If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re G. M. DIXSON, Minor. June 23, 2022

No. 358376

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2017-001531-NA

Before: LETICA, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to her minor child, 

GMD,

1

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent gave birth to twins on May 11, 2011, and established a guardianship with a 

relative or family friend2to care for these children. Respondent then gave birth to GMD on 

April 16, 2014, and cared for her for 18 months. In December 2015, respondent felt overwhelmed 

and left GMD with the Branches, a husband and wife that respondent knew through church. 

Respondent then became pregnant with twins. Respondent miscarried one of the twins, but gave 

birth to daughter ABD on February 18, 2017. While in respondent’s care, ABD died on March 3, 

2017, due to unsafe sleep practices. Children’s Protective Services (CPS) conducted an 

investigation as a result of ABD’s death and learned of GMD’s informal fictive kin placement with 

the Branches.

 

1 GMD’s father’s parental rights were also terminated, but he is not a party to this appeal.

2

Initially, in the lower court record, Michelle Henry, the guardian, was referred to as a family 

friend; however, respondent also identified Henry as “the children’s grandmother.” At another 

time, respondent reported that she left the twins in a fictive kin placement with the person who 

raised her, even though that person was not a biological relative. Thus, the exact relationship of 

Henry to respondent and her twins was unclear.
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Consequently, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition on 

September 5, 2017, and GMD was placed with DHHS. GMD was allowed to remain with the 

Branches while they undertook the process of becoming a licensed foster care home. The juvenile 

court assumed jurisdiction following admissions made by respondent on September 22, 2017. In 

essence, respondent acknowledged her unstable housing, unstable mental health, a domestic 

violence incident in 2015, and her placement of GMD without granting the caregivers legal 

authorization. A parent-agency agreement (PAA) was created. During the course of the 

proceedings, respondent participated in services including medical health evaluations and 

treatment, domestic violence counseling, parenting classes, and visitation. Respondent received 

monthly social security benefits purportedly because of hearing loss and her mental health issues. 

DHHS assisted respondent in acquiring Section 8 housing as well as hearing aids. Respondent’s 

physical examination revealed that she had untreated medical conditions consisting of type-2

diabetes and high blood pressure. Her psychiatric evaluation revealed that she suffered from 

bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and anxiety. Respondent, however, did not consistently take the 

prescribed medications for her mental conditions or wear the hearing aids. According to the 

caseworkers, it became apparent that although respondent participated in services, she did not 

appear to benefit and practically apply the lessons learned.

Nonetheless, respondent’s supervised visitations with GMD were going well, and DHHS 

exercised its discretion to allow unsupervised visits with respondent at her home. Respondent took 

GMD to various places during the unsupervised visitation without obtaining permission. And

respondent had individuals who were strangers to GMD present at the home. Finally, DHHS made 

an unannounced visit to respondent’s home and found respondent asleep in her car while GMD 

was playing outside without any monitoring. In light of these incidents, supervised visitation at 

the DHHS office was reinstated.

On September 12, 2019, respondent attended a visitation with GMD at the DHHS office. 

Respondent, who was pregnant, got into an argument over the use of the car with her boyfriend, 

Matthew Jordan (Jordan), the father of her then unborn child. Respondent told a DHHS 

caseworker that Jordan was being violent and would not return her car keys. Respondent also 

advised that Jordan had been violent the prior week at their home, and the police had to be called. 

The caseworker retrieved the car keys from Jordan and reported that he was acting erratic, yelled 

obscenities and threats, and refused to leave. The police had to be called, and Jordan was banned 

from the DHHS premises. GMD shared with her therapist and caseworker that she was afraid of 

Jordan because of the domestic violence she witnessed.

Respondent gave birth to MJJ in Macomb County on October 31, 2019. MJJ was removed 

from respondent and Jordan’s care in early November 2019. Because of his birthplace and 

respondent’s residence, a CPS investigation commenced in Macomb County.

At the end of 2019, the trial court instructed DHHS to file a supplemental petition seeking 

permanent custody of GMD. The trial court agreed to bifurcate the permanent custody and best 

interest hearings. Two hearings were held in early 2020 before the courts were closed because of 

the pandemic. The caseworker testified that respondent and GMD came to the agency’s attention 

because of the asphyxia death of ABD resulting from respondent’s unsafe sleep practice. The

PAA was created on November 27, 2017. This agreement required respondent to complete 

parenting classes, complete individual and family therapy, domestic violence and anger 
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management, participate in a clinic for child study, and undergo psychiatric and psychological 

evaluations and take prescribed mental health medications. Further, respondent was to obtain 

suitable housing and a legal source of income, maintain regular contact with DHHS, visit GMD, 

and attend court hearings.

Although respondent completed parenting and domestic violence classes, the caseworker 

opined that respondent did not benefit from those classes because she struggled to make proper, 

consistent parenting choices during the weekly scheduled visitation. Initially, respondent’s 

supervised visits went “really well,” and she transitioned to unsupervised visits. However, the 

caseworker cited the reports of domestic violence between respondent and Jordan as well as the 

incident in which respondent fell asleep in the car, leaving GMD unattended. Respondent did not 

heed the advice to end the relationship with Jordan. Further, the caseworker opined that respondent 

did not benefit from the mental health services. Although psychological and psychiatric 

evaluations were completed, respondent continued to struggle with understanding the importance 

of maintaining healthy relationships for herself and GMD. Respondent was diagnosed with 

depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and anxiety, but did not consistently take her 

prescribed mental health medications. The caseworker acknowledged that respondent secured 

Section 8 housing, but there was evidence that respondent allowed her sister and Jordan to stay 

there contrary to the program’s rules. The caseworker acknowledged that respondent had monthly 

income through social security benefits.

Respondent testified that she was in compliance with her PAA and had benefited from 

services. In parenting classes, respondent learned how to properly nurture and care for her children 

physically, mentally, and emotionally. Respondent disagreed with the testimony that she had not 

learned anything from her domestic violence counseling. Rather, if she encountered Jordan and 

he tried to cause problems, respondent would call the police. Respondent lived in a two-bedroom 

home for five months that was deemed suitable for GMD. She obtained the housing through a 

Section 8 voucher, and her monthly social security benefits for her hearing loss covered her other 

expenses. Respondent also cited her completion of individual and family therapy, and the therapy 

allowed her to understand GMD’s feelings and emotions. Respondent attended her weekly 

visitation with GMD. Respondent denied that she was currently prescribed medications for mental 

health conditions, but would take them if prescribed. Respondent also denied that domestic 

violence was involved in her relationship with Jordan. She testified that their relationship had 

ended and their only contact involved the co-parenting of MJJ. Respondent admitted that she 

obtained a personal protection order (PPO) against Jordan, but claimed that she did not fear Jordan. 

Rather, the PPO was obtained at the behest of the caseworker who threatened to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights unless respondent complied. Respondent denied the caseworker’s 

testimony that reflected negatively on her such as the September 2019 domestic incident at the 

DHHS office, the visit in which respondent was found asleep in the car, the continuation of a 

relationship with Jordan, and the occupants of her Section 8 housing.

On May 10, 2021, the permanent custody hearing continued because the court had 

reopened. Respondent’s counsel asked that the case be dismissed, contending that the petition was 

stale because of delay. The trial court agreed with the request by DHHS and the guardian ad litem

to update the proofs in lieu of dismissal.
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Respondent testified that her rights to MJJ in the Macomb County case were not 

terminated, she had supervised visitation with him, and she was no longer in a relationship with 

Jordan; they merely co-parented MJJ together. Respondent had visitation with GMD twice a week 

at the local mall. Respondent did not feel comfortable with the Branches3so the visits were 

supervised by a parenting coach, and respondent had only missed one visit due to pneumonia. 

Respondent took blood pressure medication and participated in therapy for her mental health. She 

also maintained her Section 8 housing. And, in addition to her social security benefits, respondent 

earned income by working 16 hours per week as an aide at a senior living facility. If there were 

warrants pending for her arrest, respondent believed they only pertained to traffic offenses. 

Although respondent currently had a suspended license, she had a car and drove to work. 

Respondent testified that she would not drive with children in her car and reported that a friend 

had driven her to the court hearing. Respondent further denied that she ever grabbed the steering 

wheel of her car as her father drove it. Respondent did not want her parental rights terminated and 

would take mental health medications to continue the relationship with GMD.

The caseworker testified that respondent was doing well in her visits with GMD, but the 

visitation supervisor indicated that respondent could get “lazy” during the visits and he would have 

to motivate her and also provide redirection or education. Respondent recently sought to renew 

her Section 8 housing, continued to see her mental health counselor, and continued to work. 

Despite positive action including housing, disability benefits, and a job, the caseworker testified 

that respondent needed help with daily living and parenting was overwhelming particularly when 

she had supervised visits with both GMD and MJJ.

Nonetheless, the caseworker did not recommend additional time for respondent to make 

progress on her PAA. The case had been pending for three years, and GMD had been placed with 

the Branches for nearly six years. GMD was starting to deteriorate, show signs of trauma, and 

change her behavior; she was scared and anxious. GMD feared being removed from the Branches

and referred to them as “mom and dad.” GMD began to act out before the visits with respondent, 

insulted the respondent’s hygiene, and was torn because she did not want to upset respondent or 

the Branches.

Additionally, the caseworker was concerned about respondent’s mental health. 

Respondent’s father, Kenneth Ray, called the caseworker to report that respondent stopped taking 

her mental health medication and stopped cleaning her home, so he cleaned it. Respondent began 

to hang out with a motorcycle club and stopped bathing. She became erratic. In October 2020, 

Ray was driving with respondent as a passenger when she became irate and grabbed the steering 

wheel nearly causing an accident. Respondent insisted that Ray get out of the car, and she drove 

off without him.

The caseworker opined that GMD would be traumatized by a return to respondent’s care. 

GMD’s therapist mirrored the concerns of the caseworker, noting that GMD was placed with the 

 

3 Although initially respondent and the Branches worked well together, things had changed. 

Respondent’s father, Kenneth Ray, contacted DHHS to report that respondent prompted her friend 

to call in a fabricated CPS complaint against the Branches in August 2020. The complaint at 

respondent’s behest was investigated, not substantiated, and closed.
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Branches at a stage of development where she formed attachments and looked to the Branches for 

security, comfort, and emotional support. GMD became anxious and nervous before court 

hearings and feared leaving the home and bond she had built for the last six years. GMD preferred 

to remain with the Branches, but still visit with respondent and her siblings. The caseworker 

opined that respondent could not raise GMD alone and indicated that respondent herself needed 

assistance or a guardian. Respondent’s mental health caused her to go in and out of periods of 

depression. As an adult, respondent needed to address her hygiene, blood pressure, hearing, 

weight, dental, and sleep apnea issues. The addition of attending to the needs of children, their 

schooling, and their medical appointments would be “a lot.” Thus, the barriers to reunification 

continued.

The trial court found that the statutory grounds for termination, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), 

(g), and (j), were established. And, after considering additional testimony, the trial court 

determined that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in GMD’s best interest. 

Respondent appeals.

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Respondent alleges that DHHS failed to present clear and convincing evidence to support 

the statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights. We disagree.

To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that 

at least one of the statutory grounds for termination expressed in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been 

established. In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020) (citation omitted). A 

challenge to the trial court’s finding that a statutory ground for termination was established is 

reviewed for clear error. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when there is some evidence to support 

it, but a review of the entire record, leaves the reviewing court with the definite and firm conviction 

that the trial court made a mistake. Id.

The specific statutory grounds for termination of MCL 712A.19b relied on by the trial court 

provide:

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, 

by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

* * *

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or 

more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the 

court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no 

reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time 

considering the child’s age.

* * *
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(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so, fails to 

provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation 

that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s 

parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the 

parent.

Generally, the state may not fail to evaluate or involve a respondent, but then terminate her rights 

premised on her failure to comply with the case service plan at that time or in the future. In re 

Mason, 486 Mich 142, 159-160; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). “Only one statutory ground need be 

established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental rights, even if 

the court erroneously found sufficient evidence under other statutory grounds.” In re Ellis, 294 

Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). Regard is given to the trial court’s special opportunity 

to determine the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it. Id. at 33. We conclude that 

there was clear and convincing evidence to support MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), and the trial court did 

not clearly err in its determination. In re Mota, 334 Mich App at 320.

Contrary to respondent’s assertion, the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to 

exist and there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a 

reasonable time when considering GMD’s age. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). GMD was 18 months 

old when respondent informally placed GMD with the Branches. The Branches were not given a 

formal guardianship. Rather, it was proffered by respondent that the placement was temporary 

until she could obtain stable and suitable housing. But respondent alleged that she was unable to 

retrieve GMD because she became pregnant again. Shortly after respondent gave birth to ABD, 

ABD died of asphyxia due to unsafe sleep practices. This death caused a CPS investigation and 

for DHHS to learn of GMD’s informal placement with the Branches.

After respondent made admissions to unstable housing, unstable mental health, and 

domestic violence, the court assumed jurisdiction over GMD, and a formal PAA was prepared. 

Respondent was required to address mental health issues, parenting, domestic violence, visitation, 

legal source of income, and housing. Although respondent completed many of the components of 

the PAA, there was no indication that respondent benefited from the services. When respondent 

had physical contact with GMD, she conducted a strip search of the child to search for bruises and 

markings. The caseworker and therapist had to apprise respondent of the physical intrusion that 

involved and other means of inquiry, such as communication, to achieve the same goal.

According to the caseworkers and respondent’s father, respondent did not consistently take 

her medication, did not timely appear for visits, and did not address her improper relationships. 

During her most recent visitation, the supervisor opined that respondent still needed direction, got 

“lazy,” and had to be motivated by him. When the visits were briefly transferred to unsupervised, 

an unannounced visit found respondent asleep in her car as GMD was not monitored. Although 

GMD expressed fear of Jordan, respondent continued her relationship with him. When respondent 

was presented with facts that were unfavorable, she simply denied their occurrence. Thus, 
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respondent denied that GMD was present as she slept in the car, denied that she grabbed the 

steering wheel as her father drove, and denied that a Macomb County CPS investigator found 

Jordan asleep in respondent’s home after their child MJJ had been removed from their care. 

Indeed, respondent denied driving to court on a suspended license despite two witnesses observing 

her driving that morning. 

Respondent’s psychological evaluation revealed that she was one of 13 children, and she 

grew up in foster care because the rights of her parents were terminated. Respondent indicated 

that she was physically abused by her foster mother. Thus, it did not appear that respondent had a 

personal foundation to apply to her own parenting, and she did not incorporate the training received 

in the services to the parenting of GMD. Accordingly, respondent resorted to strip searches of 

GMD for signs of abuse, but did not discuss inappropriate touching with the child. Respondent 

further acknowledged that she had mental health and hearing issues. Nevertheless, she failed to 

consistently take her medication or wear her hearing aids.

Respondent had a history of giving birth to children and relying on others to raise them 

when she could not cope. Respondent authorized the guardianship of her older twins to Henry, 

terminated the guardianship, but had to agree to its reinstatement because of CPS involvement. 

When respondent did not have housing, she placed GMD with the Branches when the child was 

only 18 months old. The Branches, respondent’s fellow church members, were not given formal 

authorization to obtain benefits or seek treatment for the child. Although it was proffered that 

formality was not required because the arrangement was only temporary, respondent became 

pregnant again. That child died in respondent’s care because respondent engaged in unsafe sleep 

practices. And during a brief period of unsupervised visitation as to GMD, respondent left her 

unmonitored while she slept in a car because she was tired. The record reflects that the mental 

health services and the parenting and domestic violence classes that respondent received did not 

rectify the conditions that caused GMD to come into care. Respondent did not appear to be 

interested in consistently taking medication to control her mental health issues. Her erratic 

behaviors, periods of depression, and questionable relationships failed to provide any assurance 

that the adjudicative conditions were rectified such that GMD could properly be cared for by 

respondent. Respondent completed the housing and legal source of income requirements of the 

PAA but it was not reasonably likely that the remaining components would be completed within a 

reasonable time given GMD’s age. In light of the facts and circumstances, the trial court did not 

clearly err in determining that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) was established by clear and convincing 

evidence.4

 

4 Although only one statutory ground for termination of parental rights is necessary, the trial court 

also did not clearly err in concluding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j) were satisfied by clear and 

convincing evidence for these same reasons.
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III. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent contends that termination of her parental rights was not in GMD’s best 

interests. We disagree.

Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must conclude 

that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental 

rights. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). A 

trial court’s decision regarding a child’s best interests is also reviewed for clear error. In re Laster, 

303 Mich App 485, 496; 845 NW2d 540 (2013). When making the best interests determination, 

the trial court may consider the entire record. In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 476; 951 NW2d 

704 (2020).

“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that 

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of 

parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be 

made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). “In deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the 

court may consider the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need 

for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s 

home.” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). “The trial court may also 

consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case 

service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, 

and the possibility of adoption.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). A 

child’s placement with relatives is also a factor to consider and generally weighs against 

termination. In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015).

The trial court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of respondent’s parental 

rights was in GMD’s best interests. Respondent was never able to plan for the child or demonstrate 

appropriate parenting skills in an unsupervised setting. To respondent’s credit, she obtained 

housing, had a legal source of income through social security benefits, and she obtained additional 

employment as an aide in a senior living facility. However, respondent failed to demonstrate that 

she could parent children. Of her four children, ABD died within weeks of birth because of unsafe 

sleep practices. Respondent gave Henry guardianship over her twins and informally turned GMD 

over to the Branches. Respondent failed to demonstrate that she was interested in long-term 

parenting of GMD by consistently taking her medication to maintain her mental health. 

Respondent’s father testified that respondent could not manage her mood or emotions and maintain 

a clean home when she failed to take her medication. Additionally, respondent engaged in poor 

decision-making. She continued to associate with Jordan despite GMD’s fear of him. She failed 

to address outstanding misdemeanor traffic warrants and drove on a suspended license. The recent 

parenting time supervisor noted that respondent lacked motivation and got lazy with her parenting. 

Under the circumstances, it is questionable whether respondent could manage GMD’s needs. In 

light of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred in its determination that 
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termination of respondent’s parental rights was in GMD’s best interests. In re Laster, 303 Mich 

App at 496.5

Affirmed.

/s/ Anica Letica

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

 

5

In a single sentence, respondent alleged that a guardianship should have been contemplated in 

lieu of termination. Although it is true that an alternative, such as placement with relatives, may 

weigh against termination, In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 434, this request was not made 

in the trial court. Indeed, it appears that no request was made because the relationship between 

respondent and the Branches had soured. Given respondent’s actions in searching for signs of 

physical abuse by the Branches and the purportedly false report against them, guardianship with 

the Branches in lieu of termination of parental rights was never contemplated.