-1- 

### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

THE MT. VERNON PARK ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED December 29, 2015

v No. 323482
Oakland Circuit Court PATRICIA WILLIAMS, LC No. 2013-135603-CK

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: S AWYER , P.J., and B ECKERING and B OONSTRA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

This appeal arises from a compl aint that plaintiff, the Mt. Ve rnon Park Association, filed against defendant, Patricia Williams, the co-owner of a condomi nium unit in the Mt. Vernon Park development in Southfield. Defendant appeals as of right a circuit court order granting summary disposition in favor of pl aintiff. We reverse and rema nd.

Plaintiff sought summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10). Concerning MCR 2.116(C)(9), plaintiff contended that because defendant und isputedly failed to paint her front door in conformity with the Michigan Condominium Act, MCL 559.101 et seq ., and the
relevant condominium documents , including rules and regulations adopted by plaintiff’s board in 2009, defendant had no defense to plaintiff’s claim. Regarding MCR 2.116(C)(10), plaintiff insisted that no genuine issues o f material fact existed in lig ht of defendant’s undisputed failure to comply with her obligation to paint her front door and to pa y plaintiff’s assessments against her for failing to paint the front door. The circuit court rul ed:

The Court . . . has considered the argument . . . of counsel, and the Court
looks at this matter and ca nnot help but look at the . . . matt er concerning the other
case and Ms. Clark. [1] This Court is of the opinion that reasonable minds could differ as to the meaning of t he language . . . in the bylaws an d the articles, and that

1 Plaintiff filed a nearly identic al complaint against Chantelle Clark in LC No. 2013-135604-CK. Plaintiff filed a nearly identi cal motion for summary dispositi on, defendant Clark requested summary disposition on her behal f, and the circuit court grante d Clark summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2).-2- it is not . . . repugnant to justice to read the rules as you d o, [plaintiff’s] counsel, even though this Court has taken a contrary opinion and made . . . an adjudication repugnant to your interpretation. But looking at this from the perspective of this non-appearing party, that the Cour t is comfortable in ruling fa vorably to you in this case, even though this Court has a different opinion, and made that manifest in its other case. . . . [A]gain, for the reason . . . that . . . it doesn’t strain credulity to conclude as you do, and since she’s not challenging it by he r absence, the Court grants your motion.

Defendant contends that the circ uit court should have granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) in her favor. Although defendant did not file a response to plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, she highlights the circuit court’s rec ognition that the same facts and law applied in both LC No. 2013-135604-CK and her case. We rev iew de novo the circuit court’s summary disposition ruling. Walsh v Taylor , 263 Mich App 618, 621; 689 NW2d 506 (2004). 2

A summary disposition motion prem ised on subrule (C)(10) tests the factual support for a
claim. Walsh , 263 Mich App at 621. “In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116( C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and othe r relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most favor able to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine
issue of material facts exists to warrant a trial.” Id . MCR 2.116(I)(2) authorizes a circuit court to “render judgment in favor of the opposing party” if “it appe ars to the court that the opposing party, rather than the moving pa rty, is entitled to judgment.” The circuit court may grant the opposing party summary disposit ion pursuant MCR 2.116(I)(2) if “no genuine issue of material fact [exists] and the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” City of Holland v Consumers Energy Co , 308 Mich App 675, 681-682; 866 NW2d 871 (2015).

“[I]ssues involving statutory interpretation, as well as contr act interpretation, present
issues of law which are reviewed de novo.” Tuscany Grove Ass’n v Peraino , ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2015) (Docket No. 320685, issued July 14, 2015); slip op at 2. Regarding statutory interpretation, this Court summarized in Paris Meadows, LLC v City of Kentwood , 287 Mich App 136, 141; 783 NW2d 133 (2010):

The primary goal of statutor y interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. This Court begins by reviewing the text of th e statute at issue; if the language is unambiguous, it is presumed that the Legislatur e intended the meaning plainly expressed, and j udicial construction of the sta tute is not permitted. Nothing may be read into a clear statute that is no t within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the stat ute itself. [Internal quotations and citations omitted.]

2 The circuit court did not speci fy the subrule supporting its s ummary disposition ruling for plaintiff. Because the circuit court considered documentary ev idence beyond the pleadings, the court apparently granted summa ry disposition under MCR 2.116(C) (10). MCR 2.116(G)(5).-3- The rules governing contract int erpretation apply to the const ruction of condominium bylaws. Tuscany Grove Ass’n , ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2.

Accordingly, this Court begins by examining the language of th e bylaws. Words are interpreted according t o their plain an d ordinary mea ning. Further, this Court avoids interpretations tha t would render any part of the document surplusage or nugatory, and instead this Court gives effect to every word, phrase, and clause. Ultimately, we enforce clear and unambiguous langu age as written. [ Id .]

Concerning interpretation of a d eed, courts generally enforce as a matter of law “the plain language in a deed” that contains no ambiguity. Taylor v Taylor , 310 Mich 541, 545; 17 NW2d 745 (1945). “[I]n interpreting de eds and other written instrum ents, the primary object is to determine the intention of the parties from the instrument itse lf.” Thomas v Jewell , 300 Mich 556, 558-559; 2 NW2d 501 (1942).

We conclude that the circuit court erred by granting summary d isposition in favor of plaintiff and by failing to grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) in favor of
defendant. The Condominium Act expressly provides in MCL 559.1 02 that “[f]or the purposes of this act, the words and phr ases defined in sections 3 to 10 shall have the meanings respectively ascribed to them in those sections.” According to the Condomin ium Act, “a condominium project consists of ‘units’ a nd ‘common elements’ only.” Paris Meadows , 287 Mich App at 146 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Condominium Act defines a “condominium unit” as “that portion of the condomini um project designed and intend ed for separate ownership and use, as described in the master deed . . . .” MCL 559.104(3). The term “common elements” “means the portions of the condominium project other than the c ondominium units.” MCL 559.103(7). “General common elements” include “the common elem ents other than the limited common elements.” MCL 559.106(5). And, “limited common elemen ts” means “a portion of
the common elements reserved in the master deed for the exclusi ve use of less than all of the coowners.” MCL 559.107(2).

The clear and unambiguous language in Article IV of the master deed reflects the grantors’ plain intent regarding the development’s common eleme nts. Taylor , 310 Mich at 545;

Thomas , 300 Mich at 558-559. Article IV( A)(7) states that “[t]he gen eral common elements” include “[f]oundations, supporting columns, unit perimeter walls (including windows and doors therein) [,] roofs, ceilings, floor construction between unit levels and chimneys.” (Emphasis added). “Limited common elements” include “[t] he interior surfaces of apartment perimeter walls (including windo ws and doors herein) , ceilings and floors contained within an apartment.” Article IV(B)(5) (emphasis added). Article IV(C) plainly place s on a condominium co-owners’ association, like plaintiff, res ponsibility for the “costs of m aintenance, repair and replacement of all . . . general and limited common elements described” in the master deed, except that a coowner bears responsibility for “ the costs of decoration and mai ntenance (but not repair or replacement except in cases of co-owner fault) of all surfaces referred to in [Artic le IV(B)(5)].”

The Condominium Act’s definitions, including the definitions o f general common elements, MCL 559.106(5), and limited common elements, MCL 559. 107(2), and the provisions of the master deed, plainly plac e the outer walls surrounding t he condominium units, including-4- the exterior doors, in the category of general common elements. The master deed also unambiguously categorized the int erior surfaces of the unit’s p erimeter doors as limited common elements. Additionally, the mast er deed plainly assigned plain tiff the responsibility for any “costs of maintenance, repair and replacement of all . . . gene ral and limited common elements described” in the master deed, but for “the costs of decoration and maintenance (but not repair or replacement except in cases of co-owner fault) of all [interior ] surfaces” of the units. Article IV(C).

The parties did not dispute that plaintiff possessed the autho rity to adopt the regulation requiring the uniform front-door color of dark brown. However, to the extent that the regulation also purported to place on co-own ers the responsibility for fun ding or arranging for the painting
of the condominium units’ exteri or front doors, the regulation was plainly inconsistent with the unambiguous language in Article IV of the master deed. Cf. Meadow Bridge Condo Ass’n v

Bosca , 187 Mich App 280, 282; 466 NW2d 303 (1990) (holding that “a r ule or regulation is a tool to implement or manage existing structural law,” the regul ation challenged by a co-owner was “not inconsistent with the original bylaw,” “and d[id] noth ing to change the general rule”) (internal quotation a nd citation omitted). 3

Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favo r of defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction. Defenda nt, being the prevailing party , may tax costs pursuant to MCR

7.219.

/s/ David H. Sawyer /s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

3 In light of our conclusion that the circuit court erred in fai ling to grant defendant summary disposition, we need not address defendant’s alternative argume nt that the circuit court should have granted her motion for relief from judgment.