1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

__________________________________________ 

 ) 

CAMILLA YOUNGER, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civil Action No. 13-1296 (RMC) 

 ) 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC ) 

SCHOOLS, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

__________________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 Defendant District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) moves—just before the 

fourth rescheduled trial date, in a case that has been pending since 2013, and over a year after the 

Court entered its order on DCPS’s Motion for Summary Judgment—to dismiss the sole 

remaining claim as moot because Plaintiff Camilla Younger is not entitled to any compensatory 

damages on the remaining claim. DCPS argues that Ms. Younger is only entitled to a jury trial if 

she has a claim for damages. 

I. FACTS 

 The facts have been laid out in detail in three prior opinions in this case and will 

only be briefly summarized here. See Younger v. DCPS (Younger I), 60 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D.D.C. 

2014); Younger v. DCPS (Younger II), No. 13-1296, 2017 WL 3129733 (D.D.C. July 21, 2017); 

Younger v. DCPS (Younger III), No. 13-1296, 2018 WL 3995875 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2018). Ms. 

Younger served DCPS as a dual-certified art teacher and attendance officer from 1992 to 2010. 

Due to physical altercations that occurred while she was teaching at Woodson Ninth Grade 

Academy, a DCPS school, Ms. Younger took extended leave in early October 2009 and stopped 

reporting for work at the Academy; however, she continued to teach at Roosevelt STAY, another 
2 

DCPS school, during the evening. Ms. Younger did not return to the Woodson Ninth Grade 

Academy for the remainder of the 2009-2010 school year. 

 During the summer of 2010, Ms. Younger applied and was interviewed for a parttime position as an art teacher at the Youth Engagement Academy, a DCPS school. Ms. 

Younger alleges that after her interview with Principal Tanisha Williams-Minor of the Youth 

Engagement Academy, she was offered a part-time position as art teacher there. Ms. Younger 

further alleges that Principal Williams-Minor withdrew the transfer offer after she learned Ms. 

Younger’s age. DCPS argues that Ms. Younger was never offered a position at the Youth 

Engagement Academy. 

On August 16, 2010, Ms. Younger received a notice of termination from the 

Director of Labor Management and Employee Relations at DCPS, which stated that she would 

be terminated effective August 27, 2010. See Ex. 6, Mot. for Summ. J., Notice of Termination 

[Dkt. 58-1]. 

Other than her claim of age discrimination in the failure to transfer her to the 

Youth Engagement Academy, all of Ms. Younger’s claims have been dismissed. See Younger I, 

60 F. Supp. 3d 130; Younger II, 2017 WL 3129733. This matter was initially scheduled for trial 

in January 2018 and was continued four times at the parties’ various requests until it was set for 

trial on September 11, 2018. After briefing on DCPS’s Motion in Limine, the Court issued a 

Memorandum Opinion and Order on August 21, 2018 and held that Ms. Younger is not entitled 

to compensatory damages for any violation of her rights that may be found on the failure to 

transfer. See Younger III, 2018 WL 3995875. 

DCPS now moves to dismiss this last remaining claim as moot because no 

damages are available. See Def. District of Columbia’s Trial Br. [Dkt. 89]. Ms. Younger 
3 

expressed her opposition in open court and filed an opposition, which will be filed on the docket. 

The motion is ripe for review. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Younger II concluded that genuine disputes of material facts prevented a ruling on 

the papers concerning the denial of Ms. Younger’s requested transfer and DCPS’s motion for 

summary judgment was denied on that claim. See Younger II, 2017 WL 3129733. Younger III 

held that Ms. Younger was not entitled to compensatory damages even if she prevailed at trial on 

her failure to transfer claim. See Younger III, 2018 WL 3995875. DCPS now moves for the 

Court to find that this remaining claim is moot because Ms. Younger is not entitled to damages 

and, therefore, is not entitled to a jury trial. 

DCPS cites a few cases for the proposition that an Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2012), claim is mooted when a plaintiff has 

no compensatory damages. The Court finds that none are dispositive of Ms. Younger’s right to a 

trial. For instance, McLaren v. Emory Univ., 705 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Ga. 1988), held that the 

plaintiff, who suffered no lost wages from the alleged discrimination, was not entitled to recover 

“damages in lieu of liquidated damages” and, therefore, was not entitled to a jury trial. Id. at 

568; see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (“[A] person shall be entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of 

fact in any such action for recovery of amounts owing as a result of a violation of [ADEA], 

regardless of whether equitable relief is sought by any party in such action.”). The McLaren

court reasoned that because ADEA does not permit damages for non-pecuniary losses, such as 

pain and suffering, the plaintiff could not be awarded some other amount of damages in lieu of 

liquidated damages. McLaren, 705 F. Supp. at 566-67; see also Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. 

Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1995) (“ADEA does not permit a separate recovery of 

compensatory damages for pain and suffering or emotional distress.”). Additionally, McLaren
4 

found that permitting other non-pecuniary damages would “[d]estroy[] the incentive to 

conciliate” because employers could not predict a possible loss amount at trial. McLaren, 705 F. 

Supp. at 567. 

This Court agrees that an ADEA plaintiff is not entitled to non-pecuniary 

compensatory damages, but clearly, equitable damages are available, such as declaratory 

judgment, a verdict, or nominal money damages. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 326; 29 U.S.C. 

§ 626(c)(2). However, the Court does not agree that such an award would destroy the parties’ 

incentives to conciliate. Assuming an employer knows the total backpay potentially owed to a 

plaintiff, the possibility of an additional “nominal” amount of damages being awarded would not 

alter the incentives to reach a settlement agreement. McLaren does not stand for the proposition 

that without money damages a plaintiff is not entitled to any trial or that her claim is mooted, but 

only holds that such a plaintiff is not entitled to a trial by jury. 

DCPS also cites Johnson v. District of Columbia, an unpublished 2017 decision 

by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 688 F. App’x 4 (D.C. 

Cir. 2017). DCPS argues that Johnson decided that an ADEA claim is mooted when no damages 

are available. The Circuit found, however, that a plaintiff’s claim was not mooted when 

“additional remedies” were available, “including, for example, liquidated damages.” Id. at 7. 

The Circuit did not list all the potential “additional remedies” that might be available and did not 

specifically address the availability of a favorable verdict or nominal damages. The Circuit also 

did not address the possibility of a bench trial in instances where no amounts are owed, which 

appears to be contemplated by the statute itself.1 

 

1 Meyers v. I.B.M. Corp., 335 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), also cited by DCPS, found its 

plaintiff’s ADEA claim mooted because “the Plaintiff has not suffered any economic damage.” 

Id. at 412. This Court respectfully disagrees. 
5 

ADEA states that a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial when there are “amounts 

owing.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2). Nominal damages are not “amounts owing” because they are 

awarded only when a plaintiff has no actual damages. As this Court previously held, Ms. 

Younger is not owed any amounts of back pay; therefore, she is not entitled to a jury trial, but 

will be permitted to proceed with her claim via a bench trial as scheduled to begin September 11, 

2018. 

DCPS would also have the Court find that nominal damages are not permitted in 

ADEA cases. Although the statute does not specifically list nominal damages as a potential 

remedy, some courts have permitted nominal damages awards in ADEA cases. See, e.g., Berg v. 

Auto Nation, Inc., 212 F. App’x 668, 669 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming award of nominal damages 

and attorney fees in ADEA case); Petrunich v. Sun Bldg. Sys., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204 

(M.D. Pa. 2008) (awarding “nominal damages of $1.00”); Poland v. Chertoff, 559 F. Supp. 2d 

1127, 1131-32 (D. Or. 2008) (finding “the vindication of [plaintiff’s] right to be free from such 

discrimination justifies an award of nominal damages”); Grimes v. City of Fort Valley, 773 F. 

Supp. 1536, 1538 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (awarding “nominal damages and attorney’s fees as required 

by the ADEA”). This Court will permit an award of nominal damages if Ms. Younger prevails 

after a bench trial. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 The Court will grant in part and deny in part DCPS’s motion. The trial beginning 

on September 11, 2018 will be converted from a jury trial to a bench trial. A memorializing 

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

Date: September 7, 2018 

 ROSEMARY M. COLLYER 

 United States District Judge