37972 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 135 / Monday, July 19, 2021 / Proposed Rules 

USEPA. 2008. Drinking Water: Regulatory 

Determinations Regarding Contaminants 

on the Second Drinking Water 

Contaminant Candidate List. Federal 

Register. Vol. 73, No. 174. p. 44251, July 

30, 2008. 

USEPA. 2009a. Final Contaminant Candidate 

List 3 Chemicals: Identifying the 

Universe. EPA 815–R09–006. August 

2009. 

USEPA. 2009b. Final Contaminant Candidate 

List 3 Chemicals: Screening to a PCCL. 

EPA. 815–R09–007. August 2009. 

USEPA. 2009c. Community Water System 

Survey 2006. Volume 1: Overview. EPA 

815–R–09–001. February 2009. 

USEPA. 2009d. Community Water System 

Survey 2006. Volume II: Detailed Tables 

and Survey Methodology. EPA 815–R– 

09–002. May 2009. 

USEPA. 2009e. Drinking Water Contaminant 

Candidate List 3—Final. Federal 

Register. Vol. 74, No. 194. p. 51850, 

October 8, 2009. 

USEPA. 2011. Drinking Water: Regulatory 

Determination on Perchlorate. Federal 

Register. Vol. 76, No. 29. p. 7762, 

February 11, 2011. 

USEPA. 2012a. Revisions to the Unregulated 

Contaminant Monitoring Regulation 

(UCMR 3) for Public Water Systems. 

Federal Register. Vol. 77, No. 85. p. 

26071, May 2, 2012. 

USEPA. 2012b. TSCA Work Plan Chemicals: 

Methods Document. February 2012. 

Available on the internet at: https://

www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/ 

2014-03/documents/work_plan_

methods_document_web_final.pdf. 

USEPA. 2014. Announcement of Preliminary 

Regulatory Determination for 

Contaminants on the Third Drinking 

Water Contaminant Candidate List. 

Federal Register. Vol. 79, No. 202, p. 

62716, October 20, 2014. 

USEPA. 2015. Algal Toxin Risk Assessment 

and Management Strategic Plan for 

Drinking Water, Strategy Submitted to 

Congress to Meet the Requirements of 

P.L. 114–45. EPA 810–R–04–003. 

USEPA. 2016a. Revisions to the Unregulated 

Contaminant Monitoring Regulation 

(UCMR 4) for Public Water Systems. 

Federal Register. Vol. 81, No. 244. p. 

92666, December 20, 2016. 

USEPA. 2016b. Final Regulatory 

Determinations on the Third Drinking 

Water Contaminant Candidate List. 

Federal Register. Vol. 81, No. 1. P. 13– 

19, January 4, 2016. 

USEPA. 2016c. Drinking Water Contaminant 

Candidate List 4-Final. Federal Register. 

Vol. 81, No. 222. P. 81099, November 17, 

2016. 

USEPA. 2017. Analysis of Occurrence Data 

from the Third Six-Year Review of 

Existing National Primary Drinking 

Water Regulations: Chemical Phase 

Rules and Radionuclides Rules. EPA– 

810–R–16–014. December 2016. 

USEPA. 2018a. Request for Nominations of 

Drinking Water Contaminants for the 

Fifth Contaminant Candidate List. 

Notice. Federal Register. Vol. 83, No. 

194. p. 50364, October 5, 2018. 

USEPA. 2018b. Basic Information on PFAS. 

Available at: https://www.epa.gov/pfas/ 

basic-information-pfas. 

USEPA. 2019a. Drinking Water: Final Action 

on Perchlorate. Federal Register. Vol. 84, 

No. 123, p. 30524. June 26, 2019. 

USEPA. 2019b. EPA’s Per- and 

Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) 

Action Plan. EPA 823–R–18–004, 

February 2019. Available at: https://

www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/ 

2019-02/documents/pfas_action_plan_

021319_508compliant_1.pdf. 

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43990, July 2020. EPA–HQ–OW–2018– 

0780–0302. 

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Contaminant Monitoring Regulation 

(UCMR 5) for Public Water Systems. 

Federal Register. Vol. 86, No. 46. p. 

13846, March 11, 2021. 

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Regulatory Determinations for 

Contaminants on the Fourth Drinking 

Water Contaminant Candidate List. 

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12272, March 3, 2021. EPA–HQ–OW– 

2019–0583. 

USEPA. 2021c. Technical Support Document 

for the Draft Fifth Contaminant 

Candidate List (CCL 5)—Chemical 

Contaminants. EPA 815–R–21–005, July 

2021. 

USEPA. 2021d. Technical Support Document 

for the Draft Fifth Contaminant 

Candidate List (CCL 5)—Microbial 

Contaminants. EPA 815–R–21–007, July 

2021. 

USEPA. 2021e. Technical Support Document 

for the Draft Fifth Contaminant 

Candidate List (CCL 5)—Contaminant 

Information Sheets. EPA 815–R–21–006, 

July 2021. 

USEPA. 2021f. TSCA Section 8(a)(7) 

Reporting and Recordkeeping 

Requirements for Perfluoroalkyl and 

Polyfluoroalkyl Substances. Proposed 

Rule. 86 FR 33926. June 28, 2021. 

Williams, A.J., C.M. Grulke, J. Edwards, A.D. 

McEachran, K. Mansouri, N.C. Baker, G. 

Patlewicz, I. Shah, J.F. Wambaugh, R.S. 

Judson, and A.M. Richard. 2017. The 

CompTox Chemistry Dashboard: a 

community data resource for 

environmental chemistry. Journal of 

Cheminformatics. 9:61. doi:10.1186/ 

s13321–017–0247–6. 

Radhika Fox, 

Assistant Administrator, Office of Water. 

[FR Doc. 2021–15121 Filed 7–16–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6560–50–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Parts 1 and 73 

[AU Docket No. 21–284; DA 21–801; FR ID 

37717] 

Auction of Construction Permits for 

Low Power Television and TV 

Translator Stations; Comment Sought 

on Competitive Bidding Procedures for 

Auction 111 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; proposed auction 

procedures. 

SUMMARY: The Office of Economics and 

Analytics and the Media Bureau 

announce a closed auction of 

construction permits for new or 

modified low power television (LPTV) 

stations and TV translator stations 

(collectively, LPTV/translator stations). 

This document seeks comment on the 

procedures to be used for this auction, 

which is designated as Auction 111. 

DATES: Comments are due on or before 

August 3, 2021, and reply comments are 

due on or before August 13, 2021. 

Bidding in this auction is expected to 

commence in February 2022. 

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may file 

comments or reply comments in AU 

Docket No. 21–284. Comments may be 

filed using the Commission’s Electronic 

Comment Filing System (ECFS). All 

filings in response to the Auction 111 

Comment Public Notice must refer to 

AU Docket No. 21–284. 

• Electronic Filers: Comments may be 

filed electronically using the internet by 

accessing the ECFS at https://

www.fcc.gov/ecfs/. 

• Paper Filers: Parties who choose to 

file by paper must file an original and 

one copy of each filing. 

• Filings in response to the Public 

Notice can be sent by commercial 

courier or by first-class or overnight U.S. 

Postal Service mail. All filings must be 

addressed to the Commission’s 

Secretary, Office of the Secretary, 

Federal Communications Commission 

• Commercial deliveries (other than 

U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and 

Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 

Junction Dr., Annapolis Junction, MD 

20701. 

• U.S. Postal Service first-class, 

Express, or Priority mail must be 

addressed to 45 L Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20554. 

• Until further notice, the 

Commission no longer accepts any hand 

or messenger delivered filings. This is a 

temporary measure taken to help protect 

the health and safety of individuals, and 


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to mitigate the transmission of COVID– 

19. 

• Email: Commenters are asked to 

also submit a copy of their comments 

and reply comments electronically to 

the following address: auction111@

fcc.gov. 

• People with Disabilities: To request 

materials in accessible formats (braille, 

large print, electronic files, audio 

format) for people with disabilities, 

send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call 

the Consumer and Governmental Affairs 

Bureau at (202) 418–0530 (voice), (202) 

418–0432 (TTY). 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Auction legal questions: Lyndsey 

Grunewald, (202) 418–0660, 

Lyndsey.Grunewald@fcc.gov, or Scott 

Mackoul, (202) 418–0660, 

Scott.Mackoul@fcc.gov. 

General auction questions: Auction 

Hotline at (717) 338–2868. 

LPTV/translator station service 

questions: Shaun Maher (legal), (202) 

418–2324, Shaun.Maher@fcc.gov, or 

Mark Colombo (technical questions), 

(202) 418–7611, Mark.Colombo@fcc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Public Notice (Auction 

111 Comment Public Notice), AU 

Docket No. 21–284, DA 21–801, adopted 

on July 9, 2021, and released on July 9, 

2021. The Auction 111 Comment Public 

Notice includes the following 

attachments: Attachment A, 

Construction Permits in Auction 111. 

The complete text of the Auction 111 

Comment Public Notice, including its 

attachments, is available on the 

Commission’s website at http://

www.fcc.gov/auction/111 or by using 

the search function for AU Docket No. 

21–284 on the Commission’s ECFS web 

page at www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Alternative 

formats are available to persons with 

disabilities by sending an email to 

FCC504@fcc.gov or by calling the 

Consumer & Governmental Affairs 

Bureau at (202) 418–0530 (voice), (202) 

418–0432 (TTY). 

I. Introduction 

1. By the Auction 111 Comment 

Public Notice, the Office of Economics 

and Analytics (OEA) and the Media 

Bureau (MB), announce a closed auction 

of construction permits for new or 

modified low power television (LPTV) 

stations and TV translator stations 

(collectively referred to as LPTV/ 

translator stations) and seek comment 

on the procedures to be used for this 

auction. The bidding for the auction, 

which is designated as Auction 111, is 

expected to commence in February 

2022. 

2. OEA and MB has sent a copy of the 

Auction 111 Comment Public Notice by 

email and overnight delivery to the 

contact address listed on each LPTV/ 

translator station application listed in 

Attachment A of the Auction 111 

Comment Public Notice. Future public 

notices in this proceeding may be 

provided directly to each applicant 

listed in Attachment A at this contact 

address as well. Each applicant is 

reminded that pursuant to § 1.65 of the 

Commission’s rules, it is obligated to 

maintain the accuracy of this 

information. 47 CFR 1.65. OEA and MB 

ask each party that is eligible to file a 

short-form application in Auction 111 to 

make sure that the contact address 

provided in its LPTV/translator station 

application is accurate and is a location 

capable of accepting packages. After the 

deadline for filing short-form 

applications (FCC Form 175) to 

participate in Auction 111, Auction 111- 

related materials will be sent to auction 

applicants at the contact addresses in 

their short-form applications. 

II. Construction Permits Offered and 

Application Processing 

A. Construction Permits To Be Offered 

in Auction 111 

3. Auction 111 will resolve groups of 

pending mutually exclusive (MX) 

engineering proposals for up to 17 new 

or modified LPTV/translator station 

construction permits. Auction 111 is a 

closed auction; only those individuals 

or entities listed in Attachment A to the 

Auction 111 Comment Public Notice are 

eligible to participate in this auction 

with respect to the construction 

permit(s) for which each is listed. 

4. The MX groups and engineering 

proposals listed in Attachment A to the 

Auction 111 Comment Public Notice 

consist of applications for new LPTV/ 

translator stations, or major changes to 

existing stations, that were accepted on 

a first-come, first-served basis (i.e., 

rolling one-day windows), pursuant to 

§ 74.787(a)(3) of the Commission’s rules 

and displacement relief applications 

filed pursuant to a special filing 

window for eligible LPTV/translator 

stations displaced by the broadcast 

television spectrum incentive auction 

(Auction 1000). Any LPTV/translator 

station applications for new facilities, 

major changes to existing facilities, or 

displacement relief that are mutually 

exclusive with one another must be 

resolved via the Commission’s part 1 

and part 73 competitive bidding rules. 

In 2009, MB began accepting 

applications for new rural digital LPTV/ 

translator stations on a limited basis and 

then later froze those filings. All but one 

of the MX groups listed in Attachment 

A to the Auction 111 Comment Public 

Notice consist of applications for new or 

modified rural digital LPTV/translator 

stations that were submitted on the first 

day that MB began accepting such 

applications. With regard to the 

remaining MX group, Auction 1000, 

which repurposed 84 megahertz of the 

600 MHz band spectrum, resulted in the 

channel reassignments of certain full 

power and Class A television stations, 

and in turn displaced certain LPTV/ 

translator stations. In 2018, the 

Incentive Auction Task Force and MB 

opened a special displacement 

application filing window for eligible 

licensees and permittees of LPTV/ 

translator stations displaced by Auction 

1000 to apply for new channels. The 

remaining MX group listed in 

Attachment A to the Auction 111 

Comment Public Notice consists of two 

displacement relief applications filed 

pursuant to this special displacement 

application filing window. 

5. In order to facilitate resolution of 

pending mutually exclusive LPTV/ 

translator station applications before 

initiating competitive bidding 

procedures, and given the passage of 

time since the applications were filed, 

MB announced that it would withhold 

action on certain MX applications for 

new or modified LPTV/translator 

stations, including each application 

listed in Attachment A to the Auction 

111 Comment Public Notice, from June 

1, 2020 to July 31, 2020, in order to 

provide applicants with an opportunity 

to resolve mutual exclusivity through 

settlement or technical modification of 

their engineering proposals. MB advised 

each applicant that, absent resolution of 

its mutual exclusivity, its application 

would be subject to the Commission’s 

competitive bidding procedures. 

6. The 17 MX groups listed in 

Attachment A to the Auction 111 

Comment Public Notice are the groups 

of 24 applicants that filed 40 

applications that remain MX after the 

filing window closed, and OEA and MB 

will now proceed to resolve these 

mutually exclusive LPTV/translator 

station proposals by competitive 

bidding in Auction 111. Attachment A 

to the Auction 111 Comment Public 

Notice also lists, for each proposal in 

each MX group, the applicant name, 

FCC Registration Number (FRN), file 

number, facility identification number, 

community of license, and the channel 

requested in the relevant construction 

permit application. 

B. Application Processing and Limited 

Auction Settlement Period 

7. Attachment A to the Auction 111 

Comment Public Notice lists the 

pending LPTV/translator station 


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applications that will be resolved 

through Auction 111 unless the 

applicants resolve their mutual 

exclusivity by entering into settlement 

agreements or making minor 

amendments to their pending 

applications before the deadline for 

filing short-form applications (FCC 

Form 175) to participate in Auction 111, 

which will be announced in a future 

public notice. Specifically, if a member 

of an MX group withdraws its 

application on its own initiative or files 

a unilateral engineering amendment, or 

if members of the MX group enter into 

and submit a settlement agreement and 

supporting documentation that the 

Commission staff determines to be fully 

in accordance with the Communications 

Act of 1934, as amended (Act) and the 

Commission’s rules, and such actions 

completely resolve the mutual 

exclusivity prior to the short-form 

application deadline, that MX group 

will be removed from Auction 111 and 

the remaining engineering proposal(s) 

will be processed under standard 

licensing procedures. 

8. Conversely, if an MX group listed 

in Attachment A to the Auction 111 

Comment Public Notice remains 

mutually exclusive as of the short-form 

application filing deadline, each 

applicant in that MX group must timely 

file a short-form application in order to 

avoid dismissal of its pending LPTV/ 

translator station application. 

Specifically, if any member of an MX 

group that remains mutually exclusive 

as of the short-form application filing 

deadline fails to submit a timely shortform application, that party will have its 

pending application for a new or 

modified LPTV/translator station 

dismissed for failure to prosecute. 

Likewise, if only one member of an MX 

group that remains mutually exclusive 

as of the short-form application filing 

deadline submits a short-form 

application, the MX group will be 

removed from the auction and the 

engineering proposal of the party that 

submitted a short-form application will 

be treated as a singleton application and 

processed under standard licensing 

procedures. If an applicant forgoes filing 

a short-form application pursuant to an 

agreement with mutually exclusive 

applicants, such settlement agreement 

must be submitted to MB for approval 

in accordance with § 73.3525 of the 

Commission’s rules. 

9. After the short-form application 

filing deadline, OEA and MB will 

release a public notice identifying the 

mutually exclusive applications for 

Auction 111. As provided in section 

73.5002(d) of the Commission’s rules, 

these mutually exclusive applicants will 

then be given a limited opportunity to 

resolve mutual exclusivity of the 

Commission’s rules by the filing of 

technical amendments, dismissal 

requests, and requests for approval of 

universal settlements. The specific dates 

of the settlement period will be 

announced in the public notice 

identifying the MX applications, but 

will only last, at most, two weeks. Due 

to the Commission’s competitive 

bidding rule prohibiting certain 

communications, 47 CFR 1.2105(c), 

applicants in Auction 111 will not be 

able to communicate after the shortform application deadline with each 

other for the purpose of resolving 

conflicts outside of this limited 

settlement period. 

10. An applicant listed in Attachment 

A to the Auction 111 Comment Public 

Notice may become qualified to bid in 

Auction 111 only if it complies with the 

auction filing, qualification, and 

payment requirements, and otherwise 

complies with applicable rules, policies, 

and procedures. Each listed applicant 

may become a qualified bidder only for 

those construction permits specified for 

that applicant in Attachment A to the 

Auction 111 Comment Public Notice. 

Each of the engineering proposals 

within each MX group are directly 

mutually exclusive with one another; 

therefore, no more than one 

construction permit will be awarded 

through Auction 111 for each MX group 

identified in Attachment A to the 

Auction 111 Comment Public Notice. 

Under the Commission’s established 

precedent, once two or more short-form 

applications are accepted for an MX 

group, mutual exclusivity exists for the 

relevant construction permit for auction 

purposes. Unless the mutual exclusivity 

is resolved during the limited settlement 

opportunity mentioned above, an 

applicant in Auction 111 cannot obtain 

a construction permit without placing a 

bid, even if no other applicant for that 

particular construction permit becomes 

qualified to bid or in fact places a bid. 

III. Implementation of Part 1 and Part 

73 Competitive Bidding Rules and 

Requirements 

11. Consistent with the provisions of 

section 309(j)(3)(E)(i) of the Act, and to 

ensure that potential bidders have 

adequate time to familiarize themselves 

with the specific rules that will govern 

the day-to-day conduct of an auction, 

OEA and MB seek comment on a variety 

of auction-specific procedures relating 

to the conduct of Auction 111. 

12. The Commission’s part 1 and part 

73 competitive bidding rules require 

each applicant seeking to bid to acquire 

a construction permit in a broadcast 

auction to provide certain information 

in a short-form application (FCC Form 

175), including ownership details and 

numerous certifications. The 

competitive bidding rules in part 1, 

subpart Q, and part 73 also contain a 

framework for the implementation of a 

competitive bidding design, application 

and certification procedures, reporting 

requirements, and the prohibition of 

certain communications. 

A. Upfront Payments and Bidding 

Eligibility 

13. In keeping with the usual practice 

in spectrum auctions, OEA and MB 

propose that applicants be required to 

submit upfront payments as a 

prerequisite to becoming qualified to 

bid. An upfront payment is a refundable 

deposit made by an applicant to 

establish its eligibility to bid on 

construction permits. Upfront payments 

that are related to the specific 

construction permits being auctioned 

protect against frivolous or insincere 

bidding and provide the Commission 

with a source of funds from which to 

collect payments owed at the close of 

the bidding. As required by 47 CFR 

1.2106(a), a former defaulter must 

submit an upfront payment equal to 

50% more than the amount that would 

otherwise be required. 

14. OEA and MB seek comment on an 

appropriate upfront payment for each 

construction permit being auctioned, 

taking into account such factors as the 

efficiency of the auction process and the 

potential value of similar construction 

permits. With these considerations in 

mind, OEA and MB propose the upfront 

payments set forth in Attachment A to 

the Auction 111 Comment Public Notice 

and seek comment on those proposed 

upfront payment amounts. 

15. OEA and MB further propose that 

the amount of the upfront payment 

submitted by an applicant will 

determine its initial bidding eligibility 

in bidding units, which are a measure 

of bidder eligibility and bidding 

activity. OEA and MB propose to assign 

each construction permit a specific 

number of bidding units, equal to one 

bidding unit per dollar of the upfront 

payment listed in Attachment A to the 

Auction 111 Comment Public Notice. 

The number of bidding units for a given 

construction permit is fixed and does 

not change during the auction as prices 

change. If an applicant is found to be 

qualified to bid on more than one 

permit being offered in Auction 111, 

such bidder may place bids on multiple 

construction permits, provided that the 

total number of bidding units associated 

with those construction permits does 

not exceed that bidder’s current 


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eligibility. A bidder cannot increase its 

eligibility during the auction; it can only 

maintain its eligibility or decrease its 

eligibility. In calculating its upfront 

payment amount and hence its initial 

bidding eligibility, an applicant must 

determine the maximum number of 

bidding units on which it may wish to 

bid (or hold provisionally winning bids) 

in any single round and submit an 

upfront payment amount covering that 

total number of bidding units. OEA and 

MB request comment on these 

proposals. 

B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening 

Bids 

16. As part of the pre-bidding process 

for each auction, OEA and MB seek 

comment on the use of a minimum 

opening bid amount and/or reserve 

price, as mandated by section 309(j) of 

the Act. OEA and MB propose to 

establish minimum opening bid 

amounts for Auction 111. Based on its 

experience in past broadcast auctions, 

the Commission has found that setting 

a minimum opening bid amount 

judiciously is an effective bidding tool 

for accelerating the competitive bidding 

process. In the last auction of LPTV 

construction permits (Auction 104), 

OEA and MB similarly proposed 

establishing minimum opening bids and 

not reserve prices; no comments 

opposed that proposal, and it was 

adopted. Based on all of these facts, 

OEA and MB propose establishing 

minimum opening bids for Auction 111. 

OEA and MB do not propose to 

establish separate reserve prices for any 

of the construction permits to be offered 

in Auction 111 nor do they see any 

reason to propose an aggregate reserve 

price for the auction. 

17. For auctions of broadcast permits, 

the Commission generally proposes 

minimum opening bid amounts 

determined by taking into account the 

type of service and class of facility 

offered, market size, population covered 

by the proposed broadcast facility, and 

recent broadcast transaction data, to the 

extent such information is available. 

Consideration of such factors for 

Auction 111 is complicated by a dearth 

of such transaction data, the fact that a 

permittee may opt to switch its intended 

use of such facility from LPTV to 

translator operation, or vice versa, and 

the lack of accurate data on the 

population that would be covered by 

each proposed facility. In Auction 104, 

the last auction of LPTV construction 

permits, OEA and MB proposed 

minimum opening bid amounts based 

on the limited information available, 

and received no comments suggesting 

changes to the minimum opening bid 

amounts. OEA and MB followed a 

similar methodology used in Auction 

104 to set the minimum opening bid 

amounts proposed in Attachment A to 

the Auction 111 Comment Public Notice 

for each construction permit available in 

Auction 111. OEA and MB seek 

comment on the minimum opening bid 

amounts specified in Attachment A to 

the Auction 111 Comment Public 

Notice. 

18. If commenters believe that these 

minimum opening bid amounts will 

result in unsold construction permits or 

are not reasonable amounts at which to 

start bidding, they should explain why 

this is so and comment on the 

desirability of an alternative approach. 

Commenters should support their 

claims with valuation analyses and 

suggested amounts or formulas. In 

establishing the minimum opening bid 

amounts, OEA and MB particularly seek 

comment on factors that could 

reasonably have an impact on bidders’ 

valuation of the broadcast spectrum, 

including the type of service and class 

of facility offered, market size, 

population covered by the proposed 

broadcast facility and any other relevant 

factors. Commenters also may wish to 

address the general role of minimum 

opening bids in managing the pace of 

the auction. For example, commenters 

could compare using minimum opening 

bids—e.g., by setting higher minimum 

opening bids to reduce the number of 

rounds it takes for construction permits 

to reach their final prices—to other 

means of controlling auction pace, such 

as changes to bidding schedules, 

percentage increments, or activity 

requirements. 

C. Auction Delay, Suspension, or 

Cancellation 

19. For Auction 111, OEA and MB 

propose that at any time before or 

during the bidding process they may 

delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in the 

auction in the event of a natural 

disaster, technical obstacle, network 

interruption, administrative or weather 

necessity, evidence of an auction 

security breach or unlawful bidding 

activity, or for any other reason that 

affects the fair and efficient conduct of 

competitive bidding. Notification of any 

such delay, suspension, or cancellation 

will be provided by public notice or 

through the FCC auction bidding 

system’s messages function. If bidding is 

delayed or suspended, the auction may 

resume starting from the beginning of 

the current round or from some 

previous round, or the auction may be 

cancelled in its entirety. This authority 

will be exercised solely at the discretion 

of OEA and MB, and not as a substitute 

for situations in which bidders may 

wish to apply activity rule waivers. OEA 

and MB seek comment on this proposal. 

D. Interim Withdrawal Payment 

Percentage 

20. As discussed below, OEA and MB 

propose not to allow bid withdrawals in 

Auction 111. In the event bid 

withdrawals are permitted in Auction 

111, however, OEA and MB propose the 

interim bid withdrawal payment be 

20% of the withdrawn bid. A bidder 

that withdraws a provisionally winning 

bid during an auction is subject to a 

withdrawal payment equal to the 

difference between the amount of the 

withdrawn bid and the amount of the 

winning bid in the same or a subsequent 

auction. 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(1). However, 

if a construction permit for which a bid 

has been withdrawn does not receive a 

subsequent higher bid or winning bid in 

the same auction, the Commission 

cannot calculate the final withdrawal 

payment until that construction permit 

receives a higher bid or winning bid in 

a subsequent auction. In such cases, 

when that final withdrawal payment 

cannot yet be calculated, the 

Commission imposes on the bidder 

responsible for the withdrawn bid an 

interim bid withdrawal payment, which 

will be applied toward any final bid 

withdrawal payment that is ultimately 

assessed. 

21. The percentage amount of the 

interim bid withdrawal payment is 

established in advance of bidding in 

each auction and may range from 3% to 

20% of the withdrawn bid amount. The 

Commission has determined that the 

level of interim withdrawal payment in 

a particular auction will be based on the 

nature of the service and the inventory 

of the licenses being offered. The 

Commission noted specifically that a 

higher interim withdrawal payment 

percentage is warranted to deter the 

anti-competitive use of withdrawals 

when, for example, bidders will not 

need to aggregate the licenses being 

offered in the auction or when there are 

few synergies to be captured by 

combining licenses. In light of these 

considerations with respect to the 

construction permits being offered in 

this auction, OEA and MB propose to 

use the maximum interim bid 

withdrawal payment percentage 

permitted by § 1.2104(g)(1) in the event 

bid withdrawals are allowed in this 

auction. OEA and MB request comment 

on using 20% for calculating an interim 

bid withdrawal payment amount in 

Auction 111 in the event that bidders 

would be permitted to withdraw bids. 

Commenters advocating the use of bid 

withdrawals should also address the 


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percentage of the interim bid 

withdrawal payment. 

E. Deficiency Payments and Additional 

Default Payment Percentage 

22. Any winning bidder that defaults 

or is disqualified after the close of an 

auction (i.e., fails to remit the required 

down payment by the specified 

deadline, fails to make full and timely 

final payment, fails to submit a timely 

long-form application, or whose longform application is not granted for any 

reason, or is otherwise disqualified) is 

liable for a default payment under 

§ 1.2104(g)(2) of the rules. This payment 

consists of a deficiency payment, equal 

to the difference between the amount of 

the Auction 111 bidder’s winning bid 

and the amount of the winning bid the 

next time a construction permit 

covering the same spectrum is won in 

an auction, plus an additional payment 

equal to a percentage of the defaulter’s 

bid or of the subsequent winning bid, 

whichever is less. 

23. The Commission’s rules provide 

that, in advance of each auction, it will 

establish a percentage between 3% and 

20% of the applicable winning bid to be 

assessed as an additional default 

payment. As the Commission has 

indicated, the level of this additional 

payment in each auction will be based 

on the nature of the service and the 

construction permits being offered. 

24. For Auction 111, OEA and MB 

propose to establish an additional 

default payment of 20%, which is 

consistent with the percentage in prior 

auctions of broadcast construction 

permits. As the Commission has noted, 

defaults weaken the integrity of the 

auction process and may impede the 

deployment of service to the public, and 

an additional 20% default payment will 

be more effective in deterring defaults 

than the 3% used in some earlier 

auctions. In light of these 

considerations, OEA and MB propose 

for Auction 111 an additional default 

payment of 20% of the relevant bid. 

OEA and MB seek comment on this 

proposal. 

IV. Proposed Bidding Procedures 

A. Simultaneous Multiple-Round 

Auction Design 

25. OEA and MB propose to use the 

Commission’s simultaneous multipleround auction format for Auction 111. 

As described further below, this type of 

auction offers every construction permit 

for bid at the same time and consists of 

successive bidding rounds in which 

qualified bidders may place bids on 

individual construction permits. 

Typically, bidding remains open on all 

construction permits until bidding stops 

on every construction permit. OEA and 

MB seek comment on this proposal. 

B. Bidding Rounds 

26. The Commission will conduct 

Auction 111 over the internet using the 

FCC auction bidding system. A bidder 

will also have the option of placing bids 

by telephone through a dedicated 

auction bidder line. 

27. Under this proposal, Auction 111 

will consist of sequential bidding 

rounds, each followed by the release of 

round results. The initial bidding 

schedule will be announced in a public 

notice to be released at least one week 

before the start of bidding. Details on 

viewing round results, including the 

location and format of downloadable 

round results files, will be included in 

the same public notice. 

28. OEA and MB propose that the 

initial bidding schedule may be 

adjusted in order to foster an auction 

pace that reasonably balances speed 

with the bidders’ need to study round 

results and adjust their bidding 

strategies. Under this proposal, such 

changes may include the amount of time 

for the bidding rounds, the amount of 

time between rounds, or the number of 

rounds per day, depending upon 

bidding activity and other factors. OEA 

and MB seek comment on this proposal. 

Commenters on this issue should 

address the role of the bidding schedule 

in managing the pace of the auction, 

specifically discussing the tradeoffs in 

managing auction pace by bidding 

schedule changes, by changing the 

activity requirement(s) or bid amount 

parameters, or by using other means. 

C. Stopping Rule 

29. OEA and MB have discretion to 

establish stopping rules before or during 

multiple round auctions in order to 

complete the auction within a 

reasonable time. 47 CFR 1.2104(e). For 

Auction 111, OEA and MB propose to 

employ a simultaneous stopping rule 

approach, which means all construction 

permits remain available for bidding 

until bidding stops on every 

construction permit. Specifically, 

bidding will close on all construction 

permits after the first round in which no 

bidder submits any new bid, applies a 

proactive activity rule waiver, or 

withdraws any provisionally winning 

bid (if bid withdrawals are permitted in 

this auction). Thus, under the proposed 

simultaneous stopping rule, bidding 

would remain open on all construction 

permits until bidding stops on every 

construction permit. Consequently, 

under this approach, it is not possible 

to determine in advance how long the 

bidding in this auction will last. 

30. Further, OEA and MB propose to 

retain the discretion to exercise any of 

the following stopping options during 

Auction 111: (1) The auction would 

close for all construction permits after 

the first round in which no bidder 

applies a waiver, no bidder withdraws 

a provisionally winning bid (if 

withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction), or no bidder places any new 

bid on a construction permit for which 

it is not the provisionally winning 

bidder. Absent any other bidding 

activity, a bidder placing a new bid on 

a construction permit for which it is the 

provisionally winning bidder would not 

keep the auction open under this 

modified stopping rule; (2) the auction 

would close for all construction permits 

after the first round in which no bidder 

applies a waiver, no bidder withdraws 

a provisionally winning bid (if 

withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction), or no bidder places any new 

bid on a construction permit that 

already has a provisionally winning bid. 

Absent any other bidding activity, a 

bidder placing a new bid on an FCCheld construction permit (a construction 

permit that does not already have a 

provisionally winning bid) would not 

keep the auction open under this 

modified stopping rule; (3) the auction 

would close using a modified version of 

the simultaneous stopping rule that 

combines (1) and (2); (4) the auction 

would close after a specified number of 

additional rounds (special stopping 

rule) to be announced in advance in the 

FCC auction bidding system. If this 

special stopping rule is invoked, bids 

will be accepted in the specified final 

round(s), after which the auction will 

close; and (5) the auction would remain 

open even if no bidder places any new 

bid, applies a waiver, or withdraws any 

provisionally winning bid (if 

withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction). In this event, the effect will be 

the same as if a bidder had applied a 

waiver. The activity rule will apply as 

usual, and a bidder with insufficient 

activity will either lose bidding 

eligibility or use a waiver. 

31. OEA and MB propose to exercise 

these options only in certain 

circumstances, for example, where the 

auction is proceeding unusually slowly 

or quickly, there is minimal overall 

bidding activity, or it appears likely that 

the auction will not close within a 

reasonable period of time or will close 

prematurely. Before exercising these 

options, OEA and MB are likely to 

attempt to change the pace of the 

auction. For example, the pace of 

bidding may be adjusted by changing 


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the number of bidding rounds per day 

or the minimum acceptable bids. OEA 

and MB propose to retain the discretion 

to exercise any of these options with or 

without prior announcement during the 

auction. OEA and MB seek comment on 

these proposals. Commenters should 

provide specific reasons for supporting 

or objecting to these proposals. 

D. Activity Rule 

32. To ensure that the auction closes 

within a reasonable period of time, an 

activity rule requires bidders to bid 

actively throughout the auction, rather 

than wait until late in the auction before 

participating. For purposes of the 

activity rule, the FCC auction bidding 

system calculates a bidder’s activity in 

a round as the sum of the bidding units 

associated with any construction 

permits upon which it places bids 

during the current round and the 

bidding units associated with any 

construction permits for which it holds 

provisionally winning bids. Bidders are 

required to be active on a specific 

percentage of their current bidding 

eligibility during each round of the 

auction. OEA and MB propose a singlestage auction with a 100% activity 

requirement. That is, in each bidding 

round, a bidder desiring to maintain its 

current bidding eligibility will be 

required to be active on 100% of its 

bidding eligibility. Thus, the activity 

requirement would be satisfied when a 

bidder has bidding activity on 

construction permits with bidding units 

that total 100% of its current eligibility 

in the round. If the activity rule is met, 

then the bidder’s eligibility does not 

change in the next round. Failure to 

maintain the requisite activity level will 

result in the use of an activity rule 

waiver, if any remain, or a reduction in 

the bidder’s eligibility for the next 

round of bidding, possibly curtailing or 

eliminating the bidder’s ability to place 

additional bids in the auction. OEA and 

MB seek comment on these activity 

requirements. Commenters that oppose 

a 100% activity requirement are 

encouraged to explain their reasons 

with specificity. 

E. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing 

Eligibility 

33. For the proposed simultaneous 

multiple-round auction format, OEA 

and MB propose that when a bidder’s 

activity in the current round is below 

the required minimum level, it may 

preserve its current level of eligibility 

through an activity rule waiver, if the 

bidder has any available. Consistent 

with prior Commission auctions of 

broadcast construction permits, OEA 

and MB propose that each bidder in 

Auction 111 be provided with three 

activity rule waivers that may be used 

as set forth below at the bidder’s 

discretion during the course of the 

auction. 

34. An activity rule waiver applies to 

an entire round of bidding, not to a 

particular construction permit. Activity 

rule waivers can be either proactive or 

automatic. Activity rule waivers are 

primarily a mechanism for a bidder to 

avoid the loss of bidding eligibility in 

the event that exigent circumstances 

prevent it from bidding in a particular 

round. 

35. The FCC auction bidding system 

will assume that a bidder that does not 

meet the activity requirement would 

prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if 

available) rather than lose bidding 

eligibility. Therefore, the system will 

automatically apply a waiver at the end 

of any bidding round in which a 

bidder’s activity level is below the 

minimum required unless: (1) The 

bidder has no activity rule waiver 

remaining; or (2) the bidder overrides 

the automatic application of a waiver by 

reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the 

activity requirement. If a bidder has no 

waivers remaining and does not satisfy 

the required activity level, the bidder’s 

current eligibility will be permanently 

reduced, possibly curtailing or 

eliminating the ability to place 

additional bids in the auction. 

36. A bidder with insufficient activity 

may wish to reduce its bidding 

eligibility rather than use an activity 

rule waiver. If so, the bidder must 

affirmatively override the automatic 

waiver mechanism during the bidding 

round by using the reduce eligibility 

function in the FCC auction bidding 

system. In this case, the bidder’s 

eligibility would be permanently 

reduced to bring it into compliance with 

the activity rule described above. 

Reducing eligibility is an irreversible 

action; once eligibility has been 

reduced, a bidder cannot regain its lost 

bidding eligibility. 

37. Under the proposed simultaneous 

stopping rule, a bidder would be 

permitted to apply an activity rule 

waiver proactively as a means to keep 

the auction open without placing a bid. 

If a bidder proactively applies an 

activity rule waiver (using the proactive 

waiver function in the FCC auction 

bidding system) during a bidding round 

in which no bid is placed or withdrawn 

(if bid withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction), the auction will remain open 

and the bidder’s eligibility will be 

preserved. An automatic waiver applied 

by the FCC auction bidding system in a 

round in which there is no new bid, no 

bid withdrawal (if bid withdrawals are 

permitted in this auction), or no 

proactive waiver would not keep the 

auction open. OEA and MB seek 

comment on these proposals. 

F. Bid Amount 

38. OEA and MB propose that, in each 

round, a qualified bidder will be able to 

place a bid on a given construction 

permit in any of up to nine different 

amounts: The minimum acceptable bid 

amount or one of the additional bid 

amounts. Bidders must have sufficient 

eligibility to place a bid on the 

particular construction permit. 

39. Minimum Acceptable Bid 

Amounts. The first of the acceptable bid 

amounts is called the minimum 

acceptable bid amount. The minimum 

acceptable bid amount for a 

construction permit will be equal to its 

minimum opening bid amount until 

there is a provisionally winning bid for 

the construction permit. Once there is a 

provisionally winning bid for a 

construction permit, the minimum 

acceptable bid amount for that 

construction permit will be equal to the 

amount of the provisionally winning bid 

plus a specified percentage of that bid 

amount. The percentage used for this 

calculation, the minimum acceptable 

bid increment percentage, is multiplied 

by the provisionally winning bid 

amount, and the resulting amount is 

added to the provisionally winning bid 

amount. If, for example, the minimum 

acceptable bid increment percentage is 

10%, then the provisionally winning 

bid amount is multiplied by 10%. The 

result of that calculation is added to the 

provisionally winning bid amount, and 

that sum is rounded using the 

Commission’s standard rounding 

procedure for auctions as described in 

the Auction 111 Comment Public 

Notice. If bid withdrawals are permitted 

in this auction, in the case of a 

construction permit for which the 

provisionally winning bid has been 

withdrawn, the minimum acceptable 

bid amount will equal the second 

highest bid received for the construction 

permit. 

40. Additional Bid Amounts. Under 

this proposal, the Commission will 

calculate the eight additional bid 

amounts using the minimum acceptable 

bid amount and an additional bid 

increment percentage. The minimum 

acceptable bid amount is multiplied by 

the additional bid increment percentage, 

and that result (rounded) is the 

additional increment amount. The first 

additional acceptable bid amount equals 

the minimum acceptable bid amount 

plus the additional increment amount. 

The second additional acceptable bid 

amount equals the minimum acceptable 


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bid amount plus two times the 

additional increment amount; the third 

additional acceptable bid amount is the 

minimum acceptable bid amount plus 

three times the additional increment 

amount; etc. If, for example, the 

additional bid increment percentage is 

5%, then the calculation of the 

additional increment amount would be 

(minimum acceptable bid amount) * 

(0.05), rounded. The first additional 

acceptable bid amount equals 

(minimum acceptable bid amount) + 

(additional increment amount); the 

second additional acceptable bid 

amount equals (minimum acceptable 

bid amount) + (2*(additional increment 

amount)); the third additional 

acceptable bid amount equals 

(minimum acceptable bid amount) + 

(3*(additional increment amount)); etc. 

41. For Auction 111, OEA and MB 

propose to use a minimum acceptable 

bid increment percentage of 10%. This 

means that the minimum acceptable bid 

amount for a construction permit will be 

approximately 10% greater than the 

provisionally winning bid amount for 

the construction permit. To calculate 

the additional acceptable bid amounts, 

OEA and MB propose to use a bid 

increment percentage of 5%. OEA and 

MB seek comment on these proposals. 

42. Bid Amount Changes. OEA and 

MB propose to retain the discretion to 

change the minimum acceptable bid 

amounts, the minimum acceptable bid 

percentage, the additional bid increment 

percentage, and the number of 

acceptable bid amounts if, consistent 

with past practice, circumstances so 

dictate. OEA and MB propose to retain 

the discretion to do so on a construction 

permit-by-construction permit basis. 

OEA and MB also propose to retain the 

discretion to limit (a) the amount by 

which a minimum acceptable bid for a 

construction permit may increase 

compared with the corresponding 

provisionally winning bid, and (b) the 

amount by which an additional bid 

amount may increase compared with 

the immediately preceding acceptable 

bid amount. For example, a $1,000 limit 

could be set on increases in minimum 

acceptable bid amounts over 

provisionally winning bids. In this 

example, if calculating a minimum 

acceptable bid using the minimum 

acceptable bid increment percentage 

results in a minimum acceptable bid 

amount that is $1,200 higher than the 

provisionally winning bid on a 

construction permit, the minimum 

acceptable bid amount would instead be 

capped at $1,000 above the 

provisionally winning bid. OEA and MB 

seek comment on the circumstances that 

would call for employing such a limit, 

factors to consider when determining 

the dollar amount of the limit, and the 

tradeoffs in setting such a limit or 

changing other parameters, such as 

changing the minimum acceptable bid 

percentage, the bid increment 

percentage, or the number of acceptable 

bid amounts. If OEA and MB exercise 

this discretion, bidders would be 

notified by announcement in the FCC 

auction bidding system during the 

auction. 

43. OEA and MB seek comment on 

these proposals. If commenters disagree 

with the proposal to begin the auction 

with nine acceptable bid amounts per 

construction permit, they should 

suggest an alternative number of 

acceptable bid amounts to use. 

Commenters may wish to address the 

role of the minimum acceptable bids 

and the number of acceptable bid 

amounts in managing the pace of the 

auction and the tradeoffs in managing 

auction pace by changing the bidding 

schedule, activity requirement, bid 

amounts, or by using other means. 

G. Provisionally Winning Bids 

44. The FCC auction bidding system 

will determine provisionally winning 

bids consistent with practice in past 

auctions. At the end of a bidding round, 

the bidding system will determine a 

provisionally winning bid for each 

construction permit based on the 

highest bid amount received for that 

permit. The FCC auction bidding system 

will advise bidders of the status of their 

bids when round results are released. A 

provisionally winning bid will remain 

the provisionally winning bid until 

there is a higher bid on the same 

construction permit at the close of a 

subsequent round, unless the 

provisionally winning bid is withdrawn 

(if bid withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction). Provisionally winning bids at 

the end of the auction become the 

winning bids. As a reminder, 

provisionally winning bids count 

toward activity for purposes of the 

activity rule. 

45. The FCC auction bidding system 

assigns a pseudo-random number 

generated by an algorithm to each bid 

when the bid is entered. If identical 

high bid amounts are submitted on a 

construction permit in any given round 

(i.e., tied bids), the FCC auction bidding 

system will use a pseudo-random 

number generator to select a single 

provisionally winning bid from among 

the tied bids. The tied bid with the 

highest pseudo-random number wins 

the tiebreaker and becomes the 

provisionally winning bid. The 

remaining bidders, as well as the 

provisionally winning bidder, can 

submit higher bids in subsequent 

rounds. However, if the auction were to 

end with no other bids being placed, the 

winning bidder would be the one that 

placed the provisionally winning bid. If 

the construction permit receives any 

bids in a subsequent round, the 

provisionally winning bid again will be 

determined by the highest bid amount 

received for the construction permit. 

H. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal 

46. Bid Removal. The FCC auction 

bidding system allows each bidder to 

remove any of the bids it placed in a 

round before the close of that round. By 

removing a bid placed within a round, 

a bidder effectively unsubmits the bid. 

In contrast to the bid withdrawal 

provisions described below, a bidder 

removing a bid placed in the same 

round is not subject to a withdrawal 

payment. Once a round closes, a bidder 

may no longer remove a bid. Consistent 

with the design of the bidding system, 

bidders in Auction 111 would be 

permitted to remove bids placed in a 

round before the close of that round. 

47. Bid Withdrawal. OEA and MB 

propose not to permit bidders in 

Auction 111 to withdraw bids. When 

permitted in an auction, bid 

withdrawals provide a bidder with the 

option of withdrawing bids placed in 

prior rounds that have become 

provisionally winning bids. A bidder 

would be able to withdraw its 

provisionally winning bids using the 

withdraw function in the FCC auction 

bidding system. A bidder that 

withdraws its provisionally winning 

bid(s), if permitted, is subject to the bid 

withdrawal payment provisions of the 

Commission’s rules. 47 CFR 1.2104(g), 

1.2109. 

48. The Commission has recognized 

that bid withdrawals may be a helpful 

tool in certain circumstances for bidders 

seeking to efficiently aggregate licenses 

or implement backup strategies. The 

Commission has also acknowledged that 

allowing bid withdrawals may 

encourage insincere bidding or 

increased opportunities for undesirable 

strategic bidding in certain 

circumstances. The Commission stated 

that this discretion should be exercised 

assertively, with consideration of 

limiting the number of rounds in which 

bidders may withdraw bids, and 

preventing bidders from bidding on a 

particular market if a bidder is abusing 

the Commission’s bid withdrawal 

procedures. In managing the auction, 

therefore, OEA and MB have discretion 

to limit the number of withdrawals to 

prevent bidding abuses. 

49. Based on this guidance and on 

experience with past auctions of 


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broadcast construction permits, OEA 

and MB propose to prohibit bidders 

from withdrawing any bid after the 

close of the round in which that bid was 

placed. OEA and MB make this proposal 

in light of the site-specific nature and 

wide geographic dispersion of the 

permits available in this auction, which 

suggests that potential applicants for 

this auction may have fewer incentives 

to aggregate permits through the auction 

process (as compared with bidders in 

many auctions of wireless licenses). 

Thus, OEA and MB believe that it is 

unlikely that bidders will have a need 

to withdraw bids in this auction. 

Further, bid withdrawals, particularly if 

they were made late in this auction, 

could result in delays in licensing new 

broadcast stations and attendant delays 

in the offering of new broadcast service 

to the public. OEA and MB comment on 

this proposal to prohibit bid 

withdrawals in Auction 111. 

Commenters advocating alternative 

approaches should support their 

arguments by taking into account the 

construction permits offered, the impact 

of auction dynamics and the pricing 

mechanism, and the effects on the 

bidding strategies of other bidders. 

V. Tutorial and Additional Information 

for Applicants 

50. The Commission intends to 

provide additional information on the 

bidding system and to offer 

demonstrations and other educational 

opportunities for applicants in Auction 

111 to familiarize themselves with the 

FCC auction application system and the 

auction bidding system. For example, 

OEA and MB intend to release an online 

tutorial that will help applicants 

understand the procedures to be 

followed in the filing of their auction 

short-form applications (FCC Form 175) 

and on the bidding procedures for 

Auction 111. 

VI. Procedural Matters 

A. Paperwork Reduction Act 

51. The Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) has approved the 

information collections in the 

Application to Participate in an FCC 

Auction, FCC Form 175, OMB Control 

No. 3060–0600. The Auction 111 

Comment Public Notice does not 

propose new or modified information 

collection requirements subject to the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(PRA), Public Law 104–13. Therefore, it 

does not contain any new or modified 

information collection burden for small 

business concerns with fewer than 25 

employees pursuant to the Small 

Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 

Public Law 107–198. 

B. Supplemental Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis 

52. As required by the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended 

(RFA), 5 U.S.C. 603, the Commission 

prepared Initial Regulatory Flexibility 

Analyses (IRFAs) in connection with the 

Broadcast Competitive Bidding Notice 

of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), 62 FR 

65392, December 12, 1997, and other 

Commission NPRMs (collectively, 

Competitive Bidding NPRMs) pursuant 

to which Auction 111 will be 

conducted. Final Regulatory Flexibility 

Analyses (FRFAs) likewise were 

prepared in the Broadcast Competitive 

Bidding Order, 63 FR 48615, September 

11, 1998, and other Commission 

rulemaking orders (collectively, 

Competitive Bidding Orders) pursuant 

to which Auction 111 will be 

conducted. The Office of Economics and 

Analytics (OEA), in conjunction with 

the Media Bureau (MB), has prepared a 

Supplemental Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental 

IRFA) of the possible significant 

economic impact on small entities of the 

policies and rules addressed in the 

Auction 111 Comment Public Notice, to 

supplement the Commission’s Initial 

and Final Regulatory Flexibility 

Analyses completed in the Competitive 

Bidding NPRMs and the Competitive 

Bidding Orders pursuant to which 

Auction 111 will be conducted. Written 

public comments are requested on the 

Supplemental IRFA. Comments must be 

identified as responses to the 

Supplemental IRFA and must be filed 

by the same filing deadlines for 

comments specified in the DATES section 

of this document. The Commission will 

send a copy of the Auction 111 

Comment Public Notice, including the 

Supplemental IRFA, to the Chief 

Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration (SBA). 

53. Need for, and Objectives of, the 

Public Notice. The proposed procedures 

for the conduct of Auction 111 as 

described in the Auction 111 Comment 

Public Notice would constitute the more 

specific implementation of the 

competitive bidding rules contemplated 

by parts 1 and 73 of the Commission’s 

rules, adopted by the Commission in 

multiple notice-and-comment 

rulemaking proceedings, including the 

Commission’s establishing in the 

underlying rulemaking orders 

additional procedures to be used on 

delegated authority. More specifically, 

the Auction 111 Comment Public Notice 

seeks comment on proposed procedures, 

terms and conditions governing Auction 

111, and the post-auction application 

and payment processes, as well as 

seeking comment on the minimum 

opening bid amounts for the specified 

construction permits, and is fully 

consistent with the underlying 

rulemaking orders, including the 

Broadcast Competitive Bidding Order 

and other relevant competitive bidding 

orders. 

54. The Auction 111 Comment Public 

Notice provides notice of proposed 

auction procedures and adequate time 

for Auction 111 applicants to comment 

on those proposed procedures. To 

promote the efficient and fair 

administration of the competitive 

bidding process for all Auction 111 

participants, including small 

businesses, the Auction 111 Comment 

Public Notice seeks comment on the 

following proposed procedures: 

Establishment of an interim bid 

withdrawal percentage of 20% of the 

withdrawn bid in the event bid 

withdrawals are allowed in Auction 

111; Establishment of an additional 

default payment of 20% under 

§ 1.2104(g)(2) in the event that a 

winning bidder defaults or is 

disqualified after the auction; use of a 

simultaneous multiple-round auction 

format, consisting of sequential bidding 

rounds with a simultaneous stopping 

rule (with discretion to exercise 

alternative stopping rules under certain 

circumstances); retention by OEA, in 

conjunction with MB, to exercise its 

discretion to delay, suspend, or cancel 

bidding in Auction 111 for any reason 

that affects the ability of the competitive 

bidding process to be conducted fairly 

and efficiently; retention by OEA of 

discretion to adjust the bidding 

schedule in order to manage the pace of 

Auction 111; a specific minimum 

opening bid amount for each 

construction permit available in 

Auction 111; a specific number of 

bidding units for each construction 

permit; a specific upfront payment 

amount for each construction permit; 

establishment of a bidder’s initial 

bidding eligibility in bidding units 

based on that bidder’s upfront payment 

through assignment of a specific number 

of bidding units for each construction 

permit; use of an activity requirement so 

that bidders must bid actively during 

the auction rather than waiting until late 

in the auction before participating; a 

single stage auction in which a bidder 

is required to be active on 100% of its 

bidding eligibility in each round of the 

auction; provision of three activity 

waivers for each qualified bidder to 

allow it to preserve eligibility during the 

course of the auction; use of minimum 


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acceptable bid amounts and additional 

bid increments, along with a proposed 

methodology for calculating such 

amounts, while retaining discretion to 

change their methodology if 

circumstances dictate; bid removal 

procedures; and proposal to allow for 

bid removals (before the close of a 

bidding round) but not allow bid 

withdrawals (after the close of a bidding 

round). 

55. Legal Basis. The Commission’s 

statutory obligations to small businesses 

participating in a spectrum auction 

under the Act are found in sections 

309(j)(3)(B) and 309(j)(4)(D). The 

statutory basis for the Commission’s 

competitive bidding rules is found in 

various provisions of the Act, including 

47 U.S.C. 154(i), 301, 303(e), 303(f), 

303(r), 304, 307, and 309(j). The 

Commission has established a 

framework of competitive bidding rules 

pursuant to which it has conducted 

auctions since the inception of the 

auction program in 1994 and would 

conduct Auction 111. The Commission 

has directed that OEA and MB, under 

delegated authority, seek comment on a 

variety of auction-specific procedures 

prior to the start of bidding in each 

auction. 

56. Description and Estimate of the 

Number of Small Entities to Which the 

Proposed Procedures Will Apply. The 

RFA directs agencies to provide a 

description of and, where feasible, an 

estimate of the number of small entities 

that may be affected by the proposed 

procedures, if adopted. The RFA 

generally defines the term small entity 

as having the same meaning as the terms 

small business, small organization, and 

small government jurisdiction. 5 U.S.C. 

601(6). In addition, the term small 

business has the same meaning as the 

term small business concern under the 

Small Business Act. A small business 

concern is one which: (1) Is 

independently owned and operated, (2) 

is not dominant in its field of operation, 

and (3) satisfies any additional criteria 

established by the SBA. 15 U.S.C. 632. 

57. The specific procedures and 

minimum opening bid amounts on 

which comment is sought in the 

Auction 111 Comment Public Notice 

will directly affect all applicants 

participating in Auction 111, in which 

applicant eligibility is closed. Therefore, 

the specific competitive bidding 

procedures and minimum opening bid 

amounts described in the Auction 111 

Comment Public Notice will affect only 

the 24 individuals and entities listed in 

Attachment A to the Auction 111 

Comment Public Notice and that are the 

only parties eligible to complete the 

remaining steps to become qualified to 

bid in Auction 111. These specific 24 

Auction 111 individuals and entities 

include firms of all sizes. 

58. The Television Broadcasting 

Economic Census category comprises 

establishments primarily engaged in 

broadcasting images together with 

sound. These establishments operate 

television broadcast studios and 

facilities for the programming and 

transmission of programs to the public. 

These establishments also produce or 

transmit visual programming to 

affiliated broadcast television stations, 

which in turn broadcast the programs to 

the public on a predetermined schedule. 

Programming may originate in their own 

studio, from an affiliated network, or 

from external sources. The SBA has 

created the following small business 

size standard for such businesses: Those 

having $41.5 million or less in annual 

receipts. 13 CFR 121.201, NAICS Code 

515120. The 2012 Economic Census 

reports that 751 firms in this category 

operated that entire year. Of that 

number, 656 had annual receipts of 

$25,000,000 or less, and 25 had annual 

receipts between $25,000,000 and 

$49,999,999. Based on this data OEA 

and MB therefore estimate that the 

majority of commercial television 

broadcasters are small entities under the 

applicable SBA size standard. 

59. Additionally, the Commission has 

estimated the number of licensed 

commercial television stations to be 

1,374. Of this total, 1,269 stations (or 

about 92.5%) had revenues of $41.5 

million or less, according to 

Commission staff review of the BIA 

Kelsey Inc. Media Access Pro Television 

Database (BIA) in April 20, 2021 and 

therefore these stations qualify as small 

entities under the SBA definition. 

60. In addition, the Commission has 

estimated the number of licensed 

noncommercial educational (NCE) 

television stations to be 384. These 

stations are non-profit, and therefore 

considered to be small entities. 

61. There are also 2,371 LPTV 

stations, including Class A stations, and 

3,306 TV translators. Given the nature of 

these services, OEA and MB presume 

that all of these entities qualify as small 

entities under the SBA small business 

size standard. 

62. The SBA size standard data, 

however, does not enable a meaningful 

estimate of the number of small entities 

that may participate in Auction 111. 

63. In assessing whether a business 

entity qualifies as small under the SBA 

definition, 13 CFR 121.103(a)(1), 

business control affiliations must be 

included. Business concerns are 

affiliates of each other when one 

concern controls or has the power to 

control the other, or a third party or 

parties controls or has the power to 

control both. This estimate therefore 

likely overstates the number of small 

entities that might be affected by this 

auction because the revenue figures on 

which this estimate is based does not 

include or aggregate revenues from 

affiliated companies. Moreover, the 

definition of small business also 

requires that an entity not be dominant 

in its field of operation and that the 

entity be independently owned and 

operated. The estimate of small 

businesses to which Auction 111 

competitive bidding rules may apply 

does not exclude any television station 

from the definition of a small business 

on these bases and is therefore overinclusive to that extent. Furthermore, 

OEA and MB are unable at this time to 

define or quantify the criteria that 

would establish whether a specific 

LPTV station or TV translator is 

dominant in its field of operation. 

64. Further, it is not possible to 

accurately develop an estimate of how 

many of the 24 entities in this auction 

are small businesses based on the 

number of small entities that applied to 

participate in prior broadcast auctions, 

because that information is not collected 

from applicants for broadcast auctions 

in which bidding credits are not based 

on an applicant’s size (as is the case in 

auctions of licenses for wireless 

services). OEA and MB conclude, 

however, that the majority of Auction 

111 eligible bidders would likely meet 

the SBA’s definition of a small business 

concern. 

65. Description of Projected 

Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 

Compliance Requirements for Small 

Entities. The Commission designed the 

auction application process itself to 

minimize reporting and compliance 

requirements for applicants, including 

small business applicants. To 

participate in this auction parties will 

file streamlined, short-form applications 

in which they certify under penalty of 

perjury as to their qualifications. 

Eligibility to participate in bidding is 

based on an applicant’s short-form 

application and certifications, as well as 

its upfront payment. In the second 

phase of the process, there are 

additional compliance requirements for 

winning bidders. Thus, a small business 

that fails to become a winning bidder 

does not need to satisfy additional 

requirements of a winning bidder. 

66. OEA and MB do not expect the 

processes and procedures proposed in 

the Auction 111 Comment Public Notice 

will require small entities to hire 

attorneys, engineers, consultants, or 

other professionals to participate in 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 135 / Monday, July 19, 2021 / Proposed Rules 37981 

Auction 111 and comply with the 

procedures ultimately adopted because 

of the information, resources, and 

guidance the Commission makes 

available to potential and actual 

participants. For example, the 

Commission intends to release an online 

tutorial that will help applicants 

understand the procedures for filing the 

auction short-form application (FCC 

Form 175). The Commission also 

intends to make information on the 

bidding system available and to offer 

demonstrations and other educational 

opportunities for applicants in Auction 

111 to familiarize themselves with the 

FCC auction application system and the 

auction bidding system. By providing 

these resources as well as the resources 

discussed below, OEA and MB expect 

small business entities who use the 

available resources to experience lower 

participation and compliance costs. 

Nevertheless, while OEA and MB 

cannot quantify the cost of compliance 

with the proposed procedures, they do 

not believe that the costs of compliance 

will unduly burden small entities that 

choose to participate in the auction 

because the proposals for Auction 111 

are similar in many respects to the 

procedures in recent auctions 

conducted by the Commission. 

67. Steps Taken to Minimize the 

Significant Economic Impact on Small 

Entities, and Significant Alternatives 

Considered. The RFA requires an 

agency to describe any significant, 

specifically small business, alternatives 

that it has considered in reaching its 

proposed approach, which may include 

the following four alternatives (among 

others): (1) The establishment of 

differing compliance or reporting 

requirements or timetables that take into 

account the resources available to small 

entities; (2) the clarification, 

consolidation, or simplification of 

compliance and reporting requirements 

under the rule for such small entities; 

(3) the use of performance rather than 

design standards; and (4) an exemption 

from coverage of the rule, or any part 

thereof, for such small entities. 5 U.S.C. 

603(c)(1)–(4). 

68. The Commission has taken steps 

to minimize any economic impact of its 

auction procedures on small businesses 

through, among other things, the many 

resources it provides potential auction 

participants. Small entities and other 

auction participants may seek 

clarification of or guidance on 

complying with competitive bidding 

rules and procedures, reporting 

requirements, and the FCC’s auction 

bidding system. An FCC Auctions 

Hotline provides access to Commission 

staff for information about the auction 

process and procedures. The FCC 

Auctions Technical Support Hotline is 

another resource which provides 

technical assistance to applicants, 

including small entities, on issues such 

as access to or navigation within the 

electronic FCC Form 175 and use of the 

FCC’s auction bidding system. Small 

entities may also use the web-based, 

interactive online tutorial produced by 

Commission staff to familiarize 

themselves with auction procedures, 

filing requirements, bidding procedures, 

and other matters related to an auction. 

69. The Commission also makes 

various databases and other sources of 

information, including the Auctions 

program websites and copies of 

Commission decisions, available to the 

public without charge, providing a lowcost mechanism for small entities to 

conduct research prior to and 

throughout the auction. Prior to and at 

the close of Auction 111, the 

Commission will post public notices on 

the Auctions website, which articulate 

the procedures and deadlines for the 

auction. The Commission makes this 

information easily accessible and 

without charge to benefit all Auction 

111 applicants, including small entities, 

thereby lowering their administrative 

costs to comply with the Commission’s 

competitive bidding rules. 

70. Prior to the start of bidding, 

eligible bidders will be given an 

opportunity to become familiar with 

auction procedures and the bidding 

system by participating in a mock 

auction. Further, the Commission 

intends to conduct Auction 111 

electronically over the internet using its 

web-based auction system that 

eliminates the need for bidders to be 

physically present in a specific location. 

Qualified bidders also have the option 

to place bids by telephone. These 

mechanisms are made available to 

facilitate participation in Auction 111 

by all eligible bidders and may result in 

significant cost savings for small 

business entities that use these 

alternatives. Moreover, the adoption of 

bidding procedures in advance of the 

auction, consistent with statutory 

directive, is designed to ensure that the 

auction will be administered 

predictably and fairly for all 

participants, including small entities. 

71. Federal Rules that May Duplicate, 

Overlap, or Conflict with the Proposed 

Rules. None. 

C. Deadlines and Filing Procedures 

72. Interested parties may file 

comments or reply comments on or 

before the dates indicated in the DATES

section of this summary in AU Docket 

No. 21–248. Comments may be filed 

using the Commission’s Electronic 

Comment Filing System (ECFS). 

73. Ex Parte Requirements. This 

proceeding has been designated as a 

‘‘permit-but-disclose’’ proceeding in 

accordance with the Commission’s ex 

parte rules. 47 CFR 1.1200(a), 1.1206. 

Persons making ex parte presentations 

must file a copy of any written 

presentation or a memorandum 

summarizing any oral presentation 

within two business days after the 

presentation (unless a different deadline 

applicable to the Sunshine period 

applies). Persons making oral ex parte 

presentations are reminded that 

memoranda summarizing the 

presentations must (1) list all persons 

attending or otherwise participating in 

the meeting at which the ex parte 

presentation was made, and (2) 

summarize all data presented and 

arguments made during the 

presentation. If the presentation 

consisted in whole or in part of the 

presentation of data or arguments 

already reflected in the presenter’s 

written comments, memoranda, or other 

filings in the proceeding, the presenter 

may provide citations to such data or 

arguments in his or her prior comments, 

memoranda, or other filings (specifying 

the relevant page and/or paragraph 

numbers where such data or arguments 

can be found) in lieu of summarizing 

them in the memorandum. Documents 

shown or given to the Commission staff 

during ex parte meetings are deemed to 

be written ex parte presentations and 

must be filed consistent with section 

§ 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by 

§ 1.49(f) or for which the Commission 

has made available a method of 

electronic filing, written ex parte 

presentations and memoranda 

summarizing oral ex parte 

presentations, and all attachments 

thereto, must be filed through the 

Electronic Comment Filing System 

available for that proceeding, and must 

be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, 

.xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants 

in this proceeding should familiarize 

themselves with the Commission’s ex 

parte rules. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

William W. Huber, 

Associate Chief, Auctions Division, Office of 

Economics and Analytics. 

[FR Doc. 2021–15146 Filed 7–16–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 


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