alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Christopher Lynn SHORT, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 11-6184.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 28, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 2, 2011.

Christopher Lynn Short, Appellant Pro Se. Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Lynn Short seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2011) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28. U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of ap-pealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Short has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 99.1



                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Town Sports International, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Robert Giardina, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. (Section Mark)1350, as adopted pursuant to (Section Mark)906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

                (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

                (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


/s/ ROBERT GIARDINA
Town Sports International, Inc.
Chief Executive Officer
March 14, 2003
#### BATHRICK v. COFFIN.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

April 7, 1898.)

Appeal—Law of the Case—Second Trial.

Where judgment dismissing a complaint is reversed, and a new trial ordered, upon the ground that the question involved should have been submitted to the jury, and upon the second trial the evidence is substantially the same, the law declared by the court on the appeal is the law of the case, and a second dismissal is improper.

Appeal from trial term.

Action by Ellsworth R. Bathrick against Charles E. Coffin. From a judgment dismissing the complaint; plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and BARRETT, RUMSEY, McLaughlin, and patterson, jj.

Isaac N. Miller, for appellant.

William G. Romaine, for respondent.

*895PEE OUEIAM.

Upon the first trial the complaint was dismissed, but upon appeal the judgment was reversed, and a new trial ordered upon the ground that the question involved should have been submitted to the jury. 13 App. Div. 101, 43 N. Y. Supp. 313. Upon the second trial the learned trial justice again dismissed the complaint, notwithstanding the fact that the evidence offered was substantially the same as that presented upon the first trial. The law declared by the court on the first appeal is the law of the case. The learned trial justice, for some reason which does not appear, did not see fit to apply the law as there declared.

Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
that Coyer provided assistance in the prosecution of another case. The 

sentencing agreement was drafted after Coyer entered his plea and did not 

have the effect of amending the guilty plea agreement; it was not signed 

by Coyer and it was not presented to the district court for approval. 

Moreover, the sentencing agreement's terms were fulfilled.' The parties 

informed the district court that Coyer provided substantial assistance, the 

district court considered Coyer's assistance as a mitigating factor, and the 

State argued for probation. Accordingly, we conclude that Coyer's 

contention is belied by the record and that he has failed to demonstrate 

plain error in this regard. 

Coyer also contends that "[t]he district court abused its 

sentencing discretion by failing to consider the July Sentencing Agreement 

and the assistance [he] provided in the prosecution of another matter." 

We review a district court's sentencing decision for abuse of discretion. 

Chavez v. State, 125 Nev. 328, 348, 213 P.3d 476, 490 (2009). Coyer's 16- 

to 60-month prison sentence falls within the parameters of the relevant 

statute, see MRS 205.060(2), he has not demonstrated that the district 

court relied solely upon impalpable evidence, see Denson v. State, 112 Nev. 

489, 492, 915 P.2d 284, 286 (1996), and the district court's decision to 

grant probation is discretionary, see NRS 176A.100(1)(c). Moreover, as 

1The sentencing agreement provided, "If I provide the substantial 

assistance by testifying truthfully at all criminal proceedings including 

but not limited to the preliminary hearing and trial, then the State will 

inform the Court that I have provided substantial assistance and 

recommend probation for the charge of burglary." 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A ze 
Cherry 

discussed above, the record indicates that the district court considered the 

assistance that Coyer provided as a mitigating factor. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. 

Having determined that Coyer is not entitled to relief, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

ji-A--Q-Ldartt 

Hardesty 

tELfii tAr-S 

Douglas 

cc: Hon. Gary Fairman, District Judge 

State Public Defender/Ely 

State Public Defender/Carson City 

Attorney General/Carson City 

White Pine County District Attorney 

White Pine County Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-19-00158-CR

EX PARTE EVERETT MADURAI §

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 431st District 

Court

of Denton County (F17-2519-431)

August 22, 2019

Opinion by Justice Bassel

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that the 

appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed as moot.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By _________________________________

 Justice Dabney Bassel
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

GERALD HALL JR.,

Petitioner

v.

MICHAEL ZAKEN, SUPERINTENDENT,

Respondent :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 55 EM 2021

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 8 th day of December , 2021, the Application for Leave to File

Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.
# C_2020390EN.01003602.xml

| 16.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 390/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 390/36

---

Judgment of the General Court of 23 September 2020 — Clouds Sky v EUIPOEUIPO — The Cloud Networks (Wi-Fi Powered by The Cloud)

(Case T-738/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark Wi-Fi Powered by The Cloud - Absolute grounds for refusal - Distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - No descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001))

(2020/C 390/52)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Clouds Sky GmbH (Cologne, Germany) (represented by: C. Weil, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Rampini and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: The Cloud Networks Ltd (London, United Kingdom)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 September 2019 (Case R 696/2019-5) relating to invalidity proceedings between Clouds Sky and The Cloud Networks.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Clouds Sky GmbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Clouds Sky GmbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 10, 13.1.2020.

---
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-20401

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

LEONEL GARCIA JUAREZ, also known as Leonel Juarez Garcia, also known

as Leonel Garcia-Juarez, also known as Leonel Garcia, also known as Leonel J.

Garcia,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:10-CR-894-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, GARZA, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Leonel Garcia Juarez

has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th

Cir. 2011). Garcia Juarez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s

brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 17, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 11-20401 Document: 00511761958 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2012
No. 11-20401

counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate

review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED,

counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS

DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

2

Case: 11-20401 Document: 00511761958 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/17/2012
# C_2021019EN.01004701.xml

| 18.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 19/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 19/47

---

Judgment of the General Court of 18 November 2020 — Topcart v EUIPO — Carl International (TC CARL)

(Case T-378/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark TC CARL - Earlier national figurative mark CARL TOUCH - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2021/C 19/49)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Topcart GmbH (Wiesbaden, Germany) (represented by: M. Hoffmann, lawyer)

Defendant: European Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Carl International (Limonest, France) (represented by: B. Müller, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 April 2019 (Case R 1617/2018-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Carl International and Topcart.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Topcart GmbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Topcart GmbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 270, 12.8.2019.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE THREE AND SIX MONTH PERIOD ENDED JULY 31, 1998 AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-27-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-26-1998
<CASH>                                          38,589
<SECURITIES>                                    31,245
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,099
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     13,785
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                98,967
<PP&E>                                          12,097
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,784
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 112,546
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           31,596
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            25
<OTHER-SE>                                      80,925
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   112,546
<SALES>                                         53,396
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                53,396
<CGS>                                           31,058
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   31,058
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                12,162
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 372
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,723
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,753
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,970
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,970
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .30
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .27
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2

NANOGEN, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with
the accompanying Quarterly Report of Nanogen Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the three months ended June 30, 2008 (the Report), I, Nicholas Venuto, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                |  |  |  |                        
|--------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------
|                |  | 
|August 13, 2008 |  |  |  | /s/ NICHOLAS J. VENUTO 
|                |  |  |  | Nicholas J. Venuto     
|                |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FORM THE
UNAUDITED INTERIM CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ROSE HILLS COMPANY AND
SUBSIDIARIES, FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                           1,694
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,052
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        904
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                22,302
<PP&E>                                          63,585
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 321,149
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           17,038
<BONDS>                                         80,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     130,671
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   321,149
<SALES>                                         21,787
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                21,787
<CGS>                                           13,358
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   13,358
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,640
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,839
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,450
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,071
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,379
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
# C_2019328EN.01002401.xml

| 30.9.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 328/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.9.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 328/24

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 9 July 2019 — Entoma SAS v Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances, Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation

(Case C-526/19)

(2019/C 328/26)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Entoma SAS

Defendants: Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances, Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation

Question referred

Is Article 1(2)(e) of the Regulation of 27 January 1997 (1) to be interpreted as including within its scope foods consisting of whole animals intended to be consumed as such or does it apply only to food ingredients isolated from insects?

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997 concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients (OJ 1997 L 43, p. 1).

---
#### SCHLESINGER v. BUTCHER et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

October 18, 1907.)

Action by Leo Schlesinger, as receiver, against Edward Butcher, imleaded.

No opinion. Motion granted, with 10 costs. Order filed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Genovevo CHACON-MARQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-10415

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 6, 2009.

Cody Lee Skipper, U.S. Attorney’s Office Northern District of Texas, Lubbock, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Sherylynn Ann Kime-Goodwin, Federal Public Defender’s Office Northern District of Texas, Lubbock, TX, for Defendants Appellant.

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Genovevo Chacon-Marquez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation. The presentence report (PSR) recommended a base offense level of eight pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a) and an increase of eight levels pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C) based upon his previous Arizona conviction for Aggravated Driving Under the Influence (DUI). Chaeon-Mar*80quez argues that the district court erred in treating his Arizona conviction for Aggravated DUI federal drug conviction as an “aggravated felony” under § 2L1.2.

Pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C), a defendant’s base offense level for the conviction of illegal reentry is enhanced by eight levels if the defendant has previously been convicted for an “aggravated felony.” “For the purposes of subsection (b)(1)(C), ‘aggravated felony’ has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)), without regard to the date of conviction for the aggravated felony.” § 2L1.2, comment. (n.3(A)). Section 1101 provides, in pertinent part, that crimes of violence as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 16 constitute aggravated felonies. § 1101(a)(43)(F). In *United, States v. Chapa-Garza,*243 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir. 2001), this court held that a felony DUI was not a crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16.

The Government has confessed error on this point and requests that the sentence be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. We agree. The Government’s motion to vacate and remand is GRANTED. The Government’s motions for dismissal or summary affirmance and extension of time are DENIED.

Chacon-Marquez’s sentence is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for resentencing. As Chacon-Marquez’s sentence has been vacated there is no need to discuss or preserve any other issues related to that sentence.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.