;
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
BETTY J. DUMAS y
Plaintiff, ) RECEIVED
¥. ) No. 02€6271

, ) Judge Milton I. Shadur APR 2 7 gg95
DOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE, INC., et al. ) Magistrate Judge Schenfic

“ ON I.
Defendants. ) SENIOR Us oistme rs, vce

PLAINTIFF RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS’*MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiff Betty J. Dumas, prose must hereby make a response, to Defendant’s
Motion To Strike, because it leads the court outside the facts and a misrepresentation of
discovery material in an alleged attempt by Dovenmuehle, to use their money and
education to pretend as if they don’t understand hew some of us Negroes because its not
intelligent/White enough for them.

The court will generally rule for a White Million Dollars Law Firm and against a
Negro, under a court approve lie with case law and play like when a Prose Negroes bring
up racism that us Negroes be a lie and did not prepare the documents like an attorney that
is now warranting my response.

Many Negroes take to the street seeking justice and in rap music because some
Afro-American leaders have sold-out their community, as The Community Development
Block Grant now goes to Whites and as a pay off to government workers, politicians and
churches for votes, as equal access to government contracts don’t reach the urban
community without violence because many White lawyer will fight to discrimination
Negroes from generation to generation with a minority fronting set aside contract as a
cover-up for discrimination and discreditment of Black Business and their Home Equity,

like they did my great aunt Margaret King know as “BIG SISTER”.


violation of Section 1681s-2(b) must show that a furnisher of
information failed to fulfill its duty once notice of a dispute
was received from a credit reporting agency. But Dumas has
provided no evidence at all along those lines.

In short, no facts have been presented that would support
any claim by Dumas under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Hence
summary judgment is also granted as to that claim.

Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act

What remains is a state law claim under the Illinois Act,
815 ILCS 505/2 et seq. Because this opinion has already found
that all of Dumas’ federal claims lack merit, that determination
could well trigger the without-prejudice dismissal of any
remaining state law claims under the principle exemplified by

United Mine Workers vy. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). But

where the outcome is clear and judicial economy would be
disserved by dismissal, a federal district court may choose to
act on any remaining supplemental claims (Brazinski y. co

Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993)).

That approach is called for here.

To make out a claim under the Illinois Act, Dumas must prove
(1) a deceptive act or practice by Dovenmuehle, (2) Dovenmuehle’s
intent that Dumas rely on the deception and (3) that the
deception occurred in the course of conduct involving trade and

commerce (Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill.2d 482, 501, 675

14


to allege facts that support the legal claims she has set forth.
And as to the remaining claims, Dumas has not provided any
meaningful evidence to refute the facts presented by Dovenmuehle
that clearly establish the nonviability of the claims presented.
What follows is a brief description of the relevant facts that
have been presented, viewed where possible in the appropriate
light favorable to Dumas, and then a discussion of each of Dumas’
claims.

Factual Background

In August 1995 Dumas assumed a mortgage for property at 47
West 114th Street, Chicago (D. St. 12).3 At that time the
mortgage was being sub-serviced by Dovenmuehle, which received a
fee from the mortgagee for collecting payments from the mortgagor
(D. St. 948, 10). Dumas notified Dovenmuehle that she had
assumed the mortgage by a letter dated November 8, 1995 (D. Ex.
6).

Beginning with a payment made September 29, 1995, Dumas made
payments to Dovenmuenle for about a year after she assumed the
mortgage (D. Ex. 7). Perhaps Dumas intended the September 29
payment to cover the October 1 mortgage installment, but it was
instead applied--as was certainly permissible--to then-

outstanding prior installments that had been due August 1 and

———

) povenmuehle’s submissions will be cited throughout this
opinion as “D. St. --" or “D. Ex. --”, while citations to Dumas
submissions will carry the prefix “BD.”

5


course be a false representation: Dovenmuehle has admitted that
it repeatedly made reports of delinquency. For its part,
Dovenmuehle contends that the Novak letter is not deceptive
because it refers to reporting only at the time of the letter.
But even if Dumas’ reading were to be accepted, her claim would
still fail because she has presented no evidence that Dovenmuehle
intended her to rely on the deception or that she actually
suffered any injuries as a result.

On that latter score, Dumas has identified only two claimed
harms in the course of this lawsuit: She has asserted that
Dovenmuehle’s actions led her to be turned down for loans and
that she has suffered humiliation and emotional distress as a
result of her treatment. Again neither ccentention withstands
analysis.

As to the first of those purported harms, although Dumas has
referred to four loans that she claims to have been affected by
Dovenmuehle’s actions, no activity took place as to any of those
applications after the issuance of the Novak letter. And Dumas
has not shown (or even alleged) any facts to suggest a denial of
any loan after July 12, 2001 (much less that Dovenmuehle’s
deception was somehow a proximate cause of any such denial).

As to the second claimed injury, Dumas offers only her own
conclusory statements of emotional harm (Dumas Dep. 282-85). But

such statements are insufficient to create an issue of fact

18


in Dovenmuehle’s direction.

For example, in response to Dovenmuehle’s contention that it
was unaware of her race because it does not track the race of the
mortgagors for the loans it sub-services (D. Ex. 2 93), Dumas
claims that both defendants must know her race because they know
her address and because “[i]t’s easy to know people’s race by the
geographical area you live in” (Dumas Dep. 155). And as the only
possible basis for a claim that Dovenmuehle’s behavior was
motivated in any way by race, she asserts that a receptionist
“acted funny” when she visited Dovenmuehle to make a payment and
that another Dovenmuehle employee “got kind of smart on the
telephone” (id. 150-51, 26).

That does not even begin to raise a triable issue that
Dovenmuehle discriminated on the basis of race at any point
during the events at issue here. And because no prima facie case
of credit discrimination has been made, summary judgment is
appropriate under both civil rights statutes upon which Dumas
relies (see Latimore, 151 F.3d at 716).

Beyond that, there is an additional problem with Dumas’ ECOA
claim that bears mention. Although Complaint 142 alleges that
Dumas “is an applicant within the meaning of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act” (hereafter “ECOA”), she has provided no evidence
that would bring her within the statutory definition of that term

in Section 1691a(b):

10


After several more months of nonpayment, Devenmuehle (this
time through its administrative assistant Norma Bourbeau) wrote
Dumas a June 26, 1997 letter stating that her mortgage file was
being forwarded to a law firm for foreclosure (D. Ex. 12). Dumas
consistently denied ever receiving that letter during her
deposition, and in fact she has denied ever hearing from
Dovenmuehle regarding any foreclosure proceedings (D. Ex. 32 at
248-52).4 But that assertion is directly belied by a letter from
Dumas to Dovenmuehle written in 1999, in which Dumas said that
“the Administrative Assistant Norma Bourbeau informed me to
contact one of your legal firm regarding my accounts or
foreclosure FROM THAT POINT ON” (D. Ex. 13).

As it happened, the foreclosure proceedings never progressed
beyond the planning stage: No foreclosure complaint was ever
filed against Dumas. Instead the mortgagee decided to write off
the loan rather than pursue foreclosure because of the low amount
of the outstanding principal (D. Ex. 29). Following that
decision, Dovenmuehle issued a satisfaction of the mortgage (D.
Ex. 14).

Dumas’ primary complaints relate to Dovenmuehle’s credit
reporting during the events just described. In particular she

complains that Dovenmuehle made numerous reports to credit

——

4 9, Ex. 32 reproduces portions of Dumas’ deposition, which
is hereafter cited “Dumas Dep. --,” omitting further references
to D. Ex. 32.


September 1, 1995 (D. St. 418). Thereafter, even though Dumas
made payments roughly once a month, all of her payments were
treated as late because the payments had never been made to bring
the mortgage fully current (D. Ex. 7). In August 1996 Dumas
abruptly stopped remitting payments to Dovenmuehle (D. St. 419).
At that time the remaining principal on the loan was $471.84 and
there was a positive escrow balance (D. Ex, 7).

Between August and October 1996 Dovenmuehle sent numerous
notices to Dumas informing her that the mortgage was delinquent
(D Ex. 8). At least one of those notices--a letter dated October
16, 1996 notifying Dumas that $968.52 was owed (D. Ex. By--
reached its destination, as evidenced by Dumas’ having responded
with a letter to Dovenmuehle stating her view that only $398.00
was owed and telling Dovenmuehle that she would make no payment
at all because Dovenmuehle’s October 16 letter warned that “any
amount less than the total due won’t be accepted” (D, Ex. 9).

Dovenmuehle ultimately agreed with Dumas that something less
than $968.52 was outstanding (D. Ex. 10). Through its Assistant
Counsel Paul Brask it informed Dumas that the actual amount of
delinquency was $843.90 and offered her the option of paying the
loan off without reinstatement before February 2, 1997 (id.).
Dumas did not quarrel with that revised figure, responding
instead with another letter on January 13, 1997 that asked for

forbearance on the loan until March 1 (D. Ex. 11).


“unless the facts underlying the case are so inherently degrading
that it would be reasonable to infer that a person would suffer
emotional distress from the defendant’s action” (Denius v.
Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir. 2003)). Because this is
plainly not such a case, Dumas’ failure to “explain the
circumstances cf [her] injury in reasonable detail” (id.) sinks
her emotional damages claim.

us,

Despite the inadequate and often incendiary nature of Dumas’
submissions in this case, this opinion has essayed to treat them
in a dispassionate way. Indeed, it has dealt with them at
greater length than they really merit, in an effort to
demonstrate the total absence of any basis for relief on any of
the claims Dumas has raised. It seems most likely that Dumas,
given her predilections, will not accept the outcome reached
today as a just result. But what must control is not her
subjective mindset, but rather the fact that the claims Dumas has
advanced simply have not been supported (and in any event could
not be supported) by the evidence. For that reason Dovenmuehle
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and summary

judgment is granted in its favor. This action is dismissed.

ler QO Souda

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: June 23, 2005

19


§1691(a) (1) :°

It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate
against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a
credit transaction--

1. on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, sex or marital status, or age
(provided the applicant has the capacity to
contract).

Latimore v. Citibank Fed, Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712 (7th Cir.

1998), construing the requirements for a prima facie case of
credit discrimination, has declined to adopt as a general matter
the kind of burden shifting commonly applied to employment

discrimination cases as in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973). Instead burden shifting applies only in the
relatively rare situations where evidence is presented that would
permit a comparison of the credit treatment of (say) different
races in similar situations (Latimore, 151 F.3d at 715).

Because Dumas has made no attempt at such a showing here, no
shifting of burdens is appropriate. She must rather establish
her prima facie case by showing “that there is enough evidence,
direct or circumstantial, of discrimination to create a triable
issue” (Latimore, 151 F.3d at 715). In those terms she has
failed utterly, having proffered no evidence that would even
inferentially support the notion that discrimination was in play

here. Instead she has lobbed vague and unsupported accusations

—

5’ All further citations to provisions of Title 15 will
simply take the form “Section --."

9


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

BETTY J. DUMAS, )
Plaintiff,
v. } No. 02 C 6271
DOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE, INC., et al.)
Defendants. }
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Betty Dumas (“Dumas”) has sued Dovenmuehle Mortgage, inc.
and its President William A. Mynatt, Jr. (collectively
“povenmuehle,” treated for convenience as a singular noun)
asserting violations of several federal statutes as well as of
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
("tllinois Act”). Dovenmuehle has responded with a Fed. R. Civ.
Pp. (“Rule”) 56 motion for summary judgment.

Throughout the proceedings Dumas has aggressively played the
“race card” in an obvious effort to convert her case into a forum
for her views about the state of race in modern society.’ In
doing so she has regrettably called into question the integrity
not only of Dovenmuehle but also of this Court and of the legal
system in general, But the legal sufficiency of claims is
measured by evidence rather than by their vitriolic content, and

it is abundantly clear that Dumas’ entire case is fundamentally

—_

‘ as but the latest example of that attempt, this opinion
has attached the first page of Dumas’ most recent filing.


that Dovenmuehle assertedly (1) engaged in deceptive business
practices toward her and (2) reported erroneous information about
the status of her mortgage to various credit agencies. This
opinion will take up the merits of those contentions shortly.

But what controls at this stage of the analysis is that nothing
has been tendered that raises even an arguable whisper of racial
discrimination, so that summary judgment must be and is granted
as to both of Dumas’ civil rights claims.

Fair Credit Reporting Act

Dumas has also sought to establish a claim under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (Sections 1681-168lu, provisions of which
are hereafter cited “Section --,"” omitting the repetition of “15
u.S.C.”). , In so doing, she points to Section 1681s-2(a), which
as part of its 1996 amendments created a duty on the part of
furnishers of credit information to provide accurate information.

But that ignores other provisions of Section 1681s-2 that
flatly bar her attempt to bring this private suit. To that
end Section 1681s-2(d) (emphasis added) provides:

Subsection (a) of this section shall be enforced

exclusively under section 1681s of this title by the

Federal agencies and officials and the State officials

identified in that section.

And Section 1681s-2(c) reinforces that exclusivity by expressly
making the Fair Credit Reporting Act's civil liability provisions
(Sections 168in and 16810) inapplicable to violations of Section

1681s-2(a). Taken together, those two provisions doom any effort

12


The term “applicant” means any person who applies to a
creditor directly for an extension, renewal, or
continuation of credit, or applies to a creditor
indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an
amount exceeding a previously established credit limit.

Dumas has never even suggested that she applied (directly or
indirectly) to Dovenmuehle for credit, and the substance of her
claims is unrelated to any credit decision made by Dovenmuehle.*
Instead Dumas charges Dovenmuehle with malfeasance as to its
credit reporting--clearly not a cognizable ECOA claim.

Despite Dumas’ empty attempts to drag race into the mix at

every conceivable stage,’ an objective recap of Dumas’ charges is

* Notwithstanding her pro se status, Dumas is not in any
position to claim unfamiliarity with the law as a basis for her
unwarranted attempts to fashion an ECOA claim out of the facts
alleged here. On two prior occasions she has made similar
efforts to bring an ECOA claim despite the absence of an
application for credit, and in both cases those efforts have been
rebuffed on summary judgment (see Dumas v. City of Chicago, 2000
WL 1597787, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 24, 2000), reported in table at

234 F.3d 1272; Dumas v. Sentinel Mortgage Corp., 2003 WL
22859807, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 26, 2093)). Indeed, under the

circumstances this claim must be viewed as blatantly
frivolous--Dumas could well be sanctioned for such repeated abuse
of the litigation process.

7 Por example, Dumas includes. various allegations that
other lenders that purportedly relied on the credit information
that Dovenmuehle provided were racist, just as she charges
Dovenmuehle to have been. Dumas seeks to make those assertions
relevant to her claims against Dovenmuehle by charging in her
response that it has “participate[d] in conspiracy to
discriminate and is alleged to be a redlining conspiracy and
racist attempt to discriminate ‘Dumas’ because she is Afro-
American” (BD. Mem. 10), But apart from her not having pleaded
any such conspiracy (at least not as to any Fair Housing Act
violation), she offers nothing other than her own apparent bias
to “support” her generalized pejorative charges.

11


reporting agencies after August 1996 indicating that her loan was
delinquent. And she targets Dovenmuehie’s later reports to
agencies indicating that foreclosure proceedings had been
initiated and then redeemed. Beyond that she claims that
Dovenmuehle sent her a fraudulent letter that informed her that
she was not being reported as delinquent. Finally, she appears
to suggest that Dovenmuehle was engaged in deceptive business
practices because it issued the mortgage satisfaction in the name
of the original mortgagor rather than in her name. Based on
Dovenmuehle’s actions, Dumas claims that she was unfairly denied
credit for several loans and that she has suffered emotional harm
and humiliation.
Credit Discrimination Claims

In an initial attempt to fashion a cognizable claim for
federal relief, Dumas has asserted violations of two civil rights
statutes that relate to credit discrimination. First she cites
the Federal Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3605(a):

It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity

whose business includes engaging in real estate-related

transactions to discriminate against any person in

making available such a transaction, or in the terms or

conditions of such a transaction, because of race,

color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or

national origin.

And she also cites the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.


F.3d 673, 675 (7 Cir. 1998)).

Despite the operative ground rules having been spelled out
both in LR 56.1 and in this Court’s explanatory letter to Dumas,
only one assertion in her LR 56.1 statement is not subject to the
deficiencies just described. That being the case, this Court
would be well justified, as the price for her extensive
noncompliance, in refusing to consider all other evidence

submitted by Dumas (see, @.9-+s Cichon v, Exelon Generation Co.,

401 F.3d 803, 809-10 (7th Cir. 2005)). But lest Dumas mistakenly
think that her case is being decided on a merely technical basis
this opinion will put aside those shortcomings in her LR 56.1

statement (despite their seriousness) in favor of considering her

claims in light of all of the admissible evidence she has

presented.’

Kone of that evidence creates any material (that is,
outcome-determinative) issues of fact here. To the contrary,

several of Dumas’ claims must be dismissed because they fail even

—_—

2 That does not of course mean that this Court will blindly
credit all matters that Dumas has proffered. So for example Rule
56(c) expressly states that unsworn statements in Dumas
Complaint must be disregarded for purposes of summary judgment
And much of the affidavit from her husband Jerome Casimir
(“Casimir”) that Dumas has submitted must likewise be set for
naught, for it presents assertions that conflict with his earlier
deposition testimony and cannot now be properly relied upon by

Dumas to generate a material issue of fact (Russell v, Acme-fvans
Co., 51 F.3d 64, 67-68 (7th Cir. 1995)). This Court therefore

considers only the portions of the Casimir affidavit that are not
so tainted, rendering it unnecessary to grant Dovenmuenhle’s
motion to strike the affidavit as a formal matter

4


N.E.2d 584, 593 (1996)). And Dumas must “also demonstrate that
the fraud complained of proximately caused [her] injury” (Zekman

v. Direct Am, Marketer Ine., 182 Ill.2d 359, 373, 695 N.E.2d

853, 861 (1998)).

Most of Dumas’ assertions fail to meet even the first of
those requirements, because the actions complained of can in no
way be considered deceptive in light of the evidence. For
example, Dumas contends that Dovenmuehle’s reports to credit
agencies that she was delinquent were deceptive or fraudulent,
pointing to the satisfaction piece and to Dovenmuehle’s
December 6, 1996 letter. But neither of those documents
establishes in any way that Dovenmuehle’s reporting was suspect.

As for the former document, the eventual satisfaction of a
mortgage says nothing about the propriety of reporting
delinquencies before the issuance of the satisfaction. And as
for the letter, while it acknowledged that Dovenmuehle had made a
minor error as to the amount of the delinquency, it reconfirmed
the fact of the delinquency itself (D. Ex. 10). And that was
indeed a fact: Dumas herself never argued in her letters to
Dovenmuehle that it was in error in that respect, instead asking
a short forbearance on the delinquency on account of her
financial troubles (D. Ex. 11).

Dovenmuchle has provided documentation that demonstrates

that Dumas was chronically behind on her payments (D. Ex. TY,

15


mon - aeevd

delinquent as of July 12, 2001 (D. Ex. 17), so that argument
fails to get off the ground.

Dumas gets no further with her more general quarrel that it
was somehow fraudulent for Dovenmuehle to report her status as
“foreclosure redeemed” at all, Dumas contends that Dovenmuehle
should not have reported anything related to “foreclosure”
because she did not receive notice of any foreclosure
proceedings. As discussed earlier, that is a dubious claim given
Dumas’ later reliance on the information provided in the letter
that announced Dovenmuehle’s intentions along those lines.

But even if, despite all that, Dumas’ nonreceipt of notice
were to be assumed for present purposes, Devenmuehle did not act
outside of its rights in reporting the initiation of foreclosure
proceedings: Dumas was unquestionably delinquent on her mortgage
payments, and Dovenmuehle had “taken steps within its own

organization to initiate the foreclosure process” (Voyles v.

Sandia Mortagage Corp., 196 Ill.2d 288, 299-300, 751 N.E.2da 1126,
1133 (2001)). Its post-satisfaction report that the foreclosure

was redeemed was likewise accurate. And that means that the
Novak letter correctly informed Dumas that no correction letters
needed to be issued.

Finally, Dumas reads the language in the Novak letter as a
representation from Dovenmuehle that it never reported her as

delinquent. And if that were accurate, the statement would of

17


particular, LR 56.1(b) (3) (A) requires a nonmovant such as Dumas
who seeks to avoid summary judgment to file “a response to each
numbered paragraph in the moving party’s statement, including, in
the case of any disagreement, specific references to the
affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials
relied upon.” Despite having been informed of that requirement
in detail by this Court's customary letter to pro se litigants
facing a Rule 56 motion, and despite several extensions granted
to enable her to comply, Dumas has tendered a statement that is
wholly inadequate in LR 56.1(b) (3) (A) terms.

Although Dumas properly admits many facts contained in
Dovenmuehle’s opening LR 56.1(a) statement, her attempted
response to many others is either (1) to object and disagree or
(2) to claim insufficient knowledge to agree or disagree. Those
nonresponses just won’t do. LR 56.1 has been devised to distill
the record presented to the court into a manageable series of
clearly admitted or disputed facts. Accordingly, responses that
mistakenly echo the second sentence of Rule 8(b)--which to begin
with applies only to responsive pleadings, not to Rule 56
submissions--by stating that the declarant does not have
sufficient information to speak to a fact, or responses that fail
to cite any record evidence to support a controverted assertion,
are ineffective. And any factual assertions that are thus

inadequately addressed are deemed admitted (McGuire v. UPS, 152



deficient in evidentiary terms. Because Dovenmuehle has supplied
evidence that demonstrates that none of Dumas’ claims is even
arguably viable, and because Dumas has failed to summon up any
admissible evidence of her own that creates any material issue of
fact in that respect, the Rule 56 motion is granted and this
action is dismissed.
ule rds
Every Rule 56 movant bears the burden of establishing the

absence of any genuine issue of material fact (Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). For that purpose courts
consider the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to
nonmovants and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor

(Lesch y. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir.

2002)). But to avoid summary judgment a nonmovant “must produce
more than a scintilla of evidence to support his position” that a

genuine issue of material fact exists (Pugh v. City of Attica,

259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001)) and “must set forth specific
facts that demonstrate a genuine issue of triable fact” (id.).
Ultimately summary judgment is appropriate only if a reasonable
jury could not return a verdict for the nonmovant (Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)}.

This District Court has implemented Rule 56 through its LR
56.1, which structures the bidding by requiring both sides to

submit factual statements supported by record evidence. In


by Dumas to bring a private suit to enforce what she has
characterized as a Section 1681s~-2(a) violation.

In an effort to respond, Dumas cites to Nelson _v. Chase
Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 282 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2002) as
purportedly providing support for her efforts. But Nelson, id.
at 1059 actually reaffirms the unavailability of private
enforcement for violations of Section 1681s-2(a) before going on
(id. at 1059-60) to recognize a private right of action for
violations of Section 1681s-2(b). So that provides Dumas no
comfort.

If Dumas were instead to try to invoke Section 1681s-2(b),
she would fall at another hurdle: the absence of any evidence
that Dovenmuehle failed to respond adequately after having
received notice of a dispute from a credit reporting agency. As
Nelson, id. at 1060 acknowledges, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
“has been drawn with extreme care, refiecting the tug of the
competing interests of consumers, leredit reporting agencies],
furnishers of credit information, and users of credit
information.” And by its terms, Section 1681s-2(b) imposes
duties on furnishers of information only “{aJfter receiving
notice pursuant to section 168li(a) (2) of this title,” and the
latter section in turn imposes a duty on credit reporting
agencies to notify furnishers when a dispute has been reported.

In sum, then, any private claim seeking to establish 4

13


that it made numerous efforts to inform her of that delinquency
(D. Ex. 8) and that Dumas herself was aware of her delinquency
(D. Ex. 11}. In the face of that proof, and having provided no
evidence to the contrary, Dumas cannot now be heard to complain
that Dovenmuehle’s decision to report her delinquency was an act
of deception or fraud.

In a different attempt to claim fraud, Dumas cites the July
12, 2001 letter that Dovenmuehle (through Julie Novak, hence the
“Novak letter”) sent Dumas in response to her demand that
correction letters be issued to credit agencies (D, Ex. 16). In
the course of that response, the Novak letter informed Dumas that
“there is no indication that Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. reported
you as delinquent to the credit bureaus to whom we regularly
report. Therefore, it is not necessary to issue correction
letters.”

At various times in her submissions Dumas appears to make
three possible claims based on that language. None survives
scrutiny.

First Dumas suggests that the Novak letter’s representation
as to delinquency was fraudulent because Dovenmuehle was in fact
reporting her status at that time as “foreclosure redeemed” (D.
Ex. 17). But of course foreclosure and delinquency are two
different concepts, as Dumas herself is aware (Dumas Dep. 256).

And Dumas does not suggest that Dovenmuehle was reporting her as

16