alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 28 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), 

3 SECTION 1. USE OF EMANCIPATION HALL FOR EVENT TO 

4 AWARD THE CONGRESSIONAL GOLD MEDAL. 

5 (a) AUTHORIZATION.—Emancipation Hall in the 

6 Capitol Visitor Center is authorized to be used for an 

7 event on November 2, 2011, to award the Congressional 

8 Gold Medal, collectively, to the 100th Infantry Battalion, 

9 442nd Regimental Combat Team, and the Military Intel10 ligence Service, United States Army, in recognition of 

11 their dedicated service during World War II. 

12 (b) PREPARATIONS.—Physical preparations for the 

13 conduct of the event described in subsection (a) shall be 
2 

†SCON 28 ES 

1 carried out in accordance with such conditions as may be 

2 prescribed by the Architect of the Capitol. 

Passed the Senate September 8, 2011. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 28 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Authorizing the use of Emancipation Hall in the 

their dedicated service during World War II. Service, United States Army, in recognition of Combat Team, and the Military Intelligence 100th Infantry Battalion, 442nd Regimental Congressional Gold Medal, collectively, to the Capitol Visitor Center for an event to award the
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Barry Murphy, Appellant.

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Martin, J.), rendered November 23, 1982, convicting him of robbery in the first degree and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

Judgment affirmed.

Both the photographic array viewed by the complainant and the circumstances surrounding the viewing thereof were not impermissibly suggestive. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to suppress the in-court identification by the complainant. Gibbons, J. P., Brown, Lawrence and Hooper, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Synovics Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the Company) for the quarterly period ended April 30, 2009 filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Mahendra Desai Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|(3) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                                                                                                                     
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   
|(4) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and consolidated results of operations of the Company for the
periods presented.
|   

Dated: June 22, 2009

|    |                            
|--- | ---------------------------
|By: | /s/
        Mahendra Desai 
|    | Mahendra Desai             
|    | Chief Financial
    Officer







This certification has been furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Synovics Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and will be retained by Synovics Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

---
##### 



Exhibit 99.1

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the annual report of Texas United Bancshares, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, L.
Don Stricklin, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.     The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and operating results of the
Company.

| |                                                                                            
| | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | /s/ L. DON STRICKLIN

L. Don Stricklin
President and Chief Executive Officer
March 28, 2003
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dukieem M. Wilson, Appellant.

[948 NYS2d 77]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Greller, J.), rendered April 21, 2011, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty (Hayes, J.), and imposing sentence. The appeal from the judgment brings upon for review the denial, after a hearing (Hayes, J.), of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

“ ‘[A]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred,’ even if the underlying reason for the stop was to investigate another matter unrelated to the *981traffic violation” *(People v Sluszka,*15 AD3d 421, 423 [2005], quoting *People v Robinson,*97 NY2d 341, 348-349 [2001]; *see Whren v United States,*517 US 806, 810 [1996]). Here, the police had probable cause to stop the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger upon observing that it failed to signal when leaving the curb and entering a public highway *(see*Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 [d]).

Additionally, “[t]he credibility determinations of the Supreme Court following a suppression hearing are entitled to great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record” *(People v Smith,*77 AD3d 980, 981 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; *see People v Spann,*82 AD3d 1013, 1014 [2011]). Here, contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the testimony of the officers at the hearing was not unbelievable *(cf. Matter of Robert D.,*69 AD3d 714, 716-717 [2010]). Based on the officers’ testimony, the hearing court properly concluded that the frisking of the defendant which resulted in the seizure of a gun was supported by the requisite predicate of reasonable suspicion by the police that the defendant might be armed *(see e.g. People v Batista,*88 NY2d 650 [1996]; *People v Benjamin,*51 NY2d 267, 271 [1980]; *People v Caicedo,*69 AD3d 954 [2010]; *People v Zingale,*246 AD2d 613 [1998]). Angiolillo, J.P., Belen, Roman and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                     254,191,435
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  126,206
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           256,020,812
<PP&E>                                      23,122,264
<DEPRECIATION>                               8,999,417
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             275,474,274
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       14,508,334
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       386,265
<OTHER-SE>                                  88,166,370
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               275,474,274
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            10,579,555
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               15,856,973
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             7,704,032
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (11,652,347)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   350,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (11,320,582)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (11,320,582)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    ($0.30)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  ($0.30)



</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CHLOE WALLACE

, 1

Respondent Below,

Appellant,

v.

VIVIAN DICKENS and MEGAN

ROLAND

,

Petitioners Below,

Appellee s

. §

§

§ No. 66 , 2019

§

§ Court Below

— Family Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§

§ File No. CN18

- 05978

§ Petition No. 18

- 31705

§

§

§

Submitted: March 12, 2019

Decided: March 28 , 2019

Before STRINE

, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and SEITZ

, Justices.

OR DER

After considering the notice of appeal from an interlocutory order under

Supreme Court Rule 42

, it appears to the Court that :

(1) On February 15, 2019, the appellant, Chloe Wallace, filed a notice of

interlocutory appeal from a Family Court order, dated January 18, 2019 and

docketed on January 22, 2019, finding there was probable cause to believe the

appellant’s children would be dependent and/or neglected in the appellant’ s care and

that temporary guardianship should be granted to appellee Vivian Dickens until

1 The Court assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).2

further order of the Family Court

. A preliminary hearing was scheduled for January

29, 2019, but was continued at the request of the appellant and is currently scheduled

for March 28, 2019. On March 8, 2019, the Family Court treated the notice of appeal

as an application for certification under Supreme Court Rule 42 and denied it as

untimely.

(2) We refuse this interlocutory appeal, which fails to comply with Rule

42. Under Rule 42, the appellant was required to file an application for ce rtification

o f the January 18 th order in the Family Court within ten days of that order. 2 She was

also required to file an application for certification in the Family Court before filing

a notice of interlocutory appeal in this Court. 3 Instead she filed a notice of

i nterlocutory appeal in this Court without ever filing an application for certification

in the Family Court. The appellant’s pro se status does not excuse her failure to

comply with the requirements of Rule 42. 4

2 Supr. Ct. R. 42(c)(i) (“ Such application shall be served and filed within 10 days of the entry of

the order from which the appeal is sought or such longer time as the trial court, in its discretion,

may order for good cause shown .”).

3 Supr. Ct. R. 42(c) ( providing that “[a]n applicat ion for certification of an interlocutory appeal

shall be made in the first instance to the trial court ”).

4 See, e.g.

, Hall v. Danberg , 2010 WL 2624382, at *1 (De L . July 1, 2010) (rejecting pro se

litigant's argument that his failure to comply with Rule 4 2 should be excused due to his pro se

status).3

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the interlocutory

appeal is REFUSED

.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.

Justice
# C_2019288EN.01006202.xml

| 26.8.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 288/62 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 288/62

---

Action brought on 28 June 2019 — Di Meo v Parliament

(Case T-409/19)

(2019/C 288/76)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Maria Di Meo (Cellole, Italy) (represented by: M. Merola, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

| — | order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

| — | order the European Parliament to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those relied on in Case T-389/19, Coppo Gavazzi v Parliament.

---
# C_2019187EN.01008502.xml

| 3.6.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 187/85 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.6.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 187/85

---

Action brought on 9 April 2019 — Vinos de Arganza v EUIPO — Nordbrand Nordhausen (ENCANTO)

(Case T-239/19)

(2019/C 187/92)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Vinos de Arganza, SL (Toral de los Vados, Spain) (represented by: L. Broschat García, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Nordbrand Nordhausen GmbH (Nordhausen, Germany)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark ENCANTO — Application for registration No 15 542 251

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 17 January 2019 in Case R 392/2018-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | reject the opposition; |
| --- | --- |

—

reject the opposition;

| — | allow the registration of the trade mark applied; |
| --- | --- |

—

allow the registration of the trade mark applied;

| — | order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

---
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 133 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 133

               To require that new war funding be offset.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                April 6 (legislative day, April 5), 2011

 Mr. Franken submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                      the Committee on the Budget

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
               To require that new war funding be offset.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This resolution may be cited as the ``Pay for War Resolution''.

SEC. 2. DEFICIT-NEUTRAL WAR SPENDING.

    (a) In General.--For purposes of budget enforcement and except as 
provided in this section, it shall not be in order for the Senate to 
consider budget authority for overseas contingency operations if it 
increases the on-budget deficit over the period of the budget year and 
the ensuing 9 fiscal years following the budget year.
    (b) Offsets.--Budget authority provided for overseas contingency 
operations in a bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference 
report shall be considered deficit neutral for the purpose of this 
section if such authority--
            (1) is considered subsequent to an Act of Congress that 
        raises revenue for the designated purpose of paying for such 
        overseas contingency operations; or
            (2) includes new reductions in spending authority.
    (c) Iraq and Afghanistan.--For purposes of this section, the 
following amounts are not required to be offset with respect to the 
overseas contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan:
            (1) For fiscal year 2012, $118,000,000,000.
            (2) For fiscal years 2013 through 2016, an amount equal to 
        the President's budget request for that fiscal year for 
        overseas contingency operations funds for Iraq and Afghanistan.
    (d) Budget Determinations.--Compliance with this section shall be 
determined on the basis of estimates provided by the Committee on the 
Budget of the Senate.
    (e) Waiver and Appeal.--
            (1) Waiver.--The provisions of this section may be waived 
        or suspended in the Senate only by the affirmative vote of 
        three-fifths of the Members, duly chosen and sworn.
            (2) Appeals.--Appeals in the Senate from the decisions of 
        the Chair relating to any provision of this section shall be 
        limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided between, and 
        controlled by, the appellant and the manager of the bill or 
        joint resolution, as the case may be. An affirmative vote of 
        three-fifths of the Members of the Senate, duly chosen and 
        sworn, shall be required to sustain an appeal of the ruling of 
        the Chair on a point of order raised under this section.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
# C_2019295EN.01004801.xml

| 2.9.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 295/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.9.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 295/48

---

Action brought on 2 July 2019 — Martelli v Parliament

(Case T-423/19)

(2019/C 295/62)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Claudio Martelli (Rome, Italy) (represented by: M. Merola, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

| — | order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

| — | order the European Parliament to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those relied on in Case T-389/19, Coppo Gavazzi v Parliament.

---