United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 02-2103

MARTA I. TORRES-ROSADO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

ÁNGEL E. ROTGER-SABAT; JOSÉ A. FUENTES-AGOSTINI;

ANÍBAL TORRES-RIVERA,

Defendants, Appellees;

JOSÉ R. RAMOS-ROMÁN; ITALA RIVERA-BUONOMO; EDWIN VÁZQUEZBERRIOS; CARLOS D. RIESTRA-CORTÉS,

Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Lynch, Circuit Judge.

Manuel R. Suarez Jiménez for appellant.

Leticia Casalduc-Rabell, Assistant Solicitor General,

with whom Roberto Y. Sánchez-Ramos, Solicitor General, and

Vanessa Lugo-Flores, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for

appellees.

July 2, 2003
1 To avoid confusion between plaintiff Torres-Rosado and

defendant Torres-Rivera, we will refer to the former as

"plaintiff."

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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from entry of

summary judgment against claims by a public employee that her

superiors retaliated for her speech on a matter of public concern

and terminated her employment without due process. Plaintiff Marta

Torres-Rosado, an agent in the Puerto Rico Justice Department's

Special Investigations Bureau (SIB), claims that her superiors

fired her because she wrote a confidential internal memorandum

suggesting that the SIB's investigation of an important politician

might be "paralyzed" as part of a cover-up. She has since been

reinstated, pursuant to a settlement of related litigation in the

Puerto Rico courts.

The defendants remaining in the case are Aníbal TorresRivera, Ángel Rotger-Sabat, and José Fuentes-Agostini, who were, at

the relevant time, Director of the SIB, Assistant Attorney General,

and Attorney General, respectively. In her federal case, brought

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (2000), plaintiff1 claims that these

defendants denied her procedural due process, violated her First

Amendment rights, and engaged in a conspiracy to deprive her of

civil rights. She also advanced pendent claims under Puerto Rico

law that are not part of this appeal.

The district court granted summary judgment to defendants

on all federal claims and declined jurisdiction over the pendent
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claims. We affirm the dismissal of the due process and civil

rights conspiracy claims. On the First Amendment claim, we find

that the district court erred in determining that plaintiff's memo

raised no issue of public concern. Nonetheless, we affirm summary

judgment against the First Amendment claim on other grounds.

I.

A. Scope of Summary Judgment Record

Before turning to the facts of the case, we address a

preliminary question of what material should properly be considered

in the summary judgment record before us. The district court

deemed defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the factual

assertions supporting it, to be unopposed, because plaintiff failed

to file timely oppositions to them. See Torres-Rosado v. RotgerSabat, 204 F. Supp. 2d 252, 253 & n.1 (D.P.R. 2002). Such

oppositions are required by the district court's local rules. See

D.P.R. R. 311.5, 311.12. This court has held repeatedly that the

district court in Puerto Rico is justified in holding one party's

submitted uncontested facts to be admitted when the other party

fails to file oppositions in compliance with local rules. See,

e.g, United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323, 330

& n.10 (1st Cir. 2003); Corrada-Betances v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.,

248 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2001); Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF,

246 F.3d 32, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2001); Ruiz-Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d

24, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2000). This, of course, does not mean the
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unopposed party wins on summary judgment; that party's uncontested

facts and other evidentiary facts of record must still show that

the party is entitled to summary judgment.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on April 15, 2002,

and included with their motion a statement of uncontested facts.

Plaintiff's response was due ten days later. See D.P.R. R. 311.5.

This deadline came and went, and only on April 29 did plaintiff

submit a motion requesting still another week to respond -- an

extension which would have taken her response up to the eve of the

trial date that had been set in a pretrial order entered five

months before. The next day, April 30, the district court denied

the requested extension. Plaintiff nonetheless filed her belated

response on May 7, 2002, the same day that the district court

granted summary judgment. The plaintiff later moved for

reconsideration, arguing that the court should consider her tardy

opposition. The court denied this motion in a detailed unpublished

opinion issued on July 11, 2002.

Plaintiff's appellate briefs draw repeatedly on facts and

arguments that were included only in the rejected filing, and her

notice of appeal encompasses the denial of the motion to

reconsider. However, she does not offer any sustained argument

that the court erred in denying the initial extension of time or

the motion to reconsider. The failure to argue the point means
2 Even if we considered the issue, we would find that the

district court was well within its discretion. In its unpublished

opinion denying the motion for reconsideration, the court

exhaustively chronicled the plaintiff's repeated delays and missed

deadlines in this litigation. The court counted at least fifteen

requests for extensions of time by plaintiff, many of which were

filed after deadlines had already passed. Plaintiff did not even

serve defendant Torres-Rivera, who was living in Romania at the

time, until over a year after filing the complaint. One motion

filed by plaintiff explaining the failure to meet deadlines is

entitled, "Plaintiff's Attorney Apologies to the Court." The

district court correctly said that it had been "more than generous"

in offering plaintiff repeated extensions of time. Given the

history of the litigation, and the clear deadlines found in both

Local Rule 311.5 and the court's November 2001 pretrial order, this

decision was quite justifiable.

3 There is no merit in the suggestion, advanced by

plaintiff at oral argument, that the district court considered the

late-filed facts when it rejected the motion to reconsider, so that

they are part of the record. Rather, in its order denying

reconsideration, the district court meticulously explained why it

rejected plaintiff's filing. It then, as a matter of its

discretion, went on to discuss why, "even if the Court had

considered plaintiff's factual problems with [defendants']

uncontested facts . . . it would have arrived at the same

conclusion."

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that the issue has been waived. See Donovan v. City of Haverhill,

311 F.3d 74, 76 (1st Cir. 2002).2

When the district court granted defendants' summary

judgment motion, its findings of fact were based on the defendants'

submission of uncontested facts. See Torres-Rosado, 204 F. Supp.

2d at 253-56 & n.1.3 On appeal, we consider the same record that

was before the district court. The uncontested facts are deemed

admitted. A small amount of other material qualifies as part of

the summary judgment record, such as a verified objection filed by
4 This memo and much of the rest of the record was written

in Spanish; we rely on the certified translations provided by the

parties.

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plaintiff at an earlier stage of the litigation and some portions

of depositions and interrogatories submitted to the court.

B. Factual Background

In October 1998, plaintiff was a career employee of the

SIB with approximately fifteen years of experience. She held the

title of "Agent III." She also supervised a public integrity

squad. Torres-Rivera conferred these supervisory duties on

plaintiff; they were not part of plaintiff's status as an Agent

III, nor were they assigned through civil service competition.

One of the squad's pending investigations concerned

corruption allegations against Aníbal Marrero-Pérez, then the vice

president of the Puerto Rico Senate. Plaintiff had a confidential

informant who was providing information to her about alleged

unlawful behavior by Marrero. Apparently, this informant provided

plaintiff with an accusation and some evidence suggesting that

Marrero had received an improper payment.

Plaintiff wrote a four-paragraph internal memorandum to

Torres-Rivera on October 16, 1998 expressing concerns about the

pace of the Marrero investigation. The first and fourth paragraphs

of the memo alluded to leads that had been developed in the case.4

The middle two paragraphs stated:
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It is my concern that at present this investigation is

paralyzed due to lack of communication with you, since it

is you who are authorized to give us instructions whether

to proceed or not regarding this case with the aforesaid

debriefings.

At the last meeting held with you, you indicated that you

would make efforts to verify with the federal agencies

whether there was any investigation into this matter to

thus know what course of action to follow.

The memo closed, "For your information and appropriate action."

A week later, on Friday, October 23, Torres-Rivera wrote

a memo responding to plaintiff. It quoted her accusation of

paralysis and then stated:

Your concern is groundless, inasmuch as communication

with my office flows openly at my request or at the

request of a party. It is by means of your memorandum

that I found out about the information you cited. I do

not know what your intentions are in making such serious

imputations.

In the face of your assertion, I have no other

alternative but to withdraw you from my trust as a

supervisor . . . .

The memo instructed plaintiff to report for duty to José Ramos,

another SIB official, the following Monday.

The same day, Friday, Torres-Rivera and Ramos held a

meeting with plaintiff where Torres-Rivera read her this memo aloud

and said that plaintiff would be removed from the Marrero

investigation. The following Monday, however, Torres-Rivera wrote

another memo to plaintiff which reversed this decision and

reinstated her as the agent in charge of the Marrero
5 The translation submitted to this court indicates that

the memo was written on November 26, not October 26, but this

appears to be an error, and the district court found that it was

written on Monday, October 26. This conclusion makes sense,

especially since Torres-Rivera no longer worked at the SIB by

November 26.

6 It is not entirely clear from the record whether this

reinstatement also extended to plaintiff's other supervisory

duties. Earlier in the litigation, plaintiff stated under oath

that she was a supervisor of the squad as well as the investigation

"[a]t the time of her dismissal," suggesting that she regained both

of her supervisory roles.

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investigation.5 This memo concluded, "I reiterate that all the

resources necessary to help you conduct this investigation to the

consequences that it warrants, will be at your disposal."6

During the meeting on Friday, after she had been given

the memo and told that she was being removed from the

investigation, plaintiff asked that she be allowed to use some

accumulated vacation time. She filed a form, which Ramos signed,

requesting leave from the following Monday until December 8.

Torres-Rivera told her at that meeting that she could commence her

leave only after filing a report about the Marrero investigation.

After the meeting, but before she left the premises, she told Ramos

that she refused to complete the report that she had been ordered

to prepare because she did not want to name her informant to

another agent.

Plaintiff did not come to work the following Monday,

October 26. She telephoned Ramos and told him that her young son

was sick and she would be unable to come to the office. She says
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that she indicated in this conversation that he had chicken pox and

that she was potentially contagious. Also on Monday, Torres-Rivera

went to Ramos' office and asked if plaintiff had filed the report;

when he found out that she had not done so, he annotated the

vacation request form that Ramos had signed, indicating that

plaintiff could not take leave until she handed in the report.

Meanwhile, plaintiff had attempted to go over Torres-Rivera's head

by requesting and receiving an appointment with Rotger-Sabat at

3:00 that day, an appointment she then cancelled. Finally, in

another telephone conversation between plaintiff and Ramos that

day, Ramos told her that no vacation time was approved until she

submitted the report, and she repeated her previous statements

about not revealing her confidential informant.

Plaintiff remained out of the office from October 26

until November 20. Her verified statement is that her two-year-old

son had chicken pox between October 23 and November 11; that she

and her son were both ill with bronchitis between November 11 and

November 24 and so she was unable to work; and that regulations

instructed her not to go to work if she were exposed to a

contagious disease. She later submitted medical documentation to

her employer. Defendants have submitted sworn evidence indicating

that plaintiff was informed several times during that period that

her absence was unauthorized. She has not denied this; she says

the SIB acquiesced to her leave by accepting her form.
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During her absence, plaintiff did not hand in the report

that Torres-Rivera had ordered her to submit. She received a memo

on October 30 again instructing her to prepare the status report.

Plaintiff does not say that she was physically unable to do so;

indeed, her evidence is that she offered to come into the office

and prepare the report, but would have to bring her contagious son.

While plaintiff was still out of the office, the

newspaper El Vocero published nine articles concerning

investigations of Senator Marrero for alleged corruption.

Plaintiff denies speaking to journalists or anyone else concerning

the case. Another El Vocero article in November reported that

materials for santería rituals were found in plaintiff's SIB car

and suggested that she was practicing witchcraft against TorresRivera and other government officials. Plaintiff, a Roman

Catholic, says the story was baseless.

Also during plaintiff's absence, Torres-Rivera left his

position as director of the SIB; his last day was November 16. On

that final day, he wrote a complaint, which he gave to Attorney

General Fuentes-Agostini, requesting a disciplinary investigation

of plaintiff. This complaint began by discussing the original memo

from plaintiff, stating that it "described in writing a situation

of lack of communication with the undersigned Director, alluding

that for those reasons an investigation was paralyzed." It said

that Torres-Rivera had removed plaintiff from her supervisory
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position because of "the falseness of the imputations" and

complained about her ignoring the chain of command by trying to

meet with Rotger-Sabat. It went on to characterize her absence as

unauthorized; there is no indication in the complaint that

plaintiff had ever requested or received approval for sick time.

Because the department's inspector general was friendly with

plaintiff, she recused herself from any such inquiry, and FuentesAgostini assigned another employee, Itala Rivera-Buonomo, to

investigate plaintiff for "improper conduct."

Plaintiff returned to work on November 20, before the end

of her requested leave. It is unclear if she had learned of

Torres-Rivera's complaint, but that day she received a handdelivered letter from Rivera-Buonomo informing her of the internal

investigation of her conduct. Enclosed with the letter were

various documents on which the investigation relied, including

copies of Torres-Rivera's complaint and a memo from another SIB

official, Carlos Riestra-Cortés, discussing her absence. Plaintiff

delivered the report on the Marrero investigation on November 20;

it was deemed unsatisfactory and she submitted a revised version

four days later, which was also deemed unsatisfactory. On November

24, she turned in medical certificates and again requested regular

vacation leave.

Rivera-Buonomo prepared a preliminary report about her

investigation on December 9, 1998. According to the report,
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plaintiff had again been out of the office since November 24.

Rivera-Buonomo concluded that, because plaintiff failed to follow

rules concerning permission for absences, she had been "absent from

her job from October 26, 1998 until November 20th without having

her absence . . . authorized for any reason." The report also

recounted sworn testimony by Ramos that plaintiff had told him she

refused to write the report about the Marrero investigation, in

part because she did not want others to speak with her confidential

informant, and that if Torres-Rivera "wanted information, that he

should search for it." Rivera-Buonomo determined that this

constituted insubordination. It is an uncontested fact that agents

must disclose confidential sources to their supervisors upon

request.

On January 28, 1999, Fuentes-Agostini suspended plaintiff

with pay and sent her a detailed letter informing her of the

decision and the reasons for it, which were based on RiveraBuonomo's conclusions that plaintiff was absent without leave and

insubordinate. Plaintiff appealed, and an administrative hearing

concerning the charges was held on April 9, 1999. Plaintiff was

represented by counsel and had the opportunity to present evidence

and testimony. The hearing officer found that plaintiff's sick

leave was not authorized, and that she resisted handing in her

report because she did not want anyone else communicating with her

confidential informant. As a result, he concluded that she had
7 Although the settlement mooted much of the relief

plaintiff had sought, her federal complaint also pled emotional

distress damages, including "partial hospitalization in a mental

institution and a miscarriage." The record before us contains no

evidence of these damages.

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been absent without leave and had disobeyed orders, and that

dismissal was warranted. Plaintiff's employment was terminated on

June 30, 1999.

Plaintiff filed a defamation suit against Torres-Rivera

in the Puerto Rico courts in November 1999, which alleged that he

was the source for El Vocero's santería story. In June 2001, a new

attorney general reached a settlement of this defamation suit

whereby plaintiff was reinstated with back pay. Plaintiff had

filed her federal case on July 14, 2000.7

II.

Even where the record is circumscribed because summary

judgment was unopposed, a district court may grant summary judgment

against the nonresponding party only "if appropriate." See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e). "Under this provision it is clear that where the

evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the

absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if

no opposing evidentiary matter is presented." NEPSK, Inc. v. Town

of Houlton, 283 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted); see

Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1991) (in

considering unopposed summary judgment motion, "[o]f course, the

district court was still obliged to consider the motion on its
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merits"). We look at the "pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), and we apply the

familiar de novo standard of review. See Mullen v. St. Paul Fire

& Marine Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 446, 452 (1st Cir. 1992). Plaintiff

"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her]

pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). An unsworn assertion of fact in

the complaint alone is not enough to create a material factual

dispute.

A. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff alleges her right to procedural due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated, first when she was

removed from her supervisory duties (but not from her status as an

Agent III), then when she was suspended with pay, and finally when

she was terminated. Constitutional procedural due process protects

only those aspects of public employment recognized as property

interests; we refer to Puerto Rico law for guidance in defining

such interests. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.

532, 538 (1985); Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio, 221 F.3d 1, 5-6

(1st Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff's supervisory duties alone do not qualify as

such a protected interest -- even if we assume, despite indications

to the contrary in her own sworn statement, that they were

eliminated permanently. It was uncontested that the supervisory
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duties were conferred on a discretionary basis to those of the rank

of Agent III "who held the trust of the Director of the SIB."

Torres-Rosado, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 254. Plaintiff was assigned

these duties without any civil service competition. Id. Thus, she

cannot demonstrate that Puerto Rico's public employment law created

any "reasonable expectation, arising out of a statute, policy,

rule, or contract," that she would continue to perform supervisory

duties. Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery Comm'n, 300 F.3d 92, 101

(1st Cir. 2002). Torres-Rivera wrote in his memo to plaintiff that

he had decided to "withdraw you from my trust as a supervisor." He

did not violate procedural due process by doing so. See FigueroaSerrano, 221 F.3d at 7 ("Without career status, the plaintiffs do

not have a constitutionally protected property interest in

continued employment . . . .").

Due process requirements do not attach to the paid

suspension either, at least on the facts of record in this case.

The Supreme Court explained in Loudermill that a government

employer who wishes to remove a worker immediately may suspend that

worker with pay until the procedures associated with termination

can be completed. 470 U.S. at 544-45. That is exactly what

happened here. More recently, a unanimous Supreme Court rejected

a categorical rule imposing constitutional due process requirements

on suspensions without pay. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924,

929-30 (1997) ("Due process is flexible and calls for such
8 Numerous courts have held that paid suspensions could be

imposed without the sorts of procedures the Constitution demands

for terminations of career employees who have proprietary interests

in their jobs. Pratt v. Ottum, 761 A.2d 313, 320 (Me. 2000)

(collecting cases); see, e.g., Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d

737, 746 n.4 (10th Cir. 1991); Koelsch v. Town of Amesbury, 851 F.

Supp. 497, 500 (D. Mass. 1994). Still, it is conceivable that a

very long or open-ended paid suspension might function so much like

a termination that some due process protection might attach. We

need not consider that prospect here.

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procedural protections as the particular situation demands.")

(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). The

Gilbert Court also called the deprivation in such cases "relatively

insubstantial." Id. at 932. Plaintiff's paid suspension in this

case, which caused only a very temporary deprivation of job

functions and no financial loss, did not give rise to any

constitutional entitlement to due process.8

The termination of her employment, however, did require

due process. It is well-established under Puerto Rico law and

First Circuit precedents that career employees in positions such as

plaintiff's -- and who are not in political or policymaking

positions, cf. Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.

1998) -- are entitled to due process in association with their

termination. See Acosta-Orozco v. Rodriguez-De-Rivera, 132 F.3d

97, 104 (1st Cir. 1997). The crucial question becomes: what

process was due? This is an issue of federal law. See Loudermill,

470 U.S. at 541; Vitek v. Jones, 455 U.S. 480, 491 (1980).
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Plaintiff received far more than the minimum elements of

procedural due process: "some kind of a hearing" and an opportunity

to respond to the allegations against her. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at

542; see O'Neill v. Baker, 210 F.3d 41, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2000). The

day she returned to the office, November 20, 1998, she received

notice of the investigation and a copy of the documents enumerating

the allegations against her. When the investigation was complete,

the January 28, 1999, letter informed plaintiff of its specific

conclusions, that she faced possible termination, and that she had

a right to a hearing before such action was taken. Finally, the

hearing on April 9, 1999, was conducted before an examining

officer, plaintiff was accompanied by counsel, plaintiff herself

testified, and she had the opportunity to present other witnesses

and evidence.

We do not review the substance of decisionmaking under

the rubric of procedural due process analysis. See Bishop v. Wood,

426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976). Plaintiff alleges that the procedures

employed departed from applicable regulations under Puerto Rico

law. An agency's failure to follow its own rules may be

significant in administrative law, but the federal Due Process

Clause does not incorporate the particular procedural structures

enacted by state or local governments; these claims should be

pursued, if at all, under Puerto Rico law. See O'Neill, 210 F.3d

at 49 n.9.
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Plaintiff also argues that she was not given sufficient

warning of the evidence to be used against her at the hearing, as

she says Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), requires. We

disagree. The original complaint by Torres-Rivera and the January

28 letter laid out in detail the allegations and findings that

provided cause for termination. There was no unfair surprise to

plaintiff or her attorney. This was "an explanation of the

employer's evidence" which, combined with notice and an opportunity

to respond, satisfied the requirements of procedural due process.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (explaining Arnett).

B. First Amendment

A government employee "may not be dismissed for

exercising rights protected under the First Amendment." Hennessy

v. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 245 (1st Cir. 1999). At the same

time, that employee's free speech rights must be balanced against

"the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the

efficiency of the public services it performs through its

employees." Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968);

see Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987); Connick v.

Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983).

The line of Supreme Court cases striking this balance has

yielded a three-part test, which this court summarized in O'Connor

v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 912-13 (1st Cir. 1993). The court must

first determine whether the issue about which the employee spoke
9 Plaintiff's complaint presents the alleged First

Amendment infractions as three different claims: freedom of speech

as a public employee, unlawful retaliation, and whistleblower

protection. Since she appeals under the First Amendment and not

under Puerto Rico law, the substantive issues raised by these

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was a "matter of public concern;" if not, there is no claim for

First Amendment protection. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; see Tang v.

Rhode Island, 163 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1998). Second, the court

evaluates the balance between the employee's First Amendment

interests and the government's interests as an employer. See

Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388; Mullin v. Town of Fairhaven, 284 F.3d 31,

39-41 (1st Cir. 2002). Finally, if the claim survives both of

these tests, the plaintiff employee must show that the protected

speech was a substantial or motivating factor behind the adverse

employment action; the burden then shifts to the government

employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it

would have taken the same action absent the protected speech. See

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,

287 (1977); Wytrwal v. Saco Sch. Bd., 70 F.3d 165, 170 (1st Cir.

1995). While the first two tests are typically legal

determinations subject to de novo review, the third is a question

of fact which normally belongs to the jury. Nethersole v. Bulger,

287 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002); O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 912-13.

The district court here disposed of plaintiff's First

Amendment claim at the initial stage, finding that her speech was

not about a matter of public concern.9 It concluded that
claims are essentially identical and we consider them together.

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the matters in the case at bar relate to the fundamental

inner workings of an office -- that Plaintiff perceived

the investigation was proceeding too slowly. While

[allegations of] corruption in the Puerto Rican senate

are certainly matters of public concern, the

investigation itself, or how it is progressing, is

entirely an internal matter, and not of public concern.

That is to say, while the end result might be a matter of

public concern, the means to that end[] is not.

Torres-Rosado, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 260.

As a matter of law, the district court too narrowly

evaluated the nature of the public concern in context. In essence,

some months before plaintiff wrote her October 16, 1998 memo, she

had been told that she should hold off on her investigation of

Marrero while her supervisors checked to see if federal authorities

were also investigating him. When she heard nothing, she expressed

concern that "at present this investigation is paralyzed due to

lack of communication with you, since it is you who are authorized

to give us instructions whether to proceed or not." "Paralyze" is

defined as "to deprive of strength or activity; make powerless;

make ineffective." Webster's Third New International Dictionary

1638 (1993). The public is concerned about more than just the "end

result" of the investigation of an elected official. The public is

also concerned, and understandably so, about whether government

investigations of political corruption are influenced improperly or

are derailed by political connections. Plaintiff's interpretation

of her memo to Torres-Rivera is that the word "paralyzed"
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represented "an elegant way of accusing him of being engaged in a

cover up." Certainly Torres-Rivera's response to the memo suggests

that he understood it in exactly that way.

"Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of

public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context

of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Connick,

461 U.S. at 147-48. Even if the content of the employee's speech

on its face relates largely to the internal affairs of the

government agency, Connick requires a more searching contextual

analysis to determine if the speech implicates matters of public

concern as well. See id. at 148-49 (assistant district attorney

distributed survey to her colleagues asking their opinions about

the functioning of the office; most questions related to internal

matters that were not of public concern, but one asking whether

employees felt pressure to work in political campaigns passed this

initial inquiry and court went on to the second test); O'Connor,

994 F.2d at 914 (interpreting Connick to require more searching

inquiry even where speech "would not necessarily qualify, on the

basis of its content alone, as a matter of inherent public

concern").

Under Connick's directive to examine "the whole record,"

it is difficult to understand Torres-Rivera's heated reaction to

plaintiff's memo if it truly signified only an internal concern

about intra-office communication or the pace of investigative work.
10 It is true that plaintiff did not speak publicly about

her cover-up accusation; indeed, she specifically denied that she

had done so. But the First Amendment protects employee speech

about matters of public concern even if the employee does not seek

to make that speech to an audience outside the workplace. Givhan

v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979); see also

Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387; O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 916.

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Torres-Rivera's memo characterized her statements as "serious

imputations" that left him "no other alternative but to withdraw

you from my trust." He had already halted the investigation in

order to make inquiries with federal authorities about their

possible parallel inquiries, but had not ordered the SIB's

investigation resumed. He then removed plaintiff from the

investigation; the fact that he reinstated her a few days later

does not negate an interpretation that he read her memo as

involving charges of cover-up and obstruction. Significantly,

Torres-Rivera's strong reaction happened before other issues arose

-- such as plaintiff's absence from the office and the dispute over

the report -- that might otherwise explain his displeasure with

her. We find, contrary to the district court's conclusion, that

the "public concern" test was satisfied here.10 Cf. Nethersole, 287

F.3d at 18 n.5 (memo seeking meeting to discuss "concerns" about

diversity at university survived first test at Rule 12(b)(6)

stage).

Since we may affirm summary judgment "on any basis that

is manifest in the record," John G. Danielson, Inc. v. WinchesterConant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2003), we go on. We
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will assume without deciding that plaintiff satisfies the second

test. In general, government interests outweigh First Amendment

rights when employee speech prevents efficient provision of

government services or disrupts the workplace. See Rankin, 483

U.S. at 388-89; Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-54; see also Hennessy, 194

F.3d at 248 (teacher's immoderate, intransigent, and public

criticism of curriculum undermined operation of school). Here,

however, plaintiff wrote a private memo which she worded fairly

diplomatically; it is difficult to think of a less disruptive

manner in which plaintiff might have communicated. See O'Connor,

994 F.2d at 915-17 (town employee who disclosed alleged wrongdoing

by a town selectman to the full Board of Selectmen passed second

test, despite the fact that he also had personal reasons for doing

so).

We will likewise assume that plaintiff has met her

initial burden under the third test to create a question of fact

for the jury as to whether the memo was at least a substantial or

motivating factor in her termination. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at

287. After all, it was Torres-Rivera's complaint about her,

shortly after her memo to him, that initiated the investigation,

and plaintiff need not produce a "smoking gun" to carry this

burden. Lewis v. City of Boston, 321 F.3d 207, 219 (1st Cir.

2003).
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All of this is to no avail for plaintiff if, under the

third test, the defendants have met their burdens of both

persuasion and proof to demonstrate other reasons for the adverse

actions besides her speech. The uncontested facts and the

documentation submitted by defendants supply several such reasons.

Plaintiff, as the party opposing summary judgment, has not produced

any evidence creating a material issue of fact that she would not

have been terminated in any event for insubordination or for

absenteeism. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

249 (1986).

Defendants' uncontested evidence that plaintiff would

have been terminated anyway is buttressed by the conclusions

reached during the administrative investigation and appeal. The

report by Rivera-Buonomo concluded that plaintiff violated several

departmental policies unconnected to her speech. It found that

plaintiff was absent without authorization for a prolonged period

and that she disobeyed several direct orders to submit a report on

the investigation, which constituted insubordination. Moreover,

the uncontested fact is that she was required to identify her

informant to her supervisors; refusal to do so amounted to

insubordination. The record plainly shows insubordination.

Defendants also submitted a sworn statement from the

hearing officer, who concluded there was both unauthorized absence

and insubordination, and who says that he decided the issues at the
11 As to the change in plaintiff's duties, as discussed

above, plaintiff's own sworn statement indicates that this change

was temporary. The only remedies still at stake in the case are

emotional distress and similar damages, and plaintiff has not

adequately demonstrated that she suffered any such harm from

whatever changes in duties occurred. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist.

v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1986) (damages in § 1983 case

based on First Amendment must be compensatory). This is not a

situation comparable to Nethersole, 287 F.3d at 17, where a

university's statewide vice president was transferred to another

campus and made an assistant dean.

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hearing "based on the law and the evidence there presented. No

other factors were taken into consideration when deciding on the

facts of the hearing . . . and no one intervened with my

recommendations, either before or after the hearing." Plaintiff

testified at that hearing and was represented there by an attorney.

The defendants have offered ample uncontested evidence that the

same decisions as to her employment would have been reached whether

or not plaintiff sent the memo to Torres-Rivera. See Mt. Healthy,

429 U.S. at 285; Wytrwal, 70 F.3d at 171.11

Plaintiff protests in her brief to us that these

determinations, made during the disciplinary process, were

factually incorrect in various ways. We assume that it would be

probative for plaintiff if she could show she was subjected to a

biased kangaroo court in the disciplinary process. But her

objections come too late. Even assuming, dubitante, that such

evidence exists, she failed to contest these facts before the

district court within the deadlines established by the local rules,

and to provide evidence -- not just assertions -- that the process
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had been biased and flawed. Plaintiff has lost the right to make

these arguments. Parties ignore rules such as Local Rule 311.12 at

their peril. Ruiz-Rivera, 209 F.3d at 27-28. "[T]he decision to

sit idly by and allow the summary judgment proponent to configure

the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence. This case

is no exception." Kelly, 924 F.2d at 358.

Because defendants have carried their Mt. Healthy burden

on the facts of record, the First Amendment claim fails.

C. Conspiracy

Finally, plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to deprive her of

civil rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3).

Under § 1985(3), a conspiracy must be motivated by some "racial, or

perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus."

Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268-69

(1993) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971));

see Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir.

1996). Plaintiff failed to offer any indication whatsoever that

this threshold requirement of class-based animus has been met.

To demonstrate conspiracy under § 1983, plaintiff must

show "an actual abridgement of some federally-secured right."

Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2001) ("The fact

that a plaintiff styles her claim as a conspiracy . . . does not

diminish her need to show a constitutional deprivation."); see

Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 844 (1st Cir. 1988). Plaintiff
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cannot resuscitate her failed constitutional claims to prove

conspiracy. Summary judgment was proper against both claims.

III.

For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of

the district court is affirmed. Costs are awarded to defendants.