contends on these meager assertions that she is “entitled to have the trier of fact review this
evidence, evaluate the ercdibility of the witnesses and reach a decision on these fundamental
questions of fact.” (R. 46, Pl. Resp. at 10-11). We disagree. It is Plaintiffs burden to show that
she could make her prima facie case, and she must do so with credible evidence from the record.
The Seventh Circuit has noted that summary judgment is the “put up or shut up” moment in a
lawsuit, when a party “must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to
accept its version of events.” Schacht vy, Wis. Dep't of Corr., 175 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir, 1999).
As discussed above, bald assertions in an alfidavit will not suffice to meet this burden or place
material fact issues in dispute for trial when those elements cannot be satisfied by such proof.
Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2001); Wagner vy. Access Cash Int'l,
Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 886, 891 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (court notes that if plainti!f could have tendered
witnesses to substantiate ADEA claim, he should have offered these witnesses’ depositions
and/or affidavits in response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment; a plaintiff cannot, in
the face of a summary judgment motion, assume that a trial will be held at which time he may
prove his case); Vandeveer v. Fort James Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 918, 931-32 (E.D. Wis. 2002)
(granting summary judgment to defendant where although plaintilf had “mustered a great deal of
indignation and conclusory allegations in her moving papers, she has failed to identify evidence
relevant to at least two of the clements of her case, perhaps in the mistaken belief that she could

later do so at trial if the court found a trial to be required.”); Nwangwa v. Fed. Express Corp.,

No. 00 C 3709, 2001 WL 1646569, *4 (N.D. Ill. Dee. 20, 2001). Grevas has not put up any



a little inappropriate. (R. 39, Def.’s Facts, Ex. 1, Grevas Dep. at 94-95.) The following day, July
20, 2000, Grevas became agitated when Marion counseled her on her interaction with Crichlow
and Jamison and advised her to take the rest of the day off to calm down. (/d., Ex. 7, Marion Aff.
4.31.) Grevas agreed that she needed to calm down. (R. 48, Grevas Aff. 4 40.)

The next day Grevas had an exchange with Crichlow. (/d. at 41.) The events between
July 19 and July 21, 2000 culminated in Marion suspending Grevas with pay for three days. (R.
39, Def.’s Facts, Ex. 7, Marion Aff. § 32.) Marion subsequently sent Grevas a memo, which
outlined the basis of her suspension. (/d., Ex. 7, Marion Aff., Ex. A, Aug. 30, 2000 Memo).
According to the memo, Grevas was suspended because she refused to establish an effective
working relationship with department personnel, was insubordinate to her supervisor, continued
to make unfounded allegations against her coworkers, and made abusive and/or inappropriate
comments towards coworkers. (/d.) The memo concluded by waming Grevas that any
additional violations of Village policy would result in disciplinary action up to and including
termination. (/d.) During Grevas’s absence Jamison handled the employee status forms. (/d.,
Ex. 2, Jamison Dep. at 44-45.) Marion and Temesvari noticed that Jamison processed the forms
better than Grevas, so Marion reassigned this job duty from Grevas to Jamison. (/d., Ex. 7,
Marion Alf, 36; Ex. 3, Temesvari Dep. at 42.).

Problems continued in the department in October and November 2000. (R. 47, PI.’s
Facts, {{] 55-59.) On November 9, 2000, Grevas gave Marion a memo alleging that she was
being harassed by various Village employees. (R. 48, Pl.’s Facts, Ex. 2, Nov, 9, 2000 Memo.)

That same day Marion submitted the memo to Assistant Village Manager Ray Wiggins and

requested that Wiggins conduct an investigation into the allegations. (R. 39, Def.’s Facts, Ex. 7,



indication that her sleep problems were severe, long term, or had a permanent impact and no
evidence showing whether her problems persist or are resolved, when, where or how the
problems developed, how severe they were, how long they may have lasted, or whether she
received medical treatment for insomnia. See Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th
Cir. 1999); see also Bond v. Sheahan, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (court rejects
plaintiff's argument (hat she was substantially limited in the major life activity of sleeping
because “the record does not indicate the severity of Plaintiff's sleeping problems, how long she
experienced difficulty sleeping, or how it affected her daily life.”); 29 C.V.R. app. pt. 1630, §
1630.2(j) (*temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or
permanent impact, are usually not disabilities”).

Indeed, the severity and chronic nature of Grevas’s alleged insomnia is belied by other
record evidence. In an April 2002 psychiatric evaluation performed pursuant to Grevas’s
application for disability insurance benefits, Grevas stated not only that she had trouble sleeping
or getting to sleep, bul also that she “sometimes sleeps too much, ten or twelve hours.” (/d., Ex.
23, Apr. 5, 2002 Psych. Eval.) She also stated that her daily activities include “fall[ing] asleep
around 2:00 a.m. and sleep[ing] until 10;00 a.m.,” thus supporting an inference that she sleeps
upwards of eight hours a night. (Jd) Moreover, Grevas admits in her answers to interrogatorics
as well as her affidavit supporting summary judgment that she “often only can fall asleep with
the use of medication” and that her condition is alleviated, albeit temporarily, by the use of
medication. (/d., Ex. 14, Grevas Answer Interrogs.; R. 49, Grovas Aff. |[ 87.) See Sutton v.

United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (“A person whose physical or mental

impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does not have an impairment that



she requested because of her alleged depression was a brief break during work to collect herself
or time off from work. (R. 49, Grevas Aff, 7 50.) Grevas admitted in her deposition that the only
occasion on which she was denied a break was after the November 10, 2000 incident, (R. 39,
Def.’s Facts ff 51, 63; Ex. 1, Grevas Dep. at 359-361); instead of a break that day, Grevas was
sent home,
LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This rule “mandates an approach in which summary judgment is
proper only if there is no reasonably contestable issue of fact that is potentially outcome-
determinative.” F.E.O.C. v, Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir, 2000). In
resolving a motion for summary judgment, this Court will neither decide factual disputes nor
weigh conflicting evidence. Jd. Instead, this Court limits its inquiry to whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists for trial. Jd, In doing so, we view the evidence and draw all inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. But a nonmoving party cannot survive summary judgment with a
mere scintilla of evidence supporting its position; the party must present definite, competent
evidence to rebut the motion. fd. at 437 (citing Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir,

1997))2

? To this end, we note that “[sJelf-serving affidavits without factual support in the record
will not defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Slowiak v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293,
1295 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Keolsch v. Beltone Elecs. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 708-09 (7th Cir.
1995) (concluding that plaintiff's uncorroborated deposition testimony regarding the causal link
between her report of alleged sexual harassment and her termination was insufficient to preclude

6



Marion Aff. 453.) Wiggins conducted a thorough investigation; he interviewed cight Village
employees, including the seven named in Grevas’s complaint, along with Grevas herself. (/d.,
Ex. 13, Wiggins Aff. 4 5.) On November 10, 2000, a final exchange occurred between Marion
and Grevas, which other members of the department witnessed, and which ultimately resulted in
Marion sending Grevas home for the day. (/d., Ex. 7, Marion Aff. 950.) Again, the parties
widely dispute the particulars of the incident, but it is clear that some sort of conflict involving
Grevas ensucd, and there is no question that Grevas was suspended as a result of it. (/d.)

Wiggins completed his investigation into Grevas’s harassment memo on January 31,
2001, and concluded that Grevas had not been harassed. (/d., Ex. A, Jan. 31, 2001 Investigation
Report.) He then began investigating the November 10, 2000 incident. Ie determined, based in
part on Marion’s suggestion, that Grevas’s employment should be terminated because of her poor
job performance, prior misconduct and interpersonal problems with other Village staff. (/d., Ex.
7, Marion Aff. § 55; Ex. 13, Wiggins Aff. 4 6.)

Finally, the parties dispute when the Village first became aware of Grevas’s depression.
Grevas asserts that Village was aware of her depression from the outset because she identified
the condition on an employment form. (R. 49, Grevas Aff. 450.) The Village claims that ii was
not until September 2000 that Grevas informed Marion that she had a psychological disorder.
(R. 39, Def.’s Facts, Ex. 7, Marion Aff. | 37.) In support the Village notes that Grevas did not
identify any mental illness or emotional problems during her pre-employment physical with the
Village’s occupational health care provider. (/d., Ex. 16, Pre-employment Physical Record.)

Grevas also denied having any past or present disability on a occupational hazard form during her

physical. Ud.) In any event, Grevas acknowledges that the only potential accommodation that



life activity to be substantially limited a plaintiff must show that she, as compared to the general
population, is “unable to perform a major lile activity” or is “significantly restricted” as to the
condition, manner or duration under which she can perform that major life activity. Stein v,
Ashcroft, 284 F.3d 721, 728 (7th Cir. 2002).

Grevas has presented insufficient evidence to meet her burden of showing that her
sleeping was substantially limited by depression. Her only evidence consists of bare assertions
in her affidavit and snippets of medical records. In her affidavit Grevas claims that she “suffers
from chronic insomnia, and can experience little more than an hour or two of sleep every 3-4
days.” (R. 48, Grevas Aff. § 87.) But “{b]ald and self-serving assertions in affidavits,
unsubstantiated by any documentation or other testimony, are not sufficient to create a material
issue of fact as to whether an impairment has substantially limited a major life activity.” Stein,
284 F.3d at 726 (citing Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 764 (7th Cir. 2001)).

Nor do Grevas’s medical records support the assertions made in her affidavit. The only
support in the record for the existence of these physical limitations is five sleep-related remarks
contained within some fifteen pages of portions of medical records dating from 1996 to 2001.
Four of the references are Grevas’s own subjective descriptions of her symptoms, such as
“difficulty sleeping” or “poor ability to sleep.” One doctor diagnosed “fatigue/malaise” in June
2000, but there is no evidence that Grevas was treated for the chronic insomnia she alleges and

no information on its severity, duration or relation to her depression. In summary, there is no

3 Although Stein was a disability suit brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the Seventh
Circuit has noted that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are nearly identical statutes and
require substantially similar proof. See Silk v, City of Chi., 194 F.3d 788, 798 n.6 (7th Cir,
1999).



Sy United States District Court, Northern District of Mlinois
Name of Assigned Judge Ruben Castillo Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER OL C 8368 DATE 12/19/2002
CASE Kathryn M. Grevas vs. Village of Oak Park
TITLE

{In the following bux (u) indicate the party (ting the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, aud (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY;

dy Oo Kiled motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer bricf to totion due . Reply to answer briefduc__

4 oO Ruling/Hearing on set for, at

(5) o Status hearing|held/continued to) (set for/re-set for}on set for__ at

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—sset for at

(7) oO Trialfset for/re-set for] on at

@ oa [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuanl to}

Orrcra(m) O Local Rule 41.4 OC Prcp4itay(1) O FRCP41(ax(2).

ao [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendant's motion for summary
judgment [38-1] is granted. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendant, Village of Oak Park and
against plaintiff, Kathryn M. Grevas. This case is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

(il) [For further detail sce order altached to the original minute order. |

No notices required, advised in open court. Document

Number,

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[plaintiff] and his co-workers” were due to his disabilities), McCollum v, Bolger, 794 F.2d 602,
610 (11th Cir, 1986) (“Personality animosity is not the equivalent of sex discrimination and is
not proscribed by Title VII.”); Riding v. Kaufmann’s Dep't Store., 220 F. Supp. 2d 442, 461
(W.D. Pa. 2002) (court notes that although plaintiff disagreed with employer’s conclusions
regarding the particulars of various conflicts with numerous co-workers, “the bona fides of its
determinations simply cannot be doubted” because plaintiff cannot show she satisfied the
criterion identified by Kaufmann’s as necessary to her job— the ability to manage so as to
minimize, rather than foster, tension and conflict—or that Kaufmann’s did not in fact rely upon
her perceived deficiencies in “people development” skills in making its employment decision).
Accordingly, Grevas’s ADA claim fails.

Grevas’s claim that she was terminated and subjected to a hostile work environment
because she is Caucasian fares no better. Grevas did not provide any direct evidence of reverse
race discrimination, so we must rely on the burden-shifting method established in McDonnell
Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the traditional formulation of the
McDonnell Douglas test, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that: (1) she is a
member of a protected class; (2) she was mecting the employer’s legitimate employment
expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) the employer treated
similarly situated employees more favorably. Grayson v. O'Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 817-18 (7th Cir.
2002). If the plaintiff establishes these clements, the burden shifis to the defendant to articulate
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment action. /d. at 818. The plaintiff then
must cast doubt on whether these reasons are credible, or whether they are merely pretext for

discrimination. /d. In a reverse discrimination case, however, the first prong of Plaintiff's prima

11



presently ‘substantially limits’ 4 major life activity.”). ‘Thus, Grevas’s disability claim fails
because she presents no evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that her
alleged limitations are substantial under the ADA. Stein, 284 F.3d at 727.

Because we hold that Grevas cannot satisfy the first prong of her ADA case, we need not
address the remaining prongs. We note, however, that even if we were to assume that Grevas is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA, she cannot satisfy the remaining elements of her prima
facie case. First, she was not qualified to perform the essential functions of her job. Although
she was capable of performing the job requirements, she demonstrated an inability to get along
with her co-workers such that her continued employment became disruptive to the work force,
Moreover, she has not shown that the Village terminated her because of her disability or failed to
accommodate her disability; there is ample evidence in the record that the Village fired Grevas
because of her demeanor and inability to co-cxist with her co-workers. In this context it makes
no difference whether we accept Grevas’s version of the workplace environment or the
Village’s. In either case, it is undisputed that Grevas could not get along with her co-workers,
and Grevas has not presented a shred of evidence thal these conflicts, which were the basis for
her termination, were motivated by the Village’s intolerance of a disability. See, e.g., Siciliano y.
Chi. Local 458-3M, No, 95 C 6555, 1997 WL 792977, *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1997) (court
concludes plaintiff was not qualified for position and suffered no adverse employment action as a
result of her disability because she demonstrated an inability to get along with her co-workers
and was disruptive on the job); see also Wallin v. Mina. Dep’t of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 688 (81h
Cir, 1998) (affirming summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's ADA hostile work

environment claim because there was no evidence that “numerous incidents of friction between

10



ANALYSIS

Grevas alleges that the Village discriminated against her because of her disability when it
fired her and failed to reasonably accommodate her depression. Grevas also claims that the
Village discriminated against her by firing her because she is Caucasian. In order to establish a
claim of disability discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a person
with a disability as defined in the Act; (2) she was qualified for the job that she was performing;
and (3) the employer terminated her because of her disability or failed to reasonably
accommodate that disability. Basith vy. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 926-27 (7th Cir. 2001).
Because Grevas has not met her burden of showing that her major life activity of sleeping was
substantially limited by her depression, her ADA claim fails.

For purposes of the ADA, a disability is a “physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Depression can
constitute a “mental impairment” under the ADA. Krocka v, City of Chi., 203 F.3d 507, 512 (7th
Cir, 2000). Major life activities include caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working, as wel] as sleeping, 29 C_F.R. §
1630.2(i); see also Arnold vy. Cook County, 220 F, Supp. 2d 893, 896 (N.D. Ill. 2002). The Court
must consider several factors when assessing whether an impairment is substantially limiting: (1)
its nature and severity; (2) its duration or expected duration; and (3) its permanent or long-term
impact or its expected impact. See § 1630.2(j)(2). See also Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin

Park Pub. Sch. Dist., 133 F.3d 1054, 1058 n.5 (7th Cir. 1998). Therefore, in order for a major

summary judgment; court notes that the defendant amply supported its reasons for terminating
her and that the plaintiff could have presented employment records, testimony from co-workers,
or anything to permit the inference that she was unfairly treated).

7



At some point after Grevas’s probationary period, Marion began noticing problems with
Grevas’s performance at work. For example, Grevas was responsible for processing employee
status forms, which notify the Village Payroll department of changes affecting employees”
salaries or benefits. (/d, at [ 31.) In July 2000 personnel from other departments complained to
Marion that employee forms processed by Grevas routinely contained errors, were submitted
more than once and were oflen submitted late. (/d., Ex. 11, Munizza Aff. 9 4, Ex. 12, Peters Aff.
4/4.) Other Human Resources department personnel also noticed shortcomings in Grevas’s
work; Colleen Temesvari testified in her deposition that Grevas exhibited incompetency in many
atcas of her work, including a lack of timeliness in executing certain forms and inefficient
prioritization of oflice tasks, (/d., Ex. 3, Temesvari Dep. at 44-46.) On one occasion, unsigned
employee status forms were found in Grevas’s desk when she was out sick, (id, Ex. 2, Jamison
Dep. at 33); because Grevas had not timely submitted the forms, some employees failed to
receive earned pay increases, (id., Ex. 7, Marion Aff. { 28).

Grevas also began experiencing conflicts with her coworkers, Although the parties
present widely divergent versions of these incidents, certain facts and inferences are undisputed.
Tn July 2000 Jacquelyn Jamison was hired as an Administrative Secretary in the Human
Resources department. (/d., Ex. 2, Jamison Dep. at 6.) Jamison’s duties included filing,
answering phones, assisting with training and providing clerical and administrative support to the
department. (/d,) Almost immediately conflicts arose between Jamison and Grevas regarding
scheduling lunch breaks and assignment of duties, and Marion was forced to intervene. (/d., Ex.
7, Marion Aff. ¥ 30; R. 48, Grevas Aff. | 39). Grevas admitted that during her meeting with

Jamison and Marion she was angry, stressed and frustrated and that her actions may have seemed



evidence, aside from her own affidavit, to support the first, second and fourth prongs of her
prima facic case.* Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted on this claim as well.
CONCLUSION

Although we are sympathetic to Grevas as an employee who sincercly believes that she
was treated shabbily by her former employer, these feelings do not translate into a viable claim of
disability and race discrimination that should proceed to trial. Grevas simply has not adduced
sufficient evidence to create a material fact issue from which a reasonable jury could rule in her
favor, and thus the undisputed facts do not allow Grevas to avoid defendant's motion for
summary judgment in its favor. Grevas’s ADA claim fails because she has not shown that her
depression substantially limited her major life activity of sleeping. Consequently, Grevas is
unable to show that she is disabled under the ADA, an essential prong of her prima facie case, In
addition, Grevas has not met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of reverse race
discrimination under Title VII. She has not shown any background circumstances from which
we may conclude that the Village engaged in reverse discrimination against Caucasians. Nor has

she shown that she was meeting the Village’s legitimate expectations or that other similarly

4 Even if Grevas’s own assertion in her affidavit that she was performing satisfactorily
were sufficient to satisfy the second prong of her prima facie case, such assertions would not be
sufficient to withstand a pretext analysis. See, ¢.g., Campbell v. Fasco Indus., Inc. 861 F. Supp.
1385, 1399 (N.D. lll. 1994) (as opposed to prima facie stage, plaintiff's own assertions that he
was performing satisfactorily are entitled to little, if any, weight at pretext stage because the
employce’s burden at the latter stage is “infinitely more rigorous.”). Thus, even if we were to
assume arguendo that Grevas had met her prima facie case and shift the burdens, Grevas’s claim
would nonetheless fail because her affidavit evidence would not be sufficient to establish that the
Village’s reasons for firing her were pretextual.



(Id. at $9.3, 14.) He is responsible for hiring within the department, as well as assigning duties
based on the strengths of the employee and the department’s needs. (/d. at 13.) Aside from
Grevas, the department included the following individuals: (1) Marion was the Dircctor, (id. at §]
3); (2) Colleen Temesvari, a Caucasian, was the Human Resources Representative, (id. at ] 4);
(3) Phleace Crichlow, an African-American, was the Employee Relations Assistant, (id. at 5);
and (4) Estella Sanders and Jacquelyn Jamison, who is African-American, held the position of
Administrative Secretary at various times during Grevas’s tenure at the Village, (id. at {¥] 6-7).
Grevas started working at the Village on September 13, 1999; the first six months of her
employment were probationary and she, like other members of the Human Resources
department, were not members of any collective bargaining unit. (/d. at 19.) Marion met with
Grevas to explain her job duties and responsibilities. (Jd. at | 20.) As part of her job, Grevas
was required to perform various clerical and secretarial duties, including but not limited to typing
and filing Marion’s correspondence, typing other department documents such as job descriptions
and union contracts, and maintaining and processing Village employee forms. (/d. at 4 22.)
Grevas also provided secretarial support to Crichlow and Temesvari. (/d. at 23.) Other
qualifications of Grevas’s job included establishing and maintaining effective working
relationships with her co-workers, other Village departments and outside agencies. (/d., Ex. 17,
Executive Secretary Job Description.) Grevas reported to Marion and he periodically reviewed
her performance. (/d. at ]22.) At the end of Grevas’s probationary period in March 2000
Marion allowed her to continuc her employment with the Village, and also pave her a four

percent salary increase. (Jd, at | 29.)



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KATHRYN M. GREVAS, )
Plaintiff, }
v } No. 01 C 8368
} Judge Ruben Castillo DOCKETED
VILLAGE OF OAK PARK, ) DEC 2 6 2099
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Kathryn Grevas (““Grevas”) sued the Village of Oak Park, Illinois (“Village”)
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 e¢ seq., and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e e¢ seq., claiming that the Village discriminated against her
because she suffered from depression and because of her race. Presently before the Court is the
Village’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
After careful considcration, we grant the Village’s motion in its entirety. (R. 38-1.)

RELEVANT FACTS!

In August 1999 Grevas, a Caucasian, applied for and was offered a position as Executive

Secretary in the Village’s Human Resources department. (R. 39, Def.’s Facts, {{ 13-15.)

Rodney Marion, who is African-American, is the Director of the wman Resources department.

' The following undisputed, material facts are drawn from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1
Statements of Facts and Responses. The partics present widely divergent versions of certain
events underlying this lawsuit. As indicated in this opinion, to the extent that these events arc
not material to this Court’s inquiry on summary judgment and the disputed facts do not create a
material issue for trial, we have not relied on them in making our determination. See LE£.0.C. v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2000).

oe)



facie case is altered to require, in lieu of a showing that the plaintilf is a member of a protected
class, a showing of at least one background circumstance giving rise to inference of
discrimination, such as an employee being clearly more qualified than the person ultimately hired
or the employer expressing intense interest in hiring a person from protected class. Mills v.
Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 454, 457 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Phelan y. City of Chi.,
No. 99 CV 40, 2002 WL 31204784, *4 (N.D. Il. Oct. 1, 2002).

In its memorandum supporting summary judgment, the Village argues that Grevas
presents no evidence that background circumstances giving risc to an inference of reverse
discrimination existed. The Village further argues that Grevas was not meeting legitimate job
expectations, as evidenced by her suspensions and the complaints from other Village
departments. Finally, the Village notes that Grevas has not identified any similarly situated non-
Caucasian employees who were treated more favorably. In her complaint, Grevas alleged that
Jacquelyn Jamison, Malinda Gaylord and Tina Brown--all African-American Administrative
Secretaries at the Village—were treated more favorably. But these employees occupied different
positions and, with respect to Gaylord and Brown, were employed in different departments, so
they cannot be considered similarly situated. Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612,
617-18 (7th Cir. 2000).

Grevas devotes less than a page to countering these arguments in her response, summarily
asserting without any support {tom or citation to the record that (a) “the Village unfairly accepted
the position of Ms. Grevas’ co-workers, who are African American;” (b) she was adequately
performing her job; (c) she was treated less favorably than similarly situated African-American

employees; and (d) the Village lacked a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing her. She

12



situated employces were treated more favorably. Accordingly, we grant the Village’s motion for

summary judgment. (R. 38-1.)

ENTERED: (eE —

Judge Ruben Castillo
United States District Court

Dated: December 19, 2002