NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JORDEN B., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, L.B., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 21-0188 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD39266

The Honorable Christopher Whitten, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne W. Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Emily M. Stokes

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 1-18-2022
JORDEN B. v. DCS, L.B.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in 

which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Jorden B. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order

terminating her parental rights to L.B. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

juvenile court’s order. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 2 (2016). 

Mother is the biological mother of L.B. and two other minor children.

1

Mother was not married to the children’s fathers. L.B. was born in March 

2020, and at the time of L.B.’s birth, Mother tested positive for 

methamphetamine, amphetamine, cannabinoids, and Fentanyl. L.B. tested 

positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and cannabinoids, and 

presumptive positive for Fentanyl. L.B. underwent withdrawal treatment. 

Mother told hospital staff that she used substances daily, even throughout 

the pregnancy, and was homeless. Hospital staff observed her suspicious 

behaviors, which indicated that she was likely under the influence of drugs.

¶3 Hospital staff confronted Mother about her recent substance 

abuse, but she left the hospital without being discharged and without L.B. 

The Department soon after took custody of the other children and placed 

them with a relative. After L.B. was discharged from the hospital, she lived

with her paternal grandparents (“Grandparents”), who were willing to 

adopt her. Because L.B. had been in the hospital and has a different father 

from her siblings, the Department did not place her with her siblings. The 

Department placed L.B.’s siblings with their paternal aunt and uncle, a 

non-adoptive placement because they would likely be reunified with their 

1 L.B.’s father—who was incarcerated at the time of the Department’s 

involvement—and the two other children—who do not share the same 

father with L.B.—are not subject to this appeal. Her father’s rights were also 

terminated.
JORDEN B. v. DCS, L.B.

Decision of the Court

3

father. Despite the siblings’ separation, Grandparents intended to

coordinate frequent visitation and contact with her siblings.

¶4 Meanwhile, the Department provided Mother with the 

following services: substance-abuse treatment with TERROS, 

transportation, substance-abuse testing with Physicians Services, 

Incorporated (“PSI”), supervised visitation, and parent aide. Mother was 

eventually discharged from TERROS for failing to maintain contact with it.

She also never provided a drug test at PSI, initially attended visits but

stopped, and failed to appear for three intakes at the parent-aide service.

¶5 The Department petitioned for dependency of L.B., and the 

court found that she was a temporary ward and set hearings on the petition.

Before the dependency hearing, the Department disclosed a list of exhibits 

in its initial disclosure statement. Mother objected to the introduction of the 

exhibits in part because the Department’s list was “incredibly vague and 

ma[de] it impossible for Mother to ascertain what evidence [the

Department was] actually planning to admit at trial.” The court conducted 

a dependency hearing, admitted the exhibits, and found by a 

preponderance of the evidence that L.B. was dependent as to Mother based 

on neglect due to Mother’s substance abuse and her unwillingness or 

inability to properly and effectively provide for L.B.’s basic needs. The case 

plan, however, remained family reunification.

¶6 A month later, the Foster Care Review Board found that no 

progress was being made toward establishing permanency but that L.B. 

was healthy and eating well in her Grandparents’ home. Mother continued 

not to engage in her case plan, participate in services, or attend visits. The 

juvenile court held a permanency planning hearing for L.B. and Mother did 

not appear. The court found that Mother’s failure to appear was not 

supported by any good cause. The court further found that L.B. continued 

to be dependent. The court held subsequent report and review hearings, 

which Mother also did not attend, again without good cause.

¶7 A short time later, the Department moved to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to L.B., arguing that her failure to maintain a 

normal parent-child relationship for six months constituted prima facie 

evidence of abandonment and that she had failed to participate in visitation 

and the Department’s recommended services. The Department also argued 

that she was unable to parent due to her history of substance abuse, which 

could continue for an “indeterminate period” under A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(3).

The juvenile court held a termination hearing, and Mother failed to appear, 

again without good cause. The court ruled that her failure to appear waived 
JORDEN B. v. DCS, L.B.

Decision of the Court

4

her right to contest the termination of her parental rights based on the 

allegations in the motion for termination. Nevertheless, the court set the 

evidentiary hearing for the following month.

¶8 Mother appeared at the evidentiary hearing and expressed 

her desire to contest the termination action. The court warned her that if she 

failed to appear without good cause at subsequent hearings, the court could 

order termination without her ability to contest it. Counsel gave their 

statements and L.B.’s guardian ad litem told the court that Mother had not 

visited L.B. The court reset the hearing as a contested termination hearing

later that day, so that Mother could speak with her counsel, with whom she 

failed to maintain contact. Despite her agreement to appear and the court’s 

warnings, Mother again failed to appear at the reset hearing later that same 

day. The court determined that Mother’s failure to appear was without 

good cause and proceeded with the hearing in absentia.

¶9 During the hearing, the Department asked the court to admit 

seven marked exhibits, several of which the court had admitted into 

evidence during previous dependency hearings. These exhibits consisted of 

Department progress reports, disclosed through the Juvenile Access 

Communication Exchange (“JAX”) before each hearing, and PSI records.

One of the exhibits did not even concern Mother, only L.B.’s father. 

Mother’s counsel objected to their admission because the Department did 

not provide Mother or her counsel with a list or copies of the exhibits before 

the hearing pursuant to Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court

(“Rule”) 44, allegedly making it “very difficult for counsel to do her job.”

The court noted that this issue needed to be addressed at another time and 

that the Department should comply with the rules. Notwithstanding its 

statement, the court elected to proceed, admitted the exhibits, and heard 

testimony. Grace Blanco, a Department safety specialist, testified that

although Mother initially visited with L.B., she eventually stopped 

attending and failed to appear three times for the parent-aide intake, 

resulting in closure of the service. She also testified about Mother’s failure 

to participate in TERROS or drug test through PSI. Ms. Blanco also testified 

that L.B. was less than three years old and that for more than six months, 

Mother had failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with L.B. She 

added that L.B. was “thriving” with Grandparents, who were meeting her 

needs in providing her with clothing, food, and shelter. Mother’s counsel 

did not cross-examine Ms. Blanco or offer her own evidence.

¶10 The court considered the exhibits, testimony, arguments of 

counsel, and written submission of the parties in thereafter granting the 

Department’s motion for termination. The court found that clear and 
JORDEN B. v. DCS, L.B.

Decision of the Court

5

convincing evidence existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights under 

A.R.S. § 8–533. More specifically, it found that Mother had abandoned L.B. 

and failed to maintain a “normal parental relationship” with her by not 

providing her with reasonable support, regular contact, or normal 

supervision for at least six months. The court further found that her history 

of substance abuse provided “reasonable grounds to believe that the 

condition [would] continue for a prolonged indeterminate period,” that 

L.B. was in out-of-home care for six months or longer, and that Mother took 

no steps to remedy the circumstances. Further, the court found that the

Department made diligent efforts to provide Mother with necessary 

services and treatment, in which she did not actively participate, and that

termination would be in L.B.’s best interests because “it would further the 

plan of adoption” and give her permanency and stability. In addition, the 

court found that Grandparents were the “least restrictive placement,” she

was adoptable, and continuing the parent-child relationship would be 

detrimental to her. Mother timely appeals. 

DISCUSSION

¶11 Mother argues that this court should vacate and remand the 

termination order because (1) the Department failed to follow Rule 44 in not 

disclosing a list and copies of exhibits before the evidentiary hearing,

thereby violating her due process right to meaningful notice and 

warranting preclusion of the evidence; and (2) the court abused its 

discretion in its best interests determination because it discounted the 

separation of siblings. We review constitutional issues and the 

interpretation of statutes and court rules de novo. Brenda D. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 243 Ariz. 437, 442 ¶ 15 (2018). A trial court has broad discretion in

evidentiary rulings, and thus we will review the court’s decision for an 

abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice. Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, 82–83 ¶ 19 (App. 2005). Because the juvenile court 

is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts, Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. 

v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334 ¶ 4 (App. 2004), we will affirm a termination 

decision unless no reasonable evidence supports it, Xavier R. v. Joseph R., 

230 Ariz. 96, 100 ¶ 11 (App. 2012). 

I. Disclosure of exhibits

¶12 The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

some of the exhibits, and any error it did commit was harmless. If a parent

fails to timely appear for the termination hearing without good cause 

shown, the court may find that the parent has waived their legal rights and 
JORDEN B. v. DCS, L.B.

Decision of the Court

6

admitted the allegations in the motion for termination. A.R.S. § 8–863(C); 

Rule 66(D)(2). The court may then terminate the parent-child relationship 

“based on the record and evidence presented,” A.R.S. § 8–863(C), which

includes evidence admitted during previous dependency hearings, Adrian 

E. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 96, 102 ¶ 23 (App. 2007). Although 

Rule 44 requires that parties disclose a list and copies of the exhibits that 

they intend to use at the termination hearing, Rule 44(D)(2), (B)(2)(e), the 

presentation of evidence . . . “shall be as informal as the requirements of 

due process and fairness permit[,]” Rule 66(D). If a party fails to comply 

with Rule 44, “the court may impose sanctions” upon that party, which 

includes precluding evidence, granting a continuance, and entering an 

order against a party. Rule 44(G) (emphasis added).

¶13 Here, Mother does not contest the grounds for termination or 

that the Department failed to meet its burden of proof. Rather, she argues 

that the Department violated her due process rights by not strictly 

complying with Rule 44’s prescriptions. Due process requires reasonable 

notice and an opportunity to be heard. See In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. 

JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 355 (App. 1994). But Mother failed to appear at the 

evidentiary hearing. Thus, the court could consider (1) that she admitted 

the allegations in the motion as true, and (2) the record and evidence 

presented in making its termination determination. In fact, the Department 

had already disclosed the progress reports in connection with previous

hearings, and their admission during those hearings secured their inclusion 

as part of the record—a point Mother does not contest. See Rule 45(C) (the 

Department must disclose progress reports to a parent no later than 10 days 

before review hearings). Thus, the court was permitted to consider these 

exhibits during the termination hearing. Even so, evidence that the court 

considered here not only included the seven exhibits but also testimony, 

arguments of counsel, and written submissions of the parties.

¶14 Mother argues that the Rule 44 violation prejudiced her in not 

giving her notice of the evidence and in having the testifying witness be the 

author of only one exhibit. A report is not necessarily inadmissible as 

evidence if its author does not testify. Alice M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 

Ariz. 70, 73 ¶ 10 (App. 2015). To reverse a ruling, the court’s error must have

prejudiced a party, and prejudice must appear from the record. Walsh v. 

Walsh, 230 Ariz. 486, 494 ¶ 24 (App. 2012). Here, the exhibits’ admission did

not prejudice her. Although the termination implicates Mother’s substantial 

rights, any error the court may have made is harmless because the record 

demonstrates that she and her counsel had previously received most of 

these exhibits. Thus, because the purpose of disclosure is to avoid undue 
JORDEN B. v. DCS, L.B.

Decision of the Court

7

delay or surprise, Wells v. Fell, 231 Ariz. 525, 528 ¶ 13 (2013), the use of the 

exhibits should not have surprised her or her counsel.

¶15 Even if the court erred in admitting the remaining exhibits, 

such error was also harmless because the court would have still found 

termination of Mother’s parental rights proper by clear and convincing 

evidence regardless of these previously undisclosed exhibits. See Rule 

66(C); Alice M., 237 Ariz. at 73 ¶ 12. First, the court could consider the 

allegations in the motion for termination as true because Mother failed to 

appear at the hearing. Second, Ms. Blanco’s testimony helped support the 

statutory grounds for abandonment: L.B. was less than three years old and 

in foster care for more than six months, and Mother did not visit her or 

participate in services. Third, L.B.’s guardian ad litem spoke to Mother’s 

lack of participation in visits. Taking the motion, testimony, and other 

statements together with the exhibits already in the record, sufficient 

evidence exists such that any reasonable judge would have found

termination of Mother’s rights warranted.

¶16 Mother also argues that the court should have sanctioned the 

Department by precluding the evidence. However, evidence preclusion is 

not favored. See Jimenez v. Chavez, 234 Ariz. 448, 452 ¶ 18 (App. 2014)

(preclusion is a proper sanction only if “no less stringent sanctions will 

suffice”). Further, the Rules should “be interpreted in a manner designed 

to protect the best interests of the child, giving paramount consideration to 

the health and safety of the child.” Rule 36. Precluding evidence that would 

further L.B.’s best interests and support termination when proper would be 

contrary to the intent of the Rules. The court properly gave paramount 

consideration to L.B.’s health and safety over disclosure requirements that,

even if violated, had no effect on the outcome of the ruling. Therefore, the

court did not abuse its discretion because reasonable evidence supports the 

court’s decision and any error committed was harmless.

II. Best interests determination

¶17 The court did not abuse its discretion in its best interests

determination because reasonable evidence supports the court’s decision to

allow the siblings to live in separate foster homes. Mother challenges only 

the juvenile court’s finding of best interests and not the statutory grounds 

for termination. To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find 

by clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one statutory 

ground under A.R.S. § 8−533 and by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination would be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8–533(B); Rule

66(C); Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 286 ¶ 15 (App. 2016).
JORDEN B. v. DCS, L.B.

Decision of the Court

8

Termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests if the child will 

benefit from the termination or be harmed if the relationship continues. 

Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13 (2018). 

¶18 Whether a child will benefit from termination requires 

considering whether the current placement is meeting the child’s needs, the 

child is adoptable, and an adoption plan is in place. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. 

at 1, 3–4 ¶ 12. Other primary considerations include the child’s stability and 

security, id. at 4 ¶ 15, the parent’s prospects for rehabilitation, Alma S., 245 

Ariz. at 151 ¶ 15, as well as the child’s health and safety, Rule 36. The 

interests of the parent and child diverge once the juvenile court has found 

one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing 

evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286 ¶ 35 (2005). Thus, the best 

interests analysis “focuses primarily upon the interests of the child, as 

distinct from those of the parent,” id. at 287 ¶ 37, and the juvenile court 

considers the totality of the circumstances, Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

250 Ariz. 139, 145 ¶ 20 (App. 2020). 

¶19 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of 

best interests. L.B. is adoptable and Grandparents are willing to adopt her, 

they are meeting her needs, and she is “thriving” in their care. Termination 

will benefit L.B. because if Mother’s parental rights are not terminated, L.B. 

will remain in foster care, delaying permanency. Mother’s failure to attend 

visits or to participate in and complete recommended services has 

demonstrated that her prospects for rehabilitation are quite low. 

Grandparents will thus offer her stability and security. The court therefore 

did not err in determining that termination was in L.B.’s best interests.

¶20 Mother nonetheless argues that the court discounted the fact 

that L.B. and her siblings are in different foster homes because the court did 

not address it in its findings of fact. In doing so, she points to

the Sibling Information Exchange Program under A.R.S. § 8–543 and 

believes that her children may not have contact with each other. Because 

the juvenile court’s primary consideration is the best interests of the child, 

it has substantial discretion when placing dependent children. Antonio P. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 402, 404 ¶ 8 (App. 2008). While placing 

siblings together is an important consideration, other factors such as 

stability, security, health, and safety are paramount. See Rule 36; see also 

Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3–4 ¶ 15. The juvenile court found that L.B. would 

be harmed if Mother’s parental rights were not terminated. Further, the 

record supports that Grandparents intend to coordinate frequent visitation 

and contact with her siblings. The juvenile court also found that L.B. is in 

the least restrictive placement. See A.R.S. § 8–513(B). 
JORDEN B. v. DCS, L.B.

Decision of the Court

9

¶21 Because reasonable evidence supports the factual basis 

underlying the juvenile court’s finding of termination and best interests, the 

court did not abuse its discretion. 

CONCLUSION

¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.