nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7" Cir. 2000).

The parties disagree whether plaintiffs are entitled to “prevailing party” status under the
IDEA. The IDEA provides:

[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this subsection, the court, in its

discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the parents or

guardian of a child or youth with a disability who is the prevailing party.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). In Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department
of Health and Human Resources, 121 8. Ct. 1835 (2001), the United States Supreme Court held that
prevailing party status is achieved only through a favorable judgment on the merits or a settlement
agreement enforced through a consent decree. Indeed, the Buckhannon court specifically found that
“[a] defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff
sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change” to confer
prevailing party status. /d. at 1840. Therefore, a “prevailing party” is one who has been awarded
some relief by a judicial body. /d. at 1838.

Neither party claims the hearing officer entered judgment on the merits. Rather, plaintiffs
contend the mediation agreement read into the record before the hearing officer should be construed
as a consent decree for purposes of assessing prevailing party status. Joliet Township argues the
mediation agreement was a private settlement, rather than a consent decree, because the hearing
officer did not make any findings or deliver a ruling.

A consent decree is defined as a “contract of the parties entered upon the record with the
approval and sanction of a court of competent jurisdiction, which cannot be set aside without the

consent of the parties...“ Barron's Law Dictionary, p. 97 (1996)(emphasis added). In approving


The court does not condone plaintiffs’ initial failure to comply with Local Rule 56.
However, the substance of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, including plaintiffs’ amended
statement of undisputed material facts, is already before the court. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment is substantively indistinguishable from plaintiffs’ response filed in opposition to Joliet
Township’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs’ amended statement of undisputed material
facts also is identical in substance to plaintiffs’ response to Joliet Township’s statement of
uncontested material facts. The court’s consideration of these pleadings will not prejudice Joliet
Township. Therefore, the court grants plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and for leave to file
their amended statement of undisputed material facts.

Il. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

On cross-motions for summary judgment, each movant must individually satisfy the
requirements of Rule 56. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission y. Admiral Maintenance
Service, L.P.,No. 97 C 2034, 1998 WL 102748, at * 6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1998). Summary judgment
is appropriate when the moving papers and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c); Celofex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); King v. National Human Resource Committee, Inc., 218 F.3d 719,
723 (7" Cir. 2000). Once a moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must go beyond
the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56 (e); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798 (7" Cir. 1999). The court considers the record as
a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7" Cir. 2000). A genuine issue of

material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the


a consent decree, a court must determine whether a proposed decree is lawful, fair, reasonable and
adequate. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768
F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, Agee v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
106 S. Ct. 3293 (1986). According to the Seventh Circuit, the court should consider the following
factors in determining whether a proposed decree is lawful, fair, reasonable and adequate:

a comparison of the strengths of plaintiffs’ case versus the amount of the settlement

offer; the likely complexity, length, and expense of the litigation, the amount of

opposition to the settlement among affected parties, the opinion of competent

counsel; and, the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery already
undertaken at the time of the settlement.
ld.

Plaintiffs fail to offer any evidence that the hearing officer approved or sanctioned the
parties’ agreement. Plaintiffs’ 56.1(a)(1) Facts (“Pl. Facts”), 4 10, Ex. 1 to amended complaint;
Joliet Township’s 56. 1(a)(1) Facts (“Def. Facts”), 95, Ex. 1 to Ex. A. To the contrary, the hearing
officer refused to make any comment on the agreement other than to state that the hearing was held
solcly because of plaintiffs’ concern regarding the enforceability of the agreement. PI. Facts, Ex. 1
to amended complaint at 11-12; Def. Facts, Ex. 1 to Ex. A at 11-12. Plaintiffs never asked the
hearing officer to approve or sanction the agreement. PI. Facts, Ex. 1 to amended complaint; Def.
Facts, Ex, 1 to Ex. A at 1 1-12. Without court approval or sanction, the agreement between the parties
is simply a private settlement agreement. Private settlement agreements do not confer prevailing
party status. Buckhannon, 121 S.Ct. at 1840, fn. 7 (“Private settlements do not entail the judicial
approval and oversight involved in consent decrees”).

Contrary to plaintiffs’ position, there is nothing in Buckhannon to suggest that the Supreme

Court limited its decision to cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair


Ming S Otaer Forme (04077)

United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois

Suzanne B. Conlon Sitting Judge if Other
. than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 4798 DATE 1/14/2002
CASE JOSE LUIS R., et al. vs. JOLIET TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 204
TITLE
{In the following box (a) indicate the party tiling the motion, e.g... plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}
rt
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
Q) QO Brief in support of motion due
(GB) a Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due. 7
(4) QO Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference(held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) Oo Trial{set for/re-set for] on at
(8) QO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
Crrcpa(m) O General Rule21 COFRCP4I(a\(1) [ FRCP41(a)(2).
qo) {Other docket entry] Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and for leave to file an amended
statement of material facts [25-1] is granted. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [17-1] is
granted. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment [20-1] is denied. ENTER MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER. ~,
(1) of (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court, Document
Number
No notices required. umber of notices
VY | Notices mailed by judge’s stat N 1 5 2002
Notified counsel by telephone, date docketed ~
Docketing to mail notices. y 2K)
Y | Mail AO 480 form. i Cr.
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. - t ’
a . vyar2002
coutroom eye dle mailed notice
SB deputy’s Ly ay an) “Ya se! ch
initials
Date/timg received in
central Clerk's OMfige naling deputy initials



Housing Amendments Act. Indeed, this court earlier rejected plaintiffs’ argument in ruling on Joliet
Township’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Moreover, the Buckhannon court refers to
similar fee-shifting statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1988, throughout the opinion. /d. at 1839, fn. 4.
‘The term “prevailing party” connotes the same general meaning under the IDEA as under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. Board of Education of Downers Grove Grade School District No. 58 y. Steven L., 89 F.3d
464, 468 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1556 (1997). The rule regarding prevailing party
status clarified in Buckhannon applies to all similar fee-shifting statutes, including the IDEA.

Finally, plaintiffs contend Joliet Township is barred from objecting to the claim for attorneys”
fees pursuant to 34 C.F.R. 300.5 13(c)(3) for failing to observe IDEA procedural safeguards. Neither
the IDEA nor the regulations support plaintiffs’ position. Rather, the IDEA and the supporting
regulations only require the court to reduce the amount of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party upon
certain findings. 20 U.S.C. 1415(/)(F). As plaintiffs are not a prevailing party under IDEA,
reduction in attorneys’ fees is not an issue.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and for leave to file an amended statement of material

facts is granted. Joliet Township’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment is denied.

January 14, 2002 ENTER:
/

zane B. Conlon
United States District Judge


DOCKETED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JAN £5 2002
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSE LUIS R., et al. )
)
Plaintiffs, ) No. 01 C 4798
)
v. ) Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge

)
JOLIET TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL )
DISTRICT 204 )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Jose Luis R. (“Jose”) and his mother Janette H. (collectively, “plaintiffs”) sue Joliet
Township H.S. District 204 (“Joliet Township”) for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 er seq. Joliet Township
moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiffs’ motion
for summary judgment was previously denied for failure to comply with Local Rule 56. Plaintiffs
move for leave to file an amended statement of uncontested material facts and for reconsideration
of the court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

‘The facts are undisputed. During the relevant time period, Jose was a special education
student enrolled in Joliet Township. On or about November I, 2000, plaintiffs requested a due
process hearing. At mediation, the parties reached an agreement that contained the relief requested
by plaintiffs. One week later, the agreement was read into the record before a hearing officer. At
that time, plaintiffs withdrew their request for a due process hearing.

1


Plaintiffs then filed this action seeking recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs under the IDEA.
Joliet Township responded by filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the court denied.
Thereafter, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion
for failure to cite record evidence in support of their statement of facts as required by Local Rule 56.
Plaintiffs move for reconsideration of the court’s order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) and request leave to file an amended statement of facts.

DISCUSSION

1 Motion for Reconsideration and for Leave to File Amended Statement of Facts

In addressing plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the court’s order denying summary
judgment, both parties erroneously rely on Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Joliet
Township also mistakenly relies on Rule 59(e). Rules 60(b) and Rule 59(e) apply only to motions
seeking relief from final judgments or orders. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(‘“the court may relieve a party .
. . from a final judgment [or] order . . .”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)(‘Any motion to alter or amend a
judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.”)

In contrast, Rule 54(b) specifically provides:

any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer

than all the claims. . . . shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims... and

the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry

of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of the parties.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The court also has inherent authority to reconsider interlocutory orders before
entering final judgment. Wimberly v. General Motors Corp., No. 95 C 1318, 1997 WL 30960, at

*1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 1997). The court may grant a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order “as

justice requires.” Young v. Murphy, 161 F.R.D. 61, 62 (N.D. III. 1995).