J-A17002-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JENNA MARIE SCOTT, BY AND THROUGH 

HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM, JUDITH 

ALGEO, ESQUIRE

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

LOWER BUCKS HOSPITAL, LOWER 

BUCKS HEALTH ENTERPRISES, INC., 

ADVANCED PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS, 

BUCKS COUNTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 

LT., PRIMARY HEALTH CARE SERVICES 

(BRISTOL, PA) AND PRIMARY HEALTH 

CARE SERVICES (ONTARIO, CA)

No. 2607 EDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order August 27, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): December Term, 2013 No. 3662

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 30, 2015

Jenna Marie Scott, by and through her guardian ad litem, Judith Algeo, 

Esquire, appeals from the order entered on August 27, 2014, in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia, transferring this action sua sponte to Bucks 

County for the purposes of coordination with another lawsuit. Scott claims 

the trial court lacked authority to transfer the matter sua sponte, and that 

the trial court erred in applying the Pa.R.C.P. 213.1(c) factors. After a 
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thorough review of the submissions by the parties,1relevant law, and the 

certified record, we reverse the order transferring the action. Additionally, 

appellees motion to quash appeal as moot is denied.

We note initially that an order directing coordination of actions in 

different counties is an interlocutory order appealable as of right. 

Pa.R.A.P. 311(c); Richardson Brands, Inc. v. Pennsylvania 

Dutch Co., Inc., 405 Pa. Super. 202, 592 A.2d 77 (1991); 

Lincoln General Ins. Co. v. Donahue, 151 Pa. Cmwlth. 297, 

616 A.2d 1076 (1992). We review an order coordinating actions 

under [Pa.R.C.P.] rule 213.1[2]for abuse of discretion by the trial 

court. Where the record provides a sufficient basis to justify the 

order of coordination, no abuse of discretion exists. Richardson 

Brands, Inc., 405 Pa. Super. at 208, 592 A.2d at 81.

Wohlson/Crow v. Pettinato Associated Contractors & Eng’rs, 666 A.2d 

701, 703 (Pa. Super. 1995).

We derive the factual history from our review of the certified record, 

and is as follows:

Prior to the institution of this action, Scott filed a medical malpractice 

action in Bucks County against the instant defendants alleging her severe 

birth defects were caused by the negligence of the defendants. However, 

Lower Bucks Hospital was in bankruptcy. Procedurally, this would force the 

negligence action to be stayed unless Scott agreed to proceed solely against 

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1 Defendants/Appellees, Lower Bucks Hospital, et al, did not file a brief in 

this matter. However, they did file a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot.

2 The trial court did not provide procedural authority for the basis of its sua 

sponte order. We rely upon the standards set forth for Pa.R.C.P. Rule 213.1 

because that is the rule governing transfer of cases for purpose of 

coordination.
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available insurance coverage. Although claiming the possibility of damages 

in excess of $100,000,000, Scott agreed to proceed solely against the limits 

of insurance coverage. Subsequently, Scott filed the instant action in 

Philadelphia County, claiming Lower Bucks Hospital had fraudulently induced 

her to proceed against non-existent insurance limits. 

On April 15, 2014, Lower Bucks Hospital filed a joinder complaint 

against Scott’s counsel in both the medical negligence (Bucks County) and 

fraud (Philadelphia County) cases. This joinder complaint alleged legal 

malpractice against opposing counsel. Various preliminary objections and 

amended joinder complaints followed, the specifics of which are immaterial 

herein, except to note venue of the Philadelphia fraud action was never 

contested. Next, on or about April 30, 2014, Scott sent her first set of 

requests for admissions to Lower Bucks Hospital. Lower Bucks Hospital 

responded on or about May 29, 2014. Scott then filed a motion to strike 

those responses. Lower Bucks Hospital filed its response to the motion on or 

about July 3, 2014. Neither the requests for admissions nor any of the 

answers addressed the issue of venue. Nonetheless, on August 27, 2014, 

the trial court issued its order regarding the motion to strike the responses 

to the requests for admissions. The order contains no directive regarding 

the request for admissions or the responses thereto. Rather, the trial court, 

sua sponte, ordered the Philadelphia fraud/legal negligence matter 

transferred to Bucks County for coordination with the medical negligence 

case. Scott filed this timely appeal. 
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On August 24, 2014, three days prior to the order transferring venue, 

the medical negligence claim went to trial. That trial lasted until September 

24, 2014 when the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants. Post-trial 

motions have been filed in that matter, and pending resolution of those 

issues, an appeal to this Court could follow.

As noted above, the trial court provided no procedural basis to support 

the sua sponte transfer of this matter from Philadelphia County to Bucks 

County. However, the trial court did cite Pennsylvania Manufacturers’

Association Ins. Co.[PMAIC] v. The Pennsylvania State University, 63 

A.3d 792 (Pa. Super. 2013) in support of its actions. PMAIC relied upon 

Pa.R.C.P. 213.1 as the procedural foundation enabling the court to transfer 

the case. In relevant part, Rule 213.1 states:

Rule 213.1. Coordination of Actions in Different Counties.

(a) In actions pending in different counties which involve a 

common question of law or fact or which arise from the same 

transaction or occurrence, any party, with notice to all other 

parties, may file a motion requesting the court in which a 

complaint was first filed to order coordination of the actions. 

Any party may file an answer to the motion and the court may 

hold a hearing.

Pa.R.C.P. 213.1(a).

While Rule 213.1 does provide the procedural basis to transfer cases 

for purposes of coordination, it does not provide the ability of the trial court 
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to do so on its own volition.3 The rule requires a party to formally request 

the transfer by filing a motion and then serving notice of the motion to all 

other parties. By acting unilaterally, the trial court ignored the requirements 

that a party request the transfer and that all parties be given both notice 

and the opportunity to respond. We have found no case law addressing this 

situation, addressing the sua sponte transfer of a case to another jurisdiction 

pursuant to Rule 213.1. Nonetheless, we have no hesitation in determining 

that the plain language of the Rule does not grant the trial court the power

to act in such a manner. 

We agree with Scott that this determination is bolstered by Horn v. 

Erie Insurance Exchange, 540 A.2d 584 (Pa. Super. 1988), that 

determined the trial court did not have inherent power to sua sponte

transfer a matter to another jurisdiction pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d), 

regarding forum non conveniens. In finding the trial court could not act 

unilaterally, a panel of our Court noted that transfer pursuant to Rule 

1006(d) required a petition be filed by any party. Accordingly, the trial court 

abused its discretion “by sua sponte transferring venue to another forum 

which, for reasons perceived by the transferring court, could more 

conveniently decide the case.” Id. at 586. Similarly, Rule 213.1 requires 

transfer to be initiated by a party and it follows that the Rule does not 

____________________________________________

3 Compare Pa.R.C.P. 213, which allows the court to sua sponte consolidate 

or coordinate actions that originated within in the same county.
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sanction sua sponte action based upon reasons perceived solely by the trial 

court.

Finally, we note that generally, the law “vests great weight in the 

plaintiff’s initial choice of forum.” Wilson v. Levine, 963 A.2d 479, 487 

(Pa. Super. 2008). If we were to sanction the unilateral transfer of a case to 

another forum, we would be improperly ignoring that directive. Accordingly, 

the transfer of this matter from Philadelphia to Bucks County must be 

reversed.

Based on the foregoing, we need not address Scott’s other claim that 

the trial court erred substantively in transferring the case. Additionally, 

because the matter was transferred without generating a record on the 

factors to be considered, see Pa.R.C.P. 213.1(c), we would have no basis 

upon which to rule.

Finally, based upon the fact that it prevailed in the underlying medical 

negligence action, Lower Bucks Hospital has moved this Court to dismiss the 

appeal as moot. It has been asserted that there are pending post-trial 

motions and a potential appeal. Accordingly, the medical negligence action 

has not concluded. Because there is still a chance Scott can prevail in the 

medical negligence action, the issue of transfer is not moot. 

Based on the foregoing, Lower Bucks Hospital’s motion to quash 

appeal as moot is denied, and the August 27, 2014 order transferring this 

matter to Bucks County is reversed and remanded to the Court of Common 
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Pleas of Philadelphia County for action consistent with this decision. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/30/2015