UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-4524

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NORBERTO QUINONES, a/k/a Jose Rosado, a/k/a “J”,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 07-4525

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SEAN ADONIS SIMPSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 07-4667

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.
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LIONEL DEWAYNE GILLIAM, a/k/a Lionel Dewayne Gillium,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District 

of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. 

(8:04-cr-00234-RWT)

Submitted: March 18, 2010 Decided: May 21, 2010

Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph Roll Conte, Washington, D.C.; Parks N. Small, Federal 

Public Defender, Columbia, South Carolina; William B. Purpura, 

Jr., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Rod J. Rosenstein, 

United States Attorney, Deborah A. Johnston, Michael Pauzé, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Greenbelt, Maryland, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

In this consolidated appeal, Norberto Quinones appeals 

his convictions of conspiracy to distribute marijuana and crack 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006) (Count 1); 

conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a drug 

trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006) 

(Count 2); possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (Counts 3 and 4); and possession of 

a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 5).

Sean Simpson appeals his convictions of conspiracy to 

distribute marijuana and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841 (Count 1); conspiracy to possess firearms in 

furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 2); possession and discharge of a firearm 

in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 8); conspiracy to commit carjacking, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006) (Count 9); carjacking, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Counts 10 and 14); possession and 

discharge of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts 11 and 15); murder, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (2006) (Count 16); and 

possession of a firearm by an unlawful drug user, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (Count 22).
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Lionel Gilliam appeals his convictions of conspiracy 

to distribute marijuana and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841 (Count 1); conspiracy to possess firearms in 

furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 2); possession and discharge of a firearm 

in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts 6, 8, 17, 19); murder, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (Counts 7, 16, 18, 20); conspiracy to commit 

carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Count 9); 

carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Counts 12, 14); 

possession and discharge of a firearm in furtherance of a crime 

of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts 13, 15); 

and possession of a firearm by an unlawful drug user, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (Count 21).

I. Quinones’s issues

A. Joinder of Defendants

Quinones raises two related issues on appeal. First, 

Quinones contends that the district court erred in denying his 

motion for a separate trial. Quinones argues that, as he was 

not charged with any of the violent crimes with which the other 

two Defendants were charged, he was greatly prejudiced by the 

admission of evidence of such crimes in his trial, as this
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evidence would not have been admissible against him had he been

tried alone.

We review de novo whether the initial joinder of 

defendants was proper under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8. United 

States v. Mackins, 315 F.3d 399, 412 (4th Cir. 2003). However, 

even if initial joinder was proper, Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 provides 

for severance where joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant or 

the government.” This court reviews a district court’s refusal 

to sever for abuse of discretion. Mackins, 315 F.3d at 412. 

The burden of demonstrating prejudice lies with the party 

seeking severance. See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 

341 (4th Cir. 2008).

Here, Quinones makes no argument that initial joinder 

was improper under Rule 8. Therefore, we review the district 

court’s denial of Quinones’s pretrial severance motion for abuse 

of discretion. A court abuses its discretion “only where the 

trial court’s decision to deny a severance deprives the 

defendants of a fair trial and results in a miscarriage of 

justice.” United States v. Harris, 498 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 

2007). There is no miscarriage of justice where “the verdicts 

demonstrate that the jury meticulously sifted through the 

evidence and appraised the independent evidence against each 

defendant.” United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1361 (4th Cir. 

1996). After reviewing the record, we find that Quinones fails 
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to demonstrate that the district court’s refusal to grant his 

severance motion deprived him of a fair trial or resulted in a 

miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, this issue is without 

merit.

B. Joinder of conspiracy and carjacking charges

Next, Quinones contends that the conspiracy and 

carjacking charges were improperly joined under Rule 8(b) of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 8(b) provides:

The indictment or information may charge 2 or more 

defendants if they are alleged to have participated in 

the same act or transaction, or in the same series of 

acts or transactions, constituting an offense or 

offenses. The defendants may be charged in one or 

more counts together or separately. All defendants 

need not be charged in each count.

We review de novo whether offenses in an indictment are properly 

joined. United States v. Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378, 384-85 (4th 

Cir. 2005). Joinder is proper where the offenses have a logical 

relationship with one another. Id. at 385. A logical 

relationship exists “when consideration of discrete counts 

against the defendant paints an incomplete picture of the 

defendant’s criminal enterprise.” Id. Having reviewed the 

record, we find that the carjacking and narcotics charges were 

properly joined, and this issue is similarly without merit.
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II. Simpson’s and Gilliam’s issues

A. Admission of Iesha Johnson’s testimony

In their first issue, Simpson and Gilliam contend that 

the district court erred in allowing the grand jury testimony of 

Iesha Johnson, in the form of an audio tape and a transcript, to 

be introduced as trial exhibits. Though Simpson and Gilliam 

concede that the evidence was admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 

801(d)(1)(A) (prior inconsistent statement), they nevertheless 

contend that allowing the statement to be included in various 

forms as exhibits at trial was unfairly prejudicial, in 

violation of Fed. R. Evid. 403. We review a district court’s 

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 2007).

Under Rule 403, relevant evidence “may be excluded if 

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice.” However, the record reflects that the 

district court properly considered the probative versus 

prejudicial value of the evidence when allowing it to be 

submitted to the jury as an exhibit. Accordingly, we find that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 

admission of Johnson’s grand jury testimony.*

 * Though not fully addressed in the Defendants’ original 

brief, Defendants argue in their reply brief that the district 

court erred in allowing Iesha Johnson’s statement to the police 

(Continued)
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B. Cross-examination of Iesha Johnson

During cross-examination, Gilliam’s counsel twice 

sought to question Johnson as to the reason her grand jury 

testimony differed from her trial testimony. The Government 

objected each time, contending that the question was 

inconsistent with Johnson’s testimony on direct examination that 

she never appeared before the grand jury. The judge sustained 

each objection. On appeal, Gilliam and Simpson assert that 

denying their counsel the opportunity to inquire into the 

inconsistency deprived them of their Sixth Amendment right to 

cross-examine Johnson.

We review a trial court’s limitations on a defendant’s 

cross-examination of a witness for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 220 (4th Cir. 2006). If a 

constitutional error is demonstrated, it is then subjected to 

harmless-error analysis. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 

673, 684 (1986). Though the Sixth Amendment guarantees the 

accused the right to cross-examine witnesses against him, such a 

right is not unlimited. See id. at 678-79. Instead, “trial 

 

to be admitted as a jury exhibit, in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 

803(5). However, as this issue was not articulated in 

Defendants’ original brief, it is not properly before us on 

appeal. Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, 100 F.3d 1150, 1152 n.2 

(4th Cir. 1996).
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judges retain wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on 

such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other 

things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the 

witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only 

marginally relevant.” Id. After reviewing the record, we find

that the district court did not unreasonably limit Gilliam’s 

cross-examination of Iesha Johnson. 

C. Joinder of drug and carjacking charges

Finally, Simpson and Gilliam contend that the district 

court erred in refusing to sever the carjacking counts from the 

narcotics charges. However, for the same reasons stated in 

section I.B., above, we find that the carjacking and narcotics 

charges were properly joined. Therefore, Simpson’s and 

Gilliam’s claims are without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court and deny Quinones’s motion to file a pro se supplemental 

brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately addressed in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED