alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT 99.2



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Valley National Gases
Incorporate (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2002
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Robert D. Scherich, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

                  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
         13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

                  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
         in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
         operations of the Company.



                                           /s/ Robert D. Scherich
                                           ------------------------------
                                           Robert D. Scherich
                                           Chief Financial Officer
                                           February 13, 2003
#### Michael V. Greco et al., Appellants, v Town of Kent et al., Respondents.

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from water contamination, plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County *310(Beisheim, J.), dated August 19,1983, which, upon the motion of the defendants Putnam County and Putnam County Board of Health to dismiss the complaint as against them for nonjoinder of the State of New York as a necessary party, dismissed the complaint as against all defendants “without prejudice to the right of the plaintiffs to pursue their claim against the defendants in the Court of Claims”.

Order reversed, without costs or disbursements, and motion denied. *(See, Baisley v Town of Kent,*111 AD2d 299.) Thompson, J. P., Brown, Niehoff and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 56 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That when the Senate recesses or adjourns 

3 on any day from Thursday, August 2, 2012, through Mon4 day, August 6, 2012, on a motion offered pursuant to this 

5 concurrent resolution by its Majority Leader or his des6 ignee, it stand recessed or adjourned until 12:00 noon on 

7 Monday, September 10, 2012, or such other time on that 

8 day as may be specified by its Majority Leader or his des9 ignee in the motion to recess or adjourn, or until the time 

10 of any reassembly pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent 

11 resolution, whichever occurs first; and that when the 

12 House adjourns on any legislative day from Thursday, Au13 gust 2, 2012, through Monday, August 6, 2012, on a mo14 tion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its 

15 Majority Leader or his designee, it stand adjourned until 

16 2:00 p.m. on Monday, September 10, 2012, or until the 

17 time of any reassembly pursuant to section 2 of this con18 current resolution, whichever occurs first. 
2 

†SCON 56 ES 

1 SEC. 2. The Majority Leader of the Senate and the 

2 Speaker of the House, or their respective designees, acting 

3 jointly after consultation with the Minority Leader of the 

4 Senate and the Minority Leader of the House, shall notify 

5 the Members of the Senate and House, respectively, to re6 assemble at such place and time as they may designate 

7 if, in their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it. 

Passed the Senate August 2, 2012. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 56 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Providing for a conditional adjournment or recess 

of Representatives. of the Senate and an adjournment of the House
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Freddie Sutton, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Spodek, J.), rendered September 29, 1983, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

Contrary to defendant’s position, the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting into evidence his videotaped confession to the murder of his wife, which was taken at the police precinct following his arrest. In the first instance, defendant’s present challenge to the admissibility of the videotaped confession on the ground that it was tainted by his prior confession which the trial court suppressed, was not raised at the *Huntley*hearing *(People v Huntley,*15 NY2d 72) and thus has not been preserved for appellate review *(see, People v Martin,*50 NY2d 1029). In any event, in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt in the record, any alleged error is clearly harmless *(see, People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230). On this point, it is noted that defendant shot his wife twice in the head in front of two police officers and a third witness.

We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Titone, J. P., Lazer, Thompson and Rubin, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Lydia DD., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent. Broome County Attorney’s Office, Respondent; Lydia DD., Appellant.

[943 NYS2d 635]

Rose, J.

Appeal from an amended order of the Family Court of Broome County (Connerton, J.), entered September 16, 2011, which, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 3, denied respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as moot.

Petitioner commenced this juvenile delinquency proceeding by filing a petition on July 19, 2011 alleging that respondent (born in 1998) committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of grand larceny in the third degree. By notice of motion dated August 10, 2011, with a return date of August 29, 2011, respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that, among other things, it was fatally insufficient *1386on its face. On August 26, 2011, petitioner faxed a letter to respondent’s counsel and Family Court indicating that it “would like to withdraw the pending petition.” Family Court issued an order deeming both the petition and respondent’s motion “withdrawn and dismissed, without prejudice.” Respondent’s counsel immediately wrote to the court that the motion to dismiss had not been withdrawn and that he would not consent to dismissal of the petition unless it was with prejudice. Family Court thereupon amended its order by denying respondent’s motion to dismiss, without prejudice, as moot. Respondent appeals from the amended order.

We agree with respondent that the August 26, 2011 letter must be viewed as a motion for voluntary discontinuance pursuant to CPLR 3217 (b) *(see*Family Ct Act § 165 [a]; *Matter of Fiacco v Engler,*79 AD3d 1206, 1207 n 1 [2010]) and, in the absence of proper service, Family Court was without jurisdiction to grant the motion *(see Bianco v LiGreci,*298 AD2d 482 [2002]; *Burstin v Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co.,*98 AD2d 928, 929 [1983]; *see also*22 NYCRR 205.11 [b]). There is no affidavit of service or other evidence in the record proving that petitioner served respondent with the letter and, although petitioner submits a fax transmission sheet as part of its appendix reflecting transmission to respondent’s counsel, he did not consent to such service. In any event, there is no evidence of a follow-up mailing as required to complete such service *(see*CPLR 2103 [b] [5]).

Furthermore, there is no basis for petitioner’s contention that the petition was dismissed pursuant to Family Ct Act § 315.2. Family Court did not set forth any reasons upon the record for dismissing the petition in the furtherance of justice as required by that statute *(see*Family Ct Act § 315.2 [2]) and, in any event, such a dismissal is considered a termination of the proceeding in respondent’s favor *(see*Family Ct Act § 375.1 [2] [b]).

Peters, PJ., Lahtinen, Malone Jr. and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the amended order is reversed, on the law, without costs, and matter remitted to the Family Court of Broome County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                             DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                  DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                            582,972
<SECURITIES>                                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   2,858,081
<ALLOWANCES>                                      165,000
<INVENTORY>                                     3,740,480
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                7,084,973
<PP&E>                                          3,040,123
<DEPRECIATION>                                  1,763,504
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 14,375,094
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           2,086,858
<BONDS>                                         6,704,294
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                   0
<PREFERRED>                                             0
<COMMON>                                          123,746
<OTHER-SE>                                      5,425,829
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   14,375,094
<SALES>                                        23,684,307
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               23,684,307
<CGS>                                          14,541,681
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   9,078,223
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                        0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                703,721
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (639,318)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        8,840
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (648,158)
<DISCONTINUED>                                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                         0
<CHANGES>                                               0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (648,158)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (.05)



</TABLE>
#### Terry Keels PRESSLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN OF RIDGELAND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent-Appellee, and South Carolina Department Of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 11-6489.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Aug. 2, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 15, 2011.

Terry Keels Pressley, Appellant pro se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

*849Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Terry K. Pressley seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appeal-able unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2258(c)(1)(A) (2006). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Pressley has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Willie M. Williams, Appellant.

[944 NYS2d 912] —

Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated June 2, 2009 *(People v Williams,*63 AD3d 762 [2009]), affirming a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County, rendered June 25, 2004.

*1363Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]). Skelos, J.P., Florio, Leventhal and Hall, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1








                    CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation of our
report dated February 1, 2001, included in the Annual Report on Form 20-F of SAP
Aktiengesellschaft Systeme, Anwendungen, Produkte in der Datenverarbeitung (the
Company) for the year ended December 31, 2000, into the Company's previously
filed registration statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-60399, 333-65083, 333-30380
and 333-41762) and to all references to our Firm included in these registration
statements.




                                    Eschborn/Frankfurt/M., March 28, 2001


                                    ARTHUR ANDERSEN
                                    Wirschaftspruefungsgesellschaft
                                    Steuerberatungsgesellschaft mbH

                                    /s/ Gross              /s/ Turowski
                                    ----------             ------------
                                    Gross                  Turowski
                                    Wirtschaftspruefer     Wirtschaftspruefer
# C_2019295EN.01007101.xml

| 2.9.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 295/71 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.9.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 295/71

---

Action brought on 4 July 2019 — Pettinari v Parliament

(Case T-455/19)

(2019/C 295/93)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Luciano Pettinari (Rome, Italy) (represented by: M. Merola, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

| — | order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

| — | order the European Parliament to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those relied on in Case T-389/19, Coppo Gavazzi v Parliament.

---
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 31.1

I, Stephan Kuppenheimer, certify that:

         1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, and all reports on
Form 8-K containing distribution or servicing reports filed in respect of
periods included in the year covered by this annual report, of Merrill Lynch
Depositor, Inc., on behalf of PreferredPLUS Trust Series ELP-1;

         2. Based on my knowledge, the information in these reports, taken as a
whole, does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state
a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading as of the
last day of the period covered by this annual report;

         3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicing information
required to be provided to the depositor by the trustee under the pooling and
servicing, or similar, agreement, for inclusion in these reports is included in
these reports;

         4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
depositor and the trustee under the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement
and based upon my knowledge and the annual compliance review required under that
agreement, and except as disclosed in the reports, the depositor and trustee
have each fulfilled its obligations under that agreement; and

         5. The reports disclose all significant deficiencies relating to the
compliance by the depositor or trustee with the minimum servicing or similar
standards based upon the report provided by an independent public accountant,
after conducting a review in compliance with the Uniform Single Attestation
Program for Mortgage Bankers or similar procedure, as set forth in the pooling
or servicing, or similar, agreement, that is included in these reports.

         In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: The Bank of
New York and its officers and agents.


                                               /s/ Stephan Kuppenheimer
                                               ------------------------
                                               Stephan Kuppenheimer
Date: March 29, 2005                           President
EXHIBIT 31.2



CERTIFICATION



I, Jasmine Gregory, certify that:



(1)I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A of Premier Holding Corp. for the period ended September 30. 2009;





(2) Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





(3) Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;





(4) The Registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:





(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;





(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and





(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the Registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrants internal control over financial reporting; and





(5) The Registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrants auditors and the audit committee of the Registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):





(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and





(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|Date:  August 13, 2010 | Jasmine Gregory
Chief Financial Officer
|---------------------- | ---------------------------------------