Hensley v. Eckerhard, 461 U.,S. 424, 435 (1983). Other courts have specifically found this to be the case in
tedistricting litigation. See, e.g., Daggett v. Kimmelman, 617 F. Supp 1269, 1271 (D.N.J. 1985).

Next, Lake County argues that the attorneys’ fees should be reduced because the hours expended are
unreasonable, plaintiffs’ counsel charged varying amounts of time for attending the same meetings, plaintiffs’
counsel charged travel time, the number of attomeys was excessive and the time claimed reflects duplicative work by
different attorneys. Taking the remainder of Lake County’s arguments together, and having considered each
carefully in light of the circumstances of the litigation, I find that a reduction in the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees by 25

Percent represents a more appropriate fee award for plaintiffs.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs [30-1] is GRANTED in part and
ENTER:
a N\veaCEen
lames|B. Zagel vi

United States District Jadge

DENIED in part.

pate: Odt 2002

ee


\

ha,

‘Minute Order Form (06/97)

; . United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
sire Magia Judge James B. Zagel “Than Asigned Joge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 6541 DATE 10/9/2002
CASE VASQUEZ, ET AL vs. COUNTY OF LAKE, ET AL .
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.}
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) Go Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due __.
(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue___.
(4) Qo Ruling/Hearingon____setfor__—_at
(5) oO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) 0 Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) o [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to __at
(9) qa This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 COFRCP41(a)(1) [1 FRCP4i(a)(2).
ao @ (Other docket entry] Motion (30-1) for attorney fees is granted/denied in part.
(a1) @ [For farther detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

av | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
Dw deputy's
initials

Date/time received in
~central Clerk’s Office

umber of notices

HesileY novice

mailing deputy initials

Document
Number

mae



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

AMADOR VASQUEZ, SILVERIA VASQUEZ,
ARMONDO ZIRES, JOSE ZIRES, BARBARA.
RICHARDSON, JACK ANDERSON, COLIN
McRAE, JACK POTTER, DAVID N.
BIRKHAUSEN, RONALD K. WEEKS,

Plaintiffs,
v.
COUNTY OF LAKE, ILLINOIS, a Body Corporate
and Politic, and WILLARD HELANDER, in her
official capacity as County Clerk for the County of
Lake, Illinois,

Defendants.

No. 01 C 6541
Judge James B. Zagel

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

bey.
AE 7;
Or ty ome

Plaintiffs seek an award of attorneys’ fees in connection with their action to enjoin defendants County of

Lake, Ilinois and Willard Helander (together, “Lake County”) from conducting elections pursuant to a redistricting

plan passed by the Lake County Board. Plaintiffs alleged a violation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1971, et.

seq., in that the plan approved by the Lake County Board dilutes Hispanic voting strength and because such plan did

not conform to the Illinois Counties Code, 55 ILCS 5/2-3003. On December 7, 2001, after I entered an order

invalidating the plan approved by the Lake County Board, Lake County created a revised redistricting plan that

contains a Hispanic super-majority in excess of 65 percent in the Waukegan area and minimizes the population

deviation. On January 18, 2002, I entered an order directing that the revised plan adopted on December 7, 2001

shall govern all applicable elections until the next decennial apportionment.

Lake County argues that its actions in creating a revised plan were voluntary’ and, therefore, plaintiffs are

not properly considered “prevailing parties” and are consequently not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees pursuant to

the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human

Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001).

T note that Lake County's actions were only "voluntary" insofar as it knew it could not defend the

original board-adopted plan because such plan's population differentials were in contravention of state law.



The Court in Buckhannon sought to clarify its previous rulings and make clear that a party is entitled to
attorneys’ fees only when there occurs a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” (quoting Texas
State Teachers Ass’n. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989)). In addressing what disposition of
a case rises to the level of such a “material alteration,” the Court discussed consent decrees and noted that
“{a]ithough a consent decree does not always include an admission of liability by the defendant, it nonetheless is a
court ordered ‘chang[e} [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant,” id. at 604 (quoting
Texas State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 792). What the Court found most important about consent decrees that
merited their inclusion on the “side of the line” that merits attorneys’ fees was that they “entail . . . judicial approval
and oversight .....” Id. at604 n.7.

This is a very close issue but I believe that plaintiffs fall on this same side of the line and are “prevailing
parties” within the meaning enunciated in Buckhannon. The Buckhannon Court does not require an admission of
liability and, indeed, there is none here. The Court does, however, require that there be “judicial approval and
oversight,” id., at 604, n.7, and the unusual circumstances of the settlement and the subsequent order I entered meet
that standard. Were Lake County to breach the agreement, I retain jurisdiction over the matter and plaintiffs could
seek a remedy in my court

Having decided that plaintiffs are entitled to some attorneys’ fees, I turn now to Lake County’s arguments
that plaintiffs’ claimed attomeys’ fees should be reduced. Taking the most significant challenge first, I reject Lake
County’s argument that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees in connection with the state claim
pursuant to the Illinois Counties Code as well as the federal claim pursuant to the Voting Rights Act. The state and

federal claims are based on the same core of operative facts and are not properly considered as two discrete claims.

2 Buckhannon also addresses Lake County’s argument that this case was mooted by the Lake County

Board’s approval on December 7, 2001 of the revised plan. [ note that there was nothing to stop the Lake County
Board from adopting any number of revised plans at any point in time, any one of which could have reversed the
effects of the December 7, 2001 plan. My order of January 18, 2002 addressed this issue and binds the Lake County
Board to the revised plan for 10 years. The Court in Buckhannon also addressed the concept of mootness in this
context by noting that “for so long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for damages, a change in conduct will not
moot the case.” Jd. at 608-09. The Court noted that a case can only be considered moot if subsequent events make it
absolutely clear that the challenged practice count not reasonably be expected to recur. Id. at 609 (citing Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). I do not find that to be the situation here.

2