alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2021252EN.01002401.xml

| 28.6.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 252/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.6.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 252/24

---

Order of the General Court of 4 May 2021 — Asoliva and Anierac v Commission

(Case T-822/19) (1)

(Action for annulment - Agriculture - Classification into one of three categories of virgin olive oil - Implementing measures - Lack of individual concern - Inadmissibility)

(2021/C 252/33)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicants: Asociación Española de la Industria y Comercio Exportador de Aceite de Oliva (Asoliva) (Madrid, Spain), Asociación Nacional de Industriales Envasadores y Refinadores de Aceites Comestibles (Anierac) (Madrid) (represented by V. Rodríguez Fuentes, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: M. Konstantinidis, F. Castilla Contreras and M. Morales Puerta, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Article 1(1)(b) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1604 of 27 September 2019 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2568/91 on the characteristics of olive oil and olive-residue oil and on the relevant methods of analysis (OJ 2019 L 250, p. 14).

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

| 2. | Asociación Española de la Industria y Comercio Exportador de Aceite de Oliva (Asoliva) et Asociación Nacional de Industriales Envasadores y Refinadores de Aceites Comestibles (Anierac) shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Asociación Española de la Industria y Comercio Exportador de Aceite de Oliva (Asoliva) et Asociación Nacional de Industriales Envasadores y Refinadores de Aceites Comestibles (Anierac) shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 27, 27.1.2020.

---
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 01 CR 561-2

)

WITCLIFFE PLUMMER, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM

This Court has had under consideration for some time the

application by attorney Steven Levy for reimbursement under the

Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”). Although the delay is regrettable,

it was occasioned by a matter of principle that the application

poses: the reimbursability of the portion of attorney Levy’s

claim that he attributes to claimed travel time and travel

expense.

This Court’s inquiry has revealed that no official

guidelines exist for the determination of what constitutes

“reasonable travel time and expenses” for CJA purposes, a subject

left to the discretion of the reviewing court. In this instance

fully $3,757 of attorney Levy’s claim--well over 40% of the total

request--is ascribable to those travel-related items. And that

presents in high profile the question as to how much should be

allowed to CJA lawyers generally on the premise that portal-toportal time (say spent in going to court, appearing in court and

returning to the office) appropriately reflects opportunity
costs--after all, what a lawyer has to sell is his or her time.

In this instance attorney Levy resides or offices in Gary,

Indiana, and his claimed charges reflect that location and

Flossmoor as the base points for the claim. This Court sees no

reason why he should be compensated at $125 an hour plus travel

expenses for having made that choice, while many other members of

the criminal defense bar office (say) in the Monadnock Building

(53 West Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, catercorner from the federal

courthouse) and spend only a few minutes in transit.

This Court has recommended to its colleagues that a local

rule be adopted establishing a reimbursement norm based on an

assumed Loop location, and something along those lines is under

consideration by the District Court’s Rules Committee. In the

meantime, this Court has recalculated attorney Levy’s claim as if

an appropriately modest amount of time and travel via shank’s

mare were involved. That would knock the present claim down by

$2,750 attributable to travel time and the entire $207 claimed in

travel expense.

CJA Guideline §230.36(a) reads:

The CJA provides that the reviewing judge shall

fix the compensation and reimbursement to be paid

to appointed counsel. If the court determines

that a claim should be reduced, appointed counsel

should be provided:

prior notice of the proposed reduction with a

brief statement of the reason(s) for it, and

an opportunity to address the matter.

2
This memorandum complies with that requirement, and this Court

awaits a prompt response from attorney Levy.

________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: December 5, 2011

3
# C_2019246EN.01004401.xml

| 22.7.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 246/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.7.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 246/44

---

Action brought on 30 May 2019 — Ntolas v EUIPO — General Nutrition Investment (GN GENETIC NUTRITION LABORATORIES)

(Case T-333/19)

(2019/C 246/46)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Christos Ntolas (Wuppertal, Germany) (represented by: C. Renger, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: General Nutrition Investment Co. (Wilmington, Delaware, United States)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark GN GENETIC NUTRITION LABORATORIES — Application for registration No 13 116 678

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 March 2019 in Case R 1343/2017-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | reject the opposition; |
| --- | --- |

—

reject the opposition;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
# C_2021431EN.01002702.xml

| 25.10.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 431/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.10.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 431/27

---

Judgment of the General Court of 8 September 2021 — AH v Eurofound

(Case T-52/19) (1)

(Civil service - Members of the contract staff - Disclosure of personal data - Request for assistance - Rejection of the request - Lack of competence of the author of an act adversely affecting a member of staff - Document prepared and signed by an external law firm - Liability - Non-material damage)

(2021/C 431/29)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: AH (represented by: N. de Montigny, lawyer)

Defendant: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (represented by: F. van Boven and M. Jepsen, acting as Agents, and by C. Callanan, Solicitor)

Re:

Application under Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment of the decision of 22 March 2018, prepared and signed by an external law firm, concerning a request for assistance made by the applicant as regards the disclosure of his personal data and a claim for damages, and second, compensation for the non-material damage allegedly suffered by the applicant as a result of that decision and that disclosure.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of 22 March 2018, prepared and signed by an external law firm, concerning a request for assistance made by AH as regards the disclosure of his personal data; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of 22 March 2018, prepared and signed by an external law firm, concerning a request for assistance made by AH as regards the disclosure of his personal data;

| 2. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 3. | Orders the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) to pay, in addition to its own costs, those incurred by AH. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) to pay, in addition to its own costs, those incurred by AH.

---

(1)  OJ C 112, 25.3.2019.

---
P u rsuan t t o 5 T H C IR . R. 47. 5, t h e courtha s det erm i n ed that t h i s opi n i on * shou l d n otbe pu bl i shedan d i s not preceden texcept u n der t h e l i m i t ed c i r c um s t anc e s s e tf

o r t h i n 5 T H C IR . R. 47. 5. 4. 

### INTHE UNITED S TATESCOU RT OFAPPEALS

FORTHEFIFTH CIRCU IT

N o. 08- 40992 Su m m ar y Cal endar
AL EJA N D RO M O RA LE S Pet i t i o ne r - Appe l l ant

v. T C O U TLA W , W ar de n R espon den t
- A pp el l ee

A pp ealf

rom t h e U n i t ed S t ates D i st ri ctC ou rt f or th e E aster n D i st ri ctof T exas U SD C N o. 1: 06- C V

- 88

B ef ore G A R Z A , P R A D O , an d E L R O D , C i rcui tJu dg es. P E R C U R IA M: * A l ej an dro M oral es, federalpri son e r #143 68-179, app eal s t h e di st ri ct court’ s di sm i ssal of hi s 28 U
. S
. C
. § 2241 petit i on chal l en gi n g a pri son d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o c e e d i n g i n wh i c h t h e d i s c i p l i n a r y h e a r i n g o f f i c e r( DHO) determ i n ed that M oral es h ada t t em pted a sexu ala ssaultof a pri son coun sel or. M oral es l ost54 da ys of good cond u ctt i m e, i n add i t i on t o ot h er pena l t i es. United States Court of App eals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D Jul y 29, 2009 Cha rl es R. F ulb ru g e II I ClerkN o. 08- 40992

2 M oral es contend s t h at t h e evi den ce w as i n suff i ci en t t o sup port t h e de cisio n of t h e DHO. M or al es has nots how n t hatt he di st r i c tc our ter r ed bydet er m i ni ng t hat t h ere w as “ som e evi den ce” i n t h e rec ord t o sup port t h e D H O ’ s d iscip li n ary de c i s i o n wher e t hatde c i s i o n was b as e d o n t he c o uns e l o r ’ s w r i t t e n r e po r ts t at i ng th a t M ora l es b l ock edh er ex i t f rom the off

i ce, ex p ose dh i m self

to h er i n astate
o f a r o u s a l, a n dre fu s e dh e ro r d e r s to le a v e th e o ffic e . S ee Hu d son v. Joh n son , 2 4 2 F .3 d5 3 4 , 5 3 6 -3 7 (5 th C ir . 2 0 0 1 ). T h e j u d g me n to f

t h e d i s t r i c tc o u r ti s A F F I RMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          24,701
<SECURITIES>                                    11,846
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,381
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,364
<INVENTORY>                                        773
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                50,618
<PP&E>                                          23,636
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,280
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  74,167
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           11,807
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           339
<OTHER-SE>                                      60,067
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    74,167
<SALES>                                         15,060
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                18,352
<CGS>                                            1,565
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    3,270
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 8,352
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,319
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,001
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,318
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,318
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .13
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4512

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

GERALD WAYNE TIMMS,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:15-cr-00169-BO-1)

Submitted: April 20, 2017 Decided: April 24, 2017

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John Keating Wiles, CHESHIRE PARKER SCHNEIDER & BRYAN, PLLC, Raleigh, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. 

May-Parker, First Assistant United States Attorney, Donald R. Pender, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Gerald Wayne Timms appeals his conviction for possession of contraband in 

prison, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791 (2012). Timms contends that his conviction was 

improper, because as a civil detainee under the Adam Walsh Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4248 

(2012), he was not an “inmate” under the meaning of § 1791. Timms argues that 

“inmates” are held in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, while Adam Walsh detainees 

are in the custody of the Attorney General. We affirm.

Section 1791 prohibits an “inmate of a prison” from possessing a prohibited 

object. 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2). While “inmate” is not specifically defined, “prison” is 

defined as “a Federal correctional, detention, or penal facility or any prison, institution, or 

facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or 

agreement with the Attorney General.” 18 U.S.C. § 1791(d)(4). Adam Walsh Act 

detainees are committed to the custody of the Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d). 

Thus, we find that Timms is an inmate under the meaning of § 1791. See 28 C.F.R. 

§ 500.1(c) (including “detainees” and other “persons held” in the definition of “inmate” 

in Bureau of Prisons regulation); see also United States v. Savage, 737 F.3d 304, 309 (4th 

Cir. 2013) (noting that, “for purposes of § 4248, there is no substantive difference 

between vesting legal custody in the Attorney General and legal custody in the [Bureau 

of Prisons]”).
3

Accordingly, we affirm Timms’ conviction. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. §1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Vascular Solutions, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Howard Root, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify to my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.
        The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


2.
        The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




| | /s/ Howard Root                                  
| | -------------------------------------------------
| | Howard Root
Chief Executive Officer
July 27, 2007







---
f8k122309ex10i_celsius.htm


     

    Exhibit
10.1

    


     

    SERIES B CONVERSION
NOTICE

    


    
      	
              TO:

            	
              Celsius
      Holdings, Inc.

              140
      NE 4th
      Avenue, Suite C

              Delray
      Beach, Florida 33483

              Facsimile:  561
      276 2268

            



     

    The
undersigned owner of 4,011 shares of Series B Convertible Preferred Stock
(“Series B Shares”) issued by Celsius Holdings, Inc., a Nevada corporation, (the
“Company”), and 332 Series B Shares accrued thereon for a total of 4,343 Series
B Shares.

    


    The
undersigned hereby irrevocably exercises its right to convert 4,343 Series B
Shares, which based on the current Conversion Price, are to be converted into
4,343,000 shares of the Company’s Common Stock post-split taking place on
December 23, 2009. Enclosed herewith is the certificate or certificates
representing 4,011 Series B Shares, it being understood that the 332 Series B
Shares accrued thereon, have not been issued to the undersigned in certificate
form.

    


    The
undersigned directs that the Common Stock and certificates therefor deliverable
upon conversion, together with any check in payment for fractional Common Stock,
be registered in the name of and/or delivered to the undersigned unless a
different name has been indicated below.  All capitalized terms used
and not defined herein have the respective meanings assigned to them in the
Series B Shares Certificate of Designation and Securities Purchase Agreement
between the undersigned and the Company.  The conversion pursuant
hereto shall be deemed to have been effected at the date and time specified
below, and at such time the rights of the undersigned as a holder of the Series
B Shares so converted shall cease and the Person or Persons in whose name or
names the Common Stock Issued at Conversion shall be registered shall be deemed
to have become the holder or holders of record of the Common Shares represented
thereby and all voting and other rights associated with the beneficial ownership
of such Common Shares shall at such time vest with such Person or
Persons.

    


    In
connection with the above requested conversion, Celsius Holdings, Inc. has
agreed to pay on December 15, 2010 $100,000 (one hundred thousand) as
compensation for the premature conversion of the preferred shares.

     

    Date:  December
23, 2009

     

    /s/ William H.
Milmoe       

     

    By:
William H. Milmoe

    Title:
President of CDS Ventures of South Florida, LLC

    3299 NW
Second Ave

    Boca
Raton, FL
33431                                                                                     Agreed
to:  /s/ S.
Haley                        


    S. Haley,
CEO

    Celsius
Holdings, Inc.
#### Christopher Carter MIKELL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Leroy CARTLEDGE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-6517.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 28, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 2, 2011.

Christopher Carter Mikell, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, James Anthony Mabry, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Carter Mikell seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Mi-kell has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of ap-pealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
# C_2019372EN.01001301.xml

| 4.11.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 372/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.11.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 372/13

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (Romania) lodged on 15 July 2019 — CY and Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ v Inspecția Judiciară, Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii and Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție

(Case C-547/19)

(2019/C 372/13)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: CY and Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’

Defendants: Inspecția Judiciară, Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii and Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție

Question referred

Must Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, Article 19(1) thereof and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding the intervention of a constitutional court (a body which is not, under national law, a judicial institution) as regards the way in which a supreme court has interpreted and applied infra-constitutional legislation in the activity of establishing panels hearing cases?

---
IIA 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. J. RES. 40 

Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United 

States Code, of the rules submitted by the Department of the Treasury 

and the Internal Revenue Service relating to the reporting requirements 

for interest that relates to deposits maintained at United States offices 

of certain financial institutions and is paid to certain nonresident alien 

individuals. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 15, 2012 

Mr. RUBIO (for himself, Mr. CORNYN, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. PAUL, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. DEMINT, Mr. BLUNT, and Mr. LEE) 

introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of 

title 5, United States Code, of the rules submitted by 

the Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service relating to the reporting requirements for 

interest that relates to deposits maintained at United 

States offices of certain financial institutions and is paid 

to certain nonresident alien individuals. 

Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS

2 

•SJ 40 IS 

1 That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the De2 partment of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service relat3 ing to the reporting requirements for interest that relates 

4 to deposits maintained at United States offices of certain 

5 financial institutions and is paid to certain nonresident 

6 alien individuals (published at 77 Fed. Reg. 23391 (April 

7 19, 2012)), and such rule shall have no force or effect. 

Æ 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS