Opinion filed May 17, 2012

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-10-00177-CR

__________

PETER HELLMUTH EGGERT, Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 266th District Court

Erath County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CR12121

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This appeal arises from a judgment revoking community supervision. The jury convicted 

Peter Hellmuth Eggert of conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence. The trial court sentenced 

him to two years confinement, probated for five years, and a fine of $5,000. We affirmed the 

conviction in Cause No. 11-05-00234-CR. The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke

community supervision on April 12, 2010, alleging violations of two of the terms and conditions 

of appellant’s community supervision. The trial court considered the motion at a hearing 

conducted on May 20, 2010. The trial court revoked appellant’s community supervision and 
2

assessed his punishment at confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice for a term of two years. We affirm.

Background Facts

The State alleged that appellant violated the following terms and conditions of appellant’s 

community supervision:

18. The Defendant shall not engage in the practice of law in any judicial 

proceeding in this State during the term of probation.

19. The Defendant shall not give any legal advice or engage in the practice 

of law during the term of probation.

Specifically, the State alleged that appellant engaged in the practice of law by filing an adversary 

proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas on behalf of 

an entity known as “Maximillan, L.L.C.” Among other documents, the State attached 

correspondence to its motion written by appellant on the letterhead of “PETER H. EGGERT–

ATTORNEY AT LAW – INTERNATIONAL APPELLATE LAW*.”1

Analysis

Appellant brings four issues on appeal in his pro se brief. He contends in his first issue 

that “the trial court stepped outside its jurisdictional boundaries when it interfered in a federal 

court proceeding.”2 In his third issue, he alleges that “the prosecution failed to prove that a ‘third 

party’ existed for legal purposes.” Appellant essentially challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the revocation of community supervision in these two issues. In this regard, 

the State has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant committed 

a violation of the conditions of community supervision. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873

(Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Kulhanek v. State, 587 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Hartv.

State, 264 S.W.3d 364, 366 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). The trial court’s order 

revoking community supervision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Rickels v. 

State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Hart, 264 S.W.3d at 366. If the State fails to meet its burden of proof, 

 

1The bottom of the letterhead contained the following description of appellant’s status in “INTERNATIONAL APPELLATE 

LAW”; “*FOREIGN JURISDICTION • MEMBER TEXAS BAR – INTL • INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION • AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

• TEXAS CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION • TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF MEDIATORS • NOT LICENSED BEFORE TEXAS 

COURTS.”

2Appellant contends that the trial court “interfered in a federal court proceeding” when it determined that his activities 

in federal court constituted a violation of the terms and conditions of his community supervision.
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the trial court abuses its discretion in revoking the community supervision. Cardona, 665 

S.W.2d at 493–94; Hart, 264 S.W.3d at 366–67. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence of 

any one of the alleged violations of the conditions of supervision is sufficient to support a 

revocation order. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 21(b) (West Supp. 2011); Moore v. 

State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Hart, 264 S.W.3d at 367.

Appellant has not caused a reporter’s record to be filed in this appeal. In this regard, he

filed a motion for a free record in this court on September 17, 2010. The court overruled this 

motion on September 30, 2010.3 The clerk of this court notified appellant in a letter dated 

October 13, 2010, that the appeal would be submitted on the clerk’s record alone unless he made 

arrangements for the preparation of the reporter’s record with the court reporter by October 28, 

2010. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(b)(1), 35.3(b)(2)–(3), & 37.3(c). The clerk later notified 

appellant in a letter dated November 5, 2010, that the appeal would be submitted on the clerk’s 

record alone because of the absence of timely proof of the requirements for designating and 

paying for the reporter’s record. 

Appellant’s failure to cause a reporter’s record to be filed in this cause precludes a review 

of his evidentiary issues. “[A] defendant who wishes to raise a sufficiency issue on appeal has 

the burden of ensuring that the entire record of the trial before the fact finder is before the 

appellate court.” O’Neal v. State, 826 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). An appellate 

court cannot determine the merits of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence without a 

review of the entire record of the trial before the factfinder. Skinner v. State, 837 S.W.2d 633, 

634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Greenwood v. State, 823 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 

In the absence of a reporter’s record, appellant’s first and third issues are overruled. 

Appellant asserts in his second issue that the trial court failed to award him proper jail 

credit for periods of presentence and post-sentence confinement. With regard to his presentence 

contention, he asserts that he was arrested on April 15, 2010, on the motion to revoke and that he 

remained incarcerated until the hearing on May 20, 2010. He contends that the trial court did not 

give him credit for this period of presentence incarceration. We disagree. The judgment 

revoking community supervision clearly states that appellant was credited for his period of 

incarceration from April 15, 2010, to May 20, 2010. 

 

3The clerk’s record indicates that the trial court previously denied appellant’s request for a free record on July 2, 2010.
4

Appellant additionally contends that the trial court should have awarded him jail credit 

from the date of sentencing (May 20, 2010) until the date he was released on appeal bond 

pending appeal. The State does not dispute that appellant is entitled to jail credit for this period. 

See Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1970); Gardner v. State, 542 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1976); Ex parte Griffith, 457 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). However, it does 

not appear that appellant has preserved his complaint for appellate review because the record 

before us does not reflect that appellant presented a request to the trial court for credit for this 

post-sentence period of incarceration.4 Moreover, appellant’s request for credit for post-sentence 

incarceration is in the nature of postconviction relief. The habeas corpus procedure set out in 

Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides the exclusive remedy for felony 

postconviction relief in state court. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, § 5 (West Supp. 

2011); Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Dist., 910 

S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Ex parte Brown, 662 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1983). If the habeas corpus applicant is held by virtue of a final conviction, in a felony case, the 

writ is returnable to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Article 11.07, section 3(a); Ex parte 

Brown, 662 S.W.2d at 4. There is no role for the courts of appeals in the procedure under 

Article 11.07. Article 11.07, section 3; see Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241, 

242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (stating that only the Court of Criminal Appeals 

has jurisdiction over state postconviction felony proceedings). Accordingly, appellant’s second 

issue is overruled.

Appellant asserts in his fourth issue that the imposition of terms and conditions eighteen 

and nineteen (quoted above) was unreasonable and not supported by evidence. Appellant has 

waived this contention for appellate review by waiting until after his community service was 

revoked to present his protest. An award of community supervision is not a right, but a 

contractual privilege entered into between a court and a defendant. Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 

534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). For this reason, the law is well settled that conditions of 

community supervision not objected to are affirmatively accepted as terms of the contract, and a 

defendant cannot challenge a condition of community supervision for the first time at a 

revocation proceeding. Id. at 535; Vale v. State, 486 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); In re 

 

4As noted by the State, it was not possible for the judgment revoking community supervision entered on May 20, 2010, 

to award credit for periods of incarceration occurring after that date. 
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V.A., 140 S.W.3d 858, 860 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (defendant could not object at 

revocation hearing that condition of community supervision was unreasonable); see Hart, 264 

S.W.3d at 368. Appellant’s fourth issue is overruled.

This Court’s Ruling

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

May 17, 2012

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Kalenak, J.