This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains regulatory documents having general

applicability and legal effect, most of which

are keyed to and codified in the Code of

Federal Regulations, which is published under

50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by

the Superintendent of Documents.

Rules and Regulations Federal Register

40299 

Vol. 86, No. 142 

Wednesday, July 28, 2021 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

Food Safety and Inspection Service 

9 CFR Part 352 

[Docket No. FSIS–2019–0028] 

RIN 0583–AD80 

Inspection of Yak and Other Bovidae, 

Cervidae, and Camelidae Species; 

Correction 

AGENCY: Food Safety and Inspection 

Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture 

(USDA). 

ACTION: Final rule; correction. 

SUMMARY: This document corrects the 

Regulation Identifier Number that 

appeared in a final rule published in the 

Federal Register on July 15, 2021, 

regarding the inspection of yak and 

other bovidae, cervidae, and camelidae 

species. 

DATES: This final rule correction is 

effective July 28, 2021. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rachel Edelstein, Assistant 

Administrator, Office of Policy and 

Program Development by telephone at 

(202) 205–0495. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Correction 

In final rule FR Doc. 2021–15062, 

beginning on page 37216 in the issue of 

July 15, 2021, make the following 

correction: On page 37216, in the 

second column, the Regulation 

Identifier Number is corrected to read 

‘‘RIN 0583–AD80’’. 

Done at Washington, DC. 

Paul Kiecker, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2021–16059 Filed 7–27–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410–DM–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2020–0442; Project 

Identifier AD–2020–00260–E; Amendment 

39–21640; AD 2021–14–13] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Pratt & 

Whitney Turbofan Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pratt 

& Whitney (PW) PW2037, PW2037M, 

PW2040, and F117–PW–100 model 

turbofan engines. This AD was 

prompted by a report of an uncontained 

engine failure resulting from cracks in 

the knife edge of the high-pressure 

turbine (HPT) 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly. This AD requires fluorescent 

penetrant inspections (FPIs) and visual 

inspections of the HPT 2nd-stage air 

seal assembly and, depending on the 

results of the inspections, replacement 

of the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly 

with a part eligible for installation. This 

AD also requires replacement of the 

affected HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly, depending on the engine 

model, at either the next engine shop 

visit or the next piece-part opportunity. 

The FAA is issuing this AD to address 

the unsafe condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective September 1, 

2021. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this final rule, contact Pratt 

& Whitney, 400 Main Street, East 

Hartford, CT 06118; phone: (800) 565– 

0140; fax: (860) 565–5442; email: 

help24@pw.utc.com; website: https://

fleetcare.pw.utc.com. You may view this 

service information at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 1200 District 

Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call (781) 238– 

7759. It is also available at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2020– 

0442. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket at 

https://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2020–0442; or in person at Docket 

Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

final rule, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for 

Docket Operations is U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Carol Nguyen, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

ECO Branch, FAA, 1200 District 

Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803; phone: 

(781) 238–7655; fax: (781) 238–7199; 

email: carol.nguyen@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to all PW PW2037, PW2037M, 

PW2040, and F117–PW–100 model 

turbofan engines. The NPRM published 

in the Federal Register on June 1, 2020 

(85 FR 33043). The NPRM was 

prompted by a report of an uncontained 

engine failure resulting from cracks in 

the knife edge of the HPT 2nd-stage air 

seal assembly. After further analysis, it 

was determined that the knife-edge 

crack was due to seal rubbing that 

elevated the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly temperature and induced 

fatigue. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed 

to require initial and repetitive 

borescope inspections (BSIs), FPIs, and 

visual inspections of the HPT 2nd-stage 

air seal assembly and, depending on the 

results of the inspections, replacement 

of the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly 

with a part eligible for installation. The 

NPRM also proposed to require 

replacement of the affected HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly, depending on 

the engine model, at either the next 

engine shop visit or the next piece-part 

opportunity. The FAA is issuing this AD 

to address the unsafe condition on these 

products. 


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Discussion of Final Airworthiness 

Directive 

Comments 

The FAA received comments from six 

commenters. The commenters were the 

Air Line Pilots Association, 

International (ALPA); Delta Air Lines, 

Inc. (Delta); FedEx Express (FedEx); 

MTU Maintenance Hannover GmbH 

(MTU); The Boeing Company (Boeing); 

and United Airlines (UAL). 

The following presents the comments 

received on the NPRM and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Requests To Revise Proposed BSI 

Requirement 

Delta, MTU, and FedEx requested 

revisions to the BSI proposed in the 

NPRM. The FAA details the comments 

to the BSI in the following paragraphs 

but is not providing an individual 

response to each comment given that 

the FAA removed the proposal for BSI 

from this AD. 

Request To Increase the Compliance 

Time for Initial BSI To Allow Sufficient 

Time To Complete Inspector Training 

Delta requested that the compliance 

time of 500 FCs after the effective date 

of this AD for the initial BSI proposed 

by paragraph (g)(1)(i) of the NPRM be 

extended to account for the difference in 

predicted flight utilization versus actual 

utilization as a result of the COVID–19 

pandemic. Delta cited concerns that the 

500 FC compliance time will not allow 

sufficient time for training inspectors to 

obtain qualifications to perform the BSI 

proposed by paragraph (g)(1)(i) of the 

NPRM. Delta noted that government 

restrictions and recommendations on 

travel and class size for in-person onsite training plus the lack of remote 

training opportunities represent 

obstacles to adequately training 

inspectors. 

Request To Update Repetitive BSI 

Language 

Delta requested that the FAA update 

paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of the NPRM from 

‘‘. . . perform the BSI required by 

paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this AD within 

every 500 FCs since performance of the 

last BSI’’ to ‘‘. . . perform the BSI 

required by paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this 

AD within every 500 FCs since 

performance of the last BSI that was 

done per paragraph (g)(1)(i) or (g)(1)(ii) 

of this AD.’’ Delta reasoned that the 

phrase ‘‘last BSI’’ of paragraph (g)(1)(ii) 

of the NPRM could cause confusion 

since the ‘‘last BSI’’ is the ‘‘initial BSI.’’ 

Request To Clarify ‘‘Before Further 

Flight’’ 

Delta requested that the FAA update 

paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of the NPRM to 

clarify the phrase ‘‘before further flight.’’ 

Delta asked whether the action is to 

remove the engine before the flight of 

the aircraft, or remove the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly and perform the 

inspections proposed by paragraph 

(g)(2) of the NPRM before flight of the 

engine. Delta stated there could be 

confusion that the aircraft is prohibited 

from further flight until the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly is removed from 

the engine. 

Request To Include a Scenario When To 

Perform the BSI 

Delta and MTU requested 

confirmation that the FAA included all 

the non-modulated turbine cooling air 

(TCA) system engines population into 

the proposed BSI requirement. MTU 

requested that the FAA update 

paragraph (g)(1) of the NPRM to include 

engines that have deactivated/ 

mechanically disconnected the TCA 

system. 

Request To Update the Costs of 

Compliance and Work Hours 

FedEx requested that the hours to 

perform the BSI of the HPT 2nd-stage air 

seal assembly be changed to 4.8 hours. 

FedEx cited PW Service Bulletin (SB) 

PW2000 72–773, dated March 11, 2020 

(PW SB PW2000 72–773), that indicates 

that the on-wing inspection takes 4.8 

hours and not 2 work hours as indicated 

in the NPRM. 

Request To Update the Terminating 

Action 

FedEx requested that the FAA revise 

paragraph (h), Terminating Action, of 

the NPRM from ‘‘. . . terminating 

action for the repetitive BSI 

requirements in paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of 

this AD’’ to ‘‘. . . terminating action for 

the initial BSI requirement in paragraph 

(g)(1)(i) and the repetitive BSI 

requirements in paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of 

this AD.’’ FedEx reasoned that an HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly could be 

removed for a reason unrelated to this 

AD and inducted for an engine shop 

visit before the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly is subject to the initial BSI 

proposed by paragraph (g)(1)(i) of the 

NPRM. As written in the NPRM, FedEx 

suggested it could be interpreted that 

the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly 

would still need an initial inspection 

within 2,500 FCs after this unrelated 

engine shop visit. 

Request To Clarify Revision of NDIP– 

1217 

Delta requested clarification if this AD 

allows for any revision level of NonDestructive Inspection Procedure, 

Technique Sheet for Detection of 

Cracking in the PW2000 HPT 2nd Stage 

Airseal by Borescope Inspection Method 

(NDIP–1217). Delta cited paragraph 

(g)(1)(i) of the NPRM that proposed to 

require PW SB PW2000 72–773, which 

references NDIP–1217. 

Request To Clarify Reporting 

Delta requested clarification if 

paragraph (g)(1)(i) of the NPRM 

proposed to require reporting of the 

inspection results to PW Materials & 

Processes Engineering/Non-Destructive 

Evaluation Engineer. Delta noted that 

paragraph (g)(1)(i) of the NPRM 

references paragraph 6 of PW SB 

PW2000 72–773, which references 

NDIP–1217, which specifies reporting of 

the inspection results. 

Request To Approve Tooling Equivalent 

Delta requested that their rotator be 

approved as a tooling equivalent for 

performing the BSI proposed by 

paragraph (g)(1) of the NPRM. Delta 

reasoned that they worked in 

conjunction with PW to approve a 

tooling equivalent and requested 

confirmation that PW has the authority 

to approve tooling equivalents and that 

an alternative method of compliance 

request would not be required. 

Delta also requested approval to 

deviate from paragraph 6.1.2 of NDIP– 

1217 to remove the starter rather than 

the crank pad to use their rotator. 

Request To Allow HPT Rotating by 

Hand for BSI 

Delta requested that the FAA allow 

the performance of the BSI of the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly proposed by 

paragraph (g)(1) of the NPRM to be 

rotated by hand rather than by a motordriven unit per paragraph 6 of NDIP– 

1217. Delta reasoned the motor-driven 

unit may not be available at all stations 

and a second maintenance technician 

can rotate the HPT rotor manually, 

which allows the inspector to use two 

hands for the BSI. 

Request To Confirm Affected Engine 

Serial Numbers 

Delta commented that ‘‘EagleNet case 

(CAS–83493–C0M6W0)’’ was submitted 

to P&W to confirm RTC engines cannot 

be converted to CET/pre-CET engines or 

vice versa. Delta requested that the FAA 

confirm that the list of affected engine 

serial numbers in the proposed AD is an 

adequate method for controlling risk of 

affected population. 


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Comment on Operational and Economic 

Costs 

FedEx commented that the proposed 

rule would impact approximately half of 

its fleet of PW2000 model turbofan 

engines. The inspection program itself 

will have a minor operational impact as 

it can be incorporated into an existing 

hot section inspection program, but 

unplanned engine changes will result in 

local operational impact. FedEx noted 

that the cost of the on-wing inspection 

program [BSI] would be minimal but the 

cost of engines that need to be removed 

immediately will have a fairly 

significant impact. FedEx noted that 

these operational and economic impacts 

are acceptable when weighed against 

the impact of an in-service event. 

FAA Response to Comments To Revise 

the BSI Inspection 

The FAA determined the need to 

remove the proposed BSI requirement 

from this AD based on comments 

regarding accessibility of inspector 

training. The FAA may consider 

additional rulemaking and will consider 

these comments in the development of 

any additional requirements. 

Request That Individual Part 

Serviceability Not Depend on the 

Inspection Results of Other Parts 

Delta commented that individual part 

serviceability should not depend on the 

inspection results of other parts. Delta 

also commented that if inspections are 

not possible which would allow the 

mating HPT 1st-stage disk or the HPT 

2nd-stage hub to be deemed serviceable, 

independent from inspection status of 

the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly, 

then the manufacturer should revise the 

engine manuals to clarify that the 

mating HPT 1st-stage disk or HPT 2ndstage hub cannot be made serviceable 

unless an inspection of the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly indicates it is 

free of cracks. Delta stated that this 

would remove the possibility that the 

mating HPT 1st-stage disk or HPT 2ndstage hub would be made serviceable 

and then installed in an engine before 

the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly is 

inspected. 

The FAA did not revise this AD in 

response to this comment. A crack, as 

identified in the shaded regions of 

Figure 1 to paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of this 

AD (Figure 1), which extends towards 

the knife-edge region of the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly, impacts the 

serviceability of the mating HPT 1ststage disk and the HPT 2nd-stage hub. 

A crack identified in the shaded region 

of Figure 1 of this AD of the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly results in the 

requirement to remove the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly, mating HPT 1ststage disk, and HPT 2nd-stage hub. 

Request To Remove Inspections for 

Parts Being Scrapped 

Delta requested that the FAA update 

paragraph (g)(2)(i) of the NPRM 

(paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this AD) to 

remove the visual inspection, knife-edge 

coating strip, and FPI of the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly if the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly, mating HPT 1ststage disk, and HPT 2nd-stage hub are 

being scrapped. Further, Delta requested 

if the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly 

is planned to be scrapped, then the 

mating HPT 1st-stage disk and HPT 2ndstage hub be allowed to be made 

serviceable without FPI of the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly. 

The FAA disagrees with the need to 

change the AD based on this comment. 

If the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly, 

HPT 1st-stage disk, and HPT 2nd-stage 

hub are removed from service, then the 

inspections required by paragraph 

(g)(1)(i) of this AD are not applicable. 

The inspections are required only if the 

operator returns the parts to service. 

FPI is the only way to ensure the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly is free from 

cracks because an FPI will reveal cracks 

not detected by a visual inspection. The 

serviceability of the both the HPT 1ststage disk and HPT 2nd-stage hub is 

directly dependent on the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly. If an operator 

does not FPI the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly, then neither the HPT 1st-stage 

disk nor HPT 2nd-stage disk can be 

returned to service. The FAA did not 

change this AD. 

Request To Reference Engine Manual 

for Inspection Instructions 

FedEx requested that the FAA update 

paragraph (g)(2)(i) of the NPRM 

(paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this AD) to 

reference Chapter 72–52–60, Inspection/ 

Check-01, of the PW2000 Series Engine 

Manual for instructions to perform the 

visual inspection, knife-edge coating 

removal, and FPI of the HPT 2nd-stage 

air seal assembly. 

The FAA determined it is not 

necessary to require use of specific 

service information as the visual 

inspection and FPI required by 

paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this AD are routine 

inspections that may vary between 

operators. The FAA, however, revised 

paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this AD to refer to 

Chapter 72–52–60, Repair-01, of the 

PW2000 Series Engine Manual for 

guidance on striping the knife edge 

coating from the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly. 

Request To Remove FPI 

Delta requested that paragraph 

(g)(2)(ii) of the NPRM (paragraph 

(g)(1)(ii) of this AD) remove the 

proposed requirement to perform an FPI 

and require only visual inspections of 

the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly. 

Delta reasoned that based on NDIP– 

1217, cracks are detectable by visual 

inspection, thereby making FPI 

unnecessary. Delta concluded that 

performing only the visual inspection 

enables the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly to be inspected at initial 

disassembly while still in the presence 

of the mating HPT 1st-stage disk and 

HPT 2nd-stage hub, which simplifies 

determining if parts need to be scrapped 

if a crack is found. Otherwise, Delta 

stated that paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of the 

NPRM creates a logistical challenge for 

performing inspections as the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly, mating HPT 1ststage disk, and HPT 2nd-stage hub 

could be routed to different locations 

with different lead times. 

The FAA disagrees. While cracks may 

be detected by visual inspection, an FPI 

will reveal cracks not detected by visual 

inspection. Additionally, the FPI is 

required to confirm that the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly is free of cracks. 

The FAA did not change this AD. 

Request To Allow Repair of the HPT 

2nd-Stage Air Seal Assembly 

Delta and MTU requested that 

paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of the NPRM 

(paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of this AD) be 

updated to allow repair of the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly if a crack is 

found. The commenters reasoned that 

Chapter 72–52–60, Inspection/Check-01 

and Repair-02, of the PW2000 Series 

Engine Manual provides information for 

repairing a cracked HPT 2nd-stage air 

seal assembly. The commenters 

concluded that this AD should allow 

repair; otherwise, Chapter 72–52–60 of 

the PW2000 Series Engine Manual 

should be deleted or updated. 

The FAA disagrees that the crack 

repairs identified in the engine manual 

should be incorporated in this AD. If a 

crack is found during the inspections 

required by this AD for the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly, the part must be 

removed from service and cannot be 

repaired. The FAA disagrees that 

Chapter 72–52–60 of the PW2000 Series 

Engine Manual should be deleted or 

updated. This repair is specifically for 

mechanical damage such as handling 

damage and foreign object damage in 

the knife edge area. This repair is not 

applicable to cracks identified by this 

AD. The damage addressed is unrelated 

and the repair does not need to be 


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40302 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 142 / Wednesday, July 28, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 

prohibited. The requirements contained 

in this AD take precedence over any 

contrary provisions in the 

manufacturer’s instructions for 

continued airworthiness. The FAA did 

not update this AD. 

Request To Clarify Removal From 

Service 

Delta requested that the FAA clarify 

paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of the NPRM 

(paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of this AD) that 

states the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly must be removed from service 

if a crack is found. Delta asked if the 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly must be 

scrapped, or if the HPT 2nd-stage air 

seal assembly can be repaired and 

returned to service after re-identifying it 

with a new P/N. Delta added that the 

engine manual provides a repair option 

of knife-edge cracks caused by 

mechanical damage. 

The FAA notes that ‘‘remove from 

service’’ in this AD indicates that the 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly should 

be permanently removed from service if 

a crack is found. Any cracked HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly cannot be 

repaired and returned to service per the 

requirements of this AD. 

Request To Remove ‘‘Before Further 

Flight’’ 

FedEx requested that the FAA remove 

the phrase ‘‘before further flight’’ from 

paragraphs (g)(2)(ii) and (iii) of the 

NPRM (paragraphs (g)(1)(ii) and (iii) of 

this AD). FedEx reasoned that since the 

visual inspection, knife edge coating 

removal, and FPI are performed at every 

piece-part opportunity of the mating 

HPT 1st-stage disk, HPT 2nd-stage disk, 

or the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly, 

‘‘before further flight’’ is redundant. 

Additionally, FedEx stated that the 

overhaul facility must comply with the 

engine manual inspection criteria and 

would have no other option but to make 

the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly 

permanently unserviceable. 

The FAA agrees and removed ‘‘before 

further flight’’ from paragraphs (g)(1)(ii) 

and (iii) of this AD. 

Request To Clarify Part Replacement 

After Crack Is Found 

MTU requested clarification regarding 

whether the mating HPT 1st-stage disk 

or HPT 2nd-stage hub needs to be 

replaced if a crack is found after 

performing the inspections proposed by 

paragraph (g)(2)(iii) of the NPRM 

(paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of this AD), or if 

both the mating HPT 1st-stage disk and 

HPT 2nd-stage hub need to be replaced. 

If a crack is found as identified in the 

shaded region of Figure 1 to paragraph 

(g)(1)(iii) of this AD (Figure 1) that 

extends toward the knife-edge region of 

the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly, 

this AD requires replacement of the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly, mating HPT 

1st-stage disk, and HPT 2nd-stage hub. 

Request To Clarify Terminating Action 

UAL requested clarification if 

paragraph (h), Terminating Action, of 

the NPRM applies to the visual 

inspection and FPI of the HPT 2nd-stage 

air seal assembly proposed by paragraph 

(g)(2) of the NPRM (paragraph (g)(1) of 

this AD). 

The FAA notes that there is no 

terminating action to the visual 

inspection and FPI of the HPT 2nd-stage 

air seal assembly required by paragraph 

(g)(1) of this AD. The visual inspection 

and FPI required by paragraph (g)(1) of 

this AD are required for all HPT 2ndstage air seal assemblies, including P/Ns 

others than 1A8209 or 1A8209–001. As 

stated in an earlier response, with the 

removal of the BSI requirements from 

this AD, the FAA removed the 

terminating action from this AD. 

Request To Clarify Applicability for 

Visual Inspection and FPI 

UAL requested clarification of 

whether paragraph (g)(1) of this AD 

applies if an HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly, with a P/N other than P/N 

1A8209 or 1A8209–001, is installed. 

Delta requested that an applicability 

statement referencing P/Ns for affected 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assemblies be 

added to paragraph (g)(2) of the NPRM. 

Paragraph (g)(2) of the NPRM proposed 

to require a visual inspection of the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly, stripping 

the knife edge coating from the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly, and then 

performing an FPI of the HPT 2nd-stage 

air seal assembly. Delta noted that if an 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly has 

been modified and re-identified with a 

new P/N using PW SB PW2000 72–754, 

Revision No. 2, dated April 30, 2019, 

then it should not be subject to the same 

inspections as HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly, P/N 1A8209 or 1A8209–001. 

The FAA disagrees and notes that the 

visual inspection and the FPI required 

by paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this AD are 

required for all HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assemblies, regardless of the P/N. The 

FAA did not update this AD. 

Request To Allow Installation of Mating 

Parts Without Past HPT 2nd-Stage Air 

Seal Assembly Inspection Verification 

Delta requested that a mating HPT 1ststage disk and HPT 2nd-stage hub made 

serviceable before the effective date of 

this AD be eligible for installation 

without verification that all past HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assemblies had visual 

inspections and FPI to verify no cracks 

were found. Delta reasoned that the 

inspections were not previously 

required and adequate records may not 

exist. Additionally, Delta stated it might 

not be possible to re-inspect all previous 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assemblies for 

cracks as some may have been scrapped 

before the inspection. 

The FAA notes that an HPT 1st-stage 

disk and HPT 2nd-stage hub made 

serviceable before the effective date of 

this AD are not subject to the 

requirements of (g)(1)(iii) of the AD 

until their next piece part exposure. The 

FAA did not update this AD. 

Request To Clarify the Location of the 

Forward and Aft Edges 

Delta and MTU requested that the 

FAA clarify the location of the forward 

and aft edges of the HPT 2nd-stage air 

seal assembly. Delta asked if the forward 

edge is the barrel section forward of the 

#1 knife-edge or any part that extends 

beyond the barrel section. 

The FAA removed references to 

‘‘forward edge’’ and ‘‘aft edge’’ of the 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly from 

this AD. In their place, the FAA added 

Figure 1 to paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of this 

AD to specify the locations of the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly that require 

inspection for cracks. 

Request To Clarify the Definition of 

Through-Crack 

Delta and FedEx requested that the 

FAA clarify the definition of ‘‘throughcrack.’’ Delta asked if a ‘‘through-crack’’ 

is a crack going through the axial 

direction or radial direction of the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly. Delta 

referenced Figure 5 of NDIP–1217 that 

appears to show a through-crack in the 

axial direction. Delta inferred from 

paragraph (i)(4) of the NPRM that a 

through-crack is in the radial direction. 

Delta requested a diagram to help 

illustrate what constitutes a throughcrack. 

FedEx stated that a lenticular seal is 

a two-piece component that becomes an 

inseparable assembly during 

manufacturing. As a result, it would be 

impossible to distinguish a throughcrack from a surface crack over a large 

area of the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly’s exterior since its interior 

surfaces are inaccessible. FedEx cited 

Chapter 72–52–60, Inspection/Check– 

01, Figures 801 and 801A, of the 

PW2000 Series Engine Manual, which 

highlights areas where throughthickness cracks are critical. According 

to FedEx, however, these images fail to 

address the ability to determine whether 

a surface crack is a ‘‘through-crack.’’ 

Additionally, the PW2000 Series Engine 


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Manual does not provide dimensions 

that bound the areas making HPT disk 

replacement subjective. 

The FAA agrees that it is difficult to 

differentiate between a surface crack 

and through-crack; therefore, the FAA 

removed references to ‘‘through-crack’’ 

from this AD. The FAA notes that any 

crack, in any direction, found in the 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly, 

requires removal of the HPT 2nd-stage 

air seal assembly from service. As stated 

in an earlier response, the FAA added 

Figure 1 to show the locations of the 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly that 

require inspection for cracks. However, 

the FAA is not providing dimensions 

that bind the areas. If the inspections of 

the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly 

reveal a crack in the shaded regions of 

Figure 1, which extends towards the 

knife-edge region, the HPT 2nd-stage air 

seal assembly must be removed from 

service. 

Request To Clarify Engine Shop Visit 

Delta requested that the FAA clarify 

the definition of ‘‘engine shop visit’’ 

related to which engine flanges the FAA 

considers ‘‘major mating engine 

flanges.’’ Delta requested that the FAA 

exclude the low-pressure compressor 

(LPC) module flange as a major mating 

engine flange because LPC module life 

limited parts (LLPs) can be swapped 

while the engine is installed on the 

aircraft. Delta reasoned that the 

separation of the LPC module flange 

should not require replacement of the 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly. These 

LPC swaps may extend time between 

engine shop visits if the LLPs are 

located in the LPC. 

The FAA determined the need to 

revise the definition of ‘‘engine shop 

visit’’ by replacing separation of ‘‘major 

mating engine flanges’’ with separation 

of the ‘‘N or M engine flange.’’ If the 

LPC swap does not involve separating 

the N or M engine flange, then the 

compliance time for replacing the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly has not 

occurred as required by this AD. 

Request To Update the Definition of 

Piece-Part Opportunity 

Delta requested that the FAA update 

the definition of ‘‘piece-part 

opportunity’’ from ‘‘when the part is 

completely disassembled’’ to ‘‘any time 

the seal is removed from the HPT 

module.’’ Delta reasoned that while the 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly is 

referred to as an ‘‘assembly,’’ the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly cannot be 

dissembled. 

The FAA partially agrees and updated 

the definition to clarify what constitutes 

‘‘piece-part opportunity’’ for the HPT 

1st-stage disk, HPT 2nd-stage hub, and 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly. 

Request To Update the Definition of 

Part Eligible for Installation 

Delta requested that the FAA update 

the definition of ‘‘part eligible for 

installation’’ to remove paragraph 

(i)(3)(ii) and to refer only to ‘‘An HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly that is not P/ 

N 1A8209 or 1A8209–001.’’ Delta 

reasoned that paragraph (i)(3)(ii) of the 

NPRM, which states that an HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly that has been 

modified using the service information 

is eligible for installation, is 

unnecessary because the HPT 2nd-stage 

air seal assembly receives a new P/N, 

which is not P/N 1A8209 or 1A8209– 

001, after repair. 

The FAA agrees and revised the 

definition of an HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly that is eligible for installation, 

now in paragraph (h)(3) of this AD, to 

refer to an HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly with a P/N other than 1A8209 

or 1A8209–001. 

Request To Update Service Information 

Revision 

MTU requested that the FAA 

reference PW SB PW2000 72–754, 

Revision No. 3, dated August 14, 2019, 

in this AD instead of Revision No. 2, 

dated April 30, 2019. 

The FAA agrees. The FAA updated 

PW SB PW2000 72–754 to Revision No. 

3, dated August 14, 2019, throughout 

this AD. 

Request To Update the Service 

Information Description 

MTU requested that the FAA update 

the service information description in 

the Other Related Service Information 

paragraph of the NPRM (Related Service 

Information of this AD) to include the 

replacement and modification of the 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly. 

The FAA agrees. The FAA updated 

the service information description in 

the Related Service Information 

paragraph in this AD. 

Request To Update the Costs of 

Compliance 

UAL requested that the Costs of 

Compliance include additional costs 

such as delays in engine builds and 

modifications. UAL reasoned that piecepart modification of the HPT 2nd-stage 

air seal assembly, mating HPT 1st-stage 

disk, and HPT 2nd-stage hub are 

independent of each other. Scraping all 

parts proposed by paragraph (g)(2)(iii) of 

the NPRM (paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of this 

AD) will force engine centers to delay 

routing the mating HPT 1st-stage disk 

and HPT 2nd-stage hub for modification 

until the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly is inspected, thus delaying an 

engine build or incurring costs while 

the mating HPT 1st-stage disk and HPT 

2nd-stage hub are partially or fully 

scrapped. 

The FAA disagrees with updating the 

costs of compliance. The cost analysis 

in AD rulemaking actions typically 

includes only the costs associated with 

complying with the AD and does not 

include secondary costs. The FAA’s cost 

estimate includes the work hours and 

parts costs to perform the required 

actions. 

No Comments on This AD 

ALPA supported the AD and 

appreciated the opportunity to 

comment. Boeing had no comments. 

Conclusion 

The FAA reviewed the relevant data, 

considered any comments received, and 

determined that air safety requires 

adopting this AD as proposed. 

Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD 

to address the unsafe condition on these 

products. Except for minor editorial 

changes, and any other changes 

described previously, this AD is 

adopted as proposed in the NPRM. 

None of the changes will increase the 

economic burden on any operator. 

Related Service Information 

The FAA reviewed PW SB PW2000 

72–754, Revision No. 3, dated August 

14, 2019, and PW SB PWF117 72–402, 

Revision No. 2, dated May 3, 2019. The 

SBs describe procedures for replacing or 

modifying the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly. 

Interim Action 

The FAA considers this AD to be an 

interim action. The FAA may consider 

additional rulemaking based on further 

investigation of the unsafe condition. 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates that this AD 

affects 445 engines installed on 

airplanes of U.S. registry. 

The FAA estimates the following 

costs to comply with this AD: 


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40304 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 142 / Wednesday, July 28, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Visually inspect, strip the knife edge coating, and FPI the 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly.

10 work-hours × $85 per hour 

= $850.

$0 $850 $378,250 

The FAA estimates the following 

costs to do any necessary replacements. 

The FAA has no way of determining 

how many replacements of the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly will be done 

with a modified HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly and how many will be done 

with a new HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly. The FAA also has no way of 

determining the number of engines that 

might need replacement of the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly, HPT 1ststage disk, and HPT 2nd-stage hub. 

ON-CONDITION COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Replace the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly with modified HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly.10 work-hours × $85 per hour = 

$850.

$5,000 $5,850 

Replace the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly with new seal assembly 0.25 work-hours × $85 per hour = 

$21.25.

355,000 355,021.25 

Replace the HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly, HPT 1st-stage disk, and 

HPT 2nd-stage hub (based on FPI results).

0.25 work-hours × $85 per hour = 

$21.25.

970,000 970,021.25 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

2021–14–13 Pratt & Whitney: Amendment 

39–21640; Docket No. FAA–2020–0442; 

Project Identifier AD–2020–00260–E. 

(a) Effective Date 

This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective September 1, 2021. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all Pratt & Whitney 

(PW) PW2037, PW2037M, PW2040, and 

F117–PW–100 model turbofan engines. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 7250, Turbine Section. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by a report of an 

uncontained engine failure resulting from 

cracks originating in the knife edge of the 

high-pressure turbine (HPT) 2nd-stage air 

seal assembly. The FAA is issuing this AD to 

prevent failure of the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly. The unsafe condition, if not 

addressed, could result in uncontained HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly release, damage 

to the engine, and damage to the airplane. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Required Actions 

(1) Visual Inspection and Fluorescent 

Penetrant Inspection (FPI) of HPT 2nd-Stage 

Air Seal Assembly 

After the effective date of this AD, at every 

piece-part opportunity of the HPT 1st-stage 

disk, HPT 2nd-stage hub, or the HPT 2ndstage air seal assembly: 

(i) Perform a visual inspection of the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly, strip the knife 

edge coating from the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly, and then perform an FPI of the 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly. 

Note 1 to paragraph (g)(1)(i): Guidance on 

striping the knife edge coating from the HPT 

2nd-stage air seal assembly required by 

paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this AD can be found 

Chapter 72–52–60, Repair-01, of the PW2000 

Series Engine Manual. 

(ii) If a crack is found in the HPT 2nd-stage 

air seal assembly during the visual inspection 

or FPI required by paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this 

AD, remove the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly from service and replace it with a 

part eligible for installation. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 142 / Wednesday, July 28, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 40305 

(iii) During the visual inspection or FPI 

required by paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this AD, if 

a crack is found in the shaded regions of the 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly identified in 

Figure 1 to paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of this AD 

(Figure 1), which extends towards the knifeedge region of the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly, remove the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly, mating HPT 1st-stage disk, and 

HPT 2nd-stage hub from service, and replace 

the parts with parts eligible for installation. 

In order to return the mating HPT 1st-stage 

disk and HPT 2nd-stage hub to service, the 

inspections of the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly cannot reveal a crack identified in 

the shaded regions of Figure 1, which 

extends towards the knife-edge region. 

(2) Replacement of HPT 2nd-Stage Air Seal 

Assembly 

(i) For PW PW2037, PW2037M, and 

PW2040 model turbofan engines, at the next 

engine shop visit after the effective date of 

this AD, remove the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly, part number (P/N) 1A8209 or 

1A8209–001, and replace it with a part 

eligible for installation. 

(ii) For PW F117–PW–100 model turbofan 

engines, at the next piece part opportunity 

after the effective date of this AD, remove the 

HPT 2nd-stage air seal assembly, P/N 1A8209 

or 1A8209–001, and replace it with a part 

eligible for installation. 

(h) Definitions 

(1) For the purpose of this AD, an ‘‘engine 

shop visit’’ is the induction of an engine into 

the shop for maintenance involving the 

separation of the N or M engine flange. The 

separation of engine flanges solely for the 

purposes of transportation of the engine 

without subsequent engine maintenance does 

not constitute an engine shop visit. 

(2) For the purpose of this AD, a ‘‘piecepart opportunity’’ is: 

(i) For the HPT 1st-stage disk, when the 

disk is removed from the engine and all the 

blades are removed; 

(ii) For the HPT 2nd-stage hub, when the 

hub is removed from the engine and all the 

blades are removed; or 

(iii) For the HPT 2nd-stage air seal 

assembly, when the assembly is removed 

from either the HPT 1st-stage disk or the HPT 

2nd-stage hub. 

(3) For the purpose of this AD, a ‘‘part 

eligible for installation’’ is an HPT 2nd-stage 

air seal assembly with a P/N other than 

1A8209 or 1A8209–001. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, ECO Branch, FAA, has 

the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, 

if requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the certification office, 

send it to the attention of the person 

identified in Related Information. You may 

email your request to: ANE-AD-AMOC@

faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 


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Figure 1 to Paragraph (g)(l)(iii)- Crack Inspection Critical Areas 

m-

:r 
40306 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 142 / Wednesday, July 28, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Carol Nguyen, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, ECO Branch, FAA, 1200 District 

Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803; phone: (781) 

238–7655; fax: (781) 238–7199; email: 

carol.nguyen@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued on June 30, 2021. 

Ross Landes, 

Deputy Director for Regulatory Operations, 

Compliance & Airworthiness Division, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2021–15947 Filed 7–27–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 71 

[Docket No. FAA–2021–0295; Airspace 

Docket No. 21–ANE–2] 

RIN 2120–AA66 

Amendment and Establishment of 

Class E Airspace; Bar Harbor, ME 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This action amends Class E 

surface area and Class E airspace 

extending upward from 700 feet above 

the surface at Hancock County-Bar 

Harbor Airport, Bar Harbor, ME. This 

action would also update the geographic 

coordinates of the airport to coincide 

with the FAA’s database. In addition, 

this action also establishes Class E 

airspace extending upward from 700 

feet above the surface for Bar Harbor 

Heliport, Bar Harbor, ME. Controlled 

airspace is necessary for the safety and 

management of instrument flight rules 

(IFR) operations in the area. 

DATES: Effective 0901 UTC, October 7, 

2021. The Director of the Federal 

Register approves this incorporation by 

reference action under 1 CFR part 51, 

subject to the annual revision of FAA 

Order 7400.11 and publication of 

conforming amendments. 

ADDRESSES: FAA Order 7400.11E, 

Airspace Designations and Reporting 

Points, and subsequent amendments can 

be viewed online at http://www.faa.gov/ 

air_traffic/publications/. For further 

information, you can contact the 

Airspace Policy Group, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591; 

Telephone: (202) 267–8783. The Order 

is also available for inspection at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of FAA 

Order 7400.11E at NARA, email 

fedreg.legal@nara.gov or go to https://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ 

ibr-locations.html. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John 

Fornito, Operations Support Group, 

Eastern Service Center, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 1701 Columbia Ave., 

College Park, GA 30337; Telephone 

(404) 305–6364. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules 

regarding aviation safety is found in 

Title 49 of the United States Code. 

Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the 

authority of the FAA Administrator. 

Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, 

describes in more detail the scope of the 

agency’s authority. This rulemaking is 

promulgated under the authority 

described in Subtitle VII, Part A, 

Subpart I, Section 40103. Under that 

section, the FAA is charged with 

prescribing regulations to assign the use 

of airspace necessary to ensure the 

safety of aircraft and the efficient use of 

airspace. This regulation is within the 

scope of that authority as it amends and 

establishes Class E airspace in Bar 

Harbor, ME, to support IFR operations 

in the area. 

History 

The FAA published a notice of 

proposed rulemaking in the Federal 

Register (86 FR 24562, May 7, 2021) for 

Docket No. FAA–2021–0295 to amend 

Class E surface airspace and Class E 

airspace extending up from 700 feet 

above the surface for Hancock CountyBar Harbor Airport, Bar Harbor, ME. In 

addition, the geographical coordinates 

of Hancock County-Bar Harbor Airport 

would be updated. This action also 

proposed to establish Class E airspace 

extending upward from 700 feet above 

the surface for Bar Harbor Heliport. 

Interested parties were invited to 

participate in this rulemaking effort by 

submitting written comments on the 

proposal to the FAA. No comments 

were received. 

Class E airspace designations are 

published in Paragraphs 6002 and 6005, 

respectively, of FAA Order 7400.11E, 

dated July 21, 2020, and effective 

September 15, 2020, which is 

incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 

71.1. The Class E airspace designations 

listed in this document will be 

published subsequently in the Order. 

Availability and Summary of 

Documents for Incorporation by 

Reference 

This document amends FAA Order 

7400.11E, Airspace Designations and 

Reporting Points, dated July 21, 2020, 

and effective September 15, 2020. FAA 

Order 7400.11E is publicly available as 

listed in the ADDRESSES section of this 

document. FAA Order 7400.11E lists 

Class A, B, C, D, and E airspace areas, 

air traffic routes, and reporting points. 

The Rule 

The FAA is amending 14 CFR part 71 

by amending Class E surface airspace for 

Hancock County-Bar Harbor Airport, 

Bar Harbor, ME, by increasing the radius 

from 4.2 miles to 5.5 miles and 

eliminating the extensions off the 204° 

and 024° bearings, respectively. The 

Class E airspace extending up from 700 

feet above the surface for Hancock 

County-Bar Harbor is amended by 

increasing the radius from 7.4 miles to 

8.0 miles and adding an extension 3.7 

miles each side of the Hancock CountyBar Harbor Airport 025° bearing 

extending from the 8.0-mile radius to 

11.4 miles northeast of the airport. In 

addition, the geographical coordinates 

of Hancock County-Bar Harbor Airport 

are updated to coincide with the FAA’s 

database. This action also establishes 

Class E airspace extending upward from 

700 feet above the surface for Bar Harbor 

Heliport. These changes are necessary 

for continued safety and management of 

IFR operations in the area. 

FAA Order 7400.11, Airspace 

Designations and Reporting Points, is 

published yearly and effective on 

September 15. 

Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

The FAA has determined that this 

regulation only involves an established 

body of technical regulations for which 

frequent and routine amendments are 

necessary to keep them operationally 

current. It, therefore: (1) Is not a 

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under 

Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a 

‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 

FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) 

does not warrant preparation of a 

regulatory evaluation as the anticipated 

impact is minimal. Since this is a 

routine matter that only affects air traffic 

procedures and air navigation, it is 

certified that this rule, when 

promulgated, does not have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities under the 

criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 


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