discovery, Defendants also provided notice that they intended to call witnesses that they had not
previously so identified.

A pre-trial conference in this matter was set for June 15, 2004, with a trial date of
June 28, 2004. However, those dates were stricken; and the pre-trial conference was resct to
October 21, 2004, with a trial date of October 25, 2004.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs move for the imposition of discovery sanctions against Defendants.
Specifically, Plaintiffs seek sanctions for Defendants’ alleged failure to: (1) properly answer
interrogatories; (2) produce personnel documents before depositions of witnesses occurred;

(3) produce a box of materials sought by Plaintiffs; and (4) properly identify certain persons as
trial witnesses.

As to Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions regarding their interrogatories, Defendants have
been ordered, on two separate occasions, to fully answer the interrogatories. Defendants, in the
June 15, 2004 minute order, were given one week, until June 22, 2004, to fully answer the
interrogatories. The reply to the instant motion was filed on June 17, 2004. Thus, it cannot be
determined whether Defendants complied with the order. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for
sanctions regarding their interrogatories is denied.

Plaintiffs also seek sanctions for Defendants’ alleged failure to produce personnel
documents before depositions of witnesses occurred. Defendants contend that these materials are
not central to Plaintiffs’ claims and that most of these materials were available when the

depositions occurred. Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs’ decisions of when to take

depositions were tactical choices that Plaintiffs made in pursuing this case.



finding of bad faith against the violating litigant. While bad faith is not necessary to impose
sanctions, discovery sanctions are proper if the litigant acts in bad faith, willfully violates a
discovery order, or is found at fault for failure to comply with a discovery order. fn re Golant,
239 F.3d 931, 936, n.1 (7th Cir. 2001).
BACKGROUND

The facts, for the purposes of this motion, are as follows. After Plaintiffs filed their
lawsuit, they served interrogatory requests upon all Defendants. While Defendants responded,
they objected to many of the interrogatory requests or provided answers insufficient to Plaintiffs.
Thereafter, Defendants were ordered to comply with the unanswered interrogatories. In addition,
Defendants, in a minute order dated June 15, 2004, were ordered to answer the interrogatories, as
directed in that minute order, within onc week.

Plaintiffs also sought documents relating to the personnel files and Board of Fire and
Police Commission files regarding certain individuals employed by the City of Calumet City.
Trregularities existed in producing some of these documents. Previously, Defendants claimed
that personnel records older than cighteen months were destroyed. However, it was later
revealed that some of these files were kept in the office of Calumet City Chief of Police George
Vallis (“Police Chief Vallis”) and were not produced unti] many depositions were taken. Some
of these materials were also produced during depositions of witnesses. Plaintiffs were not
provided with all of the personnel files until after many people were deposed,

Onc day before the end of discovery, the City of Calumet City provided Plaintiffs with
complete access to City records and the records of the Board of Fire and Police Commission. As

a result of this inspection, Plaintiffs requested an additional box of materials. Near the end of



Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) states that “[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party . . .
relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears to be reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant material.” Here, the personnel records Plaintiffs
sought mect this standard. Moreover, it is irrelevant whether most of these materials were
available when the depositions occurred; Plaintiffs were entitled to have all the materials it
requested before the depositions so that the materials may be uscd at the depositions. Lastly, it
cannot be said that Plaintiffs’ choices of when to take the depositions were simply tactical
decisions. Plaintiffs, on multiple occasions, sought full compliance from Defendants; and
Defendants’ failure to comply helped to prevent Plaintiffs from obtaining these materials before
the close of discovery.

The trial date in this matter has becn rescheduled until October 25, 2004. The parties
now have over three months to resolve the outstanding discovery disputes and prepare for trial,
In light of this schedule, Plaintiffs, in good faith, are permitted to re-depose witnesses that have
been deposed prior to the full disclosure of the personnel files and Board of Fire and Police
Commission files regarding certain individuals employed by the City of Calumet City. Plaintiffs
are permitted to re-depose these witnesses limited to the issues relating to these files. Defendants
are ordered to pay for the costs and attorney’s fees incurred in re-deposing these witnesses.

As to Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions regarding the box of materials Defendants have not
yet produced, Defendants are ordered to producc those materials within one week of the date of

this order. Because the trial date has been extended, it would not be proper to award sanctions at

this time.



Minute Order Foray (06097)

United States District Court, Northern District of Minois

eo a e Indge if Oth
vi Magirate fudge Jobn W. Darrah “Tuan Asigned Jude
CASE NUMBER 02 C 6268 DATE 7/12/2004
CASE Zorzi, et. al. vs. City of Calumet City, et. al.
TITLE

[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party pluintift, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motiun being presented.}

DOCKRT ENTRY:

(1) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due |

(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due_ ___. Reply to answer brief due____.

(4) a Ruling/Hearing on __ set for at

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] (set for/re-set for] on __—_sset for at .

(6) ia) Pretrial conference[held/continued to] |set for/re-set for]on ___set for at

(7) 0 Trial[set for/re-set for] on __ at

(8) Oo [BenchyJury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at 7

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agrecment/pursuant to]

CIFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 [#RCP41(a\(1) Cl FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) 4 [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion and order,
defendants are ordered 1o pay for the costs and attormey’s fees incurred in re-deposing witnesses that have
been deposed prior to the full disclosure of the personnel files and Board of Fire and Police Commission
files regarding certain individuals employed by the City of Calumet City. Defendants are also ordered to
produce the box of materials plaintiffs scek within onc week of the date of this order. Both defendants
and plaintiffs are ordered to identify all potential trial witnesses within one week of the date of this order,
and to produce for deposition new potential trial witnesses within one month of the date of this order.
Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order,

(il) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

Nu notices required, advised in open court,

No notices required, number of notices

Notices mailed by judge’s statT. ty 4 3004

Notified counsel by telephone,

| Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magisteate judge. 82:8 Wd ZI WP 002

conrtroom i
MF deputy's
initials

Adcketing deputy initials

date mailed roticy

3-a ia

Dute/time received in
ventral Clerk's Office railing deputy initils



Finally, Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions for Defendants’ alleged failure to properly
identify certain persons as trial witnesses is denied. As discussed above, because the trial date
has been rescheduled, Plaintiffs have ample time to depose these new potential witnesses.
However, both Defendants and Plaintiffs are ordcred to identify all potential trial witnesses
within one week of the date of this order and to produce new potential trial witnesses for
depositions within one month of the date of this order. If the parties fail to comply, these
witnesses will be barred from testifying at trial.

CONCLUSION

Defendants are ordered to pay for the costs and attorney’s fees incurred in re-deposing
witnesses that have been deposed prior to the full disclosure of the personnel files and Board of
Fire and Police Commission files regarding certain individuals employed by the City of Calumet
City. Defendants are also ordered to produce the box of materials Plaintiffs seek within one
week of the date of this order. Both Defendants and Plaintiff's are ordered to identify all potential

trial witnesses within one week of the date of this order, and to produce for deposition new

potential trial witnesses within one month of “¥ ve A

Dated: “7 | (2 04

JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Judge



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DANTE G. ZORZI, KEVIN P. GLASER,
and BERNARD BEGESKE,

Plaintiffs,

v. No: 02 C 6268
CITY OF CALUMET CITY, ILLINOIS,

a municipal corporation;

JEROME P. GENOVA,

individually and in his official

capacity as Mayor of Calumet City, Mlinois;
CALUMET CITY CHIEF OF POLICE
GEORGE VALLIS, individually and in

his official capacity, DOMINICK GIGLIOTTI,
individually and in his official capacity;

IDA GALLOWAY, individually and in her
official capacity; DANIEL BALOG,
individually and in his official capacity;

JUAN LOPEZ ACOSTA, individually and in
his official capacity; and WILLIAM BORAR,
individually and in his official capacity,

Judge John W. Darrah

Nee eS eS SS Se SS SS Seer

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, Dante Zorzi, Kevin Glaser, and Bernard Begeske, filed suit against Defendants,
the City of Calumet City, Illinois; Jerome Genova; George Vallis; Dominick Gigliotti; Ida
Galloway; Juan Lopez. Acosta; William Borah; and Daniel Balog. Plaintiffs allege that they were
discriminated against with respect to certain job practices conducted by Defendants. Thereafter,
Plaintiffs sought discovery from Defendants, but the parties have becn unable to resolye many

disputes about this discovery. Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions.

8


LEGAL STAN

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide authority to sanction litigants that fail to
comply with their discovery obligations, Rule 37(d) provides that if a party fails:

to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after

proper service of those interrogatories, or . . . to serve a written response to a

request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request,

the court in Which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in

regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action

authorized under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this

rule, ... In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the

party failing to act or the attorney advising that party or both to pay the reasonable

expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure unless the court finds

that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an

award of expense unjust.

Rule 37(b)(2)(A) states that if a party fails to comply with a court order regarding discovery, “an
order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be
taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party
obtaining the order” may be entered.

District courts have “wide latitude in fashioning appropriate” discovery sanctions.
Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1999), However, a sanction must be
proportionate to the circumstances resulting in a litigant’s failure to comply with its discovery
obligations. “The sanction must be one that a reasonable jurist, apprized of all of the
circumstances, would have chosen as proportionate to the infraction.” Salgado v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 150 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 1998).

If a litigant knows or should have known that it failed to comply with a discovery order, it

may be found at fault for failure to comply with the order. See Melendez y. illinois Bell Tel. Co.,

79 F.3d 661, 671 (7th Cir. 1996). A knowing and willing violation of a discovery order merits a