Harrison, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1360 at *9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1993). However, there are
a limited number of exceptions, when the attorney/client privilege can apply to the
identity of a client. None of those exceptions are present in this case. Therefore,
plaintiff's motion to compel a response to Interrogatory 4 is granted and defendant's
motion for a protective order is denied.

Next, plaintiff seeks to compel “financial discovery”, which it argues is relevant to
its punitive damages claims. Specifically, plaintiff requests information on defendant's
net worth, supporting financial statements, and any documents to support these
requests. Defendant objects on the grounds that plaintiff has not provided any evidence
to justify the awarding of punitive damages under CROA. Defendant’s arguments go to
the merits of plaintiff's claim. However, at this stage in the litigation plaintiff is merely
required to properly plead a claim for damages, not provide evidence to support that
claim. Because plaintiff's punitive damage claims are at least minimally viable, its
request for financial information is relevant. Whether the district court actually decides
to award punitive damages in this case is a separate question, not presently before us.
Therefore, plaintiff motion to compel response to Interrogatories 8, 9, and 11 and
Document Requests 14, 15, and 16 is granted and defendant's protective order is
denied as to this information.

Finally, plaintiff seeks to compel documents relating to “other issues.” Plaintiff
alleges that defendant has refuses to turnover documents that it previously agreed to
produce. Specifically, plaintiff seeks more complete responses to Document Requests
3, 4 and 12 and interrogatories 5 and 7. To the extent defendant has any responsive
information that it has not disclosed, it is ordered to do so. We agree with defendant

4


Conclusion

Plaintiff's motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part. Defendant’s
motion for a protective order is denied. Any discovery requests that plaintiff has been
ordered to modify must be provided to defendant by March 5, 2004. Defendant is
ordered to produce any outstanding discovery addressed in this opinion by March 20,
2004. Defendant is also ordered to brief the issue of why its form letters qualify as work
product or trade secrets by March 12, 2004. Plaintiffs response is due by March 19,

2004. Defendant's reply, if necessary, is due by March 26, 2004. It is so ordered.

ENTER:

MICHAEL T. ude

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: March 1, 2004


information is discoverable under most circumstances, because the Court can safeguard
its confidentiality by entering a protective order. However, in this case, defendant
contends that a protective order will not safeguard the confidentiality of the information
because protective orders are designed to shield information from disclosure to parties
and non-parties not counsel. Defendant correctly states that a protective order cannot
prevent disclosure of the information to plaintiff's counsel. However, defendant
incorrectly concludes that it should not be ordered to disclose its proprietary information.

As an initial matter, we find that the number of defendant's clients, the identity of
its employees, the amount of money it received from customers in the last five years,
and documents supporting such information do not qualify as confidential proprietary
information and therefore, must be disclosed to plaintiff. Furthermore, even it this
information was confidential and proprietary, defendant has not presented sufficient
evidence to support its argument that plaintiff's counsel is a direct competitor and that
disclosure of the information to them would harm defendant. However, we will error on
the side of caution and therefore, order the parties to enter into an appropriate protective
order to prevent the disclosure of this information to any non-parties before defendant
produces the information at issue. Plaintiff's motion to compel is granted as to Requests
to Admit 6 and 7, Interrogatories 2,3, and 5, and Document Request 17. Defendant's
motion for a protective order is denied as to those requests,

As for the identity of defendant's clients, Interrogatory 4, in addition to arguing
that such information is confidential, defendant also argues that it is protected by the
attorney/client privilege. We do not agree. The general rule is that the identity of a client
is not a confidential communication within the attorney/client privilege. Amon v.

3


that Interrogatory 7 is vague and therefore, defendant is not ordered to respond to it.
Second Discovery Request

Plaintiff's second discovery request seeks (1) all letters sent on behalf of plaintiff
and (2) copies of all form letters defendant has sent on behalf of all of its clients.
Defendant's response to the first request listed the date and subject matter of each letter
sent on behalf of plaintiff, but stated that it could not produce the actual letters because
defendant has a “paper-less” office. To the extent defendant has any copies of the
letters sent on behalf of plaintiff, whether in paper or electronic form, it is ordered to
produce them.

Defendant objects to the second request, copies of every form letter sent on
behalf of all its clients, arguing that they are confidential commercial information.
Defendant also characterizes the form letters as trade secrets and work product, without
any citations to case law. Because both sides provided cursory briefing on this issue,
we will not determine whether the form letters qualify as trade secrets or work product at
this time. However, we do believe that, at the very least, the form letters contain
defendant's confidential proprietary information. Therefore, we will not compel their
disclosure at this time.

Third Discovery Request

Plaintiff's third discovery request seeks a list of ail the lawsuits defendant has filed
in the last five years. Defendant objects, stating that this information is not relevant, is
overbroad and unduly burdensome, is redundant and repetitive of previous discovery

requests, and can be retrieved as easily by plaintiff as by defendant. Defendant argues


‘Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judj iti i f
ae: Magisnate jude Ronald A. Guzman Siting ead Sudiee Michael T. Mason
CASE NUMBER 03 C 987 DATE 3/1/2004
CASE Iosello vs. Victor Lawrence
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

ql) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue__.

(4) a) Ruling/Hearingon___setfor__—__at

(5) 0 Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—sset for at

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor_—— at.
(a) a Trial[set for/re-set for]on___at

(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto___at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) (Local Rule 41.1 CI FRCP4i(a)(1) [1 FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) WM [Otherdocketentry} As stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order, plaintiffs motion
to compel [66-1] is granted in part and denied in part and defendant’s motion for a protective order [73-1]
is denied. Defendant’s motion for a protective order filed on 9/29/03 [43-1] is denied as moot. Defendant
is ordered to brief the issue of why its form letters qualify as work product or trade secrets by 3/12/04.
Plaintiff's response is due by 3/19/04. Defendant’s reply, if necessary, is due by 3/26/04. Courtesy copies
to be delivered to chambers, room 2206.

ab [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open coutt.

3

No notices required.
“ umber of notices

o | Notices mailed by judge’s staff,

Notified counsel by telephone

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. docketing deputy initials

LYNco

vo | Copy to judge/magistrate judge. y

3/1/2005

date mailed notice

courtroom Oyrgie ues
KF deputy’s

¢ KF
initials

(1, Datetinne reedived in ; 7
central Clerk's Office ling deputy intl



that it does not have this information readily available and would have to contact each
individual court that it has appeared before in the last five years, a task that can just as
easily be done by plaintiff.

We find it hard to believe that defendant does not have a list of current and
former cases somewhere in its office. Moreover, creating such a list should not require
defendant to call each court that it has appeared before in the past five years, as plaintiff
would be required to do. Based on information within its office, defendant should,
without much time and effort, be able to create a list with the name, case number,
venue, and claims asserted for each case that it has filed in the past five years.
Therefore, plaintiffs motion to compel a response to its third discovery request is

granted.


DOCKETED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS MAR 05 2004
EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER IOSELLO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 03 C 0987
vs.

VICTOR LAWRENCE, d/b/a,
LEXINGTON LAW FIRM,

Judge Ronald A. Guzman
Magistrate Judge Michael T. Mason

Defendant.

wee SS SS SS SS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Michael T. Mason, United States Magistrate Judge:

On February 10, 2003, plaintiff, Christopher losello, filed a class action suit
against defendant, Lexington Law Firm, alleging violations of the Credit Repair
Organization Act (“CROA”), 15 U.S.C. §1679. The punitive class has not been certified
and fact discovery was set to close March 2, 2004. In a February 27, 2004 minute
order, we extended fact discovery to June 2, 2004. Before us are cross motions from
the parties regarding the proper scope of discovery. For the following reasons, we
grant in part and deny in part plaintiff's motion to compel and deny defendant's motion
for a protective order.

Plaintiff's motion to compel seeks responses to its first, second, and third
discovery requests. Plaintiff categorizes the information it seeks to compel from its first
discovery request as (1) class discovery, (2) financial discovery, and (3) other issues.
Its second discovery request seeks letters defendant sent to various credit bureaus on

behalf of plaintiff and its other clients. Its third discovery request seeks a list of all the

4)



lawsuits defendant filed in the last five years. Defendant's motion for a protective order
only addresses plaintiff's first discovery request.’ Defendant addresses the remaining
two requests in its response to the motion to compel.

First Discovery Request

Plaintiff seeks to compel (1) class discovery, (2) financial discovery, and (3) other
issues from its first discovery request. Under “class discovery”, plaintiff seeks the
number of persons who contracted with defendant’, their identities, the identities of
defendant's employees, the amount of money it received from customers in the last five
years, and documents to support these requests. Plaintiff asserts that it needs this
information to determine whether there is a punitive class and whether it should proceed
with its class action claim. Defendant objects, arguing that these requests seek
privileged and confidential information and are overbroad and burdensome.

The argument in defendant’s motion for a protective order is two fold. First
defendant asserts that the “class discovery” plaintiff seeks includes confidential
proprietary information, like its client list and revenue documents, which must be
safeguarded from disclosure. Second, defendant argues that plaintiff's counsel, not
plaintiff, is a direct competitor and therefore should be barred from accessing any of its

confidential proprietary information. Defendant concedes that confidential proprietary

‘Defendant also argues that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. That is a dispositive issue, not properly before this court. All dispositive
issues must be raised before Judge Guzman.

Plaintiff's request for information on all “persons who contracted with defendant” and
“customers” is too broad. Plaintiff is not entitled to information on all persons who contracted
with defendant. Plaintiff must narrow the scope of this request to individuals who are potential
members of a punitive class in this case.