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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

THE MT. VERNON PARK ASSOCIATION, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

December 29, 2015 

v No. 323482 

Oakland Circuit Court 

PATRICIA WILLIAMS, LC No. 2013-135603-CK 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and BECKERING and BOONSTRA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 This appeal arises from a complaint that plaintiff, the Mt. Vernon Park Association, filed 

against defendant, Patricia Williams, the co-owner of a condominium unit in the Mt. Vernon 

Park development in Southfield. Defendant appeals as of right a circuit court order granting 

summary disposition in favor of plaintiff. We reverse and remand. 

 Plaintiff sought summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10). Concerning 

MCR 2.116(C)(9), plaintiff contended that because defendant undisputedly failed to paint her 

front door in conformity with the Michigan Condominium Act, MCL 559.101 et seq., and the 

relevant condominium documents, including rules and regulations adopted by plaintiff’s board in 

2009, defendant had no defense to plaintiff’s claim. Regarding MCR 2.116(C)(10), plaintiff 

insisted that no genuine issues of material fact existed in light of defendant’s undisputed failure 

to comply with her obligation to paint her front door and to pay plaintiff’s assessments against 

her for failing to paint the front door. The circuit court ruled: 

 The Court . . . has considered the argument . . . of counsel, and the Court 

looks at this matter and cannot help but look at the . . . matter concerning the other 

case and Ms. Clark.[1] This Court is of the opinion that reasonable minds could 

differ as to the meaning of the language . . . in the bylaws and the articles, and that 

 

1

 Plaintiff filed a nearly identical complaint against Chantelle Clark in LC No. 2013-135604-CK. 

Plaintiff filed a nearly identical motion for summary disposition, defendant Clark requested 

summary disposition on her behalf, and the circuit court granted Clark summary disposition 

pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). 
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it is not . . . repugnant to justice to read the rules as you do, [plaintiff’s] counsel, 

even though this Court has taken a contrary opinion and made . . . an adjudication 

repugnant to your interpretation. But looking at this from the perspective of this 

non-appearing party, that the Court is comfortable in ruling favorably to you in 

this case, even though this Court has a different opinion, and made that manifest 

in its other case. . . . [A]gain, for the reason . . . that . . . it doesn’t strain credulity 

to conclude as you do, and since she’s not challenging it by her absence, the Court 

grants your motion. 

 Defendant contends that the circuit court should have granted summary disposition under 

MCR 2.116(I)(2) in her favor. Although defendant did not file a response to plaintiff’s motion 

for summary disposition, she highlights the circuit court’s recognition that the same facts and 

law applied in both LC No. 2013-135604-CK and her case. We review de novo the circuit 

court’s summary disposition ruling. Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich App 618, 621; 689 NW2d 506 

(2004).2

 A summary disposition motion premised on subrule (C)(10) tests the factual support for a 

claim. Walsh, 263 Mich App at 621. “In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this 

Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence 

of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine 

issue of material facts exists to warrant a trial.” Id. MCR 2.116(I)(2) authorizes a circuit court 

to “render judgment in favor of the opposing party” if “it appears to the court that the opposing 

party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment.” The circuit court may grant the 

opposing party summary disposition pursuant MCR 2.116(I)(2) if “no genuine issue of material 

fact [exists] and the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” City of Holland v 

Consumers Energy Co, 308 Mich App 675, 681-682; 866 NW2d 871 (2015). 

 “[I]ssues involving statutory interpretation, as well as contract interpretation, present 

issues of law which are reviewed de novo.” Tuscany Grove Ass’n v Peraino, ___ Mich App ___; 

___ NW2d ___ (2015) (Docket No. 320685, issued July 14, 2015); slip op at 2. Regarding 

statutory interpretation, this Court summarized in Paris Meadows, LLC v City of Kentwood, 287 

Mich App 136, 141; 783 NW2d 133 (2010): 

 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of 

the Legislature. This Court begins by reviewing the text of the statute at issue; if 

the language is unambiguous, it is presumed that the Legislature intended the 

meaning plainly expressed, and judicial construction of the statute is not 

permitted. Nothing may be read into a clear statute that is not within the manifest 

intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. [Internal 

quotations and citations omitted.] 

 

2

 The circuit court did not specify the subrule supporting its summary disposition ruling for 

plaintiff. Because the circuit court considered documentary evidence beyond the pleadings, the 

court apparently granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). MCR 2.116(G)(5). 
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 The rules governing contract interpretation apply to the construction of condominium 

bylaws. Tuscany Grove Ass’n, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2. 

 Accordingly, this Court begins by examining the language of the bylaws. 

Words are interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Further, this 

Court avoids interpretations that would render any part of the document 

surplusage or nugatory, and instead this Court gives effect to every word, phrase, 

and clause. Ultimately, we enforce clear and unambiguous language as written. 

[Id.] 

 Concerning interpretation of a deed, courts generally enforce as a matter of law “the plain 

language in a deed” that contains no ambiguity. Taylor v Taylor, 310 Mich 541, 545; 17 NW2d 

745 (1945). “[I]n interpreting deeds and other written instruments, the primary object is to 

determine the intention of the parties from the instrument itself.” Thomas v Jewell, 300 Mich 

556, 558-559; 2 NW2d 501 (1942). 

 We conclude that the circuit court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of 

plaintiff and by failing to grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) in favor of 

defendant. The Condominium Act expressly provides in MCL 559.102 that “[f]or the purposes 

of this act, the words and phrases defined in sections 3 to 10 shall have the meanings respectively 

ascribed to them in those sections.” According to the Condominium Act, “a condominium 

project consists of ‘units’ and ‘common elements’ only.” Paris Meadows, 287 Mich App at 146 

(internal quotation and citation omitted). The Condominium Act defines a “condominium unit” 

as “that portion of the condominium project designed and intended for separate ownership and 

use, as described in the master deed . . . .” MCL 559.104(3). The term “common elements” 

“means the portions of the condominium project other than the condominium units.” MCL 

559.103(7). “General common elements” include “the common elements other than the limited 

common elements.” MCL 559.106(5). And, “limited common elements” means “a portion of 

the common elements reserved in the master deed for the exclusive use of less than all of the coowners.” MCL 559.107(2). 

 The clear and unambiguous language in Article IV of the master deed reflects the 

grantors’ plain intent regarding the development’s common elements. Taylor, 310 Mich at 545; 

Thomas, 300 Mich at 558-559. Article IV(A)(7) states that “[t]he general common elements” 

include “[f]oundations, supporting columns, unit perimeter walls (including windows and doors 

therein)[,] roofs, ceilings, floor construction between unit levels and chimneys.” (Emphasis 

added). “Limited common elements” include “[t]he interior surfaces of apartment perimeter 

walls (including windows and doors herein), ceilings and floors contained within an apartment.” 

Article IV(B)(5) (emphasis added). Article IV(C) plainly places on a condominium co-owners’ 

association, like plaintiff, responsibility for the “costs of maintenance, repair and replacement of 

all . . . general and limited common elements described” in the master deed, except that a coowner bears responsibility for “the costs of decoration and maintenance (but not repair or 

replacement except in cases of co-owner fault) of all surfaces referred to in [Article IV(B)(5)].” 

 The Condominium Act’s definitions, including the definitions of general common 

elements, MCL 559.106(5), and limited common elements, MCL 559.107(2), and the provisions 

of the master deed, plainly place the outer walls surrounding the condominium units, including 
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the exterior doors, in the category of general common elements. The master deed also 

unambiguously categorized the interior surfaces of the unit’s perimeter doors as limited common 

elements. Additionally, the master deed plainly assigned plaintiff the responsibility for any 

“costs of maintenance, repair and replacement of all . . . general and limited common elements 

described” in the master deed, but for “the costs of decoration and maintenance (but not repair or 

replacement except in cases of co-owner fault) of all [interior] surfaces” of the units. Article 

IV(C). 

 The parties did not dispute that plaintiff possessed the authority to adopt the regulation 

requiring the uniform front-door color of dark brown. However, to the extent that the regulation 

also purported to place on co-owners the responsibility for funding or arranging for the painting 

of the condominium units’ exterior front doors, the regulation was plainly inconsistent with the 

unambiguous language in Article IV of the master deed. Cf. Meadow Bridge Condo Ass’n v 

Bosca, 187 Mich App 280, 282; 466 NW2d 303 (1990) (holding that “a rule or regulation is a 

tool to implement or manage existing structural law,” the regulation challenged by a co-owner 

was “not inconsistent with the original bylaw,” “and d[id] nothing to change the general rule”) 

(internal quotation and citation omitted).3

 Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant. We do 

not retain jurisdiction. Defendant, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 

7.219. 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra 

 

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 In light of our conclusion that the circuit court erred in failing to grant defendant summary 

disposition, we need not address defendant’s alternative argument that the circuit court should 

have granted her motion for relief from judgment.