United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued March 28, 2006

Decided May 8, 2006

Before

 Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 05-3434

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TERRY N. TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Western Division.

No. 04 CR 50038

Philip G. Reinhard,

Judge.

O R D E R

Defendant-Appellant Terry Taylor was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §

922(g), for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and 28 U.S.C. § 5861(d), for

unlawfully possessing a firearm that was not registered to him in the National

Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. Taylor appeals the district court’s

denial of his pre-trial suppression motion and his sentencing as an “armed career

criminal,” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). For the reasons discussed below, we

affirm the judgment of the district court. 

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-3434 Page 2

1

 Appellant Taylor claims that the officers did not know the identity of the caller, who he claims was

actually his brother. The State claims that the caller identified herself as Ressie Taylor, Taylor’s mother.

For the purposes of this appeal, we assume that the identity of the caller was unknown. 

I. BACKGROUND

On March 8, 2004, at approximately 3:00 a.m., a 911 caller1

 reported hearing

gun shots coming from a house at 415 N. Central Avenue in Rockford, Illinois. 

Rockford police officers Ty Eagleson and Michael Schissel were dispatched to that

address, the home of Ressie Taylor, who is defendant-appellant Terry Taylor’s

mother. When the officers arrived, they saw Terry Taylor walking out of the front

door of the house. The officers patted him down, finding nothing, and then locked

him in the police squad car. During Taylor’s pat-down, Officer Eagleson observed a

spent shotgun casing on the ground near the front porch of the home. Officer

Eagleson spoke with Taylor’s mother in the living room of the home, and she told

him that she had been awakened by a loud boom that she thought was a gun shot. 

She also told Officer Eagleson that after waking, she saw Taylor standing in her

living room. After speaking with Taylor’s mother, Officer Eagleson walked around

the exterior of the home, where he found a live shotgun casing and another spent

shotgun casing. 

 At that point, Terry Taylor’s brother, Otis Taylor, and his nephew, Stephen

Neely, arrived at the home. Otis Taylor told Officer Eagleson that Terry Taylor,

Neely, and he had been at a club that night and that he had just dropped his

brother off at his mother’s home. Shortly after leaving defendant Taylor at his

mother’s home, Otis Taylor said, his mother had called him and told him that

defendant Taylor had shot a gun in the house. Mr. Neely confirmed to Officer

Eagleson that Otis Taylor had received this call from Ressie Taylor and mentioned

that defendant Taylor had pointed a shotgun at him while he was sitting in the

kitchen of Ressie Taylor’s home the previous evening. 

 Officer Eagleson then reentered the Taylor home and asked Taylor’s mother for

permission to search the home. The district court credited the testimony of the

police officers that she consented to the search, finding her later testimony to the

contrary not credible. In the ensuing search, an officer found an empty box of

shotgun shells, but no gun. While the interior search was being conducted, Officer

Schissell, using his flashlight, discovered a sawed-off shotgun on the roof of the

Taylor home. Officer Schissel also found another live shotgun casing in the back of

the squad car where Taylor had been sitting. 

 Taylor was charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon

and unlawfully possessing a sawed-off shotgun not registered with the National

Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. Taylor moved to suppress the physical
No. 05-3434 Page 3

evidence against him but the district court denied this motion, finding that the

warrantless search of the premises was justified by exigent circumstances. The

district court also found that, even absent such exigent circumstances, the

warrantless search was valid because Taylor’s mother had consented to the search

of her home for a weapon.

 At trial, a jury convicted Taylor of both charges. At the sentencing hearing,

the district court determined that Taylor was an armed career criminal as defined

by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). This provision mandates that a person convicted of

possessing a firearm as a convicted felon who has three previous violent felony

convictions shall be imprisoned for not less than fifteen years. Specifically, the

district court found that Taylor qualified for sentencing as an armed career criminal

because he had two armed robbery convictions and one conviction for theft from a

person. The district court sentenced Taylor to concurrent terms of 300 months’

imprisonment for possession of a firearm as a felon and 120 months’ imprisonment

for possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun. Taylor now appeals. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Suppress

Taylor argues that the district court erred in denying his suppression motion

because exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless search of his mother’s

home and because there was no consent to the search. This court reviews findings of

historical fact and credibility determinations for clear error, United States v.

Johnson, 170 F.3d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 1999), and reviews mixed questions of law and

fact, including whether exigent circumstances existed, de novo. United States v.

Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 2000).

 The test for whether exigent circumstances existed is objective. Richardson,

208 F.3d at 629. To justify a warrantless search, “the government must establish

that the circumstances as they appeared at the moment of entry would lead a

reasonable, experienced law enforcement officer to believe that someone inside the

house, apartment, or hotel room required immediate assistance.” United States v.

Arch, 7 F.3d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1993). This court has held that “911 calls reporting

an emergency can be enough to support warrantless searches under the exigent

circumstances exception, particularly where . . . the caller identifie[s] himself.”

Richardson, 208 F.3d at 630. In Richardson, police received a 911 call reporting a

rape and murder. Although the caller stated that the crimes were already complete,

this court concluded that exigent circumstances still existed to justify a search of the

crime scene identified by the caller because the police had a reasonable basis for

believing there was a continuing danger. See id. at 631 (noting police testimony that

the caller might have mistaken as dead a person who was still alive). Likewise, in
No. 05-3434 Page 4

United States v. Jenkins, 329 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2003), this court held that

exigent circumstances justified an officer’s search when the police received a 911 call

regarding an assault and the police officer heard suspicious noises from inside the

search premises. The circumstances in Richardson and Jenkins gave rise to the

police’s reasonable fear for the safety of someone inside the premises, and thus

justified warrantless searches. 

 In the instant case, the 911 dispatcher told police that gun shots had been

reported in the Taylor home. When the officers arrived they observed Taylor leaving

the home and found spent and live shotgun casings on the property. The police

spoke to Taylor’s brother and nephew, who provided additional information

regarding defendant’s possession of a firearm. Since no gun had been recovered,

police did not know if someone inside the home had access to the gun, or whether

there might be injured persons inside the home. A police officer confronting this

situation could reasonably believe that a threat of violence existed. Therefore, it was

reasonable for the officers to check the home to ensure that no one posed a threat to

them or anyone else. 

 Taylor objects that the 911 call could not create exigent circumstances because

the caller did not identify himself. While we have stated that a caller who identifies

himself is particularly credible, see Richardson, 208 F.3d at 630, unidentified 911

callers may also provide information contributing to the police’s reasonable belief

that exigent circumstances exist. Here, the information given to the 911 dispatcher

was confirmed by Taylor’s mother upon police’s arrival at the home. The initial

ambiguity of the caller’s identity does not undermine the police’s reasonable

conclusion that a threat of danger existed.

 Taylor also objects that the circumstances police confronted at his home are

distinguishable from the exigent circumstances existing in Richardson and Jenkins

because the situation at his home was more stable than those the police encountered

in those cases. Specifically, Taylor claims that because he, the suspect, was

sequestered in a police squad car and police had not encountered any other violent

activity, any exigency that may have existed had dissipated before the search of the

home. Taylor’s argument, however, benefits from too much hindsight. When the

police detained Taylor in their car, they had not found the gun, and they did not

know if he was the person who had fired shots. Taylor did not admit his guilt to the

police, so the officers could have reasonably believed that the gunman was still

inside the home. As discussed above, the police also needed to ascertain whether

any victims were present inside the home. The threat of a remaining gunman and

the fear of remaining victims justified the police’s further searching of the Taylor

home even after Taylor was in custody. The district court therefore correctly denied

Richardson's suppression motion because the warrantless search fell within the

exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. 
No. 05-3434 Page 5

 Moreover, we note that even if the search of the Taylor home was not justified

by exigent circumstances, it was justified by Ressie Taylor’s consent. Voluntary

consent to a search is an exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). It is undisputed that Taylor’s mother owned

the house at 415 N. Central Avenue and had authority to consent to the search of

her home. At the suppression hearing, Officers Eagleson and Schissel testified that

Taylor’s mother consented to a search of the home for the gun. She testified that she

did not consent. The district court, weighing her credibility against that of the

officers, concluded that she consented to the search. While Taylor maintains that no

consent was given, he does not point to any factors that would undermine the

district court’s finding. The district court’s credibility assessment is accorded

substantial deference and will only be disturbed if exceedingly improbable testimony

is credited. United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1152 (7th Cir. 1990);

see also United States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241, 247 (7th Cir. 1999) (“In a swearing

contest, the trial judge’s choice of whom to believe will not be rejected unless the

judge credited exceedingly improbable testimony.”). Such a showing of improbability

has not been made here, and thus the district court’s denial of the suppression

motion is affirmed.

B. Taylor’s Sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal 

 The second issue presented in this appeal is whether the district court

properly determined that Taylor was an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. §

924(e)(1). The armed career criminal provision of Section 924 requires a fifteen-year

minimum prison sentence for anyone convicted under Section 922(g) of unlawfully

possessing a firearm as a convicted felon who has three prior “violent felony” or

“serious drug offense” convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). According to Section

924(e)(2)(B), “violent felony” means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year that:

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion,

involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a

serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).

 It is undisputed that Taylor has three prior convictions: two for armed robbery

and one for theft from a person. The two armed robberies are unquestionably

“violent felonies” under Section 924(e)(1), but Taylor argues that his Illinois

conviction for “theft from a person” does not fall within the statutory definition of a

violent felony. Taylor’s argument rests primarily on a document filed by the State’s

Attorney regarding that conviction which indicated that no violence was used in
No. 05-3434 Page 6

2

 There is no relevant distinction between the Minnesota statute under which the defendant in Howze

was convicted and the Illinois statute at issue here. See Minn. Stat. § 609.52(3)(3)(d)(1); 720 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 5/16-1(b)(4)) (2005). Taylor has not argued that there is a distinction.

Taylor’s theft. The government argues that this document is irrelevant because it

was filed six days after the defendant’s guilty plea and thus was not part of the trial

judge’s factual findings. The relevant portion of this document recounted the facts of

the case and stated: “The defendant handed [the cashier] some money and when she

opened the cash drawer the defendant took the cash drawer and he and the other

man left the business. [The cashier] was not threatened or hurt in any way.”

 In determining that the theft charge was a “violent felony” as defined by 18

U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), the district court looked to the charging document, the statutory

elements of the offense, and a transcript of the plea colloquy. The district court did

not consider the statement made by the State’s Attorney after the defendant pled

guilty to the theft charge.

 This court has previously concluded that theft from a person constitutes a

violent felony under Section 924. See United States v. Howze, 343 F.3d 919 (7th Cir.

2003). In Howze, the defendant had three prior convictions, one of which was for

“theft from a person” under Minnesota law.2 In Howze, we described the manner in

which a court should determine whether a crime is classified as a violent felony for

the purposes of the armed career criminal determination. Citing Taylor v. United

States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), we stated:

first, that classification depends on the nature of the offense as defined in the 

criminal code rather than either the label the state applies or the specific acts

the defendant committed, and second, that the best way to determine which

offenses count as “burglary” for the purposes of federal law is to determine

which offenses pose risks that force will be used. 

Howze, 343 F.3d at 921. Following this framework, we first examined the theft from

a person statute in question. We then noted that “[w]hat theft from a person has in

common with generic burglary is that both entail a risk that violence will erupt

between the thief and the victim.” Id. at 923. We also noted that thefts from

persons create “the potential not only for violence but also for injury caused by the

act of taking.” Id. at 924. On the basis of this reasoning, we concluded that theft

from a person is a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924. Id. at 924 (overruling

United States v. Lee, 22 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 1994)). 

Taylor argues only that the situation in this case can be distinguished from

that in Howze because the document filed by the State’s Attorney describes the acts

underlying Taylor’s theft conviction as nonviolent. However, the Supreme Court

recently cautioned that any inquiry beyond the statute and charging document in

determining what constitutes a “violent felony” must be narrowly restricted to
No. 05-3434 Page 7

implement the objective of the statute and avoid evidentiary disputes. Shepard v.

United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1261 n. 4 (2005). This court recently

discussed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shepard and observed that sentencing

courts should not look to police reports or complaint applications in assessing

whether particular crimes implicate the Armed Career Criminal Act. See United

States v. McGee, 408 F.3d 966, 988 (7th Cir. 2005). We held that later courts

considering whether crimes constitute violent felonies are “generally limited to

examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement,

transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to

which the defendant assented.” Id. (quoting Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1257). The

document that Taylor claims the district court should have considered is not within

the scope of documents that may be considered, and was never considered by the

state trial judge or the defendant when he pled guilty to theft from a person. Thus,

the district court was correct not to consider it in the assessment of whether Taylor

had committed three prior “violent felonies.” 

Taylor finally argues that the Sixth Amendment required the district court to

submit the question of whether Taylor was an armed career criminal to the jury,

citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). However, Booker stated that

“[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence

exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a

jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (emphasis added). Furthermore,

Taylor’s argument has been specifically rejected by this court. In United States v.

Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706, 707 (7th Cir. 2005), we held that prior convictions are an

exception to the rule that juries determine all facts that affect maximum available

punishments, and specifically concluded that a defendant’s status as an armed

career criminal need not be submitted to a jury. The district court appropriately

determined Taylor’s armed career criminal status, and we reject Taylor’s Sixth

Amendment argument. 

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.