Suburban on a public road, determined that the license plates had expired 

and belonged on a different vehicle, and initiated a traffic stop. The officer 

investigated Warren for driving under the influence after observing his 

appearance and behavior and detecting the odor of an alcoholic beverage. 

Warren refused to perform the standard field sobriety tests and was 

transported to the Clark County Detention Center. A blood draw 

performed within two hours of the traffic stop revealed that Warren had a 

blood alcohol concentration of .174. We conclude that a rational trier of 

fact could reasonably infer from this evidence that Warren was driving the 

Suburban while under the influence of alcohol. See NRS 484C.110(1)(c). 

It is for the trier of fact to determine the weight and credibility to give 

conflicting testimony, and its verdict will not be disturbed on appeal 

where, as here, substantial evidence supports the verdict. See McNair v. 

State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992). 

Evidentiary decisions 

Warren contends that the district court made four evidentiary 

errors. "We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence 

for abuse of discretion." Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 

106, 109 (2008). 

First, Warren claims that the district court erred by allowing 

the arresting officer to speculate about what might happen during a traffic 

stop of a vehicle displaying the wrong license plates. Warren argues that 

"speculation about what might have happened amounts to inflammatory 

and prejudicial commentary not based on the evidence." Warren did not 

object to this testimony and we conclude he has not demonstrated plain 

error. See id. (discussing plain-error review). 

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Second, Warren claims that the district erred by admitting 

testimony describing the standard field sobriety tests because these tests 

were not administered. We fail to see how descriptions of these tests were 

relevant and conclude that the district court abused its discretion by 

admitting them into evidence. See NRS 48.015 (evidence is relevant if it 

has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 

to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence"). Nonetheless, we conclude that the error was 

harmless. See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188-89, 196 P.3d 465, 476 

(2008) (discussing harmless-error review). 

Third, Warren claims that the district court erred by 

admitting evidence regarding the second blood draw because it was made 

more than two hours after he had driven the vehicle. The district court 

determined that the result of the second blood draw was not relevant to 

the State's per se theory of liability, but may be relevant to the State's 

other theories of liability. See NRS 484C.110(1) (providing three 

alternative ways the offense of driving under the influence of intoxicating 

liquor may be committed). We conclude that Warren has not 

demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in this regard. 

Fourth, Warren claims that the district court erred by 

rejecting an exhibit that set forth the federal definition of "motor vehicle" 

because it supported his theory of the case. See 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(6). 

Warren was not charged with violating a federal law, and we conclude 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this 

exhibit was irrelevant. 

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1, ".= 

Proposed jury instructions 

Warren contends that the district court erred by rejecting 

proposed instructions on his theory of the case. "The district court has 

broad discretion to settle jury instructions, and this court reviews the 

district court's decision for an abuse of that discretion or judicial error." 

Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). "A 

defendant in a criminal case is entitled, upon request, to a jury instruction 

on his theory of the case so long as there is some evidence, no matter how 

weak or incredible, to support it." Harris v. State, 106 Nev. 667, 670, 799 

P.2d 1104, 1105-06 (1990) (internal quotation marks and alteration 

omitted). However, a defendant is not entitled to instructions that are 

"misleading, inaccurate or duplicitous." Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 765, 

121 P.3d 592, 596 (2005). Here, Warren's proposed jury instructions 

included excerpts from the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. 

Constitution, the Articles of Confederation, the constitutions of various 

states, the federal code, Nevada's DUI penalty statutes, and the case law 

of various jurisdictions. The State objected to Warren's proposed 

instructions because they were factoids and not really instructions, the 

subject of penalty and punishment was not appropriate for jury 

consideration, and the case law excerpts seemed to ask for jury 

nullification and for the jurors to take the law into their own hands. The 

district court determined that the instructions were not relevant and 

sustained the State's objections. We have reviewed the proposed 

instructions and conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in this regard. 

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Ealkinte. 
SIMPARISIM 

Cross-examination 

Warren contends that the district court abused its discretion 

by limiting his cross-examination of the arresting officer. The district 

court has wide latitude to restrict cross-examination "based on concerns 

[of] harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or 

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Bridges v. 

State, 116 Nev. 752, 761, 6 P.3d 1000, 1007 (2000) (quotation marks 

omitted). Here, the district court sustained the State's relevance 

objections to questions as to whether the arresting officer knew what 

branch of government he worked for, remembered his oath of office, had 

read the U.S. Constitution, and understood the Supremacy Clause of the 

U.S. Constitution. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in this regard. 

Brady violation 

Warren contends that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose a Detention Booking Voucher that 

showed he was booked under the wrong penal statute. Warren argues 

that this document was highly relevant to his theory of the case, would 

have undermined the arresting officer's claim that the error on the 

Temporary Custody Record was a single mistake, and may have 

buttressed his theory that the officer was biased against him. "Brady and 

its progeny require a prosecutor to disclose evidence favorable to the 

defense when that evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment." 

Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 66, 993 P.2d 25, 36 (2000). Evidence that 

was not requested or requested generally "is material [only] if there is a 

reasonable probability that the result would have been different if the 

evidence had been disclosed." Id. The Detention Booking Voucher 

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appears to be nothing more than a computer-generated duplicate of the 

Temporary Custody Record that Warren received as part of his discovery. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Warren has not demonstrated a reasonable 

probability that the trial outcome would have been different if this 

evidence had been disclosed. 

Right of allocution 

Warren contends that the district court improperly limited his 

right of allocution at sentencing. However, Warren failed to preserve this 

issue for appeal, the record does not support his claim that his allocution 

was improperly limited, and we conclude that he has not demonstrated 

plain error. See NRS 176.015(2)(b)(1); Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 125 Nev. 

634, 644, 218 P.3d 501, 507-08 (2009) (applying plain-error review to 

alleged sentencing error); see also Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 133-35, 

825 P.2d 600, 604-05 (1992) (limiting right of allocution to facts in 

mitigation or pleas for leniency). 

App rendi violation 

Warren contends that the district court violated his due 

process rights by failing to conduct a jury trial on the felony enhancement 

for a third DUI offense. However, Warren failed preserve this issue for 

appeal, the record reveals that the only fact not submitted to the jury was 

the existence of prior convictions, and we conclude that he has not 

demonstrated plain error. See NRS 484C.400(1)(c); Apprendi v. New 

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, 

any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt"); Mendoza-Lobos, 125 Nev. at 644, 218 P.3d at 507-08 

(applying plain-error review to alleged sentencing error). 
j. 

Hardesty 

erry 

Cumulative error 

Warren contends that cumulative error deprived him of a fair 

trial. However, we have found only one error, which was harmless. "One 

error is not cumulative error." United States v. Sager, 227 F.3d 1138, 1149 

(9th Cir. 2000); see also Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239, 1245 (10th Cir. 

1997) ("Cumulative-error analysis applies where there are two or more 

actual errors."); State v. Perry, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (Idaho 2010) ("[A] 

necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine [of cumulative error] 

is a finding of more than one error."). 

Having concluded that Warren is not entitled to relief, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 2 

cc: Hon. Valorie J. Vega, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

David Thomas Warren 

2We direct the clerk of this court to file ■ Warren's proper person 

motion received August 31, 2012. We decline to reconsider our order 

denying Warren's motion to represent himself on appeal. See Martinez v. 

Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152 (2000); Blandino v. State, 112 Nev. 

352, 914 P.2d 624 (1996). The motion therefore is denied. 

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