statutorily defined as a department of state government. 20 ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/5-15
(2003). Hudson, in response to the motion to dismiss, concedes that because IDHS isa
state department, the Eleventh Amendment bars her from seeking monetary damages.
However, she contends that she is not prohibited from seeking injunctive relief.
Hudson’s contention is misplaced.

In Kimel, the plaintiffs, similar to Hudson, sought injunctive and monetary relief
under the ADEA. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 69-70. The Court dismissed the entire case because
it impeded upon the States’ sovereign immunity. Jd. at 91. Thus, it is clear that the
Eleventh Amendment bars jurisdiction of ADEA claims even if a plaintiff seeks
injunctive remedies.

Although the holding in Garrett was narrower in that it specified that monetary
damages be prohibited, it appears that the U.S. Supreme Court intended that injunctive
relief be barred as well. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Supreme Court
stated that “the type of relief sought is irrelevant to the question of Eleventh Amendment
immunity.” 517 U.S. at 58. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit took an extensive approach
when it held that an individual cannot sue a state under Title I of the ADA. Erickson v.
Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for Northeastern Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 952
(7th Cir. 2000). Such a blanket statement refers to both monetary and injunctive
remedies. Additionally, in Molinari v. State of Illinois, the district court held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars a plaintiff from seeking injunctive relief under the ADA when
the plaintiff is suing the state. No. 01 C 2474, 2001 WL 849748, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 27,
2001).

Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's ADEA

4



Dismiss Hudson’s Title VII religious discrimination claim is denied.

III. Request for Relief in Form of Punitive Damages

42 U.S.C. § 1981a exempts governmental agencies from judgments for punitive
damages. This section is applicable to this case, because it deals with claims arising
under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2003), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), with
emphasis added, provides in pertinent part:

A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this
section against a respondent (other than a government, government
agency, or political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates
that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory
practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual.

For purposes of this statute, a state agency is considered a governmental agency.
Krawczyk v. Re, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1999); McInnis v, N.C. Dep’t of
Env’t & Natural Res., 223 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763 (M.D.N.C. 2002). Because IDHS is a
state agency, it is exempt from judgments for punitive damages.

In Baker v. Runyon, a case in which the plaintiff sued the U.S. Post Office, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1),
govemmental agencies are exempt from punitive damages under Title VII. 114 F.3d 668,
669 (7th Cir. 1997). Besides relying on the plain meaning of the statute, the Court
explained that punitive damages, when awarded against governmental entities, do not
serve their intended deterrent purpose. Jd. at 672. “[A]n award of punitive damages
against a [government agency] ‘punishes’ only the taxpayers, who took no part in the
commission of the tort.” Jd. (quoting City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.

1


shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend XI. Although the language suggests that the
Amendment only applies to suits against a State by citizens of another State, the
Amendment has been interpreted as extending to suits brought by citizens against their
own states. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); see also
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 669-70 (1999); Seminole Tribe of
Fila. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).

There are two well-recognized exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment. First, a
state may consent to suit brought by a private citizen. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73. Second,
Congress may abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73). To
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, Congress must unequivocally intend to do so and
“act pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” Jd. The Supreme Court in
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents held that the ADEA was not a valid exercise of Congress’
power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. 528 U.S. at 91. The
Supreme Court in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett reached a
similar holding in regard to Title lof the ADA. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360. As such,
federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear these types of claims unless the state
consents. Id.; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.

In the case at hand, it is clear that Hudson, a private individual, is suing a
department of the state of Illinois, which has not consented to litigation. IDHS is

3


and ADA claims. Because the Court dismisses Hudson’s ADA claim for want of
Jurisdiction, the Court need not address defendant’s other arguments in support of the

motion to dismiss.

IL. Title VII Claim

To survive a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6), a plaintiff's
complaint only needs to contain a short and plain statement of the claim in order to put
the defendant on fair notice. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). A complaint does not need to spell out
every element of a legal theory. Hemenway v. Peabody Coal Co., 159 F.3d 255, 261 (7th
Cir. 1998). When considering a motion to dismiss, this Court views the complaint’s facts
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health
Scis., 167 F.3d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir, 1999).

IDHS incorrectly argues that Hudson, in order to survive the motion to dismiss
her religious discrimination claim, must demonstrate a prima facie case under the
McDonnell Douglas standard. IDHS contends that Hudson would have to demonstrate
that: (1) she belongs to some protected class; (2) she performed her job satisfactorily; (3)
she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) IDHS treated similarly situated
employees outside of her classification more favorably.

However, the U.S. Supreme Court flatly rejected this argument in Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A. and held that a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary
standard, not a pleading requirement that a plaintiff must satisfy to survive a motion to
dismiss. 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002). Accordingly, accepting IDHS’ argument would

5


247, 267 (1981)) (alteration in original). Although Baker dealt with a federal agency,

this policy argument is equally applicable to state agencies such as IDHS.

Thus, it is clear that under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), Hudson is precluded from
seeking punitive damages from IDHS. Accordingly, the Court grants defendant’s motion

to dismiss with regard to plaintiff's request for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons provided in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court
grants in part and denies in part [DHS’ Motion to Dismiss [doc. no. 22-1]. The motion is
granted as to Hudson’s ADEA and ADA claims, as well as, her request for punitive
damages. The motion is denied as to Hudson’s Title VII religious discrimination claim,

and only that claim remains.

SO ORDERED ENTERED: /yfel 4/03

HON. RONALD A. G
United States Judge


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Ronald A. Guzman

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 02 C 9227 DATE 11/24/2003
CASE ODESSA HUDSON vs. IL DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
TITLE
Lin the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.}

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.

4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at :

(5) a Status hearing set for 12/5/2003 at 9:30 A.M..

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :

a a Trial{set for/re-set for] on at

(8) QO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) Qo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) OlLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) OC) FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) MW [Other docket entry] ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court grants in part
and denies in part IDHS’ motion [22-1]. The motion is granted as to Hudson’s ADEA and ADA claims,
as well as, her request for punitive damages. The motion is denied as to Hudson’s Title VII religious
discrimination claim, and only that claim remains.

dl) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. numer of notices
Not led by judge’s staff.

lotices mailed by judge's sta WOV 2.5 2003
Notified counsel by telephone. satay ‘

v | Docketing to mail notices,

Mail AO 450 form, 4 YEA Es sq docketing gefry Rats
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. CJ
courtroom " OR LG MY date mailed notice
cG deputy’s
initials is — ——-4
| ,Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office tnaiing deputy initials



prematurely require Hudson to present evidence rather than simply provide notice to
IDHS of her religious discrimination claim.

The Seventh Circuit has similarly addressed this issue. In Bennett, the plaintiff
alleged racial discrimination, and the Court held that an allegation that “I was turned
down for a job because of my race” was satisfactory. Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516,
518 (7th Cir. 1998). In Scott, another Title VII case, the defendant argued that the
plaintiff's complaint needed to identify with more specificity the adverse employment
actions. Scott v. City of Chicago, 195 F.3d 950, 951 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court rejected
this argument holding that the complaint was sufficient because the City knew what
conduct it was being accused of and who was being accused of the discrimination. Jd. at
952.

It is clear that Hudson’s complaint, like those in Bennett and Scott, provides
IDHS with sufficient notice of her religious discrimination claim. In her Amended
Complaint, Hudson states that she was a member of the Evangelist religion. (Am.
Compl. { 29.) She claims that she was subjected to undue harassment and demeaning
remarks directed at her religious practices. (/d. {{] 17, 19.) She contends that her job
performance was satisfactory and that any charges of poor job performance were false.
(Id. 15.) Hudson points out that she was “written-up” and argues that other employees
who were not Evangelist were “not written up under similar circumstances, and/or at
least were given information regarding the reasons for their write-ups.” (Id. {{] 20-21.)
Lastly, Hudson alleges that she was forced to retire. (Id. {{] 22-26.) These allegations go
well beyond what was required in Bennett and Scott and provide IDHS with detailed
notice of Hudson’s religious discrimination claim. Accordingly, IDHS’ Motion to

6



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
ODESSA HUDSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Judge Ronald A. Guzman
)
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF ) 02 C 9227
HUMAN SERVICES, )
)
Defendant. ) Obie; oe
BE
Noy 2 5 &
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER a 003

Odessa Hudson (“Hudson”) has sued the Illinois Department of Human Services
(“IDHS”) for alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (“ADEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
(“ADA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 20006 et
seq. (“Title VII”). Before the Court is IDHS’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First
Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
For the reasons provided in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court grants in

part and denies in part the motion.

FACTS
From 1971 to 2001, Hudson was employed at IDHS as an office associate. (Am.
Compl. 44, 14.) On April 6, 2001, Hudson filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) stating that she had been the subject of undue

harassment due to her age and religion. (Jd. §] 7, 28-30.) Among other things, Hudson

IL


claimed that she was denied medical leave, was forced to undergo an independent
medical examination, and was sent notice that she must either retire or resign because
IDHS perceived her as having a disability. (Ud. J] 22-29.)

On September 27, 2002, the EEOC issued Hudson a Notice of Right to Sue letter.
Cd. J] 10-11.) Accordingly, Hudson filed a complaint in this Court. Hudson asks this
Court for an Order directing IDHS to re-instate her, as well as, other appropriate
injunctive relief. (Jd. { 32.) Hudson also requests lost wages, costs, compensatory and

punitive damages. (Id.)

DISCUSSION
IDHS raises several grounds for dismissal. First, IDHS argues that Hudson’s
ADEA and ADA claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and, in the alternative,
that Hudson does not state a valid cause of action under the ADA. Next, IDHS opines
that Hudson fails to state a valid claim under Title VII. Lastly, IDHS argues it is

statutorily exempt from punitive damages.

I. ADEA and ADA Claims

A Rule 12 (6)(1) motion to dismiss requires a court to dismiss any action for
which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Manos v. Caira, 162 F. Supp. 2d 979, 986
(NLD. Il. 2001) (citing Fep. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)). “‘The Seventh Circuit considers
Eleventh Amendment immunity to be a jurisdictional bar.’” Jd. at 987 (quoting Hodgson
v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 963 F. Supp. 776, 783 (E.D. Wis. 1997)).

The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States

2