F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v

.

J U A N M A N U E L R I V E R

A

C O N S T A N T I N O , AKA J uan RiveraConstantino, Defendant-Appellant

. N o. 14-10314

D.C. No. 4:13-cr-01510- CKJ -B GM-1

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na Cindy K. J o r g enson, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted May 15, 2015—San F rancisco, California

F iled Aug ust 19, 2015

B efore: Richard A. Paez

and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit J udg es and Kevin Thomas Duffy
, * District J udg e.

Opinion by J udg e Clifton; D issent by

J u d g e Paez

* T h e Ho n o rab le Kev in T h o m as Du f f y , U.S. District J u d g e f

o r th e So u th ern District o f

New Yo rk , sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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SUMMARY * *

Crim inal Law

Affirming a sentence f

or illeg al reentry , the panel h eld that a p rior federal conviction f o r c o n spiring to possess marijuana with intent to distri b u t e , 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), c onstitutes a prior conviction for “conspiring [ ]

. . . to c o mmit” a “drug trafficking offense” as that phrase is used in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2L 1

. 2 ( b)(1), thereby making

a defendant subject to a 1 6-level enhance m ent under § 2L 1.2(a)(1)(A).

The panel rejected the defendant’s arg ument that because his prior federal conspiracy conviction did not r e quire an

o v e r t act, it w as n ot technically a “conspiracy ” within t h e meaning of § 2L 1.2, c mt. n.5. The panel wrote that it need not rely on a g eneric definition analy sis because the p lain meaning of § 2L 1. 2 (b)(1) and related commentary is to encompass § 846 as a predicate offense.

Dissenting, J u dg e Paez would hold that where a prior conspiracy conviction u nder § 846 does not require proof o f

an overt act, it does not qualify categ orically as a d rug trafficking offense for p u rp o s es of the § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) enhancement.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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COUNSEL

Saul M. Huerta, Tucson, Ariz ona, for Defendant-Appellant.

Robert L

. Miskell, Assistant United States Attorney
, and J ohn S. L eonardo, United State s A t t orney , Tucson, Ariz ona, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OP INION

CL I F TON, Circuit J udg e :

This sentencing a

ppeal requires u s to answer the following q

u estion: I s a federal drug trafficking conspiracy conviction a conviction for conspi r a c y to commit a d rug trafficking o ffense? Or, to put it more precisely
, does a prior federal conviction f

or conspiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § § 846, 841(a)(1), constitute a prior conviction for “ conspiring [ ]

. . . to comm i t ” a “ d r ug trafficking offense” as that phrase is used in the c ommentary to section 2L 1.2(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines, thereby making a defendant subject to a 16-level sentencing enhan c e m e n t? No matter how the question is phrased, the
answer, we conclude, is “ y e s

. ” W e therefore affirm the
sentence that Defendant J uan Manuel Rivera-Constantino received and that he now challeng es on appeal.

I. Background

I n 2011, Rivera-Constantino was c onvicted of conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute approx imately 195 kilog rams of marijuana, a violat i o n o f 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to 2 4 months in prison a nd 36U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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months of supervised release. Althoug h Rivera-Constantino

was deported to Mex ic o in 2011, he r eturned to the United States in A ug ust 2013 a n d w as arrested. I n March 2014, a jury found him g uilty of o ne count o f illeg al reentry , 8 U .S.C. § 1326. I n c al cu l a t ing the advisory rang e under the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court imposed a 1 6-level enh ancement on the basis that Rivera-Constantino’s prior conviction for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute was a p redicate drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1). Rivera-Constantino objected to the application of this enhancement, but his obje c t i o n was overrul e d

. The district court imposed a sentence of 51 months in prison and 36 months of supervised r elease. That

s e n t ence w as within the Guidelines rang e, including the 1 6

- level enhancement. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Rivera-Constantino arg ues that the distric t court erred when it determined that his prior convi c t ion for conspiracy made him subject to a 16-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to section 2L 1.2(b)(1). W e review the d istrict court’s interpretation of t h e Sentencing Guidelines d e novo. United State s v

. G rajeda
, 581 F .3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2009).

“U.S.S.G. § 2 L 1.2 is the Sentencing Guidelines provision applicable to defendants who illeg ally reenter the country in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The sentencing scheme embodied in [ sec tion] 2L 1.2 imposes, v ia enhancements to the defendant’s base offens e level, more severe punishment for defendants who h ave committed serious prior crimes.” United S tates v . Rosales-Garcia , 667 F

. 3d 1348, 1349 (10th Cir. 2012). Under section 2L 1 .2(b)(1), a 16-levelU N I T E D S T A T E S V

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enhancement applies “[ i] f the d e f endant previously was deported, or unlawfully r emained in the United States, a fter

. . . a c onviction for a felony that is

. . . a d r u g trafficking offense for w hich the sentence imposed e x ceeded 13 months . . . .” 1

According to Applica t i o n N ote 1 for this section, a “‘[ d] r ug trafficking o ffense’” is “an offe n s e under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import,

ex p ort, distribution, or dispensing of, or offer to sell a controlled subs t a n ce (or a c ounterfeit substance) or the
p o s session of a c ontrolled substance (or a c ounterfe i t subst a n ce) with intent to manufacture, import, ex p ort, distribute, o r dispense.” U.S.S.G. § 2 L 1.2, cmt. n.1(B )(iv) (2014). Application Note 5 further provide s that “[ p] r ior convictions of offenses counted under subsection (b)(1) [ a set of offenses that includes, a mong o ther th i n gs , ‘drug trafficking offenses’] include the offenses of a iding a nd abetting
, conspiring
, and attempting
, to commit such

o f f e nses.” I

d

. at § 2 L 1.2, cmt. n.5 (emphasis added). “Application notes are binding on the courts in their construction o f the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v

.

1 Sectio n 2 L 1 .2 (b )(1 )(A ) h as b een m em o rab ly d escrib ed as “ a sen ten ce

o n ly a g ram

m ar teach er co u ld lo v e,” w ith “ p assiv e v oice, f ollo w ed by a scrag g l y ex pressio n o f tim e (‘ p rev io u sly

. . . af ter’ ), th en a train of
p rep o sitio n al p h rases lin k ed o n e aft e r an o th er an d th em selv es ru d ely in te r r u p t e d b y a p air o f p aren th etical p u n ctu atio n s.” Ro sa les-Ga rcia
, 6 6 7 F .3 d at 1 3 5 6 (Go rsu ch
, J., dissen tin g ). F o rtu n ately
, th e b asic m ean in g

o f th e s en ten ce is clear: “ [I]f th e d ef en d an t w as d e p o rted af t er a d ru g

- traf f ick in g f elo n y c o n v ictio n f

o r w h ich th e sen ten ce im

po s ed

ex ceed ed t

h irteen m o n t

h s, th en ap p l y t h e 1 6- lev el en h an cem en t.” A n n a Natalie Ro l, Co m

m en t, U.S

. vs. Th em: A Persp ective o n U.S

. Immig ra tio n La w Arisin g fro m Un ited States v

. Ro sales- Garcia a n d th e Co mb i n atio n

o f Imp riso n men t a n d Dep o rta tio n , 9 0 D E NV

. U. L

. R E V

. 7 6 9
, 7 9 0 (2 0 1 2 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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Malley
, 307 F .3d 103 2
, 1034 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation a nd internal quotation marks omitted).

Rivera-Constantino’s c e n t ral arg ument is that his prior conspiracy co n v i c t ion is not e ncompassed by the word “conspiring ” as used in Application Note 5. H i s 2 011

c o n viction was for the crime of conspiracy to posses s marijuana with intent to d i s tribute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1). 2 This offense—like the overwhelming majority o f federal conspiracy offenses—does not r equire pro o f o f “any
overt acts in furtherance o f the conspiracy .” United States v

. Shabani
, 513 U.S. 1 0, 1 5 (1994). I n c ontrast, in United States

v

. Garcia-Santana
, 774 F

. 3d 528 (9th Cir. 2014)
, w e considered the appropriate treatment under a section o f the I mmig r a tion and Nat i o n ality Act (“I NA”) for a Nevada conviction for “conspiracy to commit the crime of burg lary ” in violation of N E V

. R E V

. S T A T . §§ 199.480, 205.060(1). I n that c ontex t, we d efined the g eneric o ffense of conspiracy for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U) as requiring an overt act. 774 F .3d at 534. Rely ing o n Gar cia-Santana
, RiveraConstantino asserts that it was error to impose the sentencing enhancement because his prior federal c o nspiracy conviction, which did n ot require an overt a ct, was no t t ec hnically a

2 21 U.S.C. § 8 4 6 p ro v id es th at “ [a]n y p erso n w h o attem p ts o r co n sp i res to co m m it an y o f

f en se d ef in ed i n th is su

b ch ap te r s h a ll b e su

b j ect to th e

sam e p en alties as th o se p rescrib ed f o r t h e o f f en se, th e co m

m issio n of

w h ich w as th e ob

j ect o f th e attem

p t or co n sp iracy .” 21 U.S.C. 8 4 1 (a)(1 ), in tu rn , m ak es i t u n law f

u l “ f o r an y p erso n k

n o w in g ly or in ten tio n ally

. . . to m an u f actu re, d istrib u te, o r d isp en se, o r p o ssess w i t h in ten t to

m an u f actu re, d istrib u te, o r d isp en s e, a c o n t r o l l ed su b stan ce

. . . .” S

ee Un ited S ta tes v. O’Brien
, 5 2 F.3 d 2 7 7
, 2 7 8 (9 th Cir. 1 9 95 ) (“ T h e l an g u ag e

o f sectio n 8 4 6 is clear. A p erso n w h o co n sp ires to d istrib u te a co n tro lled

su b stan ce d escrib ed b y sectio n 8 4 1 (a)(1 ) is su

b j ect to th e sam e pen alties
p rescrib ed f

o r a sectio n

8 4 1 (a) o f

f en s e.”).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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“conspir[ a cy ] ” within the meaning o f the word as it w as used in Application Note 5.

Rivera-Constantino’s arg ument is c r ea t i v e but

u n p e r suasive. W e reject this arg ument because we do n o t accept the premise that the g eneric definition of conspiracy a s articulated in Ga r ci a -Santana is c ontrolling in this contex t. Rather, we concl u d e that the c lear intent of the Sentencing Commission in drafting section 2L 1.2 and its accompany ing

c ommentary was to encompass a prior federal d ru g conspiracy

conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846.

“W e apply the traditional rules of statutory c onstruction when interpreting the [ S ] e n tencing [ G] uidelines,” United States v

. F

lores
, 729 F .3d 910, 9 14 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013), a nd “[ w] e interpret the Guidelin es to g ive effect to the intent o f the Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Gibson
, 135 F .3d 2 57, 261 (2d Cir. 1998). I nterpreting a term used in the Guidelines based on its “g eneric definition”—the approach urg e d by Rivera-Constantino and discussed in Taylor v. United States
, 495 U.S. 575 (1 9 9 0 )—represents a useful tool f

or divining leg islative intent. B ut when the plain meaning of a term is readily apparent from the tex t, contex t, and structure of the relevan t G u i delines provision a nd commentary , that meaning is d ispositive and there is n o need to rely on the “g eneric definition” framework. See EstradaEspinoz a v. Mukasey
, 546 F .3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2 008) (en banc) (recogniz ing that it w as “unnecessary t o s u rvey current criminal law to ascertain a federal definition because Cong r ess has alr e a d y supplied it”), overruled o n other grounds by United States v. A guila-Montes de Oca
, 655 F .3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam), and abrogated by Descamps v. United S

tates , 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013); cf. United States v

. Gonzalez-Corn , No. 13-50480, 2015 W L 4385278,U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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at * 1, *5 (9th Ci r

. J u l y 1 7, 2015) (recog niz ing that where a “conviction qualifies as an ag g r avated felony on its f ace[ ,]

. . . there is no need to compare the elements of [a] conviction to the elements o f a g eneric federal offense

. . . to d e t er m i n e if [ the] conviction was for an ag g ravated felony ” a nd concluding that the “categ orical matching a n a l y sis is inapplicable . . . because there is nothing to match”). 3

Our d issenting c olleag ue sug g es t s t hat reliance on the f e d e ral definition embodied in 21 U.S.C. § 846 would b e “inapposite” because “Cong r ess u s ed the word ‘conspiracy ’ both for crimes wi t h a n overt act element and for others witho u t such an element” and because “Cong r ess has not supplied a sing le set of elements that define ‘conspiracy ’ for

us to use in interpreting U.S.S.G. § 2L 1 .2 cmt. n.5.” Dissent
at 17. B ut at l e a st with reg ards to federal drug trafficking conspiracies, Cong ress surely has provide d a sing le, clear d e f i n i tion: the one articulated in 21 U.S.C. § 846. This, we conclude, w as overwhelming ly likely to have been the

m e a n i n g i n t e n d e d by the Sentencing Commissio n , notwithstanding the g eneric meaning o f the word “conspiracy

” as used in other contex ts.

Taylor itself is instructiv e on this point. I n Taylor
, the Supreme Court beg an by

emphasiz ing that:

[ o] n th e face of the federal enhancement provision, it is not r eadily app a r e nt whether

3 In th e w ord s o f an o th er circu it, w e “ d iscern f ro m th e l an g u ag e th at th e Sen ten cin g Co m

m issio n u sed w

h eth er it in ten ded f

o r an o v ert act to b e an elem en t o f ev ery co n sp iracy co n v ictio n ,” rath er th an b y “ em p lo y [in g ] th e categ o rical ap p ro a ch to d iscern th e elem en ts o f ‘ co n sp iracy .’ ” Un ited S ta tes v. Pa sca cio -Ro d

rig uez , 7 4 9 F.3 d 3 5 3, 3 5 8 (5 th Cir. 2 0 1 4 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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Cong ress intended “burg lary ” to mean

w h atever the State of the defendant’s p ri o r conviction d efines as burg lary
, o r wh e ther it intended that some uni form definition o f burg lary b e ap p l i ed to all cases

. . . . And if Cong r ess intended that a uniform definition o f b u r glary be applied, was that definition to b e the traditional common-law definition, or [ a] broader “g eneric” d efinition[ ]

. . . or some other definition specifically ta i l o red to the purposes of the enhancement statute?

495 U.S. at 580 (footnote omitted).

Here, in contrast, it is readily apparent that the Sentencing Commission intended section 2 L 1.2(b)(1) to encompass a s predicate offenses f

ederal drug c o nspiracy convictions that do
not require proof of an overt act. To h old otherwise would be
to conclude that the Sentencing Commission inte n d ed to

ex c lude federal drug trafficking conspiracy

offenses when it used the w ord “cons piring ” to modify the phrase “drug
tr afficking o ffenses.” Such a result would be not just
marg inally “underinclusive,” a s the r esults of the categ orical

a p p r o ach sometimes are, Moncrieffe v. Holder
, 133 S. C t

. 1678, 1 692 ( 2 013)
, but downrig ht absurd. W hy would the Sentencing C o m mission intend to ex clude from the term “drug trafficking o f

f e n ses” a federal conviction for a d rug trafficking offense u nder federal law? Cong r ess has decided
not to require an overt act as an element of fed e ral d rug conspiracy
, and w e h ave no reason to conclude that the Sentencing Commission intended to abrog ate that de c i s ion. I ndeed, to adopt such an interpretation would run counter to ba s i c n otions of c o mmon sense. “[ I ] n the course of the applica t i o n of the [ S] entencing [ G] uidelines, as in theU N I T E D S T A T E S V

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application o f any leg al concept, the use of ‘ common sense’ is more than j u s t relevant, but required.” United States v

. W hite
, 903 F .2d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 1990). W e reject RiveraCo n s t antino’s reading of section 2 L 1.2(b)(1) because “[ c] ourts oug ht not read t h e Guidelines in a way that makes
t he Sentencing Commission look foolish.” United Sta t e s v. Turner , 998 F .2d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 1993).

Our i n t erpretation of section 2L 1.2(b)(1) is f urther supported b y an ex amination of the Sentencing Guidelines a s

a whole. See United S

tates v

. L eal-Felix
, 665 F

. 3d 1037, 1041–42 ( 9th Cir. 2011) ( “I nterpretation of a word or phrase [ in a statute] d epends u

pon reading the whole statutory tex t, considering the p u r

p o s e and contex t of the statute, a nd consulting any precedents o r a uthorities that inform the analy sis.” (alteration in orig inal; c i t ation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The term “ c onspiracy ” is used elsewhere in the Guidelines (and associated commentary a nd appendices) to encompass a conspiracy convictio n u nder 21 U.S.C. § 846. See, e.g. , U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1; U

. S

. S .G. § 2X1.1. “A standard principle of statu tory c onstruction provides that identical words and phrases w i thin the same statute should normally b e given the same meaning

. ” Powerex Corp. v. R eliant Energy Servs., Inc. , 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007).

Moreover, the two o ther circuits that have c onsidered this question have both held that the Sentencing Commission intended s e ction 2L 1.2(b)(1) to encompass federal d rug trafficking conspiracies. The F ifth Circuit has concluded that “[ t] here is n o reason to search outside the Gui d e l i n es for a definition of ‘conspiracy ’ applicable to this enhancement” be ca u s e “ Application Note 5 is a clear statement by the Sentencing Commission that the e nhancement applies toU N I T E D S T A T E S V

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c o n spiracies to commit federal drug trafficking offenses. ” United S tates v

. R odriguez-Escareno
, 700 F .3d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 2 012) ( footnote omitted). T he Six th Circuit has similarly held that “[ a] violatio n o f § 841(a)(1) is a federal d rug trafficking offense a s defined in Application Note 1” and that “Application Note 5

. . . c larifies that a conspiracy to commit

an o f f e nse d efined in Note 1 is also a ‘drug trafficking offense’ for pur

p oses o f the Guidelines.” United States v

. Sanbria-Bueno , 549 F . App’x 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2013).

Our prior decision in Garcia-Santana
, 774 F .3d 528, does
not compel a contr ary conclusion. I n Garcia-Santana
, we held “that the g eneric d efinition of ‘conspir a c y ’ under [ a provision of] the I m m i gr ation and Nationality Act

. . . include[ d] proof of a n o v ert act in furtherance of the conspiracy .” Id

. at 532. Here, in contrast, we are called upon to interpret the Sentencing Guide l i n e s , not the I NA. I n addition, the predicate c o nviction w e consider here is a federal o ffense, not a conviction under state l a w. Althoug h it is true that “decis i o n a l l a w defining [ a] term

. . . [ used] in the sentencing contex t

. . . is informed by the definition of the

sa m e t e rm in the immig r ation contex t,” United States v

. Medina-Villa
, 567 F .3d 507, 511 (9t h C ir. 2009) (citations and footnote omitted), we will not blindly import a definition

w h e n the c ontex t makes clear that d oing so would b e inappropriate. The lang uag e used in the provision at issue here is m a t e rially different from that used in the provision considered in Garcia-Santana
, and the contex t i s e ntirely different. Cf. United S

tates v

. Leal-Vega
, 680 F

. 3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2 0 1 2 ) (n oting that “our holding s in the immig ration contex t do not definitively resolve the issue

. . . because t h e tex t of the immig r ation statute

. . . differs from the tex t of the Sentencing Guidelines”).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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W e conclude that we need not rely on a g eneric definition analy sis because the plain meaning of section 2L 1.2(b)(1) a nd related commentar y is to encompass 21 U.S.C. § 846 a s a predicate offense. 4

III. Conclusion

The di s t r i ct c ourt p roperly determined that the 16-level

s entencing enhancement applied to Rivera-Constant i n o b a s e d

on his pri o r f

e deral d rug conspiracy conviction. W e affirm the sentence.

AF F IRMED.

PAEZ , Circuit J udg e, dissenting

.

I respectfully diss ent. The majority a ttempts to disting uish United States v. Garcia-Santana
, 774 F .3d 528 (9th Cir. 2 0 14), and to sidestep the Taylor 1 catego r i c al approach to hold that a co n s piracy conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 qualifies categ orically a s a drug trafficking offense, warranting the six teen-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2( b ) ( 1 ) ( A)(i). B ecause I would f ollow

4 W e em p h asize th at ou r h o ld in g is a n arro w o n e. W e n eed n o t, an d d o

n o t, co n sid er th e m ean in g o f th e p h rase “ co n sp i rin g

. . . to c o m m it

. . . a

‘ d ru g traf f ick i n g o f f en s e’ ” as it relates to co n sp ir a c y co n v ictio n s u n der
state law
, f

o r ex am p le. W e h old on ly th at, in th is c o n t e x t , t h e p lain

m ean in g o f th e lan g u ag e us e d b y th e Sen ten cin g Co m m issio n w as to

en co m p ass a prio r f

ed eral d ru g c o n s p iracy co n v ictio n u n d er 2 1 U.S.C. § 8 4 6

.

1 Ta ylo r v. Un ited

S t a tes , 4 9 5 U.S. 5 75 (1 9 9 0 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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G a r cia-Santana
, I would hold that where a prior conspirac y conviction u nder § 8 46 does not require proof o f an overt act, it does not qualify

categ orically

as a drug trafficking offense for purposes of the § 2 L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) enhancement. I therefore would vacate t h e d istrict court’s sentence, a nd

r e mand f or consideration of whether Rivera-Constantino’s prior c onviction under § 846 warran t s an eig ht-level enhancement u n d er U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(C) as an ag g r avated felony for “ illicit trafficking in a co ntrolled substance (as d efined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924 ( c ) of Title 18),” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B ).

1. The majority recog niz es that we already have defined the g eneric offense of conspiracy
, Maj. Op. at 6 (citing Garcia-Santana , 774 F .3d 528), but seeks to avoid a pply ing that definition outside the I mmig ration and Nati onality A ct (“I NA”) contex t. The majority
, however, fails to disting uish meaning fully the U.S.S.G. § 2L 1 .2(b)(1) ( A ) ( i) and cmt. n.5

e nhancement here f

rom the I

NA p rovision interpreted in Garcia-Santana
, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U). B oth refer to a class of prior convictions, b oth refer g enerically to

c onspiracy
, and both c apture for enhancement purpos e s o r collateral conseque n c es prior offenses under federal or state l a w

. U n d e r the I

NA, “‘ag g ravated f

elony ’ means

. . . an attempt or conspiracy t o c ommit a n o ffense described in [ § 1101(a)(43)] .” § 1101(a)(43)(U). “The term applies to an offense described in th[ at] parag raph w hether in violation of F ederal or State law

. . . .” § 1101(a)(43). And “ag g ravated felony ” includes the offense of “illicit traffick i n g in a controlled substance (as d efine d i n s e ction 802 of Title 2 1), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in s e c t i o n 924(c) of Title 18).” § 1101(a)(43)(B ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I V E R A

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N T I N O 14

R e a ding that I

NA provision side-by -side with U.S.S. G

. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) and cmt. n.5 b e l ies the majority ’s view that the provisions are “materially different,” Maj. Op. a t 11. Application Note 5 for § 2L 1

. 2 ex plains: “Prior convictions of offenses counted under s ubsection (b)(1) include the offenses of aiding a

nd abetting
, conspiring
, and att empting
, to commit such of

f e n s es.” § 2L 1 .2 cmt. n.5. I n turn, subsec t i on (b)(1) r efers, in r elevant part, to a class of prior convictions: “ ‘Drug traffick i ng offense’ means an offense under fede r al, state, o r local law that prohibits

. . . the possession of a controlled substance

. . . with intent to

. . . distribute, o r dis p ense.” § 2L 1

. 2 cmt. n.1(B )(iv). The majority say s the t wo p rovisions are “materially different,” Maj. Op. at 11, but offers no analy sis to demonstrate how we should reach that ess en t i a l conclusion in this case involving

an enhancement that refers to g eneric conspiracy and c aptures a class of prior convictions.

2. Nex t, the majority d isreg ards our e s tablished rule o f
ap p l y i n g “t h e categ orical a nd modified categ orical approaches described in Taylor v. United States
, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), to determine whether a de fe n dant’s prior conviction satisfies U.S.S.G. § 2 L 1

. 2(b)(1)(A),” United States v

. Torre-Jimenez
, 771 F .3d 1163, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Leal-Vega
, 680 F .3d 1160, 1 1 6 3 (9th Cir. 2012)) (quotation marks omitted). “W e derive the meaning of an e numerated G uidelines crime not from the offense’s ordinary m ea n i n g but rather by survey ing the Model Penal Code and stat e s tatutes to determine how they define the offense.” United States v. Esparza-Herrera
, 557 F

. 3d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). I n Garcia-Sant a n a , we applied “the methodolo gy prescribed by the Supreme Court for defining g eneric offenses for categ orical purposes,” to determine t hat “the g eneric federal definition of conspiracy
,U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I V E R A

- C O N S T A

N T I N O 15

codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U), conditions conviction

on performance o f an overt act in pursuit of the conspiratorial objective.” 774 F .3d at 534 (footnote omitted). B ecause § 2 L 1

. 2 (b)(1)(A)(i) captures p rior federal, state, and local offenses for purposes of s entence enhancement and because
t h e tex t of A pplication Notes 1(B )(iv) a nd 5 under § 2 L 1

. 2

are n o t materially distinct from the tex t interpreted in GarciaSantana
, I would c onclude that a prior conviction for
consp i racy must h ave an overt act element to qualify

c a t e go r i c al l y a s a d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g o f

fense und e r § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(i).

W e already have applied this approach to U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A). I n addition to conspiracy
, Application Note 5 i n cl u d e s certain prior attempt offenses. See § 2L 1.2

cm t

. n

. 5

. And “in dealing w ith attempt crimes, the district
court can impose the 16-level enhancement under § 2L 1.2(a) only if both the state’s definition of ‘attempt’ a nd the underly ing state offense are categ orica l matches for the f e d e r a l g eneric ‘attempt’ definition and the underlying federal
g eneric offense.” United S tates v. Gonzalez-Monterroso
, 745 F .3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir

. 2 0 14) (emphasis added). Notably
, in defining “attempt,” Gonzalez-M o nterroso cited the definition of “attempt” set forth in an I NA case involving 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a )(43)(G) & (U). S ee 745 F .3d at 1243; Hernandez-Cruz v. H

older
, 651 F .3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011). 2 The majority recog niz e s the g eneric definition of

2 Bu t see Un ited

S ta t es v. Ta

ylo r , 5 2 9 F.3 d 1 2 3 2
, 1 23 6 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 8) (“ Fo r p u rp o ses o f USSG § 4 B 1 .2 (a), a state o f f en se q u alif

ies as a crim e of

v io len ce if th e s tate crim e’ s d ef in itio n is c o e x t e n siv e w ith th e crim e’ s

c o m m o n

- law o r ‘ f

ed eral’ def

in itio n .”); id

. at n .2 (“ W e u se th e t e r m s

‘ f ed eral d ef

in iti o n ’ an d ‘ co m

m on

- law d ef

in itio n ’ in terch an g eab ly in th e

co n tex t o f crim es o f v i o len ce.”).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I V E R A

- C O N S T A

N T I N O 16

conspiracy as ex plained in Garcia-Santana
, Maj. Op. at 6
, but the majority today carves out “conspiracy ” from “attempt.” Stating that “the [ I

N A or Garcia-Santana ] contex t is entirely different,” Maj. Op. at 11, does not address the precedent that should g uide our interpretation of the c onspiracy provision in § 2L 1.2 cmt. n.5.

3. The majority i n footnote 4 states that its holding is a

narrow one, but U.S.S.G. § 2 L 1.2 refers collect i v e l y to federal, state, a n d local p redicate offenses without disting uishing federal f

rom state or local offenses. The majority also relies on a F ifth Circuit opinion, United States

v. Rodriguez-Escareno
, 7 00 F .3d 751 (5th Cir. 2012), and an unpublished S ix th Circuit memorandum, United States v

. Sanbria

- B u e n o , 549 F

. App’x 434 (6th Cir. 2 013) (unpublished), that followed the F ifth Circuit’s re a s oning

. B ut the F ifth Circuit since h as called into question a footnote nearly identical to the majority ’s footn o t e 4

. See United States v. Pascacio-Rodriguez
, 749 F .3d 353, 367 (5th Cir. 2014). 3 “ [ T] here is no b asis for concluding t h a t the S en tencing Commission intended to create a dichotomy i n § 2L 1.2 between c o nspiracy convictions under f ed e r al law and conspiracy convictions u n d e r s tate law.” Id. Thus, the

3 Co mp a re Maj

. Op

. at 1 2 n .4 (“ W e n eed n o t, an d d o n o t, co n s id er th e

m ean in g o f th e p h r a s e ‘c o n s p i r in g

. . . to co m m it

. . . a d ru g traf

f ick in g

o f f en se’ a s i t relates to co n sp iracy co n v ictio n s u n d er state law
, f or

ex am p le.” (q u o tatio n m ark s o m itted )) with Ro d rig u ez-Esca ren o , 7 00 F.3 d

a t 7 5 4 n .2 (“ W e im

ply n o p o s itio n o n th e relev an ce o f th is reaso n i n g t o ap p ly in g th e en h an cem en t to co n v i ctio n s f or co n sp iracies to co m

m i t state- law o f f en ses.”).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I V E R A

- C O N S T A

N T I N O 17

majority leaves to future cases the u nenviable task of divining how to make today ’s holding a narrow one. 4

4

. Separately
, because Cong ress used the wo r d “conspiracy

” both for c rimes with an overt act element a nd for others without such an element, our cas e l a w that
recog niz es when Cong ress “h a s already supplied [ a federal definition] ,” Maj. Op. at 7 ( q uoting Estrada-Espinoza v

. Mukasey
, 5 46 F .3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008) (en b anc)) 5

, is inapposite. Cong ress h as not supplied a sing le set o f elements that define “conspiracy ” for u s to use in interpreting U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2 c m t. n.5. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 846 (not requiring an o vert act) with 18 U.S.C. § 371 ( r equiring an overt act). “Parallel f

ederal crimes are probative, b ut not independently determinative, of the c ontemporary , g eneric definition of an offense.” Garcia-Santana , 774 F .3d at 535.

4 T h e Fif th Circu it in Pa sca cio -Ro d rig u ez p ro v i d ed altern ativ e b ases f or its h o ld in g th at a state co n v i c t io n f o r co n s p iracy to co m

m it m u rd er q u a l i f i e d f o r a s i x t e e n

- l e v e l e n h a n c e m e n t u n d e r U

. S

. S

. G

. § 2 L 1 .2 (b )(1 )(A )(ii). Co m p a re i d

. at 3 6 7– 6 8 with Maj

. Op

. at 8 n .3

. T h e Fif th Circu it ex

p lain ed th at “ th e g en e r i c , co n tem p o rary m ean in g of

‘ co n sp iracy to co m

m it m u rd er’ d o es n o t req u ire an o v ert act” an d th at th e

“ l an g u ag e an d co n tex t o f § 2 L 1 .2 i n d i cate th at an o v ert act is n o t req u ired f o r a c o n s p iracy to co m

m it m u rd er.” Pa sca cio -Ro d

rig u ez , 74 9 F.3 d at 3 6 7

– 6 8

. W h ereas b o th b ases co u ld lead to t h e sam e resu lt in th e Fif

th Circu it, Ga rcia -S

a n ta n a alread y h as d eterm in ed th e g en e r i c f ed eral d ef in i tio n o f co n sp iracy

in o u r circu i t. S

ee Ga rcia -S

a n ta n a , 7 7 4 F.3 d at 5 3 7

.

5 Cf. Un ited S t

a tes v. Go n za lez-Co rn , No

. 1 3

- 5 0 4 8 0
, slip o p

. at 4
, 9 (9 th C i r

. J u ly 1 7
, 2 0 1 5 ) (d eclin in g t o ap p l y Ta ylo r in rev iew i n g a p rio r

co n v ictio n w

h en th at co n v ictio n ’ s “ statu to ry s ch em e” w as in co rp orated in to th e INA , w

h ich cro ss- ref

eren ces 1 8 U.S.C. § 9 2 4 (c)(2 )).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I V E R A

- C O N S T A

N T I N O 18

F ocusing on w h a t the majority considers the “overw h e lming ly likely ” intention of the Sentencing Commission “at least with reg a rds to federal drug trafficking conspiracies,” Maj. Op. a t 8, disreg ards Garcia-Santana a nd
t h e structure of the Sentencing Guidelines. B oth require u s to determine and apply the g e n e r ic meaning of “conspiracy

. ” See G arcia-Santana
, 774 F .3d at 5 35–37 (focusing on “the
g eneric definition of c onspiracy ”); U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A) & cmt. n .5 ( requiring application of “conspiring ” to not only federal, state, and local drug trafficking offenses, but also to crimes of viole n c e , firearms offenses, child pornog raphy offense s , national security offenses, human trafficking offenses, and alien smug g ling of fenses). 6 Althoug h the categ orical approach at times is underinclusive, c f. GarciaSantana
, 774 F .3d at 539, we are oblig ated to follow Taylor
,

6 T h e au t h o rs o f Fed era l S

en ten cin g La w a nd Pra ctice h av e o b s erv ed :

[T h e Fif th Circu i t ’s statem en t, “ T h ere is n o reaso n to search ou t sid e th e Gu i d elin es f o r a d e fi n itio n of

‘ c o n s p i r a c y ’ a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s e n h a n c e m e n t

. A p plicatio n No te 5 is a clear statem en t b y th e Sen ten cin g Co m

m issio n th at th e en h an cem en t ap p lies
to co n sp iracies to co m

m i t f ed eral d ru g tr af

f ick in g

o f f en ses”] seem s to sid es t e p t h e issu e raised b y th e d ef en d an t,—w

h at d oes “ co n sp i racy ” m ean as u sed in
ap plicatio n n o t e 5 ? A lth o u g h a co n v i ctio n f or

co n s p iracy u n d e r 2 1 U.S.C. § 8 4 6 d o es n o t req u ire
p ro o f o f an o v ert act, th e g en eral co n sp i racy o f f en se in 1 8 U.S.C.A

. § 3 7 1 do es. A p p licatio n n o te 5 i s n o t lim ited to co n sp i racy to co m m it a dru g traf

f ick in g

o f f en se; it also en co m

p asses co n sp iracy to co m m it a

c r i m e o f v io len ce an d o th er o f f en ses th at w o u ld b e p ro secu ted u n d er 1 8 U.S.C. § 3 7 1

.

T h o m as W

. H u t c h i so n et al., Fed era l S en t en cin g La w a n d Pra ctice § 2 L 1 .2 n .3 0 0 (q u o tin g Ro d rig u ez-Esca ren o , 7 0 0 F.3 d at 7 5 4 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I V E R A

- C O N S T A

N T I N O 19

Garcia-Santana
, and other relevant precedent in interpreting the enhancement provisions in § 2L 1.2, including conspiracy offenses. Garcia-Santana d efined g e neric fe d e r a l c o n s p i racy , and, I would apply

it here.

F urther, the majority cites United States v

. Shabani
, 513 U.S. 10 (1994), to but tress its holding

. However, we already have disting uished Shabani as one o f “ a line o f Supreme C o u rt cases interpreting ‘conspiracy ’ as used in specific federal cri m i n a l statutes, rather than in the g eneric federal conspiracy statute.” G arcia-Santana
, 774 F

. 3d at 537 (citing Shabani
, among other cases). “[ T ] hose cases e x plain how c ourts should interpret f ederal statutes criminaliz ing conspiracies.” I

d. at 538. B u t provisions that assig n “collateral consequ e n ces

. . . to convictions from all jurisdictions, not merely to f ederal convictions,” i d

. , a re distinct.

5. F inally
, following Garcia-Santana and T aylor y ields

a result consistent with the p urpose an d s t r ucture of the Sentencing Guidelines. F irst, a prio r c o n spiracy conviction that lacks an o vert act requireme n t still may constitute an ag g r avated felony and trig g er an eig ht-level enhanc ement under U .S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(C), alleviating concerns about

u n d e rinclusiveness. See Garcia-Santana
, 774 F .3d at 539 n.9; § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(C) (“a c o nviction f or an ag g ravated felony
, increase by 8 levels”). Second, reading in co ntex t other references in the Guidelines to “conspiracy ” de m o nstrates that they a

re meaning fully d istinct from § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). T h e m aj o r i t y c i t es U

. S

. S

. G. § 2D1.1, “Unlawf u l Manufacturing
, I mporting
, Ex p orting
, or Trafficking (I ncluding Possession with I n tent to Commit These Offenses); A ttempt o r Conspiracy ,” and U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, “Attemp t , Solicitation, o r Conspiracy (Not Covered b y aU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. R I V E R A

- C O N S T A

N T I N O 20

Specific Offense Guideline).” See Maj. Op. at 10. Yet both reference specific federal statutes, not g eneric local, state, a nd federal offenses. See, e .g. , U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (referencing
, for instance, c onvictions under § 841(b)(1)A)); U.S.S.G. § 2 X1.1
cmt. (listing statutory provisions, including 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 372, 2271, 2 282A, 2 282B ). And the title of § 2 D1.1 lists “At t e m p t or Conspiracy ” after a semicolon that f ollows a listing of drug offense ty

pes. B y contrast, Application N otes 1(B )(iv) and 5 under § 2L 1.2 lack any such c ross-references
to federal statutes a

n d apply to more than just drug trafficking offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A) (including crimes o f violence, f

irearms o ffenses, child pornog raphy offenses, national security offenses, human t r a fficking offenses, alien
smug g ling o ffenses, in addition to drug trafficking offenses). I n sum, following G arcia-Santana and Taylor to define
g eneric c onspiracy recog niz es the purpose a nd structure o f the Sentencing Guidelines.

F or these r easons, I w ould reverse Rivera- C o n stantino’s
sentence and remand with directions to the district court to consider in the first instance wheth er his prior conspiracy conviction under § 846 warrants an eig ht-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(C) as an ag g ravated felony

.