UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WILLIAM E. POWELL,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 18-2675 (JEB)

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiff William E. Powell moves once again to supplement his Amended 

Complaint, which seeks records from the Internal Revenue Service concerning his family’s 

printing business. He desires to add claims: (1) challenging the IRS’s failure to respond to two 

specific requests for documents, and (2) characterizing the Service’s behavior as amounting to an

unlawful pattern or practice of withholding information under the Freedom of Information Act. 

Because such proposed counts would be futile, the Court will deny the Motion. 

I. Background

The present Motion to Supplement Plaintiff’s already-supplemented, thrice-amended 

Complaint represents merely the most recent chapter in Powell’s years-long quest to obtain tax 

records relating to him and his family’s printing business. See ECF No. 62 (Mot. to Suppl.). 

The Court’s most recent Opinion on the matter sketches the history of this journey. See Powell 

v. IRS, No. 18-2675, 2020 WL 3605774, at *1–2 (D.D.C. July 2, 2020). 
2

Powell now seeks to supplement his Complaint to challenge the IRS’s failure to provide 

him with two specific — and familiar — records. The first is the Powell Printing Company’s 

1989 corporate tax return. See Mot. to Suppl. at 2. The second is Powell’s specific master file 

transcript using MFT code 30 for the years 1989 to 1992. Id. A master file is “the official 

repository of all taxpayer data extracted from magnetic tape records, paper and electronic tax

returns, payments, and related documents,” I.R.S. IRM 21.2.1.2(1), Master File (Oct. 1, 2011), 

and MFT code 30 narrows the request to Form 1040 information. Powell, 2020 WL 3605774, at 

*5; see also I.R.S. IRM 21.2.4.2.1.1(1), AMRH Transcripts (May 12, 2015) (“A specific module 

transcript generates for all [individual master file] categories with the numeric indicator for the 

. . . category met.”). Plaintiff seems to assert causes of action to access these records under 26 

U.S.C. § 6103, id. at 1–2, 4–5, as well as FOIA. Id. at 5; but see ECF No. 70 (Pl. Reply) at 5–7 

(suggesting that Plaintiff seeks to add claim solely under 26 U.S.C. § 6103). Finally, Powell 

wishes to include an allegation that the IRS is engaging in an unlawful pattern or practice of not 

responding to his document requests. See Mot. to Suppl. at 1–2, 5; Pl. Reply at 6–8. 

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) allows the Court, “[o]n motion and reasonable 

notice . . . [and] on just terms,” to permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth 

events that have happened since the filing of its complaint. “Rule 15(d) is used to set forth new 

facts that update the original pleading or provide the basis for additional relief; to put forward 

new claims or defenses based on events that took place after the original complaint or answer 

was filed.” United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Wright & Miller, 

6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1504 (2d ed. 1990)). 
3

Rule 15(d)’s intent is “to make pleadings a means to achieve an orderly and fair 

administration of justice.” Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411, 417 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting 

Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 227 (1964)). The Rule “promote[s] as complete an 

adjudication of the dispute between the parties as is possible.” Wright & Miller, 6A Fed. Prac. & 

Proc. Civ. § 1504 (3d ed. 2020). It seeks “to avoid ‘needlessly remitt[ing] [plaintiffs] to the 

difficulties of commencing a new action even though events occurring after the commencement 

of the original action have made clear the right to relief.’” Scahill v. District of Columbia, 909 

F.3d 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), advisory committee notes to 

1963 amendment). “It follows that supplementation of pleadings is encouraged ‘when doing so 

will promote the economic and speedy disposition of the entire controversy between the parties, 

will not cause undue delay or trial inconvenience, and will not prejudice the rights of any of the

other parties to the action.’” U.S. ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 

2015) (quoting Wright & Miller, 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1504 (3d ed. 2010)). 

Courts typically resolve motions to supplement under the same standard as motions to 

amend under Rule 15(a). See, e.g., Banner Health v. Burwell, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 n.9 (D.D.C. 

2014); Wildearth Guardians v. Kempthorne, 592 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23 (D.D.C. 2008). The key 

difference between the two Rules is that amendments “relate to matters that occurred prior to the 

filing” of the pleading to be amended, whereas supplements “set[] forth transactions or 

occurrences or events which have happened since” that pleading. Hall v. CIA, 437 F.3d 94, 100 

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphases added) (quoting Wright & Miller, 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.

§ 1504 (3d ed. 1990), then quoting Hicks, 283 F.3d at 385). Further, “[s]upplements under Rule 

15(d) always require leave of the court, and the court has broad discretion in determining 
4

whether to allow supplemental pleadings in the interests of judicial economy and convenience.” 

The Fund For Animals v. Hall, 246 F.R.D. 53, 54 (D.D.C. 2007). 

Typically, Courts grant leave to amend or supplement “unless there is a good reason, 

such as futility, to the contrary.” Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999, 1003 

(D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (noting that reasons not to 

permit Rule 15(a) amendment may include “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part 

of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, [and] 

undue prejudice to the opposing party”). In other words, if the new causes of action would be 

deficient as stated in the proposed supplement, courts need not grant leave. See In re Interbank 

Funding Corp. Secs. Lit., 629 F.3d 213, 218 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court may properly 

deny a motion to amend if the amended pleading would not survive a motion to dismiss.”) (citing 

Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, for proposition that “‘futility of amendment’ is permissible justification

for denying Rule 15(a) motion”); James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 

1996) (“Courts may deny a motion to amend a complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim 

would not survive a motion to dismiss.”). 

III. Analysis

As Powell offers two new proposed causes of action, the Court will consider each 

separately.

A. Failure to Provide Records 

Plaintiff seeks to add a count relating to two types of records — the 1989 corporate return 

and the 1989–92 master file transcripts — under both FOIA and 26 U.S.C. § 6103. See Mot. to 

Suppl. at 5. The Government responds that claim preclusion bars any FOIA count, and that 

§ 6103 provides no independent cause of action. It is correct. 
5

“A subsequent lawsuit is barred by claim preclusion ‘if there has been prior litigation 

(1) involving the same claims or cause of action, (2) between the same parties or their privies, 

and (3) there has been a final, valid judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of competent 

jurisdiction.’” NRDC v. EPA, 513 F.3d 257, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Smalls v. United 

States, 471 F.3d 186, 192 (D.C. Cir 2006)). Because Powell has previously brought (1) claims

under FOIA to access these very records, (2) against the IRS, (3) which were denied, (4) in 

federal courts with jurisdiction to decide them, each of these elements is easily met. 

This very Court held last year that Powell’s request for the Powell Printing Company’s 

1989 corporate tax return under the Privacy Act was barred by claim preclusion, given that the 

same request, brought under FOIA, had been previously adjudicated on the merits in the Eastern 

District of Michigan. See Powell v. IRS, No. 17-278, 2019 WL 4247246, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 

2019); see also Powell v. IRS, No. 14-12626, 2015 WL 5271943, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 2015). A 

third effort for the same document meets the same fate. 

Similarly, the request for Powell’s specific master file transcript for the years 1989 to 

1992 using MFT code 30 has also already been litigated and denied. When he last tried to 

supplement his Complaint here, the Court held that “the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes 

Powell from relitigating requests for . . . MF-Specific transcripts for Form 1040 between 1987 

and 2017.” Powell v. IRS, No. 18-2675, 2019 WL 4750317, at *5–6 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2019) 

(reasoning that “this Court previously found these requests moot because the IRS had turned 

over Form 1040 transcripts from 1989 to 1992, . . . and it had adequately searched for the 1987 

to 2017 forms”) (cleaned up); see also Powell, 2020 WL 3605774, at *5 (explaining that MFT 

codes simply indicate the type of form requested, and MFT code 30 is used to request a Form 

1040). Not only does the Court’s application of the collateral-estoppel doctrine still hold true, 
6

but given that ruling, claim preclusion now also prohibits Plaintiff from supplementing his 

Complaint with such a count. 

Powell seems to realize the weakness of his position under FOIA, arguing that, although 

“[c]ollateral [e]stoppel would be applied if [he were] trying to litigate the same issue under the 

same statute . . . as [was] litigated in Plaintiff’s prior cases,” he now seeks to bring his claim

under 26 U.S.C. § 6103 instead, which delineates the IRS’s responsibilities to disclose tax-return 

information. See Pl. Reply at 5. This Court explained in its most recent Opinion, however, that 

section 6103 does not “provide an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction” over claims 

seeking the disclosure of return information. See Powell, 2020 WL 3605774, at *5 (quoting

Maxwell v. O’Neill, No. 00-1953, 2002 WL 31367754, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2002), aff’d, 

Maxwell v. Snow, 409 F.3d 354, 357–58 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Instead, section 6103 “operates as 

part of the larger FOIA framework,” id. (quoting Maxwell, 2002 WL 31367754, at *3), and

requests for tax-return information thus must comply with the procedures set forth under FOIA. 

Id. (citing Maxwell, 2002 WL 31367754, at *4); see also Powell v. IRS, No. 16-1682, 2017 WL 

2799934, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2017) (collecting cases). In other words, FOIA provides the sole

avenue through which Powell could conceivably add the claims he seeks, but, as just explained, 

that route is closed. 

In sum, because supplementing the Complaint with counts concerning the records at issue 

would be futile under either FOIA or section 6103, the Court will deny the Motion in this regard. 

B. Policy-or-Practice Claim

Powell also moves to add an allegation that the IRS “is engaging in a pattern or practice 

of withholding” tax-return information and “not responding or providing any . . . status 

correspondences” to him. See Mot. to Suppl. at 2; see also Pl. Reply at 6–8. He alleges that he 
7

not only received no response from the IRS regarding his requests for the two documents at issue 

in this case, but that he also “has submitted multiple Form 4506 (non-FOIA) Requests for the 

Federal Estate Tax Return (706s)” for many of his family members without response. See Pl. 

Reply at 6–7. 

These allegations are plainly insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. “To state a 

policy-or-practice claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege ‘that the agency has adopted, endorsed, 

or implemented some policy or practice that constitutes an ongoing failure to abide by the terms 

of the FOIA.’” Am. Ctr. for Law & Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 249 F. Supp. 3d 275, 281 

(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Muttitt v. Dep’t of State, 926 F. Supp. 2d 284, 293 (D.D.C. 2013) 

(internal quotation omitted)). “Claims targeting agencies’ internal FOIA workings usually . . .

involve instances where conduct is ‘sufficiently outrageous.’” Id. (quoting Payne Enters., Inc. v. 

United States, 837 F.2d 486, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). In contrast, there is little meat on the bones 

of Powell’s claim here; in any event, the agency has already largely provided him with the 

documents he seeks. See Powell, 2019 WL 4750317, at *6. As Plaintiff has not pled sufficient

facts on which a policy-or-practice claim could proceed, the Court will deny as futile the Motion 

to Supplement with regard to this claim. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement the 

Amended Complaint. An Order so stating will issue this day. 

/s/ James E. Boasberg

JAMES E. BOASBERG

United States District Judge

Date: November 30, 2020