1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49034

STATE OF IDAHO ,
Plaintiff

- Respondent ,

v.

CESAR RAUL CAMACHO ,
Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Filed: November 29, 2022
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Samuel A. Hoagland , District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for eluding a police officer wi th a persistent violator enhancement, affirmed

. Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jacob L. Westerfield , Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

_______________________________________________ BRAILSFORD, Judge Cesar Raul Camacho appeals from his judgment of conviction for eluding a poli ce officer,
Idaho Code § 49

- 1404(2) , with a persistent violator enhancement, I.C. § 19

- 2514 , and challenges
the district court ’ s denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
I.
F ACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Detectives Carter and Holland are members of Boise City’s Special Operations Unit (SOU) , which investigates suspected drug trafficking. Based on investigations in 2018 and 2019,
the detectives believed , among other things, that Camacho was a member of the Mexican Mafia
gang , had a criminal history, frequently traveled to Boise for drug trafficking purposes, and was seeking to recover approximately 12 pounds of stolen methamphetamine in Boise

. On June 6, 2019, the detectives obtained information indicating that Camacho was in Boise

.2

Believing that Camacho posed an immediate threat of harm to certain individuals potentially involved in stealing the methamphetamine , Detective Holland requested a third

- party service provider to use Global Position ing System (GPS) data to “ping” Camacho’s cell phone to
reveal his real

- time location. 1 The first ping indicated Camacho was in the general location of a hotel on Broadway Avenue in Boise . A second pin g indicated that the first ping was not a “fleeting ping” and that Camacho was in the same location rather than moving

. Officers confirmed with a hotel employee that Camacho was staying at the hotel , obtained his room number, and began surveilling the hot el parking lot and a nearby truck stop. During this surveillance, Camacho left the hotel in a rental car. Officers followed him until he pulled into a fast

- food restaurant ’s drive

- through lane . When Camacho saw an officer approaching him, he ac celerated through the drive

- through lane , hit a police car, and sped away. Thereafter, Detective Holland requested a ping of Camacho’s cell phone every fifteen minutes.
T hat evening, officers located and arrested Camacho after he fled on foot.
The follow ing day, o fficers requested and obtained a search warrant for Camacho’s hotel

room where they found a loaded firearm, cocaine, heroin, and drug paraphernalia. Later, a grand jury indicted Camacho for conspiracy to traffic in heroin , conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine , possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) , possession of a controlled substance (heroin) , possession of drug paraphernalia , eluding a police officer , and resisting and obstructing . Further, the State alleged Camacho was a persiste nt violator . A t the State’s request,
the district court consolidated Camach o’s case for trial with the cases of four other defendants. Camacho filed a motion to suppress , arguing that the State’s “acquisition of cell

- site data

was a n unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment” and that “no exigent circumstances justif[ied] the warrantless search of [ his ] cell

- site data and of his person.” The State responded that pinging Camacho’s cell phone was not a search , o r alternatively, that if it were a search,

1 In the district court’s decision denying Camacho’s suppression motion, the court relies on United States v. Riley , 858 F.3d 1012 ( 6th Cir. 2017), to describe how law enforcement in this case tracked Camacho’s real

- time location by having the third

- party service provider “ping” his cell phone . In Riley , the court explained that one form of cell phone tracking refers to using satellite

based GPS data to reveal a cell phone’s latitude and longitude coordinates and that “pinging” in this context refers to “a service provider’s act of proactively identifying the real

- time location” of a cell phone. Id. at 1014. The parties do not dispute the district court’s reliance on Riley or that law enforcement in this case requested and received GPS data re vealing the real

- time location of Camacho’s cell phone as described in Riley

.3

ex i gent circumstances justified the search . The district court held an evidentiary hearing over the

co urse of three days. During the hearing, the court heard the testimony of three law enforcement officers, including Detectives Carter and Holland , and admitted into evidence the affidavit for the
search warrant of Camacho’s hotel room , a supplement al affidavit, the return of the search warrant, the search warrant, and the audio recordings of jailhouse phone calls related to the stolen drugs

. Followi ng the hearing, the district court issued a written decision denying Camacho’s suppression motion. It concluded that “obtaining ping tracking data from [Camacho’s] cell phone provider constituted a search that required a warrant” but that “there were exig ent circumstances justifying the warrantless search.” Camacho conditionally pled guilty to eluding a police officer with a persistent violator enhancement and reserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression
motion. Camacho timely appeals
II. S TANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court ’ s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the applic ation of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson , 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, a nd draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez

- Molina , 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers , 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III. ANALYSIS On appeal, Camacho challenge s the dis trict court’s ruling that exigent circumstances justified pinging his cell phone to disclose his real

- time location

. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 Carpenter v. United States , ___ U.S. ___, ___, 138

2 Camacho contends the warrantless ping of his cell phone violated both Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitutio n. Camacho, however, fails to provide any argument why th is Court should apply the Idaho Constitution differently than the Fourth Amendment. As a result, this Court relies on judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to analyze Camacho’s arguments. See State v. Schaffer , 133 Idaho 126, 130, 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999) (ruling court will rely on judicial interpretation of Fourth Amendment absent “any cogent reason” why it should apply Idaho Constitution differently)

.4

S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018). The State may overcome this pres umption by demonstrating that a
warrantless search fell within a well

- recognized exception to the warrant requirement

. Id

. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. One such exception is when exigent circumstances are so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable. Id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2222. “Such exigencies include the need to pursue a fleeing suspect, protect individuals who are threatened with imminent harm, or prevent imminent destruction of evidence.” Id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 ; see also State
v. Sessions , 165 Idaho 658, 661, 450 P.3 d 306 , 309 (2019) (noting emergency aid exception to protect against imminent injury or aid injured individual ) ; State v. Holton , 132 Idaho 501, 504, 975 P.2d 789, 792 (1999) (noting need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is exigent
circu mstance)

. Two essential requirements of the exigent circumstances exception are a compelling need
for official action and no time to secure a warrant. State v. Blancas , 170 Idaho 631 , 636, 515 P.3d 718, 722 (2022). Whether exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless search is determined

on a case

- by

- case basis and turns on “whether the totality of circumstances would lead a reasonable officer to believe that immediate action was necessary.” Id. at 637 , 515 P.3d at 723 . The nature of the exigen cy justifying the intrusion must strictly circumscribe the warrantless search. State v.
Townsend , 160 Idaho 885, 888, 380 P.3d 698, 701 (Ct. App. 2016).
A. Search Neither the United States Supreme Court nor Idaho appellate courts have previously addressed whether requesting a third

- party service provider to ping a cell phone to determine an individual’s real

- time location based on GPS data constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and if so, what ci rcumstances justify obtaining this information without a warrant. See, e.g., Carpenter , ___ U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (declining to express view on whether obtaining GPS real

- time data constitu tes a search). The State, however, does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that “pinging” Camacho’s cell phone to determine his real

- time location using GPS data was a warrantless search. Thus, f or purposes of resolving Camacho’s appeal, we

as sume

-- without deciding

-- that it was a warrantless search

. B. Exigent Circumstances On appeal, Camacho cites several cases, including Idaho case law , addressing whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of a residence or a hotel room

. Se e , e.g., Sessions , 165 Idaho at 661

- 62 , 450 P.3d at 309

- 10 (concluding exigent circumstances did not exist5

to enter home under emergency aid exception ) ; State v. Heard , 158 Idaho 667, 670, 350 P.3d 1044 , 1047 (Ct. App. 2015) ( concluding exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into hotel room) ; State v. Barrett , 138 Idaho 290, 294, 62 P.3d 214, 218 (Ct. App. 2003) (concluding exigent circumstances justified entering home)

. Because these cases address circumstances dissimilar to pinging a cell phone to determine an individual’s real

- time location, they are not factually
instructive

. C ourts in other jurisdictions, however, have ruled that exigent circumstances justified pinging a defendant’s cell phone without a warrant . These cases ident ify the types of exigent
circumstances justifying such a warrantless search , like threats of violence and gang

- related drug trafficking . For example, in United States v. Hobbs , 24 F. 4 th 965, 967 ( 4 th Cir. 2022), the Fourth
Circuit concluded exigent circumstances justified pinging a defendant’s cell phone because he had
a crimi nal history of violent offenses; was armed; and had threatened imminent harm to numerous people, including his former girlfriend, her child, and law enforcement officers

. In Un ited States
v. Bank s , 884 F.3d 998, 1012 ( 10th Circ. 2018), the Tenth Circuit concluded exigent circumstances justified pinging a defendant’s cell phone because officers knew the defendant “was associated with a ‘violent street gang,’” “had a history of vi olent behavior,” and had threatened to kill an
informant

. In United States v. Caraballo , 831 F.3d 95, 98, 104 ( 2d Cir. 2016), the Second Circuit concluded exigent circumstances justified pinging a defendant’s cell phone because he was the primary suspect in a brutal murder, had a propensity for violence, possessed numerous firearms, was involved in a drug operation, did not live in the area but rather traveled and stayed in hotel s , and posed a threat to undercover informants.
The district court in this cas e found that Detectives Carter and Holland were aware of similar types of exigent circumstances arising from Camacho’s presence in Boise that led them to
believe he posed an imminent threat of harm to certain individuals requiring immediate action.
See Carpenter , ___ U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (noting exigency compelling warrantless search includes protecting individuals who are threatened with imminent harm). In support of the district court’s findings, th e eviden ce shows that, a s members of t he SOU , Detectives Carter and Holland have experience, trainin g , and expertise regarding gang

- related activiti es, including drug trafficking, and they have been involved in law enforcement operations related to drug traffickin g6

in the Boise area. On e such operation was a “buy/bust” operation 3 that occurred in November 2018. During that operation, o fficers seized $60,000 during a drug transaction and arrested H.R

. The day after arresting H.R., an officer conducted a welfare check on H.R.’s eleven

- year

old daughter, located the girl at her residence, and discovered Camacho hiding in a bathroom. Initially, Camacho claimed that he was the girl’s uncle and that he was taking her to California

. Later, however, Camacho admitted he was not the girl’s uncle but claimed he had her father’s permission to take her. Based on the information the girl provided, the officer believed Camacho was involved in drug trafficking and intended to kidnap the girl. Although the off icer did not arrest Camacho, the officer obtained and confirmed Camacho’s cell phone number. Later, in January 20 19, officers were preparing for another buy/bust operation. During that time, Camacho reported to an undercover officer that “somebody in [the] group [which included the undercover officer] must be cooperating with the police.” Further, Camacho disclosed certain
facts to the undercover officer indicating Camacho was aware of the tactical specifics of the earlier
November 2018 buy/bust operation

. This information indicated Camacho had watched and
pr ovided “security detail” for that drug transaction , raise d concerns Camacho “ was possibly aware of the tactical side” of the operation
, and was “out the approximately $60,000” seized during the operation. Then, in May 2019, another drug

- related arrest in Boise implicated Camacho in drug trafficking. On May 29 , Detective Carter was surveilling the residence of an individual who had successfully eluded officers earlier

. During this surveillance, Detective Carter observed a vehicle, which was traveling at a high rate of speed , pull into the alley by the residenc e and then drive
away . Believing that the suspected individual might be in the vehicle, Detective Carter followed the vehicle and requested assistance. Several officers responded to the request and conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle. The vehicle’s driver, Robert Cockerell, had a loaded firearm on his hip. The officers
removed the firearm and had Cockerell ex it the vehicle. After Cockerell exited, t he passenger

“ jumped into the driver’s seat ,” “accelerated” the vehicle, and “knocked down” and dragged an officer with the vehicle after the officer ordered him to stop at gunpoint. Officers followed the

3 Officer Carter testifie d that a “buy/bust” operation means undercover officers were “going to purchase narcotics and then arrest the people that they purchased them from right then and there.”7

vehicle and found it crashed into a tree . The passenger, however, had fled the scene. In the vehicle,
officers discovered a large amount of cash , methamphetamine, heroin, and a scale . Missing, however, was “a large white grocery bag” Detective Carter had seen earlier “in the pocket of the driver’s door.” Officers arrested Cockerell, who helped identify the fleeing passenger as Michael Chapman.
T he following day, May 30, officers located Chapman and arrested him . Detectives Carter
and Holland interviewed Chapman , with whom they were familiar, knowing him to be a gang member and drug dealer in the community. After Chapman initially denied having fled from law enforcement the prior day, he admitted fleeing and claimed he was forced to do so. Chapman explained that “there was 12 pounds of methamphetamine in a location in Boise that was just left there” ; he feared “Cesar” ; “[p]eople were going to di e” because Chapman had been arrested; and Chapman and his family would be “toast,” meaning subject to “either great bodily harm or death,” if Chapman or C esar did not recover the drugs. Further , Chapman reported that Cesar “was a Mexican Mafia member” wit h a tattoo signifying his membership , had been in federal prison , was connected to the Sinaloa Cartel , came “to town one to two times a month for drug drop off and to
monitor activ ity of how drug sales are going , ” and “would be back in town within a couple days.” During the interview, Chapman gave the detectives Cesar’s cell phone number, and the detectives understood Chapman to be talking about Camacho. Shortly after the interview with the detectives , Chapman called H. from jail, told her where the 12 pou nds of drugs were located, and asked her to retrieve them. On June 3, Chapman spoke
to H. again who reported that the drugs had been stolen from her and that she had been “running for her life” all night. 4 On June 6, Chapman called Camacho from jail . D uring the call, Chapman
told Ca macho that H. had the drugs; C

. had stole n the drugs from H.; and “people were saying” A. “might have something to do with the 12 pounds [of methamphetamine] being stolen.” Meanwhile, Camacho made statement s during the call indicating he was presently in Boise. Detectives Carter and Holland were in training at the time of Chapman’s call with Camacho. They heard a recording of the call a few hours later , however, and believed that Camacho was presently
in Boi se and that H., C

. , and A

. were in imminent danger.

4 Camacho challenges the district court’s finding that “[H.] called Chapman” and cites to the record showing instead that Chapman called H. from jail. Regardless, neither party disputes the content of the call.8

Based on thi s information, Detective Holland testified he had concerns, particular ly about
C

. ’s safety. He testified he based these concerns on his prior knowledge of Camacho
, the
information obtained du ring the 2018 and 2019 operations of a cartel connection , the attempted kidnapping , Chapman’s “adamant belief” Camacho was connected with the Mexican Mafia and Chapman’s fear for his family
, the content of the jailhouse phone calls ind icating Camacho was i n the area , the Mexican Mafia “code of honor” requiring “severe consequence s ” and “violence” for stealing , and “the potential for another attempted kidnapping or some type of violent act in order to get the money and[/]or drugs back.” Similarly, Detective Carter testified that he was concerned “there was an imminent danger to the person who took those drugs” and concern ed about “all the history,” including the phone call about the stolen drugs, “the drug trafficking organization ties,” the attempted kidnap ping, and the belief that “there was a possibility that [C.] might be killed or kidnapped.” Based on the detectives’ concerns of imminent danger to C. and others, Detective
Holland requested the third

- party service provider to ping Camacho’s cell phone to determine his
real

- time location. On appeal, Camacho challenges the sufficiency of this evidence as establishing exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search. He contends “no compelling need” justified pinging
of his cell phone. In support, he challenges Chapman’s credibility regarding Camacho’s gang membership and the detectives ’ efforts to determine whether Camacho was indeed a gang member. Specifically, Camacho argues that the detectives received “the primary information” about Camacho’s “alleged ties to any gang” during their May 2019 interview with Chapman
, but “despite [Chapman’s] sever e credibility issues,” the detectives “made no further efforts to obtain additional information on whether [Camacho] was a documented gang member.” We d isagree, however, with Camacho’s assertion that the detectives obtained their “primary information” about Camacho’s gang activities from Chapman. To the contrary, the detectives testified to a series of events giving rise to their belief that Camacho was involved in gang

- related drug activities, including the November 2018 and January 2019 buy/bust operations. Moreover, Detective Holland specifically testified that the information Chapman provided was “consistent” with the
information the detectives had l earned from their prior investigations and that Detective Holland believed “the credibility of what [Chapman] was saying was high.”
Camacho also criticizes the detectives for not “investigating a violent robbery and a large quantity of methamphetamine be ing present on the streets” but instead purportedly “waiting” until9

Camacho was in Boise to act

. The record, however, does not support Camacho’s assertion that law enforcement was not investigating these matters. Regardless, the lack of any such investig ation does not bear on whether Camacho posed an imminent danger when his cell phone was pinged. Finally, Camacho argues the district c ourt erred by concluding that “ law enforcement had reasonable grounds to believe that obtaining a warrant would be impract icable because taking the time to do so would have posed a significant risk to the safety of others and [Camacho] was a flight risk.” Challenging this ruling, Camacho asserts “the police had ample time to obtain a warrant. ” In support, he notes that the detectives “spent ‘a couple of hours’ gathering an investigative team” and the first ping “did not occur until approximately four hours and thirty minutes after the call between [Camacho] and [Chapman], ” thereby suggesting a search warrant could have been
obtained within the same timeframe. These facts, however, do not support Camacho’s argument that the detectives had “ample time” to obtain a warrant. Rather, these facts show that even when acting expeditiously to locate Camacho without a warrant, the pr ocess of concluding he posed an imminent threat of danger and pinging his cell phone took several hours. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that exigent circumstances justified pinging Camacho’s cell phone. Based on the totality of circumstances known to the detectives when they requested the third

- party service provider to ping Camacho’s cell phone, a reasonable officer would have objectively believed that Camacho posed an imminent threat of danger; immediat e action was necessary to protect against imminent harm; and there was not adequate time secure a warrant. See B lancas , 170 Idaho at 637, 515 P.3d at 723 (noting whether exigent circumstances justify warrantless search turns on “whether the totality of
ci rcumstances would lead a reasonable officer to believe that immediate action was necessary”).
IV. CONCLUSION The district court did not err in denying Camacho ’ s suppression motion

. Substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances justified pinging Camacho’s cell phone without a warrant

. Accordingly, we affirm Camacho ’ s judgment of conviction for eluding a police officer with a persistent violator enhancement. Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR

.