1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49034

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CESAR RAUL CAMACHO,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Filed: November 29, 2022

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Samuel A. Hoagland, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for eluding a police officer with a persistent violator 

enhancement, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jacob L. Westerfield, 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

_______________________________________________

BRAILSFORD, Judge

Cesar Raul Camacho appeals from his judgment of conviction for eluding a police officer, 

Idaho Code § 49-1404(2), with a persistent violator enhancement, I.C. § 19-2514, and challenges 

the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Detectives Carter and Holland are members of Boise City’s Special Operations Unit

(SOU), which investigates suspected drug trafficking. Based on investigations in 2018 and 2019, 

the detectives believed, among other things, that Camacho was a member of the Mexican Mafia

gang, had a criminal history, frequently traveled to Boise for drug trafficking purposes, and was 

seeking to recover approximately 12 pounds of stolen methamphetamine in Boise. On June 6, 

2019, the detectives obtained information indicating that Camacho was in Boise. 
2

Believing that Camacho posed an immediate threat of harm to certain individuals

potentially involved in stealing the methamphetamine, Detective Holland requested a third-party 

service provider to use Global Positioning System (GPS) data to “ping” Camacho’s cell phone to 

reveal his real-time location.1 The first ping indicated Camacho was in the general location of a 

hotel on Broadway Avenue in Boise. A second ping indicated that the first ping was not a “fleeting 

ping” and that Camacho was in the same location rather than moving. Officers confirmed with a 

hotel employee that Camacho was staying at the hotel, obtained his room number, and began 

surveilling the hotel parking lot and a nearby truck stop.

During this surveillance, Camacho left the hotel in a rental car. Officers followed him until 

he pulled into a fast-food restaurant’s drive-through lane. When Camacho saw an officer 

approaching him, he accelerated through the drive-through lane, hit a police car, and sped away. 

Thereafter, Detective Holland requested a ping of Camacho’s cell phone every fifteen minutes. 

That evening, officers located and arrested Camacho after he fled on foot.

The following day, officers requested and obtained a search warrant for Camacho’s hotel 

room where they found a loaded firearm, cocaine, heroin, and drug paraphernalia. Later, a grand 

jury indicted Camacho for conspiracy to traffic in heroin, conspiracy to traffic in 

methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), possession of a controlled 

substance (heroin), possession of drug paraphernalia, eluding a police officer, and resisting and 

obstructing. Further, the State alleged Camacho was a persistent violator. At the State’s request, 

the district court consolidated Camacho’s case for trial with the cases of four other defendants.

Camacho filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the State’s “acquisition of cell-site data 

was an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment” and that “no exigent circumstances 

justif[ied] the warrantless search of [his] cell-site data and of his person.” The State responded 

that pinging Camacho’s cell phone was not a search, or alternatively, that if it were a search, 

1

In the district court’s decision denying Camacho’s suppression motion, the court relies on 

United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012 (6th Cir. 2017), to describe how law enforcement in this case 

tracked Camacho’s real-time location by having the third-party service provider “ping” his cell 

phone. In Riley, the court explained that one form of cell phone tracking refers to using satellitebased GPS data to reveal a cell phone’s latitude and longitude coordinates and that “pinging” in 

this context refers to “a service provider’s act of proactively identifying the real-time location” of 

a cell phone. Id. at 1014. The parties do not dispute the district court’s reliance on Riley or that 

law enforcement in this case requested and received GPS data revealing the real-time location of 

Camacho’s cell phone as described in Riley.
3

exigent circumstances justified the search. The district court held an evidentiary hearing over the 

course of three days. During the hearing, the court heard the testimony of three law enforcement 

officers, including Detectives Carter and Holland, and admitted into evidence the affidavit for the 

search warrant of Camacho’s hotel room, a supplemental affidavit, the return of the search warrant, 

the search warrant, and the audio recordings of jailhouse phone calls related to the stolen drugs.

Following the hearing, the district court issued a written decision denying Camacho’s 

suppression motion. It concluded that “obtaining ping tracking data from [Camacho’s] cell phone 

provider constituted a search that required a warrant” but that “there were exigent circumstances 

justifying the warrantless search.” Camacho conditionally pled guilty to eluding a police officer 

with a persistent violator enhancement and reserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression 

motion. Camacho timely appeals

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion 

to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 

as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 

suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 

weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 

III. 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Camacho challenges the district court’s ruling that exigent circumstances 

justified pinging his cell phone to disclose his real-time location. The Fourth Amendment protects 

against unreasonable searches and seizures.2 Carpenter v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 138 

2 Camacho contends the warrantless ping of his cell phone violated both Article I, Section 17 

of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Camacho, 

however, fails to provide any argument why this Court should apply the Idaho Constitution 

differently than the Fourth Amendment. As a result, this Court relies on judicial interpretation of 

the Fourth Amendment to analyze Camacho’s arguments. See State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 

130, 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999) (ruling court will rely on judicial interpretation of Fourth 

Amendment absent “any cogent reason” why it should apply Idaho Constitution differently).
4

S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018). The State may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a 

warrantless search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at ___, 

138 S. Ct. at 2221. One such exception is when exigent circumstances are so compelling that a 

warrantless search is objectively reasonable. Id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2222. “Such exigencies 

include the need to pursue a fleeing suspect, protect individuals who are threatened with imminent 

harm, or prevent imminent destruction of evidence.” Id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2223; see also State 

v. Sessions, 165 Idaho 658, 661, 450 P.3d 306, 309 (2019) (noting emergency aid exception to 

protect against imminent injury or aid injured individual); State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 504, 

975 P.2d 789, 792 (1999) (noting need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is exigent 

circumstance).

Two essential requirements of the exigent circumstances exception are a compelling need 

for official action and no time to secure a warrant. State v. Blancas, 170 Idaho 631, 636, 515 P.3d 

718, 722 (2022). Whether exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless search is determined 

on a case-by-case basis and turns on “whether the totality of circumstances would lead a reasonable 

officer to believe that immediate action was necessary.” Id. at 637, 515 P.3d at 723. The nature 

of the exigency justifying the intrusion must strictly circumscribe the warrantless search. State v. 

Townsend, 160 Idaho 885, 888, 380 P.3d 698, 701 (Ct. App. 2016).

A. Search

Neither the United States Supreme Court nor Idaho appellate courts have previously 

addressed whether requesting a third-party service provider to ping a cell phone to determine an 

individual’s real-time location based on GPS data constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth 

Amendment, and if so, what circumstances justify obtaining this information without a warrant. 

See, e.g., Carpenter, ___ U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (declining to express view on whether 

obtaining GPS real-time data constitutes a search). The State, however, does not challenge the 

district court’s conclusion that “pinging” Camacho’s cell phone to determine his real-time location 

using GPS data was a warrantless search. Thus, for purposes of resolving Camacho’s appeal, we 

assume--without deciding--that it was a warrantless search.

B. Exigent Circumstances

On appeal, Camacho cites several cases, including Idaho case law, addressing whether 

exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of a residence or a hotel room. See, e.g.,

Sessions, 165 Idaho at 661-62, 450 P.3d at 309-10 (concluding exigent circumstances did not exist 
5

to enter home under emergency aid exception); State v. Heard, 158 Idaho 667, 670, 350 P.3d 1044, 

1047 (Ct. App. 2015) (concluding exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into hotel 

room); State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 294, 62 P.3d 214, 218 (Ct. App. 2003) (concluding exigent 

circumstances justified entering home). Because these cases address circumstances dissimilar to 

pinging a cell phone to determine an individual’s real-time location, they are not factually 

instructive.

Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have ruled that exigent circumstances justified 

pinging a defendant’s cell phone without a warrant. These cases identify the types of exigent 

circumstances justifying such a warrantless search, like threats of violence and gang-related drug 

trafficking. For example, in United States v. Hobbs, 24 F.4th 965, 967 (4th Cir. 2022), the Fourth 

Circuit concluded exigent circumstances justified pinging a defendant’s cell phone because he had 

a criminal history of violent offenses; was armed; and had threatened imminent harm to numerous 

people, including his former girlfriend, her child, and law enforcement officers. In United States 

v. Banks, 884 F.3d 998, 1012 (10th Circ. 2018), the Tenth Circuit concluded exigent circumstances 

justified pinging a defendant’s cell phone because officers knew the defendant “was associated 

with a ‘violent street gang,’” “had a history of violent behavior,” and had threatened to kill an 

informant. In United States v. Caraballo, 831 F.3d 95, 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2016), the Second Circuit 

concluded exigent circumstances justified pinging a defendant’s cell phone because he was the 

primary suspect in a brutal murder, had a propensity for violence, possessed numerous firearms, 

was involved in a drug operation, did not live in the area but rather traveled and stayed in hotels, 

and posed a threat to undercover informants.

The district court in this case found that Detectives Carter and Holland were aware of 

similar types of exigent circumstances arising from Camacho’s presence in Boise that led them to 

believe he posed an imminent threat of harm to certain individuals requiring immediate action. 

See Carpenter, ___ U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (noting exigency compelling warrantless search 

includes protecting individuals who are threatened with imminent harm). In support of the district 

court’s findings, the evidence shows that, as members of the SOU, Detectives Carter and Holland

have experience, training, and expertise regarding gang-related activities, including drug 

trafficking, and they have been involved in law enforcement operations related to drug trafficking 
6

in the Boise area. One such operation was a “buy/bust” operation3that occurred in November 

2018. During that operation, officers seized $60,000 during a drug transaction and arrested H.R. 

The day after arresting H.R., an officer conducted a welfare check on H.R.’s eleven-yearold daughter, located the girl at her residence, and discovered Camacho hiding in a bathroom. 

Initially, Camacho claimed that he was the girl’s uncle and that he was taking her to California. 

Later, however, Camacho admitted he was not the girl’s uncle but claimed he had her father’s 

permission to take her. Based on the information the girl provided, the officer believed Camacho 

was involved in drug trafficking and intended to kidnap the girl. Although the officer did not arrest 

Camacho, the officer obtained and confirmed Camacho’s cell phone number.

Later, in January 2019, officers were preparing for another buy/bust operation. During that 

time, Camacho reported to an undercover officer that “somebody in [the] group [which included 

the undercover officer] must be cooperating with the police.” Further, Camacho disclosed certain 

facts to the undercover officer indicating Camacho was aware of the tactical specifics of the earlier 

November 2018 buy/bust operation. This information indicated Camacho had watched and 

provided “security detail” for that drug transaction, raised concerns Camacho “was possibly aware 

of the tactical side” of the operation, and was “out the approximately $60,000” seized during the

operation. 

Then, in May 2019, another drug-related arrest in Boise implicated Camacho in drug 

trafficking. On May 29, Detective Carter was surveilling the residence of an individual who had 

successfully eluded officers earlier. During this surveillance, Detective Carter observed a vehicle, 

which was traveling at a high rate of speed, pull into the alley by the residence and then drive 

away. Believing that the suspected individual might be in the vehicle, Detective Carter followed 

the vehicle and requested assistance. Several officers responded to the request and conducted a 

traffic stop of the vehicle. 

The vehicle’s driver, Robert Cockerell, had a loaded firearm on his hip. The officers 

removed the firearm and had Cockerell exit the vehicle. After Cockerell exited, the passenger

“jumped into the driver’s seat,” “accelerated” the vehicle, and “knocked down” and dragged an 

officer with the vehicle after the officer ordered him to stop at gunpoint. Officers followed the 

3 Officer Carter testified that a “buy/bust” operation means undercover officers were “going 

to purchase narcotics and then arrest the people that they purchased them from right then and 

there.” 
7

vehicle and found it crashed into a tree. The passenger, however, had fled the scene. In the vehicle, 

officers discovered a large amount of cash, methamphetamine, heroin, and a scale. Missing, 

however, was “a large white grocery bag” Detective Carter had seen earlier “in the pocket of the 

driver’s door.” Officers arrested Cockerell, who helped identify the fleeing passenger as Michael 

Chapman.

The following day, May 30, officers located Chapman and arrested him. Detectives Carter 

and Holland interviewed Chapman, with whom they were familiar, knowing him to be a gang 

member and drug dealer in the community. After Chapman initially denied having fled from law 

enforcement the prior day, he admitted fleeing and claimed he was forced to do so. Chapman 

explained that “there was 12 pounds of methamphetamine in a location in Boise that was just left 

there”; he feared “Cesar”; “[p]eople were going to die” because Chapman had been arrested; and 

Chapman and his family would be “toast,” meaning subject to “either great bodily harm or death,” 

if Chapman or Cesar did not recover the drugs. Further, Chapman reported that Cesar “was a 

Mexican Mafia member” with a tattoo signifying his membership, had been in federal prison, was 

connected to the Sinaloa Cartel, came “to town one to two times a month for drug drop off and to 

monitor activity of how drug sales are going,” and “would be back in town within a couple days.” 

During the interview, Chapman gave the detectives Cesar’s cell phone number, and the detectives 

understood Chapman to be talking about Camacho.

Shortly after the interview with the detectives, Chapman called H. from jail, told her where 

the 12 pounds of drugs were located, and asked her to retrieve them. On June 3, Chapman spoke 

to H. again who reported that the drugs had been stolen from her and that she had been “running 

for her life” all night.4 On June 6, Chapman called Camacho from jail. During the call, Chapman 

told Camacho that H. had the drugs; C. had stolen the drugs from H.; and “people were saying” A. 

“might have something to do with the 12 pounds [of methamphetamine] being stolen.” 

Meanwhile, Camacho made statements during the call indicating he was presently in Boise. 

Detectives Carter and Holland were in training at the time of Chapman’s call with Camacho. They 

heard a recording of the call a few hours later, however, and believed that Camacho was presently 

in Boise and that H., C., and A. were in imminent danger.

4 Camacho challenges the district court’s finding that “[H.] called Chapman” and cites to the 

record showing instead that Chapman called H. from jail. Regardless, neither party disputes the 

content of the call.
8

Based on this information, Detective Holland testified he had concerns, particularly about 

C.’s safety. He testified he based these concerns on his prior knowledge of Camacho, the 

information obtained during the 2018 and 2019 operations of a cartel connection, the attempted 

kidnapping, Chapman’s “adamant belief” Camacho was connected with the Mexican Mafia and 

Chapman’s fear for his family, the content of the jailhouse phone calls indicating Camacho was in 

the area, the Mexican Mafia “code of honor” requiring “severe consequences” and “violence” for 

stealing, and “the potential for another attempted kidnapping or some type of violent act in order 

to get the money and[/]or drugs back.” Similarly, Detective Carter testified that he was concerned 

“there was an imminent danger to the person who took those drugs” and concerned about “all the 

history,” including the phone call about the stolen drugs, “the drug trafficking organization ties,” 

the attempted kidnapping, and the belief that “there was a possibility that [C.] might be killed or 

kidnapped.” Based on the detectives’ concerns of imminent danger to C. and others, Detective 

Holland requested the third-party service provider to ping Camacho’s cell phone to determine his

real-time location.

On appeal, Camacho challenges the sufficiency of this evidence as establishing exigent 

circumstances justifying a warrantless search. He contends “no compelling need” justified pinging 

of his cell phone. In support, he challenges Chapman’s credibility regarding Camacho’s gang 

membership and the detectives’ efforts to determine whether Camacho was indeed a gang member. 

Specifically, Camacho argues that the detectives received “the primary information” about 

Camacho’s “alleged ties to any gang” during their May 2019 interview with Chapman, but “despite 

[Chapman’s] severe credibility issues,” the detectives “made no further efforts to obtain additional 

information on whether [Camacho] was a documented gang member.” We disagree, however, 

with Camacho’s assertion that the detectives obtained their “primary information” about 

Camacho’s gang activities from Chapman. To the contrary, the detectives testified to a series of 

events giving rise to their belief that Camacho was involved in gang-related drug activities, 

including the November 2018 and January 2019 buy/bust operations. Moreover, Detective 

Holland specifically testified that the information Chapman provided was “consistent” with the 

information the detectives had learned from their prior investigations and that Detective Holland 

believed “the credibility of what [Chapman] was saying was high.” 

Camacho also criticizes the detectives for not “investigating a violent robbery and a large 

quantity of methamphetamine being present on the streets” but instead purportedly “waiting” until 
9

Camacho was in Boise to act. The record, however, does not support Camacho’s assertion that 

law enforcement was not investigating these matters. Regardless, the lack of any such 

investigation does not bear on whether Camacho posed an imminent danger when his cell phone 

was pinged.

Finally, Camacho argues the district court erred by concluding that “law enforcement had 

reasonable grounds to believe that obtaining a warrant would be impracticable because taking the 

time to do so would have posed a significant risk to the safety of others and [Camacho] was a flight 

risk.” Challenging this ruling, Camacho asserts “the police had ample time to obtain a warrant.” 

In support, he notes that the detectives “spent ‘a couple of hours’ gathering an investigative team” 

and the first ping “did not occur until approximately four hours and thirty minutes after the call 

between [Camacho] and [Chapman],” thereby suggesting a search warrant could have been 

obtained within the same timeframe. These facts, however, do not support Camacho’s argument

that the detectives had “ample time” to obtain a warrant. Rather, these facts show that even when 

acting expeditiously to locate Camacho without a warrant, the process of concluding he posed an 

imminent threat of danger and pinging his cell phone took several hours.

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that exigent 

circumstances justified pinging Camacho’s cell phone. Based on the totality of circumstances 

known to the detectives when they requested the third-party service provider to ping Camacho’s 

cell phone, a reasonable officer would have objectively believed that Camacho posed an imminent 

threat of danger; immediate action was necessary to protect against imminent harm; and there was 

not adequate time secure a warrant. See Blancas, 170 Idaho at 637, 515 P.3d at 723 (noting 

whether exigent circumstances justify warrantless search turns on “whether the totality of 

circumstances would lead a reasonable officer to believe that immediate action was necessary”). 

IV. 

CONCLUSION 

The district court did not err in denying Camacho’s suppression motion. Substantial 

evidence supports the court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances justified pinging Camacho’s 

cell phone without a warrant. Accordingly, we affirm Camacho’s judgment of conviction for 

eluding a police officer with a persistent violator enhancement. 

Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.