alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Leslie G. Freeland, Appellant.

— Casey, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Tompkins County (Barrett, J.), rendered May 22, 1983, upon a verdict convicting defendant of two counts of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

Defendant was convicted, after trial, of driving with a blood alcohol level of at least .10% (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [2]) and the lesser included offense of driving while ability impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [1]) under the second count of the indictment, which charged defendant with driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]). By virtue of a prior conviction on October 1, 1975, the crime of driving with a blood alcohol level of at least .10% achieved felony status. Defendant was sentenced to 90 days’ intermittent incarceration and five years’ probation, plus a fine.

On this appeal, defendant contends that since the trial court ruled that the certificates of calibration of the breathalyzer, the test ampoules and the simulator solution were inadmissible for lack of proper foundation, the result of the breathalyzer test should also have been suppressed. Despite its ruling on the certificates, the trial court admitted such results showing a .13% blood alcohol level.

We disagree with defendant’s claim. The certificates ruled inadmissible here are not indispensible to the admission of the breathalyzer results since "there is no longer any question about the general reliability of the breathalyzer test when properly administered by a qualified operator” *(People v Ippo*
      *766
      *lito,*100 AD2d 734), and there is proof here that the test was properly administered by a qualified operator. Defendant’s contention is more appropriately addressed to the weight that should be accorded to the result of the breathalyzer test than to its admissibility *(see, People v Gower,*42 NY2d 117, 121122).

We also reject defendant’s claim concerning the validity of the predicate conviction.

Judgment affirmed. Kane, J. P., Casey, Weiss, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2

                              PACIFIC STATE BANCORP

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
    Regarding Annual Report on Form 10-K for the Year Ended December 31, 2005

         In connection with the Annual Report of Pacific State Bancorp (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2005, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report'), the
undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of her
knowledge, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13
                  (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company



                                        BY:  /s/  JOANNE ROBERTS
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             Senior Vice President and
                                             Chief Financial Officer
                                             Date: March 30, 2006
#### JOSEPH F. CLARKE CO., Respondent, v. POMERANA, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 11, 1907.)

Action by the Joseph F. Clarke Company against Israel Pomerana.

No opinion. Judgment of the Municipal Court affirmed by default, with costs.
Exhibit
11
 
 
 LIVEREEL
MEDIA CORPORATION
 
 CODE
OF ETHICS
 
 FOR
 
 CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OR CONTROLLER AND PERSONS PERFORMING
SIMILAR FUNCTIONS
 
 
 General
Philosophy
 
 The
honesty, integrity and sound judgment of LiveReel Media Corporation (“LiveReel ”
or the “Company”) Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer or Controller
and persons performing similar functions (collectively the “Principal Officers”)
is fundamental to our reputation and success.  The professional and
ethical conduct of the Principal Officers is essential to the proper functioning
and success of LiveReel.
 
 Applicability
 
 This Code
of Ethics shall apply to LiveReel’s Principal Officers.
 
 Standards
of Conduct
 
 To the
best of their knowledge and ability, the Principal Officers shall:
 
 ·
              act
      with honesty and integrity, including the ethical handling of actual or
      apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional
      relationships;
 
 ·
              provide
      full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in reports and
      documents that LiveReel files with, or submits to, the Securities and
      Exchange Commission (“Commission”) and in other public communications made
      by LiveReel;
 
 ·
              comply
      with applicable governmental laws, rules and regulations;
 
 ·
              promote
      the prompt internal reporting of violations of this Code of Ethics to
      LiveReel’s board of directors and outside legal counsel;
 
 ·
              respect
      the confidentiality of information acquired in the course of employment;
  ·
              maintain
      the skills necessary and relevant to LiveReel’s needs; and
 
 ·
              proactively
      promote ethical and honest behavior among employees of LiveReel and its
      subsidiary.
 
 All
Principal Officers are expected to adhere to the LiveReel Code of
Ethics.  Any violation of this Code of Ethics will be subject to
appropriate discipline, up to and including dismissal from the Company and
prosecution under the law.  The board of directors shall have
responsibility for administration of this Code of Ethics and shall have the sole
and absolute discretionary authority to approve any deviation or waiver from
this Code of Ethics for Principal Officers.  In the event that a
waiver of, modification of and/or change to this Code of Ethics is approved and
granted, then the notice of the waiver, modification, and/or change shall be
disclosed as may be required by SEC rules or the rules of any exchange on which
the securities of the Company are then trading.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. JOSE GUADALUPE ZEPEDA

- RAMIREZ , AKA Jose Guadalupe Zepeda Ramirez,

Defendant

- Appellant

. No. 16

- 5 0369
D.C. No. 2:16

- cr - 0 0226

- R

- 2

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Manuel L. Real , District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 8, 2018 Pasadena, California Before: REINH ARDT and NGUYEN , Circuit Judges, and SIMON , ** District Judge

. Appellant Jose Guadalupe Zepeda

- Ramirez appeals the jury’s verdict and the district court ’s order denying his motion for acquittal . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 3 6

- 3.

** The Honorable Michael H

. Simon , United States District Judge for the District of Oregon , sitting by designation. 

# FILED

MAR 13 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

1. We review the district court’s denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. United States v. Mincoff

, 574 F.3d 1186, 1191

– 92 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In reviewing the motion and the jury’s verdict, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 11 92 (citation omitted)

. Here, Zepeda

- Ramirez and one other person traveled to the United States from Mexico on a small boat (“panga”) filled with 1,664 kilograms of marijuana. Zepeda

- Ramirez knew the cargo was marijuana and he helped steer the boat to the United States. Experienced l aw enforcement officers testified that drug smuggling operations from Mexico to the United States by panga require at least two people, and the panga Zepeda

- Ramirez arrived in contained equipment typically used by smugglers to coordinate with partners to p ick up the cargo after making landfall. A conversation between Zepeda

- Ramirez and the other occupant of the boat was covertly recorded after they were arrested, in which Zepeda

- Ramirez made statements from which the jury could have inferred that he was in volved in the smuggling operation and trying to concoct the best possible exculpatory story. This evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to convict Zepeda

- Ramirez for both conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute and for possession w ith intent to distribute marijuana.
AFFIRMED .
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Donald Thomas, Appellant.

—Three judgments of the County Court, Nassau County (Lawrence, J.), all rendered April 3, 1984, affirmed *(see, People v Kazepis,*101 AD2d 816). Lazer, J. P., Thompson, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v *525Elizabeth Rodriguez, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Herbert Altman, J.), rendered on December 5, 1983, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted. *(See, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders, 52*AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur&emdash;Sandler, J. P., Carro, Asch, Fein and Lynch, JJ.
#### Jerry DeLuca, as Executor of Valentina E. D. Squires, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v Smithkline Beckman Corporation et al., Respondents. (Action No. 1.) Jerry DeLuca, as Executor of Valentina E. D. Squires, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v Robert E. Hardy et al., Respondents. (Action No. 2.)

— Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Cholakis, J.), entered December 17, 1984 in Rensselaer County, which, *inter alia,*denied plaintiffs’ motion in action No. 2 to dismiss the affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations and granted defendants’ cross motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and (2) from two orders of said court, entered December 14, 1984 and March 12, 1985 in Rensselaer County, which granted defendants’ motion in action No. 1 to dismiss the complaint.

Orders affirmed, with costs, upon the opinion of Justice Con. G. Cholakis at Special Term. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Levine, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 580 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 580

  To amend the Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration 
Authorization Act of 1978 to require the appointment of a member of the 
Science Advisory Board based on the recommendation of the Secretary of 
                              Agriculture.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 15, 2011

  Ms. Klobuchar (for herself, Mr. Lugar, and Mr. Nelson of Nebraska) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
               Committee on Environment and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration 
Authorization Act of 1978 to require the appointment of a member of the 
Science Advisory Board based on the recommendation of the Secretary of 
                              Agriculture.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Representation for Farmers Act''.

SEC. 2. SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD.

    Section 8(b) of the Environmental Research, Development, and 
Demonstration Authorization Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. 4365(b)) is amended 
in the first sentence by inserting ``and not more than 3 of whom shall 
be appointed based on the recommendation of the Secretary of 
Agriculture,'' after ``Chairman,''.
                                 <all>
```
#### SCHRADER, Respondent, v. ELIAS et al., Appellants.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

October 16, 1907.)

Action by John Schrader, an infant, etc., against Gabriel Elias and another.

No opinion. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
<PAGE>


Exhibit 99.2


                        CERTIFICATION OF CFO PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Oxford Ventures, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Robert Harrison, as
President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, to the best of his knowledge, that:

(1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the
         Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, thefinancial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.


By:  /s/ Robert Harrison
------------------------------
Robert Harrison
President, CEO AND CFO
March 27, 2003
# C_2020103EN.01000801.xml

| 30.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 103/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 103/8

---

Appeal brought on 29 August 2019 by BS against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 17 June 2019 in Case T-593/18, BS v Parliament

(Case C-642/19 P)

(2020/C 103/10)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: BS (represented by: M. Maes and J.-N. Louis, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament

By order of 15 January 2020, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 883 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 883

To authorize National Mall Liberty Fund D.C. to establish a memorial on 
  Federal land in the District of Columbia to honor free persons and 
slaves who fought for independence, liberty, and justice for all during 
                        the American Revolution.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 4, 2011

 Mr. Lieberman (for himself and Mr. Grassley) introduced the following 
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                           Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To authorize National Mall Liberty Fund D.C. to establish a memorial on 
  Federal land in the District of Columbia to honor free persons and 
slaves who fought for independence, liberty, and justice for all during 
                        the American Revolution.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FINDING.

    Congress finds that the contributions of free persons and slaves 
who fought during the American Revolution were of preeminent historical 
and lasting significance to the United States, as required by section 
8908(b)(1) of title 40, United States Code.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Federal land.--
                    (A) In general.--The term ``Federal land'' means 
                the parcel of land--
                            (i) identified as ``Area I''; and
                            (ii) depicted on the map numbered 869/
                        86501B and dated June 24, 2003.
                    (B) Exclusion.--The term ``Federal land'' does not 
                include the Reserve (as defined in section 8902(a) of 
                title 40, United States Code).
            (2) Memorial.--The term ``memorial'' means the memorial 
        authorized to be established under section 3(a).

SEC. 3. MEMORIAL AUTHORIZATION.

    (a) Authorization.--In accordance with subsections (b) and (c), 
National Mall Liberty Fund D.C. may establish a memorial on Federal 
land in the District of Columbia to honor the more than 5,000 
courageous slaves and free Black persons who served as soldiers and 
sailors or provided civilian assistance during the American Revolution.
    (b) Prohibition on Use of Federal Funds.--National Mall Liberty 
Fund D.C. may not use Federal funds to establish the memorial.
    (c) Applicable Law.--National Mall Liberty Fund D.C. shall 
establish the memorial in accordance with chapter 89 of title 40, 
United States Code.

SEC. 4. REPEAL OF JOINT RESOLUTIONS.

    Public Law 99-558 (110 Stat. 3144) and Public Law 100-265 (102 
Stat. 39) are repealed.
                                 <all>
```
#### NOCITO v. ACIERNO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

November 22, 1907.)

Discovery—Examination of Party Before TRiai>—Evidence Obtainable.

In an action for slander, the complaint alleged that defendant accused plaintiff of setting fire to a drug store for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining the insurance thereon. The answer was a general denial, with two separate defenses, one of which alleged that a third person came *786in after the alleged slanderous statement was made, at which plaintiff told the third person that he was a witness, but that defendant did not know who the third person was. The answer also set up facts in mitigation of damages. *Reid,*that defendant was not entitled to an examination of plaintiff before trial, there being no issue as to whether or not plaintiff set fire to the drug store, and such examination not being authorized for the purpose of finding out the name of the third person, as none of the testimony obtainable by such examination could he material upon the trial of any of the issues raised.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 16, Discovery, § 54.]

Appeal from Special Term.

Action by Antonio Nocito against Gioacchino Acierno. From an order denying a motion to vacate an order for the examination of plaintiff before trial, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and motion to vacate order granted.

Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and INGRAHAM, Mc-LAUGHEIN, HOUGHTON, and SCOTT, JJ.

George J. McDonnell, for appellant.

Percival S. Menken, for respondent.

INGRAHAM, J.

This was an action for slander; the charge being that defendant said, “You (meaning the plaintiff) are a dishonest man. You (meaning plaintiff) have willfully set fire to your drug store at 9 Spring street, intending to defraud the insurance companies of the amount of your insurance.” The answer is a general denial, with two separate defenses, neither of which is a justification, arid facts are set up in mitigation of damages. In one of the defenses it is alleged that a third person came in after the conversation at which the plaintiff told this third person that he was a witness, but that the defendant does not know who the third person was.

It does not seem that any of the subjects upon which this defendant seeks to examine the plaintiff can be material evidence upon the trial. An examination before trial is not authorized for the purpose of finding out the name of a third person who will be a witness, and there seems to be no issue here .as to whether or not the plaintiff set fire to his drug store at No. 9 Spring street. As none of this testimony could be material upon the trial upon any issue raised by the pleadings, the defendant was not entitled to the examination of the plaintiff.

The order appealed from is reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion to vacate the order for the examination of the plaintiff granted, with $10 costs. All concur.
#### The State ex rel. Foster, Appellant, *v.*Belmont County Court of Common Pleas et al., Appellees.

[Cite as *State ex rel. Foster v. Belmont Cty. Court of Common Pleas,*107 Ohio St.3d 195, 2005-Ohio-6184.]

(No. 2005-0768

Submitted October 12, 2005

Decided December 7, 2005.)

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a complaint for a writ of prohibition.

{¶ 2} In 1991, appellant, Kent C. Foster, was convicted of two counts of rape, one count of felonious sexual penetration, and one lesser included offense of gross sexual imposition and was sentenced to prison. On appeal, his conviction and sentence were affirmed. *State v. Foster*(Apr. 12, 1994), Belmont App. No. 91-B-17, 1994 WL 149881.

*196Kent C. Foster, pro se.

Christopher Berhalter, Belmont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert W. Quirk, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Belmont County Court of Common Pleas and Belmont County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office.

Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Jeri L. Fosnaught, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.

{¶ 3} In October 2004, Foster filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Belmont County for a writ of prohibition against appellees, Belmont County Court of Common Pleas, Belmont County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Foster requested that the writ issue “to vacate his sentence and records as it is a legal nullity.” Although Foster filed an affidavit of indigency indicating that he could not pay the fee to file his original action, he did not file the statement required by R.C. 2969.25(C)(1) setting forth the balance in his inmate account “for each of the preceding six months, as certified by the institutional cashier.” Appellees moved to dismiss. On March 16, 2005, the court of appeals dismissed the complaint.

{¶ 4} This cause is now before us upon Foster’s appeal as of right.

{¶ 5} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. Foster essentially seeks release from prison, but habeas corpus, rather than prohibition, is the appropriate action to obtain this type of relief. *State ex rel. Nelson v. Griffin,*103 Ohio St.3d 167, 2004-Ohio-4754, 814 N.E.2d 866, ¶ 5. In addition, Foster’s failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C)(1) warranted dismissal. *State ex rel. Qualls v. Story,*104 Ohio St.3d 343, 2004-Ohio-6565, 819 N.E.2d 701, ¶ 3.

Judgment affirmed.

Moyer, C.J., Resnick, Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, O’Donnell and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.