SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1099 

KA 10-01864 

PRESENT: FAHEY, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, WHALEN, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES BEARD, ALSO KNOWN AS “POPS,” 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, ESQS., SYRACUSE (BRADLEY E. KEEM OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

SCOTT D. MCNAMARA, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, UTICA (STEVEN G. COX OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Oneida County Court (Michael L.

Dwyer, J.), rendered March 9, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant,

upon a jury verdict, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the

third degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a controlled

substance in the third degree (two counts). 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law and a new trial is granted. 

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury

verdict of two counts each of criminal possession of a controlled

substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1]) and criminal

sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (§ 220.39 [1]),

defendant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to

support his conviction. Defendant contends that the People failed to

establish that he had constructive possession of the controlled

substance (drugs) because there is no evidence that he controlled the

premises where the drugs were sold or that he exercised control over

the unknown suspect who participated in the drug sales. That

contention is unpreserved for our review inasmuch as it was not

specifically raised in support of defendant’s motion for a trial order

of dismissal (see People v Latorre, 94 AD3d 1429, 1429-1430, lv denied

19 NY3d 998; People v Jones, 92 AD3d 1218, 1218, lv denied 19 NY3d

962; see generally People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19). In any event, that

contention lacks merit because the evidence is legally sufficient to

establish that defendant “exercised ‘dominion or control’ over the

[drugs] by a sufficient level of control . . . over the [unknown

suspect] from whom the [drugs were] seized” (People v Manini, 79 NY2d

561, 573, quoting Penal Law § 10.00 [8]; see Penal Law § 220.39). 

There is likewise no merit to defendant’s further contention, which is

preserved for our review, that the evidence is legally insufficient to
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KA 10-01864 

establish defendant’s identity (see Jones, 92 AD3d at 1218). “It is

well settled that, even in circumstantial evidence cases, the standard

for appellate review of legal sufficiency issues is whether any valid

line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational

person to the conclusion reached by the [jury] on the basis of the

evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the People”

(People v Hines, 97 NY2d 56, 62, rearg denied 97 NY2d 678 [internal

quotation marks omitted]; see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d

490, 495). Here, we conclude that the trial evidence, although

largely circumstantial, could lead a rational person to conclude that

defendant was the individual who arranged the drug sales (see Latorre,

94 AD3d at 1430; Jones, 92 AD3d at 1218). Further, although a

different result would not have been unreasonable (see People v

Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348; Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495), we conclude

that, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as

charged to the jury (see Danielson, 9 NY3d at 349), the verdict is not

against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at

495). 

We agree with defendant, however, that he is entitled to a new

trial because County Court violated his right to counsel. “Under our

State and Federal Constitutions, an indigent defendant in a criminal

case is guaranteed the right to counsel” (People v Medina, 44 NY2d

199, 207; see US Const, 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6; People v

Linares, 2 NY3d 507, 510). That “right does not begin and end with

the assignment of counsel” (Linares, 2 NY3d at 510). Rather, trial

courts bear the “ongoing duty” to “ ‘carefully evaluate serious

complaints about counsel’ ” (id. at 510, quoting Medina, 44 NY2d at

207; see People v Sides, 75 NY2d 822, 824). Although “[t]he right of

an indigent criminal defendant to the services of a court-appointed

lawyer does not encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyers

at defendant’s option[,] . . . the right to be represented by counsel

of one’s own choosing is a valued one, and a defendant may be entitled

to new assigned counsel upon showing ‘good cause for a substitution’ ”

(Sides, 75 NY2d at 824, quoting Medina, 44 NY2d at 207). Thus, trial

courts are obligated to conduct, at the very least, a “ ‘minimal

inquiry’ ” when a defendant voices “ ‘seemingly serious’ ” complaints

about his or her assigned defense counsel (People v Porto, 16 NY3d 93,

100, quoting Sides, 75 NY2d at 824-825).

Here, we conclude that defendant articulated complaints about his

assigned counsel that were sufficiently serious to trigger the court’s

duty to engage in an inquiry regarding those complaints (see Sides, 75

NY2d at 824-825). Before jury selection, defendant advised the court

that he was not comfortable proceeding with his assigned attorney

because he had never spoken to the attorney before that time, he had

not been informed that his trial was commencing that day, and he had

not been informed of certain pretrial hearings conducted in his

absence. The court interrupted defendant and engaged in an off-therecord discussion with the attorneys. Thereafter, the court explained

to defendant that the trial was “going to have to go forward” with his

assigned counsel because “[t]he District Attorney’s Office has brought

up a confidential witness all the way from the State of Texas and
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KA 10-01864 

they’re ready to go today,” the District Attorney’s office had “spent

a lot of money” to secure the confidential witness, and there were 50

prospective jurors in the courthouse. The court then proceeded to

explain the jury selection process and, when the court asked defendant

whether he would permit defense counsel to handle certain juror issues

at the bench, outside of defendant’s presence, defendant reiterated

that he did not “feel comfortable” with defense counsel. The court

replied that “if [defendant could] afford to hire [his] own attorney,

[he could] do so, but if [he could not] afford to do that, then the

Public Defender’s Office . . . has designated [defense counsel] as

[his] trial attorney and so [defense counsel would] be [his] trial

attorney.”

Defendant’s allegations——in particular, the allegation that he

had never previously spoken to his assigned counsel and that he was

unaware his trial was commencing that day——are serious on their face

and should not have been “summarily dismiss[ed]” by the court,

especially in light of the fact that defendant’s allegations are

either supported by or uncontradicted by the record (Sides, 75 NY2d at

825; cf. People v Augustine, 89 AD3d 1238, 1240-1241, lv denied 19

NY3d 957). Indeed, the record established that an assistant public

defender other than defendant’s assigned counsel met with defendant

before trial and reviewed with him critical evidence, i.e., the police

surveillance videotapes, prepared an extensive omnibus motion, and

argued the motion. Additionally, the record does not contradict

defendant’s allegations that he was not apprised of a change in the

trial date and that a hearing was conducted in his absence. 

Specifically, although the record establishes that defendant was

present when the court initially scheduled the trial date, there is no

evidence that he subsequently received notice of the change in the

trial date. Moreover, the minutes of the court clerk indicate that an

audibility hearing was held, but no transcript of that proceeding is

included in the record. Thus, there is no evidence that defendant was

present at that hearing.

We therefore conclude, based on the record before us, that the

court violated defendant’s fundamental right to counsel by failing to

make any inquiry concerning his serious complaints regarding his

assigned counsel (see Sides, 75 NY2d at 824-825; cf. People v Haith,

44 AD3d 369, 370, lv denied 9 NY3d 1034; People v Reese, 23 AD3d 1034,

1035, lv denied 6 NY3d 779; People v England, 19 AD3d 154, 154-155, lv

denied 5 NY3d 805). The court did not, for example, ask defendant to

explain his position or ask defense counsel, on the record, to address

defendant’s allegations that they had never met or that defendant had

not been advised of the new trial date. Instead, as noted above, the

court advised defendant that the trial would proceed with his assigned

counsel because the District Attorney’s office had arranged for the

appearance of a confidential witness, who had traveled from Texas, and

prospective jurors were waiting. While “[t]he court might well have

found upon limited inquiry that defendant’s [complaints regarding his

assigned counsel were] without genuine basis, . . . it could not so

summarily dismiss [his complaints]” (Sides, 75 NY2d at 825; see People

v Graham, 169 AD2d 512, 512-513, lv denied 77 NY2d 906; see generally

People v Branham, 59 AD3d 244, 245; People v Rodriguez, 46 AD3d 396,
-4- 1099 

KA 10-01864 

397, lv denied 10 NY3d 844).

We reject the People’s contention that the court had no duty to

conduct an inquiry regarding defendant’s complaints because his

assertions were “conclusory” (cf. People v Watkins, 77 AD3d 1403,

1404, lv denied 15 NY3d 956). To the contrary, defendant’s complaints

were highly specific and factual in nature. Additionally, we note

that the court failed to give defendant an opportunity to explain his

complaints. Indeed, the court cut defendant off, admonished him not

to interrupt, and advised him that, unless he could afford to hire his

own attorney, there would be no substitution of counsel (see Branham,

59 AD3d at 245; Rodriguez, 46 AD3d at 397; cf. People v Rodriguez, 166

AD2d 903, 904, lv denied 77 NY2d 910).

In light of our conclusion, there is no need to address

defendant’s remaining contentions.

Entered: November 16, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court