alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
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###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.

The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

*Name of Committee:* National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke Special Emphasis Panel; NINDS BRAIN Review Meeting (U01 and R01 Applications).

*Date:* August 12-13, 2021.

*Time:* 10:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

*Agenda:* To review and evaluate grant applications.

*Place:* National Institutes of Health, Neuroscience Center, 6001 Executive Boulevard, Rockville, MD 20852 (Virtual Meeting).

*Contact Person:* Mir Ahamed Hossain, Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, Scientific Review Branch, NINDS/NIH/DHHS, Neuroscience Center, 6001 Executive Blvd., Suite 3208, MSC 9529, Rockville, MD 20852, (301) 496-9223, *mirahamed.hossain@nih.gov.*

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.853, Clinical Research Related to Neurological Disorders; 93.854, Biological Basis Research in the Neurosciences, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

Dated: July 20, 2021.

Tyeshia M. Roberson-Curtis,

Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 2021-15744 Filed 7-22-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

December 8, 2023 SC-2023-0790 Ex parte Michael Shane Fletcher. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re:Michael Shane Fletcher v. State of Alabama) (Mobile Circuit Court: CC19-436; Criminal Appeals: CR-2022-0807).

CERTIFICATE OF JUDGMENT WHEREAS, the petition for writ of certiorari in the above referenced cause has been duly submitted and considered by the Supreme Court of Alabama and the judgment indicated below was entered in this cause on December 8, 2023: Writ Denied. No Opinion. Cook, J. -- Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., concur. NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 41, Ala. R. App. P., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court's judgment in this cause is certified on this date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, unless otherwise ordered by this Court or agreed upon by the parties, the costs of this cause are hereby taxed as provided by Rule 35, Ala. R. App. P.

I, Megan B. Rhodebeck, certify that this is the record of the judgment of the Court, witness my hand and seal.

Clerk, Supreme Court of Alabama
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE FORM
10-QSB REPORT OF OVM INTERNATIONAL HOLDING CORP. FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE
30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH REPORT.
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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arthur C. ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-4198.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 25, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 11, 2011.

Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, William J. Watkins, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appel-lee.

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Arthur C. Rodgers pled guilty to use of a means of identification of another person in connection with a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2006). On appeal, he alleges that his forty-two-month variance sentence was error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. *Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). As we have explained, “no matter what provides the basis for a deviation from the Guidelines range — we review the resulting sentence only for reasonableness.” *United States v. Evans,*526 F.3d 155, 164 (4th Cir.2008) (citing *Gall,*552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586).

In assessing a sentencing court’s decision to depart from a defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range, we “consider whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” *United States v. McNeill,*598 F.3d 161, 166 (4th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), *aff'd on another ground,*— U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2218, 180 L.Ed.2d 35 (2011). We will find a sentence to be unreasonable if the sentencing “court provides an inadequate statement of reasons or relies on improper factors in imposing a sentence outside the properly calculated advisory sentencing range.” *United States v. Hernandez-Villanueva,*473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir.2007).

Here, the district court correctly calculated Rogers’ advisory Sentencing Guidelines range as 24-30 months of imprisonment. After listening to the arguments of counsel, to the defendant himself, and addressing some of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, the court imposed an upward variance sentence of forty-two months. The court, which was faced with a recalcitrant career criminal with an extensive criminal history, adequately explained its reasons for departing upward. In these circumstances we do not find that *832the sentence was unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
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#### Haim Yuzary, Appellant, v WCP Wireless Lease Subsidiary LLC et al., Defendants, and Fannie Mae et al., Respondents.

[943 NYS2d 466]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mary BriganttiHughes, J.), entered March 28, 2011, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and granted that portion of defendant Fannie Mae’s cross motion for summary judgment seeking to restrict plaintiffs mortgage to a one-quarter interest in the mortgaged property and to declare Fannie Mae’s mortgage superior, unanimously modified, on the law, to so declare, and otherwise affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff failed to establish his entitlement to summary judgment since the maturity date of the mortgage and note at issue was February 15, 1992 and his submissions raised questions of fact as to whether this action for foreclosure was timely commenced (CPLR 213 [4]; *see CDR Créances S.A. v Euro-American Lodging Corp.,*43 AD3d 45, 51 [2007]).

The motion court properly declined to dismiss the affirmative defenses alleging that plaintiffs action is based on forged documents. The submissions in this regard raise an issue of fact as to whether the signature on a letter purporting to extend the mortgage term was, in fact, forged *(see Seaboard Sur. Co. v Earthline Corp.,*262 AD2d 253 [1999]; *cf. Banco Popular N. Am. v Victory Taxi Mgt.,*1 NY3d 381, 383-384 [2004]).

The motion court also properly found that Fannie Mae’s mortgage has priority over plaintiff’s mortgage. Plaintiff’s mortgage had, from all appearances, reached its maturity date 14 years before Fannie Mae acquired its mortgage. Thus, any foreclosure action would have been time-barred as of February 14, 1998 (CPLR 213 [4]). Moreover, even assuming that the letter purporting to extend the mortgage term was genuine, it was *680never recorded, and therefore is not effective against Fannie Mae, which is a bona fide encumbrancer with no notice of the purported extension (Real Property Law § 291; *Bergenfeld v Midas Collections,*38 AD2d 939, 939-940 [1972]; *Weideman v Zielinska,*102 App Div 163, 165-166 [1905]).

The motion court properly found that, at best, plaintiff is limited to a one-quarter interest in the mortgaged property *(see CitiFinancial Co. [DE] v McKinney,*27 AD3d 224, 226-227 [2006]), subordinate to the Fannie Mae mortgage.

We have considered plaintiffs remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur — Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Catterson, Renwick and Román, JJ.
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 99.2

                            STATEMENT UNDER OATH FOR
                           PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT


I, Davinder Sethi, certify that:

         The Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 31,
2003 of Entrada Networks, Inc. fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information
contained in the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January
31, 2003 of Entrada Networks, Inc. fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of Entrada Networks, Inc.


                                            Subscribed and sworn to
                                            before me this 18th  day of April


    /s/ Davinder Sethi                             Raksha Jobanputra
-------------------------------             ------------------------------
Name:    Davinder Sethi                     Notary Public of New Jersey
Principal Financial Officer
Date:    April 18, 2003                     Seal
EXHIBIT 32.1

CEO/CFO Certification Pursuant to § 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.
§1350)

The undersigned, as the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation, respectively,
certify that, to the best of their knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2006, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable,
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Pinnacle Bankshares Corporation and subsidiary at the dates
and for the periods indicated.

The foregoing certification is made pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350) and
shall not be relied upon for any other purpose. The undersigned expressly disclaim any obligation to update the foregoing certification except as required by law.



|                  |  |                                                 
|----------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------
|November 10, 2006 |  | /s/ Robert H. Gilliam, Jr.                      
|Date              |  | Robert H. Gilliam, Jr.,                         
|                  |  | President and Chief Executive Officer           
|                  | 
|November 10, 2006 |  | /s/ Bryan M. Lemley                             
|Date              |  | Bryan M. Lemley,                                
|                  |  | Secretary, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
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</TABLE>
# C_2019295EN.01005802.xml

| 2.9.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 295/58 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.9.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 295/58

---

Action brought on 1 July 2019 — Melandri v Parliament

(Case T-437/19)

(2019/C 295/76)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Eugenio Melandri (Rome, Italy) (represented by: M. Merola, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

| — | order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

| — | order the European Parliament to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those relied on in Case T-389/19, Coppo Gavazzi v Parliament.

---
#### DONALDSON, Respondent, v. RUTLAND R. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

November 13, 1907.)

Action by Andrew Donaldson against the Rutland Railroad Company. ■

No opinion. Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs.
#### Alfred J. Farone, Inc., Respondent, v Thomas W. Ruhle et al., Defendants, and William Briell, Appellant.

—Casey, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Doran, J.), entered February 7, 1985 in Sara-toga County, which, *inter alia,*granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against defendant William Briell.

*900Plaintiff sued on a promissory note signed by defendants Thomas W. Ruble and William Briell.* Briell contends that Special Term erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against him since factual issues exist regarding the status in which he signed the note and whether his obligation on the note has been discharged.

We agree with Special Term’s holding that the language of the note preceding the signatures of Ruble and Briell is inconsistent with Briell’s conclusory allegation that he signed as an indorser. As noted by Special Term, Briell was either a comaker or an accommodation party, and the fact that his signature on the note appears to be that of a comaker does not preclude a finding that he was an accommodation party *(see,*UCC 3-415 [1]). We also agree with Special Term’s conclusion that the alleged failure of plaintiff to make proper presentment and give notice of dishonor does not raise factual questions as to whether Briell was discharged on the note, since there are no allegations that the bank where presentment was to be made had become insolvent *(see,*UCC 3-502 [1] M).

Our review of the record, however, does reveal sufficient allegations to raise questions of fact as to whether plaintiff’s conduct, in light of its knowledge of Ruble’s financial difficulties and ultimate filing for bankruptcy (which Briell claims he did not learn about for several months), constituted a release of Ruble or impaired Briell’s rights against Ruble and whether Briell’s obligation has thereby been discharged, in whole or part *(see,*UCC 3-606 [1]). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied.

Order reversed,-, on the law, with costs, and motion denied. Main, J. P., Casey, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.

*

 Briell’s wife was also named as a defendant since she, too, signed the original note, but Special Term held that a subsequent note, signed only by Ruble and Briell, constituted a novation; this ruling is not challenged on appeal.