## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Marriage of Brankin , 2012 IL App (2d) 110203

Appellate Court Caption In re MARRI AGE OF KAREN M. BRANKI N, Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and GARY W. BRANKI N, Respondent-Appe llant and Cross-Appellee

.

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-11-0203

Filed Marc h 12, 2012

Held (Note : T

his syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The trial court’s awa rd of p ermanent maintenanc e in the amount of $3,000 per month was aff irmed based on petitioner’s curr ent needs, responde nt’s curr ent in co m e and his impending reduc ed employ ment income, but the summary denial of peti t ioner’s reque st that the maintenanc e awa

rd be secur ed by a life insurance policy was vacated and the cause was rema

nded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion in deter mining whether responde nt shoul d p u rcha se life insurance to

secur e his obligation and what terms should be included in such an order

.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Winnebag o County
, No. 07-D-984; the Hon. J oseph J. Bruce , J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med in part a

nd vacated in part; ca

use re manded with dire ctions.Counsel on

Appea l Robert C. Pott inge r and Jody L . Be ilke, both of Ba

rrick, Switz er, L ong , Ba lsley & V an Eve ra, L L P, of Rockford, f or appe llant.

Peter A. Savitski, of Rockfor d, for a ppellee.

Panel J USTI CE SCHOSTOK delivere d the judgme nt o f th e c o u r t, w it h opinion.
J ustices B urke a

nd Birke tt concurr ed in the judgment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 The responde nt, Gar y Br ankin, appea ls from the order of the circ uit court of Winnebag o County awa

rding the petitioner, Kar en Br ankin, $3,000 a month in perma nent maintenanc e. On appeal
, Ga ry argues that the trial court’s maintenanc e awa rd was improper. Kar en has filed a c ross-appe al, ar guing that the trial court’s maintenance awa rd was insufficient. She al so arg ues that the trial court err ed in denying her reque st that the maintenanc e aw ar d b e

secur ed by a life insurance policy

. For the following rea sons, we aff irm in part, vacate in part, and re mand for a dditional procee dings.

¶ 2 I . Gene ral B ackground ¶ 3 The parties wer e marrie d on September 12, 1981. They had one child toge ther, Allison, who was born in 1984 and is now emanc ipated. In 2010, Gar y was a 58-year -old endodontist

ear ning approximately $400,000 a y ear

. Kar en was a 55-year -old tenure d school teac her for the Rockfor d school sy stem, ear ning a pproxi mately

$75,000. ¶ 4 Kar en filed a petition for dissoluti on of marria g e on August 10, 2007. On September 27, 2010, the parties enter ed into a marital settlement agree ment (MSA) res o l v i n g all issues except maintenanc e and life insurance

. The MSA provided that Kar en was to rec eive assets with a value of betwee n $605,340 and $800,100. This included $55,000 in cash, her Tea cher s Retirement Sy stem acc o u n t (valued at betwee n $330,840 and $526,900), $137,000 in a 403(b) acc ount, $15,000 in an individual retire ment acc ount (I RA), and $67,500 from Gar y ’s 401(k) acc ount. Gar

y rec eived assets that wer e valued at betwee n $574,000 and $1.8 milli on. The discrepanc y in that amount was based on the val u e o f Ga ry ’s m edica l prac tice. Karen place d the value o f t h e medical prac tice at $960,000, while Gar y place d the value of the medical prac tice at $57,445. Gar y also rec eived the marital residenc e, which had a neg ative equity of betwe en $234,000 and $334,000. ¶ 5 Be g inning September 27, 2010, the trial court conducte d a three -day hear ing on the issue of maintenanc e and life insurance

. At the close of the hear ing, the trial court awa rded Kar en $ 3
, 0 0 0 per month in perma nent maintenanc e. The trial court’s decision indicates that it particula rly considere d (1) the parties’ standard of living during the marria g e; (2) Kar en’s

-2-need for maintenanc e; (3) Gar y ’s curr ent ability to pay maintenanc e; and (4) Gar y ’s ability
to p ay m ai n t en an ce in the future, based on his ag e and health in light of his rec ent hear t attack. The trial court denied Kar en’s reque st that Gar y be require d to secur e the maintenanc e

awa rd wit h a $1 m i l l i o n l i fe insurance policy

. The trial court ex plained that, based on this court’s decision in In re Marriage of Feldman
, 199 I ll. App. 3d 1002 (1990), it could not order Gar y to purcha se such life insurance

. Following the trial court’ s rul ing, Gar y filed a timely notice of a

ppeal a nd Kar en filed a

timely notice of c ross-appe al.

¶ 6 I I . Discussion ¶ 7 A. Maintena nce ¶ 8 Gar

y ’s first contention on appea l is that the t rial court err ed in awa rding Kar en $3,000
per month in perma

nent mainten an ce

. Ga ry contends that, based on the rele vant statutory fac tors in setting maintenanc e, Kar en s hould not have been awa rded any maintenanc e. Kar en’s first contention on her cross-a ppeal is that the trial court’s awa rd of maintenanc e was insufficient. She insists that she should have re ceive d a monthly awa rd of $7,000. ¶ 9 Maintenanc e is desig ned to be reha bilitative and to allow a depende nt spouse to become financ ially independe nt. In re Marriage of Haas
, 215 I ll. App. 3d 959, 964 (1991). “Perma nent maintenanc e, o n the other hand, is appropr iate wher e it is evident that the

rec ipient spouse is either unemployable or employ able only at an income that is substantially lower than the previous standard of living.” In re Marriage of Murphy
, 359 I ll. App. 3d 289, 303 (2005). Section 504(a ) o f the I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Marr iag e Act (the Dissolut i o n Act) (750 I L CS 5/504(a) (West 2010)) provides that a court is to awa rd maintenanc e in an amount and of a duration as i t d eems just, afte r consideration of the following fac tors: the income and proper ty of eac h party ; the needs of eac h party ; the prese nt and future ear

ning capacity of eac h party ; any impairment of prese nt and future ear ning
capa city of the rec ipient spouse due to dev o t i n g time to domestic duties or forg oing opportunities beca

us e o f the marria g e; the time nece ssary to enable the party seeking

m aint enanc e to acquir e appropriate education, training and employ ment; the standard o f living established during the marria g e; the duration of the marria g e; the ag e and phy sical and

em o t i o n al condition of both parties; the tax conseque nces of the proper ty division; any contribution and services by the re ci p i ent s pouse t o the other spouse; any valid agree ment of the parties; and any other fac tor that the trial court expressly finds to be just and equitable. 750 I L CS 5/504(a) (West 2010); In re Marriage of Stam
, 260 I ll. App. 3d 754, 756 (1994). ¶ 10 “[I ]n awa

rding maintenanc e, courts have wide latitude in considering what fac to r s s h o u ld be used in deter

mining rea sonable needs, and the trial court is not limit ed to the fac tors listed in the g overning statute.” In re Marriage of Mohr
, 260 I ll. App. 3d 98, 106 (1994). “No one fac tor is deter

minative of the issue conce rning the propriety of the maintenanc e awa rd once it has been deter

mined that an awa

rd is appropr iate.” Murphy
, 359 I ll. App. 3d at 304. “When deter mining the amount and duration of maintenanc e, the trial court must balanc e the ability of the spouse to support himself [or herse lf] in some approximation to the standard of living he [or she] enjoy ed during the marria g e.” In re Marriage of Shinn
, 313 I ll. App. 3d 317, 322 (2000). A trial court’s deter mination as to an awa

rd of maintenanc e will not be disturbed on

-3-ap p eal absent an abuse of di scre tion. In re Marriage of Dunlap
, 294 I ll. App. 3d 7 6 8
, 7 7 2

(1998). ¶ 11 During the last y ear s of the marria g e, the parties had a com b i n ed an n ual income of approximately $50 0,000 and they had assets that, based on some valuations, wer e worth

more than $2.5 milli on. This enable d the par t i es t o enjoy a high standard of living. They lived in a home that orig inally cost $1.3 milli on. Both parties wer e able to enjoy trave ling on Gar y ’s airpla ne. ¶ 12 The recor d is clea r t hat Kar en would not be able to maintain the s tandar d of l iving she

was acc ustomed to without some assistance from Gar y

. Ex penses for Kar en’s rea sonable monthly needs, as found by the trial court, wer e betwee n $6,608 and $7,108, which exceede d her monthly income of $6,333. Fur ther, as Gar

y ’s monthly income, based on his salary alone,

was $30,667, he was able to pay maintenanc e without g reatly aff ecting his own standard of living. Ga ry argues that the pa

rties’ standard of living during the marriag e should be g iven minimal weight beca

use the parties wer e living beyond their means during the marria g e. The primary example Gary

cites is the $1.3 million hom e that the par ties bought and for which he is still personal l y o b ligated to pay over $800,000. Gar y ’s argument is unpersua sive. Alth o u gh t h e p arties might have been living beyond their means during the marria g e, we believe it would be inequitable to saddl e Ka re n al o ne with a reduc ed standard of living,
espec ially since Gar

y earn s over $30,000 a month and continues to live in the expensive home that, he now c omplains, the parties should neve r have purcha sed. ¶ 13 We a lso r ejec t G ary ’s argument that Kar en should not have been awa rded maintenanc e beca use she has a job that pay s a g ood salary of $75,000 and had alre ady been awa rded marital assets that wer e worth over $600,000. Ga ry contends that maintenanc e should be

awa rded only if the depe ndent spouse nee ds assistance to be come f inancially independe nt. See In re Marriage of Hero y , 3 8 5 I l l

. App. 3d 640, 652 (2008). Base d on Kar en’s income and assets, Gar

y argues t hat maintenanc e was inappropriate beca use she was alre ady financ ially

independe nt. ¶ 14 We do not disag ree with the principle that Gar y cites from Heroy

. Howeve r, whether one is able to meet her rea sonable needs and become financ ially independe nt is still set in the
context of what the standard of living was during the marria g e. See In re Marriage of Culp
, 341 I ll. App. 3d 390, 398 (2003) (re asonable needs must be viewed in light of the standard of living established during the marria g e); In re Marriage of Tietz
, 238 I ll. App. 3d 965, 972 (1992) (“[ t ] h e benchma

rk for deter

mination of m aintenanc e is the reasonable needs of the
spouse seeking maintena n ce i n v i ew of the standard of living established during the marria g e”)

. Her e, the asse t s t h at Kar en rec eived in the MSA wer e g ener ally not incomeproducing

. Other than the $55,000 in c ash, which could produce some interest income, the
assets she was awa

rded could not help her offse t the expenses for her monthly needs. Cf. In

re Marriage of Bratch er , 383 I ll. App. 3d 388 (2008) (trial court’s decision to awa rd maintenanc e t o wi fe was improper in light of $1.6 milli on in assets that wer e awa rded to wife, many of which wer e income-pr oducing ). Fur ther, Kar en’s salary
, althoug h signific ant at $75,000, was not high enough by itself to allow her to maintain the same standard of living she enjoy ed during the marria g e as part of a household that had a $500,000 annual income. Thus, we agree with the trial court that Kar en could not meet her rea sonable needs, in view

-4-of the standard of living established during the marria g e, without some assistance from Gar y

. ¶ 15 Gar

y further contends that Kar en’s maintenanc e awa rd was excessive beca

use the needs she listed in her financ ial aff idavit and testified to wer e exagg erated. In her financ ial aff idavit, Kar en l i s t ed $7,434 in monthly expenses. Of that amount, Gar y complains of $5,223. Specifica lly
, Gar

y complains that the following expenses wer e excessive: (1) $705
payable to her mother for a mortg ag e pay ment; (2) $128 in healthca re and hospital premiums for Gar y ; (3) $350 for cell phones for four people; (4) $250 for repa irs to her condominium; (5) $825 for food; (6) $170 for computer suppl ies; (7) $560 for clothing; (8) $250 for ga s; (9) $225 for gi ft s; (10) $650 for charity donations; (11) $530 for vacations; and (12) $580 in cash. ¶ 16 In its judgment setti ng maintenanc e, the trial court specifica lly considere d whether the expenses listed in Karen’ s aff idavit were excessive. The tria l court stated:
“Ka ren testified that her financ ial aff idavit is an acc urate ref

lection of her n ee d s

. I
agree t h at t h e figures listed on her aff idavit on the whole repr esent her actua l aver ag e expenditures over the past three y ear s. Howeve r, in eva luating her needs in light of the standard of living during the marria g e, I find that some listed items are i n fl at ed. I will
g ive some examples. Kar en lists $650 per month ( $7,800 annually ) as her contribution
to char ity
, primarily to Hea rtland Church. Yet, a revie w of Plaintiff’s Ex

. 2A, the parties’ joint tax return f

or 2007, t he y ear the di ssolution petition was filed, shows a c ombined total char itable contribution of $6,675, with only $2,810 allocate d to Hea rtland Church,
out of a total $476,041 of combined taxab l e i n come. Kar en’s curr ent char itable contributions exceed the patter n o f gi v i ng during the m arr iag e. S he also lists $128 per month for health insurance for Gary
, which terminates upon the entry of the J udg ment for Dissolution. In addition, items such as $20 0 p er m o n t h for furniture repa ir and repla ceme nt and $250 per month for condominium repa irs are unrea sonably high and do
not repr esent Kar en’s actua l needs at t h i s t i me. Her listi ng of $170 for continuing education includes some reimbursa ble expenses. Her listi ng of $175 per month for office and computer supplies includes the purcha se of items that do not have to be repur chase d annually
, or ever

y three y ear s. I conclude that her budg et in some respe cts is inflated and
not commensurate with her actu al n eeds in light of the standard of living during the marria g e. The issue of Kar en’s expenditures for vacations has been raised in argument. I note that Kar en lists $530 per month for vacations beca use she wishes to approximate the trips she took with Gar

y when he trave led on business related confe renc es. Although Gar y has been able to enjoy many vacations, his ability to take many of those vacations is beca use he tr av el ed t o business related confe renc es and he was able to combine business with pleasure

. [ In re Marriage of ] Murphy
, 359 I ll. App. 3d 289 (3d Dist. 2005) calls into question the court’s ability t o use these business related vacations as part of Kar en’s standard of living. On the other hand, Gar y himself lists $450 per month as his persona l

vacation related expenditures, which presumably does not include the business portions of his trips. On balance, I consider Kar en’s budg etar y expenditure for vacations to be somewhat inflated. I find this particula r item should be rate d at $450, the same as rate d by Gar y

.

-5-* * *
I am awa re that Kar en’s budg et is not fully ref lective of t h e diminis hment of her lifestyle from the lifestyle of the marria g e. For example, during the marria g e, Kar en enjoy ed living in a much larg er home and enjoy ed t h e ab ility to trave l on a private airc raf t. In both of these respe cts, Gar y has maintained that previous lifestyle. Kar en also testified that during the separ ation and even while rec eiving temporar y maintenanc e, she had to borrow money from her mother to pay her condominium expenses. Howeve r, her condominium pa

y ments are listed as part of her monthly budg et and I consider them as part of K are n’s monthly

expenses. In s u m m ary , Kar en’s total budg et lists monthly expenditures of $7,434, plus debt
pay ments of $608. In my view, a budg et m ore refle ct i v e of her actual needs i n light of the standar d of living during the marria g e is in the are a of $6,000 to $6,500 per month, plus $608 for debt pa

y ments.” ¶ 17 Ba sed on the t rial court’s comments, it is appar ent t h at i t agree d with Gar y ’s asser tion that many of the expenses that Kar en listed in her financ ial aff idavit wer e inflated. The trial
court took that into consideration when it lowere d Kar en’s monthly expenses to wha t it believed they rea lly wer e. Nonethele ss, it is also appar ent that the trial court found that Kar en’s standard of l iving would be reduc ed in compar ison to what it was during the marria g e if it set maintenanc e only at a level that met her curr ent needs. As set forth above, it was appropr iate for the trial court to consider not only Kar en’s curr ent needs but also how much m aintenanc e was nec es s ary to allow her to enjoy a st andar d of l iving compara ble t o that she enjoyed duringthe marr iag e. Culp , 341 I ll. App. 3d at 398. ¶ 18 We next consider Gary ’s contention that maintenanc e was inappropriate in light of his
ag e and declining h ea l t h

. Ga ry testified that he was near ing 60, the ag e at which most endodondists retire

. He also testified that his rec ent hear t attack resulted in his working less, and hence ear

ning less. Alternatively
, Gar y argues that, even if the maintenanc e awa rd was appropr iate, in light of his ag e and health the trial co u rt should not have made the maintenanc e aw ard pe rmane nt. ¶ 19 We note that in entering its judgme nt the trial court specific ally addre ssed Gar y ’s ag e and health. The trial court found t h at Gar y ’s hear t attack had cause d him to chang e his work schedule

. The trial court further found that Gar y ’s work was “p h y s i ca l i n nature and his health may

aff ect his ability

to work in the future.” The trial c ourt’s dec ision demonstrates that it place d signific ant weight on Gar y ’s health and age i n d et er m i ning maintenance

. As noted above, there was a substantial disparity betwee n Gar y ’s and Kar en’s monthly incomes. Gar y ea rned over $30,000 a mont h while Karen earne d $6,333. Such a dis parity
, by itself,
sug g ested that the ma intenance awa rd t o Kar en should have been higher. See Dunlap , 294 I ll. App. 3d at 774 (dete rmining that equalizing parties’ incomes in setting maintenanc e would help approximate the standard of living during the m arri age ). Howeve r, as Gar y ’s testimony indicated that his income w ould likely soon be fa lling due to his ag e and he alth,
we cannot s ay that the t rial court abused its discretion i n s et t i n g the m aintenanc e award at a lower rate

. ¶ 20 I n s o deter

mining, we reje ct Gar

y ’s argument that the trial court err ed in making t h e

-6-mainte nance awa rd perma nent. Her e, perma

nent ma in te n a n c e w a s a p p r o p ria te b e c a u s e K a r e n was not employ able at an income that would enable her to mai n t ai n her previous standard of living. See Murphy
, 359 I ll. Ap p

. 3 d at 303. Fur ther, due to Gar

y ’s substantial assets, many of which were income-pr oducing
, he would still be able to pay maintenanc e afte r

re t i re ment without signific antly aff ecting his own s tandar d of l iving. I t is appar ent t hat, i n setting the maintenanc e awa rd, the trial court considere d (1) Kar en’s need for perma nent maintenanc e; (2) Gary ’s s ubstantial assets; and (3) Gar y ’s health and how much l ong er he would likely continue to work. Ba sed on its consideration of these fac tors, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in deter mining that the awa

rd of maintenanc e should be per manent. ¶ 21 In so ruling
, we find Gar y ’s relianc e on Bratcher
, Murphy
, and In re Marriage of Haas
, 215 I ll. App. 3d 959 (1991), to be misplaced. In Bratcher
, the review i n g co u rt found that monthly mai n tenanc e of $12,500 for 111 months was inappropriate beca use the wife had been a war ded substantial assets ($1.6 million, the same as her husba nd). Bratcher , 383 I ll. Ap p

. 3d at 388. These assets provided her a monthly income of approximately $1 4
, 0 0 0

. Fur ther, the monthly maintenanc e awa rd was improper beca

use it made the wife’ s monthly income ($26,500) substantially highe r than the husband’s ($14,500). Id. at 389. Her e, the
assets that Kar en was awa rded wer e g ener ally not income-pr oducing

. Also, the maintenanc e

awa rd did not cre ate a

situation where he r monthly income wa s highe r than Ga ry ’s. ¶ 22 In Murphy
, following a 10-year -marr iag e, the wife was awa rded $826,000 in marital and nonmarital assets, some of which wer e income-producing. S h e was also awa rded $15,000

a month in maintenanc e for four y ear s. On appea l, the wife argued that she sho u l d h av e

rec eiv ed m onthly maintenanc e of $46,000 and for a longe r period of time in order to

m ai n tain the standard of living that she enjoy ed during the marria g e. The revie wing co u rt reje cted he r argument, finding that her e x penses we re inflated bec ause she soug ht to enjoy the same perks (flying on jets, trave ling on y achts) that she did when she was trave ling with her husband o n business. Murphy
, 359 I ll. App. 3d at 304. The revie wing court explained that there was no require ment that the parties are to perma nently maintain the same standard of living. Id. at 306. Her e, Kar en and Gar y wer e marrie d substantially longe r than the parties in Murphy
, and, compar ed to the wife in Murphy
, Kar en was awa rded rela tively few incomeproducing assets and was awa rded maintenanc e at a substantially lower rate , althoug h for a longe r period of t ime. Moreove r, despite Gar y ’s i nsistence to the contrary
, based up o n his ability to pay , the trial court did not abuse its discretion in order ing that he pay maintenanc e in order to h el p Kar en approximate the standard of living that she enjoy ed during the marria g e. Culp , 341 I ll. App. 3d at 398. ¶ 23 In Haas
, the wife r ece ived $80,468 in marital asse ts a nd the husband rec eived $72,964 in marital assets. The wife’ s annual gross income was approximately $14,524 while the husband’s was $49,000. The trial court awarde d the wife maintenanc e of $600 per month,
to be revie wed in 18 months. On appea l, the wife argued that her maintenanc e awa rd should have been highe r and for a longe r duration. The revi ew i n g co u rt found that perma nent maintenanc e was not justified, beca use the wife had been employed throug hout the marria g e and see m i ng ly had the potential to become self-suf ficient. Haas
, 215 I ll. App. 3d at 964. Fur ther, the revie wing court found that $600 a month in maintenanc e was sufficie nt to allow

-7-the wife to maintain her standard of living. Id. at 964-65. Her e, in contra st, as set forth above,

Kar en did not have the ability to meet her rea sonable needs, based on the standard of living established duringthe marr iag e, without some assistance from Ga ry

. ¶ 24 I n d et er m i n ing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the monthly maintenanc e awa

rd at $3,000, we also reje ct Kar en’s argument that t h e t ri al court should have awa rded her $7,000. Kar en argues that the trial court’s awa rd was improper beca

use it
was not based on all of Gary ’s i ncome. Kare n further contends that the t rial co u rt ’s awa rd

was insu fficient beca

use it left a wide disparity betwee n her monthly income and Gar y ’s monthly income. ¶ 25 In its judgme nt, the trial court noted that Gar y arg ued that his curr ent annual income wa s $ 3 00,000. The trial court found that his salary was actua lly $368,004. The trial court also found that Gar

y had annual renta l income of over $30,000, rec eived the b en ef i t s of contributions from his employ er to a pension plan, and also benef i t t ed from his employ er paying some of his persona l expenses (clothing
, a health club membership) as part of its business expenses. After considering the various fac tors rele vant in awa rding maintenanc e, t he trial court found that an award of $3,000 per month was “well within Gar y ’s ab i l i t y t o pay , even a ssuming his employ ment income is $300,000 annua lly , as he a rgued.” ¶ 26 As Kar en points out, a trial cour t’s failure to base its maintenanc e deter mination on a ll
proper ty is a n abuse of discretion. Feldman , 199 I ll. App. 3d at 1006-07. Kar en insists that the trial court’s decision was improper beca use it was based on Gar

y ’s annual income being $300,000, when clea

rly it was much highe r. Kar en’s argument misconstrues the trial court’s
comments. In setting maintenanc e, the trial court may proper ly consider the payor spouse’s ability to pay

. In re Marriage o f L i ch t en auer , 408 I ll. App. 3d 1075, 1089 (2011). That is what the trial court did when it deter mined that Gar

y ’s minimum income was $300,000, an amount that allowed him to pay maintenanc e. As the trial cour t did not purport to make its maintenanc e awa

rd a perc entag e of Gar

y ’s income, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in b as i n g Gary ’s ability to pay maintenanc e on a level of income lower than his actua l income. ¶ 27 We also reje ct Kar en’s argument t h at t h e t ri al co u rt er re d i n n ot more e qually apportioning the parties’ incomes so that she could enjoy a standard of living compar able to what she enjoyed during the marria g e. In making this argument, Kar en relies on Dunlap

. In that case , the revie wing court equalized the parties’ incomes to approximate their rea sonable needs in view of the marital standard of living. Dunlap
, 294 I ll. App. 3d at 774. Kar en argues that, if she wer e awa

rded ma intenance of $7,000, Gar y ’s monthly income would drop only to $23,000, a level still high e noug h for him to meet all of his nee ds. ¶ 28 There is no require ment under either the Dissolution Act or I llinois case law that require s the equa liz ation of incomes. In re Marriage of Rey nard
, 344 I ll. App. 3d 785, 791 (2003). There is also no such prohibition. Id

. Thus, whether a trial court should equalize the parties’ i ncomes (or more equally apportion t hem, as Kar en argues i n this case ) i s a m at t er fo r t h e trial court’s discretion. For the rea sons set forth above, we do not believe that the trial court ab u s ed its discretion in setting the maintenanc e awa rd at $3,000. In arguing that t h ei r incomes should have been more equally apportioned, Kar en minimi zes Gary ’s health

-8-conce rns as well as the likelihood that his employ ment income would be dropping due to his
ag e. Thus, althoug h Gar y ’s curr ent income indicated t hat he could pay Kar en more in maintenanc e, there wa s not the same ce rtainty with reg ard to Ga

ry ’s future income. As we believe that the trial court proper ly considere d Gar y ’s curr ent income, Kar en’s needs, and the imp ac t of Gar

y ’s impending reduc ed employ ment income, we do not believe that the trial
court a bused its discretion in not setting the ma intenance awa rd at a highe r leve l.

¶ 29 B. L ife Insuranc e ¶ 30 Kar en’s second contention on appea l is that the trial court er red in de nying her request that her maintenanc e awa rd be secur ed by a life insurance policy

. Kar en acknow ledg es that the trial court relied o n this court’s decision in Feldman in deter mining that it could not

awa rd her the relief she requested. However
, Kar en argues t hat Feldman should no longe r be viewe d as precede ntial in light of rec ent case l aw as well as a shift in public policy that favor s maintenanc e aw ards be ing se cure d by life insuranc e. ¶ 31 In Feldman
, we reje cted the wife’ s argument that the trial court err ed in not order ing he r maintenanc e awa

rd to be secur ed by the husband’s life insurance

. Feldman
, 199 I ll. App. 3d
at 1007. We explained that we agree d with the rea so n i n g o f t h e Appellate Court, Four th District, in In re Marriage of Clarke
, 125 I ll. App. 3d 432 (1984). The Clarke court held that, absent the parties’ agree ment, the court had no authority to order secur ity for the husband’s
pay ment of the wife’ s unallocate d maintenanc e afte r his death. Id. at 436. The Clarke court explained that post-death life insurance benef i t s received in lieu of maintenanc e would violate the Dissolution Act beca use maintenanc e obligations ter minate upon death. Id. The Clarke court further expounded that, beca use a prior version of the Dissolution Act g ave the trial court discretion in having a n awa rd of maintenanc e supported by rea sonable security and the curr ent version did not, there was evidenc e of a leg islative intent to withdraw authority from the c ourt to require such sec urity

. Id. at 437. ¶ 32 The Four

th District subsequently abandone d its decision in Clarke in In re Marriage of W alker
, 386 I ll. App. 3d 1034, 1049 (2008). The W alker co u rt fo u n d that, althoug h the Dissolution Act prohibits maintena nce pay ments afte r a payor’s death, the Dissolution Act does not pr ohibit pay

ments during a payor’s life that have an eff ect afte r the payor’s death. Id. at 1045. In support of this finding
, the W alker court g ave the example that trial courts are

encour ag ed to awa

rd larg e amounts of proper ty in lieu of maintenanc e. Property
, l i k e insurance
, is available to the payee afte r the payor’s death. Id. The W alker court also reje cted the Clarke court’s finding that a chang e in the statutory languag e evidenc ed an intent by the leg islature to prohibit a trial court from using its discretion to have a maintenan ce awa rd

secur ed by life insurance

. The W alker court explained that the curr ent statute was not simply

a revision of I llinois law but an adoption of a standardized, uniform act

. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Vernon
, 253 I ll. App. 3d 783, 789 (1993))

. “Co n s eq u ently
, such an omission should not be construed as evincing a leg islative intent to chang e the law and withdraw the court’s a uthority to order se curity

for maintena

nce.” Id. at 1045-46 (citing Vernon
, 253 I ll. App. 3d at 789). ¶ 33 We also note that, eff ective J anuar

y 1, 2012, the I llinois Gene ral Assembly modified the

-9-Dissolution Act to specific ally allow the trial court discretion i n o rd ering a maintenanc e

awa rd to be s ec u re d by life insurance

. Section 504(b-7) (f) of the Dissolution Act now provides:
“An awa rd order ed by a court upon entry of a dissoluti on judgme nt or upon entry of an

awa rd of maintenanc e following a rese rvation of maintenanc e in a dissoluti on judgme nt may be re asonably

secur ed, in whole or in part, by life insuranc e on the pa

yor’s life on
terms as to which the parties agree , or if they do not agree , on such terms deter mined by the cour t ***.” Pub. Act 97-608, § 5 (e ff. Jan. 1, 2012). ¶ 34 Although the trial court was bound to follow this court’s decision in Feldman
, we are not. In considering the Feldman
, Clarke
, and W alker courts’ rationale s for the ir d e c isions, we find the W alker court’s decision to be the best rea soned. The Dissolution Act g ives the court wide discretion in awa

rding maintenanc e and dividing marital proper ty in “just proportions.” 750 I L CS 5/ 503(d) ( West 2010). As the Dissolution Act is to be libera lly construed ( 750 I L CS 5/102(5) (West 2010)), w e believe that the trial cour t havingdiscretion to awa rd a f orm of

secur ity
, such as life insurance
, for a maintenanc e obligation is consistent with the purposes of the Dissolution Act. Fur ther, we believe that the Gene ral Assembly ’s rec ent amendment
to the Dis solution Ac t d o es not chang e a court’s ability to order that a maintenance awar d b e s ec u red by a li fe insurance policy ; rathe r, t he Genera l Assembly ’s amendment clar ifies that the court does have that power

. We there fore depar t from this co u rt ’s decision in Feldman

. Acc ording ly
, since the trial court did not consider the merits of Kar en’s argument that her maintenanc e awa rd be secur ed by a life insurance policy
, we vaca te that part of the trial court’s decision and rema nd with direc tions that it exercise its discretion in deter mining whether Gar

y should purcha se life insurance to secur e his maintenanc e obligations to Kar en and, if so, in what amount and under what terms it should be order ed. See Pub. Act 97-608, § 5 (ef f. Jan. 1, 2012).

¶ 35 I I I . Conclusion ¶ 36 For t h e fo re go i n g re as ons, we aff irm the trial court’s awa rd of $3,000 a month in
perma nent maintenanc e to Kar en. We vacate the trial court’s decision as to the issue of life insurance , and we rema

nd for a dditional procee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.

¶ 37 Affir

med in part a

nd vacated in part; ca

use re manded with dire ctions.

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