alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2019122EN.01002801.xml

| 1.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 122/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 122/28

---

Action brought on 12 February 2019 — AL v Commission

(Case T-83/19)

(2019/C 122/32)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: AL (represented by: A. Blot and S. Rodrigues, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare the action admissible and well founded; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare the action admissible and well founded;

| — | annul the decision implicitly rejecting the applicant’s claim for compensation submitted on 19 December 2017 and, if necessary, the decision of 12 November 2018 rejecting the applicant’s complaint; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision implicitly rejecting the applicant’s claim for compensation submitted on 19 December 2017 and, if necessary, the decision of 12 November 2018 rejecting the applicant’s complaint;

| — | compensate the material and non-material damage suffered by the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

compensate the material and non-material damage suffered by the applicant;

| — | order the defendant to pay all the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay all the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging breach of the defendant’s contractual commitments to the applicant, in that the Commission failed to comply with the undertaking it had given by appointing the applicant as the European Union facilitator for the Congo Basin Forests Partnership. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging breach of the defendant’s contractual commitments to the applicant, in that the Commission failed to comply with the undertaking it had given by appointing the applicant as the European Union facilitator for the Congo Basin Forests Partnership.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of respect for legitimate expectations. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of respect for legitimate expectations.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging breach of the right to be heard. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging breach of the right to be heard.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of good administration and the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of good administration and the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials.

---
#### Soide Fabian et al., Petitioners, v Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, Appellant, and Allstate Insurance Company et al., Respondents.

Appeal by the *367Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Held, J.), dated January 6, 1984, which, after a “framed issue” trial, determined a disclaimer of insurance coverage by Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) was valid.

Judgment reversed, on the law, with costs to MVAIC payable by Allstate, and Allstate’s disclaimer is determined to be invalid.

Allstate, in its letter of disclaimer, failed to assert the alleged noncooperation of its insured. Thus, Allstate cannot now assert that reason as a basis for its disclaimer *(General Acc. Ins. Group v Cirucci,*46 NY2d 862, 864).

“Although an insurer may disclaim coverage for a valid reason (Insurance Law § [3420 (d)]) the notice of disclaimer must promptly apprise the claimant with a high degree of specificity of the ground or grounds on which the disclaimer is predicated. Absent such specific notice, a claimant might have difficulty assessing whether the insurer will be able to disclaim successfully. This uncertainty could prejudice the claimant’s ability to ultimately obtain recovery. In addition, the insurer’s responsibility to furnish notice of the specific ground on which the disclaimer is based is not unduly burdensome, the insurer being highly experienced and sophisticated in such matters” *(General Acc. Ins. Group v Cirucci, supra,*at p 864).

The only ground stated in the disclaimer letter, to wit, the insured’s failure to notify Allstate of the accident, was not effective as against petitioners. As injured third parties, petitioners may seek recovery from an insured’s carrier despite the failure of the insured to provide timely notice of the accident (Insurance Law § 3420 [a] [3]; *see, Lauritano v American Fid. Fire Ins. Co.,*3 AD2d 564, *affd*4 NY2d 1028). While under the facts of this case, a disclaimer might have been made based upon late notice by petitioners themselves, the failure to raise this ground in the disclaimer letter precludes consideration of this ground for disclaiming coverage.

Accordingly, we determine that Allstate’s disclaimer is not valid.

In light of our determination, we need not reach the issue of the timeliness of Allstate’s disclaimer. Mangano, J. P., Gibbons, Niehoff and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 55 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That, in the enrollment of the bill (H.R. 

3 1627) an Act to amend title 38, United States Code, to 

4 furnish hospital care and medical services to veterans who 

5 were stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, while 

6 the water was contaminated at Camp Lejeune, to improve 

7 the provision of housing assistance to veterans and their 

8 families, and for other purposes, the Clerk of the House 

9 of Representatives shall make the following correction: in 

10 section 201, strike ‘‘Andrew Connelly’’ and insert ‘‘An11 drew Connolly’’. 

Passed the Senate August 1, 2012. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 
112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 55 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Directing the Clerk of the House of Representatives 

1627. to make a correction in the enrollment of H.R.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 6725** 

RUSSELL LEON DAVID, SR. , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,
v. JON E. OZMINT, Director, S outh Carolina D epartment of Corrections; DONALD R. SAMPSON, Dr.; A. G. ALEWINE, Dr.; K. MCCULLOUGH, Nurse; S. SHERMAN, Nurse , Defendants

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Beaufort
. R. Bryan Harwell , District Judge. ( 9:10

- cv - 01976

- RBH )

Submitted : September 11, 2012 Decided: September 14,2012

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Russell Leon David, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Mason Abram Summers, RICHARDSON, PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Russell Leon David, Sr. seeks to appeal the district
court ’ s order adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, which advised su mmary jud gment in favor of the
D efendants named in David’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) action . We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. In a civil case where the United States, a federal agency, or a federal o fficer is not a party , the notice of appeal must be filed no more than thir ty days after the entry of the district court ’ s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A ), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5 ), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). Here, t he district court ’ s order was entered on the d ocket on April 12, 2011
. As the district court has subsequently determined, David did not file a notice of appeal as to that order until May 31, 2011
. Because David failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the ap peal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### In the Matter of Gerald A. Powell, a Suspended Attorney, Petitioner.

by petitioner, a suspended attorney, whose period of suspension has expired for reinstatement to the roll of attorneys. The matter was referred to the Grievance Committee for the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts for investigation and report on certain matters pending before it concerning the petitioner. The application was held in abeyance pending the Grievance Committee’s report. The Committee’s report has been received and the complaints against petitioner have been disposed of.

The matter is now referred to the Committee on Character and Fitness for its investigation and report on (1) whether the petitioner has complied with this court’s order of suspension and (2) whether he presently possesses the character and fitness requisite to an attorney and counselor-at-law.

The petition will be held in abeyance pending the report of the Committee on Character and Fitness. Mollen, P. J., Mangano, Thompson, Brown and Weinstein, JJ., concur.
# C_2019172EN.01004501.xml

| 20.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 172/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 172/45

---

Action brought on 29 March 2019 — Glaxo Group v EUIPO (colour mark purple)

(Case T-187/19)

(2019/C 172/59)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Glaxo Group Ltd (Brentford, United Kingdom) (represented by: S. Malynicz, QC, S. Baran, Barrister and R. Jacob, Solicitor)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union colour mark purple (PANTONE: 2587C) — Application for registration No 14 596 951

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 15 January 2019 in Case R 1870/2017-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by finding that the sign lacked inherent distinctive character so that it could not validly be registered as a trade mark; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by finding that the sign lacked inherent distinctive character so that it could not validly be registered as a trade mark;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) and Article 7(3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by failing to find that the sign had acquired distinctiveness through the use made of it by the applicant for annulment and/or with its authorisation. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) and Article 7(3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by failing to find that the sign had acquired distinctiveness through the use made of it by the applicant for annulment and/or with its authorisation.

---
#### Long Island University et al., Plaintiffs, v J. Baranello & Sons et al., Defendants. J. Baranello & Sons, Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, v Bri-Den Construction Co., Inc., et al., Third-Party Defendants, and William Bayley Company, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Kenneth Shorter, J.), entered on April 19, 1985, unanimously affirmed. Respondent shall recover of appellant $50 costs and disbursements of this appeal. Application by appellant to strike plaintiff’s brief granted. No opinion. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Sandler, Sullivan, Asch and Kassal, JJ.
# C_2019295EN.01006301.xml

| 2.9.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 295/63 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.9.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 295/63

---

Action brought on 1 July 2019 — Arroni v Parliament

(Case T-443/19)

(2019/C 295/82)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Aldo Arroni (Milan, Italy) (represented by: M. Merola and L. Florio, lawyers)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

| — | order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

| — | order the European Parliament to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those relied on in Case T-389/19, Coppo Gavazzi v Parliament.

---
EXHIBIT 31.1

               CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a)

        I, Melissa Payner-Gregor, certify that:

        1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Bluefly, Inc;

        2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
quarterly report;

        3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for the periods presented in this report;

        4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

                a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

                b. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

                c. disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's
most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely
to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting; and

        5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation, of internal control over financial
reporting to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

                a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

                b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting.

Date:  May 3, 2005                                 /s/Melissa Payner-Gregor
                                                   ------------------------
                                                   Melissa Payner-Gregor
                                                   Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 23.1CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMWe consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (Form S-3 No.333-133890, Form S-8 No. 33-99214, 333-32039, 333-83193, 333-85320, 333-109186, 333-63076,333-112139, 333-126157, 333-131097, 333-136491, 333-138978 pertaining to the amended andrestated 1995 Stock Option Plan, Employee Stock Purchase Plan and International Employee StockPurchase Plan, 1995 Non-Employee Directors Stock Option Plan, Special Stock Option Plan, SanDiskCorporation 2005 Incentive Plan, SanDisk Corporation 2005 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, SanDiskCorporation 2005 International Employee Stock Purchase Plan, Rhombus, Inc. 1998 Long Term EquityIncentive Plan, Matrix Semiconductor, Inc. 1999 Stock Plan, Matrix Semiconductor, Inc. 2005 StockIncentive Plan, msystems Ltd. 2003 Stock Option and Restricted Stock Incentive Plan and themsystems Ltd. Section 102 Stock Option/Stock Purchase and Stock Option Plans) of SanDiskCorporation, of our reports dated February 22, 2007, with respect to the consolidated financialstatements of SanDisk Corporation, SanDisk Corporation’s management’s assessment of theeffectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of internalcontrol over financial reporting of SanDisk Corporation, included in the Annual Report on Form 10-Kfor the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006./s/ Ernst& Young LLPSan Jose, California
# C_2020061EN.01003401.xml

| 24.2.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 61/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.2.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 61/34

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Judgment of the General Court of 19 December 2019 — Nosio v EUIPO (BIANCOFINO)

(Case T-54/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU word mark BIANCOFINO - Absolute ground for refusal - No distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Obligation to state reasons - Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001)

(2020/C 61/42)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Nosio SpA (Mezzocorona, Italy) (represented by: J. Graffer and A. Ottolini, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Rampini, acting as Agent)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 November 2018 (Case R 2434/2017-1), relating to an application for registration of the word sign BIANCOFINO as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Nosio SpA to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Nosio SpA to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 112, 25.3.2019.

---
EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Minera Andes Inc. (the
"Corporation"), on Form 10-QSB for the three month period ended March 31, 2005
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Allen V. Ambrose, President of the Corporation, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Corporation.


MINERA ANDES INC.


Date:  May 20, 2005                         By:  /s/  Allen V. Ambrose
     ----------------                          --------------------------------
                                                      Allen V. Ambrose
                                                      President
#### Stephen G. Glatzer, Appellant, v Rocco Scappatura et al., Defendants, and Sherman & Citron et al., Respondents.

In an action to recover damages for fraud, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Sullivan, J.), entered June 7, 1984, which granted defendants Cecil Citron and Sherman & Citron’s motion to dismiss the third amended complaint as to them.

Order affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiffs second, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action fail to state a claim sounding in fraud against the moving defendants because plaintiff has failed to allege that the moving defendants made any representation, fraudulent or otherwise, to him *(see, Glatzer v Scappatura,*99 AD2d 505). The third amended complaint generally alleges that the moving defendants somehow participated in a scheme to defraud plaintiff and gave advice, direction and authorization to those members of the conspiracy who actually made the alleged fraudulent representations on which he relied to his detriment. However, as this court noted in plaintiffs recent appeal, "mere allegations, in conclusory form, that the moving defendants participated in or assisted in the commission of a fraud are insufficient to state a cause of action (see *Halperin v Lieberman,*271 App Div 878)” *(Glatzer v Scappatura, supra).*Further, we note that because plaintiff suffered no damages as a result of the conduct complained of in his fourth cause of action, the claim asserted therein was not actionable *(see, Channel Master Corp. v Aluminum Ltd. Sales,*4 NY2d 403, 407).

Plaintiffs sixth cause of action was also properly dismissed on the ground of collateral estoppel. In a previous action, *698plaintiff was precluded from objecting to the settlement of a lawsuit brought by two shareholders against Emergency Beacon Corporation. That very same objection forms the gravamen of plaintiff’s instant six cause of action, which is thus barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Plaintiffs fifth cause of action is time barred by the Statute of Limitations. The claim asserted therein was only interposed upon the service of plaintiffs third amended complaint, in February 1984. There was not sufficient notice given of the transactions intended to be proved in any of plaintiffs earlier complaints, and thus CPLR 203 (e) does not apply. Accordingly, since the alleged fraudulent conduct complained of occurred in 1976, and the claim was not interposed until 1984, the claim is barred by CPLR 213 (8). Gibbons, J. P., Weinstein, Fiber and Kooper, JJ., concur.