Flowers had never been entered by the state court, he would not
have suffered injury. In this connection, compare Young, where the
Seventh Circuit, faced with plaintiff's due process claims,
recognized that if the plaintiff had “prevailed in [state court],
despite the alleged due process errors, he would have had no injury
and no constitutional claim to bring before the district court.”
Young, 90 F.3d at 1231. Accordingly, the court in Young held that
plaintiff “is really claiming [his] injury resulted from the state
court judgment rather than the due process afforded by Illinois
probate courts.” Id.; cf. Remer, 205 F.3d at 997 ("A plaintiff may
not circumvent the effect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine simply by
casting [his] complaint in the form of a civil rights action.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Likewise here, although
Flowers dresses his claim up as a due process violation, he is in
effect seeking to attack the results of the state court judgment,
and this Rooker-Feldman will not permit.

Second, even assuming that subject matter jurisdiction were
proper in this court, “[dJue process analysis requires that there
be state action sufficient to invoke the constitutional
guarantee. . . .” Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d
1251, 1262 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis supplied); see also Dykema v.
Skoumal, 261 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The purpose of due
process is to protect people from the state. . . .”). Flowers has

not made any allegation of state action in his Complaint, and it is

-13-


and emotional distress. The Adverse Judgment was vacated on
January 11, 2000.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The applicable standard of review for a Rule 12(b) (1) motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction depends on the
purpose of the motion. See Wright, Miller & Kane, § 1363 at 456-
57. If the defendant is merely challenging the sufficiency of the
allegations of subject matter jurisdiction, then the court must
accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. United Transp.
Union v. Gateway Western Ry. Co., 78 F.3d 1208, 1210 (7th Cir.
1996). If, however, as here, the defendant is denying the actual
existence of subject matter jurisdiction, then the court may
properly “look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the
complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the
issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction
exists.” Capital Leasing Co. v. F.D.I.C., 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see Wright, Miller & Kane, § 1363
at 456 (where motion “challenges actual existence of subject matter
jurisdiction, then the pleading’s allegations are merely evidence

on the issue”).



*3 > (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2001) (because plaintiff “is complaining
about the eviction itself . . . [and is therefore] alleging injury
caused by the state court judgment itself[,} [{ujJnder the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine this court is without jurisdiction to consider
plaintiff’s claims.”); Williams v. City of Joliet, 2000 WL 968825
at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2000) (notwithstanding claims of “racial
animus and conspiracy,” Rooker-Feldman applied because plaintiff’s
loss of property “was the direct result of the . . . state court
order which authorized demolition”); Fayyumi, 18 F.Supp.2d at 917
(“While the plaintiffs allege that the defendants were motivated by
racial animus in seeking to evict the plaintiffs,” Rooker-Feldman
applied because “the injury was only complete when the state court
issued its ruling.” (emphasis in original)).

Although the Seventh Circuit has recognized a limited
exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine under circumstances where
a plaintiff did not have a “reasonable opportunity” to raise his
federal claims in the underlying state court proceedings, see
Brokaw v. Weaver, 2002 WL 31040195 at *6-7 (7th Cir. Sept. 13,
2002) (“While the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal subject
matter jurisdiction over issues raised in state court, and those
inextricably intertwined with such issues, ‘an issue cannot be
inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if the
plaintiff did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise the issue

in state court proceedings.’ (quoting Long, 182 F.3d at 558)),

that exception is inapplicable here. The defendants in this case



Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal courts from engaging in
appellate review of state court decisions or from considering
collateral attacks on state court civil judgments.”). Within the
jurisdictional architecture of our system of judicial federalism,
the United States Supreme Court is the only federal court empowered
to exercise appellate review over state court decisions. See
28 U.S.C. § 1257; Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir.
1996). “As a result, litigants who feel a state proceeding has
violated their constitutional rights must appeal that decision
through their state courts and thence to the Supreme Court.”
Young, 90 F.3d at 1230.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “bars claims seeking equitable
relief and money damages equally.” See Fayyumi v. City of Chickory
Hills, 18 F.Supp.2d 909, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing Garry,
82 F.3d at 1370). Moreover, the Rooker-Feldman “doctrine applies
not only to claims that were actually raised before the state
court, but also to claims that are inextricably intertwined with
state court determinations.” Long, 182 F.3d at 554. This is a
natural corollary of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, since “claims
that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with state court judgments of
necessity call upon the district court to review the state court
decision.” Young, 90 F.3d at 1231.

Thus, in determining whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

applies in a given case,



DISCUSSION
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Before addressing the merits in any case, a federal court must
initially resolve the question of its own subject matter
jurisdiction. See State of Ill. v. City of Chicago, 137 F.3d 474,
478 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction is the first
question in every case, and if the court concludes that it lacks
jurisdiction it must proceed no further.”); cf. Young v. Murphy, 90
F.3d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1996) (If a “court lack[s] subject-matter
jurisdiction over the claim then even an appropriate analysis on
the merits is moot.”). In bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1985, 1986 and 3604, Flowers purports to invoke the original
jurisdiction of this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Flowers’ state
law claims are provisionally part of this case pursuant to the
court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Pointing
to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, Burton Wells argues that
this court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear Flowers's
claims.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine embodies the principle that, with
very limited exception, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241, lower federal
courts lack the authority to review state court judgments. See
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Long v.

Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 553 (7th Cir. 1999) (“{T]he



Applying these principles in the instant case, it is clear
that the Rooker~Feldman doctrine bars this court from considering
Flowers’s claims. The gravamen of Flowers’s Complaint is that the
defendants wrongfully pursued eviction proceedings against him and
that, “as a result of the eviction” (Am. Compl. at 991 26, 47) and
“as a result of the enforcement of the [eviction] judgment” (Am.
Compl. at 9 38), he suffered damages. Put another way, if Flowers
had prevailed in state court and never become subject to eviction,
he would not have been injured. To consider Flowers’s claims,
therefore, would “of necessity call upon th[is] district court to
review the state court decision.” Young, 90 F.3d at 1231. This is
precisely the type of scenario that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
meant to prevent. See, e.g., Garry, 82 F.3d at 1368 (Rooker~
Feldman applied because “the injury alleged was only complete when
the state court actually condemned the property”) (emphasis
supplied); GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, Illinois, 995 F.2d
726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993) (where plaintiff had “no claim independent
of the state court's adverse decision” Rooker~Feldman “barred the
litigation because the plaintiffs’ injury stemmed from the state
judgment - an erroneous judgment, perhaps, entered after procedures
said to be unconstitutional, but a judgment nonetheless.”)
(emphasis supplied); Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir.
1993) (Rooker-Feldman applied because “but for the tax lien
foreclosure judgment in Rock County Circuit Court, [plaintiffs]
would have no complaint; they would still have their land and would

have suffered no injury.”); Drewicz v. Dachis, 2001 WL 1223524 at



Minute Order Fora (06/97)

5

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

ate Judge

Sitting Judge if Other

Harry D. Leinenweber
than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER

01 C 9306 DATE 10/8/2002

CASE Troy Flowers vs. Burton Wells, Ltd., et al
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) QO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

(3) oq Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(5) Qa Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at

(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] (set for/re-set for] on set for _ at

(7) Q Trial[set for/re-set for} on at.

(8) Q [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) im) This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(ay(1) CO FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) a [Other docket entry) ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Defendant Burton
Wells’ Amended Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. The
courtalso hereby relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367 over any remaining
state law claims. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.

adi [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court
No notices required nub of wotices
Notices mailed by judge's stalf.
Notified counsel by telephone, CCT 69 zme
VY | Docketing to mail notices
Y | Mail AO 430 form Na
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
Hi ia date maited notice
courtroom: A Jd
wap deputy’s
ini
Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office availing deputy initials



certain other types of discrimination. See Tyus v. Urban Search
Mgmt., 103 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The Fair Housing Act
prohibits racial discrimination of all kinds in housing.”); Lowe v.
Letsinger, 772 F.2d 308, 311 (7th Cir. 1985) (42 U.S.C. $$ 1981 and
1985 directed at punishing “racial or some other type of invidious,
class-based discrimination”); Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629
F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir. 1980) (violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 a
prerequisite to violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986). It is clear that
claims of racial discrimination and civil rights violations, like
the ones set forth in Flowers’s Complaint, are germane to an
Illinois forcible entry and detainer action. See Rosewood Corp. v.
Fisher, 263 N.E.2d 833, 838 (1970) (holding that claims of
discrimination and civil rights violations are equitable defenses
“germane to the distinctive purpose of the forcible entry and
detainer actions”); Marine Park Assocs. v. Johnson, 274 N.E.2d 645,
648 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (holding that allegations of racial
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. S§ 3604 and 1982 are “pertinent and
germane under Rosewood to the distinctive purpose of the [forcible
entry and detainer] proceeding”); Fayyumi, 18 F.Supp.2d at 912, 917
n.5 (“Illinois caselaw specifically states that a petitioner’s
motivation in bringing a forcible entry and detainer action is
germane to the proceeding.”). Accordingly, Flowers certainly would
have been afforded a “reasonable opportunity” to raise these claims

in the underlying state proceeding. See 735 ILCS 5/9-106.

-1li-



effected the eviction of Flowers by instituting a forcible entry
and detainer action under the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer
Act (codified at 735 ILCS 5/9-101, et seg.) (“FEDA”). Section 9-106
of the FEDA provides that, in a forcible entry and detainer
proceeding, “(t]he defendant may . . . offer in evidence any matter
in defense of the action. No matters not germane to the
distinctive purpose of the proceeding shall be introduced by

joinder, counterclaim or otherwise.” The “distinct {ive] purpose of
the forcible entry and detainer proceeding is to determine only who
should be in rightful possession.” Miller v. Daley, 476 N.E.2d
753, 754 (111. App. Ct. 1985). “The types of claims which Illinois
courts have found to be germane to the issue of possession
generally fall into one of four categories: (1) claims asserting a
paramount right of possession; (2) claims denying the breach of any
agreement vesting possession in plaintiff; (3) claims questioning
the validity or enforceability of the document upon which
plaintiff's right to possession is based; and (4) claims
questioning a plaintiff's motivation for the bringing of the
forcible action.” Sawyier v. Young, 556 N.E.2d 759, 763-64. (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (citations omitted).

Flowers alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986
and 3604, claiming, in essence, that racial animus was the engine
that drove the defendants to seek his eviction. The central

purpose of each of these statutes is the prohibition of racial and

- 10 -



the fundamental and appropriate question to

ask is whether the injury alleged by the

federal plaintiff resulted from the state

court judgment itself or is distinct from that

judgment. If the injury alleged resulted from

the state court judgment itself, Rooker-

Feldman directs that the lower federal courts

lack jurisdiction. If the injury alleged is

distinct from that judgment, i.e., the party

maintains an injury apart from the loss in

state court and not “inextricably intertwined”

with the state judgment, res judicata may

apply, but Rooker-Feldman does not.
Garry, 82 F.3d at 1365. “The pivotal inquiry is whether the
federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment or
whether he is, in fact, presenting an independent claim.” Long,
182 F.3d at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this
connection, the Seventh Circuit has “recognized a distinction
between a federal claim alleging injury caused by a state court
judgment and a federal claim alleging a prior injury that a state
court failed to remedy. A federal court is precluded from
considering the former, but not the latter, under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Finally, it is well-settled that “fa] plaintiff may not

circumvent the effect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine simply by
casting [his} complaint in the form of a civil rights action.”
Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 997 (7th Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Ritter v. Ross,
992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993). No matter how the claims are
couched, the court “must look beyond the four corners of [the]

complaint to discover whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies.”

Remer, 992 F.2d at 754.



BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, in 1990 Flowers took up residence
in a Chicago apartment building that is now owned by Burton Wells
(Flowers alleges that “Taurus or another party” sold the building
to Burton Wells on or about July 31, 2000 (Am. Compl. at 410))
During 2000, Flowers renewed his lease upon its previous terms. On
July 18, 2000, Taurus filed state court eviction proceedings
against Flowers in the Circuit Court of Cook County, First
Municipal District (the “State Court”), seeking a judgment for
possession and money damages of $1,763.20 for unpaid rent. On
August 8, 2000, Taurus failed to appear in court and the eviction
proceedings were dismissed for want of prosecution. On August 15,
2000, however, Mitchell Asher, an attorney that had previously
“performed services” for Burton Wells “in connection with Troy
Flowers” (Am. Compl. at 97), filed an appearance on behalf of
Taurus and had the eviction proceedings reinstated.

On August 21, 2000, the State Court entered judgment against
Flowers for possession and for money damages totaling $1,763.20
{the “Adverse Judgment”). On October 2, 2000, a Cook County
sheriff enforced the judgment for possession by removing Flowers’s
belongings from the apartment and placing them on the street.
Flowers claims that, “as a result of the eviction” (Am. Compl. at
426), he lost personal property valued at approximately $45,000 and

suffered various other personal injuries, including pain, suffering



therefore dismissible in any event under Rule 12(b) (6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Cf. Thomas v.
5445 Edgewater Plaza Condo. Asss’n, 1999 WL 66572 at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 8, 1999).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Burton Wells’ Amended
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED without
prejudice. The court also hereby relinquishes supplemental

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over_any rémaining state law

claims. All pending motions are DENJED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court

save, tlh b 002

- 14 -


motion to dismiss had been fully briefed, but before the court had
issued a ruling, Flowers filed an amended complaint (the
“Complaint”). To facilitate a prompt resolution of this court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, on October 1, 2002 the court granted
Burton Wells’ motion to: (i) bifurcate consideration of the
Rule 12(b)(1) issue of subject matter jurisdiction from the
Rule 12(b) (6) grounds for dismissal raised in its amended motion to
dismiss; (ii) allow its previously-filed amended motion to dismiss,
accompanying memoranda of law, and reply brief to stand as to the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction, cf. 6 Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure,
§ 1476 at 558 (2d Ed. 1990) [hereinafter “Wright, Miller & Kane”]
(“[D]efendants should not be required to file a new motion to
dismiss simply because an amended pleading was introduced while
their motion was pending. If some of the defects raised in the
original motion remain in the new pleading, the court simply may
consider the motion as being addressed to the amended pleading.”);
and (iii) file a supplemental response directed to the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction.

Before the court, therefore, is Burton Wells’ amended motion
to dismiss the Complaint based on Rule 12(b) (1). For the following
reasons, the court grants the motion and dismisses this case

without prejudice.



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT E I gL E
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS © " ies D

EASTERN DIVISION
LOCT ~ 8-2qn

TROY FLOWERS, duidge Harry D. Leinenwebier
Plaintiff, TS. District Court
v. Case No. 01 Cv 9306
BURTON WELLS, LID. and TAURUS Hon. Harry D. Leinenw, r
MANAGEMENT, INC., Tite rey
Defendants. oer “9 emp

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Troy Flowers (“Flowers”) brings this pro se
complaint against Burton Wells, Ltd., an Tllinois corporation
(“Burton Wells”), and Taurus Management, Inc., an Illinois
corporation (“Taurus”), asserting federal claims under the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985
and 1986. Flowers also asserts a variety of state law claims,
including wrongful eviction, negligence, violation of the Chicago
Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (codified at Municipal
Code of Chicago § 5-12-010, et seqg.), and violation of the Illinois
Security Deposit Return Act (codified at 765 ILCS 710/1, et seq.).

Flowers filed his original complaint on December 5, 2001.
Taurus filed an answer on January 17, 2002, and Burton Welis filed
an amended motion to dismiss based on Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b) (1) (“Rule 12(b) (1)”) and 12(b) (6) (“Rule 12(b) (6)”)

on February 26, 2002. On September 9, 2002, after the amended

K


As a final point, the court notes that Count 2 of Flowers’s
Complaint alleges that the defendants “violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
in that they prevented Flowers from obtaining due process prior to
obtaining a judgment against him.” (Am. Compl. at 9 42). This may
well have been a scrivener’s error, since an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) does not lie for a violation of due process. Rather,
§ 1985(3) is directed only at deprivations of equal protection.
See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (under
§ 1985(3), plaintiff must prove conspiracy based on “racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus” to
deprive a person or class of persons of the “equal enjoyment of
rights secured by law to all”). Accordingly, the court has
interpreted Count 2 of Flowers’s Complaint as an equal protection
Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and, derivatively, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1986.

However, even if the sprinkling of the words “due process” in
Count 2 were somehow to convert that claim into an allegation of
violation of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (notwithstanding
Count 2's heading as “42 U.S.C. § 1986,” the inclusion of a full
excerpt of the text of that statute, and an express allegation of
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)), it would fail in any event.
First, it is clear that Flowers’s real injury flowed directly from
the eviction judgment, not any alleged denial of due process.

Indeed, as noted previously, if the eviction judgment against

-12-