If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED
In re G. M. DIXSON , Minor. June 23, 2022

No. 35 83 7 6 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 20 17

- 00 1531

- NA

Before: L E T IC A
, P .J., and K. F. K ELLY and R I ORDAN , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.
Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating h er parental rights to her minor child,
GMD

, 1 under MCL 712A.19b(3)( c ) ( i )

, ( g )

, and (j). W e affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HIST ORY

Respondent gave birth to twins on May 11, 2011, and established a guardianship with a relative or family friend 2 to care for these children. Respondent then gave birth to G MD on April 16, 2014, and cared for her for 18 months. In December 2015, responden t felt overwhelmed
and left G MD with the Branches, a husband and wife that respondent knew through church. Respondent then became pregnant with twins. Respondent miscarried one of the twins, but gave birth to daughter ABD on February 18, 2017. While in respondent’s care, A BD died on March 3, 2017, due to unsafe sleep practices. Child ren’s Protective Services (CPS) conducted an investigation as a result of A BD ’s death and learned of G MD ’s informal fictive kin placement with
the Branches.

1 GMD’s father ’s parental rights were also terminated , but he is not a party to this appeal.

2 Initially, in the lower cour t record, Michelle Henry, the guardian, was referred to as a family
friend ; however, re spondent also identified Henry as “the children’s grandmother.” At another time, respondent reported that she left the twins in a fictive kin placement with the person who
raised her

, even though that person was no t a biological relati ve . Th us, the exact relationship of Henry to respondent and her twins was unclear.- 2

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Consequently, t he D epartment of H ealth and H uman S ervices (DHHS) filed a petition on September 5, 2017, and G MD was placed with DHHS. GMD was allowed to remain with the Branches while they undertook the process of becoming a licensed foster care home. The juvenile

cour t assumed jurisdiction following admissions made by respondent on September 22, 2017. In

essence, respondent acknowledged her unstable housing, unstable mental health, a domestic violence incident in 2015, and her placement of GMD without granting the car egivers legal authorization. A parent

- agency agreement (PAA) was created. During the course of the proceedings, respondent participated in services including medical health evaluations and treatment, domestic violence counseling, parenting classes, and v isitation. Respondent received monthly social security benefits purportedly because of hearing loss and her mental health issues. DHHS assisted respondent in acquiring S ection 8 housing as well as hearing aids. Respondent’s physical examination revealed that she had untreated medical conditions consisting of type

- 2 diabetes and high blood pressure. Her psychiatric evaluation revealed that she suffered from bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and anxiety. R espondent , however, did not consistently take the prescribed medications for her mental conditions or wear the hearing aids. According to the caseworkers, it became apparent that although respondent participate d in services, she did not appear to benefit and practically apply the lessons learned.

Nonetheless, respondent’s supervised visitation s with GMD w ere going well , and DHHS exercised its discretion to allow unsupervised visits with respondent at her home. R espondent took GMD to various places during the unsupervised visitation without obtaini ng permission . A nd respondent had individuals who were strangers to GMD present at the home. Finally, DHHS made an unannounced visit to respondent’s home and found r espondent asleep in her car while GMD was playing outside without any monitoring. In li ght of these incidents, supervised visitation at the DHHS office was reinstated

.
On September 12, 2019, respondent attended a visitation with G MD at the DHHS office. Respo n dent , who was pregnant, got into an argument over the use of the car with her boyf riend, Matthew Jordan (Jordan), the father of her then unborn child. Respondent told a DHHS caseworker that Jordan was being violent and would not return her car keys. Respondent also advised that Jordan had been violent the prior week at their home, and the police had to be called.
Th e caseworker retrieved the car key s from Jordan and reported that he was acting erratic, yelled obscenities and threats, and refused to leave. The police had to be called

, and Jordan was banned from the DHHS premises. GMD shared with her therapist and caseworker that she was afraid of
Jordan because of the domestic violence she witnessed

.
Respondent gave birth to M JJ in Macomb County on October 31, 2019. MJJ was removed from respondent and Jordan’s care in early November 2019. Because of his birthplace and respondent’s residence, a CPS investigation commenced in Macomb County

.
At the end of 2019, the trial court instructed DHHS to file a supplemental petition seeking permanent custody of G MD

. The trial court agreed to bifurcate the permanent custody and best interest hearings. Two hearings were held in early 2020 before the courts were closed because of the pandemic. The caseworker testified that respondent and GMD came to the agency’s attention
because of the asphyxi a death of ABD resulting from respondent’s unsafe sleep practice. The PAA was created on November 27, 2017. This agreement required respondent to complete parenting classes, complete individual and family therapy, domestic violence and anger- 3

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management, participate in a clinic for child study, and undergo psychiatric and psychological evaluations and take prescribed mental health medications. Further, respondent was to obtain suitable housing and a legal source of income, maintain regular contact with DH HS, visit G MD

, and attend court hearings.

Although respondent completed parenting and domestic violence classes, the caseworker opined that respondent did not benefit from th os e classes because she struggled to make proper, consistent parenting choices du ring the weekly scheduled visitation. Initially, respondent’s supervised visits went “really well,” and she transitioned to unsupervised visits. However, the
caseworker cited the reports of domestic violence between respondent and Jordan as well as the
i ncident in which respondent fell asleep in the car, leaving GMD unattended. Respondent did not heed the advice to end the relationship with Jordan. Further, the caseworker opined that respondent did not benefit from the mental health services. Although psychological and psychiatric evaluations were completed, respondent continued to struggle with understanding the importance of maintaining healthy relationships for herself and G MD

. R espondent was diagnosed with depression, bipolar disorder, schizophreni a, and anxiety , but did not consistently take her prescribed mental health medications

. The caseworker acknowledged that respondent secured Section 8 housing, but there was evidence that respondent allowed her sister and Jordan to stay there contrary to t he program’s rules. The caseworker acknowledged that respondent had monthly income through social security benefits.

Respondent testified that she was in compliance with her PAA and had benefited from
services. In parenting classes

, respondent learned ho w to properly nurture and care for her children physically, mentally, and emotionally. Respondent disagreed with the testimony that she had not learned anything from her domestic violence counseling. Rather, if she encountered Jordan and
he tried to caus e problems, respondent would call the police. Respondent lived in a two

- bedroom
home for five months that was deemed suitable for G MD . She obtained the housing through a
S ection 8 voucher, and her monthly social security benefits for her hearing loss cov ered her other expenses. Respondent also cited her complet ion of individual and family therapy , and the therapy
allowed her to understand G MD ’s feelings and emotions. Respondent attended her weekly
visitation with GMD . Respondent denied that she was cur rently prescribed medications for mental health conditions, but would take them if prescribed. Respondent also denied that domestic violence was involved in her relationship with Jordan. She testified that their relationship had ended and their only cont act involved the co

- parenting of MJJ. Respondent admitted that she
obtained a personal protection order ( PPO ) against Jordan, but claimed that she did not fear Jordan. Rather, the PPO was obtained at the behest of the caseworker who threatened to termina te respondent’s parental rights unless respondent complied. Respondent denied the caseworker’s testimony that reflected negatively on her such as the September 2019 domestic incident at the DHHS office, the visit in which respondent was found asleep in th e car, the continuation of a relationship with Jordan, and the occupants of her Section 8 housing.

On May 10, 2021, the permanent custody hearing continued because the court had reopened. Respondent’s counsel asked that the case be dismissed, contending t hat the petition was stale because of delay. The trial court agreed with the request by DHHS and the guardian ad litem to update the proofs in lieu of dismissal.- 4

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Respondent testified that her rights to M JJ in the Macomb County case were not terminated, sh e had supervised visitation with him, and she was no longer in a relationship with Jordan; they merely co

- parented M JJ together. Respondent had visitation with G MD twice a week
at the local mall . Respondent did not feel comfortable with the Branches 3 so the visits were supervised by a parenting coach , and respondent had only missed one visit due to pneumonia. Respondent took blood pressure medication and participated in therapy for her mental health. S he
also maintained her S ection 8 housing. And, i n addition to her social security benefits, r espondent earned income by work ing 16 hours per week as an aide at a senior living facility. If there were warrants pending for her arrest, respondent believed they only pertained to traffic offenses. Althoug h r espondent currently had a suspended license , she had a car and drove to work. Respondent testified that she would not drive with children in he r car and reported that a friend
had driven her to the court hearing. Respondent further denied that she eve r grabbed the steering
wheel of her car as her father drove it. Respondent did not want her parental rights terminated and would take mental health medications to continue the relationship with G MD

.

The caseworker testified that respondent was doing well in her visits with G MD, but the
visitation supervisor indicated that respondent could get “lazy” during the visits and he would have
to motivate her and also provide redirection or education. Respondent recently sought to renew
her S ection 8 housing, cont inued to see her mental health counselor, and continued to work. Despite positive action including housing, disability benefits , and a job, the caseworker testified that respondent needed help with daily living and parenting was overwhelming particularly when
she had supervised visits with both G MD and M JJ

.

Nonetheless, the caseworker did not recommend additional time for respondent to make

progress on her PAA . The case had been pending for three years, and G MD had been placed with the Branches for nearly six years. G MD was starting to deteriorate, show signs of trauma, and change her behavior; she was scared and anxious. G MD feared being removed from the Branches
and referred to the m as “mom and dad.” G MD began to act out before the visits with respondent

, insulted the respondent’s hygiene, and was torn because she did not want to upset respondent or
the Branches.

Additionally, the caseworker was concerned about respondent’s mental health. Respondent’s fa ther, Kenneth Ray , called the caseworker to report that respondent stopped taking her mental health medication and stopped cleaning her home, so he cleaned it. Respondent began to hang out with a motorcycle club and stopped bathing. She became erratic. In October 2020, Ray was driving with respondent as a passenger when she became irate and grabbed the steering wheel nearly causing an accident. Respondent insisted that Ray get out of the car

, and she drove
off without him.

The caseworker opined that G MD would be traumatized by a return to respondent ’s care

. G MD ’s therapist mirrored the concerns of the caseworker

, not ing that GMD was placed with the

3 Although initial ly respondent and the Branches worked well together, things had changed. Respondent’s father, Kenneth Ray, contacted DHHS to report that respondent prompted her friend to call in a fabricated CPS complaint against the Branches in August 2020 . The complai nt at respondent’s behest was investigated, not substantiated, and closed.- 5

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Branches at a stage of development where she formed attachments and looked to the Branches for security

, c omfort

, and emotional support. G MD became anxious and nervous before court hearings and feared leaving the home and bond she had built for the last six years. GMD preferred
to remain with the B ranches, but still visit with respondent and her siblings. T he caseworker opined that respondent could not raise G MD alone and indicated that respondent herself needed assistance or a guardian. Respondent’s mental health caused her to go in and out of periods of depression. As an adult, respondent needed to addre ss her hygiene, blood pressure, hearing, weight, dental, and sleep apnea issues. The addition of attending to the needs of children, their schooling, and their medical appointments would be “a lot.” Thus, the barriers to reunification
continued.

The tria l court found that the statutory grounds for termination, MCL 712A.19b(3) (c)( i ), (g)

, and (j)

, were established

. And, a fter considering addition al testimony, the trial court
determined that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in GMD’s best int erest. Respondent appeals.

II. STATUTORY GROUN DS

Respondent alleges that DHHS failed to present clear and convincing evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination of h er parental rights. We disagree.

To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination expressed in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been
established. In re Mota , 334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020) ( citation omitted). A challenge to the trial court’s finding that a statutory ground for termination was established is
reviewed for clear error. Id . A finding is clearly erroneous when there is some evidence to support it, but a review of the entire rec ord, leave s the reviewing court with the definite and firm conviction
that the trial court made a mistake. Id

.

T he specific statutory grounds for termination of MCL 712A.19b relied on by the trial court provide :

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s pare ntal rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

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(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial di spositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

( i ) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

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(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.

Generally, the state may not fail to evaluate or involve a respondent, but then terminate her rights premised on her failure to comply with the case service plan at that time or in the future. In re
Mason , 486 Mich 142, 159

- 160; 782 NW 2d 747 (2010). “Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent ’ s parental rights, even if the court erroneously found sufficient evidence under other statutory grounds. ” In re Ellis , 294 Mich App 30, 3 2 ; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). Regard is given to the trial court’s special opportunity to determine the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it. Id . at 33. We conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence to support MCL 712A.19b(3)( c ) ( i ), and the trial court did not clearly err in its determination

. In re Mota , 334 Mich App at 320.

Contrary to respondent’s assertion, the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to
exist and there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditio ns would be rectified within a reasonable time when considering GMD’s age. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ). GMD was 18 months old when respondent informally placed GMD with the Branches. The Branches were not given a formal guardianship. Rather, it was proffered by respondent that the placement was temporary until she could obtain stable and suitable housing. But respondent alleged that she was unable to retrieve GMD because she became pregnant again. Shortly after respondent gave birth to ABD, ABD died of asph yxia due to unsafe sleep practices. This death caused a CPS investigation and for DHHS to learn of GMD’s informal placement with the Branches.

After respondent made admissions to unstable housing, unstable mental health, and domestic violence, the court a ssumed jurisdiction over GMD, and a formal PAA was prepared. Respondent was required to address mental health issues, parenting, domestic violence, visitation, legal source of income, and housing. Although respondent completed many of the components of

t he PAA, there was no indication that respondent benefited from the services. When respondent had physical contact with G MD , she conducted a strip search of the child to search for bruises and markings. The caseworker and therapist had to apprise responde nt of the physical intrusion that involved and other means of inquiry, such as communication, to achieve the same goal.

According to the caseworkers and respondent’s father , respondent did not consistently take her medication, did not timely appear for vis its, and did not address her improper relationships. During her most recent visitation, the supervisor opined that respondent still needed direction, got “lazy,” and had to be motivated by him. When the visits were briefly transferred to unsupervised,

an unannounced visit found respondent asleep in her car as G MD was not monitor ed . Although
G MD expressed fear of Jordan, respondent continued her relationship with him . When respondent was presented with facts that were unfavorable, she simply denied their occurrence. Thus,- 7

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respondent denied that G MD was present as she slept in the car, denied that she grabbed the steering wheel as her father drove, and denied that a Macomb County CPS investigator found
Jordan asleep in respondent’s home after their child M JJ had been removed from their care. Indeed, respondent denied driving to court on a suspended license despite two witnesses observing her driving that morning.

Respondent’s psychological evaluation revealed that she was one of 13 children

, and she

gre w up in foster care because the rights of her parents were terminated. Respondent indicated that she was physically abused by her foster mother. Thus, it did not appear that respondent had a personal foundation to apply to her own parenting, and she did not incorporate the training received in the services to the parenting of G MD . Accordingly, respondent resorted to strip searches of
G MD for signs of abuse, but did not discuss inappropriate touching with the child. Respondent
further acknowledged that s he had mental health and hearing issues. Nevertheless , she failed to
consisten tl y take her medication or wear her hearing aids.

Respondent had a history of giving birth to children and relying on others to raise them
when she could not cope. Respondent a uthorized the guardianship of her older twins to Henry, terminated the guardianship, but had to agree to its reinstate ment because of CPS involvement. When respondent did not have housing, she placed G MD with the Branches when the child was only 18 months old. The Branches, respondent’s fellow church members, were not given formal authorization to obtain benefits or seek treatment for the child. Although it was proffered that formality was not required because the arrangement was only temporary, respondent became pregnant again. That child died in respondent’s care because respondent engaged in unsafe sleep practices. And during a brief period of unsupervised visitation as to GMD, respondent left her

u n monitored while she slept in a car because she was tired. The record reflects that the mental
health services and the parenting and domestic violence c lasses that respondent received did not
rectif y the conditions that caused G MD to come into care

. Resp ondent did not appear to be interested in consistently taking medication to control her mental health issues . H er erratic behaviors, periods of depression, and questionable relationships failed to provide any assurance
that the adjudicative conditions wer e rectified such that G MD could properly be cared for by respondent. R espondent completed the housing and legal source of income requirements of the PAA but it was not reasonably likely that the remaining components would be completed within a
reasonable time given GMD’s age. In light of the facts and circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err in determining that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) w as established by clear and convincing
evidence. 4

4 Although only one statutory ground for termination of parental rights is necessary, the trial court also did not clearly err in concluding that MCL 712A.19b(3) (g) and (j) w ere satisfied by clear and convincing evidence for these same reasons

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- III. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent contends that termination o f h er parental rights was not in GMD ’s best
interests

. We disagree.

Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must conclude that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate p arental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). A trial court’s decision regarding a child’s best interests is also reviewed for clear error. In re Laster

, 303 Mich App 485, 496; 845 NW2d 540 (2013). When m aking the best interests determination, the trial court may consider the entire record. In re Pederson , 331 Mich App 445, 476; 951 NW2d 704 (2020).

“ If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child ’ s best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be
made. ” MCL 712A.19b(5). “ In deciding whether termination is in the child ’ s best interests, the court may consider the child ’ s bond to the parent, the parent ’ s parenting ability, the child ’ s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent ’ s home. ” In re Olive/Metts , 29 7 Mich App at 41

- 42 (citations omitted). “ The trial court may also consider a parent ’ s history of domestic violence, the parent ’ s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent ’ s visitation history with the child, the children ’ s well

- being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. ” In re White , 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). A child’s placement with relatives is also a factor to consider and generally weighs against
termination. In re Gonzales/Martinez , 310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015).

The trial court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in GMD’s best interests. Respondent was never able to plan for the child or demonstrate appropriate parenting skills in an unsuper vised setting. To respondent’s credit, she obtained housing, had a legal source of income through social security benefits, and she obtained additional employment as an aid e in a senior living facility. However, respondent failed to demonstrate that
she could parent children. Of her four children, ABD died within weeks of birth because of unsafe sleep practices. Respondent gave Henry guardianship over her twins and informally turned GMD over to the Branches. Respondent failed to demonstrate that she wa s interested in long

- term parenting of GMD by consistently taking her medication to maintain her mental health. Respondent’s father testified that respondent could not manage her mood or emotions and maintain
a clean home when she failed to take her medic ation. Additionally, respondent engaged in poor
decision

- making. She continued to associate with Jordan despite GMD’s fear of him. She failed to address outstanding misdemeanor traffic warrants and drove on a suspended license. The recent parenting tim e supervisor noted that respondent lacked motivation and got lazy with her parenting. Under the circumstances, it is questionable whether respondent could manage GMD’s needs . In light of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred i n its determination that- 9

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termination of respondent’s parental rights was in GMD’s best interests. In re Laster , 303 Mich App at 496. 5

Affirmed.

/s/ Anica Letica /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Michael J. Riordan

5 In a single sentence, respondent alleged that a guardianship should have been contemplated in lieu of termination. Although it is true that an alternative, such as placement with relati ves, may weigh against termination, In re Gonzales/Martinez , 310 Mich App 434, this request was not made in the trial court. Indeed, it appears that no request was made because the relationship between respondent and the Branches had soured. Given respon dent’s actions in searching for signs of physical abuse by the Branches and the purportedly false report against them

, guardianship with the Branches in lieu of termination of parental rights was never contemplated.