NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

DAVID C. CORSON, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2010-7059 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in Case No. 08-2573, 

Judge Alan G. Lance, Sr. 

____________________________ 

Decided: October 6, 2010 

____________________________ 

DAVID C. CORSON, of Chloe, West Virginia, pro se. 

WILLIAM P. RAYEL, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. 

With him on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and ALAN J.
CORSON v. DVA 2

LO RE, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were 

DAVID J. BARRANS, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, 

and Y. KEN LEE, Staff Attorney, Office of the General 

Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, 

of Washington, DC. 

__________________________ 

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and DYK, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

David Corson (“Corson”) appeals from the decision of 

the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(“the Veterans Court”) affirming a June 19, 2008, decision 

of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“the Board”) in which 

the Board dismissed Corson’s motion to revise an earlier, 

October 9, 2001, Board decision on grounds of clear and 

unmistakable error (“CUE”). Corson v. Shinseki, No. 08-

2573 (Vet. App. Jan. 5, 2010). We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Corson served on active duty in the United States 

Navy from October 1957 to December 1961. In April 

1983, the Board denied Corson’s claims of entitlement to 

(1) service connection for a psychiatric disability and 

chronic brain syndrome, (2) an increased disability rating 

for postoperative residuals of angiofibroma of the nasopharynx, and (3) a total disability rating based upon 

individual unemployability. Corson did not appeal the 

Board’s decision, but he subsequently requested its revision based on multiple allegations of CUE. In October 

2001, the Board concluded that there was no CUE in its 

earlier, 1983 decision. Corson then requested revision of 

the Board’s 2001 decision, again based on multiple allegations of CUE. In June 2008, the Board held Corson’s 
3 CORSON v. DVA

allegations of CUE to be an improper second collateral 

attack on the Board’s 1983 decision, and thus to be precluded by 38 C.F.R. § 20.1409(c), which provides that once 

the Board renders a final decision on CUE, a claimant is 

prohibited from challenging that CUE determination on 

the same basis. Accordingly, the Board dismissed 

Corson’s claims with prejudice. 

On January 5, 2010, the Veterans Court affirmed. 

The court agreed that Corson’s CUE allegations directed 

at the Board’s 2001 decision were improper attempts to 

relitigate theories of error in the Board’s 1983 decision, 

and thus the Board properly dismissed Corson’s claims 

based on principles of res judicata as reflected in 

§ 20.1409(c). The Veterans Court issued its final judgment on January 29, 2010, and Corson appealed. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). 

DISCUSSION

This court’s jurisdiction to review decisions of the 

Veterans Court is limited by statute. 38 U.S.C. § 7292. 

We “have exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide any 

challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or 

any interpretation thereof [by the Veterans Court] . . . , 

and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 

to the extent presented and necessary to a decision.” Id.

§ 7292(c). We must hold unlawful and set aside any 

regulation or any interpretation thereof relied upon by 

the Veterans Court that we find to be “(A) arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, 

power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory 

jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a 

statutory right; or (D) without observance of procedure 

required by law.” Id. at § 7292(d)(1). We, however, “may 
CORSON v. DVA 4

not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or 

(B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the 

facts of a particular case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2). 

In this case, the Veterans Court ruled that Corson’s 

challenge to the Board’s October 2001 decision was precluded by 38 C.F.R. § 20.1409(c), which provides that 

“[o]nce there is a final decision on a [CUE] motion . . . relating to a prior Board decision on an issue, 

that prior Board decision on that issue is no longer subject to revision on the grounds of clear and unmistakable 

error.” Rather, “[s]ubsequent motions relating to that 

prior Board decision on that issue shall be dismissed with 

prejudice.” Id. This court has upheld the validity of 

§ 20.1409(c), agreeing that the rule “promotes the interests of judicial economy and finality of decision.” Disabled 

Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 702 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

Corson challenges the Board’s application of 

§ 20.1409(c), arguing that the Board incorrectly applied 

the regulation when it “reached a broad general determination rather than addressing . . . each separate reasonably raised issue of CUE” as required by 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7104(d)(1). We disagree. To the extent that the decisions of the Board and the Veterans Court interpreted 

§ 20.1409(c) in applying the regulation, we see no error in 

their interpretation. On its face, § 20.1409(c) does not 

require each issue of CUE previously presented be addressed separately, but rather it requires that such claims 

must be dismissed with prejudice. That is what the 

Board did. Furthermore, Corson fails to explain how any 

alleged failure to set forth reasons and bases under 

§ 7104(d)(1) could have “manifestly changed the outcome” 

of the Board’s decision as required for a determination of 

CUE. Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 

2002) (en banc). 
5 CORSON v. DVA

Corson also alleges various constitutional violations, 

including violations of his due process rights under the 

Fifth Amendment, and numerous statutory and regulatory violations. He further alleges that the Veterans 

Administration conspired to violate his rights in retaliation for his filing a discrimination action against the 

Administration. It is unclear how any of Corson’s allegations relate to the decision of the Veterans Court from 

which he appeals. To the extent that Corson is arguing 

that the application of § 20.1409(c) violated his due process rights by denying him veterans benefits, such an 

argument challenges the Board’s application of the regulation to the facts of this case, i.e., it challenges the 

Board’s determination that Corson’s allegations of CUE 

amounted to no more than an attempt to relitigate his 

prior CUE allegations directed at the 1983 Board decision. We lack jurisdiction to entertain such a claim. 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 

We have considered Corson’s other arguments and 

find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm the 

decision of the Veterans Court. 

AFFIRMED 

COSTS

 No costs.