United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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 No. 09-2185

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United States of America, *

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Appellee, *

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v. *

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Timothy J. Adamson, *

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Appellant. *

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Appeals from the United States 

 No. 09-2582 District Court for the

 ___________ District of Minnesota.

United States of America, *

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Appellee, *

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v. *

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Galo Eric Quintero, *

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Appellant. *

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 No. 09-2606

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United States of America, *

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Appellee, *

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1

The Honorable William Jay Riley became Chief Judge of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 1, 2010.

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v. *

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Jerry Joe Larson, *

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Appellant. *

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 No. 09-2666

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United States of America, *

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Appellee, *

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v. *

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Marshall Thomas Bakken, *

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Appellant. *

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Submitted: March 12, 2010

Filed: June 24, 2010

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge,1

 BRIGHT, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.

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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Timothy J. Adamson, Marshall Thomas Bakken, and Jerry Joe Larson pleaded

guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute

500 grams or more of methamphetamine and five kilograms or more of cocaine, in
2

The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota. 

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violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. The district court2

 sentenced

them to sixty, thirty-six, and twenty-four months’ imprisonment respectively. On

appeal, Adamson, Bakken, and Larson argue that the district court erred in applying

the advisory guidelines when it denied them each a two-level minor role reduction. 

A jury convicted Galo Eric Quintero of conspiracy to distribute and possess

with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and five kilograms

or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, and 851.

He was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. He argues on appeal that the district

court (1) committed plain error when it admitted evidence of firearms possession and

an alleged drive-by shooting and (2) erred in sentencing Quintero as a manager or

supervisor of five or more participants during the course of the offense. We affirm.

I. 

The defendants were involved in a drug trafficking organization that moved 2.5

metric tons (more than 5500 pounds) of cocaine from Columbia to Mexico for

eventual importation into the United States between January 2005 and September

2007. Roman Garcia facilitated the shipment of cocaine in the United States. He

employed couriers to transport the cocaine to high volume customers in New York,

New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, and Minnesota.

Garcia used fourteen different couriers during the conspiracy, twelve of whom were

recruited by co-conspirator Manny Valdez. Typically recruiters referred couriers to

the drug trafficking organization and the recruiters and the courier would then travel

to California or Mexico so that the organization could screen the potential courier.

The organization usually paid its couriers between $600 and $700 per kilogram of

controlled substance transported. 
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Couriers were provided with automobiles retrofitted with hidden compartments,

known as “traps,” that were capable of holding multiple kilograms of drugs or

packages of currency. Loads of controlled substances were transported east and the

couriers returned to California or traveled to New York with loads of currency. To

avoid reporting requirements, couriers were instructed to make multiple cash deposits

under $10,000 to various bank accounts. The organization utilized partially legitimate

businesses and shell corporations to launder the drug proceeds.

Adamson, Bakken, and Larson served as couriers for the organization.

Adamson transported 225 kilograms of cocaine, 10 pounds of methamphetamine, and

approximately $1,745,000 in cash. The organization provided Adamson with multiple

vehicles, which he helped license with Minnesota plates. Adamson also received wire

transfers and deposited money into bank accounts at the request of the organization.

Larson transported 18 kilograms of cocaine and $90,000 in drug proceeds. He also

made deposits at the direction of the organization and obtained pre-paid cellular

telephones, which he shipped to a member of the organization. Bakken transported

approximately 66 kilograms of cocaine and $220,000 in drug proceeds. Bakken

traveled to Mexico to meet the leaders of the organization and also traveled to

Massachusetts, New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Illinois while working for the

organization. He obtained Minnesota license plates for the vehicle he used. 

Quintero had a more extensive role in the organization. He operated a major

receiving destination for cocaine on Staten Island, New York. To reach Quintero,

couriers phoned him at a phone number provided by Valdez or Garcia once they were

nearing Staten Island. Quintero would then meet the courier at a nearby hotel, store,

or restaurant and then lead the courier to the delivery location, typically his mother’s

home. The courier would park the vehicle in the home’s garage and unload the drug

packages. 

In August 2007, law enforcement officials obtained a warrant to search

Quintero’s mother’s home. Firearms were discovered in a vehicle that was parked in
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the garage. Although the vehicle was registered to Quintero’s brother, Quintero had

been observed in the vehicle. 

At Quintero’s trial, eight couriers, including Adamson and Bakken, testified

that they had made deliveries to Quintero. The couriers described delivering hundreds

of kilograms of cocaine to Quintero and delivering and receiving millions of dollars

in drug proceeds. Couriers would bring money from other locations to New York,

which would be used to purchase more drugs or to pay off prior purchases. Adamson

testified that he would deliver loads of currency to Quintero and would then count the

money with Quintero. On occasion, Quintero gave couriers money for their expenses

returning to the west coast. Two New York City police officers testified about two

occasions on which they observed Quintero deliver hundreds of thousands of dollars

while they were conducting surveillance regarding money laundering. Drug

Enforcement Agency agent John Francolla testified regarding the firearms seized from

the garage. Additionally, Francolla testified that Quintero told him that he had “shot

up” a house belonging to a member of a crime family who had failed to pay him for

some unknown debt.

In accordance with its plea agreements with them, the government requested

that Adamson, Bakken, and Larson receive a two-level downward adjustment in

offense level because of their role as minor participants. Although the district court

denied the requests, it nonetheless sentenced each of the three defendants below the

advisory guidelines range after taking into account the sentencing factors and the

government’s downward departure motion for substantial assistance. 

The district court determined that Quintero was a manager or supervisor of

criminal activity and imposed a three-level enhancement. After calculating an

advisory guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment, and noting the twentyyear mandatory minimum, the district court granted a sixty-month variance and

sentenced Quintero as set forth above.
3

While this provision was changed to § 2D1.1(a)(5) in the 2009 edition of the

U.S.S.G., we refer to it as § 2D1.1(a)(3), based on the guidelines that were in effect

when these defendants were sentenced. 

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II. 

A. Adamson, Bakken, and Larson

 

Adamson, Larson, and Bakken argue that the district court committed

procedural error when it declined to grant them a two-level adjustment in offense level

for having a minor role in the offense and in turn not applying U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2D1.1(a)(3)3

 to further reduce the offense level. This

adjustment applies to a defendant who is “less culpable than most other participants,

but whose role could not be described as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.5. 

A defendant’s role in the offense is measured by the relevant conduct for

which he is held responsible. Once the district court has determined the

relevant conduct, each participant’s actions should be compared against

the other participants, and each participant’s culpability should be

evaluated in relation to the elements of the offense. 

United States v. Johnston, 353 F.3d 617, 626 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a defendant played a minor role is a

question of fact that we review for clear error. United States v. Deans, 590 F.3d 907,

909 (8th Cir. 2010). 

In declining to grant Adamson a two-level minor role adjustment, the district

court explained:

During the course of his involvement in this conspiracy, [Adamson]

transported approximately 225 kilograms of cocaine, 10 pounds of

methamphetamine and $1,745,000 on behalf of the organization. . . .

Now he was a courier. There is no question about that. It is also
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disclosed, I think, in the facts portion of the case, of the investigation,

that he earned something in the neighborhood of $120,000 of cash

money for his labors. That is not in my view a minor or minimal

participant, and I simply cannot do that. 

The district court continued, “[Adamson] is lower than some, but you could then make

the argument that General Noriega’s chief distributing lieutenants who distributed

thousands of kilos are in fact minor or minimal vis-a-vis the leader of the

organization.” 

At Bakken’s sentencing the district court explained that the amount of drugs

that Bakken had transported and the amount he had earned were too great for a minor

role reduction. The district court commented that in the six months that Bakken was

involved in the conspiracy he earned approximately “more or less what a federal judge

gets to take home after a year’s pay.” The district court commented on Larson’s

knowing participation in a distribution scheme and the amount of money that Larson

earned from the transactions and concluded that it was different from the participation

of individuals that engage in body packing (internal concealment) of drugs or

lookouts, whose roles may be very minor.

Adamson, Bakken, and Larson first argue that instead of comparing their

culpability with other participants in the drug trafficking organization, the district

court improperly compared their conduct with others outside the organization or failed

to make any comparison. In comparing Adamson’s conduct with that of General

Noriega’s distributors, the district court was illustrating the point that being less

culpable than some other member of the organization does not entitle the defendant

to a minor role adjustment. See United States v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1177, 1182 (8th Cir.

2003). The district court properly considered the relevant conduct for which

Adamson was responsible in comparison to other members of the organization and did

not commit clear error in its factual determination that Adamson’s role was not minor.

Similarly, although a comparison of Bakken’s illicit earnings with a federal judge’s
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net pay may not have been the most apt point of reference, the court’s statement

contextualized the scale of Bakken’s criminal endeavor. Lastly, Larson’s contention

that the district court failed to consider his culpability compared with other

participants in the organization is also without merit. During Larson’s sentencing the

district court explained that the denial of the minor role reduction was a “continuing

theme throughout these cases,” indicating that it had compared Larson’s conduct with

other participants in the organization. 

Second, Adamson, Bakken, and Larson contend that they are less culpable than

other co-conspirators and therefore they are entitled to a minor-role reduction. We

have routinely rejected this argument, and our case law is clear that “merely showing

the defendant was less culpable than other participants is not enough to entitle the

defendant to the adjustment if the defendant was ‘deeply involved’ in the offense.”

Bush, 352 F.3d at 1182; see, e.g., United States v. Cubillos, 474 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th

Cir. 2007). All three men were active, necessary, and well-compensated members of

this conspiracy. Their roles as couriers do not necessarily entitle them to the minor

role adjustment. United States v. Alverez, 235 F.3d 1086, 1090 (8th Cir. 2000).

Transportation is an important component of an illegal drug distribution organization,

and Adamson’s, Larson’s, and Bakken’s roles were such that the district court did not

clearly err in its determination that their roles were not minor. See United States v.

Martinez, 168 F.3d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Transportation is a necessary part of

illegal drug distribution, and the facts of the case are critical in considering a reduction

for minor role.”). 

Next, Bakken and Larson argue that the district court impermissibly created

sentencing disparities and failed to address “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence

disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of

similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Bakken points to another courier who

transported a larger quantity of drugs and was granted a minor role reduction. Larson

points to two other participants who both transported more drugs and recruited

couriers, yet they were treated, like Larson, as average participants. The district court
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had no obligation to consider the § 3553 factors in its determination that these

defendants were average participants. 

Finally, Bakken argues that it would be contrary to § 2D1.1(a)(3) to allow drug

quantity to affect the availability of a § 3B1.2 minor role reduction. Once a defendant

is granted a minor role reduction, he is entitled to a further offense-level reduction

under § 2D1.1(a)(3) if his base offense level from the drug quantity table is 32 or

higher. As the defendant’s base offense level rises, the additional reduction in offense

level increases. For example, if a defendant receives a mitigation role adjustment and

the base offense level from the drug quantity table is 32, his offense level is decreased

by two levels, whereas if the base offense level is 38, his offense level is decreased by

four levels. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3). Although Bakken has aptly described the

function that drug quantity plays under § 2D1.1(a)(3), we reject his contention that

§ 2D1.1(a)(3) limits the consideration of drug quantity when deciding the availability

of a minor role reduction. We have routinely considered drug quantity when

reviewing the denial of a minor role reduction. See United States v. Carpenter, 487

F.3d 623, 626 (8th Cir. 2007) (no minor role reduction warranted when defendant

distributed three pounds of methamphetamine during the conspiracy); United States

v. Tinajero, 469 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 2006) (no minor role reduction when the

defendant was trusted with more than a pound of drugs).

We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in denying a § 3B1.2

offense-level adjustment to Adamson, Bakken, and Larson. Accordingly, we need not

separately consider their contention that the district court should have applied the

§ 2D1.1(a)(3) reduction in offense level, because it is dependent upon application of

the § 3B1.2 reduction. 
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B. Quintero

1. Admissibility of Evidence

Quintero argues that the firearms recovered from his mother’s garage and the

account of his involvement in a drive-by shooting were improperly admitted into

evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. Because Quintero did not

object in a timely manner to the introduction of this evidence, we review for plain

error. See United States v. Marcus, 2010 WL 2025203, at *3 (May 24, 2010). To

establish plain error Quintero must demonstrate that (1) there was an error that he did

not affirmatively waive, (2) the error was clear and obvious, (3) the error affected his

substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.

Quintero contends that the firearms seized from his mother’s garage were not

relevant to whether he conspired to distribute cocaine, arguing that the firearms were

in the trunk of a car registered to his brother and that there was no evidence that

Quintero knew that they were there. Evidence is relevant if it “make[s] the existence

of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or

less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. There is a

close and well-established connection between firearms and the drug trade, and “we

often have held that evidence of firearms is relevant and admissible in a prosecution

of drug trafficking charges.” United States v. Sherman, 440 F.3d 982, 986 (8th Cir.

2006); see United States v. Ruiz, 412 F.3d 871, 881 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Firearms are

tools of the drug trade due to the dangers inherent in that line of work.”). The

presence of firearms in the garage where Quintero received drugs and dispatched large

sums of money to the west coast made the fact of his involvement in the drug

conspiracy more probable. Moreover, photographs, video footage, and testimony

confirm that Quintero regularly accessed the garage. The evidence was thus properly

admitted. 
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Quintero also argues that Agent Franolla’s testimony about Quintero’s account

of a drive-by shooting was irrelevant. Similarly, this testimony was relevant in that it

demonstrated Quintero’s willingness to use violence and made his involvement in the

drug conspiracy more likely. We identify no error, let alone plain error, in the district

court’s failure to exclude this evidence sua sponte based on relevance.

Quintero also argues that the firearm and drive-by shooting evidence should

have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Relevant evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Quintero did not object to the admission of this

evidence. The district court did not plainly err in failing to exclude the evidence sua

sponte on prejudice grounds. 

2. Manager or Supervisor Enhancement

Quintero contends that the district court erred in imposing the three-level

enhancement for his role in the offense. At sentencing, the district court found that

Quintero was in a position of authority and that he directed a large number of people.

Further, the district court considered the nature and scope of Quintero’s criminal

activity that was manifest throughout the record and concluded that Quintero served

as the central depot and transfer point for large quantities of drugs.

 We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings underlying the

imposition of a role enhancement. United States v. Rosas, 486 F.3d 374, 376 (8th

Cir. 2007).

A defendant’s offense level may be increased by three levels if he “was a

manager or supervisor . . . and the criminal activity involved five or more participants

. . . .” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). “We construe the terms ‘manager’ or ‘supervisor’ broadly

under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.” United States v. Erhart, 415 F.3d 965, 973 (8th Cir. 2005).

The sentencing court may consider factors such as: 
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[T]he exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation

in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the

claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of

participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope

of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised

over others. 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4; Rosas, 486 F.3d at 376. 

We conclude that the district court’s imposition of the three-level enhancement

was not clearly erroneous. Quintero met with couriers, coordinated the receipt of

large quantities of drugs, sent couriers to other locations with instructions, and

coordinated the loading and shipment of millions of dollars in drug proceeds.

Quintero exercised management responsibility over both individuals and significant

assets of the organization. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2 (“An upward departure may

be warranted . . . in the case of a defendant who did not organize, lead, manage, or

supervise another participant, but who nevertheless exercised management

responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization.”).

III. 

Quintero’s conviction is affirmed, as are all of the defendants’ sentences. 

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur in the opinion and judgment with the following observation.

Ordinarily computation of the guideline sentence for couriers (often referred to as

“mules”) in drug cases include minor participant role reductions, particularly when,

as here, the probation office and the prosecutor made such a recommendation.

Although the district court in this case rejected those recommendations, the

judge sentenced Adamson, Bakken, and Larson below the advisory guideline range
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upon taking account of the sentencing factors and the government’s downward

departure motion for substantial assistance. As we know, United States v. Booker, 543

U.S. 220 (2005), rendered the guidelines advisory. Here, the sentences reflect the

district court’s careful consideration of section 3553(a)’s purpose, and based on the

record as a whole, the sentences are reasonable.

Accordingly, I join in the affirmance.

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