_ Minuto Qeder Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Mlinois

()

Name of Assigned Judge James B. Moran Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 00 C 7082 DATE 4/30/2001
CASE Alma Diaz etc. Vs. Joe Rizza Ford, Inc.
TITLE

[in the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the

nature of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:
Memorandum Opinion and Order
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Qo Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue___.
(4) QO Ruling/Hearing on__setfor__at
(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor sat
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor____at___.
(a) im Trial{set for/re-set for] on _at
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__at
(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4(m) General Rule21 OFRCP41(a(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
qo) (Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Defendant’s motion to stay

proceedings is denied. Status hearing set for May 31, 2001 at 9:45am.

(11) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

‘No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.
oq umber of,notices

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

v Docketing to mail notices.

Mail A 450 form,

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

fate mailed nati
courtroom date mailed notice

WAH deputy’s
initials

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central Clerk’s Office

mailing deputy inisiats



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
ALMA DIAZ, individually and on )
behalf of all others similarly situated, y
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 00 C 7082 Up,
) May, EP
Ay (7)
JOE RIZZA FORD, INC., ) 7] Z
) <My
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff filed this class action in federal court, contending that defendant has violated
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) in part because of what it did and did not do with respect
to debt cancellation coverage, commonly called “GAP” insurance. She also filed a state court
action the same day. There she sued Joe Rizza Ford, Inc. (Joe Rizza) and also joined Old Kent
Bank, the purported purchaser of retail installment obligations. In that action she alleges
various state and federal claims arising out of her purchase of two vehicles, claiming that Joe
Rizza inflated the price on the first vehicle and charged an unconscionable amount for the
second, charged her for GAP coverage and extended service contract coverage she did not ask
for and did not want, unilaterally extended the contract term on the second vehicle, sold her
defective vehicles, and failed to provide a required written statement and required terms.

Defendant, understandably concerned about having to defend against plaintiff in two
courts at the same time and about the possibility of having to pay plaintiff's attorneys’ fees in

two actions, moves to stay the proceedings here. It relies on the Colorado River abstention

doctrine. Zz


No. 00 C 7082 Page 2

Both parties have cogently argued the reach of that doctrine, but we do not believe it
necessary to discuss it in detail here. Both cases arise from plaintiff's vehicle transactions with
defendant, and the GAP coverage figures in both. We do not believe, however, that they can
truly be described as parallel actions or that the state action protects the federal plaintiff's
rights.

The state action claims are personal to plaintiff. The GAP coverage is but a small
portion of those claims. Plaintiff’s personal stake in the federal action TILA claim is likewise
rather modest, certainly far less than the claims she advances in state court. The TILA claim
becomes a matter of substance only if it can be pursued as a class action. Could plaintiff join
her class claim with her personal claims in state court? We think not. We have some difficulty
in casting plaintiff as an appropriate class representative in an action in which she has a far
greater stake in her personal claims than in her class claim. In short, we consider it unlikely
that plaintiff could pursue a class claim in the pending state action. Accordingly, we deny the
motion to stay. We expect, however, the parties to coordinate their discovery so as to avoid

duplication. Any discovery in the state action may be used here without any further leave of

Arona. Nyce

q | JAMES B. MORAN
ior Judge, U. S. District Court

court.

Oped 30_, 2001.

/