shall be the deciding factor. The Company, in its sole discretion,

shall determine the necessary qualifications of an employee and all

questions of skill, ability and physical fitness, and shall determine

whether or not an employee shall be promoted. An unreasonable

determination by the Company shall be subject to the grievance

procedure set forth herein.

4. Layoffs and Recalls. A) In the event of a reduction in the work

force, all probationary employees in the affected departments shall

be laid off first, the employees with seniority shall thereafter be

laid off in the reverse order of seniority within the classifications

in the departments affected subject, however, to the provisions of

Section 3 of this Article.
In compliance with the labor contract and after consulting with union leadership
regarding which union employees held the lowest classifications of skills and abilities,
defendant decided to permanently lay off all of its Class II maintenance associates.
This resulted in the termination of two employees, plaintiff and Dimitrios Kangadis.
In the aftermath of defendant’s RIF, it retained several Class III machine builders who
were as old as or older than plaintiff (who was 51 when he was laid off) but has not
hired any new Class II machine builders since plaintiffs termination.

While Kangadis accepted a severance package and signed a release agreement
with defendant, plaintiff filed a grievance based on being “laid off out of seniority.”
Adamezyk denied the grievance and told plaintiff that the labor contract required
defendant to lay off union workers in order of skill and ability, and that only if skill
level and physical ability were equal among workers could defendant make lay offs
based on seniority. Plaintiff never filed a grievance complaining of defendant’s failure
to promote him to the level of Class III machine builder. Plaintiff did, however, pursue

his age discrimination grievance through every level of the grievance process without

-4.


or John A. were unqualified to earn their Class III status, or that plaintiff was more
qualified and still earned only Class II status. Ghosh v. Ind. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 192
F.3d 1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding employees similarly situated when new hires
held similar or lesser qualifications for the job). Plaintiff also has not presented
evidence that he is capable of performing the tasks required of a Class III builder,
except for his own belief that, had defendant asked him to perform more complex jobs,
he would have been able to do so. The factual record before the court supports
defendant’s assertion that the job responsibilities of Class II and Class [I machine
builders are distinct and that plaintiff did not qualify as a Class III machine builder.
Without additional evidence in the record (beyond plaintiffs own self-serving
assessment of his abilities and skills) from which the court can infer that the two
classifications are meaningless, the court must conclude that plaintiff is not similarly
situated to Morris and John A. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., 141 F.3d 667, 676
(7th Cir. 1998) (finding employer in best position to define job criteria).

Because plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he is similarly situated to younger,
Class III machine-builders, he cannot establish the fourth element of his prima facie
case. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, plaintiffs failure to make out his
prima facie case is fatal to his age discrimination claim, and summary judgment must

be entered in favor of defendant.


burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 US.
792, 802 (1978). See also Thorn v. Sundstrand Aero. Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 386 (7th Cir.
2000). Under this framework, a plaintiff first must establish the four elements of a
prima facie case of age discrimination. Ifthe plaintiff succeeds, there is a presumption
that he suffered discrimination, and the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. If the
defendant proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, then the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s reason was mere pretext. If the plaintiff
succeeds in casting sufficient doubt on the legitimacy of the defendant’s excuse, “the
case proceeds to trial.” Miller v. Borden, Inc., 168 F.3d 308, 313 (7th Cir. 1999).

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that “(1) he belongs to a protected class [age forty or older]; (2) he
performed his job satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)
his employer treated similarly-situated employees outside of his protected class more
favorably.” Stockett v. Muncie Ind. Transit Sys., 221 F.3d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 2000).
Here, defendants concede that plaintiff has satisfied the first three elements of his
prima facie case: he has presented evidence to show that he is over 40 years of age and
was performing his job satisfactorily when he was terminated by defendant. With
respect to the fourth element, defendant admits that at least two younger employees,
Morris and John A., were retained after the RIF and are doing some of the same work

that plaintiff had been doing prior to his termination. Defendant argues, however, that


success before filing an age discrimination charge with the EEOC. This lawsuit timely
followed.
II. Discussion

Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists,
the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Neither “the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, nor the
existence of a “metaphysical doubt,” Matsushita Elec, Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

The ADEA bars an employer from discriminating against any individual in the
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of the
individual's older age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Solon v. Gary Community Sch. Corp., 180
F.3d 844, 849 (7th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff in this case has no direct evidence of age
discrimination, but this is not unusual. “Direct evidence, such as an employer
statement that reveals hostility to older workers, is rarely found.” Castleman v. Acme

Boot Co., 959 F.2d 1417, 1420 (7th Cir. 1992). Instead, plaintiff must rely on the

5.


hold due to economic considerations. Plaintiff offers no evidence comparing his past
experience and resume or his actual job responsibilities while employed with defendant
to Morris's or John A.’s past experience or on-the-job responsibilities. In fact, plaintiff
admitted during his deposition that he has no knowledge of either Morris’s or John A.’s
actual qualifications or on-the-job performance at Littlefuse.

Plaintiffs strongest argument is that Morris performed many of plaintiffs tasks
once plaintiff was terminated, but this alone is insufficient to prove that defendant’s
classification of plaintiff as a Class II machine builder and Morris and John A. as Class
III machine-builders was meaningless. Gustovich v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 972
F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding plaintiffs self-serving evaluations of his own
skills insufficient to contradict employer's assessment of employee’s ability); Dale v.
Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986) (“This court does not sit as a
super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.”). Here,
defendant provided evidence that the job of Class ITI machine-builder demands the
ability to execute complex repairs, supervise other employees, and work largely
unsupervised. Defendant also asserts that plaintiff did not possess the level of ability
required by the job of Class III machine builder, while both Morris and John A.
demonstrated that they did. Moreover, defendant provided uncontroverted evidence
that Morris’s performance on the job was “excellent.”

Plaintiff simply has not presented sufficient evidence calling into doubt
defendant's classification of him as a Class II machine builder or of Morris and John

A. as Class III machine builders. Plaintiff has not provided evidence that either Morris

-8-


Minute Order For: (06197)

lige

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judi : 2 Sitting Judge if Oth
ior Magistrate Judge Joan B. Gottschall than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 8475 DATE 9/2/2004
CASE Lewkowicz vs. Littlefuse, Inc.
TITLE

of the motion being presented.

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. Case Terminated.

dl) gf [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

MOTION:
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and motion to strike
DOCKET ENTRY:
(60) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Qo Brief in support of motion due
@) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue_____—.
(4) o Ruling/Hearingon__setfor__at
(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor___at
(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor___—at__—.
) a Trial[set for/re-set for]on__—_at
(8) a (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at.
(9) im) This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
DOFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(i) O FRCP41(a)(2).
(0) +i [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion and order,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Age Discrimination and Employment Act claim
{11-1] is granted. Defendant’s motion to strike [16-1] is granted in part and denied in part. Enter final

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

number of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff. ‘ SEP 0 3 2004

Notified counsel by telephone,

date docketod

X Docketing to mail notices.
X Mail AO 450 form,

Copy to judge/magistrate judge

courtroom yin ' date mailed notion
deputy’s aig
initials —_

,  Date/time-regeiyed in

central Clerkis.Office mailing deputy initials

1g deputy initials

Loereta cea

Document
Number



III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination based
on defendant’s decision to terminate all of its Class IJ machine-builders, including
plaintiff. Therefore, summary judgment is entered in favor of defendant and against

plaintiff on plaintiffs ADEA claim.

ENTER:

Joan 8. Gottschall
nited States District Judge

DATED: September 2, 2004

-10-


these employees are not similarly situated to plaintiff because they are Class III
machine builders while plaintiff held Class II status.

Plaintiff argues that, notwithstanding their different job classifications, he is
similarly situated to Morris and John A. because they all possessed comparable skills
and abilities and performed essentially the same jobs. See Radue v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2000) (considering employees who possessed
analogous attributes, experience, education, and qualifications to be similarly
situated). An employee may prove himself similarly situated to others with different
job titles or positions by showing substantial similarity in job responsibilities,
education, experience, performance, qualifications, and workplace conduct. Zaccagnini
uv. Charles Levy Circulating Co., 338 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003); Radue, 219 F.3d at
618 (“‘[AJn employee need not show complete identity in comparing [himself] to the
better treated employee, but he must show substantial similarity.”).

Even drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, the court cannot
conclude that plaintiff is similarly situated to Morris and John A. Under the burden-
shifting approach, plaintiff carries the burden of producing evidence that he, as a Class
II machine builder, was in fact similarly situated to the Class III machine builders who
were not terminated by defendant in August of 2001. Plaintiffs only evidence in
support of his position are his own averments that he “is capable of rebuilding a part
from a complex blueprint,” that his twenty years of machine-building experience at
other companies is at least as extensive as Morris’s and John A.’s experience, and that

he was told by his supervisors that his promotion to Class III machine builder was on

-7-


classify machine builders, including plaintiff. Plaintiffreceived acceptable performance
reviews from Monday and Adamczyk during his employ with defendant and, pursuant
to his labor contract, earned automatic pay raises.

While plaintiff was employed with defendant, the company posted several new
job openings for Class III machine builder positions. Plaintiff never applied in writing
for any of these openings, and eventually two of the positions were filled by new,
younger hires. On April 17, 2000, defendant hired 40 year-old John Adamezyk (“John
A.” — no relation to supervisor Adamczyk) as a Class III machine builder, and on
November 6, 2000, defendant hired 28 year-old Scott Morris, also as a Class III
machine builder. Plaintiff claims that he made repeated verbal inquiries to his
supervisors about a promotion to Class III before and after these jobs were filled by
Morris and John A., but that his supervisors told him he would have to wait to receive
a promotion to the higher class due to economic considerations.

After a downturn in the economy in 1999, defendant laid off approximately 300
non-union production and office associates company-wide, including 179 at its Des
Plaines facility from February 2001 to October 2001. In August of 2001, defendant
reduced its union maintenance associate workforce for the first time. Plaintiff and
other maintenance associates at Littlefuse are represented by the Tool and Die Local
Lodge 113, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“union”).
The labor contract between defendant and the union provided, in relevant part:

3. Application of Seniority. In all applications of seniority under
this Agreement, where present skill and ability to perform the
available work and physical fitness are relatively equal, seniority

-3-


Defendant Littlefuse is a leading manufacturer of surge protection devices.
Defendant's manufacturing facility in Des Plaines, Illinois, where plaintiff worked,
produces 15 to 20 million fuses per day. In May of 1997 defendant hired plaintiff, then
47 years old, as a tool and machine builder/troubleshooter in defendant's mechanical
maintenance department. At his time of hire and all times thereafter, plaintiff was
designated as a maintenance associate with a Class II skill and pay level, the lowest
of defendant’s three skill classifications for this particular job, and assigned to work
the third shift at defendant’s Des Plaines factory. As a Class II maintenance associate,
plaintiffs job responsibilities at Littlefuse included executing basic maintenance tasks,
such as repairing defective parts in machines and performing minor tooling from
simple blueprints under supervision. In contrast, defendant’s Class III associates were
called upon to execute more significant maintenance tasks with minimal supervision,
such as rebuilding machines and parts from blueprints, and to supervise or mentor
other employees. Defendant typically scheduled its more complex maintenance projects
for its first shift, on which its more highly skilled Class III and VI associates worked.

Beginning in late 1998, Plaintiff was supervised directly by the third shift
foreman, Curtis Monday, and more generally by the molding and fabrication manager,

John Adamczyk. Both supervisors participated in defendant's decisions to hire and

substance of defendant’s allegations, and the responses in paragraphs 56, 57, 64,
71, 75, 78, 79, and 84 are unsupported by the portions of the record cited; therefore,
these responses will be stricken. However, the court finds plaintiffs responses in
paragraphs 21, 36, 38, 59, and 74 to be properly stated, responsive, and supported
by the record; consequently, these responses will not be stricken.

-2-



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
Janusz Lewkowicz, ) poe
) ISEP 03 2004
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 02 C 8475
v. )
) Honorable Joan B. Gottschall
)
Littlefuse, Inc. )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Janusz Lewkowicz brought this action against his former employer,
defendant Littlefuse, Inc. (“Littlefuse”), alleging violations of the Age Discrimination
and Employment Act (“ADEA”), 42 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. Specifically, Plaintiff claims
that he was unlawfully discharged from defendant’s employ during a company-wide
reduction in force (“RIF”) because of his age. Now before the court is defendant's motion
for summary judgement, which, for the reasons that follow, is granted.

I. Backgrounp'

‘The facts contained herein are undisputed and taken from the parties’ own
statements of undisputed facts. Defendant has filed a motion to strike certain of
plaintiff's responses to defendant’s statement of undisputed facts as either
inadequately responsive to defendant’s alleged fact, unsupported by citations to the
record, based solely on plaintiff's personal belief, or contradictory to plaintiffs
discovery responses. This motion is granted in part and denied in part. After
reviewing defendant’s statement of facts against plaintiffs responses, the court
finds that plaintiffs responses in paragraphs 18, 45, and 65 fail to respond to the

“1.

2\