alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.2
CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

I, Gregory J. Dawson, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Kentucky Bancshares,
Inc.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including
its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;
b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of
the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's
most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably
likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting; and
5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and
b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
controls over financial reporting.
Date:   March 30, 2007
BY  /s/ Gregory J. Dawson
Gregory J. Dawson
Chief Financial Officer
100
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Steven Dottery, Appellant.

[943 NYS2d 907] —

Appeal by the defendant, as limited by his motion, from a sentence of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Sullivan, J.), imposed March 15, 2010, upon his plea of guilty, on the ground that the sentence was excessive.

Ordered that the sentence is affirmed.

The defendant’s purported waiver of his right to appeal was invalid *(see People v Bradshaw,*18 NY3d 257, 265 [2011]; *People v DeSimone,*80 NY2d 273, 283 [1992]) and, thus, does not preclude review of his excessive sentence claim. However, the sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Mastro, A.P.J., Rivera, Belen, Roman and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
#### Stacy Rodriguez et al.1 v. Robert H. Leavy et al.2,3

Superior Court, Hampden, SS

No. 20031102

Memorandum Dated June 14, 2004

1

Dorinne A. Rodriguez and Arcadio Rodriguez, Jr.

2

Gayle S. Leavy.

3

Jason Chojnowski, Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Company, third-party defendants.

Velis, J.

This action arises from an alleged sexual assault on the plaintiff, Stacy Rodriguez (Rodriguez), while she was a guest at a party hosted by the defendants, Robert H. Leavy and Gayle S. Leavy (the Leavys) on January 19, 2001. On November 12, 2003, Rodriguez, Dorinne A. Rodriguez, and Arcadio Rodriguez, Jr. (the plaintiffs) filed a complaint against the Leavys alleging four counts of negligence (Counts I-IV) and asserting a claim for loss of society and companionship (Count V). On March 12, 2004, the plaintiff served discovery on the Westfield Police Department (Westfield) seeking information relative to their claims of negligence against the Leavys. On March 22, 2004, Westfield objected, citing G.L.c. 4, §7 cl. 26(c) and (f). The plaintiffs now move this court to compel Westfield to produce the requested records. For the following reasons, the motion is *denied.*

*DISCUSSION*

Westfield, in its objection to produce the requested records, asserts that such production is barred by the rape shield law. Further, Westfield argues that, pursuant to G.L.c. 4, §7 cl. 26(c) and (f), such production may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and may so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure is not in the public interest. Westfield has produced an index of the requested records that indicates their content in broad terms.

General Laws c. 66, §10, requires that public information be exhibited for inspection upon request. However, G.L.c. 4, §7 cl. 26(f), prorides an exception for “investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the public view by law enforcement.. . the disclosure of which materials would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest. . .” Here, the disputed materials consist of voluntary statements to police and police reports prepared in connection with an investigation, including witness identities and statements. Such materials are within the exemption. See *Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington.*371 Mass. 59, 62-63 (1977). The plaintiffs argue that the investigatory exemption does not apply to closed investigations. This argument, however, is without legal support. See *id.,*at 63 (holding that “the fact that the investigation to which these materials related had been concluded [does not] destroy the exemption”). Therefore, this court rules that the investigatory exemption applies.

*7ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby *ORDERED*that the plaintiffs motion to compel production of records is *DENIED.*
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-1278
LOUIS G. ANTONELLIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; WILLIAM C. HARRISON; JEFF JERNIGAN; DONNA WEEKS, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:07-cv-00188-H) Submitted: July 29, 2008 Decided: September 17, 2008 Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis G. Antonellis, Appellant Pro Se. Reid Calwell Adams, Jr., WOMBLE, CARLYLE, SANDRIDGE & RICE, PLLC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Julie B. Bradburn, WOMBLE, CARLYLE, SANDRIDGE & RICE, PLLC,, Raleigh, North Carolina; Mark P. Henriques, WOMBLE, CARLYLE, SANDRIDGE & RICE, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Louis Antonellis appeals the district court’s order granting the Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny Antonellis’ motion to present oral argument and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Antonellis v. Cumberland County Bd. of Educ. , No. 5:07-cv-00188-H (E.D.N.C. Feb. 12, 2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Nora Osmon, Respondent, v Iskalo Development Corporation, Defendant, and H&M Plumbing & Mechanical Contracting, Inc., Appellant.

[942 NYS2d 730]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Frank A. Sedita, Jr., J.), entered September 23, 2010 in a personal injury action. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that part of the motion of plaintiff to set aside the jury *1457verdict with respect to defendant H&M Plumbing & Mechanical Contracting, Inc.

It is hereby ordered that the order insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the post-trial motion is denied in its entirety and the verdict with respect to defendant H&M Plumbing & Mechanical Contracting, Inc. is reinstated.

Memorandum: Defendant H&M Plumbing & Mechanical Contracting, Inc. (H&M) appeals from an order granting that part of plaintiffs post-trial motion to set aside a jury verdict in favor of H&M. We reverse the order insofar as appealed from, deny the post-trial motion in its entirety and reinstate the jury verdict with respect to H&M. Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she tripped over a ladder at property owned by defendant Iskalo Development Corporation (Iskalo). Iskalo entered into a contract with H&M to perform plumbing work on the premises. It is undisputed that plaintiff tripped over a ladder owned by H&M, but the jury’s conclusion that H&M was not negligent is supported by the record. Although the evidence established that the ladder was marked as belonging to H&M, it was unclear who placed the ladder in the hallway where plaintiff fell. The jury was entitled to determine that an employee of H&M did not place the ladder in the hallway or that the ladder’s brief and slight incursion into the hallway was not a dangerous condition. Thus, we conclude that the jury’s determination is one that reasonably could have been rendered based on the evidence presented at trial *(see Ruddock v Happell,*307 AD2d 719, 720-721 [2003]). Present — Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Sconiers and Martoche, JJ.
#### Roby Triplett et al., Respondents, v City of Mount Vernon, Appellant.

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nicolai, J.), dated April 1, 1985, as, upon granting renewal of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, adhered to the original determination denying the motion.

Order affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Our review of the record indicates that there is a triable issue of fact as to when certain repairs were allegedly done on the sidewalk upon which plaintiff Angelina Lillian Triplett purportedly fell. Accordingly, the denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment was proper. Mangano, J. P., Bracken, Weinstein, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Spencer, Appellant.

[945 NYS2d 94]—

Judgment of resentence, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael R. Sonberg, J.), rendered July 26, 2011, resentencing defendant upon his conviction, after a jury trial, of two counts of assault in the second degree, and one count each of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and promoting prostitution in the fourth degree, to an aggregate term of five years, unanimously affirmed. Appeal from judgment, same court and Justice, rendered May 18, 2010, unani*782mously dismissed, as superceded by the appeal from the judgment rendered July 26, 2011.

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]). The testimony of the undercover officer that defendant offered the services of prostitutes established his commission of the crime of promoting prostitution in the fourth degree *(see People v Brown,*74 AD3d 1748 [2010], *lv denied*15 NY3d 802 [2010]; Penal Law § 230.20 [1]). There is no basis to disturb the jury’s determination to credit the testimony of the officer.

Moreover, since the officers were performing a lawful duty in arresting defendant, his subsequent actions of violently refusing to be handcuffed or moved from the scene of the incident to the hospital and then to central booking, and causing physical injury to two police officers, established his guilt of assault and obstructing governmental administration. Concur — Tom, J.P, Andrias, Saxe, Moskowitz and Acosta, JJ.
# C_2019148EN.01006101.xml

| 29.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/61 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/61

---

Action brought on 2 March 2019 — Solar Ileias Bompaina v Commission

(Case T-143/19)

(2019/C 148/61)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Solar Ileias Bompaina AE (Athens, Greece) (represented by: A. Metaxas and A. Bartosch, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested acts of the Commission, i.e., Decision C(2018) 6777 final of 10 October 2018 to the extent that it rejects the complaints brought before the Commission in Case SA.41794 and specifically only the paragraphs 111-121 of that Decision as well as the Letter dated 8.2.2019 (B.2 VI/MJ/mkl D*2019/019026); |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested acts of the Commission, i.e., Decision C(2018) 6777 final of 10 October 2018 to the extent that it rejects the complaints brought before the Commission in Case SA.41794 and specifically only the paragraphs 111-121 of that Decision as well as the Letter dated 8.2.2019 (B.2 VI/MJ/mkl D*2019/019026);

| — | order the Commission to bear the costs incurred by the applicant. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to bear the costs incurred by the applicant.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on one plea in law, alleging infringement of the procedural rights of the applicant, because of the omission to define the relevant reference system as the prerogative for assessing the material selectivity of the contested measure, the incorrect assessment of facts presented to the Commission during the administrative procedure as to the compatibility of RES producers and energy suppliers, the wrongful legal analysis of the criterion of comparability to be carried out when assessing the material selectivity of the contested measure, the insufficient reasoning underpinning the apparent lack of carrying out a diligent assessment, as well as the erroneous assessment of the subject due to incorrect application of the invoked jurisprudence.

---
# C_2023035EN.01004501.xml

| 30.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 35/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 35/45

---

Judgment of the General Court of 7 December 2022 — PNB Banka v ECB

(Case T-275/19) (1)

(Economic and monetary policy - Prudential supervision of credit institutions - Powers of the ECB - Investigatory powers - On-site inspections - Article 12 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 - Decision of the ECB to conduct an inspection at the premises of a less significant credit institution - Action for annulment - Challengeable act - Admissibility - Competence of the ECB - Obligation to state reasons - Elements capable of justifying an inspection - Article 106 of the Rules of Procedure - Request for a hearing without a statement of reasons)

(2023/C 35/51)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: PNB Banka AS (Riga, Latvia) (represented by: O. Behrends, lawyer)

Defendant: European Central Bank (represented by: C. Hernández Saseta, F. Bonnard and V. Hümpfner, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendant: European Commission (represented by: D. Triantafyllou, A. Nijenhuis and A. Steiblytė, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the European Central Bank (ECB), notified by letter of 14 February 2019, to conduct an on-site inspection at the applicant’s premises.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders PNB Banka AS to bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Central Bank (ECB); |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders PNB Banka AS to bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Central Bank (ECB);

| 3. | Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 213, 24.6.2019.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 6 Placed on Calendar Senate (PCS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 219
112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. J. RES. 6

     Disapproving the rule submitted by the Federal Communications 
   Commission with respect to regulating the Internet and broadband 
                          industry practices.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 16, 2011

Mrs. Hutchison (for herself, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Ensign, Mr. Alexander, 
    Ms. Ayotte, Mr. Barrasso, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Boozman, Mr. Burr, Mr. 
Chambliss, Mr. Coats, Mr. Coburn, Ms. Collins, Mr. Corker, Mr. Cornyn, 
 Mr. Crapo, Mr. DeMint, Mr. Enzi, Mr. Graham, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Hatch, 
   Mr. Hoeven, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Isakson, Mr. Johanns, Mr. Johnson of 
Wisconsin, Mr. Kirk, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Lee, Mr. McCain, Mr. Paul, Mr. Risch, 
   Mr. Roberts, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Shelby, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Thune, Mr. 
 Toomey, Mr. Vitter, Mr. Wicker, Mr. Heller, Mr. Rubio, and Mr. Lugar) 
  introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and 
   referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

                            November 3, 2011

  Committee discharged by petition, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 802(c), and 
                         placed on the calendar

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
     Disapproving the rule submitted by the Federal Communications 
   Commission with respect to regulating the Internet and broadband 
                          industry practices.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress disapproves the 
rule submitted by the Federal Communications Commission relating to the 
matter of preserving the open Internet and broadband industry practices 
(Report and Order FCC 10-201, adopted by the Commission on December 21, 
2010), and such rule shall have no force or effect.

                                                       Calendar No. 219

112th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                              S. J. RES. 6

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

     Disapproving the rule submitted by the Federal Communications 
   Commission with respect to regulating the Internet and broadband 
                          industry practices.

_______________________________________________________________________

                            November 3, 2011

  Committee discharged by petition, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 802(c), and 
                         placed on the calendar
```
#### BRADY, Respondent, v. DEMPSEY, Appellant, et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

November 8, 1907.)

Action by Susan Brady against James Dempsey, impleaded. T. M. Tyng, for appellant. Á. R. Latson, for respondent.

No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs. Order filed.
Exhibit
32.2

Certification
of Periodic Report

Pursuant
to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. §1350, the undersigned
officer of Renaissance Learning, Inc. (the Company), hereby certifies that,
to the undersigneds knowledge:

| |     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) | the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended June 30, 2009 (the Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
| |     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.                                                                     

|       |                 |  |                                                      
|------ | --------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------
|Dated: | August 10, 2009 |  |                                                      
|      
|       |                 |  | /s/ Mary T. Minch                                    
|       |                 |  | Name: Mary T. Minch                                  
|       |                 |  | Title: Senior Vice President-Finance, Chief Financial
|       |                 |  | Officer and Secretary                                

THIS WRITTEN STATEMENT ACCOMPANIES THIS REPORT PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 AND SHALL NOT BE DEEMED TO BE
FILED BY THE COMPANY FOR PURPOSES OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934.

---
S. J. Res. 22 

One Hundred Twelfth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE FIRST SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday, 

the fifth day of January, two thousand and eleven 

Joint Resolution 

To grant the consent of Congress to an amendment to the compact between the 

States of Missouri and Illinois providing that bonds issued by the Bi-State Development Agency may mature in not to exceed 40 years. 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled, That 

SECTION 1. CONSENT. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The consent of Congress is given to the 

amendment of the powers conferred on the Bi-State Development 

Agency by Senate Bill 758, Laws of Missouri 2010 and Public 

Act 96–1520 (Senate Bill 3342), Laws of Illinois 2010. 

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment to the powers conferred 

by the Acts consented to in subsection (a) shall take effect on 

the date of enactment of this Act. 

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF ACT OF AUGUST 31, 1950. 

The provisions of the Act of August 31, 1950 (64 Stat. 568) 

shall apply to the amendment approved under this joint resolution 

to the same extent as if such amendment was conferred under 

the provisions of the compact consented to in such Act. 

SEC. 3. RIGHT TO ALTER, AMEND, OR REPEAL. 

The right to alter, amend, or repeal this joint resolution is 

expressly reserved. 
S. J. Res. 22—2 

SEC. 4. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS. 

The right is reserved to Congress to require the disclosure 

and furnishings of such information or data by the Bi-State Development Agency as is deemed appropriate by Congress. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.