alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Abel Jimenez, Appellant.

[943 NYS2d 808]—

Malone Jr., J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Washington County (McKeighan, J.), rendered May 12, 2011, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of assault in the second degree.

Following a domestic dispute, defendant was stopped by a po*1506lice officer while driving his vehicle with his eight-year-old daughter as a passenger. During the stop, defendant accelerated the vehicle causing the police officer to be dragged and to sustain serious injuries. Defendant was thereafter charged in an indictment with assault in the second degree, to which he pleaded guilty. Under the terms of the plea agreement, County Court agreed to sentence defendant to not more than six but not less that four years in prison and to impose a term of postrelease supervision of between IV2 and 3 years. Defendant was thereafter sentenced to five years in prison, to be followed by a three-year period of postrelease supervision. He now appeals.

We find no merit to defendant’s claim that the sentence is harsh and excessive. While fleeing the traffic stop, defendant exhibited total disregard for the safety of the officer by speeding away with the officer partially inside the vehicle, thereby exposing him to the risk of serious injury and potential death. Notably, the injuries sustained by the officer were significant, precluding him from working for many months and having permanent effects. In view of this, and given that the sentence imposed was within the range agreed to as part of the plea agreement, we find no extraordinary circumstances nor any abuse of discretion warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice *(see generally People v Kendall,*91 AD3d 1191, 1193 [2012]; *People v Brodus,*307 AD2d 643, 644 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 618 [2003]; *see also People v Rolfe,*83 AD3d 1217, 1219 [2011], *lv denied*17 NY3d 809 [2011]).

Peters, P.J., Rose, Lahtinen and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.1


            Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on
Forms S-8 (No. 333-81961 and No. 333-81967) pertaining to the Nicholas
Financial, Inc. Employee Stock Option Plan of Nicholas Financial, Inc. of our
report dated May 21, 2004, (except for note 13 as to which the date is
June 8, 2004) with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Nicholas
Financial, Inc. and subsidiaries included in its Annual Report (Form 10-KSB)
for the year ended March 31, 2004, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.


                                 /s/ Dixon Hughes PLLC
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

MALCOLM M. SATCHELL,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 314 EAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 18th day of November, 2019

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
#### Julio VALDEZ-BLAINE, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 10-70054.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed June 28, 2011.

John Martin Pope, Pope & Associates, PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner.

John J.W. Inkeles, Esquire, Trial, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Oil, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

*411MEMORANDUM **

Julio Valdez-Blaine, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order sustaining the government’s appeal from an immigration judge’s decision granting his application for cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo constitutional claims, *Khan v. Holder,*584 F.3d 773, 776 (9th Cir.2009), and for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, *Alarcon-Serrano v. INS,*220 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir.2000). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order of removal against Valdez-Blaine under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i) because substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that it had reason to believe that Valdez-Blaine knew he was participating in illicit drug trafficking, and Valdez-Blaine does not raise any constitutional or question of law challenge to the order of removability. *See 8*U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) & (D); *Lopez-Molina v. Ashcroft,*368 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir.2004).

We also lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of Valdez-Blaine’s application for cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion. *See Bermudez v. Holder,*586 F.3d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam). To the extent that Valdez-Blaine contends that the BIA misapplied the standards set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3), this contention is not supported by the record.

Valdez-Blaine’s contention that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) violates due process is not persuasive.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED, in part; DENIED, in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### GORDON, Appellant, v. ELLENVILLE & K. R. CO., Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

September 26, 1907.)

Action by Harry S. Gordon against the Ellenville & Kingston Railroad Company.

No opinion. Motion granted. See 1Ó4 N. Y. Supp. 702.
# C_2019148EN.01006301.xml

| 29.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/63 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/63

---

Action brought on 12 March 2019 — Koenig & Bauer v EUIPO (we’re on it)

(Case T-156/19)

(2019/C 148/63)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Koenig & Bauer AG (Würzburg, Germany) (represented by: B. Reinisch, B. Sorg and M. Ringer, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Registration of EU word mark we’re on it — Application for registration No 16 983 066

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 January 2019 in Case R 1027/2018-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision and amend it to the effect that EUIPO’s decision of 23 April 2018 rejecting EU trade mark application No 16 983 066 is annulled, continue the registration procedure of EU trade mark application No 16 983 066 and refund the applicant (applicant for the contested mark) the costs incurred in relation to the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision and amend it to the effect that EUIPO’s decision of 23 April 2018 rejecting EU trade mark application No 16 983 066 is annulled, continue the registration procedure of EU trade mark application No 16 983 066 and refund the applicant (applicant for the contested mark) the costs incurred in relation to the appeal;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 94(1), first sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 94(1), first sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 94(1), second sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 94(1), second sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
#### In re HUMMEL.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

November 15, 1907.)

In the matter of Abraham H. Hummel.

No opinion. Respondent disbarred. Present order.
#### KLINKER, Respondent, v. THIRD AVE. R. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

March 15, 1898.)

Action by Frederick Klinker against the Third Avenue Railroad Company.

No opinion. Motion for reargument denied. Application for leave to appeal to the court of appeals denied. See 49 N. Y. Supp. 793.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Fitzpatrick, Overton and Senior Judge Hodges Argued by Teleconference

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA v. Record No. 2790-95-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON KENNETH LEE MAYS APRIL 30, 1996

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellant. Elizabeth P. Murtagh, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellee.

Kenneth Lee Mays (appellee) was indicted for possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. Appellee filed a motion to suppress the cocaine in which he asserted the police officer stopped his vehicle without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The trial court granted the suppression motion, and the Commonwealth appeals that ruling.

In Terry v. Ohio , the United States Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). "[I]f

* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.- 2 - there are articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a criminal offense, that person may be stopped in order to identify him, to question him briefly, or to detain him briefly while attempting to obtain additional information." Hayes v. Florida , 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985). "Justification for stopping an automobile does not depend on the subjective intent of the police," however. Bosworth v. Commonwealth , 7 Va. App. 567, 570, 375 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1989). Compliance with the Fourth Amendment depends instead on "an objective assessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him." Id. (quoting Scott v. United States , 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)). In an appeal by the Commonwealth from an order by the trial court suppressing evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. We will not reverse the trial judge's decision unless it is plainly wrong.

Commonwealth v. Grimstead , 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 747, 723 (1992). The Commonwealth presented no evidence that narcotics were actually present, that the observed behavior was consistent with a narcotics transaction, or that any of the participants were connected in any way with narcotics. The testifying officer gave no objective reason why her observations led her to the conclusion that a sale of narcotics had occurred. Based on the- 3 - record, we cannot say that the trial judge was plainly wrong in his ruling, and we accordingly affirm the order of suppression. Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1


          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Scott  Edwards,  Chief  Financial  Officer of Radix  Marine (the  "Company"),
certify,  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that to the best of my knowledge:

         (1)      the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-QSB/A of the Company for the
                  fiscal  quarter  ended  March 31,  2004 (the  "Report")  fully
                  complies with the  requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of
                  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));
                  and

         (2)      the information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in
                  all material respects,  the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

Dated: December 1, 2004

                                    /s/ Scott Edwards
                                    -----------------------
                                    Scott Edwards
                                    Chief Financial Officer
# C_2019348EN.01001702.xml

| 14.10.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 348/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.10.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 348/17

---

Action brought on 23 August 2019 – Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Management v EUIPO – Lacoste (LOVE PINK)

(Case T-582/19)

(2019/C 348/18)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Management, Inc. (Reynoldsburg, Ohio, United States) (represented by: J. Dickerson, Solicitor)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Lacoste SA (Paris, France)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark LOVE PINK – Application for registration No 11 853 389

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 May 2019 in Case R 1078/2018-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | partially annul the contested decision, namely as far as it relates to the ground of opposition based on Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR; |
| --- | --- |

—

partially annul the contested decision, namely as far as it relates to the ground of opposition based on Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR;

| — | authorize for the registration of European Union trade mark Application No 11 853 389; |
| --- | --- |

—

authorize for the registration of European Union trade mark Application No 11 853 389;

| — | order the Defendant to pay the costs of the action. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Defendant to pay the costs of the action.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Art 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Art 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 USC
SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Medallion Financial Corp. (the Company) for the year ended December 31, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the
undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 USC Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of
the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.



|                        |  |                   
|----------------------- |  | ------------------
|By:                     |  | /s/ Alvin Murstein
|Chairman and           
|Chief Executive Officer

Date: June 20, 2014
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED BALANCE SHEET OF REGENT ASSISTED LIVING, INC., AS OF DECEMBER 31,
1997, AND THE RELATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS IN THE
PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                       4,483,048
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  806,302
<ALLOWANCES>                                    37,000
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,267,082
<PP&E>                                      55,632,728
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,441,404
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              66,273,756
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,705,127
<BONDS>                                     49,704,567
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       10,808,703
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     9,349,841
<OTHER-SE>                                (15,903,419)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                66,273,756
<SALES>                                     30,217,379
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            30,419,195
<CGS>                                       25,602,709
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               39,859,223
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,594,777
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (11,062,132)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (11,062,132)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (11,062,132)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.52)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.52)
         

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2



Certification



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of AHL Services, Inc.
(the Company), hereby certifies that the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2003 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: August 11, 2003



Name:

/s/ Heinz StubblefieldHeinz StubblefieldChief Financial Officer




A signed original of this
written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 907, has been
provided to AHL Services and will be retained by AHL Services and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I, Kenneth J. Saunders, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Peregrine Systems, Inc.;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4.     The
registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:



5.     The
registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



| |  | Date:                                                                                        |  | November 4, 2004
| |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | ----------------
| |  | /s/KENNETH J. SAUNDERSKenneth J. Saunders
Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer

---
# C_2019112EN.01004401.xml

| 25.3.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 112/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.3.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 112/44

---

Action brought on 29 January 2019 — Nosio v EUIPO (BIANCOFINO)

(Case T-54/19)

(2019/C 112/53)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Nosio SpA (Mezzocorona, Italy) (represented by: J. Graffer and A. Ottolini, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU word mark BIANCOFINO — Application for registration No 16 376 758

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 November 2018 in Case R 2434/2017-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the contested decision;

| — | Order EUIPO to pay the costs of the present proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order EUIPO to pay the costs of the present proceedings.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
_______________________________________ __ 

## ___________________ ___________________ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



## October 17, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r Marilyn Kell y Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, 

## 135778(63) J ustices



## ROBERT E. BENEFIEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, SC: 135778 v COA: 273664 Livingston CC: 05-021742-NI AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

On order of the Chief Jus tice, the motion by plaintiff-a ppellee for extension of the time to file his brief is considered and, it appearing the brief was filed October 13, 2008, the time for filing is extended to that date.

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 17, 2008

Clerk
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Douglas R.
Young, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of NeoMagic Corporation on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended October 26, 2008
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of
operations of NeoMagic Corporation.

Date: March 19, 2009



|       |  |                        
|------ |  | -----------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ Douglas R. Young   
|Name:  |  | Douglas R. Young       
|Title: |  | Chief Executive Officer