FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA E. PINTOS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 04-17485

PACIFIC  D.C. No. CREDITORS ASSOCIATION;

EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, CV-03-05471-CW

INC.,

Defendants-Appellees. 

MARIA E. PINTOS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 04-17558

PACIFIC CREDITORS ASSOCIATION,

D.C. No. Defendant,  CV-03-05471-CW

and OPINION

EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS,

INC.,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Claudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 9, 2007—San Francisco, California

Filed September 21, 2007

12947
Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Circuit Judge,

Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judge, and George P. Schiavelli,*

District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Clifton

*The Honorable George P. Schiavelli, United States District Judge for

the Central District of California, sitting by designation. 

12948 PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N
COUNSEL

Andrew J. Ogilvie (argued), Kemnitzer, Anderson, Barron &

Ogilvie, LLP, San Francisco, California, for appellant/crossappellee Maria E. Pintos. 

Daniel J. McLoon (argued), Jones Day, Los Angeles, California; Adam R. Sand and Marc S. Carlson, Jones Day, San

Francisco, California, for appellee/cross-appellant Experian

Information Solutions, Inc. 

Andrew M. Steinheimer (argued) and Mark E. Ellis, Ellis

Coleman Poirier LaVoie & Steinheimer, LLP, Sacramento,

California, for appellee Pacific Creditors Association.

12950 PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N
OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge: 

Maria E. Pintos appeals the district court’s summary adjudication of her claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act

(“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Pintos contends that

Pacific Creditors Association violated the FCRA by obtaining, without any FCRA-sanctioned purpose, a credit report on

her from Experian Information Solutions, Inc., a credit reporting agency. Pintos also argues that Experian violated the

FCRA by furnishing the report to PCA. 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

the defendants. Relying on our decision in Hasbun v. County

of Los Angeles, 323 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2003), the court held

that PCA was authorized to obtain Pintos’s credit report under

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) because it was attempting to collect a debt from Pintos. Hasbun held that debt collection was

a permissible purpose for obtaining a credit report, but we

decided that case prior to the enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (“FACTA”), Pub. L. No.

108-159, 117 Stat. 1952. FACTA makes clear that debt collection is a permissible purpose for obtaining a credit report

under § 1681b(a)(3)(A) only in connection with a “credit

transaction” in which a consumer has participated directly and

voluntarily. Because PCA obtained a credit report on Pintos

unrelated to any such transaction, we reverse the district court

with respect to Pintos’s claims against PCA and remand for

further proceedings with respect to damages and to Experian’s

liability.

I. Background 

Police officers found a sport utility vehicle belonging to

Maria Pintos parked on the street in San Bruno, California on

May 29, 2002. The vehicle’s registration was expired. At

police direction, the vehicle was towed, and the towing comPINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N 12951
pany, P&S Towing, obtained a lien on the vehicle for the cost

of towing and impound. P&S later sold the vehicle when Pintos failed to reclaim it or pay the outstanding charges. Since

the vehicle’s sale price did not cover the amount owed, P&S

asserted a deficiency claim against Pintos and later transferred

the claim to PCA, a collection agency.1

PCA sought and obtained a credit report on Pintos from

Experian on December 5, 2002, in connection with its effort

to collect on the debt assigned by P&S. Pintos subsequently

filed a complaint against PCA and Experian under the FCRA.

She alleged that PCA violated the FCRA by obtaining her

credit report without any FCRA-sanctioned purpose and that

Experian was liable for providing the report to PCA. 

PCA and Experian filed separate motions for summary

judgment. Both argued that, under 15 U.S.C.

§ 1681b(a)(3)(A), PCA had a permissible purpose for obtaining Pintos’s credit report because it was seeking to collect a

debt, the towing deficiency claim. Experian further argued

that it was not liable for a violation because it had fulfilled its

obligations under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e, which immunizes a

reporting agency against FCRA violations by the agency’s

subscribers so long as the agency takes certain steps. 

Pintos filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment

1California Civil Code § 3068.1(a) provides for liens “dependent upon

possession for the compensation to which [a] person is legally entitled for

towing, storage, or labor associated with recovery or load salvage of any

vehicle subject to registration that has been authorized to be removed by

a public agency.” The statute also allows for lien sales with varying procedures dependant on the value of the vehicle towed and stored. See Cal.

Civ. Code §§ 3068.1(b)-3068.1(c). In addition, a tow truck operator with

a lien pursuant to § 3068.1 “has a deficiency claim against the registered

owner of the vehicle if the vehicle is not leased or leased with a driver for

an amount equal to the towing and storage charges, not to exceed 120 days

of storage . . . less the amount received from the sale of the vehicle.” Cal.

Civ. Code § 3068.2(a). 

12952 PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N
on the issues of permissible purpose and Experian’s negligence. She attached to that motion several Experian documents detailing the company’s internal procedures for

complying with its FCRA obligations. Claiming these documents were confidential and proprietary, Experian filed a

motion to seal them. 

The district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on November 9, 2004. Relying on Hasbun v.

County of Los Angeles, 323 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2003), the

court agreed that debt collection was a permissible purpose

under § 1681b(a)(3)(A) for PCA to obtain Pintos’s credit

report. The court denied Experian’s motion to seal documents,

without explanation. 

Pintos filed a timely notice of appeal on December 8, 2004.

Experian cross-appealed the district court’s denial of its

motion to seal on December 9, 2004. It also sought reconsideration by the district court of the denial of that motion. On

April 29, 2005, the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter since Experian already appealed the order

to this court. Nevertheless, the court stated that, if it had jurisdiction, it would grant Experian’s motion under Phillips v.

General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2002), and it

stayed its prior order on the subject pending the appeal. 

II. Discussion 

We review grants of summary judgment de novo. ACLU v.

City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 790 (9th Cir. 2006). Crossmotions for summary judgment are evaluated separately

under this same standard. Id. at 790-91; Hoopa Valley Indian

Tribe v. Ryan, 415 F.3d 986, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2005).

A. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A)

“Congress enacted the FCRA in 1970 to promote efficiency

in the Nation’s banking system and to protect consumer privaPINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N 12953
cy.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 23 (2001). Those two

goals potentially lie in tension, and the FCRA strikes a balance between them. The Act authorizes credit reporting agencies to “furnish . . . consumer report[s]” because “[c]onsumer

reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in assembling

and evaluating consumer credit and other information on consumers.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)(3), 1681b(a). At the same

time, the FCRA “requir[es] credit reporting agencies to maintain reasonable procedures designed to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information contained in credit reports,”

limits access to credit reports except for “certain statutorily

enumerated purposes,” and creates “a private right of action

allowing injured consumers to recover any actual damages

caused by negligent violations and both actual and punitive

damages for willful noncompliance.” Andrews, 534 U.S. at 23

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

[1] Statutory limitations on the furnishing of credit reports

are particularly relevant here. Section 1681b(a) authorizes the

furnishing of credit reports only for a limited number of purposes, including, under § 1681b(a)(3)(A), the furnishing of

reports “in connection with a credit transaction involving the

consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and

involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of

an account of, the consumer.” Concluding that debt collection

is the “collection of an account” described in this subsection,

the district court held that the statute authorized PCA to

obtain Pintos’s credit report. 

[2] Section 1681b(a)(3)(A) does not provide that all “account collection” is a permissible purpose for obtaining credit

reports, however. Debt collections are authorized to obtain

credit reports on debtors only for account collection “in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer.” 15

U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) (authorizing the release of credit

reports “in connection with a credit transaction involving the

consumer . . . and involving the . . . review or collection of

an account”) (emphasis added).

12954 PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N
[3] The FCRA does not define the term “credit transaction”

and initially did not define the term “credit.” This changed

with the adoption of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (“FACTA”). In FACTA, Congress amended

the FCRA by, inter alia, defining credit for purposes of the

statute as amounting to a particular kind of debt: “the right

granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or

to incur debts and defer its payment or to purchase property

or services and defer payment therefor.”

2

See Pub. L. No. 108-

159, § 111, 1955 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§ 1691a(d)). By defining credit as a “right . . . to defer payment,” FACTA indicates that a § 1681b(a)(3)(A) “credit

transaction” is a transaction in which the consumer directly

participates and voluntarily seeks credit. Accord Stergiopoulos v. First Midwest Bancorp, Inc., 427 F.3d 1043,

1047 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that § 1681b(a)(3)(A) applies

“only if the consumer initiates [a credit] transaction”). Not all

“debt” involves a “credit transaction.”

Interpreting “credit transaction” to require voluntary consumer participation comports with the FCRA’s underlying

goal of protecting consumer privacy. See Andrews, 534 U.S.

at 23 (noting that Congress enacted the FCRA “to protect consumer privacy,” among other goals, and identifying § 1681b

specifically as embodying this purpose). A consumer who

chooses to initiate a credit transaction implicitly consents to

the release of his credit report for related purposes. By requiring this consent, § 1681b(a)(3)(A) forges a “direct link”

between a consumer’s search for credit and the furnishing of

his credit report. See Stergiopoulos, 427 F.3d at 1047. This

link is critical for providing the consumer with some degree

2Congress enacted FACTA to “amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act, to

prevent identity theft, improve resolution of consumer disputes, improve

the accuracy of consumer records, make improvements in the use of, and

consumer access to, credit information, and for other purposes.” Pub. L.

No. 108-159, 117 Stat. at 1952. Only FACTA’s defining of “credit” for

FCRA purposes is relevant here. 

PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N 12955
of privacy protection in accordance with the underlying purposes of the FCRA. Id. (“If the connection between a consumer’s search and a [credit] request is clear, it is unlikely that the

request will infringe the consumer’s privacy interests, for it

will ‘involve’ the plaintiff directly.”).

[4] Here, Pintos did not voluntarily seek credit. Rather, the

debt arose by statute when the lien sale price of her vehicle

failed to cover the towing and impound charges. See Cal Civ.

Code § 3068.2. Pintos never sought to have her vehicle

towed, and she incurred the resulting debt involuntarily. Consequently, no one granted her “credit” as defined by

§ 1681a(r)(5), and there was no “credit transaction” within the

meaning of § 1681b(a)(3)(A). PCA, therefore, had no purpose

specified as permissible under the statute to obtain Pintos’s

credit report.

In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court relied

on our decision in Hasbun. Hasbun presented the question of

whether a government agency looking to enforce a child support judgment could obtain a credit report on a judgment

debtor under § 1681b(a)(3)(A). 323 F.3d at 802-03. The court

determined that debt collection was generally a permissible

purpose for obtaining credit reports under § 1681b(a)(3)(A),

and that the government, which stood in the shoes of the judgment creditor, could, like any other creditor, obtain credit

reports for debt collection. Id. at 803-04, 805 (holding that the

government agency “was engaged in the ‘collection of an

account’ under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) and therefore had

a permissible purpose for obtaining [the credit report]”). Relying on Hasbun, the district court concluded that PCA had a

permissible purpose to obtain Pintos’s credit report because it,

too, was engaged in debt collection. 

[5] This reading of Hasbun was not unreasonable at the

time. Hasbun was decided prior to the 2003 FACTA amendments, however, and it must be reevaluated in light of the

12956 PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N
amended FCRA.3

See United States v. McNeil, 362 F.3d 570,

574 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “when Congress amends

statutes, our decisions that rely on the older versions of the

statutes must be reevaluated in light of the amended statute”).

By defining “credit” for purposes of the FCRA, FACTA

helped to clarify the specific circumstances in which credit

reporting agencies may furnish credit reports to debt collectors under § 1681b(a)(3)(A). Post-FACTA, it is apparent that

debt collection is not always a permissible purpose for obtaining credit reports. To the extent that the Hasbun court read

§ 1681b(a)(3)(A) more broadly, its pre-FACTA interpretation

is no longer persuasive.4

[6] Because PCA obtained Pintos’s credit report for debt

collection efforts unrelated to a proper credit transaction, it

violated the FCRA.5 Accordingly, we reverse the district

court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

3We are not faced with the question addressed in Hasbun, that is, “when

and how a child support enforcement agency may lawfully obtain the consumer credit report of an individual who has fallen behind in paying courtordered child support.” Hasbun, 323 F.3d at 802. We thus take no position

on the merits of that decision and merely reevaluate § 1681b(a)(3)(A) in

light of FACTA and the facts presented by this case. 

4The same is true of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) nonbinding

commentary regarding judgment creditors, on which the Hasbun court

relied. See Hasbun, 323 F.3d at 803 (citing 16 C.F.R. Pt. 600, App. at 509

(2002)). Although the FTC commentary suggests that a “judgment creditor

has a permissible purpose to receive a consumer report on the judgment

debtor for use in connection with collection of the judgment debt, because

it is in the same position as any creditor attempting to collect a debt from

a consumer,” id., a 2002 interpretation of the FCRA provides little insight

into the post-FACTA meaning of § 1681b(a)(3)(A). The pre-FACTA

authorities relied on by the Hasbun court are unpersuasive for the same

reason. See, e.g., Duncan v. Handmaker, 149 F.3d 424, 428 (6th

Cir.1998); Baker v. Bronx-Westchester Investigations, Inc., 850 F.Supp.

260, 262-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 

5PCA and Experian only argue that § 1681b(a)(3)(A) authorized PCA

to obtain Pintos’s credit report. Thus, we need not determine whether PCA

had a permissible purpose under any other § 1681b subsection. In addition, the parties do not argue, and we do not address, whether PCA’s preFACTA conduct may subject it to penalties under a post-FACTA reading

of the FCRA. 

PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N 12957
B. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e

We next consider whether Experian is also liable for PCA’s

violation of the FCRA. The district court did not reach this

issue, as it determined, incorrectly, that PCA had a permissible purpose to obtain Pintos’s credit report. Experian argues

that because 15 U.S.C. § 1681e immunizes it from subscribers’ FCRA violations, the statute offers an alternative basis to

affirm the summary judgment with respect to its liability.

A credit reporting agency may be liable for its subscriber’s

violation when the agency fails to comply with the statutory

obligations imposed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681e. See Guimond v.

Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir.

1995). Experian argues that because PCA gave it a “blanket

certification” — a written promise to use Experian’s credit

reports only for permissible purposes — the agency satisfied

its statutory obligations under § 1681e. We disagree. 

[7] Section 1681e requires more from a credit reporting

agency than merely obtaining a subscriber’s general promise

to obey the law. After prospective subscribers “certify the

purposes for which [credit] information is sought, and certify

that the information will be used for no other purpose,” the

reporting agency must make “a reasonable effort” to verify

the certifications and may not furnish reports if “reasonable

grounds” exist to believe that reports will be used impermissibly. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a). Under the plain terms of

§ 1681e(a), a subscriber’s certification cannot absolve the

reporting agency of its independent obligation to verify the

certification and determine that no reasonable grounds exist

for suspecting impermissible use.6 Blanket certification can6Experian suggests that Davis v. Asset Servs., 46 F. Supp. 2d 503, 508

(M.D. La. 1998), Boothe v. TRW Credit Data, 557 F. Supp. 66, 71

(S.D.N.Y. 1982), and Hiemstra v. TRW, Inc., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1629, 1634

(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) support the contention that blanket certifications will

satisfy a credit reporting agency’s obligations under § 1681e(a). While

12958 PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N
not eliminate all genuine issues of material fact with regard to

Experian’s liability.

C. Experian’s Motion to File Documents Under Seal

Two standards generally govern motions to seal documents

like the one at issue here.7 First, a “compelling reasons” standard applies to most judicial records. See Kamakana v. City

and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)

(holding that “[a] party seeking to seal a judicial record . . .

bears the burden of overcoming . . . the ‘compelling reasons’

standard”); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d

1122, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2003). This standard derives from the

common law right “to inspect and copy public records and

documents, including judicial records and documents.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). To limit this common law right of access, a party

seeking to seal judicial records must show that “compelling

reasons supported by specific factual findings . . . outweigh

the general history of access and the public policies favoring

these cases hold that credit reporting agencies may rely on blanket certifications rather than having to verify credit requests individually, none provides that a blanket certification by itself is sufficient to satisfy the

§ 1681e inquiry. See, e.g., Davis, 46 F. Supp.2d at 508 (holding that the

defendant complied with the requirements of § 1681e(a) because it

obtained a blanket certification and because the plaintiff did not submit

“any evidence to prove that the [defendant] knew or should have had reason to know that [the subscriber] would access the report for an impermissible purpose”); Boothe, 577 F. Supp. at 71 (finding no violation where the

primary business of the requesting entity used reports for a permissible

purpose and there was “no showing that TRW knew of the improper purpose for the report issued”). Even if Experian did not have to verify PCA’s

request for Pintos’s credit report individually, § 1681e(a) still required

proper verification of PCA generally. 

7A third standard covers the “narrow range of documents” such as

“grand jury transcripts” and certain “warrant materials” that “traditionally

[have] been kept secret for important policy reasons.” Kamakana, 447

F.3d at 1178. No party asserts this third standard is relevant here. 

PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N 12959
disclosure.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“Private materials unearthed during discovery” are not part

of the judicial record. Id. at 1180. A different standard applies

to that category, from Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which provides that a trial court may grant a protective order “which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue

burden or expense.”

The relevant standard for purposes of Rule 26(c) is whether

“ ‘good cause’ exists to protect th[e] information from being

disclosed to the public by balancing the needs for discovery

against the need for confidentiality.” Phillips v. General

Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002). This

“good cause” standard presents a lower burden for the party

wishing to seal documents than the “compelling reasons”

standard. The cognizable public interest in judicial records

which underlies the “compelling reasons” standard does not

exist for documents produced between private litigants. See

Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1134 (“When discovery material is filed

with the court . . . its status changes.”); Kamakana, 447 F.3d

at 1180 (holding that “[d]ifferent interests are at stake with the

right of access than with Rule 26(c)”). 

The “good cause” standard is not limited to discovery. In

Phillips, we held that “good cause” is also the proper standard

when a party seeks access to previously sealed discovery

attached to a nondispositive motion. Id. at 1213 (“[W]hen a

party attaches a sealed discovery document to a nondispositive motion, the usual presumption of the public’s right of

access is rebutted.”). Nondispositive motions “are often ‘unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of

action,” and, as a result, the public’s interest in accessing dispositive materials “do[es] not apply with equal force” to nondispositive materials. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (citation

omitted). In light of the weaker public interest in nondisposi12960 PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N
tive materials, we apply the “good cause” standard when parties wish to keep them under seal. Applying the “compelling

interest” standard under these circumstances would needlessly

“undermine a district court’s power to fashion effective protective orders.” Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. 

Experian wishes to seal documents attached to Pintos’s

cross-motion for summary judgment. Rule 26(c) does not

govern these documents because they are not “private materials unearthed during discovery” but have become part of the

judicial record. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 180. Additionally, the

documents do not fall within the Phillips exception to the general presumption of access because Pintos’s motion was dispositive.8

See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135 (holding that the Phillips

exception is “expressly limited to the status of materials . . .

attached to a non-dispositive motion”). Consequently,

Experian must overcome a strong presumption of access by

showing that “compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings . . . outweigh the general history of access and

the public policies favoring disclosure.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d

at 1180 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Under the “compelling reasons” standard, a district court

must weigh “relevant factors,”

9

 base its decision “on a com8This case differs slightly from Phillips, in which a nonparty sought

access to court records previously filed under seal. Phillips, 307 F.3d at

1209. Here no third party seeks access to previously sealed documents, but

this is a distinction without a difference. It is undisputed that a “strong presumption of access to judicial records applies fully to dispositive pleadings.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. Accordingly, whether a third party

has sought access is immaterial when a party moves to seal documents

already filed with the court. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (holding

simply that “ ‘compelling reasons’ must be shown to seal judicial records

attached to a dispositive motion”). 

9

“Relevant factors” include the “public interest in understanding the

judicial process and whether disclosure of the material could result in

improper use of the material for scandalous or libelous purposes or

infringement upon trade secrets.” Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1434 (quoting

EEOC v. Erection Co., Inc., 900 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N 12961
pelling reason,” and “articulate the factual basis for its ruling

. . . without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Hagestad v.

Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). A proper analysis is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Foltz, 331 F.3d at

1135. An order that fails to articulate its reasoning must be

vacated and remanded because “[m]eaningful appellate

review is impossible” when the appellate panel has no way of

knowing “whether relevant factors were considered and given

appropriate weight.” Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1434-35 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The district court’s November 9, 2004 denial of Experian’s

motion to seal offered no explanation for the decision. The

explanation provided in the court’s April 29, 2005 order denying Experian’s motion to alter or amend judgment did not fill

the gap. With the case already on appeal, the district court

denied Experian’s motion on jurisdictional grounds but suggested that it would grant Experian’s motion if it still had

jurisdiction, staying its prior order to file the documents in the

public record pending our resolution of the appeal. According

to the district court, Phillips would govern the motion and

good cause existed for placing Experian’s documents under

seal. 

[8] Because the documents at issue here were attached to

a dispositive motion, however, Phillips does not provide the

proper standard. A determination by the district court that

good cause exists for sealing Experian’s documents does not

establish that there are “compelling reasons” to do so. See

Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (holding that “a ‘good cause’

showing . . . will not suffice to fulfill the ‘compelling reasons’

standard that a party must meet to rebut the presumption of

access to dispositive pleadings and attachments”). Instead, the

court must decide whether compelling reasons exist to seal

the documents. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135-36. We vacate and

remand “for the making of findings in support of an[ ] order

on this issue,” Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1435, in light of the

proper legal standard. 

12962 PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N
III. Conclusion

We reverse the district court’s summary judgment in favor

of defendants and remand for further proceedings. Additionally, we vacate the district court’s order denying Experian’s

motion to seal documents and remand for consideration in

light of the proper legal standard. 

REVERSED; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

PINTOS v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS’N 12963