alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2019093EN.01007601.xml

| 11.3.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 93/76 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.3.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 93/76

---

Action brought on 21 January 2019 — Amigüitos pets & life v EUIPO – Société des produits Nestlé (THE ONLY ONE by alphaspirit wild and perfect)

(Case T-40/19)

(2019/C 93/98)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Amigüitos pets & life, SA (Lorca, Spain) (represented by: N. Fernández Fernández-Pacheco, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Société des produits Nestlé SA (Vevey, Switzerland)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark THE ONLY ONE by alphaspirit wild and perfect in colours white, red and black — Application for registration No 15 385 719

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 19 November 2018 in Case R 272/2018-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision in so far the contested decision accepted the opposition against EUTM application No 15 385 719 for goods in classes 5 and 31; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision in so far the contested decision accepted the opposition against EUTM application No 15 385 719 for goods in classes 5 and 31;

| — | order EUIPO to confirm the registration of EUTM application No 15 385 719 for all goods for which the said trademark seeks protection; |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to confirm the registration of EUTM application No 15 385 719 for all goods for which the said trademark seeks protection;

| — | order the intervener and, in which it may apply, the defendant, to bear the costs of the proceedings followed before the EUIPO and the General Court. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the intervener and, in which it may apply, the defendant, to bear the costs of the proceedings followed before the EUIPO and the General Court.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(5) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(5) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
#### Roberto CANCHOLA-VELEZ, also known as Ruben Ayala, also known as Robert Canchola, also known as Roberto Vasquez, also known as Enrique Hernandez, Petitioner v. Mark FILIP, Acting U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-60331

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 23, 2009.

Marlene A. Dougherty, Brownsville, TX, for Petitioner.

Thomas Ward Hussey, Director, Linda Susan Wendtland, Saul Greenstein, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C., E.M. Trominski, District Director, U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service District Directors Office, Harlingen, TX, for Respondent.

Before WIENER, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Petitioner Roberto Canchola-Velez petitions this court to review the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Canchola-Velez raises two issues for the first time: whether the regulation that prohibits an alien from filing a motion to reopen subsequent to removal is *872ultra vires because it conflicts with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) and whether he should be permitted to file the motion because his “exile” entitles him to the same protections given to refugees who seek asylum. Because Canchola-Velez did not raise the two issues in his motion to reopen or in a subsequent motion to reconsider before the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to consider them. *See Wang v. Ashcroft,*260 F.3d 448, 451, 452-53 (5th Cir.2001).

Canchola-Velez also challenges the BIA’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to reopen his removal proceedings. He asserts that his former attorney’s ineffectiveness amounted to a denial of due process that justifies reopening the proceedings on equitable grounds. In *Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft,*330 F.3d 672, 675-76 (5th Cir.2003), we upheld as reasonable the BIA’s interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (formerly found in 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(d)) as removing its jurisdiction to reopen the removal proceedings of a deported alien. We are “bound by *Navarro-Miranda*under this circuit’s strict application of *stare decisis.” Castillo-Perales v. Mukasey,*298 Fed.Appx. 366, 369 (5th Cir.2008)(unpublished). Accordingly, we defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1003.2(d).

It is not necessary to reach the remaining issue raised by Canchola-Velez, whether his former attorney’s ineffectiveness tolled the statute of limitations for filing a motion to reopen. *See Am. Eagle Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int'l*343 F.3d 401, 411 n. 6 (5th Cir.2003).

The petition for review is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Patrick Lynch, Appellant.

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Sangiorgio, J.), rendered August 10, 1983, convicting him of rape in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial (Felig, J.), after a hearing, of the defendant’s motion to suppress identification testimony.

Judgment affirmed.

While there were certain inconsistencies in the complaining witness’s testimony, these inconsistencies were fully explored at trial *(see, People v Bigelow,*106 AD2d 448) and, in any event, did not rise to such a level as to make her testimony incredible as a matter of law *(see, People v Herbert,*100 AD2d 883; *People v Monaco,*93 AD2d 823). The defendant’s guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, although we strongly disapprove of the failure of the police to preserve the photo array shown to the complainant *(see, People v Ennis,*107 AD2d 707; *People v Foti,*83 AD2d 641), the inference of suggestiveness arising from that failure was sufficiently rebutted by the circumstances surrounding the identification procedure employed and by the volume of pictures shown to the complainant *(see, People v Rahming,*26 NY2d 411; *cf. People v Johnson,*106 AD2d 469).

The alleged errors in the jury charge and the alleged bolstering of identification testimony were not preserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Thomas,*50 NY2d 467), and we decline to exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction to review them.

Finally, in light of the defendant’s prior criminal history *824and the nature of the offense at bar, the court’s imposition of the maximum sentence upon the defendant’s adjudication as a second violent felony offender does not require modification. Lazer, J. P., Thompson, Weinstein and Eiber, JJ., concur.
# C_2019423EN.01005901.xml

| 16.12.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 423/59 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.12.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 423/59

---

Order of the President of the General Court of 2 October 2019 — FV v Council

(Case T-542/19 R)

(Interim relief - Civil service - Officials - Placing on leave and retirement in the interests of the service - Article 42c of the Staff Regulations - Application for a suspension of operation of a measure - No urgency)

(2019/C 423/75)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: FV (represented by: É. Boigelot, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Bauer and R. Meyer, Agents)

Re:

Application on the basis of Articles 278 and 279 TFEU seeking suspension of the operation of the Council’s decision dated 3 May 2019 to place the applicant on leave in the interests of the service in accordance with Article 42c of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and having effect as of 31 December 2015.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The application for interim relief is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The application for interim relief is dismissed.

| 2. | The costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The costs are reserved.

---
#### Federal Insurance Company, Appellant, v Alfonso K. Kimbrough et al., Respondents.

In a proceeding to stay arbitration on an uninsured motorist claim, petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Roncallo, J.), entered November 7, 1984, which denied its application.

Judgment reversed, on the law, with costs payable by respondent Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Company, petitioner’s application granted, and arbitration permanently stayed.

It is incumbent upon an insurer which has disclaimed insurance coverage to come forward with proof that it had validly canceled the policy prior to the date of the accident *(see, Matter of American Sec. Ins. Co. [Novoa],*97 AD2d 541, 542). The insurer can satisfy that burden by presenting evidence of an office practice geared to insure the likelihood that a notice of cancellation is always properly addressed and mailed *(see, Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray,*46 NY2d 828, 830; *Anzalone v State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,*92 AD2d 238). In the instant case, the sole witness to testify at the hearing was an underwriter employed by the respondent insurer who had no personal knowledge of or participation in its mailing procedures. Under the circumstances, there is insufficient proof on the record to support a conclusion that the policy issued by respondent insurer on behalf of Cebage Taxi, the owner of the vehicle involved in the collision, had been properly canceled *693prior to the date of the accident. Gibbons, J. P., Weinstein, Eiber and Kooper, JJ., concur.
----

Euro exchange rates (1)

31 December 2004

(2005/C 1/02)

1 euro= 

----

(1)

Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

----
# C_2020027EN.01002001.xml

| 27.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 27/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 27/20

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 28 October 2019 — TUIfly GmbH v EUflight.de GmbH

(Case C-792/19)

(2020/C 27/26)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: TUIfly GmbH

Respondent: EUflight.de GmbH

Questions referred

| 1. | In the event of a strike, is the cancellation or long delay in the arrival of a flight caused by extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) even if the flight at issue was not directly affected by the strike and could have proceeded as scheduled, but was cancelled or delayed due to measures taken by the air carrier to reorganise the flight schedule as a result of the strike (in this case, the use of the aircraft intended for the flight in order to remedy the consequences of the strike)? |
| --- | --- |

1.

In the event of a strike, is the cancellation or long delay in the arrival of a flight caused by extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) even if the flight at issue was not directly affected by the strike and could have proceeded as scheduled, but was cancelled or delayed due to measures taken by the air carrier to reorganise the flight schedule as a result of the strike (in this case, the use of the aircraft intended for the flight in order to remedy the consequences of the strike)?

| 2. | In the event that an air carrier may also be released from liability in the case of a reorganisation measure:
  Is it essential that the reorganisation measure had already been taken before the strike began, when it was not yet foreseeable which flight would ultimately be affected by the strike action, or is exculpation possible also if the flight schedule was reorganised only during or after the strike and it was already established that the flight at issue was not directly affected by the strike? |
| --- | --- |

2.

In the event that an air carrier may also be released from liability in the case of a reorganisation measure:

Is it essential that the reorganisation measure had already been taken before the strike began, when it was not yet foreseeable which flight would ultimately be affected by the strike action, or is exculpation possible also if the flight schedule was reorganised only during or after the strike and it was already established that the flight at issue was not directly affected by the strike?

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Salvador Guillermo JIMENEZ-PIZANA, a.k.a. Roberto Jimenez-Pina, a.k.a. Salvador Jimenez-Pizana, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-10121.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed July 1, 2011.

Randall M. Howe, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Rosemary Marquez, Esquire, Marquez Law Firm, PLLC, Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.

Salvador Guillermo Jimenez-Pizana, Bennettsville, SC pro se.

Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Salvador Guillermo Jimenez-Pizana appeals from the district court’s order revoking his supervised release and the 12-month sentence imposed upon revocation. Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Jimenez-Pizana’s counsel has filed a brief stating there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided the appellant the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80-81, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 43 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. CON. RES. 43

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That when the Senate recesses or adjourns on any day from Thursday, 
April 26, 2012, through Sunday, May 6, 2012, on a motion offered 
pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its Majority Leader or his 
designee, it stand recessed or adjourned until 12:00 noon on Monday, 
May 7, 2012, or such other time on that day as may be specified by its 
Majority Leader or his designee in the motion to recess or adjourn, or 
until the time of any reassembly pursuant to section 2 of this 
concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first; and that when the House 
adjourns on any legislative day through Friday, May 4, 2012, on a 
motion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its Majority 
Leader or his designee, it stand adjourned until 2 p.m. on Monday, May 
7, 2012, or until the time of any reassembly pursuant to section 2 of 
this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first.
    Sec. 2.  The Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House, or their respective designees, acting jointly after consultation 
with the Minority Leader of the Senate and the Minority Leader of the 
House, shall notify the Members of the Senate and House, respectively, 
to reassemble at such place and time as they may designate if, in their 
opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.

            Passed the Senate April 26, 2012.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
112th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                            S. CON. RES. 43

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Providing for a conditional adjournment or recess of the Senate and an 
              adjournment of the House of Representatives.
```
**Exhibit 32.2****Certification of Periodic Report**     Pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. §1350, the undersigned officerof Renaissance Learning, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certifies that, to the undersigned’sknowledge: (1) the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2005(the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), asapplicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.Dated: August 8, 2005                                                     /s/ Mary T. Minch   Name:  Mary T. Minch   Title:  Vice President-Finance, Chief Financial Officer
# C_2009246EN.01001701.xml

| 14.10.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 246/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.10.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 246/17

---

Corrigendum to Commission opinions within the framework of Article 17(5) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (‘The Working Time Directive’)

(
  Official Journal of the European Union C 245 of 13 October 2009
  )

(
  Official Journal of the European Union C 245 of 13 October 2009

2009/C 246/10

The texts of documents 2009/C 245/01, 2009/C 245/02 and 2009/C 245/03, published in the
  Official Journal of the European Union C 245 of 13 October 2009 on pages 1, 6 and 10, should be considered as null and void.

Official Journal of the European Union

---
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

DAVID R. CARRUTHERS and JEAN E. CARRUTHERS,

Appellants,

v.

TOWER HILL PRIME INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellee.

No. 4D22-3415

[September 7, 2023]

Appeal of a non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth 

Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Barbara Anne McCarthy, Judge; L.T. 

Case No. CACE15018429.

Richard M. Benrubi of Benrubi Law, Boca Raton, and Bard D. 

Rockenbach of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, for 

appellants.

Robert Alden Swift of Swift Legal Group, P.A., Orlando, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

WARNER, GERBER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Exhibit 99.1

                                  BLUEFLY, INC.
                               SEPTEMBER 30, 2002


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Bluefly, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, E.
Kenneth Seiff, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

         1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


/s/ E. Kenneth Seiff

E. Kenneth Seiff
Chief Executive Officer
November 13, 2002
### NUMBER S 13 - 09 - 00402 - CV 13 - 09 - 00678 - CV 13 - 09 - 00679 - CV 13 - 10 - 00091 - CV 13 - 10 - 00092 - CV 

## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________ DEAN CORY ROBLIN , Appellant,

v. DEBORAH SUSAN BRIGGS , Appellee.

____________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Montgomery County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________



## MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam Appellant, Dean Cory Roblin , in appellate cause numbers, 13
- 09
- 00402
- CV, 13
- 09
- 00678
- CV, 13
- 09
- 00679
- CV, 13
- 10
- 00091
- CV, and 13
- 1 0
- 0 0092
- CV, appealed a2

judgment entered by the County Court at Law No. 1 of Montgomery, County. In all five causes, Roblin filed an affidavit of indigenc e with this Court. However, o n October 28, 2010, in Roblin v. Briggs , No. 13
- 09
- 00475
- CV , 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8655 , at *12 (Tex.

– Corpus Christi Oct. 28, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.), this Court concluded that Roblin had not met his burden of showing that he was indigent ; and therefore Roblin was not entitled to a free record

. On May 16, 2011, the Clerk of this Court notified Roblin, in accordance with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.3(c), that we would dismiss his appeals unless the $175.00 filing fee s were paid. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 42.3(c ). Roblin responded to the notice from the Clerk; however, he has not cured the defect by paying the $175.00 filing fee in each cause. See id 5, 12.1(b). The Court, having considered the documents on file and Roblin’s failure to pay the filing fee, is of the opinion that the appeals should be dismissed. See id. 42.3(b), (c). Accordingly, the appeals in cause numbers 13
- 09
- 00402
- CV, 13
- 09
- 00678
- CV, 13
- 09
- 00679
- CV, 13
- 10
- 00091
- CV, and 13
- 1 0
- 0 0092
- CV are dismiss ed for want of prosecution. PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the 9th day of June, 2011.
III 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 147 

Recognizing the celebration of National Student Employment Week at the 

University of Minnesota Duluth. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 14, 2011 

Ms. KLOBUCHAR submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

RESOLUTION 

Recognizing the celebration of National Student Employment 

Week at the University of Minnesota Duluth. 

Whereas National Student Employment Week offers the University of Minnesota Duluth the opportunity to recognize 

students who work while attending college; 

Whereas the University of Minnesota Duluth is committed to 

increasing awareness of student employment as an educational experience for students, as well as an alternative 

to financial aid; 

Whereas there are nearly 1,500 student employees at University of Minnesota Duluth; 

Whereas the University of Minnesota Duluth recognizes how 

important student employees are to their employers; and 


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2 

•SRES 147 IS 

Whereas National Student Employment Week is celebrated 

the week of April 11 through 17, 2011: Now, therefore, 

be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate recognizes the celebration 

2 of National Student Employment Week at the University 

3 of Minnesota Duluth. 

Æ 


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