J-S53029-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF: 

J.Z.Z.D.J.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.J., NATURAL FATHER No. 629 WDA 2014

Appeal from the decree entered March 17, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Orphans’

Court, at No(s): No. 77 in Adoption 2013

BEFORE: DONOHUE, OLSON, and PLATT*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 30, 2014

C.J. (“Father”), appeals from the trial court decree entered on March 

17, 2014, involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his minor, 

dependent, female child, J.Z.Z.D.J. (“Child”), born in April of 2009, pursuant 

to section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b).1 We affirm. 

On October 14, 2013, the Erie County Office of Children and Youth 

(“OCY” or “the Agency”) filed a petition for the involuntary termination of the 

parental rights of Father and Mother to Child. The trial court held a hearing 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to Superior Court.

1 The trial court noted that Child’s mother, B.C. (“Mother”), failed to appear 

at the hearing regarding the termination of her parental rights, despite the 

fact that she had been given notice, and that the evidence presented against 

her was uncontested and overwhelming. Trial Court Opinion, 4/28/14, at 2 

n.1. Thus, on March 17, 2014, the trial court also entered a decree, dated 

March 14, 2014, terminating the parental rights of Mother to Child pursuant 

to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Id. Mother has not challenged 

the termination of her parental rights in a separate appeal, nor is she a party 

in this appeal. 
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on the petition on March 14, 2014, during which Father, who was 

incarcerated, was present. The guardian ad litem appointed for Child, 

Attorney Deanna Heasley, was also present.2 At the hearing, OCY presented 

five witnesses, the first of whom was Christopher Kessler, Father’s 

supervising parole office between 2007 and October 28, 2013. N.T., 

3/14/14, at 14. Mr. Kessler testified that Father was re-incarcerated in 

October of 2013, and has a maximum parole date of August 20, 2019. Id.

at 18. OCY then presented the testimony of Patty Bush, the OCY ongoing 

caseworker assigned to the family between November of 2011 and May of 

2012. Id. at 20-21.

Next, OCY presented the testimony of Mary Bliley, who is currently an 

ongoing caseworker for OCY, and served as a social service aide for the 

family, providing transportation for visitation and supervised visits between 

Father and Child. Id. at 35-36. OCY then presented the testimony of 

Sharon Slubowski, an OCY caseworker for another of Father’s children, 

Child’s slightly older half-sister, U.J., who is also dependent, and to whom 

Father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights. Id. at 46, 49, 88, and 

93. Finally, OCY presented the testimony of Michelle DuShole, who served 

as the OCY caseworker for the family from May 7, 2012 to the time of the 

 

2 The termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child’s half-brother, J.J.J.C., 

as well as the termination of the parental rights of J.J.J.C.’s father, A.K., also 

were addressed on March 14, 2014. Neither Mother nor A.K. appeared to 

challenge the termination of their parental rights to J.J.J.C., despite notice. 

See N.T., 3/14/14, at 5 and 8-10. 
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termination hearing. Id. at 51. She testified that Child and her halfbrother, J.J.J.C., have been in the same pre-adoptive foster home of P.C. 

and M.A.C. since November of 2011. Id. at 56. 

Father presented the testimony of his girlfriend, L.R. Id. at 70. 

Father also presented the testimony of D.S., his first cousin; and B.L.H., his 

maternal grandmother. Id. at 77, 80. Additionally, Father testified on his 

own behalf. Id. at 85. Father testified that he has a son. Id. at 88. He 

also had a second daughter, to whom he voluntarily relinquished his parental 

rights. Id. at 95. 

OCY called Patty Bush, Mary Bliley, and Michelle DuShole on re-direct 

examination. The trial court admitted a number of exhibits offered by OCY, 

including Child’s juvenile court records, and Father’s criminal history. Id. at 

8-12; Petitioner’s Exhibits 1-21. The trial court also admitted the sole 

exhibit offered by Father, a certificate of achievement from a Foundations of 

Fatherhood workshop. Id. at 13; Defendant’s Exhibit A. 

In its opinion entered on April 28, 2014, the trial court fully set forth 

the factual background and procedural history of this appeal, which we adopt 

herein. The trial court considered the history of the case, including Father’s 

failure/neglect as a parent to Child from the time of her birth in April of 2009 

until she was placed in shelter care on November 2, 2011. Trial Court 

Opinion, 4/28/14, at 6. The trial court found that, although it was unclear 

when Father became aware of Child’s existence, he knew of her at the time 
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of the dependency adjudication for Child on November 29, 2011. Id. The 

trial court stated that, at the dependency adjudication hearing, Father 

stipulated to Child’s dependency without explaining his lack of involvement 

in parenting or why Mother had left Child in the care of a teenager before 

Child’s placement. Id. 

The trial court found that Father made progress under the plan to 

reunify him with Child, by completing parenting classes on April 19, 2012, 

and completing a mental health assessment. Id. at 7. Although Father did 

not look for a job, his visits with Child went well, and OCY permitted him to 

keep Child for overnight visitation. Id. However, the trial court found that 

Father’s progress was washed out by his drug screen results beginning in 

2012, which included several dilute positives for drugs, and numerous noshow positives because of his incarceration. Id. The trial court found that 

Father lost the privilege of visiting Child several times for several months in 

2012 because of his failures to comply completely with urine testing. Id. at 

8. 

The trial court stated as follows:

Complicating matters for [] Father is the amount of time he 

spent in and out of prison following the date of the 

Adjudication Hearing on November 29, 2011 [through] the 

day of the Adjudication Hearing on March 13, 2014. He is 

currently serving an aggregate state sentence of [41] 

months to [91] months with credit for [647] days imposed 

October 28, 2013 on two separate charges from 2006 and 

2013. That sentence is also part of a probation revocation 

proceeding. He may or may not be eligible for parole in 

2015; his maximum date is August 20, 2019. Father’s 
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Criminal History Exhibit 19; IVT Hearing Transcript, 

3/14/14, [at] 15-18. 

One additional point to note about Father’s criminal history 

is that his last conviction stems from a domestic violence 

incident on February 26, 2013, a cause of concern to the 

Agency, particularly in light of his past history with the 

Agency and an ICC [Indirect Criminal Contempt] violation 

predating the birth of [C]hild by approximately a year. The 

criminal charge resulted in a suspension of visitation. 

Father has not seen or been in contact with his daughter 

since. IVT Hearing Transcript, 3/14/14, [at 16 and] 61. 

At the conclusion of the Agency’s case at the termination 

hearing, Father offered three witnesses before Father 

testified. The court finds [that] none of the witnesses were 

credible or offered any evidence of value that would assist 

the court in resolving the issues before it, particularly on the 

issue of whether a bond existed between Father and Child in 

light of his incarceration.

Father’s testimony likewise was not credible. Of particular 

note to the court were the poor excuses he offered for his 

failure to at least try to maintain some contact or 

relationship with his daughter while he remains 

incarcerated. Father was simply not convincing in his 

attempt to place blame on his last caseworker for the lack 

of contact or for blaming his inattentiveness to lack of 

resources. Likewise, he offered nothing to convince the 

court a strong bond existed with his child. IVT Hearing 

Transcript, 3/14/14, pp. 89-90, 94. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/28/14, at 8-9.

On March 17, 2014, the trial court entered the decree terminating 

Father’s parental rights. On April 14, 2014, Father filed a notice of appeal, 

along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, Father raises the following issues:
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1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law 

and/or abused its discretion in involuntarily terminating 

Appellant’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), (5), 

and (8) when the conditions that led to the removal of 

[C]hild had been remedied and the only barrier to the 

Appellant assuming proper parental care and control of 

[C]hild that exists is the incarceration of the Appellant[?]

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law 

and/or abused its discretion in involuntarily terminating [] 

Appellant’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(b) when the 

statutory requirements for termination had not been met, 

[C]hild was bonded to the Appellant and such finding was 

contrary to the best interests of [C]hild[?]

Father’s Brief at 5.3

With regard to his first issue, Father argues that the trial court erred in 

terminating his parental rights under section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), when 

the evidence did not demonstrate that the conditions that led to Child’s 

removal from the home continued to exist. Rather, he contends that he has 

remedied all of the conditions that led to the initial removal of Child, and 

that the only barrier to his assuming proper parental care and control of 

Child is his incarceration. Father claims that he has done everything OCY 

requested of him, and that he has remedied the concerns about his mental 

health, lack of employment, and history of substance abuse. Father urges 

that, until his incarceration in February of 2013, he was doing so well that he 

 

3 Although Father’s issues are not identical to those raised in his concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal, we find them sufficiently 

suggested by the issues he raised in his concise statement so as to be 

preserved for this Court’s review. See Krebs v. United Refining Co., 893 

A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that any issue not set forth in or 

suggested by an appellate brief’s statement of questions involved and 

concise statement is deemed waived). 
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had custody of Child on the weekends, and that there was a strong bond 

between Child and him. Father claims that his visits with Child were stopped 

solely because of his incarceration.

Additionally, Father states that he is scheduled to be released from 

prison on July 21, 2015. He acknowledges that he has had little or no 

contact with Child while he has been incarcerated, but he asserts that he has 

continued to inquire about Child and to demonstrate a genuine desire to be a 

parent to her. Father claims that the only reason he cannot parent Child is 

his incarceration, and that, under Pennsylvania law, incarceration alone is 

not grounds for the termination of his parental rights.

We review the appeal from the termination of parental rights in 

accordance with the following standard.

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in 

dependency cases, our standard of review requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error 

of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, 

an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] discussed in [In re: 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2010)], there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. [The Supreme Court] observed that, unlike trial 

courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-
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specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial 

judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing 

and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding 

the child and parents. Therefore, even where the facts 

could support an opposite result, as is often the case in 

dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must 

resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose 

its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we 

must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings 

are supported by the record and the court’s legal 

conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse 

of discretion. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some internal 

citations omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained:

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that 

is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to 

come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue.” 

Id., quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights under section 

2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). We will analyze the trial court’s decision to 
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terminate Father’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(2) and (b). These 

sections provide:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be 

terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied 

by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

We have stated:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must 

be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 
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mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal 

citations omitted).

Our Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as 

follows.

[Section] 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for termination of parental 

rights where it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent 

has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.”

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can 

seldom be more difficult than when termination is based 

upon parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in 

enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent 

who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as 

parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (internal citations and some 

internal quotations omitted).

Moreover, our Supreme Court instructed:

[I]ncarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor, in a 

court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) 

where the repeated and continued incapacity of a parent due to 

incarceration has caused the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence and [] the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not 

be remedied.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828.
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After re-visiting its decision in In re: R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2011), 

regarding incarcerated parents, the Supreme Court stated:

[W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while not a 

litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the 

question of whether a parent is incapable of providing 

“essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the 

length of the remaining confinement can be considered as 

highly relevant to whether “the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent,” sufficient to provide grounds for 

termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). See e.g. 

Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d at 891 (“[A] parent who is 

incapable of performing parental duties is just as parentally 

unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.”); [In re:]

E.A.P., [944 A.2d 79, 85 (Pa. Super. 2008)] (holding 

termination under § 2511(a)(2) supported by mother’s 

repeated incarcerations and failure to be present for child, 

which caused child to be without essential care and 

subsistence for most of her life and which cannot be 

remedied despite mother’s compliance with various prison 

programs). If a court finds grounds for termination under 

subsection (a)(2), a court must determine whether 

termination is in the best interests of the child, considering 

the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child pursuant to § 2511(b). In this regard, 

trial courts must carefully review the individual 

circumstances for every child to determine, inter alia, how a 

parent’s incarceration will factor into an assessment of the 

child’s best interest. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 830-31.

The trial court provided the following analysis of section 2511(a)(2):

Father’s status as an inmate in a state prison is the sole 

reason for his incapacity; it will not be remedied any time 

soon. Since the [Dependency] Adjudication Hearing on 

November 29, 2011 up to the day of the IVT [involuntary 

termination] hearing on March 14, 2014[,] he has been in 

and out of jail. Currently he is serving an aggregate 

sentence of [41] to [91] months [in prison,] with credit for 

[647] days in state prison. He received the sentence on 
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October 13, 2013, five months before the IVT hearing on 

two separate charges from 2006 to 2013. The charge in 

2013 involved an incident of domestic violence. The 

sentence is part of a probation revocation proceeding. 

Though Father claimed he would be paroled in 2015[,] there 

was no credible evidence presented either in the form of 

documents from the Parole Board or his parole officer to 

prove that time frame is accurate. Even if 2015 is the 

correct date . . . , 2015 is only the year he may become 

eligible for parole, not that he necessarily will [be released 

on parole]. 2015 is also eight months in the future. At 

best, therefore, it could be close to a year before he is free 

once more to attempt to reunite with his daughter, 

assuming he is not paroled to a half-way house and is able 

to immediately find a job and satisfactory housing for 

himself and his daughter. Keeping in mind [C]hild was four 

years old at the time of the IVT hearing, it is a simple 

matter of mathematics to conclude Father has been 

incarcerated and incapacitated the majority of [C]hild’s life, 

including the last thirteen consecutive months.

Incarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be 

determinative if the question of whether a parent is 

incapable of providing “essential parental care, control or 

subsistence, and the length of the remaining confinement 

can be considered as highly relevant to whether “the 

conditions and cause[s] of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied. In re Adoption of 

S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012).

Here, Father’s incarceration resulted in long gaps in his 

ability to visit with [C]hild, negating what progress he 

clearly made forming a bond with his daughter when he was 

permitted to see her following adjudication. Twice, 

according to testimony from Agency workers, he was on the 

verge of reunification with his daughter but lost the 

opportunity at least once because he had been arrested.

In addition to the significant length of time Father has spent 

in jail since the birth of [C]hild, [the trial court] also 

considered the reasons for the incarceration. . . . Father 

remains imprisoned in part because he was revoked from 

probation, strong evidence he does not follow the directives 

of his probation officer or complete programs designed with 
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his rehabilitation in mind. Given his propensity to ignore 

rules created with his best interests in mind, and the length 

of time passing since the [dependency] adjudication of his 

daughter, the record supports a finding that Father cannot 

or will not remedy the conditions which led to placement of 

[C]hild[,] and that the services made reasonably available 

to him are not likely, and in fact failed, to remedy, in a 

reasonable amount of time, the conditions which led to 

placement.

The failure of Father to comply with drug urine analysis 

appointments provides more evidence of Father’s inability to

remedy the conditions which led to the placement. It is an 

example of his disregard of the rules he needed to follow to 

be reunified with his daughter, particularly when the 

violations resulted in the loss of visitation with her for 

extended times, and[,] more important, the opportunity for 

reunification. 

An episode of domestic violence on February 26, 2013 . . . 

led to his arrest and incarceration[,] and plea to a simple 

assault charge later that year, in effect negating all progress 

he made with the Agency towards reunification with [C]hild. 

Because of his actions[,] he has not seen [C]hild since. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/28/14, at 10-12 (some internal citations omitted).

In In re Adoption of Michael J.C., 486 A.2d 371 (Pa. 1984), our 

Supreme Court held as follows:

When a parent has demonstrated a continued inability to conduct his or her 

life in a fashion that would provide a safe environment for a child, whether 

that child is living with the parent or not, and the behavior of the parent is 

irremediable as supported by clear and competent evidence, the termination 

of parental rights is justified.

Id. at 375.

This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts 

towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. 

In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to 
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cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity 

or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or 

disingenuous. Id. at 340. The evidence demonstrated that Father’s 

continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal to parent could not or would 

not be remedied, despite OCY’s offering reasonable efforts to assist in his 

reunification with Child. 

Father’s argument regarding section 2511(a)(2) essentially requests 

this Court to make credibility and weight determinations different from those 

of the trial court. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Father 

claims to love Child and requests another chance to parent her. See N.T., 

3/14/14, at 88 and 91. A parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a 

child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights, however. In re 

Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). We stated in In re Z.P., a 

child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will 

summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. 

Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of 

his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to 

the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her 

potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 

A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004).

After our careful review of the record in this matter, we find that the 

trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are supported by 
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competent evidence in the record. In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-

326, 47 A.3d at 826-827. Father cannot now shift the blame to OCY for his 

failure to parent Child. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s 

determinations regarding section 2511(a)(2) are supported by sufficient, 

competent evidence in the record.

After having determined that the requirements of section 2511(a) 

were satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of subsection 

(b) were satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (en banc). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating 

parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child 

pursuant to section 2511(b). Id. at 1008.

In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 

2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and 

welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to 

include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993), the 

Supreme] Court held that the determination of the child’s 

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional 

bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the 

child of permanently severing the parental bond. In re 

K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

See also In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013).
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Father argues that OCY failed to satisfy its initial burden of establishing 

that termination was appropriate under section 2511(a). Therefore, Father 

contends that a discussion of Child’s best interests is irrelevant. Father, 

however, declares that the trial court ignored the OCY caseworkers’ 

acknowledgement that a bond exists between Father and Child. See

Father’s Brief at 19-20. 

The trial court found as follows:

The record reflects [that] Father had no relationship with 

[C]hild or involvement in her life from the time of her birth 

[in April of 2009] until the date of the Adjudication Hearing 

on November 29, 2011, a period of more than two and a 

half years. He appeared with counsel at the Adjudication 

Hearing and stipulated to the dependency of [C]hild even 

though he played no role in the actions leading to [C]hild’s 

detention on November 2, 2011. He made no offer to take 

care of his daughter, or request she at least be placed with 

a relative who could help him parent her. Instead, he 

stipulated to the necessity of continued foster placement. 

[C]hild was [thus] placed in the foster home with the foster 

parents who have cared for her since.

Once Child was in foster care, however, Father initially 

made efforts to establish a bond with her, for a time visiting 

with her consistently and impressing Agency workers 

enough where reunification was considered twice, the first 

time before the first permanency hearing on May 7, 2012. 

However, because he did not appear for a urine screen in 

April and because [his urine] was dilute on May 3, visits 

stopped. Father lost visiting privileges several more times 

for several months in 2012 because he failed to comply with 

urine testing. 

The inability of Father to comply with a simple order to take 

a test to determine if he was drug free, especially when he 

knew that failure to do so would result in loss of visitation 

with his daughter for [a] significant period of time, makes it 

impossible to accept any of his testimony about the bond he 
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feels exists between [him] and his daughter. It also makes 

it difficult to credit his assertions he cares for his daughter, 

wants to be a part of her life, and will take the steps 

necessary to make that a reality.

The year 2012 was not the only time Father failed to take 

advantage of the opportunities to bond with Child. He was 

arrested on February 26, 2013 as discussed[,] and has not 

seen his daughter since.

While incarcerated he made no effort to maintain contact 

with her. He has not sent her birthday cards[] or presents; 

he has not attempted to phone her from prison or inquire 

about the possibility of visits. He claimed during his 

testimony he had no resources to do anything to maintain a 

bond, but that excuse is flimsy at best and one more 

example of the excuses he uses to rationalize his lack of 

real effort. 

Whatever positive bond that existed in 2012 when Father 

was not in jail and was visiting with Child was short lived 

and now too remote in time for the court to give any great 

weight to it. All gains made were more than offset by 

Father’s lack of compliance with the drug testing and his 

last run-in with the law which resulted in large amounts of 

time Father was not permitted to see [] Child.

Since the day of her detention on November 2, 2011, 

[C]hild has been in the same foster home with the same 

foster parents who provide for her and meet her physical 

and emotional needs. The evidence was uncontested Child 

was doing well under their care. If [C]hild has any strong 

bond it would be with people who have provided for her and 

kept her safe the majority of her young life. The foster 

parents are the only people she knows as her parents. 

Given this, it would be severely traumatic and cause 

irreparable harm to a now five[-]year[-]old child if the court 

were to cut that relationship in favor of a [f]ather who has 

no bond with her, has failed to care for her, [sic] or create 

an equally strong bond, and who, when given every 

opportunity over an extended period of time to prove he is 

capable of being a good parent, demonstrated he is not up 

to the task. 
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. . .

While there was no affirmative act on the part of Father that resulted in the 

adjudication [of dependency] and placement of [C]hild, his continued 

incarceration and failure to comply with the court[-]ordered treatment 

plan[,] specifically the drug component, caused her to remain in placement 

much longer than necessary, contrary to her best interests. The lack of a 

strong bond between Father and Child, and [F]ather’s failure[,] while he 

remains in prison[,] to make any effort to create or maintain the bond 

established when he was permitted to visit [C]hild further lead to the 

conclusion it is in [C]hild’s best interests to terminate [Father’s] parental 

rights.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/28/14, at 14-17 (internal citations omitted). 

The trial court found that Father had not provided for Child’s 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and will not be 

able to provide for Child’s needs, particularly because of Father’s failure to 

provide a stable and appropriate home for Child because of his incarceration, 

and his lack of effort to maintain significant contact with Child. Trial Court 

Opinion, 4/28/14, at 14-17. Further, the trial court found that there is no 

strong bond between Child and Father. Id. at 16. The trial court found that 

the termination of Father’s parental rights would be in the best interests of 

Child. Id. at 17. 

We have stated that, in conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of social 

workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 

2010). This Court has observed that no bond worth preserving is formed 

between a child and a natural parent where the child has been in foster care 

for most of the child’s life, and the resulting bond with the natural parent is 
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attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008). Here, 

Father failed to “exhibit [the] bilateral relationship which emanates from the 

parent[’s] willingness to learn appropriate parenting.” In re K.K.R.S., 958 

A.2d 529, 534 (Pa. Super. 2008). The trial court properly found from the 

evidence that Father, because of his absence from Child’s life, did not put 

himself in a position to develop a real bond with Child. Trial Court Opinion, 

4/28/14, at 16-17; see In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1249 (Pa. Super. 

2003). 

Additionally, as part of its bonding analysis, the trial court 

appropriately examined Child’s relationship with her foster parents. See In 

re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267-268 (stating that existence of a bond attachment 

of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination 

petition, and the court must consider whether the child has a bond with the 

foster parents). The trial court found that Child has a bond with her foster 

parents, who are pre-adoptive, and have served as her parents since her 

adjudication of dependency.

As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial 

court’s credibility and weight assessments regarding Child’s needs and 

welfare, and the absence of any bond with Father, we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion as to section 2511(b). See In re 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Accordingly, we affirm the decree 

terminating Father’s parental rights to Child.
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Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/30/2014