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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48235

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHELLEY KIMBERLY ELWOOD,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: July 6, 2021

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Lansing L. Haynes, District Judge. Hon. James D. Stow, 

Magistrate.

Order affirming denial of motion to suppress, affirmed.

Anne Taylor, Kootenai County Public Defender; Samuel Y. Geddes, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Coeur d’Alene, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge 

Shelley Kimberly Elwood appeals from the district court’s order affirming the magistrate 

court’s denial of her motion to suppress following her conviction for misdemeanor possession of 

marijuana entered on a conditional guilty plea. Elwood argues that the magistrate and district 

courts erred in their interpretation of Idaho Code § 49-625 by finding that the officer who stopped 

her vehicle had reasonable suspicion that she violated the statute. 

I. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Elwood was driving eastbound in the lane nearest the curb on a road with one center, two 

westbound, and two eastbound lanes when she was passed by a police vehicle with its emergency 

lights activated traveling in the opposite direction. While other drivers pulled over, Elwood did 

not. Another officer, parked in a nearby parking lot, observed Elwood fail to pull over and initiated 
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a traffic stop believing Elwood violated I.C. § 49-625. In the course of the traffic stop, the officer 

observed Elwood in possession of marijuana vapes. 

Elwood was charged with possession of marijuana. She filed a motion to suppress, arguing 

that she was illegally detained when the officer initiated the traffic stop. Specifically, she denied 

that there was a passing police vehicle with its emergency lights activated and that, even had there 

been a passing police vehicle, she did not fail to yield the right-of-way as she was not required to 

under I.C. § 49-119 since she was traveling in the opposite direction and did not inhibit the police

vehicle or give rise to any danger of collision. The magistrate court found, based on Elwood’s and 

the arresting officer’s testimony, that there was a passing police vehicle with its emergency lights 

activated and that Elwood violated I.C. § 49-625 by failing to pull over and yield the right-of-way, 

thereby providing reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. Based on these findings, the magistrate 

court denied Elwood’s motion to suppress. 

Elwood entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of marijuana, reserving the right to 

appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. The magistrate court entered judgment, and Elwood 

filed a timely intermediate appeal to the district court. 

On intermediate appeal, Elwood argued that the magistrate court erred in its interpretation 

of I.C. § 49-625. Elwood argued that the magistrate court ignored the immediacy requirement in 

the statute, as she was separated from the emergency vehicle by two to three lanes, and again 

argued that she was not required to yield the right-of-way when she did not inhibit or create a 

danger of collision with the police vehicle. The district court held that the statute directs all traffic 

to yield to approaching emergency vehicles, and the magistrate court did not err in its interpretation 

that of the statute. Further, the district court held that the magistrate court correctly applied the 

statute in finding that Elwood was required to yield the right-of-way since Elwood could not know 

where the emergency vehicle was ultimately headed. Elwood again appeals.

II. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the 

magistrate division, we review the magistrate court record to determine whether there is substantial 

and competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings of fact and whether the 

magistrate court’s conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 

415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of 
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the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 

968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we review the magistrate court’s findings and 

conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and the basis 

therefore, and either affirm or reverse the district court. 

III.

ANALYSIS

Elwood argues that the magistrate and district courts erred in finding that the officer who 

stopped her vehicle had reasonable suspicion that she violated I.C. § 49-625. Elwood asserts that 

both courts erred in their interpretation of I.C. § 49-625 by failing to recognize the need for 

immediacy of an approaching police vehicle, and by finding that Elwood was required to yield the 

right-of-way under I.C. § 49-119(18). We address each of these contentions below.

This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State v. 

Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a statute 

is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging 

in statutory construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State 

v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of the statute is to 

be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If 

the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative 

history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this 

Court must engage in statutory construction because an ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain 

the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 

116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). To ascertain such intent, not only must the literal words of the statute 

be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and its 

legislative history. Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give an ambiguous statute an interpretation 

which will not render it a nullity. Id. 

A. Idaho Code § 49-625

Idaho Code § 49-625 states that “upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency 

or police vehicle making use of an audible or visible signal . . . the driver of every other vehicle 

shall yield the right-of-way.” Elwood does not argue that the statute is ambiguous or dispute 

whether the police vehicle met the statutory requirements for the audio and visual signal. Instead, 
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Elwood argues that the magistrate and district courts ignored the immediacy requirement and erred 

in finding that Elwood was required to yield the right-of-way to the passing police vehicle.

Elwood first defines “immediate” in a temporal, spatial, and causal sense, then argues that 

both the distance between her vehicle and the passing police vehicle and the fact that the officer 

driving with emergency signals did not notice Elwood fail to stop indicate that there was both 

spatial separation and “a lack of direct impact.” Since the police vehicle was driving in the 

opposite direction and was at least two lanes away from her vehicle, Elwood argues the magistrate 

and district courts erred in failing to find that there was no “immediate approach.” 

As noted in Elwood’s brief, the magistrate court did not address whether the police 

vehicle’s approach was immediate. This is due to the fact that Elwood did not present this 

argument until her appeal to the district court. Generally, issues not raised below may not be 

considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 

(1992). Even had Elwood’s argument been preserved, the district court did not err in affirming

the magistrate court’s application of the statute. Elwood advocates for a very limited definition of 

immediate, which would require that a police vehicle be within one lane or heading in the same 

direction as a passing vehicle before the statute requires a driver to yield the right-of-way. Here, 

the police vehicle passed Elwood traveling in the opposite direction and a couple of lanes apart. 

Nonetheless, the approach of the police vehicle was immediate under the statute regardless of the 

spatial relationship between the two vehicles, which were in close proximity. Under the facts 

presented here, the magistrate court did not err in failing to address Elwood’s argument regarding 

the interpretation of “immediate,” and the district court correctly affirmed the magistrate court’s 

application of I.C. § 49-625 to find reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop of Elwood’s 

vehicle. 

B. Idaho Code § 49-119(18)

Elwood next argues that the magistrate and district courts erred in finding that Elwood was 

required to yield the right-of-way to the police vehicle in this case. Idaho Code § 49-119(18)

defines right-of way as:

the right of one (1) vehicle or pedestrian to proceed in a lawful manner in preference 

to another vehicle or pedestrian approaching under circumstances of direction, 

speed and proximity as to give rise to danger of collision unless one grants 

precedence to the other.
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Elwood argues that she had no right-of-way to yield and therefore was not required to drive 

her vehicle to the side of the road. In support of this argument, Elwood cites I.C. § 49-625 which 

states that upon the approach of a police vehicle, drivers shall “yield the right-of-way and 

immediately drive to . . . the right side of the highway.” Based on this section, Elwood argues that

since yielding the right-of-way is connected to the requirement to drive to the right side of the 

highway by the statute’s use of the word “and,” if a driver has no right-of-way to yield, the driver

also has no obligation to drive the vehicle to the right side of the highway. Since Elwood’s vehicle 

was traveling in the opposite direction of the police vehicle and was separated by at least two lanes, 

Elwood asserts her vehicle did not inhibit the police vehicle based on the direction, speed, and 

proximity of the two vehicles. Therefore, Elwood argues there was no danger of collision and she 

had no right-of-way to yield. 

Elwood was required to yield the right-of-way. In arguing that the right-of-way only exists 

where there is a danger of collision, Elwood misreads I.C. § 49-119 as it applies in the context of 

I.C. § 49-625. The right-of-way is the right to lawfully proceed unimpeded by vehicles or 

pedestrians where one must yield to the other to avoid collision. Prior to the passing of the police 

vehicle, Elwood maintained the right-of-way in her lane. Idaho Code § 49-625 requires that that 

right be yielded to passing emergency and police vehicles with the proper signals activated. The 

fact that the police vehicle in this case did not turn into the businesses Elwood was passing is 

irrelevant. Neither is Elwood’s belief that she could have avoided a danger of collision due to the 

multiple lanes between her vehicle and the police vehicle. Elwood was required to yield the right 

to proceed lawfully in her lane, regardless of whether that right was actually utilized by the passing 

police vehicle. Therefore, the district court did not err in affirming the magistrate court’s finding 

that Elwood failed to yield the right-of-way, and the magistrate court’s conclusion that the officer 

had reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. 

IV. 

CONCLUSION

The magistrate and district courts correctly determined that the officer who stopped 

Elwood’s vehicle had reasonable suspicion that she violated I.C. § 49-625 and did not err in 

interpreting I.C. § 49-625. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s order affirming the magistrate 

court’s denial of Elwood’s motion to suppress. 

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge LORELLO CONCUR.