alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
S. J. Res. 49 

One Hundred Twelfth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE SECOND SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, 

the third day of January, two thousand and twelve 

Joint Resolution 

Providing for the appointment of Barbara Barrett as a citizen regent of the Board 

of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled, That, in accordance with section 5581 of the Revised Statutes of the United States 

(20 U.S.C. 43), the vacancy on the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, in the class other than Members of Congress, 

occurring by reason of the expiration of the term of Alan Spoon 

of Massachusetts on May 5, 2012, is filled by the appointment 

of Barbara Barrett of Arizona. The appointment is for a term 

of 6 years, beginning on the later of May 5, 2012, or the date 

of the enactment of this joint resolution. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
#### Stanley Lorenzo WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Robert W. SMITH, Supt.; Secretary of Corrections, Theodis Beck, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 11-6333.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 22, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 11, 2011.

Stanley Lorenzo Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, Mary Carla Hollis, Assistant Attorneys General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before KING, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Stanley Lorenzo Williams seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Williams has not made the requisite show*836ing. Accordingly, we deny Williams’ motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We deny Williams’ motion for a transcript at Government expense and for a stay pending appeal, and grant his motion for leave to amend his informal brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
# C_2019172EN.01003901.xml

| 20.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 172/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 172/39

---

Action brought on 20 March 2019 — Hebberecht v EEAS

(Case T-171/19)

(2019/C 172/53)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Chantal Hebberecht (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: K. Bicard, lawyer)

Defendant: European External Action Service (EEAS)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare Ms Hebberecht’s application admissible and well founded; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare Ms Hebberecht’s application admissible and well founded;

| — | annul the penalty imposed on the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the penalty imposed on the applicant;

| — | order the European External Action Service (EEAS) to pay the applicant EUR 36 000 in respect of arrears of salary and default interest; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European External Action Service (EEAS) to pay the applicant EUR 36 000 in respect of arrears of salary and default interest;

| — | order the EEAS to pay the applicant EUR 450 000 as compensation for injury to her health, material and non-material damage; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the EEAS to pay the applicant EUR 450 000 as compensation for injury to her health, material and non-material damage;

| — | in the alternative, order the EEAS to pay the applicant EUR 300 000 as compensation for those damages; |
| --- | --- |

—

in the alternative, order the EEAS to pay the applicant EUR 300 000 as compensation for those damages;

| — | in the further alternative, order the EEAS to pay the applicant EUR 150 000 as compensation for those damages; |
| --- | --- |

—

in the further alternative, order the EEAS to pay the applicant EUR 150 000 as compensation for those damages;

| — | in the still further alternative, order the EEAS to pay the applicant EUR 50 000 as compensation for those damages; |
| --- | --- |

—

in the still further alternative, order the EEAS to pay the applicant EUR 50 000 as compensation for those damages;

| — | order the EEAS to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the EEAS to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant claims that the findings made against her by the tribunal de première instance du Hainaut (Court of First Instance, Hainaut, Belgium) in its judgment of 13 December 2017, relied on by the EEAS as constituting a particularly serious failure to comply with the obligations of officials, inter alia under Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, are incorrect. She also claims that the penalties imposed on her are discriminatory.

---
Order entered March 14, 2014

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05 - 13 - 00221 - CR No. 05 - 13 - 00222 - CR No. 05 - 13 - 00240 - CR VICTOR JOEL SUAREZ, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Cour t No. 4

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . F09 - 41419 - K , F06 - 45426 - K, F06 - 45427 - K 

### O RDER The Court GRANTS appellant’s March 12, 2014 motion to supplement the clerk’s records. We ORDER the Dallas County District Clerk to file, within FIFTEEN DAYS of the date of this order, supplemental clerk’s records containing the following documents: (1) the Ominbus Pretrial Motion; (2) the Request for Notice of Extraneous Offenses; and (3) the Motion Restricting Prosecutor’s Nomenclature.

/s/ DAVID EVANS JUS TICE
#### WEAVER V. ALABAMA WESTERN RY.

*Damages.*

(Decided Nov. 26, 1907.)

Appeal from Birmingham City Court.

Heard before Hon. C. W. Ferguson.

Sam Will John, for appellant.

Percy & Benners, for appellee.

Per curiam.

Dismissed by agreement of parties.
**EXHIBIT 13****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**     In connection with this Annual Report of SAP AG (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the yearended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), we, Prof. Dr. Henning Kagermann, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Dr.Werner Brandt, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that to our knowledge:     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.        Dated April 2, 2007   /s/ HENNING KAGERMANN    Name:  Prof. Dr. Henning Kagermann    Title:  Chief Executive Officer           Dated April 2, 2007   /s/ WERNER BRANDT    Name:  Dr. Werner Brandt    Title:  Chief Financial Officer        The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 andis not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.
# C_2019270EN.01005001.xml

| 12.8.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 270/50 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.8.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 270/50

---

Action brought on 27 June 2019 — Muscardini v Parliament

(Case T-390/19)

(2019/C 270/51)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Cristiana Muscardini (Milan, Italy) (represented by: M. Merola, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare non existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament redetermined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare non existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament redetermined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

| — | order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

| — | order the European Parliament to pay the costs of the legal proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs of the legal proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those raised in Case T-389/19 Coppo Gavazzi v Parliament

---
**EXHIBIT
      32.3**




Written
      Statement of Principal Accounting Officer Furnished Pursuant to


18
      U.S.C.
      Section 1350,


as
      Adopted by


Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002








In
      connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of HouseRaising, Inc. (the
      "Company") for the year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Christine M. Carriker,
      Senior Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer, certify, pursuant to
      18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
      2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:




(1)
      the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition as of December 31, 2006 and results of operations for
      the year ended December 31, 2006 of the Company and its
      subsidiaries.




/s/ Christine
              M. CarrikerChristine
              M. CarrikerSenior
                Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer
              (Principal
                Accounting Officer)




April
      2,
      2007





This
      certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by
      the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Companle call
      volume.


8.
      Strategic advice and other customary IR services.
(121 App. Div. 690.)

#### KNICKERBOCKER INV. CO. v. VOORHEES et al. In re DAVIES, STONE & AUERBACH.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

October 25, 1907.)

Reference—Order—Defect of Pasties—Waives.

Where a copy of an order of reference is served on a party, and he knows of the method directed for the service of the order, his objection that all parties are not before the court must be taken on the return of the order, or it is waived.

[Ed. Note.—For eases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 42, Reference, § 62.]

Appeal from Special Term.

Action by the Knickerbocker Investment Company against Foster M. Voorhees, William Sherer, the Bankers’ Life Insurance Company, and others. From an order denying a motion to vacate the proceedings, defendants William Sherer and the Bankers’ Life Insurance Company appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and INGRAHAM, LAUGH-LIN, CLARKE, and HOUGHTON, JJ.

Eugene Van Schaick, for appellant Bankers’ Life Insurance Company.

Joseph A. Keenan, for appellant Sherer.

Julian C. Harrison, for respondent.

INGRAHAM, J.

I do not see that the appellants could on this motion take advantage of the objection that all of the parties to the special proceeding were not before the court. In the affidavit upon which the motion was made, Sherer swears that he did not know, until a motion was made on behalf of Voorhees to vacate the order of reference, that Voorhees had not been properly made a party to this proceeding. A copy of the order of May 24, 1906, had been served upon him, and he knew of the method for the service of the order directed, and, if he had wished to take the objection that all parties were not before the court, he should have taken it on the return of that order, and, not having done so, it is waived. So far as appears, the only objection that was taken before the referee was that the order was unconstitutional and void. The specific objection that there was a defect of parties to the special proceeding was not taken, either before the court at Special Term on the return of the order to show cause or be*456fore the referee. It also appears that the order of May 34, 1906, was affirmed by this court. 100 N. Y. Supp. 1124, 114 App. Div. 912. The question as to what, if any, final order should be entered in this proceeding, can be raised upon the motion to confirm the referee's-report.

The order should be affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. All concur.
Exhibit 10.115

UTSTARCOM, INC.        AMENDED AND RESTATED CHANGE OF CONTROL SEVERANCE AGREEMENT

This Amended and Restated Change of Control/Involuntary Termination Severance Agreement (the "Agreement") is made and entered into effective as of
                        , 2006 (the "Effective Date"), by and between Ying Wu (the "Employee") and UTStarcom, Inc., a
Delaware corporation (the "Company"). Certain capitalized terms used in this
Agreement are defined in Section 1 below.

R E C I T A L S

A.    The
Company and Employee previously entered into a Change of Control Severance Agreement which provided the Employee with certain severance benefits upon the Employee's
termination of employement following a Change of Control (the "Original Agreement").

B.    The
Board of Directors of the Company (the "Board") believes that it is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders to provide the Employee with further
incentives to continue his employment.

C.    In
order to provide the Employee with enhanced financial security and sufficient encouragement to remain with the Company, the Board wishes to augment certain terms of
the Original Agreement, which is hereby amended and restated in its entirety as follows.

AGREEMENT

In
consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained and the continued employment of Employee by the Company, the parties agree as follows:



---





2

---





3

---





Unless
the Company and the Employee otherwise agree in writing, any determination required under this Section shall be made in writing by the Company's independent public accountants
(the "Accountants"), whose determination shall be conclusive and binding upon the Employee and the Company for all purposes. For purposes of making the calculations required by this Section, the
Accountants may make reasonable assumptions and approximations concerning applicable taxes and may rely on reasonable, good faith interpretations concerning the application of Section 280G and
4999 of the Code. The Company and the Employee shall furnish to the Accountants such information and documents as the Accountants may reasonably request in order to make a determination under this
Section. The Company shall bear all costs the Accountants may reasonably incur in connection with any calculations contemplated by this Section.

4

---





5

---





6

---





7

---





IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties has executed this Agreement, in the case of the Company by its duly authorized officer, as of the day and year first above written.

|COMPANY:  |  | UTSTARCOM, INC.    
|--------- |  | -------------------
|          |  | By:                
|          |  | Title:             
|EMPLOYEE: |  | Signature          
|          |  | Ying WuPrinted Name

SIGNATURE PAGE TO AMENDED AND RESTATED CHANGE OF CONTROL
SEVERANCE AGREEMENT

8

---



QuickLinks
# C_2020279EN.01001601.xml

| 24.8.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 279/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 279/16

---

Appeal brought on 29 October 2019 by Paix et justice pour les juifs séfarades en Israël against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 5 September 2019 in Case T-337/19, Paix et justice pour les juifs séfarades en Israël v Commission and Council of Europe

(Case C-798/19 P)

(2020/C 279/21)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Paix et justice pour les juifs séfarades en Israël (represented by: R. Paternel, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Council of Europe

By order of 27 May 2020, the Court (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible.

---
#### Mikael Nevruzoglu, Respondent, v Otsego Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Appellant.

In an action to recover under a policy of insurance for a burglary loss, defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lerner, J.), dated May 22, 1984, which granted plaintiff’s motion to vacate the dismissal of its complaint and restore the action to the Trial Calendar.

Order affirmed, with costs.

Special Term did not abuse its discretion in restoring this case since plaintiff never intended to abandon the action, but rather, delayed due to his belief that further pretrial discovery remained *(see,*CPLR 3404; *Marco v Sachs,*10 NY2d 542). In addition to establishing a reasonable excuse for his delay, plaintiff demonstrated a lack of any significant prejudice to defendant and the existence of a meritorious claim *(see,*22 NYCRR 675.5; *Monacelli v Board of Educ.,*92 AD2d 930). O’Connor, J. P., Weinstein, Brown and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 8 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Whereas women have served with distinction in the United 

States Armed Forces since the American Revolution and 

have made significant and lasting contributions to the security of the United States; 

Whereas in 2011, women comprise nearly 16 percent of the 

United States Armed Forces and serve in positions of responsibility in the active and reserve components of the 

Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard, 

as compared with less than 5 percent in 1976 when 

women were first integrated into the service academies; 

Whereas women serve at the highest levels in the Department 

of Defense and other governmental organizations contributing to the defense of the United States; and 

Whereas the accomplishments of generations of women have 

contributed to the history of the United States Armed 

Forces and to the strength of the United States: Now, 

therefore, be it 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That Congress— 

3 (1) recognizes the importance of women to na4 tional defense throughout the history of the United 

5 States; and 
2 

†SCON 8 ES 

1 (2) encourages the people of the United States 

2 to honor women who have served and who continue 

3 to serve the United States in the United States 

4 Armed Forces. 

Passed the Senate February 28, 2011. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 8 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Recognizing women serving in the United States 

Armed Forces.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Danny MOREL, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 10-4004 (L), 10-4016(CON).

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Dec. 9, 2011.

Nicholas J. Pinto, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.

Brian R. Blais, (Katherine Polk Failla, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Preet Bhar-ara, U.S. Attorney, on the brief), United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.

PRESENT: JOSEPH M. McLaughlin, josé a. cabranes and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-appellant Danny Morel (“Morel”) appeals from two judgments of conviction entered by the District Court on September 16, 2010, convicting him, pursuant to his guilty plea, of conspiracy to commit access device fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(b)(2), access device fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(4), and failure to appear at a court proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a)(1) and 3146(b)(1)(A)®. After Morel was indicted on the access device fraud charges in 2002, he fled prosecution and remained a fugitive for nearly seven years, until he was arrested in Pennsylvania on February 11, 2010. Following his guilty plea to the access device fraud charges and the failure to appear charge, Morel was sentenced principally to 27 months of imprisonment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review a criminal sentence for “unreasonableness,” which “amounts to review for abuse of discretion.” *United States v. Cavera,*550 F.3d 180, 187 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted); *see also Sims v. Blot,*534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (explaining “abuse of discretion”). “Reasonableness review requires an examination of the length of the sentence (sub*61stantive reasonableness) as well as the procedure employed in arriving at the sentence (procedural reasonableness).” *United States v. Johnson,*567 F.3d 40, 51 (2d Cir.2009). We have previously likened our review for substantive unreasonableness “to the consideration of a motion for a new criminal jury trial, which should be granted only when the jury’s verdict was ‘manifestly unjust,’ and to the determination of intentional torts by state actors, which should be found only if the alleged tort ‘shocks the conscience.’ ” *United States v. Dorvee,*616 F.3d 174, 183 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting *United States v. Rigas,*583 F.3d 108, 122-23 (2d Cir.2009)).

On appeal, Morel challenges only the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the District Court should have imposed a below-Guidelines sentence in light of (1) his lack of a prior criminal record; (2) his strong family support; (3) his work history; and (4) the fact that he did not commit any additional crimes during the period of his flight. The record is clear that the District Court considered these facts at sentencing and nonetheless concluded that a sentence of 27 months was “appropriate and reasonable.” Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

*CONCLUSION*

We reject all of the defendant’s claims on appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.