alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Andrew Czuchta et al., Appellants, v Joan Bribitzer, Respondent.

In an action to recover damages for assault, etc., plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Gurahian, J.), entered November 29,1983, as granted defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment entered against her and permitted her to serve a notice of appearance and answer.

Order affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, on condition that defendant pays plaintiffs $200 and serves an answer within 30 days after service upon her of a copy of the order to be made hereon, with notice of entry. In the event said conditions are not complied with, order reversed insofar as appealed from, as a matter of discretion, with costs, and defendant’s motion to vacate her default denied.

Defendant established a reasonable excuse for her delay in answering the complaint and raised a meritorious defense (CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; *Passalacqua v Banat,*103 AD2d 769). Therefore, Special Term did not abuse its discretion in vacating the default judgment entered against her and permitting her to *146serve a notice of appearance and answer. However, we have imposed an appropriate sanction. Titone, J. P., Lazer, Thompson and Eiber, JJ., concur.
First Amendment dated 12/23/2009 between Convergys Corp. and JANA Partners LLC



 Exhibit 10.1 
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT 
 The Agreement
(the “Agreement”) dated February 4, 2009 by and among JANA Partners LLC (“JANA”) and Convergys Corporation (the “Company”, and together with JANA, the “Parties”) is hereby amended by this first amendment
(this “Amendment”) dated as of December 23, 2009. 
 1. Section 3(b). The words “after
November 30, 2009 and on or prior to January 1, 2010” in Section 3(b) of the Agreement are hereby replaced with the words “after November 30, 2009 and on or prior to February 1, 2010”. 
 2. Miscellaneous. This Amendment (i) shall be governed in all respects, including validity, interpretation and effect, by the
laws of the State of New York without giving effect to the choice of law principles of such state, (ii) constitutes, together with the Agreement, the entire agreement of the Parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof, superseding
all prior agreements, written or oral, (iii) may not be amended, except in writing, (iv) may be executed in counterparts, (v) shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of each Party’s successors and permitted assigns,
(vi) may not be assigned without the prior written consent of the other Party and (vii) shall be enforceable, notwithstanding the unenforceability of any particular provision hereof, with respect to all other provisions hereof. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Amendment as of the date above written. 
  

			
	CONVERGYS CORPORATION
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Karen Bowman

	Name:	 	Karen Bowman
	Title:	 	General Counsel


  

			
	JANA PARTNERS LLC
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Charles Penner

	Name:	 	Charles Penner
	Title:	 	Partner, General Counsel
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, May 18, 2016.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of

the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, May 18, 2016

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A16D0345. THE MARCUS MASHBURN, JR. et al. v. CITY OF CUMMING, GEORGIA.

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be

hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this

order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record

transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

LC NUMBERS:

14CV17943
Exhibit 12.1

CERTIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, Herbjorn Hansson, certify that:

1. I have  reviewed this annual  report on Form 20-F of Nordic  American  Tanker
Shipping Limited;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition,  results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of,
and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.  The  Company's  other  certifying  officer(s)  and  I  are  responsible  for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and have:

     a)   designed  such  disclosure  controls  and  procedures,  or caused such
          disclosure   controls  and   procedures  to  be  designed   under  our
          supervision,  to ensure  that  material  information  relating  to the
          Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries,  is made known to us
          by others  within those  entities,  particularly  during the period in
          which this report is being prepared;

     b)   evaluated the effectiveness of the Company's  disclosure  controls and
          procedures  and  presented  in this report our  conclusions  about the
          effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
          of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     c)   disclosed  in this  report  any  change in the  registrant's  internal
          control  over  financial  reporting  that  occurred  during the period
          covered by this annual  report  that has  materially  affected,  or is
          reasonably  likely to materially  affect,  the  registrant's  internal
          control over financial reporting.

5. The Company's other  certifying  officers and I have disclosed,  based on our
most recent  evaluation of internal  control over  financial  reporting,  to the
Company's  auditors  and  the  audit  committee  of the  registrant's  board  of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

     a)   all significant  deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
          operation  of internal  control  over  financial  reporting  which are
          reasonably likely to adversely affect the Company's ability to record,
          process, summarize and report financial information; and

     b)   any fraud, whether or not material,  that involves management or other
          employees  who  have a  significant  role  in the  Company's  internal
          control over financial reporting.

Date: June 29, 2006

/s/ Herbjorn Hansson
-------------------------------
Herbjorn Hansson
Chief Executive Officer

SK 01318 0002 681624
#### In the Matter of Claude Nelson, Appellant, v Eugene S. LeFevre, as Superintendent of Clinton Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents.

Kane, J. P.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Walsh, Jr., J.), entered September 24, 1984 in Clinton County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul the determination of a Superintendent’s proceeding finding petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

Petitioner was restrictively confined for institutional rules violations on January 27, 1984 as a result of an altercation involving an assault upon a correction officer on that date. A Superintendent’s proceeding on the charge was commenced on February 7, 1984. On this appeal, petitioner seeks to annul the disciplinary action imposed upon him on the grounds that the Superintendent’s proceeding was not commenced within seven days of restrictive confinement (7 NYCRR 251-5.1 [a]).

This rule provides: “Where an inmate is confined pending a disciplinary hearing or superintendent’s hearing, the hearing must be commenced as soon as is reasonably practicable following the inmate’s initial confinement pending said disciplinary hearing or superintendent’s hearing, but, in no event may it be commenced beyond seven days of said confinement without authorization of the commissioner or his designee”. Here, the record demonstrates that authorization to extend the hearing was obtained from the Commissioner of Correctional Services’ duly authorized designee. As a result of the promulgation of the above rule, effective June 15,1983, there is no requirement that there be a showing of exigent circumstances to extend the seven-*457day limit, as urged by petitioner, only that the hearing be commenced “as soon as is reasonably practicable following the inmate’s initial confinement” *(see, Matter of Estades v Coughlin,*101 AD2d 299, 300, n 1).

In any event, we agree with Special Term that the evidence submitted was sufficient for it to find that the delay in the hearing emanated from the assault perpetrated by petitioner against the complaining witness *(see, Matter of Peterson v Le Fevre,*85 AD2d 874).

Judgment affirmed, without costs. Kane, J. P., Casey, Mikoll, Levine and Harvey, JJ., concur.
# C_2019280EN.01004702.xml

| 19.8.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 280/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.8.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 280/47

---

Action brought on 28 June 2019 — Lavarra v Parliament

(Case T-404/19)

(2019/C 280/66)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Vincenzo Lavarra (Bari, Italy) (represented by: M. Merola, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

| — | order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

| — | order the European Parliament to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those relied on in Case T-389/19, Coppo Gavazzi v Parliament.

---
Exhibit 10.4



Confidential



LOGO



Interoffice Memorandum



|      |  |                                                      
|----- |  | -----------------------------------------------------
|To:   |  | Personnel File                                       
|      | 
|From: |  | David M. Wurzer, EVP & Chief Financial Officer       
|      | 
|Date: |  | February 1, 2005                                     
|      | 
|Re:   |  | Amendment to Employment Agreement dated April 1, 2002



I, David M. Wurzer, (the
Executive) signed an Employment Agreement (the Agreement) with my employer, CuraGen Corporation (the Company), on or about April 1, 2002, and subsequently signed an Addendum to the Agreement on October 31, 2003. Exhibit
A, Item 1) of the original Agreement provides that the Executives initial base salary shall be subject to increases by the Board of Directors, which shall review the salary periodically. Therefore, pursuant to the minutes of the January 25,
2005, Meeting of the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors, the Executives 2005 base salary will be adjusted to $286,000 per year, payable in bi-weekly installments.



Unless explicitly changed in the Addendum dated October 31, 2003, all other terms of the original Agreement shall remain in full force and
effect.



|                        
|------------------------
|/s/ David M. Wurzer     
|David M. Wurzer         
|                        
|/s/ Jonathan M. Rothberg
|Jonathan M. Rothberg
# C_2021297EN.01003701.xml

| 26.7.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 297/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.7.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 297/37

---

Judgment of the General Court of 9 June 2021 — Iniciativa ‘Derecho de la UE, derechos de las minorías y democratización de las instituciones españolas’ v Commission

(Case T-611/19) (1)

(Institutional law - European citizens’ initiative - ‘EU law, minority rights and democratisation of Spanish institutions’ - New EU framework to strengthen the rule of law - Refusal of registration - Manifest lack of powers of the Commission - No invitation to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union - Article 4(2) and Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 - Obligation to state reasons - Article 296 TFEU)

(2021/C 297/44)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Citizens’ committee of the initiative ‘Derecho de la UE, derechos de las minorías y democratización de las instituciones españolas’ (represented by: G. Boye, I. Elbal Sánchez, E. Valcuende Sillero and I. González Martínez, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: I. Martínez del Peral, acting as Agent)

Intervener in support of the defendant: Kingdom of Spain (represented by: S. Centeno Huerta, acting as Agent)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2019/1182 of 3 July 2019 on the proposed citizens’ initiative entitled ‘EU law, minority rights and democratisation of Spanish institutions’ (OJ 2019 L 185, p. 46).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders the citizens’ committee of the initiative ‘Derecho de la UE, derechos de las minorías y democratización de las instituciones españolas’ to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the citizens’ committee of the initiative ‘Derecho de la UE, derechos de las minorías y democratización de las instituciones españolas’ to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

| 3. | Orders the Kingdom of Spain to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Kingdom of Spain to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 363, 28.10.2019.

---
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Joseph R. Tomkinson, certify that:

 

1.              I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K/A of Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc.; and

 

2.              Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

 
|   | /s/ JOSEPH R. TOMKINSON |
|--------|-------------------------|
|   | Joseph R. Tomkinson     |
|   | Chief Executive Officer |
|   |                    |
|   |                    |
|   | April 28, 2017     |

 

----
Case 10-00875 Doc 14 Filed 01/19/10 Entered 01/20/10 07:24:48 Desc Main

 Document Page 1 of 1
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-6385

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus EDWARD WARLICK WHITE, JR., Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Shelby. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (CR-92-100, CA-97-101-V-4) Submitted: September 10, 1998 Decided: September 24, 1998 Before MURNAGHAN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Edward Warlick White, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Harry Thomas Church, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). Appellant also seeks review of the court’s order declining to reconsider that disposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinions and find noreversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. White , Nos. CR-92-100; CA-97-101-V-4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 1998; Dec. 12, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented inthe materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
# C_2020019EN.01005302.xml

| 20.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 19/53 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 19/53

---

Order of the President of the General Court of 26 September 2019 — Micreos Food Safety v Commission

(Case T-568/19 R)

(Application for interim measures - Bacteriophage - Listeria - ListexTM P100 - Inadmissibility)

(2020/C 19/65)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Micreos Food Safety BV (Wageningen, Netherlands) (represented by: S. Pappas, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: B. Eggers, W. Farrell and I. Galindo Martín, Agents)

Re:

Application pursuant to Articles 278 and 279 TFEU seeking the suspension of the alleged decision by the European Commission of 17 June 2019 by which it allegedly prohibited the placing on the market of ListexTM P100 for use as a processing aid on animal derived Ready-To-Eat-Food.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The application for interim measures is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

| 2. | The costs are reserved |
| --- | --- |

2.

The costs are reserved

---
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

SHANNON DOUGLAS ROBINSON, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D18-494

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

___________________________________)

Opinion filed May 2, 2018.

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P.

9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court 

for Polk County; Donald G. Jacobsen, 

Judge.

Shannon Douglas Robinson, pro se.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
#### Stuart F. Shaw, Respondent, v Joel J. Silver et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[943 NYS2d 89]—

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Saliann Scarpulla, J.), entered March 24, 2011, awarding plaintiff the amounts of $230,273.53 as against Joel J. Silver, Ethan Eldon, and other defendants who are not parties to this appeal, $115,743.85 as against Mr. Silver, and $370,038.58 as against Mr. Silver and Esther Silver, unanimously affirmed, with costs. Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered on or about March 22, 2011, which found in plaintiffs favor after a nonjury trial, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the judgment.

Plaintiffs bills were sufficient to create an account stated *(see e.g. Zanani v Schvimmer,*50 AD3d 445, 446 [2008]). The account stated was not impeached by an error that was rectified at trial *(see O’Connell & Aronowitz v Gullo,*229 AD2d 637, 639 [1996], *Iv denied*89 NY2d 803 [1996]; *see also Geron v DeSantis,*89 AD3d 603, 604 [2011]).

“[W]here an account is rendered showing a balance, the party receiving it must, within a reasonable time, examine it and object, if he disputes its correctness. If he omits to do so, he will be deemed by his silence to have acquiesced, and will be bound by it as an account stated, unless fraud, mistake or other equitable considerations are shown” *(Peterson v Schroder Bank & Trust Co.,*172 AD2d 165, 166 [1991] [internal quotation marks omitted]; *see also Rosenman Colin Freund Lewis & Cohen v Neuman,*93 AD2d 745, 746 [1983]). Defendants-appellants (hereinafter defendants) do not claim fraud or mistake. We find no equitable considerations that would prevent defendants’ silence from being deemed acquiescence to plaintiff’s bills. Furthermore, insofar as the bills for *Beta v Eldon*are concerned, there was not merely “retention of bills without objection” *(Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein, LLP v Waters,*13 AD3d 51, 52 [2004]), there was also partial payment *(see id.; see also e.g. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl v Daelen Corp.,*59 AD2d 375, 378 [1977]).

Defendants’ contention that plaintiffs fees were unreasonable is unavailing; “it is not necessary to establish the reasonableness of the fee since the client’s act of holding the statement without objection will be construed as acquiescence as to *417its correctness” *(Cohen Tauber Spievak & Wagner, LLP v Alnwick,*33 AD3d 562, 562-563 [2006], *lv dismissed*8 NY3d 840 [2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Defendants’ argument that plaintiff violated the Code of Professional Responsibility is “unpreserved and may not be raised for the first time on appeal” *(Morse, Zelnick, Rose & Lander, LLP v Ronnybrook Farm Dairy, Inc.,*92 AD3d 579, 580 [2012]). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P, Acosta, Renwick and Richter, JJ.
#### Rood Stuardo PENA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 10-70449.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed June 29, 2011.

Thomas J. Tarigo, Esquire, Law Offices of Thomas J. Tarigo, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.

Christina J. Martin, Esquire, Trial, OIL, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Rood Stuardo Pena, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. *Mohammed v. Gonzales,*400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir.2005). We deny the petition for review.

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Pena’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than three years after his final administrative order, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), and Pena failed to demonstrate that he warranted equitable tolling of the filing deadline, *see Iturribarria v. INS,*321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.2003) *434(equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.