1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DUANE J. JOHNSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civ. Action No. 11
- 0119 (RMC) ) STEPHEN J. MCCOOL et al. , ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION In what remains of this civil action, the United States moves to dismiss plaintiff
Duane J. Johnson ’s surviving claims of conversion and trover under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or for summary judgment under Rule 56 . Renewed Mot. to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. 39]. See Johnson v. McCool , 808 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D.D.C. 2011) ( substituting the United States and dismissing Mr. Johnson’s breach of contract claim). Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions , and f or the following reasons, the Court will grant the United States’ motion to dismiss under Rule 1 2(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

T he United States argues that this Co urt lacks juris diction over Mr. Johnson’s tort
claims because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies un der the Federal Tort Claims
Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671

- 2680

. Mr. Johnson has not refuted the United
States’ argument for dismissal , see generally Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Pl

. ’s Opp’n to Def.’s
Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. 46], and a n FTCA “action shall not be instituted . . . unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.” 28 U.S .C.2

§ 2675(a) ; see also § 2401(b) (“forever barr[ing]” tort claim that is not “presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues . . . ”). The e xhaustion
of administrative remedies i s a jurisdictional prerequ isite to maintaining a lawsuit under the
FTCA. See GAF Corp. v. United States , 818 F.2d 901, 917

- 20 (D.C. Cir. 1987); McAlister v.
Potter , 843 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123 (D.D.C. 2012) ; see also Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov’t , 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C

. Cir. 1997) (explaining that since “[t]his court and the other courts of appeals have treated the FTCA's requirement of filing an administrative complaint with the appropriate agency prior to instituting an action as jurisdictional[,] . . . the [district] court could no more rule in favor of the government than against it. ”)

.

Since Mr. Johnson has not refuted the United States’ argument that he failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies under the FTCA with respect to his surviving claims of
conversion and trover , the Court finds that he has conceded that argument

. See Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. Of Global Ministries , 284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003) (“It is well
understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”) (citing FDIC v. Bender , 127 F.3d 58, 67

– 68 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (other citation omitted) ; Order (Feb. 2, 2012) [Dkt. 40] (advising Mr. Johnson about responding to the United States’ dispositive motion). Hence, t he Court, lacking subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Johnson’s unexhausted tort claims , must dismiss the case. See
Abdu r rahman v. Engstrom , 168 F

. App’x 445 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“[T]he district court properly dismissed case [based on unexhausted FTCA claim] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”)

. A memorializing Order accompa nies this M emorandum Opinion.

__________

/s/

______________ ROSEMARY M. COLLYER Date: August 14 , 201 2 United States District Judge