# Official Journal L 282/2010

| | ISSN 1725-2555
  doi:10.3000/17252555.L_2010.282.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 282 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 5328 October 2010 |

ISSN 1725-2555

doi:10.3000/17252555.L_2010.282.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 282

English edition

Legislation

Volume 5328 October 2010

---

| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Council implementing Regulation (EU) No 964/2010 of 25 October 2010 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in the People’s Republic of China | 1 |
| | * | Council implementing Regulation (EU) No 965/2010 of 25 October 2010 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of sodium gluconate originating in the People’s Republic of China | 24 |
| | * | Commission Regulation (EU) No 966/2010 of 27 October 2010 initiating an investigation concerning the possible circumvention of anti-dumping measures imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China by imports of certain iron or steel fasteners consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not, and making such imports subject to registration | 29 |
| | * | Commission Regulation (EU) No 967/2010 of 27 October 2010 closing the sale provided for in Regulation (EU) No 446/2010 opening the sale of butter by a tendering procedure | 33 |
| | | Commission Regulation (EU) No 968/2010 of 27 October 2010 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables | 34 |
| | | Commission Regulation (EU) No 969/2010 of 27 October 2010 on the issue of licences for importing rice under the tariff quotas opened for the October 2010 subperiod by Regulation (EC) No 327/98 | 36 |
| | | DECISIONS |
| | | 2010/651/EU |
| | * | Commission Decision of 26 October 2010 amending Decision 2010/89/EU as regards the list of certain establishments for meat, fishery products, egg products and coldstores in Romania subjected to transitional measures concerning the application of certain structural requirements
  (notified under document C(2010) 7269)

   (
  1
  ) | 39 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

REGULATIONS

*

Council implementing Regulation (EU) No 964/2010 of 25 October 2010 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in the People’s Republic of China

1

*

Council implementing Regulation (EU) No 965/2010 of 25 October 2010 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of sodium gluconate originating in the People’s Republic of China

24

*

Commission Regulation (EU) No 966/2010 of 27 October 2010 initiating an investigation concerning the possible circumvention of anti-dumping measures imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China by imports of certain iron or steel fasteners consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not, and making such imports subject to registration

29

*

Commission Regulation (EU) No 967/2010 of 27 October 2010 closing the sale provided for in Regulation (EU) No 446/2010 opening the sale of butter by a tendering procedure

33

Commission Regulation (EU) No 968/2010 of 27 October 2010 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

34

Commission Regulation (EU) No 969/2010 of 27 October 2010 on the issue of licences for importing rice under the tariff quotas opened for the October 2010 subperiod by Regulation (EC) No 327/98

36

DECISIONS

2010/651/EU

*

Commission Decision of 26 October 2010 amending Decision 2010/89/EU as regards the list of certain establishments for meat, fishery products, egg products and coldstores in Romania subjected to transitional measures concerning the application of certain structural requirements
  (notified under document C(2010) 7269)

   (
  1
  )

(notified under document C(2010) 7269)

1

39

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.

---

II Non-legislative acts

REGULATIONS

| 28.10.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 282/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 282/1

---

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 964/2010

of 25 October 2010

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain aluminium road wheels originating in the People’s Republic of China

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (1) (‘the basic Regulation’) and in particular Article 9 and 14(3) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal submitted by the European Commission after having consulted the Advisory Committee,

Whereas:

1.   PROVISIONAL MEASURES

PROVISIONAL MEASURES

| (1) | The Commission, by Regulation (EU) No 404/2010 (2) (‘the provisional Regulation’) imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium wheels originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Commission, by Regulation (EU) No 404/2010 (2) (‘the provisional Regulation’) imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium wheels originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’).

2

| (2) | The proceeding was initiated as a result of a complaint lodged on 30 June 2009 by the Association of European Wheel Manufacturers (EUWA) (‘the complainant’) on behalf of producers representing a major proportion, in this case more than 50 % of the total Union production of certain aluminium wheels. The complaint contained evidence of dumping of the said product and of material injury resulting therefrom, which was considered sufficient to justify the initiation of a proceeding. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The proceeding was initiated as a result of a complaint lodged on 30 June 2009 by the Association of European Wheel Manufacturers (EUWA) (‘the complainant’) on behalf of producers representing a major proportion, in this case more than 50 % of the total Union production of certain aluminium wheels. The complaint contained evidence of dumping of the said product and of material injury resulting therefrom, which was considered sufficient to justify the initiation of a proceeding.

2.   SUBSEQUENT PROCEDURE

SUBSEQUENT PROCEDURE

| (3) | Subsequent to the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was decided to impose provisional measures (‘provisional disclosure’), several interested parties made written submissions making known their views on the provisional findings. The parties who so requested were granted the opportunity to be heard. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Subsequent to the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was decided to impose provisional measures (‘provisional disclosure’), several interested parties made written submissions making known their views on the provisional findings. The parties who so requested were granted the opportunity to be heard.

| (4) | The Commission continued to seek information it deemed necessary for its definitive findings. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The Commission continued to seek information it deemed necessary for its definitive findings.

| (5) | It is recalled that, as set out in recital (18) of the provisional Regulation, the investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 (‘the investigation period’ or ‘IP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2006 to the end of the IP (‘the period considered’). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

It is recalled that, as set out in recital (18) of the provisional Regulation, the investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 (‘the investigation period’ or ‘IP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2006 to the end of the IP (‘the period considered’).

| (6) | All parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium wheels originating in the PRC and the definitive collection of the amounts secured by way of the provisional duty. They were also granted a period of time within which they could make representations subsequent to this disclosure. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

All parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium wheels originating in the PRC and the definitive collection of the amounts secured by way of the provisional duty. They were also granted a period of time within which they could make representations subsequent to this disclosure.

| (7) | The oral and written comments submitted by the interested parties were considered and taken into account where appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The oral and written comments submitted by the interested parties were considered and taken into account where appropriate.

2.1.   Scope of investigation. Inclusion of imports from Turkey

Scope of investigation. Inclusion of imports from Turkey

| (8) | One party, representing the interests of exporting producers, claimed that imports of the product concerned from Turkey should be included in the scope of the present investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

One party, representing the interests of exporting producers, claimed that imports of the product concerned from Turkey should be included in the scope of the present investigation.

| (9) | Concerning the non-inclusion in the complaint of imports originating in Turkey, it should be noted that at initiation stage, there was no sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and causal link from this country to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding on such imports. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Concerning the non-inclusion in the complaint of imports originating in Turkey, it should be noted that at initiation stage, there was no sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and causal link from this country to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding on such imports.

| (10) | To the contrary, the complainants submitted information that imports from Turkey of the product concerned were at non-dumped prices (see non-confidential version of the complaint, page 13, point 5, and annex 5.1.a.). |
| --- | --- |

(10)

To the contrary, the complainants submitted information that imports from Turkey of the product concerned were at non-dumped prices (see non-confidential version of the complaint, page 13, point 5, and annex 5.1.a.).

3.   PRODUCT CONCERNED AND THE LIKE PRODUCT

PRODUCT CONCERNED AND THE LIKE PRODUCT

| (11) | Following provisional measures some parties reiterated their arguments concerning differences between the Original Equipment Manufacturer (‘OEM’) and aftermarket (‘AM’) wheels, claiming that the two segments should be treated as two different products. Those parties claimed that OEM wheels should be excluded from the scope of the present investigation because the OEM and AM wheels are produced in accordance with different production processes, have different technical and physical characteristics, different channels of distribution and even different uses. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Following provisional measures some parties reiterated their arguments concerning differences between the Original Equipment Manufacturer (‘OEM’) and aftermarket (‘AM’) wheels, claiming that the two segments should be treated as two different products. Those parties claimed that OEM wheels should be excluded from the scope of the present investigation because the OEM and AM wheels are produced in accordance with different production processes, have different technical and physical characteristics, different channels of distribution and even different uses.

| (12) | It is recalled that, as stated in recital (21) of the provisional Regulation, both AM and OEM wheels can be produced by means of all production processes, in all diameters and weights, with all different types of finishing. OEM and AM wheels share the same physical and technical characteristics and are interchangeable. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

It is recalled that, as stated in recital (21) of the provisional Regulation, both AM and OEM wheels can be produced by means of all production processes, in all diameters and weights, with all different types of finishing. OEM and AM wheels share the same physical and technical characteristics and are interchangeable.

| (13) | Some parties claimed that the ultimate consumer of OEM and AM wheels is different: for OEM it would be the car manufacturer and for AM it would be the car owner. Such an understanding is misguided. Although indeed the OEM wheels are sourced by car makers the use of both OEM and AM wheels is the same: they are fitted on cars and similar vehicles. Hence they have the same ultimate user – the driver. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Some parties claimed that the ultimate consumer of OEM and AM wheels is different: for OEM it would be the car manufacturer and for AM it would be the car owner. Such an understanding is misguided. Although indeed the OEM wheels are sourced by car makers the use of both OEM and AM wheels is the same: they are fitted on cars and similar vehicles. Hence they have the same ultimate user – the driver.

| (14) | The most common argument put forward was that the requirements for OEM wheels differ from those for AM wheels. According to that argument measures should not be imposed on OEM wheels because they are not interchangeable with AM wheels (they are purchased to meet the needs of different product markets and differ in terms of design, quality requirements, investment, production process, prices, and import penetration). |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The most common argument put forward was that the requirements for OEM wheels differ from those for AM wheels. According to that argument measures should not be imposed on OEM wheels because they are not interchangeable with AM wheels (they are purchased to meet the needs of different product markets and differ in terms of design, quality requirements, investment, production process, prices, and import penetration).

| (15) | Another argument was that OEM wheels are produced according to car makers’ specifications while AM wheels are designed and manufactured according to specifications chosen by the wheel manufacturer without taking into account the requirements of a specific car model. Although the AM wheels are not nominally produced according to the specifications provided by the car makers, they will be fitted on different car models. In fact, eventually, they will be fitted on exactly the same car models for which the OEM wheels had been originally produced. The fact that specifications come from different sources cannot be considered as such as a proof of differences in physical and technical characteristics. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Another argument was that OEM wheels are produced according to car makers’ specifications while AM wheels are designed and manufactured according to specifications chosen by the wheel manufacturer without taking into account the requirements of a specific car model. Although the AM wheels are not nominally produced according to the specifications provided by the car makers, they will be fitted on different car models. In fact, eventually, they will be fitted on exactly the same car models for which the OEM wheels had been originally produced. The fact that specifications come from different sources cannot be considered as such as a proof of differences in physical and technical characteristics.

| (16) | Additional information was received from the Union producers and car makers. It confirmed that the same production processes (casting, flow forming, rolling, forging, 2-3 parts wheels) are used for both AM and OEM wheels. They are both produced in all weights and diameters. Inserts, the use of certain types of finishing and heat treatment are applicable to OEM and AM wheels alike. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Additional information was received from the Union producers and car makers. It confirmed that the same production processes (casting, flow forming, rolling, forging, 2-3 parts wheels) are used for both AM and OEM wheels. They are both produced in all weights and diameters. Inserts, the use of certain types of finishing and heat treatment are applicable to OEM and AM wheels alike.

| (17) | Some parties claimed that technical differences between the OEM and AM wheels were reflected in the fact that OEM wheels use primary aluminium whereas in the production of AM wheels aluminium would be often extracted from scrap. The Commission thoroughly analysed those comments. Also, additional information was received from car makers and EU producers. In particular those EU producers which manufacture both OEM and AM wheels attested that both primary aluminium and – although to a limited extent – aluminium extracted from scrap is used in the production of both types of wheels. Additional information collected in the investigation confirmed that the main criterion used to distinguish the type and quality of aluminium used is the percentage of silicium (7 % or 11 %). Both alloys are used for OEM and AM wheels alike. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Some parties claimed that technical differences between the OEM and AM wheels were reflected in the fact that OEM wheels use primary aluminium whereas in the production of AM wheels aluminium would be often extracted from scrap. The Commission thoroughly analysed those comments. Also, additional information was received from car makers and EU producers. In particular those EU producers which manufacture both OEM and AM wheels attested that both primary aluminium and – although to a limited extent – aluminium extracted from scrap is used in the production of both types of wheels. Additional information collected in the investigation confirmed that the main criterion used to distinguish the type and quality of aluminium used is the percentage of silicium (7 % or 11 %). Both alloys are used for OEM and AM wheels alike.

| (18) | Differences in testing requirements are also not as such conclusive that OEM and AM wheels are two different products. It has to be noted that there is no general homogeneous set of requirements for aluminium wheels. Standards change according to producer and country. In the end it is not possible to establish a coherent dividing line between AM and OEM wheels on the basis of standards or requirements. According to the information on file, both OEM and AM wheels are subject to various tests (x-ray tests, chemical tests, leakage test, stress tests, anti-corrosion tests, wheel balancing tests, impact tests, radial endurance tests, bending tests, salt spray tests, CASS-tests (Copper-Accelerated Acetic Salt Spray test). Further, it appears that differences in testing as well as differences in standards are an indication of a dividing line between different Member States rather than between OEM and AM wheels as two different products. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Differences in testing requirements are also not as such conclusive that OEM and AM wheels are two different products. It has to be noted that there is no general homogeneous set of requirements for aluminium wheels. Standards change according to producer and country. In the end it is not possible to establish a coherent dividing line between AM and OEM wheels on the basis of standards or requirements. According to the information on file, both OEM and AM wheels are subject to various tests (x-ray tests, chemical tests, leakage test, stress tests, anti-corrosion tests, wheel balancing tests, impact tests, radial endurance tests, bending tests, salt spray tests, CASS-tests (Copper-Accelerated Acetic Salt Spray test). Further, it appears that differences in testing as well as differences in standards are an indication of a dividing line between different Member States rather than between OEM and AM wheels as two different products.

| (19) | According to the information on file, quality requirements imposed by the car industry lead to a highly standardized product which is easily interchangeable between all producers worldwide. In the AM segment quality requirements can also be laid down by the customers and those wheels also have to meet international and national requirements. Consequently, more stringent requirements or specifications may apply to certain wheels in both segments, meaning that some AM wheels might comply with more stringent standards than OEM wheels. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

According to the information on file, quality requirements imposed by the car industry lead to a highly standardized product which is easily interchangeable between all producers worldwide. In the AM segment quality requirements can also be laid down by the customers and those wheels also have to meet international and national requirements. Consequently, more stringent requirements or specifications may apply to certain wheels in both segments, meaning that some AM wheels might comply with more stringent standards than OEM wheels.

| (20) | The fact that AM wheels are customarily not installed on new cars and that car makers use wheels produced by selected manufacturers under their brand name is a sourcing decision which has no bearing on the conclusion on the interchangeability of OEM and AM wheels. Physically an AM wheel, i.e. a wheel bearing a brand name of a wheel manufacturer, could be installed on a new car. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The fact that AM wheels are customarily not installed on new cars and that car makers use wheels produced by selected manufacturers under their brand name is a sourcing decision which has no bearing on the conclusion on the interchangeability of OEM and AM wheels. Physically an AM wheel, i.e. a wheel bearing a brand name of a wheel manufacturer, could be installed on a new car.

| (21) | These conclusions are confirmed by the fact that car makers also source and sell aftermarket wheels. Some of these are sold under the car maker brand name (Original Equipment Supplier, OES), some under the brand name of the wheel manufacturer. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

These conclusions are confirmed by the fact that car makers also source and sell aftermarket wheels. Some of these are sold under the car maker brand name (Original Equipment Supplier, OES), some under the brand name of the wheel manufacturer.

| (22) | Many comments concerned the requirements imposed by car manufacturers on suppliers of wheels (e.g. evidence of a fully-functioning ISO certified quality management system, assessment of quality performance based on experience from previous projects and delivery and field quality, product specific and project specific risk assessment). However, aluminium road wheels share the same physical, technical and chemical characteristics and uses regardless of imposed requirements which are not pertinent to those characteristics. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Many comments concerned the requirements imposed by car manufacturers on suppliers of wheels (e.g. evidence of a fully-functioning ISO certified quality management system, assessment of quality performance based on experience from previous projects and delivery and field quality, product specific and project specific risk assessment). However, aluminium road wheels share the same physical, technical and chemical characteristics and uses regardless of imposed requirements which are not pertinent to those characteristics.

| (23) | It should finally also be recalled that many wheel manufacturers produce for both segments and OEM and AM wheels are produced on the same production lines. Producers active in one segment can enter the other segment. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

It should finally also be recalled that many wheel manufacturers produce for both segments and OEM and AM wheels are produced on the same production lines. Producers active in one segment can enter the other segment.

| (24) | Finally, some parties argued that OEM and AM wheels should be considered as two different products because they fall under different customs subheadings. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Finally, some parties argued that OEM and AM wheels should be considered as two different products because they fall under different customs subheadings.

| (25) | The current anti-dumping proceeding concerns aluminium road wheels (‘ARWs’) currently falling within CN codes ex 8708 70 10 and ex 8708 70 50. CN code 8708 70 10 concerns road wheels and parts and accessories thereof for industrial assembly. This means that the application of the lower duty rate foreseen therein is subject to the so-called end-use control. The two CN codes are split to indicate the difference in duty rate and to allow for the application of a lower rate for road wheels for industrial assembly. This however does not have any impact on the definition of the product concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The current anti-dumping proceeding concerns aluminium road wheels (‘ARWs’) currently falling within CN codes ex 8708 70 10 and ex 8708 70 50. CN code 8708 70 10 concerns road wheels and parts and accessories thereof for industrial assembly. This means that the application of the lower duty rate foreseen therein is subject to the so-called end-use control. The two CN codes are split to indicate the difference in duty rate and to allow for the application of a lower rate for road wheels for industrial assembly. This however does not have any impact on the definition of the product concerned.

| (26) | In reply to parties comments it has to be noted first that the definition of the product concerned in an anti-dumping proceeding does not refer to product classifications under different customs headings. Hence, a product concerned in an anti-dumping proceeding might encompass different CN codes. In fact such a situation is rather common. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

In reply to parties comments it has to be noted first that the definition of the product concerned in an anti-dumping proceeding does not refer to product classifications under different customs headings. Hence, a product concerned in an anti-dumping proceeding might encompass different CN codes. In fact such a situation is rather common.

| (27) | Secondly, wheels falling under both CN codes are the same. The only difference is the way they are channelled after importation. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Secondly, wheels falling under both CN codes are the same. The only difference is the way they are channelled after importation.

| (28) | Thirdly, it has to be also noted that the volumes of imports under the CN code linked to industrial assembly are less than volumes of OEM imports declared by the cooperating car makers. This appears to imply that OEM wheels have been customs cleared under both CN codes. Given that it therefore seems that car makers import under both CN codes, formal differentiation based on end use would be extremely difficult. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Thirdly, it has to be also noted that the volumes of imports under the CN code linked to industrial assembly are less than volumes of OEM imports declared by the cooperating car makers. This appears to imply that OEM wheels have been customs cleared under both CN codes. Given that it therefore seems that car makers import under both CN codes, formal differentiation based on end use would be extremely difficult.

| (29) | Consequently, the arguments put forward by interested parties are rejected and the conclusions of the provisional Regulation confirmed. OEM and AM wheels are considered to form one single product concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Consequently, the arguments put forward by interested parties are rejected and the conclusions of the provisional Regulation confirmed. OEM and AM wheels are considered to form one single product concerned.

3.1.   Motorcycle and trailer wheels

Motorcycle and trailer wheels

| (30) | The product concerned by the present investigation are ‘aluminium road wheels of the motor vehicles of CN headings 8701 to 8705, whether or not with their accessories and whether or not fitted with tyres, currently falling within CN codes ex 8708 70 10 and ex 8708 70 50 (TARIC codes 8708701010 and 8708705010)’. This definition conforms to the Notice of initiation published on 13 August 2009 and to the complaint at the origin of the case. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The product concerned by the present investigation are ‘aluminium road wheels of the motor vehicles of CN headings 8701 to 8705, whether or not with their accessories and whether or not fitted with tyres, currently falling within CN codes ex 8708 70 10 and ex 8708 70 50 (TARIC codes 8708701010 and 8708705010)’. This definition conforms to the Notice of initiation published on 13 August 2009 and to the complaint at the origin of the case.

| (31) | Parties raised questions as to whether the investigation would also cover motorcycle and trailer wheels. The above mentioned definition implicitly excludes aluminium road wheels for motorcycles of heading 8711 and for trailers of heading 8716 which are in principle classified respectively under headings 8711 and 8716. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Parties raised questions as to whether the investigation would also cover motorcycle and trailer wheels. The above mentioned definition implicitly excludes aluminium road wheels for motorcycles of heading 8711 and for trailers of heading 8716 which are in principle classified respectively under headings 8711 and 8716.

| (32) | Regarding trailer wheels, during the investigation, it was argued that, apart from the CN codes indicated in the Notice of initiation of the proceeding, another code which covers, inter alia, wheels for trailers (CN code 8716 90 90) could be used for imports into the Union to circumvent measures on the product concerned (although it appears that the code is not currently used for that purpose in practice). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Regarding trailer wheels, during the investigation, it was argued that, apart from the CN codes indicated in the Notice of initiation of the proceeding, another code which covers, inter alia, wheels for trailers (CN code 8716 90 90) could be used for imports into the Union to circumvent measures on the product concerned (although it appears that the code is not currently used for that purpose in practice).

| (33) | It was proposed that the present investigation should also cover aluminium wheels falling under CN code 8716 90 90. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

It was proposed that the present investigation should also cover aluminium wheels falling under CN code 8716 90 90.

| (34) | The Commission services informed all parties concerned by means of a note put in the file open for consultation by interested parties advising of the possible inclusion of the other CN code in the proceeding. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The Commission services informed all parties concerned by means of a note put in the file open for consultation by interested parties advising of the possible inclusion of the other CN code in the proceeding.

| (35) | However, as stated above, aluminium wheels which genuinely are intended for trailers and therefore are covered by CN code 8716 90 90, were not covered by the Notice of Initiation. It can therefore not be excluded that certain operators that produce and or trade in such wheels did not come forward in this investigation since they expected that such imports would not be covered, and thus were not aware of the abovementioned note. Under those circumstances, it is not appropriate to include such wheels in the proceeding. On the other hand, since there appears to be an especially high risk of circumvention with the use of the aforementioned CN code, it is appropriate to introduce a TARIC code with which the development of the level of imports of wheels under that code can be precisely monitored. On the basis of Article 14(3) of the basic Regulation, a provision to this effect is included in the operative part of this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

However, as stated above, aluminium wheels which genuinely are intended for trailers and therefore are covered by CN code 8716 90 90, were not covered by the Notice of Initiation. It can therefore not be excluded that certain operators that produce and or trade in such wheels did not come forward in this investigation since they expected that such imports would not be covered, and thus were not aware of the abovementioned note. Under those circumstances, it is not appropriate to include such wheels in the proceeding. On the other hand, since there appears to be an especially high risk of circumvention with the use of the aforementioned CN code, it is appropriate to introduce a TARIC code with which the development of the level of imports of wheels under that code can be precisely monitored. On the basis of Article 14(3) of the basic Regulation, a provision to this effect is included in the operative part of this Regulation.

4.   MARKET ECONOMY TREATMENT (MET), INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT (IT) AND ANALOGUE COUNTRY

MARKET ECONOMY TREATMENT (MET), INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT (IT) AND ANALOGUE COUNTRY

4.1.   Market Economy Treatment (MET)

Market Economy Treatment (MET)

| (36) | All sampled exporting producers contested the provisional findings as set out in recitals (26) to (53) of the Provisional Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

All sampled exporting producers contested the provisional findings as set out in recitals (26) to (53) of the Provisional Regulation.

Criterion 1

Criterion 1

| (37) | First, it has to be underlined that in the PRC, primary aluminium accounts for more than 50 % of the cost of production of an aluminium wheel. Three of the four sampled companies have claimed that the decision to deny MET should be individual and company specific whereas in the present case the Commission, by stating that there is State interference in decisions concerning the acquisition of the main raw material (aluminium) as indicated in recitals (30) to (37) of the provisional Regulation, has denied MET on a general country-wide basis. This argument cannot be accepted; indeed the analysis made by the Commission has been made individually for each sampled producer. It is true the Commission has reached the same conclusion for the four of them but this is due to the fact that there is State interference in the decision making process of each of them as explained in recitals (30) to (37) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission would have not arrived to the same conclusion for any company operating in the PRC showing that it acquires the vast majority of the aluminium alloy it consumes at London Metal Exchange (LME) prices with the usual mechanisms used by any company in the sector established in the rest of the world. If this were to be the case, it would have been possible for this company to be granted MET even if established in the PRC in case of fulfilment of the other Criteria. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

First, it has to be underlined that in the PRC, primary aluminium accounts for more than 50 % of the cost of production of an aluminium wheel. Three of the four sampled companies have claimed that the decision to deny MET should be individual and company specific whereas in the present case the Commission, by stating that there is State interference in decisions concerning the acquisition of the main raw material (aluminium) as indicated in recitals (30) to (37) of the provisional Regulation, has denied MET on a general country-wide basis. This argument cannot be accepted; indeed the analysis made by the Commission has been made individually for each sampled producer. It is true the Commission has reached the same conclusion for the four of them but this is due to the fact that there is State interference in the decision making process of each of them as explained in recitals (30) to (37) of the provisional Regulation. The Commission would have not arrived to the same conclusion for any company operating in the PRC showing that it acquires the vast majority of the aluminium alloy it consumes at London Metal Exchange (LME) prices with the usual mechanisms used by any company in the sector established in the rest of the world. If this were to be the case, it would have been possible for this company to be granted MET even if established in the PRC in case of fulfilment of the other Criteria.

| (38) | Having regard to the above, the conclusions drawn in the said recitals and in recital (48) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Having regard to the above, the conclusions drawn in the said recitals and in recital (48) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

| (39) | Concerning State interference in other business decisions, none of the three groups referred to in recital (38) of the provisional Regulation has provided additional evidence that could allow arriving to different conclusions. In particular, it has been argued that that the judgement of the General Court in case Zheijiang Xinan v Council (3) provides that ‘the concept of’ significant State interference ‘cannot be assimilated to just any influence on the activities of an undertaking or to just any involvement in its decision-making process, but must be understood as meaning action by the State which is such as to render the undertaking’s decisions incompatible with market economy conditions’. Having regard to this judgement, exporters claim that the European Institutions should apply it and analyze in detail whether the actions taken by the State when running the company are incompatible with market economy conditions. In this respect, it has to be pointed out that the said judgement is presently under appeal. Therefore, the said judgement of the General Court shall take effect only as from the date of decision on the appeal. Consequently, the Institutions are in a position to maintain that State interference found in the present case is sufficient to conclude that Criterion 1 is not fulfilled. Having regard to the above, the conclusions of recital (38) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Concerning State interference in other business decisions, none of the three groups referred to in recital (38) of the provisional Regulation has provided additional evidence that could allow arriving to different conclusions. In particular, it has been argued that that the judgement of the General Court in case Zheijiang Xinan v Council (3) provides that ‘the concept of’ significant State interference ‘cannot be assimilated to just any influence on the activities of an undertaking or to just any involvement in its decision-making process, but must be understood as meaning action by the State which is such as to render the undertaking’s decisions incompatible with market economy conditions’. Having regard to this judgement, exporters claim that the European Institutions should apply it and analyze in detail whether the actions taken by the State when running the company are incompatible with market economy conditions. In this respect, it has to be pointed out that the said judgement is presently under appeal. Therefore, the said judgement of the General Court shall take effect only as from the date of decision on the appeal. Consequently, the Institutions are in a position to maintain that State interference found in the present case is sufficient to conclude that Criterion 1 is not fulfilled. Having regard to the above, the conclusions of recital (38) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

3

Criterion 2

Criterion 2

| (40) | None of the two groups which, according to the conclusions reached at provisional stage, did not comply with the requirements of Criterion 2 has contested these provisional conclusions. It is therefore confirmed, as indicated in recitals (39) and (49) of the provisional Regulation that two of the sampled groups do not have their respective accounts prepared and audited in line with International Accounting Standards. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

None of the two groups which, according to the conclusions reached at provisional stage, did not comply with the requirements of Criterion 2 has contested these provisional conclusions. It is therefore confirmed, as indicated in recitals (39) and (49) of the provisional Regulation that two of the sampled groups do not have their respective accounts prepared and audited in line with International Accounting Standards.

Criterion 3

Criterion 3

| (41) | It has been claimed by Baoding Lizhong group that Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation explicitly requires that the distortions are caused by the former non-market economy system; the group claimed that since it would have allegedly always operated as privately-held group, distortions cannot be the result of the ‘former’ non-market economy system as the group never operated as State-owned companies. The argument cannot be accepted. As established in the present case, production costs and financial situation of companies can be subject to significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system regardless if a company has operated as a Sate-owned company or not. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

It has been claimed by Baoding Lizhong group that Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation explicitly requires that the distortions are caused by the former non-market economy system; the group claimed that since it would have allegedly always operated as privately-held group, distortions cannot be the result of the ‘former’ non-market economy system as the group never operated as State-owned companies. The argument cannot be accepted. As established in the present case, production costs and financial situation of companies can be subject to significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system regardless if a company has operated as a Sate-owned company or not.

| (42) | In addition, Baoding Lizhong group, YHI Manufacturing (Shanghai) Co. Ltd and CITIC Dicastal reiterated the arguments already put forward before the adoption of the provisional Regulation and insisted on the fact that the advantages enjoyed by the companies are not significant. However, as explained in recital (50) of the provisional Regulation, the investigation revealed that distortions on the financial situation of the groups were significant. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

In addition, Baoding Lizhong group, YHI Manufacturing (Shanghai) Co. Ltd and CITIC Dicastal reiterated the arguments already put forward before the adoption of the provisional Regulation and insisted on the fact that the advantages enjoyed by the companies are not significant. However, as explained in recital (50) of the provisional Regulation, the investigation revealed that distortions on the financial situation of the groups were significant.

| (43) | Furthermore, YHI Manufacturing (Shanghai) Co. Ltd has put forward that tax exemptions granted to foreign companies do not represent a specific subsidy and, according to the WTO case law concerning countervailing measures the burden of proof of specificity is with the investigating authorities (4). In its submission, YHI Manufacturing (Shanghai) Co. Ltd also refers to Article 4(5) of the Anti-Subsidy basic Regulation (5) which states that ‘any determination of specificity (...) shall be clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence’. The company mentions as well Article 4.2(b) of the Anti-Subsidy basic Regulation (objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility of a subsidy implicating the specificity does not exist) and Article 10 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures defining a countervailing duty as ‘a duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production or export of a merchandise’. Finally, YHI Manufacturing (Shanghai) Co. Ltd suggests that ‘if the Commission Services want to offset subsidies provided by the by the Chinese government, the proper process to do so is through an anti-subsidy investigation’. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Furthermore, YHI Manufacturing (Shanghai) Co. Ltd has put forward that tax exemptions granted to foreign companies do not represent a specific subsidy and, according to the WTO case law concerning countervailing measures the burden of proof of specificity is with the investigating authorities (4). In its submission, YHI Manufacturing (Shanghai) Co. Ltd also refers to Article 4(5) of the Anti-Subsidy basic Regulation (5) which states that ‘any determination of specificity (...) shall be clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence’. The company mentions as well Article 4.2(b) of the Anti-Subsidy basic Regulation (objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility of a subsidy implicating the specificity does not exist) and Article 10 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures defining a countervailing duty as ‘a duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production or export of a merchandise’. Finally, YHI Manufacturing (Shanghai) Co. Ltd suggests that ‘if the Commission Services want to offset subsidies provided by the by the Chinese government, the proper process to do so is through an anti-subsidy investigation’.

4

5

| (44) | Concerning this interpretation of the anti-dumping legislation, it must be said that it is not correct since the criteria of the Anti-Subsidy basic Regulation cannot be applied in the context of a MET analysis. The basic Anti-dumping Regulation provides for the examination of whether the production costs and financial situation of firms are not subject to significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system and, as stated above, actions that imply the involvement of the State in shaping the business environment through measures that are typical of a non-market economy should be considered as a State influence carried over from the former non-market economy system. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

Concerning this interpretation of the anti-dumping legislation, it must be said that it is not correct since the criteria of the Anti-Subsidy basic Regulation cannot be applied in the context of a MET analysis. The basic Anti-dumping Regulation provides for the examination of whether the production costs and financial situation of firms are not subject to significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system and, as stated above, actions that imply the involvement of the State in shaping the business environment through measures that are typical of a non-market economy should be considered as a State influence carried over from the former non-market economy system.

| (45) | Having regard to the above, the conclusions of recitals (40) to (44) and (50) to (52) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Having regard to the above, the conclusions of recitals (40) to (44) and (50) to (52) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

Other considerations

Other considerations

| (46) | Exporters have reiterated their claims addressed in recitals (46) – (47) of the provisional Regulation that, pursuant to Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation, determination whether the producers meet the criteria to be granted MET shall be made within three months of the initiation of the investigation whereas, in the present case, this determination was made beyond this three months deadline. To support their argument exporters quoted the judgement of the General Court in Case T-299/05 (6). In particular, exporters have put forward that, by the time of the sending of the disclosure on MET, the Commission had received all the answers to the anti-dumping questionnaires sent to exporters as well as the answers to the questionnaires sent to the companies established in the analogue country, therefore, being in possession of the data contained in the answers to these questionnaires, the Commission services had all the information necessary to calculate the dumping margin under the regular methodology and under the analogue country methodology. The exporters arrive then to the conclusion that, as such, the Commission was in a position to know what the effect of its MET decision would be in terms of the calculation of the dumping margin. Having regard to the above, exporters do not exclude that the MET decision was taken on the basis of the effects on dumping. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Exporters have reiterated their claims addressed in recitals (46) – (47) of the provisional Regulation that, pursuant to Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation, determination whether the producers meet the criteria to be granted MET shall be made within three months of the initiation of the investigation whereas, in the present case, this determination was made beyond this three months deadline. To support their argument exporters quoted the judgement of the General Court in Case T-299/05 (6). In particular, exporters have put forward that, by the time of the sending of the disclosure on MET, the Commission had received all the answers to the anti-dumping questionnaires sent to exporters as well as the answers to the questionnaires sent to the companies established in the analogue country, therefore, being in possession of the data contained in the answers to these questionnaires, the Commission services had all the information necessary to calculate the dumping margin under the regular methodology and under the analogue country methodology. The exporters arrive then to the conclusion that, as such, the Commission was in a position to know what the effect of its MET decision would be in terms of the calculation of the dumping margin. Having regard to the above, exporters do not exclude that the MET decision was taken on the basis of the effects on dumping.

6

| (47) | This argument cannot be accepted. First, contrary to what it has been stated, by the time of the sending of the disclosure on MET, the Commission did not have all the information necessary to calculate the dumping margin. Indeed, in the circumstances of the present case, the information contained in the answers to the anti-dumping questionnaires and in the questionnaires sent to the companies established in the analogue country was neither complete nor correct and therefore the Commission was not in a position to calculate the dumping margins at that moment. Indeed, verification visits had to be carried out to gather information and data which were necessary to make an accurate calculation of the dumping margins. These visits only started to take place more than two weeks after the sending of the disclosure on MET. Therefore, in the absence of data obtained during the verification visits, it was materially impossible for the Commission to make dumping calculations before the sending of the disclosure on MET and take MET decision on the basis of the effects on dumping. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

This argument cannot be accepted. First, contrary to what it has been stated, by the time of the sending of the disclosure on MET, the Commission did not have all the information necessary to calculate the dumping margin. Indeed, in the circumstances of the present case, the information contained in the answers to the anti-dumping questionnaires and in the questionnaires sent to the companies established in the analogue country was neither complete nor correct and therefore the Commission was not in a position to calculate the dumping margins at that moment. Indeed, verification visits had to be carried out to gather information and data which were necessary to make an accurate calculation of the dumping margins. These visits only started to take place more than two weeks after the sending of the disclosure on MET. Therefore, in the absence of data obtained during the verification visits, it was materially impossible for the Commission to make dumping calculations before the sending of the disclosure on MET and take MET decision on the basis of the effects on dumping.

| (48) | Second, the exporters have not presented any evidence to demonstrate that the decision with regard to MET would have been different had it been adopted within the three moths period. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

Second, the exporters have not presented any evidence to demonstrate that the decision with regard to MET would have been different had it been adopted within the three moths period.

4.2.   Conclusion

Conclusion

| (49) | The finding that all companies that had requested MET should be denied MET, as established in recital (53) of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The finding that all companies that had requested MET should be denied MET, as established in recital (53) of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed.

4.3.   Individual treatment (IT)

Individual treatment (IT)

| (50) | Both sampled groups which were provisionally denied IT due to state interference which was found to be such as to permit circumvention of measures if individual exporters are given different rates contested the provisional finding as set out in recital (55) of the provisional Regulation. Baoding Lizhong claims that there is no State interference and it also puts forward that from the wording of Article 9(5)(c) and (e) it does not suffice that there is some State interference for IT to be refused and that the explicit wording of Article 9(5) allows that there is some State interference and still to grant IT provided that there is still sufficient independence from the State and that the State interference is not such as to permit circumvention. This would only be the case if State officials were holding a majority of key functions and could interfere with daily business decisions. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Both sampled groups which were provisionally denied IT due to state interference which was found to be such as to permit circumvention of measures if individual exporters are given different rates contested the provisional finding as set out in recital (55) of the provisional Regulation. Baoding Lizhong claims that there is no State interference and it also puts forward that from the wording of Article 9(5)(c) and (e) it does not suffice that there is some State interference for IT to be refused and that the explicit wording of Article 9(5) allows that there is some State interference and still to grant IT provided that there is still sufficient independence from the State and that the State interference is not such as to permit circumvention. This would only be the case if State officials were holding a majority of key functions and could interfere with daily business decisions.

| (51) | The second group claimed that the majority of its shares belongs to private persons and the risk of circumvention is non-existing because the group supplies exclusively car makers in the OEM market and for each wheel model the contract with a car-maker stipulates specifically the production site which is audited prior to, as well as in the course of the life of the contract. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

The second group claimed that the majority of its shares belongs to private persons and the risk of circumvention is non-existing because the group supplies exclusively car makers in the OEM market and for each wheel model the contract with a car-maker stipulates specifically the production site which is audited prior to, as well as in the course of the life of the contract.

| (52) | Regarding the claims made by Baoding Lizhong, the risk of circumvention has been re-examined. Indeed, the State interference is not such as to permit circumvention. Accordingly, IT can be granted to Baoding Lizhong. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Regarding the claims made by Baoding Lizhong, the risk of circumvention has been re-examined. Indeed, the State interference is not such as to permit circumvention. Accordingly, IT can be granted to Baoding Lizhong.

| (53) | As regards CITIC Dicastal, it is a State-owned company directly controlled by the State (the majority of its shares belong to the State). The State interference is such that it permits circumvention of measures if it obtains a different rate of duty. In other words, production of other State-controlled companies could be re-directed through CITIC Dicastal. Concerning the other argument put forward by CITIC Dicastal, the fact that it supplies exclusively car makers in the OEM market does not prevent it from supplying to other clients in the future. It can therefore be concluded that CITIC Dicastal should be denied IT. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

As regards CITIC Dicastal, it is a State-owned company directly controlled by the State (the majority of its shares belong to the State). The State interference is such that it permits circumvention of measures if it obtains a different rate of duty. In other words, production of other State-controlled companies could be re-directed through CITIC Dicastal. Concerning the other argument put forward by CITIC Dicastal, the fact that it supplies exclusively car makers in the OEM market does not prevent it from supplying to other clients in the future. It can therefore be concluded that CITIC Dicastal should be denied IT.

4.4.   Analogue country

Analogue country

| (54) | A number of interested parties have contested the choice of Turkey as analogue country. Their arguments cannot be accepted: first, because comments arrived well beyond the legal deadline to submit comments on the choice of the analogue country (the deadline expired on 24 August 2009) and second, because they cannot be taken into consideration from a substantial point of view. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

A number of interested parties have contested the choice of Turkey as analogue country. Their arguments cannot be accepted: first, because comments arrived well beyond the legal deadline to submit comments on the choice of the analogue country (the deadline expired on 24 August 2009) and second, because they cannot be taken into consideration from a substantial point of view.

| (55) | The arguments can be summarized as follows:






  1. | One of the cooperating companies in Turkey (Hayes Lemmerz) is related to an EU producer and both cooperating companies are members of EUWA (the association representing European producers which has submitted the complaint). This cannot be accepted. Indeed, the fact that one of the companies in the Analogue country is related to an EU company and that both companies are members of the same association as the complainants cannot be considered a relevant criteria to exclude Turkey as analogue country given that the criteria to be taken into account when analysing the appropriateness of an analogue country have to be based exclusively on facts such as the degree of competition in the domestic market of the analogue country and the non-existence of significant differences in the production process between producers in the analogue country and the Non-Market-Economy exporter. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(55)

The arguments can be summarized as follows:

1.

One of the cooperating companies in Turkey (Hayes Lemmerz) is related to an EU producer and both cooperating companies are members of EUWA (the association representing European producers which has submitted the complaint). This cannot be accepted. Indeed, the fact that one of the companies in the Analogue country is related to an EU company and that both companies are members of the same association as the complainants cannot be considered a relevant criteria to exclude Turkey as analogue country given that the criteria to be taken into account when analysing the appropriateness of an analogue country have to be based exclusively on facts such as the degree of competition in the domestic market of the analogue country and the non-existence of significant differences in the production process between producers in the analogue country and the Non-Market-Economy exporter.

| 2. | It has also been argued that the production process in China is not comparable to Turkey because Chinese companies have access to cheaper raw material. This claim cannot be taken into account. On the one hand, access to cheaper aluminium is due to a distortion on prices caused by State interference. As explained above, the PRC benefits from a unique world position in terms of access to the cheapest possible prices for raw materials and no comparable situation can be found in other countries. On the other hand, the investigation has shown that the production process is practically identical in China and in Turkey. |
| --- | --- |

2.

It has also been argued that the production process in China is not comparable to Turkey because Chinese companies have access to cheaper raw material. This claim cannot be taken into account. On the one hand, access to cheaper aluminium is due to a distortion on prices caused by State interference. As explained above, the PRC benefits from a unique world position in terms of access to the cheapest possible prices for raw materials and no comparable situation can be found in other countries. On the other hand, the investigation has shown that the production process is practically identical in China and in Turkey.

| 3. | Finally, it has been claimed that there is insufficient competition at domestic level because domestic production is mainly used for exports and there are entry barriers to imports from outside the EU. These claims cannot be taken into consideration. Indeed, the EU market is much more than six times larger than the Turkish market and there are no barriers to entry; it is therefore reasonable that Turkey sends to the EU a significant part of its production. Moreover, there is sufficient competition in the domestic Turkish market because there are at least five domestic producers and there are not barriers to imports from the EU. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Finally, it has been claimed that there is insufficient competition at domestic level because domestic production is mainly used for exports and there are entry barriers to imports from outside the EU. These claims cannot be taken into consideration. Indeed, the EU market is much more than six times larger than the Turkish market and there are no barriers to entry; it is therefore reasonable that Turkey sends to the EU a significant part of its production. Moreover, there is sufficient competition in the domestic Turkish market because there are at least five domestic producers and there are not barriers to imports from the EU.

| (56) | Having regard to the above, the provisional conclusion that Turkey is an appropriate and reasonable analogue country, as set out in recital (63) of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Having regard to the above, the provisional conclusion that Turkey is an appropriate and reasonable analogue country, as set out in recital (63) of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed.

4.5.   Dumping

Dumping

4.5.1.   Calculation

Calculation

| (57) | Two exporting producers have contested the provisional findings as set out in recitals (57) to (77) of the provisional Regulation. It has been claimed that, according to Article 2(11) of the basic Anti-dumping regulation, dumping calculations should be based on ‘all export transactions to the Community’; in other words, they consider that 100 % of the transactions should be taken into consideration when calculating dumping margins. It has been also argued that the most expensive transactions, in particular for one of the companies investigated, have not been taken into account when calculating dumping margins. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

Two exporting producers have contested the provisional findings as set out in recitals (57) to (77) of the provisional Regulation. It has been claimed that, according to Article 2(11) of the basic Anti-dumping regulation, dumping calculations should be based on ‘all export transactions to the Community’; in other words, they consider that 100 % of the transactions should be taken into consideration when calculating dumping margins. It has been also argued that the most expensive transactions, in particular for one of the companies investigated, have not been taken into account when calculating dumping margins.

| (58) | In relation to the argument regarding the number of transactions to be taken into account, it has to be pointed out that Article 2(11) of the basic Anti-dumping Regulation establishes that dumping calculations should be based on ‘all export transactions to the Community’ but they should be ‘Subject to the relevant provisions governing fair comparison’. This means that, if it is impossible to reach a reasonable matching for 100 % of the products, it will not be possible to take into account 100 % of the export transactions. This is considered reasonable provided the calculations are based on a sufficiently large percentage of total export transactions. In the present case, around 85 % of the transactions were taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In relation to the argument regarding the number of transactions to be taken into account, it has to be pointed out that Article 2(11) of the basic Anti-dumping Regulation establishes that dumping calculations should be based on ‘all export transactions to the Community’ but they should be ‘Subject to the relevant provisions governing fair comparison’. This means that, if it is impossible to reach a reasonable matching for 100 % of the products, it will not be possible to take into account 100 % of the export transactions. This is considered reasonable provided the calculations are based on a sufficiently large percentage of total export transactions. In the present case, around 85 % of the transactions were taken into account.

| (59) | Concerning the claim that the most expensive transactions have not taken into account, a new dumping calculation has been made in order to take them into consideration. An additional number of product types have been added to the ones used for the calculation made at provisional level. This has allowed to include in the calculations as many transactions as possible, also ensuring that the weighted average unit price of all export transactions per exporting company is as close as possible to the weighted average unit price of export transactions (of this company) which has been used to calculate the dumping margin. In this way, the value of all export transactions, even the most expensive ones, has been considered. Normal values for these additional product types have been calculated following the methodology explained in recital (70) of the provisional Regulation. With this new calculation dumping margins have decreased in particular for YHI. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Concerning the claim that the most expensive transactions have not taken into account, a new dumping calculation has been made in order to take them into consideration. An additional number of product types have been added to the ones used for the calculation made at provisional level. This has allowed to include in the calculations as many transactions as possible, also ensuring that the weighted average unit price of all export transactions per exporting company is as close as possible to the weighted average unit price of export transactions (of this company) which has been used to calculate the dumping margin. In this way, the value of all export transactions, even the most expensive ones, has been considered. Normal values for these additional product types have been calculated following the methodology explained in recital (70) of the provisional Regulation. With this new calculation dumping margins have decreased in particular for YHI.

| (60) | The methodology followed for the determination of Normal Value, Export Price and Comparison is the same as the one described in recitals (64) to (75) of the provisional Regulation. The only changes for the new calculations concern the increase of the number of transactions taken into account and the consideration that the average price of the export transactions used for the calculation of dumping for any given company should not be substantially different from the average export price of all transactions of this company. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The methodology followed for the determination of Normal Value, Export Price and Comparison is the same as the one described in recitals (64) to (75) of the provisional Regulation. The only changes for the new calculations concern the increase of the number of transactions taken into account and the consideration that the average price of the export transactions used for the calculation of dumping for any given company should not be substantially different from the average export price of all transactions of this company.

| (61) | It has been claimed that the analysis of the Commission does not take into consideration the evolution of exchange rates, in particular the appreciation of the American Dollar over the Euro, and of costs of primary aluminium and international freight. This allegation is not grounded, as the Commission services, according to their practices, have included all types of verifiable costs in their analysis of the market of the product concerned during the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

It has been claimed that the analysis of the Commission does not take into consideration the evolution of exchange rates, in particular the appreciation of the American Dollar over the Euro, and of costs of primary aluminium and international freight. This allegation is not grounded, as the Commission services, according to their practices, have included all types of verifiable costs in their analysis of the market of the product concerned during the IP.

| (62) | The Chinese producer YHI claimed that the computation of allowances in its individual dumping calculation was inaccurate. The Commission accepted this claim and performed a new calculation, which gave a dumping margin result of 23,81 %, i.e. 2,14 % less than what previously calculated. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The Chinese producer YHI claimed that the computation of allowances in its individual dumping calculation was inaccurate. The Commission accepted this claim and performed a new calculation, which gave a dumping margin result of 23,81 %, i.e. 2,14 % less than what previously calculated.

4.5.2.   Definitive dumping margins

Definitive dumping margins

| Company | Definitive dumping margin |
| --- | --- |
| YHI Manufacturing (Shanghai) Co. Ltd | 23,81  % |
| Zhejiang Wanfeng Auto Wheel Co. Ltd | 60,29  % |
| Baoding Lizhong | 67,66  % |
| Other cooperating companies | 44,23  % |
| All other companies | 67,66  % |

Company

Definitive dumping margin

YHI Manufacturing (Shanghai) Co. Ltd

23,81  %

Zhejiang Wanfeng Auto Wheel Co. Ltd

60,29  %

Baoding Lizhong

67,66  %

Other cooperating companies

44,23  %

All other companies

67,66  %

5.   INJURY

INJURY

| (63) | The Commission received comments on the provisional findings concerning injury. Some of those comments were a repetition of comments already addressed in the provisional Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The Commission received comments on the provisional findings concerning injury. Some of those comments were a repetition of comments already addressed in the provisional Regulation.

| (64) | Arguments already addressed in the provisional Regulation are not repeated in this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Arguments already addressed in the provisional Regulation are not repeated in this Regulation.

5.1.   Imports from the PRC

Imports from the PRC

| (65) | Parties claimed that the methodology of calculating imports has not been sufficiently explained. Those criticisms, however, have not been substantiated. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Parties claimed that the methodology of calculating imports has not been sufficiently explained. Those criticisms, however, have not been substantiated.

| (66) | It is recalled that at the provisional stage the methodology was based on the complaint but cross-checked with other sources (data provided by cooperating producers, users, exporters). In view of parties’ comments these data have been analyzed once again and the provisional conclusions are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

It is recalled that at the provisional stage the methodology was based on the complaint but cross-checked with other sources (data provided by cooperating producers, users, exporters). In view of parties’ comments these data have been analyzed once again and the provisional conclusions are hereby confirmed.

| (67) | It is recalled that three notes providing detailed information on methods of calculation of production, imports and sales were included in the file open for consultation by interested parties on the day of publication of provisional Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

It is recalled that three notes providing detailed information on methods of calculation of production, imports and sales were included in the file open for consultation by interested parties on the day of publication of provisional Regulation.

| (68) | Because the CN codes covered by the present investigation contain also other products than the product concerned, most of the comments concerned the methodology used by the Commission to exclude product non-concerned from the volumes reported. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Because the CN codes covered by the present investigation contain also other products than the product concerned, most of the comments concerned the methodology used by the Commission to exclude product non-concerned from the volumes reported.

| (69) | CN code 8708 70 50 covers aluminium wheels and parts and accessories thereof, of aluminium. Corresponding data were extracted in tonnes from Comext without any further adjustment at this stage, assuming, as suggested in the complaint, that parts and accessories are of minor importance. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

CN code 8708 70 50 covers aluminium wheels and parts and accessories thereof, of aluminium. Corresponding data were extracted in tonnes from Comext without any further adjustment at this stage, assuming, as suggested in the complaint, that parts and accessories are of minor importance.

| (70) | CN code 8708 70 10 covers, inter alia, aluminium wheels and parts and accessories thereof, of aluminium. Here also, corresponding data extracted in tonnes from Comext were duly adjusted in accordance with the methodology described in the complaint. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

CN code 8708 70 10 covers, inter alia, aluminium wheels and parts and accessories thereof, of aluminium. Here also, corresponding data extracted in tonnes from Comext were duly adjusted in accordance with the methodology described in the complaint.

| (71) | Comments submitted by parties were in great part critical of this approach without however suggesting a more suitable or reliable alternative. The criticisms related mainly to the fact that parties, unaware of which method the Commission was about to apply could not comment. It is recalled that the non-confidential version of the complaint, setting out in a detailed manner the exclusion methodology, was available in the non-confidential file as from the initiation of the proceeding. The Commission cross checked the data provided in the complaint and could not establish anything that would undermine the reasonableness of the method chosen. Further, in view of the fact that parties did not propose an alternative method of exclusion, their comments were considered as unsubstantiated. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

Comments submitted by parties were in great part critical of this approach without however suggesting a more suitable or reliable alternative. The criticisms related mainly to the fact that parties, unaware of which method the Commission was about to apply could not comment. It is recalled that the non-confidential version of the complaint, setting out in a detailed manner the exclusion methodology, was available in the non-confidential file as from the initiation of the proceeding. The Commission cross checked the data provided in the complaint and could not establish anything that would undermine the reasonableness of the method chosen. Further, in view of the fact that parties did not propose an alternative method of exclusion, their comments were considered as unsubstantiated.

| (72) | A second set of comments related to the method of conversion of volumes initially expressed in tonnes into units for the two CN codes. Here again the Commission followed the method suggested in the complaint and subsequently corroborated by the questionnaire replies of Chinese exporters. Such methodology suggests that the average weight per unit imported from China is around 9 kg per wheel. The unit weight of products imported from other third countries has been estimated at around 10 kg per unit in accordance with the complaint but cross checked with available information received during the present investigation from different parties. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

A second set of comments related to the method of conversion of volumes initially expressed in tonnes into units for the two CN codes. Here again the Commission followed the method suggested in the complaint and subsequently corroborated by the questionnaire replies of Chinese exporters. Such methodology suggests that the average weight per unit imported from China is around 9 kg per wheel. The unit weight of products imported from other third countries has been estimated at around 10 kg per unit in accordance with the complaint but cross checked with available information received during the present investigation from different parties.

| (73) | In their post-provisional submissions parties claimed that 10 instead of 9 kg should be used as an average weight as this would be the average weight of imported OEM wheels. As specified in the provisional Regulation, the average weight of 9 kg has been based on data provided by the sampled exporting producers. Therefore it is concluded that it is the most reasonable method of conversion reflecting the average weight of Chinese imports. In any case, conversion based on 10 kg for OEM wheels showed that there would be no impact on final conclusions. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

In their post-provisional submissions parties claimed that 10 instead of 9 kg should be used as an average weight as this would be the average weight of imported OEM wheels. As specified in the provisional Regulation, the average weight of 9 kg has been based on data provided by the sampled exporting producers. Therefore it is concluded that it is the most reasonable method of conversion reflecting the average weight of Chinese imports. In any case, conversion based on 10 kg for OEM wheels showed that there would be no impact on final conclusions.

| (74) | The conclusions in recitals (86) to (88) in the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The conclusions in recitals (86) to (88) in the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

5.1.1.   Volume and prices of imports from the PRC

Volume and prices of imports from the PRC

| (75) | The conclusions drawn from, i.a., Eurostat data reported in recitals (86) and (89) of the provisional Regulation have been confirmed by the questionnaire replies of the exporting producers. Given that the data emanates from different sources, naturally the trends may differ slightly depending on the segment and company. In any event, they confirmed low price levels which combined with the high undercutting levels and steep increase in volumes of imports from the PRC, stresses the accuracy of the overall conclusion in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The conclusions drawn from, i.a., Eurostat data reported in recitals (86) and (89) of the provisional Regulation have been confirmed by the questionnaire replies of the exporting producers. Given that the data emanates from different sources, naturally the trends may differ slightly depending on the segment and company. In any event, they confirmed low price levels which combined with the high undercutting levels and steep increase in volumes of imports from the PRC, stresses the accuracy of the overall conclusion in this case.

| (76) | Data and trends have also been checked for OEM and AM segments considered separately. The provisional regulation mistakenly stated in recital (89) that prices for years 2006 to 2008 had to be based on Eurostat because the exporters’ questionnaires did not provide relevant data. The statement should have related to a split between OEM and AM transactions. The split can only be established on the basis of transaction-by-transaction listings provided by exporters. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Data and trends have also been checked for OEM and AM segments considered separately. The provisional regulation mistakenly stated in recital (89) that prices for years 2006 to 2008 had to be based on Eurostat because the exporters’ questionnaires did not provide relevant data. The statement should have related to a split between OEM and AM transactions. The split can only be established on the basis of transaction-by-transaction listings provided by exporters.

| (77) | As for AM unit prices data shows a more or less flat levels with a slight increase at the end of the period. They ranged from 25 to 34 EUR in 2006, from 24 to 32 EUR in 2007, from 25 to 29 EUR in 2008 and from 26 to 36 EUR in the IP. For confidentiality reasons those ranges have been modified upwards or downwards by 15 % at maximum.







  Price range for China AM imports (based on sample of exporters) | +/– 15 % | +/– 15 % |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2006 | 25 | 34 |
| 2007 | 24 | 32 |
| 2008 | 25 | 29 |
| IP | 26 | 36 |

(77)

As for AM unit prices data shows a more or less flat levels with a slight increase at the end of the period. They ranged from 25 to 34 EUR in 2006, from 24 to 32 EUR in 2007, from 25 to 29 EUR in 2008 and from 26 to 36 EUR in the IP. For confidentiality reasons those ranges have been modified upwards or downwards by 15 % at maximum.

Price range for China AM imports (based on sample of exporters)

+/– 15 %

+/– 15 %

2006

25

34

2007

24

32

2008

25

29

IP

26

36

| (78) | OEM unit prices of imports from the PRC show a decrease of more than 15 % over the period considered. Further details cannot be disclosed due to confidentiality reasons as explained in the section on the calculation of the injury elimination level below. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

OEM unit prices of imports from the PRC show a decrease of more than 15 % over the period considered. Further details cannot be disclosed due to confidentiality reasons as explained in the section on the calculation of the injury elimination level below.

| (79) | One party claimed that the Chinese import prices increased between 2008 and the IP when most of the injury indicators suffered from a significant decline. Indeed there has been a nominal increase of Chinese import prices (although by only 1,6 %) (7). It has to be stressed however that over the entirety of the period considered they decreased by 8 %. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

One party claimed that the Chinese import prices increased between 2008 and the IP when most of the injury indicators suffered from a significant decline. Indeed there has been a nominal increase of Chinese import prices (although by only 1,6 %) (7). It has to be stressed however that over the entirety of the period considered they decreased by 8 %.

7

| (80) | Overall, low price levels have been confirmed for both segments, which combined with high undercutting and steep increase of imports from the PRC confirms the conclusions in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

Overall, low price levels have been confirmed for both segments, which combined with high undercutting and steep increase of imports from the PRC confirms the conclusions in this case.

5.2.   Separate injury analysis for OEM and AM segments

Separate injury analysis for OEM and AM segments

| (81) | One of the main comments received after the imposition of provisional measures was that a separate analysis of all injury indicators for OEM and AM segments should have been conducted. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

One of the main comments received after the imposition of provisional measures was that a separate analysis of all injury indicators for OEM and AM segments should have been conducted.

| (82) | One party referred in that regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1888/2006 (8) as well as Council Regulation (EC) No 682/2007 (9) concerning imports of sweetcorn originating in Thailand, claiming that such segment-specific analysis was conducted there. That party further claimed that by not following the sweetcorn case the Commission was in breach of WTO requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

One party referred in that regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1888/2006 (8) as well as Council Regulation (EC) No 682/2007 (9) concerning imports of sweetcorn originating in Thailand, claiming that such segment-specific analysis was conducted there. That party further claimed that by not following the sweetcorn case the Commission was in breach of WTO requirements.

8

9

| (83) | In the sweetcorn case a reference was made to the relevant WTO provisions that pursuant to the Appellate Body ‘where investigating authorities undertake an examination of one part of a domestic industry, they should, in principle, examine, in like manner, all of the other parts that make up that industry, as well as examine the industry as a whole’ (10). This case demonstrates clearly that the approach followed in the present case is in line with the Institution’s practice hitherto and compliant with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (11). Segmental analysis is possible but it has to be accompanied by an analysis of the whole industry. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

In the sweetcorn case a reference was made to the relevant WTO provisions that pursuant to the Appellate Body ‘where investigating authorities undertake an examination of one part of a domestic industry, they should, in principle, examine, in like manner, all of the other parts that make up that industry, as well as examine the industry as a whole’ (10). This case demonstrates clearly that the approach followed in the present case is in line with the Institution’s practice hitherto and compliant with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (11). Segmental analysis is possible but it has to be accompanied by an analysis of the whole industry.

10

11

| (84) | It is recalled that in the current proceeding at the provisional stage the two segments have been considered together, however, some indicators have been analysed separately for OEM and AM wheels (undercutting, consumption, market shares). In view of comments submitted by parties the Commission conducted further analysis and some additional indicators have been analysed at the segment level (see below). As shown below, this analysis confirms that the trends for the product concerned considered as a whole in general correspond to those for OEM and AM segments considered separately. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

It is recalled that in the current proceeding at the provisional stage the two segments have been considered together, however, some indicators have been analysed separately for OEM and AM wheels (undercutting, consumption, market shares). In view of comments submitted by parties the Commission conducted further analysis and some additional indicators have been analysed at the segment level (see below). As shown below, this analysis confirms that the trends for the product concerned considered as a whole in general correspond to those for OEM and AM segments considered separately.

5.2.1.   Consumption

Consumption

| (85) | The table below demonstrates the development of the Union consumption of aluminium road wheels in the OEM and AM segment, considered separately. More detailed information on split between OEM and AM imports has been provided above in the section on imports. Data on the split was based on various sources of information provided by cooperating EU producers, users and exporting producers in the country concerned.









  Units (in 000) | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Total Union Consumption | 58 607 | 62 442 | 58 313 | 49 508 |
| Index 2006 = 100 | 100 | 107 | 99 | 84 |
| Consumption OEM | 43 573 | 44 009 | 42 076 | 34 915 |
| Index 2006 = 100 | 100 | 101 | 97 | 80 |
| Consumption AM | 15 033 | 18 432 | 16 237 | 14 592 |
| Index 2006 = 100 | 100 | 123 | 108 | 97 |

(85)

The table below demonstrates the development of the Union consumption of aluminium road wheels in the OEM and AM segment, considered separately. More detailed information on split between OEM and AM imports has been provided above in the section on imports. Data on the split was based on various sources of information provided by cooperating EU producers, users and exporting producers in the country concerned.

Units (in 000)

2006

2007

2008

IP

Total Union Consumption

58 607

62 442

58 313

49 508

Index 2006 = 100

100

107

99

84

Consumption OEM

43 573

44 009

42 076

34 915

Index 2006 = 100

100

101

97

80

Consumption AM

15 033

18 432

16 237

14 592

Index 2006 = 100

100

123

108

97

| (86) | Total Union consumption decreased by 16 % over the period considered from 58,6 million units to 49,5 million units. The same trend could be observed in both segments. The consumption of OEM wheels decreased by 20 % from 43,5 million units to 34,9 million units, whereas the consumption of AM wheels decreased by 3 % from 15 to 14,5 million units. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

Total Union consumption decreased by 16 % over the period considered from 58,6 million units to 49,5 million units. The same trend could be observed in both segments. The consumption of OEM wheels decreased by 20 % from 43,5 million units to 34,9 million units, whereas the consumption of AM wheels decreased by 3 % from 15 to 14,5 million units.

5.2.2.   Imports from the PRC and market shares for OEM and AM segments

Imports from the PRC and market shares for OEM and AM segments

| (87) | Many comments referred to the Commission’s conclusions with regard to the size of OEM and AM segments on the EU aluminium wheel market, in particular to the market share of imports. In particular parties argued that the Commission miscalculated the market share of OEM imports. Following these comments further investigation was conducted with regard to market share of imported OEM and AM wheels. It is recalled that the provisional Regulation specified market shares of OEM and AM imports from the PRC. These market shares have been specified on the basis of information on file at the provisional stage, based on data provided by the EU producers, exporters as well as car makers. On that basis it was established that the market share of OEM imports would account for around 3 % (conservative calculation) but it could reach up to 6 %. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

Many comments referred to the Commission’s conclusions with regard to the size of OEM and AM segments on the EU aluminium wheel market, in particular to the market share of imports. In particular parties argued that the Commission miscalculated the market share of OEM imports. Following these comments further investigation was conducted with regard to market share of imported OEM and AM wheels. It is recalled that the provisional Regulation specified market shares of OEM and AM imports from the PRC. These market shares have been specified on the basis of information on file at the provisional stage, based on data provided by the EU producers, exporters as well as car makers. On that basis it was established that the market share of OEM imports would account for around 3 % (conservative calculation) but it could reach up to 6 %.

| (88) | In view of criticisms expressed by the interested parties all data was re-verified and this verification confirmed the provisional findings. A detailed explanation of all investigative steps and all sources of information used to establish the share of both segments in imports not only from the country concerned but also from other third countries has been included in a note to the file open for consultation by interested parties. This note demonstrates the variety of sources used in order to obtain relevant information. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

In view of criticisms expressed by the interested parties all data was re-verified and this verification confirmed the provisional findings. A detailed explanation of all investigative steps and all sources of information used to establish the share of both segments in imports not only from the country concerned but also from other third countries has been included in a note to the file open for consultation by interested parties. This note demonstrates the variety of sources used in order to obtain relevant information.

| (89) | In addition, in reply to parties’ comments that the market share of 3 % was small, it has to be stressed that a market share of even 3 % cannot be considered small on a price sensitive market like the one in the case at hand. This is particularly true in view of the price depression described below in recital (116). Moreover, there has been also a significant increase in volumes and market share of imports from the PRC.









  Import volumes in 000 units OEM | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| PRC | 455 | 476 | 508 | 1 183 |
| Index 2006 = 100 | 100 | 105 | 112 | 260 |
| Market share (%) | 1  % | 1  % | 1  % | 3  % |
| Import volumes in 000 units AM | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | IP |
| PRC | 3 247 | 4 667 | 5 301 | 4 954 |
| Index 2006 = 100 | 100 | 144 | 163 | 153 |
| Market share (%) | 22  % | 25  % | 33  % | 34  % |

(89)

In addition, in reply to parties’ comments that the market share of 3 % was small, it has to be stressed that a market share of even 3 % cannot be considered small on a price sensitive market like the one in the case at hand. This is particularly true in view of the price depression described below in recital (116). Moreover, there has been also a significant increase in volumes and market share of imports from the PRC.

Import volumes in 000 units OEM

2006

2007

2008

IP

PRC

455

476

508

1 183

Index 2006 = 100

100

105

112

260

Market share (%)

1  %

1  %

1  %

3  %

Import volumes in 000 units AM

2006

2007

2008

IP

PRC

3 247

4 667

5 301

4 954

Index 2006 = 100

100

144

163

153

Market share (%)

22  %

25  %

33  %

34  %

5.3.   Price undercutting

Price undercutting

| (90) | It is recalled that at the provisional stage undercutting was calculated for the product concerned considered as a whole as well as for both segments separately. The split has been based on the transaction-by-transaction listings provided by the sampled EU producers and exporters by identifying sales to car manufacturers. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

It is recalled that at the provisional stage undercutting was calculated for the product concerned considered as a whole as well as for both segments separately. The split has been based on the transaction-by-transaction listings provided by the sampled EU producers and exporters by identifying sales to car manufacturers.

| (91) | The ranges of undercutting disclosed in recitals (95) and (98) of the provisional Regulation were recalculated due to most notably changes in the dumping calculations (see above). They were also refined with regard to the customs tariff applied. Namely, at the provisional stage a uniform 4,5 % customs duty rate was applied. This approach has been followed at the definitive stage in the calculation of the general undercutting (for both segments). This was due to the fact that not all of the OEM imports have been declared under the CN code linked with a lower 3 % duty rate. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

The ranges of undercutting disclosed in recitals (95) and (98) of the provisional Regulation were recalculated due to most notably changes in the dumping calculations (see above). They were also refined with regard to the customs tariff applied. Namely, at the provisional stage a uniform 4,5 % customs duty rate was applied. This approach has been followed at the definitive stage in the calculation of the general undercutting (for both segments). This was due to the fact that not all of the OEM imports have been declared under the CN code linked with a lower 3 % duty rate.

| (92) | Some parties reiterated their comments that the level of undercutting should be calculated by reference to the value added component of the price only (excluding aluminium cost). As stated in recital (96) of the provisional Regulation using such methodology would indeed increase the level of undercutting. Since the level of undercutting established with reference to the full price (as percentage) was already substantial this method was not further explored. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

Some parties reiterated their comments that the level of undercutting should be calculated by reference to the value added component of the price only (excluding aluminium cost). As stated in recital (96) of the provisional Regulation using such methodology would indeed increase the level of undercutting. Since the level of undercutting established with reference to the full price (as percentage) was already substantial this method was not further explored.

| (93) | Undercutting calculated for the product concerned as a whole ranges from 20 % to 38 %. Undercutting remains substantial for both segments (between 15 % and 29 % for OEM and 49 % and 63 % for AM). |
| --- | --- |

(93)

Undercutting calculated for the product concerned as a whole ranges from 20 % to 38 %. Undercutting remains substantial for both segments (between 15 % and 29 % for OEM and 49 % and 63 % for AM).

6.   SITUATION OF THE UNION INDUSTRY

SITUATION OF THE UNION INDUSTRY

6.1.   Definition of the Union industry and macro and micro injury indicators

Definition of the Union industry and macro and micro injury indicators

| (94) | One party claimed that the Commission applied an incorrect definition of the Union industry and Union production and that the injury assessment had to be based on information related solely to the complainants and supporters of the complaint and not on the basis of the total Union production. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

One party claimed that the Commission applied an incorrect definition of the Union industry and Union production and that the injury assessment had to be based on information related solely to the complainants and supporters of the complaint and not on the basis of the total Union production.

| (95) | The Union industry was defined as provided for in Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation. The assessment of the situation of the entire Union production complies with the basic Regulation. The argument that the injury assessment was based on an incorrect definition of the Union industry must thus be rejected. Consequently, all arguments concerning the development of trends of injury indicators where data of sampled and cooperating producers was used as a basis of analysis had to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The Union industry was defined as provided for in Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation. The assessment of the situation of the entire Union production complies with the basic Regulation. The argument that the injury assessment was based on an incorrect definition of the Union industry must thus be rejected. Consequently, all arguments concerning the development of trends of injury indicators where data of sampled and cooperating producers was used as a basis of analysis had to be rejected.

| (96) | Another more general comment was that non-confidential versions of producers’ questionnaires and mini-questionnaires were deficient. The Commission examined those comments in detail and requested improved non-confidential versions, where warranted. Those were included in the file open for consultation by interested parties, thereby fully allowing proper defence of rights. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Another more general comment was that non-confidential versions of producers’ questionnaires and mini-questionnaires were deficient. The Commission examined those comments in detail and requested improved non-confidential versions, where warranted. Those were included in the file open for consultation by interested parties, thereby fully allowing proper defence of rights.

| (97) | Some parties claimed that some EU producers should have been excluded due to the fact that they did not provide full information about their activities. The parties further claimed that this exclusion would have had an impact on standing. However, these claims are not supported by the facts since the EU producers in question have indeed provided all relevant information. Therefore, they have to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

Some parties claimed that some EU producers should have been excluded due to the fact that they did not provide full information about their activities. The parties further claimed that this exclusion would have had an impact on standing. However, these claims are not supported by the facts since the EU producers in question have indeed provided all relevant information. Therefore, they have to be rejected.

| (98) | One importer also claimed that it should have been classified as EU producer due to the fact it had outsourced the manufacturing process to the country concerned while many other activities were conducted in the EU (e.g. design). This company outsourced the manufacturing process while retaining in the Union some activities e.g. testing of wheels. Given however, that manufacturing process takes place in the country concerned, this importer cannot be considered as EU producer in the anti-dumping proceeding. In the light of the above, this claim had to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

One importer also claimed that it should have been classified as EU producer due to the fact it had outsourced the manufacturing process to the country concerned while many other activities were conducted in the EU (e.g. design). This company outsourced the manufacturing process while retaining in the Union some activities e.g. testing of wheels. Given however, that manufacturing process takes place in the country concerned, this importer cannot be considered as EU producer in the anti-dumping proceeding. In the light of the above, this claim had to be rejected.

| (99) | Some parties conducted analysis of injury indicators on a company basis. Such an approach must be rejected as injury analysis is conducted for the EU industry as a whole. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

Some parties conducted analysis of injury indicators on a company basis. Such an approach must be rejected as injury analysis is conducted for the EU industry as a whole.

6.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

Macroeconomic indicators

6.2.1.   Sales and market share

Sales and market share

| (100) | Subsequent to the publication of the provisional Regulation, parties requested data with a split between OEM and AM segments. Table below demonstrates the sales and market share data with a split between OEM and AM segments: | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sales volume entire Union industry OEM in 000 units | 36 820 | 36 240 | 34 932 | 28 719 |
| Index 2006 = 100 | 100 | 98 | 95 | 78 |
| Sales volume entire Union industry AM in 000 units | 8 626 | 10 443 | 7 962 | 7 075 |
| Index 2006 = 100 | 100 | 121 | 92 | 82 |
| Market share OEM (%) (EU producers’ share of total OEM consumption) | 84,5  % | 82,3  % | 83  % | 82,3  % |
| Index 2006 = 100 | 100 | 97 | 98 | 97 |
| Market share AM (%) (EU producers’ share of total AM consumption) | 57,4  % | 56,7  % | 49  % | 48,5  % |
| Index 2006 = 100 | 100 | 99 | 85 | 84 |

(100)

Subsequent to the publication of the provisional Regulation, parties requested data with a split between OEM and AM segments. Table below demonstrates the sales and market share data with a split between OEM and AM segments:

2006

2007

2008

IP

Sales volume entire Union industry OEM in 000 units

36 820

36 240

34 932

28 719

Index 2006 = 100

100

98

95

78

Sales volume entire Union industry AM in 000 units

8 626

10 443

7 962

7 075

Index 2006 = 100

100

121

92

82

Market share OEM (%) (EU producers’ share of total OEM consumption)

84,5  %

82,3  %

83  %

82,3  %

Index 2006 = 100

100

97

98

97

Market share AM (%) (EU producers’ share of total AM consumption)

57,4  %

56,7  %

49  %

48,5  %

Index 2006 = 100

100

99

85

84

| (101) | Different sources of information were used to establish the split, most notably data provided by EU producers during the investigation, data from the complaint as well as data collected at pre-initiation stage. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

Different sources of information were used to establish the split, most notably data provided by EU producers during the investigation, data from the complaint as well as data collected at pre-initiation stage.

| (102) | The above table demonstrates a downward trend with regard to sales and market shares for both OEM and AM segment. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The above table demonstrates a downward trend with regard to sales and market shares for both OEM and AM segment.

6.2.2.   Contractual landscape

Contractual landscape

| (103) | As specified in recital (112) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission continued to look into the tenders awarded during the IP which however would be executed thereafter. Data already on file has been supplemented by new information received from the EU wheel manufacturers and car makers. This data confirmed the orders of magnitude of purchases and trends with regard to market shares of European and Chinese suppliers. It is reinforced by arguments submitted by car makers according to which the share of Chinese imports increased because of enhanced competitiveness and quality and improved capabilities of production processes. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

As specified in recital (112) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission continued to look into the tenders awarded during the IP which however would be executed thereafter. Data already on file has been supplemented by new information received from the EU wheel manufacturers and car makers. This data confirmed the orders of magnitude of purchases and trends with regard to market shares of European and Chinese suppliers. It is reinforced by arguments submitted by car makers according to which the share of Chinese imports increased because of enhanced competitiveness and quality and improved capabilities of production processes.

6.3.   Microeconomic indicators

Microeconomic indicators

6.3.1.   Cost of production

Cost of production

| (104) | One party claimed that the data on profitability reported in recital (117) of the provisional Regulation did not match with those on sales and cost of production in recitals (89) and (122) of the provisional Regulation. This was due to a clerical mistake in calculating the cost of production leading to the use of a wrong set of data. This error has been corrected and the cost of production figures are shown in the table below.









  In Euro | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Average cost of production (per unit) | 48,1 | 49,4 | 48,7 | 49,1 |

(104)

One party claimed that the data on profitability reported in recital (117) of the provisional Regulation did not match with those on sales and cost of production in recitals (89) and (122) of the provisional Regulation. This was due to a clerical mistake in calculating the cost of production leading to the use of a wrong set of data. This error has been corrected and the cost of production figures are shown in the table below.

In Euro

2006

2007

2008

IP

Average cost of production (per unit)

48,1

49,4

48,7

49,1

| (105) | The correction did not affect the trend established at the provisional stage. The average cost of production remained stable over the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

The correction did not affect the trend established at the provisional stage. The average cost of production remained stable over the period considered.

6.3.2.   Profitability

Profitability

| (106) | In reply to parties’ requests to provide data with a split between OEM and AM, the profitability has been calculated separately for the OEM and AM segments. The trends and orders of magnitude have been confirmed.









  In % | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Profitability total | 3,2 | 0,7 | –1,5 | –5,4 |
| Profitability OEM | 3,1 | 0,4 | –1,4 | –5,7 |
| Profitability AM | 5,2 | 5,7 | –3,3 | –2,4 |

(106)

In reply to parties’ requests to provide data with a split between OEM and AM, the profitability has been calculated separately for the OEM and AM segments. The trends and orders of magnitude have been confirmed.

In %

2006

2007

2008

IP

Profitability total

3,2

0,7

–1,5

–5,4

Profitability OEM

3,1

0,4

–1,4

–5,7

Profitability AM

5,2

5,7

–3,3

–2,4

| (107) | As demonstrated in the table above the profitability has been affected in both OEM and AM segments. It fell by 8,8 percentage points over the period considered in the OEM and by 7,6 percentage points in the AM segment. Consequently the orders of magnitude and trends for OEM and AM segments considered separately coincide with those for the product concerned considered as a whole (a drop by 8,7 percentage points). |
| --- | --- |

(107)

As demonstrated in the table above the profitability has been affected in both OEM and AM segments. It fell by 8,8 percentage points over the period considered in the OEM and by 7,6 percentage points in the AM segment. Consequently the orders of magnitude and trends for OEM and AM segments considered separately coincide with those for the product concerned considered as a whole (a drop by 8,7 percentage points).

6.3.3.   Return on investment

Return on investment

| (108) | Parties pointed out possible inaccuracies in the calculation of return on investment. The figures reported take into consideration all items making up the return of investment, including depreciation. The claims have to be thus rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

Parties pointed out possible inaccuracies in the calculation of return on investment. The figures reported take into consideration all items making up the return of investment, including depreciation. The claims have to be thus rejected.

6.4.   Conclusion on injury

Conclusion on injury

| (109) | The conclusions on injury as set out in recitals (80) – (123) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. The Union industry suffered material injury, which was reflected most notably in decreasing profitability. Some injury indicators have been analysed separately for OEM and AM segments. The trends and orders of magnitude of developments of these indicators correspond to those established for the whole product concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

The conclusions on injury as set out in recitals (80) – (123) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. The Union industry suffered material injury, which was reflected most notably in decreasing profitability. Some injury indicators have been analysed separately for OEM and AM segments. The trends and orders of magnitude of developments of these indicators correspond to those established for the whole product concerned.

7.   CAUSATION

CAUSATION

7.1.   Impact of the imports from the PRC

Impact of the imports from the PRC

| (110) | Some parties claimed that the decline in Union industry’s production and sales was a result of decreasing consumption (which allegedly also triggered decrease in capacity). The provisional Regulation indeed did not contest that the consumption on the Union market has been shrinking. Although it is possible that factors other than dumped imports from the PRC (economic crisis and imports from Turkey) might have contributed to the injury suffered by the EU industry, the impact of those other factors is not such as to break the causal link as stated in recitals (136) – (152) of the provisional Regulation. In any case, as outlined in recitals (126) et seq of the provisional Regulation there is an evident link between the significant increase in Chinese import volumes at low prices and the injury observed with the Union industry. Furthermore, as outlined in recital (103) of the provisional Regulation and contrary to parties’ claims capacity remained stable over the period considered (most notably between 2006 and 2008, with a decrease of 4 % between 2008 and the IP). |
| --- | --- |

(110)

Some parties claimed that the decline in Union industry’s production and sales was a result of decreasing consumption (which allegedly also triggered decrease in capacity). The provisional Regulation indeed did not contest that the consumption on the Union market has been shrinking. Although it is possible that factors other than dumped imports from the PRC (economic crisis and imports from Turkey) might have contributed to the injury suffered by the EU industry, the impact of those other factors is not such as to break the causal link as stated in recitals (136) – (152) of the provisional Regulation. In any case, as outlined in recitals (126) et seq of the provisional Regulation there is an evident link between the significant increase in Chinese import volumes at low prices and the injury observed with the Union industry. Furthermore, as outlined in recital (103) of the provisional Regulation and contrary to parties’ claims capacity remained stable over the period considered (most notably between 2006 and 2008, with a decrease of 4 % between 2008 and the IP).

| (111) | Some parties referred to statements published by Union producers on their Internet sites and to the fact that dumped imports from the PRC were not mentioned among causes of injury. Irrespective of any public statements by the Union producers (which in any case do not exclude Chinese imports as possible cause of injury) the data on file demonstrates clearly that there is a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from the PRC. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

Some parties referred to statements published by Union producers on their Internet sites and to the fact that dumped imports from the PRC were not mentioned among causes of injury. Irrespective of any public statements by the Union producers (which in any case do not exclude Chinese imports as possible cause of injury) the data on file demonstrates clearly that there is a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from the PRC.

| (112) | Some parties claimed that the loss in profitability was due to the decreasing production volumes. Hence, producers were unable to amortize their fixed costs over the smaller number of wheels produced. However, the drop in production was due to loss in market share which was due to import penetration by Chinese imports. |
| --- | --- |

(112)

Some parties claimed that the loss in profitability was due to the decreasing production volumes. Hence, producers were unable to amortize their fixed costs over the smaller number of wheels produced. However, the drop in production was due to loss in market share which was due to import penetration by Chinese imports.

| (113) | Some parties claimed that the imports from the PRC could not have been the cause of injury suffered by the Union industry because year 2007 saw a drop in profitability despite stable prices and sales. It is recalled that between 2006 and 2007 there has been an increase in market share of imports from the PRC and a 40 % increase in terms of volumes. On those grounds the claim had to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

Some parties claimed that the imports from the PRC could not have been the cause of injury suffered by the Union industry because year 2007 saw a drop in profitability despite stable prices and sales. It is recalled that between 2006 and 2007 there has been an increase in market share of imports from the PRC and a 40 % increase in terms of volumes. On those grounds the claim had to be rejected.

| (114) | The conclusions set out in recitals (126) – (130) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

The conclusions set out in recitals (126) – (130) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

7.2.   Effects of other factors

Effects of other factors

7.2.1.   Segmental split

Segmental split

| (115) | Parties reiterated their claims that the injury to the Union industry which channels most of its sales to the OEM segment could not have been caused by Chinese imports which concentrate predominantly on the AM segment and have limited OEM presence. It is recalled that these comments have been addressed in the provisional Regulation,in recitals (131) – (135). |
| --- | --- |

(115)

Parties reiterated their claims that the injury to the Union industry which channels most of its sales to the OEM segment could not have been caused by Chinese imports which concentrate predominantly on the AM segment and have limited OEM presence. It is recalled that these comments have been addressed in the provisional Regulation,in recitals (131) – (135).

| (116) | After imposition of the provisional measures some parties referred to recital (133) of the provisional Regulation which stated that ‘there are indications that car makers use Chinese prices to force down the EU industry prices’. Those parties claimed that the Institutions cannot base their findings on indications but on positive evidence only. Parties further pointed out that no information on the file open for consultation by interested parties was made available in order to evidence such claims. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

After imposition of the provisional measures some parties referred to recital (133) of the provisional Regulation which stated that ‘there are indications that car makers use Chinese prices to force down the EU industry prices’. Those parties claimed that the Institutions cannot base their findings on indications but on positive evidence only. Parties further pointed out that no information on the file open for consultation by interested parties was made available in order to evidence such claims.

| (117) | The high commercial sensitivity of this type of information has to be underlined at the outset. On top of the information at Commission’s disposal, further information was provided by the parties. This additional information confirmed conclusions based on evidence at Commission’s disposal at the provisional stage showing a pattern of clear downward price pressure. The Commission has further build up the file with regard to price pressure aspect. A detailed submission has been provided by the Union producers. It provided the Commission with a further insight into the details of the bidding process and confirmed the conclusions with regard to the downward price pressure and the use of Chinese offers as benchmark to exercise such pressure. Indeed in some cases the target price set out by the car makers (which constitutes the starting point of negotiations) was already set below the Union producers’ costs and was thus unsustainable from the outset. In some cases even offers below that level have been unsuccessful. |
| --- | --- |

(117)

The high commercial sensitivity of this type of information has to be underlined at the outset. On top of the information at Commission’s disposal, further information was provided by the parties. This additional information confirmed conclusions based on evidence at Commission’s disposal at the provisional stage showing a pattern of clear downward price pressure. The Commission has further build up the file with regard to price pressure aspect. A detailed submission has been provided by the Union producers. It provided the Commission with a further insight into the details of the bidding process and confirmed the conclusions with regard to the downward price pressure and the use of Chinese offers as benchmark to exercise such pressure. Indeed in some cases the target price set out by the car makers (which constitutes the starting point of negotiations) was already set below the Union producers’ costs and was thus unsustainable from the outset. In some cases even offers below that level have been unsuccessful.

| (118) | According to the information at the Commission’s disposal some car makers just indicate to their bidders that they should lower prices in line with Chinese offers; some other are using quotes from companies which were not participating in the tenders; some others finally do not even restrict their tenders and anybody can bid (even those that would never meet the requirements). |
| --- | --- |

(118)

According to the information at the Commission’s disposal some car makers just indicate to their bidders that they should lower prices in line with Chinese offers; some other are using quotes from companies which were not participating in the tenders; some others finally do not even restrict their tenders and anybody can bid (even those that would never meet the requirements).

| (119) | Car manufacturers claimed that the price is not a determining factor in their sourcing decisions. Indeed the information on file demonstrates that there can be other considerations, however price plays a predominant role. |
| --- | --- |

(119)

Car manufacturers claimed that the price is not a determining factor in their sourcing decisions. Indeed the information on file demonstrates that there can be other considerations, however price plays a predominant role.

| (120) | The conclusions set out in recitals (131) – (135) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

The conclusions set out in recitals (131) – (135) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

7.2.2.   Impact of imports from Turkey

Impact of imports from Turkey

| (121) | Parties claimed that the Commission underestimated the impact of Turkish imports as a cause of injury suffered by the Union industry. It is recalled that the provisional Regulation in recitals (136) – (137) recognized that the lower prices of Turkish imports might have had some negative impact on the situation of the Union industry but not such as to break, on its own, the causal link between dumped imports from the PRC and the injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(121)

Parties claimed that the Commission underestimated the impact of Turkish imports as a cause of injury suffered by the Union industry. It is recalled that the provisional Regulation in recitals (136) – (137) recognized that the lower prices of Turkish imports might have had some negative impact on the situation of the Union industry but not such as to break, on its own, the causal link between dumped imports from the PRC and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

| (122) | The impact of imports from Turkey has also been considered per segment. It has been established that 3⁄4 of the Turkish imports were OEM. It was confirmed that the trends and orders of magnitude established for OEM and AM segments considered together corresponded to those for both segments considered separately. According to the information on file (provided by different cooperating parties) the AM prices of Turkish imports decreased over the period considered. As for prices of Turkish OEM imports those remained relatively stable. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

The impact of imports from Turkey has also been considered per segment. It has been established that 3⁄4 of the Turkish imports were OEM. It was confirmed that the trends and orders of magnitude established for OEM and AM segments considered together corresponded to those for both segments considered separately. According to the information on file (provided by different cooperating parties) the AM prices of Turkish imports decreased over the period considered. As for prices of Turkish OEM imports those remained relatively stable.

| (123) | Parties pointed out that prices of imports from Turkey decreased significantly between 2008 and the IP. However, as noted in recital (137) of the provisional Regulation the price differential has been still considerably lower that that between Chinese import prices and the EU producers’ prices. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

Parties pointed out that prices of imports from Turkey decreased significantly between 2008 and the IP. However, as noted in recital (137) of the provisional Regulation the price differential has been still considerably lower that that between Chinese import prices and the EU producers’ prices.

| (124) | In view of comments of one party that Turkey should have been included in the complaint (see recital (9) et seq above), it has to be noted that the non-inclusion of Turkey does not break the causal link between the Chinese exports of the product concerned and the injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

In view of comments of one party that Turkey should have been included in the complaint (see recital (9) et seq above), it has to be noted that the non-inclusion of Turkey does not break the causal link between the Chinese exports of the product concerned and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

| (125) | On these grounds therefore, claims put forward by the parties have to be rejected. In the light of the foregoing, and in absence of any other comments, recitals (136) – (137) of the provisional Regulation are herby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

On these grounds therefore, claims put forward by the parties have to be rejected. In the light of the foregoing, and in absence of any other comments, recitals (136) – (137) of the provisional Regulation are herby confirmed.

7.2.3.   Impact of imports from other countries

Impact of imports from other countries

| (126) | Some parties claimed that the market share of imports from third countries other than the PRC increased between 2006 and 2008. It has to be noted that the share of imports from third countries remained stable with small variations in the range of 1 %. Therefore, this claim had to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(126)

Some parties claimed that the market share of imports from third countries other than the PRC increased between 2006 and 2008. It has to be noted that the share of imports from third countries remained stable with small variations in the range of 1 %. Therefore, this claim had to be rejected.

| (127) | Some countries mentioned imports from South Africa as contributing to the injury suffered by the Union industry because of their volume and/or prices. As outlined in recital (99) of the provisional Regulation the market share of the South African imports, even if they increased in terms of volumes, has been stable since 2007 (at the level of 1,4 % with an increase of 0,6 % between 2006 and 2007). The Commission received information that the majority of those imports were intended for the OEM market. As far as the prices of South African OEM imports are concerned the Commission received contradictory information. On the basis of Eurostat data it can be concluded that they increased from 43 to 51 EUR. These data would be also in line with information provided by one EU producer. Therefore, the claim with regard to impact of South African imports has to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

Some countries mentioned imports from South Africa as contributing to the injury suffered by the Union industry because of their volume and/or prices. As outlined in recital (99) of the provisional Regulation the market share of the South African imports, even if they increased in terms of volumes, has been stable since 2007 (at the level of 1,4 % with an increase of 0,6 % between 2006 and 2007). The Commission received information that the majority of those imports were intended for the OEM market. As far as the prices of South African OEM imports are concerned the Commission received contradictory information. On the basis of Eurostat data it can be concluded that they increased from 43 to 51 EUR. These data would be also in line with information provided by one EU producer. Therefore, the claim with regard to impact of South African imports has to be rejected.

| (128) | The conclusions of provisional Regulation in recitals (136) – (138) with regard to imports from third countries taken together or in isolation are therefore confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(128)

The conclusions of provisional Regulation in recitals (136) – (138) with regard to imports from third countries taken together or in isolation are therefore confirmed.

7.2.4.   Impact of economic crisis

Impact of economic crisis

| (129) | Parties reiterated their arguments on the impact of financial crisis. Those comments, most notably the drop in car production, have been addressed in the provisional Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

Parties reiterated their arguments on the impact of financial crisis. Those comments, most notably the drop in car production, have been addressed in the provisional Regulation.

| (130) | As stated in recital (142) of the provisional Regulation the downward trend started well before the economic crisis and coincided in time with the market penetration by the imports from the PRC. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

As stated in recital (142) of the provisional Regulation the downward trend started well before the economic crisis and coincided in time with the market penetration by the imports from the PRC.

| (131) | The conclusions set out in recitals (139) – (144) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

The conclusions set out in recitals (139) – (144) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

7.2.5.   Competition between Union producers and concentration on the EU market

Competition between Union producers and concentration on the EU market

| (132) | Parties claimed that the structure of the Union industry contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry. However, as specified in recitals (146) and (147) of the provisional Regulation data collected during the investigation demonstrates that larger and smaller companies have been similarly affected. |
| --- | --- |

(132)

Parties claimed that the structure of the Union industry contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry. However, as specified in recitals (146) and (147) of the provisional Regulation data collected during the investigation demonstrates that larger and smaller companies have been similarly affected.

7.2.6.   Management decisions by Union producers

Management decisions by Union producers

| (133) | Some parties claimed that the causes of injury lied in wrong management decisions by the Union producers. Those comments referred to the producers mentioned in recital (124) of the provisional Regulation which have either closed or gone under insolvency proceedings. It is recalled that the provisional Regulation mentioned 30 companies whereas the comments of parties refer to only 4. In general those comments have not been substantiated. In any case the data on file demonstrates clearly the causal link between injury suffered by the Union industry and imports from the PRC. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that despite closures the market share of remaining companies did not go up. |
| --- | --- |

(133)

Some parties claimed that the causes of injury lied in wrong management decisions by the Union producers. Those comments referred to the producers mentioned in recital (124) of the provisional Regulation which have either closed or gone under insolvency proceedings. It is recalled that the provisional Regulation mentioned 30 companies whereas the comments of parties refer to only 4. In general those comments have not been substantiated. In any case the data on file demonstrates clearly the causal link between injury suffered by the Union industry and imports from the PRC. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that despite closures the market share of remaining companies did not go up.

7.2.7.   Imports from third countries by the EU industry

Imports from third countries by the EU industry

| (134) | Some parties claimed that one EU producer offered cheaper wheels from third countries thereby contributing to the injury suffered by the EU industry. These allegations however have not been confirmed by evidence. Above all it was not clear whether such imports would have affected any significant quantities. Therefore the claim had to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

Some parties claimed that one EU producer offered cheaper wheels from third countries thereby contributing to the injury suffered by the EU industry. These allegations however have not been confirmed by evidence. Above all it was not clear whether such imports would have affected any significant quantities. Therefore the claim had to be rejected.

7.2.8.   Aluminium prices and supply contracts of the Union industry

Aluminium prices and supply contracts of the Union industry

| (135) | It was claimed that the average cost of production remained stable despite the changes in the aluminium prices. Parties claimed that the losses suffered by the Union producers were due to the fact that they entered into long-term contracts for supply of aluminium which did not allow for price adjustment in line with the decreasing LME prices. The information on file submitted by cooperating Union producers contradicted such claims. They had to be therefore rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

It was claimed that the average cost of production remained stable despite the changes in the aluminium prices. Parties claimed that the losses suffered by the Union producers were due to the fact that they entered into long-term contracts for supply of aluminium which did not allow for price adjustment in line with the decreasing LME prices. The information on file submitted by cooperating Union producers contradicted such claims. They had to be therefore rejected.

7.2.9.   Exchange rate fluctuations

Exchange rate fluctuations

| (136) | It has also been argued that the injury to the Union producers is likely to decrease as a result of the appreciation of the RMB to the EUR. The fluctuation in currency would push up the prices of the dumped imports that are traded in EUR so as to close the price gap between the dumped imports and Union producer prices. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

It has also been argued that the injury to the Union producers is likely to decrease as a result of the appreciation of the RMB to the EUR. The fluctuation in currency would push up the prices of the dumped imports that are traded in EUR so as to close the price gap between the dumped imports and Union producer prices.

| (137) | In this context it should be noted that the investigation has to establish whether the dumped imports (in terms of prices and volume) have caused (or are likely to cause) material injury to the Union industry or whether such material injury was due to other factors. In this respect, Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation states that it is necessary to show that the price level of the dumped imports cause injury. It therefore merely refers to a difference between price levels, and there is thus no requirement to analyse the factors affecting the level of those prices. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

In this context it should be noted that the investigation has to establish whether the dumped imports (in terms of prices and volume) have caused (or are likely to cause) material injury to the Union industry or whether such material injury was due to other factors. In this respect, Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation states that it is necessary to show that the price level of the dumped imports cause injury. It therefore merely refers to a difference between price levels, and there is thus no requirement to analyse the factors affecting the level of those prices.

| (138) | The likely effect of the dumped imports on the Union industry’s prices is essentially examined by establishing price undercutting, price depression and price suppression. For this purpose, the dumped export prices and the Union industry’s sales prices are compared, and export prices used for the injury calculations may sometimes need to be converted into another currency in order to have a comparable basis. Consequently, the use of exchange rates in this context only ensures that the price difference is established on a comparable basis. From this, it becomes obvious that the exchange rate can in principle not be another factor of the injury. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

The likely effect of the dumped imports on the Union industry’s prices is essentially examined by establishing price undercutting, price depression and price suppression. For this purpose, the dumped export prices and the Union industry’s sales prices are compared, and export prices used for the injury calculations may sometimes need to be converted into another currency in order to have a comparable basis. Consequently, the use of exchange rates in this context only ensures that the price difference is established on a comparable basis. From this, it becomes obvious that the exchange rate can in principle not be another factor of the injury.

| (139) | The above is also confirmed by the wording of Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, which refers to known factors other than dumped imports. The list of the other known factors in this Article does not make reference to any factor affecting the price level of the dumped imports. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

The above is also confirmed by the wording of Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, which refers to known factors other than dumped imports. The list of the other known factors in this Article does not make reference to any factor affecting the price level of the dumped imports.

| (140) | However, even in the event that this factor was taken into account, given the likely pressure on consumer prices in a context of a market downturn, it is unlikely that importers buying from the country concerned would be able to increase prices to retail as a result of the appreciation of the RMB. Furthermore, exchange rates as such are very difficult to predict. Finally, an appreciation of the RMB against the EUR has been seen post IP. All these elements make it impossible to conclude that the currency fluctuations will have an upward effect on prices of dumped imports from the country concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

However, even in the event that this factor was taken into account, given the likely pressure on consumer prices in a context of a market downturn, it is unlikely that importers buying from the country concerned would be able to increase prices to retail as a result of the appreciation of the RMB. Furthermore, exchange rates as such are very difficult to predict. Finally, an appreciation of the RMB against the EUR has been seen post IP. All these elements make it impossible to conclude that the currency fluctuations will have an upward effect on prices of dumped imports from the country concerned.

| (141) | In view of the foregoing it cannot be concluded that the development of exchange rate could be another factor causing injury. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

In view of the foregoing it cannot be concluded that the development of exchange rate could be another factor causing injury.

7.2.10.   Increasing demand for steel wheels

Increasing demand for steel wheels

| (142) | Some parties claimed that the injury suffered by the Union industry was due to the fact that in times of economic crisis consumers turned to less expensive steel wheels, or to smaller cars which would allegedly more frequently be equipped with steel wheels. This argument was alleged to be reinforced by the fact that aid schemes introduced by different European countries incentivised sales of smaller cars. On the other hand, other parties claimed that although aid schemes indeed might have incentivised sales of smaller cars those cars were better equipped and fitted with aluminium wheels. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

Some parties claimed that the injury suffered by the Union industry was due to the fact that in times of economic crisis consumers turned to less expensive steel wheels, or to smaller cars which would allegedly more frequently be equipped with steel wheels. This argument was alleged to be reinforced by the fact that aid schemes introduced by different European countries incentivised sales of smaller cars. On the other hand, other parties claimed that although aid schemes indeed might have incentivised sales of smaller cars those cars were better equipped and fitted with aluminium wheels.

| (143) | Additional analysis has been conducted on the basis of data available, since there are no general statistics concerning steel wheels. Data on the level of consumption of steel wheels could be retrieved by comparing data on car production in the EU (recital (141) of the provisional Regulation) and consumption of OEM wheels (see recital (85) above). | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | IP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Production of cars in the EU (in 000 units) | 16 198 | 17 103 | 15 947 | 13 443 |
| Amount of wheels used in car production (production*4.5 wheel) | 72 891 | 76 963 | 71 761 | 60 493 |
| Consumption of OEM aluminium wheels in the EU (in 000 units) | 43 573 | 44 009 | 42 076 | 34 915 |
| Consumption of steel wheels in the EU (in 000 units) | 29 318 | 32 954 | 29 685 | 25 578 |
| Share of OEM aluminium wheels | 59  % | 57  % | 58  % | 57  % |
| Share of steel wheels | 40  % | 42  % | 41  % | 42  % |

(143)

Additional analysis has been conducted on the basis of data available, since there are no general statistics concerning steel wheels. Data on the level of consumption of steel wheels could be retrieved by comparing data on car production in the EU (recital (141) of the provisional Regulation) and consumption of OEM wheels (see recital (85) above).

2006

2007

2008

IP

Production of cars in the EU (in 000 units)

16 198

17 103

15 947

13 443

Amount of wheels used in car production (production*4.5 wheel)

72 891

76 963

71 761

60 493

Consumption of OEM aluminium wheels in the EU (in 000 units)

43 573

44 009

42 076

34 915

Consumption of steel wheels in the EU (in 000 units)

29 318

32 954

29 685

25 578

Share of OEM aluminium wheels

59  %

57  %

58  %

57  %

Share of steel wheels

40  %

42  %

41  %

42  %

| (144) | The table demonstrates that the consumption of steel wheels decreased by 12 % between 2008 and the IP. The share of aluminium wheels in production of new cars decreased by 1 percentage points between 2008 and the IP (period affected by the economic crisis). The share of steel wheels in the production of new cars in the EU increased by 1 percentage points over the same period. |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The table demonstrates that the consumption of steel wheels decreased by 12 % between 2008 and the IP. The share of aluminium wheels in production of new cars decreased by 1 percentage points between 2008 and the IP (period affected by the economic crisis). The share of steel wheels in the production of new cars in the EU increased by 1 percentage points over the same period.

| (145) | It can be concluded that the share of aluminium and steel wheels in the production of new cars remained stable. Besides, trends of consumption and production of aluminium wheels also do not support the above argument. Therefore, it had to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

It can be concluded that the share of aluminium and steel wheels in the production of new cars remained stable. Besides, trends of consumption and production of aluminium wheels also do not support the above argument. Therefore, it had to be rejected.

7.3.   Conclusion on causation

Conclusion on causation

| (146) | None of the arguments submitted by the interested parties demonstrates that the impact of factors other than dumped imports from the PRC is such as to break the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury found. The conclusions on causation in the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

None of the arguments submitted by the interested parties demonstrates that the impact of factors other than dumped imports from the PRC is such as to break the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury found. The conclusions on causation in the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

8.   UNION INTEREST

UNION INTEREST

| (147) | In view of parties’ comments the Commission conducted further analysis of all arguments pertaining to the Union interest. All issues have been examined and the conclusions of the provisional Regulation confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

In view of parties’ comments the Commission conducted further analysis of all arguments pertaining to the Union interest. All issues have been examined and the conclusions of the provisional Regulation confirmed.

8.1.   Interest of importers

Interest of importers

| (148) | As announced in recital (160) of the provisional Regulation the Commission further investigated the impact of duties on companies that import and resell their own branded ARWs, the production of which they have outsourced to the PRC. It has been established that although the impact of duties on such a company would most probably be more than impact on other types of importers as defined in recitals (159) – (160) of the provisional Regulation, it would still not be disproportionate in view of global effects on the whole Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

As announced in recital (160) of the provisional Regulation the Commission further investigated the impact of duties on companies that import and resell their own branded ARWs, the production of which they have outsourced to the PRC. It has been established that although the impact of duties on such a company would most probably be more than impact on other types of importers as defined in recitals (159) – (160) of the provisional Regulation, it would still not be disproportionate in view of global effects on the whole Union industry.

| (149) | Based on price data provided for the IP by one cooperating importer (outsourcer) it was established that the profit margins achieved by such company would be sufficient to shoulder the effects of the duties. The margins achieved by that company were higher than the proposed duties. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

Based on price data provided for the IP by one cooperating importer (outsourcer) it was established that the profit margins achieved by such company would be sufficient to shoulder the effects of the duties. The margins achieved by that company were higher than the proposed duties.

8.2.   Interest of users

Interest of users

| (150) | After imposition of provisional measures parties reiterated general comments on high cost impact of measures without providing evidence substantiating such claims. It is recalled that the cost impact analysis was based on data provided by the cooperating car manufacturers. Only three companies provided such data before imposition of provisional measures and only this data could form the basis of the Commission’s conclusions. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

After imposition of provisional measures parties reiterated general comments on high cost impact of measures without providing evidence substantiating such claims. It is recalled that the cost impact analysis was based on data provided by the cooperating car manufacturers. Only three companies provided such data before imposition of provisional measures and only this data could form the basis of the Commission’s conclusions.

| (151) | As stated in recital (165) of the provisional Regulation, the cost impact of measures is limited,with a maximum cost impact of 0,223 % (if accepting that all price levels would go up by 22,3 %). However even this maximum cost impact appears limited in view of the turnover achieved by car makers. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

As stated in recital (165) of the provisional Regulation, the cost impact of measures is limited,with a maximum cost impact of 0,223 % (if accepting that all price levels would go up by 22,3 %). However even this maximum cost impact appears limited in view of the turnover achieved by car makers.

| (152) | Some parties claimed that the cost increase due to measures would force them to delocalize their production. However, in view of the limited cost impact a decision to delocalize car production mentioned by some car makers would seem disproportionate to the cost impact established. The claims had to be therefore rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

Some parties claimed that the cost increase due to measures would force them to delocalize their production. However, in view of the limited cost impact a decision to delocalize car production mentioned by some car makers would seem disproportionate to the cost impact established. The claims had to be therefore rejected.

| (153) | It has to be also noted that the arguments on high cost impact contradict with comments of some car manufacturers that they rely on Chinese supplies to a very limited extent. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

It has to be also noted that the arguments on high cost impact contradict with comments of some car manufacturers that they rely on Chinese supplies to a very limited extent.

| (154) | The conclusions on cost impact of measures in the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

The conclusions on cost impact of measures in the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

8.3.   Variety of sources of supply

Variety of sources of supply

| (155) | The complainant submitted that imposition of measures would be in the interest of car industry. By ensuring that the Union industry would remain operational it would ensure a variety of sources of supply. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

The complainant submitted that imposition of measures would be in the interest of car industry. By ensuring that the Union industry would remain operational it would ensure a variety of sources of supply.

| (156) | Other parties, most notably users, reiterated their arguments with regard to the competition on the EU market. They also claimed that imports from the PRC were essential to cover the demand on the EU market with EU producers being unable to provide sufficient capacities. Whereas the capacity utilisation rate remained at the level of 92 % in the years 2006 and 2007, there has been a dramatic drop to 84 % in 2008 and 73 % in the IP. These data clearly demonstrates that there are, especially currently, sufficient free capacities which could be used for increased production. Further, the argument of insufficient capacities on the part of the Union industry contradicts with other claims by the car industry namely those of substantially reduced demand for OEM wheels. The claims therefore had to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

Other parties, most notably users, reiterated their arguments with regard to the competition on the EU market. They also claimed that imports from the PRC were essential to cover the demand on the EU market with EU producers being unable to provide sufficient capacities. Whereas the capacity utilisation rate remained at the level of 92 % in the years 2006 and 2007, there has been a dramatic drop to 84 % in 2008 and 73 % in the IP. These data clearly demonstrates that there are, especially currently, sufficient free capacities which could be used for increased production. Further, the argument of insufficient capacities on the part of the Union industry contradicts with other claims by the car industry namely those of substantially reduced demand for OEM wheels. The claims therefore had to be rejected.

| (157) | One party also claimed that the Chinese producers were not producing the same product types as the European ARW manufacturers. These claims had to be rejected in view of the level of PCN matching found in this case (depending on the calculation performed, as explained in recital (93), the matching ratio would be 92 % for the undercutting calculation for the product concerned considered as a whole and 77 % for OEM and AM segments considered separately). |
| --- | --- |

(157)

One party also claimed that the Chinese producers were not producing the same product types as the European ARW manufacturers. These claims had to be rejected in view of the level of PCN matching found in this case (depending on the calculation performed, as explained in recital (93), the matching ratio would be 92 % for the undercutting calculation for the product concerned considered as a whole and 77 % for OEM and AM segments considered separately).

| (158) | The conclusions in recital (166) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

The conclusions in recital (166) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

8.4.   South Korea

South Korea

| (159) | Parties reiterated their comments with regard to the negative impact of the duties in the present case when combined with other factors, like the competitive advantage given to South Korean car manufacturers on the basis of the Free Trade Agreement. These comments have not been substantiated by any new evidence. It should be noted that there is no evidence that FTA would result in injury to the car industry and that in any event a safeguard instruments is available under the FTA in question as a remedy. The conclusions in recitals (167) and (168) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

Parties reiterated their comments with regard to the negative impact of the duties in the present case when combined with other factors, like the competitive advantage given to South Korean car manufacturers on the basis of the Free Trade Agreement. These comments have not been substantiated by any new evidence. It should be noted that there is no evidence that FTA would result in injury to the car industry and that in any event a safeguard instruments is available under the FTA in question as a remedy. The conclusions in recitals (167) and (168) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

8.5.   Conclusion on Union interest

Conclusion on Union interest

| (160) | The conclusions in recitals (153) – (171) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

The conclusions in recitals (153) – (171) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

9.   PROVISIONAL MEASURES

PROVISIONAL MEASURES

9.1.   Injury elimination level

Injury elimination level

| (161) | Most of the comments received concerned the calculation of the injury elimination level. Parties questioned the methodology of this calculation as such and complained about insufficient disclosure. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

Most of the comments received concerned the calculation of the injury elimination level. Parties questioned the methodology of this calculation as such and complained about insufficient disclosure.

9.1.1.   Disclosure

Disclosure

| (162) | It is recalled that the methodology for calculation of the injury elimination level has been explained in detail in the note included in the file open for consultation by interested parties on the date of publication of provisional measures. All interested parties also received this note together with the disclosure letter sent on the same day. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

It is recalled that the methodology for calculation of the injury elimination level has been explained in detail in the note included in the file open for consultation by interested parties on the date of publication of provisional measures. All interested parties also received this note together with the disclosure letter sent on the same day.

| (163) | A second note has been included in the file open for consultation by interested parties in reply to comments submitted after the imposition of provisional measures. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

A second note has been included in the file open for consultation by interested parties in reply to comments submitted after the imposition of provisional measures.

| (164) | It is recalled that PCNs used for the calculation per car maker were clearly identified in the above mentioned note. However, precise data on price and volume items could not be disclosed due to confidentiality reasons. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

It is recalled that PCNs used for the calculation per car maker were clearly identified in the above mentioned note. However, precise data on price and volume items could not be disclosed due to confidentiality reasons.

| (165) | As regards imports from China, data on quantities exported, on CIF Union border value and weighted average unit sales prices could not be disclosed as they were based on transactions made by two exporters. The disclosure hence would breach the confidentiality requirements as contained in the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

As regards imports from China, data on quantities exported, on CIF Union border value and weighted average unit sales prices could not be disclosed as they were based on transactions made by two exporters. The disclosure hence would breach the confidentiality requirements as contained in the basic Regulation.

| (166) | As regards transactions made by the Union producers on the EU market, providing more detailed information would only be meaningful if given individually for each of the producers. This is however not possible since it would be in breach of the abovementioned confidentiality requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

As regards transactions made by the Union producers on the EU market, providing more detailed information would only be meaningful if given individually for each of the producers. This is however not possible since it would be in breach of the abovementioned confidentiality requirements.

| (167) | On these grounds, it is therefore considered that the detailed information on the methodology applied in calculating the duty (including among others the PCNs used and split by car maker) has provided the parties with sufficient information to allow them to fully exercise their rights of defence, while respecting the confidentiality requirements provided for in the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

On these grounds, it is therefore considered that the detailed information on the methodology applied in calculating the duty (including among others the PCNs used and split by car maker) has provided the parties with sufficient information to allow them to fully exercise their rights of defence, while respecting the confidentiality requirements provided for in the basic Regulation.

9.1.2.   Methodology

Methodology

| (168) | It is recalled that underselling was computed on the basis of data relating to ARW purchases made by car makers. For the reasons set out in particular in recitals (174) – (177) of the provisional Regulation, this approach encompasses only ARWs destined for the OEM segment. Car makers which cooperate with the investigation confirmed that they purchase ARWs pursuant to tender proceedings. Given the nature of tender proceedings, models that are ‘dual-sourced’ have to be the same in all respects, whether purchased from the PRC or the EU. In order to ensure the highest possible level of comparison between imported Chinese and EU products, comparison has been made PCN per PCN separately for each large car maker identified in the data supplied by both EU sampled producers and cooperating Chinese exporters. Contrary to claims by some parties this level of duties is not an outcome of any kind of adjustment but it recognizes that the duty has to be set at a level appropriate to remedy the injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

It is recalled that underselling was computed on the basis of data relating to ARW purchases made by car makers. For the reasons set out in particular in recitals (174) – (177) of the provisional Regulation, this approach encompasses only ARWs destined for the OEM segment. Car makers which cooperate with the investigation confirmed that they purchase ARWs pursuant to tender proceedings. Given the nature of tender proceedings, models that are ‘dual-sourced’ have to be the same in all respects, whether purchased from the PRC or the EU. In order to ensure the highest possible level of comparison between imported Chinese and EU products, comparison has been made PCN per PCN separately for each large car maker identified in the data supplied by both EU sampled producers and cooperating Chinese exporters. Contrary to claims by some parties this level of duties is not an outcome of any kind of adjustment but it recognizes that the duty has to be set at a level appropriate to remedy the injury suffered by the Union industry.

9.1.2.1.   Information used as the basis for the calculation

Information used as the basis for the calculation

| (169) | Parties claimed that the injury elimination level calculation was conducted on the basis of tenders although information on tenders was neither requested in the investigation nor made available in the file open for consultation by interested parties. |
| --- | --- |

(169)

Parties claimed that the injury elimination level calculation was conducted on the basis of tenders although information on tenders was neither requested in the investigation nor made available in the file open for consultation by interested parties.

| (170) | Although tenders were mentioned in the description of the methodology applied to calculate the duty level, this reference was only a reference to the type of sourcing procedure applied by car makers which guaranteed that dual-sourced wheels would be the same and that a higher level of comparability could be achieved. It was not a reference to documentation or sources of information on the basis of which calculations were conducted. |
| --- | --- |

(170)

Although tenders were mentioned in the description of the methodology applied to calculate the duty level, this reference was only a reference to the type of sourcing procedure applied by car makers which guaranteed that dual-sourced wheels would be the same and that a higher level of comparability could be achieved. It was not a reference to documentation or sources of information on the basis of which calculations were conducted.

| (171) | To the contrary, the calculations were conducted in accordance with the usual practice on the basis of the transaction-by-transaction listings provided by the sampled exporting producers and EU manufacturers. The PCN matching was conducted at the level of car maker, i.e. within a group of transactions identified as exporters’ and EU producers’ sales to this specific car maker. These data were fully verified. |
| --- | --- |

(171)

To the contrary, the calculations were conducted in accordance with the usual practice on the basis of the transaction-by-transaction listings provided by the sampled exporting producers and EU manufacturers. The PCN matching was conducted at the level of car maker, i.e. within a group of transactions identified as exporters’ and EU producers’ sales to this specific car maker. These data were fully verified.

9.1.2.2.   Adjustments

Adjustments

| (172) | Parties’ comments further related to adjustments made in the calculation. The Commission accepted some of those comments. |
| --- | --- |

(172)

Parties’ comments further related to adjustments made in the calculation. The Commission accepted some of those comments.

| (173) | It is recalled that the CIF prices of Chinese exporters were adjusted upwards by adding 7,6 %: 4,5 % customs duty plus 3,1 % other importation cost. In order to construct a target price on the basis of the actual EU manufacturers’ sales price, two additions had to be made:






  1. | add 5,4 % on a turnover basis to reach the level of cost of production (note that this is the weighted average loss for EU wheel producers found for the IP), |
| --- | --- | --- |

(173)

It is recalled that the CIF prices of Chinese exporters were adjusted upwards by adding 7,6 %: 4,5 % customs duty plus 3,1 % other importation cost. In order to construct a target price on the basis of the actual EU manufacturers’ sales price, two additions had to be made:

1.

add 5,4 % on a turnover basis to reach the level of cost of production (note that this is the weighted average loss for EU wheel producers found for the IP),

| 2. | add 3,2 % on a turnover basis to cost of production (computed under (1)) to cater for a reasonable profit and to arrive at a target price. The 3,2 % correspond to the profit achieved by the Union industry in 2006, the first year of the period considered, when the financial results of Union producers were not yet affected by injurious dumping. |
| --- | --- |

2.

add 3,2 % on a turnover basis to cost of production (computed under (1)) to cater for a reasonable profit and to arrive at a target price. The 3,2 % correspond to the profit achieved by the Union industry in 2006, the first year of the period considered, when the financial results of Union producers were not yet affected by injurious dumping.

| (174) | As regards customs duties, at the provisional stage import prices have been adjusted upwards by 4,5 %. This duty corresponds to the customs duty applied to CN code 8708 70 50. However, it is CN code 8708 70 10 which in principle concerns aluminium road wheels for the industrial assembly (i.e., OEM), and not CN code 8708 70 50. A duty of 3 % is applicable to imports under this code. Given the methodology used to determine the injury elimination level, which is based on the OEM segment, and in view of comments by parties after the imposition of provisional measures, it is appropriate, in order to ensure consistency in the approach, to use a duty rate of 3 %. |
| --- | --- |

(174)

As regards customs duties, at the provisional stage import prices have been adjusted upwards by 4,5 %. This duty corresponds to the customs duty applied to CN code 8708 70 50. However, it is CN code 8708 70 10 which in principle concerns aluminium road wheels for the industrial assembly (i.e., OEM), and not CN code 8708 70 50. A duty of 3 % is applicable to imports under this code. Given the methodology used to determine the injury elimination level, which is based on the OEM segment, and in view of comments by parties after the imposition of provisional measures, it is appropriate, in order to ensure consistency in the approach, to use a duty rate of 3 %.

| (175) | With regard to target profit parties claimed that this profit margin has been calculated for both OEM and AM producers and might thus inflate the calculation based on OEM transactions only. In view of parties’ comments, the Commission adjusted these calculations by applying rates of loss and profit calculated for OEM wheels only (-5,7 % and 3,1 % respectively, see recital (106) et seq. above). |
| --- | --- |

(175)

With regard to target profit parties claimed that this profit margin has been calculated for both OEM and AM producers and might thus inflate the calculation based on OEM transactions only. In view of parties’ comments, the Commission adjusted these calculations by applying rates of loss and profit calculated for OEM wheels only (-5,7 % and 3,1 % respectively, see recital (106) et seq. above).

| (176) | On the other hand parties argued that the level of profit should be adjusted downwards in order to reflect the impact of the crisis. However, it is a consistent practice to apply the profit margin which the industry would have achieved in the absence of dumping practices. Other causes of injury, even if contributing, are not singled out in the calculation of target profit. |
| --- | --- |

(176)

On the other hand parties argued that the level of profit should be adjusted downwards in order to reflect the impact of the crisis. However, it is a consistent practice to apply the profit margin which the industry would have achieved in the absence of dumping practices. Other causes of injury, even if contributing, are not singled out in the calculation of target profit.

| (177) | Certain parties claimed that the methodology used to calculate the injury elimination level was in breach of the methodology prescribed by the basic Regulation. However, the basic Regulation does not prescribe any particular method to establish the injury elimination level. The method to establish such a level must be examined in terms of the specific facts of the case. As explained in the provisional Regulation and elsewhere in this Regulation, the facts of the case support the use of the methodology applied by the Institutions. Further, it has to be noted that the undercutting levels disclosed in the provisional Regulation and above in recital (93) are an indication that the underselling levels using the approach suggested by certain parties would be much higher. |
| --- | --- |

(177)

Certain parties claimed that the methodology used to calculate the injury elimination level was in breach of the methodology prescribed by the basic Regulation. However, the basic Regulation does not prescribe any particular method to establish the injury elimination level. The method to establish such a level must be examined in terms of the specific facts of the case. As explained in the provisional Regulation and elsewhere in this Regulation, the facts of the case support the use of the methodology applied by the Institutions. Further, it has to be noted that the undercutting levels disclosed in the provisional Regulation and above in recital (93) are an indication that the underselling levels using the approach suggested by certain parties would be much higher.

| (178) | Taking into account these changes the duty rate amounts to 22,3 %. |
| --- | --- |

(178)

Taking into account these changes the duty rate amounts to 22,3 %.

9.1.2.3.   Applicability of ‘OEM duty’ to AM sales

Applicability of ‘OEM duty’ to AM sales

| (179) | One party claimed that it was inappropriate that the calculation of the injury elimination level was based only on OEM sales while the duty was also applicable to AM wheels. However, as explained above (and also in points (174) – (177) of the provisional Regulation), this approach is appropriate in this case, in particular since 85 % of Union producers’ sales relate to the OEM segment. |
| --- | --- |

(179)

One party claimed that it was inappropriate that the calculation of the injury elimination level was based only on OEM sales while the duty was also applicable to AM wheels. However, as explained above (and also in points (174) – (177) of the provisional Regulation), this approach is appropriate in this case, in particular since 85 % of Union producers’ sales relate to the OEM segment.

| (180) | The approach applied by the Commission whereby the calculation of the injury elimination element has been limited only to the OEM was the most appropriate. A different approach did not seem appropriate because it would lead to a situation where a set of export data geared more to AM would be compared to that of the EU industry selling predominantly to the OEM segment. |
| --- | --- |

(180)

The approach applied by the Commission whereby the calculation of the injury elimination element has been limited only to the OEM was the most appropriate. A different approach did not seem appropriate because it would lead to a situation where a set of export data geared more to AM would be compared to that of the EU industry selling predominantly to the OEM segment.

| (181) | The approach applied is justified and reasonable given that the aim of the measure is to eliminate injury of the EU industry. It ensures that the duty was not set at a level higher than what is necessary to eliminate injury. |
| --- | --- |

(181)

The approach applied is justified and reasonable given that the aim of the measure is to eliminate injury of the EU industry. It ensures that the duty was not set at a level higher than what is necessary to eliminate injury.

9.1.2.4.   Impracticability and the obligation to establish an individual duty for those operators having been granted IT

Impracticability and the obligation to establish an individual duty for those operators having been granted IT

| (182) | One party caimed that unlike the first paragraph of Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation, the second paragraph does not provide for the possibility not to specify the individual duty. Consequently, it argued that the exception linked to impracticability could not be applied in the present case and that the obligation to establish an individual duty rate for those exporters having been granted IT remains. |
| --- | --- |

(182)

One party caimed that unlike the first paragraph of Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation, the second paragraph does not provide for the possibility not to specify the individual duty. Consequently, it argued that the exception linked to impracticability could not be applied in the present case and that the obligation to establish an individual duty rate for those exporters having been granted IT remains.

| (183) | Certain parties further claimed that impracticability was only due to the methodology applied; hence it was ‘self-induced’ by the Commission. The parties alleged that the Commission had at its disposal all data submitted by the AM exporting producers enabling it to include AM sales in the calculation of the injury elimination level. |
| --- | --- |

(183)

Certain parties further claimed that impracticability was only due to the methodology applied; hence it was ‘self-induced’ by the Commission. The parties alleged that the Commission had at its disposal all data submitted by the AM exporting producers enabling it to include AM sales in the calculation of the injury elimination level.

| (184) | Finally, certain parties claimed that since the Commission was able to calculate undercutting separately for OEM and AM segments it must have been able to calculate underselling. A final argument was that AM prices could be compared with OEM prices since the PCN construction did not make any distinction between the two segments. |
| --- | --- |

(184)

Finally, certain parties claimed that since the Commission was able to calculate undercutting separately for OEM and AM segments it must have been able to calculate underselling. A final argument was that AM prices could be compared with OEM prices since the PCN construction did not make any distinction between the two segments.

| (185) | Regarding the first argument, it is true that Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation is based on the presumption that if an operator is granted IT, it will be possible to specify an individual duty for it. However, in this particular case, doing so would be impracticable and/or inappropriate. That is because, as explained above, for determining the injury elimination level it is necessary to focus on OEM sales. Moreover, regarding all producers having been granted IT, a duty also based on their AM-sales would be inappropriately high, i.e. in excess of what would be warranted in the circumstances of this particular case in order to eliminate injury. That is because, as explained above, an injury elimination level of 22,3 % is sufficient to protect Union producers on their primary market (OEM). A duty which would also be based on those producers’ AM-sales – which, in all three cases of producers granted IT, would be higher – would therefore be unduly high. |
| --- | --- |

(185)

Regarding the first argument, it is true that Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation is based on the presumption that if an operator is granted IT, it will be possible to specify an individual duty for it. However, in this particular case, doing so would be impracticable and/or inappropriate. That is because, as explained above, for determining the injury elimination level it is necessary to focus on OEM sales. Moreover, regarding all producers having been granted IT, a duty also based on their AM-sales would be inappropriately high, i.e. in excess of what would be warranted in the circumstances of this particular case in order to eliminate injury. That is because, as explained above, an injury elimination level of 22,3 % is sufficient to protect Union producers on their primary market (OEM). A duty which would also be based on those producers’ AM-sales – which, in all three cases of producers granted IT, would be higher – would therefore be unduly high.

| (186) | It also has to be mentioned that the reference to lack of reliable data in recital (182) of the provisional Regulation did not relate to the quality of data provided but to the type of data used for the calculation (PCN matching per car maker, i.e. comparing the models sourced from the PRC and EU by a specific car maker). The type of procedure used to source wheels on the OEM segment gave the opportunity to achieve a greater level of comparability. The same type of data, due to the fact that different procedures are used, could not be provided for the AM-sales. |
| --- | --- |

(186)

It also has to be mentioned that the reference to lack of reliable data in recital (182) of the provisional Regulation did not relate to the quality of data provided but to the type of data used for the calculation (PCN matching per car maker, i.e. comparing the models sourced from the PRC and EU by a specific car maker). The type of procedure used to source wheels on the OEM segment gave the opportunity to achieve a greater level of comparability. The same type of data, due to the fact that different procedures are used, could not be provided for the AM-sales.

| (187) | The exercise of establishing injury on the basis of Article 3 of the basic Regulation is legally separate from setting the level of the duty. The latter exercise is conducted once injury has been established with a view to setting a level of duty which would be sufficient to remedy injury. Consequently, the Commission conducted this calculation in accordance with the chosen methodology. Also the fact that the PCN structure did not include the criterion of sales channels is not linked to the methodology applied when establishing the injury elimination level. |
| --- | --- |

(187)

The exercise of establishing injury on the basis of Article 3 of the basic Regulation is legally separate from setting the level of the duty. The latter exercise is conducted once injury has been established with a view to setting a level of duty which would be sufficient to remedy injury. Consequently, the Commission conducted this calculation in accordance with the chosen methodology. Also the fact that the PCN structure did not include the criterion of sales channels is not linked to the methodology applied when establishing the injury elimination level.

| (188) | Parties’ arguments related to the application of impracticability exception as well as to the unconditional character of the obligation to establish an individual duty rate have to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(188)

Parties’ arguments related to the application of impracticability exception as well as to the unconditional character of the obligation to establish an individual duty rate have to be rejected.

9.1.2.5.   Representativity of transactions used

Representativity of transactions used

| (189) | Parties’ criticisms related also to the fact that the injury elimination level calculation was arbitrary because it selected only few unrepresentative transactions. |
| --- | --- |

(189)

Parties’ criticisms related also to the fact that the injury elimination level calculation was arbitrary because it selected only few unrepresentative transactions.

| (190) | First and foremost, parties claimed that the calculation was based on an unrepresentative volume of import transactions from the PRC. Such an approach allegedly contradicts the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (12) as it cannot be considered as based on positive evidence. Complainant argued that the fact that most of the EU industry sales were OEM was of no importance since the purpose of the underselling calculation is to determine the average amount by which the price of dumped imports should be raised in order not to cause injury. The underselling calculation must be representative for the dumped imports and not for the sales of EU industry. Another party claimed that such an approach contradicted Institutions’ own practice as normally the individual undercutting and underselling is weighted per PCN on the basis of share of undercutting and underselling quantities of exports rather than quantities sold by EU industry. |
| --- | --- |

(190)

First and foremost, parties claimed that the calculation was based on an unrepresentative volume of import transactions from the PRC. Such an approach allegedly contradicts the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (12) as it cannot be considered as based on positive evidence. Complainant argued that the fact that most of the EU industry sales were OEM was of no importance since the purpose of the underselling calculation is to determine the average amount by which the price of dumped imports should be raised in order not to cause injury. The underselling calculation must be representative for the dumped imports and not for the sales of EU industry. Another party claimed that such an approach contradicted Institutions’ own practice as normally the individual undercutting and underselling is weighted per PCN on the basis of share of undercutting and underselling quantities of exports rather than quantities sold by EU industry.

12

| (191) | It is recalled that the injury elimination margin reflects (based on the sample) the situation of around 85 % of the EU industry sales, which are directed to the OEM segment. It was the choice of methodology, and not the technicalities of the calculation as such, that was driven by the specific situation on the EU market where the majority of sales are directed to the OEM segment. This choice led the Commission to compare prices at the level of car maker, achieving a greater level of comparability and at the same time ensuring that the injury elimination level is not overstated. |
| --- | --- |

(191)

It is recalled that the injury elimination margin reflects (based on the sample) the situation of around 85 % of the EU industry sales, which are directed to the OEM segment. It was the choice of methodology, and not the technicalities of the calculation as such, that was driven by the specific situation on the EU market where the majority of sales are directed to the OEM segment. This choice led the Commission to compare prices at the level of car maker, achieving a greater level of comparability and at the same time ensuring that the injury elimination level is not overstated.

| (192) | It is further recalled with regard to representativity that the matching ratio of export transactions used in proportion with all exports by sampled Chinese exporters into the OEM segment was found to be more than 55 %. Such a ratio was considered representative given the methodology used in calculating the injury elimination level. |
| --- | --- |

(192)

It is further recalled with regard to representativity that the matching ratio of export transactions used in proportion with all exports by sampled Chinese exporters into the OEM segment was found to be more than 55 %. Such a ratio was considered representative given the methodology used in calculating the injury elimination level.

9.1.2.6.   Duty based on undercutting

Duty based on undercutting

| (193) | One party claimed that the injury margin should have been based on undercutting pursuant to the practice established in the Council Regulation (EC) No 1531/2002 (13) imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Indeed in this case the duty was based on price undercutting taking account of the fact that factors other than the dumped imports appeared to have contributed to the injury to the Union industry and secondly that on a worldwide basis this industry had for a number of years realised no or extremely low profits (14). |
| --- | --- |

(193)

One party claimed that the injury margin should have been based on undercutting pursuant to the practice established in the Council Regulation (EC) No 1531/2002 (13) imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Indeed in this case the duty was based on price undercutting taking account of the fact that factors other than the dumped imports appeared to have contributed to the injury to the Union industry and secondly that on a worldwide basis this industry had for a number of years realised no or extremely low profits (14).

13

14

| (194) | It should be noted that the factors that led to the decision to set the level of duties at the level of price undercutting are not applicable to the present case. Unlike in colour television receivers case (15) the product concerned is not characterised by low levels of profitability. The profitability decreased substantially as a result of low priced imports from the country concerned. Also the imports from other third countries remained stable over the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(194)

It should be noted that the factors that led to the decision to set the level of duties at the level of price undercutting are not applicable to the present case. Unlike in colour television receivers case (15) the product concerned is not characterised by low levels of profitability. The profitability decreased substantially as a result of low priced imports from the country concerned. Also the imports from other third countries remained stable over the period considered.

15

9.2.   Conclusion on injury elimination level

Conclusion on injury elimination level

| (195) | The approach in the provisional Regulation with regard to the methodology used is hereby confirmed. Taking into account parties’ comments on adjustments the re-calculated level of the duty amounts to 22,3 %. |
| --- | --- |

(195)

The approach in the provisional Regulation with regard to the methodology used is hereby confirmed. Taking into account parties’ comments on adjustments the re-calculated level of the duty amounts to 22,3 %.

10.   ALLEGATION OF CIRCUMVENTION

ALLEGATION OF CIRCUMVENTION

| (196) | Parties alleged that measures can possibly be circumvented, pointing to notably recent increase of imports of ARWs from countries without known local production. Competent authorities have been alerted about those developments and possibilities and the issue will be closely monitored. |
| --- | --- |

(196)

Parties alleged that measures can possibly be circumvented, pointing to notably recent increase of imports of ARWs from countries without known local production. Competent authorities have been alerted about those developments and possibilities and the issue will be closely monitored.

11.   UNDERTAKING

UNDERTAKING

| (197) | One unrelated importer expressed an interest to offer a price undertaking. Although no formal price undertaking was offered, it is noted that Article 8 of the basic Regulation limits the possibility to offer price undertakings exclusively to exporters. The Commission’s practice not to accept undertaking offers from importers was also accepted by the European Court of Justice (16), arguing, inter alia, that the acceptance of an undertaking offered by an importer would have the effect of encouraging him to continue to obtain supplies at dumped prices. |
| --- | --- |

(197)

One unrelated importer expressed an interest to offer a price undertaking. Although no formal price undertaking was offered, it is noted that Article 8 of the basic Regulation limits the possibility to offer price undertakings exclusively to exporters. The Commission’s practice not to accept undertaking offers from importers was also accepted by the European Court of Justice (16), arguing, inter alia, that the acceptance of an undertaking offered by an importer would have the effect of encouraging him to continue to obtain supplies at dumped prices.

16

| (198) | Two cooperating Chinese exporting producers offered a price undertaking in accordance with Article 8(1) of the basic Regulation. However, the product concerned exists in a multitude of product types, for which prices vary significantly (for one company even up to 300 %), thus posing a very high risk of cross-compensation. In addition, the product types will evolve in design and finishing. It was therefore considered that the product is not suitable for a price undertaking. In addition, one of the companies did receive neither Market Economy Status nor Individual Treatment, whereas for the other company, major accounting problems were identified and its structure and product range (production of OEM/AM) was considered too complex. The undertaking offers therefore were rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(198)

Two cooperating Chinese exporting producers offered a price undertaking in accordance with Article 8(1) of the basic Regulation. However, the product concerned exists in a multitude of product types, for which prices vary significantly (for one company even up to 300 %), thus posing a very high risk of cross-compensation. In addition, the product types will evolve in design and finishing. It was therefore considered that the product is not suitable for a price undertaking. In addition, one of the companies did receive neither Market Economy Status nor Individual Treatment, whereas for the other company, major accounting problems were identified and its structure and product range (production of OEM/AM) was considered too complex. The undertaking offers therefore were rejected.

12.   CUSTOMS DECLARATION

CUSTOMS DECLARATION

| (199) | Statistics of aluminium wheels are frequently expressed in number of pieces. However, there is no such supplementary unit for aluminium wheels specified in the Combined Nomenclature laid down in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (17). It is therefore necessary to provide that not only the weight in kg or tonnes but also the number of pieces of the product concerned and of certain products of CN code ex 8716 90 90 for imports is entered in the declaration for release for free circulation. |
| --- | --- |

(199)

Statistics of aluminium wheels are frequently expressed in number of pieces. However, there is no such supplementary unit for aluminium wheels specified in the Combined Nomenclature laid down in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (17). It is therefore necessary to provide that not only the weight in kg or tonnes but also the number of pieces of the product concerned and of certain products of CN code ex 8716 90 90 for imports is entered in the declaration for release for free circulation.

17

13.   DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF PROVISIONAL DUTY

DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF PROVISIONAL DUTY

| (200) | In view of the magnitude of the dumping margins found and in the light of the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, it is considered necessary that the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, imposed by the provisional Regulation be definitively collected, |
| --- | --- |

(200)

In view of the magnitude of the dumping margins found and in the light of the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, it is considered necessary that the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, imposed by the provisional Regulation be definitively collected,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.   A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of aluminium road wheels of the motor vehicles of CN headings 8701 to 8705, whether or not with their accessories and whether or not fitted with tyres, currently falling within CN codes ex 8708 70 10 and ex 8708 70 50 (TARIC codes 8708701010 and 8708705010) and originating in the People’s Republic of China.

2.   The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 shall be 22,3 %.

3.   Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

Amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties pursuant Regulation (EU) No 404/2010 on imports of certain aluminium road wheels, currently falling within CN codes ex 8708 70 10 and ex 8708 70 50 (TARIC codes 8708701010 and 8708705010), and originating in the People’s Republic of China, shall be definitively collected.

Article 3

Where a declaration for release for free circulation is presented in respect of imports of aluminium road wheels of vehicles of CN heading 8716, whether or not with their accessories and whether or not fitted with tyres, and currently falling within CN code ex 8716 90 90, TARIC code 8716909010 shall be entered in the relevant field of that declaration.

Member States shall, on a monthly basis, inform the Commission of the number of pieces imported under this code, and of their origin.

Article 4

Where a declaration for release for free circulation is presented in respect of the products mentioned under Articles 1 and 3, the number of pieces of the products imported shall be entered in the relevant field of that declaration.

Article 5

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 25 October 2010.

For the Council

The President

S. VANACKERE

---

(1)  
  OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 117, 11.5.2010, p. 64.

2

(3)  Case T 498/04. Zheijiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group Co. Ltd, paragraph 85.

3

(4)  European Communities-Countervailing Measures on Dynamic random Access memory Chips from Korea, WT/DS299/R, Panel Report 17 June 2005, para 7186.

4

(5)  Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ L 188, 18.7.2009).

5

(6)  Shanghai Excell M&E Enterprise Co. Ltd and Shanghai Adeptech Precision Co. Ltd vs Council.

6

(7)  There was a clerical error in recital (90) of the provisional Regulation which stated that the increase amounted to 0,5 % (it was 0,5 EUR and 1,6 %).

7

(8)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1888/2006 of 19 December 2006 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in Thailand (OJ L 364, 20.12.2006, p. 68).

8

(9)  Council Regulation (EC) No 682/2007 of 18 June 2007 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in Thailand (OJ L 159, 20.6.2007, p. 14).

9

(10)  WT/DS184/AB/R, 23.8.2001, United States – Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan.

10

(11)  Recitals (50) – (51) of Regulation (EC) No 1888/2006.

11

(12)  Agreement on Implementation of Article IV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.

12

(13)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1531/2002 of 14 August 2002 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand and terminating the proceeding regarding imports of colour television receivers originating in Singapore (OJ L 231, 29.8.2002, p. 1).

13

(14)  Ibid, para 229.

14

(15)  Ibid, para 231.

15

(16)  Nashua Corporation and others vs Commission and Council, joined cases C-133/87 and C-150/87, ECR 1990 page I-719 and Gestetner Holdings plc vs Council and Commission, C-156/87, ECR 1990 p. I-781.

16

(17)  
  OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1.

17

---

| 28.10.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 282/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 282/24

---

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 965/2010

of 25 October 2010

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of sodium gluconate originating in the People’s Republic of China

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (1) (the ‘basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 9 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal submitted by the European Commission (‘the Commission’), after consulting the Advisory Committee,

Whereas:

1.   PROCEDURE

PROCEDURE

1.1.   Provisional measures

Provisional measures

| (1) | The Commission by Regulation (EU) No 377/2010 (2) (the ‘provisional Regulation’) imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of dry sodium gluconate originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘China’ or ‘country concerned’). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Commission by Regulation (EU) No 377/2010 (2) (the ‘provisional Regulation’) imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of dry sodium gluconate originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘China’ or ‘country concerned’).

2

| (2) | It is recalled that the proceeding was initiated following a complaint lodged by the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) (‘the complainant’) on behalf of producers representing 100 % of the total Union production. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

It is recalled that the proceeding was initiated following a complaint lodged by the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) (‘the complainant’) on behalf of producers representing 100 % of the total Union production.

| (3) | As set out in recital 13 of the provisional Regulation, the investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 (‘investigation period’ or ‘IP’). With respect to the trends relevant for the injury assessment, the Commission analysed data covering the period from 1 January 2005 to the end of the IP (‘period considered’). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

As set out in recital 13 of the provisional Regulation, the investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 (‘investigation period’ or ‘IP’). With respect to the trends relevant for the injury assessment, the Commission analysed data covering the period from 1 January 2005 to the end of the IP (‘period considered’).

1.2.   Subsequent procedure

Subsequent procedure

| (4) | Subsequent to the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was decided to impose provisional anti-dumping measures (‘provisional disclosure’), several interested parties made written submissions making known their views on the provisional findings. The parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard. The Commission continued to seek and verify all information it deemed necessary for its definitive findings. To this end verification visits were carried out at the following companies:

  Producers in the Union:







  — | Roquette GmbH, Germany, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

Subsequent to the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was decided to impose provisional anti-dumping measures (‘provisional disclosure’), several interested parties made written submissions making known their views on the provisional findings. The parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard. The Commission continued to seek and verify all information it deemed necessary for its definitive findings. To this end verification visits were carried out at the following companies:

Producers in the Union:

Producers in the Union:

—

Roquette GmbH, Germany,

| — | Roquette UK, United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

—

Roquette UK, United Kingdom.

| (5) | All parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of dry sodium gluconate originating in China and the definitive collection of the amounts secured by way of the provisional duty (‘final disclosure’). They were also granted a period within which they could make representations subsequent to this disclosure. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

All parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of dry sodium gluconate originating in China and the definitive collection of the amounts secured by way of the provisional duty (‘final disclosure’). They were also granted a period within which they could make representations subsequent to this disclosure.

| (6) | The oral and written comments submitted by the interested parties were considered and, where appropriate, the provisional findings were modified accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The oral and written comments submitted by the interested parties were considered and, where appropriate, the provisional findings were modified accordingly.

2.   PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

| (7) | In the absence of any comments concerning the product concerned or the like product, recitals 14 to 17 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In the absence of any comments concerning the product concerned or the like product, recitals 14 to 17 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

3.   DUMPING

DUMPING

3.1.   Market economy treatment (MET)

Market economy treatment (MET)

| (8) | The Union industry (UI) reiterated its reservations on the MET granted to the Chinese exporting producer, Shandong Kaison Biochemical, without providing any new elements to support them. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The Union industry (UI) reiterated its reservations on the MET granted to the Chinese exporting producer, Shandong Kaison Biochemical, without providing any new elements to support them.

| (9) | The UI further claimed, without providing any evidence, that the raw materials used to produce dry sodium gluconate in China were exempt from VAT and that the buyer could be reimbursed a ‘virtual VAT’ of 13 % to 17 % on their purchases. In this regard, it was found that to produce dry sodium gluconate, the raw material (cornstarch) was purchased from several industrial suppliers that process the corn (agricultural product) into cornstarch. Furthermore, the prices of cornstarch in major regions of the world were examined and there were no indications that Chinese users of cornstarch obtained the product at favourable prices. In addition, several purchase invoices for cornstarch were checked and all of them carried VAT. In addition, there was no evidence that ‘virtual VAT’ was reimbursed on purchases. These claims were therefore rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The UI further claimed, without providing any evidence, that the raw materials used to produce dry sodium gluconate in China were exempt from VAT and that the buyer could be reimbursed a ‘virtual VAT’ of 13 % to 17 % on their purchases. In this regard, it was found that to produce dry sodium gluconate, the raw material (cornstarch) was purchased from several industrial suppliers that process the corn (agricultural product) into cornstarch. Furthermore, the prices of cornstarch in major regions of the world were examined and there were no indications that Chinese users of cornstarch obtained the product at favourable prices. In addition, several purchase invoices for cornstarch were checked and all of them carried VAT. In addition, there was no evidence that ‘virtual VAT’ was reimbursed on purchases. These claims were therefore rejected.

| (10) | In the absence of any other comments with regard to MET, recitals 18 to 21 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

In the absence of any other comments with regard to MET, recitals 18 to 21 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

3.2.   Individual treatment (IT)

Individual treatment (IT)

| (11) | In the absence of any comments with regard to individual treatment (IT), recitals 22 to 25 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

In the absence of any comments with regard to individual treatment (IT), recitals 22 to 25 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

3.3.   Normal value

Normal value

3.3.1.   Analogue country

Analogue country

| (12) | In the absence of any comments with regard to the analogue country, recitals 26 to 32 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

In the absence of any comments with regard to the analogue country, recitals 26 to 32 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

3.3.2.   Methodology applied for the determination of the normal value

Methodology applied for the determination of the normal value

3.3.2.1.   For the company granted MET

For the company granted MET

| (13) | It should be clarified that, as a result of applying the methodology described in recitals 33 to 38 of the provisional Regulation, the normal value was not based on the actual domestic price of all transactions, as stated in recital 39 of that Regulation, but only on the profitable sales since the volume of profitable sales represented 80 % or less of the total sales volume. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

It should be clarified that, as a result of applying the methodology described in recitals 33 to 38 of the provisional Regulation, the normal value was not based on the actual domestic price of all transactions, as stated in recital 39 of that Regulation, but only on the profitable sales since the volume of profitable sales represented 80 % or less of the total sales volume.

| (14) | In the absence of any other comments with regard to the methodology for the determination of the normal value for the company granted MET, recitals 33 to 38 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In the absence of any other comments with regard to the methodology for the determination of the normal value for the company granted MET, recitals 33 to 38 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

3.3.2.2.   For the company granted IT

For the company granted IT

| (15) | In the absence of any comments with regard to the method for calculating the normal value for the company granted IT, recitals 40 and 41 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In the absence of any comments with regard to the method for calculating the normal value for the company granted IT, recitals 40 and 41 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

3.4.   Export price

Export price

| (16) | In the absence of any comments with regard to the determination of the export price, recital 42 of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

In the absence of any comments with regard to the determination of the export price, recital 42 of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed.

3.5.   Comparison

Comparison

| (17) | In the absence of any comments with regard to the comparison of the normal value and the export price, recitals 43 and 44 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

In the absence of any comments with regard to the comparison of the normal value and the export price, recitals 43 and 44 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

3.6.   Dumping Margins

Dumping Margins

| (18) | In the absence of any comments with regard to the dumping margins, recitals 45 to 50 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

In the absence of any comments with regard to the dumping margins, recitals 45 to 50 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

| (19) | The definitive weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are:

  Table 1







  Company | Definitive dumping margin |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Shandong Kaison Biochemical Co., Ltd | 5,6  % |
| Qingdao Kehai Biochemistry Co. Ltd | 51,1  % |
| All other companies | 79,2  % |

(19)

The definitive weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are:

Table 1

Table 1

Company

Definitive dumping margin

Shandong Kaison Biochemical Co., Ltd

5,6  %

Qingdao Kehai Biochemistry Co. Ltd

51,1  %

All other companies

79,2  %

4.   INJURY

INJURY

4.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

Definition of the Union industry and Union production

| (20) | In the absence of any comments concerning the definition of the Union industry and Union production, recitals 51 to 53 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

In the absence of any comments concerning the definition of the Union industry and Union production, recitals 51 to 53 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

4.2.   Union consumption

Union consumption

| (21) | In the absence of any comments concerning Union consumption, recitals 54 to 55 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

In the absence of any comments concerning Union consumption, recitals 54 to 55 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

4.3.   Imports into the Union from China

Imports into the Union from China

| (22) | It is noted that, as mentioned below in recital 34 of this Regulation, subsequent to the imposition of provisional measures, there were some minor corrections in the Union industry’s sales value. However, these had no impact on the undercutting margins as set out in recital 59 of the provisional Regulation. Therefore recitals 56 to 59 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

It is noted that, as mentioned below in recital 34 of this Regulation, subsequent to the imposition of provisional measures, there were some minor corrections in the Union industry’s sales value. However, these had no impact on the undercutting margins as set out in recital 59 of the provisional Regulation. Therefore recitals 56 to 59 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

4.4.   Economic situation of the Union industry

Economic situation of the Union industry

| (23) | Further to provisional disclosure one Chinese exporting producer contested the provisional findings claiming that some of the main injury indicators showed a positive development between 2008 and the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Further to provisional disclosure one Chinese exporting producer contested the provisional findings claiming that some of the main injury indicators showed a positive development between 2008 and the IP.

| (24) | It should first of all be noted that while certain injury indicators showed a somewhat positive development between 2008 and the IP (e.g. production volume, market share and investments), other indicators showed negative developments (e.g. sales volumes and prices, as well as profitability). In this regard, it is noted that Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation provides that no one or more of the injury indicators is decisive in assessing whether the Union industry suffered material injury. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

It should first of all be noted that while certain injury indicators showed a somewhat positive development between 2008 and the IP (e.g. production volume, market share and investments), other indicators showed negative developments (e.g. sales volumes and prices, as well as profitability). In this regard, it is noted that Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation provides that no one or more of the injury indicators is decisive in assessing whether the Union industry suffered material injury.

| (25) | In addition, the period under consideration covers the period between 2005 and the end of the IP. During this period most injury indicators clearly showed a negative development resulting in material injury during the IP. The somewhat positive development of certain injury indicators in the last year of this period did not undermine the finding of material injury. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

In addition, the period under consideration covers the period between 2005 and the end of the IP. During this period most injury indicators clearly showed a negative development resulting in material injury during the IP. The somewhat positive development of certain injury indicators in the last year of this period did not undermine the finding of material injury.

| (26) | Subsequent to the imposition of provisional measures, the replies to the questionnaire of two other sales branches of the Union industry were verified at their premises, as mentioned above in recital 4. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Subsequent to the imposition of provisional measures, the replies to the questionnaire of two other sales branches of the Union industry were verified at their premises, as mentioned above in recital 4.

| (27) | As result of these verifications, some minor adjustments were made to the total value of sales in the domestic market and to the cost of production. The profitability figure was also accordingly slightly amended. However, these changes did not have an impact on the trends and indexes in prices and profitability as provisionally established in recitals 66 and 68 as well as Tables 5 and 7 of the provisional Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

As result of these verifications, some minor adjustments were made to the total value of sales in the domestic market and to the cost of production. The profitability figure was also accordingly slightly amended. However, these changes did not have an impact on the trends and indexes in prices and profitability as provisionally established in recitals 66 and 68 as well as Tables 5 and 7 of the provisional Regulation.

| (28) | Therefore the conclusions reached at provisional stage, i.e. that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, are confirmed and recitals 60 to 79 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Therefore the conclusions reached at provisional stage, i.e. that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, are confirmed and recitals 60 to 79 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

5.   CAUSALITY

CAUSALITY

| (29) | In the absence of any comments concerning causality, recitals 80 to 96 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

In the absence of any comments concerning causality, recitals 80 to 96 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

6.   UNION INTEREST

UNION INTEREST

| (30) | One cooperating user claimed that any increase in costs could not be easily passed on to final customers; therefore duties would have a significant impact on its profitability. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

One cooperating user claimed that any increase in costs could not be easily passed on to final customers; therefore duties would have a significant impact on its profitability.

| (31) | However, the investigation revealed that this user made high profit margins both overall and on a wide range of its products. For most of the products produced by this user, the expected cost increase was found not to be significant due to the small part of dry sodium gluconate in the total production cost and it was considered that, overall, the expected cost increase could be absorbed without significantly affecting the overall profitability. The user in question did not submit any further evidence or information supporting its claim. Therefore this claim had to be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

However, the investigation revealed that this user made high profit margins both overall and on a wide range of its products. For most of the products produced by this user, the expected cost increase was found not to be significant due to the small part of dry sodium gluconate in the total production cost and it was considered that, overall, the expected cost increase could be absorbed without significantly affecting the overall profitability. The user in question did not submit any further evidence or information supporting its claim. Therefore this claim had to be rejected.

| (32) | In the absence of any other comments concerning the Union interest, recitals 97 to 107 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

In the absence of any other comments concerning the Union interest, recitals 97 to 107 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

7.   DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

7.1.   Injury elimination level

Injury elimination level

| (33) | For the determination of the non-injurious price at definitive stage, the same methodology was used as the one described in recitals 111 to 113 of the provisional Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

For the determination of the non-injurious price at definitive stage, the same methodology was used as the one described in recitals 111 to 113 of the provisional Regulation.

| (34) | However, as mentioned above in recital 27, the verification of additional data of the Union industry led to minor corrections in the value of total domestic sales, total cost of production and profitability. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

However, as mentioned above in recital 27, the verification of additional data of the Union industry led to minor corrections in the value of total domestic sales, total cost of production and profitability.

| (35) | In the absence of any other comments that would alter the conclusion regarding the injury elimination level, recitals 108 to 113 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

In the absence of any other comments that would alter the conclusion regarding the injury elimination level, recitals 108 to 113 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

7.2.   Definitive measures

Definitive measures

| (36) | In the light of the foregoing, it is considered that, in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, a definitive anti-dumping duty should be imposed on imports of dry sodium gluconate originating in China at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins, in accordance with the lesser duty rule. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

In the light of the foregoing, it is considered that, in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, a definitive anti-dumping duty should be imposed on imports of dry sodium gluconate originating in China at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins, in accordance with the lesser duty rule.

| (37) | The proposed definitive anti-dumping duty rates are the following:

  Table 2









  Name | Injury Margin | Dumping Margin | Definitive duty |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Shandong Kaison Biochemical Co. Ltd, Wulian County, Rizhao City | 29,7  % | 5,6  % | 5,6  % |
| Qingdao Kehai Biochemistry Co. Ltd, Jiaonan City | 27,1  % | 51,1  % | 27,1  % |
| All other companies | 53,2  % | 79,2  % | 53,2  % |

(37)

The proposed definitive anti-dumping duty rates are the following:

Table 2

Table 2

Name

Injury Margin

Dumping Margin

Definitive duty

Shandong Kaison Biochemical Co. Ltd, Wulian County, Rizhao City

29,7  %

5,6  %

5,6  %

Qingdao Kehai Biochemistry Co. Ltd, Jiaonan City

27,1  %

51,1  %

27,1  %

All other companies

53,2  %

79,2  %

53,2  %

| (38) | The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of the present investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during that investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates (as opposed to the countrywide duty applicable to ‘all other companies’) are thus exclusively applicable to imports of products originating in the country concerned and produced by the companies mentioned. Imported products produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation with its name and address, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of the present investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during that investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates (as opposed to the countrywide duty applicable to ‘all other companies’) are thus exclusively applicable to imports of products originating in the country concerned and produced by the companies mentioned. Imported products produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation with its name and address, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’.

| (39) | Any claim requesting the application of these individual company anti-dumping duty rates (e.g. following a change in the name of the entity or following the setting up of new production or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission (3) forthwith with all relevant information, in particular any modification in the company’s activities linked to production, domestic and export sales associated with, for example, that name change or that change in the production and sales entities. If appropriate, the Regulation will then be accordingly amended by updating the list of companies benefiting from individual duty rates. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Any claim requesting the application of these individual company anti-dumping duty rates (e.g. following a change in the name of the entity or following the setting up of new production or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission (3) forthwith with all relevant information, in particular any modification in the company’s activities linked to production, domestic and export sales associated with, for example, that name change or that change in the production and sales entities. If appropriate, the Regulation will then be accordingly amended by updating the list of companies benefiting from individual duty rates.

3

| (40) | In order to ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duty, the countrywide duty level should not only apply to the non-cooperating exporting producers but also to those producers which did not have any exports to the Union during the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In order to ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duty, the countrywide duty level should not only apply to the non-cooperating exporting producers but also to those producers which did not have any exports to the Union during the IP.

7.3.   Definitive collection of provisional duties

Definitive collection of provisional duties

| (41) | In view of the magnitude of the dumping margins found and in the light of the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, it is considered necessary that the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, imposed by the provisional Regulation should be definitively collected to the extent of the amount of the definitive duties imposed. Where the definitive duties are lower than the provisional duties, amounts provisionally secured in excess of the definitive rate of anti-dumping duties shall be released. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

In view of the magnitude of the dumping margins found and in the light of the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, it is considered necessary that the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, imposed by the provisional Regulation should be definitively collected to the extent of the amount of the definitive duties imposed. Where the definitive duties are lower than the provisional duties, amounts provisionally secured in excess of the definitive rate of anti-dumping duties shall be released.

7.4.   Special monitoring

Special monitoring

| (42) | In order to minimise the risks of circumvention due to the high difference in the duty rates, it is considered that special measures are needed in this case to ensure the proper application of the anti-dumping duties. These special measures include the following. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

In order to minimise the risks of circumvention due to the high difference in the duty rates, it is considered that special measures are needed in this case to ensure the proper application of the anti-dumping duties. These special measures include the following.

| (43) | The presentation to the Customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice, which shall conform to the requirements set out in the Annex to this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by such an invoice shall be made subject to the residual anti-dumping duty applicable to all other producers. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The presentation to the Customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice, which shall conform to the requirements set out in the Annex to this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by such an invoice shall be made subject to the residual anti-dumping duty applicable to all other producers.

| (44) | Should the exports by the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rates and the consequent imposition of a countrywide duty, |
| --- | --- |

(44)

Should the exports by the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rates and the consequent imposition of a countrywide duty,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.   A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of dry sodium gluconate, with a Customs Union and Statistics (CUS) number 0023277-9 and a Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry number 527-07-1, currently falling within CN code ex 2918 16 00 (TARIC code 2918160010) and originating in the People’s Republic of China.

2.   The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the products described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies below shall be as follows:

| Company | Anti-Dumping duty rate (%) | TARIC additional codes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Shandong Kaison Biochemical Co., Ltd, Wulian County, Rizhao City | 5,6 | A972 |
| Qingdao Kehai Biochemistry Co. Ltd, Jiaonan City | 27,1 | A973 |
| All other companies | 53,2 | A999 |

Company

Anti-Dumping duty rate (%)

TARIC additional codes

Shandong Kaison Biochemical Co., Ltd, Wulian County, Rizhao City

5,6

A972

Qingdao Kehai Biochemistry Co. Ltd, Jiaonan City

27,1

A973

All other companies

53,2

A999

3.   The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice, which shall conform to the requirements set out in the Annex. If no such invoice is presented, the duty rate applicable to all other companies shall apply.

4.   Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

The amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 377/2010 on imports of dry sodium gluconate with a Customs Union and Statistics (CUS) number 0023277-9 and a Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry number 527-07-1, currently falling within CN code ex 2918 16 00 (TARIC code 2918160010), and originating in the People’s Republic of China shall be definitely collected at the rate of the definitive duty imposed pursuant to Article 1. The amounts secured in excess of the rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty shall be released.

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 25 October 2010.

For the Council

The President

S. VANACKERE

---

(1)  
  OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 111, 4.5.2010, p. 5.

2

(3)  
  European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate H, Office N105 04/092, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË.

3

---

ANNEX

A declaration signed by an official of the entity issuing the commercial invoice, in the following format, must appear on the valid commercial invoice referred to in Article 1(3):

| 1. | The name and function of the official of the entity issuing the commercial invoice. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The name and function of the official of the entity issuing the commercial invoice.

| 2. | The following declaration: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of dry sodium gluconate sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in (country concerned). I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The following declaration: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of dry sodium gluconate sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in (country concerned). I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’.

| 3. | Date and signature. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Date and signature.

---

| 28.10.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 282/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 282/29

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 966/2010

of 27 October 2010

initiating an investigation concerning the possible circumvention of anti-dumping measures imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China by imports of certain iron or steel fasteners consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not, and making such imports subject to registration

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (1) (‘the basic Regulation’) and in particular Articles 13(3), 14(3) and 14(5) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | The Commission has decided, pursuant to Article 13(3) of the basic Regulation, to investigate on its own initiative the possible circumvention of the anti-dumping measures imposed on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Commission has decided, pursuant to Article 13(3) of the basic Regulation, to investigate on its own initiative the possible circumvention of the anti-dumping measures imposed on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China.

A.   PRODUCT

PRODUCT

| (2) | The product concerned by the possible circumvention is certain iron or steel fasteners, other than of stainless steel, i.e. wood screws (excluding coach screws), self-tapping screws, other screws and bolts with heads (whether or not with their nuts or washers, but excluding screws turned from bars, rods, profiles or wire, of solid section, of a shank thickness not exceeding 6 mm and excluding screws and bolts for fixing railway track construction material), and washers, originating in the People’s Republic of China, falling within CN codes 7318 12 90, 7318 14 91, 7318 14 99, 7318 15 59, 7318 15 69, 7318 15 81, 7318 15 89, ex 7318 15 90, ex 7318 21 00 and ex 7318 22 00. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The product concerned by the possible circumvention is certain iron or steel fasteners, other than of stainless steel, i.e. wood screws (excluding coach screws), self-tapping screws, other screws and bolts with heads (whether or not with their nuts or washers, but excluding screws turned from bars, rods, profiles or wire, of solid section, of a shank thickness not exceeding 6 mm and excluding screws and bolts for fixing railway track construction material), and washers, originating in the People’s Republic of China, falling within CN codes 7318 12 90, 7318 14 91, 7318 14 99, 7318 15 59, 7318 15 69, 7318 15 81, 7318 15 89, ex 7318 15 90, ex 7318 21 00 and ex 7318 22 00.

| (3) | The product under investigation is the same as that defined in the previous recital, but consigned from Malaysia, whether originating in Malaysia or not, currently falling within the same CN codes as the product concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The product under investigation is the same as that defined in the previous recital, but consigned from Malaysia, whether originating in Malaysia or not, currently falling within the same CN codes as the product concerned.

B.   EXISTING MEASURES

EXISTING MEASURES

| (4) | The measures currently in force and possibly being circumvented are anti-dumping measures imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 (2). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The measures currently in force and possibly being circumvented are anti-dumping measures imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 (2).

2

C.   GROUNDS

GROUNDS

| (5) | The Commission has at its disposal sufficient prima facie evidence that the anti-dumping measures on imports of the product concerned are being circumvented by means of the transhipment via Malaysia. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The Commission has at its disposal sufficient prima facie evidence that the anti-dumping measures on imports of the product concerned are being circumvented by means of the transhipment via Malaysia.

prima facie

| (6) | The prima facie evidence at the Commission’s disposal is as follows: |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The prima facie evidence at the Commission’s disposal is as follows:

prima facie

| (7) | There is a significant change in the pattern of trade involving exports from the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia to the Union which has taken place following the imposition of measures on the product concerned, without sufficient due cause or justification other than the imposition of the duty for such a change. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

There is a significant change in the pattern of trade involving exports from the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia to the Union which has taken place following the imposition of measures on the product concerned, without sufficient due cause or justification other than the imposition of the duty for such a change.

| (8) | This change in the pattern of trade appears to stem from the transhipment of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China via Malaysia. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

This change in the pattern of trade appears to stem from the transhipment of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China via Malaysia.

| (9) | Furthermore, the evidence points to the fact that the remedial effects of the existing anti-dumping measures on the product concerned are being undermined both in terms of quantity and price. Significant volumes of imports of the product under investigation appear to have replaced imports of the product concerned. In addition, there is sufficient evidence that this increased volume of imports is made at prices well below the non-injurious price established in the investigation that led to the existing measures. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Furthermore, the evidence points to the fact that the remedial effects of the existing anti-dumping measures on the product concerned are being undermined both in terms of quantity and price. Significant volumes of imports of the product under investigation appear to have replaced imports of the product concerned. In addition, there is sufficient evidence that this increased volume of imports is made at prices well below the non-injurious price established in the investigation that led to the existing measures.

| (10) | Finally, the Commission has sufficient prima facie evidence at its disposal that the prices of the product under investigation are dumped in relation to the normal value previously established for the product concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Finally, the Commission has sufficient prima facie evidence at its disposal that the prices of the product under investigation are dumped in relation to the normal value previously established for the product concerned.

prima facie

| (11) | Should circumvention practices via Malaysia covered by Article 13 of the basic Regulation, other than transhipment, be identified in the course of the investigation, the investigation may also cover these practices. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Should circumvention practices via Malaysia covered by Article 13 of the basic Regulation, other than transhipment, be identified in the course of the investigation, the investigation may also cover these practices.

D.   PROCEDURE

PROCEDURE

| (12) | In the light of the above, the Commission has concluded that sufficient evidence exists to justify the initiation of an investigation pursuant to Article 13 of the basic Regulation and to make imports of the product under investigation, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not, subject to registration, in accordance with Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

In the light of the above, the Commission has concluded that sufficient evidence exists to justify the initiation of an investigation pursuant to Article 13 of the basic Regulation and to make imports of the product under investigation, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not, subject to registration, in accordance with Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation.

(a)   Questionnaires

Questionnaires

| (13) | In order to obtain the information it deems necessary for its investigation, the Commission will send questionnaires to the known exporters/producers and to the known associations of exporters/producers in Malaysia, to the known exporters/producers and to the known associations of exporters/producers in the People’s Republic of China, to the known importers and to the known associations of importers in the Union and to the authorities of the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia. Information, as appropriate, may also be sought from the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

In order to obtain the information it deems necessary for its investigation, the Commission will send questionnaires to the known exporters/producers and to the known associations of exporters/producers in Malaysia, to the known exporters/producers and to the known associations of exporters/producers in the People’s Republic of China, to the known importers and to the known associations of importers in the Union and to the authorities of the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia. Information, as appropriate, may also be sought from the Union industry.

| (14) | In any event, all interested parties should contact the Commission forthwith, but not later than the time limit set in Article 3 of this Regulation, and request a questionnaire within the time limit set in Article 3(1) of this Regulation, given that the time limit set in Article 3(2) of this Regulation applies to all interested parties. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In any event, all interested parties should contact the Commission forthwith, but not later than the time limit set in Article 3 of this Regulation, and request a questionnaire within the time limit set in Article 3(1) of this Regulation, given that the time limit set in Article 3(2) of this Regulation applies to all interested parties.

| (15) | The authorities of the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia will be notified of the initiation of the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The authorities of the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia will be notified of the initiation of the investigation.

(b)   Collection of information and holding of hearings

Collection of information and holding of hearings

| (16) | In accordance with Article 13(4) of the basic Regulation, imports of the product under investigation may be exempted from registration or measures if the importation does not constitute circumvention. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

In accordance with Article 13(4) of the basic Regulation, imports of the product under investigation may be exempted from registration or measures if the importation does not constitute circumvention.

| (17) | Since the possible circumvention takes place outside the Union, exemptions may be granted, in accordance with Article 13(4) of the basic Regulation, to producers in Malaysia of certain iron or steel fasteners that can show that they are not related (3) to any producer subject to the measures (4) and that are found not to be engaged in circumvention practices as defined in Article 13(1) and 13(2) of the basic Regulation. Producers wishing to obtain an exemption should submit a request duly supported by evidence within the time limit indicated in Article 3(3) of this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Since the possible circumvention takes place outside the Union, exemptions may be granted, in accordance with Article 13(4) of the basic Regulation, to producers in Malaysia of certain iron or steel fasteners that can show that they are not related (3) to any producer subject to the measures (4) and that are found not to be engaged in circumvention practices as defined in Article 13(1) and 13(2) of the basic Regulation. Producers wishing to obtain an exemption should submit a request duly supported by evidence within the time limit indicated in Article 3(3) of this Regulation.

3

4

E.   REGISTRATION

REGISTRATION

| (18) | Pursuant to Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation, imports of the product under investigation should be made subject to registration in order to ensure that, should the investigation result in findings of circumvention, anti-dumping duties of an appropriate amount can be levied retroactively from the date of registration of such imports consigned from Malaysia. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Pursuant to Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation, imports of the product under investigation should be made subject to registration in order to ensure that, should the investigation result in findings of circumvention, anti-dumping duties of an appropriate amount can be levied retroactively from the date of registration of such imports consigned from Malaysia.

F.   TIME LIMITS

TIME LIMITS

| (19) | In the interests of sound administration, time limits should be stated within which:






  — | interested parties may make themselves known to the Commission, present their views in writing and submit questionnaire replies or any other information to be taken into account during the investigation, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(19)

In the interests of sound administration, time limits should be stated within which:

—

interested parties may make themselves known to the Commission, present their views in writing and submit questionnaire replies or any other information to be taken into account during the investigation,

| — | producers in Malaysia may request exemption from registration of imports or measures, |
| --- | --- |

—

producers in Malaysia may request exemption from registration of imports or measures,

| — | interested parties may make a written request to be heard by the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

—

interested parties may make a written request to be heard by the Commission.

| (20) | Attention is drawn to the fact that the exercise of most procedural rights set out in the basic Regulation depends on the party’s making itself known within the time limits mentioned in Article 3 of this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Attention is drawn to the fact that the exercise of most procedural rights set out in the basic Regulation depends on the party’s making itself known within the time limits mentioned in Article 3 of this Regulation.

G.   NON-COOPERATION

NON-COOPERATION

| (21) | In cases in which any interested party refuses access to or does not provide the necessary information within the time limits, or significantly impedes the investigation, findings, affirmative or negative, may be made in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, on the basis of the facts available. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

In cases in which any interested party refuses access to or does not provide the necessary information within the time limits, or significantly impedes the investigation, findings, affirmative or negative, may be made in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, on the basis of the facts available.

| (22) | Where it is found that any interested party has supplied false or misleading information, the information shall be disregarded and use may be made of the facts available. If an interested party does not cooperate or cooperates only partially and findings are therefore based on the facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the result may be less favourable to that party than if it had cooperated. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Where it is found that any interested party has supplied false or misleading information, the information shall be disregarded and use may be made of the facts available. If an interested party does not cooperate or cooperates only partially and findings are therefore based on the facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the result may be less favourable to that party than if it had cooperated.

H.   SCHEDULE OF THE INVESTIGATION

SCHEDULE OF THE INVESTIGATION

| (23) | The investigation will be concluded, according to Article 13(3) of the basic Regulation, within nine months of the date of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The investigation will be concluded, according to Article 13(3) of the basic Regulation, within nine months of the date of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Official Journal of the European Union

I.   PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA

PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA

| (24) | It is noted that any personal data collected in this investigation will be treated in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (5). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

It is noted that any personal data collected in this investigation will be treated in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (5).

5

J.   HEARING OFFICER

HEARING OFFICER

| (25) | It is also noted that if interested parties consider that they are encountering difficulties in the exercise of their rights of defence, they may request the intervention of the Hearing Officer of Directorate-General for Trade. He acts as an interface between the interested parties and the Commission services, offering, where necessary, mediation on procedural matters affecting the protection of their interests in this proceeding, in particular with regard to issues concerning access to the file, confidentiality, extension of time limits and the treatment of written and/or oral submission of views. For further information and contact details, interested parties may consult the Hearing Officer’s web pages on the website of Directorate-General for Trade (http://ec.europa.eu/trade), |
| --- | --- |

(25)

It is also noted that if interested parties consider that they are encountering difficulties in the exercise of their rights of defence, they may request the intervention of the Hearing Officer of Directorate-General for Trade. He acts as an interface between the interested parties and the Commission services, offering, where necessary, mediation on procedural matters affecting the protection of their interests in this proceeding, in particular with regard to issues concerning access to the file, confidentiality, extension of time limits and the treatment of written and/or oral submission of views. For further information and contact details, interested parties may consult the Hearing Officer’s web pages on the website of Directorate-General for Trade (http://ec.europa.eu/trade),

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

An investigation is hereby initiated pursuant to Article 13(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009, in order to determine if imports into the European Union of certain iron or steel fasteners, other than of stainless steel, i.e. wood screws (excluding coach screws), self-tapping screws, other screws and bolts with heads (whether or not with their nuts or washers, but excluding screws turned from bars, rods, profiles or wire, of solid section, of a shank thickness not exceeding 6 mm and excluding screws and bolts for fixing railway track construction material), and washers, consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not, currently falling within CN codes ex 7318 12 90, ex 7318 14 91, ex 7318 14 99, ex 7318 15 59, ex 7318 15 69, ex 7318 15 81, ex 7318 15 89, ex 7318 15 90, ex 7318 21 00 and ex 7318 22 00 (TARIC codes 7318129011, 7318129091, 7318149111, 7318149191, 7318149911, 7318149991, 7318155911, 7318155961, 7318155981, 7318156911, 7318156961, 7318156981, 7318158111, 7318158161, 7318158181, 7318158911, 7318158961, 7318158981, 7318159021, 7318159071, 7318159091, 7318210031, 7318210095, 7318220031 and 7318220095), are circumventing the measures imposed by Regulation (EC) No 91/2009.

Article 2

The Customs authorities are hereby directed, pursuant to Articles 13(3) and 14(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009, to take the appropriate steps to register the imports into the Union identified in Article 1 of this Regulation.

Registration shall expire nine months following the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

The Commission, by regulation, may direct Customs authorities to cease registration in respect of imports into the Union of products manufactured by producers having applied for an exemption of registration and having been found to fulfil the conditions for an exemption to be granted.

Article 3

Questionnaires should be requested from the Commission within 15 days of the date of publication of this Regulation in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Interested parties, if their representations are to be taken into account during the investigation, must make themselves known by contacting the Commission, present their views in writing and submit questionnaire replies or any other information within 37 days from the date of the publication of this Regulation in the Official Journal of the European Union, unless otherwise specified.

Producers in Malaysia requesting exemption from registration of imports or measures should submit a request duly supported by evidence within the same 37-day time limit.

Interested parties may also apply to be heard by the Commission within the same 37-day time limit.

Any information, any request for a hearing or for a questionnaire as well as any request for exemption from registration of imports or measures must be made in writing (not in electronic format, unless otherwise specified) and must indicate the name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers of the interested party. All written submissions, including the information requested in this Regulation, questionnaire replies and correspondence provided by interested parties on a confidential basis shall be labelled as ‘Limited’ (6) and, in accordance with Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation, shall be accompanied by a non-confidential version, which will be labelled ‘For inspection by interested parties’.

Commission address for correspondence:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Trade |
| Directorate H |
| Office: N105 4/92 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22978486 |
| E-mail: TRADE-AD-FASTENERS-MALAYSIA@ec.europa.eu |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Trade

Directorate H

Office: N105 4/92

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22978486

E-mail: TRADE-AD-FASTENERS-MALAYSIA@ec.europa.eu

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 27 October 2010.

For the Commission

The President

José Manuel BARROSO

---

(1)  
  OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 29, 31.1.2009, p. 1.

2

(3)  In accordance with Article 143 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 concerning the implementation of the Community Customs Code, persons shall be deemed to be related only if: (a) they are officers or directors of one another’s businesses; (b) they are legally recognised partners in business; (c) they are employer and employee; (d) any person directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds 5 % or more of the outstanding voting stock or shares of both of them; (e) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other; (f) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; (g) together they directly or indirectly control a third person; or (h) they are members of the same family. Persons shall be deemed to be members of the same family only if they stand in any of the following relationships to one another: (i) husband and wife; (ii) parent and child; (iii) brother and sister (whether by whole or half blood); (iv) grandparent and grandchild; (v) uncle or aunt and nephew or niece; (vi) parent-in-law and son-in-law or daughter-in-law; (vii) brother-in-law and sister-in-law (OJ L 253, 11.10.1993, p. 1). In this context ‘person’ means any natural or legal person.

3

(4)  However, even if producers are related in the aforementioned sense to companies subject to the measures in place on imports originating in the People’s Republic of China (the original anti-dumping measures), an exemption may still be granted if there is no evidence that the relationship with the companies subject to the original measures was established or used to circumvent the original measures.

4

(5)  
  OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1.

5

(6)  This means that the document is for internal use only. It is protected pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43). It is a confidential document pursuant to Article 19 of the basic Regulation and Article 6 of the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).

6

---

| 28.10.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 282/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 282/33

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 967/2010

of 27 October 2010

closing the sale provided for in Regulation (EU) No 446/2010 opening the sale of butter by a tendering procedure

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (1), and in particular Article 43(j), in conjunction of Article 4 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Sales by a tendering procedure of butter entered into storage before 1 October 2009 were open by Commission Regulation (EU) No 446/2010 (2) in accordance with the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1272/2009 of 11 December 2009 laying down common detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards buying-in and selling of agricultural products under public intervention (3). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Sales by a tendering procedure of butter entered into storage before 1 October 2009 were open by Commission Regulation (EU) No 446/2010 (2) in accordance with the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1272/2009 of 11 December 2009 laying down common detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards buying-in and selling of agricultural products under public intervention (3).

| (2) | Given the current situation on the butter market and in particular the situation of the intervention stocks of butter and the fact that certain quantities of butter are reserved under the scheme for food distribution to the most deprived scheme in the Union, the sales open by Regulation (EU) No 446/2010 should be closed. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Given the current situation on the butter market and in particular the situation of the intervention stocks of butter and the fact that certain quantities of butter are reserved under the scheme for food distribution to the most deprived scheme in the Union, the sales open by Regulation (EU) No 446/2010 should be closed.

| (3) | In order to give a rapid signal to the market and to ensure efficient management of the measure, this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In order to give a rapid signal to the market and to ensure efficient management of the measure, this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

| (4) | The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The sales by a tendering procedure of butter, open by Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 446/2010, are closed.

Offers received by the intervention agencies of the Member States after 11.00 (Brussels time) on and after 19 October 2010 are rejected.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 27 October 2010.

For the Commission, On behalf of the President,

Dacian CIOLOŞ

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 299, 16.11.2007, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 126, 22.5.2010, p. 17.

2

(3)  
  OJ L 349, 29.12.2009, p. 1.

3

---

| 28.10.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 282/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 282/34

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 968/2010

of 27 October 2010

establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (1),

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1580/2007 of 21 December 2007 laying down implementing rules for Council Regulations (EC) No 2200/96, (EC) No 2201/96 and (EC) No 1182/2007 in the fruit and vegetable sector (2), and in particular Article 138(1) thereof,

Whereas:

Regulation (EC) No 1580/2007 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in Annex XV, Part A thereto,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The standard import values referred to in Article 138 of Regulation (EC) No 1580/2007 are fixed in the Annex hereto.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 28 October 2010.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 27 October 2010.

For the Commission, On behalf of the President,

Jean-Luc DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 299, 16.11.2007, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 350, 31.12.2007, p. 1.

2

---

ANNEX

Standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

| (EUR/100 kg) |
| --- |
| CN code | Third country code (1) | Standard import value |
| 0702 00 00 | MA | 79,4 |
| MK | 64,0 |
| XS | 73,2 |
| ZZ | 72,2 |
| 0707 00 05 | TR | 140,5 |
| ZZ | 140,5 |
| 0709 90 70 | TR | 130,3 |
| ZZ | 130,3 |
| 0805 50 10 | AR | 68,3 |
| BR | 68,9 |
| CL | 74,1 |
| TR | 89,4 |
| UY | 61,0 |
| ZA | 70,0 |
| ZZ | 72,0 |
| 0806 10 10 | BR | 210,3 |
| TR | 131,5 |
| US | 155,2 |
| ZA | 64,2 |
| ZZ | 140,3 |
| 0808 10 80 | AR | 77,5 |
| CL | 110,6 |
| CN | 89,6 |
| NZ | 101,1 |
| ZA | 75,9 |
| ZZ | 90,9 |
| 0808 20 50 | CN | 67,5 |
| ZZ | 67,5 |

(EUR/100 kg)

CN code

Third country code (1)

Standard import value

0702 00 00

MA

79,4

MK

64,0

XS

73,2

ZZ

72,2

0707 00 05

TR

140,5

ZZ

140,5

0709 90 70

TR

130,3

ZZ

130,3

0805 50 10

AR

68,3

BR

68,9

CL

74,1

TR

89,4

UY

61,0

ZA

70,0

ZZ

72,0

0806 10 10

BR

210,3

TR

131,5

US

155,2

ZA

64,2

ZZ

140,3

0808 10 80

AR

77,5

CL

110,6

CN

89,6

NZ

101,1

ZA

75,9

ZZ

90,9

0808 20 50

CN

67,5

ZZ

67,5

---

(1)  Nomenclature of countries laid down by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1833/2006 (OJ L 354, 14.12.2006, p. 19). Code ‘
  ZZ
  ’ stands for ‘of other origin’.

---

| 28.10.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 282/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 282/36

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 969/2010

of 27 October 2010

on the issue of licences for importing rice under the tariff quotas opened for the October 2010 subperiod by Regulation (EC) No 327/98

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (1),

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1301/2006 of 31 August 2006 laying down common rules for the administration of import tariff quotas for agricultural products managed by a system of import licences (2), and in particular Article 7(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 327/98 of 10 February 1998 opening and providing for the administration of certain tariff quotas for imports of rice and broken rice (3) opened and provided for the administration of certain import tariff quotas for rice and broken rice, broken down by country of origin and split into several subperiods in accordance with Annex IX to that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 327/98 of 10 February 1998 opening and providing for the administration of certain tariff quotas for imports of rice and broken rice (3) opened and provided for the administration of certain import tariff quotas for rice and broken rice, broken down by country of origin and split into several subperiods in accordance with Annex IX to that Regulation.

| (2) | October is the only subperiod for the quota with order number 09.4138 laid down in Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98. This quota comprises the balance of the unused quantities from the quotas with order numbers 09.4127-09.4128-09.4129-09.4130 in the previous subperiod. October is the last subperiod for the quotas with order numbers 09.4148 and 09.4168 laid down in Article 1(1)(b) and (e) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98, which comprise the balance of the unused quantities from the previous subperiod. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

October is the only subperiod for the quota with order number 09.4138 laid down in Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98. This quota comprises the balance of the unused quantities from the quotas with order numbers 09.4127-09.4128-09.4129-09.4130 in the previous subperiod. October is the last subperiod for the quotas with order numbers 09.4148 and 09.4168 laid down in Article 1(1)(b) and (e) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98, which comprise the balance of the unused quantities from the previous subperiod.

| (3) | The notifications presented under Article 8(a) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98 show that, for the quotas with order number 09.4138 and 09.4148 the applications lodged in the first 10 working days of October 2010 under Article 4(1) of that Regulation cover a quantity greater than that available. The extent to which licences may be issued should therefore be determined by establishing the allocation coefficient to be applied to the quantities requested. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The notifications presented under Article 8(a) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98 show that, for the quotas with order number 09.4138 and 09.4148 the applications lodged in the first 10 working days of October 2010 under Article 4(1) of that Regulation cover a quantity greater than that available. The extent to which licences may be issued should therefore be determined by establishing the allocation coefficient to be applied to the quantities requested.

| (4) | The final percentage take-up for 2010 of each quota provided for by Regulation (EC) No 327/98 should also be made known. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The final percentage take-up for 2010 of each quota provided for by Regulation (EC) No 327/98 should also be made known.

| (5) | In order to ensure sound management of the procedure of issuing import licences, the present Regulation should enter into force immediately after its publication, |
| --- | --- |

(5)

In order to ensure sound management of the procedure of issuing import licences, the present Regulation should enter into force immediately after its publication,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.   For import licence applications for rice under the quotas with order number 09.4138 and 09.4148 as referred to in Regulation (EC) No 327/98 lodged in the first 10 working days of October 2010, licences shall be issued for the quantities requested, multiplied by the allocation coefficients set out in the Annex to this Regulation.

2.   The final percentage take-up for 2010 of each quota provided for by Regulation (EC) No 327/98 is given in the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 27 October 2010.

For the Commission, On behalf of the President,

Jean-Luc DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 299, 16.11.2007, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 238, 1.9.2006, p. 13.

2

(3)  
  OJ L 37, 11.2.1998, p. 5.

3

---

ANNEX

Quantities to be allocated for the October 2010 subperiod under Regulation (EC) No 327/98 and final percentage take-ups for 2010:

| (a) | Quota for wholly milled or semi-milled rice falling within CN code 1006 30 provided for in Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98:








  Origin | Order number | Allocation coefficient for October 2010 subperiod | Final percentage take-up of the quota for 2010 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| United States of America | 09.4127 | | 96,77  % |
| Thailand | 09.4128 | | 90,36  % |
| Australia | 09.4129 | | 52,94  % |
| Other origins | 09.4130 | | 100  % |
| All countries | 09.4138 | 3,216100  % | 100  % |

(a)

Quota for wholly milled or semi-milled rice falling within CN code 1006 30 provided for in Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98:

Origin

Order number

Allocation coefficient for October 2010 subperiod

Final percentage take-up of the quota for 2010

United States of America

09.4127

96,77  %

Thailand

09.4128

90,36  %

Australia

09.4129

52,94  %

Other origins

09.4130

100  %

All countries

09.4138

3,216100  %

100  %

| (b) | Quota for husked rice falling within CN code 1006 20 provided for in Article 1(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98:








  Origin | Order number | Allocation coefficient for October 2010 subperiod | Final percentage take-up of the quota for 2010 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| All countries | 09.4148 | 33,333333 % | 100  % |

(b)

Quota for husked rice falling within CN code 1006 20 provided for in Article 1(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98:

Origin

Order number

Allocation coefficient for October 2010 subperiod

Final percentage take-up of the quota for 2010

All countries

09.4148

33,333333 %

100  %

| (c) | Quota for broken rice falling within CN code 1006 40 provided for in Article 1(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98:







  Origin | Order number | Final percentage take-up of the quota for 2010 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Thailand | 09.4149 | 37,90  % |
| Australia | 09.4150 | 0  % |
| Guyana | 09.4152 | 0,78  % |
| United States of America | 09.4153 | 54,87  % |
| Other origins | 09.4154 | 100  % |

(c)

Quota for broken rice falling within CN code 1006 40 provided for in Article 1(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98:

Origin

Order number

Final percentage take-up of the quota for 2010

Thailand

09.4149

37,90  %

Australia

09.4150

0  %

Guyana

09.4152

0,78  %

United States of America

09.4153

54,87  %

Other origins

09.4154

100  %

| (d) | Quota for wholly milled or semi-milled rice falling within CN code 1006 30 provided for in Article 1(1)(d) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98:







  Origin | Order number | Final percentage take-up of the quota for 2010 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Thailand | 09.4112 | 100  % |
| United States of America | 09.4116 | 100  % |
| India | 09.4117 | 100  % |
| Pakistan | 09.4118 | 100  % |
| Other origins | 09.4119 | 100  % |
| All countries | 09.4166 | 100  % |

(d)

Quota for wholly milled or semi-milled rice falling within CN code 1006 30 provided for in Article 1(1)(d) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98:

Origin

Order number

Final percentage take-up of the quota for 2010

Thailand

09.4112

100  %

United States of America

09.4116

100  %

India

09.4117

100  %

Pakistan

09.4118

100  %

Other origins

09.4119

100  %

All countries

09.4166

100  %

| (e) | Quota for broken rice falling within CN code 1006 40 provided for in Article 1(1)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98:








  Origin | Order number | Allocation coefficient for October 2010 subperiod | Final percentage take-up of the quota for 2010 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| All countries | 09.4168 | — (1) | 100  % |

(e)

Quota for broken rice falling within CN code 1006 40 provided for in Article 1(1)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 327/98:

Origin

Order number

Allocation coefficient for October 2010 subperiod

Final percentage take-up of the quota for 2010

All countries

09.4168

— (1)

100  %

---

(1)  No quantity remaining available for this subperiod.

---

DECISIONS

| 28.10.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 282/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 282/39

---

COMMISSION DECISION

of 26 October 2010

amending Decision 2010/89/EU as regards the list of certain establishments for meat, fishery products, egg products and coldstores in Romania subjected to transitional measures concerning the application of certain structural requirements

(notified under document C(2010) 7269)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2010/651/EU)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs (1), and in particular the second paragraph of Article 12 thereof,

Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin (2), and in particular the second paragraph of Article 9 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Decision 2010/89/EU (3) lays down transitional measures concerning the application of certain structural requirements laid down in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 and in Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 to establishments for meat, egg products, fishery products and coldstores in Romania listed in Annexes I to IV to that Decision. As long as those establishments are covered by transitional measures, products originating from them are only to be placed on the domestic market or used for further processing in Romanian establishments covered by the same measures. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Decision 2010/89/EU (3) lays down transitional measures concerning the application of certain structural requirements laid down in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 and in Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 to establishments for meat, egg products, fishery products and coldstores in Romania listed in Annexes I to IV to that Decision. As long as those establishments are covered by transitional measures, products originating from them are only to be placed on the domestic market or used for further processing in Romanian establishments covered by the same measures.

| (2) | In July 2010 the Romanian Authorities officially informed the Commission, that, since the entry into force of Decision 2010/89/EU, nine meat establishments have been approved for intra-Union trade and four were closed; one fishery products establishment was approved for intra-Union trade; one egg products establishment has been approved for intra-Union trade and two coldstores have been closed. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In July 2010 the Romanian Authorities officially informed the Commission, that, since the entry into force of Decision 2010/89/EU, nine meat establishments have been approved for intra-Union trade and four were closed; one fishery products establishment was approved for intra-Union trade; one egg products establishment has been approved for intra-Union trade and two coldstores have been closed.

| (3) | In light of the ongoing structural improvements, it is appropriate that the lists of establishments set out in Annex I to IV to Decision 2010/89/EU be modified accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In light of the ongoing structural improvements, it is appropriate that the lists of establishments set out in Annex I to IV to Decision 2010/89/EU be modified accordingly.

| (4) | The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The lists of establishments for meat, egg products, fishery products and coldstores in Romania listed in Annexes I to IV to Decision 2010/89/EU (‘establishments’) are replaced by the lists of establishments in Annex I to IV of this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 26 October 2010.

For the Commission

John DALLI

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 55.

2

(3)  
  OJ L 40, 13.2.2010, p. 55.

3

---

ANNEX I

‘ANNEX I

LIST OF MEAT ESTABLISHMENTS

| No | Veterinary No | Name of establishments | Town/Street or Village/Region | Activities |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| SH | CP | PP | MM/MP |
| 1 | AB 927 | SC LIDER PROD CARN SRL | Alba Iulia, jud. Alba, 510340 | | | X | |
| 2 | AB 2771 | SC MONTANA POPA SRL | Blaj, str. Gh. Barițiu, jud. Alba, 515400 | X | X | X | X |
| 3 | AB 3263 | SC TRANSEURO SRL | Ighiu, str. Principală nr. 205 A, jud. Alba, 517360 | X | X | X | X |
| 4 | AG 008 IC | SC CARMEN SRL | Bascov, jud. Argeș, 117045 | X | X | X | X |
| 5 | AG 024 IC | SC RADOR A&E SRL | Bascov, str. Serelor nr. 48, jud. Argeș, 117045 | X | X | X | X |
| 6 | AR 4930 | SC FILIP D IMPEX SRL | Arad, str. Lăcrimioarelor, nr. 4/A, jud. Arad, 310445 | | X | X | |
| 7 | B 40632 | SC MEDEUS & CO SRL | București, str. Parcului nr. 20, sector 1, București, 012329 | | | X | X |
| 8 | BC 4165 | SC TIBERIAS SRL | Răcăciuni, jud. Bacău, 607480 | | | X | |
| 9 | BC 5196 | SC MIRALEX SRL | Loc. Bacău, str. Bicaz nr. 8, jud. Bacău, 600293 | | | X | |
| 10 | BH 223 | SC FLORIAN IMPEX SRL | Oradea, str. Morii nr. 11/B, jud. Bihor, 410577 | | | X | |
| 11 | BH 3001 | SC GLOBAL AGRO PRODEXIM SRL | Sârbi nr. 469, jud. Bihor, 417520 | | X | X | |
| 12 | BH 5185 | SC CARMANGERIE TAVI BOGDAN SRL | Loc. Mihai Bravu nr. 169, jud. Bihor, 417237 | X | | | |
| 13 | BH 5341 | SC ABATOR DARA SRL | Tulca 668 A, jud. Bihor, 417600 | X | | | |
| 14 | BR 62 | SC DORALIMENT SRL | Brăila, jud. Brăila, 810650 | | X | X | X |
| 15 | BR 574 | SC ELECTIV SRL | Comuna Romanu, jud. Brăila, 817115 | X | | | |
| 16 | BR 774 | SC TAZZ TRADE SRL (SC ROFISH GROUP) | Brăila, str. Faleza Portului nr. 2, jud. Brăila, 810529 | | | X | |
| 17 | BT 125 | SC IMPEX DONA SRL | Băisa, jud. Botoșani, 717246 | | | X | |
| 18 | BT 138 | SC SAGROD SRL | Dărăbani, str. Muncitorului, jud. Botoșani, 715100 | X | | X | |
| 19 | BT 140 | SC RAFFAELLO SRL | Tîngeni, jud. Botoșani, 717120 | | | X | |
| 20 | BT 144 | SC AGROCARN COMPANY SRL | Botoșani, str. Pod de Piatra nr. 89, jud. Botoșani, 710350 | | | X | |
| 21 | BT 198 | SC EMANUEL COM SRL | Răchiți, jud. Botoșani, 717310 | X | X | X | |
| 22 | BZ 101 | SC FRASINU SA | Buzău, șos. Sloboziei km 2, jud. Buzău 120360 | X | | | |
| 23 | BZ 115 | SC FERM COM PROD SRL | Căldărăști, jud. Buzău, 125201 | X | | | |
| 24 | BZ 110 | SC CARMOZIMBRUL SRL | Râmnicu Sărat, str. LTL. Sava Rosescu 140, jud. Buzău, 125300 | X | | | |
| 25 | BZ 112 | SC TRI PROD COM SRL | Com. Berca, Sat Valea Nucului, jud. Buzău, 127048 | | X | X | X |
| 26 | CJ 108 | SC TURISM VÂLCELE SRL | Vâlcele FN, jud. Cluj, 407274 | X | | | |
| 27 | CJ 122 | SC RIANA SERV PRODCOM SRL | Iclod FN, jud. Cluj, 407335 | X | X | | |
| 28 | CJ 5519 | SC 2 T PROD SRL | Cluj-Napoca, str. Taberei nr. 3A, jud. Cluj, 400512 | | X | X | X |
| 29 | CS 40 | SC PALALOGA CARNEPREP SRL | Bocșa, str. Binișului nr. 1, jud. Caraș, 325300 | X | X | | |
| 30 | CS 47 | SC GOSPODARUL SRL | Reșița, str. Țerovei, F.N. jud. Caraș, 320044 | X | X | X | X |
| 31 | CT 19 | SC CARNOB SRL | Lumina, str. Lebedelor nr. 1A, jud. Constanța, 907175 | X | | | |
| 32 | DB 3457 | SC NEVAL SRL | Pietroșița, jud. Dâmbovița, 137360 | X | | | |
| 33 | GJ 5 | SC LEXI STAR SRL | Sat Bucureasa, Com. Dănești, jud. Gorj, 217200 | X | X | X | X |
| 34 | GL 3330 | SC KAROMTEC SRL | Tecuci, str. Mihail Kogălniceanu nr. 48, jud. Galați, 805300 | | | X | X |
| 35 | GL 4121 | SC ROMNEF SRL | Munteni, jud. Galați, 807200 | X | | | |
| 36 | HR 73 | SC ELAN TRIDENT SRL | Odorheiu Secuiesc, str. Rákóczi Ferenc 90, jud. Harghita, 535600 | | | X | |
| 37 | HR 153 | SC ARTEIMPEX SRL | Gheorgheni, str. Kossuth Lajos nr. 211, jud. Harghita, 535500 | X | | | |
| 38 | HR 207 | SC DECEAN SRL | M-rea Ciuc, jud. Harghita, 530320 | | X | X | X |
| 39 | HR 263 | SC AVICOOPEX SRL | Cristuru Secuiesc, str. Orban Balays, jud. Harghita, 535400 | | | X | |
| 40 | MM 1609 | SC LABORATOR CARMANGERIE SRL | Baia Mare, str. Gh. Șincai 14, jud. Maramures, 430311 | | X | X | X |
| 41 | MM 4406 | SC CARMANGERIA DALIA SRL | Baia Mare, jud. Maramureș, 430530 | X | X | X | X |
| 42 | MS 3585 | SC CAZADELA SRL | Reghin, str. Oltului nr. 34, jud. Mureș, 545300 | X | | | |
| 43 | NT 33 | SC CORD COMPANY SRL | Roman, str. Bogdan Dragoș nr. 111, jud. Neamț, 611160 | X | | | |
| 44 | NT 549 | SC TCE 3 BRAZI SRL | Zănești, jud. Neamț, 617515 | X | X | X | X |
| 45 | OT 24 | SC SPAR SRL | Potcoava, str. Gării nr. 10, jud. Olt, 237355 | X | X | X | X |
| 46 | OT 2093 | SC COMAGRIMEX SA | Slatina, str. Grigore Alexandrescu nr. 19, jud. Olt, 230049 | | X | X | X |
| 47 | PH 3618 | SC BRUTUS IMPEX SRL | Mănești, jud. Prahova, cod 107375 | X | | | |
| 48 | PH 4417 | SC GOPA SRL | Ploiești, str. Gheorghe Doja nr. 124, jud. Prahova, 100141 | | | X | X |
| 49 | PH 5644 | SC MARAGET PROD SRL | Ploiești, str. Corlătești nr. 15, jud. Prahova, 100532 | X | | | |
| 50 | PH 5878 | SC COMNILIS PROD SRL | Măgureni, str. Filipeștii de Pădure, tarla 24, jud. Prahova, 107350 | | | X | X |
| 51 | PH 6044 | SC ALGRIM CENTER SRL | Bărcănești, jud. Prahova, 107055 | X | | | |
| 52 | PH 6190 | SC BANIPOR SRL | Târg Vechi, jud. Prahova, 107590 | X | | | |
| 53 | SB 111 | SC M&C IMPORT SRL EXPORT | Copșă Mică, sat Târnăvioara nr. 90, jud. Sibiu, 555400 | | X | X | X |
| 54 | SB 126 | SC CAPA PROD SRL | Sibiu, Calea Turnișorului nr. 150, jud. Sibiu, 550048 | | X | X | X |
| 55 | SB 138 | SC MUVI IMPEX SRL | Sibiu, str. Drumul Ocnei nr. 4, jud. Sibiu 550092 | | X | X | X |
| 56 | SV 039 | SC TONIC DISTRIBUTION SRL | Broșteni, jud. Suceava, 727075 | | X | X | X |
| 57 | SV 139 | SC APOLO SRL (SC ADRAS SRL) | Rădăuți, str. Constantin Brâncoveanu, jud. Suceava, 725400 | | X | X | X |
| 58 | SV 217 | SC ROGELYA SRL | Fălticeni, str. Ion Creangă nr. 69, jud. Suceava, 725200 | | X | X | X |
| 59 | SV 5661 | SC HARALD PROD SRL | Măzănaiești, jud. Suceava, 727219 | X | X | X | X |
| 60 | SV 5819 | SC MARA ALEX SRL | Bădeuți, jud. Suceava, 727361 | X | | | |
| 61 | SV5943 | SC SCUZA PROD | Forăști 96, jud. Suceava, 727235 | | X | X | X |
| 62 | SV 5963 | SC DANILEVICI SRL | Gura Humorului, str. Fundătura Ghiocei 2, jud. Suceava, 725300 | X | X | X | X |
| 63 | SV 6071 | SC ANCAROL SRL | Gura Humorului, bd. Bucovina FN, jud. Suceava, 72530 | X | X | X | X |
| 64 | TL 177 | SC GAZDI PROD SRL | Stejaru, jud. Tulcea, 827215 | X | X | | |
| 65 | TL 418 | SC STOLI SRL | Cerna, jud. Tulcea, 827045 | X | | | |
| 66 | TL 686 | SC PIG COM SRL | Satu nou, jud. Tulcea, 827141 | X | | | |
| 67 | TL 782 | SC PROD IMPORT CDC SRL | Frecăței, jud. Tulcea, 827075 | X | X | | |
| 68 | TM 378 | SC VEROMEN SRL | Timișoara, jud. Timiș, 300970 | | X | X | X |
| 69 | TM 2725 | SC RECOSEMTRACT SRL | Recaș, Calea Bazoșului nr. 1, jud. Timiș, 307340 | | X | X | X |
| 70 | TM 4187 | SC FEMADAR SRL | Giroc, str. Gloria nr. 4, jud. Timiș, 307220 | | X | X | X |
| 71 | TM 4297 | SC KENDO SRL | Victor Vlad Delamarina, jud. Timiș, 307460 | X | X | X | X |
| 72 | TM 7438 | SC AMBAX SRL | Timișoara, Calea Buziașului nr. 14, jud. Timiș, 300693 | | X | X | X |
| 73 | TR 10 | SC ROMCIP SA | Salcia, jud. Teleorman, 147300 | X | X | X | X |
| 74 | TR 26 | SC COM GIORGI IMPEX SRL | Alexandria, jud. Teleorman, 140150 | | X | X | |
| 75 | TR 36 | SC AVICOLA COSTESTI SRL | Roșiori de Vede, str. Vadu Vezii 1, jud. Teleorman, 145100 | X | | | |
| 76 | TR 93 | SC MARA PROD COM SRL | Alexandria, str. Abatorului nr. 1 bis, jud. Teleorman, 140106 | | X | X | X |
| 77 | VN 42 | SC STEMARADI SRL | Tătăranu, jud. Vrancea, 627350 | X | | | |
| 78 | VN 3045 | SC VANICAD SRL | Milcov, jud. Vrancea, 627205 | X | | | |
| 79 | VS 2243 | SC CIB SA | Bârlad, Fundătura Elena Doamna nr. 2, jud. Vaslui, 731018 | X | X | X | X |
| 80 | VS 2300 | SC CARACUL SRL | Vaslui, jud. Vaslui, 730233 | X | X | | |
| 81 | AR 92 | SC AGRIPROD SRL | Nădlac, str. Calea Aradului nr.1, jud. Arad, 315500 | X | X | | |
| 82 | AR 294 | SC PRODAGRO CETATE SRL | Siria, Complex zootehnic, jud. Arad | X | X | | |
| 83 | B 120 | SC ROM-SELECT 2000 SRL | București, B-dul Iuliu Maniu nr. 220, sector 6 | | X | | |
| 84 | B 269 | SC FOODICOM SRL | București, str. Cătinei nr. 25, sector 6 | | X | | |
| 85 | BH 103 | SC FLAVOIA SRL (S.C. AVICOLA SALONTA SA) (*1) | Salonta, str. Ghestului, nr. 7, jud. Bihor, 415500 | X | X | | |
| 86 | BV 12 | SC DRAKOM SILVA SRL | Codlea extravilan, șos. Codlea Dumbrăvița, jud. Brașov | X | X | | |
| 87 | CJ 109 | SC ONCOS IMPEX SRL | Florești, str. Abatorului nr. 2, jud. Cluj, 407280 | X | X | | |
| 88 | CV 210 | SC ABO-FARM SA (SC NUTRICOD SA) (*2) | Sf. Gheorghe, str. Părăului nr. 6, jud. Covasna, 520033 | X | X | | |
| 89 | DJ 34 | SC FELVIO SRL | Bucovăț, Platforma Bucovăț, jud. Dolj | X | X | | |
| 90 | IS 1376 | SC AVICOLA SA IAȘI | Tg Frumos, str. Ștefan cel Mare și Sfânt nr 44, jud. Iași, 705300 | X | X | | |
| 91 | TM 2739 | SC AVIBLAN SRL | Jebel, jud, Timiș, 307235 | X | X | | |

No

Veterinary No

Name of establishments

Town/Street or Village/Region

Activities

SH

CP

PP

MM/MP

1

AB 927

SC LIDER PROD CARN SRL

Alba Iulia, jud. Alba, 510340

X

2

AB 2771

SC MONTANA POPA SRL

Blaj, str. Gh. Barițiu, jud. Alba, 515400

X

X

X

X

3

AB 3263

SC TRANSEURO SRL

Ighiu, str. Principală nr. 205 A, jud. Alba, 517360

X

X

X

X

4

AG 008 IC

SC CARMEN SRL

Bascov, jud. Argeș, 117045

X

X

X

X

5

AG 024 IC

SC RADOR A&E SRL

Bascov, str. Serelor nr. 48, jud. Argeș, 117045

X

X

X

X

6

AR 4930

SC FILIP D IMPEX SRL

Arad, str. Lăcrimioarelor, nr. 4/A, jud. Arad, 310445

X

X

7

B 40632

SC MEDEUS & CO SRL

București, str. Parcului nr. 20, sector 1, București, 012329

X

X

8

BC 4165

SC TIBERIAS SRL

Răcăciuni, jud. Bacău, 607480

X

9

BC 5196

SC MIRALEX SRL

Loc. Bacău, str. Bicaz nr. 8, jud. Bacău, 600293

X

10

BH 223

SC FLORIAN IMPEX SRL

Oradea, str. Morii nr. 11/B, jud. Bihor, 410577

X

11

BH 3001

SC GLOBAL AGRO PRODEXIM SRL

Sârbi nr. 469, jud. Bihor, 417520

X

X

12

BH 5185

SC CARMANGERIE TAVI BOGDAN SRL

Loc. Mihai Bravu nr. 169, jud. Bihor, 417237

X

13

BH 5341

SC ABATOR DARA SRL

Tulca 668 A, jud. Bihor, 417600

X

14

BR 62

SC DORALIMENT SRL

Brăila, jud. Brăila, 810650

X

X

X

15

BR 574

SC ELECTIV SRL

Comuna Romanu, jud. Brăila, 817115

X

16

BR 774

SC TAZZ TRADE SRL (SC ROFISH GROUP)

Brăila, str. Faleza Portului nr. 2, jud. Brăila, 810529

X

17

BT 125

SC IMPEX DONA SRL

Băisa, jud. Botoșani, 717246

X

18

BT 138

SC SAGROD SRL

Dărăbani, str. Muncitorului, jud. Botoșani, 715100

X

X

19

BT 140

SC RAFFAELLO SRL

Tîngeni, jud. Botoșani, 717120

X

20

BT 144

SC AGROCARN COMPANY SRL

Botoșani, str. Pod de Piatra nr. 89, jud. Botoșani, 710350

X

21

BT 198

SC EMANUEL COM SRL

Răchiți, jud. Botoșani, 717310

X

X

X

22

BZ 101

SC FRASINU SA

Buzău, șos. Sloboziei km 2, jud. Buzău 120360

X

23

BZ 115

SC FERM COM PROD SRL

Căldărăști, jud. Buzău, 125201

X

24

BZ 110

SC CARMOZIMBRUL SRL

Râmnicu Sărat, str. LTL. Sava Rosescu 140, jud. Buzău, 125300

X

25

BZ 112

SC TRI PROD COM SRL

Com. Berca, Sat Valea Nucului, jud. Buzău, 127048

X

X

X

26

CJ 108

SC TURISM VÂLCELE SRL

Vâlcele FN, jud. Cluj, 407274

X

27

CJ 122

SC RIANA SERV PRODCOM SRL

Iclod FN, jud. Cluj, 407335

X

X

28

CJ 5519

SC 2 T PROD SRL

Cluj-Napoca, str. Taberei nr. 3A, jud. Cluj, 400512

X

X

X

29

CS 40

SC PALALOGA CARNEPREP SRL

Bocșa, str. Binișului nr. 1, jud. Caraș, 325300

X

X

30

CS 47

SC GOSPODARUL SRL

Reșița, str. Țerovei, F.N. jud. Caraș, 320044

X

X

X

X

31

CT 19

SC CARNOB SRL

Lumina, str. Lebedelor nr. 1A, jud. Constanța, 907175

X

32

DB 3457

SC NEVAL SRL

Pietroșița, jud. Dâmbovița, 137360

X

33

GJ 5

SC LEXI STAR SRL

Sat Bucureasa, Com. Dănești, jud. Gorj, 217200

X

X

X

X

34

GL 3330

SC KAROMTEC SRL

Tecuci, str. Mihail Kogălniceanu nr. 48, jud. Galați, 805300

X

X

35

GL 4121

SC ROMNEF SRL

Munteni, jud. Galați, 807200

X

36

HR 73

SC ELAN TRIDENT SRL

Odorheiu Secuiesc, str. Rákóczi Ferenc 90, jud. Harghita, 535600

X

37

HR 153

SC ARTEIMPEX SRL

Gheorgheni, str. Kossuth Lajos nr. 211, jud. Harghita, 535500

X

38

HR 207

SC DECEAN SRL

M-rea Ciuc, jud. Harghita, 530320

X

X

X

39

HR 263

SC AVICOOPEX SRL

Cristuru Secuiesc, str. Orban Balays, jud. Harghita, 535400

X

40

MM 1609

SC LABORATOR CARMANGERIE SRL

Baia Mare, str. Gh. Șincai 14, jud. Maramures, 430311

X

X

X

41

MM 4406

SC CARMANGERIA DALIA SRL

Baia Mare, jud. Maramureș, 430530

X

X

X

X

42

MS 3585

SC CAZADELA SRL

Reghin, str. Oltului nr. 34, jud. Mureș, 545300

X

43

NT 33

SC CORD COMPANY SRL

Roman, str. Bogdan Dragoș nr. 111, jud. Neamț, 611160

X

44

NT 549

SC TCE 3 BRAZI SRL

Zănești, jud. Neamț, 617515

X

X

X

X

45

OT 24

SC SPAR SRL

Potcoava, str. Gării nr. 10, jud. Olt, 237355

X

X

X

X

46

OT 2093

SC COMAGRIMEX SA

Slatina, str. Grigore Alexandrescu nr. 19, jud. Olt, 230049

X

X

X

47

PH 3618

SC BRUTUS IMPEX SRL

Mănești, jud. Prahova, cod 107375

X

48

PH 4417

SC GOPA SRL

Ploiești, str. Gheorghe Doja nr. 124, jud. Prahova, 100141

X

X

49

PH 5644

SC MARAGET PROD SRL

Ploiești, str. Corlătești nr. 15, jud. Prahova, 100532

X

50

PH 5878

SC COMNILIS PROD SRL

Măgureni, str. Filipeștii de Pădure, tarla 24, jud. Prahova, 107350

X

X

51

PH 6044

SC ALGRIM CENTER SRL

Bărcănești, jud. Prahova, 107055

X

52

PH 6190

SC BANIPOR SRL

Târg Vechi, jud. Prahova, 107590

X

53

SB 111

SC M&C IMPORT SRL EXPORT

Copșă Mică, sat Târnăvioara nr. 90, jud. Sibiu, 555400

X

X

X

54

SB 126

SC CAPA PROD SRL

Sibiu, Calea Turnișorului nr. 150, jud. Sibiu, 550048

X

X

X

55

SB 138

SC MUVI IMPEX SRL

Sibiu, str. Drumul Ocnei nr. 4, jud. Sibiu 550092

X

X

X

56

SV 039

SC TONIC DISTRIBUTION SRL

Broșteni, jud. Suceava, 727075

X

X

X

57

SV 139

SC APOLO SRL (SC ADRAS SRL)

Rădăuți, str. Constantin Brâncoveanu, jud. Suceava, 725400

X

X

X

58

SV 217

SC ROGELYA SRL

Fălticeni, str. Ion Creangă nr. 69, jud. Suceava, 725200

X

X

X

59

SV 5661

SC HARALD PROD SRL

Măzănaiești, jud. Suceava, 727219

X

X

X

X

60

SV 5819

SC MARA ALEX SRL

Bădeuți, jud. Suceava, 727361

X

61

SV5943

SC SCUZA PROD

Forăști 96, jud. Suceava, 727235

X

X

X

62

SV 5963

SC DANILEVICI SRL

Gura Humorului, str. Fundătura Ghiocei 2, jud. Suceava, 725300

X

X

X

X

63

SV 6071

SC ANCAROL SRL

Gura Humorului, bd. Bucovina FN, jud. Suceava, 72530

X

X

X

X

64

TL 177

SC GAZDI PROD SRL

Stejaru, jud. Tulcea, 827215

X

X

65

TL 418

SC STOLI SRL

Cerna, jud. Tulcea, 827045

X

66

TL 686

SC PIG COM SRL

Satu nou, jud. Tulcea, 827141

X

67

TL 782

SC PROD IMPORT CDC SRL

Frecăței, jud. Tulcea, 827075

X

X

68

TM 378

SC VEROMEN SRL

Timișoara, jud. Timiș, 300970

X

X

X

69

TM 2725

SC RECOSEMTRACT SRL

Recaș, Calea Bazoșului nr. 1, jud. Timiș, 307340

X

X

X

70

TM 4187

SC FEMADAR SRL

Giroc, str. Gloria nr. 4, jud. Timiș, 307220

X

X

X

71

TM 4297

SC KENDO SRL

Victor Vlad Delamarina, jud. Timiș, 307460

X

X

X

X

72

TM 7438

SC AMBAX SRL

Timișoara, Calea Buziașului nr. 14, jud. Timiș, 300693

X

X

X

73

TR 10

SC ROMCIP SA

Salcia, jud. Teleorman, 147300

X

X

X

X

74

TR 26

SC COM GIORGI IMPEX SRL

Alexandria, jud. Teleorman, 140150

X

X

75

TR 36

SC AVICOLA COSTESTI SRL

Roșiori de Vede, str. Vadu Vezii 1, jud. Teleorman, 145100

X

76

TR 93

SC MARA PROD COM SRL

Alexandria, str. Abatorului nr. 1 bis, jud. Teleorman, 140106

X

X

X

77

VN 42

SC STEMARADI SRL

Tătăranu, jud. Vrancea, 627350

X

78

VN 3045

SC VANICAD SRL

Milcov, jud. Vrancea, 627205

X

79

VS 2243

SC CIB SA

Bârlad, Fundătura Elena Doamna nr. 2, jud. Vaslui, 731018

X

X

X

X

80

VS 2300

SC CARACUL SRL

Vaslui, jud. Vaslui, 730233

X

X

81

AR 92

SC AGRIPROD SRL

Nădlac, str. Calea Aradului nr.1, jud. Arad, 315500

X

X

82

AR 294

SC PRODAGRO CETATE SRL

Siria, Complex zootehnic, jud. Arad

X

X

83

B 120

SC ROM-SELECT 2000 SRL

București, B-dul Iuliu Maniu nr. 220, sector 6

X

84

B 269

SC FOODICOM SRL

București, str. Cătinei nr. 25, sector 6

X

85

BH 103

SC FLAVOIA SRL (S.C. AVICOLA SALONTA SA) (*1)

Salonta, str. Ghestului, nr. 7, jud. Bihor, 415500

X

X

86

BV 12

SC DRAKOM SILVA SRL

Codlea extravilan, șos. Codlea Dumbrăvița, jud. Brașov

X

X

87

CJ 109

SC ONCOS IMPEX SRL

Florești, str. Abatorului nr. 2, jud. Cluj, 407280

X

X

88

CV 210

SC ABO-FARM SA (SC NUTRICOD SA) (*2)

Sf. Gheorghe, str. Părăului nr. 6, jud. Covasna, 520033

X

X

89

DJ 34

SC FELVIO SRL

Bucovăț, Platforma Bucovăț, jud. Dolj

X

X

90

IS 1376

SC AVICOLA SA IAȘI

Tg Frumos, str. Ștefan cel Mare și Sfânt nr 44, jud. Iași, 705300

X

X

91

TM 2739

SC AVIBLAN SRL

Jebel, jud, Timiș, 307235

X

X

| SH | = | Slaughter Houses |
| --- | --- | --- |
| CP | = | Cutting Plants |
| PP | = | Processing Plants |
| MM/MP | = | Minced Meat/Meat Preparations’ |

SH

=

Slaughter Houses

CP

=

Cutting Plants

PP

=

Processing Plants

MM/MP

=

Minced Meat/Meat Preparations’

---

(*1)  SC. AVICOLA SALONTA SA has changed its name to SC FLAVOIA SRL.

*1

(*2)  SC. NUTRICOD SA has changed its name to SC ABO-FARM SA.

*2

---

ANNEX III

‘ANNEX III

LIST OF EGG PRODUCT ESTABLISHMENTS

| No | Veterinary No | Name of establishments | Town/Street or Village/Region | Activities |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EEP | EPC | LEP |
| 1 | B 39833 | SC COMPRODCOOP SA BUCUREȘTI (EPP) | București, B-dul Timișoara nr. 52, sector 6, 061333 | X | | |
| 2 | CV 471 | SC ABO-FARM SA (EPC) (SC NUTRICOD SA) (*1) | Sf. Gheorghe, str. Jokai Mor FN, jud. Covasna, 520033 | | X | X |
| 3 | GR 3028 | SC AVICOLA BUCUREȘTI SA CSHD MIHĂILEȘTI (EPC) | Mihăilești, jud. Giurgiu, 085200 | | X | |
| 4 | VN 16 | SC AVIPUTNA SA GOLEȘTI (EPC) | Com. Golești, str. Victoriei nr. 22, jud. Vrancea, 627150 | | X | |

No

Veterinary No

Name of establishments

Town/Street or Village/Region

Activities

EEP

EPC

LEP

1

B 39833

SC COMPRODCOOP SA BUCUREȘTI (EPP)

București, B-dul Timișoara nr. 52, sector 6, 061333

X

2

CV 471

SC ABO-FARM SA (EPC) (SC NUTRICOD SA) (*1)

Sf. Gheorghe, str. Jokai Mor FN, jud. Covasna, 520033

X

X

3

GR 3028

SC AVICOLA BUCUREȘTI SA CSHD MIHĂILEȘTI (EPC)

Mihăilești, jud. Giurgiu, 085200

X

4

VN 16

SC AVIPUTNA SA GOLEȘTI (EPC)

Com. Golești, str. Victoriei nr. 22, jud. Vrancea, 627150

X

| EEP | = | Egg Processing Plant |
| --- | --- | --- |
| EPC | = | Egg Packing Centre |
| LEP | = | Liquid Egg Product’ |

EEP

=

Egg Processing Plant

EPC

=

Egg Packing Centre

LEP

=

Liquid Egg Product’

---

(*1)  SC. NUTRICOD SA has changed its name to SC ABO-FARM SA.

*1

---

ANNEX IV

‘ANNEX IV

LIST OF COLDSTORES

| No | Veterinary No | Name of establishments | Town/Street or Village/Region | Activities |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| CS |
| 1 | BC 1034 | SC AGRICOLA INT. SRL | Bacău, Calea Moldovei 16, jud. Bacău, 600352 | X |
| 2 | CT 8070 | SC MIRICOS SRL | Constanța, șos. Interioară nr. 1, jud. Constanța, 900229 | X |
| 3 | CT 146 | SC FRIAL SA | Constanța, Port Constanța, Dana 53, jud. Constanța, 900900 | X |

No

Veterinary No

Name of establishments

Town/Street or Village/Region

Activities

CS

1

BC 1034

SC AGRICOLA INT. SRL

Bacău, Calea Moldovei 16, jud. Bacău, 600352

X

2

CT 8070

SC MIRICOS SRL

Constanța, șos. Interioară nr. 1, jud. Constanța, 900229

X

3

CT 146

SC FRIAL SA

Constanța, Port Constanța, Dana 53, jud. Constanța, 900900

X

| CS | = | Coldstores’ |
| --- | --- | --- |

CS

=

Coldstores’

---