J-A11024-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

H.S.

v.

D.S.

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1166 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Civil Division at No(s): 

859 of 2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: September 7, 2023

Appellant, D.S., appeals from the trial court’s September 15, 2022 order 

denying his petition to vacate its final protection from abuse (“PFA”) order for 

lack of due process and specific jurisdiction.1 We affirm. 

On March 29, 2021, Appellee, H.S., filed a PFA petition against Appellant 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County. In the petition, H.S. sought 

protection from abuse for herself and her minor daughter, L.S., who was twoyears old at the time. Petition for Protection from Abuse (“Petition”), 3/29/21, 

at ¶¶ 1, 3, 8. H.S. averred therein that Appellant is her spouse or former 

spouse, and the father of L.S. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 8. H.S. also indicated that she 

and L.S. live in Nanty Glo, Pennsylvania, and that D.S. resides in Pemberville, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122 (“Protection from Abuse Act”). 
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Ohio. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2, 8.2 In addition, she provided the following information 

about the alleged abuse, which we produce verbatim except for the parties’ 

names:

10. The facts of the most recent incident of abuse are as follows:

On about Saturday, March 27, 2021 at approximately 8:00 PM

location: 304 Bond St.[3]

I had gone out to his place to retrieve my things because 

he said I had 2 weeks to pick up my belongings or he was 

throwing them away. I have some family heirlooms and 

some of my daughters belongings that I needed to retrieve. 

[Appellant] had asked me to not bring anyone or contact 

the police to come with me. I was uneasy by this so I did 

ask a friend to drive me there for safety. [Appellant] had 

my belongings in a storage unit. I had called the Sherriff 

department in that local area to give his license plate and 

description in the event something happened because 

[Appellant] would not give me the address to the facility 

but insisted he meet me and I follow him there. I got my

belongings and got back into the car and noticed 

[Appellant] still in the area. [Appellant] then started 

following us for approximately 10 miles in a direction 

opposite from his residence. I had then called [Appellant] 

to ask him to stop following us and he became defensive 

with me and he had a friend with him who started yelling 

at me over the phone and the friend then threatened to kill 

me and leave my body on the side of the road.

I did contact the Wood County Sherriffs Dept. in Ohio 

regarding this and was able to file for and Emergency PFA 

in Cambria County 

____________________________________________

2 Pemberville is located in Wood County, Ohio.

3 H.S. conveyed elsewhere in the petition that this was Appellant’s address at 

the time she filed the petition. Id. at ¶ 2.
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11. Prior incidents of abuse that Defendant has committed against 

Plaintiff or the minor child/ren, (including any threats, injuries, or 

incidents of stalking) are as follows:

Summer 2020 I contacted the police because he and his 

family were threatening to kill me and throw me in a ditch. 

They also made threats toward my daughter with physical 

harm and threats on her life.

Sexual abuse allegations of our 2 year old daughter from 

2018 thru 2019 made by the baby sitter that is currently 

under investigation by NCIS

When I took our daughter to Indiana PA to visit with 

[Appellant] and he had physically struck our daughter so I 

took her home.

Id. at ¶¶ 10, 11. 

The same day that H.S. filed her petition, the trial court issued a 

temporary PFA order and scheduled a hearing for April 12, 2021. On April 7, 

2021, an affidavit of service was filed by Wood County’s acting sheriff, noting 

that service of the ‘Notice of Hearing and Order, Petition and Temporary Order’ 

was made by hand delivery to Appellant at his home address on the morning 

of March 31, 2021. 

On April 12, 2021, the hearing occurred. Appellant did not attend. 

Following the hearing, on April 13, 2021, the trial court entered a final PFA 

order for a period of two years. That same day, it amended that order to state 

that all provisions entered in the March 29, 2021 temporary PFA order shall 

remain in effect.4 

____________________________________________

4 The trial court sent the final PFA order and a cost order to Appellant. 

However, that mailing was returned to the trial court, on the basis that it was 

unable to be delivered. Similarly, the trial court mailed the amended order to 

Appellant, but it was also returned as unable to be delivered. 
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Over a year later, on June 28, 2022, Appellant’s counsel filed a praecipe 

for entry of appearance. Two months after that, on September 12, 2022, 

Appellant filed a “Petition to Vacate PFA For Lack of Due Process and Lack of 

Specific Jurisdiction.” He claimed, inter alia, that he has no connection to 

Pennsylvania and that H.S. had to file the action in the state where the alleged 

abuse occurred, i.e., Ohio. See Petition to Vacate, 9/12/22, at ¶¶ 26, 27. 

On September 19, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying 

Appellant’s petition to vacate. In support, it pointed to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Civil Procedure 1901.1, entitled “Venue.” Rule 1901.1 states, in relevant part:

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), an action for protection 

from abuse may be brought in a county in which

(1) the plaintiff resides, either temporarily or permanently, or is 

employed, or

(2) the defendant may be served, or

(3) the abuse occurred.

(b) If the relief sought includes possession of the residence or 

household to the exclusion of the defendant, the action shall be 

brought only in the county in which the residence or household is 

located.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1901.1(a), (b). The trial court explained that, in H.S.’s March 29, 

2021 petition, she listed an address in Nanty Glo, Pennsylvania, as her 

residence, and sought exclusion of Appellant from her residence there. Based 

on these facts, it determined that Appellant’s petition lacked merit under Rule 

1901.1.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. That same day, he also filed a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 
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1925(b). The trial court later issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion, in which it relied 

on the reasoning set forth in its September 19, 2022 order denying Appellant’s 

petition to vacate. 

Presently, Appellant raises a single issue for our review:

Whether the facts in ... [H.S.’s] PFA petition were sufficient to 

confer specific jurisdiction over [Appellant] under the Supreme 

Court’s rationale in International Shoe [Co. v. Washington, 

326 U.S. 310 (1945)].

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (emphasis in original).5 

Before we delve into Appellant’s issue, we must address whether this 

appeal is moot, as the final PFA order expired on April 13, 2023. See M.B.S. 

v. W.E., 232 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that we may address 

mootness sua sponte) (citations omitted). It is well-established that:

As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all 

stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot. 

An issue can become moot during the pendency of an appeal due 

to an intervening change in the facts of the case or due to an 

intervening change in the applicable law. In that case, an opinion 

of this Court is rendered advisory in nature. An issue before a 

court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an 

order that has any legal force or effect.

Id. (citations omitted). However,

[t]his Court will decide questions that otherwise have been 

rendered moot when one or more of the following exceptions to 

the mootness doctrine apply: 1) the case involves a question of 

great public importance, 2) the question presented is capable of 

repetition and apt to elude appellate review, or 3) a party to the 

controversy will suffer some detriment due to the decision of the 

trial court. ... [T]his Court has employed exceptions to the 

mootness doctrine to review issues stemming from expired PFA 

orders. 

____________________________________________

5 H.S. has not filed an appellee’s brief. 
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Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 920 (Pa. Super. 2013) (cleaned up). 

Here, Appellant’s appeal meets the third exception to the mootness 

doctrine, as he will suffer some detriment due to the trial court’s final PFA 

order. As this Court has recognized, “[a]t the very least, the present PFA 

order may be considered by the trial court in any subsequent PFA proceedings, 

as well as in any child custody proceedings.” N.H. v. M.E., 2019 WL 3780900, 

at *2 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 12, 2019) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(a)).6 Further, 

“[i]t would also appear in a criminal history record check conducted by the 

Pennsylvania State Police.” Id. (23 Pa.C.S. § 6105(e)(3)). Accordingly, 

because Appellant will suffer some detriment due to the final PFA order, we 

will not deem his appeal moot. See id. 

On appeal, Appellant argues that “[t]he [t]rial [c]ourt’s exercise of 

specific jurisdiction over [him] offends the traditional notions of [d]ue 

[p]rocess, fair play, and substantial justice.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. He says 

that “[n]othing under Pennsylvania’s long[-]arm statute applied to give the 

[c]ourt jurisdiction, [Appellant] did not avail themselves [sic] to Pennsylvania 

[c]ourts, and there are no contacts by [Appellant] sufficient to give 

Pennsylvania jurisdiction over this matter.” Id. at 14-15. He insists that, 

“[b]ecause all of the events that led to [H.S.’s] filing the PFA [petition] 

occurred in Ohio, the PFA [action] needed to be adjudicated under Ohio law 

____________________________________________

6 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that an unpublished non-precedential 

memorandum decision filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for its persuasive 

value). 
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in an Ohio [c]ourt.” Id. at 6. Consequently, Appellant claims that “the Court 

of Common Pleas of Cambria County violated [his] right to [d]ue [p]rocess of 

[l]aw when it adjudicated the PFA [petition] filed by [H.S]. The lack of [d]ue 

[p]rocess voids the judgment entered by the [trial court] and the matter must 

be dismissed.” Id. at 15.7

Initially, we note that, in general, an objection to personal jurisdiction 

must be raised in preliminary objections. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 

1028 provides:

(a) Preliminary objections may be filed by any party to any 

pleading and are limited to the following grounds:

(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action 

or the person of the defendant, improper venue or improper 

form or service of a writ of summons or a complaint.... 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1). Further, Rule 1032(a) sets forth that:

(a) A party waives all defenses and objections which are not 

presented either by preliminary objection, answer or reply, except 

a defense which is not required to be pleaded under Rule 

____________________________________________

7 Appellant also claims that the trial court did not undertake a jurisdictional 

analysis, but instead wrongly focused on whether venue was proper in 

Cambria County. Appellant’s Brief at 6. We agree, as jurisdiction and venue 

are distinct concepts. See Barr v. Bureau of Professional and 

Occupational Affairs, 803 A.2d 243, 247 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (“Venue is 

defined as ‘[t]he proper or a possible place for the trial of a lawsuit....’ BLACK’S 

LAW DICTIONARY 1553 (7th ed.1999). Jurisdiction is defined, on the other 

hand, as ‘[a] government’s general power to exercise authority over all 

persons and things within its territory....’ Id. at 855. Venue and jurisdiction 

are distinguishable; venue relates to where judicial authority may be 

exercised, but more important, jurisdiction is the power to adjudicate.”) 

(emphasis in original; citation omitted); see also Barrett v. M&B Medical 

Billing, Inc., 291 A.3d 371, 376 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“Although decisions 

of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this Court, they may provide 

persuasive authority.”) (citation omitted). 
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1030(b),[8]the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable 

party, the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim, 

the defenses of failure to exercise or exhaust a statutory remedy 

and an adequate remedy at law and any other nonwaivable 

defense or objection.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1032(a). 

Thus, it would appear that Appellant has waived his personal jurisdiction 

objection by not raising it in preliminary objections. However, we are aware 

that special rules apply to PFA proceedings. Specifically, with respect to PFA 

petitions, the Rules provide that “[t]he defendant is not required to file an 

answer or other responsive pleading to the petition or the certified order, and 

all averments not admitted shall be deemed denied.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1901.6 

(emphasis added).9 As such, because Rule 1901.6 suggests that Appellant 

was not required to file a responsive pleading, and because H.S. has not filed 

a brief offering a contrary argument, we will assume for purposes of this 

appeal that Appellant has not waived this issue by failing to file preliminary 

objections.10 Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of his issue. 

Section 6103 of the Protection from Abuse Act provides:

____________________________________________

8 Rule 1030(b) states that “[t]he affirmative defenses of assumption of risk, 

comparative negligence and contributory negligence need not be pleaded.” 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030(b). 

9 We also note that “[a] protection order or approved consent agreement shall 

be for a fixed period of time not to exceed three years. The court may amend 

its order or agreement at any time upon subsequent petition filed by either 

party.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108(d). 

10 Perhaps with more complete advocacy in the future, we would reach a 

different conclusion. 
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(a) General rule.--The court shall have jurisdiction over all 

proceedings under this chapter.

(b) Effect of departure and nonresidence.--The right of the 

plaintiff to relief under this chapter shall not be affected by either 

of the following:

(1) The plaintiff’s leaving the residence or household to 

avoid further abuse.

(2) The defendant’s absence from this Commonwealth or 

the defendant’s nonresidence in this Commonwealth, 

provided that the court has personal jurisdiction over the 

defendant in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 5322 (relating to 

bases of personal jurisdiction over persons outside this 

Commonwealth).

23 Pa.C.S. § 6103. Therefore, H.S.’s right to relief is not affected by 

Appellant’s absence from and/or nonresidence in Pennsylvania, so long as the 

court has personal jurisdiction over Appellant in accordance with our long-arm 

statute, Section 5322. 

With respect to Section 5322, this Court has observed:

Section 5322(a) contains ten paragraphs that specify particular 

types of contact with Pennsylvania deemed sufficient to warrant 

the exercise of specific jurisdiction. In addition, [S]ection 5322(b) 

operates as a “catchall,” providing that jurisdiction may be 

exercised over persons who do not fall within the express 

provisions of [S]ection 5322(a) to the fullest extent permitted by 

the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 

Regardless, if a defendant’s activities in Pennsylvania only give 

rise to jurisdiction under [S]ection 5322(a) or (b), the plaintiff’s 

cause of action is limited to those activities which formed the basis 

of jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 5322(c).

N.T. ex rel. K.R.T. v. F.F., 118 A.3d 1130, 1134-35 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(quoting Mendel v. Williams, 53 A.3d 810, 820-21 (Pa. Super. 2012); some 

brackets added).

In addition, we have noted:
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[E]ach of the ten subsections of [Section] 5322(a) [is] wholly 

subsumed within the catchall provision of [Section] 5322(b). 

Consequently, the only appropriate focus ... is whether the 

minimum requisites of due process have been met, for if they have 

not, the various subsections of [Section] 5322(a) cannot 

statutorily authorize an unconstitutional exercise of in personam

jurisdiction. If they have been met, any analysis of the 

subsections of [Section] 5322(a) would be superfluous.

Id. at 1135 n.5 (citations omitted; some brackets added). 

As mentioned supra, “Pennsylvania courts have recognized that Section 

5322(b) renders the reach of the long-arm statute coextensive with that 

permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 

(cleaned up). Regarding the specific jurisdiction permitted by the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, our Supreme Court has explained:

[A]t its most simplistic, the question for specific personal 

jurisdiction continues to be whether the defendant has sufficient 

“minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of 

the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 ... 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Requiring 

minimum contacts satisfies due process by ensuring that the 

defendant may “reasonably anticipate” where it may be “haled 

into court” based upon which forums it has “purposefully avail[ed] 

itself of the privilege of conducting activities.” Burger King Corp. 

[v. Rudzewicz], 471 U.S. [462,] 474[ (1985)]. The High Court 

has opined that this requirement ensures that a defendant will not 

be subject to jurisdiction “solely as a result of random, fortuitous, 

or attenuated contacts.” Id. at 475 ... (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

As Justice Sotomayor cited in her dissenting opinion in [BristolMyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San 

Francisco County, 582 U.S. 255 (2017)], a preeminent treatise 

on federal practice and procedure observed that courts have 

synthesized the specific personal jurisdiction caselaw into a more 

manageable three-part test:

(1) Did the plaintiff’s cause of action arise out of or relate to 

the out-of-state defendant’s forum-related contacts?
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(2) Did the defendant purposely direct its activities, 

particularly as they relate to the plaintiff’s cause of action, 

toward the forum state or did the defendant purposely avail 

itself of the privilege of conducting activities therein?

(3) Would the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the 

nonresident defendant in the forum state satisfy the 

requirement that it be reasonable and fair?23

23 To determine whether personal jurisdiction would 

be “reasonable and fair” under the third part of the 

test, courts will consider the following factors: “the 

burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in 

adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in 

obtaining convenient and effective relief, the 

interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the 

most efficient resolution of controversies, and the 

shared interest of the several States in furthering 

fundamental substantive social policies.” Burger 

King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477 ... (quoting World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 ... 

(1980)) (internal quotations marks removed).

4 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam N. Steinman, 

Federal Practice & Procedure Civil § 1069 (4th ed. 2015 & Supp. 

2020) (“Federal Practice & Procedure Civil”); [Bristol-Myers 

Squibb Co., 582 U.S. at 271-72] (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).

Hammons v. Ethicon, Inc., 240 A.3d 537, 556-57 (Pa. 2020) (original 

brackets omitted).11 

We consider Appellant’s jurisdictional challenge unavailing. To begin, 

regarding the first two prongs of the above-stated, three-part test, Appellant’s 

argument is premised on his insistence that he has had no contact with 

____________________________________________

11 Further, when challenging the exercise of in personam jurisdiction, the 

moving party must support its objections to personal jurisdiction and, once it 

has done so, the burden of proving personal jurisdiction is placed upon the 

party asserting it. N.T. ex rel. K.R.T., 118 A.3d at 1134 (citation omitted). 

In addition, “when deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction[,] the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the non-moving party.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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Pennsylvania. Appellant’s Brief at 5. He says that “everything [H.S.] alleged 

occurred in Ohio, not Pennsylvania[,]” and insists that the “only link” to 

Pennsylvania is H.S.’s address. Id. at 6, 13. See also id. at 5 (“Can the 

purported victim of abuse that occurs in another state flee to Pennsylvania 

and obtain a [PFA] order, when [Appellant] has no contact with 

Pennsylvania?”); id. at 10 (“Further from [H.S.’s] complaint[,] all the things 

occurred in Ohio, no tortious conduct occurred within Pennsylvania.”). 

Problematically, the record does not support the premise of Appellant’s 

argument, and we therefore cannot accept his claim that the court lacked 

jurisdiction over him because H.S.’s petition shows that he has had no contact 

with Pennsylvania. 

Instead, our review of the record supports that Appellant has had 

contact with H.S. and L.S. in Pennsylvania. In H.S.’s petition, she alleged a 

prior incident of abuse where she took their daughter, L.S., to visit with 

Appellant in Indiana, Pennsylvania, and he physically struck L.S., prompting 

H.S. to take L.S. home. Petition at ¶ 11. While H.S. did not aver when this 

incident took place, we reiterate that L.S. was only two-years old at the time 

the petition was filed and, as such, this incident could not have happened very 

far in the past. Appellant does not address this specific incident at all, nor 

does he explain how his coming to Pennsylvania — and seeing L.S. and H.S.
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— affects Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction over him.12 We decline to conduct this 

jurisdictional analysis on his behalf. See Commonwealth v. Frey, 41 A.3d 

605, 613-14 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“It would be improper for this Court to act as 

counsel for a party. That is, we must not write a party’s brief and develop the 

analysis necessary to support the party’s position.”) (citations omitted). 

Moreover, as for the third prong of the three-part test, whether the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over Appellant in Pennsylvania is reasonable 

and fair, Appellant proffers no developed argument on this point. Despite 

listing the factors that courts are to consider when ascertaining whether 

personal jurisdiction would be “reasonable and fair,” see Appellant’s Brief at 

12-13, he does not meaningfully discuss any of them. See Hammons, supra 

(“To determine whether personal jurisdiction would be ‘reasonable and fair’ 

under the third part of the test, courts will consider the following factors: ‘the 

____________________________________________

12 Appellant generally argues that “any allegation of abuse concerning the 

parties’ minor child cannot be used to bootstrap jurisdiction. Clearly the 

allegations that give rise to the PFA [order] involve an incident between two 

adults. The allegations that give rise to the PFA [order] do not involve the 

parties’ minor child.” Appellant’s Brief at 13-14 (footnote omitted). We 

disagree. The allegations that gave rise to the PFA order did involve the 

parties’ minor child, and H.S. requested protection for both herself and L.S. 

therein. See Petition at ¶¶ 3, 4, 11. Further, to the extent that Appellant 

claims lack of notice that L.S. was involved, see Appellant’s Brief at 14 n.2, 

we note that the petition, notice of hearing, and temporary order were hand 

delivered to Appellant at his home address on March 31, 2021. The caption 

of the Notice of Hearing and Order stated “[H.S.] individually and on behalf of

minor[,]” and the trial court included L.S. as a protected person in its 

temporary order. Notice of Hearing and Order, 3/29/21. Further, H.S.’s 

petition was captioned “[H.S.] Et. Al.[,]” and stated that she and L.S. sought 

protection from abuse. See Petition at ¶¶ 3, 4. 
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burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the 

dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the 

interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution 

of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering 

fundamental substantive social policies.’”). Instead, he merely states:

Applying these principles to the case at bar[,] it is clear the 

Cambria County Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction to hear 

this matter. From the allegations in the PFA [petition] and the 

motion to vacate, it is a dispute between ex-husband and ex-wife 

over an incident that occurred in Ohio. [Appellant] did not avail 

themselves [sic] to Pennsylvania [l]aw and could not reasonably 

be held to expect being [haled] into [c]ourt in Pennsylvania. It is 

not fair for a Pennsylvania [c]ourt to exercise jurisdiction over the 

matter especially when all of the witnesses and other evidence is 

located in Ohio. The only link to Pennsylvania is [H.S.’s] address.

Appellant’s Brief at 13. 

“When briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is an 

appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our 

review. The brief must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with 

references to the record and with citations to legal authorities.” 

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations 

omitted). Further, “[t]his Court will not act as counsel and will not develop 

arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Id. (citation omitted).

Appellant has failed to meaningfully discuss the relevant factors, and we 

again decline to conduct this analysis for him. As such, he has not convinced 

us that Pennsylvania’s exercising jurisdiction over him is not fair and 
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reasonable under the circumstances. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the 

trial court’s order denying Appellant’s petition to vacate.13 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/7/2023

____________________________________________

13 While we affirm the trial court’s order, we acknowledge that our reasoning 

differs from the rationale used by the trial court. Nevertheless, “this Court is 

not bound by the reasoning of the trial court, and we may affirm the trial 

court’s order on any valid basis.” Dockery v. Thomas Jefferson University 

Hospitals, Inc., 253 A.3d 716, 721 (Pa. Super. 2021) (cleaned up).