NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

GERMAN RAMIREZ-GONZALEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-50096 

D.C. No. 

3:18-cr-02342-BTM-2 

MEMORANDUM*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

MARY ARAGON, AKA Mary Delgado, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-50178 

D.C. No. 

3:18-cr-02342-BTM-3 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Barry Ted Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 4, 2021

Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and HILLMAN,** District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JUN 10 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Defendants German Ramirez-Gonzalez and Mary Aragon (collectively, 

“Defendants”) appeal their convictions for transporting an illegal alien or aliens 

within the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(II), 

and three supervised release conditions imposed on Ramirez-Gonzalez. We 

affirm, except as to the challenged supervised release conditions.

1. Because the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District 

of California was validly appointed under 28 U.S.C. § 546(d), the United States 

had the legal authority to indict and prosecute Defendants. See CFPB v. Gordon, 

819 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying de novo review to questions of 

constitutional law). We need not consider the constitutionality of Acting Attorney 

General Whitaker’s appointment because, to be valid, “indictments need only be 

signed by ‘an attorney for the government.’” See United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 

987, 998 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1)) (overruled on other

grounds by United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2008)).

2. The Third Superseding Indictment did not prejudicially misstate the 

scienter element of the alien transportation statute when it charged that Defendants

acted with “knowing and in reckless disregard” to violate federal immigration law. 

ER 1-2 (emphasis added). Defendants cannot show prejudice on plain error review 

** The Honorable Timothy S. Hillman, United States District Judge for 

the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
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because framing the indictment conjunctively to require both “knowing and in 

reckless disregard” worked to the Defendants’ advantage by making it harder for 

the government to prove its case. See United States v. Leo-Maldonado, 302 F.3d 

1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[R]eview of an untimely objection to the sufficiency 

of the indictment is limited to the plain error test.”).

3. Applying plain error review, United States v. Conti, 804 F.3d 977, 

981 (9th Cir. 2015), the district court’s jury instructions on aiding and abetting 

liability satisfied the rule announced in Rosemond v. United States that an 

accomplice must have advance knowledge of the crime so that he or she has the 

requisite intent to assist in its commission. 572 U.S. 65, 77-81 (2014). 

4. We review de novo the district court’s denial of Defendants’ Rule 29 

motions for judgments of acquittal. See United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 914 

(9th Cir. 2010). Having considered the evidence presented by the Government at 

trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we agree that there was 

sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Aragon not 

only aided and abetted co-Defendant Patara in the transportation, but also that she 

acted as a principal. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (providing 

standard for district courts to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence to support a 

criminal conviction). We also agree that there was sufficient evidence to show that 

Ramirez-Gonzalez aided and abetted Patara in transporting Lopez, an 
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undocumented passenger in Patara’s car. Defendants can be convicted of aiding 

and abetting even though one alleged principal, co-Defendant Patara, was 

acquitted. As noted, the evidence sufficed to show that Aragon acted as a 

principal, and the government pressed that alternative theory at trial. Regardless of 

Patara’s acquittal, inconsistent verdicts are not a ground for reversal in this case 

because the evidence sufficed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that someone, 

whether Aragon or Patara, committed the underlying substantive crime. United 

States v. Martinez, 806 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1986). 

5. The district court committed plain error by imposing Standard 

Supervised Release Conditions 4, 5, and 13 on Ramirez-Gonzalez. See United 

States v. Vega, 545 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying plain error review to 

supervised release conditions not challenged at sentencing). We previously held 

those conditions to be unconstitutionally vague in United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 

1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, we vacate Standard Supervised Release 

Conditions 4, 5, and 13 for Ramirez-Gonzalez and remand to the district court with 

instructions to issue an amended judgment consistent with our decision in Evans. 

Id. at 1162-64.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED as to 

Standard Supervised Release Conditions 4, 5, and 13.