COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Benton and Overton 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

CHARLIE MAURICE HAIRSTON 

v. Record No. 1003-94-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DECEMBER 19, 1995 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE 

Frank I. Richardson, Jr., Judge 

 Kimble Reynolds, Jr. (Law Office of Rickey G. Young, 

 on brief), for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), 

 for appellee. 

 Charlie Maurice Hairston (appellant) appeals from a judgment 

of the Circuit Court of the City of Martinsville (trial court) 

that approved a jury verdict convicting him for abduction. 

Appellant contends that he was denied a speedy trial as required 

by the United States Constitution and Virginia Code § 19.2-243. 

Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 The record discloses that on June 16, 1993, appellant was 

arrested pursuant to warrants issued charging him with abduction 

and aggravated sexual battery. On that same day, he was released 

on bond. On July 22, 1993, at a preliminary hearing, the charges 

were certified to the grand jury. 

 Appellant remained on bond until August 23, 1993, when he 

was arrested pursuant to a bench warrant issued for a possible 

____________________ 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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parole violation based upon the charges of aggravated sexual 

battery and abduction. Because of the parole violation charge, 

appellant was held continuously in custody from the date of his 

arrest on August 23, 1993 until March 17, 1994, the day on which 

he was tried and convicted. 

 At the preliminary hearing, appellant was represented by the 

Public Defender's office. On October 18, 1993, before appellant 

was indicted, the trial court, by order, approved a motion made 

by the Public Defender to withdraw as appellant's counsel and 

further ordered that the trial be set for December 29, 1993. 

Appellant was indicted on November 1, 1993. 

 On the trial court's own motion, a further order entered on 

December 29, 1993 provided as follows: 

 This case was set for trial on this day but 

an accumulation of snow and sleet required 

the Court to continue cases for those 

defendants who felt unable to safely come to 

Court and for the safety of Jurors and 

witnesses. 

 It is therefore Ordered that this case be, 

and the same hereby is, continued, with no 

objection by the defendant, his attorney, or 

the Attorney for the Commonwealth. 

 On March 9, 1994, appellant moved the trial court to dismiss 

the charges. His motion was based solely upon the speedy trial 

provision of Code § 19.2-243. That motion was denied. 

 Trial pursuant to the November 1, 1993 indictment was 

conducted before a jury on March 17, 1994. Appellant was found 

not guilty of the charge of aggravated sexual battery and guilty 
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of abduction. 

 Relying solely upon Code § 19.2-243, appellant moved to set 

aside the jury's verdict, alleging that he should have been 

brought to trial within five months of his arrest for his parole 

violation. The motion was denied. 

 Appellant argues on appeal that he was denied the right to a 

speedy trial granted to him by the United States Constitution. 

He did not make that argument to the trial court, and the sole 

issue granted for this appeal was "whether appellant was denied a 

speedy trial pursuant to Code § 19.2-243." Therefore, because 

the ends of justice do not require a review of that issue, we 

decline to consider the constitutional issue raised. 

 Appellant further contends that the five-month provision of 

Code § 19.2-243 was violated. He argues that the time provision 

of the Code should be computed from August 23, 1993, the day he 

was arrested for the parole violation, and he asserts that he was 

not tried within the five-month period provision. In Harris v. 

Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1995), we said: 

 Code § 19.2-243 specifically sets forth two 

discrete time-frames, one five months in 

duration, the other nine months. The five 

month time-frame applies when the accused "is 

held continuously in custody thereafter 

. . . ." "Thereafter" plainly refers to the 

beginning point of the time-frame. Thus, 

detention in custody for a five month period 

does not invoke the five month rule unless 

that custody runs continuously from the 

statutory beginning point. 

 Code § 19.2-243 specifies a nine month 

time-frame applicable to an accused who is 

not "held continuously in custody 
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thereafter," but is "not held in custody but 

has been recognized for his appearance 

. . . ." 

 Appellant having been released on bond for the charges on 

which he was tried, Code § 19.2-243 does not apply to the time he 

was being held for the parole violation. When you apply the 

provisions of Code § 19.2-243 to the conviction from which this 

appeal emanates, appellant was tried within the speedy trial 

provisions contained in that statute. 

 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.