CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for all the above stated reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED. This case is dismissed in its entirety without prejudice. All pending motions are moot.

All previous dates and schedules are moot.

ENTER:

eermee Be Nylberrvar

janes F. HOLDERMAN
United States District Judge

DATE: February 26, 2002

13


exception of some bridge improvements along the eastern segment, IDOT is no longer considering
federal funds or federal reimbursement as to the eastern segment of Route 22. IDOT continues,
however, to preserve the option to request federal funds or federal reimbursement with regard to the
western and middle segments of Route 22 in the future.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the undisputed
evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the

nonmovant’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513

(1996). This court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.

A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue, however, may not rest on its
pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine
issue of material fact that requires trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S. Ct.
2548, 2553 (1986). There is no issue for trial “unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct.
at 2511.

It is not the function of this court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion
for summary judgment; the nonmoving party must identify with reasonable particularity the evidence

upon which that the party relies. Bombard v, Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th


federal funding for Route 22 in the future. This evidence standing alone is insufficient to create an

issue of material fact. Id.

As stated earlier, Lincolnshire also argues that the entire 20-mile corridor of Route 22
possesses the requisite degree of federal involvement to trigger the application of NEPA because the
eastern segment of Route 22 is an improper segmentation of an entire Route 22 project. “[I]mproper
segmentation” has been defined as an attempt by an agency to divide a major federal action into
smaller components in order to allow those smaller components to escape the application of NEPA.
See, e.g., Scottsdale Mall v. State of Ind., 549 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977); Swain v. Brinegar, 542 F.2d
364 (7th Cir.1975) (en banc). The case law dealing with improper segmentation typically involves
a situation where major federal action is found to exist and then the segment in question is analyzed
in order to determine whether a particular segment has been separated from the whole to prevent the
application of NEPA to that segment. See, ¢.g., Mach v. Skinner, 916 F.2d 13, 16 n. 4
(D.C.Cir.1990) (“Because we hold that the Light Rail Project does not involve ‘major federal action,’
we do not decide whether the district court correctly held that Maryland’s segmentation of the
Project was proper.”). The possibility does exist, however, that a state agency could improperly
segment critical portions of a proposed project before the project was developed to the stage of
becoming a major federal action. Save Barton, 950 F.2d at 1139. In general, segmentation analysis
should function to weed out state highway projects which are segmented as a pretext to remove the
segmented portion from the purview of NEPA. When the segmentation of a project has no
independent justification, or is simply illogical when viewed in isolation, the segmentation should

be held invalid. Id. (citations omitted).

Since, however, all projects must start and end somewhere, an otherwise state project does

not fall within the scope of NEPA simply because that state project ends at a junction next to a

federally-funded project. Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Barnhart, 906 F.2d 1477, 1482
-1484 (10th Cir. 1990). A local project closely related physically to a federal project may be deemed


afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation a reasonable opportunity to comment with

regard to such undertaking.”

These federal statutes and regulations only apply when the federal government’s involvement
ina project is sufficient to constitute a “major federal action.” “The purpose of NEPA is to require
that federal decision-makers consider the environmental consequences of their actions before
deciding to proceed,” Swain v. Brinegar, 542 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir.1976). Accordingly, as stated
earlier, the threshold issue in this case is whether there is sufficient federal involvement in the
proposed improvements to the eastern segment of Illinois Route 22 to constitute a “major federal

action.” See Save Barton Creek Ass’n v. Federal Highway Admin., 950 F.2d 1129, 1134 (Sth Cir.
1992).

Lincolnshire argues that the preparation of an environmental impact statement in compliance
with federal law is necessary because the proposed improvements along the entire 20-mile corridor
of Route 22 constitute a “major federal action.” Lincolnshire asserts that there is a genuine issue of
material fact regarding: (1) whether the proposed improvements along the entire 20-mile corridor
of Route 22 constitute a major federal action; (2) whether defendants have inappropriately segmented
the eastern segment of the Route 22 project from the 20-mile corridor of Route 22 so as to
circumvent NEPA requirements; and (3) whether the federal involvement found within the proposed
improvements on the eastern segment of Route 22 constitutes a major federal action. The court will

address each argument in tum after first addressing the scope of Lincolnshire’s standing in this case.
IL The Scope of Lincolnshire’s Standing

Under the facts of this case, Lincolnshire lacks proper standing to seek the cessation of any
highway improvement constituting a major federal action occurring on Route 22 outside of

Lincolnshire’s village borders. To obtain judicial review of a federal agency action under NEPA,


Cir. 1996). The evidence relied upon must be competent evidence of a type otherwise admissible
at trial. Id, Thus, a party may not rely upon inadmissible hearsay in an affidavit or deposition to
oppose a motion for summary judgment. Russell vy. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir.1995)
(hearsay testimony may not be considered in summary judgment proceeding).
ANALYSIS

Inits complaint, Lincolnshire seeks to halt the proposed improvements to the eastern segment
of Route 22 pending the preparation of environmental studies in compliance with the requirements
of NEPA, the regulations enacted under NEPA, and Section 106 of the NHPA.

NEPA provides in pertinent part:

The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies,
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in
accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal
Government shall--

(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on--

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented,

(ii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in
the proposed action should it be implemented.

42 U.S.C. § 4332.

Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470f, provides that the
head of any federal agency “having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed federal or
federally-assisted undertaking,” shall, prior to approving the use of any federal funds, “take into

account the effect of the undertaking on any site that is included in the National Register” and “shall


could be traceable to any interests it may have consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting the
NEPA. Accordingly, Lincolnshire has not demonstrated its standing to bring any environmental

claim as to any proposed improvements of Route 22 beyond its village borders.
Il. Federal Involvement Regarding The Entire Route 22 Project

In addition to lacking standing beyond its own borders, Lincolnshire also has failed to
establish an issue of material fact regarding the existence of major federal action over the entire 20-
mile corridor of Route 22. First, Lincolnshire attempts to submit evidence of an unidentified IDOT
attorney who “candidly admitted to a resident of Lincolnshire that (after six years of processing the
improvements for federal approval) it would proceed with state-only funding for that portion of
Route 22 east of Route 83 in order to avoid meeting the stringent environmental review requirements
imposed by NEPA.” (PI. Response to Def. Motion at 8). This inadmissible hearsay evidence does
not create an issue of material fact and this court cannot consider this evidence in evaluating the
merits of defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The law in the Seventh Circuit is clear that
in response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party may not rely upon
inadmissible hearsay in an affidavit or deposition to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Bombard, 92 F.3d at 562.

Second, Lincolnshire argues that since defendants proceeded in a manner that would have
allowed the proposed work for all of Route 22 to receive federal funding, the aggregate of all the
coordination between IDOT and FHWA should constitute a major federal action. The fact that a
project has been designed to preserve the option of federal funding in the future is not enough,
standing alone, to make it a federal project. Historic Preservation Guild of Bay View v. Burnley,
896 F.2d 985, 990-91 (6th Cir. 1989). In this case, it is undisputed that IDOT has not, as of yet,
requested nor received any federal funds or reimbursements for any of the proposed improvements
on Route 22. The only additional evidence Lincolnshire presents is the undisputed evidence of

continued coordinated operations between state and federal agencies, which preserve the option for


Minute@rder Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge James F, Holderman Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge . than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C5974 DATE 2/26/2002
CASE VILLAGE OF LINCOLNSHIRE vs. BROWN et al
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented,]
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) qa Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due
(4) ia} Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) im} Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Qa Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor_ at
(7) m7] Trial{set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CUFRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule 21 CIFRCP4i(a)(1) CO FRCP41(a)(2).
qo) «=o [Other docket entry] Pursuant to Memorandum Opinion and Order entered this day, defendants’
motion for summary judgment is granted. This action is dismissed in its entirety without prejudice. All
pending motions are moot. All previously set dates are stricken.
(1) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.}
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. umber of notices
UV | Notices mailed by judge's staff. FEB 9 7 2002

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mait notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
2262002

date mailed notice

courtroom
deputy’s
initials

JS . Is

x

= Lt
UT Baeehintie recehvad in

central Clerk’s Office ‘mailing deputy initials



Typically, a project is considered a major federal action when it is funded with federal
money. Southwest Williamson County Community Ass’n, Inc. v. Slater, 243 F.3d 270, 278 (6th
Cir. 2001). The absence of federal funding, however, is not necessarily dispositive in determining
whether a highway project is considered a major federal action. Historic Preservation Guild, 896
F.2d at 990. Outside of federal funding, there are no clear standards for defining the point at which
federal participation transforms a state project into a federal project and no litmus test exists to
determine what constitutes a “major federal action.” Save Barton Creek, 950 F.2d at 1134 (citation
omitted); U.S. v. Southern Florida Water Management Dist., 28 F.3d 1563, 1572 (11th Cir.
1994)(citations omitted).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that an Indiana by-pass
project was a “major federal action” requiring an environmental impact statement where the facts
of the case indicated federal participation in the programming, location, design, preliminary
engineering, and right of way acquisition stages of the project. Scottsdale Mall, 549 F.2d at 489.
In addition, the Tenth Circuit has stated that the touchstone of major federal activity is a federal
agency’ s authority to influence nonfederal activity, “[T]he federal agency must possess actual power

to control the nonfederal activity.” Village of Los Ranchos, 906 F.2d at 1482.

In looking at the facts of this case and in light of the paucity of case law from the Seventh
Circuit on point with the issues presented, this court believes that applying the test and reasoning

enunciated by the Sixth Circuit in the Slater case is appropriate to determine when a state project has

become so imbued with a federal character that compliance with federal environmental statutes is
necessary. Accordingly under that test, there are two alternative bases for a court to find that a
non-federal project constitutes a “major federal action” such that NEPA requirements apply: (1)
when the non-federal project restricts or limits the statutorily prescribed federal decision-makers’
choice of reasonable alternatives; or (2) when the federal decision-makers have authority to exercise

sufficient control or responsibility over the non-federal project so as to influence the outcome of the

11


independent for NEPA purposes only after consideration of whether the proposed segment: (1) has
logical termini, (2) has substantial independent utility, (3) does not foreclose the opportunity to
consider alternatives, and (4) does not irretrievably commit federal funds for closely related projects.

Id 23 CER. § 771.111(6 (1991).

In view of the federal regulations regarding proper segmentation, Lincolnshire has failed to
present sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that the
eastern segment of the Route 22 constitutes an improper segmentation. It is undisputed that IDOT
conducted no analysis to determine where to segment the Route 22 project outside of Route 22’s
actual endpoints of Route 14 to the west and Route 41 to the east. In addition, it is undisputed that
in April 1993, a consultant prepared for IDOT a report describing possible improvements to Route
22 by dividing Route 22 into five segments for study purposes. Lincolnshire asserts that since no
analysis was done in determining the construction segmentation of Route 22 and since earlier
divisions of Route 22 which were done for study purposes are inconsistent with the current
segmentation, the three current segments proposed by IDOT must be improper. In essence
Lincolnshire argues that Route 14 and Route 41 are more logical termini for the Route 22 project
than Route 83. That a terminus is the most logical is not mandated by the segmentation analysis,
segmentation analysis requires only that a terminus be “logical.” See Village of Los Ranchos, 906
F.2d at 1483. This court finds that Lincolnshire has failed to present evidence in the record which
creates a genuine issue of material fact that Route 83 is not a logical terminus in which to divide

Route 22.
Il. Federal Involvement within the eastern segment of the Route 22 Project

Lincolnshire argues that because over a six-year period there has been sufficient federal
involvement within the eastern segment of Route 22, a question of material fact exists as to whether
the eastern segment of Route 22 has been so imbued with a federal character that compliance with

federal environmental statutes is necessary.

10


and thereby make use of judicial tools of litigation such as discovery’, litigants must meet both the
constitutional requirements for standing and the requirements imposed by Congress through the

APA. Florida Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 666 (D.C.Cir. 1996); Foundation on
Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 82- 83 (D.C.Cir.1991).

Under the constitutional standing doctrine, “[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested
relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (citing
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
USS. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758-59, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)). Under section 10(a) of the APA,
when, as here, the challenge is against a federal agency under NEPA, the plaintiff claiming a right
to judicial review must be “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning ofa relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted section 10(a) of
the APA to require that the person claiming a right to sue (1) identify some ‘agency action’ that
affects him in the specified fashion; and (2) establish that the injury he complains of falls within the
“zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal
basis for his complaint. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3185,
3186, 111 L-Ed.2d 695 (1990).

The obvious interest Lincolnshire seeks to protect is the environment of Lincolnshire affected
by the proposed improvements to Route 22, and Lincolnshire’s environmental interest coincides with
the Congressional intent of NEPA. Lincolnshire, however, has neither argued nor presented
evidence identifying any injury or potential injury outside of its borders. Nor has Lincolnshire

substantiated how any unlawful conduct by defendants’ occurring outside of Lincolnshire’s borders

> In response to this motion for summary judgment, Lincolnshire argued that defendants
improperly denied discovery to it as to the proposed improvements of Route 22 west of Route 83
which encompasses the middle and western segments of the Route 22 project.

7


highways which intersect Route 22: Route 14; Route 83; and Route 41 run generally in a north-south
direction. The 4 miles of Route 22 which passes through Lincolnshire is contained entirely within
the eastern segment.

IDOT historically has participated in monthly coordination meetings with the Federal
Highway Administration (“FHWA”) in order to maintain the possibility of receiving federal funds
in connection with any highway project the State of Illinois considers. In these coordination
meetings, FHWA typically receives information from IDOT regarding specific highway
improvement projects and FHWA provides IDOT guidance and approvals regarding various aspects
of these projects. FHWA and IDOT work together to develop state highway projects for federal
funding and to maintain communication with one another ensuring that if and when a state project
becomes a federal project, the state project has maintained the standards necessary under federal law.

Over the course of about six years, IDOT and FHWA have discussed and agreed upon certain
project aspects of Route 22 including roadway geometry, intersection improvements, design
exceptions, environmental issues, historic properties, and public parks. The coordination between
IDOT and the FHWA as to Route 22 has allowed IDOT to proceed with its proposed improvements
along Route 22 with the knowledge that if, and when it sought to request the assistance of federal
funding assistance, the requisite federal requirements would have been satisfied. IDOT initially
made arrangements for the entire Route 22 project to receive federal funds or reimbursement under
the federal-aid highway program. IDOT, however, to date, has neither received nor requested any
federal funds or reimbursements for any of its activities concerning any segment of Route 22. More
specific to this litigation, IDOT has neither requested nor received federal funding or reimbursement

for the proposed improvements along the eastern segment of Route 22. Furthermore, with the


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56. This court ordered expedited discovery on the threshold issue of whether any of major federal
action existed in connection with the State of Illinois’ proposed improvements to the eastern segment
of Illinois Route 22. Upon further review of the record, for all the reasons stated herein, this court
finds insufficient evidence in the record to create an issue of material fact regarding the existence
of major federal action in connection with the proposed improvements to the eastern section of
Illinois Route 22. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. This case
is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS!

Illinois Route 22 (“Route 22”) is a two-lane National Highway System (“NHS”) highway,
which runs east and west across Lake County, Illinois. U.S. Route 14 (“Route 14”) is Route 22’s
western point of origin. Route 22 extends east from Route 14, a distance of approximately 20 miles,
terminating at U.S. Route 41 (“Route 41”)’. Approximately 4 miles of Route 22 passes through the
Village of Lincolnshire. In the early 1990’s, the Illinois Department of Transportation (“IDOT”)
proposed to widen the entire length of Route 22 from Route 14 to Route 41. For construction and
planning purposes, IDOT divided the proposed improvements to Route 22 into three segments: (1)
Route 14 to Quentin Road, a distance of approximately 8 miles (“western segment”); (2) Quentin
Road to Illinois Route 83 (“Route 83”), a distance of approximately 3.5 miles (“middle segment”);

and (3) Route 83 to Route 41, a distance of about 8.5 miles (“eastern segment”). The primary

'The following facts are undisputed and are taken from the plaintiff's and defendants’
respective Local Rule 56.1(a) & (b) statements of material facts and accompanying exhibits.

2A copy of a scale map of Illinois Route 22 and the surrounding area is attached to this
opinion. The map is marked Defense Exhibit 4 and defendants submitted the original map in
Defendants’ Supplemental Appendix Of Materials In Reply to Plaintiff's Statement and in
Further Support of Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment .

2


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Feb 2720

VILLAGE OF LINCOLNSHIRE,

Plaintiff,
No. 01 C 5974
v.

)

)

)

)

)
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, )
Kirk Brown, SECRETARY; )
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, )
Norman Y. Mineta, SECRETARY; )
ILLINOIS DIVISION OF THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY )
ADMINISTRATION, Norman R. Stoner, DIVISION )
ADMINISTRATOR; )
FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, )
)

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES F, HOLDERMAN, District Judge:

On August 3, 2001, plaintiff Village of Lincolnshire (“Lincolnshire”) filed a four-count
complaint against defendants seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Lincolnshire seeks relief
pursuant to the National Environment Policy Act of 1969 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq.
(“NEPA”), the regulations adopted under NEPA, 49 U.S.C. § 303 and 23 U.S.C. § 138, the National
Historic Preservation Act, as amended 16 U.S.C. §470f (‘NHPA”), and the Administrative
Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 701 et. seg (“APA”). On October 9, 2001, defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. On October 30, 2001, this court converted defendants’

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

yl


project. Slater, 243 F.3d at 281. If either test is satisfied, the otherwise non-federal project must

be considered a major federal action. Id.

In this case, under either test, Lincolnshire has failed to present sufficient evidence to create
an issue of material fact that the eastern segment of Route 22 is a major federal action. Specifically,
there has been no showing that non-federal agencies proceeding with the proposed improvements
along the eastern segment of Route 22 will restrict possible federal decisions in the future.
Additionally, there has been no showing that federal decision-makers have been given any authority,

control, or responsibility over the proposed improvements on the eastern segment of Route 22.

In this case, it is undisputed that there has been no federal money expended in the
development or planning of the improvements of the eastern segment of Route 22. In addition, the
evidence in this case reveals that FHWA was involved with and approved of various design aspects
of the eastern segment. It is also undisputed that FHWA in working with IDOT on the eastern
segment of Route 22 also approved various environmental reviews prepared by IDOT. Finally, the
evidence in the case establishes that the possibility that federal funds will be used to improve bridges
within the eastern segment of Route 22 remains. In light of all this undisputed evidence and
resolving all reasonable ambiguities in favor of Lincolnshire, Lincolnshire has not presented
sufficient evidence in the record to create an issue of material fact regarding whether the FHWA has
any control over the eastern segment of Route 22 or whether any actions on the part of the IDOT on
the eastern segment of Route 22 will restrict possible federal actions in the future. The undisputed
evidence in this case establishes that defendants have continued to coordinate and communicate with
one another to keep the option of receiving federal funding open. None of the coordination or
communication between federal and non-federal agencies and none of the work done to keep the
option of federal funding open, however, rises to the level of major federal action so as to require

compliance with the NEPA requirements in this case.

12


AO 450(Rev. 5/85)Judgment in a Civil Case

United States District Court

Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division

VILLAGE OF LINCOLNSHIRE JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
v. Case Number: 01 C 5974
BROWN et al

oO Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been
tried and the jury rendered its verdict.

a Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues
have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that summary judgment is granted in favor of
defendants Brown et al and against plaintiff Village of Lincolnshire. This action is dismissed
in its entirety without prejudice.

Michael W. Dobbins, Clerk of Court

Date: 2/26/2002 yi S Cc

J. Smith, Bgputy Clerk