# United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 9, 2022 Decided June 30, 2023

No. 22

- 5058

T HOMAS M ASSIE

, H ON

., I N HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL

CAPACITIES

, ET AL

., A PPELLANTS

v.

N ANCY P ELOSI

, H ON

., I N HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY ONLY

, ET

AL

., A PPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia (No. 1:21

- cv

- 02023)

Christopher Wiest argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs was Thomas Bruns

.

Douglas N. Letter , General Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, argued the cause for appellees. With him on

the brief were Todd B. Tatelman , Principal Deputy General
Counsel, Eri c R. Columbus and Michelle S. Kallen , Special Litigation Counsel, and Stacie M. Fahsel

, Associate General

Counsel at the time the brief was filed.2

Before: R AO and C HILDS

, Circuit Judges , and T ATEL

, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge R AO

.

R AO

, Circuit Judge : In January 2021, the United States House of Representatives adopted Resolution 38, which required wearing a mask when in the Hall of the House and provided fines for the failure to do s o

. When t hree

r epresentatives entered the House chamber without masks , t hey

were each fined $500

. The Representatives sued the Speaker of
the House, the Sergeant

- at

- Arms, and the Chief Administrative

O fficer, challenging the constitutionality of the Resolution and

its enforcement

. The district court dismissed the complaint

, holding the Speech or Debate Clause barred the suit

. See U.S.

C ONST

. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.

The Speech or Debate Clause ’s immunity from suit

extends to all legislative acts, including matters within the constitutional jurisdiction of the House. The House adopted the Resolution pursuant to its authority to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings

, ” and it fined the Representatives pursuant to its authority to “punish its members for disorderly Behaviour. ”

U.S. C ONST

. art. I, § 5, cl. 2

. Both the adoption and execution

of the Resolution are legislative acts over which the Speech or Debate Clause confers immunity

. We therefore affirm the

dismissal of the suit.

I.

As part of the response to concerns about the transmission

of the Covid

- 19 virus

, House Resolution 38 authorized and

directed the Sergeant

- at

- Arms to impose a fine for the failure

to wear a mask in the Hall o f the Hous e

. H.R. Res. 38, § 4(a)(1), 117th Cong. (2021) (allowing members to remove their masks only while recognized to speak)

. A few months after the3

Resolution took effect, Representatives Marjorie Taylor

Green e , Thomas Massie, and Ralph Norman protested the

Resolution by entering the House floor to vote without wearing

masks. The Sergeant

- at

- Arms fined the Representatives. After

the House Ethics Committee denied their appeals, t he Chief

Administrative Officer de ducted the $500 fine from their July

2021 paychecks.

T he Representatives sued the Speaker of the House, the Sergeant

- at

- Arms, and the Chief Administrative Officer, claiming the adoption and enforcement of the Resolution

violated the First Amendment, the Twenty

- Seventh

Amendment

, the Discipline Clause, the Compensation Clause,

and the Presentment Clause

. The district court held the suit barred by the Speech or Debate Clause and dismissed for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction

. Massie v. Pelosi , 590 F. Supp. 3d 196, 231 (D.D.C. 2022). T he Representatives timely appealed.

II.

We begin with the defendants’ claim that the Speech or

Debate Clause bars the Representatives’ suit

. The Clause ’s immunity from suit presents a jurisdictional issue, so we must
consider it at the outset. 1 See Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Schiff

, 23 F.4th 1028, 103 5 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

F ollowing the reasoning of our recent decision in McCarthy v.

1 This case concerns only the Clause’s immunity from suit and does not implicate the other protections recognized as flowing from the
Clause, such as its evidentiary and testimonial privileges. These privileges shield Members against certain forms of questio ning , but do not deprive the court of jurisdiction. See Fields v. Off. of Eddie

Bernice Johnson , 459 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (en banc) (explaining that even “[w]hen the Clause does not preclude suit altogether” members of Congress may still have the protection of evidentiary and testimonial privilege regarding legislative acts).4

Pelosi

, w e hold the defendants have immunity from suit

because the adoption and enforcement of the Resolution were legislative acts within the jurisdiction of the House. 2 5 F.4 th 34,

40 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

A.

The Speech or Debate Clause states : “Senators and Representatives

... for any Speech or Debate in either

House

... shall not be questioned in any other Place .” U.S.

C ONST

. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The Clause has long been understood

to immunize “things done in the House in a Parliamentary

course.” 1 T HOMAS J EFFERSON

, A M ANUAL OF

P ARLIAMENTARY P RACTICE 23 ( 2d ed. 1812) ; see also J OSEPH
S TORY

, C OMMENTARIES ON THE C ONSTITUTION § 86 3 (1833) (“[T]his privilege is strictly confined to things done in the

course of parliamentary proceedings.”). T he Massachusetts Supreme Court, interpreting a n identical state provision, held the privilege encompassed “act [s] resulting from the nature,

and in the e xecution, of the [legislator’s] office.” Coffin v. Coffin

, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808)

. In one of the earliest decisions to address the Clause, the Supreme Court adopted Coffin ’s

“authoritative” holding and held the Speech or Debate Clause

immunized M embers for matters “generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business

before it.” Kilbourn v. Thompson , 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880)

.

Although the Clause refers to “ S peech or D ebate in either House,” t he Supreme Court has consistently held the Clause’s

2 Because we hold the Speech or Debate Clause bars this suit and the court lacks jurisdiction to consider it, we have no occasion to consider whether the Representatives have standing to sue. Cf. McCarthy v. Pelosi , 5 F.4th 34, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (reaffirming that “we can take up jurisdictional issues in any order”).5

protections extend to other “ legislative acts.” United States v.
Brewster , 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972); see also, e.g.

, Tenney v. Brandhove , 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951); Dombrowski v. Eastland , 387 U.S. 82, 84

– 85 (1967); Hutchinson v. Proxmire

, 443 U.S. 111, 126 (1979). Beyond actual speech or debate, a n act is considered “legislative” only if it is “ an integral part of

the deliberative and comm unicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with

respect to ” either : (1) “the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation ” or (2) “ other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdictio n of either House .”

Gravel v. United States , 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) ; see also

M cCarthy

, 5 F.4 th at 40

. An act may be considered legislative

if it fits within one of Gravel ’s categories.

B.

The Representatives challenge the adoption and

enforcement of the Resolution , which requir ed wearing a mask

in the Hall of the House. We cannot consider the merits of the Representatives’ constitutional arguments because their suit concerns legislative acts protected by the Speech or Debate

Clause.

The House enacted the Resolution pursuant to its constitutional authority to “ determine the Rules o f its Proceedings” and to “punish its Members for disorderly

Behaviour.” U.S. C ONST

. art. I, § 5, cl 2

. The House is “expressly empower[ed]” to enact internal rules and punish

members for violating those rules

. Kilbourn , 103 U.S. at 189

– 90 ; s ee also Rangel v. Boehner , 785 F.3d 19, 23

– 24 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Congress’ adoption and “execution of internal rules is legislative.”) (cleaned up)

. The enactment of the Resolution

and its enforcement are squarely within the jurisdiction of the

House

, and therefore are legislative acts

.6

In reaching this conclusion, we rely on the reasoning and analysis in McCarthy v. Pelosi

, which similarly held that the adoption and implementation of a house resolution were legislative acts protected by the Speech or Debate Clause

. In McCarthy

, several r epresentatives challenged the constitutionality of House Resolution 965

— the so

- called proxy voting rule

— and sought an injunction barring the Speaker , the Sergeant

- at

- Arms, and the Clerk of the House from imple menting it

. 5 F.4th at 38

– 39

. After holding “ the acts presented for examination are quintessentially legislative

, ” we explained that the actions also “ fall within Gravel ’s second category” because “the House adopted its rules for proxy voting under its power to ‘determine the Rules of its Proceedings.’” Id

. at 39

– 40 (quoting U.S. C ONST

. art. I, § 5, cl. 2)

. As with the proxy voting rule, the Resolution here was a rule of proceeding committed to the jurisdiction of the House

. 3

And, like the proxy voting rule, it regulates the conduct of

Members on the House floor. Therefore, its adoption was a legislative act protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.

The enforcement of the Resolution was also a legislative

act . The Speech or Debate Clause protects the “execution of legislation when the executing act ions themselves constitute legislative acts.” I

d

. at 41. Fining members for the violation of

a House rule is an aspect of Congress’ power to “punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour .” U.S. C ONST

. art. I, § 5,

3 Although McCarthy held the proxy voting rule was a legislative act within the meaning of both Gravel categori es , it made clear that immunity may attach under either category. Id

. at 40 ; see also Barker v. Conroy

, 921 F.3d 1118, 1126

– 2 7 (D.C. Cir. 2019). W e decide this case solely under Gravel ’s second category , concluding the challenged acts are committed by the Constitution to the House

.7

cl

. 2. Here, the imposition of a fine for violating the Resolution

is a legislative act that may not be questioned in this court

.

In sum, the Speaker, Sergeant

- at

- Ar ms, and Chief Administrative Officer have immunity from suit because the adoption and execution of the Resolution are legislative acts protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.

C.

The Representatives raise familiar arguments against the application of Spe ech or Debate Clause immunity to their suit

, but these are foreclosed by our case law.

The Representatives maintain the Clause does not

immunize the execution of the Resolution because the “execution or carrying out” of a resolution “is not cloaked with Speech or Debate immunity” even though its adoption and ratification may be. This argument fails because as we recentl y explained, “ [t] he salient distinction under the Speech or Debate Clause is not between enacting legislation and executing it,” but rather “between legislative acts and non

- legislative acts.” McCarthy , 5 F.4th at 41. The execution of t he Resolution falls

within the House’s power to punish its members for disorderly

behavior

— a matter the Constitution commit ted to the House

, and therefore a legislative act protected by the Speech or

Debate Clause.

To the extent the Representatives contend that the

defendants who are House e mployees a re n ot i mmune f rom

s uit , their argument is also barred by our precedent. By its
terms, the Speech or Debate Clause references only “Senators and Representatives,” U.S. C ONST

. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, but we have repeated ly explained that it protects staff who perform legislative acts

. S ee McCarthy , 5 F.4th at 39 ; Rangel , 785 F.3d

at 2 5. The adoption and enforcement of the Resolution here are8

legislative acts. T he Sergeant

- at

- Arms engaged in a legislative

act when he fined the Representatives for violating the

Resolution

, a nd the Chief Administrative Officer engaged in a legislative act when she deducted those fines from the Representatives’ salaries. As a result, both officials are entitled

to immunity from suit

.

Fin ally, t he Representatives claim immunity does not

extend to the enactment and enforcement of House rules that are allegedly unconstitutional. Similar arguments have been “rejected time and again” because immunity from suit is “absolute” as to legislative a cts

. Rangel , 785 F.3d at 24. Immunity attaches even if a plaintiff alleges that a member has

violated internal rules or the Constitution. Id ; s ee also

Kilbourn , 103 U.S. at 202 ( “[W]hatever is done within the walls of either assembly must pass without question in any other place .”)

. Immunity for legislative acts reinforces the separation of powers by protecting the independence of Congress and “prevent[ ing ] intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.” Gravel , 408 U.S. at 617; United States v. Johnson

, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966) (same)

. “If the mere allegation that a valid legislative act was undertaken for an unworthy purpose would lift t he protection of the Clause, then the Clause simply

would not provide the protection historically undergirding it.”

Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen ’ s Fund

, 421 U.S. 491, 508

– 09 (1975)

. Because the adoption and enforcement of the

Resolution were legislative acts, we cannot pass on their constitutionality.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, t he judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

So ordered

.