alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ORIGINAL 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

DA 23-0433 

IN RE THE PARENTING OF; 

A.M.O., 

Minor Child. 

AVANLEE CHRISTINE OKRAGLY, 

Petitioner and Appellee, 

and 

SEBASTIAN ALEXANDER KEITEL, 

Respondent, 

and 

FREDERICK J. KEITEL, III, 

Proposed Intervenor and Appellant. 

ORDER 

FILED 

APR - 2 2024 

Bowen Greenwood 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

State of Montana 

Before the Court are Appellee Avanlee Okragly's motions to strike the Appellant's 

Reply Brief and to Seal the Case Record in this matter. Appellant Frederick Keitel has not 

responded to the motions. 

In a January 4, 2024 Order, this Court granted Avanlee's motion to seal Appellant's 

opening brief and took under advisement her motion to strike the opening brief. Avanlee 

asserts that Keitel has, despite the Court's order, submitted in his additional filings "myriad 

outrageous and disparaging allegations about members of this State's Bar Association and 

judiciary who are not parties to this cause of action . . . with the sole intent to make this 

information public." Avanlee seeks additional relief to include restrictions on Keitel's 

ability to make additional filings without involvement of counsel and attorney's fees incurred 

04/02/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0433
in conjunction with the motions. 

Similar to the Opening Brief, the Court finds good cause to seal Keitel's reply brief. 

As evidenced by the decision rendered this date, however, the issue on appeal is resolved as 

a matter of statutory procedure. The Court has not found it necessary to consider Keitel's 

other arguments or included the disputed material in its Opinion. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to seal Intervenor and Appellant's 

Reply Brief is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to file the brief under seal. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to strike Intervenor and Appellant's 

opening and reply briefs and for other relief is DENIED. 

The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to all counsel and parties of 

record. 

DATED this Z. -Uay of April, 2024. 

(r(4--ig 

0 

4

♦,0 ). C0 le 0 . . imi . 

Justices 

2
# C_2022095EN.01002501.xml

| 28.2.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 95/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.2.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 95/25

---

Judgment of the General Court of 21 December 2021 — DD v FRA

(Case T-703/19) (1)

(Action for damages - Civil service - Members of the temporary staff - Initiation of an administrative inquiry - Article 86(2) of the Staff Regulations - Duty to provide information - Duration of the procedure - Reasonable time - Obligation to state reasons - Manifest error of assessment - Confidentiality of the administrative inquiry - Duty to have regard for the welfare of officials - Non-material damage - Causal link)

(2022/C 95/33)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: DD (represented: initially by L. Levi and M. Vandenbussche, lawyers, and subsequently by L. Levi, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (represented by: M. O’Flaherty, acting as Agent, and by B. Wägenbaur, lawyer)

Re:

Action under Article 270 TFEU seeking, in essence, compensation for the non-material damage allegedly suffered by the applicant estimated ex aequo et bono at EUR 50 000 as a result of the initiation and conduct of an administrative procedure within FRA.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders DD to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders DD to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).

---

(1)  OJ C 432, 23.12.2019.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED BY THE 10-QSB FOR
THE PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 FOR INNOVACOM,  INC. AND IS QUALIFIED BY ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               172,000
<CGS>                                          136,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  3,640,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             2,531,000
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (6,001,000)
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<EXTRAORDINARY>                                207,000
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,794,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (.23)
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</TABLE>
#### Moshe IMMERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, being sued as Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 09-35827.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 20, 2011.*

Filed July 21, 2011.

Moshe Immerman, Eugene, OR, pro se.

James Edward Cox, Jr., Amy Potter, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: SKOPIL, FARRIS, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Moshe Immerman appeals pro se from the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants in his action alleging the United States Forest Service (“USFS”) wrongly withdrew a 1997 offer of employment in violation of Title VII. We *228have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, *Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget,*548 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir.2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on Immerman’s claim of religious discrimination under Title VII. Even assuming Im-merman established a prima facie case of discrimination, he has not offered “specific” and “substantial” circumstantial evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether USFS’s legitimate reasons for its actions in 1997 are a pretext for a discriminatory motive. *See Nilsson v. City of Mesa,*503 F.3d 947, 954-55 (9th Cir.2007).

The district court’s denials of Immer-man’s motions to recuse Judge Hogan were not an abuse of discretion. *See United States v. Hernandez,*109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir.1997).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Immerman’s request to appoint permanent pro bono counsel because Immerman’s case did not present exceptional circumstances. *See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,*390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir.2004).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the motion for summary judgment without holding oral argument or an evidentiary hearing. *See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County Inc.,*171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.1999).

Finally, Immerman has waived any challenge to the district court’s disposition of his discrimination claim arising from his 1992 employment. *See Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. v. PC Onsite,*561 F.3d 983, 994-95 (9th Cir.2009) (“We will not ordinarily consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly argued in appellant’s opening brief.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Immerman’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
EXHIBIT 21.2


     Consent of Grant Thornton LLP, Independent Certified Public Accountants


We have  issued  our  report  dated May 31,  2003,  accompanying  the  financial
statements  included in the Annual Report of US Global  Nanospace,  Inc. on Form
10-KSB for the year ended March 31, 2004. We hereby consent to the incorporation
by  reference  of  said  report  in  the  Registration  Statement  of US  Global
Aerospace,  Inc. on Form S-8 (File No.  333-97213)  pertaining  to the Company's
Amended  and  Restated  2002  Stock  Plan  and  Form S-8  (File  No.  333-85970)
pertaining to the Company's 2001 Employee Stock Compensation Plan.


/s/ GRANT THORNTON LLP


Seattle, Washington
July 12, 2004
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 11-13805

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 7:11-cv-00044-HL

JAY GREGORY BRANCH, SR.,

TERRI ROBERTS BRANCH,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

as receiver for Tifton Banking Company, 

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

 No. 11-13806

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 7:11-cv-00045-HL

TIMOTHY V. BRANCH,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

Case: 11-13805 Date Filed: 07/25/2012 Page: 1 of 3 
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

as receiver for Tifton Banking Company, 

Interested Party-Appellant.

___________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

____________________________

 (July 25, 2012)

Before JORDAN and FAY, Circuit Judges, and EDENFIELD, District Judge. *

PER CURIAM:

On November 12, 2010, the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance

closed Tifton Banking Company and appointed the FDIC as receiver of the bank. 

Two months after Tifton closed, on January 13, 2011, the plaintiffs filed suit against

Tifton in Georgia state court. On March 28, 2011, the FDIC filed a motion to

substitute itself as a party for Tifton in the state court action. The FDIC attached to

its motion copies of the documents appointing it as Tifton’s receiver. Before the state

court could rule on the motion, the FDIC filed a notice of removal in the United

 Honorable B. Avant Edenfield, United States District Judge for the Southern District of *

Georgia, sitting by designation.

2

Case: 11-13805 Date Filed: 07/25/2012 Page: 2 of 3 
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. 

The plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to state court, arguing that the

district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the state court

had not entered an order substituting the FDIC as a party. The district court granted

the plaintiffs’ motion. It determined that since the FDIC had not been substituted in

the manner required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c), it was not a party for

the purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B), the FDIC removal provision. The FDIC

appeals the district court’s remand order. 

We recently addressed the issues raised in this appeal in FDIC v. North

Savannah Properties, LLC, — F.3d—, 2012 WL 2849488 (11th Cir. July 12, 2012). 

We held that the FDIC becomes a party for the purposes of removal under 12 U.S.C.

§ 1819(b)(2)(B) once it is appointed receiver and files a notice of substitution; the

state court does not have to enter an order of substitution for subject-matter

jurisdiction to exist. In light of our decision in North Savannah Properties, we vacate

the district court’s remand order. And because we conclude that the district court had

subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, we also vacate the district court’s order

vacating its prior order of substitution of the FDIC. 

VACATED.

3

Case: 11-13805 Date Filed: 07/25/2012 Page: 3 of 3
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-30,849-05

IN RE JOHN CLIFTON WILBANKS, Relator

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CAUSE NO. 1576594-A IN THE 262ND DISTRICT COURT

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Relator has filed a motion for leave to file an application for a writ of mandamus under this

Court’s original jurisdiction.

Relator filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in Harris County on August 1, 2019,

but the habeas application has not been forwarded to this Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

11.07; TEX. R. APP. P. 73.4(b)(5). Respondent, the District Clerk of Harris County, shall forward

Relator’s habeas application to this Court. This motion for leave to file will be held. Respondent

shall comply with this order within thirty days from the date of this order.

Filed: January 13, 2021

Do not publish
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</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 4.0.3

Eastern Division

Carmen Feliciano, et al.

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:03−cv−01768

Honorable James B. Zagel

County of Cook, et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Friday, February 5, 2010:

 MINUTE entry before Honorable James B. Zagel:Status hearing held on 2/5/2010.

Pretrial Order due by 5/4/2010. Jury trial estimate 3−5 days. Defendant Dart to substitute

counsel. Status hearing set for 5/5/2010 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice(drw, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case 1:03-cv-01768 Document 241 Filed 02/05/10 Page 1 of 1
Case 10-00902 Doc 1 Filed 01/12/10 Entered 01/12/10 12:30:26 Desc Main

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#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Samuel Hirsch, on Behalf of Joseph Fischer, Appellant, v Benjamin Ward et al., Respondents, and Shoshana Fischer, IntervenorRespondent.

Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Gabel, J.), entered December 21, 1983, which, pursuant to the petitioner husband’s stipulation, released him from the . Bronx House of Detention on certain conditions, modified, on the law, the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, only to the extent of providing that all future matters involving this petitioner and Shoshana Fischer and their offspring and family shall be heard in Part V, New York County, and shall not be referred to the Judge previously presiding over such matters involving these parties, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Sandler, Sullivan and Bloom, JJ.
#### PRENTICE, Appellant, v. SOMMER, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 11, 1907.)

Action by Westervelt Prentice against Maurice Sommer.

No opinion. Motion for reargument denied, with costs.
#### Darka Genza et al., Appellants, v Stephen B. Richardson, M.D., et al., Respondents.

[945 NYS2d 61]—

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Marilyn Shafer, J.), entered March 3, 2011, after a jury trial, in favor of defendants and against plaintiff, and bringing up for review an order, same court and Justice, entered July 10, 2008, which denied plaintiffs posttrial motion to set aside the verdict, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The jury’s verdict that defendant Stephen B. Richardson, M.D., departed from good and accepted medical practice by not providing plaintiff with appropriate medical supervision after prescribing insulin to her on May 30, 2001, but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in causing her injuries, was supported by sufficient evidence *(see Cohen v Hallmark Cards,*45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]). Indeed, given the evidence of plaintiff’s complicated medical history and concurrent conditions, the jury could have rationally concluded that Dr. Richardson’s failure to supervise plaintiffs condition was not a substantial cause of her injuries *(see generally Mortensen v Memorial Hosp.,*105 AD2d 151, 158 [1984]).

The trial court providently exercised its discretion in permitting testimony as to the existence of a preexisting brain injury, as defendants’ expert exchange adequately informed plaintiff *705that their neurologist would provide such testimony *(see*CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]). In any event, there was no evidence of a willful failure to disclose, and there was no showing of prejudice to plaintiff *(see St. Hilaire v White,*305 AD2d 209, 210 [2003]). The trial court also properly admitted plaintiff’s unredacted treatment records, as the portions plaintiff sought to preclude were “germane to her diagnosis and treatment” *(Niles v Patel,*235 AD2d 275 [1997], *lv denied*89 NY2d 814 [1997]). Moreover, plaintiffs objections went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility *(see id.;*CPLR 4518 [a]).

There is no evidence that defense counsel’s references to plaintiffs burden on causation, which were addressed by the trial court and cured by the court’s charges to the jury, and brief and limited remarks as to plaintiffs expert’s credibility, improperly affected the verdict *(see Pareja v City of New York,*49 AD3d 470 [2008]; *cf. Nuccio v Chou,*183 AD2d 511, 514-515 [1992], *lv dismissed*81 NY2d 783 [1993]). Concur — Gonzalez, P.J., Andrias, Saxe, DeGrasse and Román, JJ.
Motion Granted; Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 11, 

2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00510-CV

AMERICAN REALTY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Appellant

V.

EDGAR RODRIGUEZ AND SARA ANN RODRIGUEZ, Appellee

On Appeal from the 215th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2013-31285

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from a judgment signed June 7, 2013. On July 8, 2013, 

appellant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1. The 

motion is granted.

Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Frost and Donovan.
# Official Journal C 297I/2022

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 297I |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 654 August 2022 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 297I

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 654 August 2022

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | Council |
| 2022/C 297 I/01 | Notice for the attention of the data subjects to whom the restrictive measures provided for in Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine apply | 1 |

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Council

2022/C 297 I/01

Notice for the attention of the data subjects to whom the restrictive measures provided for in Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine apply

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN