The Commissioner’s final argument is that the $100 per hour rate charged by Holland’s attorneys
for paralegal services was unreasonable. Asserting that the services performed by the paralegals were
“clerical” in nature, the Commissioner requests that we award only $25 per hour for their work. See
Taylor v. Barnhart, 2002 WL 31654944 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2002) (compensating paralegals for clerical
work at the rate of $25 per hour), ‘The billing submissions provided by Holland demonstrate, however,
that the three hours of work done by the paralegals in this case were not clerical in nature. The
submissions show that they performed the types of tasks normally conducted by paralegals and not
clerical staff, including preparing and submitling court documents, serving process, and discussing the
case with attorneys, However, we agree that the rate of $100 per hour, billed by Holland's attorneys,
is high for paralegal work. The only authority that Holland cites to support her purported $100 per hour
paralegal rate is the so-called Laffey Matrix, which recommends a rate of $100 per hour for paralegals
working in Washington, 1).C. Although the Laffey Matrix has been accepted by the district courts in
Washington, D.C., it has not been adopted in this jurisdiction. We belicve that the rate of $50 per hour
is reasonable for the paralegal services provided in this case and will so order.

For the reasons listed above, we find that Holland is entitled to a fee award in the amount of
$8,049.71. Specifically, we award 1) $826.31 for attorney's fees incurred during 2002 (5.65 hours times
an hourly rate of $146.25); 2) $7,035.75 for attorney’s fees incurred during 2003 (47.7 hours times an

hourly rate of $147.50); 3) $150 for paralegal fecs (3 hours tj Acs $50 per hour); and 4) copying costs

of $37.65 (251 pages at $0.15 per page). It is so orde

MARVIN E. ASPEN

United States District Judge
Dated d / /o Y



accept Holland’s proposed hourly rates for attorney’s fees as reasonable,

Although the Commissioner does not contest Holland's proposed rate for attorney’s fees, she
does argue that the 56.85 hours devoted to the preparation of “three briefs, totaling 48 pages” is an
unreasonable amount of time to spend on a disability case. (Plaintiff's Reply at 2.) We cannot agree.
The attorneys (with the permission of this court) filed an additional memorandum in the case because
they felt it was necessary to respond to several of the arguments made by the Commissioner in her reply
memorandum.

The Commissioner next claims that attorneys Frederick J. Daley, an experienced disability
benefits lawyer, and James Commerford, a more junior attorney, over-billed by spending 3.5 hours
working together on the case. She argues that billing the time spent working together was improper
because “the EAJA statute is not designed to subsidize the training and development of new attorneys.”
(Def’s Response at 3) (citing Dunn v. Shalala, 92 C 4090, 1995 WI. 23116, *7 (N.D. Ill, Jan. 19, 1995),
Although it may be improper to bill time for two attorneys where the work performed is duplicative, the
billing submissions provided by Holland in this case show that Daley edited Commerford’s work and
made suggestions, which Commerford then spent time incorporating into the drafts. We find this joint
effort appropriate and proper in this case.

We do agree with the Commissioncr’s contention, however, that it was unreasonable for
Holland’s attorneys to bill the Commissioner for time spent preparing a motion for extension of time.
See Burr vy. Bowen, 782 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (N.D. Ill. 1992), We therefore will deduct the 0.5 hours

that it took to prepare that motion from our final fee calculation.

"At one point, however, the Commissioner does contend that Holland’s attorneys should not
charge the same rate for junior and scniot level attorneys. She argues that “such billing is unreasonable
and is not compensable under the EAJA,” but does not cite any authority for that proposition. (Def's
Response at 4.) We find their assertions untenable in light of the fact that the EAJA itself sets a flat
compensation rate for all attorneys.


Minute iter Fama (05:97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge * . Sitting Judge if Other
. or Magitrate Judge Marvin Aspen than Assigned tudge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 8398 DATE (2/2004
CASE Tracy D. Holland vs. Jo Anne B, Barnhart. Commissioner of Social Security
TITLE

[In the following hox (a) indicate the party filing the motion, c.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, andl (b) state bricfly the nature
of the motion being presented.)

MOTION;

DOCKET ENTRY:

ql) ia Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due

Q@) q Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due, | __

(4) B Ruling/Hearing on set for att

(8) o Status hearing[held/continued to] {sct for/re-set forlon___—ssetfor_— att)

(6) o Pretrial conference[held/continued to] {set for/re-set for]on__ set for at__s.

(7) oO Trial(sct for/re-set for] on at

8) O [Bench/Jury trial] [Ilearing] held/continued to at

(9) a This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
MFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).

aol {Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order: We grant plaintiff's application for

attomey’s fees (25-1) and for final judgment (25-2). We find that Holland is entitled to a fee award in the amount
of $8,049.71. Specifically, we award 1) $826.31 for atlomey’s fees incurred during 2002 (5.65 hours limes an
hourly rate of $146.25); 2) $7,035.75 lor attorney’s fecs incwred during 2003 (47.7 hours times an hourly rate
of $147.50); 3) $150 for paralegal fees (3 hours times $50 per hour); and 4) copying costs of $37.65 (251 pages
at $0.15 per page).

(ail) ff {For further detail see order attached to the original minute ordcr.]

No notices required, advised in open court. Document

Number

ele

No notices required umber of nti

B 03,2004

V | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone. f

Docketing, 1 mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form,

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
Gl deputy’s
initials

Date/time received in

cenwal Clerk's Office ruling deputy initials



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION ANCKETER

TRACY D. HOLLAND, FEE 8 3 2004

Plaintiff,

v.
No. 02 C 8398
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

weve

Defendant.
MEM' NDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge:
Presently before us is Plaintiff Tracy D. Holland’s Application for Attotney’s Fees made
pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. For the reasons set forth below, we grant
her application and award fees and costs in the amount of $8,049.71.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Tracy D. Holland (“Holland”) applied for and was denied Disability Insurance Benefits
in 2001. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) affirmed the denial in June of 2002. Upon review, this
court found that the ALJ’s opinion contained a substantial number of omissions and errors that were
material to Holland's disability determination. We therefore granted Holland’s motion to remand the
matter to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Holland now applies for attorney’s
fees and costs incurred in connection with filing her appeal and with preparing the present motion.

ANALYSIS

‘The Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) provides that a party who prevails against the United

States may receive atlorney’s fees and costs if certain conditions are met. 28 U.S.C, § 2412, A party

seeking such fees and expenses must demonstrate that: 1) she filed a request for fees within thirty days


of final judgment in the action; 2) that she was a “prevailing party”; and 3) that the United States was
not “substantially justified” in the earlier action. fd. § 2412 (d)(1)(B).

Holland has met all three requirements, First, she made a timely request for fecs. Second, a
person is considered a prevailing party if, as here, the action is remanded to the agency for further
consideration. Schutt v. Massanari, 2001 WL 1155253, *2 (N.D. Il, Sep. 28, 2001), ‘Third, the
government bears the burden of proving that the position of the United States in the earlier action was
substantially justified. See Jackson v. Chater, 94 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 1996). In this case, the
Commissioner has not argued that the United States was “substantially justitied” in the earlier action.
In light of our carlier holding that the ALJ’s opinion contained a substantial number of material
omissions and errors, we therefore find that the government's position was not “substantially justified”
within the meaning of the EAJA and that an award of attorney’s fees and costs is appropriate.

Holland has submitted a request for $8,273.46 in fees and costs. In assessing the amount of
attomey’s fees, we must first consider whether the rate proposed by Holland is reasonable. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(2)(A). ‘The BAJA provides that “attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour
unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited
availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” Jd. Iolland
requests an adjustment of the hourly rate provided by the EAJA based on an increase in the cost of living
since the enactment of § 2412(d)(2)(A) in 1996. Specifically, she asks that the court grant an hourly rate
of $146.25 for work performed in 2002 and $147.50 for work performed in 2003. She bases her cost
of living adjustments on the “all items” figures for 2002 and 2003 listed in the Consumer Price Index.
(Plaintiff's Application for Fees, Ex. A.) Several courts in this district have accepted the use of the
Consumer Price Index as a basis for adjusting attorncy’s fees to correspond with increases in the cost

of living, See, ¢.g., Baker v. Barnhart, 2003 WL 22715829, *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2003). We therefore