2022 UT App 50

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TIMOTHY MAHONEY,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES AND TROON GOLF LLC,

Respondents.

Opinion

No. 20200884-CA

Filed April 14, 2022

Original Proceeding in this Court

Timothy Mahoney, Petitioner Pro Se

Amanda B. McPeck, Attorney for Respondent

Department of Workforce Services

JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

RYAN M. HARRIS and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1 Timothy Mahoney seeks judicial review of a Workforce 

Appeals Board (the Board) decision denying him unemployment 

insurance benefits. Mahoney contends that the Board “ignored 

evidence and testimony,” “assumed facts not in evidence,” and 

“made conclusions that are contradictory to evidence and 

testimony.” We set aside the Board’s decision and instruct it to 

reconsider Mahoney’s claim.
Mahoney v. Department of Workforce Services

20200884-CA 2 2022 UT App 50

BACKGROUND1

¶2 Mahoney was employed by Troon Golf LLC (Employer) as 

a general manager of its resort property in St. George, Utah. The 

property is made up of twenty-eight individual bungalows, with 

one bungalow functioning as a welcome center where guests 

check in. In March 2020, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 

welcome center was closed to outside guests and the resort 

instead provided contactless check-in and check-out. It also 

eliminated “same-day turnovers” so that “a sanitation worker 

[could] disinfect the bungalows before [the] housekeeping staff 

cleaned and prepared them for other customers.”2 This 

adjustment “lowered the risk of [the] housekeeping staff being 

exposed to the COVID-19 virus.” During this time, Mahoney 

provided masks for himself and his co-workers, but “guests and 

owners were not required to wear masks.” In addition, the 

1. In reviewing a decision of the Board, we recite the facts in the 

light most favorable to the Board’s findings. Utah Paiute Tribal 

Housing Auth. Inc. v. Department of Workforce Services, 2019 UT App 

191, ¶ 2 n.1, 454 P.3d 865. “But we present conflicting evidence to 

the extent necessary to address the issues raised on [review].” See 

Lundahl Farms LLC v. Nielsen, 2021 UT App 146, ¶ 2 n.2, 504 P.3d 

735; see also Carbon County v. Department of Workforce Services, 2012 

UT App 4, ¶ 9, 269 P.3d 969 (“In applying the substantial evidence 

test, we review the whole record before the court, and consider 

both evidence that supports the Board’s findings and evidence 

that fairly detracts from them.” (cleaned up)), aff’d sub nom. Carbon 

County v. Workforce Appeals Board, 2013 UT 41, 308 P.3d 477.

2. Having a “same-day turnover” means that one guest will check 

out of a bungalow on the same day another guest checks in. Sameday turnovers increase occupancy rates but shorten the time 

available for cleaning staff to prepare the units for new guests.
Mahoney v. Department of Workforce Services

20200884-CA 3 2022 UT App 50

sanitation worker used “a Tyve[k] suit, gloves and a face shield” 

as well as a “disinfectant fogger.”3

¶3 Near the end of May 2020, Employer instructed Mahoney 

to “return to same-day turnovers for rooms.” Mahoney did not 

want to disinfect rooms “moments after” guests left, nor did he 

“want to have to order someone to do that.” Mahoney claimed 

that as same-day turnovers increased, the responsibility for 

disinfecting rooms “would fall more and more on” him instead of 

the sanitation worker. Mahoney was concerned that these 

changes could unnecessarily expose him and his staff to COVID19. He was also worried about contracting the disease and 

potentially infecting his wife, whose medical condition placed her 

at an increased risk of serious illness if she contracted COVID-19.

¶4 At the same time, Employer “insisted” that Mahoney 

reopen the welcome center. Accordingly, Mahoney worked to 

ensure that the welcome center “had all the proper precautions in 

place,” like “[f]loor signage for social distancing” and the 

installation of plexiglass between the guests and the front-desk 

employee. However, Employer demanded that Mahoney open 

the welcome center to guests in June 2020, before those 

precautions were in place. Specifically, the plexiglass was not “in 

place when [Employer] insisted the welcome center be open” and 

there is no evidence in the record that the floor signage had 

arrived. Further, D.H., “the manager of the owner organization,” 

entered the welcome center “on an almost daily basis,” “refused 

3. The Board found that Employer provided its employees with 

“N100 masks, Tyvek suits, face shields, and professional-grade 

foggers.” While Mahoney testified about an N100 mask, Tyvek 

suit, face shield, and disinfectant fogger that he (on one occasion)

and the sanitation worker used to disinfect the units, there is no 

evidence in the record that Employer provided multiple face 

shields, Tyvek suits, and foggers, or that such equipment was 

generally available to all employees.
Mahoney v. Department of Workforce Services

20200884-CA 4 2022 UT App 50

to wear a mask,” and “failed to properly social distance.” He also 

ignored Mahoney’s request that when they were together he “step 

away and please wear a mask.”

¶5 Mahoney was concerned about re-opening the welcome 

center because guests came “from all over the country including 

places that still had stay-at-home orders in effect and . . . places 

that were considered hot spots for COVID.” He was also 

specifically concerned about D.H., who would not wear a mask or 

socially distance even after returning from traveling to a “highrisk area[].”

¶6 Although Mahoney did not tell Employer he was 

considering quitting, he expressed “extreme displeasure” and 

“strong objections” to reopening the welcome center and 

resuming same-day turnovers. Employer was not receptive to 

these concerns and moved forward with its plans. As a result, 

Mahoney quit and began looking for another job.

¶7 Following his resignation, Mahoney filed a claim for 

unemployment insurance benefits. The Utah Department of 

Workforce Services denied his claim, finding that Mahoney failed 

to “establish good cause for leaving.” Mahoney appealed the 

denial and, after a hearing,4 the denial was affirmed by an 

Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ). The ALJ determined that 

Mahoney had “not shown he faced an unpreventable harm by 

remaining at work, and ha[d] not met his burden of proving he 

had good cause to voluntarily end his employment.” Further, the 

ALJ declined to award Mahoney benefits under the equity and 

good conscience standard because “[i]t was not reasonable or 

practical for [him] to quit his job to pursue employment where his 

risk of contracting COVID-19 would be the same or greater than 

the risk he faced by continuing to work for the Employer,” and

4. Mahoney was the only witness to testify at the hearing.

Employer chose not to appear. 
Mahoney v. Department of Workforce Services

20200884-CA 5 2022 UT App 50

because Mahoney’s “decision to quit did not involve any 

mitigating circumstances suggesting a denial of benefits was an 

affront to fairness.”

¶8 Mahoney appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board. The 

Board upheld the ALJ’s decision, explaining that Mahoney “failed 

to produce persuasive evidence that remaining employed created 

a hardship outside of his control.” And while the Board was 

“sympathetic” to Mahoney’s health-related concerns, it also 

found that the “denial of benefits is not an affront to fairness” 

because the “decision to quit and look for other work in this 

field—where he does not seem likely to find anything appreciably 

safer—was not logical, sensible, or practical.” Thus, the Board 

affirmed the decision to deny Mahoney’s claim for 

unemployment insurance benefits.

¶9 Mahoney seeks judicial review of the Board’s decision.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 Mahoney challenges the Board’s denial of unemployment 

insurance benefits on the bases that the Board overlooked 

material evidence and made factual findings that are not 

supported by substantial evidence.

¶11 This court’s authority to review the Board’s decision is 

derived from the Administrative Procedures Act. Utah Code Ann. 

§ 63G-4-403(1) (LexisNexis 2019). The Act provides, among other 

things, that we may grant relief if we determine that the Board 

“substantially prejudiced” a person by not deciding “all of the 

issues requiring resolution” or by basing its decision upon a 

factual determination “that is not supported by substantial 

evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 

court.” Id. § 63G-4-403(4)(c), (g); see also Davis v. Department of 

Workforce Services, 2012 UT App 158, ¶ 2, 280 P.3d 442; Benson v. 

Peace Officer Standards & Training Council, 2011 UT App 220, ¶ 22, 
Mahoney v. Department of Workforce Services

20200884-CA 6 2022 UT App 50

261 P.3d 643. “Substantial evidence exists where more than a mere 

scintilla, though something less than the weight of the evidence, 

supports the Board’s findings.” Prosper Team, Inc. v. Department of 

Workforce Services, 2011 UT App 246, ¶ 4, 262 P.3d 462 (cleaned 

up). This is met “when a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate the evidence supporting the” relevant findings. Id.

(cleaned up).

¶12 “A person is substantially prejudiced by an agency action 

if that challenged action was not harmless.” Foye v. Labor Comm'n, 

2018 UT App 124, ¶ 31, 428 P.3d 26. “An error will be harmless if 

it is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable 

likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.” 

Smith v. Department of Workforce Services, 2010 UT App 382, ¶ 17, 

245 P.3d 758 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶13 Claimants who voluntarily quit their employment may be 

entitled to unemployment insurance benefits if they can show 

“good cause for the separation or if denying benefits would be 

contrary to equity and good conscience.” Gibson v. Department of 

Workforce Services, 2017 UT App 107, ¶ 3, 400 P.3d 1152 (per 

curiam); see also Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(1)(a)–(b)

(LexisNexis 2019); Utah Admin. Code R994-405-101(3).

¶14 To establish good cause, a claimant must first “show that 

continuing the employment would have caused an adverse effect 

which the claimant could not control or prevent.” Utah Admin. 

Code R994-405-102. An adverse effect exists when the separation 

is “motivated by circumstances that made the continuance of the 

employment a hardship or matter of concern, sufficiently adverse 

to a reasonable person so as to outweigh the benefits of remaining 

employed.” Id. R994-405-102(1)(a). This standard requires a 

showing of “actual or potential physical, mental, economic, 
Mahoney v. Department of Workforce Services

20200884-CA 7 2022 UT App 50

personal or professional harm caused or aggravated by the 

employment.” Id. Second, a claimant must also show “that an 

immediate severance of the employment relationship was 

necessary.” Id. R994-405-102. A claimant will not be able to make 

this showing “if the claimant: (i) reasonably could have continued 

working while looking for other employment, (ii) had reasonable 

alternatives that would have made it possible to preserve the job 

. . . , or, (iii) did not give the employer notice of the circumstances 

causing the hardship.” Id. R994-405-102(1)(b).

¶15 Additionally, even if the good cause standard is not met, 

“benefits may be allowed under the provisions of the equity and 

good conscience standard if” “there are mitigating 

circumstances,” “a denial of benefits would be unreasonably 

harsh or an affront to fairness,” and the claimant “acted 

reasonably” and “demonstrated a continuing attachment to the 

labor market.” Id. R994-405-103(1)(a)–(b).

¶16 Here, the Board determined that Mahoney “failed to 

produce persuasive evidence that remaining employed created a 

hardship outside of his control.” Mahoney challenges this 

determination and the findings of fact that support it. In 

particular, he attacks findings about returning to same-day 

turnovers and reopening the welcome center. He also complains 

that the Board overlooked related evidence that D.H. declined 

Mahoney’s requests to abide by social distancing guidelines in the 

welcome center and to wear a mask. In other words, Mahoney 

asserts that there is insubstantial evidence to support the Board’s 

factual findings and thus its ultimate determinations.

¶17 We begin by addressing Mahoney’s challenges to the 

Board’s factual findings and conclude that certain of the Board’s 

findings are not supported by substantial evidence and that other 

material facts were overlooked. We then address whether the 

Board’s errors were material to its decision and thus substantially 

prejudiced Mahoney.
Mahoney v. Department of Workforce Services

20200884-CA 8 2022 UT App 50

I. The Board’s Factual Findings

A. Same-Day Turnovers

¶18 Beginning in March 2020, based on “research . . . that said 

that coronavirus can survive in the air for two or three hours,” the 

resort suspended same-day turnovers and instead “required 24 

hours in between occupancies.” And in May 2020, the resort

arranged for a sanitation worker to disinfect the bungalows with 

a professional grade hospital fogger before the housekeeping staff 

would be allowed to clean and prepare the units for new 

occupants. Specifically, the sanitation worker would put on a 

Tyvek suit, N100 mask, face shield, and gloves, and disinfect the 

rooms in the evening so that the housekeeping staff could return 

in the morning and “feel safe and comfortable that [Employer 

was] eliminating exposure for them.”

¶19 In late May 2020, Employer insisted that Mahoney “return 

to same-day turnovers.” Mahoney thought this decision was 

“irresponsible.” He testified that as same-day turnovers 

increased, the responsibility for disinfecting bungalows “would 

fall more and more on” him instead of the sanitation worker.

Mahoney explained he did not want to disinfect the units 

“moments after” guests left, nor did he “want to have to order 

someone to do that.” Despite Mahoney’s concerns, Employer 

implemented the change.

¶20 In support of his claim for benefits, Mahoney asserted that 

this change in policy created a hardship for him. But the Board 

disagreed. It found that his concern that he would be placed “at 

an unreasonable risk of infection” by having to enter a bungalow 

“soon after a guest checked out” was unconvincing because 

Employer “provided extensive protection to the workers as they 

cleaned the rooms, including N100 masks and Tyvek suits.” And 

“[g]iven such protection,” the Board found that Mahoney “did not 
Mahoney v. Department of Workforce Services

20200884-CA 9 2022 UT App 50

persuasively show that he or other workers were significantly 

placed at risk by entering a room to fog it.”

¶21 Mahoney challenges these findings as unsupported by 

substantial evidence. He argues that the Board “made an incorrect 

assumption about the availability and prevalence of proper 

[personal protective equipment],” explaining that Employer did 

not provide multiple Tyvek suits and other protective equipment 

for its employees. Rather, Mahoney asserts that he provided a

singular Tyvek suit, N100 mask, and face shield from his own 

“personal supply.”5

¶22 We agree with Mahoney that the Board made an incorrect 

assumption about the availability of protective equipment 

necessary for the disinfecting of the bungalows. Mahoney 

testified that the sanitation worker used a N100 mask, Tyvek suit, 

face shield, and a disinfectant fogger, and that Mahoney himself 

put on the equipment when he filled in for the sanitation worker 

on one occasion. But there is no evidence in the record that 

Employer provided multiple face shields, Tyvek suits, and 

foggers, or that the equipment was generally available to all 

employees. Thus, there is an absence of support in the record for 

the Board’s finding that with the return to same-day turnovers, 

Mahoney and his staff would have “extensive protection” as they 

prepared the rooms for new guests.

5. There is a lack of clarity in the record about who provided the 

protective gear worn while disinfecting the bungalows. Mahoney 

argues that he provided the equipment from his own personal 

supply, but Mahoney did not testify to that during the hearing 

before the ALJ. Thus, we cannot fault the Board for finding that 

Employer (rather than Mahoney) provided this equipment.
Mahoney v. Department of Workforce Services

20200884-CA 10 2022 UT App 50

B. The Welcome Center

¶23 Mahoney next challenges the Board’s findings that with the 

reopening of the welcome center in June 2020, Employer “planned 

to enforce social distancing guidelines in the center” and arranged 

“to install plexiglass shields in between the guests and the frontdesk employee.” In challenging this finding, Mahoney contends 

that the Board neglected to acknowledge that the welcome center 

was going to be reopened without the plexiglass installed and that 

far from enforcing social distancing guidelines, D.H. himself was 

dismissive of Mahoney’s requests that D.H. wear a mask and 

socially distance during their interactions. Mahoney’s complaint 

is well taken.

¶24 While the Board’s findings are not inaccurate on their 

face—Employer did plan to enforce social distancing guidelines 

in the welcome center and install plexiglass shields between its 

employees and guests—the Board failed to account for the current 

and immediate risk to Mahoney from guests and Employer alike. 

Specifically, when asked “what was unsafe about” reopening the 

welcome center, Mahoney testified that not having plexiglass in 

place before reopening impelled his resignation because he would 

be “forced to have . . . face-to-face unmasked contact with guests 

and . . . [the] owners.” This concerned him because guests came 

“from all over the country including places that still had stay-athome orders in effect and . . . places that were considered hot spots 

for COVID.” Mahoney explained that without the plexiglass 

shields in place, he was concerned about his safety, the safety of 

his employees, and the safety of his wife, who “is considered a 

high-risk person.” Further, Mahoney testified that he felt unsafe 

because, regardless of whether Employer intended to display 

signage encouraging social distancing among the guests, 

Employer was not abiding by the recommended guidelines. In 

particular, D.H. visited with Mahoney “on an almost daily basis” 

but refused to wear a mask or socially distance.
Mahoney v. Department of Workforce Services

20200884-CA 11 2022 UT App 50

¶25 Unfortunately, the Board made no findings on these issues, 

which Mahoney testified drove him to resign. Instead, the Board 

focused on the precautions Employer anticipated taking 

regarding the welcome center, but it did not address Mahoney’s 

complaints that Employer insisted on opening the welcome center 

without these precautions in place and that D.H.’s daily 

interactions with Mahoney were inconsistent with Employer’s 

stated intentions. And while it is possible that the Board did not 

credit Mahoney’s testimony on these points, there is nothing in 

the record to suggest that is the case. Neither the ALJ nor the 

Board suggested that they found Mahoney not credible; indeed, 

his testimony was supported, in part, by contemporaneous 

emails, and there was no rebuttal on these points by Employer.

II. The Board’s Analysis

¶26 To demonstrate that he was entitled to unemployment 

insurance benefits, Mahoney was required to show good cause for 

his separation or that denying him benefits would be contrary to 

equity and good conscience. See Gibson v. Department of Workforce 

Services, 2017 UT App 107, ¶ 3, 400 P.3d 1152 (per curiam). 

Mahoney attempted to meet his burden by showing that his 

health (and the health of his wife) was at risk because of the 

decisions made by Employer. He complained that Employer was 

reinstating same-day turnovers, requiring him (and others) to 

clean rooms without sufficient time to sanitize them. He also 

complained that he would be required to interact with out-of-state 

guests before appropriate precautions were in place with the 

reopening of the welcome center. And he complained that,

despite Employer’s assurances that it would enforce social 

distancing guidelines in the welcome center, D.H. interacted with 

Mahoney daily while refusing to wear a mask or socially distance.

¶27 The Board ultimately determined that Mahoney did not 

meet his burden and “did not show he was placed at an 

unreasonable risk of infection in the workplace.” But the Board 
Mahoney v. Department of Workforce Services

20200884-CA 12 2022 UT App 50

made that determination based on at least one factual finding that 

was unsupported by substantial evidence and without addressing 

two of Mahoney’s chief complaints. Specifically, as discussed 

above, the Board erroneously determined that “Employer 

provided extensive protection to the workers as they cleaned the 

rooms.” See supra ¶¶ 20–22. Further, in finding that Employer 

intended to install plexiglass shields and post floor signage 

encouraging social distancing in the welcome center, the Board 

failed to address Mahoney’s complaint that the welcome center 

would reopen without the plexiglass installed and that D.H., the 

manager of the owner organization, would not wear a mask or 

socially distance when interacting with Mahoney. See supra ¶¶ 23–

25.

¶28 We conclude that Mahoney was prejudiced by the Board’s 

unsupported factual determination and its failure to address all 

the issues presented. Each of these complaints were material to 

Mahoney’s resignation and therefore relevant to the question of 

whether Mahoney is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits 

under either the good cause or the equity and good conscience 

standards. Thus, there is a reasonable likelihood that but for the 

Board’s errors the outcome of this proceeding would have been 

different. See Smith v. Department of Workforce Services, 2010 UT 

App 382, ¶ 17, 245 P.3d 758. We accordingly set aside the Board’s

decision and remand this matter for a full consideration of 

Mahoney’s complaints.

CONCLUSION

¶29 The Board made at least one factual finding lacking 

substantial evidence, and it declined to address two of Mahoney’s 

complaints. In our view, these errors were significant enough to 

perhaps have made a difference to the outcome. Accordingly, we 

set aside the Board’s decision and remand this matter to the Board

for reconsideration.