alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 12.1
 STATEMENT REGARDING CALCULATION OF RATIO OF CONSOLIDATED EARNINGS TO CONSOLIDATED FIXED CHARGES
(Dollars in thousands)
 Years Ended December 31,2009
    
    
    2008
    
    
    2007
    
    
    2006
    
    
    2005Pre-tax income, as reported
    
    $
    265,532
    
    
    $
    421,870
    
    
    $
    409,869
    
    
    $
    455,277
    
    
    $
    204,063Equity in earnings (losses) of investees1
    
    
    53,187
    
    
    
    (51,238
    )
    
    
    12,985
    
    
    
    87,762
    
    
    
    19,026Pre-tax income before adjustment for equity in
earnings of equity investees
    
    
    212,345
    
    
    
    473,108
    
    
    
    396,884
    
    
    
    367,515
    
    
    
    185,037Fixed charges:Interest expense
    
    
    43,307
    
    
    
    39,838
    
    
    
    46,258
    
    
    
    41,765
    
    
    
    53,078Rentals representing interest
    
    
    3,711
    
    
    
    3,598
    
    
    
    3,558
    
    
    
    3,808
    
    
    
    3,810Total fixed charges
    
    
    47,018
    
    
    
    43,436
    
    
    
    49,816
    
    
    
    45,573
    
    
    
    56,888Distributed income of equity investees
    
    
    665
    
    
    
    1,890
    
    
    
    5,487
    
    
    
    87,670
    
    
    
    9,148Pre-tax income before equity in earnings of
investees plus fixed charges and distributed
income of equity method investees
    
    $
    260,028
    
    
    $
    518,434
    
    
    $
    452,187
    
    
    $
    500,758
    
    
    $
    251,073Ratio of earnings to fixed charges
    
    
    5.5
    x
    
    
    11.9
    x
    
    
    9.1
    x
    
    
    11.0
    x
    
    
    4.4
    x
 1
    
    Equity in earnings (losses) of investees is in respect of those investments
that are investment companies or similar equity method investees and, as such, are
included as part of investment income on the consolidated statements of income.
#### Jorge Munoz et al., Respondents, v City of New York et al., Defendants, et al., Additional Defendant on Cross Claims. Board of Managers of Regatta Condominium et al., Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, v Admiral Indemnity Company et al., Third-Party Defendants-Appellants.

[943 NYS2d 536]—

Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Jane S. Solomon, J), entered August 18, 2011, which, in the third-party action seeking a declaratory judgment, denied the cross motion of third-party defendants Admiral Indemnity Company and Clermont Specialty Managers, Ltd. (collectively, Admiral) for summary judgment, granted the motion of third-party plaintiffs the Board of Managers of Regatta Condominium and Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) (collectively, Regatta) for summary judgment and declared that Admiral was obligated to defend and indemnify them in the underlying personal injury action, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Admiral’s disclaimer of coverage based solely on late notice of claim, issued 43 days after receiving first notification of the occurrence, claim and suit, was unreasonable as a matter of law *(see George Campbell Painting v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA,*92 AD3d 104, 106 [2012]; *see also West 16th St. Tenants Corp. v Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co.,*290 AD2d 278, 279 [2002], *lv denied*98 NY2d 605 [2002]). Attached to the complaint and notice of loss form was an incident report, which was dated one year earlier, and contained the typed name of Regatta’s property manager. Although unsigned, the report, received from Regatta’s broker, made the basis for disclaimer “readily apparent” *(Hunter Roberts Constr. Group, LLC v Arch Ins. Co.,*75 AD3d 404, 409 [2010]), and could have been confirmed in a telephone conversation that was held between Admiral and Regatta’s property manager within days of receipt.

Moreover, Admiral’s argument that BPCA was not an insured *649under the subject policy, based on its exclusion for contractual liability, is unavailing. The exclusion states an exception for an “insured contract,” which is defined to include a contract for a lease of premises, and as noted by the motion court, article 19 of the lease provided that Regatta Condominium would indemnify BPCA from bodily injury claims arising from work by the condominium’s contractors. Concur — Saxe, J.P., Sweeny, Acosta and Freedman, JJ. [Prior Case History: 2011 NY Slip Op 32082(U).]
# C_2021471EN.01004001.xml

| 22.11.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 471/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.11.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 471/40

---

Judgment of the General Court of 6 October 2021 — Tempus Energy Germany and T Energy Sweden v Commission

(Case T-167/19) (1)

(State aid - Polish electricity market - Capacity mechanism - Decision not to raise any objections - Aid scheme - Article 108(2) and (3) TFEU - Concept of doubts - Article 4(3) and (4) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 - Serious difficulties - Article 107(3)(c) TFEU - Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 - Failure to initiate the formal investigation procedure - Procedural rights of the interested parties - Obligation to state reasons)

(2021/C 471/55)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Tempus Energy Germany GmbH (Berlin, Germany), T Energy Sweden AB (Gothenburg, Sweden) (represented by: D. Fouquet and J. Derenne, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: K. Herrmann and P. Němečková, acting as Agents

Interveners in support of the defendant: Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna, acting as Agent), PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna S.A (Warsaw, Poland) (represented by: A. Ryan and A. Klosok, Solicitors, and by T. Janssens and K. Bojarojć-Bartnicka, lawyers), Enel X Polska z o.o. (Warsaw) (represented by: V. Cannizzaro, S. Ventura and L. Caroli, lawyers), Enspirion sp. z o.o. (Gdańsk, Poland) (represented by: A. Czech, lawyer)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision C(2018) 601 final of 7 February 2018 not to raise objections to the aid scheme for the capacity mechanism in Poland, on the ground that that scheme is compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU (State aid SA.46100 (2017/N)).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Tempus Energy Germany GmbH and T Energy Sweden AB to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission, PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna S.A., Enel X Polska z o.o. and Enspirion sp. z o.o.; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Tempus Energy Germany GmbH and T Energy Sweden AB to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission, PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna S.A., Enel X Polska z o.o. and Enspirion sp. z o.o.;

| 3. | Orders the Republic of Poland to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Republic of Poland to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 155, 6.5.2019.

---
#### Mayer *v.*Cohn.

*Measure of damages*— *Business automobile*— *Loss of use.*

The proper measure of damages against one who wrongfully injures the automobile of another, which is used for business purposes, includes compensation for the loss of use during the time necessarily expended in making the repairs.

(Decided November 3, 1919.)

Error: Court of Appeals for Hamilton county.

*Messrs. Robertson, Buchwalter & Oppenheimer,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. Robert P. Goldman*and *Mr. Murray Seasongood,*for defendant in error.

Shohl, P. J.

Plaintiff in error, Jesse C. Mayer, brought suit against the defendant in error, Arthur Cohn, in the municipal court of Cincinnati for damages caused in a collision between the automobiles of the parties. The defendant in error, who was the' defendant in the original action, filed a cross-petition for the damages caused to his automobile, alleging the cost of his repairs to be $6.98, and also claiming damages for the loss of the use of his machine for the time ■expended in making the repairs. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff in the sum of $81.98, and judgment was entered thereon. This was affirmed by the court of common pleas, and it is now sought to reverse both judgments.

The principal error complained of is that the court permitted the defendant to recover damages *135for the loss of the use of the automobile. The automobile in. question was a touring car, used by the defendant in his business to call on the trade. He did not hire another machine for the three days that it was in the repair shop. The weight of authority and the better reasons support the rule allowing compensation for the loss of use during the time necessarily expended in making repairs.

The primary end to be attained in the awarding of damages for torts is to put the injured person in as good a position as he would have been if the tort-feasor had not injured him. If one is wrongfully deprived of the use of a chattel through the tort of another, the proper measure of damages includes compensation’ for the loss of use proximately caused by the tort. There is no good reason why the injured party should be required to hire another chattel in order to establish the value of the use. If that use is valuable it can be shown by evidence, like any other question of fact. The statement of the rule in Sedgwick on Damages (8 ed.), Section 435, which was approved by the court in the case of *P., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co.*v. *Kelly,*12 C. C., 341, affirmed 53 Ohio St., 667; is:

“Where the plaintiffs property was injured, he may recover the expense of restoration of the property to health or soundness, compensation for the loss of use of it during the period of disability, and the amount of the difference, if any, between its value before the injury, and after the cure or repair.”

See also *Loud & Sons Lumber Co.*v. *Peter,*20 C. C., 73; and *Cook*v. *Packard Motor Car Co.,**13688 Conn., 590, and note to same, L. R. A. 1915C, page 319.

The trial court did not err and the judgment will be affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Hamilton and Cushing, JJ., concur.
| 1. | I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of AspenBio Pharma, Inc. (the “Registrant”); and |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |
|--------|

|   |
|--------|

|   |                                                                                               |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | /s/ Jeffrey G. McGonegal                                                                           |
|   | Jeffrey G. McGonegal, Chief Financial Officer PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING OFFICER |
II 

Calendar No. 121 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 839 

To ban the sale of certain synthetic drugs. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 14, 2011 

Ms. KLOBUCHAR (for herself, Mr. GRASSLEY, and Mr. BLUMENTHAL) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

JULY 28, 2011 

Reported by Mr. LEAHY, without amendment 

A BILL 

To ban the sale of certain synthetic drugs. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘Combating Designer Drugs Act of 2011’’. 


pwalker on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 839 RS

1 SEC. 2. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT. 

2 Schedule I of section 202(c) of the Controlled Sub3 stances Act (21 U.S.C. 812(c)) is amended in subsection 

4 (c) by adding at the end the following: 

5 ‘‘(18) 2-(2,5-Dimethoxy-4- 

6 ethylphenyl)ethanamine (2C-E). 

7 ‘‘(19) 2-(2,5-Dimethoxy-4- 

8 methylphenyl)ethanamine (2C-D). 

9 ‘‘(20) 2-(4-Chloro-2,5- 

10 dimethoxyphenyl)ethanamine (2C-C). 

11 ‘‘(21) 2-(4-Iodo-2,5- 

12 dimethoxyphenyl)ethanamine (2C-I). 

13 ‘‘(22) 2-[4-(Ethylthio)-2,5- 

14 dimethoxyphenyl]ethanamine (2C-T-2). 

15 ‘‘(23) 2-[4-(Isopropylthio)-2,5- 

16 dimethoxyphenyl]ethanamine (2C-T-4). 

17 ‘‘(24) 2-(2,5-Dimethoxyphenyl)ethanamine (2C18 H). 

19 ‘‘(25) 2-(2,5-Dimethoxy-4-nitro20 phenyl)ethanamine (2C-N). 

21 ‘‘(26) 2-(2,5-Dimethoxy-4-(n)- 

22 propylphenyl)ethanamine (2C-P).’’. 


pwalker on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with BILLS

pwalker on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 121 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 839 

A BILL 

To ban the sale of certain synthetic drugs. 

JULY 28, 2011 

Reported without amendment 


pwalker on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### SCHWEIGER, Appellant, v. BLOCK, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

April 12, 1912.)

Action by Max Schweiger against Emanuel M. Block. O. A. Samuels, for appellant. C. U. Carruth, for respondent. No opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. Order filed.
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2007-1315 

PRISM TECHNOLOGIES LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

VERISIGN, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee, 

. 

and 

RSA SECURITY, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

NETEGRITY, INC. 

and COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

 

Defendants-Appellees, 

 and 

JOHNSON & JOHNSON SERVICES, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

David P. Swenson, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P, of Minneapolis, 

Minnesota, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were Ronald J. Schutz, 

Aziz Burgy, and Christopher J. Kuhlman. 

John M. DiMatteo, Willkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP, of New York, New York, argued 

for all defendants-appellees. With him on the brief for defendant-appellee Johnson & 

Johnson Services, Inc. were Steven H. Reisberg and Leslie M. Spencer. On the brief 

for defendant-appellee Verisign, Inc. were Frank C. Cimino, Jr. and Daniel E. Yonan, 

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, of Washington, DC, and Jason A. Snyderman

and John D. Simmons, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On the brief for defendantappellee RSA Security, Inc. were Mark D Selwyn, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and 
Dorr LLP, of Palo Alto, California, and William F. Lee, David B. Bassett, Donald R. 

Steinberg, and Gregory P. Teran, of Boston, Massachusetts. On the brief for 

defendants-appellees, Netegrity, Inc., et al, were David M. Schlitz, Baker Botts LLP, of 

Washington, DC, and Samir A. Bhavsar and Jeffrey D. Baxter, of Dallas, Texas. 

Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of Delaware 

Judge Joseph J. Farnan, Jr. 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2007-1315 

PRISM TECHNOLOGIES LLC, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

VERISIGN, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

RSA SECURITY, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

NETEGRITY, INC. 

and COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

 Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

JOHNSON & JOHNSON SERVICES, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Judgment 

ON APPEAL from the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

 DISTRICT OF DELAWARE 

 

In CASE NO(S). 05-CV-214. 

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

Per Curiam: (MAYER, BRYSON and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges): 

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36. 

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT 

DATED: _February 6, 2008____ / s / Jan Horbaly

 Jan Horbaly, Clerk
# C_2019406EN.01001701.xml

| 2.12.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 406/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.12.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 406/17

---

Appeal brought on 20 September 2019 by Pilatus Bank plc against the order of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 10 July 2019 in Case T-687/18: Pilatus Bank v European Central Bank (ECB)

(Case C-701/19 P)

(2019/C 406/24)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Pilatus Bank plc (represented by: O.H. Behrends, M. Kirchner, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Central Bank (ECB)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| — | set aside the contested order of the General Court; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the contested order of the General Court;

| — | declare that the application for annulment is admissible; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that the application for annulment is admissible;

| — | refer the case back to the General Court for it to determine the action for annulment; and |
| --- | --- |

—

refer the case back to the General Court for it to determine the action for annulment; and

| — | order the ECB to pay the appellant's costs and the costs of this appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the ECB to pay the appellant's costs and the costs of this appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on the following pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging that the General Court distorted Maltese law by assuming that all powers of the appellant and its board were transferred to the competent person.

Second plea in law, alleging that the order under appeal violated the guarantee of an effective remedy under European law.

Third plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in assuming that the contested decision is a mere preparatory measure.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the General Court distorted the content of the contested decision as well as more generally the facts of the case.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the order under appeal cannot be upheld based on the alternative ground of a possible consultation of the competent person with the directors.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the order under appeal cannot be upheld based on the alternative ground of an involvement of a lawyer in the case.

Seventh plea in law, alleging that the order under appeal cannot be upheld based on the alternative ground of the contested decision being contained in a mere email.

Eighth plea in law, alleging that the application has not become devoid of purpose.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 45 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. CON. RES. 45

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

SECTION 1. USE OF EMANCIPATION HALL FOR EVENT TO AWARD THE 
              CONGRESSIONAL GOLD MEDAL.

    (a) Authorization.--Emancipation Hall in the Capitol Visitor Center 
is authorized to be used for an event on June 27, 2012, to award the 
Congressional Gold Medal, collectively, to the Montford Point Marines.
    (b) Preparations.--Physical preparations for the conduct of the 
event described in subsection (a) shall be carried out in accordance 
with such conditions as may be prescribed by the Architect of the 
Capitol.

            Passed the Senate June 5, 2012.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
112th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                            S. CON. RES. 45

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Authorizing the use of Emancipation Hall in the Capitol Visitor Center 
 for an event to award the Congressional Gold Medal, collectively, to 
                      the Montford Point Marines.
```
#### ANNISTON MANUFACTURING CO. V. WALDROP.

(Decided Jan. 14th, 1908.)

Appeal from Anniston Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. John Pelham.

No counsel marked for either side.

Affirmed on certificate.

Per curiam.
# C_2019255EN.01001801.xml

| 29.7.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 255/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.7.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 255/18

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 19 April 2019 — eurocylinder systems AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg

(Case C-324/19)

(2019/C 255/26)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Finanzgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: eurocylinder systems AG

Defendant: Hauptzollamt Hamburg

Question referred

Is Council Regulation (EC) No 926/2009 of 24 September 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of iron or steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (1) valid?

---

(1)  OJ 2009, L 262, p. 19.

---
EXHIBIT 31.2 CERTIFICATE OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER I, James A. Meer, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this
quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Pharmos Corporation; 2. Based on my knowledge, this
report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the
financial statements, and other financial information included in this report,
fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report; 4. The registrants other
certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining
disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: (a)
designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared; (b)
evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and (c)
disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrants other
certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of
internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing
the equivalent functions): (a)
all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and (b)
any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting. Dated: May 12, 2006



/s/ James A. MeerJames A. MeerChief Financial Officer  29