# L_2011250EN.01003101.xml

| 27.9.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 250/31 |
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27.9.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 250/31

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DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

of 10 May 2011

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009, Section III — Commission

(2011/550/EU, Euratom)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,

| — | having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009 (1),

1

| — | having regard to the annual accounts of the European Union for the financial year 2009 (SEC(2010) 963 – C7-0211/2010) (2), |
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—

having regard to the annual accounts of the European Union for the financial year 2009 (SEC(2010) 963 – C7-0211/2010) (2),

2

| — | having regard to the Commission’s report on the follow-up to the discharge for the 2008 financial year (COM(2010) 650), and to the Commission staff working documents accompanying that report (SEC(2010) 1437 and SEC(2010) 1438), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s report on the follow-up to the discharge for the 2008 financial year (COM(2010) 650), and to the Commission staff working documents accompanying that report (SEC(2010) 1437 and SEC(2010) 1438),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 2 June 2010 entitled ‘Synthesis of the Commission’s management achievements in 2009’ (COM(2010) 281), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 2 June 2010 entitled ‘Synthesis of the Commission’s management achievements in 2009’ (COM(2010) 281),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s annual report to the discharge authority on internal audits carried out in 2009 (COM(2010) 447), and to the Commission staff working document accompanying that report (SEC(2010) 994), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s annual report to the discharge authority on internal audits carried out in 2009 (COM(2010) 447), and to the Commission staff working document accompanying that report (SEC(2010) 994),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s report on Member States’ replies to the Court of Auditors’ 2009 annual report (COM(2011) 104), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s report on Member States’ replies to the Court of Auditors’ 2009 annual report (COM(2011) 104),

| — | having regard to the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors on the implementation of the budget concerning the financial year 2009, together with the institutions’ replies (3), and to the Court of Auditors’ special reports, |
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—

having regard to the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors on the implementation of the budget concerning the financial year 2009, together with the institutions’ replies (3), and to the Court of Auditors’ special reports,

3

| — | having regard to the statement of assurance as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (4), |
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—

having regard to the statement of assurance as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (4),

4

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 26 May 2010 entitled ‘More or less controls? Striking the right balance between the administrative costs of control and the risk of error’ (COM(2010) 261), and to the Commission staff working documents accompanying that communication (SEC(2010) 640 and SEC(2010) 641), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 26 May 2010 entitled ‘More or less controls? Striking the right balance between the administrative costs of control and the risk of error’ (COM(2010) 261), and to the Commission staff working documents accompanying that communication (SEC(2010) 640 and SEC(2010) 641),

| — | having regard to the report of the Court of Auditors on the annual accounts of the European Schools for the financial year 2009 together with the Schools’ replies, |
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—

having regard to the report of the Court of Auditors on the annual accounts of the European Schools for the financial year 2009 together with the Schools’ replies,

| — | having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 15 February 2011 on discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2009 (05891/2011 – C7-0053/2011), |
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—

having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 15 February 2011 on discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2009 (05891/2011 – C7-0053/2011),

| — | having regard to Articles 274, 275 and 276 of the EC Treaty, Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 179a and 180b of the Euratom Treaty, |
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—

having regard to Articles 274, 275 and 276 of the EC Treaty, Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 179a and 180b of the Euratom Treaty,

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (5) as amended by Council Regulations (EC, Euratom) No 1995/2006 (6) and (EC) No 1525/2007 (7), and in particular Articles 55, 145, 146 and 147 thereof, |
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—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (5) as amended by Council Regulations (EC, Euratom) No 1995/2006 (6) and (EC) No 1525/2007 (7), and in particular Articles 55, 145, 146 and 147 thereof,

5

6

7

| — | having regard to Rule 76 of, and Annex VI to, its Rules of Procedure, |
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—

having regard to Rule 76 of, and Annex VI to, its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinions of the other committees concerned (A7-0134/2011), |
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—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinions of the other committees concerned (A7-0134/2011),

| A. | whereas pursuant to Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union the Commission shall execute the budget and manage programmes and shall do so, pursuant to Article 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in cooperation with the Member States on its own responsibility, having regard to the principle of sound financial management, |
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A.

whereas pursuant to Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union the Commission shall execute the budget and manage programmes and shall do so, pursuant to Article 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in cooperation with the Member States on its own responsibility, having regard to the principle of sound financial management,

| 1. | Grants the Commission discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009; |
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1.

Grants the Commission discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009;

| 2. | Sets out its observations in the resolution that forms an integral part of the Decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009, Section III — Commission and executive agencies, and in its Resolution of 10 May 2011 on the Court of Auditors’ special reports in the context of the 2009 Commission discharge (8); |
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2.

Sets out its observations in the resolution that forms an integral part of the Decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009, Section III — Commission and executive agencies, and in its Resolution of 10 May 2011 on the Court of Auditors’ special reports in the context of the 2009 Commission discharge (8);

8

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward this Decision, and the resolutions that form an integral part of it, to the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series). |
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3.

Instructs its President to forward this Decision, and the resolutions that form an integral part of it, to the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

Official Journal of the European Union

The President

Jerzy BUZEK

The Secretary-General

Klaus WELLE

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(1)  OJ L 69, 13.3.2009.

1

(2)  OJ C 308, 12.11.2010, p. 1.

2

(3)  OJ C 303, 9.11.2010, p. 1.

3

(4)  OJ C 308, 12.11.2010, p. 129.

4

(5)  OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1.

5

(6)  OJ L 390, 30.12.2006, p. 1.

6

(7)  OJ L 343, 27.12.2007, p. 9.

7

(8)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0195 (see page 63 of this Official Journal).

8

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RESOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

of 10 May 2011

with observations forming an integral part of its Decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009, Section III — Commission and executive agencies

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,

| — | having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009 (1), |
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—

having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009 (1),

| — | having regard to the annual accounts of the European Union for the financial year 2009 (SEC(2010) 963 – C7-0211/2010) (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the annual accounts of the European Union for the financial year 2009 (SEC(2010) 963 – C7-0211/2010) (2),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s report on the follow-up to the discharge for the 2008 financial year (COM(2010) 650), and to the Commission staff working documents accompanying that report (SEC(2010) 1437 and SEC(2010) 1438), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s report on the follow-up to the discharge for the 2008 financial year (COM(2010) 650), and to the Commission staff working documents accompanying that report (SEC(2010) 1437 and SEC(2010) 1438),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 2 June 2010 entitled ‘Synthesis of the Commission’s management achievements in 2009’ (COM(2010) 281), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 2 June 2010 entitled ‘Synthesis of the Commission’s management achievements in 2009’ (COM(2010) 281),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s annual report to the discharge authority on internal audits carried out in 2009 (COM(2010) 447), and to the Commission staff working document accompanying that report (SEC(2010) 994), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s annual report to the discharge authority on internal audits carried out in 2009 (COM(2010) 447), and to the Commission staff working document accompanying that report (SEC(2010) 994),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s report on Member States’ replies to the Court of Auditors’ 2009 annual report (COM(2011) 104), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s report on Member States’ replies to the Court of Auditors’ 2009 annual report (COM(2011) 104),

| — | having regard to the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors on the implementation of the budget concerning the financial year 2009, together with the institutions’ replies (3), and to the Court of Auditors’ special reports, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors on the implementation of the budget concerning the financial year 2009, together with the institutions’ replies (3), and to the Court of Auditors’ special reports,

| — | having regard to the statement of assurance as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, provided by the Court of Auditors pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of assurance as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, provided by the Court of Auditors pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (4),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 26 May 2010 entitled ‘More or less controls? Striking the right balance between the administrative costs of control and the risk of error’ (COM(2010) 261), and to the Commission staff working documents accompanying that communication (SEC(2010) 640 and SEC(2010) 641), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 26 May 2010 entitled ‘More or less controls? Striking the right balance between the administrative costs of control and the risk of error’ (COM(2010) 261), and to the Commission staff working documents accompanying that communication (SEC(2010) 640 and SEC(2010) 641),

| — | having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 15 February 2011 on discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2009 (05891/2011 – C7-0053/2011), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 15 February 2011 on discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2009 (05891/2011 – C7-0053/2011),

| — | having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 15 February 2011 on discharge to be given to the executive agencies in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2009 (05893/2011 – C7-0054/2011), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 15 February 2011 on discharge to be given to the executive agencies in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2009 (05893/2011 – C7-0054/2011),

| — | having regard to Articles 274, 275 and 276 of the EC Treaty, Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 179a and 180b of the Euratom Treaty, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 274, 275 and 276 of the EC Treaty, Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 179a and 180b of the Euratom Treaty,

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (5) (‘Financial Regulation’) as amended by Council Regulations (EC, Euratom) No 1995/2006 (6) and (EC) No 1525/2007 (7), and in particular Articles 55, 145, 146 and 147 thereof, |
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—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (5) (‘Financial Regulation’) as amended by Council Regulations (EC, Euratom) No 1995/2006 (6) and (EC) No 1525/2007 (7), and in particular Articles 55, 145, 146 and 147 thereof,

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes (8), and in particular Article 14(2) and (3) thereof, |
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—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes (8), and in particular Article 14(2) and (3) thereof,

| — | having regard to Rule 76 of, and Annex VI to, its Rules of Procedure, |
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—

having regard to Rule 76 of, and Annex VI to, its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinions of the other committees concerned (A7-0134/2011), |
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—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinions of the other committees concerned (A7-0134/2011),

| A. | whereas the Barroso I Commission had a strategic objective to obtain a positive statement of assurance from the Court of Auditors by 2009 and whereas this objective was not achieved, |
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A.

whereas the Barroso I Commission had a strategic objective to obtain a positive statement of assurance from the Court of Auditors by 2009 and whereas this objective was not achieved,

| B. | whereas the Treaty of Lisbon has enhanced the Commission’s role by providing that it shall execute the budget and manage programmes (Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union) and it shall do so on its own responsibility (Article 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) — regardless of the method of implementation applied — and that the Member States shall cooperate with the Commission to ensure that the appropriations are used in accordance with the principles of sound financial management, |
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B.

whereas the Treaty of Lisbon has enhanced the Commission’s role by providing that it shall execute the budget and manage programmes (Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union) and it shall do so on its own responsibility (Article 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) — regardless of the method of implementation applied — and that the Member States shall cooperate with the Commission to ensure that the appropriations are used in accordance with the principles of sound financial management,

| C. | whereas the Treaty of Lisbon has also provided that the Commission shall submit an evaluation report on the Union’s finances based on the results achieved (Article 318 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), |
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C.

whereas the Treaty of Lisbon has also provided that the Commission shall submit an evaluation report on the Union’s finances based on the results achieved (Article 318 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union),

| D. | whereas European citizens expect taxpayers’ money to be used correctly, efficiently and usefully and whereas the question of the ‘size’ of the Union budget has to be discussed on the basis of the objectives to be achieved, as well as on the basis of the competences and responsibilities given by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
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D.

whereas European citizens expect taxpayers’ money to be used correctly, efficiently and usefully and whereas the question of the ‘size’ of the Union budget has to be discussed on the basis of the objectives to be achieved, as well as on the basis of the competences and responsibilities given by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| E. | whereas the second subparagraph of Article 287(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union requires the Court of Auditors to provide Parliament and the Council with a statement of assurance as to the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, adding that the statement may be supplemented by specific assessments for each major area of Union activity, |
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E.

whereas the second subparagraph of Article 287(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union requires the Court of Auditors to provide Parliament and the Council with a statement of assurance as to the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, adding that the statement may be supplemented by specific assessments for each major area of Union activity,

| F. | whereas not only the Commission but also the Member States have to be held accountable for the fact that the Court of Auditors has, thus far, not been able to issue an unqualified statement of assurance, |
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F.

whereas not only the Commission but also the Member States have to be held accountable for the fact that the Court of Auditors has, thus far, not been able to issue an unqualified statement of assurance,

| G. | whereas mandatory national management declarations issued and signed at ministerial level and duly audited by an independent auditor are a necessary and indispensable step to counter the current lack of ownership and the widespread perception of financial mismanagement at Union level, |
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G.

whereas mandatory national management declarations issued and signed at ministerial level and duly audited by an independent auditor are a necessary and indispensable step to counter the current lack of ownership and the widespread perception of financial mismanagement at Union level,

| H. | whereas the current multi-level assurance system does not yet guarantee the compliance of Union spending with the requirements of legality, regularity and sound financial management provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Financial Regulation, |
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H.

whereas the current multi-level assurance system does not yet guarantee the compliance of Union spending with the requirements of legality, regularity and sound financial management provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Financial Regulation,

| I. | whereas independent states — not regions — are members of the Union and whereas Member States, even if their structure is federal, bear a responsibility to the outside world and the Union, |
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I.

whereas independent states — not regions — are members of the Union and whereas Member States, even if their structure is federal, bear a responsibility to the outside world and the Union,

| J. | whereas the ‘accountability’ process is instrumental to good management, improving delivery and analysis, allowing for changes to be made to management and strategy and for better use being made of scarce resources and whereas, as observed by the Council, an accurate and accountable use of the EU resources is one of the essential means to reinforce the trust of European citizens (9), |
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J.

whereas the ‘accountability’ process is instrumental to good management, improving delivery and analysis, allowing for changes to be made to management and strategy and for better use being made of scarce resources and whereas, as observed by the Council, an accurate and accountable use of the EU resources is one of the essential means to reinforce the trust of European citizens (9),

| K. | whereas there is a need to move away from the current ‘culture of entitlements’ and to take decisive measures towards implementing a culture of accountability at both national and Union level and to address both compliance and performance issues in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the Union, |
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K.

whereas there is a need to move away from the current ‘culture of entitlements’ and to take decisive measures towards implementing a culture of accountability at both national and Union level and to address both compliance and performance issues in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the Union,

| L. | whereas the Commission and the Court of Auditors must be provided with assurance evidence in the form of a statement of assurance from international organisations implementing Union assistance, |
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L.

whereas the Commission and the Court of Auditors must be provided with assurance evidence in the form of a statement of assurance from international organisations implementing Union assistance,

| M. | whereas improving the financial management of the Union, the quality of spending and the arrangements for holding the Commission to account for its management of funds is a high priority and a key objective for Parliament to be achieved during the revision of the Financial Regulation, the new multiannual financial framework and the budget reform, |
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M.

whereas improving the financial management of the Union, the quality of spending and the arrangements for holding the Commission to account for its management of funds is a high priority and a key objective for Parliament to be achieved during the revision of the Financial Regulation, the new multiannual financial framework and the budget reform,

| N. | whereas concrete proposals for an efficient implementation of regular, tripartite meetings between the Presidents of Parliament, the Council and the Commission — as provided for in Article 324 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — shall be drawn up so as to ensure good cooperation between those institutions, |
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N.

whereas concrete proposals for an efficient implementation of regular, tripartite meetings between the Presidents of Parliament, the Council and the Commission — as provided for in Article 324 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — shall be drawn up so as to ensure good cooperation between those institutions,

| O. | whereas simplification and better regulation must be reinforced by more efficient management in the Commission and the Member States, |
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O.

whereas simplification and better regulation must be reinforced by more efficient management in the Commission and the Member States,

| P. | whereas, in its Resolution of 11 November 2010 on simplifying the implementation of the Research Framework Programmes (10), Parliament expressed its views concerning certain difficulties relating to monitoring and certification of research, |
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P.

whereas, in its Resolution of 11 November 2010 on simplifying the implementation of the Research Framework Programmes (10), Parliament expressed its views concerning certain difficulties relating to monitoring and certification of research,

| Q. | whereas the role of the Court of Auditors is to check information, and whereas the Court of Auditors’ ability to carry out its responsibilities effectively under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should in no way be constrained, |
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Q.

whereas the role of the Court of Auditors is to check information, and whereas the Court of Auditors’ ability to carry out its responsibilities effectively under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should in no way be constrained,

| R. | whereas the Court of Auditors’ mandate to audit the use of Union funds includes the audit of public-private partnership bodies, |
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R.

whereas the Court of Auditors’ mandate to audit the use of Union funds includes the audit of public-private partnership bodies,

| S. | whereas the Court of Auditors could provide the coordination required for the introduction of mechanisms such as the stability mechanism, the rules governing which should ensure that there are appropriate audit arrangements, together with arrangements for accountability and full transparency, |
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S.

whereas the Court of Auditors could provide the coordination required for the introduction of mechanisms such as the stability mechanism, the rules governing which should ensure that there are appropriate audit arrangements, together with arrangements for accountability and full transparency,

| T. | whereas the Member States should consider the efficiency of the Union’s present external audit arrangements, |
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T.

whereas the Member States should consider the efficiency of the Union’s present external audit arrangements,

| U. | whereas simplification of sectoral legislation — for instance through standardisation and the establishment of one set of procurement rules — and streamlining with the Financial Regulation are necessary to achieve a significant improvement in performance and reduction of cumbersome bureaucracy, |
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U.

whereas simplification of sectoral legislation — for instance through standardisation and the establishment of one set of procurement rules — and streamlining with the Financial Regulation are necessary to achieve a significant improvement in performance and reduction of cumbersome bureaucracy,

| V. | whereas the Commission’s role is also to provide guidance to the Member States and spread good practice among national bodies continuously, |
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V.

whereas the Commission’s role is also to provide guidance to the Member States and spread good practice among national bodies continuously,

| W. | whereas various measures decided in 2008, such as the EUR 1 000 000 000 Food Facility, the speeding-up of payments of the Structural Funds through the European Economic Recovery Plan and the extension of the eligibility period for various programmes into 2009 presented a challenge for budgetary control in 2009 and beyond, |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas various measures decided in 2008, such as the EUR 1 000 000 000 Food Facility, the speeding-up of payments of the Structural Funds through the European Economic Recovery Plan and the extension of the eligibility period for various programmes into 2009 presented a challenge for budgetary control in 2009 and beyond,

Overall findings

Accounts

| 1. | Notes that the annual accounts of the Union present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Union as of 31 December 2009 and the results of operations and cash flows; |
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1.

Notes that the annual accounts of the Union present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Union as of 31 December 2009 and the results of operations and cash flows;

| 2. | Deplores the fact that the Council delivered its opinion belatedly; |
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2.

Deplores the fact that the Council delivered its opinion belatedly;

| 3. | Considers it abnormal for the annual accounts to be presented with negative own capital of EUR 44 700 000 000 and wonders whether the amounts to be requested from Member States should not be entered as assets, given that the estimated EUR 37 000 000 000 in staff pensions is clearly a commitment; notes the explanations provided by the Commission’s Accounting Officer to the effect that international accounting standards applicable to the public sector have been complied with; proposes that consideration be given to creating a Union pension fund to externalise financial commitments of this kind concerning staff; |
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3.

Considers it abnormal for the annual accounts to be presented with negative own capital of EUR 44 700 000 000 and wonders whether the amounts to be requested from Member States should not be entered as assets, given that the estimated EUR 37 000 000 000 in staff pensions is clearly a commitment; notes the explanations provided by the Commission’s Accounting Officer to the effect that international accounting standards applicable to the public sector have been complied with; proposes that consideration be given to creating a Union pension fund to externalise financial commitments of this kind concerning staff;

| 4. | Urges the Commission to eliminate the risk of misstatements in the accounts in the future by dealing with the weaknesses identified by the Court of Auditors without delay; |
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4.

Urges the Commission to eliminate the risk of misstatements in the accounts in the future by dealing with the weaknesses identified by the Court of Auditors without delay;

| 5. | Calls on the Court of Auditors to provide it, in future, with a single statement of assurance as to the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 287(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in the same way as it does for the reliability of the accounts; |
| --- | --- |

5.

Calls on the Court of Auditors to provide it, in future, with a single statement of assurance as to the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 287(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in the same way as it does for the reliability of the accounts;

Legality and regularity

| 6. | Notes that while Article 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that the Commission implements the Union budget on its own responsibility, in the present understanding of ‘shared management’ most of the management functions are carried out by national bodies not directly accountable at Union level and over which the Commission has limited powers of enforcement; takes the view therefore that these bodies are meant to be directly accountable at Union level to the Commission; insists that this does not absolve the Commission of its responsibility for the implementation of the Union budget but on the contrary requires it to take a hard line with any Member States not fulfilling their responsibilities under ‘shared management’; |
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6.

Notes that while Article 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that the Commission implements the Union budget on its own responsibility, in the present understanding of ‘shared management’ most of the management functions are carried out by national bodies not directly accountable at Union level and over which the Commission has limited powers of enforcement; takes the view therefore that these bodies are meant to be directly accountable at Union level to the Commission; insists that this does not absolve the Commission of its responsibility for the implementation of the Union budget but on the contrary requires it to take a hard line with any Member States not fulfilling their responsibilities under ‘shared management’;

| 7. | Calls, therefore, pursuant to Article 287(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as regards shared-management controls, for cooperation to be stepped up between national audit bodies and the Court of Auditors; proposes examination of the possibility of national audit bodies, in their capacity as accredited and independent external auditors, and with due regard for international audit standards, issuing national audit certificates for the management of Union funds, which would be submitted to Member State governments with a view to being produced during the discharge process in accordance with an appropriate interinstitutional procedure to be introduced; |
| --- | --- |

7.

Calls, therefore, pursuant to Article 287(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as regards shared-management controls, for cooperation to be stepped up between national audit bodies and the Court of Auditors; proposes examination of the possibility of national audit bodies, in their capacity as accredited and independent external auditors, and with due regard for international audit standards, issuing national audit certificates for the management of Union funds, which would be submitted to Member State governments with a view to being produced during the discharge process in accordance with an appropriate interinstitutional procedure to be introduced;

| 8. | Recalls that the Member States have primary responsibility for day-to-day management and control of Union expenditure under shared management and that national bodies initiate and process files for Union financial support and validate the reimbursement claims presented to the Commission; |
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8.

Recalls that the Member States have primary responsibility for day-to-day management and control of Union expenditure under shared management and that national bodies initiate and process files for Union financial support and validate the reimbursement claims presented to the Commission;

| 9. | Notes the Court of Auditors’ opinion on the legality and regularity of the transactions underlying the accounts according to which payments for the policy groups ‘Agriculture and natural resources’, ‘Cohesion’, ‘Research, energy and transport’, ‘External Aid, development and enlargement’ and ‘Education and citizenship’ are materially affected by error and that the supervisory and control systems are only ‘partially effective’ in preventing or detecting and correcting the reimbursement of overstated or ineligible costs (statement of assurance, paragraph X); |
| --- | --- |

9.

Notes the Court of Auditors’ opinion on the legality and regularity of the transactions underlying the accounts according to which payments for the policy groups ‘Agriculture and natural resources’, ‘Cohesion’, ‘Research, energy and transport’, ‘External Aid, development and enlargement’ and ‘Education and citizenship’ are materially affected by error and that the supervisory and control systems are only ‘partially effective’ in preventing or detecting and correcting the reimbursement of overstated or ineligible costs (statement of assurance, paragraph X);

| 10. | Notes that the most likely error rate in payments estimated by the Court of Auditors for the policy groups ‘Agriculture and natural resources’ (EUR 56 318 000 000), ‘Research, energy and transport’ (EUR 7 966 000 000), ‘External Aid, development and enlargement’ (EUR 6 596 000 000) and ‘Education and Citizenship’ (EUR 2 153 000 000) is between 2 % and 5 %; |
| --- | --- |

10.

Notes that the most likely error rate in payments estimated by the Court of Auditors for the policy groups ‘Agriculture and natural resources’ (EUR 56 318 000 000), ‘Research, energy and transport’ (EUR 7 966 000 000), ‘External Aid, development and enlargement’ (EUR 6 596 000 000) and ‘Education and Citizenship’ (EUR 2 153 000 000) is between 2 % and 5 %;

| 11. | Notes that the most likely error rate in payments estimated by the Court of Auditors for the policy group ‘Cohesion’ (EUR 23 081 000 000 reimbursed certified expenditure) is above 5 % although Parliament does not know the exact error rate; |
| --- | --- |

11.

Notes that the most likely error rate in payments estimated by the Court of Auditors for the policy group ‘Cohesion’ (EUR 23 081 000 000 reimbursed certified expenditure) is above 5 % although Parliament does not know the exact error rate;

| 12. | Notes further that the Court of Auditors’ audit results show a very marginal increase in its estimate of the most likely error rate concerning the payments for the policy group ‘Agriculture and natural resources’ and a significant decrease in its estimate of the most likely error rate concerning the payments for the policy group ‘Cohesion’; |
| --- | --- |

12.

Notes further that the Court of Auditors’ audit results show a very marginal increase in its estimate of the most likely error rate concerning the payments for the policy group ‘Agriculture and natural resources’ and a significant decrease in its estimate of the most likely error rate concerning the payments for the policy group ‘Cohesion’;

| 13. | Notes that the reduction in the most likely error rate could be due to the composition of the Court of Auditors’ sample which contained smaller Member States with centralised political systems, such as Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg and Hungary; warns against premature conclusions as long as the Member States’ supervisory and control systems are only ‘partially effective’; regrets that this fundamental problem continues to exist; |
| --- | --- |

13.

Notes that the reduction in the most likely error rate could be due to the composition of the Court of Auditors’ sample which contained smaller Member States with centralised political systems, such as Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg and Hungary; warns against premature conclusions as long as the Member States’ supervisory and control systems are only ‘partially effective’; regrets that this fundamental problem continues to exist;

| 14. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to make annual improvements in the most likely error rates in implementing the Union budget; considers that the aim should be to bring the rate below the materiality threshold, thus securing a positive statement of assurance from the Court of Auditors; |
| --- | --- |

14.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to make annual improvements in the most likely error rates in implementing the Union budget; considers that the aim should be to bring the rate below the materiality threshold, thus securing a positive statement of assurance from the Court of Auditors;

| 15. | Recalls its repeated invitations to the Commission to present a proposal for the introduction of mandatory national management declarations (NMDs) issued and signed at ministerial level, made public and duly audited by an independent auditor so far as such declarations are a necessary and indispensable first step to improve the efficiency of national systems and to enhance national accountability for the use of Union money; reiterates (11) that for Member States with federal systems or substantial decentralisation such NMDs could take the form, in whole or in part, of a collation of regional declarations, provided that each component declaration has been audited and signed by an elected political office-holder; insists that the Commission will present such a proposal by September 2011 irrespective of the fact that some Member States might not yet agree with such an initiative; |
| --- | --- |

15.

Recalls its repeated invitations to the Commission to present a proposal for the introduction of mandatory national management declarations (NMDs) issued and signed at ministerial level, made public and duly audited by an independent auditor so far as such declarations are a necessary and indispensable first step to improve the efficiency of national systems and to enhance national accountability for the use of Union money; reiterates (11) that for Member States with federal systems or substantial decentralisation such NMDs could take the form, in whole or in part, of a collation of regional declarations, provided that each component declaration has been audited and signed by an elected political office-holder; insists that the Commission will present such a proposal by September 2011 irrespective of the fact that some Member States might not yet agree with such an initiative;

| 16. | Notes that NMDs should contain full information about the use of Union funds, and that after the signing of NMDs at ministerial level they should be made public; |
| --- | --- |

16.

Notes that NMDs should contain full information about the use of Union funds, and that after the signing of NMDs at ministerial level they should be made public;

| 17. | Regrets that in respect of the shared management programmes, the Member States do not yet acknowledge fully their enhanced responsibility which is enshrined in Article 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

17.

Regrets that in respect of the shared management programmes, the Member States do not yet acknowledge fully their enhanced responsibility which is enshrined in Article 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

Recovery and correction mechanisms

| 18. | Recalls that in implementing the Union budget the Commission has final responsibility for ensuring that amounts incorrectly paid are recovered and that weaknesses in the Member States’ management and control systems are corrected as quickly as possible; |
| --- | --- |

18.

Recalls that in implementing the Union budget the Commission has final responsibility for ensuring that amounts incorrectly paid are recovered and that weaknesses in the Member States’ management and control systems are corrected as quickly as possible;

| 19. | Recalls that since the 2005 discharge procedure Parliament has encouraged the Commission and the Member States to take the necessary steps to ensure completeness and accuracy of the information available with the aim of providing reliable evidence to allow the Court of Auditors to assess the effectiveness of multiannual correction mechanisms; |
| --- | --- |

19.

Recalls that since the 2005 discharge procedure Parliament has encouraged the Commission and the Member States to take the necessary steps to ensure completeness and accuracy of the information available with the aim of providing reliable evidence to allow the Court of Auditors to assess the effectiveness of multiannual correction mechanisms;

| 20. | Welcomes that the Commission in Note 6 to the Annual Accounts of the European Union, financial year 2009 has responded to Parliament’s requests by including more detailed information about recoveries and financial corrections than it has done in the past; |
| --- | --- |

20.

Welcomes that the Commission in Note 6 to the Annual Accounts of the European Union, financial year 2009 has responded to Parliament’s requests by including more detailed information about recoveries and financial corrections than it has done in the past;

| 21. | Further notes the important difference between ‘recovery’ (sums incorrectly received are repaid by the recipient) and ‘financial correction’ (addressing weaknesses in the system the financial consequences of which are borne by the national taxpayer); emphasises that the ‘financial correction’ mechanism should not be used as an easy way of avoiding the use of a ‘recovery’ procedure and that whenever possible a ‘recovery’ procedure should be pursued to ensure that those who have benefited from sums paid ‘incorrectly’ do not retain such funds; recalls its request that all data concerning recoveries should be an integral part of, and included in, the database of final beneficiaries; |
| --- | --- |

21.

Further notes the important difference between ‘recovery’ (sums incorrectly received are repaid by the recipient) and ‘financial correction’ (addressing weaknesses in the system the financial consequences of which are borne by the national taxpayer); emphasises that the ‘financial correction’ mechanism should not be used as an easy way of avoiding the use of a ‘recovery’ procedure and that whenever possible a ‘recovery’ procedure should be pursued to ensure that those who have benefited from sums paid ‘incorrectly’ do not retain such funds; recalls its request that all data concerning recoveries should be an integral part of, and included in, the database of final beneficiaries;

| 22. | Regrets that for the policy group ‘Cohesion’ merely 20 % of the amounts confirmed in 2009 have been implemented and a total amount of EUR 2 332 000 000 of corrections still remain to be implemented at year-end 2009 (Annual Report, point 1.44); |
| --- | --- |

22.

Regrets that for the policy group ‘Cohesion’ merely 20 % of the amounts confirmed in 2009 have been implemented and a total amount of EUR 2 332 000 000 of corrections still remain to be implemented at year-end 2009 (Annual Report, point 1.44);

| 23. | Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ finding that the Commission presents complete information on its recoveries and financial corrections; deplores, on the other hand, the fact that the Commission does not always receive complete and reliable information from the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

23.

Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ finding that the Commission presents complete information on its recoveries and financial corrections; deplores, on the other hand, the fact that the Commission does not always receive complete and reliable information from the Member States;

| 24. | Invites the Member States to improve their systems for control, detecting and reporting corrections to the Commission, and the Commission to refine the financial reporting guidelines to ensure that all relevant information about the operation of the multiannual correction mechanisms is appropriately disclosed in the accounts; further asks the Commission to keep Parliament informed on its efforts to verify the work of the national audit authorities; |
| --- | --- |

24.

Invites the Member States to improve their systems for control, detecting and reporting corrections to the Commission, and the Commission to refine the financial reporting guidelines to ensure that all relevant information about the operation of the multiannual correction mechanisms is appropriately disclosed in the accounts; further asks the Commission to keep Parliament informed on its efforts to verify the work of the national audit authorities;

| 25. | Notes that the vast majority of the corrections by value involve financial corrections on the Member States or third countries, rather than recoveries from individual beneficiaries who received Union funds incorrectly (Annual Report, point 1.50); |
| --- | --- |

25.

Notes that the vast majority of the corrections by value involve financial corrections on the Member States or third countries, rather than recoveries from individual beneficiaries who received Union funds incorrectly (Annual Report, point 1.50);

| 26. | Believes that future rules applicable to the Union budget and programmes should provide that unspent Union funds are not returned to the Member States if a Member State has not paid back to the Union amounts incorrectly received and invites the Commission to take into account any financial correction not yet paid by the Member States before returning unspent annual budget appropriations to the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

26.

Believes that future rules applicable to the Union budget and programmes should provide that unspent Union funds are not returned to the Member States if a Member State has not paid back to the Union amounts incorrectly received and invites the Commission to take into account any financial correction not yet paid by the Member States before returning unspent annual budget appropriations to the Member States;

| 27. | Suspects, with some concern, that under the present system, which does not include fines and makes it possible to substitute most of the expenditure found to be ineligible by the Commission or the Court of Auditors, the Member States seem to have limited interest in developing efficient control systems that could result in a reduction of their share of Union spending; therefore repeats its opinion from the 2008 discharge Resolution, that reallocation of ineligible expenditure should only be allowed if it was discovered by the Member States themselves; further welcomes that the Commission has made use of the new possibility to immediately suspend payments and demands that suspension of payments continue to be used resolutely and consistently, making the decisions taken and the reasons for them clear to Parliament; calls on the Commission to develop a system which will punish underperformers, and reward those who perform well, by reducing their administrative burden; |
| --- | --- |

27.

Suspects, with some concern, that under the present system, which does not include fines and makes it possible to substitute most of the expenditure found to be ineligible by the Commission or the Court of Auditors, the Member States seem to have limited interest in developing efficient control systems that could result in a reduction of their share of Union spending; therefore repeats its opinion from the 2008 discharge Resolution, that reallocation of ineligible expenditure should only be allowed if it was discovered by the Member States themselves; further welcomes that the Commission has made use of the new possibility to immediately suspend payments and demands that suspension of payments continue to be used resolutely and consistently, making the decisions taken and the reasons for them clear to Parliament; calls on the Commission to develop a system which will punish underperformers, and reward those who perform well, by reducing their administrative burden;

| 28. | Calls on the Commission to provide Parliament with an analysis of the paying agencies’ capacity to deliver reliable data based, in addition, on ex ante declarations and on-the-spot checks, comparing those declarations and those checks with the information given by the Court of Auditors, and to check the veracity of the information provided by these bodies in the last 4 years; |
| --- | --- |

28.

Calls on the Commission to provide Parliament with an analysis of the paying agencies’ capacity to deliver reliable data based, in addition, on ex ante declarations and on-the-spot checks, comparing those declarations and those checks with the information given by the Court of Auditors, and to check the veracity of the information provided by these bodies in the last 4 years;

| 29. | Is aware of the fact that suspension of payments can sometimes create a trade-off with quick implementation, but is convinced that in cases where high risk is already established, reliability should take precedence over speed; |
| --- | --- |

29.

Is aware of the fact that suspension of payments can sometimes create a trade-off with quick implementation, but is convinced that in cases where high risk is already established, reliability should take precedence over speed;

| 30. | Accordingly, does not agree with the Commission’s statement that financial corrections represent ‘a strong incentive for Member States to improve their management and control systems and thus to prevent or detect and recover irregular payments to final beneficiaries’ (Annual Accounts of the European Union, financial year 2009, Note 6, page 100); |
| --- | --- |

30.

Accordingly, does not agree with the Commission’s statement that financial corrections represent ‘a strong incentive for Member States to improve their management and control systems and thus to prevent or detect and recover irregular payments to final beneficiaries’ (Annual Accounts of the European Union, financial year 2009, Note 6, page 100);

| 31. | Notes that financial corrections could be an indicator of whether a policy has been implemented according to established rules and that the regular and increasing number of financial corrections could indicate not only that the Commission is fulfilling its supervisory role in a more stringent way but also that financial corrections have only had a limited effect as a preventive and structural measure; further notes that the Member States’ efforts to create efficient systems are influenced by the efficiency of the Commission’s supervision; |
| --- | --- |

31.

Notes that financial corrections could be an indicator of whether a policy has been implemented according to established rules and that the regular and increasing number of financial corrections could indicate not only that the Commission is fulfilling its supervisory role in a more stringent way but also that financial corrections have only had a limited effect as a preventive and structural measure; further notes that the Member States’ efforts to create efficient systems are influenced by the efficiency of the Commission’s supervision;

| 32. | Welcomes the Commission’s guidance note on reporting on recoveries; asks the Commission to carefully analyse the Member States’ reports on recoveries and, if necessary, carry out further training; |
| --- | --- |

32.

Welcomes the Commission’s guidance note on reporting on recoveries; asks the Commission to carefully analyse the Member States’ reports on recoveries and, if necessary, carry out further training;

Member State responsibility and transparency

| 33. | Notes with concern the slow pace of improvements to the financial management of Union funds; at the same time takes note of the repeated opinions of both the Court of Auditors and the Commission that the quality of management and control systems differs widely between the Member States and between the different programmes; calls on the Commission to systematically account for these differences in control systems and to make available clear evaluations of efforts by the Member States to detect irregularities so as to make sure that those Member States detecting higher irregularities due to more onerous control systems are not discredited at any point; |
| --- | --- |

33.

Notes with concern the slow pace of improvements to the financial management of Union funds; at the same time takes note of the repeated opinions of both the Court of Auditors and the Commission that the quality of management and control systems differs widely between the Member States and between the different programmes; calls on the Commission to systematically account for these differences in control systems and to make available clear evaluations of efforts by the Member States to detect irregularities so as to make sure that those Member States detecting higher irregularities due to more onerous control systems are not discredited at any point;

| 34. | Agrees with the recommendation of the Council that information on recoveries, financial corrections and suspensions should be easily accessible to the public; |
| --- | --- |

34.

Agrees with the recommendation of the Council that information on recoveries, financial corrections and suspensions should be easily accessible to the public;

| 35. | Invites the Commission to publish in the Synthesis Report an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of individual Member States’ management and control systems on the basis of the audit work it already performs as well as other relevant available information; further invites the Commission to include a progress report on the improvements in the discharge information; calls on the Commission to establish a ‘scoreboard’ on the quality of controls per Member State and policy area according to the following matrix model: | Policy area A | Policy area B | Policy area C | Etc. |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Member State A | | | | |
| Member State B | | | | |
| Member State C | | | | |
| Etc. | | | | |

35.

Invites the Commission to publish in the Synthesis Report an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of individual Member States’ management and control systems on the basis of the audit work it already performs as well as other relevant available information; further invites the Commission to include a progress report on the improvements in the discharge information; calls on the Commission to establish a ‘scoreboard’ on the quality of controls per Member State and policy area according to the following matrix model:

Policy area A

Policy area B

Policy area C

Etc.

Member State A

Member State B

Member State C

Etc.

| 36. | Underlines that low levels of fraud and error rates could signify weaknesses in the control systems and vice versa; urges the Commission on the basis of concrete data per Member State and per policy area, to report to Parliament on the effectiveness of management and control mechanisms and to implement, together with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), stricter control on the spending of Union money; |
| --- | --- |

36.

Underlines that low levels of fraud and error rates could signify weaknesses in the control systems and vice versa; urges the Commission on the basis of concrete data per Member State and per policy area, to report to Parliament on the effectiveness of management and control mechanisms and to implement, together with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), stricter control on the spending of Union money;

| 37. | Calls on the Court of Auditors, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 287(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to deliver an opinion on the quality of the national audit authorities as regards shared management, with particular reference to technical expertise and independence; |
| --- | --- |

37.

Calls on the Court of Auditors, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 287(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to deliver an opinion on the quality of the national audit authorities as regards shared management, with particular reference to technical expertise and independence;

| 38. | Notes that the present statement of assurance is an expression of the regularity and legality of the financial management in the Union overall, and that it does not contain information on error rates in individual Member States; |
| --- | --- |

38.

Notes that the present statement of assurance is an expression of the regularity and legality of the financial management in the Union overall, and that it does not contain information on error rates in individual Member States;

| 39. | Believes that it is of utmost importance to analyse if certain errors occur in all the Member States with more or less the same frequency; notes, if so, that the solution would be Union-wide action; however, further notes that if certain errors are mainly located in specific Member States or regions, other solutions should be envisaged; |
| --- | --- |

39.

Believes that it is of utmost importance to analyse if certain errors occur in all the Member States with more or less the same frequency; notes, if so, that the solution would be Union-wide action; however, further notes that if certain errors are mainly located in specific Member States or regions, other solutions should be envisaged;

| 40. | Believes that a ‘scoreboard’ on the quality of controls per Member State and policy area as requested would be an important element in such an analysis and invites the Commission to follow-up on this request starting with its Synthesis Report on 2011 and in time for the 2010 discharge procedure; |
| --- | --- |

40.

Believes that a ‘scoreboard’ on the quality of controls per Member State and policy area as requested would be an important element in such an analysis and invites the Commission to follow-up on this request starting with its Synthesis Report on 2011 and in time for the 2010 discharge procedure;

| 41. | Suggests that the Court of Auditors should carry out occasional audits based on the same matrix model so that all 27 Member States would be audited for a specific policy area which would allow the quality of controls to be evaluated comparatively; |
| --- | --- |

41.

Suggests that the Court of Auditors should carry out occasional audits based on the same matrix model so that all 27 Member States would be audited for a specific policy area which would allow the quality of controls to be evaluated comparatively;

| 42. | In addition, invites the Commission to publish in the Synthesis Report clear and unequivocal information on the value of recovery orders made against individual Member States as well as a systematic presentation of the results of recovery and correction mechanisms; |
| --- | --- |

42.

In addition, invites the Commission to publish in the Synthesis Report clear and unequivocal information on the value of recovery orders made against individual Member States as well as a systematic presentation of the results of recovery and correction mechanisms;

| 43. | Notes that many Member States are undertaking difficult fiscal adjustments to their domestic budgets, and that value for money, efficiency and transparency have become increasingly important in domestic public spending; |
| --- | --- |

43.

Notes that many Member States are undertaking difficult fiscal adjustments to their domestic budgets, and that value for money, efficiency and transparency have become increasingly important in domestic public spending;

| 44. | Considers that such fiscal adjustments and savings are important tools in restoring public confidence in national as well as Union institutions; |
| --- | --- |

44.

Considers that such fiscal adjustments and savings are important tools in restoring public confidence in national as well as Union institutions;

| 45. | Considers that ensuring sound financial management and a well-balanced and appropriate size of budget, should help to deliver value for money as regards both domestic budgets as well as the Union’s budget; believes, accordingly, that the principles of value for money and transparency should be at the heart of all actions to improve the financial management of Union funds; |
| --- | --- |

45.

Considers that ensuring sound financial management and a well-balanced and appropriate size of budget, should help to deliver value for money as regards both domestic budgets as well as the Union’s budget; believes, accordingly, that the principles of value for money and transparency should be at the heart of all actions to improve the financial management of Union funds;

| 46. | Requests, accordingly, that the Commission make the Member States’ annual summaries publicly available as part of next year’s discharge procedure and upgrade the information provided in these summaries to present a meaningful picture of the Member States’ financial management performance; underlines that making the Member States’ annual summaries publicly available should be considered as a step towards NMDs and not as a goal in itself; |
| --- | --- |

46.

Requests, accordingly, that the Commission make the Member States’ annual summaries publicly available as part of next year’s discharge procedure and upgrade the information provided in these summaries to present a meaningful picture of the Member States’ financial management performance; underlines that making the Member States’ annual summaries publicly available should be considered as a step towards NMDs and not as a goal in itself;

| 47. | Considers that a review of the Financial Regulation should be based on an evaluation of the existing Regulation, notes that a review is not an end in itself; |
| --- | --- |

47.

Considers that a review of the Financial Regulation should be based on an evaluation of the existing Regulation, notes that a review is not an end in itself;

Tolerable risk of errors

| 48. | Believes that control systems cannot aim at zero risk in all spending areas, not only because it would be extremely expensive, but also because it is unlikely that zero risk in all spending areas will ever be achieved; accepts that a certain risk of error will always exist when implementing any spending programmes; emphasises that tolerating risk is not the same as tolerating error and reaffirms that the Commission must pursue a zero-tolerance approach to all cases of mismanagement and fraud; |
| --- | --- |

48.

Believes that control systems cannot aim at zero risk in all spending areas, not only because it would be extremely expensive, but also because it is unlikely that zero risk in all spending areas will ever be achieved; accepts that a certain risk of error will always exist when implementing any spending programmes; emphasises that tolerating risk is not the same as tolerating error and reaffirms that the Commission must pursue a zero-tolerance approach to all cases of mismanagement and fraud;

| 49. | Notes that this discussion is only taking place at the Union level and recalls that ‘error rates’ for national administrations’ implementation of national programmes are not known; |
| --- | --- |

49.

Notes that this discussion is only taking place at the Union level and recalls that ‘error rates’ for national administrations’ implementation of national programmes are not known;

| 50. | Invites the Commission to identify weaknesses in present management and control systems as well as to analyse the cost and benefits of various possible changes; underlines that where it is difficult to obtain a sufficiently high level of compliance with scheme rules, a number of options such as simplification of the rules, redesigning the programme, tightening controls, or terminating the programme, are possible; |
| --- | --- |

50.

Invites the Commission to identify weaknesses in present management and control systems as well as to analyse the cost and benefits of various possible changes; underlines that where it is difficult to obtain a sufficiently high level of compliance with scheme rules, a number of options such as simplification of the rules, redesigning the programme, tightening controls, or terminating the programme, are possible;

| 51. | Underlines that any comparison between the estimated benefits and costs of controls must be based on a reasonable belief that controls are being applied in an efficient and effective manner; further underlines that this is currently not fully the case as demonstrated by the Court of Auditors for many years when stating that management and control systems are still only partially effective; |
| --- | --- |

51.

Underlines that any comparison between the estimated benefits and costs of controls must be based on a reasonable belief that controls are being applied in an efficient and effective manner; further underlines that this is currently not fully the case as demonstrated by the Court of Auditors for many years when stating that management and control systems are still only partially effective;

| 52. | Regrets that the Commission uses the notion ‘tolerable risk of error’ exclusively to manage the risk of error and as a basis to decide what level of irregular use of funds should be considered as acceptable ex post; takes the view that a forward-looking approach to a possible introduction of a comprehensive concept of ‘tolerable risk of error’ would include in the Financial Regulation a requirement for the Commission to match spending proposals with an assessment of the irregularity risks; |
| --- | --- |

52.

Regrets that the Commission uses the notion ‘tolerable risk of error’ exclusively to manage the risk of error and as a basis to decide what level of irregular use of funds should be considered as acceptable ex post; takes the view that a forward-looking approach to a possible introduction of a comprehensive concept of ‘tolerable risk of error’ would include in the Financial Regulation a requirement for the Commission to match spending proposals with an assessment of the irregularity risks;

| 53. | Calls for a study of the distinction between the materiality threshold, which is associated with the holding of an audit and therefore subject to assessment by the Court of Auditors, and the acceptable error rate, which is a concept associated with internal audits for which the Commission is responsible; |
| --- | --- |

53.

Calls for a study of the distinction between the materiality threshold, which is associated with the holding of an audit and therefore subject to assessment by the Court of Auditors, and the acceptable error rate, which is a concept associated with internal audits for which the Commission is responsible;

Commission’s Internal Audit Service (IAS)

| 54. | Notes that ‘internal audit’ in the Commission is carried out by the horizontal IAS and the vertical Internal Audit Capabilities (IAC) in each Directorate-General; believes that this model can only be efficient if the work carried out by the IAC is reliable; notes, however, that an IAS audit of the IAC audit results could be perceived as a policing activity and would harm the relationship between the IAS and the IAC; |
| --- | --- |

54.

Notes that ‘internal audit’ in the Commission is carried out by the horizontal IAS and the vertical Internal Audit Capabilities (IAC) in each Directorate-General; believes that this model can only be efficient if the work carried out by the IAC is reliable; notes, however, that an IAS audit of the IAC audit results could be perceived as a policing activity and would harm the relationship between the IAS and the IAC;

| 55. | Invites the Commission, accordingly, to carry out an external quality review of all the IAC in the Commission and to inform Parliament of the results; |
| --- | --- |

55.

Invites the Commission, accordingly, to carry out an external quality review of all the IAC in the Commission and to inform Parliament of the results;

| 56. | Proposes that the Commission split the hierarchical power between people with accounting responsibility and those responsible for transferring funds in application of the customary rules on security and separation of powers for internal control in treasury management; |
| --- | --- |

56.

Proposes that the Commission split the hierarchical power between people with accounting responsibility and those responsible for transferring funds in application of the customary rules on security and separation of powers for internal control in treasury management;

| 57. | Notes the Commission annual report to the discharge authority (COM(2010) 447) on internal audits carried out in 2009 and that the Commission’s Internal Auditor is of the opinion that an overview at the level of the institution is necessary if common processes such as risk analysis and business continuity management are to be effective in protecting the institution as a whole and in order to ensure sound financial management; |
| --- | --- |

57.

Notes the Commission annual report to the discharge authority (COM(2010) 447) on internal audits carried out in 2009 and that the Commission’s Internal Auditor is of the opinion that an overview at the level of the institution is necessary if common processes such as risk analysis and business continuity management are to be effective in protecting the institution as a whole and in order to ensure sound financial management;

| 58. | Invites the Commission to make appropriate bodies responsible for obtaining this overview and for making appropriate recommendations whilst taking care not to reduce responsibility for the implementation of each process; recommends that the Commission’s governance framework be adapted to allow for enhanced institutional overview; would appreciate being informed in a timely manner about developments in this matter; |
| --- | --- |

58.

Invites the Commission to make appropriate bodies responsible for obtaining this overview and for making appropriate recommendations whilst taking care not to reduce responsibility for the implementation of each process; recommends that the Commission’s governance framework be adapted to allow for enhanced institutional overview; would appreciate being informed in a timely manner about developments in this matter;

| 59. | Invites the IAS to allocate part of its resources to an examination of whether the spending by the main DGs is efficient, economical and effective, thereby completing the current financial and compliance audits; |
| --- | --- |

59.

Invites the IAS to allocate part of its resources to an examination of whether the spending by the main DGs is efficient, economical and effective, thereby completing the current financial and compliance audits;

| 60. | Further invites the IAS to audit the methodology to be used for the production of the Article 318 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union evaluation report and to assess the work done; |
| --- | --- |

60.

Further invites the IAS to audit the methodology to be used for the production of the Article 318 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union evaluation report and to assess the work done;

Single audit

| 61. | Urges the introduction of a single audit model whereby audits are carried out, recorded and reported to a common standard — as proposed by the Court of Auditors in its Opinion 2/2004/EC and repeatedly supported by Parliament — where each level of control builds on the proceeding one, with a view to reducing the burden on the auditee and enhancing the quality of audit activities but without undermining the independence of the audit bodies concerned; believes that internal controls should provide reasonable assurance on the legality and regularity of transactions, and compliance with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness and underlines that controls should be coordinated to avoid unnecessary duplication; draws attention to the fact that the Court of Auditors is the external auditor of the Union and therefore not an element of internal control; |
| --- | --- |

61.

Urges the introduction of a single audit model whereby audits are carried out, recorded and reported to a common standard — as proposed by the Court of Auditors in its Opinion 2/2004/EC and repeatedly supported by Parliament — where each level of control builds on the proceeding one, with a view to reducing the burden on the auditee and enhancing the quality of audit activities but without undermining the independence of the audit bodies concerned; believes that internal controls should provide reasonable assurance on the legality and regularity of transactions, and compliance with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness and underlines that controls should be coordinated to avoid unnecessary duplication; draws attention to the fact that the Court of Auditors is the external auditor of the Union and therefore not an element of internal control;

| 62. | Invites the Commission to present a report on the feasibility of introducing a single audit model applicable to the Union budget putting to an end the current juxtaposition of national and Union internal control systems; invites the Commission to adopt a risk-based approach for the auditing sampling rather than an approach based on statistical sampling; |
| --- | --- |

62.

Invites the Commission to present a report on the feasibility of introducing a single audit model applicable to the Union budget putting to an end the current juxtaposition of national and Union internal control systems; invites the Commission to adopt a risk-based approach for the auditing sampling rather than an approach based on statistical sampling;

| 63. | Recalls the opinion expressed in paragraph 65 of its Resolution of 27 April 2006 (12) concerning discharge for the financial year 2004 that called for ‘national audit bodies to assume responsibility for controlling the local use of EU funds, so as to make any consideration of establishing national offices of the Court of Auditors unnecessary’; believes that if national audit bodies are not willing for public bodies within their Member States to take over the control of expenditure from the Union budget, that consideration should be given to reorganising the Court of Auditors so that some of its members have responsibility for defined policy areas whilst others have responsibility for groups of Member States; notes that as the number of members of the Court of Auditors has virtually doubled in recent years, whilst the number of policy areas has not, this should be within the capacity of the Court of Auditors to manage; |
| --- | --- |

63.

Recalls the opinion expressed in paragraph 65 of its Resolution of 27 April 2006 (12) concerning discharge for the financial year 2004 that called for ‘national audit bodies to assume responsibility for controlling the local use of EU funds, so as to make any consideration of establishing national offices of the Court of Auditors unnecessary’; believes that if national audit bodies are not willing for public bodies within their Member States to take over the control of expenditure from the Union budget, that consideration should be given to reorganising the Court of Auditors so that some of its members have responsibility for defined policy areas whilst others have responsibility for groups of Member States; notes that as the number of members of the Court of Auditors has virtually doubled in recent years, whilst the number of policy areas has not, this should be within the capacity of the Court of Auditors to manage;

Transparency

| 64. | Notes the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases Volker and Markus Schecke GbR C-92/09 and Hartmut Eifert C-93/09 (13) and the subsequent need to balance ‘the European Union’s interest in guaranteeing the transparency of its acts and ensuring the best use of public funds against the interference with the right of the beneficiaries concerned to respect for their private life in general and to the protection of their personal data in particular’ (Volker and Markus Schecke GbR, paragraph 77 of the judgment); stresses however that the Court of Justice has recalled the validity of the principle of transparency (Volker and Markus Schecke GbR, paragraph 68) as stated in Articles 1 and 10 of the Treaty on European Union and in Article 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and has also underlined that ‘publication on the Internet of data by name relating to the beneficiaries concerned [...] reinforces public control of the use to which that money is put and contributes to the best use of public funds’ (Volker and Markus Schecke GbR, paragraph 75); |
| --- | --- |

64.

Notes the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases Volker and Markus Schecke GbR C-92/09 and Hartmut Eifert C-93/09 (13) and the subsequent need to balance ‘the European Union’s interest in guaranteeing the transparency of its acts and ensuring the best use of public funds against the interference with the right of the beneficiaries concerned to respect for their private life in general and to the protection of their personal data in particular’ (Volker and Markus Schecke GbR, paragraph 77 of the judgment); stresses however that the Court of Justice has recalled the validity of the principle of transparency (Volker and Markus Schecke GbR, paragraph 68) as stated in Articles 1 and 10 of the Treaty on European Union and in Article 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and has also underlined that ‘publication on the Internet of data by name relating to the beneficiaries concerned [...] reinforces public control of the use to which that money is put and contributes to the best use of public funds’ (Volker and Markus Schecke GbR, paragraph 75);

| 65. | Calls on the Commission to follow up on the request of the Court of Justice and to swiftly propose criteria where the public interest in transparency should override the protection of personal data of Union funds’ beneficiaries; recalls that the Court of Justice has proposed criteria such as the periods during which natural persons have received Union funds, the frequency of such aid or the nature and amount of aid (Volker and Markus Schecke GbR, paragraph 89); |
| --- | --- |

65.

Calls on the Commission to follow up on the request of the Court of Justice and to swiftly propose criteria where the public interest in transparency should override the protection of personal data of Union funds’ beneficiaries; recalls that the Court of Justice has proposed criteria such as the periods during which natural persons have received Union funds, the frequency of such aid or the nature and amount of aid (Volker and Markus Schecke GbR, paragraph 89);

| 66. | Asks the Commission to define the criteria mentioned by the Court of Justice in the Financial Regulation, sectoral legislation or any other act in a way that allows a high level of transparency, ensuring that data on beneficiaries falling under these criteria can be published again; urges the Commission to monitor the Member States’ obligation to publish the data correctly and in a timely manner and requests the Commission to present the results of its monitoring in the next Synthesis Report; |
| --- | --- |

66.

Asks the Commission to define the criteria mentioned by the Court of Justice in the Financial Regulation, sectoral legislation or any other act in a way that allows a high level of transparency, ensuring that data on beneficiaries falling under these criteria can be published again; urges the Commission to monitor the Member States’ obligation to publish the data correctly and in a timely manner and requests the Commission to present the results of its monitoring in the next Synthesis Report;

| 67. | Recalls its request from its Resolution on discharge for the financial year 2008 to standardise the structure and presentation of beneficiaries’ data on national, regional and international sites, including details of recipients and their projects; |
| --- | --- |

67.

Recalls its request from its Resolution on discharge for the financial year 2008 to standardise the structure and presentation of beneficiaries’ data on national, regional and international sites, including details of recipients and their projects;

| 68. | Reiterates its belief that transparency is one of the main instruments in achieving legal and regular expenditure and believes that the objective should be the creation of a single and comprehensive online system (a central database) which can be accessed easily by any individual and would therefore allow the public to have easy access to full and complete information about the expenditure of the Union by budget line and by beneficiary; insists that the Commission collect data regarding the beneficiaries of funds in that central database and make the data collected easily accessible and user-friendly; further requests that the data be published in a comparable, machine-readable, searchable and open data format in one of the official languages of the Union; |
| --- | --- |

68.

Reiterates its belief that transparency is one of the main instruments in achieving legal and regular expenditure and believes that the objective should be the creation of a single and comprehensive online system (a central database) which can be accessed easily by any individual and would therefore allow the public to have easy access to full and complete information about the expenditure of the Union by budget line and by beneficiary; insists that the Commission collect data regarding the beneficiaries of funds in that central database and make the data collected easily accessible and user-friendly; further requests that the data be published in a comparable, machine-readable, searchable and open data format in one of the official languages of the Union;

| 69. | Proposes, in order to increase transparency, that the central database regarding the beneficiaries of funds shall make it possible to visualise not only money flows in figures but also the connections between the different actors in a project at different levels, whilst always taking into account the protection of privacy; |
| --- | --- |

69.

Proposes, in order to increase transparency, that the central database regarding the beneficiaries of funds shall make it possible to visualise not only money flows in figures but also the connections between the different actors in a project at different levels, whilst always taking into account the protection of privacy;

| 70. | Invites the Commission, when establishing that central database, to seek inspiration from the American Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board and its website (www.recovery.gov); |
| --- | --- |

70.

Invites the Commission, when establishing that central database, to seek inspiration from the American Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board and its website (www.recovery.gov);

Evaluations

| 71. | Emphasises that for the public to have confidence in the Union budget, three objectives must be pursued:






  — | that the accounts give a ‘true and fair view’ of the financial position of the Union, |
| --- | --- | --- |

71.

Emphasises that for the public to have confidence in the Union budget, three objectives must be pursued:

—

that the accounts give a ‘true and fair view’ of the financial position of the Union,

| — | that all expenditure is ‘legal and regular’ and receives a positive statement of assurance from the Court of Auditors, |
| --- | --- |

—

that all expenditure is ‘legal and regular’ and receives a positive statement of assurance from the Court of Auditors,

| — | that all expenditure delivers the outcomes for which it was intended, |
| --- | --- |

—

that all expenditure delivers the outcomes for which it was intended,

and notes that even if the first two objectives are secured, considerable resources could still in fact be wasted unless sufficient attention is also given to the third;

| 72. | Calls on the Commission to review its systems for evaluating the effectiveness of expenditure programmes to assess whether they are adding value, delivering value for money, and achieving the objectives for which they were established; insists that such evaluations should be both conducted and then assessed independently; calls therefore for independent evaluations to be submitted to Parliament and its relevant committees for scrutiny; |
| --- | --- |

72.

Calls on the Commission to review its systems for evaluating the effectiveness of expenditure programmes to assess whether they are adding value, delivering value for money, and achieving the objectives for which they were established; insists that such evaluations should be both conducted and then assessed independently; calls therefore for independent evaluations to be submitted to Parliament and its relevant committees for scrutiny;

Permanent crisis mechanism

| 73. | Notes the conclusions of the European Council of 28-29 October 2010 (EUCO 25/1/10) and that the ‘Heads of State or Government agree on the need for Member States to establish a permanent crisis mechanism to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area’; |
| --- | --- |

73.

Notes the conclusions of the European Council of 28-29 October 2010 (EUCO 25/1/10) and that the ‘Heads of State or Government agree on the need for Member States to establish a permanent crisis mechanism to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area’;

| 74. | Invites the Council and the Member States to give due consideration to the following issues when devising a permanent crisis mechanism:






  — | appropriate arrangements for public external audit and accountability and full transparency for the permanent crisis mechanism shall be established, |
| --- | --- | --- |

74.

Invites the Council and the Member States to give due consideration to the following issues when devising a permanent crisis mechanism:

—

appropriate arrangements for public external audit and accountability and full transparency for the permanent crisis mechanism shall be established,

| — | the reliability of data and statistics shall be ensured, |
| --- | --- |

—

the reliability of data and statistics shall be ensured,

| — | responsibility and reporting arrangements shall be clear and all actors whose liabilities will be involved shall also be involved in the establishment of the mechanism, |
| --- | --- |

—

responsibility and reporting arrangements shall be clear and all actors whose liabilities will be involved shall also be involved in the establishment of the mechanism,

| — | Parliament’s political scrutiny of any euro-bond issue, in general, and of the permanent crisis mechanism in particular shall be defined; |
| --- | --- |

—

Parliament’s political scrutiny of any euro-bond issue, in general, and of the permanent crisis mechanism in particular shall be defined;

Whistleblowers

| 75. | Calls on the Commission to review the briefing and training given to staff regarding ‘Title II: Rights and Obligations of officials’ of the Staff Regulations so as to ensure that all staff are fully conversant with its terms and particularly with the obligations pursuant to Article 22a(96); asks that the Commission provide details to Parliament’s competent committee of the work undertaken in this area; |
| --- | --- |

75.

Calls on the Commission to review the briefing and training given to staff regarding ‘Title II: Rights and Obligations of officials’ of the Staff Regulations so as to ensure that all staff are fully conversant with its terms and particularly with the obligations pursuant to Article 22a(96); asks that the Commission provide details to Parliament’s competent committee of the work undertaken in this area;

The European Schools

| 76. | Welcomes the fact that the Court of Auditors did not find errors that might call into question the reliability of the accounts that it audited and the legality and regularity of the transactions underlying those accounts; |
| --- | --- |

76.

Welcomes the fact that the Court of Auditors did not find errors that might call into question the reliability of the accounts that it audited and the legality and regularity of the transactions underlying those accounts;

| 77. | Invites the Office of the Secretary-General of the European Schools to ensure without delay a thorough follow-up of the Court of Auditors’ 2008 and 2009 recommendations; |
| --- | --- |

77.

Invites the Office of the Secretary-General of the European Schools to ensure without delay a thorough follow-up of the Court of Auditors’ 2008 and 2009 recommendations;

| 78. | Points to an increase in overall costs where teachers appointed by the Member States were absent for long periods and had to be replaced by part-time teachers; expects schools to be able to provide figures for these extra costs; |
| --- | --- |

78.

Points to an increase in overall costs where teachers appointed by the Member States were absent for long periods and had to be replaced by part-time teachers; expects schools to be able to provide figures for these extra costs;

Reform of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union

| 79. | Notes that the reputation of the Union is strongly influenced by the public perception of its civil service; notes that the last reform of the Staff Regulations did not adapt its provisions to a changed working environment nor lead to a remuneration policy that provides for equal pay for equal work; notes that it contains out-dated perks and benefits; calls on the Commission to present proposals for a comprehensive modernisation of the Staff Regulations, including the end of out-dated perks and benefits; |
| --- | --- |

79.

Notes that the reputation of the Union is strongly influenced by the public perception of its civil service; notes that the last reform of the Staff Regulations did not adapt its provisions to a changed working environment nor lead to a remuneration policy that provides for equal pay for equal work; notes that it contains out-dated perks and benefits; calls on the Commission to present proposals for a comprehensive modernisation of the Staff Regulations, including the end of out-dated perks and benefits;

Specific findings

| 80. | Welcomes the concrete measures and corresponding timelines presented by the Commission as a result of the constructive discussions within the discharge procedure; |
| --- | --- |

80.

Welcomes the concrete measures and corresponding timelines presented by the Commission as a result of the constructive discussions within the discharge procedure;

Agriculture and natural resources — EUR 56 300 000 000

| 81. | Welcomes the fact that the Commission has succeeded in bringing the error rate down to around 2 % in recent years; however, notes that the error rate increased slightly in 2009; |
| --- | --- |

81.

Welcomes the fact that the Commission has succeeded in bringing the error rate down to around 2 % in recent years; however, notes that the error rate increased slightly in 2009;

| 82. | Calls upon the Commission to take steps to ensure that the reduction in the error rate becomes a trend that is maintained year-on-year so as to ensure that the irregularities cease; |
| --- | --- |

82.

Calls upon the Commission to take steps to ensure that the reduction in the error rate becomes a trend that is maintained year-on-year so as to ensure that the irregularities cease;

| 83. | Recalls that for agriculture and rural development practically all expenditure is carried out under shared management; |
| --- | --- |

83.

Recalls that for agriculture and rural development practically all expenditure is carried out under shared management;

| 84. | Notes that on the basis of its audit results the Court of Auditors estimates that the most likely error rate for ‘Agriculture and natural resources’, which accounts for nearly half of the budget, is between 2 % and 5 %; |
| --- | --- |

84.

Notes that on the basis of its audit results the Court of Auditors estimates that the most likely error rate for ‘Agriculture and natural resources’, which accounts for nearly half of the budget, is between 2 % and 5 %;

| 85. | Also notes that in 2009, out of 241 transactions examined, 66 (27 %) were affected by error and that 42 (64 %) of these transactions were affected by quantifiable errors notably concerning eligibility and accuracy errors, resulting from over-declaration of eligible land; |
| --- | --- |

85.

Also notes that in 2009, out of 241 transactions examined, 66 (27 %) were affected by error and that 42 (64 %) of these transactions were affected by quantifiable errors notably concerning eligibility and accuracy errors, resulting from over-declaration of eligible land;

| 86. | Considers that the effectiveness of the spending areas as a whole, not just individual projects, must be evaluated on its overall trend of errors; |
| --- | --- |

86.

Considers that the effectiveness of the spending areas as a whole, not just individual projects, must be evaluated on its overall trend of errors;

| 87. | Notes the improvements of the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) in Greece following Parliament’s continuous attention; |
| --- | --- |

87.

Notes the improvements of the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) in Greece following Parliament’s continuous attention;

| 88. | Recalls, however, that the Court of Auditors in recent years has found the effectiveness of the IACS adversely affected by inaccurate data in the databases, incomplete cross-checks or incorrect or incomplete follow-up of anomalies; |
| --- | --- |

88.

Recalls, however, that the Court of Auditors in recent years has found the effectiveness of the IACS adversely affected by inaccurate data in the databases, incomplete cross-checks or incorrect or incomplete follow-up of anomalies;

| 89. | Notes that for its 2009 audit of eight paying agencies, the Court of Auditors found the systems to be effective in ensuring the regularity of payments in only one agency, partially effective in four agencies, and ineffective in the remaining three agencies; |
| --- | --- |

89.

Notes that for its 2009 audit of eight paying agencies, the Court of Auditors found the systems to be effective in ensuring the regularity of payments in only one agency, partially effective in four agencies, and ineffective in the remaining three agencies;

| 90. | Notes the Court of Auditors’ conclusion that the supervisory and control systems for Agriculture and natural resources were, at best, partially effective in ensuring the regularity of payments; |
| --- | --- |

90.

Notes the Court of Auditors’ conclusion that the supervisory and control systems for Agriculture and natural resources were, at best, partially effective in ensuring the regularity of payments;

| 91. | Further notes that the Court of Auditors concludes that the IACS needs significant improvements in three out of eight paying agencies audited; |
| --- | --- |

91.

Further notes that the Court of Auditors concludes that the IACS needs significant improvements in three out of eight paying agencies audited;

| 92. | Also notes that the Court of Auditors found that the Annual Activity Report and the declaration given by the Director-General for Agriculture provided only partially fair assessment of financial management in relation to the regularity of payments; |
| --- | --- |

92.

Also notes that the Court of Auditors found that the Annual Activity Report and the declaration given by the Director-General for Agriculture provided only partially fair assessment of financial management in relation to the regularity of payments;

| 93. | Deplores the fact that the Member States’ practice of defining used farmland independently results in substantial misallocation of area payments; expects the Commission’s evaluation report to consider this practice and illustrate it with examples; |
| --- | --- |

93.

Deplores the fact that the Member States’ practice of defining used farmland independently results in substantial misallocation of area payments; expects the Commission’s evaluation report to consider this practice and illustrate it with examples;

| 94. | Invites the Commission:






  — | to improve the reliability and completeness of the data recorded in the Land Parcel Identification System, |
| --- | --- | --- |

94.

Invites the Commission:

—

to improve the reliability and completeness of the data recorded in the Land Parcel Identification System,

| — | to take proactive measures to ensure that all the IACS databases provide a reliable and full audit trail for all modifications made, paying particular attention to those countries known to have a poor record, |
| --- | --- |

—

to take proactive measures to ensure that all the IACS databases provide a reliable and full audit trail for all modifications made, paying particular attention to those countries known to have a poor record,

| — | to clarify and further enforce the rules so that Union direct aid is not paid to claimants who have neither used the land for farming nor maintained it in Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions, |
| --- | --- |

—

to clarify and further enforce the rules so that Union direct aid is not paid to claimants who have neither used the land for farming nor maintained it in Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions,

| — | to review and improve the guidelines as regards the work to be performed by certification bodies, in particular the work related to the validation of the Member States’ control and inspection statistics, and to provide Parliament with the number and an assessment of the soundness of the existing paying agencies, |
| --- | --- |

—

to review and improve the guidelines as regards the work to be performed by certification bodies, in particular the work related to the validation of the Member States’ control and inspection statistics, and to provide Parliament with the number and an assessment of the soundness of the existing paying agencies,

| — | to further reduce bureaucracy, to simplify procedures and to avoid adverse effects on farmers arising from the plethora of rules, which in some cases conflict, |
| --- | --- |

—

to further reduce bureaucracy, to simplify procedures and to avoid adverse effects on farmers arising from the plethora of rules, which in some cases conflict,

| — | to keep Parliament regularly updated about the progress of the work; |
| --- | --- |

—

to keep Parliament regularly updated about the progress of the work;

| 95. | Is of the opinion that the tripartite meetings of the Court of Auditors, the Commission and national authorities, which proved important for the mutual understanding and judgment of problems in relation to the annual DAS exercises in the Cohesion policy area, should be extended to the policy area of agriculture and natural resources in order to facilitate a harmonised interpretation and application of the rules regarding the management and control of expenditure, as well as a coordinated approach between the Commission and the Court of Auditors; |
| --- | --- |

95.

Is of the opinion that the tripartite meetings of the Court of Auditors, the Commission and national authorities, which proved important for the mutual understanding and judgment of problems in relation to the annual DAS exercises in the Cohesion policy area, should be extended to the policy area of agriculture and natural resources in order to facilitate a harmonised interpretation and application of the rules regarding the management and control of expenditure, as well as a coordinated approach between the Commission and the Court of Auditors;

| 96. | Agrees with the Court of Auditors that the conformity clearance puts too much emphasis on flat-rate corrections and conformity adjustments that do not concern the final beneficiary; |
| --- | --- |

96.

Agrees with the Court of Auditors that the conformity clearance puts too much emphasis on flat-rate corrections and conformity adjustments that do not concern the final beneficiary;

Cohesion — EUR 35 500 000 000

| 97. | Recalls that management of Cohesion spending is shared with the Member States, that expenditure takes place through a large number of multiannual operational programmes (OPs), that the Commission approves OPs on the basis of proposals from the Member States and that the Member States choose the individual projects to be included in the OPs; |
| --- | --- |

97.

Recalls that management of Cohesion spending is shared with the Member States, that expenditure takes place through a large number of multiannual operational programmes (OPs), that the Commission approves OPs on the basis of proposals from the Member States and that the Member States choose the individual projects to be included in the OPs;

| 98. | Recalls that the Member States co-finance the projects under Cohesion spending; notes that effective management and control systems are of interest to the Member States, who participate with national co-financing; asks the Commission to work decisively to improve and overcome temporary flaws in the management and control systems; |
| --- | --- |

98.

Recalls that the Member States co-finance the projects under Cohesion spending; notes that effective management and control systems are of interest to the Member States, who participate with national co-financing; asks the Commission to work decisively to improve and overcome temporary flaws in the management and control systems;

| 99. | Notes that the Court of Auditors estimates that the most likely error rate for the Cohesion policy area is above 5 %; notes that the frequency of errors continues to decrease for the third consecutive year; |
| --- | --- |

99.

Notes that the Court of Auditors estimates that the most likely error rate for the Cohesion policy area is above 5 %; notes that the frequency of errors continues to decrease for the third consecutive year;

| 100. | Also notes that 36 % of payments to projects were affected by errors, and that this still is the area with the highest error rate; |
| --- | --- |

100.

Also notes that 36 % of payments to projects were affected by errors, and that this still is the area with the highest error rate;

| 101. | Considers that the spending areas themselves, not just individual projects, must be evaluated on the overall trend of errors; |
| --- | --- |

101.

Considers that the spending areas themselves, not just individual projects, must be evaluated on the overall trend of errors;

| 102. | Notes the complexity of the regulatory framework of Cohesion, requiring conformity with both national requirements, including regional and local powers, and a variety of Union policies and rules, such as those relating to public procurement and State aid, the large number of authorities responsible for the implementation of Cohesion policy in the Member States and the even larger number of beneficiaries and recipients of Union support; |
| --- | --- |

102.

Notes the complexity of the regulatory framework of Cohesion, requiring conformity with both national requirements, including regional and local powers, and a variety of Union policies and rules, such as those relating to public procurement and State aid, the large number of authorities responsible for the implementation of Cohesion policy in the Member States and the even larger number of beneficiaries and recipients of Union support;

| 103. | Considers that such complexity is an important issue to take into account when deciding on improvements and simplifications; |
| --- | --- |

103.

Considers that such complexity is an important issue to take into account when deciding on improvements and simplifications;

| 104. | Notes that a major proportion of the estimated error rate is attributable to eligibility errors and serious failures to respect public procurement rules; further notes that the non-respect of public procurement rules alone accounts for 43 % of all quantifiable errors and forms approximately three quarters of the estimated error rate; |
| --- | --- |

104.

Notes that a major proportion of the estimated error rate is attributable to eligibility errors and serious failures to respect public procurement rules; further notes that the non-respect of public procurement rules alone accounts for 43 % of all quantifiable errors and forms approximately three quarters of the estimated error rate;

| 105. | Notes that infringements of procurement procedures reveal a failure to complete the Union internal market; asks the Commission and the Court of Auditors to set up a platform for the consultation process on methodology used with regard to the seriousness of the infringements detected in the public procurement domain; |
| --- | --- |

105.

Notes that infringements of procurement procedures reveal a failure to complete the Union internal market; asks the Commission and the Court of Auditors to set up a platform for the consultation process on methodology used with regard to the seriousness of the infringements detected in the public procurement domain;

| 106. | Further notes that diversity of interests will, without doubt, have an influence on the effective implementation of the Member States’ control obligations in so far as Union expenditure within the respective Member State and national contributions to the Union budget from the respective Member State are concerned; |
| --- | --- |

106.

Further notes that diversity of interests will, without doubt, have an influence on the effective implementation of the Member States’ control obligations in so far as Union expenditure within the respective Member State and national contributions to the Union budget from the respective Member State are concerned;

| 107. | Asks the Commission to analyse the reasons for those infringements of public procurement rules and to cooperate decisively with the Member States to overcome the difficulties identified; |
| --- | --- |

107.

Asks the Commission to analyse the reasons for those infringements of public procurement rules and to cooperate decisively with the Member States to overcome the difficulties identified;

| 108. | Welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy — Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market (COM(2011) 15); calls on the Council and the Commission to finalise the adoption of the reform of the basic Union public procurement rules (Directives 2004/17/EC (14) and 2004/18/EC (15) of the European Parliament and of the Council) by 2012; |
| --- | --- |

108.

Welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy — Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market (COM(2011) 15); calls on the Council and the Commission to finalise the adoption of the reform of the basic Union public procurement rules (Directives 2004/17/EC (14) and 2004/18/EC (15) of the European Parliament and of the Council) by 2012;

| 109. | Is worried that the Court of Auditors also found a significant number of shortcomings in tendering and contracting procedures; |
| --- | --- |

109.

Is worried that the Court of Auditors also found a significant number of shortcomings in tendering and contracting procedures;

| 110. | Notes that for at least 30 % of the errors found by the Court of Auditors sufficient information was available for the Member State authorities in charge of implementing the OPs to have detected and corrected the error prior to certifying the expenditure to the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

110.

Notes that for at least 30 % of the errors found by the Court of Auditors sufficient information was available for the Member State authorities in charge of implementing the OPs to have detected and corrected the error prior to certifying the expenditure to the Commission;

| 111. | Believes that this finding seriously brings into question the efficiency of a system in which the Member States hold the main responsibility for the accuracy of the declared expenditure; |
| --- | --- |

111.

Believes that this finding seriously brings into question the efficiency of a system in which the Member States hold the main responsibility for the accuracy of the declared expenditure;

| 112. | Recalls that management verifications are key controls to prevent irregularities, and regrets that for 11 of the 16 OPs audited, the verifications carried out by managing authorities of the Member States were only partially compliant with the regulatory requirements; |
| --- | --- |

112.

Recalls that management verifications are key controls to prevent irregularities, and regrets that for 11 of the 16 OPs audited, the verifications carried out by managing authorities of the Member States were only partially compliant with the regulatory requirements;

| 113. | Notes that, overall, the supervisory and control systems for the 2007-13 programming period were only partially in compliance with the audited key provisions of the regulatory framework; |
| --- | --- |

113.

Notes that, overall, the supervisory and control systems for the 2007-13 programming period were only partially in compliance with the audited key provisions of the regulatory framework;

| 114. | Notes that final figures can only be established for those financial years that can be deemed to have been closed, and that the most recent financial year that can be deemed closed is 2004; |
| --- | --- |

114.

Notes that final figures can only be established for those financial years that can be deemed to have been closed, and that the most recent financial year that can be deemed closed is 2004;

| 115. | Recalls that the Commission’s role includes providing guidance to the Member States and developing good practices among national bodies; calls on all Commission DGs to further improve their performance in this respect; |
| --- | --- |

115.

Recalls that the Commission’s role includes providing guidance to the Member States and developing good practices among national bodies; calls on all Commission DGs to further improve their performance in this respect;

| 116. | Stresses that the Member States’ administrations are, to a high degree, stakeholders of policies they implement in shared management; emphasises, in that respect, that shared management between the Commission and the Member States depends upon an atmosphere of mutual respect and recognition between the administrations concerned; underlines that this atmosphere, to a large degree, can be further strengthened in day-to-day management and resulting contacts between the Commission and the Member States’ administrations; |
| --- | --- |

116.

Stresses that the Member States’ administrations are, to a high degree, stakeholders of policies they implement in shared management; emphasises, in that respect, that shared management between the Commission and the Member States depends upon an atmosphere of mutual respect and recognition between the administrations concerned; underlines that this atmosphere, to a large degree, can be further strengthened in day-to-day management and resulting contacts between the Commission and the Member States’ administrations;

| 117. | Requests that the Commission identify and spread best practices amongst the Member States in order to allow an increased absorption of funds and improved beneficiary cash-flow by amending and simplifying the Structural Funds implementing regulations at national level; |
| --- | --- |

117.

Requests that the Commission identify and spread best practices amongst the Member States in order to allow an increased absorption of funds and improved beneficiary cash-flow by amending and simplifying the Structural Funds implementing regulations at national level;

| 118. | Is worried that according to OLAF there is growing evidence that in many cases the frauds in the Structural Funds are organised and planned and have not resulted from simple opportunity; calls on all stakeholders in the Member States and in the Union institutions to work together closely to deal with this phenomenon (OLAF Annual Report 2010, p. 41); |
| --- | --- |

118.

Is worried that according to OLAF there is growing evidence that in many cases the frauds in the Structural Funds are organised and planned and have not resulted from simple opportunity; calls on all stakeholders in the Member States and in the Union institutions to work together closely to deal with this phenomenon (OLAF Annual Report 2010, p. 41);

| 119. | Deplores the belated issuing of the Member States’ annual summaries concerning the Structural Funds, on account of which it is impossible to obtain an adequate assurance of the regularity of the implementation of regional programmes; regards this as sufficient grounds to suspend payments from the Structural Funds to the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

119.

Deplores the belated issuing of the Member States’ annual summaries concerning the Structural Funds, on account of which it is impossible to obtain an adequate assurance of the regularity of the implementation of regional programmes; regards this as sufficient grounds to suspend payments from the Structural Funds to the Member States;

| 120. | Invites the Commission, in connection with the revision of the Financial Regulation, to look into the effectiveness of NMDs as incentives and/or deterrents and the advantages and improvements they could bring in terms of sound financial management; considers that account should also be taken of the fact that for the period 2007-13 major changes have been made to management and control systems and that the results produced need to be assessed with a view to making further improvements; takes the view that the introduction of this instrument should genuinely make it possible for the Commission to fulfil its duty to supervise the Member States and to ensure an effective functioning of the national management and control systems; |
| --- | --- |

120.

Invites the Commission, in connection with the revision of the Financial Regulation, to look into the effectiveness of NMDs as incentives and/or deterrents and the advantages and improvements they could bring in terms of sound financial management; considers that account should also be taken of the fact that for the period 2007-13 major changes have been made to management and control systems and that the results produced need to be assessed with a view to making further improvements; takes the view that the introduction of this instrument should genuinely make it possible for the Commission to fulfil its duty to supervise the Member States and to ensure an effective functioning of the national management and control systems;

| 121. | Calls upon the Commission to intensify the contacts with the Member States’ administrations for the purpose of a mutual exchange of information to tackle pending questions without delay; |
| --- | --- |

121.

Calls upon the Commission to intensify the contacts with the Member States’ administrations for the purpose of a mutual exchange of information to tackle pending questions without delay;

| 122. | Is very worried about the continually low standard of some Member States’ management and control systems and the slow rate of progress in improving those systems; |
| --- | --- |

122.

Is very worried about the continually low standard of some Member States’ management and control systems and the slow rate of progress in improving those systems;

| 123. | Invites the Commission to include in the Financial Regulation a request for mandatory NMDs issued and signed at ministerial level and duly audited by an independent auditor as a vital first step towards greater national accountability for Union expenditure; takes the view that without introducing this instrument the Commission will not be able to fulfil its duty to supervise the Member States and to ensure an effective functioning of the national management and control systems; |
| --- | --- |

123.

Invites the Commission to include in the Financial Regulation a request for mandatory NMDs issued and signed at ministerial level and duly audited by an independent auditor as a vital first step towards greater national accountability for Union expenditure; takes the view that without introducing this instrument the Commission will not be able to fulfil its duty to supervise the Member States and to ensure an effective functioning of the national management and control systems;

| 124. | Draws attention to its Rules of Procedure, in particular to Annex VI, Article 6(3) thereof, according to which the President on ‘the basis of a report by the committee responsible for budgetary control ... acting on behalf of Parliament may bring an action before the Court of Justice against ... the institution concerned, pursuant to Article 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, for failure to comply with the obligations deriving from the comments accompanying the discharge decision or the other resolutions concerning implementation of expenditure’; recalls, in addition, the need to ensure an efficient implementation of regular, tripartite meetings under the budgetary procedure as mentioned in Article 324 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

124.

Draws attention to its Rules of Procedure, in particular to Annex VI, Article 6(3) thereof, according to which the President on ‘the basis of a report by the committee responsible for budgetary control ... acting on behalf of Parliament may bring an action before the Court of Justice against ... the institution concerned, pursuant to Article 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, for failure to comply with the obligations deriving from the comments accompanying the discharge decision or the other resolutions concerning implementation of expenditure’; recalls, in addition, the need to ensure an efficient implementation of regular, tripartite meetings under the budgetary procedure as mentioned in Article 324 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

| 125. | Regrets that the certifying bodies under Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund (16) lack coherent and clear auditing standards; calls on the Commission to set up a working group with the Member States to prepare uniform auditing standards in order to further enhance the audit work of the certifying/auditing bodies; |
| --- | --- |

125.

Regrets that the certifying bodies under Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund (16) lack coherent and clear auditing standards; calls on the Commission to set up a working group with the Member States to prepare uniform auditing standards in order to further enhance the audit work of the certifying/auditing bodies;

| 126. | Calls on the Commission to provide Parliament with the number and an assessment of the soundness of the existing managing authorities; |
| --- | --- |

126.

Calls on the Commission to provide Parliament with the number and an assessment of the soundness of the existing managing authorities;

Research, energy and transport — EUR 8 000 000 000

| 127. | Recalls that the majority of expenditure for this policy group is implemented by the Commission under direct centralised management and, increasingly, by indirect centralised management through agencies and Joint Undertakings; |
| --- | --- |

127.

Recalls that the majority of expenditure for this policy group is implemented by the Commission under direct centralised management and, increasingly, by indirect centralised management through agencies and Joint Undertakings;

| 128. | Notes that the most likely error rate estimated by the Court of Auditors for this policy area is between 2 % and 5 %; |
| --- | --- |

128.

Notes that the most likely error rate estimated by the Court of Auditors for this policy area is between 2 % and 5 %;

| 129. | Further notes that the Court of Auditors found that management and control systems were only partially effective in ensuring the regularity of transactions; |
| --- | --- |

129.

Further notes that the Court of Auditors found that management and control systems were only partially effective in ensuring the regularity of transactions;

| 130. | Notes that the main source of error in this policy group remains the reimbursement of overstated personnel and indirect costs to research projects; further takes note of the increase in reservations concerning direct management (from 4 to 9) mainly as a result of complex eligibility criteria; |
| --- | --- |

130.

Notes that the main source of error in this policy group remains the reimbursement of overstated personnel and indirect costs to research projects; further takes note of the increase in reservations concerning direct management (from 4 to 9) mainly as a result of complex eligibility criteria;

| 131. | Also notes that, in view of the particular importance of research and development for the Union economy, errors in this area are especially alarming; |
| --- | --- |

131.

Also notes that, in view of the particular importance of research and development for the Union economy, errors in this area are especially alarming;

| 132. | Recalls that FP6 beneficiaries’ cost statements submitted for reimbursement shall be accompanied by an audit certificate issued by an independent auditor certifying that the independent auditor has reasonable assurance that the declared costs meet the eligibility requirements; draws attention to the fact that, by the Commission’s own admission, the acceptability criteria adopted for obtaining certification are too restrictive; |
| --- | --- |

132.

Recalls that FP6 beneficiaries’ cost statements submitted for reimbursement shall be accompanied by an audit certificate issued by an independent auditor certifying that the independent auditor has reasonable assurance that the declared costs meet the eligibility requirements; draws attention to the fact that, by the Commission’s own admission, the acceptability criteria adopted for obtaining certification are too restrictive;

| 133. | Is worried about the fact that the Court of Auditors found errors in 43 % of the audited cost statements — both in 2009 as well as in 2008 — which had received an unqualified opinion from the certifying auditor before submission for reimbursement; |
| --- | --- |

133.

Is worried about the fact that the Court of Auditors found errors in 43 % of the audited cost statements — both in 2009 as well as in 2008 — which had received an unqualified opinion from the certifying auditor before submission for reimbursement;

| 134. | Notes that while the Commission substantially increased the amount of ineligible costs recovered during 2009, the outstanding recoverable amounts showed a similar increase and have almost tripled to EUR 31 500 000; |
| --- | --- |

134.

Notes that while the Commission substantially increased the amount of ineligible costs recovered during 2009, the outstanding recoverable amounts showed a similar increase and have almost tripled to EUR 31 500 000;

| 135. | Considers that public trust in the area of research, energy and transport is very important, since this area is anticipated to increase its share of the Union budget in the coming years; |
| --- | --- |

135.

Considers that public trust in the area of research, energy and transport is very important, since this area is anticipated to increase its share of the Union budget in the coming years;

| 136. | Invites the Commission to ensure that the independent auditors who have incorrectly certified cost statements are made aware of the eligibility criteria for declared costs and if applicable held accountable, to review the operation of the system for the certification of beneficiaries’ costing methodologies, to reduce the backlog in recovering undue amounts paid and to impose sanctions where necessary, to further simplify the research funding rules, to significantly improve access to research funding for SMEs and to ensure full accountability for the proper use of Union money; |
| --- | --- |

136.

Invites the Commission to ensure that the independent auditors who have incorrectly certified cost statements are made aware of the eligibility criteria for declared costs and if applicable held accountable, to review the operation of the system for the certification of beneficiaries’ costing methodologies, to reduce the backlog in recovering undue amounts paid and to impose sanctions where necessary, to further simplify the research funding rules, to significantly improve access to research funding for SMEs and to ensure full accountability for the proper use of Union money;

| 137. | Reiterates its call on the Commission to provide legal certainty by refraining from applying a stricter definition of the rules for participation retroactively and by refraining from asking recipients to recalculate financial statements already approved by Commission services, hence reducing the need for ex post audits and retroactive corrections; asks the Commission rapidly to resolve prior situations arising from inspections in progress, acting with discernment and respect for the principles of sound financial management; recommends that disputes regarding such prior situations be resolved by agreement between all parties, based for example on an independent reaudit and/or with the intervention of an ad-hoc independent mediator; |
| --- | --- |

137.

Reiterates its call on the Commission to provide legal certainty by refraining from applying a stricter definition of the rules for participation retroactively and by refraining from asking recipients to recalculate financial statements already approved by Commission services, hence reducing the need for ex post audits and retroactive corrections; asks the Commission rapidly to resolve prior situations arising from inspections in progress, acting with discernment and respect for the principles of sound financial management; recommends that disputes regarding such prior situations be resolved by agreement between all parties, based for example on an independent reaudit and/or with the intervention of an ad-hoc independent mediator;

| 138. | Welcomes the fact that the Commission has started to make use of its sanctions in the area of research (34 actions, EUR 514 330 received); nevertheless, supports the IAS conclusion that a strong fraud detection mechanism is needed; |
| --- | --- |

138.

Welcomes the fact that the Commission has started to make use of its sanctions in the area of research (34 actions, EUR 514 330 received); nevertheless, supports the IAS conclusion that a strong fraud detection mechanism is needed;

| 139. | Further invites the Commission to ensure that the IAS exercises the same powers over the bodies set up by the Union having a legal personality and receiving contributions from the budget (Union Joint Undertakings) as those which it exercises over Commission departments, in accordance with Article 185(3) of the Financial Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

139.

Further invites the Commission to ensure that the IAS exercises the same powers over the bodies set up by the Union having a legal personality and receiving contributions from the budget (Union Joint Undertakings) as those which it exercises over Commission departments, in accordance with Article 185(3) of the Financial Regulation;

| 140. | Believes that the FP8 should be based on a radical change of view including the introduction of a bonus system partially replacing the current upfront payment system and better access to venture capital in order to enhance efficiency; |
| --- | --- |

140.

Believes that the FP8 should be based on a radical change of view including the introduction of a bonus system partially replacing the current upfront payment system and better access to venture capital in order to enhance efficiency;

External aid, Development and Enlargement — EUR 6 600 000 000

| 141. | Recalls that the majority of the expenditure in this policy area is subject to direct centralised management by Commission services either from Commission Headquarters or at the Union Delegations level (‘European Union Delegations’ after the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union); further takes note of the increasing use of joint management in, for example, the Food Facility; |
| --- | --- |

141.

Recalls that the majority of the expenditure in this policy area is subject to direct centralised management by Commission services either from Commission Headquarters or at the Union Delegations level (‘European Union Delegations’ after the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union); further takes note of the increasing use of joint management in, for example, the Food Facility;

| 142. | Considers that the effectiveness of the spending areas themselves, not just individual projects, must be evaluated on its overall trend of errors; |
| --- | --- |

142.

Considers that the effectiveness of the spending areas themselves, not just individual projects, must be evaluated on its overall trend of errors;

| 143. | Notes that the most likely error rate estimated by the Court of Auditors for the audited domain is between 2 % and 5 %; |
| --- | --- |

143.

Notes that the most likely error rate estimated by the Court of Auditors for the audited domain is between 2 % and 5 %;

| 144. | Further notes that the Court of Auditors’ overall assessment of supervisory and control systems is that they are only partially effective; |
| --- | --- |

144.

Further notes that the Court of Auditors’ overall assessment of supervisory and control systems is that they are only partially effective;

| 145. | Also notes that the Court of Auditors found that the Annual Activity Report and the declaration given by the Director-General for EuropeAid only give a partially fair assessment of financial management in relation to regularity; |
| --- | --- |

145.

Also notes that the Court of Auditors found that the Annual Activity Report and the declaration given by the Director-General for EuropeAid only give a partially fair assessment of financial management in relation to regularity;

| 146. | Notes that the assessment of management and control systems in the candidate and potential candidate countries is an ongoing process carried out within the framework set out by the roadmap for the decentralised management process for an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) that leads to the granting of management powers by the Commission to a specified component, programme or measure within the IPA; |
| --- | --- |

146.

Notes that the assessment of management and control systems in the candidate and potential candidate countries is an ongoing process carried out within the framework set out by the roadmap for the decentralised management process for an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) that leads to the granting of management powers by the Commission to a specified component, programme or measure within the IPA;

| 147. | Asks the Commission to closely cooperate with candidate and potential candidate countries in order to effectively improve management and control systems, to promote best practices for fighting fraud, and to ensure that their practices are in conformity with all Union rules and standards; |
| --- | --- |

147.

Asks the Commission to closely cooperate with candidate and potential candidate countries in order to effectively improve management and control systems, to promote best practices for fighting fraud, and to ensure that their practices are in conformity with all Union rules and standards;

| 148. | Deplores the fact that in some potential candidate countries appointments in the public administration in breach of the civil service law continue; regrets that the judiciary in many cases functions poorly; invites the Commission to provide all potential candidate countries with the necessary know-how and institutional knowledge to efficiently fight corruption and continue the reforms needed; |
| --- | --- |

148.

Deplores the fact that in some potential candidate countries appointments in the public administration in breach of the civil service law continue; regrets that the judiciary in many cases functions poorly; invites the Commission to provide all potential candidate countries with the necessary know-how and institutional knowledge to efficiently fight corruption and continue the reforms needed;

| 149. | Is concerned by the high rejection rates in countries with decentralised implementation, i.e. where Union Delegations control procurement files ex ante; underlines that national authorities in those countries seem to have difficulties in implementing decisive improvements which are necessary for waiving the Commission’s ex ante controls; invites the Commission and candidate countries to improve dialogue and ensure effective cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

149.

Is concerned by the high rejection rates in countries with decentralised implementation, i.e. where Union Delegations control procurement files ex ante; underlines that national authorities in those countries seem to have difficulties in implementing decisive improvements which are necessary for waiving the Commission’s ex ante controls; invites the Commission and candidate countries to improve dialogue and ensure effective cooperation;

| 150. | Notes the Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 12/2009 on the effectiveness of the Commission’s projects in the area of Justice and Home Affairs for the Western Balkans; |
| --- | --- |

150.

Notes the Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 12/2009 on the effectiveness of the Commission’s projects in the area of Justice and Home Affairs for the Western Balkans;

| 151. | Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ positive assessment on the supervisory and control systems applied in the area of humanitarian aid; nevertheless, invites the Commission to give greater attention to and derive full benefit from the follow-up of weaknesses revealed by its audits on implementing partners and monitoring the extent of the use of humanitarian procurement centres; |
| --- | --- |

151.

Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ positive assessment on the supervisory and control systems applied in the area of humanitarian aid; nevertheless, invites the Commission to give greater attention to and derive full benefit from the follow-up of weaknesses revealed by its audits on implementing partners and monitoring the extent of the use of humanitarian procurement centres;

| 152. | Invites the successor of RELEX to complete its ex post control methodology and promptly address related recommendations made by the Internal Auditor; |
| --- | --- |

152.

Invites the successor of RELEX to complete its ex post control methodology and promptly address related recommendations made by the Internal Auditor;

| 153. | Invites Enlargement DG to develop and put in place mechanisms to facilitate the analysis and follow-up of the results of the verification missions carried out and to devote sufficient resources to the analysis of the outstanding final declarations submitted by the Member States that have recently joined the Union, but relating to the pre-accession period; |
| --- | --- |

153.

Invites Enlargement DG to develop and put in place mechanisms to facilitate the analysis and follow-up of the results of the verification missions carried out and to devote sufficient resources to the analysis of the outstanding final declarations submitted by the Member States that have recently joined the Union, but relating to the pre-accession period;

| 154. | Invites ECHO to improve the assessments of the proposals’ documentation for humanitarian aid actions (such as the introduction of standardised evaluation reports) and to report on its experience with the implementation of the Food Facility in its Annual Activity Report for 2010; |
| --- | --- |

154.

Invites ECHO to improve the assessments of the proposals’ documentation for humanitarian aid actions (such as the introduction of standardised evaluation reports) and to report on its experience with the implementation of the Food Facility in its Annual Activity Report for 2010;

| 155. | Notes that there could also be negative effects in providing foreign aid, such as when corrupt regimes in receiving countries mismanage funds, and that the work to prevent such effects must be given top priority; |
| --- | --- |

155.

Notes that there could also be negative effects in providing foreign aid, such as when corrupt regimes in receiving countries mismanage funds, and that the work to prevent such effects must be given top priority;

| 156. | Welcomes the fact that the Commission spent EUR 396 000 000 between 2007 and 2010 to support accession candidates in their efforts to improve judicial systems and the fight against corruption as well as the progress made in this regard; nevertheless cautions against being too optimistic and asks the Commission to provide evidence that this money was spent efficiently and whether improved control structures actually lead to increased sanctions against corrupt actors, including in high-profile cases, whether laws are fully implemented, and whether reforms are sustained; |
| --- | --- |

156.

Welcomes the fact that the Commission spent EUR 396 000 000 between 2007 and 2010 to support accession candidates in their efforts to improve judicial systems and the fight against corruption as well as the progress made in this regard; nevertheless cautions against being too optimistic and asks the Commission to provide evidence that this money was spent efficiently and whether improved control structures actually lead to increased sanctions against corrupt actors, including in high-profile cases, whether laws are fully implemented, and whether reforms are sustained;

| 157. | Notes with concern the weaknesses identified by the Court of Auditors in the decentralised implementation system (DIS) in Croatia and Turkey; asks the Commission to report on all measures taken to address this problem and provide estimates of the amount of expenditure at risk; |
| --- | --- |

157.

Notes with concern the weaknesses identified by the Court of Auditors in the decentralised implementation system (DIS) in Croatia and Turkey; asks the Commission to report on all measures taken to address this problem and provide estimates of the amount of expenditure at risk;

| 158. | Asks the Commission, and in particular Enlargement DG, to step up its efforts to deal with the final declarations for the Phare programme, the CARDS programme, and the transition facility and to proceed with the closure of these programmes prudently and in a timely manner; |
| --- | --- |

158.

Asks the Commission, and in particular Enlargement DG, to step up its efforts to deal with the final declarations for the Phare programme, the CARDS programme, and the transition facility and to proceed with the closure of these programmes prudently and in a timely manner;

| 159. | Regrets the fact that a significant share of pre-accession aid is dealt with in Chapters 3 (agriculture — EUR 254 000 000) and 4 (cohesion — EUR 65 000 000) of the Court of Auditors’ annual report; is surprised that, unlike in previous years, the Court of Auditors’ annual report does not contain information on audit visits per country for non-Union countries; |
| --- | --- |

159.

Regrets the fact that a significant share of pre-accession aid is dealt with in Chapters 3 (agriculture — EUR 254 000 000) and 4 (cohesion — EUR 65 000 000) of the Court of Auditors’ annual report; is surprised that, unlike in previous years, the Court of Auditors’ annual report does not contain information on audit visits per country for non-Union countries;

| 160. | Regrets the fact that Regional Policy DG did not undertake any audit missions to Croatia in 2009 despite there being major problems with the tendering process there; |
| --- | --- |

160.

Regrets the fact that Regional Policy DG did not undertake any audit missions to Croatia in 2009 despite there being major problems with the tendering process there;

| 161. | Further invites the Commission to inform international organisations that future Union assistance will be subject to the delivery of assurance evidence in the form of a statement of assurance; |
| --- | --- |

161.

Further invites the Commission to inform international organisations that future Union assistance will be subject to the delivery of assurance evidence in the form of a statement of assurance;

| 162. | Asks the Court of Auditors to provide reasons why its transaction sampling for the external aid Chapter delivered a comparably low error rate (13 %), a big share of non-quantifiable errors at the level of the Union Delegations and no evidence of accuracy or occurrence errors in an area that is, by its nature, at high risk of misuse of funds; asks the Commission, and in particular the Union Delegations, to provide a clear audit trail and all other information necessary to facilitate the Court of Auditors’ analysis; |
| --- | --- |

162.

Asks the Court of Auditors to provide reasons why its transaction sampling for the external aid Chapter delivered a comparably low error rate (13 %), a big share of non-quantifiable errors at the level of the Union Delegations and no evidence of accuracy or occurrence errors in an area that is, by its nature, at high risk of misuse of funds; asks the Commission, and in particular the Union Delegations, to provide a clear audit trail and all other information necessary to facilitate the Court of Auditors’ analysis;

Education and Citizenship — EUR 2 200 000 000

| 163. | Recalls that the majority of expenditure in this area is managed by indirect centralised management or through shared management; |
| --- | --- |

163.

Recalls that the majority of expenditure in this area is managed by indirect centralised management or through shared management;

| 164. | Welcomes the Commission’s positive role in this area by providing guidance to the Member States and encourages the Commission to continue to spread good practice amongst national bodies; |
| --- | --- |

164.

Welcomes the Commission’s positive role in this area by providing guidance to the Member States and encourages the Commission to continue to spread good practice amongst national bodies;

| 165. | Notes that the Court of Auditors found the error rate for closures to be between 2 % and 5 % and that the supervisory and control systems for this policy area were only partially effective in ensuring the regularity of closures made in 2009; |
| --- | --- |

165.

Notes that the Court of Auditors found the error rate for closures to be between 2 % and 5 % and that the supervisory and control systems for this policy area were only partially effective in ensuring the regularity of closures made in 2009;

| 166. | Is worried that 29 of the 120 closures audited (24 %) contained quantifiable errors; |
| --- | --- |

166.

Is worried that 29 of the 120 closures audited (24 %) contained quantifiable errors;

| 167. | Is worried that the supervisory and control systems at Commission level in 2009 left undetected and uncorrected a significant number of errors in the closures made that year; |
| --- | --- |

167.

Is worried that the supervisory and control systems at Commission level in 2009 left undetected and uncorrected a significant number of errors in the closures made that year;

| 168. | Invites the Commission to continue to reinforce the checks on closures to ensure that errors are detected and corrected and prevent the reoccurrence of previously identified errors; |
| --- | --- |

168.

Invites the Commission to continue to reinforce the checks on closures to ensure that errors are detected and corrected and prevent the reoccurrence of previously identified errors;

Economic and Financial Affairs — EUR 700 000 000

| 169. | Recalls that the main programmes in this policy group are parts of the Sixth and Seventh Framework Programmes (FP) for research and technological development (EUR 222 000 000), the linked funding of Union agencies (EUR 116 000 000), the Guarantee Fund for external actions (EUR 92 000 000) and the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) which followed the Multiannual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship (MAP) (EUR 175 000 000); |
| --- | --- |

169.

Recalls that the main programmes in this policy group are parts of the Sixth and Seventh Framework Programmes (FP) for research and technological development (EUR 222 000 000), the linked funding of Union agencies (EUR 116 000 000), the Guarantee Fund for external actions (EUR 92 000 000) and the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) which followed the Multiannual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship (MAP) (EUR 175 000 000);

| 170. | Recalls further that the majority of the actions under FP6, FP7 and CIP are funded through a grant agreement with the Commission, and that grants are paid out as follows: an advance when the grant agreement is signed, followed by interim and final payments which reimburse eligible expenditure on the basis of cost statements submitted by the beneficiaries; |
| --- | --- |

170.

Recalls further that the majority of the actions under FP6, FP7 and CIP are funded through a grant agreement with the Commission, and that grants are paid out as follows: an advance when the grant agreement is signed, followed by interim and final payments which reimburse eligible expenditure on the basis of cost statements submitted by the beneficiaries;

| 171. | Recalls that the Parliament Resolutions on discharge for the financial years 2007 and 2008 both call on the Commission to allow beneficiaries to use average personnel costs per cost centre and to refrain from requesting individual costs of persons actively involved in a specific research project; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission Decision C(2011) 174 of 24 January 2011 on the three measures simplifying the implementation of Decision No 1982/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decision No 970/2006/Euratom; |
| --- | --- |

171.

Recalls that the Parliament Resolutions on discharge for the financial years 2007 and 2008 both call on the Commission to allow beneficiaries to use average personnel costs per cost centre and to refrain from requesting individual costs of persons actively involved in a specific research project; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission Decision C(2011) 174 of 24 January 2011 on the three measures simplifying the implementation of Decision No 1982/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decision No 970/2006/Euratom;

| 172. | Notes that the main risk to regularity is that eligible costs in the cost statements are overstated and that this is not detected by the Commission’s supervisory and control systems and that the Court of Auditors assesses as ‘high’ the risk to regularity of payments made on the basis of cost statements; |
| --- | --- |

172.

Notes that the main risk to regularity is that eligible costs in the cost statements are overstated and that this is not detected by the Commission’s supervisory and control systems and that the Court of Auditors assesses as ‘high’ the risk to regularity of payments made on the basis of cost statements;

| 173. | Notes the illustrative examples mentioned by the Court of Auditors as regards:






  — | the Sixth Framework Programme where serious deficiencies in the cost statements were neither detected by the firm which provided the audit certificate nor during the two ex post controls carried out by another external audit firm on behalf of the Commission, |
| --- | --- | --- |

173.

Notes the illustrative examples mentioned by the Court of Auditors as regards:

—

the Sixth Framework Programme where serious deficiencies in the cost statements were neither detected by the firm which provided the audit certificate nor during the two ex post controls carried out by another external audit firm on behalf of the Commission,

| — | the Seventh Framework Programme where a beneficiary applied a methodology for the calculation of personnel costs which did not comply with either the FP6 or the FP7 rules, and, accordingly, for one project audited, the costs declared were overcharged by more than 17 % and that the same methodology was applied to another 13 projects, |
| --- | --- |

—

the Seventh Framework Programme where a beneficiary applied a methodology for the calculation of personnel costs which did not comply with either the FP6 or the FP7 rules, and, accordingly, for one project audited, the costs declared were overcharged by more than 17 % and that the same methodology was applied to another 13 projects,

| — | the European Space Agency (ESA) — Joint management — where the Court of Auditors noted the inclusion of costs which should not be funded by the Community, or costs which were insufficiently supported for an amount of close to 10 % of the audited sample, as well as serious weaknesses in the procurement rules and procedures; |
| --- | --- |

—

the European Space Agency (ESA) — Joint management — where the Court of Auditors noted the inclusion of costs which should not be funded by the Community, or costs which were insufficiently supported for an amount of close to 10 % of the audited sample, as well as serious weaknesses in the procurement rules and procedures;

| 174. | Notes with concern and is worried that the Court of Auditors continues to detect errors in payments for which an unqualified opinion has been issued by the approved auditor and that the Court of Auditors considers audit certification as only partially effective in identifying errors in the declared costs; |
| --- | --- |

174.

Notes with concern and is worried that the Court of Auditors continues to detect errors in payments for which an unqualified opinion has been issued by the approved auditor and that the Court of Auditors considers audit certification as only partially effective in identifying errors in the declared costs;

| 175. | Notes that the Court of Auditors concludes that payments in this policy group were free from material errors but also that the Court of Auditors recommends that attention be paid to the type and extent of errors found in research framework expenditure; notes that while two supervisory and control systems out of three for this policy group were assessed as effective, one system was only partially effective in ensuring the regularity of payments; |
| --- | --- |

175.

Notes that the Court of Auditors concludes that payments in this policy group were free from material errors but also that the Court of Auditors recommends that attention be paid to the type and extent of errors found in research framework expenditure; notes that while two supervisory and control systems out of three for this policy group were assessed as effective, one system was only partially effective in ensuring the regularity of payments;

| 176. | Invites the Commission:






  — | to look at the existing arrangements for ex ante verification, with a view to establishing how effective they are, |
| --- | --- | --- |

176.

Invites the Commission:

—

to look at the existing arrangements for ex ante verification, with a view to establishing how effective they are,

| — | to consider, in the light of experience, whether the use of certification by an external auditor appointed by the beneficiary is an effective control, and to look into alternative methods of verification, |
| --- | --- |

—

to consider, in the light of experience, whether the use of certification by an external auditor appointed by the beneficiary is an effective control, and to look into alternative methods of verification,

| — | to raise the certifying auditors’ awareness of expenditure eligibility rules to improve the reliability of the audit certificates they issue, and, if applicable, holding such auditors accountable, |
| --- | --- |

—

to raise the certifying auditors’ awareness of expenditure eligibility rules to improve the reliability of the audit certificates they issue, and, if applicable, holding such auditors accountable,

| — | to further improve the quality of its ex ante controls on the procurement procedures and interim/final payments and ensure that ex post controls functions are covered by work programmes; |
| --- | --- |

—

to further improve the quality of its ex ante controls on the procurement procedures and interim/final payments and ensure that ex post controls functions are covered by work programmes;

Comprehensive Spending Review

| 177. | Calls on the Commission to undertake urgently during 2011 a comprehensive spending review of all areas of activity to ensure all expenditure is delivering value for money in order to identify possible savings which would reduce the pressure on the budget in this period of austerity; |
| --- | --- |

177.

Calls on the Commission to undertake urgently during 2011 a comprehensive spending review of all areas of activity to ensure all expenditure is delivering value for money in order to identify possible savings which would reduce the pressure on the budget in this period of austerity;

| 178. | Believes that all demands for increased expenditure in key priority areas can be met by savings from existing programmes and that greater scrutiny should therefore be made of outdated or ineffectual programmes to allow funds to be reallocated; |
| --- | --- |

178.

Believes that all demands for increased expenditure in key priority areas can be met by savings from existing programmes and that greater scrutiny should therefore be made of outdated or ineffectual programmes to allow funds to be reallocated;

Priority actions

| 179. | Calls on the Commission to present to Parliament’s competent committee a plan presenting the actions that it intends to take regarding reform of the current discharge procedure, NMDs, the completion of the Commission’s governance structure, systematic interruption and suspension of payments as well as lifting of the measure and the improvement of the corrective mechanisms; |
| --- | --- |

179.

Calls on the Commission to present to Parliament’s competent committee a plan presenting the actions that it intends to take regarding reform of the current discharge procedure, NMDs, the completion of the Commission’s governance structure, systematic interruption and suspension of payments as well as lifting of the measure and the improvement of the corrective mechanisms;

Reform of the current discharge procedure

| 180. | Calls on the Commission to organise an interinstitutional discussion involving at the initial phase, at the highest level, representatives of the Council, of the Commission, of the Court of Auditors and of Parliament, and in the second phase representatives from the Member States, from national parliaments and from supreme audit institutions, with a view to embarking on a comprehensive debate on the current discharge procedure system; |
| --- | --- |

180.

Calls on the Commission to organise an interinstitutional discussion involving at the initial phase, at the highest level, representatives of the Council, of the Commission, of the Court of Auditors and of Parliament, and in the second phase representatives from the Member States, from national parliaments and from supreme audit institutions, with a view to embarking on a comprehensive debate on the current discharge procedure system;

| 181. | Calls on the Commission to put forward proposals for reducing the periods involved in the discharge process, so that the vote in plenary can be held in the year following the financial year under review; encourages the Court of Auditors and all institutions to shorten and strengthen the discharge procedure, making it more transparent and understandable to Union taxpayers; |
| --- | --- |

181.

Calls on the Commission to put forward proposals for reducing the periods involved in the discharge process, so that the vote in plenary can be held in the year following the financial year under review; encourages the Court of Auditors and all institutions to shorten and strengthen the discharge procedure, making it more transparent and understandable to Union taxpayers;

National management declarations

| 182. | Stresses that NMDs are to be understood as an instrument facilitating greater national accountability for Union spending by giving both national parliaments and national audit institutions an opportunity to participate in ensuring legality, regularity and performance of Union spending; is of the opinion that NMDs are an instrument which will allow national institutions and Union institutions to work together while fully respecting each others’ roles and responsibilities; |
| --- | --- |

182.

Stresses that NMDs are to be understood as an instrument facilitating greater national accountability for Union spending by giving both national parliaments and national audit institutions an opportunity to participate in ensuring legality, regularity and performance of Union spending; is of the opinion that NMDs are an instrument which will allow national institutions and Union institutions to work together while fully respecting each others’ roles and responsibilities;

| 183. | Recalls that since 2005, Parliament has asked the Commission to present a proposal for the introduction of mandatory NMDs; |
| --- | --- |

183.

Recalls that since 2005, Parliament has asked the Commission to present a proposal for the introduction of mandatory NMDs;

| 184. | Underlines that not only the Union manager but also the national manager should be held to account for the spending in as far as about 80 % of the budget is implemented by national authorities; |
| --- | --- |

184.

Underlines that not only the Union manager but also the national manager should be held to account for the spending in as far as about 80 % of the budget is implemented by national authorities;

| 185. | Has repeatedly requested that each national finance minister should issue and sign a national management declaration as to the use of the funds and has also suggested that the national audit institution or another independent auditor should audit the finance minister’s national management declaration because to audit a declaration issued by a national ministry would normally fall under the mandate of any independent national audit institution; |
| --- | --- |

185.

Has repeatedly requested that each national finance minister should issue and sign a national management declaration as to the use of the funds and has also suggested that the national audit institution or another independent auditor should audit the finance minister’s national management declaration because to audit a declaration issued by a national ministry would normally fall under the mandate of any independent national audit institution;

| 186. | Welcomes that some Member States (namely Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden) deliver NMDs, but notes that they differ in quality and clarity; |
| --- | --- |

186.

Welcomes that some Member States (namely Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden) deliver NMDs, but notes that they differ in quality and clarity;

| 187. | Considers that as these Member States deliver NMDs, it shows the remaining Member States that it is feasible to do so; |
| --- | --- |

187.

Considers that as these Member States deliver NMDs, it shows the remaining Member States that it is feasible to do so;

| 188. | Notes that the Commission’s proposal on the financial rules applicable to the annual budget of the Union (COM(2010) 815, Article 56) envisages the introduction of management declarations at managerial level; underlines that Parliament considers this proposal to be a step towards NMDs which is the final objective; |
| --- | --- |

188.

Notes that the Commission’s proposal on the financial rules applicable to the annual budget of the Union (COM(2010) 815, Article 56) envisages the introduction of management declarations at managerial level; underlines that Parliament considers this proposal to be a step towards NMDs which is the final objective;

| 189. | Invites the Commission to present a formal proposal for the introduction of mandatory NMDs duly signed by each national finance minister according to the following steps:






  — | an analysis of the quality, completeness, objectivity, relevance and usefulness of existing NMDs including an assessment of the added value of the information given as well as possible shortcomings in them, |
| --- | --- | --- |

189.

Invites the Commission to present a formal proposal for the introduction of mandatory NMDs duly signed by each national finance minister according to the following steps:

—

an analysis of the quality, completeness, objectivity, relevance and usefulness of existing NMDs including an assessment of the added value of the information given as well as possible shortcomings in them,

| — | the drawing up of guidelines on the definition of common key aspects of NMDs ensuring that they will be useful for both the Commission and the Court of Auditors, |
| --- | --- |

—

the drawing up of guidelines on the definition of common key aspects of NMDs ensuring that they will be useful for both the Commission and the Court of Auditors,

| — | the establishment of a roadmap indicating the date at which the Member States shall have completed the main steps in the process of introducing NMDs, as well as the introduction in the Financial Regulation of mandatory NMDs by 1 January 2014, which marks the start of the new Financial Perspectives, |
| --- | --- |

—

the establishment of a roadmap indicating the date at which the Member States shall have completed the main steps in the process of introducing NMDs, as well as the introduction in the Financial Regulation of mandatory NMDs by 1 January 2014, which marks the start of the new Financial Perspectives,

and proposes that the substance of the NMDs should comply with international auditing standards and should assist the audit by the Court of Auditors;

Completion of the Commission’s governance structure

| 190. | Stresses that both the Director-General’s Annual Activity Report as well as the College of Commissioners’ Synthesis Report are important elements to allow the Commission to give account to the discharge authority; |
| --- | --- |

190.

Stresses that both the Director-General’s Annual Activity Report as well as the College of Commissioners’ Synthesis Report are important elements to allow the Commission to give account to the discharge authority;

| 191. | Invites the Commission by analogy with the call for the establishment of NMDs at political level to complete its governance structure by adding the signature of the responsible Commissioner to the Director-General’s Annual Activity Report and by having the Synthesis Report — which also shall include a ‘scoreboard’ on the quality of controls per Member State and policy area — signed by the President of the European Commission; |
| --- | --- |

191.

Invites the Commission by analogy with the call for the establishment of NMDs at political level to complete its governance structure by adding the signature of the responsible Commissioner to the Director-General’s Annual Activity Report and by having the Synthesis Report — which also shall include a ‘scoreboard’ on the quality of controls per Member State and policy area — signed by the President of the European Commission;

| 192. | Notes that in order to complete the Commission’s governance structure it may have to undertake a strengthening of procedures to allow the College to adopt the Synthesis Report and to allow the individual Commissioners’ involvement and participation in the preparation of the Director-General’s Annual Activity Report which includes the following measures applicable for the financial year 2010:






  — | the transmission to Parliament’s competent committee and publication of the minutes from the meeting at which the College adopts the Synthesis Report, |
| --- | --- | --- |

192.

Notes that in order to complete the Commission’s governance structure it may have to undertake a strengthening of procedures to allow the College to adopt the Synthesis Report and to allow the individual Commissioners’ involvement and participation in the preparation of the Director-General’s Annual Activity Report which includes the following measures applicable for the financial year 2010:

—

the transmission to Parliament’s competent committee and publication of the minutes from the meeting at which the College adopts the Synthesis Report,

| — | the transmission to Parliament’s competent committee of the declaration from the Director-General about his meeting with the responsible Commissioner explaining clearly and completely the content of their deliberations on the Annual Activity Reports as well as any reservations; |
| --- | --- |

—

the transmission to Parliament’s competent committee of the declaration from the Director-General about his meeting with the responsible Commissioner explaining clearly and completely the content of their deliberations on the Annual Activity Reports as well as any reservations;

| 193. | Underlines that these measures should in no way dilute the direct responsibility of each Director-General or other authorising officers by delegation; |
| --- | --- |

193.

Underlines that these measures should in no way dilute the direct responsibility of each Director-General or other authorising officers by delegation;

Systematic activation of interruption and suspension of payments as well as lifting of the measure

| 194. | Notes that the total financial corrections confirmed in 2009 for structural actions alone amount to EUR 7 719 000 000 (Annual Accounts of the European Union, financial year 2009, page 112); observes, however, that only EUR 5 387 000 000 (7 719 000 000 - 2 332 000 000) (page 103) was implemented and registered in the accounts; is of the opinion that the gap between the amounts to be corrected and the amounts actually corrected makes it necessary to introduce an automatic suspension, without a decision of the Commission, of payments as soon as evidence suggests a significant deficiency in the functioning of the management and control systems; |
| --- | --- |

194.

Notes that the total financial corrections confirmed in 2009 for structural actions alone amount to EUR 7 719 000 000 (Annual Accounts of the European Union, financial year 2009, page 112); observes, however, that only EUR 5 387 000 000 (7 719 000 000 - 2 332 000 000) (page 103) was implemented and registered in the accounts; is of the opinion that the gap between the amounts to be corrected and the amounts actually corrected makes it necessary to introduce an automatic suspension, without a decision of the Commission, of payments as soon as evidence suggests a significant deficiency in the functioning of the management and control systems;

| 195. | Invites the Commission to introduce a systematic activation of interruptions and suspensions of payments as soon as evidence suggests a significant deficiency in the functioning of the Member States’ management and control systems; |
| --- | --- |

195.

Invites the Commission to introduce a systematic activation of interruptions and suspensions of payments as soon as evidence suggests a significant deficiency in the functioning of the Member States’ management and control systems;

| 196. | Believes that the process leading up to the achievement of systematic interruption and systematic suspension of payments shall include:






  — | the transmission to Parliament’s competent committee of information clearly showing all interruptions and suspensions of payments so far, as well as the reasons for these decisions, |
| --- | --- | --- |

196.

Believes that the process leading up to the achievement of systematic interruption and systematic suspension of payments shall include:

—

the transmission to Parliament’s competent committee of information clearly showing all interruptions and suspensions of payments so far, as well as the reasons for these decisions,

| — | a description of clear, unequivocal criteria applicable for all Directorates-General and leaving no room for interpretation of future interruptions/suspensions of payments as well as lifting interruptions/suspensions of payments whereby a systematic mechanism without prior decision on political level shall be created, |
| --- | --- |

—

a description of clear, unequivocal criteria applicable for all Directorates-General and leaving no room for interpretation of future interruptions/suspensions of payments as well as lifting interruptions/suspensions of payments whereby a systematic mechanism without prior decision on political level shall be created,

| — | the inclusion in the Financial Regulation of the principle of systematic interruption and suspension of payments triggered by evidence of significant deficiencies in the functioning of the Member States’ management and control system and the development of comprehensive guidelines for the Member States in order to help national authorities avoid misunderstandings and irregularities, |
| --- | --- |

—

the inclusion in the Financial Regulation of the principle of systematic interruption and suspension of payments triggered by evidence of significant deficiencies in the functioning of the Member States’ management and control system and the development of comprehensive guidelines for the Member States in order to help national authorities avoid misunderstandings and irregularities,

| — | the transmission by the Commission of a copy of any recovery letter and any letter announcing financial corrections to the national parliament and the national supreme audit institution of the Member State concerned as well as to Parliament’s competent committee; |
| --- | --- |

—

the transmission by the Commission of a copy of any recovery letter and any letter announcing financial corrections to the national parliament and the national supreme audit institution of the Member State concerned as well as to Parliament’s competent committee;

Improvement of corrective mechanisms

| 197. | Insists that the Commission improve the corrective mechanisms ensuring that the financial consequences of incorrectly made payments are borne by the beneficiaries and not the taxpayers; |
| --- | --- |

197.

Insists that the Commission improve the corrective mechanisms ensuring that the financial consequences of incorrectly made payments are borne by the beneficiaries and not the taxpayers;

| 198. | Believes that the process leading up to the achievement of this objective shall also include the presentation to Parliament’s competent committee of the following:






  — | a clear, comprehensive and fully correct list of all financial corrections implemented since 2000, as well as information on whether incorrectly received payments have been recovered or replaced by other projects, in which case a qualitative assessment of these replacement projects shall also be presented, |
| --- | --- | --- |

198.

Believes that the process leading up to the achievement of this objective shall also include the presentation to Parliament’s competent committee of the following:

—

a clear, comprehensive and fully correct list of all financial corrections implemented since 2000, as well as information on whether incorrectly received payments have been recovered or replaced by other projects, in which case a qualitative assessment of these replacement projects shall also be presented,

| — | the measures to be taken following the Court of Auditors’ conclusion that ‘the Commission does not always receive reliable information from Member States’ (Annual Report 2009, point 1.49), with a list of the concerned Member States and the amount of the irregularities as well as with information on the results of the ‘standardised procedure’ (Commission’s reply in Annual Report 2009, point 1.34) introduced for the 2007-13 period, |
| --- | --- |

—

the measures to be taken following the Court of Auditors’ conclusion that ‘the Commission does not always receive reliable information from Member States’ (Annual Report 2009, point 1.49), with a list of the concerned Member States and the amount of the irregularities as well as with information on the results of the ‘standardised procedure’ (Commission’s reply in Annual Report 2009, point 1.34) introduced for the 2007-13 period,

| — | an action plan on how to better integrate and reconcile the Court of Auditors’ findings on annual error rates at the beneficiary level and the Commission’s work on the follow-up of those findings as well as the financial corrections and recoveries made over the whole life-cycle of the different programmes up to the closure procedure and including the identification of payments that may be subject to further verification and clearance of accounts procedures and a better follow-up of the Member States’ recovery efforts; |
| --- | --- |

—

an action plan on how to better integrate and reconcile the Court of Auditors’ findings on annual error rates at the beneficiary level and the Commission’s work on the follow-up of those findings as well as the financial corrections and recoveries made over the whole life-cycle of the different programmes up to the closure procedure and including the identification of payments that may be subject to further verification and clearance of accounts procedures and a better follow-up of the Member States’ recovery efforts;

Performance evaluator

| 199. | Invites the Commission to appoint a ‘performance evaluator’ with responsibility for the preparation of the evaluation report required in accordance with Article 318 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to be endorsed by the College of Commissioners in order to establish a clear ‘ownership’ of this report; |
| --- | --- |

199.

Invites the Commission to appoint a ‘performance evaluator’ with responsibility for the preparation of the evaluation report required in accordance with Article 318 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to be endorsed by the College of Commissioners in order to establish a clear ‘ownership’ of this report;

| 200. | Believes that the evaluation report shall be drawn up so that the relation between the key performance indicators, their legal/political basis, the amount of expenditure and the results achieved is clear and transparent, that the methodology to be used for the production of this report should be audited by the IAS which should also assess the work done, and that the key performance indicators used by all departments in the Commission shall be publicly available; |
| --- | --- |

200.

Believes that the evaluation report shall be drawn up so that the relation between the key performance indicators, their legal/political basis, the amount of expenditure and the results achieved is clear and transparent, that the methodology to be used for the production of this report should be audited by the IAS which should also assess the work done, and that the key performance indicators used by all departments in the Commission shall be publicly available;

| 201. | Is of the opinion that the evaluation report should be presented in Plenary during a debate at which the Court of Auditors will also be invited to present its opinion on the evaluation report; |
| --- | --- |

201.

Is of the opinion that the evaluation report should be presented in Plenary during a debate at which the Court of Auditors will also be invited to present its opinion on the evaluation report;

Introduction of a new spending logic

| 202. | Invites the Commission to introduce a new spending logic aimed at improving the quality of spending and ensuring that funds provided by Union taxpayers are spent both correctly and wisely, and including the following principles:






  — | establishing the Union budget on the basis of an examination of the proposed policies, the ‘delivery’ costs for the bodies involved and the beneficiaries and the objectives which could be achieved with the available funds, |
| --- | --- | --- |

202.

Invites the Commission to introduce a new spending logic aimed at improving the quality of spending and ensuring that funds provided by Union taxpayers are spent both correctly and wisely, and including the following principles:

—

establishing the Union budget on the basis of an examination of the proposed policies, the ‘delivery’ costs for the bodies involved and the beneficiaries and the objectives which could be achieved with the available funds,

| — | ensuring that schemes and programmes are realistic and as simple as possible, |
| --- | --- |

—

ensuring that schemes and programmes are realistic and as simple as possible,

| — | ensuring full and agreed accountability for spending, |
| --- | --- |

—

ensuring full and agreed accountability for spending,

and proposes that the Commission, in cooperation with the Court of Auditors, study a procedure with a view to obtaining an overall statement of assurance for each Financial Perspective and, pending a legal basis to make such a procedure mandatory, that it apply it voluntarily;

Observations from opinion giving committees

Committee on Development

| 203. | Is concerned that the Court of Auditors found the supervisory and control systems for external aid and development to be merely partially effective in ensuring the regularity of payments and that payments were affected by material error; is concerned that errors in some final payments found by the Court of Auditors were not detected by the Commission and that the Commission does not monitor the extent to which the Humanitarian Procurement Centres are used by partners; welcomes the fact that the number of transactions affected by error (13 %) was less than half the number in previous years, however, underlines that efforts need to be made towards a further reduction of this percentage; |
| --- | --- |

203.

Is concerned that the Court of Auditors found the supervisory and control systems for external aid and development to be merely partially effective in ensuring the regularity of payments and that payments were affected by material error; is concerned that errors in some final payments found by the Court of Auditors were not detected by the Commission and that the Commission does not monitor the extent to which the Humanitarian Procurement Centres are used by partners; welcomes the fact that the number of transactions affected by error (13 %) was less than half the number in previous years, however, underlines that efforts need to be made towards a further reduction of this percentage;

| 204. | Notes that ‘weaknesses identified during regular audits of the partners’ systems are not always addressed ... in a timely manner’ (17) by ECHO; accordingly, urges ECHO to bolster its monitoring and follow-up capacity; |
| --- | --- |

204.

Notes that ‘weaknesses identified during regular audits of the partners’ systems are not always addressed ... in a timely manner’ (17) by ECHO; accordingly, urges ECHO to bolster its monitoring and follow-up capacity;

| 205. | Calls on the Commission to integrate environmental aspects more comprehensively into development projects, including budget support programmes, and to evaluate environmental mainstreaming in development cooperation; regrets that these shortcomings may be due to staff shortages and looks forward to progress with the advent of the European External Action Service; |
| --- | --- |

205.

Calls on the Commission to integrate environmental aspects more comprehensively into development projects, including budget support programmes, and to evaluate environmental mainstreaming in development cooperation; regrets that these shortcomings may be due to staff shortages and looks forward to progress with the advent of the European External Action Service;

| 206. | Calls once again for greater involvement of parliaments and consultation of local civil society in partner countries when drawing up and reviewing Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) Country Strategy Papers; |
| --- | --- |

206.

Calls once again for greater involvement of parliaments and consultation of local civil society in partner countries when drawing up and reviewing Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) Country Strategy Papers;

| 207. | Urges the Commission to help partner countries develop parliamentary control and audit capacities and to increase transparency and public access to information, in particular when aid is provided via budget support, in line with the provisions of Article 25(1), point (b), of the DCI Regulation (18), and invites the Commission to report regularly on progress achieved; |
| --- | --- |

207.

Urges the Commission to help partner countries develop parliamentary control and audit capacities and to increase transparency and public access to information, in particular when aid is provided via budget support, in line with the provisions of Article 25(1), point (b), of the DCI Regulation (18), and invites the Commission to report regularly on progress achieved;

| 208. | Calls once again on the Commission to demonstrate that it has spent at least 20 % of development aid on basic and secondary education and basic health, including safe access to water and sanitation; further suggests that impact assessments accounting for this spending should be thoroughly carried out in order to maximise the effectiveness of the programmes undertaken; |
| --- | --- |

208.

Calls once again on the Commission to demonstrate that it has spent at least 20 % of development aid on basic and secondary education and basic health, including safe access to water and sanitation; further suggests that impact assessments accounting for this spending should be thoroughly carried out in order to maximise the effectiveness of the programmes undertaken;

| 209. | Invites the Commission to place greater emphasis on women’s health in developing countries in general, and improving maternal health in particular, as this is the area where the Millennium Development Goals targets are furthest from being met; |
| --- | --- |

209.

Invites the Commission to place greater emphasis on women’s health in developing countries in general, and improving maternal health in particular, as this is the area where the Millennium Development Goals targets are furthest from being met;

| 210. | Highlights that development aid mechanisms should be also aimed at promoting wealth creation and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, since wealth creation remains a crucial tool in alleviating poverty; recalls that an estimated EUR 800 000 000 000 is lost annually from developing countries through illicit capital flows, prevention of which could prove decisive in alleviating poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals; |
| --- | --- |

210.

Highlights that development aid mechanisms should be also aimed at promoting wealth creation and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, since wealth creation remains a crucial tool in alleviating poverty; recalls that an estimated EUR 800 000 000 000 is lost annually from developing countries through illicit capital flows, prevention of which could prove decisive in alleviating poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals;

| 211. | Appreciates that United Nations’ organisations often possess specific experience and expertise not readily found elsewhere; expresses concern, none the less, that the Commission does not convincingly demonstrate beforehand whether the choice of a UN organisation is in fact more efficient and effective than other ways of delivering aid (19); calls on the Commission to implement a more transparent and objective process for selecting aid implementation channels; |
| --- | --- |

211.

Appreciates that United Nations’ organisations often possess specific experience and expertise not readily found elsewhere; expresses concern, none the less, that the Commission does not convincingly demonstrate beforehand whether the choice of a UN organisation is in fact more efficient and effective than other ways of delivering aid (19); calls on the Commission to implement a more transparent and objective process for selecting aid implementation channels;

| 212. | Urges the Commission to ensure better visibility for Union-funded activities overseas; |
| --- | --- |

212.

Urges the Commission to ensure better visibility for Union-funded activities overseas;

Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

| 213. | Notes that the utilisation rate for 2009 payment appropriations under the financial framework 2000-06 for the European Social Fund (ESF) was 97,1 % (EUR 1 540 000 000); notes that interim payments and pre-financing under the financial framework 2007-13 totalled EUR 11 300 000 000; acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to improve financial management; deplores the fact that, despite the financial crisis, the Member States are not using ESF resources; |
| --- | --- |

213.

Notes that the utilisation rate for 2009 payment appropriations under the financial framework 2000-06 for the European Social Fund (ESF) was 97,1 % (EUR 1 540 000 000); notes that interim payments and pre-financing under the financial framework 2007-13 totalled EUR 11 300 000 000; acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to improve financial management; deplores the fact that, despite the financial crisis, the Member States are not using ESF resources;

| 214. | Notes that the error rate has fallen over the last 3 years, from 54 % in 2007 to 36 % in 2009, acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to reduce the error rate; calls for greater efforts to reduce, in particular, instances of the reimbursement of ineligible costs; |
| --- | --- |

214.

Notes that the error rate has fallen over the last 3 years, from 54 % in 2007 to 36 % in 2009, acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to reduce the error rate; calls for greater efforts to reduce, in particular, instances of the reimbursement of ineligible costs;

| 215. | Calls on the Commission to contribute to improved financial management by continuing the action programme to speed up decision-making procedures in respect of financial corrections; |
| --- | --- |

215.

Calls on the Commission to contribute to improved financial management by continuing the action programme to speed up decision-making procedures in respect of financial corrections;

| 216. | Welcomes the fact that the implementation of the ESF programme in 2009 focused on the European Employment Strategy, particularly on measures aimed at improving employability in the labour market (30,6 % (20)) and on activities to develop educational and vocational training (22,8 % (20)), social inclusion (20,8 % (20)) and equal opportunities (6,5 % (20)); |
| --- | --- |

216.

Welcomes the fact that the implementation of the ESF programme in 2009 focused on the European Employment Strategy, particularly on measures aimed at improving employability in the labour market (30,6 % (20)) and on activities to develop educational and vocational training (22,8 % (20)), social inclusion (20,8 % (20)) and equal opportunities (6,5 % (20));

| 217. | Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to hold all the Member States fully to account through annual audit control reports and summary annual reports; |
| --- | --- |

217.

Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to hold all the Member States fully to account through annual audit control reports and summary annual reports;

Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection

| 218. | Underlines the importance of budget lines 17 02 02 (activities in favour of consumers) and 17 01 04 03 (related to administrative management) for effective implementation of each annual work programme under the Consumer Programme 2007-13 and invites the Commission to increase the publicity given to available grants (especially as concerns the joint actions in the framework of the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (21)), where no applications were received); is pleased with the fruitful use of the additional resources (EUR 2 000 000) provided in 2009 for the pilot project concerning monitoring measures in the field of consumer policy; |
| --- | --- |

218.

Underlines the importance of budget lines 17 02 02 (activities in favour of consumers) and 17 01 04 03 (related to administrative management) for effective implementation of each annual work programme under the Consumer Programme 2007-13 and invites the Commission to increase the publicity given to available grants (especially as concerns the joint actions in the framework of the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (21)), where no applications were received); is pleased with the fruitful use of the additional resources (EUR 2 000 000) provided in 2009 for the pilot project concerning monitoring measures in the field of consumer policy;

| 219. | Welcomes the subsequent editions of the Consumer Markets Scoreboard (CMS) as an important tool for improved monitoring and innovative ranking of markets; considers that the empirical base that has been created should be the basis for new policy insights at the Union and national level and asks the Commission to use the results of the CMS in its policy-making in all relevant areas; |
| --- | --- |

219.

Welcomes the subsequent editions of the Consumer Markets Scoreboard (CMS) as an important tool for improved monitoring and innovative ranking of markets; considers that the empirical base that has been created should be the basis for new policy insights at the Union and national level and asks the Commission to use the results of the CMS in its policy-making in all relevant areas;

| 220. | Notes with great interest the transformation of Public Health Executive Agency into the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers (EAHC) and its first year of operation under an extended mandate; congratulates the EAHC on reaching the targets set for the management of grants and contracts under the Consumer Programme (Decision No 1926/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (22)); finds it problematic, none the less, that 3 % of the payments were made after the payment deadline; |
| --- | --- |

220.

Notes with great interest the transformation of Public Health Executive Agency into the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers (EAHC) and its first year of operation under an extended mandate; congratulates the EAHC on reaching the targets set for the management of grants and contracts under the Consumer Programme (Decision No 1926/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (22)); finds it problematic, none the less, that 3 % of the payments were made after the payment deadline;

| 221. | Welcomes the improvements made to reach an execution rate of 92 % for payment credits for the implementation and development of the Internal market (budget line 12 02 01); notes that the execution rate for the SOLVIT programme (budget line 12 02 02) is expected to be close to 92 % taking payments made during 2008, 2009 and 2010 together into account; reiterates the need to maintain a separate budget line for SOLVIT; |
| --- | --- |

221.

Welcomes the improvements made to reach an execution rate of 92 % for payment credits for the implementation and development of the Internal market (budget line 12 02 01); notes that the execution rate for the SOLVIT programme (budget line 12 02 02) is expected to be close to 92 % taking payments made during 2008, 2009 and 2010 together into account; reiterates the need to maintain a separate budget line for SOLVIT;

| 222. | Underlines the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and urges the Commission to analyse the effectiveness of current financing programmes for SMEs and facilitate their participation in Union research programmes through the introduction of innovative financial instruments in the Union budget; |
| --- | --- |

222.

Underlines the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and urges the Commission to analyse the effectiveness of current financing programmes for SMEs and facilitate their participation in Union research programmes through the introduction of innovative financial instruments in the Union budget;

| 223. | Notes the Court of Auditors’ considerations on goods unlawfully introduced into Union territory (in point 2.22 of its Annual Report) and the Commission’s response, indicating the clarification provided by the Modernised Customs Code; asks the Commission to report back as soon as possible on the follow-up given to the relevant judgments of the Court of Justice; |
| --- | --- |

223.

Notes the Court of Auditors’ considerations on goods unlawfully introduced into Union territory (in point 2.22 of its Annual Report) and the Commission’s response, indicating the clarification provided by the Modernised Customs Code; asks the Commission to report back as soon as possible on the follow-up given to the relevant judgments of the Court of Justice;

| 224. | Encourages the Member States to use appropriate risk analysis methods in order to focus customs controls on high risk traders or consignments; moreover, invites the Member States to supplement risk-based checks with a number of randomly selected checks; asks the Commission to pay particular attention when drafting the implementing provisions of the Modernised Customs Code to the performance of physical checks on goods, both for fiscal and safety/security purposes; and asks for improvement of pre/post audit controls in respect of simplified procedures and centralised clearance; |
| --- | --- |

224.

Encourages the Member States to use appropriate risk analysis methods in order to focus customs controls on high risk traders or consignments; moreover, invites the Member States to supplement risk-based checks with a number of randomly selected checks; asks the Commission to pay particular attention when drafting the implementing provisions of the Modernised Customs Code to the performance of physical checks on goods, both for fiscal and safety/security purposes; and asks for improvement of pre/post audit controls in respect of simplified procedures and centralised clearance;

Committee on Transport and Tourism

| 225. | Notes that in the 2009 budget, as finally adopted and amended during the course of the year, specifically for policies within the remit of the Committee on Transport and Tourism, a total of EUR 2 427 000 000 was included in commitment appropriations and EUR 2 103 000 000 was available in payment appropriations; notes further that of these amounts:






  — | EUR 934 582 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 830 594 000 in payment appropriations was available for Trans-European Networks for Transport (TEN-T), |
| --- | --- | --- |

225.

Notes that in the 2009 budget, as finally adopted and amended during the course of the year, specifically for policies within the remit of the Committee on Transport and Tourism, a total of EUR 2 427 000 000 was included in commitment appropriations and EUR 2 103 000 000 was available in payment appropriations; notes further that of these amounts:

—

EUR 934 582 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 830 594 000 in payment appropriations was available for Trans-European Networks for Transport (TEN-T),

| — | EUR 17 600 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 14 500 000 in payment appropriations was available for transport safety, |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 17 600 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 14 500 000 in payment appropriations was available for transport safety,

| — | EUR 64 971 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 29 054 000 in payment appropriations was available for the Marco Polo Programme, |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 64 971 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 29 054 000 in payment appropriations was available for the Marco Polo Programme,

| — | EUR 146 902 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 109 257 000 in payment appropriations was available for the transport agencies and the European GNSS Supervisory Authority, |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 146 902 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 109 257 000 in payment appropriations was available for the transport agencies and the European GNSS Supervisory Authority,

| — | EUR 427 424 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 388 859 000 in payment appropriations was available for transport, including a priority area dedicated to sustainable urban mobility, in the Seventh Framework Programme for research and technological development, |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 427 424 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 388 859 000 in payment appropriations was available for transport, including a priority area dedicated to sustainable urban mobility, in the Seventh Framework Programme for research and technological development,

| — | EUR 2 750 000 in commitment appropriations was available for transport security, |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 2 750 000 in commitment appropriations was available for transport security,

| — | EUR 3 800 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 3 600 000 in payment appropriations was available for tourism; |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 3 800 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 3 600 000 in payment appropriations was available for tourism;

| 226. | Regrets that, in considering the implementation of the budget for the 2009 financial year, the Court of Auditors has again chosen to focus on energy and research policies rather than on transport policy; |
| --- | --- |

226.

Regrets that, in considering the implementation of the budget for the 2009 financial year, the Court of Auditors has again chosen to focus on energy and research policies rather than on transport policy;

| 227. | Welcomes the continuing high utilisation rates of both commitment and payment appropriations for TEN-T projects, both reaching almost 100 %; calls on the Member States to ensure that adequate funding is made available from national budgets to match this Union commitment; recalls that Parliament supported a higher level of Union funding; welcomes the mid-term review of the 2007-13 TEN-T Multi-Annual Programme Project Portfolio published on 27 October 2010, which aims at optimising the use of TEN-T funds and underlines the importance of reliable financial planning of projects; |
| --- | --- |

227.

Welcomes the continuing high utilisation rates of both commitment and payment appropriations for TEN-T projects, both reaching almost 100 %; calls on the Member States to ensure that adequate funding is made available from national budgets to match this Union commitment; recalls that Parliament supported a higher level of Union funding; welcomes the mid-term review of the 2007-13 TEN-T Multi-Annual Programme Project Portfolio published on 27 October 2010, which aims at optimising the use of TEN-T funds and underlines the importance of reliable financial planning of projects;

| 228. | Is concerned that there has, once again, been a low uptake (73 %) of payment appropriations for the safety and optimisation of transport systems and for passengers’ rights; regrets that the 100 % take-up rate of payment appropriations for the Marco Polo II Programme was achieved only because half the appropriations originally allocated to it were reallocated in the course of the year 2009; |
| --- | --- |

228.

Is concerned that there has, once again, been a low uptake (73 %) of payment appropriations for the safety and optimisation of transport systems and for passengers’ rights; regrets that the 100 % take-up rate of payment appropriations for the Marco Polo II Programme was achieved only because half the appropriations originally allocated to it were reallocated in the course of the year 2009;

| 229. | Welcomes the substantial increase in the take-up rate of payment appropriations for the Galileo Programme compared to 2008 and stresses the considerable importance of that programme for the logistics and sustainable transport sectors; |
| --- | --- |

229.

Welcomes the substantial increase in the take-up rate of payment appropriations for the Galileo Programme compared to 2008 and stresses the considerable importance of that programme for the logistics and sustainable transport sectors;

| 230. | Notes the fact that sampling checks on transactions reveal a margin of error most probably between 2 % and 5 %; calls on the Commission to intensify its efforts to further reduce this figure; |
| --- | --- |

230.

Notes the fact that sampling checks on transactions reveal a margin of error most probably between 2 % and 5 %; calls on the Commission to intensify its efforts to further reduce this figure;

| 231. | Notes with satisfaction that the Court of Auditors has taken the view that the annual accounts of the Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency are legal and regular in all significant aspects; welcomes the fact that the Agency succeeded in filling the posts that were still vacant at the end of 2008; |
| --- | --- |

231.

Notes with satisfaction that the Court of Auditors has taken the view that the annual accounts of the Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency are legal and regular in all significant aspects; welcomes the fact that the Agency succeeded in filling the posts that were still vacant at the end of 2008;

| 232. | Stresses that there is an urgent need for regional and transport policies to be transparent through the provision of proper information to taxpayers and budget authorities, and to be more closely coordinated, particularly as regards TEN-T funding, as at present only cursory consideration is given to the potential European added value of projects and consequently funds are not used as effectively as possible to eliminate bottlenecks and problems in connection with border crossings or inadequate connections; |
| --- | --- |

232.

Stresses that there is an urgent need for regional and transport policies to be transparent through the provision of proper information to taxpayers and budget authorities, and to be more closely coordinated, particularly as regards TEN-T funding, as at present only cursory consideration is given to the potential European added value of projects and consequently funds are not used as effectively as possible to eliminate bottlenecks and problems in connection with border crossings or inadequate connections;

| 233. | Insists that the procedures for selecting and approving transport projects under the Cohesion Policy should be more soundly based; |
| --- | --- |

233.

Insists that the procedures for selecting and approving transport projects under the Cohesion Policy should be more soundly based;

| 234. | Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 8/2010 on EU rail infrastructure investments and, above all, its finding that the current TEN-T coordinators played an important role, in particular by facilitating contacts between the stakeholders concerned; supports the recommendation that the Commission should consider appointing further coordinators for the other priority projects; |
| --- | --- |

234.

Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 8/2010 on EU rail infrastructure investments and, above all, its finding that the current TEN-T coordinators played an important role, in particular by facilitating contacts between the stakeholders concerned; supports the recommendation that the Commission should consider appointing further coordinators for the other priority projects;

| 235. | Notes the observation by the Court of Auditors that priority projects were not selected on the basis of actual and anticipated traffic flows and that greater use could be made of cost/benefit analysis; points out, however, that priority projects also satisfy Union economic, social and territorial cohesion objectives and the desire to combat climate change through support for more environment-friendly means of transport; |
| --- | --- |

235.

Notes the observation by the Court of Auditors that priority projects were not selected on the basis of actual and anticipated traffic flows and that greater use could be made of cost/benefit analysis; points out, however, that priority projects also satisfy Union economic, social and territorial cohesion objectives and the desire to combat climate change through support for more environment-friendly means of transport;

Committee on Civil liberties, Justice and Home affairs

| 236. | Welcomes the fact that significant progress has been achieved in the level of implementation of commitments in the budget for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (97,7 % in comparison with 87,5 % in 2008), as well as in the level of implementation of payments (89,6 % in comparison with 80,9 % in 2008); |
| --- | --- |

236.

Welcomes the fact that significant progress has been achieved in the level of implementation of commitments in the budget for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (97,7 % in comparison with 87,5 % in 2008), as well as in the level of implementation of payments (89,6 % in comparison with 80,9 % in 2008);

| 237. | Deplores the fact that the level of cancellations of payments was so high (8,5 %) mainly due to cancellations of payments in the budget for the Agencies and for large scale IT systems (SIS II and VIS); |
| --- | --- |

237.

Deplores the fact that the level of cancellations of payments was so high (8,5 %) mainly due to cancellations of payments in the budget for the Agencies and for large scale IT systems (SIS II and VIS);

| 238. | Welcomes the high implementation rates of the four ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’ funds; notes that the high implementation levels also reflect the utility of those funds and calls for that to be taken into consideration for future budgetary planning and in the discussions of the next Multiannual Financial Framework, in the light of the mid-term evaluation reports prepared by the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

238.

Welcomes the high implementation rates of the four ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’ funds; notes that the high implementation levels also reflect the utility of those funds and calls for that to be taken into consideration for future budgetary planning and in the discussions of the next Multiannual Financial Framework, in the light of the mid-term evaluation reports prepared by the Commission;

| 239. | Regrets that the level of implementation of payments was lower regarding the ‘Fundamental rights and justice’ and ‘Security and safeguarding liberties’ programmes; takes note of the justifications given by the Commission, namely that the results of the calls for proposals were not satisfactory and that the economic crisis made it more difficult for applicants to secure co-financing; |
| --- | --- |

239.

Regrets that the level of implementation of payments was lower regarding the ‘Fundamental rights and justice’ and ‘Security and safeguarding liberties’ programmes; takes note of the justifications given by the Commission, namely that the results of the calls for proposals were not satisfactory and that the economic crisis made it more difficult for applicants to secure co-financing;

| 240. | Deplores the fact that the Court of Auditors pointed out that some agencies have omitted to submit declarations concerning their consolidated accounts or have submitted modified declarations and that the information they are required to provide has been outstanding for several years; |
| --- | --- |

240.

Deplores the fact that the Court of Auditors pointed out that some agencies have omitted to submit declarations concerning their consolidated accounts or have submitted modified declarations and that the information they are required to provide has been outstanding for several years;

| 241. | Calls on the Commission to publish the mid-term evaluation reports on the different funds and programmes as soon as possible; |
| --- | --- |

241.

Calls on the Commission to publish the mid-term evaluation reports on the different funds and programmes as soon as possible;

Committee on Culture and Education

| 242. | Calls on the Commission to continue its efforts to constantly reduce the error rate for closures and to closely evaluate the previous generation of programmes; notes that the error rate in the management of the new generation of programmes shows a downward trend compared to the previous generation, reflecting the usefulness of technical changes inserted into the rules of the current programmes; |
| --- | --- |

242.

Calls on the Commission to continue its efforts to constantly reduce the error rate for closures and to closely evaluate the previous generation of programmes; notes that the error rate in the management of the new generation of programmes shows a downward trend compared to the previous generation, reflecting the usefulness of technical changes inserted into the rules of the current programmes;

| 243. | Notes that, in the ‘Education and Culture’ policy area, the bulk of all transactions are implemented through national agencies; welcomes in this regard the efforts made by the Commission to assist national agencies in improving their accounting systems, and asks the Commission to take the necessary steps in the event of non-compliance with Union auditing requirements; |
| --- | --- |

243.

Notes that, in the ‘Education and Culture’ policy area, the bulk of all transactions are implemented through national agencies; welcomes in this regard the efforts made by the Commission to assist national agencies in improving their accounting systems, and asks the Commission to take the necessary steps in the event of non-compliance with Union auditing requirements;

| 244. | Expresses its satisfaction with the extension of the use of IT tools, as this cuts red tape and can help considerably to facilitate procedures for applicants and reduce the time needed for the processing of applications; |
| --- | --- |

244.

Expresses its satisfaction with the extension of the use of IT tools, as this cuts red tape and can help considerably to facilitate procedures for applicants and reduce the time needed for the processing of applications;

| 245. | Urges the Commission, the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency and national agencies to continue their work on flexible procedures and further reducing payment delays, since beneficiaries are entitled to expect that time schedules indicated in programme guides or other official communications are respected; |
| --- | --- |

245.

Urges the Commission, the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency and national agencies to continue their work on flexible procedures and further reducing payment delays, since beneficiaries are entitled to expect that time schedules indicated in programme guides or other official communications are respected;

Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

| 246. | Considers the overall implementation rates of the budgetary headings for environment, public health and food safety satisfactory; |
| --- | --- |

246.

Considers the overall implementation rates of the budgetary headings for environment, public health and food safety satisfactory;

| 247. | Underlines the overall rate of 97,12 % of the budget execution in the field of environment, which represents a better result compared to 95,15 % in the previous year in commitment appropriations; notes, further, that the implementation of payments was at the high level of 99,92 %; |
| --- | --- |

247.

Underlines the overall rate of 97,12 % of the budget execution in the field of environment, which represents a better result compared to 95,15 % in the previous year in commitment appropriations; notes, further, that the implementation of payments was at the high level of 99,92 %;

| 248. | Welcomes the generally remarkable level of execution of commitment credits and payment credits in the field of Public Health, which, for commitment appropriations on all budget lines, is close to 100 %; |
| --- | --- |

248.

Welcomes the generally remarkable level of execution of commitment credits and payment credits in the field of Public Health, which, for commitment appropriations on all budget lines, is close to 100 %;

| 249. | Notes that the high level of execution in the field of Food Safety, Animal health and welfare and plant health remains stable at 98 % in commitments compared to the previous year; is aware of the slightly decreased payment implementation (82 %); calls on the Member States to strengthen their efforts to submit more accurate estimates to the Commission regarding eradication measures; |
| --- | --- |

249.

Notes that the high level of execution in the field of Food Safety, Animal health and welfare and plant health remains stable at 98 % in commitments compared to the previous year; is aware of the slightly decreased payment implementation (82 %); calls on the Member States to strengthen their efforts to submit more accurate estimates to the Commission regarding eradication measures;

| 250. | Welcomes the achievement of 99,35 % of the implementation of the LIFE + operational budget, especially as the budget authority had increased the commitment appropriations by EUR 29 000 000 compared to the Commission’s initial proposal; notes that, under the third call for the LIFE + programme, 210 projects were selected covering actions in the fields of Nature & Biodiversity (84), Environment Policy & Governance (115), and Information & Communication (11); |
| --- | --- |

250.

Welcomes the achievement of 99,35 % of the implementation of the LIFE + operational budget, especially as the budget authority had increased the commitment appropriations by EUR 29 000 000 compared to the Commission’s initial proposal; notes that, under the third call for the LIFE + programme, 210 projects were selected covering actions in the fields of Nature & Biodiversity (84), Environment Policy & Governance (115), and Information & Communication (11);

| 251. | Underlines the fact that the contribution to international environmental activities, are intended to cover obligatory and voluntary contributions to international conventions, protocols and agreements and to reach the overall implementation rate of 84,46 % compared to 76,12 % in 2008; knows that the implementation rate is also subject to exchange rate variations as most contributions are paid in US dollars; |
| --- | --- |

251.

Underlines the fact that the contribution to international environmental activities, are intended to cover obligatory and voluntary contributions to international conventions, protocols and agreements and to reach the overall implementation rate of 84,46 % compared to 76,12 % in 2008; knows that the implementation rate is also subject to exchange rate variations as most contributions are paid in US dollars;

| 252. | Notes that the Civil Prevention Financial Instrument which covers disaster response, preparedness actions and measures to prevent or reduce the effects of an emergency achieved an implementation rate of 72,56 % corresponding to EUR 15 411 000; consequently remarks that the implementation rate in payment appropriations is 44,52 %, as calls for tender were only published in the first semester of 2009 and thus projects have not yet been completed; |
| --- | --- |

252.

Notes that the Civil Prevention Financial Instrument which covers disaster response, preparedness actions and measures to prevent or reduce the effects of an emergency achieved an implementation rate of 72,56 % corresponding to EUR 15 411 000; consequently remarks that the implementation rate in payment appropriations is 44,52 %, as calls for tender were only published in the first semester of 2009 and thus projects have not yet been completed;

| 253. | Remarks that, with regard to emergency funds and funds related to the occurrence of disasters, the final cost claims submitted for payments by the Member States are often much lower than the initial estimation; calls on the Member States to strengthen their efforts to submit more accurate estimates to the Commission and urges the Commission to develop further assistance to the Member States in the estimation process; |
| --- | --- |

253.

Remarks that, with regard to emergency funds and funds related to the occurrence of disasters, the final cost claims submitted for payments by the Member States are often much lower than the initial estimation; calls on the Member States to strengthen their efforts to submit more accurate estimates to the Commission and urges the Commission to develop further assistance to the Member States in the estimation process;

| 254. | Notes that, under the 2009 budget, three pilot projects and two preparatory actions were implemented in the area of environment and four in the area of public health; takes note of the poor quality of proposals submitted to the pilot project ‘Sulphur dioxide emission trading in the Baltic Sea’ where, as a consequence, no contract was signed; is aware that the preparatory action on control posts in relation to transport of animals was cancelled owing to the poor quality of proposals, which did not meet the minimum evaluation criteria; |
| --- | --- |

254.

Notes that, under the 2009 budget, three pilot projects and two preparatory actions were implemented in the area of environment and four in the area of public health; takes note of the poor quality of proposals submitted to the pilot project ‘Sulphur dioxide emission trading in the Baltic Sea’ where, as a consequence, no contract was signed; is aware that the preparatory action on control posts in relation to transport of animals was cancelled owing to the poor quality of proposals, which did not meet the minimum evaluation criteria;

| 255. | Underlines the importance of better focus in calls for tenders and the provision of further assistance to applicants, especially in public health programmes, in order to avoid the submission of project applications which are clearly not eligible for funding or of poor quality; is none the less aware that some projects will always meet with difficulties in implementation; |
| --- | --- |

255.

Underlines the importance of better focus in calls for tenders and the provision of further assistance to applicants, especially in public health programmes, in order to avoid the submission of project applications which are clearly not eligible for funding or of poor quality; is none the less aware that some projects will always meet with difficulties in implementation;

| 256. | Points out that compliance with administrative and financial provisions of the Financial Regulation should not lead to unnecessary delays in awarding grants or selecting projects to be financed; calls on the Commission to continue its efforts to improve administrative procedures which have an impact on the implementation of commitment and payment appropriations; |
| --- | --- |

256.

Points out that compliance with administrative and financial provisions of the Financial Regulation should not lead to unnecessary delays in awarding grants or selecting projects to be financed; calls on the Commission to continue its efforts to improve administrative procedures which have an impact on the implementation of commitment and payment appropriations;

| 257. | Notes that at the end of 2009, the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers, an administrative entity of the Commission, was managing a portfolio of 361 cost-shared public health programme projects of which 287 were signed agreements, representing a total of Union contribution of EUR 156 000 000; underlines that the administrative budget necessary to implement Union programmes amounted to EUR 6 400 000 for the Executive Agency for the Public Health Programme (PHEA) in total; takes note of the new structured reporting methods to allow better monitoring of the budget execution to avoid carry-overs and to apply strictly the annuality principle of the budget; |
| --- | --- |

257.

Notes that at the end of 2009, the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers, an administrative entity of the Commission, was managing a portfolio of 361 cost-shared public health programme projects of which 287 were signed agreements, representing a total of Union contribution of EUR 156 000 000; underlines that the administrative budget necessary to implement Union programmes amounted to EUR 6 400 000 for the Executive Agency for the Public Health Programme (PHEA) in total; takes note of the new structured reporting methods to allow better monitoring of the budget execution to avoid carry-overs and to apply strictly the annuality principle of the budget;

| 258. | Observes that communication between the agencies and the Institutions, and also between the agencies and the Union public, leaves a certain amount to be desired; encourages all parties concerned at the agencies and in the Institutions to improve mutual communication and work harder at public relations; |
| --- | --- |

258.

Observes that communication between the agencies and the Institutions, and also between the agencies and the Union public, leaves a certain amount to be desired; encourages all parties concerned at the agencies and in the Institutions to improve mutual communication and work harder at public relations;

| 259. | Urges the Commission Health and Consumers DG and Environment DG to annually report to Parliament’s respective committees within the discharge procedure on the efficiency and effectiveness of the projects and programmes implemented; |
| --- | --- |

259.

Urges the Commission Health and Consumers DG and Environment DG to annually report to Parliament’s respective committees within the discharge procedure on the efficiency and effectiveness of the projects and programmes implemented;

Committee on Foreign Affairs

| 260. | Notes that, in the Court of Auditors report on the implementation of the budget for the 2009 financial year, the Court states ‘that the payments for the year ended 31 December 2009 for External aid, Development and Enlargement were affected by material error’ (23); is concerned about the fact that the errors are related to eligibility and irregularities in procurement procedures, which are the areas most vulnerable to mismanagement and fraud (24); |
| --- | --- |

260.

Notes that, in the Court of Auditors report on the implementation of the budget for the 2009 financial year, the Court states ‘that the payments for the year ended 31 December 2009 for External aid, Development and Enlargement were affected by material error’ (23); is concerned about the fact that the errors are related to eligibility and irregularities in procurement procedures, which are the areas most vulnerable to mismanagement and fraud (24);

| 261. | Welcomes, with regard to the regularity of transactions relating to external relations expenditure, the increased frequency of transactions adjudged by the Court of Auditors to be completely regular as compared with the figures for 2008 and 2007; |
| --- | --- |

261.

Welcomes, with regard to the regularity of transactions relating to external relations expenditure, the increased frequency of transactions adjudged by the Court of Auditors to be completely regular as compared with the figures for 2008 and 2007;

| 262. | Also welcomes the introduction, in 2009, of new procedures and checklists that have made it possible to improve ex ante control procedures in RELEX; |
| --- | --- |

262.

Also welcomes the introduction, in 2009, of new procedures and checklists that have made it possible to improve ex ante control procedures in RELEX;

| 263. | Stresses, with regard to the implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), that Parliament should be swiftly informed of the objectives and mission choices established so that it can better formulate its recommendations to the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; |
| --- | --- |

263.

Stresses, with regard to the implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), that Parliament should be swiftly informed of the objectives and mission choices established so that it can better formulate its recommendations to the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;

| 264. | Welcomes the fact that the Commission has spent EUR 396 000 000 between 2007 and 2010 to support candidate countries for accession in their efforts to improve their judicial systems and fight corruption, along with the progress made in this regard; nevertheless cautions against being too optimistic, and asks the Commission to provide evidence that this money has been used effectively and to state whether improved control mechanisms have actually led to harsher sanctions against corrupt actors, including in high-profile cases, whether laws are implemented fully and whether reforms are sustained; |
| --- | --- |

264.

Welcomes the fact that the Commission has spent EUR 396 000 000 between 2007 and 2010 to support candidate countries for accession in their efforts to improve their judicial systems and fight corruption, along with the progress made in this regard; nevertheless cautions against being too optimistic, and asks the Commission to provide evidence that this money has been used effectively and to state whether improved control mechanisms have actually led to harsher sanctions against corrupt actors, including in high-profile cases, whether laws are implemented fully and whether reforms are sustained;

| 265. | Takes note of the increasing use of joint management in the context of the Food Facility and invites ECHO to report on its experience with the implementation of the Food Facility in its Annual Activity Report for 2010; |
| --- | --- |

265.

Takes note of the increasing use of joint management in the context of the Food Facility and invites ECHO to report on its experience with the implementation of the Food Facility in its Annual Activity Report for 2010;

Committee on Regional Development

| 266. | Notes that cohesion funds are subject to particularly complex rules and are implemented differently from other Union spending areas, which makes them more vulnerable to errors; draws attention to the fact that the error rate in cohesion spending remains the highest of all Union payments (greater than 5 % in 2009); highlights, none the less, the major decrease in the error rate in comparison to 2008, and therefore calls for greater simplification and more technical support to enable the Member States and regions to ensure more effective implementation; points out that regional authorities must be given the technical knowledge and skills by the Commission or by the Member States that will enable them to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the resources made available to them; |
| --- | --- |

266.

Notes that cohesion funds are subject to particularly complex rules and are implemented differently from other Union spending areas, which makes them more vulnerable to errors; draws attention to the fact that the error rate in cohesion spending remains the highest of all Union payments (greater than 5 % in 2009); highlights, none the less, the major decrease in the error rate in comparison to 2008, and therefore calls for greater simplification and more technical support to enable the Member States and regions to ensure more effective implementation; points out that regional authorities must be given the technical knowledge and skills by the Commission or by the Member States that will enable them to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the resources made available to them;

| 267. | Notes that infringement of public procurement rules remains one of the most frequent reasons for irregularities, which is partly due to its complexity; recommends the simplification and reduction of public procurement rules in order to reduce the overall incidence of errors; |
| --- | --- |

267.

Notes that infringement of public procurement rules remains one of the most frequent reasons for irregularities, which is partly due to its complexity; recommends the simplification and reduction of public procurement rules in order to reduce the overall incidence of errors;

| 268. | Is concerned that Regional Policy DG states in its declaration of assurance of the Annual Activity Report 2009 that for 38 out of the 79 programmes concerned, Regional Policy DG does not have reasonable assurance on the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions in relation to reimbursements in 2009 of expenditure declared; asks for further details on missing information with regard to reimbursements in 2009; notes that the Member States have an obligation to provide sufficient information in their Annual Activity Reports and asks the Commission to propose a penalty system in case information provided does not allow the Commission to establish legality and regularity; |
| --- | --- |

268.

Is concerned that Regional Policy DG states in its declaration of assurance of the Annual Activity Report 2009 that for 38 out of the 79 programmes concerned, Regional Policy DG does not have reasonable assurance on the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions in relation to reimbursements in 2009 of expenditure declared; asks for further details on missing information with regard to reimbursements in 2009; notes that the Member States have an obligation to provide sufficient information in their Annual Activity Reports and asks the Commission to propose a penalty system in case information provided does not allow the Commission to establish legality and regularity;

| 269. | Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ Opinion No 1/2010 on ‘Improving the financial management of the European Union budget: Risks and challenges’ and draws attention to the partial effectiveness of supervisory and control systems in a number of high-risk areas with regard to the European Economic Recovery Plan, in particular cohesion and rural development; |
| --- | --- |

269.

Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ Opinion No 1/2010 on ‘Improving the financial management of the European Union budget: Risks and challenges’ and draws attention to the partial effectiveness of supervisory and control systems in a number of high-risk areas with regard to the European Economic Recovery Plan, in particular cohesion and rural development;

| 270. | In the context of the revision of the Financial Regulation, stresses the need to clarify rules and management schemes under shared management, and in respect of cohesion policy that this clarification shall be to the maximum extent possible in order to avoid contradictions to the Financial Regulation; notes that governance problems between the Financial Regulation and the cohesion regulations can be avoided by better alignment of eligibility rules across various policies; takes the view, none the less, that simplification, in particular in connection with the revision of the Financial Regulation, needs to ensure stable rules and management schemes in the long term; |
| --- | --- |

270.

In the context of the revision of the Financial Regulation, stresses the need to clarify rules and management schemes under shared management, and in respect of cohesion policy that this clarification shall be to the maximum extent possible in order to avoid contradictions to the Financial Regulation; notes that governance problems between the Financial Regulation and the cohesion regulations can be avoided by better alignment of eligibility rules across various policies; takes the view, none the less, that simplification, in particular in connection with the revision of the Financial Regulation, needs to ensure stable rules and management schemes in the long term;

| 271. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider the advisability of developing the ‘contract of confidence’ principle so as to be able to scale down checks on systems that have proved their worth in combating errors and fraud; |
| --- | --- |

271.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider the advisability of developing the ‘contract of confidence’ principle so as to be able to scale down checks on systems that have proved their worth in combating errors and fraud;

| 272. | Notes that control and auditing systems for INTERREG programmes are partly lacking a uniform approach that is recognised by the auditing bodies of all participating Member States; calls for mutual recognition of a common set of rules and standards among Member States’ authorities involved in auditing and controlling for cross-border programmes; |
| --- | --- |

272.

Notes that control and auditing systems for INTERREG programmes are partly lacking a uniform approach that is recognised by the auditing bodies of all participating Member States; calls for mutual recognition of a common set of rules and standards among Member States’ authorities involved in auditing and controlling for cross-border programmes;

| 273. | Refers, for other observations accompanying its Decision on discharge, which are of a specific nature, to its Resolution of 10 May 2011 on the Court of Auditors’ special reports in the context of the 2009 Commission discharge (25). |
| --- | --- |

273.

Refers, for other observations accompanying its Decision on discharge, which are of a specific nature, to its Resolution of 10 May 2011 on the Court of Auditors’ special reports in the context of the 2009 Commission discharge (25).

---

(1)  OJ L 69, 13.3.2009.

(2)  OJ C 308, 12.11.2010, p. 1.

(3)  OJ C 303, 9.11.2010, p. 1.

(4)  OJ C 308, 12.11.2010, p. 129.

(5)  OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1.

(6)  OJ L 390, 30.12.2006, p. 1.

(7)  OJ L 343, 27.12.2007, p. 9.

(8)  OJ L 11, 16.1.2003, p. 1.

(9)  Ecofin Council conclusions on the budget guidelines for 2011 adopted on 16 March 2010, doc 6794/10, 24 February 2010, page 9.

(10)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2010)0401.

(11)  For example paragraphs 23 and 24 of the European Parliament Resolution of 24 April 2007 with comments forming an integral part of the Decision on discharge for implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2005, Section III – Commission (OJ L 187, 15.7.2008, p. 25).

(12)  OJ L 340, 6.12.2006, p. 5.

(13)  Judgment of 9 November 2010 in Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker and Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, not yet published in the ECR.

(14)  OJ L 134, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

(15)  OJ L 134, 30.4.2004, p. 114.

(16)  OJ L 210, 31.7.2006, p. 25.

(17)  Court of Auditors’ annual report on the implementation of the 2009 budget, p. 144, paragraph 6.42.

(18)  Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (OJ L 378, 27.12.2006, p. 41).

(19)  Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 15/2009 on ‘EU assistance implemented through United Nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring’.

(20)  Of certified expenditure.

(21)  OJ L 364, 9.12.2004, p. 1.

(22)  OJ L 404, 30.12.2006, p. 39.

(23)  OJ C 303, 9.11.2010, p. 146.

(24)  OJ C 303, 9.11.2010, p. 140.

(25)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0195 (see page 63 of this Official Journal).

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RESOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

of 10 May 2011

on the Court of Auditors’ special reports in the context of the 2009 Commission discharge

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,

| — | having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009 (1),

| — | having regard to the annual accounts of the European Union for the financial year 2009 (SEC(2010) 963– C7-0211/2010) (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the annual accounts of the European Union for the financial year 2009 (SEC(2010) 963– C7-0211/2010) (2),

| — | having regard to the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors on the implementation of the budget concerning the financial year 2009, together with the institutions’ replies (3), and to the Court of Auditors’ special reports, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors on the implementation of the budget concerning the financial year 2009, together with the institutions’ replies (3), and to the Court of Auditors’ special reports,

| — | having regard to the statement of assurance as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of assurance as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (4),

| — | having regard to its Decision of 10 May 2011 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009, Section III – Commission (5) and to its resolution with observations that forms an integral part of that Decision, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its Decision of 10 May 2011 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009, Section III – Commission (5) and to its resolution with observations that forms an integral part of that Decision,

| — | having regard to the special reports of the Court of Auditors drawn up pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the special reports of the Court of Auditors drawn up pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 15 February 2011 on discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2009 (05891/2011 – C7-0053/2011), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 15 February 2011 on discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2009 (05891/2011 – C7-0053/2011),

| — | having regard to Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 179a and 180b of the Euratom Treaty, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Articles 179a and 180b of the Euratom Treaty,

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (6), and in particular Articles 145, 146 and 147 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (6), and in particular Articles 145, 146 and 147 thereof,

| — | having regard to Rule 76 of and Annex VI to its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 76 of and Annex VI to its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinions of the other committees concerned (A7-0135/2011), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinions of the other committees concerned (A7-0135/2011),

| A. | whereas, pursuant to Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Commission shall execute the budget and manage programmes and shall do so, pursuant to Article 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in cooperation with the Member States on its own responsibility, having regard to the principle of sound financial management, |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas, pursuant to Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Commission shall execute the budget and manage programmes and shall do so, pursuant to Article 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in cooperation with the Member States on its own responsibility, having regard to the principle of sound financial management,

| B. | whereas the special reports of the Court of Auditors provide information on issues of concern related to the implementation of funds, which are thus useful for Parliament in exercising its role of discharge authority, |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the special reports of the Court of Auditors provide information on issues of concern related to the implementation of funds, which are thus useful for Parliament in exercising its role of discharge authority,

| C. | whereas its remarks on the special reports of the Court of Auditors form an integral part of Parliament’s Decision of 10 May 2011 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009, Section III – Commission, |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas its remarks on the special reports of the Court of Auditors form an integral part of Parliament’s Decision of 10 May 2011 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009, Section III – Commission,

GENERAL REMARKS

| 1. | Welcomes the fact that the Court of Auditors has managed to produce, every year, more and better special reports; regrets the fact that, unfortunately, they do not always get the political attention they deserve because of the rules applicable in Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Welcomes the fact that the Court of Auditors has managed to produce, every year, more and better special reports; regrets the fact that, unfortunately, they do not always get the political attention they deserve because of the rules applicable in Parliament;

| 2. | Points out that those special reports are of great importance when reflecting on and changing and/or adapting programmes and projects because they can result in a more efficient use of human and budgetary resources; appreciates the positive attitude of the Commission to those processes and its willingness to take prompt action to remedy most of the shortcomings noted by the Court of Auditors in those reports; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Points out that those special reports are of great importance when reflecting on and changing and/or adapting programmes and projects because they can result in a more efficient use of human and budgetary resources; appreciates the positive attitude of the Commission to those processes and its willingness to take prompt action to remedy most of the shortcomings noted by the Court of Auditors in those reports;

| 3. | Calls once more on its competent bodies to adapt the rules in such a way that the competent committee can decide — based on the gravity of the findings of the Court of Auditors — whether there is a need to draw up an initiative report for plenary outside the quota set for own initiative reports; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Calls once more on its competent bodies to adapt the rules in such a way that the competent committee can decide — based on the gravity of the findings of the Court of Auditors — whether there is a need to draw up an initiative report for plenary outside the quota set for own initiative reports;

SPECIFIC REMARKS

Part I:   Special Report No 15/2009 of the Court of Auditors entitled ‘EU assistance implemented through United Nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring’

| 4. | Notes that Union development funds channelled through UN bodies doubled to over EUR 1 billion between 2002 and 2008; |
| --- | --- |

4.

Notes that Union development funds channelled through UN bodies doubled to over EUR 1 billion between 2002 and 2008;

| 5. | Appreciates that working through UN bodies can generate economies of scale, as well as more effective aid as a result of better donor coordination, yet points out that this is not necessarily always the case, as civil society organisations often bring valuable local field knowledge and their involvement can lead to greater ownership by developing-country partners; |
| --- | --- |

5.

Appreciates that working through UN bodies can generate economies of scale, as well as more effective aid as a result of better donor coordination, yet points out that this is not necessarily always the case, as civil society organisations often bring valuable local field knowledge and their involvement can lead to greater ownership by developing-country partners;

| 6. | Is concerned by the Court of Auditors’ finding that there are difficulties translating the strict legal requirements for the objective and transparent selection of partners into practical criteria for the purpose of supporting decision-making; |
| --- | --- |

6.

Is concerned by the Court of Auditors’ finding that there are difficulties translating the strict legal requirements for the objective and transparent selection of partners into practical criteria for the purpose of supporting decision-making;

| 7. | Calls, accordingly, on the Commission to draw up clear selection criteria and processes which guarantee the choice of the most efficient and effective aid delivery mechanisms in every case; |
| --- | --- |

7.

Calls, accordingly, on the Commission to draw up clear selection criteria and processes which guarantee the choice of the most efficient and effective aid delivery mechanisms in every case;

| 8. | Calls on the Commission to monitor more thoroughly UN-implemented aid projects to ascertain their actual impact and cost-effectiveness; |
| --- | --- |

8.

Calls on the Commission to monitor more thoroughly UN-implemented aid projects to ascertain their actual impact and cost-effectiveness;

| 9. | Takes the view that the Commission’s proposal on multi-donor trust funds should combine the Commission’s capacities to create, manage and coordinate such funds with sufficient democratic and budgetary scrutiny; |
| --- | --- |

9.

Takes the view that the Commission’s proposal on multi-donor trust funds should combine the Commission’s capacities to create, manage and coordinate such funds with sufficient democratic and budgetary scrutiny;

| 10. | Believes that cooperation with the UN system should depend on satisfactory progress as regards the UN reform process, the status of the Commission in the UN system and the development of procedures and practices as regards prosecution of criminal acts committed by staff in international organisations; further believes that a system for fact-finding and recovery of unduly spent Union money needs to be established; |
| --- | --- |

10.

Believes that cooperation with the UN system should depend on satisfactory progress as regards the UN reform process, the status of the Commission in the UN system and the development of procedures and practices as regards prosecution of criminal acts committed by staff in international organisations; further believes that a system for fact-finding and recovery of unduly spent Union money needs to be established;

| 11. | Sees the need to complete the existing control framework by giving the Commission’s competent authorising officers by delegation, the Commission’s Internal Audit Service and the Court of Auditors, access to UN internal audit reports; |
| --- | --- |

11.

Sees the need to complete the existing control framework by giving the Commission’s competent authorising officers by delegation, the Commission’s Internal Audit Service and the Court of Auditors, access to UN internal audit reports;

| 12. | Believes that Parliament should be provided with assurance evidence in the form of a statement of assurance from the international organisation similar to the statement that Commission’s competent authorising officers by delegation are required to issue and similar to the national management declarations which Parliament requests from the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

12.

Believes that Parliament should be provided with assurance evidence in the form of a statement of assurance from the international organisation similar to the statement that Commission’s competent authorising officers by delegation are required to issue and similar to the national management declarations which Parliament requests from the Member States;

| 13. | Takes the view that the creation of the European External Action Service and its complicated structure, which permits its officials to administer the Commission’s funds in external actions, makes management and control problems even more pressing; believes, accordingly, that it is essential for the Union to attain an equal footing with the Member States in the UN in order to achieve visible progress in the control of and, as the case may be, to follow-up recoveries or other liabilities; |
| --- | --- |

13.

Takes the view that the creation of the European External Action Service and its complicated structure, which permits its officials to administer the Commission’s funds in external actions, makes management and control problems even more pressing; believes, accordingly, that it is essential for the Union to attain an equal footing with the Member States in the UN in order to achieve visible progress in the control of and, as the case may be, to follow-up recoveries or other liabilities;

| 14. | Urges the Commission to increase the amount of information on the implementation of the EDF at national and regional level in the ACP countries and to ensure better visibility for all Union-funded activities overseas; |
| --- | --- |

14.

Urges the Commission to increase the amount of information on the implementation of the EDF at national and regional level in the ACP countries and to ensure better visibility for all Union-funded activities overseas;

Part II:   Special Report No 17/2009 of the Court of Auditors entitled ‘Vocational training actions for women co-financed by the European Social Fund’

| 15. | Reminds the Court of Auditors and the Commission that, pursuant to Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the promotion of equality between men and women is a fundamental principle of the European Union in all its activities; therefore, gender aspects must be taken into consideration at all steps of the budgetary procedure including the preparation, implementation and auditing of the budget of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

15.

Reminds the Court of Auditors and the Commission that, pursuant to Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the promotion of equality between men and women is a fundamental principle of the European Union in all its activities; therefore, gender aspects must be taken into consideration at all steps of the budgetary procedure including the preparation, implementation and auditing of the budget of the European Union;

| 16. | Reminds the Court of Auditors and the Commission of the findings and the recommendations of the feasibility study on gender budgeting; |
| --- | --- |

16.

Reminds the Court of Auditors and the Commission of the findings and the recommendations of the feasibility study on gender budgeting;

| 17. | Welcomes the report based on evaluations carried out at Commission level and in five Member States (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom), accounting in total for 76 % of expenditure, dealing with vocational training actions for women co-financed by the European Social Fund during the 2000-06 programming period; notes, however, that the report revealed a number of weaknesses in the establishment of measures and selection of projects audited by the Court of Auditors; and notes shortcomings with regard to the performance monitoring of the programmes; |
| --- | --- |

17.

Welcomes the report based on evaluations carried out at Commission level and in five Member States (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom), accounting in total for 76 % of expenditure, dealing with vocational training actions for women co-financed by the European Social Fund during the 2000-06 programming period; notes, however, that the report revealed a number of weaknesses in the establishment of measures and selection of projects audited by the Court of Auditors; and notes shortcomings with regard to the performance monitoring of the programmes;

| 18. | Notes that the training actions contained within the programmes that were audited were not established as a direct response to the analyses of labour market requirements and the measures established tended to leave a broad choice on how actions were to be implemented, failing to focus sufficiently on specific target groups; regrets that the Court of Auditors did not take into account the wider issues surrounding getting women back into work, or improving their skills; |
| --- | --- |

18.

Notes that the training actions contained within the programmes that were audited were not established as a direct response to the analyses of labour market requirements and the measures established tended to leave a broad choice on how actions were to be implemented, failing to focus sufficiently on specific target groups; regrets that the Court of Auditors did not take into account the wider issues surrounding getting women back into work, or improving their skills;

| 19. | Understands that future operational programmes need to take into account an analysis of the labour market so that training activities can respond to the findings of this analysis; however, remains of the opinion that training for women needs to enhance their skills, whilst taking into account the specific needs of women, such as child-care and flexible working arrangements; furthermore, supports the view that an effective project selection procedure be put in place to approve projects which tackle inequality and respond to problems highlighted in the analysis; |
| --- | --- |

19.

Understands that future operational programmes need to take into account an analysis of the labour market so that training activities can respond to the findings of this analysis; however, remains of the opinion that training for women needs to enhance their skills, whilst taking into account the specific needs of women, such as child-care and flexible working arrangements; furthermore, supports the view that an effective project selection procedure be put in place to approve projects which tackle inequality and respond to problems highlighted in the analysis;

| 20. | Notes that, in using current indicators, project selection criteria in the Member States audited did not take sufficient account of analyses of the labour market nor ensure that the projects that were selected were in line with overall programme objectives; recommends that, in future, indicators be more focussed on gender equality, that clear targets be established and that reliability of information be improved to ensure that evaluations can be carried out effectively by the implementing authorities, the Member States and the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

20.

Notes that, in using current indicators, project selection criteria in the Member States audited did not take sufficient account of analyses of the labour market nor ensure that the projects that were selected were in line with overall programme objectives; recommends that, in future, indicators be more focussed on gender equality, that clear targets be established and that reliability of information be improved to ensure that evaluations can be carried out effectively by the implementing authorities, the Member States and the Commission;

| 21. | Asks the Commission to continue to verify the establishment by the Member States of appropriate and feasible indicators in order to ensure that reliable data is collected, thereby allowing meaningful conclusions to be drawn on the efficiency and effectiveness of co-financed actions; asks to be regularly informed of progress achieved, ensuring that the obligations on project sponsors do not become too burdensome; |
| --- | --- |

21.

Asks the Commission to continue to verify the establishment by the Member States of appropriate and feasible indicators in order to ensure that reliable data is collected, thereby allowing meaningful conclusions to be drawn on the efficiency and effectiveness of co-financed actions; asks to be regularly informed of progress achieved, ensuring that the obligations on project sponsors do not become too burdensome;

| 22. | Calls on the Court of Auditors to take account of the Commission’s note in the Annual Report on the implementation of the budget, regarding budget headings 4 and 13, stating that they are wider in scope and include, inter alia, gender equality policy; |
| --- | --- |

22.

Calls on the Court of Auditors to take account of the Commission’s note in the Annual Report on the implementation of the budget, regarding budget headings 4 and 13, stating that they are wider in scope and include, inter alia, gender equality policy;

| 23. | In view of the continuing gender pay gap in Europe, calls on the Commission to continue to promote vocational training actions specifically for women, in order for them to gain or improve the skills needed to remedy this distortion; |
| --- | --- |

23.

In view of the continuing gender pay gap in Europe, calls on the Commission to continue to promote vocational training actions specifically for women, in order for them to gain or improve the skills needed to remedy this distortion;

| 24. | Regrets the Court of Auditors’ observations in the Annual Report concerning undue payments in the implementation of the Daphne II project; urges the Commission to follow up the situation and ensure proper implementation of the Daphne programme in the future; |
| --- | --- |

24.

Regrets the Court of Auditors’ observations in the Annual Report concerning undue payments in the implementation of the Daphne II project; urges the Commission to follow up the situation and ensure proper implementation of the Daphne programme in the future;

| 25. | Reiterates its demand to the Commission and the Court of Auditors that the information on gender mainstreaming policies and gender-specific data be included in the budget discharge report; |
| --- | --- |

25.

Reiterates its demand to the Commission and the Court of Auditors that the information on gender mainstreaming policies and gender-specific data be included in the budget discharge report;

Part III:   Special Report No 1/2010 of the Court of Auditors entitled ‘Are simplified customs procedures for imports effectively controlled?’

| 26. | Welcomes the publication of the report by the Court of Auditors and the thorough analysis carried out by the Court; |
| --- | --- |

26.

Welcomes the publication of the report by the Court of Auditors and the thorough analysis carried out by the Court;

| 27. | Appreciates the key role of simplified customs import procedures for economic operators with regard to trade facilitation, but regrets that such procedures have led to unjustified levels of losses to the Union budget and breaches in Union trade policy; |
| --- | --- |

27.

Appreciates the key role of simplified customs import procedures for economic operators with regard to trade facilitation, but regrets that such procedures have led to unjustified levels of losses to the Union budget and breaches in Union trade policy;

| 28. | Welcomes the improved regulatory framework for simplified procedures for imports, introduced from the beginning of 2009 and expects the Commission to complete its guidelines for ex post audits without any further delay and at the latest by the end of 2011; |
| --- | --- |

28.

Welcomes the improved regulatory framework for simplified procedures for imports, introduced from the beginning of 2009 and expects the Commission to complete its guidelines for ex post audits without any further delay and at the latest by the end of 2011;

| 29. | Invites the Member States to implement this framework rapidly and calls on the Commission to monitor progress thoroughly; |
| --- | --- |

29.

Invites the Member States to implement this framework rapidly and calls on the Commission to monitor progress thoroughly;

| 30. | Finds the lack of effective controls, which the report revealed, for simplified procedures in respect of imports in the Member States to be unacceptable, and calls on the Commission to further investigate the effectiveness of controls for simplified procedures in the Member States, and in particular to investigate progress in the conduct by the Member States of ex post audits (for example, the frequency, methodology, use of risk analysis and organisation thereof), and to present the results of such an investigation to Parliament by the end of 2011 in respect of at least half of the Member States and by the end of 2012 in respect of the remainder of the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

30.

Finds the lack of effective controls, which the report revealed, for simplified procedures in respect of imports in the Member States to be unacceptable, and calls on the Commission to further investigate the effectiveness of controls for simplified procedures in the Member States, and in particular to investigate progress in the conduct by the Member States of ex post audits (for example, the frequency, methodology, use of risk analysis and organisation thereof), and to present the results of such an investigation to Parliament by the end of 2011 in respect of at least half of the Member States and by the end of 2012 in respect of the remainder of the Member States;

| 31. | Is of the opinion that the Member States should put more effort into ensuring the effective collection of customs duties, particularly given that they retain 25 % of those duties by way of compensation for the costs of collecting them; |
| --- | --- |

31.

Is of the opinion that the Member States should put more effort into ensuring the effective collection of customs duties, particularly given that they retain 25 % of those duties by way of compensation for the costs of collecting them;

| 32. | Requests the Court of Auditors to consider a follow-up to this special report after the introduction of the guidelines for ex post audits and calls on the Commission to provide Parliament with estimates of losses in Traditional Own Resources as a result of the current ineffective controls for simplified procedures in the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

32.

Requests the Court of Auditors to consider a follow-up to this special report after the introduction of the guidelines for ex post audits and calls on the Commission to provide Parliament with estimates of losses in Traditional Own Resources as a result of the current ineffective controls for simplified procedures in the Member States;

| 33. | Calls on the Commission to analyse the Dutch idea for pre-authorisation audits, which, although not generally followed in the Netherlands, were found by the Court of Auditors to fully correspond to the Court’s control model, and to recommend the use of that model in other Member States and to inform Parliament on progress made by September 2011; |
| --- | --- |

33.

Calls on the Commission to analyse the Dutch idea for pre-authorisation audits, which, although not generally followed in the Netherlands, were found by the Court of Auditors to fully correspond to the Court’s control model, and to recommend the use of that model in other Member States and to inform Parliament on progress made by September 2011;

| 34. | Urges the Commission to investigate in more detail the issue of abuse of ‘super-simplifications’ (notification waivers) and to provide Parliament with detailed figures on the frequency of super-simplifications per Member State by the end of the discharge procedure for 2009; calls on the Commission to define in more detail the special circumstances under which traders may benefit from the notification waivers; |
| --- | --- |

34.

Urges the Commission to investigate in more detail the issue of abuse of ‘super-simplifications’ (notification waivers) and to provide Parliament with detailed figures on the frequency of super-simplifications per Member State by the end of the discharge procedure for 2009; calls on the Commission to define in more detail the special circumstances under which traders may benefit from the notification waivers;

| 35. | Calls on the Commission to examine by February 2011 the cases of Belgium, France, Ireland, Sweden and United Kingdom, where traders were unable to provide the requested customs documentation in the framework of ex post audits, and to inform Parliament of actions taken by those Member States in order to remedy the situation before the end of the discharge procedure for 2009; |
| --- | --- |

35.

Calls on the Commission to examine by February 2011 the cases of Belgium, France, Ireland, Sweden and United Kingdom, where traders were unable to provide the requested customs documentation in the framework of ex post audits, and to inform Parliament of actions taken by those Member States in order to remedy the situation before the end of the discharge procedure for 2009;

| 36. | Regrets the lack of a coherent Union policy of sanctions to be imposed by Member States on traders who act in breach of the rules on the simplified procedures introduced for them to facilitate economic operations; calls on the Commission to inform Parliament as to the steps taken to remedy this situation; |
| --- | --- |

36.

Regrets the lack of a coherent Union policy of sanctions to be imposed by Member States on traders who act in breach of the rules on the simplified procedures introduced for them to facilitate economic operations; calls on the Commission to inform Parliament as to the steps taken to remedy this situation;

| 37. | Calls on the Member States to make economic operators aware of their responsibilities when using the simplified procedures, which may include compulsory training; |
| --- | --- |

37.

Calls on the Member States to make economic operators aware of their responsibilities when using the simplified procedures, which may include compulsory training;

Part IV:   Special Report No 2/2010 of the Court of Auditors entitled ‘The effectiveness of the Design Studies and Construction of New Infrastructures support schemes under the Sixth Framework Programme for Research’

| 38. | Notes the increasing competition that the Union faces from traditional competitors and emerging countries in the field of research, development and innovation; notes, accordingly, that research and specifically new research infrastructure, is essential for the Union to achieve the objectives set out in the ‘EU 2020’ strategy: a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; |
| --- | --- |

38.

Notes the increasing competition that the Union faces from traditional competitors and emerging countries in the field of research, development and innovation; notes, accordingly, that research and specifically new research infrastructure, is essential for the Union to achieve the objectives set out in the ‘EU 2020’ strategy: a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth;

| 39. | Emphasises that the Commission should carefully consider all elements in order to get the best value for money; notes, however, that there is no explicit evidence provided by this special report or in the reply of the Commission which could lead to the conclusion that the Commission did indeed get the best value for money; |
| --- | --- |

39.

Emphasises that the Commission should carefully consider all elements in order to get the best value for money; notes, however, that there is no explicit evidence provided by this special report or in the reply of the Commission which could lead to the conclusion that the Commission did indeed get the best value for money;

| 40. | Emphasises the importance of the conclusion of the Commission analysis carried out in 2000 that there is a lack of critical mass in technological development related to infrastructures; notes that neither from this special report nor from the reply of the Commission can it be concluded that the characteristics and the number of projects financed (28 in total) have achieved this critical mass; calls, accordingly, on the Commission to further clarify in this particular case the objective of reaching a critical mass and the way it was promoted; |
| --- | --- |

40.

Emphasises the importance of the conclusion of the Commission analysis carried out in 2000 that there is a lack of critical mass in technological development related to infrastructures; notes that neither from this special report nor from the reply of the Commission can it be concluded that the characteristics and the number of projects financed (28 in total) have achieved this critical mass; calls, accordingly, on the Commission to further clarify in this particular case the objective of reaching a critical mass and the way it was promoted;

| 41. | Notes that, as concerns design studies, it is not apparent that the Court of Auditors, when interviewing the beneficiaries, the representatives of research organisations, the representatives of the research community and the representatives of the Member States and Associated States, took into consideration the fact that these parties are by nature positively pre-disposed to the implemented studies; in addition, encourages the Court of Auditors to use complementary evidence in order to better examine the effectiveness of the projects in question; |
| --- | --- |

41.

Notes that, as concerns design studies, it is not apparent that the Court of Auditors, when interviewing the beneficiaries, the representatives of research organisations, the representatives of the research community and the representatives of the Member States and Associated States, took into consideration the fact that these parties are by nature positively pre-disposed to the implemented studies; in addition, encourages the Court of Auditors to use complementary evidence in order to better examine the effectiveness of the projects in question;

| 42. | Notes that according to the reply of the Commission, the ‘EU funding under the CNI scheme was not meant to trigger any decision to build new infrastructure but rather to enhance the European dimension’; notes, however, that there is an insufficient definition of the terms ‘European dimension’ and ‘European added value’ (7) and specifically how these are measured and in which way the funds spent for these projects correspond to the terms ‘European dimension’ and ‘European added value’; calls, accordingly, on the Commission to clarify these terms further, in a specific and measurable manner; |
| --- | --- |

42.

Notes that according to the reply of the Commission, the ‘EU funding under the CNI scheme was not meant to trigger any decision to build new infrastructure but rather to enhance the European dimension’; notes, however, that there is an insufficient definition of the terms ‘European dimension’ and ‘European added value’ (7) and specifically how these are measured and in which way the funds spent for these projects correspond to the terms ‘European dimension’ and ‘European added value’; calls, accordingly, on the Commission to clarify these terms further, in a specific and measurable manner;

| 43. | Agrees with the Court of Auditors and the Commission that the benefits of using complementary funding sources should be made clear to potential applicants and further promoted by the Commission and the Member States’ authorities, even if significant progress has been made under FP7; |
| --- | --- |

43.

Agrees with the Court of Auditors and the Commission that the benefits of using complementary funding sources should be made clear to potential applicants and further promoted by the Commission and the Member States’ authorities, even if significant progress has been made under FP7;

| 44. | Notes that using complementary funding sources is a crucial factor in the establishment of new research infrastructures in the years to come; |
| --- | --- |

44.

Notes that using complementary funding sources is a crucial factor in the establishment of new research infrastructures in the years to come;

| 45. | Notes that there is a need for practical steps to be taken by the Commission to adequately administer the complementarity aspect, by carrying out, inter alia, checks for double financing or ineligible co-financing; |
| --- | --- |

45.

Notes that there is a need for practical steps to be taken by the Commission to adequately administer the complementarity aspect, by carrying out, inter alia, checks for double financing or ineligible co-financing;

| 46. | Recalls that the Commission published, in 2008, a Practical Guide to EU funding opportunities for Research and Innovation and invited the Member States to improve the arrangements for a coordinated use of funding; |
| --- | --- |

46.

Recalls that the Commission published, in 2008, a Practical Guide to EU funding opportunities for Research and Innovation and invited the Member States to improve the arrangements for a coordinated use of funding;

| 47. | Requests the Court of Auditors to conduct, from the accounts and budgetary perspective, an evaluation of Union-funded security research and development, including FP6, PASR and FP7, following the recommendation of the study of Parliament’s Policy Department C) ‘Review of security measures in the research framework programme’ of October 2010; |
| --- | --- |

47.

Requests the Court of Auditors to conduct, from the accounts and budgetary perspective, an evaluation of Union-funded security research and development, including FP6, PASR and FP7, following the recommendation of the study of Parliament’s Policy Department C) ‘Review of security measures in the research framework programme’ of October 2010;

Part V:   Special Report No 3/2010 of the Court of Auditors entitled ‘Impact Assessments in the EU institutions: do they support decision-making?’

| 48. | Welcomes the report of the Court of Auditors, and endorses the Court of Auditor’s observations and conclusions; |
| --- | --- |

48.

Welcomes the report of the Court of Auditors, and endorses the Court of Auditor’s observations and conclusions;

| 49. | Welcomes the good start and commends the on-going improvements of the Commission’s Impact Assessment (IA) system, in particular, the constant updating of the Commission’s IA guidelines and strengthening of the role of the Impact Assessment Board (IAB); |
| --- | --- |

49.

Welcomes the good start and commends the on-going improvements of the Commission’s Impact Assessment (IA) system, in particular, the constant updating of the Commission’s IA guidelines and strengthening of the role of the Impact Assessment Board (IAB);

| 50. | Notes with satisfaction that, according to the Court of Auditors’ findings, the IA procedures have become an integral part of the policy development process and have contributed towards improving the Commission’s legislative proposals; |
| --- | --- |

50.

Notes with satisfaction that, according to the Court of Auditors’ findings, the IA procedures have become an integral part of the policy development process and have contributed towards improving the Commission’s legislative proposals;

| 51. | Encourages the Commission to establish measures aimed at enhancing the transparency of the IA planning process; believes that the Commission should not only explain the reasons why an IA is needed, but also make public the reasons behind any decisions not to carry out an IA (in particular in cases when its IAB has identified the need to carry out an IA); |
| --- | --- |

51.

Encourages the Commission to establish measures aimed at enhancing the transparency of the IA planning process; believes that the Commission should not only explain the reasons why an IA is needed, but also make public the reasons behind any decisions not to carry out an IA (in particular in cases when its IAB has identified the need to carry out an IA);

| 52. | Is of the opinion, as stated in the second interim report on legislative activities and interinstitutional relations by the Working Party on Parliamentary Reform of 21 May 2008, that the IAs should cover all legislative initiatives, including simplification and comitology measures; invites all the parties involved to redefine the scope of the IAs during the next interinstitutional talks, in particular taking into account the recent changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon; |
| --- | --- |

52.

Is of the opinion, as stated in the second interim report on legislative activities and interinstitutional relations by the Working Party on Parliamentary Reform of 21 May 2008, that the IAs should cover all legislative initiatives, including simplification and comitology measures; invites all the parties involved to redefine the scope of the IAs during the next interinstitutional talks, in particular taking into account the recent changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon;

| 53. | Urges the Commission to involve stakeholders, not only in the preparatory work of the IAs, but also to consult the interested parties on draft IA reports, and, following the approach taken by some OECD countries, to make draft IAs public; |
| --- | --- |

53.

Urges the Commission to involve stakeholders, not only in the preparatory work of the IAs, but also to consult the interested parties on draft IA reports, and, following the approach taken by some OECD countries, to make draft IAs public;

| 54. | Encourages the Commission to improve the planning of the IA process in order to provide sufficient time for IAB scrutiny; |
| --- | --- |

54.

Encourages the Commission to improve the planning of the IA process in order to provide sufficient time for IAB scrutiny;

| 55. | Is of the opinion that presenting and discussing the IAs should be an integral part of Parliament’s legislative work and encourages its committees to invite the Commission’s representatives to participate in this more often; |
| --- | --- |

55.

Is of the opinion that presenting and discussing the IAs should be an integral part of Parliament’s legislative work and encourages its committees to invite the Commission’s representatives to participate in this more often;

| 56. | Draws the Commission’s attention to the critical comments on the lengthy and technical nature of the IAs, as well as on the complexity of language used; believes that improvement in those areas would enhance the usefulness of the IAs for legislators, stakeholders and the public; |
| --- | --- |

56.

Draws the Commission’s attention to the critical comments on the lengthy and technical nature of the IAs, as well as on the complexity of language used; believes that improvement in those areas would enhance the usefulness of the IAs for legislators, stakeholders and the public;

| 57. | Notes, however, that the independence of IAs as they are currently carried out is questionable due to the fact that the members of the Commission’s Impact Assessment Board (IAB), which is responsible for the Commission’s IAs, are appointed by, and subject to the instructions of, the Commission President; |
| --- | --- |

57.

Notes, however, that the independence of IAs as they are currently carried out is questionable due to the fact that the members of the Commission’s Impact Assessment Board (IAB), which is responsible for the Commission’s IAs, are appointed by, and subject to the instructions of, the Commission President;

| 58. | Further notes that the same problem occurs as regards the Commission’s ex post evaluations which are of only limited value as support to Parliament in its supervision of the Commission’s implementation of the budget; |
| --- | --- |

58.

Further notes that the same problem occurs as regards the Commission’s ex post evaluations which are of only limited value as support to Parliament in its supervision of the Commission’s implementation of the budget;

| 59. | Stresses that IAs should not take place only before the adoption of a legislative text (ex ante) but should also be carried out after its adoption (ex post); points out that this is necessary in order to evaluate more accurately whether the objectives of a law have actually been achieved and whether a legal act should be amended or retained; |
| --- | --- |

59.

Stresses that IAs should not take place only before the adoption of a legislative text (ex ante) but should also be carried out after its adoption (ex post); points out that this is necessary in order to evaluate more accurately whether the objectives of a law have actually been achieved and whether a legal act should be amended or retained;

| 60. | Is convinced that IAs and evaluations carried out on behalf of Parliament would enhance the general public’s insight into and knowledge of the value of the policies of the Union, and play a role in creating public participation and debate; |
| --- | --- |

60.

Is convinced that IAs and evaluations carried out on behalf of Parliament would enhance the general public’s insight into and knowledge of the value of the policies of the Union, and play a role in creating public participation and debate;

| 61. | Underlines that the Commission’s right of initiative limits Parliament’s role and believes strongly that independent, free and unrestricted IAs and evaluations would give Members of the European Parliament a bigger say on future developments of European policies; |
| --- | --- |

61.

Underlines that the Commission’s right of initiative limits Parliament’s role and believes strongly that independent, free and unrestricted IAs and evaluations would give Members of the European Parliament a bigger say on future developments of European policies;

Part VI:   Special Report No 4/2010 of the Court of Auditors entitled ‘Is the design and management of the mobility scheme of the Leonardo da Vinci Programme likely to lead to effective results?’

| 62. | Welcomes the report of the Court of Auditors and the sound assessment of the design and management of the mobility scheme of the Leonardo da Vinci programme contained therein; |
| --- | --- |

62.

Welcomes the report of the Court of Auditors and the sound assessment of the design and management of the mobility scheme of the Leonardo da Vinci programme contained therein;

| 63. | Notes with satisfaction the Court of Auditors’ overall conclusion that the design and management of the mobility scheme of the Leonardo da Vinci programme could lead to effective results; |
| --- | --- |

63.

Notes with satisfaction the Court of Auditors’ overall conclusion that the design and management of the mobility scheme of the Leonardo da Vinci programme could lead to effective results;

| 64. | In spite of being fully aware of the complexity of the task of developing suitable indicators for the many objectives set for the programme, and recognising the recent progress in that respect, is concerned by the Court of Auditors’ finding of a lack of a comprehensive system for the measurement of the impact of the programme, and of the Commission’s inability to assess how the objectives are being met 3 years into the programme, which period represents approximately half of its life span; |
| --- | --- |

64.

In spite of being fully aware of the complexity of the task of developing suitable indicators for the many objectives set for the programme, and recognising the recent progress in that respect, is concerned by the Court of Auditors’ finding of a lack of a comprehensive system for the measurement of the impact of the programme, and of the Commission’s inability to assess how the objectives are being met 3 years into the programme, which period represents approximately half of its life span;

| 65. | Calls on the Commission to inform Parliament of the progress in establishing a new user-friendly and effective partner-search tool which would address applicants’ difficulties in finding host partners in other countries; |
| --- | --- |

65.

Calls on the Commission to inform Parliament of the progress in establishing a new user-friendly and effective partner-search tool which would address applicants’ difficulties in finding host partners in other countries;

| 66. | Calls on the Commission to ensure correct assessment of applications by further developing the assessment handbook for evaluators and by integrating, into its quality and impact monitoring visits to participating countries assessment checks of applications, should the analysis of the added value of such checks prove positive; |
| --- | --- |

66.

Calls on the Commission to ensure correct assessment of applications by further developing the assessment handbook for evaluators and by integrating, into its quality and impact monitoring visits to participating countries assessment checks of applications, should the analysis of the added value of such checks prove positive;

| 67. | Calls on the Commission to establish a comprehensive system for the measurement of the impact of the programme and to improve the system for reporting on the results and effects of the programme and, in particular, to finalise the LLPLink software application for reporting on impact measurement without further delay, and to keep Parliament informed of progress in that respect; |
| --- | --- |

67.

Calls on the Commission to establish a comprehensive system for the measurement of the impact of the programme and to improve the system for reporting on the results and effects of the programme and, in particular, to finalise the LLPLink software application for reporting on impact measurement without further delay, and to keep Parliament informed of progress in that respect;

| 68. | Calls on the Commission to address the weaknesses of controls identified in the Court of Auditors’ special report; |
| --- | --- |

68.

Calls on the Commission to address the weaknesses of controls identified in the Court of Auditors’ special report;

Part VII:   Special Report No 5/2010 of the Court of Auditors entitled ‘Implementation of the Leader approach for rural development’

| 69. | Notes that, as the Court of Auditors points out, there are a number of areas where significant improvements can be made to ensure the added value that is key to the Leader approach; finds it very regrettable that 10 years after the Court of Auditor’s previous audit of the Leader approach, the same serious weaknesses persist; |
| --- | --- |

69.

Notes that, as the Court of Auditors points out, there are a number of areas where significant improvements can be made to ensure the added value that is key to the Leader approach; finds it very regrettable that 10 years after the Court of Auditor’s previous audit of the Leader approach, the same serious weaknesses persist;

| 70. | Supports recommendations 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Court of Auditors; |
| --- | --- |

70.

Supports recommendations 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Court of Auditors;

| 71. | Agrees with recommendation 1 that funding for projects that have been completed should not be granted but considers that this should not prevent Leader from funding the expansion of existing projects; accordingly, welcomes the Commission’s intention to present proposals that would enable the expansion of projects where a new application for funding has been presented for subsequent phases; |
| --- | --- |

71.

Agrees with recommendation 1 that funding for projects that have been completed should not be granted but considers that this should not prevent Leader from funding the expansion of existing projects; accordingly, welcomes the Commission’s intention to present proposals that would enable the expansion of projects where a new application for funding has been presented for subsequent phases;

| 72. | Notes in recommendation 2 that members of the local action groups (LAGs) should ‘be absent from any discussion, assessment or decision’ where they have any ‘personal, political, professional or business interest in a project proposal’; notes, in addition, that the Financial Regulation prohibits actions that may result in a conflict of interest; invites the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the Financial Regulation is fully applied by members of the LAGs’ project assessment and decision-making committees; agrees that a written declaration of interest should always be made where relevant and that declarations of interest should be published in the minutes of the meeting; |
| --- | --- |

72.

Notes in recommendation 2 that members of the local action groups (LAGs) should ‘be absent from any discussion, assessment or decision’ where they have any ‘personal, political, professional or business interest in a project proposal’; notes, in addition, that the Financial Regulation prohibits actions that may result in a conflict of interest; invites the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the Financial Regulation is fully applied by members of the LAGs’ project assessment and decision-making committees; agrees that a written declaration of interest should always be made where relevant and that declarations of interest should be published in the minutes of the meeting;

| 73. | Calls on the Commission to ensure a clear definition of the notion of ‘interest in a project’ and takes the view that detailed minutes of all decision-making meetings should become the norm, to allay concerns about unfairness in project selection and to reinforce transparency and neutrality in decision-making; |
| --- | --- |

73.

Calls on the Commission to ensure a clear definition of the notion of ‘interest in a project’ and takes the view that detailed minutes of all decision-making meetings should become the norm, to allay concerns about unfairness in project selection and to reinforce transparency and neutrality in decision-making;

| 74. | Believes that, to ensure the ‘value-added’ element of Leader, the Commission should further encourage LAGs to undertake outreach work to identify local actors that are able to develop more strategic projects in areas, such as currently happens in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) and Ireland; |
| --- | --- |

74.

Believes that, to ensure the ‘value-added’ element of Leader, the Commission should further encourage LAGs to undertake outreach work to identify local actors that are able to develop more strategic projects in areas, such as currently happens in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) and Ireland;

| 75. | Calls on the Commission to introduce, without delay, measures that increase the transparency of project selection, using the examples of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) and Pays de la Loire (France) and believes that a system under which LAGs publish minutes of project selection meetings on their websites should be introduced; |
| --- | --- |

75.

Calls on the Commission to introduce, without delay, measures that increase the transparency of project selection, using the examples of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) and Pays de la Loire (France) and believes that a system under which LAGs publish minutes of project selection meetings on their websites should be introduced;

Part VIII:   Special Report No 6/2010 of the Court of Auditors entitled ‘Has the reform of the sugar market achieved its main objectives?’

| 76. | Notes that, in general terms, the 2006 reform of the Union sugar market was successful and achieved the objectives of increasing competitiveness and bridging the price gap between the internal Union and world market; |
| --- | --- |

76.

Notes that, in general terms, the 2006 reform of the Union sugar market was successful and achieved the objectives of increasing competitiveness and bridging the price gap between the internal Union and world market;

| 77. | Notes that the Court of Auditors has reservations concerning the measurement of competitiveness based solely on regions; emphasises that the Commission did not have the opportunity to examine the actual competitiveness of individual growers and factories; is concerned that, if, accordingly, the competitiveness in a region is based not on its real potential but on the distortion of the market owing to relatively high quotas in some regions based on political criteria, the new situation created by the reform does not guarantee the optimum in terms of the real competitive potential of these regions; |
| --- | --- |

77.

Notes that the Court of Auditors has reservations concerning the measurement of competitiveness based solely on regions; emphasises that the Commission did not have the opportunity to examine the actual competitiveness of individual growers and factories; is concerned that, if, accordingly, the competitiveness in a region is based not on its real potential but on the distortion of the market owing to relatively high quotas in some regions based on political criteria, the new situation created by the reform does not guarantee the optimum in terms of the real competitive potential of these regions;

| 78. | Agrees with the Court of Auditors that data on the productivity and efficiency of sugar producers could be very useful for the purpose of assessing the implementation of the reform; accordingly, asks the Commission why it did not require such data as a prerequisite for receiving financial assistance; |
| --- | --- |

78.

Agrees with the Court of Auditors that data on the productivity and efficiency of sugar producers could be very useful for the purpose of assessing the implementation of the reform; accordingly, asks the Commission why it did not require such data as a prerequisite for receiving financial assistance;

| 79. | Asks the Commission why the big sugar producers who have renounced their quotas by accepting compensation from the restructuring fund as a financial incentive to leave the sector were not asked to provide information on the way that they used that compensation; notes, in addition, the importance of collecting and handling such information in order to promote a more effective and efficient organisation of the Common Agricultural Policy in the future; |
| --- | --- |

79.

Asks the Commission why the big sugar producers who have renounced their quotas by accepting compensation from the restructuring fund as a financial incentive to leave the sector were not asked to provide information on the way that they used that compensation; notes, in addition, the importance of collecting and handling such information in order to promote a more effective and efficient organisation of the Common Agricultural Policy in the future;

| 80. | Recalls that sugar factories occupy an important place in agricultural policy and their presence locally is a prerequisite for beet production, although this does not apply to traditional sugar cane refiners given that sugar cane is produced outside the Union; accordingly, asks the Commission what public good was served by the transitional aid paid to the sugar cane industry; |
| --- | --- |

80.

Recalls that sugar factories occupy an important place in agricultural policy and their presence locally is a prerequisite for beet production, although this does not apply to traditional sugar cane refiners given that sugar cane is produced outside the Union; accordingly, asks the Commission what public good was served by the transitional aid paid to the sugar cane industry;

| 81. | Emphasises, as far as the additional isoglucose quota is concerned, that its industrial production is not connected with the local availability of maize and other raw materials and that, as the Commission mentions, the price of maize and other raw materials used for processing isoglucose remains unaffected; notes, accordingly, that the demand and the pattern of isoglucose consumption are fundamentally different from sugar consumption; agrees, as a result, with the Court of Auditors that ‘the logic of including those additional quotas free of charge in the subsequent quota reductions is far from clear’ (8) and asks the Commission what public good was served in the case of the free allowances which were given to isoglucose producers; |
| --- | --- |

81.

Emphasises, as far as the additional isoglucose quota is concerned, that its industrial production is not connected with the local availability of maize and other raw materials and that, as the Commission mentions, the price of maize and other raw materials used for processing isoglucose remains unaffected; notes, accordingly, that the demand and the pattern of isoglucose consumption are fundamentally different from sugar consumption; agrees, as a result, with the Court of Auditors that ‘the logic of including those additional quotas free of charge in the subsequent quota reductions is far from clear’ (8) and asks the Commission what public good was served in the case of the free allowances which were given to isoglucose producers;

| 82. | Calls on the Commission to examine whether funds provided for the restructuring scheme were used for relocation of some Union factories to third countries that receive preferential treatment from the Union, given that subsidising productivity outside Europe was not one of the objectives of the sugar reform; |
| --- | --- |

82.

Calls on the Commission to examine whether funds provided for the restructuring scheme were used for relocation of some Union factories to third countries that receive preferential treatment from the Union, given that subsidising productivity outside Europe was not one of the objectives of the sugar reform;

| 83. | Draws the Commission’s attention to the fact that the benefits of the increase in industrial concentration in the sector are combined with no or limited transfer of price reductions to consumers; queries, accordingly, whether the Commission took any measures or initiatives during, or within the context of, the sugar reform in order to ensure that reductions in the price of bulk sugar would be passed on to the final consumer; |
| --- | --- |

83.

Draws the Commission’s attention to the fact that the benefits of the increase in industrial concentration in the sector are combined with no or limited transfer of price reductions to consumers; queries, accordingly, whether the Commission took any measures or initiatives during, or within the context of, the sugar reform in order to ensure that reductions in the price of bulk sugar would be passed on to the final consumer;

| 84. | Notes that, according to the Court of Auditors’ special report, there are ‘very wide variations ranging from a net surplus of EUR 390 per tonne renounced compared to the net closure costs to a net deficit of EUR 226 per tonne’ (9) and wonders whether the reform could have been designed in a way which could have minimised these variations; |
| --- | --- |

84.

Notes that, according to the Court of Auditors’ special report, there are ‘very wide variations ranging from a net surplus of EUR 390 per tonne renounced compared to the net closure costs to a net deficit of EUR 226 per tonne’ (9) and wonders whether the reform could have been designed in a way which could have minimised these variations;

| 85. | Agrees with the Court of Auditors that ‘there is no comprehensive data on the impact of quota renunciations on the local economies, on how many jobs were lost or alternative employment of the staff previously employed at the factories which were dismantled’ (10) and considers these data very useful in order to have an overall picture of the reform on the regions concerned; notes, accordingly, that when funds from the Union flow towards a beneficiary, a reverse flow of transparent information on the way these funds were used, which is in no way contradictory to the Member States’ competencies, can be expected, based on the European taxpayer’s right to know; |
| --- | --- |

85.

Agrees with the Court of Auditors that ‘there is no comprehensive data on the impact of quota renunciations on the local economies, on how many jobs were lost or alternative employment of the staff previously employed at the factories which were dismantled’ (10) and considers these data very useful in order to have an overall picture of the reform on the regions concerned; notes, accordingly, that when funds from the Union flow towards a beneficiary, a reverse flow of transparent information on the way these funds were used, which is in no way contradictory to the Member States’ competencies, can be expected, based on the European taxpayer’s right to know;

| 86. | Agrees with the Court of Auditors that the Member States which decided to grant aid for diversification should have established national restructuring programmes detailing the diversification measures to be undertaken in the regions concerned and should have informed the Commission about these programmes; calls, accordingly, on the Commission to give an indication of the impact of the diversification aid on the regions affected; |
| --- | --- |

86.

Agrees with the Court of Auditors that the Member States which decided to grant aid for diversification should have established national restructuring programmes detailing the diversification measures to be undertaken in the regions concerned and should have informed the Commission about these programmes; calls, accordingly, on the Commission to give an indication of the impact of the diversification aid on the regions affected;

| 87. | Agrees with the Court of Auditors that the Commission should propose a series of measures ‘to remove the rigidities and constraints in the current quota system which affect adversely the competitiveness of growers and producers’ (11); |
| --- | --- |

87.

Agrees with the Court of Auditors that the Commission should propose a series of measures ‘to remove the rigidities and constraints in the current quota system which affect adversely the competitiveness of growers and producers’ (11);

| 88. | Is unable, with regard to the Court of Auditors’ remark that the Union has become more dependent on imports, to pass judgment on the Commission’s reply that, in general terms, ‘the level of self-supply within quota maintained after the reform (around 85 %) can be considered satisfactory’ (12), taking into account the opening of the Union market to third countries; notes that the discussion on availability of supply is not well-documented or substantiated, Parliament had no access to any studies regarding the optimum level of sugar availability or possible scenarios demonstrating the consequences of its unavailability and the possible reactions (and the relevant costs) in case of a major disruption of the world sugar market; |
| --- | --- |

88.

Is unable, with regard to the Court of Auditors’ remark that the Union has become more dependent on imports, to pass judgment on the Commission’s reply that, in general terms, ‘the level of self-supply within quota maintained after the reform (around 85 %) can be considered satisfactory’ (12), taking into account the opening of the Union market to third countries; notes that the discussion on availability of supply is not well-documented or substantiated, Parliament had no access to any studies regarding the optimum level of sugar availability or possible scenarios demonstrating the consequences of its unavailability and the possible reactions (and the relevant costs) in case of a major disruption of the world sugar market;

Part IX:   Special Report No 8/2010 of the Court of Auditors entitled ‘Improving transport performance on Trans-European rail axes: Have EU rail infrastructure investments been effective?’

| 89. | Welcomes the publication of the well-prepared and constructive report by the Court of Auditors and the thorough analysis carried out by the Court; |
| --- | --- |

89.

Welcomes the publication of the well-prepared and constructive report by the Court of Auditors and the thorough analysis carried out by the Court;

| 90. | Is of the opinion that improvements in the definition of the Priority Projects could further enhance the coordination and concentration of Union financial resources; calls on the Commission to determine the definition of Priority Projects according to demonstrable needs in terms of existing and anticipated rail services; |
| --- | --- |

90.

Is of the opinion that improvements in the definition of the Priority Projects could further enhance the coordination and concentration of Union financial resources; calls on the Commission to determine the definition of Priority Projects according to demonstrable needs in terms of existing and anticipated rail services;

| 91. | Calls on the Commission to take necessary action in order to adapt the rail infrastructure to cater for trans-European services while creating missing links at cross-border locations, removing bottlenecks on important junctions and replacing or upgrading the old rail infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

91.

Calls on the Commission to take necessary action in order to adapt the rail infrastructure to cater for trans-European services while creating missing links at cross-border locations, removing bottlenecks on important junctions and replacing or upgrading the old rail infrastructure;

| 92. | Welcomes the Commission’s effort to make progress at European level with the legislation adopted; is of the opinion that the Commission should further improve cooperation with the Member States in order for legislative measures regarding rail safety and passenger rights, market opening and interoperability at the Union level to be successfully transposed into national legislation; |
| --- | --- |

92.

Welcomes the Commission’s effort to make progress at European level with the legislation adopted; is of the opinion that the Commission should further improve cooperation with the Member States in order for legislative measures regarding rail safety and passenger rights, market opening and interoperability at the Union level to be successfully transposed into national legislation;

| 93. | Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to continue investing significant resources which contribute to the improvement of project preparation; |
| --- | --- |

93.

Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to continue investing significant resources which contribute to the improvement of project preparation;

| 94. | Urges the Commission to consult external rail infrastructure experts in order to better evaluate the technical aspects of proposed projects prior to their approval under the Cohesion Fund; |
| --- | --- |

94.

Urges the Commission to consult external rail infrastructure experts in order to better evaluate the technical aspects of proposed projects prior to their approval under the Cohesion Fund;

| 95. | Stresses the need to promote better preparation of projects in order to reduce the risk of cost escalations of future projects influenced by unforeseeable factors, such as unexpectedly difficult geographical conditions, and environmental protection requirements; |
| --- | --- |

95.

Stresses the need to promote better preparation of projects in order to reduce the risk of cost escalations of future projects influenced by unforeseeable factors, such as unexpectedly difficult geographical conditions, and environmental protection requirements;

| 96. | Notes that there are sometimes delays before infrastructure becomes available for use; asks the Commission to cooperate more closely with the Member States in order to make the necessary improvements in future planning; |
| --- | --- |

96.

Notes that there are sometimes delays before infrastructure becomes available for use; asks the Commission to cooperate more closely with the Member States in order to make the necessary improvements in future planning;

| 97. | Welcomes effective performance on sections dedicated to high-speed passenger services, which is found to be in line with expectations; |
| --- | --- |

97.

Welcomes effective performance on sections dedicated to high-speed passenger services, which is found to be in line with expectations;

| 98. | Notes that the Court of Auditors observed various complications, including differences in gauge, traction energy, train control (signalling) systems, train length and operational rules; asks the Commission to better assist the Member States in making progress to alleviate such complications which would facilitate improvements in developing trans-European transport links; points out that the Union needs to play an important role in promoting the interoperability of national networks along with efficient financial support; |
| --- | --- |

98.

Notes that the Court of Auditors observed various complications, including differences in gauge, traction energy, train control (signalling) systems, train length and operational rules; asks the Commission to better assist the Member States in making progress to alleviate such complications which would facilitate improvements in developing trans-European transport links; points out that the Union needs to play an important role in promoting the interoperability of national networks along with efficient financial support;

| 99. | Notes that the appointment of European coordinators has considerably improved the implementation of TEN-T projects by concentrating investments and facilitating development of Priority Projects; calls on the Commission to maintain the role currently played by the coordinators and to evaluate the possibility of appointing more coordinators in the sections of Priority Projects that face significant complications; |
| --- | --- |

99.

Notes that the appointment of European coordinators has considerably improved the implementation of TEN-T projects by concentrating investments and facilitating development of Priority Projects; calls on the Commission to maintain the role currently played by the coordinators and to evaluate the possibility of appointing more coordinators in the sections of Priority Projects that face significant complications;

| 100. | Is of the opinion that the responsibilities of the TEN-T Executive Agency need to be extended in terms of an increase of effective control and the evaluation procedure in respect of the co-financing of Priority Projects; |
| --- | --- |

100.

Is of the opinion that the responsibilities of the TEN-T Executive Agency need to be extended in terms of an increase of effective control and the evaluation procedure in respect of the co-financing of Priority Projects;

| 101. | Notes that while the concentration of TEN-T co-financing at cross-border locations has improved since 2006, much remains to be achieved, including the elimination of the bottlenecks and the filling-in of missing links; |
| --- | --- |

101.

Notes that while the concentration of TEN-T co-financing at cross-border locations has improved since 2006, much remains to be achieved, including the elimination of the bottlenecks and the filling-in of missing links;

| 102. | Emphasises that all the remaining problems and issues need to be evaluated while preparing for the review of the TEN-T guidelines; |
| --- | --- |

102.

Emphasises that all the remaining problems and issues need to be evaluated while preparing for the review of the TEN-T guidelines;

| 103. | Calls on the Commission to review TEN-T policy in order to meet future challenges related to the climate change objectives, further economic growth, and social and economic cohesion; |
| --- | --- |

103.

Calls on the Commission to review TEN-T policy in order to meet future challenges related to the climate change objectives, further economic growth, and social and economic cohesion;

Part X:   Special Report No 9/2010 of the Court of Auditors entitled ‘Is EU Structural Measures spending on the supply of water for domestic consumption used to best effect?’

| 104. | Stresses that water and especially drinking water is a strategic natural resource which, like other natural resources, is under increasing pressure in the 21st century from the continuous growth in demand and, accordingly, it is Parliament’s task and duty to pay particular attention to the protection, prudent and rational use of water, in order to secure good water quality and sufficient drinking water supply for the growing population and future generations; |
| --- | --- |

104.

Stresses that water and especially drinking water is a strategic natural resource which, like other natural resources, is under increasing pressure in the 21st century from the continuous growth in demand and, accordingly, it is Parliament’s task and duty to pay particular attention to the protection, prudent and rational use of water, in order to secure good water quality and sufficient drinking water supply for the growing population and future generations;

| 105. | Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ constructive recommendations and invites the Member States to pay greater attention to integrated water management, which serves both environmental and economic interests, while preparing their programmes and projects for Union co-financing and to aim for maximising the added value of Union intervention; |
| --- | --- |

105.

Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ constructive recommendations and invites the Member States to pay greater attention to integrated water management, which serves both environmental and economic interests, while preparing their programmes and projects for Union co-financing and to aim for maximising the added value of Union intervention;

| 106. | Underlines the need for more rigorous examination of projects at the application stage in order to prevent shortcomings; accordingly, invites the Commission to further improve the use of guidance and checklists by providing clearer criteria for assessing the grant applications in order to enhance the effectiveness and consistency of the procedures and their results, as well as to ensure proper follow-up action in cases of non-provision of required information or action; |
| --- | --- |

106.

Underlines the need for more rigorous examination of projects at the application stage in order to prevent shortcomings; accordingly, invites the Commission to further improve the use of guidance and checklists by providing clearer criteria for assessing the grant applications in order to enhance the effectiveness and consistency of the procedures and their results, as well as to ensure proper follow-up action in cases of non-provision of required information or action;

| 107. | Is shocked by the Court of Auditors’ finding that although some projects were completed several years before the audit took place, they were not in operation because of a lack of complementary infrastructure; accordingly, urges the Member States to strive for better planning of projects in order to prevent expensive infrastructures, such as those in the water supply sector, from not functioning as a result of missing links in the network; |
| --- | --- |

107.

Is shocked by the Court of Auditors’ finding that although some projects were completed several years before the audit took place, they were not in operation because of a lack of complementary infrastructure; accordingly, urges the Member States to strive for better planning of projects in order to prevent expensive infrastructures, such as those in the water supply sector, from not functioning as a result of missing links in the network;

| 108. | Also invites the Member States to ensure better planning by making comprehensive needs assessments and to ensure, as far as possible, that investments are efficient and economic by considering the potential to recover costs from users and to increase the efficiency of the water use in order to protect water resources, but also by aiming to increase the efficiency of water use and reducing losses; |
| --- | --- |

108.

Also invites the Member States to ensure better planning by making comprehensive needs assessments and to ensure, as far as possible, that investments are efficient and economic by considering the potential to recover costs from users and to increase the efficiency of the water use in order to protect water resources, but also by aiming to increase the efficiency of water use and reducing losses;

| 109. | Asks the Member States to guarantee better coordination and to involve more stakeholders in project planning in order to avoid situations such as those where investments aimed at increasing the capacity of water supply are made in a municipality without taking into consideration reduced consumption resulting from other investments in the same municipality, or where investments are made in a supra-municipal supply system without the commitment of municipalities to use it; |
| --- | --- |

109.

Asks the Member States to guarantee better coordination and to involve more stakeholders in project planning in order to avoid situations such as those where investments aimed at increasing the capacity of water supply are made in a municipality without taking into consideration reduced consumption resulting from other investments in the same municipality, or where investments are made in a supra-municipal supply system without the commitment of municipalities to use it;

Part XI:   Special Report No 10/2010 of the Court of Auditors entitled ‘Specific measures for agriculture in favour of the outermost regions of the Union and the smaller Aegean islands’

| 110. | Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ report and the Commission’s replies; |
| --- | --- |

110.

Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ report and the Commission’s replies;

| 111. | Endorses the Court of Auditors’ recommendation 1; acknowledges, with reference to Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 247/2006 of 30 January 2006 laying down specific measures for agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union (13), that the subsidiarity principle applies in connection with the drafting of programmes consistent with the guidelines laid down by the Commission; recognises the need for the right measures to be taken at national level in accordance with the guidelines laid down; welcomes the Commission’s role in determining whether programmes are consistent with Union law and in providing coordination with national authorities during the programming phase, a role which also encompasses the guidelines made available to the Member States; emphasises, in particular, the importance of developing cooperation between the Commission and the Member States with a view to improving control indicators and efficiency; |
| --- | --- |

111.

Endorses the Court of Auditors’ recommendation 1; acknowledges, with reference to Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 247/2006 of 30 January 2006 laying down specific measures for agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union (13), that the subsidiarity principle applies in connection with the drafting of programmes consistent with the guidelines laid down by the Commission; recognises the need for the right measures to be taken at national level in accordance with the guidelines laid down; welcomes the Commission’s role in determining whether programmes are consistent with Union law and in providing coordination with national authorities during the programming phase, a role which also encompasses the guidelines made available to the Member States; emphasises, in particular, the importance of developing cooperation between the Commission and the Member States with a view to improving control indicators and efficiency;

| 112. | Endorses the Court of Auditors’ recommendation 2; welcomes the amendment of the relevant article of Regulation (EC) No 247/2006, as proposed by the Commission, with a view to facilitating the Member States’ annual review process; |
| --- | --- |

112.

Endorses the Court of Auditors’ recommendation 2; welcomes the amendment of the relevant article of Regulation (EC) No 247/2006, as proposed by the Commission, with a view to facilitating the Member States’ annual review process;

| 113. | Endorses the Court of Auditors’ recommendation 3; acknowledges that the subsidiarity principle applies in connection with the framing of the measures; notes that closer involvement on the part of programme participants and more detailed economic analysis in the Member States concerned can help to improve the measures; points out that, when measures are framed at national level, due account must be taken of sustainable objectives with a view to ruling out any overemphasis on superficial measures; regards flat-rate aid payments and purely production-based aid payments as justified in certain regions, but calls for sustainable approaches to be developed with a view to guaranteeing the future viability of farming in the regions concerned; |
| --- | --- |

113.

Endorses the Court of Auditors’ recommendation 3; acknowledges that the subsidiarity principle applies in connection with the framing of the measures; notes that closer involvement on the part of programme participants and more detailed economic analysis in the Member States concerned can help to improve the measures; points out that, when measures are framed at national level, due account must be taken of sustainable objectives with a view to ruling out any overemphasis on superficial measures; regards flat-rate aid payments and purely production-based aid payments as justified in certain regions, but calls for sustainable approaches to be developed with a view to guaranteeing the future viability of farming in the regions concerned;

| 114. | Endorses the Court of Auditors’ recommendation 4; in addition, calls on the Member States to draw up guidelines for joint control indicators; is aware that the differing characteristics of countries covered by individual programmes makes the development of control indicators which are valid throughout the Union more difficult; takes the view, nevertheless, that joint control indicators are fundamental to the sustainable development of farming and rural areas; welcomes the consultation process undertaken by the Commission with the Member States with a view to defining joint control indicators for programmes as from 2011; regards this consultation process as an approach which can serve as a model for other areas in which the Union provides funding; |
| --- | --- |

114.

Endorses the Court of Auditors’ recommendation 4; in addition, calls on the Member States to draw up guidelines for joint control indicators; is aware that the differing characteristics of countries covered by individual programmes makes the development of control indicators which are valid throughout the Union more difficult; takes the view, nevertheless, that joint control indicators are fundamental to the sustainable development of farming and rural areas; welcomes the consultation process undertaken by the Commission with the Member States with a view to defining joint control indicators for programmes as from 2011; regards this consultation process as an approach which can serve as a model for other areas in which the Union provides funding;

| 115. | Endorses the Court of Auditors’ recommendation 5; welcomes the Court of Auditors’ proposal to reduce the period between programme assessments to less than 5 years; notes the Commission’s answers to the Court of Auditors’ proposal; echoes the Court of Auditors’ in recommending a reduction in the period between assessments from 5 years to 1 year, regardless of the annual implementation reports submitted by the Member States to the Commission; calls, further, for the establishment of an information management system to monitor the data collected by the Member States on the basis of representative control indicators, making for a more effective and more sustainable use of financial aid; |
| --- | --- |

115.

Endorses the Court of Auditors’ recommendation 5; welcomes the Court of Auditors’ proposal to reduce the period between programme assessments to less than 5 years; notes the Commission’s answers to the Court of Auditors’ proposal; echoes the Court of Auditors’ in recommending a reduction in the period between assessments from 5 years to 1 year, regardless of the annual implementation reports submitted by the Member States to the Commission; calls, further, for the establishment of an information management system to monitor the data collected by the Member States on the basis of representative control indicators, making for a more effective and more sustainable use of financial aid;

| 116. | Calls on the Commission to cooperate more effectively with the Member States; notes that the Commission cannot force a Member State to implement proposed changes designed to improve programme sustainability; takes the view that the closer involvement of the Commission in control measures will increase programme efficiency; |
| --- | --- |

116.

Calls on the Commission to cooperate more effectively with the Member States; notes that the Commission cannot force a Member State to implement proposed changes designed to improve programme sustainability; takes the view that the closer involvement of the Commission in control measures will increase programme efficiency;

| 117. | Instructs its President to forward this Resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series). |
| --- | --- |

117.

Instructs its President to forward this Resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

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(1)  OJ L 69, 13.3.2009.

(2)  OJ C 308, 12.11.2010, p. 1.

(3)  OJ C 303, 9.11.2010, p. 1.

(4)  OJ C 308, 12.11.2010, p. 129.

(5)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0194 (see page 31 of this Official Journal).

(6)  OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1.

(7)  Special Report No 2/2010, reply of the Commission on points 25-26: ‘The objective of the CNI scheme was to optimise European infrastructures by providing limited support for the development of a restricted number of projects for new infrastructures in duly justified cases where such support could have a critical catalysing effect in terms of European added value’.

(8)  Special Report No 6/2010, point 43.

(9)  Special Report No 6/2010, point 72.

(10)  Special Report No 6/2010, point 73.

(11)  Special Report No 6/2010, recommendation 2.

(12)  Special Report No 6/2010, Commission reply, point 58.

(13)  OJ L 42, 14.2.2006, p. 1.

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