UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

 

LAURA WROBLE, 

Plaintiff,

v.

THE LOCKFORMER COMPANY, a

division of MET-COIL SYSTEMS CORP.,

a Delaware corp., MESTEK, INC., a

Pennsylvania corp., and HONEYWELL

INTERNATIONAL INC., a Delaware corp.,

Defendants.

No. 02 C 4992

Judge James B. Zagel

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Laura Wroble alleges that due to the negligent conduct of the defendant

corporations, she was exposed to the industrial solvent trichloroethylene (“TCE”) as a child and

young adult and developed cervical cancer as a result of that exposure. After several years of

litigation, Wroble and other plaintiffs alleging similar injuries reached a settlement with two of

the three corporations named as defendants in the suit: The Lockformer Company

(“Lockformer”), a division of Met-Coil Systems Corp. (“Met-Coil”), and Mestek, Inc.

(“Mestek”). The only remaining Defendant, Honeywell International, Inc., (“Honeywell”), seeks

summary judgment on the ground that Wroble has not disclosed and cannot offer competent

medical opinion evidence establishing a causal connection between her illness and alleged TCE

exposure. 

Summary judgment is warranted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
1On September 22, 2004, I entered an order finding a good faith settlement between

Plaintiffs and Defendants MetCoil and Mestek. Defendant Honeywell was not a party to the

settlement. Nonetheless, on November 22, 2004, I entered an order dismissing the case with

prejudice. Shortly thereafter, Wroble moved to amend the November 22 dismissal order

pursuant to Rule 60, arguing that the inclusion of Defendant Honeywell in the order was an

inadvertent mistake. After hearing oral arguments, I agreed with Wroble, granted her Rule 60

motion, and set a briefing schedule for Defendant Honeywell’s Renewed Motion for Summary

Judgment. 

2Defendants moved to exclude Dr. Hirsch after discovery ended. Wroble did not respond

in writing, but withdrew Dr. Hirsch as an expert witness at an October, 2003 hearing. In

2

Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is evidence on the basis of

which a reasonable jury could find in the plaintiff’s favor, allowing for all reasonable inferences

drawn in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986). Rule 56(c) requires the entry of summary judgment against a party “who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986). 

Despite Wroble’s vigorous efforts to ensure that Defendant Honeywell remained a party

to the suit,1

 she failed to file a response to Honeywell’s Motion for Summary Judgment or a

Statement of Material Facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1. The result of this failure is dire, as all

of Defendant’s facts are deemed admitted. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B); see also Malec v. Sanford, 191

F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“the penalty for failing to properly respond to a movant’s

56.1(a) statement is usually summary judgment for the movant . . . because the movant’s factual

allegations are deemed admitted”). Wroble’s failure to respond is all the more troublesome given

the state of the record. Wroble withdrew her sole medical causation expert, Dr. Alan Hirsch,

after Defendants objected to Dr. Hirsch’s qualifications at the close of discovery.2 Defendant
November, Wroble sought leave to supplement her Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures in order to add

another expert. I granted the motion, but almost immediately vacated the ruling on Defendant

Mestek’s motion. Thereafter, expert discovery was stayed while the parties pursued settlement. 

Since Defendant Honeywell renewed its motion for summary judgment, Wroble has not sought

leave to disclose an expert witness. 

3

Honeywell argues that absent expert testimony, Wroble has no admissible evidence that might

demonstrate a causal link between her cancer and Defendant’s alleged conduct. 

Wroble alleges negligence on the part of Defendant and seeks compensation for her

disease, emotional distress and the cost of medical monitoring in the future. A plaintiff in a

negligence action bears the burden of proving duty, breach of duty, proximate causation and

damages. Brown v. Baker, 672 N.E.2d 69, 71 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). Generally, a plaintiff must

establish proximate cause in a personal injury action through the admissible testimony of an

expert witness. Kane v. Motorola, Inc., 779 N.E.2d 302, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“plaintiffs . . .

must come forward with scientific evidence regarding causation to preclude the entry of

summary judgment”); Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 515 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[u]nder

Illinois law, to serve as the sole basis for a conclusion that an act was the proximate cause of the

plaintiff’s injury, an expert must be able to testify with a reasonable degree of medical certainty

that proximate cause existed”). Summary judgment for the defendant is appropriate when a

plaintiff cannot prove proximate cause. Kane, 779 N.E.2d at 310-11; Wintz, 110 F.3d at 515-16. 

Wroble claims that her cervical cancer was caused by TCE exposure, but offers no

evidence to that effect. Without Dr. Hirsch’s testimony, Wroble has no expert or other medical

testimony linking her cancer with her childhood exposure to TCE. In Porter v. Whitehall Labs.,

Inc., 9 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 1993), the plaintiff administratrix filed suit against drug manufacturers,

alleging that the defendants’ drugs had caused the decedent’s renal failure and death. The
4

defendants successfully moved for summary judgment after the district court excluded the

plaintiff’s expert witness pursuant to Daubert. Affirming the district court’s decision, the Court

of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit held that the district court correctly concluded that “expert

testimony is necessary to determine the cause of Mr. Porter’s renal failure.” Id. at 612 (observing

first that under Indiana law, a plaintiff “must prove every element of a prima facie case, including

causation”). As with the plaintiff in Porter, Wroble’s failure to offer expert testimony

establishing Defendant’s conduct as the proximate cause of her cancer warrants summary

judgment of her claim. 

Defendant also asserts that Wroble’s lack of expert, medical testimony requires summary

judgment on her claim for medical monitoring. Illinois courts and federal courts interpreting

Illinois law have grappled with the medical monitoring remedy and have produced less than clear

results. See Guillory v. Am. Tobacco Co., 97 C 8641, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3353, at *20-22 n.2

(N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2001) (reviewing cases and concluding that “[a]lthough the viability of a

cause of action for medical monitoring has not yet been addressed in many jurisdictions,

including this one, courts that have recognized the claim have concluded that a plaintiff may

recover the cost of diagnostic medical evaluation proved to be proximately caused by the

defendant’s wrongdoing”). In Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 60 F. Supp.2d 800 (N.D. Ill.

Aug. 18, 1999), Judge Gettleman denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment of the

minor plaintiffs’ claim for medical monitoring, observing that plaintiff’s experts offered opinion

evidence that raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the need for medical

monitoring. 
3Wroble’s Rule 26(a)(2) Disclosure does not identify a treating physician who will offer

the opinion that her cancer was caused by her exposure to TCE.

4

It is true that two Defendants settled with Plaintiff on the basis of the same allegations

made here. Some may believe that because the other Defendants settled there must be at least

some evidence to prove the validity of Plaintiff’s claims. But this is not so. Defendants routinely

settle suits that they might otherwise win and they do so for a variety of reasons. Moreover, even

if a court could draw an inference from the actions of a settling defendant that there was a good

basis in fact for a plaintiff’s claim, the law has turned its face from such inferences by requiring

that the case against each defendant be decided on its own merits. Cases such as this one are

really three separate lawsuits, and Plaintiff must prove her case against each Defendant

individually. 

5

While it is not entirely clear that expert testimony is the only possible source of evidence

for a medical monitoring claim, there are simply no facts in the record to support Wroble’s claim

that she requires continued medical monitoring.3 Moreover, given that Wroble cannot prove that

Defendant’s actions proximately caused her injury, she cannot establish Defendant’s liability for

the costs of medical monitoring. See Guillory, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3353 at *21. Summary

judgment is granted on this claim, as well. 

For these reasons, Defendant Honeywell’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of

Plaintiff’s claims is GRANTED.4

ENTER:

_________________ James B. Za______________ gel

James B. Zagel

United States District Judge

DATE: March 17, 2006