alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Angel PERDOMO-CASTRO, a.k.a. Jose Angel Perdomo Castro, a.k.a. Jose Angel Peredomo-Castro, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-10080.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*417Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed June 29, 2011.

Ryan P. Dejoe, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Isabel Michela Robles, Law Offices of Clay Hernandez, PC The Johnson House, Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Angel Perdomo-Castro appeals from the 48-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Perdomo-Castro contends that the district court erred by imposing a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) for his 2005 Texas felony sexual assault conviction. The district court did not err in imposing the enhancement, as the indictment and Perdomo-Castro’s judicial confession in the Texas case clearly show that the conviction was for a sex offense perpetrated without the victim’s consent through “the use of physical force and violence.” *See*U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n. l(B)(iii) (forcible sex offense is a crime of violence); *United States v. Espinoza-Morales,*621 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir.2010) (prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence if the “record of conviction shows the ... defendant necessarily *418admitted all of the generic elements in a plea”) (internal quotations and footnote omitted).

Perdomo-Castro also contends that the enhancement violates the constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws. He forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in his opening brief, and no exceptions to this rule apply. *See Koemer v. Grigas,*328 F.3d 1039, 1048-49 (9th Cir.2003).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
CT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)

)

vs. ) No. 01 CR 557

)

KENNETH JAY RANEY, )
)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant has filed a motion for resentencing, motion to appoint counsel for hearing
for resentencing, motion for return of all personal property, and motion for a new P.S.R.
The motions for sentencing and for appointment of counsel are denied. His motions

rely upon United States v. Booker, _ U.S._, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). But he was sentenced

April 23, 2002, and Booker does not apply retroactively. McReynolds v. United States, 397
F.3d 479 (7" Cir. 1005).

His motion for return of property is likewise denied for now. Defendant does not
indicate that he ever requested the government to return specific items or that the government
ever represented that it had in its possession any of defendant’s property but was refusing to
return any items, and the reason for refusing. If defendant believes his counsel retains any of
his property, he should direct his request for return to counsel.

Finally, the P.S.R. is not in error. It does not assign any criminal history points for
battery and disorderly conduct charges. Rather, it assigns points for conviction on Count 5 of
Case No. 96 CF 35, second degree recklessly endangering safety/User Dangerous Weapon, on

the basis of defendant’s guilty plea to that charge. The motion for a new P.S.R. is denied.

JAMES B. MORAN
fenior Judge, U. S. District Court

Has 14 _, 2008.
#### In the Matter of Gene Crescenzi.

Motion granted only insofar as to appoint the Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department to inventory respondent’s files and to take such action as it may deem necessary and appropriate to protect the interests of respondent’s clients, and the motion is otherwise denied, with leave to renew, all as indicated in the order of this court; and the cross motion to vacate the order of suspension is denied. Concur&emdash;Kupferman, J. P., Sullivan, Ross, Asch and Milonas, JJ.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

THE REAL PROPERTY AND 

IMPROVEMENTS KNOWN AS 12534 

CHILTON ROAD PHILADELPHIA, PA 

19154

PETITION OF: COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 659 EAL 2015

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Unpublished Memorandum 

Opinion and Order of the 

Commonwealth Court at No. 1254 CD 

2014 entered on November 2, 2015, 

vacating and remanding the Order 

Dated of the Philadelphia County Court 

of Common Pleas at No. CP-51-MD9001252-2004 entered on June 17, 

2014

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 16th day of June, 2017, this petition for allowance of appeal is 

hereby GRANTED, the order of the Commonwealth Court is VACATED, and the matter 

is REMANDED to the Commonwealth Court to remand to the trial court for 

reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 

__ A.3d __, 2017 WL 2291733 (Pa. May 25, 2017).
In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 15-294C

(Filed May 16, 2023)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*

*

J. CASARETTI, et al., *

*

Plaintiffs, *

*

v. *

*

THE UNITED STATES, *

*

Defendant. *

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

SCHEDULING ORDER

As discussed during today’s status conference, the parties shall file a joint 

status report on or by Friday, July 21, 2023. The Court will hold a status 

conference by telephone at 3:00 p.m. EDT on Monday, July 24, 2023.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Victor J. Wolski

VICTOR J. WOLSKI

Senior Judge
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             387,227
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,171,988)
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# C_2020339EN.01002002.xml

| 12.10.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 339/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.10.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 339/20

---

Judgment of the General Court of 8 July 2020 — Austria Tabak v EUIPO — Mignot & De Block (AIR)

(Case T-800/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Revocation proceedings - EU word mark AIR - Genuine use of the mark - Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Alteration of distinctive character)

(2020/C 339/26)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Austria Tabak GmbH (Vienna, Austria) (represented by: J.L. Gracia Albero and R. Ahijón Lana, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Mignot & De Block BV (Eindhoven, Netherlands) (represented by: S. Körber, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 September 2019 (Case R 1665/2018 4), concerning revocation proceedings between Mignot & De Block and Austria Tabak.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Austria Tabak GmbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Austria Tabak GmbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 45, 10.2.2020.

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Phillip E. Kroft, Jr., Also Known as Phillip E. Kroft, Appellant.

[944 NYS2d 712]

Appeal from a judgment of the Genesee County Court (Robert C. Noonan, J.), rendered February 23, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of rape in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Present — Scudder, PJ., Smith, Fahey and Sconiers, JJ.
#### Barbara Bird, Respondent, v Harry L. Bird, Appellant.

In a matrimonial action, the defendant husband appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Ferraro, J.), dated November 10,1983, as, in denying the plaintiff wife’s motion to amend the parties’ judgment of divorce so as to incorporate but not merge therein the terms of a stipulation of settlement entered into in open court on April 19, 1983, did so “without prejudice to an application to resettle [said] judgment”.

Appeal dismissed, without costs or disbursements.

The order appealed from is the functional equivalent of an order denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the judgment without prejudice to renewal. We have previously determined that a substantial right of a party is affected (CPLR 5701 *205[a] [2] [v]) by an order denying *that*party’s motion for relief without prejudice to renewal *(see, e.g., Winn v Warren Lbr. Co.,*11 AD2d 713; *Ciaffone v Manhattantown, Inc.,*20 AD2d 666; *Guttentag v Guttentag,*22 AD2d 895), but not where, as here, the party seeking to appeal was the successful opponent of such a motion *(Samuels v Ames Realty Corp.,*79 AD2d 651; *cf. Sherman v Morales,*50 AD2d 610).

Defendant’s remedy, if he be so disposed, is to prosecute an appeal from any subsequent order granting resettlement. Mollen, P. J., Mangano, Gibbons and Bracken, JJ., concur.
#### Muriel King, Respondent, v Mark W. Dobriner et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

[941 NYS2d 526]

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, etc., the defendants Mark W. Dobriner and Colon & Rectal Surgical Associates of LI, EC., appeal, as limited by their brief, from so *822much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Iannacci, J.), entered January 26, 2011, as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing, as time-barred, the causes of action alleging acts of medical malpractice committed before April 3, 2007, insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The defendants Mark W. Dobriner and Colon *&*Rectal Surgical Associates of LI, P.C. (hereinafter together the Dobriner defendants), moved for summary judgment dismissing, as time-barred, the causes of action alleging acts of medical malpractice committed before April 3, 2007, insofar as asserted against them *(see*CPLR 214-a). The plaintiffs opposed the motion on the ground that the continuous treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limitations *(id.).*

The Dobriner defendants satisfied their prima facie burden of establishing that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiffs’ causes of action alleging acts of medical malpractice committed before April 3, 2007, were time-barred *(id.; see Vodos v Coopersmith,*85 AD3d 909 [2011]). In opposition, however, the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous treatment doctrine *(see Vodos v Coopersmith,*85 AD3d at 909; *Gomez v Katz,*61 AD3d 108, 111 [2009]; *Gehbauer v Baker,*292 AD2d 255 [2002]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the Dobriner defendants’ motion. Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUAN JESUS BANDA-HUERTA, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 16-73809 

Agency No. A205-647-890 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 15, 2018**

Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. 

Juan Jesus Banda-Huerta, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal 

from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 21 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-73809 

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence 

the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th 

Cir. 2006). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Banda-Huerta 

failed to establish that any harm his family experienced or that he fears in Mexico 

was or would be on account of a protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 

1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by 

criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus 

to a protected ground”). We do not address Banda-Huerta’s contentions as to his 

alleged membership in or the cognizability of the social group of his family,

because the BIA did not rely on these bases in denying relief. See SantiagoRodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing the decision 

of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.”) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in the absence of a nexus to a 

protected ground, Banda-Huerta’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. 

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because 

Banda-Huerta failed to show it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by

or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See 

Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2016).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### GRIFFITHS, Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL RY. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

November 20, 1907.)

Action by Edward R. Griffiths, as administrator, etc., against the International Railway Company.

'PER CURIAM.

Judgment and order reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event. Held, that reversible error was committed in the reception of evidence, and also that the verdict was contrary to and against the weight of the evidence.

KRUSE, J., dissents.
Exhibit 32.2



THANKSGIVING COFFEE COMPANY, INC.



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the
Annual Report of Thanksgiving Coffee Company, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, the undersigned
Chief Financial Officer of the Company hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (i) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Joan KatzeffPresidentMarch 29, 2004
#### William A. SEAWRIGHT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael McCALL, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-6414.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 28, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 2, 2011.

Wilham A. Seawright, Appellant Pro Se.

Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Melody Jane Brown, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Wilham A. Seawright seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appeal-able unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, *971120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Seawright has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 870 

To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to modify oil and 

hazardous substance liability, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 3, 2011 

Mr. TESTER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

A BILL 

To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to modify 

oil and hazardous substance liability, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Pollution Account5 ability Act of 2011’’. 

6 SEC. 2. OIL AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE LIABILITY. 

7 Section 311(b)(7) of the Federal Water Pollution 

8 Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(7)) is amended— 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 870 IS

1 (1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ‘‘, which2 ever amount is higher’’ before the period at the end; 

3 and 

4 (2) in subparagraph (D), by inserting ‘‘, which5 ever amount is higher’’ before the period at the end. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
Document Headings

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                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Election Commission

# TIME AND DATE:

Tuesday, July 27, 2021 at 10:00 a.m. and its continuation at the conclusion of the open meeting on July 29, 2021.

# PLACE:

 1050 First Street NE, Washington, DC (This meeting will be a virtual meeting).

# STATUS:

This meeting will be closed to the public.

# MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

Compliance matters pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109.

Matters concerning participation in civil actions or proceedings or arbitration.

* * * * *

      ( print page 38714)    

# CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: 

Judith Ingram, Press Officer. Telephone: (202) 694-1220.

Vicktoria J. Allen,

Acting Deputy Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 2021-15734 Filed 7-20-21; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE 6715-01-P
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                         875
<SECURITIES>                                   18,976
<RECEIVABLES>                                  6,986
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