41540 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

1See Figure 1 in Section IV, ‘‘Product Scope of 

the Investigation,’’ for the uranium products 

addressed by this report. 

2U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of 

Industry and Security. The Effect of Imports of Steel 

on the National Security (Washington, DC: 2018) 

(‘‘Steel Report’’) and U.S. Department of Commerce. 

Bureau of Industry and Security. The Effect of 

Imports of Aluminum on the National Security 

(Washington, DC: 2018) (‘‘Aluminum Report’’). 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/ 

steel/2224-the-effect-of-imports-of-steel-on-thenational-security-with-redactions-20180111/file. 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

RIN 0694–XC078 

Publication of a Report on the Effect of 

Imports of Uranium on the National 

Security: An Investigation Conducted 

Under Section 232 of the Trade 

Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended 

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and 

Security, Commerce. 

ACTION: Publication of a report. 

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and 

Security (BIS) in this notice is 

publishing a report that summarizes the 

findings of an investigation conducted 

by the U.S. Department of Commerce 

(the ‘‘Department’’) pursuant to Section 

232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 

as amended (‘‘Section 232’’), into the 

effect of imports of uranium on the 

national security of the United States. 

This report was completed on April 14, 

2019 and posted on the BIS website in 

July 2021. BIS has not published the 

appendices to the report in this 

notification of report findings, but they 

are available online at the BIS website, 

along with the rest of the report (see the 

ADDRESSES section). 

DATES: The report was completed on 

April 14, 2019. The report was posted 

on the BIS website in July 2021. 

ADDRESSES: The full report, including 

the appendices to the report, are 

available online at https://bis.doc.gov/ 

232. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

further information about this report 

contact Erika Maynard, Special Projects 

Manager, (202) 482–5572; and Leah 

Vidovich, Trade and Industry Analyst, 

(202) 482–1819. For more information 

about the Office of Technology 

Evaluation and the Section 232 

Investigations, please visit: http://

www.bis.doc.gov/232. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

The Effect of Imports of Uranium on the 

National Security 

An Investigation Conducted Under 

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act 

of 1962, As Amended 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Office of Technology Evaluation 

April 14, 2019 

Table of Contents 

I. Executive Summary 

II. Legal Framework 

A. Section 232 Requirements 

B. Discussion 

III. Investigation Process 

A. Initiation of Investigation 

B. Public Comments 

C. Site Visits and Information Gathering 

Activities 

D. Interagency Consultation 

E. Review of the Department of Commerce 

1989 Section 232 Investigation on 

Uranium Imports 

IV. Product Scope of the Investigation 

V. Background on the U.S. Nuclear Industry 

A. Summary of the U.S. Uranium Fuel 

Cycle 

B. Summary of U.S. Nuclear Power 

Generation Industry 

VI. Global Uranium Market Conditions 

A. Summary of the Global Uranium Market 

B. Uranium Transactions: Book Transfers 

and Flag Swaps 

C. The Effect of the Fukushima Daiichi 

Incident on U.S. and Global Uranium 

Demand 

D. The Effect of State-Owned Enterprises 

on Global Uranium Supply 

VII. Findings 

A. Uranium Is Important to U.S. National 

Security 

1. Uranium Is Needed for National Defense 

Systems 

2. Uranium Is Required for Critical 

Infrastructure 

B. Imports of Uranium in Such Quantities 

as Are Presently Found Adversely 

Impact the Economic Welfare of the U.S. 

Uranium Industry 

1. U.S. Utilities’ Reliance on Imports of 

Uranium in 1989 

2. U.S. Utilities’ Reliance on Imports of 

Uranium Continue To Rise 

3. High Import to Export Ratio 

4. Uranium Prices 

5. Declining Employment Trends 

6. Loss of Domestic Long Term Contracts 

Due to Imported Uranium 

7. Financial Distress 

8. Research and Development Expenditures 

9. Capital Expenditures 

C. Trade Actions: Anti-Dumping and 

Countervailing Duties 

D. Displacement of Domestic Uranium by 

Excessive Quantities of Imports Has the 

Serious Effect of Weakening Our Internal 

Economy 

1. U.S. Production Is Well Below Demand 

and Utilization Rates Are Well Below 

Economically Viable Levels 

2. Domestic Uranium Production Is 

Severely Weakened and Concentrated 

3. Reduction of Uranium Production 

Facilities Limits Capacity Available 

E. Uranium Market Distortion by StateOwned Enterprises Is a Circumstance 

That Contributes to the Weakening of the 

Domestic Economy 

1. Excess Russian, Kazakh, and Uzbek 

Production Adversely Affects Global 

Markets and Creates a Dangerous U.S. 

Dependence on Uranium From These 

Countries 

2. The Increasing Presence of China in the 

Global Uranium Market Will Further 

Weaken U.S. and Other Market Uranium 

Producers 

3. Increasing Global Excess Uranium 

Production Will Further Weaken the 

Internal Economy as U.S. Uranium 

Producers Will Face Increasing Import 

Competition 

VIII. Conclusion 

A. Determination 

B. Economic Impacts of 25 Percent U.S.- 

Origin Requirement 

C. Public Policy Proposals 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Section 232 Investigation 

Notification Letter to Secretary of Defense 

James Mattis, July 18, 2018 

Appendix B: Federal Register Notices— 

Notice of Requests for Public Comments on 

Section 232 National Security Investigation 

of Imports of Uranium, July 25, 2018; 

Change in Comment Deadline for Section 

232 National Security Investigation of 

Imports of Uranium, September 10, 2018 

Appendix C: Summary of Public Comments 

Appendix D: Survey for Data Collection 

(Front-End Uranium Industry) 

Appendix E: Survey for Data Collection 

(Nuclear Electric Power Generation 

Industry) 

Appendix F: Uranium Product Specific Trade 

Flows 

Appendix G: Summary of Commerce 

Department 1989 Section 232 Uranium 

Investigation 

Appendix H: The National Security Aspect of 

U.S. Uranium Industry Regulation 

Appendix I: The Role of State Owned 

Enterprises in the Global Uranium Market 

Appendix J. U.S. Naval and Nuclear 

Weapons Uses of Uranium 

Appendix K: Glossary 

Prepared by Bureau of Industry and 

Security 

http://www.bis.doc.gov 

I. Executive Summary 

This report summarizes the findings 

of an investigation conducted by the 

U.S. Department of Commerce (the 

‘‘Department’’) pursuant to Section 232 

of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as 

amended (19 U.S.C. 1862 (‘‘Section 

232’’)), into the effect of imports of 

uranium 1 on the national security of the 

United States. 

In conducting this investigation, the 

Secretary of Commerce (the ‘‘Secretary’’) 

noted the Department’s prior 

investigations under Section 232. This 

report incorporates the statutory 

analysis from the Department’s 2018 

reports on the imports of steel and 

aluminum 2 with respect to applying the 


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file. 

3Steel Report at 13–14; Aluminum Report at 12– 

13. 

4 19 U.S.C. 1862(b)(3)(A). 

5 Domestic uranium production refers to all stages 

of the nuclear fuel cycle and their associated 

products, including uranium mining, uranium 

milling, uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, 

and nuclear fuel fabrication. Uranium mining and 

milling produce uranium concentrate, uranium 

conversion produces uranium hexafluoride (UF6), 

uranium enrichment produces enriched uranium 

product (EUP), and nuclear fuel fabrication 

produces finished nuclear fuel assemblies. 

6U.S. White House. Office of the Press Secretary. 

Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 

Presidential Policy Directive 21. (Washington, DC: 

2013) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policydirective-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 

7U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the 

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics. Report of the Defense 

Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy. 

(Washington, DC: 2008), 18. https://apps.dtic.mil/ 

dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a477619.pdf. 

8For the purposes of this report, the front-end 

industry is defined as companies owning or 

operating uranium mines, uranium mills, uranium 

converters, uranium enrichers, and nuclear fuel 

fabricators. 

9Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended; Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954; 1964 Private Ownership of 

Special Nuclear Materials Act; The Energy Policy 

Act of 1992; The United States Enrichment 

Corporation Privatization Act of 1996. 

10U.S. Energy Information Administration, 

‘‘Table S1a. Uranium purchased by owners and 

operators of U.S. civilian nuclear power reactors, 

1994–2017’’, 2017 Uranium Marketing Annual 

Report (May 31, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/ 

uranium/marketing/pdf/umartableS1afigureS1.pdf. 

11U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Bureau of Export 

Administration; The Effect of Imports of Uranium 

on the National Security; 1989 (‘‘1989 Report’’) 

available at https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/ 

documents/section-232-investigations/88-uranium1989/file. 

terms ‘‘national defense’’ and ‘‘national 

security’’ in a manner that is consistent 

with the statute and legislative intent.3

As required by the statute, the 

Secretary considered all factors set forth 

in Section 232(d). In particular, the 

Secretary examined the effect of imports 

on national security requirements, 

specifically: 

i. Domestic production needed for 

projected national defense 

requirements; 

ii. the capacity of domestic industries 

to meet such requirements; 

iii. existing and anticipated 

availabilities of the human resources, 

products, raw materials, and other 

supplies and services essential to the 

national defense; 

iv. the requirements of growth of such 

industries and such supplies and 

services including the investment, 

exploration, and development necessary 

to assure such growth; and 

v. the importation of goods in terms 

of their quantities, availabilities, 

character, and use as those affect such 

industries; and the capacity of the 

United States to meet national security 

requirements. 

The Secretary also recognized the 

close relation of the economic welfare of 

the United States to its national 

security. Factors that can compromise 

the nation’s economic welfare include, 

but are not limited to, the impact of 

‘‘foreign competition on the economic 

welfare of individual domestic 

industries; and any substantial 

unemployment, decrease in revenues of 

government, loss of skills, or any other 

serious effects resulting from the 

displacement of any domestic products 

by excessive imports.’’ 19 U.S.C. 

1862(d). In particular, this report 

assesses whether uranium is being 

imported ‘‘in such quantities’’ and 

‘‘under such circumstances’’ as to 

‘‘threaten to impair the national 

security.’’ 4

Findings 

In conducting the investigation, the 

Secretary found: 

A. Domestic Uranium Production Is 

Essential to U.S. National Security.5

1. Domestic uranium is required, 

based on U.S. policy and restrictions in 

international agreements on the use of 

most imported uranium, to satisfy the 

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 

requirements for maintaining effective 

military capabilities, including nuclear 

fuel for the U.S. Navy’s fleet of 11 

nuclear powered aircraft carriers and 70 

nuclear powered submarines, source 

material for nuclear weapons, depleted 

uranium for ammunition, and other 

functions. 

2. Uranium is also essential to 

maintaining U.S. critical infrastructure 

sectors, specifically the nation’s 98 

reactors for nuclear power generation to 

support the Nation’s commercial power 

grid. Nuclear reactors supply 19 percent 

of U.S. electricity consumed in the U.S. 

and they support 15 of the 16 critical 

infrastructure sectors identified by the 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS).6 Maintaining a robust civilian 

nuclear power industry is essential to 

U.S. national security, including both 

national defense and critical 

infrastructure requirements. DoD 

installations in the U.S. rely on the 

commercial power grid for 99 percent of 

their electricity needs.7 The entire U.S. 

nuclear enterprise—weapons, naval 

propulsion, nonproliferation, 

enrichment, fuels services, and 

negotiations with international 

partners—depends on a robust U.S. 

civilian nuclear power industry. 

3. Domestic uranium production and 

processing, referred to in this report as 

the ‘‘front-end’’ of the fuel cycle, 

depends on an economically viable, 

competitive U.S. commercial uranium 

industry.8 The distinct stages of the U.S. 

nuclear fuel cycle extract uranium from 

the ground and ultimately transform it 

into fuel suitable for civilian nuclear 

power. The same stages of the U.S. 

nuclear fuel cycle are needed to fulfill 

national defense requirements for 

uranium used in naval nuclear fuel and 

tritium production in the future. 

4. Since 1946, U.S. legislation 

governing the uranium production and 

nuclear power generation industries has 

consistently made explicit written 

reference to these industries’ national 

security functions.9

B. Imports in Such Quantities as 

Presently Found Adversely Affect the 

Economic Welfare of the U.S. Uranium 

Industry 

1. In 2018, almost all uranium used 

for civilian U.S. nuclear electric power 

generation was imported, totaling 

approximately 94 percent of 

consumption. Between 2009 and 2018, 

U.S. nuclear electric power generators 

increased their reliance on imported 

uranium products from 85.8 percent to 

93.3 percent of their annual 

requirements.10 In comparison, the 

Department’s 1989 Section 232 

investigation into ‘‘The Effect of Imports 

of Uranium on the National Security’’ 

found that imported uranium satisfied 

just 51 percent of U.S. nuclear electric 

power generators’ requirements at that 

time. 11

2. Uranium is imported into the 

United States in eight forms, with the 

two largest categories being uranium 

concentrate and enriched uranium. 

Uranium concentrate is primarily 

imported from Australia, Canada, 

Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Enriched 

uranium is primarily imported from 

Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, 

France, and the Netherlands. 

3. Between 2014 and 2018, an average 

of 52 percent of U.S. nuclear electric 

power generator requirements of 

uranium concentrate was provided by 

Australia and Canada, 25 percent from 

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and the 

remainder from Namibia (8.4 percent), 

Niger (2.5 percent), South Africa (2.2 

percent), Malawi (1.4 percent), China 

(0.3 percent), and Russia (0.2 percent). 

The Department notes that between 

2014 and 2018, an average of 24.2 

percent of the uranium concentrate 

provided by Australian and Canadian 


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companies to U.S. nuclear power 

generators was originally sourced from 

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In the same 

period, 20 percent of enrichment 

services purchased by U.S. utilities were 

from Russia. While a significant portion 

of imports come from Australia and 

Canada, the non-market practices of 

state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have 

similarly harmed the financial 

operations of uranium producers in 

these countries and threaten their 

continued ability to supply uranium 

mined in Australia or Canada to the U.S. 

market. China is also making steady 

strides to become a major supplier in 

the U.S. and global nuclear fuel market. 

4. The entrance of China’s stateowned nuclear fuel companies as 

potential actors in the global nuclear 

fuel industry will further intensify 

pressure on market economy producers 

in Canada, Australia, Europe, and the 

U.S. By 2020, China could have 

enrichment capacity beyond their 

domestic needs. U.S. utilities have 

reported purchases of uranium 

concentrate and enrichment services 

from Chinese controlled companies in 

the 2014–2018 period. China provided 

two percent of U.S. utilities’ enrichment 

services contracts during this period, 

and is expected to supply even more in 

the coming years. Overall, the nonmarket business practices of Russia, 

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and China’s 

uranium industries continue to erode 

U.S. uranium mining and processing 

capacity. 

5. Import competition from stateowned uranium enterprises has caused 

a significant atrophy in U.S. uranium 

infrastructure to the point where 

production levels from front-end 

companies are no longer economically 

sustainable. Documented declines in 

employment and skilled workforce 

(front-end employment is down 47 

percent since 2009), as well as idling 

and closures of mining (13 since 2009), 

milling (only one of five remaining U.S. 

mills is presently active), and uranium 

conversion operations (the last U.S. 

facility is idled), demonstrate the steep 

decline in U.S. production capacity. 

Additionally, loss of long-term contracts 

with nuclear utilities, minimal market 

share, falling marginal net income, and 

a tenuous financial outlook indicate a 

moribund U.S. uranium industry. 

C. Displacement of Domestic Uranium 

by Excessive Quantities of Imports Has 

the Serious Effect of Weakening Our 

Internal Economy 

1. U.S. nuclear electric power utilities 

and uranium suppliers face multiple 

challenges. Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission (FERC) market rules do not 

compensate nuclear power and other 

fuel-secure generation resources for 

their resilience value. In addition, 

subsidized renewable energy and lower 

natural gas prices are causing premature 

retirements of U.S. civilian nuclear 

power plants before the end of their 

useful lives. To cut costs and remain 

viable in distorted U.S. electricity 

markets, many nuclear power operators 

have ended long-term contracts with 

higher-priced U.S. uranium producers 

and turned to foreign SOEs for 

artificially low-priced uranium imports. 

The loss of long-term contracts, which 

provided the revenue stability needed to 

adequately support capital investment, 

research and development (R&D), and 

facility expansion, as well as to 

maintain workforce and production, has 

adversely impacted all elements of the 

U.S. uranium industry. 

2. High dependence on uranium 

imports—averaging 93.3 percent of 

annual U.S. nuclear power utility 

consumption in 2018—has caused all 

elements of the U.S. uranium sector to 

shut down production capacity, struggle 

to maintain financial viability, reduce 

workforce, cut R&D, and slash capital 

expenditures. Excessive imports have 

dropped U.S. uranium mining 

production to some of the lowest levels 

seen since uranium mining began in the 

late 1940s. 

3. Without a viable U.S. uranium 

industry, the United States cannot 

effectively respond to moderate or 

extended national security emergencies, 

or over the long-term meet the domestic 

uranium requirements of the U.S. 

Department of Defense. Moreover, U.S. 

nuclear electric power generators would 

not be able to operate at full capacity 

and would not be able to support 

critical infrastructure electric power 

needs if foreign nations, particularly 

Russia and other former Soviet states, 

chose to suspend or otherwise end 

uranium exports to the United States. 

D. Uranium Market Distortion by StateOwned Enterprises Is a Circumstance 

That Contributes to the Weakening of 

the Domestic Economy 

1. The 2011 Fukushima Daichii 

incident prompted the shutdown and/or 

idling of existing nuclear operators in 

Japan, Germany, and other countries. 

Additionally, many proposed nuclear 

reactors around the world, including in 

the United States, were cancelled. These 

actions decreased global demand for 

uranium, creating a supply glut and low 

uranium prices. This has severely 

affected the financial viability of U.S. 

uranium mining and milling in 

particular, as uranium imports have 

reached over 94 percent of U.S. utility 

consumption. 

2. The Fukushima incident caused 

similar declines in other elements of the 

U.S. front-end nuclear fuel business, 

including conversion, enrichment, and 

fuel fabrication companies. [TEXT 

REDACTED] As of 2018, the total 

domestic front-end uranium industry 

employs 4,958 workers, compared to 

9,232 workers in 2009, a decline of 47 

percent. 

3. During this same period SOEs in 

Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan 

undercut U.S. uranium producers with 

lower priced uranium. SOEs in China 

also injected additional quantities of 

uranium into the marketplace despite 

lower prices and a drop in overall 

demand. In contrast, U.S. producers 

significantly cut production, shut down 

capacity, and shrank workforce levels. 

4. Market economy uranium 

producers such as Australia, Canada, 

South Africa, France, Germany, the 

Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 

have also been forced to curtail or 

suspend operations due to the excess 

production by SOE uranium producers 

that has depressed global uranium 

prices. SOE competition has displaced 

demand for Canadian and Australian 

product. Between 2016 and 2017, 

Canada cut back domestic production 

approximately 6.6 percent. Australia 

reduced output by 6.9 percent. In 

contrast, Russia and Kazakhstan 

decreased their production by only 5.1 

and 2.9 percent, respectively; but China 

increased production by 16 percent. 

Uzbekistan made no production cuts. 

5. U.S. nuclear electric power 

generators maintain only a limited 

amount of nuclear fuel materials in 

reserve to address potential supply 

disruptions. The U.S. Government 

maintains only a small stockpile of 

enriched uranium for utility use in the 

event of a fuel supply disruption. U.S. 

nuclear electric power generators are 

therefore vulnerable to sudden and 

extended disruptions in the nuclear fuel 

supply chain, especially product 

supplied through Russia and 

Kazakhstan. 

Conclusion 

Based on these findings, the Secretary 

of Commerce has concluded that the 

present quantities and circumstance of 

uranium imports are ‘‘weakening our 

internal economy’’ and ‘‘threaten to 

impair the national security’’ as defined 

in Section 232. An economically viable, 

secure supply of U.S.-sourced uranium 

is required for national defense needs. 

International obligations, including 

agreements with foreign partners under 

Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 


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12U.S. White House Office. National Security 

Strategy of the United States of America. 

(Washington, DC: 2017), 2 https://

www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ 

NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. 

1954, govern the use of most imported 

uranium and typically restrict it to 

peaceful, non-explosive uses. As a 

result, uranium used for military 

purposes must generally be 

domestically produced from mining 

through the fuel fabrication process. 

Furthermore, the predictable 

maintenance and support of U.S. critical 

infrastructure, especially the electric 

power grid, depends on a diverse 

supply of uranium, which includes 

U.S.-sourced uranium products and 

services. 

The Secretary further recognizes that 

the U.S. uranium industry’s financial 

and production posture has significantly 

deteriorated since the Department’s 

1989 Report. That investigation noted 

that U.S. nuclear power utilities 

imported 51.1 percent of their uranium 

requirements in 1987. By 2018, imports 

had increased to 93.3 percent of those 

utilities’ annual requirements. Based on 

comprehensive 2019 industry data 

provided by U.S. uranium producers 

and U.S. nuclear electric power utilities 

to the Department in response to a 

mandatory survey, U.S. utilities’ usage 

of U.S. mined uranium has dropped to 

nearly zero. [TEXT REDACTED] Based 

on the current and projected state of the 

U.S. uranium industry, the Department 

has concluded that the U.S. uranium 

industry is unable to satisfy existing or 

future national security needs or 

respond to a national security 

emergency requiring a large increase in 

domestic uranium production. 

Absent immediate action, closures of 

the few remaining U.S. uranium mining, 

milling, and conversion facilities are 

anticipated within the next few years. 

Further decreases in U.S. uranium 

production and capacity, including 

domestic fuel fabrication, will cause 

even higher levels of U.S. dependence 

on imports, especially from Russia, 

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and China. 

Increased imports from SOEs in those 

countries, and in particular Russia and 

China, which the 2017 National 

Security Strategy noted present a direct 

challenge to U.S. influence, are 

detrimental to the national security.12

The high risk of loss of the remaining 

U.S. domestic uranium industry if the 

present excessive level of imports 

continue threatens to impair the 

national security as defined by Section 

232. 

The Secretary has determined that to 

remove the threat of impairment to 

national security, it is necessary to 

reduce imports of uranium to a level 

that enables U.S. uranium producers to 

return to an economically competitive 

and financially viable position. This 

will allow the industry to sustain 

production capacity, hire and maintain 

a skilled workforce, make needed 

capital expenditures, and perform 

necessary research and development 

activities. A modest reduction of 

uranium imports will allow for the 

revival of U.S. uranium mining and 

milling, the restart of the sole U.S. 

uranium converter, and a reduction in 

import challenges to fuel fabricators, 

while also recognizing the market and 

pricing challenges confronting the U.S. 

nuclear power utilities. 

Recommendation 

Due to the threat to the national 

security, as defined in Section 232, from 

excessive uranium imports, the 

Secretary recommends that the 

President take immediate action by 

adjusting the level of these imports 

through the implementation of an 

import waiver to achieve a phased-in 

reduction of uranium imports. The 

reduction in imports of uranium should 

be sufficient to enable U.S. producers to 

recapture and sustain a market share of 

U.S. uranium consumption that will 

allow for financial viability, and would 

enable the maintenance of a skilled 

workforce and the production capacity 

and uranium output needed for national 

defense and critical infrastructure 

requirements. The reduction imposed 

should be sufficient to enable U.S. 

producers to eventually supply 25 

percent of U.S. utilities’ uranium needs 

based on 2018 U.S. U308 concentrate 

annual consumption requirements. 

Based on the survey responses, the 

Department has determined that U.S. 

uranium producers require an amount 

equivalent to 25 percent of U.S. nuclear 

power utilities’ 2018 annual U308 

concentrate consumption to ensure 

financial viability. Based on the 

Department’s analysis, if U.S.-mined 

uranium supplied 25 percent of U.S. 

nuclear power utilities’ annual U308 

concentrate consumption, U.S. uranium 

prices will increase to approximately 

$55 per pound (see Figure 1A). The 

current spot price is low due to 

distortions from SOEs. 


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The $55 per pound price will increase 

mine capacity to the point where U.S. 

uranium mines can supply 

approximately 6 million pounds of 

uranium concentrate per year, which is 

approximately 25 percent of U.S. 

nuclear power utilities’ consumption for 

U308 concentrate in any given year. 

The Secretary recommends that the 

import reduction be phased in over a 

five-year period. This will allow U.S. 

uranium mines, mills, and converters to 

reopen or expand closed or idled 

facilities; hire, train and maintain a 

skilled workforce; and make necessary 

investments in new capacity. This 

phased-in approach will also allow U.S. 

nuclear power utilities time to adjust 

and diversify their fuel procurement 

contracts to reintroduce U.S. uranium 

into their supply chains. 

The Secretary recommends that either 

a targeted or global quota be used to 

adjust the level of imports and that such 

quota should be in effect for a duration 

sufficient to allow the necessary time 

needed to stabilize and revitalize the 

U.S. uranium industry. According to 

survey responses, the average time to 

restart an idle uranium production 

facility is two to five years, and several 

additional years are needed to add new 

capacity. Market certainty, which can be 

provided by long-term contracts with 

U.S. nuclear power utilities, is needed 

to build cash flow, pay down debt, and 

raise capital for site modernization; 

workforce recruitment; and to conduct 

environmental and regulatory reviews. 

Option 1—Targeted Zero Quota 

This targeted zero quota option would 

prohibit imports of uranium from 

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and China (the 

‘‘SOE countries’’) to enable U.S. 

uranium producers to supply 

approximately 25 percent of U.S. 

nuclear power utility consumption. A 

U.S. nuclear power utility or other 

domestic user would be eligible for a 

waiver that allows the import of 

uranium from the SOE countries, with 

any import of uranium from Russia 

subject to the Russian Suspension 

Agreement, after such utility or user 

files appropriate documentation with 

the Department. In the case of a U.S. 

nuclear power utility, the 

documentation must show that such 

utility has a contract or contracts to 

purchase for their consumption on an 

annual basis not less than the 

percentage of U.S. produced uranium 

U308 concentrate shown in the phasein table below. 

PERCENT OF ANNUAL U308 CONCENTRATE CONSUMPTION REQUIRED TO BE SOURCED FROM THE U.S. 

Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 and 

beyond 

Percent of Annual U308 Concentrate Consumption Required to be Sourced from the U.S. ..... 5 10 15 20 25 

Phased-in incrementally over five 

years, this option will help facilitate the 

reopening and expansion of U.S. 

uranium mining, milling, and 

conversion facilities, and will ensure 

that U.S. uranium producers can make 

investments required for future financial 

viability without causing unintentional 

harm to other market economy uranium 

producers. This option avoids undue 

financial harm to U.S. nuclear power 

utilities by affording them sufficient 

time to adjust their fuel procurement 

strategies. 

The zero quota on uranium imports 

from SOE countries would not apply to 


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$80 

$70 

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.. $30 

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Figure lA: U.S. Uranium Supply Curve 

Approximate optimal 

price ($55/lb.} to ensure I 

CUmlnt U.S. U308 ..•.. ,,., ... economic viebility. ... 7 concentrate price ("'$40). ..... ✓ . .... ~·· 

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I Anumes only production at currently permitted mines. 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Front;End SurveY, Tab 4b 

, ... 

,,, 

12.0 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41545 

13As of April 2019, EURATOM includes all 28 

members of the European Union. The United 

Kingdom will cease to be a member of EURATOM 

if and when it leaves the European Union. Should 

the United Kingdom cease to be a member of 

EURATOM, the same preferential treatment given 

to EURATOM members will also be applied to the 

United Kingdom. 

uranium imports from SOE countries for 

use by U.S. milling, conversion, 

enrichment, and fuel fabrication 

services that produce uranium products 

for export from the United States. A U.S. 

milling, conversion, enrichment, or fuel 

fabricator seeking to import uranium 

from an SOE country for use to produce 

uranium products for export would 

need to file appropriate documentation 

with the Department to obtain a waiver 

for the import of such uranium for 

export. 

The Secretary believes that this option 

to impose a zero quota for imports of 

uranium from SOE countries, while 

continuing to allow unrestricted 

importation of uranium from Canada, 

Australia, and EURATOM 13 member 

countries based on their security and 

economic relationships with the United 

States, should address the threatened 

impairment of U.S. national security. 

This would be accomplished by 

promoting the economic revival of the 

U.S. uranium industry, so long as there 

is not significant transshipment or 

reprocessing of SOE country uranium 

through these unrestricted countries. 

The Department will monitor these 

unrestricted imports to ensure there is 

not significant transshipment, 

reprocessing, or book transfers from 

SOE countries to unrestricted countries 

in an attempt to circumvent and 

undermine the U.S. uranium producers’ 

ability to provide 25 percent of U.S. 

annual U308 concentrate consumption. 

Many companies in unrestricted 

countries supply uranium sourced from 

SOE countries. Consequently, up to onethird of the materials delivered to U.S. 

nuclear power utilities, at this time, is 

not sourced directly from the country of 

import. 

Imports of uranium from Russia under 

a waiver would also be subjected to the 

Russian Suspension Agreement. This 

option assumes that such agreement 

will continue to be in effect over the 

relevant time period and would apply to 

any Russian uranium imports by U.S. 

nuclear power utilities, thus holding 

Russian uranium imports to their 

current level of approximately 20 

percent of U.S. enrichment demand. In 

the event that the Russian Suspension 

Agreement is not extended and 

terminates, then the Secretary 

recommends that a quota on uranium 

imports under a waiver of Russian 

Uranium Products (as defined in the 

Russian Suspension Agreement) of up to 

15 percent of U.S. enrichment demand 

be imposed. If adopted this quota would 

be administered by the Department in 

the same manner as the Russian 

Suspension Agreement is presently 

administered. 

The adjustment of imports proposed 

under this option would be in addition 

to any applicable antidumping or 

countervailing duties collections. 

To complement the proposed trade 

action, the Secretary recommends that 

the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission (FERC) should act 

promptly to ensure that regulated 

wholesale power market regulations 

adequately compensate nuclear and 

other fuel-secure generation resources. 

Specifically, FERC should determine 

whether current market rules, which 

discriminate against secure nuclear fuel 

generation resources in favor of 

intermittent resources, such as natural 

gas, solar, and wind, result in unjust, 

unreasonable, and unduly 

discriminatory rates that distort energy 

markets, harm consumers, and 

undermine electric reliability. If so, 

FERC should consider taking 

appropriate action to ensure that rates 

are just and reasonable. 

The Department of Commerce, in 

consultation with other appropriate 

departments and agencies, will monitor 

the status of the U.S. uranium industry 

and the effectiveness of this remedy and 

will make recommendations to the 

President regarding whether it should 

be modified, extended, or terminated. 

Option 2—Global Zero Quota 

This option would establish a zero 

quota on imports of uranium from all 

countries until specific conditions are 

met to enable U.S. producers to supply 

25 percent of U.S. nuclear power 

utilities’ annual consumption of 

uranium U308 concentrate. A U.S. 

nuclear power utility or other domestic 

user would be eligible for a waiver to 

import uranium from any country after 

submitting appropriate documentation 

to the Department. In the case of a U.S. 

nuclear power utility, the 

documentation must show that such 

utility has a contract or contracts to 

purchase for their consumption on an 

annual basis not less than the 

percentage of U.S. produced uranium 

U308 concentrate shown in the phasein table below. 

PERCENT OF ANNUAL U308 CONCENTRATE CONSUMPTION REQUIRED TO BE SOURCED FROM THE U.S. 

Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 and 

beyond 

Percent of Annual U308 Concentrate Consumption Required to be Sourced from 

the U.S. .................................................................................................................... 5 10 15 20 25 

Phased-in incrementally over five 

years, this option will help facilitate the 

reopening and expansion of U.S. 

uranium mining, milling, and 

conversion facilities, and will ensure 

that U.S. uranium producers can make 

investments required for future financial 

viability. This option avoids undue 

financial harm to U.S. nuclear power 

utilities by affording them sufficient 

time to adjust their fuel procurement 

strategies. 

The zero quota on uranium imports 

would not apply to uranium imports for 

use by U.S. milling, conversion, 

enrichment, and fuel fabrication 

services that produce uranium products 

for export from the United States. A U.S. 

milling, conversion, enrichment, or fuel 

fabricator seeking to import uranium for 

use to produce uranium products for 

export would need to file appropriate 

documentation with the Department to 

obtain a waiver for the import of 

uranium. 

The Department will provide 

adequate time for U.S. industry to 

receive a waiver prior to a zero quota 

being implemented globally. Based on 

information received during the 

investigation, the Department believes 

that this option will not cause undue 

burdens. 

The Secretary believes that this option 

to impose a zero quota for imports of 

uranium will address the threatened 

impairment of U.S. national security by 

promoting the economic revival of the 

U.S. uranium industry. This option also 

prevents the possibility of 

transshipment of SOE overproduction 

through third countries and avoids 


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14An investigation under Section 232 looks at 

excessive imports for their threat to the national 

security, rather than looking at unfair trade 

practices as in an antidumping investigation. 

undue harm to U.S. enrichment and fuel 

fabrication export operations. These 

domestic export operations rely on an 

ability to access working uranium stock 

regardless of the specific mining origin 

of a given uranium-based material. 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 

purchases of Canadian UO3 natural 

uranium diluent in its execution of the 

National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s current highlyenriched uranium (HEU) down-blending 

campaign would be excluded from the 

zero quota on imports of uranium. In 

addition, any transfer pursuant to a 

Mutual Defense Agreement that 

references special nuclear material 

would be excluded from the zero quota 

on imports of uranium. 

Imports of uranium from Russia under 

a waiver would also be governed by the 

Russian Suspension Agreement. This 

option assumes that such agreement 

will continue to be in effect over the 

relevant time period and would apply to 

any Russian uranium imports by U.S. 

nuclear power utilities, thus holding 

Russian uranium imports to their 

current level of approximately 20 

percent of U.S. enrichment demand. In 

the event that the Russian Suspension 

Agreement is not extended and 

terminates, then the Secretary 

recommends that a quota on uranium 

imports under a waiver of Russian 

Uranium Products (as defined in the 

Russian Suspension Agreement) of up to 

15 percent of U.S. enrichment demand 

be imposed. If adopted, this quota 

would be administered by the 

Department in the same manner as the 

Russian Suspension Agreement is 

presently administered. 

The adjustment of imports proposed 

under this option would be in addition 

to any applicable antidumping or 

countervailing duties collections. 

To complement the proposed trade 

action, the Secretary recommends that 

the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission (FERC) should act 

promptly to ensure that regulated 

wholesale power market regulations 

adequately compensate nuclear and 

other fuel-secure generation resources. 

Specifically, FERC should determine 

whether current market rules, which 

discriminate against secure nuclear fuel 

generation resources in favor of 

intermittent resources, such as natural 

gas, solar, and wind, result in unjust, 

unreasonable, and unduly 

discriminatory rates that distort energy 

markets, harm consumers, and 

undermine electric reliability. If so, 

FERC should consider taking 

appropriate action to ensure that rates 

are just and reasonable. 

The Department of Commerce, in 

consultation with other appropriate 

departments and agencies, will monitor 

the status of the U.S. uranium industry 

and the effectiveness of this remedy to 

determine if it should be modified, 

extended, or terminated. 

Option 3—Alternative Action 

Should the President determine that 

the threatened impairment of national 

security does not warrant immediate 

adjustment of uranium imports at this 

time but that alternative action should 

be taken to improve the condition of the 

U.S. uranium industry to enable the 

U.S. industry to supply 25 percent of 

U.S nuclear power utilities annual 

consumption of uranium U308 

concentrate, the President could direct 

the Department of Defense (DOD) and 

the Department of Energy (DOE) to 

report to the President within 90 days 

on options for increasing the economic 

viability of the domestic uranium 

mining industry. The report should 

include, but not be limited to, 

recommendations for: (1) The 

elimination of regulatory constraints on 

domestic producers; (2) incentives for 

increasing investment; and (3) ways to 

work with likeminded allies to address 

unfair trade practices by SOE countries, 

including through trade remedy actions 

and the negotiation of new rules and 

best practices. The President could also 

direct the United States Trade 

Representative to enter into negotiations 

with the SOE countries to address the 

causes of excess uranium imports that 

threaten the national security. 

To complement the proposed 

alternative action, the Secretary 

recommends that the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC) should 

act promptly to ensure that regulated 

wholesale power market regulations 

adequately compensate nuclear and 

other fuel-secure generation resources. 

Specifically, FERC should determine 

whether current market rules, which 

discriminate against secure nuclear fuel 

generation resources in favor of 

intermittent resources, such as natural 

gas, solar, and wind, result in unjust, 

unreasonable, and unduly 

discriminatory rates that distort energy 

markets, harm consumers, and 

undermine electric reliability. If so, 

FERC should consider taking 

appropriate action to ensure that rates 

are just and reasonable. 

The Department of Commerce, in 

consultation with other appropriate 

departments and agencies, will monitor 

the status of the U.S. uranium industry 

and the effectiveness of this remedy and 

recommend to the President if any 

additional measures are needed. 

Alternatively, the Secretary may initiate 

another investigation under Section 232. 

The Secretary also makes public 

policy recommendations for additional 

measures that complement these three 

options. 

II. Legal Framework 

A. Section 232 Requirements 

Section 232 provides the Secretary 

with the authority to conduct 

investigations to determine the effect on 

the national security of the United 

States of imports of any article. It 

authorizes the Secretary to conduct an 

investigation if requested by the head of 

any department or agency, upon 

application of an interested party, or 

upon his own motion. See 19 U.S.C. 

1862(b)(1)(A). 

Section 232 directs the Secretary to 

submit to the President a report with 

recommendations for ‘‘action or 

inaction under this section’’ and 

requires the Secretary to advise the 

President if any article ‘‘is being 

imported into the United States in such 

quantities or under such circumstances 

as to threaten to impair the national 

security.’’ See 19 U.S.C. 1862(b)(3)(A). 

Section 232(d) directs the Secretary 

and the President to, in light of the 

requirements of national security and 

without excluding other relevant 

factors, give consideration to the 

domestic production needed for 

projected national defense requirements 

and the capacity of the United States to 

meet national security requirements. 

See 19 U.S.C. 1862(d). 

Section 232(d) also directs the 

Secretary and the President to 

‘‘recognize the close relation of the 

economic welfare of the Nation to our 

national security, and . . . take into 

consideration the impact of foreign 

competition on the economic welfare of 

individual domestic industries’’ by 

examining whether any substantial 

unemployment, decrease in revenues of 

government, loss of skills or investment, 

or other serious effects resulting from 

the displacement of any domestic 

products by excessive imports, or other 

factors, results in a ‘‘weakening of our 

internal economy’’ that may impair the 

national security.14 See 19 U.S.C. 

1862(d). 

Once an investigation has been 

initiated, Section 232 mandates that the 

Secretary provide notice to the Secretary 

of Defense that such an investigation 

has been initiated. Section 232 also 


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15 Department regulations (i) set forth additional 

authority and specific procedures for such input 

from interested parties, see 15 CFR 705.7 and 705.8, 

and (ii) provide that the Secretary may vary or 

dispense with those procedures ‘‘in emergency 

situations, or when in the judgment of the 

Department, national security interests require it.’’ 

Id., 705.9. 

16 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export 

Administration; The Effects of Imports of Iron Ore 

and Semi-Finished Steel on the National Security; 

Oct. 2001 (‘‘2001 Iron and Steel Report’’) at 5. 

17 Id. 

18Presidential Policy Directive 21; Critical 

Infrastructure Security and Resilience; February 12, 

2013 (‘‘PPD–21’’). 

19See Op. Cit. at 16. 

20The 2001 Iron and Steel Report used the phrase 

‘‘fundamentally threaten to impair’’ when 

discussing how imports may threaten to impair 

national security. See 2001 Iron and Steel Report at 

7 and 37. Because the term ‘‘fundamentally’’ is not 

included in the statutory text and could be 

perceived as establishing a higher threshold, the 

Secretary expressly does not use the qualifier in this 

report. The statutory threshold in Section 

232(b)(3)(A) is unambiguously ‘‘threaten to impair’’ 

and the Secretary adopts that threshold without 

qualification. 19 U.S.C. 1862(b)(3)(A). 

21 19 U.S.C. 1862(b)(3)(A). 

22See 19 U.S.C. 1862(d) (‘‘the Secretary and the 

President shall, in light of the requirements of 

national security and without excluding other 

relevant factors . . .’’ and ‘‘serious effects resulting 

from the displacement of any domestic products by 

excessive imports shall be considered, without 

excluding other factors . . .’’). 

23This reading is supported by Congressional 

findings in other statutes. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 

271(a)(1)(‘‘The future well-being of the United 

States economy depends on a strong manufacturing 

base . . . ’’) and 50 U.S.C. 4502(a)(‘‘Congress finds 

that—(1) the security of the United States is 

dependent on the ability of the domestic industrial 

base to supply materials and services . . . (2)(C) to 

provide for the protection and restoration of 

domestic critical infrastructure operations under 

emergency conditions . . . (3) . . . the national 

defense preparedness effort of the United States 

Continued 

requires the Secretary to do the 

following: 

(1) ‘‘Consult with the Secretary of 

Defense regarding the methodological 

and policy questions raised in [the] 

investigation;’’ 

(2) ‘‘Seek information and advice 

from, and consult with, appropriate 

officers of the United States;’’ and 

(3) ‘‘If it is appropriate and after 

reasonable notice, hold public hearings 

or otherwise afford interested parties an 

opportunity to present information and 

advice relevant to such 

investigation.’’ 15 See 19 U.S.C. 

1862(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii). 

As detailed in the report, all of the 

requirements set forth above have been 

satisfied. 

In conducting the investigation, 

Section 232 permits the Secretary to 

request that the Secretary of Defense 

provide an assessment of the defense 

requirements of the article that is the 

subject of the investigation. See 19 

U.S.C. 1862(b)(2)(B). 

Upon completion of a Section 232 

investigation, the Secretary is required 

to submit a report to the President no 

later than 270 days after the date on 

which the investigation was initiated. 

See 19 U.S.C. 1862(b)(3)(A). The report 

must: 

(1) Set forth ‘‘the findings of such 

investigation with respect to the effect 

of the importation of such article in 

such quantities or under such 

circumstances upon the national 

security;’’ 

(2) Set forth, ‘‘based on such findings, 

the recommendations of the Secretary 

for action or inaction under this 

section;’’ and 

(3) ‘‘If the Secretary finds that such 

article is being imported into the United 

States in such quantities or under such 

circumstances as to threaten to impair 

the national security . . . so advise the 

President . . . See 19 U.S.C. 

1862(b)(3)(A). 

All unclassified and non-proprietary 

portions of the report submitted by the 

Secretary to the President must be 

published. 

Within 90 days after receiving a report 

in which the Secretary finds that an 

article is being imported into the United 

States in such quantities or under such 

circumstances as to threaten to impair 

the national security, the President 

shall: 

(1) ‘‘Determine whether the President 

concurs with the finding of the 

Secretary’’; and 

(2) ‘‘If the President concurs, 

determine the nature and duration of 

the action that, in the judgment of the 

President, must be taken to adjust the 

imports of the article and its derivatives 

so that such imports will not threaten to 

impair the national security’’ (see 19 

U.S.C. 1862(c)(1)(A)). 

B. Discussion 

While Section 232 does not 

specifically define ‘‘national security,’’ 

both Section 232, and the implementing 

regulations at 15 CFR part 705, contain 

non-exclusive lists of factors that the 

Secretary must consider in evaluating 

the effect of imports on the national 

security. Congress in Section 232 

explicitly determined that ‘‘national 

security’’ includes, but is not limited to, 

‘‘national defense’’ requirements. See 19 

U.S.C. 1862(d)). 

The Department in 2001 determined 

that ‘‘national defense’’ includes both 

defense of the United States directly and 

the ‘‘ability to project military 

capabilities globally.’’ 16 The 

Department also concluded in 2001 that, 

‘‘In addition to the satisfaction of 

national defense requirements, the term 

‘‘national security’’ can be interpreted 

more broadly to include the general 

security and welfare of certain 

industries, beyond those necessary to 

satisfy national defense requirements, 

which are critical to the minimum 

operations of the economy and 

government.’’ The Department called 

these ‘‘critical industries.’’ 17 This report 

once again uses these reasonable 

interpretations of ‘national defense’’ and 

‘‘national security.’’ However, this 

report uses the more recent 16 critical 

infrastructure sectors identified in 

Presidential Policy Directive 21 18

instead of the 28 industry sectors used 

by the Bureau of Export Administration 

in the 2001 Report.19

Section 232 directs the Secretary to 

determine whether imports of any 

article are being made ‘‘in such 

quantities’’ or ‘‘under such 

circumstances’’ that those imports 

‘‘threaten to impair the national 

security.’’ See 19 U.S.C. 1862(b)(3)(A). 

The statutory construction makes clear 

that either the quantities or the 

circumstances, standing alone, may be 

sufficient to support an affirmative 

finding. They may also be considered 

together, particularly where the 

circumstances act to prolong or magnify 

the impact of the quantities being 

imported. 

The statute does not define a 

threshold for when ‘‘such quantities’’ of 

imports are sufficient to threaten to 

impair the national security, nor does it 

define the ‘‘circumstances’’ that might 

qualify. 

Likewise, the statute does not require 

a finding that the quantities or 

circumstances are impairing the 

national security. Instead, the threshold 

question under Section 232 is whether 

those quantities or circumstances 

‘‘threaten to impair the national 

security.’’ See 19 U.S.C. 1862(b)(3)(A). 

This makes evident that Congress 

expected an affirmative finding under 

Section 232 before an actual impairment 

of the national security. 20

Section 232(d) contains a list of 

factors for the Secretary to consider in 

determining if imports ‘‘threaten to 

impair the national security’’21 of the 

United States, and this list is mirrored 

in the implementing regulations. See 19 

U.S.C. 1862(d) and 15 CFR 705.4. 

Congress was careful to note twice in 

Section 232(d) that the list provided, 

while mandatory, is not exclusive.22

Congress’ illustrative list is focused on 

the ability of the United States to 

maintain the domestic capacity to 

provide the articles in question as 

needed to maintain the national security 

of the United States.23 Congress broke 


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government requires—(C) the development of 

domestic productive capacity to meet—(ii) unique 

technological requirements . . . (7) much of the 

industrial capacity that is relied upon by the United 

States Government for military production and 

other national defense purposes is deeply and 

directly influenced by—(A) the overall 

competitiveness of the industrial economy of the 

United States; and (B) the ability of industries in the 

United States, in general, to produce internationally 

competitive products and operate profitably while 

maintaining adequate research and development to 

preserve competitiveness with respect to military 

and civilian production; and (8) the inability of 

industries in the United States, especially smaller 

subcontractors and suppliers, to provide vital parts 

and components and other materials would impair 

the ability to sustain the Armed Forces of the 

United States in combat for longer than a short 

period.’’). 

24Accord 50 U.S.C. 4502(a). 

the list of factors into two equal parts 

using two separate sentences. The first 

sentence focuses directly on ‘‘national 

defense’’ requirements, thus making 

clear that ‘‘national defense’’ is a subset 

of the broader term ‘‘national security.’’ 

The second sentence focuses on the 

broader economy and expressly directs 

that the Secretary and the President 

‘‘shall recognize the close relation of the 

economic welfare of the Nation to our 

national security.’’ 24 See 19 U.S.C. 

1862(d). 

In addition to ‘‘national defense’’ 

requirements, two of the factors listed in 

the second sentence of Section 232(d) 

are particularly relevant in this 

investigation. Both are directed at how 

‘‘such quantities’’ of imports threaten to 

impair national security See 19 U.S.C. 

1862(b)(3)(A). In administering Section 

232, the Secretary and the President are 

required to ‘‘take into consideration the 

impact of foreign competition on the 

economic welfare of individual 

domestic industries’’ and any ‘‘serious 

effects resulting from the displacement 

of any domestic products by excessive 

imports’’ in ‘‘determining whether such 

weakening of our internal economy may 

impair the national security.’’ See 19 

U.S.C. 1862(d). 

Another factor, not on the list, that the 

Secretary found to be relevant is the 

presence of global excess supply of 

uranium. This excess supply results in 

uranium imports occurring ‘‘under such 

circumstances’’ that they threaten to 

impair the national security. See 19 

U.S.C. 1862(b)(3)(A). The Secretary 

considers excess global uranium supply 

as a relevant circumstance because 

state-owned enterprises have 

maintained or increased uranium 

production, and reduced prices, 

notwithstanding declining market 

conditions. At the same time, market 

producers, including U.S. producers, 

have decreased production under these 

market conditions. This excess supply 

means that U.S. uranium producers, for 

the foreseeable future, face increasing 

competition from state-owned uranium 

producers as well as foreign marketbased competitors. 

After careful examination of the facts 

in this investigation, the Secretary has 

concluded that excessive imports of 

uranium in the present circumstances 

are weakening our internal economy 

and threaten to impair the national 

security as defined in Section 232. 

Several important factors support this 

conclusion, including the global excess 

uranium supply due to non-market 

based production by state-owned 

enterprises, the resulting near total 

dependence of U.S. nuclear power 

production on uranium imports, and the 

impact that the loss of a domestic U.S. 

uranium production capacity and 

workforce would have on the nation’s 

ability to respond to potential national 

emergencies. 

III. Investigation Process 

A. Initiation of Investigation 

On January 16, 2018, Energy Fuel 

Resources (US) Inc. and UR-Energy USA 

Inc. (hereafter ‘‘Petitioners’’) petitioned 

the Secretary to conduct an 

investigation under Section 232 of the 

Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as 

amended (19 U.S.C. 1862), to determine 

the effect of imports of uranium on the 

national security. 

Upon receipt of the petition, the 

Department carefully reviewed the 

material facts outlined in the petition. 

Initial discussions were held with other 

bureaus within the Department of 

Commerce as well as with other 

interested parties at the Departments of 

Defense and Energy. Legal counsel at 

the Department also carefully reviewed 

the petition to ensure it met the 

requirements of the Section 232 statute 

and the implementing regulations. 

Subsequently, on July 18, 2018, the 

Department accepted the petition and 

initiated the investigation. Pursuant to 

Section 232(b)(1)(b), the Department 

notified the U.S. Department of Defense 

with a July 18, 2018 letter from 

Secretary Ross to the Secretary of 

Defense, James Mattis (see Appendix A). 

On July 25, 2018, the Department 

published a Federal Register Notice (see 

Appendix B—Federal Register, Vol. 83, 

No. 143, 35,204–35,205) announcing the 

initiation of an investigation to 

determine the effect of imports of 

uranium on the national security. The 

notice also announced the opening of 

the public comment period. 

B. Public Comments 

On July 25, 2018, the Department 

invited interested parties to submit 

written comments, opinions, data, 

information, or advice relevant to the 

criteria listed in Section 705.4 of the 

National Security Industrial Base 

Regulations (15 CFR 705.4) as they 

affect the requirements of national 

security, including the following: 

(a) Quantity of the articles subject to 

the investigation and other 

circumstances related to the importation 

of such articles; 

(b) Domestic production capacity 

needed for these articles to meet 

projected national defense 

requirements; 

(c) The capacity of domestic 

industries to meet projected national 

defense requirements; 

(d) Existing and anticipated 

availability of human resources, 

products, raw materials, production 

equipment, facilities, and other supplies 

and services essential to the national 

defense; 

(e) Growth requirements of domestic 

industries needed to meet national 

defense requirements and the supplies 

and services including the investment, 

exploration and development necessary 

to assure such growth; 

(f) The impact of foreign competition 

on the economic welfare of any 

domestic industry essential to our 

national security; 

(g) The displacement of any domestic 

products causing substantial 

unemployment, decrease in the 

revenues of government, loss of 

investment or specialized skills and 

productive capacity, or other serious 

effects; 

(h) Relevant factors that are causing or 

will cause a weakening of our national 

economy; and 

(i) Any other relevant factors. 

The public comment period was 

originally scheduled to end on 

September 10, 2018. Following requests 

from the general public, the Department 

extended the deadline from September 

10 to September 25 (see Appendix B— 

Federal Register Vol. 83, No. 175, 

45,595–45,596). The Department 

received 1,019 written submissions 

concerning this investigation. 

Representative samples were grouped 

together then 837 comments were 

posted on Regulations.gov for public 

review. Parties who submitted 

comments included firms representing 

all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, 

representatives of U.S. federal, state and 

local governments, foreign governments, 

as well as other concerned 

organizations. All public comments 

were carefully reviewed and factored 

into the investigative process. The 

public comments of key stakeholders 

are summarized in Appendix C, along 


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25 1989 Report, Letter Requesting 232 

Investigation, also III–21. 

26 1989 Report, III–2, III–25. 

27 Ibid., V–4 to V–5. 

with a link to the docket (BIS–2018– 

0011) where all public comments can be 

viewed in full on Regulations.gov. 

Due to the limited number of firms 

engaged in the U.S. uranium industry 

and in nuclear power generation, it was 

determined that a public hearing was 

not necessary in order to conduct a 

comprehensive investigation. In lieu of 

holding a public hearing on this 

investigation, the Department issued 

two separate mandatory surveys (see 

Appendix D and Appendix E) to 

participants in the U.S. front-end 

uranium industry and the U.S. nuclear 

power generation sector, which 

collected both qualitative and 

quantitative information. The front-end 

survey was sent to 34 companies 

engaged in uranium mining and milling, 

uranium concentrate production, 

uranium enrichment, and nuclear fuel 

fabrication. The nuclear power 

generation survey was sent to all 24 

operators of U.S. nuclear power plants 

and covered 98 reactors. 

The surveys provided an opportunity 

for organizations to disclose 

confidential and non-public information 

needed by the Department to conduct a 

thorough investigation. These 

mandatory surveys were conducted 

using statutory authority pursuant to 

Section 705 of the Defense Production 

Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. 

4555), and collected detailed 

information concerning factors such as 

imports/exports, production, capacity 

utilization, employment, operating 

status, global competition, and financial 

information. The resulting aggregate 

data provided the Department with 

detailed industry information that was 

otherwise not publicly available and 

was needed to effectively conduct 

analysis for this investigation. 

Responses to the Department’s 

surveys were required by law (50 U.S.C. 

4555). Information furnished in the 

survey responses is deemed confidential 

and will not be published or disclosed 

except in accordance with Section 705 

of the DPA. Section 705 of the DPA 

prohibits the publication or disclosure 

of this information unless the President 

determines that the withholding of such 

information is contrary to the interest of 

the national defense. Information will 

not be shared with any non-government 

entity other than in aggregate form. 

C. Site Visits and Information Gathering 

Activities 

To obtain additional information on 

the U.S. uranium industry and the U.S. 

nuclear power generation sector, the 

Department conducted site visits to 

several uranium and nuclear power 

generation facilities: 

1) Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 

in Lusby, Maryland. This is a double 

reactor facility. 

2) Three uranium mines: La Sal 

(Utah—Conventional Mine), Nichols 

Ranch (Wyoming—In Situ facility), and 

Lost Creek (Wyoming—In Situ facility). 

(3) White Mesa Mill in Blanding, 

Utah. This facility is the only fullylicensed and operating conventional 

uranium mill in the U.S. 

In order to gain insights into the U.S. 

uranium industry’s challenges, 

information gathering activities and 

meetings were held with representatives 

of domestic and international uranium 

producers, associations, power 

generators, foreign governments, and 

others interested parties. 

D. Interagency Consultation 

The Department consulted with the 

Department of Defense including the 

Office of Industrial Base, Defense 

Logistics Agency, and the Department of 

the Navy regarding methodological and 

policy questions that arose during the 

investigation. 

The Department also consulted with 

other U.S. Government agencies with 

expertise and information regarding the 

uranium industry including the 

Department of Energy, the Energy 

Information Administration, the 

National Nuclear Security 

Administration, the International Trade 

Administration, the Department of 

State, the Office of the United States 

Trade Representative, the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, the U.S. 

Geological Survey, and the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission. 

E. Review of the Department of 

Commerce 1989 Section 232 

Investigation on Uranium Imports 

The Department reviewed the 

previous Section 232 Investigation on 

the Effect of Uranium Imports on 

National Security from September 1989. 

This investigation, requested by the 

Secretary of Energy, determined that 

U.S. utilities imported a significant 

share of their uranium requirements. In 

1987, U.S. utilities imported 

approximately 51.1 percent of their 

requirements, and the investigation 

projected that this level would reach 

70.8 percent by 1993.25 The 1989 

investigation also found that U.S. 

uranium producers faced strong foreign 

competition, particularly from the 

Soviet Union. It further reported that 

employment in the domestic industry 

was steadily decreasing.26

[TEXT REDACTED]27 Consequently, 

the Secretary concluded that uranium 

was not being imported into the United 

States under such quantities or 

circumstances that threatened to impair 

the national security. 

The Department took note of the 

methodologies and analytic approaches 

used to conduct the 1989 investigation 

and evaluated its findings and 

conclusion in light of the current state 

of the U.S. uranium industry. Further 

discussion of the September 1989 

Section 232 Investigation is in 

Appendix G. 

IV. Product Scope of the Investigation 

The scope of this investigation 

defined uranium products at the 

Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the 

United States (HTS) 10-digit level. The 

eight product categories and related 

HTS codes covered by this report (see 

Figure 1B) are produced by U.S. 

uranium companies engaged in the 

nuclear fuel cycle, and are imported for 

use by U.S. nuclear power operators. 

Detailed information was collected in 

the Department’s survey responses from 

U.S. uranium producers and U.S. 

nuclear power operators regarding 

products covered by the HTS codes. 

These products are used in, or otherwise 

support, various national defense and 

critical infrastructure applications. 


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41550 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

28Conversion is defined as the conversion of 

uranium concentrate (U3O8) to uranium 

hexafluoride (UF6). 

29Enrichment is defined as the process that 

increases the concentration of Uranium-235 

isotopes within a quantity of natural uranium. 

30Fuel fabrication is defined as the process by 

which enriched uranium is converted to uranium 

dioxide powder that is then pressed into pellets and 

placed in fuel rods. Bundles of these fuel rods 

become fuel assemblies that are placed in nuclear 

reactors. 

FIGURE 1B: URANIUM PRODUCT SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION

Heading/subheading/product 10 Digit HTS code 

Imports of uranium ores and concentrates, natural uranium compounds, and all forms of enriched uranium: 

• Uranium Ore and Concentrates ........................................................................................... 2612.10.00.00 

• Uranium Compounds (Oxide, Hexafluoride, and Other) ...................................................... Oxide 2844.10.20.10 

Hexafluoride 2844.10.20.25 

Other 2844.10.20.55 

• Uranium enriched in U235 and its compounds; alloys, dispersions (including cermets), 

ceramic products and mixtures containing uranium enriched in U235.

Oxide 2844.20.00.10 

Hexafluoride 2844.20.00.20 

Other 2844.20.00.30 

Imports of natural uranium metal and forms of natural uranium other than compounds: 

• Uranium Metal ...................................................................................................................... 2844.10.10.00 

• Other ..................................................................................................................................... 2844.10.50.00 

Uranium depleted in U235 and its compounds; thorium and its compounds; alloys, dispersions 

(including cermets), ceramic products and mixtures containing uranium depleted in U235, 

thorium, or compounds of these products: 

• Uranium Compounds (Depleted) ......................................................................................... Oxide 2844.30.20.10 

Fluorides 2844.30.20.20 

Other 2844.30.20.50 

• Other (Depleted) ................................................................................................................... Uranium Metal 2844.30.50.10 

Nuclear reactors; fuel elements (cartridges), non-irradiated, for nuclear reactors; machinery and 

apparatus for isotopic separation; parts thereof: 

• Fuel elements (cartridges), non-irradiated, and parts thereof ............................................. 8401.30.00.00 

Source: United States International Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security. 

In addition to the uranium products 

identified in Figure 1, this report 

examines the provision of three services 

in the nuclear fuel cycle: Conversion,28

enrichment,29 and fuel fabrication.30

Transactions for these services are 

examined separately from transactions 

involving uranium hexafluoride (UF6), 

enriched uranium product (EUP) and 

finished fuel assemblies (fuel for 

nuclear power plants). The Department 

made this distinction because U.S. 

nuclear power operators, the endconsumer of most uranium products in 

the U.S., purchase services and finished 

products for UF6, EUP, and finished 

fuel assemblies. 

A U.S. utility, for example, may opt 

to buy a specified amount of UF6, EUP, 

or finished fuel assemblies directly from 

a producer. Alternatively, it may 

directly contract for conversion, 

enrichment, or fuel fabrication services 

using material owned by the utility. 

These services are regularly procured 

both inside and outside the United 

States. 

The Department determined that 

assessing U.S. utilities’ procurement of 

UF6 or EUP through conversion, 

enrichment, and fuel fabrication 

services was critical to understanding 

the effects of imports of uranium 

products on U.S. national security. 

Information regarding conversion, 

enrichment, and fuel fabrication 

services was collected and incorporated 

into the investigation via the front-end 

uranium industry survey. 

This report also examines the state of 

the U.S. nuclear power generation 

sector. The Department is aware that the 

principal customers of uranium are 

nuclear power reactor operators, thus 

examination of the U.S. nuclear power 

generation industry through a 

comprehensive Department survey was 

necessary to ensure a complete analysis 

of the effect of uranium imports on the 

national security. The Secretary’s 

recommendations consider the 

interdependence of the U.S. uranium 

industry and the U.S. nuclear power 

generation sector. 

V. Background on the U.S. Nuclear 

Industry 

A. Summary of the U.S. Uranium Fuel 

Cycle 

The processes that prepare uranium 

for use in nuclear power generation 

constitute the front-end of the nuclear 

fuel cycle. In the United States, these 

front-end processes consist of uranium 

mining, milling, conversion, 

enrichment, and nuclear fuel 

fabrication. The nuclear fuel cycle and 

its products at each stage are shown in 

Figure 2. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41551 

31 ‘‘Nuclear Explained: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle.’’ 

U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://

www.eia.gov/energyexplained/ 

index.php?page=nuclear_fuel_cycle. 32 ‘‘Conventional Uranium Mills.’’ United States 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. https://

www.nrc.gov/materials/uranium-recovery/ 

extraction-methods/conventional-mills.html. 33U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2017 

Domestic Uranium Production Report. 

(Washington, DC: 2017) https://www.eia.gov/ 

uranium/production/annual/pdf/dupr.pdf. 

34 ‘‘Locations of Uranium Recovery Facilities.’’ 

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

https://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/materials/ 

uranium/. 

Uranium mining is the first step of the 

cycle. Several techniques are used for 

uranium mining including open pit, 

underground, and in-situ recovery (ISR). 

The ISR technique, used by all active 

U.S. uranium mining operations today, 

involves pumping a slightly acidic 

solution into ore bodies to dissolve 

uranium ore in preparation for 

extraction.31

The ore-bearing solution recovered 

from uranium mining is then transferred 

to a facility for processing into triuranium octoxide concentrate (U3O8), 

commonly referred to as uranium 

concentrate. For open pit and 

underground mines, uranium milling 

involves crushing ore and treating it 

with chemicals in order to produce 

U3O8.32

In 2018, all domestic uranium 

concentrate was produced by five ISR 

facilities located in Nebraska and 

Wyoming, and one milling operation 

located in Utah.33 These facilities were 

the only operating uranium mines and 

mill in the U.S. in 2018, thus no 

uranium concentrate was produced by 

conventional underground or open-pit 

mines during the same year. Another 

five mines are currently licensed, but 

idled (see Figures 3 and 4).34

FIGURE 3: U.S. FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES—MINES

[In Situ Recovery] 

Project name Company name Location [TEXT REDACTED] 

Crow Butte Operation ............................................. Cameco .................................................................. Nebraska ...... [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Lost Creek Project .................................................. Ur-Energy (Lost Creek ISR LLC) .......................... Wyoming ...... [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Smith Ranch-Highland Operation ........................... Power Resource Inc., dba Cameco Resources .... Wyoming ...... [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Ross CPP ............................................................... Strata Energy Inc ................................................... Wyoming ...... [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Nichols Ranch ISR Project ..................................... Energy Fuels Resources Corp. (Uranerz Energy 

Corporation).

Wyoming ...... [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Willow Creek Project (Christenson Ranch & 

Irigaray).

Uranium One USA, Inc .......................................... Wyoming ...... [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Alta Mesa Project ................................................... Energy Fuels Resources Corp (Mestena Uranium 

LLC).

Texas ........... [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Hobson ISR Plant ................................................... South Texas Mining Venture ................................. Texas ........... [TEXT REDACTED]. 

La Palangana ......................................................... South Texas Mining Venture ................................. Texas ........... [TEXT REDACTED]. 


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Figure 2: Nuclear Fuel Cycle 

..... 

J t . 1& I . I I 

Ba&Ewlq/'Cyde 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security 
41552 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

35 ‘‘Annual Energy Review 2011.’’ U.S. Energy 

Information Administration (Washington, DC: 

2012). https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/ 

annual/showtext.php?t=ptb0903. 

36 ‘‘Uranium Production Figures, 2008–2017.’’ 

World Nuclear Association. http://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/ 

uranium-production-figures.aspx. 

37 ‘‘Conversion and Deconversion.’’ World 

Nuclear Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversionenrichment-and-fabrication/conversion-anddeconversion.aspx. 

38U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2017 

Domestic Uranium Production Report. 

(Washington, DC: 2017) https://www.eia.gov/ 

uranium/production/annual/pdf/dupr.pdf. 

39 [TEXT REDACTED]. 

40 ‘‘Uranium Enrichment.’’ United States Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. https://www.nrc.gov/ 

materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html. 

41 ‘‘Uranium Enrichment.’’ World Nuclear 

Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversionenrichment-and-fabrication/uraniumenrichment.aspx. 

42 ‘‘Uranium Downblending.’’ WISE Uranium 

Project. http://www.wise-uranium.org/eudb.html. 

43Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is uranium 

with U–235 content of at least 20 percent. Naval 

reactors and weapons applications utilize HEU 

enriched to more than 90 percent U–235. 

FIGURE 3: U.S. FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES—MINES—Continued 

[In Situ Recovery] 

Project name Company name Location [TEXT REDACTED] 

Goliad ISR Uranium Project ................................... Uranium Energy Corp ............................................ Texas ........... [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Source: [TEXT REDACTED]; U.S. Energy Information Administration—Annual Domestic Uranium Production Report (2018). 

[TEXT REDACTED]. 

FIGURE 4: U.S. FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES—MILLS, 2018 

Project name Company name Location [TEXT REDACTED] 

White Mesa Mill ...................................................... EFR White Mesa LLC ............................................ Utah ............. [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Shootaring Canyon Uranium Mill ........................... Anfield Resources .................................................. Utah ............. [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Sweetwater Uranium Project .................................. Kennecott Uranium Company ............................... Wyoming ...... [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Pinon Ridge Mill ..................................................... Western Uranium/Pinon Ridge Resources Corporation.Colorado ...... [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Sheep Mountain ..................................................... Energy Fuels Wyoming Inc ................................... Wyoming ...... [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Source: [TEXT REDACTED] U.S. Energy Information Administration—Annual Domestic Uranium Production Report (2018). 

[TEXT REDACTED]. 

U.S.-based mining and milling 

facilities have dramatically declined 

over recent years, falling from eighteen 

mines and four mills in 2009 to five 

operating mines and one operating mill 

in 2018. These facilities have shut down 

or idled for several reasons, including 

competition from subsidized foreign 

imports, low spot prices, as well as costs 

and delays associated with the U.S. 

permitting process. 

Similarly, production of uranium 

concentrate (U308) in the United States 

has declined, dropping 95 percent from 

43.7 million pounds in 1980 35 to 1.97 

million in 2018. Kazakhstan, Canada, 

and Australia were the top suppliers in 

2017, producing roughly 46.8, 26.2, and 

11.8 million pounds of uranium 

concentrate, respectively.36

The third step in the fuel cycle is 

conversion, where a gas is used to 

facilitate enrichment of the U–235 

isotope in uranium concentrate into 

natural uranium (UF6). ConverDyn, the 

sole U.S. uranium conversion facility, is 

currently in standby/idled (see Figure 

5). 

FIGURE 5: U.S. FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES—CONVERSION, 2018 

Project name Company name Location Operating status 

ConverDyn Metropolis Works .................................. Honeywell Energy/ConverDyn ................................. Metropolis, IL ...... Standby/Idle. 

Source: [TEXT REDACTED] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

ConverDyn began producing UF6 for 

commercial use in the 1960s and 

supplied commercial conversion 

services to the U.S. and global uranium 

market, competing against suppliers in 

Canada, Russia, France, and China.37

However, it announced a suspension of 

operations in late 2017 related to 

ongoing challenges facing the nuclear 

fuel industry.38 [TEXT REDACTED] 

Furthermore, the Russians, Chinese, and 

French bundle conversion services as 

part of their nuclear fuel sales. [TEXT 

REDACTED] 39

Uranium enrichment, the fourth stage 

in the fuel cycle, produces material to 

be used in the operation of nuclear 

reactors. Natural uranium (UF6) consists 

of three distinct isotopes: U–234, U– 

235, and U–238. The enrichment 

process alters the isotopic makeup in 

order to increase the prevalence of the 

U–235 isotope. The U–235 isotope must 

be enriched so that fission, or splitting 

of the U–235 atoms, can occur to 

produce energy.40 41 Gaseous centrifuges 

are the industry standard for uranium 

enrichment into low-enriched uranium 

(LEU) or high-enriched uranium (HEU). 

LEU is used by commercial power 

reactors as fuel where the U–235 is 

enriched to between three and five 

percent. HEU is used in naval ships, 

submarines, nuclear weapons, and some 

research reactors,42 43 with enrichment 

at 20 percent. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41553 

44 ‘‘Nuclear Power in the USA.’’ World Nuclear 

Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/ 

usa-nuclear-power.aspx. 

45 ‘‘Uranium Enrichment.’’ United States Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. https://www.nrc.gov/ 

materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html. 

46 ‘‘DOE Plans $115M Investment in Uranium 

Enrichment Project.’’ U.S. News & World Report, 

January 8, 2019. https://www.usnews.com/news/ 

best-states/ohio/articles/2019-01-08/doe-plans115m-investment-in-uranium-enrichment-project. 

47 ‘‘Nuclear Fuel Fabrication—Current Issues 

(USA).’’ WISE Uranium Project. 

48 ‘‘Monthly Energy Review March 2019.’’ U.S. 

Energy Information Administration. https://

www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec7_

5.pdf. 

49 ‘‘Fuel Fabrication.’’ United States Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. https://www.nrc.gov/ 

materials/fuel-cycle-fac/fuel-fab.html. 

The United States first used gaseous 

diffusion uranium enrichment plants in 

the 1940s during the Second World 

War. Additional plants were built in the 

1950s for defense needs and later 

opened for commercial enrichment use. 

These plants are located in Paducah, 

Kentucky and Piketon, Ohio, but both 

closed by 2013.44 Today, URENCO USA 

(UUSA) is the only uranium enrichment 

company operating in the United States, 

serving the commercial power reactor 

market. UUSA is a subsidiary of 

URENCO Group, a consortium owned 

by the governments of the United 

Kingdom and the Netherlands, as well 

as two German utilities (see Figure 6). 

UUSA employs gas centrifuge 

enrichment at its Louisiana Energy 

Services (LES) plant in Eunice, New 

Mexico to produce LEU for nuclear 

reactor fuel.45 Per the 1992 Washington 

Agreement governing the LES facility’s 

construction and operation, the plant 

cannot be used to produce enriched 

uranium for U.S. defense purposes. 

However, in January 2019, DOE 

announced plans to reopen the Piketon 

facility to demonstrate a U.S.-origin 

centrifuge technology for production of 

High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium 

(HALEU) in support of advanced reactor 

development efforts.46

FIGURE 6: U.S. FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES—ENRICHMENT

Project name Company name Ownership Enrichment type Location Operating status 

Louisiana Energy Services 

(LES).

URENCO USA ................. United Kingdom, the 

Netherlands, Germany.

Gas Centrifuge ... New Mexico ........ Operating. 

Source: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

The fifth and final step in the frontend nuclear fuel cycle is fuel 

fabrication, where enriched uranium is 

formed into pellets and then fabricated 

into fuel rods for fuel assemblies. Three 

active fuel fabrication plants in the U.S. 

are licensed to transform low-enriched 

uranium into fuel assemblies for 

commercial power reactors: 

Westinghouse, GE, and Framatome (see 

Figure 7). 

Naval reactors require HEU fuel and 

their fuel assemblies come from a 

different supply base. All uranium used 

in the manufacture of naval fuel 

assemblies is from the Department of 

Energy’s stockpile and is not currently 

purchased on the commercial market. 

The naval fuel is manufactured by BWX 

Technologies (BWXT) at its Nuclear 

Fuel Services (NFS) facility in 

Tennessee. Additionally, BWXT 

downblends high-enriched uranium 

(HEU) to produce low-enriched uranium 

(LEU), which is needed to produce the 

tritium required for nuclear weapons.47

FIGURE 7: U.S. FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES—FUEL FABRICATION, 2018 

Company name Ownership NRC category Location Operating status 

BWXT Nuclear Operations 

Group.

United States .................... Category 1 ........................ Virginia .............................. Operating. 

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc United States .................... Category 1 ........................ Tennessee ........................ Operating. 

Framatome, Inc ................. France ............................... Category 3 ........................ Washington ....................... Operating. 

Global Nuclear Fuel— 

Americas LLC (General 

Electric).

United States .................... Category 3 ........................ North Carolina ................... Operating. 

Westinghouse .................... United States .................... Category 3 ........................ South Carolina .................. Operating. 

Category 1: High Strategic Significance. 

Category 3: Low Strategic Significance (commercial services). 

Source: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

B. Summary of U.S. Nuclear Power 

Generation Industry 

The first U.S. commercial nuclear 

reactor came online in 1958, and most 

active U.S. reactors were built between 

1967 and 1990. Originally certified for 

40 years of operation, the lifespans of 85 

reactors have been extended by the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

for an additional 20 years. These 

certifications followed assessments 

confirming that they were safe to 

continue operating well after the end of 

their original design life. 

As of October 2018, 98 reactors were 

located at 58 different facilities in 28 

states across the country 48 (see Figure 

8). The two main commercial reactor 

designs used for power generation are 

pressurized-water reactors (PWR) and 

boiling-water reactors (BWR), with 65 

and 33 operating in the U.S., 

respectively. These reactors have 

varying designs, dimensions, and 

numbers of fuel rods in each fuel 

assembly based on the six commercial 

power reactor manufacturers in the 

United States: Allis-Chalmers, Babcock 

& Wilcox, Combustion Engineering, 

General Atomics, General Electric, and 

Westinghouse.49


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41554 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

50 ‘‘Frequently Asked Questions.’’ U.S. Energy 

Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/ 

tools/faqs/faq.php?id=207&t=3. 

51 ‘‘Nuclear Power in the USA.’’ World Nuclear 

Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/ 

usa-nuclear-power.aspx. 

52U.S. Energy Information Administration. 

‘‘America’s oldest operating nuclear power plant to 

retire on Monday’’ (September 14, 2018), https://

www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37055. 

These reactors are important to 

produce steady-state baseload power to 

the U.S., in contrast to hydro, solar, and 

wind, which have fluctuating generating 

capabilities.50 51 Despite providing a 

significant portion of the nation’s 

electricity (more than 19 percent), a 

number of U.S. utilities have 

prematurely retired their nuclear power 

reactors due to cost pressures resulting 

from distortions in wholesale electricity 

market pricing mechanisms, subsidized 

renewable energy, and lower natural gas 

prices. Since 2013, U.S. electric utilities 

have permanently closed six nuclear 

power plants. Another eight reactors are 

slated to be retired between 2019 and 

2025.52 However, two new reactors are 

scheduled to come online by 2022. The 

domestic uranium industry is 

challenged by this shrinking customer 

demand for their product in the United 

States (see Figures 9 and 10). 


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Figure 8: U.S. Operating Commercial Power Reactors, 2018 

Source: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

&•lid 

&-2!dl!I 

&=aid& 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41555 

53 ‘‘Nuclear Power in the USA.’’ World Nuclear 

Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/ 

usa-nuclear-power.aspx. 

54Stelloh, Tim. ‘‘Construction Halted at South 

Carolina Nuclear Power Plant.’’ NBC News, July 31, 

2017. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ 

construction-halted-south-carolina-nuclear-powerreactors-n788331. 

55 ‘‘Plans for New Reactors Worldwide.’’ World 

Nuclear. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/current-and-future-generation/ 

plans-for-new-reactors-worldwide.aspx. 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] [TEXT REDACTED] 

Source: [TEXT REDACTED]. 

[TEXT REDACTED]. 

The majority of the plants shut down 

due to cost-driven factors, including 

competition from alternative generation 

sources such as natural gas, solar, and 

wind, as well as additional capital 

expenditures needed to meet NRC 

regulatory requirements. [TEXT 

REDACTED] 

Only one new reactor has been 

completed in the United States since 

1996—Tennessee Valley Authority’s 

Watts Bar 2 plant, which began 

operating in 2016. Construction started 

on two commercial PWR reactors in 

Georgia in 2013 and those are scheduled 

to begin operation in 2021. In South 

Carolina, construction of two 

commercial reactors began in 2013, but 

cost overruns caused the projects to be 

abandoned in 2017.53 54 While the U.S. 

nuclear power industry is declining, 

global demand for nuclear power plants 

is rising with no less than 50 new 

reactors under construction in 15 

countries. A majority of the new builds 

are in Russia, China, India, the United 

Arab Emirates, and South Korea.55

VI. Global Uranium Market Conditions 

A. Summary of the Global Uranium 

Market 

Uranium, in various forms 

(‘‘uranium’’), is a globally-traded 

commodity supplied primarily through 

privately negotiated contracts with 

varying durations. Short-term contracts 

usually span less than two years, midterm contracts run between two to five 

years, and long-term contracts can be in 

force for five years or more. 

Additionally, uranium can be bought on 

‘‘spot,’’ which are contracts with a onetime uranium delivery (usually) for the 

entire contract, where the delivery 

occurs within one year of contract 

execution. The spot market can be lower 

or higher than the contract market. 

Since 2011, the number of spot, midterm, and long-term contracts for all 

front-end industry participants has 

varied (see Figure 11). Of note, longterm contracts have declined from 35 to 

just 19, and no short-term contracts 

were reported. 


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105 

vi 

:::> 104 

.5 

~ 

j 

!' 

:;::: 

e 

& 

0 

0 

] 

e 

:::s 

z 

103 

102 

101 

100 

99 

97 

Figure 9: U.S. Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, 2009-2018 

104 104 104 104 

2009 .2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 

source: U.S. Energy Information Administration-Monthly Energy Review, January 2019 

2018 
41556 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

56Susan Hall and Margaret Coleman, U.S. 

Geological Survey, Critical Analysis of World 

Uranium Resources, (2013) pp. 26–27. 

The spot market price of a pound of 

uranium averaged only $28.27 in the 

last three months of 2018, and dropped 

even further to $25.75 in April 2019. 

This is a 74 percent reduction since the 

recent price high of $99.24 per pound in 

2007. 

According to Department survey 

respondents, the main factor causing the 

current low spot market price of 

uranium is global excess uranium 

supply, much of which is attributed to 

continued production of uranium from 

state-owned enterprises in the aftermath 

of the Fukushima incident. Low spot 

prices have significantly impacted the 

viability of U.S. uranium producers. 

Mining companies operating in the U.S. 

have been forced to idle operations due 

to low spot prices, and since 2009, four 

companies have closed 10 mines with 

the intention to permanently halt 

operations. 

Additionally, the U.S. has 

approximately 1.28 million metric tons 

of uranium in prognosticated uranium 

resources (the largest reserves in the 

world 56), much of which has not been 

developed specifically due to low spot 

prices (see Figure 12). 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–P 


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Figure 11: Total Active Front-End Uranium Contracts by Contract Term 

50 

... 

m 4s ► t 40 

C. 

~ 35 

J:; 30 C: 

0 

u 25 

~ 

~ 20 

15 15 ... 

Ji 10 

E 

;:I 5 

z 

0 

Total contracts peaked in 2010 and declined 44.4% by 2018 

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 

■ long Term Contracts ■ Medium Term Contracts s Short Term Contracts II Spot Contracts 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of lndll'itry and Security, Front-End Survey, Tab9a 

12 respondents 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41557 

Nuclear fuel prices are, however, 

impacted by more than just the uranium 

spot market price. On the supply side, 

uranium prices are affected by mine 

closures and the release of existing 

inventory for sale. On the demand side, 

price is impacted by new reactor 

startups and reactor closures (see Figure 

13). 


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1,400 

1,200 

1,000 

5' 

.... 800 C 

-~ 

~ 600 

400 

200 

0 

Figure 12: Prognosticated Uranium Resources 

-~ ,·--·--·---· --

1,273 

United States 

The United States has the largest amount 

of prognosticated uranium resources. It 

has more uranium than the next twoKazakhstan and Brazil- combined. 

Kazakhstan Brazil 

11 <USO 36.3/lb. 11 <USO 59/lb. 

Source: U.S. Geologica I SUTvey Critical Analysis of World Uranium Resources (2013) 

Figure 13: Global Commercial Operating Reactors, 2009-2018 

455 ------·-·----- -- ----- ···••·········•··453 

"' .... 

0 450 ..., 

'-' m 

Qi 

0::: 

(I} 445 ::0 

m 

.... 

Q) 

Q. 440 0 

iij 

.a 

.2 435 (.!) 

430 

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 

Source: lnremational Atomic Energy Agency- Unit Capability Trend Report January 2019 and "Current Status" Page. 
41558 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

57Swaps in the International Fuel Market, 7. 

World Nuclear Association. http://www.worldnuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/WNA/Publications/ 

Working_Group_Reports/swaps-report-2015.pdf, 7. 

Additionally, converters, enrichers, 

and fuel fabricators experience specific 

market pressures, resulting in uranium 

products that have slightly different 

price considerations. Department survey 

data indicates that, on average, aggregate 

fuel acquisition accounts for 25 percent 

of total facility operating costs. When 

looking at fuel acquisition as a 

percentage of a nuclear power utilities’ 

total facility operating costs, the 

contribution of each stage of the frontend nuclear fuel cycle is relatively 

small: Mining/milling and uranium 

concentrate acquisition (10 percent), 

enrichment (8 percent), fuel fabrication 

(5 percent), and conversion (2 percent) 

(see Figure 14). 

B. Uranium Transactions: Book 

Transfers and Flag Swaps 

Unlike many commodities, exchanges 

of uranium between suppliers and 

customers often take place without 

physical movement of material. This 

occurs through book transfers and flag 

swaps. 

Book Transfer 

For the purposes of this investigation, 

a book transfer is defined as a ‘‘change 

of ownership of two quantities of 

material with all other characteristics of 

the material being unchanged.’’ 57 Book 

transfers are used to exchange material 

between two customers at a third-party 

producer without having to physically 

ship or otherwise move material (see 

Figure 15). 


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Figure 14: Fuel Acquisition as a Percentage of Total Facility Operating Costs 

ranium Concentrate 

Acquisition 10% 

Conversion 2% 

Enrichment 8% 

Fuel Fabrication 5% 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau oflndustry and Security, Nuclear Power Operator Survey, Q3C 22 Respondents 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41559 

58 Ibid. 

59 ‘‘Swaps in the International Fuel Market.’’ 

World Nuclear Association. (2015). http://

www.world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/WNA/ 

Publications/Working_Group_Reports/swapsreport-2015.pdf 

60 In this example, the United States obligations 

associated with material are established in U.S. 

peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements, also 

known as 123 agreements. Section 123 of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 generally requires the 

entry into force of a peaceful nuclear cooperation 

agreement prior to significant exports of U.S. 

nuclear material or equipment. As of 2019, the 

United States has in force approximately 23 of these 

agreements with foreign partners. Congressional 

Research Service. Nuclear Cooperation with Other 

Countries: A Primer, 1. (Washington, DC: 2019). 

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/ 

RS22937 

Book transfers also can be used to 

convey payment for conversion or 

enrichment services (see Figure 16).58

Flag Swap 

In certain cases, utilities and uranium 

industry producers may find it 

necessary to conduct ‘‘obligation 

swaps’’ of material, a practice 

commonly known as ‘‘flag swapping.’’ 59

In the uranium industry, obligations are 

defined as conditions assigned by a 

particular country’s government to a 

specific set of nuclear material. These 

conditions control the use of nuclear 

material, including uranium, and may 

restrict where it is shipped. For 

example, if such material has a United 

States obligation, the material can only 

be used in accordance with conditions 

established by the United States 

government.60

Depending on the parties involved in 

the uranium exchange, it is possible for 

a given quantity and type of uranium to 

acquire multiple obligations. If material 

is mined in Canada, converted in the 

United States, enriched in Germany, 


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Figure 15: Example of Book Transfer 

Utility A Mine B 

Before Where (Account Location): Converter C, Where (Account Location): Converter C, USA 

USA What (Contract): Provide 100,000 pounds of 

What (Contract): Buy 100,000 pounds U3O8 to Utility A. 

of U3O8 from Mine B. Where (U3O8 Origin): Country D 

Where (U3O8 Origin): Not yet 

purchased 

What Happens: Mine B already has 100,000 pounds of U3O8 in Converter C's Account 

Mine B Transfers U3O8 at Converter C to Utility A ~ 

After Account Location: Converter C, USA Account Location: Converter C, USA 

Contract: Buy 100,000 pounds of U3O8 Contract: Transfer 100,000 pounds of U308 at 

from Mine B. Converter C to Utility A's account 

U3O8 Origin: Country D U3O8 Origin: Country D 

NOTE: In this example, 100,000 pounds of U308 has changed ownership from Mine B to Utility A, but 

retains its origin from Country D. 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security 

Figure 16: Payment for Conversion Services via Book Transfer 

I Utility A , ..... 100,000 kgs 

.... J Converter B I ofUF6 

I I ... 50,000 lbs 

..., I Converters Utility A ofU308 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security 
41560 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

61 In these cases, South African and Soviet 

producers used third-party brokers to facilitate 

origin swaps that would circumvent restrictions on 

imports of these materials. DOC 1989 investigation, 

also, Written Question by Mr. Paul Saes (V) to the 

Commission of the European Communities, 26 

February 1990, http://publications.europa.eu/ 

resource/cellar/a6838643-4b6d-4f39-aebbd538ff795091.0004.01/DOC_1. 

62 Ibid. 

and fabricated into nuclear fuel in 

Japan, then the uranium would then 

acquire obligations from Canada, the 

United States, the European Atomic 

Energy Community (EURATOM), and 

Japan. The uranium can only be used in 

accordance with regulations imposed by 

the above countries and EURATOM. 

Customers and producers engage in 

obligation swaps to ease administrative 

burdens on the maintenance of material. 

By exchanging in obligation swaps, 

customers and producers can minimize 

the number of obligations that must be 

adhered to for the tracking and ultimate 

use of uranium materials (see Figures 17 

and 18). 

Note that the exchange of obligations 

does not change the origin. Although 

origin swaps are usually not permitted 

by regulatory authorities, it is possible 

to de facto origin swap through a change 

of obligation and ownership. These 

combination obligation/ownership 

swaps have in the past been used to 

circumvent uranium import restrictions, 

as previously encountered with South 

African and Soviet-origin uranium in 

the late 1980s.61

Book transfers and flag swaps are also 

advantageous because of the specialized 

nature of the nuclear fuel cycle. Nuclear 

fuel facilities are concentrated in only a 

few countries: five nations have 

uranium conversion facilities (the 

United States, Canada, China, France, 

and Russia) and eight enrichment 

facilities 62 (the aforementioned 

countries as well as Germany, the 

United Kingdom, and the Netherlands). 

Consequently, book transfer and flag 

swaps ensure that converters and 

enrichers can quickly process customer 

orders. 

Furthermore, the nature of the 

uranium industry’s manufacturing 

processes mean that an individual 


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Figure 17: Obligation Swap, Example 1 

NOTE; Company A has 50,000 pounds of UR:i with Obligation X. Company B has 50,000 pounds of UF6 with Obligation Y. Both 

quantities of UR:i have Origin P. 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security 

Figure 18: Obligation Swap, Example 2 

I Company A , .... 50,000 lbs of UF6 with 

ConditionX -------..J Exchanges for 

~ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security 

50,000lbs of UF6 with 

ConditlonY 

-------~I CompanyB 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41561 

63 Ibid. 

64 ‘‘Nuclear Power in Japan.’’ World Nuclear 

Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/ 

japan-nuclear-power.aspx. 

65Annika Breidthart, ‘‘German government wants 

nuclear exit by 2022 at latest’’, Reuters (May 30, 

2011), https://uk.reuters.com/article/idINIndia57371820110530. 

66 ‘‘Nuclear Power in France.’’ World Nuclear 

Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/ 

france.aspx. 

67 ‘‘Nuclear Power in Germany.’’ World Nuclear 

Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/ 

germany.aspx. 

company’s inventories of material are 

not kept separately at their facilities. 

Instead, materials are stored at 

converters, enrichers, and fuel 

fabricators (see Figures 19 and 20).63 At 

these facilities, customers are assigned a 

particular share of the facility’s product 

proportional to the amount specified in 

their contract. In this sense, uranium 

industry transactions function in the 

same way as banking transactions. An 

individual bank customer withdrawing 

$100 from an ATM does not receive the 

same physical $100 that he or she 

deposited at an earlier point. Similarly, 

a utility customer does not receive an 

end product—whether UF6, SWU, or 

fabricated fuel assemblies—to be the 

source material that the utility supplied 

to the producer. 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–C 

The Department incorporated its 

understanding of book transfers and flag 

swaps to its survey instrument and 

interpretation of responses. The 

Department is particularly cognizant of 

the reality that many imports of 

uranium into the United States do not 

necessarily occur through physical 

transportation of materials into the 

country. As described above, U.S. 

uranium producers and U.S. utilities 

can acquire and exchange materials 

without them ever entering the country. 

Consequently, the Department accounts 

for these types of transfers in assessing 

the overall impact of imported uranium 

on the national security. 

C. The Effect of the Fukushima Daiichi 

Incident on U.S. and Global Uranium 

Demand 

Reduction in global uranium demand 

in recent years can be traced to several 

factors including the impacts of Japan’s 

To ̄hoku earthquake and the subsequent 

meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi 

Nuclear Power Plant. This event 

profoundly affected the economics of 

the nuclear industry by reducing global 

demand for uranium. Some 

governments in the developed world 

reacted to the Fukushima incident by 

closing existing reactors and cancelling 

plans for new construction. Japan 

cancelled plans for 14 new reactors and 

shut down all 50 operable reactors by 

2012 to reassess safety standards. Since 

then, only nine have restarted.64

Germany decided to shut down all 17 of 

its reactors by 2022 65 and France 

announced plans to shut down 14 

reactors by 2035.66 As of 2019, Germany 

has closed 10 reactors, while France has 

not yet closed any.67 Consequently, the 

global uranium market was flooded with 

uranium products after a significant 

reduction in nuclear power plants 

operating worldwide. 


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Figure 19: Reconciliation of Book Transfer Accounts, Example 1 

Utifity A wants to buy Utility A pays for lhe SWUs 

10,000 SWUsfrom ... by paying Enricher B 

Enricher B 10,000 KgU UF6-

source: u .s. Oe-partment of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security 

Enricher B manufactures 

10,000 SWUs for Utility A from 

their working stock of UF6 

Figure 20: Reconciliation of Book Transfer Accounts, Example 2 

The working stock used to make 

Utility Ns order included 5,000 

KgU of UF6 from Utility C's 

account. and 5,000 from Utility 

O's account. 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security 

Enricher Buses the 10,000 KgU 

UF6 received from Utility A to 

make Utility C & D accounts 

whole. 
41562 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

68 IAEA Red Book, 102, 2016. 69 Global Business Reports, ‘‘Kazakhstan’s mining 

industry: Steppe by Steppe’’, Engineering and 

Mining Journal (September 2015), p. 83, https://

www.gbreports.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ 

Kazakhstan_Mining2015.pdf. 70 In August 20, 2015 the National Bank of 

Kazakhstan allowed the national currency—the 

tenge—to float freely. Immediately, the tenge fell in 

value. Before the transition, the tenge had limited 

ability to move within a range determined by the 

national bank, resting at 185.7 KZT per USD. With 

the introduction of a free floating exchange rate, the 

currency has been consistently devaluing and 

resides at 380.1 KZT per USD (Department of 

Treasury). The switch to a free floating exchange 

rate was motivated in part to an effort to prop-up 

Kazak oil and resource sectors. The transition has 

successfully boosted growth in mining and resource 

markets. For more, consult Andrew E. Kramer, 

‘‘Kazakhstan’s Currency Plunges’’, New York Times 

(August 20, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 

08/21/business/international/kazakhstanscurrency-plunges.html. 

Twelve projects primed for 

construction in the United States, 

encompassing seventeen new nuclear 

reactors, were canceled/postponed 

following the post-Fukushima upgrades 

mandated by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. The new NRC 

requirements, coupled with the 

resurgence in public opposition to 

nuclear power, have been deterrents to 

future construction. Intense competition 

from other energy generation methods, 

paired difficulties in securing financing, 

also increased costs of new construction 

(see Figure 21). The number of active 

nuclear power plants worldwide 

reached a low in 2014 of 435 operating 

reactors. Although the number of 

reactors has since increased to 453 in 

2018, the oversupply of uranium that 

remains in the market has continued to 

depress global prices. 

FIGURE 21: CANCELLED NUCLEAR PROJECTS SINCE 2009 

Facility name Location 

Projected 

generation 

capacity 

(MW) 

Date of 

cancellation Reason for cancellation 

Bellefonte 2–4 ................................ Hollywood, AL ........ 3,435 August 2009 .. Unfavorable market conditions. 

Victoria County Station .................. Victoria, TX ............ 3,070 August 2012 .. Unfavorable market conditions, competition from 

natural gas. 

Shearon Harris 2–3 ........................ New Hill, NC .......... 2,017 May 2013 ....... Regulatory concerns, unfavorable market conditions. 

Comanche Peak 3–4 ..................... Glen Rose, TX ....... 3,400 November 

2013.

Delay in reactor design review. 

Nine Mile Point 3 ............................ Scriba, NY .............. 1,600 November 

2013.

Unfavorable market conditions. 

Calvert Cliffs 3 ................................ Lusby, MD ............. 1,600 July 2015 ....... Unfavorable market conditions, inability to secure financing. 

Callaway 2 ...................................... Steedman, MO ...... 1,600 August 2015 .. Regulatory concerns, unfavorable market conditions. 

Grand Gulf 3 .................................. Port Gibson, MS .... 1,520 September 

2015.

Unfavorable market conditions. 

River Bend 3 .................................. St. Francisville, LA 1,520 December 

2015.

Unfavorable market conditions. 

Bell Bend 1 ..................................... Salem Twp., PA ..... 1,600 August 2016 .. Suspension of reactor design certification. 

Bellefonte 1 .................................... Hollywood, AL ........ 1,100 May 2016 ....... Unfavorable market conditions. 

V.C. Sumner 2–3 ........................... Jenkinsville, SC ..... 2,500 July 2017 ....... Unfavorable market conditions, cost overruns. 

Levy County Nuclear Power Plant Levy County, FL .... 2,234 August 2017 .. Unfavorable market conditions, public opposition. 

Source: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

D. The Effect of State-Owned 

Enterprises on Global Uranium Supply 

The business practices of state-owned 

enterprises (SOEs) cause significant 

challenges for U.S. uranium producers. 

SOEs are insulated from market 

pressures in which the U.S. and other 

market producers, namely those in 

Australia and Canada, must contend. 

Specifically, a steep drop in uranium 

spot market prices can adversely affect 

miners’ ability to cover their operating 

costs. In contrast, SOEs often produce 

uranium regardless of price because 

state support enables SOEs to make 

business decisions insensitive to market 

conditions. For example, although 

global uranium production declined by 

six percent between 2012 and 2014, 

Kazakhstan’s production of uranium 

increased by seven percent over the 

same time period.68 In Kazakhstan’s 

case, state support includes statefinanced exploration services 69 and 

employee training, as well as currency 

devaluation to artificially depress prices 

of all exports, including uranium.70

State-owned suppliers dominate the list 

of leading global uranium producers 

(see Figure 22). 

FIGURE 22: LEADING GLOBAL URANIUM PRODUCERS

Company Ownership 

Uranium 

production 

(in tons of MT) 

Global 

market 

share 

(%) 

KazAtomProm ............................................................... Kazakhstan ................................................................... 12,093 20 

Cameco ........................................................................ Private ........................................................................... 9,155 15 

Orano ............................................................................ France ........................................................................... 8,031 13 

Uranium One ................................................................ Russia ........................................................................... 5,102 9 

CNNC & CGN ............................................................... China ............................................................................ 3,897 7 

ARMZ ............................................................................ Russia ........................................................................... 2,917 5 

Rio Tinto ....................................................................... Private ........................................................................... 2,558 4 

Navoi ............................................................................. Uzbekistan .................................................................... 2,404 4 

BHP Billiton ................................................................... Private ........................................................................... 2,381 4 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41563 

71Russia has recently finished construction of 

Iran’s only operating nuclear reactor at Bushehr, 

and Rosatom is the sole fuel supplier for the plant. 

Rosatom is also actively constructing the Akkuyu 

nuclear plant in Turkey, and is pursuing projects in 

Finland, Hungary, Bangladesh, Egypt and Belarus. 

http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/ 

current-and-future-generation/plans-for-newreactors-worldwide.aspx. 

72 ‘‘Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A 

Primer.’’ Congressional Research Service. (January 

15, 2019). https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/ 

RS22937.pdf. 

73Ernest J. Moniz, ‘‘The National Security 

Imperative for U.S. Civilian Nuclear Energy Policy’’, 

Energy Futures Initiative (July 12, 2017), https://

energyfuturesinitiative.org/news/2017/7/12/monizthe-national-security-imperative-for-us-civiliannuclear-energy-policy. 

74 [TEXT REDACTED]. 

75Commerce Department Survey of U.S. Nuclear 

Power Generation Sector, 2019. 

FIGURE 22: LEADING GLOBAL URANIUM PRODUCERS—Continued 

Company Ownership 

Uranium 

production 

(in tons of MT) 

Global 

market 

share 

(%) 

Energy Asia .................................................................. Private ........................................................................... 2,218 4 

General Atomics/Quasar .............................................. Private ........................................................................... 1,556 3 

Sopamin ........................................................................ Niger ............................................................................. 1,118 2 

Paladin .......................................................................... Private ........................................................................... 970 2 

Italicized = State Ownership. 

Not Italicized = Private Ownership. 

Source: World Nuclear Association—World Uranium Mining Production, 2017. 

The leading global uranium producers 

account for about 92 percent of current 

world uranium production. Of these, 

SOEs in the former Soviet Union and 

China control about 45 percent of the 

global market. These companies are 

insulated from market and regulatory 

pressures experienced by market 

producers, placing U.S. uranium mines 

at a distinct disadvantage. 

Uranium-related SOEs, however, have 

broader roles than sales of uranium 

products. Many countries leverage their 

SOEs’ integration of the nuclear fuel 

cycle and nuclear power generation to 

further geopolitical ambitions. Rosatom, 

a Russian state-owned enterprise that 

participates in every step of the nuclear 

fuel cycle, including power generation, 

uses this leverage. With virtually 

complete control over the Russian 

nuclear industry, Rosatom can offer 

prices for nuclear plant construction 

and fuel services that are significantly 

below that of market-based suppliers. 

Generous financing packages, usually 

consisting of low-cost loans 

underwritten by the Russian 

government, also incentivize deals with 

Rosatom.71 China emulates Rosatom’s 

model of pairing subsidized nuclear 

construction with state-supported 

financing, as seen with its construction 

of reactors in Pakistan and Romania. 

Summaries of individual countries’ nonmarket economy nuclear activities are 

discussed more in Appendix I. 

Uranium-related SOEs also have a 

deleterious impact on U.S. 

nonproliferation objectives. U.S. exports 

of nuclear technologies and supplies, 

including uranium products, are 

generally governed by Section 123 

agreements.72 These agreements, which 

include peaceful use restrictions and 

other nonproliferation requirements, 

ensure that the U.S. nuclear industry 

can play a role in the global nuclear 

fuels trade without contributing to 

nuclear weapons development. 

However, if the U.S. uranium industry 

cannot compete with SOEs, particularly 

Russia and China, the U.S. contribution 

to global nuclear nonproliferation 

regimes will substantially diminish. As 

former Secretary of Energy Enest Moniz 

remarked in July 2017: 

‘‘A world in which Russia and China come 

to have dominant positions in the global 

nuclear supply chain will almost certainly 

see a weakening of requirements, just as 

nuclear technology and materials spread to 

many countries.’’ 73

U.S. utilities contract with uraniumrelated SOEs in Russia, Kazakhstan, 

Uzbekistan, and China primarily 

because of concerns with price and 

diversity of supply. These utilities 

believe that with the limited number of 

worldwide uranium producers, 

particularly in the conversion and 

enrichment stages, any additional 

competition is welcome. Most of the 24 

utility respondents indicated that price 

and reliability of delivery 

considerations were the chief drivers of 

their fuel procurement policies; only 

[TEXT REDACTED] alluded to 

geopolitical considerations as a 

significant factor. Domestic utilities’ 

desire to cut costs includes support for 

increased market penetration by China. 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

Utilities’ emphasis on diversity of 

supply also underpins their rationale for 

purchasing Russian uranium. [TEXT 

REDACTED] 74 Several utilities 

suggested that if current restrictions on 

Russian imports were eliminated, they 

would purchase more Russian 

material.75

France 

Respondents have also raised 

concerns about the activities of French 

state-owned enterprises. There are two 

principal French companies 

participating in the nuclear fuel cycle: 

Orano and Framatome. Orano, 

previously a part of Areva SA, is 

minority-owned by the French state and 

has direct ownership of uranium mines 

in Niger, Kazakhstan, and Canada. It 

also owns and operates all uranium 

enrichment and conversion facilities in 

France. Framatome, which is majority 

owned by the French government’s 

electric utility E ́ lectricite ́ de France, 

operates fuel fabrication and reactor 

construction businesses. 

U.S. producers acknowledge that state 

support gives Orano and Framatome a 

competitive edge over U.S. and other 

European firms. [TEXT REDACTED] 

expressed concerns that, if U.S. antidumping duties on French enriched 

uranium were lifted, Orano’s state 

backing would allow it to sell to utilities 

below-market cost. 

The U.S. International Trade 

Commission has previously concluded 

that French state-owned enterprises 

have undersold U.S. producers of 

enriched uranium (see Chapter VII). 

Unlike SOEs in Russia, Kazakhstan, 

Uzbekistan, and China, French nuclear 

entities are partially owned by private 

companies and are somewhat subject to 

market pressures. Furthermore, the 

French nuclear market is not closed off 

to the U.S. or other uranium producers, 

and U.S. companies reported sales to 

France between 2014 and 2018. In 

contrast, U.S. uranium producers cannot 

sell into the Russian or Chinese markets, 

as these countries are served only by 

their state-owned enterprises. 


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41564 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

76Nuclear Energy Agency & International Atomic 

Energy Agency. Uranium 2018—Resources, 

Production and Demand, 55. 2018. http://

www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2018/7413-uranium2018.pdf. 

77 Ibid. 

78 Ibid., 134. 

79 Ibid., 159. 

80 ‘‘Cameco: uranium prices too low to restart 

McArthur River mine operation.’’ MRO Magazine, 

August 3, 2019. https://www.mromagazine.com/ 

2018/08/03/cameco-uranium-prices-too-low-torestart-mcarthur-river-mine-operation/. 

81 ‘‘Australia’s Uranium Mines.’’ World Nuclear 

Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/ 

appendices/australia-s-uranium-mines.aspx. 82U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Nuclear Power Generator 

Survey, Question 9. 83U.S. Department of Energy. Tritium And 

Enriched Uranium Management Plan Through 

2060, iv. Report to Congress. (Washington DC: 2015) 

http://fissilematrials.org/library/doe15b.pdf. 84Agreement Between the Three Governments of 

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 

Ireland, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 

Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of 

the United States of America Regarding the 

Establishment, Construction and Operation of an 

Uranium Enrichment Installation in the United 

States, Washington, 24 July 1992, Treaty Series No 

133 (2000). 

85U.S. Department of Energy. Tritium And 

Enriched Uranium Management Plan Through 

2060. Report to Congress. (Washington DC: 2015) 

http://fissilematrials.org/library/doe15b.pdf. 

86February 2019 discussion between U.S. 

Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security 

Administration, Office of Major Modernization 

Programs and the U.S. Department of Commerce, 

Bureau of Industry and Security. 

E. Market Uranium Producers: Canada 

and Australia 

Market uranium producers in Canada 

and Australia have historically 

performed better than their U.S. 

counterparts. Between 2014 and 2016, 

Canada and Australia increased their 

production of uranium by 59 percent 

and 26 percent, respectively.76 In 2014, 

Canada opened the Cigar Lake mine and 

Australia opened the Four Mile mine,77

both increasing overall production 

numbers. 

These mines also exhibit positive 

geologic factors. Cigar Lake has an 

average ore grade of 14.5 percent 

uranium, one of the highest in the 

world. Higher ore grades require less 

processing to recover uranium from the 

ore, reducing overall production costs. 

Australia’s largest mine, Olympic Dam, 

is also a significant producer of copper, 

gold, and silver.78 Production of these 

commodities can therefore support 

continued uranium extraction even in 

the face of lower global spot prices. 

Despite these geologic advantages, 

Canadian and Australian producers are 

also subject to the same market 

pressures caused by SOEs’ 

overproduction. For example, McArthur 

River, estimated to have the world’s 

largest deposit of high-grade uranium,79

was idled in November 2017 by Cameco 

Resources due to poor economic 

conditions.80 Australian mines have 

also cut production in response to poor 

market conditions between 2016 and 

2018, most notably Olympic Dam cut 

production by eight percent and the 

Ranger mine by 10 percent.81 As a 

result, between 2014 and 2018, 24.2 

percent of uranium concentrate 

provided by Australian and Canadian 

companies to U.S. nuclear power 

generators came from Kazakhstan and 

Uzbekistan.82

Like their U.S. counterparts, Canadian 

and Australian producers cannot 

produce without regard for spot market 

price. SOEs’ continued price-insensitive 

production therefore threatens all 

market uranium producers, including 

the U.S., Canada, and Australia. 

VII. Findings 

A. Uranium Is Important to U.S. 

National Security 

As discussed in Part II, ‘‘national 

security’’ under Section 232 includes 

both (1) national defense and (2) critical 

infrastructure needs. 

1. Uranium Is Needed for National 

Defense Systems 

An assured supply of U.S.-origin 

uranium is critical to national defense 

for the purpose of nuclear weapons and 

the naval fleet. Nuclear reactors provide 

propulsion and electricity for key 

elements of the nation’s naval fleet: 11 

aircraft carriers and 70 submarines. 

Uranium is also vital for producing 

tritium, a radioactive gas used in U.S. 

nuclear weapons. 

Many international nuclear 

cooperation agreements to which the 

United States is a party, including 

Section 123 agreements on civil nuclear 

cooperation, restrict the use of nuclear 

material imported under those 

agreements to peaceful uses. The United 

States requires U.S.-origin uranium and 

nuclear technologies for use in the 

production of uranium-based products 

for U.S. defense systems, with no 

foreign obligations that restrict the uses 

of such nuclear material.83 At this time, 

there is only one functional enrichment 

facility in the United States. Located in 

Eunice, New Mexico and operated by 

the British-German-Dutch consortium 

URENCO, this enrichment facility may 

only enrich uranium for civil purposes; 

the material it produces may not be 

used for U.S. nuclear weapons or naval 

reactors.84

However, the U.S. has three defense 

systems that require highly-enriched 

uranium (HEU) (see Figure 23). The 

Department of Energy currently meets 

requirements for HEU by drawing on its 

stockpile. DOE also satisfies its ongoing 

need for HEU by recycling components 

from retired nuclear weapons. DOE is 

estimated to have approximately 575 

tons of HEU and 80.8 tons of plutonium. 

Russia, in contrast, has an estimated 679 

tons of HEU and 128 tons of 

plutonium.85

Furthermore, U.S.-origin uranium 

with no foreign obligation is required 

for the manufacture of tritium for 

defense purposes (see Figure 24). 

Tritium, a hydrogen isotope, is used in 

nuclear warheads to boost explosive 

yield. Tritium must be continually 

replenished in warheads because it has 

a short half-life of 12.3 years, decaying 

at a rate of 5.5 percent per year. The 

Department of Energy has an 

Interagency Agreement with the 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for 

production of tritium using the TVA’s 

Watts Bar 1 commercial power reactor. 

TVA’s Watts Bar 2 commercial power 

reactor will soon be used for tritium 

production as well.86

FIGURE 23: DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S.-ORIGIN URANIUM-BASED PRODUCTS

Submarines (70)—HEU 

Fuel.

Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carriers (11)—HEU Fuel .......... Tritium Nuclear Weapons 3,800 +/¥ *. 

* Includes 1,700 warheads on missiles and strategic bombers; 2,100 warheads in reserve; 150 warheads in Europe. An additional 2,500 warheads are slated for dismantlement. 

Sources: U.S. Navy, International Panel on Fissile Materials (www.fissilematerials.org). 

See Appendix J for entire chart. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41565 

87Low-enriched uranium (LEU) is uranium 

enriched to less than 20% U–235. (Uranium used 

in power reactors is usually 3.5–5.0% U–235). 

High-enriched uranium (HEU) is uranium enriched 

to 20% U–235 or more. (Uranium used in weapons 

is about 90% enriched U–235.) 88For the purposes of this 232 investigation, 

downblending is the reduction of uranium 

enrichment levels to less than 20 percent, a low 

enriched uranium (LEU), which cannot be used in 

weapons, but is suitable for use as fuel in nuclear 

power plants and naval nuclear reactors. 89U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Should Clarify Long-Term 

Uranium Enrichment Mission needs and Improve 

Technology Cost Estimates, Report to Congressional 

Committees. 14. [GAO–18–126], February 2018. 

https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-126. 90High assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU)— 

Low-enriched U–235 uranium product that has 

enrichment levels higher than the 3.5–5%. HALEU 

U–235 uranium product can have enrichment levels 

approaching 20%, depending on the application. 91U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear 

Security Administration, Office of Major 

Modernization Programs, February 2019 discussion 

with the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security. 

92 ‘‘Estimate of Global HEU Inventories as of 

January 2017.’’ International Panel on Fissile 

Materials. http://fissilematerials.org. 

93 In 2005, the U.S. Department of Energy set up 

the American Assured Fuel Supply (formerly 

Reliable Fuel Supply) with $49.5 million in funding 

from Congress. This entity supports the 

International Atomic Energy Agency’s International 

Fuel Bank initiative—a back-up source of uranium 

for global supply disruptions. 

94U.S. Department of Energy. Notice of 

Availability: American Assured Fuel Supply, 

Federal Register 76 no. 160, August 18, 2011, 

51358. 

95U.S. Department of Energy. National Nuclear 

Security Administration. Report to Congress: Fiscal 

Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management 

Plan—Biennial Plan Summary. (Washington, DC: 

2018). https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/ 

2018/10/f57/FY2019%20SSMP.pdf. 

96For this report, micro-reactors are defined as 

reactors generating no more than 50 megawatts 

(MWe) Section 327, John S. McCain National 

Defense Authorization Act 2019 (Pub. L. 115–233), 

https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/ 

house-bill/5515/text?format=txt. 

97 Defense Science Board. Department of Defense. 

‘‘Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force 

on DoD Energy Strategy, More Fight—Less Fuel,’’ 2. 

(Washington, DC: 2008). https://www.acq.osd.mil/ 

dsb/reports/2000s/ADA477619.pdf. 

98 Ibid. 

FIGURE 24: URANIUM REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. NATIONAL DEFENSE

Material Defense application Other application 

Natural Uranium (NU) ..... Enrichment ......................................................................... Materials Research Reactors. 

Low Enriched Uranium 

(LEU).

Tritium Production for Nuclear Weapons .......................... Medical Isotope Production. 

Highly Enriched Uranium Reactor Fuel for Aircraft Carriers and Submarines ........... U.S. High Performance Research Reactors. 

Depleted Uranium U–235 Munitions—Kinetic Energy Penetrators ............................. Mixed-Oxide Reactor Fuel. 

Munitions—Armor .............................................................. Triuranium Octoxide (U3O8). 

Radiation Shielding ............................................................ Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6). 

Targets for Pu–239 Production .......................................... Aircraft Parts. 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security; U.S. Department of Energy, February 2019. 

Low-enriched uranium (LEU) 87 is 

used to produce tritium and to supply 

fuel to U.S. research reactors. DOE 

meets some of its internal demands for 

LEU by downblending HEU into LEU.88

DOE uses a bartering program of 

uranium derived from HEU as payment 

for services to defray cleanup costs at 

the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant 

in Piketon, Ohio.89 The downblending 

practice also provides high assay lowenriched uranium (HALEU),90 which is 

used in research reactors and medical 

isotope production reactors. 

Lastly, DOE’s downblending program 

for production of LEU fuel used in TVA 

reactors requires a supply of natural 

uranium trioxide (UO3) to be used as a 

diluent in the downblending process. 

As of 2019, there is no U.S. production 

of UO3; consequently, TVA has to 

import it from Canada and swaps 

unobligated flags from DOE stocks of 

natural uranium in other physical 

forms. DOE does not maintain a 

stockpile of unprocessed uranium of 

any type. Furthermore, the stockpile of 

HEU allocated to production of HALEU 

is expected to be depleted by 2060 91

and DOE’s supply of LEU will be 

exhausted around 2041. The 

Department anticipates that its HEU 

stockpile, at current projected rates of 

consumption for naval reactor 

operations, will be depleted between 

2050 and 2059.92

The National Nuclear Security 

Administration maintains the American 

Assured Fuel Supply (AFS), which is a 

stock of low-enriched uranium for use 

by U.S. and foreign utilities during a 

serious fuel supply disruption.93 The 

AFS contains 230 tons of LEU that was 

downblended from DOE’s HEU 

stockpile.94 This stock is not available 

for use by DOE/NNSA. Only civilian 

nuclear power plant operators may use 

the AFS. 

U.S. national security relies on 

credible nuclear deterrence. A shortage 

of HEU to fuel aircraft carriers and 

submarines and LEU to support tritium 

production would undermine U.S. 

defense operations and readiness. 

Likewise, an inability to supply HALEU 

to research reactors and medical isotope 

manufacturers would be detrimental to 

several critical infrastructure sectors.95

The supply of U.S.-mined uranium will 

be critical as a feedstock for producing 

LEU and HEU in an enrichment facility 

that is planned to serve national defense 

needs. Without economically viable 

uranium mining operations in the 

United States, the enrichment of nuclear 

materials for DOE defense missions will 

not be possible under present law and 

policies. Defense needs for uranium are 

not enough to financially sustain the 

U.S. front-end uranium industry. 

Future Defense Needs: Microreactors 

DoD is pursuing the deployment of 

small modular reactors and 

microreactors that will require HALEU 

fuel as early as 2027. DoD microreactors 

may require fuel that is free from 

peaceful use restrictions, including the 

peaceful use restrictions that are 

generally applied by foreign suppliers of 

nuclear material to the United States. 

The 2019 National Defense 

Authorization Act requires the Secretary 

of Defense to issue requirements for a 

pilot program to design, test, and 

operate micro-reactors by December 31, 

2027.96

DoD’s need for microreactors stems 

from its facilities’ reliance on 

commercial electric power. At present, 

DoD installations consume 21 percent of 

total federal energy consumption in the 

United States, at a cost of approximately 

$3.7 billion per year. Fifty-three percent 

of all energy consumed by DoD is 

delivered as electricity, 99 percent of 

which is provided via the commercial 

grid.97

In the event of a power outage, many 

DoD installations have only diesel 

generators and a limited supply of onsite diesel fuel. An extended grid failure 

could severely limit DoD’s ability to 

carry out domestic and foreign 

operations.98 Microreactors would be 

expected to operate 24 hours per day 

without disruption and do not require 

frequent refueling. DoD installations 

could therefore continue normal 

operations in the event of an extended 

commercial grid disruption. 


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41566 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

99Roadmap for the Deployment of Micro-Reactors 

for U.S. Department of Defense Domestic 

Installations.’’ Nuclear Energy Institute. October 4, 

2018. https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/ 

filefolder/resources/reports-and-briefs/Road-mapmicro-reactors-department-defense-201810.pdf. 

100 ‘‘Report to Congress on the Annual LongRange Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for 

Fiscal Year 2020.’’ Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations. March 2019. https://

www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/20pres/ 

PB20%2030-year%20Shipbuilding

%20Plan%20Final.pdf. 101S9G Nuclear Reactors: http://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/non-power-nuclearapplications/transport/nuclear-powered-ships.aspx. 102U.S. White House. Office of the Press 

Secretary. Critical Infrastructure Security and 

Resilience. Presidential Policy Directive 21. 

(Washington, DC: 2013) https://

obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/ 

2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-criticalinfrastructure-security-and-resil. 

103 Ibid. 

104 Ibid. 

DoD aims to deploy microreactors in 

2027, or shortly thereafter. This timeline 

assumes that there are no major 

technical hurdles to overcome. In 

addition, there are environmental and 

reactor siting reviews to address. Should 

microreactors become viable on a 

commercial scale, large-scale adoption 

of microreactors will require significant 

amounts of HALEU. DoD currently can 

only supply its HALEU needs through 

DOE’s downblending of highly-enriched 

uranium, the supply of which is 

limited.99 Future deployment of microreactors for defense purposes will 

increase national defense requirements 

for uranium and emphasizes the need 

for a viable U.S. commercial uranium 

industry. 

A healthy U.S. commercial uranium 

industry is essential for defense needs. 

As DoD does not anticipate requiring 

newly-mined uranium for some years, it 

is impractical to suggest that a privatelyowned mine could afford to operate on 

standby awaiting future DoD purchases. 

DoD analysts have noted that it ‘‘can be 

difficult to reconstitute a material 

capability if all expertise and market 

share is lost,’’ as most recently seen 

with U.S. rare earth mineral producers. 

U.S. uranium producers must be able to 

attract sufficient commercial (i.e. 

nuclear power generator) business in the 

present market to ensure their 

availability for defense requirements in 

the future. 

Future Defense Needs: Proposed 

Nuclear Submarine Production 

The Department of the Navy recently 

submitted its Fiscal Year 2020 

President’s Budget, recommending the 

construction of 55 new battle force ships 

over the next five years.100 Fourteen of 

these are nuclear-powered: Eleven 

Virginia-class submarines, two 

Columbia-class submarines, and one 

Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier. 

The Virginia-class and Columbia-class 

submarines both house reactors which 

contain enough fuel to last the life of the 

ship, roughly 33 and 40 years 

respectively, unlike previous models 

which required refueling and 

overhaul.101 The Ford-class aircraft 

carrier requires refueling, but at a 

significantly lower rate than the Nimitzclass aircraft carriers it will replace. 

DOE’s current projection of HEU 

stockpile consumption for naval 

reactors does not take into account the 

addition of these 14 new nuclearpowered vessels. If these vessels are 

built, the total naval demand for HEU 

fuel will increase beyond what NNSA 

has anticipated, thus accelerating the 

date by which the HEU stockpile will be 

depleted. 

The Role of National Security in 

Nuclear Regulation 

Since Congress passed the Atomic 

Energy Act in 1946, all legislation 

governing the nation’s uranium and 

nuclear power generation industries has 

been written with an emphasis on 

national security functions. As 

envisioned by Congress, regulation of 

the U.S. uranium and nuclear power 

generation industries is to be conducted 

in support of national security 

objectives. Consequently, Congress has 

empowered federal agencies to 

intervene in support of continued 

domestic U.S. uranium production 

capacity on several occasions. A brief 

history of this legislation can be found 

in Appendix H. 

2. Uranium Is Required for Critical 

Infrastructure 

Uranium is also required to satisfy 

requirements associated with the 16 

critical infrastructure sectors identified 

by the U.S. Government in the 2013 

Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD– 

21) 102 (see Figure 25). Critical 

infrastructure, as defined by PPD–21, 

provides the ‘‘essential services that 

underpin American society’’ and ‘‘are 

vital to public confidence and the 

Nation’s safety, prosperity, and wellbeing.’’ 103

FIGURE 25: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS

Chemical Commercial facilities Communications 

Critical Manufacturing ..................... Dams ...................................................................................................... Defense Industrial Base. 

Emergency Services ....................... Energy (Including Electric Power Grid) ................................................. Financial Services. 

Food and Agriculture ....................... Government Facilities ............................................................................ Healthcare and Public Health. 

Information Technology ................... Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste ............................................... Transportation Systems. 

Water and Wastewater Systems .... ................................................................................................................

Source: PPD–21; Department of Homeland Security. 

U.S. nuclear power generators are 

specifically included in the Nuclear 

Reactors, Materials, and Waste sector. 

Additionally, as U.S. nuclear power 

generators are integral to the nation’s 

commercial electric grid, they are also 

part of the Energy sector. PPD–21 

specifically notes that the Energy sector 

supports all other sectors because of its 

‘‘enabling function.’’ 104 Consequently, 

as all critical infrastructure sectors are 

dependent on reliable supplies of 

electricity, 19 percent of which is 

provided by the nation’s 98 nuclear 

reactors. Thus, uranium is needed to 

support all U.S. critical infrastructure 

sectors. 

Changing Electricity Generation Markets 

Affect U.S. Nuclear Generators 

One of the primary challenges to the 

viability of the U.S. uranium industry is 

the closure of U.S. nuclear power 

plants. The front-end U.S. uranium 

industry relies on nuclear power plant 

operators for approximately 98 percent 

of its business. Consequently, the 

uranium industry cannot survive 

without a healthy U.S. nuclear power 

generation sector. Between January 2013 

and September 2018, U.S. utilities 

retired seven reactors at six nuclear 

power facilities—a loss of more than 

5,000 megawatts (MW) of generation 

capacity. Another 12 reactors with a 

combined generation capacity of 11.7 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41567 

105 ‘‘America’s oldest operating nuclear power 

plant to retire on Monday.’’ U.S. Energy Information 

Administration. September 14, 2018. https://

www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37055. 106 ‘‘Advancing Past ‘‘Baseload’’ to a Flexible 

Grid- How Grid Planners and Power Markets Are 

Better Defining System Needs to Achieve a CostEffective and Reliable Supply Mix,’’ 1. The Brattle 

Group. June 26, 2017. http://files.brattle.com/ 

system/publications/pdfs/000/005/456/original/ 

advancing_past_baseload_to_a_flexible_

grid.pdf?1498246224. 

107Roughly defined, baseload generation capacity 

refers to generation capacity that can provide 

‘‘relatively low-cost electricity production to meet 

around-the-clock electricity loads’’. Ibid., 5. 

108The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

(FERC or the Commission) has recognized that there 

are deficiencies in the way the regulated wholesale 

power markets price power (‘‘price formation,’’ i.e., 

energy, capacity, and ancillary services) and has 

developed an extensive record on price formation 

in the Commission-approved ISOs and RTOs. 109 ‘‘Ensuring Resilient and Efficient Electricity 

Generation: The Value of the current diverse US 

power supply portfolio.’’ IHS Markit. April 2018. 

[hereinafter IHS Ensuring Resilient and Effective 

Electricity Generation]. 

110FERC acknowledges that that there are 

deficiencies in the way the regulated wholesale 

power markets price power (‘‘price formation,’’ i.e., 

energy, capacity, and ancillary services) and has 

developed an extensive record on price formation 

in the Commission-approved ISOs and RTOs. FERC 

‘‘Grid Resilience in Regional Transmission 

Organizations and Independent System Operators,’’ 

Docket No. AD18–7–000 (January 2018) 

111 ‘‘Long Term Reliability Assessment,’’ 12. 

North American Reliability Electric Reliability 

Corporation. December 2018. https://

www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/ 

Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_

2018_12202018.pdf. 

112 In 1990, the compound annual growth rate in 

demand for both summer and winter exceeded 2%. 

Ibid. 

gigawatts (GW) are scheduled to close 

within the next seven years.105

A majority of the current nuclear fleet 

was constructed in the 1970s and 1980s 

when large-scale bulk power generators, 

including nuclear plants, were 

considered the most cost-effective 

means of providing reliable electricity. 

Although these plants required 

significant capital expenditures for 

construction, low fuel and operating 

costs made them practical to operate on 

a near-constant basis.106 Energy 

planners particularly recognized that 

large scale plants were well equipped to 

provide baseload generation capacity.107

However, lower-than-projected 

electrical consumption growth rates, 

combined with aggressive energy 

conservation efforts, prevented many 

utilities from operating the baseload 

nuclear power plants at optimal levels. 

Distorted electricity markets caused by 

current FERC-approved market rules 

and increased adoption of renewable 

energy resources, such as solar and 

wind, which are subsidized through 

Federal and state tax incentives, are 

resulting in increased cost sensitivity 

within the nuclear power industry and 

premature retirements of nuclear power 

generation units.108

[TEXT REDACTED] In this decreased 

demand environment, wind generators 

were able to compete through the 

Production Tax Credit (PTC) that allows 

them to produce at negative cost. 

Nuclear generators, in contrast, 

generally do not receive similar 

subsidies. 

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In addition to renewables, the 

introduction of highly efficient turbine 

gas generators and the wide availability 

of low cost natural gas, has changed the 

competitive landscape. Ten survey 

respondents indicated that their nuclear 

facilities faced significant challenges to 

their viability from natural gas-fired 

generators. Under current wholesale 

electricity pricing mechanisms, natural 

gas-fired generators are able to sell their 

electricity to the grid at lower costs than 

nuclear operators. This is partially due 

to the intermittent nature of natural-gas 

fired generation; natural gas-fired 

generators can be activated and 

deactivated as needed, whereas nuclear 

power generators have less operational 

flexibility. Similarly, subsidized 

renewable sources, such as solar and 

wind, are intermittent operators (e.g., 

during daytime hours for solar, and 

favorable wind conditions for wind) and 

can be sold at a lower cost than 

constantly-running nuclear generators. 

These factors create a situation that 

substantially disadvantages nuclear 

power generators. A 2017 IHS Markit 

study observed that, ‘‘generating 

resources providing security of supply 

receive negative market-clearing prices 

because distorted market conditions 

drive rival subsidized suppliers to bid 

against each other to avoid the loss of 

output-based subsidy payments.’’ 109

FERC, recognizing challenges faced by 

nuclear and other baseload generators, 

opened a proceeding in January 2018 to 

examine the relationship between grid 

reliability and wholesale market 

rules.110 The proceeding will examine 

grid resilience pricing and consider how 

valuation deficiencies lead to premature 

retirements of fuel-secure generation, 

including nuclear. FERC, has not yet 

taken action to address the inequities of 

the markets that threaten the resilience 

of the Nation’s electricity system. 

Increased state energy efficiency 

standards and the predominance of the 

service sector in the economy, which 

does not consume as much energy as 

other sectors such as manufacturing, 

have slowed electricity demand growth. 

In 2017, the North American Electric 

Reliability Corporation (NERC) reported 

that the annual growth rate of peak 

demand reached record lows of 0.61 

percent in summer and 0.59 percent in 

winter.111 Slower growth in electricity 

demand places increased economic 

pressures on large-scale generators, 

including nuclear power plants.112

The increased presence of natural gasfired and renewable power plants in the 

nation’s electric generation grid does 

not obviate the need for nuclear power 

baseload generators. In fact, there is a 

continued role for nuclear power plants 

because they can provide a constant 


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41568 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

113 ‘‘Special Reliability Assessment: Potential 

Bulk Power System Impacts Due to Severe 

Disruptions on the Natural Gas System,’’ 10. North 

American Electric Reliability Corporation. 

November 2017. https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ 

ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_

SPOD_11142017_Final.pdf. 

114 Ibid. 

115Blake Sobczak, Hannah Northey, and Peter 

Behr, ‘‘Cyber raises threat against America’s energy 

backbone’’, E&E News (May 23, 2017), https://

www.eenews.net/stories/1060054924/. 

116 During extreme cold temperatures in January 

2018, Distrigas of Massachusetts had to import 

liquefied natural gas from Russia to address a gas 

shortage in the region. 

Chesto, Jon. ‘‘Russian LNG Is Unloaded in 

Everett; the Supplier (but Not Gas) Faces US 

Sanctions.’’ Boston Globe, January 30, 2018. https:// 

www.bostonglobe.com/business/2018/01/29/tankerunloads-lng-everett-terminal-that-contains-russiangas/rewj1wKjajaKtLp79irzTI/story.html. 

117 1989 Report, I–2. 

118 Id. III–10 and III–27. 

119 Ibid., V–4 to V–5. 

flow of electricity to the grid and do not 

require constant deliveries of fuel from 

external sources. Nuclear power plants 

can produce at near-full capacity when 

solar and wind generation facilities 

cannot produce electricity. 

Similarly, natural gas plants are 

reliant on ‘‘just-in-time’’ deliveries of 

natural gas, and natural gas storage 

capacity in the U.S. is severely limited 

in many regions.113 A North American 

Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 

report noted that only 27 percent of U.S. 

natural gas-fired generation capacity 

installed since 1997 is capable of dual 

fuel usage, which uses alternative fuel 

such as diesel to maintain generation.114

Natural gas pipelines are also vulnerable 

to cyberattack, which can disable 

pipeline operations and cut off gas 

supply.115

In contrast, nuclear generators are not 

subject to similar potential disruptions 

or energy storage limitations since they 

have long refueling cycles between 18 

and 24 months, and do not require 

constant fuel deliveries. These refueling 

operations are planned well in advance, 

allowing both plant and transmission 

system operators to make arrangements 

for alternative generation capacity. All 

survey respondents indicated that they 

could maintain normal generation 

operations even with a missed delivery 

of uranium concentrate, uranium 

hexafluoride, or enriched uranium. 

Respondents indicated that they 

maintain sufficient inventory of the 

above products and have layered 

contracts with multiple suppliers. Any 

single missed delivery could therefore 

be addressed with existing inventory. 

Respondents identified missed 

deliveries of fabricated fuel prior to a 

scheduled refueling as the greatest 

threat to continue operation. [TEXT 

REDACTED] 

Based on the nature of the nuclear 

supply chain, nuclear power generators 

are comparatively more resilient than 

other power generation sources that 

require constant fuel deliveries. As 

presented in Chapter VII, U.S. nuclear 

power generators can use U.S.-sourced 

uranium to meet their power needs, 

potentially avoiding situations where 

U.S. utilities would be reliant on lastminute imports of natural gas or other 

materials to address shortfalls.116

Leveraging the unique operational 

characteristics of nuclear power 

generators and the unused capacity of 

the U.S. uranium industry can ensure 

greater grid reliability. 

B. Imports of Uranium in Such 

Quantities as Are Presently Found 

Adversely Impact the Economic Welfare 

of the U.S. Uranium Industry 

1. U.S. Utilities’ Reliance on Imports of 

Uranium in 1989 

In September 1989, the Secretary 

completed a Section 232 investigation 

on the effect of uranium imports on the 

national security. The investigation, 

requested by the Secretary of Energy, 

determined that U.S. utilities imported 

a significant share of their uranium 

requirements. At the time, imports of 

uranium concentrate accounted for 

roughly 51 percent of domestic utility 

demand.117 The 1989 investigation also 

found that U.S. uranium producers 

faced strong foreign competition, 

particularly from the Soviet Union. It 

further reported that employment in the 

industry was steadily decreasing.118

[TEXT REDACTED] 119

Consequently, the Secretary 

concluded that uranium was not being 

imported into the United States under 

such quantities or circumstances that 

threatened to impair the national 

security. For more discussion of the 

1989 Section 232 investigation, refer to 

Appendix G. 

2. U.S. Utilities’ Reliance on Imports of 

Uranium Continue To Rise 

U.S. utilities’ reliance on foreign 

suppliers to meet their uranium product 

and service requirements have 

continued to increase since the 1989 

uranium 232 investigation. In 2018, U.S. 

nuclear utility operators relied on 

foreign suppliers for 93.3 percent of 

their uranium concentrate requirements, 

85.5 percent of their uranium 

hexafluoride requirements, and 97.6 

percent of their enriched uranium 

hexafluoride (UF6) requirements. As for 

uranium service requirements, U.S. 

nuclear utility operators relied on 

foreign suppliers for 42.3 percent of 

their conversion service requirements 

and 61.5 percent of their enrichment 

service requirements from 2014 to 2018 

(see Figure 27). 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–P 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41569 

120USITC Dataweb. 121USITC Dataweb. 

In 2018, U.S. imports of uranium 

products reached a 10-year low in terms 

of both total quantity and aggregate 

value. Imports peaked in both terms in 

2011, when 40 million pounds of 

uranium products were imported, at a 

total value of $5.3 billion USD.120

However, the Fukushima incident 

occurred in the same year, and both 

figures have since declined, reaching a 

total of just over 19 million pounds in 

2018 (a 52 percent decrease), for a 

combined value of $2.2 billion USD (a 

58 percent decrease) 121 (see Figures 28 

and 29). 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–P 


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Figure 27: Aggregated U.S. Utility Consumption of Uranium Products1 

2014-2018 

160,000 

140,000 

120,000 

~ 100,000 

::) 

.... 

0 

VI 

~ 80,000 

51 

5 

fE. 60,000 

20,000 

0 

Uranium 

Concentrate 

{lbsU308) 

U.S. utilities rely on foreign suppliers for: 

Uranium Concentrate- 92.7 percent 

Uranium Hexaflouride - 85.4 percent 

Enriched uranium Hexaflouride-97.6 percent 

Conversion Services - 57 .7 percent 

Enrichment Services• 62.1 percent 

Uranium Enriched Uranium conversion services Enrichment Services 

Hexafluoride (lbs Hexafluoride {Kgll) (KgU UF6) {Separative Work 

U308 equivalent) Units/SWU) 

• us ill Non-US 

Sotm:e: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of lndllStry and Serurll:y, Nuclear Power Operator Survey, Tab 9 20 Respondents 
41570 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–C 

The HTS codes that represent 

uranium products are broken out by 

materials that represent the different 

stages of the fuel cycle that uranium ore 

goes through to become a nuclear fuel 

assembly. The total composition of 2018 

imports of uranium products was 

comprised of a little over half (56.4 


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Figure 28: U.S. Imports of Uranium Products 

45.0 

15.0 

10.0 

2009 20!0 201 l 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 

i--(Jua,~tity (Millions LBS) 39.1 34.9 40.0 20.7 29.8 24.0 24;2 31.2 28.4 19.l 

--.. 

Source: US.ITC Dataweb Updated 3.18.2019, HTS Codes: 2612.10.00, 2844.10.20, 2844.20.00, 2844.10.10, 2844.1050, 2844.30.20, 284430.:50 

Figure 29: Value of U.S. Imports of Uranium Products 

$5,000 --

$4,000 ---

$3,000 ., .. 

$2,000 .. 

$1,000 

. r 1 : j -·--;-· -"~-- r i r 1 T -

YTO ; 

-

vro 1 

l~l~l~l~!~l~l~!~1~1~1 ~aji~I 

viti(M1l~sofU~~1$5,096t$~~08;~~·303l$4,3~:;-~3:879t~~-1~!$~~1~~19.7l~~22ls2,2~L.:.··"·j ;::--! ;;;J 

Source: USITC Dataweb Updated 3.18.2019, HTS Codes: 2612.10.00, 2844.10.20, 2844.20.00, 2844.10.10, 2844.10.50, 2844.30.20, 2844.30.50 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41571 

122 Department of Energy, Nuclear Security 

Administration, Nuclear Materials Management and 

Safeguard System. 

percent) of uranium compounds (oxide, 

hexafluoride, and other) and about onethird (29.5 percent) of enriched uranium 

(see Figure 30). Fuel assemblies are not 

listed in Figure 30 due to the fact that 

from 2014 to 2018, no fuel assemblies 

imported into the U.S. were for actual 

use by U.S. nuclear electric power 

operators. During this time period 

imported fuel assemblies where either 

test assemblies or products that were 

being returned to the original 

manufacture.122

3. High Import to Export Ratio 

U.S. imports of uranium products, 

which displace demand for domestic 

uranium and lower production at U.S. 

mines, reached 2.7 times the level of 

exports of U.S. uranium products in 

2013 (see Figure 31). In 2018, U.S. 

import levels were 2.2 times the level of 

exports of U.S. uranium products. 

Uranium production from state owned 

enterprises continues to depress world 

uranium spot prices, making it 

increasingly difficult for U.S. companies 

to export their uranium products. In 

2018, 98 percent of U.S. uranium 

exports were made up of ‘‘uranium 

compounds, uranium metal, and other 

forms of natural uranium,’’ 1.8 percent 

was ‘‘enriched uranium’’, and 0.2 

percent was ‘‘depleted uranium’’ (see 

Figure 32). 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–P 


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Figure 30: U.S. Imports of Uranium Products, 2018 

12,000,000 

10,000,000 

8,000,000 ------- 29.S0%of 

2018 Imports 

6,000,000 

14.04%of 

2018 Imports 

O.O~of 

2018 Imports 

0,00% of 0.04% of 

2018 !mpom 2018 lmp,rts 

0,S1%of 

2018 lqiorn 

zooo,ooo -1 ·· 

0 '. ' -~- ---,-.-----~-·., ' , 1 Uranium I Other Forms i i · ;_;_ Uranium Ore ) Compounds I of Natural l Uranium l Depleted l. · Enriched Uranium ·, · • j and ; (Oxide, M-§to! Uranium i Compounds l Uranlu.m j · Uranium ~ .. · · 1 Concentrates I Hexafluoride 1 I Other Than J_ (Depleted) ( (Other) 

l , and Other) i Compounds ' 

Io1s·i;;;;,m,1.SS>l 2.sa1,a21 i 10,1gai;g J s:sii:001 1 s::sn i · 29 · l 1jsi ; 9,747 .... J > _., •• ,_.,., •• ,._,,_,,,___.,.,~>,,,-,_ :,•,, "c•~--~-,•-~~--• c-", -,•~•" •"•,•••••"--•,•••,ww~••••,s,s '"", •','" Y, -,l,,~~,•-•-•••,••, , :•• ,,,,, s,•••v~ , · J, '"'• .-,-.,,,,,_,,,,~,•, ""''"'~J.-,. .,, •" ,","" , • ,~,--.,-.,.:•,, __ _._ •"~•• ."" ."''••"'"""~""• , l~-.••--••-,•,. •, --. •'•~•,,-

Sooo:e: USIK Dataweb Updat.ed 3 . .28.19,HTSCode:s: 2612.10.00, 2844.10.2.Q.2844.20.00, 2844.10.10, 2844.1050, 2844.30.20, 2844 . .30.50 
41572 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

123 1989 Report. III–12 to III–14 and III–26 to III– 

27. 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–C 

4. Uranium Prices 

The Department’s 1989 uranium 232 

investigation identified several trends 

responsible for the decline in global 

uranium prices, including increased 

production from lower-cost ore bodies 

in Canada, Australia, and South Africa; 

dumping of Russian, Kazakh, and Uzbek 

material on the global enriched uranium 

market; and cancellations of proposed 

reactors in the U.S. and other Western 

nations.123

Many of these trends persisted well 

after 1989, and following the dissolution 

of the Soviet Union, uranium sales from 

Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan 

continued to influence both the U.S. 

and global uranium markets. As detailed 

in the end of this section, the U.S. 

Government addressed the impact of 

these sales of subsidized uranium 

through anti-dumping investigations 

and the imposition of suspension 

agreements. 


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Figure 31: U.S. Imports and Exports of Uranium Products 

45,000 

35,000 

30,000 

.; 

~ 25,000 ... 

11 

.. 20,000 -g 

~ 

! 15,000 

5,000 

' 2009 ! 2010 2011 2012 ; 2013 ' 2014 . 2015 . 2016 , . . 2017 . . ' 2018 ! 

!-lmpms(lluJUSandsofl.BSJl 39,074 i _·34_,9_10_.,___40 2

_0 '..~~-;-,·---201

.

6

_'.~~-----!,. ___ 291

,,0 •• ~568 ',, :40

,~58 i .2

2

~•:',!---:,•:. i;;,.;;,.Eliports{Tl1<Jumndsofi.Bs): 20,659 1 16,134 ~-J . ,....., , • ,.. .. -

31,171 i _, 28,390 ___ __!, 19,148 ! 

12,580 ! U,098 ' ... 8,892 ---- i 

Source: Global Trade Atlas Update<l4.12.2019, HTSCodes: 2612.10. 2844.10, 2844.20, 2844.30.20, and 2844.30.50 

Figure 32: U.S. Exports of Uranium Products, 2018 

6000000 -••·••'•-·-,.s'<"''" ····e····•··· '"""''""''"''""''"""-· 

~ .. so·. 5000000 ... _ .... ,,. ..... _,, ... 

... 4000000 -•---.• ..... -· '""· ----·.-·. '"'· ., . --

II ;·········--··--•-... ~--

Uranium Ore and~ 

Source; USITC 0ataweb Updated 3.28.19, HTS Codes: 2612.10.00, 2844.10.20, 2844.20.00. 2844.10.10, 2844.1050, 2844.30.20 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41573 

124 ‘‘Megatons to Megawatts program will 

conclude at the end of 2013.’’ U.S. Energy 

Information Administration. (Washington, DC: 

2013). https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 

detail.php?id=13091. 

125 ‘‘Nuclear Power in the USA.’’ World Nuclear 

Association. http://world-nuclear.org/informationlibrary/country-profiles/countries-t-z/usa-nuclearpower.aspx. 

126Rascoe, Ayesha. ‘‘U.S. Approves First New 

Nuclear Plant in a Generation.’’ Reuters, February 

9, 2012. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usanuclear-nrc/u-s-approves-first-new-nuclear-plantin-a-generation-idUSTRE8182J720120209. 

At the same time, other imports from 

the former Soviet Union continued to 

depress uranium prices. Under the 1993 

Megatons to Megawatts program 124

(officially the ‘‘Agreement Between the 

Government of the United States of 

America and the Government of the 

Russian Federation Concerning the 

Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium 

Purchase Agreement’’), the U.S. and 

Russian governments agreed to the 

conversion of 500 metric tons of HEU 

from dismantled ex-Soviet nuclear 

weapons into LEU, which was 

ultimately sold to U.S. utilities. Between 

1993 and 2013, this program resulted in 

the introduction of 14,000 metric tons of 

LEU into the U.S. nuclear fuel market, 

directly competing with U.S. uranium 

production. 

Demand in the United States for 

nuclear power also stagnated after 1989. 

The Tennessee Valley Authority’s Watts 

Bar 1, which came online in 1996, was 

the only nuclear reactor completed in 

the United States between 1989 and 

2016. Between 1989 and 2000, nine 

reactors were decommissioned and no 

new reactors were authorized. Lack of 

domestic demand, spurred in part by 

competition from other generation 

sources and public opposition to new 

nuclear power projects after the Three 

Mile Island and Chernobyl incidents, 

were factors that contributed to low 

uranium prices during this period. By 

November 2000, uranium spot market 

prices had fallen to $7.13 per pound; a 

56 percent decrease from the July 1996 

high of $16.50 and a 39 percent decrease 

from the January 1989 price of $11.60. 

Uranium prices then began to climb 

beginning in fall 2001, and by 

November 2001, the spot price reached 

$9.43. The price then climbed 

exponentially thereafter, reaching 

$13.18 in November 2003, $33.55 in 

November 2005, and a record $136.22 in 

June 2007—a 1,810 percent increase on 

the November 2000 price. The principal 

driver of this price increase was a trend 

widely referred to as the ‘‘nuclear 

renaissance,’’ which anticipated the 

construction of dozens of reactors 

worldwide. 

Influenced, in part, by increasing oil 

and natural gas prices, as well as, public 

concern about carbon emissions, many 

Western governments adopted policies 

intended to promote the construction of 

new nuclear power generators. In the 

United States, the Energy Policy Act of 

2005 provided financial incentives for 

the construction of new nuclear plants, 

including a production tax credit and 

guarantees for construction loans.125

U.S. utilities took advantage of these 

policy changes and applied for 

construction and operating licenses for 

25 new reactors between 2007 and 

2009.126

Most of these reactors, however, were 

not built. As discussed earlier, the 

March 2011 Fukushima incident 

prompted a groundswell of public 

opposition to new nuclear power 

generation. Additionally, competition 

from low-cost gas fired turbine 

generators made plans for many nuclear 

plants economically unfeasible. Of the 

25 reactor applications submitted 

between 2007 and 2009, only three will 

be completed by 2022. The remaining 

reactor plans were cancelled due to a 

variety of factors, including public 

reaction to the Fukushima incident and 

falling electricity prices. 

The Fukushima incident and 

subsequent cancellation of proposed 

new reactors created a global uranium 

oversupply. The uranium spot market 

price fell from $63.50 in March 2011 to 

$42.28 by March 2013. By March 2017, 

the price had fallen to $24.55—a 61 

percent decline from the March 2011 

price (see Figure 33). 


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; 

I 

::::, 

Hislorie High 

Jun2007 

140.oo .u~~---

12(t00 

100 .. 00 

80.00 

60.00 

40.00 

20.00 

crno 

2007 

Figure 33: Spot Market Price of Uranium, 2007- Present 

Uranium Spot Prices 

2013 

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. I.Duis, Economic Research Division and lntt;mational Monetary Fund 

2019 
41574 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

127 ‘‘Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan.’’ 

World Nuclear Association. http://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/ 

countries-g-n/kazakhstan.aspx. 

128 ‘‘Uranium Production Figures, 2008–2017.’’ 

World Nuclear Association. http://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/ 

uranium-production-figures.aspx. 

In the years following the Fukushima 

incident, U.S. uranium producers closed 

or idled 22 facilities, including mining, 

milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel 

fabrication, and R&D operations. As U.S. 

uranium producers ceased production 

due to poor market conditions, stateowned uranium enterprises increased 

output. According to available data, 

Kazakh and Chinese output had strong 

increases during the 2011 to 2016 

period, even when global spot market 

prices were decreasing post-Fukushima 

incident (see Figure 34). 

Between 2011 and 2016, Kazakhstan’s 

uranium production increased by 26 

percent.127 Similarly, China increased 

domestic uranium production by 83 

percent during the same period.128

These increases in production during a 

61 percent decline in global uranium 

spot market prices further increased 

imports into the U.S., and highlights the 

ability of state-owned uranium 

enterprises to distort markets and 

disadvantage U.S. producers. 

5. Declining Employment Trends 

Employment in the U.S. front-end 

uranium industry has experienced 

steady declines over the surveyed years 

of 2014 to 2018. Data regarding 

employment in 2009 was collected in 

order to observe the levels of 

employment pre-Fukushima and postFukushima. As anticipated, between 

2009 and 2018, miners, millers, 

converters, and enrichers experienced 

drastic decreases in workforce numbers. 

Overall employment in the front-end 

uranium industry declined by 45.8 

percent over this period (see Figure 35). 


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I Figure 34: Foreign Production and Uranium Spot Market Price, 2011- 2016 I 

.... 

.... 

0 

N 

E 

0 

... -C 

0 

~ ::J 

'CJ 

0 

... 

0. 

C 

GI 

'11 

l'IJ 

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... 

u 

.E 

+100% ", .. / 

+75% 

+$0% 

+25% 

+0% 

2011 2012 

-Kazakh Production 

(left axis) 

2013 2014 

-Chinese Production 

(left axis) 

Source: World Nuclear Association; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Low 

2015 2016 

-uranium Spot Price 

{right axis) 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41575 

129 1989 Report. III–10. 

U.S. Front-End Uranium Industry 

Employment 

For uranium miners, the decline in 

employment has been evident since the 

1989 uranium 232 investigation. Indeed, 

the peak of uranium mining 

employment was 21,951 workers in 

1979, but by 1989, employment had 

fallen 91 percent to just 2,002 

workers.129 Survey data shows that 

employment has further decreased since 

the 1989 uranium 232 investigation and 

steadily declined by 54.6 percent 

between 2009 and 2018, with further 

declines projected for 2019 (see Figure 

36). 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–P 


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Figure 35: U.S. Uranium Industry Employment, Front-End, 2009 and 2014-2018 

12,000 

!!l 10,000 V 

... 

.e 8,000 ;),I': 

,_ 

0 

:?; 6,000 ,ii 

..,, 

{?. 4,000 

2,000 

0 

2009 

U.S. uranium industry employment has 

declined by 45.8% since 2009 

2014 2015 2016 

6,424 5,647 

2017 2018 

NOTE: 2009 included to show realistic levels of employment pre-Fukushima; indm:les miners, millers_, converters, emichers, and fuel 

fabricators. 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of lndustiy and Security, Front-End Survey, Tab 10 32 respondents 
41576 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

130 [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Events in the nuclear electric utility 

sector over the past 40 years have 

adversely affected uranium mining 

industry employment levels. Notably, 

the 1979 Three Mile Island accident and 

the 2011 Fukushima incident prompted 

significant downturns in the industry 

and caused steep declines in mining 

employment. 

Mining employment is also affected 

by spot market prices. High spot market 

prices correspond with higher 

employment, while lower prices cause 

mines to idle and increased 

unemployment. The combined 

repercussions of the Fukushima 

incident and low spot market prices can 

be seen in the U.S. front-end uranium 

industry, as companies continue to cut 

workforce numbers and idle production. 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 130


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Figure 36: U.S. Uranium Miners and Millers, Industry Employment 

1000 

876 

900 

800 VI 

(II 

(II 700 

~ 0. 600 

e 

LI.I 

.... 500 

0 

... 

(II 400 

.Q 

E 

:::, 300 

z 

200 

100 

0 

2009 2014 2015 2016 2017 

-Aggregate Uranium Mining Industry Employment 

NOTE: 2009 included to show realistic levels of employment pre-Fukushima 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, FronHnd Survev, Tab 10 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

fTEXT REDACTEDl 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

2018 2019 

(Projected) 

20 Respondents 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41577 

Fuel fabricators have seen a 19.8 

percent decrease in workforce numbers 

since 2009. This moderate decrease is 

expected, as the vast majority of 

fabrication of fuel assemblies is still 

produced domestically due to the highly 

engineered nature of the final products. 

Decreases in domestic demand and poor 

market conditions have affected 

domestic fuel fabricators, and workforce 

cuts were made in response to financial 

difficulties and reported bankruptcies 

(see Figure 39). 

The substantial decreases observed in 

the front-end domestic uranium 

industry can have adverse effects on 

competitiveness and long-term 

production in the industry. The entirety 

of the front-end uranium industry 


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[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

rTEXT REDACTEDl 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

' Figure 39: U.S. Uranium Fabricators, Industry Employment 

4500 

3950 

.4000 . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . ... . . . . . . . .. . .. .... · .. • • • •<>>• oc.. . r "·••·• 

i 3500 ··• ·· •• ~,. • 3041 ·• · ''3018 · · I011" · • 9142· at&~ " 

~ 3000 · "· ·' .,. .. , .. ,.,. ...... __ .,, .. · •·· ... ., ......... , ... " I l 

-a. 

s 2soo 

I.U 

'o 2000 ,,, .... c., .. ,:.,. ... _:_• ..... ,; .. : •• ·:::..:.·_···-·'·'-====:::=·;,::, .. ;;;;;.. ............................................... , ....... ,, .. ,., ..... ,., .. , ............ ,. ....... . t rt 1500 

::, 

z 1000 

.. SOO 

0 

2009 

A 19.8 percent drop 

from 2009-2019 

2014 2015 2016 

NOT£:. 2009 lnduded ft> show reallstfe levels of employment pre-Fukushima 

2017 

Source: u.s. Department of Comme~. Bureau oftndust,vand ~. Front-End SuMv, Tab 10 

2018 2019 

(Projected) 

4Re~ts 
41578 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

requires a specialized workforce which 

consists of a wide range of expertise and 

education levels. Some skillsets within 

the industry are transferable to other 

applications. However, an aging 

workforce can mean the loss of 

knowledge and skillsets specific to the 

uranium industry as workers continue 

to transfer industries and retire. 

According to the Department’s 2019 

survey data, the average age of 

specialized workers in the front-end 

industry is roughly 50 years old. Should 

workforce numbers continue to 

decrease, specialized workers will 

become increasingly difficult to hire or 

re-hire in the event of a market upswing 

due to both retirement and competition 

from other industries. Department 

survey data indicates various difficulties 

in hiring and retaining workers in the 

front-end uranium industry (see Figure 

40). 

Front-end uranium companies may be 

able to fill vacancies should production 

resume or increase, but difficulties in 

obtaining skilled employees will take 

time and investment. A lack of available 

skilled employees will require training 

new hires, thus adding additional costs. 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

Efforts to recruit personnel are also 

complicated by the remote location of 

many uranium mines. Over half of the 

mining/milling respondents indicated 

that their facilities’ rural location 

imposed a significant barrier to 

recruitment and retention. [TEXT 

REDACTED] 

In the event of a major production 

increase, current employment levels and 

the trending decline in employment in 

all industries associated with the frontend uranium industry indicate that 

production needs would not be met by 

the current workforce, and significant 

additional hiring would be required (see 

Figure 41). 


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Figure 40: Difficulties Hiring and Retaining Workers in the Uranium Industry 

Hiring into a 

Supressed Industry 

Competition from 13% 

Finding Workers 

with Uranium 

Experience 

Other Industries 

23% 

------~~dingWorkers 

with Mettalurgy 

Experience 

7% 

Source: US. Department of Commen:e, Bureau of mdustfv and Serum.y, Front-End SuNey, Tab 10 32 Respondents 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41579 

6. Loss of Domestic Long Term 

Contracts Due to Imported Uranium 

Front-end uranium industry 

companies in the U.S. have experienced 

a decline in new or renewed contracts 

over the last decade. From 2010 to 2018, 

the number of active contracts for 

domestic front-end uranium industry 

companies, including miners, millers, 

converters, enrichers, and fuel 

fabricators, declined by 46.7 percent 

(see Figure 42). 


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[TEXT RED t\CTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

fTEXT REDACTEDl 

Figure 42: Number of Active Front-End Contracts 2008-2018 

so ····--·-----•-•» Total contracts declined by 44.4% from 2010 to 2018 

~ 45 4.,...5 ____ ~----~.......-------~-------~~-

~ _, 40 

8. 

111 35 ti 

ca 

J:; 30 

C 

0 

u 25 

~ '£ 20 

<C 

'o 15 ... 

~ 10 

E 

~ s 

0 

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Front-End Survey; Tab 9a 

2017 2018 

12 Respondents 
41580 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

131 1989 Report. I–2. 

132Financial risk is evaluated based on survey 

data including balance sheets and income 

statements. Many of the companies classified as 

Low/Neutral Risk provided no information or do 

not incur many costs due to being idled, shutdown 

or having undeveloped deposits. Low/Neutral Risk 

is not necessarily an indication that they are not 

financially struggling but indicates in the near term 

they are unlikely to go out of business. 

These expiring contracts are not being 

offset by new contracts. From 2010 to 

2018, the total number of new contracts 

extended to front-end companies fell by 

76.2 percent. [TEXT REDACTED] This is 

evident by the decline in newly formed 

long-term contracts. Long-term contracts 

have fallen by 92.3 percent since 2010 

and only one contract was signed in 

2018. 

In particular, long-term contracts for 

U.S. miners and millers fell by 71.4 

percent, with just two active long-term 

contracts in 2018 (see Figure 43). The 

number of contracts that front-end 

companies retain is likely to fall further, 

as long-term contracts from previous 

years are set to expire. [TEXT 

REDACTED] 

7. Financial Distress 

The 1989 uranium 232 investigation 

found that the front-end uranium 

industry was not financially viable 

during the period of the 

investigation.131 Since these findings, 

increasing volumes of imported 

uranium have further crippled the 

financial health of the domestic frontend uranium industry. Uranium miners, 

converters, and enrichers have all felt 

the detrimental effects of decreasing 

market shares due to drastically 

increasing levels of imports. According 

to survey data, key points in the frontend uranium industry experienced 

increasing debt ratios and critically low 

profit margins during the 2014 to 2018 

period. An assessment of financial risk 

for all surveyed uranium miners, 

converters, enrichers, and fuel 

fabricators is shown in Figures 44a and 

44b.132


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25 

... 

"' i 

... 

... "' 

... 

"' i 

ti 10 

I 

8 s '3 

j 

E 0 ::> 

z 

Figure 43: Types of Contracts- Millers and Miners, 2008-2018 

2010 

The number of lon1 term contracts siped each year fell by 76.9% from 2010 to 

2018 

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 

■ long Term COfltracts Ill Spot Q:mtrads ■ Medium Term Contracts 

201& 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bm-eau of Industry and Security, Front-End Survey, Tab 9a 

12Res nil' 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41581 

133 1989 Report III–1 to III–2. 134 1989 Report. III–2. 

[TEXT REDACTED] Uranium Miners 

The financial health of uranium 

mining companies has deteriorated to 

even more unsustainable levels than at 

the time of the 1989 uranium 232 

investigation.133 As a result of the 

consolidation and homogenization of 

the industry in the past 30 years, 

financial struggles during market 

downturns have been magnified. U.S. 

uranium mining companies continue to 

struggle to compete in a market with 

low spot market prices that do not cover 

production costs, increasing imports 

from SOEs, and static/declining 

domestic demand. Should current 

market conditions continue, U.S. 

uranium miners will not be able to 

sustain operations for much longer. 

The 1989 Uranium 232 Investigation 

found that a, ‘‘characteristic of the 

uranium mining industry is that few 

companies are exclusively dependent 

on the production and sale of the ore. 

Uranium production is usually a 

relatively small part or byproduct of 

other major activities of the firm.’’ 134

This is a material difference between the 

state of uranium mining during the 1989 

uranium 232 investigation and the 

uranium mining industry today. 

According to Department survey data, a 

majority of the 20 companies in today’s 

domestic uranium mining industry 

depend exclusively on uranium mining 

for financial viability, and do not have 

the support of diverse business lines 

that would offset losses in their uranium 

mining activities. 

The trend in industry debt ratios for 

the 2014 to 2018 period is worsening 

(see Figure 45). The increasing average 

and stable median for approximately 

half of the companies surveyed implies 

poor performance in managing debt. 

[TEXT REDACTED] The increase in debt 


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[TEXT REDA.CTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

fTEXT REDACTEDl 

[TEXT REDA.CTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

fTEXT REDACTEDl 
41582 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

ratios one observes can reasonably be 

attributed to companies actively 

engaged in unprofitable uranium mining 

operations. 

Average quick ratios and average 

current ratios indicate whether, on 

average, companies are able to cover 

near term liabilities in the short term. 

Values greater than one indicate that a 

company’s assets can cover their near 

term liabilities, but it does not ensure 

that a company is able to cover long 

term liabilities with assets (see Figure 

46). 

Uranium miners have also suffered 

from low profit margins (see Figure 47) 

and persistently negative net income 

(see Figure 48). The average gross profit 

margin for the surveyed companies is 

strongly negative and when paired with 

the average net income it shows that 

miners are losing money on operations 

at an alarming rate. 


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Figure 45: U.S. Miners Debt Ratio 

f1----------- 1.01 

< 

'! 0.8 

~ 

0.784 0.7!13 

I o.6 

:!!l ! 0.4 

E. j 02 

i 

Q 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 

/We- O..btRallo ■ Median D<!btratlo 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Front-End Survey, Tab 5 20 Respondents 

Figure 46: U.S. Mining Companies Quick and Current Ratios 

3 

2.5 

2 

1 

0.5 

0 

ff EXT REDACTED} 

2014 

0.55 

2015 

-Average Quick Ratio 

2.67 

0.6 

2016 2017 

--Average Current Ratio 

SOurc-e: U.S. Department of commerce, Bureau of l.ndustry and Security, Front-End Survey, Tabs 

20111 

19 Respondents 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41583 

135 [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Both gross profit margin and net 

income should be interpreted in the 

context of the few actively operating 

companies currently suffering the 

largest losses. Many of the idled 

companies reported negative net income 

due to the cost of maintaining permits 

and machinery. [TEXT REDACTED] 135

This is in fact the case with other 

miners as well. In order to fulfill 

contracts, miners have purchased off the 

spot market to mitigate the financial 

losses from producing themselves or 

fulfilling contracts with their 


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Figure 47: U.S. Miners Gross Profit Margins 

20 -·-·····----····-·····---······ -

-0.04 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.53 

0 

-20 

.5 

1:1!' -40 .. 

::i: 

... 

e -60 

... 

i -80 I!) 

. -83 .• 12 .. 

-100 

-120 

-140 

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 

-Average Gross Profit Margin -Median Gross Prafd: Margin 

NOTE: 11 out of 20 respondents had .no net sales at all from 2014-2018 and by 2018 only 7 companies reported any net sales 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Front-End Survey, Tab5 20 Respondents 

Figure 48: U.S. Miners Net Income 

-440 

-2,000 

-1,766 -1,613 

-2,528 

-5,435 

Q -'6,000 ~ 

~ <I). 

i -8,000 

j 

;- -10,000 

-12,000 

-14,000 

-16,000 

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 

-Average Net Income -Median Net Income 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Front-End Survey, Tab 5 20 Respondents 
41584 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

136 [TEXT REDACTED]. 137 [TEXT REDACTED]. 

inventories. [TEXT REDACTED] 136 To 

this end financial statements do not 

fully capture the cost cutting 

implementations being made to remain 

solvent. 

Without a decrease in imports and an 

increase in prices and demand, mining 

operations will continue to have 

surmounting financial struggles. If 

current market conditions continue to 

exist, mining companies will begin to 

exit the market and this vital component 

of the fuel cycle will be lost. 

Uranium Converters 

There is only one location in the U.S. 

that has conversion services. This is an 

integral point in the fuel cycle, yet it is 

not immune to financial struggles faced 

by the miners. [TEXT REDACTED] 137


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[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

fTEXT REDACTEDl 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41585 

138 [TEXT REDACTED]. 

Uranium Enrichers 

Urenco USA and Centrus Energy are 

the only uranium enrichers in the U.S., 

though only Urenco currently operates 

in that capacity. [TEXT REDACTED] 138

[TEXT REDACTED] 


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[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 
41586 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 


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[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

rTEXT REDACTEDl 

[TEXT RED AC TED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41587 

Enrichment is a key part of the 

nuclear fuel cycle and these two 

companies represent the entire U.S. 

capability to commercially enrich 

nuclear material. Retaining their vital 

capabilities is necessary to preserve the 

domestic fuel cycle, as their financial 

struggles are driven by the current state 

of the market. 

Fuel Fabricators 

The fuel fabricators are largely 

unaffected by financial struggles in 

other sectors of the industry. Debt ratios 

show that most cover the majority of 

their liabilities (see Figure 53). 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] Over the longer 

term, the fuel fabricators are concerned 

that Russia and Chinese SOEs will sell 

fabricated fuel directly to the nuclear 

electric power operators, bypassing the 

need for U.S. domestic fuel fabricators. 


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[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

fTEXT REDACTEDl 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

fTEXT REDACTEDl 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

fTEXT REDACTEDl 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

fTEXT REDACTEDl 
41588 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

8. Research and Development 

Expenditures 

Research and development (R&D) is 

critical to the future competitiveness of 

the U.S. uranium industry. Across all 

sectors, from initial mining through 

final fuel fabrication, consistent R&D 

expenditures are needed to devise and 

implement new manufacturing 

techniques and improved processes. 

R&D is particularly critical for uranium 

enrichment and fuel fabrication, as their 

uranium products are highly engineered 

and tailored to individual utility 

customers’ specifications. 

The oversupplied global uranium 

market has impacted the industry’s 

ability to support continued R&D and 

expenditures have been consistently 

declining over the 2014 to 2018 period 

(see Figure 56). 

[TEXT REDACTED] Other mining 

company respondents, including both 

existing mining companies and those 

owning deposits for future 

development, have limited available 

working capital. These firms prioritize 

the maintenance of existing sites and 

development costs (particularly 

permitting) for future sites, and have no 


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[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

fTEXT REDACTEDl 

Figure 56: Total Front-End U.S. Uranium Industry R&D Expenditures, 2014-2018 

$180,000 

~ $160,000 

:) 

1 $140,000 IIJ 

"' S: $120,000 

~ 

';;;' $100,000 GI 

::, 

:li $80,000 

& 

~ $60,000 

0 t $40,000 

! $20,000 

Only 9 of 34 front-end survey respondents indicated 

any R&0 expenditures 2014-2018, with expenditures 

declining almost SO percent in the past 5 years. 

$0 ' __ ,_ _________ _ 

2014 2015 2016 2017 

Source: U .s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Fmnt-End Survey, Tab 7 

$80,808 

-

2018 

34 Respondents 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41589 

ability to spend on R&D. The lack of 

R&D spending by mining companies, 

caused by poor uranium market 

conditions, will negatively affect their 

long-term competitiveness. These firms 

will not be able to develop new 

production methods and techniques- for 

example, [TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] noted that poor 

economic conditions caused them to 

significantly cut R&D expenditures. 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

Although U.S. uranium firms are 

currently able to fund a small amount of 

R&D, their limited ability to invest in 

this area will constrain future growth. 

Depressed uranium prices, caused by 

artificially low-priced imports, oblige 

U.S. firms to cut costs wherever 

possible, particularly in R&D. Low R&D 

expenditures will, in turn, inhibit U.S. 

firms from being competitive on a global 

level. 

9. Capital Expenditures 

All sectors of the U.S. uranium 

industry are capital-intensive. Mining 

companies hold significant capital 

investments in their deposits and the 

associated mining equipment; 

converters and enrichers hold 

significant investments in their 

proprietary conversion and enrichment 

processes; and fuel fabricators also have 

significant investments in the 

equipment and facilities needed to make 

fuel assemblies. Capital investment in 

the industry, however, has been 

hampered by poor uranium market 

conditions, with capital expenditures 

across the U.S. uranium industry falling 

by 60.2 percent from $330.8 million in 

2014 to $131.7 million in 2018 (see 

Figure 57). 

Global uranium market conditions 

have had various impacts on different 

stages of the fuel cycle. [TEXT 

REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] Both of these 

firms are representative of the effect of 

global import trends on U.S. uranium 

mining as well as U.S. uranium 

enrichment. Excess global supply of 

uranium concentrate, as well as excess 

global capacity to produce enriched 

material, places pressure on domestic 

U.S. producers, thus impacting their 

ability to invest in expanding 

productive capacity. 

In contrast, however, U.S. fuel 

fabricators reported an increase in 

capital expenditures over the 2014 to 

2018 period. [TEXT REDACTED] These 

increases indicate the comparatively 

strong state of the U.S. fuel fabrication 

sector. Due to prohibitive tariffs and 

reporting requirements associated with 

imported fuel assemblies, U.S. nuclear 

power generators opt to have their 

assemblies produced in the United 

States. U.S. fuel fabricators do not 

experience the same market pressures as 

do U.S. producers of uranium 

concentrate and enriched uranium. 

However, should demand for nuclear 

fuel in the U.S. drop due to continued 

or accelerated reactor retirements, these 

firms will likely experience financial 

pressures that will force them to cut 

capital expenditures. In addition, longterm Russian and Chinese efforts to sell 

fuel directly to U.S. nuclear electric 

power utilities will also negatively 

impact domestic fuel fabricators. 

A viable U.S. uranium industry must 

be able to make adequate capital 

expenditures to maintain existing 

production levels and prepare for future 

expansion. However, in the current 

depressed uranium market, it is not 

possible for U.S. firms to do so. 

C. Trade Actions: Anti-Dumping and 

Countervailing Duties 

The U.S. Government has taken action 

against artificially low-priced uranium 

imports. Several anti-dumping 

investigations conducted by the 


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Figure 57: Total Front-End U.S. Uranium Industry Capital Expenditures, 2014-2018 

$350,000 

o $300,000 

::I 

,:, "' 

C 

IIJ 

"' ::I

0 

.c 

t:. 

"' G) 

,_ 

;;i 

'6 -

C 

G) 

0. 

X 

w 

iii 

~ 

a. 

Ill 

V 

5 

0 

I-

$250,000 

$200,000 

$150,000 --------- ·-··········--······ 

$100,000 - -· ........ Capital Expenditures_have. 

declined by 60.2 percent since 2014 

$50,000 

$0 

2014 2015 2016 

Source; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Front-End Survey, Tab 6a 

2017 2018 

18 Respondents 
41590 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

139U.S. International Trade Commission. 

Uranium from the U.S.S.R.’’ Investigation No. 731– 

TA–539 (Preliminary). (Washington, DC: 1991). 

https://www.usitc.gov/publications/701_731/ 

pub2471.pdf. 

140 ‘‘Uranium from Russia: Investigation No. 731– 

TA–539–C (Fourth Review).’’ USITC. (September 

2017). 

141 Ibid. 1. 

142U.S. International Trade Commission. Low 

Enriched Uranium from France, Germany, the 

Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, 18. 

Investigation Nos. 701–TA–409–412 and 731–TA– 

909, Final. (Washington, DC: 2002). https://

www.usitc.gov/publications/701_731/pub3486.pdf. 

143Low-Enriched Uranium from France: Final 

Results of Sunset Review and Revocation of 

Antidumping Duty Order, Federal Register 84 FR 

9493, (March 15, 2019), https://

www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/03/15/ 

2019-04882/low-enriched-uranium-from-francefinal-results-of-sunset-review-and-revocation-ofantidumping-duty. 

Department and the U.S. International 

Trade Commission (USITC) affirm that 

many sources of imported uranium have 

engaged in dumping and other anticompetitive practices to the detriment of 

U.S. producers. Figure 58 lists USITC 

investigations into uranium imports 

since 1991: 

U.S.S.R. Less Than Fair Value Sales 

FIGURE 58: U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION URANIUM CASES SINCE 1991 

Country Date Finding 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) ............................................................................................ December 23, 1991 Affirmative. 

Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan *.June 3, 1992 .......... Affirmative. 

Tajikistan ...................................................................................................................................................... July 8, 1993 ........... Negative. 

Ukraine ......................................................................................................................................................... July 8, 1993 ........... Affirmative. 

Kazakhstan ................................................................................................................................................... July 13, 1999 ......... Negative. 

Ukraine ......................................................................................................................................................... August 22, 2000 .... Negative. 

Russia (First Review of 1992 Determination) .............................................................................................. August 22, 2000 .... Affirmative. 

France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom .................................................................... February 4, 2002 ... Affirmative. 

Russia (Second Review of 1992 Determination) ......................................................................................... August 2006 .......... Affirmative. 

France (First Review of 2002 Determination) .............................................................................................. December 2007 ..... Affirmative. 

Russia (Third Review of 1992 Determination) ............................................................................................. February 2012 ....... Affirmative. 

Russia (Fourth Review of 1992 Determination) ........................................................................................... September 2017 .... Affirmative. 

France (Third Review of 2002 Determination) ............................................................................................. November 2018 ..... Negative. 

* The cases determined on June 3, 1992 were a continuation of the December 23, 1991 anti-dumping case against the U.S.S.R. As the 

U.S.S.R. was dissolved December 25, 1991; the International Trade Commission opened cases against the twelve former Soviet republics. 

Source: USITC. 

In December 1991, the Department 

and the USITC determined that imports 

of uranium from the U.S.S.R., including 

natural and enriched uranium, were 

sold in the U.S. at less than fair value 

and threatened material injury to the 

U.S. uranium industry.139 Following the 

dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in the same 

month, the single investigation was then 

transformed into twelve separate 

investigations, which covered most 

former Soviet republics.140 In June 1992, 

the Department and USITC found that 

uranium imports from each of these 

republics were sold at less than fair 

value and threatened to materially 

injure U.S. producers. Subsequently, six 

of the republics—Russia, Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and 

Uzbekistan—signed agreements with the 

U.S. government to suspend the 

underlying antidumping duty 

investigations. These suspension 

agreements permitted the countries in 

question to import defined amounts of 

uranium into the United States, thereby 

avoiding the imposition of antidumping 

duty orders and the resulting duties. 

After 1992, most of the antidumping 

duty orders and suspension agreements 

had been terminated pursuant to 

proceedings; the Department and USITC 

determined that imports of uranium 

from most of the Soviet republics were 

not materially injuring, or threatening to 

materially injure, U.S. industry. By 

2000, only the agreement with Russia 

remained in force. In its 2000, 2006, 

2012, and 2017 reviews of the Russian 

Suspension Agreement (RSA), USITC 

reaffirmed that imports of Russian 

uranium beyond the quantities 

permitted in the RSA would lead to a 

‘‘recurrence of material injury’’ to the 

U.S. uranium industry.141

France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 

the United Kingdom 

In December 2000, United States 

Enrichment Corporation (now Centrus 

Energy Corp.) filed a petition with the 

Department and USITC concerning 

imports of low-enriched uranium (LEU) 

from France, Germany, the Netherlands, 

and the United Kingdom. In February 

2002, USITC concluded that LEU 

imports from these countries were sold 

inside the U.S. at less than fair value 

and had a ‘‘significant adverse impact’’ 

on domestic U.S. LEU production.142

Commerce accordingly imposed 

countervailing duties on LEU imports 

from all of the above countries as well 

as anti-dumping duties on French 

imports. 

Subsequent actions by the Department 

revoked all of the countervailing duties 

by May 2007. However, the antidumping duties on French LEU 

remained in place. Further USITC 

reviews in December 2007 and 

December 2013 affirmed that the antidumping duties were needed to deter 

less than fair value sales of French LEU. 

Following a final review in November 

2018 and a lack of domestic interested 

parties, the Department revoked the 

anti-dumping duties on French LEU on 

March 15, 2019.143

Prior actions by USITC and the 

Department support the U.S. 

Government’s broader concern about the 

viability of the domestic uranium 

industry as well as the clear impact of 

anticompetitive practices by non-U.S. 

suppliers on U.S. producers. 

D. Displacement of Domestic Uranium 

by Excessive Quantities of Imports Has 

the Serious Effect of Weakening Our 

Internal Economy 

1. U.S. Production Is Well Below 

Demand and Utilization Rates Are Well 

Below Economically Viable Levels 

Based on the Department’s 2019 

survey data, U.S. uranium production is 

well below U.S. demand even though 

adequate capabilities and resources 

exist. In 2018, U.S. utility requirements 

were about 51.9 million pounds of U308 

to run all reactors at full capacity, and 

total U.S. licensed and operating 

uranium production capacity was about 

226 million pounds of U308. However, 

U.S. uranium production in 2018 was 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41591 

144U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

less than two million pounds of U308 

(see Figure 59). 

The average projected utility 

requirements of U308 for 2019 to 2025 

are 280 million pounds. These 

variations are due to the 2019 

decommissioning of two reactors with 

potentially eleven more reactors closing 

by 2025. In addition, four new reactors 

will be coming online by 2020.144

Despite this demand, the prognosis for 

the U.S. uranium industry worsens with 

only 331,000 pounds of U308 

production in 2019, which is 53 percent 

lower than 2018 and is only six percent 

of 2014 levels. 

This decline is largely due to 

unfavorable market conditions. For 

example, the 25 mines that are currently 

idled/in standby said the primary factor 

prohibiting restart is low uranium spot 

prices. An additional two mines are 

completely shut down due to low 

uranium spot prices. Total production 

by U.S. mines and mills of uranium ore 

and concentrates continues to decrease 

drastically as global uranium market 

conditions continue to decline (see 

Figure 60). 


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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Front-End Survey, Tab 3a, 4a 

Nuclear Power O rator Sector SUrve , Tabla 

Figure 60: U.S. Production and Global Spot Price of U308 

10,000,000 $36.76 

2: Average Price per Pound U308 for 

"iii 9,000,000 IJ U.S.. Producers to be Viable: $50t .:; 

VI 

QJ 8,000,000 

E 

8 7,000,000 

5,962,244 "C 

8 6,000,000 ::, 

"e 5,000,000 Q.. 

00 4,000,000 0 

rt') 

::., 3,000,000 

-

0 

"" 2,000,000 1,432,806 "C 

c:; 

::, 

0 1,000,000 331,000 Cl. 

.~'-'"""•~~••S-,.«•,so;,.,h .•... , .••• ,., .... _.lllllllll .... ,.,., .. 

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 

(projected) 

$40.00 

$35.00 

$30.00 0 

II') 

::., 

$25.00 .5 

QJ 

V 

$20.00 ·c 

Q. 

.... 

0 

$15.00 0.. 

II') 

~ 

$10.00 rt') 

:> 

$5.00 

$-

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Front-End Survey, Tab4a; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 

6 respondents 
41592 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

The low uranium spot price also 

contributes to utilization rates that are 

well below economically viable levels. 

According to BIS survey data, front-end 

U.S. uranium producers indicated 

widely varying capacity utilization rates 

needed to remain profitable, with the 

lowest recorded at 25 percent, and the 

highest recorded at 100 percent. The 

industry average capacity utilization 

rate U.S. uranium producers need to 

remain profitable is roughly 56 percent. 

In the recent past, the utilization rate 

has been 3/10 of one percent (0.3 

percent) of licensed/operating capacity. 

The industry cannot sustain at these 

unprofitable rates. 

However, once market conditions 

improve, U.S. uranium producers can 

justify restarting operations and/or 

starting new operations. Most U.S. 

uranium miners and millers are unable 

to produce at a viable level at the 

current low spot prices, but are ready to 

produce when economic conditions are 

more favorable (see Figure 61). 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–P 

Of the uranium mining projects in 

idling/standby status, many indicated 

that it would take about one year to 

restart production, with a maximum 

time period estimated at four years and 

the minimum estimated at 30 days. The 

cost to fully restart production varied 

more widely with the maximum being 

$100 million, the minimum being $200 

thousand, and the average being $12.8 

million. 

Furthermore, uranium deposits in the 

U.S. are vast (approximately 1.2 billion 

pounds of U308) and can be extracted 

when the price reaches a level for 

production to be economically viable 

(see Figures 62 and 63). 


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Figure 61: Current State of the U.S. Uranium Miners 

- Of the 14 mines "under development,• 6 are "permitted to operate• and 2 are ready to start operations. 

- Of the 39 mines in nstandby/idle." 28 are "permitted to operate" and 4 are ready to start operations. 

- Of the 5 mines "operating," one (1) is expected to enter "standby/idle" (2019--2023). 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau ofl ndustry and Security, Front-End Survev, Tab 3a 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41593 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–C 

2. Domestic Uranium Production Is 

Severely Weakened and Concentrated 

As the U.S. uranium industry 

contracts and shuts down due to the 

imports adversely impacting its 

economic welfare and viability, 

domestic uranium production is 

severely weakened and concentrated. 

Since imports as a percentage of U.S. 

utilities’ annual uranium consumption 

have increased to upwards of 94 

percent, U.S. production of uranium 

concentrate has declined from 12.3 

million pounds in 1989 to just 331,000 

pounds of uranium concentrate 

projected for 2019. Consequently, the 

mills which process uranium ore are 

near to shuttering operations. 

[TEXT REDACTED] 


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1 includes mined and milled products produced by miller.;; only 

So1rn:e: U.S. Department of Commen::e, Bureau of Industry and Security, front-End Survey, Tab3a, 4a; 

Nuclear Power Operator SUrvey, Tab3a 

Figure 63: Undeveloped U.S. Uranium Resources 

58 Respondents 

State Measured Inferred Avg .. Est. ' Effected FTEs , Resources Resources Production Cost 

source: U.S. Department of commerce, Bureau of Industry and security, Front-End Survey, Tab 3b 

15 respondents 
41594 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

3. Reduction of Uranium Production 

Facilities Limits Capacity Available for 

a National Emergency and Threatens To 

Impair National Security 

Key factors in this investigation 

include growth requirements of 

domestic industries to meet national 

defense requirements; however, 

reduction of uranium production 

facilities limits the capacity available in 

the event of a national emergency. The 

United States cannot be subject and 

should not be subject to foreign 

dependence in the face of potential 

uranium needs in an emergency 

scenario. The decline of the U.S. 

uranium production industry limits 

availability and puts the U.S. at risk, 

impairing national security. On the 

miners side, sales and export data show 

that U.S. producers are selling more 

product than they are producing, 

indicating that contracts are being 

fulfilled with either inventory, spot 

market purchases, or other. U.S. mines 

have resorted to buying spot market 

uranium in order to fulfill contracts 

since it is cheaper than producing 

themselves. 

The U.S. uranium industry’s low 

production levels force U.S. nuclear 

power generators into heavy 

dependence on foreign uranium 

supplies. Of the 98 active U.S. nuclear 

reactors, only four have annual 

requirements less than 331,000 pounds 

U3O8 per year, which is the total U.S. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41595 

145 ‘‘World Uranium Mining Production.’’ World 

Nuclear Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-ofuranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx. 

production expected for 2019 (see 

Figure 65). 

Projected 2019 U.S. uranium 

production would be sufficient to fuel 

only one of these reactors. [TEXT 

REDACTED] Low U.S. production levels 

denote that a sudden loss of access to 

foreign uranium supplies has the 

potential to severely disrupt the nuclear 

power plants that provide almost onefifth of the nation’s electricity. 

[TEXT REDACTED] Therefore, a 

remedy to resolve the inhibiting factors 

to production must be implemented so 

that U.S. miners are once again reliable 

suppliers of uranium, and with 

additional U.S. capability to convert and 

enrich the mined uranium, U.S. utilities 

are able to fulfill their need of domestic 

uranium for national security or 

national emergency use. 

As previously discussed, the stockpile 

maintained by DOE is anticipated to 

satisfy needs for LEU and HEU through 

2041 and 2060 respectively. However, 

U.S. nuclear electric power utilities only 

maintain enough inventory of uranium 

to fuel their reactors for an average of 

[TEXT REDACTED] (see Figure 66). The 

compounded effects of both minimal 

inventory and minimal U.S. production 

highlights the national security threat 

imposed by U.S. nuclear electric 

utilities’ near complete dependence on 

imports of uranium to fuel their 

reactors. In the event of a supply 

disruption, U.S. utilities’ would be 

unable to supply the 19 percent of U.S. 

electricity consumption they usually 

provide after [TEXT REDACTED]. The 

continued loss in U.S. production 

capabilities ensures that a disruption in 

supply to the nation’s 98 reactors would 

be catastrophic to U.S. critical 

infrastructure. 

E. Uranium Market Distortion by StateOwned Enterprises Is a Circumstance 

That Contributes to the Weakening of 

the Domestic Economy 

1. Excess Russian, Kazakh, and Uzbek 

Production Adversely Affects Global 

Markets and Creates a Dangerous U.S. 

Dependence on Uranium From These 

Countries 

Although global uranium production 

increased by 42 percent between 2008 

and 2016, the subsequent supply glut 

following the Fukushima disaster and 

reactor retirements has begun to affect 

production.145 As the potential for new 

reactor construction increased, new 

mines came online to meet potential 

demand. In 2008, the world’s uranium 

mines produced enough uranium to 

fulfill 70 percent of existing world 

demand. By 2016, global uranium 

production filled 98 percent of world 

demand. 

However, the increasing pace of 

reactor retirements, cancellation of 

proposed new reactors, and excess 

supply caused by the shutdown of 

German and Japanese reactors all 

impacted the global uranium market. 

Accordingly, between 2016 and 2017, 

global uranium production dropped by 

4.7 percent—remaining production 

could satisfy 93 percent of 2017 

demand. As more reactors come online 

in certain regions, particularly in Asia, 

the Middle East, and Africa, global 

demand is expected to grow once more. 

By 2025, the International Atomic 

Energy Agency estimates that global 

uranium demand could be as high as 

68,920 metric tons—a 10 percent 

increase on 2016 levels. However, 

current poor market conditions, 

exacerbated by artificially low-priced 

SOE producers, have forced many 

producers in the U.S. and other 

countries to idle production or close 

mines entirely. U.S. and other market 

producers may therefore not be present 

in the market to take advantage of 

higher future demand. 

Thus, while U.S. production declined 

by 16 percent between 2016 and 2017, 

Russian and Kazakh production 

declined only by 5.1 and 2.9 percent 

respectively (see Figure 67). Uzbek 

production remained constant. Even 

Canada and Australia, which have 

historically produced more than the 

U.S., cut their production to a greater 

degree than did Russia, Kazakhstan, and 

Uzbekistan. 

FIGURE 67: CHANGES IN URANIUM PRODUCTION, 2016–2017 

Country 

2016 Production 

(metric tons 

uranium) 

2017 Production 

(metric tons 

uranium) 

Change in 

production 

(percentage) 

United States ............................................................................................................. 1,125 940 ¥16.4 

Canada ...................................................................................................................... 14,039 13,116 ¥6.55 

Australia ..................................................................................................................... 6,315 5,882 ¥6.86 

Russia ........................................................................................................................ 3,004 2,917 ¥2.89 

Kazakhstan ................................................................................................................ 24,586 23,321 ¥5.14 

Uzbekistan ................................................................................................................. 2404 2404 0 

China .......................................................................................................................... 1616 1885 16.6 

Source: World Nuclear Association, March 2019, 2018 data has not been released. 


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[TEXT REDACTED] 

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41596 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

Russia’s Rosatom, Kazakhstan’s 

Kazatomprom, and Uzbekistan’s Navoi 

are able to maintain higher production 

levels than most producers despite 

unfavorable global markets because they 

are state-owned enterprises. Should 

global market trends persist and 

uranium prices remain low, U.S. 

producers will not be able to compete 

with price-insensitive production in 

these countries. 

As U.S. and other market production 

declines and Russian, Kazakh, and 

Uzbek production remains stable, U.S. 

utilities are purchasing increasing 

amounts of uranium products from 

these countries. Figure 68 shows the 

extent to which U.S. utilities rely on 

Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan for 

a significant share of their uranium 

needs. 

Between 2014 and 2018, U.S. utilities 

relied on material from Russia, 

Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan for 25 

percent of their uranium concentrate, 32 

percent of their uranium hexafluoride, 

14 percent of their conversion services, 

and 20 percent of their enrichment 

services. Consequently, U.S. utilities are 

dependent on imports from these 

countries to maintain normal operations 

at their nuclear generators. As U.S. and 

other market producers cut or cease 

uranium production due to unfavorable 

market conditions, it is likely that U.S. 

utilities will increase purchases of 

uranium from price-insensitive Russian, 

Kazakh, and Uzbek producers. 

Continued high levels of Russian, 

Kazakh, and Uzbek production is also 

affecting U.S. allies. As described in 

Chapter VI, Canadian and Australian 

producers have had to idle production 

at their own mines due to poor market 

conditions. Furthermore, to fulfill 

contracts with U.S. utilities, Canadian, 

Australian, and French producers have 

procured material from state-owned 

suppliers. Figure 69 shows that 

Canadian, Australian, and French 

producers used Russian, Kazakh, and 


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160,000,000 

140,000,000 

100,000,000 

80,000,000 

60,000,000 

40,000,000 

20,000,000 

0 

Figure 68: U.S. Utility Purchases of Uranium Products from 

Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, 2014-2018 

U.S. Utilities Rely on Uranium from Russia, 

Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan for: 

uranium Concentrate - 25 percent 

Uranium Hexaflourlde - 33 percent 

Enriched Uranium Hexaflouride ... 88 percent 

Enrichment Services - 20 percent 

Uranium Concentrate (lbs Uranium Hexafluoride (lbs Enriched Uranium 

U308l uaos equivalent) Heqfiuoride (K,gU} 

Enrithmen.t Services 

(Se~rative Work 

Unlts/SWU) 

Som-ce: US. .Oepanment of u:immerre, Bureau of tmruRy and Se1:U1ity, Nudeai-l"owerOperamr Stmrey, Tab !J 16 Hespomiel'IIS 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41597 

146Coats, Daniel. Director of National 

Intelligence, Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence. Statement for the Record: Worldwide 

Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 

Community, 37. January 29, 2019. https://

www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATASFR-SSCI.pdf. 

Uzbek uranium to fulfill many 2018 

contracts with U.S. utilities. 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–C 

Continued excess production of 

artificially low-priced uranium by 

Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan will 

make U.S. and foreign market producers 

noncompetitive on global markets. As 

U.S. and other allied nations decrease 

their production due to poor market 

conditions, U.S. nuclear power 

generators will purchase increasing 

amounts of Russian, Kazakh, and Uzbek 

uranium to meet their needs. 

Dependence on such imports raises a 

distinct national security concern. The 

Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence’s 2019 Worldwide Threat 

Assessment identifies Russia’s 

ambitions to expand its ‘‘global military, 

commercial, and energy footprint’’ as an 

integral part of its strategy to 

‘‘undermine the international order.’’ 146

U.S. utilities’ direct dependence on 

Russian enriched uranium for 20 

percent of their annual supply gives the 

Kremlin significant economic leverage. 

Moscow exercises further leverage 

through its de facto control of uranium 

exports from Kazakhstan and 

Uzbekistan. Although Kazakh and 

Uzbek SOEs are controlled by their 

respective governments and not Russia, 

a significant majority of uranium 

shipments from Kazakhstan and 

Uzbekistan transit through Russia on 

their way to U.S. customers. 

[TEXT REDACTED] 


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6,000,000 

5,000,000 

4,000,000 

3,000,000 

2,000,000 

1,000,000 

0 

Figure 69: Uranium Concentrate Purchased by U.S. Utilities 

from French, Australian, and Canadian firms, 2018 

(Pounds U308} 

60,000 

Canadian firms, 2018 

Imports from Russia, ,Kazakhstan, and 

Uzbekistan constituted 29 pen:ent of 

Canadian sales to U.S. utilities~ 17 

percent of Australian sales, and 34 

15,000 

Australian firms, 2018 French finns, 2018 

■ Rest of Wor1d □ Russia II Kazakhstan ■ Uzbekistan 

*"Rest of Wodd' indudes Australia, Brazil, canada, Malawi, Nammia, Niger, South Africa, the United states, Ukraine, and 

unspecified West Africa 

Source: U.S. Depatment d Conmerce,. Bureauof lmfuslry andSecU'ity, Nuclear PowerOJBator SUlvE!l Tab9 16 lespondents 
41598 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

147Since the Russian annexation of Crimea and 

intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Russia has 

steadily built up its military assets in the Baltic Sea 

region. Russia therefore could close Baltic Sea 

shipping lanes with comparative ease. Oder, Tobias. 

‘‘The Dimensions of Russian Sea Denial in the 

Baltic Sea.’’ Center for International Maritime 

Security, January 04, 2018. http://cimsec.org/ 

dimensions-russian-sea-denial-baltic-sea/35157. 

148 ‘‘China’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle.’’ World Nuclear 

Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/ 

china-nuclear-fuel-cycle.aspx. 149Pascale Massot and Zhan-Ming Chen. ‘‘China 

and the Global Uranium Market: Prospects for 

Peaceful Coexistence.’’ The Scientific World 

Journal, 2013. https://www.hindawi.com/journals/ 

tswj/2013/672060/. 150 ‘‘China’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle.’’ World Nuclear 

Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 

information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/ 

china-nuclear-fuel-cycle.aspx. 

151 ‘‘Rio Tinto to sell Ro ̈ ssing stake.’’ World 

Nuclear News, November 26, 2018. http://

www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Rio-Tinto-tosell-Rossing-stake. 

152Hui Zhang, ‘‘China’s Uranium Enrichment 

Capacity: Rapid Expansion to Meet Commercial 

Needs’’, (Cambridge: Harvard Kennedy School, 

2015), 32. 

153 Ibid., 34. 

In the event of increased political or 

potential military tensions, Russia could 

choose to ban uranium exports to the 

United States; denying U.S. utilities a 

significant share of their enriched 

uranium. Russia further possesses the 

military means to deny U.S. and U.S.- 

aligned countries access to Kazakh and 

Uzbek uranium exported through 

Russian ports, principally on the Baltic 

Sea.147 In either of these circumstances, 

U.S. utilities would conceivably be 

denied a significant percentage of their 

uranium requirements and could face 

critical fuel shortages. 

2. The Increasing Presence of China in 

the Global Uranium Market Will Further 

Weaken U.S. and Other Market Uranium 

Producers 

Although China’s uranium industry 

has been developed primarily to serve 

the country’s growing fleet of nuclear 

reactors, China is increasing its 

involvement in the global nuclear fuel 

industry.148 China’s involvement in the 

global nuclear fuel industry is an 

outgrowth of its domestic uranium 

procurement strategy. As China has only 

limited domestic uranium reserves, it 

has also acquired interests in uranium 

deposits outside China. This ‘‘two 

markets, two resources’’ 149 policy has 

led Chinese firms to acquire significant 

shares of mines in Kazakhstan and 

Namibia, with prospective 

developments in Niger and Canada.150

China’s activity in Namibia is of 

particular interest.151 Namibia has two 

active uranium mines—Husab and 

Rossing. Chinese firms have a majority 

stake in Husab and purchased a majority 

stake in Rossing. However, the Rossing 

transaction is under review by the 

Namibia Competition Commission. A 

Chinese firm does have a 25 percent 

stake in the Langer Heinrich mine, but 

that mine was placed in care and 

maintenance in 2018 and thus cannot be 

characterized as active. These mines’ 

production costs exceed current global 

uranium prices, and so cannot support 

commercial production. However, cost 

recovery is seemingly not a concern for 

Chinese-state owned producers. 

Between 2014 and 2018, U.S. utilities 

purchased approximately 347,781 

pounds of uranium concentrate, 2.33 

million pounds of U3O8 equivalent of 

conversion services, and 1.4 million 

separative work units (SWU) of 

enrichment services—enough to supply 

16 average reactors per year—from 

Chinese producers. U.S. utilities also 

have contracts with Chinese producers 

for at least 130,000 SWU between 2019 

and 2023, indicating an interest in 

continued relationships with Chinese 

producers. U.S. utilities have also 

contracted with CGN Global Uranium 

Ltd., the trading arm of Chinese SOE 

China General Nuclear, for certain 

uranium purchases. Between 2014 and 

2018, U.S. utilities purchased 800,000 

pounds of uranium concentrate from 

CGN Global. 

As the bulk of China’s uranium 

concentrate production is consumed by 

domestic nuclear power generators, 

most Chinese exports of uranium will 

likely be in the form of enrichment 

services. Domestic Chinese enrichment 

capacity is increasing faster than 

domestic demand: By 2020, the 

country’s enrichment centrifuges will 

have a total capacity of 12 million SWU, 

compared to domestic demand of 9 

million SWU.152 Chinese producers 

intend to use this excess capacity to 

increase the country’s presence in the 

nuclear fuels trade. A China National 

Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) executive 

remarked in 2013: ‘‘On the basis of 

securing its domestic supply [of SWU], 

CNNC will gradually expand its foreign 

markets and make China’s fuel industry 

internationally competitive.’’ 153 China’s 

increasing control of global uranium 

deposits and its excess enrichment 

capacity will allow it to further enter the 

nuclear fuels market and undermine 

U.S. and other market producers. 

3. Increasing Global Excess Uranium 

Production Will Further Weaken the 

Internal Economy as U.S. Uranium 

Producers Will Face Increasing Import 

Competition 

Continued high levels of production 

by state-owned enterprises in Russia, 

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and China will 

place further financial pressure on U.S. 

uranium producers. U.S. uranium 

concentrate production, which declined 

by 94 percent between 2014 and 2018, 

will be non-existent in the near future 

as subsidized foreign production 

continues. 

Foreign market producers are not 

immune from the effects of state-owned 

producers either. As described in 

Chapter VI, Canadian and Australian 

producers have had to idle production 

at their own mines due to poor market 

conditions. Furthermore, to fulfill 

contracts with U.S. utilities, Canadian, 

Australian, and French producers have 

procured material from state-owned 

suppliers. 

VIII. Conclusion 

A. Determination 

Based on these findings, the Secretary 

of Commerce has concluded that the 

present quantities and circumstance of 

uranium imports are ‘‘weakening our 

internal economy’’ and ‘‘threaten to 


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fTEXT REDACTEDl 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41599 

154U.S. White House Office. National Security 

Strategy of the United States of America. 

(Washington, DC: 2017), 2 https://

www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ 

NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. 

impair the national security’’ as defined 

in Section 232. An economically viable 

and secure supply of U.S.-sourced 

uranium is required for national defense 

needs. International obligations, 

including agreements with foreign 

partners under Section 123 of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, govern the 

use of most imported uranium and 

generally restrict it to peaceful, nonexplosive uses. As a result, uranium 

used for military purposes must 

generally be domestically produced 

from mining through the fuel fabrication 

process. Furthermore, the predictable 

maintenance and support of U.S. critical 

infrastructure, especially the electric 

power grid, depends on a diverse 

supply of uranium, which includes 

U.S.-sourced uranium products and 

services. 

The Secretary further recognizes that 

the U.S. uranium industry’s financial 

and production posture has significantly 

deteriorated since the Department’s 

1989 Report. That investigation noted 

that U.S. nuclear power utilities 

imported 51.1 percent of their uranium 

requirements in 1987. By 2018, imports 

had increased to 93.3 percent of those 

utilities’ annual requirements. Based on 

comprehensive 2019 industry data 

provided by U.S. uranium producers 

and U.S. nuclear electric power utilities 

to the Department in response to a 

mandatory survey, U.S. utilities’ usage 

of U.S. mined uranium has dropped to 

nearly zero. [TEXT REDACTED] Based 

on the current and projected state of the 

U.S. uranium industry, the Department 

has concluded that the U.S. uranium 

industry is unable to satisfy existing or 

future national security needs or 

respond to a national security 

emergency requiring a significant 

increase in domestic uranium 

production. 

Absent immediate action, closures of 

the few remaining U.S. uranium mining, 

milling, and conversion facilities are 

anticipated within the next few years. 

Further decreases in U.S. uranium 

production and capacity, including 

domestic fuel fabrication, will cause 

even higher levels of U.S. dependence 

on imports, especially from Russia, 

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and China. 

Increased imports from SOEs in those 

countries, and in particular Russia and 

China, which the 2017 National 

Security Strategy noted present a direct 

challenge to U.S. influence, are 

detrimental to the national security.154

The high risk of loss of the remaining 

U.S. domestic uranium industry, if the 

present excessive level of imports 

continue, threatens to impair the 

national security as defined by Section 

232. 

The Secretary has determined that to 

remove the threat of impairment to 

national security, it is necessary to 

reduce imports of uranium to a level 

that enables U.S. uranium producers to 

return to an economically competitive 

and financially viable position. This 

will allow the industry to sustain 

production capacity, hire and maintain 

a skilled workforce, make needed 

capital expenditures, and perform 

necessary research and development 

activities. A modest reduction of 

uranium imports will allow for the 

revival of U.S. uranium mining and 

milling, the restart of the sole U.S. 

uranium converter, and a reduction in 

import challenges to fuel fabricators, 

while also recognizing the market and 

pricing challenges confronting the U.S. 

nuclear power utilities. 

Recommendation 

Due to the threat to the national 

security, as defined in Section 232, from 

excessive uranium imports, the 

Secretary recommends that the 

President take immediate action by 

adjusting the level of these imports 

through implementation of an import 

waiver to achieve a phased-in reduction 

of uranium imports. The reduction in 

imports of uranium should be sufficient 

to enable U.S. producers to recapture 

and sustain a market share of U.S. 

uranium consumption that will allow 

for financial viability, and enable the 

maintenance of a skilled workforce and 

the production capacity and uranium 

output needed for national defense and 

critical infrastructure requirements. The 

reduction imposed should be sufficient 

to enable U.S. producers to eventually 

supply 25 percent of U.S. utilities’ 

uranium needs based on 2018 U.S. U308 

concentrate annual consumption 

requirements. 

Based on the survey responses, the 

Department has determined that U.S. 

uranium producers require an amount 

equivalent to 25 percent of U.S. nuclear 

power utilities’ 2018 annual U308 

concentrate consumption to ensure 

financial viability. Based on the 

Department’s analysis, if U.S.-mined 

uranium supplied 25 percent of U.S. 

nuclear power utilities’ annual U308 

concentrate consumption, U.S. uranium 

prices will increase to approximately 

$55 per pound (see Figure 71). The 

current spot price is low due to 

distortions from SOEs. 


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41600 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

The $55 per pound price will increase 

mine capacity to the point where U.S. 

uranium mines can supply 

approximately 6 million pounds of 

uranium concentrate per year, which is 

approximately 25 percent of U.S. 

nuclear power utilities’ consumption for 

U308 concentrate in any given year. 

The Secretary recommends that the 

import reduction be phased in over a 

five-year period. This will allow U.S. 

uranium mines, mills, and converters to 

reopen or expand closed or idled 

facilities; hire, train and maintain a 

skilled workforce; and make necessary 

investments in new capacity. This 

phased-in approach will also allow U.S. 

nuclear power utilities time to adjust 

and diversify their fuel procurement 

contracts to reintroduce U.S. uranium 

into their supply chains. 

The Secretary recommends that either 

a targeted or global quota be used to 

adjust the level of imports and that such 

quota should be in effect for a duration 

sufficient to allow the necessary time 

needed to stabilize and revitalize the 

U.S. uranium industry. According to 

survey responses, the average time to 

restart an idle uranium production 

facility is two to five years, and several 

additional years are needed to add new 

capacity. Market certainty, which can be 

provided by long-term contracts with 

U.S. nuclear power utilities, is needed 

to build cash flow, pay down debt, and 

raise capital for site modernization; 

workforce recruitment; and to conduct 

environmental and regulatory reviews. 

Option 1—Targeted Zero Quota 

This targeted zero quota option would 

prohibit imports of uranium from 

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and China (the 

‘‘SOE countries’’) to enable U.S. 

uranium producers to supply 

approximately 25 percent of U.S. 

nuclear power utility consumption. A 

U.S. nuclear power utility or other 

domestic user would be eligible for a 

waiver that allows the import of 

uranium from the SOE countries, with 

any import of uranium from Russia 

subject to the Russian Suspension 

Agreement, after such utility or user 

files appropriate documentation with 

the Department. In the case of a U.S. 

nuclear power utility, the 

documentation must show that such 

utility has a contract or contracts to 

purchase for their consumption on an 

annual basis not less than the 

percentage of U.S. produced uranium 

U308 concentrate shown in the phasein table below. 

PERCENT OF ANNUAL U308 CONCENTRATE CONSUMPTION REQUIRED TO BE SOURCED FROM THE U.S. 

Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 and 

beyond 

Percent of Annual U308 Concentrate Consumption Required to be Sourced from the U.S. ..... 5 10 15 20 25 

Phased-in incrementally over five 

years, this option will help facilitate the 

reopening and expansion of U.S. 

uranium mining, milling, and 

conversion facilities, and will ensure 

that U.S. uranium producers can make 

investments required for future financial 

viability without causing unintentional 

harm to other market economy uranium 

producers. This option avoids undue 

financial harm to U.S. nuclear power 

utilities by affording them sufficient 

time to adjust their fuel procurement 

strategies. 

The zero quota on uranium imports 

from SOE countries would not apply to 

uranium imports from SOE countries for 

use by U.S. milling, conversion, 


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$90 

$80 

$70 

a $60 en 

~ $50 .a . .... 

~ $40 

C. 

*$30 

$20 

$10 

so 

0.0 

Figure 71: U.S. Uranium Supply Curve 

Current u.s. usoa 

concentrate price {"'$40). 

Approximate optimal 

price ($55/lb.) to ensure 

economic viability. 

~~~~-----·· 

• Uranium spot price "'$25 

(April 1, 2019) 

An increase of $15/lb. would increase 

U.S. US08 concentrate production by 

"'5.5 million lbs. 

2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 

Pounds supplied (Millions) 

I Assumes only production at currently permitted mines. 

Source: US. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, FrontEnd Survey, Tab 4b 

12.0 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41601 

enrichment, and fuel fabrication 

services’ that produce uranium products 

for export from the United States. A U.S. 

milling, conversion, enrichment, or fuel 

fabricator seeking to import uranium 

from an SOE country for use to produce 

uranium products for export would 

need to file appropriate documentation 

with the Department to obtain a waiver 

for the import of such uranium for 

export. 

The Secretary believes that this option 

to impose a zero quota for imports of 

uranium from SOE countries, while 

continuing to allow unrestricted 

importation of uranium from Canada, 

Australia, and EURATOM member 

countries based on their security and 

economic relationships with the United 

States, should address the threatened 

impairment of U.S. national security. 

This would be accomplished by 

promoting the economic revival of the 

U.S. uranium industry, so long as there 

is not significant transshipment or 

reprocessing of SOE country uranium 

through these unrestricted countries. 

The Department will monitor these 

unrestricted imports to ensure there is 

not significant transshipment, 

reprocessing, or book transfers from 

SOE countries to unrestricted countries 

in an attempt to circumvent and 

undermine the U.S. uranium producers’ 

ability to provide 25 percent of U.S. 

annual U308 concentrate consumption. 

Many companies in unrestricted 

countries supply uranium sourced from 

SOE countries. Consequently, up to onethird of the materials delivered to U.S. 

nuclear power utilities, at this time, are 

not sourced directly from the country of 

import. 

Imports of uranium from Russia under 

a waiver would also be subjected to the 

Russian Suspension Agreement. This 

option assumes that such agreement 

will continue to be in effect over the 

relevant time period and would apply to 

any Russian uranium imports by U.S. 

nuclear power utilities, thus holding 

Russian uranium imports to their 

current level of approximately 20 

percent of U.S. enrichment demand. In 

the event that the Russian Suspension 

Agreement is not extended and 

terminates, then the Secretary 

recommends that a quota on uranium 

imports under a waiver of Russian 

Uranium Products (as defined in the 

Russian Suspension Agreement) of up to 

15 percent of U.S. enrichment demand 

be imposed. If adopted this quota would 

be administered by the Department in 

the same manner as the Russian 

Suspension Agreement is presently 

administered. 

The adjustment of imports proposed 

under this option would be in addition 

to any applicable antidumping or 

countervailing duties collections. 

To complement the proposed trade 

action, the Secretary recommends that 

the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission (FERC) act promptly to 

ensure that regulated wholesale power 

market regulations adequately 

compensate nuclear and other fuelsecure generation resources. 

Specifically, FERC should determine 

whether current market rules, which 

discriminate against secure nuclear fuel 

generation resources in favor of 

intermittent resources, such as natural 

gas, solar, and wind, result in unjust, 

unreasonable, and unduly 

discriminatory rates that distort energy 

markets, harm consumers, and 

undermine electric reliability. If so, 

FERC should consider taking 

appropriate action to ensure that rates 

are just and reasonable. 

The Department of Commerce, in 

consultation with other appropriate 

departments and agencies, will monitor 

the status of the U.S. uranium industry 

and the effectiveness of this remedy and 

will make recommendations to the 

President regarding whether it should 

be modified, extended, or terminated. 

Option 2—Global Zero Quota 

This option would establish a zero 

quota on imports of uranium from all 

countries until specific conditions are 

met to enable U.S. producers to supply 

25 percent of U.S. nuclear power 

utilities’ annual consumption of 

uranium U308 concentrate. A U.S. 

nuclear power utility or other domestic 

user would be eligible for a waiver to 

import uranium from any country after 

submitting appropriate documentation 

to the Department. In the case of a U.S. 

nuclear power utility, the 

documentation must show that such 

utility has a contract or contracts to 

purchase for their consumption on an 

annual basis not less than the 

percentage of U.S. produced uranium 

U308 concentrate shown in the phasein table below. 

PERCENT OF ANNUAL U308 CONCENTRATE CONSUMPTION REQUIRED TO BE SOURCED FROM THE U.S. 

Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 and 

beyond 

Percent of Annual U308 Concentrate Consumption Required to be Sourced from the U.S. ..... 5 10 15 20 25 

Phased-in incrementally over five 

years, this option will help facilitate the 

reopening and expansion of U.S. 

uranium mining, milling, and 

conversion facilities, and will ensure 

that U.S. uranium producers can make 

investments required for future financial 

viability. This option avoids undue 

financial harm to U.S. nuclear power 

utilities by affording them sufficient 

time to adjust their fuel procurement 

strategies. 

The zero quota on uranium imports 

would not apply to uranium imports for 

use by U.S. milling, conversion, 

enrichment, and fuel fabrication 

services’ that produce uranium products 

for export from the United States. A U.S. 

milling, conversion, enrichment, or fuel 

fabricator seeking to import uranium for 

use to produce uranium products for 

export would need to file appropriate 

documentation with the Department to 

obtain a waiver for the import of 

uranium for export. 

The Department will provide 

adequate time for U.S. industry to 

receive a waiver prior to a zero quota 

being implemented globally. Based on 

information received during the 

investigation, the Department believes 

that this option will not cause undue 

burdens. 

The Secretary believes that this option 

to impose a zero quota for imports of 

uranium will address the threatened 

impairment of U.S. national security by 

promoting the economic revival of the 

U.S. uranium industry. This option also 

prevents the possibility of 

transshipment of SOE overproduction 

through third countries and avoids 

undue harm to U.S. enrichment and fuel 

fabrication export operations. These 

domestic export operations rely on an 

ability to access working uranium stock 

regardless of the specific mining origin 

of a given uranium-based material. 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 

purchases of Canadian UO3 natural 

uranium diluent in its execution of the 

National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s current highlyenriched uranium (HEU) down-blending 

campaign would be excluded from the 

zero quota on imports of uranium. In 

addition, any transfer pursuant to a 


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41602 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

Mutual Defense Agreement that 

references special nuclear material 

would be excluded from the zero quota 

on imports of uranium. 

Imports of uranium from Russia under 

a waiver would also be governed by the 

Russian Suspension Agreement. This 

option assumes that such agreement 

will continue to be in effect over the 

relevant time period and would apply to 

any Russian uranium imports by U.S. 

nuclear power utilities, thus holding 

Russian uranium imports to their 

current level of approximately 20 

percent of U.S. enrichment demand. In 

the event that the Russian Suspension 

Agreement is not extended and 

terminates, then the Secretary 

recommends that a quota on uranium 

imports under a waiver of Russian 

Uranium Products (as defined in the 

Russian Suspension Agreement) of up to 

15 percent of U.S. enrichment demand 

be imposed. If adopted this quota would 

be administered by the Department in 

the same manner as the Russian 

Suspension Agreement is presently 

administered. 

The adjustment of imports proposed 

under this option would be in addition 

to any applicable antidumping or 

countervailing duties collections. 

To complement the proposed trade 

action, the Secretary recommends that 

the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission (FERC) act promptly to 

ensure that regulated wholesale power 

market regulations adequately 

compensate nuclear and other fuelsecure generation resources. 

Specifically, FERC should determine 

whether current market rules, which 

discriminate against secure nuclear fuel 

generation resources in favor of 

intermittent resources, such as natural 

gas, solar, and wind, result in unjust, 

unreasonable, and unduly 

discriminatory rates that distort energy 

markets, harm consumers, and 

undermine electric reliability. If so, 

FERC should consider taking 

appropriate action to ensure that rates 

are just and reasonable. 

The Department of Commerce, in 

consultation with other appropriate 

departments and agencies, will monitor 

the status of the U.S. uranium industry 

and the effectiveness of this remedy to 

determine if it should be modified, 

extended, or terminated. 

Option 3—Alternative Action 

Should the President determine that 

the threatened impairment of national 

security does not warrant immediate 

adjustment of uranium imports at this 

time but that alternative action should 

be taken to improve the condition of the 

U.S. uranium industry to enable the 

U.S. industry to supply 25 percent of 

U.S nuclear power utilities annual 

consumption of uranium U308 

concentrate, the President could direct 

the Department of Defense (DOD) and 

the Department of Energy (DOE) to 

report to the President within 90 days 

on options for increasing the economic 

viability of the domestic uranium 

mining industry. The report should 

include, but not be limited to, 

recommendations for: (1) The 

elimination of regulatory constraints on 

domestic producers; (2) incentives for 

increasing investment; and (3) ways to 

work with likeminded allies to address 

unfair trade practices by SOE countries, 

including through trade remedy actions 

and the negotiation of new rules and 

best practices. The President could also 

direct the United States Trade 

Representative to enter into negotiations 

with the SOE countries to address the 

causes of excess uranium imports that 

threaten the national security. 

To complement the proposed 

alternative action, the Secretary 

recommends that the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC) act 

promptly to ensure that regulated 

wholesale power market regulations 

adequately compensate nuclear and 

other fuel-secure generation resources. 

Specifically, FERC should determine 

whether current market rules, which 

discriminate against secure nuclear fuel 

generation resources in favor of 

intermittent resources, such as natural 

gas, solar, and wind, result in unjust, 

unreasonable, and unduly 

discriminatory rates that distort energy 

markets, harm consumers, and 

undermine electric reliability. If so, 

FERC should consider taking 

appropriate action to ensure that rates 

are just and reasonable. 

The Department of Commerce, in 

consultation with other appropriate 

departments and agencies, will monitor 

the status of the U.S. uranium industry 

and the effectiveness of this remedy and 

recommend to the President if any 

additional measures are needed. 

Alternatively, the Secretary may initiate 

another investigation under Section 232. 

B. Economic Impact of 25 Percent U.S.- 

Origin Requirement 

The Department analyzed the 

economic impact of a 25 percent U.S.- 

origin uranium concentrate requirement 

on the U.S. uranium mining industry as 

well as U.S. nuclear power utilities. The 

Department’s analysis and modeling 

indicates that U.S. uranium mining and 

milling will substantially benefit from 

the 25 percent U.S.-origin uranium 

concentrate requirement and will return 

to an economically competitive and 

financially viable industry. U.S. nuclear 

power utilities will experience only 

marginal increases in fuel costs and 

slight decreases in revenue due to usage 

of U.S.-origin uranium concentrate for 

25 percent of their fuel supply. 

The Department’s analysis indicates if 

Option 1 or 2 is implemented, U.S. 

uranium producers between 2020 and 

2024 will see a substantial increase in 

their production compared to the 

projected 2019 level of 331,000 pounds 

U3O8 equivalent (see Figure 72). 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41603 

Over the five-year implementation, 

U.S. uranium concentrate producers, 

including mines and mills, will see 

prices rise to a level that will support 

sustained production of approximately 

6 million pounds U3O8 equivalent per 

year, or 25 percent of U.S. concentrate 

requirements based on 2018 data. 

[TEXT REDACTED] By acquiring 

more U.S.-origin uranium concentrate, 

U.S. utilities will need to have at least 

some of that material converted 

domestically. [TEXT REDACTED] 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–P 


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Figure 72. Projected U.S. Uranium Concentrate Production 

and Per-Pound Price, 2020-2024 

Price Per Pound Given Projected U.S. Demand 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Front-End Survey, Q4B 

13 respondents 
41604 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

[TEXT REDACTED] Preserving 

ConverDyn’s conversion capacity is 

imperative to preserving the U.S.’s 

entire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, 

particularly as DOE looks to build a new 

enrichment facility in the coming 

decades. 

U.S. utilities will experience only 

marginal effects from the 25 percent 

U.S.-origin requirement. Due to reactor 

retirements, overall uranium 

requirements are expected to decrease 

by approximately 6.9 percent over the 

next five years (see Figure 74). 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–C 

Based on this projected level of 

consumption, the Department’s 

modelling indicates that a 25 percent 

U.S.-origin requirement will increase 

aggregate utility fuel costs by $120.1 

million, or 13.72 percent, between 2020 


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[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

[TEXT REDACTED] 

rTEXT REDACTEDl 

Figure 74. U.S. Utility Uranium Requirements, 2018; Projected 2019-2024 

5l. 

49.0 

Aggregate uranium requirements are expected to decrease by 

3.6 million pounds U308 by 2024. This assumes 8 reactor 

closings and 2 new openings. 

Other potential reactor openings may ba possible if U.S. 

Government loan guarantees, FERC action, and other 

initiatives are pursued. 

47,1 47.1 

46.5 46,6 

4'1,.1 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Nuclear Power Generator Survey, Q3B 

98 reactors 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41605 

and 2024. This is based on aggregated utility fuel costs of nearly $900 million 

in 2018 (see Figure 75). 

On a per-reactor basis, the 25 percent 

U.S.-origin requirement will increase 

fuel costs by approximately $1.3 

million, or 13.76 percent, between 2020 

and 2024. This calculation is based on 

overall fuel reactor costs of nearly $9.2 

million per reactor in 2018 (see Figure 

76). 


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Figure 75. U.S. Utility Aggregate Change in Projected Operating Costs: 

Phased-In 25 Percent U.S. Origin Requirement, 2020-2024 

Incorporates U308 Concentrate 

25% U.S. origin comentlncreaMsannuel utility operetlng costtl by 1.2'1!.• 

, ... -··· . . ······~-- --..... -·····- ....... , ........ , ....... -·· ., . -·· ... , --- , ..... ,, .... -·.. .... . . ··- .............. , ..... ... .. ,,,_...._,,_,-.,~-,~._,,,,-.-...""' -.,-,-. .. ~-,,.,....,._,_ ,,_ ·•····"'"' ... ~~--""''-"~ --"~ ~ ---- .. •"1⁄4.~~---- ► -~,--,.., ' -~-----,- , ., .. , ' --- ... , .. , '-····~ ... ················ ... . •······ .. . . .... I .. , ,,,.;:·· , .. ,.,··••·•··••·•c•::·,., .• ·••·~.:::····::, .:.:,,.,.. •••··•··••:.··•··'·••.•·•··••·•••·•··•··•• L.'.·••·•••••·>·•:·•··••···•··••··· :i .... _$1 ___ _ 

,., ........•............. , , .....• ,.. _, 

, ... , ... , ... -. ' 

____ ., .. ,-.,.,.. ., 

·······" ' , ..... -...... .., 

_,,,,,,.,~"-'""" ~ 

,.......... ., 

'""""""'''"'· "' 

2020-21 2022·23 

5% U.S. Content 

2021,22 

10% U.S. Content 15% U.S. Content 

2023-24 

20% U.S. Content 

1 -oenotn difference 1 ■ 2018 Utility Costs ■ 2020-2024 Projected U.S. Content Costs 

2024-25 

25% U.S. Content 

**This includes financial data for both utilities reporting at 1he. mmpany-wide level as well as nuclear-specificopNating 

units. EXT REDACTED] were not included due to imp.roper! submitted data 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Nuclear Power Generator Survey, Q98Q 

20 respondents 
41606 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

On a per-megawatt hour (MWh) basis, 

the Department’s data shows that U.S. 

nuclear electric utilities have 

experienced declining average net 

revenues since 2014. Between 2014 and 

2016, average net revenues per MWh 

dropped from $23.60 to $15.00, a 36.4 

percent decline. However, average net 

revenues have recovered since 2016. 

U.S. nuclear electric utilities reported 

an average per-MWh net revenue of 

$15.00 in 2018 (see Figure 77). 


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Figure 76. U.S. Utility Per-Reactor Change in Projected Fuel Costs: I 

Phased-In 25 Percent U.S. Origin Requirement, 2020-2024 I 

U308 Concentrate Consum tion 

$1l.O " A 25% u.s. ongm contentrequnmentin«Nsennnualutility twt c,osnperreactorby 13.8% 

,_ 

~ &! $10.5 

$9.,0 

$8,S 

•Denotes difference 

Th = Thousand 

M=Million 

··············1·•··-.· 

-· .. ,.•.•·····~•··-· ., 

,....._.__,...,,._..., "' 

.•.. -...•.....•..••..•.•.•.....•••.••... ·•··· 

2020-21 2021-22 2022·23 2023-24 

5% U.S. Content 10% U.S. Content 15% U.S. Content 20% U.S. Content 

112018 Utility Costs • 2020-2024 Projected U.S. Content Costs 

2024-25 

25% U.S. Content 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Nuclear Power GeneratorSurvey, Q98-Q 

*ITEXT REDACTED] were not included due to improperly submitted data. 

95 reactors"' 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41607 

A similar trend can be observed on a 

per kilowatt-hour (KWh) basis. U.S. 

utility per-KWh revenues fell from 

$0.024 in 2014 to just $0.009 in 2016 

before increasing to $0.015 in 2018 (see 

Figure 78): 


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$70 

Figure 77. U.S. Utility Average Revenue and Operating Costs 

Per MWh, 2014-2018 

Despite decreasing average revenue per MWh, utilities on average 

continue to have positive net revenues per MWh. 2018 averaged 

the lhlrd highest average net revenue per MWh of the surveyed 

.. . years. Total operating costs per MWh is on a downward trend. 

so ................. ······~ 

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 

-Average Revenue per MWh 

-Average Net Revenue 

-Total Operating Costs per MWh 

*"'Excludes [TEXT REDACTED] 

Source: US. Department of Commerce, Bureau of l ndustry and Security, Nuclear Power Generator Survey, Q6C 

20respondents 
41608 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

The Department’s analysis also 

projected the U.S.-origin requirement 

through 2024. The Department’s 

analysis concludes that U.S. utility 

operating costs per MWh will increase 

to $34.45 in 2024, a small 1.29 percent 

increase over the projected 2020 cost of 

$34.01. U.S. utility average net revenues 

per MWh will drop slightly to $14.50, 

a marginal 3.4 percent decline 

compared to projected 2020 net 

revenues of $15.01 (see Figure 79). 


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$0.07 

Figure 78. U.S. Utility Average Revenue and Operating Costs 

Per KWh, 2014-2018 

2014 

Despite decreasing average revenue per KWh, Utilities on average 

continue to have posilive net revenues per KWh. 2018 averaged 

the tlird highest average net revenue per KWh of Ille surveyed 

years. Total operating costs per KWh is on a downward trend. 

2015 2016 

....,_Average Revenue per KWh 

.-Average Net Revenue 

-Total Operating Costs per KWh 

2017 2018 

**[TEXT REDACTED] 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Nuclear Power Generator Survey, Q6C 

20 respondents 
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 41609 

155Section V of the January 1989 Section 232 

investigation into crude oil and refined petroleum 

imports contained several non-trade policy 

recommendations to be executed by Congress or 

other Federal departments. These recommendations 

included implementation of an oil and gas leasing 

plan, opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 

to oil exploration, oil and gas licensing reform, and 

technical tax changes. U.S. Department of 

Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration; ‘‘The 

Effect of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Product 

Imports On The National Security’’; January 1989. 

156 In 2005, the Department of Energy (DOE) 

announced that it would set aside 17.4 metric tons 

of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for conversion to 

low-enriched uranium (LEU) that could be released 

to nuclear power generators in times of national 

emergency. 

157Notice of Availability: American Assured Fuel 

Supply. The Federal Register/FIND. Vol. 76. 

Washington: Federal Information & News Dispatch, 

Inc., 2011. http://search.proquest.com/docview/ 

884208970/. 

158U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

Highlights of GAO–17–472T, a testimony before the 

Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. 

Senate, 5. (Washington, DC: Mar. 8, 2017). https:// 

www.gao.gov/assets/690/683764.pdf. 

C. Public Policy Proposals 

The Secretary finds that the effect of 

imported uranium on the national 

security can only be addressed through 

targeted Section 232 remedies. The 

Secretary has noted that the U.S. 

uranium industry and nuclear power 

generators face other non-trade 

challenges that hinder their ability to 

remain financially solvent and 

economically competitive. 

These challenges, as discussed in 

Chapters VI and VII, include the 

premature shutdown of U.S. reactors, 

competition from natural gas-fired 

generators, and subsidized renewable 

energy sources. In addition, the nuclear 

power industry is hindered by 

electricity market rules that do not 

consider nuclear energy’s unique 

operational attributes. To address these 

issues, the Secretary advances the 

following public policy proposals for 

discussion which complement the 

Section 232 remedies identified in this 

investigation.155

(1) Expansion of the American Assured 

Fuel Supply (AFS) 

The Department of Energy maintains 

a reserve of enriched uranium for 

nuclear power generators known as the 

American Assured Fuel Supply (AFS), 

which is an emergency source of fuel for 

both U.S. and foreign nuclear power 

plants.156 The AFS currently includes 

230 metric tons of LEU, only enough 

material to reload six average nuclear 

reactors once (the U.S. has 98 

reactors).157 DOE should increase the 

AFS’s inventory to 500 metric tons of 

LEU, enough to fuel 13 reactors in the 

U.S. and allied countries. This could 

supplement the [TEXT REDACTED] 

average inventory U.S. nuclear power 

utilities already maintain (see Figure 

66). The LEU procured for the AFS 

should come from newly mined, 

converted, and enriched U.S.-origin 

uranium. 

(2) Adoption of a Domestic Uranium 

Purchase Tax Credit 

Congress should institute a tax credit 

for domestic uranium purchases for a 

five-year period. Under this proposal, 

U.S. nuclear power generators would 

receive a fixed dollar amount-per pound 

tax credit for purchasing uranium 

mined in the United States. The credit 

would be claimable in the tax year in 

which the nuclear power generator takes 

delivery of the material. 

(3) Continue the Moratorium on DOE 

Stockpile Sales 

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

the DOE possesses authority to sell or 

transfer its stockpiles to other parties.158

DOE has used this authority to pay for 

cleanup efforts at the Portsmouth 

Gaseous Diffusion Facility. While DOE’s 


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Figure 79. U.S. Utility Average Revenue and Operating Costs I 

Per MWh, 2014-2018 and Projections to 2024 ] 

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 

-Average Revenue pa- MWh 5%U.S. 10%U.S. 15%U.S. 20%U.S. 25%U.S. 

lllillllllllAvemge Net Revenue eontent Content Content Content content 

-Total Operating Costs per MWh 

"'"'Excludes [TEXT REDACTED] 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bure.au of Industry .and Security, Nuclear Power Gener.at or Survey, Q6C 

21 respondents 
41610 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 145 / Monday, August 2, 2021 / Notices 

determination process evaluates 

whether DOE transfers are having a 

material effect on the industry, 

respondents to the Department’s 2019 

uranium survey have reported that 

DOE’s uranium transfer program has 

negatively impacted uranium producers’ 

business. Congress should block further 

transfers of DOE stockpile material. 

(4) State Adoption of Zero Emissions 

Credits 

Implement zero emissions credits 

(ZEC) to compensate nuclear power 

generators for the value of the zeroemissions electricity that they produce. 

ZECs will help nuclear generators fairly 

compete against renewable sources such 

as solar and wind, which are subsidized 

through the federal production tax 

credit (PTC) and similar state subsidies. 

ZECs, if adopted by more states, may 

halt some current U.S. reactor 

retirements and solidify utility demand 

for U.S.-produced uranium. 

(5) Mandate That Federal Departments 

and Agencies Use Nuclear Power 

The Federal government can support 

U.S. nuclear power generation by 

requiring Federal departments and 

agencies to purchase an average of 20 

percent of their power from nuclear 

power plants for a period of five years 

at a fixed price. This would provide 

predictable demand for nuclear power 

generators. 

(6) Expand the Responsibilities of the 

Nuclear Materials Management and 

Safeguard Systems (NMMSS) 

The 123 Agreements do not require 

tracking and reporting of ‘‘mining 

origin’’ data for nuclear material subject 

to peaceful use provisions. Furthermore, 

the domestic U.S. operators are not 

required to report origin data to NMMSS 

for imports, exports, and other nuclear 

material inventory changes. 

NMMSS, as the national U.S. system 

of nuclear material accounting, can add 

the capability to track mining origin 

data. However, this outcome required 

changes impacting NRC regulations, 123 

Agreements, and industry practices. 

The Secretary recommends that the 

NRC and NNSA work with the 

Departments of Commerce, Defense, 

Energy, Homeland Security, and Justice 

to examine potential options and 

mechanisms to enable the reporting of 

origin data to NMMSS, and to 

coordinate with NMMSS to identify 

actions necessary for changes to the 

system. 

Matthew S. Borman, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2021–16113 Filed 7–30–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–33–P 


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