granted unless it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle
him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Motions to dismiss test whether the plaintiff has properly stated
a claim upon which relief could be granted, not whether the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits. Scheuer, 416 U.S.
at 236.
Illinois Department of Human Services as Defendant

Citing to the large body of cases dealing with municipal
liability in § 1983 claims, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ real
action lies against the Department of Human Services and that the
official capacity claims against them should be dismissed as
redundant. Defendants ask the Court to disregard the well-
established principle that states and state agencies enjoy immunity
from suit in federal courts under the Eleventh Amendment. See
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports
Authority, 525 U.S. ___ (2002) (reexamining the boundaries of state
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment). In addition to
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, neither a state nor a state
agency is viewed as a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and are
therefore not amenable to suit. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Despite the broad immunity from
suit enjoyed by states and state agencies, plaintiffs may file

actions for prospective relief against state officials in federal


need for psychiatric care, this might well be a different case.”
Id. This may or may not be such a case. The bar which Plaintiffs
must eventually clear to survive summary judgment on the conditions
of confinement aspect of their claim is admittedly high, but it is
not so insurmountable as to require the Court to hold that no set
of facts, if proven, would entitle them to relief. Regardless of
whether they will ultimately prevail on the merits, Plaintiffs

complaint challenging their treatment and the conditions of their

confinement properly states a claim upon which relief may be

granted. a
CONCLUSION fo
For the foregoing reasons, pheonden

pursuant to Rule 12({b) (6) is DENIED.

" Motion to Dismiss

IT IS SO ORDERED.

saad

“flarry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court

saree SMEARS. POND



purpose of treating rather than punishing sexually dangerous
persons by committing them to an institution expressly designed to
provide psychiatric care and treatment.” 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986)).
The Illinois SVP Act is, however, distinguishable from the Kansas
Act in one important aspect. As noted in Hendricks, the Kansas
Supreme Court found that, in enacting the Kansas SVP Act, “the
clear and overriding concern of the legislature [was] to continue
the segregation of sexually violent offenders from the public.
Treatment with a goal of reintegrating them into society [was]
incidental, at best.” 521 U.S. at 365 (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). In contrast, the primary purpose of the Illinois SVP Act
is to give the individual an opportunity to receive treatment for
his propensity to commit sexual offenses. See People v. Trainor,
196 Tll.2d 318, 752 N.E.2d 1055, 1058-59 (I11. 2001) (stating that,
in creating and amending the Act, the primary objective of the
Tllinois legislature was to provide for individual treatment of
SVPs “designed to effect recovery”). When, as in Illinois,
treatment is used as a primary justification for civil confinement,
fundamental fairness requires that the involuntarily civilly
committed person receive such individual treatment as will provide
him a meaningful chance to improve and win his eventual release.
See, e.g., Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 545 (3d Cir. 2002); D.W.
v. Rogers, 113 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (llth Cir. 1997); Clark v. Cohen,

794 F.2d 79, 92-95 (3d Cir. 1986).


court when they allege that enforcement of state law violates
rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution. See Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908). Plaintiffs were correct in naming the
officials in question, rather than the Department of Human
Services, as the proper defendants in this case. See Lett v.
Magnant, 965 F.2d 251, 256 (7th Cir. 1992).
§ 1983 - Inadequate Mental Health Treatment

Defendants assert that there is no set of facts Plaintiffs
could produce to substantiate their claim that the treatment
program provided to SVPs is constitutionally inadequate. As an
initial matter, Defendants contend that substantive due process
does not require states to provide mental health treatment to
civilly detained, sexually violent persons. Contrary to
Defendants’ suggestion, the issue of whether or not involuntarily
civilly committed SVPs possess a substantive due process right to
meaningful mental health treatment was not definitively resolved by
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). Indeed, the language
used in Hendricks suggests divergent resolutions of this question.
Compare Id. at 366 (stating that, even if the primary objective of
the Kansas Act is to continue incarceration and not to provide
treatment, “this does not rule out that an ancillary purpose of the
Act was to provide treatment, and it does not require us to
conclude that the Act is punitive”), with Id. at 368 n.4 (citing

Allen v. Illinois, for the proposition that “the State serves its


deference, which is precisely what Defendants seem to be seeking
when they contend that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the conditions of
their confinement fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. While Youngberg and Sandin require substantial deference
to the judgment of officials managing state institutions, these and
other cases also recognize that this deference is not absolute.
For civil commitment of SVPs to operate within the bounds of
the Constitution, a purpose of that confinement, even if it is only
an ancillary purpose, must be treatment as opposed to continuing
punishment for past crimes. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
366-68 (1997). Moreover, “(p]ersons who have been involuntarily
committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions
of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22. Reviewing a
challenge to an earlier version of Illinois’ Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff in that
case had not demonstrated that sexually dangerous persons in
Illinois were confined under impermissibly punitive conditions.
The Court also found that the conditions imposed on Illinois’ SVPs
at that time bore a reasonable relationship to the State’s interest
in treatment. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986).
However, the Court noted that “had petitioner shown, for example,
that the confinement of such persons imposes on them a regimen

which is essentially identical to that imposed upon felons with no


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Sitting Judge if Other

Harry D. Leinenweber than Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 02 C 1456 DATE 7/25/2002
CASE Jeffrey Hargett, et al vs. Linda R. Baker, et al
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented]

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) im Brief in support of motion due

(3) QO Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due

(4) a Ruling/Hearing on setfor at

(5) ao Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor att

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor at.

mM Oo Trial[set for/re-set for}on____at

(8) im [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued toa

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
CFRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule21 OFRCP4I(a)(1) O FRCP4I(a)(2).

ao) wf [Other docket entry] _ ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss is denied.

[For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required

Mail AO 450 form,

No notices required. advised in open court

Notices mailed by judge
Notified counsel by telephone

Docketing to mail notices:

Copy to judge/magistrate judge LUND Fourier og

Document
Number

_numiber of notices

ff.
‘ey 2 8 20Re

date docketed

2(

WAP

date maited notice
courtroom,

deputy's
initials

Date/time recived jn

sailing deputy initials

-_-contral Clerks Offiee



The Court recognizes that, under the professional judgment
standard set forth in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982),
states enjoy wide latitude in developing treatment regimens and
that the decisions of the professional decision maker overseeing a
state institution are presumptively valid. Liability may be
imposed only when treatment decisions represent a “substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards.” Id. While Youngberg certainly sets a high bar for
Plaintiffs, the question of whether professional judgment has in
fact been exercised by the administrators of the Joliet facility
cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. Recent cases such as
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. ___ (2002) may have made it extremely
difficult for Plaintiffs to advance arguments regarding certain
aspects of their treatment, but it is still possible that
Plaintiffs could establish that Defendants failed to exercise
professional judgment in other aspects of the SVP treatment
program.

§ 1983 - Conditions of Confinement

Defendants repeatedly and vigorously remind the Court that
cases such as Youngberg and Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)
require federal courts to afford “appropriate deference and
flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile
environment.” Sandin, $15 U.S. at 482 (citations omitted). Fair

enough. Appropriate deference is not, however, unbounded


custody until such time as “the person is no longer sexually
violent.” 725 ILCS 207/40(a).

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint challenging what
they characterize as the impermissibly punitive conditions of their
confinement and the constitutionally inadequate treatment they
receive as detainees in the Sexually Violent Persons Unit in
Joliet. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the punitive
conditions and inadequacies of the treatment program work together
to deprive SVPs at the Joliet facility of a realistic opportunity
to progress through the treatment program and gain their release.
Plaintiffs’ class action complaint seeks, inter alia, a declaratory
judgment that the conditions of confinement and mental health
treatment of the SVPs violate rights protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also request a
permanent injunction against Defendants compelling them to
implement a plan correcting the alleged constitutional deficiencies
in the current program. Defendants now move to dismiss the
complaint in its entirety.

DISCUSSION
Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must construe all
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). A motion to dismiss will not be


Director. Plaintiffs assert a civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Before
the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint in its
entirety pursuant to Fep.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6).
BACKGROUND

Concerned with alarmingly high recidivism rates among sex
offenders, states began in the 1990's to enact civil commitment
regimes for the detention and treatment of those found to be
“sexual predators” or “sexually dangerous.” Illinois revisited its
existing regime for civil commitment of the “sexually dangerous” by
enacting the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act in 1997. See
725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. Under Illinois’ civil commitment program,
a “sexually violent person” (“SVP”) is defined as a “person who has
been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated
delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not
guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and who
is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that
makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts
of sexual violence.” 725 ILCS 207/5(f). Once found to qualify as
an SVP under the Act, the person is committed to the custody of the
Sexually Violent Persons Unit operated by the Illinois Department
of Human Services (the “DHS”) at its Joliet Correctional Center.

See 725 ILCS 207/40. SVPs confined under the Act remain in DHS


Hho Bora

Ga r

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT we

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS :
EASTERN DIVISION EILED

JEFFREY HARGETT, KIM A. Wh 95 UWA

OVERLIN, JIMMIE SMITH, and

LOREN K. WALKER, individually, . ‘
weber

and on behalf of all persons Judge Harry, Ds teinenté

ce . Us. Se District Court
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 02 C 1456 2
v.

LINDA R. BAKER, Secretary of Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

the Illinois Department of
Human Services, MARY BASS,
Head Facility Administrator
for the Illinois Department of
Human Services, TIMOTHY BUDZ,
Facility Director of the
Sexually Violent Persons Unit
at the Joliet Correctional
Center, RAYMOND WOODS,
Clinical Director, and TRAVIS
HINZE, Associate Clinical
Director,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Jeffery Hargett, Kim A. Overlin, Jimmie Smith, and
Loren K. Walker brought this action individually and on behalf of
a class of persons similarly situated against Defendants Linda R.
Baker, Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services, Mary
Bass, Head Facility Administrator for the Illinois Department of
Human Services, Timothy Budz, Facility Director of the Sexually
Violent Persons Unit at the Joliet Correctional Center, Raymond

Woods, Clinical Director, and Travis Hinze, Associate Clinical

A\