In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 16-4105

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DANIEL STEWART,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:15-cr-00024-WTL-DKL-1 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.

ARGUED MARCH 30, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018

Before EASTERBROOK and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and

GILBERT, District Judge.

*

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Daniel Stewart was convicted of

drug trafficking, firearms offenses, and money laundering,

primarily based on evidence gathered as a result of a traffic

*

 Of the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2 No. 16-4105

stop and a subsequent confession. We affirm the district court’s

denial of Stewart’s motion to suppress the traffic stop evidence

and the confession, and we reject Stewart’s additional claims

on appeal.

I.

On January 20, 2015, Detectives Jeff Sequin and Ryan

VanOeveren were surveilling the home of Daniel Stewart.

Stewart w as not the main focus of their investigation. For

months, Indianapolis police had been tryingto gather evidence

about a large-scale cocaine supplier ultimately identified as

Geraldo Colon. In May 2014, with the assistance of the federal

Drug Enforcement Agency, they arrested three Arizona-based

couriers who were bringing drugs into Indianapolis. One of

those couriers, Juan Lizarraga, began cooperating with the

investigators and provided information that led the officers to

a major customer of Colon. Lizarraga did not know the

customer by name but he knew the apartment complex where

the customerlived, and he had seen Colon deliver drugs to the

customer at that apartment complex and also at Colon’s

furniture store. Lizarraga offered the officers a general physical

description of the customer.

Over a period of several months, officers surveilled Colon’s

furniture store. During that time, they twice observed Stewart

visit the store, once on October 23, 2014, and once on December

16, 2014. On each occasion, Stewart stayed only a short time

and made no purchase. Through further investigation, the

officers identified Stewart and learned that he lived in the

apartment complex pointed out by Lizarraga. Stewart had a

criminal record that included felony drug offenses. In early
No. 16-4105 3

January 2015, believing that Stewart was the customer identified by Lizarraga, they began to surveil Stewart in an attempt

to connect him to Colon’s drug trafficking. 

In the early evening of January 20, 2015, Detectives

VanOeveren and Sequin followed Stewart’s white Volkswagen

from his apartment complex to a Shell gas station. After

Stewart pulled up to a pump, another man exited a grey car

that was parked at the station, and walked over to the passenger side of Stewart’s car. The man got into Stewart’s car and

closed the door. A few minutes later, the man exited Stewart’s

car and immediately left the station in the grey car. Stewart

then got out of his Volkswagen and pumped gas. Although

they could not see through Stewart’s tinted windows from

their vantage point some eighty yards away, based on their

many years of experience investigating drug crimes,

VanOeveren and Sequin believed that they had just witnessed

a drug sale at the gas station. 

They decided to watch Stewart’s car for traffic violations

and to attempt a traffic stop. Because they were in plain clothes

and unmarked cars, they called Detective Brady Ball to the

scene in his squad car. Detective Ball specialized in drug

interdiction stops, and he traveled with Josie, a dog who had

been trained to detect the scent of illegal drugs. Detective Ball

testified that he arrived in the area in time to see Stewart fail to

stop at a red light when he made a right turn, the same

violation observed by the other detectives.1 Detective Ball

1

 The district court found that some ambiguity existed in the record as to

whether Ball himself saw Stewart fail to stop or whether he effected the

(continued...)
4 No. 16-4105

activated his lights and Stewart pulled over in the parking lot

of a Speedway gas station. 

Detective Ball recorded the audio of his encounter with

Stewart and so the trial court had a detailed, time-indexed

account of everything that was said during the stop.2 At the

suppression hearing, Detective Ball supplemented this recording with his personal observations and recollection. Detective

Ball explained to Stewart the reason for the stop and asked for

routine information such as license and registration. Stewart

seemed unusually nervous, fidgeting with his wallet and

taking several deep breaths as he complied with Ball’s requests. Because the car was registered to a business named

“Eleete Image, Inc.” and because Stewart’s address was

different from that on the registration, Ball asked for clarification. Ball also asked questions related to officer safety such as

whether Stewart had any guns or knives in the car or on his

person. Stewart denied having any weapons. Ball asked

Stewart to exit the car and sit on the bumper. He noted that

Stewart’s tinted windows were “borderline” illegal and asked

1

 (...continued)

stop on the basis of VanOeveren’s report that Stewart failed to stop. Under

the collective knowledge doctrine, Ball was entitled to stop Stewart based

on the traffic violation witnessed and reported by VanOeveren. See United

States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255, 268 (7th Cir. 2016) (under the collective

knowledge doctrine, the court may attribute facts known to one officer to

other officers).

2

The audio recording was submitted to the district court as an exhibit at

the suppression hearing without a separate record number. Stewart

supplied it to this court as a compact disc attached to his supplemental

appendix.
No. 16-4105 5

if Stewart had ever been arrested. Stewart responded that he

had been arrested on drug charges “a long time ago.” Ball

asked for consent to search the car and Stewart declined. Ball

noticed a bulge in Stewart’s pocket and asked him what it was.

Stewart replied that it was $700 in cash. Ball then returned to

his squad carto run the license and registration information as

well as a check for outstanding warrants. Seconds later, Ball

was back out of his car, again asking Stewart to sit on the

bumper. Five minutes had elapsed at this point in the stop.

Moments after returning to the squad car, Ball radioed a

request for backup. He explained that he was on an interdiction stop and wanted to run his dog around the car. He

requested that officers arrive as quickly as possible. It appears

from the audio recording that Ball continued to work on the

traffic violation as he waited for a response to his request for

backup, but an estimate of the time attributed to calling for

backup would be at most seventy-five seconds.3

As he waited for backup to arrive, Detective Ball continued

the process of checking the license and registration, running a

3 All references to the audio recording will be given in the format

minutes:seconds elapsed from the beginning of Detective Ball’s encounter

with Stewart. Ball’s call for backup began at 5:11. From 5:23 to 6:01, the

recording consists of occasional electronic beeps, undecipherable radio

transmissions and periods of silence. From 6:01 to 6:09, from 6:50 to 7:04,

and from 7:16 to 7:19, Ball supplied additional information about his

location and his need for backup. In the midst of waiting for a reply on his

request, at 6:25, Ball can be heard beginning to run a check on the car’s

registration under the name, “Eleete.” We estimate that the time spent

calling for backup, excluding audio content clearly related to the traffic

mission of the stop, is at most seventy-five seconds.
6 No. 16-4105

check for outstanding warrants, and beginning to write the

ticket. Approximately thirteen minutes into the stop, while

Detective Ball was still completing tasks related to writing the

ticket,thebackupofficers arrived. For approximately forty-five

seconds, Detective Ball spoke to the backup officers, explaining

to one officer how to complete the electronic ticket-writing

process (which was apparently new), and asking the other

officer to keep a watch over Stewart. Ball then removed Josie

from his car and walked her around Stewart’s car. On her

second pass around the Volkswagen, Josie alerted to the

driver’s side door. The entire process of Josie exiting the squad

car, sniffing, and then alerting took one minute and forty-five

seconds. The backup officer was still working on the ticket

when Josie alerted. Detective Ball offered further advice on

completing the ticket, and then approached Stewart.

He explained to Stewart that Josie had alerted to the odor

of illegal drugs, and he handcuffed Stewart, clarifying that he

was not under arrest. Detective Ball explained at the suppression hearing that he felt this was necessary for officer safety

based on the description of the suspected gas station drug

transaction, Josie’s alert, and the background information that

he had learned about Stewart prior to making the stop.

Believing he now had probable cause to search the car, he

began to inspect the interior of Stewart’s Volkswagen. See

Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246–47 (2013) (certification of a

dog by a bona fide organization aftertesting the dog’s reliability in a controlled setting or successful completion of a recent

training program that evaluated the dog’s proficiency in

locating drugs creates a rebuttable presumption that the dog’s

alert provides probable cause to search). Almost immediately,
No. 16-4105 7

Detective Ball found a handgun in the center console area,

within reach of the driver’s seat. Knowing that Stewart was a

convicted felon, he now had probable cause for an arrest. See

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He placed Stewart under arrest and gave

him Miranda warnings. He then continued his search of the car.

Although he found no drugs in the passenger compartment of

the car, he found a bag in the trunk containing approximately

102 grams of crack cocaine, 250 grams of powder cocaine, 241

grams of heroin, 19 grams of methamphetamine, and a digital

scale. He also found $7,420 in cash. The purported $700 in

Stewart’s pocket turned out to be $1,904, for a total of $9,324 in

cash.

Detective Ball approached Stewart again and said, “That’s

a lot of drugs, bud. You want to talk to a detective?” Stewart

appeared to shake his head to indicate “no.” Ball clarified,

“You do not want to talk to a detective? Well, you understand

I gotta have one come out.” Stewart replied, “Can you put me

in the car? It’s kind of cold out.”4 Ball said, “Yes, they’re going

to talk to you regardless so you’ll get in the car at that point. I

have a dog in my car.” Ball then radioed for narcotics officers

to come to the scene. We will discuss that call and the subsequent interchange between Ball and Stewart more completely

below when we address Stewart’s motion to suppress his

confession. Eventually Stewart was placed in the car of the

narcotics officers when they arrived on the scene. 

4

Temperatures hovered between thirty-eight and forty-one degrees onthis

January day, and Stewart was wearing pants, a sweatshirt and tennis shoes.
8 No. 16-4105

VanOeveren and Sequin were the officers who arrived to

transport Stewart. VanOeveren reminded Stewart of his

Miranda rights and asked if Stewart wanted to talk about the

gun, narcotics and cash found in his car. Stewart first tried to

talk the detectives into releasing him for a short period,

promising to meet them later to assist them in their investigation. The officers declined and gave Stewart two options: come

with the detectives to the police station to discuss his situation

or go straight to the Marion County Jail. Stewart opted to go to

the police station with the detectives. Once there, officers

brought Stewart into an interview room and Detective Ryan

Clark gave Stewart his Miranda rights. Stewart indicated that

he understood his rights and he signed a written waiver of

those rights. He then made incriminating statements that were

video-recorded. In the meantime, officers obtained a search

warrant for his residence. The affidavit supporting the warrant

detailed the cash, drugs and gun found in the car. The search

of Stewart’s home yielded an additional 1650 grams of cocaine;

1005 grams of methamphetamine; 1500 grams of heroin; four

more handguns; and $487,542 in cash. 

Stewart was charged in a six-count indictment with

possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 851; possession of a firearm by

a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); engaging in monetary transactions in

property derived from specified unlawful activity, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1957; and two counts of money laundering, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). The district court denied

Stewart’smotionto suppress the evidence obtained during and
No. 16-4105 9

as a result of the traffic stop and the confession he gave at the

police station. The district court also denied Stewart’s pre-trial

motion in limine to prevent or limit the use of evidence that he

had twice visited Colon’s furniture store. After a four-day trial

that included testimony about Colon’s criminal activities, a

jury convicted Stewart on all counts. Because Stewart had two

qualifying prior felony drug convictions, his sentence on the

drug possession count was life imprisonment without parole.

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). For four of the remaining counts, the

court sentenced Stewartto termsofimprisonment between five

and fifteen years’ imprisonment to be served concurrent with

the life sentence. The sentence for possession of a gun in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime tacked on a gratuitous

five consecutive years to the sentence of life imprisonment.

Stewart appeals.

II.

On appeal, Stewart contends that the evidence gained

through the traffic stop should have been suppressed because

Detective Ball unconstitutionally prolonged the stop in order

to conduct the dog sniff procedure. Stewart also asserts that the

prolonged detention due to the sniff was not otherwise

supported by reasonable suspicion. Any evidence obtained

after the search of his car, he argues, should be suppressed as

the fruit of the poisonous tree. Stewart maintains that the

incriminating statements he made following his arrest should

also have been suppressed because investigators violated his

invocation of his right to remain silent. He also submits that the

district court erred in admitting substantial amounts of

prejudicial and irrelevant evidence of prior bad acts. And

finally, he asserts that the government failed to present
10 No. 16-4105

sufficient evidence in support of the money laundering

convictions, rendering them infirm as a matter of law. He seeks

to have the convictions on every count vacated and the case

remanded for further proceedings. But he also contends that

his convictions for money laundering should be reversed

outright. Because some of these objections were preserved and

others were not, we will address the standard of review as we

turn to each issue.

A.

Josie conducted her life-altering sniff of Stewart’s car on

January 20, 2015. The next day, the Supreme Court heard

argument in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).

The Court decided Rodriguez on April 21, 2015, some three

months before Stewart filed his motion to suppress and five

and a half months before the district court held the suppression

hearing. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court considered “whether

police routinely may extend an otherwise-completed traffic

stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog

sniff.” 135 S. Ct. at 1614. The Court concluded that a traffic stop

may become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time

reasonably necessary to complete the traffic-related mission of

the stop. 135 S. Ct. at 1614–15. Unrelated inquiries may not

measurably prolong a traffic stop, although an officer may

conduct ordinary inquiries incident to the stop such as questions involving the driver’s license, the vehicle’s registration,

and whetherthere are outstanding warrants forthe driver. 135

S. Ct. at 1615. These activities are all related to the mission and

objective of enforcing the traffic code, and “ensuring that

vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” 135

S. Ct. at 1615. Because traffic stops are “especially fraught with
No. 16-4105 11

danger to police officers,” an officer may also take “certain

negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his

mission safely.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (citing Arizona v.

Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009)). Dog sniffs, the Court said,

may not be fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic

mission, and so dog sniffs may not prolong or add time to the

stopunless supportedseparately by individualized,reasonable

suspicion. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616–17.

On appeal, Stewart first argues that Detective Ball unreasonably lengthened the stop in order to conduct the dog sniff.

Such a delay was unconstitutional under Rodriguez, he continues, and no reasonable suspicion supported lengthening the

stop in order to conduct the sniff. Moreover, Stewart contends

that the government failed to argue below that the evidence

obtained from the stop was admissible under any exception to

the exclusionary rule, and so the government forfeited any

such claim on appeal. See United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742,

748–49 (7th Cir. 2015). In considering a district court’s denial of

a motion to suppress, we usually review findings of fact for

clear error and questions of law de novo. United States v.

Borostowski, 775 F.3d 851, 863 (7th Cir. 2014). However, the

government asserts that Stewart did not preserve the issue that

he raises on appeal because he failed to make a timely and

specific objection in the district court.Because Stewart forfeited

the issue,the government argues, we should review the district

court’s decision for plain error only. See United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993); United States v. Hamad, 809 F.3d 898,

904 (7th Cir. 2016); Fed. Rule Crim. P. 52(b). The government

also contends that this court should consider its claim that

Detective Ball conducted the dog sniff in good faith reliance on
12 No. 16-4105

then-binding circuit precedent. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

897, 909 (1984) (unlawfully obtained evidence should not be

suppressed when the police act on an objectively good-faith

belief that their conduct is lawful); Davis v. United States, 564

U.S. 229, 241 (2011) (when binding appellate precedent

specifically authorizes a particular police practice, the

exclusionary rule should not apply if that precedent is later

overruled by the Supreme Court); United States v. Jenkins, 850

F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2017) (same). Stewart responds that he

adequately preserved the argument by raising it in a letter to

the court after the suppression hearing, and that, in any case,

the district court addressed the issue on the merits and did not

treat it as forfeited. See R. 69 (Supplemental Authority In

Support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress). By Stewart’s

measure, this court should therefore apply the usual standard

of review and the government should be precluded from

raising an exception to the exclusionary rule.

In his Motion to Suppress Evidence, Stewart challenged

only whetherJosie’s sniff of the car provided probable cause to

conduct a search. Specifically, Stewart complained that(1) Josie

is not a reliable dog; (2) Josie was subjected to handler error;

and (3) the drugs were planted in his car by police officers after

Josie performed the sniff. R. 33 and 33-1. At the suppression

hearing, Stewart made no mention of a claim that extra time

was taken to conduct the sniff. After the suppression hearing,

Stewart filed a supplemental memorandum where he contended for the first time that Ball was not entitled to conduct
No. 16-4105 13

the sniff at all.5

Stewart argued that VanOeveren’s testimony

that he had observed Stewart engage in a drug sale at the Shell

station was unreliable and not entitled to any weight in

determiningprobable cause orreasonable suspicion to conduct

the sniff. Stewart also argued in his supplemental memorandum that the sniff could not be justified by his apparent

nervousness, and that Josie was unreliable because there was

testimony that she had alerted in the past on occasions when

drugs were not found. Stewart thus made no claims about the

sniff improperly lengthening the stop before, during or after

the suppression hearing. His only reference to Rodriguez came

after he filed a post-hearing supplemental memo, where he

submitted a copy of Rodriguez to the district court as supplemental authority. The letter accompanying the copy of the

Rodriguez decision read, in its entirety:

Enclosed please find a case entitled Rodriguez v.

United States, No. 13-9972. ArguedJanuary 21, 2015-

Decided April 21, 2015 in the Supreme Court of the

United States.

Please give consideration to this decision in reviewing Mr. Stewart’s Motion to Suppress Evidence.

R. 69.

In denying the Motion to Suppress, the district court

rejected any argument that Josie was unreliable orthat handler

error contributed to her alert, claims which Stewart has now

5

By order of the district court, the parties were allowed to file supplemental memoranda simultaneously, three days after the suppression hearing.

R. 87, at 84.
14 No. 16-4105

abandoned on appeal.6 The court also briefly addressed what

it characterized as Stewart’s challenge to the reasonableness of

the length of time he was detained for the traffic stop. Citing

Rodriguez, the court noted that police officers may not extend

an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff. After a brief discussion of

governing law, the district court concluded that Ball did not

unconstitutionally prolong the stop:

Approximately fifteen minutes elapsed between the

time Ball pulled Stewart over and Josie’s alert. ...

During that fifteen-minute period, Ball was actively

engaged in conducting the traffic stop. When other

officers arrived, Ball directed one officer to continue

writing the ticket while Ball had Josie conduct an

open air sniff. Thus, Ball did not prolong or extend

the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to effectuate its purpose. Once Josie alerted, the encounter

moved beyond that of a mere traffic stop, as probable cause to search the vehicle was established.

R. 70, at 6 (footnotes omitted).

Stewart is correct, in a sense, that the district court addressed the merits of the issue of whether the sniff prolonged

the stop. The court, as we have just seen, found that Detective

Ball did not, as a matter of fact, prolong the stop beyond the

6

The district court also noted that Stewart presented no evidence or

argument in support of his claim that police officers planted drugs in his

trunk after the sniff was completed. The court found no reason to give the

claim any credence and rejected it. That claim has also been abandoned on

appeal.
No. 16-4105 15

time necessary to effectuate the traffic purpose of the stop

when he conducted the sniff procedure with Josie. On appeal,

Stewart now challenges this fact-finding by parsing the time

line of the stop. He faults Ball for taking the time to call for

backup, complains about the forty-five second delay in

explaining the electronic ticket process to the backup officer,

and objects to the actual time taken to run Josie around the car.

According to Stewart, the only conclusion is that “[t]he

resulting stop was longer than if Ball had simply written

Stewart a traffic citation,” rendering the stop unconstitutional

under Rodriguez. Opening Brief, at 8. 

Although Stewart has correctly identified the key question

under Rodriguez, prior to the appeal, Stewart never raised an

objection that would have alerted the government to the need

to make a record on this very point. In seeking to use evidence

obtained without a warrant, the government bore the burden

of proving by a preponderance of the evidence at the suppression hearing that an exception to the warrant requirement

applied. United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.

2000). At that hearing, the government presented evidence

relevant to Stewart’s stated objections. That is, the government

provided evidence that Josie is a well-trained and reliable dog

with a proven track record of detecting the odor of illegal

drugs. The government also presented evidence that Detective

Ball was a highly trained handler and that no handler error

was involved in this search. Finally, the government presented

evidence that Detective Ball found the drugs in the trunk

during the search, negating the contention that the drugs were

planted in the truck after the fact. 
16 No. 16-4105

The government had no reason to ask Detective Ball why

he took the time to call for backup, and so the record is silent

on whether he summoned backup both for officer safety and

in order to conduct the sniff. He testified that safety was on his

mind when he asked backup officers to watch Stewart after

Josie alerted because he knew from his fellow officers that

there were “some pretty serious allegations” of drug dealing

by Stewart. Because Stewart failed to object specifically to the

time taken for calling for backup, the court had no occasion to

rule on whether the seventy-five seconds7 used for that task

should be attributed to the dog sniff or to some other proper

purpose of the traffic stop such as officer safety. From the

record that was developed, the government (had it been

alerted to this objection) could have made a non-trivial

argument that the call for backup was related as much to

officer safety as to conducting the dog sniff. Detective Ball

knew he was being asked to stop a felon suspected of selling

drugs moments earlier. As the stop properly progressed, Ball

saw that Stewart was unusually nervous, and learned that the

bulge in Stewart’s pocket was a notably large amount of

currency, lending credence to the charge of recent drug

dealing. Ball had to twice direct Stewart to sit on the bumper

7 As we noted above, seventy-five seconds is the maximum amount of time

taken to call for backup and respond to questions regarding the need for

backup. That includes periods of near-silence. Because Stewart failed to

alert the government and the court that he challenged this period of time,

the record is undeveloped on what Ball wasdoing during that quiet period.

For at least part of the gaps, he was audibly engaged in tasks related to the

traffic violation. The district court, of course, found that Ball was actively

engaged in conducting the traffic stop throughout the challenged period.
No. 16-4105 17

of his car while Ball worked on the ticket. And as soon as the

two backup officers arrived, Ball asked one officer to watch

Stewart, which would seem to indicate that he was concerned

for his safety even before conducting the sniff. But the government had no opportunity to present evidence or argument on

this point because Stewart failed to timely and specifically

object to this part of the time line.

Nor did Stewart alert the court or the government to his

ultimate claim that “[t]he resulting stop was longerthan if Ball

had simply written Stewart a traffic citation,” the salient

question under Rodriguez. And so the government had no

reason or opportunity to ask Detective Ball if he could have

finished writing the ticket himself in less time than it took to

conduct the sniff. Again, by listening to the time-indexed

audio, we know that Detective Ball took approximately fortyfive seconds to hand off the ticket to the backup officer (who

was not fully familiar with the new electronic system), and

roughly ninety seconds to run Josie around the car. The officer

working on the ticket was not finished writing it when Josie

alerted. That suggests that some additional amount oftime was

needed for any officer to complete the ticket. We are left with

more questions than answers. Was the backup officerdiligently

working on the ticket while Detective Ball ran the dog around

the car? Could Detective Ball have completed the ticket in less

time than it took to call for backup, hand off the ticket and run

the dog? Was any of that time attributable to tasks permissibly

related to the mission of the traffic stop? And if so, could
18 No. 16-4105

Detective Ball have completed the ticket more quickly than the

time attributed solely to the dog sniff?

8

The reason we have no answers to these questions is that

Stewart failed to raise this specific objection in a timely

manner, when the government could have developed the

record and the court could have ruled on the issue with full

knowledge of the circumstances. From the moment the stop

began to the moment Josie alerted, fewer than sixteen minutes

had elapsed, not an unreasonable amount of time in the

abstract for a ticket for running a red light. We know from the

audio recording that the vast majority of that time was spent

diligently completing tasks related solely to the mission of the

stop. Any uncertainty about the remaining few minutes can be

attributed only to the defendant’s failure to raise this objection

in a timely manner. Rodriguez had been on the books for

months, and so the defendant had every opportunity to raise

the issue before the suppression hearing. We will therefore

treat the issue as forfeited and review for plain error. 

In order to reverse for plain error, we must find (1) error

(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects the defendant's substantial

rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732; Hamad, 809 F.3d at 904. An error

is plain if it is clear or obvious. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; Hamad,

809 F.3d at 904. And an error affects the defendant’s substantial

8

By analyzing Stewart’s claim in this fashion, we do not mean to imply

that certain tasks will automatically count against the length of the mission

of a traffic stop so as to prohibit a dog sniff in future cases. We simply

cannot tell on this record how to allocate these tasks because the defendant

failed to timely and specifically object. We leave that analysis for another

day where the parsing of the time line matters to the outcome.
No. 16-4105 19

rights when it is prejudicial, that is, when it has affected the

outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at

734. Finally, “Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to correct the

forfeited error within the sound discretion of the court of

appeals, and the court should not exercise that discretion

unless the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Olano, 507 U.S. at

732 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)). 

To state the standard is to demonstrate that Stewart cannot

meet it here. He challenges the district court’s factual finding

that the sniff did not lengthen the stop. The court determined

that Ball was actively engaged in conducting the traffic stop

before handing off the ticket, and that another officer continued that mission while Ball ran Josie around the Volkswagen.

In other words, the sniff was conducted contemporaneously

with the traffic mission of the stop. Based on the evidence that

the district court had before it, there is no reason to conclude

that this finding was in error. Nothing in the record calls the

court’s finding into question, and to the extent that we simply

do not know whether every moment was spent in trafficrelated tasks, the fault for those omissions lies with Stewart.

The district court did not address whether any lengthening

of the stop to conduct the dog sniff was otherwise supported

by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See R. 70, at 9 n.10

(declining to decide whether Ball independently had probable

cause to search). Because we have concluded that there was no

plain error in the court’s finding that the stop was not unconstitutionally lengthened, we need not address whether Detective Ball possessed reasonable suspicion that would have

allowed lengthening the stop in any case. Nonetheless, for the
20 No. 16-4105

sake of completeness we note that, at the time Detective Ball

decided to conduct the sniff, he knew that Stewart was a felon

and a drug trafficker who wasbeing investigated for additional

trafficking and an association with Colon. He knew that,

moments earlier, his fellowofficers witnessed Stewart engaged

in an encounter that, in their extensive experience, they

believed to be a drug sale. He knew that Stewart was unusually nervous when stopped for running a red light. And he

knew that Stewart admitted to having $700 in cash in his

pocket. It would be difficult to say that this information would

not supply reasonable suspicion to support a delay of a few

minutes to conduct a dog sniff. In short, the court did not err,

much less plainly err, when it denied Stewart’s motion to

suppress the evidence found in the Volkswagen.

Stewart also contends that all evidence obtained as a result

of the traffic stop should have been excluded as the fruit of the

poisonous tree. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016)

(the exclusionary rule encompasses both the primary evidence

obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure and

evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an

illegality, the so-called fruit of the poisonous tree). Obviously,

if the original search was not unlawful, there is no basis to

exclude evidence derived from the original search. The

contraband found in the car formed the basis of a request for

a warrant to search Stewart’s home. Because there is no basis

to exclude the evidence found in the car, there is no basis to

exclude the evidence found in the home. Stewart also asserts

that his confession was obtained as a result of the unlawful

search of the car. Again, because there is no reason to exclude
No. 16-4105 21

the evidence found in the car, that search cannot provide a

foundation for excluding Stewart’s confession.

B.

We turn to Stewart’s contention that the court erred when

it refused to suppress his confession on the separate ground

that it was obtained when the officers ignored his invocation of

his right to remain silent and continued to question him.

Stewart preserved this argument and so we review findings of

fact for clear error and questions of law de novo. United States v.

Wysinger, 683 F.3d 784, 793 (7th Cir. 2012). The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Police officers

must warn suspects prior to questioning that they have a right

to remain silent, and if the suspect indicates that he wishes to

remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Maryland v. Shatzer,

559 U.S. 98, 103–04 (2010); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,

444–45, 473–74 (1966). A person who wishes to invoke his or

her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously. Berghuis

v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381–82 (2010). “If an ambiguous act,

omission, or statement could require police to end the interrogation, police would be required to make difficult decisions

about an accused’s unclear intent and face the consequence of

suppression ‘if they guess wrong.’” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382

(quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1994)). 

Stewart asserts that he unambiguously invoked his right to

remain silent by shaking his head “no” in response to a

question from Detective Ball regarding whether he wanted to

talk to a detective. The district court found that “Stewart never

affirmatively and unequivocally invoked his right to remain
22 No. 16-4105

silent.” R. 70, at 10. The court noted that Stewart appeared to

shake his head, and that when Ball twice tried to clarify the

meaning of that gesture, Stewart responded by twice asking to

be placed in a car because it was cold outside. 

Such responses were not an unambiguous invocation of Stewart’s right to remain silent such that

officers were precluded from further questioning

him. Stewart did not tell Ball that he no longer

wished to answer Ball’s questions. Nor did he

explicitly state that he did not want to speak with

detectives. As such, Stewart’s argument on this

ground must fail.

R. 70, at 10. 

We begin with the context of that incident. Wysinger, 683

F.3d at 793–94 (in determining whether a suspect clearly

invoked his or her right to counsel, we consider the circumstances in which the statement was made as well as the words

employed); United States v. Hampton, 675 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir.

2012) (objective inquiry into whether suspect invoked right to

counsel includes review of not only the words the suspect used

but also the circumstances in which the statement was made).

See also Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381–82 (the standards which apply

in determining whether a person has unambiguously invoked

the right to counsel also apply in determining whether a

person has invoked the right to remain silent). As soon as

Detective Ball found a gun in the Volkswagen, he placed

Stewart under arrest and read him his Miranda rights. He then

began asking Stewart about the gun. Stewart freely answered

these questions, telling Ball that his “girl” left the gun in the
No. 16-4105 23

car, denying that his fingerprints or DNA would be found on

the gun, and then changing his story to indicate that he had

fired it at a gun range and that his prints might be on it.

Detective Ball then searched the rest of the car and found the

bag in the trunk that contained drugs and cash. Ball approached Stewart again and said, “That’s a lot of drugs, bud.

You want to talk to a detective?” Stewart appeared to shake his

head to indicate “no.” Ball clarified, “You do not want to talk

to a detective? Well, you understand I gotta have one come

out.” Stewart replied, “Can you put me in the car? It’s kind of

cold out.” Ball said, “Yes, they’re going to talk to you regardless so you’ll get in the car at that point. I have a dog in my

car.” After this, Ball called for narcotics officers to come to the

scene. In the course of that call, Ball said over the radio:

He’s going to need to talk to a narcotics detective at

some point. I don’t know if he’s going to talk but

maybe if we sit him in a car and explain the seriousness of it, he’ll talk to somebody but I’ve explained

to him that, regardless, when we find the stuff, we

have to have a detective. ... I don’t mean to waste

your time but he doesn’t seem like he wants to talk

out in the open. Maybe if we sit him in a car, he’ll

want to talk. He originally said he didn’t. He’s been

Mirandized and everything. But you know our

protocols on the street. We have to call for a detective regardless.

Supplemental Appendix, audio disc at 28:25–29:26.

Detective Ball then returned to Stewart and said, “A

detective is going to talk to you. If you want to talk to him, it’s
24 No. 16-4105

up to you. I have a protocol to follow. You understand that? I

wearthis uniform. I may have a drug dog. I can do all this stuff

but we have to follow our procedures, okay?” Stewart responded, “Can I sit in somebody’s car? It’s cold out here.” Ball

again told him that he had a dog in his squad car. The narcotics

detectives then arrived and Stewart was placed in their car.

Those officers delivered Miranda warnings again, and Stewart

freely spoke to them as he tried to convince them to release

him. He gave a video-recorded statement after being taken to

the police station where he was given his Miranda warnings yet

again and then signed a written waiver before making the

video-recorded statement.

Stewart relies on the head nod as the unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent. He argues that it is clear from

the audio recording that Detective Ball understood that nod to

mean that he did not wish to speak to the officer. Stewart

contends that Ball was not asking for clarification when he

said, after the head nod, “You do not want to talk to a detective.” To Stewart, there is a period on the end of that sentence.

The government contends that it is a question mark. The

district court found that it was a question, a request for

clarification. After listening to the recording, we can find no

clear error in that conclusion. Detective Ball also indicated to

other officers that he was not sure if Stewart would talk, that

he appeared not to want to talk out in the open but that he

might be willing to speak with officers if they sat him in a car.

Incontext, none of Detective Ball’s ensuing comments convince

us that the district court clearly erred.

But in any case, Detective Ball’s subjective beliefs do not

govern the outcome here. The inquiry into whether a person
No. 16-4105 25

has actually invoked the right to remain silent is an objective

one. Davis, 512 U.S. at 458–59; Wysinger, 683 F.3d at 793. When

a person “appears” to nod in the negative and then refuses to

clarify the meaning of that gesture, there is no clear error in

concluding that the nod was not an unambiguous invocation

of the right to remain silent. This is especially true in the

circumstances here. Stewart freely spoke to Ball after Miranda

warnings and before the head nod. He refused to clarify the

meaning of the nod and asked to sit in a car because of the

cold. An ambiguous or equivocal reference that causes a

reasonable officer to understand only that the suspect “might

be invoking the right” to remain silent is not enough to require

the cessation of questioning. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. A reasonable officer would have understood Stewart’s apparent nod to

mean that he might be invoking his right to remain silent, and

such an officer would not be required to cease questioning if

the suspect refused to clarify. 

C.

Stewart also contends that his convictions for money

laundering must be reversed because the evidence was

insufficient as a matter of law. “Ordinarily, we review a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to determine only

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.”

United States v. Webster, 775 F.3d 897, 904–05 (7th Cir. 2015). But

Stewart failed to raise this objection in the district court and so
26 No. 16-4105

we review this forfeited claim only for plain error.

9 Fed. R. Civ.

Proc. 52(b); Olano, 507 U.S. at 731; Webster, 775 F.3d at 905;

United States v. Esterman, 324 F.3d 565, 569–70 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Counts V and VI of the indictment charged Stewart with

laundering of monetary instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).10 Count V specifically charged that, on July

29, 2014, Stewart deposited $2,040 in currency into an Eleete

Image, Inc. account at Chase Bank; that this money was the

proceeds of ongoing narcotics trafficking; that he made the

deposit knowing that the transaction was designed in whole or

in part to “conceal and disguise the nature, location, source,

ownership, and control of the proceeds” of that unlawful

9 At oral argument, defense counsel confirmed that Stewart had no

objection to the jury instructions, and so any claim regarding the jury

instructions has been waived. United States v. Locke, 759 F.3d 760, 763 (7th

Cir. 2014) (when a defendant intentionally relinquishes or abandons a

known right, the issue has been waived and cannot be reviewed on appeal,

not even for plain error); United States v. Aslan, 644 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir.

2011) (where a defendant seeks to overturn a verdict for insufficiency of the

evidence but did not challenge his conviction for money laundering in the

district court and did not object to the jury instructions on this count, we

review the conviction for plain error).

10

That statute provides, in relevant part, “Whoever, knowing that the

property involved in a financialtransaction represents the proceeds of some

form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial

transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful

activity ... knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part ...

to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or

the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity ... shall be

sentenced to a fine ... or imprisonment ... or both.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
No. 16-4105 27

activity; and that while conducting and attempting to conduct

this transaction, Stewart knew that the property involved

represented the proceeds of ongoing controlled substances

trafficking activity.

11 Count VI charged the same conduct,

changing only the date and the amount of the deposit: on

August 4, 2014, Stewart deposited $2350 into the Eleete Image

bank account.

We previously mentioned Eleete Image, Inc. only once. The

car that Stewart was driving when he was arrested was

registered to that company and the license plates bore the

name “Eleete.” In order to address the sufficiency of the

evidence claim on the money laundering counts, some background on Eleete is necessary. The evidence at trial demonstrated that, in 2012, Stewart hired Rosemarie Brown to

incorporate a business for him in the name “Eleete Image, Inc.”

Brown filed the necessary paperwork with the state to create

the corporationand also applied for an EmployerIdentification

Number with the Internal Revenue Service. She listed Stewart

as the business owner in the corporate documents but substituted her own address forthe business address on the incorpo11 Although Stewart pointedly did not challenge the jury instructions here,

it is helpful to note that the jury was instructed, consistent with the

language of the indictment and with the Seventh Circuit pattern instructions, that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

“[t]he Defendant knew that the transaction was designed in whole or in

part to conceal and [sic] disguise the nature, the location, the source, the

ownership, or the control of the proceeds of ongoing drug trafficking

activity. ... The term ‘conceal or disguise’ means to hide the nature, the

location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of

specified unlawful activity.” R. 137. 
28 No. 16-4105

ration papers. She also created a website for Eleete, and

testified that Stewart told herthat he intended to run a number

of businesses under the “Eleete” name including a food truck

and a cleaning service, among other things. Stewart opened

bank accounts in the company name, including a checking

account with an associated debit card. He was the only

signatory listed on these accounts. 

Stewart never ran any legitimate business under the Eleete

name. He had no legitimate source of income,12

and the

government was able to demonstrate at trial that most of the

money that flowed through the Eleete accounts came from the

sale of illegal drugs. Stewart purchased the Volkswagen he

was driving at the time of his arrest with a check from the

Eleete account. On the memo line, he noted that the check was

for a “company car,” and the car was in fact registered to the

company. He also used the Eleete account debit card to make

purchases at retail establishments. For example, the government introduced evidence that Stewart spent approximately

$7400 at Saks Fifth Avenue, including a single purchase of

$1200, all using the Eleete Image debit card rather than large

amounts of cash that might have raised suspicion. 

Money entered and left the Eleete accounts in unusual

ways. For example, Stewart gave $10,000 in cash to a friend,

purportedly to enable the friend to buy a car on Stewart’s

behalf. The friend never purchased a car, however, and instead

12

Testimony at trial showed that, in the five years preceding his arrest,

Stewart had gambling winnings of $1400, and that he sold a few paintings

for less than $1000 total. That was the extent of any identifiable legitimate

income during that time period.
No. 16-4105 29

returned the money to Stewart by writing three checks to

Eleete Image, including at least one check from the friend’s

business account. Stewart also deposited into the Eleete

accounts third party checks totaling more than $66,000 in a

three-year period. These checks, made out to others and

endorsed over to Stewart, outwardly appeared to be paychecks. 

At trial, the government argued that Eleete Image was a

“front company,” “a scam and a sham.” R. 202, at 645–46. The

government contended that Stewart created Eleete Image and

tried to make it look like a legitimate company in orderto have

a place to deal with the cash he earned from drug sales.

Possessing and using large amounts of cash, the government

argued, would potentially draw scrutiny, but using a business

account and a business debit card helped prevent suspicion

that the funds were illegitimate. When seeking a bank loan in

2014, for example, Stewart noted on the application that he had

been “employed” by Eleete Image for five years and had an

income of $6700 per month. 

In closing arguments, the government went through the

elements of money laundering one by one, associating evidence from the trial with proof of those elements. For the

fourth element of money laundering, whether the defendant

“knew that the transaction was designed in whole or in part to

conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the

ownership, or the control of the proceeds of ongoing drug

trafficking activity,” the government argued in closing that the

Eleete business account was designed to hide the nature of the

funds as drug money and to distance Stewart from ownership

of the funds:
30 No. 16-4105

Why does making cash deposits into the Eleete

Image bank account—why does it meet that last

element? Well, as we’ve discussed, what is the

whole point of this Eleete Image bank account? The

whole point is not to conduct any legitimate business. He had more than two years to do that or to

make something of a start of it.

The point was he is a drug trafficker. That is what he

does for a living. That is what he’s done for a living

for years, and he needs to find a way to spend and

use his money in a way that’s not going to raise

eyebrows.

So, concealing or disguising the nature or source of

that cash, well, once the cash—we do that financial

transaction, put that somewhat small amount,

couple thousand dollars—once we put that—run it

through into the business account, now we’re not

just walking around with several thousand dollars

in our pockets. It’s a business account. It looks like

business-related money. It can be spent like

business-related money through the Eleete Image

cards. 

Then, of course, it also goes to the ownership or

control, the attempt to hide the ownership or control. It’s not Daniel Stewart walking around. It is

Eleete Image who now has the money. 

We know it is difficult—certainly the detectives did

it; but it is somewhat difficult to make that leap from

Eleete Image at Dowitch Lane, which we know is
No. 16-4105 31

associated with Rosemarie Brown, to Daniel Stewart

at 4523 Eagle Creek Parkway; but that was the point.

R. 202, at 656–57.

Stewart now claims that this evidence was insufficient as a

matter of law to prove money laundering. Citing Esterman,

Stewart contends that the government was required to prove

that the charged transactions were specificallydesigned to hide

the provenance of the funds involved. The government failed

to do so here, he argues, because he did nothing more than

deposit money into accounts that he opened, accounts that

could be traced easily back to him. He asserts that the facts of

his case are remarkably similar to the facts in Esterman, where

this court reversed a conviction for money laundering on the

same forfeitedinsufficiency-of-the-evidence claimthathe raises

here. He notes that his name is on the incorporation papers for

Eleete, and that he is the signatory on the Eleete bank accounts.

Having made no attempt to hide behind the Eleete account, the

facts cannot support a finding of concealment under Esterman,

he argues. So we turn to Esterman.

In that case, Gary Esterman opened a bank account at

Edens Bank in Skokie, Illinois, with a Russian business partner

in order to facilitate the financing for a project that the two

were planning in Russia. The business partner returned to

Russia and money began flowing into the Edens Bank account.

Almost as quickly, Esterman began withdrawing money from

the account and transferring it to his G.E. International

Account at Michigan Avenue National Bank. Contrary to his

agreement with his Russian business partner, Esterman

engaged in at least thirty-three separate transactions including
32 No. 16-4105

wire transfers and withdrawals to remove the money from

Edens Bank, taking the money for his own personal use.

Esterman then spent the money in the G.E. account by withdrawing cash or writing checks directly for purchases. 324 F.3d

at 567–68.

Assessing these facts, we noted that we have struggled “to

define precisely what amount of concealment must occur

before mere use of ill-gotten gains becomes money laundering

prohibited by subpart (B)(i) of the statute.” 324 F.3d at 570.

Two principles emerged from the cases:

First, we have tried to maintain some separation

between the initial transaction from which illegal

proceeds were derived and further transactions

designed to conceal the source of those proceeds. ...

Second, we have stressed that the mere transfer and

spending of funds is not enough to sweep conduct

within the money laundering statute; instead,

subsequent transactions must be specifically designed to hide the provenance of the funds involved.

Esterman, 324 F.3d at 570 (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted). To restate the first principle, “money laundering criminalizes a transaction in proceeds, not the transaction

that creates the proceeds.” United States v. Mankarious, 151 F.3d

694, 705 (7th Cir. 1998). The government’s proof in Esterman

failed because the defendant made no effort to disguise or

conceal either his withdrawals from Edens Bank or the

destination of the funds. He simply made deposits into other

bank accounts that were correctly identified as his and then

spent the money in retail transactions. 
No. 16-4105 33

We rejected the government’s argument that, because the

Russian business partner was unaware of the existence of the

G.E. account, Esterman’s use of that account established an

intent to conceal:

But this is just another way of describing Esterman’s

initial fraudulent scheme, whereby he took the

money away from [the Russian business partner].

Most fraud victims probably assume that their

money has either been spent or placed in an account

of some sort, even if they do not know the specific

destination of the funds. If that were enough to

show money laundering at the same time, there

would be no distinction left between money laundering and the underlying fraud, and individuals

who perpetrate simple fraud by transferring

ill-gotten funds into a personal account would

always be triable as money launderers.

Esterman, 324 F.3d at 571–72.

The proceeds at issue in Esterman were generated by fraud.

That is, fraud was the “specified unlawful activity” mentioned

in section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). In addition to the initial transaction

where Esterman took the money by fraud, the government

failed to prove that he engaged in an additional transaction

that was designed “to hide the provenance of the funds

involved.” Instead, he simply deposited the money that he

took by fraud into an easily identifiable account and began to

spend it. 

In Stewart’s case, the proceeds were created by the specified unlawful activity of drug trafficking. In transactions that
34 No. 16-4105

are readily identifiable as separate from the original crime,

Stewart took the cash generated from that drug trafficking and

engaged in a series of steps designed to conceal or disguise that

money as business proceeds rather than drug money. With

those same steps, he sought to distance himself from personal

ownership of the funds. He incorporated a business using a

false address and then took several steps to make the business

appear legitimate. He obtained an Employer Identification

Numberfrom the IRS and created a website. He opened a bank

account in the name of the business and enlisted others to help

him deposit drug proceeds into the account in a manner that

would cause outsiders to believe the money was income to the

business. On the two charged occasions, he simply deposited

relatively small amounts of cash into the business account at

ATMs. He then spent that money, sometimes on items that

couldprobablybe identified as strictly personal and sometimes

on items, like his car, that he titled in the name of his sham

business. 

In short, this was not an Esterman-style scheme, where the

defendant did little more than take money, store it and spend

it. Esterman required “concrete evidence of intent to disguise or

conceal transactions, whether that evidence comes directly

from statements by the defendant that indicate an intent to

conceal, or from circumstantial evidence like unusual secrecy

surrounding transactions, careful structuring of transactions to

avoid attention, folding or otherwise depositing illegal profits

into the bank account or receipts of a legitimate business, use

of third parties to conceal the real owner, or engaging in

unusual financial moves culminating ina transaction.” 324 F.3d

at 573. Stewart’s machinations surrounding the Eleete bank
No. 16-4105 35

account supply the necessary circumstantial evidence. Under

the usual standard for a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we

can easily conclude that a rational jury could have found the

essential element of concealment (the only element challenged)

beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the government. Webster, 775 F.3d at 904–05;

Aslan, 644 F.3d at 540. Underthe even more stringent standard

of plain error, this is not a close case, and the money laundering convictions must be affirmed.

III.

Finally, we note that Stewart raised a number of challenges

to the admissionof evidence that he characterizes as prejudicial

and irrelevant “bad acts” evidence. Stewart asks us to review

the admission of most of that evidence for plain error and some

of it for abuse of discretion, depending on whether he preserved the particular objection in the district court. The

government asserts both that the evidence was properly

admitted and that, in any event, if there was error, it was

harmless. We agree that any error in admitting the challenged

evidence was harmless. “The test for harmless erroris whether,

in the mind of the average juror, the prosecution’s case would

have been significantly less persuasive had the improper

evidence been excluded.” United States v. Curtis, 781 F.3d 904,

911 (7th Cir. 2015). The evidence against Stewart was overwhelming. United States v. Gonzalez, 863 F.3d 576, 588–89 (7th

Cir. 2017) (evidentiary error found harmless where there was

overwhelming admissible evidence of guilt). The admissible

evidence included kilogram quantities of drugs, five firearms,

and nearly half a million dollars in cash. The prosecution’s case
36 No. 16-4105

would have been no less persuasive had the challenged

evidence been excluded.

AFFIRMED