NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1116

CHAD L. OAKES

vs.

SHELLY L. BILDEN-OAKES.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a two-day trial, a judgment of divorce nisi (divorce 

judgment) entered. This appeal stems from the denial of Shelly 

Bilden-Oakes's (wife) request for alimony. She argues that the 

judge incorrectly found that Chad Oakes (husband) was unable to 

pay alimony and incorrectly found that, even if the husband 

could pay alimony, there was insufficient evidence of the 

parties' marital lifestyle to determine what amount of alimony 

would enable her to maintain a lifestyle comparable to that the 

parties enjoyed during the marriage. We agree. We vacate so 

much of the divorce judgment as pertains to alimony and remand 

for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and 

order.
2

Background. The parties were married in 2001 and separated 

in Fall 2017. In 2018, the husband filed a complaint for 

divorce and both parties filed financial statements prior to 

trial. Relevant to this appeal, the husband reported on his 

financial statement a gross weekly income of $3,206.29, total 

gross weekly deductions from his paycheck of $1,438.76, and 

weekly expenses of $1,538. To calculate his net weekly income, 

the husband subtracted his total gross weekly paycheck 

deductions from his gross weekly income, arriving at a net 

weekly income of $1,767.53 (before deducting his reported weekly 

expenses of $1,538). The parties also filed a statement of 

uncontested facts which described the timeline of their 

marriage, their employment qualifications and history, and a 

detailed summation of many of their assets including the value 

of their marital home when it was sold and their various bank 

accounts.

At trial, the only witnesses were the husband and the wife. 

Both the husband and wife provided a significant amount of

evidence regarding their lifestyle after their separation. As 

to the parties' marital lifestyle prior to their separation, 

there was evidence that the parties lived in a four-bedroom,

single-family home in Braintree which they purchased in 2008 for 

$375,000, they had their house professionally cleaned every 
3

couple of weeks, the wife and husband were able to regularly 

contribute to their retirement accounts, and they had $5,000 per

month of disposable income between them. The husband testified 

that his credit cards were paid in full each month, but that a 

source of contention in the marriage was the wife's spending 

habits. According to the testimony of the husband, the wife

spent a considerable amount of money purchasing items using 

their credit cards and would spend money on shoes and clothes. 

The wife testified that she often had to buy clothes because of 

a medical condition that causes her weight to fluctuate.

In her detailed findings, the judge credited the husband's

reported gross weekly income of $3,206.29. The judge credited 

"most" of the husband's weekly expenses, determining his weekly 

expenses to be $1,464.08 (after recalculating the amount of his 

weekly rent and discrediting his claim regarding weekly "motor 

vehicle expenses"). The judge also credited various paycheck 

deductions reported by the husband totaling $610.45. The judge 

added those paycheck deductions to the weekly expenses that she 

found credible, concluding that the husband's combined weekly 

expenses and paycheck deductions totaled $2,074.53. The judge 

then deducted that $2,074.53 figure from the husband's reported 

net weekly income of $1,767.53, ultimately concluding that the 

husband's total weekly expenses exceeded his net weekly income 
4

by more than $300. This finding was, however, based on a 

miscalculation by the judge: she double counted a portion of 

the husband's paycheck deductions, by adding $610.45 in paycheck 

deductions to his weekly expenses and then subtracting that 

total from his net weekly income, despite that his net weekly 

income already reflected those paycheck deductions. Had the 

judge not double counted those paycheck deductions, her findings 

would have shown that the husband's net weekly income 

($1,767.53, which reflected all reported paycheck deductions) 

actually exceeded his credible weekly expenses ($1,464.08) by 

more than $300.

The judge ultimately declined to enter an alimony order.

She found that while the wife was in need of alimony, the 

husband was unable to pay alimony because his weekly expenses, 

which the judge did not find excessive, exceeded his net income. 

As previously noted, this finding was error. The judge did not 

end the inquiry there, however, but added that even if the 

husband could pay alimony, "[t]here was insufficient evidence at 

trial for the Court to make finding[s] as to the parties' 

marital lifestyle" such that the judge could not "determine what 

amount of alimony would enable Wife to maintain a lifestyle 

comparable to that the parties enjoyed during the marriage."
5

Discussion. The wife makes three arguments as to why the 

judge's determination that she was not entitled to alimony was 

error. Before addressing her arguments, we note that "[a] judge 

has broad discretion when awarding alimony under the statute," 

and an appellate court will not disturb an alimony judgment

unless it is plainly wrong. See Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 

230, 235-236 (2014). An abuse of discretion occurs "where we 

conclude the judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing 

the factors relevant to the decision such that the decision 

falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation 

and citations omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 

185 n.27 (2014).

First, the wife argues that in determining that the husband 

could not afford to pay alimony, the judge subtracted his weekly 

deductions from his net weekly income, which already accounted 

for his weekly deductions. We review this factual determination

for clear error, see Murray v. Super, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 146, 148 

(2015), and note that the husband concedes that the judge's 

calculation was based on double counting his weekly deductions. 

After reviewing the financial evidence, we agree that the 

judge's determination that the husband could not afford alimony

payments was erroneous as the deductions were in fact double 
6

counted and remand so that the judge can make new factual 

findings regarding the husband's ability to pay alimony.1

The wife's second argument is that there was enough 

evidence for the judge to make a factual finding regarding the 

parties' standard of living prior to their separation. 

"'Alimony' is defined . . . as 'the payment of support from a 

spouse, who has the ability to pay, to a spouse in need of 

support for a reasonable length of time, under a court order.'" 

Young v. Young, 478 Mass. 1, 5 (2017), quoting G. L. c. 208, 

§ 48. "A judge must consider and weigh all the relevant factors

[under G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a)], but where the supporting spouse 

has the ability to pay, 'the recipient spouse's need for support 

is generally the amount needed to allow that spouse to maintain 

the lifestyle he or she enjoyed prior to termination of the 

marriage.'" Young, supra at 6, quoting Pierce v. Pierce, 455 

Mass. 286, 296 (2009). The husband is correct that need is 

measured, in part, by evidence of the parties' lifestyle prior 

to their separation. See Zaleski, 469 Mass. at 243 ("Because 

'need' is a relative term for purposes of the act, it must be 

1 The wife also argues that the judge did not include all of 

the husband's income when calculating the husband's total gross 

income. We need not rule on this because we have already ruled 

the judge's math regarding the husband's ability to pay is 

fundamentally flawed and remand so that it can be recalculated 

based on the reasoning above.
7

measured in light of mandatory considerations that include the 

parties' marital lifestyle").

Based on the financial summaries submitted by the parties, 

statement of uncontested facts, and the trial testimony of both 

the husband and the wife about their lifestyle prior to 

separation, we determine that there was enough evidence for the 

judge to make the necessary considerations under G. L. c. 208, 

§ 53 (a). While the evidence of the monetary value of the

wife's marital lifestyle was certainly not overwhelming, there 

was evidence of the wife's spending habits and the lifestyle the 

couple enjoyed. See M.C. v. T.K., 463 Mass. 226, 234 n.11 

(2012) ("standard of living . . . may be closely linked to 

household spending"). For example, testimony established that 

their home was worth $375,000 when they purchased it in 2008.

The judge also acknowledged that "there were several months in 

which wife spent all $5,000.00 of the parties' monthly 

disposable income." The judge also was provided with evidence 

that, while married, the parties were each able to regularly 

contribute to their retirement accounts. Lastly, the judge 

heard testimony from the husband that he routinely paid the full 

amount on his credit card debt every payday. Although a 

difficult task, we often ask fact finders to assign monetary 

value to extremely abstract concepts. See Aleo v. SLB Toys USA, 
8

Inc., 466 Mass. 398, 412 (2013), quoting Clifton v. 

Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 445 Mass. 611, 624 (2005) ("a 

'proper punitive damage award"' is one that is 'sufficient . . .

to send a clear message to the [defendant] of condemnation for 

its reprehensible behavior"). Where some evidence was presented 

of the parties' marital lifestyle, this case is no different.

Where the judge has already determined that the wife had a need 

for alimony, we remand for the judge to redetermine the 

husband's ability to pay (after correcting the double counting 

error), consider all relevant factors under G. L. c. 208, 

§ 53 (a), and make an appropriate award for alimony.

Lastly, the wife argues that the judge arbitrarily found 

the wife to be underemployed. It is unclear how this factored 

into the judge's decision-making when the judge had already 

found the husband unable to pay alimony. In this instance, 

where we are remanding so that alimony can be redetermined, the 

wife's employment status will be revisited by the judge.
9

Conclusion. So much of the divorce judgment as it relates 

to alimony is vacated, and the case is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.

So ordered.

By the Court (Meade, Walsh & 

D'Angelo, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: September 16, 2024.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.