F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

N A O M I F A W

N M A R S H , Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

C A R O L Y N W

. C O L

V I N , Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration Defendant-Appellee

. N o. 12-17014

D.C. No. 3:11-cv-02096- CRB

ORDER AND SUPERSEDI

NG OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Charles R. B rey er, Senior District J udg e, Presiding

Submitted J u ne 8, 2015 * San F rancisco, California

F iled J uly 10, 2015

B efore: B arry

G. Silverman, Ronald M. Gould, and Andrew D. Hurwitz
, Circuit J udg es.

Order; O pinion by

J udg e Gould

* T h e p an el u n a n i m o u sl y co n clu d es th is case is su itab le f o r d ecisio n

w ith o u t o ral arg u

m en t. S ee Fed . R. A pp . P . 3 4 (a)(2 ).M A R S H V

. C O L V I N 2

SUMMARY * *

Social Security

The panel g ran t e d a joint motion for clarification, withdrew t h e o p i nion filed on J une 18, 2015, and filed a superseding opinion vacating the d istrict court’s o r der affirming the So cial Security Commissioner’s denial of a claimant’s application for social security disability benefits.

The panel held that harmless error analy sis applied to the

case to a ssess the impact of the administrative law judg e’s failu r e to mention Dr. D avid B etat or his clinical prog ress notes. The panel further hel d t h a t t he district court did not offend the principle o f SEC v. Chenery Corp.
, 332 U.S. 194, 196 ( 1947) (stating that a reviewing court may o n l y a f f irm
ag ency action o n “the g rounds invoked by the ag e ncy ”), when it applied harmless error analy sis.

The panel also held that the A L J erred by not mentioning Dr. B etat or h is notes in the written decision. The panel could
not confidently conclude that the error was h a r m less. Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 5(g ), the panel remanded with instructions to the district court to remand to the AL J
, and specifically to invite the A L J to comment on Dr. B etat’s medical opinions and records.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.M A R S H V

. C O L V I N 3

COUNSEL

J ames Hunt Miller, Oakland, California, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Melinda L

. Haag
, United States Attorney
, Grace M. Kim, Reg ional Chief Co u n s e l
, Reg ion I X, and Shea L ita B ond, Special A ssistant U nited St ates A ttorney , Social Security Administration, San F rancisc o , California, for D efendantAppellee Caroly

n W . Colvin.

ORDER

The parties’ “J o int Motion for Clarification of the Court’s J une 18, 2015 Opinion” is G RANTED

. T h e opinion in the above-captione d matter, filed on J une 18, 2015, is WITHDRAWN

. The superseding o p i n i o n shall be filed concurrently

with this order.

OP INION

GOUL D, Circuit J udg e :

Naomi Marsh appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of her a pplication for social security disability benefits. W e have jurisdi c t i on under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand with instructions.M A R S H V

. C O L V I N 4

I

Marsh a pplied fo r disability benefits on November 21, 2006, claiming that she b ecame disabled on October 2
, 2001 from a work-related injury to her back, leg
, and hip, and from complications arising fro m a c ar wreck. A fter the ag ency denied her application initially and on reconsideration, Marsh requested a h earing befo r e a n Administrative L aw J udg e (“AL J ”); the AL J a lso denied benefits. T he r ecord on which the AL J deni e d M arsh’s application contains, among other evidence, medical opinions f rom several doctors
, including clinical prog ress ( SOAP) notes f r om Dr. David H. B etat, M.D. Dr. B etat’s SOAP n otes track Marsh’s clin i cal
prog r ess, beg inning in September 2003 and ending in November 2006. Dr. Be t a t ’ s SOAP n ote from J anuary 31, 2006 states, in part:

The p atient h as chronic trochanteric bursitis to t h e p o i n t t h a t s h e i s p r e t t y m u c h nonfun c t i onal. She also finds herself not being able to concentrate enoug h to do office work such as bookk e eping

. The patient
appea r s to be disabled, unfortunately
, at a fairly y oung ag e. I t seems to be leg itimate,

a l t houg h it is sometimes difficult to tell fo r

sure.

The A L J ’s decision deny ing Marsh disability benefits nowhere mentions Dr. B etat or his SOAP notes.

The AL J ’s denial became the ag ency ’s final d e cision a fter the ag ency ’s Appeals Council denied further review. Marsh
soug h t judicial review of the ag ency ’s decision, and the district court affirmed the ag en c y

. T h e district court alsoM A R S H V

. C O L V I N 5

denied Marsh’s Rule 5 9 (e) motion for reconsideration, see F ed. R. Civ. P

. 5 9 ( e), which c h a lleng ed the district court’s application of harmless error to the A L J ’ s denial o f benefits.

II

W e review de novo a district court’s judg ment upholding

an ag ency d enial of social security benefits. See Berry v

. Astrue
, 6 22 F .3d 1228, 1231 ( 9 t h C ir. 2010). W e will set aside a denial of benefits only if the denial is unsupported b y substantial e vidence in the administrative record o r i s based on leg al error. See id.

III

Ma r s h arg ues that the law apply ing harmless error analy sis to social security cases i s u n clear and that no published authority of our court has applied harmless error analy sis to a social security c ase whe re a n AL J ig nores a treating source’s medical opinion. B ut w e apply harmless

error analy sis to social security cases. See McLeod v. Astrue
, 640 F

. 3d 881, 8 87 (9th Cir. 2011); Molina v. Astrue
, 674 F .3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (“W e have long r e c o gn i z ed that harmless error principles apply in t h e Social Security A ct contex t.”). The nature of that application is factintensive—“no presumptions operate” a nd “we must analy

z e harmlessness in lig ht of the circumstances of the case.” Id. at 1121 (internal quotation marks omitted). W e decline to draw the distinction that Marsh urg es, i.e., one based on the nature

or source of e vidence ig nored in an AL J ’s opinion. W e hold that h armless error analy sis applies in this case to assess the impact o f the AL J ’s failure to even mention Dr. B etat or his SO A P notes, let a lone its f ailure to g ive “specific a nd leg itimate reasons that a

r e supported by substantial evidence”M A R S H V

. C O L V I N 6

for rejecting a treating source’s medical opinion. Garrison v

. Colvin , 759 F .3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014).

Marsh also arg ues that the district court ex ceeded its

a u thority when it a

pplied harmless error analy sis, violat i n g the rule of Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp.
, 332 U.S. 194, 1 96 ( 1947) (stating that a reviewing court may only affirm ag ency action on “the g rounds invoked b y t h e ag ency ”). I f the district co u r t h a d applied h a rmless error in

a way that affirmed the ag enc y o n a g round not invoked b y the AL J
, then the district court would have violated the Chenery p rinciple. See Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. S e c

. Admin.
, 454 F .3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006). B ut Marsh d id not show that th e d i strict court affirmed the ag ency on a g r ound that the AL J had n ot invoked in its written d e ci s i o n. The district c ourt’s conclusion t h a t Dr. B etat’s SOAP notes “provide minimal a dditional insig ht,” as to Marsh’s condition did not preclude the district c ourt from “[ g ] iving full effect”
to the AL J ’s r easoning

. Molina
, 6 74 F .3d a t 1 1 2 1

. The district court ex pressly stated that Dr. B etat’s notes “do[ ] not contradict the determination of the AL J

. ” T h e district court did not offend the principle of Chenery.

Marsh further arg ues that the AL J erred by n ot mentioning Dr. B etat’s SOAP notes i n its written decision. W e ag ree. As we note above, an AL J may rejec t a t r e a ting source’s o pinion that is contradicted b y another doctor’s opinion only “by providing specific and leg itimate reasons that are supported b y substan tial evidence.” 1 Garrison
,

1 W e rej ect th e Co m

m i ssio n er’ s co n t e n t i o n s th at Dr. B etat w as n o t a

“ t reatin g so u rce” an d th at h is SOA P n o tes w ere n o t “ m ed ical o p i n i o n .” T h e d i s trict co u rt co rrectly ap p lied th e Co m m issio n er’ s reg u latio n d ef in i n g “ treatin g so u rce” to co n clu de t h at Dr. B etat w as o n e o f

Marsh ’ sM A R S H V

. C O L V I N 7

759 F .3d at 1012. H ere, the AL J g ave no reasons for not mentioning Dr. B e tat or his SOAP notes. Tha t w a s error. B ecause a court must g ive “spec i fi c and leg itimate reasons” for rejecting a treating doc t o r’s opinions, it follows even

more strong ly that an AL J c annot in its decision totally ig nore

a treating doctor and hi s o r her notes, without even mentioning them. See id. (“W here an AL J does not ex plicitly reject a medical opinion . . . he errs.”).

W e nex t address whether that error w as harmless. As we

ex p lained above, harmless error a n aly sis applies in the social security contex t, and we find no authority that would lead us to adopt the rule sug g ested by M a r s h t o make distinctions

w h e re a treating source’s medical opinion is not mentione d

. However, our prece d e nts have been cautious about when harmless error should be found, e ven though t h e analy tical framework itself applies broadly . F or ex ample, in Stout , we held that an AL J ’s silent disreg ard of lay testimony w a s n ot harmless, and we ex plained that AL J errors in social security

cases are h armless if they are “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination” and that “a revi e wing court cannot consider [ an] error harmless u nless it can confidently conclude that no reasonable AL J
, when full y crediting the testimony
, cou l d have reached a different d isability determination.” Stout
, 4 54 F

. 3d a t 1 0 5 5–56. Recently
, in McLeod , we cautioned:

treatin g so u rces. S

ee 20 C.F.R. § 4 0 4.1 5 0 2. Dr. B etat’ s SOA P n o tes are

“ m ed ical o p in io n ,” becau se th ey co n tain “ statem en ts f ro m [Dr. B etat] th at

r e f lect j u d g m en ts ab o u

t th e n atu re an d sev erity o f [Mars h ’s ] im p airm en t(s), in clu d in g [h er] sy m p t o m s, d iag n o sis an d p ro g n o sis, w h at [sh e] can still d o d esp ite h er im p airm en t(s), an d [h er] p h y sical o r m en t al restrictio n s.” 2 0 C.F.R. § 4 0 4 .1 5 2 7

.M A R S H V

. C O L V I N 8

[ W ] here the circumstances of the case show a substantial likelihood of p rejudice, remand is appropriate so that the a ge ncy can decide whether re-con s ideration is n ecessary

. B y contrast, where harmlessness is clear and not

a b o r d e r l i n e q u e s t i o n , r e m a n d f o r reconsideration is not appropriate.

McLeod
, 6 40 F .3d at 888 (internal quotation marks omitted).

W e reject the idea that n ot mentioning a treating source’s medical opinion precludes use of h a r mless error doctrine, but
at the same time, because our law requires “specific a nd leg itimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence” for rejecting a treati n g source’s medical opinion, that precedent surely implies that an AL J must discuss the relevant views of a treating source. O ur preced ents do not quantify the d eg r ee of certainty needed to co n c lude that an AL J ’s error w as harmless, and we would h e s itate to sug g e st

a rig id r ule for all such c ases. B ut it does seem that where the
mag nitude of an AL J e rror is more sig nificant, then t h e deg ree of certainty of harmlessne s s must also b e heig htened before an error can be determi n e d t o b e harmless. I n other words, the more serious the AL J ’s error, the more difficult it should be to show the error was harmless.

Here, the district c ourt g ave persuasive reasons to determine harmlessness. B u t the decision on disability rests with the AL J a n d t he Commissioner of the Social Security Administration in the first instance, not with a district court. See 20 C.F .R. § 404.1527(d)(1)–(3). I n the c ircumstances o f
t h i s case, where the AL J did not even mention Dr. Be t a t ’s opinion that Marsh’s chro nic bursitis rendered her “pretty much nonfunctional,” we cannot “confidently conclude” thatM A R S H V

. C O L V I N 9

the error was harmless. See Stout
, 454 F .3d at 1056; Bowen

v

. C o mm’r of Soc. Sec.
, 478 F .3d 742, 750 (6th Cir. 2007 ). W e think it is most a p p r opriate to vacate the district court’s opinion, remand with instructions to the district c our t t o

r e m a nd to the AL J
, and specifically to invite the A L J t o comment on Dr. B e tat’s medical opinions and records. 2 This remand is pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g ). 3

V A C A T E D a n d R

E M A N D E D w i t h I NSTR U C T I O N S

. Each party

shall bear its own costs.

2 W e rej ect Marsh ’ s arg u m en t th at t h e A L J erred b y d isco u n t in g h er testim o n y o n sy

m p to m sev erity an d p h y sical l im itatio n s b ecau se th e A L J

“ h eld Marsh ’ s g o o d w o r k h isto ry ag ain st h er.” A n A L J m ay rej ect a claim an t’ s testim o n y ab o u t sy m p to m sev erity “ o n ly b y

o f f erin g sp ecif

ic, clear an d co n v in cin g reaso n s f o r d o i n g so .” Lin g en

fe lter v. Astru e , 5 0 4 F.3 d 1 0 2 8
, 1 0 3 6 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ). A n d su ch reaso n s m u st b e su p p orted b y su bstan tial ev id en ce f

ro m th e ad m in istrativ e reco rd

. S ee M e i e r v

. Co lvin
, 7 2 7 F.3 d 8 6 7
, 8 7 2 ( 9 t h C ir. 2 0 1 3 ). Here, t h e A L J satisf

ied th is
stan d ard w

h en h e f o u n d : (1 ) th at Marsh ’ s treatm en t w as “ ro u t i ne or

co n serv ativ e”; (2 ) th at g ap s ex isted in Marsh ’ s treatm en t reg im en ; (3 ) th at Marsh d id n o t tak e a ty

p e an d d o s ag e o f m ed icatio n c o n sisten t w ith th e alleg e d sev erity o f h er im p airm en ts; (4 ) th at Marsh w as ab le to atten d

v o catio n al reh ab ilitatio n classes, “ in d ic a t i n g activ ities in ex cess o f th e resid u al f u n ctio n al cap acity ”; (5 ) th at Marsh
, w ith assistan ce, cared f o r a six

- y ear- old ch ild ; an d (6 ) th at Marsh ’ s “ lim i ted w o rk h isto ry also d etracts f ro m th e cred i b ility o f h er su b j ectiv e alleg atio n s.” No n e o f th ese reaso n s

w as im p erm issib le. W e rej ect Marsh ’ s co n ten t io n th at th e A L J ’ s ref eren ce to h er w o rk h isto ry w as im pro p er. S

ee 2 0 C.F.R. § 40 4.1 5 2 9 (c ) ( 3 ); Th o ma s v. Ba r

n h art , 2 7 8 F.3 d 9 4 7
, 9 5 9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 2 ). T h e A L J p ro p erly d i s c o u n t ed th e cred ib ility of Marsh ’ s testim o n y ab o u t th e s ev erity an d in ten sity o f h er sy

m p to m s, an d t h e ph y sical l im itatio n s cau sed b y th ose sy m p to m s.

3 Sen ten ce f

o u r o f 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 5 ( g ) s tates: “ T h e co u rt sh all h av e p o w er to en ter, u

p o n th e p lead in g s an d tran scrip t of th e reco rd
, a j u dg m en t af f irm in g , m o d if

y i n g , o r rev ersin g t

h e d ecisio n o f th e Co m

m issio n er of So cial Secu rity , w ith

o r w ith o u

t rem an d in g th e cau se f

o r a reh earin g .”