designed “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” Publishers Res., Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publ’ns, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th
Cir. 1985). Such motions do not give a party the opportunity to rehash old arguments
or to present new arguments “that could and should have been presented to the district
court prior to the judgment.” Moro v, Shell Oil Co,, 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996).
Rather, a Rule 59(e) motion “must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or
fact or must present newly discovered evidence” in order to be successful. LB Credit

Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Federal

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986)). The decision of
whether to grant or deny a Rule 59(e) motion “is entrusted to the sound judgment of
the district court.” In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996).

Principally, Local 710 argues that reconsideration is appropriate in this case
because, in its view, the structure of the UPS benefit plan for part-time employees
precludes any possibility of those employees being unjustly enriched through duplicate
benefit payments. In relevant part, the plan provides that a part-time employee’s
benefits may be reduced if another UPS plan provides benefits for the same period of
service. The cited language in essence relies on the same reasoning as our prior

opinion: each employee receives the equivalent of only one set of benefits for any



maximum amount UPS was required to pay for a single employee was the amount that
employee could claim as a full-time employee, not the amount due for a full-time
employee and a part-time employee as if the employee was two people rather than one.
Thus, our opinion addressed only the proper formula to use in calculating any
deficiency in contributions to the affected funds, not the resulting dollar amount and
attendant fees, interest, etc. The notation on the September 4, 2003, order to the effect
that the case was terminated therefore contradicts the thrust of all prior proceedings.
This was a clerical error in translation of the intended result, which can be corrected
by Rule 60(a). Accordingly, we vacate the entry of final judgment indicated by the
September 4 order. However, this decision does not in any way address whether any
deficiencies actually exist or whether Local 710 will be entitled to any of the other
amounts they have claimed. Those issues have yet to be properly presented or
resolved.
B. Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

Rule 59(e)' permits parties to file, within ten days of the entry of a judgment, a

motion to reconsider the judgment. Motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) are

' Although Local 710’s motion does not refer to a specific provision of Fed. R.
Civ. Proc. 59, because it was filed within 10 days of the entry of judgment, we construe

it as though it were brought pursuant to subsection (e). Russell v, Delco Remy Div,
of Gen. Motors Corp,, 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995).

3-



given period of time. Contrary to Local 710’s assertion, while this provision may mean
that our ruling was unnecessary, it certainly does not render it faulty.

Local 710 advances four other arguments in support of their Rule 59(e) motion.”
The second and fourth were already argued in Local 710’s brief in opposition to the
motion for partial summary judgment. As stated, 59(e) motions are not the place to
rehash old arguments. Moro, 91 F.3d at 876. Local 710 may not agree with the
outcome of our decision on these issues, but that is not a proper basis for

teconsideration.

Neither has Local 710 presented a meritorious basis for reconsideration with
either of the other two grounds offered in the motion. Ground one concerns the timing
of the arbitrator’s decision. Local 710 does not claim that we made a manifest error
regarding these facts at the time of the initial decision on the partial summary judgment
motion. In fact, they make no argument whatsoever as to why this time lapse has any
bearing on whether UPS can offset contributions they already made for the employees
in question. Ground three states that our analysis did not take into account paragraphs
5 and 9 of the First and Second Year Agreement. Again, Local 710 provides no

rationale to explain why the contents of these paragraphs would have any effect on the

2 Local 710’s reply brief appears to advance other arguments in addition to these
four, but it is axiomatic that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are

waived. Fenster v. Tepfer & Spitz, Ltd,, 301 F.3d 851, 859 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Minute Ordee Form (0697)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

seraceratngs | Cares P.Kocoms | Sure
CASE NUMBER 02 C 4420 DATE 10/28/2003
CASE Local 710 vs. United Parcel Service, Inc.
TITLE

[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.}

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due, - Reply to answer brief due .

(4) Qa Ruling/Hearing on set for at .

(5) 1 | Status hearing set for 11/13/2003 at 9:30 A.M..

(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :

(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) im [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

OFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)\(1) [FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) UH! [Otherdocketentry) ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION: Local 710's 60(a) motion (Doc 40-1)
to vacate the order of final judgment is granted. Order cause reinstated. Their 59(e) motion to alter or
amend judgment is denied.

(11) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required, vember of wsisea

Notices mailed by judge's staff. —

Notified counsel by telephone. ocT 2g 2003
a | Docketing to mail notices. y,

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to jud wgistrate judge.

}-courtroom.
SCT deputy’s
initials

anim fg 02 10069 —
wy

Wit © Dateltime received in 7
central Clerk's Office amaling deputy intial

stab fee ae 48



issue of set-off. Undeveloped arguments, like recycled ones, are insufficient to clearly
establish “manifest errors of law or fact” that could warrant relief under Rule 59(e).
LB Credit, 49 F.3d at 1267. Accordingly, the motion to reconsider the grant of partial
summary judgment in favor of UPS is denied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Local 710’s 60(a) motion to vacate the order

of final judgment is granted. Their 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment is denied.

Charles P. Kocoras
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Dated: OCT 28 2003



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
LOCAL 710 L.B.T. PENSION FUND, )
Plaintiff,
vs. 02 C 4420
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant, } DOCKETFN
OCT 2 9 2003

MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, Chief District Judge:

This matter comes before the court on the motions of Plaintiff Local 710 L.B.T.
Pension Fund (“Local 710”) to vacate the entry of final judgment in this case and for
reconsideration of our decision granting partial summary judgment to Defendant
United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”). For the reasons set forth below, the motion to
vacate the September 4 entry of final judgment is granted; the motion to reconsider is
denied.

Knowledge of the situation underlying the original opinion is assumed. Local

710 LB.T. Pension Fund v, United Parcel Serv.,Inc., No. 02 C 4420 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4,

2003) (memorandum opinion and order granting partial summary judgment in favor

of defendant).



A. Rule 60(a) Motion to Vacate

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(a) provides, in part, that a court can correct clerical
mistakes in judgments. For an error to be clerical, the outcome reflected in the
judgment must be inconsistent with what has been previously expressed by the court,
and the inconsistency must arise exclusively from a problem with the “translation of
the original meaning to the judgment.” American Fed’n of Grain Millers, Local 24 v,
Cargill Inc,, 15 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1994). In other words, if the result stated in the
entry of judgment is not what was actually intended by the court and indicated in the
proceedings leading up to the entry of judgment, Rule 60(a) allows the mistake to be
corrected without revisiting any of the bases for the intended result. See Wesco Prods,
Corp, v. Alloy Auto. Co., 880 F.2d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 1989).

As indicated by this court’s order of July 9, 2003, the submissions in support of
and in opposition to the motion, and the text of the September 4, 2003, memorandum
opinion, and the bulk of the order accompanying the opinion, the motion decided by
our September 4, 2003, memorandum opinion was a motion for partial summary
judgment. The sole issue presented was whether, in the context of part-time employees
who were later determined to have been entitled to full-time employment while they
were working only part-time, UPS could deduct contributions already made pursuant

to agreements pertaining to part-time employees. Our opinion decided only that the

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