alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
III 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 25 

Expressing the sense of the Senate that comprehensive tax reform legislation 

should include incentives for companies to repatriate foreign earnings 

for the purpose of creating new jobs. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 25 (legislative day, JANUARY 5), 2011 

Mrs. BOXER submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Finance 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the Senate that comprehensive tax 

reform legislation should include incentives for companies 

to repatriate foreign earnings for the purpose of creating 

new jobs. 

Whereas innovative proposals to create new American jobs 

must be enacted in order to reduce the United States unemployment rate, which was 9.4 percent at the end of 

2010; 

Whereas United States multinational companies have an estimated $1,000,000,000,000 in overseas earnings that 

could be used to invest in the economic recovery, but the 

current tax structure gives them more incentive to leave 

those earnings overseas; 


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2 

•SRES 25 IS 

Whereas Congress passed section 422 of the American Jobs 

Creation Act of 2004, which allowed for the short-term 

repatriation of foreign earnings at a lower tax rate to encourage companies to bring their overseas earnings back 

to invest in this country during the economic downturn; 

Whereas more than $300,000,000,000 in foreign earnings 

was returned to the United States as a result of section 

422 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004; and 

Whereas $18,000,000,000 in additional revenue was provided 

to the United States Treasury as a result of section 422 

of the American Jobs Creation Act: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that inno2 vative proposals to create new American jobs, such as re3 patriation, should be considered in the 112th Congress as 

4 part of comprehensive tax reform. 

Æ 


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<PAGE>


SECTION 906                                                         EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

       In connection with the Quarterly Report of Globecomm Systems Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
David E. Hershberg, Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
       of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and.

(2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
       respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
       Company.


                                          /s/ DAVID E. HERSHBERG
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          Chairman of the Board of Directors and
                                          Chief Executive Officer
                                          November 14, 2002
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eduardo Jimenez, Appellant.

[945 NYS2d 897]

Appeal from an order of the Onondaga County Court (William D. Walsh, J.), entered December 10, 2009 pursuant to the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act. The order denied defendant’s application to be resentenced upon defendant’s 2004 conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law and the matter is remitted to Onondaga County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order denying his application for resentencing pursuant to CPL 440.46. The People correctly concede that County Court erred *1405in determining that defendant is ineligible for resentencing on the ground that he had a prior conviction for an “exclusion offense” as defined in CPL 440.46 (5) (a) (ii). The court made that determination by erroneously calculating the look-back period of 10 years set forth in the statute from the date on which defendant committed the crimes for which he seeks resentencing, rather than from the date on which he filed the application for resentencing *(see People v Sosa,*18 NY3d 436, 440 [2012]; *People v Hill,*82 AD3d 77, 79-80 [2011]). We therefore reverse the order and remit the matter to County Court for further proceedings on defendant’s application for resentencing. Present—Scudder, PJ., Smith, Centra, Lindley and Martoche, JJ.
The Honorable Samuel H. Mays, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District *

of Tennessee, sitting by designation. 

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 10a0497n.06

No. 09-3165

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN HOOD,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

JULIUS WILSON, WARDEN,

Respondent-Appellee.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF OHIO

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: COLE and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; MAYS, District Judge.*

PER CURIAM. Petitioner Steven Hood appeals the district court’s denial of his petition

for habeas corpus. Because Hood’s period of incarceration has expired, we find the appeal is now

moot. See United States v. Waltanen, 356 F. App’x 848, 851 (6th Cir. 2009) (“If a prisoner does not

challenge the validity of the conviction but rather only challenges his sentence or some aspect of it,

the request for relief is moot once the challenged portion of the sentence has expired.”) (quoting

United States v. Goldberg, 239 F. App’x 993, 994 (6th Cir. 2007)). The sole issue before this court

is whether Hood’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge his sentence of

incarceration pursuant to State v. Foster, 845 N.E.2d 470 (Ohio 2006). On February 6, 2006, Hood

was sentenced to five years of incarceration, with eligibility for judicial release after serving four
No. 09-3165

Stephen Hood v. Julius Wilson

- 2 -

years. On February 24, 2010, Hood sent a letter to the court stating that he had been discharged from

his prison term on February 22, 2010. Because he has served the challenged portion of his sentence,

his petition is DISMISSED as moot.
#### In the Matter of Kristina GG., Also Known as Baby Girl GG., a Child Alleged to be Permanently Neglected. Albany County Department of Social Services, Appellant; Bridgette GG. et al., Respondents.

— Harvey, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Albany County (Cheeseman, J.), entered May 14, 1985, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, to rescind an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal and to adjudicate respondents’ child to be neglected.

In November 1983, the underlying neglect proceeding was *858commenced. On April 24, 1984, the proceeding was adjourned for a period of one year in contemplation of dismissal on the condition that respondents comply with certain terms, including attendance in various counseling sessions. By petition dated April 5, 1985, petitioner sought to have the adjournment in contemplation of dismissal rescinded on the ground that respondents were not complying with its conditions, and petitioner further sought a hearing to adjudicate respondents’ child to be neglected. Since respondents could not be found to be served, the matter was adjourned until May 14, 1985. On the hearing date, Family Court dismissed the petition when petitioner’s attorney arrived 12 minutes late. Although the attorneys for the adverse parties also had not arrived, the court refused to consider petitioner’s opposition to the dismissal. This appeal ensued.

Petitioner contends that justifiable circumstances were shown and thus the case should have been restored to the Court Calendar. We agree. A proceeding dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404 is properly restored to the Court’s Calendar when the petitioner establishes the existence of a meritorious proceeding, a lack of prejudice to the respondents, a sufficient excuse for the delay and an absence of intent to abandon the action *(see, e.g., Merrill v Robinson,*99 AD2d 578, 578-579). Here, the petition sufficiently indicates that the proceeding was meritorious. Indeed, the safety and welfare of a child are at stake. Furthermore, the record unequivocally establishes that there was no intent to abandon this proceeding and that no prejudice to respondents resulted from the delay of 12 minutes. Accordingly, we conclude that Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in refusing to consider petitioner’s opposition to the dismissal of the petition.

Order reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, petition reinstated and matter remitted to the Family Court of Albany County for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Harvey, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>


EXHIBIT 23.1


                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


         We consent to the incorporation by reference in (1) the Registration
Statement on Form S-3/A, File No. 333-81320, (2) the Registration Statement on
Form S-8, File No. 333-60004 and (3) the Registration Statement on Form S-8,
File No. 333-35450 of our report dated February 13, 2004 on the financial
statements of PacificHealth Laboratories, Inc. as of December 31, 2003 and for
the year then ended included in this Annual Report on Form 10-KSB.


Eisner LLP

Florham Park, New Jersey
March 30, 2004
Amendment No. 2 to the Maxygen License



 Exhibit 10.2C 
 AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO LICENSE AGREEMENT 
 This Amendment
No. 2 (“Amendment No. 2”) amends that certain License Agreement effective March 28, 2002, entered into by and between Maxygen, Inc. (“MUS”) and Codexis, Inc. (“Codexis”), as amended by Amendment
No. 1 to License Agreement effective September 13, 2002 (as amended, the “Agreement”), and shall be effective as of October 1, 2002. MUS and Codexis hereby amend the Agreement as follows: 
 1. Section 1.44 of the Agreement shall be amended to provide in its entirety, as follows: 
 1.44 “Separation Event” shall mean the earlier of (i) four (4) years after the Amendment Date, and
(ii) the date upon which a Change of Control of Codexis occurs. 
 2. Article 1 is amended by the addition of the following new definition:

 1.59 “Change of Control of Codexis” means (i) a dissolution or liquidation of Codexis;
(ii) a sale of all or substantially all the assets of Codexis, (iii) any consolidation or merger of Codexis with or into any other corporation or other entity or person, or any other corporate reorganization, in which the stockholders of
Codexis immediately prior to such consolidation, merger or reorganization, own less than fifty percent (50%) of the Company’s voting power immediately after such consolidation, merger or reorganization, excluding any consolidation, merger
or reorganization effected exclusively to change the domicile of Codexis, or (iv) acquisition by any person, entity or group within the meaning of Section 13(d) or 14(d) of the Exchange Act, or any comparable successor provisions (other
than MUS, CMEA Ventures Life Sciences 2000, L.P., Chevron Technology Ventures, LLC, Pequot Private Equity Fund III, L.P. and their respective Affiliates (collectively, the “Current Stockholders”, or any group including any Current
Stockholder that does not include, within the reasonable discretion of Maxygen, a competitor of Codexis) of the beneficial ownership (within the meaning of Rule 13d-3 promulgated under the Exchange Act, or comparable successor rule) of securities of
the Company such that after the acquisition the person, entity or group owns securities of Codexis representing at least fifty percent (50%) of the combined voting power entitled to vote in the election of directors. 
 3. Subsections 2.1.1(b)(i) and (ii) and 2.1.1(e)(i) and (ii) are amended to add the words “in the Codexis Field” as the last words of
each such clause. 
 4. As soon as practicable after the date hereof, an Amended and Restated License Agreement will be prepared reflecting the
amendments to the Agreement contained in this Amendment No. 2 and the September 13, 2002 amendment to the Agreement, without the need for any additional approval by the Board of Directors of Codexis or any member thereof. 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, MUS and Codexis have executed this Amendment No. 2 to License
Agreement as of the first above written. 
  

									
	MAXYGEN, INC.	 		 	CODEXIS, INC.
					
	By:	 	 /s/ Russell J. Howard
	 		 	By:	 	 /s/ Alan Shaw

	Name:	 	 Russell J. Howard
	 		 	Name:	 	 Alan Shaw

	Title:	 	 Chief Executive Officer
	 		 	Title:	 	 President


  

 2
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 68 

To amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize certain disabled former 

prisoners of war to use Department of Defense commissary and exchange 

stores. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 25 (legislative day, JANUARY 5), 2011 

Mr. INOUYE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize certain 

disabled former prisoners of war to use Department of 

Defense commissary and exchange stores. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. USE OF COMMISSARY AND EXCHANGE STORES 

4 BY CERTAIN DISABLED FORMER PRISONERS 

5 OF WAR. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 54 of title 10, United 

7 States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1064 

8 the following new section: 


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2 

•S 68 IS

1 ‘‘§ 1064a. Use of commissary and exchange stores: 

2 certain disabled former prisoners of war 

3 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Under regulations prescribed by 

4 the Secretary of Defense, former prisoners of war de5 scribed in subsection (b) may use commissary and ex6 change stores. 

7 ‘‘(b) COVERED INDIVIDUALS.—Subsection (a) applies 

8 to any former prisoner of war who— 

9 ‘‘(1) separated from active duty in the armed 

10 forces under honorable conditions; and 

11 ‘‘(2) has a service-connected disability rated by 

12 the Secretary of Veterans Affairs at 30 percent or 

13 more. 

14 ‘‘(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

15 ‘‘(1) The term ‘former prisoner of war’ has the 

16 meaning given that term in section 101(32) of title 

17 38. 

18 ‘‘(2) The term ‘service-connected’ has the 

19 meaning given that term in section 101(16) of title 

20 38.’’. 

21 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 

22 at the beginning of chapter 54 of such title is amended 

23 by inserting after the item relating to section 1064 the 

24 following new item: 


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3 

•S 68 IS

‘‘1064a. Use of commissary and exchange stores: certain disabled former prisoners of war.’’. 

Æ 


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#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David Hoffman, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Sherman, J.), rendered June 8, 1983, as convicted him of forgery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposed sentence.

Judgment affirmed, insofar as appealed from.

Where the prosecution’s expert witness testified that two of the three signatures found on the certificate of title were written by defendant, but as to the third he could only state that it very probably was written by defendant, a prima facie case of forgery in the second degree by falsely completing a commercial instrument has been made out. It is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given expert testimony *(United States v Williams,*583 F2d 1194, *cert denied*439 US 1117), and the jury may make a comparison between a writing sample and a disputed writing whether or not the expert offers an opinion (CPLR 4536; *People v Hunter,*34 NY2d 432).

In the instant case, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as we must, we find that sufficient evidence was adduced to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “The resolution of questions relating to the credibility of witnesses is properly a function of the jury and said determination may not be overturned lightly on appeal (see *People v Gruttola,*43 NY2d 116)” *(People v Rodriguez,*72 AD2d 571).

We have reviewed defendant’s other contention and find it equally without merit. Weinstein, J. P., Rubin, Lawrence and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>

THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1998, IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.

</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0001000285
<NAME>                        Colmena Corp.
<CURRENCY>                      none

<S>                                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  12-MOS
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<PERIOD-START>                                 OCT-01-1997
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<CASH>                                         6,287
<SECURITIES>                                   3,400
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   321,588
<SALES>                                        10,344,480
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               10,344,480
<CGS>                                          3,164,474
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  23,846,750
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               20,682,276
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             120,414
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</TABLE>
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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Stacy Arthaniel THREATT, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 08-4444.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Jan. 13, 2009.

Decided: Jan. 15, 2009.

Claire J. Slawinski Charlotte Shappert, E. Ray, Carolina, Rauscher, Executive Director, Ann L. Hester, Steven, Federal Defenders of Western North Carolina, Inc., North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C.F. United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KING, Circuit Judges.

*818PER CURIAM:

Stacy Arthaniel Threatt appeals from his 288-month sentence imposed pursuant-to his guilty plea to robbery, using a firearm during a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.' On appeal, he asserts that his sentence was proeedurally unreasonable because the court failed to address the reasons for variance that Threatt presented. We affirm.

When imposing sentence, a court must consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), and explain the chosen sentence. *See Gall v. United States,*- U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Failure to do so is procedural error. *Id.*Here, the court explicitly stated that it reviewed all the § 3553 factors and chose to highlight the. particularly pertinent factors during its imposition of sentence. Regarding the specific arguments raised by Threatt for a variance sentence below the advisory Guidelines range, the court commended Threatt for starting to turn his life around, discussed the extent of Threatt’s past criminal conduct, noted Threatt’s success in continued employment, and stated that Threatt had incredible support from his community. In support of its decision to deny the motion for a variance sentence, the court relied upon the violent nature of the charged offense, Threatt’s career offender status, the need to protect the public from Threatt, and the drug treatment inherent in a longer sentence. Finally, the court noted that, due to Threatt’s age, education, and employment history, he possessed both the ability and the opportunity to stay out of legal trouble, but he chose instead to violate the law repeatedly.

We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering all the appropriate sentencing factors and explaining its reasons for imposing the sentence chosen. *See Gall,*128 S.Ct. at 597 (standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm Threatt’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*