alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

                             CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In  connection  with the  Annual  Report  of  Minden  Bancorp,  Inc.  (the
"Company") on Form 10- KSB for the period ending December 31, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, A.
David Evans,  President  and Chief  Executive  Officer of the Company,  certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


                                           /s/ A. David Evans
                                           ------------------
                                           A. David Evans
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer
                                           March 30, 2005

      A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act has  been  provided  to  Minden  Bancorp,  Inc.  and will be
retained by Minden  Bancorp,  Inc. and furnished to the  Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.


                                      -1-
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 134 (Friday, July 16, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37737-37738]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-15128]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[S-100-2021]


Foreign-Trade Zone 50--Long Beach, California, Application for 
Expansion of Subzone 50R, VF Outdoor, LLC, Corona, Ontario, and Santa 
Fe Springs, California

    An application has been submitted to the Foreign-Trade Zones (FTZ) 
Board by the Port of Long Beach, grantee of FTZ 50, requesting an 
expansion of Subzone 50R on behalf of VF Outdoor, LLC, located in 
Ontario, California. The application was submitted pursuant to the 
provisions of the Foreign-Trade Zones Act, as amended (19 U.S.C. 81a-
81u), and the regulations of the FTZ Board (15 CFR part 400). It was 
formally docketed on July 12, 2021.
    Subzone 50R consists of the following sites: Site 1 (13.55 acres) 
3950 East Airport Drive, Ontario, San Bernardino County; Site 2 (22.09 
acres) 15614-15620 and 15700 Shoemaker Avenue, Santa Fe Springs, Los 
Angeles County; and, Site 3 (11.5 acres) 2571 Sampson Avenue, Corona, 
Riverside County.
    The applicant is now requesting authority to expand the subzone to 
include an additional site (54.78 acres) located at 5051 South 
Carpenter Avenue, Ontario, San Bernardino County, which would be 
designated as Site 4. The expanded subzone would be subject to the 
existing activation limit of FTZ 50.
    In accordance with the FTZ Board's regulations, Qahira El-Amin of 
the FTZ Staff is designated examiner to review the application and make 
recommendations to the Executive Secretary.
    Public comment is invited from interested parties. Submissions 
shall be addressed to the FTZ Board's Executive Secretary and sent to: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c9afbdb389bdbba8adace7aea6bf"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="83e5f7f9c3f7f1e2e7e6ade4ecf5">[email protected]</span></a>. The closing period for their receipt is August

[[Page 37738]]

25, 2021. Rebuttal comments in response to material submitted during 
the foregoing period may be submitted during the subsequent 15-day 
period to September 9, 2021.
    A copy of the application will be available for public inspection 
in the ``Reading Room'' section of the FTZ Board's website, which is 
accessible via www.trade.gov/ftz.
    For further information, contact Qahira El-Amin at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#306151585942511e755c1d715d595e7044425154551e575f46"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="cb9aaaa3a2b9aae58ea7e68aa6a2a58bbfb9aaafaee5aca4bd">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: July 12, 2021.
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-15128 Filed 7-15-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
# C_2020390EN.01005103.xml

| 16.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 390/51 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 390/51

---

Order of the General Court of 28 September 2020 — Sky v EUIPO — Safran Electronics & Defense (SKYNAUTE by SAGEM)

(Case T-523/19) (1)

(2020/C 390/70)

Language of the case: English

The President of the Sixth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 305, 9.9.2019.

---
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S. C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of American Commerce Solutions, Inc., (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ended February 28,
2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Daniel L. Hefner, Chief Executive Officer, President and Director of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S. C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                   |  |                                                
|------------------ |  | -----------------------------------------------
|Date: June 1, 2010 |  | /s/ Daniel L. Hefner                           
|                   |  | Daniel L. Hefner                               
|                   |  | Chief Executive Officer, President and
Director
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 792 

To authorize the waiver of certain debts relating to assistance provided 

to individuals and households since 2005. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 12, 2011 

Mr. PRYOR introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

A BILL 

To authorize the waiver of certain debts relating to 

assistance provided to individuals and households since 2005. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Disaster Assistance 

5 Recoupment Fairness Act of 2011’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEBTS SINCE 2005. 

7 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 

8 (1) the term ‘‘covered area’’ means an area— 

9 (A) located in an area that has been iden10 tified by the Administrator of the Federal 


rfrederick on DSKD9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 792 IS

1 Emergency Management Agency as an area 

2 having special flood hazards under the National 

3 Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4001 

4 et seq.); and 

5 (B) located in a community that does not 

6 participate in the national flood insurance pro7 gram under the National Flood Insurance Act 

8 of 1968; and 

9 (2) the term ‘‘covered assistance’’ means assist10 ance provided— 

11 (A) under section 408 of the Robert T. 

12 Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assist13 ance Act (42 U.S.C. 5174); and 

14 (B) in relation to a major disaster declared 

15 by the President under section 401 of the Rob16 ert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 

17 Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5170) during the pe18 riod beginning on August 28, 2005, and ending 

19 on December 31, 2011. 

20 (b) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—The Administrator of the 

21 Federal Emergency Management Agency— 

22 (1)(A) may waive a debt owed to the United 

23 States relating to covered assistance provided to an 

24 individual or household if the covered assistance was 


rfrederick on DSKD9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 792 IS

1 distributed based on an error by the Federal Emer2 gency Management Agency; and 

3 (B) shall waive a debt owed to the United 

4 States relating to covered assistance provided to an 

5 individual or household located in a covered area if 

6 the reason for the debt relates to a failure to partici7 pate in the national flood insurance program under 

8 the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968; and 

9 (2) may not waive a debt under paragraph (1) 

10 if the debt involves fraud, the presentation of a false 

11 claim, or misrepresentation by the debtor or any 

12 party having an interest in the claim. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSKD9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
**Exhibit 23.1**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

 

The Board of Directors 

Optical CableCorporation: 

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference inRegistration Statement No. 333-09433 on Form S-8, Registration Statement No. 333-103108 on Form S-3 and Registration Statement No. 333-115575 on Form S-8 of Optical Cable Corporation of our report dated December 17, 2004, with respect to the balancesheets of Optical Cable Corporation as of October 31, 2004 and 2003, and the related statements of operations, shareholders’ equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended October 31, 2004, which report isincorporated by reference in the October 31, 2004 Annual Report on Form 10-K of Optical Cable Corporation. 

 

Roanoke, Virginia 

January 21, 2005
# C_2020191EN.01001402.xml

| 8.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 191/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 191/14

---

Order of the General Court of 23 March 2020 — Highgate Capital Management v Commission

(Case T-280/19) (1)

(Action for annulment - State aid - Complaint - Measure not open to challenge - Inadmissibility)

(2020/C 191/19)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Highgate Capital Management LLP (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: M. Struys, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: K. Blanck, A. Bouchagiar and K.-Ph. Wojcik, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of the Commission’s decision rejecting a complaint relating to unlawful State aid granted to Eurobank Ergasias SA through the acquisition of Piraeus Bank Bulgaria (SA.53105), allegedly contained in the letter of 8 March 2019 from the Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition and in the public statement of 20 March 2019 of the Commissioner responsible for competition.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as being inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as being inadmissible.

| 2. | There is no need to rule on the application to intervene of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund. |
| --- | --- |

2.

There is no need to rule on the application to intervene of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund.

| 3. | Highgate Capital Management LLP shall pay the costs, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures, with the exception of those relating to the application to intervene. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Highgate Capital Management LLP shall pay the costs, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures, with the exception of those relating to the application to intervene.

| 4. | The Hellenic Financial Stability Fund shall bear its own costs relating to the application to intervene. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Hellenic Financial Stability Fund shall bear its own costs relating to the application to intervene.

---

(1)  OJ C 213, 24.6.2019.

---
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CUAUHTEMOC BALTAZAR-OROZCO,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-73200

Agency No. A075-664-548

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 13, 2010** 

Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Cuauhtemoc Baltazar-Orozco, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for cancellation of

removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo

FILED

SEP 27 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-73200

questions of law, Altamirano v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2005), and

claims of constitutional violations in immigration proceedings, Iturribarria v. INS,

321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2003). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition

for review. 

The agency properly concluded that Baltazar-Orozco was the subject of an

expedited removal order that interrupted his continuous physical presence. See

Juarez-Ramos v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 2007) (an expedited

removal order interrupts an alien’s continuous physical presence for cancellation

purposes). Baltazar-Orozco’s due process claim fails because he cannot

demonstrate prejudice. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000)

(requiring prejudice for a petitioner to prevail on a due process claim).

We lack jurisdiction over Baltazar-Orozco’s contention that the expedited

removal order in the record did not pertain to him, because he failed to exhaust this

contention before the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.

2004).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
# C_2020230EN.01003401.xml

| 13.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 230/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 230/34

---

Judgment of the General Court of 28 May 2020 — Martínez Albainox v EUIPO — Taser International (TASER)

(Case T-342/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark TASER - Earlier EU word marks TASER - Relative grounds for refusal - Detriment to reputation - Unfair advantage taken of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark - Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2020/C 230/42)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Martínez Albainox, SL (Albacete, Spain) (represented by: J. Carbonell Callicó, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Gája, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Taser International, Inc. (Scottsdale, Arizona, United States)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 March 2019 (Case R 1576/2018-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Taser International and Martínez Albainox.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Martínez Albainox, SL to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Martínez Albainox, SL to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 255, 29.7.2019.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 837 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 837

  To amend title 23, United States Code, to remove privatized highway 
           miles as a factor in apportioning highway funding.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 14, 2011

 Mr. Bingaman (for himself and Mr. Grassley) introduced the following 
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment 
                            and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title 23, United States Code, to remove privatized highway 
           miles as a factor in apportioning highway funding.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Transportation Equity for All 
Americans Act''.

SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF PRIVATIZED HIGHWAY MILES.

    (a) In General.--Section 104(b) of title 23, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
            ``(6) Privatized highway miles.--
                    ``(A) Definition of privatized highway.--In this 
                paragraph, the term `privatized highway' means a 
                highway subject to an agreement giving a private 
                entity--
                            ``(i) control over the operation of the 
                        highway; and
                            ``(ii) ownership over the toll revenues 
                        collected from the operation of the highway.
                    ``(B) Exclusion.--For the purposes of paragraphs 
                (1), (3), and (4), the lane miles and vehicle miles 
                traveled on a privatized highway that is otherwise an 
                included highway shall be excluded from consideration 
                as factors in the formula for apportionment of funds 
                under this title.''.
    (b) Equity Bonus.--Section 105 of title 23, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(g) Privatized Highways.--Calculations under this section shall 
be made without taking into account the exclusion under section 
104(b)(6) of certain lane miles and vehicle miles traveled from 
consideration as factors in the formula for apportionment of funds 
pursuant to this title.''.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2020247EN.01001001.xml

| 27.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 247/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 247/10

---

Judgment of the General Court of 10 June 2020 — L. Oliva Torras v EUIPO — Mecánica del Frío (Vehicle couplings)

(Case T-100/19) (1)

(Community design - Invalidity proceedings - Registered Community design representing a coupling to hitch refrigeration or air conditioning equipment to a motor vehicle - Single head of claim seeking alteration - Implicit application for annulment - Admissibility - Ground of invalidity - Failure to comply with the requirements for protection - Articles 4 to 9 and Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 - Extent of the examination carried out by the Board of Appeal - Position adopted by the Board of Appeal on the failure to comply with a requirement for protection during the procedure - Divergent conclusion in the contested decision - Obligation to state reasons - Article 62 and second sentence of Article 63(1) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002)

(2020/C 247/15)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: L. Oliva Torras, S.A. (Manresa, Spain) (represented by: E. Sugrañes Coca and M. D. Caballero Pérez, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Mecánica del Frío, S.L. (Cornellá de Llobregat, Spain) (represented by: J. Torras Toll, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 19 November 2018 (Case R 1397/2017-3), relating to invalidity proceedings between L. Oliva Torras and Mecánica del Frío.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 19 November 2018 (Case R 1397/2017-3); |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 19 November 2018 (Case R 1397/2017-3);

| 2. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 3. | Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by L. Oliva Torras, SA; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by L. Oliva Torras, SA;

| 4. | Orders Mecánica del Frío, SL, to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Orders Mecánica del Frío, SL, to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 139, 15.4.2019.

---
# C_2019295EN.01000501.xml

| 2.9.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 295/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.9.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 295/5

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Apelativen sad — Plovdiv (Bulgaria) lodged on 21 May 2019 — Criminal proceedings against OM

(Case C-393/19)

(2019/C 295/08)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Apelativen sad — Plovdiv

Party to the main proceedings

OM

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be interpreted as meaning that a national provision such as that pursuant to Article 242(8) of the Nakazatelen kodeks (Criminal Code, ‘the NK’) of the Republic of Bulgaria, according to which a means of transport used to commit aggravated smuggling which belongs to a third person who neither knew nor could or should have known that its employee was committing the offence must be confiscated for the benefit of the State, is unlawful on the grounds that it undermines the fair balance between the public interest and the need to protect the right to property? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be interpreted as meaning that a national provision such as that pursuant to Article 242(8) of the Nakazatelen kodeks (Criminal Code, ‘the NK’) of the Republic of Bulgaria, according to which a means of transport used to commit aggravated smuggling which belongs to a third person who neither knew nor could or should have known that its employee was committing the offence must be confiscated for the benefit of the State, is unlawful on the grounds that it undermines the fair balance between the public interest and the need to protect the right to property?

| 2. | Is Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be interpreted as meaning that a national provision such as that pursuant to Article 242(8) of the NK, according to which a means of transport owned by a person who is not the person who committed the offence can be confiscated without the owner being guaranteed direct access to the courts to state its case, is unlawful? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Is Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be interpreted as meaning that a national provision such as that pursuant to Article 242(8) of the NK, according to which a means of transport owned by a person who is not the person who committed the offence can be confiscated without the owner being guaranteed direct access to the courts to state its case, is unlawful?

---