alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Winiford Fortune, Petitioner, v James Kralik et al., Respondents.

[944 NYS2d 920] —

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, in the nature of prohibition to prohibit the respondents from proceeding with an underlying criminal prosecution entitled *People v Fortune,*pending in the County Court, Rockland County, under indictment No. 2011-155, and in the nature of mandamus to compel the respondents to dismiss the indictment, and application by the petitioner for poor person relief.

Ordered that the application for poor person relief is granted to the extent that the filing fee imposed by CPLR 8022 (b) is waived, and the application is otherwise denied; and it is further,

Adjudged that the petition is denied and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, without costs or disbursements.

“Because of its extraordinary nature, prohibition is available only where there is a clear legal right, and then only when a court — in cases where judicial authority is challenged — acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in excess of its authorized powers” *(Matter of Holtzman v Goldman,*71 NY2d 564, 569 [1988]; *see Matter of Rush v Mordue,*68 NY2d 348, 352 [1986]). The extraordinary remedy of mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of a ministerial act, and only where there exists a clear legal right to the relief sought *(see Matter of Legal Aid Socy. of Sullivan County v Scheinman,*53 NY2d 12, 16 [1981]).

The petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought. Skelos, J.E, Eng, Belen and Cohen, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31.1

Certifications

SECTION 302

I, Frank D. Puissegur, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of American
Commerce Solutions, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4. The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and
have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual report (the Evaluation Date); and

c) presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the
Evaluation Date;

5. The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the
registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrants
auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal controls; and

6. The registrants other certifying officers
and I have indicated in this annual report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any
corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.



|                       |  |  |  |                                                                    |              | 
|---------------------- |  |  |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------ | 
|/s/ Frank D. Puissegur |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) and Director |              | 
|Frank D. Puissegur     |  |  |  |                                                                    | May 29, 2007
Exhibit 32



SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF

FINANCIAL OFFICER



Statement



Solely for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C.§1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of Sonic Foundry, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify, based on our knowledge, that the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Dated: | August 9, 2005
|------ | --------------



By:

/s/ Rimas P. BuineiviciusBy:

Rimas P. BuineiviciusTitle:

Chief Executive OfficerBy:

/s/ Kenneth A. MinorBy:

Kenneth A. MinorTitle:

Chief Financial Officer




20
Slip Op. 08-126 

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

TRUSTEES IN BANKRUPTCY OF 

NORTH AMERICAN RUBBER THREAD 

CO., INC., FILMAX SDN. BHD., 

HEVEAFIL USA, INC., AND 

HEVEAFIL SDN. BHD., 

 Before: Richard W. Goldberg, 

 Plaintiffs, Senior Judge 

 v. Consol. Court No. 05-00539 

UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant. 

JUDGMENT

 Upon consideration of defendant’s motion for entry of final 

judgment, and all other pertinent papers, it is hereby 

ORDERED that the defendant’s motion is granted; and it is 

further 

ORDERED that this Court’s order of June 10th, 2008 is vacated to 

the extent that it remands this action to the Department of 

Commerce for further proceedings; and it is further 

ORDERED that the Department of Commerce shall initiate a changed 

circumstances review pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b); and it is 

further 

ORDERED that all further claims are dismissed as unripe. 

Dated: November 21, 2008 /s/ Richard W. Goldberg

 New York, New York Richard W. Goldberg 

 Senior Judge
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

 

I, D. James (Jim) MacKenzie, certify that;

(1)         I have reviewed this Report on Form 10-KSB (Amendment No. 1) for the year ended December 31, 2006 of Nordic Nickel Ltd.;

(2)         Based on my knowledge, this Report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this Report;

(3)         Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this Report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

(4)         The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)         designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)         evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this Report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

(c)         disclosed in this Report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

(5)         The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of the internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)         all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

(b)         any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.  

Date:     July 27, 2007.

/s/ D. James (Jim) MacKenzie
# C_2020019EN.01003701.xml

| 20.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 19/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 19/37

---

Action brought on 25 November 2019 — European Commission v Hungary

(Case C-856/19)

(2020/C 19/39)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: C. Perrin and A. Sipos, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Hungary

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

| — | declare that Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 10(2) and (3) of Council Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco, (1) by levying, after the expiration of the transitional period granted until 31 December 2017, an overall excise duty of less than 60 % of the weighted average retail selling price of cigarettes released for consumption and levying an excise duty of less than EUR 115 per 1 000 cigarettes. |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 10(2) and (3) of Council Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco, (1) by levying, after the expiration of the transitional period granted until 31 December 2017, an overall excise duty of less than 60 % of the weighted average retail selling price of cigarettes released for consumption and levying an excise duty of less than EUR 115 per 1 000 cigarettes.

| — | order Hungary to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order Hungary to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pursuant to Article 10(2) of Council Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco, as of 1 January 2014, the overall excise duty on cigarettes is to represent at least 60 % of the weighted average retail selling price of cigarettes released for consumption, unless the excise duty levied amounts to at least EUR 115 per 1 000 cigarettes. Since Hungary levies an excise duty of less than EUR 115 per 1 000 cigarettes, that Member State is required to establish an excise duty at a rate equivalent to or greater than 60 % of the weighted average price.

The third subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2011/64/EU granted Hungary and seven other Member States a transitional period until 31 December 2017 in order to reach that rate of excise duty. Under Article 10(2) and (3) of Directive 2011/64/EU, those Member States were required to reach the abovementioned excise duty thresholds by the end of that period.

The Commission claims that, at the end of the transitional period, Hungary did not reach the excise duty thresholds set out in Article 10(2) and (3) of Directive 2011/64/EU and that, as of 31 December 2017, that Member State continues to levy an excise duty that is below the thresholds established in that directive.

---

(1)  Council Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco (OJ 2011 L 176, p. 24).

---
EXHIBIT 32.1


CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SS 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Americare Health
Scan, Inc. (the "Company") for the quarter ended March 31, 2006, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Dr. Joseph P. D'Angelo, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
   15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
   material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
   the company.

Date: September 12, 2008     /s/  Dr. Joseph P. D'Angelo
      ----------------      ---------------------------
                            Dr. Joseph P. D'Angelo, President, Chief
                            Executive Officer

      September 12, 2008     /s/  Robert Cano
      ----------------      --------------------
                            Robert Cano, Chief Financial Officer
(January 21, 1986)

#### Bernice Alberti et al., Appellants, v St. John’s Episcopal Hospital-Smithtown, Defendant, and Samuel J. Roth, Respondent.

In a medical malpractice action, plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Underwood, J.), entered June 1, 1984, which dismissed the complaint at the close of all the evidence for failure to establish a prima facie case.

Judgment reversed, on the law, and a new trial granted as against defendant Roth, with costs to abide the event.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and resolving all questions of credibility in their favor, as we must *(see, Lipsius v White,*91 AD2d 271), there was *613sufficient evidence adduced from which a reasonable person might conclude that defendant Roth’s acts or omissions constituted a departure from the standards of medical care in the community, and that this departure proximately caused plaintiff Bernice Alberti’s injuries. Therefore, plaintiffs established a prima facie case of medical malpractice against defendant Roth under a negligence theory *(see, Gibson v D'Amico,*97 AD2d 905, *lv denied*61 NY2d 603; *Lipsius v White, supra).*

In addition, plaintiff Bernice Alberti’s testimony that defendant Roth did not inform her of any of the risks involved in reconstructive surgery and her testimony from which it may reasonably be inferred that she would not have had the operation had she known the risks involved, combined with the expert testimony as to the risks a reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, served to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice based on lack of informed consent *(see,*Public Health Law § 2805-d; *Ogden v Bhatti,*92 AD2d 658; *Lipsius v White, supra).*Lazer, J. P., Bracken, Niehoff and Hooper, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 31.1


                                    CERTIFICATION
                               PURSUANT TO SECTION 302
                           OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Yonglin Du, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this Form 10-KSB of Dahua Inc.

2.   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.   The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

       a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

       b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

       c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5.   The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's Board
of Directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

      a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

      b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting.


Date:   April 12, 2006

/s/ Yonglin Du
-------------------------------------
Yonglin Du, President & CEO
# C_2019372EN.01002601.xml

| 4.11.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 372/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.11.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 372/26

---

Appeal brought on 12 September 2019 by Fulmen against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 2 July 2019 in Case T-405/15, Fulmen v Council

(Case C-680/19 P)

(2019/C 372/28)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Fulmen (represented by: A. Bahrami, N. Korogiannakis, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission

Form of order sought

Primarily:

| — | set aside the judgment under appeal in part; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment under appeal in part;

| — | give final judgment in the matter; |
| --- | --- |

—

give final judgment in the matter;

| — | order the Council to pay Fulmen the sum of EUR 6 456 507 in respect of material damage and EUR 100 000 in respect of non-material damage, together with default interest; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council to pay Fulmen the sum of EUR 6 456 507 in respect of material damage and EUR 100 000 in respect of non-material damage, together with default interest;

| — | order the Council to pay all of the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council to pay all of the costs.

In the alternative:

| — | set aside the judgment under appeal in part; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment under appeal in part;

| — | refer the case back to the General Court; |
| --- | --- |

—

refer the case back to the General Court;

| — | order the Council to pay all of the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council to pay all of the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Concerning the material damage, the General Court, in the first place, erred in law, infringed the principle of full reparation and deprived Article 340(2) TFEU and Article 41(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of their practical effect. The standard of proof required by the General Court made any compensation for the harm suffered impossible, despite the existence of a sufficiently serious and flagrant breach of EU law. In the second place, the judgment under appeal was vitiated by an error of law and by contradictory reasoning. In the third place, the General Court distorted the evidence and the facts.

Concerning the non-material damage, the judgment under appeal contains no statement of reasons as regards the criteria taken into account in order to assess ex aequo et bono the amount of the compensation.

---
# L_2009049EN.01004802.xml

| 20.2.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 49/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.2.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 49/48

---

Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EC) No 1167/2008 of 24 October 2008 amending and updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology

(
  Official Journal of the European Union L 325 of 3 December 2008
  )

On page 88, in the Annex, Category 2, in reference 2B006, b.1.c.2.:

for:

| ‘2. | maintaining for at least 12 hours at a temperature of ± 20 °C all of the following:’, |
| --- | --- |

‘2.

maintaining for at least 12 hours at a temperature of ± 20 °C all of the following:’,

read:

| ‘2. | maintaining for at least 12 hours at a temperature of 20 ± 1 °C all of the following:’. |
| --- | --- |

‘2.

maintaining for at least 12 hours at a temperature of 20 ± 1 °C all of the following:’.

---
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Carl F. Fahrenkrug, Chief Executive Officer of Microwave Filter Company,
Inc. (the Company), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1) the quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the period ended
    June 30, 2007 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section
    13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or
    78o(d); and

(2) the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
    Company.

Dated: August 14, 2007                      /s/ Carl F. Fahrenkrug
                                                Carl F. Fahrenkrug
                                                Chief Executive Officer

<page>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Richard L. Jones, Chief Financial Officer of Microwave Filter Company, Inc.
(the Company), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1) the quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the period ended
    June 30, 2007 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section
    13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or
    78o(d); and

(2) the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
    Company.

Dated: August 14, 2007                      /s/ Richard L. Jones
                                                Richard L. Jones
                                                Chief Financial Officer