The Honorable William M. Conley, Chief Judge of the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin,

sitting by designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-3966

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BROOK ABEBE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:09-cr-00116-SEB-KPF-1—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.

ARGUED JUNE 1, 2011—DECIDED JUNE 29, 2011

Before FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and CONLEY,

District Judge.



FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Brook Abebe pled guilty to armed

bank robbery, discharge of a firearm during a crime of

violence, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a
2 No. 10-3966

convicted felon. He contends that the district court committed a procedural error in setting his sentence and that

his above-guideline sentence is substantively unreasonable.

We disagree and affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. Background

Abebe robbed a Chase Bank in Indianapolis, Indiana,

while armed with a .38-caliber handgun and a rifle pellet

gun. During the robbery, he ordered bank employees and

customers at gun point to lie on the floor and threatened to

kill them if they did not comply. Abebe stole over $9,000

from the bank and discharged his handgun twice in the

process, the first time inside the bank when he fired a

round into the bank’s ceiling, the second outside the

bank when he shot a bystander in the face while leaving

the scene. (The bystander survived with serious injuries.) Abebe then hopped into his getaway car, but drove

only one-half mile or so from the bank before he crashed

into a ditch and was subsequently arrested. Law enforcement officials recovered Abebe’s handgun in the

getaway car. Notably, Abebe had four prior felony convictions at the time he robbed the bank.

Abebe was indicted on three charges: armed bank

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) (Count

One); discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Two); and unlawful

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Count Three). He pled guilty without a

plea agreement to all three counts.
No. 10-3966 3

At Abebe’s sentencing hearing, the district court calculated a guideline range of 84 to 105 months

of imprisonment on Counts One and Three, noted that

Count Three had a maximum sentence of 120 months of

imprisonment, and found Abebe subject to a mandatory

minimum sentence of 120 months of imprisonment on

Count Two, to run consecutively to Counts One and Three.

After hearing arguments from both sides, the district court

considered the factors in § 3553(a) and sentenced Abebe to

300 months’ imprisonment, consisting of 180 months on

Count One, a concurrent sentence of 120 months on Count

Three, and a consecutive sentence of 120 months on Count

Two. It also ordered Abebe to pay restitution and imposed

five years of supervised release on Counts One and Two

and three years of supervised release on Count Three,

to run concurrently.

II. Discussion

Abebe directly appeals, arguing that the district court

procedurally erred in setting his sentence and that

his above-guideline sentence is substantively unreasonable.

We discuss each argument in turn.

1. Procedural Error

Abebe claims that the district court erroneously focused

on reasonableness when setting his sentence, instead of on

imposing a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than

necessary,” to comply with the factors in § 3553(a)(2). 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a). We review de novo whether the district
4 No. 10-3966

court followed proper procedures at sentencing. United

States v. Pape, 601 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2010); United

States v. Coopman, 602 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2010).

Section 3553(a) provides that sentencing courts “shall

impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph

(2) of this subsection,” and then lists a number of factors

that the courts “shall consider.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But

courts are not required to expressly refer to that provision

at sentencing. See United States v. Tyra, 454 F.3d 686, 687-88

(7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a defendant’s argument that the

district court committed a procedural error because, he

claimed, it was not clear that the district court concluded

that his sentence was “sufficient, but not greater than

necessary,” to comply with the goals in § 3553(a), and

explaining that “district courts need not recite any magic

words at sentencing to assure us that the correct standard

is being used”). Rather, they must “ ’(1) calculate the

applicable Guidelines range; (2) give the defendant

an opportunity to identify any of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

factors that might warrant a non-Guidelines sentence; and

(3) state which factors influenced the final sentence.’ ”

United States v. Curb, 626 F.3d 921, 926 (7th Cir. 2010)

(quoting United States v. Campos, 541 F.3d 735, 749-50 (7th

Cir. 2008)); see also Tyra, 454 F.3d at 687-88. “ ’The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate

court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and

has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision

making authority.’ ” Curb, 626 F.3d at 926 (quoting Rita v.

United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). But “[t]he court

need not make factual findings as to each of the sentencing
No. 10-3966 5

factors; it is sufficient that the record shows that the court

considered them.” Campos, 541 F.3d at 750.

We find no indication in the record that the district court

did not comply with its obligation to set Abebe’s sentence

at a level “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to

satisfy the goals of sentencing. Further, the district court

did not err by stating at sentencing that it sought to impose

a “reasonable” sentence, or by never expressly mentioning

its obligation to impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but

not greater than necessary,” to comply with the factors in

§ 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). District courts are not

prohibited from using the word “reasonable” at sentencing, nor are they required to expressly mention their

obligation to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater

than necessary,” to comply with the goals of sentencing.

See Tyra, 454 F.3d at 687-88. 

The district court did exactly what we ask courts to do at

sentencing. It calculated the applicable guidelines range,

considered Abebe’s arguments for a lower sentence, and

discussed and applied the factors in § 3553(a), specifically

focusing on the nature and circumstances of Abebe’s

offense and his history and characteristics. We find no

procedural error.

2. Substantive Unreasonableness

We also disagree with Abebe’s argument that his sentence, seventy-five months above the applicable guideline

range, is substantively unreasonable. “We ‘will uphold an

above-guidelines sentence so long as the district court
6 No. 10-3966

offered an adequate statement of its reasons, consistent

with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), for imposing such a sentence.’

There is no presumption that a sentence outside the guidelines’ range is unreasonable.” United States v. Aldridge, No.

09-2520, slip op. at 12, 2011 WL 1518834, at *6 (7th Cir. Apr.

22, 2011) (quoting United States v. McIntyre, 531 F.3d 481,

483 (7th Cir. 2008)).

The fact that we “might reasonably have concluded

that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient

to justify reversal of the district court.” Our review

must take into account that a “sentencing judge is in a

superior position to find facts and judge their import

under [section] 3553(a) in the individual case. The

judge sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility

determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and

gains insights not conveyed by the record.” Because

the district court has greater familiarity with the case

and the individual defendant and therefore an institutional advantage over an appellate court in making

sentencing determinations, we must defer, absent an

abuse of discretion, to its ruling. 

United States v. Carter, 538 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).

The district court considered the factors in § 3553(a) and

adequately articulated its decision to impose an aboveguideline sentence. Specifically, it explained that “the

nature and circumstances of this offense are by every

measure horrific,” and that the nature of the crime was not

sufficiently accounted for by the guidelines. It also emphasized that Abebe carried two firearms during the robbery,
No. 10-3966 7

fired his handgun “twice, once to scare the wits out of

people, and the other to come within a hair’s breadth of

taking a life,” terrorized the bank’s employees and customers, forcing them “to lie down on the ground and . . .

wonder[ ] if they were drawing their last breath,” and

placed people at risk. Although Abebe contends that a

within-guideline sentence would have kept him in jail until

his early-60s and thus that his above-guideline sentence is

not necessary to protect the public from him committing

more crimes, we find no abuse of discretion in sentencing

him to 300 months of imprisonment. Cf. United States v.

Ellis, 622 F.3d 784, 800 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding a 90-

month sentence where the applicable guideline range was

46 to 57 months); United States v. McKinney, 543 F.3d 911,

912, 913-14 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding a 293-month sentence

where the applicable guideline range was 188 to 235

months).

III. Conclusion

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

6-29-11