Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 14A01-1606-CR-1530 | May 12, 2017 Page 1 of 28

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kimberly A. Jackson

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Armando M. Bruno,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 12, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

14A01-1606-CR-1530

Appeal from the Daviess Superior 

Court

The Honorable Dean A. Sobecki, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

14D01-1502-FA-172

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary
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[1] Following a jury trial, Armando M. Bruno was convicted of two counts of child 

molesting as Class A felonies and two counts of child molesting as Class C 

felonies. Bruno was sentenced to an aggregate term of eighty years 

imprisonment. Bruno presents five issues for our review, which we restate as:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting Bruno’s 

recorded statement into evidence?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding certain 

evidence pursuant to the Rape Shield Rule?

3. Is the evidence sufficient to support Bruno’s Class A felony 

child molesting convictions?

4. Did the trial court err in sentencing Bruno?

5. Is Bruno’s sentence inappropriate?

6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering Bruno to 

pay restitution to the State?

[2] We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Bruno was born on December 4, 1959 and is a native of Guatemala. Bruno 

came to the United States in 2003. In 2006, Bruno became the pastor of a small 

church in Washington, Indiana. Initially, Bruno lived with a family at their 

home on Grand Avenue, and Bruno’s church met in the family’s basement. 

The family had a six-year-old son, D.A., who was born in December of 2000. 
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[4] Bruno had an extremely close relationship with the family and would often care 

for D.A. and his siblings while D.A.’s parents were away. One evening during 

the time Bruno lived with D.A.’s family and while Bruno was babysitting D.A., 

Bruno called D.A. into D.A.’s room. After D.A. complied with Bruno’s 

instructions to pull his pants down and bend over his bed, Bruno inserted his 

penis into D.A.’s anus. The assault ended abruptly when the phone rang. 

Bruno instructed D.A. to go to the bathroom and clean himself before his 

parents returned. 

[5] After approximately a year of operating the church out of the family’s 

basement, D.A.’s family purchased a building on Main Street to house Bruno’s

church. Bruno had a room in the building and thus, moved from the family’s 

home. Even after Bruno moved from the family’s home, he visited D.A. and 

the family daily and would spend the night at their house on a regular basis. 

[6] At some point D.A.’s family moved from the Grand Avenue home. Shortly 

thereafter, D.A. told his father about what Bruno had done to him—

specifically, that Bruno had placed his penis in his anus. D.A.’s father 

confronted Bruno, who denied the inappropriate encounter and claimed that 

D.A. was lying and was possessed by the devil. Bruno shared with D.A.’s 

father an excerpt from a book titled “Lucifer Dethroned” and convinced him 

that D.A. “was in bad shape.” Transcript Vol. I at 133. D.A.’s father apologized 

to Bruno and did not further pursue D.A.’s allegation. 
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[7] After moving from the Grand Avenue home, D.A. and his family moved to a 

home on John Street and then moved in with D.A.’s maternal grandparents for 

a short time. D.A. maintains that Bruno did not assault him while the family 

lived at either of these locations. In June or July of 2010, D.A.’s family moved 

into a three-bedroom mobile home in Southview Homes in Washington. 

Bruno continued his close relationship with D.A.’s family and would often visit 

and stay overnight at the Southview home. When Bruno stayed over, he would 

sleep in the room closest to the children’s room. 

[8] Within weeks after D.A.’s family moved to the Southview home, Bruno 

resumed his sexual assaults of D.A. Over the course of the next four years, 

Bruno repeatedly sexually assaulted D.A. The assaults occurred at night when 

Bruno would go into the room D.A. shared with his siblings. While D.A.’s 

siblings were sleeping, Bruno would fondle D.A.’s penis with his hand or have 

D.A. touch his penis and masturbate him. On more than fifteen occasions, 

Bruno had D.A. bend over his bed and then Bruno inserted his penis into

D.A.’s anus. D.A. reported that Bruno would put a cream or his own saliva on 

his own penis before doing so. Bruno would ejaculate during some of the 

encounters, and D.A. would then go to the bathroom to clean himself. Bruno 

told D.A. not to tell anyone about their encounters or he would “do it harder.” 

Id. at 211. 

[9] In the summer of 2014, when D.A. was thirteen years old, D.A. told his father 

about the ongoing sexual abuse perpetrated by Bruno. D.A.’s father, along 

with D.A., confronted Bruno, who again denied all of D.A.’s allegations. D.A. 
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began to cry and, pointing at Bruno, implored, “You know the truth.” Id. at 

138. After D.A. left the room, Bruno then began to cry and admitted to D.A.’s 

father that he had touched D.A. and asked D.A.’s father for forgiveness.

[10] About a month later, Bruno met with D.A.’s parents at the family’s Southview 

home. Unbeknownst to Bruno, D.A.’s father recorded the conversation. Bruno 

admitted he was guilty of unspecified acts and begged for the family’s 

forgiveness. After this meeting, Bruno sent text messages to D.A.’s father 

apologizing and acknowledging again that he was “guilty of what occurred.” 

State’s Exhibit 16.

[11] D.A.’s father did not immediately report the molestation out of concern for the 

church and because Bruno was seeking forgiveness. Approximately six months 

later, Bruno made disparaging comments about D.A.’s family to the church 

congregation and as a result, D.A.’s family decided to leave the church. On 

January 30, 2015, D.A. and his father went to the police station to report the 

sexual abuse.

[12] After receiving the report, Detective Daniel Christie of the Washington City 

Police Department, along with other officers, went to Bruno’s house. It was 

late and Bruno was asleep. Bruno was asked if he would come to the police 

station and answer some questions, and he agreed. After Bruno changed his 

clothes, he was transported to the police station in the back of a patrol car. 

Bruno was never placed in handcuffs. Once at the police station, Bruno was 
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placed in an interview room. Bruno speaks, reads, and writes very little 

English, so he was provided with an interpreter for the interview.

[13] Before the interview began, the interpreter translated an advisement of rights 

and waiver form to Bruno as Detective Christie read it aloud. Bruno nodded 

indicating he understood his rights and the waiver thereof. Detective Christie 

then asked him to sign the form indicating his understanding. Bruno signed the 

written waiver form, which was written entirely in English. During the 

interview, Bruno admitted to Detective Christie that he had fondled D.A.’s 

penis and D.A. had touched his penis on several occasions. Bruno claimed that 

he never hurt D.A., but admitted that he knew what he was doing was wrong. 

Bruno’s entire statement to Detective Christie was recorded. Following his 

statement, Detective Christie arrested Bruno. 

[14] During the investigation of D.A.’s allegations, the police were made aware of 

the conversation between Bruno and D.A.’s parents that D.A.’s father had 

recorded with his cell phone. After the recording was obtained, the State had 

the conversation translated and transcribed. 

[15] On February 4, 2015, the State charged Bruno with one count of child 

molesting as a Class A felony (Count I) and two counts of child molesting as 

Class C felonies (Counts II and III). The State later filed an additional count of 

Class A felony child molesting (Count IV) and two additional counts of Class C 

felony child molesting (Counts V and VI). Prior to trial, the court granted the 
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State’s oral motion to dismiss Counts II and III. Counts IV, V, and VI were 

renumbered as Counts II, III, and IV respectively.

[16] On February 18, 2016, Bruno filed a motion to suppress his statement to police 

alleging that he did not knowingly waive his Miranda rights. Initially, Bruno 

claimed that he was never advised of his rights, but after he was confronted 

with the recording of his interview, he acknowledged that his rights may have 

been read to him. Bruno also argued that his signature on the waiver of rights 

form is of no import because the waiver form is written in English. After a 

hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding that Bruno was properly 

advised and voluntarily waived his rights. At trial, Bruno objected to admission 

of his statement on the same grounds. The trial court overruled Bruno’s 

objection.

[17] On March 28, 2016, Bruno filed a motion requesting that he be permitted to 

introduce evidence of alleged past molestation of a witness, to which the State 

objected. At a hearing on this motion, Bruno claimed that D.A.’s mother and 

D.A.’s aunts had allegedly been molested by D.A.’s grandfather. Bruno 

asserted that he wanted to introduce such evidence to show that someone other 

than him, i.e., D.A.’s grandfather, molested D.A. The trial court denied 

Bruno’s motion, finding such evidence inadmissible for several reasons. 

[18] A four-day jury trial commenced on April 5, 2016, and concluded with the jury 

finding Bruno guilty as charged. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on 

June 2, 2016. In sentencing Bruno, the trial court identified several aggravating 
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factors. The “most important” aggravating factor for the court was Bruno’s 

abuse of his position of trust as a pastor and as a family friend. Transcript Vol. II

at 96. The court also noted that the acts were committed over a long period of 

time, D.A.’s young age at the time of the first molestation, and the excessive 

harm to D.A., both psychologically and physically. Although affording it little 

weight, the trial court also acknowledged Bruno’s illegal immigration status. 

As mitigating, the trial court noted Bruno’s lack of criminal history while living 

in the United States. 

[19] Finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 

circumstances, the trial court sentenced Bruno to consecutive terms of forty 

years imprisonment on Counts I and II, the Class A felony convictions. As to 

Counts III and IV, the Class C felony convictions, the trial court sentenced 

Bruno to concurrent terms of six years for each conviction and ordered the 

sentences be served concurrent with the forty-year sentence for Count II. The 

trial court also ordered Bruno to pay $5,000 in restitution to the State for 

transcription and translation expenses incurred with regard to the recorded 

conversation between Bruno and D.A.’s family. Bruno now appeals. 

Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

1. Admission of Evidence

[20] Bruno argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his statement 

to police. Our standard of review is well-settled.
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The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility 

of evidence, and we will reverse the trial court’s ruling only when 

the trial court abuses that discretion. Fuqua v. State, 984 N.E.2d 

709, 713-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The trial court 

abuses its discretion only if its decision regarding the admission 

of evidence is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before it, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. 

Id. Regardless of whether the challenge is made through a 

pretrial motion to suppress or by an objection at trial, our review 

of rulings on the admissibility of evidence is essentially the same: 

we do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting 

evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, but 

we may also consider any undisputed evidence that is favorable 

to the defendant. Id. Additionally, we may consider 

foundational evidence introduced at trial in conjunction with any 

evidence from a suppression hearing that is not in direct conflict 

with the trial evidence. Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 427 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2005).

Hicks v. State, 5 N.E.3d 424, 427 (Ind. 2014), trans. denied. 

[21] Bruno argues that his statement was inadmissible because he did not 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.1 A waiver of 

one’s Miranda rights occurs when the defendant, after being advised of those 

rights and acknowledging that he understands them, proceeds to make a 

statement without taking advantage of those rights. Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 

1209, 1211-12 (Ind. 2000). As our Supreme Court has stated:

 

1 As a precursor to this argument, Bruno argues that he was in custody for purposes of invoking the 

protections afforded by Miranda. The State argues that Bruno was not in custody. Herein, we will assume, 

without deciding, that Bruno was in custody when he was interviewed by Detective Christie.
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[t]he admissibility of a confession is controlled by determining 

from the totality of the circumstances whether the confession was 

made voluntarily and was not induced by violence, threats, or 

other improper influences that overcame the defendant’s free 

will. See Wilcoxen v. State, 619 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind. 1993). The 

same test determines whether Miranda rights were voluntarily 

waived. See Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind. 1989). 

Thus, the voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver of rights is judged 

by the totality of the circumstances. See Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 

760, 770 (Ind. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073, 119 S.Ct. 807, 

142 L.Ed.2d 667 (1999). 

Id. at 1212. A signed waiver form is one item of evidence showing the accused 

was aware of and understood his rights. Id. An express written waiver of 

rights, however, is not necessary to establish a waiver of Miranda rights. Carter 

v. State, 730 N.E.2d 155, 157 (Ind. 2000).

[22] Bruno presents his challenge under both the United States and Indiana 

Constitutions. Under the United States Constitution, the State must prove the 

statement was voluntarily given by a preponderance of the evidence. Malloch v. 

State, 980 N.E.2d 887, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Pruitt v. State, 834

N.E.2d 90, 114 (Ind. 2005)), trans. denied. The Indiana Constitution, however, 

requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

voluntarily waived his rights and that the confession was voluntarily given. Id.

[23] Bruno first argues that the interpretation of his rights was deficient because the 

interpreter told him that his statements “could be used against him,” Transcript
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Vol. I at 46,2rather than “can and will” be used against him as required by 

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. 

[24] Our Supreme Court has previously held that the omission of the word “will” 

did not create a fatal variance so as to require suppression of the defendant’s 

statement. See Myers v. State, 510 N.E.2d 1360, 1365 (Ind. 1987); see also 

Santana v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1355, 1358 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In both cases, the 

courts relied upon the fact that the advisements were in all other respects in 

conformance with Miranda and the fact that circumstances surrounding the 

defendant’s waiver indicated the defendants voluntarily waived their rights. 

Here, the same result obtains. There is perhaps some error in the Spanish 

translation of Bruno’s Miranda rights, but Bruno himself acknowledges that he 

was at least advised in Spanish that his statement “could” be used against him. 

Bruno makes no other challenge to the accuracy of the advisement of his rights 

or waiver thereof.

[25] With regard to the circumstances surrounding his interview, the record clearly 

reflects that Detective Christie read Bruno his Miranda rights and the standard 

waiver language and that an interpreter translated those rights into Spanish. 

Detective Christie stated multiple times that he wanted to make sure Bruno 

understood his rights and the interpreter conveyed such statements to Bruno. 

 

2 At the suppression hearing, a different Spanish-language interpreter was asked to translate how the 

interpreter during the interview translated to Bruno what Detective Christie was saying. This is that 

interpreter’s translation.
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Although Bruno had varying responses, both verbal and non-verbal, he never 

indicated or demonstrated that he did not understand his rights as they were 

interpreted for him. It was also explained to Bruno that signing the advisement 

of rights form, although written in English, was an acknowledgment that he 

understood his rights.3 Bruno then signed the advisement of rights form and 

proceeded to voluntarily answer Detective Christie’s questions. There is 

nothing in the record that suggests Detective Christie engaged in any violent, 

coercive, or threatening conduct prior to or during his interview of Bruno. 

[26] Bruno also makes much of the fact that the written advisement form that he 

signed was in English. As noted above, while a signed waiver form is one item 

of evidence showing the accused was aware of and understood his rights, an 

express written waiver is not necessary to establish a waiver of Miranda rights. 

Carter v. State, 730 N.E.2d at 157; cf. Morales v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1260, 1267

(suggesting in dicta that “both the defendant’s rights and effective law 

enforcement would be better served if standardized forms containing Miranda

warnings and waivers written in Spanish were created and distributed to all law 

enforcement agencies”). Thus, the signed waiver form, whether in English or 

Spanish, was not necessary to establish that Bruno voluntarily waived his rights. 

The record makes clear that Bruno was orally advised in Spanish of the 

implications of signing the waiver form and that he indicated that he was 

 

3 As interpreted at the suppression hearing, Bruno was told “Okay. You understand your rights and you can 

sign.” Transcript, Volume 1 at 47. 
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willing to talk to Detective Christie. Bruno then signed the form and 

voluntarily answered Detective Christie’s questions. It is evident from the 

record that Bruno understood and voluntarily waived his rights. The fact that 

the waiver form was written in English does not change this result. 

[27] We further note that Bruno is an adult who was educated through the 11th grade 

and can speak, read, and write in Spanish. Bruno came to the United States in 

2003 and has served as a pastor of his own church. Bruno did not appear 

distressed or confused at the time of the interview. Further, he did not seek 

clarification during the simultaneous translation of the interview. In fact, he 

even challenged some of the questions that he felt were unfair. 

[28] There is nothing in the record to suggest that Bruno’s statement was induced by 

violence, threats, or other improper influences that overcame his free will. 

Bruno was clearly advised of his rights and waiver thereof in Spanish prior to 

answering Detective Christie’s questions. Considering the totality of the 

circumstances, we conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Bruno knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his rights.4

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Bruno’s statement into 

evidence.

 

4 Having concluded that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Bruno voluntarily waived his rights

for purposes of the Indiana Constitution, it follows that there is likewise no violation under the 

preponderance of the evidence standard for review of such claims under the United States Constitution. 
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2. Exclusion of Evidence - Rape Shield Statute

[29] Bruno argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence that 

another person may have perpetrated the sexual abuse against D.A. 

Specifically, Bruno sought to introduce evidence that D.A.’s grandfather 

allegedly molested D.A.’s mother and aunts when they were younger. Bruno 

notes that D.A. and his family resided in D.A.’s grandfather’s home shortly 

after D.A. made the first allegations against Bruno. As part of his defense, 

Bruno wanted to suggest that it was D.A.’s grandfather who perpetrated the 

acts of molestation and was responsible for any injury to D.A.

[30] Ind. Evidence Rule 412, also known as the Rape Shield Rule, generally bars the 

admission of evidence regarding a victim’s or witness’s prior sexual conduct. 

Evid. Rule 412 sets out very limited exceptions to this rule with regard to 

admission of evidence in a criminal case. Specifically, Rule 412(b)(1)(A) does 

not bar the admission of evidence of “specific instances of a victim’s or 

witness’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the 

defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence.” See also

Ind. Code § 35-37-4-4 (Rape Shield Act); Sallee v. State, 785 N.E.2d 645, 651 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that “[t]o the extent there is a difference between 

the two, the rule controls”).

[31] This exception to the Rape Shield Rule is not applicable in this case. Bruno 

claims, without any supporting evidence, that D.A.’s mother disclosed to him 

that D.A.’s grandfather had molested her and her sisters when they were 
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younger. As found by the trial court in denying Bruno’s motion seeking to 

proffer such evidence, such allegations were at least hearsay as it concerned 

D.A.’s aunts. Secondly, Bruno offered no “specific instances” of sexual 

behavior by D.A.’s grandfather toward D.A.’s mother and his aunts other than 

his own self-serving allegations. Further, we note that the evidence Bruno 

sought to admit concerned matters that were remote in time and pertained to a 

different type of conduct. Bruno cannot show how such evidence has any 

bearing on any physical evidence introduced by the State relating to the source 

of semen in the victim, injury to the victim, or other physical evidence. 

[32] Even if the evidence was erroneously excluded, the error was harmless. An 

error in the exclusion of evidence is harmless when its probable impact on the 

jury, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to 

affect the substantial rights of the parties. See Barnhart v. State, 15 N.E.3d 138, 

143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Here, D.A. gave a clear account of what Bruno did 

to him and he never equivocated on the identity of his abuser. The first 

instance involving anal penetration occurred when D.A. was just six years old 

and prior to the time when D.A. and his family lived with D.A.’s grandfather. 

At the relevant times, Bruno had complete access to D.A. Further, Bruno 

admitted to D.A.’s father, in his statement to police, and in his testimony at 

trial that he had molested D.A. Whether the jury believed Bruno’s denial of 

anal penetration or D.A.’s testimony that Bruno inserted his penis into D.A.’s

anus is a matter of credibility as to those witnesses. Bruno’s suppositions 

concerning D.A.’s grandfather’s conduct toward D.A.’s mother and aunts 
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would have had no impact on such determination. Thus, any error in 

excluding the challenged evidence would have been harmless. 

3. Sufficiency

[33] Bruno argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions for child molesting as Class A felonies.5 In reviewing a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the 

credibility of witnesses. Atteberry v. State, 911 N.E.2d 601, 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2009). Instead, we consider only the evidence supporting the conviction and 

the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence 

of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the 

conclusion that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged beyond a 

reasonable doubt, the judgment will not be disturbed. Baumgartner v. State, 891 

N.E.2d 1131, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). It is not necessary that the evidence 

overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence is 

sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the 

conviction. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007). The 

uncorroborated testimony of a victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction. 

Jenkins v. State, 34 N.E.3d 258, 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

 

5 Acknowledging his admission to fondling D.A., Bruno does not challenge his convictions for child

molesting as Class C felonies.
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[34] To sustain Bruno’s convictions for Class A felony child molesting, the State’s 

evidence must have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Bruno, who was at 

least 21 years of age, knowingly performed deviate sexual conduct with D.A., a 

child under the age of fourteen. See I.C. § 35-42-4-3. Deviate sexual conduct is 

an act involving “a sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of 

another person[] or (2) the penetration of the sex organ or anus of a person by 

an object.”6 Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-94 (2014). 

[35] Bruno argues that while he admitted to fondling D.A., he consistently denied 

any anal intercourse and further argues that D.A.’s testimony to the contrary 

lacked specificity and was incredibly dubious. Under the incredible dubiosity 

rule, a court will impinge upon the factfinder’s responsibility to judge the 

credibility of witnesses only when confronted with inherently improbable 

testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible 

dubiosity. Whatley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 276, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. 

denied. In other words, the evidence presented must be so unbelievable, 

incredible, or improbable that no reasonable person could ever reach a guilty 

verdict based upon that evidence alone. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 751 (Ind.

2015). We also note that application of this rule is limited to cases where a 

single witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or 

 

6 Bruno committed his crimes prior to the repeal of the deviate sexual conduct definition and replacement 

with the term “other sexual conduct.” “Other sexual conduct” has an identical definition as deviate sexual 

conduct previously had. See Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5.
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the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of 

guilt. Id.

[36] Here, D.A. testified that Bruno performed anal sex on him numerous times 

throughout the years. D.A. described the first encounter as taking place at the 

Grand Avenue house where Bruno lived with D.A.’s family in 2006 and as 

repeatedly occurring from 2010 through 2013 when D.A.’s family lived in their 

Southview home. D.A.’s testimony that some of the encounters happened 

while his siblings slept in the same room is not an uncommon occurrence in 

child molesting cases, and unfortunately, not counter to human experience. 

There is nothing inherently contradictory or equivocal about D.A.’s testimony. 

Bruno’s arguments simply amount to blatant requests for this court to reweigh 

the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses. We will not indulge such a

request on appeal. 

Sentencing

[37] Bruno challenges his sentence in two respects. He first argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion in finding aggravating circumstances and imposing 

consecutive sentences. He also argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light 

of the nature of the offense and his character. “As our Supreme Court has 

made clear, inappropriate sentence and abuse of discretion claims are to be 

analyzed separately.” King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

We will address each in turn.

4. Abuse of Discretion
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[38] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 

218. So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review 

only for an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs if the 

decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom.’” Id. at 490 (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)).

[39] A trial court may abuse its sentencing discretion in a number of ways, 

including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a 

sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are 

unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits 

reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing 

statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-

91. If the trial court abuses its discretion in one of these or another way, 

remand for resentencing is the appropriate remedy “if we cannot say with 

confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it 

properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id. at 491.

[40] Bruno’s sole argument with respect to the aggravating circumstances is that the 

trial court abused its discretion when it found that the harm to D.A. exceeded 

that required for a conviction. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(1) (a trial court 

may consider harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by the victim that is 

significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of 

the offense). Bruno maintains that the psychological impact of Bruno’s actions 
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on D.A. was not out of the ordinary for a child subjected to such conduct. He 

further argues that the State presented no evidence linking any physical harm to 

Bruno’s actions. 

[41] With regard to the psychological harm, we note that Bruno was a spiritual 

leader who used his closeness with D.A.’s family to take advantage of D.A. 

beginning when D.A. was just six years old. Even after D.A. summoned the 

courage to tell his father of the abuse he suffered at the hands of Bruno, Bruno 

convinced D.A.’s father that D.A. was possessed by the devil, which destroyed 

D.A.’s trust in his father. Bruno later engaged in a pattern of sexual abuse of 

D.A. that involved anal penetration and having D.A. masturbate him. All the 

while, D.A. had to endure Bruno as his family’s minister and as being treated 

like a member of the family. The testimony and evidence presented by the State 

at sentencing clearly demonstrates that the circumstances under which Bruno 

perpetrated his crimes had a significant psychological impact on D.A. 

[42] With regard to physical harm, even Bruno acknowledges that the State 

presented evidence that D.A. suffered from and was treated for encopresis7 and 

that encopresis can be a sign of sexual abuse. Bruno argues, however, that such 

is an improper aggravating circumstance in this case because the State 

presented no evidence linking this physical condition to Bruno’s conduct. 

Despite the lack of an explicit connection between D.A.’s physical condition 

 

7 Encopresis is defined as “involuntary defecation.” Dictionary.com, 

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/encopresis (last visited May 5, 2017).
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and Bruno’s conduct, there was ample evidence from which the trial court 

could have properly found the harm D.A. suffered was significant and greater 

than that necessary for the offense. D.A. recounted the numerous times Bruno 

anally penetrated him with his penis. D.A. told a nurse who examined him 

that it was “really hurting [his] bottom” and that he was “having problems 

when [he had] loose poop.” State’s Sentencing Exhibit 1. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion in finding as an aggravating circumstance that the harm 

inflicted was greater than that required for the offense.

[43] Bruno next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing 

consecutive sentences. Bruno maintains that the trial court fell short of the 

requirement that it explain its reasons for the sentence imposed by not 

explaining why the aggravating circumstances warranted consecutive sentences 

as opposed to simply enhanced concurrent sentences.

[44] Trial courts are permitted to impose consecutive sentences if warranted by the 

aggravating circumstances. Monroe v. State, 886 N.E.2d 578, 579 (Ind. 2008). 

In doing so, however, a trial court must articulate, explain, and evaluate the 

aggravating circumstances that support the sentence. Id. Where the trial 

court’s sentencing statement lacks specificity with regard to an explanation for 

imposition of consecutive sentencing, remand for resentencing is not required 

where the rationale for consecutive sentences is apparent on the face of the 

record. Lewis v. State, 31 N.E.3d 539, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
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[45] Here, in arguing for consecutive sentences, the State emphasized that this was 

not a single act of molestation, noting that Bruno first molested D.A. sometime

between 2006 and 2007 and then again, years later, engaged in repeated acts of 

molestation. In its sentencing statement, the trial court found that the acts 

occurred over a long period of time and were “not a single mistake.” Transcript 

Volume II at 96. As our Supreme Court has held, “additional criminal activity 

directed to the same victim should not be free of consequences.” Horton v. State, 

949 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ind. 2011). The trial court’s order of consecutive 

sentences demonstrates the trial court’s acknowledgment of the two distinct 

time periods during which the molestations occurred. The trial court’s rationale 

is apparent from the record and its imposition of consecutive sentences was not 

an abuse of discretion. 

5. Inappropriate Sentence

[46] Bruno argues that his sentence is inappropriate. Article 7, section 4 of the 

Indiana Constitution grants our Supreme Court the power to review and revise 

criminal sentences. See Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014), cert. 

denied, 135 S.Ct. 978 (2015). Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 7, the Supreme 

Court authorized this court to perform the same task. Cardwell v. State, 895 

N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). Per App. R. 7(B), we may revise a sentence “if 

after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character 

of the offender.” Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting App. R. 

7). “Sentencing review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is very deferential to the trial 
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court.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). The defendant bears 

the burden on appeal of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. See id.

[47] The determination of whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on 

our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the 

damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given 

case.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Cardwell, 895 

N.E.2d at 1224). Moreover, “[t]he principal role of such review is to attempt to 

leaven the outliers.” Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013). It is 

not our goal in this endeavor to achieve the perceived “correct” sentence in 

each case. Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1292. Accordingly, “the question under 

Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, 

the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” King v. State, 

894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis in original).

[48] In order to assess the appropriateness of a sentence, we first look to the 

statutory range established for the classification of the relevant offense. Bruno 

was convicted of two Class A felonies and two Class C felonies. The relevant 

statutes provide a sentencing range of twenty to fifty years with an advisory 

sentence of thirty years for a Class A felony and two to eight years with an 

advisory sentence of four years for a Class C felony. Ind. Code §§ 35-50-2-4, -6. 

Here, the trial court imposed enhanced sentences for each conviction and 

ordered the convictions for the Class A felonies to run consecutively as an 

acknowledgement that the crimes were committed during two separate and 
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distinct time periods against the same victim. Bruno’s total aggregate sentence 

is eighty years.

[49] We begin with the nature of the offense. Bruno’s offenses are particularly 

reprehensible. Bruno held himself out to be a man of God and used his position 

to ingratiate himself into D.A.’s family. D.A.’s parents trusted Bruno, 

providing him with a place to live, financially supporting the start-up of his 

church, and allowing him to care for their children, including D.A. D.A.’s 

father described Bruno as being like family. Bruno violated his extraordinary 

position of trust when he began molesting D.A. at just six years old. After D.A. 

courageously reported the abuse to his father, Bruno lied and covered up his 

actions by convincing D.A.’s father that D.A. was demonically possessed. A 

few years later, Bruno, who remained close with D.A.’s family, resumed his 

molestations of D.A. Over the course of the next several years, Bruno 

repeatedly molested D.A. by anal penetration and fondling. D.A. again 

summoned the courage to tell his father about Bruno’s actions. When 

confronted again, Bruno initially denied having engaged in the alleged conduct. 

Although Bruno finally admitted to touching D.A., he continually denied that 

any anal penetration occurred.

[50] Bruno incorrectly argues that there was no proof of physical harm to D.A. 

There is evidence that D.A. suffered from encopresis and that, at one point, 

D.A. had a dilated anus. As noted above, D.A. told a nurse examiner about the 

sexual abuse and reported that “[i]t was really hurting my bottom and I am 

having problems when I have loose poop, it will leak some.” State’s Sentencing 
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Exhibit 1. Despite Bruno’s desire to downplay this evidence, it is sufficient to 

establish that there was physical harm. We further note that the psychological 

harm of a spiritual leader and close family friend molesting a child over a 

period of years goes above and beyond the physical ramifications. 

[51] Finally, we observe that the molestations occurred during two distinct time 

periods, the first occurring when D.A. was six years old. Years later, Bruno

resumed his molestation of D.A. As noted above, the imposition of consecutive 

sentences accounts for the fact that Bruno molested a six-year-old D.A., had 

time (i.e., years) to reflect upon his actions, and yet began molesting D.A. 

again. Bruno has failed to show that the nature of his offense is deserving of a 

lesser sentence.

[52] With regard to the character of the offender, we note that Bruno is an 

undocumented immigrant. Aside from his repeated molestation of D.A. over a 

period of time, there is no evidence that he engaged in other criminal activity. 

More telling of his character, however, is that Bruno used his position of power 

as a spiritual leader to gain favor with D.A. and his family. He then abused 

their trust by molesting D.A. After D.A.’s first disclosure of the molestation, 

Bruno damaged the trust between D.A. and his father when Bruno convinced 

D.A.’s father that D.A.’s allegations were a result of being demonically 

possessed. In the end, Bruno did not voluntarily disclose his actions, but 

admitted to fondling D.A. only after confronted. Even then, he continued to 

downplay his actions while begging for forgiveness. 
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[53] Bruno has failed to demonstrate that his aggregate eighty-year sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense or his character. 

5. Restitution

[54] Bruno argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $5000 in 

restitution to the State. The restitution order covered the State’s expenses for 

translation and transcription of the recorded conversation between D.A.’s 

father and Bruno that was taken from D.A.’s father’s cell phone. 

[55] As part of a sentence or as a condition of probation, a trial court may order a 

defendant to pay restitution to a victim. Bailey v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind.

1999). We review a trial court’s order of restitution for an abuse of discretion. 

Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

[56] Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3 sets forth the requirements for a restitution order, in 

pertinent part as follows:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (i), (j), (l), or (m), in 

addition to any sentence imposed under this article for a felony 

or misdemeanor, the court may, as a condition of probation or 

without placing the person on probation, order the person to 

make restitution to the victim of the crime, the victim’s estate, or 

the family of a victim who is deceased. The court shall base its 

restitution order upon a consideration of:

(1) property damages of the victim incurred as a result of 

the crime, based on the actual cost of repair (or 

replacement if repair is inappropriate);
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(2) medical and hospital costs incurred by the victim 

(before the date of sentencing) as a result of the crime;

(3) the cost of medical laboratory tests to determine if the 

crime has caused the victim to contract a disease or other 

medical condition;

(4) earnings lost by the victim (before the date of 

sentencing) as a result of the crime including earnings lost 

while the victim was hospitalized or participating in the 

investigation or trial of the crime; and

(5) funeral, burial, or cremation costs incurred by the 

family or estate of a homicide victim as a result of the 

crime.

[57] The trial court abused its discretion in ordering Bruno to pay restitution. “[T]he 

principal purpose of restitution is to vindicate the rights of society and to 

impress upon the defendant the magnitude of the loss the crime has caused, and 

that restitution also serves to compensate the victim.” Iltzsch v. State, 981 N.E.2d 

55, 56 (Ind. 2013) (emphasis supplied). I.C. § 35-50-5-3(a) authorizes 

restitution only to the victim of the crime, the victim’s estate, or the family of a 

victim who is deceased. While a State entity may be considered a victim for 

purposes of the restitution statute, the State must first make a showing as to 

how its entity was a victim. Lohmiller v. State, 884 N.E.2d 903, 916 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2008). Where the State makes no such showing, the State is not a victim 

entitled to restitution. Id. (citing Green v. State, 811 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004)). 
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[58] Here the State merely requested restitution and submitted invoices for the 

translation and transcription services provided. The State did not show how it 

was a victim. The State is therefore not a victim entitled to restitution.

[59] Further, we note that I.C. § 35-50-5-3 provides for restitution for property 

damage, medical costs, cost of laboratory tests, lost earnings, and funeral and 

burial expenses. Here, the State is seeking reimbursement for costs associated 

with its investigation. As was noted by this court in Green, if the State were 

entitled to restitution any time it elects to spend money to obtain criminal 

evidence, then the State would seek restitution for any and all of its discovery 

costs. This is contrary to I.C. § 35-50-5-3 and the purposes of restitution. The 

trial court’s restitution order is improper as a matter of law. We therefore 

reverse the trial court’s order that Bruno pay $5000 in restitution to the State. 

[60] Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Riley, J. and Crone, J., concur.