alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2020287EN.01003201.xml

| 31.8.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 287/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.8.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 287/32

---

Judgment of the General Court of 25 June 2020 — Off-White v EUIPO (OFF-WHITE)

(Case T-133/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU figurative mark OFF-WHITE - Partial rejection of the application for registration - Absolute grounds for refusal - Descriptive character - No distinctive character - Name of a colour - Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2020/C 287/50)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Off-White LLC (Springfield, Illinois, United States) (represented by: M. Decker, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Crawcour, J. Crespo Carrillo and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 December 2018 (Case R-580/2018-2), concerning an application for registration of the figurative sign OFF-WHITE as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 14 December 2018 (Case R-580/2018-2), in so far as it refused registration as an EU trade mark of the figurative sign OFF-WHITE in respect of the goods in Classes 9 and 20 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and for ‘watches; wall clocks; horological and chronometric instruments; watch bands; watch cases; presentation boxes for watches; jewelry cases’ and ‘precious stones, semi-precious stones’ in Class 14; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 14 December 2018 (Case R-580/2018-2), in so far as it refused registration as an EU trade mark of the figurative sign OFF-WHITE in respect of the goods in Classes 9 and 20 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and for ‘watches; wall clocks; horological and chronometric instruments; watch bands; watch cases; presentation boxes for watches; jewelry cases’ and ‘precious stones, semi-precious stones’ in Class 14;

| 2. | Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Off-White LLC, including the expenses necessarily incurred for the purpose of the appeal proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Off-White LLC, including the expenses necessarily incurred for the purpose of the appeal proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

---

(1)  OJ C 139, 15.4.2019.

---
# C_2019406EN.01001801.xml

| 2.12.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 406/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.12.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 406/18

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 25 September 2019 — Admiral Sportwetten GmbH and Others

(Case C-711/19)

(2019/C 406/25)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Admiral Sportwetten GmbH, Novomatic AG, AKO Gastronomiebetriebs GmbH

Defendant: Magistrat der Stadt Wien

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 1 of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the provisions of the Vienna Betting Terminal Duty Law which provide for taxation of the operation of betting terminals are to be assessed as ‘technical regulations’ within the meaning of that provision? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Article 1 of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the provisions of the Vienna Betting Terminal Duty Law which provide for taxation of the operation of betting terminals are to be assessed as ‘technical regulations’ within the meaning of that provision?

| 2. | Does the failure to notify the provisions of the Vienna Betting Terminal Duty Law within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 mean that a duty such as the betting terminal duty may not be levied? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Does the failure to notify the provisions of the Vienna Betting Terminal Duty Law within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 mean that a duty such as the betting terminal duty may not be levied?

---

(1)  OJ 2015, L 241, p. 1.

---
FILED

September 25, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

ANTONIO SWEATT, )

)

Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9805-CC-00132

)

 vs. ) LAKE COUNTY

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) No. 98-7778

)

Respondent. )

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the state to affirm the

judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. 

This case represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for

writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated rape in

1990 and received an effective 25 year sentence. No appeal was taken. In his present

petition, the petitioner claims that he was induced to plead guilty by a misrepresentation

of the extent of his sentence and that his sentence has expired. Specifically, the

petitioner claims he was informed that he would be released from prison after serving

30% of his effective sentence because he was sentenced as a Range I offender.

Habeas corpus relief is available in Tennessee only when “it

appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the

proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered” that a

convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to

sentence a defendant, or that a defendant’s sentence of

imprisonment or other restraint has expired.

Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). Since the challenge to the guilty

plea in this case would necessarily involve investigation beyond the face of the

judgment or record, the trial court properly denied habeas corpus relief. See id.

Moreover, the judgment clearly reflects that the petitioner received an effective 25 year

sentence in 1990; this sentence has not expired. The petitioner is eligible for parole

after serving 30% of his sentence; parole, however, is not guaranteed.
2

In his brief on appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court should

have treated the petition as one for post-conviction relief. See T.C.A. § 40-30-205(c). 

This contention is without merit. A petition for post-conviction relief must be filed with

the court in which the conviction occurred. T.C.A. § 40-30-204(a). Judgment in this

case was rendered in Davidson County, however, this petition was filed in Lake County. 

 Furthermore, judgment in this case became final on December 13, 1990, and this

petition was filed on March 26, 1998. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for filing a

petition for post-conviction relief had expired. T.C.A. § 40-30-202(a). The petitioner’s

claim that the statute did not begin to run until he was denied release on parole is

without merit. See Cox v. State, No. 02C01-9508-CR-00221 (Tenn. Crim. App., May,

30, 1997).

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that the

state’s motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance

with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

_________________________

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE

_________________________

 PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE

_________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 38 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. CON. RES. 38

Providing for a conditional adjournment or recess of the Senate and an 
              adjournment of the House of Representatives.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 29, 2012

   Mr. Reid (for himself and Mr. McConnell) submitted the following 
       concurrent resolution; which was considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
Providing for a conditional adjournment or recess of the Senate and an 
              adjournment of the House of Representatives.

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That when the Senate recesses or adjourns on any day from Thursday, 
March 29, 2012, through Sunday, April 1, 2012, on a motion offered 
pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its Majority Leader or his 
designee, it stand recessed or adjourned until 12:00 noon on Monday, 
April 16, 2012, or such other time on that day as may be specified by 
its Majority Leader or his designee in the motion to recess or adjourn, 
or until the time of any reassembly pursuant to section 2 of this 
concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first; and that when the House 
adjourns on any legislative day through Friday, April 13, 2012, on a 
motion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its Majority 
Leader or his designee, it stand adjourned until 2 p.m. on Monday, 
April 16, 2012, or until the time of any reassembly pursuant to section 
2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first.
    Sec. 2.  The Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House, or their respective designees, acting jointly after consultation 
with the Minority Leader of the Senate and the Minority Leader of the 
House, shall notify the Members of the Senate and House, respectively, 
to reassemble at such place and time as they may designate if, in their 
opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of John Dell’Orfano, Appellant, v State of New York Board of Parole, Respondent.

—Judgment unanimously affirmed *(see, Matter of Vuksanaj v Hammock,*93 AD2d 958; *Matter of Lynch v New York State Div. of Parole,*
      *102182 AD2d 1012). (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Cayuga County, Contiguglia, J.—art 78.) Present—Denman, J. P., Boomer, Green, O’Donnell and Schnepp, JJ.
#### Taft J. PERRY, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM, UAB Undergraduate Admission, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11-12668

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 5, 2011.

Taft J. Perry, Jr., Birmingham, AL, pro se.

Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Taft J. Perry, Jr. appeals *pro se*from the district court’s *sua sponte*dismissal of his amended complaint for want of prosecution. On appeal, Perry does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his suit, but instead argues the merits of his complaint that he was denied admission to the undergraduate program at the University of Alabama at Birmingham because defendants improperly calculated some of the grades he received at a prior university.

We may affirm a decision of the district court on any ground supported by the record. *Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty.,*480 F.3d 1072, 1088 n. 21 (11th Cir.2007). *Pro se*pleadings are construed liberally. *Hughes v. Lott,*350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.2003). Issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned. *Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.,*385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.2004).

A court shall dismiss a case proceeding *in forma pauperis*“at any time if the court determines that ... the action ... fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” as well as “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1)-(2).

Perry has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of his amended complaint by failing to raise that issue in his appellate brief. Moreover, the district court did not err in dismissing Perry’s complaint because Perry did not assert any federal constitutional or statutory violation in his complaint.

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

                            SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION



I, Steven A. Schmidt, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Renaissance Learning, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent function):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.



Date:  August 11, 2003
       ---------------

                            /s/ Steven A. Schmidt
                            ----------------------------------------------------
                            Steven A. Schmidt
                            Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 138 (Thursday, July 22, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 38739]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-15631]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-4583-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2021-0001]


Maryland; Amendment No. 1 to Notice of a Major Disaster 
Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Maryland (FEMA-4583-DR), dated February 4, 2021, and 
related determinations.

DATES: This change occurred on June 1, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dean Webster, Office of Response and 
Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW, 
Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2833.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the 
Administrator, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, Timothy S. 
Pheil, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer 
for this disaster.
    This action terminates the appointment of E. Craig Levy, Sr., as 
Federal Coordinating Officer for this disaster.

    The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers 
(CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, 
Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis 
Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster 
Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance 
Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and 
Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, 
Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance--Disaster Housing 
Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially 
Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households--Other 
Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants--Public Assistance (Presidentially 
Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.


Deanne Criswell,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[FR Doc. 2021-15631 Filed 7-21-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
#### Mark Alan LANE, Appellant v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Appellee.

No. 11-5175.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Dec. 19, 2011.

Mark Alan Lane, Lompoc, CA, pro se.

Warden, United States Penitentiary, Lompoc, CA, R. Craig Lawrence, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Washington, DC, for Ap-pellee.

BEFORE: GARLAND, BROWN, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

*JUDGMENT*

PER CURIAM.

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief filed by the appellant. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C.Cir. Rule 34(j). It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order filed July 8, 2011, 2011 WL 2669203, be affirmed. The Bureau of Prisons has exempted its inmate records systems from the Privacy Act’s accuracy and amendment provisions. *See Martinez v. Bureau of Prisons,*444 F.3d 620, 624 (D.C.Cir.2006) (per curiam); *White v. United States Probation Office,*148 F.3d 1124, 1125 (D.C.Cir.1998) (per curiam).

*579Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to -withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.
# C_2020222EN.01002401.xml

| 6.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 222/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 222/24

---

Order of the General Court of 13 March 2020 — Aurora v CPVO — SESVanderhave (M 02205)

(Case T-278/19) (1)

(Action for annulment - Plant varieties - Nullity proceedings - Sugar beet variety M 02205 - Decision to remit the case to the competent body of the CPVO for further action - Article 72 of Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 - No interest in bringing proceedings - Power to alter decisions - Action in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

(2020/C 222/26)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Aurora Srl (Padua, Italy) (represented by: L.B. Buchman, lawyer)

Defendant: Community Plant Variety Office (represented by: M. Ekvad, F. Mattina, M. Garcia Monco-Fuente and A. Weitz, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of the CPVO, intervener before the General Court: SESVanderhave NV (Tienen, Belgium) (represented by: P. de Jong, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Board of Appeal of the CPVO of 27 February 2019 (Case A 10/2013 RENV), concerning nullity proceedings between Aurora and SESVanderhave.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | Aurora Srl, the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) and SESVanderhave NV shall bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Aurora Srl, the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) and SESVanderhave NV shall bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 213, 24.6.2019.

---
# C_2022148EN.01002301.xml

| 4.4.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.4.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/23

---

Judgment of the General Court of 9 February 2022 — Sped-Pro v Commission

(Case T-791/19) (1)

(Competition - Abuse of dominant position - Rail freight transport services market - Decision rejecting a complaint - Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 - Reasonable time - EU interest in pursuing examination of a complaint - Determination of the authority best placed to examine a complaint - Criteria - Manifest error of assessment - Systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning respect for the rule of law - Risk of infringement of a complainant’s rights if a complaint is rejected - Obligation to state reasons)

(2022/C 148/30)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: Sped-Pro S.A. (Warsaw, Poland) (represented by: M. Kozak, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: J. Szczodrowski, L. Wildpanner and P. van Nuffel, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendant: Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna, acting as Agent)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision C(2019) 6099 final of 12 August 2019 (Case AT.40459 — Rail freight forwarding in Poland — PKP Cargo), rejecting the complaint lodged by the applicant concerning alleged infringements of Article 102 TFEU on the rail freight transport services market in Poland.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls Commission Decision C(2019) 6099 final of 12 August 2019 (Case AT.40459 — Rail freight forwarding in Poland — PKP Cargo); |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls Commission Decision C(2019) 6099 final of 12 August 2019 (Case AT.40459 — Rail freight forwarding in Poland — PKP Cargo);

| 2. | Orders the Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Sped-Pro S.A; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Sped-Pro S.A;

| 3. | Orders the Republic of Poland to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Republic of Poland to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 27, 27.1.2020.

---