IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-1032

Filed June 6, 2018

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CRYSTAL LAKTAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, Mark E. Kruse 

and John M. Wright, Judges.

A defendant appeals her sentence. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Brenda J. Gohr, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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VOGEL, Presiding Judge.

Crystal Laktas appeals her sentence following her guilty plea to seconddegree theft, in violation of Iowa Code sections 714.1 and 714.2(2) (2016). Laktas 

claims the district court abused its discretion by focusing only on Laktas’s prior 

criminal record, and it did not consider mitigating factors such as her employment 

history and status as her father’s primary caregiver.

Following her guilty plea, Laktas was sentenced to five years of 

imprisonment and a $750 fine with a surcharge. The district court suspended the 

fine and surcharge. In pronouncing the sentence, the district court stated:

The Court has considered all the sentencing provisions 

provided in Iowa Code Chapters 901 and 902. The following 

sentence is based upon my judgment of what will provide the 

maximum opportunity for your rehabilitation and at the same time 

protect the community from further offenses by you and others.

The Court has specifically considered all the arguments made 

here today, all the contents of the presentence investigation. There 

are a number of attachments, including letters by family members 

and so forth, which the Court has also considered and read in this 

case.

. . .

In reaching this sentence, ma’am, I’ve taken into account your 

prior criminal record, which, as indicated, obviously is not good. 

You’ve had the benefit of probation, you’ve had the benefit of various 

services while on probation, you’ve had the benefit of parole. You’ve 

been incarcerated before. This is a situation where multiple—the last 

of multiple felony convictions. And, again, I’m a little bit taken aback 

by the Department of Correctional Services’ recommendation with 

a—on the risk assessment when the same thing keeps happening 

over and over and over again and then come up with a conclusion 

that it’s not a risk, which, again, does not make sense.

The other thing for the presentence investigation, it 

appeared—I mean you just got off parole or probation within a very 

short time. You’re back at it again with this offense, which didn’t

occur once, not a one-time thing, but multiple offenses occurring over 

a long period of time when you were put in a position of trust in this 

case.

So that’s the reasons for the sentencing and, again, I’ve taken 

into account everything else that was said here today. You know, 
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you can’t say, well, I’ve done this and this since I was arrested on 

this charge and that makes—you know, and that should determine 

what happens here today. This has happened before multiple times 

and I’m sure the same thing has happened before. So I’ve taken into 

account but give it less weight than what the presentence 

investigation does. 

When a sentence falls within statutory limits, the sentence is reviewed for 

abuse of discretion. State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2015). A 

sentencing court abuses its discretion when the sentencing decision is based on 

grounds that are clearly untenable or unreasonable. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 

720, 724 (Iowa 2002). 

In applying the abuse of discretion standard to sentencing decisions, 

it is important to consider the societal goals of sentencing criminal 

offenders, which focus on rehabilitation of the offender and the 

protection of the community from further offenses. Iowa Code § 

901.5 (2001). It is equally important to consider the host of factors 

that weigh in on the often arduous task of sentencing a criminal 

offender, including the nature of the offense, the attending 

circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender, 

and the chances of reform.

Id. at 724–25.

The record reflects the district court properly emphasized Laktas’s criminal 

history in determining her sentence, as well as her inability to take advantage of 

time on probation or parole. The district court also considered the nature of the 

offense and how Laktas deceived her employer over time while she was in a 

position of trust. The record does not suggest the court’s decision was based on 

clearly untenable or unreasonable grounds. The sentence was based on Laktas’s 

criminal history and the nature of the offense. Laktas’s assertion that the district 

court should have given greater consideration to the fact that she is the primary 

caregiver for her ailing father does not render the sentence imposed untenable or 
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unreasonable. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in sentencing Laktas.

AFFIRMED.