In order for Roberts to demonstrate that her injuries were
caused by a widespread practice or custom of sexual harassment and
discrimination, she must show “knowledge or awareness—actual or
imputed-of the custom and its consequences showing the
municipality’s approval, acquiescence, or encouragement of the
alleged unconstitutional violation.” Jones v. City of Chicago, 787
F.2d 200, 204 (7th Cir. 1986). “The longstanding or widespread
nature of a particular practice would support the inference that
policymaking officials must have known about it but failed to stop
it.” McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 511 (7th Cir.
1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Roberts
alleges a widespread policy of discriminatory acts and that Cook
County was aware of them, Comp. { 30; and that other women were
similarly treated, Comp. { 33. The defendants maintain that
Roberts’ allegations are boilerplate and need to be supported by
facts to withstand a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court, however,
has expressly rejected a heightened pleading standard for § 1983
claims against municipalities. Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993); see also McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324-25
(7th cir. 2000). Therefore, the portions of Roberts’ claims of
widespread custom and usage against Cook County in Counts II and
III are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id.

Roberts also sues Flick in his official capacity. Under §


Roberts’ IIED claim remains fully “intact because it does not
depend on the prohibitions against sex discrimination for its
survival.” Siljak v. Ravenswood Disposal Serv., Inc., No. 00 C
3405, 2001 WL 436133, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2001) (Darrah, J.).
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a “long recognized”
tort action that exists independently of a cause of action under
the IHRA.. Maksimovic, 687 N.E.2d at 23. I retain subject matter
jurisdiction over Count X.
VII. Punitive Damages, Counts I and Vv.

The defendants seek dismissal of the punitive damages claims
against Cook County and Flick in his official capacity. The Supreme
Court has made it clear that a municipality, unlike an individual
defendant, is immune from punitive damages under § 1983. City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). The
punitive damage claims against Cook County are therefore improper.
See Langford v. County of Cook, 965 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (Castillo, J.) (dismissing punitive damage claims against
Cook County). The punitive damage claims against Flick would be
improper even if I had not already dismissed the underlying claim,
because “[o]fficial capacity suits are another way of pleading an
action against a government entity for which the officer works”.
Id. (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 165). Roberts concedes this.
Accordingly, the portions of Counts I and V that seek punitive

damages against Cook County or Flick are dismissed.


to an adverse employment action even though (4) [s]he was
performing hfer] job in a satisfactory manner; unless (5) the
defendant presents evidence of a reason (good or bad, provided only
that it is not one that the law forbids) for the adverse action.”
Stone v. City of Indianapolis Public Utilitie

A lateral transfer without loss in benefits does not
constitute an adverse employment action. Place v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc., 215 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2000). Significant changes in
employment status occur by actions such as “hiring, firing, failing
to promote, ‘reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761
(1998); Stutler v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 263 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir.
2001). The defendants contend that Roberts, in her original
complaint, merely alleged a transfer as a result of her opposition
to the sexual harassment and cannot, therefore, meet the pleading
requirements for retaliation. However, in her response to the
motion to dismiss, Roberts alleges that she was demoted from an
office manager to a receptionist, transferred from an office to a
space in a file room, that her responsibilities were significantly
reduced to menial ones, and her opportunities for promotion were
diminished. Response at 9-10. Accepting Roberts allegations as
true, as I must, I find Roberts has adequately pleaded a

significant change in employment status. See Knox v. Indiana, 93


1983, a suit against a government officer in his official capacity
is actually a suit against the government entity for which the
government officer works. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985). Since Ihave already found that Roberts stated a valid
claim against Cook County, the claims against Flick in his official
capacity are redundant. The portions of Counts I, II and III that
are based on the official capacity of Flick are dismissed. Of
course, individual and official capacity suits are separate and “a
government official may be sued in his individual capacity for acts
done within the scope of his employment[.]” Mitchell v. Fairman,
No. 95 C 3648, 1997 WL 224990, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 1997)
(Gettleman, J.). As Cook County does not challenge the counts
against Flick in his individual capacity, the portions of Counts I,
II and III directed against Flick in his individual capacity are
not dismissed.

Iv. Roberts’ Title VII Retaliation Claim, Count VI

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate
against an employee who has opposed sexual discrimination. Hoffman-
Dombrowski v. Arlington Int’l Race Course, 254 F.3d 644, 653 (7th
Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (3) (a)). In order to prevail
on a retaliation claim, an employee must demonstrate by a
preponderance of evidence that: “(1) after lodging a complaint
about discrimination, (2) only [s]he, and not any otherwise

similarly situated employee who did not complain, was (3) subjected


Roberts concedes that the incident of September 2000 is barred
by the one-year limitation. Resp. at 11. Roberts may not recover
any damages for that incident, although of course, that does not
bar its introduction into evidence insofar as consistent with Fed.
R. Evid. 403(b) and other applicable rules.

VI. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Count xX

The defendants argue that Roberts’ common law claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”’) should be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it is
preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”). Pursuant to
the IHRA, * [e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, no court of this
state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil
rights violation other than as set forth in this Act.” 775 ILCS 775
5/8-111(c) (2002). The Illinois Supreme Court has held that
“whether [a court] may exercise jurisdiction over a tort claim
depends upon whether the tort claim is inextricably linked to a
civil rights violation such that there is no independent basis for
the action apart from the {IHRA] itself.” Maksimovic V. Tsongalis,
687 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ill. 1997). This means that a “common law tort
claim is not inextricably linked with a civil rights violation
where a plaintiff can establish the necessary elements of the tort
independent of any legal duties created by the [IHRA].” Id. at 24.
Although the allegations of discrimination and intentional

infliction of emotional distress both involve sexual elements,


Migute Order Fem (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge i Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Elaine E. Bucklo than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 9373 DATE 8/2/2002
CASE Sharla Roberts vs, County of Cook et al.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
i MOTION: of the motion being presented.}
i :
‘ DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) Q Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) QO Brief in support of motion due

(3) Oo Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due

(4) im Ruling/Hearing on__set for at

(5) a Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on__set for at

(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at.

(7) oO Trial[set for/re-set for] on at

(8) o (Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto___at

(9) Q This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) OGeneralRule21 O FRCP41(a)(1) [ FRCP41(a)(2).

do «xf [Other docket entry] For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order,
defendants’ motion to dismiss certain counts of plaintiff's complaint [12-1] is granted in part and denied
in part. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order.

(1) Mf {For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

umber of notices

NIG 05 2002

date docketed

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Lunes 13

Isla ‘sn
id

ES 2 iid e- SAY 29

Dhtgtifrjejecéivell in}
erecta 4

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
deputy’s
initials

KF

mailing deputy initials



sae cue taSCORR,

vIIr.

I Dismiss (1) the portions of Counts ITI, III, IV, V, VI and X
directed against the Inspector General’s Office, (2) the portions
of Counts I, II and III that are directed against Flick in his
official capacity, and (3) the portions of Counts I and V that
claim punitive damages against Cook County or Flick in his official
capacity. I Deny the motions to dismiss (1) the portions of Counts
II and III directed against Cook County, and (2) the motions to

dismiss Count VI, (3) Counts VIII and IX, and (4) X.

Enter Order:

Dhue 0 Buhl

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

Dated: August 2, 2002

10


F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) (“No one would question the
retaliatory effect of many actions that put the complainant in a
more unfriendly working environment: actions like moving the person
from a spacious, brightly lit office to a dingy closet.”). The
motion to dismiss Count VI is denied.
Vv. Assault and Battery Claims, Counts VIII and Ix

The Illinois Tort Immunity Act imposes a one-year statute of
limitations on all claims against a local entity based on common
law or the Illinois Constitution. 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/8-101;
Foster v. Unknown Cook County Deputy Sheriff, 914 F. Supp. 221, 224
& n.l (N.D. Ill. 1995) (Aspen, J.). The defendants argue that the
Illinois tort law claims of battery (Count VIII) and assault (Count
IX) are barred because they are based on events which occurred in
September 2000, Compl. @ 92, and that the complaint was not filed
until December 2001. However, Roberts alleges that the batteries
and assaults continued throughout her employment. Compl. 71 91, 98.
She clarifies that the period of period of employment continued
until January 31, 2001 and that many of the incidents of battery
and assault occurred within the one-year limit. Resp. at 11.
Because Roberts properly alleges instances of battery and assault
within the one-year limit, Counts VIII and IX are sufficiently
pleaded. See Foster, 914 F. Supp. at 224 (holding that a corrected
date, contained in a plaintiff’s response to a motion to dismiss,

was sufficient to defeat the motion).


from Cook County). As Roberts concedes this, the portions of Counts
II, III, IV, V, VI and X directed against the Inspector General’s
Office are dismissed.
III. Robert’s § 1983 Claims, Counts I-III

To impose § 1983 liability on Cook County, Roberts must show
that she was deprived of some constitutionally protected right
pursuant to one of Cook county’s customs, polices, or practices.
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A
municipality can violate someone’s civil rights by: (1) an express
policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation;
(2) a permanent and well settled custom or usage with the force of
law; or (3) a constitutional injury caused by a person with final
policymaking authority. Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d
728, 734-35 (7th Cir. 1994). Roberts proceeds under (2), arguing a
widespread custom of sex discrimination, sexual harassment and
retaliation. in Count II, and a widespread custom of denying equal
protection to women in Count III, as well as (3) a claim that the
harassment was committed by someone with ultimate policy-making
authority, viz. Flick in Counts I, II and III. Flick is not an
ultimate policy-maker, Adams v. Altman, No. 94 C 5093, 1995 WL
127779, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1995) (Marovich, J.) (holding
that the head of a municipal internal investigation unit lacked
ultimate policy-making authority), so Robert must proceed on the

basis of her allegation of a discriminatory practice or custom.


discriminatory treatment. Compl. 7 21. She sues under § 1983, Title
VII, and Illinois tort law.

The defendants moved to dismiss several counts either in whole
or in part under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). I grant the motions in
part and deny them in part.

I. Standard of Review

On a motion to dismiss, I accept all well-pleaded allegations
in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. City Nat’l Bank of Fla. v. Checkers, Simon
& Rosner, 32 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 1994). Dismissal is proper
only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle her to
relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Additionally,
a plaintiff need not put all of the essential facts in the
complaint and may add them by affidavit or brief “in order to
defeat a motion to dismiss if these facts are consistent with the
allegations in the complaint.” Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ.,
167 F.3d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 1999).

It. Claims Brought Against the Inspector General’s Office

The defendants maintain that the Inspector General's Office
does not have a legal existence separate from that of Cook County
and cannot be sued. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Fry, No. 00 C 5296,
2001 WL 109545, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2001) (Keys, Mag.)

(holding that Cook County Board does not have a separate identity


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION DOCKETED
AUG 0 5 2002

SHARLA ROBERTS,
Plaintiff,

v. No. 01 C 9373
COUNTY OF COOK, COOK COUNTY
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
and TIMOTHY FLICK, individually
and in his official capacity,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Sharla Roberts sues the County of Cook, Illinois, the Cook
County Office of the Inspector General, and Timothy Flick, the
Director of the Inspector General’s Office. The Inspector General’s
Office is charged with investigating allegations of fraud,
corruption and wrongdoing on the part of Cook County employees.
Compl. @ 5. At the time of the incidents in question, Roberts was
employed at the Inspector General’s Office under the supervision of
Flick. Compl. @ 9. Roberts alleges that Flick engaged in a pattern
of verbal and physical sexual discrimination. He also allowed and
encouraged other men to sexually discriminate against her as well.
Compl. @ 23. Roberts alleges that she was transferred to an
inferior position because she complained about her treatment at the
hands of Flick. Compl. at 791 79-83 & Resp. at 9-10. Roberts alleges

that Flick acted as a final policy maker with respect to

TD)