reasons I am dismissing her § 1985 claim against Banker’s Life, for her allegations provide no

additional information with respect to the EEOC’s alleged involvement in the alleged conspiracy.

Ms. Collier also seeks redress under the Fifth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
but those claims must also fail. Although the Fifth Amendment does restrict the federal
government, it is inapplicable where a agency performs fact finding investigations and does not
adjudicate or make binding determinations. Hannah v. Larche, 363 USS. 420, 440-52 (1960).
The EEOC is such an agency, and therefore, Ms. Collier has no claim against the EEOC under the
Fifth Amendment. Ms. Collier’s claim under the Thirteenth Amendment is also unavailing
because Ms. Collier does not state a cause of action. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits
slavery and involuntary servitude, and Ms. Collier makes no allegations that she was in any way
forced to work for Banker’s Life. The Fourteenth Amendment is directed to state action, and
therefore, the EEOC cannot be sued pursuant to it. .

Finally, with respect to Title VII, in order for Ms. Collier to have claim against the EEOC,
she must demonstrate that Congress granted a right of action against the EEOC in Title VI
“either expressly or by clear implication.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). The
Seventh Circuit has made it clear that “[iJt is settled law, in this and other circuits, that Title VII
does not provide either an express or implied cause of action against the EEOC to challenge its
investigation and processing of a charge.” _McCottrell v. EEOC, 736 F.2d 350, 351 (7* Cir.
1984). Thus, Ms. Collier has no claim against the EEOC under Title VII.

With respect to the IDHR, Ms. Collier cannot proceed with her claims because they are
barred by res judicata, which applies when (1) there has been a judgment on the merits in a prior
lawsuit; (2) the same parties are involved in both suits; and (3) the same causes of action are

4



Generally, sovereign immunity limits this court’s jurisdiction in cases against the
government-the sovereign cannot be sued except in the manner in which it consents to be sued.
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). There must be statutory authority
evidencing the consent of the sovereign to be sued and conferring jurisdiction on the District
Court to entertain the action. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940). The
Constitution does not waive sovereign immunity or create jurisdiction in a federal district court
absent statutory expression of Congress’ intent to waive immunity and to grant jurisdiction to the
federal district courts. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 582 (1934). Ms. Collier looks
to § 1343 for such statutory grant of jurisdiction. However, § 1343 confers jurisdiction only
where a federal cause of action is provided by one of the substantive sections of the Civil Rights
Act. The first two subsections of § 1343 address claims created by § 1985. However, Iam
dismissing Ms. Collier’s claim against the EEOC under § 1985 for reasons that I will explain
shortly. The last two subsections of § 1343 address civil rights claims arising only from state
action. See Ramierez v. Washington, 363 F. Supp. 105, 108 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd 415 U.S. 970
(1974). Hence, § 1343 does not provide for a statutory grant of jurisdiction for Ms. Collier’s
claims.

Tam dismissing Ms. Collier’s claim against the EEOC under § 1985 because the United
States is not subject to suit under the civil rights conspiracy, nor has it consented to be sued under
§ 1985, and §1985 does not create or otherwise allow claims against federal officers acting under
color of federal law. Benson y. United States, 969 F. Supp. 1129, 1136 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Francis-
Sobel v, University of Maine, 597 F.2d 15, 17 (1* Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
The EEOC, acting under color of federal law, is not subject to suit under § 1985. Even if this
were not the case, I would dismiss Ms. Collier’s § 1985 claim against the EEOC for the same

3


involved in both suits. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Hunt,
296 F.3d 624, 628 (7 Cir. 2002). A cause of action will be considered the same for res judicata
purposes when it arises from the same, or nearly the same, factual allegations as the prior
litigation. Spencer v. U.S. Railroad Retirement Board, 2002 WL 31375499 (N.D. Til. 2002),
citing Brzostowski v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., 49 F.3d 337, 338-39 (7* Cir. 1995). Ms.
Collier’s allegations are almost identical to those made against the IDHR in a prior case in front
of Judge Anderson in which Ms. Collier accused the IDHR of failing to respond to her racial
discrimination complaint against LaSalle National Corporation and conspiring against her in
violation of § 1985. Judge Anderson dismissed Ms. Collier’s complaint, and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed Judge Anderson’s dismissal in Collier v. Illinois Department of Human Rights, 221 F.3d
1338 (7" Cir. 2000). Afterwards, Ms. Collier filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court which was subsequently dismissed. All three elements for res
judicata are met: there was final judgment on the merits, the parties are the same with respect to
the IDHR, and both complaints state the same cause of action. Ms. Collier cites Terry v. Watts
Copy Systems, Inc., 768 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. 2002), in which the trial court’s finding that the
plaintiff's claim was barred by res judicata was reversed, However, even if Terry were binding
authority for this case, which it is not, the decision was reversed because the appellate court held
that the Illinois Human Rights Commission (“IHRC”) does not have jurisdiction over workers’
compensation claims, and therefore, the IHRC’s adjudication over the plaintiff's workers’
compensation claim did not bar the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim. The case is not
analogous to Ms. Collier’s case and is thus irrelevant.

Even if Ms. Collier’s claims were not barred by res judicata, there is a statutory bar to

suing a state agency under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,

5



ae Minute

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

forme of Assigned Judge James B. Zagel Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge . than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 7062 DATE 12/20/2002
CASE MARTHA COLLIER vs. BANKER’S LIFE & CASUALTY CO., ET AL
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) i) Brief in support of motion due
(3) oO Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due .
(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) oOo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at .
(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
(8) o {Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) (C) Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a)(1) [1 FRCP41(a)(2).
. ao ll [Other docket entry] Defendants motion (7-1 and 10-1) to dismiss is granted.
(i) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court. Document
. Number
No notices required.
Notices mailed by judge's staff, DEC
Notified counsel by telephone. 4 02
of | Docketing to mail notices.
ov | Mail AO 450 form,
Copy to judge/magistrate judge Lunod Lois
y
courtroom y .
Dw deputy's LO:S Hd €2 93202
initials Dan Tel
ate/time, _
era Ce Shee TU ling Sept iia



491 U.S. 58 (1989) establishes that a state is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983, and
Burgess v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 1992 WL 137393 (NLD. Ill. 1992) extends Will to §
1985. Claims under the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments must be brought pursuant
to § 1983, and Ms. Collier’s conspiracy claim must be brought under §1985. Because the IDHR
is not a “person,” it cannot be subject to liability under either statute.

Even if the barriers to Ms. Collier’s § 1985 claim did not exist, I would nevertheless
dismiss the claim for the same reason I am dismissing the § 1985 claim against Banker’s Life, for
Ms. Collier’s allegations provide no more information regarding the IDHR’s alleged involvement
in the alleged conspiracy.

For the reasons stated above, Ms. Collier’s complaint is dismissed with Tespect to
Banker’s Life, the EEOC, and the IDHR.

ENTER:

QQ (CG Sa med
Jameg B. Zagel
Unitgd States District hee?

DATE: 2 Qu Zope


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARTHA COLLIER,
Plaintiff,

Vv. No. 02 C 7062
Judge James B. Zagel
BANKER’S LIFE & CASUALTY CO.,
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, and ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,

DOCKETED
DEC 2 4 2092

Defendants.
ME! UM OPINION AND ORDE

Plaintiff Martha Collier brings this action against Banker’s Life and Casualty Co.
(“Banker’s Life”), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and the Illinois
Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”). All three defendants have moved to dismiss Ms.
Collier’s complaint. Dismissal is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if “it is clear that no relief
could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.”
Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

Against Banker’s Life, Ms. Collier alleges violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and the Fifth,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, Ms. Collier alleges that Banker’s Life hired “low
criminals to harass plaintiff's children without their awareness,” and that on September 16, 2002,
“some employees from management set up illegal stalking of plaintiff's daughter and paid some
criminals to harass her.” She alleges that Banker’s Life conspired with the EEOC and IDHR “to
form a greater conspiracy using government agencies as a shield for their crimes.” While “i]t is
true that all the federal rules require of a complaint is that it put the defendant on notice of the

plaintiff's claim, . . . notice implies some minimum description of the defendant’s complained-of



conduct.” Ryan v. Mary Immaculate Queen Ctr., 188 F.3d 857, 860 (7" Cir. 1999). Sucha
“minimum description” includes when the alleged conspiracy was formed, what its terms were,
and what each conspirator’s specific roles were. Ms. Collier’s allegations indicate neither the
form nor the scope of the alleged conspiracy, and thus, there is only “a bare allegation of
conspiracy,” which does not satisfy the Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. For this reason, Ms. Collier’s claim
against Banker’s Life under § 1985 is dismissed.

With respect to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, there is no allegation that Banker’s
Life acted under color of state law, and therefore, these claims are dismissed. Finally, a plaintiff
cannot bring a private right of action directly under the Thirteenth Amendment for employment
discrimination. Rash v. Minority Intermodal Specialists, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21371 at
*13 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Insofar as Ms. Collier’s Thirteenth Amendment claim is based on the terms
and conditions of her current employment with Banker’s Life, she does not allege that she is
being forced to work for Banker’s Life and thus, her claim must fail and is dismissed.

Ms. Collier alleges that the EEOC failed to investigate her charge, arguing that its
conclusion that “the evidence available did not indicate that plaintiff was discriminated against
based on race in violation of Title VIT’ was clearly improper because she gave the EEOC
“sufficient” documents to prove race discrimination. She also alleges that an EEOC investigator
called her a “fool” on the telephone and that the EEOC conspired with the IDHR to prevent her
complaint against LaSalle National Corporation from “reaching court” in December of 1998.
Based on these allegations, Ms. Collier claims violation of her rights under the Fifth, Thirteenth,
and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as under Title VI, and that the EEOC is liable pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985.