to the benefit of all reasonable favorable inferences, the
threshold substantive viability of the retaliation claim is
assured. It may well be, of course, that Scott and Johnson may
prove unable to deliver as advertised, so that the requisite
level of Arrow's knowledge cannot be shown--but for the present
the Count III claim must stand in those terms.

Most serious among Arrow's challenges is its contention that

the current Count III claim is beyond the scope of the

corresponding EEOC charges, even with the degree of leeway that .
the cases establish in that respect. On that score the two EEOC
charges are extraordinarily cryptic--obviously the work product
of agency personnel possessed of less skill than should be
expected of them. But because the issue is less than certain,
this Court will permit Count III to survive for the present, with
the understanding that if later factual development supports

application of the principles set out in such cases as Cheek v.

Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 497, 500 (7% Cir. 1994) (the

decision invoked by Arrow), the issue may be revisited.
As stated earlier, Arrow's motion is denied. It is ordered

to answer SAC Counts III and IV on or before December 10, 2001.

Cole. De. clo

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: November 29, 2001



Minute Order Form (06/97)"

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Jud; i Sitting Judge if Oth
° or Magiseate Judge Milton I. Shadur than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 7489 DATE 11/29/2001
CASE Ronnie Scott, et al vs. Arrow Chevrolet, Inc.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintif¥, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented}

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im) Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon____ssetfor__at

(5) qa Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on__setfor___at

(6) im Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor___—sat__
(7) o Trial[set for/re-set forlon___—_at

(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at.

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOPRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule2i OOFRCP41(@)\(1) OO FRCP41(a\(2).

(10) Ml [Otherdocketentry] Enter Memorandum Order. Arrow’s motion to dismiss is denied. It is ordered
to answer SAC Counts III and IV on or before December 10, 2001. (12-1)

(11) wf [For further detail see

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
aired umber of notices

V_ | Notices mailed by judge’s staff. wy NOY 30 anni

Notified counsel by telephone.

date docketed

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

cketing deputy initials

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

tisizo01

date mailed notice

courtroom
SN deputy’s
initials ss

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office ‘nailing deputy initials



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RONNIE SCOTT, et al.,

DOCKETED

)
Plaintiffs, Nov
Vv. No. 01 C 7489 ; ° 2004
ARROW CHEVROLET, INC.,
Defendant. }
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Shortly after Arrow Chevrolet, Inc. (“Arrow”) had filed a
motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule”) 12(b) for the dismissal of

Count III of the employment discrimination action filed against
it by four African-American ex-employees, this Court orally
denied that motion without prejudice on October 30, 2001. That
denial was based on the representation by plaintiffs' counsel
that the challenged claim had contained some mistaken allegations
as to the timing of certain events. Because such timing was
critical to the viability or nonviability of the Count III
retaliation claim, plaintiffs were then granted leave to file a
Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), with Arrow then being given
time to file its responsive pleading.

On November 13 the SAC was filed, and now Arrow has renewed
its Rule 12(b) motion on the ground that the current Count III is
still flawed. For the reasons stated in this memorandum order,
Arrow's motion is denied and it is ordered to answer SAC
Counts III and Iv (for some reason, Arrow's contemporaneously

filed Answer has addressed only Counts I and II, so that neither



the Answer nor the motion to dismiss spoke to Count IV at all).

One facet of Arrow's motion can be dispatched summarily at
the outset: its initial invocation of the well-recognized
doctrine that when exhibits are attached to a complaint, any
facts set out in the exhibits override inconsistent allegations
in the complaint itself. That principle, sound enough in itself,
is frankly absurd when (as here) the SAC alleges that the dates
in the exhibits were mistaken. It may be said parenthetically
that lawyers too often tend to be unaware that when such a
frivolous argument is joined with other and more tenable
contentions (let alone being placed first, as Arrow's counsel
have done here), the lawyers run the risk of a loss of
credibility that might adversely affect the judicial perspective
in addressing counsel's more colorable legal arguments.

As for Arrow's other contentions, in all but one respect
they ignore the fundamental premise that the allegations of a
complaint must be accepted as gospel for purposes of any Rule
12(b) (6) motion. When that approach is taken, it must be viewed %
as true (1) that coplaintiffs Ronnie Scott and Derrick Johnson
were prepared to assist coplaintiff Jacky Burks in his then-
contemplated claim of race discrimination, (2) that Arrow knew of
the Scott-Johnson-Burks relationship and (3) that it promptly
proceeded to terminate both Scott and Johnson as a retaliatory
measure. And when those assumed facts are supplemented by the
equally fundamental proposition that plaintiffs are also entitled

2