## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUN 9 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

ANDREW LADICK,

Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 97-1147 GERALD J. VAN GEMERT; LAW OFFICES OF GERALD J. VAN GEMERT, a professional corporation,

Defendants - Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

(D.C. NO. 96-D-581)
O. Randolph Bragg, Horwitz, Horwitz & Associates, C hicago, Illinois (Vincent C. Todd, Lakewood, Colorado, with him on the briefs), for Appellant. Gerald J. Van Gemert (James A. Judge with him on th e brief), Gerald J. Van Gemert, P.C., Irvine, California, for Appellees.

Before ANDERSON , EBEL , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

ANDERSON , Circuit Judge.-2-

The question presented in this appeal is whether anassessment owed to a condominium association qualifies as a “debt” withi n the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692 o . Guided by our recent decision in Snow v. Riddle , -- F.3d --, No. 97-4045, 1998 WL 233383 (10th Cir. May 11, 1998), which interprets the term“debt” under the FDCPA, we hold that it does. We therefore reverse the distri ct court’s contrary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND Andrew Ladick brought this action in federal distri ct court against Gerald J. Van Gemert and the Law Offices of Gerald J. Van Gem ert (“Mr. Van Gemert”), seeking declaratory judgment and statutory damages for violations of the FDCPA. Mr. Ladick alleged that Mr. Van Gemert, an attorney , sent him a letter on behalf of a California condominium association demanding p ayment of a past-due condominium assessment fee. According to the compl aint, the letter violated the FDCPA in that it failed to give a “validation notic e” and did not expressly disclose that Mr. Van Gemert was attempting to coll ect a debt and that any information obtained would be used for that purpose . See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 g , 1692 e . After both parties moved for summary judgment, t he district court found that the condominium assessment sought to be collec ted by Mr. Van Gemert was-3-

not a “debt” under the FDCPA and granted summary ju dgment in favor of Mr. Van Gemert and his law firm. Mr. Ladick appeals.

DISCUSSION “We review the grant or denial of a motion for summ ary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the distri ct court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).” Sender v. Simon , 84 F.3d 1299, 1303 (10th Cir. 1996). Where there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispu te, we determine whether the substantive law requires judgment for the moving party. Id. Under the FDCPA, a “debt” means any obligation or alleged obligation of a con sumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the mon ey, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purpos es, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Mr. Van Gemert argues that the condominium assessment does not involve an extension of credit, and is mor e like a tax than a debt. In particular, he asserts that the assessment at issue here is more like a tax because it is similar to a municipality levying a tax on its r esidents. See Appellees’ Br. at 10-13. Just last month, in Snow v. Riddle , -- F.3d --, No. 97-4045, 1998 WL 233383 (10th Cir. May 11, 1998), we stated that und er the plain meaning of this-4-

statutory definition, “an offer or extension of cre dit is not required for a payment obligation to constitute a ‘debt’ under the [FDCPA] .” Id. at *4. This conclusion is consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s holding inBass v. Stolper, Koritzinksy, Brewster & Neider, S.C. , 111 F.3d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir. 1997), as well as the holdings of several other circuits which have addre ssed this issue. See, e.g. , Duffy v. Landberg , 133 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (8th Cir. 1998); Charles v . Lundgren & Assoc., P.C. , 119 F.3d 739, 742 (9th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Budge t Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. , 119 F.3d 922, 924 (11th Cir. 1997). But see Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group , 834 F.2d 1163, 1168-69 (3d Cir. 1987) (construing the FDCPA as requiring an offer or extension of credit). It is but a small step from our holding in Snowto the resolution of Mr. Van Gemert’s additional argument. Mr. Van Gemert argue s that even if an extension of credit is not necessary, the condominium assessm ent at issue here still does not qualify as a debt because Mr. Ladick’s obligation t o pay did not arise from a “transaction” within the meaning of the FDCPA. App ellees’ Br. at 14. In particular, he asserts that in order to qualify as a debt, the obligation to pay the assessment must arise from a specific transaction o r agreement with the condominium association. Id. at 2, 4, 14-15. According to this argument, Mr. Ladick’s condominium purchase did not constitute su ch an agreement.-5-

We reject this argument, and instead follow the rea soning of the Seventh Circuit in Newman v. Boehm, Pearlstein & Bright, Lt d. , 119 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997), which, building upon its reasoning in Bass , held that the obligation to pay a condominium assessment arises in connection with the purchase of the condominium itself. Newman , 119 F.3d at 481; see also Thies v. Law Offices of William A. Wyman , 969 F. Supp. 604, 607 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (applying Newman and holding that the obligation to pay homeowners a ssociation fees based on a covenant running with the property constituted a “transaction” within the meaning of the FDCPA). Under this reasoning, Mr. Ladick be came obligated upon purchasing his condominium unit to pay any assessme nts pursuant to the governing documents of his assocation, the Rancho S anta Margarita Recreation and Landscape Corporation, as well as under the Cal ifornia statute addressed to condominium property. See Appellant’s App. at A-30; Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1350-77 . The assessment at issue in this case therefore qualifies as an “obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692 a (5). We recognize that not all such obligations are “deb ts” under the FDCPA because the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction must be primarily for “personal, family , or household purposes.” Id. On this issue, we also follow the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit and hold that-6-

although the assessment at issue here is used to ma intain and repair the common area, it nevertheless has a primarily personal, fam ily, or household purpose. See Newman , 119 F.3d at 481; see also Thies , 969 F. Supp. at 607-08 (applying Newmanand holding that homeowner association fees for ma intenance and improvement of common areas are a service primarilyfor personal, family, or household use). Therefore, we conclude that the co ndominium assessment owed by Mr. Ladick to his condominium association qualif ies as a debt under the FDCPA.

CONCLUSION Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the distric t court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.