alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 31.1  CERTIFICATION  I, the Chief Executive Officer of PHL Variable Insurance Company (the registrant), certify that:  1. I have reviewed this Quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the registrant;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:  (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  (c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and  5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.   Date:November 14, 2006/s/ Philip K. PolkinghornName:Philip K. PolkinghornTitle:Chief Executive Officer
[942 NYS2d 790]

#### In the Matter of Brandon Lisi (Admitted as Brandon Giel Lisi), an Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts, Petitioner.

Second Department,

April 24, 2012

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Diana Maxfield Kearse,*Brooklyn *(Myron C. Martynetz*of counsel), for petitioner.

*230OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

On July 29, 2011, in the County Court, Suffolk County, before the Honorable James F.X. Doyle, the respondent was convicted of two counts of grand larceny in the first degree, in violation of Penal Law § 155.42, a class B felony, and one count of grand larceny in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 155.40, a class C felony. The respondent, who has not yet been sentenced, was convicted for his role in a mortgage fraud scheme. Although served with a copy of this motion, the respondent has neither submitted a response nor requested additional time in which to submit a response.

By virtue of his felony conviction, the respondent was automatically disbarred and ceased to be an attorney pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (a).

Accordingly, the motion to strike the respondent’s name from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (b), upon his conviction of a felony, is granted, to reflect the respondent’s automatic disbarment on July 29, 2011, and his proffered resignation from the New York State bar is rejected.

Mastro, A.P.J., Rivera, Skelos, Dillon and Cohen, JJ., concur.

Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (a), the respondent, Brandon Lisi, admitted as Brandon Giel Lisi, is disbarred, effective July 29, 2011, and his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent, Brandon Lisi, admitted as Brandon Giel Lisi, shall comply with this Court’s rules governing the conduct of disbarred, suspended, and resigned attorneys *(see*22 NYCRR 691.10); and it is further,

Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, effective immediately, the respondent, Brandon Lisi, admitted as Brandon Giel Lisi, is commanded to desist and refrain from (1) practicing law in any form, either as principal or as agent, clerk, or employee or another, (2) appearing as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, judge, justice, board, commission, or other public authority, (3) giving to another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto, and (4) holding himself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law; and it is further,

Ordered that if the respondent, Brandon Lisi, admitted as Brandon Giel Lisi, has been issued a secure pass by the Office of *231Court Administration, it shall be returned forthwith to the issuing agency and the respondent shall certify to the same in his affidavit of compliance pursuant to 22 NYCRR 691.10 (f); and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent’s proffered resignation from the New York State bar is rejected.
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 15

- 00409

- CV

CITY OF PHARR v. GERMAN GARCIA, ANNA LEAL, DOMINGO LOPEZ JR., SAN JUANITA DE LA FU ENTE, AND EZEQUIEL P EREZ

On Appeal from the 430th District Court of Hidalgo County , Texas Trial Cause No. C

- 5232

- 14

- J

J UDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case should be remanded to the trial court. The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against the party incurring same

. We further order this decision certified below for o bservance. December 1, 2016
# C_2020313EN.01002601.xml

| 21.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 313/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 313/26

---

Judgment of the General Court of 8 July 2020 — Pablosky v EUIPO — docPrice (mediFLEX easySTEP)

(Case T-21/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU figurative mark mediFLEX easySTEP - Earlier EU figurative mark Stepeasy - Relative grounds for refusal - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2020/C 313/37)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Pablosky, SL (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: M. Centell, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, H. O’Neill and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: docPrice GmbH (Koblenz, Germany) (represented by: K. Landes, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 November 2018 (Case R 76/2018-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Pablosky and docPrice.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 8 November 2018 (Case R 76/2018-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Pablosky, SL and docPrice GmbH, in so far as it concerns ‘clothing’ and ‘headgear’ in Class 25 of the Nice Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 8 November 2018 (Case R 76/2018-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Pablosky, SL and docPrice GmbH, in so far as it concerns ‘clothing’ and ‘headgear’ in Class 25 of the Nice Agreement;

| 2. | Dismisses the appeal which docPrice brought before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO in so far as it concerns the goods referred to in point 1; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the appeal which docPrice brought before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO in so far as it concerns the goods referred to in point 1;

| 3. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 4. | Orders each party to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Orders each party to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 82, 4.3.2019.

---
# C_2020215EN.01006001.xml

| 29.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 215/60 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 215/60

---

Action brought on 1 May 2020 — Da Silva Carreira v Commission

(Case T-260/20)

(2020/C 215/69)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: José Da Silva Carreira (Olhos de Água, Portugal) (represented by: S. Orlandi and T. Martin, avocats)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

| — | annul the decision of 26 July 2019 by which the Commission refused to reassess, for the future, the applicant’s retirement pension; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of 26 July 2019 by which the Commission refused to reassess, for the future, the applicant’s retirement pension;

| — | order the Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant puts forward a single plea, alleging breach of Articles 21 and 22 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’). He claims, inter alia, that the Commission’s refusal to reassess, for the future, his retirement pension is contrary to Article 41 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations and to the principle of legality.

---
#### In the Matter of Patricia Simpson, Petitioner, v New York State Office of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

[942 NYS2d 374]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of John Franklin Udochi, as designee of the commissioner of the respondent, the New York State Office of Children and Family Services, dated August 2, 2010, which, after a hearing, affirmed a prior determination of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services to suspend and revoke the petitioner’s license to operate a group family day care home.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

The determination that the petitioner violated relevant regulations concerning the supervision of children in group family day care centers is supported by substantial evidence in the record *(see Matter of Berenhaus v Ward,*70 NY2d 436, 443 [1987]; *300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights,*45 NY2d 176, 180-181 [1978]; *Matter of Occhiogrosso v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs.,*72 AD3d 1092 [2010]; *Matter of Alexander v New York State Off. of Children &**1009*Family Servs.,*50 AD3d 895 [2008]; *Matter of Tender Loving Care Day Care, Inc. v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs.,*47 AD3d 940, 940-941 [2008]).

Furthermore, the penalty of license revocation was neither arbitrary and capricious nor so disproportionate to the misconduct so as to shock one’s sense of fairness as a matter of law *(see Matter of Ellis v Mahon,*11 NY3d 754 [2008]; *Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County,*34 NY2d 222, 234 [1974]; *Matter of Alexander v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs.,*50 AD3d 895 [2008]; *Matter of Tender Loving Care Day Care, Inc., v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs.,*47 AD3d at 941). Skelos, J.P., Dillon, Eng and Austin, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NIGEL RAY LACHEY,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security; UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 21

- 17095

D.C. No. 2:20

- cv

- 01438

- BNW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada Brenda Weksler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 19, 2023 * *

Before: D. NELSON, O’SCANNLAIN, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

Nigel Ray Lachey appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying his application

for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

SEP 19 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 21

- 17095

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review the

district court’s decision de novo, Attmore v. Colvin , 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir.

2016), and we affirm.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Lachey did not meet

or equal listing 12.04 at step three of his analysis. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,

App. 1, §§ 12.00(A)(2) , 12.04. The ALJ correctly found (1) that Lachey neither

had an extreme limitation in one area of mental functioning n or had marked

limitations in two areas of mental functioning

, s ee 20 C.F.R. P t. 404, Subpt. P,

App. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(b) , and (2) that Lachey did not demonstrate that he only

marginally adjusted the requirements of daily life despite ongoing treatment

, s ee

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00(G)(2)

. We do not reach Lachey’s

assertion that he meets other unspecified listings. See Carmickle v. Comm ’ r , 533

F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) ( declining to reach issues that are not a r gued

“with any specificity” ).

The ALJ also did not err by failing to develop the record, where the record

does not indicate that Lachey’s juvenile records were relevant or that an additional

consultative examination was necessary. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(b)(1)

( establishing that the agency must develop the medical record only for the year

preceding a claim “unless there is a reason to believe that development of an

earlier period is necessary”) ; Mayes v. Massanari , 276 F .3d 453, 459

– 60 (9th Cir.3 21

- 17095

2001 ) (“An ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper

evaluation of the evidence.”)

.

To the extent that Lachey contends the ALJ did not all ow him to review

exhibits, prevented him from raising issue s and presenting witnesses

, improperly

weighed medical opinions, and failed to consider evidence, we reject the

contentions as unsupported by the record.

AFFIRMED.
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed November 17, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D20-1829 Lower Tribunal No. 15-15587

________________ 

### Sam Zalloum , Appellant, vs. 

### Deutsche Bank National Trust Company , etc., Appellee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mark Blumstein, Judge. Sam Zalloum, in proper person. DeLuca Law Group, PLLC, and Brandi Wilson (Fort Lauderdale), for appellee. Before EMAS, HENDON and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM.2

Affirmed. See Zalloum v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 300 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (Table); De Sousa v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., 170 So. 3d 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
# C_2020255EN.01001701.xml

| 3.8.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 255/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 255/17

---

Judgment of the General Court of 10 June 2020 — Leinfelder Uhren München v EUIPO — Schafft (Leinfelder)

(Case T-577/19) (1)

(European Union trade mark - Revocation proceedings - European Union word mark Leinfelder - Lack of genuine use of the mark - Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Abuse of rights)

(2020/C 255/21)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Leinfelder Uhren München GmbH & Co. KG (Munich, Germany) (represented by: S. Lüft, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Fischer, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Thomas Schafft (Munich) (represented by: V. Sandulache, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 May 2019 (Joined Cases R 1930/2018 2 and R 1937/2018 2), concerning revocation proceedings between Mr Schafft and Leinfelder Uhren München.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Leinfelder Uhren München GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Leinfelder Uhren München GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 328, 30.9.2019.

---
<PAGE>
 
                                                                   EXHIBIT 11.1

                         INTERNATIONAL COMPUTEX, INC.

                      COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER SHARE


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                            1996        1997
                                          ---------  ---------
<S>                                       <C>        <C>
Net income                                  150,708    172,505
 
Weighted average number
   of common and common equivalent
   shares are as follows:
 
   Weighted average common
       shares outstanding                 2,125,000  2,125,000
 
   Shares issued from assumed exercise
       of common stock equivalents (1)      232,836    232,836
                                          ---------  ---------
 
Weighted average number
   of common and common  equivalent
   shares outstanding                     2,357,836  2,357,836
                                          =========  =========
Per share data:
 Net income                                 $   .06    $   .07
                                          =========  =========
</TABLE> 

(1) Shares issued from assumed exercise of common stock equivalents include the
    number of incremental shares which would result from applying the 
    treasury stock method.

                                       12
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. EDWARD A. FLECKENSTEIN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

June 2, 1960.

*Mr. Edvoard A. Fleclcenstein pro se.*

*Mr. Franlc A. Dolan*for the respondent.

Denied.
#### NICHOLAS DeASIO, PETITIONER-PETITIONER, v. CITY OF BAYONNE, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

October 17, 1960.

*Messrs. Sachs & Sachs*and *Mr. Aaron Gordon*for the petitioner.

*Mr. Frank J. Ziobro*for the respondent.

Denied.
Irrevocable Waiver


 Exhibit 10.1 
 IRREVOCABLE WAIVER 
 This Irrevocable Waiver (the
“Waiver”) is made by J. Downey Bridgwater ( “Executive”), with respect to that certain Employment Agreement (the “Employment Agreement”), by and between Sterling Bancshares, Inc., a Texas
corporation (the “Company”), effective as of January 1, 2007, as amended from time to time. Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Employment Agreement.

 W I T N E S S E T H: 
 WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 3.3(a) of the Employment Agreement, Executive was awarded 125,000 Performance Restricted Share Units (“PRSUs”) on January 1, 2006, which PSRUs were
adjusted for a three for two stock split, and now equal 187,500 PSRUs. The PSRUs are to vest on December 31, 2009 based on the Company’s performance as compared to its peers over the three year period beginning on January 1, 2007 and
ending December 31, 2009, in accordance with Exhibit B to the Employment Agreement and the Company is required to issue to the Executive Bonus Shares (as defined under the Company’s 2003 Stock Incentive and Compensation Plan (the
“2003 Plan”)) no later than March 15, 2010. 
 WHEREAS, the number of PRSUs that will vest and the number of
Bonus Shares that would be paid in 2010 has not yet been determined; and 
 WHEREAS, Executive desires to waive irrevocably his
right to receive any and all of Bonus Shares that would otherwise be issued to him in 2010 in connection with the PSRUs. 
 NOW,
THEREFORE, Executive hereby waives irrevocably his right to receive any and all Bonus Shares that may be payable in connection with the PSRUs specified in Section 3.3(a) of the Employment Agreement, such irrevocable waiver to be effective as of
the date Executive executes this Waiver. Executive instructs the Company to cancel irrevocably the PSRUs effective as of this date. 
 Nothing contained in this Waiver shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of any other rights or remedies that Executive has pursuant to the Employment Agreement, including, without limitation, any of the other subsections of Section 3.3
of the Employment Agreement. 
 Executive represents and warrants to the Company that this Waiver has been given voluntarily, is
duly executed and delivered by Executive and constitutes a valid, binding and irrevocable waiver of any and all rights to receive the Bonus Shares and is enforceable against Executive in accordance with its terms. 






 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Executive has executed this Waiver on the 29th day of December, 2009.

  

	
	 /s/ J. Downey Bridgwater

	J. Downey Bridgwater
	“EXECUTIVE”
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF  THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the filing of the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the "Report") by META
Group, Inc. (the "Company"), each of the undersigned hereby certifies that:



|                     |  | /s/HERBERT L. VANHOOKHerbert L. VanHook
President and Chief Operating Officer
|-------------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                     |  | /s/JOHN W. RILEYJohn W. Riley
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer     
|Dated: July 20, 2004 |  |                                                                              

---



QuickLinks
#### Yolanda Gonzalez, Respondent, v Club Monaco U.S., LLC, et al., Appellants.

[943 NYS2d 109] —

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Anil C. Singh, J.), entered May 5, 2011, which, in an action for personal injuries sustained when plaintiff tripped and fell while exiting defendant Club Monaco US LLC’s store, denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants failed to establish their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The photographs submitted by defendants depict a sizable irregularity on the outermost edge of a top step and fail to show that the defect at issue was trivial as a matter of law *(see Abreu v New York City Hous. Auth.,*61 AD3d 420 [2009]; *Argenio v Metropolitan Transp. Auth.,*277 AD2d 165 [2000]). Although it is possible that the defect has no appreciable depth, that cannot be conclusively determined from the photographs, and there is no other evidence of record in that regard *(see Rivas v Crotona Estates Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc.,*74 AD3d 541 [2010]). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Moskowitz, Renwick and Freedman, JJ.