alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 6781** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. ELAN CHRISTOPHER LEWIS, a/k/a Jamal Xavier Harris , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond
. John A. Gibney, Jr. , District Judge. ( 3:94

- cr - 00094

- JAG

- 1 )

Submitted : September 11 , 2012 Decided: September 13, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Elan Christopher Lewis, Appellant Pro Se. David Thomas Maguire, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Elan Christopher Lewis appeals the district court’s orders denying his motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2) (2006) and denying his motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Lewis’s
§ 3582(c)(2) motion for the reasons stated by the district
court. United States v. Lewis , No. 3:94

- cr - 00094

- JAG

- 1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 2012). We also affirm the denial of Lewis’s motion
to re consider, noting that the district court lacked authority to even consider the motion. See United States v. Goodwyn , 596 F.3d 233, 235

- 36 (4th Cir. 2010). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
<PAGE>   1

                                   EXHIBIT 21

                         SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                                                     STATE OF
                                                                                                 PERCENTAGE        INCORPORATION
                                                                                                     OF                 OR
                   PARENT                                           SUBSIDIARY                   OWNERSHIP         ORGANIZATION
---------------------------------------------    ---------------------------------------------   ----------       --------------
<S>                                              <C>                                             <C>              <C>
ITLA Capital Corporation                         Imperial Capital Bank                              100%            California

ITLA Capital Corporation                         ITLA Funding Corporation                           100%             Delaware

ITLA Funding Corporation                         ITLA Servicing Corporation                         100%             Delaware

ITLA Funding Corporation                         ITLA Commercial Warehouse Corporation              100%             Delaware

ITLA Capital Corporation                         ITLA Management Corporation                        100%             Delaware

ITLA Management Corporation                      ITLA Commercial Investment Corporation             100%             Maryland

ITLA Capital Corporation                         Imperial Capital Real Estate Investment Trust      100%             Delaware

Imperial Capital Real Estate Investment Trust    ICCMAC Multifamily and Commercial Trust 1999-1     100%             Delaware

ITLA Capital Corporation                         ITLA Capital Statutory Trust I                     100%    (1)   Connecticut

ITLA Capital Corporation                         ITLA Capital Statutory Trust II                    100%    (1)   Connecticut
</TABLE>


----------

(1)    Represents ownership of the common securities of the trust.
#### Lena Witkowski, Appellant, v New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Respondent.

— Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Murray, J.), entered May 2, 1985, which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim.

Order affirmed, without costs, upon the opinion of Judge Edward M. Murray of the Court of Claims. Kane, J. P., Casey, Weiss, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.
Order entered May 7, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-01469-CV

CRESENCIO BASTIDA, Appellant

V.

ABEL'S MOBILE HOME SERVICE, INC., ET AL, Appellees

On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 199-02287-06

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s May 2, 2013 unopposed motion for a second extension of 

time to file appellant’s brief. Appellant’s motion is GRANTED. Appellant’s brief shall be filed 

on or before June 5, 2013.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
**EXHIBIT 13**CERTIFICATION     In connection with this Annual Report of SAP AG (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the periodended December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), we, Prof. Dr. Henning Kagermann, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Dr.Werner Brandt, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, thatto our knowledge:     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.Dated March 22, 2006         /s/ HENNING KAGERMANN   Name:  Prof. Dr. Henning Kagermann   Title:  Chief Executive Officer            /s/ WERNER BRANDT   Name:  Dr. Werner Brandt   Title:  Chief Financial Officer        A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002 has been provided to SAP AG and will be retained by SAP AG and furnished to the Securitiesand Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.     The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 andis not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 993 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 993

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to prevent the extension of 
 the tax collection period merely because the taxpayer is a member of 
    the Armed Forces who is hospitalized as a result of combat zone 
                               injuries.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 12, 2011

  Mr. Cornyn introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to prevent the extension of 
 the tax collection period merely because the taxpayer is a member of 
    the Armed Forces who is hospitalized as a result of combat zone 
                               injuries.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Wounded Warrior Tax Equity Act of 
2011''.

SEC. 2. PREVENTION OF EXTENSION OF TAX COLLECTION PERIOD FOR MEMBERS OF 
              THE ARMED FORCES WHO ARE HOSPITALIZED AS A RESULT OF 
              COMBAT ZONE INJURIES.

    (a) In General.--Section 7508(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(3) Collection period after assessment not extended as a 
        result of hospitalization.--With respect to any period of 
        continuous qualified hospitalization described in subsection 
        (a) and the next 180 days thereafter, subsection (a) shall not 
        apply in the application of section 6502.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to taxes assessed before, on, or after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM AHL
SERVICES, INC. CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AT JUNE 30, 1998 AND THE
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30,
1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH CONDENSED
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                     1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                           5,222
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   68,139
<ALLOWANCES>                                       741
<INVENTORY>                                      1,894
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                79,066
<PP&E>                                          22,988
<DEPRECIATION>                                  10,951
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 137,856
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           37,656
<BONDS>                                         17,446
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           136
<OTHER-SE>                                      78,938
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   137,856
<SALES>                                        183,371
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               183,371
<CGS>                                          135,597
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  135,597
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                40,541
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   179
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 214
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,318
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,927
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,391
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,391
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.32
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.31
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 10.3



 Exhibit 10.3 
 LOCK-UP AGREEMENT 
                  ,                    

  

			
	 By Facsimile
(                    )
	  	 By Facsimile ((804) 648-3404)

	Dehaier Medical Systems Limited	  	Anderson & Strudwick, Incorporated
	1223 Epoch Center	  	707 East Main Street
	No. 31 Zi Zhu Yuan Road	  	20th Floor
	Haidian District, Beijing 100089	  	Richmond, Virginia 23219
	People’s Republic of China	  	Attn: L. McCarthy Downs, III,
	Attn: Ping Chen	  	         Senior Vice President
	         CEO	  	

 Re: Lock-Up Agreement 
 Dear Mr. Ping and Mr. Downs: 
 The undersigned understands that
Anderson & Strudwick, Incorporated (the “Placement Agent”), proposes to enter into a Placement Agreement with Dehaier Medical Systems Limited (the “Company”), providing for the public offering (the “Offering”),
by the Placement Agent of a minimum of 1,250,000 common shares and a maximum of 1,500,000 common shares (the “Shares”). 
 In consideration of the Placement Agent’s agreement to undertake the Offering of the Shares on a “best efforts, minimum/maximum” basis, and for other good and valuable consideration, the
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned agrees that the undersigned will not register, offer, sell, contract to sell, grant any securities convertible into or exercisable or exchangeable for the Shares or any warrants to purchase
the Shares (including, without limitation, securities of the Company which may be deemed to be beneficially owned by the undersigned in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission and securities which may be
issued upon the exercise of a stock option or warrant) for a period of (a) as to one-half ( 1/2) of the Shares now or in the future beneficially owned by the undersigned, ninety (90) days after the date of effectiveness or commencement of sales of the public
offering and (b) as to the other one-half of such Shares, one hundred ninety (190) days after the date of effectiveness or commencement of sales of the public offering. The obligations under this lock-up period are separate from any
obligations that may relate to the Make Good Escrow Agreement to be entered between the Placement Agent, an escrow agent, the Company and certain shareholders of the Company on the date hereof. 
 The undersigned understands that the Company, the Placement Agent and the Representatives will proceed with the Offering in reliance upon
this Lock-up Agreement. 
  

			
	Very truly yours,
		
	By:	 	  

	Name:	 	  

	Its:
RECANTOAZUL,  S.A.
                                Apartado  90-1007
                           Centro  Colom,  Paseo  Colom,
                              San  Jose,  Costa  Rica


                                December  22,  2000



United  Trading.Com
c/o  Myers  Porter,  LLP
380Technology  Blvd.,  Suite  250
Irvine,  CA  92618

Attn:  Mr.  Norman  Wright.

Re:  United  Trading.Com  Sports  book  Software  license  agreement
     dated  September  28,  2000

Dear  Mr.  Wright:

On  September  30,  2000,  Recantoazul  S.A. entered into a Sports book software
license  agreement  with United Trading.Com (formerly United Casino Corp.).  Due
to  Recantoazul's  current inability to provide and bring on to the Internet the
Internet  site  which  was  planned to  be used to make the Sports book software
provided  by  the  subject  agreement  available  to  players over the Internet,
Recantoazul  is  hereby  canceling  the subject agreement effective immediately.

It  is  hoped  by  Recantoazul  that  when the required Internet site is finally
available  that  a  new  contract  can  be  negotiated.

Yours  truly,

Recantoazul  S.A.



By:   s/  Darren  Wright
     ---------------------------

Name:  Darren  Wright
     ---------------------------

Title:  President
     ---------------------------


















                                     113
EXHIBIT
13.2





PRINCIPAL
FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350








In
connection with this Annual Report of Nordic American Tanker Shipping Limited.
(the "Company") on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") on or about the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Turid M. Sørenson, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:







(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








A signed
original of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon
request.








Date:  May
21, 2010








Turid M.
Sørenson





Turid M.
Sørenson


Chief
Financial Officer











SK 01318
0002 1099649
#### Maria Shickler, Respondent, v Nassau Trust Company, Appellant.

In an action to recover damages for fraudulent consumer credit and collection practices and for conversion of personal property, defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Wager, J.), dated February 14, 1984, which denied its motion to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute.

Order affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff claims that the defendant wrongfully repossessed her automobile for nonpayment of a personal loan when that loan was protected by disability credit insurance. She commenced this action by service of a summons and complaint in May 1980. Three amended complaints were served, the last of which was verified by the plaintiff on July 24, 1981. Issue was joined with respect to the final complaint on December 9, 1981 and discovery proceeded until August 1982. On October 27, 1982, the defendant served a demand upon the plaintiff to serve and file a note of issue within 90 days, pursuant to CPLR 3216. Plaintiff responded by making a motion for supplemental discovery, which motion was granted in part on March 21, 1983. While that motion was pending, the defendant made a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, which motion was denied due to the ongoing discovery.

The plaintiff conducted an additional deposition in June 1983. However, due to the illness of the witness deposed, said witness did not sign the transcript of his testimony until the following December. The defendant then made a second motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute by notice of motion dated January 3, 1984, without serving a new 90-day demand for plaintiff to serve and file a note of issue. Special Term denied that motion as well, and this appeal ensued.

The plaintiff successfully met the defendant’s first motion to dismiss by showing an excusable delay in filing a note of issue *(see,*CPLR 3216 [e]). The defendant’s initial motion had been prematurely made. While the defendant’s second motion to dismiss may have been warranted, Special Term could not reach the merits of the motion unless the defendant met the procedural requirements of CPLR 3216. Service of a demand for a note of issue is a condition precedent to a dismissal for failure to *801prosecute *(see, Cohn v Borchard Affiliations,*25 NY2d 237; *Martine v Griffiths,*39 AD2d 553). Because the defendant had not complied with this condition with respect to the second motion to dismiss, Special Term properly denied the defendant’s motion. Lazer, J. P., Bracken, O’Connor and Brown, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Amon Rashad PEOPLES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-31217

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 5, 2011.

Josette Louise Cassiere, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Cristina Walker, Assistant U.S. *988Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Peter Questaverd John, Esq., O’Neal Legal, L.L.C., Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Amon Rashad Peoples pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit access device fraud, aggravated identity theft, and attempted bank fraud. He was sentenced, *inter alia,*to 111-months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution in excess of $93,000.

Peoples claims ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in district court. He maintains counsel failed: to analyze properly the elements of aggravated identity theft; to object to the pre-sentence investigation report; to assert insufficiency of the evidence; and to file a sentencing memorandum. On the record before us, we cannot assess either the professional reasonableness of performance by counsel or any prejudicial effect. *See, e.g., Massaro v. United States,*538 U.S. 500, 504-05, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003) (28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion preferable for claiming IAC because, without record developed for IAC claim, “appellate court may have no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive”); *United States v. Higdon,*832 F.2d 312, 313-14 (5th Cir.1987) (“The general rule in this circuit is that a claim of [IAC] cannot be resolved on direct appeal when the claim has not been raised before the district court since no opportunity existed to develop the record on the merits of the allegations.”). Accordingly, we decline to address Peoples’ IAC claim. It may be raised, of course, pursuant to a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.

Peoples also contends the court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. There is no discussion of the pertinent law or application of that law to the facts. By failing to brief this issue adequately, Peoples has waived it. *See, e.g., United States v. Green,*508 F.3d 195, 203 (5th Cir.2007).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 16

- 17710 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________

Agency No. A097

- 828

- 139

ESPERANZA SILVA

- SOLIS, Petitioner,

versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

________________________ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________ (August 2, 2018) Before MARCUS , ROSENBAUM and B LACK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 16-17710 Date Filed: 08/02/2018 Page: 1 of 32 Esperanza Silva

- Solis, proceeding pro se , petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ ( BIA) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s ( IJ) denial of her motion to reopen her removal proceedings pursuant to it s sua sponte authority. The G overnment filed a motion to dismiss Silva

- Solis’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, and we previously ordered the G overnment’s motion be carried with the case. Both the BIA and the IJ have the authority to reopen removal proceedings or reconsider earlier decisions pursuant to their sua sponte authority at any time.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Butka v. U.S. Att’y Gen. , 827 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Butka v. Sess ions , 138 S. Ct. 299 (2017). We have held, however, that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen based on its sua sponte authority because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provides no meaningful standard against which to judge the BIA’s exercise of its discretion. Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen. , 525 F.3d 1291, 1292

- 94 (11th Cir. 2008).
W e lack jurisdiction to review the denial of Silva

- Solis’s motion to reopen
under the BIA’s sua sponte authority. See Lenis , 525 F.3d at 1293. Although we have potentially reserved jurisdiction to review such decisions where constitutional issues are implicated, no such claims are present in this case. See id. at 1294 n.7; Butka , 827 F.3d at 1284. Silva

- Solis’s claim , that the BIA “abused its d iscretion” by violating her due process rights when it failed to consider her evidence of

Case: 16-17710 Date Filed: 08/02/2018 Page: 2 of 33 changed law , is an abuse of discretion argument that is not “colorable” as a constitutional issue. See Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen. , 482 F.3d 1281, 1283

- 84 (11th Cir. 20 07 ) (holding , in the context of constitutional challenges to final orders of removal that would otherwise be unreviewable by us, that such constitutional claims must be “colorable” and not simply abuse of discretion arguments disguised
in constitutional la nguage )

. Silva

- Solis’s argument regards the BIA’s failure to consider an alleged change in law, which this Court has held it lacks jurisdiction to consider. See Butka , 827 F.3d at 1285

- 86; Lenis , 525 F.3d at 1292, 1294. Accordingly, we grant the G overnm ent’s motion and dismiss Silva

- Solis’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. PETITION DISMISSED. Case: 16-17710 Date Filed: 08/02/2018 Page: 3 of 3