alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2021028EN.01004901.xml

| 25.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 28/49 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/49

---

Order of the General Court of 24 November 2020 — Camerin v Commission

(Case T-367/19) (1)

(Action for annulment - Civil service - Officials - Deductions from a retirement pension - Enforcement of a decision of a national court - No need to adjudicate - Liability - Inadmissibility)

(2021/C 28/75)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Laure Camerin (Bastia, France) (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: T. Bohr and D. Milanowska, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment in part of the decision of the Office for Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements (PMO) of the Commission of 17 April 2019 regarding the enforcement of a garnishee order issued by a Belgian court, in so far as the PMO reserves the right to deduct from pension payments that the applicant is yet to receive additional amounts within the limits set by Belgian law and, second, compensation for the non-material damage allegedly suffered by the applicant.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for annulment in part of the decision of the Office for Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements (PMO) of the European Commission of 17 April 2019 regarding the enforcement of a garnishee order. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for annulment in part of the decision of the Office for Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements (PMO) of the European Commission of 17 April 2019 regarding the enforcement of a garnishee order.

| 2. | The claim for damages is dismissed as inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The claim for damages is dismissed as inadmissible.

| 3. | Ms Laure Camerin shall pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Ms Laure Camerin shall pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings.

---

(1)  OJ C 270, 12.8.2019.

---
#### Marilyn Daniels, Appellant, v City of New York et al., Respondents.

[946 NYS2d 510]

— In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for defamation, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lewis, J.), dated March 8, 2011, as denied that branch of her motion which was for recusal.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The record does not reveal that any of the reasons for disqualification of a justice pursuant Judiciary Law § 14 are present here. Given the absence of any basis for disqualification predicated upon those express statutory provisions, the determination concerning a motion seeking recusal based on alleged impropriety, bias, or prejudice is within the discretion and “the personal conscience of the court” *(People v Moreno,*70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]; *see Ashmore v Ashmore,*92 AD3d 817, 820 [2012]; *Vogelgesang v Vogelgesang,*71 AD3d 1131, 1131 [2010]).

Here, the plaintiff failed to set forth any proof of bias or prejudice on the part of the court which would have warranted recusal *(see Matter of Greenfield,*53 AD3d 488, 488 [2008]; *Vest v Vest,*50 AD3d 776, 777 [2008]; *Schreiber-Cross v State of New York,*31 AD3d 425, 425 [2006]).

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are either without merit or improperly raised for the first time on appeal.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was for recusal *(see Ashmore v Ashmore,*92 AD3d at 820; *Irizarry v State of New York,*56 AD3d 613, 614 [2008]; *Matter of Khan v Dolly,*39 AD3d 649, 650 [2007]). Dillon, J.P., Leventhal, Hall and Austin, JJ., concur.
# C_2019155EN.01004801.xml

| 6.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 155/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 155/48

---

Action brought on 8 March 2019 — Société des produits Nestlé v EUIPO — Jumbo Africa (Device of a human figure centered over an escutcheon)

(Case T-149/19)

(2019/C 155/58)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Société des produits Nestlé SA (Vevey, Switzerland) (represented by: A. Jaeger-Lenz, A. Lambrecht and C. Elkemann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Jumbo Africa, SL (L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark representing a human figure centered over an escutcheon in colours red, blue, light blue, dark blue, grey and white — Application for registration No 15 273 634

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 30 November 2018 in Case R 876/2018-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | dismiss the appeal relating to Opposition Proceedings No. B 2 738 030; |
| --- | --- |

—

dismiss the appeal relating to Opposition Proceedings No. B 2 738 030;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and order the potential intervener to pay the costs before EUIPO. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and order the potential intervener to pay the costs before EUIPO.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 94(1), second sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 94(1), second sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 91(1), first sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 91(1), first sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 46(1)(a) read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 46(1)(a) read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
EXHIBIT 12

                    MERRILL LYNCH PREFERRED CAPITAL TRUST II
                    MERRILL LYNCH PREFERRED FUNDING II, L.P.
                      COMPUTATION OF RATIOS OF EARNINGS TO
          COMBINED FIXED CHARGES AND PREFERRED SECURITIES DISTRIBUTIONS

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                 For the Period February 6, 1997 to to March 28, 1997
                                 ----------------------------------------------------

                                 Merrill Lynch Preferred      Merrill Lynch Preferred
                                     Capital Trust II              Funding II, L.P.
                                 -----------------------      -----------------------

<S>                                    <C>                       <C>       
Earnings                               $3,711,341                $4,347,538
                                       ==========                ==========

Fixed charges                          $       -                 $        -

Preferred securities distribution
  requirements                          3,600,000                 3,711,341
                                       ----------                ----------

Total combined fixed charges and
  preferred securities distributions  $3,600,000                $3,711,341
                                       ==========                ==========

Ratio of earnings to combined
  fixed charges and preferred
  securities distributions                   1.03                      1.17
</TABLE>


                                       14
EXHIBIT 31.2



CERTIFICATION



I, Jasmine Gregory, certify that:



(1)I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A of Premier Holding Corp. for the period ended June 30, 2010;





(2) Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





(3) Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;





(4) The Registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:





(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;





(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and





(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the Registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrants internal control over financial reporting; and





(5) The Registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrants auditors and the audit committee of the Registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):





(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and





(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|Date:  October 8, 2010 | Jasmine Gregory
Chief Financial Officer
|---------------------- | ---------------------------------------
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Michael G. Milczakowskyj, Appellant.

[944 NYS2d 713]

Motion for writ of error coram nobis denied. Present — Centra, J.P, Garni, Lindley and Sconiers, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David Waters, Also Known as James Davis, Also Known as Daniel Walls, Also Known as David Walls, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lodato, J.), rendered April 2, 1982, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

We have reviewed the record and agree with defendant’s assigned counsel that there are no meritorious issues that could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted *{see, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631; *cf. People v Gonzalez, 47*NY2d 606). Mollen, P. J., Rubin, Lawrence and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
# C_2019363EN.01003401.xml

| 28.10.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 363/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 363/34

---

Action brought on 12 September 2019 — Katjes Fassin v EUIPO — Haribo The Netherlands & Belgium (WONDERLAND)

(Case T-616/19)

(2019/C 363/43)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Katjes Fassin GmbH & Co. KG (Emmerich am Rhein, Germany) (represented by: T. Schmitz and M. Breuer, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Haribo The Netherlands & Belgium BV (Breda, Netherlands)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU word mark WONDERLAND — Application No 16 263 295

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 July 2019 in Case R 2164/2019-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Reynaldo BARRON-MARTINEZ, also known as Martin Sanchez, also know as Benjamin Navarro-Hernandez, also known as Martin Espinoza, also know as Manuel Ayala, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-50926.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 7, 2011.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Rafael Henry Salas, Salas & Salas, L.L.P., El Paso, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Because of two later judicial decisions, the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.

*73Following defendant’s plea of guilty the district court sentenced him to 36 months of imprisonment, which was an upward variance over the Guidelines because of his under-represented criminal history. In calculating the Guidelines range the court imposed an eight-point enhancement of the offense level due to the treatment of a second state conviction for possession of a controlled substance as an aggravated felony under § 2L1.2. Thereafter the Supreme Court held that the second conviction could be an aggravated felony only if it was actually a recidivist felony conviction. *Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,*— U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2577, 177 L.Ed.2d 68 (2010).

Because the court must consider the correct Guidelines range before deciding upon the sentence to impose, the question remains of whether the court’s error was harmless. After the briefs were filed here, our court held that “the harmless error doctrine requires the proponent of the sentence to convincingly demonstrate that the court actually *would*have followed the very same reasoning absent the error.” *United States v. Ibarra-Luna,*628 F.3d 712, 717 (5th Cir.2010)(emphasis in original). “On these facts, the government has not met its burden to convincingly demonstrate that the court would have imposed the very [same] sentence if it had not made an erroneous calculation. We must therefore VACATE [the defendant’s] sentence and REMAND to the district court for resentencing.” *Id.*at 719.

SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under *73the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**Exhibit
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Metalline Mining Company (the "Company")
      on Form 10-QSB for the period ended July 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Wayne L.
      Schoonmaker, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
      to 18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, that:





1.  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2.  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition, and results of operations of the Company.








/s/
      Wayne L. Schoonmaker


Principal
      Financial Officer








Dated:
      September 18, 2006
FOR PUBLICATION JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT No. 14-90084 ORDER

KOZINSKI , Chief Judge: An attorney alleges that a bankruptcy judge is showing some early signs of dementia, such as slow reaction time, moodiness and memory problems. Pursuant to the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, any person who believes that a federal judge “is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or physical disability,” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a), may file a complaint stating the reasons for his belief. Such co mplaints are rare, perhaps in part because lawyers (who are in the best position to obs erve judicial behavior) are reluctant to point an accusatory finger at judges before whom they appear. Nevertheless, such complaints are welcome and encouraged, and we make every effort to keep the identity of the complainant confidential, if he wishes not to be identified. Such complaints are also taken seriously , particularly where (as in this case) the complainant specifies the particular be haviors that he believes are the result of 

# FILED

JUL 14 2014 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALSmental disability. This complainant was given an additional measure of deference because he reports familiarity with the symptoms of dementia, having tended to a family member who showed similar symptoms. Based on the complaint, therefore, I have undertaken a limited inquiry, as authorized by Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(b). I was unable to inquire about the particular instances in which complainan t observed the alleged signs of dementia because complainant doesn’t provide any transcripts or audio in support of his allegations; nor does he point to a case orspecify a date where the alleged signs were discernible. Nevertheless, I have spoken to judges who have had repeated recent opportunities to observe the subject judge in both private and public settings. They observed none of the symptoms reported by complainant. I have also spoken to judges who regularly review the subject judge’s work on appeal, and they report that they have observed no decline in his performance. All these judges expressed their continued confidence in the ability of the subject judge to discharge his duties competently and with distinction. In addition, I reviewed appeals to the Ninth Circuit of the judge’s cases for the last three years. No issues regard ing the judge’s competency were raised by the parties or evident from the appellate court’s disposition. Without more specific facts, complain ant’s allegations are insufficient to “raise an inference that . . . a disability exists.” Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(c)(1)(D);see also 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii). I nevertheless appreciate complainant’s willingness to file a complaint and bring his observations to my attention. And, of course, the matter is always subject to re -consideration if he or another member of the public should come forward with more concrete evidence of mental or physical disability.

DISMISSED.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 165 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 165

 Designating July 23, 2011, as ``National Day of the American Cowboy''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 5, 2011

  Mr. Enzi (for himself, Mr. Barrasso, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. 
Conrad, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Johnson of South Dakota, 
  Ms. Murkowski, Mr. Reid, Mr. Risch, and Mr. Roberts) submitted the 
   following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the 
                               Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Designating July 23, 2011, as ``National Day of the American Cowboy''.

Whereas pioneering men and women, recognized as ``cowboys'', helped establish 
        the American West;
Whereas the cowboy embodies honesty, integrity, courage, compassion, respect, a 
        strong work ethic, and patriotism;
Whereas the cowboy spirit exemplifies strength of character, sound family 
        values, and good common sense;
Whereas the cowboy archetype transcends ethnicity, gender, geographic 
        boundaries, and political affiliations;
Whereas the cowboy is an excellent steward of the land and its creatures, who 
        lives off the land and works to protect and enhance the environment;
Whereas cowboy traditions have been a part of the culture of the United States 
        for generations;
Whereas the cowboy continues to be an important part of the economy through the 
        work of many thousands of ranchers across the Nation who contribute to 
        the economic well-being of every State;
Whereas millions of fans watch professional and working ranch rodeo events 
        annually, and rodeo is one of the most-watched sports in the Nation;
Whereas membership and participation in rodeo and other organizations that 
        promote and encompass the livelihood of cowboys span every generation 
        and transcend race and gender;
Whereas the cowboy is a central figure in literature, film, and music and 
        occupies a central place in the public imagination;
Whereas the cowboy is an icon in the United States; and
Whereas the ongoing contributions made by cowboys and cowgirls to their 
        communities should be recognized and encouraged: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate--
            (1) designates July 23, 2011, as ``National Day of the 
        American Cowboy''; and
            (2) encourages the people of the United States to observe 
        the day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report  of  Bluefly,   Inc.  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2007, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Melissa
Payner-Gregor,  Chief Executive Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

         1. The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Melissa Payner-Gregor
----------------------------
Melissa Payner-Gregor
Chief Executive Officer
May 9, 2007