1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CLINTON T. ELDRIDGE , ) ) Petitioner, ) v. ) Civil Action No. 20

- cv - 1009 (UNA) ) BOON BLA NCKENSEE , et al ., ) ) Respondent s
. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION & TRANSFER ORDER This matter is before the c ourt on Respondents’ C ombined Motion T ransfer and Partial Motion to Dismiss

. For the reasons stated herein, the M otion will be granted in part; R espondents’ Motion to T ransfer will be granted and this case will be transferred in the interest of justice to the District of Arizona.
BACKGROUND
I. Procedural History Petitioner Clinton T. Eldridge , who has been designated to the United States Penitentiary (“USP”) T ucson for the entirety of this litigation , Amended Petition (“Am. Pet. ” ), ECF No. 4 at 3 ; Motion to Transfer an d Partially Dismiss ( “Tran s f. Mot. ”), ECF No. 15 at 2, id. n.2, initiated this matter on April 17, 2020, by filing a petition of habeas corpus pursuant to D.C. Code § 16

- 901(b). See generally Pet., ECF No. 1. On April 28, 2020, another court in this District reviewed the petition and determined that it lacked suffici ent detail. See 4/28/20 Ord., ECF No. 3. The identity of the intended respondent, Boon Blanckensee , was unclear, and the petition was want of information sufficient to satisfy Local Civil Rule 5.1(c)(1). See id. at 1

– 2. The claims, as well as the relief sought and entitl ement to same, were also somewhat unclear. See id. at 2. Instead of2 dismi ssing the petition outright, that court issued an o rder identifying these deficiencies and providing petitioner with an opportunity to amend within 30 days. See id . at 1

– 2. On June 4, 2020, petitioner filed an amend ed petition for habeas corpus

. He named Blanckensee again as a respondent, identifying him as the Complex Warden at USP Tucson , and he also named the Acting C hairperson of the United States Parole Commission (“USPC”) as an additional respondent . Am. Pet. at 3. This c ourt then randomly screened, see 28 U.S.C. § § 1915 ; 1915A, the amended petition, and found that p etitioner has complied with the April 28 th order, granted his mot ion to proceed in forma pauperis , and directed the action to be randomly assigned to a judge for further proceedings. See 6/8/2020 Min. Ord. On June 9, 2020, the Clerk then randomly assigned the action to this c ourt.
II. Facts & Amended Petition Petitioner is a Distr ic t of Columbia Code offender, who entered a guilty plea on May 14, 1984, to nine counts of the indictment, including r ap e, armed robbery , and burglary. See Transf.
Mot. at 1; see also United States v. Eldridge , No. 1983 FEL 006638 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1993) at

“ disposition. ” On July 19, 1984, the District of Columbia Superior Court sentenced p etitioner to an aggregate term of 40 to 120 years of imprisonment. See Transf. Mot. at 1; see also Eldridge , No. 1983 FEL 006638 at “sentencing .” At the time of petitioner’s conviction and sentencing, parole eligibility was determined by

a separate D.C. Parole Board , see Austin v. Reilly , 6 06 F. Supp. 2d 4, 8 (D.D.C. 2009), pursuant to regulations promulgated in 1972 (“1 972 R egulations”) , see 9 D.C.R.R. ch. 2, § 105.1 (1972)

. Subsequently, the D.C. Parole Board published additional guidelines (“1987 Guidelines”) intended to achieve more uniform application of the 1972 Regulations, s ee D.C. Mun. Regs. T it le 28 §§ 100 et seq

. (1987) (repealed Au g. 5, 2000) , as well as supplemental policy guideline s which more3 specifically defined the terms cited in the 1987 Guideline app endices , s ee Sellmon v. Reilly , 551
F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2008). Congress eventually abolished the D.C. Board of Parole, and in 2000, formally transferred parole jurisdiction to USPC for D.C. felony offenders , through the enactment of the National Capital Revitalization and Self

- Government Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105

- 33, § 11231, 111 Stat. 712, 745 (codified at D.C. Code §§ 24

- 101 et seq .). Shortly thereafter, the USPC adopted new parole regulations and guidelines (“2000 Guide lines”), see 28 C.F.R. § 2.80, applicable to any such offender who received an initial parol e hearing after August 5, 1998. See Sellmon , 551 F. at 71

. These regulations are still currently in effect

. S ee id. (Oct. 19, 2015). Petitioner contends that he is still subject to the now

- defunct 1972 Regulations and that, as such , they should have been applied with the 1987 Guidelines at his parole hearings

. See Am. Pet.
at 6

– 10

. He states that he has had five total parole hearings, and that in four of those five, USPC relied improperly on the 2000 Guidelines in rendering its determinations

. 1 Id. at 6

– 7. More specifically, he alleges that the 2000 Guidelines were misapplied at parole hearings held on: July 21, 2010, October 29, 2013, February 2, 2016, and September 24, 2019. He alleges that the 1972 Regulations and 1987 Guidelines were only properly applied once, namely, at his parole hearing held on June 1, 2018. See i d. As a result of these alleg ed misapplications , petitioner maintains that USPC has miscalculated the time between his parole hearing s

– where his parole has been denied each time

1 The c ourt takes judicial notice of several other cases where petitioner has raised substantially similar claims. See, e.g., Eldridge v. US Parole Comm’n , No. 18

- cv - 00797 ( GPG ) , 2018 WL 10426189 (D. Colo. May 8, 2018) (dismissing action alleging USPC’s failure to apply the correct D.C. parole guidelines at hearings held in 2010 and 2013, and challenging USPC’s denial of his release to outpatient facility, as “malicious” and “repetitive” ) (collecting cases) , cert. of appealability denied , 737 Fed. Appx. 901 (10th Cir. Sept. 14, 2018). B ecause this c ourt lacks jurisdiction over petitioner’s claims, and respond ents do not raise the argument, it does reach the applicability, if any, of res judicata , but notes its potential relevance for the receiving court.4 – and the subsequent hearing s , also known as a known as “set

- off s .” See id

. at 6

– 10; see also Petitioner’s Opposition (“Opp.”), ECF No. 18 at 2, 6

– 11

. 2 Petitioner argues that he is entitled to
12

- month set

- offs pursuant to the 1972 Regulations and 1987 Guidelines , but that he has instead received four punitive and illegitimate 36

- month set

- offs. See Am. Pet. at 8; Opp. at 3 , 6

– 11. He also takes issue with his purported designation as a “sexual predator,” and challenges USPC’s denial of his request to be imminently placed in a residential treatment program. See Pet. at 8; Opp. at 10

– 11. Petit ioner seeks a rehearing based on the 1972 Regulations a nd 1987 Guidelines, and should r espondents fail to conduct such a hearing, he demands immediate release from custody.
See Am. Pet. Proposed Order, ECF No. 4

- 1 at 1. He also requests placement in a re sident ial treatment program within 90 days, and aga in, should r espondents fail to comply, he seeks immediate release from custody. See id. at 2. Petitioner has also filed two motions for orders, in which he requests that respondents grant him greater ac cess to the prison library, c omputers, and copier

. See Petitioner’s First Motion for Order (“Pet.’s First Mot.”), ECF No. 19 at 1

– 2, 4; Petitioner’s Second Motion for Order (“Pet.’s Sec. Mot.”), ECF No. 21, at 5. He contends that, due to prison restricti ons largely in place to prevent the spread of COVID

- 19, he has faced hardships in timely and thoroughly researching and preparing his legal memoranda and serving respondents

. See Pet.’s First Mot. at 2

– 4; Pet.’s Sec.

2 Appro ximately one month after the filing of his opposition, petitioner filed an opposition “amendment,” ECF No. 20, though without lea ve to do so. Nonetheless, the c ourt reviewed and considered the filing. In the amendment, P etitioner again raises substantial ly similar arguments regarding the miscalculation of his set

- offs based on the alleged misapplication of the 2000 Guidelines , s ee id. at 3, 5 , 7

– 8, and also includes a duplicative request to be transferred to a residential treatment center, see id. at 8

– 9. Petitioner also alleges that USPC failed to provide adequate reaso ning for its determinations, or to provide him with formal notice, as required by statute

. See id

. at 2

– 5

.5 Mot. at 2. In the second motion, petitioner also requests some of the relief sought in his amended petition, namely, his release to a residential treatment program

. S ee Pet

. ’s Sec. Mot. at 2.
ANALYSIS Respondents argue that this habeas action should be construed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241. Trans f . Mot. at 2

– 3, 5. Notably , “[a] district court may not entertain a [ § 2241] habeas petition involving present physical custody unless the respondent custodian is within its territorial jurisdiction.” Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n , 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Day v. Trump , 860 F.3d 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal for want of jurisdiction where the District of Columbia was not “the distric t of residence of [petitioner’s] immediate custodian for purposes of § 2241 habeas relief”). R espondents also argue that this c ourt cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over respondent Blanckensee. Trans f . Mot. at 4

– 5. For all of these reasons, responde nts contend that this matter should be transferred in the interest of justice to the Distr ict of Arizona, where petitioner has been and remains incarcerated. See id. at 1, 2, id. n.2, 4

– 5. In oppo si tion, petitioner argues that, because he is a D.C. Code offender who raises his habeas claims pursuant to D.C. Code § 16

- 1901(b) , he may establish subject

- matter jurisdiction in this District. See Opp. at 4

– 7

. Notwithstanding, a petitioner relying on thi s statute must be incarcerated “within the District” at the time of filing , see id. at § 16

- 1901(a ); see also Stokes , 374 F.3d at 1238

– 39 (holding that habeas jurisdiction , for D.C. Code offenders, is predicated on a petitioner’s physical location at the t ime of filing of the petition )

. “[W]i thin the District” is a t erm of art, applicable only to individual s confined within the District of Columbia, or within a designated District correctional facility “ locat ed outside the District limits

. ” See Blair

- Bey v. Quick , 151 F.3d 1036 , 1039 n.1, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Neither now, nor at the time of filing, was petitioner located in the District or otherwise designated to a District of Columbia facility. Thus, petitioner may not bring his habeas claim s under Se ction 16

- 1901.6 The District of Columbia Circuit has held, however, that federal courts are not precluded by D.C. Code § 16

– 1901 from entertaining habeas corpus petitions filed by D.C. Code offenders. See id. at 1046

– 47. Instead, these petitioners may al ternatively file a habeas petition pursuant through the “available avenue” of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See id. at 1044; see also Jiminian v. Nash , 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (Section 2241 is proper for challenges to the execution of a federal prisoner's sentence, including: the administration of parole, the computation of a prisoner's sentence, and the type of detention and resulting prison conditions ). Consequently, petitioner’s habeas claims relating to his parole determinations are not ent irely foreclosed but, he must raise
t hem pursuant to Section 2241. See Blair

- Bey 151 F.3d at 1044. And this District may not entertain his Section 2241 claims because his immediate custodian is located in Arizona. See Stokes , 374 F.3d at 1239 (holding tha t even though petitioner had been arrested and convicted in Superior Court, and that he served a prior portion of his prison term in a D.C. correctional facility, it was “ of no moment und er the immediate custodian rule

. ”) (citing Rumsfeld v. Padilla , 542 U .S.
426 , 443

– 47 (2004)). Petitioner argues that has sued a federal official, and that he seeks review of determinations rendered by a federal agency, thus suggesting that doing so ascertains subject matter jurisdiction in the District of Columbia

. See Opp. at 4

– 7. Courts in this jurisdiction must examine personal jurisdiction and venue carefully to guard against the danger that a litigant might manufacture venue in the District of Columbia. See Cameron v. Thornburgh , 983 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

. By naming a federal government agency or official as a respondent , a petitioner could attempt to bring a suit in the District of Columbia that should properl y be pursued elsewhere. See id. As noted by the cases cited by petitioner, habeas litigants i ncarcerated outside of this District have, at times, successfully obtained subject matter jurisdiction over USCP and challenged its determinations here

. However, the cases cited by petitioner are distinguishable from the instant7 matter in two respects. F irst, for example, petitioner cites to Noble v. U.S. Parole Comm’n , 887
F. Supp. 11 ( D.D.C. 1995) , and other similar case law. See Opp. at 5. The petitioner in Noble was granted parole and und er active supervision by USPC, and then later specifically detained by
UPSC in a federal prison on aggregated federal and local sentences

. See Noble , 887 F. Supp. at 11

– 12. The refore, that petitioner was considered “in the custody” of USPC. Id. Here, pe titioner has never been granted parole, and therefore is simply not in the custody of USPC. Second, petitioner cites to Da niel v. Fulwood , 893 F. S upp
. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2012), reversed and remanded , 766 F.3d 57 (2014), and Daniel v. Smoot , 287 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2018). Opp.
at 9. In the se related Daniel opinions , however, class

- action petitioners challenged determinations by USPC through means other than habeas and did not raise claims against the wardens of their respective faciliti es. Here, petitioner has explicitly pursued his claims through habeas , 3 and he has named his warden as a respondent

. I d. at 2, 3. There is no ambiguity that petitioner’s claims should be filed in the District of Arizona.
S

ee Guerra v. Meese , 786 F.2d 414 , 417 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“ a district court may not entertain a habeas petition involving present physical custody unless the respondent custodian is within its territorial jur isdiction”). Additionally, t here is also no indication that this c ourt can exe rcise personal jurisdiction over respondent Blanckensee

. S ee International Shoe Co. v Washington , 326
U

. S . 310, 316 (1945) (holding that due process of law requires that, in order to subject a respondent to a judgment in personam , the respondent must eith er (1) be present within territory of forum, or (2) have certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fa ir play and substantial justice) (citations and inter nal quotation marks omitted ); see also Stokes , 374 F.3d at 1239.

3 Petitioner has accumulated three strikes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), see Eldridge v. Tucker , No. 99

- 0061 (D.D.C. June 6, 2000), which could explain his determination to file this as a habeas matter, rather as another type of civil action.8 “A district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could ha ve been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), transfer is appropriate when procedural obstacles impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication on the merits of a case. Sinclair v. Kleindienst , 711 F.2d 291, 293

– 94 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Smith v.
BOP , 971 F. Supp. 2d 99 , 102

– 03 (D.D.C. 2013) (transferring habeas matter challenging parole determinations, from the District of Columbia to the Central District of California

– where petitioner was incarcerated at the time of filing and wh ere the warden was located)

. Consequently, this matter shall be transferred in the interest of justice to the District of Arizona. Respondents also argue that the USPC Chairperson should be dismissed from this matter pursuant to precedent established b y the District of Columbia Circuit. Trans f . Mot. at 3

– 4; s ee also Blair

- Bey , 151 F.3d at 1039; Guerra , 786 F.2d at 416. This c ourt, however, is want of jurisdiction over this matter, and therefore, will leave any determinations regarding dismissal of the p artie s to the receiving court.
CONCLUSION For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondents’ Motion, ECF No. 15, is GRANTED IN
PART , and it is hereby ORDERED that this case is TRANSFERRED in the interest of justice,

see 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), to the United States District Court for t he District of Arizona. Whether Petitioner is entitled to the relief sought in his First Motion for Order, ECF No. 19, or Second Mo tion for Order, ECF No. 21, are determination s left to the receiving court.
Date: February 1, 2021

_ __________/s/_____________ EMMET G. SULLIVAN United States District Judge