IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

In the Matter of the Marriage of

LAWRENCE L’HOMMEDIEU, No. 53639-1-II 

(consolidated with No. 54702-3-II)

Respondent,

And

SHELANE L’HOMMEDIEU, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

CRUSER, J. – Shelane L’Hommedieu1appeals from the trial court orders addressing the 

division of property and spousal maintenance in the dissolution action brought by her former 

husband Lawrence L’Hommedieu. Shelane2also appeals from the trial court’s denial of her 

various motions for reconsideration. She argues that the trial court erred when it (1) characterized 

Lawrence’s Oregon PERS3income as his separate disability income, (2) failed to address her 

community interest in various assets that Lawrence took or liquidated before the current 

dissolution action was filed, (3) precluded her from introducing evidence or questioning Lawrence 

 

1 Shelane is a self-represented party. 

2 Because Shelane and Lawrence share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names 

to avoid confusion.

3 Public Employees Retirement System. 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

November 9, 2021
Consolidated Nos. 53639-1-II / 54702-3-II

2

about missing assets, (4) failed to address her community property interest in the River Glen Road 

property and concluded that Lawrence had not acted in bad faith when he deeded the property to 

his father, (5) failed to distribute all of the parties’ vehicles and unequally distributed the vehicles 

it did address, (6) failed to find that Lawrence acted in bad faith when he removed her as the 

survivor beneficiary of the Oregon PERS pension, (7) refused to rule on Lawrence’s violation of 

the temporary orders regarding the family health insurance and failed to order Lawrence to pay 

her additional health care costs, (8) failed to consider all relevant factors, including each parties’ 

resources, when awarding spousal maintenance, (9) failed to resolve unpaid child support issues, 

(10) set the temporary child support lower than the amount in the economic table and child support 

worksheets without explanation, (11) restricted her access to her portion of the PERS individual 

account program (IAP)4account until Lawrence turns 55 years old and limited her access to the 

account records, (12) assigned various debts to her, and (13) referred to allegations of opiate abuse 

in a clarification order. Shelane also request costs.

Because of the disparity in income between the parties, despite Lawrence’s ability to pay, 

we hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it set Shelane’s spousal maintenance at 

$1,500 a month for three years. Accordingly, we remand this matter for the trial court to determine 

the spousal maintenance. We otherwise affirm. Because Shelane has not filed the required financial 

affidavit, we deny Shelane’s request for costs.

 

4

“ ‘Individual account program’ means the defined contribution individual account program of 

the Oregon Public Service Retirement Plan established under ORS 238A.025.” ORS 238A.005(9) 

(ORS 238A.005 was amended in 2021. See 2021 Or. Laws ch. 135, § 3 [, at ___]. Because the 

amendment does not impact our analysis, we cite to the current version of the statute.).
Consolidated Nos. 53639-1-II / 54702-3-II

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FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

Starting in 1996, Lawrence began working for the Tualatin Valley Fire & Rescue in 

Oregon. Shelane and Lawrence were married on April 29, 1998. The couple had two girls, who 

were born in November 1998 and August 2002. 

Lawrence became disabled in 2010, after 14 years of service with the fire department. In 

2011, his application for a PERS “disability retirement allowance” based on “a duty-related 

disability” was approved. Tr. of Excepts of Test. from Audio Files (Tr.) (May 24, 2019) at 21. At 

the time of trial, Lawrence was receiving $6,269 a month from his PERS disability. He also 

qualified for social security disability in the amount of $2,660 a month, and for veteran’s disability 

in the amount of $3,458.07 a month. 

The marital community ended on September 1, 2013. Lawrence filed for dissolution in July 

2014. 

In December 2015, the trial court issued temporary orders requiring Lawrence to pay 

Shelane $3,000 a month in spousal maintenance and $1,500 a month in child support.5 These orders 

also restrained Lawrence from “assigning, transferring, borrowing, lapsing, surrendering or 

changing entitlement of any insurance policies of either or both parties whether medical, health, 

life or auto insurance.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) (Oct. 1, 2019) at 3. They further required Lawrence to 

pay the health insurance premiums for the children and to notify Shelane when the coverage 

terminated. 

 

5 The standard child support calculation was stated as $2,524 per month. 
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II. TRIAL

The case went to trial in May 2019. At trial, Lawrence called his mother, himself, and 

Shelane as witnesses. Shelane, acting pro se, called herself as a witness. And Lawrence called 

himself as a rebuttal witness. 

Shelane has not supplied this court the complete transcript from the two-day trial. Instead, 

she has supplied selected portions of the record. The transcribed portions of the verbatim report of 

proceedings show numerous short gaps throughout and completely omits (1) Shelane’s testimony 

as Lawrence’s witness, which lasted just over an hour and (2) Lawrence’s rebuttal testimony, 

which lasted approximately 36 minutes.

A. LAWRENCE’S WITNESSES

1. LAWRENCE’S MOTHER’S TESTIMONY

Lawrence’s mother testified about a property (the River Glen Road property) that 

Lawrence and Shelane had purchased with Lawrence’s father during the marriage. Lawrence’s 

mother testified that the property was purchased for $250,000 and that she and her husband used 

$200,000 of their line of credit on their home to finance the purchase for Lawrence and Shelane. 

At some point Lawrence quitclaimed the property to his father, but Lawrence continued to pay 

them back to cover the interest payments on the line of credit that financed the property. She also 

testified that the property was sold for $179,000 “a few months” before the trial. Tr. (May 24, 

2019) at 16.

2. LAWRENCE’S TESTIMONY

Lawrence testified about his injury, his disability, his other disability benefits, and his 

“PERS disability determination” as described above. Id. at 20. He testified that his PERS 
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“application for disability retirement allowance was approved for a duty-related disability” in 

2011, and that his disability status was reexamined almost yearly. Id. at 21.

Lawrence also testified that he and Shelane had initially separated in March 2012, when 

Shelane left the family home with their children while he was away. He testified that after 

discovering that Shelane had left, he found that she had taken all of their gold and silver with her. 

Shelane filed for dissolution in April 2012, but they reconciled in June 2012. They separated again 

on September 1, 2013, and he filed this dissolution action in 2014. 

In regard to the River Glen Road property, Lawrence testified that he purchased the 

property with his father and that his father had provided $200,000 of the purchase price and he 

(Lawrence) provided $50,000 towards the purchase. He had initially purchased the property to put 

his and Shelane’s home’s septic system on the lot, but they did not have to do so. Lawrence stated 

that his father was involved simply to help him (Lawrence) and Shelane, and that the agreement 

was that the purchase of the land “wouldn’t cost [his father] any money.” Id. at 35. Lawrence 

testified that his father no longer owned the land. 

On cross-examination, Shelane presented Lawrence with evidence that he had purchased 

the property for $200,000, not $250,000, but Lawrence asserted that there was “a mistake” on the 

sales history and the deed that had since been corrected. Id. at 44. Also on cross-examination, 

Lawrence testified that he had quitclaimed the deed for the property to his father when “EPG”6

filed a lien on the property and that EPG later filed a claim against him and his father under the 

fraudulent transfer act. Id. at 55.

 

6 EPG appears to be an investment company; there is no detail regarding EPG’s action against 

Lawrence in the record beyond the fact it existed and there was a judgment against Lawrence.
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In regard to health insurance, Lawrence testified that he had Blue Cross health insurance 

coverage for his family when the temporary orders were filed. But he stopped paying the insurance 

premiums around July 2016, when he was struggling with his mental health and had been 

“admitted to a mental hospital.” Id. at 60-61. After leaving the hospital, he was “assigned a 

fiduciary to assist [him] with” the dissolution and help him pay his bills. Id. at 61. Lawrence 

testified that he had previously entrusted $22,000 to someone who had “ripped [him] off” and part 

of the fiduciary’s role was to make sure he handled his money appropriately. Id.

Lawrence also testified that the family home was foreclosed on around the time the current 

dissolution was filed. When asked what property was left, Lawrence testified that there was just 

their personal property and some vehicles. He identified the vehicles as collectable Plymouth 

‘Cuda with an estimated value of between $35,000 and $50,000;7a motorcycle valued at $3,000; 

a Chevy Nova valued at $3,000 to $5,000; a Subaru; and a “VersaClimber.” Id. at 38.

Regarding child support, Lawrence testified that he had been paying $919 in child support 

and that Social Security sent that money to Shelane. He believed that the social security payment 

was a garnishment. He denied having taken social security child benefits that were supposed to go 

to their daughters. 

Lawrence admitted that he had “cash[ed] in some accounts in order to prevent [Shelane] 

[from] . . . attempting to take them, just like she did with our gold and silver.” Id. at 81. But he

testified that he did not cash in these accounts “with the intent to keep it from [Shelane]” or “hide 

any assets from Shelane.” Id. at 81-82.

 

7 Lawrence testified that he had purchased 1500 ounces of silver at some point after he and Shelane 

had initially reconciled, but he asserted that he traded this silver for the Plymouth ‘Cuda. 
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B. SHELANE’S WITNESSES

The only witness in Shelane’s case in chief was Shelane. 

Shelane asserted that Lawrence had tricked her into signing documents that removed her 

as the “survivor beneficiary on the pension account.” Id. at 87. She also presented evidence that 

there had been substantial withdrawals from joint investment accounts between 2010 and 2013, 

which she asserted demonstrated that Lawrence had been draining these accounts in an attempt to 

hide these assets. While presenting numerous exhibits in support of this argument, the trial court 

asked Shelane “[i]f there’s a way to speed it up” because they were running out of time. Id. at 103.

Shelane also asserted that the property transfer between Lawrence and his father was 

fraudulent and that Lawrence was the one who took the gold and silver that went missing when 

she left the home in 2012.8 Additionally, Shelane asserted that Lawrence had been receiving social 

security child benefits that were intended for their children and that he did not provide her with 

those benefits even though the children were living with her. She stated that Lawrence had only 

paid the court ordered child support “out of his own pocket” for six months. Id. at 136.

She further testified that Lawrence had violated the temporary orders by letting the family’s 

health insurance lapse, which caused her to incur substantial medical debt when she suffered a 

“ministroke” in December 2016 and required her to purchase her own health insurance and cover 

additional medical expenses. Id. at 140. She stated that she did not believe Lawrence’s testimony 

that he had let the insurance lapse due to mental health issues because he had previously moved to 

cancel the insurance and that motion had been denied. 

 

8 She valued the gold and silver at $51,000. 
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Shelane testified that her stroke was disabling, but she did not qualify for social security 

disability benefits because she had not worked enough. She also questioned whether Lawrence 

was actually disabled based on “things that [she had] seen during the marriage and people that he 

knows” who were also faking disabilities. Tr. (May 28, 2019) at 7.

III. TRIAL COURT ORDERS, MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION

On July 9, 2019, the trial court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of 

law:

Specific Findings of Fact

1. [Lawrence] has been found to be disabled by State of Oregon, the Social 

Security Administration and Veteran's Administration. [Shelane] did not present 

sufficient compelling testimony or evidence to disturb the conclusions of these 

governmental entities regarding [Lawrence’s] disability status.

. . . . 

3. [Shelane’s] performance in representing herself in this complicated 

dissolution action involving multiple days of testimony, hundreds of exhibits and 

examination and cross-examination of witnesses somewhat undermines her 

argument that she is not employable due to cognitive disabilities. At the same time, 

her performance in this litigation does not establish conclusively that she is 

immediately employable or that a job she could obtain would provide her with a 

standard of living commensurate with the financial position [Lawrence] will 

occupy post-dissolution.

. . . .

5. I am not persuaded by the evidence submitted on this record that 

[Lawrence] engaged in fraud in connection with the selection of beneficiaries for 

his Oregon PERS account.

6. I am not persuaded by the evidence on this record that [Lawrence] 

fraudulently or falsely appropriated Social Security benefits for himself that were 

allegedly due to the parties’ children.

7. I am not persuaded by the evidence on this record that [Lawrence] 

improperly failed to pay any support (child or spousal) that he was court-ordered to 
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pay during the parties’ separation. Indeed, although [Shelane] alleges a deficit 

exists with regard to payments she and the children did not receive for “years” she 

concedes that this amount is unknown and she is “unable to calculate” it.

8. I find that the property in Skamania County on River Glen Road was 

purchased by [Lawrence] and his father in or around 2006 for approximately 

$250,000. This real property was then subsequently sold in 2018 for approximately 

$179,000. [Lawrence] is currently making monthly payments to his parents to repay 

for the investment they made in this property. The substantial evidence on the 

record established that the sale of this property did not provide any profit that would 

be subject to division in this action.

9. There is not sufficient evidence on this record that the money in the 

parties’ bank accounts at separation and the silver and gold assets that [Shelane] 

claims are subject to division are actually assets that are available for distribution. 

Similarly, there is not sufficient evidence on this record to conclude precisely what 

became of these assets or that either party is entitled to an offsetting judgment in 

this matter to account for these unavailable assets. For instance, without persuasive 

proof, both parties have charged the other with secreting the silver and gold assets 

at or around the time of separation. Neither party has presented sufficient evidence 

on this issue for the court to make a conclusive finding of fact one way or another 

regarding these items.

10. [Lawrence] worked for Tualatin Valley Fire & Rescue from 1996-2010. 

[Lawrence] suffered a job-related injury on May 8, 2010. [Lawrence] separated 

from this employer with a disability retirement as of February 28, 2011.

Child Support

1. [Lawrence’s] income is comprised of benefit payments he receives from 

U.S. Veterans Administration, Social Security Disability, and Oregon [PERS]. 

Currently, these payments to petitioner total approximately $12,387.00 per month. 

Given [Lawrence’s] recent determination that some of these assets may be subject 

to taxation the current payment amount may be slightly different going forward. . . 

. 

2. [Shelane] asserts that she has not been employed for a lengthy period of 

time and that she does not possess the requisite skills, training or experience to 

obtain a job of any kind. [Lawrence] counters these arguments by claiming that 

[Shelane] has not attempted to find work and that she outwardly appears competent 

to hold a job. In partial support of this position, [Lawrence] claims that the work 

that [Shelane] did in representing herself in this matter is proof that she can be 

gainfully employed in the current work force. While there is some appeal to this 

logic, it ignores the broader reality regarding [Shelane’s] physical condition, age, 
Consolidated Nos. 53639-1-II / 54702-3-II

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lack of work history, limited education and job skills. That said, [Shelane] 

marshalled a substantial amount of evidence in this case, conducted a deposition of 

[Lawrence] and conducted examinations and cross-examinations of witnesses over 

two days of testimony in a competent and thorough manner. Despite her statements 

that she is not able to process information quickly, her examinations and legal 

argument at trial partially belie her assertions that she is unable to work at anything 

because of cognitive and processing limitations. Furthermore, while [Shelane] 

presented testimony concerning her lack of job experience and current medical 

challenges, there was not a substantial amount of authoritative evidence in the 

record on this issue. Consequently, I will hold [Shelane] to contribute simply the 

minimum amount to child support of $50.00 per month for purposes of calculating 

the proper amount owed by [Lawrence], and not impute a minimum-wage income 

to her at this time.

3. [Lawrence] shall be obligated to pay child support until the parties’

youngest daughter reaches 18 years of age. . . .

Spousal Maintenance

1. In every dissolution action where the issue of spousal maintenance is 

presented the court is obligated by statute to consider several factors in deciding 

how much, if any, support should be ordered. The factors include: the financial 

resources of the party seeking maintenance; the time necessary to acquire sufficient 

education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate 

employment; the standard of living established during the marriage; the duration of 

the marriage; the age, physical and emotional condition, and financial obligations 

of the spouse seeking maintenance; and the ability of the obligated spouse to meet 

his or her needs and financial obligations while meeting those of the spouse seeking 

maintenance.

2. In the present matter, [Shelane] has limited financial resources and has 

needed the temporary maintenance she has received to meet her regular expenses. 

It is uncertain what time would be necessary for [Shelane] to complete training or 

education to enable her to be self-sufficient. Indeed, [Shelane] seems to indicate 

that she will never be able to obtain employment of any kind given her health issues, 

lack of skills, age and lack of job experience. As for the parties’ standard of living 

during marriage, it appears that they were comfortable. This marriage lasted 15 

years before the most recent separation in 2013, and there has obviously been a 

lengthy period of separation. [Shelane] has not provided any information regarding 

efforts, if any, she has undertaken to obtain self-sufficiency since separation. At the 

same time, it is undisputed that for much of this time, [Shelane] was responsible for 

raising the parties’ children including home schooling. Nevertheless, the testimony 

presented at trial established that [Shelane’s] home schooling duties are effectively 

complete or nearly so. Therefore, [Shelane] will be largely freed from these 
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responsibilities to pursue employment. [Shelane] has alleged that her age and 

physical limitations make it difficult for her to meet her basic financial needs while 

[Lawrence] has relatively little difficulty meeting his own regular and recurring 

financial obligations.

3. [Lawrence], for his part, claims that spousal maintenance is inappropriate 

here because: he has paid a significant amount of support to date; [Shelane] has not 

satisfied her obligation to become self-sufficient; and any award of spousal 

maintenance should not extend beyond [their youngest daughter’s] graduation from 

high school or 18[th] birthday, whichever first occurs. [Shelane’s] request for 

maintenance is less easily summarized, but appears to seek one-half of 

[Lawrence’s] monthly payments from Oregon PERS presumably as long as it is 

paid to [Lawrence]; $130 per month to apply toward a life insurance policy on 

[Lawrence] in favor of [Shelane]; and $1,622.49 per month payments for 14 years. 

In arriving at these numbers, [Shelane] appears to conflate property settlement 

issues and spousal maintenance under the rubric of “alimony.” While it is certainly 

proper for a court to consider a spousal maintenance award in the overall context 

of the property and/or child support awards in order to achieve a fair financial result 

for the parties, it is also important that the court differentiate between these items 

in issuing its decision so there is no misunderstanding regarding the actual terms of 

the court’s award and judgment. [Shelane’s] request for three separate “alimony” 

awards risks creating this confusion and the court will decline to adopt this 

approach to the ruling herein.

4. [Lawrence] contends that he has paid a substantial amount of spousal 

maintenance to [Shelane] already due to the temporary order requirement that he 

pay $3,000.00 per month in spousal support since November of 2015. His argument 

is that this is sufficient amount of support given the duration of the marriage and 

the position of the parties. This is not, however, the full scope of considerations that 

the court will examine in making this decision. Indeed, an important consideration 

for the court is the relative financial positions of the parties and the financial 

prospects that they will each face going forward. Here, [Lawrence] is in much better 

financial situation than [Shelane] and that is likely to be the case for the foreseeable 

future. So, while a permanent award of maintenance is rare in Washington, there 

are circumstances where a just result may require spousal maintenance to continue 

for a period of time where, as is the case here, [Lawrence] will have a much greater 

post-dissolution income than [Shelane], and [Shelane] faces significant barriers to 

becoming self-sufficient (health, age, job experience, etc.). Specifically, if no 

changes were made, [Lawrence] will receive approximately $12,387.00 per month 

from his various disability payments post-dissolution, while [Shelane] does not 

have a recent job history that would provide her with a monthly salary even close 

to that amount. In this setting, our state’s appellate courts have held that the 

maintenance can occasionally be properly utilized as a “flexible tool by which the 
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parties’ standard of living may be equalized for an appropriate period of time.” See, 

[In re Marriage of Washburn, 101 Wn.2d 168, 179 677 P.2d 152 (1984)].

5. I find that [Lawrence] will have sufficient assets post dissolution to 

maintain a standard of living that relatively comports with the manner in which he 

lived during marriage even while paying maintenance to [Shelane]. [Shelane], on 

the other hand, has a limited potential to achieve this standard of living even with 

a maintenance payment from [Lawrence]. So, while it is not necessarily the court’s 

duty to equalize the parties’ post-dissolution financial situations, the relative 

financial circumstances of the parties can be part of the calculations in setting a 

maintenance award. Taking all these factors into consideration I am persuaded that 

a fair and equitable result in this case is for [Lawrence] to pay [Shelane] spousal 

maintenance of $1,500 per month for three years. This award takes into account my 

findings that there will be a disparity in the relative financial positions of the parties 

post-dissolution without this order of maintenance and that [Shelane] presented 

sufficient evidence to show that she will have a difficult time obtaining gainful 

employment given her lack of experience and medical problems. Contrary to 

[Lawrence’s] assertions, I do not find [Shelane’s] claims regarding her medical 

problems and lack of recent or extensive job experience to be “unsubstantiated” . . 

. or the product of a “ruse” tied to the home schooling of the parties’ children. That 

said, I am persuaded that [Shelane’s] role in home schooling will not prevent her 

from getting a job. In addition, her testimony that she is unable to “keep up” in a 

modern workforce given her physical limitations and lack of experience may make 

[Shelane’s] transition back to employment difficult, but not impossible. The

maintenance provided herein is designed to assist her in making this transition.

Property Division

l. The major dispute with regard to property division in this matter is 

whether or not the payments [Lawrence] receives for his disabilities are subject to 

division. Not surprisingly, both parties contend that this issue is easily resolvable 

in their respective favor without acknowledging that Washington’s appellate courts 

have long struggled with finding such precise characterizations of these sorts of 

assets. The linch pin of this question centers on whether or not the disability 

payments are intended to serve as a replacement of future compensation or are more 

akin to retirement benefits or deferred compensation. The former type of asset is 

typically not distributable while the latter is more properly subject to division. A 

hybrid situation exists where the payments are not clearly denominated or classified 

as either retirement benefits or disability benefits. Predictably, the appellate courts 

have struggled with these issues and in some cases sent differing signals to trial 

courts on how to proceed.

2. In examining the benefits that [Lawrence] currently receives, it is not 

entirely clear in each instance whether or not they are more like retirement benefits 
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13

or disability benefits. While [Shelane] concedes that [Lawrence’s] military 

disability income is not subject to division, she asserts that the entirety of the 

benefits he receives from Oregon PERS should be subject to division. One of 

[Shelane’s] stated reasons for this division is her claim that [Lawrence] is receiving 

more in compensation from disability benefits than he did while he was employed. 

While this is not a proper basis on its own for dividing the assets, there is a more 

apposite rationale for examining these PERS assets and their possible division. In 

addition, it is clear from appellate court precedent that this question of a benefit’s 

divisibility is not resolved simply by the label that is attached to it. Finally, it is 

well-settled that the characterization of property as community or separate is not 

controlling in division of property between the parties, but “ [‘]the court must have 

in mind the correct character and status of the property . . . before any theory of 

division is ordered.[’] ” [In re Marriage of Brewer, 137 Wn.2d 756, 766, 976 P.2d 

102 (1999) (second alteration in original) (quoting Blood v. Blood, 69 Wn.2d 680, 

682, 419 P.2d 1006 (1966)).]

3. Here, [Lawrence’s] benefits from Oregon PERS are a form of hybrid 

benefits that were made available to him due to his disability, but also are a form 

of retirement benefit. With regard to the IAP account [Lawrence] has through 

PERS, this asset has not been distributed to [Lawrence] and has been accumulating 

value separate from any effort of [Lawrence] after he ceased making contributions 

to the principal from his paychecks. As such, this asset more closely resembles a 

retirement account that is properly considered a community asset subject to 

division. Consequently, I find that [Shelane] shall be entitled to receive 43% of 

[Lawrence’s] IAP account on the accrual of this benefit during the parties’ twelve 

years of marriage during [Lawrence’s] 14 year career with Tualatin Valley Fire & 

Rescue. . . .

4. With regard to [Lawrence’s] remaining PERS income, it is clear that the 

payments he has received and will receive until age 55 represent payment for 

income not received due to his disability and this asset is his separate property not 

subject to division. However, the payments due to him after retirement age would 

be properly considered a community asset subject to division according to the 

Washington appellate courts that have addressed this issue. Although most of 

[Lawrence’s] career as a firefighter in Oregon occurred during marriage, there was 

a period of time prior to marriage where he was working for Tualatin Valley Fire 

& Rescue and accruing these benefits. Consequently, I find that [Shelane] shall be 

entitled to 43% of the pension retirement benefits [Lawrence] is entitled to receive 

commencing with his retirement eligibility at 55 years of age.

5. With regard to the remaining property assets, each party is to retain the 

property they currently possess as their own -- free from any claim from the other 

party. Specifically, [Lawrence] shall retain the Cuda automobile, and [Shelane] 

shall keep the Mazda 3 vehicle she currently possesses. Each party has an 
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independent obligation to execute documents necessary to release any interest they 

may possess in the property held by the other party. Failure to provide the other 

party with the necessary releases and conveyance documents to transfer these items 

of property may expose the recalcitrant party to contempt sanctions.

6. In arriving at this award, I have determined what I believe is fair, just and 

equitable under all of the circumstances, and while I have taken into consideration 

the character of the assets that are subject to division here, I have also exercised my 

discretion to achieve a property division that, in conjunction with the other aspects 

of this order, presents an equitable division of the parties’ assets.

CP (Oct. 1, 2019) at 128-34.

On September 23, 2019, Lawrence moved for “clarification” of the trial court’s July 9, 

2019 order. CP (Aug. 14, 2020) at 1. On April 15, 2020, the trial court issued an order on 

Lawrence’s motion for clarification. In this clarification, the trial court mentioned that it had 

considered Lawrence’s allegations that Shelane was an opiate user when determining Shelane’s 

employability and that no clarification was needed regarding this issue. 

Also on April 15, 2020, the trial court entered its “[f]indings and [c]onclusions,” which 

incorporated the July 9, 2019 order and the April 15, 2020 clarification order by reference, and a 

final divorce order. Id. at 70. The April 15, 2020 findings and conclusions included two exhibits, 

Exhibit H and Exhibit W, which described what assets and debts were awarded to Lawrence and 

to Shelane respectively.9

Shelane filed several motions for reconsideration, each addressing a separate set of issues. 

The trial court denied the motions for reconsideration. 

 

9 The trial court also entered a final child support order directing a transfer payment from Lawrence 

for the support of the remaining minor child in the amount of $1,383, starting on March 1, 2020. 

This support was to continue until the child turned 18, which occurred in August 2020. 
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ANALYSIS

I. OREGON PERS DISABILITY

Shelane first argues that the trial court erred in characterizing the disability portion of 

Lawrence’s Oregon PERS “retirement pension” as his separate property. Br. of Appellant (No. 

53639-1-II) at 11. Shelane asserts that (1) because the PERS account was an asset acquired during 

the marriage, the trial court should have characterized it as community property, and (2) there was 

no evidence that the disability payment was “anything other than a retirement pension” and the 

trial court’s own findings demonstrate that the benefits were not entirely disability payments. Id.

at 15. We disagree.

As part of making a just and equitable distribution of property in a marriage dissolution 

action, the trial court is required to determine whether the property before it is community or 

separate property. In re Marriage of Groves, 10 Wn. App. 2d 249, 254, 447 P.3d 643 (2019), 

review denied, 195 Wn.2d 1005 (2020). We review a trial court’s characterization of property as

community or separate de novo, but we review the findings of fact on which that characterization 

was based for substantial evidence. Id.; In re Marriage of Skarbek, 100 Wn. App. 444, 447, 997 

P.2d 447 (2000). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. Brewer, 137 Wn.2d at 766.

Shelane is correct that the trial court recognized that, as a whole, the Oregon PERS benefits 

were mixed disability and retirement benefits. That premise is demonstrated by the court’s 

conclusion that “[Lawrence’s] benefits from Oregon PERS are a form of hybrid benefits that were 

made available to him due to his disability, but also are a form of retirement benefit.” CP (Oct. 1, 

2019) at 133.
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16

But the trial court also concluded that the PERS benefits Lawrence was currently receiving 

were in the form of disability benefits, stating that “[w]ith regard to [Lawrence’s non-IAP account] 

PERS income, it is clear that the payments he has received and will receive until age 55 represent 

payment for income not received due to his disability.” Id. So, even though the PERS benefits as 

a whole represented hybrid benefits, the trial court concluded that the benefit payments Lawrence 

was currently receiving were disability benefits and, thus, his separate property.

Under Washington law “disability benefits that are intended to be compensation for lost 

future earnings are not distributable upon dissolution.” Groves, 10 Wn. App. 2d at 259. And, based 

on the record before us, the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the PERS income 

Lawrence was receiving was based on his disability. For instance, not only was Lawrence also 

receiving disability income from two other sources, there was evidence that to continue his PERS 

payments he had to regularly demonstrate that he continued to be disabled and that if he again 

became employable his PERS payments would cease. Furthermore, Shelane herself stated in her 

own “proposed settlement award” that Lawrence’s “disability retirement becomes regular PERS 

retirement” when he turns 55.10 CP (Oct. 19, 2019) at 95, 98. Accordingly, the trial court did not 

err by characterizing Lawrence’s PERS disability income as his separate property.

 

10 Shelane asserts that Lawrence’s PERS tax forms establish that the Oregon PERS benefits were 

“from retirement/pensions/annuities and not disability pay.” Br. of Appellant (No. 53639-1-II) at 

14. This argument is not persuasive. Lawrence’s 1099-R forms from the Oregon PERS state that 

the PERS payments were “[d]istributions from [p]ensions, [a]nnuities, [r]etirement or [p]rofit-

[s]haring [p]lans, IRAs, [i]nsurance [c]ontracts, etc.” Ex. 12. Although this shows that the 

payments were distributions from a PERS fund, the reference to “etc.” shows that this list is not a 

finite list. Accordingly the 1099-R forms do not conclusively establish that the funds Lawrence 

was receiving were retirement funds rather than disability funds.
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II. ASSETS TAKEN PRIOR TO THIS DISSOLUTION ACTION BEING FILED

Shelane next argues that the trial court erred “by not protecting her community property 

interest in” numerous assets that she asserted Lawrence took possession of prior to filing this 

dissolution action, including various bank and investment accounts, gold, and silver. Br. of 

Appellant (No. 53639-1-II) at 20. This arguments fails.

In evaluating the parties’ property in a dissolution proceeding, “the trial 

court may properly consider a spouse’s waste or concealment of assets.” In re 

Marriage of Wallace, 111 Wn. App. 697, 708, 45 P.3d 1131 (2002), . . . . But it is 

well settled that, “[w]hen exercising this broad discretion, a trial court focuses on 

the assets then before it—i.e., on the parties’ assets at the time of trial. If one or 

both parties disposed of an asset before trial, the court simply has no ability to 

distribute that asset at trial.” In re Marriage of White, 105 Wn. App. 545, 549, 20 

P.3d 481 (2001) (footnote omitted).

In re Marriage of Kaseburg, 126 Wn. App. 546, 556, 108 P.3d 1278 (2005). Consideration of each 

party’s responsibility for creating or dissipating marital assets is relevant to the just and equitable 

distribution of property. In re Marriage of Steadman, 63 Wn. App. 523, 527, 821 P.2d 59 (1991);

In re Marriage of Clark, 13 Wn. App. 805, 808-09, 538 P.2d 145 (1975).

Although Lawrence admitted that he liquidated some community assets in 2012,11 and that 

he sold some additional silver in 2013 in order to buy the Plymouth ‘Cuda,12 there is nothing in 

the record before us establishing that these assets were available to distribute at the time of trial. 

Thus, the trial court did not err in failing to distribute these assets.

 

11 Lawrence testified that Shelane took the couple’s silver and gold in 2012, when she temporarily 

left the residence with their children. He admitted that he then cashed out some of the couple’s 

other assets. But he testified that he was trying to keep Shelane from taking them, like she did the 

silver and gold, and that he did not intend to keep these assets from her or hide them. 

12 Tr. (May 24, 2019) at 72.
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18

And to the extent Shelane is arguing that the trial court should have considered the waste 

or concealment of these assets when distributing the parties’ other assets, the partial record 

supplied by Shelane omits significant portions of her testimony as Lawrence’s witness and 

Lawrence’s rebuttal testimony, and is therefore inadequate to allow us to review this issue in as 

far as it relates to the assets that were disposed of in 2012.13 RAP 9.2(b) (party seeking review 

must provide an appellate record that contains all of the evidence necessary and relevant to the 

issues to be reviewed); Bulzomi v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 72 Wn. App. 522, 525, 864 P.2d 996 

(1994) (an “insufficient record on appeal precludes review of the alleged errors.”).

III. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE RELATED TO MISSING ASSETS

Shelane also argues that the trial court restricted her ability to question Lawrence about 

“where these assets went” and that the trial court did not believe that evidence related to these 

assets was relevant. Br. of Appellant (No. 53639-1-II) at 32. Shelane does not establish that she is 

entitled to relief on these grounds.

The record shows that the trial court merely attempted to expedite the process of admitting 

the exhibits Shelane asserted were relevant to demonstrating that Lawrence had liquidated some 

community assets before this current dissolution proceeding. Merely expediting the admission of 

exhibits does not show that the trial court attempted to prevent Shelane from admitting any relevant 

evidence.

And to the extent Shelane is also arguing that the trial court prevented her from questioning 

Lawrence about these assets, she fails to direct us to any portion of the record to support this 

 

13 To the extent Shelane is also arguing that the trial court misapplied the burden of proof as to 

“where these assets went,” we cannot address that argument given the missing portions of the 

record. Br. of Appellant (No. 53639-1-II) at 32.
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19

argument. We hold pro se litigants to the same standard as attorneys, requiring compliance with 

all procedural rules. In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). RAP 

10.3(a)(6) requires the appellant to cite to the “relevant parts of the record.” Because Shelane fails 

to direct us to the relevant part of the record, we decline to consider this argument.

IV. RIVER GLEN ROAD PROPERTY

Shelane further argues that the trial court erred “by not protecting her community property 

interest in the [River Glen Road property],” and by not concluding that Lawrence had acted in bad 

faith when he gave the land to his father. Br. of Appellant (No. 53639-1-II) at 23. Shelane does 

not establish that she is entitled to relief on these grounds.

First, the lot was sold prior to the trial, so it was not before the court for distribution. 

Second, the record before us establishes that there was no equity in the lot as it was purchased for 

at least $200,000 and sold for $179,000. Because there was no equity in the lot, there was no 

community asset to distribute.

And to the extent Shelane is arguing that the trial court should have considered Lawrence’s 

transfer of this property to his father as waste or concealment of this asset when distributing the 

parties’ other assets, the partial record supplied by Shelane omits significant portions of her 

testimony and Lawrence’s testimony and is therefore inadequate to allow us to review this issue.

RAP 9.2(b); Bulzomi, 72 Wn. App. at 525.

V. VEHICLES

Shelane next argues that trial court erred when it awarded the Mazda to her and the 

collectable Plymouth ‘Cuda to Lawrence and when it failed to “disperse all of the remaining 

marital vehicles.” Br. of Appellant (No. 53639-1-II) at 29. She contends that the division of the 
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20

Mazda and the Plymouth and the other vehicles “was not indicative of a just and fair division.” Id.

She also argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for reconsideration on this issue. 

The trial court’s July 9, 2019 order stated, in part, “With regard to the remaining property 

assets, each party is to retain the property they currently possess as their own -- free from any 

claim from the other party. Specifically, [Lawrence] shall retain the Cuda automobile, and 

[Shelane] shall keep the Mazda 3 vehicle she currently possesses.” CP (Oct. 1, 2019) at 134. 

Although the trial court did not specifically describe the other vehicles, it clearly states that each 

party was to retain ownership of the vehicles currently in their possession. Accordingly, the trial 

court did not err by failing to distribute all of the vehicles.

As to whether the division of the vehicles was just and equitable, it is true that the Mazda 

awarded to Shelane had significantly less value than the combined value of the Plymouth ‘Cuda 

and the other vehicles awarded to Lawrence. But when determining whether a property division is 

just and equitable, we cannot view the value of one classification of assets in isolation. See In re 

Marriage of Larson and Calhoun, 178 Wn. App. 133, 137, 313 P.3d 1228 (2013) (in a dissolution 

proceeding all property is before the court). Accordingly, this argument fails.

VI. CHANGE OF SURVIVOR BENEFICIARY

Shelane further argues that the trial court erred “by not finding [Lawrence] had acted in 

bad faith by removing her as the survivor beneficiary of the Oregon PERS retirement pension.” 

Br. of Appellant (No. 53639-1-II) at 32-33. She contends that the trial court erred by not requiring 

Lawrence to prove that the removal was in good faith. Because significant portions of Shelane’s 

and Lawrence’s testimony are not included in the record before us, we are unable to review this 

issue. RAP 9.2(b); Bulzomi, 72 Wn. App. at 525.
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VII. VIOLATION OF TEMPORARY HEALTH INSURANCE ORDERS

Shelane argues that the trial court erred when it refused to rule on Lawrence’s violation of 

the temporary orders regarding the family health insurance and failed to order Lawrence to pay 

her additional health care costs. Shelane further argues that the trial court erred by denying her 

motion for reconsideration on this same ground. Again, because significant portions of Shelane’s 

and Lawrence’s testimony are not included in the record before us, we are unable to review this 

issue. RAP 9.2(b); Bulzomi, 72 Wn. App. at 525.

VIII. SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE

Shelane next argues that the spousal maintenance was not just and equitable and that the 

trial court did not “fairly consider[ her] age, medical condition, disabilities, lack of skills, work 

history, financial obligations.” Br. of Appellant (No. 53639-1-II) at 39. She asserts that the spousal 

support award was an abuse of discretion “in relation to the values in the assets it awarded to 

[Lawrence].”14 Id.

We review a trial court’s decision in a dissolution action for manifest abuse of discretion. 

In re Marriage of Landry, 103 Wn.2d 807, 809-10, 699 P.2d 214 (1985) (citations omitted). We

will affirm the trial court’s decision, “unless no reasonable judge would have reached the same 

conclusion.” Id. at 809-10.

 

14 Shelane also appears to assert that the trial court “placed itself in an ally position with 

[Lawrence],” and accepted everything he said as true. Br. of Appellant (No. 53639-1-II) at 39. She 

further alleges that the trial court placed her in a position wherein she had to represent herself and 

then used her ability to do so against her when evaluating her claim that she was disabled, but then 

failed to question Lawrence’s disability in light of evidence that may have brought that disability 

into question. While we are troubled that Shelane’s self-representation, which was likely forced as 

a result of her financial inability to hire counsel, was effectively used by Lawrence as evidence 

against her, these arguments address the trial court’s weight and credibility determinations, which 

we do not review on appeal. In re Estate of Palmer, 145 Wn. App. 249, 266, 187 P.3d 758 (2008).
Consolidated Nos. 53639-1-II / 54702-3-II

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When deciding whether to award maintenance, the trial court must consider factors that 

“include the financial resources of each party; the age, physical and emotional condition, and 

financial obligations of the spouse seeking maintenance; the standard of living during the marriage; 

the duration of the marriage; and the time needed by the spouse seeking maintenance to acquire 

education necessary to obtain employment.” In re Marriage of Luckey, 73 Wn. App. 201, 209, 868 

P.2d 189 (1994); RCW 26.09.090. The only limitation placed on a court’s ability to award 

maintenance is that the amount and duration must be just in light of the relevant factors. Washburn, 

101 Wn.2d at 178. Maintenance is “not just a means of providing bare necessities, but rather a 

flexible tool by which the parties’ standard of living may be equalized for an appropriate period of 

time.” Id. at 179.

Shelane contends that the trial court did not “fairly consider[ her] age, medical condition, 

disabilities, lack of skills, work history, financial obligations.” Br. of Appellant (No. 53639-1-II) 

at 39. But the record shows that the trial court fully considered each of these factors. The record 

also shows that the trial court considered the parties’ “relative financial positions,” noting the vast 

disparity in the parties’ incomes.15 CP (Oct. 1, 2019) at 132. Thus, the only remaining question is 

whether the trial court’s decision was just in light of these factors. Washburn, 101 Wn.2d at 178.

The trial court awarded Shelane $1,500 a month in maintenance for three years. The court 

stated,

This award takes into account [its] findings that there will be a disparity in the 

relative financial positions of the parties post-dissolution without this order of 

maintenance and that [Shelane] presented sufficient evidence to show that she will 

 

15 Although the trial court could not divide Lawrence’s social security and veteran’s benefits as 

community assets, it could consider the income from those sources when determining the amount 

of maintenance. See In re Marriage of Weiser, 14 Wn. App. 2d 884, 901-02, 475 P.3d 237 (2020) 

(quoting Perkins v. Perkins, 107 Wn. App. 313, 327, 26 P.3d 989 (2001)).
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23

have a difficult time obtaining gainful employment given her lack of experience 

and medical problems.

CP (Oct. 1, 2019) at 132.

But even with the $1,500 maintenance award,16 Shelane’s financial resources and income 

pale in comparison to Lawrence’s resources, which amount to over $12,000 a month. Importantly, 

Shelane was not awarded any assets that she would be able to access before Lawrence turned 55 

apart from an aging, high-mileage vehicle. And the trial court found that Shelane’s lack of a recent 

job history made it unlikely that she would get a job with a salary approaching Lawrence’s monthly 

income. Although we are generally hesitant to find an abuse of discretion when examining spousal 

maintenance, “where, as here, the disparity in earning power and potential is great, [we] must 

closely examine the maintenance award to see whether it is equitable in light of the post-dissolution 

economic situations of the parties” In re Marriage of Sheffer, 60 Wn. App. 51, 56, 802 P.2d 817 

(1990). In this instance, the disparity in income, despite Lawrence’s ability to pay, is significant 

enough to allow us to find that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding only $1,500 a month 

in maintenance for three years despite Shelane’s lack of access to any other assets until Lawrence 

turns 55. Accordingly, we remand this matter for revision of the maintenance awarded by the trial 

court.17

 

16 We note that this is half the amount of the temporary support that the trial court originally 

granted. 

17 Although “we do not mandate a maintenance award of a specific amount or duration[,] [w]e 

commend to the trial court’s just discretion . . . consideration of an award tailored to the 

commencement of receipt of retirement benefits.” Sheffer, 60 Wn. App. at 58 n.2 (citing In re 

Marriage of Bulicek, 59 Wn. App. 630, 633-36, 800 P.2d 394 (1990)).
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IX. UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT

Shelane argues that the trial court erred when it failed to resolve unpaid child support issues 

in the final orders. She also argues that the trial court erred when it failed to resolve this issue when 

it denied her motion for reconsideration. Once again, because significant portions of Shelane’s and 

Lawrence’s testimony are not included in the record before us, we are unable to review this issue. 

RAP 9.2(b); Bulzomi, 72 Wn. App. at 525.

X. TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS

Shelane further argues that the trial court erred when it set the child support in the 

temporary orders lower than the amount in the economic table and child support worksheets. But 

Shelane has not provided us with the record from the proceedings that resulted in the temporary 

orders, so we cannot address this issue. RAP 9.2(b); Bulzomi, 72 Wn. App. at 525.

XI. RESTRICTING ACCESS TO PERS IAP ACCOUNT

Shelane next argues that the trial court erred by restricting her access to her portion of the 

PERS IAP account until Lawrence turns 55 years old and limiting her access to the account 

records. She asserts that there was no evidence that supports this restriction and that this restriction 

violates ORS 238A.375 because Lawrence had access to the account’s funds when he “retired” in 

February 2012. Br. of Appellant (No. 54702-3-II) at 12. Shelane further argues that the trial court 

erred in denying motion for reconsideration on this matter. 

There is no evidence in the record before us suggesting that the trial court has limited 

Shelane’s access to the IAP account records. Accordingly, we do not further address Shelane’s 

claim that the trial court has limited her access to account records.
Consolidated Nos. 53639-1-II / 54702-3-II

25

And Shelane does not direct us to any evidence in the record regarding when the IAP 

account is available to Lawrence. Nor can we locate any evidence in the record supporting her 

assertion that the funds are available to Lawrence before he turns 55 years old. Although there is 

a possibility that Lawrence could have access to the IAP funds under ORS 238A.375 if he is an 

“inactive member,” the record before us is devoid of any evidence regarding whether Lawrence is 

in fact an “inactive member” with respect to his PERS benefits. Accordingly, Shelane has not 

shown that the trial court erred when it restricted access to the IAP account until Lawrence turns 

55.

Shelane also asserts that since the trial court denied her motion for reconsideration, she has 

obtained a letter from PERS stating that she could access the IAP account at any time, regardless 

of Lawrence’s age. In the appendix to her brief, she attaches a copy of an email from PERS dated 

Monday, August 17, 2020, almost three months after the trial court entered its orders on Shelane’s 

motion for reconsideration. Although this email states that once PERS determined that there was 

an award to her from Lawrence’s IAP account, Shelane “may access those funds at any time by 

applying for them,” the letter is not part of the record, so we cannot consider it. Br. of Appellant 

(No. 54702-3-II), app.

XII. ASSIGNMENT OF DEBT

Shelane next argues that the trial court erred “by assigning unsubstantiated and 

unsupported debts towards [her] within the final orders.” Id. at 4. She further argues that the trial 

court erred in denying motion for reconsideration on this issue. 

To the extent Shelane is challenging the trial court’s statement in Exhibit W that awards 

her community property “subject to any loans, liens, mortgages, or encumbrances,” CP (Aug. 14, 
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26

2020) at 77, the record before us does not show that any of the property awarded to Shelane was 

subject to any loans, liens, mortgages, or encumbrances. Thus, based on this record, the trial court 

did not assign any “debts” to Shelane, and this argument has no merit.

To the extent Shelane is arguing that the trial court failed to adequately address the 

following liabilities: (1) “[t]he attorney’s fees accumulated by [Lawrence] and his father regarding 

the fraudulent transfer act of the land on River Glen Rd.,” (2) “[t]he real estate taxes paid on the 

land located on River Glen Rd[.] . . . ,” and (3) “[t]he debt for Bank of America that was placed 

upon the land on River Glen R[d.],” that argument has no merit. Id. at 108. The trial court’s order 

expressly assigned those debts and liabilities to Lawrence. 

XIII. REFERENCE TO OPIATE USE

Finally, Shelane argues that the trial court erred when it referred in the April 15, 2020 order 

on Lawrence’s clarification motion to Lawrence’s allegations that she was an opiate user. She 

contends that the reference to Lawrence’s allegations was not supported by any evidence in the 

trial record and that including this language in the order “slanders [her].” Br. of Appellant (No. 

54702-3-II) at 5. Shelane also argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for 

reconsideration of this issue. 

The part of the April 15, 2000 order that Shelane challenges references Lawrence’s 

apparent assertions that Shelane had a history of opiate abuse:

The court has previously considered all evidence presented at trial and considered 

[Lawrence’s] arguments regarding [Shelane’s] employability and [Lawrence’s] 

allegations of multi-decade opiate use in making its written decision. No 

clarification is necessary on this issue as the prior written decision is not lacking in 

specificity or clarity.

CP (Aug. 14, 2020) at 69.
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27

In his motion for clarification, Lawrence argued that the trial court had failed to consider 

his argument that Shelane was a long-term opiate user and that the court needed to consider this 

when determining Shelane’s employability. The trial court’s April 15, 2020 order merely stated 

that the court had considered the evidence presented and Lawrence’s allegations and that the prior 

order did not require clarification regarding these allegations. The trial court’s order addressed 

whether the trial court had considered Lawrence’s argument, it did not need to be supported by 

evidence. And in merely confirming that it had considered Lawrence’s argument, it did not slander 

Shelane. Accordingly, this argument fails.

XIV. COSTS

Shelane requests “an award in the associated costs to bring this appeal.” Br. of Appellant 

(No. 53639-1-II) at 47. Because Shelane has not filed and served the required affidavit of financial 

need within 10 days of the hearing date for this appeal, we decline to consider her request for costs. 

RAP 18.1(c).

CONCLUSION

We hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it set Shelane’s spousal maintenance 

at $1,500 a month for three years. Accordingly, we remand this matter for the trial court to 

determine the spousal maintenance.18 We otherwise affirm. We deny Shelane’s request for costs.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

 

18 Shelane requests that we resolve this case without remanding for additional proceedings. But 

because the trial court must exercise its discretion in determining the proper amount of spousal 

support, remand is required.
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28

CRUSER, J. 

We concur:

GLASGOW, A.C.J.

VELJACIC, J.