SecurityLink: that the white employee who was ultimately selected
for the position had higher upsell numbers and had been with the
company longer. Resp. to Def’s Stmt. of Facts FI 178, 180. A
plaintiff cannot.create a genuine issue of fact for trial unless he
rebuts each. non-discriminatory reason offered by the employer for
the adverse employment action. Adreani v. First Colonial Bankshares
Corp., 154 F.3d 389, 399 (7th Cir. 1998).

Johnson also claims that he was consistently denied sales
leads in affluent white suburbs because he is African American. But
in his response he points to no evidence of similarly situated
white employees who were given such leads. He claims that two non-
African American employees “received systematically better
treatment in the form of leads and other terms and conditions of
employment,” Resp. at 8-9, but he points to no evidence to support
that allegation. He also claims that he was subjected to “constant
write-ups and harassment from his supervisor,” ordered to return a
pager when. a similarly situated white employee was not, publicly
disciplined and embarrassed by his supervisor, and ordered to give
up leads to other non-African American sales representatives. Id.
at 6-7. To the extent that Johnson means to argue that this is
direct evidence of discrimination, he has not met his burden.
“[Dlirect evidence ‘must not only speak directly to the issue of
Qiscriminatory intent, it must also relate to the specific

employment decision in question.’” Baron v. City of Highland Park,


related to him by another . . . employee, they cannot satisfy his
evidentiary burden of proving that the other individuals are
similarly situated.”). Johnson has failed to create a question of
material fact on either of his claims of discrimination, so I Grant
SecurityLink’s motion for summary judgment, and Deny its motion to

strike as moot.

ae 2 Butt.

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: May) | , 2002


SecurityLink does so, the burden shifts back to Johnson to come
forward with evidence to show that SecurityLink’s stated reason is
a pretext for discrimination. Id.
Il.

Johnson claims that he was denied an opportunity to apply for
a position as the transfer and upsell representative. Although he
claims that white employees were hand-picked to become transfer and
upsell representatives, he admits that the positions were not
posted at all, and that neither African American nor white
employees were allowed to “bid” for the position. Resp. to Def.’s
Facts 9 172. Johnson argues that the failure to post the position
was a violation of company policy and that it was pretextual. Even
assuming that those white employees were similarly situated and
that Johnson could make out a prima facie case, he cannot
demonstrate pretext, because a departure from company policy is not
suspect if it applies equally to all employees. See Floyd v.
Missouri Dept. of Soc. Servs., 188 F.3d 932, 937 (8th Cir. 1999
{refusing to draw inference of pretext where deviation from
selection procedures affected all candidates); cf. Gordon, 246 F.3d
at 892 (finding evidence of pretext where plaintiff was fired for
obscure rule violation and only other time rule had been enforced,
similarly situated person outside the protected class was not
fired). Even if he could create a question of fact as to pretext

for this reason, he does not dispute the other reasons given by


195 F.3d 333, 339 (7th Cir. 1999). Even assuming that this evidence
showed some discriminatory animus, it is not sufficiently connected
to any of the adverse employment actions of which Johnson
complains. Only the surrender of leads to white co-workers is
relevant to his claim about lead assignments, and he does not point
to evidence to support this claim. Citations to evidence in the
record must appear.in the briefs, or else the plaintiff will not be
deemed to have created a genuine issue of fact. See Weeks v.
Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 942 (7th Cir. 1997).
“It is not [my] task . . . to scour the record in search of a
genuine issue of triable fact.” Richards v. Combined Ins. Co. of
Am., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995).

Furthermore, sales leads were assigned by SecurityLink’s Lead
Coordinator, also an African American, based on a variety of
factors, including scheduling conflicts, distance from the sales
representative’s home, prior leads, and prior handling of leads.
Def’s Stmt. of Facts {71 31, 46. The Lead Coordinator testified that
she did not assign leads on the basis of race, id., I 44-45, and
Johnson does not claim that she discriminated against him on the
basis of race. Id. 9 28. He responds only that he received leads in
predominantly African American neighborhoods, but does not point to
any evidence in support of this claim. Resp. to Def’s Stmt. of
Facts. 9 28. This is insufficient to rebut the Lead Coordinator’s

testimony that she did not take race into account.


Kainate Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Elaine E. Bucklo Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
SS CASE NUMBER 00 C 7966 DATE 5/21/2002
(R CASE Johnson vs. Securitylink from Ameritech
Ty TITLE

[En the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented]

qu)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(th) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support ofmotion due.

@) o Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due _

(4) im Ruling/Hearingon____ set for____att

(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on __set for____at.

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor__—sat_—

(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for]on__—sat_—

(8) Qo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) QO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4¢n) OGeneral Rule21 CPFRCP41(a)(1) Ci FRCP41(a)(2).

do [Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order granting defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. Defendant’s motion to strike is denied as moot. Judgment is therefore entered in

favor of defendant and against plaintiff. Any pending motion in this case is terminated as moot.

a [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
2

No notices required.

umber of notices

Document:
Numbers.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff, MAY 9 2

Notificd counsel by telephone. date docketed

Docketing to mail notices.
Mait AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice

courtroom uy r
MPI deputy’s we)
initials

oT
ived in .
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials

Datertioe rece’



Johnson, admits that sales representatives were also free to
generate their own leads in any part of the Chicago metro area.
Resp. to Def.’s Facts 7 77. At his deposition, he testified about
his perception.that certain white sales representatives made more
sales in the northern suburbs, Pl. Dep. at 147, but he did not say
anything from which it could reasonably inferred that those sales
were the product of assigned leads as opposed to self-generated
leads. Id. Johnson testified that, shortly after he began working
at SecurityLink, an African American co-worker said “they are not
going to give you good leads. They are going to cherry pick and
they are going to give them to their boys,” and then named several
non-African American sales representatives. Pl. Dep. at 146. There
is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that his co-
worker’s statement is attributable to Ameritech as an admission.
Moreover, his co-worker’s warning that he would be treated
differently than. certain white employees is insufficient to show
that white employees actually were treated better, much less that
they were similarly situated. “[U]ncorroborated generalities” are
insufficient to satisfy this element of the prima facie case. Oest
v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 240 F.3d 605, 615 (7th Cir.
2001); see also. Burns v. Interparking, Inc., No. 01-1134, 2001 WL
1464026, at *3 (7th Cir. Nov. 16, 2001) (unpublished order)
(“Because these alleged occurrences of differential treatment were

not within [the plaintiff]’s personal knowledge, but rather were


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

BARRY J. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

v. No. 00 C 7966

WAY 2 % 2002

SECURITYLINK FROM. AMERITECH,

‘Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Barry Johnson sues his former employer, SecurityLink from
Ameritech, Inc. (“SecurityLink”), for race discrimination under
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seg. SecurityLink moves for summary
judgment, and also. moves to strike certain paragraphs of Johnson's
Local Rule 56.1(b) response to SecurityLink’s statement of material
facts. I.grant the motion for summary judgment.

I.

Johnson, an African American, is no longer employed by
SecurityLink, which sells and installs security systems. He
resigned voluntarily on March 31, 2000, after he had already filed
his charge of race.discrimination with the EEOC. His discrimination
claim is based’on allegations that he was denied opportunities for

advancement as. a sales representative based on his race.

Specifically, he.claims he was not allowed to apply for a position
as a “transfer” or “upsell” representative (“transfers” and

“upsells” are sales of upgraded systems to customers who already

ow,


have security systems), and that he was not assigned sales leads in
the affluent, mostly-white northern suburbs of Chicago, Illinois.

To survive. summary judgment, Johnson must come forward with
evidence to demonstrate the existence of a material fact for trial.
I must construe all facts in the light most favorable to Johnson
and draw all. reasonable and justifiable inferences in his favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). ‘A
genuine issue of fact ‘exists only when a reasonable jury could
find for the party opposing the motion based on the record as a
whole.’” Culver v. McRoberts, 192 F.3d 1095, 1098 (7th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted).

If there is no direct evidence of race discrimination, as
there is not here, Johnson may proceed under the burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Under McDonnell Douglas, Johnson must first make out a prima facie
case of discrimination by showing that: “(1) he belongs to a
protected class, (2) he performed his job according to his
employer's legitimate expectations, (3) he suffered an adverse
employment action, and (4) similarly situated employees outside the
protected class were treated more favorably by the defendant.”
Gordon v. United.Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 886 (7th Cir. 2001).
If Johnson establishes the prima facie case, the burden shifts to
SecurityLink.to.come forward with evidence of a legitimate, non-

discriminatory.reason for the challenged action. Id. If