potential federal judicial remedy is limited to seeking review of
the Illinois courts’ judgments in that ultimate Supreme Court
forum (see the extended explanation of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine and its application in Manley v. City of Chicago, 236

F.3d 392, 396 (7 Cir. 2001)).

Those principles are so fundamental to federal jurisprudence
that the Complaint might have been expected to be the work
product of a pro se plaintiff unlettered in law. But in fact a
lawyer prepared that pleading for Gorzelanczyk--someone obviously
lacking in those fundamentals and without having done the
necessary homework to cure his gaps in knowledge. In any case,
the plain absence of subject matter jurisdiction in this federal
court compels dismissal of both the Complaint and this action,

and this Court so orders.?

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: June 28, 2001

* This Court does not of course express any view (1) as to
whether Gorzelanezyk’s claims have any substantive force or
(2) as to whether he may perhaps have some state court remedy
available to correct any wrong that he may have sustained. All
that is decided here instead is that Gorzelanczyk is not entitled
to enter the federal courthouse door to assert those claims.

4


v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991), following and applying Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)). And that is so even if, as

Gorzelanczyk claims, State's Attorney Devine has been mistaken
(or even malicious, which Gorzelanczyk does not assert) in doing
so (see such cases as Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir.
1994)).

Even more fundamentally, because this operates to bar any
claim here against either defendant, Gorzelanczyk is seeking to
have this Court second-guess the judgments of an Illinois state
court on matters of Illinois law (indeed, all of his objections
flow from the original 1994 judgment that has long since become
final). It is not simply that the Illinois court has assertedly
violated state law (a contention that would not implicate Section
1983 at all), but rather than the state court orders also
assertedly violate Gorzelanczyk’s rights under the federal
Constitution.

But that last contention, when sought to be tendered to this
federal court, runs head on into the brick wall of the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416

(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462 (1983)). Rooker-Feldman precludes any such attempted
resort to any federal court below the level of the United States
Supreme Court--if Gorzelanczyk believes that the Illinois courts

have violated his federal constitutional rights, his only


* Minute Seder Form (067293

254

United States District Court, Northern District of Tllinois

Name of Assigned Judge i Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Milton I. Shadur than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 4852 DATE 6/28/2001
CASE Michael Gorzelanezyk vs. Mary Baldassone, et al
TITLE
{in the following box (a) indicate the party fiting the motion, e.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (by state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}

courtroom GI UH 29 Fy 3: 96

SN deputy’s

DOCKET ENTRY:

(1) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due

(3) im Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due

(4) Qo Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at o

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at.

(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) im) [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) Q This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) OGeneralRule21 O FRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) soi (Other docket entry] _ Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. In any case, the plain absence of
subject matter jurisdiction in this federal court compels dismissal of both the Complaint and this action,
and this Court so orders.

(il) gf [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required, umber of notices

ao | Notices maited by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone. JUL deeb
Docketing to mail notices. OY)
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

sn9n001

date maited notice

SN

initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office

railing deputy initials



a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL GORZELANCZYK,

Plaintiff,
v. No. 01 C 4852

MARY BALDASSONE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Michael Gorzelanezyk (“Gorzelanczyk”) has just sued Mary
Baldassone (“Baldassone”) and Cook County State's Attorney
Richard Devine, purporting to invoke federal question
jurisdiction under the auspices of 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Section
1983”), which allows the assertion of federal constitutional
claims against state actors. For the reasons stated in this
memorandum opinion and order, however, this Court dismisses both
the Complaint and this action sua sponte because of the patent
absence of such federal jurisdiction.?

Gorzelanczyk complains of a series of state court child

+ Our Court of Appeals has reconfirmed in Cook v. Winfrey,
141 F.3d 322, 325 (7 Cir. 1998):

It is axiomatic that a federal court must assure itself
that it possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter
of an action before it can proceed to take any action
respecting the merits of the action. “The requirement
that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter
‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial
power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and
without exception.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1012 (quoting
Mansfield C.& L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382).



support orders and related enforcement proceedings, all of which
stem from an August 31, 1994 determination by the Circuit Court
of Cook County described in Complaint quo:

On August 31, 1994, upon a motion to reconsider, the

Circuit Court ruled that there was a statutory

presumption that Plaintiff was the father of the minor

child {born to Mary Baldassone], and Plaintiff failed

to rebut the presumption. There was no determination

by the Circuit Court that Plaintiff was the father of

the minor child.
Gorzelanczyk seeks to hang his hat on the propositions (1) that
Tllinois law (750 ILCS 45/15{a)) requires the declaration of a
parent-child relationship before any enforcement of the
consequences of such relationship may take place, but that no
such declaration has been made by the Circuit Court (Complaint
qQ11-12), and (2) that the alternative of a temporary order for
child support (under 750 ILCS 45/13.1) was not properly obtained
either (Complaint §§14-15).

But Gorzelanczyk has addressed those challenges to a federal

and not to a state court, and that effort is fatally flawed in

more than one respect. No extended discussion is needed to
identify the impermissibility of Gorzelanezyk’s attempt to seek
federal judicial assistance to resolve his contentions.

For one thing, State’s Attorney Devine enjoys absolute
immunity for conduct undertaken (as Gorzelanczyk admits is the
case, see Complaint 8) within the scope of the State’s

Attorney’s designated prosecutorial authority (see, e.g., Burns