[Cite as State v. Smith, 2014-Ohio-3855.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 WOOD COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-13-057 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. 12 CR 395 

v. 

Amanda Smith DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: September 5, 2014 

* * * * * 

 Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 Heather Baker and David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting 

 Attorneys, for appellee. 

 Tim A. Dugan, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

YARBROUGH, P.J. 

I. Introduction 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Amanda Smith, appeals the judgment of the Wood County Court 

of Common Pleas (“trial court”), finding her guilty of one count of complicity to rape and 

sentencing her to a prison term of 10 years. For the following reasons, we affirm. 
2.

A. Facts and Procedural Background 

{¶ 2} On November 7, 2011, appellant’s stepfather, W.L., reported to the Bowling 

Green Police Department that appellant had received several photos from A.L. revealing 

instances of sexual abuse against A.L.’s 17-month old daughter, E.L. Upon further 

investigation, the police discovered that appellant encouraged A.L. to engage in the 

sexual activities depicted in the photos and asked him to send her the pictures upon 

completion of the acts. Appellant was 17 years old at the time of the incident. Appellant 

confessed to her involvement in the incident when she was questioned by the police, 

indicating that she received sexual gratification from the pictures. 

{¶ 3} As a result of the foregoing, a complaint was filed on November 8, 2011, in 

the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“juvenile court”), charging 

appellant with an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute complicity to rape 

in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), a felony of the first degree. Thereafter, the state 

filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction under Juv.R. 30. Upon a finding of probable 

cause that appellant committed the acts charged in the complaint, the juvenile court 

continued the matter for an amenability hearing. 

{¶ 4} The amenability hearing occurred on three separate days. On the first day of 

the hearing, appellant presented the testimony of Dr. Gerald J. Briskin. Regarding his 

examination of appellant, Dr. Briskin testified that appellant 

* * * presented a rather unusual clinical picture. From a diagnostic 

standpoint there really is no clear-cut entity that she fits into, but in 
3.

understanding the personality dynamics, the way she’s put together, the 

impact of her life experiences, you can formulate a picture of the way she 

tends to function, her general personality, her general personality structure. 

* * * But what I concluded was that as [a] result of her history and her life 

experiences she is basically a very, very dependent individual and a very 

frightened individual. 

{¶ 5} Dr. Briskin went on to characterize appellant’s actions as a hypomanic 

incident, and opined that appellant had an atypical bipolar reaction. To appellant, Dr. 

Briskin testified, the sexually explicit conversation with A.L. was a fantasy. He stated 

that the fantasy was appellant’s “way of escaping the reality of what was going on in her 

life with the passing of her aunt.” He concluded that appellant was fantasizing “because 

there – there was no contact of any physical nature, any visual nature. It was all in her 

head and it was impersonal. It was avoidant. She didn’t really want to be involved.” 

{¶ 6} When questioned about whether appellant’s condition was amenable, Dr. 

Briskin stated that counseling would be necessary, but that appellant was cooperative and 

responsive. Thereafter, defense counsel asked Dr. Briskin whether the necessary 

progress could be obtained by the time appellant turned 21, to which he replied: “Yeah. 

Again, you know, that’s a judgment call. I would say, you know, I would – I would be 

hopeful and think that the prognosis is favorable given the circumstances and given what 

you’re starting with because her problems are not essentially behavioral problems, 

they’re personal emotional problems.” Regarding amenability, Dr. Briskin further stated: 
4.

I think she’s amenable to treatment, I think that this has been a very 

instructive kind of experience for her. I think in terms of her history of no 

prior difficulties, no conflict with the law, no antisocial behavior, that she is 

very amenable to treatment. 

{¶ 7} Ultimately, Dr. Briskin concluded that appellant was too immature to be 

transferred to the general trial division to be tried as an adult. 

{¶ 8} On the second day of the amenability hearing, the state solicited the 

testimony of Wood County probation officer Laura Graves. In her testimony, Graves 

stated that, in her experience, treatment for juvenile sexual offenders takes an average of 

two years to complete. Graves indicated that she had reservations about appellant’s 

amenability, primarily due to the timeframe involved (since appellant was approaching 

19 years of age at the time of the hearing). Moreover, Graves explained that the 

timeframe usually exceeds two years where the offender fails to accept responsibility for 

the actions. Here, Graves was concerned that appellant was not taking responsibility for 

her actions insofar as she stated to Graves that “she should have been awarded a medal 

for reporting the incidents.” 

{¶ 9} Next, the state called E.L.’s mother, B.T., and grandmother, T.J. Both 

witnesses testified that they noticed marked changes in E.L.’s behavior following the 

incidences of sexual abuse, including a propensity to lash out physically against her 

caregivers. Specifically, B.T. stated that E.L. would “hit people, pull hair, bite.” T.J. 

elaborated on E.L.’s behavior, stating: “She started to get really angry about little things. 
5.

I mean, yeah, in a toddler you have fits, tantrums, but this was beyond that. She would 

lash out, scratch your face, pull your hair, smack you. I mean it was – it was to the point 

where she would hurt you as badly as she possibly could as a little child.” Further, T.J. 

noted the changes in E.L.’s relationship with her grandfather, including a refusal to play 

games with him or be affectionate towards him. 

{¶ 10} On the final day of the amenability hearing, appellant called the medical 

director of the Court Diagnostic and Treatment Center, Dr. Thomas Sherman, who was 

ordered by the court to conduct an amenability evaluation on appellant. Upon examining 

appellant, Dr. Sherman diagnosed her with borderline personality disorder. When asked 

whether appellant would benefit from being placed into the adult rehabilitative system, 

Dr. Sherman responded: “I think that there’s nothing in the adult system that could 

possibly help this kind of condition. That’s not to say that there’s much in the juvenile 

system that could help it either.” Dr. Sherman went on to note that “[t]his is a tough case 

to treat unless you’ve got a lot of money and can get somebody into long-term 

psychotherapy, but talking therapy helps this, medication does not. * * * You’re talking 

about Cadillac treatment here and I’m not sure that that’s available within the juvenile 

justice system.” Dr. Sherman opined that appellant’s case was “difficult” and that 

completion of treatment by the time appellant turned 21 would be “a real stretch.” 

{¶ 11} Upon conclusion of the amenability hearing, the juvenile court took the 

matter under advisement. Subsequently, on July 24, 2012, the juvenile court issued its 

decision transferring the matter to the general trial division. In its decision, the juvenile 
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court provided a detailed analysis of the amenability factors contained in R.C. 

2152.12(D) and (E). Specifically, the juvenile court found that appellant was mature 

enough for transfer to the general trial division, and was not suffering from a mental 

illness. The juvenile court also determined that there would not be sufficient time to 

rehabilitate appellant within the juvenile justice system, as she was already 18 years old 

at the time of the hearing. Ultimately, the juvenile court concluded that “[appellant] is 

not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system and that the 

safety of the community requires [appellant] be subject to adult sanctions.” 

{¶ 12} Upon transfer to the trial court, the matter proceeded through pretrial, 

during which time appellant filed a motion to suppress, which was subsequently denied. 

Thereafter, appellant entered into a plea agreement with the state, wherein appellant 

agreed to plead guilty to one count of complicity to rape in exchange for the state’s 

modification of the indictment to remove any mention of the victim’s age, thereby 

eliminating the possibility of a life sentence. After accepting appellant’s guilty plea, the 

trial court immediately sentenced appellant to the agreed upon ten-year prison term. 

Appellant’s timely appeal followed. 

B. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 13} On appeal, appellant assigns the following errors for our review: 

1) The Juvenile Court abused its discretion by granting the State’s 

motion to relinquish jurisdiction. 
7.

2) Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel when 

counsel allowed appellant to enter a guilty plea and agree to a mandatory 

ten year prison term. 

II. Analysis 

A. Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction 

{¶ 14} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues that the juvenile court 

erred in granting the state’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction. 

{¶ 15} “A juvenile court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction in a discretionary 

transfer proceeding conducted pursuant to R.C. 2152.12 will not be overturned on appeal 

absent a finding of abuse of discretion.” State v. Fontenet, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-

1366, 2013-Ohio-1355, ¶ 30, citing State. v. Grimes, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2009-CA-30, 

2010-Ohio-5385, ¶ 14. An abuse of discretion requires a finding that the trial court’s 

decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 

Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 276 (1983). 

{¶ 16} Transfer of a juvenile proceeding is governed by R.C. 2152.12. Under 

R.C. 2152.12(B), a juvenile court may transfer a case to the general trial division if the 

court finds that (1) the child was at least 14 years of age at the time of the offense, (2) 

there is probable cause to believe the child committed the offense, and (3) the child is not 

amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community 

may require adult sanctions. In determining whether the child is amenable to 

rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the juvenile court must consider “whether the 
8.

applicable factors under [R.C. 2152.12(D)] indicating that the case should be transferred 

outweigh the applicable factors under [R.C.2152.12(E)] indicating that the case should 

not be transferred.” R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). Moreover, the juvenile court must specifically 

indicate the factors that it considered in rendering its decision. Id. 

{¶ 17} Here, appellant acknowledges that she was over 14 years of age at the time 

the offense was committed. Further, she does not contest the juvenile court’s finding of 

probable cause. Rather, she argues that the juvenile court did not properly examine the 

factors set forth in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E). 

{¶ 18} R.C. 2152.12(D) sets forth a list of nine factors for the court to consider 

that weigh in favor of transfer. The court may also consider “any other relevant factors” 

in arriving at its decision. The factors that were considered by the juvenile court in this 

case are: 

(1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psychological 

harm * * * as a result of the alleged act. 

(2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim due 

to the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of the physical or 

psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim. 

* * * 

(8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature 

enough for the transfer. 
9.

(9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the 

juvenile system. 

{¶ 19} R.C. 2152.12(E) sets forth the following factors that argue against such a 

transfer. The juvenile court considered these factors, and found the following relevant to 

this case: 

* * * 

(3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, at the 

time of the act charged, the child was under the negative influence or 

coercion of another person. 

* * * 

(5) The child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent child. 

{¶ 20} In this case, appellant contends that the juvenile court improperly weighed 

the factors listed above. In particular, appellant argues that the juvenile court’s 

conclusion that she was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system was 

unreasonable and not supported by the evidence. We disagree. 

{¶ 21} We note at the outset that the juvenile court’s judgment entry includes a 

thorough analysis of each factor contained in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E). Indeed, the 

juvenile court provided its reasoning with respect to each relevant factor and explained 

why certain factors were irrelevant. Regarding appellant’s amenability under R.C. 

2152.12(D)(9) and (E)(8), the juvenile court noted that, at the time of the hearing, 

appellant was 18 years of age, leaving her less than three years to be rehabilitated within 
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the juvenile system. The juvenile court went on to examine the testimony provided at the 

amenability hearing, concluding that there was not sufficient time to rehabilitate appellant 

within the juvenile system. 

{¶ 22} Upon consideration of the evidence produced at the amenability hearing, 

along with the juvenile court’s judgment entry, we find that the juvenile court adequately 

considered the entire record and analyzed the evidence in light of the factors both in favor 

of and against the transfer of jurisdiction. Notably, we have previously stated that “a 

‘juvenile court is not bound by the experts’ opinions in making its determination whether 

the defendant is amenable to rehabilitation.’” State v. Houston, 70 Ohio App.3d 152, 

156, 590 N.E.2d 839 (6th Dist.1990), quoting State v. Dickens, 9th Dist. Summit No. 

12967, 1987 WL 17928 (Sept. 23, 1987). Nevertheless, we find that the expert evidence 

at the hearing supports the juvenile court’s findings. 

{¶ 23} Regarding appellant’s amenability, Dr. Briskin could not definitively state 

that appellant would be rehabilitated by the time she turned 21. Rather, Dr. Briskin stated 

that he was “hopeful” that appellant could be rehabilitated within that timeframe. 

Further, Dr. Sherman testified that appellant would need the “Cadillac treatment” in order 

to complete rehabilitation by her 21st birthday. Even with such treatment, rehabilitation 

would be a “stretch” according to Dr. Sherman. Given the foregoing testimony, and in 

light of the seriousness of the underlying offense and the age of the victim, we cannot say 

that the juvenile court’s finding that appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation within 
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the juvenile system was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Thus, the juvenile 

court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the state’s motion to relinquish 

jurisdiction. 

{¶ 24} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is not well-taken. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

{¶ 25} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that her trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance by allowing her to enter a guilty plea and agreeing to a 

mandatory ten-year prison sentence. 

{¶ 26} To support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must 

satisfy the two-prong test developed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 

S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). That is, appellant must show counsel’s performance 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and a reasonable probability exists 

that but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id.

at 687–688, 694. In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court opined, 

[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was 

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a 

result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is 

not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which 

we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. Id. at 697. 
12.

{¶ 27} Here, appellant argues that effective trial counsel would never have 

allowed her to enter into a plea agreement resulting in a ten-year prison sentence. She 

contends that trial counsel “saw no positive outcome and just gave up.” However, as 

appellant acknowledges, the plea agreement negotiated by her trial counsel eliminated the 

potential for the trial court to impose a life sentence. Further, the Ohio Supreme Court 

has previously held that acts that are based upon reasonably debatable tactical strategies 

do not give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio 

St.2d 45, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980). “The Clayton analysis has been applied in the context 

of recommendations by counsel on whether to accept a proposed plea agreement.” State 

v. McIntosh, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-07-048, 2008-Ohio-4743, ¶ 33, citing State v. Burke, 

7th Dist. Columbiana No. 98-CO-64, 2000 WL 288522 (Mar. 15, 2000); State v. Jiminez, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 75382, 1999 WL 342221 (May 27, 1999). 

{¶ 28} Here, we find that counsel’s plea recommendation to accept the plea 

agreement rather than run the risk of receiving a life sentence constituted a strategic 

decision that does not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. 

Jefferson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-238, 2014-Ohio-11 (finding that trial counsel 

rendered effective assistance by reducing the defendant’s risk of a life sentence to a 

sentence of a fixed number of years); see also State v. Davidson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L09-1194, 2010-Ohio-3928 (concluding that the negotiation of a plea agreement that 
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reduced the defendant’s maximum potential sentence from eight years to five years did 

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). Accordingly, appellant’s second 

assignment of error is not well-taken. 

III. Conclusion

{¶ 29} The judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. The clerk is 

ordered to serve all parties with notice of this decision. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Arlene Singer, J. 

_______________________________ 

Stephen A. Yarbrough, P.J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.