Blue Cross provides no support for plaintiff's argument that the Court can amend the
dismissal order without resort to Rule 60. An amendment of a final.order, which is al! that plainuiff
requests, is governed by Rulc 60 — a fact reaffirmed, nol changed, by Blue Cross. See id. al 636-38.
Thus, the Court can amend the stipulated dismissal order: (1) at any time, to correct a clerical error;
(2) within one year, on the grounds of mistake, excusable neglect, surprise, newly discovered
evidence or fraud; or (3) within a reasonable time, if the judgment is void or has been satisfied or
there is “any other reason justifying relief” from the order, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that his request falls into any of these categories, His motion to amend is, therefore,

denied.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s motion to amend the parties’ dismissal order | doc.

no, 93] is denied.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED: °/ 3/ 67

’

et ee Ed: z
HON. RONALD A. GUZMAN

United States District Judge



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID II. SITRICK,

Plaintiff, No. 02 C 1568
Y Judge Ronald A. Guzman

FREEHAND SYSTEMS, INC. and
THEODORE L. SCHROEDER,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In January 2005, this patent infringement suit was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the
parties’ stipulation. Plaintiff now secks to have the Court amend that dismissal order. For the

reasons provided in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court denies the motion.

Background

On March 4, 2002, plaintiff filed a patent infringement suit against defendants. In December
2004, the partics rcached a settlement in which plaintiff gave Freehand a limited license in exchange
for royalty payments.

On January 4, 2005, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal, which reads: “The parties
hereto, having reached a settlement of the disputes underlying this action, hereby dismiss this action
with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with cach party

to bear his or its own costs and attomney’s fees.” (Defs.’ Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Order Court’s Expressly

Retained Ongoing Jurisdiction, Ex. A, 1/4/05 Stipulation & Order of Dismissal.)



Two days later, on January 6, 2005, the Court entered a dismissal order that says:
Pursuant to parties’ stipulation to dismiss, th[is] action is dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with each party to
bear his or its own costs and attorney’s fees. Defendant Theodore L. Schroeder
hereby expressly withdraws his bill of costs filed on 10/27/04, and hereby expressly
waives any right to receive costs in this action. The Court retains jurisdiction to
enforce any settlement agreement. Any pending motions or schedules are stricken
as moot. [T]erminating case.

(1/6/05 Min. Order.)

Discussion

Tn his motion, plaintiff asks the Court to amend its January 6, 2005 dismissal order to
incorporate the terms of the parties’ settlement. The Court’s dismissal order, however, was not
entered until after the parties had filed an unconditional stipulation to dismiss pursuant to Rule
41(a)(1). Once filed, that unconditional stipulation “terminate[d] federal jurisdiction cxcept for the
limited purpose of reopening and setting aside the judgment of dismissal within the scope allowed
by Rule 60(b).” MeCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1190 (7th Cir, 1985); see Szabo Food Serv.,
Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that ‘a dismissal under Rule
41(a)(1)(i) strips a court of jurisdiction” and “terminates the case all by itself’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)), Because the dismissal order entered by. the Court, after the parties filed their
stipulation was “a nullity,” McCall-Bey, 777 F.2d at 1185, the only order the Court can amend is the
stipulation.

Moreover, contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Ass'n v. American Express Co., 467 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2006) provides no basis for doing

so. In that case, the parties settled their dispute and thercafter moved the court for an order of


dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1). See Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n v. Am. Express Co., No. 99 C
6679, 5/23/00 Min. Order (granting “[s}tipulated motion for dismissal with prejudice”), available
at, hitps://ecf.ilnd.cire7 dcen/cgi-bin/ShowIndex.pl. The court granted the motion in an order that

said: “This court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for purposes'of enforcing the terms of the

settlement agreement.” Jd, The terms of the agreement were not, however, set forth i F

dd. iad

Four years later, plaintiff returned to the court seeking enforcement of the settlement
agreement. Blue Cross, 467 F.3d at 636. The court sought to invoke ancillary jurisdiction to enforce
the agreement. fd. To do so, the Court attempted to amend its dismissal order to comport with
Lynch v. SamataMason, Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir, 2006), which holds that a court has
ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement only ifits dismissal order sets forth the terms
of the agreement. B/ue Cross, 467 F.3d at 636. Consequently, the Court entered an amended order
pursuant to Rule 60(a) that said:

Nunc pro tunc 5/23/2000, the stipulated motion for dismissal with prejudice,

pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(1), and with each party bearing its own costs and attomey’s

fees is granted. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the settlement

agreement, which is hereby incorporated into the judgment. ‘The Court shall retain

junsdiction for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the settlement agreement,
7d, (quotation omitted). Thereafter, American Exptess appealed.

The Seventh Circuit said that the amended order, which still did not incorporate the
settlement’s terms, did not comport with Lyzch, was not an enforceable injunction under Rule 65(d)
and, in any event, was improper under Rulc 60. Jd. at 636-38. Nonetheless, the appellate court said,

the trial court still had jurisdiction to enforce the agreement because the requirements for diversity

jurisdiction were met. Jd. at 638.