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Minute Order Form (06/97)

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United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois é

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Name Arigna ude James B. Moran Satine eaearonner |
CASE NUMBER 00 C 7924 DATE 4/10/2002
CASE Frederick House vs. Russ Nelson et al.
TITLE
[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
Memorandum Opinion and Order
DOCKET ENTRY:
() a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) a Brief in support of motion due
(3) o Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due___.
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon set for_aat
(5) im) Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for}on___—ssetffor___—_aat.
(6) QO Pretrial conference[held/contifued to] (set for/re-set for] on setfor_ se at_
) oO Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to_ at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) (General Rule21 [FRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
(0) =o {Other docket entry] | Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendant Nelson’s motion to
dismiss is granted.
(il) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

wv | Docketing to mail notices,

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
deputy's
initials

WAH

‘Datertime received in
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date mailed notice

mailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FREDERICK HOUSE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 00 C 7924

)

RUSS NELSON, Investigator for Illinois )
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), —_) APR 4 4 200P

DENNIS PEPEL, Parole Officer for )

IDOC, and JOHN DOE, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
According to plaintiff, after his release on parole he was directed to report to his parole
officer. He did so, and met with another parole officer, defendant Pepel, and an IDOC
investigator, defendant Nelson, who accused plaintiff of impregnating a female inmate when
he was in prison. Nelson directed plaintiff to take a lie detector test, which he did. Plaintiff
was later directed to take second lie detector test, which he declined to do on advice of counsel.
He was thereafter arrested and incarcerated for about a month, and was then released.
Plaintiff claims that defendants had no right to arrest or imprison him when he declined to

take a lie detector test, because he was not in violation of his parole.
Defendant Nelson moves to dismiss on the ground of qualified immunity, claiming that
his conduct did not violate clearly-established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. He argues that even assuming that requiring a parolee
to submit to a lie detector test is a constitutional violation, the right to be free from taking such
an examination has not been clearly established. Plaintiff points out that the Mandatory

Supervised Release (MSR) Agreement states that the parolee is to comply with the requests of

lo


No. 00 C 7924 Page 2

his parole agent, that Nelson was not his parole agent, that taking lie detector tests is not a
requirement of the MSR Agreement, and that the alleged incident took place prior to his
release.

Weare not here dealing with the issue of whether or not defendant Nelson had probable
cause to arrest plaintiff for allegedly illegal conduct while he was in prison. Rather, the issue
is whether or not it is clearly established that a Department of Corrections investigator could
not constitutionally require a parolee to take a lie detector test. While plaintiff advances a
number of reasons why it should be concluded that such an investigator does not have that
authority, he can cite no case that so rules.

Defendant Nelson contends that plaintiff, on parole, was still in custody and subject to
the commands of the Department of Corrections, citing People ex rel, Johnson v. Pate, 47 Iil.2d
172, 174 (Ill. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976 (1971). That is so, up to a point, but it is an
oversimplification. Parolees retain rights, although they are circumscribed, See Faheem-El v.
Klincar, 814 F.2d 461 (7" Cir, 1987), rehearing granted and opinion vacated by Faheem-El v.
Klincar, 822 F.2d 35 (7" Cir. 1987); Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712 (7" Cir. 1988).
Faheem-E] illustrates, the borderlines between the authority of the Department of Corrections
over parolees and their retained rights is neither self-evident nor well-defined. An IDOC
investigator, we believe, could reasonably believe he had, as an agent of the Department, the
authority to require plaintiff to submit to a lie detector test, whether or not he constitutionally

could so require. He had no established precedent telling him he could not. The motion to

Ae oe B. Morea —

SL JAMES B. MORAN

~ nior Judge, U. S. District Court
Ocgerall JO, 2002. .

dismiss is granted.