alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v George Wright, Appellant.

— (1) Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (Hanofee, J.), rendered March 21, 1985, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of burglary in the third degree, and (2) motion for permission to appeal said judgment of conviction.

In full satisfaction of a five-count indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of burglary in the third degree and was sentenced in strict accordance with the plea bargain struck by defendant and the People. Defendant appealed, *935arguing only that the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive, and, after realizing that permission to appeal was necessary (CPL 450.10, 450.15), so moved. We have examined the argument that the sentence was harsh and excessive and find it to be without merit. Accordingly, we now dismiss his appeal and deny his motion for permission to appeal.

Motion denied.

Appeal dismissed. Kane, J. P., Main, Casey, Mikoll and Yesawich, Jr., JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Franklin Street
Properties Corp. (the "Company") for the period ended June 30, 2007 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
the undersigned, John G. Demeritt, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

      (1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


Date:  July 31, 2007                           /s/ John G. Demeritt
                                               --------------------------
                                               John G. Demeritt
                                               Chief Financial Officer
# L_2009003EN.01S00301.xml

| 7.1.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 3/s3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.1.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 3/s3

---

NOTE TO THE READER

The institutions have decided no longer to quote in their texts the last amendment to cited acts.

Unless otherwise indicated, references to acts in the texts published here are to the version of those acts currently in force.

---
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 21, 2019.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-00727-CV

SONIA BARBOZA, Appellant 

V.

MORRELL MASONRY SUPPLY, INC., Appellee 

On Appeal from the 129th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2017-20565 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This is an appeal from a judgment signed May 9, 2018. The clerk’s record 

was filed November 6, 2018. The reporter’s record was filed September 18, 2018. 

No brief was filed.

On January 10, 2019, this court issued an order stating that unless appellant 

filed a brief on or before January 25, 2019, the court would dismiss the appeal for 

want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b).
2

Appellant filed no brief or other response. Accordingly, the appeal is ordered 

dismissed. 

 PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jewell and Bourliot.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Howell, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Winick, J.), rendered October 29, 1982, convicting him of robbery in the second degree (four counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of defendant’s motion which was to suppress certain physical evidence (Santagata, J.).

Judgment affirmed.

At midnight on November 4, 1981, Police Officer Donald Meyer was on routine motor patrol, proceeding southbound on Route 107 in the vicinity of its intersection with Union Avenue, in Bethpage, New York. He had been “keeping an eye” on a gas station located at this intersection because it had been the target of two previous robberies. He looked eastward down Union Avenue and noticed a dark-colored Chevrolet, legally parked, with its lights off. This vehicle matched the description of a vehicle reportedly used by a “stickup team” which had been broadcast on Officer Meyer’s police radio earlier that night. The vehicle was parked near a house which was being renovated, and a Dairy Barn store which was closed, as well as near the service station at which the prior robberies had occurred. It appeared to Officer Meyer that, considering the time of night, it was unusual for an automobile to be parked in this location. Meyer activated the alley light on his patrol car in the direction of the green Chevy. As soon as the light illuminated the vehicle, its lights came on and it began to move down Union Avenue. Officer Meyer pursued the vehicle and then turned on his patrol *769car’s red light and siren, whereupon the subject vehicle came to a stop. Defendant argues that this stop was not justified in that Officer Meyer, prior to the stop, had no “reasonable suspicion” that the car was in any way connected with criminal activity (see, *People v Sobotker,*43 NY2d 559, 564). We disagree.

“[T]he degree of suspicion required to justify [a] stop is minimal. Nothing like probable cause * * * is required” *(People v Ingle,*36 NY2d 413, 415). The record in this case supports the finding that Officer Meyer observed the car, which matched the description of a car which had been involved in prior robberies, parked in the vicinity of a service station where prior robberies had occurred. Furthermore, this car began to drive away only after Officer Meyer made his presence known by flashing his car’s alley light. At this point, Meyer had a reasonable suspicion, and his stopping of the car was justified. The record further supports the finding that any subsequent search of the vehicle was consented to by the vehicle’s owner. Suppression of the evidence seized during that search is, therefore, not warranted.

We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Lazer, J. P., Bracken, O’Connor and Brown, JJ., concur.
#### Stanley Akivis et al., Respondents, v Sixty Four Reade Corporation et al., Defendants, and Elliot Goldberg et al., Appellants. Sixty Four Reade Corporation et al., Third-Party Plaintiffs, v A. C. Brennan & Co., Inc., et al., Third-Party Defendants.

Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Louis Grossman, J.), entered February 27, 1984, denying the motion of defendants Elliot Goldberg and Irving Port for summary judgment, modified, on the law, to the extent of granting the motion as to the first cause of action and, except as so modified, affirmed, without costs.

In April 1984 the corporate defendant contracted to sell premises 64 Reade Street, New York City to plaintiffs. The contract of sale was executed by the individual defendants, Goldberg and Port, as attorneys in fact for the corporate defendant. Among other things, the contract of sale provided that the seller was to have 60 days after the date of closing to remove the contents of the building and that the premises were to be left “broom clean”. To insure compliance with this provision, $5,000 was placed in escrow with the law firm representing the corporate defendant.

The complaint alleges that during the removal period substantial damage was done to the building. This suit was commenced to recover such damages. The complaint alleges two causes of action. The first cause is couched in terms of breach of contract, the second in negligence.

Goldberg and Port moved for summary judgment, contending that the allegations contained in the complaint and in the answering papers were insufficient to raise any triable issue of fact. Special Term disagreed and denied the motion.

We think this was error as to the first cause of action. Goldberg and Port, in signing the contract of sale, indicated plainly that they were acting solely as agents for a disclosed principal. Nothing contained in the contract signifies any intent *98on their part to be *personally*bound by its terms. Absent such an indication, they are not personally liable for the contract’s breach *(Savoy Record Co. v Cardinal Export Corp.,*15 NY2d 1, 4; *Mencher v Weiss,*306 NY 1, 4). Hence, no action will lie against them for breach of contract. As to the cause sounding in negligence, which is alleged against all defendants except the escrow holder, sufficient is shown from which a jury could conclude that the moving defendants are liable by reason of affirmative, willful acts. The answering affidavit avers that plaintiff Stanley Akivis visited the premises during the period of moving. He requested that the movers cease their destructive activities. He was informed by the movers that they took their orders from Goldberg and Port. Thereupon he telephoned either Goldberg or Port and lodged his complaint. In response, he was told that he had secured a bargain and ought not complain about the damage inflicted. Accordingly, we agree with Special Term’s holding denying summary judgment as to that cause. Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Sandler, Sullivan and Bloom, JJ.
#### M U N R O, Respondent, v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 11, 1907.)

Action by Rilla Munro against the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company.

No opinion. Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals granted. Settle order on notice.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-7045
In Re: GREGORY LYNN GORDON, Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CA-04-1212-JAB) Submitted: September 29, 2005 Decided: October 11, 2005 Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Gregory Lynn Gordon, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Gregory Lynn Gordon petitions for writ of mandamus, alleging the district court has unduly delayed acting on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. We find there has been no undue delay in the district court. Gordon also challenges the magistrate judge’s interpretation of North Carolina law. However, mandamus relief is not available on this claim because Gordon may challenge the district court’s decision upon entry of final judgment on his § 2254 petition. See, e.g. , In re United Steelworkers , 595 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1979). Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the mandamus petition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
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Exhibit 32.1

CEO/CFO Certification Pursuant to § 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350)

The undersigned, as the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation, respectively, certify that, to the best of their knowledge and belief, the Quarterly Report
on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2010, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information
contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation and subsidiary at the dates and for the periods indicated.

The foregoing certification is made pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350) and shall not be relied upon for any
other purpose. The undersigned expressly disclaim any obligation to update the foregoing certification except as required by law.



|                  |  |  |  |                                                                  
|----------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------
|November 12, 2010 |  |  |  | /s/ Robert H. Gilliam, Jr.                                       
|Date              |  |  |  | Robert H. Gilliam, Jr.,
President and Chief Executive Officer    
|                  |  | 
|November 12, 2010 |  |  |  | /s/ Bryan M. Lemley                                              
|Date              |  |  |  | Bryan M. Lemley, Secretary,
Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
Case: 1:02-cv-05118 Document #: 4 Filed: 08/06/02 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:21
Exhibit 23.1

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (No. 333-121562) and
Form S-8 (Nos. 333-12025, 333-68128, 333-83650, 333-106647, 333-117070, 333-117137, 333-128113
and 333-136575) and related Prospectuses of Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. of our reports dated March 9, 2007 with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Impac
Mortgage Holdings, Inc., management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Impac
Mortgage Holdings, Inc., in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2006.



Orange
County, California
March 12, 2007

---



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Case 09-75754 Doc 23 Filed 09/28/10 Entered 09/28/10 16:49:32 Desc Main Document Page 1 of 1
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Derrick Miller, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ramirez, J.), rendered November 18, 1983, convicting him of robbery in the second degree and grand larceny in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him on the robbery count as a persistent violent felony offender to an indeterminate term of 12 *Vz*years to life imprisonment and on the grand larceny count as a second felony offender to an indeterminate term of 3 to 6 years’ imprisonment.

Judgment modified, on the law, by vacating the sentence and persistent violent felony offender adjudication with respect to the robbery count and substituting therefor an adjudication that defendant is a second violent felony offender. As so modified, judgment affirmed, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for resentence on the robbery count.

The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit certain expert psychiatric testimony *(see, People v Cronin,*60 NY2d 430, 433; *Rodriquez v Board of Educ.,*104 AD2d 978, 979). The expert’s conclusion, upon an offer of proof, was merely that "[i]t is *possible*that [defendant] could have been acting under some illusion or delusion at the time” of the incident, and that this possibility was "more likely” if this had happened before (emphasis added). It is well settled that expert opinions which are "contingent, speculative, or merely possible” lack probative force and are, therefore, inadmissible *(Matott v Ward,*48 NY2d 455, 461; *Strohm v New York, Lake Erie & W. R. R. Co.,*96 NY 305, 306; *see also, People v Bethune,*105 AD2d 262, 271). The proposed expert opinion did not reflect an acceptable degree of certainty *(see, People v Allweiss,*48 NY2d 40, 50; *People v Bethune, supra).*In any event, the expert’s testimony would have been cumulative in nature *(see, People v Kehn,*109 AD2d 912, 914).

The People concede, however, that defendant was improp*596erly adjudicated a persistent violent felony offender with respect to the robbery count (Penal Law § 70.08), and that the matter should, therefore, be remitted for resentencing as indicated *(see, People v Taylor,*103 AD2d 853, 854).

We have examined defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Gibbons, J. P., Thompson, Brown and Eiber, JJ., concur.