1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JEFFERSON

- 11TH STREET, LLC , Plaintiff ,

v. Civil Action No. 1: 19

- cv - 1416 ( C JN )
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA , et al., Defendant s.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Jefferson

- 11th Street, LLC owns an apartment building in Washington’s Columbia Heights neighborhood. Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1. The building is outdated and in need of repair, though it has remained partially occupied in recent years. Id. ¶¶ 10, 15, 21

– 25 . After Jefferson engaged in a protracted battle with tenants over plans to improve the property and raise rents, the District of Columbia’s Attorney General intervened and brought a civil suit against Jefferson in D.C. Superior Court in 2017. I d. ¶ 110. As part of that proceeding, the Superior Court placed the property in receivership and appointed a r eceiver to oversee the building’s rehabilitation under a c ourt

- approved plan. Id. ¶¶ 129

– 40. Jefferson subsequently brought this federal lawsuit , alleging that the District’s suit and the ensuing r eceivership constitute an uncompensated taking of property under the Fifth Amendment , id. ¶¶ 153

– 63, or, in the alternative, a deprivation of property without due process of law, id. ¶¶ 163

– 74. 1 The Com plaint also alleges a c ommon l aw tortious interference with

1 In addition to the District of Columbia, the Complaint names the r eceiver, Benjamin Gilmore, as a Defendant in Cou nts I and II. Id. ¶¶ 153

– 74.2 business expectancy claim against Defendants 2724 11th St. NW Tenants’ Association, Inc. ( “Tenants”) and the Latino Economic Development Corporation of Washington, D.C. (“LEDC”), an organizati on allegedly assisting the Tenants in their legal battle. Both sets of Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See generally Defs. The District of Columbia and Benjamin Gilmore’s Mot. to Dismiss (“D.C. Mot.”), ECF No. 10; Defs. 2724 11th St. NW Tenants’ Ass’n, Inc. and Latino Econ. Dev. Corp. of Wash., D.C.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Tenants’ Mot.”) , ECF No 11. The Court
agrees with the District that the ongoing proceedings in Superior Court “are judicial in nature and implicate important District interests ; [that] those proceedings afford [Jefferson] an adequate opportunity to litigate its federal claims; and [that] there are no extraordinary circumst ances warranting equitable relief.” JMM Corp. v. District of Columbia , 378 F.3d 1117, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Court therefore grants the District’s Motion to Dismiss. Because that action “dismisse[s] all claims over which [the Court] has original jur isdiction,” the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count III of the Complaint and grants the Tenants’ Motion to Dismiss. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
I. Background 2724 11th Street NW is a century

- old, two

- story apartment building containin g 26 residential apartments . Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff acquired the building in 2009 and owns the property outright. Id. ¶¶ 10

– 11. The units are rent

- controlled and have not been updated in some time, so the tenants’ rent is significantly below the market rate in the neighborhood. Id. ¶¶ 16

– 19. Because of the low rents and the moderate level of occupancy, the operation is not profitable. Id. ¶ 19. The building “lacks central air conditioning[] and requires major structural repairs .

. . and major improvements to or replacement of all systems.” Id. ¶ 23. It also needs3 “substantial interior repairs and rehabilitation, including repair and replac ement of many interior floors, walls, and ceilings, some of which are known to cover asbestos and lead paint.” Id. ¶ 24. Beginning in 2012, Jefferson began the first of its several attempts to overhaul the building. Id. ¶ 26. It tried to secure approval from a sufficient number of tenants to institute a voluntary rehabilitation plan that would have completely renovated the property and raised rents accordingly. Id. ¶¶ 27

– 28. The tenants did not agree

. Id. ¶ 29. Jefferson th en turned to the administrative process, filing a h ardship p etition with the District government to obtain permission to upgrade the property and raise rents unilaterally. Id. ¶¶ 32

– 35. Individual tenants, allegedly aided by LEDC, filed objections to the h ardship p etition. Id. ¶ 39. The newly incorporated Tenants Association then filed its own t enants ’ p etition , seeking the government’s assistance in remediating existing D.C. Housing Code violations. Id. ¶¶ 43

– 46. Several rounds of administrative pet itions, hearings, and orders followed, along with multiple property inspections that found dozens of code violations in each instance. Id. ¶¶ 46

– 97. Jefferson alleges that it resolved most of the violations at substantial cost

. Id. One inspection turne d up evidence of mold in several units , prompting individual tenants to file a lawsuit in Superior Court to force Jefferson to alleviate the mold problem

. Id. ¶¶ 98

– 102, 106

– 109. On April 24, 2017, the District’s Attorney General filed a three

- count suit against Jefferson in D.C. Superior Court, seeking the appointment of a r eceiver to take control of the property and renovate it under the Tenant Receivership Act, D.C. Code. §§ 42

- 3651.01

– .08; injunctive relief under the same statute, id. ; and money damages for alleged unfair trade practices in violation of the District’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act, id. §§ 28

- 3901

– 13. Compl. ¶¶ 110

– 12. Parallel administrative proceed ings continued. Id. ¶¶ 114

– 21. Jefferson resolved many of the outstanding code violations and proposed to the Court a plan to abate the remainder,4 but the District continued to conduct new inspections and to identify even more problems. Id. ¶¶ 122

– 28. The Superior Court therefore rejected Jefferson’s proposal and granted the District’s petition to appoint D efendant Benjamin Gilmore as r eceiver with “sole and plenary authority to collect rents, operate the Property in accordance with the powers conferred by the [Tenant
Rec eivership Act], and abate not merely the housing code violations alleged in the [District’s] complaint, but all violations that currently exist or may exist in the future at the Property while the [ r eceivership] is in effect

. ” Id. ¶¶ 128

– 30 (internal quo tation omitted). The reafter, Gilmore submitted two potential abatement plans for the C ourt’s review. Id. ¶ 131. The Court adopted the more extensive of the two, requiring Jefferson to contribute over $2 million toward the property’s complete overhaul, as well as more than $260,000 to pay for the tenants to relocate temporarily during construction. Id. ¶¶ 139

– 43. The Superior C ourt declined to amend certain aspects of the plan at Jefferson’s request, though it permitted Jefferson to negotiate with Gilmore to fund desired projects that exceeded the planned upgrades so as to accomplish all new work at the same time. Id. ¶¶ 144

– 46. As work began, Gilmore revised his cost estimate upwards. Id. ¶¶ 147

– 49. He also declined to amend his plan at Jefferson’s re quest, even though Jefferson pointed out that some of the planned work (such as replacing the building’s boiler rather than installing a central climate control system) would preclude future upgrades and would require the new work to be torn out and starte d from scratch. Id. ¶¶ 150

– 51. Jefferson then turned to the federal courts for assistance. On May 15, 2019, it filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , seeking a declaration that the District’s litigation and the Superior Court’s actions constitute an impermissible taking of private property under the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, id. at 31, or, in the alternative, money damages for a deprivation of private property without due process, id. at 32. The Complaint also seeks5 damages from the Tenants ’ As sociation and LEDC for allegedly scheming to thwart Jefferson’s rehabilitation plans and thereby tort iously interfering with its business expectations. Id. Both sets of Defendants move to dismiss. See generally D.C. Mot.; Tenants’ Mot. The District fir st argues that the Court should abstain from this dispute under Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). See D.C. Mot

. at 6

– 8. It also argues that Defendant Gilmore is immune from suit as the Superior Court’s agent, id. at 8

– 9, and that the Complaint f ails to state a takings claim, id. at 9

– 16. The Tenants argue that the Noerr

- Pennington Doctrine bars any suit against them for legitimately exercising their First Amendment rights, Tenants’ Mot. at 7

– 11, and alternatively that the Complaint fails to stat e a claim for tortious interference with business expectancy, id. at 11

– 16. Because the Court resolves the District’s Motion on the question of Younger abstention, it does not reach any other arguments.
II. Legal Standard “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain

. . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “When evaluating a motion to dismiss [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)], the Court must treat the comp laint’s factual allegations as true and afford the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Atlas Brew Works, LLC v. Barr , 391 F. Supp. 3d 6, 11 (D.D.C. 2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although the Court accepts all well pleaded facts in the Complaint as true, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “While a complain t .

. . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of [its] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 554

– 556 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The claim to relief must be “plausible on its face,” enough to “nudge[ the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 570.
III. Analysis The Complaint alleges that the District of Col umbia, acting through the Attorney General, the Superior Court, and the r eceiver , Gilmore , has effected a taking of (a) the reasonable expectancy of the excess in market value the Property would have achieved under [Jeffer s on’s Substantial Rehabilitation] Plan over the market value the Property will have on the completion of the Receiver’s “Scenario 2” abatement work; (b) the reasonable expectancy of the increased rent revenues the Property would have achieved under the Housing Act under a substantial reha bilitation

. . . ; (c) the lion’s share of [ Jefferson ’ s] equity in the Property; (d) the portion of the $2,072,738 that [ Jefferson ] has been required to pay into the receivership thus far but that [ Jefferson ] will not recover in the form of improved Prop erty value at the end of the receivership; and (e) the earning power of $2,072,738 during the period from payment of funds into the receivership until the receivership is terminated. Compl. ¶ 158. Jefferson alleges that “[t]he District has thereby depriv ed [it] of all economically beneficial use of the Property and the Protected Property Interests and has prevented the Property from ever providing a reasonable rate of return.” Id. ¶ 159. T he District responds that these same issues are currently being litigated in the Superior Court, undercutting the necessity of raising them in parallel proceedings here. See D.C. Mot. at 6

– 8. Although the Younger doctrine originally applied only to ongoin g criminal prosecutions in state court, 401 U.S. at 48

– 54, the Supreme Court later extended the doctrine to “pending civil court proceedings in which important state interests are involved.” JMM Corp. , 378 F.3d at 1126 (citing Huffman v. Pursue , Ltd. , 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)). “[E]xcept in extraordinary7 circumstances, a federal court should not enjoin a pending state proceeding (including an administrative proceeding) that is judicial in nature and involves important state interests.” Id. at 1120 (citin g Younger , 401 U.S. at 41) (other citations omitted)

. Younger applies to the District of Columbia even if the federalism concerns underlying the doctrine are absent here

. Id. at 1125.
In JMM Corp ., the District initiated administrative proceedings agai nst an unlicensed adult video store

. Id. at 1119. The store sued to enjoin the enforcement action in federal court, and then the District sued the store in Superior Court to enforce its order. Id. at 1120. The district court dismissed the federal suit on the basis of Younger abstention and the D.C. Circuit affirmed (deciding for the first time that the doctrine applie s in the District of Columbia ). Id. at 1120, 1128. In doing so, the C ourt of A ppeals recognized that “the enforcement of zoning regulations .

. . constitutes an important state interest.” 378 F.3d at 1126 . So long as the plaintiff
h as “‘a full and fair opportunity to litigate’ its constitutional claims” in Superior C ourt, abstention is appropriate. Id. at 1127 (quoting Ohio C ivil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch s ., Inc. , 477 U.S. 619, 627 (198 6 )). Two exception s to the doctrine ar e whe n “the pending [District] action was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassing” the plaintiff or “where

a [District] statute is flagrantly and patently unconstitutional.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Here, the District argues that its dispute with Jefferson is ongoing in Superior Court, that it relates to important District interests (health and safety regulation of housing), that Jefferson has an adequate forum in which to raise its constitutional concerns ( Superior Court and the D

. C

. Court of Appeals), and that there is no allegation that the District brought the suit in bad faith.
D.C. Mot. at 6

– 8. To be sure, the Complaint alleges that the Tenants Association and LEDC have acted in bad faith by “induc[ing] the [Attorney General] to commence and prosecute the8 District’s Receivership Case in furtherance of [their] Scheme [to gain control of the proper ty ], ” but the Complaint does not allege bad faith on the District’s part. Compl. ¶ 111. Jefferson responds by noting that abstention is disfavored and that “federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been confe rred

. ” See Pl.’s
Mem . of P. & A. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss of Defs. D.C. & Benjamin Gilmore (“Pl.’s D.C. Opp’n”) at 5, ECF No. 14 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans (“ NOPSI ”), 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) )

. It is tr ue that , “[i]n the main, federal courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction” and therefore “[a]bstention is not in order simply because a pending [Superior Court] proceeding involves the same subject
matter.” Sprint Commc’ ns, Inc. v. Jacobs , 571 U.S. 69, 7 2 (2013) (citing NOPSI , 491 U.S. at 373). “[F]ederal courts ordinarily should entertain and resolve on the merits an action within the scope of a jurisdictional grant, and should not ‘refus[e] to decide a case in deferenc e to the
States.’” Id. at 73 (quoting NOPSI , 491 U.S. at 368 (alteration in original)). But there are certain “exceptional” circumstances in which Younger does appl y : (1) “ongoing state criminal prosecutions;” (2) “certain civil enforcement proceedings” that are “akin to a criminal prosecution” and “are characteristically initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff .

. . for some wrongful act;” or (3) “ pending civil p roceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial function.” Pl.’s D.C. Opp’n at 6 (quoting Sprint , 571 U.S. at 78

– 79 (citing NOPSI , 491 U.S. at 368) (internal quotations omitted) )

. Both si des agree that the re is no ongoing criminal prosecution , see Pl.’s D.C. Opp’n
at 6; Defs. D.C. & Benjamin Gilmore’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“D.C. Reply”) at 3, ECF No. 18, so the question is whether the District ’s suit against Jeffe rson is either

a “ civil enforce ment proceeding .

. . akin to a criminal prosecution ” or a “pending civil9 proceeding[] involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the [Superior Court’s] ability to perform [its] judicial function.” Sprint , 571 U.S. at 79. The Sprint Court listed several examples of the former category : “state

- initiated disciplinary proceedings against [a] lawyer for violation of state ethics rules,” Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n , 457 U.S. 423 (1982); “st ate

- initiated administrative proceeding s to enforce state civil rights laws,” Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n , 477 U.S. 619; a “state

- initiated proceeding to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their parents,” Moore
v. Sims , 442 U.S. 415 (1979); a “civil proceeding brought by the State in its sovereign capacity to recover welfare payments defendants had allegedly obtained by fraud,” Trainor v. Hernandez , 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (internal quotation omitted) ; and a “state

- initiated proceeding to enforce obscenity laws,” Huffman , 420 U.S. at 598. 571 U.S. at 79 . These cases usually involve investigations “culminating in the filing of a formal complaint or charges.” Id. at 79

– 80. Some of those scenarios are analogous to the si t uation here

— if federal courts should not disturb a
state ’s civil enforcement action to remove children from their parents ’ custody temporarily for the sake of the children’s w elfare , it would seem reasonable for courts to give states some leeway to remove a property owner’s control over its tenants ’ homes temporarily for the tenants’ welfare. See also Worldwide Moving & Storage, Inc. v. District of Col umbia , 445 F.3d 422, 42 3,
42 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (abstaining from District’s civil enforcement action to stop moving company from “misleading customers in violation of the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act”)

. Jefferson tries to distinguish those cases in four ways. First, it points to the type of relief it seeks in this suit. See D.C. Opp’n at 7. Rather than asking for an injunction to prevent Gilmore from exercising control over the property, Jefferson merely seeks a judicial declaration10 that a taking (or a due process deprivation) has occurred and that Jefferson is entitled to just compensation. Id. But Jefferson cites no cases for th e proposition that a federal court ’s declaration that a taking has occurred would not interfer e with the District’s enforcement proceeding

. But see Herrera v. City of Palmdale , 918 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2019) (O’Scannlain, J.) (upholding stay of § 1983 suit for damages alleging, among other claims, a taking of a motel in a state

- initiated nuisance suit because even a declaratory judgment or a damages remedy would have preclusive effect on parallel state enforcement proceeding ). And it is inconceiva ble that the Superior Court would permit the receivership to remain in place in the face of a federal judicial declaration that the entire process violates the Constitution, Jefferson’s assurances to the contrary notwithstanding. See D.C. Opp’n at 8

– 9; Samuels v. Mackell , 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) (“[O]rdinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid.”)

. That i s especially true when the federal p laintiff alleges that the Superior Court’s actions themselves form part of the unconstitutional actions. See Compl. ¶ 168 (“The District’s deprivation of [Jefferson’s] property resulted from a municipal policy, expresse d in rulings of the DC Superior Court in the District’s Receivership Case.” (emphasis added)). Jefferson also fails to explain how the Court would determine the appropriate level of compensation given that work remains ongoing and costs are subject to change. That fact further support s the proposition that Jefferson should raise its Fifth Amendment claims either in the Superior Court (which is monitoring the progress and cost of renovations) or after the receivership case ends (when th ere is no chance of federal interference with important District interests )

.11 Second, Jefferson tries to distinguish receivership proceedings from other enforcement actions. See D.C. Opp’n at 10

– 12. Receivership, it argues, is remedial rather than punitive in
nature. See id. at 10

– 11. It’s fast tracked, and the only decision a court makes is whether a mere preponderance of the evidence suggests that the landlord can no longer care for the property. See id. at 11. R elying on Family Division Trial Lawyers , Jefferson compares the Superior Court proceedings to child neglect enforcement actions, which are also limited in scope and remedial in
nature. See id. (citing Family Div. Trial Lawyers of Super. Ct.

- D.C., Inc. v. Moultrie , 725 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1984) )

. In Family Division , a group of attorneys brought a constitutional challenge to the Superior Court’s practice of forcing lawyers to represent certain clients without compensation. 725 F.2d at 69 7

. The attorneys regularly requested appointments to represent juveniles in delinquency proceedings; that work was typically paid. Id. at 698

– 99. But, as a condition of eligibility for juvenile delinquency work, the attorneys had to volunteer for uncompensa ted appointments to represent indigent parents in child

- neglect proc eedings in the Superior Court’s Family Division. Id. The lawyers moved for injunctive relief in the Superior Court, but their motion was denied. Id. at 699. They ap pealed to the D.C. C ourt of Appeals but later withdrew the appeals because they did not have enough money to cover their costs. Id. at 700. While their appeals were pending, the group filed a federal takings suit , seeki ng compensation for their previous work and injunctive relief to stop the practice going forward. Id. The D.C. Circuit ultimately held that abstention under Younger was inappropriate in part because the D.C. Superior Court proceedings were not enforcement proceedings against the federal plaintiffs

. Id. at 700

– 04. The legal proceedings at issue targeted neglectful parents

— the lawyers merely assi sted the Superior Court in the conduct of those proceedings. Id. at 700

– 04.12 Family Division was a constitutional challenge to a ge neral administrative practice of the Superior Court ; there was no pending enforcement proceeding for the federal court to disrupt. Id. at 702

– 03 ; see also id. at 71 1 n.2 (Starr, J., dissenting) (“Unlike Younger v. Harris , . . . and its civil progeny, in this case there was no pending proceeding in the District of Columbia courts. Moreover, as the majority correctly observes, any remedial order would not, as in O'Shea v. Littleton , 414 U.S. 488 (1974), impinge upon the day

- to

- day operations of the superior court.”). Here, of course , the District’s receivership case directly targets Jefferson in an effort to enforce the D.C. Housing Code

. A nd the content of that proceeding is identical to the claims Jefferson brings here. Jefferson’s citation to Family Division is unavailing

. For its part, t he District notes that the Attorney General filed his complaint in the Superior Court’s Civil Division (not in some specialized, limited forum) and , in addition to its petition to place the property in receivership, alleged a violation of the D. C

. Consumer Protection Procedures Act , bringing the possibility of punitive sanctions to bear against Jefferson

. D.C. Reply at 5

– 6; see als o id. Ex. 1, ECF No. 18

- 1; Carroll v. City of Mt. Clemens , 139 F.3d 1072, 1074

– 75 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that Younger abstention was appropriate in municipal enforcement action to enforce housing code violations against landlord when landlord mounted constitutional challenge to the violate d ordinance). Jeffer son has not provided (either in its pa p e rs or at a hearing on the Motions) specific facets of the Superior Court case that distinguish it from a typical judicial proceeding. Third (and related ly ), Jefferson argues that it has had no opportunity to raise its constitutional claims in Superior Court because of the expedited and limited nature of the proceedings

. See D.C. Opp’n at 12

– 15. It correctly notes that , in order for Younger abstention to be appropriate, the plaintiff must “have a full and fair opportunity to litigate its constitutional13 claims in [the Superior Court] proceedings.” JMM Corp. , 378 F.3d at 1127 (citing Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n , 477 U.S. at 627). “[T]he burden on this point rests on [Jefferson] to show ‘ that [District] procedural law barred presentation of [its] claims. ’ ” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. , 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987) (quoting Moore , 442 U.S. at 432 ). Jefferson’s brief details the special procedures in place to handle receivership pe titions, though it ignores the Superior Court’s additional duty to adjudicate the Attorney General’s claim under the Consumer Protection Procedures Act. See D.C. Opp’n at 13.
But Jefferson acknowledges that it has made no effort to raise the due process and takings arguments in Superior Court and that the primary obstacle to litigating constitutional challenges to the receivership is that “the judge wouldn’t be interested in hearing it .” While that may be true (and may be grounds for an appeal), it’s a far cry from a structur al defect in the forum itself that would preclude Younger abstention. 2 In Hoai v. Sun Refining and Marketing, Inc. , 8 6 6 F.2d 1515, 1519

– 20 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the D.C. Circuit recognized that where a Superior Court judge attempts to limit the scope of the proceedings before him to issues of District law and separate out the federal concerns, abstention is likely not appropriate. But in that instance, the federal lawsuit preceded the Superior Court action, so the Superior Court judge was trying to limit the extent to which he would have been duplicating issues already under litigation in federal court.

2 Jefferson has also suggested that it may have lost its chance to bring a potentially compulsory counterclaim against the District in Superior Court, or alternatively that the statute of limitations may preclude it from brin ging such a claim now. Aside from the fact that the receivership is ongoing and would theoretically constitute a continuing Fifth Amendment violation that would cure any statute

- of

- limitations concerns, a plaintiff’s failure to bring timely claims in Supe rior Court does not somehow enable it to bring (or to attempt to bring) the same claims in another court. Cf. Pumpelly v. Cook , 106 F.R.D. 238 (D.D.C. 1985) (dismissing Complaint that should have been brought as a compulsory counterclaim in earlier litigation between the same Parties)

.14 Id. That situation does not apply here, where Jefferson had an opportunity to try to raise these issues in Superior Court but opted to file a new federal lawsuit instead. Jefferson’s citations to other cases in which federal courts found that abstention was inappropriate because of insuf ficient opportunity to raise constitutional claims are also unavailing, as those cases either involved specialized forums that limited the scope of litigation,
see, e.g. , LaShawn A. by Moore v. Kelly , 990 F.2d 1319, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Proceedings in
t he Family Division a re
. . . questionable vehicle [ s ] for adjudicating the claims raised in the present case ” ), or situations in which the Superior Court’s Civil Division was reviewing the decisions of administrative bodies and was therefore limited in its standard of review and ability to consider claims not raised in administrative adjudications, see, e.g. , Bridges v. Kelly , 84 F.3d 470, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ( “Nor have we found anything suggesting that, on appeal from the [Office of Employee Appeals], the D.C. Superior Court or Court of Appeals could entertain requests for relief that were not cognizable before the [Office of Employee Appeals].”). None of that appears to be the case here , and “when a litigant has not attempted to present [its] federal clai ms in related [District]

- court proceedings, a federal court should assume that [District] procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil , 481 U.S. at 1 5

. Finally, Jefferson argues that even i f the Attorney General did not bring the enforcement action in bad faith, the Tenants’ Association and LEDC allegedly acted in bad faith to cause the District to bring the action by filing serial complaints as part of a conspiracy to take the property for themselves. See D.C. Opp’n at 15

– 16. Jefferson correctly notes that abstention is inappropriate when there is a “showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex Cty. , 457 U.S. at 435. But Jefferson cites no legal authority for the15 proposition that federal courts may impute the motivations of third parties to the District of Columbia’s official actions, initiated by the District in its governmental capacity

. See Sprint , 571 U.S. a t 80. Absent an allegation that the District itself acted in bad faith, there is no “extraordinary circumstance[]” warranting federal intervention in the Superior Court case. Middlesex Cty. , 457 U.S. at 435.
IV. Conclusion The Dis trict has demonstrated that the Superior Court’s receivership case is an “ongoing [District] proceeding [] that is judicial in nature,” that it “implicate[s] important [District] interests,” and that it “afford[s] an adequate opportunity in which to raise t he federal claims” that Jefferson has raised in this Court. Hoai , 866 F.2d at 1518. The Court therefore finds that it is appropriate to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction under Younger . 401 U.S. at 41. Jefferson may attempt to raise its constitutional claims in the Superior Court or, once that case has concluded, resurrect those claims in federal court. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Jefferson’s tort claim against the Tenants ’ Association and LEDC. For the foregoing reasons, the District of Columbia’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED

. The Tenants’ Association and LEDC’s Motion to Dismiss is also GRANTED . All counts in the Complaint are DISMISSED without prejudice. An Order will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.

DATE: April 9, 2020 CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge