[Cite as Drew v. State ex rel. Neil, 2020-Ohio-4366.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

GEOFFREY DREW

 Petitioner, 

 vs. 

THE STATE OF OHIO, EX REL. 

JIM NEIL, 

 Respondent. 

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APPEAL NO. C-190609 

TRIAL NO. B-1904419 

 O P I N I O N.

 

Original Action in Habeas Corpus 

Judgment of Court: Petition Denied 

Date of Judgment Entry: September 9, 2020 

L. Patrick Mulligan & Associates, LLC, and Brandon A. Moermond, for petitioner Geoffrey 

Drew. 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alex S. Havlin, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Respondent State of Ohio ex rel. Jim Neil, 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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BERGERON, Judge. 

{¶1} Indicted on nine counts of rape in August 2019 for conduct occurring decades 

ago, petitioner Geoffrey Drew challenged the staggering $5,000,000 bail set by the trial 

court at arraignment. He first requested that the trial court reduce the amount of the bail, 

but to no avail—the court denied his motion. This ultimately prompted Mr. Drew to seek 

relief from this court through the mechanism of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

claiming excessive bail. The state, on behalf of respondent Hamilton County Sheriff Jim 

Neil, requested that we deny the petition, maintaining that the trial court acted within its 

discretion, and highlighting Mr. Drew’s failure to meet his burden in order to establish 

entitlement to relief. Based on the record at hand, we agree with the state and deny the writ. 

{¶2} In Ohio, appellate courts enjoy original jurisdiction over writs of habeas 

corpus and are empowered with the authority to grant such relief. Ohio Constitution, 

Article IV, Section 3(B)(1)(c) (“The courts of appeals shall have original jurisdiction in the 

following * * * [h]abeas corpus[.]”); R.C. 2725.02 (“The writ of habeas corpus may be 

granted by the supreme court, court of appeals, court of common pleas, probate court, or by 

a judge of any such court.”). Moreover, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the 

appropriate channel for a claim of excessive pretrial bail. Chari v. Vore, 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 

325, 744 N.E.2d 763 (2001) (“Habeas corpus is the proper remedy to raise the claim of 

excessive bail in pre-trial release cases.”). Courts recognize this procedural avenue because 

the Ohio Constitution secures the right to reasonable bail. Ohio Constitution, Article 1, 

Section 9 (“All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties * * * [e]xcessive bail shall not 

be required[.]”). Therefore, where an offense is bailable, the right to reasonable bail may 

not be denied or infringed. Lazzerini v. Maier, 2018-Ohio-1788, 111 N.E.3d 727, ¶ 2 (5th 

Dist.). 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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{¶3} We treat review of a claim of excessive bail brought in a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus as presenting a type of “hybrid” standard of review. Smith v. Leis, 165 Ohio 

App.3d 581, 2006-Ohio-450, 847 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.). As the action is akin to an 

appeal from the trial court, we afford “some weight” to the trial court’s decision setting the 

bail, but we also recognize that habeas corpus is an original action which normally warrants 

independent review. Id. (finding that trial court abused its discretion when setting 

petitioner’s bail); In re DeFronzo, 49 Ohio St.2d 271, 273, 361 N.E.2d 448 (1977) (noting an 

anomaly in original actions which seek habeas corpus relief for excessive bail, the effect of 

which is an appeal from the trial court, but as an original action permits hearings and 

findings of fact). Therefore, we first focus our examination on whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in setting the bail amount. Garcia v. Wasylyshyn, 6th Dist. Wood No. 

WD-07-041, 2007-Ohio-3951, ¶ 6, citing Hardy v. McFaul, 103 Ohio St.3d 408, 2004-Ohio5467, 816 N.E.2d 248, ¶ 7. And if we find an abuse of discretion, we may exercise our own 

independent judgment in resetting bail at a reasonable figure based on the evidence 

presented to us. Gallagher v. Johnson, 129 Ohio App.3d 775, 779, 719 N.E.2d 60 (11th 

Dist.1998), citing DeFronzo at 273. In other words, the petitioner bears the burden of 

showing “that appropriate grounds for independent review by this court exist.” Garcia at ¶ 

9. 

{¶4} In bringing a habeas corpus action, the petitioner must establish “(1) the 

person whose liberty is restrained, (2) the officer who is confining the prisoner, (3) the place 

where the person is imprisoned, and (4) a copy of the commitment or cause of detention.” 

Smith at ¶ 13; R.C. 2725.04. Additionally, the petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate 

“with particularity the extraordinary circumstances entitling him to habeas corpus relief.” 

State ex rel. Wilcox v. Seidner, 76 Ohio St.3d 412, 414, 667 N.E.2d 1220 (1996); Chari at 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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325 (noting that in a habeas corpus case the burden rests on the petitioner to establish his 

or her right to release). 

{¶5} In reviewing a claim of excessive bail, we note that the purpose of bail is to 

ensure the accused’s presence at trial, and therefore, the reasonableness of the bail amount 

“is a question for the exercise of sound discretion by the trial court * * * dependent upon all 

the facts and circumstances in each individual case.” Lazzerini, 2018-Ohio-1788, 111 N.E.3d 

727, at ¶ 2, citing Bland v. Holden, 21 Ohio St.2d 238, 239, 257 N.E.2d 397 (1970); Sargent 

v. Leis, 159 Ohio App.3d 658, 2005-Ohio-526, 825 N.E.2d 178, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.), citing 

Jenkins v. Billy, 43 Ohio St.3d 84, 85, 538 N.E.2d 1045 (1989) (noting that amount of bail 

in within discretion of the trial court). In setting the amount of bail, Crim.R. 46(C) directs 

the trial court to factors it should weigh in making this determination, including: the nature 

and circumstances of the charged crime, weight of the evidence against the defendant, 

confirmation of the defendant’s identity, consideration of the defendant’s familial ties, 

employment, financial resources, residence in the community, conviction record, mental 

condition, and finally, whether the defendant is on probation, bail, community control or 

protection order. Crim.R. 46(C)(1-5). Therefore, examining the propriety of the amount of 

bail requires a consideration of these factors as well as any conditions of bail. Smith at ¶ 16. 

Crim.R. 46 was recently amended (effective July 1, 2020, after Mr. Drew’s hearing) to 

require the least amount of monetary bail: any monetary conditions “shall be in an amount 

and type which are least costly to the defendant while also sufficient to reasonably assure 

the defendant’s future appearance in court.” Crim.R. 46(B). 

{¶6} Here, Mr. Drew maintains that the trial court improperly deemed him a flight 

risk, pointing to his age, finances, and familial and community ties to imply that the trial 

court misapplied the Crim.R. 46 factors. But Mr. Drew failed to supply the transcripts of 

the trial court hearing from which we might review the trial court’s evaluation of the Crim.R. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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46 factors. See Armendariz v. McFaul, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82703, 2003-Ohio-2327, ¶ 

6-10 (review of transcript of the hearing on motion to reduce bail amount revealed that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reduce bail amount); Hardy, 103 Ohio 

St.3d 408, 2004-Ohio-5467, 816 N.E.2d 248, at ¶ 10 (presumption of regularity where 

petitioner failed to include transcript of bail hearing in which the trial court noted its 

reasons for its bail amount). Nor did Mr. Drew present any other evidence which supports 

his claims that he is not a flight risk, such as proof of his financial status or passport status. 

See Lazzerini at ¶ 8 (noting that petitioner failed to introduce evidence to support his claims 

regarding excessive bail). To be sure, he makes conclusory statements, but we need more 

than that to grant relief, particularly when we lack a transcript of what transpired before the 

trial court. 

{¶7} In original actions, one means of providing substantiation of certain factual 

matters is through the vehicle of the stipulated factual record. 1st Dist. Loc.R. 33.2 (“To 

facilitate the consideration and disposition of original actions, counsel, when possible, 

should submit an agreed statement of facts.”). While the parties did tender us a stipulated 

set of facts, these facts steer well clear of any of the considerations under Crim.R. 46 or any 

examination of the review undertaken by the trial court. Nor does Mr. Drew offer us 

probative information relevant to other factors the trial court needs to consider in setting 

the amount of bail, such as the strength of the evidence against him or the nature and 

circumstances of the crimes charged. See Miller v. Reid, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96110, 

2010-Ohio-6485, ¶ 10 (though nothing in record indicated that petitioner was flight risk, in 

light of all the circumstances the trial court did not err in increasing bail). 

{¶8} Mr. Drew does tender a chart that he created reflecting bail amounts in other 

similar alleged offenses (including some claimed to be more serious offenses) that portrays 

his $5 million bail as an excessive outlier. We acknowledge this comparative evidence is 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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troubling, to say the least, but standing alone, it cannot translate into a ticket to a writ. A 

petitioner must marshal a more powerful evidentiary record highlighting the problems 

inherent in the trial court’s decision before triggering our independent review. 

{¶9} As a last gasp, Mr. Drew concludes that the only rational explanation for the 

amount of bail is the high media attention on the case, but he again fails to transform this 

suspicion into something of evidentiary quality. See Johnson v. LaRose, 7th Dist. Mahoning 

No. 18 MA 0135, 2019-Ohio-5443, ¶ 6 (unsupported and uncorroborated statements by 

petitioner are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the court’s 

judgment); Chari, 91 Ohio St.3d at 328, 744 N.E.2d 763 (dismissal of habeas corpus petition 

appropriate where it was “replete with unsupported, legal conclusions” that the bail was 

unlawful, excessive, and unconstitutional). 

{¶10} Therefore, while we recognize that this case involves an extremely high bail 

and one that might ordinarily give us pause, Mr. Drew has not made a proper showing of the 

excessiveness of bail under the circumstances of the case. See Lewis v. Telb, 26 Ohio 

App.3d 11, 12, 497 N.E.2d 1376 (6th Dist.1985) (noting that before relief may be afforded in 

petitions of this nature it must be clear that the amount of bail set was unreasonable and the 

necessary criteria under Crim.R. 46 was not applied in setting the amount of bail); Jenkins,

43 Ohio St.3d at 85, 538 N.E.2d 1045 (“[P]etitioner alleges no facts that indicate an abuse of 

discretion by the trial court or that appropriate grounds for independent review by this 

court exist.”). Ultimately, we find nothing to demonstrate an abuse of discretion on the 

record presented by Mr. Drew. 

{¶11} Based on the foregoing, we accordingly deny Mr. Drew’s habeas corpus 

petition. 

 Petition denied. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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WINKLER, J., concurs.

MOCK, P.J., concurs in judgment only.

Please note: 

The court has recorded its own entry this date.