entitled to a general dispensation from the rules of

procedure or court-imposed deadlines.” Jones v.

Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7 Cir. 1994).

In this instance Richee has plainly failed to do what this
Court directed him to do--a task well within the capacity of
anyone as able to articulate his complaints as Richee has shown
himself to be. That being so, this Court carries out its express
caveat (as earlier quoted from the end of the November 15 Order)
by dismissing both the existing Complaint and this action without
prejudice.

Two other things should be mentioned, one relating to this
now-dismissed lawsuit and the other as to any further effort that
Richee might hereafter undertake. Here they are:

1. Despite the fact that this action is now
terminated, Richee's preexisting obligation to pay the $150
filing fee remains. Although a copy of the October 31 Order
was sent to the appropriate officials at the County Jail,
requesting that they transmit a proper printout of
transactions in Richee's trust fund account (one covering
the period from about April 1, 2002 to the end of October
2002) to enable this Court to make the necessary Section
1915 calculations, no such printout has been forthcoming.
Accordingly Richee is ordered to take whatever steps are
necessary to obtain and transmit such a printout to this

District Court, and a copy of this memorandum order is being


scrutiny reveals Richee's continuation of (1) a pattern of overly
repetitive allegations (really an understatement), (2) the
assertion of claims that stretch back beyond the two-year
limitation period applicable to Illinois-based 42 U.S.C. §1983
claims, (3) an undifferentiated emphasis on state-law and state-
regulation claims rather than constitutional violations
cognizable under Section 1983?--and the list could go on.

Despite this Court's invariable recognition of the Haines v.
Kerner teaching of generosity toward pro se pleadings (something
that, as already stated, was specifically expressed in the
October 31 Order), it also remains true that such litigants must
conform to the procedural requirements imposed on everyone who
seeks or who has gained access to the federal courts (see, e.g.,
the Supreme Court's teaching in McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S.
106, 113 (1993)). And one of those requirements is the
obligation to comply with court orders--as our Court of Appeals
has said in Downs v. Westphal, 78 F.3d 1252 (7% Cir. 1996):

But being a pro se litigant does not give a party

unbridled license to disregard clearly communicated

court orders. It does not give the pro se litigant the

discretion to choose which of the court's rules and

orders it will follow, and which it will wilfully

disregard. “Although civil litigants who represent

themselves (“pro se”) benefit from various procedural

protections not otherwise afforded to the attorney-
represented litigant...pro se litigants are not

2 Despite the point made on that score in the October 31
Order, Richee has made no effort to differentiate those, instead
continuing to mix everything together in a kind of hodgepodge.

3


transmitted to the officials at the County Jail for like
action (in a sort of belt-and-suspenders effort) .*

2. Up to now this Court has simply taken Richee at his
word as to his claimed exhaustion of administrative remedies
(a precondition to the bringing of any prisoner's lawsuit
under 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a)). But the wide range of Richee's
claims, as well as his references to making oral complaints
(which would not of course qualify as the exhaustion of
administrative remedies), appear to call for better informed
treatment if Richee were to attempt the filing of a new
action. Accordingly, if he does do so he will be required
to include as part of any new Complaint photocopies (a) of
any grievances on which he relies for that purpose and

(b) the administrative dispositions of those grievances.

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: December 4, 2002

3 As directed in the October 31 Order, the printout should
be sent in a communication that identifies Case No. 02 C 7761 and
is directed to this Court's attention.

5


Min order Form ougg7)

pve States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
I

i \ ‘ Sitti ir
es Milton I. Shadur iin eee
‘ASE R 02 C 7761 DATE 12/4/2002

CAS!
PIE
—

Christopher Richee vs, Ernesto Velasco, et al

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
Of the motion being presented.]

Richee

MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:
a) im Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
Q) Oo Brief in support of motiondue_
@) a Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer briefdue__
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on setfor att
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on set for at
(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—set for sat_—
(7) oOo Trial(set for/re-set for]on__—_at
(8) 0 [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto___—_—at
9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CUFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(a)(1) [ FRCP41(a)(2).
ao [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Both the Complaint and this action

are dismissed without prejudice. Richee ‘s preexisting obligation to pay the $150 filing fee remains.

District Court, and a copy of this memorandum order is being transmitted to the officials at the County

is ordered to take whatever steps are necessary to obtain and transmit such a printout to this

ql)

Jail for like action.

a (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
Notices mailed by judge's staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
courtroom
SN deputy’s
initials

eg
Pe

i foo Ate Ylsia “sn
waa

o

04:4 Wd 4- 93020

JH 3434 rn
OR UU Baibhithe received in
central Clerk's Office



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER RICHEE, )
Plaintiff, }
Vv. No. 02 C 7761
ERNESTO VELASCO, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM _OPINION_ AND ORDER
On October 31, 2002 this court issued a memorandum order
(“October 31 Order”) that, after speaking to the preliminary
Matters that must be addressed in dealing with non-fee-paid
prisoner litigation (see 28 U.S.C. §1915 (“Section 1915”)),
granted plaintiff Christopher Richee ("“Richee”) until November 22
to replace his “present sprawling pleading” (an 85-page
handwritten complaint containing 329 paragraphs) with a complaint
that complied with the “short and plain statement” requirements
of Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 8(a). Because this Court recognized
the more generous standards applicable to the pleadings of pro se
litigants (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972) (per curiam)), the October 31 Order also took pains to call
Richee's attention to some aspects of his pleading that, in
addition to the need for greater brevity, required particular
attention.
When Richee instead tendered a handwritten response setting

out difficulties that he perceived in complying with the


timetable set by the October 31 Order (including having to
confront the then-imminent trial of his criminal case), this
Court issued a November 15 memorandum order (“November 15 Order”)
that extended the deadline for Richee's submission of a revised
complaint to December 23, 2002. And so that Richee would not
confront any added statute of limitations problems by reason of
the further delay, the November 15 Order reconfirmed that any
revised complaint would be treated as having been filed on the
date when Richee's original filing was received. But the
November 15 Order concluded with this warning:

[I]£ Richee does not comply with the requirement of

this modified order, this Court will be constrained to

consider a without-prejudice dismissal of both the

existing Complaint and this action.

Now Richee has tendered a revised Complaint that is shorter
by just half--this time it occupies 40 pages and 154 paragraphs.!
Needless to say, that repetitive document also does not comply
with Rule 8(a). But even more significantly, Richee has been
totally heedless of the several matters that this Court
identified in the October 31 Order in an effort to assist him.
Indeed, the first 17 pages of Richee's “new” submission are
simply rephotocopied pages from his original filing--and although
this Court has not undertaken the massive effort of a paragraph-

by-paragraph comparison of the two versions, its more limited

1 In the interim, Richee's state court trial has been
completed, resulting in his conviction on a murder charge.

2