Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Conaghan v. City of Harvard, 2016 IL App (2d) 151034

Appellate Court 

Caption

STEVEN CONAGHAN and BERTRAM P. IRSLINGER,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE CITY OF HARVARD; THE 

HARVARD CITY COUNCIL; and THE PLANNING AND

ZONING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF HARVARD,

Defendants-Appellants.

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-15-1034

Filed August 31, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County, No. 13-MR-399; 

the Hon. Michael T. Caldwell, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed.

Counsel on

Appeal

K. Austin Zimmer and Timothy A. Woerner, both of Del Galdo Law 

Group LLC, of Berwyn, for appellants.

John W. Gaffney, of Harvard, for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Hutchinson and Burke concurred in the judgment and 

opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Plaintiff Steven Conaghan purchased a house in Harvard, renting it out to separate tenants 

on the two floors as a legal nonconforming use. After property damage rendered it 

uninhabitable, Conaghan hired a contractor to rehabilitate the property. The contractor’s 

permit lapsed, and the property remained vacant for more than a year. Acting on the 

recommendation of defendant the Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Harvard 

(Zoning Commission), defendant Harvard City Council (City Council) passed an ordinance 

denying the petition of Conaghan and plaintiff Bertram P. Irslinger, who had become the 

property’s joint owner, to allow the continued use of the property as a multifamily residence. 

The City Council declared that the nonconforming use had been discontinued, and it restricted 

the use of the building to a single-family residence. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the 

Zoning Commission, the City Council, and defendant City of Harvard (City), under section 

11-13-25 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-25 (West 2012)), challenging the 

City Council’s act.

¶ 2 The trial court held that the denial of the petition was arbitrary and capricious and that 

plaintiffs were entitled to continue the nonconforming use. Defendants appeal, contending that 

(1) section 11-13-25 of the Municipal Code does not create a private right of action by a 

landowner against a municipality; (2) even if section 11-13-25 does create such a right of 

action in some instances, it does not here; and (3) the court erred on the merits of plaintiffs’ 

claim. We agree with defendants’ first argument and do not reach the others. We reverse.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged as follows. In 2008, Conaghan purchased the building at 206 

East Diggins Street in Harvard. He operated it as a two-unit rental residence, a legal 

nonconforming use under the pertinent ordinance (Harvard Municipal Code § 17.48.040 

(amended Jan. 19, 1999)), renting out the upper and lower levels separately. In January 2010, 

the lower-level tenant vacated the property and, shortly afterward, so did the upper-level 

tenant. Before they left, however, they had caused pipes to freeze, producing extensive water 

damage to both levels. Conaghan, with financing from Irslinger, who became part owner, 

continued to maintain the property. Upon discovering the damage in February 2010, plaintiffs 

contacted their insurance company and began work to make both levels inhabitable. 

¶ 5 The complaint continued as follows. Through their mortgage lender, plaintiffs hired a 

general contractor to repair the property. The contractor and the insurance company had a 

falling out over the release of funds to pay for the repairs; as a result, the repairs slowed down. 

As of July 17, 2012, though, they were complete for the upper unit and about 90% complete for 

the lower unit. On that date, a City zoning officer issued an opinion that, because the property 

had been vacant for more than 12 months, the previous multifamily use had been discontinued, 

as dictated by the pertinent ordinance. As pertinent here, the ordinance states: 

“Whenever a non-conforming use of a building or structure, or part thereof, has been 

discontinued for a period of 12 months or whenever there is evident a clear intent on the 

part of the owner to abandon a non-conforming use, such use shall not, after being 

discontinued or abandoned, be re-established, and the use of the premises thereafter 

shall be in conformity with the regulations of the district.” Harvard Municipal Code 

§ 17.48.040(D)(1), added by Harvard Municipal Ordinance No. 99-102, § 1 (1999). 
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¶ 6 On May 17, 2013, plaintiffs petitioned the Zoning Commission to maintain the multifamily 

use of the property. The Zoning Commission recommended to the City Council that the 

petition be denied. On June 25, 2013, the City Council did so. Harvard Municipal Ordinance 

No. 2013-115 (approved June 25, 2013). 

¶ 7 Plaintiffs claimed that the denial of the petition was improper because they had neither 

discontinued the nonconforming use of the building as a multifamily residence nor shown a 

clear intent to do so. Plaintiffs asserted that section 11-13-25 of the Municipal Code provided 

for de novo judicial review of the City’s decision. Section 11-13-25 is part of article 11 

(“Corporate Powers and Functions”), division 13 (“Zoning”), of the Municipal Code. It is 

entitled “Actions subject to de novo review; due process,” and it reads:

“(a) Any decision by the corporate authorities of any municipality *** in regard to 

any petition or application for a special use, variance, rezoning, or other amendment to 

a zoning ordinance shall be subject to de novo judicial review as a legislative decision, 

regardless of whether the process in relation thereto is considered administrative for 

other purposes. Any action seeking the judicial review of such a decision shall be 

commenced not later than 90 days after the date of the decision. 

 (b) The principles of substantive and procedural due process apply to all stages of 

the decision-making and review of all zoning decisions.” 65 ILCS 5/11-13-25 (West 

2012).

¶ 8 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint (see 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2014)), 

arguing first that section 11-13-25 of the Municipal Code does not provide a private right of 

action to challenge a municipal zoning decision. Defendants relied on Dunlap v. Village of 

Schaumburg, 394 Ill. App. 3d 629 (2009), in which the First District held that section 11-13-25 

was intended not to expand landowners’ rights to sue municipalities but only to clarify the 

standard of review for actions that are already properly in court. Id. at 642. Defendants argued 

second that, even if section 11-13-25 creates a new private right, the challenged action did not 

involve a petition or application for a special use, variance, rezoning, or other amendment to a 

zoning ordinance. 

¶ 9 Plaintiffs responded that Dunlap did not apply because this court had held that section 

11-13-25 does create a private right of action against a municipality’s zoning decision and does 

not merely specify standards of review. See Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 

Saville, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1027 (2009). Further, they argued, denying them a right of 

action under this section would leave them without a remedy, as the Administrative Review 

Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2014)) applies only to decisions by administrative bodies 

and not to a municipal council’s legislative act (Hawthorne v. Village of Olympia Fields, 204 

Ill. 2d 243, 253-54 (2003)). Also, plaintiffs contended, their action was within the statutory 

language, because defendants had denied them a special-use permit and they had been seeking 

an amendment to the zoning ordinance to allow the special use. 

¶ 10 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Defendants answered the complaint, asserting 

as an affirmative defense that section 11-13-25 did not give plaintiffs a private right of action. 

Defendants then moved for summary judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2014)), arguing 

that, under La Salle National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40 (1957), the 

denial of the nonconforming use was not arbitrary and capricious. The court denied the motion 

and held a trial on plaintiffs’ complaint.
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¶ 11 The parties first stipulated to the following facts. Plaintiffs jointly own the property at 206 

East Diggins. Conaghan purchased it in 2008. Before and after the purchase, the property was 

a multifamily rental residence, a legal nonconforming use. Plaintiffs rented out the upper and 

lower levels as two separate properties until January 2010, when the lower-level tenant vacated 

the property. The upper-level tenant also did so shortly afterward. On July 17, 2012, a zoning 

officer for the City issued an opinion that plaintiffs’ use of the property as a multifamily 

residence had been discontinued because the property had been vacant for more than 12 

months, and thus the use was no longer permitted. On May 17, 2013, plaintiffs petitioned the 

Zoning Commission to maintain the nonconforming use. The Zoning Commission 

recommended that the petition be denied. On June 25, 2013, the City Council denied the 

petition. 

¶ 12 Next, the parties stipulated to the admission of eight exhibits. Plaintiffs’ first exhibit was a 

certificate of occupancy that the City issued on June 30, 2011. The document states that a 

building permit was issued on July 14, 2010, to repair water damage. The certificate was 

signed by Steve Santeler, the City’s community development director who oversaw the 

building department and code enforcement. Santeler wrote “upper unit completed” and placed 

an “x” next to “final [occupancy]” (as opposed to “temporary” or “partial”). Plaintiffs’ second 

exhibit was a group of photographs of the lower level of the building in June 2011. 

¶ 13 Defendants introduced the following exhibits: (1) the nonconforming-use ordinance 

(Harvard Municipal Code § 17.48.040 et seq. (amended Jan. 19, 1999)); (2) the minutes of the 

Zoning Committee meeting of June 4, 2013; (3) the building permit issued to Conaghan, 

signed by Santeler, and dated July 14, 2010, allowing repair and remodeling necessitated by 

water damage; (4) a letter dated July 17, 2012, from Clayton Brennecka to Conaghan, serving 

as “formal notice that the multi-family, non-conforming residential use” of 206 East Diggins 

had been “discontinued” and was no longer permitted, because the property had been vacant 

for more than 12 months; (5) a letter dated April 5, 2013, from Santeler to Conaghan, stating 

that the property had lost its legal nonconforming use as a two-family residence and must be 

converted to a single-family home; and (6) ordinance No. 2013-115, dated June 25, 2013, 

denying plaintiffs’ petition.

¶ 14 Plaintiffs then called Conaghan, who testified as follows. In 2008, he acquired the property 

with the intent to continue its use as a “two-flat unit,” renting out both levels. At the time, the 

two levels had separate entrances and gas and electrical service, although they shared water 

service. In February 2010, after two continuous years of separate rentals, a second-floor pipe 

burst, flooding the top floor and causing leaks that “destroyed” the lower level. The insurance 

company paid Conaghan about $50,000 to repair the damage. 

¶ 15 Conaghan testified that, in July 2010, he hired a contractor to make repairs at a projected 

cost of $117,000. The building was essentially gutted. Conaghan intended to keep using the 

building as a multifamily residence. He supervised the repairs by meeting monthly with the 

contractor and immediately updating the insurance company. The insurance company released 

money “a little bit at a time as [Conaghan] met each phase of the project.” Conaghan and the 

contractor made the repairs so as to maintain the building’s character as a multifamily 

residence: they kept the utilities, furnaces, water tanks, and electrical panels separate. 

¶ 16 Conaghan testified that, at some point, the contractor slowed work down because the 

insurance company was withholding money out of dissatisfaction with the condition of the 

repairs. During 2010 and until June 2011, as the repairs were underway, nobody from the City 
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raised any objection to his goal of maintaining the property as a multifamily residence. By June 

2011, the repairs to the second floor, which the contractor had begun first, were complete. In 

that month, a City officer inspected the building and Conaghan applied for an occupancy 

permit. At trial, Conaghan identified plaintiffs’ exhibit No. 1 as the permit for the “final” (but 

not “partial”) occupancy of the building, dated June 30, 2011. When the permit was issued, 

nobody from the City objected to the use of the building as a multifamily residence. Believing 

that he did not need a separate occupancy permit for the first floor, Conaghan continued the 

work on that level, which involved “[f]inal trim, simple painting, [and] doorknobs.” The City 

did not object to his continuing the repairs with the intent to maintain the multifamily use of the 

building. 

¶ 17 Conaghan testified that Irslinger stepped in to fund the project after the insurance company 

stopped releasing money. In June 2012, when the repairs to the lower level were about 90% 

complete, Irslinger applied for a permit to replace the building’s fascia and roof but was told 

that the City would not grant plaintiffs an occupancy permit for the nonconforming use. In 

March or April 2013, Conaghan met with Santeler. Only then did he learn personally that the 

City was seeking to deny the multifamily use. After the meeting, plaintiffs filed their petition, 

appeared before the Zoning Commission, and went in front of the City Council. In June 2013, 

the City Council denied the petition. 

¶ 18 Conaghan testified that, throughout the repair process, he intended to continue using the 

building as a multifamily residence. Before he met with Santeler, nobody had objected to him 

about that use of the building. The property was vacant from February 2010 until after the City 

Council meeting, when a tenant moved into the second floor. Defendants’ counsel showed 

Conaghan the building permit; Conaghan said that he had never seen it before, but he 

acknowledged that it was issued in July 2010 and was good for one year. He admitted that, 

when it expired in July 2011, nobody sought an extension. 

¶ 19 Conaghan testified that he recognized plaintiffs’ exhibit No. 1, the certificate of 

occupancy, and that it said nothing about the lower-level unit. He reiterated that not until 2013 

did he receive notice that the nonconforming use had been lost. Counsel then asked him 

whether he recognized defendants’ exhibit No. 4, the letter dated July 17, 2012, telling him that 

the nonconforming use had been discontinued. Conaghan said that he had never seen it before. 

Also, when he sought relief to reestablish the nonconforming use, both levels of the building 

had been vacant for more than three years. 

¶ 20 Conaghan testified that the general contractor applied for the building permit and assured 

Conaghan that he would take care of it. The contractor stopped work in about June 2011 

because, he claimed, the insurance company had stopped paying him. 

¶ 21 Plaintiffs next called Irslinger, who testified as follows. He became involved with the 

property in 2013, when he provided financing to Conaghan to complete the rehabilitation. 

Irslinger intended to help Conaghan preserve the property’s use as a multifamily residence and 

had been under the impression that a final occupancy permit had been issued for the whole 

building. At the time, he was unaware of any objection the City had to the continuation of that 

use. Shown the permit issued on June 30, 2011, he testified that the issuer had checked off the 

space for “final” occupancy but not the one for “partial” occupancy.

¶ 22 Irslinger testified that, in January or February 2013, he spoke to Santeler and requested a 

building permit to replace the soffit, fascia, and roof. It was then that he was told that the 

continued use of the property as a multifamily residence was unacceptable. By then, the repairs 
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to the lower unit were more than 90% complete. The permit was issued, however. Plaintiffs 

appealed the denial of the nonconforming use to the Zoning Board and then to the City 

Council. At all times, Irslinger intended to continue the property’s use as a multifamily 

residence. 

¶ 23 Irslinger testified that he first inspected the property early in 2013, before he gave 

Conaghan money. Before then, he had had no idea what the property looked like. Shown 

defendants’ exhibit No. 4, the July 17, 2012, zoning notice, Irslinger testified that he had never 

seen it before. His attorney had reviewed the recorder of deeds’ file for the property, and 

Irslinger conceded that the notice had been stamped by that office on August 6, 2012, before he 

had inspected the property. He also agreed that the occupancy permit mentioned that the upper 

unit was complete but said nothing about the lower unit. After Irslinger testified, plaintiffs 

rested. 

¶ 24 Defendants first called Santeler, who testified as follows. As community development 

director, he was responsible for enforcing the City’s zoning code. The purpose of the 

nonconforming-use ordinance is to eliminate nonconforming uses in a district, in the interests 

of public safety and the general welfare. Plaintiffs’ use of the property as a multifamily 

residence was a nonconforming use. The lot, which was on a corner, was approximately 5300 

square feet, but the minimum size for a corner lot with a multifamily residence was 14,700 

square feet. 

¶ 25 Santeler testified that a building permit was issued for the property on July 14, 2010, and 

was valid for one year. Nobody ever requested an extension. After inspecting the property and 

finding that there was “quite a bit of work to do” on the lower unit, Santeler issued the 

certificate of occupancy on June 30, 2011. It was for the upper unit only, as shown by the 

remark “upper unit completed” and the absence of any corresponding remark about the lower 

unit. Nobody had requested a certificate of occupancy for the lower unit. 

¶ 26 Santeler testified that the July 17, 2012, notice was intended to let Conaghan know that the 

nonconforming use was no longer available, because the first floor, at least, had been vacant 

for 12 months or more. To the best of Santeler’s knowledge, the notice was mailed to 

Conaghan. It was also filed with the recorder of deeds’ office. Between June 30, 2011, and July 

17, 2012, neither plaintiffs nor the contractor contacted Santeler about the property. Between 

February 2010 and July 17, 2012, Conaghan never contacted Santeler about any of the 

hardships that he had described in his trial testimony. After Santeler issued the notice, 

plaintiffs’ contractor had complained to him about it, but nobody had filed for an extension of 

the building permit. 

¶ 27 Santeler identified defendants’ exhibit No. 5 as his letter of April 5, 2013, to Conaghan, 

stating that the property had lost its nonconforming use and must be converted to a 

single-family home. The letter stated that permits were required for the “de-conversion [sic]” 

and that the time limit was a year from “the date of property transfer.” Plaintiffs never 

converted the property and never sought any extension to avoid the loss of the nonconforming 

use. Between February 2010 and the City Council hearing, the property was not, to Santeler’s 

knowledge, used as a multifamily residence. Santeler identified defendants’ exhibit No. 6, 

ordinance No. 2013-115, which was passed on July 25, 2013. He noted the following statement 

in the ordinance: 

“The City Council finds that the petitioners failed to show a hardship that merited 

granting the petition because the situation was created by the petitioners, given the fact 
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that the Property has remained vacant more than 40 months and no meaningful 

construction progress occurred to maintain the Property as a multi-family use. In 

addition, [the] City Council finds that [the] petitioners failed to pursue extensions of 

the original building permit of July 2010 thereby demonstrating a lack of intent to 

simply suspend the non-conforming use.” Harvard Municipal Ordinance No. 2013-115 

(approved June 25, 2013). 

¶ 28 Santeler testified that, per the nonconforming-use ordinance, a landowner can lose a 

nonconforming use either by discontinuing it for 12 months or by evidencing a clear intent to 

abandon the use. The notice of July 17, 2012, referred to discontinuation but not to evidence of 

a clear intent to abandon the use; Santeler testified that he had never said that there had been 

any such intent. He did not know the precise difference between “discontinue” and “abandon”; 

his notice had cited the ordinance verbatim, and the nonconforming use at issue had been 

“either discontinued or abandoned.”

¶ 29 Santeler testified that the contractor had applied for the building permit and had not applied 

for an extension. When Santeler inspected the property before issuing the certificate of 

occupancy, he looked only at the upper unit and not at the lower one. He had never been asked 

to inspect the lower unit for a certificate of occupancy. 

¶ 30 Defendants next called James Carbonetti, who testified as follows. He was the chairman of 

the Zoning Commission and had presided over its meeting of June 4, 2013, concerning 

plaintiffs’ property. During the meeting, Carbonetti asked plaintiffs whether they had applied 

for an extension of the building permit; plaintiffs responded that they had not. They also said 

that the property had been vacant for 40 months. For this reason, the Zoning Commission 

denied plaintiffs’ request to be allowed to use the property as a multifamily residence.

¶ 31 Carbonetti testified that he did not know how long the property had been used as a 

multifamily residence or whether it had ever been used as a single-family home. After 

Carbonetti testified, defendants rested. 

¶ 32 Conaghan testified in rebuttal as follows. When he purchased the building, he intended to 

use it as a multifamily residence, and he did so until the tenants vacated it. At no time after he 

purchased the building did he use it as a single-family residence (until the City required him to 

do so), and his intent had never changed. After Conaghan testified, plaintiffs rested. 

¶ 33 In argument, plaintiffs contended as follows. First, by ordinance, plaintiffs could lose their 

nonconforming use only by discontinuing it or evidencing an intent to abandon it. The City had 

not asserted that plaintiffs had done the latter, so the case hinged on whether they had 

“discontinued” the use. Plaintiffs maintained that discontinuation did not automatically follow 

from “simply not using [the property] as a two-unit for a period of 12 months.” Had they used 

it as a single-family residence for 12 months, then tried to revert to renting it to two separate 

tenants, they could not revive the nonconforming use, but that had not happened. 

¶ 34 Second, plaintiffs argued, they had done everything that they could to preserve the 

building’s use as a multifamily residence, and the delays involved were not their fault. Even so, 

by 2011, the repairs were “90 percent complete.” The purpose of the nonconforming-use 

ordinance was to protect the public health and safety, but that purpose was not served by the 

City’s refusal to allow plaintiffs to continue the building’s longstanding use simply because 

more than 12 months had elapsed. Thus, the City’s denial of the petition to continue the 

nonconforming use had been arbitrary and capricious. Plaintiffs’ argument did not mention 

La Salle or the reasoning of that opinion. 
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¶ 35 Defendants responded as follows. Plaintiffs had the burden to prove that the City’s actions 

were arbitrary and capricious. They had not met their burden. Moreover, under the plain 

meaning of the nonconforming-use ordinance, the use of the building as a multifamily 

residence had been discontinued for at least 12 months after the tenants vacated it early in 

2010. The dispute between the contractor and the insurance company was irrelevant. 

¶ 36 Defendants argued further that, although the nonconforming use lapsed early in 2011, a 

year after the tenants left, the City waited more than a year from that date to issue a notice that 

plaintiffs had lost their nonconforming use. Yet, despite the notice provided by the July 17, 

2012, letter from Santeler, which was also filed with the recorder of deeds’ office, plaintiffs did 

nothing. In May 2013, the City sent plaintiffs another letter; this time plaintiffs finally 

appeared before the Zoning Commission, having waited 40 months without requesting an 

extension of the building permit. The nonconforming-use ordinance existed because sound 

policy disfavors nonconforming uses, and discontinuation promotes the public health and 

safety. Plaintiffs had allowed the use to expire. The City had not acted irrationally. 

¶ 37 The trial judge announced his decision, stating as follows. The evidence of hardship was 

clear and convincing: Conaghan had been victimized by events beyond his control, specifically 

the accident that caused the flooding, followed by the delays occasioned by the dispute 

between the contractor and the insurance company. The City had provided no warning that the 

nonconforming use might be lost “because of elapsed time.” Only “when [plaintiffs] came in to 

apply for their building permit they were (Unintelligible) that the two-flat use was gone 

because it had been abandoned. There were no exceptions. There was no warning, and there 

were no extensions.”

¶ 38 The judge continued as follows. Plaintiffs had never intended to abandon the use of the 

property as a multifamily residence. From the time that the damage occurred, Conaghan had 

diligently attempted to renovate the property so as to restore it to that use. The judge 

concluded: 

“The diligent pursuit of the repair by Mr. Conaghan, who has stated from [sic] 

making the insurance claim, hiring a contractor, seeking an additional investor, all 

militate against the conclusion in the ordinance that there was a clear intention to 

abandon the property. 

The fact that it wasn’t occupied as a rental unit by any resident is—is immaterial in 

this particular kind of a circumstance. 

 The Court finds that the decision of the building inspector to declare this a 

discontinued use was arbitrary and capricious, and that the proof is indeed clear and 

convincing.”

¶ 39 Defendants timely appealed. 

¶ 40 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 41 Defendants contend first that the trial court should not have entertained plaintiffs’ action at 

all because section 11-13-25 of the Municipal Code does not confer a private right of action on 

a landowner against a municipality for its zoning decision. Plaintiffs respond that our decision 

in Our Savior correctly held that section 11-13-25 creates a private right of action. 

¶ 42 To resolve this dispute, we must construe section 11-13-25. Our fundamental objective is 

to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. King v. First Capital Financial Services 
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Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2005). To do so, we start with the statutory language, which is 

ordinarily the best guide to legislative intent. Id. If the language is unambiguous, we must 

follow it without resorting to aids of construction and without reading in qualifications or 

additions that the legislature did not express. Id. To the extent that the language is ambiguous, 

we may resort to aids of construction, including legislative history. Krohe v. City of 

Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392, 397-98 (2003). We may also follow the maxim that statutes that 

address similar subject matters are in pari materia and should be construed together to produce 

a harmonious whole. People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 26.

¶ 43 For ease of discussion, we again set out section 11-23-25 of the Municipal Code: 

“(a) Any decision by the corporate authorities of any municipality *** in regard to 

any petition or application for a special use, variance, rezoning, or other amendment to 

a zoning ordinance shall be subject to de novo judicial review as a legislative decision, 

regardless of whether the process in relation thereto is considered administrative for 

other purposes. Any action seeking the judicial review of such a decision shall be 

commenced not later than 90 days after the date of the decision. 

 (b) The principles of substantive and procedural due process apply to all stages of 

the decision-making and review of all zoning decisions.” (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 

5/11-13-25 (West 2012). 

¶ 44 Before we apply principles of statutory construction to this language, we discuss the two 

appellate court opinions on which the parties place the greatest weight. In Dunlap, the plaintiff 

filed an action under section 11-13-15 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-15 (West 

2006)), challenging the Village of Schaumburg’s grant, by ordinance, of a zoning variance to 

her neighbors. Both the village and the neighbors were named as defendants. Section 11-13-15 

provides that, if any building is constructed in violation of an ordinance adopted under division 

13 of the Municipal Code, any owner or tenant of property within 1200 feet of the offending 

structure may file an action to correct, restrain, or abate the violation. Dunlap, 394 Ill. App. 3d 

at 632. The village moved to dismiss the action on the ground that section 11-13-15 does not 

give private landowners a right of action against a municipality. Id.

¶ 45 The trial court denied the motion. It held that, although section 11-13-15 did not grant the 

plaintiff a right of action against the village, section 11-13-25 did. The court eventually granted 

all the defendants summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. Id. at 636-37. On appeal, the 

first issue was whether either section 11-13-15 or section 11-13-25 gave the plaintiff a right of 

action against the village for its grant of the variance to a third party. The court recognized first 

that, although section 11-13-15 was not explicit on the matter, case law established that the 

section grants a right of action only against private violators and not against municipalities. Id.

at 638-39. The court then turned to section 11-13-25.

¶ 46 At the pertinent time in Dunlap, subsection (a) of section 11-13-25 provided, “ ‘[a]ny 

special use, variance, rezoning, or other amendment to a zoning ordinance *** shall be subject 

to de novo review as a legislative decision, regardless of whether the process of its adoption is 

considered administrative for other purposes.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 639 (quoting 65 

ILCS 5/11-13-25(a) (West 2006)). The denial of a request for a special use, variance, or 

rezoning was not within the scope of section 11-13-25(a). With that caution in mind, we turn to 

the Dunlap court’s construction of section 11-13-25(a). 

¶ 47 The court began by explaining that enacting section 11-13-25(a) was a response to People 

ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 202 Ill. 2d 164 (2002). Dunlap, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 639. 
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Klaeren had held that a municipality’s grant of a special-use permit is a quasi-judicial 

administrative decision, not a legislative one. Klaeren, 202 Ill. 2d at 183. Therefore, on judicial 

review for due process, the trial court must consider not only whether the act had a rational 

basis but also whether it met basic procedural requirements and followed “any criteria in the 

zoning ordinance based upon the facts in the record.” Dunlap, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 641; see 

Millineum Maintenance Management, Inc. v. County of Lake, 384 Ill. App. 3d 638, 646-47 

(2008). 

¶ 48 The Dunlap court continued that, in enacting section 11-13-25(a), the legislature was 

concerned that municipalities “lacked the resources to conduct proceedings that would 

conform to the heightened level of scrutiny that is placed on administrative decisions.” 

Dunlap, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 641-42. The court concluded: 

“Thus ***, the intent of the legislature in enacting this amendment to the Zoning 

Enabling Act was not to expand private landowners’ right to take judicial action against 

municipal zoning decisions, but rather to clarify that when such challenges are properly 

made, the decisions are to be reviewed under the standards for legislative rather than 

administrative actions.” Id. at 642. 

The court held that the plaintiff had no action against the village under section 11-13-25(a). Id. 

¶ 49 Dunlap cited Millineum Maintenance, in which this court construed section 5-12012.1 of 

the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5-12012.1 (West 2006)), which was substantively similar to 

section 11-13-25 of the Municipal Code but applied to counties only. The plaintiffs there 

brought an action for judicial review of the county board’s denial of a conditional-use permit. 

Millineum Maintenance, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 639. On an interlocutory appeal by one defendant, 

we considered a certified question: whether the denial of the permit was “ ‘subject to de novo 

judicial review as a legislative decision under 55 ILCS 5/5-12012.1, per which “Any special 

use ... adopted by the county board of any county ... shall be subject to de novo judicial review 

as a legislative decision ***.” ’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting 55 ILCS 5/5-12012.1(a) 

(West 2006)). 

¶ 50 We began our analysis by noting Klaeren’s distinction between a municipality’s or 

county’s quasi-judicial administrative functions and its legislative functions. Id. at 641-42. 

Further, we observed, the Administrative Review Law does not apply to the legislative acts of 

legislative bodies. Id. at 642. We then held that, under the plain-meaning rule of statutory 

construction, only the grant of a special-use permit, and not the denial of one, was subject to 

the provision. Id. at 648. 

¶ 51 The appellant raised another argument that focused on language in section 5-12012.1(a), 

which immediately followed the portion that we had just construed. It stated, “ ‘[certain zoning 

decisions] shall be subject to de novo judicial review as a legislative decision, regardless of 

whether the process of its adoption is considered administrative for other purposes.’ ” Id.

(quoting 55 ILCS 5/5-12012.1(a) (West 2006)). Of course, this provision is similar to section 

11-13-25(a) of the Municipal Code. The appellant argued that section 5-12012.1 would violate 

the constitutional separation of powers were it read to require that special-use permit 

applications be reviewed as legislative, rather than administrative, decisions, as the legislature 

may not exercise such control over judicial decision making. Id. He contended that, if section 

5-12012.1(a) required courts to consider the zoning decisions covered by the provision as 

legislative, even if their true character were judicial, the statute would usurp the judiciary’s 
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authority. Id. We therefore considered the type and extent of “de novo judicial review” (55 

ILCS 5/5-12012.1(a) (West 2006)) for which the provision called. 

¶ 52 We construed this phraseology so as to avoid any constitutional infirmity. We observed 

that the legislature may not control the courts’ power to adjudicate justiciable matters 

(Millineum Maintenance, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 649) and that a court may not directly review 

legislative decision making—but may decide whether legislation is unconstitutional (id. at 

649-50). We held that the provision permissibly removed certain zoning decisions from the 

Administrative Review Law (id. at 650). 

¶ 53 We next turned to whether, by providing for de novo review of zoning decisions as 

legislative acts, section 5-12012.1(a) impermissibly allowed the judiciary to infringe on the 

prerogatives of legislative bodies. We adopted a narrow construction that avoided this danger. 

We noted that a statute that grants a party a trial de novo on an action to review an 

administrative agency’s decision without giving any deference to the agency’s decision would 

be unconstitutional. Id. However, consistent with the separation of powers, the trial court could 

still receive new evidence, and it could review the (now) “legislative” zoning decision for 

violations of substantive due process. Id. at 651-52. We explained: 

“[A]t the time the legislature enacted section 5-12012.1, courts had chosen between 

two types of review for the relevant categories of zoning decisions—administrative 

review under the Administrative Review Law or ‘legislative’ review for arbitrariness 

as a matter of substantive due process [citation]—before finally settling on the former 

option [citation]. Against this backdrop, the language of section 5-12012.1, which 

invokes ‘de novo judicial review as a legislative decision’ (emphasis added), indicates 

an intent to remove certain zoning decisions from the bounds of administrative review 

and instead choose the second, ‘legislative’ type of review. As the legislature has the 

authority to dictate the type of review applicable to administrative decisions, this 

interpretation renders section 5-12012.1 constitutional. 

The same language, ‘de novo review as a legislative decision’ (emphasis added), 

also provides a necessary qualification on the ‘de novo’ hearing the statute describes. 

*** [W]holly ‘de novo’ judicial review of an administrative decision impermissibly 

invites the judiciary to perform executive functions ***. The ‘as a legislative decision’ 

language invokes the alternative type of review described in [City of Chicago Heights 

v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church & Ministries, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 1, 14 

(2001)]: review for ‘arbitrariness as a matter of substantive due process.’ [Citation.] 

This so-called ‘legislative’ test prescribes the deference to agency decision making 

necessary ***, because it requires not that a court independently reevaluate facts or 

assert independent judgment, but rather that a court intervene only where there was no 

rational basis for the challenged decision, just as it would with a legislative enactment. 

Though *** evidence outside the already-developed record may be presented to the 

trial court, that evidence must bear on a much narrower question than is presented in 

typical administrative review. Since a trial court in this type of case must confine itself 

to the question of whether the challenged decision had any rational basis (just as it 

would with a legislative enactment), the trial court may not conduct even the limited 

direct factual review allowed under the Administrative Review Law (just as it could not 

with a legislative enactment). Thus ***, the evidence received must bear on the court’s 
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review ‘for arbitrariness as a matter of substantive due process under the six-part test 

set forth in [La Salle].’ ” Id. at 652-53. 

We note that this statement of the limited role for the judiciary in reviewing zoning decisions is 

consistent with what our supreme court later stated: “Zoning is primarily a legislative function, 

and it is within the province of local governmental bodies to determine the use of land and to 

establish zoning classifications.” Gurba v. Community High School District No. 155, 2015 IL 

118332, ¶ 11. Thus, constitutional constraints on the zoning power are always appropriate for 

judicial consideration, but judicial review in other respects may be limited by the legislature. 

Even with the addition of de novo review, the intent of section 5-12012.1 was to narrow the 

range of judicial inquiries into municipal zoning decisions. 

¶ 54 We now turn to Our Savior, which we discuss in the context of the foregoing opinions. In 

Our Savior, as pertinent here, the plaintiff applied for a special-use permit for proposed 

changes to its property. The defendant’s city council initially denied the applications but later 

granted a special-use permit subject to several conditions. In between the two decisions, the 

plaintiff filed a three-count complaint in the trial court, based on (1) the Administrative Review 

Law, (2) certiorari, and (3) a request for a declaratory judgment (see 735 ILCS 5/2-701 (West 

2006)) that the city’s actions violated a state statute. Apparently, the plaintiff’s complaint did 

not assert section 11-13-25 of the Municipal Code as an independent basis for a cause of 

action. The trial court ruled for the city on all three counts, reasoning that the city’s decision 

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Our Savior, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 1017-18. 

The plaintiff appealed. 

¶ 55 In addressing the plaintiff’s argument that the city had improperly denied the permit 

applications, we first clarified that we were concerned with the city’s denial of the plaintiff’s 

original application, and we then turned to “the standard of review to be applied” to that action. 

Id. at 1025. After Millineum Maintenance was issued, the legislature had amended both section 

5-12012.1 of the Counties Code and section 11-13-25 of the Municipal Code so that they now 

applied to either the grant or the denial of a special-use permit. Id. at 1025-26. We noted that 

the trial court had treated the decision as an administrative (quasi-judicial) one to be reviewed 

in accordance with Klaeren, which had been the law when the trial court ruled. Id. at 1025. 

However, in the interim, the legislature had passed the amendment to section 11-13-25(a), 

which now called for “ ‘de novo judicial review’ ” of the denial of a special-use permit. Id. at 

1026 (quoting Pub. Act 95-843, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2009)). After deciding that the amended 

section 11-13-25(a) applied retroactively (id.), we considered what it meant for the case before 

us. We stated: 

“This ‘de novo judicial review as a legislative decision’ is not the familiar de novo

standard of appellate review generally applicable in appeals of purely legal issues, 

grants of summary judgment, and so on. Millineum Maintenance, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 

653. Indeed, it is not a standard of appellate review at all. Rather, it describes a wholly 

new action under which a plaintiff may challenge a zoning decision in the same manner 

that a plaintiff may challenge a legislative action. Thus, ‘the “de novo” language 

indicates that, unlike typical administrative review, evidence outside the 

already-developed [administrative] record may be presented to the trial court.’ 

Millineum Maintenance, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 653.” Id. at 1027. 

¶ 56 Applying the foregoing to the facts of Our Savior, we noted that, although the city’s 

decision must be reviewed as a legislative one per the amended section 11-13-25(a), the trial 
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court had tried the case on the assumption that Klaeren applied (as indeed it had at the time) 

and therefore had proceeded under the Administrative Review Law. Thus, the court and both 

parties had assumed that the administrative record could not be supplemented with new 

evidence and that the only issue was whether that preexisting record demonstrated that the 

city’s decision had been against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 1027-28. We 

remanded the cause so that the parties could present new evidence on, and the trial court could 

decide, whether the denial of the permit “passe[d] muster as a legislative decision, that is, 

whether it complie[d] with substantive due process (or any other barriers to legislative 

action).” Id. at 1028-29. In so doing, the court was to apply the La Salle factors, as the 

plaintiff’s argument was that the city’s decision had been arbitrary and capricious as applied to 

the facts of the case. Id. at 1029. 

¶ 57 Finally, we note that, in two opinions postdating Our Savior, the First District followed 

Dunlap and held that section 11-13-25 does not create a private right of action but merely 

provides standards of review in cases that are already properly in court. Figiel v. Chicago Plan 

Comm’n, 408 Ill. App. 3d 223, 233 (2011); Condominium Ass’n of Commonwealth Plaza v. 

City of Chicago, 399 Ill. App. 3d 32, 47-48 (2010). 

¶ 58 We consider the implications of the foregoing opinions for the construction of section 

11-13-25 of the Municipal Code. In every opinion other than Our Savior, the appellate court 

unambiguously held that section 11-13-25 does not create a private right of action against a 

municipality. It is true that, in these opinions, the plaintiffs sought to challenge municipal 

zoning decisions in which zoning changes were granted or denied to third parties and not to the 

plaintiffs themselves. But that this is a meaningful distinction is by no means self-evident. 

¶ 59 Only Our Savior provides any support for plaintiffs’ argument that such a private right of 

action exists. In Our Savior, however, the plaintiff did not actually assert a cause of action 

under section 11-13-25. Instead, it relied on (1) the Administrative Review Law, (2) certiorari, 

and (3) the statute commonly known as the declaratory judgment act (735 ILCS 5/2-701 et seq.

(West 2006)). Here, plaintiffs’ complaint did not invoke any of these three grounds. (Plaintiffs 

even state that the first ground is unavailable.) Thus, although there is reasonably clear case 

authority against plaintiffs, the sole authority that they invoke is arguably dictum, even if it is 

as plain as plaintiffs contend it is. 

¶ 60 Our Savior relied heavily on Millineum Maintenance, which, as noted, did not hold that 

section 11-13-25’s cognate provision, section 5-12012.1 of the Counties Code, creates a 

private right of action against a unit of government’s zoning decision. Instead, Millineum 

Maintenance held that section 5-12012.1 means that judicial review of specified county zoning 

decisions shall treat these decisions as legislative acts and not administrative acts. Based on our 

reading of Millineum Maintenance, we cannot say whether the plaintiff in that case relied on 

section 5-12012.1 as a basis for relief; the opinion does not say either way. Had this court 

intended to announce a holding that section 5-12012.1 creates a private right of action, it would 

seem that our opinion would have said so directly. Instead, this court (apparently) presupposed 

that, on whatever basis, the plaintiff’s action had properly been before the trial court.

¶ 61 In view of this background, we cannot read one paragraph in Our Savior to hold that, in 

enacting sections 5-12012.1 of the Counties Code and 11-13-25 of the Municipal Code, the 

legislature intended to create brand-new causes of action for private property owners against 

governmental bodies’ zoning decisions. More fundamentally, that holding is not compelled by 
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the statutory language itself, and insofar as the history of the legislation sheds light on the 

issue, it helps to persuade us that section 11-13-25 should receive a more modest construction. 

¶ 62 As we noted earlier, the plaintiff in Our Savior did not assert that section 11-13-25 gave it 

a private right of action against the defendant municipality. The plaintiff relied on other 

grounds, none of which plaintiffs have invoked here. Thus, without a clear holding that section 

11-13-25 creates a private right of action, plaintiffs rely on our statement that “ ‘de novo 

judicial review as a legislative decision’ ” (see 65 ILCS 5/11-13-25(a) (West 2006)) was not “a 

standard of appellate review at all” but “describes a wholly new action under which a plaintiff 

may challenge a zoning decision in the same manner that a plaintiff may challenge a legislative 

action.” Our Savior, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 1027. Theoretically, at least when read in isolation, this 

passage could be taken to mean that section 11-13-25 creates a wholly new cause of action. But 

it could as easily be given a more modest construction: that section 11-13-25 provides not for 

review de novo but for a hearing de novo—in a case that is properly before the court on some 

other established basis. And, as Millineum Maintenance explained, this hearing de novo would 

be limited to the issue of whether the zoning authority’s legislative decision violated due 

process. 

¶ 63 Thus, as we explained in Millineum Maintenance, the hearing de novo in the trial court that 

section 11-13-25 provides enables the parties to introduce new evidence that had not been 

before the county or municipality that decided the zoning matter. But enabling parties to 

introduce new evidence and new issues once they are in court is very different from enabling 

them to enter the courthouse in the first place. Nothing in Our Savior compels us to hold that 

section 11-13-25 creates a wholly new private right of action, even were we committed to 

adhering to our opinion on a matter that was not directly before us. 

¶ 64 Moreover, and more fundamentally, section 11-13-25 itself does not support the broad 

reading that plaintiffs give Our Savior. Even could we read that opinion as broadly as do 

plaintiffs, we would not follow it. 

¶ 65 Section 11-13-25(a) reads, in part, “Any [zoning] decision by the corporate authorities of 

any municipality *** shall be subject to de novo judicial review as a legislative decision ***.” 

65 ILCS 5/11-13-25(a) (West 2014). Again, reading this language in isolation, it is possible to 

see it as creating a brand-new cause of action for private property owners against 

municipalities. However, aside from the fact that the legislature might have used more 

straightforward language to effect such a change, this language can reasonably be read to 

imply that the legislature intended only to provide a hearing de novo, under the legal standards 

for legislative acts, in a case that is already properly before the trial court. Phrased differently, 

the language can be read to state merely that the rules for judicial review of zoning decisions 

have been changed and not that the availability of judicial review has been expanded. The 

amendment that the legislature chose focused on new procedural rules and legal standards. 

¶ 66 But the deciding consideration is that, read in the broader constitutional and statutory 

context, section 11-13-25 is not even ambiguous, and we cannot construe it to create a new 

private right of action. 

¶ 67 Our state’s trial courts have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters but only “such 

power to review administrative action as provided by law.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. Thus, 

a party seeking judicial review of a municipal zoning decision must establish that the trial court 

has jurisdiction as provided by law. And proof of this prerequisite does not follow from the 

mere fact that section 11-13-25 provides that a zoning decision “shall be subject to de novo 
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judicial review as a legislative decision, regardless of whether the process in relation thereto is 

considered administrative for other purposes.” (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/11-13-25(a) 

(West 2014). 

¶ 68 Reading section 11-13-25 in the context of division 13 of article 11 of the Municipal Code 

refutes the assertion that it creates a new cause of action. Division 13 sets out municipal zoning 

powers. Section 11-13-11 (65 ILCS 5/11-13-11 (West 2014)) sets out procedural requirements 

for every grant of a variance or special use, whether made by a municipality’s board of appeals 

or by ordinance. Section 11-13-12 (65 ILCS 5/11-13-12 (West 2014)) sets out rules for appeals 

to the municipality’s board of appeals. Section 11-13-13 (65 ILCS 5/11-13-13 (West 2014)) 

makes all final administrative decisions of the board of appeals subject to judicial review under 

the Administrative Review Law. 

¶ 69 Of most direct significance here is section 11-13-15, which stands in contrast to section 

11-13-25 in respects that are crucial here. Section 11-13-15 does create a separate cause of 

action, albeit not against the municipality (Dunlap, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 638-39). That this was 

the intent of the legislature cannot be doubted, because section 11-13-15 is both explicit in its 

purpose and detailed in the procedures it creates toward that purpose. 

¶ 70 Section 11-13-15 initially provides that, if any building or structure violates a zoning 

ordinance, either the municipal authorities or any landowner or tenant within a given distance 

who is affected by the violation, “in addition to other remedies, may initiate any appropriate 

action or proceeding” to prevent or abate the violation. (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/11-13-15 

(West 2014). This language in itself plainly creates a new ground for a cause of action. Section 

11-13-15 then provides rules for notice to the municipality whenever any such action is 

instituted by a private party and gives the trial court “[i]n any action or proceeding for a 

purpose mentioned in this section” the discretion to issue injunctive relief. Id. Next, section 

11-13-15 requires the trial court to award reasonable attorney fees to a successful private 

plaintiff. Finally, section 11-13-15 states that a private plaintiff need not prove special 

damages to his property “in order to maintain a suit under the foregoing provisions.” Id. Thus, 

section 11-13-15 sets out a detailed scheme for a specific type of proceeding, with specific 

provisions for notice, injunctive relief, attorney fees, and proof of damages. When the 

legislature intended to create a new cause of action, it knew how to do so without leaving any 

doubt as to its purpose. 

¶ 71 Section 11-13-25 is altogether different. It shows no such indicia of an intent to open a new 

avenue of relief or create a new type of action. The title, “Actions subject to de novo review; 

due process” (65 ILCS 5/11-13-25 (West 2014)), itself implies that the purpose of the section 

is to specify rules for (some) preexisting types of proceedings. More important, in contrast to 

section 11-13-15, section 11-13-25 does not state that a specified class of plaintiffs may 

institute an action or proceeding; does not provide for notice to the municipality; does not grant 

any specific powers, injunctive or otherwise, to a trial court; says nothing about special 

damages or the type of injury that a plaintiff need show; and does not provide for awarding 

attorney fees. All these provisions are conspicuously absent from section 11-13-25, for the 

logical reason that section 11-13-25 was never intended to create a new cause of action, and the 

matters that such provisions would address are already covered by the statutes that actually do 

create independent rights of action. Section 11-13-25 is limited to standards of review in 

preexisting causes of action and to reciting the principle—which would apply even absent such 

an explicit recitation—that constitutional due process applies to zoning decisions. 
- 16 - 

¶ 72 Insofar as we need consider the legislative history of section 11-13-25, it refutes plaintiffs’ 

interpretation. As Senator Garrett, quoted in Millineum Maintenance, explained, the primary 

aim of section 11-13-25(a) was to nullify Klaeren’s holding that municipal zoning decisions 

are administrative and not legislative—and the primary motivation for this legislative undoing 

of Klaeren was the concern that subjecting zoning decisions to review as administrative acts, 

not legislative ones, would place an undue burden on municipalities (and counties): 

“ ‘The corporate authorities of municipalities and counties are primarily—lawmaking 

bodies that operate through the political process. Their legislative decisions have 

traditionally been subject to de novo judicial review. While accepting the Supreme 

Court’s analysis regarding the character of the special use permit process, the General 

Assembly notes that quasi-judicial proceedings are to be reviewed on the record, which 

in turn requires such proceedings to be conducted in the manner of a mini-trial. Given 

their essential legislative character, the corporate authorities of municipalities and 

counties are not well suited to—conduct mini-trials. In order to promote the efficient 

and effective governance of municipalities and counties, the General Assembly hereby 

adopts Senate Bill 94. Senate Bill 94 is not intended to question the essential 

conclusions in Klaeren regarding the legal character of special use permit decisions or 

due process, but it provides that any special use decision made by a municipality—or 

county shall be treated as legislative decisions subject to de novo judicial review.’ ” 

Millineum Maintenance, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 646 (quoting 94th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate 

Proceedings, May 3, 2006, at 22-23 (statements of Senator Garrett)). 

See also Dunlap, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 641-42 (citing Millineum Maintenance, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 

646-47, court explained that the passage of section 11-13-25 was “born out of the legislature’s 

concern that corporate authorities of municipalities lacked the resources to conduct 

proceedings that would conform to the heightened level of scrutiny that is placed upon 

administrative decisions”).

¶ 73 We decline to read an enactment that was aimed primarily at easing the burden on counties 

and municipalities as creating a right of action that could potentially increase the burden on 

these same bodies. We agree with defendants that section 11-13-25 does not create a right of 

action for property owners to challenge zoning decisions. As the viability of plaintiffs’ 

complaint depended on a contrary premise, we must reverse the trial court’s judgment outright.

¶ 74 We intimate no position on whether plaintiffs could have based their action on something 

other than section 11-13-25, such as the declaratory judgment act. Plaintiffs never attempted to 

use any key to the courthouse door other than section 11-13-25.

¶ 75 Owing to our holding, we need not decide whether the trial court erred in holding that the 

denial of plaintiffs’ petition deprived them of due process.

¶ 76 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is 

reversed. 

¶ 77 Reversed.