RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2515-19

V. P.,

1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

K.C.B.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted December 6, 2021 – Decided February 9, 2022

Before Judges Sumners and Vernoia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset 

County, Docket No. FV-18-0406-20.

Wronko Loewen Benucci, attorneys for appellant 

(Kevin Hewitt, Jr., of counsel and on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

1 We use initials to identify the parties because the names of victims of domestic 

violence are excluded from public access under Rule 1:38-3(d)(10).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2515-19

Defendant appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) entered against 

her pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 

2C:25-17 to -35, for committing the predicate acts of harassment and stalking

against plaintiff, her former boyfriend. Defendant argues:

POINT I 

THE TRIAL COURT HAS AN AFFIRMATIVE 

DUTY TO INTERVENE TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL 

WHICH WAS NEGATED BY ITS REPEATED 

ADMISSION OF HEARSAY AND PREJUDICIAL 

EVIDENCE. 

POINT II 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CREDIBILITY 

DETERMINATIONS AND ITS FACTUAL 

FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE 

EVIDENCE. 

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT 

THE PLAINTIFF HAD PROVED THE PREDICATE 

ACT OF HARASSMENT. 

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT 

THE PLAINTIFF HAD PROVED THE PREDICATE 

ACT OF STALKING. 
3 A-2515-19

POINT V

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY FOUND AN 

FRO WAS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE VICTIM 

UNDER [THE] SECOND PRONG OF SILVER.

[2]

Having considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal 

principles, we affirm. 

I

At the FRO trial, plaintiff alleged defendant harassed and stalked him, 

constituting predicate acts of domestic violence. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13)-(14).

Harassment is defined, in relevant part, as "[e]ngag[ing] in any . . . course of 

alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or 

seriously annoy such other person." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). Stalking occurs when 

someone "purposefully or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at 

a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety or 

the safety of a third person or suffer other emotional distress." N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

10(b). For the purposes of stalking:

(1) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining 

a visual or physical proximity to a person; directly,

indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, 

method, device, or means, following, monitoring, 

2 Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006).
4 A-2515-19

observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating 

to or about, a person, or interfering with a person's 

property; repeatedly committing harassment against a 

person; or repeatedly conveying, or causing to be 

conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed 

by any other means of communication or threats 

implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at 

or toward a person.

(2) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.

(3) "Emotional distress" means significant mental

suffering or distress.

(4) "Cause a reasonable person to fear" means to cause 

fear which a reasonable victim, similarly situated, 

would have under the circumstances.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a).]

The testimony revealed the parties were involved in a steady romantic 

relationship for over a year, until they broke up in November 2018, and then 

began dating on-again, off-again for several months, eventually ending their 

relationship for good at the end of March 2019. Defendant claimed the 

relationship ultimately ended when she found out that plaintiff was dating 

another woman. 

Before and after the parties' relationship ended, plaintiff became 

concerned when he believed defendant was following him because he began 

seeing her or running into her at unexpected places and times. He found trackers 
5 A-2515-19

under his car on January 12, May 10, 28, and 31, June 2 and 7, and July 4, 2019. 

In fact, defendant admitted she "placed trackers3 on [his] car prior to when [they] 

stopped talking" but "didn't have anything to do with them past . . . April." She 

acknowledged that if a tracker was placed on plaintiff's car in April it would 

remain there until it was removed but its limited battery life was two weeks to a 

month. Plaintiff stated trackers were also found on the cars of his parents and a 

female friend. Defendant claimed she had "nothing to do with" those trackers. 

Plaintiff said that on July 27, 2019, he, "a friend[,] and her sister were 

visiting or in the area, so we went to have pizza together . . . , and I think within 

like, [ten] minutes of sitting down, . . . I saw . . . defendant walk around outside, 

. . . poke[] her head in, look[] at me, smirk[], [and] walk[] away." Defendant 

admitted she saw him at a pizzeria when she was there to pick up some food but

said nothing to him and immediately walked away. 

On August 10, plaintiff attended a Somerset Patriots minor league 

baseball game with his co-workers and saw defendant there. He testified that as 

he was in the stadium, he "[saw] her walking by. [She] look[ed] at me, ma[de] 

a smirk[,] and then walk[ed] away." He believed she was there to follow him. 

3

 Defendant bought the trackers on the internet and linked them to send signals 

to her cell phone. 
6 A-2515-19

She was neither a baseball nor Patriots fan, according to plaintiff, and they had 

never gone to a game together before. Defendant testified she saw him at a 

Patriots game, but it was on September 10 for Bark in the Park night, when fans 

took their dogs to the game. She was there because an animal shelter she 

volunteered was an event sponsor. She denied being at the Patriots game on 

August 10. 

On September 25, plaintiff was meeting a friend at a parking lot in the 

Princeton area before taking her to Philadelphia when he saw defendant

following him. She claimed she was on her way to dinner with a colleague when 

they saw each other in a parking lot. She accused plaintiff of following her, 

thinking he wanted her to return an ankle bracelet that he brought her, which she 

gave him and then drove off. Later that night, defendant went to Philadelphia 

to meet a different friend who had recently moved there but she did not see 

plaintiff, contending she was unaware that he was also in Philadelphia that night. 

Plaintiff said that on October 8, he had gone to funeral home with a friend 

and when he came out, defendant was sitting on a bench outside the funeral 

home. She then walked away. She claimed the location was a Methodist church

fifteen minutes away from her home and she was there to meet a friend at a 

restaurant which happened to be across the street. She said that, after seeing 
7 A-2515-19

plaintiff, she immediately walked away without saying anything, but he 

followed her for a couple of minutes. 

On October 12, plaintiff was in a park with a friend, who stated "there's 

someone watching us" from nearby bushes. Plaintiff could not positively 

identify the person, who was wearing a hoodie and crouched in the bushes, but 

he believed it was a female. That day, defendant made a Facebook post stating 

she was hospitalized for a poison ivy infection. She testified she had poison ivy 

before October 12, and was not in the park that day because she was doing 

animal rescue. 

On October 24, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) 

against defendant based upon the allegations of harassment and stalking, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b). 

Plaintiff claimed that due to his history with defendant, the trackers she 

placed on his car, and seeing him on several occasions at unexpected places, he 

was seeking final restraints. He testified, "I live in, basically, paranoia. If I hear 

a sound outside my window at three in the morning, I'm jumping out of bed to 

see if there's some person in my car. It's, you know, and then . . . , in fear for 

my family[.]" He further indicated that "fear is what's causing me to do this 

right now. . . . [I]t's almost like it's been controlling my life because [until now] 
8 A-2515-19

I . . . haven't done [anything] about it." He wanted "boundar[ies]" to prevent 

defendant's future contact with him. 

Franklin Township Detective Ordel Taylor, who testified on behalf of 

plaintiff, discussed his investigation into plaintiff's complaints about defendant, 

relying upon his reports and notes. He did a license plate reader inquiry on 

defendant's car, which determined her car was in Philadelphia on September 25. 

The judge overruled defendant's hearsay objection to Taylor's testimony that 

GPS trackers were found on his parents' car and on his friend's car. Taylor 

confirmed there were five global positioning systems (GPS) trackers on the cars 

of plaintiff and his friend and family, and determined they belonged to defendant 

based on information he found on her cell phone following her arrest. The judge 

overruled defense counsel's objection to Taylor's testimony regarding: (1) his 

discovery through social media that defendant checked herself into the 

emergency room for a poison ivy infection shortly after plaintiff reported to the 

police that someone was hiding in the woods at a park watching him and a friend; 

and (2) defendant's car being in Philadelphia on September 25, based on 

information from license plate readers. The judge, over defendant's objection, 

also allowed plaintiff to testify about Taylor's investigative efforts during which 
9 A-2515-19

he searched defendant's phone because it was merely a repeat of Taylor's 

testimony. 

At the trial's conclusion, the judge issued an FRO against defendant under 

Silver based on harassment and stalking. In his bench decision, the judge found 

plaintiff's testimony was "inherently believable," citing his demeanor and direct 

responses to questions. The judge also found Taylor credible. On the other 

hand, he found defendant's testimony evasive and incredible, coming across as 

an embittered ex-girlfriend. He found it was hard to believe that on September 

25 she just happened to be in the Princeton area and Philadelphia on the same 

night as plaintiff when she lived in Warren. 

The judge found defendant had no legitimate reason for her contacts with 

plaintiff on September 25, October 8, October 15, and October 14, 2019, 

especially after he previously told her leave him alone.4 The judge thus 

determined defendant's contacts were solely to harass plaintiff under N.J.S.A. 

2C:33-4(c) because she "engag[ed] in . . . [a] course of alarming conduct or of 

repeatedly committed acts with [the] purpose to alarm or seriously annoy [him]." 

4

 The judge did not find defendant harassed or stalked plaintiff at the Patriots 

game on August 10. Although he found plaintiff was credible, the judge 

suggests the contact occurred on September 10, the date defendant admitted 

attending a Patriots game. However, the judge provided no specific explanation 

for his finding. 
10 A-2515-19

The judge further determined that defendant's conduct constituted stalking under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b) because she "engag[ed] in a course of conduct directed at 

[plaintiff] that . . . would cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety or suffer 

other emotional distress." He specifically pointed to the "number of occasions 

[defendant] placed tracking devices on . . . plaintiff's car, the contin[ous] . . . 

sightings of her in various locations[,] clearly would cause a reasonable person

. . . to suffer emotional distress . . . [as] plaintiff described[.]" 

In determining that final restraints were required, the judge reasoned: 

the only thing that appears to have stopped

[defendant's] behavior . . . was the issuance of the 

[TRO] and . . . without a restraining order, . . . 

defendant, . . . in my opinion, will continue this 

harassment . . . in all likelihood and that . . . plaintiff 

needs to be protected for his own peace of mind, 

meaning his own . . . psychological welfare that a[n] 

. . . [FRO will provide]. 

 II

In a domestic violence case, we accord substantial deference to the family 

judge's findings, which "are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, 

substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) 

(citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). 

Deference is especially given when much of the evidence is testimonial and 

implicates credibility determinations. Id. at 412. We do not disturb the judge's 
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factual findings and legal conclusions, unless we are "convinced that they are so 

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and 

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Ibid. (quoting 

Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484). 

When determining whether to grant an FRO pursuant to the PDVA, the 

trial judge must make two determinations. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27. 

The first Silver prong is "whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance 

of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in 

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125. 

Upon finding the commission of a predicate act, the judge must then 

address the second Silver prong—whether an FRO is necessary to protect the 

plaintiff from future acts or threats of violence. Id. at 126. In other words, the 

judge must find that "relief is necessary to prevent further abuse." J.D. v. 

M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476 (2011) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)); see also

Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127 (explaining the judge must find that a FRO is 

necessary to protect "the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further 

abuse"). The second prong, like the first, "must be evaluated in light of the 

previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant 

including previous threats, harassment and physical abuse," as well as "whether 
12 A-2515-19

immediate danger to the person or property is present." Silver, 347 N.J. at 124 

(quoting Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1995) (citing 

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)-(2))). 

Applying those principles, we conclude there is no basis to disturb the 

factual findings or legal conclusions of the trial judge. The judge heard the 

testimony of the parties and Detective Taylor. The judge had the opportunity to 

assess their credibility based on believability and their demeanor. Defendant 

points to no evidence in the record that undermines the judge's credibility 

findings. 

We dismiss defendant's contentions that the judge abused his discretion in 

allowing some of the testimony by Taylor and plaintiff. See State v. Prall, 231 

N.J. 567, 580 (2018) ("The trial court's evidentiary rulings 'are reviewed under 

the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit 

or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion.'") 

(citing Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 

(2010)). Defendant incorrectly contends Taylor's testimony regarding his 

reliance on the license plate query to show that she was in Philadelphia on 

September 25 was inadmissible hearsay. Taylor relied on notes and reports 

prepared during his investigation of defendant to testify "fully and accurately" 
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because he could not remember all that he wrote. Therefore, under N.J.R.E. 

803(c)(5)(A-C), his testimony was admissible as past recollection recorded. 

And even though she contends on appeal for the first time that Taylor relied on 

surveillance cameras videos without personal knowledge that they were accurate 

depictions of the information recorded, no plain error occurred. See R. 2:10-2 

("Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is 

of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result 

. . . ."). There was no manifest injustice in the admission of the testimony 

because defendant admitted she was in Philadelphia that day. In fact, many of 

defense counsel's objections to testimony by plaintiff and Taylor were sustained. 

The judge's finding that defendant harassed and stalked plaintiff is 

supported in the record that following their breakup, she ignored his directive 

that he wanted nothing to do with her and then admittedly placed tracking 

devices on his car allowing her to know where he was. Defendant's contention 

that she did not speak or interact with plaintiff is of no consequence; the fact she 

tracked his whereabouts to observe him and who he was with satisfied the 

elements of harassment and stalking. Likewise, her claim that her intent was 

not to harass, as the GPS trackers were meant to be hidden, is belied by the 

judge's sound findings. We discern no cause to upset the judge's adequate 
14 A-2515-19

findings that an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff as they are supported by 

his determination that plaintiff gave credible testimony. 

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's 

arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.