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No. 95-3780

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United States of America, *

 * Appeal from the United States

 Appellee, * District Court from the

 * District of Minnesota

 v. *

 *

Thomas Dale French, *

 *

Appellant. *

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Submitted: May 14, 1996

 Filed: July 19, 1996

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Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, MAGILL, Circuit Judge, and

VAN SICKLE, Senior District Judge*

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VAN SICKLE, District Judge

I. BACKGROUND

 Thomas Dale French in the late 1970's expanded from his

farming operation into a grain hauling business, and from that into

a grain buying business. As a grain buyer, he was required by the

Minnesota Grain Buyers Act to be licensed and bonded. He was first

licensed about July 1, 1983.

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* The HONORABLE BRUCE M. VAN SICKLE, Senior United States

District Judge for the District of North Dakota, sitting by

designation.
2

 By 1989, French was unable to pay his license fee and

operated for a time without a license. He managed to renew his

license through June 30, 1990. However, he continued to operate

after July 1, 1990 without a license. He continued to represent to

his customers, and in his advertising, that he was licensed. He

often represented to his customers that he had sold the grain for

a higher price than he actually received, and delayed, or

completely failed to remit for sales to his customers. Among other

things, French picked up grain and sold it without permission of an

owner, and also altered weigh tickets to hide the actual place of

sale of the grain.

 French also converted grain which was pledged to the Commodity

Credit Corporation (CCC). In one instance a farmer, Oleen, had

been using French as his grain buyer for about ten years, and using

the CCC as his financier during that time. In July, Mr. Oleen

agreed to sell soybeans to French at $5.72 a bushel. He told

French the beans were under a CCC loan, and, as usual, to pay off

the loan and remit the balance to him. Oleen then called the local

Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS), which

administered the CCC program, and received permission to sell the

soybeans to French. The ASCS confirmed this permission in writing

to Oleen, reminding him to, as usual, inform French of his

obligation to remit directly to the CCC. The ASCS also sent to

Oleen and French, by mail, copies of the marketing authorization.

French received his copy, sold the soybeans and mailed Oleen a

written copy of the transaction with the name of the buyer cut from

the sales slip. And French, in writing, asserted that the loan,

$8,687.51.00, had gone "to CCC." Two months later ASCS advised

Oleen his loan had not been paid. Oleen demanded that French remit

the loan to CCC and the balance to him. French wrote out a check

to CCC which Oleen delivered to ASCS only to have it bounce.

French declared bankruptcy December 14, 1990.

 French was indicted in April, 1995 and charged with seven
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counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and one

count of agriculture conversion in violation of 15 U.S.C. §
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714m(c) - The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.

French was sent to prison and restitution was ordered in the amount

of $50,000.00 to be divided among the farmers who lost in excess of

$238,000.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Acquittal

 French claims that the district court erred in denying a

motion for judgment of acquittal on Count I in that there was

insufficient evidence that French caused the use of the mails for

the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud. In reviewing a

motion for a judgment of acquittal the court examines the evidence

in the light most favorable to the government, and gives the

government the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn

from the evidence. United States v. Freitag, 768 F.2d 240, 242

(8th Cir. 1985). To uphold the conviction, the government must

have produced sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find the

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. A similar

standard of review applies in challenges to the sufficiency of the

evidence, United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 226 (8th Cir.

1995), and the conviction will be upheld unless no reasonable fact

finder could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

 In the case of Oleen, for example, French well knew that if he

sold the grain, Oleen his customer, would need to receive, in the

mail, a form authorizing the sale of the mortgaged grain. French

also knew that it would be his duty to remit the amount owed to the

CCC. Both of these transactions were handled by mail. Both

parties knew and understood that this cross mailing was a basic

element in the grain buying and selling transaction. The order

denying the motion for acquittal on count one is affirmed.

B. Defendant's Proposed Instruction
5

 Appellant asserts that the district court erred in refusing to

give the defendant's proposed instruction as to the elements of
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mail fraud. The key language in the instruction which the

defendant protests is the phrase "that the mails were used in

furtherance of some essential step in the scheme." The defendant

feels that the language should have been "that the mails were used

for the purpose of executing the scheme." The statute involved is

18 U.S.C. § 1341. It contains the language "for the purpose of."

Appellant claims that the language "in furtherance of" reduces the

burden of proof imposed upon the prosecution by the statute. The

court had used the Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instruction which

adopts the language "in furtherance of." The entire instruction was

taken verbatim from the Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instructions and

reads as follows:

In order to sustain its burden of proof for the crime of mail

fraud as charged in counts 1-7 of the indictment, the

government must prove the following four essential elements

beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: The defendant voluntarily and intentionally devised or

made up a scheme to defraud farmers of money or property by

means of false representations, or promises as set forth in

the indictment;

Second: The defendant did so with the intent to defraud;

Third: It was reasonably foreseeable that the mails

would be used; and

Fourth: The mails were used in furtherance of some essential

step in the scheme.

Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instructions, 6.18.1341 (1996).

In Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), the mail fraud

statute is discussed in some depth. The Supreme Court pointed out

that it is not necessary to show that the petitioners actually

mailed or transported anything themselves; it is sufficient if they

caused it to be done. Id. at 8. Further, it is not necessary that

the schemes contemplate the use of the mails as an essential

element. Where one does an act with the knowledge that the use of
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the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where

such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually
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intended, then he "causes" the mail to be used. Id. at 8-9. Given

the established interpretation of the statute, the use of the

phrase "in furtherance of," as contrasted to the use of the phrase

"for the purpose of," is easily seen as the preferred choice of

language, and the district court's use of the Eighth Circuit

instruction is not an abuse of discretion.

C. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

 Finally, the Appellant asserts that the district court erred

by denying French's motion for mistrial because the prosecutor

stated during closing argument that "I think it is fair for you to

conclude that he [the defendant] was lying to you."

 It does not appear that the prosecutor engaged in any

misconduct. However, even if this statement could be considered

misconduct, this court would still affirm the denial of the motion

for mistrial. If prosecutorial misconduct allegedly has occurred,

a reviewing court looks into its prejudicial impact by assessing

the cumulative effect of the misconduct, determining if the court

took any curative actions, and gauging the strength of the evidence

against the defendant in the context of the entire trial. United

States v. O'Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1428 (8th Cir. 1987) , cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 1011 (1989). This court applies the harmless

error rule, Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) , and will only reverse "if the

improper remarks could reasonably have affected the jury's

verdict." Id. at 1429. See United States v. Peyro, 786 F.2d 826,

831-32 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that while prosecutor engaged in

unprofessional conduct, reversal was not required since the jury

was not affected by the improper comment made during closing

argument).

 While the prosecutor may have, indirectly, been expressing his

own opinion, he was primarily leaving to the jury the question of

the defendant's credibility. The Eighth Circuit has denied a

reversal of a conviction when a prosecutor has used stronger and
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more personal language. Peyro, 786 F.2d at 831-32 (finding that no
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reversal was required though prosecutor had made statements such as

"The man is an obvious liar."). Furthermore, the district court,

during his delivery of the final instructions, cautioned the jury

to disregard the prosecutor's statement. The evidence against the

defendant on all the counts of mail fraud was quite strong.

Therefore, the prosecutor's statement did not affect the verdict,

and the conviction must stand.

The defendant's conviction is affirmed.

A true copy.

 Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT