alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1370 

CA 13-01053 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

JAY W. HANES, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROBERT N. NARRACCI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

JOSEPH D. CALDWELL, NEW HARTFORD, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

THE GOLDEN LAW FIRM, UTICA (LAWRENCE W. GOLDEN OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Herkimer County (Erin

P. Gall, J.), entered December 31, 2012 in a personal injury action. 

The order denied the motion of defendant for summary judgment

dismissing the complaint. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for

injuries he allegedly sustained when he slipped and fell down the

exterior stairway of a building owned by defendant. Supreme Court

properly denied defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing

the complaint. Defendant submitted evidence that, during the winter

months, a gap between the roof and the gutter caused icicles to form

and drip onto the stairway, resulting in the formation of black ice

thereon. We reject defendant’s contention that he was entitled to

judgment as a matter of law based upon plaintiff’s testimony at his

deposition that he was “guessing it was black ice” that caused his

fall (see Godfrey v Town of Hurley, 68 AD3d 1527, 1527-1528; Belles v

United Church of Warsaw, 66 AD3d 1470, 1471). Although plaintiff

testified that he did not see or otherwise sense that there was black

ice on the stairway before he fell, we conclude that defendant’s own

submissions raised a triable issue of fact with respect to proximate

cause (see Belles, 66 AD3d at 1471). Contrary to his further

contention, defendant failed to establish as a matter of law the merit

of his alternative theory that the accident was caused by snow tracked

onto the stairway in the treads of plaintiff’s boots (see Higgins v

Pope, 37 AD3d 1086, 1087). Inasmuch as defendant failed to meet his

burden on the motion, there is no need to consider the sufficiency of

plaintiff’s opposing papers (see Gafter v Buffalo Med. Group, P.C., 85

AD3d 1605, 1606). 

 Entered: January 3, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
Exhibit 99.1

THANKSGIVING COFFEE COMPANY, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report ofThanksgiving Coffee Company, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, the undersigned Chief ExecutiveOfficer of the Company hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|      (i)  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                               |                                                                                                                                                 |
|      (ii) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |

 

|   | /s/ PAUL KATZEFF            |
|--------|-----------------------------|
|   |                             |
|   | **Chief Executive Officer** |
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                           9,891
<SECURITIES>                                   553,832
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,061
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               641,885
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           19,377
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   641,885
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                76,024
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  168,907
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (92,883)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

DA 21-0165 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

IOLA MAERRIEA JOHNSTON, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

L L:113 

MAY 1 0 2022 

Bowen Greenwood 

Cie. , of Supreme Court 

rlf 11firIntana 

ORDER 

Counsel for Appellant Iola Maerriea Johnston fi led a motion and brief asking to be 

allowed to withdraw from this appeal on grounds that counsel has been unable to find any 

nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal, pursuant to § 46-8-103(2), MCA, and Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). Johnston responded to counsel's brief 

and objected to counsel's motion. 

The Court has now independently examinecl the record pursuant to § 46-8-103(2), 

MCA, and Anders. We have considered the arguments raised by counsel and by Johnston 

in her response. We conclude no arguments with potential legal merit can be raised in 

Johnston's case. 

Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that this appeal is DISM1SS'FD. 

The Clerk is directed to provide copies of thi., > )rder to all counsel of record and to 

Johnston personally. kin.,

DATED this ) 6 day of May, 2022. 

Chief Justice *

05/10/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0165
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Salvatore Ricotta, Appellant.

—Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Rohl, J.), rendered May 30, 1984, convicting him of arson in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

Defendant was accused of acting in concert with one Curtis *683Craig to start a fire in a building occupied by defendant and his family. Craig, who testified at the trial, maintained that because defendant had admittedly started a previous fire at his former residence he needed an alibi and thus solicited Craig’s assistance. Evidence of this previous fire was properly admitted into evidence with appropriate limiting instructions to establish defendant’s motive in soliciting an accomplice *(see, People v Schwartzman,*24 NY2d 241, 246, *cert denied*396 US 846; *People v Connally,*105 AD2d 797, 797-798; *People v Vincek,*75 AD2d 412, 415).

In addition, such evidence was admissible because it was inextricably interwoven into the transaction forming the basis of the charge *(see, People v Vails,*43 NY2d 364; *People v Gantz,*104 AD2d 692) and completed the narrative of the episode *(see, People v Gines,*36 NY2d 932).

We have examined defendant’s remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Lazer, J. P., Mangano, Brown and Kooper, JJ., concur.
# C_2021452EN.01002301.xml

| 8.11.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 452/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.11.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 452/23

---

Judgment of the General Court of 15 September 2021 — Albéa Services v EUIPO — dm-drogerie markt (ALBÉA)

(Case T-852/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - International registration designating the European Union - Figurative mark ALBÉA - Earlier international registration designating the European Union - Word mark Balea - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Distinctiveness of the earlier international registration designating the European Union - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2021/C 452/23)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Albéa Services (Gennevilliers, France) (represented by: J.-H. de Mitry, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: dm-drogerie markt GmbH & Co. KG (Karlsruhe, Germany) (represented by: O. Bludovsky, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 September 2019 (Case R 1480/2019-2), relating to opposition proceedings between dm-drogerie markt and Albéa Services.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 23 September 2019 (Case R 1480/2019-2) to the extent that it annulled the decision of the Opposition Division, except in so far as it annulled the decision of the Opposition Division as regards ‘cosmetics’ in Class 3; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 23 September 2019 (Case R 1480/2019-2) to the extent that it annulled the decision of the Opposition Division, except in so far as it annulled the decision of the Opposition Division as regards ‘cosmetics’ in Class 3;

| 2. | Dismisses the remainder of the action; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the remainder of the action;

| 3. | Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Albéa Services; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Albéa Services;

| 4. | Orders dm-drogerie markt GmbH & Co. KG to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Orders dm-drogerie markt GmbH & Co. KG to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 68, 2.3.2020.

---
#### Jason BOWEN, Petitioner-Appellant v. Constance REESE, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 08-60022

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 5, 2009.

Jason Bowen, Yazoo City, MS, pro se.

*60Before HIGGIBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jason Bowen, federal prisoner # 09907-031, appeals the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. Bowen alleged that he was subjected to and engaged in sexual activity with Tennessee prison officials and that drugs were planted in his cubicle. Bowen asserted that as a result of these incidents, he was confined in a special housing unit and subsequently was transferred to a prison in Mississippi. Bowen contends that because he is asserting that he is incarcerated in the wrong prison, § 2241 is the proper vehicle for his claims.

Because a favorable determination would not automatically entitle Bowen to accelerated release from custody, his claims do not arise under § 2241. *See Carson v. Johnson,*112 F.3d 818, 820-21 (5th Cir.1997). Claims that have no relation to a prisoner’s ultimate date of release from custody are not grounds for habeas relief. *Malehi v. Thaler,*211 F.3d 953, 958-59 (5th Cir.2000). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in '5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

DAVID R. CARRUTHERS and JEAN E. CARRUTHERS

, Appellant s

,

v.

TOWER HILL PRIME INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellee.

No. 4D 22

- 3415

[ September 7, 2023 ]

Appeal of a non

- final order from the C ircuit Court for the Seven teenth

Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Barbara Anne McCarthy

, Judge; L.T.

Case No. CACE15018429

.

Richard M. Benrubi of Benrubi Law, Boca Raton, and Bard D.

Rockenbach of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, for

appellant s

.

Robert Alden Swift of Swift Legal Group, P.A., Orlando, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

W ARNER

, G ERBER and K UNTZ

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

204 CAF 16-00027
PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF JUSTIN E. KIEFFER, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DELEMA DEFRAIN, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, ESQS., SYRACUSE (ELIZABETH deV. MOELLER OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

CONBOY, MCKAY, BACHMAN & KENDALL, LLP, WATERTOWN (MATTHEW J. PORTER OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.

RUTHANNE G. SANCHEZ, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, WATERTOWN.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Jefferson County (Diana D. Trahan, R.), entered August 24, 2015 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6. The order, inter alia, granted joint custody of the subject child to the parties, with primary physical residence to petitioner.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by vacating the tenth ordering paragraph and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, modified a prior order entered on stipulation of the parties by awarding petitioner father primary physical residence of the parties’ child. Contrary to the mother’s contention, we conclude that Family Court properly determined that the father met his burden of establishing a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant an inquiry into whether a change of custody is in the best interests of the child ( see Matter of Murphy v Wells , 103 AD3d 1092, 1093, lv denied 21 NY3d 854; Matter of Markey v Bederian , 274 AD2d 816, 817-818; Matter of Brewer v Whitney , 245 AD2d 842, 843). Contrary to the mother’s further contention, there is a sound and substantial basis in the record for the court’s determination that it is in the child’s best interests to award the father primary physical residence of the child and to award visitation with the mother ( see Matter of Tuttle v Tuttle , 137 AD3d 1725, 1726; see generally Eschbach v Eschbach , 56 NY2d 167, 171-174). In addition, we reject the mother’s contention that she was denied effective assistance of counsel ( see Matter of Nicholson v Nicholson , 140 AD3d 1689, 1690, lv denied 28-2- 204 CAF 16-00027

NY3d 903; Matter of Brown v Gandy , 125 AD3d 1389, 1390).

We agree with the mother, however, that the court erred in sua sponte ordering that the father shall have the right to relocate the residence of the child anywhere in the continental United States with 30 days’ notice to the mother inasmuch as that relief was not requested by the parties or the Attorney for the Child ( see Matter of Irons v Schneller , 258 AD2d 652, 653; see generally Matter of Majuk v Carbone , 129 AD3d 1485, 1485-1486). We therefore modify the order accordingly.

Entered: February 10, 2017 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
##### 



Exhibit 14.10 Consent of Independent Accountants To the Board of Directors of
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce S.A. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form F-3 (File
Nos. 333-110867; 333-10867-01) of CVRD and Vale Overseas of our report dated January
16th, 2004 on the financial statements of Companhia Coreano-Brasileira de Pelotização 
KOBRASCO, which appear in the Annual Report on Form 20-F of CVRD and Vale Overseas for the year
ended December 31st, 2004. /s/ Deloitte Touche TohmatsuDELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU
 May 30, 2005
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 9 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        S.J.Res.9

                      One Hundred Twelfth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

         Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
            the fifth day of January, two thousand and eleven

                            Joint Resolution

 
 Providing for the reappointment of Robert P. Kogod as a citizen regent 
         of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That, in accordance with 
section 5581 of the Revised Statutes (20 U.S.C. 43), the vacancy on the 
Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, in the class other 
than Members of Congress, occurring by reason of the expiration of the 
term of Robert P. Kogod of the District of Columbia, is filled by 
reappointment of the incumbent for a term of 6 years, effective May 6, 
2011.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
#### Martha Coello, Appellant, v Graciano Gonzalez, Respondent.

[945 NYS2d 575]

— In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.), dated May 9, 2011, which denied her motion for summary judgment on the complaint.

Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, with costs.

“It is the obligation of the appellant to assemble a proper record on appeal” *(Gaffney v Gaffney,*29 AD3d 857, 857 [2006]; *see Civil v Tae Hwa Sim,*65 AD3d 1074 [2009]; *Fernald v Vinci,*13 AD3d 333 [2004]). An appellant’s record on appeal must contain all of the relevant papers that were before the Supreme Court *(see*CPLR 5526; *Cohen v Wallace & Minchenberg,*39 AD3d 689 [2007]; *Gaffney v Gaffney,*29 AD3d 857 [2006]; *Fernald v Vinci,*13 AD3d 333 [2004]).

Here, the record is inadequate. The appellant failed to include all of the relevant documents that were before the Supreme Court, omitting, inter alia, the papers submitted by the defendant to the Supreme Court in opposition to her motion for summary judgment on the complaint. These omissions have rendered meaningful appellate review of the Supreme Court’s *708order virtually impossible *(see*CPLR 5526; *Cohen v Wallace & Minchenberg,*39 AD3d 689 [2007]; *Gaffney v Gaffney,*29 AD3d 857 [2006]; *Fernald v Vinci,*13 AD3d 333 [2004]). Accordingly, dismissal of the appeal is the appropriate disposition *(see Matter of Butti v Butti,*92 AD3d 781 [2012]; *Clarke v Clarke,*90 AD3d 690 [2011]; *CitiMortgage, Inc. v Thorpe,*87 AD3d 1048 [2011]; *Cohen v Wallace & Minchenberg,*39 AD 3d at 690). Florio, J.P., Balkin, Chambers and Cohen, JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 14.9 Consent of Independent Accountants To the Board of Directors of
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce S.A. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form F-3 (File
Nos. 333-110867; 333-10867-01) of CVRD and Vale Overseas of our report dated January
15th, 2004 on the financial statements of Companhia Ítalo-Brasileira de Pelotização 
ITABRASCO, which appear in the Annual Report on Form 20-F of CVRD and Vale Overseas for the year
ended December 31st, 2004. /s/ Deloitte Touche TohmatsuDELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU
 May 30th, 2005
Exhibit 10.6



 Exhibit 10.6 
 Summary translation of Lease Agreement 
 Party A: Beijing De-haier
Technology Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred as “Party A”) 
 Party B: Beijing Dehaier Medical Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred
as “Party B”) 
 On September 23, 2008, Party A and Party B have achieved mutual agreements on the following items: 

Party A agrees to lease its land and buildings at 45 Yong An Road, Science Park, Changping District Beijing (102200) to Party B for free. The lease
period is from September 24th, 2008 to September 24th, 2010. Part B will be responsible for and pay all the fees of water, power, etc. 
 Party A agrees to renew the above agreement with Party B for another 2 years to September 24, 2012 on expiration of this lease on terms mutually acceptable to the parties.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

SCOTT LEVINE

,

Appellant

,

v. Case No. 5D 15

- 3130

BONNIE STIMMEL

,

Appellee

.

________________________________/

Opinion filed October 14, 2016

A ppeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County

, Donald A. Myers, Jr. , Judge.

Christopher V. Carlyle, and John N. Bogdanoff, of the Carlyle Appellate Law
Firm, The Villages, for Appellant.

Alexander S. Douglas, II, and Robert Clayton Roesch, of Shuffield

, Lowman & Wilson, P.A, Orlando, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We have carefully considered the arguments raised by the parties and the record

before the court

. We commend the trial court for preparing a thorough

, thoughtful final

judgment that includes a detailed review of the evidence, findings of fact, discussion of

witness credibility, and conclusions of law. The trial court’s findings are supported by2

competent substantial evidence

, and we find no legal error. Accordingly, we affirm the

final judgment

.

AF FIRMED.

SAWAYA

, TORPY and EDWARDS , JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 14.3 CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS To the Board of Directors of
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in (i) the
Registration Statement on Form F-4 (File Nos. 333-109610; 333-109610-01) of
CVRD and Vale Overseas Limited (Vale Overseas); and (ii) the Registration
Statement on Form F-3 (File Nos. 333-110867; 333-10867-01) of CVRD and Vale
Overseas of our report dated January 17, 2003 on the consolidated financial
statements of ALBRAS  Alumínio Brasileiro S.A. which appears in the Annual
Report on Form 20-F of CVRD and Vale Overseas for the year ended December 31,
2003. June 4, 2004 /s/ Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
DISMISS and Opinion Filed January 20, 2021 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-20-00025-CV 

SHANNON RICE, Appellant 

V. 

PATRICIA WOOD, Appellee 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-03744-D 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia 

Opinion by Justice Garcia 

On January 12, 2021, appellant filed an unopposed motion to dismiss this 

interlocutory appeal. We grant the motion and dismiss this appeal. See TEX.R. APP.

P. 42.1(a)(1). 

200025F.P05 

 

/Dennise Garcia/ 

DENNISE GARCIA 

JUSTICE 
 –2– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

SHANNON RICE, Appellant 

No. 05-20-00025-CV V. 

PATRICIA WOOD, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the County Court at 

Law No. 4, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-03744-

D. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. 

Justices Schenck and Smith 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is 

DISMISSED. 

 It is ORDERED that, subject to any agreement of the parties, appellee 

Patricia Wood recover her costs of this appeal from appellant Shannon Rice. 

Judgment entered January 20, 2021.