most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972
(7th Cir. 2000). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000). Although Smith failed
to respond to Rush’s Rule 56.1 statement of facts, summary judgment will be granted only if Rush
demonstrates there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See Johnson v, Gudmundsson, 35 F.3d 1104, 1112 (7th Cir. 1994).

Il. Title VII Race Discrimination Claim (Count I)

Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer... to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race[.] “ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Campbell v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 85
F.Supp.2d 866, 870 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Smith may prove intentional race discrimination through direct
or indirect evidence. Robin v. Espo Eng. Corp., 200 F.3d 1081,1088 (7th Cir. 2000); Michas v.
Health Cost Controls of Illinois, 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000). Smith fails to offer direct
evidence of race discrimination. The court examines her claim under the burden-shifting method
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Hartley v. Wisconsin
Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 1997). First, Smith must establish a prima facie case of race
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If successful, the burden of production shifts
to Rush to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. /d. If Rush
provides a legitimate reason, the burden shifts back to Smith to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that Rush’s proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. /d. at 804.


Facts at 59. Smith advances the thermostat incident with Malecki. Finally, Smith states Malecki
asked her to listen to a telephone message from an African-American caller. Jd. at { 60. Those
incidents are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive environment. Tutman v.
WBBM-TYV, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 2000). "The workplace that is actionable is the one
that is hellish." Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotations omitted). Isolated comments cannot demonstrate a pervasive hostile work environment.
Nguenjuntr v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 146 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Jones v. Illinois
Dept. of Transp., No. 99 C 0266, 2001 WL 1545882, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2001) (isolated
comments about “black comedy and apes” do not create a hostile work environment). Smith fails
to demonstrate Malecki’s adjustment of the thermostat setting was motivated by race. See Hardin,
167 F.3d at 345 (complained of conduct must have a racial purpose to be a violation of Title VII).
Finally, Smith does not offer any evidence that Rush was negligent in discovering or remedying the
purported harassment. Parkins y. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir.
1998). Because Smith fails to create a genuine issue for trial on her hostile work environment claim,
summary judgment is granted on Count III.
CONCLUSION

The motion for summary judgment is granted.

March 21, 2002 ENTER:

Qeertnend B Crohn

Suzarine & Conlon
United States District Judge



Morgridge, the Pediatrics administrator, investigated Malecki’s complaint. Morgridge reviewed the
security report, interviewed Malecki, and reviewed Malecki’s written account of the incident. In
addition, Morgridge interviewed other hospital employees who stated they had interpersonal
conflicts with Smith. Morgridge and Dr. Kimura unsuccessfully attempted to contact Smith about
the incident. Morgridge consulted with Linda Meeks, Rush’s human resource consultant. Meeks
recommended Smith’s termination. On February 26, 1998, Morgridge prepared a memorandum to
Dr. Kimura summarizing his investigation, identifying Smith’s violations of Rush’s employment
policy, and recommending Smith’s termination. Rule 1.03b of Rush’s employment policy prohibits
the use of “profane, obscene, abusive, discourteous or threatening language towards patients, fellow
employees, supervisors or others. This includes derogatory ethnic name calling or offensive
references to ethnic background.” Def. 56.1 Facts at ¢40. Rule 1.03} prohibits the making of “false
vicious or malicious statements” about any employee. Jd, Pl. Ex. 8. Meeks terminated Smith’s
employment on February 27, 1998.
DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving papers and affidavits show there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); King v. National Human Resource
Committee, Inc., 218 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2000). Once a moving party has met its burden, the
nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir.

1999). The court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light


At the outset, the court notes Smith fails to advance any evidence to defeat summary
judgment. Smith’s response to the summary judgment motion is a replica of the allegations in her
complaint. Further, Smith attaches to her response several performance reviews, EEOC charges, and
state administrative decisions without referring to those documents in her response. It is not the
court’s function “to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.” Bombart v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996).
Nevertheless, the court’s review of those documents does not reveal a genuine dispute of material
fact to defeat summary judgment.

The court proceeds directly to the pretext prong of the McDonnell Douglas test because Rush
proffers a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Fuka v. Thomson Consumer
Electronics, 82 F.3d 1392, 1404 (7th Cir. 1996). When an employer articulates a reason for
discharging the plaintiff, the court does not evaluate whether that reason was wise, fair or correct.
Giannopoulous v. Brach & Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 1997). Rush’s
employment policy prohibited the use of profanity and abusive language against other employees.
Smith violated that policy by making several abusive statements to Malecki, including calling her
a “racist bitch.” Def. 56.1 Facts at (22. Smith made those statements in a threatening manner by
clenching her fists and stating, “let’s get it on.” Jd. at ]23. Asa result, Malecki reported the incident
to security personne! immediately. Morgridge and Meeks determined Smith’s behavior violated
Rush’s employment policy, and terminated her employment.

Smith fails to demonstrate pretext. "A pretext, in employment law, is a phony reason that
the employer offers for engaging in discriminatory conduct." Mills v. First Fed'l Sav. & Loan Ass'n

of Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). Smith fails to advance


Minute Onder Form moat

< | Oi nited States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
4 ff

Name of ay OR Suzanne B. Conlon Sitting Judge if Other
or Magisp/ate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASENUMBER 01 C 4971 DATE 3/21/2002
CASE ANTOINETTE SMITH vs. RUSH PRESBYTERIAN-ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL
TITLE CENTER
[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, eg. plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

(ap) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
G) im Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__
(4) 0 Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor____at
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor__— ss at_
(7) q Trial[set for/re-set for]on_____at.
(8) a [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto_ at.
(9) ob This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) O General Rule21 CI) FRCP41(a)(1) [I FRCP41(a)(2).
ao [Other docket entry] Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [19-1] is granted. ENTER
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.
dl) {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court. Document
Number.

No notices required. number of notices,

22 2002

date docketed

Y | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

vo Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
cB deputy’s
initials

Gt Ou
Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office

mailing Jeputy initials



any evidence to demonstrate Rush’s proffered reason for her termination is false. Kralman v. Illinois
Dept. of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 156 (7th Cir. 1994). Smith’s good performance reviews fail
to establish Rush did not honestly believe Smith’s verbal assault on Malecki required termination.
See Anderson v. Stauffer Chemical, 965 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The fact that an employee
does some things well does not mean that any reason for [her] firing is a pretext for discrimination”).
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on Count I,

HI. Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claim (Count Hi)

Title VI prohibits an employer from engaging in racial harassment that creates a hostile or
offensive work environment. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180 (1989). To
establish a Title VII harassment claim, Smith must demonstrate her workplace was objectively and
subjectively hostile. Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Co., Inc., 167 F 34340, 345 (7th Cir. 1999). Whether
a work environment is hostile depends on the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance. Logan v. Kautex Textron N. Am. » 259 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 2001).
Smith claims she was subjected to racial slurs by other employees but she does not identify the
individuals who purportedly made the comments or the nature of the comments. Smith’s response
brief consists of conclusory statements about purported racial harassment at Rush. Smith advances
no evidence to support her allegations.

Rush identifies three incidents that Smith described at her deposition to demonstrate hostile
work environment. Even if the court considers those incidents, Smith fails to establish a hostile
work environment claim. Smith claims Malecki stated on several occasions that Malecki did not

grow up in an area where black people reside and did not know much about black people. Def. 56.1


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
ANTOINETTE SMITH )
)
Plaintiff, ) No. 01 C 4971
)
v. ) Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge
)
RUSH-PRESBYTERIAN-ST. LUKE’S ) &
MEDICAL CENTER ) ay
) ie
Defendant. ) 25 hey
“%
ad

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Antoinette Smith, pro se, sues Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center ("Rush") for race
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seg. (Counts I & III); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II); and breach of an oral employment
agreement (Count IV). On September 6, 2001, the court dismissed Counts II and IV, as well as
Counts I and II as they pertain to retaliation claims outside the scope of Smith’s Equal Employment
Opportunity charge. Rush moves for summary judgment on the remaining claims in Counts I and
U1.

BACKGROUND
1. Local Rule 56.1 Responses

Although pro se plaintiffs are entitled to more lenient standards in some circumstances, the
standards do not diminish when it comes to complying with procedural rules. Jones v. Phipps, 39
F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994). Rush provided Smith with a Local Rule 56.1 notice to pro se litigants
opposing summary judgment. Nevertheless, Smith failed to respond to Rush's Rule 56.1 statement

1


of facts. Accordingly, all Rule 56.1 facts supported by the record are deemed admitted. Oates v.
Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1167 (7th Cir. 1997); L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B); see also Michas v. Health
Cost Controls of Illinois, Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 2000).

Il. The Facts

Smith, an African-American woman, was a Rush temporary employee performing clerical
work in October 1991. In August 1992, Smith was assigned to the Department of Pediatrics as a
medical transcriptionist. She was required to transcribe dictation for physicians under the
supervision of Dr. Robert Kimura. Dr. Kimura considered Smith to be an excellent transcriptionist.
However, Smith’s performance review in 1993 and 1994 identified two areas of concern: staff
conflicts and poor communication skills. Dr. Kimura was aware of personality conflicts between
Smith and other staff members. As a result, Dr. Kimura separated Smith from other staff members
by assigning her a workspace in 691 Pavilion, a physician on-call room, where she kept her personal
effects and worked alone during the day. At night, Smith was permitted to work in 622 Murdock
at Bertha Perez’s desk, Dr. Kimura’s secretary.

On February 20, 1998, Smith and Dorothy Malecki, a white clerical Pediatrics employee,
engaged in a verbal brawl. Smith was working at Perez’s desk. Malecki entered the office and
turned the thermostat to a lower setting. Smith turned it back up. Smith called Malecki a “racist
bitch.” Def. 56.1 Facts at 22. In addition, Smith rose from her chair, clenched her fists, and said
to Malecki, “let’s get it on, let’s get it on.” Jd. at § 23. Malecki left the office and went directly to
Rush’s security department to report the incident. Anthony Murray, a security officer, recorded
Malecki’s account of the incident. The report quotes Smith as stating: “what’s the matter bitch,

haven’t you been laid by your husband. Come on white bitch, let’s get it on.” /d. at § 26. James