find this rate to be a reasonable rate for Chicago attorneys handling this type of litigation and
comparable to the hourly rates previously awarded by this Court in civil rights cases. Moreover,
there were no contested hearings in this matter and the underlying legal theories did not need to
be litigated. The time expended on this case is more akin to preparation rather than litigation.
Finally, a rate of $300 is more comparable to, and still greater than, the hourly rate charged by the
lawyers who handled the defense in this case. For these reasons, we will base counsel’s fee
award on an hourly rate of $300.

After our extensive review of the pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties and in
consideration of the attorneys’ hourly rates, the amount for which the underlying lawsuit was
settled and the minimal amount of time that was expended in the underlying suit, we have
determined that of total fee of $62,550.00 (208.50 hours multiplied by $300) for attorneys
Taylor, Susler and Hoft is reasonable, plus costs in the amount of $388.62.

For the foregoing reasons, we award plaintiff's counsel an amount of $62,550.00 for
attorneys’ fees and $388.62 in costs.

It is so ordered.

Dated: Morel 2 206

Ld. (A

7 Wayne R. Andersen
United States District Judge



Fees are calculated based upon market rates for the services rendered. Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); Small v. Richard Wolf Medical Instruments, Corp., 264 F.3d 702, 707
(7th Cir. 2001). The market rate for an attorney’s services is “the rate that lawyers of similar
ability and experience in the community normally charge their paying clients for the type of work
in question.” Small, 264 F.3d at 707. Once a fee applicant comes forward with evidence
establishing his or her rate, the burden shifts to the defendan to demonstrate why a lower rate
should be awarded. Jd. at 894. The defendant must pst evidence establishing “a good reason
why a lower rate is essential.” People Who Care, 90 F.3d. at 13 13.

The Court’s initial step is to determine the “lodestar” amount by determining the hours
reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable rate. Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983). This Court has reviewed and scrutinized all time records submitted by plaintiff's
counsel. After throughly reviewing these records and comparing the work performed and hours
billed by each attorney, we have concluded that there was excessive and/or duplicative billing for
certain tasks, and we have reduced plaintiffs counsel’s total hours by 50.25 hours. Thus, we
find that attorney Taylor is entitled to be compensated for 70.35 hours of time, attomey Susler
84.85 hours and attorney Hoft 53.30 hours for a total of 208.50 hours. This Court believes that
208.50 hours is more than reasonable and sufficient to compensate attorneys Taylor, Susler and
Hoft for their efforts, particularly in light of the relatively prompt resolution of this matter and
the amount for which the underlying suit was settled.

Plaintiff's counsel is seeking to be compensated at an hourly rate of $450 for Taylor,
$400 for Susler and $350 for Hoft, claiming that these rates are their current billing rates. In this

case, we find that an hourly rate of $300 is reasonable for the services of plaintiff's counsel. We


Minute Onder Fagg (0697),

oo United States District Court, Northern District of Iinois
Sr
CASE NUMBER 3C 246 DATE 3/3/2004
CASE AM. vs. Chicago Police et al
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}
DOCKET ENTRY:
(63) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) a Brief in support of motion due
@) oO Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer briefdue___.
(4) oO Ruling/Hearingon__setfor___at
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] (set for/re-set for]on__setfor__at
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for}on____—ssetfor__——sat__—
(?) Oo Trial[set for/re-set forlon___—_—at
(8) im [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto__at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

COFRCP4(m) Local Rule 41.1 OUFRCP41(a)(1) 1 FRCP41(a)(2).

ao [Other docket entry] Enter MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER: For the foregoing
reasons, we award plaintiff’s counsel an amount of $62,550.00 in attorneys’ fees {19-1} and $388.62

in costs.

(1) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. umber of noti

Notices mailed by judge's staff,

MAR 0 4 2004

Notified counsel by telephone.

a | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form, dunca Layisia sn
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. nuald

soutroom iO Ny be terme
TSA deputy’s

initials ——
" ©" Datertime received in
centrat Clerk's Office snaiing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Officer L. Corey, Star No. 11442; and
the City of Chicago,

EASTERN DIVISION
AM., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 03 C 0246
)
Chicago Police Detectives James ) Wayne R. Andersen
Cassidy, Star No. 20207; Edward ) District Judge D Ye)
Schmidt, Star No. 20253; Edward ) CkKETg
Winstead, Star No. 20119; James ) MAp D
Redmond, Star No. 20248; Youth ) 94 2004
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. For the
following reasons, we award $62,550.00 in attorneys’ fees to plaintiff's counsel and $388.62 in
costs.

In this case, plaintiff A.M. alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, false
imprisonment and wrongful conviction by the police detective defendants and that these alleged
constitutional violations were accomplished pursuant to interrelated policies, practices and
customs of the defendant City of Chicago. On September 16, 2003, plaintiff accepted the City of
Chicago and the individual defendants’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 Offer of Judgment in
the amount of $55,000.00 plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiff now seeks an

award of $98,961.50 in attorneys’ fees for plaintiff's counsel -- attorneys Flint Taylor, Jan Susler

SO

and Janine Hoft -- and $388.62 in costs.



Defendants acknowledge that plaintiff is entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys’ fees
and costs as the Rule 68 Offer of Judgment specifically provides for the recovery of reasonable
fees and costs. The defendants do not dispute the amount of the costs. However, defendants do
dispute the amount of attorneys’ fees requested by plaintiffs counsel, arguing that an award of
$98,961.50 is excessive, duplicative and unnecessary. Alternatively, defendants suggest that an
award of $30,000.00 in attorneys’ fees is appropriate.

A plaintiff who has accepted an offer of judgment presented by a defendant can, in certain
circumstances, recoup his fees if that plaintiff is a prevailing party and his recovery is not
insubstantial. Fletcher v. City of Fort Wayne, 162 F.3d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1998). As there is no
dispute among the parties that plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs,
it is the responsibility of this Court to determine the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees. The
parties have waived their right of have an evidentiary hearing on this matter and have rested on
their pleadings submitted to the Court.

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys’ fees in the amount of $98,961.50. Defendants have
the following objections: (1) plaintiff's counsel claim an excessively high hourly rate; and (2)
some of the work billed is duplicative and unnecessary. In general, the amount of a reasonable
attorney’s fee is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the
attorney’s hourly rate (the “lodestar” method). Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
In determining whether fees are recoverable, the question is simply “whether [the attorney’s}
actions were reasonable.” People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 1307, 1314 (7th

Cir. 1996).