NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 21-2617

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BRIDGET HOLMES-MERGUCZ,

Appellant

v.

CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, d/b/a VERIZON;

ECKERT, SEAMANS, CHERIN & MELLOTT LLC 

_______________

On appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 3:18-cv-11816)

U.S. Chief District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

on September 15, 2022

Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Filed: October 31, 2022)

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OPINION*

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BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

Bridget Holmes-Mergucz worked for Verizon. She was a poor employee: She missed 

deadlines, fell short of quotas, and dissatisfied customers. She came off as unprofessional 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 

precedent.
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and combative over the phone and in meetings, sparking complaints by her peers. Plus, she 

often worked unapproved overtime and left work early. In 2015, she was ranked 176th out 

of 180 customer-service representatives. Her productivity was much too low and her error 

rate way too high. So she was often put on plans to improve her performance.

In May 2016, Holmes-Mergucz was seriously injured in a car accident. Verizon gave 

her medical leave from work and then, starting in December, a work-from-home accommodation. But she kept making errors, missing deadlines, and disrespecting both clients 

and colleagues. In mid-2017, Verizon again put her on an action plan to improve.

In late 2017, Verizon sought to cut costs by firing its lowest-scoring employees. As part 

of this downsizing, it fired Holmes-Mergucz. Her division was one of two selected by her 

boss for layoffs. Of the three employees in her division, she and one other were cut. She 

now sues, claiming disability discrimination and retaliation. The District Court granted 

summary judgment for Verizon. Holmes-Mergucz v. Cellco P’ship, 2021 WL 3163985, at 

*9–10 (D.N.J. July 27, 2021). We review de novo, drawing every reasonable inference in 

her favor. Crosbie v. Highmark Inc., 47 F.4th 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2022). Because there is no 

genuine factual dispute over causation or pretext, we will affirm. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Holmes-Mergucz relies on circumstantial rather than direct evidence. Thus, as the parties agree, her claims are governed by the familiar three-step burden-shifting framework 

under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801–05 (1973). See Canada v. 

Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340, 346–49 (3d Cir. 2022). At step one, her prima 

facie case fails for lack of causation. Her firing came two months after her last request to 

extend her disability accommodation. That was not suspiciously close in time, particularly 
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because her first request came more than a year earlier. See, e.g., Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a three-week interval was not unduly suspicious). And she was fired as part of Verizon’s blanket decision to cut costs, which 

had nothing to do with her injury. She tries to patch this hole by claiming that, after she 

started working from home, her bosses showed a pattern of antagonism. But the District 

Court adeptly dissected and rejected each of her conclusory, self-serving claims of antagonism. 2021 WL 3163985, at *6–9. We need not duplicate that analysis here.

Even if Holmes-Mergucz made out a prima facie case, she would still fail at step three. 

At step two, Verizon gave a legitimate reason for firing her: she was not good enough at 

her job to survive the company-wide cost cutting. So at step three, she must show that this 

explanation was pretextual. She cannot. She has neither directly rebutted Verizon’s explanation nor produced evidence beyond her prima facie case. Verizon’s neutral policy and 

her poor performance explain her firing. Her low rating included her objectively poor output, error rate, and company-wide rank, plus being on improvement plans. All of these 

were persistent problems before her injury. Indeed, even she admits that she was less 

skilled than the sole employee in her division who was kept on. That admission alone sinks 

her already leaky argument. Cf. Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 193–94 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding plaintiff’s pretext argument “belied by the record” because he had “admitted to his subpar performance”).

* * * * *

Holmes-Mergucz suffered twice, first in a car crash and then being fired. Both hardships

were surely difficult. But especially considering her poor job performance before her 
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injury, no reasonable jury could conclude that Verizon would have made a different decision if she had never asked for disability accommodations. Cf. Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 

352 F.3d 789, 801 (3d Cir. 2003). So the District Court correctly granted summary judgment. We will affirm.