alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2019372EN.01001801.xml

| 4.11.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 372/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.11.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 372/18

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Darmstadt (Germany) lodged on 30 July 2019 — RJ v Stadt Offenbach am Main

(Case C-580/19)

(2019/C 372/19)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Darmstadt

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: RJ

Defendant: Stadt Offenbach am Main

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC (1) to be interpreted as meaning that periods of stand-by time during which an employee is subject to the obligation to reach the city boundary of his place of employment in uniform with the operational vehicle within twenty minutes are to be regarded as working time, even though the employer has not prescribed a place for the employee to stay, but the employee is nevertheless significantly restricted in his choice of location and in the opportunities to devote himself to his personal and social interests? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC (1) to be interpreted as meaning that periods of stand-by time during which an employee is subject to the obligation to reach the city boundary of his place of employment in uniform with the operational vehicle within twenty minutes are to be regarded as working time, even though the employer has not prescribed a place for the employee to stay, but the employee is nevertheless significantly restricted in his choice of location and in the opportunities to devote himself to his personal and social interests?

| 2. | If the first question referred is answered in the affirmative: | In a situation such as that of the first question referred, is Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC to be interpreted as meaning that, when defining the concept of working time, account is also to be taken of whether and to what extent a service call-out is usually to be expected during stand-by duty which is to be spent at a place not prescribed by the employer? |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

If the first question referred is answered in the affirmative:

In a situation such as that of the first question referred, is Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC to be interpreted as meaning that, when defining the concept of working time, account is also to be taken of whether and to what extent a service call-out is usually to be expected during stand-by duty which is to be spent at a place not prescribed by the employer?

---

(1)  Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).

---
# Official Journal C 249/8 Oc

| | ISSN 1725-2423 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 249 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 478 October 2004 |

ISSN 1725-2423

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 249

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 478 October 2004

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Information |
| | Commission |
| 2004/C 249/1 | Euro exchange rates | 1 |
| 2004/C 249/2 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.3419 — ADECCO/MANPOWER/VEDIORBIS/JV) (1) | 2 |
| 2004/C 249/3 | Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures | 3 |
| 2004/C 249/4 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.3492 — EXEL/TIBBET & BRITTEN) (1) | 4 |
| 2004/C 249/5 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.3555 — HEWLETT-PACKARD/SYNSTAR) (1) | 4 |
| 2004/C 249/6 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.3552 — DEUTSCHE POST/GUIPUZCOANA) (1) | 5 |

Notice No

Contents

page

I   Information

Commission

2004/C 249/1

Euro exchange rates

1

2004/C 249/2

Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.3419 — ADECCO/MANPOWER/VEDIORBIS/JV) (1)

2

2004/C 249/3

Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures

3

2004/C 249/4

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.3492 — EXEL/TIBBET & BRITTEN) (1)

4

2004/C 249/5

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.3555 — HEWLETT-PACKARD/SYNSTAR) (1)

4

2004/C 249/6

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.3552 — DEUTSCHE POST/GUIPUZCOANA) (1)

5

---

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
# C_2021513EN.01003602.xml

| 20.12.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 513/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.12.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 513/36

---

Order of the General Court of 20 October 2021 — AstraZeneca and Others v Commission

(Case T-476/19) (1)

(2021/C 513/52)

Language of the case: English

The President of the Second Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 312, 16.9.2019.

---
#### Domenico Spoatea *vs.*Berkshire Street Railway Company.

Berkshire.

September 23, 1912.

October 15, 1912.

Present: Rugg, C. J., Morton, Hammond, Braley, & DeCourcy, JJ.

*Negligence,*Street railway.

Evidence, that one riding a bicycle in the night-time on a wide street became so blinded by a “large night reflector” headlight on a street car coming round a curve that he was unable to guide his bicycle and ran into a team at a place where there was plenty of room for him to pass the team without collision if he had not become blinded by the light, that the light was “the same light on the cars that” he had seen “them ordinarily use,” and that the track of the street railway was at the side of the street, is not sufficient to show that the injury to the rider was caused by negligence in the use of the light.

*600Tort for personal injuries received by a collision in the nighttime between the plaintiff, riding on a bicycle, and a team on the highway, alleged to have been caused by the plaintiff becoming blinded by a headlight of great power used on a street car of the defendant. Writ dated August 2, 1909.

In the Superior Court the case was tried before *McLaughlin,*J. The plaintiff was the only witness. Material portions of his testimony are stated in the opinion. At the close of his testimony the plaintiff rested, and at the request of the defendant the judge ordered a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff alleged exceptions.

The case was submitted on briefs.

*M. E. Couch,*for the plaintiff.

*H. W. Ely & J. B. Ely,*for the defendant.

Rugg, C. J.

The plaintiff traveling in the night-time upon a bicycle on a highway was injured by collision with a team. It is sought to fasten liability upon the defendant because a headlight upon one of its cars proceeding on its track dazzled the plaintiff so that he ran into the team/ The plaintiff testified: — “The light blinded me, I was unable to guide my bicycle. ... It blinded me for the moment and I could not see; ... it was one of those large night reflectors. ... It was the same light on the cars that I saw them ordinarily use, that is about the same. . . . The light was thrown upon me as it rounded a curve. I was coming down the hill, straight down when the car rounded the curve.” The plaintiff saw the team a few steps ahead. The street was wide, and the tracks of the defendant were on its side, and there was plenty of room to pass without collision but for the blinding effect of the light.

This, in substance, is the plaintiff’s case. It is too meagre to show any negligence on the part of the defendant, either in the character or management of the light or in the running of the car. At most, there appears to have been only a momentary blinding of the plaintiff, as the rays from a headlight such as are in common use included him in their range for an instant while the car came around a curve. More facts than these must appear before it can be said that there.was fault in the use or operation of the light or car.

*Exceptions overruled.*
EXHIBIT 31.1

                           SECTION 302 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Linda Broenniman, certify that:

         1. I have reviewed this  quarterly  report on form 10-QSB of MediaWorx,
Inc.;

         2. Based on my knowledge,  this  quarterly  report does not contain any
untrue  statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary
to make the  statements  made,  in light of the  circumstances  under which such
statements  were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
quarterly report;

         3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial  condition,  results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

         4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
exchange act rules 13a-14 and 15d-14 for the registrant and have:

        a)  designed  such  disclosure  controls  and  proceduresto  ensure that
        material   information   relating  to  the  registrant,   including  its
        consolidated  subsidiaries,  is made known to us by others  within those
        entities,  particularly  during the period in which this report is being
        prepared;

        b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's  disclosure  controls
        and  procedures  as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of
        this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

        c)  presented  in  this  quarterly  report  our  conclusions  about  the
        effectiveness  of the disclosure  controls and  procedures  based on our
        evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

         5. The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation,  to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee  of  registrant's  board  of  directors  (or  persons  performing  the
equivalent functions):

        a) all  significant  deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
        control which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
        process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
        registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and


<PAGE>


        b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
        employees  who  have a  significant  role in the  registrant's  internal
        controls.


         6. The registrant's  other certifying  officers and I have indicated in
this quarterly report whether or not there were significant  changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could  significantly  affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of my most recent  evaluation,  including any  corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date:  May 14, 2003

/s/  Linda Broenniman
---------------------
Linda Broenniman
Chief Executive Officer and Director
(Principal Executive and Financial Officer)
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements of
Regent Assisted Living, Inc. on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-61239, 333-12159 and
333-12157) and Form S-3 (File No. 333-55769) of our report dated March 10, 1999,
on our audit of the consolidated financial statements of Regent Assisted Living,
Inc. as of December 31, 1998 and for the year then ended, which report is
included in this Annual Report on Form 10-KSB.


PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP


Portland, Oregon
March 29, 1999
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pane l unani m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T C UA UH T E MOC B AL T AZ AR - OR OZ C O, P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 08- 73200 A ge nc yN o. A 075- 664- 548 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

an O r de rof

the B o ar do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d S e pt e m be r13, 2010 ** B efo re: S IL V E R M A N , C A L L A H A N , an dN . R . S M IT H , C i rcu i tJu d g es. C uauht e m oc B a l t a z ar - O r oz c o, ana t i ve and c i t i z e n of M e xi c o, pe t i t i ons f

or re vi ew of the B oard of Im m i grat i on A pp ea l s’ (“ B IA ”) order di sm i ss i ng hi s app ea l f r om an i m m i gr a t i on j udge ’ s de c i s i on de ny i ng hi s appl i c a t i on f orc anc e l l a t i on of r e m ova l . O urj ur i s di c t i on i s gove rne d by8 U . S . C . § 1252. W e r e vi e w de novo 

# FI LED SEP 27 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS08- 73200 2 q u e s t i o n s o f

l aw, A l tam i rano v. G on zales , 427 F . 3d 586, 591 ( 9th C i r . 2005) , and c la im s o f c o n s titu tio n a l v io la tio n s in im m ig r a tio n p r o c e e d in g s , I tu rr i b a rr i a v . I

NS , 321 F . 3d 889, 894 ( 9th C i r . 2003) . W e de nyi n partand di s m i s s i n partthe pe t i t i on f o rr e v ie w . T he agency properl y c on clud ed thatB al t az ar -O rozc o w as the subj ec tof an e x p e d ite dr e m o v a l o r d e rth a t in te rrup te dh is c o n tin u o u s p h y s ic a l p r e s e n c e . See Juarez -R am os v. G on zales , 48 5 F . 3d 50 9, 51 2 (9th C i r. 20 07 ) ( an expedi t ed r e m ova l or de ri nt e rrupt s an a l i e n’ s c ont i nuous phy s i c a l pr e s e nc e f orc anc e l l a t i on purpos e s ) . B a l t a z ar - O r oz c o’ s due pr oc e s s c l a i m f a i l s be c aus e he c annot d e m o n s tr a te p r e

ju d ic e . Se e La ta v . I

NS , 204 F . 3d 1241, 1244 ( 9th C i r . 2000) (r equi ri ng prej ud i ce for apet i t i on ert o p re vai l on a due process cl ai m ). W e l ac k j uri sdi ct i on ov erB al t az ar -O rozc o’ s c on t ent i on thatthe expedi t ed r e m o v a l o r d e rinth e r e c o r dd idn o t p e rta into h im , b e c au s e h e f a ile dto e x h au s t th is c o n te n tio n b e f

o r e th e B I A . Se e B a rr o n v . A s h c r o ft , 35 8 F . 3d 67 4, 67 8 (9th C i r. 20 04 ). P E T IT IO N F O R R E V IE W D E N IE D i n p art; D IS M IS S E D i n p art.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricco Lamont McKOY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-7688.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 19, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 1, 2011.

Ricco Lamont McKoy, Appellant Pro Se. Edward D. Gray, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Ap-pellee.

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ricco Lamont McKoy seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2011) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that McKoy has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Henry, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Pincus, J.), rendered June 9, 1982, convicting him of robbery in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

Defendant asserts that the court erroneously denied his challenge of a prospective juror for cause. The challenge at issue here occurred after defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges to the regular jury, 11 veniremen had *738already been selected, and a new panel of 12 prospective jurors was being examined for the purpose of selecting the last regular juror and two alternates. After questioning by the court and counsel, the court entertained challenges for cause as to the entire panel of prospective jurors. Defendant’s challenge for cause at issue here concerned the third prospective juror, whose wife and daughter had been victims of purse and chain snatchings. After it was denied by the court, the first prospective juror was dismissed on the People’s peremptory challenge and the second venireman was seated, thereby completing the regular trial jury. Defendant then exercised a peremptory challenge to the juror at issue here as an alternate and the two alternates were selected without further challenge by defendant, leaving defendant with three unused peremptory challenges as to alternates. None of the alternates deliberated.

Under the above facts, the denial of defendant’s challenge for cause is not a cognizable issue insofar as selection of the regular jury is concerned. Thus, we need not reach the merits of the court’s ruling on defendant’s challenge as the regular panel was completely selected and the challenged juror was never actually considered for service upon the regular jury.

Nor do we believe the court abused its discretion in imposing the maximum authorized sentence upon this defendant *(see, e.g., People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). The sentence record reveals that the court considered all the relevant circumstances, including defendant’s admission, during the sentencing hearing, that his testimony at trial was perjurious, and imposed an appropriate sentence. Gibbons, J. P., Bracken, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 21

SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

Company                                                   State of Incorporation

Denticator International, Inc.......................      Missouri
Young Dental Manufacturing I, LLC...................      Missouri
         Young Dental International, Inc............      Barbados
         Lorvic Holdings, Inc.......................      Delaware
                  The Lorvic Corporation............      Delaware
         YI Europe, Limited.........................      England
Young Acquisitions Company..........................      Missouri
         Panoramic Rental Corp......................      Missouri
YI Europe, Limited..................................      England
Athena Technology, LLC..............................      Missouri
Young PS Acquisitions, LLC..........................      Delaware
IIA 

Calendar No. 153 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. J. RES. 25 

Relating to the disapproval of the President’s exercise of authority to increase 

the debt limit, as submitted under section 3101A of title 31, United 

States Code, on August 2, 2011. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 6, 2011 

Mr. MCCONNELL (for himself, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. PAUL, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. 

BLUNT, Mr. COATS, Mr. ENZI, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. 

ROBERTS, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. BARRASSO, Mr. BOOZMAN, Mr. CORNYN, 

Mr. RUBIO, Mr. KYL, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. HATCH, Ms. AYOTTE, Mr. 

CHAMBLISS, Mr. MORAN, Mr. WICKER, Mr. SHELBY, and Mr. LEE) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and placed 

on the calendar, pursuant to Public Law 112–25 section 301(a)(2) 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Relating to the disapproval of the President’s exercise of 

authority to increase the debt limit, as submitted under 

section 3101A of title 31, United States Code, on August 

2, 2011. 

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 That Congress disapproves of the President’s exercise of 

4 authority to increase the debt limit, as exercised pursuant 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•SJ 25 PCS 

1 to the certification under section 3101A(a) of title 31, 

2 United States Code. 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS

jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 153 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. J. RES. 25 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Relating to the disapproval of the President’s exerUnited States Code, on August 2, 2011. submitted under section 3101A of title 31, cise of authority to increase the debt limit, as 

SEPTEMBER 6, 2011 

Read twice and placed on the calendar, pursuant to 

Public Law 112–25 section 301(a)(2) 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 138 (Thursday, July 22, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 38788-38789]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-15558]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 11470]


Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation--Notice 
of Virtual Open Meeting

    The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation will 
meet on August 30, 2021 in a virtual open session to discuss the status 
of the production of the Foreign Relations series and any other matters 
of concern to the Committee.
    The Committee will meet in open session from 10:00 a.m. until noon 
through a virtual platform TBD. Members of the public planning to 
attend the virtual meeting should RSVP to Julie Fort at 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#bafcd5c8cef0f6fac9cedbcedf94ddd5cc"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="45032a37310f090536312431206b222a33">[email protected]</span></a>. RSVP and requests for reasonable accommodation should 
be sent not later than August 13, 2021. The platform type and 
instructions on how to join the virtual meeting will be provided upon 
receipt of RSVP. Note that requests for reasonable accommodation 
received after August 13 will be considered but might not be possible 
to fulfill.
    Questions concerning the meeting should be directed to Adam M. 
Howard, Executive Secretary, Advisory Committee on Historical 
Diplomatic Documentation, Department of State,

[[Page 38789]]

Office of the Historian, Washington, DC 20372, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#7810110b0c170a01380b0c190c1d561f170e"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="0b6362787f6479724b787f6a7f6e256c647d">[email protected]</span></a>.

Adam M. Howard,
Executive Secretary, Advisory Committee on Historical, Diplomatic 
Documentation.
[FR Doc. 2021-15558 Filed 7-21-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-34-P


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#### HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF TRENTON, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. MAURICE A. FINKLE, *ET AL.,*DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS.

October 3, 1960.

*Mr. John A. Eartpence*for the petitioners.

*Mr. Mark D.*Kaplan, *Mr. Jules J. Kelsey*and *Mr. Arthur S. Kelsey*for the respondent.

Denied.