the assumptions' dubious underpinning, at odds as they are with
principles of representative democracy) falls far short of
establishing an injury in fact for purposes of standing to bring
a federal action.*®

This action is therefore dismissed as to Non-resident
Plaintiffs. But because Resident Plaintiffs and Polish American
Congress do have standing, this opinion turns next to Chicago’s
Rule 12(b) (6) challenges to the particular claims advanced in the
Complaint.

Equal Protection

Count I alleges that the ward redistricting process violated
Plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because race--and more specifically a desire
to create Latino-majority wards--was the predominant factor in
Chicago’s determination of the 30th Ward boundaries. To support
that Plaintiffs point to the Complaint’s allegations that the
redistricting process and the Ward’s ultimate shape demonstrate
that Chicago’s primary goal was to ensure that the 30th Ward had

a Latino majority.

16 Pp. Mem. 9 claims that Plaintiffs need not provide
evidentiary support for their assertion of jurisdiction,
erroneously citing to two cases that deal only with Rule 12 (b) (6)
motions to dismiss (Palda v. General Dynamics Corp., 47 F.3d 872,
874 (7th Cir. 1995) and Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959
F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1992)). As stated earlier, Rule 12(b) (1)
differs in that respect: It places the burden on Plaintiffs to
support their assertion of jurisdiction with competent proof,
even at this threshold stage of the litigation.

13


different citizen groups--including a Polish ethnic coalition--
presented alternative redistricting plans, none of which was
seriously considered by Chicago (925). On December 19 the City
Council adopted new ward redistricting ordinances based on the
November 28 map (426).

This action concerns northwest Chicago’s 30th Ward, which
under the redistricting ordinance surrounds the 31st Ward on
three sides and at points is as narrow as two city blocks (9§28,
32). Year 2000 census figures show the population of northwest
Chicago to be 55% Latino, while at the time of the 1990 census
that area was also home to 184,614 people (but see n.6) of single
and multiple Polish ancestry (§29).”7 Many members of the Polish
ethnic community do not speak, or have a limited understanding
of, the English language (435).

Polish American Congress is a not-for-profit corporation
that represents the interests of Polish-Americans by promoting
civic, educational and cultural programs (5). Each of the seven
individual plaintiffs is a registered voter who either previously
resided or now resides in the 30th Ward (9§6-12). Six of the

seven individuals are of Polish or combined Polish-German

7 Because the Complaint is silent both (1) as to the
concept of “northwest Chicago,” as well as how that relates to
the ward areas at issue, and (2) as to how much of the total
Polish ancestry population represented by the 184,614 figure or
the 210,421 figure lived or lives in that area, 29 seems to
compare an undefined apple with an undefined orange.

4


Because Plaintiffs have made no such allegation here, they
have also failed to state a claim for a violation of their
Fifteenth Amendment rights. Count II is therefore dismissed in
its entirety.

Freedom of Association

Pinally, Wojcik alone claims a violation of his First
Amendment rights. To that end he contends that the new ward
boundaries deny him the right to meaningful participation in the
aldermanic election by forcing him to seek votes from non-Polish-
American residents of the 30th Ward and by “eliminating his
ability to expressively associate with those individuals who
would vote for him in order to express and advance his political
views” (P. Mem. 16).

Quite apart from the manner in which such a mindset is at
odds with the principles of representative democracy articulated
in the earlier quotation from Shaw, there is no support for such
a claim of a First Amendment violation. While the First
Amendment does guarantee citizens the right to freedom of
association for the purpose of expressing their political views,
nowhere does that Amendment guarantee that citizens will be

politically successful or effective (see Washington v. Finlay,

664 F.2d 913, 927-28 (4th Cir. 1981)). Wojcik has not said that
the redistricting imposes any impediment on his ability to have

his name placed on the ballot and to run a serious campaign for

17


3. that the “bizarre” shape of the 30th Ward can be
explained only on the basis of the residents’ race or ethnic
origin (432).

Together those allegations sufficiently state a claim of racial
gerrymandering and provide Resident Plaintiffs and Polish

American Congress with standing (see Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649).

On the other hand, all other Plaintiffs--Dolores Bajda, Anne
Janiga and Virginia Wielgos (“Non-resident Plaintiffs”) --must
make a different kind of showing that they have suffered harm
(the “injury in fact” prong of the Lujan test) to establish
standing.’® That they have failed to do.

Non-resident Plaintiffs’ asserted injuries stem from the
harms that they claim the 30th Ward redistricting has inflicted
on the “Polish ethnic community of interest,” which they of
course claim to represent. Yet they have failed to allege any
judicially cognizable harms. Despite the Complaint's
characterization of a geographically and culturally cohesive
Polish community of interest (933), most of Chicago’s Polish-
American residents--even most of those residents living in
northwest Chicago--did not reside within the former boundaries of

the 30th Ward (929, 31).%* Nothing in the Complaint explains

*° Additionally, of course, they would have to meet the
other two prongs of the Lujan test to establish standing.

4. Under the ward redistricting plan adopted in 1991, each
ward had approximately 55,675 residents (see Barnett v. Chicago,
969 F. Supp. 1359, 1371 (N.D. Ill. 1997)). If 184,614 Polish-

9


Jurisdiction

Chicago first argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to
hear this action under Rule 12(b) (1) because Plaintiffs lack
standing and the claims are unripe. To establish standing,
plaintiffs must generally show (1) that they have suffered an
injury in fact, (2) that there is a causal connection between
that injury and the challenged conduct and (3) that it is
likely--as opposed to merely speculative--that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision (Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).

But United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-45 (1995)
(citation omitted) teaches a variation on that standing
requirement that is specific to legislative redistricting
challenges based on equal protection principles:

Where a plaintiff resides in a racially gerrymandered

district, however, the plaintiff has been denied equal

treatment because of the legislature’s reliance on
racial criteria, and therefore has standing to

challenge the legislature’s action. Voters in such

districts may suffer the special representational harms

racial classifications can cause in the voting context.

On the other hand, where a plaintiff does not live in

such a district, he or she does not suffer those

special harms, and any inference that the plaintiff has

personally been subjected to a racial classification

would not be justified absent specific evidence tending
to support that inference. Unless such evidence is

present, that plaintiff would be asserting only a

generalized grievance against governmental conduct of

which he or she does not approve.

In literal terms that means that every voter in a racially

gerrymandered district has suffered an injury in fact because the


ethnicity (id.). In addition, plaintiff Michael Wojcik
(“Wojcik”) is the current 30 Ward alderman and sues in both his
personal and his official capacity (12). Plaintiffs claim to
represent the Polish community of interest for the purposes of
this action (413).

Plaintiffs oppose the new redistricting map as it relates to
the 30th Ward because the new ward boundaries splinter the Polish
ethnic community of interest, previously contained in two wards,
into four different wards (9928, 31). According to Plaintiffs,
Chicago designed the new ward boundaries for the sole purpose of
creating a Latino majority in the 30% Ward (34). That focus on
race injures the Polish community of interest by minimizing the
representation of that community’s needs on the City Council
(id.). Other harms inflicted on the community by redistricting
include (1) the removal of certain churches and businesses from
the 30th Ward, (2) potential cuts to certain ward services
(including Polish-language translation) and (3) the difficulty
that Wojcik will face in being re-elected and thereby
representing the Polish community’s interests in the City Council
(4937-40). Plaintiffs have produced an alternative map
establishing boundaries for the 30th Ward that they believe will
redress those injuries (441), and they now request declaratory

and injunctive relief.


reelection as alderman by appealing to all of his constituents
for support. Count III is also dismissed for failure to state a
claim.*¢
Conclusion

In summary, Chicago’s Rule 12(b) (1) motion is granted as to
Non-resident Plaintiffs Dolores Bajda, Anne Janiga and Virginia
Wielgos and denied as to the Resident Plaintiffs and Polish
American Congress. Its Rule 12(b) (6) motion is denied as to
Complaint Count I and is granted as to Counts II and III.
Chicago is ordered to answer Count I on or before August 5, 2002,

and a status hearing is set at 9 a.m. August 12, 2002.”

CMe. S$.

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: July 24, 2002

16 Pp. Mem. 16 also argues that Wojcik has suffered a
separate violation of his Equal Protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, but nothing in Count III asserts anything
other than a violation of his First Amendment rights (via the
Fourteenth Amendment) to freedom of expression and association.
That argument is therefore disregarded.

7 On a collateral subject, it appears clear from Chicago's
vigorous presentation on the current issues (as this Court had
anticipated) that there is no reason to fear that the interests
of its Latino residents will not be fully and adequately (indeed,
aggressively) represented by the present defendants. That being
the case, this Court contemplates denying the previously deferred
motion for intervention by Dixon Negron (who is represented by
the able counsel for Mexican American Legal Defense and Education
Fund) at that next status hearing, unless his counsel can then
assert a convincing reason for granting that motion.

18


contains specific information on this score, it would seem

certain that at least some of Polish American Congress' members

live in that redrawn ward--so its representative standing vel non
depends on the same analysis.

Determining whether a legislative district has been racially
gerrymandered--that is, whether its boundaries have been set with
a primary purpose of distinguishing between voters on the basis
of race--can be difficult (Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646
(1993)). At this stage the Resident Plaintiffs and Polish
American Congress need only to have included well-pleaded
allegations from which it may reasonably be inferred that the
30th Ward boundaries “rationally cannot be understood as anything
other than an effort to separate voters into different districts
on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient
justification” (id. at 649). To that end the Complaint includes
allegations:

1. that the redistricting map adopted by Chicago was
based on maps drawn up by the African-America and Latino
caucuses in the City Council, and that those caucuses were
“primarily motivated to maximize the number of majority-
minority wards in the City” (423);

2. that the boundaries of the wards in northwest
Chicago were drawn “with the specific purpose” of creating

eleven Latino-majority wards (30); and


‘Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Sitting Judge if Other

Milton I. Shadur than Assigned Judge

Mail AO 450 form.

Docketing to mail notices.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

CASE NUMBER 02 C 1477 DATE 7/24/2002
CASE Polish American Congress vs. City of Chicago, et al
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]}

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) Qo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.

(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for at :

(5) | Status hearing set for 8/12/02 at 9:00 A.M..

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :

(1) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) im (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

CUFRCP4(m) O General Rule2! OFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) a (Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. In summary, Chicago’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion is
granted as to Non-resident Plaintiffs Dolores Bajda, Anne Janiga and Virginia Wielgos and denied as to the Resident Plaintiffs
and Polish American Congress. Its Rule 12(b)(6) motion is denied as to Complaint Count | and is granted as to Counts II and
Ill, Chicago is ordered to answer Count I on or before August 5, 2002 and a status hearing is set at 9 a.m. August 12, 2002.
(9-1, 10-1)

dl) of [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document.
No noti ired “ Number.
lo notices required, umber of notices
ov | Notices mailed by judge’s staff. WL 25 202
Notified counsel by telephone. date docketea

Jocketing deputy initials

A>

~ rar2002

SN

date mailed notice

66: hd 22 Wr 20
Cinitdataata,

courtroom
deputy’s

initi SN
initials

mailing deputy initials

central Clerk's Office.



it is entirely speculative and therefore unripe (see Hinrichs v.
Whitburn, 975 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1992)) and (2) the
entitlement to city services extends to all residents equally and
does not itself create a particular community of interest that is
specially injured by any failure to provide such services.

Finally, Non-resident Plaintiffs’ claim that the Polish
community’s interests will cease to be represented in the City
Council as a result of the redistricting of the 30th Ward is also
fatally flawed. That proposition is inherently troublesome,
because it proceeds from the premise that our elected
representatives necessarily and slavishly vote (and otherwise
act) in accordance with their ethnic origins, no matter how many
generations they and their forebears may have lived in this
country. Shaw, one of the very cases to which Plaintiffs look as
a ticket of entry to the federal court, explains the
offensiveness of that notion in terms of racially-based
reapportionment that could equally be said as to ethnically-based
reapportionment (509 U.S. at 647-48 (citations omitted)):

Put differently, we believe that reapportionment is one

area in which appearances do matter. A reapportionment

plan that includes in one district individuals who

belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely

separated by geographical and political boundaries,. and

who may have little in common with one another but the

color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance

to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception

that members of the same racial group--regardless of

their age, education, economic status, or the community

in which they live--think alike, share the same
political interests, and will prefer the same

11


how the Polish-Americans who happen to have lived in the former
30th Ward constitute a cohesive community of interest distinct
from any broader community of interest that might be shared by
all of Chicago’s Polish-American residents.

And even if the Non-resident Plaintiffs had appropriately
asserted the existence of a clearly-defined Polish ethnic
community of interest contained within the previous boundaries of
the 30th Ward (as they have not), the harms they claim that
community suffered as a result of the redistricting are simply
not judicially cognizable injuries. No injury stems from the
fact that certain churches or businesses fall outside of the new
30th Ward boundaries: There is obviously no requirement that
political boundaries must track the boundaries of other
institutions,’ and just as obviously there is no impediment to
xvesidents crossing ward boundaries to attend religious services
or to go shopping, or to aldermen leaving their wards to appear
at institutions located elsewhere. Similarly, any concern about
the quality of city services that residents of different wards

might receive fails to rise to the level of an injury because (1)

Americans had been concentrated in “northwest Chicago” (an

undefined concept--see n.7) at the time of the 1990 census, they

could have filled well over three entire wards. In reality the

Polish-American population was much more widely dispersed than

that: According to 1990 census figures, only 39% of the 30th
‘Ward residents claimed Polish ancestry.

2 And as C. R. Mem. 7 suggests, any attempt to draw
political boundaries that coincide with church congregational
boundaries would raise serious Establishment Clause problems.

10


use of racial criteria in structuring the district has
impermissibly skewed the political process. All voters are
entitled instead to have the forces of political competition
operate independently of an artificially-created and racially-
based distortion of a district's makeup. That being true, it
must be recognized (as neither Plaintiffs nor Chicago appear to
realize) that Plaintiffs' Polish ethnicity is really irrelevant
to the issue of their standing to challenge the redistricting.®
That being said, this opinion turns to the standing question
in light of Hays. That decision calls for the application of
different tests for standing, depending on where Plaintiffs live.
Plaintiffs who reside within the boundaries of the redrawn 30th
Ward--in this case Frank Golinski, Robert Kocabinski, Mary
Taylor-Hart and Wojcik® (“Resident Plaintiffs”) --have standing if
their pleading adequately asserts that the district is “racially

gerrymandered.” And although nothing in the parties' submissions

@ It is worth noting that the same principle could well
vise up to haunt Plaintiffs' action in substantive terms.
Although ethnicity does not equate to race, it might seem to
trigger the Hays rationale if the map that Plaintiffs propose
were to equate to an ethnically gerrymandered district--and if
so, the same analysis that allows some Plaintiffs into the
federal courts on standing grounds could drive Plaintiffs out of
court on the merits. That however is for the future--for now,
once the standing question is resolved in favor of at least some
Plaintiffs, only the substantive viability of Plaintiffs' action
in Hishon terms is at issue.

° Wojcik's standing arises solely out of his individual
capacity as a resident of the 30th Ward, not from his official
capacity as the ward’s current Alderman.

7


Rule 12(b) (6) motion restricts the parties and court to the
contents of the complaint itself.‘
Facts

Every ten years the United States Census Bureau conducts a
national census. Under Illinois law the Chicago City Council is
authorized to redistrict Chicago's 50 wards® by ordinance one
year after each census (65 ILCS 20/21-22).

In late 2001 the City Council began to consider ward
redistricting plans based on the results of the 2000 census. On
November 28 it announced a proposed redistricting map that
incorporated suggestions made by members of the Council’s
African-American and Latino caucuses (9922-23). Members of those
caucuses were primarily motivated to maximize the number of
Chicago’s majority-minority wards (23). That proposed map did
not take into account census information about voting age
population or ancestry, because those figures were not yet

available (f24).° At a December 14 public hearing three

‘ What follows in the Facts section is therefore drawn from
the Complaint (cited simply “f ”). Hence the recital omits
“Plaintiffs allege” or any comparable locution, although this
Court has not of course made any findings or even expressed any
views on the allegations (as the caption Facts might otherwise
suggest). Chicago’s initial memorandum is cited as “C. Mem. --”
and its reply memorandum as “C. R. Mem. --,” while Plaintiffs’
submission is cited as “P. Mem. -.”

* Each Chicago ward elects one alderman to the City Council.
° P, Mem. Ex. E is an excerpt from the since-released year

2000 census figures, listing Chicago's Polish ancestry population
as 210,421.


Chicago’s arguments in favor of dismissing that Count are
unconvincing. And more than one reason calls for the rejection
of Chicago's position.

First, C. Mem. 9 asserts that the new shape of the 30th Ward
was “obviously determined” by its prior shape. But even a brief
comparison of the former ward boundaries with the new ward
boundaries demonstrates that the ward’s new shape was far from
“obvious” before redistricting.

To summarize that comparison, the 30th Ward previously
comprised two main sections joined by a connecting corridor
approximately four city blocks wide, with the entire ward being
situated to the immediate north and west of the 31st Ward
(Complaint Ex. C). Now the 30th Ward consists of three main
sections, joined by two connecting corridors that are two or
three blocks wide and that surround the 31st Ward on its west,
north and east sides (Complaint Ex. A). That is a significant
alteration, and the resulting shape is irregular enough (shades
of Elbridge Gerry!) to defeat Chicago’s assertion--at least at
this stage of the litigation--that the ward's present boundaries
are merely the obvious outcome of its historical shape.

Second, C. Mem. 10 urges this Court to label as a mere
“conclusory allegation” the Complaint's assertion that race was
the predominant factor in drawing the 30th Ward boundaries. To

be sure, a complaint can be dismissed if it contains conclusions

14


Neither of those theories states a cognizable claim.

As for the Act, on its face it does not support Plaintiffs’
claim. Plaintiffs argue that their rights have been violated
because the Act prohibits discrimination against any “language
minority group” (Section 1973b(f) (2)), but they have obviously
missed the related provision of Section 19731(c) (3) that
expressly limits “language minority group” to “persons who are
American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives or of Spanish
heritage.” Expressio unius est exclusio alterius--persons of
Polish heritage are not covered. That torpedoes Plaintiffs’
claim of a violation of the Act.

Plaintiffs' advancement of a claimed Fifteenth Amendment
violation fares no better. They argue that the new ward
boundaries violated their constitutional rights under that
Amendment by unfairly diluting the Polish-American community’s
voting power--but the Supreme Court has never found vote dilution
claims cognizable under the Fifteenth Amendment (see Reno v.

Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 334 n.3 (2000), citing

Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) and Voinovich v.
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993)). Instead the Fifteenth
Amendment has been successfully invoked only by plaintiffs who
allege government interference with their abilities to register
to vote or to cast ballots in elections because of their race or

color (see, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000)).

16


Amendments and under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“Act,” 42
U.S.C. §§1973 to 1973p) .°

Chicago has filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ entire
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6). For
the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order,
Chicago’s motion is granted in part and'denied in part.

Applicable Legal Standards

When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept
all of the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor (Johnson
v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 520 (7 Cir. 2001)). No claim will be
dismissed unless “it is clear that no relief could be granted
under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the
allegations” (Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984),
quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

When as here a Rule 12(b) (1) motion challenges the substance
{and not the sufficiency) of a complaint’s jurisdictional
allegations, the court may entertain affidavits and other
competent evidence, weighing any conflicts (Capitol Leasing Co.
v. FDIC, 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). In that
respect plaintiffs have the burden of supporting their

jurisdictional assertions by competent proof. By contrast, a

3 Citations to the Act will take the form “Section --,”
omitting the Title 42 reference.

2


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
POLISH AMERICAN CONGRESS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

EID
wnt 5 qt

)
)
)
)
Vv. ) No. 02 C 1477
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., }
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Polish American Congress and seven individuals (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) bring this action for declaratory and injunctive
relief against (1) City of Chicago, (2) Richard F. Mell in his
official capacity as Chairman of the Chicago City Council
Committee on Committees, Rules and Ethics, (3) Chicago's Board of
Election Commissioners and (4) Langdon D. Neal, in his official
capacity as Chairman of Chicago's Board of Election Commissioners
(for convenience, defendants are collectively referred to as
“Chicago,” treated as a singular noun). Plaintiffs allege that

Chicago's ward redistricting map adopted in December 2001

violates their rights under the First,? Fourteenth and Fifteenth

» Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed claims against
Richard M. Daley, in his official capacity as Chicago's Mayor,
and the Chicago City Council.

? As always, this opinion adheres to the conventional and
convenient (though technically imprecise) practice of referring
to the underlying Bill of Rights provision (which of course
imposes limitations only on the federal government) rather than
to the Fourteenth Amendment (which applies to state actors and
has been construed to embody such Bill of Rights guaranties).


candidates at the polls. We have rejected such
perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial
stereotypes. By perpetuating such notions, a racial
gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial
bloc voting that majority-minority districting is
sometimes said to counteract.

The message that such districting sends to elected

representatives is equally pernicious. When a district

obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived
common interests of one racial group, elected officials

are more likely to believe that their primary

obligation is to represent only the members of that

group, rather than their constituency as a whole. This

is altogether antithetical to our system of

representative democracy.

But even apart from such a problematic (and offensive)
assumption, Plaintiffs' claim relies on a further chain of
speculative and interdependent assumptions: (1) that Wojcik
would certainly lose any reelection bid he would launch in the
new 30th Ward, (2) that any candidate who might defeat Wojcik
would not be Polish-American, (3) that Wojcik would assuredly be
reelected if Plaintiffs’ own proposed boundaries for the 30th
Ward were adopted and (4) that no other alderman, whether elected
in the 30th Ward or in any other ward, could possibly represent

the needs of the Polish-American community adequately.“4 Again

such speculation about what might possibly occur (even apart from

3 C. R. Mem. 6 points out that when Wojcik was last
reelected (in 1999) the population of the 30th Ward was nearly
50% Latino and only about 20% Polish-American. Apparently the
voting population can exercise more independent and unbiased
judgment than Plaintiffs are willing to credit to their elected
representatives.

“At least four other current alderman are of Polish or
Polish-German ancestry (C. Exs. 4-7).

12


so vague that defendant has not been provided with adequate
notice of plaintiff’s claim and the grounds on which it rests

(see, e.g., Kyle v. Morton High Sch., 144 F.3d 448, 454-57 (7th

Cir. 1998) (per curiam)). But this case surely does not fit that
description. Plaintiffs have not simply advanced a broad and
unsupported conclusion that race played a role in the
redistricting. They have also included at 923-34 specific
allegations about how race--and particularly how a singular focus
on the creation of a Latino-majority ward--figured into the
redistricting process. To require greater specificity at this
point would effectively hold Plaintiffs to a heightened fact-
pleading standard inconsistent with the Rules’ notice pleading

system (see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S. Ct.

992, 998 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993)).

In sum, the Complaint adequately states a claim that the
equal protection rights of Resident Plaintiffs, and of the
members of Polish American Congress who live in the 30% Ward,
were violated when Chicago used race as the predominant factor in
the determination of that Ward’s boundaries. Chicago’s motion to
dismiss Count I is therefore denied.

Voting Rights
Count II of the Complaint alleges a violation of Plaintiffs’

voting rights under both the Act and the Fifteenth Amendment.

15