Gar y has appe aled this judg ment, which is pr esently pendingin Cause No. 03-03- 00751- 1 CV in t his Court
. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00444- CV

G ar y L. M oy e r , A ppe lla nt

v. Marsha Ann Moyer , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WILLI AMSO N COUNTY , 277TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 00-1 5120 -F C2-2 77, H ONO RAB LE DERWOO D JOH NSO N, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
This is an appea l f

rom an order g rantingturnover r elief a nd appointing a

rec eiver and master in cha

ncer y who had pa

rticipated in the unde rlying a cti on as a te stifying e x pert. In the underlying a ction, appellee Marsha Ann Moy er w as aw arde d a divorc e fr om appellant Ga ry Moy er, actua l damag es for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damag es. Gar y did not 1
su pe rs e de the jud g me nt. I t is un dis pute d th a t, f oll ow ingthe ve rd ic t, G ary a ssi g ne d p ro pe rt

y of his wholly -owne d corpor ation to a pair of newly -cr eate d fore ign limi ted par tnerships in which he ha d
c on tr oll ingint e re sts ; he a lso a ssi g ne d c e rt a in r e a l pr op e rt y fr om t he c orpor ation to him se lf ind ivi du a lly

and pr oc e e de d to c la im i t a s his ho me ste a d. B a se d o n e vid e nc e of the se tr ans a c tio ns , M ar s h a o b t ai n edth e o rd er o nap p ea l i nth i s p ro ce ed i n g.2 I n eig ht issues, Gary

argues that the district cour t abused its discre t i o n b ec ause (1) the turnover relief order ed by the district is insufficiently specific reg arding the proper ty to be turned
over a nd extends to ex empt proper ty ; (2) the a

ppointed rec eiver

had an inte re st in the underlying lit ig a tio n a

nd the dis tr ic t c ourt

imp ro pe rl y

awa rd e d h im fe e s with out a

sh ow ingof

re a so na ble ne ss or complete d work; and ( 3) there was no showingof g ood cause to appoint a master in c hance ry , the appointee ha d an intere st in the lit igation, and was not a lice nsed attorne y . W e wi l l reve rse a nd
r e ma n d th e o r d e r a s it p e rta in s to th e tu

r n o v e r , th e r e c e iv e r appoi n te d , an d th e r e c e iv e r ’ s f

e e . We
are without jurisdiction t o consider the issues relate d to the appointment of a ma ster in cha ncer y . BACK GR OUND I n this cause, Ma

rsha soug ht a ra

ng e of r emedies to aid in enforc ing he r judg ment ag ainst Gary

in the underlying a ction. The district cour t hear d evidence that, ar ound the time the court re ndere d judgme nt on the jury ’s verdic t, G ary undertook a series of transac tions that had the eff ect of :

• transfe rringthe business assets of his wholly -owne d Texas c orporation, Paper R e s o u r c e s In t e r n a t i o n a l , In c . — i n c l u d i n g o f

f i c e e qu i p m e n t , i n t e l l e c tu a l p r o p e r t y, tax credits, an dacc ounts rece ivable—to a ne wly -cr eate d Alaska limited pa rt ne rs hip , Pa

pe r R e so ur c e s Inte rn a tio na l L .P ., wh ic h M oy e r s ub se qu e ntl y desig nated a s the succe ssor to his Tex as cor poration;

• transfe rringcer

tain land and a ssets “per

tinent to the land”—inc luding livestock, horses, a sprayer, a

truck, tra ilers, heavy

equipment, and a

welder —from the Texas corporation to a newly -cr eate d Alaska limi t ed partne rship, Flore nce I nvestments L .P.;

• transfe rring t h e T ex as cor poration’s 100 a cre s of re maining la nd to Gary individually , who proc eede d to claim the prope rty as his homestead; a

ndGar y ’s daug hter, Anne tte Capriotti, was assig ned a one p er ce n t interest in ea ch limited 2 partne rship. The re maining one perc ent of ea ch limited partner ship was held by its ge nera l partner
. Th is m ay e xpla in t he re fe re nc e s to F lor e nc e in t he name s o f s ome of

the ne w e nti tie s. 3 3 • placing control of both limited partne rships in G ary , who had 98% l i m ited par tn e r s h ip inte r e s ts in

b o th , a s w e ll a s 1 0 0 % me mb e r s h ip in e a c hli mi ted 2 partne rship’s g ener al partne rs, a pair of newly -cr eate d West Indies limit ed lia bil ity c or po ratio ns . T he g e ne ra l pa rt ne r of Pa pe r R e so ur c e s Inte rn a tio na l L .P. was Pape r Resourc es Mana g ement, L .L .C.; the ge nera l partner o f F lorenc e I nv e stm e nts L .P. wa s F lor e nc e Inv e stm e nts Ma na g e me nt, L .L .C. The princ ipal place of both limit ed par tnerships was the sa

me Flo re n ce, Texas, address a s the orig inal Texas corpora

tion. 3 Although a dmitti ng to an ea rlier utteranc e that he had wanted to “pre serve something for my self,” G ary

insisted that there was nothing “ illega l or immoral” about these transac tions. He emphasized that, in the underly ing action, the issue of whe ther Pape r Resourc es International, I nc. was his alter

eg o had been submitt ed to the jury , which had f ound in the neg ative. Ga

ry conclude d that beca use only he, and not Pape r Resourc es International, I nc., was a judgme nt debtor, nothing preve nted t h e co m p any

from re structuringand tra nsfer ring its assets so as to avoid entang lement wi th G ary ’s pers on al le g a l pr ob le ms. As he put it , “ Pa pe r R e so ur c e s is and

wa s a se pa rate e nti ty from me, a

nd Ihad a r esponsibility

to do the bes t I co u l d b y those companie s to keep them fr om beingsubject to any

thing that would g o wrongwith me.” Mars ha char acte ri zes the tr ans a c tio ns a s a “ patte rn of sh if tin g fu nd s and a sse ts t o avoid e xe c u ti o n ” o nth e u n s u

p e r s e d e d ju d g me n t. A t t

h e c lo s e o f

th e h e ar in g , th e d is tr ic t c ourt g rante d the remedies M arsha had requested, including (1) a temporary injunction barringGar

y from transfe rring assets related to his businesses; (2) a char g ing or der a g ainst Gary ’s intere sts in the twoTh e re c or d d oe s n ot i nd ic a te wh e the r t his or any oth e r i nju nc tiv e re lie f i s p re se ntl y

in e ff e c t. 4 4 limit ed par

tnerships, see Tex. Rev. Civ. St at. Ann. ar t. 6132a-1 (West Supp. 2004-05); (3) a turnove r order ; a nd (4) the appointment of Steve Pena, an ac countant who ha d serve d as Mar sha’s damag es expert in the underlying c ase, a s both rece iver a nd master in cha

ncer y , and aw ardinghim fees. Ga ry larg e ly did no t c on te st e ith e r t

he inj un c tio n o r t

he c ha rg ingor de r, and ne ith e r are a t iss ue on a pp e a l, 4 but contends that the district cour t abused its discretion with re g ard to other relief it ordere d.
DI SCU SSIO N Gar y bring s eig ht issues in which he cha lleng es the district cour t’s order of turnover relief , its appointment of Pena as re ceive r, its fee awa rd to Pena, a

nd its appointment of Pena as
m a s t e r i nc h an c e r

y.
Stand ard of review

We reviewa turnove r orde r, an a ppointment of a rec eiver , and an awa rd of fe es to the
rec eiver for a n abuse of

discretion. See B eaumont Bank , N.A. v. Buller , 8 0 6 S. W. 2 d 2 2 3 , 2 2 6 ( T e x. 19 91 ); Ro e bu c k

v . H or n , 7 4 S. W.3 d 1 60 , 1 63 (T e x. Ap p. —Beau mo nt 200 2, no pe t.) ; Stanfield v. Sta nfi e ld , No. 09-99-00453- CV, 2000 Tex. App. L EXI S 6743, at *14 (Te x . App.—B eaumont 2000,
no pe t.) (n ot d e signate d f

or pu bli c a tio n) ; Ru sk

v . R us k, 5 S.W .3d 299, 306-07 (Te x . App.—Houston [14t h D ist .] 19 99 , p e t. d e nie d) ; see also Fortenbe rry v. Cavanaugh , N o . 0 3

- 0 4

- 0 0 8 1 6

- C V , 2 0 0 5 T e x. App. L EXI S 4665, at *5-6 (Te x . App.—Austin 2005, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Schulze v . Cap Collection JV7 , N o. 03 -0 3- 00 39 0- CV , 2 00 4 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 84 54 , at *8 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin Se pt. 23, 2004, pet. filed) ( mem. op.). A trial c ourt may be re verse d for a

busing its discre tion if we find5

that i t ac t ed in an unreasona ble or a rbitrar y manner , without refe renc e to any g uiding r

ules and principles. Beaumont Bank , N.A. , 806 S.W .2d at 226.
Turnover re lief

Gar y asser t s i n his first issue that the district court’s turnove r orde r constitutes an
a bu se of dis c re tio n b e c a

us e it f a ils to i de nti fy sp e c if

ic no n- e xemp t pr op e rt

y to be tur ne d o ve r. I n h is
se c on d, so me wh a t ove rl a

pp ing iss ue , he c on te nd s that th e tur no ve r o rd e r i mpe rm iss ibl y e xten ds to exempt property . A “turnove r” or der i s a st atutory proce dural de vice throug h which judg ment
cre ditors may rea ch asse ts of a judg ment debtor that a re othe rwise diff

icult to attach or le vy

by ordinary leg al proc ess. SeeTex. Ci v. Prac. & R em . Code Ann. § 31.002 (West Supp. 2004-05); Beaumont Bank

, N.A. , 806 S.W .2d at 224. To obtain relief under the “turnove r s t at u t e, ” s ection 3 1
. 0 0 2 o f th e c iv il p r a c ti c e s an d r e me d ie s c o d e , a ju d g me n t c r e d it o r mu s t p r o v e ( 1 ) the judg ment debtor owns pr operty , including prese nt or future r ights to prope rty ; (2) the pr operty is not ex empt from attac hment, execution, or seizure; and (3) the property “ca nnot rea dily be attached or levied on or by ordinary leg al proc ess.” Te x . Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. § 31.00 2 (a ). The district cour t
ma de the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s r e g ard ingthe se statut or y e le me nts :
1. Def endant owns pr operty

descr ibed as 100% me mbership intere st in Paper Resource s Manag ement, L .L .C. a n d100% member ship interest in Flore nce I nv e stm e nts Man a g e me nt, L .L .C. Pa pe r R e so ur c e s Ma

na g e me nt, L .L .C. is purportedly

the g ener al manag er of

Paper Resour ces L imited Par tnership, and Flore nce I

nvestments Manag ement, L .L .C. is purportedly the g ener al manag er of F lorenc e Investm en t s L imited Partnership. Paper Re source s L imited Partnership is purportedly the s ucce ssor of P aper Resource s I nternational, I nc., of which D efe ndant is the sole owner , office r, and dire ctor; 2. These pr operties a

re not exempt under any statute from attachment, execution or se izur e fo r t

he satis fa c tio n o f l ia

bil iti e s.6

3
. Thes e p r o p e rti e s c an n o t r e a d il y b e a tt a c h e d

o r le v ie d u p o nb y o r d in ar y le g al pr oc e ss. Upon findingthat the eleme nts of section 31.002(a ) ar e satisfied, a trial court ha s discretion to issue a r ang e of r emedie s , i n cl u ding or deringthe judg ment debtor to turn over nonexempt property

that is in the debtor’s possession or is subject to the de btor’s co n t ro l to a desig nated she riff or

constable f

or execution, and “appoint[ing] a rec eiver with the authority to take possession of the nonex empt proper ty , sell it, and pay the proceeds to the judg ment cre ditor to the extent required to satisfy

the judg ment.” Id . § 31.002(b). Her e, the district court a ppointed Steve Pe na a s r e c e ive r a

nd ve ste d h im w iththe fo llo wi ngpo we rs :
all the power and authority to take possession of all nonexempt prop er t y o f Gary Moy er that is in t he ac tu al o r const ructive posse ssion or control of Ga ry Moy er, inc lud ingbut no t li mited to al l pr op e rt y inc ide nta l to or

a sso c iate d w iththe da ily op e ratio ns of

Pa pe r R e so ur c e s Inte rn a tio na l, I nc ., P a pe r R e so ur c e s Ma

na g e me nt, L .L .C. , a nd F lor e nc e I nv e stm e nts Ma na g e me nt, L .L .C. , inc lud ing but not l imi te d to a ll c a sh , a c c ounts re c e iva ble , n ote s r e c e iva

ble , p ro mis so ry

no te s, dr a ft s and

c he c ks , monies on deposit in financial institutions , financ ial ac co unts (bank ac counts), c e rt i f i c a t e s o f d e p o s i t , m o n e y m ar k e t a c c o un t s , a c c o un t s h e l d b y an y th i r d

p arty, stocks, all secur ities, all r eal proper ty deeds to r eal proper

ty , titles to automobi les or other ve hicles, boats, plane s, all safe deposit box es or va ults and the contents ther ein, mon ie s re c e ive d by the De fe nd ant in the fo rm of c he c ks , c a shor c re dit c ard pa y me nts or re ceipts; any

and all ca uses of action or chooses of action, contra ct rig hts whether prese nt or future; and all furniture , fix tures, equipment, supplies and inventory , and all do cum e nts , b oo ks and re c or ds re late d to any

of the he re in d e sc ri be d p ro pe rt y (includingfinanc ial rec ords) that a re in the a ctual or c onstru ct i v e possession or c on tr ol o f G ary

Mo y e r; and

to p ay the pr oc e e ds to Pla int if

f to the e xten t r e qu ir e d to satisfy her judg ment (or the ba lance due if the judg ment has been partially satisfied) which amount includes principal, prejudg ment and post judgme nt interest, tog ether wi th c os ts.
Ga ry ur g e s th a t th is o rd e r i mpe rm iss ibl y fa ils to i de nt if

y spec if ic no n- e xemp t pr op e rt

y or ri g hts the re to that he po ss esse d th a t w ou ld e na ble him to c omp ly

wi th t he or de r, but me re ly

e mpl oy s a7

“laundr y list” of broad pr operty

cate g ories with little or no relationship to the evidenc e. In response , Marsha contends that it is sufficie nt that the order purports to be limit ed to “none x empt proper ty of Gar y Moy er that is in t he ac tual or constructive possession or control of Ga ry Moy er,” and identifies

“ a ll p ro pe rt

y inc ide nta l to or a sso c iate d with the da ily op e ra tio ns of Pa pe r R e so ur c e s Inte rn a tio na l, Inc ., Pa pe r Re so ur c e s Mana g e me nt, L .L .C. , and F lor e nc e Inv e stm e nts Ma na g e me nt, L .L .C. ” Whil e herse lf cha

rac terizing the r emainder of the pa ragraph a s a “la

undry list,” Marsha sug g ests that the district court did not abuse its discretion in employing broad categ ories in the fa ce of evidenc e that Gar y had bee n “eng ag ed in a

complicated ma

neuver ing of

assets that had c onverte d previouslynonexempt assets to homestead and that ha s made the e x ecution on asse ts difficult.”

Gar y ’s ar g ument finds support in de cisions inva lidating turnover order s in whole or part f o r l ac k o f specific ity

conce rning the prope rty

to be turned ove r. See Ne wman v. Toy , 926 S.W. 2d 62 9, 63 1- 32 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 96 , w ri t de nie d) ; Ex parte Prado , 911 S.W .2d 849, 850 (T e x. App .— Austin 1 99 5, no wr it) ; se e als o I n r e Mo ntgom e ry , 1 3 8 S. W. 3 d 5 6 9 , 5 7 2

- 7 3 ( T e x. Ap p. —B e a

umo nt 2 00 4, pe t. d e nie d) ; Ro e bu c k v . H or n , 7 4 S. W. 3 d

1 6 0 , 163- 6 5 ( T e x. Ap p. —B e a

umo nt 2 00 2, no pe t.) ; Bu rn s v . M ill e r, Hi e rsc he

, M ar te ns & Ha

y war d, P. C. , 948 S.W .2d 31 7, 32 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 99 7, wr it d e nie d) ; Bergman v . Bergman , 8 2 8 S. W. 2 d 5 5 5 , 5 5 7 ( T e x. App.—El Paso 1992, no writ). Marsha attempts to distinguish these decisions as involving turnove r
or de rs that, d

ue to t he ir va g ue ne ss o f l a c k o f s pe c if ic ity , e nc omp a sse d e xemp t pr op e rt y or thi rd -p art y proper ty , or ef fec ted other unla

wful r es u l t s that she asse rts are not present he re. I n fac t, some of th e s e d e c is io n s h av e a

p p e ar e d to li n k th e s p e c if

ic it y r e qu ir e me n t t o th e s e p ur

p o s e s . So me e mp h a s iz e that turnover or ders a

re in the nature of ma

ndatory injunctions and are enfor cea ble by contempt, and thus implicate due pr ocess c oncepts. Bergman , 828 S.W .2d at 557 (orde r “must be de finite, clea r8

and co n ci s e, leaving the person e njoined in no doubt about his duti es, and should not be suc h as
wo u l d ca l l o nh i mfo r i n t er

p re t at i o n s , i n fe re n ce s o r c o n cl u s i o n s ”) (c i t i n g Schult z v. Fifth Judicial Di st. Cou rt o f A pp e als , 810 S.W .2d 738 (Tex. 1991), and Gulf Oil Corp. v. W alton , 317 S.W .2d 260, 26 4 ( Te x. Civ . App .—El Pa so 19 58 , n o w ri t) ); see also Burns , 948 S.W .2d at 324 (same ). Other s acknow ledg e that this require ment aids in e nsuring that the turnover order does not e x tend to exempt proper ty or prop er t y o f third par ties. Roebuc k, 74 S.W .3d at 163-64 (br oad turnove r orde r imp ro pe rl y e xten de d to a sse ts ow ne d in wh ole or pa rt by thi rd pa rt ie s) ; Burns , 948 S.W .2d at 326-27 (non- s p e c if

ic o r d e r to tu r no v e r “ c a s h , mo n e y

o r d e r s , c h e c k s . . . in

an y f o r m a n d in an y one’s possession which Bur

ns benef icially owns or may own in the future” improperly extended to exempt and cur rently nonexis tent proper

ty). S imilarly , we have re cog nized that a turnover or der r equiring a judg ment debtor to m ake cash pay ments without specify

ing the non-exempt asset from whic h the pay ments are to be der ived ef fec tively forc ed the judgme nt de btor “to choose betwee n work [to earn the re quired pa

y ment] and jail,” and held that “ the impositi on of such a choice is bey ond the power of the [turnover] statute.” Ex parte Prado , 911 S.W .2d at 850.

But the spe cificity

require ment is not merely a mea ns to these ends. Instead, it derive s fr om t he statut or

y re qu ir e me nts and

lim itatio ns g ov e rn ing tur

no ve r r e lie f. To me e t th e re qu ir e me nts of section 31.002, the court’s order must be specific in both identify ing the non-exempt property that is susc eptible to tur

nover relief and in ta iloring the turnover relief to that property . As the Bergman court e x plained:
In the Sc hu ltz

opinion, the [ Supreme] C o u rt re ferringto the turnover statute said: Th e s tatute r e qu ir e s a

f a c tu a l s h o w in g th at t

h e ju d g me n t d e b to r

h a s non-exempt pr op e rt y tha t is not rea dily su b j ec t to ordinary

execution. . . . Upon proof of the nece ssary fac ts, it authoriz es the trial c ourt to order affi rmative a ction by

the9

judgme nt debtor and othe rs t o as sist the judgment cr editor in subjectingsuch none xemp t pr op e rt

y to s a tis fa c tio n o f t

he un de rl yingjud g me nt.
828 S.W .2d at 557 (e mphasis in origina l). The c ourt of appe als then ela borate d that this langua g e ce rtainly

mandates that the trial court is to have a hear ing, de termine what specific assets are exempt, and what asse ts are subje ct to the cour t’s order and then to direc t the pay

ment as the c ourt deter

mines is p roper. I f the statute r equire s a fa c tua l sh ow ingof

no n- e xemp t pr op e rt

y , th e c ourt ha s to be ac tin g wi th r e g ard to c e rt a in s pe c if

ic pr op e rt y that it wi ll dir e c t be tur

ne d ov e r t o s a tis fy

a jud g me nt. I t is not to b e lef

t to the debtor to deter

mine what prope rty

that person ha s and whe ther it is ex empt. Otherw ise, there would be no need for a ny ‘fa ctual showing ’ by

‘proof of the ne cessa

ry fac ts’ as re quired by

[t he supre me cour

t’s] opi nion.
Id
. The turnove r orde r in this case doe s not comply with section 31.002. SeeTex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code § 3 1
. 0 0 2
. I t compels Gar y to turn over pr operty

beyond the sole non-e x empt proper ty the district court found that he possessed and c ontrolled and that “ cannot r eadily be attac hed or levied upon by

ordinary l eg al proc ess,” his “100% membership intere st in P aper Resource s Manag ement, L .L .C. a

nd 100% membership interest in Flore nce I nvestments Manag ement, L .L .C.” Moreove r, the list refe rs to proper ty items whose exist ence —whether contro l l ed by

Moy er, Pape r Resource s I nternational, I nc., or any other entity —is not supported by

the evidenc e. F or example, the re wa s n o e vid e nc e pr e se nte d re g ard ing any “ bo a ts, ” “ pla ne s, ” and “ sa fe de po sit

bo xes o r v a

ult s and the c ontents therein.” In Newman , we invalidated a portion of a n order requiringturnover of money rec eipts from a podiatrist’s “independent wo rk as a sole proprie tor” whe re the re w as no evidenc e that he, in f

act, r ece ived any

sums from a sole propr ietorship and, “in a ll events, the orde r omit[ ted] to i dentify

specific ally

such prope rty .” Newman , 926 S.W .2d at 631-32.10 Som e of the c a te g or ie s, a s Ma

rs ha ob se rv e s, do a

pp e ar t o e nc omp a ss p ro pe rt y wh os e exis tence was e stab l ished in the evidenc e. B ut the mere fac t that ge nera l property cate g ories in a turnover order coincide with some actua l exis ting property is insufficient to cure the orde r’s lac k of specific ity . The B eaumont Court of Appe als invalidated a simil ar turnover order that “did not make
any sp e c if ic re fe re nc e to t

he a ssets th at were pr ov e d d ur ingthe he ari ng ” but r e fe rr e d g e ne ra lly to “books,” “ stocks,” “titles to automobiles,” “cash,” “other vehicles,” and “r eal pr operty /deeds to re al proper ty .” Roebuc k, 74 S.W .3d at 163. Although some of these c ateg ories included spe cific none xemp t a sse ts of the jud g me nt de bto r, the c ourt re ve rs e d and re mand e d the or de r in i ts enti re ty be c a us e “ [a] re fe re nc e to b ro a d c a te g or ie s o f a sse ts d oe s n ot c on sti tut e a re fe re nc e to s pe c if

ic a sse ts that i s re q u i red in a turnover or der” and the or der c ontained “nume rous g ener alized categ ories of assets without any

supporting pr oof as to their ownership by [t he debtor ].” Id
. W e are simi larl y

pe rs ua de d th at w e mus t r e ve rs e and re mand the tur no ve r o rd e r i n this case. Its fatal lac k of spec ificity cannot be ju s t i fi ed , as Mar sha urg es, by evidenc e of G ary ’s “complicated m aneuve ringof asse ts that had conve rted pre viously non-exempt assets to homestead and that has ma de the e x ecution on asse ts difficult.” Even if these a re va lid concer

ns, we a re not p e r mi tt e d to ign o r e th e r e s tr ic ti o n s an d li mi tati o n s th e le g is latu

r e h a s p la c e d

in s e c ti o n3 1
. 0 0 2
. We
no te th a t i n

ju n c ti v e r e li e f

is av a il a b le to p r e v e n t j u d g me n t d e b to r s f r o m d is s ip a ti n g o r

c o n v erting
a sse ts a nd that, i n f a c t, t he dis tr ic t c ourt

g ra nte d s uc h r e lie f h e re . N or did Ga ry ’s tr ans fe r o f a sse ts appea r to cre ate unc erta inty

reg ardingthe nature of the a ssets at issue. To t he contrary , the evidenc e clea rly identified sever al specific items of business assets, re al prope rty , and asse ts “pertinent to theAt the t urnover hear ing, Gary ’s attorney stated t hat “not one si ng le piece of post-judg ment 5 discovery has g one out.” Ma

rsha’ s attorney

argued that post-judg ment discovery was not re quired beca use Ga ry “does not g et to dictate or choose howIg o about collec ting on my judgme nt.” 11 land.” To the extent that Mar sha desire s g reater c larity conce rning the nature of Ga ry ’s prope rty , she
m ay s e e k i tth r o u g hp o s t
-

j u d g m e n td i s c o v e r

y. SeeTex. R. C iv. P. 621a. 5 We sustain Gary ’s first issue, and reve rse a nd rema nd the turnover

order for f urther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. We thus do not rea ch Ga ry ’s s econd issue in whic h he
c on te nd s th e c ur

re nt o rd e r i mpr op e rl y

e xten ds to e xemp t pr op e rt y , b ut t ru st t hat th e dis tric t c ourt , while ensuring the require d specific ity reg arding non-exempt proper ty , will ensure that a

ny further turnover or ders c omply

with this l imitation. Appoin tm ent of Marsha’s exper t as re ceive r

Th e re c e ive r a

pp ointe d b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt , St e ve D. Pe na , a c e rt if ie d p ub lic
acc ountant, had bee n Marsha ’s retained dama g es expert in the under lying c ase. G ary contends that Pena’s appointment was an abuse of discretion because Pena has an int ere st in the matter. We ag ree that the district court a

bused its discretion in appointing Pena
. Th e pa rt ie s a g re e that th e c on fl ic t- of -i nte re st s tand ard

in s e c tio n 6 4. 02 1 o f t

he c ivi l prac tice and reme dies code g overne d the district c ourt’s rec eiver appointment. SeeTex. Ci v. Prac. & Re m. Code Ann. § 64.021 (West Supp. 2004-05). Section 64.021 provides, in re levant par t, that a person appointed as a rece iver for proper ty located in this state must not be “a party , attorney , or other pe rson intere sted in the ac tion for appointment of a rec eiver .” Id . O n a

pp e a l, t he partie s’ dispute focuse s primarily on the meaning of “inter ested in the action for appointment of a receiv er .” (E mph a sis a dd e d. ) Ga

ry c on te nd s that Pe na , a re ta ine d e xpe rt wh o te sti fi e d o n b e ha lf of Mars ha in12

the under lying a ction, would nece ssarily be intere sted and biase d aga i n s t him when ac ting a s
rec eiver . Marsha

does not dispute that Pena wa s “intere sted” in the underlying action , but contends that Pe n a h a s n o inte r e s t i nth e r e c e iv e r s h ip a c ti o nit s e lf
. Sh e a d d s th a t s h e f

il e d “ th e a c ti o nfor appointment of re ceive r” unde r a se parate ca use number from the underly ing divorce and dama g es suit in which Pena testified. See id
. § 31.002(d) ( judgme nt cre ditor may

seek turnove r re lief in either
same c ause in whic h judgme nt was re ndere d or indepe ndent proc eeding ).

We a g re e wi th Mars ha

that th e fo c us on

our i nq uir y mus t be wh e the r P e na

ha s a d is qu a li f yin g inte r e s t i n“ th e a c ti o nf o r a p p o intm e n t o f

r e c e iv e r ” in

p arti c u la r , n o t t h e un d e r ly ing action; we ma

y not ignor e the langu age the leg islature has de liberate ly chosen. See Sorok

olit v. Rhodes , 8 8 9 S
. W
. 2 d239, 241 (Tex. 1994) (“I n applying the plain and common mea ning of the langua g e in a

statut e , c ourt s ma

y no t by imp lic a tio n e nla

rg e the me anin g of any

wo rd in t he statut e beyond its ordinary

meaning ; such implicat i o n i s i nappropr iate whe n leg islative intent may be g a the re d f

ro m a re a so na ble int e rp re tatio n o f t

he statut e a s it

is wri tte n. ” ); Gonzales v. Conce rned Citi ze ns of W

e bb e rv ill e , N o . 0 3

- 0 5
- 0 0 0 1 4

- CV , 2 0 0 5 T e x. Ap p . L EXI S 5 9 0 2 , a t * 1 4 ( T e x. App.—Austin J uly

28, 2005, no pet. h.); see also Jam es v. Robe rts Tel. & Electr. Co. , 206 S.W . 933, 935 (Tex. Comm ’n App. 1918, judg m’t adopted) ( stating c o n fl i ct i ssue in terms of “ [w] hether a
rec eiver who is interested in the rece ivership . . . .”) ( emphasis adde d). However, at least wher e
rec eiver s have be en appointed pr ior to judgme nt, Texas courts have appea red to a ssume that persons interested in the underlying action would likewise be interested in the r ece ivership. See O ’Ferral v. Coolidge , 228 S.W .2d 146, 149 (Tex. 1950) (attorne y for pa rty was “ clea

rly ” disqualified f

rom servingas re ceive r); Zan es v. Mer can til e Ba nk &Tru st C

o ., 49 S.W .2d 922, 928 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1932, writ ref ’d) ( rec eiver

“is an indiffe rent pe rson, betwe en the pa rties to a ca

use,13

appointed by

the cour t to rece ive and pr eser

ve the pr operty

or fund in li tigation pendente lite”) ; Cra wfo rd v . Crawf or d , 163 S.W . 115, 116 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tex ark an a 1 9 1 3, no writ) (“ persons interested in the subje ct-matter of the litigation or results soug ht to be attained there by ” prohibited f r o mr e c e i v e r s h i p a

p p o i n t m e nt) ; s ee also W iley v. Sc lafani , 9 4 3 S. W. 2 d 1 0 7 , 1 1 0 ( T e x. App.—Houston [ 1 st Dist.] 1997, no writ) (r elying on Zanes in a dd re ssi ngsta

nd ingof re c e ive r t o appea l). Howeve r, this case prese nt s the somewhat differ ent question of whe ther a reta ined
e xpe rt in t he un de rl yingc a

us e may no ne the le ss n ot b e int e re ste d in a po st- jud g me nt p ro c e e din g to appoint a re ceive r. This appe ars to b e a q u es t i o n of first impression under Texas law, as Mar sha observe s. Our re solution of that issue depends in pa rt on the nature of the “ interest” w ith which the leg islature wa s conce rned in sec tion 64.021 and its statutory prede cessor s. See T ex . C iv. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.021. Texas courts have long a ssumed that a fina ncial stake in one of the parties would disqualify

a prospe ctive re ceive r. See , e.g. , J ames , 2 0 6 S.W . at 935 (disqualifying sh are ho lde r of pa

rt y ; c iti ng c a se s inv olv ing pa rt ne rs a pp ointe d a s re c e ive rs of

pa rt ne rs hip pr op e rt

y and trustees or executors a ppointed as re ceive r of trusts estate s from which the y wer e compe nsated); Roberts Tel. & Electr. Co. v. Farme rs’ &Merc hants’ Nat. Bank , 155 S.W
. 6 2 9 , 6 3 2 (T ex . Civ. Ap p . — Texarkana

1913), rev’d on other grounds , 206 S.W . 933, 935 (Tex. Comm ’n App. 1918, judgm’ t adopted) ( cashie r and a cting manag er of bank who was a lso shareholde r wa s disqualified from ser ving a s rec eiver

of bank)
. Ho we ve r, we ne e d no t de c ide wh e the r, a s a g e ne ra l pr op os iti on , r e ta ine d e xpe rt s in
un d er l yi n g l i t i gat i o nco u l d ev er b e ap p o i n t ed as re ce i v er i na s u b s equ en tre ce i v er s h i p p ro ce ed i n g. On the rec ord befor e us, there was no e vidence that Pena met the statutory require ments for ser

ving14

as re ceive r in this case. Se e Pe na v . S e ll , 760 S.W .2d 811, 812-13 (Tex
. App.—Amar illo 1988, no
wr it) ; se e als o Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 64.021. There was undisputed evi d en ce t h at Pe na ha d s e rv e d a s Ma

rs ha ’s te sti fy

inge xpe rt in t he un de rl ying c a

us e . Ho we ve r, Mars ha

did no t c a ll Pena to testify

at the hea ringand off

ere d no evidenc e, only

argument, to establish that Pena did not have an o ng oin g bu sin e ss r e latio ns hip , f ina nc ia l st ake , o r o the r i nte re st i n th e re c e ive rs hip . O n th is
rec ord, we are compelled to hold that the di strict court a bused its discretion in appointing Pena as
rec eiver . We sustain Gary ’s third issue.
Rec eiver ship fees

I n his fourth and fif

th issues, Gary argues that the district c ourt abused its discre tion by setting the rec eiver ’s fee without any evidenc e of r easona

bleness, and by

allowing the re ceive r to b e c omp e ns a te d pri or to his dis c ha rg e . M ars ha

re sp on ds that th e or de r a uth or izin g fe e s is interlocutory

beca use the trial c ourt did not purport to determine the total value of the re ceive r’s fe e up to a certain ti me, depriving thi s Court of jurisdiction to consider this issue. Bergeron v . Sessions , 561 S.W .2d 551, 553 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, writ ref ’d n.r.e .). The orde r states that “ it is here by ORDERED, DI RECTED and AUTH ORI Z ED that R e c e i v e r , S T E V E D
. P E N A , C P A p ay h i m s e l f a s r e c e i v e r ’ s f e e s a nam o un tn o tm o r e th antw e n tyfive pe rce nt (25%) o

f all proceeds c oming into his poss ession to be paid by the Rece iver, which amount the Court finds to be a fair, reasonable and nece ssary fee for theRec eive r , an d to dis tr ibute all remaining proceeds to Plaintiff’ s attorney s. . . . Rece iver fe es in excess of twenty -five pe rce nt (25%) may

be aw arde d afte r a

pp lic ati on to a se

pa ra te or de r of t his Court.” (Emphasis adde d.) The plain languag e of the order indicates that at the ti m e t h e o rd er w as sig ned, the c ourt made a15

de te rm inatio n th a t a

tw e nty -f ive pe rc e nt c omm iss ion wo uld be re a so na ble . T he c omm iss ion

c ou ld be collecte d as the proce eds came into the rec eiver ’s possession; only rema ining pr ocee ds would be distributed. Moreover , the cour t found that if the rece iver determined that twenty -five pe rce nt was
no t su ff ic ie nt, he c ou ld a

pp ly fo r m or e in a se pa

ra te re qu e st. Th e pla in l angua g e of the or de r r e su lts in a final determination that twenty -five pe rce nt of proce eds wa s a fa ir, rea sonable a nd nece ssary

fee , and wa s made whe n the orde r wa s signe d. There fore , the orde r wa s not interlocutory and we have jurisdiction to consider whethe r there was evidence to support a finding that the fe e wa s rea sonable. Id
. The re ceive r’s fe e should be mea sured by the value of the ser

vices re ndere d; the results which a

re a ccomplished by the receive r m ust be considered in deter mining a rea sonable fe e. Sta nfi e ld , 2 00 0 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 67 43 , at *1 4; B.B.M.M., Ltd. v. Tex as CommerceBank-Che mical , 77 7 S. W.2 d 1 93 , 1 98 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 1989 , n o p e t.) . T he re mus t be e vid e nc e to establish rea sonablene ss of the fe e. Sta nfi e ld , 2000 Tex. App. L EXI S 6743, at *14. Furthe rmore, prior to a f

i n al acc ounting a

nd discharg e of the rec eiver , only a par tial advanc e towar d a fina l fee may be made beca

use the re asonable ness of the fee is measure d in light of the value of the re ceive r’s work. Bergeron , 5 61 S.W. 2d a t 55 3; se e Sta nfi e ld , 20 00 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 67 43 , a t *1 4; B.B.M.M., Ltd. , 77 7 S.W. 2d a t 19 8. Ye t, in the tr ia l c ourt , n o e vid e nc e wa s p re se nte d o f what w ou ld c on sti tut e a fa ir, rea sonable, or ne cessa ry fee
. Marsha urg es us to presume that the fee is r easona ble beca use there was e vidence that it would be difficult to trac e Ga ry ’s assets a

nd collect them. Eve n assuming she is corre ct, howeve r, there was no testimony

or other evidenc e establishing how much the rec eiver should be compensated16

for the ta sk. Furthe rmore, the value of the rec eiver ’s future or ultimate ac complishments could not have be en conside red a

t the time the order

appointing him wa s signe d. We sustain Gary ’s fourth a nd fi ft h is su e s.
Maste r in chancery

I n his six th, seventh, and e ighth issues, Ga ry asser ts that the trial co u rt err ed by appointing Pena

as master

in chanc ery

without a finding of g ood cause and whe n Pena is not an attorney an d h as an interest in the litigation. SeeTex. R. C iv. P. 171. Marsha re sponds that the appointment of a ma ster in cha ncer y is not a final, appe alable or der. Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 171 permits the trial court, “in exceptional ca ses, for g ood cause ,” to a

ppoint a master in chanc ery “who sha ll be a citizen of this State, and not an attorne y for either party

to the action, nor r elated to e ither par ty .” Id
. The order g ives Pena, as master , “the fullest and broa dest power s” under rule 171, including but not limited to orderingthe produc tion of evidenc e, sche duling he aring s, and ex amining witnesses under oath. Also pursuant to rule 171, Pena must file a master’ s rep o rt , and the c ourt may then conf

irm, modify , corr ect, r ejec t, reve rse or
rec ommit t he re port, afte r it is filed, as the cour t may deem pr oper an d n ec es sary in the particula

r circ umstances of

the ca se. Id
. As a gene ral rule, an appeal may be taken only from a f inal judgme nt. See Lehm ann v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3 d 191 , 195 (T e x. 20 01 ). A jud g me nt is f ina l f or purp os e s o f a

pp e a l if it disposes of all pending parties a nd claims in the rec ord, ex cept as nece ssary to car ry out the decr ee. Id . Be cause Pena must complete his master’ s duties and file a final repor t which the trial court may
acc ept, modify , or fully

reje ct, amongother options, the orde r does not fully dispose of all issues andWe express no opinion reg ardingthe merits of thes e i s s u es in the eve nt they are later 6 pr e se nte d thro ug h o the r a pp e llate ave nu e s. 17 is interlocutory
. Se e id . The leg islature has de clar ed that only cer tain narr ow issues may be broug ht by interlo c u to r

y a p p e a l, an d , in

c o n tr a s t t o th e r e c e iv e r s h ip is s u e s a d dr e s s e d p r e v io u s ly , ano r der appointing a master in chanc ery is not one of them. Se e Ur so v . Ly on Fi n. Se rv

s. , 93 S.W .3d 276, 278 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see also Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51 .0 14 (We st Su

pp . 2 00 4- 05 ); Hardy v . Silva , No. 01-90-00135- CV, 1990 Tex. App. L EXI S 1690 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 1990, no pe t.) (n ot d e sig nate d f or pu bli c a tio n) (“ Withre sp e c t to the order appointi ng a master in chanc ery , we are awar e of no authority authorizing a

n interlocutory appea l from this order.” ). Ac cording ly , we a re w ithout jurisdi ction to consider Ga ry ’s six th, seventh,
and e ig hth iss ue s. 6
CO NC LU SION Havingsustained Gar

y ’s first five issues, w e re v erse and re mand for f urther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Reverse d and Remande d Filed: August 17, 2005