### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN

NO. 03-01-00317-CV

Donna Thor

nton, Appell

ant v. The Texas

Department of P rotective and Regulator y Services, Appel

lee

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 126T H JUDICIAL DIST RICT NO. FM100464, HONORAB LE SUZANNE COVINGT ON, JUDGE PRESIDING
Pu rsu ant t o a jury’s finding, t he dist rict co ur t t er minated t he pa r en t - ch ild r ela t io nsh ip between Donna Thornton and h

er chi ld. On appeal , Thornto n contends that the di strict court deni ed her due pr oc ess a nd

the eff ective assistance of couns el by fa iling t o ap po int an at t o rne y fo rhe run t il forty-f our day s bef

ore t rial . She al so contends that the distri ct court subm itted aj ury

in struction that er r o ne o us ly

perm i tted the j ury

to mak e f i ndi ngs supp ortin

g the term i na tion of h er r igh t s w it hout re quir ingt ha t t en jur o r s a gr ee t ha t she ha d e ng ag ed in par t icular pr ohibit ed c ond uct . We affirm the j udgm en t. Bec aus e T hor nt on d oe s no t challenge t he suf fi ci ency of t he evide nce t o s upp or t t he j udgm en t, we will c o nfine o ur r ev iew o f t he r ec o r d la r ge ly t o t he re levant pr oc edu ra l det ails. T he Te xas D epa rt ment of

Prote cti ve an d Reg ul atory Ser vi ce s f i l ed i ts p eti ti on to ter mi nate T hornt on’s parental righ ts on April

17, 2000. On October 12, 2000, Thorn ton re j ected th e c our t’s of f er to1 We ac ce pt a s tru e the p arti

es ’ u nc ontr adi cte d a ss erti

ons of fact re gard ing Thornt on’s attem pts to hi re an attorney . See Tex . R. A

pp. P. 38 .1(f

), 38.2(a )(1). 2 app oint counsel

for her an

d asserted th at she int ende d t o r et ain co unse l. On Ja nuar y 4, 2 001 , she gave t he na me and te lephone number of her at to rney to a Depar tment ca sewo rker , but the at to rney’s secretary told the cas eworker t hat Thornton had not ret ai ned h is servi ces; b y order si gne d Ja nua ry 31, 2001, the distri ct court me mori aliz ed

its Jan uary 12, 2001 appoi

ntmen t o f couns el

for Tho rnt on. 1 At the four-day

trial that began on F ebruary

26, 2001, evi dence was

in tro duced showing, among ot her t hin gs, th at Thorn

ton use d crac

k coca i ne and ab andone d he

r ch i l d on occ asi

on. The j ury unan im ously found that Thornton’s parental righ ts should b e termi

nated. On appeal , Thornto n contends that the di strict court erred by del ay in g t oo l on g in app oint ing co unse l for he r a nd by submitt ing a br oa d- for m jury instr uct ion.

Thorn ton contends thatt he del ay

in appoin tment of couns el

violated her right to due pr ocess. The fed er al C o nst it ut io n, ho we ve r , do es no t r eq uir e t ha t co un se l be ap po int ed fo rall i n di gen ts faced w ith t erminatio n of t heir par ent al rights; t he tri al court must weigh the pa rent ’s in terest s, the St at e’ s in terests , and the ri sk of an errone ous de ci sion wi

thout coun sel . Lassiter v. Department

of So c. Servs. , 452 U.S. 18, 27- 32 (19 81). Th e Tex as F am i l y Code re qui

res th e court to ap poi nt a n a ttorn ey f oran i nd i ge nt p are nt w ho r espon dsan d opp ose s term

i na ti on, bu t doe s n ot sp ec ify a de adline bywhi ch the appoi

ntmen t must occur. Tex. Fam. Code An n. § 107.013(a)(1) (West Su pp . 20 02 ) . Ac co r din gly, “in Te x as th e ti m i n g of appoi n tmen t of cou n se l to i n di gen t pa re n ts app ear ingi

n opp osi ti on to t er minat io n is a mat t er wit hin the trial court ’s di scretion.” In re M.J.M.L. , 31 S.W.3d 347, 354 (Tex. App.—San A ntonio 2000, pet. den ie d) . Thornto n recei ved appoi nted2 The righ t t o counsel ca

n be wai ved, ev en by cri m i na l def endan ts. See Col

lier v. Sta te , 959 S.W.2d 621 , 6 26 ( Te x. Crim

. App. 199 7) . T he r equ irement not ed in t hat cas e t hat t he de fendant be fully admo nished o f the right he wa s su rr ende ring w hen pr oc eed ing pro se is in appli cable to this case in w hic h T ho rnt o n o pt ed t o pr o ce ed , no t wit ho ut co un se l, bu t wit h r et ain ed co un se l.

3 See A rteaga v. T

exas Dep’t of

Prot. & Reg. Servs. , 924 S.W.2d 756, 762 ( Tex . Ap p. —A us t in

1996, wri t deni ed); see also In re

B.B. , 9 71 S .W. 2d 1 60, 172 (T ex. App. —Be aumo nt 199 8, pet . de nied); In re J. F. , 88 8 S. W.2d 140 , 14 3 (T ex. App .—T yl er 1 994 , no writ ); Pos ner v . Dallas County C

hild We lfare Unit, 784 S.W.2d585, 58 8 (Tex . App.—Eastla nd 1 990, w

ri t deni ed); How ell v. Dallas C

ounty Ch ild Welfar

e Unit , 710 S.W.2d 729, 734-35 (Tex. App.—Dal las 1986, wr it ref ’d n .r.e.). But see In re B.L.D. , 56 S.W.3d 203, 211-12 (Tex . App.—Waco 200 1, pet. f i l ed); In re J.M.S. , 43 S.W .3d 60, 6 2-64 (Tex. A pp.—H ouston [1s

t Di st.] 2001 , no pet.). 3 co un se l, but c onten

ds that the a

ppoi ntm en t on Jan uary 12, 2001—alm

ost nin e m onths af ter th e S tate fi le d the ter mi nation petition and less than two months bef ore t rial —violated her right t o due pr ocess by d ep r iving he ro f t he effe ct ive as sis t an ce o f co un se l.

We conc l ude that the d

i strict court did not vi ola te Thorn ton’s due process

ri gh ts . Thorn ton re j ected appoi n ted cou n se l an d a n n oun ce d th at sh e i n te nd ed to h ire an at t o rne y; t his in dic ated tha

t, at l ea st f orpurposes of hi

rin g an attor ney

, she was n

ot in dige nt. Texas Fam

il y C ode se cti on 107.01 3 doesnot requ

i re app oin tme nt of attorney s f or non -i ndi gen ts. Thor nto n’s rej ec ti on of the appoin

ted att orney al

so waiv ed, at least temporaril

y, wh atever righ

t t he f ederal Consti tution off ered re spe ct ing app oint ment o f co unse l for indige nt parents. 2 Though the di strict court appoin ted counsel o nly fo r t y-fo ur da ys be fo r e t r ial, it ap po inted co unse l upo n being in form ed that Thornto n ha

d not hi red an attor ney . We concl ude that the di str i ct c ourt nei ther depriv

ed Thornton of her constitutional

ri gh t to due pr oc ess no r a buse d it s discr et ion in app oint ingthe atto rney when it did. See Lassiter, 45 2 U. S. at 32; M.J.M.L. , 31 S.W.3d at 355-56.

Thor nto n’s com

pl ai nts tha t sh e w asdepri

ve d of effe ct ive co un se l simila r ly fai l. Eve n if pa r en t s fa cin g t er minat io n o f t he ir parental r igh t s a r e c o nst it ut io na lly ent it led t o effe ct ive co un se l, 34

she in itially rejected appointed counsel and does not all

ege that t he appoi

nted counsel

she acc epted wasi ne f f ecti ve . The di strict court did not err. Thorn ton al so con tend s tha t the district courterred by subm ittin g a defec tive c harge. Thorn ton wai ve d this com

plai nt by f ail i ng to obj ect to the ch

arge a t the district court. SeeTex. R. App. P. 33 .1. Because the termi nation of parental ri

ghts i s such

an i mportant decis ion, we

will, in t he in terest of justice, revi

ew this c omp l ai

nt. See In re B.L.D. , 5 6 S .W. 3d 2 03, 215 (T ex. App.—W aco 200 1, pet. f

i l ed). Thorn ton contends that the s ub mission o f multiple gr ou nds fo r t er minatio n in the disjunct ivewa s e rr o rbe ca us e it en ab led t er minat io n wi thout the re qui

red ag reem en t by a supermajo r it y; she contends

that the broad-form ch

arge allowed diff

erent jurors to fin

d dif feren t gro unds f ortermi nation w ithout any particular ground havi

ng the support of at least ten jurors. See id. at 215- 18. The char ge in B.L.D. an d the c ha rge i n th i s c as e w ere

si m i l ar. Both perm i tted te rm i na ti on u pon finding (1 ) t hat t he pa r en t eit he r( a) kn o win gly p lac ed o rkn o win gly allo we d t he ch ild t o r ema in in co ndit ions or surro undi

ngs wh ic h en dangered the chi ld’s p hysical or emot ional we ll-being, o r ( b) engaged i n c ond uc t or kn owi ngl y pl ac ed the ch i l d w i th p ers on s who engaged i n conduct that endan gered t he ch ild’ s p hysic al o remo t io na l we ll-b ein g, an d ( 2) t ha t t er minat io n o f t he pa r en t - ch ild relati onsh i p i s i n the ch i l d’s be st i ntere st. See i

d. at 214-15. Thor nto n’s argumen

t disrega rd s the su

prem e court’ s ap

prova l of b road-f orm su bm i ss i on in termination cases. See T exas Dep’t of Huma n Ser

vs. v . E.B. , 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Te x. 199 0) . I n E.B. , t he su pr eme co ur t co nsid er ed a c ha r ge t ha t pr es en t ed mult iple gr o und s fo r termi nation a nd asked o nly wh et he rt he pa r en t - ch ild relati onsh

i p sh oul d be term i na ted. Id . at 648.5

T his Court reversed

t he t er minat io n o f pa r en t al r igh t s u nd er t his charge, holdin g that “a si

ngle broad f orm que st ion inco rp or at ing t wo indepe ndent grou nds f or ter m i na ti on of a p ar en t - ch ild r ela t io nsh ip perm i ts the state to obtai

n a n af f i rm ati ve an swe r wi thout di sch

argi ng th e burden that the j ury co nclude t hat a pa re nt violat ed o ne or mor e o f the gr ou nds fo r t er minatio n unde r t he statut e.” Id. at 649 (disc

ussi ng E.B. v. Texas Dep’t of Human Services , 766 S.W.2d 387, 38 9-9 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us t in

1989) , rev ’d, 802 S.W .2d at 64 9). The su prem e court rev

erse d our ru li

ng and rei nstated the

j udgm ent of term

i nation, holdi

ng as fol l ows: The co nt r o lling q ue st io n in t hi s c as e w as wh et he rt he pa r en t - ch ild r ela t io nsh ip between t he mot her and each of

her two chil dren sh ould be termi nated, not what sp ec ific gr ound or gro unds un der [the statut e] the jury reli ed on to answer affir mat ive ly

the questions posed. All t en j urors agree t hat the m ot her had endan gered the chi l d by doi ng on e or t h e other

of th e thi ngs l i sted i n [the statute]. Petitioner arg ues that the charge, as pr esented t o t he j ury, violates her due pr ocess right by depriv in g a natural m

ot her of he r fund ament al right t o t he car e, cus t od y and manage ment o f he rch ildr en . Re co gn iz in g her r i gh ts doesnot c

ha ng e the f orm of sub m i ssi on. The stan

dard for review of the charge is abuse of discretion, and abuse of discre ti on

occ ur s on l y wh en th e tr i al cou rt a cts wit hou t re fere nce t o a ny guiding prin ci ple . He r e t he t r ia lco ur t t ra cke d t he st at ut or y languag e in the instr uct ion and then ask ed t he co nt roll in

g que sti on. Thi s s i

m pl y doe s n ot am oun t to ab us e of discr et ion. Id. Tho rn ton

ar gue s t hat we a do pt t he Wac o c ou rt ’s co nclusio n in B.L.D. beca use t he su pr eme court ’s an

al ys is has ch anged si nce the court decided E.B . S ee B.L.D. , 56 S.W.3d at 216 (c iting Cr ow n L ife Ins. Co. v. Casteel , 2 2 S .W. 3d 3 78, 387 -9 0 ( Te x. 2 000 )) . I n Casteel , the jury was presented with thi rteen statut es def

endan t mi ght have vi

olated and aske d si

mpl y w hether a v i ol ati on occurred; t he jur y found that the def endan t comm i tted a vi ola

tion . Id . at 387. T hi s Court held that6

t he di strict court i

m properl y sub m i tted som e of the l i sted v i ola tions, but hel

d the erroneous su bm i ss i on harml ess because suff

ici ent eviden ce suppor ted fin

din gs of prop erly

subm itted violations. Seeid. at 38 8. T he su pr eme co ur t r ev er se d, co nc lud ing t ha t ap pe llat e c o ur t s c o uld no t ac cu r at ely det er mine whether the jury had b ased

i ts ve rdict on prope

rl y sub m i tted grounds. Id. at 389 . R elying on t his rea so ning

, t he Wac o c ou rt co nclude s in B.L.D. that t he disjunc t ivesubm is si on of the grounds f or ter m i na ti on “al l owsf or th e p oss i

bi l i ty of term i na ti on base d o n a st at ut or y gro und no t fou nd by at least ten j urors t o have b een v iolated.” B.L.D., 56 S.W .3d at 21 7. We ca nn ot ag re e th at Casteel overt urns E.B. The su pr eme co ur t ba se d it s o pin io n in Casteel on the ef fect s o f the com

m i ngl i ng of va l i d an d i nv al i d the orie s of

recovery . Casteel , 22 S.W.3d at 389 . It held, however, that “when questions are subm itted in a manner t hat allows t he appe l l ate cou rt to dete rm i n e th at th e j ur y ’s v erdi ct was actual l y b as ed on a v al i d l i ab i l i ty t he o ry, t he err orma y b e harm le ss.” Id. That reasonin

g does not nega t e t he su pr eme co ur t ’s ho lding in E.B. that t he co nt r o lling q ue st io n in t er minatio n cas es is no t which sp ecific gr ou nd t he individual jur or s find jus tif ie s t he t er minat io n, bu t wh et he rt he pa r en t - ch ild r ela t io nsh ip shoul d be term i na ted. See E.B. , 802 S.W.2 d at 649 . Eve

n i f j urors f i nd th at di f f eren t acti ons b

y the p are n t jus

tif y term in ation, an affirmative response m

eans that they

agree that t he pa r en t - ch ild relationshi

p should be termi

nated. Un t il the suprem

e court holds that ten jur or s must agr ee t hat a pa rt icular gr ou nd just ify ing term i na ti on ex i sts , we con cl ude tha t j udg men ts b as ed on br o ad
- fo rm su bmiss io n o f va lid grounds a

re acc eptab l e. See id. ; see also Tex. R. Ci v. P. 277. The re i s n o as sertion

that an y o f t he ba se s fo rt er minat io n su bmit t ed t o t he jur y in t his case are i nv al i d. Eac h of the d i sj unc tiv el y sub m i tted i ssues is a s

uf f i cien t bas i s f or term i na tion . See4 T his st at ut e au t hor izes a c ou rt t o t er minate t he pa re nt -c hild relat ions h ip if clear a nd

co nvincing

evi dence sh ows that a parent has comm itted an y o f several acts or o mi

ssions and that ter mi nation is in

the child’sb est i

n terest. Tex. Fam . Code Ann . § 161.001(1)(D) , (E) (West Supp. 2002) . The statu

te l i sts t he many (su bsec t ions A t hro ugh S , many wit h subp ar t s) a ct s and omissio ns supp ortin g term i na tion i n the di sj unc

tiv e. Id. 7 Te x. Fam . Code A nn . § 161.0 01(1)(D ), (E) (West Sup p. 2002 ). 4 Like t he jur y in E.B. , th e j ury be l ow was pr ese nt ed w ith var iou s gr ou nds fo r t er minatio n, t hen as ked simply whet her t he pa re nt -c hi ld rel ati on sh ip sh oul d b e term i na ted . The j ury

answ ere d i

n th e a f f i rm ati ve , an d Th orn ton d oesnot co nt end that t he ev

ide nce is i nsuf fi ci ent to suppo rt t hat answer wi th respec t to an

y of t he sp ec ific gro unds. W e af

f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e d i str i ct c our t.

Jan P. Patterson, Justice Be f ore J us ti ce s K i dd, Ye akel

an d Pa tters on Af fi rmed File d: February

22, 2002 Do No t Publis

h