J-S19014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANTONIO MARRERO-CRUZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1584 MDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 13, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-06-CR-0005480-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2023

Appellant, Antonio Marrero-Cruz, appeals from the order denying his 

petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant alleges that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate and/or call witnesses during his bench trial. 

We affirm. 

I.

Our memorandum decision affirming Appellant’s judgment of sentence

sets forth the basic facts underlying this matter:

This incident was instigated by Angel “Gordo” Melendez (“Gordo”), 

who borrowed the motor bike of [A]ppellant’s son, William 

Marrero-Rodriguez [(“William”)], and was involved in an accident. 

Gordo refused to pay for the repairs or replace the dirt bike. On 

June 14, 2019, [A]ppellant’s son arrived in the Glenside area of 

Reading to discuss payment for the damages to his dirt bike. 

Appellant’s son spoke with both Luis Salame-Morales (“Luis”) and 

Gordo. Gordo reiterated that he would not pay to repair or replace 
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the bike, slapped [A]ppellant’s son, and kicked his car. Appellant’s 

son left and returned with [A]ppellant and other family members. 

When [A]ppellant arrived, he was angry and agitated by Gordo’s

behavior toward his son. Jorge Salame (“[Jorge]”), Luis’ brother, 

testified that [A]ppellant had a gun in his hand and was making 

threats. Appellant and Luis argued. Luis testified that [A]ppellant 

said if the damages to the motor bike were not paid for, he “was 

going to shoot everybody and break everybody’s car.” Both men 

pointed guns at one another. [Jorge] attempted to calm things 

down. When [A]ppellant threatened Luis, by placing a gun to his 

head, Jonathan Salame, Luis’ son, tackled [A]ppellant. The three 

men, [A]ppellant, Luis and Jonathan, fell to the ground and 

struggled over the guns. In the process, a weapon discharged, 

injuring all three men. Luis and Jonathan ran. Although [Jorge]’s 

hands were in the air, [A]ppellant fired his gun, hitting [Jorge] in 

the side of his back. This injury led to hospitalization and medical 

complications. As a result of the shooting, [Jorge] will be in a 

wheelchair for the rest of his life. 

Commonwealth v. Marrero-Cruz, 1648 MDA 2019, unpublished 

memorandum at *1-2 (Pa. Super. filed June 3, 2020) (citations omitted). 

Appellant’s son, William, was charged with several crimes for his role in 

the incident and was convicted following a jury trial of, inter alia, prohibited 

possession of a firearm, carrying a firearm without a license, simple assault, 

and conspiracy. As our Superior Court decision affirming William’s judgment 

of sentence stated, William argued on appeal that he had not fired any shots. 

Commonwealth v. Marrero-Rodriguez, 1066 MDA 2019, unpublished 

memorandum at *3 (Pa. Super. filed April 13, 2020) (quoting William’s brief 

stating that he “didn’t shoot anybody”). We note this circumstance because 

William testified at the PCRA hearing, claiming that he was willing to testify at 

Appellant’s trial. William abandoned his stance that he did not shoot anyone 

and stated that he would have admitted to firing his gun multiple times 
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towards Jorge. William was convicted in February of 2019, and his direct 

appeal was pending when Appellant’s bench trial took place in May of 2019. 

For his part, Appellant raised self-defense. Because Appellant did not 

testify at trial, that defense was largely based on the chaotic circumstances 

surrounding the incident, as well as the testimony of Detective Justin 

Uczynski, who interviewed Appellant at the hospital. Detective Uczynski 

testified on direct examination as follows to that conversation:

Q. Tell me what happened next as part of the conversation you 

had with [Appellant]. 

A. During that argument that [Appellant] was having with [Luis],

he was tackled [from] behind, and he was knocked to the ground. 

On the ground[,] he heard a shot. He was able to pull out his gun 

that he had on him, and he explained that a person, a male in 

white pants, had approached him and pointed a gun at him. And 

he shot that man in the white pants.

Q. So the first night that you met him, on the night of the 

shooting, he had told you that he shot a person in white pants.

A. Yes.

Q. During the course of this investigation, did you determine who 

the person in the white pants was?

A. I did.

Q. Who was that?

A. Jorge Salame.

N.T. Bench Trial, 5/20-24/19, at 208-09. During this discussion with Detective 

Uczynski, Appellant expressed uncertainty as to whether he hit anyone. “He 

said he may have fired one to two shots. He even said he may have shot 

himself. He was not sure.” Id. at 210. 
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On direct appeal, we rejected Appellant’s argument that the 

Commonwealth failed to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, 

because the Commonwealth proved that Appellant was the aggressor.1 We 

noted that Appellant “provoked the initial confrontation ... [by] arriv[ing] in an 

angry and agitated state.” Marrero-Cruz, 1648 MDA 2019, unpublished 

memorandum at *6. We cited the testimony of Luis, who told the trial court 

that his hands were in the air when Appellant shot him. Id. at *7. We also 

adopted the trial court opinion’s statement that “there was no testimony by 

any witness, and the video of the incident d[id] not show[] that [Jorge] had a 

gun at any point.” Id. (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 12/3/19, at 4) (first 

bracketing in original). 

Appellant unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 

for review by order dated December 16, 2020. Commonwealth v. MarreroCruz, 242 A.3d 1248 (Pa. 2020) (per curiam). Appellant thereafter filed a 

timely PCRA petition, and the PCRA court held evidentiary hearings on June 

28th and July 19th of 2022. Appellant called a total of four witnesses, and we

summarize the pertinent aspects of their testimony. 

The first witness was Jose Alvarez, who offered character testimony 

regarding Appellant’s community reputation for peacefulness and nonviolence. He did not witness the shooting. 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly 

endangering another person, and possessing an instrument of crime. 
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The remaining three witnesses were fact witnesses, beginning with

Appellant’s wife, Marilyn Rodriguez. She testified that William came home to 

report his confrontation with Gordo. Then, she and Appellant, both carrying 

firearms, drove to Glenside in one vehicle while William and another son, 

Marlon, followed in a separate car. Upon arrival, Luis approached their vehicle 

and was acting “crazy. He was arguing, telling [Appellant] that he was going 

to kill [Appellant] and our children.” N.T., 6/28/22, at 24. She stated that 

Appellant attempted to defuse the situation, telling Luis “that he didn’t want 

to talk to him, that he came to talk to [Gordo].” Id. The situation escalated 

when Jonathan Salame “came out of nowhere” and “pushed [Appellant] to the 

ground.” Id. at 25. According to Ms. Rodriguez, Luis and Jonathan Salame

began pummeling Appellant with their guns while trying to take away 

Appellant’s firearm. She heard a gunshot and the men scattered, with 

Appellant visibly bleeding. Turning to the gunshot that left Jorge paralyzed, 

Ms. Rodriguez recounted the following version of events:

A. Well, I see [Appellant] on the ground. He is bleeding from one 

arm, from the head. Then Jonathan ran away bleeding from one 

hand. And then I heard [Jorge] screaming at [Appellant,] telling 

[Appellant] that [Appellant] shot at him.

Q. Did you hear any other gunshots after you heard the first shot?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall how many?

A. It was many.

Q. Okay. Now, backing up, while Jonathan, Luis, and [Appellant] 

were on the ground, did you ever see your husband point a 

weapon at [Jorge]? 
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A. No.

* * *

Q. Okay. Now, after [Jorge] is saying that [Appellant] shot him, 

what happens next that you saw?

A. [Appellant] tells him, ‘No.’ Don’t bring up the weapon because 

he didn’t shoot anyone. That his bullets are complete.

Q. Meaning that his weapon didn’t fire a single shot. Is [sic] what 

you heard [Appellant] saying? 

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. After that is done, after [Appellant] says that, do you 

see [Jorge] pick up a firearm?

A. Yes. He was already bleeding, but he picked up the weapon.

Q. And what did he do with that firearm?

A. He pointed it at [Appellant].

Q. Did he say anything when he was pointing it at [Appellant]?

A. He keep [sic] repeating that he was the one that shot at him, 

that he shot him once.

Q. Did he ever make any threats against [Appellant]?

A. He was saying that he shot at him and that he was going to kill 

him.

Q. And in response to hearing that, what did your – did you see 

what [Appellant] did?

A. [Appellant] picked up the firearm.

Q. Okay. In response to [Jorge] saying, [“]I’m going to kill 

you[,”] and pointing the firearm at [Appellant], what happened 

next?

A. My husband fired his weapon.

Q. Okay. 

* * *
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Q. Did you see that round hit [Jorge]?

A. No.

Id. at 26-29. 

Appellant’s third witness was Carlos Herrera-Torres, who witnessed the 

events while inside a vehicle from about 20 feet away. Mr. Herrera-Torres 

and his girlfriend2 drove through the parking lot of Glenside Apartments as he 

“wanted to see something.” Id. at 46. While driving, he “saw [Appellant] 

telling [Luis] to put away his weapon.” Id. at 47. He saw that Luis had a 

firearm and he “heard [Luis] threatening [Appellant]’s life.” Id. at 48. He 

saw Jonathan tackle Appellant and the ensuing struggle on the ground. During 

that struggle, he “heard one gunshot.” Id. at 50. At that point, people started 

running. Mr. Herrera-Torres stayed in his vehicle and, like Ms. Rodriguez, he 

heard “[Jorge] saying to [Appellant] that [Appellant] shot him. [Appellant] 

replie[d] back, ‘My gun hasn’t shot one bullet.’” Id. at 51. Unlike Ms. 

Rodriguez, however, he did not see or hear Appellant shoot Jorge. (“Q. [Y]ou 

never saw this gentleman fire a shot at [Jorge] from where you were seated 

in your vehicle, correct? A. No. I couldn’t see.”). He confirmed that the only 

gunshot he heard came while Appellant, Jonathan, and Luis were struggling 

on the ground:

____________________________________________

2 Appellant’s brief also discusses a statement by Mr. Herrera-Torres’ girlfriend, 

Migdalia Gonzalez, which was apparently consistent with Mr. Herrera-Torres’ 

account. As she did not testify at the PCRA proceedings, we do not further 

discuss her version of events.
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Q. All right. So Jonathan comes running up, and then did you 

actually see them with your own eyes struggling on the ground?

A. Yes. That I saw with my own eyes.

Q. When they were struggling, is that when you heard the first 

gunshot?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. And then[,] if I remember correctly[,] [on direct 

examination] you used your hands and you kind of spread them 

apart and said, [“]Everybody spread out[]?” 

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. After that, did you hear any more gunshots?

A. No. After that, I didn’t hear no gunshot [sic]. 

Q. All right. So you only heard one gunshot then?

A. Only heard one gunshot.

Id. at 55-56.

Appellant’s final witness was his son, William. As with the previous two 

witnesses, William saw Jonathan tackle Appellant. William saw a gun drop 

during the tackle, and “Gordo picked it up. And as soon as that shot went off, 

[Gordo] started shooting in my direction.” N.T., 7/19/22, at 15. At that point, 

William “shot back in his direction.” Id. at 16. He related the following 

account of Jorge being shot:

Q. Okay. After you have fired your shots in response and this 

struggle was happening, what happens next? Who is saying – is 

there anything being said or what do you see?

A. Jonathan ran off bleeding, and then [Jorge] was on the ground 

screaming at my dad telling him, “Oh, you shot me.” And my dad 

is telling him, “I didn’t shoot. Like I didn’t – I didn’t shoot any 

bullets out of my gun.”
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* * *

Q. After that, from your position in the vehicle, did you see [Jorge] 

do anything else?

A. Well, when I was sitting down and my dad was walking up to 

him, he like – from the side of his like leg, he lifted a gun. And 

that was when my –

Q. When you say he, who do you mean?

A. [Jorge, Jorge].

Q. Lifted a firearm?

A. Yes.

* * *

Q. And where did he point it?

A. At my dad.

Q. And in response to that, what did your – what did you see 

[Appellant] do?

A. He left off a shot.

Q. Did he shoot [Jorge] or did he shoot around [Jorge]?

A. He shot around him. He shot like towards him, but not at him.

Id. at 16-17.

On October 13, 2022, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition in a 

joint order/opinion, concluding that Appellant failed to establish that PCRA 

counsel was ineffective. The PCRA court reasoned that counsel reasonably 

failed to discover Mr. Herrera-Torres, as trial counsel had reviewed the 

surveillance video with Appellant and Ms. Rodriguez, neither of whom 

“volunteered information, or otherwise indicated to trial counsel, that they 

knew any of the other people on the video, or specifically that their friend, 
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Carlos Herrera-Torres, saw the incident from his car, had helpful 

information[,] and was willing to testify.” Order/Opinion, 10/13/22, at 

unnumbered 5. 

Both Ms. Rodriguez and William, on the other hand, were known to trial 

counsel. The PCRA court concluded that counsel established a reasonable

strategic basis for failing to call these witnesses. As to William, the PCRA court 

noted that William’s testimony would have undermined his then-ongoing 

appellate proceedings. Additionally, “[t]rial counsel was credible when he 

stated that even if [William] communicated that he wanted to testify at his 

father’s trial, that trial counsel would have had a conversation about conflicts 

of interest[.]” Id. The PCRA court credited trial counsel’s opinion that “there 

certainly would have been questions as to whether [William] would have been 

an effective witness.” Id. at unnumbered 5-6. 

Turning to Ms. Rodriguez, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant was 

not prejudiced by her omission from trial as there must be “some positive 

demonstration that the testimony would have been helpful to the defense.” 

Id. at unnumbered 6. “As to calling Ms. Rodriguez, as a fact witness, trial 

counsel testified that he felt she added nothing that was not in the video, and 

her testimony would be inappropriate.” Id. 

Finally, addressing Mr. Alvarez’ character testimony, the PCRA court

considered this witness in reference to the trial testimony only, which "d[id] 

not show that Jorge had a gun at any point.” Id. at unnumbered 2. “In cases 

where the failure to present character testimony has been found to be 
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prejudicial, there is normally a juxtaposition of the credibility of the

[d]efendant with that of a witness, in many cases, the victim. Here, 

[Appellant] chose not to testify at trial.” Id. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and complied with the order to 

file a concise statement. He now presents one issue, which comprises three 

subparts: 

1. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt’s denial of Appellant’s counseled 

PCRA [p]etition was supported by the record and free of legal error 

when:

a. The evidence of record demonstrates that Appellant was 

denied his constitutionally guaranteed right of effective 

representation due to trial counsel’s failure to call character 

witnesses at trial?

b. The evidence of record demonstrates that Appellant was 

denied his constitutionally guaranteed right of effective 

representation due to trial counsel’s failure to 

call/investigate material fact witnesses to substantiate 

Appellant’s affirmative defense of self-defense and raise a 

reasonable doubt in the mind of the factfinder?

c. The evidence of record demonstrates that Appellant was 

denied his constitutionally guaranteed right of effective 

representation due to the trial counsel’s failure to 

call/investigate a material fact witness, Mr. William MarreroRodriguez and/or investigate the discharge of gunfire from 

William Marrero-Rodriguez’s vehicle?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Our standard of review is well-settled: 

This Court analyzes PCRA appeals “in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party at the PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. 

Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2012). Our “review is 

limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of 

record” and we do not “disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is 

supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.” Id.
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Similarly, “[w]e grant great deference to the factual findings of 

the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have 

no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference 

to its legal conclusions.” Id. (citations omitted). “[W]here the 

petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de 

novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Finally, we “may affirm 

a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it.” 

Id.

Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014).

The United States Supreme Court has set forth the basic legal 

framework for resolving a challenge to trial counsel’s stewardship: 

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 

defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 

result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it 

cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from 

a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 

unreliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Our Supreme Court 

has modified the Strickland inquiry into three prongs: 

Pennsylvania has recast the two-factor inquiry regarding the 

effectiveness of counsel set forth by the United States Supreme 

Court in Strickland ... as the following three-factor inquiry:

[I]n order to obtain relief based on [an ineffective assistance 

of counsel] ... claim, a petitioner must establish: (1) the 

underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable 

basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) 

petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error 

such that there is a reasonable probability that the result of 

the proceeding would have been different absent such error.
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Commonwealth v. Perry, 128 A.3d 1285, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted). 

A claim challenging trial counsel’s failure to call a witness claim is 

reviewed under the following test: 

When raising a failure to call a potential witness claim, the PCRA 

petitioner satisfies the performance and prejudice requirements of 

the Strickland test by establishing that:

(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to 

testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have 

known of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was 

willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the 

testimony of the witness was so prejudicial as to have 

denied the defendant a fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Washington, ... 927 A.2d 586, 599 ([Pa.] 

2007). To demonstrate Strickland prejudice, the PCRA petitioner 

“must show how the uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have 

been beneficial under the circumstances of the case.” 

Commonwealth v. Gibson, ... 951 A.2d 1110, 1134 ([Pa.] 

2008); see also Commonwealth v. Chmiel, ... 889 A.2d 501, 

546 ([Pa.] 2005) (“Trial counsel’s failure to call a particular 

witness does not constitute ineffective assistance without some 

showing that the absent witness’ testimony would have been 

beneficial or helpful in establishing the asserted defense.”).

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 536 (Pa. 2009). 

II.

We decline to affirm the order based on the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions. First, with respect to Ms. Rodriguez, the PCRA court appears to 

credit Attorney Douglas Breidenbach’s testimony that Ms. Rodriguez would not 

have added anything helpful to the case because the surveillance videos 

captured all the relevant events. It is clear from the notes of testimony of 

Appellant’s bench trial that the video does not capture what Jorge was doing 
J-S19014-23

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when he was shot, nor does it show whether he was armed. This is evident 

from the cross-examination of Detective Uczynski, who narrated the videos

on direct examination: 

Q. Let’s put ... aside whether the video showed Luis had a gun or 

not. So when the video shows – you don’t know whether Luis had 

a gun. The video shows when Gordo has a gun, correct, those 

points?

A. Yes.

Q. You don’t see Jorge with a gun?

A. I never saw Jorge with a gun.

Q. You can’t tell from the video?

A. That’s right.

Q. As to all three, you also can’t tell from the video that they did 

not have guns, correct?

A. I suppose that is fair to say.

N.T. Bench Trial at 238.

Appellant also elicited Detective Uczynski’s opinion regarding how 

Appellant, Luis, and Jonathan were injured during the fight that broke out 

after Jonathan tackled Appellant:

Q. So if Luis didn’t have a gun and Jonathan did not have a gun 

during the scuffle, how did the three of them get shot? Do you 

have any theories on that?

A. My opinion is that Luis had a gun during that struggle, and his 

gun discharged resulting in the three of them getting shot during 

that close quarter struggle.

Id. at 241. Turning to Jorge’s shooting, Detective Uczynski testified as 

follows:
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Q. So still sticking to the video, we know that [Appellant] breaks 

free and overcomes these two guys. He has been shot, and now 

he walks off camera to the right of the screen that we see in the 

video, correct?

A. Yes, that’s right.

Q. There is no video to show Jorge at the moment that he is struck 

by a bullet, correct?

A. Not entirely.

Q. There is no video that would help us prove or disprove 

Jorge at that moment held a gun, correct?

A. I think that is fair to say. 

Id. at 242 (emphasis added). 

Thus, the video did not address Ms. Rodriguez’ testimony that Jorge 

pointed a firearm at Appellant. See also id. at 295 (Commonwealth’s arguing 

during closing that Appellant’s “words that Jorge had a gun is the only instance 

that shows anything in regards to Jorge having a gun”). Notwithstanding, it 

may well be that counsel, in his professional judgment, would have chosen 

not to call Ms. Rodriguez based on, inter alia, her obvious bias towards her 

husband and her role in driving to the scene with her family to confront Gordo. 

But counsel testified only that “her participation was ... visible on the video. 

So the need to call her as a fact witness was not something that I considered 

appropriate.” N.T., 7/19/22, at 42. Appellant’s self-defense claim would have 

been supported by testimony establishing that Jorge had a firearm, something 

which is not visible in the video. We therefore cannot agree that trial counsel 

articulated a reasonable strategic basis for declining to call Ms. Rodriguez. 
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Turning to Mr. Herrera-Torres, the PCRA court concluded that trial 

counsel had no duty to investigate this witness because Appellant did not 

supply his name. We disagree.

Counsel has a general duty to undertake reasonable investigations 

or make reasonable decisions that render particular investigations 

unnecessary. Counsel’s unreasonable failure to prepare for trial 

is “an abdication of the minimum performance required of defense 

counsel.” The duty to investigate, of course, may include a duty 

to interview certain potential witnesses; and a prejudicial failure 

to fulfill this duty, unless pursuant to a reasonable strategic 

decision, may lead to a finding of ineffective assistance. 

Johnson, 966 A.2d at 535–36 (citations omitted). 

The duty to investigate must be assessed under the circumstances of 

the case, and we disagree with the PCRA court’s conclusion that counsel had 

no duty to investigate under these facts. Appellant and Attorney Breidenbach

chose to pursue a self-defense theory, and Mr. Herrera-Torres’ vehicle is 

apparently observable on video. N.T., 6/28/22, at 44 (Mr. Herrera-Torres’

testifying that, during a conversation with Appellant’s first attorney, he 

identified himself on video).3 We conclude that, under these circumstances,

trial counsel had the duty to investigate to see if the eyewitnesses had 

anything helpful to add to Appellant’s defense. 

Strickland states that “counsel has a duty to make reasonable 

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 

investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S at 691. Appellant clearly 

____________________________________________

3 Mr. Herrera-Torres testified that this attorney did not take a statement from 

him, and it is unclear whether, and to what extent, Attorney Breidenbach 

spoke to former counsel. 
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could have told Attorney Breidenbach that Mr. Herrera-Torres may have 

helpful information. By the same token, trial counsel simply could have asked 

Appellant if he knew any of the people depicted on video. We conclude that 

of these two parties, the duty to speak up lies with the attorney, not the client 

he or she represents. Counsel is required to conduct reasonable 

investigations, which includes interviewing potential eyewitnesses. “Neglect 

even to interview available eyewitnesses to a crime simply cannot be ascribed 

to trial strategy and tactics.” Hoots v. Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214, 1220 (4th 

Cir. 1986). We therefore do not agree that counsel’s performance was not 

deficient in that regard. However, as explained infra, we agree that Appellant 

has failed to establish all prongs of the ineffectiveness test. 

With respect to William, we agree with the PCRA court that there was 

an obvious potential conflict of interest involved, especially given that Attorney 

Breidenbach represented both William and Appellant at their separate trials. 

The PCRA court concluded that Attorney Breidenbach would have had a 

conversation with William about that conflict had he known of William’s 

testimony. However, trial counsel’s testimony that he would have addressed 

the issue had William told him that he intended to testify does not adequately 

address Appellant’s argument. That conclusion simply tells us what trial 

counsel would have done had he known William was willing to testify, but it 

does not tell us anything about whether William would have chosen to waive 

any conflicts and/or his Fifth Amendment privilege. Our affirmance on an 
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alternative ground dispenses of the need to address whether William would 

have testified at Appellant’s trial. 

Finally, as to the character testimony, explained infra, our alternative 

affirmance also addresses this claim. 

III.

We affirm the PCRA court’s order on the alternative basis that Appellant 

failed to establish that trial counsel was ineffective for pursuing the chosen

self-defense strategy. Appellant takes the conflicting position both that (a) 

he acted in justifiable self-defense and (b) someone else shot Jorge. The 

following passage from Appellant’s brief illustrates those theories: 

Accordingly, these omissions resulted in substantial prejudice to 

Appellant in substantiating his affirmative defense of self[-]

defense, especially given [t]rial [c]ounsel’s advisement that 

Appellant not testify on his own behalf. In that vein, had the 

testimony been presented, there is a high likelihood that a 

reasonable doubt would have been raised in the mind of the 

factfinder as to the identity of Jorge Salome’s shooter and/or 

successfully raised the affirmative defense of self-defense; this 

evidence, had it been admitted, would likely result in a different 

verdict if a new trial were granted.

Appellant’s Brief at 41.

The failure to articulate a clear strategy that counsel should have 

pursued in lieu of the self-defense claim presented at trial is fatal to Appellant’s 

ineffectiveness claim, as a valid self-defense claim required Appellant to admit 

that he shot Jorge. Thus, Appellant’s assertion that “the identity of [the 

shooter] was never truly substantiated at Appellant’s trial” is an irrelevant 

point if Appellant continues to insist that he shot Jorge in self-defense.
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We begin with a review of the legal prerequisites for a valid self-defense 

claim. Self-defense is a statutory entitlement, as set forth by Section 505 of 

the Crimes Code: 

(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.--

The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when 

the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the 

purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by 

such other person on the present occasion.

(b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.--

...

(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this 

section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary 

to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, 

kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or 

threat; nor is it justifiable if:

(i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or 

serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force 

against himself in the same encounter; or

(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of 

using such force with complete safety by retreating, 

except the actor is not obliged to retreat from his 

dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial 

aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by another 

person whose place of work the actor knows it to be.

18 Pa.C.S. § 505. 

Our decisional law views a valid self-defense claim as comprising three 

elements:

(1) the defendant reasonably believed that he was in imminent 

danger of death or serious bodily injury and that it was necessary 

to use deadly force against the victim to prevent such harm; (2) 

the defendant was free from fault in provoking the difficulty which 

culminated in his use of deadly force; and (3) the defendant did 

not violate any duty to retreat.
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Commonwealth v. Steele, 234 A.3d 840, 846 (Pa. Super. 2020).

As our Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 

A.3d 738, 752 (Pa. 2012), the first element is further broken down into “two 

aspects, one subjective and one objective.” The subjective inquiry asks 

whether the defendant had an “honest, bona fide belief that he was in 

imminent danger[.]” Id. Notably, the subjective component does not require 

that the defendant testify; in Mouzon, the defendant “rel[ied] instead on 

inferences from the circumstances as observed by others.” Id. Objectively, 

the subjective belief “must be reasonable in light of the facts as they appeared 

to the defendant....” Id. 

Trial counsel chose to pursue a straightforward case of self-defense 

presented without calling Appellant to the stand. Appellant now faults counsel 

for failing to pursue mutually exclusive alternatives. Arguing alternative legal 

theories is not in and of itself problematic in most cases. For example, a 

defendant facing a charge of possessing controlled substances with the intent 

to deliver can argue that he or she did not possess the drugs, and, 

alternatively, that if the fact-finder finds the element of possession, that said

possession was not with an intent to deliver. However, self-defense does not 

lend itself to this type of in-the-alternative approach. In the drug example, 

those alternative theories speak to the Commonwealth’s duty to establish all

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Self-defense differs in that 

it acts as a justification for the use of force, and the defendant is entitled to 

acquittal if the Commonwealth fails to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1218 n.6 (Pa. 2009) (“[T]he 

affirmative defense of self-defense ... is a justification for the crime and, if 

accepted, results in acquittal....”). The lawful use of deadly force establishes 

that no crime has occurred, as the actor was justified in their actions. 

As stated in Mouzon, the defendant is not required to testify to establish 

the subjective component of a self-defense claim through his own testimony. 

Still, the actor cannot claim that the injury was accidental. Indeed, in 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 665 A.2d 1172, 1175 (Pa. 1995), our Supreme 

Court held that a defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction 

because he did not admit to shooting the victim. Instead, the victim claimed 

that the firearm discharged accidentally. “[W]hen he took the stand and 

denied that the shooting was intentional and, instead, said it was caused by 

mistake or accident as he backed up the stairs, he denied that the act was 

done intentionally in defense of self.” Id.

Harris establishes that Appellant’s PCRA claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective for not pursuing a mixed strategy of both admitting and denying 

that Appellant shot Jorge is a nonstarter. The difference between the claim in 

Harris that the gun accidentally discharged versus Appellant’s claim that he 

did fire the gun but may not have hit Jorge is rather negligible. In both cases, 

there must be a definitive concession that deadly force was intentionally 

employed. A defendant is not required to offer testimony to support the 

subjective intent, but this does not extend to denying the factual predicate for 

a self-defense claim. Appellant cannot pick and choose which facts support a 
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self-defense claim, while simultaneously arguing that someone else must have 

shot Jorge. 

On this point, we note that Appellant was convicted of aggravated 

assault, which may be established by proof of either an intentional act or a 

reckless one. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) (stating that person is guilty of 

aggravated assault if he causes serious bodily injury “intentionally, knowingly 

or recklessly...”). Had Appellant fired at Jorge in valid self-defense, but 

accidentally struck someone else, then doctrinal complications arise. 

Compare Commonwealth v. Fowlin, 710 A.2d 1130, 1137 (Pa. 1998) 

(holding that “a person who unintentionally injures a third[-]party bystander 

while using justifiable force in self-defense” is not criminally liable), with 

Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(suggesting that Fowlin’s holding is fact-intensive, as the case involved an

innocent bystander at a bar who was ambushed by three people and was 

maced to near blindness). But that problem does not arise here, as Appellant 

is not charged with injuring a third party. 

Relatedly, the fact that this is a one-victim case is significant, as 

demonstrated by Commonwealth v. Scott, 73 A.3d 599 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

in which this Court granted a new trial due to the trial court’s failure to instruct 

on both self-defense and mistake-of-fact in an unusual fact pattern involving 

two victims. The appellant, Dustin Scott, was at Bill Ledford’s apartment with 

several other people, “smoking, snorting, and injecting bath salts, a lawful 

practice at the time.” Id. at 601. A man named Jeremiah Shoop had 
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attempted to burglarize Scott’s home the night before and Shoop had made 

threats against other members of the group. At some point, Shoop arrived at 

the apartment, and “began yelling threats ... and tr[ying] to pry the front door 

open.” Id. Shoop eventually broke in and, during the chaos, someone turned 

out the lights. Ledford yelled, “‘They’re in’ and ‘shoot, shoot!’” Id. 

Scott, who was on the ground, saw a silhouetted figure with a gun. 

Believing this man to be Shoop, Scott fired and shot at the figure. It turned

out that the man was one of the men he had been partying with, Josh Lemin. 

Scott was charged with the attempted murder of Shoop and aggravated 

assault of Lemin. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense as to 

Shoop but refused to give an instruction on mistake-of-fact as to Lemin. We 

held that this was erroneous. “[T]he trial record indicates that a reasonable 

jury could have concluded that [Scott] shot at Shoop intentionally, warranting 

a self-defense charge, but shot at Lemin mistakenly, warranting a mistakeof-fact charge. Quite obviously, the defenses are not mutually exclusive under 

these circumstances.” Id. at 604. 

Unlike Scott, this case does not involve separate, alternative defense 

theories with respect to separate victims, as Appellant was not convicted for 

striking an unintended victim. In other words, if Appellant maintains that he 

shot in self-defense but did not actually hit anyone, then the self-defense claim 

is nonsensical; if his bullet struck no one then Appellant is guilty of nothing. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s alternative theory that someone else shot Jorge is 

mutually exclusive of his claim that he shot in self-defense. 
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In terms of the PCRA and his burden to establish trial counsel was 

ineffective, Appellant has failed to show that it was unreasonable for trial 

counsel to focus on self-defense, instead of pursuing mutually exclusive 

defense theories. “A finding that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis 

is not warranted unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen 

offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually 

pursued.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 719 A.2d 233, 237 (Pa. 1998). 

Appellant’s complaint that trial counsel should have pursued a defense that 

the law does not permit cannot possibly meet this standard. In fact, even 

where an alternative strategy is not prohibited by law, an attorney’s decision 

to focus on one defense over the other is arguably not subject to challenge. 

See, e.g., Dill v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1344, 1357 (11th Cir. 2007) (“In light of 

the reasonableness standard set forth by the Strickland Court, our circuit 

maintains that constitutionally sufficient assistance of counsel does not require 

presenting an alternative-not to mention unavailing or inconsistent-theory of 

the case.”). 

Due to our resolution, we need not specifically address each witness’ 

testimony.4 We will not parse out aspects of the testimony that would be 

____________________________________________

4 The fact that Appellant presented a character witness demonstrates the 

confusing nature of Appellant’s complaint with trial counsel’s performance. 

Appellant explains that evidence of his character would be relevant for these 

reasons:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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relevant towards a claim that the bullet fired by Appellant did not strike Jorge

versus those facts that implicate a justifiable use of deadly force. Appellant 

could have attempted to show that the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim 

concerning who shot Jorge was so strong that counsel’s decision to pursue a 

self-defense claim was constitutionally unreasonable. Alternatively, Appellant 

could have limited his claim to an assertion that the witnesses should have 

been called to support the self-defense theory offered at trial. What he cannot 

do is try to argue both. 

Finally, we observe that while Appellant was not required to testify at 

trial to establish the subjective component of his self-defense claim, he 

declined to testify at the PCRA hearing, too. Our Supreme Court’s statement 

____________________________________________

Jorge Salome explicitly indicated that he did not see which 

individual shot him, calling the identity of Appellant as the shooter 

into question, and further compounding the importance of calling 

character evidence on Appellant’s behalf.

***

As the [t]rial [c]ourt wrestled with this difficult determination[,] it 

was deprived of the opportunity to consider Appellant’s reputation 

for being peaceful and law abiding when deciding if Appellant had 

a subjective, reasonable belief that he was in fear of death or 

serious bodily injury, and equally as important in determining

Appellant’s ‘intent’ as required for conviction.

Appellant’s Brief at 32.

Appellant does not explain why character testimony would be relevant 

to the self-defense claim. It is the objective circumstances and a bona fide 

subjective fear which give rise to a valid self-defense claim, not the character 

of the defendant. Whether Appellant is a peaceful, nonviolent person or not 

has no bearing on whether the elements of a valid self-defense claim have 

been met.
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in Mouzon that the “failure to offer any evidence to support the subjective 

aspect of his claim of self-defense highlights the difficulties associated with 

assigning the Commonwealth the burden to disprove a defense where 

necessary facts are peculiarly within the knowledge and control of the 

defense,” Mouzon, 53 A.3d at 752 n.10, has increased relevance in this 

collateral proceeding where Appellant bears the burden of establishing that 

counsel was ineffective. Appellant has twice declined to offer evidence 

regarding his subjective account of the event.

5

 Paired with his presentation 

of evidence and legal arguments that both support and undermine a selfdefense claim, we conclude that Appellant has failed to establish that counsel 

was ineffective in selecting a strategy that raised the issue of self-defense 

while avoiding contradictory and confusing testimony about who shot whom. 

We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order on this alternative basis.

Order affirmed. 

Judge Sullivan joins this memorandum.

Judge McLaughlin concurs in the result.

____________________________________________

5 As previously quoted, Appellant claims that the failure to call these witnesses 

“resulted in substantial prejudice to Appellant in substantiating his affirmative 

defense of self[-]defense, especially given [t]rial [c]ounsel’s advisement that 

Appellant not testify on his own behalf.” Appellant’s Brief at 41. Appellant

does not otherwise develop that point, and, in any event, he chose not to 

testify during collateral proceedings. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 09/25/2023