Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596,
599 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must consider the record as a whole, in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences that favor the
non-imoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S, at 255; Bay v. Cassens Transport Co, 212
F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

L Failure By Jones To Respond

We note that Jones has not responded to the arguments presented by ILA in
regards to the summary judgment motion or to ILA’s Local Rule 56.1 statement of
facts, thereby admitting the veracity of ILA’s stated facts. On September 25, 2003,
we gave the parties until January 12, 2004, to respond to dispositive motions that
were filed by December 30, 2003. Jones failed to respond to ILA’s summary
judgment motion by January 12, 2004. Jones filed a motion seeking an extension of
time to file an answer, but neither Jones nor her counsel appeared in court for her
noticed motion and we denied the motion. On February 10, 2004, Jones filed a brief

indicating that she would not be filing a response to the summary judgment motion.

IL Whether Claim is Untimely

ILA first argues that Jones’ charge of discrimination was untimely. We agree.


CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant ILA's motion for summary

judgment in its entirety.

Samuel wale, Sate ‘

United States District Court Judge

Dated: July 22, 2004


opportunity to conciliate is required because “conciliation between the parties may
solve discriminatory problems without the animosities created by coercion, and it
provides the respondent with the chance to voluntarily explain and justify past
conduct prior to the expense, publicity, and time consumption associated with
litigation. Jd. at 906-07.

Jones admits that she failed to participate in the Agency proceedings below.
(SF 12-18). She admits that she evaded and avoided the statutory scheme of agency
investigation by the EEOC that Congress directed. The EEOC “right-to-sue” letter
adopted the findings of the IDHR. In turn the IDHR explicitly dismissed Jones’
charge because of her non-cooperation, sending her a “Notice of Dismissal for
Failure to Proceed.” (SF 18). Finally, Jones never filed a “Request for Review” of
the IDHR’s dismissal of her charge for failure to adequately respond to reasonable
requests of the IDHR. Where a claimant initiates an administrative process and then
“affirmatively frustrates the agency’s efforts to investigate the charge, thus triggering
a dismissal of the charge for failure to cooperate, sound policy calls for the denial of
the claimant’s later effort to file suit in federal court.” Morris v. Albertson, Inc.,
2001 WL 936118, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2001). ILA was prejudiced because of Jones’
refusal to cooperate with IDHR’s processes and because it never had an opportunity
to learn the basis for Jones’ charges. Jones’ excuse for failing to attend the fact-
finding conference and otherwise failing to cooperate with IDHR’s investigation was

based on her alleged mental handicap-disability. However, at her deposition, Jones



A Title VII plaintiff seeking to bring a claim in Illinois “must file a charge with the
EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.” Bilow v. Much Shelist Freed
Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C, 277 F.3d 882, 892 (7* Cir. 2001). Jones
alleges that the discrimination against her began in May of 2000, yet Jones admits
that her charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”) was not
filed until September 5, 2001. Clearly the filing of this charge was untimely. Jones
has failed to offer any reason as to why the limitations period should have been

tolled.

Ill. Failure to Exhaust Claims

ILA argues that Jones failed to exhaust administrative proceedings, and as a
result ILA was deprived of its statutory right to mediate and conciliate. We agree.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies and participation in the Agency’s conciliation
and mediation proceedings is a prerequisite to a federal court jurisdiction over
employment discrimination actions arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Burton v. Great Western Steel Co., 833 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1993). An
EEOC charge is insufficient to confer jurisdiction in a private civil action when the
charged party has not been given an opportunity to participate in conciliation
proceedings aimed at voluntary compliance. Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen

Plumbers’ Local 130, 657 F.2d 890, 905 (Ci Cir. 1981). Furthermore, sufficient



adverse employment action.” Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir.
1998). If the employer provides such a reason, the plaintiff must then show that the
reason alleged by the employer is merely a pretext for discrimination./d.

As indicated above, all of ILA’s Local Rule 56.1 facts are deemed admitted
because Jones did not respond to the facts. The facts in this case show that ILA did
not refuse to offer Patricia Jones the opportunity to work as a Checker. On the
contrary, she was called by Johnson to work as an extra seven to ten times in 1999
and 35 times in 2000. (SF 50, 51). Such conduct by Johnson is inconsistent with
Jones’ allegations of discrimination.

Jones has also failed to even show that other similarly situated employees
were treated more favorably and, since the evidence shows that Jones failed to
answer her phone, (SF 53), Jones fails to show that she suffered an adverse
employment action. Also, even if Jones could establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, ILA has established a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason why
Johnson stopped calling her in early 2001 to work as an extra. ILA claims and Jones
admits that Jones did not answer her phone and she never called Johnson to inquire
about work. Finally, the record is devoid of any indications that ILA’s given reason

is a pretext.


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Dlinois

e of Assigned Judge - i Sitting Judge if Other
be Magistrate Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 4975 DATE 7122/2004
CASE Patricia Jones vs. I.L.A. Local 1803
TITLE
[ln the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
ql) im) Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) a Brief in support of motion due
(3) im Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer briefdue____.
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) a Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Qa Pretrial conference[held/continued to) [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(7) ao Trial[set for/re-set for] on
(8) im [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
COFRCP4(m) CO Local Rule 41.1 CIFRCP41{a)(1) OO FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) =f [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum opinion, the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety. All pending dates and motions are hereby stricken
as moot. Terminating case. Enter Memorandum Opinion.
(11) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required, number of notices
Notices mailed by judge's staff.
Not WUL 22 2004
lotified counsel by telephone. dave docketed
vo | Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form. keting depul} initials
Copy to judge/magisteate judge
courtroom date muiled notice
MW deputy's
itials
_ (e/tiqnerpogived in
contd © Clerk's Office railing deputy initials



expressly withdrew any claim based on disability. (SF 9). Therefore, Jones admits

that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

IIL. Merits of Claim

Finally, we note that even if Jones had filed her claim in a timely fashion, and
had exhausted her administrative remedies she would not succeed in defeating
ILA’s motion for summary judgment.

If an employer in a Title VII discrimination case brings a motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff can proceed under the direct or indirect method of proof in
order to defeat the motion. Pafford v. Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir. 1998).
Under the direct approach, the plaintiff can show through direct or circumstantial
evidence that the alleged harmful action of the employer was “motivated by an
impermissible purpose, such as her race or national origin.” Jd. Under the indirect
approach the plaintiff must establish aprima facie case which will allow an
inference of discrimination. Jd. To establish a prima facie case of race or gender
discrimination a plaintiff must show: “(1) that she was a member of a protected
class; (2) that she was performing her job satisfactorily; (3) that she experienced an
adverse employment action; and (4) that similarly situated individuals were treated
more favorably.” Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2002). Ifa prima
facie case is established, then there is a rebuttable presumption of discrimination and

the employer is required to offer a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the


Tace.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). In seeking a grant of summary judgment the moving party must
identify “those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This initial
burden may be satisfied by presenting specific evidence on a particular issue or by
pointing out “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.”/d. at
325. Once the movant has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest
on the allegations in the pleadings, but, “by affidavits or as otherwise provided for in
[Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A “genuine issue” in the context of a motion for
summary judgment is not simply a “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty



Members of ILA function as “Checkers.” They keep a record of cargo being
unloaded or loaded. Sometimes “Extras” are needed when the supply of regular
Checkers with seniority who can work the next day is exhausted. The system of
supplying Checkers has been in place for decades. Johnson, who has been
Secretary-Treasurer for 21 years, must phone Checkers or Extras when a stevedoring
company’s work order is received. Because of the need to promptly fulfill the work
order to supply Checkers for the next day, Johnson can not leave messages or wait
for a return call that may never materialize. If a Checker or Extra does not answer
the phone and Johnson cannot speak with the individual, he calls the next person.

In late 2000 and early 2001, Johnson lost contact with Plaintiff Patricia Jones
(“Jones”). He could never reach Jones by phone, and she never called him.
Therefore Johnson stopped calling Jones as an Extra. Moreover, during this same
period, Jones did not appear for the hiring shapes at her home local ILA 19. Thus,
Johnson concluded that Jones was no longer interested in working on the docks.

As a result, Jones filed a compliant against ILA alleging that her failure to
receive further phone calls from Johnson to work as an Extra on the docks was due
to discrimination based on sex, race, retaliation for opposing unlawful employment
practices and for seeking to join ILA as a member, and disability. However, Jones
has now withdrawn her claims of disability discrimination and retaliation based on
alleged refusal of ILA to permit her to join as a member. Therefore, all that remains

at issue is Jones’ claim that she was discriminated against based on her sex and her



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
PATRICIA A. JONES, )
Plaintiff, )
v. No. 02 C 4975
LL.A. LOCAL 1803,
Defendant. }
MEMORANDUM OPINION ROCMETED

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge JUL 23 2004

This matter is before the court on Defendant International Longshoremen’s

Association Local 1803's (“ILA”) motion for summary judgment. For the reasons

stated below, we grant the motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

BACKGROUND
ILA supplies Checkers based on work orders that its Secretary-Treasurer, Bror
Johnson (“Johnson”) receives from stevedoring companies in the Port of Chicago.
Presently, work in the port has slowed significantly compared to prior years. For the
past few years there have only been two stevedoring companies that have had
collective bargaining agreement with ILA. As a consequence, work opportunities

for longshoremen have been significantly reduced, and work has been sporadic.

1