alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
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###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.

                    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could disclose                           ( print page 38493)                        confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.                

*Name of Committee:*                         Center for Scientific Review Special Emphasis Panel; Clinical Trials in Alzheimer's Disease.                    

*Date:*                         July 27, 2021.                    

*Time:*                         11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.                    

*Agenda:*                         To review and evaluate grant applications.                    

*Place:*                         National Institutes of Health, Rockledge II, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 (Telephone Conference Call).                    

*Contact Person:*                         Sara Louise Hargrave, Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, Center for Scientific Review, National Institutes of Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 3170, Bethesda, MD 20892, (301) 443-7193,                         *hargravesl@mail.nih.gov.*

This notice is being published less than 15 days prior to the meeting due to the timing limitations imposed by the review and funding cycle.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.306, Comparative Medicine; 93.333, Clinical Research, 93.306, 93.333, 93.337, 93.393-93.396, 93.837-93.844, 93.846-93.878, 93.892, 93.893, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

Dated: July 15, 2021.

Melanie J. Pantoja,

Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 2021-15449 Filed 7-20-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 72 

To repeal the expansion of information reporting requirements for payments 

of $600 or more to corporations, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 25 (legislative day, JANUARY 5), 2011 

Mr. BAUCUS (for himself, Mr. REID, Mr. BROWN of Massachusetts, Mr. 

BROWN of Ohio, Mr. BEGICH, Mr. CARDIN, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. NELSON

of Nebraska, Ms. STABENOW, Mr. SCHUMER, Ms. KLOBUCHAR, Mrs. 

SHAHEEN, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. ROCKEFELLER, Ms. CANTWELL, Mr. 

MANCHIN, Mr. COONS, and Mr. FRANKEN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To repeal the expansion of information reporting requirements for payments of $600 or more to corporations, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Small Business Paper5 work Mandate Elimination Act of 2011’’. 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 72 IS

1 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF EXPANSION OF INFORMATION REPORT2 ING REQUIREMENTS. 

3 Section 9006 of the Patient Protection and Afford4 able Care Act, and the amendments made thereby, are 

5 hereby repealed; and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 

6 shall be applied as if such section, and amendments, had 

7 never been enacted. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with BILLS
# C_2020095EN.01001402.xml

| 23.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 95/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 95/14

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 12 December 2019 — Bankia, S. A. v Unión Mutua Asistencial de Seguros (UMAS)

(Case C-910/19)

(2020/C 95/15)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Bankia, S. A.

Defendant: Unión Mutua Asistencial de Seguros (UMAS)

Questions referred

With regard to the interpretation of Article 3(2) and Article 6 of Directive 2003/71/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC:

| 1. | When an offer of shares to the public for subscription is directed at both retail and qualified investors, and a prospectus is issued for the retail investors, is an action for damages arising from the prospectus available to both kinds of investor or only to retail investors? |
| --- | --- |

1.

When an offer of shares to the public for subscription is directed at both retail and qualified investors, and a prospectus is issued for the retail investors, is an action for damages arising from the prospectus available to both kinds of investor or only to retail investors?

| 2. | In the event that the answer to the first question is that it is also available to qualified investors, is it possible to assess the extent to which they were aware of the economic situation of the issuer of the offer of shares to the public otherwise than through the prospectus, on the basis of their legal and commercial relations with that issuer (for example, being shareholders of the issuer or members of its management bodies, etc.)? |
| --- | --- |

2.

In the event that the answer to the first question is that it is also available to qualified investors, is it possible to assess the extent to which they were aware of the economic situation of the issuer of the offer of shares to the public otherwise than through the prospectus, on the basis of their legal and commercial relations with that issuer (for example, being shareholders of the issuer or members of its management bodies, etc.)?

---

(1)  OJ 2003, L 345, p. 64

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jimmie Love, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Howard E. Bell, J.), rendered April 12, 1983, which convicted defendant, after a jury trial, of two counts of robbery in the first degree and one count of robbery in the second degree, and sentenced him to two concurrent terms of 8 to 16 years and one of 5 to 10 years, unanimously modified, on the law, to reverse and vacate the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing and otherwise affirmed.

Defendant was sentenced as a predicate felon on the basis of a prior Federal conviction for theft of mail matter under 18 USC § 1709 for which he received a sentence of 18 months. To serve as the basis for a predicate felony conviction under Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i), the Federal conviction must not only have been for an offense for which a sentence in excess of one year was authorized but must also have been for an offense that would have constituted a felony if perpetrated in this State. In determining whether the crime was analogous to a felony under our law, it is the essential elements of that crime, as specified in the Federal statute creating it, that are controlling. *(People v Gonzalez,*61 NY2d 586; *People v Williams,*100 AD2d 760.) The Federal statute under which defendant was convicted prohibits the theft of any mail matter, regardless of value, in distinction to the specified monetary value thresholds which are essential elements in raising the crime of larceny to the felony level in this State. Under our Penal Law, the value of the property stolen must exceed $250 to constitute grand larceny in the third degree (Penal Law § 155.30) and must exceed $1,500 to fall within the proscription of grand larceny in the second degree (Penal Law § 155.35). Since the critical element of specified minimum monetary value of the property stolen is not an *135element of the Federal crime, that crime cannot be construed as a felony in this State since it is clearly possible to violate that statute under circumstances which would here constitute a misdemeanor. (Penal Law § 155.25; *People v Olah,*300 NY 96; *People v Cappucci,*94 AD2d 746.) As is candidly conceded by the People, defendant’s prior conviction cannot serve as the basis for a predicate felony conviction, notwithstanding the failure to raise the issue prior to the time sentence was imposed. Accordingly, inasmuch as defendant was improperly sentenced as a predicate felon, we vacate the sentences and remand the matter for resentencing of defendant. Concur — Sandler, J. P., Ross, Bloom, Milonas and Ellerin, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. §1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Vascular
Solutions, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2006, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, James Hennen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify to
my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:



1.
        The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


2.
        The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




| |  | 
| |  | 
| |  | 
| |  | 

---
# C_2020175EN.01002601.xml

| 25.5.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 175/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.5.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 175/26

---

Order of the General Court of 12 March 2020 — Le Comité de Douzelage de Houffalize v Commission and EACEA

(Case T-236/19) (1)

(Action for annulment - Europe for Citizens Programme (2014-2020) - Call for applications ‘Town Twinning 2017, second deadline’ (EACEA 36/2014) - Decision of the EACEA rejecting the applicant’s application for failure to meet the eligibility criteria - Commission’s decision rejecting the administrative action relating to the EACEA’s decision - Application submitted by a de facto association - Capacity to be party to legal proceedings - No evidence of legal existence - Inadmissibility)

(2020/C 175/34)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Le Comité de Douzelage de Houffalize (Houffalize, Belgium) (represented by: A. Kettels, lawyer)

Defendants: European Commission and the ‘Education, Audiovisual and Culture’ Executive Agency (EACEA) (represented by: H. Monet and N. Durand, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application based on Article 263 TFEU for annulment or variation, first, of the EACEA’s decision of 25 June 2018 rejecting the applicant’s application for a grant in respect of its call for applications ‘Town Twinning 2017, second deadline’ (EACEA 36/2014) and, secondly, of Commission Implementing Decision C (2019) 572 final of 4 February 2019, rejecting the administrative action brought by the applicant under Article 22(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes (OJ 2003 L 11, p. 1).

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | There is no need to rule on the objection of inadmissibility raised by the ‘Education, Audiovisual and Culture’ Executive Agency (EACEA). |
| --- | --- |

2.

There is no need to rule on the objection of inadmissibility raised by the ‘Education, Audiovisual and Culture’ Executive Agency (EACEA).

| 3. | There is no need to rule on the EACEA’s application for leave to intervene. |
| --- | --- |

3.

There is no need to rule on the EACEA’s application for leave to intervene.

| 4. | Le Comité du Douzelage de Houffalize shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission and the EACEA, with the exception of those relating to the application for leave to intervene. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Le Comité du Douzelage de Houffalize shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission and the EACEA, with the exception of those relating to the application for leave to intervene.

| 5. | The EACEA shall bear its own costs in relation to the application for leave to intervene. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The EACEA shall bear its own costs in relation to the application for leave to intervene.

---

(1)  OJ C 270, 12.8.2019.

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Christopher Ripley, Appellant.

[942 NYS2d 919]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (M. William Boiler, A.J.), rendered July 2, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted burglary in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of attempted burglary in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 140.25 [2]). We reject defendant’s contention that he did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to appeal. Contrary to defendant’s contention, Supreme Court “ engage [d] the defendant in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice” *(People v Wright,*66 AD3d 1334 [2009], *lv denied*13 NY3d 912 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]).- Further, the record as a whole establishes “that the defendant understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” *(People v Lopez,*6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; *see People v Korber,*89 AD 3d 1543, 1543 [2011]). Contrary to defendant’s further contention, a “waiver of the right to appeal [is] not rendered invalid based on the court’s failure to require [the] defendant to articulate the waiver in his [or her] own words” *(People v Dozier,*59 AD3d 987, 987 [2009], *lv denied*12 NY3d 815 [2009]; *see People v Thompson,*70 AD3d 1319, 1319-*15551320 [2010], *lv denied*14 NY3d 845 [2010], *reconsideration denied*15 NY3d 810 [2010]; *People v Ludlow,*42 AD3d 941, 942 [2007]). In addition, defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal is not invalid on the ground that the court did not specifically advise defendant that his general waiver of the right to appeal encompassed any challenge to the severity of the sentence *(see People v Hidalgo,*91 NY2d 733, 736-737 [1998]; *see generally People v Eron,*79 AD3d 1774, 1775 [2010]; *People v Tantao,*41 AD3d 1274, 1275 [2007], *lv denied*9 NY3d 882 [2007]).

Defendant’s contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his request for youthful offender status is encompassed by his valid waiver of the right to appeal *(see People v Farewell,*90 AD3d 1502, 1502 [2011]; *People v Harris,*77 AD3d 1326 [2010], *lv denied*16 NY3d 743 [2011]). Present — Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Sconiers and Martoche, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 1 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        S.Con.Res.1
                                       Agreed to January 5, 2011        

                      One Hundred Twelfth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

         Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
            the fifth day of January, two thousand and eleven

                          Concurrent Resolution

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That (a) when the Senate adjourns or recesses on any day from 
Wednesday, January 5, 2011, through Monday, January 10, 2011, on a 
motion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its Majority 
Leader or his designee, it stand adjourned or recessed until 10 a.m. on 
Tuesday, January 25, 2011, or until the time of any reassembly pursuant 
to section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first; and
     (b) when the House adjourns on the legislative day of Wednesday, 
January 12, 2011, on a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent 
resolution by its Majority Leader or his designee, it stand adjourned 
until 2 p.m. on Tuesday, January 18, 2011, or until the time of any 
reassembly pursuant to section 3 of this concurrent resolution, 
whichever occurs first; and when the House adjourns on any legislative 
day from Wednesday, January 26, 2011, through Friday, January 28, 2011, 
on a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its 
Majority Leader or his designee, it stand adjourned until 2 p.m. on 
Tuesday, February 8, 2011, or until the time of any reassembly pursuant 
to section 3 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first.
    Sec. 2. (a) The Majority Leader of the Senate, or his designee, 
after consultation with the Minority Leader of the Senate, or his 
designee, shall notify the Members of the Senate to reassemble at such 
place and time as he may designate if, in his opinion, the public 
interest shall warrant it.
    (b) After reassembling pursuant to subsection (a), when the Senate 
recesses or adjourns on a motion offered pursuant to this subsection by 
its Majority Leader or his designee, the Senate shall again stand 
recessed or adjourned pursuant to the first section of this concurrent 
resolution.
    Sec. 3.  The Speaker or his designee, after consultation with the 
Minority Leader of the House, shall notify Members of the House to 
reassemble at such place and time as he may designate if, in his 
opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.
Attest:

                                               Secretary of the Senate.
Attest:

                                 Clerk of the House of Representatives.
```
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

JOSE GUADALUPE ZEPEDA-RAMIREZ,

AKA Jose Guadalupe Zepeda Ramirez, 

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 16-50369

D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00226-R-2

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 8, 2018

Pasadena, California

Before: REINHARDT and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and SIMON,

** District 

Judge.

Appellant Jose Guadalupe Zepeda-Ramirez appeals the jury’s verdict and 

the district court’s order denying his motion for acquittal. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge for the 

District of Oregon, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAR 13 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

1. We review the district court’s denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. 

United States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 

omitted). In reviewing the motion and the jury’s verdict, we consider the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether “any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1192 (citation omitted). Here, Zepeda-Ramirez and one 

other person traveled to the United States from Mexico on a small boat (“panga”) 

filled with 1,664 kilograms of marijuana. Zepeda-Ramirez knew the cargo was 

marijuana and he helped steer the boat to the United States. Experienced law 

enforcement officers testified that drug smuggling operations from Mexico to the

United States by panga require at least two people, and the panga Zepeda-Ramirez 

arrived in contained equipment typically used by smugglers to coordinate with 

partners to pick up the cargo after making landfall. A conversation between 

Zepeda-Ramirez and the other occupant of the boat was covertly recorded after 

they were arrested, in which Zepeda-Ramirez made statements from which the jury 

could have inferred that he was involved in the smuggling operation and trying to 

concoct the best possible exculpatory story. This evidence was sufficient for a 

rational jury to convict Zepeda-Ramirez for both conspiracy to possess marijuana 

with intent to distribute and for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. 

AFFIRMED.
#### In the Matter of Peter Ramos, Petitioner, v Brian Fischer, as Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.

[944 NYS2d 405]—

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

While a correction officer was escorting petitioner to a bus, petitioner became argumentative and refused to proceed further than the second step. When the officer directed petitioner to get onto the bus, petitioner spit in the officer’s face. As a result, the officer prepared a misbehavior report charging petitioner with *1531refusing a direct order, engaging in violent conduct and committing an unhygienic act. He was found guilty of the charges at the conclusion of a tier III disciplinary hearing and the determination was affirmed on administrative appeal. This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because he was served with a misbehavior report containing only the charge of refusing a direct order and not the charges of engaging in violent conduct or committing an unhygienic act, of which he was also found guilty. Respondent concedes that the Hearing Officer did not conduct an adequate inquiry into this discrepancy and the matter must be remitted for a new hearing *(compare Matter of Brown v Fischer,*73 AD3d 1362, 1363 n [2010]; *Matter of Moore v Senkowski,*13 AD3d 683, 684 [2004]). However, insofar as petitioner was provided notice of the charge of refusing a direct order and the record contains substantial evidence supporting the determination in this regard, the new hearing shall be limited to the charges of engaging in violent conduct and committing an unhygienic act. In view of our disposition, petitioner’s remaining claims are academic.

Mercure, J.P, Spain, Malone Jr., Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is modified, without costs, by annulling so much thereof as found petitioner guilty of engaging in violent conduct and committing an unhygienic act; petition granted to that extent, matter remitted to respondent for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision, and, as so modified, confirmed.