Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-852 | October 7, 2020 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Ivan A. Arnaez

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Samuel J. Dayton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

T.B.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 7, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-JV-852

Appeal from the Posey Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Craig Goedde, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

65C01-0908-JD-179

Mathias, Judge.

[1] In 2010, the Posey Circuit Court adjudicated T.B. to be a delinquent child for 

committing what would have been Class C felony child molesting if committed 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-852 | October 7, 2020 Page 2 of 8

by an adult and ordered T.B. to register as a sex offender. Ten years later, T.B. 

filed a motion to set aside the juvenile court’s adjudication, claiming that he 

was denied the right to a jury trial. The juvenile court rejected T.B.’s motion, 

concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because T.B. was no longer a juvenile. 

T.B. appeals and claims that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion 

because he was denied what he contends to be his common-law right to a jury 

trial. Although the juvenile court erred when it determined that it lacked 

jurisdiction to entertain T.B.’s motion, we nevertheless affirm the trial court’s 

denial of T.B.’s motion to set aside because it fails as a matter of law. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 21, 2009, the State filed a petition alleging that T.B. was a 

delinquent child for committing what would be Class C felony child molesting 

if committed by an adult. At a fact-finding hearing held on April 21, 2010, T.B. 

admitted to the allegations in the petition, and the juvenile court found T.B. to 

be a delinquent child. The juvenile court held a dispositional hearing on June 7, 

2010, at which time it placed T.B. on probation for twelve months. The court 

also ordered T.B. to undergo offender-specific counseling. 

[3] On November 21, 2011, the juvenile court held a hearing to determine if T.B. 

should be required to register as a sex offender. The parties were ordered to 

submit their proposed findings and conclusions by January 23, 2012, and the 

court set a progress hearing for February 27, 2012. At the February 27 hearing, 

the juvenile court found T.B. to be at a high risk to commit a future sex offense 

and ordered him to register as a sex offender for the next ten years. T.B. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-852 | October 7, 2020 Page 3 of 8

appealed the juvenile court’s order requiring that he register as a sex offender, 

but we affirmed the trial court’s decision. T.B.B. v. State, No. 65A04-1203-JV146, 2012 WL 3599365 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2012). 

[4] On February 4, 2020, T.B. attempted to e-file a motion to set aside the juvenile 

court’s orders finding him to be a delinquent child and requiring him to register 

as a sex offender. Appellant’s App. p. 12. On March 3, 2020, the juvenile court 

rejected the e-filing, concluding that it “ha[d] no jurisdiction over the Motion 

due to the fact that [T.B.] is no longer a juvenile (but an adult age 28 . . .), that 

the matter was appealed and ruled upon with no additional appeal, and that the 

matter is now closed.” Id. at 12.1

[5] Then, on March 10, 2020, T.B. again e-filed his motion to set aside. This time, 

the juvenile court accepted the filing but denied the motion, again concluding 

that it “d[id] not have jurisdiction over the matter” for the reasons it stated 

when it rejected the initial e-filing. T.B. now appeals. 

Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)

[6] A motion to set aside a judgment is governed by Indiana Trial Rule 60(B), 

which provides in relevant part as follows: 

Mistake—Excusable Neglect—Newly Discovered Evidence—

Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just the court 

1

For some reason, neither T.B.’s attempted e-filing nor the juvenile court’s ruling thereon is listed in the 

court’s chronological case summary. See id. at 9–10. They are, however, detailed in the juvenile court’s order 

denying T.B.’s subsequent motion to set aside. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-852 | October 7, 2020 Page 4 of 8

may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, 

including a judgment by default, for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) any ground for a motion to correct error, including 

without limitation newly discovered evidence, which by due 

diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 

a motion to correct errors under Rule 59;

(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an 

adverse party;

* * *2

(6) the judgment is void;

(7) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or 

a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 

otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the

judgment should have prospective application; or

(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the 

judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs 

(1), (2), (3), and (4).

The motion shall be filed within a reasonable time for reasons (5), (6), 

(7), and (8), and not more than one year after the judgment, order or 

proceeding was entered or taken for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (4). A 

movant filing a motion for reasons (1), (2), (3), (4), and (8) must 

allege a meritorious claim or defense. A motion under this 

subdivision (B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 

2

Subsections (4) and (5) deal respectively with entry of default judgment against a party who was served only 

by publication and where an infant or incompetent person was not represented by a guardian or other 

representative. These subsections are inapplicable to the present case
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-852 | October 7, 2020 Page 5 of 8

suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a 

court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 

judgment, order or proceeding or for fraud upon the court. Writs 

of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review 

and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the 

procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 

motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

T.R. 60(B) (emphases added). 

[7] Because a juvenile delinquency adjudication is civil in nature, post-conviction 

procedures are not available to challenge such an adjudication. A.S. v. State, 923 

N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing J.A. v. State, 904 N.E.2d 250, 254 

n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied). Accordingly, our supreme court has held 

that “Trial Rule 60 is an appropriate avenue through which a juvenile must 

raise any and all claims premised on the illegality of an agreed delinquency 

adjudication.” J.W. v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1202, 1207–08 (Ind. 2019). We review 

a trial court’s ruling on a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for an abuse of discretion. 

A.S., 923 N.E.2d at 490 (citing S.E. v. State, 744 N.E.2d 536, 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2001)). 

Discussion and Decision

[8] T.B. claims that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion for relief from 

judgment because, he insists, he was denied his right to a jury trial. The juvenile 

court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because T.B. is now an adult. The 

State concedes that the juvenile court had jurisdiction, but it insists that the 

court properly denied T.B.’s motion. We agree with the State that the court had 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-852 | October 7, 2020 Page 6 of 8

continuing jurisdiction to modify its original order. D.D.J. v. State, 640 N.E.2d 

768, 769 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied; see also Jordan v. State, 549 N.E.2d 

382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (considering juvenile court’s denial of Trial Rule 60(B)

motion filed by now-adult petitioner), trans. denied. But we also agree with the 

State that the trial court nevertheless properly denied T.B.’s motion for relief 

from judgment. See Pirant v. State, 119 N.E.3d 178, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)

(holding that court on appeal may affirm trial court’s ruling on motion for relief 

from judgment if it is sustainable on any basis supported by the record). And 

here, there are several bases in the record to support the denial of T.B.’s motion. 

[9] The first is procedural. Although he appeals from the denial of his motion for 

relief from judgment, no portion of his forty-page brief (or his fifty-eight-page 

motion for relief from judgment) explains under which subsection of Trial Rule 

60(B) he brought his motion. Even if we overlook this failure to cogently argue 

the procedural aspects of his case, we observe that a motion to set aside a 

judgment brought under subsections (1), (2), (3), and (4) of Trial Rule 60(B)

must be brought within one year of the judgment. Thus, to the extent that 

T.B.’s motion is based on any of these reasons, it is untimely. 

[10] And to the extent T.B.’s motion sought relief under subsections (5), (6), (7), or 

(8) of Trial Rule 60(B), it was still required to be filed within a reasonable time. 

Here, T.B. filed his motion for relief from judgment almost ten years after his 

juvenile adjudication. T.B. makes no argument regarding why this excessive

delay was reasonable, and we conclude that it was not reasonable. See Jordan, 

549 N.E.2d at 384 (holding that lapse of over twenty years between juvenile 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-852 | October 7, 2020 Page 7 of 8

delinquency adjudication and motion for relief from judgment supported 

conclusion that motion was not filed within a reasonable time). 

[11] Furthermore, there is no indication in the record before us that T.B. ever 

requested that the juvenile court hold a jury trial or that he ever objected to 

having his case heard by the court instead. Nor did he present such a claim in 

his direct appeal. This issue was known and available to T.B. at the time of his 

direct appeal, yet he failed to present it. Trial Rule 60(B) cannot be used to 

present a claim that could have been, but was not, presented on direct appeal. 

Perkins v. State, 718 N.E.2d 790, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 

[12] Perhaps most important, however, is that T.B.’s claim that he was entitled to a 

jury trial at his juvenile delinquency adjudication is directly in conflict with 

binding precedent from our supreme court. In Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 389, 

254 N.E.2d 319, 327 (1970), our supreme court clearly held that “after very 

careful consideration of the case law, our Juvenile Act and the guidelines 

formulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, we have reached the conclusion that a 

juvenile is not constitutionally entitled to a trial by jury at a delinquency 

hearing.” T.B. acknowledges the holding in Bible, but he claims that our 

supreme court was wrong. Although T.B. is certainly free to make this 

argument, we are required to follow the binding precedent of our supreme 

court. “We are bound by the decisions of our supreme court.” Dragon v. State, 

774 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing In re Petition to Transfer Appeals, 

202 Ind. 365, 376, 174 N.E. 812, 817 (1931)). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-852 | October 7, 2020 Page 8 of 8

[13] For all of these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying T.B.’s 

motion for relief from judgment.

[14] Affirmed. 

Bradford, C.J., and Najam, J., concur.