“the claims arise from the same facts rather than merely from facts
that resemble each other or are causally linked to each other.”
Id. at 901.

Like Horton, the present case involves individual plaintiffs
rather than a class action. However, unlike Horton, no plaintiff
in the existing case has fulfilled the EEOC filing requirements.
The plaintiffs instead rely on the proper filing of a plaintiff in
the Barner class action, from which these claims have been severed.
Nothing in Horton suggests that the Seventh Circuit intended the
“single-filing” doctrine to apply so broadly. In fact, such a
broad application allowing plaintiffs to avoid the administrative
requirements of Title VII runs counter to the Seventh Circuit’s
stated concern for the importance of those requirements. Id. at
899-900. Finally, some questions of law and fact may well overlap
in the plaintiffs’ cases, as all claims arise from personnel cuts
subsequent to the 1995 mayoral election. The differences among the
individual discrimination claims that led to the severing first
from the Barner case and then from each other indicate, however,
that while the facts of each claim may be causally linked they are
not the “same facts.” Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is
denied.

ion

Defendants also move for certification of the September 29

Order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C, § 1292(b). Denial



judicata issue, I found that the verdict in Barner was limited to
a rejection of the class-wide claims, not individual claims,
September 29 Order at 4. Defendants argue that the September 29
Order represents a misapprehension of the law. However, defendants
present no new law or controlling precedent to the contrary. This
court did not err in its interpretation. The statutes of
limitations on plaintiffs’ individual claims of discrimination were
tolled until the decision against the class’ pattern and practice
claims, and the plaintiffs’ individual claims were not precluded,
Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is denied.
B.

Plaintiffs also move for reconsideration of the dismissal of
their Title VII claims for lack of a timely-filed charge with the
EEOC. Plaintiffs argue that the ruling in Horton v. Jackson Cty.
Bd. of Cty. Comm., 343 F.3d 897 (7° Cir. 2003), allows them to rely
on the timely-filed EEOC charge by a plaintiff in Barner to excuse
their own lack of filing. In Horton, the Seventh Circuit explored
the application of the “single-filing” doctrine bheyond class
actions and declined to apply it in a case with only two
complainants. Id. at 900-01. The non-filing individual sought to
intervene in the case of an individual who did fulfill the Ekoc
filing requirements, rather than attempting to file her own,
separate case. Id. at 898. The Seventh Circuit stated in dicta

that the doctrine should at the least be limited to cases where



of a motion to dismiss is not a final decision that is immediately
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Cherry v. Univ. of Wisc. Sys.
Bd. of Regents, 265 F.3d 541, 546 (7 Cir. 2001). However, under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), when I am “of the opinion” that immediate
appeal of an order involving a controlling question of law may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, I
shall so state in writing in such an order, giving the appellate
court discretionary jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal.

Four requirements must be met before I may certify an order
for immediate appeal under § 1292(b). First, there must be a
question of law; second, it must be controlling; third, it must be
contestable; and fourth, its resolution must promise to speed up
the litigation. Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 219
F.3d 674, 675-76 (7'" Cir. 2000). Defendants move for certification
of the question of whether the statute of limitations for class
members’ individual claims of discrimination remain tolled
throughout the liability phase of a pattern or practice class
action, This is a question of law within the meaning of § 1292
because it is “an abstract legal issue” that “the court of appeals
could decide quickly and cleanly without having to study the
record.” Id. at 677. It is controlling because if the statutes of
limitations on the individual claims were not tolled, plaintiffs’
surviving claims here are untimely and must be dismissed. It is

contestable because it appears to be a matter of first impression.



LL

WA bute Onter Fete (0697)

United States District Court, Northern District of Mlinois

N Assi Jud 7 Si uy
nde Magherae tude Elaine E. Bucklo “nan Amipned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 6289 DATE 5/27/2004
CASE Brewton, et al. Vs. City of Harvey, ct al.
TITLE

[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.)

qu)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) Qo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.}

(2) oOo Brief in support of motion due

@) o Answer brief to motiondue___. Reply to answer briefduc__

(4) o Ruling/Hearing on setfor ss at_

(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor at

(6) ao Pretrial conference[held/continued to] (set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor__at_

(7) a Trial[set for/re-set for] on at _

(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued toa

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COPRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) Cl FRCP41(a)(2).

ao (Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order denying both parties’ motions for

reconsideration. Defendants’ motion for certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) is granted. Pretrial order
to be filed by 8/16/04; and response to any motions in limine by 8/30/04. Pretrial conference sct for
9/21/04 at 4:30 p.m. and trial set for 9/27/04 at 9:30 a.m.

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No nolices required, advised in open court,
No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone,

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form, eure, cron

Copy to judgc/magistrate judge.

sA7/2004

MPI

. pers dyte mitt notice
courtrooin ni a

deputy's

Pa MPs
initials

Date/time received in
centsal Clerk's Office niling deputy initials



n

Cf. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for Relief &
Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1007-08 (7'" Cir, 2002). Pinally, this
question could speed up the litigation because resolution of it
could head off protracted, costly litigation. Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d
at 677. I therefore certify my September 29 Order for

interlocutory appeal pursuant to § 1292(b).

ENTER ORDER:

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: May 237" 2004


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GEORGE H, BREWION, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
No. 02 € 6289

Vv.

CITY OF HARVEY and NICHOLAS
GRAVES, individually and in his
official capacity,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants, the City of Harvey and Nicholas Graves, move this
court to reconsider its September 29, 2003 Memorandum Opinion and
Order (“September 29 Order”) with respect to Counts I and II or, in
the alternative, to certify that order for interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C, § 1292(b). Plaintiffs in turn move this court to
reconsider its September 29 Order with respect to Count IIT. For
the reasons set forth below, defendants’ and plaintiffs’ motions
for reconsideration are denied. Defendants’ motion for
certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is granted.

In the September 29 Order, I held that plaintiffs’ claims of
racial discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause
(Count I) and rétaliatory conduct in violation of the First

Amendment (Count JI) were neither precluded nor time~barred. I

also held that plaintiffs’ claims of racial discrimination in

5]


violation of Title VII (Count III) were barred because plaintiffs
had failed to comply with Title VII's EEOC filing requirement.
A.

“Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI
Indus., Ine., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7 Cir. 1996) (quoting Keene
Corp, v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill.
1982), aff'd. 736 F.2d 388 (7 Cir, 1984)), A motion for
reconsideration is not an opportunity to simply reargue a
previously decided issue. Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co,, 224 F.3d
601, 606 (7'" Cir, 2000).

Defendants argue (1) that this court has misapplied existing
law in tolling the individual discrimination claims of putative
class members until an adverse determination was made in the class
action; (2) that the tolling offends class action policy concerns;
and (3) that res judicata bars plaintiffs’ individual claims based
on a pattern or practice theory of discrimination. These arguments
were addressed in the September 29 Order. With respect to the
tolling issue, I specifically held that “{n]ot permitting tolling
of the statute of limitations on individual claims during the
liability phase would frustrate the purposes of the class action
device for the same reasons discussed in Crown, Cork & Seal and

American Pipe.” September 29 Order at 8. With respect to the res