4 Ne

Probable cause is defined as facts and circumstances “sufficient to warrant a prudent man
in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Probable cause requires more than a bare suspicion, but it need not be based
on evidence showing that a police officer’s belief is more likely true than false or be based on
evidence sufficient to support a conviction. Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 996 (7th
Cir. 2001) (Woods). Identification or a report from a single, credible eyewitness may provide
sufficient basis for probable cause. Woods, 234 F.3d at 996. If “a reasonably credible witness or
victim informs the police that someone has committed, or is committing, a crime, the officers
have probable cause to place the alleged culprit under arrest...” Jenkins v. Keating, 147 F.3d 577,
585 (7th Cir. 1998) (Jenkins). Furthermore, a police officer does not have a constitutional
obligation to conduct any further investigation before making an arrest if that officer received
information from a reasonably credible victim or eyewitness that is sufficient to supply probable
cause. Woods, 234 F.3d at 997,

Here, defendants contend that Holmes’ pleadings demonstrate that the police officers had
probable cause to arrest Holmes based on the report that the car was stolen, the information
received by the police officers from Williams, and the signed authorization form.

Reviewing the inferences reasonably drawn from the complaint in the light most
favorable to Holmes, a finding of probable cause as a matter of law cannot be made at this stage
of the litigation. Holmes may be able to demonstrate that Moore and Kaufman should not have
relied upon Williams’ allegations and alleged authorization form because Williams was not a
reasonably credible witness or victim. See Jenkins, 147 F.3d at 585. If the evidence ultimately

demonstrates that Moore and Kaufman were reasonable in their reliance on the allegations by


SS VW

to Holmes. While Holmes drove the vehicle home, Williams and others followed her home.
When Holmes arrived at her home, she phoned the Chicago Police to report vandalism to her car
while it was in Williams’ possession, The police officer on the telephone stated that Holmes’ car
was reported stolen and instructed her to report to the 22nd District, Monteray Station “to
straighten out the incident”.

At the police station, the defendant police officers conducted an investigation in which
they interviewed both Williams and Holmes. At the interview, Holmes informed the officers of
the events as stated above. Agents for Williams stated that the transmission work was authorized
by Holmes and produced a repair authorization allegedly signed by Holmes. Holmes alleges this
document was forged.

The police officers informed Holmes that she must pay the disputed $515 or face
imprisonment. Holmes refused to pay the disputed moncy, and the officers took Holmes into
custody.

While waiting for transportation to another jail facility, Lt. Edwards saw her crying and
asked the arresting police officers about the situation. The officers recited the facts, and
Lt. Edwards released Holmes.

Defendants first argue that the counts against them should be dismissed because the
arresting officers had probable cause to arrest Holmes.

State law claims of false arrest and false imprisonment, as well as section 1983 and
federal false arrest claims, are barred if the arresting officers establish they had probable cause to
arrest the plaintiff. See Simmons v. Pryor, 26 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir.1993), Kincaid v, Ames

Dept. Stores, Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d 1103, 1109 (1996).


ed VW

Williams and the authorization form, they will prevail. However, Holmes is entitled to an
opportunity to offer evidence that the officers’ reliance on these facts was not reasonable, and as
such, probable cause was lacking. See Pasiewicz y. Lake County Forest Preserve Dist., 81
F.Supp.2d 890, 893 (N.D.IIl. 1999) (Pasiewicz) (denying motion to dismiss because contestable
factual questions prevented the court from determining probable cause existed as a matter of
law).

Defendants also argue that Count V should be dismissed because the police officers are
entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects a police officer from suit if a reasonable police officer would
have believed that the arrest was lawful, in light of the clearly established law and the
information known to the police officer at the time of the arrest. Marks v. Carmody, 234 F.3d
1006, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000) (Marks). Qualified immunity exists even if the police officer is
mistaken, protecting all police officers except “the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.” Hunter v. Bryan, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991).

For the same reasons as stated above, it cannot be determined at this stage of litigation
that Holmes is unable to demonstrate that no reasonable police officer would have relied upon
the information relied upon by Moore and Kaufman. Therefore, any determination of qualified
immunity would be premature. See Pasiewicz, 81 F.Supp.2d at 893 (denying motion to dismiss

based on qualified immunity because plaintiff may be able to demonstrate that no reasonable


~~ iad }
Minute Gest Form (06/97) ?

United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois

Name of Assigned Judge John W. Darrah Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge . than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 2831 DATE 12/6/2001
CASE SOUTH SHORE IMPORTS vs. JANICE HOLMES
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
(3) go Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due
(4) o Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Q Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
(7) Qa Trial[set for/re-set for} on at
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
OFRCP4(m) OGeneralRule21 OFRCP41(a\(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) [Other docket entry] Status hearing held and continued to 12/18/01 at 9:00 a.m. Enter
Memorandum Opinion And Order. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied [18-1].
(11) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court,
No notices required, umber of notices
Notices mailed by judge's staff. nen
‘ SEC T2008
Notified counsel by telephone. due dockersd
wv | Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form. ® . enV, 4
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. a
courtroom “6 ri hd date mailed notice
LG deputy’s
initials
Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office ‘malting deputy intals



VA WY

officer would have relied upon the information relied upon by the police officers).

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied.

Dated: Chane ¢, 2001 J ( Lssne

JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Judge



VW VW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

SOUTH SHORE IMPORTS,

Plaintiff,

v.
JANICE HOLMES,
DEG ? 208i,
Defendant. No. 01 C 2831
Judge John W. Darrah

JANICE HOLMES,

Counter-plaintiff,
v.

DENNIS WILLIAMS d/b/a SOUTH SHORE

IMPORTS, MICHELLE ROBINSON, POLICE
OFFICER MOORE, POLICE OFFICER KAUFMAN
INDIVIDUALLY, AND THE CITY OF CHICAGO,

NT SS SS SH Se SS SSS

Counter-defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, South Shore Imports (South Shore), filed a breach of contract suit against
defendant, Janice Holmes (Holmes) for alleged unpaid vehicle repairs. Holmes filed a counter-
claim, alleging a breach of contract claim, a consumer and deceptive practices claim, and a
Chicago Automobile Repair Ordinance Violation claim against Dennis Williams (Williams)
d/b/a/ South Shore, a malicious prosecution claim against Michelle Robinson (Robinson) and
Williams, and false arrest/false imprisonment and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against

Police Officers Moore and Kaufman and the City of Chicago. Presently pending before the

93


Vd Ne)

Colirt is the police officers and the City of Chicago’s (collectively the defendants) Motion to
Dismiss.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court reviews all facts alleged in the complaint and
any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 326 (7th Cir.2000). Dismissal is
warranted only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claims that would entitle
it to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

A reading of the counter-claim supports the following summary of the alleged conduct of
the parties.

On July 11, 2000, Holmes brought her 1987 BMW 325.1 to Williams for the engine to be
replaced. Holmes prepaid South Shore $1,281 for the repairs, and Williams promised Holmes
that her vehicle would be ready for delivery in two weeks. On July 26, 2000, Williams informed
Holmes that he had received and installed the wrong engine and that he required an additional
two weeks to locate and install the correct engine.

On July 11, 2000, Holmes returned to Williams to retrieve her vehicle. At that time,
Williams informed her that she needed a new transmission and that Williams had already
removed her original transmission. Holmes believed that her original transmission was perfectly
functional and instructed Williams to reinstall the original transmission. Williams subsequently
installed a rebuilt transmission into Holmes’ vehicle.

Holmes returned to South Shore on September 27, 2000, and Williams insisted that she
owed $515 for a replacement transmission. Holmes denied that she authorized the repair. In

addition, the vehicle was damaged while in Williams’ possession. Williams returned the vehicle