UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) VAUGHN JONES, et al. , ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action N o. 16-cv-85 (TSC) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al. , ) ) Defendants. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION In the instant case, Plaintiffs Vaughn Jones and Antonio Pixleyassert four causes of action against Defendants: (i) failure to afford due process; ( ii) municipal liability; (iii) fraud and deceit; and (iv) intentional inf liction of emotional distress. ( See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 138-82). 1 This case was removed to this court from the Superior Court for the District of Columbia in January 2016. Prior to remova l, Superior Court Judge Geoffr ey M. Alprin issued a temporary restraining order (the “TRO”), w hich Defendants now move to dis solve. 2 The TRO ordered that Plaintiffs be restored to their coaching positions at Coolidge and prohibited them from being

1 In addition to the District of C olumbia, Plaintiffs name four District of Columbia Public School (“DCPS”) employees as defendants. Because these employees are being sued only in their official capacities ( see Am. Compl. ¶ 13), the court will re fer to the District as the s ole defendant in this case. See Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“[A]n offici al-capacity suit is, in all respects other than nam e, to be treated as a suit agains t the entity.”) (citation omitted).

2 Defendants’ motion is titled “Mo tion to Dissolve Plaintiffs’ T emporary Restraining Order and Deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Pre liminary Injunction.” However , Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction was deni ed as moot in February 2016 beca use the Superior Court TRO remained in full force and effect pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1450, which provides that “[w]henever any action is removed from a Stat e court to a district court of the United States, . . . [a]ll injunctions, orders, and other pr oceedings had in such action p rior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until disso lved or modified by the distri ct court.” Accordingly, the only portion of Defendants’ motion tha t remains to be decided is tha t portion which seeks dissolution of the Superior Court TRO.2 removed from those positions unt il a full and fai r investigatio n is conducted into the allegations against them. ( See Mot. Ex. 1). Upon consideration of the Distr ict’s motion, Plaintiffs’ opposi tion thereto, and the District’s reply in support there of, and for the reasons set fo rth below, the motion is hereby
GRANTED

. I. BACKGROUND During the time period relevant t o this case, Plaintiffs served as basketball coaches at Coolidge High School. Coaching w as not their primary employmen t or source of income – Jones was employed as a teacher at a public charter school and Pixley was “employed full-time at Coolidge as a Behavioral Tech nician working with at-risk stu dents.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 18). Coaching positions within DCPS are “extra duty pay” assignments open to non-DCPS employees, with head coaches like Jones making an annual stipen d of $4,500 and assistant coaches like Pixley making an annual stipend of $2,000. ( See Mot. Ex. 2 ¶¶ 3-5). Plaintiffs were removed from th eir coaching assig nments in Octo ber 2015 after an investigation purportedly determin ed that they had told a Cooli dge guidance counselor during the 2014-15 school year that a Coolidge basketball player was a ris ing junior “when [they] knew or should have known that” he was actually a rising senior. (Am. Compl. Ex. A). This alleged misrepresentation led the guidan ce counselor to incorrectly adj ust the student-athlete’s records, thereby improperly extending his eligibility to play basketball for another year. ( See id. ). Plaintiffs sued DCPS in Superi or Court in December 2015, simult aneously filing a motion for a temporary restr aining order. On December 29, 2015 , after an in-chambers hearing, Judge Alprin issued the TRO, whi ch ordered that Plaintiffs be r estored to their coaching positions at Coolidge and prohibited them from being removed fr om those positions until a full and fair investigati on is conducted into the allegations agains t them. ( See Mot. Ex. 1).3 Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint in Superior Court, substituting the District of Columbia for DCPS and adding four individual DCPS e mployees as defendants sued only in their official capacities . The District removed the ca se to this court on January 15, 2015 based on the federal question rai sed by Plaintiffs’ due process claim. ( See Notice of Removal). Plaintiffs have since amende d their complaint again. ( See generally Am. Compl.). The District now moves for the dissolution of the Superior Court TRO.
II. LEGAL STANDARD When a case is removed to federal court, “[a]ll injunctions, or ders, and other proceedings had in such action prior to its r emoval shall remain in full fo rce and effect until dissolved or modified by the district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1450. Importantl y, however, “federal rather than state law governs the future course of proceedings, notwithstan ding state court orders issued prior to removal.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda Cty. , 415 U.S. 423, 437 (1974). Under federal law, injunctive relief is an “extraordinary and d rastic remedy” that is “never awarded as of right,” Munaf v. Geren , 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008) (quotation and citations omitted), and “that s hould be granted only when the p arty seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Cobell v. Norton , 391 F.3d 251, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). A party’ s entitlement to injunctive relief depends upon his or her ability to demonstrate (i) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (ii) that he or she would suffer irreparable injury absent the requested injunctive relief; (iii) that the balance of equities tips in his or her fa vor; and (iv) that the public int erest would be furthered by the requested injunctive relief. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “The basis of injunctive relief i n the federal courts has alway s been irreparable harm.” CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision , 58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting4 Sampson v. Murray , 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974)); see also Trudeau v. FTC , 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 296-97 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d , 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“A s howing of irreparable harm is the sine qua non of the prelimin ary injunction inquiry.”) (citi ng Experience Works, Inc. v. Chao , 267 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96 (D.D.C. 2003)). Accordingly, the “failure to show any irreparable harm is . . . grounds for refusing to issu e a preliminary injunction , even if the other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England , 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 105 F. Supp. 3d 108, 112 (D.D.C. 2015) (“the movant must always show i rreparable harm or injury, and if a party makes no showing of irrepa rable injury, the court ma y deny the motion for injunctive relief without considering the other factor s”) (citing CityFed , 58 F.3d at 747). The D.C. Circuit “has set a hi gh standard for irr eparable injury.” Chaplaincy , 454 F.3d at 297. “[T]he injury ‘must be both c ertain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.’” Id. (quoting Wisc. Gas Co. v. FERC , 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). The injury must also be “of such imminence that there is a ‘clear and pres ent’ need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Wisc. Gas Co. , 758 F.2d at 674 (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the injur y must be “beyond remediation,” Chaplaincy , 454 F.3d at 297, as it is “well settled that economic loss doe s not, in and of itse lf, constitute irreparable harm.”
Wisc. Gas Co. , 758 F.2d at 674. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has made clear tha t [t]he key word in this consideration is irreparable . Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily exp ended in the absence of a stay are not enough. The possibility that adequate compen satory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date in the ordi nary course of litigation weighs heavily against a c laim of irreparable harm. Chaplaincy , 454 F.3d at 297-98 (quoting Wisc. Gas Co. , 758 F.2d at 674) (emphasis in original).5 III. ANALYSIS The District argues that Plain tiffs have failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because they allege only loss of employm ent and reputational injuries, which are “clearly redressable through corrective means after trial and thus [are] not irrepar able as a matter of law.” ( See Mot. at 7-9). Plaintiffs acknowledge “that e conomic loss alone does not give rise to irreparable harm.” (Opp’n at 10) (citing Davis v. Billington , 76 F. Supp. 3d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2014)). They point out, however, that there may be situations “where ‘the circumstances surrounding an employee’s discharge, together with the r esultant effect on the employee, may so far depart from the normal situation that irreparable i njury might be found,’” though thes e “‘extraordinary cases are hard to define in advance of their occurrence.’” Davis , 76 F. Supp. 3d at 65 (quoting Sampson , 415 U.S. at 92 n.68). They also point out tha t economic loss can “rise to the level of i rreparable harm when it threatens the movant’s business” (Opp’ n at 10) (citing Wisc. Gas Co. , 758 F.2d at 674), and that “‘[r]eputational injury can be used to establish irrep arable harm in certain circumstances.’” (Opp’n 10) (quoting Trudeau , 384 F. Supp. 2d at 297). More specifically, Plaintiffs a rgue that the “decision to dismi ss [them] goes far beyond them losing a job,” as they a re “banned . . . from pursuing coa ching opportunities at other DCPS high schools,” as well. (Opp’n a t 10). Plaintiffs further ass ert that, after his initial removal from his coaching position, Jones was questioned by his employer abo ut the allegations against him, various colleges and universitie s stopped communicating with hi m regarding scholarship opportunities for certain Coolidge players, several Coolidge pl ayers and assistant coaches protested his removal, and he “be gan having migraine headaches, pains in his left arm, chest pains and sleeplessness,” lead ing his wife and son to move out of the family home “because of the impact [his removal] was having on him.” ( Id. at 10-11). Plaintiffs also claim that Pixley’s6 future coaching prospects were ha rmed, that he suffered “signif icant distress,” and that he “resigned from his position as a behavior tech at Coolidge and now works part time at a hotel.” ( Id. at 11-12). 3 The District responds by arguing that Plaintiffs’ opposition br ief fails to show that any harm to them will be irreparable. ( See Reply at 2). 4 It also notes that the three main cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of their i rreparable injury argument – Davis , Wisconsin Gas Company and Trudeau – are all inapposite. ( See id. ). The court agrees with the D istrict, as none of these three cases actually found that th e movant had established irre parable harm based on an employee’s discharge, economic l oss or reputational injury. 5 Instead, these cases merely acknowledge the theore tical possibility of e stablishing irrepar able harm on such bases. And in

3 Plaintiffs also argue that thei r players and their players’ fa milies would be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief, given that Plaintiffs’ initial remova l from their coaching positions caused the team to begin losing games and led to members of the team l osing scholarship opportunities. ( See Opp’n at 12-13). But the irrepar able harm prong of the injunct ive relief calculus only concerns harm suffered by the party or parties seeking injunctive relief

. See , e.g. , Winter , 555 U.S. at 20 (“A plaintiff seeki ng a preliminary injunction must establish . . . that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the a bsence of preliminary relief.”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, any alleged harm to third partie s is properly addressed under the public interest prong of the injunctive relief calcu lus, as Plaintiffs themselves acknowledg e. ( See Opp’n at 12) (“In reviewing whether to grant a pr eliminary injunction, [c]ourts c onsider harm to third parties as a matter of public interest.”).

4 The District also correctl y points out (as noted by the court at footnote 3, supra ) that “Plaintiffs primarily focus on the alleged harm to the students they coach” even though “the students Plaintiffs coach are not parties to this lawsuit,” and that the only harm the court should review “is the harm that will come to Plaintiffs in the absence of pretrial re lief.” (Reply at 2) (emphasis in original).

5 See , e.g. , Davis , 76 F. Supp. 3d at 69 (“[T]he Court c oncludes that the plainti ff’s motion for a preliminary injunction must be de nied. This result is required because the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of the four f actors the Court must conside r weigh in his favor.”); Wisconsin Gas Co. , 758 F.2d at 676 (“Petitioners have not demonstrated that they will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a stay. Indeed, the showings made fal l so far short that these petitions should not have been filed. The mot ions for stays are denied.” ); Trudeau , 384 F. Supp. 2d at 296 (“Even if the Court had reached a different result on the motio n to dismiss, however, the Court would nonetheless deny the moti on for a preliminary injunction [based on] Trudeau’s failure to establish that he would suffer i rreparable harm in the absence of an injunction pending trial.”).7 the court’s view, Plaintiffs’ position on irreparable harm in the instant litigati on suffers from the same kinds of infirmities present in Davis , Wisconsin Gas Company and Trudeau

. To wit, Plaintiffs’ primary alleg ed injury is simply the loss o f their part-time supplemental employment via thei r “extra duty pay” assignments as basketball coaches. As the District correctly points out , “cases are legion holding that l oss of employment does not constitute irreparable injury.” Farris v. Rice , 453 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing, inter
alia , Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Nat’l Mediation Bd. , 374 F. Supp. 2d 135, 142 (D.D.C. 2005) (“a loss of income does not constitute i rreparable injury because the financial loss can be remedied with money damages”)). Plaintiffs acknowledge this, and attempt to demonstrate irreparable injury by positing the instant litig ation as the kind of “extraordinary case[]” contemplated by the case law they cite. Davis , 76 F. Supp. 3d at 65 (quoting Sampson , 415 U.S. at 92 n.68). But Plaintiffs f all well short of actual ly demonstrating how the harm they will suffer absent injunctive reli ef is in any way extraordinar y. Indeed, the court agrees with the District that, at least insofar as the irreparable injury calcu lus is concerned, this case is simply “a garden-variety employment di spute over part-time at will pos itions.” (Mot. at 1). In terms of their alleged reputa tional injuries, Plaintiffs are correct that harm to reputation can, in certain circumstances, c onstitute irreparable injury. See Brodie v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
and Human Services , 715 F. Supp. 2d 74, 84 (D.D.C. 2010); Trudeau , 384 F. Supp. 2d at 297. Indeed, because “[i]njury to reputation and goodwill is not eas ily measured in monetary terms,” it is “often viewed as irreparabl e.” 11A Charles Alan Wright et al. , Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2013 & 2015 Supp.). “[A]s with all other forms of irreparable harm,” however, “the showing of re putational harm must be concr ete and corroborated, not merely speculative.” Trudeau , 384 F. Supp. 2d at 297 (citations omitted); see also Wisc. Gas
Co. , 758 F.2d at 674 (noting that a m ovant’s injury “must be both certain and great; it must be8 actual and not theoretical”). C onjecture and “vague and unsupp orted” assertions of harm are not sufficient. Brodie , 715 F. Supp. 2d at 84. While Plaintiffs have shown that th eir removal from their coach ing positions has been reported in the media, they have not demonstrated that they wil l suffer any great, concrete, corroborated and certain reputati onal injuries absent the injun ctive relief gran ted in the TRO. For example, the court does not vi ew the fact that certain coll eges and universities stopped communicating with Jones about Coo lidge basketball players afte r his removal as Coolidge’s coach as evincing any reputationa l injury. Inste ad, the court views this cessation of communications as a simple refl ection of the fact that Jones wa s no longer Coolidge’s coach, such that colleges and universi ties would have no reason to com municate with him about scholarship opportunities for C oolidge players. Additionally, the mere fact that Jones was questioned by his employer about t he allegations against him do es not rise to the level of reputational injury that would wa rrant the extraordinary remedyof injunctive relief, nor do any of the other facts cited in Pl aintiffs’ opposition brief, parti cularly where the allegations against them are already public knowledge. In sum, because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they will suffer great, concrete, corroborated and certain irreparable harm absent the in junctive relief now in place unde r the TRO, the court will grant the District’s motion and dissolve th e TRO without considering the remaining injunctive relief factors. See Chaplaincy , 454 F.3d at 297 (the “failure to show any irreparable harm is . . . grounds f or refusing to issue a preli minary injunction, even if the other three factors entering the cal culus merit such relief”); Save Jobs USA , 105 F. Supp. 3d at 1112 (“the movant must always show i rreparable harm or injury, and i f a party makes no showing of irreparable injury, the court may deny the motion for injunctiv e relief without considering the other factors”) (citing CityFed , 58 F.3d at 747).9 IV. CONCLUSION Upon consideration of the Distr ict’s motion, Plaintiffs’ opposi tion thereto, and the District’s reply in support there of, and for the reasons set fo rth above, the motion is hereby
GRANTED , and the temporary restraining orde r issued by Superior Court Ju dge Alprin on December 29, 2015 is hereby dissolved. An appropriate Order accompani es this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: April 14, 2016 

## Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge