awarded.

Gilbert supports his request of the hourly rate of $565.00 through an affidavit in which he
avers that the $565.00 per hour is his billable hourly rate. He also avers that this rate is comparable
to the hourly rate charged by lawyers within the firm of similar years of experience and within the
Chicago legal community in general.

Merouse supports his request of $405.00 per hour through an affidavit in which he avers that
the $405.00 per hour rate is the rate customarily charged by his firm for similar work performed by
attorneys with similar skills and experience.

Plaintiff does not argue that the requested rates are above the prevailing market rates. The
hourly rates of $565.00 and $405.00 are found to be reasonable.

Based on the above, Defendant is awarded $970.00 in attorneys’ fees.

Defendant also seeks travel costs of $241.70 relating to bringing Michael Wade to the
settlement conference. Defendant supports this claim with an attached receipt from Atlas World
Travel. Plaintiff does not contend this amount to be incorrect but, rather, that granting it would be
inappropriate, as it does not agree with sanctions being necessary. Such travel costs are reasonable
and are awarded.

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions is granted. Defendant is

granted a total of $1,211.70 in attorneys’ fees and costs,

JOH W. DARRAH
\ United States District Judge

Dated: [. 3e 2a04 Arh ——


Based on the above, sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 are granted.

The party seeking attorney’s fees bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the hours
worked and the claimed hourly rates. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (Hensley).
The amount of reasonable fees is the number of hours reasonably expended on the case multiplied
by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.

After determining the reasonably expended hours, a court must determine a reasonable hourly
rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The reasonable hourly rate is based on the “market rate” for the
services rendered. See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir.
1996). Counsel seeking fees has the burden of proving the market rate. Once counsel establishes
this rate, the burden shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate why the rate should be lower.
Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, \75 F.3d 544, 554 (7th Cir. 1999) (Spegon).

An attorney’s market rate is the rate that attorneys with similar experience and ability in the
community normally charge their paying clients for the same type of work. Spegon, 175 F.3d at 555.
Counsel’s actual billing rate for comparable work is presumptively appropriate for use as the market
rate.

Defendant seeks a total of $1,211.70 in costs and fees relating to the settlement conference.
This amount includes one hour each of Alan Gilbert’s and Steve Merouse’s time for a total of
$970.00, and the cost of Gleaner’s president’s round trip airfare to Chicago of $241.70.

Defendant has provided affidavits for both the attorney’s rates and the airline ticket. These
costs would not have been incurred absent the settlement conference and, as such, are recoverable.
Based on the relative complexity of the conference, a reasonable amount of time spent preparing and

attending is found to be two hours. The two hours sought by Gleaner are reasonable and are


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge John W. Darrah Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge . than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 3076 DATE 6/30/2004
CASE Brdecka vs. Gleaner Life Insurance Society
TITLE
[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due __
(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
(4) im) Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Qa Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to} (set for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

qo) =f {Other docket entry) For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion and order,

defendant’s motion for sanctions is granted. Defendant is granted a total of $1,211.70 in attorneys’ fees

and costs. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order.
dl sf {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.)

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Y | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
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initials

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL J. BRDECKA, )
Plaintiff, : No. 02 C 3076
v. } Judge John W. Darrah
GLEANER LIFE INSURANCE SOCIETY, ‘
Defendant. ) Doey, E; TEp
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER “Oy £004

Plaintiff, Michael Brdecka, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, against
Defendant, Gleaner Life Insurance Society (“Gleaner”), alleging counts of intentional
misrepresentation (Counts I and Il), requests for an accounting (Counts III and IV), and interference
with prospective economic advantage (Counts V and VI). The suit was then removed to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Presently before the Court is Defendant’s
Motion for Sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

BACKGROUND

At the parties’ February 10, 2004 initial settlement conference, the Court ordered Plaintiff
to provide Gleaner with Plaintiff's revised damage analysis on March 31, 2004, which was 14 days
before the parties’ next scheduled April 14, 2004 settlement conference. Plaintiff took
Joseph Burnett’s deposition on March 11, 2004, regarding the computation and calculation of
damages. Plaintiff contends that the deposition was not as informative as he had hoped on the issue
of damages. Plaintiff did not provide Gleaner with a revised damage analysis by March 31, 2004.
Gleaner did not receive such a report until the morning of April 14, 2004, which was the same day

as the settlement conference. Michael Wade, Gleaner’s President, who lived in Michigan, attended

om”


the settlement conference in Chicago.

Gleaner argues that Plaintiffs counsel showed bad faith by failing to adhere to the Court’s
orders regarding the settlement conference, making the settlement conference ineffectual. Gleaner
seeks $1,211.70 in attorneys’ fees and travel costs in preparing for and attending the settlement
conference.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, an attorney who multiplies the proceedings in any
unreasonable and vexatious manner may be required to satisfy, personally, the costs, expenses, and
attorney’s fees incurred because of such conduct. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927; Kotsilieris v. Chalmers, 966
F.2d 1181, 1183 (7th Cir. 1992) (Kotsilieris). “Vexatious” has been interpreted to mean either
subjective or objective bad faith, such as counsel who acted recklessly, counsel who raised baseless
claims despite the notice of frivolous nature of the claims, or counsel who otherwise showed
indifference to statutes, rules or court orders. Kotsilieris, 966 F.3d at 1183-85. Specifically, a
party’s failure to follow orders or directions of a court in a settlement context is grounds for
sanctions. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 655-57 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Heileman); see also Halas y. Consumer Services, Inc., 16 F.3d 161, 164 (7th Cir. 1994).

Here, Plaintiff did not comply with the Court’s order, despite many opportunities. From the
date of the deposition of Burnett, which Plaintiff considered integral, Plaintiff had twenty days to
complete a revised damage analysis by March 31, 2004. Even after this deadline had passed,
Plaintiff had fourteen more days until the settlement conference; and while Plaintiff contends
“scheduling conflicts” led to delays, no notice was given to the Court or opposing counsel until after
the settlement conference was rendered useless and the Defendant’s president had expended the time

and money to travel to attend the settlement conference.