~

liberally construed, the court finds that the complaint puts DePaul on notice, and “when the
complaint adequately performs the notice function prescribed for complaints by the civil rules,

the presence of extraneous matter does not warrant dismissal.” Davis, 269 F.3d at 820 ~21.

Yet, the court is sympathetic to DePaul’s concerns relating to being able to fashion an
appropriate response to Slovinec’s complaint. Therefore, the court orders Slovinec to file an
amended complaint which conforms with the pleading requirements set forth in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the court advises the parties of Rule 11. While the court
is concerned with and seeks to avoid chilling meritorious claims, the court is also concerned that
parties comply with the rules. “[T]he central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in

district court.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). “Rule 11 is

violated when ‘parties or their attorneys’ sign a pleading, motion, or other paper that, after
reasonable inquiry, is not well grounded in fact and is not warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Burda v. M. Ecker Co.,
2 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 1993).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and gives
Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint that complies with this order by March 5, 2002.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

a 1G, Oe CHARLES R. NORGLE, SR.
DATED:


113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993)). With these principles in mind, the court finds that the
complaint places Defendant on notice of the claims against them.

Slovinec’s complaint seems similar to the complaint in Davis, where the Seventh Circuit

stated: “Indeed, because of its prolixity, [plaintiffs complaint] gives the defendant much more

information about the plaintiff's conception of his case than the civil rules require.” Davis, 269

F.3d at 820. At this juncture, the court cannot say with any degree of certainty that Slovinec has
failed to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted, sufficient to warrant dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6). DePaul’s own concession that “the Complaint appears to allege violations
of the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFEL), 20 U.S.C. § 1071 - 1087, and tortuous
interference with contracts,” (Def.’s Motion to Dismiss, pg. 1) shows that they have notice of the
gravamen of Slovinec’s complaint.

Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds
upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader
seeks. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rule 8 also requires pleadings to be “simple, concise and
direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1). Rule 10 requires pleaders to present their claims in numbered
paragraphs, which are limited to a single set of circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). The
purpose of these rules is to present the case in its simplest terms to the court and the opposing

side, and to streamline the litigation. See 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:

Civil 2d § 1281 (2d ed. 1990), The court finds that Slovinec’s complaint fails to comply with
these rules, in so far as much of it is unintelligible and contains extraneous matter. Therefore,
the court admonishes Slovinec for his past filings with the court, many of which were sent

directly to the court’s chambers, rather than appropriately being filed with the court. However,

3


eer ~ —

Minute OfGaorm (06/97)

¥ United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
a
Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Charles R. Norgle than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 0576 DATE 211 §/2002
CASE Slovinec vs, DePaul University
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented,]
Motion to dismiss
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]}
(2) QO Brief in support of motion due
@) Qo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) im [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
9) QO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) (General Rule21 CIFRCP4i(a)(1) CM FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) [Other docket entry] | Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied. See attached.
a) {For further detail see
No notices required, advised in open court. Dociiment ©”
. . Number
No notices required. not
umber of notices
Notices mailed by judge’s staff. FEB. 209 2002!
Notified counsel by telephone. date docketed
X | Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form. yynos LOneLsia By \ U
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. yi i)
courtroom Gif id GE de mailed notice
deputy’s
initials Es ae
, Date/time recived ins 2 J 4
central Clerk’s Office mating doputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSEPH SLOVINEC, )
Plaintiff, ,)
v. } No. 01 €.0576 DOCKETED
2 F
DEPAUL UNIVERSITY, ») Judge Charles R. Norgle, Sr. EB 26 2002
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. For the

following reasons, the motion is denied.
BACKGROUND

On January 26, 2001, the Plaintiff, Joseph Slovinec (“Slovinec”), filed a pro se
complaint, in excess of one hundred pages, against the Defendant, DePaul University
(“DePaul”). Slovinec’s complaint was largely a narration of events and extraneous attachments,
including, inter alia, a correspondence to former President Clinton and Chicago Alderman
Schulter. DePaul subsequently filed this motion to dismiss Slovinec’s complaint with prejudice
and to grant such other relief as the court deems just and equitable, brought pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), 8(e)(1), 10(b), and 12(b)(6).

DISCUSSION

This motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), 8(e)(1), 10(b), and
12(b)(6) seems to “imply that the complaint is simultaneously too long and too short.” Bennett
v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 517 (7" Cir. 1998). It is appropriate to clarify the differing purposes

of the above-cited rules of civil procedure.


A motion to dismiss a complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), does not test whether the
plaintiff will prevail on the merits, but instead whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court
must assume all facts alleged in the complaint to be true, construe the allegations liberally and
view the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wilson v. Formigoni, 42 F.3d
1060, 1062 (7" Cir, 1994). In regard to pro se complaints, the Seventh Circuit has stated:

It is, by now, axiomatic that district courts have a special responsibility to
construe pro se complaints liberally and to allow ample opportunity for amending
the complaint when it appears that by so doing the pro se litigant would be able to
state a meritorious claim. Not only is the district court to view the pro se
complaint with an understanding eye, but, while the court is not to become an
advocate, it is incumbent on it to take appropriate measures to permit the
adjudication of pro se claims on the merits, rather than to order their dismissal on
technical grounds, Indeed, it is the well-established duty of the trial court to
ensure that the claims of a pro se litigant are given a fair and meaningful
consideration.

Donald v, Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7" Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). At

the same time, however, “pro se litigants are not entitled to a general disposition from the rules
of civil procedure.” Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7" Cir. 1994). Thus, “[a] complaint may
not be dismissed unless it is impossible to prevail under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations.” Moriarty v. Lewis Funeral Directors, Ltd., 150 F.3d 773, 777

(7" Cir. 1998). “A complaint need not plead law or match facts to every element of a legal

theory.” Bennett, 153 F.3d at 518. A complaint is sufficient where it “performs the essential

function of a complaint under the civil rules, which is to put the defendant on notice of the

plaintiffs claim.” Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7" Cir. 2001) (citing

Leatherman vy. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168,