alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11** 
**- 6997** 

SYLVESTER WILDER ,
Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v.

WARDEN of LIEBER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION , Respondent

– Appellee,

and

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS , Respondent

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Florence

. Richard Mark Gergel , District Judge. ( 4:10

- cv
- 02368

- RMG )

Submitted : November 15, 2011 Decided: November 18, 2011

Before NIEMEYER an d KEENAN , Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Sylvester Wilder, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, William Edgar Salter, III, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM:
Sylvester Wilder seeks to appeal the district court’s

order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006)
petition. The distr ict court referred this case to a magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(B) (West 2006 & Supp.
2011). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied

and advised Wilder that failure to file timely and specific
objections to this recom mendation could waive appellate review
of a district court order based upon the recommendation.
The timely filing of specific objections to a
magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve
appellate review of the substance of that recommendatio n when
the parties have been warned of the consequences of
noncompliance. Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 845

- 46 (4th
Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Wilder
has waived appellate review by failing to file objections after

receivi ng proper notice. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of
appealability and dismiss the appeal.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 683 

To provide for the conveyance of certain parcels of land to the town of 

Mantua, Utah. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 30, 2011 

Mr. LEE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to 

the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To provide for the conveyance of certain parcels of land 

to the town of Mantua, Utah. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Box Elder Utah Land 

5 Conveyance Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. CONVEYANCE. 

7 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

8 (1) MAP.—The term ‘‘map’’ means the map en9 titled ‘‘Box Elder Utah Land Conveyance Act’’ and 

10 dated July 14, 2008. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 683 IS

1 (2) NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LAND.—The 

2 term ‘‘National Forest System land’’ means the par3 cels of National Forest System land that— 

4 (A) are located in— 

5 (i) sec. 27, T. 9 N., R. 1 W., Salt 

6 Lake meridian; and 

7 (ii) the Wasatch-Cache National For8 est in Box Elder County, Utah; 

9 (B) consist of approximately 31.5 acres; 

10 and 

11 (C) are depicted on the map as parcels A, 

12 B, and C. 

13 (3) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 

14 the Secretary of Agriculture. 

15 (4) TOWN.—The term ‘‘Town’’ means the town 

16 of Mantua, Utah. 

17 (b) CONVEYANCE.—As soon as practicable after the 

18 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall convey 

19 to the Town, without consideration and by quitclaim deed, 

20 all right, title, and interest of the United States in and 

21 to the National Forest System land. 

22 (c) SURVEY.— 

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—If determined by the Sec24 retary to be necessary, the exact acreage and legal 

25 description of the National Forest System land shall 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 683 IS

1 be determined by a survey approved by the Sec2 retary. 

3 (2) COST.—The Town shall pay each cost aris4 ing from a survey described in paragraph (1). 

5 (d) USE OF NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LAND.—As 

6 a condition of the conveyance under subsection (b), the 

7 Town shall use the National Forest System land only for 

8 public purposes. 

9 (e) REVERSIONARY INTEREST.—In the quitclaim 

10 deed to the Town, the Secretary shall provide that the Na11 tional Forest System land shall revert to the Secretary, 

12 at the election of the Secretary, if the National Forest 

13 System land is used for a purpose other than a public pur14 pose. 

15 (f) ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—With re16 spect to the conveyance under subsection (b), the Sec17 retary may require such additional terms and conditions 

18 as the Secretary determines to be appropriate to protect 

19 the interests of the United States. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

HAZEL JOHNSON,

Appellant,

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY,

Appellee.

No. 4D2023-2288

[July 18, 2024]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Christopher William Pole, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE17-002925.

David J. Winker of David J. Winker, P.A., Coral Gables, for appellant.

Kathleen D. Dackiewicz, Sara F. Holladay, and Emily Y. Rottmann of 

McGuireWoods LLP, Jacksonville, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J., MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
---

EXHIBIT 13.01

CERTIFICATION

PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Ronald W. Thiessen, Chief Executive Officer of Northern
Dynasty Minerals Ltd. (the Company), hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1)         
 The Annual Report on Form 20-F/A of the Company for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2014 (the Annual Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
and

(2)         
 The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



| | By:    | /s/
      R. Thiessen  
| | ------ | -----------------------
| |        |                        
| | Name:  | Ronald W. Thiessen     
| | Title: | Chief Executive Officer
| |        |                        
| | Date:  | May 22, 2015           



This written statement is being furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the Companys Annual Report on Form
20-F/A. A signed original of this statement has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies this Annual Report on Form
20-F/A pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not,
except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
Exchange Act). Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by
reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the
Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it
by reference.

---
#### Federated Retail Holdings, Inc., et al., Respondents, v Weatherley 39th Street, LLC, Appellant.

[943 NYS2d 881]—

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Bernard J. Fried, J.), entered April 11, 2011, granting plaintiff tenant’s motion and declaring it cured a lease default concerning the self-insured retention provisions of commercial insurance policies obtained for the benefit of defendant landlord and that landlord cannot terminate plaintiffs lease based upon that default, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The primary issue on this appeal is whether tenant was able to cure a lease default caused by the presence of a self-insured *606retention in the excess/umbrella insurance policies obtained for the benefit of landlord. Landlord makes vague, ultimately irrelevant, policy arguments and cites to an opinion of the New York State Insurance Department which is not binding on any court *(see Goll v New York State Bar Assn.,*193 AD2d 126, 128 [1993]). Landlord cites no case law, regulation or other rule of law standing for the proposition that a self-insured retention may not be eliminated through the use of an endorsement to the original occurrence based policy, which covers the same policy period. Accordingly, the motion court properly granted the motion and correctly declared that the lease default has been cured and the lease cannot be terminated based upon that default.

We have considered landlord’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Catterson, Richter and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ. [Prior Case History: 32 Mise 3d 247.]

Motion for an order modifying a *Yellowstone*injunction denied.
#### Beatriz Elena ESPINEL, a.k.a. Edwing Flores-Gonzalez, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 09-71329.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed June 29, 2011.

Joubin Nasseri, Nasseri Law Group, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Daniel I. Smulow, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

*440Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Beatriz Elena Espinel, a native and citizen of Venezuela, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, *Iturnbarria v. INS,*321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003), and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Espinel’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final removal order, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Espinel failed to establish changed circumstances in Venezuela to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); *see also Toufighi v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir.2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted. The docket shall be amended to reflect that Espinel is proceeding pro se.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit
      32


**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








Pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of
      the
      registrant certifies, to the best of his knowledge, that the registrant's Annual
      Report on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2004 (the "Form 10-KSB")
      fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Form 10-KSB,
      fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
      of operations of the registrant.







Date:
      July 25, 2005





Amanasu Technologies
      Corporation




Hideyuki
      Shiraishi


_____________________


Hideyuki
      Shiraishi


President
      and


Principal
      Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 23
      ==========






CLYDE BAILEY P.C.
Certified Public Accountant
10924 Vance Jackson #404
San Antonio, Texas 78230
(210) 699-1287 (ofc.)
(888) 699-1287 - (210) 691=2911 (fax)



Member: American Institute of CPA's
        Texas Society of CPA's

February 6, 2004

I consent to the use of my report dated February 6, 2004,
in the Form 10K-SB on the financial statements of Crafty
Admiral Enterprises, Ltd., dated December 31, 2003 and 2001,
included herein and to the reference made to me.

/s/ Clyde Bailey
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-6805
THOMAS D. CROOKS, JR., Petitioner - Appellant, versusMICHAEL MOORE, Director; WILLIAM DAVIS, Warden; CHARLES MOLONY CONDON, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (CA-97-888-2-17AJ) Submitted: August 14, 1997 Decided: August 25, 1997 Before NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Thomas D. Crooks, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's orders denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997) and denying his motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate j udge and find no reversibleerror. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Crooks v. Moore , No. CA-97-888-2-17AJ (D.S.C. Ma y 6 & 19, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-1212

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus WILLIAM R. ENDICOTT, DDS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge. (CA-97-1413-4-22) Submitted: June 17, 1999 Decided: June 24, 1999 Before MURNAGHAN and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. William R. Endicott, Appellant Pro Se. Deborah Brereton Barbier, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on January 14, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was entered on the docket sheet on January 15, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 2 PER CURIAM: William Endicott appeals the district court’s orders: (1) adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation to impose civil penalties and imposing sanctions; and (2) denying Endicott’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record, the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge, and the order denying the Rule 59(e) motion, and we find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Endicott , No. CA-97-1413-4-22 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 1998, and Jan. 15, 1999). * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### KONRAD, Respondent, v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

November 22, 1907.)

Action by Joseph Konrad, as administrator, against the New York City Railway Company. B. H. Ames, for appellant. Roger Foster, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment and order reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event, unless plaintiff stipulates to reduce verdict, with interest and costs, etc., to $5,000, in which event judgment, as so modified, and order, affirmed, without costs to either party. Settle order on notice.
#### David W. FERNANDES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-15344.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed July 7, 2011.

David Wayne Fernandes, III, Fresno, CA, pro se.

Elizabeth Firer, Special Assistant U.S., Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

David W. Fernandes appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his action against the Commissioner of Social Security. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Subia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,*264 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir.2001). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Fernandes’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Fernandes, through counsel, withdrew his request for a hearing before an administrative law judge and thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and he failed to allege a colorable constitutional claim. *See id.*at 902-03.

Fernandes’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

421 

CA 11-02575 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, FAHEY, AND PERADOTTO, JJ. 

 

STEWART M. SHUTE, JR., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V ORDER

ROBERT MCLUSKY AND MICHAEL BLOOM, 

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

(APPEAL NO. 1.) 

 

D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, ESQS., SYRACUSE (JOHN A. CIRANDO OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

RIEHLMAN, SHAFER & SHAFER, TULLY (JOEL I. ROSS OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT MICHAEL BLOOM. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John

C. Cherundolo, A.J.), entered November 4, 2011. The order settled the

record for appeals from judgments entered July 14, 2010 and September

9, 2010. 

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed

without costs (see CPLR 5511; see also Town of Massena v Niagara

Mohawk Power Corp., 45 NY2d 482, 488).

Entered: June 8, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
EXHIBIT 32.2



Certification of Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code,

as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002



Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States
Code, the undersigned, Paul D. Ridder, the Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Radnor Holdings Corporation (the Company), hereby certifies that:



The Companys quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2005 (the Report) fully
complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |  |  |                                                                                        
|----------------------- |  |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                        |  |  |  |                                                                                        
|                        |  | 
|Date: November 28, 2005 |  |  |  | /s/    PAUL D. RIDDER                                                                  
|                        |  |  |  | Paul D. Ridder Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)



A signed original of this written
statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos. 333-87958, 333-127367, and 333-181318 on Form S-8 and No. 333-182383 on Form S-3 of Regal Entertainment Group of our report dated March 9, 2015, relating to the financial statements of National CineMedia, LLC, appearing in Regal Entertainment Group’s Form 10-K/A for the year ended January 1, 2015.

 
| /s/   Deloitte & Touche LLP |   |
|--------------------------------------|--------|
|                                 |   |
| Denver,   Colorado                   |   |
| March 25,   2015                |   |

 

----
*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstancesset forth in LocalRule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-60525

Summary Calendar

LARRY C. MAXWELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

LAUDERDALE COUNTY; LAUDERDALE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT;

KEMPER COUNTY; KEMPER COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT;

CHIEF DEPUTY MICHAEL VICK; T.R. VICK; C.M. VINCENT;

JOEL WALTERS; and MICHAEL WEST,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Mississippi

(4:93-CV-39-LN)

June 18, 1997

Before WISDOM, JOLLY, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Larry Maxwell appeals the district court’s entry of summary

judgment for all defendants. We affirm.

Maxwell concedes on appeal that the district court properly

dismissed his § 1983 claim against Lauderdale County because the

county cannot be held liable under a theory of repondeat
2

superior.

Maxwell failed to brief his state law claims, his claims of

excessive force, denial of medical care, conversion and

conspiracy, and his claim that Michael West is liable for

rendering an opinion concerning an alleged pattern of bruises on

Maxwell’s hand. This failure constitutes abandonment of these

claims. Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d

744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

We hold that Lauderdale County Chief Deputy Michael Vick and

Deputies C.M. Vincent, Joel Walters, and T.R. Vick are entitled

to qualified immunity for their actions in connection with

Maxwell’s arrest and indictment. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 344-45 (1986)(holding that “[o]nly where the warrant

application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to

render official belief in its existence unreasonable will the

shield of [qualified] immunity be lost.); See also Morin v.

Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 122 (5th Cir. 1996)(stating that an officer

applying for a warrant will be entitled to qualified immunity

unless his affidavit contains misstatements and omissions of

“such character that no reasonable official would have submitted

it to a magistrate”).

We find no violation of Maxwell’s civil rights in his arrest

and prosecution by Kemper County authorities. Gerstein v. Pugh,

420 U.S. 103, 117 & n.19 (1975)(the issuance of an indictment by
3

a properly constituted grand jury “conclusively determines the

existence of probable cause”).

As Maxwell has pleaded no facts that suggest that West acted

with malicious intent, Maxwell’s allegations against Michael West

fail to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Neals v.

Harwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995)(negligence will not

support a § 1983 action); Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761

F.2d 242, 244 (5th Cir. 1985)(Plaintiffs must state specific

facts, not merely conclusory allegations to support a § 1983

claim).

AFFIRMED.