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16-3620-bk 

Bais Din v. Congregation Birchos Yosef 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. 

CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS 

PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A 

SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST 

CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH 

THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, at 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 1st day of November, two thousand seventeen. 

 

Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 

 Chief Judge, 

 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 

Circuit Judges. 

________________________________________________ 

In re: CONGREGATION BIRCHOS YOSEF 

 Debtor, 

________________________________________________ 

BAIS DIN OF MECHON L’HOYROA, 

Appellant, 

v. No. 16-3620-bk 

CONGREGATION BIRCHOS YOSEF, 

 Debtor-Appellee. 

________________________________________________ 

FOR APPELLANT: Y. DAVID SCHARF (Joseph T. Moldovan, on the brief), 

Morrison Cohen LLP, New York, NY. 

FOR DEBTOR-APPELLEE: MICHAEL LEVINE, Levine & Associates, P.C., Scarsdale, NY. 

________________________________________________ 
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 Appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Seibel, J.).

 ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Bais Din of Mechon L’Hoyroa (“the Bais Din”) appeals from a judgment of 

the Southern District of New York (Seibel, J.) entered October 20, 2016, dismissing the Bais 

Din’s appeal from a bankruptcy court order enforcing the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, 11 

U.S.C. § 362(a). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the history of the 

case, and the issues on appeal. 

 The bankruptcy court’s order declared that certain defendants in adversary proceedings 

brought by Congregation Birchos Yosef had violated the automatic stay by initiating proceedings 

in the Bais Din, a rabbinical court, after the automatic stay went into effect, and it held those 

defendants in contempt. The bankruptcy court further ordered that decrees issued by the Bais Din 

in furtherance of those rabbinical proceedings, which violated the stay, were void ab initio and of 

no force or effect. The Bais Din, which was not a party in the adversary proceeding, appealed the 

bankruptcy court’s order to the district court, arguing that the order violated the Free Exercise 

Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Following supplemental briefing on the 

question of standing, the district court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that 

the Bais Din did not have standing to appeal the bankruptcy court’s order. This appeal followed. 

“When reviewing [a] dismissal . . . for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we review 

factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo . . . .” Liranzo v. United States, 690 

F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2012). The Bais Din, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the 

burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 
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Although “[t]he current Bankruptcy Code prescribes no limits on standing beyond those 

implicit in Article III of the United States Constitution[,] . . . . this Court and others have 

‘adopted the general rule, loosely modeled on the former Bankruptcy Act, that in order to have 

standing to appeal from a bankruptcy court ruling, an appellant must be “a person aggrieved”—a 

person “directly and adversely affected pecuniarily” by the challenged order of the bankruptcy 

court.’” DISH Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 88–

89 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Int’l Trade Admin. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 936 F.2d 744, 747 

(2d Cir. 1991)). This standard “reflect[s] the understandable concern that if appellate standing is 

not limited, bankruptcy litigation will become mired in endless appeals brought by the myriad of 

parties who are indirectly affected by every bankruptcy court order.” Kane v. Johns-Manville 

Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 642 (2d Cir. 1988).

As the district court correctly concluded, the Bais Din failed to demonstrate that it 

suffered a pecuniary harm. Quite the opposite, the Bais Din did not even allege a pecuniary harm 

before the district court, claiming instead that the automatic stay inhibited the free exercise of 

religion by “preventing the Bais Din from issuing notices to or against” individuals who violate 

Jewish law’s prohibition on initiating proceedings in secular courts without prior permission 

from a rabbinical court. Whatever the merits of that claim, it does not reflect a pecuniary injury. 

Moreover, to the extent that the Bais Din seeks to vindicate a non-pecuniary injury, nothing in 

this or the district court’s opinion prevents it from filing a civil action. 

The Bais Din’s alternative theories of standing were not raised before the district court, 

and so they have been forfeited. Bogle-Assegai v. Connecticut, 470 F.3d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 2006) 

(“[I]t is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for 

the first time on appeal.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
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Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the Bais Din’s appeal for lack 

of standing without considering the merits of the Bais Din’s underlying claims. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk