CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant Patel’s Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal.

ENTER: bined, di Misra,

BLANCHE M. MANNING
U.S. DISTRICT COURT SupGE
DATE:_7730-02-



Here, on July 30, 2002, this Court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. Patel,
however, did not file the instant motion until August 30, 2002. Accordingly, because Patel filed
her motion beyond the stringent 7 day period, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear her
motion, and therefore, DENIES the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence at Trial

Although this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the motion, the Court will nevertheless
discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Under section 2113(a) (the criminal
statute under which Patel is charged), a person is guilty of bank robbery, where that person “by
force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, .. . money. . . in the care,
custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank... .”

Here, at trial, the Government presented Patel’s confession to setting up the bank robbery
along with evidence that Patel allegedly violated internal bank procedures to ensure that there
was more money than usual in the bank on the day of the robbery. Although the jury failed to
return a unanimous verdict, viewing the evidence in favor of the Government, this Court finds
that there was sufficient evidence for jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Patel
committed bank robbery in violation of section 2113(a). Accordingly, the Court DENIES

Patel’s motion.


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned J i Sitting Judge if Oth
oe Magra Inet Blanche M. Manning ‘han Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 CR 716 DATE September 30, 2002
CASE United States v. Nirali Patel
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the
nature of the motion being presented.

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) im) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) im Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due__.

(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on set for ats

(5) Qo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on ___ set for at

(6) aq Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at.

(7) a Trial[set for/re-set for]on at

(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at °

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CFRCP4(m) (General Rule 21. FRCP41(a)(1) © FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) ‘Mf [Other docket entry] For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum and Order, the Court

DENIES Defendant Patel’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [60-1].

ay im) [For further detail see order on the reverse side of the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court,
No notices required. ef noises
¥ | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom
RTS deputy’s
initials . =
Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office analing deputy initials



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Hon. Blanche M. Manning

)
)
)
) No. 01 CR 716
)
NIRALI PATEL )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant Nirali Patel was indicted on charges of: (1) bank robbery by force, violence
and intimidation (Count D), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 2; and (2) bank fraud (Count
ID, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2. After pleading guilty to the bank fraud count, Patel
proceeded to trial on Count I. The jury, however, was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, and
this Court declared a mistrial. The present matter comes before this Court on Patel’s Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, a court may acquit a defendant on “one or
more offenses charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on either side is closed
if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” When
reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29, the Seventh Circuit mandates
that the district court determine:
whether at the time of the motion there was relevant evidence from which
the jury could reasonably find [the defendants] guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government

. ., bearing in mind that it is the exclusive function of the jury to
" determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and

it


draw reasonable inferences.

United States v. Reed, 875 F.2d 107, 111 (7th Cir. 1989). In short, the court views all the

evidence in the Government's favor and is absolutely barred from second-guessing the jury's
credibility determinations or findings of fact. Id. Instead, the court merely assesses the record to
determine if all the admissible evidence supports the defendants' adjudication of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
DISCUSSION

The Government contends that this Court should deny Patel’s motion on the grounds
that: (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the motion because it was not timely filed; and (11)
the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Court will address each of these
contentions in turn.

I. Timeliness of a Rule 29 Motion

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]f the jury
returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for
judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or
within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period.” Under the plain language
of Rule 29(c), a court may not extend the time for filing a motion to acquit unless the extension
is granted within the 7-day period. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 421 (1996)
(stating that “[t]here is simply no room in the text of Rules 29 and 45(b) for the granting of an
untimely postverdict motion for judgment of acquittal, regardless of whether the motion is
accompanied by a claim of legal innocence, is filed before sentencing, or was filed late because
of attorney error”); United States v. Boyd, 172 F.R.D. 363, 365 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“i]f the seven

days pass, the district court may not grant an extension of time”).