In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-1505 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

MONICA HERNANDEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:13-cr-00949-2 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MARCH 3, 2020 — DECIDED MARCH 10, 2020 

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. A jury found Monica Hernandez 

guilty of mail fraud for her participation in a fraudulent mortgage trust company. Hernandez appeals her conviction, arguing that the government did not prove that she used the mails 

in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. Her sentence also includes sizable restitution, and she contends that the district 

court improperly delegated its authority to the Bureau of Prisons by not entering a specific payment schedule for her to 
2 No. 19-1505 

follow while serving her prison sentence. But sufficient evidence supports the mail fraud convictions, and the district 

court permissibly deferred Hernandez’s restitution payments 

until after her release, so we affirm the judgment. 

I. Background 

Because Hernandez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, we recount the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See United States 

v. Kelerchian, 937 F.3d 895, 907 (7th Cir. 2019). Monica Hernandez cofounded Washington National Trust in 2011 and marketed it as a legitimate company designed to assist homeowners struggling to pay their mortgages. She and her codefendants promised prospective “members” that, in exchange for 

fees between $3,500 and $10,000, the Trust would negotiate 

with their lenders to take over their mortgages and stop or 

prevent foreclosure proceedings. The Trust promised to refund the fees if it could not purchase the mortgages and asserted that the arrangement would greatly reduce the balance 

of the homeowners’ mortgages. 

More than 50 homeowners became members of the Trust. 

When they agreed to work with the Trust, they signed membership documents and paid all or part of the Trust’s fees, 

usually in person. (If a homeowner was unable to pay the fees 

up front, he or she could make installment payments.) A 

packet consisting of the membership agreement, deed, receipt 

of payment, and other materials related to the Trust was then 

mailed to the homeowners or made available for pick-up. 

Once new members signed their paperwork, Hernandez told 

them, they could be relieved that the Trust would help them 

retain their homes. 
No. 19-1505 3

Several homeowners paid installments to the Trust after 

their membership packets arrived in the mail. Indeed, at least 

three homeowners who could not afford the Trust’s fees up 

front received payment schedules with their membership 

packets. Two such homeowners became the basis for Count 1 

and Count 4 of the indictment. A third homeowner, the subject of Count 2, received a handwritten payment schedule in 

the mail, but he decided to complete his payment in one lump 

sum. And though the third homeowner paid his fees to the 

Trust, he received a court summons to appear for foreclosure 

proceedings months after he had signed the membership 

agreement. This was not unusual; but when homeowners expressed concern about the pending foreclosure proceedings, 

Hernandez and her codefendants reassured them that the 

Trust would abide by the agreement. 

The true nature of the Trust became known in 2013 when 

Illinois authorities discovered that the Trust was not licensed. 

Nor did the Trust have enough funds to purchase a single 

mortgage. Instead, Hernandez and her codefendants had 

spent the membership fees on meals, travel, and vehicle purchases. Though it collected fees totaling over $220,000 from at 

least 50 homeowners over the course of two years, the Trust 

did not help any homeowners reduce their mortgage payments, and at least three homeowners who paid the Trust had 

their homes foreclosed on. Later in 2013, a grand jury indicted 

Hernandez and two codefendants for mail fraud. 

At trial, the government proposed a jury instruction on a 

“lulling” theory of mail fraud, which stated that communications that lull a victim into a false sense of security after being 

defrauded can support a finding that the defendant used the 

mails in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. The court 
4 No. 19-1505 

refused the instruction because the government had not presented evidence that the mailings lulled any victim into a false 

sense of security. The court did, however, agree to instruct the 

jury that communications that assist a defendant in avoiding 

detection of the scheme to defraud may be sufficient to support a finding that the defendant used the mails in furtherance 

of the scheme. Hernandez did not object to that proposed instruction. 

In its closing argument, the government urged the jury to 

find Hernandez guilty of three counts of mail fraud based on 

the mailing of the membership packets to three victim-homeowners. (The government moved to dismiss one count from 

the four-count indictment before the close of trial.) Hernandez, in turn, argued that the mailings did not further the 

scheme to defraud because they were sent after the victims 

signed their membership agreements—in other words, after 

the fraud was complete. The jury returned a guilty verdict on 

all three counts. 

Hernandez moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new 

trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, 33. She maintained her argument 

about the timing of the mailings: Because the homeowners’ 

deals with the Trust were completed upon signing the agreements, the later mailings of the membership documents were 

not in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. The district court 

denied Hernandez’s motions, concluding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the mailings contributed to the scheme and helped prevent its detection. 

Hernandez was sentenced to 60 months in prison, one 

year of supervised release, and was ordered to pay, jointly 

and severally with her codefendants, nearly $260,000 in restitution to her victims. She requested that the court establish a 
No. 19-1505 5

payment plan for her while in prison, limiting her to paying 

no more than ten percent of her monthly prison income. At 

the sentencing hearing, however, the court orally declined to 

order Hernandez to begin paying while in prison. The written 

judgment reflected that pronouncement, as the court established a schedule beginning upon Hernandez’s release: 

[Y]ou shall pay any financial penalty that is imposed by this judgment that remains unpaid at 

the commencement of the term of supervised 

release. Your monthly payment schedule shall 

be an amount that is at least 10% of your net 

monthly income, defined as income net of reasonable expenses for basic necessities such as 

food, shelter, utilities, insurance, and employment-related expenses. 

And the check box on the judgment form that sets forth a payment schedule during imprisonment was left unchecked. 

II. Discussion 

On appeal, Hernandez challenges her conviction on the 

ground that the government presented insufficient evidence 

that she used the mails in furtherance of the fraudulent 

scheme. She also contends that the district court erred in failing to set a schedule of restitution payments to be made during her term of imprisonment. 

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

We review de novo the denial of a defendant’s motion for 

acquittal, asking whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See Kelerchian, 937 F.3d at 907. Hernandez challenges 

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the second element 
6 No. 19-1505 

of mail fraud, namely, that “the use of the mailing system for 

the purpose of executing the scheme.” United States v. McClellan, 794 F.3d 743, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2015); see 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 

She argues that no evidence shows the mailings of the membership packets were for the purpose of executing the scheme 

to defraud because numerous victims testified that they believed their business with the Trust was complete once they 

signed their membership agreements—before the defendants 

mailed any documents. 

We have stated that “[a] mailing is not ‘in furtherance’ if 

the scheme has already reached fruition at the time of the 

mailing.” United States v. McClellan, 868 F.2d 210, 216 (7th Cir. 

1989). But Hernandez ignores the effects of the mailings in the 

charged counts. Two homeowners—the victims in Count 1 

and Count 4 of the indictment—received in the mail payment 

schedules for their remaining fee balances and, consistent 

with those schedules, paid down the remainder of their fees. 

The fruition of the scheme—receiving the fee payment in full 

without actually saving the homeowners’ homes or reducing 

their mortgage payments—was thus accomplished directly 

by use of the mails. See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 452 

(1986) (jury could find scheme was not completed until receipt of last payment, so mailings that took place while 

scheme was still continuing sufficiently supported mail fraud 

conviction); McClellan, 868 F.2d at 216 (mailing of invoice to 

ticket bureau, which in turn issued airline tickets, was necessary step in scheme to defraud). 

The mailing to the third homeowner—Count 2 of the indictment—was slightly different: He also did not pay the full 

fee when he signed the agreement and he received a bill in the 

mail; but he finished paying in one lump sum rather than 
No. 19-1505 7

follow the payment schedule. That payment still came after

receiving the mailing, however, so a reasonable jury could 

find that the mailing contributed to the success of the scheme. 

See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 711–12 (1989); Lane, 

474 U.S. at 452. 

Hernandez still contends that the fraud was complete 

upon the signing of the membership agreement, before the 

mailings. Even if the sign-up agreements were the heart of the 

scheme and the mailings merely secondary, mailings occurring after the fraudulent act are within the mail fraud statute 

if they assisted the defendant with avoiding detection. 

See Lane, 474 U.S. at 451–52; United States v. McGowan, 590 F.3d 

446, 457 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, the mailings contained payment 

receipts, a copy of the signed agreement that stated the Trust 

would purchase the homeowner’s mortgage, and a refund 

policy. The mailings falsely indicated that the Trust would 

soon purchase the homeowner’s mortgage and that if the 

Trust were unable to, it would refund the homeowner’s fee. 

Because the mailings repeated the fraudulent promises and 

lent credibility to the legitimacy of the Trust, a reasonable jury 

could conclude that they helped Hernandez conceal the 

fraudulent scheme. 

But, Hernandez insists, this court has said that “lulling” 

and “avoiding detection” are the same thing, and since the 

district court found no evidence of lulling, that necessarily 

means there was no evidence that the mailings helped her 

avoid detection. She relies on United States v. O’Connor, 874 

F.2d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 1989), in which this court labeled as a 

“lulling” theory an argument that post-conduct communication furthered a fraudulent scheme by making detection less 

likely. But, here, the district court declined to give a “lulling” 
8 No. 19-1505 

instruction only because no victims testified that the mailing 

had a reassuring effect on them. Although it correctly stated 

the law, the district court properly rejected the instruction because the evidence did not support it. Here, the issue of lulling the victims was separate from the question of whether the 

mailings helped conceal the scheme after the fact. And the 

court concluded there was evidence that the mailings helped 

Hernandez forestall homeowners’ inquiries and made detection of the scheme less likely. This was sound; a reasonable 

jury could infer that the mailings legitimized the scheme and 

therefore allowed it to continue longer.1

B. Restitution Payment Schedule 

Hernandez finally contends that the district court improperly delegated its authority to the Bureau of Prisons by failing 

to set a restitution payment schedule for the time she spent in 

prison. It is not clear why Hernandez raises this argument—

the district court deferred mandatory payment until after her 

prison term ends, so payment in prison would occur only 

through the Bureau of Prison’s voluntary Inmate Financial 

Responsibility Program. We have held that participation in 

that program cannot be made mandatory—indeed, it is plain 

error for a district court to order participation—even though 

the Bureau is permitted to impose penalties on prisoners who 

decline to participate. See United States v. Miller, 883 F.3d 998, 

1 Hernandez’s narrow focus on the supplemental “avoid detection” 

instruction ignores that the jury was not instructed exclusively on this theory of “use of the mails.” The court also gave the pattern jury instruction 

that the mails must have been used for the purpose of carrying out the 

scheme. Hernandez did not object to either instruction. And the preceding 

discussion explains why, as to each count, a mailing directly furthered the 

collection of fraudulent proceeds. 
No. 19-1505 9

1005 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Boyd, 608 F.3d 331, 335 

(7th Cir. 2010); 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d). But deference to the Bureau with respect to the administration of the program is not 

impermissible delegation. Boyd, 608 F.3d at 335 (error mandating participation in program was not one of delegation because court did not have authority to order participation). If 

Hernandez has an issue with any payment plan established 

by the Bureau, her remedy is through the prison’s grievance 

system. See United States v. Sawyer, 521 F.3d 792, 794 (7th Cir. 

2008). 

And, there is no impermissible delegation to the Probation 

Office or any other entity. A restitution order must be paid 

immediately unless the district court provides otherwise. See

18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1); United States v. Wykoff, 839 F.3d 581, 582 

(7th Cir. 2016). In that case, the restitution order must include 

a schedule in which restitution is to be paid. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3664(f)(2); United States v. Moeser, 758 F.3d 793, 800 (7th Cir. 

2014). Here, the district court did provide otherwise—both 

orally at the sentencing hearing and in the judgment—by setting a schedule of payments (subject to Hernandez’s income 

and expenses) commencing after Hernandez’s release from 

prison. Thus, the district court did not err with the restitution 

schedule. 

III. Conclusion 

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.