Dated:

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

CR Qe f Cera

Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge

August 23, 2001



fence

1994). Nonetheless, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege
facts that sufficiently set forth the essential elements of the cause of action. See Lucien

v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7" Cir. 1992).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failing to bring a claim in a timely
manner, the Court must apply the proper statute of limitations for a section 1983 action.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the most analogous statute of
limitations for section 1983 actions, and therefore the most appropriate one, is the
state's personal injury statute of limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261
(1985). In Illinois, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years.
See 735 ILCS 5/13-202. It is with these principles in mind that we turn to the motion
before us.

DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Martini’s complaint is time-barred. In section 1983 actions
brought in Illinois, plaintiffs have two years from the date of the incident arising from
an alleged civil rights violation in which to file a complaint. See 735 ILCS 5/ 13-202;
Kalimara v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrections, 978 F.2d 276, 277 (7" Cir. 1989).
Mr. Martini filed the case at bar nearly five years after the alleged incident occurred,
well after the two-year statute of limitations had run. For this reason, the complaint is

time-barred and must be dismissed.


Minute Order Form (06/97)

; G United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
a

N of Assigned Jud; Sitting Judge if Other
vor Magistrate Judge Charles P. Kocoras than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 1440 DATE 8/23/2001
CASE Byron Martini vs. City of Elmhurst et al
TITLE

of the motion being presented.]

[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

dismiss is granted. We dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

(1) =

{For further detail see order attached to the original minute order. ]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(i) im) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im) Brief in support of motion due

@) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue____

4 a Ruling/Hearing on___set for at

(5) QO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at_

(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for} on at

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__—_at.

(9) 0 This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) OGeneralRule21 OFRCP41(a(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

ao of {Other docket entry} ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: Defendant’s motion (Doc 8-1) to

No notices required, advised in open court,

No notices required,
required, umber of notices

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

AUG 24 200

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form,
Copy to safle judge.

date mailed notice

om
deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office

mailing deputy initials



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

BYRON MARTINI,
Plaintiff,
vs. 01 C 1440

CITY OF ELMHURST, and ELMHURST
POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICE
CHIEF JOHN MILNER [SIC],

eS SSS SS SS DL

Defendants. POPHE TED
AUG 2 4 2008
MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, we grant the motion.

BACKGROUND

Byron Martini, a resident of the city of Chicago, filed a pro se complaint against
the City of Elmhurst and Elmhurst Police Department Police Chief John Milner
(collectively “Defendants”) on or about February 28, 2001, alleging theft of property
and violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to the complaint,
in approximately February 1996 unnamed officers of the Elmhurst Police Department
entered the property of Martini’s brother, Robert Martini, and removed a 1986

Chevrolet Monte Carlo belonging to Byron. The police officers allegedly turned the

|Z


car over to an unnamed female, who proceeded to transfer the ownership of the
automobile into her name.

On June 14, 2001, this Court heard Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite
Statement, at which time Defendants accepted Martini’s oral admissions as part of the
complaint. We granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Defendants later filed
a timely motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) claiming that Martini’s
civil rights claim is time-barred.

LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the

sufficiency of the claim, not to decide the merits of the case. See Triad Assocs., Inc,

v. Chicago Housing Authority, 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7" Cir. 1989). In ruling on a motion
to dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint’s allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint
must be taken as true. See Bontkowski v. First Nat’] Bank of Cicero, 998 F.2d 459,
461 (7" Cir. 1993). The allegations of a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim “unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993); Sherwin Manor Nursing Ctr. Inc. v. McAuliffe, 37 F.3d 1216, 1219 (7" Cir.

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