alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph H. HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-6420.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 28, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 2, 2011.

Joseph H. Harris, Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth Wu, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Joseph H. Harris seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2011) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demon*977strating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Harris has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER Appellate case name: In re Alton Anjie Simmons Appellate case number: 01 - 14 - 00284 - CR ; 01 - 14 - 00285 - CR; 01 - 14 - 00286 - CR Trial court case number: 12 - CR - 1392 ; 12 - CR - 1393; 12 - CR - 1394 Trial court: 10th District Court of Galveston County On April 3, 2014, relator, Alton Anjie Simmons, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and a motion for emergency stay, requesting that the “Court stay the trial court’s order permitting release of Relator’s medical information.” Relator’s motion for emergency stay is denied . It is so ORDERED . Judge’s signature: /s/ Justice Rebeca Huddle

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court Date: April 4, 2014
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   OTHER
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-18-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           3,409
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<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                         6,356,579
<LOANS>                                              0
<ALLOWANCE>                                          0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,361,428
<DEPOSITS>                                           0
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            458,254
<LONG-TERM>                                  6,360,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               6,361,428
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<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        (290,075)
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<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                166,750
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (456,825)
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                (456,825)
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<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
# C_2020255EN.01001702.xml

| 3.8.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 255/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 255/17

---

Order of the General Court of 11 June 2020 — Lípidos Santiga v Commission

(Case T-561/19) (1)

(Action for annulment - Energy - Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources - Limit on biofuels and biomass fuels produced from food and feed crops - Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/807 - Definition of raw materials presenting a high indirect land-use change (ILUC) risk - Palm oil - Standing to bring proceedings - Lack of individual concern - Inadmissibility)

(2020/C 255/22)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Lípidos Santiga, SA (Santa Perpètua de Mogoda, Spain) (represented by: P. Muñiz Fernández, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: J.-F. Brakeland and Y. Marinova, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking the partial annulment of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/807 of 13 March 2019 supplementing Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the determination of high indirect land-use change-risk feedstock for which a significant expansion of the production area into land with high carbon stock is observed and the certification of low indirect land-use change-risk biofuels, bioliquids and biomass fuels (OJ 2019 L 133, p. 1).

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

| 2. | Lípidos Santiga, SA, is ordered to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Lípidos Santiga, SA, is ordered to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 328, 30.9.2019.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                       5
<LEGEND>
Balance Sheet at July 1, 2000,  Statement of Operations at July 1, 2000 and
July 3, 1999.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                    1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                    JUL-01-2000
<CASH>                          2,276,101
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   1,537,550
<ALLOWANCES>                    50,000
<INVENTORY>                     2,777,695
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                6,671,137
<PP&E>                          4,000,815
<DEPRECIATION>                  3,425,909
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  7,446,032
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           834,017
<BONDS>                         0
<COMMON>                        5,164,890
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<OTHER-SE>                      1,447,125
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    7,446,032
<SALES>                         4,039,300
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                4,099,410
<CGS>                           2,698,078
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   3,816,215
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              (138,611)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 0
<INCOME-TAX>                    421,806
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             421,806
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    421,806
<EPS-BASIC>                     0.13
<EPS-DILUTED>                   0.13

<FN>
<F1>                            Tag 24 Other SE is Retained Earnings
<F2>                            Tag 32 is Net Interest Income
</FN>



</TABLE>
# C_2019148EN.01002601.xml

| 29.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/26

---

Appeal brought on 20 February 2019 by Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-358/17: Mubarak v Council

(Case C-145/19 P)

(2019/C 148/24)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak (represented by: D. Anderson QC, B. Kennelly QC, J. Pobjoy, Barrister, G. Martin, C. Enderby Smith, F. Holmey, Solicitors)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| 1. | set aside the decision under appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

set aside the decision under appeal;

| 2. | itself give final judgment in this case, annulling the contested acts in so far as they concern the appellant; |
| --- | --- |

2.

itself give final judgment in this case, annulling the contested acts in so far as they concern the appellant;

| 3. | in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment, in line with the legal assessment of the Court of Justice; and |
| --- | --- |

3.

in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment, in line with the legal assessment of the Court of Justice; and

| 4. | order the Council to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings before the Court of Justice and the General Court. |
| --- | --- |

4.

order the Council to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings before the Court of Justice and the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council was not required to verify that the Egyptian authorities had respected the appellant’s fundamental EU rights.

Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council was not required to verify that the judicial proceedings and investigations involving the appellant concern acts that are such as to undermine the rule of law in Egypt.

Third plea of law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council had not made a manifest error of assessment in relying on Case No. 8897 (Private Villa Refurbishment Case).

Fourth plea of law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council had not made a manifest error of assessment in relying on Case No. 756 (Al-Ahram Establishment Gifts Allegation) and Case No. 53 (Dar El Tahrir Gifts Allegation).

---
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 22, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-50670

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAYMUNDO NAVA-HERNANDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-03-CR-234-ALL-PM

--------------------

Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Raymundo Nava-Hernandez appeals the sentence imposed

following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United

States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

Nava-Hernandez contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior

conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element

of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have

been alleged in his indictment. Nava-Hernandez maintains that he
No. 03-50670

-2-

pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds

the two-year maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed

for that offense.

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Nava-Hernandez acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
#### In re RICHARDSON.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

November 13, 1907.)

In the matter of the judicial settlement of the accounts of William A. Richardson, as administrator, etc., of Elizabeth McArthur, deceased.

No opinion. Decree unanimously affirmed, with costs.
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 983 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to disallow a deduction for 

amounts paid or incurred by a responsible party relating to a discharge 

of oil. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 12, 2011 

Mr. NELSON of Florida introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to disallow 

a deduction for amounts paid or incurred by a responsible party relating to a discharge of oil. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DENIAL OF DEDUCTION FOR AMOUNTS PAID 

4 OR INCURRED BY A RESPONSIBLE PARTY. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 162 of the Internal Rev6 enue Code of 1986 is amended by redesignating subsection 

7 (q) as subsection (r) and by inserting after subsection (p) 

8 the following new subsection: 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 983 IS

1 ‘‘(q) CERTAIN EXPENSES OF A RESPONSIBLE

2 PARTY.— 

3 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—No deduction shall be al4 lowed under subsection (a) for any amount paid or 

5 incurred by a responsible party relating to any inci6 dent resulting in the discharge of oil into the navi7 gable waters, other than an incident caused by an 

8 act of God or an act of war. 

9 ‘‘(2) DEFINITIONS.—Any term used in para10 graph (1) which is also used in the Oil Pollution Act 

11 of 1990 shall have the meaning given such term by 

12 such Act.’’. 

13 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

14 this section shall apply to returns of tax the due date of 

15 which (including extensions of time) is after the date of 

16 the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 133 (Thursday, July 15, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 37316]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-15010]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Patent and Trademark Office

[Docket No.: PTO-P-2021-0032]


Patent Eligibility Jurisprudence Study

AGENCY: United States Patent and Trademark Office, Department of 
Commerce.

ACTION: Request for information; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
published a document in the Federal Register of July 9, 2021 requesting 
public comments on the current state of patent eligibility 
jurisprudence in the United States. This notice corrects the section of 
the document that identifies the individual who may be contacted for 
information regarding the request.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Courtney Stopp, USPTO, Office of 
Policy and International Affairs, at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#15567a6067617b706c3b46617a656555606665617a3b727a63"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="16557963646278736f38456279666656636566627938717960">[email protected]</span></a> or 571-
272-9300.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Correction

    In the Federal Register of July 9, 2021, in FR Doc. 2021-14628, on 
page 36258, in the first column, correct the information provided under 
the caption FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT to read:

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Courtney Stopp, USPTO, Office of 
Policy and International Affairs, at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#7f3c100a0d0b111a06512c0b100f0f3f0a0c0f0b1051181009"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="bbf8d4cec9cfd5dec295e8cfd4cbcbfbcec8cbcfd495dcd4cd">[email protected]</span></a> or 571-
272-9300. Please direct media inquiries to the USPTO's Office of the 
Chief Communications Officer at 571-272-8400.

Andrew Hirshfeld,
Commissioner for Patents, Performing the Functions and Duties of the 
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
[FR Doc. 2021-15010 Filed 7-14-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-16-P


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Unassociated Document


    
      
        

      

      Exhibit 10.53

       

    

    CORPORATE
PROMISSORY NOTE

     

    
      
        	
                $30,000

              	
                San
      Diego, California

              	
                November
      30, 2009

              


      

    

     

     For
value received, receipt of which is acknowledged, DotVN, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, (“Maker”) promises to pay to Thomas Johnson, San Diego, California,
(“Payee”), or order, at such place as Payee may designate, the sum of THIRTY
THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($30,000.00), plus interest at the rate of ten
percent (10%) per annum, on February 28, 2010 (the “Due Date”).

     

    If action
be instituted on this note, Maker promises to pay such sum as the Court may fix
as attorneys fees.

     

    This note
will inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the respective heirs,
executors, administrators, successors and assigns of the Maker and
Payee.

     

    IN
WITNESS THERETO, Maker has affixed its signature by a duly authorized officer
under the seal of this corporation.

     

    
      	 
      	
              DOT
      VN, INC.

            
	 
      	 
      	 
      
	 
      	
                 /s/

            	
              Lee Johnson

            
	 
      	
              By:

            	
              Lee
      Johnson

            
	 
      	
              Its:

            	
              President

            


    

    


    CORPORATE
PROMISSORY NOTE
#### In the Matter of Bruce Marc Elliott, an Attorney.

Motion for a hearing before a referee, and for other relief, denied in its entirety. Concur — Murphy, P. J., Kupferman, Ross, Carro and Milonas, JJ.
(May 24, 2012)

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Carl D. Wells, Appellant.

[944 NYS2d 560]—

*697Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Seth L. Marvin, J.), rendered June 11, 2008, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of operating a motor vehicle while ability impaired by drugs, driving while ability impaired by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, and sentencing him to a term of six months, unanimously affirmed.

The court erred in relying on the inventory search doctrine in denying suppression of physical evidence recovered from the car defendant was driving, because the People did not introduce any evidence to establish a valid inventory search *(see People v Johnson,*1 NY3d 252, 256 [2003]). However, there was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, independent of the physical evidence at issue. Although the harmless error rule regarding suppression issues does not normally apply to cases where a defendant pleads guilty *(People v Grant,*45 NY2d 366, 378-380 [1978]), the particular circumstances of this case warrant a finding of harmless error *(see People v Lloyd,*66 NY2d 964 [1985]; *People v Beckwith,*303 AD2d 594, 595 [2003]; *People v Strain,*238 AD2d 452 [1997], *lv denied*90 NY2d 864 [1997]).

We have considered and rejected defendant’s pro se claims. Concur — Gonzalez, EJ., Andrias, Saxe, DeGrasse and Román, JJ.
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We herebyconsent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-19057, 333-27977, and 333-136316) of our reports dated March 12, 2010 related to the consolidated financial statements of Medallion FinancialCorp. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2009 and 2008 and for each of the three years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2009 and related to the selected financial ratios and other data for each of the five years in thefive-year period ended December 31, 2009, and on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2009 and our report dated March 12, 2010 related to the financial statements of Medallion Bank as ofDecember 31, 2009 and 2008 and for each of the three years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2009, which appear in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Medallion Financial Corp. for the year ended December 31, 2009. 

Weiser LLP 

New York, New York 

March 12, 2010