THEA NEY GENERAL 

Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr. 

Director, Texas Department of Public Safety 

Austin, Texas 

Opiriion No. V-700 

Re: Repeal of Article 1150, 

Vernon's Penal Code, 

relative to stopping, 

rendering aid, and giving Information following an accident, by 

reason of conflicts between this statute and 

the Uniform Traffic 

Code of 1947. 

Diar Sir: 

Your recent request for an oplliion 

partment contained the following question: 

by this De- 

'Was Art. 1150, Texas Penal Code, repealed by The Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on the Highways (Acts, 1947, 50th Leg. 

~it96;;o~;;H421) Vernon's Ann. CIV. St., 

. 

Article 1150 of the Texas Penal Code Is a8 follows: 

"Whenever an automobile, motorcycle 

or other motor vehicle whatsoever, regardless of the power by which the same may be 

propelleb, or &awn, strikes any person or 

collidee with any vehicle containing a person, the driver of, and all persons In control of such automobile, motor vehicle or 

other vehicle shall stop and ehall render 

to the person struck or to the occupants of 

the vehicle collided with all necessary assistance Including the carrying of such person or occupants to a physician, or surgeon 

for medical or surgical treatment, If such 

treatment be required, or if such carrying 

Is requested by the person struck or any OCcupant of the vehicle collided with; ad 8ucb 
Bon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 2 (V-700) 

driver and person having OP assuming authority of such driver shall further give to 

the occupant of such vehicle or person 

struck, if requested at the time of such 

striking OP collision OP immediately thereafter, the number of such automobile, motorcycle or motor vehicle, also the name of the 

owner thereof and his address, the names of 

the passenger or passengers not exceeding 

five in each automobile or other vehicle, 

together with the address of each one thereof. Any person violating any provision of 

this.articl.e is punishable by imprisonment 

in the penitentiary not to exceed five years 

or in jail not exceeding one year or by fine 

not exceeding five thousand dol,lfjrs, or by 

both such fine and imprisonment. 

Pertinent provisions of Article 670ld, Vernon's 

Civil Statutes, are: 

"Sec. 38 (a) The driver of any vehicle lnvolved in an accident resulting in injury 

to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such 

accident or as close thereto as possible but 

shall then forthwith return to and in every 

event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 40, Every such step shall 

be made without obstructing traffic more 

than Is necessary. 

"(b) Any person falling to stop or 

to comply with said requirements under 

such circumstances shall upon conviction 

be punished by imprisonment in the penltenMary not to exceed five (5) years or in 

jail not exceeding one (1) year or by fine 

not exceeding Five Thousand ($5,000.00) 

Dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 

Y3ec. 39. The driver of any vehicle lnvolved in an accident resulting only in 

damage to a vehicle which is driven or 

attended by any person shall immediately 

stop such vehicle at the scene of such 

accident until he has fulfilled the re- 
Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 3 (v-700) 

quirements of Section 40. Every such 

stop shaI.1 be made without obstructing 

traffic more than is necessary. Any 

person failing to stop or to comply 

with said requirements under such clrcumstances shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 

"Sec. 40. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury 

to or death of any person or damage to 

any vehicle which is driven or attended 

by any person shall give his name,address, 

and the registration number of the vehicle 

he is driving and shall upon request and 

if available exhibit his operator's, commercial operatorss, or chauffeur's license 

to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle 

collided with and shall render to any pernon injured in such accident reasonable 

assistance, including the carrying, or the 

making of arrangements for the carrying, 

of such person to a physician, surgeon or 

hospital for medical or surgical treatment 

if it is apparent that such treatment is 

necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person. 

"Sec. l.56. All laws or parts of laws inconsistent or conflictinn with the orovislons of this Act are hereby repealed, 

!i 

rovided, however, that nothing in this 

ct is, intended to repeal provisions of 

s v Q (several I.aws specified but Article 1150 of the Penal Code is not includ- 

. ed In the group,) (Emphasis supplied) 

By comparing the subject matter of Article 

1150 of the Penal Code with that of the above quoted 

provisions of Article 67016, it becomes apparent that 

the Legislature, in the enacting of such provisions of 

Article 6701&, has established a comprehensive law 

covering the field of traffic legislation provided for 

in Article 1150. Basically, the question of repeal, 

whether express or implied, of one statute by another 

is one of legislative intent. The enactment of subaequent comprehensive legislation such as is found in 

Sections 38, 39 and 40, Article 67016, manifests an in- 
Bon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 4 (v-700) 

tent on the part of the Legislature to repeal all former laws upon the subject. By every reasonable construction, It is clear that the later enactment is intended to 

supersede the existing law and the latest legislative expression prevails. 

We quote the following from Meek v. Wheeler 

County, et al, 125 g.W.(2d) 331, 334: 

‘In the case of Bryan v. gun&berg 

5 Tex. 41.8, 424, the Supreme Court of {his 

State announced the rule which, we think, 

is decisive of the issue before us. Such 

rule is in the following language: ‘It undoubtedly is true that a construction which 

repeals former statutes, by implication, 

is not to be favored; and it is also true 

that statutes In par1 materia, and relating 

to the same subject, are to be taken and 

construed together; because it is to be 

inferred that they had one object in view, 

and were Intended to be considered as constituting one entire, and harmonious system. But when the new statute, in itself, 

comprehends the entire subject, and creates 

a new, entire, and independent sy(Jtem, respecting that subject matter, it is universally held to repeal and supercede all 

previous systems and laws respecting the 

same subject matter. 1 

“An even stronger rule than the above 

is to be found in Black on Interpretation 

of Laws, Second Edition, page 355, in the 

f 011 owing language: 

“‘Even where there is no direct re ugnancy or inconsistency between the earl !i er 

and the later law, there may in some case8 

be an implied repeal. This result follows 

where the later act revises, amends, and 

sums up the whole law on the particular 

subject to which it relates, covering all 

the ground treated of In the earlier statute, and adding new or different provisions, 

and thus plainly shows that it was intended 

to supercede any and all prior enactments 

on that subject-matter, and to furnish, for 

the future, in itself alone, the whole and 
Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 5 (V-700) 

only system of statute law applicable to 

that subject.'" 

In State v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, et al, 

194 S.W. 422, 432, it is said: 

"The rule is well settled that, when 

a subsequent statute shows by its context 

that it was intended to embrace all the 

law upon the subject dealt with, such statute will, by implication, repeal all former 

laws relating to the same subject. The correctness of that rule is not controverted, 

and it is unneces$ary to c1t.e authorities 

in support of It. 

The following quotation from 39 Tex. Jur. 

pages 148, 149 is made in Luse v. City of Dallas, 131 

S.W.(2&) 1079, 1084: 

'Where it is apparent that a Statute 

is Intended to embrace all the law upon the 

subject with which It deals, it repeals all 

former laws relating to the same subject. 

Under this rule, a statute that covers the 

subject matter of a former law and is evidently intended as a substitute for it, although containing no express words to that 

effect, operates as a repeal of the former 

law to the extent that its provisions are 

revised and its field freshly covered. Accordingly, parts of the original act that 

are omitted from the new legislation are to 

be considered as anuulled. If the later 

act is clearly intended to prescribe the 

only rules which should govern, it repeals 

the prior statute, although the twt are 

not repugnant in their provisions. 

Applying the rule of ‘*comprehhenslieness” set 

out in the above quotations to the situation under oonsideration, it is our opinion that Article 1150, Vernon's Penal Code, was repealed by The Uniform Act Rs8 

ulating Traffic on the Highways, Article 670ld, Vernon’s 

Iv11 Statutes. 

SUMMARY 

When a subsequent statute shows by 
lion. Homer Garrison, Jr,, page 6 (V-700) 

its context that it was intended to embrace all the law upon the subject dealt 

with, such statute, by implication, repeals a former law covering the same subject. 

Article 1150, Vernon’s Penal Cede, 

dealing with ‘hit and runU drivem, was 

repealed by The Uniform Act Regulating 

Traffic on the Highways, Article 67016, 

Vernon’s Civil Statutes, dealing with the 

same subject . 

Your8 very truly, 

ATTORIIEY OBlWML OP TEXAS 

CBXlwb:mw BY 

APPROVED: