seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). The existence of a factual dispute is not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion,
instead the non-moving party must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the summary
judgment motion. See Vukadinovich v. Board of Sch. Trs., 278 F.3d 693, 699 (7" Cir. 2002)
(quotation and citation omitted).
ANALYSIS

Alexander brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which creates a federal cause
of action for “the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). Construing Alexander’s
pro se Second Amended Complaint liberally as the Court is required to do, see Calhoun v.
DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 943 (7 Cir. 2003), he alleges that the Cook County Department of
Corrections had an unwritten, but widespread policy of sending inmates to the acute psychiatric
unit of Cermak Health Services (“Cermak”). Alexander alleges that this widespread policy
deprived him from (1) defending grievances in front of the Cook County Jail Board, and (2)
accessing the law library and legal materials. Furthermore, Alexander alleges that Dr. Shan
conspired with the Department of Corrections to keep him at the acute psychiatric unit against his
will even though Dr. Shan knew that Alexander was representing himself in a criminal matter.
Accordingly, Alexander contends that Defendants conspired to deny him (1) procedural due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) his First Amendment right to access the courts,

and (3) his right to competent counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Finally, Alexander argues


deprivation of Alexander’s Fourth Amendment rights, See Hernandez, 324 F.3d at 537. Last,
even if there were any remaining individual Defendant who was involved in Alexander’s arrest,
the individual’s liability could not be imputed to Cook County under the theory of respondeat
superior because municipalities cannot be held liable on the grounds of respondeat superior in
Section 1983 actions. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692; Lawrence, 391 F.3d at 843. Therefore,
Alexander’s probable cause claim is without merit.

As to Alexander’s conspiracy theory, not only has he failed to establish a deprivation of a
federal right, he has not demonstrated that Defendants had an agreement to deprive him of his
constitutional rights. See Williams, 342 F.3d at 782 (mere speculation cannot support conspiracy
theory that Defendants had requisite agreement). Although Defendants have the burden of
establishing the lack of any issue of material fact in their motion for summary judgment,
Alexander must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the Defendants’ summary
judgment motion, which he has failed to do. See Vukadinovich, 278 F.3d at 699.

Because the Court concludes that Defendants did not deprive Alexander of a federal right
as a matter of Jaw, the Court need not decide whether Cook County had an express policy, a
common widespread practice, or that a deliberate act of a decision-maker for Cook County
created a policy that pre-trial detainees should be sent to the acute psychiatric unit at Cermak
instead of remaining in the general population at Cook County Jail to deprive criminal
defendants of their constitutional rights. See Lawrence, 391 F.3d at 843.

Finally, the Court notes that Defendant Cook County’s immunity argument based on the
Mlinois Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act is in error.

Specifically, immunity on federal constitutional claims is a matter of federal law, not state law.


an arrest warrant stemming from an indictment. (R. 99-1, Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Rule 56.1
Statement, { 1; R. 94-1, Def.’s Rule 56.1 Statement, 1.) Alexander was then detained at Cook
County Jail in Chicago, Illinois. (/d.) Alexander’s case proceeded to trial in July of 2001, where
Alexander represented himself, along with shadow counsel, in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
(Pl.’s Resp. $f 5,10; Def.’s Stmt. FJ] 3, 5,10, Ex. C, Alexander’s Resp. to Inter. [ 6.) The jury
found Alexander not guilty on all criminal charges. (PI.’s Resp. 410; Def.’s Stmt. 410.)

During Alexander’s pre-trial detention in Cook County Jail, he was admitted into the
acute psychiatric unit of the Cermak Hospital Division of Cook County Jail in May of 2000.
(Pl.’s Resp. 7; Def.’s Stmt. | 7.) Although Defendant Dr, Tanveer Shan, a psychiatrist working
at Cook County Jail, did not admit Alexander into the acute psychiatric unit, Dr. Shan diagnosed
Alexander as having bi-polar disorder. (PI.’s Resp. { 13, Def.’s Stmt. { 13, Ex. B, Shan Aff, {¥
1, 9.) On October 2000, Dr. Shan released Alexander from his daily care and contro] and
Alexander returned to the general population at the Cook County Jail. (Pl.’s Resp. 4 9; Def’s
Stmt. 49.) Dr. Tanveer Shan did not participate in Alexander’s arrest, the indictment resulting in
his arrest, or the decision to set Alexander’s bond. (PI.’s Resp. { 3, 4; Def.’s Sunt. 3.)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists only if “the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S, 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party


that he was arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

To establish Dr. Shan’s liability under Section 1983, Alexander must show that (1) he
was deprived a federal right (2) caused by an action taken under color of state law. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980); Hernandez v. City of
Goshen, 324 F.3d 535, 537 (7" Cir. 2003). To establish that Cook County is liable, Alexander
must show (1) he was deprived a federal right, (2) as a result of an express municipal policy,
widespread custom, or deliberate act of a decision-maker for Cook County, which (3)
proximately caused his injury. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Lawrence v. Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 843
(7TM Cir. 2004). Under a conspiracy theory, Alexander must demonstrate that Defendants reached
an agreement to deprive him of his federal rights. Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 782 (7 Cir.
2003).

The Court turns to the threshold matter of whether Dr. Shan or Cook County deprived
Alexander of his federal rights. First, Alexander claims that he was denied his First Amendment
right of access to the courts, that is, the law library and legal materials, while he was in the acute
psychiatric unit at Cermak. Pre-trial detainees who are offered assistance of appointed counsel
and choose to represent themselves, however, do not have a constitutional right to access legal
materials or law libraries. United States v. Byrd, 208 F.3d 592, 593 (7 Cir. 2000). “The rule is
that he has the right to legal help through appointed counsel, and when he declines that help,
other alternative rights, like access to a law library, do not spring up.” Jd. In addition, Alexander
must also demonstrate that the denial of access to legal materials and the law library resulted in

actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996).


Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7 Cir. 1998). Therefore, Defendants’
argument that they have absolute immunity as a matter of state law under the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act fails because this action was based on alleged violations of Alexander’s federal
civil rights. Id.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

Date: January 7, 2004

ENTERED

AMY J. ST.
United States


Mizuta Order Form (0697)

United States District Court, Northern District of Hinois

Le

Ni of Assigned Jud; ‘Sitting Judge if Other
aeor Magistrate Judge Amy J. St. Eve than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 7059 DATE 1/7/2005
CASE Windsor Alexander vs. Ellis E. Reid, et al
TITLE
[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
Motion: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) oa Answer brief to motiondue___. Reply to answer briefdue

(4) a Ruling/Hearingon___setfor__at

(5) a Status hearingfheld/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___—setfor at.

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___——ssetfor at
(7) oa Trial[set for/re-set for] on at.

(8) i] [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto__at

(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

COFRCP4(m) CiLocal Rule 41.1 CUFRCP41(a\1) O FRCP41(e\2).

(io [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is granted. Status hearing set for 1/20/05 is stricken. Jury Trial set for 2/22/05 is stricken. Any
other pending dates are stricken.

(11) Ml [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

(nat 4

No notices required.

a | Mail AO 450 form.

No notices required, ad

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
oa |} Docketing to mail notices.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom
Tav deputy’s

vised in open court.

initials



Here, Alexander was successful in defending himself in his criminal matter, and thus he incurred
no injury.

Next, Alexander argues that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment. Because Alexander chose to represent himself in his state court
criminal action, however, he cannot later claim that he was denied competent counsel under the
Sixth Amendment. Byrd, 208 F.3d at 593.

Alexander also claims that he was denied procedural due process in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment because his detention in the acute psychiatric unit prohibited him from
defending a grievance in front of the Cook County Jail Board. Even if Alexander could establish
that he has a liberty interest protected by due process under the circumstances, see Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), he admits that after
Cook County Jail initiated the hearing, the board ultimately dismissed the grievance against him.
(R. 100-1, Alexander Aff., ] 28). Therefore, the Cook County Jail Board necessarily afforded
Alexander procedural due process in the first instance.

Alexander further alleges that he was arrested without probable cause — a claim that is not
supported by the record. First, Alexander admits that he was arrested as a result of a warrant
stemming from an indictment. Arrest warrants based on indictments are necessarily founded on
probable cause. Kalina v, Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997)
(Fourth Amendment requires that arrest warrants be based on probable cause which is satisfied
by indictment returned by grand jury). Therefore, there was probable cause to arrest Alexander.
Second, because Dr. Shan did not participate in Alexander’s arrest, the indictment resulting in his

arrest, or the decision to set bond in the criminal matter, he could not have caused any such


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

WINDSOR ALEXANDER,

Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 02 C 7059

gi,

)
v

ELLIS E. REID; PAUL BERVID; RICHARD
DEVINE; DR. TANVEER SHAN,
CERMAK HEALTH SERVICES; COOK
COUNTY JAIL; and COOK COUNTY,
ILLINOIS,

Defendants.

wee we weer rw SY

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Judge:

Pro se Plaintiff Windsor Alexander brings this action against Defendants alleging civil
rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In prior orders, the Court dismissed all of the named
Defendants except Dr. Tanveer Shan and Cook County. Before the Court is Dr. Shan and Cook
County’s Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). For
the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.

iL BACKGROUND FACTS

A, Northern District of Illinois Local Rules

When determining summary judgment motions, the Court derives background facts from
the parties’ Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 statements. The Local Rules provide
parties with specific details as to how litigants in the Northern District of Illinois should
approach summary judgment motions and responses. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving

party to provide “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no

\ Ole


genuine issue.” Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires the non-moving party to admit or deny every
factual statement proffered by the moving party and to concisely designate any material facts that
establish a genuine dispute for trial. The parties’ statements must contain short numbered
paragraphs including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting
material. Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 583-85 (N.D.IIl. 2000). When citing to the record
in legal memoranda, parties are required to cite to the numbered paragraphs of the Local Rule
56.1 statements, not to the underlying parts of the record. Jd. at 586.

Even though the parties have partially complied with the Local Rules, both Defendants
and Plaintiff did not consistently follow the Local Rules in their statements, responses, and legal
memoranda. The Court notes that although courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, see
Calhoun v, DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 943 (7" Cir. 2003), a plaintiff's pro se status does not absolve
him from complying with the Local Rules. Greer v. Board of Ed. of City of Chicago, 267 F.3d
723, 727 (7" Cir. 2001); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980,
124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (pro se litigants must follow clear procedural rules).

This leaves the Court with some statements and responses that do not cite specific parts
of the record and legal memoranda that do not properly cite to the factual record. Statements and
responses that do not properly cite to the record are subject to the Court’s discretion as to their
admission. See Brasic v. Heinemann’s Inc., 121 F.3d 281, 284 (7" Cir. 1997). Statements that
are not contested are deemed admitted. Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7 Cir. 2003). With
these principles in mind, the Court turns to the relevant facts of this case.

B. Relevant Undisputed Facts

On March 12, 2000, Alexander was arrested on charges of perjury and forgery pursuant to