ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

In re Marriage of Brankin, 2012 IL App (2d) 110203

Appellate Court

Caption

In re MARRIAGE OF KAREN M. BRANKIN, Petitioner-Appellee and

Cross-Appellant, and GARY W. BRANKIN, Respondent-Appellant and

Cross-Appellee.

 District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-11-0203

Filed March 12, 2012

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

The trial court’s award of permanent maintenance in the amount of

$3,000 per month was affirmed based on petitioner’s current needs,

respondent’s current income and his impending reduced employment

income, but the summary denial of petitioner’s request that the

maintenance award be secured by a life insurance policy was vacated and

the cause was remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion

in determining whether respondent should purchase life insurance to

secure his obligation and what terms should be included in such an order.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 07-D-984; the

Hon. Joseph J. Bruce, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.
Counsel on

Appeal

Robert C. Pottinger and Jody L. Beilke, both of Barrick, Switzer, Long,

Balsley & Van Evera, LLP, of Rockford, for appellant.

Peter A. Savitski, of Rockford, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment ofthe court,with opinion.

Justices Burke and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 The respondent, GaryBrankin, appeals from the order of the circuit court of Winnebago

County awarding the petitioner, Karen Brankin, $3,000 a month in permanent maintenance.

On appeal, Gary argues that the trial court’s maintenance award was improper. Karen has

filed a cross-appeal, arguing that the trial court’s maintenance award was insufficient. She

also argues that the trial court erred in denying her request that the maintenance award be

secured by a life insurance policy. Forthe following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part,

and remand for additional proceedings.

¶ 2 I. General Background

¶ 3 The parties were married on September 12, 1981. They had one child together, Allison,

who was born in 1984 and is now emancipated. In 2010, Gary was a 58-year-old endodontist

earning approximately $400,000 a year. Karen was a 55-year-old tenured school teacher for

the Rockford school system, earning approximately $75,000.

¶ 4 Karen filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on August 10, 2007. On September 27,

2010, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA) resolving all issues

except maintenance and life insurance. The MSA provided that Karen was to receive assets

with a value of between $605,340 and $800,100. This included $55,000 in cash, her Teachers

Retirement System account (valued at between $330,840 and $526,900), $137,000 in a

403(b) account, $15,000 in an individual retirement account (IRA), and $67,500 from Gary’s

401(k) account. Gary received assets that were valued at between $574,000 and $1.8 million.

The discrepancy in that amount was based on the value of Gary’s medical practice. Karen

placed the value of the medical practice at $960,000, while Gary placed the value of the

medical practice at $57,445. Gary also received the marital residence, which had a negative

equity of between $234,000 and $334,000.

¶ 5 Beginning September 27, 2010, the trial court conducted a three-day hearing on the issue

of maintenance and life insurance. At the close of the hearing, the trial court awarded Karen

$3,000 per month in permanent maintenance. The trial court’s decision indicates that it

particularly considered (1) the parties’ standard of living during the marriage; (2) Karen’s

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need for maintenance; (3) Gary’s current ability to pay maintenance; and (4) Gary’s ability

to pay maintenance in the future, based on his age and health in light of his recent heart

attack. The trial court denied Karen’s request that Gary be required to secure the maintenance

award with a $1 million life insurance policy. The trial court explained that, based on this

court’s decision in In re Marriage of Feldman, 199 Ill. App. 3d 1002 (1990), it could not

order Gary to purchase such life insurance. Following the trial court’s ruling, Gary filed a

timely notice of appeal and Karen filed a timely notice of cross-appeal.

¶ 6 II. Discussion

¶ 7 A. Maintenance

¶ 8 Gary’s first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in awarding Karen $3,000

per month in permanent maintenance. Gary contends that, based on the relevant statutory

factors in setting maintenance, Karen should not have been awarded any maintenance.

Karen’s first contention on her cross-appeal is that the trial court’s award of maintenance was

insufficient. She insists that she should have received a monthly award of $7,000.

¶ 9 Maintenance is designed to be rehabilitative and to allow a dependent spouse to become

financially independent. In re Marriage of Haas, 215 Ill. App. 3d 959, 964 (1991).

“Permanent maintenance, on the other hand, is appropriate where it is evident that the

recipient spouse is either unemployable or employable only at an income that is substantially

lower than the previous standard of living.” In re Marriage of Murphy, 359 Ill. App. 3d 289,

303 (2005). Section 504(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the

Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2010)) provides that a court is to award

maintenance in an amount and of a duration as it deems just, after consideration of the

following factors: the income and property of each party; the needs of each party; the present

and future earning capacity of each party; any impairment of present and future earning

capacity of the recipient spouse due to devoting time to domestic duties or forgoing

opportunities because of the marriage; the time necessary to enable the party seeking

maintenance to acquire appropriate education, training and employment; the standard of

living established during the marriage; the duration of the marriage; the age and physical and

emotional condition of both parties; the tax consequences of the property division; any

contribution and services by the recipient spouse to the other spouse; any valid agreement

of the parties; and any other factor that the trial court expressly finds to be just and equitable.

750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2010); In re Marriage of Stam, 260 Ill. App. 3d 754, 756 (1994).

¶ 10 “[I]n awardingmaintenance, courts have wide latitude in consideringwhat factors should

be used in determining reasonable needs, and the trial court is not limited to the factors listed

in the governing statute.” In re Marriage of Mohr, 260 Ill. App. 3d 98, 106 (1994). “No one

factor is determinative of the issue concerning the propriety of the maintenance award once

it has been determined that an award is appropriate.” Murphy, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 304. “When

determining the amount and duration of maintenance, the trial court must balance the ability

of the spouse to support himself [or herself] in some approximation to the standard of living

he [or she] enjoyed during the marriage.” In re Marriage of Shinn, 313 Ill. App. 3d 317, 322

(2000). A trial court’s determination as to an award of maintenance will not be disturbed on

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appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Dunlap, 294 Ill. App. 3d 768, 772

(1998).

¶ 11 During the last years of the marriage, the parties had a combined annual income of

approximately $500,000 and they had assets that, based on some valuations, were worth

more than $2.5 million. This enabled the parties to enjoy a high standard of living. They

lived in a home that originally cost $1.3 million. Both parties were able to enjoy traveling on

Gary’s airplane.

¶ 12 The record is clear that Karen would not be able to maintain the standard of living she

was accustomed to without some assistance from Gary. Expenses for Karen’s reasonable

monthly needs, as found bythe trial court, were between $6,608 and $7,108, which exceeded

her monthly income of $6,333. Further, as Gary’s monthly income, based on his salaryalone,

was $30,667, he was able to pay maintenance without greatly affecting his own standard of

living. Gary argues that the parties’ standard of living during the marriage should be given

minimal weight because the parties were living beyond their means during the marriage. The

primary example Gary cites is the $1.3 million home that the parties bought and for which

he is still personally obligated to pay over $800,000. Gary’s argument is unpersuasive.

Although the parties might have been living beyond their means during the marriage, we

believe it would be inequitable to saddle Karen alone with a reduced standard of living,

especially since Gary earns over $30,000 a month and continues to live in the expensive

home that, he now complains, the parties should never have purchased.

¶ 13 We also reject Gary’s argument that Karen should not have been awarded maintenance

because she has a job that pays a good salary of $75,000 and had already been awarded

marital assets that were worth over $600,000. Gary contends that maintenance should be

awarded only if the dependent spouse needs assistance to become financially independent.

See In re Marriage of Heroy, 385 Ill. App. 3d 640, 652 (2008). Based on Karen’s income

and assets, Gary argues that maintenance was inappropriate because she was already

financially independent.

¶ 14 We do not disagree with the principle that Gary cites from Heroy. However, whether one

is able to meet her reasonable needs and become financially independent is still set in the

context of what the standard of living was during the marriage. See In re Marriage of Culp,

341 Ill. App. 3d 390, 398 (2003) (reasonable needs must be viewed in light of the standard

of living established during the marriage); In re Marriage of Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d 965, 972

(1992) (“[t]he benchmark for determination of maintenance is the reasonable needs of the

spouse seeking maintenance in view of the standard of living established during the

marriage”). Here, the assets that Karen received in the MSA were generally not incomeproducing. Other than the $55,000 in cash, which could produce some interest income, the

assets she was awarded could not help her offset the expenses for her monthly needs. Cf. In

re Marriage of Bratcher, 383 Ill. App. 3d 388 (2008) (trial court’s decision to award

maintenance to wife was improper in light of $1.6 million in assets that were awarded to

wife, many of which were income-producing). Further, Karen’s salary, although significant

at $75,000, was not high enough by itself to allow her to maintain the same standard of living

she enjoyed during the marriage as part of a household that had a $500,000 annual income.

Thus, we agree with the trial court that Karen could not meet her reasonable needs, in view

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of the standard of living established during the marriage, without some assistance from Gary.

¶ 15 Gary further contends that Karen’s maintenance award was excessive because the needs

she listed in her financial affidavit and testified to were exaggerated. In her financial

affidavit, Karen listed $7,434 in monthly expenses. Of that amount, Gary complains of

$5,223. Specifically, Gary complains that the following expenses were excessive: (1) $705

payable to her mother for a mortgage payment; (2) $128 in healthcare and hospital premiums

for Gary; (3) $350 for cell phones for four people; (4) $250 for repairs to her condominium;

(5) $825 for food; (6) $170 for computer supplies; (7) $560 for clothing; (8) $250 for gas;

(9) $225 for gifts; (10) $650 for charity donations; (11) $530 for vacations; and (12) $580

in cash.

¶ 16 In its judgment setting maintenance, the trial court specifically considered whether the

expenses listed in Karen’s affidavit were excessive. The trial court stated:

“Karen testified that her financial affidavit is an accurate reflection of her needs. I

agree that the figures listed on her affidavit on the whole represent her actual average

expenditures over the past three years. However, in evaluating her needs in light of the

standard of living during the marriage, I find that some listed items are inflated. I will

give some examples. Karen lists $650 per month ($7,800 annually) as her contribution

to charity, primarily to Heartland Church. Yet, a review of Plaintiff’s Ex. 2A, the parties’

joint tax return for 2007, the year the dissolution petition was filed, shows a combined

total charitable contribution of $6,675, with only $2,810 allocated to Heartland Church,

out of a total $476,041 of combined taxable income. Karen’s current charitable

contributions exceed the pattern of giving during the marriage. She also lists $128 per

month for health insurance for Gary, which terminates upon the entry of the Judgment

for Dissolution. In addition, items such as $200 per month for furniture repair and

replacement and $250 per month for condominium repairs are unreasonably high and do

not represent Karen’s actual needs at this time. Her listing of $170 for continuing

education includes some reimbursable expenses. Herlisting of $175 per month for office

and computer supplies includes the purchase of items that do not have to be repurchased

annually, or every three years. I conclude that her budget in some respects is inflated and

not commensurate with her actual needs in light of the standard of living during the

marriage.

The issue of Karen’s expenditures for vacations has been raised in argument. I note

that Karen lists $530 per month for vacations because she wishes to approximate the trips

she took with Garywhen he traveled on business related conferences. Although Gary has

been able to enjoy many vacations, his ability to take many of those vacations is because

he traveled to business related conferences and he was able to combine business with

pleasure. [In re Marriage of] Murphy, 359 Ill. App. 3d 289 (3d Dist. 2005) calls into

question the court’s ability to use these business related vacations as part of Karen’s

standard of living. On the other hand, Gary himself lists $450 per month as his personal

vacation related expenditures, which presumably does not include the business portions

of his trips. On balance, I consider Karen’s budgetary expenditure for vacations to be

somewhat inflated. I find this particular item should be rated at $450, the same as rated

by Gary.

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* * *

I am aware that Karen’s budget is not fully reflective of the diminishment of her

lifestyle from the lifestyle of the marriage. For example, during the marriage, Karen

enjoyed living in a much larger home and enjoyed the ability to travel on a private

aircraft. In both of these respects, Gary has maintained that previous lifestyle. Karen also

testified that during the separation and even while receiving temporarymaintenance, she

had to borrow money from her mother to pay her condominium expenses. However, her

condominium payments are listed as part of her monthly budget and I consider them as

part of Karen’s monthly expenses.

In summary, Karen’s total budget lists monthly expenditures of $7,434, plus debt

payments of $608. In my view, a budget more reflective of her actual needs in light of

the standard of living during the marriage is in the area of $6,000 to $6,500 per month,

plus $608 for debt payments.”

¶ 17 Based on the trial court’s comments, it is apparent that it agreed with Gary’s assertion

that many of the expenses that Karen listed in her financial affidavit were inflated. The trial

court took that into consideration when it lowered Karen’s monthly expenses to what it

believed they really were. Nonetheless, it is also apparent that the trial court found that

Karen’s standard of living would be reduced in comparison to what it was during the

marriage if it set maintenance only at a level that met her current needs. As set forth above,

it was appropriate for the trial court to consider not only Karen’s current needs but also how

much maintenance was necessary to allow her to enjoy a standard of living comparable to

that she enjoyed during the marriage. Culp, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 398.

¶ 18 We next consider Gary’s contention that maintenance was inappropriate in light of his

age and declining health. Gary testified that he was nearing 60, the age at which most

endodondists retire. He also testified that his recent heart attack resulted in his working less,

and hence earning less. Alternatively, Gary argues that, even if the maintenance award was

appropriate, in light of his age and health the trial court should not have made the

maintenance award permanent.

¶ 19 We note that in entering its judgment the trial court specifically addressed Gary’s age and

health. The trial court found that Gary’s heart attack had caused him to change his work

schedule. The trial court further found that Gary’s work was “physical in nature and his

health may affect his ability to work in the future.” The trial court’s decision demonstrates

that it placed significant weight on Gary’s health and age in determining maintenance. As

noted above, there was a substantial disparitybetween Gary’s and Karen’s monthly incomes.

Gary earned over $30,000 a month while Karen earned $6,333. Such a disparity, by itself,

suggested that the maintenance award to Karen should have been higher. See Dunlap, 294

Ill. App. 3d at 774 (determining that equalizing parties’ incomes in setting maintenance

would help approximate the standard of living during the marriage). However, as Gary’s

testimony indicated that his income would likely soon be falling due to his age and health,

we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the maintenance award at

a lower rate.

¶ 20 In so determining, we reject Gary’s argument that the trial court erred in making the

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maintenance award permanent. Here, permanent maintenancewas appropriate becauseKaren

was not employable at an income that would enable her to maintain her previous standard

of living. See Murphy, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 303. Further, due to Gary’s substantial assets,

many of which were income-producing, he would still be able to pay maintenance after

retirement without significantly affecting his own standard of living. It is apparent that, in

setting the maintenance award, the trial court considered (1) Karen’s need for permanent

maintenance; (2) Gary’s substantial assets; and (3) Gary’s health and how much longer he

would likely continue to work. Based on its consideration of these factors, we do not believe

that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the award of maintenance should

be permanent.

¶ 21 In so ruling, we find Gary’s reliance on Bratcher, Murphy, and In re Marriage of Haas,

215 Ill. App. 3d 959 (1991), to be misplaced. In Bratcher, the reviewing court found that

monthly maintenance of $12,500 for 111 months was inappropriate because the wife had

been awarded substantial assets ($1.6 million, the same as her husband). Bratcher, 383 Ill.

App. 3d at 388. These assets provided her a monthly income of approximately $14,000.

Further, the monthly maintenance award was improper because it made the wife’s monthly

income ($26,500) substantially higher than the husband’s ($14,500). Id. at 389. Here, the

assets that Karen was awarded were generally not income-producing. Also, the maintenance

award did not create a situation where her monthly income was higher than Gary’s.

¶ 22 In Murphy, following a 10-year-marriage, the wife was awarded $826,000 in marital and

nonmarital assets, some of which were income-producing. She was also awarded $15,000

a month in maintenance for four years. On appeal, the wife argued that she should have

received monthly maintenance of $46,000 and for a longer period of time in order to

maintain the standard of living that she enjoyed during the marriage. The reviewing court

rejected her argument, finding that her expenses were inflated because she sought to enjoy

the same perks (flying on jets, traveling on yachts) that she did when she was traveling with

her husband on business. Murphy, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 304. The reviewing court explained

that there was no requirement that the parties are to permanently maintain the same standard

of living. Id. at 306. Here, Karen and Gary were married substantially longer than the parties

in Murphy, and, compared to the wife in Murphy, Karen was awarded relatively few incomeproducing assets and was awarded maintenance at a substantially lower rate, although for a

longer period of time. Moreover, despite Gary’s insistence to the contrary, based upon his

ability to pay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that he pay maintenance

in order to help Karen approximate the standard of living that she enjoyed during the

marriage. Culp, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 398.

¶ 23 In Haas, the wife received $80,468 in marital assets and the husband received $72,964

in marital assets. The wife’s annual gross income was approximately $14,524 while the

husband’s was $49,000. The trial court awarded the wife maintenance of $600 per month,

to be reviewed in 18 months. On appeal, the wife argued that her maintenance award should

have been higher and for a longer duration. The reviewing court found that permanent

maintenance was not justified, because the wife had been employed throughout the marriage

and seemingly had the potential to become self-sufficient. Haas, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 964.

Further, the reviewing court found that $600 a month in maintenance was sufficient to allow

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the wife to maintain her standard of living. Id. at 964-65. Here, in contrast, as set forth above,

Karen did not have the ability to meet her reasonable needs, based on the standard of living

established during the marriage, without some assistance from Gary.

¶ 24 In determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the monthly

maintenance award at $3,000, we also reject Karen’s argument that the trial court should

have awarded her $7,000. Karen argues that the trial court’s award was improper because it

was not based on all of Gary’s income. Karen further contends that the trial court’s award

was insufficient because it left a wide disparity between her monthly income and Gary’s

monthly income.

¶ 25 In its judgment, the trial court noted that Gary argued that his current annual income was

$300,000. The trial court found that his salary was actually $368,004. The trial court also

found that Gary had annual rental income of over $30,000, received the benefits of

contributions from his employer to a pension plan, and also benefitted from his employer

paying some of his personal expenses (clothing, a health club membership) as part of its

business expenses. After considering the various factors relevant in awarding maintenance,

the trial court found that an award of $3,000 per month was “well within Gary’s ability to

pay, even assuming his employment income is $300,000 annually, as he argued.”

¶ 26 As Karen points out, a trial court’s failure to base its maintenance determination on all

property is an abuse of discretion. Feldman, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 1006-07. Karen insists that

the trial court’s decision was improper because it was based on Gary’s annual income being

$300,000, when clearly it was much higher. Karen’s argument misconstrues the trial court’s

comments. In setting maintenance, the trial court may properly consider the payor spouse’s

ability to pay. In re Marriage of Lichtenauer, 408 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1089 (2011). That is

what the trial court did when it determined that Gary’s minimum income was $300,000, an

amount that allowed him to pay maintenance. As the trial court did not purport to make its

maintenance award a percentage of Gary’s income, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in basing Gary’s ability to pay maintenance on a level of income lower than his actual

income.

¶ 27 We also reject Karen’s argument that the trial court erred in not more equally

apportioning the parties’ incomes so that she could enjoy a standard of living comparable to

what she enjoyed during the marriage. In making this argument, Karen relies on Dunlap. In

that case, the reviewing court equalized the parties’incomes to approximate their reasonable

needs in view of the marital standard of living. Dunlap, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 774. Karen argues

that, if she were awarded maintenance of $7,000, Gary’s monthly income would drop only

to $23,000, a level still high enough for him to meet all of his needs.

¶ 28 There is no requirement under either the Dissolution Act or Illinois case law that requires

the equalization of incomes. In re Marriage of Reynard, 344 Ill. App. 3d 785, 791 (2003).

There is also no such prohibition. Id. Thus, whether a trial court should equalize the parties’

incomes (or more equally apportion them, as Karen argues in this case) is a matter for the

trial court’s discretion. For the reasons set forth above, we do not believe that the trial court

abused its discretion in setting the maintenance award at $3,000. In arguing that their

incomes should have been more equally apportioned, Karen minimizes Gary’s health

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concerns as well as the likelihood that his employment income would be dropping due to his

age. Thus, although Gary’s current income indicated that he could pay Karen more in

maintenance, there was not the same certainty with regard to Gary’s future income. As we

believe that the trial court properly considered Gary’s current income, Karen’s needs, and the

impact of Gary’s impending reduced employment income, we do not believe that the trial

court abused its discretion in not setting the maintenance award at a higher level.

¶ 29 B. Life Insurance

¶ 30 Karen’s second contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying her request

that her maintenance award be secured by a life insurance policy. Karen acknowledges that

the trial court relied on this court’s decision in Feldman in determining that it could not

award her the relief she requested. However, Karen argues that Feldman should no longer

be viewed as precedential in light of recent case law as well as a shift in public policy that

favors maintenance awards being secured by life insurance.

¶ 31 In Feldman, we rejected the wife’s argument that the trial court erred in not ordering her

maintenance award to be secured by the husband’s life insurance. Feldman, 199 Ill. App. 3d

at 1007. We explained that we agreed with the reasoning of the Appellate Court, Fourth

District, in In re Marriage of Clarke, 125 Ill. App. 3d 432 (1984). The Clarke court held that,

absent the parties’ agreement, the court had no authority to order security for the husband’s

payment of the wife’s unallocated maintenance after his death. Id. at 436. The Clarke court

explained that post-death life insurance benefits received in lieu of maintenance would

violate the Dissolution Act because maintenance obligations terminate upon death. Id. The

Clarke court further expounded that, because a prior version of the Dissolution Act gave the

trial court discretion in having an award of maintenance supported byreasonable securityand

the current version did not, there was evidence of a legislative intent to withdraw authority

from the court to require such security. Id. at 437.

¶ 32 The Fourth District subsequently abandoned its decision in Clarke in In re Marriage of

Walker, 386 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1049 (2008). The Walker court found that, although the

Dissolution Act prohibits maintenance payments after a payor’s death, the Dissolution Act

does not prohibit payments during a payor’s life that have an effect after the payor’s death.

Id. at 1045. In support of this finding, the Walker court gave the example that trial courts are

encouraged to award large amounts of property in lieu of maintenance. Property, like

insurance, is available to the payee after the payor’s death. Id. The Walker court also rejected

the Clarke court’s finding that a change in the statutory language evidenced an intent by the

legislature to prohibit a trial court from using its discretion to have a maintenance award

secured by life insurance. The Walker court explained that the current statute was not simply

a revision of Illinois law but an adoption of a standardized, uniform act. Id. (citing In re

Marriage of Vernon, 253 Ill. App. 3d 783, 789 (1993)). “Consequently, such an omission

should not be construed as evincing a legislative intent to change the law and withdraw the

court’s authority to order security for maintenance.” Id. at 1045-46 (citing Vernon, 253 Ill.

App. 3d at 789).

¶ 33 We also note that, effective January 1, 2012, the Illinois General Assembly modified the

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Dissolution Act to specifically allow the trial court discretion in ordering a maintenance

award to be secured by life insurance. Section 504(b-7)(f) of the Dissolution Act now

provides:

“An award ordered by a court upon entry of a dissolution judgment or upon entry of an

award of maintenance following a reservation of maintenance in a dissolution judgment

may be reasonably secured, in whole or in part, by life insurance on the payor’s life on

terms as to which the parties agree, or if they do not agree, on such terms determined by

the court ***.” Pub. Act 97-608, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2012).

¶ 34 Although the trial court was bound to follow this court’s decision in Feldman, we are not.

In considering the Feldman, Clarke, and Walker courts’ rationales for their decisions, we find

the Walker court’s decision to be the best reasoned. The Dissolution Act gives the court wide

discretion in awarding maintenance and dividing marital property in “just proportions.” 750

ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2010). As the Dissolution Act is to be liberally construed (750 ILCS

5/102(5) (West 2010)), we believe that the trial court having discretion to award a form of

security, such as life insurance, for a maintenance obligation is consistent with the purposes

of the Dissolution Act. Further, we believe that the General Assembly’s recent amendment

to the Dissolution Act does not change a court’s ability to order that a maintenance award

be secured by a life insurance policy; rather, the General Assembly’s amendment clarifies

that the court does have that power. We therefore depart from this court’s decision in

Feldman. Accordingly, since the trial court did not consider the merits of Karen’s argument

that her maintenance award be secured by a life insurance policy, we vacate that part of the

trial court’s decision and remand with directions that it exercise its discretion in determining

whether Gary should purchase life insurance to secure his maintenance obligations to Karen

and, if so, in what amount and under what terms it should be ordered. See Pub. Act 97-608,

§ 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2012).

¶ 35 III. Conclusion

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s award of $3,000 a month in

permanent maintenance to Karen. We vacate the trial court’s decision as to the issue of life

insurance, and we remand for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 37 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.

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