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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 39818

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BRANDON NEIL CRUMP,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 549

Filed: June 24, 2013

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,

Bonner County. Hon. Steven C. Verby, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine by 

manufacturing, affirmed. 

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

MELANSON, Judge

Brandon Neil Crump appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in 

methamphetamine by attempted manufacturing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

In 2011, Crump was charged with one count of trafficking in methamphetamine or 

amphetamine by manufacturing and one count of felony injury to a child. Pursuant to a plea 

agreement, Crump pled guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted manufacture, I.C. 

§§ 37-2732B(a)(3) and 18-204, and the state dismissed the charge of felony injury to a child. 

Crump filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. The district court denied 

the motion and sentenced Crump to a unified term of four years, with a minimum period of 

confinement of two years. Crump appeals. 

Crump argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea. Specifically, Crump contends the district court’s factual finding that Crump 
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understood his guilty plea would expose him to a mandatory minimum sentence of two years is 

not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 

Whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district 

court and such discretion should be liberally applied. State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121, 714 

P.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 1986). Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is 

limited to determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as 

distinguished from arbitrary action. Id. We defer to a trial court’s factual findings if supported 

by substantial and competent evidence in the record. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 789, 948 

P.2d 127, 144 (1997).

In denying Crump’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court stated:

I am familiar with the required standard on appeal examining this type of 

decision that an appeal from the denial of such a motion to allow the withdrawal 

of a guilty plea results in the burden being on the moving party--in this case Mr. 

Crump--to establish that there is a claimed abuse of discretion. 

I further recognize that in the proper exercise of discretion, the Court is 

required to identify the conflicting factors which should bear on the decision and 

must arrive at a resolution which is based on a well-reasoned consideration of the 

factors that have been identified. 

So what do we have in this situation? We have Mr. Crump who entered a 

plea of guilty in front of Judge Reinhardt. The issue presented initially--and I’ll 

cover that--is, is there an agreement? Well, there is an agreement. It’s a written--

it’s a written agreement that appears to me to be written, but the agreement does 

appear to be ambiguous, at least in certain respects.

If there is ambiguity, which there appears to be, that ambiguity can be 

clarified by what I’m going to characterize as parts of the oral agreement.

Now, Mr. Crump testified that he knew that he was ineligible for a 

retained jurisdiction. He testified that he knew that he was facing a fixed term in 

prison of two years by agreeing to the amended plea agreement. So instead of 

facing five years in prison as a minimum, he was facing two years in prison as a 

minimum.

I could go ahead and simply state at this point that he did know what he 

was getting into when he entered the plea of guilty. 

The plea agreement, signed by Crump, indicated the state agreed to amend the charge of 

trafficking in methamphetamine, carrying a sentence of “5 fixed-Life,” to trafficking in 

methamphetamine by attempted manufacture, carrying a sentence of “2 fixed-15 years.” This 

agreement also indicated the state would limit its sentencing recommendation to a unified term 
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of four years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years. At the change of plea 

hearing, the following exchange took place:

[COURT] Okay. So an amended information has been filed in this 

case charging you, Mr. Crump with trafficking--or attempting to 

manufacturing a methamphetamine or amphetamine by extracting 

ephedrine or pseudoephedrine and making it into 

methamphetamine. 

Do you understand what they say you did?

[CRUMP] Yes, sir.

[COURT] Is the punishment two to 15 years and a fine from 10 to 

50,000? Is that--

[PROSECUTOR] That is correct, Your Honor.

[COUNSEL] Yes, sir. 

[COURT] Okay. Do you understand that’s the maximum punishment 

that can be imposed in the event that you plead guilty to this 

offense?

[CRUMP] Yes, Your Honor.

[PROSECUTOR] And it’s a fixed minimum of two.

[COURT] Okay. So that’s a fixed two followed by an indeterminate 

13. So two to 15.

Do you understand that?

[CRUMP] Yes, sir.

At the hearing on Crump’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the following exchange took 

place:

[PROSECUTOR] Okay. And is it your testimony that [Counsel] 

never told you that this was a mandatory minimum prison sentence 

case?

[CRUMP] Um, can you repeat that again, please?

[PROSECUTOR] Are you telling us that she never once told you that 

you were looking at a mandatory minimum prison sentence?

[CRUMP] She said that I was not eligible for a Rider. That’s what she 

told me.

[PROSECUTOR] Okay. What did she talk to you about the prison 

sentence?

[CRUMP] Nothing.

[PROSECUTOR] Okay. So she told you, though, you’re not eligible 

for a Rider?

. . . . 

So if your attorney tells you you are not eligible for a 

retained jurisdiction, why is it you’re here today saying that you 

thought you were?

[CRUMP] Because when I looked at the plea agreement that I signed--

that I was signing, that it didn’t say that on there. 
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[PROSECUTOR] It didn’t say what?

[CRUMP] That is was a mandatory minimum.

[PROSECUTOR] Okay. What does “two years fixed” mean to you, 

sir?

. . . . 

[CRUMP] Two years fixed? That means that I would do two years.

[PROSECUTOR] Okay. No confusion. Right?

[CRUMP] Mm-hmm.

[PROSECUTOR] And when the Judge talked to you at your 

sentencing hearing or at your plea hearing, he covered that several 

times. Right?

. . . . 

[CRUMP] Can you repeat it now?

[PROSECUTOR] At the time that you pled guilty to this offense--

[CRUMP] Mm-hmm.

[PROSECUTOR] --the Judge covered the fact that it was a fixed two 

several times, didn’t he?

[CRUMP] Yeah.

[PROSECUTOR] You didn’t express any confusion, did you?

[CRUMP] No.

This review of the record demonstrates the district court’s factual finding that Crump understood 

his guilty plea would expose him to a mandatory minimum sentence of two years is supported by 

substantial and competent evidence. Therefore, Crump has not demonstrated the district court 

abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, Crump’s 

judgment of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted manufacturing is 

affirmed. 

Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge LANSING, CONCUR.