JOH N D AV IS, P la in t if f,
v. DE P AR TM EN T OF JU STIC E,

Defendan t. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Ci vi l A cti on 88 -00 13 0 (H HK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION AN D O RD ER Be fore the cour

t is J ohn Davis’s motion for the attorney ’s fe es and c osts he has incurr ed in prosecutingthis lawsuit brought unde r the F ree dom of Information Ac t (“F OIA”) , 5 U.S.C. § 552, et seq . [#266] . This motion was refe rre d to Mag istrate Judge A lan Kay for his re port and
rec ommendation pursuant to L CvR 72.3. The centra l question before the cour t is whether a statutory provision, enac ted into law while this case was still pending, a nd authorizing the a

war d of attorne y ’s fe es in situations li ke those pre sented in this case , operates retr oactively . The Mag istrate Judge c oncluded that it did and re commended that Davis’s motion be g rante d. Report
and Re c omm e nd a tio n at 18 (“ Re p. & Re c .” ) [# 27 6]. T he De pa rtme nt o f Jus tic e (“ DO J”) ob je c ts to the Rep. & Rec., a

nd argues that the statutory provision does not apply retroa ctively

and that Davis ca nnot rec over a

ny attorney ’s fe es or c osts. Upon consideration of Davis’s motion, the DOJ’s opposit ion, the Rep. & Rec., the D OJ ’s objection ther eto, and Da vis’s response to the DOJ’s objection, the court conc ludes that the DOJ’s objection has merit, and that Davis’s motion for attorney ’s fe es and c osts must be denie d.2 I. BACKG ROUND Davis broug ht this case under FOIA see king a

udiotapes re corde d during a cr iminal investigation from the Fe dera l Bure au of I nvestig ation (“F BI ”). The fac ts and proce dural history of the c ase a

re thoroughly

descr ibed in the Mag istrate Judge’ s Rep. & Re c. and w ill not be repe ated he re. The court will, howeve r, g ive a br ief e x planation of the history of the attorney ’s fee s dispute. In 2000, Davis moved the c ourt to awa rd him attorney ’s fe es and c osts. This court denied the motion, holding that the Court of Appe als for the District of Columbia Circuit (“Court of Appea ls”) had f

orec losed the aw ard of

attorney ’s fe es in this case in Oi l, C he mi c al &

Atom ic W orkers Int’ l Union, AFL-CIO v. De p’t of Energy

(“ OCAW ”). O rder , Davis v. D ep’t of Justice , Civ. No. 88-130 (D.D.C. Jul y 23, 2002) [#230]
. OCAW held that to be elig ible for a n awa rd of attorney ’s fe es under

FOIA, a plaintiff must have achie ved re lief as a result of a

court judg ment
or cour t-order ed conse nt decr ee. OCAW , 288 F.3d 452, 456 ( D.C. Cir. 2002). On appe al, the C o urt o f A p p ea l s u

p h el d th i s co urt ’s o rd er , ci t i n g OCAW
. Davis v. D ep’t of Justice , 460 F.3d 92, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2006). While Davis had re ceive d 158 tapes fr om the FB I , a conside rable amount of re lief, the Court of Appe als conc luded that “none wer e produc ed as the result of a judgme nt on the merits or a

court-or dere d consent de cre e,” a nd there fore Davis could not re ceive attorney ’s fee s. Id . at 105-06 (inter

nal quotations omitt ed). A s it had in OCAW , th e Court

of Ap pe a ls reje cted the pr oposition t hat Davis c ould be awa rded attorney ’s fe es under a “c ataly st theory ,” i.e ., that he c ou ld r e c e ive a tto rn e y ’s fe e s b e c a us e the laws uit

br ou g ht a

bo ut a vo luntary

c ha ng e in the def endant’ s conduct. See id.3

In 2007, Congr ess passed the Open Gove rnment Ac t of 2007, which amended the standard f or dete rmining whether

a litiga nt is eligible for

attorney ’s fe es under

FOIA. See 5 U. S.C. § 5 52 (a )( 4) (E ). Th is n e w p ro vis ion a uth or ize s th e awa

rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in

the c a se wh e re “ the c omp la ina

nt h a s o bta ine d r e lie f t

hr ou g h .
. . a

vo luntary

or un ilate ra l c ha

ng e in position by

the ag ency , if the complaina nt’s claim is not insubst antial.” Id . Congr ess thus codified the “cataly st theory” re jected in OCAW

and Da v is . Davis now see ks to revisit the issue of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in

lig ht o f t his e na c tme nt.

II. AN AL YSI S The c entra l question before the cour t is whether the pr ovision of the Open Gove rnment Act of 2007, a

uthorizi ng attorney ’s fe es under the circ umstances of

this case, ha s retroa ctive
e ff e c t and thu s a pp lie s to Da

vis ’s re qu e st f

or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. In h is R e p. & Re c ., the Ma g istrate J udg e conc luded that the provision has re troac tive eff ect a nd rec ommended that the c ourt awa rd Davis attorne y ’s fe es. Rep. & Rec. at 8, 14. The DOJ strongly objects to this conclusion and argues that principles of

sovere ign immunity

bar the retroa ctive application of the attorney ’s fe es pr ov isi on . T he DO J is c or re c t. Th e Ma g istrate Judg e ’s Re p. & Re c . a c kn ow le dg e d th e tr a dit ion a l pr e sumpt ion a g a ins t applying statutes retroa ctively , but cited to the Supreme Court’s de cisions in Bradley and Landgraf for the pr oposition t hat this presumption does not apply to attorney ’s fe es. Rep. & Rec. at 6-8. In Bradley , the Supreme Court a ddresse d whether plaintiffs in a dese g reg ation action
we re e nti tle d to a tto rn e y ’s fe e s w he n th e statut e a uth or izin g tho se fe e s w a s e na c te d a ft e r t he c a se was submitted to the appea ls court. Bradley v . Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 698-99 (1974). The Court based its holding “ on the principle that a cour t is to apply

the law in ef

fec t at4

the tim e it r e nd e rs its de c isi on , unle ss d oin g so wo uld re su lt i n ma

nif e st i nju sti c e or

the re is statutory direc tion or leg islative history to the contra

ry ,” and de termined that the attorney ’s fe es provision was re troac tive. Id . at 711. Two de cade s later, in Landgraf , the Court rec og nized the tension betwee n the traditional pre sumption aga inst retroac tivity and Bradley , but held that fee sh if tin g statut e s d o n ot r e se mbl e the ty pe s o f c a se s in

wh ic h th e tr a dit ion a l pr e sumpt ion a g a ins t retroa ctivity

has bee n invoked bec ause “ [a] ttorney ’s fe e dete rminations . . . are collater al to the main cause of ac tion and uniquely separ able f

rom the ca

use of a ction to be prove d at trial.” Lan dg ra f v . U SI Fi lm Pr od

s. , 511 U.S. 255, 277 (1994) (inter nal quotations omitt ed). The Mag istrate Judge a lso cited Cun e o v . R um sfe ld , 553 F.2d 1360, 1367 ( D.C. Cir. 1977), overruled on other grounds , w hic h h e ld t hat th e F OIA p ro vis ion

a uth or izin g a tto rn e y ’s fe e s e na c te d in 1974 could be a

pplied to an ac tion that was commenc ed in 1967 but terminated a fter the statute’s ef fe ct i v e d at e. R ep . & R ec . at8
. On th e b as i s o f t h es e p re ce d en t s , th e M agi s tra t e J u d ge conclude d that attorney ’s fe es provisions, such as the ne wly enac ted FO I A provision, wer e retroa ctive and that Davis was e ligible f or attorne y ’s fe es. Id
. Th e DO J obje c ts t o th e Ma g istrate Judg e ’s c on c lus ion , a rg uin g that a

pp lyingthe statut e retroa ctively

in this case is contra

ry to basic principles of

sovere ign immunity . Instead, the D OJ urg es the c ourt to apply

the rule of

strict construction under

which any

doubts about the scope of
a w a i v e r o f s o v e r e i g ni m mun i ty mu s tb e r e s o l v e d i nf av o r o f th e n ar r o w e r g o v e r n m e n t a l l i a

b i l i ty,
and thu s c on c lud e that th e pr ov isi on is n ot r e tr oa c tiv e . T he DO J cit e s Br own , in which the Court of Appe als conc luded that an amendment to the Civil R ights Ac t allowing the rec overy of i n t er es to nat t o rn ey ’s fe es s h o u l d n o tb e ap p l i edre tro ac t i v el y b ec au s e w ai v er s o f s o v er ei gn immunit y are to be strictly

construed. See B rown v. Sec’ y of Army , 78 F.3d 645, 647 ( D.C. Cir.5

1996). The Court of

Appea ls in Br own , acc ording to the DOJ, di stinguished Bradley be c a us e Bradley did no t c on c e rn

so ve re ig n immun ity . D avis re joi ns that th e DO J’s a

rgume nt i s
un d e r m i n e d b y Cuneo , in

wh ic h th e Court

of Ap pe a ls a

pp lie d atto rn e y ’s fe e s ame ndme nts to FOIA re troac tively
. Cuneo , a c c o r d i n g t o D av i s , i s c l e ar an d d i r e c tp r e c e d e n tth a tF O IA attorney ’s fe es ame ndments waive sove reig n immunit y and apply

retroa ctively
. Br own , D avis argues, is of no assistance to the DOJ because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amendments at issue in that case involved chang es to the substantive law, suc h as providingfor damag es and jury tr ia ls, and no t me re ly

pr oc e dura l matte rs . Th e c ourt c on c lud e s th a t Br own dictates the outc ome in this case. In Br own , the Court of Appea ls addresse d head on the question of how to re solve the tension betwe en (1) the Bradley rule that the c ourt should apply the law in ef

fec t at the time it render s its decision and (2) the tra d i t i o n al p re s u m

p t i o naga i n s tre tro ac t i v i ty , i nth e c as e w h er e t h e U n i t edS t at es ’ s o v er ei gn immunit y is at issue. Br own , 78 F.3d at 650-61 (“A s they relate to the question of whe ther a statute is retroa ctive, then, it would see m that the Bradley presumption and the r

ule of strict
c o n s tr u c t i o nar e a

n t i p o d a l
. ” )
. Inth a tc a s e , th e qu e s t i o nw a s w h e th e r anam e n dm e n tt o T i t l e V II that allowed the a

war d of intere st on attorney ’s fe es and c osts was retr oactive. Id . at 647. The Court of Ap pe a ls h e ld t

hat “ [i]n th e sp e c ia l c a se . . . in wh ic h th e ne wl y

e na c te d s tatut e is a wavier of sover eig n immunit y , the rule of strict construction re quires . . . the statute . . . to be construed no mor e broa dly than is require d by

its terms.” Id . at 65 1. Th e Court of Ap pe a ls distinguished Bradley , concludingthat “[t] he statute at issue in Bradley , h ow e ve r, wa s n ot a
wa ive r o f t

he so ve re ig n immun ity

of the Un ite d St a te s . . . . A s a re su lt, the Sup re me Court in Bradley had no occ asion to adver t to the special princ iple of statutory construction that it had6

previously

made a pplicable to wa ivers of sove reig n immunit y .” Id . at 64 9; see also id. at 651 (“ Bradley was re adily

distinguishable: the United States w as not the def endant in that ca se.”) (i n t ern al qu o t at i o no m i t t ed ). T hu s , th e C o urt o f A p p ea l s co n cl u d edth at wh er e t h e s o v er ei gn immunit y of the United States is at issue, the r ule of strict c onstruction trumps the Bradley rule. Davis ar g ues that instead of Br own , the cour t should look t o Cuneo , w hic h h e ld t hat a FOIA attorne y ’s fe e provision applied r etroa ctively despite the fa ct that the United States wa s the defe ndant. The c ourt ac knowledg es that the holding of Cuneo a pp e ars to b e in t e ns ion

wi th Br own . The Court of Appe als, howeve r, distinguished Cuneo in Br own , ex p l ai n i n g Cuneo as follows: the “leg islative history showed that Cong ress intende d that [t he] ex isting body of law g overningattorney ’s fe es be use d to determine whether [an] awa rd could be made a g ainst [t he] Gover nment.” Id . at 65 2. Th e c ourt c on c lud e s th a t to the e xten t th a t Cuneo wo uld le a d it to
r e a c ha d i f f e r e n th o l d i n g , th i s i s f

o r e c l o s e d b y Br own , which conside red Cuneo and ne c e ssa ri ly de te rm ine d th a t Cuneo did not stand for the proposition that attorney ’s fe es provisions are retroa ctive in ca ses wher e the g overnme nt is the defenda nt absent a showingof Cong ressional intent. Moreover , Davis’s sug g estion that the amendme nt in Br own chang ed the law substantively , and so Br own i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o th i s c a s e , i s b e l i e d

b y Br own , in which the Court of Appe als consider ed only the issue of the r etroa ctivity of intere st on attorney ’s fe es. See Br own , 78 F.3d at 647. III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, it is this 24 day of Mar ch 2009, her eby th OR DE RE D that D avis ’s mot ion fo r a tto rn e y ’s fe e s [# 2 66 ] is DE NI ED
.

Henr y H. Kenne dy , J r. Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ct J u d ge