alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Robina JENKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy L. WORLEY, individually and in her capacity as Secretary of State, State of Alabama, Joe Dickson, Harry McMillan, Horace W. Powell, Sr., *491Joyce P. O’Neal, individually and in their capacity as members of the State Personnel Board, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 08-12603

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 6, 2009.

James Edward Wilson, Jr., Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Alice Ann Byrne, State of Aabama Personnel Department, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before BIRCH, HULL and COX, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Robina Jenkins was employed by the Alabama Secretary of State’s office as a Departmental Program Manager. During a state-wide budget crisis in 2008, she was laid off. Nancy L. Worley was the appointing authority within the Secretary of State’s office, and the person who informed Jenkins that she was laid off. In July 2005, Jenkins petitioned the State Personnel Board (“the Board”) for a hearing regarding the propriety of the lay-off and whether Worley had impermissibly hired another employee to fill Jenkins’s position after Jenkins was laid off. The Board responded both that Jenkins’s petition was untimely and that the Board had conducted a review of its records and could find no factual support for Jenkins’s claims.

In October 2005, Jenkins filed a lawsuit in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, alleging that Worley and the other Defendants, all members of the Board, had violated Alabama’s Merit System Act and deprived Jenkins of her property interest in her job, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Defendants removed the case to federal court. (R.l-1.) The magistrate judge denied Jenkins’s motion for remand to state court and later granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of Jenkins’s claims.1 Jenkins appeals, arguing that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that genuine issues of material fact made summary judgment inappropriate.

First, we consider the jurisdictional issue. After review of the pleadings, we conclude that the federal court had jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), an action that “aris[es] under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States” is generally removable. Each and every count of Jenkins’s complaint alleges a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Jenkins’s argument that these claims are peripheral to her state claims is insufficient to deprive the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction. Removal was proper.

On the merits, we find that summary judgment for the Defendants also was proper for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s Memorandum Opinion and Order. (R.3-50 at 11-13.)

*492For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment for the Defendants is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

1

. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties consented to entry of final judgment by the magistrate judge.
Cherry J. 920, 605 P.2d 196 (1979). The district court's written order of January 6, 2015, specifically provides that the matter is continued for further evidentiary proceedings, based on appellant's express request for the continuance. The minute order of December 24, 2014, is likewise not final for the same reasons. See also Rust v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 688-89, 747 P.2d 1380, 1381-82 (1987) (explaining that a minute order is ineffective for any purpose and cannot be appealed, and that a written order or judgment must be filed before a district court ruling can be appealed). The notice of appeal is premature under NRAP 4(a) because the district court has not entered a final written judgment adjudicating all the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Accordingly, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal and we

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED. 2

cc: Hon. Sandra L. Pomrenze, District Judge, Family Court Division Robert E. Gaston, Settlement Judge Bourke Law Ltd. The Law Offices of Patrick Driscoll, LLC Eighth District Court Clerk

2 Appellant's motion for late filing of the fast track statement, filed on May 18, 2015, is denied as moot.

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA 2

(0) 1947A
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 7190** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. DANE CLARK, a/k/a Darrell Howell, a/k/a Paul Grier, a/k/a Oral Merchant , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond
. Henry E. Hudson , District Judge. ( 3:03

- cr - 00079

- HEH

- RCY

- 7 ; 3:12

- cv - 00554

- HEH

- RCY )

Submitted : December 17, 2015 Decided: December 22, 2015

Before DIAZ and HARRIS , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge
.
Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Dane Clark , Appellant Pro Se. Stephen Wiley Miller , Elizabeth Wu , Assistant United States Attorneys, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee
.

Un published opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Dane Clark seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ( 2012 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (20 12 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (20 12 ). When the district court denies relief o n the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a con stitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Clark has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argum ent because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                      48,905,392
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  455,564
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            50,030,572
<PP&E>                                      16,719,404
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,467,130
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              63,859,568
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        5,911,310
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       132,986
<OTHER-SE>                                  50,187,561
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                63,859,568
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,013,213
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               13,089,333
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             5,219,955
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (10,178,215)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (10,178,215)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (10,686,650)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.90)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.90)
        

</TABLE>
# C_2020215EN.01004101.xml

| 29.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 215/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 215/41

---

Judgment of the General Court of 13 May 2020 — adp Gauselmann v EUIPO — Gameloft (City Mania)

(Case T-381/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark City Mania - Earlier EU word mark City Lights - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2020/C 215/51)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: adp Gauselmann GmbH (Espelkamp, Germany) (represented by: P. Koch Moreno, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Palmero Cabezas, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Gameloft SE (Paris, France)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 April 2019 (Case R 976/2018-2), relating to opposition proceedings between adp Gauselmann and Gameloft.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders adp Gauselmann GmbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders adp Gauselmann GmbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 270, 12.8.2019.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                       3,933,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  862,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  7,496,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            13,038,000
<PP&E>                                       1,965,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                 507,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              14,534,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        5,886,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       10,684,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        49,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 (10,768,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                14,534,000
<SALES>                                      7,885,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,885,000
<CGS>                                        5,982,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               12,879,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (10,968,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (10,968,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (10,968,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (2.31)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (2.31)




</TABLE>
#### KEYSTONE PUB. CO., Appellant, v. LAMBERT SNYDER CO., Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

November 22, 1907.)

Action by the Keystone Publishing Company against the Lambert Snyder Company. I. F. Russell, for appellant. W. H. Osborne, for respondent.

No opinion. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. Order filed.
# C_2019213EN.01007401.xml

| 24.6.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 213/74 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.6.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/74

---

Action brought on 30 April 2019 — Chypre v EUIPO — Filotas Bellas & Yios (Halloumi Vermion grill cheese M BELAS PREMIUM GREEK DAIRY SINCE 1927)

(Case T-281/19)

(2019/C 213/71)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Republic of Cyprus (represented by: S. Malynicz QC (Queen’s Counsel), S. Baran, Barrister, V. Marsland, Solicitor)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Filotas Bellas & Yios AE (Alexandreia Imathias, Greece)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark Halloumi χαλούμι Vermion grill cheese/grill est/grill kase M BELAS PREMIUM GREEK DAIRY SINCE 1927 –European Union trade mark No 12 172 276

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 15 February 2019 in Case R 2298/2017-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | the Defendant shall bear its own costs and pay those of the Applicant for Annulment. |
| --- | --- |

—

the Defendant shall bear its own costs and pay those of the Applicant for Annulment.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-1704
ORVILLE LEWIS, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, versus UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICER, Hopewell Police Department; WAYNE CLEVELAND, Chief of Police, Hopewell Police Department; DAN WETTA, Chairman and CEO, John Randolph Medical Center; JOSEPH WALKER, Security Officer; PATRICIA L. WILLIAMS, Attorney-in-Fact; JOYCE W. WILLIAMS, Caregiver, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge. (CA-02-141-3) Submitted: October 24, 2002 Decided: October 30, 2002 Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Orville Lewis, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Patricia L. Williams, Joyce W. Williams, Appellees; David Patrick Corrigan, HARMAN, CLAYTOR, CORRIGAN & WELLMAN, Richmond, Virginia; Michael John Otten, LECLAIR RYAN, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM: Orville Lewis, Jr., appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Lewis v. Unknown Police Officer , No. CA-02-141-3 (E.D. Va. June 3, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 8 Referred in House (RFH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. CON. RES. 8

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 1, 2011

              Referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
      Recognizing women serving in the United States Armed Forces.

Whereas women have served with distinction in the United States Armed Forces 
        since the American Revolution and have made significant and lasting 
        contributions to the security of the United States;
Whereas in 2011, women comprise nearly 16 percent of the United States Armed 
        Forces and serve in positions of responsibility in the active and 
        reserve components of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast 
        Guard, as compared with less than 5 percent in 1976 when women were 
        first integrated into the service academies;
Whereas women serve at the highest levels in the Department of Defense and other 
        governmental organizations contributing to the defense of the United 
        States; and
Whereas the accomplishments of generations of women have contributed to the 
        history of the United States Armed Forces and to the strength of the 
        United States: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That Congress--
            (1) recognizes the importance of women to national defense 
        throughout the history of the United States; and
            (2) encourages the people of the United States to honor 
        women who have served and who continue to serve the United 
        States in the United States Armed Forces.

            Passed the Senate February 28, 2011.

            Attest:

                                                NANCY ERICKSON,

                                                             Secretary.
```
Exhibit 23.1 

 

Independent Auditors’ Consent

 

The Board of Directors 

Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc.: 

 

We consent tothe incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No. 333-12025, No. 333-68128, No. 333-83650, and No. 333-106647) on Form S-8 and registration statements (No. 333-74432 and No. 333-111517) on form S-3 of Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc.,of our report dated January 29, 2004, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. as of December 31, 2003 and 2002, and the related consolidated statements of earnings and comprehensive earnings, changes instockholders’ equity and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2003, which report appears in the December 31, 2003, annual report on Form 10-K of Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. 

 

As discussed in Note A to the consolidated financial statements, the Company changed itsmethod of accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities in 2001. 

 

/s/    KPMG LLP 

 

Orange County, California 

March 15, 2004
#### BONAFEDE, Respondent, v. UVALDE ASPHALT PAVING CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Di ion, First Department-

October 25, 1907.)

Action by Eduardo Bonafede against the Uvalde Asphalt Paving Company. N. L. Keach, for appellant. L. Cohn, for respondent.

No opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. Order filed.
Exhibit 13.2

CERTIFICATION OF JIM HAGEMANN SNABE, CO-CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF SAP AG

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.

SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of SAP AG (the Company) on Form 20-F for the period ending December 31, 2013, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 21, 2014 (the Report), the undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |  |  |        |  |                            |  | 
|------------------- |  |  |  | ------ |  | -------------------------- |  | 
|Date March 20, 2014 |  |  |  | By:    |  | /s/ Jim Hagemann Snabe     |  | 
|                    |  |  |  | Name:  |  | Jim Hagemann Snabe         |  | 
|                    |  |  |  | Title: |  | Co-Chief Executive Officer |  | 

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350 and is not being
filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.
# C_2020061EN.01004201.xml

| 24.2.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 61/42 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.2.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 61/42

---

Order of the General Court of 20 December 2019 — ZU v EEAS

(Case T-154/19) (1)

(Action for annulment - Civil service - Officials - Mission expenses - Act not open to challenge - Act not adversely affecting an official - Irregular nature of the pre-litigation procedure - Premature action - Inadmissibility)

(2020/C 61/53)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: ZU (represented by: C. Bernard-Glanz, lawyer)

Defendant: European External Action Service (represented by: S. Marquardt and R. Spac, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action based on Article 270 TFEU seeking annulment of the part of the decision of 30 November 2018 by which the EEAS Appointing Authority rejected the applicant’s complaint of 27 July 2018, inasmuch as it implicitly refused the request concerning mission expenses submitted by the applicant on 26 February 2018.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

| 2. | ZU shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ZU shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 155, 6.5.2019.

---