in Syria;

Associated individuals: Maher al-Assad, Ghassan Belal

The Fourth Armoured Division is one of the most prominent military units of the Syrian army led by Maher al-Assad and commanded by Ghassan Bilal.

The Fourth Armoured Division is responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population.

The Fourth Armoured Division also profits form the war economy, especially the trafficking in Captagon. Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. Therefore, the Fourth Armoured Division benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

84.

Neptunus LLC/Neptune LLC company

شركة نبتونوس المحدودة المسؤولية

نبتونس أوفرسيز المحدودة

Place of registration: Lattakia, Syria;

Date of registration: 2017

Neptunus LLC is involved in drug operations in the port of Latakia. Neptunus LLC therefore benefits and supports the regime.

Neptunus LLC was co-founded by Taher Al-Kayali.

24.4.2023

85.

Areen foundation/مؤسسة العرين

Place of registration: Syria;

Date of registration: 1999;

Principal place of business: Syria;

Associated individuals: Asma al-Assad (wife of Bashar al-Assad and Director)

The al-Areen foundation poses as a charitable foundation, but is closely affiliated with Syrian regime militias.

The al-Areen foundation is directed by the president’s wife, Asma Al-Assad.

The foundation is channelling aid in line with the policies and priorities of the regime, and therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

86.

Stroytransgaz/Стройтрансгаз

Other information:

Stroytransgaz Group,

Stroytransgaz (STG) Logistic,

Stroytransgaz (STG) Engineering,

STG Engineering

Stroytransgaz is a Russian engineering and construction company operating in Syria, which amongst other things assumed control of Syria’s largest phosphate mines.

Stroytransgaz therefore benefits from and supports the Syrian regime.

24.4.2023

87.

Gecopham, the General Company for Phosphate and Mines

الشركة العامة للفوسفات و المناجم

Address: Palmyra Road, Homs, Syrian Arabic Republic;

Phone: 00963312751122;

Email: info@gecopham.sy;

General Manager: Younes Ramadan

Gecopham is controlled by the Syrian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and provides financial support to the regime. It therefore supports the regime.

24.4.2023

88.

Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC

شركة الجبل لخدمات الحماية والحراسة

Address: F6XR+495, Malek Bin Rabeaa, Damascus, Syria;

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company;

Place of registration: Damascus;

Date of registration: 19.10.2017;

Principal place of business: Damascus, Syria;

Associated individuals: Osama Mohammad al-Maliki

Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC is owned and managed by Osama al-Maliki.

Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC acts as a shell company to allow for the continuation of activities of the Saraya al-Areen 313 militia, a regime-affiliated militia. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

89.

Castle for Security and Protection LLC

شركة القلعة للحماية والحراسة والخدمات الأمني

a.k.a. Castle Security and Protection LLC, Citadel for Security and Protection

Address: Saraya Roundabout, Western Villas, Mazze, Damascus, Syria;

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company;

Place of registration: Damascus, Syria;

Date of registration: 18.10.2017;

Registration number: /

Principal place of business: Damascus, Syria;

Other information: Sector: Militia turned Security Company;

Phone Number: +963116119331; +963943800808

Castle for Security and Protection LLC is a private company, which acts as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, which is led by Maher al-Assad.

Castle for Security is involved also in the trafficking of narcotics. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. It therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023

90.

Aman for Protection and Security LLC

شركة أمان للحماية والحراسة الأمنية

Address: Damascus Countryside;

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company;

Place of registration: Damascus Countryside;

Date of registration: 10.10.2018;

Registration number: 2906;

Principal place of business: Damascus Countryside, Syria;

Associated individuals: Muhammad Abdo Assad

Aman for Protection and Security LLC is a private security company, which acts as a shell company for the Hosn al-Watan milita, founded by Muhammad Abdo Assaad. It therefore benefits from and supports the regime.

24.4.2023’

---

| 24.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | LI 109/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

LI 109/38

---

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2023/848

of 24 April 2023

amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 20 September 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 (1). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 20 September 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 (1).

| (2) | In view of the continued threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, two persons and one group should be added to the list of persons, groups, undertakings and entities set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In view of the continued threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, two persons and one group should be added to the list of persons, groups, undertakings and entities set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693.

| (3) | Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 April 2023.

For the Council

The President

J. BORRELL FONTELLES

---

(1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 of 20 September 2016 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them and repealing Common Position 2002/402/CFSP (OJ L 255, 21.9.2016, p. 25).

1

---

ANNEX

The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 is amended as follows:

| (1) | the following entries are added under the heading ‘A. Persons referred to in Articles 2 and 3’:






  ‘15. | Abu Yasir HASSAN (a.k.a. Sheikh Hassan, Ahmed Mahmoud Hassan, Yaseer Hassan, Abu Qasim); date of birth: 1981 to 1983; place of birth: Pwani Region, Tanzania; gender: male; nationality: Tanzanian. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1)

the following entries are added under the heading ‘A. Persons referred to in Articles 2 and 3’:

‘15.

Abu Yasir HASSAN (a.k.a. Sheikh Hassan, Ahmed Mahmoud Hassan, Yaseer Hassan, Abu Qasim); date of birth: 1981 to 1983; place of birth: Pwani Region, Tanzania; gender: male; nationality: Tanzanian.

| 16. | Bonomade Machude OMAR (a.k.a. Ibn Omar, Abu Sulayfa Muhammad, Abu Sorraca, Abu Surakha, Abu Suraqa Suraqa Filho, Omar Saide, Sheikh Omar); date of birth: 15 June 1988; place of birth: Palma district, Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique; gender: male; nationality: Mozambican.’; |
| --- | --- |

16.

Bonomade Machude OMAR (a.k.a. Ibn Omar, Abu Sulayfa Muhammad, Abu Sorraca, Abu Surakha, Abu Suraqa Suraqa Filho, Omar Saide, Sheikh Omar); date of birth: 15 June 1988; place of birth: Palma district, Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique; gender: male; nationality: Mozambican.’;

| (2) | the following entry is added under the heading ‘B. Groups, undertakings and entities referred to in Article 3’:






  ‘5. | ISIS-Mozambique (a.k.a. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Mozambique, Islamic State -Mozambique, ISIL-M, Ansar Al-Sunna, Al-Shabaab, Al-Shabaab in Mozambique, Mozambique Wilaya of the Islamic State, Ahlu Sunna wa Jamaah (ASwJ), Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa, Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah, Ahlu Sunnah Wajamo, Swahili Sunna).’. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(2)

the following entry is added under the heading ‘B. Groups, undertakings and entities referred to in Article 3’:

‘5.

ISIS-Mozambique (a.k.a. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Mozambique, Islamic State -Mozambique, ISIL-M, Ansar Al-Sunna, Al-Shabaab, Al-Shabaab in Mozambique, Mozambique Wilaya of the Islamic State, Ahlu Sunna wa Jamaah (ASwJ), Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa, Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah, Ahlu Sunnah Wajamo, Swahili Sunna).’.

---

| 24.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | LI 109/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

LI 109/40

---

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2023/849

of 24 April 2023

implementing Decision 2011/235/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP of 12 April 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran (1), and in particular Article 3(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 12 April 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/235/CFSP. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 12 April 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/235/CFSP.

| (2) | On 25 September 2022, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a declaration on behalf of the Union deploring the widespread and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian security forces against non-violent protestors, noting that it had resulted in the loss of lives as well as a large number of injuries. The declaration also spelled out that those responsible for the killing of Mahsa Amini must be held accountable, and called on the Iranian authorities to ensure transparent and credible investigations to clarify the number of deaths and arrests, to release all non-violent protestors and to provide due process to all detainees. Furthermore, the declaration stressed that Iran’s decision to severely restrict internet access and block instant messaging platforms blatantly violates freedom of expression. Finally, the declaration stated that the Union will consider all options at its disposal to address the killing of Mahsa Amini and the way Iranian security forces have responded to the ensuing demonstrations. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 25 September 2022, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a declaration on behalf of the Union deploring the widespread and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian security forces against non-violent protestors, noting that it had resulted in the loss of lives as well as a large number of injuries. The declaration also spelled out that those responsible for the killing of Mahsa Amini must be held accountable, and called on the Iranian authorities to ensure transparent and credible investigations to clarify the number of deaths and arrests, to release all non-violent protestors and to provide due process to all detainees. Furthermore, the declaration stressed that Iran’s decision to severely restrict internet access and block instant messaging platforms blatantly violates freedom of expression. Finally, the declaration stated that the Union will consider all options at its disposal to address the killing of Mahsa Amini and the way Iranian security forces have responded to the ensuing demonstrations.

| (3) | In this context, and in line with the Union’s commitment to address all issues of concern with Iran, including the human rights situation, as confirmed in the Council Conclusions of 12 December 2022, eight persons and one entity should be included in the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures set out in the Annex to Decision 2011/235/CFSP. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In this context, and in line with the Union’s commitment to address all issues of concern with Iran, including the human rights situation, as confirmed in the Council Conclusions of 12 December 2022, eight persons and one entity should be included in the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures set out in the Annex to Decision 2011/235/CFSP.

| (4) | Decision 2011/235/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Decision 2011/235/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Annex to Decision 2011/235/CFSP is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 April 2023.

For the Council

The President

J. BORRELL FONTELLES

---

(1)  
  OJ L 100, 14.4.2011, p. 51.

1

---

ANNEX

The following eight persons and one entity are added to the list of persons and entities set out in the Annex to Decision 2011/235/CFSP:

Persons

| | Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘214. | NOBAVEH VATAN Bijan
  بیژن نوباوه وطن | DOB: 1959/1960
  POB: Tehran, Iran
  Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament | Bijan Nobaveh Vatan is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as the First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament.
  He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as “Muharebeh”, or “enmity against God”.
  Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.
  As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Nobaveh Vatan supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023 |
| 215. | YAZDIKHAH Ali
  علی یزدی خواه | Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; Member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament | Ali Yazdikhah is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as a member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament.
  He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as “Muharebeh”, or “enmity against God”.
  Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.
  As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Yazdikhah supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023 |
| 216. | ALIBABAEI Mehdi
  محدی علی بابایی
  (a.k.a. ALI BABAEI Mehdi, BABAEI Ali Mehdi) | Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Rank: Major
  Function: provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom | Major Mehdi Alibabaei is the provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom. He directs IRGC and Basij forces in the city of Qom.
  Following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, some of the most intense protests have been seen in the city of Qom. Security forces, including the IRGC and the Basij militia were deployed to violently crack down on these protests. Since March 2023, the IRGC and Basij militia have also been instructed to enforce the mandatory hijab law by new methods of oppression.
  Alibabaei revealed a new scheme to deploy members of the Basij militia in each Qom neighbourhood to enforce the hijab law. The new scheme includes installing programs such as “Be a famous leader in our neighbourhood”, ordering IRGC/Basij forces to conduct neighbourhood patrols, the use of intelligence, intimidation, and enforcing accountability of regular citizens (for example by appealing to the responsibility of building and residence managers for “badly veiled” residents). This scheme represents a new level of denunciation and information gathering by the general population to oppress women.
  Under the command of Alibabaei, the local IRGC and Basij forces in Qom are ordered to enforce certain selected laws, by means and methods that intimidate citizens and violate their fundamental rights.
  As provincial deputy of the IRGC in Qom, Major Mehdi Alibabaei is responsible for the acts of oppression committed by the local IRGC and Basij forces and their violations of the rights of freedom of expression and privacy.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023 |
| 217. | NOUROUZI Ali Asghar
  (a.k.a. NOROUZI Ali Asghar) | DOB: 11.11.1962
  POB: Dashtestan, Bushehr province, Iran
  Address: Unit 29, 5th Floor, Talaieh Block- B1, Elahiyeh Complex 1, Number 0, Alley 2-Shahid Sajjad Rushanai, Rabbaninejad Street, Zein Aldin Municipality, Qom 3739144673, Iran
  Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Passport no: Y53914915 (Iran) expires 11.5.2026
  Iranian national ID no: 4591967573
  Function: chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation
  Associated individuals: Seyyed Aminollah; Emami Tabatabai; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi
  Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
  IRGC | Ali Asghar Nourouzi is the chairman of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
  The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
  The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
  As chairman of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ali Asghar Nourouzi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023 |
| 218. | TABATABAI Seyyed Amin Ala Emami
  (a.k.a. TABATBAYI Aminallah Imami) | DOB: 26.8.1963
  POB: Meybod, Iran
  Address: Tehran, Iran
  Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Iranian national ID no: 4489260229
  Function: vice-chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation; managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation
  Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi
  Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
  IRGC | Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is the vice-chairman of the board of directors as well as the managing director of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
  The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
  The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
  As vice-chairman of the board of directors and managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023 |
| 219. | ALAODDINI Yahya
  (a.k.a. ALA’ODDINI Yahya; ALAEDDINI Yahya) | DOB: 21.5.1965
  POB: Tehran, Iran
  Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Passport no: K47201906 (Iran) expires 19.10.2023
  Iranian national ID no: 0036732958
  Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation
  Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi;; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai
  Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
  IRGC | Yahya Alaoddini is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
  The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
  The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
  As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Yahya Alaoddini is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023 |
| 220. | BABAMORADI Jamal Ali | DOB: 24.5.1960
  POB: Tehran, Iran
  Address: Tehran, Iran
  Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Iranian national ID no: 0036824240
  Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation
  Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Ahmad Karimi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai
  Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
  IRGC | Jamal Ali Babamoradi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
  The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
  The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
  As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Jamal Ali Babamoradi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023 |
| 221. | KARIMI Ahmad Hasan | DOB: 11.12.1962
  POB: Qom, Iran
  Address: Tehran, Iran
  Nationality: Iranian
  Gender: male
  Iranian national ID no: 0382947983
  Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation
  Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai; Jamal Ali Babamoradi
  Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah
  IRGC | Ahmad Hasan Karimi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.
  The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.
  The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.
  As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ahmad Hasan Karimi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.
  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023’ |

Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘214.

NOBAVEH VATAN Bijan

بیژن نوباوه وطن

DOB: 1959/1960

POB: Tehran, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament

Bijan Nobaveh Vatan is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as the First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament.

He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as “Muharebeh”, or “enmity against God”.

Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.

As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Nobaveh Vatan supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023

215.

YAZDIKHAH Ali

علی یزدی خواه

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; Member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament

Ali Yazdikhah is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as a member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament.

He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as “Muharebeh”, or “enmity against God”.

Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.

As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Yazdikhah supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023

216.

ALIBABAEI Mehdi

محدی علی بابایی

(a.k.a. ALI BABAEI Mehdi, BABAEI Ali Mehdi)

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Rank: Major

Function: provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom

Major Mehdi Alibabaei is the provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom. He directs IRGC and Basij forces in the city of Qom.

Following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, some of the most intense protests have been seen in the city of Qom. Security forces, including the IRGC and the Basij militia were deployed to violently crack down on these protests. Since March 2023, the IRGC and Basij militia have also been instructed to enforce the mandatory hijab law by new methods of oppression.

Alibabaei revealed a new scheme to deploy members of the Basij militia in each Qom neighbourhood to enforce the hijab law. The new scheme includes installing programs such as “Be a famous leader in our neighbourhood”, ordering IRGC/Basij forces to conduct neighbourhood patrols, the use of intelligence, intimidation, and enforcing accountability of regular citizens (for example by appealing to the responsibility of building and residence managers for “badly veiled” residents). This scheme represents a new level of denunciation and information gathering by the general population to oppress women.

Under the command of Alibabaei, the local IRGC and Basij forces in Qom are ordered to enforce certain selected laws, by means and methods that intimidate citizens and violate their fundamental rights.

As provincial deputy of the IRGC in Qom, Major Mehdi Alibabaei is responsible for the acts of oppression committed by the local IRGC and Basij forces and their violations of the rights of freedom of expression and privacy.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023

217.

NOUROUZI Ali Asghar

(a.k.a. NOROUZI Ali Asghar)

DOB: 11.11.1962

POB: Dashtestan, Bushehr province, Iran

Address: Unit 29, 5th Floor, Talaieh Block- B1, Elahiyeh Complex 1, Number 0, Alley 2-Shahid Sajjad Rushanai, Rabbaninejad Street, Zein Aldin Municipality, Qom 3739144673, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Passport no: Y53914915 (Iran) expires 11.5.2026

Iranian national ID no: 4591967573

Function: chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation

Associated individuals: Seyyed Aminollah; Emami Tabatabai; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi

Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah

IRGC

Ali Asghar Nourouzi is the chairman of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.

The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.

The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.

As chairman of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ali Asghar Nourouzi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023

218.

TABATABAI Seyyed Amin Ala Emami

(a.k.a. TABATBAYI Aminallah Imami)

DOB: 26.8.1963

POB: Meybod, Iran

Address: Tehran, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Iranian national ID no: 4489260229

Function: vice-chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation; managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation

Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi

Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah

IRGC

Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is the vice-chairman of the board of directors as well as the managing director of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.

The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.

The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.

As vice-chairman of the board of directors and managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023

219.

ALAODDINI Yahya

(a.k.a. ALA’ODDINI Yahya; ALAEDDINI Yahya)

DOB: 21.5.1965

POB: Tehran, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Passport no: K47201906 (Iran) expires 19.10.2023

Iranian national ID no: 0036732958

Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation

Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi;; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai

Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah

IRGC

Yahya Alaoddini is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.

The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.

The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.

As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Yahya Alaoddini is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023

220.

BABAMORADI Jamal Ali

DOB: 24.5.1960

POB: Tehran, Iran

Address: Tehran, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Iranian national ID no: 0036824240

Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation

Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Ahmad Karimi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai

Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah

IRGC

Jamal Ali Babamoradi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.

The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.

The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.

As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Jamal Ali Babamoradi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023

221.

KARIMI Ahmad Hasan

DOB: 11.12.1962

POB: Qom, Iran

Address: Tehran, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Iranian national ID no: 0382947983

Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation

Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai; Jamal Ali Babamoradi

Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah

IRGC

Ahmad Hasan Karimi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.

The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.

The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC’s investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime’s brutal repression.

As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ahmad Hasan Karimi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023’

Entities

| | Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘35. | Ariantel | Address: Ariantel Head Office, No 15, 15th alley, South Gandhi Street, Tehran, Iran
  Website: http://www.ariantel.ir
  Type of entity: private company | Ariantel is an Iranian mobile service provider which has been at the forefront of rolling-out the comprehensive telecommunications surveillance architecture mapped out by the Iranian Government to quash dissent and critical voices in Iran.
  Ariantel has actively sought, and makes use of, cyberware products used to monitor, geolocate and intercept calls and other mobile communications activities of its users at the request of the Iranian Government. This information has subsequently been used to quash and disrupt protests and to identify, target and arrest peaceful protesters and activists.
  Therefore, Ariantel is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. | 24.4.2023’ |

Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘35.

Ariantel

Address: Ariantel Head Office, No 15, 15th alley, South Gandhi Street, Tehran, Iran

Website: http://www.ariantel.ir

Type of entity: private company

Ariantel is an Iranian mobile service provider which has been at the forefront of rolling-out the comprehensive telecommunications surveillance architecture mapped out by the Iranian Government to quash dissent and critical voices in Iran.

Ariantel has actively sought, and makes use of, cyberware products used to monitor, geolocate and intercept calls and other mobile communications activities of its users at the request of the Iranian Government. This information has subsequently been used to quash and disrupt protests and to identify, target and arrest peaceful protesters and activists.

Therefore, Ariantel is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

24.4.2023’

---