alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
exhibit101.htm


    FIRST
AMENDED ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT

    


    THIS
FIRST AMENDED ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT (the “Agreement”) is
entered on December 7, 2009 (the “Effective Date”)
between (i) Shrink Nanotechnologies, Inc. (f/k/a AudioStocks, Inc.), a Delaware
corporation (the “Seller”), and (ii)
DAO Information Systems, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the “Parent”) and its
wholly owned subsidiary, DAO Information Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation
(the “Subsidiary” and
collectively with the Parent, the “Buyer”); and (iii)
Luis J. Leung, an individual. The Seller and the Buyer may hereinafter be
referred to individually as a “Party” or
collectively as the “Parties.”

    


    RECITALS

    


    WHEREAS,
the parties wish to amend a previously executed Asset Purchase Agreement as
indicated herein;

    


    NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained in this Agreement,
and for good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, it is hereby agreed as follows:

     

    
 

    AMENDMENT

    


    Article
I, Section 1.1(a)(iii) shall be amended as follows:

    


    (iii)           all
future Net Sales Proceeds1 from the eventual sale of all
shares of stock, exclusive of any interest in the securities of American
Scientific Resources, Inc. which shall exclusively remain owned by Seller, held
by the Seller as set forth in Schedule B
(collectively the “Seller Securities”);
and

    


     

     

     

    
 

    1           “Net Sales Proceeds”
shall equal the gross proceeds received from the sale of the Seller Securities,
less reasonable brokerage commissions and related fees, including reasonable
legal and accounting fees.

     

    
      
         

      

      
         

        
          

        

      

      
         

      

    

     

     

     

    
 

    SIGNATURE
PAGE

    


    IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have duly executed and delivered this Agreement as
of the day and year first above written.

    


    
      	
              SELLER:

               

              Shrink
      Nanotechnologies, Inc.

               

              /s/ Mark L. Baum

              ____________________________

              By:
      Mark L. Baum, Esq.

              Its:
      Chief Executive Officer

            	
              PARENT:

               

              DAO
      Information Systems, LLC

               

              /s/ Luis J. Leung

              ____________________________

              By:
      Luis J. Leung

              Its:
      Managing Member

               

            
	 
      	
              SUBSIDIARY:

               

              DAO
      Information Systems, Inc.

               

              /s/ Luis J. Leung

              ____________________________

              By:
      Luis J. Leung

              Its:
      President

               

            
	 
      	
              Luis
      J. Leung

               

              /s/ Luis J. Leung

              ____________________________

              By:
      Luis J. Leung

              An
      individual
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.2

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

To the Board of Directors and Stockholders of CD&L, Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No.
333-3321, No. 333-3323 and No. 333-47357 on Form S-8 of our report dated March
26, 2004 (April 14, 2004 as to Notes 8 and 14), relating to the consolidated
statements of operations, changes in stockholders' equity and cash flows and
financial statement schedule of CD&L, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2003,
appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of CD&L, Inc. for the year ended
December 31, 2005.

DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

New York, New York
March 29, 2006

                                       72
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE
F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Marcos Jimenez v. The State of Texas

Ap pellate case number: 01

- 1 5

- 00 501

- CR & 01

- 15

- 00506

- CR

Trial court case number: 13CR1173 & 13CR1517

Trial court: 10th District Court of Galveston County

In his brief, a ppellant Marcos Jimenez has notified the Court that the trial court did not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as to Jackson v. Denno 1

s uppression i ssues

. The State concedes that the appeal sho uld be abated so that the trial court can issue findings of fact and conclusions of law

.
W e abate the appeal and remand for the trial court to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law, separate and apart from any docket sheet notations

in this case, in conjunction with the trial court’s denial of Jimenez’s motion to

suppress. See State v. Cullen , 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that trial court must provide findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate to provide appellate court with basis to review trial court’s application of law to facts, either in writing or on record a t hearing); Wicker v. State , 740 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ; T EX

. R. A PP . P. 44.4.

The trial court shall make the appropriate findings and conclusions and shall cause them to be filed with the trial court clerk within 20 days of the date of t his

order. We further order t he trial court clerk to file a supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law with this Court within 30 days of the date of this order.

1 378 U.S. 368, 380, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 1782

– 83 (1964).Jimenez will be permitted to file an ame nded brief within 30 days after the

supplemental clerk’s record is filed in this Court. The State will be permitted to file an amended brief within 30 days after Jimenez has filed his amended brief.

This appeal is abated, treated as a closed case, and rem oved from this Court’s active docket. The appeal will be reinstated on this Court’s active docket without further order of the Court when the supplemental clerk’s record is filed in

this Court.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Sherry Radack
 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: January 28, 2016
#### Richard Rotella, Respondent, v County of Rockland, Appellant.

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Colabella, J.), dated April 30, 1984, which granted the plaintiff’s motion pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim.

Order affirmed, with costs *(see, Fahey v County of Nassau,*111 AD2d 214; *Matter of Savelli v City of New York,*104 AD2d 943). Gibbons, J. P., Thompson, Brown and Weinstein, JJ., concur.
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### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA
F OURTH D ISTRICT

THE UNKNOWN BENEFICIARIES OF THE MARIMINA LAND TRUST

and THE UNKNOWN TRUSTEE OF THE MARIMINA LAND TRUST , Appellant s ,

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY , as trustee on behalf of THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF THE HIS ASSET SECURITIZATION CORPORATION TRUST 2007

- HE2 , Appellee

.

No. 4D 2 0

- 2793

[ January 27, 202 2 ]

Appeal from the C ircuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Glenn D. Kelley

, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2016

- CA

- 010832.

Owei Z. Belleh of The Belleh Law Group, PLLC, Plantation , for appellant s

.
Allison Morat of Bitman O’Brien & Morat, PLLC, Lake Mary , for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.
Affirmed

.

C ONNER , C.J., F ORST and K UNTZ , JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### In the Matter of Joseph Gallagher, Petitioner, v New York State Department of Correctional Services, Respondent.

[947 NYS2d 224]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of the Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

Petitioner, an inmate, was charged in a misbehavior report with violating the facility phone program guidelines by adding a telephone number to his phone contacts that listed a person with the same last name and address as that of a recently-paroled inmate, and then making three separate unauthorized attempts to telephone that number. Following a tier III disciplin*1320ary hearing, petitioner was found guilty of the charge. The determination was upheld on administrative appeal, with a reduction in the penalty imposed, and this CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.

We confirm. The detailed misbehavior report, along with the testimony of the sergeant who authored it, provide substantial evidence supporting the determination of guilt *(see Matter of Lovett v Smith,*80 AD3d 1039, 1040 [2011]). Although petitioner stated at the hearing that he was actually attempting to call the paroled inmate’s brother and not the paroled inmate himself, this created a credibility issue for the Hearing Officer to resolve *(see Matter of Lopez v Goord,*49 AD3d 1044, 1045 [2008], *lv denied*11 NY3d 703 [2008]). Notably, in the course of describing the investigation, the sergeant testified that petitioner had previously addressed mail to the paroled inmate at that address, leading to the conclusion that he put the name of the brother on the telephone list in an attempt to circumvent the facility telephone program regulations. As for petitioner’s contention that the Hearing Officer was biased against him, we are unpersuaded, inasmuch as “the record demonstrates that the finding of guilt was premised upon the evidence presented at the hearing” *(Matter of Nelson v Fischer,*93 AD3d 1059, 1059 [2012]; *see Matter of Barnes v Brack,*92 AD3d 990, 991 [2012]).

The remaining contentions advanced by petitioner have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.

Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Spain, Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
#### Joandark KASSAB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-56672.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed July 1, 2011.

Joandark Kassab, San Diego, CA, pro se.

Daniel F. Bamberg, Esquire, City Attorney’s Office, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Joandark Kassab appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from the search of her store. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review *477de novo. *Whitaker v. Garcetti,*486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir.2007). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that Kassab’s § 1983 claims were *Heck*barred. See *Heck v. Humphrey,*512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (a constitutional claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction cannot be brought under § 1983 unless the conviction has already been invalidated); *Szajer v. City of Los Angeles,*632 F.3d 607, 611 (9th Cir.2011), *petition for cert. filed,*79 U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2011) (No. 10-1343) (a claim alleging an illegal search and seizure of evidence that was used to secure a conviction necessarily implies the invalidity of that conviction).

We construe the judgment to be without prejudice. *See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa,*49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (stating that dismissals under *Heck*are without prejudice).

Kassab’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

We do not consider issues not properly raised before the district court. *See Smith v. Marsh,*194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.1999).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
# C_2019139EN.01009001.xml

| 15.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 139/90 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 139/90

---

Action brought on 20 February 2019 — Kerry Luxembourg/EUIPO — Döhler (TasteSense By Kerry)

(Case T-108/19)

(2019/C 139/89)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Kerry Luxembourg Sàrl (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: A. von Mühlendahl and H. Hartwig, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Döhler GmbH (Darmstadt, Germany)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark TasteSense By Kerry — Application for registration No 15 820 509

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 November 2018 in Case R 1179/2018-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | dismiss the opposition brought by Döhler GmbH against the registration of the mark TasteSense By Kerry No. 15 820 509; |
| --- | --- |

—

dismiss the opposition brought by Döhler GmbH against the registration of the mark TasteSense By Kerry No. 15 820 509;

| — | order EUIPO and Döhler, if it should intervene in these proceedings, to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and Döhler, if it should intervene in these proceedings, to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
#### Dilbagh SINGH, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-74170.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 20, 2011.

Christopher John Stender, Esquire, Immigration Practice Group a Professional Corporation, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

James A. Hurley, Oil, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Dilbagh Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceed*171ings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, *Toufighi v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir.2008), and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s second motion to reopen as time-barred and number-barred where the successive motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final decision, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for an exception to the time limit, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); *see also Toufighi,*538 F.3d at 996-97.

We reject Singh’s contention that the BIA did not adequately examine his evidence because he has not overcome the presumption that the BIA reviewed the record. *See Fernandez v. Gonzales,*439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir.2006). We also reject Singh’s contention that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard.

To the extent Singh challenges the agency’s underlying adverse credibility determination, we decline to consider the contentions because the court previously rejected them in *Singh v. Gonzales,*135 Fed.Appx. 907 (9th Cir.2005). *See Merritt v. Mackey,*932 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir.1991) (explaining under the ‘law of the case doctrine,’ one panel of an appellate court will not reconsider questions which another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same case).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-29-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1997
<CASH>                                           2,277
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   40,279
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (3,360)
<INVENTORY>                                     14,217
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                60,425
<PP&E>                                          37,023
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (2,871)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 212,608
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         (30,055)
<BONDS>                                      (132,025)
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           (4)
<OTHER-SE>                                    (41,127)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 (212,608)
<SALES>                                       (38,364)
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              (38,364)
<CGS>                                           17,226
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   17,226
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                20,160
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   177
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,600
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    978
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                978
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       678
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.81
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.81
        

</TABLE>
III 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 211 

Observing the historical significance of Juneteenth Independence Day. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 16, 2011 

Mr. LEVIN (for himself, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. 

CARDIN, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. HARKIN, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. 

UDALL of Colorado, Mr. BEGICH, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. 

BROWN of Ohio, Mr. AKAKA, Ms. STABENOW, and Mr. WICKER) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 

the Judiciary 

RESOLUTION 

Observing the historical significance of Juneteenth 

Independence Day. 

Whereas news of the end of slavery did not reach frontier 

areas of the United States, and in particular the Southwestern States, for more than 21⁄2 years after President 

Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, which was issued 

on January 1, 1863, and months after the conclusion of 

the Civil War; 

Whereas, on June 19, 1865, Union soldiers led by Major 

General Gordon Granger arrived in Galveston, Texas, 

with news that the Civil War had ended and that the 

enslaved were free; 


tjames on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•SRES 211 IS 

Whereas African-Americans who had been slaves in the 

Southwest celebrated June 19th, commonly known as 

‘‘Juneteenth Independence Day’’, as the anniversary of 

their emancipation; 

Whereas African-Americans from the Southwest continue the 

tradition of celebrating Juneteenth Independence Day as 

inspiration and encouragement for future generations; 

Whereas, for more than 145 years, Juneteenth Independence 

Day celebrations have been held to honor African-American freedom while encouraging self-development and respect for all cultures; and 

Whereas the faith and strength of character demonstrated by 

former slaves remains an example for all people of the 

United States, regardless of background, religion, or 

race: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That— 

2 (1) the Senate— 

3 (A) recognizes the historical significance of 

4 Juneteenth Independence Day to the Nation; 

5 (B) supports the continued celebration of 

6 Juneteenth Independence Day to provide an op7 portunity for the people of the United States to 

8 learn more about the past and to better under9 stand the experiences that have shaped the Na10 tion; and 

11 (C) encourages the people of the United 

12 States to observe Juneteenth Independence Day 


tjames on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•SRES 211 IS 

1 with appropriate ceremonies, activities, and pro2 grams; and 

3 (2) it is the sense of the Senate that— 

4 (A) the celebration of the end of slavery is 

5 an important and enriching part of the history 

6 and heritage of the United States; and 

7 (B) history should be regarded as a means 

8 for understanding the past and solving the chal9 lenges of the future. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS