*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 12/11/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. ROBERT EARL WATSON, also known as Joe,

Defendant - Appellant. No. 95-3127 (D. Ct. No. 94-CR-20075-05)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record , this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument wouldnot be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. Se eFed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered sub mitted without oral argument. This appeal is from an order of the district court sentencing defendant Watson to 120 months after a plea of guilty to one count of distribution of- 2 -

cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Defendant appeals on the grounds that the district court applied the wrong l egal standard in adding a twolevel increase under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) relatin g to the co-defendant’s possession of a dangerous weapon and further on the grounds that the case should be remanded for resentencing because the record is incomplete with respect to the reasons for denying an additional reduction for acc eptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). We affirm. On appeal here defendant alleges that the district court applied the incorrect legal standard when defendant’s sentence was enhanc ed under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 for his co-defendant’s possession of a firearm. Th e record is clear that defendant did not possess the firearm himself. Instead, the evidence before the district court related to the possession of a firearm by co-defend ant Nevels. Defendant alleges that the district court failed to make a finding re garding whether defendant should have reasonably foreseen the co-defendant’s possess ion of a hidden weapon. The probation officer involved in the case recommended the two-level increase for Nevels’ possession of a dangerous weapon. Counsel for the defendant objected. The sentencing transcript is clear that the distric t court considered carefully the facts surrounding the gun enhancement and determine d that the two-level enhancement for possession was appropriate because the gun was clearly connected with the offense and because the applicat ion notes to the sentencing- 3 -

guideline state that the enhancement should be appl ied if the weapon was present. The district court therefore found by a preponderan ce of the evidence that the two-level enhancement was appropriate. This circui t has made clear that sentencing courts are permitted to attribute to a d efendant weapons possessed by co-defendants under circumstances where the possess ion of the weapons was known to the defendant or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Further, this court has held that reasonable foreseeability may b e inferred if the co-defendant knowingly possessed the weapon. United States v. Underwood , 938 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1991). There is no dispute in this case that co-defendant Nevels knowingly possessed the weapon. In adopting the fa ctual findings and guideline applications contained in the presentence report, the district court adopted the detailed factual basis for the weapons enhancement that was set out in the presentence report. We hold that the district court made adequate findings and used the proper legal standards to increase Watson’ s base offense under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The district court in this case cle arly analyzed the gun enhancement at the sentencing hearing. This case i s unlike Underwood , id ., in that it is quite clear in this case which gun was r elied upon and that it was connected directly with the offense of conviction. Thus, we find no error in the ruling of the district court on the enhancement. Defendant further appeals on the ground that the di strict court failed to- 4 -

provide reasons for denying an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). We will not reverse a sentencing court’s determination of acceptance of responsibili ty unless the ruling of the district court is clearly erroneous. United States v. Jaynes , 75 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1996). The defendant bears the burden of prov ing that he has accepted responsibility. We cannot say that the district co urt was clearly erroneous in refusing to grant the additional one-level reductio n in this case where defendant did not provide any substantial information to the government concerning his own involvement in his defense and did not advise the c ourt or the government of his desire to plead guilty until the week before trial. Indeed the record in this case shows that the defendant continued to deny any acti ve involvement in this offense and even at one point considered withdrawing his gu ilty plea and going to trial. Under these circumstances, the district court’s ref usal to grant the additional reduction for acceptance of responsibility was not clearly erroneous. We
AFFIRM. ENTERED FOR THE COURT,

Deanell Reece Tacha Circuit Judge