alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 USC
SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Medallion Financial Corp. (the Company) for the year ended December 31, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the
undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 USC Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of
the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.



|                          |  |                  
|------------------------- |  | -----------------
|By:                       |  | /s/ Larry D. Hall
|Senior Vice President and
|Chief Financial Officer  

Date: June 20, 2014
#### Koran CAIN, Appellant v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, OFFICE OF the SECRETARY RECONSIDERATION UNIT; Devon D. Grant.

No. 11-2748.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 Aug. 11, 2011.

Opinion filed Aug. 18, 2011.

Koran Cain, Philadelphia, PA, pro se.

Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

In June 2011, Koran Cain file a complaint alleging that his constitutional rights were violated in 2006 when the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare and one of its employees “wrongfully adjudicated” his application for benefits. The District Court sua sponte dismissed the matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), holding that Cain’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Cain appealed.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over the dismissal of Cain’s claims. *See Allah v. Seiverling,*229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.2000). The District Court did not err in dismissing the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted because it was apparent from the face of the complaint that the claims were time-barred. If the allegations, taken as true, show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. *See Jones v. Bock,*549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007); *see also, e.g., Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp.,*570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir.1978). The running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. *See*Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). Where that defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, however, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. *See, e.g., Fogle v. Pierson,*435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.2006).

When considering a civil rights claim, federal courts apply the relevant state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. *Lake v. Arnold,*232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir.2000). For civil rights actions originating in Pennsylvania, a two-year statute of limitations applies. *Id.;*42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5524. According to Cain, the events giving rise to his claims occurred in March 2006. Accordingly, Cain’s complaint, filed in June 2011, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The District Court was entitled to reach the limitations question because it was obvious from the complaint and required no factual development. *See Fogle,*435 F.3d at 1258.

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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###### Department of Homeland Security

###### Federal Emergency Management Agency

          - [Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-4517-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2021-0001]

# AGENCY:

Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration for the State of West Virginia (FEMA-4517-DR), dated April 3, 2020, and related determinations.

# DATES:

This change occurred on July 6, 2021.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dean Webster, Office of Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2833.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Administrator, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, MaryAnn Tierney, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this disaster.

This action terminates the appointment of Janice P. Barlow as Federal Coordinating Officer for this disaster.

The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households—Other Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants—Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.

Deanne Criswell,

Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. 2021-15626 Filed 7-21-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
#### PEOPLE ex rel. SCHAEFER v. MARTIN et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

April 7, 1898.)

Appeal—Review.

The judgment of the police commissioners, upon conflicting testimony, in removing a police officer from the force, will not be reversed unless the preponderance of proof against their conclusion is so great, as to warrant the belief that it was the result of passion, prejudice, or mistake.

Certiorari by the people, on the relation of Henry W. Schaefer, against James J. Martin and others, police commissioners, in removing relator from the police force of the city of New York. Affirmed.

Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and BARRETT, RUMSEY,

McLaughlin, and patterson, jj.

Frank A. Butler, for appellant.

Terence Farley, for respondents.

BARRETT, J.

The evidence of the officer’s intoxication was amply sufficient to sustain the judgment. The defense seems to have been: First, that the relator showed no signs of intoxication; and, second, that, if he did, it was not the result of alcoholic stimulants, but of medicine prescribed by a physician. The most that can be said upon the relator’s side of the case is that there was a conflict of evidence as to the fact of intoxication. There was, however, no such preponderance of testimony on that head as would justify this court in disturbing the judgment of the commissioners.

*898In fact, the preponderance was the other way; and we cannot but think that the relator’s appeal, tested by well-settled rules,, as to the authority of an appellate court in reviewing the facts, is entirely without legal merit. In this class of cases, when we find that the question is purely one of fact, and that there was-competent testimony to sustain the action of the commissioners, we do not, in affirming the judgment, usually deem it necessary or useful to formulate a written opinion. We depart from this custom in the present instance only because, owing to the growing frequency of these appeals, it may be well once more to emphasize the rule that the judgment of the commissioners upon conflicting testimony will not be reversed unless the preponderance of proof against their conclusion is so great as to warrant the belief that it was the result of passion, prejudice, or mistake. The rules-which govern an appellate court in reviewing the verdict of a jury apply here with equal, if not greater, force. The efficiency of the police force cannot be maintained if the action of the commissioners' in matters of discipline is to be lightly overturned.

The proceedings of the commissioners should be affirmed, with, costs. All concur.
### IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10

- 17

- 00066

- CR

IN RE LOWELL QUINCY GREEN

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator’s petitions for writ of mandamus is denied. 1

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

1 Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus lack proof of service on any of the parties listed in his

petition. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.2. A copy of all documents presented to the Court must be served on all

parties and must contain proof of service. Id. at R. 9.5. Here, relator has not provided a certificate of service

indicating that he has served his petition on the respondents. However, to expedite these matters, we

invoke Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 to suspend the service requirement. Id. at R. 2.I n re Green Page 2

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Petition denied

Opinion delivered and filed March 22 , 2017

[OT06]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v *751Joseph Finger, Appellant.

—Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Thorp, J.), rendered June 4, 1982, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

Defendant failed to raise objections to the adequacy of his plea allocution in the court of first instance and accordingly has not preserved his claims for appellate review *(see, People v Pellegrino,*60 NY2d 636; *People v Rivera,*90 AD2d 836). In any event, we find, based upon an examination of the record, that the allocution established a factual basis for the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, and that defendant knowingly and intelligently pleaded guilty thereto *(see, People v Harris,*61 NY2d 9).

Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are based on allegations which are outside the record. Moreover, we note that at the plea allocution defendant specifically expressed satisfaction with the representation provided by his counsel. Bracken, J. P., Lawrence, Fiber and Kooper, JJ., concur.
# C_2023035EN.01004601.xml

| 30.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 35/46 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 35/46

---

Judgment of the General Court of 7 December 2022 — PNB Banka v ECB

(Case T-301/19) (1)

(Economic and monetary policy - Prudential supervision of credit institutions - Article 6(5)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 - Need for the ECB’s direct supervision of a less significant credit institution - Request by the national competent authority - Article 68(5) of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 - ECB decision classifying PNB Banka as a significant entity subject to its direct prudential supervision - Obligation to state reasons - Proportionality - Rights of the defence - Access to the administrative file - Report laid down in Article 68(3) of Regulation No 468/2014 - Article 106 of the Rules of Procedure - Request for a hearing lacking a statement of reasons)

(2023/C 35/52)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: PNB Banka AS (Riga, Latvia) (represented by: O. Behrends, lawyer)

Defendant: European Central Bank (represented by: C. Hernández Saseta, F. Bonnard and D. Segoin, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the European Central Bank (ECB), notified by letter of 1 March 2019, to classify the applicant as a significant entity subject to its direct prudential supervision.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders PNB Banka AS to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Central Bank (ECB). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders PNB Banka AS to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Central Bank (ECB).

---

(1)  OJ C 246, 22.7.2019.

---
112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. J. RES. 7 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Providing for the reappointment of Shirley Ann Jackson 

as a citizen regent of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. 

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 That, in accordance with section 5581 of the Revised Stat4 utes (20 U.S.C. 43), the vacancy on the Board of Regents 

5 of the Smithsonian Institution, in the class other than 

6 Members of Congress, occurring by reason of the expira7 tion of the term of Shirley Ann Jackson of New York, 

8 is filled by reappointment of the incumbent for a term of 

9 6 years, effective May 6, 2011. 

Passed the Senate March 15, 2011. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 
112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. J. RES. 7 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Providing for the reappointment of Shirley Ann 

gents of the Smithsonian Institution. Jackson as a citizen regent of the Board of Re-
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 23.1

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

      We consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in (1) the  Registration
Statement on Form S-3/A, File No. 333-81320,  (2) the Registration  Statement on
Form S-8,  File No.  333-60004 and (3) the  Registration  Statement on Form S-8,
File No.  333-35450  of our report dated  February 18, 2005;  March 9, 2005 with
respect to notes B[7],  C, and N on the financial  statements  of  PacificHealth
Laboratories,  Inc. as of December 31, 2004 and for the year then ended included
in this Annual Report on Form 10-KSB.  In addition,  we consent to the reference
to the firm as experts in the above Form S-3/A.

Eisner LLP

New York, NY
April 14, 2005
#### Renee Francene VALDEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-1097.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 28, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 1, 2011.

E. Scott Frison, Jr., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Gilbert Steven Rothenberg, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Arthur Thomas Catterall, Christine Durney Mason, Curtis Clarence Pett, David I. Pincus, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

*212Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Renee Francene Valdez seeks to appeal the tax court’s order denying her motion for attorney fees. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

A notice of appeal from a decision of the tax court must be filed within ninety days after the decision is entered. 26 U.S.C. § 7483 (2006); *Spencer Med. Assocs. v. Comm’r,*155 F.3d 268, 269 (4th Cir.1998). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement. *Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co.,*459 U.S. 56, 61, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982).

The tax court’s order was entered on the docket on October 15, 2010. The notice of appeal was filed on January 14, 2011. Because Valdez failed to file a timely notice of appeal, and because this jurisdictional appeal period is not subject to equitable tolling, *see Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 213-14, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007), we dismiss the appeal. We also deny Valdez’s motion for judicial notice. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO**

**18U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

This certification is notto be deemed filed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,and does not constitute a part of the Quarterly Report of UTStarcom, Inc.(the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2009as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”).

 

In connection with theReport, we, Peter Blackmore and Viraj J. Patel, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 
| (i)    | The  Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and     |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                   |
| (ii)   | The  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |

 

Dated: November 9,2009

 
| By:    | /s/  PETER BLACKMORE                          |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Name:  Peter Blackmore                        |   |
|   | Title:  Chief Executive Officer and President |   |
|   |                                          |   |
| By:    | /s/  VIRAJ J. PATEL                           |   |
|   | Name:  Viraj J. Patel                         |   |
|   | Title:  Interim Chief Financial Officer       |   |

 

----
#### In the Matter of Charles J. Scibetta, an Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee of the Eighth Judicial District, Petitioner.

Fourth Department,

May 23, 1986

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*David E. Brennan (Robert I. Gannon*of counsel), for petitioner.

*Joseph V. Sedita*for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Respondent was admitted to practice by order of this court on June 13, 1970.

*380The petition alleges that in early 1983 respondent was retained by clients to negotiate with Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company in an effort to forestall pending foreclosure proceedings by the bank of certain purchase money and collateral mortgages which it held on the clients’ property and business. On February 2, 1983, one of the clients gave respondent a draft for $10,000 payable to him as attorney. These funds were to be used in an effort to resolve the foreclosure action by the bank. According to the petition, respondent did not deposit this check in his escrow account but, instead, cashed it and used an unknown portion of these moneys for his personal purposes. On May 15, 1983, respondent was discharged by his clients, who requested a return of the funds. On May 16, 1983, respondent complied with this request and remitted to the clients a bank draft for $10,000 and another for $100, the latter apparently to cover interest. Shortly thereafter, one of the former clients made a complaint to the Grievance Committee, which resulted in the petition before the court.

Respondent has admitted the allegations in the petition.

A mitigation hearing was held at which the only testimony offered was of a psychological/psychiatric evaluation of respondent. The Referee’s report indicates that respondent has an attention deficit disorder, which is organic or biological in nature, and that his condition (which had never been previously diagnosed) can be improved with medication. We confirm the Referee’s findings.

Respondent is guilty of unprofessional conduct in that he violated Code of Professional Responsibility, Canons 1, 6 and 9, which require an attorney to maintain the integrity and competence of the legal profession, represent a client competently and avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. In addition, respondent failed to deposit funds of a client in an identifiable bank account *(see,*Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 9-102 [A]), failed to identify and label property of a client and place it in a place of safekeeping (DR 9-102 [B] [2]), and failed to maintain complete records of all funds of a client and render appropriate accounts of them to the client (DR 9-102 [B] [3]).

Having considered the mitigating circumstances, we con-*381elude that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and until further order of this court.

Dillon, P. J., Boomer, Pine, Balio and Schnepp, JJ., concur.

Order of suspension entered.
#### ARTHUR JOSEPH ASPERS, *ET AL.,*PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v. WARREN E. LAWRENCE, *ET AL.,*DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

December 17, 1960.

*Mr. 8. Arthur Levy*for the petitioners.

*Messrs. Richards, Oapehart & Wood*for the respondents.

Denied.
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