1

Filed 12/12/11

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE C.H., a Person Coming )

Under the Juvenile Court Law. )

___________________________________ )

)

THE PEOPLE, ) S183737

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )

) Ct.App. 2/6

v. )

) B214707

C.H., )

) Ventura County

Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. 2005040811

)

____________________________________)

May a court commit to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 

Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF), a juvenile who has not committed an offense 

described in subdivision (b) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707? Two 

statutes govern the answer. Welfare and Institutions Code section 731 authorizes 

a juvenile court to commit a juvenile who has been adjudged a ward of the court to 

the DJF if the ward has committed an offense described in subdivision (b) of 

Welfare and Institutions Code Section 707 ―and‖ the ward ―is not otherwise 

ineligible for commitment to the division under [Welfare and Institutions Code] 

Section 733.‖ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731, subd. (a)(4) (hereafter 

section 731(a)(4)).)1 Section 733 makes a ward ineligible for commitment to the 

 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 
2

DJF when ―the most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found 

to be true by the court is not described in subdivision (b) of Section 707, unless the 

offense is a sex offense set forth in subdivision (c) of Section 290.008 of the Penal 

Code.‖ (§ 733, subd. (c) (hereafter section 733(c), italics added.) 

Here, the juvenile court committed a juvenile ward, C.H., to the DJF based 

on his commission of a sex offense listed in Penal Code section 290.008, 

subdivision (c) (hereafter Penal Code section 290.008(c)), although he had never 

committed an offense listed in section 707, subdivision (b) (hereafter § 707(b)). 

We conclude a juvenile court lacks authority to commit a ward to the DJF under 

section 731(a)(4) if that ward has never been adjudged to have committed an 

offense described in section 707(b), even if his or her most recent offense alleged 

in a petition and admitted or found true by the juvenile court is a sex offense set 

forth in section 290.008(c) as referenced in section 733(c). We reverse the 

judgment of the Court of Appeal, which concluded otherwise.2

I.

Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2005, a witness reported seeing 13-year-old C.H. orally 

copulating his three-year-old sister S.H. while they were parked in a vehicle 

outside a grocery store. C.H. admitted his conduct to an investigating officer and 

 

2 Given our conclusion that C.H. was not eligible for commitment to the 

DJF, we do not reach the other issues presented in this case, which include 

whether it was error to commit C.H. to the DJF without evidence demonstrating 

probable benefit to him from his commitment and/or without adequately 

considering alternative placements. The request for judicial notice filed by amicus 

curiae Pacific Juvenile Defender Center and Loyola Law School Center for 

Juvenile Law and Policy is denied as unnecessary. 
3

told the officer he was in counseling for molesting S.H. a year earlier. C.H. also 

told the officer he had touched the genitalia of two of his other siblings. 

An original petition was filed in juvenile court pursuant to section 602, 

alleging C.H. had committed a lewd and lascivious act upon S.H. within the 

meaning of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). C.H. admitted the allegation 

and was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation in January 2006. 

Over the course of the next three years, C.H. made little to no progress on 

probation. He admitted four separate violations of probation for failing to comply 

with program placement rules. 

The first notice of violation of probation was filed, alleging C.H. had failed 

to comply with program placement rules by failing to obey staff directives, 

complete required assignments and participate actively in group therapy. C.H. 

admitted the violations and the court ordered him placed at a new residential 

program. 

C.H. demonstrated the same lack of commitment and progress at his second 

program placement. In addition, he disclosed having gender identity issues and 

admitted engaging in mutually consenting sex acts on two occasions with another 

resident. After three months at this second placement, a second notice of violation 

of probation was filed, alleging a failure to comply with program placement rules. 

C.H. admitted the violations and in June 2007 he was placed at a residential 

program that offered services directed to his gender identity issues. 

Approximately 10 months later, after C.H. failed to complete required 

assignments for his sex offender therapy and routinely pretended not to understand 

what he was being told in order to avoid doing work, a third notice of violation of 

probation was filed, alleging C.H.’s continuing failure to comply with program 

rules and lack of progress. C.H. admitted the violations and ultimately served 90 

days in custody at juvenile hall. 
4

C.H. returned from custody to the residential program in September 2008 

with a negative and defiant attitude. His continued failure to complete 

assignments, failing school grades, and lack of progress in his sex offender 

treatment program resulted in a fourth notice of violation of probation filed in 

January 2009. C.H. again admitted the violations. 

In February 2009, after an extensive disposition hearing, the juvenile court 

committed C.H. to the DJF in order to enable him to participate in its sex offender 

program. The court observed that C.H.’s commitment offense, the violation of 

Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), was not an offense falling within the 

provisions of section 707(b),3 but concluded that after three years of failed 

attempts to help C.H. in three different reputable programs, commitment of C.H. 

to the DJF was necessary so that he would not have access to other potential 

victims and could receive the benefit of the DJF’s adolescent sexual offender 

program. C.H. appealed the dispositional order.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. As relevant here, it rejected C.H.’s claim 

that he was ineligible for commitment to the DJF because his offense under Penal 

Code section 288, subdivision (a) was not listed in section 707(b). We granted 

C.H.’s petition for review.

 

3 Section 707(b) does not list the offense of a lewd and lascivious act on a 

child within the meaning of subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 288, the offense 

with which C.H. was charged and that he admitted committing. Section 707(b) 

lists 30 serious or violent felonies, including the sex offenses of rape with force, 

violence or threat of great bodily harm, sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace 

or threat of great bodily harm, oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace 

or threat of great bodily harm, forcible penetration with a foreign object as 

specified in subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 289, and a forcible lewd or 

lascivious act on a child described by subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 288. 

(§ 707, subd. (b)(4)-(8).) 
5

II.

Discussion

A. The Plain Meaning of Sections 731(a)(4) and 733(c)

Section 731, subdivision (a) authorizes a juvenile court to order specified 

types of treatment for a minor who is adjudged a ward of the court on the ground 

that he or she is a person described by section 602. It also authorizes certain 

additional orders and commitments. At issue here is subdivision (a)(4), which 

authorizes a juvenile court to ―[c]ommit the ward to the [DJF], if the ward has 

committed an offense described in subdivision (b) of Section 707 and is not 

otherwise ineligible for commitment to the division under Section 733.‖ 

Section 733 provides, in relevant part, that ―[a] ward of the juvenile court 

who meets any condition described below shall not be committed to the [DJF]: 

[¶] (a) The ward is under 11 years of age. [¶] (b) The ward is suffering from any 

contagious, infectious, or other disease that would probably endanger the lives or 

health of the other inmates of any facility. [¶] (c) The ward has been or is 

adjudged a ward of the court pursuant to Section 602, and the most recent offense

alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court is not 

described in subdivision (b) of Section 707, unless the offense is a sex offense set 

forth in subdivision (c) of Section 290.008 of the Penal Code.‖ It is this last 

restriction, section 733(c), which gives rise to the question presented in this case.

―As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task 

here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.‖ 

(People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) We begin by examining the 

statutory language because the words of a statute are generally the most reliable 

indicator of legislative intent. (People v. Watson (2007) 42 Cal.4th 822, 828; Hsu 

v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871.) We give the words of the statute their 
6

ordinary and usual meaning and view them in their statutory context. (People v. 

Watson, supra, at p. 828.) We harmonize the various parts of the enactment by 

considering them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. (People v. 

Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 975; Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 

Cal.4th 478, 487.) ―If the statute’s text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, 

we need go no further.‖ (Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP (2007) 42 

Cal.4th 503, 508.) ―Only when the statute’s language is ambiguous or susceptible 

of more than one reasonable interpretation, may the court turn to extrinsic aids to 

assist in interpretation.‖ (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 

Cal.4th 1094, 1103; accord, Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California

(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1142, 1147.)

It is clear from the statutory language of sections 731(a)(4) and 733(c) 

that section 731(a)(4) governs a ward’s eligibility for DJF commitment and 

section 733 governs a ward’s ineligibility for a DJF commitment. Subdivision 

(a)(4) was added to section 731 by urgency legislation passed in 2007. (See 

Stats. 2007, ch. 175 (Sen. Bill No. 81), §§ 19, 37, operative Sept. 1, 2007.) 

Initially, subdivision (a)(4) of section 731 simply authorized a juvenile court to 

―commit the ward to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division 

of Juvenile Facilities, if the ward has committed an offense described in 

subdivision (b) of Section 707.‖ The same bill that amended section 731 to 

include subdivision (a)(4) also added section 733. (See Stats. 2007, ch. 175, 

§§ 22, 37, operative Sept. 1, 2007.) Section 733(c) provided that a ward of the 

juvenile court shall not be committed to the DJF if, among other things, ―the most 

recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court 

is not described in subdivision (b) of Section 707, unless the offense is a sex 
7

offense set forth in paragraph (3) of subdivision (d) of section 290 of the Penal 

Code.‖4 Thus, from the time of enactment, section 731(a)(4) stated a ward’s 

eligibility for DJF commitment and section 733 stated a ward’s ineligibility. This 

distinction was made express by the Legislature when only a few weeks after its 

enactment of new subdivision (a)(4) of section 731 and section 733 the Legislature 

amended section 731(a)(4) to clarify that a juvenile court has authority to commit 

a ward to the DJF ―if the ward has committed an offense described in subdivision 

(b) of Section 707 and is not otherwise ineligible for commitment to the division 

under Section 733.‖ (Stats. 2007, ch. 257 (Assem. Bill No. 191), § 2, eff. Sept. 29, 

2007, italics added.) This later version of section 731(a)(4) was in effect at the 

time C.H. was committed to the DJF. 

As noted, section 731(a)(4) authorizes DJF commitment ―if the ward has 

committed an offense described in subdivision (b) of Section 707 and is not 

otherwise ineligible for commitment to the division under Section 733.‖ (Italics 

added.) The ordinary and usual usage of ―and‖ is as a conjunctive, meaning ―an 

additional thing,‖ ―also‖ or ―plus.‖ (Amerigraphics, Inc. v. Mercury Casualty Co. 

(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1551-1552; accord, Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County 

Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19 Cal.4th 851, 861-862; Santos v. Dondero 

(1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 720, 723.) 

 

4 The Legislature subsequently reorganized and renumbered the provisions of 

Penal Code former section 290. (Stats. 2007, ch. 579, §§ 8-31, 52, eff. Oct. 13, 

2007.) The sex offenses listed in paragraph 3 of subdivision (d) of former Penal 

Code section 290 were moved into subdivision (c) of new Penal Code section 

290.008. (Stats. 2007, ch. 579, § 16.) Thereafter, section 733(c) and related 

statutes were amended to reference Penal Code section 290.008(c) instead of Penal 

Code former section 290, subdivision (d)(3). (See Stats. 2008, ch. 699, §§ 27-31.) 

At the time of C.H.’s commitment to the DJF, section 733(c) referenced Penal 

Code section 290.008(c) and for clarity, we will generally reference that statute. 
8

In order for a ward to be committed to the DJF, section 731(a)(4) read as 

a conjunctive, requires that the ward has committed an offense listed in section 

707(b), plus the ward is not ineligible under section 733. Both are necessary 

predicates. A ward’s commission of an offense described in section 707(b) is, 

therefore, a prerequisite for a juvenile court’s authority to order DJF commitment. 

Only if the juvenile ward is eligible for commitment to the DJF because of his or 

her commission of an offense listed in section 707(b) should the juvenile court 

proceed to consider whether he or she is nevertheless statutorily ineligible for such 

a commitment pursuant to section 733, including section 733(c). 

Under section 733(c), a ward who has committed an offense described in 

section 707(b) is ineligible for commitment to the DJF if his or her ―most recent 

offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court is not 

described in subdivision (b) of Section 707, unless the offense is a sex offense set 

forth in subdivision (c) of Section 290.008 of the Penal Code.‖ (§ 733(c), italics 

added.) The antecedent being referenced by the offense in this quoted language is 

the ward’s most recent offense. Thus, the statutory language of section 733(c) 

provides that a ward is ineligible for commitment to the DJF if his or her most 

recent offense admitted or found true by the court is not an offense described in 

section 707(b), unless the ward has a previously sustained petition for a section 

707(b) offense and the most recent offense is one of the sex offenses set forth in 

section 290.008(c). The express exception for specified sex offenses in 

subdivision (c) of Penal Code section 290.008 is to the ineligibility to a DJF 

commitment as stated in the earlier clause of section 733(c). It is not a substitute 

for the initial, prerequisite eligibility requirement set forth in section 731(a)(4) that 

the ward have committed an offense described in section 707(b). Read together, 

sections 731(a)(4) and 733(c) limit the class of wards who may be committed to 

the DJF to those wards who (1) have committed an offense described in section 
9

707(b) and (2) whose most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or 

found to be true by the court is listed either in section 707(b) or Penal Code 

section 290.008(c). 

A contrary reading of section 733(c)’s description of those juvenile wards 

who are ineligible for commitment to the DJF would give the ―and‖ used in 

section 731(a)(4) a disjunctive meaning. That is, one would need to interpret 

―and‖ as ―or.‖ It is true that courts will sometimes substitute ―or‖ for ―and,‖ and 

vice versa, when necessary to accomplish the evident intent of the statute, but 

doing so is an exceptional rule of construction. (Bianco v. Industrial Accident 

Com. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 584, 587; Santos v. Dondero, supra, 11 Cal.App.2d at 

p. 723.) We reject application of the rule here because construing the word ―and‖ 

in section 731(a)(4) as ―or‖ would render a portion of section 733(c) superfluous. 

If ―and‖ were construed to mean ―or‖ in this context, section 731(a)(4) would 

provide that a ward is eligible for commitment to the DJF if he or she has 

committed an offense specified in section 707(b) or if he or she was eligible under 

section 733(c) because his or her most recent offense was one specified under 

section 707(b)5 or because he or she committed one of the sex offenses 

enumerated in Penal Code section 290.008(c). But if the commission of any 

offense specified in section 707(b) qualifies a juvenile ward for commitment to the 

DJF, it would be meaningless to say that the ward is also eligible if his or her most 

recent offense is listed in section 707(b). It is a settled principle of statutory 

 

5 Under traditional principles of grammar, a double negative combines to 

form an affirmative. (American Heritage Dict. (4th ed. 2000) double negative, 

p. 539, col. 1.) Thus, to say a ward shall not be committed to the DJF if his or her 

most recent offense is not a section 707(b) offense is generally understood to mean 

a ward may be committed to the DJF if his or her most recent offense is a section 

707(b) offense.
10

construction, that courts should ―strive to give meaning to every word in a statute 

and to avoid constructions that render words, phrases, or clauses superfluous.‖ 

(Klein v. United States of America (2010) 50 Cal.4th 68, 80; accord, Curle v. 

Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1063.) We harmonize statutory 

provisions, if possible, giving each provision full effect. (Cacho v. Boudreau 

(2007) 40 Cal.4th 341, 352.) 

Interpreting the word ―and‖ in section 731(a)(4) as a conjunctive not only 

avoids rendering a portion of section 733(c) meaningless, it harmonizes the 

provisions of the statutes as a whole, and preserves section 731(a)(4) as the 

eligibility statute and section 733(c) as the ineligibility statute in accordance with 

the Legislature’s apparent intent. It ascribes to the language of the statutes their 

ordinary and usual meaning. 

B. The Effect of Other Statutes Added or Amended at the Same Time 

as Sections 731(a)(4) and 733(c)

The Attorney General contends that statutes added or amended concurrently 

with sections 731(a)(4) and 733(c) reflect the Legislature’s intent that juvenile sex 

offenders remain eligible for DJF commitment. We agree that certain juvenile sex 

offenders are eligible for DJF, but only so long as they have a prior or current 

section 707(b) offense sustained against them. 

We begin by considering section 731.1, which was added, along with 

sections 731(a)(4) and 733(c), by Senate Bill No. 81. (Stats. 2007, ch. 175, §§ 20, 

37.) Section 731.1 governs a juvenile court’s authority to recall the commitment 

of a ward to the DJF. Section 731.1 provides that the court committing a ward to 

the DJF ―may recall that commitment in the case of any ward whose commitment 

offense was not an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707, unless the 

offense was a sex offense set forth in subdivision (c) of Section 290.008 of the 
11

Penal Code, and who remains confined in an institution operated by the division 

on or after September 1, 2007.‖ (§ 731.1, subd. (a).)

By its terms, section 731.1 governs recall of previous commitments of 

wards to the DJF, not eligibility for commitments starting on September 1, 2007. 

(See In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 423, 437-438.) That the Legislature 

concluded juvenile sex offenders already committed to the DJF should not receive 

the benefits of a recall under newly enacted section 731.1 sheds no light on what 

the Legislature intended regarding future commitment of juvenile offenders 

pursuant to sections 731(a)(4) and 733(c). As observed in In re N.D. (2008) 167 

Cal.App.4th 885, 891-892, the Legislature undertook a fiscal realignment through 

Senate Bill No. 81 that shifted responsibility to the counties for all but the most 

serious youth offenders. When considering such fiscal matters, the Legislature 

could reasonably make different policy choices regarding which juvenile offenders 

should be kept in the custody of the DJF and which juvenile offenders should be 

committed in the future to the DJF. 

We next consider section 1731.5, which was amended by Senate Bill 

No. 81 to read, in relevant part, as follows: ―(a) After certification to the Governor 

as provided in this article, a court may commit to the [DJF] any person who meets 

all of the following: [¶] (1) Is convicted of an offense described in subdivision (b)

of Section 707 or paragraph (3) of subdivision (d) of Section 290 of the Penal 

Code. [¶] (2) Is found to be less than 21 years of age at the time of apprehension. 

[¶] (3) Is not sentenced to death, imprisonment for life, with or without the 

possibility of parole, whether or not pursuant to Section 190 of the Penal Code, 

imprisonment for 90 days or less, or the payment of a fine, or after having been 

directed to pay a fine, defaults in the payment thereof, and is subject to 

imprisonment for more than 90 days under the judgment. [¶] (4) Is not granted 

probation, or was granted probation and that probation is revoked and terminated.‖ 
12

(Stats. 2007, ch. 175, §§ 24, 37, italics added.) After the Legislature reorganized 

and renumbered the provisions of Penal Code former section 290, the reference to 

Penal Code section 290, subdivision (b)(3) in section 1731.5 was correspondingly 

changed to Penal Code section 290.008(c). (Stats. 2008, ch. 699, § 29.)

Similar to section 731.1, section 1731.5 operates in a different context from 

the initial commitment of juvenile wards to the DJF by a juvenile court. Section 

1731.5 is part of the statutory scheme applicable to individuals who are tried as 

adults in criminal proceedings. Specifically, section 1731, subdivision (a), states: 

―When in any criminal proceeding in a court of this State a person has been 

convicted of a public offense and the person was a minor when he or she 

committed the offense, the court shall determine whether the person was less than 

21 years of age at the time of the apprehension from which the criminal 

proceeding resulted. Proceedings in a juvenile court in respect to a juvenile are 

not criminal proceedings as that phrase is used in this chapter.‖ (Italics added.) 

Section 1731.5, subdivision (a), affords the court in such criminal proceedings the 

authority to commit to the DJF an individual who is ―convicted of an offense 

described in subdivision (b) of Section 707 or subdivision (c) of Section 290.008 

of the Penal Code‖ (id., subd. (a)(1)),―found to be less than 21 years of age at the 

time of apprehension‖ (id., subd. (a)(2)), and meets certain sentence criteria. (Id., 

subd. (a)(3)-(4).) 

Section 1731.5 provides a court in a criminal proceeding the discretion to 

commit an individual who was a juvenile at the time of apprehension to the DJF as 

a lesser alternative to state prison. The Legislature’s choice to include offenses 

listed under both section 707(b) and Penal Code section 290.008(c) as qualifying 

offenses for this purpose does not shed any light on the Legislature’s intent 

regarding the authority of a juvenile court to commit a juvenile ward to the DJF 

pursuant to sections 731(a)(4) and 733(c). 
13

The Attorney General also cites Senate Bill No. 81’s amendment of both 

section 736 (regarding the DJF’s acceptance of a ward for commitment) and 

section 1766, former subdivision (a) (setting forth the Juvenile Parole Board’s 

general authority), to include a reference to section 733. (Stats. 2007, ch. 175, 

§§ 23, 25.) These amendments make explicit within these statutes the restriction 

of the pool of wards eligible for commitment to the DJF set forth in section 733. 

These amendments do not suggest an intent by the Legislature that juveniles who 

commit sex offenses not described in section 707(b) and who have not been found 

to have committed a section 707(b) offense are eligible for commitment to the 

DJF.

As the Attorney General further notes, Senate Bill No. 81 also added a new 

subdivision (b) to section 1766 to direct the county of commitment, as opposed to 

the state, to supervise the parole of any ward released after September 1, 2007, if 

the ward was committed to the custody of the DJF for committing an offense not

listed in section 707(b). (Stats. 2007, ch. 175, § 25.) This was part of the fiscal 

realignment of state and local responsibilities undertaken by Senate Bill No. 81. 

(In re N.D., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 891-892.) In the clarifying urgency 

legislation passed shortly after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 81, former 

subdivision (b) of section 1766 was further amended to additionally exclude from 

local parole supervision any ward released on parole on or after September 1, 

2007, if the ward committed an offense enumerated in Penal Code former section 

290, subdivision (d)(3) (subsequently renumbered section 290.008(c)). (Stats. 

2007, ch. 257 (Assem. Bill No. 191), § 5, eff. Sept. 29, 2007.) Such provisions 

now appear in subdivision (c) of section 1766. 

Section 1766 sets forth the authority of the Juvenile Parole Board over 

wards committed to the DJF. (§ 1766, subd. (b) [former subd. (a)].) The section 

provides for local parole supervision of wards committed to the DJF for an offense 
14

other than one listed in section 707(b) or a sex offense described in Penal Code 

section 290.008(c). (§ 1766, subd. (c) [former subd. (b)].) Section 1766 thus 

divides responsibility between the state and counties for parole supervision of 

wards who have already been committed to the DJF. As such, it is not an 

indication of the Legislature’s intent regarding which wards are eligible for 

commitment in the future to the DJF. 

Finally, we consider section 1767.35, which was also added by Senate Bill 

No. 81. As initially enacted, section 1767.35 provided for the return of a juvenile 

parolee whose parole was suspended, cancelled or revoked (1) to the custody of 

the DJF if the parolee was under the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Parole 

Operations (Division) for the commission of an offense listed in section 707(b), 

but (2) to the local county of commitment if the parolee was under the jurisdiction 

of the Division based on the commission of an offense not described in section 

707(b). (Stats. 2007, ch. 175, § 27.) The clarifying subsequent legislation 

amended section 1767.35 to authorize the return to the custody of the DJF of any 

parolee who was under the jurisdiction of the Division for the commission of an 

offense described in either section 707(b) or Penal Code section 290.008(c). 

(Stats. 2007, ch. 257, § 6.) Otherwise, the parolee is to be returned to the county 

of commitment. (§ 1767.35, subd. (c).) 

Section 1767.35 expresses once again an apparent choice by the Legislature 

to treat those juvenile offenders who have already been committed to the DJF 

differently from wards whose initial eligibility for commitment is being 

considered. The Legislature’s fiscal policy decision with respect to the return of 

juvenile parolees to the DJF or local counties does not reveal anything about the 

Legislature’s intent regarding the authority of a juvenile court to commit a juvenile 

ward to the DJF pursuant to sections 731(a)(4) and 733(c). 
15

We conclude none of these statutes support the Attorney General’s position 

that the Legislature intended juveniles who commit sex offenses not described in 

section 707(b) to be eligible for commitment to the DJF. Indeed, the wording of 

these statutes suggests the contrary is true. Specifically, the language of sections 

731.1, 1731.5, 1766, and 1767.35, demonstrates the Legislature knows how to 

specify that either an offense listed in section 707(b) or an offense listed in Penal 

Code section 290.008(c) makes a juvenile ward eligible for special treatment. It is 

reasonable, therefore, to conclude that if the Legislature had wanted to make both 

types of offenses a basis for initial commitment to the DJF, it would have said so 

in section 731(a)(4), the provision that sets forth a ward’s eligibility. When the 

Legislature uses different words or phrasing in contemporaneously enacted 

statutory provisions, a strong inference arises that a different meaning was 

intended. (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 56.) 

C. Legislative History

The Attorney General contends the legislative history of section 731(a)(4) 

and section 733(c) demonstrates a clear intent to permit juvenile sex offenders to 

be committed to the DJF. However, only when a statute’s language is ambiguous 

or susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation may we turn to extrinsic 

aids to assist in interpretation. (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc, supra, 

40 Cal.4th at p. 1103; accord, Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California, 

supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1147.) If the text reflects a plain meaning, we need go no 

further. (Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 507.) 

Sections 731(a)(4) and 733(c) have a plain meaning, as we have discussed, 

and ―judicial construction of unambiguous statutes is appropriate only when literal 

interpretation would yield absurd results.‖ (Simmons v. Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 

570, 583.) The literal interpretation of the statutes here does not yield absurd 
16

results. It simply reflects that the Legislature adopted a more nuanced approach 

than the Attorney General proposes to the issues of which juveniles may be sent to 

the DJF and which juveniles who previously have been committed to the DJF may 

be retained at or returned to the DJF or supervised at the state level. The 

Legislature’s choice to restrict the class of juvenile offenders eligible for 

commitment to the DJF serves to protect less serious youthful offenders (those 

who have not committed § 707(b) offenses) by ensuring they are not housed with 

and exposed to the more serious juvenile offenders committed to the DJF. The 

Legislature’s choice to treat differently those juvenile offenders who have 

previously been committed to the DJF recognizes that those offenders have 

already been exposed to the serious juvenile offenders who are in the custody of 

the DJF and further retention in or return to the custody of the DJF and/or 

supervision at the state level may be appropriate for them. 

Certainly, as the statutes analyzed in part B, ante, indicate, the Legislature 

knew how to make a juvenile sex offense an alternative basis for the applicability 

of a statutory provision and chose to use different language in section 731(a)(4). 

Under these circumstances, it is inappropriate to resort to the legislative history of 

sections 731(a)(4) and 733(c) to consider whether an otherwise undisclosed 

legislative intent might be reflected. (Bonnell v. Medical Board (2003) 31 Cal.4th 

1255, 1264.)

D. Public Policy

As a final point, the Attorney General contends that public policy strongly 

supports the continued discretion of juvenile courts to commit sex offenders to the 

DJF, that is, that the sex offenses listed in both section 707(b) and Penal Code 

section 290.008(c) should be qualifying offenses for a commitment to the DJF. 

The question before us, however, is one of statutory construction of two provisions 
17

with a plain meaning — not one of policy choice. (People v. Cole, supra, 38 

Cal.4th at p. 992; California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. Of Rialto Unified 

School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632-633; see Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 

Cal.4th 794, 813.) Our holding must be based on how sections 731(a)(4) and 

733(c) are written, not on our view of what could or should have been enacted. 

(Waste Management of the Desert v. Palm Springs Recycling Center, Inc. (1994) 7 

Cal.4th 478, 490.) Needless to say, the Legislature is free to reconsider the policy 

set out in the current statutes if it wishes to do so. 

III.

Conclusion

We hold that sections 731(a)(4) and 733(c), read together, grant juvenile 

courts discretion to order a ward committed to the DJF only if the ward has 

committed an offense listed in section 707(b) and then only if the ward’s most 

recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the 

juvenile court is either an offense enumerated under section 707(b) or a sex 

offense described in Penal Code section 290.008(c). Because C.H. was never 

adjudicated to have committed an offense listed in section 707(b), the juvenile 

court had no authority under section 731(a)(4) to commit him to the DJF. 
18

Disposition

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter remanded 

to that court with instructions to reverse the dispositional order of the juvenile 

court committing C.H. to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 

Division of Juvenile Facilities.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

WE CONCUR:

KENNARD, J.

BAXTER, J.

WERDEGAR, J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re C.H.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 5/18/10 – 2d Dist., Div. 6

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S183737

Date Filed: December 12, 2011

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Ventura

Judge: Don Coleman

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Susan B. Gans-Smith, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Maureen Pacheco and Lisa M. Romo for Pacific Juvenile Defender Center and Loyola Law School Center 

for Juvenile Law and Policy as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez, Michael J. Wise, 

Susan Sullivan Pithey and Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Susan B. Gans-Smith

1130 East Clark Avenue, Suite 150

Santa Maria, CA 93455-5123

(805) 937-4649

Blythe J. Leszkay

Deputy Attorney General

300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702

Los Angeles, CA 90013

(213) 897-2274