alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
III 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. RES. 415 

Designating April 4, 2012, as ‘‘National Association of Junior Auxiliaries 

Day’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 29, 2012 

Mr. WICKER (for himself and Mr. PRYOR) submitted the following resolution; 

which was considered and agreed to 

RESOLUTION 

Designating April 4, 2012, as ‘‘National Association of 

Junior Auxiliaries Day’’. 

Whereas the National Association of Junior Auxiliaries and 

the members of the National Association of Junior Auxiliaries provide valuable service and leadership opportunities for women who wish to take an active role in their 

communities; 

Whereas the mission of the National Association of Junior 

Auxiliaries is to encourage member chapters to render 

charitable services that— 

(1) are beneficial to the general public; and 

(2) place a particular emphasis on providing for the 

needs of children; and 

Whereas since the founding of the National Association of 

Junior Auxiliaries in 1941, the organization has provided 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•SRES 415 ATS 

strength and inspiration to women who want to effect 

positive change in their communities: Now, therefore, be 

it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) designates April 4, 2012, as ‘‘National As3 sociation of Junior Auxiliaries Day’’; 

4 (2) recognizes the great contributions made by 

5 members of the National Association of Junior Aux6 iliaries to their communities and to the people of the 

7 United States; and 

8 (3) especially commends the work of the mem9 bers of the National Association of Junior Auxil10 iaries to better the lives of children in the United 

11 States. 

Æ 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**

**CHRISTOPHER ALLEN TEVIS,**

**Petitioner :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 436 WAL 2015** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 4th day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allo wance of Appeal is** 

DENIED

**.**

**Justice Donohue and Wecht did not participate in the con sideration or decision of** 

**this matter.**
#### Roy C. LEWELLEN, Appellant, v. WILDLIFE FARMS II, LLC, et al., Appellees.

No. 08-2046.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 12, 2008.

Filed: Feb. 19, 2009.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 25, 2009.

Jeff Rosenweig, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellant.

Stuart W. Hankins, argued, North Little Rock, AR, for appellees.

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM, Circuit Judge, and KYLE,1 District Judge.

1

. The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

KYLE, District Judge.

Attorney Roy C. Lewellen challenges the bankruptcy court’ s2 order, and the district court’s3 affirmance thereof, impos*594ing a $10,000 sanction against him pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011. The sanction resulted from Lewellen’s filing of a Motion for Relief from Stay, which both the bankruptcy court and the district court found to be legally baseless and filed for the improper purpose of hindering the sale of land and harassing opposing parties.

After careful review of the proceedings below, including the thorough and well-reasoned opinions of both the bankruptcy court4 and the district court,5 we conclude that both the imposition of monetary sanctions and the amount thereof were warranted by the facts of the case and imposed in compliance with the applicable legal standards. Accordingly, we affirm. *See*8th Cir. R. 47B.

2

. The Honorable James G. Mixon, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

3

. The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

4

. *In re Robinson,*373 B.R. 612 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.2007).

5

. *In re Robinson,*Nos. 4:07MC00005 JMM, 4:07MC00006 JMM, 4:07CV000489 JMM, 2:07CV000089 JMM, 2:07CV000129 JMM, 2:07CV000130 JMM, 2:07MC000001 JMM, 2:08CV000014 JMM, 2008 WL 1697129 (E.D.Ark. Apr. 10, 2008).
<PAGE>
 
                                                                   EXHIBIT 11.1

                         INTERNATIONAL COMPUTEX, INC.

                       COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                     Three Months ended Sept 30,        Nine Months ended Sept 30,
                                                        1997            1998              1997            1998
                                                     ----------      -----------       ----------      -----------
<S>                                                  <C>             <C>               <C>             <C> 
Net income/(loss) (Pro forma for
nine months ended September 30, 1997)                $  243,096      $(1,107,648)      $  684,823      $(1,009,570)
                                                     ==========      ===========       ==========      ===========
Weighted average number of common
 and common equivalent shares:

  Weighted average common
   shares outstanding                                 3,250,000        3,577,380        2,750,000        3,532,064

  Shares issued from assumed exercise
   of common stock equivalents (1)                      230,245               --          230,245               --
                                                     ----------      -----------       ----------      -----------
Weighted average number
 of common and common equivalent
 shares outstanding                                   3,480,245        3,577,380        2,980,245        3,532,064
                                                     ==========      ===========       ==========      ===========
Earnings (loss) per share (Pro forma
for nine months ended September 30, 1997):

    Basic                                            $      .07      $      (.31)      $      .25      $      (.29)
                                                     ==========      ===========       ==========      ===========

    Diluted (2)                                      $      .07      $      (.31)      $      .23      $      (.29)
                                                     ==========      ===========       ==========      ===========
</TABLE>
---------------------
(1) Shares issued from assumed exercise of common stock equivalents include the
    number of incremental shares which would result from applying the treasury
    stock method.

(2) Diluted weighted average common shares outstanding are not included in the
    1998 calculations due to the anti-dilution of the net losses for the three
    and nine month periods.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### National Science Foundation

# AGENCY:

National Science Foundation.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

The Division of Acquisition and Cooperative Support within the National Science Foundation (NSF) is publishing this notice to advise the public of the availability of its Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Service Contracts Inventory Analysis Report.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Raymond McCollum, Policy Branch, Division of Acquisition and Cooperative Support, National Science Foundation. Phone: 703-292-4225; email:                         *rmccollu@nsf.gov.*

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

NSF's FY 2019 Service Contract Inventory Analysis Report is included as part of a governmentwide service contract inventory. The inventory includes covered service contracts that were awarded in FY 2019. The NSF analyzes this data for the purpose of determining whether its contract labor is being used in an effective and appropriate manner and if the mix of federal employees and contractors in the agency is effectively balanced. The report does not include contractor proprietary or sensitive information.

                    The FY 2019 Service Contract Inventory Analysis Report is provided at the following link:                     *https://www.nsf.gov/​bfa/​dcca/​contracts/​index.jsp.*

*Authority:*42 U.S.C. 1861,                     *et seq.*

Dated: July 23, 2021.

Suzanne H. Plimpton,

Reports Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation.

[FR Doc. 2021-16106 Filed 7-28-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555-01-P
Exhibit 32.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Franklin Street
Properties Corp. (the "Company") for the period ended September 30, 2005 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned, George J. Carter, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
that:

            (1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

            (2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.


Date: November 2, 2005                /s/ George J. Carter
                                      --------------------
                                      George J. Carter

                                      President and Chief Executive Officer
#### Anthony VIOLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 07-2245-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Jan. 21, 2009.

Anthony Viola, White Deer, PA, pro se.

Peter Norling, David C. James, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Benton J. Campbell, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT: Hon. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Hon. REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges, Hon. JOHN F. KEENAN,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable John F. Keenan, District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

*SUMMARY ORDER*

Anthony Viola appeals from an order of the district court, denying his “Letter/Motion” and directing the clerk of court not to accept further filings without the court’s permission. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case.

First, notwithstanding the numerous issues briefed by Viola, the Government is correct that the only issue before this Court is the district court’s filing injunction. The other issues briefed by Viola were on appeal in separate cases, all of which have been dismissed; the mandamus case to which he refers has also been dismissed. *See*2d Cir. Dkt. Nos. 07-2493-cv, 07-2714-op, and 07-2287-pr.

Second, defendant-appellee concedes that the district court erred in failing to provide Viola with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to issuing its filing injunction, and agrees that the district court’s order should be vacated and remanded. The procedure for imposing leave-to-file sanctions involves three stages: (1) the court notifies the litigant that future frivolous filings might result in sanctions; (2) if the litigant continues this behavior, the court orders the litigant to show cause as to why a leave-to-file sanction order should not issue; and (3) if the litigant’s response does not show why sanctions are not appropriate, the court issues a sanctions order. *See, e.g., Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles,*396 F.3d 525, 529 (2d Cir.2005) (setting forth the “unequivocal rule in this circuit ... that the district court may not impose a filing injunction on a litigant *sua sponte*without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to be heard”); *Moates v. Barkley,*147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir.1998) (same); *Moates v. Rademacher,*86 F.3d 13, 15 (2d Cir.1996) (same); *Bd. of Managers for 2900 Ocean Ave. Condo. v. Bronkovic,*83 F.3d 44, 45 (2d Cir.1996) *(per curiam)*(same). In this case, as the defendant-appellee concedes, the district court did not comply with the above procedures.

*540We therefore vacate the district court’s order and remand for the district court to provide Viola with notice and an opportunity to be heard.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-40491

Summary Calendar

 

CLINTON BOYD

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

AMIR MOHAMMAD; DENECE BOSS

Defendants-Appellees

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont

USDC No. 1:98-CV-1942

--------------------

March 30, 2000

Before KING, Chief Judge, and WIENER and BARKSDALE, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Clinton Boyd, Texas prisoner no. 543542, appeals the

magistrate judge’s dismissal, as frivolous, of his 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 civil rights complaint. Boyd’s motion for appointment of

counsel is DENIED. See Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir.

1987). Boyd’s motions to supplement the record are DENIED AS

MOOT. 

Boyd complains that Texas Department of Criminal JusticeInstitutional Division (TDCJ-ID) employees denied him medically-
2

necessary snacks, repeatedly gave him an incorrect dosage of

medicine, and gave him crushed, as opposed to whole, medication. 

These allegations show, at the most, negligence and do not rise

to the level of a civil rights violation. See Varnado v.

Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991). Boyd’s allegation

that he received a light burn from contact that hot prison food

made with his skin asserts only a de minimis physical injury, and

the force used is not repugnant to the conscience of mankind,

thus Boyd has no claim for § 1983 relief. See Siglar v.

Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). Because Boyd’s

claims lack arguable basis in law or fact, the magistrate judge

did not abuse his discretion in dismissing Boyd’s claims as

frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); Siglar, 112 F.3d at

193.

AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Abner Bayon, Appellant.

[941 NYS2d 855]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Konviser, J.), rendered February 27, 2009, convicting him of gang assault in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, and assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions of gang assault in the first degree and burglary in the first degree is unpreserved for appellate review *(see CPL*470.05 [2]; *People v Finger,*95 NY2d 894, 895 [2000]; *People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10, 19-21 [1995]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]; *People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor *(see People v Mateo, 2*NY3d 383, 410 [2004], *cert denied*542 US 946 [2004]; *People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to the two above-mentioned crimes was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006]). Mastro, A.P.J., Hall, Lott and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
# C_2019213EN.01007101.xml

| 24.6.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 213/71 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.6.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/71

---

Action brought on 26 April 2019 — BK v European Asylum Support Office

(Case T-277/19)

(2019/C 213/68)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Applicant: BK (represented by: B. Christianos, A. Skoulikis and D. Karagkounis, lawyers)

Defendant: European Asylum Support Office (EASO)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Annul the contested decision of the appointing authority, the content of which is set out in the email of 20 September 2018 from the head of the Administration Department, and the implied decision of the appointing authority rejecting the applicant’s complaint. Consequently, EASO must take the measures necessary to implement the decision of the Court, in accordance with Article 266 TFEU, with retroactive effect; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the contested decision of the appointing authority, the content of which is set out in the email of 20 September 2018 from the head of the Administration Department, and the implied decision of the appointing authority rejecting the applicant’s complaint. Consequently, EASO must take the measures necessary to implement the decision of the Court, in accordance with Article 266 TFEU, with retroactive effect;

| — | Order the defendant to pay all the applicant’s costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the defendant to pay all the applicant’s costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging a failure to state reasons and, therefore, breach of an essential procedural requirement within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a failure to state reasons and, therefore, breach of an essential procedural requirement within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging an inadequate statement of reasons for the contested decision, which contains a substantive error. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging an inadequate statement of reasons for the contested decision, which contains a substantive error.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging an error of law in that the decision did not take account of the interests of the service and the duty of the Administration to have regard for the welfare of its staff. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging an error of law in that the decision did not take account of the interests of the service and the duty of the Administration to have regard for the welfare of its staff.

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pedro DeSOUSA, a.k.a. Pedro J. De Sousa, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-10913

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 24, 2011.

Wifredo A. Ferrer, Carol Herman, Karen Rochlin, Kathleen M. Salyer, Anne R. Schultz, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Anne M. Lyons, Kathleen M. Williams, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before WILSON, MARTIN, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Pedro DeSousa appeals his 33-month sentence, imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. DeSousa contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. After review, we affirm.

I.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” *Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). In reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we perform two steps. *United States v. Shaw,*560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir.2009). First, we ensure that the district court did not commit significant procedural error, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence — including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” *Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597.

If we conclude that no procedural error occurred, “the second step is to review the sentence’s ‘substantive reasonableness’ under the totality of the circumstances, including ‘the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.’ ” *Shaw,*560 F.3d at 1237 (quoting *Gall,*552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597). “Although we do not automatically presume a sentence within the [G]uidelines range is reasonable, we ‘ordinarily ... expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.’ ” *United States v. Hunt,*526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting *United States v. Talley,*431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir.2005)) (alteration in original). “The party challenging the reasonableness of a sentence ‘bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and the factors in section 3553(a).’ ” *United States v. Flores,*572 F.3d 1254, 1270 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting *Talley,*431 F.3d at 788) (alteration in original).

DeSousa does not contend that the district court committed procedural error. Rather, he argues that his 33-month sentence, which was within his Guidelines’ range of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment, is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to achieve the pur*314poses of sentencing. However, DeSousa fails to offer any reason why the record does not support his sentence. Accordingly, DeSousa has not carried his burden of showing that his sentence is unreasonable. *See Flores,*572 F.3d at 1270.

AFFIRMED.