[Cite as Ward v. SKH Group, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-4161.]

COURT OF APPEALS

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

KELLY ANN WARD, : JUDGES:

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.

 Plaintiff - Appellant : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.

: Hon. Andrew J. King, J.

-vs- :

:

SKH GROUP LLC, et al., : Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076

:

 Defendants - Appellees : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

21 CV C 09 0452

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: November 17, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee

CLAY W. BALYEAT KESHA D. KINSEY

Balyeat, Leahy, Daley P.O. Box 6835

Miller & Bensinger, LLC Scranton, PA 18505-6835

1728 Allentown Road

Lima, Ohio 45805
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 2

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Kelly Ann Ward1, appeals the decision of the Delaware County 

Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to Appellees, SKH Group LLC and 

The Morgan House. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE.

{¶2} Ward visited The Morgan House, a gift shop, on November 17, 2019 as she 

had done on several past occasions. When she left the shop, she fell to the ground and 

sustained injuries that she described as including fractures to her skull, tibia and fibula. 

She pursued a claim against Appellees for negligent maintenance of the entrance of the 

shop, but her claim was dismissed when the trial court found that the hazard she 

described was “open and obvious” and that the Appellees were not liable. She contends 

the trial court erred in its findings, failed to give weight to her experts and should have 

found a that a genuine issue of material fact remained to be decided regarding the open 

and obvious state of the alleged hazard.

{¶3} Ward was Christmas shopping with her friend, Bretta, on November 17, 

2019. They had visited two other retail stores and visited Morgan House after lunch. 

Ward had been to Morgan House eight to twelve times prior to the date of her fall. She 

had Bretta drop her at the handicapped entrance and she entered the shop while Bretta 

parked. When it was time to leave, she used the front main entrance which was not 

1 Kelly Ann Ward passed away during the pendency of this appeal, prior to the matter 

being argued. The appeal was stayed to permit Appellant to designate a substitute. On 

August 15, 2023, Appellant filed the Notice of Substitution of Charles W. Ward, 

Administrator of the Estate of Kelly Ann Ward for the decedent. (Probate Court of Allen 

County, Ohio, Entry Appointing Fiduciary, July 31, 2023, Case No. 2023 ES 313). For 

ease of reference we will continue to refer to Appellant as “Ward”.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 3

handicap accessible. She had used this exit in the past and explained that she did not 

use the handicapped entrance that she had used to enter the shop because her friend’s 

car was parked closer to the main entrance, and she did not know if her friend could have 

picked her up from the handicapped entrance. (Ward Deposition, p. 30, line 23 to p. 31, 

line 14). Ward conceded that she had successfully used the main entrance in the past 

and that the bricks in the walkway that allegedly caused her fall were “always ajar” during 

her prior visits. (Ward Deposition, p. 31, line 19 to p. 3, line 8). She believed that the path 

to the handicapped entrance was lined with the same bricks and recalled tripping over 

bricks when she had entered the building in the past. (Ward Deposition, p. 25, lines 15-

24). 

{¶4} When she left the building on the day of the incident, she used the side of 

the entrance adjacent to a pole or post, which she grabbed with her left hand for support. 

She admitted that it was “normal for [her] to grab ahold of something to execute one step” 

because the ground where she was stepping did not look stable. (Ward Deposition, p. 25, 

line 12 to p. 26, line 1). Ward saw the bricks where she planned to step, but felt 

comfortable taking the step because the pole was available for support. (Ward Deposition, 

p. 26, line 8-12). 

{¶5} The entrance Ward used featured a railing on the other side, but four to six 

others were entering the building and using that railing as Ward was exiting. She recalled 

that those people had entered the store before she fell. Ward was in no hurry to leave 

and when she was asked if she could have waited and used that railing, she answered: 

“I don't know. I just walked over to the left side, grabbed ahold of the pole, looked down 

and held on and stepped.” (Ward Deposition, p. 26, lines 20-22). She explained that 
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 4

“ * * * once I took another step after I got down, I took another step and tripped over one 

of these bricks down here, I fell completely on my right side * * * .” (Ward Deposition, p. 

29, lines 18-21). When she stepped off the porch she “was paying attention to what [she] 

was doing” and not talking with her friend or the others entering The Morgan House.

(Ward Deposition, p. 36, 5-10). 

{¶6} Ward was transported to the hospital and treated. She later filed a complaint 

against Appellees alleging they were responsible for creating a hazard that caused her to 

fall and sustain injuries. Appellees moved for summary judgment contending that the 

alleged hazard was open and obvious and that condition served as a warning to Appellant 

to take action to protect herself. Appellant opposed the motion for summary judgment 

and offered an affidavit to supplement her deposition testimony as well as expert 

testimony. Appellees moved the court to strike the Ward’s affidavit arguing that it 

contradicted her deposition testimony.

{¶7} The trial court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the facts and the law and 

concluded that Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment had merit and should be 

granted:

The hazard posed by the un-level brick-paver sidewalk was open and 

obvious because it was objectively observable. In addition, the differences 

in height and spacing between the brick pavers was less than 2 inches, 

meaning that it was trivial or minor as a matter of law. Moreover, no 

attendant circumstances existed to unreasonably increase the hazard 

posed by the brick-paver sidewalk to a point that would warrant a departure 

from the 2-inch rule or the open-and-obvious doctrine.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 5

(Judgment Entry, October 24, 2022, p. 15).

{¶8} The trial court denied Appellee’s Motion to Strike Ward’s Affidavit, finding 

that:

While one portion of that affidavit directly contradicts Ward's earlier 

deposition testimony without adequate explanation for the contradiction, the 

remainder of the affidavit merely supplements or explains Ward's deposition 

testimony. I have disregarded the contradictory affidavit testimony and 

relied only on Ward's earlier deposition testimony about her observations 

regarding the un-level nature of the brick-paver sidewalk. Even so, whether 

Ward actually observed the hazard posed by the un-level brick pavers is not 

dispositive of the question whether the hazard was open and obvious. 

Rather, the critical inquiry is whether that hazard was objectively observable 

by a reasonable person. I hold that it was.

(Judgment Entry, October 24, 2022, p. 16).

{¶9} Ward filed a timely appeal of the trial court’s decision and submitted two 

assignments of error:

{¶10} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BY FINDING THAT THERE WERE NO 

ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH CREATED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT, 

WHEN VIEWED IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT, AND WHICH WOULD NEGATE THE 

"OPEN AND OBVIOUS" DEFENSE.”
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 6

{¶11} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT THE NATURE 

OF THE SIDEWALK, OR THE UNEVEN AND LOOSE PAVERS, WAS AN OPEN AND 

OBVIOUS DANGER, THEREBY DISMISSING THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIM.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶12} With regard to summary judgment, this Court applies a de novo standard of

review and reviews the evidence in the same manner as the trial court. Smiddy v. The 

Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987). We will not give any 

deference to the trial court's decision. Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Cmmrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 

704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993). Under Civ.R. 56, a trial court may grant 

summary judgment if it determines (1) no genuine issues as to any material fact remain 

to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it 

appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and 

viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for 

summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean 

United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274 (1977).

{¶13} The record on summary judgment must be viewed in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion. Williams v. First United Church of Christ, 37 

Ohio St.2d 150, 151, 309 N.E.2d 924 (1974).

{¶14} The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court 

of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court 

which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the 

nonmoving party's claim. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). 

Once the moving party has met the burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal 
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 7

burden of specificity and cannot rest on the allegations or denials in the pleadings, but 

must set forth “specific facts” by the means listed in Civ.R. 56(C) showing that a “triable 

issue of fact” exists. Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115, 526 N.E.2d 798, 801 

(1988).

ANALYSIS

{¶15} Ward’s appeal contends that the trial court erred by finding that the alleged 

hazard was open and obvious and that there were not attendant circumstances that 

distracted her from the danger of that hazard. She has presented her argument regarding 

the alleged attendant circumstances as her First Assignment of Error and the issue 

regarding the open and obvious nature of the hazard as the second assignment. Because 

attendant circumstances ““may create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a 

hazard is open and obvious,” (Citation omitted.) Carpenter v. Mt. Vernon Gateway, Ltd., 

5th Dist. Knox No. 13CA6, 2014-Ohio-465, ¶ 23 we will address whether the alleged 

hazard was open and obvious first and then consider whether there were attendant 

circumstances, reversing the order of the assignments of error to avoid unnecessary 

duplication.

OPEN AND OBVIOUS

{¶16} In her Second Assignment of Error, Ward contends that the trial court erred 

in finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the hazard 

she claims caused her fall was open and obvious. She contends that the danger posed 

by the uneven and loose pavers was such that she would not have been able to discern 

the danger that the condition posed. Ward promotes her conclusion that the condition of 

the pavers was not discoverable, but provides no clear support for that conclusion in her 
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 8

argument. Instead, the record supports a finding that not only was the condition of the 

brick pavers open and obvious, but also that Ward had prior knowledge of the condition 

of this entrance.

{¶17} Appellees were not an insurer of Ward’s safety, but they did owe her, a 

business invitee, a duty of ordinary care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe 

condition and to warn of hidden dangers. Under Ohio law, however, a business owner 

owes no duty to protect an invitee from dangers which are known to the invitee or are so 

obvious and apparent to the invitee that he or she may be reasonably expected to 

discover them and protect him or her against them. Sidle v. Humphrey, 13 Ohio St.2d 45, 

48, 233 N.E.2d 589 (1968). The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a premises owner 

owes no duty to persons entering the premises regarding dangers that are open and 

obvious. Armstrong v. Best Buy Company, Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 

N.E.2d 1088, paragraph 5 of the syllabus, quoting Sidle v. Humphrey, 13 Ohio St.2d 45, 

233 N.E.2d 589 (1968), paragraph 1 of the syllabus. The rationale of the open and 

obvious doctrine is the open and obvious nature of the hazard itself serves as a warning, 

so owners reasonably may expect their invitees to discover the hazard and take 

appropriate measures to protect themselves against it. Simmers v. Bentley Constr. Co., 

64 Ohio St.3d 642, 644, 597 N.E.2d 504 (1992).

{¶18} When considering whether a condition is open and obvious, the court must 

consider the nature of the condition itself, not the plaintiff's conduct in encountering the 

condition. Knight v. Hartville Hardware, Inc., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00121, 2016-

Ohio-1074, 2016 WL 1051598, ¶ 18, quoting Jacobsen v. Coon Restoration & Sealants, 

Inc., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2011-CA-00001, 2011-Ohio-3563, 2011 WL 2848144, ¶ 18. The 
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 9

dangerous condition at issue does not actually have to be observed by the plaintiff to be 

an open and obvious condition under the law. Kraft v. Johnny Biggs Mansfield, LLC, 5th 

Dist. Richland No. 2012 CA 0068, 2012-Ohio-5502, 2012 WL 5985086, ¶ 16 quoting 

Aycock v. Sandy Valley Church of God, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2006 AP 09 0054, 

2008-Ohio-105, 2008 WL 115829.

{¶19} The determinative issue is whether the condition is observable. Id. The 

landowner's duty is not to be determined by questioning “whether the [condition] could 

have been made perfect or foolproof. The issue is whether the conditions which did exist 

were open and obvious to any person exercising reasonable care and watching where 

she was going.” Jackson v. Pike Cty. Bd. Of Commrs., 4th Dist. Pike No. 10CA805, 2010-

Ohio-4875, 2010 WL 3902618, ¶ 18 quoting Orens v. Ricardo's Restaurant, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 70403, 1996 WL 661024 (Nov. 14, 1996). 

{¶20} Courts have also found that “ ‘ * * * the danger is open and obvious when 

the invitee admits to having had actual knowledge of the danger prior to being injured by 

that danger.’ ” (Citations omitted.) McFadden v. Discerni, 11th Dist. No. 2022-T-0019, 

2023-Ohio-1086, 212 N.E.3d 412, ¶ 16. See also Gaffney v. Soukup, 11th Dist. Geauga 

No. 2016-G-0104, 2017-Ohio-7362, ¶ 18. “When the invitee admits to knowing of the 

danger, summary judgment is easily granted. Clearly, the danger is open and obvious 

when the invitee admits to having had actual knowledge of the danger prior to being 

injured by that danger.” Zuzan v. Shutrump, 7th Dist. No. 03MA50, 155 Ohio App.3d 589, 

2003-Ohio-7285, 802 N.E.2d 683, ¶ 7. See also, Uhl v. Thomas, 12th Dist. Butler No. 

CA2008-06-131, 2009-Ohio-196, ¶ 16 (Summary judgment may also be granted where 

the invitee admits to knowing of the danger.).
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 10

{¶21} The record supports only the conclusion that the alleged defect, uneven and 

loose pavers, was open and obvious to Ward and all customers of the Appellees. Ward 

does not offer any evidence to support a conclusion that the defect that allegedly caused

her fall was not visible. Her testimony contradicts that conclusion. Ward admitted that 

she had visited Morgan House “eight, ten, twelve times.” (Ward Deposition, p. 19, lines 

22-25). She had visited the location frequently enough to know that “there’s more than 

one handicap entrance.” (Ward Deposition, p. 20, lines 12-16). She did not use the 

accessible entrance when she left the store, but used the main entrance, a path she had 

followed during prior visits to Morgan House. (Ward Deposition, p. 22, lines 16-81; p. 31, 

lines 19-25). She explained that she followed her normal practice of holding something to 

execute one step when she was leaving Morgan House because the ground did not look 

stable, she saw that the bricks were uneven, and she would typically hold something to 

stabilize herself. (Ward Deposition, p. 25, lines 12 to p. 26, line 1; p. 39, lines 13-21). She 

had the opportunity to use a handrailing on the other side of the entrance, but chose not 

to wait for the four to six customers to walk up the step and clear that area. (Ward 

Deposition, p. 26, lines 13-22; p. 27, 18-21). Ward acknowledged that saw the bricks that 

she was stepping onto as she stepped down from the entrance. (Ward Deposition, p. 29, 

lines 1-12). When she had taken that step in prior visits, she noted that the bricks were 

ajar and stated that: “They’re always ajar.” (Ward Deposition, p. 32, lines 1-8). She 

tripped over a brick, apparently while entering the handicapped entrance, during a prior 

visit. (Ward Deposition, p. 32, lines 15-21).

{¶22} Ward’s testimony that she could see that the bricks were uneven and the 

ground was unstable and that she knew from past experience that the bricks were ajar is 
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 11

corroborated by the photographs offered by the parties. These photographs show a

clearly discernable uneven surface that caused Ward to seek the stability of the porch 

post as she stepped down. The conditions that Ward claims caused her injury were not 

only open and obvious to any person exercising reasonable care and watching where 

they was going, they were readily apparent to Ward who, rather than wait a moment and 

utilize a hand rail, which she contends would be safer, or exit through the handicapped 

entrance she used to enter the building, decided to attempt to hold onto a post with the 

hope that would give her sufficient support to manage the step. 

{¶23} We find that the facts support the trial court’s conclusion that the alleged 

defect was open and obvious and that summary judgment in favor of Appellees was 

appropriate.

{¶24} The Second Assignment of Error is denied.

ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES

{¶25} In her First Assignment of Error, Ward claims the trial court erred by finding 

“no questions of fact regarding attendant circumstances which would negate the open 

and obvious rule.” (Appellant’s Brief, p. 7). Ward explains that she “was distracted by the 

number of people entering the building prohibiting her from using the handrail as well as 

distracted from the dangers below by using a large wooden post for balance.” Id. at p. 9.

{¶26} An “attendant circumstance” is “any significant distraction that would divert 

the attention of a reasonable person in the same situation and thereby reduce the amount 

of care an ordinary person would exercise to avoid an otherwise open and obvious 

hazard.” Haller v. Meijer, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP–290, 2012–Ohio–670, ¶ 10. 

For this exception to apply, “[a]n attendant circumstance must divert the attention of the 
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 12

injured party, significantly enhance the danger of the defect, and contribute to the injury.” 

Forste v. Oakview Constr., Inc., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2009–05–054, 2009–Ohio–

5516, 2009 WL 3350450, ¶ 22; Isaacs v. Meijer, Inc., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2005–

10–098, 2006–Ohio–1439, 2006 WL 766692, ¶ 16. Attendant circumstances may include 

such things as the time of day, lack of familiarity with the route taken, and lighting 

conditions. Hart v. Dockside Townhomes, Ltd., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2000–11–222, 

2001 WL 649763, *2 (June 11, 2001). Further, an attendant circumstance is a 

circumstance which contributes to the fall and is beyond the control of the injured party. 

Backus v. Giant Eagle, Inc. (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d 155, 158, 684 N.E.2d 1273. 

{¶27} Ward argues that her use of the post for support, instead of a railing, is an 

attendant circumstance that should be combined with the distraction created by others 

entering the building. We reject Ward’s contention that the use of the pole was an 

attendant circumstance as it was her choice and was within her control. She opted not to 

use the handicap accessible entrance to avoid inconveniencing her friend who would 

have to re-enter the parking lot to pick her up. She had no clear explanation why she 

chose to use the post instead of waiting for four to six people to clear the step. When first 

asked if she could have waited and used the railing, her response was “I don’t know.” 

(Ward Deposition, p. 26, line 20). She was later asked “* * * there was a handrail on the 

other side that you could have utilized, correct?” to which she responded: “There were 

people coming up that way.” Appellee’s counsel asked: “But you were in no hurry so you 

could have waited, correct?” and Ward answered: “Sure. Yes.” (Ward Deposition, p. 39, 

line 22 to p. 40, line 4).
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 13

{¶28} Ward’s choice to exit Morgan House through an other than handicap 

accessible entrance and use a post for support rather use the railing cannot serve as an 

attendant circumstance. Bovetsky v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 5th Dist. Stark 

No. 2016CA00122, 2016-Ohio-7863, ¶ 18.

{¶29} Ward also claims that the four to six people entering The Morgan House 

was an attendant circumstance, but only makes a conclusory statement and provides little 

explanation regarding how those customers diverted her attention, significantly enhanced 

the danger of the defect, or contributed to the injury. Forste, supra. And this Court held 

in Kraft v. Johnny Biggs Mansfield, LLC, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2012 CA 0068, 2012-

Ohio-5502, 2012 WL 5985086, that “normal traffic” of people coming in and out of a 

restaurant is not a circumstance so significant or unusual as to rise to the level of 

attendant circumstances. In Rayburn v. Delaware Co. Agricultural Society, 5th Dist. 

Delaware No. 15 CAE 02 0016, 2015-Ohio-1903, 2015 WL 2375858, we held there was 

no evidence to establish the numerous people in the area distracted plaintiff to the point 

of reducing the degree of care an ordinary person would exercise. See also Gurcarkowski 

v. McPeek Funeral Home, 5th Dist. Licking No. CA–3479, 1990 WL 15752 (finding no 

attendant circumstances on a standard pedestrian sidewalk); Freeman v. Value City Dept. 

Store, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010 CA 00034, 2010-Ohio-4634, 2010 WL 3766806 (finding 

no attendant circumstance when plaintiff testified nothing was distracting her at the time 

of the incident); Jackson v. Board of Pike Commissioners, 4th Dist. Pike No. 10CA805, 

2010-Ohio-4875, 2010 WL 3902618 (finding moving to the side to let someone pass on 

a handicap ramp is not an attendant circumstance); Frano v. Red Robin Int'l, Inc., 181 

Ohio App.3d 13, 2009-Ohio-685, 907 N.E.2d 796 (11th Dist.) *115 (finding no attendant 
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 14

circumstances when the record did not contain evidence the plaintiff was distracted by 

the atmosphere of the restaurant); McCoy v. Wasabi House, LLC, 5th Dist. 

No. 2017CA00098, 2018-Ohio-182, 104 N.E.3d 102, ¶ 49 (Thus, there is no evidence her 

family or other people entering the restaurant distracted appellant to the point of reducing 

the degree of care an ordinary person would exercise.)

{¶30} Ward conceded that there was sufficient light for her to see her path and, 

when asked if she was talking with anyone when she negotiated the step, she said: “No. 

I was paying attention to what I was doing.” (Ward Deposition, p. 36, lines 1-10). Even if 

we were to consider that other customers entering the store might create a distraction, 

Ward’s response demonstrates that those customers did not interfere with her ability to 

exercise care in stepping down.

{¶31} We have reviewed the record and find that the trial court did not err by 

finding that there were no attendant circumstances and the Appellees were entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law on this issue.

{¶32} The First Assignment of Error is denied.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAE 11 0076 15

{¶33} The decision of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

By: Baldwin, J.

Delaney, P.J. and

King, J. concur.