IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Office of Administration, : No. 1019 C.D. 2014

Respondent : Submitted: November 14, 2014

BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: December 18, 2015

Pennsylvanians for Union Reform (PFUR) petitions for review of the 

Pennsylvania Office of Open Record’s (OOR) June 12, 2014 Final Determination 

denying PFUR’s appeal from the Pennsylvania Office of Administration’s (OA) 

denial of PFUR’s Right-to-Know Law (RTKL)1request. There are three issues for 

this Court’s review: (1) whether OOR erred by addressing OA’s substantive 

arguments in support of its denial before determining whether OA possessed 

responsive records; (2) whether OOR erred by concluding that public disclosure of 

payroll deductions for union political action committee (PAC) contributions would 

violate Kenneth Jasper’s (Jasper) right to freedom of association under the First 

Amendment to the United States (U.S.) Constitution; and (3) whether OOR erred and 

abused its discretion by permitting Jasper to participate in OOR’s proceedings. 

Commonwealth employee bargaining unit members have the opportunity 

to have PAC contributions deducted from their paychecks and transferred to PACs. 

The authority for this deduction and transfer is memorialized in certain 

 

1 Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101–67.3104.
2

Commonwealth collective bargaining agreements, including the July 1, 2011 to June 

30, 2015 agreement between the Commonwealth and Services Employees 

International Union Local 668 (Union). See OA Br. at 9.

2

 On April 3, 2014, PFUR 

filed a RTKL request (Request) with OA for “records showing all Union [PAC] 

contributions processed by agency payroll deduction between . . . January 1, 2014 

and March 31, 2014” for 30 employees from the Pennsylvania State System of 

Higher Education, the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board and Union members

Daniel Gray (Gray) and Jasper, who are employed by the Pennsylvania Department 

of Labor and Industry (L&I). Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1a. The Request stated: 

“The primary purpose . . . is to find out whether or not these . . . employees made 

PAC contributions. Only of secondary interest is how much money they may have 

contributed.” R.R. at 2a.

 On April 10, 2014, OA acknowledged its receipt of the Request and, due 

to the need for a legal determination of whether the requested records were subject to 

access and bona fide staffing limitations, invoked a 30-day extension to more fully 

respond. See R.R. at 3a. On May 12, 2014, OA denied the Request, in pertinent part, 

because

[i]ndividual payroll deduction information is exempt from 

disclosure under 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(6), which exempts 

personal identification information including personal 

financial information. The records also do not document, 

and are not created, received or retained in connection with, 

a transaction or activity of OA, but rather of the employee; 

they are therefore not ‘records’ under 65 P.S. § 67.102. 

Further, the records are also arguably exempt under 65 P.S. 

§ 67.708(b)(12) as material prepared for a public official or 

agency employee which does not have official purpose. 

 

2

 See also

http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/collective_bargaining_m_d/20137.
3

Information about the presence or absence of a record of 

PAC contributions associated with an identifiable individual 

is itself ‘personal financial information’ under 65 P.S. § 

67.708(b)(6), and is exempt for all of the reasons elucidated 

herein.

OA’s determination is confirmed by the April 16, 2014 

[OOR] final determination regarding the nature of PAC 

contributions, which found that a record of ‘the names of 

individuals contributing to PACs is not subject to 

disclosure’ ([PFUR v. OA,] OOR Docket No. 2014-0400

[(PFUR I) at 8.3]

R.R. at 4a (emphasis in original). OA stated that it did not possess records for 

Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education or Pennsylvania Liquor Control 

Board employees.4

On May 13, 2014, PFUR appealed to OOR, but limited its appeal to 

OA’s denial of Jasper’s and Gray’s PAC contribution records. PFUR contended that 

OA’s refusal to inform PFUR whether or not responsive records existed as required 

by Section 901 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.901, constitutes “a refusal to answer the 

[R]equest. Therefore, PFUR’s [R]request was deemed denied, not denied” and it was 

not required to address OA’s grounds for deemed denial. R.R. at 10a. PFUR also 

asserted that OA acted in bad faith and unreasonably interpreted the law. 

Accordingly, PFUR requested OOR to issue an order enforcing the requirements of 

Section 901 of the RTKL and requiring OA to inform PFUR regarding whether or not 

OA possesses the requested records. R.R. at 11a.

By May 14, 2014 notice, OOR permitted the parties to supplement the 

record. OOR’s notice also mandated that Jasper and Gray receive notification that 

PFUR was seeking records that contain their personal information, and that they may 

 

3

PFUR I involved PFUR’s appeal from OA’s denial for this same information in 2013. 

Jasper joined the Union’s Request to Participate in that matter. 

4

In accordance with Section 502(b)(1) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.502(b)(1), OA forwarded 

those requests to the open records officers at the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education 

and the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board.
4

participate in the appeal as interested third parties.5 Both PFUR and OA notified 

Jasper and Gray of the appeal. On May 20, 2014, Jasper filed a Request to 

Participate accompanied by a position statement in which he represented, in pertinent 

part, that “[he] may or may not have made contributions to the Union’s [PAC].” R.R. 

at 25a. Jasper articulated that he “consider[s] deductions made from [his] gross 

wages to be personal financial information exempt from disclosure under the 

[RTKL].” R.R. at 25a. Jasper authorized the Union to represent his interests in this 

appeal. 

In accordance with OOR’s May 14, 2014 notice, OA timely responded 

to PFUR’s appeal on May 23, 2014. Therein, OA represented that it denied the 

Request, “relying upon the OOR’s opinion in [PFUR I] . . . and all of the case law to 

which it refers, and upon the logic reflected in OA’s record supplementation in 

[PFUR I] . . . .” R.R. at 27a.

By May 27, 2014 letter, the Union notified OOR that it represented 

Jasper, and asserted that: (1) the requested information constitutes personal financial 

information exempt from disclosure under Section 708(b)(6)(i)(A) of the RTKL; (2) 

release of the information would infringe on Jasper’s freedom of association right 

protected by the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions; (3) the information is exempt 

from disclosure under Section 708(b)(12) of the RTKL as material prepared for an 

agency employee not connected with OA’s business, the employee names and 

deduction amounts are not “records” under Section 102 of the RTKL,

6

and revealing 

the information would be an invasion of Jasper’s privacy and risk his personal 

 

5 Under Section 1101 of the RTKL, the appeals officer may grant a person with a direct 

interest in the record under appeal the right to participate if no hearing has been held, no order has 

been issued, and the appeals officer “believes the information will be probative.” 65 P.S. § 

67.1101(c)(2)(iii). 

6

65 P.S. § 67.102.
5

security under Section 708(b)(ii) of the RTKL;

7

(4) PFUR’s appeal should be denied 

based on the OOR’s final determination in PFUR I that PFUR is not entitled to the 

very information it now seeks; and, (5) the appeal should be denied under Section 

506(a)(1) of the RTKL8because OOR previously considered and denied identical 

PFUR appeals in 2012 (OOR Docket No. 2013-0859)9and 2013 (PFUR I), and the 

repeated requests and protracted litigation have unreasonably burdened OA and the 

Union’s members. See R.R. at 145a-151a. 

On May 27, 2014, Gray filed a Request to Participate. In his position 

statement attached thereto, he disclosed: “I have never authorized nor have I ever had 

any [PAC] contributions deducted from my paycheck by any Commonwealth agency 

and I do not consider this fact to be personal or private.” R.R. at 144a. Gray did not 

authorize the Union to represent his interests. 

On May 28, 2014, OOR granted Jasper’s Request to Participate because 

his allegation that records of any PAC contributions he may have made are not 

subject to disclosure would be probative of whether PAC contributions of a 

specifically-identified employee are public records under the RTKL.10 See R.R. at 

152a; see also Section 1101(c)(2)(iii) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1101(c)(2)(iii). 

OOR denied Gray’s Request to Participate, reasoning that because Gray admitted he 

 

7

65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(1)(ii) (exempts records the disclosure of which “would be reasonably 

likely to result in a substantial and demonstrable risk of physical harm to or the personal security of 

an individual.”).

8

65 P.S. § 67.506(a)(1) (“An agency may deny a requester access to a record if the requester 

has made repeated requests for that same record and the repeated requests have placed an 

unreasonable burden on the agency.”). 

9

The OOR Docket No. 2013-0859 request was eventually withdrawn. 

10 PFUR’s claim that OOR should have denied Jasper’s participation is meritless. 

Regardless of whether OA has deducted PAC contributions for Jasper, information concerning 

Jasper’s interests was at risk of disclosure and, thus, we agree that his participation in this appeal 

would be probative. 
6

made no PAC contributions by Commonwealth paycheck deduction, OOR’s decision 

in this case would have no bearing on him. See R.R. at 152a. 

 On May 30, 2014, PFUR filed its appeal supplement, in which it argued 

that: (1) OA should be sanctioned for refusing to issue a denial when it knew that it 

had no responsive records for Gray, and it failed to state whether it had records 

relating to Jasper; (2) Jasper should be sanctioned for proactively involving himself in 

the appeal in bad faith due to his refusal to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted; and, (3) if responsive records do exist regarding Jasper, OA failed to meet its 

burden of proving that they are public records exempt from disclosure, particularly 

when PACs must report all contributions in their campaign finance reports.

On June 12, 2014, OOR issued its Final Determination denying PFUR’s 

appeal because “[t]he government may not disclose both the employee’s name and

the amount of any financial contribution without infringing on the employee’s right to 

freedom of association[;]” whether or not information is available under the 

Pennsylvania Election Code (Election Code)11 “does not render that information 

public under the RTKL[;]” and, OOR is without authority to sanction OA. R.R. at 

173a-174a. PFUR appealed to this Court.12

 

11 Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. §§ 2600-3591. The primary and 

general election expense provisions in Article 16 of the Election Code (25 P.S. §§ 3241-3260b) 

were added by Section 2 of the Act of October 4, 1978, P.L. 893.

12 “This Court’s standard of review of a final determination of the OOR is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary.” Hunsicker v. Pennsylvania State Police, 93 A.3d 911, 913 n.7 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2014).

Jasper intervened in this appeal on July 2, 2014.

On October 30, 2014, OA filed an application to strike PFUR’s reply brief, in which PFUR 

responded to OA’s argument on appeal that “[d]isclosure of both an employee name and the amount 

or fact of that employee’s [PAC] payroll deductions would require OA to create a record” (OA Br. 

at 19), since access to PAC contribution data is limited to specific reports filed with the Department 

of State (OA Br. at 22-23; OOR Br. at 25-26). OA contended that since its records creation 

argument made in PFUR I was incorporated in this appeal by its May 23, 2014 record supplement it 

was not new and, therefore, PFUR’s reply brief was inaccurate. Having determined that PFUR’s 
7

“The RTKL was designed to promote access to official government 

information in order to prohibit secrets, scrutinize the actions of public officials and 

make public officials accountable for their actions.” Office of the Governor v. Raffle, 

65 A.3d 1105, 1107 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Accordingly, Section 301(a) of the 

RTKL requires that “[a] Commonwealth agency shall provide public records in 

accordance with [the RTKL].” 65 P.S. § 67.301(a). Section 305(a) of the RTKL 

states:

A record in the possession of a Commonwealth agency or 

local agency shall be presumed to be a public record. The 

presumption shall not apply if:

(1) the record is exempt under [S]ection 708 [of the RTKL]; 

(2) the record is protected by a privilege; or 

(3) the record is exempt from disclosure under any other 

[f]ederal or [s]tate law or regulation or judicial order or 

decree. 

65 P.S. § 67.305(a). Thus, “[p]ublic record” is defined as “[a] record, including a 

financial record, of a Commonwealth . . . agency that: (1) is not exempt under 

[S]ection 708 [of the RTKL]; (2) is not exempt from being disclosed under any other 

[f]ederal or [s]tate law or regulation or judicial order or decree; or (3) is not protected 

by a privilege.” 65 P.S. § 67.102.

“Whether [the] sought after information constitutes a ‘public record’ is a 

preliminary, threshold issue that must be decided before reaching the question of 

 

reply brief was in response to a new issue raised by OA, this Court denied OA’s application to 

strike PFUR’s reply brief on December 4, 2014.

As to the merits, we agree that OA’s record creation defense argument is waived because it 

was not raised before OOR. See Levy v. Senate of Pennsylvania, 94 A.3d 436 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). 

First, OA’s argument notwithstanding, there is no clear reference in the PFUR I final determination 

to any such defense. Second, even if reference was made therein, we are not persuaded that OA’s 

mere incorporation of PFUR I in the instant case is sufficient to raise the argument to OOR. 
8

whether any exceptions . . . apply.” Office of the Governor v. Bari, 20 A.3d 634, 

640 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). In order for the requested information to be a “public 

record,” it “must constitute a ‘record’ under the RTKL[.]” Id. at 640. Section 102 of 

the RTKL defines “[r]ecord” as “[i]nformation, regardless of physical form or 

characteristics, that documents a transaction or activity of an agency and that is 

created, received or retained pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction, 

business or activity of the agency.” 65 P.S. § 67.102. 

Although it is unclear based on this record what role OA plays in L&I 

employee payroll deductions for PAC contributions, OOR has held that if an agency 

has records that reflect the contributions of its employees to 

a PAC which are processed through the [agency’s] payroll 

system, the processing of the contribution is a transaction of 

the agency. Further, to the extent the [agency] processes a 

transaction to forward those contributions to a PAC[,] it is a 

transaction of the [agency]. 

Campbell v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist. (OOR Docket No. 2009-0766) (Pocono 

Mountain School District) at 6; see also PFUR I at 7. Because “the general 

provisions of the [RTKL] must be liberally construed to effect its objects,” Hous. 

Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh v. Van Osdol, 40 A.3d 209, 215 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), 

and where, as here, OA failed to provide evidence that it does not process or forward 

the contributions, the Request is deemed to implicate agency records and the only 

question remaining is whether they are subject to public disclosure. See Pocono 

Mountain Sch. Dist. “The burden of proving that a record of a Commonwealth 

agency . . . is exempt from public access shall be on [OA] by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” 65 P.S. § 67.708(a)(1). 

PFUR first argues that OOR committed an error of law by addressing 

OA’s substantive arguments in support of its denial before determining whether OA 

possessed records responsive to the Request. PFUR specifically asserts that where 
9

there is no evidence that the requested information exists, and OA “mislead[s PFUR] 

and [OOR] regarding the existence of records . . . , this Court should direct OA to 

disclose to [PFUR] and to the [C]ourt whether OA has possession, custody or control 

of any records that are responsive to PFUR’s [R]equest.” PFUR Br. at 14. 

Section 901 of the RTKL mandates:

Upon receipt of a written request for access to a record, an 

agency shall make a good faith effort to determine if the 

record requested is a public record, legislative record or 

financial record and whether the agency has possession, 

custody or control of the identified record, and to respond 

as promptly as possible under the circumstances existing 

at the time of the request. . . . If the agency fails to send the 

response within five business days of receipt of the written 

request for access, the written request for access shall be 

deemed denied.

65 P.S. § 67.901 (emphasis added). This Court has held: 

This Court is bound to interpret statutes according to their 

plain language and, ‘[w]hen the words of a statute are clear 

and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be 

disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.’ 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). By its plain language, Section 901 [of 

the RTKL] describes the actions that an agency is obligated 

to take when it receives a request for a record; it does not 

define what records are subject to disclosure under the 

RTKL. Pursuant to Section 901 [of the RTKL], the agency 

must: first, make a good faith effort to ascertain if the 

requested record is a public, legislative or financial 

record; second, determine whether the agency has 

possession, custody, or control of the record; and third, 

respond promptly.

Office of Budget v. Office of Open Records, 11 A.3d 618, 621-22 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)

(bold emphasis and underline added).

Here, OOR asserted that “[t]he disclosure of the mere fact that [Jasper] 

has PAC contributions deducted from his paycheck would infringe upon his right[] of 

freedom of association. This was not the situation in Staub [v. City of Wilkes-Barre 
10

& LAG Towing, Inc. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 2140 C.D. 2012, filed September 12, 2013)].” 

R.R. at 173 n.3. Based upon the record, it is clear that within the five business days 

allotted by Section 901 of the RTKL, OA notified PFUR that the Request “is under 

legal review to determine whether [the] requested record is a record subject to access 

under the RTKL,” which is a valid response under Section 902(a) of the RTKL, 65 

P.S. § 67.902(a).

13

 R.R. at 3a. Thereafter, OA timely denied the Request, inter alia, 

because OOR’s PFUR I determination established that the names of PAC 

contributors are not subject to disclosure. See R.R. at 4a-5a. Although the 

underlying bases for OA’s denial are in dispute, there is no question that OA 

complied with Section 901 of the RTKL by timely making a substantive 

 

13 Section 902(a) of the RTKL states:

Upon receipt of a written request for access, the open-records 

officer for an agency shall determine if one of the following 

applies:

(1) the request for access requires redaction of a record in accordance 

with section 706; 

(2) the request for access requires the retrieval of a record stored in a 

remote location; 

(3) a timely response to the request for access cannot be accomplished 

due to bona fide and specified staffing limitations; 

(4) a legal review is necessary to determine whether the record is 

a record subject to access under this act; 

(5) the requester has not complied with the agency’s policies 

regarding access to records; 

(6) the requester refuses to pay applicable fees authorized by this act; 

or 

(7) the extent or nature of the request precludes a response within the 

required time period. 

65 P.S. § 67.902(a) (emphasis added).
11

determination that records of only two specifically-named Commonwealth 

employees’ PAC contributions were not accessible public records, and concluding 

that revealing whether OA had possession, custody or control of such records would 

disclose otherwise protected information. 

PFUR’s reliance upon Staub14 to persuade this Court to “direct OA to 

disclose . . . whether OA has possession, custody or control of any records that are 

responsive to PFUR’s request,” is misplaced. PFUR Br. at 14. In Staub, this Court 

examined the City of Wilkes-Barre’s (City) independent obligation to secure records 

of City-directed tows executed by LAG Towing, Inc. to determine whether the 

records were subject to access under Section 506(d) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.506(d)

(relating to third-party government contractor records). This Court affirmed the trial 

court’s order directing the City to pay 10% of the costs incurred by The Citizen’s 

Voice newspaper to litigate its RTKL request because the City simply forwarded the 

record request to LAG and then forwarded LAG Towing, Inc.’s response to the 

requestor when Section 506(d) of the RTKL required the City to take reasonable 

steps to secure the records from LAG Towing, Inc. and then determine if they were 

subject to disclosure. Since OA in this case made an independent determination that 

the requested records were not subject to disclosure, and Staub involved a local 

agency’s duty under Section 506(d) of the RTKL to review third-party records, it is 

clearly distinguishable and not persuasive under the facts of the instant case.

Based upon the foregoing, we hold that OA did not mislead PFUR and 

OOR regarding the existence of the requested information, and OOR did not err by 

addressing OA’s substantive arguments in support of its denial before determining 

whether OA possessed records responsive to the Request.

 

14 Staub is an unreported decision and, thus, has no precedential authority, but rather only 

persuasive value in the eyes of this Court. See Internal Operating Procedure § 414(a). 
12

PFUR next argues that OOR committed an error of law by concluding 

that the public disclosure of Jasper’s PAC contribution deductions would violate his

right to freedom of association under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 

Under Section 305(a)(3) of the RTKL, the presumption that a record in a 

Commonwealth agency’s possession is a public record does not apply if “the record 

is exempt from disclosure under any . . . [f]ederal . . . law . . . .” 65 P.S. § 

67.305(a)(3); see also Jones v. Office of Open Records, 993 A.2d 339 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2010). Moreover, Section 306 of the RTKL expressly provides: “Nothing in [the 

RTKL] shall supersede or modify the . . . nonpublic nature of a record or document 

established in [f]ederal . . . law . . . .” 65 P.S. § 67.306; see also Dep’t of Labor & 

Indus. v. Heltzel, 90 A.3d 823 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). 

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in relevant part:

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ; or the right of 

the people peaceably to assemble . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. In Justice Douglas’ 

concurrence to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Williams v. Rhoades, 393 U.S. 23 

(1968), he explained: 

The right of association is one form of orderly group 

activity protected by the First Amendment. The right to 

engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and 

ideas is one activity of that nature that has First Amendment 

protection. . . . ‘[F]reedom of association for the purpose of 

advancing ideas and airing grievances is protected by the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from 

invasion by the States.’ [Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 

U.S. 516, 523 (1960).]

Id. at 38-39 (Douglas J., concurring) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),15 the U.S. Supreme Court specifically held that 

 

15 Buckley was superseded by statute on other grounds.
13

the First Amendment protects both political expression and political association. The 

U.S. Supreme Court recognized: 

[I]t is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure 

of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may 

constitute [an] effective * * * restraint on freedom of 

association. * * * This Court has recognized the vital 

relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in 

one’s associations. * * * Inviolability of privacy in group 

association may in many circumstances be indispensable to 

preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a 

group espouses dissident beliefs. 

Bates, 361 U.S. at 523 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People 

(NAACP) v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (hereinafter referred to as 

NAACP)). Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has long held:

Decision in [each] case must . . . turn . . . on whether . . . 

instrumentalities of the State have demonstrated so cogent 

an interest in obtaining and making public the membership 

lists of these organizations as to justify the substantial 

abridgment of associational freedom which such disclosures 

will effect. Where there is a significant encroachment 

upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon 

showing a subordinating interest which is compelling. 

[NAACP]. See also Jacobson v. Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 . . . [(1905)]; Schneider v. State 

of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 . . . [(1939)]; Cox v. State of 

New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 . . . [(1940)]; Murdock v. 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 . . . [(1943)]; 

Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 . . 

. [(1944)]; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 . . . [(1949)]. 

Bates, 361 U.S. at 524 (bold emphasis and italics added); see also Buckley; Louisiana 

v. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton 

v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 

Whether public disclosure of PAC contribution deduction records 

violates Commonwealth employees’ right to freedom of association under the First 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or whether the state has an overriding 
14

compelling interest, is an issue of first impression for this Court. However, as the 

parties acknowledge, it is not an issue of first impression for either PFUR or OOR.16

In 2009, Campbell v. Montgomery County Community College (OOR 

Docket No. 2009-0540) (MCCC), PFUR’s current president Simon Campbell 

(Campbell) made a RTKL request for copies of Internal Revenue Service W-2 forms 

sent by MCCC17 to employee Celeste Schwartz (Schwartz). MCCC supplied the 

requested record, but redacted information regarding Schwartz’s payroll deductions 

for United Way contributions because it would expose a financial transaction 

revealing her associations and beliefs. Campbell appealed to OOR. On appeal, OOR 

denied Campbell’s request based upon California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 

21 (1974); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 

1129 (1979); Shelton and OOR’s previous determinations. See MCCC. 

In California Bankers, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), as a 

depositor and representative of its bank customer members, sought to enjoin the U.S. 

Treasury Secretary and other federal agencies from implementing certain provisions 

of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (Act),18 the purpose of which was to make available 

foreign and domestic bank records of customers thought to be engaged in illegal 

activities. Title I of the Act required financial institutions to maintain records of 

customer identities and transactions. Title II of the Act obligated the institutions to 

report certain foreign and domestic financial transactions to the federal government. 

The ACLU attacked those portions of the Act and their implementing regulations 

 

16 Although OOR’s final determinations are not binding on this Court, we may rely upon 

them for their persuasive value. Capital City Lodge No. 12, Fraternal Order of Police v. 

Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 30 A.3d 1241 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); Quaglia v. State Ethics 

Comm’n, 986 A.2d 974 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Gateway Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations 

Bd., 470 A.2d 185 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).

17 As a community college, MCCC is a “state-affiliated” entity that qualifies as a 

Commonwealth agency under Sections 102 and 301(a) of the RTKL.

18 Pub.L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 

1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105, 1121-1122.
15

arguing that, pursuant to NAACP, they violated its customers’ First Amendment free 

speech and association rights. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately 

concluded that the ACLU’s claim was premature, it acknowledged that “absent a 

countervailing governmental interest, [organizational membership information] may 

not be compelled.” California Bankers, 416 U.S. at 55. Justice Powell concurred 

and added: “Financial transactions can reveal much about a person’s activities, 

associations, and beliefs. At some point, governmental intrusion upon these areas 

would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy.”19 Id. at 78-79.

In Plante, the 5

th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the lower 

court’s holding that a law mandating public disclosure of senators’ personal financial 

statements was constitutional. The Plante Court discussed the public status of an 

elected official’s finances, acknowledged the elected official’s legitimate expectation 

of privacy in their financial transactions and stated relative to organizational 

membership disclosure:

Here, memberships, associations, and beliefs are revealed, 

if at all, only tangentially. The Amendment calls for 

disclosure of assets, debts, and sources of income, each to 

be identified and valued. Although in some particular 

situations, rigorous application of the Amendment might 

implicate first amendment freedoms, when considering the 

Amendment on its face[,] this threat is too remote to raise 

the issue.[FN20]

[FN]20. Without implying any views on the merits 

of a suit which properly raised the issue, we feel a 

substantial constitutional issue might be raised by 

disclosure of one’s income tax returns. Such 

disclosure could be troublesome if it were to 

reveal the nature of various contributions made 

by the official or candidate, such as contributions 

to a church, a political party, or a charity. 

Regulations by the Commission on Ethics might, of 

 

19 The majority of the Buckley Court quoted this language with approval. Thereafter, 

Buckley was superseded by statute on other grounds.
16

course, eliminate any threat of such sensitive 

revelations. The issue must await another case.

Plante, 575 F.2d at 1132-33 (emphasis added).

20

In Shelton, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an 

Arkansas statute under which public school teachers, as an employment prerequisite, 

were required to submit affidavits giving the names and addresses of all organizations 

to which they belonged or contributed over the previous five years. The plaintiffs 

argued, inter alia, that the statute deprived them of their rights to associational liberty 

protected by the U.S. Constitution. The Arkansas Supreme Court and the U.S.

District Court upheld the statute. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that 

although teacher competence was of utmost governmental importance, the teachers 

were hired on a year-to-year basis and were not covered by the civil service system 

and, therefore, mandated disclosure to the very people at whose will they serve would 

impair the teachers’ rights of free association “which, like free speech, lies at the 

foundation of a free society.” Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486. In reaching its decision, the 

U.S. Supreme Court stated: 

In a series of decisions[,] this Court has held that, even 

though the governmental purpose be legitimate and 

substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that 

broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end 

can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative 

abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic 

means for achieving the same basic purpose. 

Id. at 488 (footnote omitted). The Shelton Court concluded that “[t]he [subject] 

statute’s comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes far beyond 

what might be justified in the exercise of the State’s legitimate inquiry into the fitness 

and competency of its teachers.” Id. at 490.

 

20 OOR recognized that the Plante disclosure was not analogous to cases preventing 

disclosure of organizational membership as in NAACP and its progeny, including Bates and 

Louisiana.
17

In MCCC, Campbell argued that by not requiring disclosure of payroll 

donations to United Way, a governmental entity was permitted to promote a private 

entity without public knowledge. OOR held that although employees do not have an 

affirmative constitutional right to use a government’s payroll mechanism to assist 

private organizations, Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009), 

“[MCCC]’s allowance and the employee’s voluntary choice to use the public payroll 

mechanism does not outweigh the privacy concerns of one’s personal finances, as 

exempted under [the RTKL].” MCCC at 9. In that case, OOR found that Campbell 

had a more narrow means of gaining information regarding whether MCCC promoted 

private charitable organizations, and that disclosure of a particular individual’s choice 

to participate in payroll deductions and the amount thereof is not necessary to achieve 

that purpose. In the case before us, OOR cited MCCC for the proposition that “the 

names of individual employees are subject to disclosure if any purported financial 

contributions [to] associational organizations are not disclosed.” R.R. at 172a. 

In Pocono Mountain School District, decided shortly after MCCC, 

Campbell sought the names of District employees who had PAC contributions 

deducted from their paychecks in 2008, together with the amounts of their 

deductions. Campbell also asked for the names of the PACs to which the 

contributions were made. The District denied the request. On appeal, OOR deemed 

the amount of the PAC contributions and PAC names public, and required the District 

to provide access to records reflecting the amounts of the individual PAC 

contributions and the names of the recipient PACs. Again citing California Bankers, 

Plante, Shelton and its holding in MCCC, OOR denied the request for individual 

contributor names because disclosure of that information would improperly infringe 

on the employees’ freedoms of association. OOR took the position in the instant 

matter that, based on Pocono Mountain School District, “[t]he government may not 

disclose both the employee’s name and the amount of any financial contribution 
18

without infringing on the employee’s right to freedom of association.” R.R. at 173a

(emphasis in original). 

In PFUR I, in January 2014, PFUR requested that OA produce the full 

names of current and former Commonwealth employees who have or had union PAC 

contributions deducted from their paychecks in 2013, the amounts deducted for each 

individual and the names of the recipient PACs. See PFUR I. Just as it did in this 

case, OA denied the request, arguing that the records are personal financial 

information (see 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(6)), are not agency records (see 65 P.S. § 

67.102) and have no official purpose (see 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(12)). PFUR appealed. 

OOR permitted numerous collective bargaining agents, including the Union, to 

participate on appeal. 

On appeal in PFUR I, OA reiterated its original denial grounds, and 

added that the requested information was protected from disclosure by the 

individuals’ rights to privacy guaranteed by the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions. 

OOR, declaring OA no different than Pocono Mountain School District, and citing 

Shelton and Bates, upheld that mandating public disclosure of the Commonwealth 

employees’ political affiliations would violate their right to freedom of association. 

OOR further acknowledged this Court’s holding in Department of Conservation and 

Natural Resources v. Office of Open Records, 1 A.3d 929 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) that, 

although certified payroll records constitute personal financial information, such 

information is personal only to the extent that the employees’ identities are attached 

to the information, and redaction of the employee names renders otherwise personal 

financial information impersonal. OOR again concluded that the names of 

individuals contributing to PACs is not subject to disclosure, but the amounts of PAC 
19

contributions deducted by a government agency and the names of the receiving PACs 

must be disclosed.21 Notably, PFUR did not appeal from OOR’s PFUR I decision.

In the instant case, citing Shelton and Pocono Mountain School District, 

OOR held that “the names of employees having PAC contributions deducted from 

their paycheck[s] was protected from disclosure by reason of their right to freedom of 

association protected by the First Amendment [to the U.S. Constitution].” R.R. at 

172a. Relying upon its holding in MCCC, OOR held that “the names of individual 

employees are subject to disclosure if any purported financial contributions [to] 

associational organizations are not disclosed.” R.R. at 172a. Referencing Pocono 

Mountain School District, OOR stated, “[c]onversely, if the names of public 

employees are not subject to disclosure, then any financial contributions to 

associational organizations are subject to disclosure.” R.R. at 172a-173a. Based 

thereon, OOR concluded here that “[t]he government may not disclose both the 

employee’s name and the amount of any financial contribution without infringing on 

the employee’s right to freedom of association.” R.R. at 173a (emphasis in original). 

PFUR contends that OOR erred in the instant case by concluding that 

disclosing both Jasper’s name and the amount of his PAC contributions would 

infringe on his right to freely associate with the Union. Specifically, PFUR argues 

that public disclosure of payroll deductions for PAC contributions “is substantially 

 

21 Jasper argues that the Request may be denied due to PFUR’s serial requests for the same 

records. Section 506(a)(1) of the RTKL indeed states that “[a]n agency may deny a requester 

access to a record if the requester has made repeated requests for that same record and the repeated 

requests have placed an unreasonable burden on the agency.” 65 P.S. § 67.506(a)(1). Section 

506(a)(2) of the RTKL states, however, that “[a] denial under this subsection shall not restrict the 

ability to request a different record.” 65 P.S. § 67.506(a)(2). In PFUR I, PFUR requested the 

payroll deduction records reflecting PAC contributions by all current or former Commonwealth 

employees during 2013. In this case, PFUR seeks records of only certain employees, who may or 

may not have made such contributions during 2013, and between January 1 and March 31, 2014. 

Because the Request clearly seeks “a different record,” neither OA nor OOR could have denied the

Request on that basis.
20

related to the significant public interest in the discovery of how public employees use 

government resources to facilitate political contributions to influence political 

elections” and, although disclosure requirements may burden one’s freedom of 

speech and financially harm unions, it does not prevent political speech and, in fact, 

often represents a less restrictive alternative to a flat ban on campaign-related 

activities. PFUR Br. at 22-23. There is no question that the Commonwealth’s use of 

taxpayer resources is of significant public concern. However, the RTKL disclosure 

requirements are not distinguishable from other disclosure laws deemed violative of 

employees’ rights to freely associate. The U.S. Supreme Court in NAACP held that 

the state’s purpose of determining whether the NAACP was conducting intrastate 

commerce in violation of Alabama’s foreign corporation registration statute was not 

sufficient justification to require disclosure of the NAACP’s rank-and-file 

membership rolls. In Bates, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the city’s purpose 

of determining whether an organization’s local chapter was a corporation subject to 

license taxes was not served by disclosure of membership lists. Similarly, the Shelton

Court determined that the state’s purpose of assuring teacher fitness and competency 

was not upheld by a statute compelling teachers to disclose their organizational 

contributions and/or memberships as a condition of employment. In Louisiana, the 

U.S. Supreme Court declared that the state’s purpose of assuring that non-trading 

associations are not affiliated with out-of-state associations whose officers or board 

members are members of subversive organizations was not attained by mandating 

annual disclosure of names and addresses of its in-state members.

More recently, in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, ___ 

U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the aggregate 

limits on contributions to political candidates and party committees 

violate the First Amendment because they are not ‘closely 

drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational 
21

freedoms.’ Buckley, 424 U.S.[] at 25 . . . . In the First 

Amendment context, fit matters. Even when the Court is 

not applying strict scrutiny, we still require ‘a fit that is not 

necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not 

necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope 

is ‘in proportion to the interest served,’ . . . that employs not 

necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means 

narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.’ B[d.] of 

Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 . . . 

(1989) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 . . . (1982)). 

Here, because the statute is poorly tailored to the 

[g]overnment’s interest in preventing circumvention of the 

base [campaign contribution] limits, it impermissibly 

restricts participation in the political process.

McCutcheon, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S.Ct. at 1456-57.

The McCutcheon Court held that the legitimate governmental interest in 

preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption was not served by placing a 

general limitation on campaign contributions. The Court acknowledged that although 

Congress may regulate campaign contributions in order to protect against corruption 

or the appearance thereof, 

[t]he First Amendment ‘is designed and intended to remove 

governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, 

putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely 

into the hands of each of us, . . . in the belief that no other 

approach would comport with the premise of individual 

dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.’

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 . . . (1971). As 

relevant here, the First Amendment safeguards an 

individual’s right to participate in the public debate through 

political expression and political association. [See]

Buckley, 424 U.S.[] at 15 . . . . When an individual 

contributes money to a candidate, he exercises both of those 

rights: The contribution ‘serves as a general expression of 

support for the candidate and his views’ and ‘serves to 

affiliate a person with a candidate.’ Id., at 21–22 . . . .

Those First Amendment rights are important regardless 

whether the individual is, on the one hand, a ‘lone 

pamphleteer[] or street corner orator[] in the Tom Paine 

mold,’ or is, on the other, someone who spends ‘substantial 
22

amounts of money in order to communicate [his] political 

ideas through sophisticated’ means. Nat[’]l Conservative 

Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.[] at 493 . . . . Either way, 

he is participating in an electoral debate that we have 

recognized is ‘integral to the operation of the system of 

government established by our Constitution.’ Buckley, 

supra, at 14 . . . .

McCutcheon, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S.Ct. at 1448. The McCutcheon Court also made 

clear that “Congress may not regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount of 

money in politics, or to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance 

the relative influence of others.” Id. at ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S.Ct. at 1441. 

Further, contrary to PFUR’s contention, the fact that the Election Code 

imposes campaign contribution reporting requirements does not compel disclosure in 

this case. In PFUR I, as it did in the instant case, PFUR argued that the PAC 

contributions cannot be withheld under the RTKL because they are publicly available 

under the Election Code. OOR concluded: “The fact that information may or may 

not be available under the Election Code through [the Department of State] does not 

render that information public under the RTKL. See also Feinour v. C[nty.] of 

Lehigh, OOR [Docket No.] 2014-0507 . . . .” R.R. at 174a. 

First, as OOR acknowledged herein, Section 1626(a) of the Election 

Code, requires that PACs publicly report contributions in excess of $250.00. Under 

Section 1626(b) of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 3246(b), PACs must disclose in their 

reports the name, address, occupation and employer of those contributing in excess of 

$250.00, and must supply the name and address of each person who contributed over 

$50.00, and for contributions under $50.00 only the contributed amount must be 

disclosed. To the extent Commonwealth employees’ contributions are below the 

relevant threshold, their names are not publicly available under the Election Code. 

Thus, in this case as in PFUR I, “there [wa]s no evidence that the requested 

information is actually on file with the Department of State.” PFUR I at 8. 
23

Second, according to the U.S. Supreme Court: 

[First Amendment f]reedoms . . . are protected not only 

against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being 

stifled by more subtle governmental interference. Grosjean 

v. Am[.] Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 . . . [(1936)]; Murdock . . . 

; Am[.] Comm[c’]ns Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 . . 

. [(1950)]; [NAACP]; Smith v. People of the State of 

California, 361 U.S. 147 . . . [(1959).]

Bates, 361 U.S. at 523 (italics added). Thus, “[w]hat the First Amendment precludes 

the government from commanding directly, it also precludes the government from 

accomplishing indirectly.” Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 77-78 

(1990). Accordingly, even “incidental restriction[s] on alleged First Amendment 

freedoms [can be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” U.S. 

v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 

The Election Code’s reporting requirements reflect the General 

Assembly’s attempt to weigh individual rights to political association and 

participation in the political process against the overriding and compelling state 

interest in deterring corruption. Rather than doing away with a reasonable 

expectation of individual associational rights, the Election Code maintains those 

rights while protecting the larger political process.22 If the RTKL were deemed by 

this Court to override the Election Code, the General Assembly’s purpose would be 

subverted.

 

22 “The Legislature enacted the Election Code to regulate the electoral process so that it is 

both orderly and fair. Campaign reporting requirements exist to ensure a fair election and to advise 

the electorate of the manner in which campaign money is spent.” Commonwealth v. Beck, 810 A.2d 

736, 746 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (citation omitted). “The importance of campaign reporting 

requirements is obvious: by preserving public access to the manner in which campaign money is 

received and spent, public confidence in the election process is maintained.” Id.
24

Based upon the foregoing, if Jasper made PAC contributions by

Commonwealth payroll deduction, such activity would be protected by his First 

Amendment right to associate freely. PFUR has not offered any support for its 

conclusion that “the significant public interest in the discovery of how public 

employees use government resources to facilitate political contributions to influence 

political elections” would be furthered by OA disclosing whether and how much 

Jasper may have contributed to a PAC in this manner. PFUR Br. at 22-23. As a 

balance between employees’ privacy and association rights and the public’s right to 

know, OOR has consistently required disclosure of the amount of PAC contributions 

and the receiving PACs. Information revealed in that manner would enlighten PFUR 

as to one way in which Commonwealth employees use Commonwealth resources to 

influence elections. However, specifically naming one particular individual 

contributor and specifying how much he may have contributed is not necessary for 

PFUR to achieve that end. 

OOR’s determination does not prohibit OA from disclosing to PFUR 

whether employee contributions are made and in what amounts. Consistent with its 

administrative precedent and case law, OOR would order OA to produce records 

responsive to PFUR’s request when the contributors’ names and/or the contributed 

sums could be redacted. However, under the specific circumstances of this case, OA 

could not produce records without violating Jasper’s rights. This Court has 

recognized:

There may be some cases in which the evidence establishes 

that disclosure of public records which are not facially 

exempt will necessarily or so easily lead to disclosure of 

protected information that production of one is tantamount 

to production of the other, or that disclosure of the one is 

highly likely to cause the very harm the exemption is 

designed to prevent . . . . 
25

Van Osdol, 40 A.3d at 216; see also Governor’s Office of Admin. v. PFUR, 105 A.3d 

61 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). This case presents just such a circumstance. PFUR initially 

sought records for two specifically-named Commonwealth employees and, on appeal, 

sought records related only to Jasper. If, in fact, Jasper makes PAC contributions by 

Commonwealth payroll deduction, and OA supplied records thereof, redacting his 

name would nevertheless disclose his Union association. Accordingly, we hold that 

OOR did not err by concluding that the public disclosure of Jasper’s PAC 

contribution deductions, if any, would violate his right to freedom of association 

under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 

Finally, PFUR argues that OOR committed an error of law and abused 

its discretion by permitting Jasper to participate in OOR proceedings when there was 

no evidence that the Commonwealth deducted PAC contributions from Jasper’s 

paycheck. PFUR seeks to have either OA or Jasper disclose whether PAC 

contributions were deducted from Jasper’s paycheck and in what amounts. Such 

disclosure would not only reveal records that are not public, but is not required in 

order for OOR to permit Jasper’s participation in this appeal. 

Section 1101(c) of the RTKL states:

(1) A person other than the agency or requester with a 

direct interest in the record subject to an appeal under 

this section may, within 15 days following receipt of actual 

knowledge of the appeal but no later than the date the 

appeals officer issues an order, file a written request to 

provide information or to appear before the appeals officer 

or to file information in support of the requester’s or 

agency’s position. 

(2) The appeals officer may grant a request under paragraph 

(1) if: 

(i) no hearing has been held; 

(ii) the appeals officer has not yet issued its order; and 
26

(iii) the appeals officer believes the information will be 

probative. 

(3) Copies of the written request shall be sent to the agency 

and the requester. 

65 P.S. § 67.1101(c) (emphasis added). Section 1102(a) of the RTKL also states, in 

relevant part: 

An appeals officer . . . shall do all of the following:

(1) Set a schedule for the requester and the open-records 

officer to submit documents in support of their positions. 

(2) Review all information filed relating to the request. 

The appeals officer may hold a hearing. . . . The appeals 

officer may admit into evidence testimony, evidence and 

documents that the appeals officer believes to be 

reasonably probative and relevant to an issue in dispute. 

The appeals officer may limit the nature and extent of 

evidence found to be cumulative. 

65 P.S. § 67.1102(a) (bold emphasis and underline added). Moreover, since the OOR 

has not adopted appeals hearing regulations, the General Assembly mandated that 

“the appeals officer shall rule on procedural matters on the basis of justice, fairness 

and the expeditious resolution of the dispute.” 65 P.S. § 67.1102(b)(3); see Bowling 

v. Office of Open Records, 75 A.3d 453 (Pa. 2013). 

As OOR directed, PFUR and OA notified Gray and Jasper of PFUR’s 

Request and appeal. Gray did not consider payroll deductions for PAC contributions

personal or private, and opted to reveal that no such deductions were made for him. 

Jasper, on the other hand, responded that he “may or may not have made 

contributions to the Union’s [PAC],” and specifically stated that revealing the fact of 

such contributions would violate his constitutional right to associate with the Union. 

R.R. at 25a. Because Jasper’s response went directly to the issue of whether PAC 

contributions by specifically-named Commonwealth employees are accessible public 

records, OOR granted Jasper’s participation request. 
27

This Court has held:

[W]hen agency action is committed to agency discretion by 

law, a court’s review of the agency’s action is well[-

]defined. Specifically,

courts will not review the actions of governmental 

bodies or administrative tribunals involving acts of 

discretion, in the absence of bad faith, fraud, 

capricious action or abuse of power; they will not 

inquire into the wisdom of such actions or into the 

details of the manner adopted to carry them into 

execution. It is true that the mere possession of 

discretionary power by an administrative body does 

not make it wholly immune from judicial review, 

but the scope of that review is limited to the 

determination of whether there has been a manifest 

and flagrant abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary 

execution of the agency’s duties or functions. 

Allegheny Cnty. Housing Auth. v. Liddell, 722 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)

(quoting Blumenschein v. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 109 A.2d 331, 335 (Pa. 1954)). 

Notwithstanding that OA did not reveal whether it had possession,

custody or control of records of PAC contributions deducted from Jasper’s paycheck, 

under circumstances in which Jasper was the only Commonwealth employee 

whose payroll records remained at issue in this appeal, OOR’s appeals officer 

properly determined that Jasper had a direct interest therein, and deemed his

participation “reasonably probative and relevant.” 65 P.S. § 67.1102(a)(2). 

Accordingly, OOR did not err or abuse its discretion, but rather properly exercised its 

discretion in permitting Jasper’s participation.
28

Based on the foregoing, OOR’s Final Determination is affirmed.23

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

 

23 Jasper’s request for costs and attorney’s fees is denied. Section 1304(b) of the RTKL, 65 

P.S. § 67.1304(b), authorizes this Court to award reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation costs for 

frivolous legal challenges “to an agency or the requester.” Because Jasper is a third-party 

intervenor, rather than an agency or requester, he is not entitled to a fee and cost award. Moreover, 

because “decisions of administrative boards or tribunals have no precedential value on this Court[,]” 

and since none of OOR’s prior determinations regarding public access to records of PAC 

contributions made by Commonwealth employees via payroll deduction have been reviewed by this 

Court, the instant legal challenge is not frivolous. Scott v. Delaware Valley Reg’l Planning 

Comm’n, 56 A.3d 40, 44 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Office of Administration, : No. 1019 C.D. 2014

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 18

th day of December, 2015, the Pennsylvania Office 

of Open Record’s June 12, 2014 Final Determination is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge