state, is not autonomous or independent of the State of Illinois, and therefore, contractual
suits against it must be filed in the Court of Claims. Tanner v Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of
Illinois, 363 N.E.2d 208, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), see also Ellis v Bd. of Governors of
State Coll. and Univ., 466 N.E.2d 202 (Sup. Ct. Ill, 1984) (holding that because the
Board is the State for sovereign immunity purposes, all claims sounding in contract must
be brought in the Court of Claims). Thus, simply because the State enters into and is
obligated under a contract does not mean that it consents to suit in a place other than the
Court of Claims. Raymond v. Goetz, 635 N.B.2d 114 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).

When the contract is a settlement agreement, the district court may have the
power to enforce it under two circumstances: 1) where there is an independent basis for
jurisdiction or 2) when the court retained jurisdiction over the settlement agreement in its
final order. VMS Sec. Litigation v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 103 F.3d 1317, 1321 (7th. Cir.
1996). In Kokkonen v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994), the
Supreme Court held that when a district court simply dismisses a claim under Fed. Rule
Civ. Pro. (“Rule”) 41(a)(1)(ii), “by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties
who have appeared in the action and causes the dismissal to be with prejudice, if the

29 cee

stipulation so specifies,” “jurisdiction of the court over disputes arising out” of that
agreement is not implied. Kokkonen v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673,
1675 (1994) (internal citation omitted). Instead, because enforcement of the settlement
agreement “is more than just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit,” the district

court must require its own basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 1675-76.

For example, in United Steel Workers of Am. v. Libby, 895 F.2d 421 (7th. Cir.


1832 (1989). When making a determination as to whether a claim should be dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6), the court needs to assume that all facts alleged are true. Id., see also
Nat'l. Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 8. Ct. 798, 803 (1994). A claim must be
dismissed if “as a matter of law, it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of
facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Neitzke, 109 S. Ct. at 1832
(internal citation omitted). Thus, a “patently insubstantial complaint may be dismissed ...
for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id.

A state is a sovereign and is therefore, immune from suit. Coll. Sav. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2223 (1999). The
State can waive its right to sovereign immunity by consenting to suit. Jd. The test for
determining whether immunity from federal-court jurisdiction has been waived by the
State is a “stringent one.” Jd. Thus, a State does not consent to suit in the federal courts
merely because it consents to suit in one of its own courts. Jd.

The “classic” way to waive immunity is by “intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Jd. (internal citation omitted). As such, a
court must be shown that the State waived sovereign immunity either by “the most
express language or by such overwhelming implications . . . as will leave no room for any
other reasonable construction.” Ranyard v. Bd. of Regents, 708 F.2d 1235, 1239 (7th.
Cir. 1983).

In Illinois, the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine
claims against the State founded upon any contract entered into with the State of Illinois.

705 ILCS 505/8. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois is an arm of the



1990), the district court entered an order of dismissal that read as follows:

The Court having approved the Settlement Agreement, Response

and Covenant Not to Sue, entered into by the parities .. . IT IS

HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

Complaint and the Counterclaim be and hereby are dismissed, with

prejudice, each party bearing its own costs and attorney’s fees.

United Steel Workers of Am. v. Libby, 895 F.2d 421, 422 (7th. Cir. 1990). The terms of
the settlement agreement were made a part of the record after the judge and the parties
signed the settlement agreement. Jd. When one of the parties later sought assistance
from the district court in interpreting the settlement agreement, the Seventh Circuit held
that the district court’s outright dismissal of the case did not leave the court any basis for
subsequent exercise of jurisdiction with regards to the settlement agreement. Id. at 422,
423-24. The court reasoned that in order for the district court to have jurisdiction over
the settlement agreement, it needed to be possible to infer that the judge intended to retain
jurisdiction. Jd. at 423. There, the court stated that there was nothing in the order of
dismissal to indicate any intention to retain jurisdiction over completion of the parties’
agreement. Jd.

In this case before us the Court lacks jurisdiction with regard to the settlement
agreement. First, there is no independent basis for jurisdiction. Illinois law clearly states
that contract claims involving the State must be brought in the Court of Claims unless the
State waives that requirement. Here, the Board is the state for contract purposes.

Thus, in order for the Court to have jurisdiction, waiver must be shown.

However, there is no indication of intentional relinquishment or abandonment of the right

to immunity by the Board. There is no express language used by the Board to waive its



Minute Order Form (06/97)

~ United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
ramcotasionestuase | Ronald A. Guzman _| Siting Judge mer
CASE NUMBER 03 C 236 DATE 9/9/2003
CASE ISAAC D. JOHNSON vs. BD OF TRUST OF THE UNIVERSITY OF IL
TITLE

of the motion being presented.]

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

(ly oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

(3) oO Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due.

(4) oO Ruling/Hearing on setfor_____at

(5) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor__at

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for}on___—setfor_—at_—
(7) 0 Trial[set for/re-set for]on__——sat_

(8) a [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto_ ss at_

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) O Local Rule 41.1 CIFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).

Board’s motion to dismiss Count II of the complaint [6-1].

(1) ff (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.)

ao {Other docket entry] ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court grants the

~~ No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

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LyNOd LOK 4

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

an sili 01 das £0

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right contained within the settlement agreement. Thus, the Board did not waive its right.
Secondly, there is no showing that the Court retained jurisdiction over the
settlement agreement entered into by Johnson and the Board. Like United Steel Workers,
the ordered of dismissal entered by Judge Duff contained no words to indicate any
inference or intention to retain jurisdiction over completion of the parties’ agreement.
The two orders are nearly identical, the main difference being with how attorney’s fees
and costs would be dealt. However, language stating that Johnson could file a petition for
costs and attorney’s fees has nothing to do with the actual enforcement of the settlement
agreement. Therefore, the order did not leave the Court any basis for subsequent exercise

of jurisdiction with regards to the settlement agreement.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Board’s motion to dismiss Count II

of the complaint [#6].

SO ORDERED

ENTERED: bykonbe Z 003

HON. RONALD A.
United States Judge


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
ISAAC D. JOHNSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Judge Ronald A. Guzman
)
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE ) 03 C 00236 Rog fe
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, ) DOCKETED
) sep 11 2003
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Isaac D. Johnson (“Johnson”) has sued defendant Board of Trustees of
the University of Illinois (“Board”). The Board has moved to dismiss Count II of the
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). For the reasons provided in this
Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court grants the Board’s motion to dismiss Count

II of the complaint.

FACTS
On March 17, 2003, plaintiff Johnson filed a complaint against defendant Board
of Trustees of the University of Illinois that alleges in Count I, race discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and in Count II, breach of the contract and settlement
agreement stemming from an earlier case involving the parties. Compl. at p. 8 4 1, 51-52.

The motion to dismiss deals solely with Count II.


The settlement agreement arose as a result of settling Johnson v Univ. of Illinois,
No. 90 C 0968. Those who signed the agreement include Johnson, two of Johnson’s
attorneys, counsel for the University of Illinois at Chicago, and the controller and
secretary of the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Compl. Ex. A at 5.
Contained within the contract is no agreement that the Northern District of Illinois shall
have jurisdiction over enforcement of the contract. Compl. Ex. A. Judge Duff's final
agreed order in this case stated:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

Petitioner Isaac D. Johnson’s second petition for rule to show

cause is dismissed with prejudice, all matters at issue having been

fully compromised and settled, except that petitioner may file a

petition for attorneys’ fees and costs with respect to his second

petition for rule to show case and the settlement thereof.
Ta.

The Board moves to dismiss Count II for want of jurisdiction, arguing, inter alia,
that the Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of contracts
that involve the State as a party. Johnson responds, inter alia, that the Court retained

jurisdiction over the settlement, and that the Board waived immunity by appearing before

the Court pursuant to which the Agreed Order was entered.

DISCUSSION
Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a claim can be dismissed for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Thus, the rule authorizes a

court to dismiss a claim based on an issue of law. Neitzke v Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827,