1 16-3620-bk Bais Din v. Congregation Birchos Yosef UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated Term of the Unit ed States Court of Appeals fo r the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthou se, at 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 1 st day of November, two thousand seventeen. Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge , RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges

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________________________________________________ In re: CONGREGATION BIRCHOS YOSEF Debtor ,

________________________________________________ BAIS DIN OF MECHON L’HOYROA, Appellant , v. No. 16-3620-bk CONGREGATION BIRCHOS YOSEF, Debtor-Appellee

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________________________________________________ F OR A PPELLANT : Y. D AVID S CHARF (Joseph T. Moldovan, on the brief ), Morrison Cohen LLP, New York, NY.
F OR D EBTOR -A PPELLEE : M ICHAEL L EVINE , Levine & Associates, P.C., Scarsdale, NY.

________________________________________________2 Appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Seibel, J. ). ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. Appellant Bais Din of Mechon L’Hoyroa (“th e Bais Din”) appeals from a judgment of the Southern District of New York (Seibel, J. ) entered October 20, 2016, dismissing the Bais Din’s appeal from a bankruptcy court order enfo rcing the Bankruptcy C ode’s automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). We assume the parties’ familiar ity with the underlying fact s, the history of the case, and the issues on appeal. The bankruptcy court’s order declared that certain defendants in adversary proceedings brought by Congregation Birchos Yose f had violated the automatic stay by initiating proceedings in the Bais Din, a rabbinical cour t, after the automatic stay went into effect, and it held those defendants in contempt. The bankruptcy court furthe r ordered that decrees issued by the Bais Din in furtherance of those rabbinical proceed ings, which violated the stay, were void ab initio and of no force or effect. The Bais Din, which was not a party in the adversary proceeding, appealed the bankruptcy court’s order to the dist rict court, arguing that the or der violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restorati on Act. Following supplemental briefing on the question of standing, the di strict court dismissed the appeal fo r lack of jurisdiction, finding that the Bais Din did not have standi ng to appeal the bankruptcy court’ s order. This appeal followed. “When reviewing [a] dismissal . . . for lack of subject matter ju risdiction, we review factual findings for clear e rror and legal conclusions de novo . . . .” Liranzo v. United States , 690 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2012). The Bais Din, as th e party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).3 Although “[t]he current Bankruptcy Code pr escribes no limits on standing beyond those implicit in Article III of the United States Consti tution[,] . . . . this Court and others have ‘adopted the general rule, loosely modeled on the fo rmer Bankruptcy Act, that in order to have standing to appeal from a bankrupt cy court ruling, an appellant must be “a person aggrieved”—a person “directly and adversely a ffected pecuniarily” by the cha llenged order of the bankruptcy
court.’” DISH Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.) , 634 F.3d 79, 88– 89 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Int’l Trade Admin. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 936 F.2d 744, 747 (2d Cir. 1991)). This standard “reflect[s] the unde rstandable concern that if appellate standing is not limited, bankruptcy litigation will become mire d in endless appeals brought by the myriad of parties who are indirectly affected by every bankruptcy court order.” Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. , 843 F.2d 636, 642 (2d Cir. 1988). As the district court correc tly concluded, the Bais Din fa iled to demonstrate that it suffered a pecuniary harm. Quite the opposite, the Ba is Din did not even allege a pecuniary harm before the district court, claiming instead that the automatic stay inhibited the free exercise of religion by “preventing the Bais Di n from issuing notices to or ag ainst” individuals who violate Jewish law’s prohibition on initiating proceedings in secular courts without prior permission from a rabbinical court. Whatever the merits of that claim, it does not re flect a pecuniary injury. Moreover, to the extent that the Bais Din seek s to vindicate a non-pecuniary injury, nothing in this or the district cour t’s opinion prevents it fr om filing a civil action. The Bais Din’s alternative theories of standing were not raised before the district court, and so they have been forfeited. Bogle-Assegai v. Connecticut, 470 F.3d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is a well-established general rule that an ap pellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).4 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the Bais Din’s appeal for lack of standing without considering the mer its of the Bais Din’s underlying claims.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O = Hagan Wolfe, Clerk