alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER



PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In connection with this Quarterly Report of Premier Holding Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Jack Gregory, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



1.   Such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2009 fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2.   The information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2009, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







|Date:  March 24, 2010 | Jack Gregory
Chief Executive Officer and Director
|--------------------- | -------------------------------------------------
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

                            SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION

I, Steven A. Schmidt, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Renaissance Learning, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: August 6, 2004

                          /s/ Steven A. Schmidt
                        ------------------------------------------------------
                          Steven A. Schmidt
                          Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 6169** 

CHRISTOPHER ODOM , Petitioner

– Appellant ,

v. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Columbia

. Richard Mark Gergel , District Judge. ( 3:11

- cv - 02713

- RMG )

Submitted : May 29, 2014 Decided: June 3, 2014

Before SHEDD, WYNN, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Christopher A. Odom, Appellant Pro Se. Albert Richard Pierce, Jr., HOWSER, NEWMAN & BESLEY, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PE R CURIAM: Christopher A. Odom seeks to appeal the district court’s order adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, and dismissing Odom’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition . We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the no tice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4 (a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bow l e s v. Russell , 551 U.S. 2 0 5, 2 1 4 ( 2007 ). The district court’s order was entered on the do cket

on June 26, 2012 . The notice of appeal was filed on January 13, 2014 . Because Odom failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because t he facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20
- 4512

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. THURS T ON JAY HARDIMAN, a/k/a Thirst , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Florence

. R. Bryan Harwell , Chief District Judge. ( 4:18

- cr - 01080

- RBH

- 4 )

Submitted : October 14, 2021 Decided: October 18, 2021

Before DIAZ and QUATTLEBAUM , Circuit Judges , and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge

.
Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
James A. Brown, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF JIM BROWN, PA, Beaufort, South Carolina, for Appellant. Everett E. McMillian, Assistant United States Atto rney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Thurston Jay Hardiman appeals his 87

- month sentence imposed after a guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute heroin , in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Counsel for Hardiman has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether trial couns el rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to an enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon under the Sentencing Guidelines . Although notified of his right to do so, Hardiman has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. Claims of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel generally should be asserted on collateral review rather than on direct appeal, unless proof of the claimed ineffective assistance is apparent on the face of the record. See United States v. King , 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir.199 7). Our review of the record does not support Hardiman’s assertion that counsel rendered ineffective assistance , we therefore decline to address th is claim on direct appeal. In accordance with Anders , we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment

. This court requires that counsel inform Hardiman , in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Cour t of the United States for further review. If Hardiman requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must s tate that a copy thereof was served on Hardiman

.3 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
#### Paul Turner, Respondent, v City of New York et al., Appellants.

[943 NYS2d 454]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Robert E. Torres, J.), entered January 19, 2011, which granted petitioner’s motion to deem the notice of claim timely filed nunc pro tunc, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, and the motion denied.

Petitioner was injured on April 14, 2009 while working in an elevator in defendants’ building. Plaintiff believed that he could not sue because his claim was covered by the Workers’ Compensation Law, and thus, he did not seek legal advice until July 13, *6362010. On that day, he retained counsel who immediately served a notice of claim. The next day, July 14, 2010, counsel sought an order deeming the notice of claim to have been timely served.

A tort action against a municipality cannot be maintained unless a timely notice of claim is served, and the action is commenced within one year and 90 days after the “happening of the event upon which the claim is based” (General Municipal Law § 50-i [1]). The court is without power to consider an application to file a late notice of claim after expiration of that limitations period *(see Pierson v City of New York,*56 NY2d 950, 954-955 [1982]).

In calculating the limitations period, the day of the accident is excluded, the one-year period is counted as 365 days, and then the 90-day period is counted *(see DeCicco v City of Syracuse,*68 AD3d 1771 [2009]; *see also*General Construction Law §§ 20, 58). The one-year period leads to the anniversary date of the event, here April 14, 2010, not April 15, 2010, as calculated by petitioner *(see*221 Siegel’s Practice Review, *Year And 90 Days For Action Against Municipality Is Not Same As Year And 3 Months*— And *Difference Brings Dismissal,*at 4 [May 2010]). The limitations period expired 90 days later, on July 13, 2010, and thus, the application made on July 14, 2010 was untimely *(see Pietrowski v City of New York,*166 AD2d 423, 425 [1990]; *Bacalokonstantis v Nichols,*141 AD2d 482 [1988]). Concur— Tom, J.P., Friedman, Catterson, Acosta and Freedman, JJ.
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 137 (Wednesday, July 21, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 38495]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-15455]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

[Docket No. USCG-2020-0278]


Port Access Route Study: Northern New York Bight; Correction

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notice; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard published a document in the Federal Register 
on July 15, 2021, concerning a Notice of availability of draft report 
and public meeting; request for comments for the Port Access Route 
Study: Northern New York Bight. The document contained incorrect date 
for the public meeting.

DATES: This correction is effective July 21, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this notice, 
contact Mr. Craig Lapiejko, Waterways Management at First Coast Guard 
District, telephone (617) 223-8351, email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#3f5c4d5e5658115b11535e4f565a5554507f4a4c5c5811525653"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="accfdecdc5cb82c882c0cddcc5c9c6c7c3ecd9dfcfcb82c1c5c0">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The document published on July 15, 2021, at 
86 FR 37339, contained incorrect meeting date in the DATES and 
ADDRESSES sections. The correct date for the meeting is July 30, 2021. 
The notice incorrectly noted the meeting would be July 30, 2020.

Correction

    In the Federal Register of July 15, 2021, in FR Doc. 2021-14757, 
beginning on page 37339, the following corrections are made:
    1. On page 37339, in the second column, in the DATES section, 
remove the text, ``July 30, 2020'' and insert, in its place, the text 
``July 30, 2021''.
    2. On page 37339 in the second column, in the ADDRESSES section, 
remove the text, ``July 30, 2020'' and insert, in its place, the text 
``July 30, 2021''.

    Dated: July 15, 2021.
M.T. Cunningham,
Chief, Office of Regulations and Administrative Law.
[FR Doc. 2021-15455 Filed 7-20-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P


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(56 Misc. Rep. 125.)

#### BRADLEY v. BLUE RIDGE HOSIERY MILL.

(City Court of New York, Special Term.

October, 1907.)

1. Execution—Vacating—Recovery of Money Collected.

Ah execution defendant can recover of plaintiff the amount of money, • with interest thereon, taken from its agent under an irregular execution issued and subsequently vacated!

2. Sheriffs—Pees—Poundage.

Where a sheriff acted under an execution valid and regular on i(s face, he is entitled on completion of the service to his poundage, though the execution and process were vacated, such poundage to be paid by the plaintiff in execution.

Action by Gordon B. Bradley against the Blue Ridge Hosiery Mill. Judgment for plaintiff. Motion to compel plaintiff, or sheriff, to refund certain moneys taken on an execution subsequently vacated. Order granted.

J. C. Kadane, for plaintiff.

F. N. Orlando, for defendant.

Maurice B. Blumenthal, for sheriff.

*1108DELEH AN T Y, J.

Upon the conceded facts of this case I am of the opinion that the defendant is entitled to recover, primarily of plaintiff, the amount of -money, with legal interest thereon, which was taken from its agent under the irregular execution issued and subsequently vacated herein. If there be any doubt about this, an examination of the statutes and authorities applicable thereto will soon dispel it. See the provisions of law regulating the fees of the sheriff of New York county, viz., Laws of 1890, p. 936, c. 523, as amended by Laws 1892, p. 868, c. 418, § 17, subd. 7; also Campbell v. Cothran, 56 N. Y. 279; Kidd v. Curry, 29 Hun, 215; and on the question of restriction, Haebler v. Myers, 132 N. Y. 363, 30 N. E. 963, 15 L. R. A. 588, 28 Am. St. Rep. 589.

The sheriff having acted under an execution valid and regular oh its face, he is entitled, the service having been completed, to his poundage, notwithstanding the judgment and process were vacated. If so entitled to his fees, it follows they must be paid by plaintiff, the party upon whose initiative he made the levy; and it is no answer thereto to say that he is barred of his fees under the execution simply because the warrant of attachment herein is still standing.

I conclude, therefore, that the order of August 9, 1907, should be vacated, and that an order be entered in lieu thereof directing and requiring the plaintiff, or his attorney, to pay over and deliver to W. M. Ailing, the person from whom the money was taken under the execution referred to, the sum of $819.05, the amount collected, with interest thereon from the date of such collection, together with $10 costs of this motion; plaintiff to be stayed in the action until compliance therewith.

Ordered accordingly.
EXHIBIT 31
                           ==========


   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

     I, Lawrence Siccia, hereby certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10K-SB of Crafty Admiral
Enterprises, Ltd.

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this annual report.

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects our financial condition, results of operations and cash flows as of,
and for, the periods presented in this annual report.

4. The other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing  and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) and we have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to Crafty Admiral Enterprises, Ltd., including
its subsidiaries, if any, is made known to us by others within  those
entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is
being prepared;

b)  evaluated the effectiveness of our disclosure controls and procedures as
of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual report (the
"Evaluation Date"); and

      c)  presented in this annual report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our
evaluation as of the Evaluation Date.

5.  The other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation, to our auditors and the audit committee of our board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) that there were no significant deficiencies in the design or operation of
internal controls which could adversely affect our ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial data and have further advised our auditors that
there we are not aware of any material weaknesses in our internal controls;
and
b) that there was no fraud, whether or not material, that involved our
management or other employees who have a significant role in our internal
controls.

6.  The other certifying officers and I have indicated in this annual report
that there were no significant changes in internal controls or in other
factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the
date of our most recent evaluation.

                                       CRAFTY ADMIRAL ENTERPRISES, LTD.
                                       Registrant
Dated: March 26, 2006                  /s/ Lawrence Siccia
                                       ------------------------------------
                                       By: Lawrence Sicia, President, Chief
                                       Executive Officer, Treasurer, Chief
                                       Financial Officer, Principal
                                       Accounting Officer and Director
BDO      BDO Seidman, LLP                 40 Broad Street, Suite 500
         Accountants and Consultants      Boston, Massachusetts 02109-4307
                                          Telephone:(617) 422-0700
                                          Fax: (617) 422-0909

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement 
of JD American Workwear, Inc. (The "Company") on Form S-8 of our report 
dated May 20, 1998 (June 12, 1998 as to Notes 1 and 10) on the financial 
statements of the Company as at February 28, 1998 and for the year ended 
February 28, 1998 appearing in this annual report on Form 10-KSB of the 
Company.


                                          /s/ BDO Seidman, LLP

                                          BDO Seidman, LLP

Boston, Massachusetts
June 12, 1998
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman,

 Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen

Kurtis T. Wilder,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 May 19, 2017

t0516

Order 

Clerk

May 19, 2017

154360

MICHAEL MARTIN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 154360

COA: 328240 

Kalamazoo CC: 2013-000485-NO

MILHAM MEADOWS I LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP and MEDALLION

MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 19, 2016 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral 

argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). 

The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order 

addressing whether genuine issues of material fact preclude summary disposition on the 

plaintiff’s claim that the stairs at issue were not “fit for the use intended by the parties” 

and that the defendants did not keep the stairs in “reasonable repair.” MCL 554.139(1)(a) 

and (b). The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers.

The Michigan Association for Justice, Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc., and 

the Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus 

curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in 

this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.
# C_2019295EN.01007501.xml

| 2.9.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 295/75 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.9.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 295/75

---

Action brought on 4 July 2019 — Cervetti v Parliament

(Case T-463/19)

(2019/C 295/99)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Giovanni Cervetti (Milan, Italy) (represented by: M. Merola, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

| — | order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

| — | order the European Parliament to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those relied on in Case T-389/19, Coppo Gavazzi v Parliament.

---