No. 02 C 657 Page 4

law claim. See 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.

jeunes B

< JAMES B. MORAN
ior Judge, U. S. District Court

PA, 2002.


a

No. 02 C 657 Page 3

such a broad scope. Congress enacted the DPPA to regulate information collected from
citizens by the state, not transactions between private businesses and their customers. Section
2721 is the operative portion of the statute; section 2724 merely creates the private right of
action to enforce it. Reading the statute as a whole, it is clear that it is concerned with the
source of the information ~ the state, as opposed to oneself — and not the medium by which it
is conveyed — a driver’s license, passport, credit card, or the spoken word. Consumers who
do not want private businesses to use their personal information can simply decline to disclose
it and can refuse to patronize businesses that demand such information as a condition of
service. Disclosing information to state motor vehicle agencies, by contrast, is significantly less
voluntary.”

We are sympathetic to plaintiff's concerns about the way businesses collect and use
personal information, and its implications for all of our privacies. But that is not what
Congress intended the DPPA to regulate. This statute seeks to control dissemination of
information collected using the coercive power of the state. It does not regulate information
freely given by consumers to private businesses, such as when plaintiff tendered his driver’s
license to Voodoo.’

Our jurisdiction over the ICFA claim was predicated on the federal DPPA claim. See
28 U.S.C. §1367(a). The instant motion was defendants’ initial filing in response to the
complaint. Because we have dismissed all claims over which we had original jurisdiction so

early in this case, we decline to exercise our supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state

>This is likely why Congress specifically prohibited states from conditioning licenses on consent to
disclose personal information. See 18 U.S.C. §2721(e).

3We express no opinion as to whether a driver’s license can constitute a motor vehicle record, only
that the statute does not regulate information an individual discloses about oneself.


Minute C=Form (06/97)

5

’ United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
| IN
bh
Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge James B. Moran than Asigned Sudge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 657 DATE 7122/2002
CASE Sean O’Brien etc. Vs. Quad Six, Inc. ete. et al.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented. ]

a)

MOTION:
Memorandum Opinion and Order
DOCKET ENTRY:
{1) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) 0 Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due___.
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon____ssetfor__— saat
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] {set for/re-set for] on setfor at
(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—_—setfor_— ss at__
(7) ii) Trial[set for/re-set for]on___at
(8) Qa [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to_ at
(9) Q This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) (General Rule21_ OO FRCP4i(a)(1) OI FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) Mi [Other docket entry) Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendants now move to dismiss for

failure to state a claim. The motion to dismiss is granted.

ag [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

hy oo ane
courtroom 684 Hd 22 In zo
WAH deputy’s A
initials Fs
OT MidmMeckiddathn
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SEAN O’BRIEN, on behalf of himself +)
and all others similarly situated, )
)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No, 02 C 657

)

QUAD SIX, INC., d/b/a THE VooDoo +)
NIGHTCLUB, et al., )
)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Sean O’ Brien brought this action against defendants Quad Six, Inc., d/b/a The
Voodoo Nightclub (Voodoo), Riprocks, Inc., d/b/a Riprocks Nightclub and Sports Grille
(Riprocks), Louis Gatziolis, Alexander Gatziolis and John Gatziolis, alleging violations of
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. §§2721 et seq., and the Dlinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act (ICFA), 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. Defendants now move to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the
motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND

The material facts are undisputed. Plaintiff was a patron of Voodoo, a nightclub
located in Schaumburg, Illinois. Upon entry, he presented his driver’s license as a means of
identification. Voodoo personnel videotaped the license, entered O’ Brien’s name and address
into a customer database and subsequently shared the customer list with Riprocks, a related
nightclub. Both Voodoo and Riprock used the list to send promotional materials to existing

Voodoo customers. Louis, Alexander and John Gatziolis are all owners or officers of the

DOCKETED

gut 2 3 2002

wy


~

No. 02 C 657 Page 2

nightclubs.
DISCUSSION

The DPPA prohibits state motor vehicle agencies from disclosing certain information
about individuals unless specific prerequisites are satisfied. 18 U.S.C. §2721(a). The statute
also prohibits authorized recipients from redisclosing that information, 18 U.S.C. §2721(c),
and grants the subject of the improperly used information a private right of action against
violators. 18 U.S.C. §2724.

Defendants did not obtain plaintiffs information (his name and address) from a state
motor vehicle agency. Plaintiff himself presented his driver’s license to nightclub personnel
as identification. Defendants argue that the DPPA does not prohibit the use of information
procured directly from the individual, as opposed to from a state motor vehicle agency, and
that a driver’s license is not a “motor vehicle record” because it is not in the agency’s custody.
Plaintiff counters that the text does not include any requirement that the information be
obtained from the state agency:

A person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from

a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under this chapter shall be

liable to the individual to whom the information pertains, who may bring a civil

action in a United States district court.

18 U.S.C. §2724, Because the phrase “from the state agency” does not appear in this section,
all it requires, plaintiff contends, is that the information be obtained from a motor vehicle
record.

We disagree.! There is absolutely nothing in the text or legislative history to suggest

1We note that existing DPPA casclaw predominantly addresses constitutional issues, There is very
little precedent interpreting the statute and none remotely on point.