investigation and a ruling on her grievance. (/d. | 18.) The grievance was pending on June 27,
2002, (/d. 17.)

On June 27, 2002, the Illinois Appellate Court issued an order reversing the decision of
the circuit court and affirming the Board’s 1995 discharge of Hunt-Golliday, Hunt-Golliday, No.
95 CH 9049, at*14, The same day, the District directed Plunkett to go to Hunt-Golliday’s
worksite, discharge her, and have her escorted off the premises by security. (Sec. Amend. Comp!.
4] 10.) Plunkett demanded that Hunt-Golliday return her job identification, boots, keys, and other
District property. (/d. § 35.) Plunkett carried out this act with the assistance of a security guard,
whom he instructed to immediately escort Hunt-Golliday off the premises (Jd. § 35). During the
duration of these termination activities, employees in the vicinity observed these proceedings.
(Id. § 36.) Hunt-Golliday alleges that she committed no offense and, prior to the discharge, safely
performed the duties of her job. (/d. 1 38.) Hunt-Golliday alleges that Plunkett intended to inflict
severe cmotional distress upon her and that he acted with knowledge that the conduct had a “high
probability of inflicting severe emotional distress” on her. (/d. {| 40.) As a result of the discharge,
Hunt-Golliday suffered, and still suffers from, severe emotional distress. (Id. J 41.)

On August 8, 2002, the Illinois Appellate Court granted Hunt-Golliday’s motion for a
stay of judgment pending exhaustion of her appellate remedies. Order of August 8, 2002. The
District reinstated Hunt-Golliday and placed her on administrative leave. (Sec. Amend. Compl.
410.) On December 5, 2002, the Tlinois Supreme Court denicd Hunt-Golliday’s petition for
leave to appeal. On January 8, 2003, the Illinois Appellate Court ended the August 8, 2002, stay
and rendered its final order upholding the Board’s 1995 discharge of Hunt-Golliday, On

January 13, 2003, the District officially discharged Hunt-Golliday. (/d.)


The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims in the
second amended complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim... if... the district court dismissed all claims
over which it has general jurisdiction.”); Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7" Cir.
1999)(“[I]t is the well-established law of this circuit (hat the usual practice is to dismiss without
prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been dismissed prior to
trial.”). As such, the court dismisses Counts VJ and VII without prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the District’s motion to dismiss is granted (#24), Plunkett’s

motion to dismiss is denied as moot (#25).

Enter: / Mf ofl
JOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW
United States District Judge

Date: March 4, 2004


recommending that Hunt-Golliday be fired for her inability to perform the essential functions of
her job without posing a threat to hersclf or others due to her physical and mental condition.
Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, No.

95 CH 9049, at *4 (Ill, App. 1" Dist. June 27, 2002)'. On August 16, 1995, the Board issued its
findings and decision to discharge Hunt-Golliday from the classified service of the District, based
upon evidence presented that her condition materially impaired her performance and could create
a hazard to herself and other employees. Jd, Hunt-Golliday then sought administrative review of
the Board’s decision in the Circuit Court of Cook County. On November 7, 1996, the circuit
court reversed the decision of the Board, and Hunt-Golliday was reinstated to her employment
and awarded backpay, /.

In April, 2002, the District pennitted Hunt-Golliday to take the Tronworker’s
examination, which she passed. The District then placed her on the eligibility list for an
Ironworker position. (Sec. Amend. Compl. { 9.)

Sometime before June 27, 2002, Hunt-Golliday filed a Title 1 and Title VII suit against
the District. Plunkett was referenced in the body of the complaint. Subsequently, Plunkett made
adverse comments on Hunt-Golliday’s job evaluation that she contends were made in retaliation
for having filed the earlier lawsuit. Hunt-Golliday filed an internal grievance with the Board
against Plunkett as a result. (/d. | 17.) The Board was to have completed its investigation and
rendcred a decision on the grievance in July, 2002, but it failed to do so. (/d. | 18.) Hunt-

Golliday alleges that the Board “thwarted and continue[d] to thwart” her efforts to obtain an

‘a district court may take judicial notice of matters in the public record without converting a 12(b)(6)
motion into a motion for summary judgment. Henson v. CSC Credit Services, 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7" Cir, 1994).

3


Hunt-Golliday alleges that the District discharged her because it regarded her as having a
mental condition within the definition of the ADA. (/d. 11, 27.) The District did not discharge
non-African-American employees whom the District regarded as having a mental condition
within the definition of the ADA. (/d. 4 12.) Hunt-Golliday also alleges that the District
discharged her because of her pursuit of an internal grievance. (Jd. 419.) Finally, she alleges that
the District removed her name from a list of those cligible for an lronworker position, cven afler
she passed the Ironworker cxam, as a result of her pursuit of an internal grievance. (/d. {| 23-4.)
Hunt-Golliday alleges that she “has suffered and continues to suffer emotional distress, mental
anguish, embarrassment, humiliation, los[s] of opportunity for promotions and advancement,
pecuniary and other non pecuniary losses.” (/d, § 15, 20, 25, 28, 33.)

DISCUSSION

The District argues that Hunt-Golliday fails to state a claim for employment
discrimination or retaliation under either Title VI] or the ADA because she cannot demonstrate a
prima facie case under the familiar McDonnell Douglas test. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S, 792, 802 (1973). However, the McDonnell Douglas test is an evidentiary
standard, not a pleading requirement that must be salisficd to defeat a 12(b)(6) motion.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 510-11 (2002). Generally, to state a claim for
employment discrimination under Title VII or the ADA, all a plaintiff needs to allege is that she
was fired or retaliated against because of her race or disability. See Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d
516, 518 (7" Cir, 1998)(““I was tumed down for a job because of my race’ is all a complaint has
to say.”). Such an allegation is sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the plaintiffs claims.

Hunt-Golliday has clearly satisfied this requirement.


Miaute, Order Form (06/07)

United States District Court, Northern District of Mlinois

jame of dT Sith e if
ae Magistrate Joe Joan H. Lefkow han Assigned ose
| CASE NUMBER 02. C9199 DATE 3/5/2004

CASE Pasha IIunt-Golliday vs. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, et al.
L TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢-g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.)
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) oO Brief in support of motion duc
@) Oo Answer brief to motion duc. _ Reply to answer bricfdue____.
(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to) [set for/re-set for] on __ set for at
(6) o Pretrial conference(held/continucd to] (set for/re-set for] on __ set for at .
(7) a] Trial[set for/re-set for] on at
~) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Iearing] held/continued to at
(9) a) This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to}
DFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(@)\(1) O FRCP4I(a)(2).
qo [Other docket entry} Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Motion of defendant Metropolitan
Watcr Reclamation District to dismiss [24-1] is granted. Case is hereby dismissed. Motion of defendant
Oliver Plunkett to dismiss [25-1] is denied as moot.
ql) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order,]
No notices required, advised in open court.
3
No notices required. nuribes of notices
| Notices mailed by judge's staff. MAR 0 & 2004
Notified counsel by telephone, date do
Docketing to mail notices,
a | Mail AO 450 form. Mailed by MD. : Hl ‘ JK
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
syste004

Hate milled notice
courtroom

deputy’s
initials

MD MD

Date/time teceived in

central Clerk's Office nwiling deputy initiaks



Nevertheless, Hunt-Golliday fails to state a claim under Title VII or the ADA. While it is
generally truc that, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded
facts alleged in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in the
plaintiff's favor, Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 486 (7th Cir,2002), the court need not accept as
true allegations that are contradicted by judicially noticed facts. I re Woodmar Realty Co.,

294 F.2d 785 (7" Cir, 1961); Garcia v. City of Chicago, 91 C 5535, 1991 WL 289204, at *1
(ND, Ill. Dec. 23, 1991); see also C.A. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§1363 at 464 (2d ed. 1990). Herc, Hunt-Golliday’s claims are contradicted by facts in the public
record,

The Board discharged Hunt-Golliday in 1995 because it found that her physical and
mental condition materially impaired her job performance and could have created a havard to
herself or others. The circuit court reversed the decision of the Board, and Hunt-Golliday was
reinstated, However, on June 27, 2002, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the decision of the
circuit court and affirmed the earlier findings and decision of the Board, putting the 1995
discharge into effect. Thus, the decision to discharge Hunt-Golliday was made in 1995, not in
2002, Even if the District had discriminatory motives to discharge Hunt-Golliday in 2002, those
motives could not have affected a decision that was made by the Board in 1995. Thus, Hunt-
Golliday fails to state a claim under Title VJ or the ADA.

Hunt-Golliday’s allegation that she was denied procedural due process when she was
“summarily discharged” fails for similar reasons. Hunt-Golliday challenged her 1995 discharge
for seven years in state court. This all the process that she is duc. Thus, the court dismisses

Counts I-V.



a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
PASHA HUNT-GOLLIDAY, ) DOCKETED
)
Plaintiff, ) MAR 08 2004
) No, 02 C9199
v. ) Judge Joan H. Lefkow
)
METROPOLITAN WATER )
RECLAMATION DISTRICT OF )
GREATER CHICAGO and )
OLIVER PLUNKETT )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Pasha Hunt-Golliday (“Hunt-Golliday”) has filed a seven-count Second
Amended Complaint against defendants, Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater
Chicago (the “District”), and Oliver Plunkett (“Plunkett”). Hunt-Golliday alleges that the
District discriminated against her on the basis of her race and disability in violation of Title VIL
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20006¢ et seq. (Count I), and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seg. (Count IV), She also alleges that the District violated
Title VIL by retaliating against her for filing an internal grievance (Counts II and II), Further, she
alleges that the District deprived her of her property interest in her job without duc process in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count V). She also alleges intentional infliction of
emotional distress against the District and Plunkett (Count VI). Finally, she alleges that the
District wrongfully discharged her in violation of public policy (Count VII). The District and

Plunkett move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

y


Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons
slated below, the court grants the District’s motion and denies Plunkett’s motion as moot.
STANDARDS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion lo dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, General Flec. Capital Corp. v. Lease
Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir.1997). Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957);
Sanville v. MeCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir.2001). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the
court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint, and it draws all reasonable
inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor. Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 486 (7th
Cir.2002). Neverthcless, the court is not required to “ignore any facts set forth in the complaint
that undermine the plaintiff's claim [nor does it] assign any weight to unsupported conclusions of
law." LeBlang Motors, Ltd. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 148 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir.1998) (intemal
citations and quotations omitted).

FACTS

Hunt-Golliday is an African-American female and a resident of Chicago, Illinois. The
District is a unit of Jocal government within the City of Chicago and Cook County. Plunkett is
an agent and employee of the District. (Second Am. Compl. 4 5, 6, 7.)

Hunt-Golliday began her employment with the District in 1987. (/d. § 8.) In 1990, Hunt-
Golliday obtained civil service status with the District as Fireman-Oiler, (/d.) On October 22,

1993, the District filed charges with the District’s Civil Service Board (the “Board”)