alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4591

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. RICHARD N. GARRIES, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (2:03-cr-00069-HCM-TEM-1)

Submitted: January 28, 2010 Decided: February 16, 2010

Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lawrence H. Woodward, Jr., SHUTTLEWORTH, RULOFF, SWAIN, HADDAD & MORECOCK, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Robert J. Seidel, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.PER CURIAM:

Richard N. Garries was convicted of one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). While serving his three-year term of supervised release, Garries engaged in conduct which resulted in his conviction on twenty-four felony counts involving fraud, money laundering, false statements, and structuring financial transactions. Based on these convictions, in conjunction with other related violations of his supervised release, the district court revoked Garries’ supervised release and imposed a twenty-four-month sentence for nine violations of supervised release. Garries appeals this sentence, arguing thatthe district court erred by sentencing him beyond his six-totwelve-month advisory sentencing range. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup , 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). District courts ultimately have broad discretion to revoke a previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum. Id. at 439. Here, the district court imposed the maximum sentence, noting that Garries’ testimony at the revocation hearing was “unbelievable,” “incredible,” and “preposterous.” (JA 102). We do not review credibility determinations on appeal, Glasser

23 v. United States , 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942), and find that Garries’ sentence was not plainly unreasonable. Crudup , 461 F.3d at 437. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
#### Arbary Phillip JACKSON, Appellant, v. MISSOURI BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Appellee.

No. 07-3882.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 3, 2008.

Filed: Jan. 9, 2009.

Arbary Phillip Jackson, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Dana C. Ceresia, Attorney General’s Office, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before MELLOY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Arbary Jackson appeals the district court’s1 dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Upon de novo review, *see Union Elec. Co. v. Mo. Dept. of Conservation,*366 F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir.2004), we agree with the district court that Jackson’s complaint was barred by sovereign immunity, *see Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,*531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). Jackson’s pro se status does not excuse his failure to name the proper parties, *see Brown v. Frey,*806 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir.1986) (pro se liti*334gants are not excused from complying with substantive and procedural law), and we decline his request to remand this matter with instructions to allow amendment of his complaint, *see Artis v. Francis Howell N. Band Booster Ass’n, Inc.,*161 F.3d 1178, 1182 (8th Cir.1998) (denying request on appeal to amend complaint to name defendant in his personal capacity where plaintiff had ample time to seek amendment but failed to do so). Finally, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson’s motion for reconsideration. *See United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist.,*440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir.2006).

Accordingly, we affirm.

1

. The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to  Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, Joel Boyarski, the Principal Financial Officer of WorldGate Communications, Inc., hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that the Form 10-Q of WorldGate Communications, Inc., for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2008, which this certification accompanies, fully complies
with requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and information contained in the March 31, 2008 Form 10-Q
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of WorldGate Communications, Inc.

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to WorldGate and will be retained by WorldGate and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

Dated:
May 20, 2008

| | /s/JOEL BOYARSKIJoel Boyarski Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
| | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---



QuickLinks
Opinion issued November 1, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-14-00647-CV

———————————

KAREN KRISTINE SILVIO, Appellant

V.

JASON B. OSTROM AND NICOLE K. SAIN, Appellees

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 937,164

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Karen Kristine Silvio, proceeding pro se, timely appealed from the 

trial court’s final judgment, signed on May 9, 2014, after moving for a new trial. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(1). However, appellant has neither paid nor made 

arrangements to pay the filing fee or the fee for preparing the clerk’s record and she 
2

has not established indigence for purposes of appellate costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 

20.1, 37.3(b). After being notified by this Court’s Order and Notice of Intent to 

Dismiss for Want of Prosecution on August 15, 2016, which reinstated this case after 

appellant’s bankruptcy case had been dismissed, that this appeal was subject to 

dismissal for want of prosecution for failure to pay the required fees, appellant did 

not timely respond.1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 37.3(b), 42.3(b), (c).

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for nonpayment of all required fees and 

for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 37.3(b), 42.3(b), (c). We dismiss 

any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Huddle.

 

1 Although appellant filed a motion to establish indigence in this Court on September 

8, 2016, appellant failed to timely respond after this Court ordered her to use the 

new form required by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1(c).
#### HARRISON et al., Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF EAST SYRACUSE, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

February 6, 1898.)

Action by Philip Harrison and others against the village of East Syracuse.

No opinion. Motion for re-argument denied, with $10 costs. See 48 N. Y. Supp. 1106.
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,409
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Hector VALADEZ-GARCIA, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 07-50406.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*72Submitted Dec. 17, 2008.*

Filed Jan. 8, 2009.

Randy K. Jones, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Elizabeth Armena Missakian, Law Office of Elizabeth A. Missakian, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GOODWIN, TROTT, and RYMER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Hector Valadez-Garcia appeals from his guilty-plea conviction for being a deported alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm, but remand to correct the judgment.

Valadez-Garcia contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motions for substitution of counsel, resulting in a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. The record discloses that the district court adequately inquired into the bases for the motions. *See United States v. McKenna,*327 F.3d 830, 844 (9th Cir.2003). Valadez-Garcia’s contention that there was a total breakdown in communication is not supported by the record. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for substitute counsel. *See id.*

In accordance with *United States v. Rivera-Sanchez,*222 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir.2000), we remand the case to the district court with instructions that it delete from the judgment the incorrect reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). *See United States v. Herrera-Blanco,*232 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir.2000) (remanding sua sponte to delete the reference to § 1326(b)).

AFFIRMED; REMANDED to correct judgment.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### In the Matter of Severio L. Bruscino, Appellant, v Raymond W Kelly, as Police Commissioner of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.

[942 NYS2d 867]—

*448Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Judith J. Gische, J.), entered June 30, 2010, dismissing a CPLR article 78 petition seeking to annul respondents’ determination, dated March 23, 2009, which terminated petitioner’s probationary employment as a police officer, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Supreme Court properly determined that the petition failed to state a claim. Respondents are entitled to discharge a probationary police officer “for ‘almost any reason, or for no reason at all’ as long as it is not ‘in bad faith or for an improper or impermissible reason’ ” *(Matter of Duncan v Kelly,*9 NY3d 1024, 1025 [2008], quoting *Matter of Swinton v Safir,*93 NY2d 758, 762-763 [1999]; *see Matter of Berenhaus v Ward,*70 NY2d 436, 445 [1987]). At its essence, the petition alleges that petitioner’s failure to disclose the psychological treatment he underwent at the age of six was inadvertent. However, even if petitioner was “ ‘ignorant,’ ‘unaware’ [of], or ‘oblivious’ ” to his personal history, respondents are entitled, given the broad discretion with which they are vested, to deem “such omissions a[s] material to his qualifications” *(Matter of Roman v Brown,*202 AD2d 321 [1994], *lv denied*83 NY2d 760 [1994]). Even assuming the truth of the petition’s allegations, the petition fails to allege any facts that would, if proven to be true, constitute a violation of “statute or policies established by decisional law” *(Matter of Talamo v Murphy,*38 NY2d 637, 639 [1976]; *see Matter of York v McGuire,*63 NY2d 760 [1984]). Petitioner has also failed to allege facts supporting a conclusion that his termination was in bad faith. Given this failure, a hearing to resolve the truth of the facts alleged is unnecessary *(see Matter of Bienz v Kelly,*73 AD3d 489 [2010]). Concur — Saxe, J.P., Sweeny, Moskowitz, Freedman and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2



NANOGEN, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)



In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of Nanogen Incorporated
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the three months ended March 31, 2005 (the Report), I, Robert Saltmarsh, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|             |  |  |  |                                         
|------------ |  |  |  | ----------------------------------------
|             |  | 
|May 10, 2005 |  |  |  | /s/ ROBERT SALTMARSH                    
|             |  |  |  | Robert Saltmarsh Chief Financial Officer
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 25, 2024

No. 04-24-00431-CV

Ali ALABUDI,

Appellant

v.

Amelia GELIN,

Appellee

From the 274th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. 24-1192-CV-B

Honorable Daniel H. Mills, Judge Presiding

ORDER

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED. Costs of 

the appeal are taxed against appellant.

It is so ORDERED on September 25, 2024.

_____________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 25th day of September, 2024.

_____________________________

Luz Estrada, Chief Deputy Clerk
#### Richard Reunis, Respondent, v Vincent J. Bowen et al, Appellants. (And Another Action.)

—In a consolidated action to declare plaintiff the owner of 25% of the stock of defendant corporation, to impose a constructive trust upon certain real property owned by defendant corporation, and to obtain an accounting, defendants appeal from so much of a *731judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Geiler, J.), dated June 27, 1984, as adjudged that plaintiff is entitled to a 50% ownership in the real property.

Judgment modified by deleting the first decretal paragraph thereof and substituting therefor: "adjudged, that upon termination of the business of defendant Riverhead Toyota, Inc. and liquidation of its assets, plaintiff shall be entitled to 50% of the net proceeds of the sale of the real property which presently houses the corporate offices, showroom and repair shop of the defendant Riverhead Toyota, Inc. at Riverhead, New York, and, it is further”. As so modified, judgment affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The issues herein were presented to Trial Term upon "a stipulation as to the testimony that each party would have given if called to testify at a trial” and certain documents. The parties now debate the inferences to be drawn therefrom.

A handwritten memorandum, dated September 2, 1977, and signed by the plaintiff Richard Reunis and defendant Vincent Bowen, who are the sole shareholders of the corporate defendant, Riverhead Toyota, Inc., set forth the individual parties’ agreement concerning the distribution of the corporate assets upon either the death of a shareholder, or termination of the business of the corporate defendant and liquidation of its assets. Specifically, the agreement provided, in pertinent part, as follows: "whereas, and *[sic]*agreement is made, that upon the sale of Riverhead Toyota the Building on Route 58 which Richard Reunis owned 50 percent will be shared 50 percent upon sale with Vincent Bowen.”

We find that pursuant to the shareholders’ agreement, plaintiff Reunis does not have a current 50% ownership in the real property on Route 58, which is currently in the corporate name and presently houses the corporate offices, showroom and repair shop of the corporate defendant at Riverhead, New York. However, upon the termination of the business of the corporate defendant and liquidation of its assets, plaintiff will be entitled to 50% of the net proceeds of the sale of the real property in question. The judgment has been modified accordingly.

Defendants’ remaining contentions have been considered and found to be without merit. Lazer, J. P., Mangano, Brown and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

BRADFORD VERNON BLAKEWAY,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-23-00278-CR 

Appeal from the

394th Judicial District Court 

of Jeff Davis County, Texas 

(TC# CR2300919)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the 

judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. This decision shall be certified 

below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 29TH DAY OF AUGUST 2024.

LISA J. SOTO, Justice

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.
CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 302


OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




I, Hua
Meng, certify that:




1.           I
have reviewed this Form 10-K of Dahua Inc.




2.           Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;




3.           Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;




4.           The
registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:




a)
designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;




b)
evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and




c)
disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and




5.           The
registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s Board of
Directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):




a) all
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and




b) any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial
reporting.





Date:   March
23, 2009





Hua
      Meng, Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)