UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ ROSALIN S. LYKINS, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee. No. 15-5081 (D.C. No. 4:14-CV -00248-GKF-FHM) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , LUCERO , and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Rosalin S. Lykins appeals a decision by the district court affirming the Commissioner of Social Securi ty’s denial of her applicat ion for benefits. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291, we affirm.
I Lykins injured her lower back in Apr il 2010. She applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental social security income shortly thereafter,

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 1, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 claiming her back pain and hist ory of congestive heart failure left her unable to work. While her application was pending, medicati on and epidural injections failed to relieve her pain, and she underw ent back surgery in January 2012. Later that year, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied her application for benefits. The ALJ followed the five-step disabili ty analysis. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (summarizing the five -step process). He found that Lykins had severe impairment s, but determined that Lykins: has the residual functional capacity [(“RFC”)] to lift and/or carry no more than 10 pounds occasiona lly or less than 10 pounds frequently; pushing and/or pulling c onsistent with the lifting and carrying limitations; st and and/or walk for 2 hours out of an 8- hour workday and 15 minutes at one time; sit for up to 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday; occas ionally climb stairs, balance, bend or stoop, kneel, crouch and cr awl, but cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolding. She would be limited to occasional use of foot controls due to her back condition, extremes of cold and heat, driving, and avoid all exposure to hazardous or fast machinery and unprotected heights. The ALJ then asked a vocational expert (“VE”) if occupations existed for a hypothetical person with thes e impairments. In the VE ’s opinion, the hypothetical individual could perform a number of unskille d, sedentary occupations. The ALJ then found Lykins unable to perform her past relevant work, but able to perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. He therefore concluded she was not disabled and denied her applicati on. The appeals council denied review and the district court affirmed . This appeal followed.3 II We review the district court’s decision in a social security ca se de novo. Id. “[W]e independently determine whether the ALJ’s decision is free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence.” Id . (quotation omitted). “Although we will not reweigh the evidence or retry the case, we meticulously examin e the record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ’s findings in order to determine if the subs tantiality test has been met. ” Id. (quotations omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant ev idence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusi on. It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). Moreover, the record must show the ALJ considered all the evidence, but he need only discuss the evidence supporting his decision, along with any “uncontroverted ev idence he chooses not to rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence he re jects.” Mays v. Co lvin, 739 F.3d 569, 576 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). A Lykins argues the ALJ’s RFC finding fa iled to incorporate a doctor’s opinion that Lykins could only occas ionally grasp tools. In particular, Dr. Ashok Kache examined Lykins in 2010. Dr. Kache de termined that Lykins could “effectively grasp tools such as a hammer . . . on occas ion.” Based on this observation, Lykins contends “a claimant limited to only occasional use of th e hands cannot perform the jobs the VE and the ALJ found for her.” We reject her argumen t that failure to4 mention the limitation undermines the s ubstantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. Lykins overstates Dr. Kache’s report. In addition to noting that she can grasp tools “on occasion,” Kache dete rmined that Lykins had a full range of motion in her wrists and hands, could pick up small objects and coins, effectively oppose her thumb to her fingertips, and ma nipulate small objects. Mo reover, the ALJ accurately summarized the opinion aside from the brie f mention that she could grasp tools on occasion. The ALJ’s omission of the “grasp tools” finding is not dispos itive, because the limitation on her grasp was neit her uncontroverted nor signifi cantly probative. Cf. id. And nothing in the medica l evidence—including record s from several physicians who treated or examined Lykins—corrobor ated Dr. Kache’s as sessment. To the contrary, Dr. Beau Jennings also assessed Lykins’ hand and wris t functioning, noting no limitation on her ability to “effectively grasp tools such as a hammer.” Nor did Lykins claim she had such li mitations in her applicati on, even when specifically asked. Instead, when Lykins was asked what caused weakness in her grip, she testified, “lift[ing] somethi ng that’s too heavy,” but clar ified that lif ting ten pounds was not a problem. In sum, Dr. Kache’s opinion regarding Lykins ’ ability to grasp tools only occasionally was c ontroverted by every other re levant medical opinion and by Lykins herself. In light of this other evidence, Dr . Kache’s observation was not significantly probative. Substantial ev idence supported the ALJ’s conclusions, and5 the ALJ was not required to discuss Dr. Ka che’s grip-related findings in greater detail. 1
B Lykins challenges the ALJ’s finding th at her “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limi ting effects of [her] symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with [the] RFC.” Credibility determinations are the province of the factfinder, and we will not upset them if they are supported by substantial evidence. Wilson v. As true, 602 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010) . But credibility findings “should be closely and affirmativ ely linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusi on in the guise of findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). To determine whether the claimant’s subjec tive complaints of pa in are credible, the ALJ should consider a variet y of factors, such as the levels of medication and their effe ctiveness, the exte nsiveness of the attempts . . . to obtain relief, th e frequency of medi cal contacts, the nature of daily activities, subjecti ve measures of cr edibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant and other witnesses, and the consistency or compatibility of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence. Id. at 1145 (quotation omitted) . However, “so long as the ALJ sets forth the specific evidence he relies on in eval uating the claimant’s credib ility, he need not make a

1 Because we conclude the ALJ was not required to include specific hand limitations in his RFC assessment, we also reject Lykins’ claim that the ALJ should have included such a limitation in his hypothe tical question to the VE. See Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1373 (10t h Cir. 2000) (hypothetical questions are generally sufficient if they include all of the limitations the ALJ f ound in his assessment of the claimant’s RFC).6 formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence.” Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). The ALJ applied the correct legal standa rd, discussed severa l of the suggested factors, and tied his findings to the evidence. He noted that Lykins’ claims of disabling pain were inc onsistent with her daily activities, noting she was able to care for herself and her two youn g children, prepare meals, clean, go outside, walk, drive a car, and go shopping. Lykins’ ability to consistently pe rform this wide range of activities on a regular basis s upports the ALJ’s finding. Cf. Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 413 (10th Cir. 1983) (activities not conduc ted on a daily basis do not “establish, without more evidence, that a person is able to engage in substantial gainful activity” (quotation omitted)). The ALJ noted Lykins’ allegations were inconsistent with objective medical evidence. Accord Newbold v. Colvin, 718 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir. 2013) . He noted the absence of medical findings that “would establish the existence of a pattern of pain of such severity as to prevent [Lykins] from e ngaging in any work on a sustained basis,” and cited the results of an X-ray revealing onl y “mild to moderate facet degenerative changes” in Lykins’ lumbar spine. The ALJ also cited reports from Lykins’ treating physician, which do cumented improvement in her symptoms after surgery and predicted continued impr ovement with physical therapy. And the ALJ noted that no physician had opined that Lykins was completely disabled. See Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 390 ( 10th Cir. 1995) (“To establish disabling pain without the explicit confirmation of trea ting physicians may be difficult.”).7 The ALJ observed Lykins’ inconsistent description of her symptoms. For example, Lykins told her treating physician on several occasions that surgery had improved her symptoms significantly, but to ld another doctor during an examination related to her application for benefits that her back pa in was worsening. Finally, the ALJ discussed Lykins’ medi cal care. He conc luded she had not “received the type of medical treatment one would expect for a totally disabled individual,” and characterized her treatment as “routine and conservative.” The ALJ cited medical reports descri bing Lykins’ improvement afte r surgery, treatment notes showing her medications had “been discontinued or otherw ise adjusted as needed,” and the lack of any side effects from her medications. Although we agree with Lykins that some of her treatment was not “routine and conservative,” the ALJ’s detailed summary of Lykins’ medical reco rds shows he understood the nature and effectiveness of her treatment . That the ALJ could have characterized her treatment differently does not undermine his conclusi on that Lykins’ pain did not preclude all types of work. The ALJ’s credibility de termination was suppor ted by substantial evidence.
III The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

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Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge