SE

CONCLUSION

The motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

August 27, 2001 ENTER:

ie B. Conlon
United States District Judge


aw

shifting statutes in general throughout the opinion. Id. at 1843. Similarly, the Court does not give
import to the fact that legislative action motivated the defendant’s concessions.

Plaintiffs’ contention that the mediation agreement qualifies them as a prevailing party is
more persuasive. Buckhannon grants prevailing party status to parties who receive favorable
judgments on the merits or enter into settlement agreements enforced through consent decrees. Id.
at 1840. “Although a consent decree does not always include an admission of liability by the
defendant, it nonetheless is a court-ordered “chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between [the
plaintiff] and the defendant.” Jd. (internal citations omitted). Private settlement agreements do not
confer prevailing party status. Jd. at n. 7 (“Private settlements do not entail the judicial approval and
oversight involved in consent decrees”).

Joliet Township contends the mediation agreement was a private settlement because an
administrative hearing was never held, evidence was not presented, and there was no finding or order
by the hearing officer. These factors do not conclusively establish that the settlement was private.
A consent decree is defined as a “contract of the parties entered upon the record with the approval
and sanction of a court of competent jurisdiction, which cannot be set aside without the consent of
the parties...” Barron’s Law Dictionary, p. 97 (1996). Itis undisputed the parties’ agreement was
read into the record before a hearing officer. Interpreting all facts in favor of the plaintiffs, the legal
relationship between plaintiffs and Joliet Township changed when the agreement was read into the

record. Accordingly, plaintiffs may be entitled to prevailing party status.


* Minute Order Form (0697)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Sitting Judge if Other

anne B. Conl
Suz Conlon than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 01 C 4798 DATE 8/27/2001
CASE JOSE LUIS R., ET AL. vs. JOLIET TOWNSHIP H.S. DISTRICT 204
TITLE
[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

() Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Q Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due _

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on __. Set for at

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to} [set for/re-set for] on set for at

(6) a Pretrial conference{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :

(2) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) im This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}

CFRCP4(m) O General Rule2] O FRCP41(a)(1) © FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) Ml [Other docket entry] Defendant Joliet Township HS. District 204's motion for judgment on the pleadings
[5-1] is denied. The parties shall comply with FRCP 26(a)(1) by September 7, 2001. All discovery shall be
completed and any dispositive motions shall be filed with supporting memoranda by November 16, 2001. The
parties shall present their joint modified pretrial order on November 29, 2001 at 9:00 am; plaintiffs’ draft pretrial
order shall be submitted to defendant by November 20, 2001. Case is set for bench trial on December 13, 2001
at 9:00 am. ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.

Gabo

(11) (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required,

number of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

~ u ETRE
courtroom GL EUG 28 pup.
SB deputy’s | AUG 28 Pid ys 37
initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office

docketing deputy initials

9/27/2001

date mailed notice

cB

ailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
JOSE LUIS R., ET AL. )
)
Plaintiff, ) No. 01 C 4798
)
v. ) Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge
)
JOLIET TOWNSHIP H.S. DISTRICT 204 )
)

Defendants.

DOCKETED

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AuG 2 9 2001

Jose LuisR. (“Jose”) and his mother Janette H. (collectively “plaintiffs”) sue Joliet Township
HLS. District 204 (“Joliet Township”) for attorney’s fees and costs from a mediation process,
pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seg.
Joliet Township moves for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).

BACKGROUND

Jose suffers from learning disabilities and emotional disturbances. He is seventeen years old.
Joliet Township is the public school responsible for providing educational services to Jose.

On November 1, 2000, plaintiffs requested a due process hearing seeking to have Joliet
Township provide Jose with specialized instruction. The parties engaged in mediation. On February
5, 2001, a mediation agreement was reached. One week later, the agreement was read into the record
before a hearing officer. Asa result of the agreement, Jose receives educational services that he was
previously denied. Plaintiffs filed a demand for payment of attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs upon

counsel for the defendant. Defendants refuse to pay expenses plaintiffs incurred as a result of the



mediation process.

DISCUSSION
I. Motion for judgment standard

Judgment on the pleadings is granted when the nonmoving party cannot prove any facts to
support its claims for relief. Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7" Cir. 2000). In
evaluating a motion for judgment, facts in the complaint must be read in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Frey v. Bank One, 91 F.3d 45, 46 (7" Cir. 1996).

Il. Attorney fees and costs

The IDEA provides, “The court, it its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part
of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is a prevailing party.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415
@G)B). The parties dispute whether plaintiffs meet the definition of a prevailing party. The
complaint alleges plaintiffs are prevailing parties because: (1) they were a catalyst for change in
Joliet Township’s school policies and (2) an enforceable settlement agreement was reached.

The Supreme Court recently rejected the catalyst theory as a way to acquire the status of a
prevailing party. Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 1835, 1840 (2001). The Court
found that acquiring prevailing party status is only possible upon “a corresponding alteration in the
legal relationship of the parties.” Jd Plaintiffs contend Buckhannon is not binding upon them
because the case involved the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Fair Housing
Amendments Act (“FHAA”) rather than the IDEA. In addition, the Buckhannon plaintiffs prevailed
as a result of legislative change. These distinctions are unpersuasive. There is no language in

Buckhannon suggesting the opinion is limited to ADA and FHAA cases. The Court refers to fee-