# FILED
March 9, 2000 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE JANUARY 2000 SESSION

JERRY L. JOHNS, ) ) Appellant, ) No. E1999-00260-CCA-R3-CD

) ) Morgan County v. ) ) Honorable E. Eugene Eblen, Jud ge ) STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Habeas corpus) ) Appellee. )

For the Appellant : For the Appellee : Joe H. Walker Michael E. Moore District Public Defender Solicitor General and and Bernard R. Sargent R. Stephen Jobe Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney Gener al of Tennessee Post Office Box 334 and Harriman, TN 37748-0334 Michael J. Fahey, II Assistant Attorney Gener al of Tennessee 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED Joseph M. Tipton Judge

O P I N I O N2 The petitioner, Jerry L. Johns, appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s deni al of habeas corpus relief. The petitioner is presently serving an effective seventy-three-year sentence for his 1987 convictions for felonious as sault with intent to comm it first degree m urder resulting in b odily injury, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery. This cour t affirmed the petitioner’s judg ments of conviction on appeal. State v. Jerry Leon J ohns , No.1145, Knox County ( Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 1988). The petitioner contends tha t he is entitled to habeas cor pus relief because the convicting court l acked jurisdiction to i mpose any sentence for a Class X felony and because the court minutes are uns igned. We affirm the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief.
A petition for the writ of habeas corpus may be brought if the judgmen t is void or the sentence has ex pired. Archer v. State , 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). If the convicting court

lacked jurisdiction or

authority to render the judgment, then the judgment is void. Dykes v. Compton , 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998); Archer , 851 S.W.2d at 164. The petitioner was convic ted in the Knox County C riminal Court for offenses occurring in Knox County. “Original jurisdiction of criminal actions is committed to the . . . criminal courts . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-107 . The trial court obviously had juri sdiction over the subject matter of the petitioner’s c ase.
The petitioner contends that the tr ial court did not have j urisdiction or authority to impose a sentence for a Class X felony because at the time of his conviction, all Cl ass X sentencing prov isions had been repealed by the Tennessee Reform Act of 1982 and the Comprehensiv e Correction Improvement A ct of 1985. A “sentence is void and illegal only if it is in direct contravention of a statute which is in existence at the time the sentence was imposed.” Taylor v. State , 995 S.W.2d 78, 84- 85 (Tenn. 1999). The petitioner w as convicted on March 5,1987, and sentenced on April 10, 1987. At the time of t he petitioner’ s convictions, aggrava ted kidnappin g, robbery by means of a deadly weapon, and assault wi th intent to commit murder resulting in bodily

injury were Cl ass X felonies. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1-702 (repealed 1989).3 The Tennessee Reform Act of 1982 stated that it governed the sentence, release eligibility and manner of service of Class X felonies committed on or afte r July 1, 1982. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112 ( b)(1)-(2) (repealed 1989). The Comprehensive Correcti on Improvement Act of 1985 applied the provisions of the Tennessee Reform Act of 1982 regarding the relea se eligibility date, manner of service and of release, and parole to defendants c ommitting Class X feloni es before July 1, 1982. Comprehensive Corr ection Improvement Act of 1985, ch. 5, §§ 7-8, 1985 Tenn. Pub. Acts 22, 23. It also extended eligibility for sentence reduction credits to Class X felons. Comprehensive Corr ection Improvement Act of 1985, ch. 5, § 12(c)(2)-(3), 1985 Tenn. Pub. Acts 22, 25. Thus, neither of these acts repealed the Class X classification. They merely requir

ed sentencing for Class X felonies to be under the 1982 act. The trial court sentenced the pet itioner as a Range II, es pecially aggrav ated offender under the 1982 act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-107(8) (repealed 1989). Th e petitioner’s sentenc es are lega l and not subject t o habeas corpus re view.

The petitioner also contends that the judgments are void bec ause the minute book entry setting forth his sentences is not si gned by the trial cour t. The copy of the minute entry attached to the habeas corpu s petition concludes as follows:

(S) GEORGE P. BALITSARIS GEORGE P. BALITSARIS, JUDGE DIVISION III CRIMINAL COURT

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-106(a) provides:

The minutes of the court for each day’ s work shall be s igne d bythe judge. The minute book shal l pr ovide a place for the judge’s signature after the minute entries

each day; however, where the orders of the court are photo copied so that an accurate facsimile of the entire order and the judge’s signature appears, it shall be suff icient for the ju dge to sign at the end of the minute book approving all the minutes in the book. In DuBoise v. State , 200 Tenn. 93, 96 , 290 S.W.2d 646, 64 7 (1956), our supreme court concluded that the statutory provision for the trial judge signing the minutes is directory rather than mandatory and that the failure to sign the minutes does not invalidate a judgment. See also State ex rel. Pierce v. Hardin , 163 Tenn. 471, 477 , 43 S.W.2d 924, 925 (1931); Jackson v. Jackson , 3 Shannon’s Cases 18, 27 (1878).4 The petitioner points to the supr eme court’s observation i n Howard v. State , 217 Tenn. 556, 561 , 399 S.W.2d 738, 740 (1966), that:

With all due respect to what has heretofore been said by this Court on the subject now before us, we are constrained to the view that so important a judicial function as authenticatingthe minute s of a Court of Record is not permi ssibly to be e ithe r lightly treated or ignored. Any other rule appears to be fraug ht with so muc h of potential mistake, mischief, and even evil doing, as to demonstrate such to be impermissible. We note, though, that Howard does not stand for the propos ition that a fa ilure to sign the minutes renders a judgment void. Cf. Rogers Lamont McKinley v. State , No. 03C01-9308-CR-00255, Hamilton County, slip op. at 4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 17, 1994) (holding that the judg e’s failure to sign the mi nutes is not a violationof a postconviction petitioner’ s constitutional rights).

Based upon the foregoing and the r ecord as a whole, we affirm the trial court’ s denial

of habeas

corpus relief.

________________________________

Joseph M. Tipto n, Judge CONCUR:

_______________________________ James Curwood W itt, Jr., Judge

_______________________________ Norma McGee Ogle, Judg e