2019 IL App (5th) 180439 

 NOS. 5-18-0439, 5-18-0440, 5-18-0441, 5-18-0442 CONS.

 IN THE

 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

 FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE CITY OF CENTRALIA, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 17-MR-54 

 ) 

DOYLE GARLAND, ) Honorable 

 ) Michael D. McHaney, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE CITY OF CENTRALIA, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 17-MR-57 

 ) 

MATTHEW MANFUCCI, ) Honorable 

 ) Michael D. McHaney, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE CITY OF CENTRALIA, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 17-MR-59 

 ) 

JAY O’BRIST, ) Honorable 

 ) Michael D. McHaney, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

THE CITY OF CENTRALIA, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 17-MR-60 

NOTICE

Decision filed 08/09/19. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Peti ion for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
- 2 -

 ) 

SCOTT PRIES and JANET PRIES, ) Honorable 

 ) Michael D. McHaney, 

Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Presiding Justice Overstreet and Justice Boie concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 In this consolidated appeal, the defendants in each of the cases below appeal the August 

10, 2018, orders of the circuit court of Marion County that, inter alia, granted the motions for 

summary judgment in favor of the City of Centralia (City) on the City’s complaints for removal 

of the defendants’ boat docks from Lake Centralia. On appeal, the defendants argue that the 

circuit court erred in granting the summary judgments in favor of the City because a question of 

material fact exists as to whether the City has extraterritorial jurisdiction to acquire, retain 

ownership of, and regulate Lake Centralia. During the course of this appeal, the City filed a 

motion requesting that this court take judicial notice of certain public records, which this court 

ordered to be taken with the case. In their reply brief, the defendants request this court take 

judicial notice of other public records. For the following reasons, we grant the City’s motion and 

the defendants’ request to take judicial notice of the respective public records and affirm the 

judgments of the circuit court. 

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 On April 28, 2017, the City filed complaints against the defendants requesting an order 

allowing the City to remove the defendants’ boat docks from Lake Centralia at the defendants’ 

expense. According to the complaints, the City owns Lake Centralia, and the defendants own 

adjacent property and boat docks in Lake Centralia. Citing section 20-66 of its municipal code 

(Centralia Municipal Code § 20-66 (amended Oct. 13, 2015)), the City alleged that the 
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defendants had failed to register their boat docks or pay the associated annual permit fees for 

2016 or 2017.1 The complaints alleged that the City manager had sent letters to the defendants 

on or about February 1, 2017, informing them of their failure to register and pay the annual fees

and placing them on notice that their docks would be removed at their expense if they did not 

comply with these requirements. The City requested that the circuit court authorize the City to 

remove the boat docks in question and order the defendants to reimburse the City for the cost of 

the removal.

¶ 4 On January 29, 2018, the City filed motions for summary judgment requesting judgment 

in its favor on each of the complaints. Exhibit A to the City’s motions is the request to admit 

facts that the City had served on the defendants in each underlying case, wherein each defendant 

admitted that he or she owned the respective boat docks in question and had failed to register the 

docks or pay the annual fees as alleged in the complaints. Exhibit B to the City’s motions is the 

affidavit of City manager Dan Ramey, in which he avers that the City is a municipal corporation

and utilizes Lake Centralia, at least in part, for waterworks and for recreational purposes.

¶ 5 On July 6, 2018, the defendants filed responses to the City’s motions for summary 

judgment. The defendants attached, as exhibits to their responses, the depositions of the City’s 

director of public works, as well as a retired utility superintendent for the City. These witnesses 

testified as to the history of the City’s use of Lake Centralia for waterworks and its work to 

1

Section 20-66 of the Centralia Municipal Code provides parameters for the length, construction, 

maintenance, and inspection of boat docks in Lake Centralia. Centralia Municipal Code § 20-66 

(amended Oct. 13, 2015). Subsection (j) of section 20-66 of the Centralia Municipal Code provides, 

inter alia, that, prior to January 1 of each year, the owner of each boat dock shall purchase a boat dock 

permit. Id. § 20-66(j). For each boat dock on the lake that is up to 350 square feet of space, there shall be 

assessed a fee of $100 annually. For each dock on the lake that is over 350 square feet of space, there 

shall be assessed a fee of $200 annually. Subsection (e) of section 20-66 of the Centralia Municipal Code 

provides that “[b]oat docks that have not been registered or the annual fee has not been paid shall 

permanently be removed from the lake by the owner of the dock. City shall remove all docks that are not 

registered or approved at the owner’s expense.” Id. § 20-66(e). 
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maintain the banks of the lake, as well as inspection of the docks and the dam. The witnesses 

testified that Lake Centralia is, at present, only used as a second backup water source for the 

City, having not been used for drinking water since the 1980s. The defendants argued in their 

responses that summary judgments were improper because there are questions of fact as to 

whether the City has the authority to regulate Lake Centralia.

¶ 6 On August 1, 2018, the defendants filed motions for leave to amend their answer and 

affirmative defenses, as well as to file counterclaims for a declaratory judgment. The defendants’ 

proposed affirmative defenses and counterclaims are premised on the defendants’ argument that 

Lake Centralia is outside of the city limits and that the City’s municipal ordinances purporting to 

regulate the defendants’ boat docks exceed the City’s jurisdictional and statutory authority. On 

August 9, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on all pending motions, including the defendants’ 

motions for leave to amend and to file counterclaims, as well as the City’s motions for summary 

judgment. 

¶ 7 On August 10, 2018, the circuit court entered detailed written orders on the City’s 

motions for summary judgment. After rendering its legal conclusions, to be detailed below, the 

circuit court ordered that (1) the defendants’ motions for leave to file amended answers, 

amended affirmative defenses, and counterclaims were granted; (2) the City’s motions for 

attorney fees were denied; (3) the City’s motions for summary judgment were granted; (4) the 

City was authorized to remove the boat docks at issue; (5) the cost of removal of the boat docks 

shall be assessed against the defendants; and (6) the circuit court would retain jurisdiction of 

these matters for the purpose of entering money judgments against the defendants for the cost of 

removal of the boat docks. The circuit court entered a finding, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court 
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Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), that there was no just reason for delaying either enforcement or 

appeal or both.2

 

¶ 8 On September 10, 2018, the defendants filed notices of appeal. On December 14, 2018, 

the defendants filed a motion to consolidate the appeals, which this court granted. In their reply 

brief, the defendants requested this court to take judicial notice of a report of proceedings of the 

City, which took place in 1893, wherein the City elected to incorporate under an 1872 act to 

provide for the incorporation of cities and villages (Cities and Villages Act) (1871-72 Ill. Laws

218). On May 22, 2019, the City filed a motion requesting that this court take judicial notice of 

certified copies of a quitclaim deed, dated August 27, 1926, by which the Centralia Water Supply 

Company conveyed Lake Centralia to the City, as well as records of the Secretary of State 

showing that Centralia Water Supply Company dissolved on November 29, 1926. Neither party 

has objected to the other’s request regarding judicial notice. This court ordered the City’s motion 

for judicial notice to be taken with the case. 

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Before turning to the merits of the defendants’ appeal, we address the parties’ requests 

that we take judicial notice of the public records indicated above. It is well-established that this 

court can take judicial notice of matters that are readily verifiable from sources of indisputable 

accuracy, such as public records. See People v. Mata, 217 Ill. 2d 535, 539-40 (2005) (citing 

People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 134 (1996)). Neither party disputes that the records that are 

the subject of the other’s request are public records. Accordingly, we grant the defendants’ 

2

The statement of jurisdiction in the appellants’ brief is deficient in that it makes no reference to 

Rule 304(a), which is the supreme court rule that confers appellate jurisdiction on this court. The orders 

appealed from dispose of fewer than all of the matters raised in the circuit court in each underlying case, 

leaving the defendants’ counterclaims, as well as the entry of money judgments for the cost of removal of 

the boat docks, pending. Accordingly, absent the written finding that there is no just reason for 

enforcement or appeal, this court would not have jurisdiction to consider these appeals. 
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request, as set forth in their reply brief, that this court take judicial notice of proceedings of the 

City, taking place in 1893, wherein the City elected to incorporate under the Cities and Villages 

Act (1871-72 Ill. Laws 218). In addition, we grant the City’s motion, which was taken with the 

case, that this court take judicial notice of the quitclaim deed, dated August 27, 1926, by which 

the Centralia Water Supply Company conveyed Lake Centralia to the City, as well as records of 

the Secretary of State showing that Centralia Water Supply Company dissolved on November 

29, 1926. 

¶ 11 Having resolved the preliminary issues with regard to judicial notice, we move to the 

standards governing the circuit court’s entry of orders granting summary judgments in the City’s 

favor, as well as our standard of review. These standards have been summarized as follows: 

“Section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for summary judgment 

when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2002). The purpose 

of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact but simply to determine if one exists. 

[Citation.] In reviewing a summary judgment disposition, this court will construe the 

record strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. 

[Citation.] Moreover, it must be noted that summary judgment dispositions ‘should not be 

allowed unless the moving party’s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt.’

[Citation.] If the undisputed material facts could lead reasonable observers to divergent 

inferences, or where there is a dispute as to a material fact, summary judgment should be 

denied and the issue decided by the trier of fact. [Citation.] This court reviews a grant of 

summary judgment de novo.” Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2007) 

(quoting Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc., 185 Ill. 2d 418, 424 (1998)). 
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¶ 12 According to public records of which we have taken judicial notice, the City owns Lake 

Centralia by virtue of a deed transferring the land on which Lake Centralia lies to the City on 

August 27, 1926. The arguments that the defendants raise on appeal to support their assertion 

that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgments in favor of the City can be restated as 

follows: (1) the City is not permitted to own Lake Centralia and so has no right to regulate its 

boat docks and (2) the City is not permitted to regulate Lake Centralia’s boat docks unless Lake 

Centralia lies within three miles of the City’s corporate limits and a determination of Lake 

Centralia’s distance from the City presents a material question of fact precluding the summary 

judgments against the defendants. We will examine each of these issues in turn. 

¶ 13 With regard to the first issue as we have restated it, we recognize the City’s argument that 

the defendants may not challenge its acquisition and continued ownership of Lake Centralia 

because it is ultra vires. In support of this proposition, the City cites Mills v. Forest Preserve 

District, 345 Ill. 503 (1931), wherein our supreme court stated the following rule: 

“ ‘ “Whether a municipal corporation with power to purchase and hold real estate for

certain purposes has acquired and is holding such property for other purposes is a 

question which can only be determined in a proceeding instituted at the instance of the 

State. If there is a capacity to purchase, the deed to the corporation divests the estate of 

the grantor and there is a complete sale; and whether the corporation, in purchasing, 

exceeds its power is a question between it and the State and does not concern the vendor 

or others.” ’ ” Id. at 516 (quoting Beckett v. City of Petaluma, 153 P. 20, 22 (Cal. 1915), 

quoting 3 John F. Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 990 

(5th ed. 1911)). 

¶ 14 The defendants, citing Avery v. City of Chicago, 345 Ill. 640, 653-54 (1931), which, 

remarkably, was decided by our supreme court on the same date as the Mills decision, argue that 
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the question of ultra vires may be raised not only by the state but may also be raised “by a party 

who has suffered the invasion of some right by the transgression of corporate power.” We find 

neither Mills nor Avery controlling as to the defendants’ authority to challenge the City’s 

acquisition of Lake Centralia. Mills is inapposite because it does not deal with a party’s standing 

to challenge a real estate contract as ultra vires in order to defend against enforcement of an 

ordinance relating to that real estate, which is the situation we confront in the case at bar. Instead, 

Mills confronts the standing of the other party to the real estate transaction to seek recission of 

the conveyance that was the subject of that transaction. Mills, 345 Ill. at 504. It was not the 

ultra vires nature of the transaction in Mills that defeated the plaintiff’s claim for relief. See 

Egidi v. Town of Libertyville, 218 Ill. App. 3d 596, 604 (1991). Rather, the plaintiff in Mills was 

not entitled to recission of the real estate transaction because he had voluntarily executed the 

transaction with the municipality and had already reaped the benefits. See id. at 604-05. Thus, 

the plaintiff in Mills had no private interest in seeking recission. See id. The circumstances in 

Mills bear no relationship to the present action. 

¶ 15 As set forth above, we agree with the defendants that Mills does not prohibit them from 

challenging the City’s power to acquire and maintain ownership of Lake Centralia. However, 

Avery, which has been cited by the defendants in support of their standing to make such a 

challenge, does not definitively speak to the issue before us either. In Avery, a taxpayer and 

citizen filed suit to have an executory contract for services, entered into between the City of 

Chicago and the Midwest Trading and Securities Corporation, declared void because it was for a 

term longer than one year, which was beyond the City of Chicago’s statutory authority. Avery, 

345 Ill. at 642. The court found that the circuit court was incorrect to invalidate the entire 

contract, finding that the portion of the contract that was within the one-year time span remained 

enforceable. Id. at 650-51. The court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the entire contract 
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should be void due to Midwest Trading and Securities Corporation’s lack of corporate power to 

enter into the contract with the city or to assign the contract to another party. Id. at 653. In so 

doing, the court did state that “[t]he question of ultra vires may be raised only by the State or by 

a party who has suffered the invasion of some right by the transgression of corporate power.” Id.

at 653-54. However, the court was referring to the standing of a private citizen to challenge a 

private corporation’s act, rather than the standing to challenge the act of a municipal corporation. 

Id. The court did not speak at all regarding the right to challenge a municipality’s ownership of 

real estate as ultra vires. 

¶ 16 For the foregoing reasons, we find that neither party’s authority on the issue of a citizen’s 

right to challenge the City’s acquisition and holding of Lake Centralia is dispositive. However, 

we are not required to make a determination on this issue should we find the City properly 

acquired Lake Centralia and has the power under current law to maintain such ownership. 

Accordingly, we proceed with an examination of whether the City had the power to acquire Lake 

Centralia in 1926 and whether it has the power to maintain ownership of Lake Centralia under 

current law.

¶ 17 The circuit court, in its order, cited to article I, section 4, of “An Act to incorporate the 

City of Centralia” (original incorporating Act) (1859 Ill. Laws 114-15 (§ 4)), adopted by the 

Illinois General Assembly on February 18, 1859, which authorized the City to purchase, receive, 

and hold property, both real and personal, outside of the corporate limits for municipal purposes. 

Although this was the City’s original incorporating Act, it is apparent from public records of 

which we have taken judicial notice that the City elected in 1893 to adopt and incorporate under 

the provisions of the 1872 Cities and Villages Act (1871-72 Ill. Laws 218). Accordingly, we 

agree with the defendants that, at the time that the City acquired Lake Centralia in 1926, the City 

was not operating under its original incorporating Act, but rather, was acting under the Cities and 
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Villages Act. However, we find this to be a distinction without a difference. Article I, section 10, 

of the Cities and Villages Act provided as follows: 

“Cities organized under the act shall be bodies politic and corporate, under the name and 

style of ‘City of (name),’ and under such name may sue and be sued, contract and be 

contracted with, acquire and hold real and personal property for corporate purposes, have 

a common seal and change the same at pleasure, and exercise all the powers hereinafter 

conferred.” 1871-72 Ill. Laws 220 (§ 10). 

¶ 18 Based on this broad grant of power to the City to acquire and hold real and personal 

property for corporate purposes, we find that the City had the power to acquire Lake Centralia 

from the Centralia Water Supply Company in 1926. Having so found, we must address the 

defendants’ arguments that current provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code prohibit the City 

from maintaining its ownership of Lake Centralia into the present day. Section 1-1-3 of the 

Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-1-3 (West 2016)) provides that all existing municipalities that

changed their corporate organizations under the provisions of the Cities and Villages Act shall be 

treated as properly incorporated under the Municipal Code. In addition, section 1-1-4 of the 

Municipal Code (id. § 1-1-4) provides that it applies to all municipalities that are incorporated as 

provided in section 1-1-3 of the Municipal Code. Thus, the City is subject to the Municipal Code 

by virtue of these sections. 

¶ 19 The defendants contend that sections 11-125-2, 11-129-1, and 11-129-9 of the Municipal 

Code (id. §§ 11-125-2, 11-129-1, 11-129-9) would prevent the City from continued ownership of 

Lake Centralia if the City ceased using Lake Centralia for “waterworks.” According to the 

defendants, whether the City is currently using Lake Centralia for “waterworks” presents a 

genuine issue of material fact that precludes the summary judgments in favor of the City. We 

disagree. Section 11-125-2 of the Municipal Code provides, in relevant part: 
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“For the purpose of establishing or supplying waterworks and to purchase, extend, 

improve and operate waterworks, each city or village may go beyond its corporate limits 

and acquire and hold property by purchase or otherwise ***. The jurisdiction of the city 

or village to prevent or punish any pollution or injury to the stream or source of water, or 

to waterworks, extends 20 miles beyond its corporate limits, or so far as the waterworks 

may extend.” Id. § 11-125-2. 

¶ 20 Section 11-129-1 of the Municipal Code provides that: 

“Any municipality with a population of less than 500,000 is authorized, as provided in 

this Division 129, to build, or purchase, and to operate a waterworks system or water 

supply system either within or without the corporate limits thereof, and also to improve 

or extend that system.” Id. § 11-129-1. 

¶ 21 Section 11-129-9 of the Municipal Code provides that:

“In addition to other projects authorized by this Division 129, any municipality with a 

population under 500,000 may construct or acquire a water-supply system to serve a 

particular locality within or without its corporate limits or to extend or improve an 

existing water-supply system for the purpose of serving a particular locality within or 

without the municipality not theretofore served by its existing system, and may pay the 

cost thereof by the issuance and sale of revenue bonds of the municipality, payable solely 

from the revenue derived from the operation of the water-supply system constructed or 

acquired for that particular locality, or from the revenue derived from the operation of the 

improvements and extensions of an existing system.” Id. § 11-129-9. 

¶ 22 Pointing to the evidence in the record regarding the City’s use of Carlyle Lake and 

Raccoon Lake as the primary source of water for the City dating back to the 1980s, the 

defendants suggest that the foregoing sections of the Municipal Code somehow preclude the City 
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from maintaining ownership of Lake Centralia if it ceases using it for waterworks. We find this 

argument contains no merit. There is nothing in these sections of the Municipal Code or to be 

found anywhere in the law that requires the City to relinquish ownership of property it lawfully 

acquired in 1926. Further, we reject the defendants’ argument that the sections of the Municipal 

Code setting forth the City’s power to acquire and hold property for the purposes of waterworks 

constitute the sole authority of the City to acquire and hold Lake Centralia. The Municipal Code 

contains the same general grant of power to municipalities to acquire and hold property as the 

Cities and Villages Act did in 1927. Section 2-2-12 of the Municipal Code states as follows: 

“Cities incorporated under this Code shall be bodies politic and corporate under the name 

of ‘City of (name),’ and under that name may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted 

with, acquire and hold real and personal property for corporate purposes, have a 

corporate seal, changeable at pleasure, and exercise all the powers hereinafter conferred.” 

Id. § 2-2-12. 

¶ 23 We find that section 2-2-12 of the Municipal Code (id.) governs the City’s authority to 

hold Lake Centralia as its property. No further grant of authority is needed. Accordingly, we will 

proceed to addressing the defendants’ arguments regarding the City’s power to regulate the boat 

docks in Lake Centralia. Section 7-4-2 of the Municipal Code provides as follows:

“All property which (1) is owned by the municipality, and (2) lies outside the

corporate limits of the municipality, and (3) does not lie within the corporate limits of any 

municipality, shall be subject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the 

municipality in all respects the same as the property owned by the municipality which 

lies within the corporate limits thereof.” Id. § 7-4-2. 

¶ 24 The defendants do not contend that there is any genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether Lake Centralia (1) is owned by the City, (2) lies outside the City’s corporate limits, and
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(3) does not lie within the corporate limits of any municipality. Accordingly, under the plain 

language of section 7-4-2 of the Municipal Code, Lake Centralia “shall be subject to the 

ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of [the City] in all respects the same as the property owned 

by [the City] which lies within the corporate limits thereof.” Id. Nevertheless, the defendants 

argue that section 7-4-2 is inapplicable to the City’s regulation of Lake Centralia. Citing County 

of Will v. City of Naperville, 226 Ill. App. 3d 662 (1992), the defendants contend that section 7-

4-4 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7-4-4 (West 2016)) renders section 7-4-2 inapplicable. In 

order to determine the propriety of the defendants’ arguments, we begin by examining City of 

Naperville. 

¶ 25 In City of Naperville, the City of Naperville purchased a 40-acre parcel of land in 

unincorporated Will County. City of Naperville, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 662. The parcel met all of the 

parameters of section 7-4-2 of the Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 24, ¶ 7-4-2) in that it 

was owned by the City of Naperville, lay outside of its corporate limits, and lay outside the 

corporate limitations of any municipality. City of Naperville, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 662-63.

However, the parcel was zoned for agricultural use under Will County’s zoning ordinance. Id.

The city attempted to use its own zoning ordinances to approve its plan to place a fire station on 

its property. Id. Will County brought suit to enjoin the project, arguing that, pursuant to section 

5-12001 of the Counties Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 34, ¶ 5-12001), the city’s use of the land 

was subject to county zoning ordinances. City of Naperville, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 663. 

¶ 26 The county argued that because section 7-4-2 of the Municipal Code was a general grant 

of jurisdiction but did not specifically apply to zoning, the city’s power to zone the property 

constituted an implied power under that statute. Id. at 664. However, the county pointed out, 

section 11-13-1 of the Municipal Code specifically provided that when a county has enacted a 

zoning ordinance, the city could not zone outside of its corporate limits. Because the power to 
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zone the property had been explicitly granted to the county by section 5-12007 of the Counties 

Code and had been explicitly denied to the city by 11-13-1 of the Municipal Code, the county 

argued that an implied power to zone under section 7-4-2 of the Municipal Code could not exist. 

Id. The City of Naperville court agreed, holding that the specific statutory provisions regarding 

zoning, set forth in the Counties Code and the Municipal Code, were controlling and could not 

be broadened by reference to the general jurisdictional provisions of section 7-4-2. Id.

¶ 27 Having examined the holding of City of Naperville and its reasoning, we turn to a 

comparison of section 7-4-2 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7-4-2 (West 2016)), which sets 

forth the general jurisdiction of power of the City to regulate property that it owns outside of its 

corporate limits, with section 7-4-4 of the Municipal Code (id. § 7-4-4). Section 7-4-4 provides 

that the City has “jurisdiction over all waters within or bordering upon the municipality, to the 

extent of 3 miles beyond the corporate limits, but not beyond the limits of the State.” Id. The 

defendants argue that because Lake Centralia is a body of water, the jurisdictional provision in 

section 7-4-4 limits the jurisdictional power section 7-4-2 grants the City over property that it 

owns outside of its limits. We disagree and find, for the following reasons, that the opposite is 

true. 

¶ 28 Section 7-4-2 of the Municipal Code grants the City the power to regulate all property the 

City owns and does not exclude bodies of water lying on such property. In contrast, section 7-4-4 

grants jurisdiction to the City over waters beyond three miles of its corporate limits, whether or 

not the City owns the property on which those waters lie. Accordingly, section 7-4-4 of the 

Municipal Code leaves the City’s jurisdiction to regulate Lake Centralia undisturbed because 

Lake Centralia is owned by the City. As a result, we reject the defendants’ argument that whether 

Lake Centralia lies within three miles of the City’s corporate limits constitutes a genuine issue of 

material fact that would defeat the City’s motion for summary judgment.
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¶ 29 The defendants make a similar argument regarding the provision in section 11-125-2 of 

the Municipal Code that states that “[t]he jurisdiction of the city or village to prevent or punish 

any pollution or injury to the stream or source of water, or to waterworks, extends 20 miles 

beyond its corporate limits, or so far as the waterworks may extend.” Id. § 11-125-2. According 

to the defendants, this section mandates that the only power that the City has to regulate Lake 

Centralia is for the purpose of preventing or punishing pollution. The defendants argue that 

whether the boat dock regulations fall under this power to regulate pollution is a material 

question of fact precluding the summary judgments in favor of the City. However, this argument 

fails for the same reason as the argument relating to section 7-4-4 of the Municipal Code. Section 

7-4-2 of the Municipal Code grants the City the power to regulate all property the City owns and 

does not restrict the subjects upon which the City can regulate. It is the City’s ownership of Lake 

Centralia that gives the City the power to regulate Lake Centralia, and the City’s ownership is 

established by the record. Accordingly, the summary judgments in favor of the City were proper. 

¶ 30 CONCLUSION

¶ 31 For the foregoing reasons, we grant the City’s motion and the defendants’ request that 

this court take judicial notice of public records and affirm the judgments of the circuit court. 

¶ 32 Affirmed. 
2019 IL App (5th) 180439 

NOS. 5-18-0439, 5-18-0440, 5-18-0441, 5-18-0442 CONS. 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE CITY OF CENTRALIA, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. ) 

v. ) No. 17-MR-54 

 ) 

DOYLE GARLAND, ) Honorable ) Michael D. McHaney, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

THE CITY OF CENTRALIA, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. ) 

v. ) No. 17-MR-57 

 ) 

MATTHEW MANFUCCI, ) Honorable ) Michael D. McHaney, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

THE CITY OF CENTRALIA, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. ) 

v. ) No. 17-MR-59 

 ) 

JAY O’BRIST, ) Honorable ) Michael D. McHaney, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

THE CITY OF CENTRALIA, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County. ) 

v. ) No. 17-MR-60 

 ) 

SCOTT PRIES and JANET PRIES, ) Honorable ) Michael D. McHaney, 

Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

Opinion Filed: August 9, 2019

______________________________________________________________________________ 

Justices: Honorable James R. Moore, J. 

Honorable David K. Overstreet, P.J., and 

 Honorable Mark B. Boie, J. 

 Concur 
______________________________________________________________________________ 

Attorney B. Jay Dowling, Clayborne Sabo and Wagner LLP, 525 West Main Street, 

for Suite 105, Belleville, IL 62220

Appellants 

______________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys Douglas C. Gruenke, John P. Long, Bruckert, Gruenke & Long, P.C., 201 

for East Hanover, New Baden, IL 62265 

Appellee

______________________________________________________________________________