457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). For a right to be clearly established
“[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
the right.” Schertz, 875 F.2d at 583. It is not enough for a
plaintiff to allege a broad right, such as the right to be free of
an unreasonable search; instead, it is necessary to show that,
under the specific facts of the case, a reasonable official should

have known that he was violating a plaintiff’s rights. See id.

Although qualified immunity is an affirmative defense,
Plaintiff bears the burden of defeating an assertion of qualified
immunity. Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 688
(7th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment should be entered in favor of a
party raising a qualified immunity defense if “a reasonable police
officer in the same circumstances and with the same knowledge ...
as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that
probable cause existed in light of well-established law.” Williams

v. Jaglowski, 269 F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 2001).

In this case, even if Plaintiff had shown a lack of probable
cause by prevailing in his argument that the van was his home and
that a warrant was required to search it, Defendant would still be
entitled to summary judgment in his favor based on qualified
immunity. A reasonable officer in Defendant’s position,
approaching a van parked on a public street, would not have known

that the van was being used as a residence, and, could reasonably

19


fact, but only twice is there a specific denial of one of
Defendant’s factual contentions. In spite of the plain
instructions Plaintiff received in the 56.2 statement to pro se
litigants, and the plain instructions given by the Court, Plaintiff
has not made a cognizable effort to comply with the Local Rules.
Therefore, even if Plaintiff’s response had been timely, the facts
in Defendant’s 56.1 statement would have been taken as admitted for

purposes of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
B. Substantive Issues.

Plaintiff’s procedural failings notwithstanding, the Court
would have granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the
merits. Defendant raises two substantive defenses to Plaintiff’s
claim, both of which, based on the undisputed facts in the record,
require entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendant. First,
Defendant asserts that, as a matter of law, probable cause existed
to arrest Plaintiff, impound Plaintiff’s vehicle, and impound
Plaintiff’s dog. Alternatively, Defendant argues that there was at
least arguable probable cause for Defendant’s actions and,
therefore, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from any

suit arising out of Plaintiff’s arrest as a matter of law.
1. Probable Cause

“The existence of probable cause for an arrest is an absolute
bar to a Section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest.” Schertz v.
Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1989). A police

13


Defendant returned to his squad car and requested a tow truck
to remove the van. After the tow truck arrived, Defendant
transported Plaintiff to the City of Blue Island Police Department
and placed him in lock-up. Defendant issued Plaintiff a ticket,
charging him with cruelty to animals pursuant to Blue Island
Ordinance. Specifically, Defendant noted that Plaintiff violated
the ordinance when he “beat the dog physically and taped its mouth
shut with duct tape.” (Connors Aff., Ex. 1 to Defendant’s Rule 56.1
Statement of Facts, 44-48, Ex. B to Connor’s Aff.)

Plaintiff remained in custody while Defendant investigated the
circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s possession of several women’s
identification cards. Defendant’s investigation lasted several
hours, during which time he established that the women whose cards
Plaintiff possessed were all alive and unharmed, and that the cards
were not stolen. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff with any
criminal offense relating to his possession of the identification
cards. Plaintiff was released from custody on November 27, 2000.
The animal cruelty charge was later dismissed. (Connors Aff., Ex.
1 to Defendant’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts, II 49-55.)

Meanwhile, on November 27, 2000, Officer Gregory Kirpach, the
Animal Control Officer for the City of Blue Island, relinquished
control of the dog to the Animal Welfare League in Chicago Ridge,
Illinois. (Connors Aff., Ex. 1 to Defendant’s Rule 56.1 Statement

of Facts, (9 45-46.) On or about November 28, 2000, Officer Kirpach


have believed that probable cause, without a warrant, was
sufficient to justify searching the van. Under these specific
facts, Defendant would be immune from suit arising out of his
search of the van, Plaintiff’s arrest, and Defendant’s seizure of

the dog and van.
CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s untimely response failed to comply with Local Rule
56.1, therefore, the facts in Defendant’s statement of undisputed
facts are deemed admitted. Based on those facts, Defendant is

entitled to Summary Judgment in his favor.

Even if Plaintiff had filed a timely response that fully
comported with Rule 56, Defendant would still be entitled to
Summary Judgment because qualified immunity shields Defendant from
Plaintiff's suit.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

DATED: August 8, 2002 E N T EB R:

OLertey faye

ARLANDER KEYS
United States Magistrate Judge

20


First, living in a van does not entitle one to the same Fourth
Amendment protections as one would enjoy inside a residence. The
Supreme Court has drawn a clear distinction between arrests that
take place in public, for which no warrant is required, U.S. v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), and arrests that take place in the
home, for which a warrant is required. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980). The basis for this distinction is the lessened
expectation of privacy that exists in public places. See U.S. v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976). Automobiles are sufficiently
public to afford occupants a markedly lower expectation of privacy
than a residence, which accounts for the fact that a warrant is not
required to search an automobile. See U.S. v. Matthews, 32 F.3d
294, 299 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that an immobile vehicle may be
searched without a warrant because there is a lessened expectation
of privacy within a motor vehicle). Moreover, the degree to which
a person may expect privacy in a given place is not determined by
reference to the individual’s subjective expectations; rather, it
is an objective determination made by the court. See Santana, 427

U.S. at 42.

Although Plaintiff may have subjectively expected his van to
afford him the full privacy of a home, according to objective
Fourth Amendment standards, the expectation of privacy in a vehicle

parked on a public street is lower than that of a residence. This

17


2. Plaintiff's failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1.

In addition to filing an untimely response, Plaintiff
submitted a materially deficient response to Defendant’s Rule
56.1(a) (3) Statement of Facts. The Northern District of Illinois
Local Rule 56.1(a) (3)+ requires a party seeking summary judgment to

w

provide “a statement of material facts as to which the moving
party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the
moving party to a judgment as a matter of law.” Likewise, Northern
District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires a party
opposing summary judgment to submit a corresponding document
containing a “response to each numbered paragraph in the moving
party’s statement, including, in the case of any disagreement,
specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and

a

other supporting materials relied upon.” Moreover, Rule
56.1(b) (3) (B) specifically warns that “all material facts set forth
in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be
admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing
party.”

These rules are imposed and enforced in order to streamline
the process of summary judgment, and to highlight for the Court
those facts that are actually at issue. See Herman v. City of

Chicago, 870 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1989). To that end, the

Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly upheld strict enforcement of these

+ Formerly Local Rule 12(m), and still earlier, Local Rule
12(f).


SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Summary judgment will be granted where there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fep. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, the Court views the record and any inferences that may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Simmons v. Pryor, 26 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1993).
The moving party need not negate its opponent’s claim. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322. Instead, with respect to issues on which the non-
moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, “the burden on the
moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’- that is, pointing out
to the district court- that there is an absence of evidence to
support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at 325.

Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the non-moving
party must present evidence that establishes a genuine issue of
material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). An issue of fact is genuine and material if it would allow
a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party. Id. However,
the non-moving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the adverse party's pleading ... but must set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
Typically, this means that a non-moving party must do more than

attack the credibility of the testimony supporting their opponent’s


spoke with a person (presumably Plaintiff) who claimed to own the
dog. Officer Kirpach informed Plaintiff that the dog was being held
in Chicago Ridge. He explained to Plaintiff that, because there
were animal cruelty charges pending against him, he would likely
require a court order to reclaim the dog. (Connors Aff., Ex. 1 to
Defendarit’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts, If 47-48.) According to
Plaintiff, despite his efforts to reclaim the dog, he was never
returned. (Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Answer to Def.’s Mot. for Summ.
J. GF 38.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant on August 8, 2001,
alleging that Defendant lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff,
impound his vehicle, and impound his dog. The case was assigned to
Judge Pallmeyer, and the parties subsequently consented to proceed
before this Court.

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on December 19
2001, which the Court denied. On April 15, 2002, Defendant filed
a motion for summary judgment, and served Plaintiff with a copy of
the Local Rule 56.2 Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Court ordered Plaintiff to file his response
to Defendant’s Motion by May 15, 2002. Plaintiff failed to do so,
and instead filed his response on May 17, 2002, without leave of

Court.


means that probable cause, without a warrant, was sufficient to

justify a search of Plaintiff’s van.

As discussed above, Defendant had probable cause to enter the
van. Once Defendant opened the van door, Plaintiff exited the van
and stated that “he and his dog were not getting along.” This
comment, along with the evidence already in Defendant’s possession,
provided ample probable cause to conduct a search of the van’s
interior. Upon conducting the search, Defendant discovered
Plaintiff’s dog, which had clearly been mistreated, as well as the
four or five women’s identification cards. All of this evidence
was the product of a lawful search of Plaintiff’s automobile, and
does not constitute fruit of a poisonous tree. Therefore, the
Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the illegality of
Plaintiff’s arrest follows from the illegality of Defendant’s
search of the van. Both the search of the van and Plaintiff's

subsequent arrest were supported by probable cause.

2. Qualified Immunity

In the alternative, Defendant also raises qualified immunity
as an affirmative defense to an unlawful arrest action. Qualified
immunity protects government officials from suits arising out of
their performance of discretionary functions, “so long as they do
not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Berman v. Young,

291 F.3d 976, 983 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

18


Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that “a decision to disregard
all materials submitted after a reasonable filing deadline is
certainly not an abuse of discretion;” rather, such a decision
preserves the integrity of the process by protecting “the moving
party’s right to respond to the resisting party’s argument and [the
Court’s ability] to decide the summary judgment motion in a timely
fashion.” See, e.g., Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse- Wisconsin, Inc., 991 F.2d 1249, 1257
(7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 858 (7th
Cir. 1985)).

Here, Plaintiff was well aware of both the necessity of filing
a timely response to Defendant’s motion, and the consequences of
failing to do so. At the status hearing on March 14, 2002,
Plaintiff agreed to the briefing schedule under which he was
required to respond to Defendant’s motion by May 15, 2002.
Moreover, at that hearing, the Court specifically impressed upon
Plaintiff the importance of meeting Court deadlines. The Court
also mailed the briefing schedule to Plaintiff after the hearing.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff allowed the May 15, 2002 deadline to pass
without filing his response, and without filing a motion for an
extension. Instead, Plaintiff filed his response late, on May 17,
2002, without leave of the court. Plaintiff’s late filing is
sufficient grounds for the Court to refuse to consider his
response, and to take as admitted the facts in Defendant’s Local

Rule 56.1 statement.


Minute Order Forns(06/97)

\ United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
4 Assigned Jud itt
vi Magitrate Judge Arlander Keys “Than Aasigne Sedge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 6025 DATE 8/8/2002
CASE Todd Steven Adams vs. Christopher Connors
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue___

(4) a Ruling/Hearingon___—_ssetfor_ att

(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor___at

(6) im Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor__—at__—
7) o Trial[set for/re-set for]on_ at

(8) oa [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto_at_—

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) General Rule21 OFRCP41(a)(1) [ FRCP41(a)(2).

qo) =o [Other docket entry] Memorandum Opinion and Order entered. Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [#16] is granted. AK

(11) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
2

No notices required,

umber of notices

aug 0 9 2002

Notified counsel by telephone. daye docketed

~ | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Docketing to mail notices.

v Mail AO 450 form. to 5 dab ii
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. LUNO3 JORNSIO SA
Wa sie72002

date maited notice

courtroom On
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FT/ deputy’s ; . rr
initials 7
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Diaeiinrecehied it “a iting deputy initials



their veracity.? Other times, Plaintiff responds to Defendant’s
factual contentions with what appear to be fragmented legal
arguments, citing cases or amendments to the U.S. Constitution, but
not specifying whether the facts themselves are admitted or denied.
At only two points does Plaintiff make a satisfactory response to
Defendant’s factual contentions, denying the veracity of the facts,
while specifically supporting the denial with reference to the
record.?

Though Plaintiff's filings are inadequate, the Court is
nonetheless aware that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant who is
entitled to a degree of accommodation by the Court. But see
McConnell v. Carlton Club/Ritz Carlton Hotel, No. 01 C 1874, No.
2001 WL 1539163 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2001) (“Although pro se

plaintiffs are entitled to more lenient standards in some

2 Plaintiff responded to several of Defendant’s factual
contentions with comments such as “Not Probable Cause,” “Still No
Probable Cause,” “Fourth Amendment U.S. Const.-did not see same
thing when he opened the door-expected privacy within confines of
the van ‘dwelling’-still not probable cause.” These responses and
others like them do not provide the Court with any coherent sense
of the Plaintiff’s view of the facts, let alone the specific
denials or admissions required under Local Rule 56.1.

3. Plaintiff specifically denied that the dog’s paws were
taped together (Def.’s 56.1 Stat. @ 35) and cited the omission of
such details in Defendant’s police report and the photographs
Defendant took at the scene. Plaintiff further denied that
Defendant found any identification cards in Plaintiff's
possession (Def.’s 56.1 Stat. 4 36), citing the absence of any
mention of the cards in Defendant’s police report, and the
Defendant’s failure to produce the cards themselves as evidence.
These two denials constitute the only instances of Plaintiff's
compliance with Local Rule 56.1(b) (3).

11


rules... when the non-movant has failed to submit a factual
statement in the form called for by the pertinent rule and thereby
conceded the movant’s version of the facts.” Waldridge v. American
Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994).

Here, notwithstanding its late filing, Plaintiff’s response to
Defendant’s motion falls drastically short of fulfilling the
requirements of Local Rule 56.1. Plaintiff’s response consists of
two documents: Plaintiff’s Answer to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, and a Brief Memorandum of Law to Accompany
Plaintiff’s Answer. Neither document contains a response to each
of the numbered paragraphs in Defendant’s motion. Both documents
are devoid of specific references to the record, affadavits, or
other evidence to support Plaintiff's disagreement as required by
Local Rule 56.1.

In large part, Plaintiff’s Answer and Memorandum of Law
consist of disjointed points of law intermixed with disputes
regarding Defendant’s factual allegations. It is difficult to
follow Plaintiff's arguments, and still more difficult to discern
when and with what support Plaintiff is disputing Defendant’s
factual allegations. Although at one point, in the midst of
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, Plaintiff does specifically address
several of Defendant’s factual allegations by paragraph number,
Plaintiff fails to make meaningful statements in disagreement. For
instance, the vast majority of Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant's
factual contentions take issue with the relevance of the facts, not

10


motion, because “discredited testimony is not [normally] considered
a sufficient basis for drawing a contrary conclusion.” Id. at 256-
57.
DISCUSSION

The Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. As
discussed below, Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s motion
suffered from fatal procedural defects. Moreover, even if the Court
had considered Plaintiff’s substantive arguments, Defendant would
still be entitled to summary judgment.
A. Procedural Issues

Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s motion is procedurally
flawed in two ways. First, Plaintiff failed to file his response in
a timely fashion. Second, Plaintiff’s response did not provide a
systematic response to the numbered paragraphs in Defendant’s
statement of undisputed facts, as required by Local Rule 56.1. Both
defects are fatal to Plaintiff’s response.

1. Plaintiff’s Failure to Timely File His Response.

The Court may, at its discretion, refuse to accept an untimely
response to a motion for summary judgment. Jovanovic v. In-Sink-
Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir
2000). When a party fails to respond to a motion for summary
judgment, such inaction constitutes an admission by the non-movant
that there are no disputed issues of genuine fact warranting a

trial. Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 1995). The


Plaintiff stated his name as Todd Adams, but could not produce any
identification. (Connors Aff., Ex. 1 to Defendant’s Rule 56.1
Statement of Facts, I1 27-31.)

Shortly thereafter, Officer Gary Johnston arrived on the scene
and stood with Plaintiff while Defendant entered the van. Inside
the van, Defendant observed no other persons, but did find a black
dog, along with numerous personal items in disarray. Defendant
claims that, upon closer inspection, he observed that the dog’s
front paws and hind legs were bound together with duct tape. In
addition, the dog’s snout was bound shut with duct tape and duct
tape was wrapped around and behind its head. Continuing his search,
Defendant sorted through some of the items inside the van, and
discovered a purse containing expired identification cards and
driver’s licenses of four or five females. Defendant placed
Plaintiff under arrest, handcuffed him, searched his person, and
placed him in the rear seat of Defendant’s squad car. (Connors
Aff., Ex. 1 to Defendant’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts, 14 32-38.)

After arresting Plaintiff, Defendant claims that he returned
to the van to remove the tape from the dog’s front and back paws.
Defendant photographed the dog and the contents of the van, and
then removed the duct tape from the dog’s snout and head. (Ex. A to
Connor’s Aff.) Another patrol officer then transported the dog to
the City of Blue Island dog kennel. (Connors Aff., Ex. 1 to

Defendant’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts, 71 39-43.)


officer “has probable cause to make an arrest when ‘the facts and
circumstances within [his] knowledge and of which [he has]
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a
prudent [person] in believing that the [suspect] had committed or
was committing an offense.’” Jones v. Webb, 45 F.3d 178, 181 (7th
Cir. 1995) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). The
facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest must reasonably
support more than a bare suspicion that an individual committed an
offense, but need not make it a probable certainty. U.S. v. Garza-
Hernandez, 623 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1980). Typically, if the
issue of probable cause arises in an unlawful arrest suit, the
existence of probable cause is an issue for the jury. Maxwell v.
City of Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1993). However,
if the material facts are not in dispute and would not allow a
reasonable jury to find for the non-movant, the Court may find that

probable cause existed as a matter of law. Id.

At the time Plaintiff was arrested and his dog and van were
impounded, Defendant knew the following: 1) someone in the
neighborhood had complained of a disturbance in Plaintiff’s van; 2)
the van was shaking; 3) he observed someone inside the van
apparently “pounding on something;” 4) after Defendant opened the
side door, Plaintiff exited and remarked that he and his dog were

“not getting along;” 5) the dog was bound with duct tape; and 6)

14


only was the dog evidence, but the unacceptable alternative to

impounding the dog was leaving it unattended to roam the streets.

Plaintiff makes numerous arguments against the existence of
probable cause, only two of which merit discussion. First,
Plaintiff argues that the offense for which he was arrested,
cruelty to animals, carried only a monetary penalty, with no
possibility of jail time. Therefore, Plaintiff argues, probable
cause to believe that Plaintiff committed cruelty to animals, even
if proven, cannot justify his arrest. Contrary to Plaintiff's
contention, the Supreme Court has recently stated that “if an
officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has
committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he
may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). Thus

Plaintiff’s argument is without merit.

Plaintiff also argues that, because he lived in his van, it
should be treated as a dwelling rather than a vehicle for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Plaintiff contends that the warrant-less
search of his van constituted an illegal search of his home, and
that the evidence discovered during that search- namely, the dog
and the identification cards- is fruit of a poisonous tree.
However, Plaintiff’s argument does not square with the law and the

facts in this case.

16


Prairie Street, Blue Island, Illinois. Upon arriving at the scene
of the reported disturbance, Defendant observed a red van, parked
facing east on the south side of the street. Defendant stopped his
squad car in the middle of Prairie Street, facing east behind the
van, and directed his spotlight toward the rear of the van.
(Connors Aff., Ex. 1 to Defendant’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts,
G@ 15-19.)

The rear windows of the van were covered or blacked out.
Defendant exited his squad car and approached the van on the
driver’s side. As Defendant neared the van, he observed that it
was shaking, and heard sounds from the inside of the van, which
sounded as if a person were banging against the inside wall of the
van. Defendant looked inside the driver’s window, observed no one
in the driver’s seat, and proceeded to the front of the van to look
through the windshield. Defendant then observed a person in the
cargo area of the van, who was moving his arms and “appeared as if
he was pounding on something.” (Connors Aff., Ex. 1 to Defendant's
Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts, I 20-26.)

Immediately upon observing this conduct, Defendant proceeded
to the passenger’s side of the van and opened the cargo door, at
which point Plaintiff exited through the open door. Defendant then
asked Plaintiff “what was going on and who was in the van?”
Plaintiff replied that he and his dog were “not getting along.” In

response to Defendant’s query regarding Plaintiff’s identity,


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TODD STEVEN ADAMS Case No. 01 C 6025
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
) Magistrate Judge
} Arlander Keys
)
)
)
)
)

CHRISTOPHER CONNORS
Defendant. ‘
pacuered

AUG 09 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
Plaintiff, Todd Steven Adams, sued Defendant, Christopher Connors,
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Defendant lacked probable cause to arrest him, impound his van, and
seize his dog. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants
Defendant’s Motion.

THE FACTS

In November of 2000, Plaintiff resided in the City of Blue
Island, Illinois, in a 1986 red Chevy Astrovan along with his dog,
Sir Pfizgig Pflatzgraph Pfeirook Bl Loco Diablo (hereinafter “the
dog”). (Pl.’s Answer to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 7 4.)

On November 26, 2000, at approximately 6:26 p.m., Defendant
responded to a radio dispatch call directing him to investigate a

reported disturbance inside a red van in the vicinity of 2214

>


circumstances, the standards do not diminish in complying with
procedural rules.”) The Court is guided in these matters by “the
well-known admonition that district courts must construe pro se
pleadings liberally.” Hudson v. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir.
1998)%. Where a pro se litigant’s pleading is otherwise
understandable, courts may be generous in dealing with a technical
failing. Id. However, an unlawful arrest action is extremely fact
sensitive and, even when dealing with a pro se litigant, “courts
are [not] ‘obliged in our adversary system to scour the record
looking for factual disputes.’” Greer v. Board of Educ. of City of
Chicago, I11., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 921-22).

In this case, construing Plaintiff's filings liberally, the
Court still cannot accept Plaintiff's filings as fulfilling either
the letter or the spirit of Local Rule 56.1(b)(3). This is not a
case of an otherwise understandable document being discarded on a
technicality. Plaintiff filed a total of forty-one pages of text
in response to Defendant’s motion. Throughout those forty-one

pages, Plaintiff vacillates between points of law and issues of

‘Further, in an effort to aid pro se litigants, this
district has enacted Local Rule 56.2, which requires a party
moving for summary judgment against a pro se litigant to serve
the opposing party with a plain-language explanation of exactly
what the party must do to comply with Local Rules and oppose the
motion. Defendant complied with Local Rule 56.2 by serving
Plaintiff with the required statement on April 15, 2002, one
month before Plaintiff's filing deadline.

12


Plaintiff was in possession of four or five women’s identification

cards and/or driver’s licenses.

A prudent, reasonable police officer, faced with this set of
circumstances, could have believed, beyond a bare suspicion, that
Plaintiff had committed the offense of cruelty to animals.
Defendant, responding to a call reporting a disturbance, personally
observed the van shaking, and saw Plaintiff apparently pounding on
something. Moreover, by stating that he and his dog were “not
getting along,” Plaintiff solidified Defendant’s suspicion that the
arm movements he saw through the windshield were Plaintiff hitting
his dog. Once Defendant discovered Plaintiff’s dog bound in duct
tape, the circumstantial evidence clearly indicated that Plaintiff
was mistreating the dog. Under these circumstances, the Court
finds that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for cruelty

to animals, as prohibited by Blue Island Ordinance.

Moreover, once Plaintiff was under arrest, it was reasonable
to impound Plaintiff's vehicle, both as a source of potential
evidence, and to avoid leaving the vehicle unattended on the
street. See U.S. v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that an impoundment must either be supported by probable
cause or be carried out in fulfillment of the police officer’s role
as caretaker of the streets). Finally, it was entirely reasonable

and necessary for the police to take possession of the dog; not

15