FAX NO. 3632 585-6022 Nov. 25 2883 85:35PM P21

+ Fermilab

November 25, 2003

In my haste yesterday I noticed I had not put a date on the fax.

Payroll Recerds
TO:

FROM: Terry Erickeca Sau Cutbioer?

suBsect, Monthly time shects
Please send a copy of my monthly timeshoets starting with Jamuary 2001 through end
including December 2002. ID 1384 Social Security 44-46-7129

1 will be away the rest of the week and I know it’s short notice, but hopefully you can get
to them before the break.

Mail to:
Rothchild & Dore

c/o P.O, Box 393
Batavia, IL, 60510

Thanks,

EXHIBIT

A



Mr. Dore’s response to the motion to dismiss relied primarily on his argument that the
protective order was not violated because defendant had not marked Ms. Erickson’s personnel
file “confidential,” as required by the order for the protection of confidential documents. Neither
Mr. Dore nor plaintiff denied the facts recited above about the alleged forgeries. Instead, Mr.
Dore argued that defendant should have produced Ms. Erickson’s time sheets but failed to do so
(which defendant denies) -- as if that justified plaintiff's conduct. Mr. Dore also complained
about other, unrelated discovery infractions by defendant and argued that his client’s conduct did
not rise (or sink) to the level of contempt or abuse that would justify sanctions pursuant to Rule
37 or the “innate” authority of the court.

Because of the serious, indeed potentially criminal* nature of the conduct alleged by
defendant, the court allowed the parties to take discovery. At her deposition on December 31,
2003, plaintiff asserted her spousal, attorney-client and Fifth Amendment privileges, and refused
to answer any substantive question. At his deposition, Paul Greviskes asserted the spousal and
attorney-client privileges, and answered those questions deemed not to implicate those privileges.

The court decided to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss, again due to
the serious nature of this matter, as well as questions about the scope of the privileges asserted by
Paul Greviskes. Additional evidence of misconduct by plaintiff in attempting to conceal certain
facts raised in defendant’s reply brief after discovery, as more fully discussed below, also
motivated the court to hold an evidentiary hearing. Although Mr. Dore filed no less than two

frivolous motions to “dismiss” the motion to dismiss and avoid the hearing, the court conducted

‘In addition to the forgery, unauthorized use of a person’s social security number may be
a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(8), and transmission of the faxes may constitute wire fraud
under 18 U.S.C. § 1343.



and non-testifying non-party witnesses whose assistance is necessary for purposes
of litigating this action to the extent necessary in order to furnish such assistance
»

The order, therefore, does not seem to prohibit disclosure of information from a
personnel file to a party’s personnel department that already possesses that
information. Moreover, as continually noted by Mr. Dore, defendant’s counsel
neglected to mark Ms. Erickson’s personnel file “Confidential,” as required by the
protective order to afford protection to those documents.

3. Consequently, the court concludes that although plaintiff's use of Ms. Erickson’s
employee identification and Social Security numbers and her (forged) signature
violated the spirit of the protective order, it did not violate the letter of the order.

4. Failure to establish an express violation of the protective order as a Rule 37(b)
violation is of little help to plaintiff, however, because her conduct was deceptive,
fraudulent, criminal’! and inexcusable.

(a) Plaintiffs forgery of Ms. Erickson’s signature is a crime under state law.
720 ILCS 5/17-3.

(b) Plaintiffs misuse of Ms. Erickson’s Social Security number is a felony
under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(8).

(c) Transmission of the November 24 and 25, 2003, faxes by telephone to
defendant’s payroll office constitutes wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343.

5. Plaintiff knew her conduct in sending the faxes was improper and tried to conceal
it by falsely representing to SBC that the court had granted in part a motion to
quash the subpoenas defendant had served on SBC. Having learned that fax
transmissions could be traced to her home, plaintiff sent her December 31, 2003,
fax to SBC from an Office Depot in her home town of Aurora on the same day she
had been questioned about the November faxes at her deposition and that her
husband filed a motion to quash defendant’s first subpoena seeking documents
concerning the telephone number on his brother’s fax machine.

6. As previously discussed, the court finds that plaintiff sent the December 31, 2003,
fax to SBC (defendant’s Exhibits 3 and 13) in an attempt to conceal material

''The court does not intend by these findings to imply that the evidence establishes guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, as would be required in a criminal proceeding (at which no inference
of guilt could be drawn from plaintiff's assertion of her Fifth Amendment privileges).

9



granted. By the last of these conversations between Ms. Hicks and plaintiff, Ms.
Hicks had learned that a motion to quash had been denied and so informed
plaintiff. According to Ms. Hicks, plaintiff began to cry when Ms. Hicks told her
the records had been released pursuant to the subpoenas, and stated to Ms. Hicks
that this was a murder case and that “the situation was too painful to discuss.”

5. The complaint that began the phone calls between Ms. Hicks and plaintiff is
reflected in defendant’s Exhibits 3 and 13, a fax sent from an Office Depot in
Aurora, Illinois (the same city as plaintiff's home address), to SBC’s “Subpoena
Center” in Dallas. According to the date and time denoted by these exhibits, this
fax was sent at 5:18 p.m. on December 31, 2003, the same day plaintiff gave her
deposition in this matter (at 10:00 a.m.).° The text of the fax reads:
Per my conversation with Rosetta Hix [sic] on 12/29/03 at 2:55
pm. And her request for a informal note a motion to quash is being
entered for 630-879-8383, and 630-879-8390,
Billed under the master number 630-896-6146, is 630-859-0045.
Only those two numbers can be released. A motion to quash is
entered on 630-896-6856.
The “Fax Transmissions” (cover) sheet bears the signature of the “customer” of Office
Depot who caused the fax to be sent. The signature is that of plaintiff, Angelita Greviskes.
Although plaintiff asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege, her signature was tentatively
identified by Ms. Erickson. In addition, a document bearing plaintiffs signature was introduced

as defendant’s Exhibit 16, which confirms that the signature on the December 31 (Exhibits 3 and

13) fax is plaintiff's. The court therefore admits these documents into evidence.’

‘December 31, 2003, was also the day Paul Greviskes filed his first motion to quash
defendant’s discovery subpoena seeking records relating to his brother’s fax machine. Paul’s
second motion and Mr. Dore’s motion to quash were filed January 5, 2004, and presented to and
ruled on by the court on January 8.

"The court had reserved ruling on the admissibility of defendant’s Exhibits 3 and 13 at the
May 26 hearing, and concludes that they are admissible as relevant (FRE 401) and authentic
(FRE 901). In addition, to the extent plaintiff objected based on hearsay, they are not being
admitted for the truth of the matters asserted therein (FRE 801(c)) and constitute admissions by a
party against the party’s interest (FRE 801(d)(2)).

6



the hearing® on May 26, 2004. At the hearing plaintiff asserted the same privileges for her and
Paul Greviskes that had been asserted at their depositions. In addition, defendant presented
several witnesses from SBC and defendant’s staff, including Ms. Erickson and Ms. Consolvo.
Mr. Dore subpoenaed Mr. Gassman, but his examination of Gassman was totally immaterial.

The following additional facts were established by documents and affidavits submitted by
defendant after it conducted discovery with respect to the motion to dismiss, and by the exhibits
and testimony at the May 26 hearing:

1. According to records and testimony from representatives of SBC Services, Inc.,
the telephone company that services plaintiffs home, Paul Greviskes’ law firm
and Greviskes Builders, the second telephone line at plaintiffs home at the time
the November 24 and 25, 2003, faxes were sent was 630-896-6856.

2. At the times those faxes were sent, one minute calls were placed from plaintiff's
second line (630-896-6856) to defendant’s payroll department’s telephone number
630-840-2528,

3. On or about December 26, 2003, SBC cancelled plaintiff's second home line
(630-896-6856) and installed a new number for a second home line (630-859-
0045), at the customer’s request.

4, According to a declaration by Rosetta Hicks, a “Service Records Clerk” at SBC’s
Dallas office, late in December 2003 and January 2004 Ms. Hicks responded to a
complaint by plaintiff “about certain records being disclosed in response to [a]
subpoena” issued by defendant in connection with the instant proceedings. Ms.
Hicks states that she called plaintiffs primary home number (630-896-6146) and
spoke with a woman identifying herself as plaintiff. Over several such telephone
conversations, according to Ms. Hicks, plaintiff (who was “noticeably upset”)
complained that SBC should not release records related to plaintiff's home
secondary line because a motion to quash the subpoena had purportedly been

°Mr. Dore also filed a motion to quash a discovery subpoena on Dore & Rothchild
seeking records relating to telephone number 630-585-8022 (Donald Greviskes’s fax machine),
and Paul Greviskes filed two motions to quash subpoenas seeking telephone records. As
discussed more fully below, Paul’s motions were denied, and Mr. Dore’s motion was granted by
agreement because defendant’s counsel had concluded that Mr. Dore was not personally involved
in plaintiff's misconduct.



well as common sense, the court finds that his professed ignorance of his home secondary
telephone number and his testimony that he had never seen his brother’s fax machine is not
credible.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Having carefully considered the evidence, including the documents submitted into
evidence and the testimony of the witnesses,’ the court finds:

1. Plaintiff sent the November 24 and 25, 2003, faxes (Appendices 1 and 2 hereto)
to defendant’s personnel department, in which plaintiff, (a) impersonated Terry
Erickson by forging her signature and using her employee identification and
Social Security numbers, (b) improperly sought to obtain Ms. Erickson’s
protected personnel records, (c) falsely represented that the documents were to be
sent to her attorney, Mr. Dore, when in fact the address and fax numbers listed in
these faxes belonged to her husband, Paul Greviskes. Plaintiff sent the faxes over
her second house telephone line (630-896-6856) using her deceased brother-in-
law’s fax machine.

2. Plaintiff obtained Ms. Erickson’s employee identification and Social Security
numbers and her signature from the personnel records produced by defendant
during discovery. The agreed protective order entered by this court on July 22,
2003, specifically covers “personnel files of individuals other than [p]laintiff,”
and provided that such records could be retained and copied only by plaintiff's
counsel (Mr. Dore)'®, and further provides: “Confidential Documents and the
contents thereof shall not be disclosed or made known by Plaintiff’s counsel to
any other person, except . . .. [t]o the Plaintiff for purposes of this lawsuit only . . .

°The court is concerned that Ms. Hicks’ testimony was presented by affidavit rather than
deposition, which could easily have been conducted by telephone. Plaintiff has not objected to
the introduction of the affidavit or sought to strike it, however. Moreover, the court took
defendant’s motion to dismiss to consider along with the summary judgment motion which,
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, maybe supported by affidavit. Finally, plaintiff has not contested the
facts asserted by Ms. Hicks, and her December 31, 2003, fax to SBC (discussed above) confirms
she spoke to “Rosetta Hix” about the subpoenas issued by defendant to SBC. Even were the
court to accord the Hicks’ affidavit little weight, this would not help plaintiff, because her
December 31, 2003, fax confirms that she was attempting to conceal material information.

‘Apparently, the order was intended by the parties also to allow disclosure to Paul
Greviskes, who represented plaintiff in the state court proceedings.

8


~ Mia Order Ferm (06197)

LY / United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Hone oasis | Robert W. Gettleman | Sweet rou
CASE NUMBER 03 C 257 DATE June 16,2004
CASE Angelita Greviskes v Universities Research Association etc.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:
DOCKET ENTRY:
[ (1) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) im} Brief in support of motion due
8B) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due
(4) Go Hearing
(5) Oo Status hearing
(6) im} Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__——ssetfor__——sat__—
(7) a} Trial{set for/re-set for] on__at
(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOFRCP4(m) OO General Rule21 OFRCP41(a)(1) [ FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) @ — [Other docket entry)

Memorandum Opinion and order entered. Accordingly, this action is
dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant’s
reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the motion to
dismiss.

ay @ (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
a number of notices:

X_ | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notificd counsel by telephone,

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. dogting depuly initials

Copy to judge/magistrate judge,

date maited notice
courtroom

os deputy’s
initials

Date/tig
contrat et §
Te

railing deputy initials



prevent this court from reaching the conclusions it has reached herein.» While
plaintiff and her attorneys (including her husband) have every right on her behalf
to assert the privileges discussed above and to put defendant to its burden to
establish the facts, the court may infer from her conduct of the litigation a
continued, unrepentant, defiant and indefensible attitude by plaintiff that
reinforces the court’s decision to impose the “ultimate” sanction of dismissal of
her action with prejudice.
The court concludes, therefore, that plaintiff’s transmission of any one of the three faxes
(the two November 2003, faxes to defendant’s personnel department and the December 31, 2003,
fax to SBC) justify dismissing this case. Taken together, these transgressions demand nothing
less.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed with prejudice. In addition, plaintiff is
ordered to pay defendant’s reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the motion to
dismiss. The parties are directed to comply with Local Rule 54.3 with respect to the fees

awarded hereunder.

ENTER: June 16, 2004

os oittc

Robert W. Gettleman
United States District Judge

In addition, Mr. Dore filed a post-hearing brief in which he repeats his Rule 37
argument and contends that this is a contempt proceeding that somehow violated plaintiff's due
process rights. The court cannot imagine how plaintiff could have been accorded any more due
process than was offered in this case. The court on several occasions informed the parties of the
issues it had identified with respect to defendant’s motion to dismiss, the seriousness of those
issues, and the evidentiary concerns the court intended to address at the hearing. Once again, Mr.
Dore’s response to the evidence demonstrates his misconception of the nature and gravity of
these proceedings.

ll


information about the transmission of her November 24 and 25, 2003, faxes to
defendant on her second home line, 630-896-6856. Plaintiff also tried to convince
SBC not to release information about that line by falsely stating or implying that
the court had granted a motion to quash defendant’s subpoenas seeking that
information. This conduct, along with plaintiff's cancelling her second line in the
first place, clearly establishes an attempt by plaintiff to conceal evidence and
obstruct justice, as well as the conduct of grossly bad faith litigation.

Plaintiffs unlawful transmission of the November 24 and 25, and December 31,
2003, faxes is an affront to this court and the entire civil justice system, and
deserves nothing less than the most severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice,
both to punish plaintiff and to deter others who might be tempted to such conduct
in the prosecution of civil claims. This court possesses the inherent authority to
impose this sanction in this highly unusual and unpleasant case. See Dotson v.
Bravo, 321 F.3d 663 (7" Cir. 2003).

In reaching this conclusion the court has carefully considered all the facts set forth
above, and is struck by plaintiff's deliberate, repeated and unrepentant
misconduct, This was no momentary lapse of judgment or misguided adventure
for this plaintiff. The fact that plaintiff sent not one but two faxes to the personnel
department of the company that she had worked for and was suing in the state and
federal courts demonstrates plaintiff's calculated scheme to impersonate Ms.
Erickson to obtain information. Her later stunning attempts to cover-up her
wrongdoing confirm plaintiff's knowledge and appreciation of the criminal nature
of her scheme (this was a “murder” case, she told Ms. Hicks).

Apparently, plaintiff believes that the processes of this court exist to serve her
selfish interests rather than to serve the cause of justice. Plaintiff is wrong, and
must be sanctioned in the only manner that will deprive her of the very process
she sought to pervert. Her misconduct exhibits “such flagrant contempt for the
court and its processes that to allow [her] to continue to invoke the judicial
mechanism for [her] own benefit would raise concerns about the integrity and
credibility of the civil justice system that transcend the interest of the parties
immediately before the court.” Dotson, 321 F.3d at 668.

In addition to plaintiff's direct misconduct, her husband’s and lawyer’s conduct
throughout the proceedings on defendant’s motion to dismiss have been aimed at
preventing the court from inquiring into the matter and determining the facts.
Beginning with Mr. Dore’s churlish response to defendant’s query about the
November faxes and continuing with Paul Greviskes’s frivolous attempts to block
the subpoena for SBC’s records, to Mr. Dore’s inept attempts to derail the
evidentiary hearing, one attempted roadblock after another has been developed to

10


As mentioned above, at the May 26, 2004, hearing plaintiff asserted her Fifth
Amendment, marital and attorney-client privileges, the latter two with respect to her testimony
and Paul’s. Paul did answer questions that did not implicate those privileges, confirming that,
(a) he had served as administrator of the estate of his brother, who died in April 2003, (b) the
post office box on the November 24 and 25 faxes was that of his law office, (c) the fax number
on those faxes (630-585-8022) was listed as his brother’s business’s second line, (d) he and
plaintiff had reviewed copies of Terry Erickson’s personnel file produced by defendant, and
(e) that his brother had a fax machine. However, Paul Greviskes claimed never to have seen his
brother’s fax machine, at his brother’s place of business or at Paul’s or plaintiffs home, and also
claimed not to know whether 630-896-6856 was his home’s second line (before it was changed
in late December 2003).

Paul Greviskes also stated that the only knowledge he had concerning the faxes in
question depended on privileged communications with plaintiff, and thus refused to answer any
questions concerning those matters.’ Although defendant agrees that plaintiff and Paul Greviskes
properly asserted and have not waived any of these privileges, this court, as trier of fact in this
civil matter, is permitted to draw negative inferences with respect to credibility as well as the

facts from the assertion of privileges. Daniels v. Pipefitters’ Ass’n Local Union No. 597, 983

F.2d 800, 802 (7" Cir. 1993) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976). “Silence is

often evidence of the most persuasive character.” U.S. ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149,

153-54 (1923) (Brandeis, J.). Based upon Paul Greviskes’s demeanor on the witness stand, as

®Paul Greviskes also refused to answer questions about whether plaintiff asked to
disconnect her secondary home telephone line, whether she had contacted SBC and whether she
had access to Donald Greviskes’s office.


counsel, David Gassman. Mr. Gassman recognized the name “Dore” as the attorney representing

plaintiff in this action.

The following facts quickly became apparent to defendant and have been established by

the evidence subsequently presented to the court.

1.

The post office box address in Batavia does not belong to Mr. Dore; it does
belong to the law firm of plaintiffs husband, Paul Greviskes (who represents
plaintiff in a pending state court action filed by plaintiff against defendant.)

The telephone number 630-879-8390 (from the November 24 fax) is the fax
number of Paul Greviskes’s law firm.

The fax number at the top of the page, which is imprinted by the sending fax
machine, is that of Greviskes Builders, a defunct company that had been owned
by Paul Greviskes’s deceased brother Donald Greviskes. Paul is the administrator
of Donald’s estate.

Both faxes were transmitted from the second telephone line belonging to the
Aurora, Illinois home of plaintiff and Paul Greviskes, 630-896-6856.

The employee identification and Social Security numbers set forth in the faxes are
those of Terry Erickson, although her signature is a forgery and she never sent or
authorized the faxes.

It gets worse. In response to defendant’s counsel’s December 1, 2003, written request to

Mr. Dore and Paul Greviskes to explain the apparent forgeries, defense counsel received only an

angry telephone message from Mr. Dore denying that he had anything to do with the allegations

and demanding a written apology. Defendant then filed the instant motion to dismiss on

December 12, 2003, based on, (a) Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) for violating the protective order,

and (b) the inherent power of the court to protect its integrity and punish litigants for gross

misconduct (citing Dotson v. Bravo, 321 F.3d 663 (7" Cir. 2003)).



discovery, plaintiff sought the personnel records of a co-employee, Terry Erickson, to attempt to
demonstrate that plaintiff was treated more harshly than Ms. Erickson for alleged similar
attendance infractions. An agreed protective order was entered that specifically covered
personnel records, although defendant neglected to mark Ms. Erickson’s records “Confidential”
when it produced them to plaintiff's counsel, John Dore.

Apparently, plaintiff was unsatisfied with the records produced, and decided that she
wanted Ms. Erickson’s time sheets that she believed she needed to respond to defendant’s motion
for summary judgment? According to defendant, plaintiff sent or caused to be sent two fax
communications to defendant’s payroll department on November 24 and 25, 2003, (copies of
which are attached to this opinion as Appendices 1 and 2). These faxes are on defendant’s
letterhead and purport to be from Ms. Erickson and bear a signature purporting to be
Ms. Erickson’s, They each request defendant’s payroll record department to send copies of “my”
monthly time sheets from January 2001 through December 2002 to “Rothchild and Dore, c/o
P.O. Box 393, Batavia, IL 60510" by November 30, 2003. The faxes also contain Ms. Erickson’s
employee identification and Social Security numbers. The November 24 fax also states that the
information may be faxed to telephone number 630-879-8390.

Plaintiff's ruse began to unravel when Bonnie Consolvo, an employee in defendant’s
payroll department who had been given the two faxes, called Ms. Erickson to explain that she
could not comply with Ms. Erickson’s request by November 30. When Ms. Erickson replied that

she had made no such request, the matter was brought to the attention of defendant’s in-house

3Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was filed on October 27, 2003, and presented
October 29. Plaintiff's response was originally due November 29, but the time was extended at
plaintiff's request to December 29, 2003.



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
ANGELITA GREVISKES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 03 C 0257
v. )
) Judge Robert W. Gettleman
UNIVERSITIES RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, _)
INC., d/b/a Fermilab, and FERMILAB, )
) :
Defendant. ) “Bie,
uy ED
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER is

This case demonstrates how an unscrupulous plaintiff can destroy what might otherwise
have been a meritorious claim. We will never know how meritorious that claim might have
been, because the court has concluded that plaintiff Angelita Greviskes’s indefensible and
unlawful conduct requires dismissal of this case and the imposition of sanctions, without
reaching the merits.

FACTS'

Plaintiff filed this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C,
§ 2000¢, et seq. against her former employer, Universities Research Associates, Inc. d/b/a

Fermilab,’ claiming employment discrimination based upon her national origin. During

'The facts and findings recited herein constitute findings of fact consistent with Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52. This order contains both findings of fact (“Findings”) and conclusions of law
(“Conclusions”). To the extent that any Findings may be deemed conclusions of law, they shall
also be considered Conclusions. To the extent that any Conclusions may be deemed findings of
fact, they shall also be considered Findings. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985).

?At the hearing held on May 26, 2004, the court was informed by defendant that its
correct name is Universities Research Association, Inc., and the court hereby orders the caption

be amended accordingly. 4q



@ooz

FRK NO. 3638 SES-&222 Nov. 24 2083 85:10 PL

ao Fermilab

TO: Payroi] .
Tey Esietsian Letgp Cation)

FROM:
SUBJECT: Timesycets

Please provide a capy-of my Rreeon ees t(monthty)

storting with January 2001 through and acluding
December 2002. They need tp be mailed to the

following address by November 30, 2003.
Dore & Rothchi}d

Fo P.O. Box 393
ataviai IL. 60510

You may fax then {f you wish 630-879-8390. I will
be out of the office the rest of the waek.
SS# 344-46-71295

Thank you