### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 15, 200 8

STA TE OF TENNES SEE v . JASO N L. HOBACK

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for F ranklin County No. 17385 Thomas W. G raham , Judge

No. M2008- 00581-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Dece m ber 16, 2008

The de fenda

nt, J ason L . Hobac k, was c onvicted in the Franklin C ounty Circuit Court of driving on
a re vo ke d li c e ns e , th ir d o ff e ns e , a Cla ss Amis de me ano r, and a vio la tio n of the se a tbe lt l aw, a Cla ss C misdemeanor. He was subsequently sentenc ed to eleve n months and twenty -nine da y s, with five months to be served in the c ounty jail, for the dr iving on a revoke d license c onviction and was f ined for the se atbelt violation. On appea l, the defe ndant ra ises the s i n gl e i s s u e of suf ficienc y of the evidenc e. F ollowing r eview, the judgme nts of conviction ar e af firmed.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, in w h ic h J ER R Y L. S MI TH and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Phili p A. Condra, District Public De fende r, and Robert G. Morg an, Assistant Public Defe nder, f or the appe llant, J ason L . Hobac k.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge nera l and

Re po rt e r; L a c y

Wilb e r, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Jame s Mi c ha e l T ay lor , D istri c t A tt or ne y Ge ne ra l; a

nd Willi a m Co pe land

and Ste ve n M . B lou

nt, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound
Shortly afte r 1:00 p.m., Offic er Stac y Shrum of the Winchester P olice De partment wa s trave ling south on C owan Highwa y when he observe d that the driver of a Jeep Cheroke e, traveling northbound, was not we ari n g a seat be lt. At the time the two vehicles pa ssed, only a turn lane separ ated them, a s both vehicles we re ope rating in the left lane of their respe ctive tra ffic f lows. He ob se rv e d th e dr ive r a

nd a t le a st o ne male p a sse ng e r i ns ide the ve hic le . O ff ic e r S hr um t ur ne d h is vehicle a round in order

to initi ate a

traff ic stop of the J eep. He acknow ledg ed that the vehicle w as out of his sight for

the short amount of time that it took for him to turn his p at ro l ca r around.-2-

Howeve r, af

ter Of fice r Shrum turned his vehicle a round and e ntere d the northbound flow of traff ic, the def endant “ was a lrea dy

heade d back his wa

y befor e he tur

ned in th e Dollar

Gene ral.” Offic er Shrum did not a ctivate his blue lights prior to e ntering the parking lot, and he did not observe any one inside the J eep sw itch seats as he trave led behind.

When Office r Shrum pulled into the par king lot, he a pproac hed the Jeep and f ound the defe ndant in the driver ’s seat

. The de fenda nt was not wea

ring a seatbelt. When Office r Shrum asked f or t h e d ef

en dant’s drive r’s lice nse, the de fenda nt informed him that his license had be en
re vo ke d. Of

fi c e r Shr um sub se qu e ntl y c on ta c te d disp a tc h a nd c on fi rm e d th a t th e de fe nd ant’ s li c e ns e was, in fa ct, re voked. The defe ndant was the n place d under a rre st.

The de fenda

nt was subs equently indicted by a F ranklin County

g rand jury

for dr iving on a revoke d license; drivingon a re voked license , fourth offe nse; and violation of the seatbe lt law

. At a subseque nt jur y trial, the State pre sented only the testimony

of Off icer Shrum and introduced a Certificate of Status of Ope rator’ s L icense , which indicate d that the def endant’ s license wa s revoke d on the date he was a

rre sted.

At trial, the defendant testified on his own behalf and contradicted the testimony of Off icer Shrum on numerous points. Specifica l l y , the def endant de nied that he wa s driving the vehicle. Acc ording to the defe ndant, he a nd two friends, w hose license s were also revoke d, wer e car pooling to w or k. Th e de fe nd ant d id a c kn ow le dg e that he wa s th e ow ne r o f t he Jee p, bu t he a sse rt e d th a t a passeng er, Ricky

Steele, had been driving. The defenda nt stated t hat t he group ha d stopped at Dollar Ge ne ra l a ft e r w or

k, and he ind ic a te d th a t th e thr e e pa sse ng e rs in the Jee p we re a ll o uts ide pr ior to Offic er Shrum’s a

rrival on the sc ene.

Af te r h e ari ngthe e vid e nc e pr e se nte d, the jur y re tur ne d v e rd icts of

g uil ty wi th r e g a rd

to dri v i n g o na r ev o k edl i ce n s e a n d v i o l at i o no f t h e s ea t

b el tl aw

. At a s ep ar at e b i fu rc at edp ro ce ed i n g, the tr ia l c ourt

fo un d th e de fe nd ant guil ty of dr ivi ngon a re vo ke d lic e ns e , thi rd of fe ns e , a ft e r t

he Sta te
conce ded that one of

the def endant’ s pri o r co n v i ctions for drivingon a re voked license was older than ten y ear s. At a later sentenc ing hear ing, the court sentenc ed the de fenda nt to a term of e leven

mon ths and

tw e nty -n ine da

y s and or de re d that fi ve mon ths of the se nte nc e be se rv e d in t he c ounty jail. The cour

t imposed a fine f

or the seatbelt violation. Following the denial of his moti on for ne w trial, the def

endant f iled the instant timely

appea l.

Ana lys is

O na p p e a l , t h e d e f

e n d an tr a i s e s t h e s i n g l e i s s u e o f s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, he a sse rt s th a t th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt b e c a

us e “ the State ’s wi tne ss w a s una ble to p os iti ve ly identify the Def endant a s the driver

of the ve hicle until he appr oache d it after i t h ad stopped in a parkinglot.” I n consideringthis iss ue, we apply the rule that wher e the sufficie ncy of the e vidence is challeng ed, the r eleva

nt question for the re viewing court is “ whether , afte r viewing the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the [State], anyrational trier of fa ct cou l d have f

ound the essential elements of t h e crime bey ond a re asonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 , 9 9 S.-3-

Ct. 27 81 (1979) ; se e als o Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( e ). Mo re ov e r, the State is e nti tle d to the str on g e st leg itimate view of the evidenc e and all rea sonable infe renc es which ma y be dra wn there from. Sta te
v . H arris , 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). All questions involving the cr edibility of witnesses, the

we ig ht a nd va lue to b e g ive n th e e vid e nc e , a nd a ll fact ual is su es are re so lve d b y the tr ie r o f f

a c t. State v. Pappas , 754 S.W .2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) . This court will not rewe igh or

ree valuate the evidenc e pre sented. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)

. “A guilty verdic t by

the jury , approve d by

the trial j u d ge, acc redits the testimony of the witnesses for

the State and r esolves all conf licts in favor of the theory of t he S tate.” State v. Grac e , 49 3 S. W.2 d 4 74 , 4 76 (T e nn

. 19 73 ). A jur y c on vic tio n re mov e s the pr e su mpt ion of inn oc e nc e wi th which a de fenda

nt is ini tially

cloake d and re place s it with one of g uilt so t hat, on appe al, a c onvicted defe ndant has the bur den of de monstrating that t h e evidence is insuffic ient. Sta te v . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). These r ules are applicable to findings of g uilt predicate d upon direc t evidenc e, circumstantial evidenc e, or a combination of both. Sta te v . M att he ws , 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)

. Although a

conviction may

be base d entirely

upon circ umstantial evidence , Du c ha c v . S tat e , 505 S.W .2d 237, 241 (Tenn. 1974) , in such ca ses , the fa cts must be “so cle arly interwove n and

connec ted that the fing er of g uilt is pointed unerr ingly at t he Defenda nt and the Defe ndant alone.” State v. Black

, 8 1 5 S

. W

. 2 d

1 6 6 , 1 7 5 (T en n

. 1 9 9 1 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Dunc an , 698 S.W .2d 63 (Tenn. 1985)). How ever , as in the case of dire ct evidenc e, the we ight to be g iven circ umstantial evidence and “the infere nces to be drawn from such evidence, and the ex tent to which the cir cumstance s are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocenc e, are questions pr imarily for the jury .” Ma ra ble

v . S tat e , 2 0 3 T e n n

. 4 4 0 , 3 1 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 5 1 , 4 5 7 ( T e n n

. 1 9 5 8 ) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

. Tenne s s e e Code Anno ta te d s e c tio n 55 -5 0- 50 4 (2 00 6) pr ov ide s that a pe rs on is g uil ty of dr ivi ngon a re vo ke d li c e ns e wh e n h e or

sh e “dri ve s a

mot or ve hic le

. . . at a

tim e wh e n th e pe rs on ’s pr ivi le g e to d o s o is

canc elled, suspende d, or re voked[.] ” Our s eatbe lt law states that “[n]o person shall operate a p a s s e n g e r m o t o r v e h i c l e o na n y h i g h w ay .

. . i nt h i s s t a t e u n l e s s s u c h p e r s o n [ i s ] r e s t r a i n e d b y a safe ty belt at all times the vehicle is in forwar d motion.” T.C.A. § 55-9-603(a )(1) (2006).

As no te d, the de fe nd ant c on te nd s th a t th e of fi c e r f a ile d to ide nti fy

him pr ior to t he sto p, thu s,
makin g the e vid e nc e ins uf fi c ie nt. Th e fo llo wi ngis t a ke n f ro m th e de fe nd ant’ s b ri e f:

Both statutes re quire the ve hicle to be in motion or opera tion before the op e rator c an b e held

c ri min a lly

lia ble . Alaw e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e r w ho ob se rv e s a driver not we aringa seat belt may leg ally detain that drive r for

the suspecte d offe nse. State v. Be

ffrey , 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 892 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 16, 20 06 ).

. . . H o w e v e r , t h e r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n s t an d ar d n e c e s s ar y f o r an o f f i c e r t o
m ak e a co n stitut ionally valid stop f alls below the rea sonable doubt ne eded for a g uilty verdic t. Sta te v . D e

grafe nreid , 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 369 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2003). . . .-4-

Fr om this assertion, we glea n that the def

endant is ar g uing that although O ffice r Strum had

rea sonable suspicion to stop the car based on se eing the driver without a seat be lt, this is not proof bey ond a rea sonable doubt be cause the office r was unable to positively identify the def endant a s the driver until af

ter the ve hicle wa s stopped. He states that the officer “did not specific ally identify the De fe nd ant a s be ing in the dr ive r’ s se a t un til a pp ro a c hin g it in the pa

rk ing lot .” Th e def

end ant is appar ently

asser ting that a

n office r is require d to know the identity of the drive r of a

vehicle pr ior to it being stopped. This is a practica l impossibi lity

. Our traffic statutes are written i n such a w ay to allow an office r to e ffe ct a traff ic stop upon rea sonable g rounds to be lieve that the driver of the

ve hic le , w ho me ve r t

hat pe rs on

may be , h a s c omm itt e d a tr a ff ic vio la tio n. Thus , w e fi nd no me ri t to the defe ndant’s ar g ument.

Af te r r e vie w, we c on c lud e that evi de nc e , vie we d in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to t he State , is

mor e tha n s uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the de fe nd ant’ s tw o c on vic tio ns

. Whil e the re we re ma te ri a l c on fl ic ts in the tes t i m o n y gi v en by Offic er Shrum and the defe ndant as to the seque nce of events a nd the place ment of the de fenda

nt when Strum approa ched, all of the testimony was he ard by the jury . Our

re vie w o f t

he e vid e nc e is no t e qu iva le nt to that of the jur y ’s , a s a ll q

ue sti on s in vo lvi ngthe c re dib ili ty of witnesses, th e we i gh t and value g iven to be g iven to the evidenc e, and a ll factua l issues are

r e s o lv e d b y th e tr ie r o f f a c t, n o t this court. See P appas , 754 S.W .2d at 623. The jury viewed the witnesses in this c ase, hear d their testimony , and obser ved their de meanor

on the stand. I t was the jur y ’s prerogati ve to we ig h th e c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s and

to r e so lve any

c on fl ic ts i n th e ir testimony . This court will not rewe igh or ree valuate the evidenc e pre sented. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d at 835.

Offic er Strum testified that he pa ssed the def endant’ s J eep on the highw ay and obser ved that the driver was not we aring a seatbelt. Offic er St rum then turned his patr ol car around to initiate a traff ic stop and, ac cordingto his testimony , the vehicle w as still movi ng on the hig hway when the office r p u l l ed b ac k into the flow of tra ffic. H e obser ved the ve hicle pull into the parking lot of Do lla r Ge ne ra l and sp e c if

ic a lly state d that he did no t se e any ind ic a tio n that pe rs on s in the ve hic le had s w it c h e d p la c e s

. A f

te r th e v e h ic le s to p p e d in th e p ar k in g lo t, O f

f ic e r Str u m a p p r oache d the vehicle a nd found the de fenda

nt seated in the driver’ s seat, not we aringa seat belt. This testim ony more than suppor

ts the infere nce that the defe ndant was the driver of the vehicle

. M o reover, the State introduced e vidence , and the de fenda nt admitted, that his driver’s lice nse wa s revoke d on the day he wa s arr ested. Thus, we conclude that the evidenc e pre sented supports the ve rdicts as rende red.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the judgme nts of conviction ar e af firmed.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI L L I AMS, J UDGE