alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                                 JUL-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-01-1994
<CASH>                                         4,015
<SECURITIES>                                   0
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 4,015
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          11,707
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<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       9,920
<OTHER-SE>                                     (17,612)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   4,015
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               2,024
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               12,148
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<NET-INCOME>                                   (10,124)
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</TABLE>
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 22

- 00049

- CV

I N THE I NTEREST OF K.J., A C HILD §

§

§

§ On Appeal from the 158th District

Court

of Denton County ( 20

- 5129

- 158 )

May 19, 2022

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

PER CURIAM
EXHIBIT 31.2





CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION





I, Lisa A. Weaver, certify that:





1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A of StarTek, Inc.; and





2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.





Date: July 29, 2014/s/ LISA A. WEAVERLisa A. WeaverSenior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
#### James J. Little *vs.*L. S. Leighton.

May 12, 1891.

Appeal — Refusal to Vacate Order Denying New Trial. — An order refusing to set aside and vacate an order denying a new trial is not an appealable order.

Refusal to Allow Renewal of *Motion*— Discretion.—Held, that upon the facts of this case there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant leave'to renew a motion for a new trial, which has been previously denied.

Appeal by defendant from the order of the district court for Lac qni Parle county, *Brotan,*J., presiding, (acting for the judge of the 12th district,) which is considered in the opinion.

*M. M. Madigan,*for appellant.

*H. L. Hayden,*for respondent.

Mitchell, J.

The practice followed in this case in the district court was so irregular, and the record in this court so confused, that it is a labor of some difficulty to determine just what this appeal is. As nearly as we can gather from the record, the following is the situation : After verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant caused a “case” to be settled containing all the evidence, except the note sued on and the certificate of its protest, and then moved for a'new trial, which was denied. He then made a motion to have the settled case amended, which was also denied. He subsequently asked for leave to renew his motion to amend the settled case, which was granted. He then made a motion to amend the settled ease, and for leave on such amended case to renew his former motion .for a new trial, and that the order denying his former motion for a new trial be vacated, and that the court again determine the motion on the amended case. „The court made an order amending the “case,” by attaching thereto copies of the note and certificate of protest, (it being claimed that the originals were lost,) but in all otter respects denying defendant’s motion. The appeal- is from this order refusing leave to renew the motion for a new trial, and refusing to vacate *202the former order denying a new trial. In so far as the order is one refusing leave to renew a motion previously made and denied, the matter was one addressed to the sound discretion of the court; and we think that the facts disclosed by the record show that, so far from that discretion being abused in this case, it was wisely exercised. In so far as the order was one refusing to set aside and vacate the order denying a new trial, (which was itself appealable,) it was not an appealable order.

Order affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED BY THE 
     10-QSB FOR THE PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 FOR INNOVACOM, INC. AND IS 
     QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                                                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         795,392
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  70,207
<ALLOWANCES>                                   34,300
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               959,753
<PP&E>                                         1,733,229
<DEPRECIATION>                                 284,965
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 3,081,627
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          6,582,422
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       20,562
<OTHER-SE>                                     (7,569,658)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   3,081,627
<SALES>                                        45,082
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               45,082
<CGS>                                          22,263
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  3,460,094
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             986,434
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (4,391,437)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   1,600
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (4,393,037)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 (1,378,978)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,772,015)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.28)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.28)
        


</TABLE>
exv10w1






Exhibit 10.1




SECOND AMENDMENT TO

EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT




     WHEREAS, Nabors Industries Ltd. and Nabors Industries, Inc. (collectively, “the Company”) and
Eugene M. Isenberg (“Employee”), entered into an Executive Employment Agreement (the “Agreement”)
effective as of April 1, 2009 and a First Amendment to the Agreement effective as of June 29, 2009
(the “First Amendment”); and



     WHEREAS, in consideration of the current economic conditions and in lieu of other cost
reductions, Employee and the Company desire to continue to decrease temporarily the compensation
payable to Employee under the Agreement;



     NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual promises, covenants and obligations
contained herein, the Company and Employee agree to amend the Agreement as follows, effective
December 28, 2009:




	 	1.	 	Section 3.1(a) of the Agreement is amended by changing the language added by
the First Amendment to read: “However, on an interim basis commencing June 29, 2009 and
ending on June 27, 2010 the amount of base salary due and payable for purposes of
biweekly payroll administration only shall be based on an annual salary of One Million
One Hundred Seventy Thousand Dollars ($1,170,000). For all other purposes under this
Agreement, the term “Base Salary” or “base salary” shall be construed in accordance
with the first sentence of this Section 3.1(a) as if the preceding sentence’s
modification had not occurred.”






	 	2.	 	As amended by paragraph 1 above, the Agreement remains in full force and
effect. This Agreement may be executed in two or more counterparts each of which shall
be deemed an original but which taken together shall constitute one and the same
instrument.




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties hereto have executed this amendment on the 28th day of December,
2009.




	 	 	 	 	 
	 	COMPANY:



Nabors Industries Ltd.

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ Martin J. Whitman
 	 
	 
	 	Nabors Industries, Inc.

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ Laura W. Doerre
 	 
	 	 	Its Secretary 	 
	 	 	 	 



 









 






	 	 	 	 	 



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	EMPLOYEE:

 	 
	 	/s/ Eugene M. Isenberg
 	 
	 	Eugene M. Isenberg 	 
	 	 	 
	 




2
-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

HASEM SALEM, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

October 14, 2014 

v No. 316464 

Wayne Circuit Court 

SALEH SALEH, LC No. 11-012076-NI 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: OWENS, P.J., and JANSEN and O’CONNELL, JJ. 

OWENS, P.J. (dissenting). 

 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the trial court’s order 

granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition. 

 While the question whether a particular defendant acted reasonably when faced with a 

sudden emergency may be a question of fact for the jury, where a defendant moves for summary 

disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), this is only true where there is a genuine issue of 

material fact. See, e.g., White v Taylor Distributing Co, Inc, 482 Mich 136, 143, 140-141; 753 

NW2d 591 (2008). In this case, even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

plaintiff, the nonmoving party, Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 206; 815 NW2d 

412 (2012), I would conclude that there was no genuine issue of material fact whether defendant 

acted reasonably under the circumstances of the particular sudden emergency. After he learned 

decedent had been shot, defendant found his passenger “in danger,” and was required to act in 

the chaotic moments that ensued—with the encouragement of his companions, including 

plaintiff—without time to consider what, in hindsight, might have been better means to avoid the 

impending danger. The evidence supported a finding that defendant acted reasonably when 

confronted with a sudden emergency. Therefore, I would conclude that the trial court correctly 

applied the sudden-emergency doctrine to grant defendant summary disposition. 

/s/ Donald S. Owens
```
**Exhibit 99.1

                  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)**

In connection with the Annual Report of Vibrant Health  International,  a Nevada
corporation  (the  "Company"),  on Form 10-KSB for the year ending  December 31,
2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange  Commission  (the  "Report"),  I,
Thomas H. McAdam,  Chief Executive  Officer and Chief  Financial  Officer of the
Company,  certify,  pursuant  toss.906  of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002  (18
U.S.C.ss.1350), that to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

                                                /s/Thomas H. McAdam
                                                Thomas H. McAdam
                                                Chief Executive Officer
                                                Chief Financial Officer
                                                March 26, 2003
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph Theodore PALMER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-3443.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 8, 2009.*

Decided Jan. 23, 2009.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 11, 2009.

Josh Minkler, Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Joseph T. Palmer, Lexington, KY, pro se.

Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge, ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge, and TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge.

*

 After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

ORDER

In 1999, Joseph Palmer and 21 other defendants were charged in count one of a superseding indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine and cocaine base (crack). After a trial in 2000, a jury found Palmer guilty as charged. He was sentenced to a term of 240 months. Palmer appealed and we affirmed his conviction and sentence. *United States v. Dumes,*313 F.3d 372 (7th Cir.2002).

On May 14, 2008, Palmer filed a *pro se*motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The motion was denied and Palmer appeals.

Palmer’s 2008 *pro se*motion sought a reduction of his sentence based upon Amendment 706 to the crack cocaine sentencing guidelines. In his motion, Palmer asserted that he is entitled to a sentence reduction pursuant to the amendment, which generally reduced the sentencing guidelines offense level by two. Palmer also asserted that he is entitled to resentencing and consideration of his postsentencing rehabilitation. Without requiring *995a response from the government, the district court denied Palmer’s motion, stating: “[T]he Court has considered the relevant factors in U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determined a sentence reduction is not appropriate.”

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Palmer’s motion because his amended guideline range (324 to 405 months; his old range was 360 to life) continues to far exceed the 240 month (statutory maximum) sentence he received. Neither *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), nor *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), affect Palmer’s sentence because he was sentenced under a statute that did not require a specific quantity of drugs to be proven to a jury.

Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Pedro Cancel, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Boklan, J.), rendered April 23, 1984, convicting him of assault in the second degree (two counts), burglary in the first degree (four counts), robbery in the first degree (three counts) and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment modified, on the law, by reversing the conviction on count 14 of the indictment charging defendant with assault in the second degree, sentence imposed thereon vacated, and said count of the indictment dismissed. As so modified, judgment affirmed.

*656There is insufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding that defendant, either as principal or accessory, assaulted the complainant with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument as charged in the fourteenth count of the indictment *(see, People v La Belle,*18 NY2d 405). Accordingly, the judgment must be modified by reversing defendant’s conviction on count 14 of the indictment charging him with assault in the second degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing said count of the indictment.

We have reviewed defendant’s remaining allegations of error, including his argument directed toward the court’s charge on accessorial liability, and find them to either be without merit, or involve harmless error *(see, People v Rockwell,*97 AD2d 853; *People v Gates,*24 NY2d 666; *People v Hall,*89 AD2d 898). Mangano, J. P., Brown, Rubin and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 684 

To provide for the conveyance of certain parcels of land to the town of 

Alta, Utah. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 30, 2011 

Mr. LEE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to 

the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To provide for the conveyance of certain parcels of land 

to the town of Alta, Utah. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CONVEYANCE. 

4 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act: 

5 (1) NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LAND.—The 

6 term ‘‘National Forest System land’’ means the par7 cels of National Forest System land that— 

8 (A) are located— 

9 (i) in sec. 5, T. 3 S., R. 3 E., Salt 

10 Lake meridian; 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 684 IS

1 (ii) in, and adjacent to, parcels of 

2 land subject to special use permit 

3 SLC102708, the authority of which expires 

4 on December 30, 2026; 

5 (iii) in the Wasatch-Cache National 

6 Forest in Salt Lake County, Utah; and 

7 (iv) in the incorporated boundary of 

8 the town of Alta, Utah; and 

9 (B) consist of approximately 2 acres (in10 cluding appurtenances). 

11 (2) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 

12 the Secretary of Agriculture. 

13 (3) TOWN.—The term ‘‘Town’’ means the town 

14 of Alta, Utah. 

15 (b) CONVEYANCE.—As soon as practicable after the 

16 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall convey 

17 to the Town, without consideration, all right, title, and in18 terest of the United States in and to the National Forest 

19 System land. 

20 (c) SURVEY.— 

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—In accordance with para22 graphs (2) and (3), the exact acreage and legal de23 scription of the National Forest System land shall 

24 be determined by a survey approved by the Sec25 retary. 


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3 

•S 684 IS

1 (2) MAXIMUM AREA.—The acreage of the Na2 tional Forest System land determined under para3 graph (1) may not exceed 2 acres. 

4 (3) COST.—The Town shall pay each cost aris5 ing from a survey described in paragraph (1). 

6 (d) USE OF NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LAND.—As 

7 a condition of the conveyance under subsection (b), the 

8 Town shall use the National Forest System land only for 

9 public purposes. 

10 (e) REVERSIONARY INTEREST.—In the deed to the 

11 Town, the Secretary shall provide that the National Forest 

12 System land shall revert to the Secretary, at the election 

13 of the Secretary based on the best interests of the United 

14 States, if the National Forest System land is used for a 

15 purpose other than a public purpose. 

16 (f) ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—With re17 spect to the conveyance under subsection (b), the Sec18 retary may require such additional terms and conditions 

19 as the Secretary determines to be appropriate to protect 

20 the interests of the United States. 

Æ 


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