alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 970 

AN ACT 

To designate additional segments and tributaries of White 

Clay Creek, in the States of Delaware and Pennsylvania, 

as a component of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers 

System. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

†S 970 ES

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘White Clay Creek Wild 

3 and Scenic River Expansion Act of 2011’’. 

4 SEC. 2. DESIGNATION OF SEGMENTS OF WHITE CLAY 

5 CREEK, AS SCENIC AND RECREATIONAL RIV6 ERS. 

7 Section 3(a)(163) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 

8 (16 U.S. C. 1274(a)(163)) is amended— 

9 (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)— 

10 (A) by striking ‘‘190 miles’’ and inserting 

11 ‘‘199 miles’’; and 

12 (B) by striking ‘‘the recommended designa13 tion and classification maps (dated June 

14 2000)’’ and inserting ‘‘the map entitled ‘White 

15 Clay Creek Wild and Scenic River Designated 

16 Area Map’ and dated July 2008, the map enti17 tled ‘White Clay Creek Wild and Scenic River 

18 Classification Map’ and dated July 2008, and 

19 the map entitled ‘White Clay Creek National 

20 Wild and Scenic River Proposed Additional 

21 Designated Segments-July 2008’ ’’; 

22 (2) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting 

23 the following: 

24 ‘‘(B) 22.4 miles of the east branch begin25 ning at the southern boundary line of the Bor26 ough of Avondale, including Walnut Run, 
3 

†S 970 ES

1 Broad Run, and Egypt Run, outside the bound2 aries of the White Clay Creek Preserve, as a 

3 recreational river.’’; and 

4 (3) by striking subparagraph (H) and inserting 

5 the following: 

6 ‘‘(H) 14.3 miles of the main stem, includ7 ing Lamborn Run, that flow through the 

8 boundaries of the White Clay Creek Preserve, 

9 Pennsylvania and Delaware, and White Clay 

10 Creek State Park, Delaware beginning at the 

11 confluence of the east and middle branches in 

12 London Britain Township, Pennsylvania, down13 stream to the northern boundary line of the 

14 City of Newark, Delaware, as a scenic river.’’. 

15 SEC. 3. ADMINISTRATION OF WHITE CLAY CREEK. 

16 Sections 4 through 8 of Public Law 106–357 (16 

17 U.S.C. 1274 note; 114 Stat. 1393), shall be applicable to 

18 the additional segments of the White Clay Creek des19 ignated by the amendments made by section 2. 

Passed the Senate December 30, 2012. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 
112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 970 

AN ACT 

To designate additional segments and tributaries of 

Wild and Scenic Rivers System. Pennsylvania, as a component of the National White Clay Creek, in the States of Delaware and
# C_2019432EN.01002101.xml

| 23.12.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 432/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.12.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 432/21

---

Application for authorisation to serve a garnishee order brought on 9 September 2019 — Ntinos Ramon v European Commission

(Case C-675/19 SA)

(2019/C 432/26)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Applicant: Ntinos Ramon (represented by: Achilleas Demetriades and Charalampos Pogiatsis, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant requests:

| Α. | an order by the Court ordering the removal of the immunity of the European Commission under Article 1 of Protocol (No 7) (1) on the privileges and immunities of the European Union and authorising the service and execution of:






  1) | the interim garnishee order nisi dated 26 June 2019 which was handed down by the Eparchiako Dikastirio Ammochostou (District Court of Famagusta) in Cyprus, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Α.

an order by the Court ordering the removal of the immunity of the European Commission under Article 1 of Protocol (No 7) (1) on the privileges and immunities of the European Union and authorising the service and execution of:

1)

the interim garnishee order nisi dated 26 June 2019 which was handed down by the Eparchiako Dikastirio Ammochostou (District Court of Famagusta) in Cyprus,

| 2) | whatever final order is made by that court, |
| --- | --- |

2)

whatever final order is made by that court,

| 3) | any other related order. |
| --- | --- |

3)

any other related order.

| Β. | whatever order and remedy the Court judges to be fair and equitable in the circumstances. |
| --- | --- |

Β.

whatever order and remedy the Court judges to be fair and equitable in the circumstances.

| C. | Costs inclusive of VAT. |
| --- | --- |

C.

Costs inclusive of VAT.

---

(1)  OJ 2016 C 202, p. 266.

---
[No. 10279.

Department One.

June 29, 1912.]

#### W. M. Meacham *et al., Respondents,*v. The City of Seattle, *Appellant.*
      *1*

Appeal—Preservation of Grounds—Exceptions to Findings. One general exception to tlie refusal of appellant’s proposed findings is insufficient to obtain a review of tbe evidence to determine whether findings unexcepted to are supported.

Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Main, J., entered February 15, 1912, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action on contract, after a trial to the court.

Affirmed.

*239
      *James E. Bradford*and *William B. Allison,*for appellant.

*Preston*<§• *Thorgrimson*and *Harry E. Wilson,*for respondents.

Reported in 124 Pac. 1125.

Paekeb., J.

The plaintiffs commenced this action in the superior court, to recover damages which they claim resulted to them from the refusal of the city of Seattle to permit them to complete the performance of three certain contracts, entered into with the city, by which they were to make improvements upon certain portions of the electric lines of the commercial electric lighting system of the city. They claim damages in a sum equal to the amount of profits they would have realized upon the portion of the improvement they were prevented from constructing under the contracts, which they set up in three causes of action. They also claim, in another cause of action, compensation for a small amount of extra work performed in connection with one of the contracts. Trial before the court without a jury resulted in findings and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, from which the city has appealed.

The principal contention of counsel for the city is that the evidence does not support the findings of fact made by the court. We are not able to find in the record any exceptions relating to the court’s findings, other than a notation in the minutes of the court as follows: “Defendants proposed findings and conclusions refused. Exception.” Assuming that this can be regarded even as a general exception, it is clear from our former holdings that it does not entitle appellant to a review of the evidence in this court for the purpose of determining whether or not it is sufficient to support the findings. *Fender v. McDonald,*54 Wash. 130, 102 Pac. 1026, and cases cited. We therefore accept the facts found as true. There is practically no room for argument against the sufficiency of the facts found to support the judgment.

Some contention is made that the complaint fails to state *240a cause of action. This claim was first made at the commencement of the trial, after the city had answered the complaint upon the merits. The question is presented here practically without argument and without any citation of authorities. It is without merit, and we think does not call for discussion.

The judgment is affirmed.

Crow, Chadwick, and Gose, JJ., concur.
form8kexh_121509.htm


    EXHIBIT
10.55


      


      


      


      


      December
14, 2009

      


      


      


      


      American
Consumers, Inc.

      55 Hannah
Way

      Rossville,
GA  30741

      


      Gentlemen:

      


      This
letter confirms that Gateway Bank & Trust (the “Lender”) has agreed to, and
hereby does, irrevocably waive any default or event of default, as well as any
right to cease making loan advances or disbursing loan proceeds, arising from or
in connection with the death of Michael A. Richardson on November 20, 2009,
under any instrument, agreement or document evidencing, securing, guarantying or
otherwise relating to any indebtedness of American Consumers, Inc., a Georgia
corporation doing business as Shop Rite (the “Borrower”) to Lender,
under:

      


      
        	
                 
      

              	
                ·

              	
                any
      term loans, revolving credit loans or other loans made, or agreed to be
      made, by Lender in favor of
Borrower;

              


      

      


      
        	
                 
      

              	
                ·

              	
                any
      agreement or commitment by Lender to issue letters of credit at the
      request of Borrower; and

              


      

      


      
        	
                 
      

              	
                ·

              	
                any
      other credit facilities or financial accommodations by Lender in favor of
      Borrower.

              


      

      


      


      By
execution of this Letter Agreement below, each of the parties hereby agrees to
and accepts the foregoing agreement and waiver of Lender, as of this   14th    
day of December, 2009.

      


      
        
          	 Gateway Bank &
      Trust   	  American Consumers,
      Inc.	 
	 	 	 	 
	
                  By: 
      /s/ Shawn Rogers

                	
                  By:
      

                	/s/ Paul
      R. Cook	 
	Name:
       Shawn Rogers	 	 Name: 
      Paul R. Cook	 
	Title: 
      Sr. Vice President	 	Title: 
      Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 31.1

                                     CERTIFICATION


I, Yonglin Du, certify that:

1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Dahua Inc.;

2.  Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this annual report;

3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respect the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report.

4.  The registrant's other certifying officers and I am responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

    a)   designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this annual report is being
prepared;

    b)   evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date
of this annual report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

    c)   presented in this annual report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our
evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5.  The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of registrant's Board of Directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):

    a)   all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of
internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability
to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified
for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls;
and

    b)  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls;
and

6.  The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this
annual report whether or not there were significant changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.



August 9, 2005


/s/ Yonglin Du
-----------------------
Yonglin Du
Chief Executive Officer
(121 App. Div. *575.)*

#### HOLLIS v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department

October 18, 1907.)

Appeal—Actual Controversy—Review.

Where, on an appeal from an order denying a motion to amend the answer, the appellant did not contend that the order was erroneous, but asked the court to affirm the order, without costs, in case it agreed with appellant that -the order was properly made because the amendment asked for was not needed, and to reverse the order in case it disagreed with such contention, appellant had no bona fide grievance, and the order would be affirmed.

Appeal from Special Term, Kings County.

Action by Edwin J. Hollis against the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company. From an order denying defendant’s motion for leave to amend its answer, it appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before HIRSCHBERG, P. J., and WOODWARD, GAYNOR, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.

D. A. Marsh, for appellant.

Robert Stewart (Ralph G. Barclay, on the brief), for respondent,

*198MILLER, J.

The action is brought for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from a nuisance; i. e., the wrongful maintenance of electric wires in a public street. Evidence offered by the defendant to prove authority to maintain said wires in the streets was excluded upon the trial on the ground that such authority was not pleaded in the answer, and upon the defendant’s request a juror was withdrawn and the case went over to enable it to move for leave to amend. Said motion was made on an affidavit containing a bare statement of the history of the case, without giving any reason whatever for the failure to allege in the original answer the facts which the defendant desired to plead in the amended answer; hence the motion to amend was denied. The defendant has apparently taken this appeal for the purpose of getting an expression from this court respecting the correctness of the ruling of the trial judge, as it asks us to affirm the order, without costs, in case we agree with it that the order which it is appealing from was properly made for the reason that the amendment asked for was not needed, and to reverse the order in case we disagree with its contention. Unless counsel thinks his client has a grievance, he should not burden this court, as we do not entertain appeals for the purpose of giving instruction.

The order should be affirmed.

Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. All concur.
#### PAUL VOHTA, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, v. BOGUE ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING COMPANY, RESPONDENT-PETITIONER.

See same case below: 60 *N. J. Super.*169.

May 4, 1960.

Denied.
EXHIBIT 32
                           ==========



Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial OfficerPursuant to
     Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In connection with the Annual Report of Crafty Admiral Enterprises, Ltd.
(Registrant) on Form 10K-SB for the year ended December 31, 2004, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Lawrence Siccia, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Principal
Accounting Officer of Registrant, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

   (1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
        13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

   (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
        material respects, the financial condition and results of
        operations of Registrant.


Dated:  March 26, 2006      /s/ Lawrence Siccia
                              ----------------------------------
                              Chief Executive Officer,
                              Chief Financial Officer and
                              Principal Accounting Officer of
                              Crafty Admiral Enterprises, Ltd.
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U. S. C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Optigenex Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004 (the "Report"), I, Richard
Serbin, as Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.



                                            /s/Richard Serbin
                                            -----------------
                                            Richard Serbin,
                                            Chief Executive Officer (Principal
                                            Executive Officer)

Dated:  April 14, 2005
# C_2019164EN.01002101.xml

| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/21

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 19 February 2019 — B.M.M., B.S. v État belge

(Case C-133/19)

(2019/C 164/23)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: B.M.M., B.S.

Defendant: État belge

Questions referred

| 1. | In order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law and not to render it impossible to benefit from the right to family reunification which, in the second applicant’s submission, is conferred on her by Article 4 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, (1) must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the sponsor’s child may enjoy the right to family reunification when he attains his majority during the judicial proceedings against the decision which refuses him that right and which was taken when he was still a minor? |
| --- | --- |

1.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law and not to render it impossible to benefit from the right to family reunification which, in the second applicant’s submission, is conferred on her by Article 4 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, (1) must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the sponsor’s child may enjoy the right to family reunification when he attains his majority during the judicial proceedings against the decision which refuses him that right and which was taken when he was still a minor?

| 2. | Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 18 of Directive 2003/86/EC be interpreted as precluding an action for annulment, brought against the refusal of a right to family reunification of a minor child, being held to be inadmissible on the ground that the child has attained his majority during the judicial proceedings, since he would be deprived of the possibility of securing a determination of his action against that decision and there would be a breach of his right to an effective remedy? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 18 of Directive 2003/86/EC be interpreted as precluding an action for annulment, brought against the refusal of a right to family reunification of a minor child, being held to be inadmissible on the ground that the child has attained his majority during the judicial proceedings, since he would be deprived of the possibility of securing a determination of his action against that decision and there would be a breach of his right to an effective remedy?

---

(1)  OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12.

---
#### In the Matter of Carlos Rodriguez, Appellant, v Brian Fischer, as Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.

[944 NYS2d 804]—

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Gilpatric, J.), entered August 3, 2011 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Inspector General designating petitioner as a central monitoring case.

In November 1997, while incarcerated upon an earlier conviction of manslaughter in the first degree, petitioner repeatedly stabbed another inmate in response to an aggressive sexual advance, causing the inmate’s death. Although petitioner was originally convicted of depraved indifference murder in the second degree for this crime, that conviction was later reduced to the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree *(People v Rodriguez,*33 AD3d 730 [2006], *lv denied*9 NY3d 850 [2007]). Thereafter, on October 16, 2008, following the completion of petitioner’s direct appeal and after his sentencing on the reduced charge, he was designated a central monitoring case (hereinafter CMC). The CMC designation was ultimately sustained by the Inspector General and petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging that determination. Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed the petition, prompting this appeal.

We affirm. The record shows that petitioner’s designation was *1571under the “management problem” criterion pursuant to Department of Corrections and Community Supervision Directive No. 0701 (III) (D) and, thus, he required close supervision because his conduct while incarcerated “represents a risk to facility safety and order” *(see*7 NYCRR 1000.3 [b]). Although defendant points to the passage of time between his stabbing of the inmate and his CMC designation as a reason to conclude that the designation was irrational, Directive No. 0701 (IV) (F), as currently written, specifically states that inmates not previously classified as CMC can be reviewed for that status “at any time during his or her incarceration.” In that regard, the Inspector General noted that petitioner’s violent response in the past to aggression from other inmates remained a concern despite the passage of time.* Accordingly, we find no basis to conclude that the CMC designation was arbitrary or capricious *(see Matter of Smith v Goord,*43 AD3d 1236, 1237 [2007]).

Petitioner’s remaining contentions, including his claim that the CMC designation affects a protected liberty interest *(see Matter of Terry J. v Annucci,*206 AD2d 578, 578 [1994], *lv denied*84 NY2d 808 [1994]), have been examined and found to be unpersuasive.

Rose, J.P, Malone Jr., Kavanagh, Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

*

 Notably, petitioner alleged in his letter of appeal to the Inspector General that he is currently being subjected to unwanted advances from a different inmate.