alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 13, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-40361

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

PEDRO CASILLAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:04-CR-619-ALL

--------------------

Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Pedro Casillas appeals his guilty-plea conviction and

sentence for possessing with the intent to distribute heroin. 

We affirm the district court’s judgment.

Casillas, who was sentenced after the Supreme Court issued

its decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),

argues that he is entitled to retroactive application of Booker’s

Sixth Amendment holding, but that the remedial portion of

Booker’s holding, which made the United States Sentencing
No. 05-40361

-2-

Guidelines advisory, may not be applied in his case without

violating the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the

Constitution. Casillas’s argument is foreclosed by this court’s

precedent. See United States v. Austin, 432 F.3d 598, 599-600

(5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Scroggins, 411 F.3d 572, 575-76

(5th Cir. 2005). 

Casillas argues, for the first time on appeal, that 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) are unconstitutional in light of

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). As Casillas

concedes, that argument also is foreclosed by this court’s

precedent. See United States v. Slaughter, 238 F.3d 580, 582

(5th Cir. 2000). Casillas raises the issue solely to preserve it

for Supreme Court review. 

Casillas next argues that the district court erred in

ordering him to cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample as a

condition of supervised release. Casillas’s claim is not ripe

for review and is therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

See United States v. Riascos-Cuenu, 428 F.3d 1100, 1102 (5th Cir.

2005), petition for cert. filed (Jan. 9, 2006) (No. 05-8662);

United States v. Carmichael, 343 F.3d 756, 757, 761-62 (5th Cir.

2003). 

Finally, Casillas argues that we should remand his case to

the district court for correction of a clerical error in the

judgment. The Government concedes that remand is appropriate

because the judgment erroneously reflects that Casillas was
No. 05-40361

-3-

convicted of a drug offense involving 3.96 kilograms of heroin

when in fact, he was convicted of an offense involving only 2.28

kilograms of heroin. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to the

district court for the limited purpose of correcting the clerical

error. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 36. 

AFFIRMED; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION;

REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERROR IN JUDGMENT
#### Noel Ray SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E.J. SMITH; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-55980.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed July 5, 2011.

Noel Ray Smith, Vacaville, CA, pro se.

*520Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Noel Ray Smith appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. *Lambert v. Blodgett,*393 F.3d 943, 965 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

Smith’s due process claim fails to state a claim for relief because he alleges no facts that give rise to a liberty interest. *See Sandin v. Conner,*515 U.S. 472, 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (requiring “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” or a restraint that exceeds the prisoner’s sentence in “an unexpected manner” to state a liberty interest; “The chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance [at a prisoner’s parole hearing] is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause”). Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed this claim.

The district court dismissed Smith’s action under Fed. R. of Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to file first amended complaint alleging only Smith’s First Amendment claim in a timely manner. However, the record reflects that Smith delivered to the prison authorities a first amended complaint by the deadline set forth in the court’s previous orders. *See Douglas v. Noelle,*567 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (9th Cir.2009) (discussing prison mailbox rule). Accordingly, we vacate in part and remand for further proceedings on Smith’s First Amendment claim.

Smith’s remaining contentions, including those raised in his objections to the magistrate judge’s order, are unavailing.

Smith’s motion to proceed in forma pau-peris is denied as moot because he has already been granted in forma pauperis status.

Smith shall bear his own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Dianna C. WALKER, Appellant, v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY CORRECTION; David Eberhard, In Official Capacity as Director, Arkansas Department of Community Correction, Appellees.

No. 11-1717.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 7, 2011.

Filed: Nov. 7, 2011.

Before MURPHY, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Dianna Walker appeals from the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary judgment on her Title VII retaliation claim against her former employer, Arkansas Department of Community Correction, and its director, David Eberhard. Upon careful de novo review, this court concludes the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Walker’s retaliation claim because she failed to present a trialworthy issue as to whether the proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for her termination was a pretext for unlawful retaliation. *See EEOC v. Trans States Airlines, Inc.,*462 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir.2006) (employee’s violation of company policy was legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing him); *Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc.,*442 F.3d 1112, 1120-21 (8th Cir.2006) (in retaliation context, plaintiff may demonstrate material issue regarding pretext by (1) indirect evidence showing that employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence because it has no basis in fact, or (2) persuading court that prohibited reason likely motivated employer, which is dependent on showing sufficient evidence of intentional retaliation exists for jury to believe plaintiffs allegations); *Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co.,*462 F.3d 925, 935 (8th Cir.2006) (proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination need not be correct if employer honestly believed asserted grounds at time of termination; plaintiff failed to show proffered reason for termination was pretext where she did not assert that employer did not honestly believe she was accountable for violations of policy when they fired her for those violations); *Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp.,*625 F.3d 1076, 1088 (8th Cir.2010) (where plaintiff asserted that she was disciplined more severely than her coworkers, but did not produce any evidence that coworkers were involved in or accused of same offense and were disciplined in different ways, plaintiff could not establish employer’s reasons for disciplining her were pretext for retaliation), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2904, 179 L.Ed.2d 1250 (2011); *fusing v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,*639 F.3d *730507, 514 (8th Cir.2011) (standard of review).

This court affirms. *See*8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
```

Exhibit 10.29 Agreement with E & E Communications

                              **E & E COMMUNICATIONS**
                          Public & Investor Relations
                 25052 Salford Street o Laguna Hills, CA 92653
                         949/707-5365 o 949/707-5375
                       http://www.eandecommunications.com

                              **CONSULTING AGREEMENT**

This Agreement is made between GenoMed, Inc., 909 S. Taylor Ave., St. Louis, MO.
63110 and E & E Communications, 25052 Salford St., Laguna Hills, CA 92653. This
agreement is made and entered into on Feb. 6, 2004.

AGREEMENTS

     1.   E & E Communications will provide to GenoMed the following services:

          o Assist in the preparation of all Company news releases and other
            Company public announcements.
          o Pitch GenoMed stories to the media, including national, feature
            and trade press. Develop story lines to make the Company attractive
            to the major media and financial community.
          o Prepare targeted materials for the media and potential investors.
            Assist in continuous communications that emphasize the key strengths
            and competitive advantages of the Company's management, business
            plan and technologies.

COMPENSATION

     1.   GenoMed will pay E & E Communications $2000 a month for the work
          described above, payable at the start of the month upon receipt of an
          invoice from E & E Communications. Also, GenoMed will be billed
          expenses for which the Company granted prior approval, such as PR
          Newswire costs to issue news releases, without any markup by E & E
          Communications.

CANCELLATION

     1.   This agreement can be cancelled by either party upon 30-day notice.

/s/Paul Knopick               /s/David W. Moskowitz
Paul Knopick                  David W. Moskowitz, MD
Principal                     President, CEO, Chairman and Chief Medical Officer
E & E Communications          GenoMed, Inc.
```
# C_2021452EN.01004702.xml

| 8.11.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 452/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.11.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 452/47

---

Order of the General Court of 7 September 2021 — BT Group and Communications Global Network Services v Commission

(Case T-482/19) (1)

(2021/C 452/61)

Language of the case: English

The President of the Second Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 312, 16.9.2019.

---
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

**(18 U.S.C. §1350)**

In connection with Oriental Financial Group Inc.’s(“Oriental”) quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30,2012, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), I, José Rafael Fernández, President and Chief Executive Officerof Oriental, hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350), that: 

*(1)    *The Report fully complies withthe requirements of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and 

*(2)    *The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of Oriental. 

In witness whereof, Iexecute this certification in San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 9th day of November,2012. 

 

                                                                                                                                By:         /s/José Rafael Fernández

                                                                                                                                                JoséRafael Fernández

                                                                                                                                                Presidentand Chief Executive Officer

 

 

 

----
# Official Journal C 22/20 J

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 22 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6620 January 2023 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 22

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6620 January 2023

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2023/C 22/01 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2023/C 22/02 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Cases where the Commission raises no objections | 10 |

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2023/C 22/01

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  )

1

1

2023/C 22/02

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Cases where the Commission raises no objections

10

---

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance. |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance.

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

    In connection with the Quarterly Report of Loral Orion, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Bernard L.
Schwartz, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

       (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

       (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

                                                     /s/ BERNARD L. SCHWARTZ
                                                     -----------------------
                                                        Bernard L. Schwartz
                                                      CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

May 10, 2004


                                       29
**Exhibit
      32.4**




**CERTIFICATION
      OF PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**


**OF
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




I,
      the
      undersigned James Roundtree, Chief Financial Officer of FIRSTPLUS Financial
      Group, Inc. (the “Company”), do hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:





1.  The
      Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A of the Company for the year ended December 31,
      2006 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated:
              April 30, 2007
            
            /s/
              James
              RoundtreeJames
              RoundtreeChief
                Financial Officer
              Principal Accounting
                Officer
#### Hawthorne Gardens, LLC, Respondent, v Salman Home, Inc., et al., Defendants, and Rafael Salman, Appellant.

[941 NYS2d 489]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Milton A. Tingling, J.), entered January 19, 2011, as amended January 21, 2011, to the extent that it directed entry of judgment in the principal amount of $686,208 in plaintiffs favor against defendant guarantor, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Although the guaranty was only for the first two years of the lease, the court properly awarded the landlord the entire accelerated rent amount through the end of the six-year lease term. This did not subject the individual guarantor to a greater obligation than he intended or offend the rule of strict construction of guaranties *(see generally Lo-Ho LLC v Batista,*62 AD3d 558, 559-560 [2009]). The possibility of acceleration was in the *426lease that the guarantor signed, and tenant’s default in rent and the acceleration took place within the period of the guaranty.

We have considered appellant’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur — Friedman, J.E, DeGrasse, Freedman and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.
Exhibit 23.1


               REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
               --------------------------------------------------


Board of Directors
Pelican Properties International Corp.
  and Subsidiaries
Fort Monroe, Virginia

We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheet of Pelican
Properties International Corp. and Subsidiaries (the "Company") as of December
31, 2000, and the related consolidated statements of operations, changes in
shareholders' equity, and cash flows for each of the two years then ended. These
consolidated financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's
management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these consolidated
financial statements based on our audits.

We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting
the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes
assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by
management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation.
We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements referred to above present
fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Pelican Properties
International Corp. and Subsidiaries as of December 31, 2000, and the results of
their operations and their cash flows for each of the two years then ended in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.

The accompanying consolidated financial statements have been prepared assuming
that the Company will continue as a going concern. As discussed in Note 1 to the
financial statements, the Company has incurred substantial losses from
operations and has experienced working capital deficiencies. The Company
currently has a working capital deficit of $3,472,080 as of December 31, 2000.
Additionally, the Company incurred a loss from operations before income taxes of
$1,160,007 and had negative cash flows from operations of $90,190. These matters
raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a going
concern. Management's plans concerning these matters are also described in Note
1 to the financial statements. The financial statements do not include any
adjustments that might result from the outcome of these uncertainties.





/s/  Illegible
----------------------------
Certified Public Accountants


Orlando, Florida
February 16, 2001
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Cubby Gibson, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lawrence Tonetti, J.), rendered on November 1, 1983, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted. *(See, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur — Sandler, J. P., Sullivan, Carro, Lynch and Rosenberger, JJ.
(121 App. Div. 516.)

#### HENNEKE v. SCHMIDT.

<Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 11, 1907.)

1. Pleading—Residence of Defendant—Necessity.

The County Court, being of limited jurisdiction, is not within the rule that jurisdiction of courts of general jurisdiction is presumed; and under Const, art. 6, § 14, giving the court jurisdiction of actions for money where defendant resides in the county and the sum demanded does not exceed $2,000, it is necessary that a complaint allege defendant’s residence in the county, to show jurisdiction.

[Ed1. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 39, Pleading, § 61.]

2. Same—Amendment.

In an action in the County Court, the court, having obtained jurisdic- ■ tion of defendant, if he resided in the county, could permit plaintiff to amend the complaint by showing such residence.

Appeal from Kings County Court.

Action by William Henneke against John William Schmidt. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Argued before JENKS, HOOKER, GAYNOR, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.

Wm. H. Klinker, for appellant.

A. F. Van Thun, Jr., for respondent.

GAYNOR, J.

The county court is of limited jurisdiction, and is therefore not within the rule that the jurisdiction of courts of general jurisdiction is presumed. It has jurisdiction of an action to recover money where the defendant resides in the county and the sum demanded does not exceed $2,000. Const. N. Y. art. 6, § 14. It can no longer be gainsaid that it is necessary that the complaint in such an action should allege that the defendant is a resident of the county in order to state a cause of action of which the court has jurisdiction. Gilbert v. York, 111 N. Y. 544, 19 N. E. 268. The complaint here did not contain that allegation. The defendant at the opening of the trial moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction appearing. The plaintiff moved to amend by alleging that the defendant resided in the county at the commencement of the action, and offered to prove that fact. The court denied the motion to amend on tlie ground that it had no jurisdiction of the action to do anything in it, and granted the motion to dismiss. This arose out of momentary inadvertence. The court got jurisdiction of the action by the summons, if the defendant was a resident of the county in fact, and could have allowed the amendment.

The judgment should be reversed.

Judgment of the County Court of Kings county reversed, and new trial ordered; costs to abide the final award of costs. All concur.