J-S23009-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EDWIN MARQUEZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3568 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 3, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0904661-2005

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McCAFFERY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: Filed: October 1, 2020

Appellant Edwin Marquez1 appeals from the order dismissing his timely 

first petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).2 On appeal, 

Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 

weight of the evidence issue after his trial and in his direct appeal. We affirm. 

The PCRA court set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as follows: 

On May 22, 2005, Appellant and his brother, Carlos Jiminez 

[(Codefendant)], arrived home after going to a nearby store and 

found three men inside their shared residence. A struggle ensued 

during which one of the three intruders had a handgun taken from 

him by [Codefendant], who did not tell police about having taken 

the firearm. The intruders then fled. 

Two days later, Carlos Alicea [(the victim)] was at bus stop located 

at 5th and Cambria Streets waiting for a bus with some family 

____________________________________________

1

It appears that Appellant’s full name is Edwin Marquez Jimenez. See N.T.

Trial, 11/2/06, at 64. 

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9456. 
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members when Appellant walked by in the company of another 

male. Appellant was talking on a cell phone and was overheard 

saying, “He is here, he is in the store[,]” all the while imploring 

the person to whom he was speaking to hurry up and get there. 

Apparently, Appellant believed that [the victim] was one of the 

men who had entered his home two days prior thereto. 

When the phone call ended, Appellant followed [the victim] into a 

store and grabbed and punched him after which he and [the 

victim] began struggling. Eventually, both men made their way 

outside where Appellant gained control of [the victim]. 

Immediately thereafter, [Codefendant], who had just driven to 

the area, quickly ran up to [the victim] and Appellant. When he 

reached them, [Codefendant] shot [the victim] in the chest from 

close range with the gun confiscated from one of the intruders two 

days earlier. When he was shot, [the victim] was firmly in 

Appellant’s grasp and completely under his control. 

After [Codefendant] shot [the victim], Appellant let [the victim] 

go at which time [Codefendant] fired a second shot at [the victim], 

who fell to the ground. [Codefendant] then walked over to [the 

victim] and fired a third shot at him.[3] Both Appellant and 

[Codefendant] fled the scene and eventually went to Florida where 

they were arrested in June of 200[5]. 

[The victim] was taken to a nearby hospital where he was 

pronounced dead shortly after arrival. An autopsy of his body 

revealed that he died as a result of two gunshot wounds to his 

torso that caused damage to his heart, lungs, and liver.

PCRA Ct. Op., 12/10/19, at 2-3. 

On November 6, 2006, a jury found Appellant guilty of third-degree 

murder and criminal conspiracy. On January 18, 2007, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to seventeen-and-a-half to thirty-five years’

imprisonment for murder and a concurrent term of ten to twenty years’

imprisonment for conspiracy. Trial counsel did not file a post-sentence motion 

____________________________________________

3 At some point during the incident, Codefendant also apparently shot 

Appellant through the wrist or hand. N.T. Trial, 11/2/06, at 91-92. 
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on Appellant’s behalf or otherwise preserve a challenge to the weight of the 

evidence, but filed a direct appeal to this Court challenging, in relevant part,

the sufficiency of the evidence.4

On August 31, 2009, an en banc panel of this Court rejected Appellant’s 

sufficiency claims and affirmed the judgment of sentence.5 Commonwealth 

v. Marquez, 980 A.2d 145 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc). On December 29, 

2009, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Marquez, 987 A.2d 160 (Pa. 2009). 

On August 17, 2011, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition pro se. See

Pro Se Pet. for PCRA Relief, 8/17/11. The PCRA court appointed David S. 

Rudenstein, Esq., as counsel for Appellant. On October 23, 2017, Attorney 

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4 Lee Mandell, Esq. (trial counsel) represented Appellant at trial and in the 

direct appeal. 

5 Specifically, in reviewing Appellant’s sufficiency claim, this Court concluded:

“From the Commonwealth’s evidence, the jury could infer that [Appellant] 

acted with malice by seeking out the [victim], calling someone to let them 

know that ‘he is here,’ and holding the [victim] in a headlock until after 

[Codefendant] shot him.” Marquez, 980 A.2d at 149. This Court further 

stated that “[t]he web of circumstantial evidence, taken as a whole, points to 

the existence of a criminal conspiracy carried out by the two brothers.” Id.

at 150. Judge Klein and Judge Cleland filed separate concurring and 

dissenting opinions. See id. at 151 (Klein, J. concurring and dissenting)

(stating that while “the record established that some type of conspiracy did 

exist[,] . . . it [was] pure conjecture to conclude that [Appellant] and 

[Codefendant] shared any intent other than to assault the victim”); id. at 154-

55 (Cleland, J. concurring and dissenting). 
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Rudenstein filed a motion to withdraw and a Turner/Finley6letter asserting 

that Appellant’s petition was untimely filed and presented no issues of 

arguable merit. On February 6, 2018, the PCRA court granted Attorney 

Rudenstein’s motion to withdraw, but dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition on 

the merits.7 

Appellant appealed the dismissal of his PCRA petition to this Court. 

Upon review, this Court concluded that the PCRA court “should not have 

permitted counsel to withdraw . . . .” Commonwealth v. Marquez, 790 EDA 

2018, 2019 WL 1896548, *2 (Pa. Super. filed Apr. 29, 2019) (unpublished

mem.). Accordingly, this Court vacated the denial of Appellant’s PCRA 

petition, remanded the matter to the PCRA court, and directed that new 

counsel be appointed for Appellant. Id. 

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6 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). 

7 Appellant, in his initial pro se PCRA petition, acknowledged that he did not 

file his petition within the one-year PCRA deadline. Pro Se Pet. for PCRA Relief 

at 3-5. However, Appellant attached to his pro se petition his correspondence 

with the trial court regarding his appeal. Additionally, Appellant attached a 

letter from trial counsel stating that counsel forgot to inform Appellant of our 

Supreme Court’s denial of his petition for allowance of appeal. 

In its opinion, the PCRA court noted that “[a]lthough Appellant did not timely

file his PCRA petition, the record clearly shows that direct appeal counsel failed 

to inform of him of the denial of his petition for allowance of appeal. Upon 

being informed of his denial, he filed his pro se PCRA petition within sixty days 

of learning of the denial thereby making the filing timely because he acted 

with due diligence.” PCRA Ct. Op., 3/28/18, at 2 n.2 (citation omitted). 
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On remand, the PCRA court appointed new PCRA counsel, and counsel 

filed the instant amended petition on May 21, 2019. See Am. Pet. for PCRA 

Relief, 5/21/19. This petition claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to challenge the weight of the evidence. Id. Specifically, Appellant 

asserted that the trial evidence failed to establish an agreement between 

Appellant and Codefendant to shoot the victim. Id. at 9.

The PCRA court found that Appellant’s amended petition lacked merit

and on October 16, 2019, issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss 

the petition without a hearing. See Notice Pursuant to Pa. Rule of Crim. P. 

907, 10/16/19. Appellant did not respond. 

On December 3, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s amended 

petition without a hearing. That same day, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. 

The PCRA court did not order the filing of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but 

issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion on December 10, 2019. See PCRA Ct. Op., 

12/10/19. 

On appeal, Appellant raises one issue for our review:

Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA [p]etition 

without a hearing when trial / direct appeal counsel was ineffective 

for failing to preserve a weight of the evidence issue as to all 

convictions and Appellant suffered prejudice because there was 

nothing tying Appellant to a conspiracy with [Codefendant] to 

shoot [the victim]? 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

Appellant asserts that trial counsel’s failure to preserve a weight of the

evidence argument deprived the trial court of its gatekeeping role when 
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considering whether he was entitled to a new trial. Id. at 16. Appellant 

argues that “[i]t is beyond rational belief that Appellant would somehow 

mentally agree with his Codefendant brother that Codefendant would shoot 

[the victim] and Appellant. Appellant stood back and did not continue to 

restrain [the victim] while Codefendant shot.” Id. at 15. Further, Appellant 

notes that trial counsel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in 

Appellant’s direct appeal and that at least two judges of this Court believed 

the evidence was insufficient.8 Id. at 5, 9, 15-16. According to Appellant, 

had the weight claim been preserved, Appellant would have been “awarded a 

new trial by the trial court or on appeal.” Id. at 16.

More specifically, Appellant contends that “[t]here was nothing on the 

initial overheard telephone conversation wherein Appellant told [Codefendant] 

to bring a gun.” Id. at 15. Moreover, Appellant argues that “[w]itnesses 

testified [at trial] that when [Codefendant] arrived, Appellant stood back and 

did not continue to restrain [the victim].” Id. at 14. Appellant emphasizes 

that he “was also shot by [Codefendant] during the underlying incident.” Id.

at 15. 

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8 Appellant references the concurring and dissenting opinions filed in this 

Court’s prior en banc decision affirming the judgment of sentence. See

Appellant’s Brief at 5, 9. We note, however, that dissenting opinions are not 

binding precedent. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 17 A.3d 390, 398 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (stating the general rule that a decision lacks precedential value 

if it does not garner the support of a majority of the sitting judges); see also

Conrad v. Dept. of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 226 A.3d 

1045, 1056 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (stating that “a dissenting opinion is not 

binding precedent”).
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Appellant further observes that “[Codefendant] was convicted of a 

specific intent crime, first-degree [m]urder, while Appellant was not.” Id.

Appellant argues that “[a] jury may render inconsistent [v]erdicts but the trial 

court should be able to address weight of the evidence issue i[f] a postsentence [m]otion is filed and this was not done by [trial] counsel.” Id.

Appellant insists that he “suffered prejudice because the [r]ecord and 

conviction are no[t] free from legal error in that Appellant's conviction is based 

upon speculation only” and constitutes a “miscarriage of justice.”9 Id. at 16-

17. Appellant concludes that “[t]here was a near presumption of guilt and no 

one, including Appellant, could foresee the crazed shooting initiated by 

[Codefendant].” Id. at 20. Ultimately, Appellant requests a remand for an 

evidentiary hearing to determine trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to 

preserve and raise a weight of the evidence claim. Id. at 8. In the alternative, 

Appellant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial or an order vacating his 

judgment of sentence. Id. 

The Commonwealth responds that the “evidence plainly demonstrated 

that [Appellant] and [Codefendant] hunted the victim down in an act of 

revenge, and that [Appellant] both called [Codefendant] to the scene and held 

the victim in place for [Codefendant] to walk up to the victim and shoot him 

from close range.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 10. The Commonwealth argues 

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9 According to Appellant, “[i]f the shooting did not occur in a deprived part of 

Philadelphia, no one would presume that an individual would show up given 

the underlying facts and start shooting.” Appellant’s Brief at 16 (citations 

omitted). 
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that Appellant’s underlying weight of the evidence claim was meritless 

because “[t]he jury was free to credit the Commonwealth’s evidence, which 

was based on several eyewitnesses, that [Appellant] was a direct and active 

participant in the murder.” Id. The Commonwealth asserts “[t]here simply 

was no substantial countervailing evidence to his knowing and direct 

participation in the murder” and concludes “[t]he jury’s verdict was well 

supported by the evidence.” Id. at 18-19. Further, the Commonwealth notes 

that there was no prejudice “as the PCRA court, which also had been the trial 

court, found[] it would have denied the proffered motion.” Id. at 11.

The Commonwealth also asserts that there was no conflict between 

Codefendant’s conviction for first-degree murder and Appellant’s conviction 

for conspiracy and third-degree murder. Id. at 18. The Commonwealth 

argues that Appellant “erroneously conflates the intent necessary to prove 

conspiracy with the intent necessary to prove murder in the first degree.” Id.

at 17. Specifically, the Commonwealth states that “[c]onspiracy to commit 

murder in the third degree is a cognizable crime. It does not require a specific 

intent to kill.” Id. at 17-18 (citing Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186, 

1195 (Pa. 2013) (stating that “one does not conspire to commit a 

denominated offense, one conspires to engage in certain conduct”). The 

Commonwealth relies on Fisher for the proposition that “the act sufficient for 

third degree is still a purposeful one, committed with malice, which results in 

death.” Id. at 18 (quoting Fisher, 80 A.3d at 1191). Further, the 
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Commonwealth argues that “[e]ven if the jury verdicts were inconsistent” 

there would be no “grounds to grant a new trial.” Id. at 19. 

This Court’s standard of review for the dismissal of a PCRA petition “is 

limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by 

the evidence of the record and whether it is free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation 

omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no 

support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 

90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). This Court reviews “the 

PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 

A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

We start with the presumption that a PCRA petitioner’s trial counsel was 

effective. Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1177 (Pa. 1999). 

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner 

“must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of 

counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the 

truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence 

could have taken place.” Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 880 

(Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

The PCRA petitioner carries the burden to prove all three of the following 

elements: “(1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had 

no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for 

the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the 
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outcome of the proceedings could have been different.” Id. (citations

omitted). “A claim of ineffectiveness may be denied by a showing that the 

petitioner’s evidence fails to meet any of these prongs.” Commonwealth v. 

Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). 

“The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the 

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis 

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit. Counsel cannot be 

found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations 

omitted and formatting altered), appeal denied, 179 A.3d 6 (Pa. 2018). 

“[B]oilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or 

ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to prove that counsel 

was ineffective.” Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 443 (Pa. 2011). 

It is well settled “[t]here is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing 

on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the record that 

no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not necessary.” 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). 

To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition 

without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised a 

genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have 

entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise abused its 

discretion in denying a hearing.
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Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 452 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted 

and formatting altered). 

This Court has stated that the following principles govern weight of the

evidence claims:

A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an 

appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial court’s discretion; 

it does not answer for itself whether the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. It is well settled that the [fact-finder] is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine 

the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial based on a weight 

of the evidence claim is only warranted where the [fact-finder’s] 

verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of 

justice. In determining whether this standard has been met, 

appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s discretion 

was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the 

facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of 

discretion.

Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 699 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). Further, this Court has held that

[a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in 

the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have 

arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial court 

is to determine that notwithstanding all the evidence, certain facts 

are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them, or to give 

them equal weight with all the facts, is to deny justice. A motion 

for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the 

weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence 

to sustain the verdict; thus the trial court is under no obligation 

to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict 

winner.

Id. (citation omitted). 
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A challenge to the weight of the evidence must be preserved in the trial 

court. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). However, the failure to file a post-sentence 

motion alone does not give rise to a presumption of prejudice. See 

Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1131-32 (Pa. 2007). A 

petitioner must establish a reasonable probability that filing a post-sentence 

motion would have led to a different outcome. See id. at 1131. 

Instantly, the PCRA court, which also presided over Appellant’s trial, 

concluded that “[r]elief was properly denied with respect to this claim because 

the evidence did not shock the conscience.” PCRA Ct. Op. at 6. The PCRA 

court explained its decision as follows: 

First, two witnesses testified that when his [Codefendant] arrived, 

Appellant had the victim in a headlock and that when the fatal 

shots were fired, Appellant still had hold of the victim. 

[Codefendant] confirmed that when he shot the victim, Appellant 

had the victim in his grasp. In fact, Appellant suffered a gunshot 

wound to his arm during the incident thereby contradicting 

Appellant’s claim that he had stepped away from the victim when 

his brother approached and killed the victim.

In addition, because Appellant . . . called [Codefendant] imploring 

him to get to that location as fast as he could, the jury could 

reasonably find that Appellant and [Codefendant] shared the goal 

of making the victim pay for the break-in. Although there was no 

evidence that Appellant told his brother to bring a gun, the jury 

could reasonably infer that Appellant knew that it was likely that 

[Codefendant] would bring a gun with him. Even if that was not 

the case, Appellant saw [Codefendant] arrive and approach the 

victim while visibly possessing a gun. As noted above, Appellant 

continued to restrain the victim as [Codefendant] approached with 

the gun visible in his hand. By not letting the victim go, Appellant 

manifested that he too had the intent to harm the victim. . . . 

[T]he jury clearly understood that both crimes required different 

mental states by convicting Appellant only of third degree murder 
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because the record failed to establish that Appellant shared the 

specific intent to kill the victim with [Codefendant].

Id. at 7-8.

Following our review, we agree with the PCRA court’s conclusion that 

Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim would not have warranted a new trial. 

We note that criminal conspiracy requires the Commonwealth to prove that 

“the defendant (1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful 

act with another person or persons, (2) with a shared criminal intent, and (3) 

an overt act done in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. 

Brinker, 882 A.2d 1008, 1017 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). The 

conspiratorial agreement “can be inferred from a variety of circumstances 

including, but not limited to, the relation between the parties, knowledge of 

and participation in the crime, and the circumstances and conduct of the 

parties surrounding the criminal episode.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Moreover, “[w]here the existence of a conspiracy is established, the law 

imposes upon a conspirator full responsibility for the natural and probable 

consequences of acts committed by his fellow conspirator or conspirators if 

such acts are done in pursuance of the common design or purpose of the 

conspiracy.” Fisher, 80 A.3d at 1192 (citation omitted). As our Supreme 

Court noted in Fisher, it is a conspiracy “to commit a bearing, which being 

carried out with the mental state of malice, [that] supports a charge of third

degree murder.” Id. at 1195.
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Instantly, Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim relies on (1) the fact 

that he did not expressly tell Codefendant to bring a gun, (2) conflicting 

testimony about when Appellant released the victim around the time of the 

shooting, and (3) the fact that Codefendant also shot Appellant through the 

wrist. However, in addition to the evidence suggesting that Appellant called 

Codefendant before attacking the victim, one of the eyewitnesses, Anthony 

Fox, testified that while Appellant was restraining the victim in a “headlock” 

or “full nelson,” Codefendant arrived at the scene with a semiautomatic pistol. 

See N.T. Trial, 11/1/06, at 44-47. Specifically, Fox testified that Codefendant 

was openly carrying a pistol, loaded the pistol by pulling back the slide, 

approached to within arm’s length of the victim, and then fired the first shot 

into the victim’s chest while standing in front of the victim. See id. According 

to Fox, Appellant, who Fox described as taller and heavier than the victim,

was behind the victim and only released the victim after Codefendant fired the 

first shot. Id. at 45-46.

Based on our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA court that 

the jury was entitled to resolve the inconsistencies in the evidence highlighted 

by Appellant. See Landis, 89 A.3d at 699. We also agree with the PCRA 

court that the jury’s findings did not shock one’s sense of justice. See id. As 

noted by the PCRA court, there was reasoned basis for the jury to conclude 

that (1) Appellant and Codefendant initially entered into an agreement to 

attack the victim, (2) Appellant acted with malice when he continued to 

restrain the victim as Codefendant approached with the gun and shot the 
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victim at close range, and (3) the victim’s death was a natural and probable 

consequence of Appellant’s and Codefendant’s actions taken in pursuance of 

their criminal agreement. See Fisher, 80 A.3d at 1192, 1195; Brinker, 882 

A.2d at 1017. It was not the role of the trial court, or this Court in a direct 

appeal, to grant a new trial merely because it would have arrived at a different 

conclusion. See Landis, 89 A.3d at 699. 

To the extent Appellant relies on Codefendant’s conviction for firstdegree murder as support for his weight claim, we find this argument to be 

meritless. Specifically, the jury heard evidence that Codefendant possessed 

the gun and shot the victim at least one time while Appellant was restraining 

the victim. Codefendant ultimately fired multiple shots, and Fox testified that 

Codefendant fired the final shot after the victim fell to the ground. See N.T.

Trial, 11/1/06, at 48. Based on this record, we find no inconsistency between 

Codefendant’s conviction for first-degree murder and Appellant’s conviction 

for third-degree murder as would support Appellant’s request for a new trial. 

In sum, we find that the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion 

that Appellant’s proposed weight of the evidence claim would not have 

resulted in a new trial.10 See Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1131-32; Ousley, 21 A.3d 

____________________________________________

10 We acknowledge that the PCRA court’s opinion refers to Appellant making 

a phone call after accosting the victim inside the store. See PCRA Ct. Op., 

12/10/19, at 7. The record, however, established that Appellant made the 

phone call before entering the store. See N.T. Trial, 10/31/06, at 106-07, 

147; N.T. Trial, 11/1/06, at 15. Further, we do not agree with the PCRA 

court’s suggestion that Appellant’s intent to harm the victim alone would have 
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at 1242. Therefore, Appellant failed to establish prejudice resulting from his 

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for preserving a weight of the evidence 

claim. See Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1131-32; Turetsky, 925 A.2d at 880. 

Lastly, Appellant has not shown a genuine issue of fact warranting an 

evidentiary hearing. See Jones, 942 A.2d at 906. Accordingly, for the 

foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law in the PCRA 

court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s amended PCRA petition without a 

hearing, we affirm. See Ousley, 21 A.3d at 1242; Jones, 942 A.2d at 906.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/1/20

____________________________________________

established his liability for third-degree murder. See Fisher, 80 A.3d at 1195. 

However, for the reasons stated herein, the PCRA court’s statements

regarding the timing of Appellant’s phone call or his intent do not affect the

overall soundness of its conclusion that Appellant would not have been entitled 

to a new trial based on his weight claim.