United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 15, 2020

Decided January 8, 2021

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 19-3456

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MAURICE D. GARDNER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District

of Indiana, Evansville Division.

No. 3:17-cr-00030-001

Richard L. Young,

Judge.

O R D E R

A jury convicted Maurice Gardner of trafficking methamphetamine and 

possessing a gun during that offense. Evidence against Gardner included his admission

that he was trying to sell drugs, scales and bags of methamphetamine found on him, 

 We previously granted the parties’ joint motion to waive oral argument. This 

appeal was therefore submitted on the briefs and the record. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C), 

(f).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19-3456 Page 2

and expert testimony from an officer who opined that Gardner’s text messages 

discussed drug sales in coded language. Gardner challenges only the expert testimony, 

arguing it was not properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. We conclude 

the district court permissibly ruled that the officer was qualified to translate the coded 

texts, and that given the other evidence at his jury trial, Gardner cannot show he was 

prejudiced by the testimony. So we affirm.

I. Background

In April 2017, in Evansville, Indiana, Gardner was riding as a passenger in a 

vehicle that police stopped for a traffic infraction. During a later search, the officers 

found bags containing six grams of methamphetamine, digital scales, and a loaded 

firearm. When an officer asked why he was in the area, Gardner admitted he was trying 

to sell methamphetamine. Gardner was indicted on three charges: (1) possession with 

intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(B); (2) carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and (3) possessing a firearm as a felon, id. § 922(g)(1).

At Gardner’s jury trial, the government called Evansville Police Officer Cliff 

Simpson as an “expert in narcotics distribution.” Simpson testified to his familiarity

with the use and distribution of controlled substances, including methamphetamine, 

based on his 25 years with the Evansville Police Department, including 21 years as a 

narcotics investigator and 15 years as a task force officer with the Drug Enforcement 

Administration. The government asked Simpson to interpret text messages, which 

Gardner had sent around the time of his arrest. Gardner’s attorney objected, arguing

Simpson was unqualified to interpret Gardner’s text conversation because he was not 

involved in the investigation and he did not translate those messages 

contemporaneously with their transmission: 

I’d like to issue an objection to Mr. Simpson testifying about the content of 

these extractions and what they mean. I believe this to be very different 

than in a conspiracy case when there is a lawful wiretap and he may be 

listening realtime. These were extracted two years after the fact and 

anything he testifies to would have to be purely guessing. He has no 

context ... [H]e may be an expert on narcotics but he is not an expert on 

the meaning of conversation between two people he is not a party to or 

that he is [not] listening to realtime.

Transcript of Trial at 151–52.
No. 19-3456 Page 3

The district court asked the government to elaborate on the foundation for 

Simpson’s qualifications to interpret the text messages. Simpson explained he had 

interpreted phone calls and text messages in 35 to 45 wiretap investigations, some 

involving between 12 and 15 phones per case. He had spent many hours listening to 

and translating phone calls and reading texts about distributing illegal drugs. He also 

had thousands of conversations with people involved in use and distribution of 

controlled substances about the coded language they use when dealing drugs. After this 

explanation, the court overruled the defense’s objection and allowed Simpson to testify 

about Gardner’s text messages.

With the foundation established, the government continued with Simpson’s 

testimony. Simpson reviewed transcripts of more than 100 text messages Gardner had 

sent around the time of his arrest. Simpson testified that, in context, the text stating “she 

will pay 245 for it” meant someone would pay $245 for methamphetamine; “I can do 

one for 250 and dat’s all” meant Gardner would sell a quantity of the drug—likely three 

grams—for $250; and “I ain’t got dat kind of deal rite now. I’m grinding dis out” meant 

that Gardner was not selling the drug in bulk but only in smaller amounts. Simpson 

admitted he was not involved in the search or arrest of Gardner and that he was first 

asked to review the text messages two weeks before trial. 

At closing arguments, Gardner’s counsel restricted his challenge to the 

government’s case. He did not contest that the evidence supported a conviction on the 

drug trafficking charge. Given the outcome of the search and Gardner’s admission at 

his arrest about trying to sell methamphetamine, the defense said it would “respect 

[their] judgment on the drug trafficking charge” and if they “believe [he] is selling 

drugs, that’s fine.” Instead, the defense focused its closing arguments on contesting the 

two charges that required proof of gun possession. 

The jury convicted Gardner of all three charges, and the court sentenced him to 

240 months in prison, a term below his guidelines range of 262 to 327 months.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Gardner challenges only the admission of Simpson’s expert testimony 

about his text messages, arguing Simpson was unqualified to give that testimony. We

review Gardner’s challenge as follows: First, we review de novo whether the district 

court properly applied Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), in 

considering expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Second, we evaluate 

whether admitting the testimony was an abuse of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 
No. 19-3456 Page 4

916 F.3d 579, 586 (7th Cir. 2019). Finally, even if the district court abused its discretion, 

we would remand for a new trial only if that error affected Gardner’s substantial rights. 

See United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 265 (7th Cir. 2018).

Gardner maintains that the district court did not properly apply Daubert to 

Simpson’s testimony about the text messages. Under Daubert, a district court must 

assess whether proposed expert testimony “both rests on a reliable foundation and is 

relevant.” 509 U.S. at 597; see Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–49 

(1999) (applying Daubert framework to all expert testimony). Gardner contends the 

district court failed to analyze whether Simpson’s opinion was reliable, and thus the 

court “failed to require the government provide a solid foundation” for Simpson’s 

opinion.

For two reasons, Gardner’s argument is unconvincing. First, the district court 

adequately examined whether Simpson’s translation of Gardner’s text messages was 

reliable: After hearing about Simpson’s more than two decades of policing illegal drug 

dealing, and before the court allowed the jury to hear his testimony, it asked the 

government to elaborate on the foundation for Simpson’s ability to interpret coded 

texts. The questioning that followed satisfied Daubert’s requirement for reliability and 

relevance: The court learned that Simpson had investigated dozens of drug trades 

involving (in total) hundreds of phone exchanges with coded messages that he 

successfully interpreted after having thousands of conversations with drug users and 

dealers about that coded language. When expert testimony is proffered from a law 

enforcement officer, a district court reasonably gauges its reliability by assessing 

whether it is rooted in “significant law enforcement experience and an application of 

the case’s facts.” See Johnson, 916 F.3d at 587. That is the precise inquiry the government 

developed for the court.

Second, even before the district court asked the government to elaborate on 

Simpson’s qualifications, Officer Simpson’s vast experience in this area established the 

reliability of his testimony. District courts need not conduct a Daubert hearing where the 

reliability of the expert’s methods may reasonably be inferred from the expert’s 

background. United States v. Tingle, 880 F.3d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kumho, 

526 U.S. at 152). Here, the court could have reasonably found that Simpson’s 

interpretation of the coded language was reliable because it was based on over 20 years 

of experience in law enforcement. See id. (affirming admission of expert testimony 

without Daubert hearing where it was “clear” officer was “properly qualified” based on 
No. 19-3456 Page 5

16 years with DEA); Johnson, 916 F.3d at 587–88 (same where 20-years’ experience 

qualified agent to testify on relationship between drugs and guns). 

That brings us to whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting 

Simpson’s testimony as expert evidence under Rule 702. Gardner contends even if 

Simpson is an expert, the court should not have admitted his testimony because it fell 

outside of his expertise, which Gardner says is limited to how drugs are distributed, not 

how language is coded. But in Simpson’s more than two decades of drug-enforcement 

experience, he had decoded phone calls and text messages after having thousands of 

conversations with coded language. That is why officers with “training and experience 

in drug-related transactions and crimes are qualified to testify as an expert concerning 

the practices of people engaged in that type of conduct,” including the meaning of 

“narcotics code words.” See United States v. Farmer, 543 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Thus, the district court reasonably concluded that Simpson’s decoding of Gardner’s text 

messages was within his expertise.

Gardner responds that Simpson’s knowledge about coded language for selling 

drugs came from his experiences with other investigations—not personal experience 

investigating this case. So, Gardner insists, Simpson’s decoding testimony should not 

have been allowed. But Gardner conflates expert with lay testimony. Where an officer’s 

testimony is based on his personal experience with the defendant during the 

investigation, it is lay testimony. United States v. Jones, 739 F.3d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 2014)

(holding that where the witness’s testimony is based on his own interactions with the 

parties in the course of an investigation, then it is based on personal knowledge and 

constitutes lay testimony). But where, as here, the testimony “is based upon the officer’s 

experience over the years in narcotics investigations, and the officer is providing an 

opinion based on that experience as to what the code words mean in the present 

transaction, then it is expert testimony.” Id. So, while Simpson’s testimony might not 

have been acceptable lay testimony, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting it as expert testimony. 

Finally, Gardner insists Simpson interpreted innocuous, everyday words that 

need not be decoded by an expert. But we have held that Rule 702 allows expert officers 

to “translate drug jargon and code words that might seem entirely innocuous to an 

untrained jury.” United States v. York, 572 F.3d 415, 423 (7th Cir. 2009). Even if some of 

the phrases Simpson interpreted could apply to other non-criminal settings, the court 

appropriately admitted his opinion that, in this context, the phrases alluded to selling 

methamphetamine. See id. at 424 (“Experts can determine, based on their expertise, that 
No. 19-3456 Page 6

certain words have drug-related meanings within the context of a single 

conversation.”).

We do not see this case as similar to United States v. Garcia, 919 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 

2019), in which the expert’s opinion testimony about the defendant’s coded messages 

was uncorroborated. In Garcia, unlike the record before us, there was no admission 

from the defendant, no testimonies from other witnesses, and no direct evidence that

the defendant possessed drugs or paraphernalia. Without corroboration, the expert’s

testimony was determined to be “educated speculation” and not enough to support a 

guilty verdict. Id. at 496. Here, however, Simpson’s opinion that Gardner’s text 

messages were about selling drugs is corroborated by Gardner’s admission to trying to 

sell drugs and by the drugs and scales found on his person. 

In any case, even if the district court abused its discretion in allowing this 

testimony, Gardner does not prevail because he does not show that, under these 

circumstances, the testimony adversely affected his substantial rights. See Jett, 908 F.3d 

at 265. To do so, he needed to show that, had the testimony been excluded, the case 

against him would have been “significantly less persuasive in the mind of the average 

juror.” United States v. Saunders, 826 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2016). But here, aside from 

Simpson’s testimony, there was substantial evidence that Gardner possessed and 

intended to distribute methamphetamine, as he was found with scales and bags of the 

drug, and he admitted to trying to sell the drug. Moreover, his own counsel told the 

jury that, based on this evidence, it “was fine” if they convicted on the drug-related 

charges, essentially conceding the strength of the government’s case. On that record, 

Gardner cannot show that, had Simpson’s testimony about the text messages been 

excluded, the case against him would have been any less persuasive. 

AFFIRMED