IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mohammad Sohail Saleem, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1358 C.D. 2019

: Submitted: March 6, 2020

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, : 

Department of Corrections, :

John Doe # 1, C.O.I.; John Doe #2, :

C.O.II; John Doe #3, C.O.I.; Barlett, :

C.O.I.; Tarentella, C.O.III; H. Probst, :

A/CO5, A/Major of Guard; Mark C. :

Garman, Superintendent; Dorina :

Varner, (Chief Grievance Coordinator); :

All sued in their individual and :

Official Capacities, et al. :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: July 20, 2020

Mohammad Sohail Saleem, pro se, appeals an order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Centre County (trial court) that dismissed his civil complaint filed 

against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections for failure to effect service on 

the Office of Attorney General. Saleem argues that the lack of service upon the 

Attorney General constitutes harmless error and does not constitute grounds for 

dismissal. We affirm.

On March 1, 2018, Saleem filed a civil complaint against the 

Department of Corrections, Superintendent Mark C. Garman and several 
2

Department employees1(collectively, Department). The complaint alleged that on 

June 26, 2017, Saleem was placed in the restricted housing unit at the State 

Correctional Institution at Rockville. During that time, his personal property was 

packed in boxes by Department employees and stored in the property room. Four 

days later, Saleem was released and returned to his regular unit. Upon collecting his 

belongings from the property room, he discovered that items were missing that he

valued at $75.00.

The civil complaint raised four counts. First, it asserted negligence by

the Department’s employees for the loss of the property. Second, it asserted a 

deprivation of property without due process of law. Third, it asserted that 

Superintendent Garman was liable for Saleem’s losses under the doctrine of 

respondeat superior. Fourth, it asserted that Superintendent Garman was vicariously 

liable for the conduct of the Department employees. Saleem sought compensatory 

damages of $75.00 for the missing commissary items; $25,000 in damages for the 

negligence and due process violations; and $25,000 for Superintendent Garman’s 

malfeasance. Saleem sought punitive damages of $25,000 against all named 

defendants.

Saleem effected service by having the Sheriff’s Office of Centre 

County serve the complaint on the Department. The Department then filed 

preliminary objections, seeking to dismiss the complaint because Saleem did not 

1 Specifically, Saleem named: John Doe #1, Correctional Officer (C.O.) I; John Doe #2, C.O. II; 

John Doe #3, C.O. I; Jeremy Bartlett, C.O. I; John Tarentella, C.O. III; Herbert Probst, Major of 

the Guard; and Dorina Varner, Chief Grievance Coordinator. 
3

serve the Attorney General, thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to hear 

the matter.2 

On September 25, 2018, the trial court sustained the preliminary 

objection based on lack of jurisdiction but gave Saleem until October 25, 2018, to 

serve the Attorney General. Saleem requested an extension of time to comply with 

the order, and the trial court granted an extension to November 30, 2018.

On February 14, 2019, the Department filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint for the stated reason that Saleem’s November 6, 2018, certified mail 

service upon the Attorney General was defective. Service was required to be made 

by sheriff. The Department asserted that this defective service violated the trial 

court’s order and deprived the court of jurisdiction.

On June 24, 2019, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of 

jurisdiction. The trial court reasoned that Saleem had failed to properly serve the 

Attorney General as previously ordered and dismissal was appropriate pursuant to 

Kreidie v. Department of Revenue, 156 A.3d 380 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (failure to 

serve the Attorney General constitutes a fatal defect).

Saleem has appealed to this Court and has raised one issue.3 He argues

improper service constitutes harmless error and should not be grounds for dismissal. 

As such, the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his complaint.

We begin with a review of the applicable law. Section 8523(b) of the 

Judicial Code states as follows:

2 The Department’s preliminary objections asserted a demurrer to the due process claim and to the 

claim against Superintendent Garman. The Department also asserted that the claims were barred 

by sovereign immunity. 

3 Absent an abuse of discretion, a court may refuse to extend the deadline for amended service due 

to failure of the litigant to comply with the court’s order. Konya v. District Attorney of 

Northampton County, 669 A.2d 890, 892 (Pa. 1995).
4

Service of process in the case of an action against the 

Commonwealth shall be made at the principal or local office of 

the Commonwealth agency that is being sued and at the office of 

the Attorney General.

42 Pa. C.S. §8523(b). In addition, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 422(a)

states as follows:

(a) Service of original process upon the Commonwealth or an 

officer of the Commonwealth, or a department, board, 

commission or instrumentality of the Commonwealth, or a 

member thereof, shall be made at the office of the defendant and 

the office of the attorney general by handing a copy to the person 

in charge thereof.

Pa. R.C.P. No. 422(a). Absent limited exceptions, “original process shall be served 

within the Commonwealth only by the sheriff.” Pa. R.C.P. No. 400(a).4

This Court has held that “failure to serve a copy of the complaint on the 

Attorney General cannot be excused. This omission renders [the plantiff’s] service 

defective and deprive[s] the trial court of jurisdiction over [the defendants].” Reaves 

v. Knauer, 979 A.2d 404, 410 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (citing Feigley v. Jeffes, 510 A.2d 

385 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986)). However, a court may give a plaintiff the opportunity to 

4 The exceptions are as follows:

(b) In addition to service by the sheriff, original process may be served also by a 

competent adult in the following actions:

(1) civil action in which the complaint includes a request for 

injunctive relief under Rule 1531, perpetuation of testimony under 

Rule 1532 or appointment of a receiver under Rule 1533,

(2) partition, and

(3) declaratory judgment when declaratory relief is the only relief 

sought.

Pa. R.C.P. No. 400(b).
5

cure the defect where there is no prejudice suffered by the opposing party. Konya, 

669 A.2d at 892.

Saleem claims that improper service constitutes harmless error. In 

support, he directs the Court to Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). There, an 

inmate, who was pro se, filed a complaint against the Texas Department of 

Corrections and its medical staff, and the complaint was dismissed for failure to state 

a claim. The United States Supreme Court remanded, holding that the handwritten 

pro se complaint was to be liberally construed and “however inartfully pleaded[]” 

could only be dismissed “if it appears beyond doubt” that the facts cannot support a 

claim. Id. at 106 (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). Saleem 

argues that Estelle establishes that his pro se status excuses his failure to effect 

service.5

The Department responds that the law requires strict, not substantial, 

compliance with the rules of procedure, and there is no exception for litigants that 

proceed pro se. Service upon the Attorney General must be done in person by a

sheriff. Moreover, the trial court gave Saleem a second chance to effect service and 

he failed to comply with the trial court’s order. In support, the Department refers 

the Court to Konya, 669 A.2d 890.

In Konya, an inmate sought to pursue a private criminal complaint, pro

se, with the Northampton County District Attorney, claiming that three witnesses in 

his criminal trial committed perjury. When the District Attorney declined to 

prosecute, the inmate filed a petition for review, pro se, addressed to this Court’s 

5 Saleem characterizes his failure to effect service as harmless error based on Commonwealth v. 

Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super. 2014). Newman addresses harmless error in the context of a jury 

instruction that omitted a material element of the crime the defendant was ultimately found guilty 

of committing. Newman is not germane to the issue before this Court.
6

original jurisdiction. He requested a writ of mandamus to compel the District 

Attorney and the Attorney General to initiate criminal proceedings against the 

witnesses. 

The applicable rules state that a petition for review must be “served by 

the petitioner in person or by certified mail on the government unit that made the 

determination sought to be reviewed. In matters involving the Commonwealth, the 

petitioner shall similarly serve a copy upon the Attorney General of Pennsylvania.” 

PA. R.A.P. 1514(c). In Konya, the Attorney General filed preliminary objections 

because service was made by First-Class Mail. This Court agreed that service was 

defective, but we held the defect to be curable. We granted the inmate 14 days to 

effect service. Instead, the inmate served the Attorney General 11 days past the 

deadline. We dismissed his petition for review. 

Before the Supreme Court, the inmate contended that this Court abused 

its discretion because there was no prejudice from the untimely service. The 

Supreme Court noted that “[w]hether a court may disregard a litigant’s defective

service of process or violation of its order is vested within the sound discretion of 

that court.” Konya, 669 A.2d at 892. The Supreme Court concluded that this Court 

did not abuse its discretion, explaining as follows:

To require the Commonwealth Court to overlook [the inmate’s] 

failure to comply with a court order and to accept service which 

is filed beyond the court-ordered extended deadline for amended 

service would be to countenance the dilatory actions of litigants 

who blatantly disregard court orders. We see no reason to adopt 

a per se rule that, as long as no prejudice is suffered by untimely 

service, a court order can be disregarded. In fact, if we were to 

adopt such a per se rule, we would be hindering the orderly 

disposition of cases before the courts of the Commonwealth and 

injecting into well-grounded procedure an element of uncertainty 

were there should be none.
7

Id. at 892.

Konya is dispositive. Here, the trial court gave Saleem a second chance 

to effect service, and he did not comply with the order. The trial court was not 

required to overlook a “failure to comply with a court order and to accept service 

which is filed beyond the court-ordered extended deadline....” Id. at 892. In short, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Saleem also claims that his pro se status excuses his inability to comply 

with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. In Green v. Harmony House North 

15th Street Housing Association, Inc., 684 A.2d 1112 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), the pro 

se litigant failed to appear at a pre-trial conference and the trial court dismissed her 

appeal from a compulsory arbitration award. She appealed to this Court, arguing 

“that the rules are too complicated for a pro se party to understand and thus, she 

should be excused from following the rules.” Id. at 1114. We responded, as follows:

[E]arly on in this Commonwealth’s legal history, the Supreme 

Court began promulgating rules of procedure consistent with the 

Pennsylvania Constitution. Pa. Const. art. V, §10(c). The fact 

that [the litigant] decided to be her own lawyer does not excuse 

her from failing to follow the rules of civil and/or appellate 

procedure. “The right of self-representation is not a license ... 

not to comply with relevant rules of procedure and substantive 

law.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 [] (1975). 

Our Supreme Court in Peters Creek Sanitary Authority v. Welch, 

[] 681 A.2d 167, 170 ([Pa.] 1996) [], again enunciated its position 

as to pro se litigants citing Vann v. Unemployment Compensation 

Board of Review, [] 494 A.2d 1081 ([Pa.] 1985) (pro se litigant 

must to some extent assume the risk that his lack of legal training 

will prove his undoing); Commonwealth v. Abu–Jamal, [] 555 

A.2d 846, 852 ([Pa.] 1989) (pro se litigant “is subject to the same 

rules of procedure as is a counseled defendant)[.]”
8

Green, 684 A.2d at 1114. Accordingly, we reject Saleem’s claim that his pro se

status excuses his failure to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

For all the above reasons, we reject Saleem’s claim that the trial court 

abused its discretion in dismissing his complaint. Accordingly, the order of the trial 

court is affirmed.

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mohammad Sohail Saleem, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1358 C.D. 2019

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, : 

Department of Corrections, :

John Doe # 1, C.O.I.; John Doe #2, :

C.O.II; John Doe #3, C.O.I.; Barlett, :

C.O.I.; Tarentella, C.O.III; H. Probst, :

A/CO5, A/Major of Guard; Mark C. :

Garman, Superintendent; Dorina :

Varner, (Chief Grievance Coordinator); :

All sued in their individual and :

Official Capacities, et al. :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of July, 2020, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Centre County, dated June 24, 2019, is hereby AFFIRMED.

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge