Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 63A05-1708-CR-1917 | March 16, 2018 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Steven E. Ripstra

Ripstra Law Office

Jasper, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Gregory Ollie Scott,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 16, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

63A05-1708-CR-1917

Appeal from the Pike Circuit Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. 

Biesterveld, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

63C01-1511-F4-563

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Gregory O. Scott (“Scott”) appeals his sentence for his conviction of Level 4 

felony child molesting.1 He argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion 

when it sentenced him because it overlooked a significant mitigating factor and 

identified improper aggravating factors; and (2) his sentence was inappropriate. 

Because we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion or that Scott’s 

sentence was inappropriate, we affirm.

[2] We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced 

Scott.

2. Whether Scott’s sentence was inappropriate.

Facts

[3] On May 2, 2017, Scott pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to 

Level 4 felony child molesting. In exchange for Scott’s plea of guilty, the State 

agreed to dismiss two additional charges against him, as well as an allegation 

that he was an habitual vehicular substance offender.2 The terms of the plea 

agreement also provided that Scott would serve a sentence of two (2) to twelve 

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-42-4-3(b).

2 Because the State dismissed the charges and allegation, we have not included the facts supporting those 

charges here. 
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(12) years. As a factual basis for his guilty plea, Scott admitted that he had 

knowingly fondled or touched an eight-year-old child, K.M., with the intent to 

arouse or satisfy his own sexual desires.

[4] At the sentencing hearing, Deputy Buck A. Seger (“Deputy Seger”) with the 

Pike County Sheriff’s Office testified to additional details regarding Scott’s 

offense. He testified that on November 28, 2015, he had been called to K.M.’s 

residence regarding a domestic battery and child molest. At the residence, 

eight-year-old K.M. had told him that Scott had touched her breasts and 

vagina. Deputy Seger had interviewed Scott the next day. During this 

interview, Scott had told Deputy Seger that “he didn’t believe [the molestation] 

[had] happened. But if it [had] happen[ed], it could have been because he was 

blacking out due to alcohol and [] pill intoxication.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 27). Deputy 

Seger said that Scott had admitted that he had lain with K.M. on the couch, 

underneath the covers, while they watched a movie and that he had rubbed 

“her [] belly and her sternum area to . . . get her to fall asleep.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 

29). Scott said this had occurred while K.M.’s siblings were in the room, also 

watching the movie. 

[5] The State introduced Scott’s pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”), which 

detailed that Scott had five prior misdemeanor convictions. He had 

unsuccessfully completed his probation for one of those causes in 2008 and had 

violated his probation in another cause by testing positive for drugs in 2013.
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[6] In addition, the probable cause affidavit revealed that K.M. was the daughter of 

Scott’s girlfriend. According to the probable cause affidavit, K.M. had told the 

investigating officers that, in addition to “squis[h]ing and rubbing” her vagina 

and “rubbing” her nipple, Scott had put his hand over her mouth at some point 

during the molestation. (App. Vol. 2 at 20). 

[7] At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Scott to 

ten (10) years executed. The court found as aggravating factors that: (1) Scott 

had been in a position of trust and in a position of having care, custody, or 

control of K.M.; (2) the harm K.M. had suffered was greater than the elements 

necessary to prove the commission of the offense; (3) Scott had a criminal 

history; (4) prior lenient treatment had not been successful; (5) K.M. had been 

less than twelve years old at the time of the offense; and (6) Scott had recently 

violated conditions of probation. The trial court also “specifically [found]” that 

Scott lacked remorse and candor as shown by his lack of cooperation in the PreSentence Investigation.3

 (Tr. Vol. 2 at 44). The trial court “consider[ed]” 

Scott’s IRAS assessment, which determined that Scott had a “very high” risk to 

reoffend. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 44). As a mitigating factor, the trial court found that 

 

3 The PSI documented that:

[d]uring the PSI interview, the defendant chose not to discuss in any details the instant 

offense or how his actions had affected the victim in this case. He was very adamant that 

he was falsely accused in this case and proclaims his innocent [sic]. He reports he has 

mistrust in the ‘system’ and is not willing to take his chances during a trial. 

(App. Vol. 2 at 142). The trial court verified that, in spite of this reports in the PSI, Scott acknowledged that 

he was guilty of child molesting.
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Scott had saved the court’s time and resources by pleading guilty. Scott now 

appeals. 

Decision

[8] On appeal, Scott argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

sentenced him and that his sentence was inappropriate. We will address each 

of these arguments in turn.

1. Abuse of Discretion

[9] First, Scott asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced 

him because the trial court omitted a significant mitigating circumstance and 

improperly identified aggravating circumstances. Sentencing decisions rest 

within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 

482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). So long as 

the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an 

abuse of discretion. Id. We will find an abuse of discretion where the decision 

is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the 

court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. 

Id. When determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, we do not 

reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Leonard v. State, 86 

N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. A trial court may abuse its 

discretion in a number of ways, including by: (1) failing to enter a sentencing

statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes aggravating 

and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a 
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sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the 

record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are 

improper as a matter of law. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490–91.

[10] As for his mitigating factors, Scott argues that the trial court should have found 

that his lack of recent probation violations was a mitigating factor. However, a 

trial court is not obligated to accept a defendant’s claim as to what constitutes a 

mitigating circumstance. Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ind. 2000). A 

claim that the trial court failed to find a mitigating circumstance requires the 

defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly 

supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.

[11] Although Scott asserted in his sentencing argument that he had not recently 

violated his probation, the State noted that Scott had violated his probation in 

2013, two years before the instant offense. Accordingly, we conclude that 

Scott’s lack of probation violations was not clearly supported by the record, and 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by omitting that circumstance as a 

mitigating factor.

[12] Additionally, Scott argues that several of the trial court’s aggravating factors 

were improper. Specifically, he asserts that: (1) there was no evidence that he 

held a position of trust with K.M. or was in a position of having care, custody, 

or control of her; (2) the harm K.M. suffered was not greater than the elements 

necessary for the offense; and (3) the trial court should not have found that his 

“high risk to reoffend” IRAS assessment result was an aggravating factor. 
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[13] The position of trust aggravator is frequently cited by sentencing courts where 

an adult has committed an offense against a minor and there is at least an 

inference of the adult’s authority over the minor. Rodriguez v. State, 868 N.E.2d 

551, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). This aggravator applies in cases where the 

defendant has a more than casual relationship with the victim and has abused 

the trust resulting from that relationship. Id.

[14] Scott’s probable cause affidavit revealed that K.M. was the daughter of Scott’s 

girlfriend. Although Scott and K.M. did not live together, the record on appeal 

demonstrates that Scott was close enough to K.M. to lie with her on a couch 

under the covers and watch a movie. This closeness indicates that Scott had 

more than a “casual” relationship with K.M. See id. In light of this evidence of 

closeness and the implied position of authority Scott held as K.M.’s mother’s 

boyfriend, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Scott 

held a position of trust with K.M. 

[15] Next, Scott argues that the harm K.M. suffered was not greater than the 

elements necessary to commit the offense. We disagree. A person commits 

child molesting when he “with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, 

performs or submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or [himself], 

with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child [or 

himself].” I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b). 

[16] The harm here was greater than those elements required because K.M. was 

only eight years old, well below the statutory age of fourteen, when Scott 
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molested her. In addition, Scott molested K.M. in the presence of her siblings 

while they watched a movie. He touched both her vagina and her breasts and 

held his hand over her mouth while he did so, presumably so that she could not 

protest or seek help. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

identifying the harm to K.M. as an aggravating factor. 

[17] As for Scott’s IRAS assessment result, Scott is correct that “the offender risk 

assessment scores do not in themselves constitute, and cannot serve as, an 

aggravating or mitigating circumstance.” J.S. v. State, 928 N.E.2d 576, 578 

(Ind. 2010). This is because such assessments are prepared by probation officers 

and other administrators relying on data and evaluations that “are not 

necessarily congruent with a sentencing judge’s findings and conclusions 

regarding relevant sentencing factors.” Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 573 

(Ind. 2010). They are neither “intended nor recommended to substitute for the 

judicial function of determining the length of sentence appropriate for each 

offender.” Id. However, our supreme court has also noted that:

such evidence-based assessment instruments can be significant 

sources of valuable information for judicial consideration in 

deciding whether to suspend all or part of a sentence, how to 

design a probation program for the offender, whether to assign an 

offender to alternative treatment facilities or programs, and other 

such corollary sentencing matters.

Id.

[18] Contrary to Scott’s argument, the trial court did not identify Scott’s IRAS score 

as an aggravating factor. It specified—after it had finished discussing the 
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aggravating factors—that it had “consider[ed] the IRAS assessment.” (Tr. Vol. 2 

at 44) (emphasis added). Consideration of a factor is not equivalent to 

identifying that factor as aggravating. Moreover, the court did not include 

Scott’s IRAS assessment in its list of aggravating factors in its sentencing order. 

Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not improperly identify Scott’s IRAS 

assessment result as an aggravating factor. 

[19] In sum, because we have not found merit in Scott’s argument that the trial court 

omitted a significant mitigating factor or found improper aggravating factors, 

we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Scott.

2. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)

[20] Next, Scott argues that his sentence was inappropriate. Under Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of 

the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The defendant has 

the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 

848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). The principal role of a Rule 7(B) review 

“should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding 

principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing 

statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. 

State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Whether a sentence is inappropriate 

ultimately turns on “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, 

the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a 

given case.” Id. at 1224.
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[21] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge that 

the advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an 

appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. 

The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is two (2) to twelve (12) years, with 

an advisory sentence of six (6) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5. As the trial court 

sentenced Scott to ten (10) years executed, his sentence was shorter than the 

maximum possible sentence but longer than the advisory sentence. 

[22] Turning to the nature of the offense, we note that Scott touched an eight-yearold girl’s vagina and breasts and held his hand over her mouth while he did so, 

thereby preventing her from seeking help. Because K.M.’s siblings were in the 

room during the molestation, Scott also risked exposing them to his offense. 

Further, as Scott was K.M.’s mother’s boyfriend, he held a position of trust and 

authority over her. 

[23] Turning to Scott’s character, we note that Scott is thirty-one years old with five 

prior misdemeanor convictions, including, among others, convictions for Class 

A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that 

endangers a person, Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated, and Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. Scott’s conviction for 

operating a vehicle while intoxicated was originally a Class D felony, but the 

trial court reduced the conviction to a misdemeanor when Scott completed the 

Alcohol Abuse Probation Services Program. In addition, Scott has previously 

violated his probation in two separate causes, once in 2008 and once in 2013, 

and he was unsuccessfully discharged from probation in 2008. He also failed to 
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complete a court-ordered drug program. This history demonstrates that Scott 

does not have a respect for the law and that prior attempts at leniency have not 

been successful. Further, the trial court noted that Scott did not show remorse 

for his actions and did not demonstrate candor. 

[24] In light of these factors regarding the nature of Scott’s offense and his character, 

we conclude that his ten-year sentence was not inappropriate.

[25] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.