COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

August 9, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2021AP510-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CF609

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

MARQUISE L. STEWART,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Outagamie County: VINCENT R. BISKUPIC, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Marquise Stewart appeals from a judgment of 

conviction for attempted first-degree intentional homicide, armed burglary, and 
No. 2021AP510-CR

2

criminal damage to property. Stewart also appeals a circuit court order denying 

his motion for postconviction relief. Stewart argues that hearsay was erroneously 

admitted at trial and its admission violated his right to confrontation, that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that we should reverse his 

conviction in the interest of justice. We reject his arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 According to the criminal complaint, in the late night hours between 

June 17 and June 18, 2018, Stewart kicked in the front door of the home of the 

victim, David,

1 went to the bedroom where David was sleeping, and hit him in the 

head with a tire iron. Stewart had previously threatened to kill David, and he had 

also made threats against Audrey, who was staying in David’s home that night and 

was pregnant with Stewart’s child. Shortly after the attack, David received a text 

message, which he believed to be from Stewart, that read, “I tried to kill yo bictch 

ass ... next time ... imma get u rite.” 

¶3 At trial, David testified that Stewart had shouted, “Where that bitch 

at?” during the attack. David further testified that he recognized his attacker as 

Stewart, based on Stewart’s size, voice, and dreadlocks with orange tips. One of 

the responding officers and an emergency room nurse both confirmed that David

had identified Stewart as his attacker shortly after the incident. The emergency 

room nurse also testified that David had told her that Stewart had been threatening 

him and “the girl [who] was sleeping on [David’s] couch.” Several days after the 

 

1

 Pursuant to the policy underlying WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86 (2019-20), we use 

pseudonyms when referring to the victims. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 

2019-20 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 2021AP510-CR

3

attack, David told another officer that he was “one hundred percent certain” that 

Stewart was his attacker. 

¶4 The prosecution also presented evidence of threatening text 

messages that David had received both before and after the attack. Some of these 

messages referred to an abbreviated version of Audrey’s name and “my baby 

momma,” suggesting that the texts came from Stewart and related to Audrey.

Among other threats, on or around June 12, 2018, David had received a text 

message that he believed to be from Stewart telling David that he had five days to 

live. The jury also heard a voicemail message that Stewart left for David the day 

after the attack, in which Stewart again threatened David’s life for disrespecting 

him and for calling the police. 

¶5 Additional evidence at trial included numerous Facebook posts from 

an account associated with Stewart, as well as messages sent from that account to 

an account associated with Audrey. One message sent shortly before the attack

read, “If I Eva see [David] again I’mma hurt him and u and all y’all.” Similar 

messages were sent between those accounts after the attack, saying, “I swear to 

god on my life imma kill dude before i get booked,” and “I asked him nicely to 

stay tf ... away from ... u.”

¶6 Several law enforcement officers testified about their investigation 

into the attack on David. Two officers testified that immediately after the attack, 

they received a dispatch report telling them to be on the lookout for a vehicle with 

the license plate ACB1916 that had reportedly fled the scene of the attack. 

Officers subsequently determined that this vehicle was registered to Stewart’s 

sister at an address associated with Stewart. Officers observed the vehicle the day 

after the attack in the driveway of another residence connected to Stewart. 
No. 2021AP510-CR

4

Officers subsequently stopped the vehicle while it was being driven by Stewart’s 

brother and received consent to search it. In the trunk, officers found a tire iron 

with dried blood on it and a Chicago Bulls hat. DNA tests matched the blood on 

the tire iron to David, and the hat resembled one that Stewart was wearing in a 

recent Facebook picture.

¶7 The jury found Stewart guilty of attempted first-degree intentional 

homicide, armed burglary, and criminal damage to property. Stewart filed a 

postconviction motion in which he argued that the circuit court erred by admitting 

testimony relating to the dispatch report of a vehicle fleeing the scene of the 

attack. Stewart also alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at 

trial. The court denied Stewart’s postconviction motion without a hearing. 

Stewart now appeals. 

DISCUSSION

¶8 Stewart makes three sets of arguments on appeal. First, he raises 

several challenges to the circuit court’s decision to admit the testimony regarding 

the dispatch report. Second, he argues that the court should have held a hearing on 

his postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Third, he 

argues that he should be granted a new trial due to the cumulative effect of the 

alleged errors made by the court and his trial attorney. We address each argument 

below.

I. Testimony about the Dispatch Report

¶9 Stewart’s first set of challenges relates to testimony by two of the 

officers who were on duty the night of the attack, Sergeant Matthew Ollwerther 

and Officer Phillip Akins. Both officers testified that dispatch had alerted them to 
No. 2021AP510-CR

5

be on the lookout for a vehicle with a license plate ACB1916, as reported by two 

callers. Stewart’s trial attorney initially objected to this line of inquiry, arguing 

that Ollwerther’s testimony about the anonymous calls was hearsay. The circuit 

court sustained this first objection. 

¶10 After the prosecutor laid additional foundation for testimony about 

the dispatch report, Stewart’s trial attorney made a second objection. This time, 

the circuit court overruled the objection, explaining that the testimony about the 

dispatch report was being offered not for the truth of the matter asserted but,

rather, to explain what prompted officers to be on the lookout for a particular 

vehicle in connection with the attack. The court admonished the jury that the 

testimony about the dispatch report “is not to be considered as to the truth because 

it could be mistaken” and instead to “wait and see if the hearsay portion even gets 

proven later on because that could be mistaken information, it could be accurate 

information.”

¶11 “A decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the circuit court’s 

discretion.” State v. Gutierrez, 2020 WI 52, ¶17, 391 Wis. 2d 799, 943 N.W.2d 

870. We “uphold a circuit court’s exercise of discretion to admit or exclude 

evidence where it examined the relevant facts, applied a proper legal standard, and 

using a demonstrated rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion.” Id., ¶21. 

¶12 Stewart makes three interrelated arguments as to why the circuit 

court erred by admitting the officers’ testimony about the dispatch report. First, he 

contends the testimony about the dispatch report was hearsay (the anonymous tip) 

within hearsay (the report from dispatch) that was not admissible under any 

exception. Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the 

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
No. 2021AP510-CR

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truth of the matter asserted.” WIS. STAT. § 908.01(3). That said, out-of-court 

statements can be “offered for the limited purpose of explaining the actions of 

investigative officers.” State v. Hines, 173 Wis. 2d 850, 858-59, 496 N.W.2d 720 

(Ct. App. 1993). 

¶13 Here, the circuit court admitted the testimony about the dispatch 

report not for the truth of the information regarding the vehicle but, rather, for the 

limited purpose of explaining the course of law enforcement’s investigation into 

the attack. Specifically, the dispatch report explained to the jury why officers 

were on the lookout for a particular vehicle and explained why officers stopped 

and searched that vehicle the following day. Through subsequent testimony, the 

prosecution established that the vehicle was registered to Stewart’s sister at an 

address associated with Stewart. When officers stopped the vehicle, it was driven 

by Stewart’s brother, and the trunk contained a tire iron with dried blood on it as 

well as a Chicago Bulls hat. The DNA in the blood on the tire iron matched a 

sample from David, while the hat matched one that Stewart had been wearing in a 

recent Facebook post.

¶14 Thus, by the conclusion of the trial, the prosecution had established

an evidentiary connection between the vehicle, the attack, and Stewart, 

independent of the dispatch report. The dispatch report simply helped to explain 

why the officers undertook the investigative steps that ultimately yielded this 

evidentiary connection. Indeed, in overruling Stewart’s second hearsay objection, 

the circuit court explained to the jury that it could not use the testimony about the 

dispatch report to establish the truth of the matter—namely, that the vehicle

identified in the report was in fact observed fleeing the scene. The court’s 

decision to admit the testimony with this limiting instruction is consistent with 

Hines, in which we concluded that out-of-court statements can be admitted for the 
No. 2021AP510-CR

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limited purpose of helping to explain the course of an investigation. See Hines, 

173 Wis. 2d at 859. We therefore conclude that the court acted within its 

permitted discretion in admitting the testimony about the dispatch report. See

Gutierrez, 391 Wis. 2d 799, ¶27 (explaining that appellate courts should “look for 

reasons to sustain a trial court’s discretionary decision” about whether to admit or 

exclude evidence) (citation omitted). 

¶15 Stewart’s second argument relating to the dispatch report is that the 

subject testimony should have been excluded under WIS. STAT. § 904.03, which

provides, “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 

or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Stewart contends that the 

testimony about the dispatch report “was misleading, of unsubstantiated reliability 

and confusing under the circumstances.” At the outset, we note that Stewart’s trial 

attorney did not make this objection during trial. Therefore, this argument has 

been forfeited. See Tatera v. FMC Corp., 2010 WI 90, ¶19 n.16, 328 Wis. 2d 

320, 786 N.W.2d 810 (“Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally 

deemed forfeited.”). 

¶16 Even if Stewart had not forfeited this particular statutory argument, 

his argument fails on the merits. See State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 766, 596 

N.W.2d 749 (1999) (“[T]he [forfeiture] rule is one of judicial administration and 

... appellate courts have authority to ignore the [forfeiture].”). As the circuit court

explained, its decision to admit testimony about the dispatch report helped to 

avoid confusion and delay by providing context for the officers’ subsequent 

investigative actions. Moreover, introducing this dispatch report earlier in the case 

gave Stewart’s trial attorney the opportunity to elicit testimony from Officer Akins 
No. 2021AP510-CR

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about the fact that he did not observe the vehicle identified in the dispatch report, 

even though he was traveling along the reported path of that vehicle and he 

expected to encounter it. Stewart’s trial attorney was then able to use this 

testimony to cast doubt on the veracity of the anonymous report. Accordingly, 

Stewart has not established that the dispatch report unfairly prejudiced him or that 

it otherwise should have been excluded under WIS. STAT. § 904.03. 

¶17 Stewart’s third argument against the admission of the dispatch report 

is that it violated his right to confront witnesses under the Confrontation Clause in

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as 

article I, section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution. As with his newly raised 

argument under WIS. STAT. § 904.03, Stewart’s trial attorney did not make this

constitutional objection in the circuit court, and Stewart has therefore forfeited it. 

See State v. Marshall, 113 Wis. 2d 643, 653, 335 N.W.2d 612 (1983) (concluding 

that the defendant’s trial attorney waived a confrontation clause challenge by 

making only a hearsay objection). 

¶18 Even if Stewart’s trial attorney had properly raised a specific 

Confrontation Clause objection, we conclude that any potential error in admitting 

the testimony about the dispatch report was harmless. See WIS. STAT. § 901.03(1) 

(“[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 

unless a substantial right of the party is affected”); see also Delaware v. 

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (holding that Confrontation Clause errors

are subject to harmless error review); State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶49, 254

Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (a constitutional error is harmless if it is “clear 

beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant 

guilty absent the error”).
No. 2021AP510-CR

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¶19 Here, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have 

found Stewart guilty even without the testimony about the dispatch report. At the 

outset, we note that the testimony about a report of a vehicle fleeing the scene was 

not by itself significant evidence against Stewart, especially because the vehicle 

was not registered to him, nor was there any testimony indicating that he had been 

observed in the vehicle. To the contrary, the unverified report of a vehicle fleeing 

the scene turned out to be a weak link in the prosecution’s case, especially given

Officer Akins’ testimony that he expected to encounter the vehicle described in the 

report but he did not see it on the night of the attack. Indeed, Stewart’s trial 

attorney used this fact during closing argument as one of many examples of how

law enforcement engaged in confirmation bias and ignored facts that did not fit its 

case against Stewart. 

¶20 In contrast to the officers’ testimony about the unverified dispatch 

report, the incriminating evidence eventually found in the trunk of that vehicle

provided a clear connection between the vehicle, the attack, and Stewart himself. 

This clear connection was accompanied by other strong evidence of Stewart’s 

guilt, including David’s consistent identification of Stewart as his attacker, 

Stewart’s threats to harm David both before and after the attack, and numerous

incriminating Facebook posts and messages. 

¶21 In short, the evidence of Stewart’s guilt was compelling without the 

dispatch report, which was at best equivocal and arguably helped the defense’s 

theory that law enforcement engaged in confirmation bias and overlooked other 

potential suspects. We therefore conclude that it is clear beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the jury would have convicted Stewart even without the testimony 

about the dispatch report. See Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶49. Thus, any error in 

admitting that testimony was harmless. 
No. 2021AP510-CR

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II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶22 We now turn to Stewart’s argument that his trial attorney was 

constitutionally ineffective. In his postconviction motion, Stewart argued that his 

trial attorney failed to object to references to the dispatch report during Officer 

Akins’ testimony and the prosecutor’s closing argument. The circuit court denied 

Stewart’s postconviction motion without a hearing. 

¶23 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires Stewart to show 

that his trial attorney’s performance was deficient and that Stewart was prejudiced 

as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish 

deficient performance, a defendant must allege facts to overcome the presumption 

that his or her trial counsel performed reasonably. See State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 

79, ¶¶25-27, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334. To establish prejudice, a

defendant must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, ¶33, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89 (citation 

omitted). Because a defendant has the burden of establishing both deficient 

performance and prejudice, “reviewing courts need not consider one prong if [a] 

defendant has failed to establish the other.” State v. Chu, 2002 WI App 98, ¶47, 

253 Wis. 2d 666, 643 N.W.2d 878. 

¶24 A circuit court must hold an evidentiary hearing if a postconviction 

motion alleges sufficient facts that, if true, would demonstrate both deficient 

performance and prejudice. See State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 

682 N.W.2d 433. We review de novo the question of whether Stewart’s 

postconviction motion alleged sufficient facts to require a hearing. Id. “[I]f the 

motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to relief, or presents 
No. 2021AP510-CR

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only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the 

defendant is not entitled to relief,” the circuit court then has discretion to deny a 

hearing. State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶30, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 849 

N.W.2d 668. We review the circuit court’s decision to deny a hearing for an 

erroneous exercise of discretion. Id. 

¶25 Stewart first points to his trial attorney’s failure to object to 

Officer Akins’ testimony about the dispatch report. This argument fails because

the circuit court had just overruled the same objection during Sergeant 

Ollwerther’s testimony. The State notes that Stewart’s initial brief did not identify 

any authority that requires an attorney to repeat an objection that has already been 

overruled. Stewart states in his reply brief that he “has no further argument on the 

issue of ineffective assistance of counsel besides that raised in” his opening brief. 

Stewart has the burden of demonstrating that his trial attorney acted unreasonably. 

See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶27. We therefore conclude that Stewart’s trial 

counsel was not deficient for failing to repeat an objection that would have been 

overruled.2 See State v. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, ¶21, 320 Wis. 2d 209, 769

 

2

 Although we see no developed argument in Stewart’s initial brief that his trial attorney

was deficient for failing to make a Confrontation Clause objection, Stewart did make this 

argument in his postconviction motion. In his reply brief, Stewart asserts that “[t]he State took 

the position that Stewart’s trial attorney sufficiently preserved the evidentiary issues raised by 

Stewart in the post conviction motion.” Stewart appears to misunderstand the State’s position, 

because the State expressly argued that Stewart’s trial attorney forfeited the Confrontation Clause 

argument by failing to make a specific objection at trial. 

This failure, however, did not prejudice Stewart. In denying Stewart’s postconviction 

motion, the circuit court rejected the Confrontation Clause argument on the merits. Although we 

agree with the State that Stewart forfeited his Confrontation Clause argument by failing to make 

the specific objection at trial, we also determine that the Confrontation Clause violation, if any, 

was harmless. Thus, Stewart cannot establish a reasonable probability that the result of the trial 

would have been different if his trial attorney had made a Confrontation Clause objection. See 

State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶40, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801.
No. 2021AP510-CR

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N.W.2d 110 (concluding that an attorney was not ineffective for failing to file a 

motion in limine that would have been denied).

¶26 Stewart also argues that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing 

to object to the prosecutor’s reference to the dispatch report during closing 

argument. Specifically, after reminding the jury of the threats that Stewart had 

made against David, the prosecutor then discussed the incriminating evidence 

found in the vehicle that was reportedly observed near the attack and that was

registered to Stewart’s sister. In connecting the vehicle to Stewart, the prosecutor 

stated:

But how else do we know that this defendant, Marquise 

Stewart, is responsible for those violent acts? Well, we 

have a car. Officers testified that a car was reportedly seen 

leaving the scene at—and that a license plate was a 

Wisconsin license plate ACB1916, and it was a silver 

Pontiac Bonneville.

When that car is looked into, it’s registered to Quinita 

Dickens, the defendant’s sister. It comes back to an 

address at 825 West—Westfield Street in Oshkosh, 

Wisconsin, one of the addresses that the defendant lists as 

his when Sergeant Rabas runs him in-house to try to 

determine where he might be.

Stewart argues that this portion of the prosecutor’s argument misused the 

testimony about the dispatch report in a manner that was inconsistent with the 

circuit court’s limiting instruction that the dispatch report not be used for the truth

of the matter stated therein. Stewart further contends that an evidentiary hearing is 

required to determine whether there was a tactical reason for his trial attorney’s 

failure to object. 

¶27 We disagree that the prosecutor misused the testimony about the 

dispatch report. By the time of closing arguments, the jury had heard additional 
No. 2021AP510-CR

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testimony connecting the vehicle to the attack and to Stewart, including testimony 

about the vehicle being registered to Stewart’s sister at an address associated with 

Stewart, along with evidence incriminating Stewart being found in its trunk. 

Given these many evidentiary connections between the vehicle, the attack, and 

Stewart, there was nothing objectionable in the prosecutor’s closing argument. 

¶28 Moreover, even if there were a basis for objection, the trial record 

suggests that Stewart’s trial attorney made a tactical choice not to object to the 

prosecutor’s reference to the dispatch report, but rather to highlight this report as 

the first of many purported weak links in the case against Stewart. Specifically, 

Stewart’s trial attorney argued that law enforcement’s focus on Stewart was a 

result of confirmation bias that caused them to ignore any facts that did not point 

to their main suspect. Stewart’s trial attorney urged the jury to focus on the 

“objective things” that the State was ignoring, starting with the fact that the

anonymous report of the vehicle at the scene was never verified. The remainder of 

Stewart’s closing argument continued with this theme, with his trial attorney

pointing to several other weaknesses in the case against Stewart that the State had

supposedly ignored. His trial attorney’s decision not to object to the prosecutor’s 

reference to the dispatch report, but instead to incorporate it into Stewart’s own 

closing argument, strikes us as an effective tactic under the circumstances. In 

short, even if there was a viable objection to the prosecutor’s reference to the 

dispatch report, Stewart has failed to overcome the presumption that his trial 

attorney performed reasonably. See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶27 (“[T]he law 

affords counsel the benefit of the doubt; there is a presumption that counsel is 

effective unless shown otherwise by the defendant.”).

¶29 Because Stewart did not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that 

his trial attorney rendered deficient performance and that he was prejudiced, we 
No. 2021AP510-CR

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see no error in the circuit court’s discretionary decision to deny Stewart’s 

postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing. See Romero-Georgana, 

360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶71 (affirming the circuit court’s decision to deny a 

postconviction motion without a hearing because the motion “failed to sufficiently 

allege facts that, if true, would entitle [the defendant] to relief”).

III. Request for a New Trial

¶30 Stewart’s final argument is that the errors discussed in Sections I and 

II above “were sufficiently prejudicial to Stewart to undermine confidence in the 

outcome of the trial.” To support this argument, Stewart points to State v. Delao, 

2002 WI 49, ¶60, 252 Wis. 2d 289, 643 N.W.2d 480. In Delao, our supreme court 

explained that errors admitting evidence do not warrant a new trial unless they 

prejudice the defendant. Id. 

¶31 Stewart contends that the errors by the circuit court and his trial 

attorney prejudiced him “[o]n the critical issue of placing a vehicle associated with 

Stewart near the scene of the crime.” This argument overlooks the incriminating 

evidence found in the trunk of the vehicle—namely, the tire iron containing

David’s blood and the Chicago Bulls hat. This evidence was sufficient to connect 

the vehicle to the attack, even without the dispatch report. Thus, Stewart has not 

shown that he was prejudiced by testimony about the dispatch report or the 

reference to the vehicle fleeing the scene during closing argument.

¶32 Stewart also points to State v. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ¶41, 279 Wis. 2d 

659, 695 N.W.2d 259. In Stuart, our supreme court identified several factors that 

guide the determination of whether a particular error is harmless:

[T]he frequency of the error, the importance of the 

erroneously admitted evidence, the presence or absence of 
No. 2021AP510-CR

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evidence corroborating or contradicting the erroneously 

admitted evidence, whether the erroneously admitted

evidence duplicates untainted evidence, the nature of the

defense, the nature of the State’s case, and the overall

strength of the State’s case.

Id. 

¶33 Although we have already rejected Stewart’s argument that the 

circuit court erred by admitting the testimony about the dispatch report, the factors 

identified in Stuart support the conclusion that any error was harmless. As we 

explained above in Section I, the testimony was helpful to the jury in terms of 

explaining the course of law enforcement’s investigation, but otherwise it was not 

important to the State’s case against Stewart. In addition, by the end of the trial, 

there was ample evidence to corroborate information in the dispatch report—most 

significantly, the incriminating evidence found in the trunk of the vehicle.

Moreover, when coupled with David’s consistent identification of Stewart as his 

attacker, along with the threats of harm that Stewart made against David both 

before and after the attack, the State’s case against Stewart was compelling even 

without the testimony about the dispatch report. Finally, the nature of the defense 

also supports our harmless error analysis because Stewart’s trial attorney adroitly 

incorporated the fact that officers were unable to verify parts of the dispatch report 

as part of the defense’s argument that the State’s investigation was based on 

confirmation bias and that the State ignored evidence that did not fit its theory of 

the case. 

¶34 We therefore conclude that Stewart has not demonstrated that the 

errors at trial (if any) warranted a new trial.
No. 2021AP510-CR

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By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.