alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 814 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 814

 To require the public disclosure of audits conducted with respect to 
  entities receiving funds under title X of the Public Health Service 
                                  Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 13, 2011

  Mr. Manchin introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
  referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To require the public disclosure of audits conducted with respect to 
  entities receiving funds under title X of the Public Health Service 
                                  Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Title X Transparency and 
Verification Act''.

SEC. 2. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF AUDIT RESULTS.

    The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall provide for the 
disclosure, on the Internet website of the Department of Health and 
Human Services, of the results of any audit conducted under title X of 
the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300 et seq.) concerning any 
entity that receives funds for activities under such title.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                       4,784,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  475,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  2,788,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,545,000
<PP&E>                                         790,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                 172,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,292,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,318,000
<BONDS>                                        470,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       59,042,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        91,000
<OTHER-SE>                                     649,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,292,000
<SALES>                                        549,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               549,000
<CGS>                                        1,834,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,857,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              93,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (6,197,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (6,197,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (6,197,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.91)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.91)


</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 130 (Monday, July 12, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 36589]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-14734]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No.: 34-92332]


Public Availability of the Securities and Exchange Commission's 
FY2018 Service Contract Inventory

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

    In accordance with Section 743 of Division C of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-117), SEC is publishing this 
notice to advise the public of the availability of the FY2018 Service 
Contract Inventory (SCI) along with the FY2018 SCI Analysis.
    The SCI provides information on FY2018 actions above the simplified 
acquisition threshold for service contracts. The inventory organizes 
the information by function to show how SEC distributes contracted 
resources throughout the agency. SEC developed the inventory per the 
guidance issued on January 17, 2017, by the Office of Management and 
Budget's Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). OFPP's guidance 
is available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/service_contract_inventories.pdf.
    The Service Contract Inventory Analysis for FY2018 provides 
information based on the FY2018 Inventory. Please note that the SEC's 
FY2018 Service Contract Inventory data is now included in government-
wide inventory available on www.acquisition.gov. The government-wide 
inventory can be filtered to display the inventory data for the SEC. 
The SEC has posted its FY2019 plans for analyzing data, a link to the 
FY2018 government-wide Service Contract Inventory, the FY2018 SCI 
Analysis on the SEC's homepage at http://www.sec.gov/about/secreports.shtml and http://www.sec.gov/open.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Direct questions regarding the service 
contract inventory to Vance Cathell, Director Office of Acquisitions 
202.551.8385 or <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#622103160a070e0e34221107014c050d14"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="337052475b565f5f65734056501d545c45">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: July 7, 2021.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-14734 Filed 7-9-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### Carl THOMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANK LUNA, Warden; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-17421.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed July 6, 2011.

Carl Thompson, Hudson, CO, pro se.

Daniel Patrick Struck, Esquire, Managing Senior Counsel, Jones Skelton & Ho-chuli, PLC, Phoenix, AZ, Nicholas D. Ace-do, Esquire, Struck, Wieneke & Love, P.L.C., Chandler, AZ, for Defendants-Ap-pellees.

Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Carl Thompson, an Alaska state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his hand injuries and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Morrison v.*Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir.2001). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Luna because Thompson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether *529Luna “participated in or directed the [alleged] violations, or knew of the [alleged] violations and failed to act to prevent them,” *Taylor v. List,*880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989), or whether “a policy or custom ... played a part in the [alleged] violation[s],” *Larez v. City of Los Angeles,*946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.1991).

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Ortiz because Thompson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Ortiz knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Thompson’s health and safety. *See Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir.2004) (“A prison official acts with ‘deliberate indifference ... only if the [prison official] knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’” (brackets in original) (citation omitted)).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Thompson’s state law claims because Thompson failed to rebut with expert medical testimony defendants’ showing that they met the appropriate standard of care and did not cause or aggravate his hand injuries. *See Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group, PC,*3 P.3d 916, 919 (Alaska 2000) (“[EJxpert testimony is needed to establish medical malpractice claim” except “in non-technieal situations where negligence is evident to lay people.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); *see also Riedisser v. Nelson,*111 Ariz. 542, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1975) (same legal standard for medical malpractice claim under Arizona law).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. *See Lopez v. Smith,*203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.2000) (a district court need not grant leave to amend where amendment would be futile).

Thompson’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

Thompson’s request for sanctions is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Robert P. O’Brien, Respondent, v Gloria Lerman et al., Appellants.

—In an action sounding in negligence and defamation, defendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Robbins, J.), dated October 22, 1984, as denied their cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Order reversed, insofar as appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements, cross motion granted and complaint dismissed.

The first cause of action seeks to recover from defendant Exchange Funding Corp., a mortgage company, the sum of $450, representing additional work hours expended by plaintiff, an attorney, in representing his clients at a closing of the sale of real property due to the alleged negligence of defendant corporation in failing to tender certified funds at said closing allegedly "because there were insufficient funds” to cover the check. Ultimately, plaintiff’s clients were given a certified check drawn on the account of another corporation. The complainant does not allege privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant corporation. Absent fraud, collusion or other special circumstances which are also not alleged in the *659complaint, defendant corporation is not subject to suit for negligent performance of its contractual duties by one, such as plaintiff, who did not contract for its services *(see, Calamari v Grace,*98 AD2d 74).

The second and third causes of action for defamation are based upon a letter written by an employee of defendant corporation to the corporation’s attorney explaining the reason for plaintiff having sent a bill for the sum of $450. One sentence reads, in part, that “when the funds at the closing were not able to be certified * * * he [plaintiff) *went crazy”*(emphasis supplied). The words "went crazy”, when construed in the context of the letter and its tenor, indicating plaintiff’s extremely angry reaction, cannot reasonably be understood by the mind of the ordinary intelligent reader as imputing to plaintiff insanity or mental instability and, thus, do not constitute libel per se *(see, Brill v Brenner,*62 Misc 2d 102; *Wetzel v Gulf Oil Corp.,*455 F2d 857; *DeMoya v Walsh,*441 So 2d 1120 [Fla]). Since plaintiff has failed to allege special damages with the requisite specificity *(see, Cambridge Assoc. v Inland Vale Farm Co.,*116 AD2d 684), those causes of action must also be dismissed. Lazer, J. P., Thompson, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
Amend #3, Revised Profit Sharing and Retirement Savings Plan


 EXHIBIT 10.3 
 Amendment Three 
 Morgan, Keegan & Company,
Inc. Revised Profit Sharing 
 and Retirement Savings Plan 
 WHEREAS Morgan, Keegan & Company, Inc. (the “Company”) adopted the Morgan, Keegan & Company, Inc. Revised Profit
Sharing and Retirement Savings Plan generally effective January 1, 2002 as amended and restated (the “Plan”); and 
 WHEREAS the Company reserved the right to amend the Plan; and 
 WHEREAS the Company has delegated the authority to
amend the Plan to the Benefits Management Committee of its parent company, Regions Financial Corporation (“Regions”); and 
 WHEREAS the Company now desires to amend the Plan to resume matching contributions; 
 NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is
hereby amended to read as follows: 
 1. 
 Effective January 1, 2010, Section 3.3(a) of the Plan is amended to read as follows: 
  

	 	(a)	Temporary Suspension of Matching Contributions. Notwithstanding the above, no Matching Contributions shall be made with respect to Basic Elective Contributions
or Compensation attributable to pay periods that begin after March 31, 2009 and before January 1, 2010. 

 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
 SIGNATURE 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Regions Financial Corporation on behalf of itself and all participating Employers has caused this Amendment Three to be
executed on this 16th day of December, 2009 by its duly authorized officers, effective as provided herein. 
  

			
	 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION

		
	By:	 	 /s/ David B. Edmonds

		 	David B. Edmonds
		 	Senior Executive Vice President


  

 1
#### RYAN v. HALLIGAN.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

November 27, 1907.)

Action by Anna F. Ryan against John J. Halligan, as executor, etc., of Catherine Clark, deceased.

No opinion. Motion denied.
# C_2019372EN.01001201.xml

| 4.11.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 372/12 |
| --------- | -- | -------------------------------------- | -------- |

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) lodged on 11 July 2019 — RQ v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Ciudad Real (Case C-533/19) (2019/C 372/11) Language of the case: Spanish Referring court Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha Parties to the main proceedings Applicant: RQ Defendant: Subdelegación del Gobierno en Ciudad Real Question referred Is an interpretation such as that set out in judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court No 191/2019 of 19 February 2019, appeal in cassation 5607/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:580), and No 257/2019 of 27 February 2019, appeal in cassation 5809/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:663), according to which, through an interpretation of Directive 2001/40/EC, ( 1 ) it is possible to come to the conclusion that any third-country national holding a long-term residence permit who has committed an offence punishable by a sentence of at least one year in duration can and should be ‘automatically’ removed, that is to say, [without] needing to give any consideration to his personal, family, social or employment circumstances, compatible with Article 12 of Council [Directive] 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, ( 2 ) and with — inter alia — the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 7 December 2017 (Case C-636/16 ( 3 )) and of 8 December 2011 (Case C-371/08 ( 4 ))? ( 1 )  Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals (OJ 2001 L 149, p. 34). ( 2 )  OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44. ( 3 )  Judgment of 7 December 2017, López Pastuzano (C-636/16, EU:C:2017:949). ( 4 )  Judgment of 8 December 2011, Ziebell (C-371/08, EU:C:2011:809).

---
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________ 

Case No. 5D2022-1462

LT Case No. 2018-CF-0899

_____________________________ 

VINCENT TERRY, 

Appellant, 

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee. 

_____________________________ 

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County. 

Lisa D. Herndon, Judge. 

Vincent Terry, Crawfordville, pro se. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. 

Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. 

June 28, 2024

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the trial court’s order in all respects except for its 

summary denial of Appellant’s claim that his counsel was 

ineffective when he opened the door to firearms evidence that was 

the subject of an order in limine, which claim he brings to this 

Court as Issue Three, and which claim the trial court addressed as 

Ground One. We vacate and remand the trial court’s summary 

denial of that claim for attachment of a copy of that portion of the 
2 

files and records in the case that conclusively shows Appellant is 

not entitled to relief as to the claim, see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(4), 

or, if there are no such files and records, for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED WITH 

INSTRUCTIONS

EISNAUGLE, BOATWRIGHT, and PRATT, JJ., concur. 

_____________________________ 

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331. 

_____________________________
#### Milton Berlin, Respondent, v Matthias O. Schlotthauer, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

—In an action for a partition of certain real property, the defendant Matthias Schlotthauer appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Orgera, J.), entered May 9, 1984, as held, in effect, that the plaintiff had title to the subject property.

Appeal dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements *(see, Berlin v Schlotthauer,*117 AD2d 768). Bracken, J. P., Lawrence, Fiber and Kooper, JJ., concur.
(38 App. Div. 109.)

#### PRITCHARD v. NEDERLAND LIFE INS. CO., Limited.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

March 10, 1899.)

Striking Cause prom Calendar—Notice op Trial—Stipulation.

A cause should he stricken from the calendar on plaintiff’s motion, where the answer was not served until too late to notice the cause for trial and put it on the calendar, though plaintiff had stipulated, in extending the time to answer, that the issue should remain as of the time when the answer first became due.

Appeal from special term.

Action by William B. Pritchard against the Nederland Life Insurance Company, Limited. From an order denying a motion to strike the cause from calendar, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and BARRETT, RUMSEY, McLaughlin, and ingraham, jj.

L. Sturcke, for appellant.

W. W. Thompson, for respondent.

VAN BRUNT, P. J.

We think that this order should be reversed. The case was not at issue at the time the note of issue was filed and the case noticed for trial. An unverified answer had been served, which was subsequently returned, and was not reserved in the verified form which the plaintiff had a right to require, until too late to notice the cause for trial and put it upon the calendar for the December term, 1898. The fact that a stipulation had been entered into upon the part of the plaintiff, as to extending the time to answer, that the issue should remain as of the time when the answer first became due, in no manner affects the question raised upon this appeal. All that the stipulation could do would- be to allow the cause to take its place among the issues of the month for which the note of issue could be properly filed as of the date when the answer was originally due. Notice of trial cannot be properly served until the case is at issue, and a note of issue can only be filed for a term at which the case is properly noticed for trial. Leonard v. Faber, 31 App. Div. 137, 52 N. Y. Supp. 772.

The order appealed from should be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion granted, with $10 costs. All concur.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 6199** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. PABLO EMILIO RODRIGUEZ, III , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh
. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. ( 5:02

- cr - 00160

- H

- 1 ; 5:12

- cv - 00302

- H )

Submitted : December 22, 2014 Decided: January 8, 2015

Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Pablo Emilio Rodriguez, I II , Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer P. May

Parker, Ethan A. Ontjes, Assistant U nited S tates Attorney s , Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee
. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Pablo Emilio Rodriguez, III seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (2012) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constituti onal right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is d ebatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently review ed the record and conclude that Rodriguez has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we de ny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Shehane *v.*Caraway, *et al.*

*Bill to< Enforce Vendor's Lieni*

(Decided Jan. 21, 1908.

45 South. 469.)

1. *Infants; Guardian ad Litem,; Necessity For.*— The legal title to land descends to the heir, and to subject it to a vendor’s lien, as against minor heirs, it is essential that a guardian ad litem be appointed for them.

2. *Same; Pleading Without Appointment; Effect.*— When no guardian ad litem had been appointed for the minor heirs, an answer filed in their name or by them cannot be considered for any purpose.

Appeal from Barbour Chancery Court.

Heard before Hon. W. L. Park.

Bill by S. J. Caraway, administrator, against Fanny Shehane, et al., to enforce a vendor’s lien. From a decree for complainants, respondents appeal.

Beversed and remanded.

Solly & Kirkland, for appellant.

The failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for the infant defendants, must work a reversal in this case.- — Sec. 17, Code 1896; *Ilibler v. Sproiol,*71 Ala. 50; *Griffith v. Ventress,*91 Ala. 366; *Barker v.*Parker, 99 Ala. 239.

Williams & Williams, for appellee.

Counsel discuss assignments of error, but cite no authority.

HARALSON, J.

The bill in this cause was filed to enforce a vendor’s lien against the widow and minor child of the deceased vendee.

Under the statute of descent and distribution, the legal title to the land descended to the children; and in order to subject the land to the lien it was necessary that *392they be represented by a guardian ad litem. Indeed the complainant could not subject their legal estate to sale, in the absence of their being property before the *court.*— Griffith *v. Ventress,*91 Ala. 366, 8 South. 312, and authorities there cited. The answer to the bill filed in behalf of the respondent minors cannot be considered, for the reason that no one had authority to make it for them, no guardian ad litem having been appointed.

What their defenses may be is purely conjectural, and therefore the determination of any right which was asserted in the answer and cross-bill found in the record would be wholly gratuitous.

Reversed and remanded.

Tyson, C. J., and Simpson and Denson, JJ., concur.