alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Communications Commission

          - 47 CFR Parts 2, 15, 90, and 95
          - [ET Docket No. 19-138; Report No. 3176; FR ID 37402]

# AGENCY:

Federal Communications Commission.

# ACTION:

Petition for Reconsideration; correction.

# SUMMARY:

                        The Federal Communications Commission (Commission) published a document in the                         **Federal Register**                         of July 7, 2021, regarding three Petitions for Reconsideration (Petitions) filed in the Commission's rulemaking proceeding. The document did not address the withdrawal of one of those petitions. This document corrects that error.                    

# DATES:

Oppositions to the Petitions must be filed on or before July 22, 2021. Replies to an opposition must be filed on or before August 2, 2021.

# ADDRESSES:

Federal Communications Commission, 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Jamie Coleman, Office of Engineering and Technology, (202) 418-2705 or                         *Jamie.Coleman@fcc.gov.*

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    In FR Doc. 21-14494, appearing on page 35700 in the                     **Federal Register**                     on July 7, 2021, the following correction is made:                

On page 35700, in the first column, the summary is corrected to read “SUMMARY: Petitions for Reconsideration (Petitions) have been filed in the Commission's rulemaking proceeding by Sean T. Conway, on behalf of 5G Automotive Association, and Hilary Cain, on behalf of The Alliance for Automotive Innovation. A third Petition for Reconsideration, filed by Julian Gehman on behalf of The Amateur Radio Emergency Data Network, was withdrawn on June 21, 2021.”

Dated: July 7, 2021.

Federal Communications Commission.

Marlene Dortch,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2021-15076 Filed 7-16-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 58 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That, in the enrollment of the bill (H.R. 

3 4240) an Act to reauthorize the North Korean Human 

4 Rights Act of 2004, and for other purposes, the Clerk of 

5 the House of Representatives shall make the following cor6 rection: in section 7, insert ‘‘is amended’’ before ‘‘by strik7 ing’’. 

Passed the Senate August 2, 2012. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 
112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. CON. RES. 58 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Directing the Clerk of the House of Representatives 

4240. to make a correction in the enrollment of H.R.
# C_2020378EN.01002901.xml

| 9.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 378/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 378/29

---

Judgment of the General Court of 9 September 2020 — Casual Dreams v EUIPO — López Fernández (Dayaday)

(Case T-50/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark Dayaday - Earlier national figurative marks DAYADAY and dayaday - Relative grounds for refusal - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001) - Reputation - Unfair advantage taken of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark)

(2020/C 378/34)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Casual Dreams, SLU (Manresa, Spain) (represented by: A. B. Padial Martínez, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: H. O'Neill, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Miguel Ángel López Fernández (Fuensalida, Spain)

Re

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 November 2018 (Case R 2097/2018-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Casual Dreams and Mr López Fernández.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 16 November 2018 (Case R 2097/2018-5) in so far as it concerns the following goods:






  — | ‘Polarizing spectacles’, ‘Snow goggles’, ‘Cyclists’ glasses’, ‘Goggles for sports’, ‘Swim goggles’, in Class 9; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 16 November 2018 (Case R 2097/2018-5) in so far as it concerns the following goods:

—

‘Polarizing spectacles’, ‘Snow goggles’, ‘Cyclists’ glasses’, ‘Goggles for sports’, ‘Swim goggles’, in Class 9;

| — | ‘Wash cloths’, ‘Textile goods and substitutes for textile goods’, ‘Fabrics’, ‘Textiles, not included in other classes’, in Class 24; |
| --- | --- |

—

‘Wash cloths’, ‘Textile goods and substitutes for textile goods’, ‘Fabrics’, ‘Textiles, not included in other classes’, in Class 24;

| 2. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 3. | Orders the parties each to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the parties each to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 103, 18.3.2019.

---
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

CHARLES THOMPSON

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 2 2

- 2812

[ July 20, 2023 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm

Beach County; Barry M. Cohen , Judge; L.T. Case No. 50

- 2021

- CF003643A

.

Charles Thompson, Arcadia , pro se.

No appearance for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

D AMOORGIAN

, F ORST and K UNTZ

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### James L. Welton et al., Appellants, v Town of Kent et al., Respondents.

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from water contamination, plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Beisheim, J.), dated August 19,1983, which, upon the motion of the defendants Putnam County and Putnam County Board of Health to dismiss the complaint as against them for nonjoinder of the State of New York as a necessary party, dismissed the complaint as against all defendants “without prejudice to the right of the plaintiffs to pursue their claim against the defendants in the Court of Claims”.

Order reversed, without costs or disbursements, and motion denied. *(See, Baisley v Town of Kent,*111 AD2d 299.) Thompson, J. P., Brown, Niehoff and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Larry Costa, Petitioner, v William Connolly, as Superintendent of Fishkill Correctional Facility, Respondent.

[942 NYS2d 693]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

While a correction officer was doing the count in one of the visiting rooms, petitioner repeatedly distracted the officer by asking him if he got the count right. He then ignored the officer’s directive to stop talking and, as a result, the count was delayed. Due to his conduct, petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with harassment, refusing a direct order, delaying the count and violating visiting room procedures. He was found guilty of the charges at the conclusion of a tier II disciplinary hearing. The determination was affirmed on administrative appeal with a modified penalty. This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.

We confirm. The misbehavior report and related documentation, together with the testimony of the correction officer who wrote the report, provide substantial evidence supporting the determination of guilt *(see Matter of Daughtry v Bezio,*84 AD3d 1623, 1624 [2011], *lv denied*17 NY3d 709 [2011]; *Matter of Bartley v Fischer,*73 AD3d 1363, 1363-1364 [2010]). Petitioner’s assertion that the report was written in retaliation for complaints he and his wife filed against its author presented a credibility issue for the Hearing Officer to resolve *(see Matter of White v Fischer,*87 AD3d 1249, 1260 [2011]; *Matter of Kalwasinski v Fischer,*87 AD3d 1187, 1188 [2011]). Moreover, we reject petitioner’s claim that the misbehavior report was defective because it did not accurately identify the visiting room where the incident occurred. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by this inaccuracy as he indicated at the hearing that he knew precisely where the incident occurred. In view of this, and given the other particulars set forth in the report, we find that it provided petitioner with sufficient notice of the charges to enable him to prepare a defense *(see Matter of Linares v Fischer,*59 AD3d 761 [2009], *lv denied*12 NY3d 709 [2009]; *Matter of Ragland v Great Meadow Correctional Facility,*245 AD2d 612, 612 [1997]). Petitioner’s remaining claims have either not been preserved for our review or are lacking in merit.

Rose, J.P, Lahtinen, Kavanagh, Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
IIA 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. J. RES. 27 

Disapproving a rule submitted by the Environmental Protection Agency relating to the mitigation by States of cross-border air pollution under the 

Clean Air Act. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 8, 2011 

Mr. PAUL introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Disapproving a rule submitted by the Environmental Protection Agency relating to the mitigation by States of crossborder air pollution under the Clean Air Act. 

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 That Congress disapproves the rule submitted to Congress 

4 by the Environmental Protection Agency on July 11, 

5 2011, entitled ‘‘Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate 

6 Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Cor7 rection of SIP Approvals’’ (76 Fed. Reg. 48208 (August 

8 8, 2011)), relating to the mitigation by States of crossVerDate Mar 15 2010 01:31 Sep 09, 2011 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\SJ27.IS SJ27

tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•SJ 27 IS 

1 border air pollution under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 

2 7401 et seq.), and such rule shall have no force or effect. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Douglas R.
Young, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of NeoMagic Corporation on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended July 27, 2008
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of
operations of NeoMagic Corporation.



|                         |  |                        
|------------------------ |  | -----------------------
|Date: September 15, 2008
|                         | 
|By:                      |  | /s/ Douglas R. Young   
|Name:                    |  | Douglas R. Young       
|Title:                   |  | Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Equitex, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"). I, Henry Fong, President,
Treasurer and Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company, as of, and for the periods presented in the Report.



                                       /s/ Henry Fong
                                       ----------------------------------------
                                       Henry Fong
                                       President, Treasurer and
                                       Chief Executive Officer
                                       August 23, 2004


A SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 906 HAS BEEN
PROVIDED TO EQUITEX, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES AND WILL BE RETAINED BY EQUITEX, INC.
AND SUBSIDIARIES AND FURNISHED TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OR ITS
STAFF UPON REQUEST.
Exhibit 32



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Tornado Gold International Corp. a
Nevada corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ending December
31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), Earl W. Abbott, Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certifies to the best of his knowledge,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Tornado Gold International Corp., and will be retained by Tornado
Gold International Corp. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.




/s/ Earl W. Abbott
--------------------------
Earl W. Abbott
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
August 30, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S.DOLLAR
       
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</TABLE>
#### Rebecca Ann DORAN, Plaintiff, v. Maurice F. PRIDDY, D. O., Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 79-1443.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

Nov. 4, 1981.

Patrick J. Michaud, Michaud, Cordry & Michaud, Wichita, Kan., for plaintiff.

Larry Withers, Kahrs, Nelson, Fanning, Hite & Kellogg, Wichita, Kan., Keith R. Henry, Weary, Davis, Henry, Struebing & Troup, Junction City, Kan., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THEIS, District Judge.

This case is a slander action. Plaintiff alleges that defendant called her a “little whore.” Plaintiff has filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence that she participated in extramarital sexual affairs on the grounds that such evidence is irrelevant and prejudicial. In addition to denying that such a statement was made, defendant has asserted truth as a defense and claims that evidence of extramarital sex is relevant to whether plaintiff was a “whore” at the time of the alleged slander.

*455The legal issue in this case is the meaning of “whore.” Plaintiff asserts that for truth to be a defense, defendant must show plaintiff was a prostitute and engaged in sex for material compensation. Defendant states that “whore” has a broader meaning than “prostitute,” and encompasses unchastity or lewdness in general, and that the evidence of extramarital sex goes to the essence of proving truth as a defense.

Both sides have cited a number of cases supporting their respective positions. Cases in which “whore” was held to have a broader meaning than “prostitute,” include *Rowe v. Myers,*204 Mich. 374, 169 N.W. 823 (1918); *Peterson v. Murray,*13 Ind.App. 420, 41 N.E. 836 (1895). Cases in which “whore” is linked just with prostitution include *Barnett v. Phelps,*97 Or. 242, 191 P. 502 (1920); and *Hollman v. Brady,*233 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1956). Both sides have pointed to dictionaries, with plaintiff showing that the first meaning given is “prostitute,” and defendant pointing out that other dictionary meanings include unchastity or a practitioner of illicit sexual intercourse.

The Court is going to look to the usual, proper and natural meaning of the word. See *Cooper v. Seaverns,*81 Kan. 267, 269, 105 P. 509 (1909). In the Court’s view, the usual, proper and natural meaning of “whore” in today’s world is “prostitute,” someone who practices sex for hire. While at one time the word “whore” may have generally been taken as a reference to unchastity, in today’s world, with its more liberal attitudes toward sexuality, the common meaning is that a “whore” is one who “plays for pay,” and not one who engages in sex merely for gratification as opposed to material compensation.

For this reason the Court will grant plaintiff’s motion to exclude evidence of extramarital affairs lacking the element of prostitution, as the evidence is irrelevant as to the truth or falsity of whether she was a “whore,” and is also highly prejudicial under Section 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

It Is So Ordered.
#### John Ciccarella, an Infant, by Vincent Ciccarella, His Parent and Natural Guardian, et al., Respondents, v Frederick Graf et al., Appellants.

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., defendants appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Velsor, J., at trial on liability; Roncallo, J., at trial on damages), dated May 8, 1984, which, upon separate jury verdicts on liability (apportioning 65% liability to defendants Graf and Veterans Transportation Co. and 35% to the defendant County of Nassau) and damages, was in favor of plaintiffs in the principal sum of $50,000.

Judgment affirmed, with one bill of costs.

The infant plaintiff was injured in a school bus accident on February 26, 1981. At the trial on the issue of liability, plaintiffs presented sufficient proof of the bus driver’s negligence to support the jury’s verdict finding him and his employer, Veterans Transportation Co., at fault. Defendant County of Nassau contends that it was not liable for the accident (which the bus driver claimed occurred when the right front wheel of the bus hit a pothole causing a blowout), because it had no prior notice of the existence of the pothole. However, the bus driver testified that he had observed the pothole the day before the accident, contradicting the testimony of a county employee who claimed to have inspected the road on the morning of the accident and had failed to observe any potholes. Resolution of the witnesses’ credibility was the jury’s proper function and we see no basis for disturbing its conclusion *(see, Taype v City of New York,*82 AD2d 648). The *616bus driver’s testimony was sufficient to support a finding that the county had constructive notice of the pothole and had a duty, which it breached, to repair it *(see, Harris v Village of East Hills,*41 NY2d 446, 450; *Gaines v Long Is. State Park Commn.,*60 AD2d 724).

Plaintiffs’ expert testified that the infant plaintiff suffered a compression "fracture of the T-8 vertebrae”, a permanent, "pain-producing injury”. Although defendant’s experts disagreed with that diagnosis, the jury’s resolution of the conflicting opinions of the experts must prevail *(see, Felt v Olson,*51 NY2d 977; *Rametta v Kazlo,*68 AD2d 579). Plaintiffs’ evidence adequately established "serious injury” as defined in Insurance Law § 5102 (d) and as found by the jury *(see, Slack v Crossetta,*75 AD2d 809).

We find no errors in evidentiary rulings made by the trial court at the trial on damages, nor do we find the amount of damages awarded by the jury excessive *(see, Juiditta v Bethlehem Steel Corp.,*75 AD2d 126, 138). Thompson, J. P., Brown, Weinstein and Eiber, JJ., concur.