alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2019363EN.01002301.xml

| 28.10.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 363/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 363/23

---

Action brought on 26 August 2019 — PL v Commission

(Case T-586/19)

(2019/C 363/31)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: PL (represented by: J.-N. Louis, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the Commission’s decision of 12 December 2018 establishing the applicant’s 2017 CDR; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the Commission’s decision of 12 December 2018 establishing the applicant’s 2017 CDR;

| — | order the Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action against the Commission’s decision establishing the applicant’s career development report in respect of 2017 (2017 CDR), the latter relies on three pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 22a and 22b of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (the Staff Regulations) and infringement by the DG of DG HR of his duty to have regard for the welfare of officials. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 22a and 22b of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (the Staff Regulations) and infringement by the DG of DG HR of his duty to have regard for the welfare of officials.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which confers on the applicant the right to good administration and, in particular, the right to have his affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which confers on the applicant the right to good administration and, in particular, the right to have his affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the general implementing provisions for Article 43 of the Staff Regulations, breach of the duty to state reasons and failure to observe the rights of the defence. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the general implementing provisions for Article 43 of the Staff Regulations, breach of the duty to state reasons and failure to observe the rights of the defence.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                           1,002
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,955
<ALLOWANCES>                                       605
<INVENTORY>                                      6,897
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                17,221
<PP&E>                                           9,628
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,582
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  29,121
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            5,575
<BONDS>                                          2,976
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           27,171
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            10
<OTHER-SE>                                      (6,946)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    29,121
<SALES>                                         11,455
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                12,659
<CGS>                                            6,919
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    8,278
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    14
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 258
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (2,307)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (2,307)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (2,307)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (.30)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.30)


</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Harry Gamble, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Mullen, J.), rendered April 15, 1983, convicting him of grand larceny in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

*870Judgment affirmed.

Defendant contends that the County Court erred by not affording him an opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty before imposing a higher sentence than that originally negotiated in the plea agreement. Although that is the usual rule *(Santobello v New York,*404 US 257), it does not apply to the instant case. Taken as a whole, the record indicates the clear intent of the court to condition the promised sentence upon the defendant’s appearance on the date scheduled for sentencing. Because defendant absconded and failed to appear on the scheduled date, the court was no longer bound by its promise and was free to impose a higher sentence *(see, People v Innes,*111 AD2d 356; *People v McDaniels,*111 AD2d 876; *People v Davis,*106 AD2d 657; *People v Chevalier,*92 AD2d 944). Lazer, J. P., Gibbons, O’Connor and Brown, JJ., concur.
# C_2020271EN.01003802.xml

| 17.8.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 271/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.8.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 271/38

---

Order of the General Court of 16 June 2020 — Luz Saúde v EUIPO — Clínica La Luz (HOSPITAL DA LUZ LEARNING HEALTH)

(Case T-558/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for registration of the EU figurative mark HOSPITAL DA LUZ LEARNING HEALTH - Earlier national figurative mark clínica LALUZ - Relative ground for refusal - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

(2020/C 271/49)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Luz Saúde, SA (Lisbon, Portugal) (represented by: G. Moreira Rato, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO intervening before the General Court: Clínica La Luz, SL (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: I. Temiño Ceniceros, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 1 July 2019 (Case R 2239/2018-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Clínica La Luz and Luz Saúde.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | Luz Saúde, SA is ordered to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Luz Saúde, SA is ordered to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 319, 23.9.2019.

---
# C_2019213EN.01005301.xml

| 24.6.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 213/53 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.6.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/53

---

Action brought on 9 April 2019 — Infineon Technologies v Commission

(Case T-234/19)

(2019/C 213/52)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Infineon Technologies AG (Neubiberg, Germany) (represented by: L. Assmann and M. Peiffer, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the defendant’s decision, notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1), of 28 May 2018 on aid scheme SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for baseload consumers under Paragraph 19 of the Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (Regulation on electricity network charges, ‘the StromNEV’); and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the defendant’s decision, notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1), of 28 May 2018 on aid scheme SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for baseload consumers under Paragraph 19 of the Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (Regulation on electricity network charges, ‘the StromNEV’); and

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The application is based on one plea in law, arguing that the contested decision is unlawful because the exemption from the network charges under the second sentence of Paragraph 19(2) of the StromNEV is not State aid within the meaning of Article 107 et seq. TFEU.

In this regard, the applicant first argues that the exemption from network charges granted on the basis of Paragraph 19(2) of the StromNEV was not granted through State resources within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU but was financed through German electricity grid operators which are organised under private law and are not attributable to the State. Neither does the effect of the disputed surcharge equate to a levy on electricity consumption in Germany. In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany has no control over the transmission system operators which are entrusted with the management of these resources.

It is further claimed that the exemption from network charges on the basis of Paragraph 19(2) of the StromNEV differs in significant aspects from the underlying circumstances in Cases C-206/06, Essent Netwerk Noord and Others and C-262/12, Vent De Colère!. The disputed case is comparable, however, with the surcharge in Case C-405/16 P, Germany v Commission, and therefore not classifiable as aid.

---
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 136 (Tuesday, July 20, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 38264]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-15315]


========================================================================
Notices
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains documents other than rules 
or proposed rules that are applicable to the public. Notices of hearings 
and investigations, committee meetings, agency decisions and rulings, 
delegations of authority, filing of petitions and applications and agency 
statements of organization and functions are examples of documents 
appearing in this section.

========================================================================


Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 136 / Tuesday, July 20, 2021 / 
Notices

[[Page 38264]]



UNITED STATES AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION


Public Quarterly Meeting of the Board of Directors

AGENCY: United States African Development Foundation.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. African Development Foundation (USADF) will hold its 
quarterly meeting of the Board of Directors to discuss the agency's 
programs and administration. This meeting will occur at the USADF 
office.

DATES: The meeting date is Tuesday, July 27, 2021, 10:30 a.m. to 12:00 
p.m.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held by teleconference. Please contact 
the Agency Contact listed below for conference details.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nina-Belle Mbayu, (202) 233-8808, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5f313d323d3e262a1f2a2c3e3b3971383029"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="b6d8d4dbd4d7cfc3f6c3c5d7d2d098d1d9c0">[email protected]</span></a>.
    Authority: Public Law 96-533 (22 U.S.C.Sec.  290h).

    Dated: July 14, 2021.
Nina-Belle Mbayu,
Acting General Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2021-15315 Filed 7-19-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6117-01-P


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Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




I,
Douglas R. Young, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the
Quarterly Report of NeoMagic Corporation on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period
ended May 3, 2009 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in
such Quarterly Report fairly presents in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of NeoMagic Corporation.




Date:
June 17, 2009


By:
            
            /s/
      Douglas R. YoungName:
            
            Douglas
      R. YoungTitle:
            
            Chief
      Executive Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             NOV-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-2000
<CASH>                                         710,193
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,444,527
<ALLOWANCES>                                    49,445
<INVENTORY>                                    244,859
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,447,950
<PP&E>                                          65,796
<DEPRECIATION>                                 289,218
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,113,005
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,473,315
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        20,816
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,618,874
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,113,005
<SALES>                                         57,054
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               187,536
<CGS>                                           17,382
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  584,102
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (86,222)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (519,060)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (519,060)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of State of New York, by Robert Abrams, as Attorney-General, Respondent, v Richard Wiley et al., Appellants, et al., Respondents.

—Levine, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Cobb, J.), entered October 2, 1984 in Albany County, which denied a motion by respondents Richard Wiley and Erna Wiley to vacate a default judgment entered against them.

Pursuant to Executive Law § 63 (12), petitioner commenced a special proceeding seeking, *inter alia,*to enjoin respondents from engaging in fraudulent business practices in connection with their sale of distributorships for security or energy equipment from or within New York. A default judgment was subsequently entered against all respondents enjoining such activities and holding them jointly and severally liable for the payment of restitution and civil penalties. Thereafter, respondents Richard and Erna Wiley sought to have that judgment vacated, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1). The Wileys’ moving affidavits submitted in support of their motion averred that, since they had at all times acted solely within their capacities as directors and officers of respondent corporations, they should not be subjected to personal liability on the judgment. However, Special Term held that, even if the Wileys had acted in their corporate capacities, they could be held liable individually if they had personally participated in or had actual knowledge of fraudulent or deceptive practices engaged in by respondent corporations. Since the Wileys did not deny such participation or knowledge, Special Term denied their motion on the ground that they had not shown the existence of a meritorious defense.

On appeal, the Wileys claim that because corporate officers are generally charged with fiduciary obligations and are thereby bound by rules of morality and honesty, they had impliedly claimed that they did not personally participate in or have knowledge of fraudulent or deceptive practices when they stated in their depositions that they had acted within their corporate capacities. On this basis, the Wileys claim that they had shown the existence of a meritorious defense as required by CPLR 5015 (a) (1). We disagree.

In order to be relieved of a default judgment, the moving party must assert facts constituting a meritorious defense *(Bishop v Galasso,*67 AD2d 753). The Wileys did not meet that burden here but, rather, attempted to establish the existence of a meritorious defense through allegations in conclusory form *(see, Wall v Bennett,*33 AD2d 827). No facts were set forth in the Wileys’ moving papers to support either *857the claim that they acted solely in their corporate capacities or that, as corporate officers and directors, they did not personally participate in or have knowledge of respondent corporations’ fraudulent or deceptive practices.

Order affirmed, with costs. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Main, Yesawich, Jr., and Levine, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 99



                       CERTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 906 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


        Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the
undersigned certifies in his capacity as an officer of ITLA Capital Corporation
(the "Company") that this Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year
ended December 31, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that information
contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and
for the periods presented in the financial statements included in such report.

Date: March 31, 2003                    s/  George W. Haligowski
                                        ------------------------------------
                                        George W. Haligowski
                                        Chairman of the Board,
                                        President and
                                        Chief Executive Officer

Date: March 31, 2003                    /s/  Timothy M. Doyle
                                        ------------------------------------
                                        Timothy M. Doyle
                                        Senior Managing Director and
                                        Chief Financial Officer

This certification accompanies this periodic report pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. A signed original
of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to ITLA
Capital Corporation and will be retained by ITLA Capital Corporation and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
---

|Exhibit 32.1                                 
|---------------------------------------------
|                                             
|CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO                    
|18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,                      
|AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO                       
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of New Jersey Mining
  Company, (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2006,
  as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
  "Report"), I, Fred W. Brackebusch, President, Treasurer and Director of New
  Jersey Mining Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
  pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
        13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                       
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                     
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
        in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
        of the Company.

Date: August 10, 2006

By /s/ FRED W. BRACKEBUSCHFred W. Brackebusch, President, Treasurer & Director

---
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-2521

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. Ann C. Morrill, Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY; JOHNS HOPKINS HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (CA-02-3891-1-CCB) Submitted: April 27, 2005 Decided: May 18, 2005 Before TRAXLER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Thomas Michael DiBiagio, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for the United States. Ann C. Morrill, Owings Mills, Maryland, Appellant Pro Se. Charles Preston Scheeler, Kurt James Fischer, Michelle Jeanine Dickinson, DLA PIPER RUDNICK GRAY CARY US LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Sheldon Krantz, DLA PIPER RUDNICK GRAY CARY US LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Ann C. Morrill appeals the district court’s order dismissing her qui tam action under the False Claims Act. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Morrill v. Johns Hopkins Univ. , No. CA-02-3891-1-CCB (D. Md. filed Oct. 29, 2004 & entered Nov. 1, 2004). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED