NO. 4-03-0139

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

In re: JANINE M.A., CHEYENNE M.A., and	)   Appeal from

DANIEL M.A., Minors,				)   Circuit Court of

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)   Mason County

	Petitioner-Appellee,		)   Nos. 00JA10

	v.						)        00JA8

JEANETTE ANDERSON, 					)	    00JA9

	Respondent-Appellant,  		)  

	and						)   Honorable

WELDON P. ANDERSON,					)   Thomas L. Brownfield,

	Respondent.				)   Judge Presiding.

_______________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

	Respondent mother, Jeanette Anderson, appeals the February 2003 order of the circuit court of Mason County finding her to be

an unfit parent and terminating her parental rights in Janine A.,

Daniel A., and Cheyenne A. (born February 15, 1991, August 15,

1989, and January 30, 1996, respectively).  Respondent mother raises two

arguments in this appeal.  She argues (1) the trial court's

findings of unfitness were erroneous as a matter of law because

the State's petitions to terminate parental rights were not

sufficiently specific where they did not comply with a statutory

notice requirement to apprise respondent she could "permanently"

lose her parental rights (705 ILCS 405/2-13(4) (West 2002)); and

(2) the trial court's determinations she was unfit and it was in

the children's best interests her parental rights be terminated

are against the manifest weight of the evidence.  We affirm.

				I. BACKGROUND

	In August 2000, the State filed a petition for 

adjudication of wardship for each minor, alleging each was

neglected because he or she resided in an injurious environment

because there was a long history of domestic violence within the

home and their father, Weldon P. Anderson, had twisted Daniel

A.'s arm behind his back and threatened to burn the house down

with Daniel A. inside if he testified against Weldon in a pending

court matter.  

	In September 2000, respondent stipulated to the allega

tions in the petition.  In November 2000, the trial court con

ducted a dispositional hearing.  The parties agreed to the

dispositional order of the trial court.  Under the order, the

children were found to be neglected and were made wards of the

court while continuing to live with respondent.  Weldon was not

to reside with the family and was only to have supervised visits

with the children.  Respondent was to comply with Illinois

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) recommendations

and complete any counseling requirements.  The children were

later removed from respondent's care on March 7, 2001, and placed

in foster homes.

	In May 2002, the State filed three identical petitions

to terminate parental rights, one for each minor.  A hearing on

the State's petitions was begun on September 11, 2002, and

completed on November 18, 2002.  At the close of evidence, the

trial court found the State had proved by clear and convincing

evidence respondent had failed to protect the minor children from

conditions within their environment that were injurious to their

welfare and had failed to make reasonable progress toward the

return of the minor children to their home within nine months of the adjudication of neglect.

	Having found respondent unfit, the court held a hearing

on the best interests of the children on February 5, 2003.  On

that date, respondent's parental rights were terminated as to all

three children.  Respondent filed a notice of appeal on February

14, 2003, and on March 12, 2003, the trial court granted her

motion to stay adoption of the children pending this appeal.  On

May 22, 2003, respondent father, Weldon P. Anderson, was dis

missed as a party to the appeal after his attorney failed to file

a separate brief.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Alleged Pleading Defect Relating to "Permanent" 

Termination of Parental Rights

	Respondent first contends the trial court's finding of

unfitness was erroneous because the State's petition to terminate

her parental rights was defective on its face in that it failed

to apprise her her parental rights could be "permanently" termi

nated.  705 ILCS 405/2-13(4) (West 2002).

	Respondent did not raise this issue at trial.  Gener

ally, pleading defects must be raised at trial so they may be

remedied; otherwise they are forfeited.  In re Dragoo, 96 Ill. App. 3d 1104, 1107, 422 N.E.2d 263, 265 (1981).  We choose,

however, to address the argument on the merits.  The forfeiture

rule is a limitation on the parties and not the jurisdiction of

the courts.  Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 11, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1183 (1996).  Further, a reviewing

court may consider an issue not raised in the trial court if the

issue is one of law and is fully briefed by the parties.  Commit tee for Educational Rights, 174 Ill. 2d at 11, 672 N.E.2d at 1183.

	When the sufficiency of pleadings is challenged, it is

an issue of law and is reviewed de novo.  U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Zurich Insurance Co., 329 Ill. App. 3d 987, 1002, 768 N.E.2d 288, 299 (2002).  

	Section 2-13(4) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act)

provides:

		"(4) If termination of parental rights

and appointment of a guardian of the person

with power to consent to adoption of the

minor under [s]ection 2-29 is sought, the

petition shall so state.  If the petition

includes this request, the prayer for relief

shall clearly and obviously state that the

parents could permanently lose their rights

as a parent at this hearing.

		In addition to the foregoing, the peti

tioner, by motion, may request the termina

tion of parental rights and appointment of a

guardian of the person with power to consent

to adoption of the minor under [s]ection 2-29

at any time after the entry of a

dispositional order under [s]ection 2-22."

	705 ILCS 405/2-13(4) (West 2002).

	In each of the State's May 2002 petitions to terminate

parental rights, the prayer for relief requested that the paren

tal rights of both Weldon and respondent "be terminated" as to each of the three minors, and that the guardianship administrator

of DCFS "be authorized and empowered *** to consent to such

adoption of said minor without further notice to or consent by

the parents of the minor."  The State's May 2002 petitions make

no explicit request for "permanent" termination of respondent's

parental rights.

	Respondent argues the State's failure to comply with

the Act's requirement that its petition "clearly and obviously"

state respondent could "permanently" lose her rights as a parent

renders the pleadings defective.  She relies on In re Andrea D., 336 Ill. App. 3d 335, 339, 783 N.E.2d 681, 684-85 (2003), in

which the court found the provision of section 2-13(4) of the Act

requiring a petition to terminate parental rights must contain

clear and obvious notice to parents they could "permanently" lose

their parental rights at the hearing on the petition requires the

notice necessarily use the word "permanently."  However, the

Supreme Court of Illinois recently directed the Second District

to vacate its judgment and reconsider.  In re Andrea D., 204 Ill. 2d 655, 789 N.E.2d 303 (2003) (nonprecedential supervisory order

directing Second District to vacate its judgment and reconsider). 

The Second District has now done so,= and affirmed the termination

of the father's parental rights.  That decision is consistent

with our decision in In re J.R., No. 4-02-0973 (July 30, 32003), ___ Ill. App. 3d ___, ___ N.E.2d ___ filed July 30, 2003, and our decision in this

case.

	Although the State's May 2002 petitions to terminate

respondent's parental rights does not state her parental rights

may be "permanently" lost by explicit use of the word "perma nently," we hold the State's petition was not defective as a

matter of law.

	In reviewing the meaning and applicability of the

notice requirement found in section 2-13(4) of the Act (705 ILCS

405/2-13(4) (West 2002)), we look not only at subsection (4)

itself, but also at the remaining relevant subsections of section

2-13 and of related sections of the Act.  Section 2-13 of the Act

provides in pertinent part:

		"(1) Any adult person, any agency[,] or

association by its representative may file,

or the court on its own motion, consistent

with the health, safety[,] and best interests

of the minor may direct the filing through

the State's Attorney of a petition in respect

of a minor under this Act.  The petition and

all subsequent court documents shall be enti

tled 'In the interest of . . . , a minor'.

		(2) The petition shall be verified but

the statements may be made upon infor-

	mation and belief.  It shall allege that the

minor is abused, neglected, or dependent,

with citations to the appropriate provisions

of this Act ***.

		(3) The petition must allege that it is 

	in the best interests of the minor and of 

	the public that he be adjudged a ward of the 

	court and may pray generally for relief available 

	under this Act.  The petition need not specify 

	any proposed disposition following adjudication 

	of wardship.	

		(4) If termination of parental rights

and appointment of a guardian of the person

with power to consent to adoption of the

minor under [s]ection 2-29 is sought, the

petition shall so state.  If the petition

includes this request, the prayer for relief

shall clearly and obviously state that the

parents could permanently lose their rights

as a parent at this hearing. 

		In addition to the foregoing, the peti

tioner, by motion, may request the termina

tion of parental rights and appointment of a

guardian of the person with power to consent

to adoption of the minor under [s]ection 2-29

at any time after the entry of a disposi-

tional order under [s]ection 2-22."

  	705 ILCS

405/2-13 (West 2002).

Section 2-21 of the Act states in part:

		"If the court finds that the minor is

abused, neglected, or dependent, the court

shall then determine and put in writing the

factual basis supporting that determination,

and specify, to the extent possible, the acts

or omissions or both of each parent, guard

ian, or legal custodian that form the basis

of the court's findings.

					* * *

		(5) The court may terminate the parental

rights of a parent at the initial

dispositional hearing if all of the following

conditions are met:

		     (i) the original or amended

petition contains a request for

termination of parental rights and

appointment of a guardian with

power to consent to adoption[.]"

	705 ILCS 405/2-21 (West 2002).

	Review of subsection (4) of section 2-13 of the Act in

conjunction with the other relevant subsections of section 2-13

as well as section 2-21 leads us to the conclusion that the

notice provision of section 2-13(4) does not apply to after-filed petitions to terminate parental rights but only to original petitions for adjudication of abuse or neglect filed in respect

to a minor.  The second paragraph of section 2-13(4) and section

2-21(5)(i) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-13(4), 2-21(5)(i) (West

2002)) indicate an original petition filed in respect to a minor

may or may not contain a request to terminate parental rights. 

If it does not contain such a request, it "need not specify any

proposed disposition following adjudication of wardship" because

it may just request a minor be adjudged a ward of the court and

may pray generally for relief available under the Act.  705 ILCS

405/2-13(3) (West 2002).  However, if an original petition seeks

to terminate parental rights, "the prayer for relief shall

clearly and obviously state that the parents could permanently lose their rights as a parent at this hearing."  705 ILCS 405/2-

13(4) (West 2002).

	The State's May 2002 petitions for termination of

parental rights filed in this case were supplemental petitions

filed over a year and a half after the original petitions for

adjudication of wardship.  The notice requirement of section 2-

13(4) does not apply to them.

	Further, the language used in the State's petitions was

sufficient to provide notice to respondent that the State sought

to permanently terminate her parental rights.  Use of the word

"permanently" is not necessary to provide adequate notice of the

State's intentions.  Notice was provided respondent by the

State's prayer that respondent's parental rights be "terminated,"

(commonly defined as "brought to an end" (see Merriam-Webster's

Collegiate Dictionary 1212 (10th ed. 2000)) and the guardianship

administrator of DCFS be authorized to consent to the adoption of

the minors without further notice to or the consent of respon

dent.  

	Finally, we note respondent in this case was fully

admonished of the consequences of the filing of the State's

petitions.  At the first appearance hearing following the filing

of the petitions for termination of parental rights, the trial

court admonished respondent as follows:

	"If the State were able to prove [these peti

tions] your parental rights may very well be

terminated and these children may be placed

for adoption or something else may occur and

you would be out of the picture.  You would have no further parental rights at any time. 

Do you understand that?"

Respondent replied that she understood.  Fundamental fairness was

achieved by the trial court's admonition and respondent's ac

knowledgment she understood.

B. Trial Court's Order nNot Against 

      Manifest Weight of the Evidence  

	Respondent's other argument is the trial court's

determinations that she was unfit and it was in the children's

best interests her parental rights be terminated are against the

manifest weight of the evidence.  The State has the burden of

proving a parent's unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. 

In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208, 752 N.E.2d 1030, 1045 (2001). Courts of review give great deference to a trial court's finding

of unfitness.  In re C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d 154, 163, 711 N.E.2d 809, 815 (1999).  To reverse a trial court's finding on parental unfitness, a reviewing court must find it was against the mani

fest weight of the evidence.  C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208, 752 N.E.2d at 1045.  A trial court's findings are against the mani

fest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is

clearly evident.  C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208, 752 N.E.2d at 1045.

	Section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)

(West 2002)) sets forth numerous grounds under which a parent may

be considered "unfit."  Any one ground properly proved is suffi

cient to enter a finding of unfitness.  In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210, 766 N.E.2d 1105, 1113 (2002).  In this case, the trial

court found respondent unfit under two of those grounds, by

finding she had:

	"(a) Failed to protect the minor children

from conditions within her environment that

were injurious to their welfare; [and]

	(b) Failed to make reasonable progress to

wards the return of the minor children to 

their home within nine months of the adjudi

cation of neglect."

See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g), (D)(m)(ii) (West 2002).

	Section 1(D)(g) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS

50/1(D)(g) (West 2002)) was construed by the Illinois Supreme

Court in C.W.  There, the court stated:

		"Under the clear and unambiguous lan

guage of section 1(D)(g), a finding of paren

tal unfitness is only warranted where the

evidence establishes that the parent failed

to protect the child from conditions in the

child's environment injurious to the child's

welfare.  It follows, therefore, that where a

child has been removed from an injurious home

environment and placed in foster care, a

parent cannot be found unfit based on a

'failure to protect' during the period the

child is in foster care."  C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 212, 766 N.E.2d at 1114.  

The court in C.W. also concluded, however, a parent may be found unfit pursuant to section 1(D)(g) based on evidence of the

parent's conduct that gave rise to the original adjudication of

neglect.  C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 218-19, 766 N.E.2d at 1117.

	In this case, the children were placed in foster care

on March 7, 2001.  Therefore, under C.W., evidence of failure to protect after this date may not be considered, but evidence of

conduct prior to the filing of the original petitions on August

7, 2000, may be considered.

	Respondent stipulated to the allegations of the August

7, 2000, petition.  One of those allegations was the children

resided in an injurious environment because their father, Weldon, 

twisted Daniel's arm behind his back and threatened to burn down

the house with Daniel inside if Daniel testified against him in a

pending court proceedings.  The petition also alleged a long

history of domestic violence in the home.

	Since August 23, 2000, when the family first appeared

in court upon the petition for adjudication of wardship, the

court entered an order that Weldon no longer live in the home

with the minor children and he not have unsupervised visitation

with them.  Evidence of respondent's actions in regard to her

relationship with Weldon after the filing of the original peti

tion and prior to the removal of the children included that

respondent had difficulty with issues of codependency and she

continued to have contact with her husband;, the children were

left with unapproved baby-sitters so respondent could spend time

with Weldon, and Weldon and one of the children were seen to

gether in an unsupervised setting.

	Respondent's failure to protect the children was

established by the record.  Respondent and Weldon had a long

history of domestic violence.  This placed respondent on notice

Weldon might be violent toward the children.  Weldon actually threatened and physically abused Daniel.  Respondent maintained a

relationship with Weldon after the original petition was filed

and allowed one of children to be in Weldon's presence, contrary

to a specific order.  Evidence supporting a parent's unfitness

toward one child may serve as the basis for termination of

parental rights as to all children.  In re D.L.W., 226 Ill. App. 3d 805, 811, 589 N.E.2d 970, 974 (1992).  Thus, respondent allowing one child to have unsupervised contact with Weldon

proves her failure to protect all three children from harm.

	Respondent argues she generally complied with the DCFS

service plan.  However, reasonable efforts and reasonable prog

ress are not affirmative defenses that can be raised by a parent

to refute allegations of neglect under one of the other subsec

tions of section 1(D).  In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 505, 777 N.E.2d 930, 946 (2002).  Thus, even if respondent did comply with

her service plan, it would not be a defense to a failure-to-

protect allegation.  See C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 219-20, 766 N.E.2d at 1118.

	Although a finding of unfitness on only one ground

found in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act is necessary, we find

the trial court's finding of unfitness on the grounds of failure

to make reasonable progress was, likewise, not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.  Under the statutory provision

for finding unfitness due to failure to make reasonable progress

within nine months of an adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS

50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2002)), only evidence within nine months

from the date of the adjudication of neglect may be considered by

the trial court.  In re Brianna B., 334 Ill. App. 3d 651, 656, 778 N.E.2d 724, 729 (2002).  The statutory period begins from the date the trial court files the dispositional order finding the

minors neglected.  Brianna B., 334 Ill. App. 3d at 656, 778 N.E.2d at 729.  The dispositional orders in this case were filed

on November 20, 2000.  Therefore, the applicable nine-month

period was from November 20, 2000, until August 20, 2001.

	Reasonable progress toward return of the child under

section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act may be measured by

looking at the parent's compliance with the service plans and the

court's directives in light of the conditions that gave rise to

the removal of the child and in light of other conditions that

later became known and would prevent the court from returning

custody of the child to the parent.  C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 216-17, 752 N.E.2d at 1050.  The standard for determining whether reason

able progress has been made is an objective one.  It may be found when the trial court can conclude the parent's progress is

sufficiently demonstrable and of such quality that the child can

be returned to the parent in the near future.  In re B.W., 309 Ill. App. 3d 493, 499, 721 N.E.2d 1202, 1207 (1999).  Minimally, reasonable progress requires measurable or demonstrable movement

toward the goal of reunification.  In re K.P., 305 Ill. App. 3d 175, 180, 711 N.E.2d 478, 482 (1999).

	In this case, between November 2000 and August 2001,

while respondent attended various counseling sessions and

parenting classes, the evidence indicated she did not internalize

and demonstrate the lessons she learned there.  The children were

removed from her care because of her continued relationship with

Weldon.  The evidence showed respondent did not meet the goals set for her as Weldon continued to dominate her, and her ability

to apply what she learned in parenting classes was described as

"pretty borderline."  

	Respondent jumped from job to job, often in tandem with

Weldon.  If he lost his job, respondent went with him.  Respon

dent was told she would need to put her children above her

desires to be with Weldon, but she continued to see him and place

her children with inappropriate baby-sitters.  Most of the

domestic violence episodes with Weldon occurred when he had been

drinking.  He participated in inpatient care for his alcohol-

abuse problem during the relevant time frame of this case. 

However, when he had a relapse under outpatient care and failed

an alcohol test in respondent's presence, she adopted his excuse

the machine was inaccurate and minimized the situation.  Although

Weldon and respondent were not living together, they maintained

constant contact through two-way radios.

	Testimony from Veronica Key, respondent's therapist at

the time of the hearing on the petition to terminate, was that

respondent had begun counseling with her in January 2002, well

after the relevant time period for making reasonable progress. 

However, at that time, respondent had not internalized prior

counseling or made any reasonable progress toward correcting her

problems.  Therefore, if respondent had failed to make reasonable

progress by January 2002, she could not have made such progress

prior to that, by August 21, 2001.  Keys testified respondent was

making slow but steady progress in her therapy by September 2002.

	Respondent argues she did not fully understand the

problems of codependency on undesirable males and the effect on the lives of her children until she began regular and individual

therapy.  She contends it was not her fault this service was not

initiated until after the nine-month period had run.  She con

tends, therefore, her lack of progress during the nine-month

period was due to DCFS negligence in failing to provide timely

services.

	The record indicates, however, respondent was counseled

early and often that she must sever her ties and dependency on

Weldon in favor of protecting her children.  She was offered

group domestic-violence counseling during the applicable nine-

month period.  DCFS had no fault where appropriate services were

offered but the necessary messages did not sink into respondent's

consciousness until a different form of the same service was

offered.

	Finally, while respondent raises the issue of the

propriety of the trial court's determination that the best

interest of the children required her parental rights be termi

nated, she does not present any argument.  The State, in response

to respondent's lack of argument, does not address the issue

either.  We find it has been forfeited.

III. CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's

judgment.

	Affirmed.         

   	McCULLOUGH, J., concurs.

	COOK, J., specially concurs.

	JUSTICE COOK, specially concurring:

	I agree the language used in the State's petition was

sufficient to provide notice to respondent that the State sought

to permanently terminate her parental rights.  I disagree the

notice provision of section 2-13(4), requiring that the prayer

for relief "clearly and obviously state that the parents could

permanently lose their rights as a parent" (705 ILCS 405/2-13(4)

(West 2002)) applies only to original petitions seeking to

terminate parental rights, not to after-filed petitions.  Such a

holding is not required by the language of the Act and serves

only to further complicate an area of the law which is already

difficult.  Even without section 2-13(4), every petition for

termination of parental rights should make it clear whether the

parents could permanently lose their parental rights.