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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES )

 ) 02 CR 200-22

v. ) 

) Judge Rebecca Pallmeyer

ANDRE LAWRENCE ) 

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REDUCED SENTENCE

UNDERSECTION 404 OF THE FIRST STEP ACT

The defendant, ANDRE LAWRENCE, has moved for a reduction in sentence 

pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. Mr. Lawrence explained in his 

motion that he qualifies for relief under the plain language of Section 404 because his 

offense of conviction is a “covered offense” as defined by that statute. Dkt. 1862 at 6 

(“Motion”). The government argues in response that Mr. Lawrence is ineligible for relief

because, in its view, the statutory range has not changed. The government essentially 

argues that in determining Mr. Lawrence’ eligibility for a sentence reduction under 

Section 404 of the First Step Act, the Court should not consider Mr. Lawrence’ offense of 

conviction, but the drug amount found by the Court at sentencing. See Dkt. 1867 at 6

(“Response”). This argument is without merit, and has consistently been rejected by 

district courts around the country.

For the reasons explained in Mr. Lawrence’ motion for reduction in sentence and 

below, this Court should follow their lead. The plain language of Section 404 makes clear 

Congress’s intent: to permit relief for all defendants convicted of federal drug offenses 

for which the Fair Sentencing Act reduced the statutory penalties. As a result, Mr. 

Lawrence is eligible for a reduced sentence.

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I. Mr. Lawrence is Eligible for Relief Under Section 404 of the First 

Step Act.

In 2002, Mr. Lawrence was charged by indictment with conspiracy to distribute 

and possess with intent to distribute an amount in excess of 50 grams of crack cocaine, 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; 8419a)(1) and 860(a) (Count One), and possessing a 

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 

(Count Thirty-Nine). Dkt. No. 172. The government then timely filed a §851 notice that 

increased Mr. Lawrence’s statutory penalties. Mr. Lawrence went to trial and was found 

guilty of the charges. The Probation Officer “held” Mr. Lawrence “accountable” for at 

least 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base. PSR at 5:128. Judge Andersen adopted the PSR’s 

quantity finding and sentenced Mr. Lawrence to a below-Guideline sentence of 300

months, with an additional 60 months’ consecutive for the firearm, which comported 

with the pre-FSA statutory penalty of twenty years to life imprisonment. Dkt. No. 936. 

After re-sentencing based on an error in the criminal history calculation, Judge Andersen 

sentenced Mr. Lawrence to a below-Guideline sentence of 252 months, with an 

additional 60 months’ consecutive for the firearm, which also comported with the preFSA statutory penalty of twenty years to life imprisonment. Dkt. No. 1473.

Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 defines a “covered offense” to mean “a 

violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified” 

by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. 115-391, Title IV, § 404(a), and 

provides that “a court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may,” upon motion, 

“impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act [] were in 

effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” Id., § 404(b). 

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Had the Court applied section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act to Mr. Lawrence, his 

statutory penalty range would be five to forty years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). The § 

851 notice would have increased that statutory penalty range to ten years to life. Under 

the First Step Act, the statutory penalties are therefore altered. According to the 

government, however, the Court should determine Mr. Lawrence’s statutory penalty 

range under the Fair Sentencing Act based on the uncharged quantity alleged in the PSR 

and adopted by the judge at sentencing. Government’s Response at 6. Thus, the 

government contends, Mr. Lawrence’s statutory range would remain twenty years to life 

under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 

The government is wrong. 

The government’s logic is inconsistent with the plain language of Section 404. The 

statute refers to the defendant’s “offense,” and asks whether it is one for which “statutory 

penalties” were modified, not to “relevant conduct.” § 404(a). An “offense” is a specific 

term applicable to a concept with specific legal consequences that are distinct from the 

legal consequences attendant to “relevant conduct.” It is a well-settled principle of 

statutory construction that “[w]hen Congress enacts a statute using a phrase that has a 

settled judicial interpretation, it is presumed to be aware of the prior interpretation.” In 

re Ford, 574 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Comm'r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 

Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993)). Among other differences between the defendant’s 

“offense” and his “relevant conduct,” “relevant conduct” is not subject to “statutory 

penalties” as referenced in the First Step Act. Relevant conduct is a consideration in 

sentencing under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See USSG § 1B1.3. Relevant 

conduct does not affect and cannot increase the statutory maximum attached to a 

defendant’s offense. That is well settled. See Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 869 (7th 

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Cir. 2000); United States v. Harris, 244 F.3d 828, 830 (11th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). 

Moreover, the government’s reading of the First Step Act would violate the 

constitutional rule set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In 

Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “facts that expose a defendant to a punishment 

greater than that otherwise legally prescribed [are] by definition ‘elements’ of a separate 

legal offense,” and “must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Id. at 483 n.10, 490. 

The Court clarified that principle in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).

The Alleyne Court reiterated that a “fact is by definition an element of the offense and 

must be submitted to the jury if it increases the punishment above what is otherwise 

legally prescribed,” id. at 107-08, and held that “because the legally prescribed range is 

the penalty affixed to the crime [], it follows that a fact increasing either end of the range 

produces a new penalty and constitutes an ingredient of the offense.” Id. at 112

(emphasis in original). The Court concluded that any fact that “aggravates the legally 

prescribed range of allowable sentences . . . constitutes an

element of a separate, aggravated offense that . . . must, therefore, be submitted to the 

jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 115-16. 

Finally, in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014), the Court applied these 

holdings to a fact, like drug quantity, that increased the penalty range under the statute 

of which Mr. Burrage was convicted:

Because the “death results” enhancement increased the minimum and 

maximum sentences to which [the defendant] was exposed, it is an element 

that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. . 

. . Thus, the crime charged in count 2 of [the] superseding indictment has 

two principal elements: (i) knowing or intentional distribution of heroin, § 

841(a)(1), and (ii) death caused by (“resulting from”) the use of that drug, § 

841(b)(1)(C). . . . Violation of § 841(a)(1) is thus a lesser included offense of 

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the crime charged in count 2. [fn3] It is undisputed that Burrage is guilty of 

that lesser included offense.

Id. at 210 & n.3. 

Likewise, Mr. Lawrence was found guilty only of a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 

That offense is a lesser included offense of a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B). 

The government’s proposed drug quantity constitutes an element of a separate, 

aggravated crime of which he was not convicted. Under Apprendi, Alleyne, and Burrage, 

Mr. Lawrence’s statutory range cannot be increased based on an uncharged judge-found 

drug quantity.

The government contends, however, that the rules announced in Apprendi and its 

progeny “do[] not apply” because the decision in Alleyne was “not decided until nearly 

three years after the defendant was sentence [sic] in this case and does not apply 

retroactively to him.” Gov. Resp. at 6. But that is incorrect. The courts’ former practice 

of using uncharged judge-found facts to determine statutory ranges was always

unconstitutional. It did not just become unconstitutional when Apprendi and Alleyne 

were announced. As the Supreme Court has explained:

“Retroactivity” suggests that when we declare that a new constitutional rule 

of criminal procedure is “nonretroactive,” we are implying that the right at 

issue was not in existence prior to the date the “new rule” was announced. 

But this is incorrect. As we have already explained, the source of a “new 

rule” is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new rules of 

law. Accordingly, the underlying right necessarily pre-exists our 

articulation of the new rule. What we are actually determining when we 

assess the “retroactivity” of a new rule is not the temporal scope of a newly 

announced right, but whether a violation of the right that occurred prior to 

the announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the 

relief sought.

Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008) (emphases added).

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The government supports its argument that Apprendi and its progeny “should not 

apply” with a citation to Crayton v. United States, 799 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir 2015). Gov. 

Resp. at 6. In Crayton, the Seventh Circuit held that Alleyne was not retroactive on 

collateral review. Id. at 624. 

But Mr. Lawrence is not seeking relief on collateral review. He is seeking relief 

under Section 404 of the First Step Act, a new statutory remedy that Congress expressly 

made retroactive. See Sec. 404(b) (court may impose a reduced sentence “as if” the Fair 

Sentencing Act “were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed”). While 

courts have held that Alleyne, Apprendi and Burrage are not retroactive “on collateral 

review” because they are procedural rather than substantive within the meaning of 

Teague v. Lane, that distinction has no bearing on the “relief sought” under Section 404. 

Danforth, 552 U.S. at 271. Instead, Apprendi and Alleyne apply because “the source of 

[those rules] is the Constitution itself,” and “the underlying right necessarily preexist[ed] [the Supreme Court’s] articulation of the new rule.” Id.

District courts around the country have considered the government’s argument and 

rejected it. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 360 F. Supp. 3d 134 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding 

that “[t]he drug type and quantity used to set the statutory range under the First Step Act 

of 2018 is the quantity charged in the indictment and found by a jury beyond a reasonable 

doubt” and rejecting the government’s argument that the relevant quantity was a greater 

number the Second Circuit later indicated “there was evidence to support”); United States 

v. Simons, No. 07-CR-00874, 2019 WL 1760840, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2019) (“Any 

argument that Simons is ineligible for relief on the basis that his actual conduct involved 

distribution of ‘280 grams or more of cocaine base,’ triggering the § 841(b)(1)(A) penalties 

and a 10-year minimum term of imprisonment, is unsound. Statutory penalties are 

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determined by facts submitted to a grand jury, a trial jury, or established by a guilty plea. 

Findings by a judge, pursuant to a Fatico hearing, may be used to determine a sentence 

within the statutory penalties, but do not establish statutory penalties and cannot change 

the mandatory minimum sentence now applicable.”); United States Of America v. Jerrod 

Martin, 03-cr-795 (BMC), 2019 WL 1558817 (E.D.N.Y Apr. 10, 2019) (rejecting the 

government’s argument that the stipulated drug weight of 1.5 kilograms should govern 

instead of the statute of conviction); United States v. Davis, No. 07-CR-245S, 2019 WL 

1054554 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019) (rejecting the government’s argument to use drug

amount established by relevant conduct); U.S. v. Allen, No. 8:00-cr-378-T-26AAS (M.D. 

Fla. Feb. 19, 2019) (rejecting the government’s argument that defendant was not eligible 

under the First Step Act because the admitted drug quantity was greater than 280 grams); 

United States v. Davis, No. 4:92-cr-04013-WS-CAS (N.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2019), ECF No. 

2245 (rejecting the government’s argument to use amount established by relevant 

conduct); United States v. Vance, No. 0:08-cr-60071-WPD (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2019), ECF 

No. 71 (using the drug weight charged in the indictment of 5 grams or more rather than 

the drug weight found in the PSR (28.4 grams) to determine the defendant’s eligibility 

under section 404 of the First Step Act); United States v. Laguerre, No. 5:02cr30098-3, 

2019 WL 861417 (W.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2019) (defendant charged with conspiracy to 

distribute 50 grams or more of crack and sentenced based on 1.5 kilograms of crack held 

eligible for relief); United States v. Newton, 5:02cr30020, 2019 WL 1007100, at *4 (W.D. 

Va. Mar. 1, 2019) (defendant charged with offense involving 50 grams or more or crack 

but sentenced based on 596 grams of crack held eligible for relief); United States v. 

Logan, No. 07-20090-01-KHV, 2019 WL 498519 (D. Kan. Feb. 8, 2019) (defendant who 

pleaded guilty to conspiracy involving 50 grams or more of crack and sentenced based on 

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1.36 kilograms of crack held eligible for relief); Memorandum Opinion and Order, United 

States v. Fleurival, No. 5:06-cr-00041-004 (W.D. Va. Feb. 6, 2019), Dkt No. 1181 at 4 

(“[T]he statutory range is based on the quantity of cocaine base charged in the indictment 

. . .”); United States v. Tucker, 356 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Iowa 2019); Order, United States 

v. Lovely, No. 2:06-cr-00062 (D. Me. Apr. 17, 2019), ECF No. 226. Courts have also 

considered similar arguments in Section 3582 motions and rejected them. See United 

States v. Whitmore, 573 F. App’x 24, 25 (2d Cir. 2014); U.S. v. Hogg, 723 F.3d 730, 741–

42 (6th Cir. 2013).

Finally, implicit in the government’s response is the assumption that, had the 

threshold amount to trigger a 20-to-life statutory penalty been 280 grams of crack, they 

would have charged that amount. The government may well have done so, but they may 

well have not. All we know is that a grand jury returned an indictment finding probable 

cause to believe that Mr. Lawrence distributed in excess of 50 grams of crack. Would a 

grand jury have returned an indictment charging in excess of 280 grams of crack? The 

answer is purely speculative. What’s more, “Congress did not direct district courts to 

consider, and this court [should] decline[] to consider, what the government might have 

charged had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect when Davis’s offense was committed.” 

Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Reduction in Sentence, United States v. Davis, 

No. 92-cr-4013 (N.D. Fl. Mar. 6, 2019) Dkt No. 2245 at 10 (emphasis in original); see also

United States v. Pierre, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. CR 07-003 WES, 2019 WL 1495123, 

(D.R.I. Apr. 5, 2019) (holding that “in determining whether a defendant is eligible for 

relief under § 404 of the First Step Act, the sentencing court ... should refrain from delving 

into the particulars of the record to determine how this specific defendant committed his 

or her offense of conviction, and how those facts would have hypothetically affected the 

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charges brought against the defendant under the new statutory regime”).

II. Mr. Lawrence’s Guideline Range Has Been Reduced and He 

Merits a Sentence Reduction.

At sentencing, Judge Andersen found that Mr. Lawrence was responsible for at least 

1.5 kilograms of crack. This is the relevant drug quantity that the Court should use to 

determine the proper, present-day guidelines for Mr. Lawrence. The government argues 

that the Court should use different quantities to determine the base offense level—either 

4.5 kilograms or 8.4 kilograms. But neither alternative number has a basis in the record.

A. There is No Basis in the Record to Support a Relevant Conduct 

Finding of 8.4 Kilograms.

Judge Andersen never made any finding on the record that Mr. Lawrence was 

responsible for 8.4 kilograms of crack. Although this Court initially rejected Mr. 

Lawrence’s Amendment 750 motion in 2012 on the basis that it was “reasonably 

foreseeable” to Mr. Lawrence that 8.4 kilograms of crack were involved in the 

offense, the Court subsequently reversed course and rejected the 8.4-kilogram figure in 

its ruling on Mr. Lawrence’s 2015 Amendment 786 motion. See Motion, at 4-5; Dkt. 

#1791.

1 The Court should continue to disregard the 8.4-kilogram number as without 

sufficient support in the record. Dkt. 1791.

B. There is Insufficient Evidence in the Record to Support a Relevant 

Conduct Finding of 4.5 Kilograms.

The basis of the 4.5-kilogram number in the record is unclear. The earliest 

 

1 Had the Court agreed with the 8.4-kilogram number for the purposes of the Amendment 786

motion, Mr. Lawrence’s base offense level would have been 36. When coupled with the two-point 

enhancement for school zone, this would have yielded a guideline range of 292-365 months. The 

Court’s sentence of 240 months indicates that the Court found that the record did not support the 

8.4-kilogram number, but rather a lesser amount, because pursuant to USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), 

courts are generally precluded from authorizing a sentence reduction below the low end of the 

newly-applicable range.

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suggestion of that quantity is a line in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion denying Mr. 

Lawrence’s appeal of the district court’s rejection of his Section 3582 motion based on 

Amendment 706. In that opinion, the Seventh Circuit stated that Judge Andersen had 

denied Mr. Lawrence’s motion “on the ground that he was responsible for well in excess 

of 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine.” See United States v. Lawrence, 09-1431 (7th Cir. April 

21, 2009). Judge Andersen’s order denying the motion, however, stated no such 

reasoning, and made no such findings regarding drug quantity. In fact, the order denying 

the motion gave no reason for the denial at all. See Dkt. 1340. Nor was there any court 

appearance where Judge Andersen put the reason for his denial of the motion on the 

record; Judge Andersen ruled by mail. See Dkt. 1284. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion did 

not contain any citation noting where the district court’s reasoning was documented, or 

how it had come to the conclusion that this was the reason for the denial. See Dkt. 1395. 

It appears that the Seventh Circuit merely assumed that that Judge Andersen adopted the 

reasoning laid out in the government’s response to the Section 3582 motion, which is the 

only place where the 4.5-kilogram number is documented. Dkt. 1298. In that response, 

the government acknowledged that the Court utilized the 1.5-kilogram number but argued 

that “there was overwhelming evidence presented at trial and sentencing that the amount 

of crack cocaine reasonably foreseeable to defendant was 4.5 kilograms or more.” Id. at 

11. The government advanced numerous alternative arguments in its response. It is 

unclear why the Seventh Circuit assumed the rationale that Judge Andersen applied in 

denying the motion when multiple bases for denial were advanced, and no reasoning 

given.

The government cites the Statement of Reasons attached to the Amended Judgment 

and Commitment Order from the 2010 resentencing as the basis for the 4.5-kilogram 

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finding. Response at 4. The SOR does indeed give the offense level as 40, which would 

correspond with a drug weight of 4.5 kilograms under the 2010 guidelines. But the SOR 

also indicates that the PSR was adopted “without change,” which indicates that the 

findings of the 2005 PSR were the basis for the resentencing. SOR at 1. Counsel has 

conferred with the Probation Office, which indicated that no updated or supplemental 

PSR was filed or submitted in this case. There is no indication that the Probation Office 

calculated an updated drug quantity after the 2005 sentencing. Indeed, in the 

government’s re-sentencing memorandum, the government stated: “The government 

agrees with the original calculation by Probation and by this Court that the offense level 

applicable to defendant is 40. This remains the case, even with the change in the 

Guidelines for crack that occurred after defendant’s original sentencing.” Dkt. #1464 at 8

(emphasis added). The government’s memorandum did not advance an argument that 

the Court should find Mr. Lawrence responsible for a greater quantity than was 

determined at the original sentencing. The defense’s two-page submission made no 

mention of a change in quantity, but assumed the same base offense level of 40. See Dkt. 

1466. It is therefore unclear from the record whether the Court used the 2005 guidelines 

in determining the new sentence, or whether the Court made new, specific findings as to 

quantity and revised its original finding of 1.5 kilograms.

The transcript of Mr. Lawrence’s re-sentencing does allude to the 4.5 kilogram 

number as the basis for denying the Section 3582 motion based on Amendment 706. See

Dkt. #1872, Tr. at 9:15-18. But, as discussed in Mr. Lawrence’s Reply Brief in Support of 

his § 3582 motion based on Amendment 782, this new purported finding regarding 

relevant conduct is inconsistent with Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010), and 

United States v. Davison, 761 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 2014). See Dkt. 1788 at 3-10.

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Under Seventh Circuit precedent, the recalculation of relevant conduct in 3582(c) 

proceedings is permissible only if the new finding is not inconsistent with the original 

finding, is specific, and is supported by the record. United States v. Woods, 581 F.3d 531, 

538-39 (7th Cir. 2009); accord, United States v. Davis, 682 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2012). 

In Davison, the Seventh Circuit held that a specific defendant’s liability for drug 

sales by other members of the conspiracy “depends not only on whether the sale quantity 

was foreseeable to him . . . but also on whether he joined with those other conspirators in 

a joint undertaking of which the making of those sales was an objective . . . .” Davison, 

761 F.3d at 685-86. In explaining this two-step inquiry, the Court made explicit that 

relying on “foreseeability” of the sales of other conspirators is not enough, and to do so 

confounds mere foreseeability with the specific findings required under Guideline § 1B1.3 

and its application notes. Id. 

Instead, the Davison Court emphasized the district court’s need to make

individualized, specific determinations in order to comply with Guideline § 1B1.3. See 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n. 2 (The scope of relevant conduct is “not necessarily the same as 

the scope of the entire conspiracy."); United States v. Edwards, 115 F.3d 1322, 1327 (7th 

Cir.1997) (“[I]n order to be held accountable for the conduct of others, that conduct must 

have been both in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity and reasonably 

foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.); United States v. Soto-Piedra, 525 

F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Foreseeability is a limitation on liability for conduct of 

others in furtherance of a jointly undertaken activity . . . .").

Judge Andersen’s comments at the re-sentencing are not the specific, 

individualized findings required by Davison. There, Judge Andersen merely stated that, 

in reviewing the previous § 3582 motion, “I felt there was no doubt that the amount of 

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drugs used in the overall conspiracy was more than 4 1⁄2 kilograms.” Dkt. #1872, Tr. 9:15-

17. The judge’s comments, on their face, speak to the overall conspiracy and make no 

mention of any amount specifically attributable or foreseeable to Mr. Lawrence, or any 

findings about whether Mr. Lawrence joined with other conspirators in a joint 

undertaking with the objective of making those sales. Without those findings in the 

record, Judge Andersen’s recalculation of the relevant conduct applicable to Mr. 

Lawrence’s case were improper. For this reason, the Court should discard the 4.5 

kilogram number as without sufficient basis in the record.

C. The Court Should Apply the 1.5 Kilogram Finding by Judge Andersen 

and Reduce Mr. Lawrence’s Sentence Accordingly.

If the Court applies the 1.5 kilogram number determined by Judge Andersen at the 

original sentencing, Mr. Lawrence’s final offense level would be 34. His guideline range 

would be 151-188 months, plus the 60 months consecutive on the gun count. At the 

original sentencing, Judge Andersen sentenced Mr. Lawrence to sixty months below the 

low end of the guideline range, specifically noting his relatively minor role in the 

conspiracy. Tr. at 63. Even if the Court determined no departure was appropriate today 

and applied the low end of the new guidelines for a 211-month total sentence, Mr. 

Lawrence will have overserved his sentence.2

Even if the Court were to apply the 4.5-kilogram number that the government 

 

2 As of the date of this filing, Mr. Lawrence has served roughly 204 months (or 17 years) since 

being taken into custody on April 9, 2002. Mr. Lawrence’s initial Motion erroneously listed the 

relevant date as July 19, 2002, but the BOP sentence computation sheet shows that Mr. 

Lawrence’s credit began on April 9, 2002, with an additional four days prior credit. With the 

addition of the good time credit governed by the pre-First Step Act policy, Mr. Lawrence has 

served the equivalent of a 233-month sentence. With the addition of the new good time 

calculation, Mr. Lawrence will have served roughly the equivalent of a 240-month sentence. 

Counsel will deliver a copy of the BOP sentence computation sheet to chambers and the 

government under separate cover.

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asserts is the proper drug quantity, Mr. Lawrence’s guideline range would fall and he 

would be entitled to a reduced sentence. The present-day base offense level for 4.5 

kilograms of crack cocaine is 34. With the addition of two levels for the school-zone 

enhancement, Mr. Lawrence’s adjusted offense level would be 36, and his resulting 

guideline range would be 188-235 months.

If the Court were to make a departure commensurate with the one Judge Andersen 

applied, Mr. Lawrence’s sentence would be 128 months, plus the consecutive 60 month 

sentence for the gun, yielding a total sentence of 188 months. With the addition of good 

time credit, Mr. Lawrence has over-served this sentence. Even if the Court were to adopt 

a much smaller departure of only 15 months below the new guidelines, Mr. Lawrence will 

still have overserved that sentence at this point. Finally, if the Court were to grant no 

departure from the new guidelines at all, and simply sentence Mr. Lawrence at the low 

end of the new guidelines, he would be entitled to a significant sentence reduction under 

the First Step Act.

The transcript of Mr. Lawrence’s resentencing, however, supports a reduced 

sentence below the new guidelines. Judge Anderson indicated that he was constrained by 

the mandatory minimum on the drug count, noting that “I can’t go below 20 years.” Tr. 

at 12:23. The judge gave Mr. Lawrence 21 years, just in excess of the mandatory minimum, 

because he did not “think that the message, for whatever it is worth, in this particular case 

is that the—that the absolute two minimums should apply.” Tr. 13:24-14:1. Judge 

Andersen explained that he tacked on the additional year above the minimum “to account 

for the fact that the Guidelines and the law generally apply for acceptance of responsibility 

and timely plea, which saves a lot of time and expense.” Tr. 14:21-24. Given the judge’s 

statements, it is reasonable to assume that had the mandatory minimum been ten years 

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instead of 20, Mr. Lawrence would have received an even lesser sentence. Indeed, Judge 

Andersen noted that “I personally believe that 21 years is probably more than required to 

protect the public. Actually I don’t think – I don’t think at this point in time the public 

needs any protection from you. I do not want to handicap your life further.” Tr. 12:24-

13:3.

Further, as noted in Mr. Lawrence’s Motion, he has displayed exemplary behavior 

in his time at BOP, with only a single minor infraction marring his record. While at FMC 

Rochester, Mr. Lawrence served as an orderly in the hospital, and took a substantial 

number of classes to further his education. He has already served a very serious and 

lengthy sentence that promotes respect for the law, and demonstrated that he does not 

present a future risk of re-offending.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing defendant respectfully requests that this 

Court exercise its power under the First Step Act and impose a sentence of time served on 

Mr. Lawrence.

Respectfully submitted,

FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM

John Murphy

Executive Director

By: /s/ Amanda G. Penabad 

Amanda G. Penabad

AMANDA G. PENABAD

FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM

55 E. Monroe, Suite 2800

Chicago, IL 60603

(312) 621-8340

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, Amanda G. Penabad, an attorney with the Federal Defender Program 

hereby certifies that in accordance with FED.R.CRIM. P. 49, FED. R. CIV. P5, LR5.5, 

and the General Order on Electronic Case Filing (ECF), the following document(s):

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REDUCED SENTENCE

UNDERSECTION 404 OF THE FIRST STEP ACT

was served pursuant to the district courts ECF system as to ECF filings, if any, and were 

sent by first-class mail/hand delivery on April 24, 2019, to counsel/parties that are nonECF filers.

By: /s/ Amanda G. Penabad

Amanda G. Penabad

FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM

55 E. Monroe St., Suite 2800

Chicago, Illinois 60603

 (312) 621-8340

Case: 1:02-cr-00200 Document #: 1873 Filed: 04/24/19 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:7600