IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 04–1705

Filed October 9, 2009

VALENTINO MAGHEE,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis Reis, 

Judge.

Inmate appeals district court’s dismissal of his postconviction-relief 

action challenging the department of correction’s revocation of his work

release. REVERSED. 

Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.
2

TERNUS, Chief Justice.

This appeal presents two issues: (1) may an inmate whose work 

release has been revoked by the department of corrections challenge the 

revocation in a postconviction-relief action, and (2) does the inmate’s 

death during the pendency of the appeal abate the cause of action or 

render the appeal moot. The district court dismissed the postconvictionrelief action filed by the appellant, Valentino Maghee, ruling he should 

have challenged the department’s revocation of his work release by a 

petition for judicial review filed under Iowa Code chapter 17A (2003). 

Maghee appealed, but died prior to the filing of briefs. The State filed a 

motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis the case abated upon Maghee’s 

death. This court ordered the motion submitted with the appeal. 

Upon our review of the arguments of Maghee and the State, we 

determine Iowa’s survival statutes, Iowa Code sections 611.20 and

625A.17 (2005),1

In considering the proper vehicle for Maghee’s challenge to the 

revocation of his work release, we hold Maghee properly chose a 

postconviction-relief action to contest the revocation, and therefore, the 

district court erred in dismissing his petition. Notwithstanding our 

decision that the district court should not have dismissed Maghee’s 

petition on this ground, we do not remand this case. The underlying 

prevent abatement of Maghee’s cause of action and this 

appeal. On the other hand, Maghee’s death renders his appeal moot. 

Nonetheless, we conclude the issue raised in this appeal should be 

addressed under the public–interest exception to the mootness doctrine, 

and therefore, we deny the State’s motion to dismiss. 

 1Two different Codes control aspects of this case. Maghee’s discipline was 

imposed in 2003, and therefore, the 2003 Iowa Code governs his rights with respect to 

review of that decision. Maghee died in 2006. Consequently, the 2005 Iowa Code will 

control our determination of the impact his death had on this lawsuit and his claims. 
3

issue––the propriety of the department’s revocation of Maghee’s work 

release––is moot, and no exception to the mootness doctrine applies so

as to justify additional proceedings in the district court. Therefore, we 

reverse the judgment of the district court, but we do not remand the 

case.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

At the time of the events giving rise to this case, Maghee was 

serving a prison sentence with the department of corrections. After being 

assigned to a facility in Marshalltown on work release, Maghee violated 

several rules governing his release. As a consequence, his work release 

was revoked, and he was transferred back to prison. Maghee filed an 

application for postconviction relief, challenging his transfer on several 

grounds. See Iowa Code § 822.2(5) (2003) (now codified at Iowa Code 

§ 822.2(1)(e) (2009)) (providing person convicted of or sentenced for a 

public offense may commence a proceeding to obtain relief for certain 

specified claims, including a claim the person is “unlawfully held in 

custody or other restraint”). The district court dismissed his application 

on the State’s motion, ruling Maghee should have contested the 

revocation of his work release under Iowa’s Administrative Procedure Act, 

Iowa Code chapter 17A (2003), rather than in a postconviction-relief 

action.

Maghee appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit. During the 

pendency of his appeal, Maghee died. The State filed a motion to dismiss 

the appeal, claiming the action had abated due to Maghee’s death. This 

court ordered the State’s motion submitted with the appeal and 

requested that the parties brief two additional issues: (1) whether 

abatement was required, and (2) whether it would be appropriate to 
4

apply the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine. We turn 

now to these issues. 

II. State’s Motion to Dismiss.

At common law causes of action ex delicto, or sounding in tort, for 

injuries to the person abated or were extinguished upon the death of the 

plaintiff or defendant.2

If the cause of action was one that did not survive, death put 

a final end to the suit. If the cause was one that survived or 

could survive, the plaintiff or his executor was obliged to 

bring a new action against the defendant or his executor.

See Shafer v. Grimes, 23 Iowa 550, 553 (1867)

(referring to the “doctrine of the common law and the distinction between 

injuries merely personal (which die with the person) and those which 

affect the estate or property rights, and therefore survive to and against 

the executor”); 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, & Revival § 51, at 137

(2005) (“At common law survivable actions are those in which the wrong 

complained of affects primarily property and property rights, and in 

which any injury to the person is incidental . . . .”). In addition, suits

abated at common law upon “the death of a natural party before trial or 

verdict.” Shafer, 23 Iowa at 554. 

Id. Early in Iowa’s existence as a state, the legislature enacted survival 

statutes to ameliorate the harshness of these common-law rules. See, 

 2It is well established that criminal prosecutions, including any pending 

appellate proceedings, abate upon the death of the defendant. See, e.g., State v. 

Holbrook, 261 N.W.2d 480, 481 (Iowa 1978) (holding that “action is abated ab initio” as 

to defendant who died during pendency of appeal); State v. Rutledge, 243 Iowa 201, 

203, 50 N.W.2d 801, 802 (1952) (“Where a defendant in a criminal case dies while an 

appeal from his conviction is pending in this court, the proceedings abate, ab initio, by 

reason of such death.”); State v. Kriechbaum, 219 Iowa 457, 458, 258 N.W. 110, 110 

(1934) (“It is almost the universal holding of the courts, federal and state, that the death 

of a defendant in a criminal prosecution abates the action.”). A postconviction-relief 

action is civil in nature, Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000), so the rule 

abating criminal prosecutions upon the defendant’s death does not apply to the present 

proceeding. 
5

e.g., Iowa Code §§ 1698, 2502 (1851). See generally Fabricius v. Horgen,

257 Iowa 268, 272, 132 N.W.2d 410, 412 (1965) (“To the extent that [the 

survival statute] saves an action from abatement it is in derogation of the 

common law.”). 

The 1851 Code provided for the survival of causes of action 

ex delicto: “Unless from the necessity of the case, no cause of action 

ex delicto dies with either or both the parties, but the prosecution thereof 

may be commenced or continued by or against their respective 

representatives.” Iowa Code § 2502 (1851). By 1873, this statute had 

been expanded to apply to all causes of action without limitation: “All 

causes of action shall survive, and may be brought, notwithstanding the 

death of the person entitled or liable to same.” Iowa Code § 2525 (1873). 

This statute is currently codified in nearly identical form in chapter 611 

of subtitle 3 of Title XV, which deals with civil procedure: “All causes of 

action shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of 

the person entitled or liable to the same.” Iowa Code § 611.20 (2005).

The 1851 Code also addressed the abatement of suits already filed: 

“Actions do not abate by the death, marriage, or other disability of either 

party . . . if from the nature of the case the cause of action can survive or 

continue.” Iowa Code § 1698 (1851). The contemporary counterpart of 

this statute is also found in chapter 611 and states in relevant part: 

“Any action contemplated in sections 611.20 and 611.21 may be 

brought, or the court, on motion, may allow the action to be continued, 

by or against the legal representatives or successors in interest of the 

deceased.” Iowa Code § 611.22 (2005). Importantly, the limiting phrase, 

“if from the nature of the case the cause of action can survive or 

continue,” is no longer part of the statute. 
6

It appears that, beginning with the 1873 Code, a special survival 

statute governed appellate cases. See Iowa Code § 3211 (1873). The 

original language of section 3211 has been carried forward to the current 

survival statute governing appellate court procedure, which provides: 

“The death of one or all of the parties shall not cause the proceedings to 

abate, but the names of the proper persons shall be substituted . . . and 

the case may proceed.” Iowa Code § 625A.17 (2005). It is this statute 

upon which the appellant relies to resist the State’s motion to dismiss 

this appeal.

A reading of the straightforward language of the current statutes

would lead one to conclude that no civil claim or action abates upon the 

death of a party. Nonetheless, this court has long held that civil claims 

or actions personal to the decedent are extinguished by the decedent’s 

death. See Jahnke v. Jahnke, 526 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Iowa 1994) (holding 

death of adoptive parent abated action to vacate adoption 

notwithstanding section 611.20); AFSCME/Iowa Council 61 v. Iowa Dep’t 

of Pub. Safety, 434 N.W.2d 401, 405 (Iowa 1988) (noting rule that cause 

of action “personal to the decedent” does not survive, but holding rule 

did not apply under circumstances of that case); State ex rel. Turner v. 

Buechele, 236 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Iowa 1975) (holding survival statute did 

not prevent abatement of civil action “where the subject matter of the 

controversy [was] personal to the decedent”); Babbitt v. Corrigan, 157 

Iowa 382, 383, 138 N.W. 466, 467 (1912) (acknowledging the predecessor

statute to section 625A.17, yet dismissing appeal of suit seeking only 

“injunctional and penal” relief, noting death had enjoined the defendant). 

While the basis for this court-made exception is not entirely clear, it 

appears to have been carried over from Iowa’s original survival statutes

that provided for survival only “if from the nature of the case the cause of 
7

action can survive or continue,” Iowa Code § 1698 (1851), or “[u]nless 

from the necessity of the case,” the cause of action must die with a party, 

Iowa Code § 2502 (1851).

In Barney v. Barney, 14 Iowa 189 (1862), this court considered the 

1851 statute that saved claims from abatement “if from the nature of the 

case the cause of action can survive or continue.” Barney, 14 Iowa at 

192. In that case, a wife obtained a divorce decree dissolving her 

marriage. Id. at 191. The wife died shortly after entry of the decree, and 

the husband thereafter appealed. Id. We concluded that with respect to 

the dissolution of the marital relation the appeal could not proceed: 

The marital relation is personal in its character, and a 

proceeding to dissolve this relation is personal. . . . From the 

nature of the case, in so far as this proceeding related to the 

divorce, the cause was ended by the death of the 

complainant. It could not be revived, because there was 

nothing to survive, death itself having settled the question of 

separation beyond all controversy. 

Id. at 193. 

Notwithstanding the absence of qualifying language in later 

versions of the 1851 statutes, this court continued to apply this 

commonsense exception to survival––that when the death of a party 

makes any relief ineffectual, survival statutes do not save the proceeding.

See Jahnke, 526 N.W.2d at 162; Buechele, 236 N.W.2d at 324; Babbitt, 

157 Iowa at 383, 138 N.W. at 467. At first blush, it is difficult to 

reconcile the holding of these cases––that actions personal to the 

decedent abate––with the all-encompassing, unqualified language of the 

survival statutes—that “[a]ll causes of action survive” and “[t]he death of 

one or all of the parties shall not cause the proceedings to abate.” Iowa 

Code §§ 611.20, 625A.17 (2005); see also Wendelin v. Russell, 259 Iowa 

1152, 1156, 147 N.W.2d 188, 191 (1966) (stating survival statutes are to 
8

be liberally construed), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. State, 256 

N.W.2d 181, 189, 192 (Iowa 1977). We conclude, however, that our 

cases are not inconsistent with the survival statutes when these cases 

are viewed as applications of the mootness doctrine. 

A case is moot when the contested issue has become academic or 

nonexistent and the court’s opinion would be of no force or effect in the 

underlying controversy. In re M.T., 625 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Iowa 2001). 

Our cases abating actions personal to the decedent meet this test. For 

example, in Buechele, the relief sought––removal of the defendant

supervisor from office––was impossible as the defendant’s death 

effectively removed him from office. 236 N.W.2d at 324. Similarly, in 

Babbitt, the relief sought––an injunction prohibiting the defendant from 

selling intoxicating liquors—became unnecessary when the defendant’s 

death terminated his ability to make the offensive sales. 157 Iowa at 

384, 138 N.W. at 467. 

Courts in other states have observed that survival statutes 

providing that causes of action or suits do not abate upon the death of a 

party do not dispense “with the requirement that there be an actual 

existing controversy between the litigants.” Olson v. Comm’n for Lawyer 

Discipline, 901 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex. App. 1995); accord In re L.W., 861 

N.E.2d 546, 551 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (holding survival statute did not 

operate to except suits from the mootness doctrine). As one court has 

observed, “The real point is not abatement of the appeal but whether the 

question has become moot . . . .” Mason v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.2d 

845, 846 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); accord In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66–67

n.1 (N.Y. 1981) (noting existence of survival statutes, yet holding issue 

posed by death of the ward was “properly resolved by consideration of the 

principles applicable to moot controversies”), superseded by statute on 
9

other grounds as noted in In re M.B., 846 N.E.2d 794, 796 (N.Y. 2006). 

We agree with the Kentucky court’s observation and confirm what has 

been implicit in our cases––that although an action does not abate upon 

the death of a party, as provided by our survival statutes, the case must 

still present a justiciable controversy in order to proceed. See 

AFSCME/Iowa Council 61, 434 N.W.2d at 405 (holding death of plaintiff 

did not abate action to obtain plaintiff’s blood test results in part because 

the issues giving rise to the request for the results “were not mooted by 

[the plaintiff’s] death”).

Turning to the present case, we conclude Maghee’s cause of action 

survived his death pursuant to section 611.20. See Iowa Code § 611.20 

(2005) (“All causes of action shall survive and may be brought 

notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same.”). 

In addition, his appeal survives. See id. § 625A.17 (“The death of one or 

all of the parties shall not cause the proceedings to abate . . . .”). 

Therefore, we reject the State’s contention that Maghee’s death abates 

this proceeding. 

This conclusion does not, however, end our inquiry. We must still 

consider whether this appeal is academic and whether our decision will 

have any effect on the underlying controversy. The mootness of this 

controversy is clearly demonstrated when one focuses on the relief 

ultimately sought by Maghee––immediate release on parole. Any decision 

we make has been rendered ineffectual by his death. Maghee’s death 

has already ended his imprisonment and rendered release impossible. 

Therefore, this case is moot. See In re Sodersten, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 

609 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding issues raised in petition for writ of 

habeas corpus became moot upon death of habeas petitioner). 
10

Maghee’s attorney urges us to apply the public-interest exception 

that permits the court to address moot controversies: “When the issue 

presented is of substantial public interest there exists a permissible 

exception to the general rule that a case which has become moot or 

presents only an academic question will be dismissed on appeal.” Bd. of 

Dirs. v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 1264, 147 N.W.2d 854, 856 (1967); see 

also Sodersten, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 610 (holding court has discretion to 

apply exception to mootness rule when habeas petitioner dies during 

pendency of proceeding). In determining whether we should exercise our 

discretion to review a moot action, we consider the following factors: 

(1) the private or public nature of the issue; (2) the 

desirability of an authoritative adjudication to guide public 

officials in their future conduct; (3) the likelihood of the 

recurrence of the issue; and (4) the likelihood the issue will 

recur yet evade appellate review. 

State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 234 (Iowa 2002); accord 

Dittmer v. Baker, 280 N.W.2d 398, 399 (Iowa 1979).

We have applied this test in cases similar to the one before us 

here. See Rhiner v. State, 703 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Iowa 2005); In re M.T., 

625 N.W.2d at 704–05; Roth v. Reagen, 422 N.W.2d 464, 466 (Iowa 

1988); Wilson v. Farrier, 372 N.W.2d 499, 501 (Iowa 1985). In Wilson, an 

inmate challenged his prison discipline, but was paroled by the time the 

case reached our court. 372 N.W.2d at 500–01. We concluded the 

question of “the appropriate standard of judicial review in appeals from 

prison disciplinary committees” was “one of public importance” that 

warranted our consideration notwithstanding the mootness of the case. 

Id. at 500, 501. In Rhiner, an inmate filed an application for 

postconviction relief from revocation of his parole. 703 N.W.2d at 175–

76. The inmate was again paroled by the time his case was heard in the 
11

district court, so the district court not only denied his application on its 

merits, but alternatively dismissed it as moot. Id. at 176. In choosing to 

address the appeal on its merits, this court noted it had not previously 

considered the operation of the statute governing revocation of probation 

and parole and review may be elusive because inmates would often be 

released from imprisonment by the time the case reached the appellate 

courts. Id. at 177. Therefore, we concluded, the case fell squarely within 

the exception to the mootness doctrine. Id.

Like these cases, the present appeal presents an issue of general 

applicability that is likely to reoccur. Prisoners are transferred in and 

out of work release every day, and challenges to such transfers inevitably 

arise. Certainly, it is desirable to have an authoritative adjudication as 

to whether such challenges should be pursued as judicial review of 

agency action under chapter 17A or by filing a postconviction-relief

action under chapter 822. Public officials as well as prisoners would 

benefit from such guidance. In addition, due to the effect of earned-time 

credits, work release, and parole, it is likely many actions similar to the 

one brought by Maghee could be rendered moot by the inmate’s release 

prior to the resolution of an appeal, as occurred in Wilson and Rhiner. 

For these reasons, we conclude we should address the issue presented 

by this appeal under the public-interest exception to the mootness 

doctrine. Accordingly, we deny the State’s motion to dismiss. 

III. Method of Challenge to Revocation of Work Release.

Maghee challenged the revocation of his work release by filing this 

postconviction-relief action. The district court dismissed his action on 

the State’s motion, ruling the revocation should have been contested in 

an administrative appeal to the Iowa parole board. Based upon our 

review of prior case law and the current statutory scheme, we conclude a 
12

postconviction-relief action is the proper vehicle to challenge the 

revocation of work release and resulting transfer to a secure facility.

We begin our discussion by recognizing the district court’s ruling 

was entirely consistent with this court’s decision in Dougherty v. State,

323 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 1982). In that case, we considered “whether a 

revocation of . . . work release can be challenged by a postconviction 

action” and concluded the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 

17A, “provides the exclusive method for attacking the revocation.” 

Dougherty, 323 N.W.2d at 249. Maghee claims this case is no longer 

good law because the statutory mechanism governing work release and 

its revocation has changed considerably. 

We question whether Dougherty was correct when decided, but in 

any event we are confident it is no longer good law. To understand why 

Dougherty must be overruled, it is necessary to review our cases 

addressing the scope and interplay of Iowa’s Administrative Procedure 

Act and other methods of obtaining relief from unlawful government 

action. 

A. Prior Case Law. We start with Allen v. State, a case predating 

Iowa’s adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act. Allen v. State, 217

N.W.2d 528 (Iowa 1974), departed from as stated in Davis v. State, 345 

N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 1984). In that case, an inmate filed a 

postconviction-relief action, asserting institutional disciplinary

procedures violated his due process rights. Id. at 531. This court 

affirmed the district court’s decision dismissing the prisoner’s claim on 

the basis it was not properly raised in a postconviction action. Id. We 

noted the postconviction-relief statute was intended to provide a vehicle 

to challenge the validity of a “ ‘conviction or sentence.’ ” Id. (emphasis 

added) (quoting Iowa Code § 663A.2 (1973) (now codified at Iowa Code 
13

§ 822.2 (2009))). In contrast, prison discipline should be challenged by 

way of a habeas corpus action, we advised. Id.

Several years later, after enactment of chapter 17A, this court was 

asked to decide whether the contested case procedures outlined in that 

chapter applied to prison disciplinary proceedings. See Langley v. Scurr, 

305 N.W.2d 418, 419 (Iowa 1981). In Langley, an inmate claimed prison 

officials failed to comply with the notice and hearing requirements of 

chapter 17A when they disciplined him for participating in a fracas at the 

prison hospital. Id. We held chapter 17A did not apply to prison 

disciplinary proceedings because contested cases included only those 

proceedings required by statute or the constitution “ ‘to be determined by 

an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.’ ” Id. (quoting 

Iowa Code § 17A.2(2) (1981)). In rejecting the inmate’s claim that 

chapter 17A required an evidentiary hearing, we summarily concluded: 

“We think the legislature did not include prison disciplinary committees 

within the definition of agencies under section 17A.2(1).” Id.

Shortly after our Langley decision, we decided Dougherty, a 

postconviction-relief action in which an inmate challenged the revocation 

of his work release. Dougherty, 323 N.W.2d at 249. At the time of the 

events giving rise to the action in Dougherty, a work release committee 

had the authority to revoke an inmate’s work release. Id. at 250 (citing 

Iowa Code §§ 247A.3, .4 (1981)). With no analysis, we concluded the 

committee’s revocation decision was “agency action” within the meaning 

of the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 17A.2(1) 

(1981)). We distinguished Langley, in which we had held a prison 

disciplinary committee was not an agency under section 17A.2(1), on the 

basis that the work release committee was created by statute. Id.

(“Because the work release committee is established by statute, it differs 
14

from the prison disciplinary committee involved in Langley . . . .”). 

Having concluded that chapter 17A applied to the work release 

committee, we then considered whether the judicial review provisions of 

chapter 17A provided the exclusive means to challenge revocation of 

work release. Id. We pointed out that, by the terms of the act, its 

judicial review provisions were 

“the exclusive means by which a person or party who is 

aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action may seek 

judicial review of [such] agency action” except as expressly 

provided otherwise by another statute referring to chapter 

17A by name.

Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19 (1981)). We held that, because the 

postconviction statute did not expressly negate the applicability of 

chapter 17A, chapter 17A provided “the exclusive means for challenging 

a chapter 247A work release revocation.” Id. 

Two years later, this court again addressed the availability of the 

postconviction-relief statute as a means of challenging prison discipline. 

See Davis, 345 N.W.2d at 98. In Davis, an inmate contested a 

disciplinary sanction of thirty-six months in administrative segregation 

and the loss of other privileges in a postconviction action 

notwithstanding the Allen decision holding that prisoners could not use 

postconviction-relief actions to challenge prison discipline. Id. Although 

the postconviction-relief statute had been amended after Allen to 

encompass a prisoner’s claim that the department had “unlawfully 

forfeited” the inmate’s good-time credits, the State argued disciplinary 

proceedings that did not involve the forfeiture of credits, such as the one 

at issue in Davis, could not be challenged in a postconviction-relief

action. Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 663A.2(6) (1983) (now codified at Iowa 

Code § 822.2(1)(f) (2009))). The inmate argued his claim was 
15

encompassed in subsection (5) of section 663A.2, which allows 

“postconviction review if the convicted person ‘is otherwise unlawfully 

held in custody or other restraint.’ ” Id. at 99 (quoting Iowa Code 

§ 663A.2(5) (1983) (now codified at Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(e) (2009))). 

Acknowledging that subsection (5) existed at the time of this court’s 

decision in Allen, we concluded nonetheless

that substantial reasons exist for departing from the position 

taken in Allen with respect to postconviction review of the 

actions of prison officials which involve a substantial 

deprivation of liberty or property rights.

Id. The primary reason for our decision to overrule Allen was this court’s 

belief that “[i]t would be unwieldly [sic] to require separate actions and 

different procedures to review prison disciplinary proceedings depending 

on the type of punishment imposed.” Id. We held, therefore, that 

disciplinary challenges “involving substantial deprivation of liberty or 

property interests” should be litigated in postconviction-relief actions. Id.

The final decision of relevance here is Drennan v. Ault, 567 N.W.2d 

411 (Iowa 1997). In Drennan, an inmate serving time for operating while 

intoxicated (OWI) was placed in a community-based corrections program. 

567 N.W.2d at 412. After the inmate violated a number of institutional 

rules, he was transferred to a secure facility. Id. The inmate brought a 

postconviction-relief action challenging the procedures employed by the 

department of corrections. Id. Citing our Davis decision, we observed: 

“Both parties agree Drennan’s appeal is properly reviewable as a 

postconviction action.” Id. at 413 (citing Davis, 345 N.W.2d at 99). Our 

citation to Davis implies that we considered the disciplinary proceeding 

in Davis, in which the inmate’s violation of an institutional rule resulted 

in the inmate’s administrative segregation, the same as, or analogous to,

the proceeding in Drennan, in which the inmate’s violation of 
16

institutional rules resulted in the inmate’s transfer to a more secure 

setting.

With these cases in mind, we now consider whether Maghee’s 

challenge to his transfer is properly reviewed in a postconviction action 

under chapter 822. 

B. Applicability of Postconviction-Relief Provisions of Chapter 

822. Maghee argues that, since our decision in Dougherty, the 

mechanism for revocation of work release has changed, undermining the 

basis for our decision in that case. Now, the department of corrections is 

responsible for termination of work release “in accordance with rules of 

the department.” Iowa Code § 904.903 (2003). Under the department’s

rules, such transfer decisions are made using the same procedure as 

that for transfer of OWI offenders in community-based programs. See

DOC Policy WR/OWI–42 (2006) (providing for “structured classification 

process to remove/transfer offenders from Work Release, OWI and PrePlacement programs to an institution setting”). As illustrated by 

Drennan and this case, transfer decisions for prisoners in work release or 

community-based correctional programs are often triggered by rule 

violations. See also Iowa Code § 904.513(1)(b)(4) (2003) (stating that 

assignment of OWI violators may be made “as a disciplinary measure”). 

In this respect, there is little to distinguish the nature of a proceeding 

resulting in transfer under DOC Policy WR/OWI–42 and a disciplinary 

proceeding resulting in administrative segregation, as occurred in Davis. 

We think the following observation in Davis is now equally 

applicable to proceedings resulting in the transfer of an inmate from 

work release to a secure institution: “It would be [unwieldy] to require 

separate actions and different procedures to review prison disciplinary 

proceedings depending on the type of punishment imposed.” Davis, 345 
17

N.W.2d at 99. There is simply no principled reason to distinguish a 

transfer from work release to a secure institution from a transfer from 

the general prison population to segregation when both are based on rule 

violations. Surely if the latter transfer decision falls within section 

822.2(5) (2003), providing for postconviction review if the convicted 

person “is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint,” as we 

held in Davis, then the transfer decision at issue in this proceeding does 

as well. While it is true transfers from work release and communitybased correctional programs can occur for reasons other than a 

disciplinary one, see DOC Policy WR/OWI–42 (listing reasons for 

transfer, including a mental condition that cannot be managed in work 

or community release), we think a more manageable and consistent 

review process results when all transfer decisions are subject to the same 

postconviction-relief method of review. Cf. Davis, 345 N.W.2d at 99 

(noting desirability of using same review procedure for all disciplinary 

proceedings). 

The State argues that Davis cannot be applied here because “work

release decisions do not implicate a substantial liberty or property 

interest.” See id. at 99 (holding disciplinary challenges “involving 

substantial deprivation of liberty or property interests” may be litigated 

in postconviction-relief actions). The State points out that this court has 

held a prisoner transferred from a community-based correctional 

program to prison has “no due process liberty interest.” Drennan, 567 

N.W.2d at 414. The State’s argument confuses the ultimate merits of 

Maghee’s claim with his right to present his claim. In this appeal, we 

address only the proper vehicle for Maghee’s challenge to the 

department’s decision to transfer him from work release to secure 

confinement. Whether his challenge has any merit is a different 
18

question. Cf. Lewis Cent. Educ. Ass’n v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Exam’rs, 625 

N.W.2d 687, 692 (Iowa 2001) (noting chapter 17A subjects nearly all 

agency action to judicial review, but “ ‘[s]uccess on the merits in such 

cases . . . is another thing’ ” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Model State 

Admin. Procedure Act § 1–102(2) cmt. (1981))).

C. Exclusivity of Chapter 17A. We now address the State’s 

argument that, even if a work-release transfer decision falls within the 

scope of chapter 822, inmates subject to such decisions must follow the 

judicial review procedure of chapter 17A. The State cites to our 

discussion in Dougherty that chapter 17A is the exclusive vehicle for 

review of agency action “except as expressly provided otherwise by 

another statute referring to chapter 17A by name,” and our conclusion 

that the postconviction statute does not contain an express reference to 

chapter 17A. 323 N.W.2d at 250 (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19 (1981)). 

Maghee responds that the internal committee responsible for 

transfer decisions is outside the scope of chapter 17A, just like the 

disciplinary committee in Langley. In Langley, we summarily concluded 

chapter 17A did not apply to disciplinary proceedings because prison 

disciplinary committees were not agencies as defined in chapter 17A. 

305 N.W.2d at 419. We choose not to rely on Langley and its 

unsupported conclusion.3

 3Chapter 17A defines an “agency” to include a “unit of the state.” Iowa Code 

§ 17A.2(1) (2003); see also id. § 904.102 (establishing the department of corrections). 

“Agency action” includes any agency decision, proceeding, investigation, or sanction. 

Id. § 17A.2(2); see also id. §§ 904.108(1)(k) (placing duty on director of department to 

adopt rules for the internal management of institutions), .505 (providing guidelines for 

discipline of inmates for violation of rules of institution). Finally, section 17A.23 states 

that “[t]his chapter shall also be construed to apply to all agencies not expressly 

exempted by this chapter.” Given these provisions, it is difficult to understand the 

basis for holding that a disciplinary decision made by a committee of the department of 

corrections is not agency action falling within chapter 17A. The fact that disciplinary 

proceedings are not “contested cases,” see Langley, 305 N.W.2d at 419, does not 

preclude their review under chapter 17A.19 as “other agency action.” See Jew v. Univ. 

 Instead, we are convinced the exclusivity 
19

provisions of chapter 17A do not prevent an inmate from challenging the 

department’s transfer decision in a postconviction-relief action. 

Since our Dougherty decision, we have taken a less rigid view of the 

exclusivity provisions of chapter 17A. There are three references in

chapter 17A to exclusivity, and we address each separately.

1. Section 17A.1(2). Section 17A.1(2) contains a statement of 

purpose that provides in relevant part: 

This chapter is meant to apply to all rulemaking and 

contested case proceedings and all suits for the judicial 

review of agency action that are not specifically excluded 

from this chapter or some portion thereof by its express 

terms or by the express terms of another chapter.

Iowa Code § 17A.1(2) (2003). In Jew v. University of Iowa, 398 N.W.2d 

861 (Iowa 1987), we held: 

Section 17A.1(2) is susceptible of an interpretation 

that, where actions for judicial review of agency action are in 

fact brought, they shall be maintained in accordance with 

the provisions of section 17A.19. It does not speak to the 

issue of exclusivity.

398 N.W.2d at 865. Therefore, section 17A.1(2) does not prevent

Maghee’s pursuit of a postconviction-relief action. 

2. Section 17A.19. This section outlines the judicial review 

process and contains the following statement: 

Except as expressly provided otherwise by another 

statute referring to this chapter by name, the judicial review 

provisions of this chapter shall be the exclusive means by 

which a person or party who is aggrieved or adversely 

affected by agency action may seek judicial review of such 

agency action. However, nothing in this chapter shall 

abridge or deny to any person or party who is aggrieved or 

adversely affected by any agency action the right to seek 

relief from such action in the courts.

 

of Iowa, 398 N.W.2d 861, 864 (Iowa 1987) (noting judicial review provisions of section 

17A.19 apply to contested case hearings, rule making and other agency action).
20

Iowa Code § 17A.19 para. 1 (2003). We considered the effect of this 

provision in City of Des Moines v. City Development Board, 633 N.W.2d 

305 (Iowa 2001). 

In that case, the City of Des Moines had sought judicial review of a 

decision of the City Development Board to stay proceedings on an 

annexation petition filed by the city. City of Des Moines, 633 N.W.2d at 

307. The district court determined the city’s petition for judicial review 

was timely filed, but dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. Id. at 309. On appeal, the timeliness of the 

city’s filing depended on whether the judicial review provisions found in

chapter 17A or the conflicting provisions in Iowa Code chapter 368 

controlled. Id. at 309–10. Chapter 368 creates the City Development 

Board and also contains a set of provisions for judicial review of board 

decisions that are to be applied together with chapter 17A judicial review 

provisions. Id. at 310 (citing Iowa Code § 368.22 (1997)). In concluding 

chapter 368 controlled, this court relied on the principle that, when two 

pertinent statutes cannot be harmonized, the court will apply the statute 

that deals with the subject “in a more definite and minute way,” as 

opposed to a statute that “deals with [the] subject in a general and 

comprehensive manner.” Id. at 311. Applying this principle, we held 

that chapter 368, as the more specific statute, governed. Id. at 312. We 

acknowledged the language of section 17A.19, quoted above, but 

concluded “there is no indication our legislature intended to make 

section 17A.19(3) controlling.” Id.

While the conflict here between chapter 17A and chapter 822 is 

more comprehensive than the conflict considered in City of Des Moines, 

we think the analysis should be the same. As we discussed above, 

Maghee’s claim falls within chapter 822, allowing review of the 
21

department’s transfer decision in a postconviction-relief action. Even 

though the department’s decision may also fall within chapter 17A, we 

think the more specific statute––chapter 822––should control the 

procedure for judicial review. The legislature provided for postconviction 

review of specified claims, some of which could only arise from agency 

action by the department. See Iowa Code § 822.2(6) (2003) (providing for 

postconviction review of claims that earned-time credits were unlawfully 

forfeited) (now codified at Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(f) (2009)). If we were to 

conclude that chapter 17A provided the exclusive means to obtain review 

of agency action by the department, we would render subsection (6) a 

nullity. We do not believe the legislature intended such a result by its 

enactment of section 17A.19. See Iowa Code § 4.4(2) (2009) (stating 

presumption that in enacting a statute, legislature intends the entire 

statute to be effective); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Alamo Motel, 264 

N.W.2d 774, 778 (Iowa 1978) (“We cannot presume the legislature 

intended to enact a futile or ineffectual law or one that would lead to 

absurd consequences.”). Nonetheless, before we conclude that chapter 

822 provides the method for review of agency action falling within its 

terms, rather than chapter 17A, we must consider the last provision in 

chapter 17A that talks about the exclusivity of that chapter.

3. Section 17A.23. Section 17A.23 addresses the construction of 

chapter 17A, stating in relevant part: 

Except as expressly provided otherwise by this chapter 

or by another statute referring to this chapter by name, the 

rights created and the requirements imposed by this chapter 

shall be in addition to those created or imposed by every 

other statute in existence on July 1, 1975, or enacted after 

that date. If any other statute in existence on July 1, 1975, 

or enacted after that date diminishes a right conferred upon 

a person by this chapter or diminishes a requirement 

imposed upon an agency by this chapter, this chapter shall 

take precedence unless the other statute expressly provides 
22

that it shall take precedence over all or some specified 

portion of this named chapter. 

The Iowa administrative procedure Act shall be 

construed broadly to effectuate its purposes. This chapter 

shall also be construed to apply to all agencies not expressly 

exempted by this chapter or by another statute specifically 

referring to this chapter by name; and except as to 

proceedings in process on July 1, 1975, this chapter shall be 

construed to apply to all covered agency proceedings and all 

agency action not expressly exempted by this chapter or by 

another statute specifically referring to this chapter by 

name.

Iowa Code § 17A.23 paras. 1–2 (2003).

In Jew, we considered whether a sex discrimination claim against 

the University of Iowa could be pursued under our state civil rights 

statute, Iowa Code chapter 601A (1985) (now codified at Iowa Code 

chapter 216 (2009)), as an original action in district court or whether 

chapter 17A provided the exclusive means of review of the university’s 

actions. 398 N.W.2d at 863. We rejected the defendants’ contention 

that,

in claims based on action by state agencies, [section 17A.23] 

create[s] a conclusive presumption of the exclusivity of the 

chapter 17A judicial review procedure over all other 

statutory remedies, unless the competing legislation has 

negated application of [chapter 17A] by specific reference 

somewhere in its provisions.

Id. at 864. We observed that the exclusivity of chapter 17A “as a means 

of assailing acts or omissions of administrative agencies, must 

necessarily vary, based on the context of the transaction.” Id. We held 

that, with respect to “other agency action” in particular, “the lines of 

exclusivity are not as rigidly drawn as defendants’ argument suggests.” 

Id. We concluded

that where, as in the present case, the action challenged 

bears scant relation to the agency’s statutory mandate or 

supposed area of expertise, agency employees should enjoy 

the same right to pursue matured statutory causes of action 
23

as other employees. This is particularly true where public 

employees are expressly included as beneficiaries of the 

enabling statute in its definitional provisions.

Id. We distinguished our decision in Dougherty, noting in that case “the 

action challenged was the very decision which the agency’s mandate 

directed it to make.” Id. at 865.

As for the exclusivity provisions, we concluded our decision to 

allow the plaintiff to pursue an original action in the district court under 

the civil rights act based on actions of a state agency did not run 

“counter to the ‘specific reference’ mandates of . . . section 17A.23.” Id. 

Focusing only on the first paragraph of section 17A.23, we reasoned: 

Section 17A.23 also talks around the subject of exclusivity, 

except with regard to statutes diminishing rights conferred 

upon a person by chapter 17A. No suggestion has been 

made in the present case that section 601A.16(1) or any 

other provision of chapter 601A serves to “diminish”

plaintiff’s rights under chapter 17A.

Id. 

We did not discuss the second paragraph of section 17A.23 in Jew. 

We did, however, consider the meaning of the second paragraph in a 

later case. In Lewis Central Education Association, we construed the 

second paragraph as addressing the unreviewability of agency action: 

“Under the Iowa act, there is clearly no room for a presumption of 

unreviewability; any exception under our act must be express and 

specifically name the act.” 625 N.W.2d at 691 (referring to section 

17A.23).

Based on our construction of section 17A.23 in Jew and Lewis 

Central Education Association, we are convinced that allowing 

postconviction review of disciplinary decisions of the department of 

corrections, whether the resulting discipline is the forfeiture of earnedtime credits, administrative segregation, or transfer out of a work release 
24

or other community program, does not contravene that statute. The 

decisions of the department are certainly not rendered unreviewable by 

allowing review under chapter 822 rather than chapter 17A. Moreover, 

Maghee does not claim that any provision of chapter 822 diminishes his 

rights under chapter 17A. And finally, it would violate our rules of 

statutory construction to conclude that chapter 822 encompasses no 

agency action notwithstanding its express provisions making agency 

action subject to chapter 822 review procedures. We recognize 

disciplinary decisions are within the mandate of the department of 

corrections, a factor deemed important in Jew. Nonetheless, this fact

does not outweigh the other factors that support our conclusion that 

chapter 822, not chapter 17A, provides the method of review for 

decisions falling within section 822.2.

For these reasons, we find no basis to distinguish Maghee’s claim 

from those asserted in Drennan and Davis with respect to the 

appropriate method to challenge the department’s transfer decision. 

Therefore, we overrule our Dougherty decision, hold Maghee properly 

sought review through a postconviction-relief action, and reverse the 

district court’s contrary decision dismissing Maghee’s petition on this 

basis.

IV. Disposition.

Having decided the district court erred in dismissing this action on 

the ground Maghee could not challenge his transfer back to prison in a 

postconviction-relief action, we must now determine the appropriate 

disposition of this appeal. If Maghee were still alive, the case would be 

remanded for a decision on the merits of his petition. We have already 

determined, however, that this case is moot. We must, therefore, 

consider whether we should invoke the public-interest exception and
25

remand the claims raised by Maghee in his petition for resolution by the 

district court. 

Maghee filed a prolix pro se petition. Reduced to its essentials, the 

petition alleges his transfer was motivated by a desire to deprive him of a 

limousine business he had formed while on work release, which he 

contends was not a proper ground for sending him back to prison. He 

also alleges he was denied a hearing in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. 

We find no basis for applying the public-interest exception to the 

issues raised in Maghee’s petition. As for the first issue regarding the 

factual basis for his transfer, this issue is of a purely private nature that 

does not warrant consideration under an exception to the mootness 

doctrine. As for his due-process claim, authoritative guidance on this 

issue already exists. See Callender v. Sioux City Residential Treatment 

Facility, 88 F.3d 666, 669–70 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding prisoner who was 

transferred from work release program to residential treatment center

had no constitutionally protected liberty interest in remaining in the 

work release program and therefore no due-process right to a pretransfer 

hearing); Drennan, 567 N.W.2d at 414 (holding inmate had no liberty 

interest in remaining in community-based correctional program and 

therefore had no due-process right to a hearing). For these reasons, we 

decline to exercise our discretion to apply the public-interest exception to 

the mootness doctrine. Because there is no viable claim remaining to be 

addressed by the district court, we do not remand this case for further 

proceedings.

REVERSED. 

All justices concur except Baker, J., who takes no part.