alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dennis Jacobs, Appellant.

[946 NYS2d 526]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Christopher J. Burns, J.), rendered November 4, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted assault in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of attempted assault in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.10 [1]), defendant contends that the waiver of the right to appeal is not valid and challenges the severity of the sentence. Although the record establishes that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived the right to appeal *(see generally People v Lopez,*6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]), we conclude that the valid waiver of the right to appeal does not encompass the challenge to the severity of the sentence because Supreme Court failed to advise defendant of the potential periods of incarceration or the potential maximum term of incarceration *(see People v Newman,*21 AD3d 1343 [2005]; *People v McLean,*302 AD2d 934 [2003]; *cf. People v Lococo,*92 NY2d 825, 827 [1998]; *People v Hidalgo,*91 NY2d 733, 737 [1998]), and there was no specific sentence promise at the time of the waiver *(cf. People v Semple,*23 AD3d 1058, 1059 [2005], *lv denied*6 NY3d 852 [2006]). Nevertheless, on the merits, we conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe in light of the severity of the offense and the favorable nature of the plea agreement. Present — Scudder, P.J., Centra, Fahey, Peradotto and Sconiers, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-1701

SIDDI JON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK; BRIAN CHAN; PROFESSIONAL CHOICE, INCORPORATED; CNA; MARCELLA WOODS LLC,
Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (1:08-cv-00632-JFM)

Submitted: November 13, 2008 Decided: November 18, 2008

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Siddi Jon, Appellant Pro Se. Virginia Wood Bryant, POPE & HUGHES, PA, Townson, Maryland; Michael Paul Tanczyn, Townson, Maryland; Jeffrey M. Kotz, Townson, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Siddi Jon appeals the district court’s order granting

the Defendants’ motion to dismiss her civil actions related to

the foreclosure action that culminated in the sale of her home.

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.
Accordingly, we deny Jon’s motion for default judgment and
affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Jon v.
Washington Mut. Bank , No. 1:08-cv-00632-JFM (D. Md. May 19,
2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
# C_2019139EN.01006501.xml

| 15.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 139/65 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 139/65

---

Action brought on 3 February 2019 — Almashreq Investment Fund v Council

(Case T-62/19)

(2019/C 139/68)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Almashreq Investment Fund (Damascus, Syria) (represented by: E. Ruchat, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

| — | Declare the applicant’s action admissible and well founded; |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare the applicant’s action admissible and well founded;

| — | Accordingly, order the European Union to pay compensation in respect of all of the harm suffered by the applicant, in the amount determined, in equity, by the General Court; |
| --- | --- |

—

Accordingly, order the European Union to pay compensation in respect of all of the harm suffered by the applicant, in the amount determined, in equity, by the General Court;

| — | In the alternative, order the appointment of an expert with a view to establishing the scale of the harm suffered by the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

In the alternative, order the appointment of an expert with a view to establishing the scale of the harm suffered by the applicant;

| — | Order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on one main plea in law and a plea in the alternative, alleging harm suffered by the applicant for which liability rests with the Council of the European Union.

The main plea alleges that the disputed restrictive measures, namely Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/778 of 28 May 2018 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria and its subsequent implementing acts, are unlawful. First, it is claimed that those measures infringe the obligation to state reasons as provided in Article 296 TFEU and Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms of the European Union; and, second, that they infringe the applicant’s right to property and its right to respect for its reputation. It is claimed that that infringement has directly caused significant non-material and material harm to the applicant consisting, respectively, in (i) damage to its reputation and (ii) breach of contract, loss of equipment and loss of revenue, in respect of which it is entitled to compensation.

The plea in the alternative alleges the existence of a system of strict liability under EU law.

---
Exhibit 32.2

Written
Statement of the Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the undersigned officer of Traffix, Inc. ("Registrant"), hereby certifies that the Registrant's annual Report on
Form 10-K for the year ended November 30, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

| |  |                                                      
| |  | -----------------------------------------------------
| |  | /s/DANIEL HARVEYDANIEL HARVEY
Chief Financial Officer

---

QuickLinks
SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MONICA JONES, Appellant,
vs. CAL-WESTERN RECONVEYANCE CORPORATION; WELLS FARGO MASTER SERVICING; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC.; AND U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR TBW MORTGAGE-BACKED TRUST MORTGAGE PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2006-3, Respondents. No. 68470 

# FILED

APR 1 5 2016

TRACE K. LINCFMAN CLERK OF SUPREME COURT BY 

### __SLYSztaa_ ,

DEPUTY CLERK 

### 4

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE This is a pro se appeal from a district court order, certified as final under NRCP 54(b), granting a motion to dismiss in a quiet title action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; William D. Kephart, Judge. Appellant contends that the district court erred by denying her "Opposition and Counter Motion without stating a reason" for the denial. Having considered appellant's appeal statement and the record, we perceive no reversible error in the district court's decision to dismiss Wells Fargo Master Servicing, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Wells Fargo Bank, and American Home Mortgage Servicing from the underlying action, as appellant acknowledged that she was not seeking any relief against those entities even though those entities were named as

(0) I.07A 

### ao-11t7G,Douglas

Cherry 

## 71 defendants in appellant's second amended complaint.' We likewise perceive no reversible error in the district court's refusal to impose sanctions or hold any attorneys in contempt because, among other reasons, the district court was within its discretion in determining that the complained-of conduct did not warrant sanctions or a contempt order. See In re Water Rights of the Humboldt River, 118 Nev. 901, 907, 59 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2002); Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 676, 856 P.2d 560, 564 (1993). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 2

Gibbo J.

cc: Hon. William D. Kephart, District Judge Monica Jones Wright, Finlay & Zak, LIP/Las Vegas Eighth District Court Clerk

1 Because those entities were named as defendants, the district court had jurisdiction to rule on their motion to dismiss, which was brought under NRCP 12(b)(5). See Fritz Hansen A/ S v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 650, 656-57, 6 P.3d 982, 986 (2000) (recognizing that lack of service of process does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant chooses not to raise that defense).

2 We have considered appellant's remaining arguments and conclude that they do not warrant reversal of the appealed order.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2

(0) 1947A ea)
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jose Latorre, Appellant.

[942 NYS2d 390]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Christopher J. Burns, J.), rendered September 8, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of manslaughter in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]), defendant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction and that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The issue of legal sufficiency is preserved for our review regarding the evidence of identification because that was the basis of defendant’s motion for a trial order of dismissal after the People presented their proof. Defendant failed, however, to preserve for our review his *1430further contention concerning the alleged legal insufficiency of the evidence of intent, inasmuch as defense counsel did not address the issue of intent in his motion for a trial order of dismissal *(see generally People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]). With respect to the legal sufficiency of the identification evidence, we note that reversal is warranted “where the testimony is incredible and unbelievable, that is, impossible of belief because it is manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-contradictory” *(People v Wallace,*306 AD2d 802, 802-803 [2003] [internal quotation marks omitted]). We conclude that the evidence of identification in this case, although largely circumstantial, is *legally*sufficient to support the conviction *(see generally People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). In addition, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence *(see generally Bleakley,*69 NY2d at 495; *People v Flagg,*59 AD3d 1003, 1004 [2009], *lv denied*12 NY3d 853 [2009]). We further reject defendant’s contention that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request that Supreme Court charge a lesser included offense *(see People v Calderon,*66 AD3d 314, 320 [2009], *lv denied*13 NY3d 858 [2009]). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present — Scudder, P.J., Fahey, Lindley and Martoche, JJ.
EXHIBIT 23

                              ACCOUNTANTS' CONSENT


The Board of Directors
Optical Cable Corporation


We consent to incorporation by reference in Registration  Statement No. 33-09433
on Form S-8 of Optical Cable  Corporation of our report dated December 10, 1999,
relating to the balance  sheets of Optical Cable  Corporation  as of October 31,
1999 and 1998, and the related statements of income,  stockholders'  equity, and
cash flows for each of the years in the  three-year  period  ended  October  31,
1999, which report appears in the October 31, 1999 Annual Report on Form 10-K of
Optical Cable Corporation.


                                                      KPMG LLP




Roanoke, Virginia
January 27, 2000
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 866 

To amend title 10, United States Code, to modify the per-fiscal year calculation of days of certain active duty or active service used to reduce 

the minimum age at which a member of a reserve component of the 

uniformed services may retire for non-regular service. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 2, 2011 

Mr. TESTER (for himself, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. LEAHY, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. 

BLUMENTHAL, Mr. WICKER, Mr. BEGICH, and Mr. CHAMBLISS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To amend title 10, United States Code, to modify the perfiscal year calculation of days of certain active duty 

or active service used to reduce the minimum age at 

which a member of a reserve component of the uniformed 

services may retire for non-regular service. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Reserve Retirement 

5 Deployment Credit Correction Act’’. 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 866 IS

1 SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF PER-FISCAL YEAR CALCULATION 

2 OF DAYS OF CERTAIN ACTIVE DUTY OR AC3 TIVE SERVICE TO REDUCE ELIGIBILITY AGE 

4 FOR RETIREMENT FOR NON-REGULAR SERV5 ICE. 

6 (a) ACCUMULATION OF 90-DAY PERIODS OF SERV7 ICE WITHIN ANY TWO CONSECUTIVE FISCAL YEARS.— 

8 Section 12731(f)(2)(A) of title 10, United States Code, 

9 is amended by striking ‘‘in any fiscal year’’ and inserting 

10 ‘‘in any two consecutive fiscal years’’. 

11 (b) RETROACTIVE EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amend12 ment made by subsection (a) shall take effect as of Janu13 ary 28, 2008, and as if included in the National Defense 

14 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110– 

15 181) as enacted. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 516 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 516

  To extend outer Continental Shelf leases to accommodate permitting 
 delays and to provide operators time to meet new drilling and safety 
                             requirements.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 9, 2011

Mrs. Hutchison (for herself, Ms. Landrieu, Mr. Cornyn, Mr. Vitter, Ms. 
 Murkowski, Mr. Wicker, Mr. Cochran, and Mr. Sessions) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                      Energy and Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To extend outer Continental Shelf leases to accommodate permitting 
 delays and to provide operators time to meet new drilling and safety 
                             requirements.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Lease Extension and Secure Energy 
Act of 2011''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF CERTAIN OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASES.

    (a) Definition of Covered Lease.--In this section, the term 
``covered lease'' means each oil and gas lease for the Gulf of Mexico 
outer Continental Shelf region issued under section 8 of the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1337) that was--
            (1) not producing as of April 30, 2010; or
            (2) suspended from operations, permit processing, or 
        consideration, in accordance with the moratorium set forth in 
        the Minerals Management Service Notice to Lessees and Operators 
        No. 2010-N04, dated May 30, 2010, or the decision memorandum of 
        the Secretary of the Interior entitled ``Decision memorandum 
        regarding the suspension of certain offshore permitting and 
        drilling activities on the Outer Continental Shelf'' and dated 
        July 12, 2010.
    (b) Extension of Covered Leases.--The Secretary of the Interior 
shall extend the term of a covered lease by 1 year.
    (c) Effect on Suspensions of Operations or Production.--The 
extension of covered leases under this Act is in addition to any 
suspension of operations or suspension of production granted by the 
Minerals Management Service or Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation and Enforcement after May 1, 2010.
                                 <all>
```
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 19 , 20 12

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________
NO. 14

- 11

- 00748

- CR

____________

ROGELIO RAMIREZ , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 14

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1770773



### MEMORANDUM OP IN ION

Appellant entered a guilty plea to driving while intoxicated . In accordance with
the terms of a plea bargain agreement with the State, the trial court sentenced appellant on
July 26, 2011 , to confinement for 30 days in the Harris County Jail, with credit for five
days served . Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial and notice of appeal. We
dismiss the appeal.

The trial court entered a certification of the defendant ’ s right to appeal stating that
the defendant has no right of appeal. See T ex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The trial court ’ s certification is included in the record on appeal. See T ex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). The trial2

court did not grant permission t o appeal, and the record does not contain any rulings on

written pre

- trial motions. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b). The refore, the record supports the

trial court ’ s certification that appellant has no right of appeal

. See Dears v. State , 154
S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Brown, and Christopher

. Do Not Publish

— T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b)
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION



In connection with this Annual Report of Hewitt Associates, Inc. (the Company) on
Form 10-K for the period ended September 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of the Company hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that: 1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 2) the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods covered in the Report.



|                        |  |  | 
|----------------------- |  |  | 
|Date: November 18, 2003 |  |  | 
|                        |  |  | 
|                        |  |  |
# C_2020399EN.01003002.xml

| 23.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 399/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 399/30

---

Judgment of the General Court of 23 September 2020 — PE Digital v EUIPO — Spark Networks Services (ElitePartner)

(Case T-36/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - Figurative EU trade mark ElitePartner - Absolute grounds for refusal - No distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Obligation to state reasons)

(2020/C 399/43)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: PE Digital GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: V. von Bomhard and J. Fuhrmann, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Hanne, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Spark Networks Services GmbH (Berlin, Germany) (represented by: C. Brennecke and J. Gräbig, lawyers)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 October 2018 (Case R 614/2017-1), relating to invalidity proceedings between Spark Networks Services and PE Digital.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders PE Digital GmbH to pay the costs, including those incurred by Spark Networks Services GmbH in the proceedings before the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders PE Digital GmbH to pay the costs, including those incurred by Spark Networks Services GmbH in the proceedings before the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

---

(1)  OJ C 93, 11. 3. 2019.

---
## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

May 25, 2005

ERRATA

Appeal No. 03-5131, -5145

WESTFED HOLDINGS v. UNITED STATES

Decided: May 12, 2005 Precedential Opinion

Please make the following change:

On page 25, line 9, replace “ $10 million” with --$3.1 million--
# C_2019295EN.01006801.xml

| 2.9.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 295/68 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.9.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 295/68

---

Action brought on 3 July 2019 — Gemelli v Parliament

(Case T-451/19)

(2019/C 295/89)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Vitaliano Gemelli (Rome, Italy) (represented by: M. Merola, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

| — | order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

| — | order the European Parliament to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Parliament to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those relied on in Case T-389/19, Coppo Gavazzi v Parliament.

---