J-S44033-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v. 

DESMOND GREENE 

 Appellee No. 207 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 7, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-43-CR-0001130-2014 

***** 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v. 

DESMOND GREENE 

 Appellee No. 208 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 7, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-43-CR-0001299-2014 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2015 

The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Mercer County granting Desmond Greene’s motion to 

suppress evidence. After careful review, we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings. 
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The suppression court set forth the facts of this matter as follows: 

Officer Adam Zazado of the Sharon Police Department was on 

patrol on July 18, 2014, in Zone 5 of the City. Zone 5 is a high 

crime area. At approximately 5:30 p.m., he observed two black 

males walking south through the alley leading to Morrison 

Street. One had no shirt and the other was wearing jeans with a 

long sleeve hoodie with the hood up. The black males glanced in 

the officer’s direction and kept on walking. 

It was a sunny day and the temperature was 78 degrees. 

Officer Zazado drove around the block to see where the two 

were headed. The two were still walking down the alley. At that 

point, the officer decided he wanted to talk to the two black 

males. He turned his vehicle around and drove up the alley. 

When Officer Zazado entered the alley, only one of the black 

males remained. It was the individual wearing the hoodie. The 

officer observed that individual fidgeting with his clothing. 

The officer identified this black male as [Greene].

As the officer drove toward [Greene], [Greene] began walking 

east through some yards. The officer drove around the block to 

get in front of [Greene].[1] He did so on South Oakland. 

The officer exited his vehicle and asked [Greene] if he could talk 

to him. [Greene] agreed. 

As the officer was talking to [Greene], he noticed [Greene] was 

pressing his legs tightly together. When asked why he was 

doing so, he indicated he had to go to the bathroom. The officer 

told [Greene] if he had to go to the bathroom, he could have 

gone in the alley when no one was watching. 

[Greene] was fidgety and avoided eye contact. In addition, 

[Greene] continued to put his hands in his pants pockets even 

though instructed not to do so by the officer. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Officer Zazado actually testified that he parked his cruiser behind, not in 

front of, Greene, who was continuing to walk. See N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 1/7/15, at 16. 
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As a result of all the above factors, the officer felt he needed to 

pat-down [Greene] to determine if he was armed. He instructed 

[Greene] to walk over to the officer’s cruiser so he could be 

patted down. As [Greene] walked over, Office[r] Zazado saw a 

large bulge in the thigh area of [Greene’s] left leg. [Greene] 

was ordered to stop. A second officer, Officer Zych, who had 

just arrived on the scene, articulated [Greene’s] left leg and 

found a hand gun. 

Trial Court Opinion, 2/24/15, at 2-3. 

 Greene was subsequently charged with one count each of carrying a 

firearm without a license,2 possession of a firearm prohibited,3 and receiving 

stolen property4 after a records search of the firearm’s serial number showed 

it to be stolen. 

On December 1, 2014, Greene filed an omnibus pre-trial motion and 

on January 7, 2015, the suppression court held that there was no basis to 

believe that criminal activity was afoot, and therefore the pat down and 

discovery of Greene’s firearm was unlawful. The Commonwealth filed a 

timely notice of appeal asserting that the grant of Greene’s suppression 

motion would substantially handicap the prosecution, see Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), 

as well as a court-ordered statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following claim: 

____________________________________________ 

2

 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106. 

3

 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. 

4

 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925. 
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Whether [Officer Zazado] lacked reasonable suspicion that 

criminal activity may have been afoot or that [Greene] may have 

been armed and dangerous to police based upon the totality of 

the circumstances that included, but were not limited to, 

[Greene’s] failure to remove his hands from his pockets in a high 

crime area after being told to do so? 

Brief of Appellant, at 4. 

Our standard of review when evaluating a suppression order is well 

settled: 

When reviewing the propriety of a suppression order, an 

appellate court is required to determine whether the record 

supports the suppression court’s factual findings and whether 

the inferences and legal conclusions drawn by the suppression 

court from those findings are appropriate. Where the [appellee] 

prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider only the 

evidence of the [appellee] and so much of the evidence for the 

Commonwealth as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the 

factual findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those 

facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn 

therefrom are in error. However, where the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of 

legal error, the suppression court’s conclusions of law are not 

binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if 

the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. 

Commonwealth v. Walls, 53 A.3d 889, 892 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted). 

The Commonwealth argues that Officer Zazado possessed reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and that Greene was armed and 

dangerous. The Commonwealth claims that there is no dispute that Officer 

Zazado’s initial contact with Greene was lawful as a mere encounter, and the 

suppression court agreed. However, the Commonwealth asserts that 

“Greene’s failure to keep his hands out of his pockets . . . has been held 
J-S44033-15 

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sufficient cause to conduct a pat down” and, even if that factor alone did not 

establish reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances did. We 

agree. 

There are three categories of interactions between citizens and police: 

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for 

information) which need not be supported by any level of 

suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to 

respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be 

supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a 

stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such 

coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of 

an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be 

supported by probable cause. 

Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 715 A.2d 1117, 1119 (Pa. 1998) 

(citations omitted). 

In order to determine whether an investigative detention has occurred, 

circumstances to be examined include any which may “evidence a show of 

authority or exercise of force including such subtle factors as the demeanor 

of the police officer, the location of the confrontation, the manner of 

expression used by the officer in addressing the citizen, and the content of 

the interrogatories or statements.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 378 A.2d 

835, 839-40 (Pa. 1977). After examining the circumstances, the standard to 

be used is whether “a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have 

thought [he was being restrained] had he been in the defendant’s shoes.” 

Id. at 840. 

To establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must “articulate specific 

observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from 
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those observations, led him to reasonably conclude, in light of his 

experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that the person he stopped 

was involved in that activity.” Commonwealth v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 

125 (Pa. Super. 2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 

1196, 1203 (Pa. Super. 2002). In such an inquiry, the totality of the 

circumstances must be considered. In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 

2001). “[T]he totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to 

an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. 

Rather, ‘even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may 

warrant further investigation by the police officer.’” Commonwealth v. 

Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004), quoting Commonwealth v. 

Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (Pa. 1999). We must give “due weight . . . to the 

specific reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw from the 

facts in light of his experience.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 

676 (Pa. 1999), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 

Here, we agree with the Commonwealth and the suppression court 

that Officer Zazado’s initial interaction with Greene was a mere encounter. 

Officer Zazado, suspicious that Greene was wearing a hoodie on a sunny, 

78-degree day, decided to investigate further. Officer Zazado took his 

cruiser to the alley where Greene was walking and, as Officer Zazado began 

following him (without lights or sirens), Greene began cutting through yards 

of residences in the other direction. Ultimately, Officer Zazado stopped his 

vehicle behind Greene as Greene continued to walk on. Officer Zazado 
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asked Greene if he could speak with him and Greene agreed. At this point, 

Officer Zazado had made no show of authority or exercise of force such as 

would cause a reasonable person to believe he was being restrained. See 

id. Greene could have simply continued to walk on, unimpeded by Officer 

Zazado or his vehicle, without responding to the officer’s request to speak 

with him. Greene, however, agreed to speak with Officer Zazado. 

As Greene’s interaction with Officer Zazado progressed, Greene began 

exhibiting signs of nervousness, fidgeting with his shoes, avoiding eye 

contact and awkwardly standing with his knees pressed tightly together. 

Most notably, during his encounter with Officer Zazado, Greene “repeatedly 

put his hands into his [pants] pockets approximately three times,” despite 

Officer Zazado’s instruction to remove them. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 

1/7/15, at 9. 

Based on the foregoing behavior exhibited by Greene – particularly his 

refusal to remove his hands from his pockets – and the fact that the 

encounter was occurring in a high-crime neighborhood, Officer Zazado 

testified that he became fearful for his own safety. As a result, Officer 

Zazado advised Greene that he wished to pat him down. After Officer 

Zazado directed Greene to walk over to his cruiser for a pat-down, Greene 

unlocked his legs and began to walk, at which point Officer Zazado “saw a 

large bulge in [Greene’s] left leg towards his thigh area like something fall 

[sic].” Id. at 12. 
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The pertinent facts in Commonwealth v. Hall, 713 A.2d 650 (Pa. 

Super. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 771 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2001), are 

analogous to the matter before the Court. In that case, 

[t]wo Reading police officers, patrolling in their cruiser, saw 

defendant and a companion conversing in an alley near a café. 

The police parked their vehicle, the conversants [sic] broke up, 

and appellant approached the police car while getting his I.D. 

out of his wallet and asked “Is everything all right, officer?” 

After a brief exchange, the officer removed from his vehicle and 

noticed Hall had his hands in his pocket. He asked if he was 

armed and Hall said he was not. Hall was asked to take his 

hands out of his pocket, but only removed his left hand. As the 

officer came to him, Hall pivoted with his hand in his pocket. 

After being asked again to remove his hand, he did, but became 

confrontational and stated that he would not be searched. The 

officer replied that he would not search him, but only pat him 

down for weapons. 

Id. at 652-53. The Court concluded that “when Hall approached with his 

hand thrust in his pocket and refused to remove it, the encounter escalated 

into a situation where the totality of circumstances involved a reasonable 

suspicion and justified a detention to stop and frisk.” Id. at 653. Thus, “the 

single factor of the defendant keeping his hand in his pocket after being 

asked to remove it escalated the encounter into one of reasonable 

suspicion.” Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 89 A.3d 679, 684 (Pa. 

Super. 2014), citing Hall, supra. 

 The result in Scarborough, supra, similarly militates in favor of a 

finding that Officer Zazado possessed reasonable suspicion to perform a 

weapons pat-down. In Scarborough, two officers were on bicycle patrol in 

a high-crime area of Philadelphia when the following transpired: 
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The officers observed the defendant heading southbound, toward 

them, . . . riding a bicycle and talking on a cellular phone. The 

officers stopped the defendant in order to issue him a citation for 

using the phone while operating a vehicle, in violation of a City 

of [a] Philadelphia ordinance[.] 

When asked, the defendant hung up his phone and placed it in 

his left jacket pocket. The officers also asked for his 

identification. The defendant began to behave nervously, and 

put his hand in his right jacket pocket but did not withdraw it. 

The officers reiterated their request for identification, and asked 

the defendant to remove his hand from his right pocket. The 

defendant looked around and appeared extremely nervous. 

Upon being asked a second time, he removed his hand from his 

right pocket. 

Id. at 682. The officers proceeded to conduct a pat-down for their safety 

and discovered a firearm. On appeal of the suppression court’s refusal to 

exclude the firearm discovered during the pat-down, this Court emphasized 

the significance of the defendant’s refusal to remove his hand from his 

pocket and concluded that the police had the right to perform a weapons 

frisk. 

 Here, as in Hall and Scarborough, we conclude that, based on the 

totality of the circumstances present at the time of the interaction, when 

Greene repeatedly placed his hands in his pockets despite Officer Zazado’s 

instructions to remove them, Officer Zazado possessed reasonable suspicion 

that Greene might be armed and dangerous. Accordingly, Officer Zazado 

was justified in requesting that Greene submit to a weapons pat-down. 

Thus, the suppression court erred by concluding that Officer Zazado lacked 

reasonable suspicion and suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of 

the pat-down. 
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Order reversed; case remanded for proceedings consistent with the 

dictates of this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 11/18/2015