## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Shacht er v. City of Chicago , 2011 IL App (1st) 103582

Appellate Court Caption J AY F. SHACHTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CI TY OF CHI CAGO,

a Munic ip a l Co r

p o r a ti o n , T H E D E PART M EN T O F A D M I N I ST RA T I

VE HE AR I NGS
, and THE DEPARTMENT OF S T R E E T S an d SANI TATI ON, De fenda

nts-Appellee s.

District & N o. First District, F irst Division Docke t No. 1-10-3582

Filed Rehea ringdenied Dec ember 5, 2011
J anuar y 5, 2012

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t o

f the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The trial court proper ly aff irmed administrative finding s that plaintiff vio l at ed ordinanc es involving the car e of his proper ty and the parkw ay outside his home and reje cted pla i n t i ff’ s arg uments that his petition for substitut ion of jud ge s h o uld have been g rante d, that the administrative law off icer ’s finding s were ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e, and that the c ity ’s wee d and par kway ordinanc es we re unc onstitut ional.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 09-M1-450812; the Hon. Will iam G. Pilegg i, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l J ay F. Shac hter, of Chica g o, appellant pro se

.

Mara S. Geor g es, Corporation Counsel, o f C h icag o (B enna Ruth Solomon, M y

riam Z rec zny

Kaspe r, Stephen R. Patton, a nd Suz anne M. L oose, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counse l), for a ppellees.

Panel J USTI CE ROCHFORD delivere d the judgme nt of the court, wi t h opinion.
J ustices Hall and K arne zis concur red in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 This a

ppeal arises out of

an administrative pr ocee ding in which plaintiff-a ppellant, J ay F. Shachter
, was found to have violated two municipal ordinanc es involving the car e of his
proper ty and the parkw ay outside his home. Plaintiff there afte r filed a complaint in the circ uit
court for administrative revie w and decla ratory judgme nt ag ainst defe ndants-appe llees, The City of Chicag o, a mun i ci p al corpor ation (the city ), the depar

tment of administrative hear ings, and the depar

tment of streets and sanitation. In that complaint, plaintiff asser ted a number of proce dural and substantive challeng es to the administrative proce eding s, as well

as constitutional challeng es to the two municipal ordinanc es he was found to have violated. After havingquashed pla intiff’s subpoenas, denied plaintiff’s reque st to prese nt a dditional evidenc e, and denied a motion for substitut ion of judge
, the circ uit court aff irm ed the administrative finding s and re jected pla intiff’s constitutional challeng es. ¶ 2 On appea l, plaintiff raises a number of challeng es to both the administrative and circ uit
court proce eding s, and also continues to press his constitutional challeng es to the ordinanc es themselves. F or the re asons that follow, we aff irm.

¶ 3 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 On Oc t o b er 2 3
, 2 0 0 9
, an office r of the city ’s depar tment of streets and sanitation completed a written “ADMI NI STRATI VE NOTI CE O F O RD I NA N CE V I O L

A T I O N

. ” T h a

t notice of violation as s er t ed that conditions on or near proper ty plaintiff owned on the northwest side of Chicag o cause d him to be in violation of two provisi o n s of the Chicag o Municipal Code (municipal code)

. Specifica lly
, the notice alleg ed that wee ds on plaintiff’s
proper ty wer e over 10 inches tall and that plaintiff had failed to maintain the parkw ay in front of his proper

ty

. These conditions wer e alleg ed to be in violation, respe ctively
, of sections 7- 28-120(a ) and 10-32-050 of the city ’s municipal code. C h i ca g o Municipal Code § 7-28- 1 2 0 (a ) (ame nded Dec

. 4, 2002) (we ed ordinanc e), § 10-32-050 (ame nded J uly 10, 2002 )

-2-(par kway ordinanc e). Finally
, the notice indicated that an admini strative hear ing on these violations had been schedule d for November 24, 2009. This notice of violation was mailed to plaintiff on November

2, 2009. ¶ 5 The hear ing was held as schedule d befor e an administrative law office r (AL O) sitti ng in the city ’s depar

tment of administrative hear i n gs , environmenta l safe ty hear ings division. Plaintiff appea

red and wa s s wo rn i n as a witness. The AL O there afte r rec ited the two violations a s specifie d on the notice of violation, state d that the office r who had completed the notice of violation had also taken pictures of plaintiff’s proper ty and the parkw ay in front of pl aintiff’s property
, and indi cate d that these photos had been provided to the AL O wit h attache d descr iptions. The A L O then stated that these photos a nd the office r’s descr iptions indicated that plaintiff’s proper ty and the par kway in front of his proper ty contained
overgrown wee ds and grass, this situation was “attra cting rodents,” and that plaintiff was a “re peat offe nder.” The AL O then enter ed the photos into the rec ord, found that the city had stated a cause of action for the alleg ed violations, and asked plaintiff: “What’s your defe nse? Tell me why

this is nota violation.” ¶ 6 Plaintiff stated that he had a written motion to dismiss
, which the AL O indicated he was not authorized to hear

. This written motion i s n o t contained in the rec ord on appea l. Neve rtheless, afte r plaintiff stated he did not want to waive any challeng e he might later raise in the circ uit court, he wa s al l o we d to rea d his motion into the rec ord. The transcr ipt indicates that plaintiff’s motion asse rted that the city had failed to provide him with proper notice of the admini strative hearing beca u s e t he name of t he officer completing the not ice of violation was not included on that document. The AL O denied this motion on the g rounds that he wa s not authorized to hear suc h prehe aring motions t o dismiss

. ¶ 7 Plaintiff then asked to see the “orig inal complaint” filed in this case

. The AL O indicated that this reque st was not rele vant in light of the fac t that he had alre ady found that the city ’s written notice of violation a nd the photos, taken toge ther, had stated a cause of action. The AL O then indicate d that plaintiff could fur ther pursue this iss ue bef

ore the circ uit court. ¶ 8 Plaintiff there afte r prese nted a written reque st for a subpoena compelling the appea ranc e and testimony of the office r who i s s ued the notice of violation. The written motion was enter ed into the rec ord and plaintiff was g iven an opportunity to suppo rt t h at motion with oral argument. In both the written motion and oral argument, plaintiff g ener ally asser ted that beca use what was or was not a “we ed” wa s “i n h ere ntly ambiguous and subjective,” and beca use he had a rig ht to cross-e x amine witnesses pursuant to section 1 -2

. 1 -5 (c ) of the I l l i n ois Municipal Code (65 I L CS 5/1-2.1-5(c ) (West 2008)), “ther e is no other wa y t h e City ’s case can be made other than by having the person who took those photogr aphs come in here and identity

for y our sake as we ll as for mine whic h of those plants he c onsiders to be the wee ds and which he does not.” The AL O denied this motion as well, finding a decision could be made upon the e vidence alre ady prese nted. ¶ 9 Plaintiff then m ade a num ber of substantive and const itutional arguments with respec t to the alleg ed violation of the city ’s wee d ordinanc e. Substantively
, plaintiff arg ued that the

wee d ordinanc e did not specific ally define what a wee d actua lly was. Citi ng to dictionary definitions defining a weed as a plant “growing wher e y ou don’t want i t , ” p l aint iff argued

-3-that “[a]ll of the plants on my land are g rowing exactly wher e I want them.” He also testified

that h i s l an d wa s well tended, it was “the best tended land on [hi s] block,” he tended the parkw ay as we ll, and other prope rties in the ar ea w ere strewn with rubbish. ¶ 10 Wit h respe ct t o h i s co n s t i t u t i o n al ar guments, plaintiff first argued that the wee d ordinanc e was “fatally unspecific beca use it does not g ive the citizenry notice of what is and what is not prohibited.” Specifica lly
, plaintiff argued that the ordinanc e did not “spec ify what

a wee d is.” Plaintiff then argued that the ordinanc e did not bear a rational relationship to any leg itimate public purpose beca use: (1) the plants on his pr operty wer e not noxious; and (2) nothing about the condition of his proper ty contributed to any rodent problem. Plaintiff also
argued that beca

use t he “rig ht to proper

ty is a fundamental right guar antee d by the I llinois Constitution it must–the ordinanc e must not only satisfy the rational relationship test but it
must also satisfy the strict scrutiny test.” Plaintiff finally argued that the ordinanc e had been arbitra rily enfor ced a

nd that it also invit ed ar

bitrary enfor ceme nt. ¶ 11 Following plaintiff’s argument, the AL O found that th e al l ege d v i o l ati ons had bee n proven by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e and imposed a total of $300 in fines and $40 in administrative costs. Plaintiff’s re quest to stay enfor ceme nt of this order wa s denied. ¶ 12 The followin g d ay , p laintiff filed a four- count complaint in the circ uit court. The fir st count soug ht administrative revie w of the AL O’s finding that he had violated the city ’s wee d ordinanc e. That count included alleg ations that this ordinanc e: (1) was vague and subjective; (2) invited arbitra

ry enfor ceme nt; (3) had b een arbitra rily enfor ced; (4) failed the “strict scrutiny” test beca

use it limit ed the right to proper ty in an overly broad manner ; and (5) bore

no rational relationship to any leg itimate or intended public purpose. Count I also included alleg ations that: (1) the administrative hear ing was conducte d without proper notice; (2) plaintiff wa s denied his rig ht to cross-e x amination at the hear ing; (3) the city ’s case was improperly prese nted by an employee of the depar tment of administrative hearings; and (4) the finding s of fac t at t h e administrative hear ing wer e ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e and contra

ry to law. Fina lly , count I soug ht reve rsal of the administrative finding with respec t to the weed or dinance or a r emand f or fur ther proc eeding s. ¶ 13 The second count of plaintif f’ s co m p l aint specific ally incorporated only the first five alleg ations discussed above a nd asked f

or a de clar ation that the city ’s wee d ordinanc e wa s invalid. The third and fourth counts al s o sought administrative revie w and a decla ratory judgme nt, re spectively
, and asserted nearly identical allegations with reg ard to the findi ng that plaintiff had violated the city ’s parkw ay ordinanc e. We do n o t e t h at these two counts omitted a ny asser tion that the parkw ay ordinanc e failed the “strict sc rutiny” test or bore no rational re lationship to any leg itimate or intended public purpose

. ¶ 14 In an order enter ed o n Fe b ru ary 1
, 2 0 10, defe ndants wer e g rante d leave to file their

answe r instanter
, and plaintiff was order ed to file a written “spec ification of the err ors relied
upon for reve rsal” pursuant to section 3-108 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (C ode) (735 I L CS 5/3-108 (West 2008)). That order also grante d defe ndants leave to file a wr i t ten response to the specific ation of err ors and continued the matter to J une 8, 2010. Plaintiff filed his specific ation of err ors on Marc h 18, 2010, and raised m an y o f t h e same issues and
arguments, including the constitutional challeng es, that he had r aised in the a dminist rative

-4-hear ing. Def endants filed their response on April 30, 2010, arguing that the administrative 1
proce eding s wer e proper , the finding s of the AL O wer e supported by the evidenc e prese nted, and the or dinance s themselves we re c onstitut ional. ¶ 15 On May 24, 2010, and J une 7, 2010, plaintiff had subpoenas issued seeking to have two Chicag o park district employ ees testify at t h e J u n e 8
, 2010, hear ing. At that hear ing, an attorney for the park district prese nted a motio n t o quash plaintiff’s subpoenas, and that motion was supported by the defe ndants. Whil e the written motion itself does not appea r in the rec ord, following oral argument the trial court g rante d the park district’s motion. The trial court’s dec i s i on was based on its finding that the circ uit court was not allowed to hear additional evidenc e in administrative review case s. The circ uit court there fore reje cted plaintiff’s argument that such an evidentiar y limit ation should not apply here beca use he had specific ally pleade d in his complaint

– in addition to his two counts seeking administrative revie w–two separ ate counts seeking a decla ratory judgme nt that the two municipal ordinanc es involved in the administrative proc eedingwer e unconstitutional. ¶ 16 Despite g ranting the motions to quash, the circ uit court agree d to include languag e in its order allowing plai n t i ff to seek an interlocutory appea l pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(a)

. I ll. S. C t

. R. 308(a) (ef f. Feb. 26, 2010). The question cer tified by the circuit court

was “whe ther the Circuit Court may hear new evidenc e in adjudicating a constitutional challeng e.” Howeve r, the circ u i t court denied plaintiff’s reque st to stay the proce eding s pending resolution of plaintiff’s Rule 308 application for leave to appea l and set the matter for a future hear ing on September 7, 2010. T h i s court denied plaintiff’s application for interlocutory appea l in an order entered on J uly 27, 2010. Whil e plainti ff’ s application for leave to appeal wa s pending in this court, he filed a motion asking the circ uit court to

re consider its J une 8, 2010, order

. That motion was hear d at a final hear i n g h el d o n September 21, 2010. ¶ 17 At that hearing, the circ uit court first denied plaintiff’s motion to rec onsider. In its written order
, the circuit court made it clea r t hat pl aintiff would not be permitted to int ro du ce any evidenc e in support of either his administrative revie w counts o r the counts seeking decla ratory judgme nt. The circ uit court then addre ssed a petition, filed by plaintiff on the day of the hear ing, reque sting a substitut ion of judge for cause pursuant to section 2-1001(a)(3) of the Code. 735 I L CS 5/2-1001(a) (3) (West 2008). In that petition, plaintiff asser ted that the circ uit court had been biased by being prese nted with defe ndants’ written re s ponse to his specific ation of err ors. Plaintiff claimed that this written response was not permitted beca use the circ uit c ourt only g rante d defe ndants leave to f ile such a re sponse and se ction 3-108(b) of the Code only allows parties to file additional pleading s wher e they are “ required by the court.” (Emphasis adde d.) 735 I L CS 5/ 3-108(b) (West 2008). ¶ 18 The circ uit court denied plaintiff’s petition, fi n d i n g i t untimely and unfounded. The

We not e t hat
, whil e cou nts I I I and I V of pla int if f’ s ori ginal complai nt inc lud ed a gener al 1

ass erti on tha t the ci ty’s par kway ord ina nce “i s, and had con si st ent ly bee n, arbit ra ri ly enf orc ed,” tha t

ar gum ent was not inc lud ed in pl ai nti ff ’s sub seq uen tl y fi le d wri tt en spe ci fi cat ion of error s. Mo re over, tha t c ont ent ion has not bee n f urt herpur sue d i n ei the r i n t he c ir cui t c our t o r o n ap pea l.

-5-circ uit court judge also reje cted plaintiff’s asser tion that he had no autho ri ty to rule on the petition for substitut ion and that the petition must rathe r be hear d by a differ ent judge

. When the circuit court then asked plaintiff if he was prepa red to cont i nu e to considera tion of t he merits of his complaint, plaintiff indicated that he did not believe he could con t i n u e to participate in the proce eding s without waiving his argument that the petition for substitut ion of judge should have been hear d by a differ ent judge

. Plaintiff maintained this position with
respe ct to the circ uit court’s deter mination of both the two administrative revie w counts and the two decla

ratory judgme nt counts. After hear ing argument from defe ndants, the circ uit
court enter ed an order

aff irming the administrative decision and finding the two municipal ordinanc es in question constitutional. P laintiff now appe als.

¶ 19 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 20 On appea l, plaintiff raises a host of proce dural, substantive, and constitutional challeng es to both the administrative and the c ircuit court proce eding s. He fir st asserts that the c ircuit
court s h o u l d not have ruled on the petition to substitut e without transfe rring it to another judge for consi d er at i o n and that the substitut ion petition should have been g rante d on the merits. He then raises a number o f ch al l en g es to the administrative proce eding s and also

asser ts that the AL O’s finding s wer e ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e. Plaintiff’s
next contention is that the circ uit court err ed in d en yi n g him the opportunity to prese nt evidenc e in support of his complaint fo r ad m inistrative revie w and decla ratory judgme nt. Finally
, plaintiff rea sserts his arguments that the city ’s wee d and parkw ay ordinanc es are unconstitutional. W e addr ess ea ch of the se ar guments in turn.

¶ 21 A. Substitution of J udg e ¶ 22 Plaintiff’s first contentions on appea l involve his petition for substi tution of j u d ge. As noted above, plaintiff asserts that the circuit court erre d by not transfe rring his petition for substitut ion to another judge for consideration and–eve n assuming that such a transfe r was not require d–the circ uit court err ed by denying that petition on the merits. We revie w these contentions first–befor e further addre ssing plaintiff’s other challeng es to the administrative and circ uit co u rt p roce eding s–beca use wher e a petition for substitut ion of judge is

err oneously denied, “all order s enter ed subsequent to the denial are null and void.” Chicago Transparent Products, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago
, 337 I ll. App. 3d 931, 945 (2002) (citing In re Dominique F.
, 145 I ll. 2d 311, 324 (1991))

. Our revie w of

a circ uit court’s ruling on a motion to substitut e judge is de novo

. Powell v. Dean Foods Co.
, 405 I ll. App. 3d 354, 359 (2010). ¶ 23 Her e, plaintiff filed a petition to substitu t e j u d ge “f or cause ” pursuant to section 2- 1001(a) (3) of

the Code, which in re levant par t provides: “(3) Substi tution for cause . When cause exis ts. (i) Ea ch par

ty shall be entitled to a substitution or substi tutions of judge f or ca use. (ii) Every ap p l i ca t i on for substi tution of j udg e for cause shall be made by petition, setting forth the specific cause for substitut ion a nd pray ing a substitut ion of judge

. The

-6-petition shall be verifie d by the af fidavit of the a

pplicant. (iii) Upon the filing of a petition for substitut ion of judge for cause , a h ea ri n g to deter mine whether the cause exis ts shall be conducte d as soon as possible by a judge other than the judge n am ed in the petition. The judge named in the petition need not testify but may submit an aff idavit if the judge wishes. I f the petition is allowed, the case shall be assig ned to a judge not named in the petition. I f the petition is denied, the case shall be assig ned back to the judge named in the petition.” 735 I L CS 5 / 2 -1 0 0 1(a) (3) (West 2008). ¶ 24 In construing this section, our supreme court has stated that the provisions of this statute:

“a re to be liberally construed to promote rathe r than defe at the rig ht of substitut i o n , particul ar l y wh er e the ‘ca use’ claimed by the petitioner is that the trial judge is prejudice d ag ainst him. [C itations.] The courts have al s o re cognized, howeve r, that a party ’s rig ht to have a petition f or substitut ion he ard by another judge is not automatic. [C itations.] Principles of l ibera l construction do not excuse the obl iga tion of parties to adher e to express statutory require ments. [C itation.] Trial cour ts are r equire d to r efe r a petition to another judge for a hear ing on whether cause for substitut ion exis ts only if the party seeking t h at relief is able to bring himself or herse lf within the provisions of the law. [Cit ation.]
In order to trig g er the rig ht to a hear ing befor e another judge on th e qu es t i on of whether substitut ion for cause is war rante d in a civil case purs uant to section 2- 1001(a) (3), the reque st must be made by petition, the petition must set forth the specific

cause for substitution, and the petition mustbe ver ified by aff idavit. ***

***
To meet the statute’s threshold require ments, a petition for substitut ion must a lleg e g rounds that, if true, would justify granting substitut ion for cause

. [C itation.] Where bias

or prejudice is invoked as the basis for seeking substitut ion, it must normally stem from

an extrajudicial source , i.e.
, from a source other than from what the judge lear ned from her participation in the case befor e her. A judge ’s previous ruling s almost never constitute a valid basis for a claim of judicial bias or partiality .” In re Estate of W ilson
, 238 I ll. 2d 519, 553-54 (2010). ¶ 25 I n d ee d
, o u r s upreme court has rec ently rea ffirme d that “ac tual prejudice ” must b e established in any petition seeking substitut ion o f a judge for cause

. In re Marriage of O’Brien
, 2011 I L 109039, ¶30. I t had also been rec og nized that opinions “ ‘form ed b y the j u d ge on the basis of fac ts introduced or events occur ring in the course of the curr en t proce eding s, or of prior proce eding s, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they

display a dee p-seated favoritism or antag onism that would make fair judgme nt impo s s i b l e. ’ ” Eyc haner v. Gross
, 202 I ll. 2d 228, 281 (2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). ¶ 26 In this case , plaintiff’s p et i t i o n fo r substitut ion was premised upon the circ uit court’s handling of his written specific ation of err ors and defe ndants’ wri t t en response there to. Plaintiff’s petition asser

ted that by allowi ng , but not requiring
, defe ndants to file a response to his specific ation of err ors, the circ uit court had not proper ly followed section 3-108(b) of

-7-the Code. 735 I L CS 5/ 3-108(b) (West 2008).

¶ 27 T h e p etition noted that while section 3-108 of the Code require s a plaintif f s ee k i n g administrative revie w to file a complaint, require s a defe ndant administrative ag ency to file

an answe r consisting of the rec ord of the administrative proce eding s, and allows the circ uit
court to require a plaintiff to file a specific ation of err ors, it further provides: “No pleading s other than as here in enumer ated shall be filed by any party unless require d by the court.” 735 I L CS 5/3-108(a)
, (b) (West 2008). Plaintiff claimed that defe ndant’s written response to his specific ation of err ors in this case was not permitted beca use the trial court o n l y g rante d defe ndants leave to file such a response , and section 3-108(b) of the Code allows parties to file additional pleading s only wher e they are “ required by the court.” (Emphasis added) 735 I L CS 5/3-108(b) (West 2008). Plaintiff further claims that he was prejudice d by defe ndant’s writ ten response , as the circ uit court judge had thus “exposed himself to argu m en t s i n support of De fenda

nt’s position t hat the L eg islature did not want him to be exposed to.” ¶ 28 As an initial matter, we fai l t o s ee how plaintiff can possibly establish a violation of section 3-108(b) or any resulting prejudice

. Whil e this section clea rly limit s the ability of the parties to independe ntly file any additional pleading s in administrative revie w proce eding s, it also quite clea

rly g rants the circ uit court authority to “re quire” such pleading s. I f a circ uit court can compel a party to file additi onal pl eading s, it can cer tainly grant that party leave
to do so. Moreove r, we fail to compre hend plaintiff’s argument that a party ’s pleading would be unprejudicia l wh ere “re quired” by the circ uit court, but that same pleading somehow prejudice s a circ uit court judg e whe n filed only afte r leave to do so is gr anted. ¶ 29 Moreove r, even if we assumed that a v i o l at i o n o f s ec t i o n 3 -1 0 8(b) occur red he re, plaintiff’s asser

tions complet ely fail to prese nt a case of “ac tual prejudice ” sufficie nt to establish the threshold require ments for a petition to substitut e for cause

. Plaintiff’s petition contained no asser

tions of any extrajudicial source of bias or prejudice
, and as noted above, opinions “ ‘f

ormed by the judg e on the basis of facts introduced or events occurr ing in the

course of the curr ent proce eding s, or of prior proce eding s, do not constitute a basis for a bias
or par tiality motion unless they

display a dee p-seated favoritism or antag onism that would make fair judgme nt impossibl e.’ ” Eyc haner
, 202 I ll. 2d at 281 (quoting Liteky
, 510 U.S. at 555). We see no such evidenc e of favor itism or antag onism here

. Indeed, plaintiff’s petition did not even i n cl u d e any such alleg ations, but instead relied on the prejudice alleg edly inhere nt in what he views a s a tec hnical violation of sec tion 1-308(b) of the Code. ¶ 30 These alleg ations are insufficient to satisfy even the threshold require ments for a petition seeking substitut ion of a judge for cause

. We there fore find that the circ uit court did not err i n either ref

using to transfe r plaintiff’s petition to another judge for consideration or i n denying the petition on the merits. As such, the order s enter ed by the circ uit court following the denial of this petition, including the final order from which plaintiff appea ls, wer e not rende red null and void.

¶ 31 B. A dminist rative Proc eeding s ¶ 32 Ha v ing deter

mined that the final circ uit court order from which plaintiff has appe aled

was validly enter ed, we may now addre ss plaintiff’s asser tions reg arding the administrative

-8-proce eding s conducte d below.

¶ 33 1. Standard of Re view ¶ 34 Pursuant to the I llinois Municipal Code (65 I L CS 5/1-2.1-1 et seq

. (West 2008)) and the city ’s municipal code, the final decision enter ed by the AL O in the administrative proce eding below is subject to judicial revie w. See 65 I L CS 5/1-2.1-7 (West 2008) (“Any final decision by a code hear ing unit that a code violation does or does not exis t shall co n s t i t u t e a final deter mination for purposes of

judicial revie w and shall be subject to revie w under the I llinois Administrative Review L aw.” ); Chicag o Municipal Code § 2-14-102 (adde d Apr. 2, 1998) (same)

. The I llinois Administrative Review L aw, in turn, provides that judicial revie w of an administrative decision “shall extend to all questions of law and fac t prese nted by the entire

rec ord befor e the court” and “[t] he finding s and conclusions of the administrative ag ency on questions of fac t sha ll be held to be prima fac ie true and corr ect.” 735 I L CS 5/3-110 (West 2008). F urthermor e, our supr eme c ourt has stated:
“T h e applicable standard of revie w–which deter mines the extent of defe rence af forde d to the administrative ag ency ’s decision–depe nds upon whether the question
prese nted is a question of fac t , a question of law, or a mix ed question of law and fac t. [C itations.] Rulings on questions of fac t will be reve rsed only if ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. [C itation.] In contra st, questions of law are revie wed de novo [citation]
, and a mix ed question of law and fac t is revie wed under the clea rly err oneous standard [citations]

. We further note that, under any standard of revie w, a plaintiff to an administrative proce eding bear s the burden of proof, and relief will be denied if he or she fails to sustain that burden.” Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board
, 225 I ll. 2d 497, 532-33 (2006)

. Finally
, “[i] n administrative case s, our role is to revie w t h e d ec i s i on of the administrative
ag ency , not the deter

mination of the circ uit court.” Id . at 531.

¶ 35 2. PleadingRequirements ¶ 36 Plaintiff first contends the administrative proce eding s aga i n s t h i m wer e void beca use there is no indication that they wer e initi at ed b y t h e fi ling of a “wr itten pleading .” We disag ree

. ¶ 37 In support of this argument, plai n t i ff ci t es to section 1-2.1-4 of the I llinois Municipal Code, which initially provides that a municipality may establish a “sy stem of administrative adjudication” and that any such sy stem “shall p rovide for a code hear ing unit within an exis ting ag ency or as a separ ate ag ency in the municipal g overnme nt.” 65 I L CS 5/1-2.1-4(a ) (West 2008). Of particular relevanc e here, the I llinois Municipal Code also states t hat any “proc eeding befor e a code hear ing unit shall be ins t i tu t ed upon the filing of a writt en pleading by an authorized officia l of the municipality .” (Emphasis added.) 65 I L CS 5/1-2.1- 4(d) (West 2008). On appea l, plaintiff notes that he asked the AL O to see the city ’s “orig inal complaint” at the administrative proce eding below but was rebuf fed. He there fore contends there is no evidenc e that a written pleading was ever fi l ed
, an d the administrative
proce eding s wer e there fore void beca use they did not comport with section 1-2.1-4( d) of the

-9-I llinois Municipal Code.

¶ 38 Howeve r, section 1-2-1 of the I llinois Municipal Code provi d es : “[ t ] h e co rp o ra t e authorities of eac h municipality may pass all ordinanc es and make all rules and regulations
proper or nece ssary , to car ry into eff ect the power s g rante d to municipalities.” 65 I L CS 5/1- 2-1 (West 2008). In turn, the city ’s municipal code provides: “[a]ny authorized depar tment

or ag ency of the city may institute an administrative adjudi cation proce eding with the depar tment of administrative hear ings by forwa rding a copy of a notice of violation or a notice of hear ing, which has been pro p er ly serve d, to the depar tment of administrative hear ings.” Chic a g o Municipal Code § 2-14-070 (ame nded Apr. 29, 1998). I t is there fore clea r that, pursuan t t o t h e authority g rante d by section 1-2-1 of the I llinois Municipal Code, the city ’s municipal code proper ly treats a fi led and serve d notice of violation as the “wr itten pleading ” re quired to institute an administrative proc eeding

. ¶ 39 Moreove r, plaintiff doe s not challeng e the f act that both he a

nd the AL O had copie s of the “ADMI

NI STRATI VE NOTI CE OF ORDI NANCE VI OLATI ON” at the administrative hear ing, a copy of this notice had been proper ly serve d up o n p l ai ntiff, and the “DEPARTMENT OF ADMI NI STRATIVE HEARI

NG COPY” of that document appea rs in the administrative rec ord orig inally filed in the circ uit court. As such, we find that t he pleading require ments of both the I llinois Municipal Code and the city ’s municipal code

wer e fully

complied with in this case.

¶ 40 3. Notice Require ments ¶ 41 Plaintiff next contends the administrative proce eding ag ainst him was improper beca use he did not rec eive pr oper notice

. ¶ 42 The I llinois Municipal Code provides: “[p] arties shall be g iven notice of an adjudicator y hear ing which includes the ty pe and nature of the code violation to be adjudicate d, the date and location of the adjudicator y hear ing, the leg al authority and jurisdiction under which the hear ing is to be held, and the penalties for failure to appea r at the hear ing.” 65 I L CS 5/1-2.1- 5(b) (West 2008). In implementing this provision of the I llinois Municipal Code, section 2- 14-074(a ) of the c ity ’s municipal code provides: “[b]efore a ny administrative adjudication
p ro ce eding may be conducted, the parties shall be afforde d notice in compliance with t h i s section.” Chicag o Municipal Code § 2-14-074( a) (ame nded Apr. 29, 199 8 ). That section further provides: “Unless otherwise provided by law or rule, th e i s suer of a noti ce of violation or not ice of hear ing shall specify on the notice his or her name and depar tment; wher e known, the

name a nd addre ss of the per son or entity char g ed with the viol ation; the date, time and place of the violat ion; and the section of the code or depar tmental rule or regulation wh i ch was alleg edly violated; and shall cer tify the corr ectne ss of the specifi ed information by signing his or her name to the notice. A not i ce of hear ing shall also include the date, time and location of the hear ing and the penalties for failure to a ppear at the hea ring .” Chicag o Municipal Code § 2-14-074(b) (a mended Apr . 29, 1998). ¶ 43 Plaintiff’s arg

ument focuse s on that p o r

ti o n o f s e c ti o n 2-14-074( b) of the city ’s municipal code that require s that “the issuer of a notice of

violation or notice of he aringshall specify

-10-on the notice his or her name and depar tment.” Plaintiff complains that the notice of violation he rec eived contained only the issuer’s illeg ible signature, the notice there fore violated the require ments of section 2-14-074( b), and the notice he rec eived thus failed to confe r proper jurisdiction upon the city ’s depa rtment of administrative he aring s. ¶ 44 We disag ree

. Even if we we re t o fi n d t h at the notice plaintiff rec eived contained a technica l violation of section 2-14-074( b), the Adm i n i strative Review L aw provides: “[t] echnic al er rors in the proce eding s befor e the administrative ag ency or its failure to observe the technica l rules of evidenc e shall not constitute g rounds for the reve rsal of the administrative decision unless it appea rs to the court that such err or or failu re m ater ially aff ecte d the rig hts of any party and resulted in substantial injusti ce to him or her.” 735 I L CS 5/3-111(b) ( West 2008); see also McCleary v. Board of Fire &Police Comm’n of the City of W oodstoc k
, 2 5 1 I ll. App. 3d 988, 993 (1993) (“the appellate court may reve rse an administrative ruling only if there is err or which prejudice d a party in the proce eding ”). Her e, plaintiff does not even attempt to alleg e any prejudice resulting from this purported violation, relying solely on his asser tio n that the require ments of section 2-14-074( b) are mandatory and may not be disreg arde d. ¶ 45 Nor do we perc eive how plaintiff could alleg e any prejudice

. The rec ord ref lects that, in addition to the issuing office r’s signature, the notice serve d upon plaintiff also included the office r’s unit and badg e number. The notice the r e fore contained all of the information neede d for plaintiff o r t h e AL O to deter mine the issuing office r’s identity
, and plaintiff cannot establish that any possible defic iency in the notice of violation materia lly aff ecte d his rig hts

or re sulted in any

substantial injust ice.

¶ 46 4. AL O’s F ailure to I ssue Subpoena ¶ 47 Plaintiff next asser ts that t h e ALO i m p roperly denied his reque st to issue a subpoena requiring the testimony of the city office r that is s u ed t h e n o t ice of violation. In the administrative proce eding below, and ag ain on appea l, plaintiff contends the AL O’s ref usal was improper

beca use: (1) he had an a

bsolute rig ht to cross-examine the witnesses a g ainst him pur suant to the I llinois Municipal Code; and (2) the offic er’ s testimony was nece ssary to bring clar ity to the city ’s otherwise vague alleg ations reg arding a vio l at i o n o f the wee d ordinanc e, and in turn a llow plaintiff to mount a proper de fense to that char g e. ¶ 48 First, we note that the I llinois Municipal Code provides: “[p] arties shall be provided with

an opportunity for a hear ing during which they may be repr esente d by coun s el
, prese nt witnesses, and cross-e x amine opposing witnesses. Parties may reque st the hear ing office r to issue subpoenas to direc t the attenda nce and testimony of rele vant witnesses and the
p ro du ct ion of rele vant documents.” 65 I L CS 5/1-2.1-5(c ) (West 2008). Fur thermore
, the city ’s municipal code provides: “[u] pon the timely reque st of any party to the proce eding
, any perso n , w h o th e a d mi n istrative law office r deter mines may rea sonably be expected to provide
test imony which is materia l and which does not constitute a needle ss prese ntation of cumulative evidenc e, shall be m ad e av ail able for cross-e x amination prior to a final deter mination of liability .” Chicag o Municipal Code § 2-14-076( j) ( amende d Apr. 29, 1998). The city ’s code there fore further provides: “[t] h e administrative law office r may issue

-11-subpoenas to secur e the attendanc e and testimony of rele vant witnesses and the production

of re levant docume nts. I ssuance of subpoena s shall be subject to the re strictions contained in Se ct i o n 2 -1 4-080.” Chicag o Municipal Code § 2-14-076( f) (ame nded Apr. 29, 1998). Section 2-14-080 of

the code in turn provides: “(a ) An administrative law office r may issue a subpoena only if he or she deter mines that the testimony of the witnesses or the documents or items soug ht by the subpoena are

nece ssary to present e vidence that is: (i) re levant to the ca se; and (ii) rela tes to a contested issue in the case .” C h i cago Municipal Code § 2-14- 080(a) (ame nded Apr . 29, 1998). ¶ 49 We find nothing in these provisions to indicate that a subpoena must be issued to a llow for cross-e x amination when reque sted by a party to an administrative hear ing. Indeed, the I llinois Municipal Code quite clea rly provides that while “[ p]arties shall be provided with

an opportunity ” for an ad m i n i s trative hear ing, at any such hear ing parties “ may ”

cross-e x amine opposing witnesses and “ may request the hear ing office r to issue subpoenas.” (Emphasis added.) 6 5 I L CS 5/1-2.1-5(c ) (West 2008). In turn, the city ’s municipal code provides t h at wi tnesses will be made available for cross-e x amination only afte r the AL O deter mines that they “may rea sonably be expected to provide testimony which is materia l and which does not constitute a needle ss prese n t ation of cumulative evidenc e.” Chicag o Municipal Code § 2-14-076( j) (am ended Apr. 29, 1998). As such, the AL O is only authorized to issue a subpoena afte r a deter mination has been made that the reque sted subpoena is “ nece

ssary to prese nt evidenc e” that is rele vant. (Emphasis added.) Chicag o Municipal Code § 2-14-080( a) (ame nded Apr. 29, 1998). We ag ain note that these municipal code provisions wer e adopted under the auth o ri t y g rante d by section 1-2-1 of the I llinois Municipal Code. 65 I L CS 5/1-2-1 (West 2008). As such, we reje ct plaintiff’s arg ument that either the I llinois Municipal Code or the city ’s municipal code provides that–upon rec eiving plaintiff’s reque st–the AL O was required to issue a subpoena and provide plaintiff with an opportunity

to cross-e x amine the of

fice r that issued the notice of violation. ¶ 50 Next, we addre ss plaintiff’s argument th at t h e o ff i ce r’s testimony was nece ssary for plaintiff to defe nd ag ainst the cit y ’s as s er tion that he violated the wee d ordinanc e. Specifica lly , plaintiff contends he : “wa s g iven a notice of violation that Plaintiff ha d ‘we eds’ on his proper ty , but Plaintiff did not know which plants were the alleg ed ‘we eds’, and which wer e not; and Plaintiff neede d to know this, in order to be able to mount a defe nse. Thus, if the issuing office r

wer e to say , ‘ these plants are wee ds, and those plants are not wee ds’, then Plaintiff could
prese nt an appropr iate defe nse (‘these plants are not wee ds’, or, ‘these plants are not ten inches tall’, or

‘these pla

nts are not on my

proper ty ’).” (Emphase s in origina l.) ¶ 51 We reje ct plaintiff’s argument on this point

. He re , p l ai n t i ff wa s issued a notice of vio l ation indicating that he was in violation of the wee d ordinanc e beca use of “WEEDS–GRASS OVER 10” TAL L FRONT–A ND BA CK YARD.” At the hear ing on this notice of violatio n , the city also prese nted phot og raphic evidenc e of these alleg ations. We fail to see how plaintiff was unable to prese nt a defe nse without the office r’s testimony about

-12-which specific plants on plaintiff’s proper ty wer e or wer e not wee ds. Plaintiff was fre e to prese nt testimony and any other evidenc e of his own to rebut the city ’s alleg ations and evidenc e, including evidenc e supporting his asser tion that none of the plants on his proper ty

wer e wee ds. Indeed, plaintiff did so in part by specific ally testifying at the hear ing that some

2 of the plants on his proper ty wer e not wee ds but rather wer e mulberr

y or elm sapling s. ¶ 52 As this court has r e c o gn iz e d “ [a ]n a d min is trative ag ency ’s decision reg arding the conduc t of its hear ing and the admission of evidenc e is g overne d by an abuse of discretion standard and is subjec t to reve rsal only if there is demonstrable prejudice to the complaining party .” Matos v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Bo a r d
, 4 0 1 I ll. App. 3d 536, 541 (2010). Her e, the AL O ul timately denied plaintiff’s reque st fo r a subpoena only afte r considering plaintiff’s
arguments and finding
, “I think I can make a decision with the evidenc e I have.” We find no abuse of discretion in that dec ision.

¶ 53 5. Notice of Violation ¶ 54 P laintiff next contends the administrative proce eding s violated his due proce ss ri gh t s beca use he was not adequatel y ap p ri sed of what, exactly
, he had done to violate the wee d ordinanc e. S pecif

ically
, he co n t en d s the city was required to tell him exactly which plants on his property

wer e we eds. We disag ree

. ¶ 55 “Administrative complaints are not require d to state the char g es with the same pre cision, ref inements, or subtleties as pleading s in a judicial proce eding .” Vuagniaux v. Departme nt of Professional Regulation
, 208 I ll. 2d 173, 195 (2003). Indeed, “ch ar ges fi l ed befor e an administrative age ncy ‘nee d only be drawn sufficie ntly so that the alleg ed wrong doer is

rea sonably apprised of the case ag ainst him to intelligently prepa re his defe nse.’ ” Id

. at 196 (quoti n g S i ddiqui v. Departme nt of Professional Regulation
, 307 I ll. App. 3d 753, 757 (1999))

. As noted abo v e, in this case plaintiff was provided with a notice of violation

s pecif ically indicating that he was char g ed with violating the wee d ordinanc e beca use o f “W E E DS –GRASS OVER 10” TAL L FRONT–A ND BA CK YARD.” We fail to compre hend how plaintiff was not suf ficiently put on notice of the alleg ations ag ainst him, and ther efor e re

ject his asser

tions with respect to this issue.

¶ 56 6. Presentation of the City ’s Case ¶ 57 We next addre ss plaintiff’s asser tion that the AL O improperly violated that portion of the city ’s municipal code which provides: “[i] n no event shall the case for the city be prese nted by an employ ee of the depar tment of administrative hear ings.” Chicag o Municipal Code § 2- 14-076(c ) (ame nded Apr. 29, 1998). Plaintiff claims that this provision was violated beca use the AL O:

We al so not e t hat pl ai nti ff was awar e of the type of eviden ce tha t woul d be pre sen te d by 2 the ci ty, as the fi ve- page wri tt en m emorandum he pre sen te d at the hea ri ng in sup por t of his re que st for a sub poe na inc lud ed the ass er ti on tha t “[ o]n inf ormati on and bel ie f, the ins pec tor bas es his cas e upon ce rt ai n ph oto graphs .”

-13-“wa s prese nted with photogr aphs which did not specify the nature o f t h e acc usation
ag ainst the Plaintiff. The [AL O] look ed at t h e photogr aphs, and constructe d his own

acc usation from them, saying to himself, ‘those plants, and those plants, and those plants, and those plants, are wee ds, and those other plants, over there
, are not wee d s ’. This is
somet h i n g t h e [AL O] may not do
, beca use to construct his own acc usation from an ambiguous set of photogr aphs is to prese nt the case for the city .” (Emphasis in orig inal.) ¶ 58 We disa g ree with pla intiff’s contention. The city ’s municipal code provides that AL Os “shall have all p o we rs n ece ssary to conduct fair and impartial hear ings including, but not limit ed to, the power to *** hear testi m o n y ; *** rule upon motions, objections, and the admissibili ty of evidenc e; *** prese rve and authenticate the rec ord of t h e h ear ing and all exhibi ts and evidenc e introduced at the hear ing; [and] *** issue a final order which includes finding s of fac t and conclusions of law.” Chicag o Municipal Code § 2

- 1 4

- 0 4 0 ( amende d Apr. 29, 1998). Indeed, the very provision plaintiff cites g oes on to s p ecif ically provide that “docume ntary evidenc e, including the notice o f violation, which has been prepa red by another depar

tment or ag ency of the city
, may be prese nted at the heari ng by the administrative law office r.” Chicag o Municipal Code § 2-14-076( c) (am ended Apr. 29, 1998). ¶ 59 In this case , the AL O proper ly enter ed into the rec ord, pursuant to the above -re fer ence d authority
, the notice of violation and photogr aphic evidenc e prepared by the city

. The AL O then adjudicated the city ’s claim in light of that evidence and the testimony provided by plaintiff. In no way did the AL O construct his “ own acc usation” from the city ’s prese ntations,

nor did he violate that portion of the city ’s municipal code prec luding him f rom prese nting the city ’s ca se.

¶ 60 7. Violation of Plaintiff’s Right to B e He ard ¶ 61 Plaintiff next argues that the AL O denied him h i s ri gh t t o b e hear d on the par kway ordinanc e violation at the administrative hea ring

. Plaintiff c ontends the AL O thus violate d section 1-2.1-5( c) of the I llinois Municipal Code (65 I L CS 5/1-2.1-5(c ) (West 2008)), which

as noted above provides: “[p] arties shall be provided with an opportunity for a hear ing during which they may be repr esente d by counsel, prese nt witnesses, and cross-e x amine opposing witnesses.” We disagree

. ¶ 62 The rec ord ref lects that on the day of the hearing in this case , plaintiff had actua lly been schedule d for administrative hearings on three separ ate municipal ordinanc es violations, i.e.
, the two violations c ontained in the notice of violation at issue in this appea l a nd a separ ate notice of violation containing another unrelated violation. During plaintiff’s prese ntation of his defe nse, the AL O told plaintiff that, beca use plaintiff had arr ived late to the hear ing, the AL O would only addre ss the two violations at issue in this case

. Specifica lly
, the AL O stated: “We’ll make a decision on this ticke t, a nd on the second ticket I ’m g oing to have to continue. Ok? ” Plaintiff re sponded, “A ll right.” ¶ 63 Plaintiff w as then g iven over an hour to pre sent his defe nse, which nota bly did inc lude

some defe nse to the parkw ay violation. Howeve r, the AL O ultimately indicated that plaintiff would have to complete his prese ntation due to other pending case s on the docket. Plaintiff

-14-did so, and the AL O proce eded to rule on both ordinanc e violations contained in the notice

of violation at issue here

. When he did so, plaintiff indicated that he did not understand that the AL O would be pr ocee ding on both the w eed a nd parkw ay

violations. ¶ 64 Now on appea l, pla intiff contends: “if he had known that he was g oing to be judge d on both charg es afte r his tim e expired, he would have abridg ed his de fense of the first char g e, and spent some time d ef en d i n g h imself from the second charg e. The [AL O] there fore conducte d the hear ing in such a way so as to deny Plaintiff his rig ht to be hear d.” (Emphasis added.) Howeve r, the rec ord does not suppor t this asser

tion. Plaintiff was clea

rly informed of the AL O’s decision as t o how the hea ringwould proce ed, and it is plaintiff himself that
appar ently mi s u

n d e r s tood this decision despite responding
, “All right.” Moreove r, the rec ord indicates that the leng th of plaintiff’s administrative hear ing was truncated, at least in pa rt, beca use he arr ived late. In no way does this rec ord ref lect that the AL O somehow denied plaintiff his rig hts under the I llinois Municipal Code.

¶ 65 8. Evidentiary Support for AL O’s De cision ¶ 66 Having addre ssed plaintiff’s proce dural cha ll e n g es to the administrative proce eding s, we

now addre ss his substantive challeng e to the AL O’s u l t i m ate finding that plaintiff had violated the city ’s wee d and par kway ordinanc es. ¶ 67 As noted above, plaintiff was alleg ed to have vio l at ed t h e ci t y ’s we ed and par kway ordinanc es. The wee d ordinanc e provides: “[a]ll wee ds which have not been cut or otherwise controlled, and which exceed an aver ag e heig ht of ten inches, are h er eb y decla red to be a public nuisance .” Chicag o Municipal Code § 7-28-120( b) (ame nded Dec

. 4, 2002). As such, the ordinanc e further provides: “[a]ny person who owns or controls proper ty within the city
must c ut or otherwise control all wee ds on such proper ty so that the aver ag e heig ht of such

wee ds does not exceed ten inches.” Chicag o Municipal Code § 7-28-120( a) (ame nded Dec

. 4, 2002). In turn, the parkw ay ordinanc e provides: “[ t ] h e owner or person in control of
proper ty contiguous to the parkw ay shall be responsible for water ing and fer tiliz ing parkw ay tree s *** and for routine car e of the parkw ay lawn. Routine c are of the parkw ay lawn shall include per iodic watering, w eedingand mowing , as we ll as replac ement of ve g etation that dies.” Chicag o Municipal Code § 10-32-050 ( amende d J uly 10, 2002). ¶ 68 In support of its asser tion that plaintiff had violated these two provisions, the city ’s notice of violation and the photo s o f p laintiff’s proper ty wer e prese nted at the administrative hear ing and enter ed into the rec ord. The notice itself includes the issuing office r’s asser tion that plaintiff’ s p roperty exhibi ted “WEEDS–GRASS OVER 10” TAL L FRONT–A ND BA CK YARD.” I t also asser ted that plaintiff had demonstrated a “F AI LURE TO MAI NTAI N P ARKWAY.” The photos showed two view s of plaintiff’s f ront y ard, a view of his backyard, and a view of the parkw ay i n front of his proper ty

. These photos depict a host of various plants g rowing on both plaintiff’s proper ty and the parkw ay , many of which

are quite obviously

sever al fe et tall. ¶ 69 In response to the city ’s evidenc e, plaintiff testified at the hear ing that “a wee d is a plant
g rowingwher e y ou don’t want it. All of the plants on my land are g rowingexactly wher e I
want them.” Plaintiff testified that he tended to all of his plants, some of which included

-15-mulberry sapling s and an elm tree sampling. Plaintiff further testified that he also g ener ally

tended his proper

ty and the parkw ay by clea ning it of g arba g e and other rubbish, and that

none of the plants on his p ro perty harbor ed rodents. Finally
, plaintiff challeng ed the photogr aphs prese nted by the city on the g rounds that they did not show his entire proper ty , and there fore no conclusions about the average heig ht of all the “we eds” on his proper ty could be drawn from that evidenc e. On ap peal, defe ndant rea sserts these asser tions and challeng es to the city ’s ca se. ¶ 70 We reje ct plaintiff’s c ontention that the AL O improperly found vi olations of t he city ’s

wee d and p arkwa y ordinanc es. We reiter ate that the notice of violation itself was “prima fac ie evide n ce o f t h e corr ectne ss of the fac ts specifie d there in.” Chicag o Municipal Code § 2-14-076( i) (a m en ded Apr. 29, 1998). This included the fac t that plaintiff’s proper ty exhibi ted “W EEDS–GRASS OVER 10” TAL L FRONT–A ND BA CK YARD” and that plaintiff had demonstrated a “F AI LURE TO M AINT AI N PARKW AY.” These alleg ed violations need only have been established upon “proof by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e” ( id .), and “ [t ]he findings a nd conclusions of the administrative ag ency on questions of fac t shall be held to be prima fac ie true and corr ect” (735 I L CS 5/3-110 (West 2008)). On appea l,

we revie w these finding s to deter mine if they are ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e, which exists:
“ ‘only if the opposite conclusion is clea rly evident.’ [C itation.] There fore
, the ‘mere fac t that an opposite conclusion is rea sonable or that the revie wing court might hav e ru led differ ently will not justify reve rsal of the administrative finding s.’ [C itation.] We are also mindful that, ‘[i] n examining an administrative ag ency ’s fa ct ual finding s, a revie wing
court does not weig h the evidenc e or substitut e its judgme nt for that of an administrative
ag ency .’ [C itation.] I f the rec ord contains evidenc e to support the ag ency ’s decision, that decision should be af

firmed. [Citation.] ” Marconi , 225 I ll. 2d at 534. ¶ 71 Th e ci t y ’s n o t i ce of violation and the photos prese nted at the hearing clea rly provided sufficie nt evidentiar

y support for the AL O’s finding that plaintiff had violated the wee d and parkw ay ordinanc es. We note that the photos themselves wer e clea rl y ad m i s s i ble, even if they could be considere d hear say

. See 65 I L CS 5/1-2.1-6 (West 2008) (“The formal and technica l rules of evidenc e do not apply in an adjudicator y hear ing perm i t t ed u n d er this Division. Evidence
, including hear say , may be admitted only if it is of a t y pe commonly relied upon by rea sonably prudent persons in the condu ct o f t h eir aff airs.”) ; Chicag o Municipal Code § 2 -14-076(h) (ame nded Apr. 29, 1998) (same)

. Moreove r, other than

asser ting that the city was require d to p ro vide additional photos of his entire proper ty , plaintiff never contende d that the four photos prese nted below did not acc urate ly ref lect the condition of that portion of his proper ty and the pa

rkwa y actua lly depicted the rein. ¶ 72 Fur

thermore
, plaintiff’s own testimony and other challeng es t o t h i s ev i d en ce wer e insufficient to call the city ’s evidenc e into question. For example, the fac t t h at plaintiff clea red his proper

ty and the parkw ay of rubbish was irrele vant to the question of the heig ht of the wee ds on his proper ty or whether plaintiff did not periodica lly water , wee d, and mow the par kway . Moreove r, the c ity

was not oblig ed to offe r photog raphs of ever y square inch of plaintiff’s proper

ty –as plaintiff appea

rs to asser t in his brief–in order to prove its alleg ation of a wee d ordinanc e vio lation by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. This standard simply

-16-require s that “the evidence prese nted renders a fac t more likely than not.” J.M. v. Briseno
, 2011 I LApp (1st) 091073, ¶ 41. ¶ 73 We cannot say , in light of all the evidenc e, that the AL O’s finding s wer e so unsupported by evidenc e th at t h e opposi te conclusion is clea rly evident. As such, we aff irm the AL O’s administrative deter

mination that plaintiff violated the city ’s wee d and parkw ay ordinanc es.

¶ 74 C. Circuit Court P roce eding s and Constitut ional Challeng es ¶ 75 We now return to plaintiff’s rema ining challeng es to the circ uit court proce eding s. First, plaintiff specific ally co n t en d s t he circ uit court err ed by quashing his two subpoenas, and

err ed more g ener ally by ref using to allow him to presen t an y ev i dence in support of his challeng es to the two ordinanc es he was found to ha ve violated. Plaintiff also contends the circ uit court improperly reje cted his constitutional challeng es to those two ordinanc es on the merits. Be cause of the interre lated nature of the issues involved, our discussion of plaintiff’s rig ht to prese nt evidenc e in support o f h i s const itutional challeng es will nece ssarily also involve a discussion of the ultimate merits of those constitutional challeng es. For that rea son, we will addr ess all of these issues toge ther in this section. ¶ 76 As an initial matter, and as plaintiff himself rec og nizes, section 3-1 1 0 o f t h e C o d e provides that upon the filing of a complaint for administrative revie w “[n] o new or additional evidenc e in support of or in opposition to any finding
, order
, deter mination or decision of the administrative ag ency shall be hear d by the court.” 735 I L CS 5/3-110 (West 2008). As such, the circ uit court proper ly ref used to allow plaintiff to introduce any new evidenc e in support of the two counts of his complaint seeking administrative revie w. Moreove r, as we have alre ady discussed above, plaintiff’s reque st for administrative revie w was also prope rly denied on the me rits. ¶ 77 Howeve r, plaintiff contends the situation is otherwise with r espec t to his c onstitut ional challeng es. Plaintiff’s constitutional challeng es include: (1) fac ial constitutional challeng es to the wee d and parkw ay ordinanc es asser ting they wer e void for vagueness b ec au s e they

eac h contain fata lly unspeci fi c t erms and invite arbitra ry enfor ceme nt; (2) an as-a pplied challeng e to the wee d ordinanc e asser ting that this ordinanc e had, in fac t , been arbitra rily enfor ced in this case ; a

nd (3) an asser

tion that the wee d ordinanc e was unconstitutional for its failure to satisfy either the strict scrutiny or rational basis standard. We find that plaintiff has notdemonstrated a

ny reve rsible error with respe ct t o the circuit court’s refusa l to hear
any additional evidenc e in support of these challeng es, n o r h as he demonstrated that the circ uit court improperly reje cted his constitutional challeng es to the wee d and parkw ay ordinanc es.

¶ 78 1. Standard of Re view ¶ 79 Our supreme court has rec ently s u m m ar i z ed t h e re l ev an t p ri n cipl es applicable to plaintiff’s constitutional arguments, stating:
“In construing the vali dity of a municipal ordinanc e, the same rules are applied as those which g overn the construction of statutes. [C itation

. ] Statutes are presumed

-17-constitutional, a nd the burden of rebutting that presumption is on the party challeng ing the validity of the statute to clea rly demonstrate a constituti o n al v i o lation. [C itation.] This court has a duty to uphold the constitutionalit y of a statute when rea sonably possible [citation] , and, ther efor e, if a statute’s construction is doubtful, a court will resolve the doubt in favor of the statute’s validity

. [C itation.] ” Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale
, 229 I ll. 2d 296, 306-07 (2008). ¶ 80 Moreove r, it is within the discretion of the circ uit court to make evidentiar y ruling s, and such deter

minations are not to be overturne d absent a clea r abuse of discretion. Simmons v. Garce s , 198 I ll. 2d 541, 570 (2002). Fur thermore
, reve rsal on appea l is not r equire d unless

an err oneous evidentiar

y ruling was substantially prejudicia l, and the burden of establishing prejudice is on the party seeking reve rsal. DiCosolo v. Janssen Pharmace uticals, Inc.
, 2011 I L App (1st) 093562, ¶ 40. As such, any improper evidentiar y ruling s may be con s i d er ed harmless e rror

. W

ade v. City of Chicago , 364 I ll. App. 3d 773, 784 (2006).

¶ 81 2. Vagueness: F acia l Challeng e ¶ 82 First, we addre ss plaintiff’s fac ial challeng e to the two ordinanc es on vagueness g rounds. Plaintiff’s complaint and specific ation of err ors asser t that the wee d ordinanc e was fac ially i n v al i d beca

use the term “we ed” is inhere ntly subjective and thus fata lly unspecific

. He simil arly challeng es the “peri o d i c” ca re require ment in the parkw ay ordinanc e as being fata lly unspecific

. Finally
, plaintiff contends both ordinanc es are void for vagueness on the
g rounds that they

invite arbitrar

y enfor ceme nt. ¶ 83 We find that plaint i ff’s fa ci al challeng es on vagueness g rounds are untenable. As our
supreme c ourt has stated:
“Void for vagueness is a conce pt derive d from t h e notice require ment of the due
proce ss clause

. A statute can be impermissib l y v agu e for either of two independe nt

rea sons: (1) if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligenc e a rea sonable opportunity
t o u n d er stand what conduct it prohibits; and (2) if it authorizes or even encour ages arbitra ry and discriminatory enfor ceme nt. [C itations.] As a g ener al rule, a litigant whose conduct falls square ly within a statute’s prohibition cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to others. [C itation.] Moreove r, in order to succe ed on a vagueness challeng e that does not involve a first amendment right, a party must establish that the
statute is vague as applied to the conduct for which the party is being prosec uted.” Maddux v . Blagojevich , 233 I ll. 2d 508, 544 (2009). Stated differ ently
, unless a municipal ordinanc e “implicates first amendment rig hts, plaintiff
may not, as h e d i d h er e, challeng e the ordinanc e as vague on its fac e. [C itation.] I f [t he ordinanc e] does not implicate first amendment rig hts, plaint i ff can only argue that the ordinanc e is vague as applied to himself, as applied to co n du ct fo r which he is being targ eted.” O’Donne ll v. City of Chi cago , 363 I ll. App. 3d 98, 105 (2005). ¶ 84 Her e, plaintiff has asser ted that the wee d and parkw ay ordinanc es are unconstitutionally
vague on their

face

. Howeve r, plaintiff’s conduct–his alleg ed failure to control wee ds on his
proper ty or to maintain the parkw ay – clea rly fall within the terms of the two ordinanc es and it is equally clea

r that these two ordinanc es do not implicate any first amendment rig hts. As

-18-such, plaintiff had no “standing ” to make a fac ial challeng e to those ordinanc es. See Owens

v. Departme nt of

Human Rights
, 403 I ll. App. 3d 899, 927 (2010). I t nece ssarily follows that, with plaint i ff’s facial vagueness challeng es being themselves invalid, these constitutional challeng es wer e proper ly reje cted on the merits by the circ uit court. Moreove r, no prejudice can the ref ore ha ve re sulted from the c ircuit court’ s ref usal to allow plaintiff to prese nt any evidenc e in support of them.

¶ 85 3. Vagueness: As-A pplied Challeng e ¶ 86 W e n ext consider plaintiff’s as-a pplied vagueness challeng e to the we ed o rd i n an ce

. Plaintiff asser

ts that he should ha

ve been allowed to pr esent additional evidenc e in support of his “as- applied” challeng e that the wee d ordinanc e had actua lly been arbitra rily enfor ced in this case , and that this constitutional challeng e should not have been denied on the merits. ¶ 87 Specifica lly
, p l aintiff contends in his specific ation of errors, he indicated to the circ uit
court that he inten d ed to prese nt evidenc e that 11 other proper ties near his wer e also in violation of the wee d ordinanc e but had not been cited with a violation. He further indicated that he would prese nt evidenc e that he had himself complaine d to the city about these
proper ties, but no action was taken. Plaintiff contends i f t h i s ev idence would have been
prese nted, his as-a

pplied challeng e would have been suc cessf ul. ¶ 88 I t is well established that wher e “a statute is challeng ed on the g rounds that it violates the constitution, the constitutional issues m ay b e ra ised in the context of a complaint for administrative revie w.” Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Departme nt of Rev enue , 163 I ll. 2d 290, 297 (1994) (citing Ho w a r d v. Lawt on , 22 I ll. 2d 331, 333 (1961))

. Howeve r, it has also been “quite established that if an argument, issue, or defe nse is not prese nted in an administrative hear ing, it is proce durally defa ulted and may not be raised for the first time befor e the circ uit
court on administrative revie w.” Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board , 228 I ll. 2d 200, 212 (2008). More spe cifica lly : “This rule of proce dural defa ult encompa sses a litigant’s rig ht to question the validity of

a statute. To be sure, an administrative ag ency lacks th e au thority to decla re a statute unconstitutional, or even to que stion its validity

. Nonethele ss, this court has repe atedly ad v ised that a party in an administrative proce eding should asser t a constituti o n al challeng e on the rec ord befor e the administrative tribunal, beca use administrative revie w is confine d to the evidenc e offe red befor e the ag ency

. Such a prac tice avoids piece meal litigation and, more importantly
, allows opposing parties a full opportunity to ref ute the constitutional challeng e.” Id . at 214. ¶ 89 Notably
, th e s e p r in c ip le s a r e e q ually applicable to decla

ratory judgme nt actions, and eve n wher e such a claim for decla ratory judgme nt alleg es that “a fac ially valid statute, ordinanc e,

or administrative rule ‘is applied in a discriminatory or arbitra ry manner , the rule g ener ally prevai l s t h at rec ourse must be had in the first instance to the appropr iate administrative board.’ ” Beahringer v. Page
, 204 I ll. 2d 363, 374 (2003) (quoting Bank of Lyons v. County

o f Co o k
, 13 I ll. 2d 493, 495 (1958). As such, i t has been rec og nized that “a challe n ge t o a statute as applied to a litigant relies upon cer tain fac tual bases. Thus, when a litigant prese nts

an as-a pplied challeng e, ‘an evidentiar y rec ord is indispensable beca use ad m inistrative

-19-revie w is confine d to the reco rd cre ated befor e the ag ency .’ ” Gruwell v. Departme nt of

Financial & Professional Regulation
, 406 I ll. App. 3d 283, 2 9 8 (2 0 1 0 ) (quoting Arvia v. Madigan , 209 I ll. 2d 520, 528 (2004)). ¶ 90 In light of the above, it is clea r that the circ uit court proper ly reje cted plaintiff’s re quest to introduce any additional evidenc e in support of this argument. P l aint iff’s as-a pplied challeng e to the wee d ordinanc e was nece ssarily a fac tual one, and the fac ts supporting that challeng e could only

be pre sented in the a dminist rative pr ocee ding. ¶ 91 Moreove r, we also find that the trial court proper ly reje cted this challeng e on the merits. Ag ain, the g ener al thrust of plaintiff’s as-a pplied challeng e to the wee d ordinanc e is that the city did not enfor ce the ordinanc e ag ainst other proper ties in his neig hborhood and, there fore
, the city ’s enfor ceme nt in this ca s e wa s arbitra ry

. Indeed, he testified at the administrative hear ing that there wer e sever al prope rt i es near his which had “plants growing on them in excess of 10 inche s” but wer e not subject to any enfor ceme nt. ¶ 92 Plaintiff cites to no authority supporting the notion that such evidenc e would support his contention t h at t h e we ed ordinanc e was actua lly enfor ced ag ainst him in an arbitra ry or discriminatory way , nor is this court awa re of any

. Indeed, “in an ‘as- applied’ challeng e, the party challeng ing the statute contends that the applicatio n o f the statute in the particular
contex t in which th e ch al l enger has acte d, or in which he proposes to act, would be unconstitutional. An ‘as- applied’ challeng e require s a party to show that the statute violates the constitution as the statute applies to him .” (Empha ses adde d.) People v . Brady , 369 I ll. App. 3d 836, 847 (2007). T hus, plaintiff’s ar gument is, as a whole, w ithout merit. ¶ 93 Fur

thermore
, the evidenc e prese nted here established that plaintiff had many tall weeds

on his proper

ty

. The administrative rec ord also includes evidenc e that plaintiff was a repe at offe nder in this reg ard, and that the condition of hi s p ro p er t y was attrac ting rodents. Plaintiff’s testimony to the contra ry was, as we have alre ady discussed, reje cted by the AL O in a prope r exercise of hi s discretion. On the basis of t his recor d, plaintiff ca nnot establish that the city ’s wee d ordinanc e wa s improperly enfor ced a g ainst him.

¶ 94 4. Strict Scrutiny and Rational B asis ¶ 95 Finally
, we addre ss plaintiff’s rema ining constitutional challeng e to the wee d ordinanc e. Plaintiff asser

ts that the distinction the ordinanc e makes betwee n plants that are “we eds” and plants that are not wee ds bear s no rational relat i o n s hip to the ordinanc e’s “ostensible”
purpose, which he descr ibes as public heath, safe t y , o r sanitation. Indeed, plaintiff further

asser ts that beca

use this ordinanc e interfe res with private proper ty rig h ts, it must actua lly
pass the strict scrutiny test for constitutionalit y

. L astly
, plaintiff asser ts that he was prepa

red to introduce e vidence to support these asse rtions, and that the circ uit c ommitt ed re versible

err or by ref using to a llow the prese ntation on any such evide nce. ¶ 96 In order to proper ly analy ze plaintiff’s claim that the wee d ordinanc e is unconstituti onal,

we must first deter

mine the nature of the rig ht alleg ed to be infring ed. Napleton
, 229 I ll. 2d at 307. Indeed, it is rec og nized: “Classification of the rig ht aff ecte d is critica l beca

use the nature of the rig ht dictates the level of scrutiny a court must employ in deter mining whether the statute i n question

-20-comports with the constitution. [C itation.] Courts examining the constitutional validity of a statute will ordinarily apply the rational basis test. [C i t at i o n

. ] Under this test, a statute will be upheld if it bear s a rational relationship to a leg itimate leg islative purpose and is neither arbitra

ry nor unrea sonable. [C itations.] In contra st, wher e a classification has been made bas ed up o n rac e or national origin [citation]
, or t he constitutional rig ht
at issue is one considered t o b e ‘fundamental’ [citation]
, the presumption of constitutionalit y is wea

ker, and courts must subject the statute to the m o re rig orous require ments of strict scrutiny analy sis. [C itation.] In order to survive strict scrutiny
, the

measure s employ ed by the g overnme nt body must be n ec es sary to serve a compelling
state interest, and must be narr owly tailored there to, i.e.
, the g overnme nt mus t u s e the least re strictive means c onsistent with the attainment of its goa l. [ Citation.] ” Id

. ¶ 97 We first reje ct plaintiff’s contention that this matter require s the application of the strict scrutiny standard beca

use the we ed ordinanc e interfe res with his rig ht to use his proper ty , which plaintiff describes as a “funda mental constitutional rig ht.” Our supreme court has only

rec ently reje cted just such an argument in Napleton

. In that case , the court first noted that it had pre v i o usly rec og nized that “funda mental rights include the expression of ideas ( i.e.
, fre edom of speec h), participation in the political proce ss, trave l among the states and privac y with reg ard to the most intimate and per sonal aspec ts of one’s life .” Id . at 307-08. ¶ 98 In reje cting the argument that a muni cipal z oning ordinance was subject to heig htened constitutional scrutiny beca use it impacted on private proper ty rig hts, the court held that “the rig hts pla intiff alleg es to be infring ed by the enac tment of the zoning code amendments do
not fall within the cate g o ry of fundame ntal rig hts set forth above, nor do they involve a suspect cl as s i fi cation. There fore
, strict scrutiny does not apply .” Id. at 308-09. The court went on to apply

the rational basis standard to the consti tutional challeng e in that case ( id

. at 309), a nd we will similarly

apply that same standa

rd to plaintiff’s c halleng e her e. ¶ 99 As has been rep ea t ed l y recog nized, the rational basis standard is highly “limited and defe rential.” Hudson v. Y MCA o f Me t r o politan Chicago, LLC
, 377 I ll. App. 3d 631, 638 (2007). Indeed, our supreme court has stated that a law will be found constitutional under this standard: “so longas it is reasona

bly desig ned to re medy the evils the leg islature has de termined
to be a threat to the public health, safe ty , and g ener al welfa re. [C itation.] The statute need
not be the best means of acc omplishi ng the leg islature’s objectives. [C itation.] As long

as the statute is rationally related to a leg it i m at e s t ate interest, it will be upheld. [C itation.] Whether a st at u t e i s wi se [or] whether it is the best means to achie ve the desired result are matters left to the leg islature, and not the courts. [C itation.] The judgme nts made by the leg islature in cra fting a statute are not subject to courtroom fac t finding and
may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidenc e or emp i ri ca l data. [C itation.] Under the rational basis test, the co u rt may hy pothesize rea sons for the l egislation, even if the rea soning advanc ed did not motivate the leg islative acti o n

. [C itation.] I f t h ere is any conce ivable basis for finding a rational rela tionship, the law will be upheld. [C itation.] ” People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy
, 1 8 4 I ll. 2d 117, 124

-21-(1998).

¶ 100 We find that the wee d ordinanc e easily passes this standard, even if solely on the g rounds of aesthe tics. The United States Supreme Court long ag o rec og nized that the “conc ept of the public welfa

re is broad and inclusive. [C itation.] The values it repr esents are spiritual as well

as phy sical, aesthe tic as well as monetary

. I t is within the power o f t h e l eg islature to deter min e t hat the community should be beautiful as well as healthy
, spacious as well as clea n ***.” Berman v. Parker
, 3 4 8 U. S

. 26, 33 (1954). That court has more rec ently reiter ated that it is “we ll settled that the state may leg itimately exercise its police power s to advanc e esthetic values.” Mem bers of City Council of the City ofLos Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent , 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984). ¶ 101 We find the city ’s prohibition on proper ties containing wee ds aver ag ing over 10 inches tall to be rationally

related to a leg itimate interest in aesthe tics. See City of Montgomery v

. Norman
, 816 So. 2d 72, 7 9 (A l a. C rim. App. 1999) (upholding simil ar municipal wee d ordinanc e as constitutional exercise of police power in support of leg itimate public interest in aesthe tics). Moreove r, beca use the ordinanc e could be proper ly based, at a minimum
, upon the city ’s “rational speculation unsupported by evidenc e or empirical d at a, ” no evidenc e plaintiff might have introduced could have altere d this finding

. We there fo re fi nd that the

c irc u it court corr ectly reje cted this constitutional challeng e on the merits, and also committed

no reve rsible er

ror by ref using to a llow plaintiff to introduce a ny supporting e vidence

.

¶ 102 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 103 For

the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the c ircuit court is af firmed.

¶ 104 Affir

med.

-22-