CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 14, 2002

ZN

WILLIAM J. HIBBLER, DISTRICT JUDGE

13


characterizing the law on time-barring § 301 claims, Defendant
stated no rational trier of fact could conclude the statute of
limitations period had run on Plaintiff’s claim and Plaintiff
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. (Def.
Mot. Summ. J., 10, 12.) Plaintiff alerted Defendant to its
errors, but in its attempt to correct these mistakes in its
reply, Defendant failed to correct all the misstatements and
continues to assert Plaintiff's claims are not time barred.!
In spite of Defendant’s sloppiness, the Court understands what
Defendant attempted to argue; however, Defendant’s argument
fails on the facts of the case nonetheless.

Defendant argues a six month statute of limitations bars
Plaintiff’s § 301 claims. See DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462
U.S. 151 (1983) (the six month statute of limitations period
borrowed from § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 160(b), is applicable to hybrid § 301 claims); see
also Christiansen v. APV Crepaco, Inc., 178 F.3d 910, 913-16

(7" Cir, 1999)*. Plaintiff responds Defendant is applying the

In its reply, Defendant admits it made substantial errors; however, Defendant is
only partially successful in its attempts to correct these fatal mistakes. In particular, in
paragraph two of its reply, Defendant states how “(i)n paragraph 8, the sentence should
read” and then proceeds to rewrite not paragraph eight but rather paragraph ten.
Defendant presumably intended to correct paragraph ten, which continues to oppose
Defendant’s position and state “(n)o rational trier of fact could conclude [the applicable
statute of limitations] period has run.” (Def. Mot. Summ. J., 10.)

? In Christiansen, unlike the present matter, the Seventh Circuit dealt with the
individual plaintiff's hybrid § 301 claims, i.e. her claims against her union (for failure to
represent) and against her employer (for breaching the collective bargaining agreement),

4


landscape they may traverse.” Rabine, 161 F.3d at 430-31
(quoting Textron, 118 S.Ct. at 1629) (alteration in original).

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to assert a violation
of a collective bargaining agreement and thus improperly
applies § 301. In Textron, the Supreme Court ruled the
plaintiff union could not bring an action in federal court
against the defendant employer seeking a declaration of
contractual invalidity due to fraudulent inducement, because
neither party had alleged a violation of the contract as
required under § 301(a). Textron, 118 S.Ct. at 1628-31.
“Because the Union’s complaint alleges no violation of the
collective-bargaining agreement, neither we nor the federal
courts below have subject matter jurisdiction over this case
under § 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act.” Id.
at 1631. Accordingly, the Court took a narrower and more
exclusionary view of the jurisdiction of federal courts under
§ 301(a). Cf. Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 83 S.Ct. 267
(1962) (“§ 301 is not to be given a narrow reading.”);
I.B.E.W., Local 481 v. Sign-Craft, Inc., 864 F.2d 499, 502 (7%
Cir. 1988) (“The Supreme Court has supported the view that §
301(a) should be given a broad interpretation.... [we now]
hold that under § 301(a) any disputes about the meaning or
validity of collective bargaining agreements come within the

jurisdiction of the federal courts.”). Further, Textron


[violation].'’” Christiansen, 178 F.3d at 914 (quoting Metz v.
Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc., 715 F.2d 299, 304 (7% Cir. 1983)).
Plaintiff stated it learned for the first time on March 16,
2001 that Defendant denied the parties had reached an
agreement on a successor contract. (Compl., f19.)
Accordingly, the clock started to run for an applicable
statute of limitations on March 16. Thus, even if Defendant
were correct that the statute of limitations applicable to
Plaintiff's § 301 claims is the six month period borrowed from
§ 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, then Plaintiff's
claim accrued on March 16 and was not time barred when
Plaintiff filed its complaint on August 8, 2001. Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant argues this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction in this matter because Plaintiff’s complaint
fails to allege a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement as a contract and instead simply states a claim for
a declaratory judgment as to the existence and validity of the
agreement.

Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6), a claim

may be dismissed if, as a matter of law, “it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support


wrong statute of limitations. Specifically, Plaintiff argues
DelCostello concerned an employee who brought suit against her
union and employer and thus was similar on its facts to a case
for a duty for fair representation under § 10(b) of the NLRA.
Plaintiff maintains the parties’ situation here is
substantively distinguishable and is actually a contract
enforcement matter, with the Illinois statute of limitations
dictating five and ten year periods for oral and written
contracts respectively. See Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Ind., Inc.,
993 F.2d 449, 465 (7'" Cir. 1991) (“Under Illinois law, there
are two separate statutes of limitations for actions on
contracts. For actions on oral contracts, the statute of
limitations is five years. Alternatively, a ten-year statute
of limitations applies to actions on written
contracts.”) (citations omitted).

However, the Court need not determine if the correct
applicable statute of limitations is six months, as Defendant
maintains, or longer, as Plaintiff alleges. “The statute of
limitations fora § 301 claim begins to run ‘when the claimant
discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should

have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged

and stated such claims are “interdependent.” Jd. at 913, n.2. Further, the court stated it
only addressed the timeliness of the union member’s claim against her union and “need
not separately examine the collective bargaining claim against” the employer. Jd.

5


labor organization ... may be brought in any district court of
the United States ..." 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a). By its terms,
“this provision confers federal subject-matter jurisdiction
only over ‘[s]Juits for violation of contracts’” and it does
not generally confer jurisdiction on Federal District Courts
in suits concerning contract validity. Textron Lycoming
Reciprocating Engine Division, AVCO Corp. Vv. United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America International Union, 118 S.Ct. 1625, 1629 (1998)
(“‘Suits for violation of contracts’ under § 301(a) are not
suits that claim a contract is invalid, but suits that claim
a contract has been violated.”); see also International Union
of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Rabine, 161 F.3d
427, 430+ (7% Cir. 1998).

In its response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff for
the first time argued the Court may adjudicate the validity of
the agreement because the violation of that contract is an
inherent and co-mingled issue in its claim. Plaintiff relied
upon the principle the jurisdictional requirement of a
contract violation “does not mean that a federal court can
never adjudicate the validity of a contract under § 301(a).
That provision simply erects a gateway [i.e. an arguable claim
of breach] through which parties may pass into federal court;

once they have entered, it does not restrict the legal


‘Minute-Opder Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

William J. Hibbler Sitting Judge if Other

or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 6097 DATE 2/14/2002
CASE TITLE Chicago and Northeast Illinois District Council of Carpenters v. GDCNI/CAWCC
{in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, eg., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#5-1) and Motion to Dismiss (#4-1)

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]}

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) im) Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) ia) Ruling/Hearing on___set for at

(5) Oo Status hearing [held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____set for at

(6) Oo Pretrial conference [held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor_ at

(7) a Trial [set for/re-set for] on at

(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to___at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs [by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) (General Rule21 OFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

qo) «xf [Other docket entry] For the attached reasons, the Court DENIES the motion for summary
judgment (#5-1) and GRANTS the motion to dismiss (#4-1). All pending dates and motions are
terminated as moot.

a) (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required.

mS

Mail AO 450 form.

No notices required, advised in open court.

Notices mailed by judge's staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices,

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

number of notices

EB 19 2002

date docketed

date mailed notice

=

courtroom
deputy’s
initials

Datgit wefFeceivvad inky |
cenfrat-Cletk’$ Office

mailing deputy initials

gL ds


validity of the contract. Plaintiff states “[t]he pending
litigation is a declaratory action to determine whether the
Union and GDCNI/CAWCC are bound to a successor collective
bargaining agreement for the period of June 1, 2001 through
May 31, 2005.” (Compl. at 95) (emphasis added). Further, in
its prayer for relief, Plaintiff asks this court to “declare”
the parties have a binding collective bargaining agreement and
to “declare” the agreement contains certain language. (Compl.
at 7 22(A), (B).) Under Textron, such a claim standing alone
fails to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction and
prevents this court from reviewing the complaint.

As stated above, in its response to the motion to
dismiss, Plaintiff asserts in a single sentence “[i]n this
lawsuit the Plaintiff is requesting that the Court adjudicate
whether there is a valid contract between the parties and to
find that the Defendant is violating that valid contract in
not recognizing it and not adhering to the provisions found in
it.” (Pl. Resp. Mot. Dismiss at p.3.) For a number of
reasons, Plaintiff’s passing comment here is ineffective in
supporting Plaintiff’s cause.

First, Plaintiff’s flat allegation comes too late; a
brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss may not amend a
complaint. See Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 470 n.6

(7% Cir. 1991); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d

il


suggests these types of cases (i.e. claims involving the
validity of a contract) are meant to be heard by the National
Labor Relations Board, which retains “the primary
jurisdiction... in resolving disputes arising from the
collective-bargaining process.” See Id. at 1631-32 (“As the
Court has long recognized, ‘{i]t is implicit in the entire
structure of the [National Labor Relations] Act that the Board
acts to oversee and referee the process of collective
bargaining.... The fact that the [National Labor Relations]
Board undoubtedly has more expertise in the
collective-bargaining area than federal judges provides an
additional reason for concluding that Congress meant what it
said in § 301(a) and for rejecting the Union's and the
Government's broad reading of the ‘[s]uits for violation of
contracts’ language.” (Stevens, J., concurring) (alterations
in original)). The Court acknowledged a federal court could
properly determine the validity of a collective bargaining
agreement in certain limited circumstances, but it stressed
“in these cases, the federal court's power ... is ancillary
to, and not independent of, its power to adjudicate ‘[s]uits
for violation of contracts.’” Id. at 1629.

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege the violation
of a contract, i.e. the agreement, and instead merely asserts

a claim for a declaratory judgment as to the formation and

10


of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The Court must assume all
well-plead allegations in the complaint are true, as well as
all inferences reasonably drawn therein, and view them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
v. Bush, 918 F.2d 1323, 1326 (7 Cir. 1990). In order to
survive the motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to outline the cause of action, proof of
which is essential to recovery.” Ellsworth v. City of Racine,
774 F.2d 182, 184 (7** Cir. 1985). However, the Federal Rules
mandate only “notice pleading” and do not require heightened
pleading, and a more extensive recital of facts, for any
claims before the Court today in this cause of action.
Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). The
Court’s task in ruling on a motion to dismiss is limited in
scope and does not determine “whether a plaintiff will
ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims. The purpose of a motion
to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to
decide the merits.” Triad Assoc., Inc. v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7 Cir. 1989)
Analysis
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act states

“[{s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a


that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute about a material fact is
“genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A plaintiff cannot
rest on mere allegations of a claim without any significant
probative evidence that supports his or her complaint. Id.
Rather, to avert summary judgment, the party opposing the
motion must present specific facts showing a genuine issue of
material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-34 (1986); see also Anderson v. Operative Plasterers’
and Cement Masons’ Int’l Assoc. Local No. 12 Pension & Welfare
Plans, 991 F.2d 356 (7 Cir. 1993). “One of the principal
purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and
dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Id. at
324, In determining the existence of any genuine issue of
material fact, the court must draw all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Bank Leumi Le-
Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7 Cir. 1991).
Analysis

At the outset, the Court is compelled to recognize
Defendant’s sloppy and nearly incoherent motion and reply.
Defendant repeatedly switched the parties and effectively

argued Plaintiff’s position. For example, after briefly


Background

The parties agree they engaged in numerous discussions
and negotiations concerning the 2001-2005 collective
bargaining agreement between the union and the employer’s
association. Plaintiff alleges Defendant left a telephone
message with Plaintiff on February 1, 2001 that indicated
Defendant accepted Plaintiff's terms and agreed to the
successor contract. Plaintiff maintains it first learned on
March 16, 2001 that Defendant denied the parties had reached
an agreement. Both parties then filed charges with the
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and claimed the other
engaged in unfair labor practices and refused to bargain in
good faith. The NLRB investigated both charges and refused to
issue a complaint; both parties filed pending appeals with the
General Counsel of the NLRB. Plaintiff filed the present
complaint under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 185.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Standard of Review

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and


DOCKETED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FEB 9 2002

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHICAGO AND NORTHEAST ILLINOIS
DISTRICT COUNCIL CARPENTERS,

)
)
Plaintiff, )
) CASE NO. 01 C 6097
v. )
) JUDGE WILLIAM J. HIBBLER
GDCNI/CAWCC, )
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

The Chicago and Northeast Illinois District Council of
Carpenters (“Plaintiff”) filed the present complaint against
GDCNI/CAWCC (“Defendant”) to determine whether Plaintiff and
Defendant are bound to a successor agreement between the union
and employers, respectively. Specifically, Plaintiff
maintains Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a binding
collective bargaining agreement for the period of June 2001
through May 31, 2005 which removed bonding disputes from the
Settlement of Disputes provision. In response, Defendant
filed the pending motion to dismiss, alleging this court lacks
jurisdiction here, and the motion for summary judgment,
alleging the complaint is time barred. Defendant’s motion to
dismiss has been held in abeyance pending disposition of its
motion for summary judgment. The following opinion contains

distinct and separate opinions for each motion.


1101, 1107 (7% Cir. 1984). Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is
devoid of any suggestion of a contract violation; instead,
Plaintiff clearly states this matter is a declaratory judgment
to determine the existence and validity of the agreement.
Second, even if this court considered the amendatory
statement Plaintiff included in its response, at best
Plaintiff has still not alleged how Defendant violated the
agreement and at worst Plaintiff has engaged in circular
reasoning. Plaintiff attempts to add a claim of contract
violation to the actual single issue of contract validity by
redefining its complaint to request the court “find that the
Defendant is violating that valid contract in not recognizing
it”. (Pl. Resp. Mot. Dismiss at p.3.) Plaintiff’s circular
definition of contract violation actually states the claim for
contract formation and validity. Further, Plaintiff simply
states Defendant “is violating that valid contract in... not
adhering to the provisions found in it,” and yet fails to cite
any sections of the contract which were violated or to even
suggest what action or inaction by Defendant was violating the
agreement. Once again, only legitimate allegations of
contract violation confer upon this court the subject matter
jurisdiction to assess contract validity. Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss is GRANTED.

12