**1**

**IN RE THE MATTER OF: ) A.J.S., a child under seventeen years of age, )**  **by J.L.S., ) )**  **Petitioner-Respondent, ) )**  **vs. ) No. SD34224 )**  **C.R., )** Filed: July 1, 2016 **) Respondent-Appellant. )** 
**APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF REYNOLDS COUNTY**

**Honorable Kelly W. Parker, Circuit Judge**
REVERSED **J.L.S. (“Father”), the biological father of A.J.S. (“Chil d”), brought this “private**  **action” under section 211.447, 1**  **to terminate the parental rights of C.R. (“Mother”), the biological mother of Child. Mother raised the affirm**  **ative defense that the petition failed to state a claim because there was non-compliance with sect** **ion 211.447, and also complained that the termination of parental rights**  **is a creature of statute, requiring strict and literal compliance with the statutory authority**  **. Mother brings these same complaints**

**1 All references to statutes are to RSMo Cum. Supp. 2014, un**  **less otherwise specified. 2** 

**in her points in this appeal. We will discuss all three points together as they are**  **interrelated. The power of a Missouri court to sever “all legal rights**  **, privileges, duties and obligations of the parent and child with respect to e**  **ach other” “derives solely from statutory enactments entitled ‘Termination of Parental Rights**  **’ ([]Sections 211.440- 211.540)” and “[t]hat body of laws is a complete code withi**  **n itself, and proceedings thereunder must be in strict accordance with its te**  **rms.”** In re S--M--W-- **, 485 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Mo.App. K.C.D. 1972). Mother did not consent, and the juvenile office**  **r did not file the petition.**  **2 Section 211.447.6 provides:**  **6. The juvenile court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child upon a**  **petition filed by the juvenile officer or the divis ion, or in adoption cases,**  **by a prospective parent, if the court finds that the termination is in the best**  **interest of the child and when it appears by clear, cogent and convincing**  **evidence that grounds exist for termination pursuant to su bsection 2, 4 or 5**  **of this section. This petition was brought by Father. It was not fil**  **ed by the juvenile officer or the division or pursuant to an adoption, as provided by sect** **ion 211.447.6. “The power given the juvenile court to terminate parental rights is**  **purely statutory and without such legislation, the power would not exist.”**  In Interest of W.F.J. **, 648 S.W.2d 210 (Mo.App W.D. 1983). If one of the reasons listed in the statute f**  **or termination of parental rights was not proved to exist, the trial court could not a**  **ct to terminate. 3**  C.S. v. Smith **, 483 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Mo.App. St.L.D. 1972). “[P]arental rights a** **re a fundamental liberty interest, and termination statutes are strictly construe**  **d in favor of the parent and**

**2 Mother is in prison and has no visitation rights w**  **ith Child. No petition for adoption was filed.**

**3 In**  C.S. v. Smith **, the applicable statute was section 211.441, which has since been repealed.** **3**

**preservation of the natural parent-child relationship.”** In re P.J. **, 403 S.W.3d 672, (Mo.App. S.D. 2012) (internal quotations and citations om** **itted). It goes without saying that statutes that provide for the termination of parent**  **al rights are strictly construed in favor of the parent and preservation of the natural p**  **arent-child relationship.** In re
S.M.F. **, 393 S.W.3d 635, 644 (Mo.App. W.D. 2013). Procedural mandat es of child**  **protection statutes applicable to proceedings generally brought by state actors apply when**  **the parties include in the petition the statute app licable to proceedings brought by state** 

**actors.** See In re S.R.F. **, 362 S.W.3d 420 (Mo.App. S.D. 2012). Father argues that the plain language of section 2**  **11.447.1 establishes that a referral to a juvenile officer is optional and not mandat**  **ory and that Mother waived any objections because she consented to add the juvenil**  **e officer as a party. Father contends that only the juvenile officer and Children’s Division are bound by the rules of process--**  **that individuals are not bound by the same rules. As noted, the power of the State to**  **terminate the parental rights of a parent are strict ly construed and derive solely from the**  **statute. There is no common law right of a parent to just t erminate the parental rights of**  **the other parent. The statutes must be strictly construe d for that reason.**  **Mother’s claims have merit. The judgment terminating Mot her’s parental rights**  **is reversed.**
**Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, J. - Opinion Author Don E. Burrell, P.J., - Concurs**  **Gary W. Lynch, J. - Concurs**