IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

J. W.,

Appellant, 

v.

Case No. 5D21-2299

LT Case No. 2021-MH-004110-O 

R. W.,

Appellee. 

________________________________/

Opinion filed December 2, 2022 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

for Orange County, 

Leticia J. Marques, Judge. 

Jacob V. Stuart, Jr., of The Law 

Office of Jacob V. Stuart, P.A., Orlando 

and Christopher R. Kaigle, of The Kaigle 

Law Firm P.A., Orlando, for Appellant. 

R. W., Oviedo, pro se.

WALLIS, J. 
2

J.W. appeals the trial court’s order granting R.W.'s petition for 

Involuntary Assessment and Stabilization under the Marchman Act. J.W. 

argues that the trial court erred by granting the petition without hearing 

testimony from the qualified professional who executed the involuntary 

assessment, as required by sections 397.6957(1) and (3), Florida Statutes

(2021). We agree and reverse. 

We review de novo the order for involuntary substance abuse 

treatment under chapter 397. J.C. v. State, 293 So. 3d 627, 628 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2020). Chapter 397, otherwise known as the Hal S. Marchman Alcohol 

and Other Drug Services Act, "explicitly places the burden of proof on the

petitioner to establish the requirements for involuntary treatment by clear and 

convincing evidence." Id. (citing § 397.6957(2), Fla. Stat. (2019)). Section 

397.6957, which governs the procedure for the evidentiary hearing on a 

petition for involuntary services, states that a petitioner must present witness 

testimony, under oath, from "one of the qualified professionals who executed 

the involuntary services certificate." § 397.6957(3), Fla. Stat. Additionally, 

"the court shall hear and review all relevant evidence, including the review of 

results of the assessment completed by the qualified professional in 

connection with the respondent’s protective custody, emergency admission, 
3

involuntary assessment, or alternative involuntary admission." § 

397.6957(1), Fla. Stat.

In this case, the record on appeal reflects that Tennille Gordon, a 

licensed mental health counselor, was the qualified professional who 

conducted the assessment pursuant to chapter 397 and recommended 

involuntary treatment for J.W. Upon conducting the assessment, Gordon 

prepared and executed a Qualified Professional Certificate that contained 

her findings and the reason for her recommendation. However, the 

transcripts from the hearing on R.W.'s petition do not show that Gordon ever 

testified as required by the statute.1 Moreover, the transcripts do not indicate 

that Gordon's certified assessment was ever offered or admitted into 

evidence at the hearing. Thus, as J.W. argued below and on appeal, R.W.'s 

failure to present testimony from Gordon and to offer the certified 

assessment into evidence fails to satisfy the burden of proof required by 

sections 397.6957(1) and (3).2 See J.C., 293 So. 3d at 628–29 (reversing 

1 The hearing on the petition took place over two days with the parties 

and their witnesses appearing remotely.

2 Notably, J.W.'s attorney filed a written closing argument after the 

hearing arguing that R.W. failed to meet her burden of proof by failing to 

present testimony from Gordon, and further arguing that testimony from 

other medical professionals who did not execute the certified assessment 

was insufficient to meet the statutory requirement.
4

and remanding order for involuntary treatment because trial court deviated 

from express requirement of section 397.6957); see also Lund v. Project 

Warm, 177 So. 3d 283, 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (quashing trial court's order 

for continued commitment under chapter 397 and explaining that "[s]tatutes 

which authorize the deprivation of an individual's liberty must be strictly 

construed"). 

Because the record on appeal does not show that the trial court 

considered Gordon's certified assessment or that it heard testimony from any 

other qualified professional that executed that assessment, we reverse the 

trial court’s order and remand for a new hearing. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

SASSO and TRAVER, JJ., concur.