Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not 

be regarded as precedent or cited 

before any court except for the purpose 

of establishing the defense of res 

judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law 

of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

STEVEN J. HALBERT GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Carmel, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

KATHERINE MODESITT COOPER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

S.L., )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1211-JV-937

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores, Judge

The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, Magistrate

Cause No. 49D09-1202-JD-456

June 27, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge
2

Case Summary

S.L. appeals his juvenile adjudication for child molesting, which would have been 

a Class B felony if committed by an adult. We affirm.

Issue

S.L. raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly excluded 

certain evidence during the fact-finding hearing.

Facts

In October 2011, sixteen-year-old S.L. had sex with twelve-year-old J.W. in the 

restroom of a church in Indianapolis. On February 23, 2012, the State alleged that S.L. 

committed what would have been Class B felony and Class C felony child molesting if 

committed by an adult. On September 25, 2012, a fact-finding hearing was held. 

During J.W.’s cross-examination, the following exchange took place between 

defense counsel and J.W.:

Q. Ok, now before I talk to about the statements, this 

incident about [S.L.] that you claimed happened, this 

wasn’t reported in October was it?

A. No sir.

Q. As a matter of fact you got in trouble at your school is 

that right?

A. Yes sir. 

Q. And you have a principal named Mr. Amos?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Ok, and at school I believe is that Warren Township 

Middleschool?
3

A. Yes sir.

* * * * *

Q. . . . . And it wasn’t until you got in trouble with a boy 

named Tyrone I think at Warren Central . . .

Tr. pp. 19-20. At that point, the prosecutor objected, arguing that this evidence was 

unrelated to this matter. Defense counsel explained that it was “very related . . . because 

there comes a time where it’s advantageous for her to make up something about [S.L.] 

after she got in trouble at Warren Central.” Id. at 20. The trial court overruled the State’s 

objection.

Defense counsel then asked J.W., “Essentially there was a boy names [sic] Tyrone 

that you supposedly had sex with at school?” Id. The prosecutor objected based on the 

Rape Shield law and Indiana Evidence Rule 412. Defense counsel responded, “I’m not 

admitting this for the truth of whether she had sex with Tyrone it has to do with the fact 

that she was in trouble and she saw it advantageous to make up a story. It goes to motive 

and making up a story.” Id. at 21. The trial court sustained the objection and explained 

“if you want to talk about trouble in its’ [sic] general sense I don’t know if the nature . . . 

of the trouble is relevant to what we’re doing.” Id. Defense counsel responded, “[f]air 

enough you’re [sic] Honor.” Id. 

Defense counsel then questioned J.W. as follows:

Q. But at, so at some point you went to talk to the 

principal?

A. Yes sir.
4

Q. And then at some point not long after that you changed 

your story about [S.L.]?

A. Yes sir.

Id. Defense counsel then began questioning J.W. about her statement to police. 

Later, defense counsel questioned J.W. as follows:

Q. Alright, and you denied any involvement with [S.L.], 

nothing happened correct?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And you continued to do that for over a month?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Ok, until you got in trouble?

A. Yes sir. 

Id. at 28. 

On re-direct, the prosecutor questioned J.W. about talking to the principal as 

follows:

Q. Did Mr. Amos ever specially say [S.L.’s] name to 

you?

A. No sir.

Q. How did he, how did Mr. Amos find out about [S.L.]?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Did you give Mr. Amos any information about what 

happened with [S.L.]?

A. No sir, no mam [sic].

Q. Did you ever tell him anything later about [S.L.]?
5

A. Yes mam [sic].

Q. And why did you tell him?

A. Because he asked me a question about that happened?

Id. at 30-31. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered a true finding as to the 

Class B felony allegation.1 S.L. now appeals. 

Analysis

On appeal, S.L. argues that the trial court improperly excluded evidence regarding 

J.W.’s motive to lie. “The admission or exclusion of evidence rests within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and we review for an abuse of discretion.” Conley v. State, 

972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind. 2012). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” 

Id. “The trial court’s decision will not be disturbed absent a requisite showing of abuse.” 

Id. 

S.L. argues that he sought to introduce testimony regarding J.W. being called into 

the principal’s office at school to support his theory that she fabricated the incident to get 

out of trouble at school. S.L. asserts that the nature of this testimony was not the sexual 

conduct of J.W. and that defense counsel explicitly stated he was not offering this 

evidence to prove whether J.W. had sexual relations with another boy. 

 

1

 The trial court merged the Class C felony allegation into the Class B felony allegation.
6

Our review of the record shows that the trial court overruled the prosecutor’s 

initial objection to this line of questioning. At that point, defense counsel began 

questioning J.W. about having sex with someone else. When the prosecutor objected 

again, the trial court sustained the objection and explained to defense counsel that he 

could question J.W. about trouble at school in a general sense. Thus, although the trial 

court did not allow defense counsel to question J.W. about past sexual conduct, the trial 

court did permit defense counsel to question J.W. about getting in trouble in school as a 

reason to lie about her allegations against S.L. And in fact, defense counsel questioned 

S.L. about changing her story after she talked to the principal and did not make an offer 

of proof regarding any excluded testimony. 

Thus, to the extent defense counsel wanted to further question J.W. about getting 

in trouble at school generally, there is no indication that the trial court would have 

prohibited that. To the extent the trial court may have erred in its ruling, S.L. has not 

shown how that error prejudiced his substantial rights because defense counsel did 

question J.W. about changing her story after talking to the principal. See Ind. Trial Rule 

61 (“No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect 

in any ruling or order in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is 

ground for granting relief under a motion to correct errors or for setting aside a verdict or 

for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order or for reversal on 

appeal, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial 

justice.”); Ind. Evidence Rule 103(a) (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 

admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected . . . .). To 
7

the extent S.L. wanted to question J.W. regarding her past sexual conduct with someone 

else, S.L. did not make an offer of proof sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal, and 

the issue is waived. See State v. Wilson, 836 N.E.2d 407, 409 (Ind. 2005) (“[A]n offer of 

proof must be sufficiently specific to allow the trial court to determine whether the 

evidence is admissible and to allow an appellate court to review the correctness of the 

trial court’s ruling and whether any error was prejudicial.”). 

Conclusion

S.L. was permitted to question J.W. about changing her story after getting in 

trouble at school and has not established that the trial court’s ruling regarding his crossexamination of J.W. prejudiced his substantial rights. We affirm.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.