UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-4006

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

CHRISTOPHER RAY PARRISH, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

Chief District Judge. (5:08-cr-00099-FL-1) 

Submitted: December 9, 2009 Decided: January 13, 2010 

Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Anne Margaret Hayes, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Christopher Ray Parrish appeals the sentence imposed 

after he pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to 

possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). On appeal, Parrish argues that trial 

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to 

the probation officer’s recommendation that he qualified for 

sentencing as a career offender. The Government has moved to 

dismiss the appeal on the ground that claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel are not cognizable on direct appeal. We 

deny the Government’s motion to dismiss but affirm Parrish’s 

sentence. 

 In the presentence report, the probation officer 

concluded that Parrish qualified for sentencing as a career 

offender based on two prior North Carolina state court 

convictions: possession with intent to manufacture, sell and 

deliver marijuana; and possession with intent to manufacture, 

sell and deliver marijuana and cocaine. Parrish did not contest 

his status as a career offender, but requested a downward 

variance based on an argument that the sentencing range overrepresented the seriousness of his prior crimes. The district 

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court denied the motion and sentenced Parrish to 262 months of 

imprisonment. 

 Parrish argues that counsel should have objected to 

his career offender status on the ground that he did not have 

the required predicate felony convictions for career offender 

sentencing, because his prior state drug convictions were not 

punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. He bases this 

argument on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 

Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008). He also relies on United States 

v. Pruitt, 545 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2008), which interpreted the 

North Carolina sentencing statutes to require an examination of 

each defendant’s prior record level to determine if a particular 

crime was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. The 

Government argues in its motion to dismiss that the objection 

Parrish asserts trial counsel should have raised was foreclosed 

by binding precedent, specifically this court’s decision in 

United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005). 

 The Government correctly notes that claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel are generally not cognizable 

on direct appeal. United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th 

Cir. 1997). Rather, to allow for adequate development of the 

record, a defendant must bring his claim in a 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 

(West Supp. 2009) motion. See id.; United States v. Hoyle, 33 

F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1994). An exception exists when the 

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record conclusively establishes ineffective assistance. United 

States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999); King, 

119 F.3d at 295. Our review of the record leads us to conclude 

that it fails to establish that counsel was ineffective. We 

decline, however, to dismiss the appeal, as the policy regarding 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted on direct 

appeal is not jurisdictional, and dismissing the appeal would 

not promote judicial efficiency. 

 Accordingly, although we deny the Government’s motion 

to dismiss the appeal, we affirm Parrish’s sentence. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED