the proceeding.’ Tempco, 819 F.2d at 74%. Where the substantive

su.t would resolve the issues raised by !

declaratory judgment
action, the declaratory judgment acticn “serve[s] no useful
purpose” because the controversy has “ripened” and the uncertainty
and anticipation of litigation are alleviated. Id.; see aiso

As

ociated Mills, Inc. v. Regina Co., Inc., 675 F. Supp. 446, 448
(N.D. ILL. 1987) (holding that filing of infringement action twelve
days after complaint for declaratory judgment “obviated the need
for a declaratory judgment in this case”); Wireless Marketing Corp.
v. Cherokee, Inc., No. 98 C 1406, 1998 WL 719944, at *4 (N.D. Tll.
Oct. 6, 1998) (same).

Here Mr. Amari seeks a declaration that his pursuit of the
“Twilight Zone” project does not breach tle consulting agreement,
and is not a breach of fiduciary duty, a usurpation of corporate
opportunity, or an interference with Radio Spirits’ expectant
business relationships. Am. Compl. @ 29. Facdio Spirits’ complaint
accuses Mr. Amari of, among other things, kreaching the consulting
agreement, Def. Ex. B, Count VIII, breaching his fiduciary duty,
Court XI, usurping corporate opportun ties, Count II, and
interfering with advantageous business relacionships, Count IX, all
based on his pursuit of the “Twilight Zone” project. See id. TI 52-
62 ‘concerning “the usurped Twilight Zone opportunity”). All of the
issues in the declaratory judgment claim will be resolved by the

substantive action, so the declaratory jucigient serves no useful


rights and other legal relations of any interested party” in a case
or controversy within my jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a)
(emphasis added). “fF]ederal courts have discretion to decline to
hear a declaratory judgment action, even though it is within their

jurisdiction.” Tempco Elec. Heater Corp. v. Omega Eng’g, Inc., 819
F.2d 746, 747 (7th Cir. 1987). Radio Spirits asks me to exercise my
discretion here and decline to hear “Mr. Amari’s declaratory
judgment claim because it serves no purocse in light of the
substantive action.

When a related substantive state action is pending at the same
time as a declaratory judgment action, concerns about forum

shopping, see Tempco, 819 F.2d at 749, the efficient allocation of

jucicial resources, comity with state courts, fairness to the

parties, see Nationwide Ins. v. Zavalis, I’. 3d 689, 692 (7th Cir.
1965), and the purpose of declaratory judgments, see Tempco, 819
F.2d at 749, come into play. Because the substantive action here
has been removed to federal court and transferred to this district,
comity and forum shopping are no longer velevant, so I consider
only whether the declaratory judgment actior, here would serve any
useful purpose and whether fairness and juciicial economy are served
by entertaining it.

“The purposes of declaratory judgments are to ‘clarify[] and

setzlf[e] the legal relations at issue’ and to ‘terminate and afford

relief from uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to


purpose. See Resource Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Continental Stock
Transfer & Trust Co., 896 F. Supp. 782, 785 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(dismissing declaratory judgment action where larger, more
comprehensive substantive action was pending in same district);
Biosite, Inc. v. Xoma Ltd., 168 F. Supp. id 1161, 1165 (N.D. Cal.
20C1) (dismissing declaratory judgment action where similar
sukstantive action, involving more claims, was pending in same
district before same judge).

Fairness to the parties and judicial economy do not weigh
heavily against dismissal of the declarato:-y judgment action here.
The only apparent inconvenience or hardship that would result from
the dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim is that Mr. Amari
will be the defendant rather than the plaintiff, but this is a
minor inconvenience. See Oce-Office Sys., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 828 F. Supp. 37, 39 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Biosite, Inc., 168 F.
Supo. 2d at 1165. Because both actions are pending before me,
judicial economy is net threatened by the pendency of both actions,
but the litigation will be streamlined by the elimination of the
unnecessary declaratory judgment claim. { therefore decline to
exercise my jurisdiction over this claim and grant the motion to
dismiss it.

IIL.
Radio Spirits also moves to dismiss Mr. Amari’s claim for

breach of the consulting agreement for .ack of subject matter



Minuter Orde Form (06 1)

+ United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Elaine &. Bucklo Sitting Judge i Other
or Magistrate Judge ~ . than Assigned Judge
CA NUMBER 02 C3130 DATE | 9/11/2002
CASE Amari vs. Radio Spirits, Inc,
TITLE
NI Lin the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, c.g.. plain(ift. Jetendant. 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly she nature
(the motion being presented. }
(A MOTION: _ :
/—~, |
DOCKET ENTRY:
a) oO Filed motion of | use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
(3) Oo Answer brief to motion duc__. Reply to answer brief due
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on _ set for _ at
(5) og Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for}on st Lor at
6 Oa Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on ___ set for at
| (7) o Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
@) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to _ at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs|by‘agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) (Local Rule 4t.1 COFRCP41(a)(1) CI FRCF41(a)(2).
ao ff {Other docket entry] i:nter Memorandum Opinion and Order granting defendant’s motion to
| disiniss this action. Any pending motion in this case is terminated as moot. All schedules set in this case
are also vacated.
dl) ff {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order
No notices required, advised in open court. | | Document
| ? Number
oY | Notices mailed by judge's staff,
Notified counsel by tel e SEp
jotified counsel by telephone. “He adtdes
Dockelin s to mail notices. 7
Y | Mail AO 450 torm Dyes, " DARA ies
Copy to jadge/magistrate judge : .
Seq nitbon
date nualee notice
courtroon .
MPI deputy’s - MPs
initiats
Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office _ sailing deputy iia’



jusisdiction. The only basis for jurisdiction alleged in the
conplaint is 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Here the parties are of diverse

citizenship, but the amount in controversy is only $44,166.65 plus

interest. Interest cannot be used to tisfy the amount-in-
controversy requirement, see § 1332(a), so tunis claim comes in well

under the jurisdictional limit. Mr. Amari argues that I have

supplemental jurisd ion over the claim urder 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
but. because I cecline to exercise my jurisdiction over the
declaratory judgment claim, I dismiss the pendent state claim as
well. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (3); Millei Aviation v. Milwaukee
County Bd. of Supervisors, 273 F.3d 722, 731 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[A]
district court’s decision to ‘relinquish pendent jurisdiction
before the federal claims have been tried is ... the norm, not the
exception.’”). Mr. Amari may bring this claim as a counterclaim in
the substantive action, See Channell v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs.,
Ine., 89 F.3d 379, 386 (7th Cir. 1996) (helcing that counterclaim
is within jurisdictional limits of § 1367(a)).
Radio Spirits’ motion to dismiss is GRAWTED.

ENTER: ORDER: p y)
Se, SC bee

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: september ff, 2002



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CARL AMARI,

Plaintiff,

Vv.
We. 02 € 3130
RADIO SPIRITS, INC., £/k/a/ CLASSIC
RADIO HOLDING CORP. ,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

Carl Amari was the president of Radio Spirits, Inc., which
markets, sells and distributes old-time raclio shows and audiobooks
and classic videos and DVDs. After Mr. Amari resigned as president
of Radio Spirits, he entered into an independent consulting
contract with Radio Spirits, which included non-solicitation and
non-compete clauses. Mr. Amari developed, through his own
production company, a new radio drama based on old scripts from the
1960s television shoe “The Twilight Zone.” Mr. Amari claims that
the “twilight Zone” project is outside she scope of the non-
sol.citation and non-compete clauses of his agreement with Radio
Spirits. When Mr. Amari approached Radio Spirits in March 2002
about entering into a marketing and distribution agreement for the
“Twilight Zone” project, however, Radio Spirits accused him of
vio.ating the consulting agreement, breaching his fiduciary duty to

Radio Spirits, usurping corporate opportunivies, and interfering

hI



with Radio Spirits’ expectant business re.ationships.

On May 1, 2002, Mr. Amari filed this action in the Northern
District of Illinois for a declaratory Judyrent that his “Twilight
Zore” project did not violate the consulting agreement. On May 21,
20C2, Radio Spirits and its parent corporation filed suit in
Flcrida state court against Mr. Amari and his production company
alleging a breach of the consulting agreement, fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, misappropriation of sccrporate opportunity,
violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, tortious interference
with business opportunities, violation cf the Lanham Act, and
unjust enrichment and conversion. On May 30, 2002, Mr. Amari
ameaded the complaint in the declaratory judgment case to add a
claim that Radio Spirits had breached the consulting agreement,
claiming $44,166.65. in damages.

Meanwhile, the Florida state action was removed to federal
couct and transferred to this district, and that case has been
reassigned to me based on relatedness to tare declaratory judgment
action. See Minute Orcer of 8/14/02. Both the declaratory judgment
action and the substantive action are pending before me now, and
Rad:.o Spirits asks me to dismiss the declaratory judgment action
for failure to state a claim (count I) and for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction (count II). I grant the motion.

II.

The Declaratory Judgment Act states that I “may declare the