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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

November 1, 2016 

v No. 326666 

Wayne Circuit Court 

KEJUAN MARCELL DOUGLAS, LC No. 14-007399-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 327354 

Wayne Circuit Court 

CHARLES ANTHONY DOUGLAS, LC No. 14-005015-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and WILDER and METER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendants Kejuan Douglas and Charles Douglas were tried jointly, before a single jury. 

The jury convicted Kejuan of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), MCL 

750.520b(1)(d)(ii), for which the trial court sentenced him to prison terms of 20 to 60 years for 

each conviction, to be served consecutively. The jury convicted Charles of third-degree CSC, 

MCL 750.520d(1)(b); assault and battery, MCL 750.81; first-degree CSC, MCL 

750.520b(1)(d)(ii); and unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530. The trial court sentenced Charles to 

concurrent prison terms of 10 to 15 years each for the third-degree CSC and unarmed robbery 

convictions, to be served consecutively to a prison term of 40 to 90 years for the first-degree 

CSC conviction, and to time served (93 days) for the assault conviction. Both defendants appeal 

as of right. We affirm each defendant’s convictions, but remand for further inquiry of Charles’s 

sentences consistent with People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015), and 

People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), lv gtd 499 Mich 934 (2016). 
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 A jury convicted defendants, who are brothers, of sexually assaulting a 16-year-old 

female victim inside a van in an isolated Detroit neighborhood on August 16, 2013. 

Approximately one month before the assault, the victim met Charles on Tagged.com, a free 

online social website, and on the day in question she decided to ask him for a ride to her Inkster 

home. The prosecution presented evidence that after Charles picked up the victim in a van, he 

then picked up Kejuan and another, unidentified man. Charles made several stops, including at a 

motel, where the victim informed him that she wanted to go home. Charles did not take her 

home, but instead parked on a dark street. Kejuan pulled the victim into the back of the van, and 

she was forced to perform fellatio on Kejuan while Charles simultaneously sexually assaulted 

her from behind. After this, Kejuan forced penile-vaginal sex upon her. When Kejuan finished, 

the unidentified man sexually assaulted the victim with defendants’ encouragement. The victim 

was ultimately left on the street, but managed to take Charles’s phone. As the victim was on the 

phone with 911, the van returned and Charles chased her to the porch of a house, attempting to 

retrieve his phone. Charles fled and the homeowner opened the door. DNA recovered from 

abrasions on the victim and a towel that Charles had used and left at the scene matched Charles’s 

DNA profile. The prosecution also presented evidence that Charles’s DNA was matched to 

DNA obtained in another sexual assault case in 2013, in which that victim, who identified 

Charles, similarly testified that she met Charles on Tagged.com, that he picked her up, and that 

he drove her to a house where she was sexually assaulted by him and several other men. 

Kejuan’s defense theory at trial was that he was misidentified as an assailant. Charles, who 

testified on his own behalf, denied any wrongdoing, and claimed that he engaged in consensual 

sexual activity with the victim. 

I. DOCKET NO. 326666 (DEFENDANT KEJUAN DOUGLAS) 

 In his only issue on appeal, defendant Kejuan Douglas argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial after the court admitted newly discovered 

other-acts evidence against Charles. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a mistrial 

for an abuse of discretion. People v Schaw, 288 Mich App 231, 236; 791 NW2d 743 (2010). An 

abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court chooses an outcome that is outside the range of 

principled outcomes. Id.

 Before trial, defendant Kejuan had no objection to a joint trial. After trial started, the 

prosecution received information that codefendant Charles’s DNA had been matched to a similar 

sexual assault case. Ultimately, the trial court agreed to admit the newly discovered other-acts 

evidence against codefendant Charles only. In turn, Kejuan moved for a mistrial, arguing that in 

light of this newly discovered evidence against his codefendant, he was entitled to a separate 

trial. The trial court denied his motion. 

 A mistrial should be granted “only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the 

defendant and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

In general, a defendant does not have a right to a separate trial. People v Hurst, 396 Mich 1, 6; 

238 NW2d 6 (1976). Indeed, a strong policy favors joint trials in the interest of justice, judicial 

economy, and administration. People v Etheridge, 196 Mich App 43, 52; 492 NW2d 490 (1992). 

Severance is mandated under MCR 6.121(C) only when a defendant demonstrates that his 

substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance is the necessary means of rectifying the 

potential prejudice. People v Hana, 447 Mich 325, 345; 524 NW2d 682 (1994), amended 447 
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Mich 1203 (1994). For severance to be warranted, a defendant must submit an affidavit or make 

an offer of proof that “clearly, affirmatively, and fully demonstrates that his substantial rights 

will be prejudiced and that severance is the necessary means of rectifying the potential 

prejudice.” Id. at 346. “The failure to make this showing in the trial court, absent any significant 

indication on appeal that the requisite prejudice in fact occurred at trial, will preclude reversal of 

a joinder decision.” Id. at 346-347. Mere inconsistency of defenses is not enough to require 

severance; the defenses must be mutually exclusive or irreconcilable. Id. at 349. “[I]ncidental 

spillover prejudice, which is almost inevitable in a multi-defendant trial, does not suffice. The 

tension between defenses must be so great that a jury would have to believe one defendant at the 

expense of the other.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). Severance should be granted 

“only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of 

the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” 

Id. at 359-360 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

 To hold separate trials in these substantially identical cases would have been 

unnecessarily duplicative and excessive. The interests of justice, judicial economy, and orderly 

administration clearly favored a joint trial. Kejuan has not provided any concrete facts or 

reasons to justify separate trials and has not persuasively demonstrated that his substantial rights 

were prejudiced by a joint trial. The record does not show a “significant indication” that the 

requisite prejudice in fact occurred at trial. Id. at 346-347. Kejuan’s mere speculation about the 

possibility of antagonistic defenses is insufficient to require a separate trial; he made no offer of 

proof demonstrating a defense that would have required the jury to believe one defendant at the 

expense of the other. On appeal, he adds the argument that had he known that other-acts 

evidence would be presented against Charles, “there was the possibility he could have presented 

a defense claiming that it was Charles and not him who committed the offenses, that [the victim] 

was mistaken in her identification, [and] that his brother, Charles, had brought him into the 

picture in order to minimize his own involvement [in] the offenses.” Kejuan’s defense theory, 

however, was already that he was misidentified, i.e., that he was not there, and that the victim 

was not credible. Further, “finger pointing” is not a sufficient reason to grant separate trials. See 

id. at 360-361. Finally, the risk of prejudice from the joint trial was allayed by a proper 

cautionary instruction. Id. at 351, 356. The trial court instructed the jury that each case was to 

be decided separately and, regarding the other-acts testimony against codefendant Charles, 

specifically instructed: 

 [T]his evidence that you are about to hear applies only to the defendant, 

Charles Douglas. 

 It is not evidence of any kind, and you can not [sic] consider it in any way 

as it applies to the other defendant, Mr. Kejuan Douglas. 

 Okay. So it’s being introduced for a limited purpose and only as it applies 

to the defendant, Charles Douglas. [Emphasis added.] 

 Kejuan acknowledges the trial court’s instruction, but asks this Court to presume that the 

jury ignored the instruction and used the other-acts evidence to his detriment. It is well 

established, however, that jurors are presumed to have followed their instructions. People v 

Breidenbach, 489 Mich 1, 13; 798 NW2d 738 (2011). Kejuan has not identified any record 
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support, and we have found none, for his suggestion that the jury disregarded the trial court’s 

instruction. Because Kejuan has failed to show that he was entitled to severance, the trial court’s 

denial of his motion for a mistrial on that basis was not an abuse of discretion.1 

II. DOCKET NO. 327354 (DEFENDANT CHARLES DOUGLAS) 

A. ADMISSION OF OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE 

 Defendant Charles Douglas argues that his defense was unfairly prejudiced by the 

admission of the other-acts evidence, which was not discovered until after trial had already 

started, and accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.2 We 

review the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v 

Burns, 494 Mich 104, 110; 832 NW2d 738 (2013). As Charles observes, he must show that he 

was unfairly prejudiced by the evidence to be entitled to relief. People v Callon, 256 Mich App 

312, 328; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). 

 Charles asserts that he was unfairly prejudiced for three distinct reasons. First, Charles 

argues that unfair prejudice resulted because defense counsel did not have the opportunity to ask 

questions during jury voir dire “to ensure that jurors hearing [the other-acts] evidence could keep 

an open mind and not immediately conclude that [Charles] was guilty . . . .” Charles does not 

indicate what additional questions counsel would have needed to ask to protect his right to a fair 

trial. The record discloses that the trial court and the attorneys adequately questioned the jury 

venire, and the trial court sufficiently instructed the potential jurors to ensure that they remained 

open-minded and understood the presumption of innocence. Moreover, before the jury heard the 

other-acts evidence, the trial court gave a cautionary instruction explaining the limited purpose of 

the evidence, which limited the potential for any prejudice. The trial court’s instruction included 

the directive that the jury “must not convict the defendant here because you think he’s guilty of 

other bad conduct,” which directly addressed Charles’s concern that the jury would assume that 

he was guilty because of the other act. Again, juries are presumed to have followed their 

instructions, Breidenbach, 489 Mich at 13, and there is no indication that the trial court’s 

 

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 Without proper analysis, Kejuan also argues that the late introduction of the other-acts evidence 

prejudiced “possible plea negotiations.” After the prosecution moved to admit the other-acts 

evidence, the trial court delayed ruling on the admissibility of the evidence against Kejuan until a 

live lineup was conducted with the victim in the other case. After the trial court’s ruling, defense 

counsel stated that if Kejuan was identified, he would request a plea offer, but “[i]f he’s not, my 

client is not interested.” The prosecutor responded that if Kejuan was identified, there would be 

no offer. The witness did not identify Kejuan and, according to defense counsel, there was no 

interest in seeking a plea. Therefore, this argument is without merit. 

2

 Charles does not argue that the other-acts evidence was not substantively admissible under 

MRE 404(b)(1). He also does not challenge the trial court’s implicit finding that, given the late 

discovery of the evidence, the prosecution was justified in failing to provide the required pretrial 

notice under MRE 404(b)(2). 
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cautionary instruction was not effective in this case. Charles simply has not demonstrated that he 

was prejudiced as a result of the allegedly inadequate voir dire questioning. 

 Second, Charles argues that he was unfairly prejudiced because defense counsel “had no 

opportunity to make an effective choice of trial strategy . . . .” Defendant did not move for a 

continuance as a result of the newly discovered evidence, and we can discern no unfair prejudice 

from its admission. We agree that the other-acts evidence was impactful. However, for relief to 

be warranted here, defendant must have suffered unfair prejudice caused by the delay itself, not 

merely because of the impact of the evidence. Charles offers no argument for how his trial 

strategy would have differed had he known about the other-acts evidence before trial. “An 

appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and 

rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no 

citation of supporting authority.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 

(1998). 

 Lastly, in an additional cursory complaint, Charles claims that defense counsel’s inability 

to address the other-acts evidence in his opening statement “likely created the impression that 

[he] had no answer to such evidence and embarrassed the defense no matter what argument 

defense trial counsel subsequently made.” It is difficult to conclude, however, that this situation 

created significant prejudice, given that the prosecutor was also unable to address this evidence 

in his opening statement. In addition, Charles’s defense theory was consent. The new evidence 

did not negate that defense. Thus, Charles has not explained how he was unfairly prejudiced. 

Because the record does not establish any unfair prejudice to the defense, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting the newly discovered other-acts evidence. 

B. UPWARD DEPARTURE SENTENCE 

 In his last issue, Charles argues that the trial court erred by departing from the sentencing 

guidelines range and imposing an unreasonable sentence. The trial court scored the guidelines 

for Charles’s conviction of first-degree CSC, which is a class A offense. MCL 777.16y. Charles 

received a total offense variable (OV) score of 120 points, which, combined with his 45 prior 

record variable points, placed him in the D-IV cell of the applicable sentencing grid, for which 

the minimum sentence range is 171 to 285 months. MCL 777.62. The trial court departed from 

that range and sentenced him to 40 to 90 years’ imprisonment. “A sentence that departs from the 

applicable guidelines range will be reviewed by an appellate court for reasonableness.” 

Lockridge, 498 Mich 392. 

 At the time Charles was sentenced, MCL 769.34(3) required a sentencing court to state 

substantial and compelling reasons for imposing a sentence that departs from the sentencing 

guidelines range. As the parties recognize, after Charles was sentenced, significant changes to 

Michigan’s sentencing scheme were effectuated by the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in 

Lockridge, 498 Mich 358. The Court held that Michigan’s sentencing guidelines are 

“constitutionally deficient” to the extent that judicial fact-finding could be used to increase the 

guidelines minimum sentence range. Id. at 364. The Court “sever[ed] MCL 769.34(2) to the 

extent that it is mandatory and [struck] down the requirement of a ‘substantial and compelling 

reason’ to depart from the guidelines range in MCL 769.34(3).” Id. at 391. The Court held that 

“[a] sentence that departs from the applicable guidelines range will be reviewed by an appellate 
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court for reasonableness.” Id. at 392. However, the Lockridge Court did not set forth a standard 

for reviewing a sentence for reasonableness. Accordingly, in Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 47-

48, this Court adopted the “principle of proportionality” previously established in People v 

Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), as the standard for reviewing a sentence for 

reasonableness, “hold[ing] that a sentence that fulfills the principle of proportionality under 

Milbourn, and its progeny, constitutes a reasonable sentence under Lockridge.” This Court 

further held that in cases where the defendant was sentenced before Lockridge was decided, 

implementation of the reasonableness standard requires remand for consideration of the 

sentence’s proportionality, following the remand procedure adopted in United States v Crosby, 

397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005); specifically, this Court stated: 

Given our conclusion that the principle of proportionality established under 

Milbourn, and its progeny, is now the appropriate standard by which a 

defendant’s sentence should be reviewed, we find that the procedure articulated in 

Lockridge, which is modeled on the procedure adopted in United States v Crosby . 

. . , should apply here. As recently stated by this Court in People v Stokes, 312 

Mich App 181, 200-201, 877 NW2d 752 (2015), [appeal held in abeyance ___ 

Mich ___; 878 NW2d 886 (2016),] “the purpose of a Crosby remand is to 

determine what effect Lockridge would have on the defendant’s sentence so that it 

may be determined whether any prejudice resulted from the error.” While the 

Lockridge Court did not explicitly hold that the Crosby procedure applies under 

the circumstances of this case, we conclude that this is the proper remedy when, 

as in this case, the trial court was unaware of, and not expressly bound by, a 

reasonableness standard rooted in the Milbourn principle of proportionality at the 

time of sentencing. [Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 48 (citation omitted).] 

 As in Steanhouse and, more recently, People v Heller, ___ Mich App___; ___ NW2d ___ 

(2016) (Docket No. 326821); slip op at 2, the trial court imposed a departure sentence without 

having an opportunity to adhere to the standard of reasonableness rooted in the Milbourn

principle of proportionality. As this Court observed in Heller, “[g]iven Steanhouse’s directive, 

the trial court must be permitted to reconsider defendant’s sentence in the light of Milbourn.” 

Heller, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2. Therefore, remand is necessary so that the trial court 

may implement the Crosby remand procedure as articulated in Lockridge.

3

 The prosecutor 

concurs with this remedy. 

 

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 Within this issue, Charles also requests that we remand the matter to a different judge. We 

reject this request. Initially, we note that Charles fails to properly brief the merits of this request. 

Kelly, 231 Mich App at 640-641. He merely states that it “appears that the Judge’s outrage at 

Mr. Douglas’s allocution prompted the harsh sentence.” We have reviewed the trial court’s 

statements at sentencing and they give no cause for concern that its sentencing decision was 

based on inappropriate considerations. Further, remand is required in this case because of the 

post-sentencing decisions in Lockridge and Steanhouse, not because the trial court’s sentence 

was patently erroneous. 
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 We affirm Kejuan Douglas’s convictions in Docket No. 326666. We affirm Charles 

Douglas’s convictions in Docket No. 327354, but remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter