alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1



Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the amendment no. 1 to the annual report of Texas United Bancshares, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K/A for the period ending
December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, L. Don Stricklin, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and operating results of the Company.



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/    L. Don Stricklin              
|L. Don Stricklin                     
|President and Chief Executive Officer
|                                     
|October 11, 2005
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO**

**18U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

This certification is notto be deemed filed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,and does not constitute a part of the Quarterly Report of UTStarcom, Inc.(the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2009 asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”).

 

In connection with theReport, we, Peter Blackmore and Viraj J. Patel, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 
| (i)    | The Report fully complies  with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and     |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                   |
| (ii)   | The information contained  in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial  condition and results of operations of the Company. |

 

Dated: August 7,2009

 
| By:    | /s/ PETER BLACKMORE                           |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Name: Peter Blackmore                         |   |
|   | Title: Chief Executive  Officer and President |   |
|   |                                          |   |
| By:    | /s/ VIRAJ J. PATEL                            |   |
|   | Name: Viraj J. Patel                          |   |
|   | Title: Interim Chief  Financial Officer       |   |

 

----
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

204 

CAF 16-00027 

PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF JUSTIN E. KIEFFER, 

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DELEMA DEFRAIN, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

 

D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, ESQS., SYRACUSE (ELIZABETH deV. MOELLER OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

CONBOY, MCKAY, BACHMAN & KENDALL, LLP, WATERTOWN (MATTHEW J. PORTER OF

COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. 

RUTHANNE G. SANCHEZ, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, WATERTOWN. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Jefferson County (Diana

D. Trahan, R.), entered August 24, 2015 in a proceeding pursuant to

Family Court Act article 6. The order, inter alia, granted joint

custody of the subject child to the parties, with primary physical

residence to petitioner. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously modified on the law by vacating the tenth ordering

paragraph and as modified the order is affirmed without costs. 

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act

article 6, respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter alia,

modified a prior order entered on stipulation of the parties by

awarding petitioner father primary physical residence of the parties’

child. Contrary to the mother’s contention, we conclude that Family

Court properly determined that the father met his burden of

establishing a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant an

inquiry into whether a change of custody is in the best interests of

the child (see Matter of Murphy v Wells, 103 AD3d 1092, 1093, lv

denied 21 NY3d 854; Matter of Markey v Bederian, 274 AD2d 816,

817-818; Matter of Brewer v Whitney, 245 AD2d 842, 843). Contrary to

the mother’s further contention, there is a sound and substantial

basis in the record for the court’s determination that it is in the

child’s best interests to award the father primary physical residence

of the child and to award visitation with the mother (see Matter of

Tuttle v Tuttle, 137 AD3d 1725, 1726; see generally Eschbach v

Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171-174). In addition, we reject the mother’s

contention that she was denied effective assistance of counsel (see

Matter of Nicholson v Nicholson, 140 AD3d 1689, 1690, lv denied 28
-2- 204 

CAF 16-00027 

NY3d 903; Matter of Brown v Gandy, 125 AD3d 1389, 1390).

We agree with the mother, however, that the court erred in sua

sponte ordering that the father shall have the right to relocate the

residence of the child anywhere in the continental United States with

30 days’ notice to the mother inasmuch as that relief was not

requested by the parties or the Attorney for the Child (see Matter of

Irons v Schneller, 258 AD2d 652, 653; see generally Matter of Majuk v

Carbone, 129 AD3d 1485, 1485-1486). We therefore modify the order

accordingly.

Entered: February 10, 2017 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
----

| Parent                              |   | Subsidiary                                         |   | Percentage      of      Ownership |   | State      of Incorporation or Organization |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------|
|                                |   |                                               |   |                              |   |                                        |
| Imperial      Capital Bancorp, Inc. |   | Imperial      Capital Bank                         |   | 100%                              |   | California                                  |
| Imperial      Capital Bancorp, Inc. |   | ITLA      Funding Corporation                      |   | 100%                              |   | Delaware                                    |
| ITLA      Funding Corporation       |   | ITLA      Servicing Corporation                    |   | 100%                              |   | Delaware                                    |
| ITLA      Funding Corporation       |   | ITLA      Commercial Warehouse Corporation         |   | 100%                              |   | Delaware                                    |
| Imperial      Capital Bancorp, Inc. |   | ITLA      Management Corporation                   |   | 100%                              |   | Delaware                                    |
| ITLA      Management Corporation    |   | ITLA      Commercial Investment Corporation        |   | 100%                              |   | Maryland                                    |
| Imperial      Capital Bancorp, Inc. |   | Imperial      Capital Real Estate Investment Trust |   | 100%                              |   | Delaware                                    |
| Imperial      Capital Bank          |   | Imperial      Capital Express, Inc.                |   | 100%                              |   | Delaware                                    |
| Imperial      Capital Bancorp, Inc. |   | ITLA      Capital Statutory Trust I                |   | 100%                              | (1)    | Connecticut                                 |
| Imperial      Capital Bancorp, Inc. |   | ITLA      Capital Statutory Trust II               |   | 100%                              | (1)    | Connecticut                                 |
| Imperial      Capital Bancorp, Inc. |   | ITLA      Capital Statutory Trust III              |   | 100%                              | (1)    | Delaware                                    |
| Imperial      Capital Bancorp, Inc. |   | ITLA      Capital Statutory Trust IV               |   | 100%                              | (1)    | Delaware                                    |
| Imperial      Capital Bancorp, Inc. |   | ITLA      Capital Statutory Trust V                |   | 100%                              | (1)    | Connecticut                                 |

| (1) | Represents      ownership of the common securities of thetrust. |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|

----
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-13-00081-CR

Juan RODRIGUEZ,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 379th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2009CR10368

Honorable Angus K. McGinty, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE BARNARD, JUSTICE MARTINEZ, AND JUSTICE ALVAREZ

The State’s July 11, 2014 motion for rehearing is DENIED. Our opinion and judgment of 

July 2, 2014 is WITHDRAWN. In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial 

court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

SIGNED August 29, 2014.

_____________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 60 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. CON. RES. 60

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That when the Senate recesses or adjourns on any day from Thursday, 
November 15, 2012, through Friday, November 16, 2012, on a motion 
offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its Majority Leader 
or his designee, it stand recessed or adjourned until 12:00 noon on 
Monday, November 26, 2012, or such other time on that day as may be 
specified by its Majority Leader or his designee in the motion to 
recess or adjourn, or until the time of any reassembly pursuant to 
section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first; and 
that when the House adjourns on any legislative day from Friday, 
November 16, 2012, through Friday, November 23, 2012, on a motion 
offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by its Majority Leader 
or his designee, it stand adjourned until 2:00 p.m. on Tuesday, 
November 27, 2012, or until the time of any reassembly pursuant to 
section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first.
    Sec. 2.  The Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House, or their respective designees, acting jointly after consultation 
with the Minority Leader of the Senate and the Minority Leader of the 
House, shall notify the Members of the Senate and House, respectively, 
to reassemble at such place and time as they may designate if, in their 
opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.

            Passed the Senate November 15, 2012.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
112th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                            S. CON. RES. 60

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Providing for a conditional adjournment or recess of the Senate and an 
              adjournment of the House of Representatives.
```
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 696 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 696

    To amend title 38, United States Code, to treat Vet Centers as 
 Department of Veterans Affairs facilities for purposes of payments or 
  allowances for beneficiary travel to Department facilities, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 31, 2011

  Mr. Tester introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend title 38, United States Code, to treat Vet Centers as 
 Department of Veterans Affairs facilities for purposes of payments or 
  allowances for beneficiary travel to Department facilities, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TREATMENT OF VET CENTERS AS DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
              FACILITIES FOR PURPOSES OF PAYMENTS OR ALLOWANCES FOR 
              BENEFICIARY TRAVEL.

    (a) In General.--Section 111 of title 38, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(i)(1) Vet Centers shall be treated as Department facilities for 
purposes of providing payment of actual expenses of travel or allowance 
for travel to or from a Department facility under this section.
    ``(2) In this subsection, the term `Vet Center' means a center for 
readjustment counseling and related mental health services for veterans 
under section 1712A of this title.''.
    (b) Applicability.--Section 111(i) of such title, as added by 
subsection (a), shall apply with respect to travel occurring on or 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Sun Graphics Corp. et al., Appellants, v Levy, Davis & Maher, LLP et al., Respondents.

[943 NYS2d 464]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Judith J. Gische, J.), entered April 5, 2011, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs failed to establish that the three-year statute of limitations on their cause of action alleging legal malpractice was tolled pursuant to the continuous representation doctrine (CPLR 214 [6]; *see CLP Leasing Co., LP v Nessen,*12 AD3d 226 [2004]). They alleged generally that defendants continued to represent them during the three years preceding the commencement of the action, but failed to allege that that representation pertained to the specific matters at issue *(see Apple Bank for Sav. v PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,*70 AD3d 438 [2010]; *Serino v Lipper,*47 AD3d 70, 76 [2007], *lv dismissed*10 NY3d 930 [2008]).

The causes of action for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation are redundant of the legal malpractice claim, since they arise from the same allegations and seek identical relief *(see Estate of Nevelson v Carro, Spanbock, Kaster & Cuiffo,*290 AD2d 399, 400 [2002]; *see also Weksler v Kane Ressler, P.C.,*63 AD3d 529, 531 [2009]).

The cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 fails to state a cause of action, since plaintiffs do not allege that defendants engaged in any deceptive conduct during a pending proceeding in which plaintiffs were parties *(see Stanski v Ezersky,*228 AD2d 311, 313 [1996], *lv denied*89 NY2d 805 [1996]).

We have reviewed plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Andrias, J.P, Saxe, Catterson, Renwick and Román, JJ.
#### Scott Androvic, Appellant, v Metropolitan Transportation Authority et al., Respondents.

[944 NYS2d 113]—

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Cynthia S. Kern, J.), entered on or about November 12, 2010, which, in this personal injury action arising out of a rear-end collision, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted the motion of defendants Metropolitan Transit Authority, MTA Bus Company and Franklin Torres (collectively the MTA defendants) and the cross motion of defendants the City of New York, the Police Department of the City of New York and Frederick Martucci (collectively the City defendants) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The MTA defendants established prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence showing that the bus operated by Torres and owned by MTA Bus Company had come to a complete stop before it was struck in the rear by a police vehicle in which plaintiff police officer was a passenger *(see Morales v Morales,*55 AD3d 306, 307 [2008]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to provide a nonnegligent explanation for the rear-end collision sufficient to establish an issue of fact regarding the MTA defendants’ negligence *(id.).*That the bus came to a sudden stop was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Francisco v Schoepfer,*30 AD3d 275, 276 [2006]). Nor did Torres’ alleged failure to yield to the emergency police vehicle raise a triable issue of fact, as such a failure would not relieve defendant Martucci, the operator of the police vehicle, from driving with reasonable care *(see*Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1144 [b]). Furthermore, it was unconverted that the bus could not have moved any further to the right side of Lexington Avenue because of a double-parked car in front of it on the right side.

The City defendants established prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence showing that the failure of the police vehicle’s brakes was unanticipated and that the City had exercised reasonable care in keeping the brakes and the rest of the vehicle in good working order *(see*34 RCNY 4-09 [a]; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 [1] [a]; *see generally Normoyle v New York City Tr. Auth.,*181 AD2d 498, 498 *611[1992]; *Liana v Atacil Contr.,*212 AD2d 673, 673-674 [1995]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

To the extent plaintiff seeks to impose liability on the City for Martucci’s alleged negligence in operating the police vehicle while responding to an emergency call, such a claim is barred by the firefighters’ rule *(see Cooper v City of New York,*81 NY2d 584, 589-592 [1993]; *see generally Flynn v City of New York,*258 AD2d 129, 135-136 [1999]).

We have considered plaintiffs remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.E, Catterson, Moskowitz, Richter and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
EXHIBIT 10.8

Non-Employee Director Compensation Summary Sheet



|                                               |  |                         |       
|---------------------------------------------- |  | ----------------------- | ------
|Annual Retainer                                |  | $                       | 35,000
|                                               | 
|Type of Meeting                                |  | Amount Paid per Meeting
|Board Meeting                                  |  | $                       | 3,500 
|Special Meeting                                |  | $                       | 3,500 
|Telephonic Board Meeting                       |  | $                       | 1,000 
|Compensation & Nominating Committee Meeting    |  | $                       | 1,500 
|Audit Committee Meeting                        |  | $                       | 3,000 
|Executive Committee Meeting                    |  | $                       | 3,500 
|Additional Fee for Chairperson (except Audit)  |  | $                       | 1,500 
|Additional Fee for Audit Committee Chairperson |  | $                       | 2,000
Exhibit 32.2

                              PACIFIC STATE BANCORP

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

    Regarding Annual Report on Form 10-K for the Year Ended December 31, 2006

                In  connection  with the Annual  Report of Pacific State Bancorp
        (the  "Company")  on Form 10-K for the year ended  December 31, 2005, as
        filed with the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof
        (the "Report'), the undersigned hereby certifies,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
        Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
        Act of 2002, to the best of her knowledge, that:

                (1)     The  Report  fully  complies  with the  requirements  of
                        Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the  Securities and Exchange
                        Act of 1934; and

                (2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
                        in all material  respects,  the financial  condition and
                        results of operations of the Company


                                                BY:  /s/ JoAnne Roberts
                                                     -------------------------
                                                     Senior Vice President and
                                                     Chief Financial Officer
                                                     Date: March 29, 2007
#### In the Matter of Brian Smith, Petitioner, v Eugene S. LeFevre, as Superintendent of Clinton Correctional Facility, Respondent.

— Yesawich, Jr., J.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this court by order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered in Albany County) to review a determination by respondent which found petitioner guilty of violating certain disciplinary rules.

While an inmate at Clinton Correctional Facility, petitioner was accused of breaching institutional rules prohibiting the unauthorized exchange of articles, Penal Law offenses, soliciting goods without approval, possessing or exchanging narcotics, and smuggling. The charges stem from his participation in a drug smuggling operation involving inmate use of fake disbursement and mail order forms to pay for drugs. Operation of the scam is described in *Matter of Fediuk v Coughlin*(106 AD2d 834).

At the Superintendent’s hearing, the evidence consisted of testimony from a correction officer (CO) regarding how the scheme worked; that information had been communicated to the CO by unidentified informants. Also introduced into evidence were purchase order and disbursement forms admittedly signed by petitioner and directed to the home of "Madelyn Serrano, c/o Record Store”; she was identified as the sister of another inmate at Clinton.

Petitioner called no witnesses on his behalf, addressed no questions to the CO, and explained only that he thought he was buying discounted tape decks. The hearing officer, disbe*783lieving petitioner, upheld the charges; a penalty of 120 days’ keeplock and loss of privileges was imposed. On appeal, the Commissioner of Correctional Services modified the disposition at the Superintendent’s hearing by dismissing the charge of possession or exchange of narcotics because of insufficient evidence.

Since "[t]here is no right of confrontation or cross-examination, and consequently no requirement that the disciplinary authority call any adverse witnesses * * * to testify at the hearing” *(Semper v Smith,*66 NY2d 130, 141) and the failure of the hearing officer to interview the three inmate informers was rationally based on a desire to protect the informers, no constitutional right of petitioner was disregarded. And, unlike *Matter of Alvarado v LeFevre*(111 AD2d 475, 476), petitioner’s guilt is not by association, but stems from direct involvement in the deception, as in *Matter of Fediuk v Coughlin (supra),*hence substantial evidence for respondent’s determination exists.

Determination confirmed, and petition dismissed, without costs. Main, J. P., Casey, Weiss, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.