OBEY GENERAL 

OFTEXAS . 

December 20, 1957 

Honorable Olin Culberson Opinion WW-328 

Chairman, Railroad Commission of Texas 

Austin, Texas Re: Railroad Commlssion jurisdiction 

of motor carrier 

and motor bus 

operations over 

Dallas-Fort Worth. 

Dear Judge Culberson, Turnpike. 

We are in receipt of your letter of October 22, 

1957, wherein you request our opinion on the following 

questions: 

"1 . Is the Dallas-Fort Worth Turnpike and 

the use of it for hauling for hire under the 

jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission a8 is provided by Texas Civil Statutes, Article glib? 

"2 . Is It necessary for any person operating 

a truck and hauling for hire to have a certificate 

of authority from the Railroad Commission to 

engage in such activity?' 

as well as another letter from you dated October 22, 1957, 

in which you ask the following additional question, which 

we designate as No. 3, to-wit: 

“3 . Is it necessary for the operator of a 

bus in the Dallas-Fort Worth area to have a permit 

from the Railroad Commission authorizing him to 

operate over the Dallas-Fort Worth Turnpike under 

Texas Civil Statutes, Article glla?" 

You state that the Railroad Commission of Texas is 

confronted with a growing situation with reference to 

transportation for hire in the area between Fort Worth, 

Arlington, Orand Prairie and Dallas on the new Dallas-Fort 

Worth Turnpike; that the-city limits of each of the above 

named cities are contiguous to each other with the exception of a small area on the Fort Worth end, where the Turnpike from the Dallas direction has already traversed about 

three and one-half miles within the Incorporated city of 

Fort Worth, then goes into an unincorporated area for about 

two miles, and again enters the incorporated limits; and 

that the city limits of each of the adjoining and oontlguous 
Honorable Olin Culberson, Page 2 WW-328 

cities have been extended in most instances to the north 

line of the right-of-way of the Dallas-Fort Worth Turnpike, 

so as to include the Turnpike within the limits of the 

respective cities. 

While you have submitted the questions with 

reference to motor carrier transportation separate from the 

question as to motor bus transportation, we have considered 

that the questions submitted should be disposed of In one 

opinion since they deal with related subjects. 

The authority of the Railroad Commission of Texas 

to regulate motor carrier operations over the public hlghways of this State Is found in Article glib of Vernon's 

Civil Statutes of Texas, as amended. Prior to the passage 

of the Texas Turnpike Statute (Article 6674V,) the answer to 

the first two questions above listed would be made to depend 

on the construction of the term "motor carrier" as that 

term is defined in Article glib, Section 1, subparagraph 

(id 9 wherein it is stated: 

"The term 'motor carrier' means any person, 

firm, corporation, company, co-partnership, association or joint stock association, and their lessees, 

receivers or trustees appointed by any Court 

whatsoever owning, controlling, managing, operating 

or causing to be operated any motor-propelled vehicle used in transporting property for compensation 

or hire over any public highway in this State, 

where in the cburse of such transportation a highway be~tiveen two or more Incorporated cities, towns, 

or villages is traversed; provided, that the term 

'motor carrier" as used in this Act shall not 

include, and this Act shall not apply to motor 

vehicles operated excluslve~ly within the incorpoPated limits of cities or towns." 

The authority of the Railroad Commisslon’of Texas. 

to regulate motor bus'transportation over the public hlghways of this State is found in Article glla of Vernon's 

Civil Statutes of Texas, as amended. Prior to the passage 

of the Texas Turnpike Act above mentioned, the answer to 

the third question above listed would depend on the construction of a "motor bus company" as that term is defined 

in Article glla, Section 1, subdivision (c), wherein it Is 

stated: 

"(c) The term 'Motor Bus Company' when used 

in this Act means every corporation or persons as 

" herein defined, their lessees, trustees, receivers, 

or trustees appointed by any court whatsoever, 

owning, controlling, operatlng or managing any 
Honorable Olin Culberson, Page 3 ~~-328 

motor propelled passenger vehicle not usually 

operated on or over rails, and engaged in the 

business of transporting persons for compensation or hire over the public highways within 

the State of Texas, whether operating over fixed 

routes or fixed schedules, or otherwise; provided further, that the term 'Motor Bus Company' 

as used in this Act shall not include corporations or persons, their lessees, trustees, or 

receivers, or trustees appointed by any court 

whatsoever, insofar as they own, control, operate, 

or manage motor propelled passenger vehicles 

operated wholly within the limits of any incorporated town'or city, and the suburbs thereof, 

whether separately incorporated or otherwise." 

Under these definitions of a "motor carrier" 

and "motor bus companyU, the jurisdiction of the Railroad 

Commission over transportation for hire over the DallasFort Worth Turnpike would turn on whether the Turnpike is 

and whether the provisos in Art. glib, 

Art. glla, Section l(c) which exclude 

strictly local operations from the statutory definition 

of a motor carrier and motor bus company, re,sp;ctd$;y, 

are applicable to the operations involved. 

Turnpike Act, however, authorizing the construction of 

the Dallas-Fort Worth Turnpike, specifically covers this 

subject matter and clearly confers jurisdiction of 

transportation for hire over the Turnpike to the Railroad 

Commission. This Act,~ now carried as Article 6674V, 

Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes (House Bill 4, chapter 

410, Acts, 53rd Legislature, Regular Session, page g67), 

provides in Section 4(c) thereof as follows: 

"Provided, however, any 'Project' or 

'Turnpike Project' which the Authority may construct under the authority of this Act shall at 

all times be deemed a public highway within the 

meaning of Chapter 270, page 399, Acts, Fortieth 

Legislature, 1927, as amended, by Chapter 78, 

page 196, Forty-first Legislature, First Called 

Session, 1929, and Chapter 314, page 698, Acts, 

Forty-first L-e islature, 

& 

1929, as amended by Chapter 277, page 80, Acts, Forty-second Legislature, 

1931, as amended by Chapter 290, page 463, Acts, 

Forty-seventh Legislature, 1941, and to that end 

no motor bus company, common carrier motor 

carrier, speciallzea motor carrier, c0rrePgct 

carrier or other motor vehicle operation POr 

compensation and hire shall be conducted thereon 

except in accordance with the terms and Provisions 

of Chapter 270, page 399, Acts, flortleth J-eglsntii a ure, 1 , page 196, 
Honorable Olin Culberson, Page 4 WW-828 

Acts, Forty-first Legislature, First Called 

Session, 1929, and Chapter 314, page 698, Acts, 

Forty-first Legislature, 1929, as amended by 

Chapter 277, page 480, Acts, Forty-second 

Legislature, 1931, as amended by Chapter 290, 

p&T .~6~~~~~~~s~~~~dS~venth Legislature, 

The Acts of the Legislature referred to in the 

above Article are Articles 911a and qllb, and Vernon's 

Ann. P.C. Articles 16goa and 16wb. 

Considering the Texas Turnpike Act in conneation 

with the Texas Motor Bus Act and the Texas Motor Carrier 

Act, we answer each of the three questions above listed in 

the affirmative. The language of the Legislature in the 

above quoted portion of the Turnpike Act clearly evidences 

a legislative Intent that all operations for hire over 

any turnpike constructed under the provisions of that Act 

are operations over a public highway "within the meaning" 

of the Motor Bus and Motor Carrier Acts, and that a motor 

bus or motor carrier certificate or permit is required 

to conduct any operations for compensation and hire over 

all or any part of such turnpikes. 

We are of the further opinion that even 

without the specific provisions of the Turnpike Act quoted 

above, the answers to your questions would be in the affirmative. A person operating a motor truck for hire from 

Dallas to Fort Worth, under the facts stated, necessarily 

traverses a highway between two incorporated cities and 

such vehicle Is not operated exclusively within the lncorporated limits of cities or towns, and he is thus a motor 

carrier as that term is defined In Art.gllb, Section l(g). 

Similarly, a person engaged in transporting persons for 

hire by motor bus from Dallas to Fort Worth Is a motor bus 

company as that term is defined in Art. glla, Section l(c), 

as such passenger vehicle is not operated wholly within 

the limits of any incorporated city or the suburbs thereof. 

Some question might arise under Article glib as 

to whether motor carrier operations between the other 

cities on the Turnpike are excluded from the Jurisdiction 

of the Commission because the cities are contiguous. ThiS 

department has had occasion to construe the Motor Carrier 

Act, and specifically Section l(g), on various occasions. 

In opinion No. O-1592 an exhaustive review of the legislative history of Section l(g) is set forth, including the 

definition of a motor carrier as oontained In the 1929 

Act and the committee recommendations, House and Senate 

amendments and committee reports on the 1981 Act, which 

among other changes not here pertinent, amended the definition of a motor carrier to its present form. This opinion, 
- 

Honorable Olin Culberson, Page 5 W-328 

and other opinions on this subJect such as opinions No. 

O-1497, No. O-3449 and 0-3449-A, and No. O-3535, uniformly 

hold that the Railroad Commission does not have jurisdiction over transportation from an incorporated city or town 

to an unincorporated town or area, where there are no 

incorporated towns between the two, since no portion of 

the transportation or route Is between or through two or 

more incorporated cities; but if the route passes into or 

through a second incorporated city, then such transportation is under the jurisdiction of the Commission. 

In none of these opinions, nor In any part of 

the Motor Carrier Act, do we find anything to Indicate 

that the distance between the Incorporated city and the 

unincorporated town or the distance be~tween the two incorporated cities or the contiguity of each to the other 

determines the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission. 

It; is true that the use of the word between In 

the phrase . . .where in the course of such transportation 

a highway between two or more incorporated cities, towns 

or villages is traversed" could be argued as denoting or 

requiring an intervening space or distance between the two 

cities. Such a strict construction is not in keeping with 

the overall purposes of the Act. In Texas Turnpike 

Authority v. Sheppard, 279 S.W.2d 302 (Sup. Ct., 1955), 

the Court disposed of a contention that the bond Issue , 

approval was properly refused because the Turnpike Authority was not empowered to build the toll road from a point 

within the city of Fort Worth to a point within the city 

of,Dallas, because the statute authorized and direated the 

construction of a toll road between "the two cities," by 

stating: 

"As used in its literal sense the word 

'between' usually denotes an intervening space 

or distance between two objects and has the effect 

of excluding the boundaries. Blackstone(s La 

ictlonary, 1 5 , p. 833 Louisville & N.R. Cow v 

Loyd, 186 Ala. 119, 65 So. 153; City of Philadell 

phia v. Citizens' Pass. Ry.Co., 151 Pa. 128, 24 

A. 1099. However, from a construction of the 

entire Act we think the word was not used by the 

Legislature in an exclusionary sense or to prohibit the construction of the toll road partly 

within the limits of the two cities. Rather the 

word designates the termini of the route. . . . 

"If the construction of the road was limited 

to begin at the boundary line of one city to the 

boundary of the other the value of the road and the 

purposes for which it is designed, namely: to 
-- , 

Honorable Olin Culberson, Page 6 WW-328 

facilitate vehicular traffic, to effect traffic 

safety, to construct modern expressways, to provide better connections between highways of this 

and adjoining cities, would be largely lost and 

rendered ineffectual. If traffic is to be facllltated the congestion and hazards within the city 

must be to some extent eliminated." 

The streets of incorporated cities or towns are 

also public highways. State v. City of El Paso, 135 Tex. 

359, 143 S.W.2d 366; Lamkin v. State, 123 S.W.2d 662. 

objectives 

Considering the Motor Carrier Act as a whole, the 

sought to be accomplished and the obvious legislative intent, as well as the previous opinions of this 

department, we conclude that the Railroad Commission has 

jurisdiction over all motor carrier operations over the 

public highways of this State except local operations within 

the limits of an incorporated city or town and operations 

from an incorporated city or town where such service does 

not pass into or through another incorporated city or town. 

The definition of a motor bus company, Art. 

glib, Sec. l(c), differs from that of a motor carrier. The 

only motor bus operations excluded from the Commission's 

jurisdiction are those "wholly within the limits of any 

incorporated town or city, and the sslburbs thereof, whether 

separately incorporated or otherwise." (Emphasis sum) 

What constitutes a suburb of a city and whether 

a city, town or village adjoining or adjacent to another 

city Is a suburb thereof within the meaning of the Motor Bus 

Act, Is necessaril 

Holguin, 146 Tex. 1 

a fact question. In Villalobos vs. 

74, 208 S.W.2d 871, the Supreme Court 

held that the Railroad Commission of Texas did not have 

authority to regulate transportation of passengers within 

the limits of an incorporated city or town and the suburbs 

thereof. The question had arisen whether Ysleta, Socorro, 

San Eliziarlo and Clint and the territory between these 

villages were suburbs of El Paso. The Supreme Court held 

that because there were farm lands between Ysleta, Socorro, 

San Eliziario, Clint and El Paso, the smaller towns named 

were not suburbs of El Paso. We do not believe that the 

existence of farm lands between towns is the sole criterion 

for determining whether or not a town or village or an 

Incorporated city adjacent to or adjoining a larger town is 

a suburb thereof. It may be that under the Motor Bus Act 

the Railroad Commission of Texas would be authorized to 

consider whether the smaller adjacent or adjoining town had 

such industry and transportation problems as to be considered separate and independent from the larger town 

adjoining it. The existence of terminals and depots In the 
Honorable Olin Culberson, Page 7 WW-328 

smaller town, the existence of separate industries, stores 

and businesses therein, which allow It to draw from the 

trade territory adjoining it, may- be factors to be considered in determining whether it exists independently or 

as a suburb of an adjacent town. 

It is our opinion that the courts would take 

judicial notice that Fort Worth is not a suburb of Dallas 

or vice versa. As to whether Grand Prairie and Arlington, 

or other communities in this general area, are suburbs of 

each other or of either Dallas or Fort Worth, if any doubt 

exists and if the occas,ion arises, the Commission can hear 

testimony on the question, in accordance with our opinion 

No. O-2737. With reference to the jurisdiction of the 

Commission over a motor bus application proposing service 

from Fruitdale acres to Preston Hollow via Dallas, Highland 

Park and University Park, it was there stated as follows: 

"The Commission can hear testimony on the 

question. If the evidence shows conclusively 

that all points involved in the operation are 

either within the city limits of Dallas or its 

suburbs, or If the Commission so finds upon disputed evidence, then the application should be 

dismissed, since the Railroad Commission would be 

without jurisdiction. On the other hand If the 

evidence shows beyond any dispute that some parts 

ofthe operation would be conducted outside the 

limits of Dallas and its suburbs, or if the 

Commission so finds upon contradictory testimony, 

the Commission would have jurlsdlction to entertain the application upon its merits." 

SUMMARY 

1. The Dallas-Fort Worth Turnpike and ~the 

use of it for hauling for hire is under the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission of Texas. 

2. It is necessary for any person operating 

a truck and hauling for hire to have a certificate 

of authority from the Railroad Commission of Texas 

to engage in such activity, and 

3. It is necessary for the operator of a 

bus Inthe Dallas-Fort,Worth area to have a permit 

from the Railroad Commission, authorizing him 

to operate over the Dallas-Fort Worth Turnpike 
Honorable Olin Culberaon, Page 8 WW-328 

under Texas Civil Statutee, Article 911a. 

Very truly yours, 

nt Attorney General, 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE: 

Geo. P. ,Blackburn, Chairfnan 

W.V. Gemert 

John Webster‘ 

Milton Richardson