Section 425/2.04, however, exempts child support collection agencies in five specific
areas only;* the ICAA does not exempt child support collection agencies from the unlawful
practices listed in Section 425/9(a) of the Act. Among the practices barred by Section 425/9 are
(1) disclosing debt information with the knowledge that it is false or disputed; (2) falsely using
any form that simulates a judicial process or that appears to be authorized by a government
agency; (3) conducting business under a name that suggests that the collector is affiliated with a
government agency; or (4) engaging in conduct likely to deceive or defraud the public. See 225
ILCS 425/9(a).

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants’ conduct violated each of these provisions
of Section 425/9(a). (R. 24-1, Compl. at § 100.) Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to
dismiss with respect to Count IV.

Vil. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies. Specifically, Defendants argue that the Complaint should be
dismissed because the issues raised by Plaintiffs’ Complaint are inextricably intertwined with the
divorce decrees and orders for child support entered by Illinois courts. (R. 8-1, Mot, to Dismiss

at 26.)

“ The five exemptions are: (i) in the frequency of contact with an obligor who is in arrears,
whether by phone, mail, or other means, (ii) from contacting the employer of an obligor who is in
arrears, (iii) from publishing or threatening to publish a list of obligors in arrears, (iv) from
disclosing or threatening to disclose an arrearage that the obligor disputes, but for which a
verified notice of delinquency has been served under the Income Withholding for Support
Act... or (v) from engaging in conduct that would not cause a reasonable person mental or
physical illness. 225 ILCS §425/2.04.

13



contract; (6) the Illinois Collection Agency Act does not apply to CSE; and (7) the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine precludes jurisdiction over Blair’s claims.
LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the suit.
Autry v. Northwest Premium Servs., Inc., 144 F.3d 1037, 1039 (7" Cir. 1998). When considering
a motion to dismiss, the Court views all facts alleged in the complaint, as well as any inferences
reasonably drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Doherty v. City of
Chiago, 75 F.3d 318, 322 (7" Cir. 1996). A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove
any set of facts entitling him or her to relief. See Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys.
Corp. , 987 F.2d 429, 432 (7" Cir. 1993).

ANALYSIS

L Declaratory Judgment (Count J)

Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgement that CSE is not entitled to collect any alleged
child support payments from them. Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss this count
because federal law authorizes them to issue an order/notice for income withholding to Plaintiffs’
employers. The parties disagree over the appropriate governing law.

Although the parties agree that an order/notice form supplied by the federal government
is the correct form to use for income withholding (see R. 8-1, Ex. E, PIQ-99-02), Plaintiffs and
Defendants disagree whether federal or Illinois law controls who is authorized to send the
order/notice form. Defendants contend they were permitted to issue order/notices to the

Plaintiffs’ employers, citing a February 2001 Policy Interpretative Question (“PIQ”) issued by the



Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Count III.
IV.  Tortious Interference with A Contract (Count IV)

In Count IV, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants tortiously interfered with the contractual
relationship between Plaintiffs and their employers, resulting in pecuniary losses to both and
liens on property belonging to Gray. Under Itinois law, tortious interference with a contract
requires that the plaintiff prove:

(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract between the

plaintiff and another; (2) the defendant’s awareness of this

contractual relation; (3) the defendant's intentional and unjustified

inducement of a breach of the contract; (4) a subsequent breach by

the other, caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct, and (5)

damages.
HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., 545 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ill. 1989) (citations and
quotations omitted); see also Wheel Masters, Inc. v. Jiffy Metal Prods. Co., 955 F.2d 1126, 1129
(7th Cir. 1992). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to plead the first, second and fourth
elements of tortious interference.

Contrary to Defendants’ claims, Plaintiffs have pleaded all of the elements of the claim of
tortious interference with a contract. Plaintiffs allege that: there was a contract between
Plaintiffs and their respective employers, (R. 24-1, Compl. {¥ 78, 80); Defendants intentionally
and unjustifiably induced a breach by the Plaintiffs’ employers of their respective contracts, (id.
at $9 41, 48-51); the breach was due to Defendants’ wrongful conduct, (id. at {ff 20, 37, 38); and
Plaintiffs suffered damages. (Jd. at {7 79, 81).

Arguably, the only element of tortious interference where the issue is even close is the

second element -- whether the Defendants were aware of the contracts between Plaintiffs and


Plaintiffs are correct that Illinois law controls on the question of who is authorized to send the
order/notice forms, Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded their claim for declaratory judgment
because they claim that Defendants were not the obligee(s), the legal representatives of the
obligee(s), or a public office.

Defendants contend that the IWSA cannot trump federal law, which Defendants maintain
authorizes “any” person to send an order/notice for income withholding. (R. 15-1, Opp. to Mot.
to Dismiss Ex. E at 2.) Even assuming that Defendants are correct, however, Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants were not authorized to send the order/notices in question because they were not, as
the February 2001 PIQ specifies, “based on an underlying withholding order issued by an
appropriate authority under State law.” (R. 8-1, Mot. to Dismiss at 9.) Indeed, Plaintiffs allege
that there is no basis underlying either of the order/notices at issue because neither Blair nor Gray
owed any back child support. (R. 24-1, Compl. {J 14, 28.) Thus, regardless whether the federal
or Illinois law governs the order/notices at issue here, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants
were not authorized to send them, and Plaintiffs have therefore adequately pleaded their claim for
a declaratory judgment.

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Count I.

I. Fraud (Count I)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides that: “[iJn all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity”
although “[mJalice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred
generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Under Illinois law, the elements of common law fraud are: “(1)

false statement of material fact; (2) known or believed to be false by the party making it; (3)



Federal Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Child Support Enforcement
(“OCSE”). There, the OCSE confirmed that the income withholding notice/order may only be
issued as an order by “a tribunal or entity authorized to issue orders under State law.” (R. 8-1,
Mot. to Dismiss at 9) (citations omitted). The OCSE further explained that an notice/order “may
also be sent by an individual, agency or entity as @ notice to an employer to withhold income, but
only if it is based on an underlying withholding order issued by an appropriate authority under
State law.” (/d. (emphasis added).). Defendants also cite a February 1999 PIQ where the OCSE
suggested that “(a]lthough the sender will ordinarily be a child support enforcement agency or
the obligee, the olbigor or any other person may supply an employer with an income
withholding order.” (R. 15-1, Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss Ex. E (emphasis added).) Based on these
authorities, Defendants contend that they were authorized to send the order/notices in question to
Plaintiffs’ employers.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the States are free to dictate the necessary
procedural steps for income withholding and, in particular, who can send order/notices for
income withholding. Plaintiffs base this argument on the Income Withholding for Support Act,
750 ILCS 28/1 et seq. (“IWSA”), which regulates wage withholding for child support payments
in Illinois. The TWSA mandates that the OCSE order/notice must “be prepared and served. . . by
the obligee or public office.” 750 ILCS 28/20(a)(1) (emphasis added). The IWSA defines
“obligee” as “the individual to whom a duty of support is owed or the individual’s legal
representative,” 750 ILCS 28/15(f), and “public office” as “any elected official or any State or
local agency which is or may become responsible by law for enforcement of, or which is or may

become authorized to enforce, an order for support.” 750 ILCS 28/15(h). Assuming that

5



Th. Defamation (Count IM

To show defamation under Illinois law, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that: “(1) the
defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff, (2) there was an unprivileged publication to
a third party with fault by the defendant, and (3) the publication damaged the plaintiff.”

Parker v. House O'Lite Corp., 756 N.E.2d 286, 291-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). Defendants argue
that the Court should dismiss the defamation claim because: (1) all statements contained in the
orders/notices were true, and (2) even if the statements were not true, the Defendants were
protected by a qualified privilege. (R. 8-1, Mot. to Dismiss at 18.)

Plaintiffs allege, however, that statements contained in the order/notices were false, (R.
1-1, Compl. ff 72, 75.) Because this is a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume that the facts
plead in the complaint are true and resolve any ambiguities in favor of the Plaintiffs. See
Levenstein, 164 F.3d at 347. Thus, for purposes of this motion, the Court accepts Plaintiffs’
allegations that the statements made by CSE in the order/notices were false.

Moreover, accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Defendants’ argument that the
statements were protected by a qualified privilege fails. Illinois law requires the following
elements in order to find a qualified privilege: “(1) good faith by the defendant by making the
statement; (2) an interest or duty to uphold; (3) a statement limited in its scope to that purpose;
(4) a proper occasion; and (5) publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only.”

Kuwik v. Star Mktg. and Admin., Inc., 619 N.E.2d 129, 133 (Ill. 1993). At a minimum,
Defendants cannot satisfy the fifth element -- publication in a proper manner and to proper
parties only -- because Plaintiffs have alleged that it was improper for Defendants to serve the

order/notices in question on Plaintiffs’ employers. (R. 24-1, Compl. at ff 16, 18, 36.)

8



Minute Order Form (8497)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

| Ni f Assigned Ji Sitting Judge if Other
‘ are Magistrate sua Amy J. St. Eve than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 632 DATE 9/20/2002
CASE Walter Blair vs. Supportkids, Inc.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

MOTION: of the motion being presented.)

DOCKET ENTRY:

0) Qo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im Brief in support of motion due

Q) oO Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at

(5) oO Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on __ set for at

(7) Qo Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) QO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at

(9) QO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

COFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(a\(1) C) FRCP41(a)(2).

(10) = [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Order. Defendant’s motion to apply fully-briefed Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to plaintiff's amended complaint is granted. Defendant’s motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is denied.

a) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.] ie

No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required. umber ot poies
Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone. EP 23 2002
ao | Docketing to mail notices. CV
Mail AO 450 form. MOR een eae Socket deputy inka
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. 7 '
courtroom ” date msiled notice
TH’ / deputy’s
initials
‘Date/time received in
central Clerk's Office railing deputy initiols



any legal services other than a regularly licensed attorney.” 705 ILCS § 205/1. Defendants
argue, however, that neither the CPLPA nor the Attorney Act provide for a private right of action
for the unauthorized practice of law and that Plaintiffs lack standing to claim damages for the
unauthorized practice of law. That is incorrect.

Illinois courts recognize a private right of action for the unauthorized practice of law
when the plaintiff alleges that the defendant represented him- or herself as an attorney or acted
negligently. See, e.g., Torres v. Fiol, 441 N.E.2d 1300 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (allowing claim for
the unauthorized and negligent practice of law); of: Rathke v. Lidisky, 375 N.E.2d 871, 873 (Ul.
App. Ct. 1978) (dismissing claim for the unauthorized practice of law where the plaintiff failed
to allege that the defendant represented himself as an attorney or acted negligently). Courts in
this District, applying Illinois law, have confirmed that a plaintiff can make a claim for the
unauthorized practice of law where the plaintiff alleges that the defendants acted negligently or
represented themselves as attorneys. Cf. Michalowski v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, No. 01 C 6095,
2002 WL 113905, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2002) (“Illinois courts have not recognized a cause of
action for the ‘unauthorized practice of law’ unless the plaintiff alleged that defendants either
had represented themselves as attorneys, or negligently provided services, thereby causing

damages.”) (emphasis added).>

3 Plaintiffs cite a recent unpublished decision by a judge in the Circuit Court of Rock Island
County, (R. 13-1, Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. S, King v. First Capital Fin. Servs. Corp., No.
01 L 189, Apr. 12, 2002), which they suggest stands for the proposition that Michalowski was
wrongly decided. However, the excerpts from the court transcripts in King suggest that the judge
in that case did not disagree with Michalowski and did not rule out a private cause of action for
the unauthorized practice of law.

11



their respective employers. Plaintiffs do not specifically plead that the Defendants were aware of
any contract between the Plaintiffs and their employers, Instead, Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants sent the order/notices in question directly to Plaintiffs’ employers (id. at #¥ 12, 33),
which creates the inference that Defendants knew the companies that the Plaintiffs worked for
and were aware of the existence of a contractual relationship between the Plaintiffs and their
employers. When considering a motion to dismiss, this Court views all facts alleged in the
complaint, as well as any inferences reasonably drawn from those facts. See Doherty, 75 F.3d at
322; see also Higgs v. Carter, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7" Cir. 2002) (“The federal rules require (with
irrelevant exceptions) only that the complaint state a claim, not that it plead the facts that if true
would establish (subject to any defenses) that the claim was valid. ... All that need be specified
is the bare minimum facts necessary to put the defendant on notice of the claim so that he can file
an answer.”).

Defendants suggest that even if Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded tortious interference,
Defendants are protected by a qualified privilege. (R. 8-1, Mot. to Dismiss at 23.) However, as
discussed above, this argument fails because Plaintiffs have alleged that it was improper for
Defendants to serve the order/notices in question on Plaintiffs’ employers. (R. 24-1, Compl. at
{J 16, 18, 36.) Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a claim of tortious
interference, and the Court must dismiss Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Count IV
Vv. Inlicense ice of Law (Count V

The Illinois Corporation Practice of Law Prohibition Act (“CPLPA”) provides that “i]t
shall be unlawful for a corporation to practice law.” 705 ILCS § 220/1. Further, the Illinois

Attorney Act specifies that “[n]o person shall receive any compensation directly or indirectly for

10



intent to induce the other party to act; (4) action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the
statement; and (5) damage to the other party resulting from such reliance.” Soules v. General
Motors Corp., 402 N.E.2d 599, 601 (III. 1980) (citations omitted); see also Michaels v. Michaels,
767 F.2d 1185, 1206 (7th Cir. 1985). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to allege two
elements: (1) that Defendants made a false statement of material fact; and (2) that Defendants
knew or believed that the statement was false. (R. 8-1, Mot. to Dismiss at 18.)

Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, Plaintiffs do allege false statements of material fact.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “caused to be transmitted to plaintiff Blair’s employer in Illinois
a document entitled ‘Order / Notice to Withhold Income for Child Support’... According to the
Simulated Order / Notice, plaintiff Blair owed $85,376,56....” (R. 24-1, Compl. J 12.)
Likewise, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants sent Gray’s employer a “document entitled
‘Computation of Child Support Arrears,’ . . . purporting to show that plaintiff Gray owed
$375,014.46... .” (d. at ] 33.) Plaintiffs further allege that these order/notices were false
because neither Blair nor Gray owed any back child support. (/d. at {J 14, 28.)

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants knew the statements were false: “CSE knew that its
documents were bogus and that it had no right to send such documents to plaintiffs’ employers.”
(id. at ¢ 60.) Further, they contend that “Defendants knew that [the order/notices and other
related documents] were not valid and that they had no right to direct plaintiffs’ employers to
withhold anything.” (/d. at ] 48). Thus, Plaintiffs have pleaded the elements of fraud with
particularity.

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Count II.



$250.00 from his paycheck. (/d. at { 38). Defendants also placed liens on Gray’s home and tied
up Gray’s savings-investment plan. (/d. at { 36.)

On January 25, 2002, Blair and Gray filed suit, alleging that Defendants sent Plaintiffs’
employers simulated order/notices and related communications that fraudulently and maliciously
directed the employers to withhold wages. (R. 24-1, Compl. at {J 41-51.) Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants have no right to withhold wages because under Illinois law only the appropriate
public agency, the obligee, or an attorney licensed to practice law in Illinois can file the
order/notices. (Id. at ff 45-46.) Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that CSE is not entitled to
collect $460,391.02 from Plaintiffs. (/d. at {{] 52-53.) In addition, Plaintiffs seek compensatory
damages, punitive damages, costs of suit, and other relief for fraud (Count Il), defamation (Count
ID), tortious interference with a contract (Count IV), unlicensed practice of law (Count V), and
violation of the Illinois Collection Agency Act (Count VI). (/d. at [9] 54-112.) Plaintiffs assert
Counts I-VI against CSE, and Counts II, IV, V and VI against Hoffman.

On March 22, 2002, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Defendants
argue that: (1) the order/notice form used is proper and Defendants are authorized to issue it; (2)
CSE is not engaged in the unlicensed practice of law and Plaintiffs have no standing to assert
such a claim; (3) Plaintiffs have failed to properly plead fraud; (4) Plaintiffs may not claim
defamation because all statements made in the orders/notices were true, and if they were not true,

Defendants were protected by a qualified privilege; (5) there was no tortious interference with a

? Although Gray contends that the 1971 divorce decree was modified and suggests that he does
not owe any back child support to his former wife, Gray recently entered an agreement to pay her
$20,000 in monthly $125 installments. (Compl. at ¥ 40, fn. 5.) Gray suggests that he did so
voluntarily, “in order to buy peace.” (Jd.)



The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal district and appellate courts from
entertaining a process to reverse or modify a state court decision. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S, 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine is
a reflection of the principle that lower federal courts cannot review state court decisions.
Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1996). Instead, only the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review final judgments entered by state courts. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 157.

Further, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts also Jack jurisdiction
over issues “inextricably intertwined” with state court judgments. Nationscredit Home Equity
Servs. Corp. v. City of Chi., 135 F. Supp. 2d 905, 909 (N.D.IIl. 2001). Although there is no
bright line that separates a federal claim that is inextricably intertwined with a state court
judgment from a claim that is not, “the underlying inquiry remains whether ‘the district court is

a3

in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.” Levin v. Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Comm'n of the Supreme Court of Ill., 74 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n.16).

In order to decide whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies here, the Court must
determine whether the federal plaintiff “seeks to set aside a state court judgment or whether he is,
in fact, presenting an independent claim. Put another way, if the injury which the federal plaintiff
alleges resulted from the state court judgment itself, then Rooker-Feldman controls, and the
lower federal courts lack jurisdiction over the claim.” 4901 Corp. v. Cicero, 220 F.3d 522, 527

(7th Cir, 2000) (internal citation omitted).

14



individuals owed child support and attempts to collect back child support on their behalf. (/d. at
10.) Richard “Casey” Hoffman is the chief executive officer of CSE. (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff Walter Blair was divorced in 1993. Blair contends that under the divorce decree
his support obligations terminated on December 9, 1998. (R. 24-1, Compl. at {¥ 12, 14.) In May
2001, however, Defendants sent to Blair’s employer in Illinois a document entitled “Hlinois
Department of Public Aid, Division of Child Support, Order/Notice to Withhold Income for
Child Support,” indicating that Blair owed $85,376.56 in child support originating from his 1993
divorce. (Id. at J 12.) Blair contends that the Illinois Department of Public Aid did not authorize
and had no knowledge of the order/notice. (Jd. at J 15.) He subsequently retained counsel to
quash the order/notice. (Id. at 19.) Before the order/notice was quashed, however, Blair’s
employer deducted $358 from Blair’s paycheck and sent it to CSE. (ld. at J 20.)

Plaintiff John Gray was divorced in 1971. Under a divorce decree, Gray was obligated to
provide $60 per week to support three children. (R. 24-1, Compl. at [J 22-23.) Gray contends
that the 1971 divorce decree was informally modified and that the divorce decree was never
revived. (/d. at J 24, 26.) In October 2000, however, Defendants sent to Gray’s employer in
Illinois an “Order/Notice to Withhold Income for Child Support,” a “Computation of Child
Support Arrears” indicating that Gray owed $375,014.46 in child support originating from his
1971 divorce, and a one-page fax directing Gray’s employer to begin wage withholding. (Jd. at

33.) After receiving these documents, Gray’s employer deducted wages in the amount of



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
WALTER BLAIR and )
JOHN GRAY, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) No. 02 C 0632
v. )
) Judge Amy J. St. Eve
SUPPORTKIDS, INC., )
d/b/a CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT; ) Q
and RICHARD “CASEY” HOFFMAN, ) ier,
) SEp . LD
Defendants. ) <3 typ

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Walter Blair and John Gray filed suit against Supportkids, Inc., d/b/a Child Support

Enforcement (“CSE”) and Richard “Casey” Hoffman, alleging that Defendants maliciously and
fraudulently sent Plaintiffs’ employers simulated order/notices requiring income withholding
pursuant to the Illinois Income Withholding for Support Act, 750 ILCS 28/1 et seg. Defendants
have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 8-1.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
denied.
BACKGROUND
CSE is a child support collection agency that purports to represent parents owed child

support obligations. (R. 24-1, Compl. at J 9.)' CSE enters into contingent fee arrangements with

' All citations to the “Complaint” are in fact to the Amended Complaint filed on September 12,
2002. (R. 24.1) Defendants did not object to the filing of the Amended Complaint, and at the
request of the parties, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is deemed to have challenged the
Amended Complaint.



In this case, Plaintiffs specifically allege that “Defendants engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law by sending [the order/notices] to plaintiffs’ employers and purporting to
represent the legal interests of plaintiffs’ ex-wives.” (R. 1-1, Compl. { 89) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs’ allegation, viewed in the light most favorable to them, does state a claim for the
unauthorized practice of law.

The Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ arguments that the act of sending the
order/notices at issue did not constitute the practice of law. Defining what constitutes the
practice of law in Illinois under the CPLPA or the Attorney Act is not a clear-cut issue.
Defendants cite several cases purporting to hold that sending an order/notice for income
withholding does not constitute the practice of law, but none of Defendants’ cases address the
particular requirements for such order/notices under Illinois law. Because the Court can grant a
motion to dismiss only if it appears beyond doubt that Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts entitling
them to relief, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Count V.

VI. Violation of the Illinois Collection Agency Act (Count VI)

The Illinois Collection Agency Act (“ICAA”) govems collection agencies, which are
defined to include “any person, association, partnership, or corporation who, for compensation,
either contingent or otherwise, or for other valuable consideration, offers services to collect an
alleged delinquent debt.” 225 ILCS § 425/2.02. Defendants argue that Section 425/2.04 of the
ICAA, which creates certain exceptions under the statute for child support collection agencies,

shields them from any liability here. (R. 8-1, Mot. to Dismiss at 24.)

12


Plaintiffs’ complaint, on its face, does not call on this Court to review the validity of state
court judgments. Instead, Plaintiffs merely seek a declaratory judgment that CSE, a private
collection agency, is not entitled to collect back child support from Plaintiffs, as well as damages
for alleged fraud, defamation, tortious interference, unlicensed practice of law, and violation of

the ICAA. In passing on those claims, this Court will not be reviewing any judgments entered by
the Illinois courts. Indeed, Plaintiffs have conceded that they have no intention of challenging '
the underlying orders pertaining to their respective divorces. At most then, the Court will be
Tequired to assess whether Plaintiffs have failed to abide by the terms of their respective divorce
decrees in order to determine whether the Defendants were authorized to collect back child
support, whether the defendants committed fraud, etc. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman does

not preclude Plaintiffs’ claims here.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied, (R. 8-1.)

United States District Court

Dated: September 20, 2002

15