NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.
EDGAR ANTONIO CASAHONDA,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 22

- 10236

D.C. No. 4:17

- cr
- 01904

- CKJ

- LCK

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 1, 2024 * * Phoenix, Arizona
Before: HAWKINS, BADE, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.
Edgar Antonio Casahonda was convicted in a federal bench trial of aiding and
abetting, making false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm,
smuggling goods from the United States, making false statements
, and conspiracy

to make false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm

. Before he

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

APR 10 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

was indicted for these crimes, and while he was still under investigation by the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), Casahonda was the
subject of an unrelated traffic stop. During the stop, which Casahonda claims
violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, officers seized from the car
$8,500 in cash and two receipts for firearm purchases . Officers shared information
from the traffic stop with ATF and, at some point thereafter, Casahonda and his

codefendants were charged in a thirty

- count indictment

. The indictment did not cite
the traffic stop or reference the evidence seized during the stop.
Prior to trial, Casahonda moved to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop

on Fourth Amendment grounds and moved to dismiss the indictment on Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection grounds

. The district court granted Casahonda’s
motion to suppress in part and excluded all the evidence seized during the stop. The

district court denied Casahonda’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The government
moved to admit evidence that was otherwise subject to the district court’s
suppression order, arguing that the government had an independent sou rce for the
evidence. The district court granted the motion in part. Casahonda moved for
reconsideration, but the court denied the motion. Casahonda does not appeal these
rulings. Rather, he appeals the district court’s partial denial of his motion to suppress

and its denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. We review both rulings de3

novo. United States v. Hylton , 30 F.4th 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2022) ; United States v.

Hancock , 231 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

1. Casahonda ’s Fourth Amendment claim is moot because the district court
granted Casahonda’s motion to suppress in part and ordered that the evidence from
the stop be suppressed

. See United States v. Kahre
, 737 F.3d 554, 565 (9th Cir. 2013)
(per curiam) ( “The record confirms the district court’s conclusion that the seized

evidence was not introduced at trial, thereby rendering the motion to suppress

moot.” )

. Even if he proved a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, Casahonda

could obtain no relief. His claim thus fail s.

2. Likewise, Casahonda cannot obtain the relief he seeks

— dismissal of the

indictment

— even if he proved that officers violated his Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection by engaging in racially discriminatory traffic stops

. The

indictment is based on evidence independent of the traffic stop
, and Casahonda does

not appeal the district court’s grant of the government ’s independent source motion

or its denial of his motion to reconsider

. Absent a challenge to the independent
source determination, Casahonda cannot attack the indictment by claiming that the
traffic stop violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

AFFIRMED.