address Annecca’s cross-motion targeting Lexent’s counterclaims.
As for the motion for reconsideration itself, in substantial

part it partakes of the qualities that led this Court to say, in

dealing with a comparable motion a decade and a half ago in

Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282,

288 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (adapted to this case):

Despite what [Annecca] appears to think, this Court’s
opinions are not intended as mere first drafts, subject
to revision and reconsideration at a litigant’s
pleasure. Motions such as this reflect a fundamental
misunderstanding of the limited appropriateness of
motions for reconsideration.

Annecca’s motion certainly does not play the limited role that
was felicitously described by the late District Judge Dortch

Warriner in Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc.,

99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983), a description that this Court
has often quoted since and that has in turn found its way into
opinions by our Court of Appeals addressing the same subject.

On that score, to the substantial extent that Annecca’s
filing rehashes the matters to which this Court gave painstaking
attention in the course of the Opinion (a rehashing that occupies
a good deal of what its counsel now tenders), this Court sees no
need for reconsideration: As it said over two decades ago in

like circumstances in Refrigeration Sales Co. v. Mitchell-

Jackson, Inc., 605 F.Supp. 6, 7 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd 770 F.2d

98 (7 Cir. 1985) (again paraphrased to fit this case):

{Annecca] contend[s] this Court was in error on the


obviously had the motion planned for quite some time before that.
It strikes this Court as an extraordinarily lame excuse for
counsel to say, as they have in their response to Lexent’s just~
filed motion to strike:

Plaintiffs decided to avail itself [sic] of the

opportunity to seek reconsideration of this Court’s

March 5° Order as part of its [sic] response to

Defendant’s second motion for summary judgment as a
matter of judicial economy and common sense.

* x *

Plaintiffs were waiting until the Defendant filed its

second Motion for Summary Judgment to raise its motion

to reconsider, but this was delayed significantly

because Defendant requested an additional month to file

its second Motion for Summary Judgment.

In any event, this Court has not granted Lexent’s motion to
strike Annecca’s bulky submission, but it refrains from granting
such relief primarily because Annecca’s supporting memorandum
also includes what had been promised on May 19 and because it
would be wasteful to force counsel to return to the drawing board
simply for purposes of submitting a substantially repetitious
filing. Instead this Court, at its June 25 hearing on the
matter, orally ordered Annecca’s counsel to file a brief
supplement to identify specifically which portions of the
preliminary statement and reconsideration aspect of their
memorandum (which appear to occupy fully three-fourths of its

length) should be considered in conjunction with the aspects that

are directly responsive to Lexent’s motion and that directly


issues it had considered fully and spoken to in detail
in the Opinion. Those arguments should of course be
directed to the Court of Appeals.
And to the extent that Annecca’s filing raises factual or legal
contentions that could have been (and should have been) advanced

the first time around, again our Court of Appeals has regularly

rejected such efforts--see, e.g., Caisse Nationale de Credit

Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269-70 (7% Cir.

1996) .?

Accordingly, even though Lexent’s motion to strike Annecca’s
motion for reconsideration has been denied, this Court also
denies Annecca’s motion itself in substantive terms. In
anticipation of the likelihood of that denial, this Court ruled
during the June 25 hearing that the clarifying and limiting
supplement by Annecca’s counsel is to be filed on or before

July 2, 2004, with Lexent’s reply regarding its own motion and

2 Strikingly, the discussion in Caisse Nationale begins

with a quotation from this Court’s opinion in Keene Corp. v.
Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F.Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Il]. 1982),
which was both affirmed and adopted as the Court of Appeals’ view
at 736 F.2d 388 (7% Cir. 1984), then goes on to cite and quote
from a number of this Court’s other opinions and unsuccessful
appeals from those opinions. All of those opinions, as well as
the other opinions cited in Caisse Nationale, have the identical
don’ t-hold-back thrust--as Caisse Nationale, 90 F.3d at 1270 put
it (quoting this Court’s opinion in Employers Ins. of Wausau v.
Bodi-Wachs Aviation Ins. Agency, 846 F.Supp. 677, 685 (N.D. Ill.
1994)):

A party seeking to defeat a motion for summary judgment
is required to “wheel out all its artillery to defeat
it.”


Minute Ofer Form (08/524

United States District Court, Northern District of INinois

Name of Assigned Judge i Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Milton I. Shadur than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 5092 DATE 6/28/2004
CASE Annecca vs. Lexent
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) i Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer briefdue__
(4) a Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] (set for/re-set for} on set for at
(6) Qo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at :
(op) a Trial{set for/re-set for] on at
(8) Qa [Bench/Jury trial) [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) o This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CFRCP4(m) Local Rule 41.1 CFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
ao wf (Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Accordingly, even though Lexent’s
motion to strike Annecca’s motion for reconsideration has been denied, this Court also denies Annecca’s
motion itself in substantive terms. In anticipation of the likelihood of that denial, this Court ruled during
the June 25 hearing that the clarifying and limiting supplement by Annecca’s counsel is to be filed on or
before July 2, 2004, with Lexent’s reply regarding its own motion and its response to Annecca’s cross-
motion be filed on or before July 16, 2004.
dl [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court. Document
No notices required, ; Number
umber of notices HES
o | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone,
Docketing to mail notices,

Mail AO 450 form.

Lunoa {oRsIa “sn

Copy to judge/magistrate judge. Wy

date mailed notice

courtroom 7 38
deputy’s
initials

HY 62 Hor hog2

Ed  Pabitime received in
Central Clerk's Office

SN

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railing depoty initials



its response to Annecca’s cross-motion to be filed on or before

July 16, 2004.

Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge

Date: June 28, 2004


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ANNECCA INC., et al.,

)
)
Plaintiffs, )
}
v. ) No. 02 C 5092
) cy ea noengere
LEXENT, INC., ) ROCKETED
)
Defendant. ) JUN 2 9 2004

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

During the May 19, 2004 scheduling conference held to
address scheduling on the motion that had been filed by Lexent,
Inc. (“Lexent”) for summary judgment on its counterclaims,*
Annecca’s counsel asked for and were given until June 16 to
respond to the Lexent motion. At that time Annecca’s counsel
also sought and were granted leave to file a memorandum in excess
of 15 pages, based on their representation that they anticipated
filing a counter-motion as to Lexent’s counterclaims. But what
Annecca’s counsel have now tendered instead is a 38-page
memorandum that begins with and is dominated by an effort to
overturn the Opinion rendered in Lexent’s favor on the principal
claims--an attack that counsel did not see fit to mention during

the May 19 session, even though fully 2-1/2 months had elapsed

1 Those are the only claims that remain in the case

following this Court’s issuance of its March 5 memorandum opinion
and order (the “Opinion,” 307 F.Supp.2d 999) that granted summary
judgment in Lexent’s favor on the claims brought against it by
Annecca, Inc. and its co-plaintiffs (collectively “Annecca,”
treated here as a singular noun for convenience).



since issuance of the Opinion, and even though by that time
counsel and their client had obviously decided to launch it.

No technical timing problem is of course posed by such a
motion for reconsideration (or, as counsel label their effort,
for “revision of this Court’s March 5 order”). As for the motion
itself, such filings are encountered with some degree of
frequency in practice even though, as this Court wrote more than

a decade ago in Spring Sys. Co. v. William G. Smart Co., No.

91 Cc 1049, 1993 WL 81445, at *1 (N.D. Tll. Mar. 19):

Motions for reconsideration cannot be located in any

search of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There

is a reason: Although such motions have long been

utilized by disappointed litigants who want to try

again, they have a very limited utility.

In this instance, because the Opinion disposed of fewer than all
of the claims in the case and was therefore not a final order,
Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 54(b) teaches that this Court’s ruling
is indeed “subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.”

All the same, it is disturbing that Annecca’s counsel did
not file their reconsideration effort far more promptly--and when
that was not done, did not even provide any mention of their
plans at all (let alone giving an actual preview of coming

attractions) at or before the scheduling conference held some

months after issuance of the Opinion, even though counsel