2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-30-2011

Park v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-1481

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Park v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 1571.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1571
1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 10-1481

KAY PARK,

 Appellant.

v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D. C. No. 2-07-cv-03195)

District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 

on January 28, 2011

Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 30, 2011)

O P I N I O N

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Kay Park is the primary beneficiary of a $1,000,000 whole life 

insurance policy acquired by and in the name of James Park (Mr. Park), her former 

husband, who died on October 5, 2006, of lymphoma. She sued the insurer, Metropolitan 
2

Life Insurance Company (MetLife), after it refused to pay on the policy following her 

husband’s death because of his alleged misrepresentations when purchasing the insurance 

policy. Park appeals the order of the United States District Court for the District of New 

Jersey granting MetLife’s Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, 

we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I. Background and Procedural History

Although born in Korea, Mr. Park was an American citizen who passed a 

citizenship test conducted in English, ran several successful businesses, and lived in the 

United States for approximately thirty years prior to applying for the contested insurance 

policy. Mr. Park considered himself a fluent English speaker. On multiple occasions, 

Mr. Park stated that he understood both Korean and English and did not need a Koreanto-English translator. 

In November 2004, Mr. Park obtained life insurance in English from MetLife. 

Mr. Kwak, a MetLife agent who speaks Korean, presented the insurance application to 

Mr. Park on or about November 11, 2004. Kwak sat next to Mr. Park, requested that Mr. 

Park read each question, asked whether Mr. Park understood the question, and recorded 

Mr. Park’s responses. Although Mr. Park provided numerous answers to health-related 

questions, his answers to a few questions inform our conclusions. First, when asked 

whether he had “ever used tobacco products,” Mr. Park answered, “No.” Second, when 

asked whether he had “EVER” received treatment for, or ever been diagnosed with, high 

blood pressure, chest pains, heart attack or any other heart disease, Mr. Park answered, 

“No.” Third, when asked whether he had, in the past six months, taken any medication or 
3

been under observation or treatment, Mr. Park answered, “No.” Finally, when asked 

whether any sibling or parent “ever had heart disease, coronary artery disease, high blood 

pressure, cancer, diabetes, or mental illness,” Mr. Park answered, “No.” At the

conclusion of the application, Mr. Park provided his signature to confirm that he 

completed the application to “the best of [his] knowledge and belief,” that “all statements 

are true and complete,” and acknowledging that his statements formed “the basis of any 

policy issued.”

On November 24, 2004, Dong Soon Yi, a fluent English and Korean speaker, 

administered the Paramedical Exam portion of the application to Mr. Park. Yi conducted 

the entire examination in Korean. Although Mr. Park provided numerous answers to 

health-related questions presented in the Paramedical Exam portion of the application, his 

answers to a few questions inform our conclusions. First, when asked to indicate the date 

he last smoked, Mr. Park answered, “5/2003.” Second, when asked whether he had 

“EVER” received treatment for, or ever been diagnosed with, high blood pressure, chest 

pains, heart attack or any other heart disease, Mr. Park answered, “No.” Additionally, 

when asked whether any sibling or parent “ever had heart disease, coronary artery 

disease, high blood pressure, cancer, diabetes, or mental illness,” Mr. Park answered, 

“No.” At the conclusion of the Paramedical Exam, Mr. Park provided his signature to 

confirm that the answers were “correctly written, as given by [him], and are true and

complete to the best of [his] knowledge and belief.” Not only did Mr. Park attest to the 

accuracy and completeness of his answers, but the policy itself contains a 10-day “free 

look” provision allowing him to review the application for accuracy and return the policy 
4

prior to its operative date of commencement. Mr. Park did not return the policy and it 

became effective on November 15, 2004. 

Mr. Park died 23 months later on October 5, 2006. A month later, Kay Park 

submitted a claim for benefits under the policy. The policy sets forth a contestability 

period of 24 months, which permits MetLife to conduct inquiries into the veracity of 

answers provided in the application.1

In response to Park’s claim, MetLife had a claims examiner, a medical 

underwriter, and a lay underwriter review the information and medical records obtained 

during the claims process. Each reviewer opined that Mr. Park’s true medical history 

would have affected the issuance of the policy or the policy’s premiums. MetLife 

 MetLife’s inquiry revealed that several of Mr. 

Park’s statements in his insurance application and subsequent Paramedical Exam were 

untrue. The record demonstrates that (1) only one month prior to the application, on or 

about October 14, 2004, Mr. Park had a chest x-ray performed in Englewood Hospital’s 

emergency room and was diagnosed with pneumonia; (2) on or about October 14, 2004, 

Mr. Park was taking antibiotics prescribed by a physician; (3) Mr. Park smoked between 

one and one-and-a-half packs of cigarettes per day for 25 years, until approximately 

December 2005, (4) Mr. Park made four complaints between April 1999 and June 2004 

regarding chest pain, sharpness, chest tightening and palpitations to his physician and 

EKGs were performed; and (5) Mr. Park’s father was diagnosed with stomach cancer and 

his sister was diagnosed with uterine cancer. 

 1 The policy provides, in relevant part, that “[MetLife] will not contest the validity 

of [a] policy in force during the insured’s lifetime 2 years from the date of the Policy.” 
5

informed appellant by letter dated April 30, 2007, that because of Mr. Park’s 

misrepresentations and their effect on the underwriting of the policy, MetLife was 

denying liability on the policy. Park filed her complaint in the District of New Jersey on 

July 11, 2007 seeking to enforce payment on the insurance policy. MetLife answered 

Park’s complaint on October 17, 2007, and counterclaimed seeking a declaration that the 

policy was rendered void and rescinded by Mr. Park’s material misrepresentations. After 

discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment for MetLife. Park appealed. 

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This 

Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. 

We exercise plenary review over a district court’s order granting summary 

judgment and apply the same standard that the district court should have applied. Farrell 

v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is 

appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any 

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 

765, 770 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This determination is made by 

viewing the “facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[ing] all 

inferences in that party’s favor.” Farrell, 206 F.3d at 278. 

III. Discussion

New Jersey law imposes a duty of “utmost good faith” upon insurance applicants, 

Gallagher v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 A.2d 857, 861 (N.J. 1955), because 
6

insurers must rely on “the truthfulness of the insured’s rendition of his medical history,” 

Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. New Horizons, Inc., 146 A.2d 466, 469 (N.J. 1958).

“An insurer is entitled to relief when it relies on incorrect information provided by an 

insured in an insurance application if the information was material either to the insurer’s 

decision to insure or to the terms of the contract.” Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 

Manzo, 584 A.2d 190, 197 (N.J. 1991). Thus, “an insurer may rescind a policy if the 

insured knowingly misrepresented facts that would have affected the estimate of the risk 

and the premium charged.” Id. at 193.

Park contends that the District Court failed to construe the evidence in the light 

most favorable to her, the nonmoving party, regarding whether Mr. Park’s statements 

were not made in good faith or were knowingly false when made. The record 

demonstrates that Mr. Park made material misrepresentations in his insurance application. 

In an effort to deflect attention from Mr. Park’s admittedly false statements, Park contests 

that the “‘false answers’ Mr. Park was blamed for were induced and created by 

defendant’s own insurance agent, Kwak.” This claim is belied by Mr. Park’s own 

assertions that he spoke English, his attestation that his application answers regarding his 

history of health were truthful and complete, and the inconsistency between the answers 

given to Kwak and those given to Yi, who interviewed Mr. Park in Korean. 

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that no reasonable juror could 

conclude from the record that Mr. Park’s answers were accurate or immaterial 

representations. We also agree with the District Court’s conclusion that no reasonable 

juror could conclude that Mr. Park’s answers were induced or created by Kwak. Nor 
7

could a reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Park did not knowingly misrepresent his 

medical history. Therefore, it was proper for the District Court to grant MetLife’s 

summary judgment motion and enter judgment in MetLife’s favor on its counterclaim for 

rescission.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.