Agency's total dismissal from this action, for Patricia's
Count II retaliation claim is facially sufficient against Agency
as well as Microplastics.*

One other thing should be mentioned at this threshold stage
of the litigation. Complaint 48 alleges in general terms that
Patricia has complied with all of the preconditions to suit under
Title VII, but her counsel has not provided copies of her charge
of discrimination or of the EEOC right-to-sue letter. Copies of
both of those documents should be provided to this Court
promptly, as well as being transmitted to each defendant together

with or shortly after the service of process.’

Che Ma) Se olurn

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: May 24, 2002

1 No view is expressed here, of course, as to whether
Patricia can actually prove such retaliation on the part of
Agency.

2 That delivery to each defendant should be accompanied by
a photocopy of this memorandum order.

3


Minute
4

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge ‘ Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Milton L. Shadur than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 3675 DATE 5/24/2002
CASE Patricia Romero vs. Microplastics, Inc.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (6) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) Bo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
(3) oO Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for at .
(5) a Status hearing set for 7/15/02 at 9:00 A.M..
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for _at .
(7) Oo Trial{set for/re-set for] on. at_
(8) a {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) O General Rule21 OFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
co) oil (Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Order. Accordingly this Court contemplates dismissing
Counts I, V and VII against Agency at the time of the initial status hearing unless Patricia’s counsel then
(or earlier) proffers an acceptable predicate for retaining Agency as a defendant to one or more of those
claims. Pretrial schedule on reverse of minute order,
(il) ff [For further detail see order on the reverse side of the original minute order.] order attached to the original minute
No notices required, advised in open court. Document
No notice: ired. Number
lo notices required. sumber of notices
UV | Notices maited by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone, N AY 28 2002
Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form.
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom
SN doputy’s
initials a
U Dateitime received in
central Clerk's Office mailing deputy



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
PATRICIA ROMERO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
v. ) No. 02 C 3675
)
MICROPLASTICS, INC., et al., )

)

)

Defendants. E;
MEMORANDUM ORDER Mr 2 8 e
Patricia Romero (“Patricia”) has filed an eight-count
Complaint against Microplastics, Inc. (“Microplastics”), The
Agency, Inc. (“Agency”) and Salvador Romero (“Salvador”),

asserting a battery of grievances stemming from asserted sexual
harassment by Salvador while Patricia was working as a temporary
employee at Microplastics on a farm-out by Agency (which, as its
name suggests, was an employment agency of that type). This
memorandum order is issued sua sponte at the same time as the
issuance of this Court's customary order setting an initial
status hearing date.

Patricia's claims are advanced in the alternative, some on
the premise that she was an employee of both Microplastics and
Agency for Title VII purposes, while others take the approach
that she was not an employee of either. That type of alternative
pleading is of course permissible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (2).

But as to the first approach, Patricia's own allegations

appear to defeat her Count I employment discrimination claim


against Agency (see the excellent analysis of the legal
consequences that flow from temporary employee situations such as

this one in Mullis v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank, 994 F.Supp. 680

(M.D. N.C. 1997)-- Complaint 412 reflects that when Patricia
reported Salvador's sexual assault to Agency, that led to
Salvador's arrest and his consequent conviction of criminal
sexual assault. Nothing there or elsewhere in the Complaint
suffices to lay any responsibility for sex-based employment
discrimination at Agency's doorstep.

It appears that Patricia has also pleaded herself out of
Court (or should have done so) in the two “non-employee” counts
in which she has joined Agency as a defendant: Count V labeled
“Negligent Supervision, Training and Retention” and Count VII
labeled “Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.” It is
really inconsistent with the relationships among (1) an
employment agency that hires out temps, (2) the hiring party and
(3) the temps themselves to impose on the employment agency the
types of duties that form the legitimate gravamina of claims of
that nature.

Accordingly this Court contemplates dismissing Counts I, V
and VII against Agency at the time of the initial status hearing
unless Patricia's counsel then (or earlier) proffers an
acceptable predicate for retaining Agency as a defendant to one

or more of those claims. This would not however call for