called the Chicago Archdiocese “one of the most backward dioceses in the nation in the area of
Hispanic communications” and asserted that the Communications Department was unresponsive
to and uninterested in the Hispanic community’s needs. (Id. at p. 11). The plaintiff accused the
Church of failing to allocate sufficient resources to Hispanic Catholics; failing to develop
sufficiently Hispanic religious teachings; and failing to properly market Catholic schools within
the Hispanic community. (Id. at p. 12, ef seq.).

On August 21, 2000, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

(EEOC Charge #210A11127; see also EEOC charge #210A04436 attached to complaint). After

receiving assurances from the defendant that her allegations would be “addressed appropriately,”
the plaintiff withdrew her EEOC complaint. (EEOC charge #210A11127).
On September 25, 2000, the plaintiff tendered her resignation, to be effective December

30, 2000. (EEOC charge #210A11181 Amended, attached to complaint; see also Defendant’s

Exhibit G, resignation letter).

In or around early November 2000, the plaintiff submitted a second letter of resignation,
citing continued discrimination and a hostile work environment. (EEOC charge #210A11181
Amended, attached to complaint). The plaintiff filed another EEOC charge on December 18,
2000. (Id.; EEOC Charge #210A11127).

On December 19, 2000, the plaintiff offered to temporarily withdraw her resignation.
(Id.; see also Defendant’s Exhibit H, Plaintiffs 12/19/00 e-mail). The Archdiocese declined the
plaintiff's offer. (Defendant’s Exhibit I, Memo to Plaintiff from Director of Human Resources).
[The plaintiff characterizes the defendant’s decision not to allow her to withdraw her resignation

as a “summary discharge.”] The plaintiff filed additional charges with the EEOC on January 9,


personally and against Hispanic employees and parishioners in general, this case would require
the Court to choose among competing religious viewpoints. Since this case involves ideological
differences of opinion concerning the internal affairs of the Catholic Church, the Court finds as a
matter of law that the complaint must be dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.

In sum, under the First Amendment, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's Title VII claims. The plaintiff's position as an Hispanic Communications Manager
essentially involved spreading the Church’s message to the Hispanic community. Furthermore,
the plaintiff’s dispute with the church basically relates to religious differences of opinion relating
to the internal workings of the Archdiocese and its treatment of Hispanics minority. Therefore,
the Church’s employment decisions are outside the purview of federal jurisdiction. If the
plaintiff seeks redress, she must avail herself of the appropriate church tribunal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to dismiss (docket #7) is
GRANTED. The complaint is dismissed without prejudice for lack of federal subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The case is terminated. The parties are to bear

lle

DAVID H. COAR

their own costs.

ENTER:

United States District Judge

DATED: April 16, 2002


While the dispute in Watson was over property, the Court’s rationale is not confined to
property.

property disputes, but it also applies to civil rights cases arising from disputes between religious
institution and its ministers. “This principle [of requiring civil court to refrain from deciding
religious doctrinal disputes] applies with equal force to church disputes over church polity and

church administration.” Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States of America and

Canada y, Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976) (applying the Watson rule to a Bishop’s

defrockment); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5" Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
896 (1972) (“application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment relationship existing
between... a church and its minister [] would result in an encroachment by the State into an area
of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of
the First Amendment”).

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in McClure established what has become known as the
“ministerial exception” to Title VII employment discrimination cases. Since McClure, the courts
have generally applied the ministerial exception to bar Title VII claims against religious
organizations. See e.g., Young v. Northern Illinois Conference of United Methodist Church, 21
F.3d 184 (7" Cir. 1994) (affirming the dismissal of a probationary minister’s Title VIJ claims of

race discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213

F.3d 795, 800 (4" Cir. 2000); Bollard v, California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d

940, 948 (9" Cir. 1999); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d

1299, 1304 (11" Cir.2000). The Church possesses the “freedom to select those who will carry

out its religious mission.” Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d at 461.



2001, and March 9, 2001. (EEOC charge numbers 210A11359 and 210A12200, attached to
complaint).

The EEOC issued right-to-sue letters on July 31, 2001. This suit followed.

III. Discussion

Even accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, the Court finds that her claims
are barred by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Courts consistently have
recognized the fundamental right of churches to decide for themselves, free from governmental
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. See EEOC v.
Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In the case at bar, plaintiff's job
involved spreading the Church’s message to the Hispanic community. Because the thrust of
plaintiff's complaint is that the Chicago Archdiocese mistreats its Hispanic adherents and
employees, the court is precluded from interfering in the dispute.

The Supreme Court has long held that civil courts are not the proper forum to decide
matters of ecclesiastical concern. See e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871)
(refusing to intervene in a property dispute between two church factions); Gonzalez v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (noting that the decision of whether to appoint a
chaplain is a canonical act exempt from judicial review); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of

Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (declaring unconstitutional a New York

statute which had the effect of displacing one church administrator with another). Under the

Watson line of cases, the First Amendment severely limits the role civil courts play in resolving

disputes within a church.


performing religious functions. For example, in EEOC y. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d
1362 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the ministerial exception to the
employment relationship between a “church-owned and operated private school” and one of its
teachers, because “the duties of the teachers at [the school] do not fulfill the function of a

minister.” 781 F.2d at 1370. And in EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Association, 676 F.2d

1272 (9th Cir. 1982), the court refused to apply the “McClure exception” because it concluded
that an editorial secretary “did not fulfill the function of a minister, nor was her employment . . .
the type of critically sensitive position within the church that McClure sought to protect.” 676
F.2d at 1278.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff, as Hispanic Communications Manager, was responsible
for promoting the Church and spreading its message within the Hispanic community (among
other, partly clerical, duties). The plaintiff's job essentially required her to be a cheerleader of
sorts for the Church in the Hispanic community. The plaintiffs position was therefore
“important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church,” see Young, 21 F.3d at 186, and
required her to act “as a liaison between the church and [those] it [seeks] to reach,” see Bryce v.
Episcopal Church, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1340 (D, Col. 2000). Given the nature of the plaintiff's
position, her Title VII claims are barred by the First Amendment.

The nature of the plaintiff's claims likewise precludes federal subject matter jurisdiction.
The plaintiff was a highly vocal critic of the Church’s perceived attitudes and outreach toward
the Hispanic community. The plaintiff contends that the Archdiocese treated her as a “second-
class” employee because she was Hispanic and ignored the needs of the Hispanic community in

general. Because the plaintiffs claims revolve around allegedly broad discrimination against her


pan aniiginieenameaeeaeieoeal

-.. Minute Orde Form (06/97)

af

3

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge i Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge David H. Coar than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 8374 DATE April 16, 2002
CASE Gloria Alicea-Hernandez v. Archdiocese of Chicago
TITLE
[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

DOCKET ENTRY:

dl) ll

this Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss [7-1].
prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. The case
is terminated. The parties are to bear their own costs.

qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) ao Brief in support of motion due

@) im) Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due

(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on setfor at

(5) 0 Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor at

(6) QO Pretrial conference{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at _

(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-set for]on__—sat_

(8) a {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CFRCP4(m) (General Rule2i OOFRCP41(a\(1) C FRCP4I(a)(2).

(0) <4 [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum and Opinion Order,

The complaint is dismissed without

Oued.

[For further detail see reverse side of original minute order.)

No notices required.

X | No notices required, advised in open court

Notices mailed by judge’s staff,
Notificd counsel by telephone,
Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
deputy’s
initials

mds(le)

i

Date/time received in
central: Clerk’s Office

late nailed notice

railing deputy initials

Document.
Number:
number of notices
isp PANE
Darn 3 ONE
date docketed

/O



The ministerial exception is not necessarily limited to ordained clergy. See EEOC v.

Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Application of the

ministerial exception does not depend on ordination but upon the function of the position.
Young, 21 F.3d at 186; Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1168-69 (4" Cir. 1985) (holding that district court correctly granted summary judgment in
Title VII case brought by a non-ordained woman who was denied a pastoral position because her

suit was barred by the ministerial exception); see also EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological

Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (S" Cir. 1981) (Title VII claims of non-ordained faculty at Baptist

seminary were barred by the ministerial exception); EEOC y. The Roman Catholic Archdiocese

of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4" Cir. 2000) (non-ordained music director); Starkman v. Evans, 198
F.3d 173 (5" Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 814 (2000) (non-ordained choir director).
Further, applicability of the ministerial exception is a question of law for the court. EEOC v.
Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 285; Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis,
42 F. Supp. 2d 849, 852 (S.D. Ind. 1998).

The ministerial exception has been extended to “lay employees of religious institutions

“whose primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of

a religious order or participation in religious ritual and worship.’” Catholic University, 83 F.3d
at 461 (quoting Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169). “This approach necessarily requires a court to
determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.”
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.

Limits to the “ministerial exception” to Title VII have been articulated in cases where the

plaintiff is a church employee who performs a secular function, rather than a clergy member


Archdiocese of Chicago on March 28, 2000. (EEOC Charge of Discrimination [charge
#210A11127], attached to the complaint as an unmarked exhibit). As Communications Manager,
the plaintiff's duties included: (1) promoting Church events and activities by working with the
bishop and Ethnic Ministries Office of Hispanic-American Relations; (2) developing
relationships with Hispanic parishes to promote Church-related activities; (3) composing and
translating articles for Church publications; (4) assisting the Cardinal in composing and
translating correspondence; and (5) generally assisting the Archdiocese in communicating the
Church’s message within the Hispanic community. (Defendant’s Exhibit A, Affidavit of James
Dwyer, Director of the Office of Communications, § 4; Defendant’s Exhibit B, Position
Description).

Three months after joining the Archdiocese, the plaintiff began to attack the Church’s
“unfair hierarchical structure” and the “racist attitudes” held by “people in the highest positions.”
(Defendant’s Exhibit C, 7/1/00 e-mail). On July 25, 2000, an unnamed church warned the
plaintiff not to communicate with anyone outside the “department” regarding internal church.
matters. (EEOC Charge #210A11127, attached to complaint).

On August 7, 2000, the plaintiff wrote a twenty-eight page memo to numerous church
officials entitled “Racism in the Communications Department and Institutional/Structural Racism
in the Archdiocese of Chicago.” (Defendant’s Exhibit D). The plaintiff also accused the Church
of “neglect[ing] the needs and issues of Hispanic Catholics” and of “mismanag|ing] programs
and resources that purport to serve the Hispanic Catholic community.” (Id, at p. 2). The plaintiff
faulted the Church for causing “eruptions of pain and anger in the Hispanic community” which

purportedly left the Hispanic community to “atrophy spiritually.” (Id. at p. 1). The plaintiff


subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
true, viewing all facts--as well as any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom--in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 855 (7th Cir. 1999). Further, ina
Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court may consider
evidentiary materials outside the pleadings that address the jurisdictional question without

treating the motion as one for summary judgment. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Gateway

Western Ry. Co., 78 F.3d 1208, 1210 (7" Cir. 1996); Capitol Leasing Co, v. F.D.LC., 999 F.2d

188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993). Dismissal should be denied whenever it appears that a basis for federal
jurisdiction in fact exists or may exist and can be stated by the plaintiff. Jones v. Edgar, 3 F.
Supp. 2d 979, 980 (C.D. Ill. 1998).

Nevertheless, the plaintiff has the obligation to establish jurisdiction by competent proof.
Commodity Trend Service. Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679, 685 (7th
Cir. 1998). The presumption of correctness accorded to a complaint’s allegations falls away on
the jurisdictional issue once a defendant proffers evidence that calls the court’s jurisdiction into

question. Sapperstein, 188 F.3d at 855-56, citing Commodity Trend Service. Inc., 149 F.3d at

685. Dismissal is proper if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts
consistent with the pleadings that would entitle her to the relief requested. Amoakowaa y. Reno,
94 F. Supp. 2d 903, 905 (N.D. Ill. 2000), relying on Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957).
Il. Background
The plaintiff, Gloria Alicea-Hernandez, a Hispanic female, was hired as Hispanic Media

Manager (her title was later changed to Communications Manager, at her request) for the


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GLORIA ALICEA-HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff,
NO. 01 C 8374

ve

ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO, HONORABLE DAVID H. COAR

wre venvevererrervw

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The plaintiff, Gloria Alicea-Hernandez, has brought this pro se civil action pursuant to 42
US.C. § 2000e. The plaintiff claims that the defendant, the Archdiocese of Chicago,
discriminated against her on the basis of her sex and national origin and retaliated against her in
violation of Title VII. More specifically, the plaintiff, who is Hispanic, alleges that she was
subjected to different terms and conditions of employment than American-born employees, that
she was harassed and excluded from meetings and training sessions; that she was summarily
discharged after she filed.charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), and that she was replaced by a less qualified Hispanic male who received a higher
salary. The defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

I. Standard of Review
It is well established that courts should construe pro se complaints liberally. Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), reh’g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); see also McCormick v.

City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7th Cir. 2000). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of

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