alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### George PANOKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, HAWAII; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 07-17229.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 21, 2008.

Filed Jan. 6, 2009.

*55Elbridge W. Smith, Esq., Raymond W. Laing, Esq., Smith Himmelmann, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Derrick K. Watson, Esq., USH-Office of the U.S. Attorney PJKK Federal Building, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SCHROEDER, PAEZ and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

George Panoke appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in his action against the United States Army Military Police Brigade and Pete Geren, the Secretary of the Department of the Army (“Arm/’). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. *Long v. County of L.A.,*442 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir.2006). We affirm.

The district court properly found that the circumstances surrounding the revocation of a security clearance are nonjusticiable. We have previously found that the preclusion of review of security clearance decisions under *Department of the Navy v. Egan,*484 U.S. 518, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988), applies equally in *56the context of a Title VII discrimination action. *Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy,*66 F.3d 193, 196 (9th Cir.1995). The nonjusticiability doctrine precludes review in this case even though review is not precluded by statute. *See Baker v. Carr,*369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). A review of the circumstances surrounding a security clearance is tantamount to a review of the security clearance itself. Therefore, the circumstances surrounding the revocation of Panoke’s security clearance must be precluded from review. *See Brazil,*66 F.3d at 197.

We affirm the district court’s conclusion that the Army had no obligation to employ Panoke after the 2002 Settlement Agreement. The district court correctly determined that the failure to provide such employment was not in retaliation for Panoke’s prior EEO activities. The record shows that the decision not to extend Panoke’s term position was solely based on the fact that there was no longer a need for the position. The 2002 Settlement Agreement is an unambiguous, fully-integrated statement of the terms of the agreement between the parties. Therefore, any extrinsic evidence indicating the intent of the Army to give Panoke a permanent position is prohibited by the parol evidence rule. *Webb v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 207*F.3d 579, 581 (9th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). Moreover, the claim that the Army has not fulfilled the agreement is barred, because it has not been administratively exhausted, as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504.

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
S. Con. Res. 60 Agreed to November 16, 2012

One Hundred Twelfth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE SECOND SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, 

the third day of January, two thousand and twelve 

Concurrent Resolution 

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That when the Senate recesses or adjourns on any day from 

Thursday, November 15, 2012, through Friday, November 16, 2012, 

on a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its 

Majority Leader or his designee, it stand recessed or adjourned 

until 12:00 noon on Monday, November 26, 2012, or such other 

time on that day as may be specified by its Majority Leader or 

his designee in the motion to recess or adjourn, or until the time 

of any reassembly pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first; and that when the House adjourns 

on any legislative day from Friday, November 16, 2012, through 

Friday, November 23, 2012, on a motion offered pursuant to this 

concurrent resolution by its Majority Leader or his designee, it 

stand adjourned until 2:00 p.m. on Tuesday, November 27, 2012, 

or until the time of any reassembly pursuant to section 2 of this 

concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first. 

SEC. 2. The Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker 

of the House, or their respective designees, acting jointly after 

consultation with the Minority Leader of the Senate and the 

Minority Leader of the House, shall notify the Members of the 

Senate and House, respectively, to reassemble at such place and 
S. Con. Res. 60—2 

time as they may designate if, in their opinion, the public interest 

shall warrant it. 

Attest: 

Secretary of the Senate. 

Attest: 

Clerk of the House of Representatives.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                  EXHIBIT 3(iii)

                            CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT

                                       OF

                           SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED

                          CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION

                                       OF

                             NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC.

     NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC., a corporation organized and existing under the
General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.

     DOES HEREBY CERTIFY:

     FIRST:    That the Board of Directors (the "Board") of said corporation,
at a meeting of the Board held on February 16, 1999, adopted a resolution
proposing and declaring advisable the following amendment to the Second Amended
and Restated Certificate of Incorporation (the "Certificate of Incorporation")
of said corporation:

          RESOLVED, that upon the approval of the stockholders of this
     Corporation, the Corporation amend its Certificate of Incorporation by
     deleting in its entirety Section A of Article IV of the Certificate of
     Incorporation and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

               A. The total number of shares of stock that the Corporation
          shall have authority to issue is two hundred twenty million
          (220,000,000) of which (i) two hundred ten million (210,000,000)
          shares shall be shares of common stock, $0.001 par value per share
          (the "Common Stock"), and (ii) ten million (10,000,000) shares shall
          be shares of preferred stock, $0.001 par value per share (the
          "Preferred Stock"). On the effective date of this Amendment, each
          outstanding share of the Corporation's Class A common stock, par
          value $0.001 per share, and Class B common stock par value $0.001 per
          share, shall be automatically reclassified and converted into one
          share of Common Stock.

     SECOND:   That the stockholders of said corporation have approved said
amendment in accordance with the provisions of Section 242 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law at a meeting of the stockholders held on May 18, 1999.

     THIRD:    That the aforesaid amendment was duly adopted in accordance with
the provisions of Section 242 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.


<PAGE>   2
     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC., has caused this
certificate to be signed by James P. Rutt, Chief Executive Officer, this 15th
day of June, 1999.

                                                 /s/ JAMES P. RUTT
                                                -----------------------------
                                                James P. Rutt
                                                Chief Executive Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DEVONTE DORSETT

, §

§ No. 522, 2019

Defendant Below, §

Appellant, §

§ Court Below: Superior Court

v. § of the State of Delaware

§

STATE OF DELAWARE, §

§ I.D. No. 1701005259

Plaintiff Below, §

Appellee. §

§

Submitted: December 2, 2020

Decided: December 17 , 2020

Before VALIHURA

, TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY

- REEVES , Justices.

O R D E R

This 17th day of December, 2020 having considered this matter on the b riefs and

the oral arguments of the parties and the record below, and having concluded that the same

should be affirmed on the basis of, and for the reasons assigned by the Superior Court in

its Memorandum Opinion dated June 17, 2019;

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Superior C ourt be,

and the same hereby is , AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Karen L. Valihura

Justice
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JON TERENCE CONRAD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JAMES LEE FOSTER, Sheriff; MICHAEL

COULTER, Chief Deputy Solicitor;

BETTY STROM, Deputy Solicitor;

No. 98-7412

DAVID E. RUSHTON, Director of

Corrections; COUNTY OF NEWBERRY,

SOUTH CAROLINA; JACKIE BOWERS,

Clerk; GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, sued as

unknown members of Governor's

Office; SUZIE NICHOLS,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.

Charles E. Simons, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CA-97-1619-4-06BE)

Submitted: May 4, 1999

Decided: May 26, 1999

Before HAMILTON, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Jon Terence Conrad, Appellant Pro Se. James Spencer Verner, III,

Newberry, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Jon Terence Conrad appeals the district court's order denying relief

on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1998) complaint. We have

reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting in part

and rejecting in part the magistrate judge's recommendation, and we

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm substantially on the

reasoning of the district court.

We note that, in granting summary judgment for Defendants, the

district court relied in part on the defense of official immunity. Immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pled by a defendant or it

is waived. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980).

Because Defendants failed to assert an immunity defense the district

court was precluded from applying it. Nevertheless, we conclude that

summary judgment was appropriately granted in favor of Defendants.

With respect to Defendant Summer, summary judgment was proper

because Conrad's pleadings failed to establish a prima facie case of

unconstitutional prison conditions. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d

1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993); Williams v. Griffin , 952 F.2d 820, 824

(4th Cir. 1991). With respect to Defendants Strom and Nichols, summary judgment was proper because Conrad's claims of retaliation and

conspiracy were so vague and conclusory as to be insufficient. See

Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994); Buschi v. Kirven, 775

F.2d 1240, 1248 (4th Cir. 1985).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 2
EXHIBIT 12.1

Computation of Ratio of Debt to Equity



|                     |  |                         |         |      |   |         |  |      |         |      |   |         |  |   |        
|-------------------- |  | ----------------------- | ------- | ---- | - | ------- |  | ---- | ------- | ---- | - | ------- |  | - | -------
|                     |  | Year ended December 31,
|Dollars in thousands |  | 2007                    |         | 2006 |   | 2005    |  | 2004 |         | 2003
|Debt                 |  | $                       | 542,549 |      | $ | 455,137 |  | $    | 400,915 |      | $ | 339,395 |  | $ | 287,454
|Equity               |  |                         | 172,423 |      |   | 169,628 |  |      | 166,354 |      |   | 170,461 |  |   | 162,116
|Debt to equity       |  |                         | 3.15    |      |   | 2.68    |  |      | 2.41    |      |   | 1.99    |  |   | 1.77   
|                     |  |                         |         |      |   |         |  |      |         |      |   |         |  |   |
No. 76-535.

#### Jones et ux. *v.*United States.

C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:193
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 2 of 15 PageID #:194
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 3 of 15 PageID #:195
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 4 of 15 PageID #:196
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 5 of 15 PageID #:197
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 6 of 15 PageID #:198
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 7 of 15 PageID #:199
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 8 of 15 PageID #:200
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 9 of 15 PageID #:201
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 10 of 15 PageID #:202
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 11 of 15 PageID #:203
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 12 of 15 PageID #:204
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 13 of 15 PageID #:205
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 14 of 15 PageID #:206
Case: 1:01-cr-00634 Document #: 96 Filed: 01/21/03 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:207
ORIGINALINTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFMONTANAPR06-0422INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONORDEROFALEXANDERJOHNNEUDECKAlexanderJohnNeudeckhaspetitionedtheCourttowaivethethree-yeartestrequirementfortheMultistateProfessionalResponsibilityExamination(MPRE)forpurposesofNeudeck'sapplicationforadmissionbymotiontotheStateBarofMontana.Byrule,applicantsforadrnissionbymotionmustprovideevidenceoftherequisitescoreonanMPREtaken"withinthreeyearsprecedingthedateoftheapplicationforadmission."RuleVII.A.9,RulesofAdmission.NeudeckpassedtheMPREin1996whenseekingadmissiontothepracticeoflawintheStateofColorado.ThepetitionstatesthatNeudeckhasbeenpracticinglaw"withoutethicalordisciplinaryissues"since1996.Goodcauseappearing,ITISHEREBYORDEREDthatthepetitionofAlexanderJohnNeudecktowaivethethree-yeartestrequirementfortheMPREforpurposesofNeudeck'scurrentapplicationforadmissionbymotiontotheStateBarofMontanaisGRANTED.TheClerkshallmailacopyofthisordertoPetitionerandtotheAdrninistratoroftheBoardofBarExaminersattheStateBarofMontana.DATEDthis1.4-dayofJanuary,2022.ChiefJusticeLFEB152022BOVV&TIGreenwoodClerkofSuprerrioCourtSfz--2.ieMontan202/15/2022Case Number: PR 06-0422,LA..../Ar.44eS24in.2.14,..Justices2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE NINE MONTH PERIOD ENDING OCTOBER 31, 1998, AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-26-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-25-1998
<CASH>                                          52,164
<SECURITIES>                                    22,184
<RECEIVABLES>                                   17,511
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      8,117
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               109,170
<PP&E>                                          13,960
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,638
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 123,959
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           33,912
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            26
<OTHER-SE>                                      90,021
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   123,959
<SALES>                                        168,535
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               168,535
<CGS>                                           99,004
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   99,004
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                37,344
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (941)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 34,179
<INCOME-TAX>                                    11,963
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             22,216
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    22,216
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .94
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .85
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Michael S. Kerekes, a Suspended Attorney, Respondent. Committee on Professional Standards, Petitioner.

[942 NYS2d 906]—

*1432Per Curiam.

Respondent was admitted to practice by this Court in 1998 and resided in California.

By decision dated June 11, 2009, this Court suspended respondent from the practice of law pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (f), upon his conviction of the serious crimes of conspiracy to defraud the United States, commit tax evasion, aid and assist in the preparation of false tax returns, and obstruct and impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue Service, in violation of 18 USC § 371, and tax evasion, in violation of 26 USC § 7201, all federal felonies *(Matter of Kerekes,*63 AD3d 1370 [2009]). Respondent was sentenced on November 18, 2011 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to concurrent one-year terms of incarceration, six months of which is to be served by home confinement, a $50,000 fine, restitution in an amount to be determined, and three years of postrelease supervision. Petitioner now moves pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (g) for the imposition of final discipline. Respondent has not appeared or otherwise responded to the motion.

At the time of respondent’s crimes, he was an attorney and principal at a major international accounting firm with offices in many cities, including New York City. The crimes involved millions of dollars. Under all of the circumstances presented, we conclude that respondent should be disbarred *(see e.g. Matter of Uhl,*88 AD3d 1052 [2011]; *Matter of Richichi, 52*AD3d 1109 [2008]).

Peters, PJ., Lahtinen, Stein, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that petitioner’s motion is granted; and it is further ordered that respondent is disbarred and his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law of the State of New York, effective immediately; and it is further ordered that respondent is commanded to desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form, either as principal or as agent, clerk or employee of another; and respondent is hereby forbidden to appear as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, judge, justice, board, commission or other public authority, or to give to another an opinion as to the law or its application, or any advice in relation thereto; and it is further ordered that respondent shall comply with the provisions of this Court’s rules regulating the conduct of disbarred attorneys *(see*22 NYCRR 806.9).
(121 App. Div. 433.)

#### POWERS v. CITY OF NEW YORK.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 11, 1907.)

Municipal Corporations—Injury to Pedestrian—Defective Sidewalk-Negligence.

Danger is not reasonably to be anticipated from a depression in a stone sidewalk, 3 to 4 inches deep, 12 inches long, and 6 inches wide; so that the city is not liable for injury to a pedestrian from stepping» therein.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 36, Municipal Corporations, §§ 1624, 1625.]

Proceeding westerly on the northerly side of St. Mark’s Place, in the borough of Richmond, the plaintiff broke her leg by stepping into a hole in the sidewalk. The sidewalk was composed of flag stones, one of which, at the point where the plaintiff was injured, had been partly broken by the driving of wagons across the sidewalk at that point. The view of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff establishes that the hole was between 3 and 4 inches deep, 12 inches long, and about 6 inches wide. The condition had existed between 6 and 14 years. There was no evidence of any prior accident *167at that place, save the testimony of one of the defendant’s witnesses that he himself once tripped over that place.

*166Appeal from Trial Term, Richmond County.

Action by Margaret Powers against the city of New York. Prom a judgment on a verdict for plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for new trial on the minutes, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.

*167Argued before JENKS, HOOKER, GAYNOR, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.

Royal E. T. Riggs and Theodore Connoly, for appellant.

Frank H. Innes, for respondent.

HOOKER, J.

We are inclined to hold as matter of law that danger was not reasonably to be anticipated from the presence of the hole in which the plaintiff was injured, and hence the defendant is not liable. In Butler v. Village of Oxford, 186 N. Y. 444, 79 N. E. 712, the leading cases in this state dealing with irregularities in sidewalks of substantially the size of the one which caused the plaintiff’s injury were carefully reviewed. It seems generally (1) that an irregularity of this size, which is in the form of a depression, is such as not reasonably to suggest danger; but, (2) on the other hand, where the depression is of this or greater depth, and the hole is so small or of such a character that a pedestrian’s foot is liable to become fastened in the hole or caught under its edge, or where the irregularity is an abrupt upward obstruction above the general level of an even sidewalk, whose presence would not in the ordinary use of the street be anticipated, a question of fact is presented as to the defendant’s negligence (see cases cited in the Butler Case).

In our opinion, the hole which caused the plaintiff’s injury falls in the first classification. The judgment should be reversed.

Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted; costs to abide the event All concur.
Exhibit 32.3



THANKSGIVING COFFEE COMPANY, INC.



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the
Annual Report of Thanksgiving Coffee Company, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, the undersigned
Chief Financial Officer of the Company hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (i) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Sam KraynekChief Financial OfficerMarch 29, 2004