the SWA. (Id. { 29.) Plaintiff received notice of the Committee’s decision on
December 18, 2000. (Compl. Exh. H, JGC Letter to Wahl.)!

Wahl filed this action on April 26, 2001, naming as defendants the CRCA,
the Union, the JGC, its chairman James Mansfield, Elgin Roofing Company, and its
president Dan Brown. (Complaint ff 3-7.) Seeking to vacate the decision issued by
the Joint Grievance Committee, Plaintiff contends that the decision constitutes a
breach of the Standard Working Agreement. (Compl. ¢ 30.) The Moving
Defendants ask this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, arguing that it is time-
barred pursuant to the Illinois version of the Uniform Arbitration Act. Further, the
Moving Defendants contend that the claims against Dan Brown and Elgin Roofing
Company must be dismissed because there is no contractual relationship between
either of them and Wahl. For the following reasons, we grant the motion to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the plaintiff has

properly stated a claim for which relief may be granted. See Pickrel v. City of

' The copy of the letter is dated December 15, 2000. Because Wahl included it as an
exhibit to his complaint, we may reference it by incorporation. See Wright v.
Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1248 (7" Cir. 1994) (stating that documents
attached to a motion to dismiss are part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the
plaintiff's complaint and are central to the claim”). Appended to the letter is a “Post-It
Fax Note” bearing the date of December 18, 2000, and addressed to “Thom” from
“Roger.” The paper appears to have been faxed from a machine registered in the name
of Sharon Wahl. Thus Wahl appears to have been in receipt of the JGC’s decision by
December 18, 2000 at the latest. Wahl does not dispute this assertion.

-4-


1961); Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Associates, 101 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir.

1996); Interstate Brands Corp. v. Bakery Drivers & Bakery Goods Vending

Machines, Local Union No. 550, Int’] Bhd. of Teamsters, 167 F.3d 764, 766-767

(2d Cir. 1999); Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union

(CT&Y), 175 F.3d 355, 357 (8th Cir. 2000); Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l

Union (AFL-CIO), Local 5-857, Labor Orgs. v. Conoco Inc., 241 F.3d 1299, 1303

(10th Cir. 2001). Having determined that Plaintiffs complaint is an appeal of an
arbitration award, we now address the issue of whether or not his claim is time-
barred.
II. Statute of Limitations

Turning to the statute of limitations issue, the Moving Defendants contend
that Wahl is barred from attacking the JGC’s arbitration decision because he failed
to challenge the award within the required time period. Specifically, the Moving
Defendants rely on the Illinois version of the Uniform Arbitration Act, arguing that
Wahl’s complaint was filed outside the 90-day limitations period set forth in the
statute. For the following reasons, we agree.

The Seventh Circuit has firmly held that “the 90 day period in the Illinois
version of the Uniform Arbitration Act, 710 ILCS 5/12(b) (West 1994), is the
appropriate statute of limitations for actions challenging arbitration awards brought

in Illinois.” Sullivan v. Lemoncello, 36 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 1994); Plumbers

-9-


Wahl believes JGC’s decision is not an arbitration award for two reasons.
First, the SWA does not refer to the JGC as an arbitrator. Second, Section 5 of
Article VIL of the SWA provides for arbitration only after the JGC has rendered a
decision if the panel has been unable to decide the grievance by majority vote.

Despite the fact that the SWA does not refer to the JGC as an arbitrator,
courts have routinely treated judgments rendered by such committees as arbitration
decisions. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local

Union No. 135 vy. Jefferson Trucking Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 1023, 1024 (7th Cir.

1980); International Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150. AFL-CIO v. J. Pease

Constr. Co., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (D.C.IIl. 1982); Int’] Union of Operating

Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Center Contractors, Inc., 1986 WL 4713, at *1

(N.D.IL. Apr. 11, 1986); Int] Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO _v.

Sinnett Excavating, Inc., 1995 WL 23040, at *2 (N.D.IIL. Jan. 19, 1995); Local 705

Int’] Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am. v. Grane

Trucking Co., 1987 WL 8638, at *1 (N.D.IIl. March 26, 1987). Similarly, courts
have consistently considered decisions of grievance panels with other designations

as arbitration awards as well. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451

U.S. 56, 58, 64 (1981) (agreeing with the District Court that the Joint Panel’s ruling
was properly characterized as an arbitration award); Local 1020 of United Bhd. of

Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. FMC Corp., 658 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1981)

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Springfield, M., 45 F.3d 1115, 1118 (7th Cir. 1995). The court must accept as true
all of the plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations as well as all reasonable

inferences. Coates v. Illinois State Bd. of Ed., 559 F.2d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 1977).

However, the court need "not strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiffs”
which are not apparent on the face of the complaint. Id. The court will dismiss a
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) only if "it is clear that no relief could be granted

under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Ledford

v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984)).
DISCUSSION

I The Nature of Plaintiff’s Claim

In order to address the statute of limitations issue in the case at bar, we must
first determine whether this action is an appeal of an arbitration award or a breach of
contract claim. The Moving Defendants contend that the JGC’s decision is an
arbitration decision. Wahl disagrees. He argues that the Joint Grievance
Committee is not an arbitrator for purposes of determining the applicable statute of
limitations and, accordingly, that this is not an appeal of an arbitration decision.
Instead, Wahl purports to base his theory of the case on breach of contract, alleging

that Defendants violated the SWA.


actions like the one before this Court are commonly dealt with as appeals of
arbitration decisions.

Moreover, Wahl’s complaint, read as a whole, is in the spirit of an appeal of
an arbitration award rather than a breach of contract claim. Wahl’s complaints--
about the fine assessed against him, the JGC’s refusal to allow a court reporter to be
present at the hearing, the Committee’s unwillingness to tender the minutes of the
hearing, and the rules and procedures applicable to the grievance procedure--are
typically heard in appeals of arbitration decisions rather than contract actions.
Moreover, Plaintiff prays that this Court reverse the JGC’s decision, an entreaty
usually associated with an appeal of an arbitration award.

Ultimately, it is well settled that when a collective bargaining agreement
contains an arbitration provision, there is a presumption that grievances under the

agreement are subject to arbitration. See Local Union 1393 Int’l Bhd. of Elec.

Workers, AFL-CIO v. Utilities Dist. of W. Indiana Rural Elec. Membership Co-op,

167 F.3d 1181, 1183 (7th Cir. 1999); Carpenters Fringe Benefit Funds of Illinois v.
McKenzie Eng’r, 217 F.3d 578, 586 (8th Cir. 2000); Teamsters Local Union No. 75

v. Schreiber Foods, Inc., 65 F. Supp.2d 959, 961 (E.D.Wis. 1999). Indeed, federal

policy strongly favors voluntary arbitration as a means of settling labor-based
disputes, especially those focusing on the terms of collective bargaining

agreements. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312, 315 (7th Cir.

-8-


Minute Ordor Form (06/97)

Js-G

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Charles P. Kocoras than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 3008 DATE 7/11/2001
CASE Wahl vs. Labor Relations Grp of Chgo Roofing
TITLE
Un the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd patty plaintiff, and (by state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due
(4) 0 Ruling/Hearing on set for at :
(5) | Status hearing held.
(6) im Pretrial conference{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) im [Bench/Jury trial) [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4m) OGeneralRule2i O FRCP41(a)(1) ( FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) Mi [Other docket entry] Ruling held. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: We grant the Moving
Defendants’ motion (Doc 7-1) to dismiss, and dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
(11) (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required, number of notices
Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
i: e Ht
Notified counsel by telephone. ULE dah
| Docketing to mail notices, TM
¥_| Mail 40 450 foffh. docketing depay ints
Copy to judgq/epfaistrate judge.
Sourtroom date msiled notice
SCT deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office

mailing deputy initials



JGC’s arbitration decision within the applicable limitations period, his complaint
seeking to vacate the arbitration award, together with his prayer for affirmative
relief, is time-barred.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Moving Defendants’ motion and

CI Peon,

Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge

dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

Dated: __July 11, 2001

-l1-


Pension Fund, Local 130, U.A. v. Domas Mech. Contractors Inc., 778 F.2d 1266,

1268 (7th Cir. 1985). Thus, unless a collective bargaining agreement provides a
specific period within which proceedings to vacate an arbitration decision must be

initiated, Illinois’ arbitration statute must be applied. See Local 1020 of United

Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. FMC Corp., 658 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir.

1981). The purpose of the short period prescribed in the statute is to achieve
finality in a timely fashion. See Jefferson Trucking Co., 628 F.2d at 1027.

Where the relief sought is to nullify an arbitration decision, “the only avenue
for such relief is a timely suit to vacate.” Sullivan v. Gilchrist, 87 F.3d 867, 871

(7th Cir. 1996); Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Centor

Contractors, Inc., 831 F.2d 1309, 1311 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, a party’s

failure to seek vacation of an arbitration award within the 90-day limitation period
prescribed by the Illinois Arbitration Act bars it from challenging the enforcement

of the award. See Domas Mech. Contractors, Inc., 778 F.2d at 1268.

In the case at bar, the SWA does not contain a statute of limitations. Thus,
the 90-day period contained in the Illinois Arbitration Act governs the time period
for challenging the JGC’s arbitration award. The JGC issued its decision on
December 15, 2000. Wahl received notice of it on or around December 18, 2000.
He initiated this action one hundred twenty-nine days later, on April 26, 2001.

Accordingly, this Court holds that, because Wahl took no action with respect to the

-10-


(noting parenthetically that the Referee of the hearing at issue was an “arbitrator”;
Davis v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2072, 97 Lab.Cas. P
10,027, *3 (1982) (Spiegel, Arb.) (concluding that the state statute of limitations for
vacation of arbitration awards applied to the decision of the Joint Area Committee).

In Sinnett_Excavating, for example, the mechanism for the resolution of
disputes provided pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement was
virtually identical to the grievance procedure in the case at bar. 1995 WL 23040 at
*1_ The District Court described the process as follows:

“The first step is that the grievance will be taken up by the Union’s

Business Representative and the Employer’s representative. If that fails

to resolve the issue, the grievance is submitted for ‘conference and

resolution by designated officials of the Union and the Association.’ . .

. If step two also fails, the dispute is to be submitted to the Joint

Grievance Committee (‘JGC’), which is comprised of an equal number

of representatives from the Union and the Association and at least

three from each. If the JGC resolves the issue by majority vote, the

Master Agreement provides that the JGC’s determination is final. If the

JGC deadlocks, the matter may be referred to arbitration.”
Id, A dispute arising between Sinnett Excavating and the Union made its way
through the grievance process to a JGC hearing, at which the Committee found for
the Union. See id. Despite the fact that, as in the present case, the collective
bargaining agreement did not refer to the JGC as an arbitrating body and provided

for arbitration if the Committee deadlocked, the Court characterized and treated the

JGC’s decision as an arbitration award. See id. at *2-3. As this case illustrates,


Originally to be heard on January 4, 2000, the grievance against Wahl was
rescheduled for hearing before the Joint Grievance Committee (“JGC”) for February
17, 2000. (Compl. { 13.) At that time, Plaintiffs counsel appeared and moved to
dismiss the matter on the grounds that it was not heard within 30 days of
submission to the JGC as required by the Agreement. (Id. J 14.) Over counsel’s
objections, the JGC proceedings continued, and the Committee rendered a decision
against Wahl on March 14, 2000. (Id. §{ 14-15.)

Plaintiff then filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County against
the Defendants. (Id. § 16.) The cause was removed to federal court whereupon the
parties agreed to dismiss the case if the JGC afforded Wahl a new hearing with an
opportunity to present evidence. (id. { 17.) This hearing was held on August 2,
2000. (Id. 4] 21.) Neither Wahl nor his counsel was present, although both were
notified of the hearing. (Id.) The JGC re-opened the proceedings on November 29,
2000 so that Wahl could be heard. (Id. 23.) He submitted a two-count motion to
dismiss the grievance, arguing that he was not subject to the moonlighting provision
and that he had permission to do the work in controversy. (Id. § 24.) On
December 15, 2000, the JGC rendered a final decision re-confirming the finding of

liability from the initial hearing on March 14, 2000 and fining Wahl for violation of


motion. Because our decision applies with equal force to the remaining non-moving
Defendants, we dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
BACKGROUND

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we accept as true all well-pleaded
allegations as we are required to do. On November 13, 1999, Dan Brown of Elgin
Roofing Company filed a grievance against union roofer Roger Wahl, alleging that
Wahl violated the “moonlighting” provision of the Standard Working Agreement
(the “SWA”) between the Chicago Roofing Contractors Association (“CRCA”) and
the United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers, Local Number 11
(“Union”). (Compl. 12.) The SWA establishes a grievance procedure for all
disputes arising in connection with the SWA. (Compl. Exh. A, SWA, at 11.)
Sections 4 and 5 of Article VII of the SWA provide in pertinent part:

Section 4. In the event the parties cannot adjust the grievance within fifteen

(15) calendar days, the grievance may be submitted to the Joint Grievance

Committee, which shall hear the grievance within thirty (30) calendar days.

The Joint Grievance Committee shall be composed of three (3) Union

representatives and three (3) Employer representatives. The Joint Grievance

Committee . . . may establish its own rules and procedures. A majority

decision of the Joint Grievance Committee on the grievance shall be

considered final and binding on the parties.

Section 5. Should the Joint Grievance Committee be unable to decide the

grievance by majority vote, then the grievance may be referred to the Federal

Mediation and Conciliation Service for the submission of a panel of five (5)

arbitrators from which one may be selected to hear and make final and
binding determination on the grievance. .. .

(id.)


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION DOCKETED

JUL 11 2094
ROGER WAHL,

Plaintiff,

vs. 01 C 3008
LABOR RELATIONS GROUP OF CHICAGO
ROOFING CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION,
UNITED UNION OF ROOFERS,
WATERPROOFERS, AND ALLIED
WORKERS, LOCAL NUMBER 11, JOINT
GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE, JAMES
MANSFIELD, SR., DAN BROWN, ELGIN
ROOFING COMPANY, AND UNKNOWN
OTHERS,

eS ESS ES Swear

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:

Plaintiff Roger Wahl (“Wahl”) filed a complaint seeking to vacate a decision
issued by a Joint Grievance Committee pursuant to the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. Defendants Chicago Roofing Contractors Association, Elgin
Roofing Company and Dan Brown (collectively the “Moving Defendants”) have

filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. For the following reasons, we grant the