alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Julian Edward ROCHESTER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David M. McCALL, Warden of Perry Correctional Institution; State of South Carolina; Jon Ozmint, Director of South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 11-6328.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 28, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 11, 2011.

Julian Edward Rochester, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

South Carolina prisoner Julian Rochester appeals the district court’s dismissal, without prejudice, of his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006 & Supp.2011) petition. To the extent that Rochester contends that he is being confined beyond the expiration of his criminal sentence, his claim is subject to dismissal because Rochester has not demonstrated exhaustion of state rem*835edies, as required by § 2241. *See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct.,*410 U.S. 484, 489-90, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). Rochester’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel challenge the validity of his convictions and should be brought, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition, *see Wilkinson v.*Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005), if Rochester obtains authorization from this court under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2006) to file such a petition. Finally, Rochester’s claims of denial of mail and phone privileges and beatings sound under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). We therefore affirm. We deny the motions for copies of documents and to expedite consideration of the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### Renu MADHAR; Santokh Madhar, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-74276.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed June 29, 2011.

Hardeep Singh Rai, Indus Law Group LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioners.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Ann Carroll Var-non, Esquire, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Renu Madhar and Santokh Madhar, natives and citizens of India, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying their motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, *Najmabadi v. Holder,*597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir.2010), and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the Madhars’ motion to reopen where the motion was filed almost three years after the BIA’s final administrative order, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the Madhars failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); *Najmabadi,*597 F.3d at 987 (new evidence “must be ‘qualitatively different’ from the evidence presented at the previous hearing”); *see also Toufighi v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir.2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Contrary to the Madhars’ contention, the BIA adequately considered the evidence presented with the motion to reopen. *See Najmabadi,*597 F.3d at 990-91 (BIA must consider issues raised and announce its decision in a manner sufficient for reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted).

To the extent the Madhars attempt to challenge the agency’s underlying credibility determination, we decline to review this claim because this court already decided the issue in *Madhar v. Gonzales,*221 Fed.Appx. 645 (9th Cir.2007). *See Disimone v. Browner,*121 F.3d 1262, 1266 (9th Cir.1997) (under law of the case doctrine, one panel of an appellate court will not reconsider questions that another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same case).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

SEPT 06, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 05-15809

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 99-00010-CR-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus 

ANGEL GIOVANNY MERCADO, 

a.k.a. Giovanni Angel Mercado-Cervantes, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

_________________________

(September 6, 2006)

Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled guilty on August 10, 1999 to
2

conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute heroin, cocaine,

and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and on December

1, 1999, the district court sentenced him to prison for 180 months. He is now

serving that sentence in a federal prison.

On June 11, 2003, appellant moved the district court to compel the

Government to state why it had not filed a Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) motion to reduce

his sentence for rendering substantial assistance. The court denied the motion in an

order entered on September 26, 2005. Record, Vol 2, at 237. Appellant now

appeals the court’s ruling.

For the reason stated in the district court’s September 26, 2005 order, we

conclude that the court properly denied appellant’s motion. 

AFFIRMED .
#### David A. Cantor, Respondent, v Frantzie Flores, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[943 NYS2d 138]

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Frantzie Flores appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), entered January 5, 2011, which denied her motion to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale of the same court entered August 11, 2008, upon her default in answering the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion of the defendant Frantzie Flores (hereinafter the appellant) to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale entered upon her default in answering the complaint. While the appellant explicitly stated that her motion was based upon CPLR 5015 (a) (4), she failed to allege that the Supreme Court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over her. The affidavit of the plaintiffs process server, which constituted prima facie evidence of proper service *(see Argent Mtge. Co., LLC v Vlahos,*66 AD3d 721 [2009]), indicated that the appellant was served on August 7, 2006, pursuant to CPLR 308 (1). The appellant failed to challenge, let alone rebut, the plaintiffs prima facie showing of proper service. To the extent the appellant based her motion to vacate the default judgment of foreclosure and sale on CPLR 5015 (a) (1), the motion was properly denied, as she failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default. While the *937Supreme Court has the discretion to accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse *(see*CPLR 2005; *Swensen v MV Transp., Inc.,*89 AD3d 924, 925 [2011]), the excuse must be supported by detailed allegations of fact explaining the law office failure *(see Matter of Esposito,*57 AD3d 894, 895 [2008]; *Gazetten Contr., Inc. v HCO, Inc.,*45 AD3d 530 [2007]). Here, the appellant’s allegation of law office failure was vague, conclusory, and unsubstantiated *(see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cervini,*84 AD3d 789, 789-790 [2011]; *Star Indus., Inc. v Innovative Beverages, Inc.,*55 AD3d 903, 904-905 [2008]). Since the appellant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default, it is unnecessary to determine whether she demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense *(see Tribeca Lending Corp. v Correa,*92 AD3d 770 [2012]; *Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cervini,*84 AD3d at 790).

The appellant’s remaining contentions either are without merit or have been rendered academic by our determination. Dillon, J.E, Dickerson, Hall and Austin, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 93 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 93

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow expenses relating 
to all home schools to be qualified education expenses for purposes of 
                 a Coverdell education savings account.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

             January 25 (legislative day, January 5), 2011

  Mr. Vitter introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow expenses relating 
to all home schools to be qualified education expenses for purposes of 
                 a Coverdell education savings account.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ALLOWANCE OF HOME SCHOOL EXPENSES AS QUALIFIED EDUCATION 
              EXPENSES FOR PURPOSES OF A COVERDELL EDUCATION SAVINGS 
              ACCOUNT.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (3) of section 530(b) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph:
                    ``(C) Private school.--For purposes of this 
                section, the term `private school' includes any home 
                school that meets the requirements of State law 
                applicable to such home schools, whether or not such 
                school is deemed a private school for purposes of State 
                law.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2020010EN.01003301.xml

| 13.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 10/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 10/33

---

Judgment of the General Court of 20 November 2019 — Rezon v EUIPO (imot.bg)

(Case T-101/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU figurative mark imot.bg - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - No distinctive character acquired through use - Article 7(1)(b) and (3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Obligation to state reasons - First sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001)

(2020/C 10/44)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Parties

Applicant: Rezon OOD (Sofia, Bulgaria) (represented by: M. Yordanova-Harizanova, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: I. Stoycheva and J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 9 November 2018 (Case R 999/2018-2) relating to an application for registration of the figurative sign imot.bg as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Rezon OOD to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Rezon OOD to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 131, 8.4.2019.

---
Exhibit 32.1

**NANOGEN, INC.**

**CERTIFICATIONSREQUIRED BYRULE 13a-14(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934**

I, Howard C. Birndorf, Chief Executive Officer of Nanogen, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), hereby certifythat, based on my knowledge:

|     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (1) | The Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2003 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;and |

|        |                                                                                                                                                     |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                |
| (2)    | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. |

|                                                        |        |                         |
|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|
| August 12, 2003                                        |   | /s/ HOWARD C. BIRDNORF  |
|                                                   |   |                         |
|           |   | Howard C. Birndorf      |
|           |   | Chief Executive Officer |
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 814 

To require the public disclosure of audits conducted with respect to entities 

receiving funds under title X of the Public Health Service Act. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 13, 2011 

Mr. MANCHIN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To require the public disclosure of audits conducted with 

respect to entities receiving funds under title X of the 

Public Health Service Act. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Title X Transparency 

5 and Verification Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF AUDIT RESULTS. 

7 The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall 

8 provide for the disclosure, on the Internet website of the 

9 Department of Health and Human Services, of the results 

10 of any audit conducted under title X of the Public Health 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 814 IS

1 Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300 et seq.) concerning any entity 

2 that receives funds for activities under such title. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 23.1







CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM






We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-91700 on Form S-8 of our report dated March 29, 2010, relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of Aéropostale, Inc. and its subsidiaries (the “Company”), and of our report dated March 29, 2010, relating to the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Aéropostale, Inc. and its subsidiaries for the year ended January 30, 2010.






/s/ Deloitte and Touche LLP






New York, New York






March 29, 2010








58
EXHIBIT
10.43


 


AMENDMENT
NO. 2


 


to


 


EMPLOYMENT
SERVICES AGREEMENT


 


AMENDMENT
NO. 2 TO EMPLOYMENT SERVICES AGREEMENT dated as of February 27, 2015 (the “Amendment”) by and between Michael
D. Rountree (the “Executive”) and Eventure Interactive, Inc. (the “Company”).


 


WHEREAS,
the Company entered into an Employment Services Agreement with the Executive dated as of March 10, 2014 and Amendment No. 1, dated
as of February 2, 2015 (the “Employment Services Agreement”) pursuant to which Executive serves as the Company’s
Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer; and


 


WHEREAS,
Executive and the Company wish to modify certain arrangements under the Employment Services Agreement in the manner set forth
herein.


 


NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements contained herein, the receipt and sufficiency of which
are hereby acknowledged, the Company and the Executive agree as follows:


 


1.     Section
2(c) of the Employment Services Agreement is amended to read as follows:


 


“(c)    However,
the parties agree that: (i) Executive may devote a reasonable amount of his time to civic, community, or charitable activities
and may serve as an investor, employee, director and/or executive officer of other corporations (provided that any such other
corporation is not a competitor of the Company, as determined by the Board) and to other types of business or public activities
not expressly mentioned in this paragraph, so long as Executive’s responsibilities with respect thereto do not conflict
or interfere with the faithful performance of his duties to the Company.”


 


2.
     No Further Changes.  Until the resignation of Executive, all other terms of the
Employment Services Agreement shall continue with full force and effect.


 


[Signature
Page Follows]


 




    	 



    	 



    




IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Amendment to be duly executed as of the date first above written.


 


	EXECUTIVE:	 	COMPANY:
    
	 	 	 	 
	/s/
    Michael D. Rountree	 	By:	/s/
    Gannon Giguiere
	Michael D. Rountree	 	Name:  Gannon Giguieree
	 	 	Title:  President
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Alvin Rivers, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lawrence Tonetti, J.), rendered on March 22, 1983, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted. *(See, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur — Murphy, P. J., Ross, Asch and Ellerin, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. §1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Quarterly Report of Vascular Solutions, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Howard Root, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify to my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Howard RootHoward RootChief Executive OfficerApril 14, 2011
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 Written Statement of the Chief Financial Officer
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350 Solely for the purposes of complying with 19 U.S.C. § 1350, I, the undersigned Chief Financial
Officer of Nicholas Financial, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify, based on my knowledge, that
the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the year ended March 31, 2005 (the Report)
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company. Nicholas Financial, Inc.By: /s/ Ralph T. FinkenbrinkRalph T. FinkenbrinkSenior Vice President andChief Financial OfficerJune 29, 2005
#### Charles W. BIRKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Keith F. PARK, Esquire; Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP; The Regents of the University of California, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 08-2074.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 29, 2008.

Decided: Jan. 20, 2009.

Charles W. Birks, Appellant Pro Se. Kathy Dawn Patrick, Gibbs & Bruns, LLP, Houston, Texas, for Appellees.

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Charles W. Birks seeks to appeal the district court’s order adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and transferring Birks’s action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Birks seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we grant Appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and deny as moot Birks’s motion for injunctive relief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
# C_2020027EN.01002402.xml

| 27.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 27/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 27/24

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Varhoven administrativen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 12 November 2019 — TC, UB v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, VA

(Case C-824/19)

(2020/C 27/31)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Varhoven administrativen sad

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants in the appeal in cassation: TC, UB

Respondents in the appeal in cassation: Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, VA

Questions referred

| 1. | Does the interpretation of Article 5(2) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and of Article [2](1), (2) and (3) and Article 4(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC (1) of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation lead to the conclusion that it is permissible for a person without the ability to see to be able to work as a court assessor and participate in criminal proceedings, or: |
| --- | --- |

1.

Does the interpretation of Article 5(2) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and of Article [2](1), (2) and (3) and Article 4(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC (1) of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation lead to the conclusion that it is permissible for a person without the ability to see to be able to work as a court assessor and participate in criminal proceedings, or:

| 2. | Is the specific disability of a permanently blind person a characteristic which constitutes a genuine and determining requirement of the activity of a court assessor, the existence of which justifies a difference of treatment and does not constitute discrimination based on the characteristic of ‘disability’? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Is the specific disability of a permanently blind person a characteristic which constitutes a genuine and determining requirement of the activity of a court assessor, the existence of which justifies a difference of treatment and does not constitute discrimination based on the characteristic of ‘disability’?

---

(1)  OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16.

---