alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
================================================================================

Exhibit 23

            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

      We have  issued  our  reports  dated  March  17,  2005,  accompanying  the
consolidated   financial   statements   and   management's   assessment  of  the
effectiveness  of internal control in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Oak Hill
Financial,  Inc. for the year ended  December 31, 2004. We hereby consent to the
incorporation by reference of said reports in the Registration Statements of Oak
Hill Financial,  Inc. on Forms S-8, File Nos. 333-116863,  333-45690,  333-81167
and 333-27481.


/s/ Grant Thornton LLP

Cincinnati, Ohio
March 24, 2005


                                       76
# C_2021357EN.01001801.xml

| 6.9.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 357/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.9.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 357/18

---

Judgment of the General Court of 14 July 2021 — AI v ECDC

(Case T-65/19) (1)

(Civil service - ECDC staff - Psychological harassment - Article 12a of the Staff Regulations - Request for assistance - Scope of the duty to provide assistance - Article 24 of the Staff Regulations - Resignation of the perpetrator of the behaviour complained of - Failure to open a disciplinary procedure - Article 86 of the Staff Regulations - Reply to a request for assistance - Action for annulment - Act adversely affecting an official - Infringement of the right to be heard - No statement of reasons - Denial of access to the investigation report and other documents - Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights - Liability)

(2021/C 357/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: AI (represented by: L. Levi and A. Champetier, lawyers)

Defendant: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (represented by: J. Mannheim and A. Iber, acting as Agents, and by D. Waelbroeck and A. Duron, lawyers)

Re:

Application under Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment of the decisions of ECDC of 18 May 2018, 20 June 2018 and 26 October 2018 taken in response to the applicant’s request for assistance on the ground of psychological harassment and his request for access to certain documents and, secondly, compensation for the damage which he suffered.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) of 18 May 2018 adopted in response to the request for assistance submitted by AI on 20 June 2017; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) of 18 May 2018 adopted in response to the request for assistance submitted by AI on 20 June 2017;

| 2. | Annuls the decision of the ECDC of 20 June 2018 in so far as it refused AI access to the non-confidential parts of the investigation report relating to his request for assistance of 20 June 2017 and of A’s email of 17 January 2018 that concern him; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Annuls the decision of the ECDC of 20 June 2018 in so far as it refused AI access to the non-confidential parts of the investigation report relating to his request for assistance of 20 June 2017 and of A’s email of 17 January 2018 that concern him;

| 3. | Annuls the ECDC decision of 26 October 2018 rejecting AI’s complaint of 2 July 2018; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Annuls the ECDC decision of 26 October 2018 rejecting AI’s complaint of 2 July 2018;

| 4. | Dismisses the claim for damages; |
| --- | --- |

4.

Dismisses the claim for damages;

| 5. | Orders ECDC to bear, in addition to its own costs, three-quarters of the costs incurred by AI; |
| --- | --- |

5.

Orders ECDC to bear, in addition to its own costs, three-quarters of the costs incurred by AI;

| 6. | Orders AI to bear one quarter of his own costs. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Orders AI to bear one quarter of his own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 131, 8.4.2019.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM RADNOR 
HOLDINGS CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
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<PP&E>                                         214,252  
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 287,548  
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           52,565  
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<COMMON>                                             1  
<OTHER-SE>                                      16,007  
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   287,548  
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<CGS>                                           49,152  
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   64,380  
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<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0  
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,021  
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,063)  
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</TABLE>
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED DAVONTE JAMES WOODSON

,

Petitioner

,

v. Case No. 5D 16

- 3560

STATE OF FLORIDA

,
Respondent

. ________________________________/

Opinion filed November 4, 2016

Petition for Belated Appeal A Case of Original Jurisdiction.

Benjamin Campbell Davis, Assistant Regional Counsel, Casselberry, for Petitioner.

No A ppearance for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed

with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the February 17, 2016

judgment and sentence in C ase N o. 2014

- CF

- 003632

- C

- O, in the Circuit Court in and

for Orange County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)( 6 )(D).

PETITION GRANTED

.

EVANDER, COHEN, LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
# C_2020103EN.01000702.xml

| 30.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 103/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 103/7

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 12 August 2019 — Flightright GmbH v IBERIA LAE SA Operadora Unipersonal

(Case C-606/19)

(2020/C 103/09)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Flightright GmbH

Defendant: IBERIA LAE SA Operadora Unipersonal

By order of 13 February 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Sixth Chamber) ruled that the second indent of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) must be interpreted as meaning that the ‘place of performance’, within the meaning of that provision, in respect of a flight consisting of a confirmed single booking for the entire journey and divided into several legs, can be the place of departure of the first leg of the journey where transport on those legs of the journey is performed by two separate air carriers and the claim for compensation brought on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, (2) arises from the cancellation of the final leg of the journey and is brought against the air carrier in charge of that last leg.

---

(1)  OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.

(2)  OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.

---
UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16
- 4512

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appellee ,

v. GERALD WAYNE TIMMS , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh

. Terrence W. Boyle , District Judge. ( 5:15

- cr - 00169

- BO

- 1 )

Submitted : April 20, 2017 Decided: April 24, 2017

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

. John Keating Wiles, CHESHIRE PARKER SCHNEIDER & BRYAN, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May

- Parker, First Assistant Unite d States Attorney, Donald R. Pender, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Gerald Wayne Timms appeals his conviction for possession of contrab and in prison, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791 (2012). Timms contends that his conviction was improper, because as a civil detainee under the Adam Walsh Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2012), he was not an “inmate” under the meaning of § 1791. Timms argues that “inmates” are held in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, while Adam Walsh detainees are in the custody of the Attorney General. We affirm. Section 1791 prohibits an “inmate of a prison” from possessing a prohibited object. 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2). Whi le “inmate” is not specifically defined, “prison” is defined as “ a Federal correctional, detention, or penal facility or any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with t he Attorney General. ” 18 U.S.C. § 1791(d)(4). Adam Walsh Act detainees are committed to the custody of the Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d). Thus, we find that Timms is an inmate under the meaning of § 1791. See 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(c) (including “d etainees” and other “persons held” in the definition of “inmate” in Bureau of Prisons regulation); see also United States v. Savage , 737 F.3d 304, 309 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that, “for purposes of § 4248, there is no substantive difference between vesting legal custody in the Attorney General and legal custody in the [Bureau of Prisons]”).3 Accordingly, we affirm Timms’ conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-40094 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOSÉ ANTONIO GARCIA MADRIGAL,
Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 1:00-CR-58-ALL

- - - - - - - - - - August 22, 2001 Before KING, Chief Judge, and POLITZ and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * José Antonio Garcia Madrigal appeals the 80-month sentence imposed following his plea of guilty to a charge of being found in the United States after deportation, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He contends that the felony conviction that resulted in his increased sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) was an element of the offense that should have been charged in the indictment. Madrigal acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998), but heNo. 01-40094 - 2 - seeks to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review in light of the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Madrigal’s plea agreement included a waiver of his right to “any appeal . . . of any error which may occur surrounding the substance, procedure, or form of the conviction and sentencing in this case.” We need not decide whether the issue is waived because Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres
. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 1214 (2001). Madrigal’s argument is foreclosed. AFFIRMED.
#### GRANT v. SMITH.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

March 8, 1898.)

Action by Charles S. Grant against Adam B. Smith.

No opinion. Motion to dismiss appeal granted.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK>0001030452
<NAME>MOLL INDUSTRIES, INC.

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<CGS>                                           81,511
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (20)
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,730
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (3,470)
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<EPS-BASIC>                                     (2.03)
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</TABLE>
EXHIBIT B
                                                                       ---------


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     I, Steve Bowen, Chief Financial Officer of Sonics & Materials, Inc. (the
"Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

           (1) the Amendment No.1 (on Form 10-KSB/A) to the Annual Report of the
           Company for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2002 as filed with the
           Securities and Exchange Commission on October October 18, 2002 (the
           "Amendment") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
           15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or
           78o(d)); and

           (2) the information contained in the Amendment fairly presents, in
           all material respects, the financial condition and results of
           operations of the Company.

Dated: October 18, 2002

                                          /s/ Steve Bowen
                                          --------------------------
                                          Steve Bowen
                                          Chief Financial Officer


This certification is made solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other
purpose.
# C_2020201EN.01000702.xml

| 15.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 201/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 201/7

---

Appeal brought on 20 December 2019 by Rubik's Brand Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24 October 2019 in Case T-601/17, Rubik's Brand Ltd v EUIPO — Simba Toys

(Case C-936/19 P)

(2020/C 201/11)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Rubik's Brand Ltd (represented by: K. Szamosi, M. Borbás, ügyvédek)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG

By order of 23 April 2020, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) decided that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.

---
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

              CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

     We have issued our report dated January 21, 1998 accompanying the
consolidated financial statements incorporated by reference in the Annual Report
of Patriot Bank Corp. and Subsidiaries on Form 10-K for the year ended December
31, 1999. We hereby consent to the incorporations by reference of said report in
the Registration Statements of Patriot Bank Corp. and Subsidiaries on Form S-8
(File No. 333-13981, effective October 11, 1996 and File No. 333-62123,
effective August 24, 1998).

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
March 27, 2000
#### BI YU ZHANG, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-2036-ag.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Jan. 16, 2009.

Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General, Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director, Scott Rempell, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

PRESENT: Hon. JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Hon. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, and Hon. REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.

*SUMMARY ORDER*

Petitioner Bi Yu Zhang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the March 26, 2008 order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. *In re Bi Yu Zhang,*No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 26, 2008). We assume the *700parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. *Azmond Ali v. Gonzales,*448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). We will construe petitioner’s *pro se*submission liberally and interpret it to raise the strongest argument that it suggests. *See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,*470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006).

Zhang does not dispute that her December 2007 motion to reopen was filed over two years after the BIA’s October 2005 decision. The BIA thus properly observed that her motion was untimely, unless she established that she was newly eligible for asylum based on changed circumstances arising in China. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii). We find no error in the BIA’s conclusion that Zhang’s decision to begin practicing Falun Gong was a change in her personal circumstances, not changed circumstances arising in China. *Cf. Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,*416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005). Although an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum solely on the basis of a likelihood of persecution on account of activities undertaken since arriving in the U.S., *see Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS,*445 F.3d 554, 570 (2d Cir.2006), because Zhang filed an untimely motion to reopen her proceedings to reapply for asylum, she was required to establish changed circumstances arising in China. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (ii).

Moreover, the BIA did not err in failing to consider whether there were changed circumstances in China regarding its treatment of Falun Gong practitioners where the evidence cited in Zhang’s motion was not submitted to the BIA. *See INS v. Abudu,*485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (providing that the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to provide material evidence); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Zhang did not explain why the documents she discussed were not attached to her motion, nor did she ask the BIA to take administrative notice of them. In light of the foregoing, the BIA’s denial of Zhang’s motion as untimely was not an abuse of discretion.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.