[Cite as State v. Stacy, 2020-Ohio-536.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

PIKE COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : Case No. 18CA895 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

v. : DECISION AND 

 JUDGMENT ENTRY 

WILLIAM RAY STACY, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 02/03/2020 

______________________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES: 

Richard M. Nash, Jr., Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellant. 

Robert Junk, Pike County Prosecutor, and Marie Hoover, Assistant Pike County 

Prosecutor, Waverly, Ohio, for appellee. 

______________________________________________________________________ 

Hess, J. 

{¶1} William Ray Stacy appeals his conviction for trafficking in heroin, a fourthdegree felony. Stacy contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to 

suppress evidence because law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the 

traffic stop that resulted in the discovery of 99.96 grams of heroin. However, the trial 

court was free to believe the testimony of a police sergeant that he observed a marked 

lanes violation. Therefore, we reject Stacy’s argument. 

{¶2} Stacy also contends that his conviction for a fourth-degree felony is not 

supported by sufficient evidence or is against the manifest weight of the evidence 

because the evidence did not support the jury’s finding that the amount of heroin 

involved equaled or exceeded one gram but was less than five grams. However, 99.96 

grams of heroin includes an amount of heroin that equals or exceeds one gram but is 
Pike App. No. 18CA895 2 

less than five grams. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports the conviction and it is 

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶3} On February 2, 2017, Deputy Brock Clemmons of the Pike County 

Sheriff’s Department received information from an anonymous caller that Stacy would 

be bringing a large shipment of heroin from Columbus southbound on U.S. Route 23 in 

a silver Chrysler van. Deputy Clemmons relayed this information to Lieutenant Jim 

Burchett of the Pike County Sheriff’s Office, and they coordinated with the Waverly 

Police Department and Piketon Police Department to intercept the van. Lieutenant 

Burchett instructed Sergeant Christopher Mosley of the Piketon Police Department to 

stop the van “if probable cause existed,” and Sergeant Mosley told his chief that he 

“was going to go see if I could stop it.” Sergeant Mosley positioned himself near U.S. 

Route 23 in the Village of Piketon to intercept the van, Lieutenant Burchett and Deputy 

Clemmons stationed themselves south of Piketon, and another officer was at a third 

location. 

{¶4} According to Sergeant Mosley, after waiting about 50 minutes to an hour, 

he spotted the van, pulled out behind it, and observed Stacy “cross over the right edge 

line of the roadway, by more than half of his vehicle.” Sergeant Mosley did not 

immediately initiate a traffic stop but instead waited until he and Stacy reached a 

location where Sergeant Mosley thought they could “pull off the roadway safely.” During 

the stop, Sergeant Mosley commented that Stacy had “swerved off the road pretty bad,” 

and Stacy said that his passenger had been sick and something to the effect that he 

was “trying to render aid or stop her from puking in his van.” The stop resulted in the 
Pike App. No. 18CA895 3 

discovery of four plastic-wrapped balls of heroin that collectively contained 99.96 grams 

of heroin. It also resulted in the discovery of 1.61 grams of cocaine on Stacy’s person. 

A search of Stacy’s home, pursuant to a search warrant, resulted in the discovery of 

$17,303.51 in cash. 

{¶5} Sergeant Mosley issued Stacy a traffic citation for a marked lanes 

violation. The Piketon Mayor’s Court later dismissed that case at the request of the 

Piketon Village Solicitor. According to Stacy, the case was dismissed due to lack of 

evidence, but in court records, the solicitor represented that the request was “not based 

upon lack of probable cause” and related to the existence of the “companion felony 

case pending in Pike County Court of Common Pleas.” 

{¶6} The Pike County grand jury indicted Stacy on one count each of (1) 

possession of heroin, a first-degree felony because the amount of heroin equaled or 

exceeded 50 grams but was less than 100 grams, see R.C. 2925.11(C)(6)(e); (2) 

trafficking in heroin, a first-degree felony because the amount of heroin equaled or 

exceeded 50 grams but was less than 100 grams, see R.C. 2925.03(C)(6)(f); (3) 

possession of cocaine, a fifth-degree felony because the amount of cocaine was less 

than five grams, see R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(a); and (4) receiving stolen property, a fourthdegree felony because the property was a firearm, see R.C. 2913.51(C).1 The 

possession of heroin, trafficking in heroin, and receiving stolen property charges each 

included forfeiture specifications for the $17,303.51 in cash and the van. 

 

1 The indictment listed the name of the first count as aggravated possession of drugs, the second count 

as aggravated trafficking in drugs, and the third count as possession of drugs. We have used the correct 

names for these offenses based on the other information in the indictment. The trial court used the 

correct names in the jury instructions and verdict forms. 
Pike App. No. 18CA895 4 

{¶7} Stacy pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to suppress. At the hearing on 

the motion, Sergeant Mosley testified about the traffic violation. Stacy testified that while 

north of Piketon, he pulled over so his passenger could throw up, but while driving in 

Piketon, he never travelled over the right edge line. Stacy claimed that during the traffic 

stop, Sergeant Mosley admitted that he did not see a traffic violation and stated that 

“Burchett had called him and said that [Stacy] had went across the line before [he] got 

to Piketon.” Stacy’s friend, Robert Russell, testified that while driving on the day in 

question, he saw Stacy’s van on the side of the road. Stacy pulled onto the road, and 

Russell followed him into Piketon. Russell saw a Piketon police officer pull out in front 

of him and behind Stacy and later saw the officer turn on his cruiser lights. Russell did 

not see Stacy travel over the right edge line. The court denied the motion to suppress. 

Relevant here, the court found Sergeant Mosley’s testimony about the traffic violation 

was credible, and the violation justified the stop. 

{¶8} Prior to trial, the state dismissed the receiving stolen property count. The 

jury found Stacy not guilty of possession of heroin and possession of cocaine. The jury 

found him guilty of trafficking in heroin. The verdict form for that count gave the jury five 

options for the amount of heroin involved: (1) less than one gram; (2) equal to or 

exceeding one gram but less than five grams; (3) equal to or exceeding five grams but 

less than 10 grams, (4) equal to or exceeding 10 grams but less than 50 grams; and (5) 

equal to or exceeding 50 grams but less than 100 grams. The jury found that the 

amount equaled or exceeded one gram but was less than five grams of heroin—a 

fourth-degree felony. The jury also found that Stacy had to forfeit the van but not the 

cash. The court sentenced Stacy to three years of community control. 
Pike App. No. 18CA895 5 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶9} Stacy presents two assignments of error: 

I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO 

CONVICT APPELLANT OF TRAFFICKING IN MORE THAN ONE 

GRAM, BUT LESS THAN FIVE GRAMS OF HERION [sic]; OR, IN 

THE ALTERNATIVE, THE CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION OF THE 

FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION, AND SECTION 14, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION, IN THAT THE STATE DID NOT HAVE 

REASONABLE SUSPICION TO MAKE AN INVESTIGATE [sic] 

STOP. 

For ease of discussion, we address the assignments of error out of order. 

 III. MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

{¶10} In the second assignment of error, Stacy contends that the trial court erred 

when it denied his motion to suppress because Sergeant Mosley lacked reasonable 

suspicion to initiate an investigative stop. Stacy contends that Sergeant Mosley’s 

testimony about the marked lanes violation lacked credibility. Stacy highlights the fact 

that two witnesses—Russell and himself—testified that no marked lanes violation 

occurred and the fact that Sergeant Mosley did not initiate a traffic stop immediately 

after observing the alleged violation. Stacy asserts that Sergeant Mosley only initiated 

the stop when Stacy exited the highway into a private parking lot and “[a]ny opportunity 

to observe a traffic violation had ended.” Stacy also emphasizes the fact that “three 

separate law enforcement groups were notified to stop” him, there were “stake outs” for 

him, and Sergeant Mosley said that he would try to stop Stacy and waited nearly an 

hour to do so. Stacy asserts that when an officer has an ulterior motive for a stop 
Pike App. No. 18CA895 6 

“courts should apply heightened scrutiny in determining whether an offense actually 

occurred.” 

{¶11} Generally “appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed 

question of law and fact.” State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 

N.E.3d 691, ¶ 7, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 

N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained: 

When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of 

trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions 

and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate 

court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by 

competent, credible evidence. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate 

court must then independently determine, without deference to the 

conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal 

standard. 

(Citations omitted.) Burnside at ¶ 8. 

{¶12} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio 

Constitution, Article I, Section 14, prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.” State 

v. Emerson, 134 Ohio St.3d 191, 2012-Ohio-5047, 981 N.E.2d 787, ¶ 15. The Supreme 

Court of Ohio has held that these provisions provide the same protection in felony 

cases. State v. Hawkins, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-4210, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 18, 

citing State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483, 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 12. “This 

constitutional guarantee is protected by the exclusionary rule, which mandates the 

exclusion at trial of evidence obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure.” State 

v. Petty, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 18CA26 & 18CA27, 2019-Ohio-4241, ¶ 11. 

{¶13} “ ‘[S]earches [and seizures] conducted outside the judicial process, 

without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
Pike App. No. 18CA895 7 

exceptions.’ ” (Alterations sic. Footnote omitted sic.) State v. Conley, 4th Dist. Adams 

No. 19CA1091, 2019-Ohio-4172, ¶ 17, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 

357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). “Once a defendant demonstrates that he or 

she was subjected to a warrantless search or seizure, the burden shifts to the state to 

establish that the warrantless search or seizure was constitutionally permissible.” State 

v. Dorsey, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 19CA3874, 2019-Ohio-3478, ¶ 13. 

{¶14} This case involved a warrantless investigatory stop, which “must be 

supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver has, is, or is about to 

commit a crime, including a minor traffic violation.” Petty at ¶ 12. In Petty, we recently 

explained: 

“To justify a traffic stop based upon reasonable suspicion, the officer must 

be able to articulate specific facts that would warrant a person of 

reasonable caution to believe that the driver has committed, or is 

committing, a crime, including a minor traffic violation.” State v. Taylor, 

2016-Ohio-1231, 62 N.E.3d 591, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.). The existence of 

reasonable suspicion depends on whether an objectively reasonable 

police officer would believe that the driver’s conduct constituted a traffic 

violation based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at 

the time of the stop. 

Moreover, a police officer may stop the driver of a vehicle after 

observing even a de minimis violation of traffic laws. “[A] traffic stop with 

the proper standard of evidence is valid regardless of the officer’s 

underlying ulterior motives as the test is merely whether the officer ‘could’ 

have performed the act complained of; pretext is irrelevant if the action 

complained of was permissible.” See State v. Koczwara, 7th Dist. 

Mahoning No. 13MA149, 2014-Ohio-1946, ¶ 22, citing [Dayton v.

Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 7, 11, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996)]. 

(Citations omitted. First alteration sic.) Id. at ¶ 12-13. 

{¶15} The trial court was free to believe Sergeant Mosley’s testimony that he 

observed a marked lanes violation but waited to initiate a traffic stop until it was safe to 

do so. Even though two witnesses testified that no violation occurred, “[s]heer number 
Pike App. No. 18CA895 8 

of witnesses testifying to a fact * * * is not the test of whether that fact is true.” Wright v. 

Suzuki Motor Corp., 4th Dist. Meigs Nos. 03CA2, 03CA3, 03CA4, 2005-Ohio-3494, ¶ 

145. “The trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any 

witness[.]” State v. Hammond, 4th Dist. Ross No. 18CA3662, 2019-Ohio-4253, ¶ 56. 

We accord deference to the trier of fact on credibility issues because “it is in the best 

position to gauge the witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and to use 

these observations to weigh their credibility.” Id. The trial court found Sergeant 

Mosley’s testimony credible, and we will not disturb its finding under these 

circumstances. 

{¶16} The trial court’s finding that Sergeant Mosley observed a marked lanes 

violation is supported by competent, credible evidence, and based on that violation, 

Sergeant Mosley had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Accordingly, we overrule 

the second assignment of error. 

IV. SUFFICIENCY AND MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 

{¶17} In the first assignment of error, Stacy contends that his conviction is not 

supported by sufficient evidence or is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶18} “When a court reviews a record for sufficiency, ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond 

a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Alteration sic.) State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio1019, 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 146, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 

(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 
Pike App. No. 18CA895 9 

S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In State v. Anderson, 4th Dist. Highland No. 

18CA14, 2019-Ohio-395, we recently explained: 

A sufficiency assignment of error challenges the legal adequacy of the 

state’s prima facie case, not its rational persuasiveness. “That limited 

review does not intrude on the jury’s role ‘to resolve conflicts in [the] 

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from 

basic facts to ultimate facts.’ ” Musacchio v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 

136 S.Ct. 709, 715, 193 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016), quoting Jackson at 319 * * *. 

By contrast in determining whether a criminal conviction is against 

the manifest weight of the evidence, we must review the entire record, 

weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility 

of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that reversal of the conviction is necessary. In order 

to satisfy this test, the state must introduce substantial evidence on all the 

elements of an offense, so that the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

Although a court of appeals may determine that a judgment of a 

trial court is sustained by sufficient evidence, that court may nevertheless 

conclude that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence. 

However, we are reminded that generally, it is the role of the jury to 

determine the weight and credibility of evidence. “ ‘A jury, sitting as the 

trier of fact, is free to believe all, part or none of the testimony of any 

witness who appears before it.’ ” State v. Reyes-Rosales, 4th Dist. Adams 

No. 15CA1010, 2016-Ohio-3338, ¶ 17, quoting State v. West, 4th Dist. 

Scioto No. 12CA3507, 2014-Ohio-1941, ¶ 23. We defer to the trier of fact 

on these evidentiary weight and credibility issues because it is in the best 

position to gauge the witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice 

inflections, and to use these observations to weigh their credibility. 

(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 13-15. 

{¶19} R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) makes it crime to knowingly “transport * * * a controlled 

substance * * *, when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the 

controlled substance * * * is intended for sale or resale by the offender or another 

person.” The degree of the offense depends on the amount and type of drug being 

trafficked. Relevant here, “[i]f the drug involved in the violation is heroin or a compound, 
Pike App. No. 18CA895 10 

mixture, preparation, or substance containing heroin” and “[i]f the amount of the drug 

involved * * * equals or exceeds fifty grams but is less than one hundred grams * * * 

trafficking in heroin is a felony of the first degree[.]” R.C. 2925.03(C)(6)(f). However, “if 

the amount of the drug involved * * * equals or exceeds one gram but is less than five 

grams, trafficking in heroin is a felony of the fourth degree[.]” R.C. 2925.03(C)(6)(c). 

{¶20} Stacy maintains that the jury could not find him guilty of a fourth-degree 

felony because there is no evidence that he trafficked an amount of heroin that equaled 

or exceeded one gram but was less than five grams. Rather, he asserts that the only 

evidence was that law enforcement seized four balls of heroin that collectively weighed 

99.96 grams, which is in the range for a first-degree felony. Essentially, Stacy argues 

that the jury had to either convict him of a first-degree felony or acquit him. 

{¶21} Stacy’s argument is not well-taken. 99.96 grams of heroin includes an 

amount of heroin that equals or exceeds one gram but is less than five grams of heroin. 

That fact is not somehow nullified because the jury could have found Stacy guilty of 

trafficking a greater amount of heroin than it did. Although Stacy suggests that the jury 

had to either convict him of a first-degree felony or acquit him, he did not object to the 

jury instructions or verdict form for the trafficking in heroin count, which allowed the jury 

to consider five options for the amount of heroin. Stacy also did not challenge the 

instructions or verdict form on appeal. 

{¶22} Sufficient evidence supported the conviction for fourth-degree felony 

trafficking in heroin, and the conviction is not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error. 
Pike App. No. 18CA895 11 

V. CONCLUSION 

{¶23} Having overruled the assignments of error, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Pike App. No. 18CA895 12 

JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that Appellant shall pay the 

costs. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Pike 

County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. 

 IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS 

BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is

temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously 

posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme 

Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. 

If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 

sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the 

Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of 

the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court 

of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as 

of the date of such dismissal. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Smith, P.J. & Hall, J.*: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. 

 For the Court 

 BY: ________________________ 

 Michael D. Hess, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing 

with the clerk. 

*Judge Michael T. Hall, Second District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the 

Supreme Court of Ohio in the Fourth Appellate District.