alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-7400

MACHIAVELLI FARRAKHAN SIBERIUS, I,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM, INC.; PRESSLEY RIDGE; 

WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at 

Charleston. Joseph R. Goodwin, District Judge. (2:18-cv-01125)

Submitted: April 20, 2020 Decided: May 6, 2020

Before AGEE, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Machiavelli Farrakhan Siberius, I, Appellant Pro Se. Dara A. DeCourcy, Greensburg, 

Pennsylvania, Joseph W. Selep, ZIMMER KUNZ PLLC, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Victor 

Flanagan, Katie LeeAnn Hicklin, PULLIN, FOWLER, FLANAGAN & POE, PLLC, 

Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Machiavelli Farrakhan Siberius, I, appeals the district court’s order denying relief 

on his civil action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, 

we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Siberius v. Am. Pub. Univ. Sys., Inc., 

No. 2:18-cv-01125 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 13, 2019). We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court 

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### PETERS, Appellant, v. MACMILLAN BOOK CO., Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

March 20,1912.)

Action by Sanford Peters against the Macmillan Book Company.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. See, also, 60 Misc. Rep. 420, 112 N. Y. Supp. 339.

KRUSE, J., dissents, upon the ground that,' although the case is not within the scaffold statute (no structure was being erected, painted, or repaired), the evidence shows that the ladder was an improper appliance for doing the work which the plaintiff was directed to do.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-6499

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

CHARLES ANTHONY BENNETT, a/k/a Tony,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District

Judge. (CR-98-599)

Submitted: July 24, 2002 Decided: August 1, 2002

Before LUTTIG, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles Anthony Bennett, Appellant Pro Se. Sean Kittrell, OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Charles Anthony Bennett pleaded guilty to violations of 18

U.S.C.A. §§ 922(u), 922(g)(1), and 922(j) (West 2000). He

initially was sentenced to ninety-seven months in prison. Upon the

Government’s motion, the district court reduced Bennett’s sentence

to sixty months. Bennett now appeals the district court’s order

denying his motion for reduction of sentence, in which Bennett

claimed he was entitled to a further reduction of his sentence

under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 599.

Commentary to Amendment 599 makes clear that the amendment

applies only to convictions under 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West 2000).

Bennett was not convicted of violating that statute. Therefore,

the district court properly denied the motion for reduction of

sentence, and we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before us and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Neil Rullo, Appellant.

—Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Brennan, J.), *633rendered April 30, 1982, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial (Eiber, J.), of defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to provide him with a speedy trial.

Judgment affirmed.

Defendant was indicted, along with three codefendants, on February 6, 1979. He had been arrested two days earlier at the customs area of JFK airport, and charged, *inter alia,*with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree.

Some 22 months later, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment against him on the ground that he had not been afforded a speedy trial. Criminal Term determined that the delay resulting from the failure of the prosecution to proceed to trial was less than the six-month period allowed pursuant to CPL 30.30. Further, it found that much of the delay was due to the many adjournments requested by the attorneys for the defendant and his codefendants.

On appeal, defendant, who waived his statutory speedy trial claim by pleading guilty *(see, People v Thill,*52 NY2d 1020), contends that Criminal Term should have apportioned the periods of delay among the individual defendants. He argues that the failure to do so deprived him of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

A review of the record demonstrates that defendant’s attorney freely agreed to those adjournments requested by the attorneys for the codefendants. Defendant, who was not incarcerated during the period at issue, was charged with an extremely serious crime, and there is no indication that his defense was impaired by reason of the delay. Therefore, applying the standards set forth in *People v Taranovich*(37 NY2d 442), we find that there was no deprivation of defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Mollen, P. J., Thompson, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>





                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.1

                            SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION



I, John R. Hickey, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Renaissance Learning, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent function):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information ; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.



Date:  August 11, 2003
       ---------------

                                        /s/ John R. Hickey
                                        -------------------------------------
                                        John R. Hickey
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32

       CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                    ss.906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      The undersigned, Kevin B. Kurtzman, the President and Chief Executive
Officer of Concero Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that, to my knowledge:

      1. The Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June
30, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2. The information contained in the aforementioned Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.


/s/ Kevin B. Kurtzman
--------------------------------------------
Kevin B. Kurtzman
President and Chief Executive Officer

October 14, 2003
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICARDO GABRIEL HERNANDEZ

MARTINEZ, Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 20

- 71656 Agency No. A206

- 673

- 212

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted February 17, 2023 * * Pasadena, California Before: TASHIMA, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges. Ricardo Gabriel Hernandez

- Martinez, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying sua sponte reopening

. We generally lack jurisdiction to review a decision not to reopen

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 23 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 proceedings sua sponte because it is “ committed to agency discretion

. ” Menendez

Gonzalez v. Barr , 929 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2019). Although we may do so if the agency relies on an erroneous constitutional or legal premise, id. at 1116

– 17, Hernandez does not raise a constitutional chall enge, and the BIA clearly exercised its discretion “against the correct legal background , ” Bonilla v. Lynch , 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). We therefore dismiss the petition. The BIA correctly recognized 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) as the source of its sua sponte reopening authority, identified “an exceptional situation” as a potential reason for sua sponte reopening, and cited precedent supporting its conclusion that Hernandez did not present such a situation. See In re G

- D

- , 22 I. & N. D ec. 1132,
1133

– 34 (B

. I

. A

. 1999); In re J

- J

- , 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (B

. I

. A

. 1997)

. N othing
in the decision suggests that the BIA “erroneously believed that the law forbade it from exercising its discretion, or that exercising its discretion would be fut ile.” Lona
v. Barr , 958 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (in the analogous context of a motion to reconsider). Instead, after consideration of the law and facts, the BIA concluded that Hernandez’s situation did not warrant an exercise of disc retion. Although Hernandez asserts that the BIA really denied reopening because he failed to establish the requisite hardship for cancellation of removal, our review “is constricted to legal or constitutional error that is apparent on the face of the BIA’s decision.” Id. We therefore do not speculate whether the BIA might have also3 denied reopening on some other ground. Because the BIA’s decision denying sua sponte reopening did not rely on an erroneous constitutional or legal premise, we lack jurisdiction

. PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.
Exhibit
13.2


PRINCIPAL
FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In
connection with this Annual Report of Nordic American Tanker Shipping Limited
(the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on or about the date hereof
(the “Report”), I, Turid Sørensen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





A
signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon
request.





Date:
May 9, 2008





/s/
      Turid
      SørensenTurid
      SørensenChief
      Financial Officer








SK
01318 0002 881219
# C_2019148EN.01005802.xml

| 29.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/58 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/58

---

Action brought on 28 February 2019 — Souruh v Council

(Case T-137/19)

(2019/C 148/57)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Souruh SA (Damascus, Syria) (represented by: E. Ruchat, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare the applicant’s action admissible and well founded; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare the applicant’s action admissible and well founded;

| — | as a consequence, order the European Union to pay compensation for all the harm suffered by the applicant at an amount to be determined by the Court on an equitable basis; |
| --- | --- |

—

as a consequence, order the European Union to pay compensation for all the harm suffered by the applicant at an amount to be determined by the Court on an equitable basis;

| — | in the alternative, order an expert to be appointed in order to establish the total extent of the harm suffered by the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

in the alternative, order an expert to be appointed in order to establish the total extent of the harm suffered by the applicant;

| — | order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on a principal plea and an alternative plea, which are, in essence, identical or similar to those raised in Case T-55/19, Cham Holding and Bena Properties v Council.

---
# C_2021163EN.01003201.xml

| 3.5.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 163/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.5.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 163/32

---

Order of the General Court of 5 March 2021 — Aquind and Others v Commission

(Case T-885/19) (1)

(Action for annulment - Energy - Trans-European energy infrastructure - Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 - Delegation of power to the Commission - Article 290 TFEU - Delegated act amending the list of projects of common interest of the Union - Nature of the act during the period within which the Parliament and the Council may express objections - Act not open to challenge - Manifest inadmissibility)

(2021/C 163/42)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Aquind Ltd (Wallsend, United Kingdom), Aquind Energy Sàrl, (Luxembourg, Luxembourg), Aquind SAS (Rouen, France) (represented by: S. Goldberg, C. Davis, J. Bille, Solicitors, and E. White, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: O. Beynet, Y. Marinova and B. De Meester, acting as Agents)

Interveners in support of the defendant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: J. Möller, D. Klebs, S. Heimerl and S. Costanzo, acting as Agents), Kingdom of Spain (represented by: M. J. Ruiz Sánchez, acting as Agent), French Republic (represented by: A.-L. Desjonquères, C. Mosser and A. Daniel, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/389 of 31 October 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the Union list of projects of common interest (OJ 2020 L 74, p. 1).

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible.

| 2. | Aquind Ltd, Aquind Energy Sàrl and Aquind SAS shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the Commission, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Aquind Ltd, Aquind Energy Sàrl and Aquind SAS shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the Commission, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures.

| 3. | The Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain and the French Republic shall bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain and the French Republic shall bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 68, 2.3.2020.

---
<PAGE>   1


                                POWER OF ATTORNEY

         Each of the undersigned officers and directors of Oak Hill Financial,
Inc., an Ohio corporation (the "Company"), hereby appoints John D. Kidd and H.
Grant Stephenson, as his true and lawful attorneys-in-fact, or either of them,
with power to act without the other, as his true and lawful attorney-in-fact, in
his name and on his behalf, and in any and all capacities stated below, to sign
and to cause to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Company's Annual Report for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1996 on Form
10-KSB (the "Annual Report") hereby granting unto such attorneys-in-fact, and to
each of them, full power and authority to do and perform in the name and on
behalf of the undersigned, in any and all such capacities, every act and thing
whatsoever necessary to be done in and about the premises as fully as the
undersigned could or might do in person, hereby granting to each such
attorney-in-fact full power of substitution and revocation, and hereby ratifying
all that any such attorney-in-fact or his substitute may do by virtue hereof.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 26th day of March,
1997.
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
Signature:                                   Title:

<S>                                          <C>
/s/ Evan E. Davis                            Chairman of the Board of Directors
  -----------------------------
         Evan E. Davis


/s/ John D. Kidd                             President and Director
  -----------------------------              (Principal Executive Officer)
         John D. Kidd


/s/ Richard P. LeGrand                       Executive Vice President and Director
  -----------------------------
         Richard P. LeGrand


/s/ H. Tim Bichsel                           Secretary and Treasurer
  -----------------------------              (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
         H. Tim Bichsel

/s/ Barry M. Dorsey, Ed.D.                   Director
  -----------------------------
         Barry M. Dorsey, Ed.D.


/s/ C. Clayton Johnson                       Director
  -----------------------------
         C. Clayton Johnson


/s/ Rick A. McNelly                          Director
  -----------------------------
         Rick A. McNelly


/s/ Donald R. Seigneur                       Director
  -----------------------------
         Donald R. Seigneur


 /s/ H. Grant Stephenson                     Director
  -----------------------------
         H. Grant Stephenson


</TABLE>
#### Douglas E. McPHAIL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee, and A Goodnight Sleepstore, Defendant.

No. 11-1221.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 26, 2011.

Decided: July 29, 2011.

*199Douglas E. MePhail, Appellant Pro Se. Megan E. Miller, Hunton & Williams LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina; Canon Pence, Hunton & Williams Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Douglas E. MePhail appeals the district court’s order dismissing his complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *McPhail v. American Gen. Fin. Serv., Inc.,*No. 5:09-ev-00451-H (E.D.N.C. Feb. 8, 2011). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Melvin Isaac, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Mirabile, J.), rendered May 17, 1979, convicting him of two counts of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1], [3]), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

There was more than ample evidence from an independent source “ ‘connecting] the defendant with the crime in such a way that the jury may be reasonably satisfied that the accomplice is telling the truth’ ” *(People v Moses,*63 NY2d 299, 306, quoting from *People v Daniels,*37 NY2d 624, 630; CPL 60.22 [1]; 1 NY CJI 7.52). We have examined defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Weinstein and Niehoff, JJ., concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

**In the Matter of**

**KEVIN WILLIAM GOLDSTEIN :**  **: :**  **: :**  **: :**  **: :**  **: No. 2119 Disciplinary Docket No. 3** 

**Board File No. C2-14-286 (United States Patent and Trademark**  **Office, No. D2014-10; Supreme Court of Delaware, No. 427, 2014)**  **Attorney Registration No. 61385**  **(Chester County)**

O R D E R

PER CURIAM: **AND NOW, this 30 th**  **day of January, 2015, Kevin William Goldstein having been excluded on consent from the practice of patent, t**  **rademark and other non-patent matters by Order of the United States Patent and Trad**  **emark Office dated March 31, 2014, and thereafter having been transferred to disa**  **bility inactive status by Order of the Supreme Court of Delaware dated August 18, 2014; the**  **said Kevin William Goldstein having been directed on December 18, 2014, to inform**  **this Court of any claim he has that the imposition of disability inactive status in th**  **is Commonwealth would be unwarranted and the reasons therefor; and no response h**  **aving been filed, it is ORDERED that Kevin William Goldstein is immediately**  **transferred to disability inactive status pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 216, fo**  **r an indefinite period and until further Order of the Court and he shall comply with a**  **ll the provisions of Pa.R.D.E. 217.**