UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4063

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

PHILLIP GERRAD RUCKER,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Anderson. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (8:08-cr-00628-GRA-2)

Submitted: September 27, 2011 Decided: October 17, 2011

Before DUNCAN and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Beattie B. Ashmore, BEATTIE B. ASHMORE, P.A., Greenville, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. Alan Lance Crick, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Phillip Gerrad Rucker appeals from his 120-month 

sentence imposed after we vacated his 262-month sentence and 

remanded for resentencing to permit Rucker to exercise his right 

to allocute. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal but raising the following 

claims: (1) whether the district court erred in conducting the 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, (2) whether Rucker was properly 

determined to be a career offender, and (3) whether Rucker’s 

sentence was substantively and procedurally reasonable. 

Although informed of his right to do so, Rucker has not filed a 

pro se supplemental brief. The Government also declined to file 

a brief.

In his first appeal, we ruled that Rucker’s Rule 11 

hearing was proper, and we affirmed Rucker’s conviction. We 

also determined that Rucker was properly sentenced as a career 

offender. In this appeal, Rucker again challenges the Rule 11 

hearing and the determination that he was a career offender. 

However, the mandate rule “forecloses relitigation of issues 

expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court.” United 

States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993). Because we 

expressly rejected these claims in Rucker’s first appeal, they 
3

are unreviewable at this time. As such, we dismiss these 

claims.

Rucker also questions whether his sentence was 

procedurally or substantively unreasonable although he offers no 

specific claims of error. We review a sentence under a 

deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step in this review 

requires the court to inspect for procedural reasonableness by 

ensuring that the district court committed no significant 

procedural errors, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines 

range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) 

factors, or failing to adequately explain the sentence. United 

States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 2010). A 

reviewing court then considers the substantive reasonableness of 

the sentence imposed, taking into account the totality of the 

circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

 Here, the district court properly calculated Rucker’s 

Guidelines sentence and then imposed a variance sentence 

substantially below the Guidelines range. Neither party 

objected to the variance or the Guidelines range, and the 

district court provided detailed reasoning supporting its 

decision. We find that the court set forth a sufficiently 

developed rationale to support the sentence, and there was no 

other procedural error.
4

Regarding the substantive reasonableness of Rucker’s 

sentence, the district court sentenced Rucker to the minimum 

sentence permitted by statute. Such a sentence is per se 

reasonable. As such, no merit can be found in this aspect of 

Rucker’s appeal. See United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 

224 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding imposition of mandatory life 

sentence per se reasonable).

Pursuant to Anders, we have reviewed the entire record 

in the case and found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This 

court requires that counsel inform Rucker in writing of his 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Rucker requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may motion this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Rucker. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART