UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Case No. 04
- 00814 (RCL)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiffs Roger Hall (“Hall”) , Studies Solutions Results, Inc., and Accuracy in Media (“AIM”) filed this action against defendant Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA” or “Agency”) under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq ., seeking records concerning prisoners of war or soldiers missing in action from the Vietnam War era. B efore the
Court is the CIA’s motion for summary judgm ent and p laintiffs’ cross - motion for summary judgment, as well as p laintiffs ’ request for discovery and in camera review. Upon consideration of Judge Kennedy’s November 12, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and Order [137]; CIA’s Supplemental Response pursuant to the Court’s 2009 Memorandum Opinion and Order [148]; AIM [163] and Hall’s [166] responses to d efendant’s supplemental response to the Cour t’s 2009 Order; CIA’s r eply to p laintiffs’ responses to CIA ’s supplemental response [169]; CIA’s supplemental items 4 and 5 response to the C ourt’s November 12, 2009 Memorandum Opinion and O rder [177]; AIM’s Response to CIA ’s supplemental responses to the C ourt’ s memorandum Opinion and O rder [181]; Memorandum of points and authorities in support of p laintiffs’

ROGER HALL, et al. , Plaintiffs,

v. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Defendant .2 suppleme ntal memorandum regarding this C ourts November 12, 2009 Order and in opposition to defendant’s supplemental it ems 4 and 5 respons e to C ourt’s November 12, 2009 Order [182]; d efendant’ s r esponse in support of its May 15, 2012 , filing and in opposition to plaintiffs’ requests for discovery and in camera review [184]; the applicable law; and the entire record of this case; the Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the CIA’s M otion for summary judgment; GRANT IN PAR T and DENY IN PART plaintiffs’ Cross

- M otion for summary judgment , and DENY p laintiffs’ M otions for in camera review and discovery . The Court will explain its reasoning in the analysis below

. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 2 003, Hall made a FOIA request to the CIA on beh alf of himself and AIM, seeking assorted records pertaining to POW/MIAs from the V ietnam War era. Hall Compl. ¶ 6. Having received no substantive response, Hall and AIM f iled this action in May, 2004. Hall v.
CIA , 668 F. Supp. 2d 172 , 176 (D.D.C. 2009). The procedural history of this case, leading up to November 12, 2009, is told comprehensively in Judge Kennedy’s 2009 Order. Id . at 175

– 78. Though the 2009 Order narrowed the case issues , and though the CIA has since released “several thousand pages of records , ” many issues remain

. Hall’s Resp. [166] at 1

. Judge Kennedy’s 2009 Order held that the CIA must complete the following to be awarded summary judgment : (1) provide plaintiffs with all non

- exempt records created by the CIA which were provided to the Senate Select Committee, i d . at 179

– 80 ; (2) search for the approximately 1,700 names in the Item 5 request and turn over all non

- exempt documents, or explain why it cannot complete the search without addi tional biographical information, i d . at 180

– 81; (3) search its system for responsive documents relating to searches recently conducted for other federal agencies, as requested in Item 7, or explain t o the Court why it cannot do so, i d

.3 at 181 ; (4) take affirmative steps to ensure that its referrals and coordination documents are being processed by the other agencies, i d . at 182; (5) provide supplemental declaration s describing its search method s , including terms, databases, and other relevant information that will allow the Court to evaluate whether the search es were adequate, i d . at 184; (6) either search other divisions for the requested records, in relation to Item 6, or explain to the Court why those divisions are unlikely to have responsive documents , i d . at 186; (7 ) submit an adequate Vaughn index for the withholdings it disclosed in November 2005; i d . at 187, (8) show an exemption for the withheld documents claimed under exceptio n 1 that are under 25 years old, i d . at 188

– 89; (9) provide further detail to the C ourt regarding the documents withheld under exception 2, or provide t he documents to Hall, i d . at 190; (10) provide Hall with the seven 1 June 2004 documents claimed exempt by the CIA under deliberative process, or provide the C ourt with more details on the reasons for non

- disclosure, i d . at 192 ; (11) disclose records withheld pursuant to the attorney

client privileg e, or indicate why withholding i s proper as to each document for which it relies on the privilege; i d ., (12) disclose the information withheld under exception 6, or provide the C ourt with more detail on why the exception applies; i d . at 193; and (13) specify in detail which portions of the documents are disclosable and which are allegedly exempt in regard to the segregability of withhe ld documents, i d at 194. II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK Under FOIA, federal government agencies are required to release records to the public upon request. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). FOIA defines “record” as “any information that would be an agency record subject to the requirements of [FOIA] when maintained by an agency in any format, including an electronic format,” including information “that is maintained for an agency

1 The documents are numbers 1100665, 1100667, 1100668, 1100669, 1100670, 1100671, and 1479603. Hall , 668 F. Supp. 2d at 191 n.18, 19. The CIA was granted summary judgment on all other deliberative process claims. Id

. at 192.4 by an entity under Gover nment contract, for the purposes of records management.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2). A FOIA requester may appeal an agency’s failure to disclose requested records. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6). The requester may bring suit in federal court if the request for appeal is denied. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). A district court has jurisdiction to order the production of any records that have been improperly denied to the requester. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a )(4)(B). III. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In det ermining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trier of fact must view all facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non

- moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In order to defeat summary judgment, a factual dispute must be capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the case and be supported by sufficient admissible evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could find for the non

- moving party. A nderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247

– 48 (1986). An agency may be entitled to summary judgment in a FOIA case if it demonstrates that no material facts are in dispute, it has conducted an adequate search for responsive records, and each respo nsive record that it has located has either been produced to the plaintiff or is exempt from disclosure. See Weisberg v. DOJ , 705 F.2d 365, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1980). To meet its burden, a defendant may rely on reasonably detailed and non

- conclusory declarati ons. See McGehee v.
CIA , 697 F.2d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In a FOIA case, the court determines de novo whether an agency properly withheld information under a claimed exemption. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Dep’t of Air Force , 566 F.2d5 242, 251 (D.C. Ci r. 1977). “The underlying facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the [FOIA] requester,” Weisberg , 705 F.2d at 1350, and the exemptions must be narrowly construed. FBI v. Abramson , 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982). However, courts generally defer to age ncy expertise in national security matters. See, e.g., Taylor v. Dep’t of the Army , 684 F.2d 99, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (according “utmost deference” to classification affidavits); Krikorian v. Dep’t of
State , 984 F.2d 461, 464

– 65 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (acknowle dging “unique insights” of executive agencies responsible for national defense and foreign relations). While the agency must not withhold information in bad faith, Military Audit Project v. Casey , 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the affidavits submitt ed by the agency to demonstrate the adequacy of its response are presumed to be in good faith. Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA , 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
IV. ANALYSIS A . CIA’s Refusal to Respond to Certain Portions of Plaintiffs’ Requests
i

. Item 5 Hall’s Item 5 request 2 asked the CIA to provid e responsive documents on 1,711 names, each of whom is an alleged Vietnam War Era POW/MIA. Hall ’ s Resp. [166] at 4. The names come from “an official [Primary Next

- of

- Kin] list drawn up by the Department of Defense.” Id

. at 3. In the 2009 Order, Judge Kennedy held that the CIA must conduct the search for the 1,711 names and release the non

- exempt records to the plaintiffs, or explain to the court why the CIA would be unable to distinguish responsive records from the s earch. Hall , 668 F. Supp. 2d at 179

– 80

. The CIA did not originally identify legal authority for denying the Item 5 search

2 Hall seek s “[r]ecords relating to [forty

- four] individuals who allegedly are Vietnam era POW/MIAs, and whose next

- of

- kin have provided privacy waivers to Roger Hall . . . and those persons who are on the Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office’s list of persons wh ose primary next

- of

- kin (PNOK) have authorized the release of information concerning them.” February 2003 Letter at 2.6 request , Id . at 180 , but now claims that a search for all 1,711 names without additional id entifying information would be unduly burdensome . CIA ’s Reply [169] at 5

– 7. In 2010, the CIA agreed to search the CIA Automatic Declassification and Release Environment ( “ CADRE ” ) system for 31 3 of the 1,711 names, as the 31 names came with additional identifying information to aid in responsiveness determinations

. CIA ’s Supp. Resp. [148] at 13

– 15. Still at issue in regard to the Item 5 request is (1) whether the CIA must search for all 1,711 names provided by Hall; (2) in which systems the CIA must search for those names; and (3) whether the CIA properly redacted and withheld Item 5 documents under FOIA exemptions. Issues 1 and 2 are addressed here , while issue 3 will be addressed with the other exemption claims later in t his Opinion.
1 . Burdensomeness of the Search The CIA claims that its CADRE system and archived records are the two systems “most likely 4 ” to contain records responsive to p laintiffs’ Item 5 FOIA request. Cole Decl. ¶ 71. However, the CIA claims that searching the CADRE system for anything other than the 34 names that it has been given “identifying information” for would be an “unreasonable burden.” Id

. ¶ 75. The CIA also argues that searching its archived records for a ny names

– even those names for which it has been supplied additional identifying information

– would be unduly burdensome. Id

. ¶ 73. This Court disagrees, and therefore denies the CIA’s motion for summary judgment, and grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in regard to the Item 5 systems search.

3 Since the 2009 Order, Hall has provided additional information for three of the names

– Matthes, Fanning, and Scharf

– all of which the CI A has agreed to search the CADRE system for, though the CIA claims it does this absent a legal obligation. Supp. Culver Decl. ¶ 51. Plaintiffs refer to a “Mathes”, while the CIA refers to a “Matthes,” neither acknowledging a spelling error by the other s ide. Id ., Hall’s Mem o . of Pts and Auth. [182] at 3. Therefore, the Court is unsure which is the correct spelling. 4 The issue of the CIA searching only those systems “most likely” to contain Item 5 responsive documents will be addressed in section IV(B)( 4) of this Opinion.7 a . CADRE System Search
CADRE stores information processed for the CIA’s information release programs. Id . at 75. A search conducted in CADRE f or the 1,711 names provided by p laintiffs identified almost 140,000 potentially responsive documents. Id . The CIA claims it would be unduly burdensome to make responsiveness determinations based on “name alone,” and therefore only agreed to process the search results for 31 of the 1,71 1 names. 5 Id . The Court finds the CIA’s argument unpersuasive. First, as argued by p laintiffs, the CIA is not asked to determine responsiveness on name alone

– if the record is regarding an individual as a POW or MIA, it is responsive. AIM ’s Resp. [163] at 3. Therefore, the CIA’s argument that “it is extremely difficult or impossible to determine responsiveness based on name alone” carries little weight. Cole Decl. ¶ 69. Also, the CIA does not state that responsiveness would be impossible for all documents, just that it may be impossible to determine for some documents. That would mean that some responsive records, perhaps even a vast majority, could be determined to be responsive. The CIA offers no estimates of the percentage of documents for which responsiveness would be “impossible

. ”
Secon d, as p laintiffs mention, the CIA gives no estimate of how long it would take to review the 1 40,000 folders . Hall’s Resp. [166] at 7. The CIA has remained sile nt on the issue of estimating the man - hours involved, even after p laintiffs raised the issue . This Court will not find a search unduly burdensome on conclusory statements alone. Therefore, the CIA must search its CADRE system for all 1,711 names, and produce all resp onsive non

- exempt documents to
p laintiffs. b . Archived Records Search

5 Thirty

- one names included information such as birthdate and/or social security numbers. Hall later supplied additional information for 3 more names, which the CIA agreed to search for, bringing the total to 34.8 The CIA’s archived records are available only in hard copy and are searchable only by an electronic index. Cole Decl. ¶ 71

– 72. A search of this electronic index found that 16,423 hard

copy file folders in the archived records might contain responsive Item 5 records. Id . ¶ 73. The CIA argues that “[t]o continue the search and process the results for the 1,711 names in the CIA’s archived records would be unduly burdens ome.” Id

. However, t his Court cannot find sufficient justification from the CIA to preclude the search. The only support the CIA can conjure for its burdensome argument is that “CIA personnel would have to pull the relevant boxes, unseal the boxes, loca te the correct file folders identified by the electronic index, then manually review all of the documents in each folder merely to determine whether each archived d ocument would be responsive to p laintiffs’ request.” Id ¶ 74. Or to put it another way, so meone would have to grab a box, open it, grasp the identified file folder, and look at it. Despite the CIA ’ s detailed tutorial on how to get a file out of a box, again it fails to provide the Court with an estimate of how many man

- hours are necessary to f ulfill the search. 6 The Court will not find a search unduly burdensome simply because of the level of description shown and the number of steps used to describe looking into a box. Therefore, the Court denies summary judgment to the CIA in regard to the adequacy of its Item 5 search, and grants summary judgment to plaintiffs’ in regard to the Item 5 systems search.
2. Item 7 Plaintiffs’ Item 7 requested “[a]ll records on or pertaining to any search conducted regarding any other requests for records per taining to Vietnam War POW/MIAs, including any search for such records conducted in response to any request by any congressional committee or

6 In support of the se arch being unduly burdensome, the CIA cites a D

. C

. Circuit Court case, affirming that a search requiring a dozen people working full

- time for over a year to be unduly burdensome. CIA’s Reply [169] at 6 (citing Int’l Counsel Bureau v. Dep’t of Defense , 723 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2010)).The CIA has offered no such estimates here for the Court.9 executive branch agency.” Pl .s’ Compl. [1] at 4. The 2009 Order found that “based on the
pa r ties’ representations, the Court will treat item 7 as excluding records of searches performed in response to previous FOIA requests.” Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 181

. The Court stated that it could not grant summary judgment until the CIA performed the Item 7 sea rch or explained to the Court why such a search was not possible. Id

. The CIA searched its CADRE system for documents requested by other federal agencies that concerned POW/MIAs. Nelson Decl. ¶ 39. The CIA searched for “EB case type” files, as that was “the only part of the CADRE database likely to contain any information concerning search requests from other federal agencies . . . .” Id

. The search , which used numerous manifestations of POW and MIA terms, returned no responsive documents. Id . ¶ 40. Plaintiffs argue that the CIA “misinterpreted the Court’s Order,” in regard to Item 7, and that the search was inadequate because it did not search for records produced “in response to any request by any congressional committee” as was originally requested. AIM Response at 7

– 8. The CIA argues that this issue was raised by AIM for the first time in the April 18, 2011 response, and that AIM has thus w aived that issue. CIA ’s Reply [169] at 10. Thi s Court disagrees. There seems t o be some confusion as to what p la intiffs’ Item 7 request entails

. In the
p laintiffs’ FOIA request and Complaint , p laintiffs requested “All records on or pertaining to any search

. . . for records pertaining to Vietnam War POW/MIAs, including

. . . in response to any request by any congressional committee

. . . . ” AIM FO IA Request [114

- 1] at 2; p laintiffs’ Complaint [1] at 4 (emphasis added). But, t he Nelson Declaration states: “In Item 7, p laintiffs initially requested ‘ all records pertaining to any search ever conducted by the Agency, at any time and for any reason, for records concerning Vietnam War POW / MIAs. ’ ” Nelson Decl. ¶ 3510 (c iting Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 181 ). T his language differs from the complaint and original FOIA request language cited above , which also asked for the congressional committee requests. The CIA appears to have u sed the language from the 2009 Order

– which appears to misquote Hall’s 2003 letter request concerning Item 7

– to excuse them from the full extent of p laintiffs’ FOIA request. The CIA then argues the issue was brought up for the first time in AIM’s
response , even though it was in the FOIA request and the C omplaint

. T he CIA has made no claims that it is unable to conduct the search in question

. T herefore , summary judgment cannot be granted until it search es for a ll records on or pertaining to any search conducted regarding any congressional committee requests pertaining to Vietnam
War POW/MIAs , in all systems likely to contain responsive documents, and provide s p laintiffs with all non

- exempt records and photographs. Therefore, the CIA’s motion for summary judgment in regard to Item 7 is denied, and the p lain tiffs’ cross

- motion for summary judgment as to the Item 7 congressional committee request search is granted.
3. Referral /Coordination Documents Referral documents are documen ts “that originated from a third agency. ” Nelson Decl. at 13 n.9. When this is the case, “[t] he agency

. . . refers the document to the originating agency for a direct response to the requester.” Id

. Coordination documents involve CIA

- originated materials that contain “ information, the disclosure of which, would affect the interests or activities of another federal agency. ” Id

. When this is the case, “[t]he Agency

. . . contacts the third

- party agency in order to obtain guidance on whether to release or withhold the information ” and the CIA responds to the FOIA requestor directly.
A n agency “ must take responsibility for processing the [ FOIA] request” even if the documents originated elsewhere. McGeh ee , 697 F.2d at 1110 . Referrals are appropriate, but a11 referral system constitutes withholding “if its net effect is significantly to impair the requester’s ability to obtain the records or significantly to increase the amount of time he must wait to obtain them.” Id . The withholding is “‘ improper’ unless the agency can offer a reasonable explanation for its procedure.” Id

. a. Item 3 Plaintiffs requested the Item 3 records in February 2003. Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 182. “The CIA released the results of the search it conducted in response to that request in September
2007. ” Id

. The search found responsive documents “ that originated from a third agency” which were referred to “unnamed agencies” for review. At the time of the 2009 Order, p laintiffs had not yet receive d those documents. Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 182. T he Court held that “ the CIA is responsi bl e for responding to [the Item 3] request and that it must take affirmative steps to ensure that its referrals are being processed, which it should describe in its supplemental filing.” Id

. The CIA updated the Court on the referral process in its August 23, 2010 Supplemental Response. CIA ’ s Supp. Resp. [148] at 17

– 20. The CIA stated that Item 3 referral documents concerned 6 dif ferent agencies, and each agency was sent a Ma y 24, 2010 , registered letter requesting that the originating agencies process the ref erral documents and respond to p laintiffs as soon as possible. Id

. at 18

– 19

. The CIA followed up with those agencies in June and July of
2010 , and as of August 2 3, 2010, the CIA claimed that “[p] laintiffs have received final responses from all six originating agencies to which the CIA sent referral documents. ” Id

. Plaintiffs have not disputed that all Item 3 referral documents have been received, so the Court finds that , here, the CIA has met its burden

. The CIA also had 13 coordination documents responsive to Item 3 , concerning 11 agencies. Id

. “[O]n August 3, 2010, two coordinat ion documents were released to p laintiffs in12 full and eleven were [released in part].” Id

. The withheld information invoked exemptions 1, 3, and 6, with supporting declarations from the coordinating agencies. Id . at 20. The appropriateness of the exemption claims will be discussed in the ex emption portion of this
O pinion, but it is found here that the Agency fulfilled its burden as to the coordination of these documents, and therefore, the CIA is granted summary judgmen t in regard to the following coordination documents. b. Item 4 Of the 1,452 Item 4 responsive documents, the CIA claims that 167 contained information that required coordination with other agencie s. Culver Supp. Decl. ¶ 7

. Of the 167 coordination documents, two have been released in whole, and 165 released in part. Id

. The CIA released the Item 4 coordination documents to p laintiffs by letter on November 30, 2011. Id

. Again, the appropriateness of the exemption claims here will be discussed in the exemption portion of this Opinion, but it is found here that the Agency fulfilled its burden as to the coordination of these documents

. c. Item 5 The CIA states that on January 21, 2011, nineteen Item 5 CIA

- originated documents were
sent to appropriate agencies 7 , while non

- CIA

- originated documents were r eferred for direct response to p laintiffs. Cole Supp. Decl. ¶ 5

. The CIA released the nineteen Item 5 coordination documents , in part , to p laintiffs by lett er on November 30, 2011. Culver Supp. Decl. ¶ 7. The appropriateness of the exemption claims here will be discussed in the exemption portion of this opinion.

7 These agencies are the Defense Intelligence Agency (“DIA”), the National Security Council (“NSC”), National Security Agency (“NSA”), Department of Defense (“DOD” ), and Department of State (“DOS”).” Cole Supp. Decl. ¶ 5.13 Of the Item 5 referral docu ments, 48 originated with DOD, three with NSA, and 20 with
DIA. Id

. ¶ 54. The CIA sent each agency a notice of the referral documents on January 21, 2011. Id . “In September 2011, the CIA followed up with the Do D and NSA about the Item 5 referral documents

. ” Id

. On September 27, 2011, the NSA stated that it hoped to have review complete by the end of the month. Id

. ¶ 55. On November 29, 2011, DOD stated that it anticipated finalizing the DOD and DIA documents “within the next 20

– 30 days.” Id

. Hall and AIM appear
to have received these d ocuments because they have not stated otherwise , the refore the Court assumes they have received these Item 5 referral documents. H owever , there is still a remaining Item 5 referral issue. The CIA conducted a supplemental Item 5 search for “Capt. Peter Richard Ma thes,” finding seven responsive docume nts, all originat ing with other agencies. Culver Supp. Decl. ¶ 52. On September 21, 2011, “the CIA sent the originating agencies a notice of the referral documents that need to be process ed

. ” Id . Hall claims he has still not heard anything from these “unnamed agencies.” Hall’s Mem. and Pts and Auth. [182] at 4. The CIA responds that “[i]f these agencies have failed t o provide a timely response to plaintiff, it is up to p laintiffs to take whatever action they deem appropriate directly with those agencies.” CIA ’s Resp. [184] at 5

– 6. The CIA goes on to state that it “has fulfilled its obligation and has no power or control over the actions of another federal agency.” Id

. at 6. Here, the CIA’s response is not only baffling, but the failure to produce the documents amount s to a n improper withholding. The CIA apparently chooses to ignore Judge Kennedy’s 2009 O rder, where it was made clear that an agency “ ‘ must take responsibility for processing the [FOIA] request’ even if the documents originated elsewhere.” Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 182 ( citing McGehee , 697 F.2d at
1110 )

. For the CIA to then tell this Court that “[i]f these agencies have failed t o provide a timely14 response to plaintiff, it is up to p laintiffs to take whatever action they deem appropriate directly with those agencies , ” may explain why this case has limped along for so many years

. CIA ’s Resp. [184] at 5

– 6. Judge Kennedy’s Order even cited a case where an agency that took 11 months to produce referral documents was found to have “ignored its responsibilities under
FOIA.” Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 182 (quoting Keys v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec ., 570 F. Supp

. 2d 59, 70 (D.D.C. 2008) )

. It has been over 10 months since the CIA sent the referral letter, and the CIA has offered no evidence that it has followed up with the “unnamed agencies” in regard to the referral documents. Because the CIA is responsible for responsive records, even when those records originated with other agencies, t his Court holds that the CIA must take immediate affirmative steps to be sure that each referral is being processed, which it shall describe in its supplemental filing. B. The A dequacy of the CIA’s Search Review of the adequacy of an agency’s search for records responsive to a FOIA request is based on “principles of reasonableness.” Weisberg , 745 F.2d at 1485. An agency is required “to make a good faith effort to conduct a sea rch for the requested records, using methods which can reasonably be expected to produce the information requested.” Int’l Trade Overseas, Inc. v. Agency for Int’l Dev. , 688 F. Supp. 33, 36 (D.D.C 1988) (quoting Marrera v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice , 622 F. Supp. 51, 54 (D.D.C 1985)). The Court may rely on “[a] reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched.” Valencia

Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard , 180 F.3d 321, 326 (D.C. Cir 1999) (quoting Oglesby , 920 F.2d at
68 ). An agency is not required to search all of its records systems if searches of particular15 systems “are unlikely to produce any marginal r eturn.” Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Oglesby , 920 F.2d at 68).
1

. Item 3
Pl aintiff’s Item 3 seeks records prepared by and/or assembled by the CIA between January 1, 1960 and December 31, 2002, relating to t he status of any United States POWs or MIAs in Laos, including but not limited to any reports, memoranda, letters, notes or other documents prepared by Mr. Horgan or any other officer, agent or employee of the CIA for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Preside nt, or any federal agency. February 7, 2003 Letter [5

- 1] at 2. The CIA provided responsive Item 3 documents on September 28, 2007 , 8 but Judge Kennedy held that the CIA did not provide enough information on the search to gra nt summary judgment, stating that “[t]he CIA must provide a supplemental declaration describing its search method, including search terms, databases searched, and other relevant information that will allow the Court to evaluate whether the Agency’s search was adequate. ” Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 184

. National Clandestine Files ( “ NCS ” ) were not searched, because “all NCS records likely to be responsive to p laintiffs’ FOIA request would be located in CIA operational files . . .

. ” Nelson Decl. at 4 n. 6. The CIA filed the Nelson Declaration in August 2010 , which detailed who conducted the Item 3 search, the databases searched, and the search terms used. Id

. ¶ 5

– 26.
P laintiffs’ argue that the Item 3 search was inadequate because the CIA only searched those systems “most likely” to contain resp onsive documents. Hall’s Resp. [166] at 4 n . 2. This C ourt disagrees. Plaintiffs are correct that an adequate FOIA search involves searching all record systems “likely to produce responsive documents.” Oglesby 920 F.2d at 68. Plaintiffs also correctly observe that the CIA states that the Item 3 search o f the DIR offices was do n e in the system s

8 CIA’s Supp. Resp. [148] at 22

– 28.16 “ most likely” to contain responsive records. Nelson Decl. ¶ 9 (emphasis added)

. A search of the systems “most likely” to contain responsive documents does not satisfy FOIA, because systems that are not the “most likely” to contain documents may still be likely to c ontain responsive documents. However, the CIA also states that the offices that were searched 9 “ were the only offices within the DIR likely to contain information responsive to Item 3 of Plaintiffs’ request.” Id . This statement meet s the test, and it does not contradict the previous assertion. Searching all systems lik ely to contain responsive documents would also be a search of the systems “most likely” to contain responsive documents. Because the CIA submitted declarations explaining in reasonable detail the scope and method of the agency’s search , 10 and explained in adequate detail that all systems likely to contain responsive records were searched, this Court finds the CIA ’s
I tem 3 search to be adequate. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment to the CIA in regard to the adequacy of its Item 3 search, and denie s summary judgment to plaintiffs.
2 . Item 4 In the 2009 Order, the Court held that the CIA must turn over all copies of non

- exempt CIA created records included with the Senate Select Committee documents on POW/MIA Affairs that were withdrawn from the Na tional Archives. Hall , 668 F. Supp. 2d at 179

– 80 . The Agency has since stated that it possesses 1,452 CIA

- originated documents responsive to the
p laintiff’s Item 4 request. CIA ’s Supp. Resp. [148] at 2. On Aug ust 20, 2010, the CIA provided
p laintiffs with 44 of the documents in full, 970 in part, and 271 were withheld in full. Id

. Documents were withheld under FOIA exceptions 1, 3, and 6. Id . 3

– 12. The agency also found

9 The Nelson Declaration states that the CIA searched the Directors Action Center, National Intelligence Counsel, Office of the Inspector General, Office of Gene ral Counsel, and the Office of Congres sional Affairs. Nelson Decl. ¶ 9. 10 Judge Kennedy’s Order asked for information about the search, specifically asking that the CIA explain “whether it used both ‘prisoner of war’ and ‘prisoners of War’ as search terms.” Hall , 668 F. Supp. 2d at 184 n . 9. The Order also asked whether t he search was case sensitive. Id . The CIA has stated that searches would have “captured records responsive to singular and plural versions of these search terms.” Nelson Decl. ¶ 10. The CIA also stated that the searches were not case sensitive. Id

.17 that 167 documents contained information that affected thir d

- party federal agencies, and that the CIA was working with those agencies to determine what releases would be appropriate. Id . at 2

– 3. Hall claims that the CIA improperly redacted and withheld Item 4 documents, Hall ’s Resp. [166] at 19

– 26 , that the Item 4 search was inadequate because subsequent searches were not conducted using terms found in released Item 4 documents, i d

. at 8

– 16 , 11 that referral do cuments have not been provided, i d

. at 16

– 17 , and that not all It em 4 documents were identified, i d

. at 19

. The adequacy of identification claims of Item 4 documents will be discussed here, while the exemption claims , use of additional search terms, and referral documents , will be discussed below in those relevant sections. Hall argues that, though the CIA identified 1,472 documents responsive to Item 4 , “1,766 documents had been forwarded to the Library of Congress and 574 documents had been denied in their entirety. ” Hall’s Resp. [166] at 19. Hall cites a November 9, 1993 , letter from CIA Director R. James Woolsey to the President for this information. Id

. The CIA counters this by stating that the letter refers to a document review effort “pursuant to Executive Order 12812, an effort entirely distinct from the CIA’s review of the” Item 4 document s, thus making it “irrelevant of Plaintiffs’ FOIA request.” CIA’s Reply [169] at 4. The Court finds the CIA’s explanation credible, and p laintiffs have not responded to the CIA’ s argumen t

. Therefore , the
Court holds that the CIA has properly identifie d all relevant Item 4 documents and grants summary judgment to the CIA in regard to th e adequacy of its Item 4 search, and denies summary judgment to plaintiffs.
3 . Item 5

11 Hall does not specify that he is referring to Item 4 documents here, but just as the CIA states in its reply, the Court also “presumes that these [inadequate search] references relate to Item 4

. . . .” CIA’s Reply [169] at 2 n. 1. This is because of Ha ll’s reference to the CIA’s recent release of thousands of pages of records, and the CIA produced the vast majority of Item 4 records in August 2010. Id

.18 For a search to be adequate, an agency must search all record systems “likely to produce responsive documents.” Oglesby 920 F.2d at 68. The CIA states that “[i]n conducting a search for records on 1,711 individuals to be responsive to Item 5, the Agency’ s Information Review Officers determined that there are two records systems most likely to contain information responsive to Plaintiffs’ Item 5 FOIA request: the CIA’s archived records . . . and the electronic CIA Automatic Declassification and Release Env ironment (a.k.a. CADRE).” Cole Decl. ¶ 71. (emphasis added). Again, only s earching the databases “most likely” to contain responsive documents does not satisfy FOIA, as it may preclude record systems that are less likely than others to contain responsiv e documents, yet may still likely contain them. The CIA argues in a reply that in regard to Item 5 it “did not limit its search to exclude any additional databases likely to contain res ponsive information.” CIA ’s Reply [169] at 9

– 10

. The CIA also states that it “made a good

- faith effort to search all records systems reasonably expected to produce the information requested.” Id . at 10. However, these statements were lacking from the agency

- supplied declarations. “To show reasonableness at the summary j udgment phase, an agency must set forth sufficient information in its affidavits for a court to determine if the search was adequate.” Nation Magazine, Washington Bureau v. United States
Customs Service , 71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Because the CIA ’s affidavits stated that the CIA searched the systems “most likely” to contain responsive documents, the Court concludes that the CIA has only searched systems “most likely” to contain responsive documents, and did not search all systems “likely to produc e responsive documents.” Therefore, the Court denies the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in respect to Item 5, grants summary judgment to plaintiffs, and holds that the CIA must search for all 1,711 names in all systems that are likely to produce responsive documents.19 4 . Item 6 Plaintiffs’ Item 6 requests “records pertaining to searches the CIA performed in response to Hall’s 1994 and 1998 FOIA requests as well as to fee assessments connected to th ose searches. ” Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 185

. The CIA had searched only one record s ystem for documents, which p laintiffs challenge d as inadequate. Id

. at 185

– 86 , AIM ’s Resp. [163] at 8. Judge Kennedy held that the Court was unable to grant summary judgment on Item 6 because the Koch Dec laration did not state whether other systems were also likely to contain responsive documents. Id . at 186

. This Court finds that the CIA ’s Item 6 search sa tisfies FOIA . The Agency provided this Court with a detailed affidavit concerning t he Item 6 search. Nelson Decl. ¶ 32

– 34. The Agency searched for the documents using Hall’s name and case numbers, searched all systems likely to contain responsive records, named the supervisor of the search, and provided the C ourt with an explanation as to why other systems would only contain duplicate responsive records. Id

. ¶ 34. AIM states that the CIA’s Item 6 search remains inadequate, but puts forth no evidence or supporting legal argument. AIM ’s Resp. [163] at 8

– 9. Because the CIA’s search methods could reasonably be expected to produce the information requested , and because p laintiffs offer no evidence or legal argument to suggest otherwise, the CIA’s item 6 search is found to be adequate . Thus, in regard to the item 6 search, the CIA is granted summary judgment, and summary judgment is denied to plaintiffs. 5 . Item 8 Plaintiffs’ Item 8 requests “[a]ll records of whatever nature pertaining to the estimates of fees made in response to the February 7, 2003 Freedom of Information Act request of Mr. Roger Hall and Studies Solutions Research, Inc., and how each estimate was made.” AIM ’s FOIA20 request [114

- 1] at 2. AIM, again, claims that the Item 8 sea rch was inadequate, without offering evidence or a legal argument. AIM ’s Resp. [163] at 8

– 9. Judge Kennedy previously ruled that
p laintiffs had conceded the adequacy of the Item 8 search, and entered judgment in favor the CIA as to the adequacy of the search for item 8 records, rendering AIM’s argument against the adequacy of the Item 8 search moot. Hall , 668 F. Supp. 2d at 186

. 6 . Use of A dditional Search T erms Hall claims that the CIA’s search for responsive documents has been inadequate because “obvious search terms” were not used

. Hall ’s Resp. [166] at 9. Hall wants a further search of CIA records using search terms or activities found in previously released doc uments from this action. Id

. at 8

– 14. Hall argues that the use of additional search words “could help pinpoint the location of records that are very much at the center of Hall’s quest for responsive records.” Id . at 9. The CIA argues that “ a gencies are generally not obligated to ‘look beyond the four corners of the request for leads to the locati on of responsive documents.’” CIA’s Resp. [169] at 2 (citing Kowalczyk v. Dep't of Justice , 73 F. 3d 386, 389 (D.C. Cir . 1996) )

. The standard for an adequ ate search is whether it was “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1351 . The question is whether the search itself was adequate, notwithstanding whether other responsive documents may exist. Steinberg v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Hall argues that the CIA search is inadequate because it does not employ the terms
“LPW 12 ,” “Walking Kilo 13
, ” “Walking K,” “circle search 14 ,” and “ stay behind status 15
, ” all of which were terms found in documents released through this litigation. Hall’s Resp. [166] at 9

–

12 Hall states that “’LPW’ appears to stand for ‘Lao tian Prisoner of War.’” Hall’s Resp. [166] at 9. 13 Hall claims that “Walking K” and “Walking Kilo” are terms that “refer to a symbol used to signal the presence of POWs.” Id . at 9. 14 “Circle Search” is a term found in document C00479111. Id

. 15 “Stay behind status” is a term found in document C00493325. Id at 10.21 10

. However, Hall only cites to a single released document containing each new search term. Id

. Hall also fails to explain why these specific terms are necessary to uncover re sponsive documents, simply stating in regard to “LPW” : “ [t]his is a significant search term which the CIA did not employ. ” Id . at 9. With “several thousand pages of records” 16 released by the CIA , a showing that each newly suggested search term existed in a single document is not enough to
f ind the CIA’s search inadequate without further explanation as to why these terms in particular would uncover responsive documents that the previous search did not. Because this Court finds that the original CIA search terms were ‘reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents , ” a further search with these new terms in not required under FOIA.
7 . Missing Documents Hall claims that the CIA’s search for responsive documents has been inadequate because released records reference other documents

– or activities that may have created additional documents

– that have not been released or otherwise identified. Hall’s Resp. [166] at 8

. Hall cites records that reference specific attachments that are missing , 17 records that detail activity that Hall claims would have created documents not produced , 18 and documents that “indicate [] the intention to create addi t io nal documents . . .” which were not produced

. 19 Failure to locate specific documents does not render the agency’s search inadequate or demonstrate that the search was conducted in bad faith. See Twist v. Gonzales , 171 F. Appx. 855, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The inquiry is “w hether the search was reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents, not whether it actually uncovered every document extant.” SafeCard , 926 F.2d at 1201. Courts measure reasonableness by examining the method of the

16 Id . at 1. 17 Hall’s Resp. [166] at 10. 18 Id . at 12. 19 Id . at 11.22 search, not by determining whether additional responsive documents might potentially exist. Cleary, Gottleib, Steen & Hamilton v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. , 844 F.Supp. 770, 777 n.4 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing Meeropol v. Meese , 790 F. 2d 942, 952

– 53 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Here,

som e of Hall’s arguments about additional responsive documents are valid, while others lack the support necessary to move beyond pure speculation. a. Missing Records, Photographs , and Attachments Specifically M entioned in Released Documents Where specific records, photographs, or attachments are referenced in CIA documents , it is no longer “mere speculation” that the files exist. H ere , the CIA has provided p laintiffs with documents that reference other specific responsive records that have not been produced

. Hall’s Resp. [166] at 10

– 14. The CIA argues that plaintiffs “must provide support for the proposition that [the records] are maintained in the agency’s database or that agency controls them.” CIA’s Resp. [184] at 3, citing Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd ., No. 03

– 00024, 2006
WL 826070 , at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2006)

. T he fact that the CIA maintained and controlled the documents that reference the other documents , many of them attachments, provides support for the proposition that the CIA maintains and controls those missing records

. T he refore, the CIA
must show that it has conducted a reasonable good

- faith search for the missing attachments, enclosures, photographs, and reports mentioned in documents C00482286, C00465737, C00482286, C00492378, C00492397, C00492546, C00478688, C0 0492526, C00471978, C00478651, C00492461, C00492546, C00472096 and C00483710, and provide plaintif fs with all non

- exempt records. For the search to be adequate, the CIA must provid e a declaration that shows the C ourt that such a reasonable good

- faith search was attempted to locate the se missing records. Though the CIA’s search will not be found inadequate if it is unable to find these attachments , it cannot23 demonstrate beyond mate rial doubt that its search was “ reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents ” until those missing responsive documents are searched for. b. Records Detailing Events that May Have Produced Additional Records That Are Missing Hall also argues that records detail ing activity that may have created additional documents were not produced , 20 and documents that “indicat e[] the intention to create additional documents . . .” were not produced

. 21 For example, document C00482214 refers to the need to “positively confirm[] the existence of POWs with [redacted], a list of names, and the exact location.” Hall argues “[t]his indicates the intention to create additional documents regarding these requirements. Hall’s Resp. [166] at 11. Here, Hall’s argument fails because the e xistence of the “missing” records is too speculative.
T he information provided in these documents

– concerning activities that may produce additional documents or the intention to create additional documents

– does not rise above

“ speculation ” as to the exist ence of additional records. There is no indication that any of these record s were actually created, only that there may have be e n an intention at one point to create documents that would have been responsive to p laintiffs’ request. Therefore, the CIA is not required to conduct additional search es concerning records C00465439 , C00472095, C00482214, C00493228, C00479111, C00479111, C00493325, C00478741, and C00480204

. C. E xemption Claims 1. Exemption 1 Judge Kennedy’s 2009 Order found that t he CIA met its burden on the e xemption 1 claims for records less than 25 years old, but found that the CIA must further justify the withholding of exemption 1 records that were more than 25 years old. Hall , 668 F. Supp. 2d at

20 Hall’s Resp. [166] at 12. 21 Id

. at 11.24 189. Since the O rder, the CIA has claimed additional withholdings under exemption 1 , in regard
to responsive documents released after that Order. Plaintiffs argue that exemption 1 withholdings by the CIA, DOD, and NSA are improper. Hall’s Memo. of Pts. and Auth. [182]
at 18. Exemption 1 protects matters that are: “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Ex ecutive order.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Pursuant to Executive Order 13526 , 22 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009),
i nformation may be classified only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) an original classification authority is classifying the information; (2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government; (3) the information falls within one of more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and (4) the original classific ation authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is a ble to identify or describe the damage.

Id

. § 1.1(a)

. The phrase “damage to the national security” means “harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States from the unauthorized disclosure of information, taking into consideration su ch aspects of the information as the sensitivity, value, utility, and provenance of that informat ion.” Id

. § 6. 1(l ). Information may be classified either at the “top secret,” “secret,” or “confidential” level, I d. § 1.2(a), and such classified information must fall within one of the following categories:

22 Hall cites Executive Order 13256. He appears to have transposed the “2” and the “5”, as this executive order concerns “President’s Board of Advisors on Historically Black Colleges and Universities.” 67 Fed. Reg. 6823 (Feb. 12, 2002).25 (a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations; (b) foreign government information; (c) intelligence activities (including covert action ), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology; (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources; (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the nati onal security ; (f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear mater ials or facilities; (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services re lating to the national security ; or (h) the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction. Id. § 1.4

. The agency bears the burden of establishing that documents are properly classified as secret and thus clearly exempt from disclosure. Founding Church of Scientology of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. Bell , 603 F.2d 945, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4)(B)). However, in national security cases, “little proof or explanation is required beyond a plausible assertion that information is properly classified.” Morley , 508 F.3d at 1124. For the reasons discussed below, the Court holds that the CIA has met its burden for all exemption 1 withholdings

. The CIA argues that it is the original classification authority, Cole Decl. ¶¶ 15, 57

– 60, that the withheld information is g overnment information, Id . ¶¶ 16, 57, that it falls within § 1.4, Id . ¶¶ 17, 57

– 60, a nd that the release of the information could be reasonably expected to damage the national security. Id . ¶¶ 58. The CIA claims the national security concerns exist because the documents could reveal confidential sources and expose CIA intelligence methods. Id . ¶ 59, ¶ 22

– 31. Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he documents released to Hall do not contain the required classification markings of this or any predecessor Executive orders.” Hall’s Resp. [166] at 28. Plaintiffs state that that there is only a “stamp which gives a crossed

- out classification level, but there is no indication of who had the authority to place the stamp or when it was put on the26 document.” Id . Therefore, plaintiffs argue that the CIA m ust either restore any classification markings or the Court should find that the exemption 1 claims fail. Id

. at 30. However, the CIA adequately explains the lack of classification markings on the documents

– the documents in their redacted form are not cl assified

– therefore the markings required by § 1.6(a) “are inapplicable to the documents released to Plaintiffs.” CIA’s Reply [169] at 16. Plaintiffs do not offer a counter to this argument, therefore the Court finds that the records are properly classifi ed. Plaintiffs also argue that the exemption 1 claims should fail because Cole’s Declaration statements may be “based on information provided by others.” Id . at 31. This argument fails, because a declarant in a FOIA case satisfies the personal knowledge requirement if he or she

“ attest [ s ] to the personal knowledge of the procedures used in handling [a FOIA] request and his familiarity with the documents in question. ” Madison Mech., Inc. v. Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., No. 99

– 2854, 2003 WL 1477014, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4110 at *17 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2003) (quoting Spannaus v. DOJ, 813 F.2d 12 85, 1289 (4th Cir.1987)). Therefore, Cole’s account that: “I make the following statements based upon my personal knowledge and information made available to me in my official capacity” as the Information Review Officer meets the test for the level of personal knowledge necessary for a FOIA declaration. Cole Decl. ¶ 1

– 4. Plaintiffs’ argument of the “speculative” 23 nature of the national security concern and the fact that the region is no longer “the subject of armed conflict or terrorism against the United
States” also fails. Hall’s Memo. of Pts and Auth. [182] at 18. Cole states that the withheld information concerns human intelligence sources, the disclosure of which, even if they are no longer living or not given by name, and in an area free from conflict, jeopardizes future cooperation with the CIA and would reveal methods still in use by the CIA today. Cole Decl.

23 Hall’s Resp. [166] at 36

.27 ¶ 22

– 31. There will always be a certain level of speculation when assessing the dangers of releasing such information, but t his circuit has held that, so long as the agency affidavit contains “reasonable specificity” and “information logically falls within claimed exemption,” then the “court should not conduct a more detailed inquiry to test the agency’s judgment.” Larson v. Dep’t of State , 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The Cole Declaration contai ns the necessary level of specificity required in exemption 1 claims, as specific documents are referenced, and the reasons for information withholding cited. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment to the CIA in respect to the current exemption 1 wi thholdings. Lastly, records over 25 years old that have permanent historical value are automatically unclassified. Exec. Order No. 12958 § 3.3(a), 60 Fed. Reg. at 19832. However, this does not apply to information that “could be expected to: reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or a human intelligence source, or reveal information about t he application of an intelligence source or method. Id . § 3.4(b)(1), 60 Fed. Reg. at 19832. The CIA, in adequate detail, has demonstrated that the withheld exemption 1 information would expose sources and reveal intelligence methods. Cole Decl. ¶ 40, 60. This Court finds that the CIA’s exemption 1 declarations contain r easonable specificity and the withholdings logically fall within the exemption. Therefore, this court grants summary judgment to the CIA in regard to its exemption 1 withholdings and deny summary judgment to plaintiffs.
2. Exemption 2 Judge Kennedy’s 20 09 Order denied summary judgment to the CIA in regard to the exemption 2 documents. Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 190. The Order stated that the CIA must submit a supplemental filing to the Court with further detail as to its exe mption 2 claim, or disclose to p laintiffs the information previously withheld under that exemption. Id. However,28 “the CIA asserted exemption (b)(3) for all the redactions where it also asserted ‘low b(2)’” and Judge Kennedy granted summary judgment to the CIA’s exemption 3 withholdin gs. CIA’s Reply [169] at 18; Hall , 668 F. Supp. 2d at 190. Therefore, the CIA correctly states that this
i ssue is moot. Id

. at 18. 3. Exemption 3 The CIA was granted summary judgment o n its e xemption 3 claims in the 2009 Order because p laintiffs did not respond to the CIA’s e xemption 3 argument

. Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 190. However, the CIA has withheld additional information and records under exemption 3 , in reference to Item 4 and 5 responsive records , following the 2009 Order. Cole Decl. ¶ 34. T his Court finds that the CIA has met the burden of supporting its new e xemption 3 withholdings and therefore grant s the CIA summary judgment on e xemption 3

. Exem ption 3 covers records that are
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . ., provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to pa rticular types of matters to be withheld. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). For a statute to fall under exemption 3, the disclosure prohibition must at least “explicitly deal with public disclosure .” Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v.
DOJ , 816 F.2d 730, 734 (D.C. Cir.), modified on other grounds , 831 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds , 489 U.S. 749 (1989). An agency invoking e xemption 3 must submit affidavits that provide “the kind of detailed, scrupulous description [of the withheld documen ts] that enables a District Court judge to perform a de novo review.” Church of Scientology of Cal.,
Inc. v. Turner , 662 F.2d 784, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1980). T he affidavits need not contain factual descriptions the public disclosure of which would endanger the agency’s mission, Vaughn v.29 Rosen , 484 F.2d 820, 826

– 27 (D.C. Cir. 1973), but neither can they be vague or conclusory. Church of Scientology , 662 F.2d at 787. Here, information is withheld under the National Security Ac t , 50 U.S.C. § 403, et seq ., the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 , 50 U.S.C. § 403g, Section 102A(i)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 403

- 1(i)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 798, to justify withholding s under e xemp tion 3. Cole Decl. ¶¶ 42

– 46, 61; Janosek Decl. ¶ 26. Plaintiffs challenge the e xemption 3 withholdings in four ways. First, Hall argues that 50 U.S.C. § 403g doesn’t apply to “deceased [CIA] officers and employees and those who have b e en publicly identified as such. ” Hall’s Resp. [166] at 37 n. 5

. Because Hall concedes that 403g is an exemption 3 statute , 24 the only question is whether “the withheld material falls within the statute.” Larson , 565 F.3d 857 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ( citing Fitzgibbon v. C.I.A ., 911 F.2d 755, 761

– 62 (D.C. Cir. 1990) )

. The CIA argues that it does , because it exempts disclosure of information concerning “the organization, functions, names , official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel, employed by the CIA .” CIA’s Reply [169] at 17 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 403g) (emphasis added)

. Because deceased former employees still fall within the plain language of 403(g) as having been “employed” by the CIA, this Court agrees. Therefore, the Court holds that the CIA has properly supported its 403(g) withho ldings under

e xemption 3. Plaintiffs also argue that “the CIA has presented insufficient evidence of the need to protect the sources and methods at issue and that there is an unacceptable risk of their disclosure.” Hall’s Resp. [166] at 38 . As explained above, the Court found the CIA’s justification for the item 1 exemptions to be adequate, and as stated by p laintiffs , “[t]he CIA invokes exemption 3 in tandem with e xemption 1 for vi rtually every document at issue.” Id

. at 37. For the same reaso ns

24 Hall’s Resp. [166] at 37 n. 5.30 as stated above concerning the withholding of intelligence sources names and methods under

e xemption 1 , the Court finds that the CIA adequately justified the need to protect the sources and methods i n the redacted documents under e xemption 3. Plaintiffs also argue that the D epartment of D efense inappropriately invoked exemption 3 in relation to 10 U.S.C. § 150b, because the st atute is “clearly discretionary ” and therefore not an

e xemption 3 statute

. Hall’s Memo. of Pts and Auth. [182] at 20. However , the Court finds that 10 U.S.C. § 1 50b is an exemption 3 statute, because it “(B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Section 150b states that the information may “be withheld from disclosure to the public . . .” when it concerns “any member of the armed forces assigned to .

. . a routinely deployable unit.” 10 U.S.C. § 150b. Therefore, § 150b “establishes particular criteria fo r wi thholding,” and thus is

an e xemption 3 statute.
In the alternative, p laintiffs argue that even if the statu t e satisfies e xemption 3, the DOD fails to show any of the redacted names “are currently serving with the Armed Forces or employees of the DOD.” Hall’s Memo. of Pts and Auth. [182] at 20. As discussed above, once
a statut e is determined to fall within e xemption 3, the only question is whether “the withheld material falls within the statute.” Larson , 565 F.3d 857 (D.C. Cir. 2009) citing Fitzgibbon , 911 F.2d at 761

– 62. Here, while granting “ substantial weight and due consideration ” to the agency affi davit , the Court finds that it does. Fitzgibbon , 911 F.2d at 762

. The Tisdale Declaration states that the only information withheld from Document C00495778 under 10 U.S.C. § 150b are the “names of individuals assigned to routinely deployable units

. ” Tisdale Decl. ¶ 5c

. Because the statute satisfies e xemption 3, and because the withheld material falls within the statute , the Court holds that the 10 U.S.C. § 150b redactions were proper.31 Plai ntiffs also argue that the DOD inappropriately invoked e xemption 3 with 50 U.S.C. § 435 , which resulted in the redaction of names from 29 documents

. Memo. of Pts and Auth. [182] at 20. DOD claims the redacted names in those documents were missing the necessary written consent required under 50 U.S.C. § 435

. Tisdale Decl. ¶ 5B

. Plaintiffs argue that the DOD was required to consult the PNOK list to determine whether consent was given, and there is no evidence that the DOD did this before redacting the names

. Hall’s Memo. of Pts and Auth. [182] at 21. In its response, the CIA did not counter Hall’s concerns regarding whether DOD bothered to consul t the provided PNOK list ; it simply regurgitated the information from the Tisdale Declaration. CIA’s Resp. [184] at 15.
T he Court finds the statute fall s under e xemption 3 because it “ establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The statute requires primary next of kin to give written consent to the release of information concerning their tr eatment, location, or condition. 50 U.S.C. § 435. However, because it is unclear whether the DOD consulted the PNOK list, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the redaction of names withheld under 50 U.S.C. § 435, and the Court cannot grant summary judgment. Therefore, the 29 documents listed under ¶ 5B of the Tisdale Declaration must be released without the POW/MIA names redacted , or a declaration must be submitted to the Court specifying that the withheld names are not on the PNOK list. 5. Exemption 5 Exemption 5 protects “inter

- agency or intra

- agency memorand[a] or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agenc y in litigation with the agency ” from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 55 2(b)(5). “[T]he parameters of e xemption 5 are determined by reference to the protections available to litigants in civil discovery; if material is not ‘available’ in32 discovery, it may be withheld from FOIA requesters.” Burka v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. , 87 F.3d 508, 516 (D.C . Cir. 1996); see also NLRB. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 421 U.S. 132, 148 (1975). a. Deliberative Process Privilege The deliberative process privilege “shields only government ‘materials which are both predecisional and deliberative.’” Tax Analysts v. IRS , 117 F.3d 607, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Wolfe v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. , 839 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc)). To show that a document is predicisional, the agency need not identify a specific final agency decision; it is sufficient to establish “what deliberative process is involved, and the role played by the documents at issue in the course of that process.” Heggestad v. DOJ , 182 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000) (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy , 617 F.2d 854, 86 8 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). A document is “deliberative” if it “makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters.” Vaughn , 484 F.2d at 1143

– 44. The de liberative process privilege is intended to “prevent injury to the quality of agency dec isions.” Sears, Robuck &
Co. , 421 U.S. at 151. In the 2009 Order, summary judgment was granted to the CIA on its deliberative process claims, excluding documents 1100665, 1100667, 1100668, 1100669, 1100670 , 1100671, 1479603

. 25 For these documents, Judge Kennedy held that t he CIA must disclose these documents or include in its supplemental filing details that “ illuminate the contents of the documents and the reasons for non

- disclosure.” Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 191 ( quoting Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. , 311 F. Supp. 2d 44, 60 (D.D.C. 2004) ). For the reasons given

25 One document contains “emails and internal memos dated in June of 2004 from individuals in various CIA directorates and offic es,” while five are “memorand[a] . . . addressed to various CIA directorates from CIA’s FOIA office and pertain to fee estimates for preliminary searches conducted in response to Roger Hall’s FOIA request.” 2008 Vaughn Index, Part 4, at 22

– 23.33 below, the Court finds that the CIA has fulfilled its burden under the del iberative process privilege of e xemption 5 for these documents. The Agency states that it withheld information from documents C0046 5476 and C00520816 under the deliberative process privilege

. CIA’s Supp. Resp. [148] at 34, Cole Decl. ¶ 88

– 89. The CIA states that the communications were between the Agency’s executive Secretariat on behalf of the Director of Central Intelli gence and other Agency officers, and consisted of predecisional deliberations. Cole Decl. ¶ 89

– 90 . Plaintiffs have no t responded with a legal argument, nor have they disputed the CIA’s factual assertions. Therefore, the Co urt grants summary judgment to the CIA in regard to the deliberative process withholdings from these two documents. The CIA states that six 26 of the documents containing e xemption 5 redactions “ consist[] of internal emails, memoranda, and handwritten notes by Agency officers regarding the calculation of fee estimates for processing Plaintiffs’ 2003 FOIA request.” Cole Decl. ¶ 103. The Agency states that the communications were between the “Agency’s PPID and various directorate information

- release officers” concerning “the legal and policy issues involved in processing Plaintiffs’ FOIA request, including recommendations as to the systems of records to be searched, estimates of the amounts of time required for conducting searches, and opinions regarding appropriate search methods and likely search costs.” Id . The Agency claims that no policy recommendations from these documents were ever adopted. Id

. Plaintiffs did no t respond with a legal argument, nor did they challenge the CIA’s factual assertions. Because the CIA has adequately explained to the Court that the redacted information was “pre

- decisional,” that the information concerned recommendations and opinions on legal and policy matters, and that t he

rec ommendations were never adopted, the court grants the CIA summary judgment in regard to

26 1383976, 1383977, 1383978, 1383979, 138398 0, and 1383983.34 the exemption 5 withholdings for these six document s. The final deliberative process document withholding concerns document 1479603 , “which is a memorandum from the head of the office that processes FOIA requests to one of his superiors, describes the FOIA request at issue as one involving a very large number of docume nt s, and contains Agency officers’ opinions about the policy issues raised by processing such a l arge request. ” Cole Decl. ¶ 104. Of particular note is that the document is over thirty years old. 27 As noted by Judge Kennedy, the age of a document is a factor to be weighed for a deliberative process withholding, but it is not determinative. Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 191 (citing Lardner v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2005 WL 758267 , at *13 (D.D.C. 2005) ). Here, the CIA has supplemented the record adequately to show the C ourt that the withheld information concerns deliberations, and not the results of deliberations, as the documents show no evidence that the policy recommendations were ever adopted. Cole Decl. ¶ 104. Plaintiffs did no t respond with a credible legal argum ent , n or did they challenge the factual assertions of the CIA. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment to the CIA in regard to the deliberative process wit hholdings from document 1479603, and denies summary judgment to plaintiffs. b. Attorney

- C lient Privilege Judge Kennedy’s 2009 Order denied summary judgment to plaintiffs in regard to the invocation of attorney

- client privilege withholdings

. Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 192

. Summary judgment was denied because the CIA did not provide adequate information about the responsibilities of the officers who were the other parties in the withheld co mmunications with CIA attorneys, and therefore the Court could not “determine whether the officers are indiv iduals who, by virtue of their authority to rep resent the Agency, are entitle d in their communications with attorneys to the protections of the attorney

- client privilege. ” Id

. This information was

27 The date of the document is June 4, 1981.35 necessary, because “ [w] here the client is an organization, the [attorney

- client] privilege extends
to those communications between attorneys and all agents or employees of the organization who are authorized to act or speak for the organization in relation to the subject matter of the communication

. ” Mead Data Cent. , Inc. , 566 F.2d at 253 n.24 (citations omitted). For the

reasons stated below, the Court finds that the CIA has supplemented the record with the necessary information about the withheld communications. Eleven documents “contain communications between CIA attorneys and in formation release p rofessionals concerning the assessment of fees for Plaintiff Hall’s 1998 FOIA request.” 28 Cole Decl. ¶ 108. Seven documents concerned communications between the se same parties, but in relation to searches conducted for Hall’s 1998 FOIA request. 29 Id

. A single document is described as a “memorandum from a CIA information release professional to CIA attorneys regarding how Hall’s 1994 FOIA request was processed. ” Id . Six documents 30 “contain discussions between CIA information release professionals and attorneys concerning litigation with Hall over his FOIA requests.” Id

. The final document 31 “is a memorandum for a CIA information release professional from a CIA attorney concerning the identification of documents responsive to Hall’s 1998 FOIA request.” Id

. The CIA claims that all documents were “prepared with the joint expectation that they would be held in confidence” and the information was only shared with those who needed it “perform their official duties.” Id . ¶ 109. The CIA further provides that “all individuals who received the communications at issue were authorized to make, implement, or oversee decisions, or to provide information, concerning the matters discussed in the communications.” Id

.

28 Documents 1370083,1370539, 1370544, 1371726, 1371727, 1371732, 1371734, 1371736, 1383981, 1383983, and 1383985. 29 Documents 1370085, 1370089, 1370540, 1370544, 1371724, 1371726, and 1371733. 30 Do cuments 1370086, 1370544, 1371725, 1371726, 1371729, and 1383986. 31 Document 1370081.36 Plaintiffs have not responded to the CIA’s argument , either with legal arguments or to challenge the CIA’s factual assertions

. Therefore, the Court finds that the CIA’s supplemental declaration has satisfied the requirements for all information withheld under the attorney

- client provision of

e xemption 5, grants the CIA summary judgment for these withholdings , and denies summary judgment to plaintiffs. c. Attorney Work Product Privilege
In Judge Kennedy ’s 2009 Order, he granted summary judgment to the CIA on all withholdings under attorney work product privilege. Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 193. To the Court’s knowledge, the CIA has not withheld any new information under attorney work product privilege.
6 . Exemption 6 Exemption 6 allows an agency to withhold from disclosure “personnel and medical files and similar files” if its disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The phrase “similar files” is interpreted broadly and exempts a ll information that “applies to a particular individual.” Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co. , 456 U.S. 595, 599

– 603 (1982). However, information about federal employees generally does not qualify for protection. See Arieff v. Dep’t of the Navy , 712 F.2d 1462, 1467

– 68 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (declining to protect information about a large group of individuals); Aguirre v. SEC , 551 F. Supp. 2d 33, 54 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Correspondence does not become personal solely because it identifies government employees.”). Whil e “similar files” is construed broadly, it must not become devoid of meaning altogether. There must be some personal information that relates to a particular individual for exemption 6 protection to be warranted. Typical p ersonal information protected under37 exemption 6 includes “place of birth, date of birth, date of marriage, employment history, and comparable data.” See Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner , 879 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In examining an exemption 6 withholding, the court must balance the privacy interest at stake against the public’s interest in disclosure. Fund for Constitutional G ov’t , 656 F.2d at 862

. “Under exemption 6, the presumption in favor of disclosure is as strong as can be found anywhere in the Act.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton , 309 F.3d 26, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Judge Kennedy’s 2009 Order denied summary judgment to the CIA in reg ard to its exemption 6 withholdings because the CIA did not provide adequate ju stification

. Hall, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 193

. Since the 2009 Order, the CIA has withheld additional information under exemption 6. The withholdings now involve records re sponsive to Item 3, 4, 6, and 8. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants summary judgment to the CIA in regard to some

e xemption 6 claims, but denies summary judgment for others.
T he CIA redacted information concerning the names and home addresses of CIA officers from Item 4 documents

. Cole Decl. ¶ 49 . The CIA argues this was necessary to protect individuals and their families , some of whom were undercover. Id . ¶ 50

. The CIA also used this same justification for a single Item 3 documen t

. 32 For classified agents, the CIA redacted the information under exemptions 1 and 3, as well as exemption 6. Id . ¶ 48 n

. 26. As discussed in the exemption 1 analysis, the CIA employees’ names were corre ctly redacted under exemption 1 and the Court has granted summary judgment to those redactions, rendering the e xemption 6 withholding to these names moot. Hall first challenges the e xemption 6 withholdings of three specific documents: C00942526, C00472096, and C00465780. Hall’s Resp. [166] at 43

– 44. The first document,

32 C0135221038 C00942526, is “a letter to the Chief Counsel of the Senate Select Committee from the CIA’s Deputy Director for Senate Affairs , whose name is redacted, as are the name s of a couple of Air America pilots whose plane crashed in March 1977. ” 2011 Hall Decl. ¶ 40, Att. 44. Hall claims that all redacted names were “involved in government operations” and that there is “great public interest” in their identities. Hall’s Resp. [166] at 43. Ha ll next challenges the redaction of the name of a photographer of crash sites from document C00472096. Id

. Hall argues that photographers are usually interested in having their names attached to their work, and that the fact that the name is in a government document shows how the government functions. Id

. at 44. Finally , Hall challenges the redaction of 58 names of POWs in a CIA intelligence Information Report, listed as document C00465780. Hall argues that the public interest is high because the names of POWs are “commonly publicized in newspapers” and that the privacy interest is low because the government contends that there are no living Vietnam Era POWs, and that death “greatly diminishes any privacy inv asion.” Id

. Hall also challenges the withholdings of the DOD and NSA under exemption 6, which he cal ls “purely conclusory in their e xemption 6 analysis” and that the agencies “assume it is sufficient that names might be disclosed” which “leads to extreme results,” including the withholding of certain photographs cited by Hall. Hall’s Memo. of Pts and Auth. [182] at 23. In reply to Hall’s specific challenges, the CIA reiterates its position that the withholdings were proper because the y consisted of names of individuals, and that the CIA concluded that there was “a significant privacy interest in the information withheld in these documents which overrides any public interest in the information.” CIA’s Reply [169] at 19. The CIA also claims that some withheld e xemption 6 information contains not only names, but date of birth, place of birth, social security number, blood type, place of residence, names of family members or39 religious affiliation. Supp. Culver Decl. ¶ 47. Not including the names of the individuals themselves, the Court finds that the privacy interest in the remaining information is high, and the public interest low. Therefore, all exemption 6 withholdings concerning date of birth, place of birth, social se curity number, blood type, place of residence, names of family members, or religious affiliation, is properly withheld, and the C ourt gra nts summary judgment to the CIA as to these withholdings. However, the Court holds t hat the CIA has not overcome the heavy “presumption in favor of disclosure” found in e xemption 6 in regard to the names themselves

. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 309 F.3d at 32. Though the CIA is correct that the superfluous information such

as blood type has a very low p ublic interest, the names of these individuals themselves appear to be the subject of substantial public interest. 33 As argued by Hall, t here is a n especially low level of privacy inte rest in the case of deceased individuals. 34 T he CIA has failed to respond to this argument , either by explaining that no deceased individual’s names have been withheld, or by explaining why the privacy interest still exists for those deceased , some supposedly for several decades. Therefore, in regard to the names

– not in cluding the names of CIA employees, which were granted summary judgment under exemption 3

– of individuals themselves, and withheld photographs, the Court denies summa ry judgment to the CIA for the e xemption 6 claims and grants summary judgment to plaintiffs. 7. Segregability FOIA requires that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portio n s which are exempt.” 5

33 Hall cites the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington D

. C

. , as well as the media attention paid to Vietnam POW/MIAs. Hall’s Memo. of Pts and Auth. [182] at 23. 34 “[D]eath clearly matters, as the deceased by definition cannot personally suffer the privacy

- related injuries that may plague the living.” Campbell , 164 F.3d at 33

. However, a court must “account for t he fact that certain reputational interests and family

- related privacy expectations survive death.” Id

.40 U.S.C. § 552(b)

. Reasonably segregable portions of withheld documents must be disclosed unless they are “inextricably intertwined with exempt portions.” Mead Data Cent. , 566 F.2d at 260. “FOIA places the burden of justifying nondisclosure on the agency seeking to withhold inform ation.” Id

. The reasoning behind unsegregability must be detailed, not conclusory
statements. Id . at 261. Though, “agencies should not be forced to provide such a detailed justification that would itself compromise the secret nature of potentially exempt informati on. Id

. Judge Kennedy’s 2009 Order held that the CIA’s declarations and Vaughn indexes lacked the necessary specificity in regard to segregability. Hall , 668 F. Supp. 2d at 194 . The Order held that the CIA’s supplemental filing s must specify in detail the portions that are disclosable and which are exempt, making specific findings for each document withheld and correlating claimed exemptions with specific passages. Id

. Because the CIA has adequately demonstrated with reasonable specificity that no withheld documents contain reasonably segregable factual information , both in the records released before the 2009 Order and after, the Court holds that the CIA has met the segregability requirements under FOIA. The CIA responded to the 2009 Order specifically in regard to Item 4 segregable information, claiming that all reasonably segregable information ha d been released. CIA’s Supp. Resp. [148] at 12, Cole Decl. ¶ 66

– 67. Hall responds that that there is evidence that segregability has not been satisfied , because , while citing specific documents, he shows that many documents appear to have redactions without exemption claims, various large documents have been withheld in full, and some redactions appear to be made inconsistently. CIA’s Resp. [166] at 19

– 26.41 The CIA counters that proper segrega tion of Item 4 documents is evidenced by the large number of documents released in part (970) , and the “ few ” that we re withheld in fu ll ( 271 ). CIA’s Reply [169] at 14. Unlike the CIA, th e Court sees 271 documents withheld in full to be a substantial number. However, t he CIA has included

– both in relation to the Item 4 withholdings as well as other re sponsive documents withholdings

– detailed information concerning the withholdings in corresponding Vaughn index es . For example, document number C00579939 is a two page docum ent withheld in full by the CIA. 35 The CIA provides the subject of the document, the exemptions claimed, and a document description: This document is a 2

- page cable pr oviding a compilation of information on a foreign government. The entire document is derived from a sensitive CIA source of intelligence, refers to specific foreign government entities, and includes personal identifying information including a name, title and date/place of birth. The document also includes CIA typed and handwritten analysis of the information, CIA control markings and other CIA organizational data including routing details, CIA dissemination information and information about a private indi vidual. It is currently and properly classified as SECRET. ECF No. 154 Ex. C 1

– 4, at 111

. The Court finds this description to contain specific findings in sufficient detail to meet the segregability requirements under FOIA. Because the CIA’s Vaughn indexes pertaining to other CIA withholdings contain similar detail, the Court holds that the CIA has met its burden of providing sufficient reasoning and detail in its Vaughn indexes to satisfy
FOIA ’s segregability requirements

. Therefore, the CIA is gra nted summary judgment in regard to segregability, and summary judgment for plaintiffs is denied. D. Discovery Hall’s previous request for discovery was denied by Judge Kennedy in his 2009 Order. Hall , 668 F. Supp. 2d at 196. Hall argued that discovery was necessary to show that the CIA

35 The Vaughn index for C00579939 is found in ECF No. 154 Ex. C 1

– 4, at 111.42 possessed records that it had not provided him. Id . Judge Kennedy denied the request because Hall was unable to show that the CIA had acted in bad faith. Id

. Pla intiffs again ask for disco v ery. Hall’ s Resp. [166] at 45; Hall’s Memo. of Pts and Auth. [182] at 8. “Discovery is not favored in lawsuits under the FOIA. Instead, when an agency’s affidavits or declarations are deficient regarding the adequacy of its search

. . . the courts generally will request that the agency supplement its supporting declarations.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 65 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing Natio n Magazine,
W

ash. Bureau , 71 F.3d at 892 ; Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68). Courts may permit discovery in FOIA cases where a “plaintiff has made a sufficient showing that the agency acted in bad faith.” Voinche v. FBI , 412 F. Supp. 2d 60, 71 (D.D.C . 2006) (citing Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) ). Hall argues that discovery is necessary because “t he adequacy o f the search in this case is a disputed fact,” and that “he cannot begin to present a full and complete record on th i s issue without being afforded an opportunity to take discovery.” Hall’ s Memo. of Pts and Auth. [182]
at 8

– 9. Hall also argues that discovery is necessary due to the classification of some documents, and because “se veral persons who have given [Hall] significant information about CIA operations and activities which would have generated records pertaining to POW/MIAs have refused to provide such information without what they regard as the protection of a court subpoena or unless they are called as witnesses at an evidentiary hearing. ” Hall’s Memo. of Pts and Auth. [182] at 10. For the reasons discussed below, this C ourt denies p laintiffs’ discovery request. First, this Court does not find evidence of bad faith on the part of the CIA. Plaintiffs argue that “the CIA’s bad faith is manifest by its abuse of the FOIA’s fee waiver provision s. ”43 AIM’s Resp. [181] at 10. Plaintiffs cite to the fact that “the CIA’s exorbitant fee estimates

. . . changed over time.” Id

. But just as noted by Judge Kennedy in the 2009 Order,
p laintiffs have “ provided no evidence for his contenti on that the CIA engaged in ‘misbehavior ’

. . . .” Id . at 40. Estimating the search fees

– especially of such a broad s earch as that of the p laintiffs

– is no doubt a difficult proposition, and a recalculation of those fees does not show that the previous estimate was intentionally inaccurate

. 36
Second , the argument p laintiffs put forward as cause for discovery

– an inadequate search shown by missing document s

– is premature

. As discussed above, the CIA has been ordered to search f or all 1,711 names provided by p laintiffs, and to search both the CADRE system and the agency archives, as well as any other system likely to contain responsive recor ds. It is possible that the “ missing ” documents wil l be found in this new search. Because p laintiffs have failed to show bad faith on the part of the CIA, and because the CIA has been ordered to carry out additional searches , this Court denies p laintiffs request for discovery at this time.
E . In Camera Inspection FOIA gives district courts the discretion to examine the contents of requested agency records in camera “to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld.”
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). “The decision whether to perform in camera inspection is left to the ‘broad discretion of the trial court judge.’” Lam Lek Chong v. DEA , 929 F.2d 729, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Carter v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce , 830 F.2d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Agency affidavits are sufficient to justify summary judgment without in camera inspection when they meet the following standard:

36 Not only have p laintiffs failed to show the previous “exorbitant” fee estimates were made in bad fa ith, there is no evidence that p laintiffs have been charged for the thousands of documents provided to them, either before the 2009 Order, or since. Hall , 668 F. Supp. 2d at 38 n

. 26, 39 n

. 27.44 [T]he affidavits must show, with reasonable specificity, why the documents fall within the exemption. The affidavits will not suffice if the agency’s claims are conclusory, merely reciting statutory standards, or if they are too vague or sweeping. If the affidavits provide specific information sufficient to place the documents within the exemption catego ry, if this information is not contradicted in the record, and if there is no evidence in the record of agency bad faith, then summary judgment is appropriate without in camera review of the documents.” Hayden v. Nat’l Sec. Agency , 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D. C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied , 446 U.S. 937, (1980). “[W]hen the agency meets its burden [under FOIA] by means of affidavits, in camera review is neither necessary nor appropriate.” Weissman v. CIA , 565 F.2d 692, 696

– 97 (D.C. Cir. 1977). However, “ in came ra inspection may be particularly appropriate when either the agency affidavits are insufficiently detailed to permit meaningful review of exemption claims or there is evidence of bad faith on the part of the agency,” when the number of withheld documents is relatively small, or “when the dispute turns on the contents of the withheld documents, and not the parties’ interpretations of those documents.” Quinon v. FBI , 86 F.3d 1222, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996). While FOIA provides the Court the option to conduct in camera review, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), it by no means compels the exercise of that option. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. , 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978). It is within the Court’s “broad discretion” to decline to conduct in camera review where, as her e, the Court believes that in camera inspection is unnecessary “to make a responsible de novo determination on the claims of exemption.” Carter v. Dep’t of Commerce , 830 F.2d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Judge Kennedy addressed Hall and AIM’s previous request for in camera review of “ a sampling ” of documents in his 2009 Order. Hall 668 F. Supp. 2d at 196

. He found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the CIA, and though there were insufficiencies in the CIA’s Vaughn45 indexes , the Court expected that the CIA’s supplemental filings to correct the deficiencies

. Id

. Therefore, the Court declined in camera review at that time. Id

. Plaintiffs continue to ask for in camera review of an unspecified “ small number of documents

. ” 37 Hall’s Resp. [166] at 27. Hall’s argument in support of in camera review is based on “segregability issues” relating to documents released in part

. Id

. Plaintiffs have also claim ed bad faith on the part of the CIA throughout their pleadings

. T hough the argument does
not appear to be made in direct support of in camera review , no evidence of bad faith on the part of the CIA has been shown by p laintiffs. 38 For the reasons given below, this Court c hooses not to review documents in camera at this time. Hall argues that in camera review is appropriate here because “[m]any of the documents which have been released in part raise segregability issues.” Id

. He then cites two documents in support of this assertion. Id

. The first had “se veral lines withheld following ‘ comment. ’ ” Id

. In the other, “ a substantial passage under the heading ‘Summary’” had been “ deleted, ” even though the contents beneath the summary had been released in full. Id . at 27

– 28. In relation to the first document, Hall claims it is “unlikely that these passages do not include some information that cannot reasonably be expected to disclose protected sources and methods.” Id . at 27. Hall does not assert that this is evidence of bad faith, he appears to simply imply that the redaction is improper, though he gives no explanation as to why. The CIA did not directly address Hall’s concerns over this document, instead resting on its record and previous

37 Hall argues that “[a] relatively small [number] of documents selected by plaintiffs might enable to the Court to cut the heart of some of the major issues presented in a way that would greatly facilitate its resolution.” Hall’s Resp. [166] at 27. 38 AIM claims bad faith on the part of th e CIA in reference to the Item 6 and 8 searches, claiming that information from those documents would “demonstrate the CIA’s pattern and practice of abusing the FOIA’s search fee provisions . . . .” AIM’s Resp. [163] at 9. AIM argues that this “impugns t he credibility of its affidavits” such that the CIA is not entitled to summary judgment. AIM’s Resp. [181] at 9

– 11. The CIA has since waived the fees, which begs the question of how the previous fee estimates show bad faith on the part of the CIA.46 submissions. CIA’s Reply [169] at 19. T his empty allegation by Hall , without more, is not enough to persuade this Court to grant in camera review

. With the second document, the CIA admitted that the summary was r edacted in error, and provided p laintiffs with a copy of the record with the summary portion intact

. Id . at 21. Though the CIA redacted the information in error, the C ourt finds that the treatment of this document does not persuade this C ourt to review documents in camera

. Once the issue of the redacted summary was brought to the attention of the CIA , it was corrected. Id

. When thousands upon thousands of pages of records are involved , it is inevitable that some unnecessary redactions will be made. Because the segregability issues cited by Hall are minor , and because p laintiffs have provided no evidence of bad faith on the part of the CIA, p laintiffs do not offer persuasive arguments as to the necessity of in camera review in this case . Thus, the Court again declines to review records in camera at this time. V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the CIA’s Motion for summary judgment, and GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART plaintiffs’
Cross

- Motion f or summary judgment, and DENY plaintiffs’ Motions for in camera review and discovery. A separate order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date. Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Jud ge, on August 3 , 2012.