FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SGT. JEFFREY S. SARVER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NICOLAS CHARTIER; SUMMIT

ENTERTAINMENT, LLC; KATHRYN

BIGELOW; THE HURT LOCKER LLC;

MARK BOAL; GREG SHAPIRO;

VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC;

GROSVENOR PARK MEDIA, LP;

KINGSGATE FILMS INC.; TONY

MARK; DONALL MCKUSKER; FIRST

LIGHT PRODUCTIONS INC.,

Defendants-Appellees,

PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 11-56986

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-09034-

JHN-JC
2 SARVER V. CHARTIER

SGT. JEFFREY S. SARVER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NICOLAS CHARTIER; SUMMIT

ENTERTAINMENT, LLC; KATHRYN

BIGELOW; THE HURT LOCKER LLC;

MARK BOAL; GREG SHAPIRO;

VOLTAGE PICTURES, LLC;

GROSVENOR PARK MEDIA, LP;

KINGSGATE FILMS INC.; DONALL

MCKUSKER; TONY MARK; FIRST

LIGHT PRODUCTIONS INC.,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 12-55429

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-09034-

JHN-JC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Jacqueline H. Nguyen, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 9, 2013

Submission Vacated May 9, 2013

Resubmitted December 24, 2015

Pasadena, California

Filed February 17, 2016
SARVER V. CHARTIER 3

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Richard A. Paez,

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

SUMMARY*

California Anti-SLAPP / Choice of Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal, pursuant

to filmmakers/defendants’ motions to strike the complaint

under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, California’s AntiStrategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP)

statute, of plaintiff Army Sergeant Jeffrey Sarver’s lawsuit

relating to the Oscar-winning film The Hurt Locker.

Sarver contended that Will James, The Hurt Locker’s

main character, was based on his life and experiences when

he served as an United States Army explosive ordnance

disposal technician in Iraq; that he did not consent to such

use; and that some scenes in the film falsely portrayed him in

a way that harmed his reputation.

The panel applied the choice-of-law rules of New Jersey,

and concluded that the California contacts predominated, and

the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 145 factors weighed

in favor of the application of California law. The panel

considered the section 6 Second Restatement principles,

and concluded that California had the most significant

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4 SARVER V. CHARTIER

relationship to this litigation, which was sufficient to

overcome any presumption of Sarver’s domicile, wherever

that may be. The panel applied California’s anti-SLAPP law.

The panel held that Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(f),

which generally provides that an anti-SLAPP motion be filed

within 60 days of the service of the complaint, did not apply

in federal court. The panel held that under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56, the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions

were timely filed.

Turning to the merits of the defendants’ anti-SLAPP

motions, the panel applied the statute’s two-step analysis. 

First, the panel held that The Hurt Locker film and the

narrative of its central character Will James spoke directly to

issues of a public nature. Second, the panel held that The

Hurt Locker was speech that was fully protected by the First

Amendment, which safeguards the storytellers and artistswho

take the raw materials of life and transform them into art,

such as movies. The panel held that because Sarver could not

show a compelling state interest in preventing the defendants’

speech, applying California’s right of publicity law – which

prohibits a person from using a celebrity’s name or likeness

without consent – in this case would violate the First

Amendment. The panel concluded that because Sarver could

not state a right of publicity claim, the district court did not

err in granting the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion regarding

the claim.

The panel concluded that Sarver’s false light invasion of

privacy, defamation, breach of contract, intentional infliction

of emotional distress, fraud, and constructive fraud/negligent

misrepresentation claims were properly dismissed.
SARVER V. CHARTIER 5

COUNSEL

Michael R. Dezsi, Law Office of Michael R. Dezsi, PLLC,

Detroit, Michigan, argued the cause and filed the briefs for

the Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jon-Jamison Hill, Eisner, Kahan & Gorry, Beverly Hills,

California; David Halberstadter, Katten Muchin Rosenman

LLP, Los Angeles, California; and Jeremiah T. Reynolds,

Kinsella Weitzman Iser Kump & Aldisert LLP, Santa

Monica, California, each argued the cause and filed the brief

for the Defendants-Appellees. With them on the brief were

Timothy J. Gorry and Jackie M. Joseph, Eisner, Kahan &

Gorry, Beverly Hills, California; Rebecca F. Ganz, Katten

Muchin Rosenman LLP, Los Angeles, California; and Dale

F. Kinsella, Kinsella Weitzman Iser Kump & Aldisert LLP,

Santa Monica, California.

Kelli L. Sager, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Los Angeles,

California, filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae Motion

Picture Association of America, Inc. And Entertainment

Merchants Association in support of the DefendantsAppellees. With her on the brief was Karen A. Henry, Davis

Wright Tremaine LLP, Los Angeles, California.
6 SARVER V. CHARTIER

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether the district court properly

applied California’s Anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public

Participation (anti-SLAPP) statute when it dismissed Army

Sergeant Jeffrey Sarver’s lawsuit relating to the Oscarwinning film The Hurt Locker.

I

A

Sergeant Jeffrey Sarver joined the United States Army in

1991. During parts of 2004 and 2005, he served as one of

approximately 150 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

technicians in Iraq. Sarver led one of three teams in the 788th

Ordnance Company whose principal duty was to identify,

make safe, and dispose of improvised explosive devices.

In December 2004, Mark Boal, a journalist working for

Playboy magazine, was embedded with the 788th out of

Camp Victory in Baghdad, Iraq. Boal followed Sarver for a

significant amount of time and took photographs and video of

him while he was on and off duty. After Sarver returned to

the United States, Boal conducted additional interviews with

him in Wisconsin.

Boal wrote an article focused on Sarver’s life and

experiences in Iraq, which was published in the

August/September 2005 issue of Playboy. A condensed

version of that article was later published in Reader’s Digest. 

The Playboy article contained two photographs of Sarver in
SARVER V. CHARTIER 7

addition to other personal information about him. Sarver

alleges that he never consented to the use of his name and

likeness in the Playboy article, that he objected to it after

reviewing an advance copy, and that he attempted to have

portions of the article removed before its publication in

Reader’s Digest.

Boal later wrote the screenplay for the film that became

The Hurt Locker, which was released in June 2009 while

Sarver was stationed at the Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey. 

Sarver contends that Will James, the movie’s main character,

is based on his life and experiences, pointing to

characteristics of James and events in the movie that

allegedly mirror his life story. Sarver asserts that he did not

consent to such use and that several scenes in the film falsely

portray him in a way that has harmed his reputation.

B

In March 2010, Sarver filed suit in the District of New

Jersey against Boal, Kathryn Bigelow, the film’s director,

Nicholas Chartier, its producer, and numerous corporate

defendants (collectively the “defendants”), alleging causes of

action for misappropriation of his likeness and right of

publicity, false light invasion of privacy, defamation, breach

of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud,

and negligent misrepresentation. The defendants moved to

dismiss Sarver’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3), or, alternately, to transfer

venue to the Central District of California pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In response, the District of New Jersey

transferred the case to the Central District of California.
8 SARVER V. CHARTIER

On February 1, 2011, Chartier and some of the corporate

defendants filed a motion to strike Sarver’s complaint under

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, California’s “anti-SLAPP”

statute, which was “enacted to allow early dismissal of

meritless first amendment cases aimed at chilling expression

through costly, time-consuming litigation.” Metabolife Int’l,

Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001). Shortly

thereafter, Boal and Bigelow filed a separate motion to strike

on the same grounds.

Four days before hearing oral argument, the district court

released a tentative order that would have allowed Sarver to

proceed on his right of publicity claim but would have

dismissed all other claims pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. 

However, in its final order, the district court reversed course,

striking Sarver’s complaint in its entirety. The district court

concluded that California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied

because the defendants were engaged in the exercise of free

speech in connection with a public issue, and also that

“[e]ven assuming that [Sarver] and Will James share similar

physical characteristics and idiosyncracies, a significant

amount of original expressive content was inserted in the

work through the writing of the screenplay, and the

production and direction of the movie.” The district court

concluded that the film’s use of Sarver’s identity was

transformative and dismissed all of Sarver’s claims.

Sarver timely appealed.1

1 We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s final order pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s choice of law analysis

de novo. Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 930 F.2d 777,

782 (9th Cir. 1991). We also review the district court’s grant of the
SARVER V. CHARTIER 9

II

Before reaching the merits of Sarver’s claims, we must

determine whether the district court properly applied

California law instead of New Jersey law and whether the

defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion was timely filed. Sarver

contends that the district court erred on both counts, arguing

that the district court should have applied New Jersey law and

that the anti-SLAPP motion was not timely filed.

A

Our “choice of law inquiry has two levels.” Schoenberg,

930 F.2d at 782. “First, we must determine whose choice of

law rules govern. Second, applying those rules, we determine

whose law applies.”2Id. Typically, “a federal court sitting

in diversity applies the conflict-of-law rules of the state in

which it sits.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, after a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the choiceof-law rules of the transferor court apply. See Newton v.

Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1459 (9th Cir. 1994). We therefore

apply the choice-of-law rules of New Jersey.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted the choiceof-law approach set forth in the Restatement (Second) of

Conflict of Laws (“Second Restatement”). P.V. ex rel. T.V. v.

Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 460 (N.J. 2008). Under that

defendants’ motions to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute de novo. Vess

v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003).

2 There is no dispute that there is a conflict of law between California

and New Jersey with regard to California’s anti-SLAPP statute, which has

no New Jersey analogue.
10 SARVER V. CHARTIER

approach, we must first consider the specific provisions of the

Second Restatement which set forth the presumptive rule for

the claims at issue. See id. at 461. Once this presumptive

rule is established, we must then consult the general tort

principles outlined in section 145 of the Second Restatement,

see id. at 461–63, before finally considering the two states’

competing interests under the general principles outlined in

section 6, id. at 455. We address each in turn.

1

Both sections 150 and 153 of the Second Restatement are

relevant when determining the presumptive rule for Sarver’s

claims.3 Fortunately, “essentially the same choice-of-law

rules are applicable to the two torts.” Restatement (Second)

of Conflicts § 152 cmt. d. Section 150 addresses multistate

defamation that arises from, among other things, “exhibition

of a motion picture” or “similar aggregate communication.” 

Id. § 150(1). This section provides that rights and liabilities

regarding defamation claims are “determined by the local law

of the state which . . . has the most significant relationship to

the occurrence and the parties.” Id. Section 153, which

addresses multistate invasion of privacy, provides the same

rule. Section 153 explains that the state with the most

significant relationship “will usually be the state where the

plaintiff was domiciled at the time if the matter complained

of was published in that state.” See also Hanley v. Trib.

Publ’g Co., 527 F.2d 68, 70 (9th Cir. 1975) (“In cases of

3 Sarver erroneously contends that section 146, which governs actions

for personal injury, applies. However, the Second Restatement expressly

excludes “injuries to a person’s reputation” and “the violation of a

person’s right of privacy” from those injuries classified as “personal

injuries.” Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 146 cmt. b (1971).
SARVER V. CHARTIER 11

defamation, [the Second Restatement factors] normallywould

call for application of the law of the plaintiff’s domicil.”).

Determining where Sarver was domiciled is not

straightforward. Sarver contends that his domicile is New

Jersey, and calls on us to enforce the laws of that state.

However, Sarver has provided little support for his

contention. Without citation to the record, Sarver asserts that

he lived in New Jersey for approximately two years while

stationed there, including at the time The Hurt Locker was

released in theaters. Even if we credit Sarver’s assertion, this

statement alone is insufficient to establish the state as his

legal domicile. See 13E Charles A. Wright et al., Federal

Practice & Procedure § 3617 (3d ed. 2015) (“Service

personnel are presumed not to acquire a new domicile when

they are stationed in a place pursuant to orders; they retain the

domicile they had at the time of entry into the service.”). 

Sarver does not appear to have marshaled other indicia of

domicile in New Jersey, for example that he obtained a New

Jersey driver’s license, registered to vote in the state, or

acquired property there. In sum, other than Sarver’s own

assertion, we have little basis to conclude that New Jersey

was indeed his legal domicile at the time The Hurt Locker

was released.

2

Even assuming arguendo that New Jersey was Sarver’s

domicile would not end our inquiry. As the New Jersey

Supreme Court would, we must next consider the factors

enumerated in section 145 of the Second Restatement, which

presents the “general rule” that informs all torts. Camp

Jaycee, 962 A.2d at 458, 461–63. Those factors include: “‘[1]

the place where the injury occurred, [2] the place where the
12 SARVER V. CHARTIER

conduct causing the injury occurred, [3] the domicile,

residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of

business of the parties, and [4] the place where the

relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.’” Id. at

458 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflicts

§ 145(2)(a)–(d)).

Here, the second and third factors weigh strongly in favor

of application of California law. The conduct causing the

alleged injury—the production of The Hurt Locker—took

place in California. Moreover, all of the corporate defendants

other than Playboy Enterprises are incorporated and alleged

to be conducting business in California. And, although Boal

is a citizen of New York and Playboy Enterprises is a citizen

of Illinois and Delaware, Sarver alleges that both conduct

business in California. For his part, although Sarver contends

that he was domiciled in New Jersey, as explained above, he

has failed to support that contention.

The first and fourth factors do not weigh strongly in favor

of either state. First, it is difficult to identify, let alone place

great weight upon, the location of Sarver’s alleged injury. 

Sarver insists that New Jersey was the primary location of his

injuries, because that is where he was best known to his Army

cohorts. But even that contention is somewhat belied by

Sarver’s admission that he and fellow service members

traveled to view the film at its premiere in New York—not in

New Jersey. Further, Sarver’s claims of reputational harm by

those who knew him would have presumably been felt not

only in the location he lived in 2009, but also where his

various friends and family live and in the states in which he

has lived since the film’s release. The multistate nature of

Sarver’s alleged harms is central to the choice-of-law

analysis. Because the film was distributed nationwide and
SARVER V. CHARTIER 13

Sarver’s alleged injuries would most likely have occurred in

multiple states, “the place of injury will not play an important

role in the selection of the state of applicable law.” 

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 145 cmt. e (emphasis

added); see also BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre

Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 267 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying this rule to

a claim of misappropriation of trade values involving

multistate harms). Finally, the fourth factor is neutral here

because the only relationship between Sarver and the

defendants centered around interviews for the Playboy article

that occurred in Iraq and Wisconsin.

Altogether, we conclude that the California contacts

predominate, and the section 145 factors weigh in favor of the

application of California law.

3

Finally, we consider the section 6 principles, which the

New Jersey Supreme Court has identified as: “(1) the

interests of interstate comity; (2) the interests of the parties;

(3) the interests underlying the field of tort law; (4) the

interests of judicial administration; and (5) the competing

interests of the states.” Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d at 463

(internal quotation marks omitted). In effect, this analysis

“focus[es] primarily on the interests of the two states.” Peter

Hay, Patrick J. Borchers & Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict

of Laws 888 (5th ed. 2010). We apply these principles to

“determine whether more or less weight should be ascribed

to those contacts” we have just discussed. Camp Jaycee, 962

A.2d at 468.

In the text of the statute itself, California has expressed a

strong interest in enforcing its anti-SLAPP law to “encourage
14 SARVER V. CHARTIER

continued participation in matters of public significance” and

to protect against “a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought

primarily to chill the valid exercise” of constitutionally

protected speech. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a). To

this end, courts are instructed to construe California’s statute

“broadly.” Id.

Although New Jersey has declined to establish a similar

law, its courts have allowed defendants to bring a claim for

malicious use of process to protect against suspected SLAPP

actions. See LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 970 A.2d 1007, 1022

(N.J. 2009). In this regard, New Jersey seems to have staked

something of a middle ground to guard against SLAPP

lawsuits. Indeed, in an opinion declining to create a specific

anti-SLAPP cause of action, New Jersey’s Appellate Division

nevertheless acknowledged that SLAPP suits require some

level of “counteraction.” Lobiondo v. Schwartz, 733 A.2d

516, 533 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).

On balance, the interests of interstate comity and the

competing interests of the states tilt in favor of applying

California law. Whereas California would appear to object

strongly to the absence of a robust anti-SLAPP regime, New

Jersey’s interests would be less harmed by the use of

California law. Moreover, because the vast majority of the

parties in this action are citizens of or do business in

California, the parties’ expectations likewise tilt in favor of

California law.

Thus, like our analysis under section 145, our section 6

inquiry weighs in favor of applying California law. Taken

together, we conclude that California has the most significant

relationship to this litigation, which is sufficient to overcome

any presumption of Sarver’s domicile, wherever that may be. 
SARVER V. CHARTIER 15

See Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d at 461 (recognizing that analysis

under sections 145 and 6 can overcome presumptive rule). 

Thus, as did the district court, we apply California’s antiSLAPP law.

B

Having determined that California’s anti-SLAPP law

applies, we must consider whether the defendants’ antiSLAPP motions—which were filed almost one year after

Sarver filed his complaint—were timely. Sarver contends that

they were not, relying on Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(f),

which provides that an anti-SLAPP motion “may be filed

within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the

court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems

proper.”

Sarver asserts that the defendants showed no good cause

for their filing delay and that the district court therefore

abused its discretion in accepting the anti-SLAPP motions so

far beyond California’s 60-day time frame. The defendants

counter that California’s timing provision does not apply in

federal court, because it is a procedural device that conflicts

directly with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See, e.g.,

Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 845 (“Procedural state laws are not

used in federal court if to do so would result in a direct

collision with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

We have previously recognized that the requirements set

forth in subsections 425.16(f) and (g) fundamentally collide

with federal courts’ rules of procedure. In Metabolife, we

considered whether federal courts are obliged to adhere to the

expedited discovery process established under subsections
16 SARVER V. CHARTIER

425.16(f) and (g). 264 F.3d at 846. We concluded that we

are not, agreeing with the district court that “[b]ecause the

discovery-limiting aspects of § 425.16(f) and (g) collide with

the discovery-allowing aspects of Rule 56, these aspects of

subsections (f) and (g) cannot apply in federal court.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

So, too, do the timing controls imposed by section

425.16(f) directly collide with the more permissive timeline

Rule 56 provides for the filing of a motion for summary

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) (permitting parties to file

a motion for summary judgment “at any time until 30 days

after the close of all discovery”). Although section 425.16(f)

does not prohibit the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion after 60

days, it certainly restricts a party’s ability to do so in a way

Rule 56 would not. We therefore decline to apply the

statute’s 60-day time frame in federal court, and we refer

instead to our own rules of procedure. Under those rules, the

defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions were timely filed.4

III

Turning to the merits of the defendants’ anti-SLAPP

motions, we have previously observed that “California’s antiSLAPP statute is designed to discourage suits that

‘masquerade as ordinary lawsuits but are brought to deter

common citizens from exercising their political or legal rights

or to punish them for doing so.’” In re NCAA Student-Athlete

Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1272 (9th

4 Because we conclude that section 425.16(f) does not apply here, we do

not reach the parties’ arguments regarding whether it was within the

District Court’s discretion to accept defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions

under California’s procedural requirements.
SARVER V. CHARTIER 17

Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Keller] (quoting Batzel v. Smith,

333 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2003)). In relevant part, the

statute states:

A cause of action against a person arising

from any act of that person in furtherance of

the person’s right of petition or free speech

under the United States Constitution or the

California Constitution in connection with a

public issue shall be subject to a special

motion to strike, unless the court determines

that the plaintiff has established that there is a

probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the

claim.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1).

Tracking the language of the statute, we evaluate antiSLAPP motions in two steps. The defendant must first

“make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s suit arises

from an act by the defendant made in connection with a

public issue in furtherance of the defendant’s right to free

speech under the United States or California Constitution.” 

Keller, 724 F.3d at 1272–73 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Second, if the defendant has made such showing,

we evaluate whether the plaintiff has “establish[ed] a

reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail on his or

her . . . claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)

(alterations in original). “‘Put another way, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and

supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to

sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the

plaintiff is credited.’” Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d
18 SARVER V. CHARTIER

894, 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wilson v. Parker, Covert &

Chidester, 50 P.3d 733, 739 (Cal. 2002)).

A

For the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions to succeed, they

must first show that “‘the act or acts of which the plaintiff

complains were taken in furtherance of [the defendants’]right

of petition or free speech under the United States or

California Constitution in connection with a public issue.”’ 

Hilton, 599 F.3d at 903 (citing Equilon Enters., LLC v.

Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685, 694 (Cal. 2002)). Thus,

if the defendants fail to show that Sarver’s lawsuit involves

a matter of public concern, California’s anti-SLAPP

provisions are inapplicable on their face.

Interpreting the California Supreme Court’s

pronouncements, we have “construe[d]‘public issue or public

interest’ . . . broadly in light of the statute’s stated purpose to

encourage participation in matters of public importance or

consequence.” Hilton, 599 F.3d at 906 (quoting Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(4)). California’s intermediate

appellate courts have offered insight into how we should

conduct this analysis. The California Court of Appeal for the

First District has identified “three categories of public issues:

(1) statements ‘concern[ing] a person or entity in the public

eye’; (2) ‘conduct that could directly affect a large number of

people beyond the direct participants’; (3) ‘or a topic of

widespread, public interest.’” Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting Rivero v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps.,

130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81, 89–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). 

California’s Court of Appeal for the Third District has

explained that “‘public interest’ does not equate with mere

curiosity,” but instead “a matter of public interest should be
SARVER V. CHARTIER 19

something of concern to a substantial number of people.” 

Weinberg v. Feisel, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 392 (Cal. Ct. App.

2003). Further, “there should be some degree of closeness

between the challenged statements and the asserted public

interest,” and the “focus of the speaker’s conduct should be

the public interest.” Id. Finally, a “person cannot turn

otherwise private information into a matter of public interest

simply by communicating it to a large number of people.” Id.

at 393.

The defendants rightly contend that the Iraq War was a

matter of significant and sustained public attention, as was

the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by insurgents

during the war. Accordingly, the defendants conclude that

The Hurt Locker’s portrayal of those issues necessarily

presents a matter of public concern. Sarver counters that our

analysis should not be so encompassing. Rather than ask

whether the film’s portrayal of the Iraq War raises a question

of public concern, Sarver calls on us to ask specifically

whether the defendants’ alleged misappropriation of his

private persona is of public interest. Under this standard,

Sarver concludes that—because he was not personally in the

public’s eye before this film—the defendants cannot satisfy

the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

Sarver’s argument relies principally on Dyer v. Childress,

55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). In that case, Troy

Dyer sued the makers of the film Reality Bites, for what he

claimed to be an unflattering representation of his younger

self. See id. at 545–46. Affirming the denial of the

defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, the California Court of

Appeal for the Second District held that, although the film

broadly addressed public matters such as the issues facing

Generation X, the film’s depiction of Dyer as “a rebellious
20 SARVER V. CHARTIER

slacker” failed to address any such issue, as there was “no

discernable public interest in Dyer’s persona.” Id. at 547–48.

The nature of Sarver’s occupation and the context in

which his alleged portrayal appears in The Hurt Locker set

him apart from Dyer. Unlike Dyer’s youth, Sarver’s work

while deployed in Iraq was an issue of public concern

significant attention devoted to the war and to the role of

IEDs in it. Importantly, the film’s alleged portrayal of

Sarver’s persona specifically centers around that work. 

Although the film allegedly incorporates personal

characteristics of Sarver—for example his appearance, his

temperament, and parts of his biography—such

characteristics are displayed only in the context of the

character’s experiences fighting in Iraq. In other words, the

private aspects that Sarver alleges the film misappropriated

are inherently entwined with the film’s alleged portrayal of

his participation in the Iraq War.

We conclude that this focus on the conduct of the Iraq

War satisfies California’s standards for determining whether

an issue is one of public concern. That war, its dangers, and

soldiers’ experiences were subjects of longstanding public

attention. Indeed, The Hurt Locker, with its unique focus on

IED disposal teams, contributed to that attention. That the

film won several Oscars and reached widespread audiences

only buttresses our conclusion. The film and the narrative of

its central character Will James speak directly to issues of a

public nature.

B

Having satisfied the public interest inquiry, we turn to the

second step in the analysis, where the burden shifts to Sarver
SARVER V. CHARTIER 21

to “state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.” Hilton,

599 F.3d at 908 (internal quotation marks omitted).

California’s right of publicity law “prohibit[s] any other

person from using a celebrity’s name, voice, signature,

photograph, or likeness for commercial purposes without the

[celebrity’s] consent.” Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary

Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 391 (2001). The elements of

a claim of misappropriation of the right of publicity are

“(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the

appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s

advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent;

and (4) resulting injury.” Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch,

265 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The parties disagree primarily over the second

element—whether the filmmakers appropriated Sarver’s

name or likeness in their production of The Hurt Locker.

But, even assuming for the sake of argument that Sarver

can establish all elements of his claim, the defendants

contend that their production of the film is nevertheless

protected under the First Amendment. That is, they argue

that allowing Sarver to pursue his right of publicity action

against them would infringe their constitutional right to free

speech. Because it is dispositive, we consider that argument

first.

1

The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment, forbids laws “abridging the freedom

of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I; Reed v. Town of Gilbert,

135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). State laws, including state

common law, may not “restrict expression because of its
22 SARVER V. CHARTIER

message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police

Dep’t of City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 

“Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its

communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional

and may be justified only if the government proves that they

are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”

5

Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.

By its terms, California’s right of publicity law clearly

restricts speech based upon its content. The Supreme Court

has reviewed the constitutionality of a state’s right of

publicity law only once, concluding that application of such

a law to prevent the broadcast of a performer’s entire

performance did not violate the First Amendment. In

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., a journalist

videotaped and broadcasted Zacchini’s entire 15-second

“human cannonball” act. 433 U.S. 562, 563–64 (1977). 

Zacchini brought an action against the television station for

violation of his right of publicity under Ohio law. Id. at 564. 

In rejecting the station’s First Amendment defense, the Court

first considered the nature of Ohio’s interest in enforcing the

law. According to the Court, the state’s right of publicity law

was aimed at protecting “the proprietary interest of the

individual in his act” and “prevent[ing] unjust enrichment by

the theft of good will,” in order to provide “an economic

incentive for [the individual] to make the investment required

to produce a performance of interest to the public.” Id. at

573, 576 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court

5 This case does not concern a law that governs commercial speech or

speech that falls within one of a few traditional categories which receive

lesser First Amendment protection. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.

460, 468 (2010); Cent. Hudson Gas &Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n

of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980).
SARVER V. CHARTIER 23

analogized this interest to those which “underlie[] the patent

and copyright laws long enforced by this Court,” as opposed

to reputational and privacy-based interests which underlie

torts like defamation. Id. at 573–76.

The Court balanced this state interest against the station’s

countervailing First Amendment interests in broadcasting

Zacchini’s performance. It determined that the First

Amendment interest in broadcasting the entire performance

(as opposed to just using Zacchini’s name or picture) was

minimal because “[n]o social purpose [was]served by having

the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would

have market value and for which he would normally pay.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court explained

that such a broadcast is tantamount to “preventing [Zacchini]

from charging an admission fee” to view what was “the

product of [his] own talents and energy, the end result of

much time, effort, and expense.” Id. at 575–76. Thus,

because the “broadcast of a film of [Zacchini]’s entire act

pose[d] a substantial threat to the economic value of that

performance,” and protection provided an “economic

incentive” for him to develop such a performance of public

interest, the Court held that the First Amendment did not

prevent Ohio from protecting Zacchini’s right of publicity. 

Id. at 575–79. The Court has not revisited the question of

when a state’s right of publicity law is consistent with the

First Amendment since Zacchini.

2

We, however, have interpreted Zacchini to uphold the

right of publicity in a variety of contexts where the defendant

appropriates the economic value that the plaintiff has built in

an identity or performance. For example, in Hilton v.
24 SARVER V. CHARTIER

Hallmark Cards, we held that Paris Hilton could pursue a

right of publicity claim for Hallmark’s use of her image and

catch phrase (“that’s hot”) from her television show in one of

its greeting cards. 599 F.3d at 899. In doing so, we

suggested that “merely merchandising a celebrity’s image

without that person’s consent, the prevention of which is the

core of the right of publicity,” is not protected by the First

Amendment.6Id. at 910. Similarly, in Keller v. Electronic

Arts, Inc., we upheld an action by a college football player

who sought to prevent the use of his likeness in EA’s video

game. 724 F.3d at 1268; see also Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,

775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding right of publicity

action challenging EA’s use of professional football player

likenesses in a video game). We noted that the video game

“literally recreates [the football player] in the very setting in

which he has achieved renown,” Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271,

and interferes with his ability “to capitalize on his athletic

success,” which took “talent and years of hard work on the

football field” to build. Id. at 1277 n.9, 1281.7

6 That case addressed the First Amendment only through the lens of

California’s “transformative use” doctrine, an affirmative defense

formulated by the California Supreme Court which aims to strike a

balance between First Amendment interests and a plaintiff’s asserted right

of publicity. We need not and do not reach the question of whether such

defense applies in this case.

7 These cases follow California decisions, which have likewise held that

the state’s right of publicity law protects celebrities from appropriation of

their performance or persona. See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 391

(registered owner of The Three Stooges act was permitted to sue an artist

who sold lithographs and t-shirts created fromhis charcoal drawing of The

Three Stooges); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th

1018, 1023 (2011) (rock band No Doubt was permitted to sue video game

company that used computer generated images of the band in its video

game).
SARVER V. CHARTIER 25

Likewise, we have upheld actions involving celebrities

challenging the use of their images in commercial

advertising. See, e.g., Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co.,

157 F.3d 686, 691–94 (9th Cir. 1998) (California’s right of

publicity law applied to use of Dodgers pitcher Don

Newcombe’s image in printed beer advertisement); White v.

Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–99, 1401 n.3

(9th Cir. 1992) (same for use of Vanna White’s likeness as a

robot in an advertisement for VCRs). Although we have not

explicitly applied Zacchini in these cases, our opinions

indicate that the state’s interest is in preventing “the

exploitation of celebrity to sell products, and an attempt to

take a free ride on a celebrity’s celebrity value.” White,

971 F.2d at 1401 n.3.8

In sum, our precedents have held that speech which either

appropriates the economic value of a performance or persona

or seeks to capitalize off a celebrity’s image in commercial

advertisements is unprotected by the First Amendment

against a California right-of-publicity claim.

3

Such lines of cases are not applicable here.

First, The Hurt Locker is not speech proposing a

commercial transaction. Accordingly, our precedents relying

on the lesser protection afforded to commercial speech are

8

In one case, we also upheld a right of publicity action brought by

private individuals challenging the use of their photo in retail advertising

under the less protective standards applicable to commercial speech. See

Downing, 265 F.3d at 1001–02 & n.2. Because this case does not involve

purely commercial speech, we do not opine on the scope of that holding.
26 SARVER V. CHARTIER

inapposite. Second, and critically, unlike the plaintiffs in

Zacchini, Hilton, and Keller, Sarver did not “make the

investment required to produce a performance of interest to

the public,” Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576, or invest time and

money to build up economic value in a marketable

performance or identity. Cf. Keller, 724 F.3d at 1280–81. 

Rather, Sarver is a private person who lived his life and

worked his job. Indeed, while Sarver’s life and story may

have proven to be of public interest, Sarver has expressly

disavowed the notion that he sought to attract public attention

to himself. Neither the journalist who initially told Sarver’s

story nor the movie that brought the story to life stole

Sarver’s “entire act” or otherwise exploited the economic

value of any performance or persona he had worked to

develop. The state has no interest in giving Sarver an

economic incentive to live his life as he otherwise would.

In sum, The Hurt Locker is speech that is fully protected

by the First Amendment, which safeguards the storytellers

and artists who take the raw materials of life—including the

stories of real individuals, ordinary or extraordinary—and

transform them into art, be it articles, books, movies, or plays. 

If California’s right of publicity law applies in this case,9it is

9 And it is not clear that California would extend its right of publicity to

Sarver’s situation. In a case decided shortly after Zacchini, the California

Supreme Court barred a right of publicity action filed by the nephew of

actor Rudolph Valentino based upon the unauthorized exhibition of a

“fictionalized version” of Valentino’s life on television, upon the

conclusion that such right “expires upon the death of the person so

protected.” Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 455

(Cal. 1979). But a concurring opinion joined by three of California’s

seven Supreme Court justices (and implicitly approved by a fourth)

expressed broader doubt that the plaintiff could prevail even on the merits

ofsuch a claim. The concurrence explained that, unlike in Zacchini, there
SARVER V. CHARTIER 27

simply a content-based speech restriction. As such, it is

presumptively unconstitutional, and cannot stand unless

Sarver can show a compelling state interest in preventing the

defendants’ speech. Because Sarver cannot do so, applying

California’s right of publicity in this case would violate the

First Amendment.

Accordingly, Sarver cannot “state and substantiate a

legally sufficient” right of publicity claim, Hilton, 599 F.3d

at 908, and the district court did not err in granting the

defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions regarding such claim.

IV

Sarver also contends that his claims for defamation, false

light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were

improperly dismissed.10 We address each in turn.

First, to prevail on his defamation claim, Sarver must

show that The Hurt Locker depicted him in a way that is

“provably false” and which exposed him “to hatred,

contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which cause[d] him to be

was no claim that the defendants secretly filmed Valentino’s

“performance” or otherwise stole his “entire act,” so as to “undercut[] his

ability to earn a living.” Id. at 464 (Bird, C.J., concurring). The justices

cautioned that the defendants’ fictionalized portrayal of Valentino’s life

was entitled to greater First Amendment protection than the conduct in

Zacchini, and explained that they wrote in an effort “to define one

boundary of this state’s common law right of publicity.” Id.

10 Because Sarver failed in his opening brief to argue any error

concerning the dismissal of his breach of contract, fraud, and negligent

misrepresentation claims, he has waived such arguments on appeal. See

United States v. Marcia-Acosta, 780 F.3d 1244, 1250 (9th Cir. 2015).
28 SARVER V. CHARTIER

shunned or avoided, or which ha[d] a tendency to injure him

in his occupation.” Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal.

App. 4th 1027, 1047–48 (2008) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Sarver contends that the film has interfered with his

employment prospects because it portrayed him as a bad

father, bereft of compassion, fascinated with war and death,

and disobedient.

Sarver’s allegations do not stand up in light of the film as

a whole. We agree with the district court that a reasonable

viewer of the film would be left with the conclusion that the

character Will James was a heroic figure, albeit one

struggling with certain internal conflicts. Directly contrary to

Sarver’s allegations, James exhibits compassion for various

Iraqi citizens, including a young boy and a man trapped in a

suicide vest; appears to care for and miss his son; and

occasionally departs from military protocol in an effort to

save human lives.11 Even if Sarver is correct that certain

aspects of Will James’s character are unflattering, it does not

support the conclusion that the film’s overall depiction of

James could reasonably be seen to defame Sarver.12

11 Further, many of Sarver’s allegations are not “provably false.” For

example, even if the film did show James to be fascinated with war or

death, many of the scenes supposedly supporting such a conclusion

resemble statements Sarver made to Boal, such as that Sarver “love[s]”

working with explosives and that “[a]nything that goes boom” is

“addictive.”

12 We do not agree with Sarver that the district court engaged in

impermissible factfinding in reaching this conclusion. Under California

law, it is a question of law for the court whether a challenged statement is

reasonably susceptible to a defamatory interpretation. See In re Sicroff,

401 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2005).
SARVER V. CHARTIER 29

Second, to prevail on his false light invasion of privacy

claim, Sarver must show that The Hurt Locker publicly

portrayed him “in a false light that would be highly offensive

to a reasonable person.” Price v. Operating Eng’rs Local

Union No. 3, 195 Cal. App. 4th 962, 970 (2011). This claim

fails for the same reasons that Sarver’s defamation claim

does; we agree with the district court that, even if the film’s

portrayal of Sarver were somehow false, such depiction

certainly would not “highly offend” a reasonable person.

Finally, to prevail on his claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, Sarver must show that the defendants

intentionally or recklessly caused him to suffer “severe or

extreme emotional distress” through their “extreme and

outrageous conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 976

(Cal. 2009). We agree with the district court that Sarver has

not alleged facts sufficient to show that any portrayal of him

in The Hurt Locker was the result of “extreme” or

“outrageous” conduct that induced severe or extreme

emotional distress.

Boal was embedded with Sarver’s unit, interviewed

Sarver, and ultimately published a factual account of those

experiences. It is not outrageous that Boal’s factual account

then led to a fictionalized screenplay and film. This is

especially true given Sarver’s numerous allegations that the

film did not transform his personality, but instead adhered

closely to Boal’s nonfiction account and Sarver’s actual

experiences. Although Sarver suggests the defendants made

substantial use of his identity and persona, he has not alleged

facts to support the notion that any such use was somehow

“outrageous.”
30 SARVER V. CHARTIER

In sum, we conclude that Sarver’s false light invasion of

privacy, defamation, breach of contract, intentional infliction

of emotional distress, fraud, and constructive fraud/negligent

misrepresentation claims were properly dismissed.13

V

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

14

13 In addition, we reject as moot Sarver’s challenge to the district court’s

denial of his motion to stay execution and waive bond pending appeal.

14 The motion of Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. and

Entertainment Merchants Association for leave to file a brief as amici

curiae is granted.