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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.

Cite as 302 Neb. 483

State of Nebraska on behalf of Walter E

a minor child, appellant, and Nebr

Department of Health and

Services, appellee, v

Mark E., appelle

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed March 8, 2019. No. S-18-436.

1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of 

law which requires an appellate court to reach its conclusions independent from a trial court.

2. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Subject matter jurisdiction is the 

power of a tribunal to hear and determine a case in the general class or 

category to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with 

the general subject matter involved.

3. Jurisdiction. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any 

time by any party or by the court sua sponte.

4. Jurisdiction: Child Support: Actions. As a prerequisite for an action 

under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-512.03(1)(a) (Reissue 2016), there cannot 

be an existing child support order in any jurisdiction. Hence, a court 

has subject matter jurisdiction for an action under § 43-512.03(1)(a) 

only “when there is no existing child support order” in Nebraska or any 

other jurisdiction.

Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: George A

Thompson, Judge. Affirme

Sarah E. Preisinger, Deputy Sarpy County Attorney, for 

appellant.

No appearance for appellee Mark E.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

03/15/2019 09:07 AM CDT
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.

Cite as 302 Neb. 483

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stac

Papik, and Freudenberg,

Miller-Lerman,

NATURE OF CASE

The State of Nebraska on behalf of Walter E. appeals the 

order of the district court for Sarpy County which dismissed 

the State’s complaint filed against his father, Mark E., to 

establish an order of support. The complaint was filed pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-512.03 (Reissue 2016). We 

conclude that because there was an existing support order, 

the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 

§ 43-512.03(1)(a) to consider the State’s complaint. We therefore affirm the district court’s order which dismissed the 

State’s complaint.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The record on appeal indicates that on February 9, 2016, 

the juvenile court ordered Walter to be placed in the custody 

of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services 

(DHHS) with placement at home pending an assessment for 

safety and services. In an order filed February 22, the juvenile court determined that Walter should be in the protective 

custody of DHHS, because although his parents had attempted 

numerous therapeutic interventions, he continued to engage 

in “extremely aggressive and out-of-control behaviors as well 

as self-harming behaviors.” The juvenile court ordered Walter 

to be placed in the temporary custody of DHHS, pending an 

appropriate placement for treatment. In the February 22 order, 

the juvenile court further ordered that “[t]he costs of the child’s 

care to the extent not covered by the parent’s insurance shall 

be borne by the State of Nebraska.” On March 11, the juvenile 

court ordered Walter to be placed at the Boys Town psychiatric 

residential treatment facility.

On July 19, 2016, the juvenile court filed an order in which 

it found Walter to be a child within the meaning of Neb. Rev. 
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.

Cite as 302 Neb. 483

Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Supp. 2015) and ordered him to remain 

in the custody of DHHS for placement at the Boys Town main 

campus. The juvenile court further ordered, inter alia, that 

DHHS “continue to be responsible for all costs associated with 

the Order herein not covered by insurance.” The record on 

appeal contains two orders filed by the juvenile court following subsequent reviews: one order was filed February 14, 2017, 

and the other was filed June 19. In both orders, the juvenile 

court ordered Walter to remain in the custody of DHHS for 

placement at the Boys Town main campus.

On June 12, 2017, the State, through a deputy Sarpy 

County Attorney, filed a complaint in the district court on 

behalf of Walter and against Walter’s father, Mark. The State 

alleged that the complaint was filed pursuant to § 43-512.03, 

which generally authorizes the county attorney to take certain 

actions in connection with child support, including filing a 

complaint against a nonsupporting party when there is no 

existing child or medical support order. See § 43-512.03(1)(a). 

The State alleged that Walter was under the jurisdiction of 

the juvenile court, that he had been placed in the custody 

of DHHS in an out-of-home placement, that he was in need 

of financial support from Mark, and that Mark had a duty 

of support for Walter. The State requested an order from the 

district court determining that Mark had a duty of support and 

ordering Mark to “pay a sum certain each month to meet that 

duty of support” and to “provide ongoing medical support 

for [Walter].”

Mark filed an answer in which he alleged, inter alia, that the 

juvenile court had placed Walter at Boys Town and had ordered 

that the State should be responsible for costs associated with 

the placement. He also alleged that he continued to provide 

coverage for Walter under his private medical insurance.

The district court’s child support referee held a hearing on 

the State’s complaint and thereafter filed a report finding that 

Mark was able to and should pay child support in accordance with the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines. The referee 
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302 Nebraska Report

STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.

Cite as 302 Neb. 483

recommended that Mark be ordered to pay to DHHS child support of $631 per month beginning September 1, 2017.

Mark took exception to the referee’s report. Mark asserted 

that the district court and referee lacked jurisdiction, because 

there was a pending case in the juvenile court and the juvenile 

court had already entered support orders specifically requiring 

the State to pay support beyond that covered by Mark’s insurance. Mark filed a motion to transfer the matter to the juvenile 

court. Mark later filed a motion to dismiss the district court 

action for lack of jurisdiction.

The district court held a hearing on Mark’s motion to dismiss, motion to transfer, and exception to the referee’s report. 

The district court received evidence, including the juvenile 

court orders discussed above. After the hearing, the district 

court filed an order on March 13, 2018, in which it dismissed 

the State’s complaint and ordered the parties to pay their 

own costs.

In its order of March 13, 2018, the district court stated that 

it had examined the juvenile court orders and that the orders 

showed that “at each juncture [the juvenile court] has assigned 

the costs of care for the child shall be paid by [Mark’s] insurance and to the extent that costs are not covered by insurance, 

they shall be paid by the State of Nebraska.” The district court 

further stated that the juvenile court had “made findings that 

the parents cannot afford appropriate treatment and costs were 

waived in that matter.”

The district court noted that § 43-512.03 authorizes an 

action seeking a support order “in cases where there is no 

existing child or medical support order.” The district court 

determined that there was “an existing order for support as 

announced by Juvenile Court.” As part of its order, the district court observed that “res judicata” prevented the parties 

from relitigating the issues in this action and noted that “the 

issue of support has been address[ed] by the Juvenile Court, 

the support order has the same finality as in this proceeding, the merits were litigated, and all of the parties are the 
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STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.

Cite as 302 Neb. 483

same.” The district court finally determined that because the 

juvenile court had jurisdiction over Walter and because the 

juvenile proceeding was still ongoing, the issue of whether 

the matter may or should be transferred to juvenile court 

was moot.

Following the denial of the State’s motion to reconsider, the 

State appealed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The State claims, restated and consolidated, that the district 

court erred when it dismissed the case based on its determination that an order of support had been entered by the juvenile 

court and that res judicata barred this action. The State alternatively claims that the district court erred when it declined to 

transfer the action to the juvenile court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not 

involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires an 

appellate court to reach its conclusions independent from a trial 

court. Retroactive, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 

298 Neb. 936, 906 N.W.2d 328 (2018).

ANALYSIS

The State challenges at length the district court’s reliance 

on “res judicata” in its order of dismissal. However, as we 

explain below, because the action was properly dismissed on a 

statutory basis for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we need 

not engage in an analysis of the relevance of the principle of 

res judicata.

[2,3] Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal 

to hear and determine a case in the general class or category 

to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with 

the general subject matter involved. Boyd v. Cook, 298 Neb. 

819, 906 N.W.2d 31 (2018). A lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by any party or by the court sua 

sponte. Id.
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302 Nebraska Report

STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.

Cite as 302 Neb. 483

In its complaint, the State alleged that it was filing the 

complaint in district court pursuant to § 43-512.03. We note 

that § 43-512.03 provides for various types of child support enforcement actions, including actions for enforcement 

of existing child support orders and actions for paternity. 

However, the State in its complaint sought an order to establish Mark’s child and medical support obligations, and therefore, it is clear that the State was specifically proceeding 

under § 43-512.03(1)(a), which authorizes a county attorney, 

on request of DHHS, to “file a complaint against a nonsupporting party in the district, county, or separate juvenile court praying for an order for child or medical support 

in cases when there is no existing child or medical support order.”

[4] In State ex rel. Gaddis v. Gaddis, 237 Neb. 264, 267-68, 

465 N.W.2d 773, 775 (1991), we held that “as a prerequisite 

for an action under § 43-512.03, there cannot be an existing 

child support order in any jurisdiction. Hence, a court has subject matter jurisdiction for an action under § 43-512.03 only 

‘when there is no existing child support order’ in Nebraska 

or any other jurisdiction.” See, also, State ex rel. Cammarata 

v. Chambers, 6 Neb. App. 467, 574 N.W.2d 530 (1998). We 

concluded in Gaddis that because there was an existing child 

support order issued in Colorado, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for an action brought under § 43-512.03 

and that therefore, the district court should have dismissed the 

proceedings on that basis.

Recently, in House v. House, 24 Neb. App. 595, 894 N.W.2d 

362 (2017), the Nebraska Court of Appeals clarified that the 

above-quoted holding in Gaddis applied specifically to a complaint filed under the part of the juvenile statute that is now 

found at § 43-512.03(1)(a). The Court of Appeals further clarified that the requirement in § 43-512.03(1)(a) that there be “no 

existing . . . support order” did not apply to actions brought 

under other subsections of § 43-512.03, such as the one at 

issue in House brought under § 43-512.03(1)(c) to enforce an 
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302 Nebraska Report

STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.

Cite as 302 Neb. 483

already existing child support order. We agree with the Court 

of Appeals’ analysis in House.

In this case, the district court determined that there was 

already an existing support order issued by the juvenile court 

and therefore dismissed the complaint. The district court made 

this determination by reviewing the juvenile court orders that it 

received into evidence and that we have described above. We 

agree with the district court’s determination that “[t]he Juvenile 

Court has issued an order of support . . . .”

On appeal, the State contends that the orders of the juvenile court were not general child support orders and that the 

juvenile court did not employ child support calculations like 

those available in the district court. As discussed below, we 

reject the contention that juvenile court orders were not general child support orders, and we do not address the State’s 

contention that the juvenile court did not employ proper procedures to determine child support. Instead, we conclude that 

the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of 

§ 43-512.03(1)(a).

In the July 19, 2016, order in which the juvenile court 

adjudicated Walter to be a child within the meaning of 

§ 43-247(3)(a) and ordered him to remain in the custody of 

DHHS for placement at the Boys Town main campus, the 

juvenile court ordered, inter alia, that DHHS “continue to be 

responsible for all costs associated with the Order herein not 

covered by insurance.” As did the district court, we read “all 

costs” to refer broadly to all necessary support required by the 

placement and not limited to medical support.

For completeness, we note that juvenile courts have authority to order support. Specifically, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-290 

(Reissue 2016), which is part of the Nebraska Juvenile Code, 

authorizes a juvenile court to order support to be paid by a parent. Section 43-290 provides in part:

Pursuant to a petition filed by a county attorney or 

city attorney having knowledge of a juvenile in his or her 
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STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.

Cite as 302 Neb. 483

jurisdiction who appears to be a juvenile described in subdivision (1), (2), (3), or (4) of section 43-247, whenever 

the care or custody of a juvenile is given by the court to 

someone other than his or her parent, which shall include 

placement with a state agency, or when a juvenile is given 

medical, psychological, or psychiatric study or treatment 

under order of the court, the court shall make a determination of support to be paid by a parent for the juvenile 

at the same proceeding at which placement, study, or 

treatment is determined or at a separate proceeding. Such 

proceeding, which may occur prior to, at the same time 

as, or subsequent to adjudication, shall be in the nature of 

a disposition hearing.

We conclude that the district court did not err when it 

determined that there was an existing support order from 

the juvenile court. Therefore, under § 43-512.03(1)(a), the 

district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over 

the State’s complaint and, consequently, the district court did 

not err when it dismissed the complaint. The State asserts 

that, in any event, the juvenile court did not follow adequate 

procedures to determine the amount of Mark’s support obligation. The State’s attempt to use a separate district court 

proceeding to challenge the sufficiency of the juvenile court 

proceeding was an impermissible collateral attack, which the 

district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain. However, as we 

noted above, juvenile courts have authority to enter support 

orders, and our decision in this matter does not foreclose 

subsequent filings in juvenile court to further consider support issues.

Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, the State alternatively claims that the district court erred when it did not 

transfer the present action to the juvenile court. However, 

we agree with the district court’s reasoning that there was 

already an ongoing proceeding in the juvenile court in which 

the State was a party and that therefore, the transfer issue 
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STATE ON BEHALF OF WALTER E. v. MARK E.

Cite as 302 Neb. 483

was moot. We conclude that the district court did not err in 

this regard.

CONCLUSION

We determine that because there was an existing support 

order issued by the juvenile court, the district court did not 

have subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint filed by 

the State under § 43-512.03(1)(a). We affirm the district 

court’s order which dismissed the State’s complaint.

Affirmed