# C_2019148EN.01002101.xml

| 29.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/21 |
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29.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/21

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour administrative (Luxembourg) lodged on 12 February 2019 — Luxaviation SA v Ministre de l’Environnement

(Case C-113/19)

(2019/C 148/20)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour administrative

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Luxaviation SA

Defendant: Ministre de l’Environnement

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 12(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC, (1) which provides that Member States must ensure the surrender by their operators of the allowances issued, to be interpreted, in conjunction with Article 41 of the Charter, which enshrines the principle of sound administration, as requiring the competent national authority to carry out individual monitoring of surrender obligations, before the deadline of 30 April of the year concerned, where that same administration is responsible for monitoring a small number of operators, in this case 25 operators at national level? |
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1.

Is Article 12(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC, (1) which provides that Member States must ensure the surrender by their operators of the allowances issued, to be interpreted, in conjunction with Article 41 of the Charter, which enshrines the principle of sound administration, as requiring the competent national authority to carry out individual monitoring of surrender obligations, before the deadline of 30 April of the year concerned, where that same administration is responsible for monitoring a small number of operators, in this case 25 operators at national level?

| 2. | a. | Should it be considered that an incomplete allowance surrender operation, like the one in the present case in which the operator relied on the receipt of electronic confirmation that the transfer procedure had been finalised, could reasonably have generated in the mind of the operator acting in good faith a legitimate expectation that it had completed the surrender operation provided for in Article 6(2)(e) of Directive 2003/87/EEC? |
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2.

a.

Should it be considered that an incomplete allowance surrender operation, like the one in the present case in which the operator relied on the receipt of electronic confirmation that the transfer procedure had been finalised, could reasonably have generated in the mind of the operator acting in good faith a legitimate expectation that it had completed the surrender operation provided for in Article 6(2)(e) of Directive 2003/87/EEC?

| b. | Bearing in mind the answer given to the second question, can the legitimacy of that expectation be presumed to be more firmly established in the mind of an operator acting in good faith if, during the previous surrender, it was voluntarily contacted by the national administration in order to remind it, a few days before expiry of the time limits laid down in Article 6(2)(e) of Directive 2003/87/EC, that the allowance surrender procedure had not yet been completed, thereby allowing that operator reasonably to assume that it had met its surrender obligations for the current year in the absence of any direct contact by that same administration the following year? |
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b.

Bearing in mind the answer given to the second question, can the legitimacy of that expectation be presumed to be more firmly established in the mind of an operator acting in good faith if, during the previous surrender, it was voluntarily contacted by the national administration in order to remind it, a few days before expiry of the time limits laid down in Article 6(2)(e) of Directive 2003/87/EC, that the allowance surrender procedure had not yet been completed, thereby allowing that operator reasonably to assume that it had met its surrender obligations for the current year in the absence of any direct contact by that same administration the following year?

| c. | In the light of the answers given to the two previous questions, whether analysed individually or together, can the principle of protection of legitimate expectations be interpreted as constituting a case of force majeure partially or wholly exempting the operator acting in good faith from the penalty provided for in Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87/EEC? |
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c.

In the light of the answers given to the two previous questions, whether analysed individually or together, can the principle of protection of legitimate expectations be interpreted as constituting a case of force majeure partially or wholly exempting the operator acting in good faith from the penalty provided for in Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87/EEC?

| 3. | a. | Does Article 49(3) of the Charter, which enshrines the principle of proportionality, preclude the fixing of a flat rate fine to penalise non-surrender of emissions allowances, as provided for in Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87/EEC, where that provision does not allow the imposition of a penalty proportionate to the infringement committed by the operator? |
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3.

a.

Does Article 49(3) of the Charter, which enshrines the principle of proportionality, preclude the fixing of a flat rate fine to penalise non-surrender of emissions allowances, as provided for in Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87/EEC, where that provision does not allow the imposition of a penalty proportionate to the infringement committed by the operator?

| b. | If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, must the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter, the general principle of good faith and the principle ‘fraus omnia corrumpit’ be interpreted as precluding — as regards the penalty to be imposed pursuant to Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC, to which the publication provided for in Article 20(7) [of the Law of 23 December 2004] is automatically added — an operator acting in good faith, which is simply negligent and which furthermore believed that it had fulfilled its obligations to surrender emissions allowances by the relevant deadline of 30 April, from being treated in the same way as an operator which behaved fraudulently? |
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b.

If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, must the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter, the general principle of good faith and the principle ‘fraus omnia corrumpit’ be interpreted as precluding — as regards the penalty to be imposed pursuant to Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC, to which the publication provided for in Article 20(7) [of the Law of 23 December 2004] is automatically added — an operator acting in good faith, which is simply negligent and which furthermore believed that it had fulfilled its obligations to surrender emissions allowances by the relevant deadline of 30 April, from being treated in the same way as an operator which behaved fraudulently?

| c. | If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, is the application of the flat rate penalty, without any possibility of a variation by the national court, other than in cases of force majeure, [and] the automatic penalty of publication consistent with Article 47 of the Charter which guarantees the existence of an effective remedy? |
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c.

If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, is the application of the flat rate penalty, without any possibility of a variation by the national court, other than in cases of force majeure, [and] the automatic penalty of publication consistent with Article 47 of the Charter which guarantees the existence of an effective remedy?

| d. | If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, is it the case that the ratification of a financial penalty fixed on the basis of the EU legislature’s intention thus expressed [and] the automatic penalty of publication, without the involvement of the principle of proportionality, except in the case of force majeure as strictly interpreted, amounts to an abdication by the national court before the supposed intention of the EU legislature and to an improper lack of judicial review in the light of Articles 47 and 49(3) of the Charter? |
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d.

If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, is it the case that the ratification of a financial penalty fixed on the basis of the EU legislature’s intention thus expressed [and] the automatic penalty of publication, without the involvement of the principle of proportionality, except in the case of force majeure as strictly interpreted, amounts to an abdication by the national court before the supposed intention of the EU legislature and to an improper lack of judicial review in the light of Articles 47 and 49(3) of the Charter?

| e. | Bearing in mind the answer given to the previous question, is it the case that the lack of judicial review by the national court in the context of the flat rate penalty provided for in Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC [and] the automatic penalty of publication provided for in Article 20(7) [of the Law of 23 December 2004] amounts to shutting off essentially fruitful channels of communication between the CJEU and the national Supreme Courts under the influence of a pre-determined solution endorsed by the CJEU, except in the case of force majeure as strictly viewed, which means that the national Supreme Court, which can only ratify the penalty once it is deemed that force majeure has not been established, is unable to enter into an effective dialogue? |
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e.

Bearing in mind the answer given to the previous question, is it the case that the lack of judicial review by the national court in the context of the flat rate penalty provided for in Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC [and] the automatic penalty of publication provided for in Article 20(7) [of the Law of 23 December 2004] amounts to shutting off essentially fruitful channels of communication between the CJEU and the national Supreme Courts under the influence of a pre-determined solution endorsed by the CJEU, except in the case of force majeure as strictly viewed, which means that the national Supreme Court, which can only ratify the penalty once it is deemed that force majeure has not been established, is unable to enter into an effective dialogue?

| 4. | Bearing in mind the answers given to the previous questions, can the concept of force majeure be interpreted as taking into account the individual hardship of an operator acting in good faith where payment of the flat rate penalty provided for in Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC [and] the automatic penalty of publication provided for in Article 20(7) [of the Law of 23 December 2004] constitutes a considerable financial risk and loss of credit which could lead to its staff being made redundant or even bankruptcy? |
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4.

Bearing in mind the answers given to the previous questions, can the concept of force majeure be interpreted as taking into account the individual hardship of an operator acting in good faith where payment of the flat rate penalty provided for in Article 16(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC [and] the automatic penalty of publication provided for in Article 20(7) [of the Law of 23 December 2004] constitutes a considerable financial risk and loss of credit which could lead to its staff being made redundant or even bankruptcy?

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(1)  Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ 2003 L 275, p. 32).

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