J. S37043/20

NON
- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION
– SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA
v. : : AQUIL JOHNSON, : No. 2478 EDA 2018
: Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 17, 2012,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No. MC

- 51

- MD

- 0003664

- 2012

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 28, 2020
Aquil Jo hnson, pro se , appeals nunc pro tunc from the December 17,
2012 aggregate judgment of sentence of 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment
imposed after the trial court found him guilty of two counts of contempt of

c ourt 1 during his Grazier 2 h earing. This sentence was ordered to run

consecutive to the 121⁄2 to 25

- year sentence appellant is currently serving in
an unrelated matter, at CP

- 51

- CR

- 0005617

- 2009. After ca reful review, we

remand this matter for the limited purpose of allowing the sentencing c ourt to

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(3). As discussed , infra , the sentencing order incorrectly states that appe llant was sentenced pursuant to Section 4137(a)(1).

2 Commonwealth v. Grazier , 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).J. S37043/20

- 2

-

correct a clerical error in the sentencing order , and affirm appellant’s
judgment of sentence in all other respects

. The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this case as follows:

[O]n September 25, 2008, [a]ppellant and his conspirator , Matthew Smith, visited their acquaintance and marijuana dealer, Michael Wilson. Mr. Wilson let the two in through the backdoor of his residence at 6111 Jefferson Street, Philadelphia and welcomed t hem into his living room. While [a]ppellant distracted Mr. Wilson, Mr. Smith positioned himself on t he other side of Mr. Wilson and shot him in the back of the head. Appellant and [Smith] then grabbed a bag of marijuana off of the living room table, laug hed at Mr. Wilson, and left him for dead. Responding officers took Mr. Wilson to the University of Pennsylvania Hospital. He then identified [a]ppellant and Mr. Smith out of a photo array, and consistently identified both of them as his assailants. As a result of their vicious attack, Mr. Wilson suffered dangerous swelling to his brain and had a portion of his skull surgically removed. Appellant wa s arrested later that same day.
On January 11, 2013, a jury sitting before the Honorable Chris R. Wogan convicted [a]ppellant of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and criminal conspiracy. [ 3 ] On March 15, 2013, [a]ppellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 30 [to] 60 years’ incarceration. [ The record reflects tha t o n May 29, 2019, a panel of this court affirmed appellant’s convictions but vacate d appellant’s judgment of sente nce and remanded for resentencing because his sentence s for conspiracy and atte mpted murder should have merged. See Commonwealth v. Johnson , A.3d , 2019 WL 2317695 , at *7 (Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum).]

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § § 901(a), 2702(a) , and 903(a)(1), respectively.J. S37043/20

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- In the lead up to trial, [a]ppellant moved to proceed pro se . At the Grazier hearing on December 17, 2012, [a]ppellant was twice found to be in contempt of court. [The trial court] sentenced [appellant] to 3 [to] 6 months’ incarceration for each finding of contempt, to be served consecutively. On December 24, 2012, [a]ppellant fi led a defective pro se notice of appeal with the wrong docket number and did not later perfect his appeal. Over one and a half years late, [a]ppellant filed a pro se PCRA[ 4 ] [ p ] etition on June 30, 2014. Appointed counsel file d
an [a] mended PCRA [ p ] etitio n on July 20, 2017 and the Commonwealth responded with a [ m ] otion to [ d ] ismiss the PCRA [ p ] etition on October 30, 2017 (docketed November 3, 2017). Appellant filed a second [a] mended PCRA [p] etition on his own behalf on November 13, 2017. On August 16, 2018, the Honorable Sean F. Kennedy ordered [a]ppellant’s direct appeal rights to be reinstated nunc pro tunc

. Trial court opinion, 1/9/20 at 1

- 3 (citations to notes of testimony and original

footnot e omitted).
On August 17, 2018, appellant’s then

- counsel, Zak T. Goldstein, Esq. , filed a timely notice of appeal on appellant’s behalf. Thereafter, on April 18,
2019, appellant filed a motion indicating his desire to proceed pro se , and the

trial court scheduled a Grazier hearing. Following the Grazier hearing,
appellant was granted leave to proceed pro se on September 23, 2019.

A ppellant filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, in
accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), on October 9, 2019. On January 9, 2020,

the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

4 Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA ”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541

- 9546.J. S37043/20

- 4

- I. Was [sic] appellant’s Pennsylvania and United States constitutional rights to due process violated when Judge Wo gan charged, convicted and sentenced the appellant for two counts of contempt of court without any prior notice, an opportunity to be heard or an opportunity to conform his conduct which was required pursuant to In Re Mandell , 414 A.2d 1013 n.7 (Pa.1980)?

II. Was appellant’s Pennsylvania and United States constitutional rights to due process violated where the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) appellant acted with intent to obstruct the proceedings and or (2) that th e administration of justice was “actually and significantly disrupted” by either count of contempt?

III. Was appellant’s Pennsylvania and United States constitutional rights to due process violated when the court failed to reinstate the appellant’s post

- s entence motion rights as requested where, Commonwealth v. Liston , 977 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009)[,] was inapplicable to the appellant where his appeal rights were reinstated due to government interference instead of ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if Li

ston was applicable, [] appellant plead and proved he was entitled to his motion rights back for the same reason he was entitled to his appeal rights back?

IV. Shoul d leave be granted to allow [] appellant to raise his judicial bias claim against [J]udge Wogan in this direct appeal instead of remanding back to the lower court to allow the appellant to file post

- sentence motions to preserve the claim where, further delay in resolution of this case would cause a manifest injustice. If leave is granted to ra ise this claim without having to go back and present it in a post

- sentence motion, the appellant’s is [sic] raising the claim that his rights to due processJ. S37043/20

- 5

- was violated where Judge Wogan showed bias or the potential for bias to [sic] high too [sic] be
con stitutionally tolerable?
Appellant’s brief at 4

- 5 (extraneous capitalization omitted).
Preliminarily, we note that the sentencing order indicates that appellant
was sentenced pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4137(a)(1), which pertains to the

contempt powers of magisterial district judges. However, the court has

indicated on the record that it intended for appellant to be convicted and

sentenced for contempt of court under Section 4132(3), and the wrong statute
noted on the sentencing order was a clerical error

. ( See notes of testimony
( CP

- 5 1

- CR0001587

- 2009), 3/15/13 at 16; trial court opinion, 1/9/20 at 4

- 5. )
Accordingly, we remand this matter for the limited purpose of allowing th e
sentencing court to correct this error. See , e.g. , United States v. James , 642 F.3d 1333, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) ( holding that, “[b]ecause the written
judgment incorrectly states that James was convicted under [21 U.S.C.]
§ 8 41(b)(1)(B)(iii), rather than § 841(b)(1)(C), we remand for the limited
purpose of correcting the clerical error”) , cert. denied , 565 U.S. 958 (2011).

We now turn to the merits of appellant’s claims.

I. Due Process Challenge
Appellant first argues that his due process rights were violated when the

trial court charged, convicted , and sentenced him for two counts of contemptJ. S37043/20

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of court without any prior notice, an opportunity to be heard , or an opportunity

to conform his conduct to court norms. (Appellant’ s brief at 12

- 15.)
Our review of the record reveals that appellant failed to properly raise

this due process challenge before the trial court or otherwise ob ject on this

basis during the December 17, 2012 hearing. Accordingly, appellant’s claim

could be fou nd waived on this basis alone. See Commonwealth v. Allen ,
2015 WL 6957090 , *13 (Pa.Super . 2015) ( unpublished memo ) ; see also
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating, “[i] ssues not raised in the lower court are waived

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”)

. In any event, we find that
appellant’s due process claim lacks arguable merit.
As discussed, ap pellant was convicted of two counts of direct criminal
contempt of court for misconduct that (1) occurred during the course of his

Grazier hearing ; and (2) was personally observed by Judge Wogan. Our
supreme court has long recognized the inherent power of a court to impose
summary punishment for misconduct that occurs in its presence , and that this

power does not of fend our notions of due process:

In Pennsylvania, [t]hi s Court has long upheld a c ourt’ s power to maintain courtroom authority by the imposition of summary punishment for contempt in appropriate cases. [A] summary proceeding to prote ct the orderly administration is perfectly proper[.] .

. . The court must be able to control those appe aring before it, and must be able to use its power summarily to avoid interference with the principal matter before the court

. Summary proceedings for contempt of court are those in which the adjudic ation omits the usual steps of the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings,J. S37043/20

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- taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes wi th a conventional court trial. Thus, the summary contempt power has been upheld against due process at tack s [.]

. . .

. . . .

. . . . Where the contempt is committed directly under the eye or within the vi ew of the court, it may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts, and punish the offender, without further proof, and without issue or trial in any form[.]
Commonwealth v. Moody , 125 A.3d 1, 8 , 11

- 12 ( Pa. 2015) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted ; brackets in original ; emphasis added ).
Based on the foregoing, even if appellant had properly preserved his
due process challenge, we would find no merit to his claim that the trial court

violate d his due process rights by finding him in contempt of court at the

Grazier hearing

.

II. Sufficiency of the E vidence
Appellant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his

convicti ons for criminal contempt of court because “ evidence was insufficient
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) [he] acted with intent to
obstruct the proceedings[, or] (2) that the administration of justice was
actually and significantly disrupted[. ]” (Appellant’s brief at 16.) We disagree.
Our standard of review in assessing whether there was sufficient

evidence to susta in a conviction is well settled:J. S37043/20

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- [W] e must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable do ubt. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Further, the trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Reese , 156 A.3d 1250, 1257

- 1258 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citation omitted), app eal denied , 173 A.3d 1109 (Pa. 2017).
“In reviewing an appeal from a contempt order, we place great reliance
on the discretion of the trial judge. We review the record to determine if the
facts support the trial court’s decision and will reverse the tria l court only if
there is a plain abuse of discretion.” In re Arrington , 214 A.3d 703, 707
(Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Criminal contempt is codified in Section 4132, which provides, in
relevant part, that the courts of the Commonwealth have the power to “impose
summary punishments for contempts of court” in cases where there is “[t]he
misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing
the administration of justice.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(3). Thus, “[t]o sustain a
conviction for direct criminal contempt under [S ection 4132 (3) ], there must
be proof beyond reasonable doubt (1) of misconduct, (2) in the presence of
the court, (3) committed with the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) that

obstructs the administration of justice.” Moody , 125 A.3d at 5 n.4 (citation
omitted).J. S37043/20

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-

Upon review, w e find that there was ample evidence from which the trial
judge could conclude that appellant was guilty of contempt of court . The

evidence establ ished that during the December 17, 2012 Grazier hearing,
appellant repeatedly interrupted Judge W ogan as he was attempting to
conduct the colloquy and failed to listen to instructions from the court

. At one
point during the hearing, Judge Wogan instructed appellant that he “ha[s] to
answer these questions so [the trial court] can determine wheth er [he can ]

represent [ him ] self.” (Notes of testimony, 12/17/12 at 3.) However,
appellant disregard ed Judge Wogan’s warning and continued to voice his
disapproval with both his court

- appointed attorney and the prospect of
representing himself

. ( Id. ) Judge Wogan cautioned appellant that he could
elect to represent himself in this matter or proceed with his current

court

- appointed counsel, but that there was no option to have a new attorney
appointed in this matter. ( Id. at 3

- 4.) This led to the following exchange
whereby appellant again interrupted Judge W ogan’s colloquy and resulted in

hi s being held in contempt of court:

A. But regardless of what you say, even in the courtroom with me, [Attorney Joseph D. Lento’s] not going to represent me whether I keep him or not.
Q. Why isn’t he?

A. Because he’s not going to do what I asked him to do. Like the thing is I want to do my defense and he’s not going to present i t.J. S37043/20

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- Q. Okay. You need to start answering my questions and not go off on a speech.

A. I understand that, Your Honor, but

-- Q. You will not talk about anything else. You’re completely misreading about the law.
You do understand that you have a right to be represented by counsel, correct?

A. Yes.
Q. [Attorney] Lento at this point was appointed to represent you, since you cannot afford an attorney, correct?

A. Yes.
Q. Now, let’s look for a list. This is nu mber one on our list. Here’s what can happen if you

--

A. I’m getting railroaded, that’s what’s happening.
Q. I’m holding you in contempt for disrupting the operations of my courtroom.

Id. at 4

- 5 (emphasis added)

. The record further reflects that Judge Wogan held appellant in contempt

of court a second time after he repeatedly feigned misunderstanding
Judge Wogan’s explanation of the sentencing guidelines in an attempt to delay
and obstruct the operations of the cou rtroom:

Q. All right. Do you understand that if you’re found guilty of attempted murder here, you could be sentenced to 20 to 40 with a pretty substantial fine, do you understand that?

A. No, I don’t understand that.J. S37043/20

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- Q. How come? You don’t understand that the maximum period of incarceration is 40 year [sic] for this and a maximum fine of

--

A. No, I don’t. Can you explain?
Q. Well, it’s pretty simpl e
--

A. Just because I make it to trial, doesn’t mean I’m guilty of those.
Q. That’s considered a trial issue. I don’t know whether you will be found guilty or not that [sic]

. That’s for a jury to decide. If you don’t understand what I’m telling you, it’s very simple. I can send you to prison for 20 to 40 years if you are found g uilty of attempted murder. Do you understand that if you’re found guilty of attempted murder you can serve 20 to 40 years on that. Do you understand that?

A. I don’t understand what’s going on right now.
Q. Okay. What is it that you don’t understand. I’ve explained

--

A. None of this. I don’t understand any of this.
Q. So I take it you withdraw your pro se motion and you’d like to continue with [Attorney] Lento?

A. I never said that. I don’t understand what you’re telling me.
Q. You don’t und erstand the very, very simple statement that if, only if, you’re found guilty, you could be facing up to 40 years for attempted murder[?]

A. I don’t know what’s going on in this courtroom. I don’t. This is my first time in this court room,J. S37043/20

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- first time mee ting you, I don’t understand what’s go [sic] on.
Q. All right. I’m holding you in contempt for obstructing the operations of my courtroom. I sentence you to serve another 3 to 6 months. That’s consecutive to the earlier 3 to 6 months.

Do not lie to me when I’m asking you a very simple question. You most certainly understand that you can get 40 years for attempted murder. Do not lie to me again and delay the operations of this courtroom.

Id. at 5

- 7 (emphasis added)

. Based on the foregoing, we find that there is ample evidence that
appellant acted with the intent to obstruct the trial court ’ s resolution of his

own Grazier hearing, and the administration of justice was actually
obstructed multiple times. See Moody , 125 A.3d at 5 n.4. Accordingly,
appellant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions

for two counts of contempt of court must fail.

III. Reinstatement of Post
- Sentence Motion Rights Nunc Pro Tunc
Appellant next argues that h is due process rights were violated when
the PCRA court failed to automatically reinstate his post

- sen tence motion
rights nunc pro tunc , following the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights

nunc pro tunc , due to alleged “ governmental interference. ” (Appellant’s brief
at 24.) We disagree.J. S37043/20

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-

This court has recognized that the r einstatement of the right to file a
direct appeal does not carry with it the automatic right to file a nunc pro tunc

post

- sentence motion. Liston , 977 A.2d at 1093

- 1094 . On t he contrary, the
PCRA court must expressly grant the right to file a nunc pro tunc

post

- sentence motion. Commonwealth v. Capaldi , 112 A.3d 1242, 1245
(Pa.Super. 2015). To the extent a ppellant challenges t he PCRA court’s failure

to do so , we find that thi s issue is of no matter since we did find any of
appellant’s claims waived based upon his failure to file timely post

- sentence

motions

. On the contrary, appellant waived his due process challenges by
failing to properly raise them before the trial court d uring the December 17,
2012 hearing. 5 See In re Martorano , 346 A.2d 22 ( Pa. 1975) (due process
challenge to contempt proceeding waived because not raised at contempt
hearing).

IV. Judicial Bias
In his final claim, appellant contends that “Judge Wogan showed bias or
the potential for bias to [sic] high t o be constitutionally tolerable ” by “injecting
himself in the accusatory process and expressing a prejudgment of guilt”
during the course of the December 17, 2012 Grazier hearing. (Appellant’ s

5 The Commonwealth has indicated that it is not opposed to a remand to allow appellant the opportunity to file post

- sentence mot ions nunc pro tunc

. ( See Commonwealth’s brief at 16.) In light of our resolution of this issue, however, we decline to do so.J. S37043/20

- 14

-

brief 33

- 35 .) Our review of the record, however, reveals that appellant failed

to properly preserve this claim before the trial court.

It is well settled that “[j] udicial bias may not be raised for the first time
during post

- trial proceedings. ” Crawford v. Crawford , 633 A.2d 155, 160
( Pa.Super. 1993) (citation omitted). On the contrary, a party seeking recusal
or disqualification on the basis of judicial bias or impartiality “must raise the
objection at the earliest possible moment, or that party will suffe r the
consequence of being time barred. ” Commonwealth v. Stafford , 749 A.2d
489, 501 ( Pa.Super. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),
appeal denied , 795 A.2d 975 (Pa. 2000). The failure to timely move for a
judge’s recusal after the facts alleged ly establishing bias come to a
defendant’s attention renders the judicial bias claim waived. See

Commonwealth v. Johnson , 71 9 A.2d 778, 790 (Pa.Super. 1998) , appeal

denied , 739 A.2d 1056 (Pa. 1999).
Instantly, the record reflects that appell ant did not move for recusal of
Judge Wogan

. Because appellant failed to raise hi s claim of judicial bias at
the earliest possi ble opportunity, it is waived. Id. ; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Case remanded for the correction of a

clerical error in the sentencing order

. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Shogan, J. joins this Memorandum.
Nichols, J. concurs in the result.J. S37043/20

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-

Judgment Entered.

J oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 12/28/2020