Filed 9/25/24 P. v. Cull CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DARYL CULL,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D083181

 (Super. Ct. No. SCD134191)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Robert O. Amador, Judge. Affirmed.

Daryl Cull, in pro. per., and Jason L. Jones, under appointment by the 

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Daryl Cull appeals an order denying his petition to vacate his 

attempted murder conviction and for resentencing under Penal Code
2

section 1172.6.1 His appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief

requesting review under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 

(Delgadillo). After we issued a Delgadillo order notifying Cull of his right to 

file a supplemental brief, he did so. We conclude Cull failed to identify any 

arguably meritorious issues for appeal and we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1999, a jury convicted Cull of premeditated attempted murder

(§§ 664/187, 189), torture (§ 206), assault with a semi-automatic firearm

(§ 245, subd. (b)), battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)), and 

assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to cause great bodily injury

(§ 245, former subd. (a)(1), amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 183, § 1). The jury 

also found true various allegations related to the attempted murder charge,

including that Cull personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily 

injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury

(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court sentenced Cull to an indeterminate life term 

for attempted murder, a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearms 

allegation under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), and an additional

determinate term of six years for assault with a deadly weapon and the 

related great bodily injury allegation pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision 

(a). In 2000, we affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v. 

Cull (Oct. 4, 2000, D033783).)

In January 2023, Cull petitioned to vacate his conviction pursuant to 

section 1172.6. The court appointed counsel and received further briefing 

1 Cull brought his petition under former section 1170.95, which was 

amended effective January 1, 2022, and then renumbered as Penal Code

section 1172.6 without substantive change on June 30, 2022. (See Stats. 

2022, ch. 58, § 10, (Assem. Bill No. 200).) We refer to the statute by its 

current number throughout this opinion. All further statutory references are 

to the Penal Code.
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from the parties. The People argued Cull was ineligible for relief as a matter 

of law because he was not convicted under any legal theory that was affected 

by the legislative amendments to the Penal Code limiting the scope of murder 

liability. According to the People, the jury instructions from Cull’s trial 

demonstrate he was convicted as the actual perpetrator, rather than under a 

felony murder theory of liability or the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine. In support of their position, the People submitted various exhibits, 

including the jury instructions and verdict form from Cull’s trial.

The jury instruction that listed the elements of attempted murder, 

CALJIC 8.66, required the prosecution to prove Cull took a direct but 

ineffectual act towards killing another person and that he harbored malice 

aforethought when did so. Malice aforethought was defined as the specific 

intent to unlawfully kill another human being. The court also instructed the 

jury with CALJIC 8.67, which required the jury to determine whether the 

attempted murder was done willfully, and with deliberation and 

premeditation. This instruction stated, in relevant part, that the jury was 

required to find the offense was “preceded and accompanied by a clear, 

deliberate, intent to kill, which was the result of deliberation and 

premeditation.” The court did not give any instruction on the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine or aiding and abetting liability generally. 

The verdict form reflects the jury convicted Cull of attempted murder and 

found true he committed the offense willfully and with premeditation and 

deliberation.

In August 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on Cull’s section 

1172.6 petition. The court found the instructions and verdict from Cull’s jury

trial demonstrated he was the actual perpetrator acting with the specific 
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intent to kill. Accordingly, the court held Cull did not “qualify under the 

statute” and denied the petition. 

This appealed followed. 

DISCUSSION

In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court explained the procedures required in 

an appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition where appellate counsel

finds no arguable issues. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231–232.) In 

such a case, “(1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that 

determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing on the 

denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send, with a copy of counsel’s 

brief, notice to the defendant, informing the defendant of the right to file a 

supplemental letter or brief and that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 

days, the court may dismiss the matter.” (Ibid.) “If the defendant 

subsequently files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is 

required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to 

issue a written opinion. The filing of a supplemental brief or letter does not 

compel an independent review of the entire record to identify unraised 

issues.” (Id. at p. 232.)

Consistent with the procedure outlined in Delgadillo, supra, we 

provided Cull with the opportunity to submit a supplemental brief, which he 

did. Cull contends he should be afforded relief because the felony murder 

resentencing process was extended to attempted murder by Senate Bill

No. 775. He also cites to other unrelated ameliorative legislation, including 

“Senate Bill 483” and “AB1310.” He claims this legislation requires him to be 

resentenced on the various firearm enhancements that were applied to his 

sentence. As we shall discuss, Cull may not establish eligibility for relief 

under section 1172.6 based on legislation unrelated to this statute, and we 
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conclude the record demonstrates he is not entitled to relief as a matter of 

law.

Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) 

(Senate Bill 1437) was enacted to “amend the felony murder rule and the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to 

ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual 

killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the 

underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 

2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure that

allows persons convicted under the former murder laws to petition for 

retroactive relief. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Thereafter, Senate Bill No. 775 

(2020–2021 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775) clarified the resentencing 

procedures in Senate Bill 1437 were applicable to persons convicted of 

attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. 

(See § 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548

(Coley).) 

A petitioner initiates the resentencing process under section 1172.6 by 

filing a declaration averring he or she is eligible for relief because: (1) a 

charging document was filed against the petitioner allowing the prosecution 

to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder or attempted murder 

under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any theory under 

which malice is imputed based solely on the petitioner’s participation in a 

crime; (2) the petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or 

manslaughter after a trial or accepted a plea offer at which the petitioner 

could have been so convicted; and (3) the petitioner could not presently be 

convicted of murder or attempted murder because of the changes to the Penal 

Code that were effectuated by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)(1)-(3), 
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(b)(1).) For a petition satisfying these pleading requirements, the court must 

appoint counsel, permit briefing, and conduct an initial hearing to determine 

whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. (Id., subds. 

(b)(3), (c).) If the petitioner has made such a showing, the court must issue 

an order to show cause. (Id., subd. (c).) 

The court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage if the record of 

conviction establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of 

law. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970–971 (Lewis).) The record of 

conviction includes the jury instructions and verdict forms from the 

petitioner’s jury trial. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50 [jury 

instructions and verdicts on which they were based supported denial of 

section 1172.6 petition].) However, the court may not engage in factfinding, 

weigh the evidence, or assess credibility, at this stage. (Lewis, pp. 971–972.) 

Rather, the court should only deny the petition if “the petition and record in 

the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief” as a 

matter of law. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) 

Here, among other evidence, the court reviewed the jury instructions 

and verdict form from Cull’s trial in rendering its decision. The jury 

instructions relating to the premeditated attempted murder charge, CALJIC

Nos. 8.66, 8.67, and 8.11, required the jury to find Cull harbored the specific 

intent to kill another human being when he committed the offense. The trial

court did not instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine or any other aiding and abetting theory of liability, and the record 

reflects Cull was the only defendant on trial. Accordingly, under the

circumstances, the jury had to find Cull was the actual perpetrator acting 

with the intent to kill in order to convict him of premeditated attempted 

murder. 
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The resentencing process in section 1172.6 is not applicable to the 

actual perpetrator of attempted murder. (People v. Patton (2023) 89 

Cal.App.5th 649, 657.) Rather, it applies “only to attempted murders based 

on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Coley, supra, 77 

Cal.App.5th at p. 548; § 1172.6, subd. (a).) Accordingly, because Cull was 

convicted as the actual perpetrator, he was not convicted of attempted 

murder under any theory specified by section 1172.6 that would afford him 

relief. (See, e.g., People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 946 [summary 

denial of section 1172.6 petition affirmed where the record demonstrated that 

the trial court did not instruct the jury on the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine].)

Cull’s reliance on unrelated legislation does not compel a contrary 

result.2 The resentencing procedure under section 1172.6 is only available in 

cases in which a person was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or 

manslaughter, under a currently invalid legal theory based on changes to the 

Penal Code made by Senate Bill 1437. Whether Cull is entitled to relief 

under other ameliorative statutes is outside the scope of his section 1172.6 

petition, and the legislation to which he cites does not afford him relief.

In summary, we conclude the issues identified by Cull in his 

supplemental brief lack arguable merit. The record of conviction conclusively 

demonstrates he was not convicted of attempted murder under any theory of 

liability that would entitle him to relief under section 1172.6, and therefore

2 As best we can discern, Cull relies on Senate Bill No. 483 (Stats. 2021, 

ch. 728, § 3), which retroactively invalidated prison prior enhancements 

imposed pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). (See § 1172.75.) We are 

unable to find any relevant statutory authority related to Cull’s citation to 

“AB 1310.” Regardless, these claims do not fall within the scope of Cull’s 

section 1172.6 petition.
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the trial court correctly found Cull did not make a prima facie showing for 

relief. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–972.) 

DISPOSITION

The order denying Cull’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.