COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

March 1, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2019AP1982-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF2671

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

ROMERO M. WATSON,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: 

FREDERICK C. ROSA, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Donald, P.J., Dugan and Graham, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2019AP1982-CR

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¶1 PER CURIAM. Romero M. Watson appeals from a judgment, 

following a jury trial, in which he was convicted of three drug charges and two gun 

charges. He argues that the circuit court erred when it refused an evidentiary hearing 

and denied his motion to suppress. Watson also argues there was insufficient 

evidence to support three of the convictions. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Milwaukee police officers received information from a confidential 

informant, who had previously provided credible information, that a man he knew 

as “RoRo” was selling cocaine, marijuana, and pills from a residence. The 

informant also told police he had seen RoRo with a gun. The informant described 

RoRo and identified Watson as RoRo from a booking photo. The police had the 

informant engage Watson in a controlled buy of cocaine. Officer Christopher 

Conway then completed a search warrant affidavit and obtained a no-knock warrant.

¶3 When police executed the warrant, there were seven people at the 

residence, including Watson. Watson ran out the back door towards a fence, then 

doubled back towards an SUV. After officers took Watson into custody, they found 

a handgun under the SUV.

¶4 In the residence’s dining room, police recovered drug paraphernalia 

and baggies of cocaine, along with various identifiers for Watson, including his 

driver’s license, an energy bill, and other mail addressed to him at the residence. 

There were photos of Watson located near the dining room china cabinet, including 

photos of Watson in that very room. In the northwest bedroom, police found 

cocaine, marijuana, and pills in a dresser. There were additional identifiers for 

Watson in that bedroom, including a vehicle title, his social security card, a debit
No. 2019AP1982-CR

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card, and more mail addressed to him. In a backpack in the bedroom’s closet, police 

found marijuana, cocaine, and a loaded semi-automatic 9mm handgun.

¶5 In the second amended information filed in this case, Watson was 

charged with possession with intent to deliver more than forty grams of cocaine as 

a second or subsequent offense; possession with intent to deliver between 200 and 

1000 grams of tetrahydrocannabinols as a second or subsequent offense; possession 

with intent to deliver between ten and fifty grams of methamphetamine as a second 

or subsequent offense; and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon.

¶6 Watson moved to suppress all evidence obtained from execution of 

the search warrant, alleging that the warrant application failed to establish probable

cause to issue the warrant. He also asserted that “information regarding the 

credibility of the informant was omitted from the affidavit in reckless disregard for 

the truth.” The circuit court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, and 

the case was tried to a jury. The jury convicted Watson of all five offenses, and he 

was ultimately given concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling thirteen years 

of initial confinement and seven years of extended supervision. Watson appeals.

DISCUSSION

Motion to Suppress/Search Warrant Application

¶7 A circuit court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence presents a 

mixed question of fact and law. See State v. Casarez, 2008 WI App 166, ¶9, 314 

Wis. 2d 661, 762 N.W.2d 385. We do not reverse the court’s factual findings unless 

clearly erroneous, but the application of constitutional principles to those findings 

is reviewed de novo. See id.
No. 2019AP1982-CR

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¶8 “A search warrant may issue only upon probable cause.” State v. 

Jones, 2002 WI App 196, ¶10, 257 Wis. 2d 319, 651 N.W.2d 305. On review of a 

challenge to probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, we examine “‘the 

totality of the circumstances presented to the warrant-issuing commissioner to 

determine whether the warrant-issuing commissioner had a substantial basis for 

concluding that there was a fair probability that a search of the specified premises 

would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.’” State v. Silverstein, 2017 WI App 64, 

¶13, 378 Wis. 2d 42, 902 N.W.2d 550 (citation omitted). We accord great deference 

to the warrant-issuer’s determination of probable cause. See State v. Kerr, 181 

Wis. 2d 372, 379, 511 N.W.2d 586 (1994).

¶9 In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), the United 

States Supreme Court determined that a defendant was entitled to a hearing upon “a 

substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, 

or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the [search] 

warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of 

probable cause.” In State v. Mann, 123 Wis. 2d 375, 385-87, 367 N.W.2d 209 

(1985), our supreme court recognized that Franks could also be applied to the 

omission of critical material from a warrant application. Then, “‘[t]he defendant 

must show that the information omitted was material to the determination of 

probable cause and that it was omitted for the purpose of misleading the 

magistrate.’” Mann, 123 Wis. 2d at 390 (quoting Illinois v. Stewart, 473 N.E.2d 

840, 851 (Ill. 1984)). “To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack 

must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to 

cross-examine.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.

¶10 In his suppression motion, Watson asserted that the warrant 

application and affidavit were insufficient to establish probable cause for a warrant 
No. 2019AP1982-CR

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because they were “based on the claims of one unnamed informant,” some 

information was “either stale or completely void of reference to time frames,” and 

the affidavit “does not provide sufficient or adequate information related to the 

credibility of the informant upon whom it relies.” In an oral ruling, the circuit court 

acknowledged Franks, and that, under Mann, the holding from Franks applies to 

omissions. It went through the warrant application, noting the information within 

it. For instance, the informant had been used and found to be reliable in the past, 

which resulted in a prior search warrant, recovery of contraband, and the filing of 

criminal charges. The court further noted that police in this case actually conducted 

a controlled buy, so “it isn’t just the word of the informant.”

¶11 Based on the information that was in the warrant application, the 

circuit court believed there was probable cause for the warrant to be issued. It 

explained that Watson “basically ... speculated as to different explanations as to 

what might have occurred, could have occurred,” but that he offered nothing to 

support those assertions. The court determined Watson had not alleged, much less 

shown, what information was “knowingly and intentionally or with reckless

disregard for the truth” omitted from the application. Instead, the court perceived, 

Watson was simply saying he “would like to know more about the confidential

informant and we don’t believe that person is reliable.” Thus, the circuit court 

denied the motion to suppress.

¶12 On appeal, Watson’s brief similarly contains facts Watson would have 

liked to know, but no explanation as to how that omitted information was “‘material 

to the determination of probable cause’” and nothing to demonstrate that the 

information “‘was omitted for the purpose of misleading the magistrate.’” See 

Mann, 123 Wis. 2d at 390 (citation omitted). He points out, for instance, that a 

specific date and time for the controlled buy were not provided. However, the 
No. 2019AP1982-CR

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warrant application specified that the buy had occurred within the preceding 

seventy-two hours. Watson cites no authority for the proposition that greater 

specificity is required. While he asserts that a Franks/Mann hearing would have 

shown that the controlled buy could not have occurred, that assertion is entirely 

conclusory and, thus, it is insufficient to mandate a hearing. See Franks, 438 U.S. 

at 171.

¶13 Citing federal cases, Watson also argues that the circuit court failed to 

consider several factors for determining probable cause, including whether the 

informant personally presented an affidavit, the extent of police corroboration of the 

informant’s statement, and the amount of detail provided. See United States v. 

Jones, 208 F.3d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Reddrick, 90 F.3d 1276, 

1281 (7th Cir. 1996). As noted, however, we examine the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the warrant application. See Jones, 257 Wis. 2d 319, 

¶10. “There are no longer specific prerequisites to a finding of confidential 

informant reliability. Rather, the current test simply requires courts to ‘consider all 

of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the veracity and basis of 

knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information.’” Id., ¶13 (citation omitted). 

The warrant issuer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts set forth in the 

affidavit, and the test is simply whether the inference drawn was reasonable, not 

that it was the only reasonable inference. See id., ¶10. A determination of probable 

cause “will stand unless the defendant establishes that the facts are clearly 

insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.” Id., ¶11.

¶14 We agree with the circuit court that the search warrant affidavit

supplied probable cause for a warrant to issue and that Watson has not identified

any critical omission from the warrant application that would have defeated 

probable cause. Though Watson might have liked to challenge the informant’s 
No. 2019AP1982-CR

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credibility through cross-examination, that is not the appropriate test. See Franks, 

438 U.S. at 171. The circuit court properly denied the motion to suppress and 

request for a Franks/Mann hearing.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶15 Watson also contends that there was insufficient evidence to support

his convictions relating to the cocaine, the marijuana, and one of the guns; 

specifically, Watson argues that, although the evidence was sufficient to support an 

inference that he possessed some of the drugs found in the residence, the evidence 

was insufficient to prove that he possessed the backpack that was found in the 

bedroom and contained drugs and a gun. At best, Watson contends, the State shows 

he was within the backpack’s presence, not in possession of it, as police testified 

that the backpack was readily moveable and had no identifiers in it. He asks that 

the drug counts be modified to lesser felonies to account for smaller quantities of 

drugs that could be attributed to him, and that the associated felon in possession

charge be vacated.

¶16 “When a defendant challenges a verdict based on sufficiency of the 

evidence, we give deference to the jury’s determination and view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the State.” State v. Long, 2009 WI 36, ¶19, 317 Wis. 2d 

92, 765 N.W.2d 557. Whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, this court 

“may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact unless the evidence, 

viewed most favorably to the [S]tate and the conviction, is so lacking in probative 

value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 507, 451 

N.W.2d 752 (1990). “If any possibility exists that the trier of fact could have drawn 

the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to find the requisite 
No. 2019AP1982-CR

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guilt, an appellate court may not overturn a verdict even if it believes that the trier 

of fact should not have found guilt based on the evidence before it.” Id. at 507.

¶17 Although there were no identifiers for Watson in the backpack, it was 

recovered from the closet of a bedroom with numerous identifiers for Watson found 

throughout. No identifiers for any other person were found in the bedroom, 

suggesting that Watson had exclusive control of the bedroom.

¶18 Actual physical possession of an item is not required; an item is also 

“in a person’s possession if it is in an area over which the person has control and the 

person intends to exercise control over the item.” WIS JI—CRIMINAL 920; State v. 

Allbaugh, 148 Wis. 2d 807, 813-14, 436 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1989). It would 

have been more than reasonable for the jury to infer that the drugs and gun found in 

a backpack belonged to the backpack’s owner; that a backpack found in the closet 

of a bedroom belonged to the person who controlled the bedroom; and that, in this 

case, the person who controlled the bedroom was Watson. Accordingly, sufficient 

evidence supports the verdicts.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5. (2019-20).