2023 IL App (1st) 230717-U

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FIRST DIVISION

October 30, 2023 

No. 1-23-0717 

______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re M.M., S.A.M., and K.M., minors, 

(People of the State of Illinois, petitioner-appellee v. P.B., 

respondent-appellant). 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County

No. 17-JA-82 

 17-JA-83 

 18-JA-935 

The Honorable 

Peter J. Vilkelis, 

Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Lavin and Pucinski concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s finding that the respondent was unfit to have a child was not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence and is affirmed.

¶ 2 The respondent, P.B., appeals from the trial court’s order finding her unfit to have a child 

under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)) as a predicate for 

terminating her parental rights over minors M.M., S.A.M., and K.M. under section 2-29(2) of the 

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022)). Appellee briefs were filed by 

the State and by the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian on behalf of the three minors. For 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 2 - 

the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A. Procedural Background

¶ 5 This action commenced on January 27, 2017, when the State filed a petition for the 

adjudication of wardship of M.M., born January 23, 2016, and S.A.M., born November 8, 2016. 

An additional such petition was filed on September 20, 2018, concerning K.M., born July 23, 2018. 

The respondent is the mother of these three minors, as well as of several other children. The fathers 

of each of these minors was found by the trial court to be unfit by clear and convincing evidence, 

and the fathers’ cases are not the subject of this appeal. 

¶ 6 The petitions filed on behalf of M.M. and S.A.M. alleged that they were abused and 

neglected. Both petitions presented allegations that S.A.M., who had been born premature with 

congenital hypothyroidism, was not taken to multiple medical appointments or given prescribed 

medications by the respondent. He had recently been hospitalized and diagnosed with non-organic 

failure to thrive. Medical personnel described him as severely malnourished and expressed 

concerns about the respondent’s ability to parent. On January 27, 2017, a temporary custody 

hearing order was entered, in which the court found probable cause existed that the minors were 

abused and neglected based on the alleged facts. M.M. and S.A.M. were thus removed from the 

respondent’s care.

¶ 7 On December 18, 2017, the trial court entered orders adjudicating both M.M. and S.A.M. 

neglected as a result of injurious environment, as well as for lack of care as to S.A.M. Its findings 

were consistent with the allegations set forth in the petitions for adjudication of wardship. On 

January 31, 2018, disposition orders were entered adjudicating both minors as wards of the court 

and finding the respondent unable to care for them. A permanency goal for the two minors to return 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 3 - 

home within 12 months was also established that day. 

¶ 8 On July 23, 2018, K.M. was born, and a petition for adjudication of wardship concerning him 

was filed on September 20, 2018. A temporary custody order was entered that day, and K.M. was 

removed from the respondent’s care. On February 4, 2019, a disposition order was entered 

adjudicating K.M. a ward of the court and finding the respondent unable to care for him. 

¶ 9 On October 28, 2019, a permanency hearing was conducted as to all three minors. Following 

that hearing, the trial court ordered a change in the permanency goal to substitute care pending a 

determination by the trial court on the termination of parental rights. 

¶ 10 On April 2, 2021, the State filed petitions on behalf of all three minors seeking the termination 

of the respondent’s parental rights. Pertinent to this appeal, the petition alleged that the respondent 

was unfit under three of the grounds enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 

50/1(D) (West 2020)): (1) ground (b) for failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, 

concern or responsibility as to the children’s welfare (id. § 1(D)(b)); (2) ground (c) for desertion 

of the children for more than three months next preceding the commencement of termination 

proceedings (id. § 1(D)(c)); and (3) ground (m) for failure to make reasonable efforts to correct 

the conditions that were the basis of removal or to make reasonable progress toward reunification 

during a nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)). 

¶ 11 B. Unfitness hearing 

¶ 12 The unfitness hearing at issue initially commenced on August 10, 2022, although the court 

proceedings that day consisted only of the State’s tendering of 14 trial exhibits. The matter was 

then continued several timesto March 23, 2023, at which time four respondent’s exhibits also were 

admitted into evidence. At the State’s request, the trial court also took judicial notice of a number 

of matters concerning the procedural background of the case. The pertinent exhibits and judicially 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 4 - 

noticed facts are addressed below and in our analysis. 

¶ 13 1. Witness testimony

¶ 14 The State’s first witness was Linda Baldwin, a caseworker for the Department of Children 

and Family Services (DCFS). Baldwin was the assigned caseworker for M.M., S.A.M., and K.M. 

from September 2018 until April 2019. At the time of Baldwin’s assignment, the respondent was 

in need of the following services under the service plan developed by DCFS to facilitate 

reunification: individual therapy, parent psychotherapy, substance abuse services, random 

toxicology screens, and visitation. 

¶ 15 For individual therapy, Baldwin referred the respondent to One Hope United. The respondent 

did not provide Baldwin with documentation that she had completed that service, but Baldwin did 

receive a report from the provider indicating that the respondent was somewhat consistent with 

participation in that service. Also, random toxicology screenings for the respondent were being 

done by TASC (Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities). 

¶ 16 On January 29, 2019, Baldwin took part in an administrative case review with the respondent, 

her attorney, and the case reviewer, to advise the respondent of the services she still needed to 

complete under her service plan for reunification. At that meeting, the respondent stated that she 

believed she had completed all the services except employment and housing. However, Baldwin 

never received communication that the respondent had in fact completed her required services. 

¶ 17 Baldwin testified to an incident on March 11, 2019, when a supervised visitation was to take 

place at 11:00 a.m. When Baldwin arrived that day at 10:45 a.m., the minor and transporter were 

present, but the respondent did not arrive. After waiting 30 minutes, Baldwin called the respondent, 

who reported that she was asleep and had forgotten the visit. She did not attend the visit that day. 

Baldwin characterized the respondent as “inconsistent” about attending visitations and testified 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 5 - 

that the respondent never provided gifts, cards, or letters to the children. 

¶ 18 The State’s second witness was Nina Alhaj, who testified that she became the assigned 

caseworker for M.M. and K.M. in April 2019 and continued in that role through December 2019. 

She was then employed with Shelter, Inc., the agency to which DCFS had transferred the case in 

April 2019. At that time, the services of which the respondent was still in need under her service 

plan included individual therapy, random toxicology screening through TASC, a parenting 

capacity assessment, and visitation. 

¶ 19 At the time the case was transferred, the respondent had been participating in individual 

therapy through One Hope United, but she had not completed it. In July 2019, she was 

unsuccessfully discharged from therapy by that provider due in part to the fact that Shelter, Inc., 

did not have a contract with it, as well as her therapist’s conclusion that the respondent lacked the 

cognitive abilities to focus on the reasons why the case had been opened. One Hope United had 

recommended a shift in the focus of therapy, which had been skills-based, to independent living 

skills and programs for parents with disabilities. However, Alhaj did not refer the respondent for 

such services because the respondent told her she was not interested in gaining independent 

housing. She was living with her sister and wanted to continue doing so. The respondent also told 

her that she was not interested in reengaging in therapy or increasing her visitation with the 

children. Alhaj never received proof that the respondent had completed individual therapy. 

¶ 20 Alhaj testified that random toxicology screens were being requested of the respondent. Alhaj 

testified that in October 2019, there were two positive toxicology reports. These positive 

toxicology reports caused Alhaj to consider substance abuse services to have been unsuccessful 

completed. 

¶ 21 Alhaj testified that a parenting capacity assessment was conducted in June 2019 through the 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 6 - 

Cook County Juvenile Court Clinic. The recommendations from that assessment were for the 

respondent to have more frequent and longer visitations, to attend the children’s medical and 

educational appointments, to engage in therapy, to obtain independent housing, to continue random 

toxicology testing, and to possibly participate in a nurturing parent program. The assessment also 

identified the respondent as having cognitive deficits and recommended she receive therapy with 

ample repetition in view of those deficits. 

¶ 22 Regarding visitation, Alhaj testified that this was initially scheduled to take place three times 

per week. However, in April 2019, the respondent requested that visitation be reduced to once per 

week. The respondent told Alhaj that visiting three times a week was “overwhelming.” The 

respondent was never interested thereafter in increasing her visits to more than once a week. 

¶ 23 Alhaj testified that problems had occurred whereby the children would be brought by their 

foster parents for scheduled visitations, but the respondent would then fail to appear or to cancel 

the appointments in advance. Accordingly, a protocol was put in place whereby the respondent 

was required to call or text Alhaj at 9:00 a.m. on the morning of a scheduled appointment, and her 

failure to do so would result in the cancellation of that morning’s visitation, which would otherwise 

be at 11:00 a.m. Alhaj testified that, from April 2019 to December 2019, the respondent would 

only call or text to confirm visitations “about once or twice a month.” She testified that the 

respondent had told her that the reason she did not confirm visits was “that 9:00 a.m. was too early, 

and it was inconvenient for her.” 

¶ 24 Alhaj testified that she did supervise numerous visitations and had concerns as a result of the 

respondent’s contact with her children. She explained that in those visitations, the respondent 

struggled to supervise all the children at once. She required prompts to remember to feed them, 

change diapers, or respond to their cues to use the bathroom. Due to these concerns, Alhaj was 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 7 - 

never able to recommend unsupervised visits. She testified that the respondent’s incomplete 

services, including that she was not in individual therapy, that she had positive toxicology drops, 

and that she had not reengaged in substance abuse treatment were also reasons why she did not 

recommend unsupervised visitation. Alhaj testified that the respondent never provided cards, gifts, 

or letters to her children. 

¶ 25 Questioning then turned to M.M.’s father. After three questions on this topic, the respondent’s 

attorney interposed an objection that “[t]he positive drops are hearsay.” After pointing out the 

untimeliness of this objection, the trial court overruled it. In doing so, the trial court stated: 

“The Court is taking judicial notice of the fact that on October 28th, 2019, this Court 

heard testimony that [the respondent] tested positive for amphetamines, 

methamphetamines, and Ecstasy in that time frame. She was pregnant at the time, and there 

was a concern about false positives, so they were sent in for confirmation, and they did 

confirm that she tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, Ecstasy, and we 

heard that testimony on October 28th, 2019, so your objection’s overruled.”

Later, on cross-examination by the respondent’s attorney, the State objected to a question posed 

to Alhaj about whether she had learned that the respondent’s pregnancy could have caused false 

positives. Overruling that objection also, the trial court stated: 

“Well, [the respondent’s attorney] previously interposed an objection to the results of 

those urinalyses, and as I indicated, I’m taking judicial notice of the fact that the testimony 

that we received by Ms. [Alhaj] *** on October 28, 2019, was that because TASC indicated 

pregnancy could cause false positives, the results of those tests were sent in for 

confirmation, and they do, in fact, confirm the positive results for amphetamine, 

methamphetamine, and Ecstasy.” 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 8 - 

¶ 26 The final witness called by the State was J’Taia Miller. She testified that she was currently 

employed as a caseworker at Shelter, Inc. She had been the assigned caseworker for the family 

from February 2022 to the present. Miller testified that, at the current time, the services of which 

the respondent was still in need included individual therapy, random toxicology screenings, and 

more consistent visitation. 

¶ 27 Miller testified that, for about the past year and a half, the respondent had been living in 

Minnesota, where she had voluntarily relocated. She had not provided Miller with documentation 

that she had completed services, but Miller was informed by a caseworker there at she was engaged 

in services. Miller testified that she never sent cards, gifts, or letters to her children. She was 

allowed one visitation per month with her children, but since Miller was assigned to the case in 

February 2022, the respondent had not attended any visits. This was primarily due to her relocation 

to Minnesota. Miller testified that, when she learned the respondent was planning to be in Chicago 

around Thanksgiving 2022, she contacted her about scheduling a visitation then; however, the 

respondent never called her back. Miller testified that the respondent’s last visitation with her 

children had occurred in January 2020. She also testified that the agency had offered “virtual’ 

visitation to the respondent, but that had not occurred for M.M. or K.M. 

¶ 28 The State and public guardian then rested as to the unfitness hearing. In the respondent’s 

case, the trial court took judicial notice of testimony given by Lakeshia Robinson-Bell on October 

15, 2018, that she met the respondent in June 2017 for 10 sessions of parenting classes, 2 times 

per week, and coaching began in February 2018, for 10 sessions every other week. Robinson-Bell 

testified that “she had no red flags.” The respondent then rested.

¶ 29 2. Closing arguments

¶ 30 The matter then proceeded to closing arguments. The State requested the trial court to make 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 9 - 

findings of unfitness as to respondent under grounds (b), (c), and (m). As to grounds (b) and (c), 

the State cited Miller’s testimony that the respondent’s last visit with the children had been in 

January 2020. Prior to then, she had voluntarily reduced her visitation from three times a week to 

once a week, and she would frequently fail to confirm those visits with a 9:00 a.m. phone call. 

¶ 31 As to ground (m), the State argued that a lack of progress was shown by her psychological 

evaluation (in June 2018), which stated that she had demonstrated poor insight into why her 

family’s case came in. The State pointed out that, although she did complete a parenting class, she 

failed to make progress in other services that she was required to complete, including independent 

therapy and substance abuse. It argued she failed to make progress in substance abuse, as the TASC 

records in evidence showed that she tested positive two times in October 2019 for amphetamines 

and methamphetamines. The State also argued that, although the parenting capacity assessment 

recommended that she increase visits with her children, the evidence had shown that she simply 

was not interested in doing so. 

¶ 32 The respondent’s attorney argued in closing that the respondent’s cognitive deficits had only 

been discovered in June 2019 during the juvenile court clinic’s parenting capacity evaluation, and 

the services that were offered to her in this case failed to accommodate and address her disabilities. 

The respondent’s attorney argued that she had completed most of the services required of her, and 

only those services after June 2019 should be considered because the ones before that failed to 

adequately address her cognitive deficits and thus help with reunification. The respondent’s 

attorney argued that she was consistent with visitation for the majority of the case and only dropped 

off in the last couple of months due to scheduling and commuting issues. 

¶ 33 In rebuttal, the State pointed out that Alhaj had testified that the respondent was not interested 

in the additional individual therapy services and increased visitation recommended by the juvenile 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 10 - 

court clinic after June 2019. Instead, the respondent had requested to decrease her visits with the 

children from three times a week to one. 

¶ 34 3. Trial court’s ruling

¶ 35 Following the conclusion of evidence and closing arguments, the trial court found that the 

State had met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent was unfit 

under grounds (b), (c), and (m). It began its ruling by refuting the respondent’s attorney’s 

contention that the respondent’s cognitive deficits had not been discovered until June 2019, 

pointing out that her June 2018 psychological evaluation referenced her full-scale IQ being 65, 

described her as having a mild intellectual disability, and opined that she lacked the emotional and 

intellectual resources to parent effectively. The court also set forth the findings that had led to the 

initial finding of neglect in 2017. It then summarized the testimony of the three witnesses, focusing 

on their testimony concerning the respondent’s lack of visitation and failure to complete services. 

The court also briefly mentioned the respondent’s positive toxicology results in 2019 while she 

was pregnant with another child. The court pointed out that it recognized that the respondent had 

put into evidence certain exhibits showing her completion of some services, “but most recently in 

2019, and this is 2023, so the completion of services was from years ago, and we haven’t had a 

visit in over a year.” 

¶ 36 C. Best interest hearing 

¶ 37 The matter then immediately proceeded to hearing on whether termination of parental rights 

was in the best interests of the children. As this aspect of the case is not the subject of appeal, we 

briefly summarize the testimony from that part of the hearing. Miller was the first witness to testify.

She testified that M.M., currently age 7, and K.M., currently age 4, have been placed together in a 

traditional foster home since September 2018. It is a pre-adoptive foster home, and the foster 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 11 - 

parents, with whom the two boys are well-bonded, have stated that they want to adopt them. Miller 

testified that it would be in the boys’ best interests to be adopted by their current foster parents due 

to the lack of visitation and completion of services by the respondent, as well as the boys’ 

recognition of their foster parents as “basically their biological parents.” Miller stated during this 

testimony that her last conversation with the respondent had occurred in December 2022 at a child 

and family team meeting. 

¶ 38 Aesha Jackson testified that she is a case manager with the Children’s Place Association, and 

since 2019 she has served as the caseworker for S.A.M., currently age 6. She explained that, since 

June 2018, S.A.M. has been in a relative placement in a specialized foster home due to his medical 

needs. A younger brother of S.A.M., not the subject of this appeal, is also placed in the same foster 

home. Jackson testified that S.A.M. is bonded and attached to his foster mother, calls her “Mama.” 

The foster parents are separated, but S.A.M. is also bonded to his foster father and calls him 

“Papa.” S.A.M. currently has an individualized education plan to address his developmental needs, 

through which he has been receiving occupational and physical therapy and social work services. 

He is in need of ongoing medical care due to hypothyroidism and dysplasia which resulted from 

the surgery he had as an infant, which requires a special diet. His foster parents have always 

ensured that he attends these appointments and that he receives his necessary services and diet. 

Jackson believes that it is in the best interest of S.A.M. to terminate the respondent’s parental 

rights, as he is in need of a sense of permanency at this time. 

¶ 39 Both foster mothers testified. The foster mother of M.M. and K.M. testified that she and her 

husband want to adopt the two boys, that their relationship with them was “very close,” and that 

they had become part of their family. The foster mother of S.A.M. testified that she is his maternal 

cousin. She testified that she and her husband want to adopt S.A.M. because they love him, he has 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 12 - 

been with them since he was a baby, and theirs is the only home that he knows. The State and 

public guardian then rested as to the best-interests hearing. 

¶ 40 The respondent then testified in her case-in-chief. She testified that she was not in agreement 

with her children being adopted. She testified that the foster mother of S.A.M., who is her cousin, 

does not respond to her texts and calls. She testified that she does talk to her children by video 

chat. She disputed the testimony that she was not in communication wither her children. She 

testified that DCFS had not helped her with housing but that on her own she obtained housing, had 

been working and in school, and was doing her services. She loved her children and wanted to be 

a part of their lives. The respondent then rested. 

¶ 41 The trial court ruled, finding that it was in the best interests of the three minors to terminate 

the respondent’s parental rights. In its ruling, the trial court noted that the respondent’s testimony 

in the best-interest hearing had not persuaded it to change its earlier ruling on unfitness. The trial 

court appointed a guardian with the right to consent to adoption. The respondent thereafter filed a 

timely notice of appeal. 

¶ 42 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 43 On appeal, the respondent first argues that the trial court erred in sua sponte taking judicial 

notice that testimony had been given by Alhaj at a permanency hearing on October 28, 2019, that, 

due to concerns that the respondent’s pregnancy might cause false positives on toxicology 

screenings taken around that time, the results of those tests were submitted for additional testing

that did in fact confirm positive test results within the category of amphetamine, 

methamphetamine, and Ecstasy. The respondent argues that the facts about which the trial court 

took sua sponte judicial notice were inaccurate and that she suffered prejudice when the trial court 

relied on this inaccurate evidence in its ruling on unfitness. Second, the respondent argues that the 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 13 - 

trial court’s finding of desertion of her children during the relevant three-month period (ground 

(c)) was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Third, she argues that the trial court erred 

in its consideration of the evidence in finding the respondent unfit on grounds (b) and (m).

¶ 44 For their part, the public guardian and the State primarily argue that any error in the trial 

court’s sua sponte taking of judicial notice of positive toxicology test results was harmless. This 

is so, they contend, because even without considering the respondent’s drug use, the State 

presented overwhelming evidence of her unfitness to meet its burden under grounds (b) and (m). 

They contend that the evidence, particularly concerning the respondent’s lack of interest in 

visitation with her children, fully supports the trial court’s ground (b) finding that the respondent 

failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for their welfare. They 

likewise contend that abundant evidence supported the trial court’s ground (m) finding, 

specifically that evidence showing the respondent had never made progress in the services required 

for reunification, particularly therapy, toxicology drops, and visitation. Finally, the State argues 

that the evidence that the respondent had not visited her children since January 2020 and had failed 

to respond to efforts to arrange in-person or virtual visits following her move to Minnesota was 

sufficient to support the trial court’s ground (c) finding of desertion. 

¶ 45 The involuntary termination of parental rights upon petition by the State is governed by the 

Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2022)) and the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 

50/0.01 et seq. (West 2022)). In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 494 (2002). Such proceedings involve a 

two-step process. See 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022). First, the State must prove, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that the parent is “unfit” as that term is defined in section 1(D) of the 

Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20. If properly 

proven, any one of the several grounds enumerated in section 1(D) is sufficient for a finding of 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 14 - 

unfitness. D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 495. The second step, if the court makes a finding of unfitness, is to 

consider whether it is in the best interests of the child that parental rights be terminated. Id.

¶ 46 This court affords great deference to a trial court’s finding of unfitness, because it has the 

best opportunity to view and evaluate the parties and their testimony; the trial court’s finding will 

not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Daphnie 

E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006) (citing D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 498-99). A decision is against 

the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite result is clearly evident from the record. 

Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1064. Further, each case concerning parental unfitness is 

sui generis, requiring close analysis of its individual facts; consequently, factual comparisons to 

other cases by reviewing courts are of little value. Id. A trial court’s finding of unfitness may be 

affirmed provided sufficient evidence is presented on any single ground set forth in section 1(D). 

In re A.H., 359 Ill. App. 3d 173, 180 (2005); accord M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 43. 

¶ 47 A. Ground (b)

¶ 48 Because we find it potentially dispositive of other issues, we choose to begin our analysis 

with the question of whether the trial court’s finding under ground (b) was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. A person may be found unfit to have a child on the grounds of his or her 

“[f]ailure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child’s 

welfare.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022). These are three disjunctive qualities, any of which 

can support a finding of unfitness, and there is no time constraint that limits a court’s consideration 

of a parent’s conduct under ground (b). In re Nicholas C., 2017 IL App (1st) 162101, ¶¶ 21, 24.

¶ 49 In determining whether a parent has shown a reasonable degree of interest, concern or 

responsibility for a child’s welfare, courts consider a parent’s efforts to visit and maintain contact 

with the child, as well as other indicia of interest, such as inquiries into the child’s welfare. Daphnie 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 15 - 

E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1064 (citing In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 278-79 (1990)). Courts 

consider a parent’s conduct in the context of the circumstances in which it occurs, accounting for 

difficulties such as a lack of transportation to the child, the parent’s poverty, conduct of others that 

hinders visitation, and the motivation underlying the failure to visit. Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 

at 1064 (citing Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 278-79). Circumstances such as an intellectual disability do not 

necessarily redeem a parent’s failure to demonstrate reasonable interest, concern, or responsibility, 

nor do such circumstances fix a different standard of reasonableness. M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 29. 

Rather, in such cases the issue is whether the parent’s then-existing circumstances present a valid 

excuse. Id. (citing Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 276). A parent does not need to be at fault to be unfit, but 

she will not be considered fit merely because she has demonstrated some interest in or affection 

toward a child. Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1064. Visitation is the primary consideration, but 

if that is shown to be somehow impractical, courts may consider other factors demonstrating 

interest, concern, or responsibility, such as phone calls, letters, gifts, or the like. M.I., 2016 IL 

120232, ¶ 36 (citing Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 279). Evidence of a parent’s infrequent or sporadic 

visitation will support a finding of unfitness under ground (b). M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 36; In re 

Y.F., 2023 IL App (1st) 221216, ¶¶ 43, 46; In re Janira T., 368 Ill. App. 3d 883, 893 (2006). 

¶ 50 We conclude from our review of the record that the trial court’s finding that the respondent 

failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of her 

three minor children was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Instead, we find the trial 

court’s determination to be fully supported by the evidence, particularly concerning the 

respondent’s lack of effort to have visitation with her children. 

¶ 51 The State presented testimony by three caseworkers demonstrating that, since early 2019, the 

respondent had made minimal efforts to have visitation with M.M., S.A.M., and K.M., to maintain 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 16 - 

contact with them, or to show any reasonable indicia of interest or concern into their welfare. 

Miller, the family’s current caseworker at the time of the hearing, testified that despite being 

entitled then to one monthly visit, the respondent had never visited the children since Miller’s 

assignment to the case 13 months earlier. The respondent had voluntarily relocated to Minnesota 

a year and a half prior to the hearing while the case was pending, and Miller testified that she 

understood that her last visitation had occurred in January 2020. Miller further testified that the 

respondent had not accepted the agency’s offer to participate in “virtual” visitation. Miller testified 

that, when she learned that the respondent was planning a visit to Chicago around Thanksgiving 

2022, Miller made efforts to schedule a visitation then. However, Miller testified that she never 

received a response or return call from the respondent. Miller also testified that the respondent has 

never sent cards, gifts, or letters to the children.

¶ 52 The testimony of Alhaj and Baldwin demonstrated that the respondent’s lack of effort or 

interest in visitation with her children had been ongoing for several years. Alhaj testified that when 

she was assigned to the case in April 2019, the respondent had the right to visitation three times a 

week, but she voluntarily reduced this to one visitation per week because she found three visits per 

week to be “overwhelming.” Even then, Alhaj explained that visits only occurred once or twice a 

month because the respondent would fail to call or text her at 9:00 a.m. to confirm that she planned 

to attend that day’s visit at 11:00 a.m. She testified that the respondent told her that 9:00 a.m. was 

too early and that it was inconvenient for her. Baldwin likewise testified to an incident in March 

2019 where the children were brought to a visit that the respondent had forgotten about and failed 

to attend, and Baldwin characterized the respondent as “inconsistent” with visitations. This 

evidence of the respondent’s disinterest in visitation fully supports the trial court’s ground (b) 

ruling. See Y.F., 2023 IL App (1st) 221216, ¶¶ 43, 46; Janira T., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 893.
No. 1-23-0717 

- 17 - 

¶ 53 On appeal, the respondent argues that the trial court erred in its consideration of the evidence, 

specifically by discounting the evidence of her efforts at participating in and completing some 

required services toward reunification. This includes her successful completion of a parenting 

program in October 2017 and parent coaching sessions in July 2018. She cites her completion of 

outpatient treatment for substance abuse (marijuana) in July 2018, wherein she was described as 

“motivated for treatment” and “want[ing] to regain custody of her children.” She cites to evidence 

of her participation in at least five therapy sessions with One Hope United between November 

2018 and January 2019, in which her therapist explained that she was working toward her goals. 

She points out that she did ultimately undergo a psychological evaluation in June 2018. She cites 

Baldwin’s testimony that she participated in an administrative case review in January 2019, as well 

as Miller’s testimony that she participated in a child-family team meeting as recently as December 

2022. She also points out that she attended the adjudication and disposition hearings. 

¶ 54 Additionally, she references the fact that she attended the parenting capacity evaluation with 

the juvenile court clinic in June 2019, including interactive sessions with the children, and that she 

was described in the evaluation report as “demonstrat[ing] some parenting knowledge and skills 

within a monitored and time-limited environment” with no significant concerns reported over 

years of supervised visits. She emphasizes the report’s description of her as having affection 

toward and interest in her children. 

¶ 55 We reject the respondent’s argument that the trial court erred in its consideration of the 

evidence concerning the respondent’s efforts toward the services required for reunification. 

Although completion of service plan objectives can be considered as evidence of a parent’s 

interest, concern, and responsibility (Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1065), ground (b) “does not 

hinge on a parent’s compliance with a service plan or directives.” M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 39. 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 18 - 

Rather, the primary consideration is visitation. Id. ¶ 36. Here, the trial court specifically stated in 

its ruling that it was considering the evidence of the respondent’s completion of some services. It 

went on to note, though, that the most recent evidence involving the completion of some services 

was from 2019, “and this is 2023, so the completion of services was from years ago, and we haven’t 

had a visit in over a year.” It is clear from the trial court’s statements that it took into account the 

evidence cited by the respondent but found that it was outweighed by the respondent’s prolonged 

failure to engage in visitation after completing those services. It was the role of the trial court to 

weigh this evidence and to determine the inferences to be drawn therefrom, and this court will not 

substitute its judgment on decisions of this nature. D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 499. The trial court’s 

determination in this regard was fully supported by the evidence. 

¶ 56 The respondent further argues on appeal that the trial court did not give sufficient 

consideration to the fact that, prior to the recognition of her mild intellectual disability during her 

psychological evaluation in June 2018, the evidence demonstrated her positive parenting 

interactions toward her children and that she was capable of maintaining employment. She cites 

the following evidence included in the exhibits and matters of which the court had taken judicial 

notice: (1) Robinson-Bell’s testimony from 2018 that she saw “no red flags” during parenting 

classes in 2017 and parent coaching sessions in 2018; (2) a stipulation of facts at the adjudication 

hearing of December 18, 2017, that, other than S.A.M., the minors removed from the respondent’s 

care in January 2017 had appeared healthy and well cared for; (3) a stipulation of facts from the 

adjudication hearing for K.M. on January 24, 2019, that on the occasion in August 2018 when 

DCFS first learned that K.M. had been born, the respondent’s interactions with him were noted to 

be safe and appropriate; and (4) that the respondent maintained full-time employment as a cashier 

at McDonald’s for five years prior to 2018, as well as two years working at White Castle and two 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 19 - 

years as a home healthcare assistant. She argues that the significance of this evidence is that it 

demonstrates that, despite experiencing a mild intellectual disability, she possesses or could 

develop better adaptive functioning if she received adequate training. She faults the agency and 

her caseworkers for failing to offer her services directed at addressing her disability, noting that 

this had been one of the juvenile court clinic’s recommendations following its assessment. 

¶ 57 We again reject this argument. This argument is primarily an effort to have this court reweigh 

the evidence and draw different conclusions from it than the trial court did, which is not the role 

of the reviewing court. Jameson v. Williams, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 51; In re J.B., 2014 IL 

App (1st) 140773, ¶ 49 (“We give great deference to the trial court’s finding of unfitness, defer to 

the trial court’s factual findings and credibility assessments, and will not reweigh the evidence 

anew on appeal.”). The cited evidence does not show that the opposite result is “clearly evident” 

so as to support reversal under the manifest weight standard. Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1064.

¶ 58 Moreover, under ground (b) the significance of a parent’s intellectual disability is whether it 

presents a circumstance that provides a valid excuse for what would otherwise appear to be the 

failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility in the child’s welfare. 

See M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 29. However, the existence of an intellectual disability does not fix a 

different standard of reasonableness, and it does not necessarily or automatically redeem a failure 

to demonstrate reasonable interest, concern, or responsibility. Id. In M.I., the supreme court 

affirmed a ground (b) finding of unfitness based on evidence of a father’s “sporadic visitation” of 

his child, where attending visitation was not a task beyond his intellectual capacity. Id. ¶ 36. 

¶ 59 In this case, we find no evidence in the record that the respondent’s mild intellectual disability 

provided a valid excuse for her failure to visit her children for at least 13 months prior to the 

hearing, including declining offers of virtual visitation, and for her diminishing interest in 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 20 - 

visitation for several years prior to that. As in M.I., the evidence here showed that she was capable 

of attending visitation when she wanted to, at least prior to her voluntary relocation to Minnesota. 

It is evident from the trial court’s remarks that it was fully aware of her mild intellectual disability 

and took it into account as part of its findings. We find no error by the trial court in this regard. 

¶ 60 B. Grounds (c) and (m)

¶ 61 Because we have concluded that the trial court’s finding that the respondent was unfit under 

ground (b) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we have no need to consider the 

respondent’s arguments that it erred by finding her unfit under grounds (c) and (m) also. Y.F., 2023 

IL App (1st) 221216, ¶ 47 (citing M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 43). As stated above, a trial court’s 

finding of unfitness will be affirmed provided sufficient evidence is presented on any single ground 

enumerated in the statute. A.H., 359 Ill. App. 3d at 180. 

¶ 62 C. Judicial Notice 

¶ 63 Finally, we address the respondent’s argument that the trial court erred by sua sponte taking 

judicial notice that testimony had been given at a permanency hearing in October 2019 that 

toxicology samples taken that month were submitted for additional testing, which confirmed 

positive test results in the category of amphetamine, methamphetamine, and Ecstasy. We note that 

neither the State nor the public guardian directs our attention to any place in the record where 

testimony or evidence supporting this fact exists. However, we agree with the argument of the 

State and public guardian that, even if the trial court did err by taking judicial notice of this 

purported fact, it did not result in prejudice to the respondent so as to affect the outcome of the 

unfitness hearing. See In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 460 (2008); In re J.G., 298 Ill. App. 3d 617, 

629 (1998). 

¶ 64 Although the trial court mentioned the respondent’s positive toxicology results from October 
No. 1-23-0717 

- 21 - 

2019 as part of its ruling on unfitness, its remarks do not suggest that this evidence played any 

significant factor in its findings of unfitness. Rather, as discussed above, the primary factor was 

the respondent’s failure to participate in any form of visitation with her children in the 13 months 

prior to the hearing, preceded by multiple years of her participating in only sporadic and irregular 

visitation. The properly admitted evidence of the respondent’s prolonged disinterest in visitation

with her children overwhelmingly established her failure to maintain a reasonable degree of 

interest, concern, or responsibility toward them. This had nothing to do with drug use or an instance 

of positive toxicology results three and a half years earlier. Accordingly, we reject the respondent’s 

argument that she suffered prejudice from the allegedly incorrect fact of which the court sua sponte

took judicial notice. 

¶ 65 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 66 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

¶ 67 Affirmed.