# THEA NEY 

## GENERAL

Hon. Homer Garrison,Jr. Director, Texas Department of Public Safety Austin, Texas Opiriion No. V-700

Re: Repeal ofArticle 1150, Vernon's Penal Code, relative to stopping, rendering aid, and giving Informationfollowing an accident,by
reason of conflictsbetween this statuteand theUniform Traffic Code of 1947.
Diar Sir:

Your recent request for an oplliion partment contained the following question: by this De-

'WasArt. 1150, Texas Penal Code, repealedby TheUniform Act RegulatingTraffic on the Highways (Acts, 1947, 50th Leg. ~it96;;o~;;H421)Vernon'sAnn. CIV. St.,

.Article 1150 of the Texas Penal Code Is a8 follows:

"Wheneveran automobile,motorcycle or other motor vehiclewhatsoever, regardless of the power by which the samemay be propelleb, or &awn, strikesany person or collideewith any vehicle containinga person, the driver of, and all persons In control of suchautomobile,motor vehicle or other vehicle shall stop and ehall render to the person struck or to the occupants of the vehicle collidedwith all necessary assistance Including the carrying of such person or occupants to a physician, or surgeon for medical or surgical treatment, If such treatmentbe required, or if such carrying Is requestedby the person struck or any OCcupant of the vehicle collidedwith; ad 8ucbBon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 2 (V-700)

driver and person having OP assuming authority of such driver shall further give to the occupant of such vehicle or person struck, if requested at the time of such striking OP collision OP immediatelythereafter, the number of such automobile,motorcycle or motor vehicle, also the name of the
owner thereof and his address, the names of the passenger or passengers not exceeding five in each automobile or other vehicle, togetherwith the address of each one thereof. Any person violatingany provision of this.articl.e

is punishableby imprisonment in the penitentiarynot to exceed five years or in jailnot exceeding one year or by fine not exceeding five thousand dol,lfjrs, orby both such fine and imprisonment.
Pertinentprovisions of Article 670ld,Vernon's Civil Statutes, are:

"Sec. 38 (a) The driver of any vehicle lnvolved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possiblebut shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accidentuntil he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 40, Every such step shall be made without obstructing trafficmore than Is necessary. "(b) Any person falling to stop or to complywith said requirementsunder such circumstances shallupon conviction be punished by imprisonment in the penltenMary not to exceed five (5)years or in jailnot exceeding one (1)year orby fine not exceedingFive Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Y3ec. 39. The driver of any vehicle lnvolved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehiclewhich is driven or attendedby any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident until he has fulfilled the re-Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 3 (v-700)

quirementsof Section 40. Every such stop shaI.1

be made without obstructing trafficmore than is necessary. Any person failing to stop or to comply with said requirementsunder such clrcumstances shallbe guilty of a misdemeanor.

"Sec. 40. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehiclewhich is driven or attended by any person shall give his name,address, and the registrationnumber of the vehicle he is driving and shallupon request and if available exhibithis operator's, commercial operatorss, or chauffeur's license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle collidedwith and shall render to any pernon injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injuredperson.

"Sec. l.56. All laws or parts of laws inconsistentor conflictinnwith the orovislons of thisAct are hereby repealed,
!i rovided,however, that nothing in this ct is,intended to repeal provisions of
s v Q (severalI.awsspecifiedbut Article 1150 of the Penal Code is not includ-

. ed In the group,) (Emphasissupplied)

By comparing the subjectmatter of Article 1150 of the Penal Code with that of the above quoted provisions of Article 67016, itbecomes apparent that the Legislature, in the enacting of such provisions of Article 6701&, has establisheda comprehensivelaw covering the field of traffic legislationprovided for inArticle 1150. Basically, the question of repeal, whether express or implied, of one statuteby another is one of legislative intent. The enactment of subaequent comprehensivelegislation such as is found in Sections 38, 39 and 40, Article 67016, manifests an in-Bon. Homer Garrison,Jr., page 4 (v-700)

tent on the part of the Legislature to repeal all former laws upon the subject. By every reasonable construction, It is clear that the later enactment is intended to supersede the existing law and the latest legislative expression prevails.

We quote the following from Meek v. Wheeler County, et al, 125 g.W.(2d) 331, 334:

‘In the case of Bryan v. gun&berg 5 Tex. 41.8,424, the Supreme Court of {his State announced the rule which, we think, is decisive of the issuebefore us. Such rule is in the following language: ‘Itundoubtedly is true that a constructionwhich repeals former statutes,by implication, is not to be favored; and it is also true that statutes In par1 materia, and relating to the same subject,are to be taken and construed together;because it is to be inferredthat they had one object in view, and were Intended to be consideredas constituting one entire, and harmonious system. But when the new statute, in itself, comprehendsthe entire subject, and creates a new, entire, and independent sy(Jtem,respecting that subjectmatter, it is universallyheld to repeal and supercedeall previous systemsand laws respecting the
same subjectmatter.1

“An even strongerrule than the above is to be found in Black on Interpretation of Laws, Second Edition,page 355, in the f011owing language:

“‘Evenwhere there is no direct re ugnancy or inconsistencybetween the earl!i er and the later law, there may in some case8 be an impliedrepeal. This result follows where the later act revises, amends, and sumsup the whole law on the particular subject to which it relates, covering all the ground treated of In the earlier statute, and adding new or differentprovisions, and thus plainly shows that it was intended to supercedeany and all prior enactments on that subject-matter,and to furnish, for the future, in itselfalone, the whole andHon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 5 (V-700)

only system of statute law applicable to that subject.'"

In State v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, et al, 194 S.W. 422, 432, it is said:

"Therule is well settled that,when a subsequent statute showsby its context that itwas intended to embrace all the law upon the subject dealtwith, such statute will, by implication,repeal all former laws relating to the same subject. The correctness of that rule is not controverted, and it is unneces$ary to c1t.e authorities in support of It.
The following quotation from 39 Tex. Jur. pages 148, 149 ismade in Luse v. City of Dallas, 131 S.W.(2&) 1079, 1084:

'Where it is apparent that a Statute is Intended to embrace all the law upon the subjectwith which It deals, it repeals all former laws relating to the same subject. Under this rule, a statute that covers the subjectmatter of a former law and is evidently intendedas a substitute for it, although containingno expresswords to that effect, operates as a repeal of the former law to the extent that its provisions are revised and its field freshly covered. Accordingly,parts of the original act that are omitted from the new legislationare to be consideredas anuulled. If the later act is clearly intended to prescribe the only rules which shouldgovern, it repeals the prior statute,although the twt are not repugnant in their provisions. Applying the rule of ‘*comprehhenslieness” set out in the above quotations to the situationunder oonsideration, it is our opinion that Article 1150,Vernon's Penal Code, was repealed by The Uniform Act Rs8ulating Traffic on the Highways,Article 670ld, Vernon’s Iv11 Statutes.

SUMMARY

When a subsequent statute showsbylion. Homer Garrison, Jr,, page 6 (V-700)

its context that it was intended to embrace all the law upon the subjectdealt with, such statute,by implication,repeals a former law covering the same subject.
Article 1150, Vernon’s Penal Cede, dealing with ‘hitand runU drivem, was repealedby The Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on the Highways,Article 67016, Vernon’s Civil Statutes, dealingwith the
same subject

. Your8 very truly,

ATTORIIEY

OBlWML OP TEXAS

CBXlwb:mw BY

APPROVED: