“accommodation for reasonable error . . . because officials should not err always on the side
of caution because they fear being sued,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991). “The
entitlement [to a qualified immunity] is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost ifa case is erroneously permitted
to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in original). Its
purpose is to protect all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.
Malley vy. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). It protects those officials who act within the
“hazy border” between the lawful and the unlawful. Riccardo v. Rausch, 359 F.3d 510, 515
(7th Cir. 2004),

Qualified immunity is a legal question properly determined by a court and answered
in reference to the particular facts of the case. Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1201-02
(7th Cir. 1987) (en banc). When qualified immunity is considered within the context of
summary judgment, the usual summary judgment procedure (consider all the undisputed facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party) should be followed and all of the
undisputed evidence in the record should be examined. Jd. at 1204.

“The inquiry focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, not the state
of mind or good faith of the officials in question.” Erwin v. Daley, 92 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir.
1996). Such an objective analysis, which is less fact bound than a subjective analysis, makes
summary judgment a practical and effective means of terminating unnecessary litigation.

Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1205.

13



Defendants that he was planning to go to the hospital because of the hypodermic needle
embedded in his groin, that he was going through heroin withdrawal, and that he was
physically in pain. /d.; Pl. Ex. Af] 13, 18. Defendants deny having knowledge of Plaintiff's
conditions, and there is no mention of Plaintiffs complaints in the case supplementary report.
Def. Exs. B-D.

Defendants transported Plaintiff to the Area Two police station, interviewed him, and
left Plaintiff there while they went to speak to Plaintiff's alleged victim’s doctor. Def. Facts
10. Defendants then returned to the police station and re-interviewed Plaintiff regarding
the alleged crime. Jd. | 12. Plaintiff claims that he made several requests for medical
treatment and again told Defendants about his injury and pain. Jd. 4 18; Pl. Ex. A ¥ 18.
Additionally, Plaintitf claims that the next day, February 22, 2001, Defendants asked to see
Plaintiff's wound, which was “draining a clear substance.” Jd. {| 18, 20; Pl. Ex. A 4 20.
Defendants claim that at no point did Plaintiffindicate that he was in physical pain or inneed
of medical attention and that they never observed any injuries to Plaintiff. Id. They also
claim that if Plaintiff had indicated that he was in physical pain or needed medical attention,
they would have arranged for Plaintiff's transportation to the nearest hospital. Jd. 4 19.

At 9:15 p.m. on February 22, 2001, in the presence of Detective Dougherty and the
assistant states attorney, Plaintiff signed a statement, confessing to the crime for which he
was arrested, Def. Ex. D, but allegedly did so only because Defendants told him that he

would not get medical treatment for his injuries unless he signed the statement, Pl. Ex. 1



or failing to state a claim, he may not file suit in federal court without prepaying the filing

fee, unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

SO ORDERED THIS 30th DAY OF MARCH, 2004.

Copies mailed to:

Cedric Nelson
#2001-0015469

P.O. Box 089002
Chicago, Illinois 60608

Pro se Plaintiff

Murtin. or Su

MORTON DENLOW
United States Magistrate Judge

Liza M. Franklin

Assistant Corporation Counsel
30 N. LaSalle Street, Ste. 1400
Chicago, Illinois 60602

Attorney for Defendants



For the following reasons, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise genuine
issues of material fact regarding the charge of deliberate indifference, and that Defendants
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that charge. Furthermore, Defendants are
protected from trial by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The Court will discuss each issue
in turn.

A. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE THROUGH DELAY OF MEDICAL CARE

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical
condition from which he suffered at the time of his arrest by depriving him of medical care
for an unreasonable amount of time. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from
deliberate indifference to a serious injury or medical need, which constitutes “unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). ‘the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends that right to pretrial detainees because
the state may not punish an offense until after it has obtained a formal adjudication of guilt
pursuant to the strictures of legal due process. Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 592-
93 (7th Cir. 2003). Similarly, a pretrial detainee’s claim of deprivation of medical care is
governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in ruling on the
claim, a court applies the standard applicable to the Eighth Amendment protections from
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, See Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 845

(7th Cir. 2001).



face. Id. There is also a “D” shaped mark encompassing the diagram’s abdomen, right hip,
and groin areas that may indicate bruising in those general areas, but its true meaning is
unclear. /d. The accompanying right-side-view diagram has no markings on it. Jd.
Additionally, the intake officer noted that Plaintiff stated that he broke a needle off in his
right hip area two months prior. /d.; Def. Facts § 28. Plaintiff disputes this statement,
claiming that he told the intake officer that the needle broke off two days prior. Def. Facts
928.

On May 10, 2001, Plaintiff was x-rayed at Cermak Health Services and no foreign
bodies were noted in his groin. Jd. 33; Def. Ex. 7. On June 14, 2001, four months after his
arrest, Plaintiff was x-rayed again and a needle was seen embedded in soft tissue projecting
over Plaintiff's hip joint. Def. Facts { 34; Def. Ex. J. Medical records dated July 20, 2001,
indicate that Plaintiff continued to complain that he broke offancedle in his right groin area
five months prior, but the physician was unable to palpate the needle and diagnosed Plaintiff
with a needle in his right hip area only. Def. Ex. K. The physician referred Plaintiff to a
surgeon for removal ofthe needle. /d. August 7, 2001 medical records indicate that Plaintiff
complained of a hypodermic needle broken off in his right groin in February 2001 and that
the right groin was tender to palpation. PI. Ex. 1. Medical records from November 27, 2001,
and July 11, 2002, indicate that both of Plaintiffs testicles demonstrated a normal

sonographic appearance and that blood flow was normal in Plaintiff's right leg. Def. Exs.


14, 17. However, the signed confession includes statements by Plaintiff that no threats or
promises had been made in exchange for his confession, that he was treated well by the
police, that he was given food, coffee, and cigarettes, and that he was not under the influence
of drugs or alcohol. Def. Ex. F.

After interrogating and detaining Plaintiff at the police station for approximately thirty
hours, Defendants brought Plaintige to the lockup facility in Area Two at approximately

/
12:05 a.m. on February 23, 2001. ‘Def. Facts 4/21. From that point in time, Defendants did
not see Plaintiff again, outside of court proceedings. Id. § 22.

At the lockup facility, Plaintiff was processed by Officer Warren Hughes, who
conducted a visual check of Plaintiff's physical condition and interviewed him. Jd. { 23.
Officer Hughes claims that he did not see any injuries or physical problems suffered by
Plaintiff and did not call to have Plaintiff transported to a hospital. /d. {{[ 24, 26. Plaintiff
claims that he informed Officer Hughes that there was a hypodermic needle embedded in his
groin area and that he was going through heroin withdrawat. Id. § 24; Pl. Ex. A { 24.
Plaintiff spent the night in the lockup. See Def. Facts 24.

During the day of February 23, 2001, Plaintiff was transported to Cermak Health
Services of Cook County, the jail’s medical facility, in order to undergo a medical screening.
Id. § 27. The intake officer completed a medical intake record, indicating that Plaintiff’s
general appearance was good and that his chief complaint was “bad health.” Def. Ex. H. On

a front-view diagram of the human body, there is a notation that Plaintiff has a scar on his



scare 1 LIVI CASE.

United States District Court

Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division

Cedric M. Nelson JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
v. Case Number: 01 C 8371

Detective D. Stover

Oo Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been
tried and the jury rendered its verdict.

a Decision by Court. This action came to hearing before the Court. The issues have
been heard and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that John Doe Staff and Jane Doe Staff are
dismissed from this case. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. This case is
dismissed with prejudice in it entirety.

Michael W. Dobbins, Clerk of Court

Date: 3/30/2004

Donna Kuempel, DeputyjClerk


Cir. 2003); Bank-Leumi Le-Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1991). Proof
presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits that are part
of the record must be considered. Degenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County, No. 97 C 7208,
2001 WL 1345991, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2001). However, the court is not required to
“scour the record” to find an issue of fact. Lee v. Brewer, No. 91 C 7819, 1994 WL 46683,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 1994). Ifthe non-moving party fails to show that there is a genuine
issue for trial, “then the court must enter summary judgment against [that party].” Waldridge
v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in the original).

Therefore, even if made by a pro se party, “bald assertions” that are completely
unsupported by evidence, are not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.
Rodriguez v. Mercado, No. 00 CIV. 8588 JSRFM, 2002 WL 1997885, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
28, 2002). Nonetheless, if the claim “turns on which of two conflicting stories best captures
what happened,” the movant is not entitled to summary judgment. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 216 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants raise two issues. The first is whether they are entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of deliberate indifference. The second is whether they are entitled to
summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. If Defendants are entitled to

judgment on either issue, this case will be dismissed.



Minute Order Fortn (06/97)

Kod

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Seetieectfas | Moron Deniow | Suede
CASE NUMBER 01 C 8371 DATE 3/30/2004
CASE Cedric M. Nelson vs. Detective D. Stover, et al.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
ql) Qa Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motiondue___.
(3) Qo Answer brief to motion due____. Reply to answer briefdue__.
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon eset for_— at
(5) oOo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on____—setfor___—_at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—setfor__——at_
(@) a Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at
(8) Q [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto__at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) (ClLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP4I1(a\(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
qo) =o [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. John Doe Staff and Jane Doe Staff
are dismissed from this case. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [55-1] is granted. This case is
dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. Any pending motions are denied as moot.
ql) Of [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.
o | Notices mailed by judge's staff,
Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom
DK deputy’s
initials
,- Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office

Wome ad



Dep’t, No. 89 C 3471, 1993 WL 369325, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 1993). To succeed, a
plaintiff who alleges that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must
place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect, that is the
substantial harm, caused by delay in medical treatment. Jd. (citing Beyerbach v. Sears, 49
F.3d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir. 1995)).

In this case, regardless whether Defendants actually knew of any pain or injury
experienced by Plaintiff, Plaintiff can not show that he sustained substantial harm as a result
of the delay in medical treatment he alleges was caused by Defendants. Defendants released
Plaintiff from their immediate custody in the early morning hours of February 23, 2001, after
taking custody of him for approximately thirty hours. From that point on, Defendants had
no further contact with Plaintiff. On that date, Plaintiff was examined at Cermak Health
Services, and his medical treatment was out of Defendant’s control because it was within the
control of the jail. The record is clear that there was no harm to Plaintiff from the time of his
arrest until he was turned over for medical examination.

Plaintiff, through no fault of Defendants, did not receive an x-ray of his groin until
May 10, 2001, at which time the x-ray revealed no foreign bodies in Plaintiff's groin area.
In fact, the needle in Plaintiff’s hip was not found until June 14, 2001, four months after
Defendants released Plaintiff from their custody.

Despite this delay, which again was not caused by Defendants, there is no indication
that Plaintiff has suffered any substantial harm. Although Plaintiff claims the delay has

caused him to sulfer constant pain, nerve damage, pain and numbness in his right leg, and

11



To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant displayed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See, e.g., Farmer
vy. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir.
1997). Thus, two elements must be satisfied. Chapman, 241 F.3d at 845. First, the plaintiff
must show that he suffered from “an objectively serious injury or medical need.” Jd.
Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with a “sufficiently culpable state
of mind”; that is, the defendant exhibited “deliberate indifference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834;
Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1369. Additionally, when a plaintiff complains of the delay in
receiving medical treatment, rather than the treatment itself, he must also show that the delay
caused him to suffer “substantial harm.” Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235 (7th Cir. 1996).

For the purposes of this motion only, the Court will assume that Plaintiff can prevail
on the first two elements of the deliberate indifference claim. Plaintiff nonetheless can not
survive summary judgment because, even if Defendants knew of Plaintiff's serious injury or
medical need, Plaintiff can not show that the delay in medical treatment allegedly caused by
Defendants caused him the requisite substantial harm needed to prevail.

Regardless of motives, a defendant officer’s failure to obtain immediate medical care
for a plaintiff constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation only if the delay was “objectively,
sufficiently serious” to constitute the “denial of the minimal civilized measures of life’s
necessities.” Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, something

more than delay is needed to show deliberate indifference. Bustamante v. City of Chi. Police

10



M,N. On June 4, 2003, Plaintiff underwent surgery for the extraction of a hypodermic
needle from his hip. Pl. Memo. at 18.

Nonetheless, Plaintiff claims that he has suffered nerve damage and pain and
numbness in his right leg. Pl. Exs. J, 1 9] 14; Pl. Memo. at 18. He alleges constant pain and
that he can not sit for a long period of time. Pl. Ex. 2.

Il. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment will be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); O’Connor v. DePaul Univ., 123 F.3d 665, 669
(7th Cir. 1997). A court must take the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Bahl v. Royal Indemnity Co., 115 F.3d 1283,1289
(7th Cir. 1997); Condo v. Sysco Corp., 1 F.3d 599, 601 (7th Cir. 1993). To defeat a motion
for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present evidence of a triable
issue of material fact. See Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 1996). A fact is
material when it would determine the outcome under the governing law. Whetstine v. Gate
Rubber Co., 895 F.2d 388, 392 (7th Cir. 1990). A material fact is genuinely in dispute when
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The non-moving party is required to go beyond the pleadings and designate specific

facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 595 (7th


fact on cross-motions for summary judgment). Therefore, the Court has construed the facts
put forth by Plaintiff in such a way as to construct the most logical sequence of events and
arguments possible.’ This liberal construction, however, does not obviate the need for
Plaintiff to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and Local Rule 56.1 because
experience has shown that the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law is
strict adherence to procedural requirements. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113
(1993). Therefore, the Court considers only those statements and allegations that Plaintiff
supports with a sworn affidavit.

On February 21, 2001, Defendants went to Plaintiff's home at 6:30 p.m. to arrest
Plaintiff in connection with an aggravated criminal assault. Def. Facts {{ 6, 8. Plaintiff
claims that at the time of his arrest he was “injecting dope in [his] groin area and the
hypodermic needle [he] was using broken [sic] leaving 2 % centimeters of needle in [him].
While [he] was preparing to go to the hospital [Defendants] knocked on [his] door.” Cmplt.

at 6; Pl. Ex. | 993-4. Plaintiff claims that when Defendants knocked on the door, he told

?On March 28, 2003, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Plaintiff responded
on May 6, 2003. Plaintiff attached four affidavits and several medical records to his response. On July 14,
2003, this Court denied Defendants’ motion without prejudice because Defendants submitted unsigned and
unsworn affidavits, as well as unauthenticated copies of medical and police records, in violation of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rules 56.1 and 56.2. Defendants now submit a proper motion for
summary judgment, to which Plaintiff has responded. Plaintiffs response, however, contains no affidavits.
Therefore, the Court must rely upon the affidavits of record, those submitted with Plaintiff's May 6, 2003
response. Because of this complication, the following citations will be used: PI. Ex. __ (refers to an exhibit
attached to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment dated May 6, 2003); Def.
Fact § __ (refers to Defendants Stover and Dougherty’s Reply in Further Support of Their 56.1(a)(3)
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment); Def. Ex. __
(refers to an exhibit attached to Defendants Stover and Dougherty’s 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment).

3



The Supreme Court articulated the test:

If the law at the time was not. clearly established, an official could not

reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could

he fairly be said to “know” that the law forbade conduct not previously

identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity question is resolved,

discovery should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, the

immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public

official should know the law governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the

official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove

that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the

defense should be sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on

objective factors.
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. A court should ask whether the defendant officer acted
reasonably under the settled law, given the circumstances, not whether another reasonable,
or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can be constructed several years after the
fact. Humphry v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998). The Seventh Circuit employs
a two-step analysis: “(1) Does the alleged conduct set out a constitutional violation? and (2)
Were the constitutional standards clearly established at the time in question?” Kernats v.
O'Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 1994). Under part (1) of this approach, a plaintift’s
supported allegations, including intent, are assumed to be true. Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1210.
The right under part (2) “should not be defined so intricately that invariably guiding law
never can be found.” /d. at 1211.

“[P ]laintiff bears the burden of showing that the officer violated a clearly established

constitutional right... .” Clash v. Bearry, 77 F.3d 1045, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996). “ ‘Closely

analogous cases, those decided betore the defendant acted or failed to act, are required to find

14



defendant officer was entitled to summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity and
the lack of any facts tending to show deliberate indifference).

In this case, there is a fatal gap in Plaintiff’s case because Plaintiff has not created a
genuine issue of material fact supporting his claim that he suffered substantial harm.
Defendants, therefore, are entitled to qualified immunity.

IV. CONCLUSION

John Doe Staff and Jane Doe Staff are dismissed from this case. Defendants’
motion for summary judgment is granted. This case is dismissed with prejudice in its
entirety. Any pending motions are denied as moot.

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this final judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with
this Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C); Hyche v. Christensen, 170 F.3d 769, 771 (7th Cir.
1999). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $105 appellate filing tee
irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. Evans v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, 150 F.3d 810,
812 (7th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, if the appeal is found to be non-meritorious, Plaintiff may
also accumulate a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff is warned that if

a prisoner has had a total of three federal cases or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious,



care at the time of his arrest and consequently causing him substantial harm. Plaintiff now
proceeds pro se because his appointed counsel was given leave to withdraw from the case
on January 14, 2003.’

This case is now before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For
the following reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted, and the
complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

I, BACKGROUND

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the brief and complaints of a pro
se prisoner who is not skilled in legal analysis must be liberally construed. Whittford v.
Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 535 n.10 (7th Cir. 1995) (liberally construing the brief of a pro se
prisoner to find that the prisoner had not waived an issue within the summary judgment
context); Woods v, Thieret, 903 F.2d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir. 1990) (liberally construing the

complaints of a pro se litigant in a civil rights case and finding a genuine issue of material

‘Plaintiff's former appointed counsel submitted a statement in support of his motion to withdraw as
appointed counsel on January 9, 2002. He stated that Plaintiff never had a needle in his groin area, jail
medical staff provided Plaintiff with much medical attention, but that Plaintiff complained about a needle
in his groin area, and medical records showed there was nothing there. Later, the medical staff at the jail
discovered that Plaintiff had a needle embedded in his right hip area, and after the Court heard this
information from Plaintiff's counsel in open court and ordered it attended to, the needle was surgically
removed from Plaintiff's right hip. The attorney further stated that because Plaintiff never complained about
his right hip to Defendants, they were as a matter of law not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs at
the time that Plaintiff was in their custody. Although this pleading from Plaintiffs counsel is not a part of
the motion for summary judgment, it is part of the record in this case as it was presented to the Court, which
advised Defendants to review Plaintiff's medical care. However, this part of the record is mentioned only
to summarize what Plaintiff appears to have admitted in his affidavits: a) that the needle was in his right hip,
not in his groin or testicles, as he claimed in his complaint; and b) that he never told Defendants anything
about his medical issue. Additionally, the objective medical evidence attached to the counsel’s motion, much
of which also was submitted by Defendants, contradicts Plaintiff's assertions.

2



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DOCKETED

MAR 31 2004

CEDRIC M. NELSON, #2001-0015469,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 01 C 8371

ve

Magistrate Judge Morton Dentow

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
DETECTIVE D. STOVER, )
Detective #21337, DETECTIVE J. )
DOUGHERTY, Detective #20432, )
JEAN KIRIAZES, JOHN DOE STAFF, and )
JANE DOE STAFF, )

)

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Cedric Nelson (“Plaintiff”), currently a pretrial detainee at the Cook County
Jail (“the jail”), brings this pro se civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against
Chicago Police Detectives Danny Stover and John Dougherty, as well as Jean Kiriazes and
unknown individuals identified as John Doe Staff and Jane Doe Staff. On June 6, 2002,
Defendant Jean Kiriazes was dismissed from the case. The unnamed John and Jane Does are
also dismissed from the case because they were never named or served. Defendants Stover
and Dougherty (collectively “Defendants”) are the only remaining defendants. They are

charged with violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights by failing to provide him with medical

[3



the inability to sit for a long period of time, he presents no verifying medical evidence to
support these claims. Quite to the contrary, Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that his
testicles appear normal, as does the blood flow in his right leg. The records do not indicate
that Plaintiff complained of the symptoms he alleges. Moreover, the only indication in the
record verified by medical evidence is that Plaintiffs condition at least stayed the same, if
not improved, since Defendants released him from their immediate custody on February 23,
2001. ;

Simply put, Plaintiff did not suffer any injury because of the delay in treatment. As
aresult, despite the issue of fact regarding whether Defendants had actual knowledge of the
pain he was suffering at the time of his arrest, Plaintiff has failed to survive summary
judgment on his claim that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
need by depriving him of medical treatment for an unreasonable period of time. Defendants
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

B. THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Defendants claim that they are protected by qualified immunity. Qualified or “good
faith” immunity is an affirmative defense that “shields the officers from suit ‘insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’ ” Harlow v, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982);
Shedd v. Lindsay, 102 F.3d 282, 287 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). The
doctrine “gives public officials the benefit of the doubt,” Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338,

341 (7th Cir. 1991), and entitles police officers who exercise discretion to an

12



that a constitutional right is clearly established.’ ” Rice v. Burks, 999 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th
Cir. 1993) (quoting Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1209). Previous case law, however, need not
contain facts that are “materially similar” to the facts contained in the underlying action.
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); see also Riccardo, 359 F.3d at 522 (Williams, J.,
dissenting). The focus is whether the prior case law would place defendant officers on notice
that their conduct is unlawful. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739.

Under the circumstances surrounding this case, the inquiries into deliberate
indifference and qualified immunity collapse into one because this Court already has
determined that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim of
deliberate indifference. Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 2002); Delgado-
Brunet v. Clark, 93 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 1996). If there were genuine issues of material
fact concerning the elements of deliberate indifference, then Defendants would not be able
to avoid trial on qualified immunity grounds. Walker, 293 F.3d at 1037 (finding defendant
prison doctors were not entitled to qualified immunity on a deliberate indifference claim
because there were issues of material fact on the deliberate indifference claim and the general
standard of liability under the Eighth Amendment for refusal to treat a serious medical
condition was well-established at the time of the events). On the other hand, if the
uncontested facts reveal a fatal gap in Plaintiff’s case, then Defendants would win on the

merits. Delgado-Brunet, 93 F.3d at 345 (affirming a district court’s determination that a

15