NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 19

- 2377

__________ BRANDON L. FAKE, Appellant

v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA; JUDGE DIANE R. THOMPSON; JUDGE MARGARET T. MURPHY

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2

- 17

- cv
- 03636 ) District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) December 18, 2019
Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and RENDELL , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : December 1 8, 2019 )2 ___________ O P I N I O N *

___________ PER CURIAM In 2004, Brandon L. Fake was party to divorce, child support, and custody proceedings in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. He later filed suit in federal court alleging a conspiracy against him in the Philadelphia courts. The District Court dismissed the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and we
affirmed. Fake v. City of Philadelphia , 7 04 F. App’x 214 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (not precedential). Fake then filed a second suit in federal court, again complaining of a conspiracy in
his state

- court proceedings and various rulings made by the judges involved. The District
Court dismisse d the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Fake moved for reconsideration, arguing, as relevant here, that District Judge Pappert should
have recused himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 because he had improper personal and
financial ti es to certain defendants in Fake’s first federal suit. Judge Pappert denied reconsideration, explaining that he did not maintain any relationships with the defendants that warranted recusal. Upon review, we determined that nothing in the record suggested
that Judge Pappert had acted with partiality and affirmed the District Court’s rulings. Fake v. Pennsylvania , 753 F. App’x 118 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (not precedential).

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.3 Fake returned to the District Court and sought reopening under Rules 60(b) and (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fake raised the same allegations that he raised in his prior motion, once again arguing that District Judge Pappert should have
recused himself from his case because of his connections to the defendan ts in Fake’s prior suit. The District Court denied the motion and Fake appealed. 1 We will affirm. Given that this Court already considered, and rejected, Fake’s recusal claim, his remedy was to pursue a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court

— not return to the District Court and file another Rule 60(b) motion. See
Morris v. Horn , 187 F.3d 333, 343 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that a request for relief
pursuant to Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal ); Reform Party
of Allegheny Cty. v. Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of Elections , 174 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 1999 ) (en banc) (noting that a petition for certiorari is the proper m eans to challenge a court of appeals ruling). To the extent that Fake asserted that he had new evidence to support his recusal claim, we have reviewed the record and conclude that this evidence, even if somehow “new,” did not advance his claim. Therefore , the District Court did not err in denying Fake’s motion to reopen. Accordingly, we will affirm.

1 We ha ve jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.