shortly after the trial began because the police had not produced exculpatory "street files" that
they possessed. Id. at 990-91. Jones sued the City and various police officers under section 1983
for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The Seventh Circuit stated: “It is
true that at some point after a person is arrested, the question whether his continued confinement
or prosecution is unconstitutional passes over from the Fourth Amendment to the due proccss
clause... ." Id. at 994. It went on to hold that "[iJf police officers have been instrumental in the
plaintiff's continued confinement or prosecution, they cannot escape liability by pointing to the
decisions of prosecutors or grand jurors or magistrates to confine or prosecute him, They cannot
hide behind the officials whom they have defrauded." Id.

Unlike the plaintiff in Jones, however, Davis has not stated a malicious prosecution

claim, nor could he. As he concedes in his Complaint and legal memorandum, the charges
against him were dismissed less than a month after his alleged false arrest. Nonetheless, Davis
argues that his allegation that Defendants knowingly created evidence with the knowledge that
such fabrication would result in charges being filed against him is sufficient to establish a cause
of action for a violation of his due process rights. In Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 752
(7th Cir. 2001), however, the court held that "there is no constitutional right not to be prosecuted
without probable cause." See also Penn v, Harris, 296 F.3d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 2002) (same).
Rather, to state a federal due process claim, a plaintiff "must allege that the officers withheld
information or evidence necessary for the fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution." Ineco v. City of Chicago, 286 F.3d 994, 998-99 (7th Cir. 2002) (interpreting

Newsome). This Davis has not done. Even a liberal reading of the Complaint demonstrates that


Amendment, In Count I, however, Plaintiff does not attempt to assert an independent
excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, he merely alleges
"Defendants acted without cause and with malice, in violation of Plaintiff's Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure," Because
Defendants are state actors, the Fourth Amendment applies to them through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the Court holds that reference to the Fourteenth Amendment in this Count
is not improper and it DENIES Defendant's motion to strike.

Motion to Dismiss Count II

Defendants argue that Count IH fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
because Plaintiff's obstruction charges were dismissed without him being subjected trial and
because he fails to demonstrate that he suffered the deprivation of a liberty interest that rises to
a constitutional magnitude separate and apart from his Fourth Amendment false arrest claim.
This Court agrees.

It is well established that the due process clause does not “provide broad generalized
protection against misdeeds by police or prosecution.” Christman v. Hanrahan, 500 F.2d 65,
67 (7th Cir, 1974). Rather, "the mission of the [due process] clause [is] avoidance of an unfair
trial to the accused, and no violation , . . result[s) unless the misconduct had some prejudicial
impact on the defense." Id.

In this case, Plaintiff concedes that the charges against him were dismissed and he never
proceeded to trial. He argues, however, that under Jones v, City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th
Cir. 1988), a trial is not necessary for an individual's due process rights to be invoked. In Jones,

the plaintiff had been wrongfully arrested and jailed for a month, but a mistrial was declared

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Plaintiff merely has plead allegations that support a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim and
this Court will not allow him to bootstrap a due process claim on a false arrest claim,
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to strike references to the Fourteenth
Amendment in Count I of the Complaint is DENIED, and its motion to dismiss Count III is

GRANTED with prejudice.

Enter:

‘

David H, Coar
United States District Judge

Dated: April 17, 2003



Minute Ordet Form (06497)

United States District Court, Northern District of [linois

Name of Assigned Judge David H. Coar Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 7049 DATE 4/17/2003
CASE Thomas Davis v. Officer Richards, et al.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
Of the mation being presented.]

MOTION:
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count IIT
DOCKET ENTRY:
(a) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.)
(2) ) Brief in support of motion due
(3) Qo Answer brief to motionduc___. Reply to answer briefdue____.
(4) a Ruling/Hearing on setfor_ at
{5) ao Status hearing(held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on set for at.
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on set for___—at_—
(”) oO Trial{set for/re-set for] on___at
(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to ___—_at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) (General Rule 21 [ FRCP41(a)(1) [ FRCP41(a)(2).
qo) of [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum and opinion order,

Defendants’ motion strike all references to the Fourteenth Amendment in Count I is DENIED and its

motion to dismiss Count Ill of the Complaint [8-1] is “Ye DL
‘

(1) [For further detail see attached memorandum and opinion order.)

Document
Number

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. number of norigns

Notices mailed by judge's staff,

Notified counsel by telephone,

| Docketing to muil notices,

Muit AQ 450 form,

LOM tsacoy
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. : aoe

date mailed notice
courtroom

mds(le) deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office erallg deputy inital



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT “
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS YS)
EASTERN DIVISION QO ©
v
THOMAS DAVIS, ) ‘ SS ag
Qe
) ®
Plaintiff, )
) No, 02 C7049 oo
v. ) we
) HONORABLE DAVID H. COAR
OFFICER RICHARDS, OFFICER )
LOWERY, OFFICER BARTLETT, and )
OFFICER VELARDI, in their individual +)
capacities, )
)
Defendants. )

MO) UM OPINION AND ER

Thomas Davis (“Plaintiff” or “Davis”) brings a three-count complaint against Zion
Police Officers Richards, Lowery, Bartlett, and Velardi (collectively “Defendants”) under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for excessive force, false arrest, and violation of due process for
the alleged arrest of Plaintiff for obstruction a peace officer on October 4, 2000. Before this
Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count II (violation of due process claim) of the
Complaint and to strike all references to the Fourteenth Amendment in Count I pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P, 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike
and GRANTS with prejudice their motion to dismiss Count ID of the Complaint.

Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint, not its

factual basis. Thus, this Court accepts as true all factual allegations in Plaintiffs complaint and

draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in Plaintiff's favor. Arazie v, Mullane, 2 F.3d

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1456, 1465 (7th Cir. 1993). Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted only if it appears
beyond doubt that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. Mattice v.
Memorial Hosp., 249 F.3d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 2001).
Discussion

The following facts are taken from the well-pleaded allegations of Plaintiff's
Complaint. On October 4, 2000, Defendants went to Plaintiff's residence in Zion, Illinois.
Defendants asked Plaintiff if they could enter his residence and Plaintiff informed them that he
did not want them to enter and that he would not open the door for them. Defendants then
kicked in Plaintiff's door and placed him under arrest. Plaintiff did not resist Defendants.
During the arrest, Defendants beat Plaintiff severely and used pepper spray on him. Plaintiff
was charged with obstruction a peace officer in violation of 720 ILCS 5/31-1, and on
November 1, 2000, the charges against him were dismissed.

On October 2, 2002, Plaintiff filed this three-count complaint against Defendants.
Count I alleges excessive force, Count II alleges false arrest, and Count III alleges a violation
of Davis's due process rights, The Defendants move this Court to strike all references to the
Fourteenth Amendment in Count I and to dismiss Count II] for failure to state a claim. This
Court addresses each motion in turn.
Motion to Strike References to Fourteenth Amendment in Count 1

Defendants argue this Court should strike references to the Fourteenth Amendment
Count I because, in Graham y, Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 396-97 (1989), the Supreme
Court held that excessive force claims are to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's

reasonableness standard rather than under the due process clause of the Fourteenth

2-