J-S08014-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

NATHAN ALLEN WELCH 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1139 MDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 8, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-38-CR-0001070-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: APRIL 1, 2024

Appellant, Nathan Allen Welch, appeals from the order entered on 

August 8, 2023, dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. On August 13, 2021, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with one 

count each of persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or 

transfer firearms and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 On November 9, 

2022, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the aforementioned crimes. 

On the same day, the trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Appellant 

to an aggregate term of five to 10 years of incarceration. Important to this 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1) and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), respectively.
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appeal, the trial court ordered Appellant’s sentence to be served concurrently 

with any other sentence Appellant was serving.2 Appellant did not file 

post-sentence motions or a direct appeal. Instead, on April 17, 2023, 

Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. On April 18, 2023, the PCRA court 

appointed counsel to represent Appellant. On July 5, 2023, counsel for 

Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition. The PCRA court held an evidentiary 

hearing on August 8, 2023. On the same day, the PCRA entered an order 

denying Appellant relief. This timely appeal resulted.3 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [PCRA] court commit prejudicial error by not granting 

[] Appellant’s petition for post[-]conviction relief because he 

failed to appreciate the significance of the plea at the time that 

it was given?

2. Did the [PCRA] court commit prejudicial error by not finding 

that [] Appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective for not properly 

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2

 Appellant was on parole on an unrelated matter at the time of this guilty 

plea hearing and sentencing. The trial court further explained that the instant 

sentence was imposed concurrently to the sentence he was already serving, 

but that his back time for violating parole could not be served concurrently. 

N.T., 11/9/2022, at 21-22 (“What won’t be concurrent is whatever back time 

[the Parole Board] give[s] you. Whatever hit they give you for that, they will 

not give you double credit for the new sentence and the old sentence; but 

once you’re done serving the back time, everything between that sentence –

everything that’s left on that sentence and this sentence, it runs concurrent 

with each other.”). 

3

 On August 10, 2023, counsel for Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

On August 15, 2023, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Counsel for Appellant complied timely on September 5, 2023. On October 9, 

2023, the PCRA court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 
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counseling him on the effect of his guilty plea on his open 

period of state [parole] supervision?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (superfluous capitalization omitted).

Appellant’s two issues are interrelated and, therefore, we will address 

them together. First, Appellant suggests that the trial court, “at the time of 

his plea and sentencing did not fully examine him regarding his understanding 

of the full effect of his plea and sentence[.]” Id. at 11. Appellant claims that,

because he was in violation of his parole on an unrelated matter, he is required 

to serve three years of imprisonment “before he would start marking his time 

on this case” which has “[t]he net effect [of turning] his five (5) year minimum 

sentence [] into an eight year minimum sentence.” Id. In his second issue 

presented, Appellant maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to 

review with him what the effect of his guilty plea would have on his parole 

violation.” Id. at 12. Appellant suggests that trial counsel’s deficient 

stewardship facilitated the entry of an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent 

guilty plea which resulted in manifest injustice. Id. at 13. Accordingly, 

Appellant asserts that he “should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and 

this matter should be remanded to the lower court for further disposition.” 

Id. 

We adhere to the following standards:

In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review is 

limited to whether the record supports the PCRA court's factual 

determinations and whether its decision is free of legal error. We 

apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal 

conclusions. The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed 

unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.
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Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 303 A.3d 823, 830 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(citations and quotations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. 

Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 633 (Pa. 2022) (“A reviewing court is bound by 

a PCRA court's credibility determinations and its fact-finding, so long as those 

conclusions are supported by the record.”).

Under the PCRA,

[t]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of 

the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process 

that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place. The petitioner must demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim 

is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic 

basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors 

and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that 

the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. The 

petitioner bears the burden of proving all three prongs of the test.

Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a 

guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness 

caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. 

Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the 

voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice 

was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases. Moreover, the law does not require that the 

defendant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a 

plea of guilty: All that is required is that his decision to plead 

guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1191–1192 (Pa. Super. 

2010) (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

Here, the PCRA court determined that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims 

lacked merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/9/2023, at 26-28. Based upon 

our standard of review and examination of the certified record, we agree. 
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Initially, we note that prior to pleading guilty, Appellant signed a written, guilty 

plea colloquy which was made part of the certified record.4 Within the written 

colloquy, Appellant acknowledged that he was aware of the permissible range 

of sentences that could be imposed for his aforementioned crimes, the 

decision to plead guilty was Appellant’s alone, he had ample time to consult 

with his attorney and was satisfied with his representation, and that no other 

promises were made to persuade Appellant to plead guilty. Written Guilty 

Plea Colloquy, 11/9/2022, at 3-4. Appellant understood that the entry of his 

guilty plea would establish a violation of the terms of his parole for which he 

could be sentenced to prison. Id. at 4. Appellant also acknowledged that he 

was entering an open plea, the trial court was not bound by the terms of the 

plea agreement, sentencing was discretionary, and Appellant could receive 

the maximum sentences allowed by law. Id. at 5. Before accepting 

Appellant’s plea, the trial court orally confirmed that the agreement was for 

an open plea, meaning the Commonwealth would make a sentencing 

recommendation, but that the trial court was not bound by it. N.T., 

11/9/2022, at 6-7 (“So is that your understanding of your open plea? The 

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4 “[A] written plea colloquy that is read, completed and signed by the 

defendant and made part of the record may serve as the defendant's plea 

colloquy when supplemented by an oral, on-the-record examination.” 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 782–783 (Pa. Super. 2015) (case 

citation omitted), citing Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 590) (“[A] plea of guilty will 

not be deemed invalid if the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea 

disclose that the defendant had a full understanding of the nature and 

consequences of his plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to 

enter the plea.”).
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[j]udge is going to give you whatever [sentence] he wants. The 

[Commonwealth is going to recommend five to ten [years of incarceration]. 

[Counsel for Appellant] may recommend something else, and the [j]udge has 

to decide; is that correct?”). Thereafter, Appellant agreed to plead guilty. Id.

at 9. 

When imposing its aggregate sentence of five to 10 years of 

imprisonment, the trial court first stated that the current sentence “be served 

concurrently with any other sentence.” Id. at 21. The trial court further 

explained that the instant sentence was imposed concurrently to the sentence 

he was already serving, but that his back time for violating parole could not 

be served concurrently. Id. at 21-22 (“What won’t be concurrent is whatever 

back time [the Parole Board] give[s] you. Whatever hit they give you for that, 

they will not give you double credit for the new sentence and the old sentence; 

but once you’re done serving the back time, everything between that sentence 

– everything that’s left on that sentence and this sentence, it runs concurrent 

with each other.”). 

Moreover, the PCRA court credited trial counsel’s testimony from the 

PCRA evidentiary hearing. See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/9/2023, at 26-28. 

Trial counsel testified that there was no specific agreement that Appellant’s 

instant sentence would be imposed concurrently to the back time served for 

a violation of parole, because “whatever sentence he would receive [in] this 

particular case would be separate and apart from any sentence he would 

receive in terms of violation and resentencing on [s]tate parole.” N.T., 
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8/8/2023, at 10. Counsel for Appellant told Appellant “it was not possible” to 

impose the instant sentence concurrently with any time served as a result of 

recommitting Appellant for violations of parole. Id. at 11. We will not disturb 

the PCRA court’s credibility determinations that are supported by the record. 

In sum, trial counsel properly explained the interplay between Appellant’s 

open plea sentence with his violation of parole and counsel’s advice was within 

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Appellant 

subsequently entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea. The 

law simply does not require that Appellant be pleased with the outcome of his 

decision to enter a plea of guilty. Accordingly, we conclude that trial counsel 

provided effective assistance of counsel and agree with the PCRA court that 

there is no merit to Appellant’s claims under the PCRA.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/1/2024