alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 914 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the waiver of the 

collection of copayments for telehealth and telemedicine visits of veterans, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 9, 2011 

Mr. BEGICH (for himself, Mr. GRASSLEY, and Mr. TESTER) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 

Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the 

waiver of the collection of copayments for telehealth and 

telemedicine visits of veterans, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. AUTHORITY TO WAIVE COLLECTION OF COPAY4 MENTS FOR TELEHEALTH AND TELEMEDI5 CINE VISITS OF VETERANS. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter III of chapter 17 of 

7 title 38, United States Code, is amended by inserting after 

8 section 1722A the following new section: 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 914 IS

1 ‘‘§ 1722B. Copayments: waiver of collection of copay2 ments for telehealth and telemedicine 

3 visits of veterans 

4 ‘‘The Secretary may waive the imposition or collec5 tion of copayments for telehealth and telemedicine visits 

6 of veterans under the laws administered by the Sec7 retary.’’. 

8 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 

9 at the beginning of chapter 17 of such title is amended 

10 by inserting after the item relating to section 1722A the 

11 following new item: 

‘‘1722B. Copayments: waiver of collection of copayments for telehealth and telemedicine visits of veterans.’’. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                             272
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,171
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,653
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                41,930
<PP&E>                                         612,332
<DEPRECIATION>                                 109,890
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 608,373
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           93,520
<BONDS>                                        410,503
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                      89,213
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   608,373
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               104,933
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   39,265
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                76,343
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   925
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,465
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (20,065)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (7,725)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (12,340)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (12,340)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (99.51)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (99.51)
        

</TABLE>
# C_2019103EN.01005801.xml

| 18.3.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 103/58 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.3.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 103/58

---

Action brought on 31 January 2019 — SBS Bilimsel Çözümler Sanayi Ve Ticaret v EUIPO — Laboratorios Ern (apiheal)

(Case T-53/19)

(2019/C 103/74)

Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: SBS Bilimsel Çözümler Sanayi Ve Ticaret AŞ (Istanbul, Turkey) (represented by: M. López Camba, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Laboratorios Ern, SA (Barcelona, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark apiheal — Application for registration No 14 411 557

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 19 November 2018 in Case R 1725/2017-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision in so far as it refused registration in respect of goods in Classes 30 and 5 (first and third paragraphs of the operative part of that decision); |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision in so far as it refused registration in respect of goods in Classes 30 and 5 (first and third paragraphs of the operative part of that decision);

| — | order EUIPO and Laboratorios Ern, SA, to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and Laboratorios Ern, SA, to pay the costs.

Plea in law

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-6798

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHNATHAN SIMRELL BROUGHTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at 

Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:15-cr-00189-WO-1; 1:17-cv00464-WO-JEP)

Submitted: July 30, 2021 Decided: August 9, 2021

Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Hood Hale, Jr., HALE LAW FIRM, PC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Jonathan Simrell Broughton seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on Broughton’s 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner 

satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 

759, 773-74 (2017). 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Broughton has not 

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and 

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 39 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. J. RES. 39

    Removing the deadline for the ratification of the equal rights 
                               amendment.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 22, 2012

 Mr. Cardin (for himself, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Durbin, Mrs. Gillibrand, Mr. 
 Harkin, Ms. Landrieu, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Menendez, and Ms. Mikulski) 
  introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
    Removing the deadline for the ratification of the equal rights 
                               amendment.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That notwithstanding any time 
limit contained in House Joint Resolution 208, 92d Congress, as agreed 
to in the Senate on March 22, 1972, the article of amendment proposed 
to the States in that joint resolution shall be valid to all intents 
and purposes as part of the Constitution whenever ratified by the 
legislatures of three-fourths of the several States.
                                 <all>
```
#### Meyermac Elmhurst, Inc., et al., Appellants, v Robert Esnard, as Commissioner, Department of Buildings of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to compel the restoration of a building permit revoked by respondent Olin, petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Buschmann, J.), dated June 29,1984, which, upon respondents’ cross motion, dismissed the proceeding.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Special Term properly dismissed the proceeding for failure to exhaust administrative remedies *(see, Watergate II Apts, v Buffalo Sewer Auth.,*46 NY2d 52; *Young Men’s Christian Assn, v Rochester Pure Waters Dist.,*37 NY2d 371). Prior to commencing the instant CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioners should have sought review by the New York City Board of Standards and Appeals pursuant to New York City Charter § 666 (7) (a) and New York City Administrative Code § C26-87.5 of the Borough Superintendent’s determination to revoke the building permit *(see, Matter of Towers Mgt. Corp. v Thatcher,*271 NY 94; *Matter of Perosi Homes v Maniscalco,*15 AD2d 563; *Matter of Valentino v O’Connell,*33 Misc 2d 224). We reject petitioners’ claim that they were deprived of any meaningful administrative appeal to the New York City Board of Standards and Appeals because they had no opportunity to make a record. The New York City *790Board of Standards and Appeals Rules of Procedure article VI (1), (5), as amended January 4, 1983, indicate that applicants appealing from orders or decisions of the Borough Superintendent are entitled to public hearings, and article I (9) thereof states that “[t]estimony at the hearing may be presented by the applicant and the owner of the subject property and by any expert or person with knowledge of the facts whom they may call”. Mollen, P. J., Niehoff, Rubin and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 12.1

Computation of Ratio of Debt to Equity



|                     |  |                         |         |  |      |   |         |      |  |   |         |  |  |      |         |  |  |   |         | 
|-------------------- |  | ----------------------- | ------- |  | ---- | - | ------- | ---- |  | - | ------- |  |  | ---- | ------- |  |  | - | ------- | 
|                     |  | Year ended December 31, |        
|Dollars in thousands |  | 2012                    |         |  | 2011 |   |         | 2010 |  |   | 2009    |  |  | 2008 |        
|Debt                 |  | $                       | 322,770 |  |      | $ | 357,779 |      |  | $ | 380,532 |  |  | $    | 382,522 |  |  | $ | 462,650 | 
|Equity               |  |                         | 216,318 |  |      |   | 171,504 |      |  |   | 162,765 |  |  |      | 162,977 |  |  |   | 174,946 | 
|Debt to equity       |  |                         | 1.49    |  |      |   | 2.09    |      |  |   | 2.34    |  |  |      | 2.35    |  |  |   | 2.64    | 
|                     |  |                         |         |  |      |   |         |      |  |   |         |  |  |      |         |  |  |   |         | 



65
#### Migdalia Camacho, Respondent, v Angel Espinoza et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[942 NYS2d 539]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lucindo Suarez, J.), entered October 20, 2011, which, insofar as appealed from, in this action for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, denied the motion of defendants Angel Espinoza and Mitzy Transportation, Inc. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety as against them, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants made a prima facie showing that plaintiff’s cervical, lumbar, left shoulder, and left wrist injuries were not serious injuries caused by the accident. Defendants submitted affirmed reports of a radiologist and an orthopedist, showing that plaintiff sustained no range of motion limitations, and objective MRI evidence evincing no evidence of traumatic or causally related injury *(see Spencer v Golden Eagle, Inc.,*82 AD3d 589 [2011]). Defendant also established that plaintiff’s cervical injuries were not serious injuries caused by the accident by submitting evidence that she suffered from degenerative conditions that preexisted the accident *(id.).*

In opposition, plaintiff raised triable issues of fact. Although plaintiffs physicians did not expressly address the conclusion of defendants’ expert that the cervical injuries were degenerative in origin, the physician attributed plaintiffs injuries to a different, yet equally plausible cause, namely, the accident *(see Yuen v Arka Memory Cab Corp.,*80 AD3d 481 [2011]).

Moreover, plaintiff raised an issue of fact regarding whether the injuries to her left shoulder and cervical spine were serious injuries. Plaintiff submitted an affirmed report from her treating orthopedic surgeon demonstrating that she continued to exhibit range of motion deficits in her left shoulder even after having surgery *(see Paulino v Rodriguez,*91 AD3d 559 [2012]). She also submitted an affidavit from her chiropractor, quantify*675ing range of motion limitations in her cervical spine. Since plaintiff established that some injuries meet the “no-fault” threshold, “it is unnecessary to address whether [her] proof with respect to other injuries [s]he allegedly sustained would have been sufficient to withstand defendants’ motion for summary judgment” *(see Linton v Nawaz,*14 NY3d 821, 822 [2010]). However, plaintiff failed to rebut defendants’ showing on causation with regard to the lumbar spine. Concur — Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Catterson, Renwick and Román, JJ.
#### David Reeves, Respondent, v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. et al., Defendants, and Community Mutual Savings Bank of Southern New York, Also Known as Community Savings & Loan Association, et al., Appellants.

—In an action to recover damages for false imprisonment, defendants Kathleen Garrett and Community Mutual Savings Bank of Southern New York, also known as Community Savings & Loan Association, appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Gurahian, J.), dated March 8, 1985, which denied their renewed motion for summary judgment.

Order reversed, on the law, with costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed as to appellants.

In a prior appeal in this case, this court held that a "trial is required to determine the basis for defendant Garrett’s belief that plaintiff was the felon * * * and whether there was an intent to confine him” *(Reeves v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,*88 AD2d 972, 973). The court thus modified an order of Special Term (Walsh, J.), insofar as it granted appellants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs cause of action for false imprisonment. Since that decision, the depositions of defendant Garrett and the two police detectives who were involved in the arrest of plaintiff were taken and the police investigation file was obtained. Upon this new evidence, appellants renewed their motion for summary judgment.

Given this expanded record, we conclude that there is no longer any reasonable basis for a determination that appellants are liable to plaintiff for false imprisonment, and, therefore, we hold that Special Term erred in denying appellants’ renewed motion for summary judgment *(see, Veras v Truth Verification Corp.,*87 AD2d 381, 384, *affd*57 NY2d 947). No reasonable inference can be drawn from the present record that appellants intended to confine plaintiff or that defendant Garrett lacked reasonable cause for her belief in plaintiff’s culpability. Under these circumstances, a refusal to dismiss plaintiffs cause of action would have an unjustifiably chilling *790effect upon citizens voluntarily providing useful information to law enforcement authorities *(see, Stearns v New York City Tr. Auth.,*24 Misc 2d 216, 217, *affd*12 AD2d 451).

Finally, we note that the doctrine of the law of the case does not require us to adhere to our decision upon the prior appeal. Where, as in the instant case, substantial "new evidence [is presented] affecting the prior determination”, this court may decide a different conclusion is warranted on the renewed motion *(Foley v Roche,*86 AD2d 887). Mollen, P. J., Gibbons, Thompson and Brown, JJ., concur.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 17

- 4326

_____________________________
J OSHUA J AMES S ELPH , Appellant,

v.

S TATE O F F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. Thomas V. Dannheisser , Judge

. September 28, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
M AKAR , O STERHAUS , and J AY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Joanna A

. Mauer
, Assistant Public Defender , Tallahassee
, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi
, Attorney Gen eral, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 58 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        S.Con.Res.58
                                        Agreed to August 7, 2012        

                      One Hundred Twelfth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
            the third day of January, two thousand and twelve

                          Concurrent Resolution

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That, in the enrollment of the bill (H.R. 4240) an Act to reauthorize 
the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, and for other purposes, the 
Clerk of the House of Representatives shall make the following 
correction: in section 7, insert ``is amended'' before ``by striking''.
Attest:

                                               Secretary of the Senate.
Attest:

                                 Clerk of the House of Representatives.
```
# C_2019372EN.01001901.xml

| 4.11.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 372/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.11.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 372/19

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Svea Hovrätt — Patent- och marknadsöverdomstolen (Sweden) lodged on 27 August 2019 — BY v CX

(Case C-637/19)

(2019/C 372/21)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Svea Hovrätt, Patent- och marknadsöverdomstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: BY

Defendant: CX

Questions referred

| 1. | Does the term ‘public’ in Articles 3(1) and 4(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society have a uniform meaning? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Does the term ‘public’ in Articles 3(1) and 4(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society have a uniform meaning?

| 2. | If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, is a court to be regarded as falling within the scope of the term ‘public’ within the meaning of those provisions? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, is a court to be regarded as falling within the scope of the term ‘public’ within the meaning of those provisions?

| 3. | If question 1 is answered in the negative:






  (a) | in the event of communication of a protected work to a court, can that court fall within the scope of the term ‘public’? |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

If question 1 is answered in the negative:

(a)

in the event of communication of a protected work to a court, can that court fall within the scope of the term ‘public’?

| (b) | in the event of distribution of a protected work to a court, can that court fall within the scope of the term ‘public’? |
| --- | --- |

(b)

in the event of distribution of a protected work to a court, can that court fall within the scope of the term ‘public’?

| 4. | Does the fact that national legislation lays down a general principle of access to public documents in accordance with which any person who makes a request can access procedural documents submitted to a court, except where they contain confidential information, affect the assessment of whether submission to a court of a protected work amounts to a ‘communication to the public’ or a ‘distribution to the public’? |
| --- | --- |

4.

Does the fact that national legislation lays down a general principle of access to public documents in accordance with which any person who makes a request can access procedural documents submitted to a court, except where they contain confidential information, affect the assessment of whether submission to a court of a protected work amounts to a ‘communication to the public’ or a ‘distribution to the public’?

---

(1)  OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10.

---
ex10_7.htm


    
      
Exhibit 10.7

     

    
      FIRST ALLONGE TO
SUBORDINATED TERM NOTE

      


      THIS
FIRST ALLONGE is made this 22nd day
of December, 2009, to be part of and attached to the subordinated term note of
the undersigned, Embassy Bancorp, Inc.  (“the Maker”) to UNIVEST
NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST CO. (the “Payee”) dated November 21, 2008, in the
original principal amount of $6,000,000 (as amended, from time to time, the
“Note”).  The
Payee is the holder of the Note.  As of the date of this Allonge, the
Note is subject to no defense, set-off, counterclaim or other claim of
avoidance.

      


      For fair
and adequate consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged, and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties hereby agree
to amend and modify the Note as follows:

      


      1.           Maturity
Date.  Notwithstanding anything contained in the Note to the contrary,
the entire unpaid principal of the Note and any accrued interest then unpaid
shall be due and payable on or before November 30, 2015.

      


      2.           Ratification.  Except
as otherwise expressly set forth above, all terms and provisions of the Note
(including, without limitation, the warrant of attorney to confess judgment) are
ratified, confirmed, and restated as though set forth at length.

      


      IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, and intending to be legally bound, the undersigned has executed
this First Allonge as of the date first above written.

      


      


      
        	 
      	 
      	 
      	
                EMBASSY
      BANCORP, INC.

              	 
      
	 
      	 
      	 
      	 
      	 
      
	
                Witness:

              	
                /s/ Judith A. Hunsicker

              	 
      	
                /s/ David M. Lobach

              	 
      


      

      


      


      


      Accepted
the 22nd day
of December, 2009

      


      UNIVEST
NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST CO.

      


      


      


      
        	
                By:

              	
                /s/ Philip C. Jackson

              	 
      
	
                Name:

              	
                Philip
      C. Jackson

              	 
      
	 
      	
                Market
      President