FILED

May 19, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

JANUARY 1997 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

)

 APPELLEE, )

) No. 02-C-01-9604-CR-00112

)

) Shelby County

v. )

) Joseph B. Brown, Jr., Judge

)

) (Sentencing)

CHRISTOPHER A. PRENTISS, )

)

APPELLANT. )

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

Terry D. Smart John Knox Walkup

Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter

371 Carroll Avenue 500 Charlotte Avenue

Memphis, TN 38105 Nashville, TN 37243-0497

Clinton J. Morgan

Assistant Attorney General

450 James Robertson Parkway

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

William L. Gibbons

District Attorney General

201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01

Memphis, TN 38103

John W. Campbell

Assistant District Attorney General

201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01

Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED:_____________________________________

AFFIRMED

Joe B. Jones, Presiding Judge

O P I N I O N
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The appellant, Christopher A. Prentiss, (defendant), was convicted of vehicular

homicide, a Class C felony, leaving the scene of an accident involving death, a Class E

felony, and driving a motor vehicle after revocation of license, following his pleas of guilty

to these offenses. The trial court imposed the following sentences pursuant to the plea

bargain agreement between the State of Tennessee and the defendant: a fine of $500 and

confinement for three (3) years in the Shelby County Correctional Center for vehicular

homicide; confinement for one (1) year in the Shelby County Correctional Center for

leaving the scene of an accident involving death; and a fine of $150 for driving after the

revocation of driver's license. The sentences are to be served concurrently.

 There was no agreement regarding alternative sentencing. A sentencing hearing

was conducted. The trial court refused to impose an alternative sentence. Thus, the

defendant raises the following issues for review:

I. The trial judge erred in not considering sentencing principles

and all relevant facts and circumstances in determining the

manner of service of defendant's sentence[s].

II. Whether the manner of service of the sentence[s] imposed

by the trial court [are] appropriate.

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law

governing the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court the judgment of the

trial court should be affirmed.

The defendant was 28 years of age when he was sentenced. He left school in the

ninth grade. He made an effort to obtain a GED, but he failed the test. He was living with

his parents. He was employed by a farm equipment company in the parts department. He

has a prior conviction for driving without a license.

On the evening of September 24, 1993, the defendant visited his girlfriend in a

trailer park in Millington. When an argument ensued between the defendant and his

girlfriend, the defendant left the trailer at a high rate of speed. Witnesses estimated the

defendant reached a speed of sixty miles per hour in a thirty mile per hour speed zone.

The defendant struck the victim, a child three and one-half years of age. The impact
3

knocked the child approximately 168 feet. The defendant did not stop after striking the

child.

The defendant went to the Millington Police Department approximately two hours

after striking the child. The officers observed that the defendant had been drinking. The

defendant refused to submit to a chemical breath test or field sobriety tests. Two officers

expressed the view the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was not impaired.

The trial court refused to impose an alternative sentence. The court found the

defendant was less than candid when he testified at the sentencing hearing, and

confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offenses. The

court also noted the defendant was not serious regarding the remorse he expressed. The

defendant testified how the incident had affected him. The defendant did not offer to make

restitution.

This Court has conducted a de novo review of the record with a presumption that

the determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d).

Before an accused is entitled to relief, the accused has the burden of overcoming the

presumption of correctness. In this case, the defendant has failed to overcome the

findings of the trial court.

The defendant's lack of candor at the sentencing hearing is sufficient to justify the

denial of an alternative sentence. State v. Chrisman, 885 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tenn. Crim.

App.) per. app. denied (Tenn. 1994); State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1987). In vehicular homicide cases, the avoidance of depreciating the seriousness

of the offenses is a valid consideration. Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its discretion

properly refused to grant an alternative sentence.

_____________________________________________

JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
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CONCUR:

______________________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE

______________________________________ 

 DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE