NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELI MELLOR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

WEST TROP STORAGE, LLC, DBA 

Great American Storage Solutions,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-15624

D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01502-JCMVCF

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 14, 2016**

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 

Eli Mellor appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction his diversity action arising from the sale of his 

property after he failed to pay rent on his storage unit. We have jurisdiction under 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 23 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-15624 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015), and 

for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of leave to amend, AE v. County of 

Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012). We reverse and remand.

The district court properly dismissed Mellor’s action for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction because Mellor failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the 

amount in controversy was satisfied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (requirements for 

diversity jurisdiction); Pachinger v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., 802 F.2d 

362, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The amount in controversy is normally determined 

from the face of the pleadings. . . . It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim 

is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.” (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd. v. 

A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 1059, 1083 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Punitive damages require a 

showing by clear and convincing evidence that Defendants acted with oppression, 

fraud or malice, express or implied.” (citing NRS § 42.005; emphasis and internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

However, the district court abused its discretion in denying Mellor’s motion 

for leave to amend because it is not clear that amendment would be futile. See AE, 
3 15-15624 

666 F.3d at 636 (setting forth the bases for denial of amendment); see also Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that leave to amend 

should be granted if it appears at all possible that a pro se plaintiff can correct the 

defect in the pleading). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this disposition. On remand, the district court 

should make a specific finding that the parties are diverse. See Johnson v. 

Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that 

an “LLC is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens”).

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See 

Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

REVERSED and REMANDED.