alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

Subsection (d) is somewhat different but not materially.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

August 20, 2002 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE, EX REL. HEATHER R. MIDDLETON v.

STANLEY COCHRAN

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Hamilton County

No. 23674 

FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2002

No. E2002-00164-COA-R3-JV 

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I vote to affirm the trial court’s judgment. I write separately to express my view that while

private school tuition for a minor child is obviously an expense incurred by a parent for the benefit

of the child, I do not believe the legislature intended to include this “extraordinary” expense as a part

of the concept of the “child support ordered pursuant to a previous order of child suport for other

children,” as that concept is embodied in Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. ch. 1240-2-4-.03(4) (emphasis

added).

In Barnett v. Barnett, 27 S.W.3d 904 (Tenn. 2000), the Supreme Court differentiated – in

my opinion, very carefully – between percentage child support and the add-on for “extraordinary

educational expenses.” I believe this is in keeping with the language of Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. ch.

1240-2-4-.04, “Criteria for Deviation from Guidelines,” in which the subsections of the rule provide

that each of the additional expenses “shall be added to the percentage calculated in the above rule.”1

The “Guidelines for Calculating Child Support Awards,” see Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. ch.

1240-2-4-.03, provide a precise step-by-step calculation leading to the “percentage” amount of child

support. This includes a detailed calculation of “net income.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. ch. 1240-2-

4-.03(4). It seems logical to me that if one is trying to determine net income for the purpose of

arriving at “percentage” child support, one would only deduct the “percentage” child support for

other children and not the “percentage” child support with the add-on of “extraordinary educational

expenses.”
-2-

I agree with the majority opinion that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial

court’s setting of prospective child support at $133 per week. Certainly, I find no abuse of discretion

in this award. Except as indicated in this separate opinion, I concur in the majority opinion.

___________________________________ 

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
<PAGE>   1
                                                                  EXHIBIT 23.1

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS





We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 33-80325) pertaining to the CORESTAFF, Inc. Long-Term Incentive Plan,
Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-3030) pertaining to the CORESTAFF, Inc.
Employee Stock Purchase Plan, Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-46347)
pertaining to the Metamor Technologies, Ltd. Restricted Stock Plan, and the
Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-31509) of Metamor Worldwide, Inc.
(formerly CORESTAFF, Inc.) and related Prospectuses of our report dated February
10, 1998, except as to Note 13 as to which the date is March 19, 1998, with
respect to the consolidated financial statements of Metamor Worldwide, Inc.
included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 1997.



                                                       ERNST & YOUNG LLP


Houston, Texas
March 26, 1998
**EXHIBIT 10.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED**

 

**PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT**

 

We,Jamie FT Dundas (Chief Executive) and Stephen J East (Finance Director) of MEPC Limited, do hereby certify that to the best of our knowledge the Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended September 30, 2002 of MEPC Limited (the “AnnualReport”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of MEPC Limited. 

 

INWITNESS WHEREOF, this certificate has been executed on this 26th day of February, 2003.
#### In the Matter of Shawn D.R.-S., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant. Wayne County Attorney, Respondent.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[942 NYS2d 913]

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Wayne County (Dennis M. Kehoe, J.), entered September 19, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3. The order, among other things, placed respondent with the New York State Office of Children and Family Services upon an adjudication of juvenile delinquency.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Respondent appeals from an order adjudicating him to be a juvenile delinquent based on the finding that he committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of criminal trespass in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.15 [1]). Contrary to respondent’s contention, the evidence presented at the hearing, when viewed in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, is legally sufficient to establish that respondent was not licensed or privileged to be in or upon the premises *(see*§ 140.00 [5]; *People v Daniels,*8 AD3d 1022, 1023 [2004], *lv denied*3 NY3d 705 [2004]; *see generally Matter of David H.,*69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]). The testimony of the three residents of the home in question established that respondent entered the home through the locked back door, that respondent was located on the second floor of the home and that none of the residents gave respondent permission to enter or remain inside the home *(see generally Daniels,*8 AD3d at 1023; *People v Matuszek,*300 AD2d 1131, 1131-1132 [2002], *lv denied*99 NY2d 630 [2003]; *cf. Matter of Quanel M.,*8 AD3d 386, 386-387 [2004]; *Matter of Daniel B.,*2 AD3d 440, 441 *1545[2003]). We reject the further contention of respondent that Family Court’s findings are against the weight of the evidence *(see Matter of Travis D.,*1 AD3d 968, 969 [2003]). Present— Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Lindley, Sconiers and Martoche, JJ.
III 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 202 

Designating June 27, 2011, as ‘‘National Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 

Awareness Day’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 26, 2011 

Mr. CONRAD (for himself, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. ROCKEFELLER, and Mr. DURBIN) 

submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

RESOLUTION 

Designating June 27, 2011, as ‘‘National Post-Traumatic 

Stress Disorder Awareness Day’’. 

Whereas the brave men and women of the United States 

Armed Forces, who proudly serve the United States, risk 

their lives to protect the freedom of the United States 

and deserve the investment of every reasonable resource 

to ensure their lasting physical, mental, and emotional 

well-being; 

Whereas 2.4 percent of servicemembers returning from deployment to Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation 

Iraqi Freedom are clinically diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (referred to in this preamble as 

‘‘PTSD’’) and up to 17 percent of Operation Enduring 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•SRES 202 IS 

Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans exposed 

to sustained ground combat report PTSD symptoms; 

Whereas up to 10 percent of Operation Desert Storm veterans, 30 percent of Vietnam veterans, and 8 percent of 

the general population of the United States suffer or 

have suffered from PTSD; 

Whereas the Department of Veterans Affairs reports that 

more than 438,000 veterans were treated for PTSD in 

2010 alone; 

Whereas many cases of PTSD remain unreported, 

undiagnosed, and untreated due to a lack of awareness 

about PTSD and the persistent stigma associated with 

mental health issues; 

Whereas PTSD significantly increases the risk of depression, 

suicide, and drug- and alcohol-related disorders and 

deaths, especially if left untreated; 

Whereas the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs 

have made significant advances in the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of PTSD and the symptoms of 

PTSD, but many challenges remain; and 

Whereas the establishment of a National Post-Traumatic 

Stress Disorder Awareness Day will raise public awareness about issues related to PTSD and help ensure that 

those suffering from the invisible wounds of war receive 

proper treatment: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) designates June 27, 2011, as ‘‘National 

3 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Awareness Day’’; 

4 (2) urges the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and 

5 the Secretary of Defense to continue working to eduVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:42 May 27, 2011 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\SR202.IS SR202

jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
3 

•SRES 202 IS 

1 cate servicemembers, veterans, the families of 

2 servicemembers and veterans, and the public about 

3 the causes, symptoms, and treatment of post-trau4 matic stress disorder; and 

5 (3) respectfully requests that the Secretary of 

6 the Senate transmit a copy of this resolution to the 

7 Secretary of Veterans Affairs and the Secretary of 

8 Defense. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 97-3536EM

_____________

Scott Collier, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Board of Police Commissioners of the *

City of St. Louis; Anne Marie Clarke; *

Robert Haar; Charles Mischeaux; *

Matthew Padberg; Mayor Freeman * Appeal from the United States

Bosley, Jr., in their official capacities as * District Court for the Eastern

members of the Board of Police * District of Missouri.

Commissioners of the City of St. Louis; *

Clarence Harmon; Gary Sperber; Linn * [UNPUBLISHED]

Laird; Edward Halveland, in their *

official capacities as Police Officers of *

the St. Louis Metropolitan Police *

Department, *

*

Appellees. *

_____________

 Submitted: March 11, 1998

Filed: March 18, 1998

_____________

Before McMILLIAN, FAGG, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.
-2-

Scott Collier appeals the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in

a civil rights action brought by Collier after he was shot by fellow police officers when

a drug investigation erupted into a gunfight. Having reviewed the record and the

parties' briefs, we see no error by the district court. We thus affirm on the basis of the

district court's orders. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Lease Agreement





Exhibit 10.2

Lease Agreement




Aquentium, Inc. agrees to rent eight thousand square feet (8,000) square feet of office and manufacturing space located at 5188 Western Way Perris, CA 92571 from Sani-Dri, Inc.




The building is a commercial office and warehouse consisting of one level.

Office space includes: Reception area, two offices.







Term:

October 1, 2009 – September 20, 2010

Rate: .50 per square foot




Term:

October 1, 2010 – September 30, 2010

Rate: .60 per square foot




Term:

October 1, 2010 – May 2011

Rate: .75 per square foot







By:

Aquentium, Inc.




/s/ Mark Taggatz     

Mark Taggatz, President







By:

Sani-Dri, Inc.




/s/ Sherry Wilson

Sherry Wilson, President
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0001031002
<NAME>                        MERRILL LYNCH PREFERRED FUNDING II, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER>                  1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   OTHER
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-29-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                   363,939
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               363,939
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 363,939
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    309,278
<COMMON>                                        54,661
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   363,939
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 7,252
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,252
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              7,252
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     7,252
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0



</TABLE>
# C_2019363EN.01001602.xml

| 28.10.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 363/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 363/16

---

Order of the President of the General Court of 1 July 2019 — Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v Parliament

(Case T-388/19 R)

(Application for interim measures - European Parliament - Verification of the credentials - No prima facie case)

(2019/C 363/24)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: Puigdemont i Casamajó (Waterloo, Belgium) and Comín i Oliveres (Waterlo) (represented by: B. Bekaert, B. Emmerson, G. Boye and S. Bekaert, avocats)

Defendant: European Parliament

Re:

Application submitted under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU seeking, first, to suspend the implementation of various decisions of the European Parliament ordered to prevent the applicants from sitting in Parliament as elected members and, second, to direct Parliament to take all necessary measures, including a declaration of the applicants’ privileges and immunities, to enable them to sit in Parliament as from 2 July 2019

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The application for interim measures is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

| 2. | The costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The costs are reserved.

---
#### HORSTKOTTER, Respondent, v. SYRACUSE & SUBURBAN R. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

November 20, 1907.)

Action by Louise Horstkotter against the Syracuse & Suburban Railroad Company.

No opinion. Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals granted.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated balance sheets and consolidated statements of operations found on
pages F-2 and F-3 of the Company's Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended May
31, 1998, and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>
<PERIOD-TYPE>          YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                   MAY-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                        MAY-31-1998
<CASH>                                   89,542
<SECURITIES>                                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                             7,315
<ALLOWANCES>                                  0
<INVENTORY>                              85,155
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                        216,592
<PP&E>                                  116,098
<DEPRECIATION>                           45,118
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                          323,561
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                   272,513
<BONDS>                                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                         0
<PREFERRED>                                   0
<COMMON>                                  1,189
<OTHER-SE>                              (66,560)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>            323,561
<SALES>                                 146,078
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        149,582
<CGS>                                    25,414
<TOTAL-COSTS>                           292,633
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                       17,514
<INCOME-PRETAX>                        (143,051)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                    (143,051)
<DISCONTINUED>                                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               0
<CHANGES>                                     0
<NET-INCOME>                           (143,018)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                              (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                              (.02)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1


CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Fred W. Brackebusch, President, Director and Principal Financial Officer
of New Jersey Mining Company ("the Registrant") do hereby certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

     1.  This Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Registrant for the
period ended September 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.

Date:  November 12, 2003
------------------------

/s/ Fred W. Brackebusch
------------------------
Fred W. Brackebusch
President, Treasurer & Director
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1027

YILMA MEKONNEN G TSADIK, Petitioner,
versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (A97-933-047) Submitted: July 31, 2006 Decided: August 10, 2006 Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Solomon Bekele, LAW OFFICE OF SOLOMON & ASSOCIATES, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, James Hunolt, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, Teresa T. Milton, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Yilma Mekonnen G Tsadik, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals adopting and affirming the immigration judge’s denial of his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In his petition for review, Tsadik challenges the determination that he failed to establish his eligibility for asylum. To obtain reversal of a determination denying eligibility for relief, an alien “must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992). We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude that Tsadik fails to show that the evidence compels a contrary result. Accordingly, we cannot grant the relief that he seeks. Additionally, we uphold the denial of Tsadik’s request for withholding of removal. “Because the burden of proof for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum--even though the facts that must be proved are the same--an applicant who is ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).” Camara v. Ashcroft , 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004). Because Tsadik failed to show that- 3 - he is eligible for asylum, he cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of removal. Tsadik also failed to meet the standard for relief under the Convention Against Torture. To obtain such relief, an applicant must establish that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2006). Tsadik failed to make such a showing before the immigration court. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-50830 

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

REYES ZAPATA-GARCIA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. DR-99-CR-631-1-WWJ

--------------------

April 12, 2001

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and JONES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Represented by the Federal Public Defender, Reyes ZapataGarcia (Zapata), a/k/a Reyes Zapata-Sandoval, a/k/a Zapata ReyesGarcia, appeals his 63-month sentence imposed following his jurytrial conviction for illegal reentry subsequent to deportation. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

Zapata contends that the felony conviction that resulted in

his increased sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) was an element

of the offense that should have been charged in the indictment

and proved by the prosecution to the jury beyond a reasonable
No. 00-50830

-2-

doubt. Zapata acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by

the Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United

States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), but he seeks to preserve the issue

for Supreme Court review in light of the decision in Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). He also attempts to

distinguish Almendarez-Torres based on the procedure resulting in

the conviction: Zapata was convicted by a jury, and the

defendant in Almendarez-Torres was convicted pursuant to a guilty

plea. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227. The asserted

distinction is unpersuasive.

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

120 S. Ct. at 2362; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1214 (2001). Zapata’s

argument is foreclosed. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.