J-S22041-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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RANDALL JENNETTE,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 964 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 24, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004413-2007 

BEFORE: MUNDY, DUBOW, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED APRIL 20, 2016

Randall Jennette (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his 

motion to vacate his sentence as an untimely-filed petition under the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the long, 

tortured procedural history of this case, we set forth only so much of the 

factual and procedural history as is necessary for our analysis.1 On June 

23, 2008, a jury convicted Appellant of multiple counts of unsworn 

falsification to authorities and tampering with public records stemming from 

his filing of illegitimate Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) financial statements 

with the Pennsylvania Department of State which resulted in fraudulent liens 

 

1 A detailed review of the factual and procedural history of this matter is set 

forth in the PCRA court’s opinion. See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/2/2015, at 1-

10.
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being filed against various judicial officers in Monroe County. On July 28, 

2008, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of eight to 16 years of 

incarceration. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on December 

24, 2009. Commonwealth v. Jennette, 990 A.2d 46 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not seek review of this decision 

by our Supreme Court. 

Following a series of unsuccessful petitions for post-conviction relief, 

Appellant filed a document entitled “Motion to Vacate Sentencing Order 

Pursuant to 55 Pa. C.S. - Statute of Limitation and Title 13 Pa. C.S. Sec. 

3305(a)(1)(ii)(3)(c) - Defenses and Claims in Recoupment” on March 24, 

2015, in which he sought to vacate his sentencing order on the basis that 

the applicable statute of limitations barred his prosecution. Appellant also 

challenged the legality of his conviction and his sentence. The PCRA court 

treated Appellant’s filing as a PCRA petition and determined that it was 

untimely filed. The court thus dismissed the petition without a hearing, and 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. 

We begin our review by noting the relevant legal principles. It is wellsettled that the PCRA is intended to be the sole means of achieving postconviction relief. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 (2013). 

“[T]he PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral relief, including habeas corpus, 

to the extent a remedy is available under such enactment.” 

Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). Any PCRA 
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petition, including second and subsequent petitions, must either (1) be filed 

within one year of the judgment of sentence becoming final, or (2) plead and 

prove a timeliness exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). However, “claims that 

fall outside the eligibility parameters of the PCRA may be raised through a 

writ of habeas corpus.” Commonwealth v. Masker, 34 A.3d 841, 850 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (en banc). Our Supreme Court has explained that “the 

boundaries of cognizable claims under the PCRA can only be extended so far 

as is consistent with the purposes of the statute.” Commonwealth v.

Judge, 916 A.2d 511, 520 (Pa. 2007).

Appellant does not classify his March 24, 2015 motion as either a PCRA 

petition or a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, it is not clear 

whether Appellant’s petition is cognizable under either provision. On the one 

hand, Appellant raises claims which are consistent with the PCRA, in that he 

maintains his innocence and states claims which challenge the truthdetermining process and the underlying adjudication of guilt. Cf. Judge, 

916 A.2d at 520 (applying habeas corpus law instead of the PCRA where 

Judge’s claim had “no connection to the truth-determining process and [did] 

not render the underlying adjudication of guilt or innocence... unreliable”); 

West, 938 A.2d at 1044 (determining that habeas corpus, rather than the 

PCRA, is the appropriate vehicle for a claim that “does not implicate the 

truth determining process underlying his conviction and sentence, nor does 

it implicate the legality of the sentence imposed”). 
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On the other hand, our Supreme Court has held that claims of due 

process violations and other trial court error which could have been raised 

on direct appeal but were not were “beyond the power of this Court to 

review under the express terms of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. AbdulSalaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa. 2001).

What is clear is that Appellant cannot prevail under either the PCRA or 

habeas corpus. If the PCRA applies, his petition is untimely-filed with no 

timeliness exception alleged. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 

A.3d 1274, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Chester, 

895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (“[I]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this 

Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without 

jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the 

substantive claims.”); Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 

2011) (“[T]he statute confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc

equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions 

expressly delineated in the Act.”) (internal quotation omitted). 

Appellant’s claims also are ineligible for habeas corpus relief. “It is 

well settled that the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, which can be 

successfully invoked only in exceptional cases, is not a substitute for an 

appeal or a motion for a new trial, nor is it available for the correction of trial 

errors.” Com. ex rel. Williams v. Myers, 162 A.2d 419, 420 (Pa. Super. 

1960). See also Com. ex rel. Ashmon v. Banmiller, 137 A.2d 236, 238 
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(Pa. 1958) (“[A] habeas corpus petition is not available for the correction of 

trial errors which could have been reviewed and corrected on appeal; it is 

not a substitute for an appeal or for a writ of error or for a motion for a new 

trial.”); Com. ex rel. Bey v. Myers, 152 A.2d 921, 922 (Pa. Super. 1959). 

(“The sufficiency of the evidence, and any trial errors which could have been 

considered and corrected on appeal are not remediable or the subject of 

relief by habeas corpus.”). Appellant could have raised his sentencing and 

statute-of-limitation claims on direct appeal, but failed to do so. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s claims are not subject to habeas corpus relief. 

Thus, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s petition.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/20/2016