alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Shaimaa Seifeldin, Appellant, v Faek M. Braick et al., Respondents.

[942 NYS2d 359]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruchelsman, J.), dated February 15, 2011, which granted the motion of the defendants Faek M. Braick and Alice Alhalak, and the separate motion of the defendants Fatma Youssef and Mohammed S. Abdelghani, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, and the motion of the defendants Faek M. Braick and Alice Alhalak, and the separate motion of the defendants Fatma Youssef and Mohammed S. Abdelghani, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them are denied.

The defendants met their respective prima facie burdens of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, *858prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the lumbosacral region of the plaintiffs spine, and to the plaintiffs right knee, did not constitute serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Rodriguez v Huerfano,*46 AD3d 794, 795 [2007]).

However, in opposition, the plaintiff submitted competent medical evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged injuries to the lumbosacral region of her spine, and to her right knee, constituted serious injuries under the permanent consequential limitation of use and/or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Perl v Meher,*18 NY3d 208, 215-218 [2011]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. Rivera, J.E, Eng, Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 106 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 106

 Recognizing the 100th anniversary of the Triangle Shirtwaist Company 
 fire in New York City on March 25, 1911, and designating the week of 
 March 21, 2011, through March 25, 2011, as the ``100th Anniversary of 
        the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire Remembrance Week''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 17, 2011

 Mrs. Gillibrand (for herself, Mr. Schumer, and Mrs. Murray) submitted 
      the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Recognizing the 100th anniversary of the Triangle Shirtwaist Company 
 fire in New York City on March 25, 1911, and designating the week of 
 March 21, 2011, through March 25, 2011, as the ``100th Anniversary of 
        the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire Remembrance Week''.

Whereas the Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire was the deadliest industrial 
        disaster in the City of New York's history and resulted in the 4th 
        greatest loss of life from an industrial accident in the history of the 
        United States, claiming the lives of 146 garment workers, many of whom 
        were young immigrants;
Whereas this human catastrophe exposed the need to strengthen labor laws, fire 
        regulations, and health and safety protections for workers;
Whereas the Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire helped spur the growth of the 
        modern-day organized labor movement, particularly the International 
        Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, which continued to fight for better 
        conditions for sweatshop workers;
Whereas from the ashes of this horrific event emerged the modern celebration of 
        International Women's Day, and the death of 129 women workers in the 
        Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire demonstrated the need for workers' 
        rights and women's rights;
Whereas more than 5,000 workers lose their lives each year on the job, and 
        protecting the health and safety of workers continues to be a critical 
        issue in the United States today; and
Whereas national events will be held to remember the victims of the Triangle 
        Shirtwaist Company fire, and to educate citizens about the important 
        role this tragic event played in the history of the United States: Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate designates the week of March 21, 2011 
through March 25, 2011 as the ``100th Anniversary of the Triangle 
Shirtwaist Factory Fire Remembrance Week''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32.1

SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS

I,
Barney A. Richmond, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to my
knowledge, the Annual Report of eCom eCom.com, Inc. on
Form 10-K for the period ended May 31, 2008, (i) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and (ii) that the information contained in such Form 10-K fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of eCom
eCom.com, Inc.



|                         |  |                              
|------------------------ |  | -----------------------------
|Date:
September 10, 2010 |  | /S/    BARNEY
A.
RICHMOND    
|                         |  | Barney A. Richmond           
|                         |  | Chief Executive Officer      
|                         |  | (Principal Executive Officer)

I, Richard C. Turner, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to my
knowledge, the Annual Report of eCom eCom.com, Inc. on Form 10-K for the period ended
May 31, 2008, (i) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) that the information
contained in such Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of eCom eCom.com, Inc.



|                         |  |                              
|------------------------ |  | -----------------------------
|Date:
September 10, 2010 |  | /S/    RICHARD
C.
TURNER     
|                         |  | Richard C. Turner            
|                         |  | Chief Financial Officer      
|                         |  | (Principal Financial Officer)
# C_2019255EN.01005301.xml

| 29.7.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 255/53 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.7.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 255/53

---

Action brought on 10 June 2019 — Gamma-A v EUIPO — Piejūra (Packing for foodstuffs)

(Case T-352/19)

(2019/C 255/66)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Gamma-A SIA (Riga, Latvia) (represented by: M. Liguts, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Piejūra SIA (Nīcas novads, Latvia)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the design at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Design at issue: European Union design No 2022 772-0001 (Packing for foodstuffs)

Contested decision: Decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 March 2019 in Case R 2516/2017-3

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision and declare the design valid; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision and declare the design valid;

| — | order EUIPO and the invalidity applicant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and the invalidity applicant to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002.

---
# C_2019280EN.01004502.xml

| 19.8.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 280/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.8.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 280/45

---

Action brought on 28 June 2019 — Novati v Parliament

(Case T-397/19)

(2019/C 280/63)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Vanda Novati (Milan, Italy) (represented by: M. Merola, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

| — | order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

| — | order the European Parliament to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those relied on in Case T-389/19, Coppo Gavazzi v Parliament.

---
1

John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. Tex. Gov’t

Code Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2003).

NO. 07-03-0381-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL E

OCTOBER 21, 2003

______________________________

HAROLD CHRISTOPHER ALANIZ, 

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Appellee

_________________________________

FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY;

NO. 14,760-A; HON. HAL MINER, PRESIDING

_______________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

_______________________________

Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ., and BOYD, S.J.1

Harold Christopher Alaniz appeals his conviction for Aggravated Assault. He pled

guilty to the offense in accordance with a plea bargain and confessed to the accusations

in the indictment. Upon determining that his plea was knowing and voluntary, the trial

court found him guilty of the offense and assessed punishment within the range
2

recommended by the prosecutor. As part of the bargain, appellant also waived his right

to appeal, and the trial court certified, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure

25.2(a)(2) and (d), that he had no right to appeal. 

According to Rule 25.2(a)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the trial

court must certify whether or not the appellant has the right to appeal. If such a

certification has not been executed, the appeal must be dismissed. TEX. R. APP. P.

25.2(d). Here, the trial court did not certify that appellant had a right to appeal; quite the

contrary, through the certification it stated that he did not. Accordingly, the appeal is

dismissed per Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d).

Per Curiam

Do not publish. 
3
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED BY THE 10-QSB FOR
THE PERIOD  ENDED JUNE 30, 1999 FOR  INNOVACOM,  INC.  AND IS  QUALIFIED  BY ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                                              <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                     6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                 JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                            54,000
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     64,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                      34,000
<INVENTORY>                                      229,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 442,000
<PP&E>                                           463,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                   230,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   712,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         15,114,000
<BONDS>                                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                          25,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   (14,427,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     712,000
<SALES>                                           61,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  61,000
<CGS>                                             50,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  1,301,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,217,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (2,457,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                           0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (2,457,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                   57,000
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (2,400,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       (.10)



</TABLE>
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 24-1052

___________________________ United States of America lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v. Ortez Jones lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________ Submitted: July 29, 2024 Filed: August 1, 2024 [Unpublished]

____________ Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. Ortez Jones appeals the sentence the district court 1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to a firearm offense pursuant to a written plea agreement containing an appeal

1 The Honorable Matthew T. Schelp, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.waiver. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief under

Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Upon careful review, we conclude that the appeal waiver is valid, applicable, and enforceable. See United States v. Scott , 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing de novo the validity and applicability of an appeal waiver). The record reflects that Jones entered into the plea agreement and appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily, and enforcing the waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Andis , 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing the enforceability of appeal waivers). Further, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 (1988). We note that, subsequent to briefing in this case, the United States Supreme Court decided Erlinger v. United States , 144 S. Ct. 1840 (2024), holding that a jury must determine if offenses were committed on separate occasions for purposes of an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). However, Jones waived any argument under Erlinger when he withdrew his objection to the ACCA enhancement based on United States v. Stowell , 82 F.4th 607 (8th Cir. 2023). See United States v. Washington , 727 Fed. Appx. 779, 780 (4th Cir. 2018) (unpublished per curiam) (finding defendant waived any argument on whether his prior convictions were properly counted as separate offenses for purposes of ACCA enhancement, as he withdrew his objection to the issue at sentencing); United States v. Rodriguez , 311 F.3d 435, 436-37 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that defendant waived his objection to the predicate offenses supporting his career offender status by withdrawing the objection at sentencing). Otherwise, we find no non-frivolous issues for appeal falling outside the scope of the appeal waiver. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal based on the appeal waiver, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________

-2-
# C_2020095EN.01001201.xml

| 23.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 95/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 95/12

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 9 November 2019 — NJ v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság

(Case C-740/19)

(2020/C 95/11)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: NJ

Defendant: Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság

Questions referred

| 1. | Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that it is possible for effective judicial protection to be guaranteed in a Member State even if its courts cannot amend decisions given in asylum procedures but may only annul them and order that a new procedure be conducted? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that it is possible for effective judicial protection to be guaranteed in a Member State even if its courts cannot amend decisions given in asylum procedures but may only annul them and order that a new procedure be conducted?

| 2. | Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, again in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that legislation of a Member State which lays down a single mandatory time limit of 60 days in total for judicial proceedings in asylum matters, irrespective of any individual circumstances and without regard to the particular features of the case or any potential difficulties in relation to evidence, is compatible with those provisions? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, again in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that legislation of a Member State which lays down a single mandatory time limit of 60 days in total for judicial proceedings in asylum matters, irrespective of any individual circumstances and without regard to the particular features of the case or any potential difficulties in relation to evidence, is compatible with those provisions?

---

(1)  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60)

---
#### In the Matter of Deckers and Mackelbert, SPLR, et al., Appellants, v A.S.A. Diamond Corporation et al., Respondents.

—Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Alfred Ascione, J.), entered on April 25, 1985, unanimously affirmed, for the reasons stated by Ascione, J., at Special Term. Appellant shall recover of respondents $50 costs and disbursements of this appeal. Concur—Sandler, J. P., Asch, Kassal, Rosenberger and Wallach, JJ.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 6701** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. ISIAH LAND , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk
. Rebecca Beach Smith, Chief District Judge. ( 2:01

- cr - 00197

- RBS

- 1 )

Submitted : June 5, 2013 Decided: June 14, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Isiah Land , Appellant Pro Se. James Ashford Metcalfe , OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee
. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Isiah Land seeks to appeal the district court’s order
tr eating his motion for a writ of error coram nobis as a successive 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2012 ) motion, and dismissing it on that basis. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 2 8 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (2006) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfi es this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (200 3). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently review ed the record and conclude that Land has not made the requisite showing. See United States v. Winestock , 340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.3 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional
process. DISMISSED
**Exhibit 23.1****Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**We have issued our report dated March 1, 2007, accompanying the consolidated financialstatements and schedule included in the Annual Report of TB Wood’s Corporation on Form 10-Kfor the year ended December 31, 2006. We hereby consent to the incorporation by referenceof said reports in the Registration Statements of TB Wood’s Corporation on Forms S-8 (FileNo. 333-139066, effective December 1, 2006, File No. 33-87936, effective May 9, 2002, FileNo. 333-31785 and 333-31787, effective July 22, 1997 and File No. 33-07231, effective June28, 1996)./s/ Grant Thornton LLPBaltimore, Maryland