UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRUCE E. LUDWICK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 96-2205

PREMIER BANK NORTH,

INCORPORATED; PREMIER BANKSHARES

CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon.

James C. Turk, District Judge.

(CA-95-189-A)

Submitted: June 30, 1997

Decided: September 9, 1997

Before HALL, MURNAGHAN, and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Edward G. Stout, BRESSLER, CURCIO & STOUT, Bristol, Virginia, for Appellant. William R. Rakes, Paul G. Klockenbrink, GENTRY, LOCKE, RAKES & MOORE, Roanoke, Virginia, for

Appellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Bruce Ludwick, the former president of a small bank in southwest

Virginia, appeals the district court's order of summary judgment in

his civil suit alleging wrongful termination and fraud. Specifically,

Ludwick claims that the Appellees, his former employers, Premier

Bank North, Inc. (Premier North), and Premier's holding company,

Premier Bankshares Corp. (Bankshares), terminated his employment

as the president of Premier North in violation of public policy and

committed fraud when they recruited him by misleading him about

the bank's financial condition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm

the district court's order.

Ludwick's wrongful termination claim is without merit. First, Ludwick was not terminated against his will. Ludwick chose to resign his

position as the president of Premier North after being informed that

Bankshares would merge Premier North with another small bank, and

Ludwick was not selected as the new bank's president. Bankshares

requested that Ludwick remain president of Premier North until completion of the merger and then accept a position in the new bank as

a senior vice-president; however, Ludwick chose to resign. Although

Ludwick asserts that his resignation was conditioned upon Bankshares' acceptance of his proposed severance package, the claim is

without merit. The parties did not have to agree on conditions for

Ludwick's employment to cease. Ludwick did not have an employment contract; thus, he was inarguably an at-will employee, and, in

Virginia, at-will employment is terminable by either party at any time.1

However, Ludwick asserts that the district court erred because his

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1 See Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys., 247 Va. 98, 102, 439

S.E.2d 328, 330 (1994); Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc. , 234 Va. 462, 362

S.E.2d 915 (1987).

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termination violated a purported public policy of Virginia to prevent

banking irregularities. The public policy exception to at-will employment provides a cause of action for an at-will employee who is discharged for a reason which violates the policy underlying a specific

state statute designed to protect the public interest.2 Ludwick's assertion fails because he cannot identify a specific Virginia statute supported by this policy, nor can he specify what precise statute the

Appellees purportedly contravened.3 When no statute is implicated,

the discharge of an at-will employee is lawful, and the employee's

wrongful discharge suit must be dismissed.

Finally, Ludwick fails to present a prima facie case of fraud. While

Ludwick claims that the Appellees fraudulently induced him into

accepting the position of president at Premier North, Ludwick cannot

establish that they concealed a material fact upon which he relied.

None of the alleged misstatements involved a promise by the Appellees to employ Ludwick for a set period of time, or that Premier North

would not merge with another bank.4 In fact, Ludwick concedes in his

deposition that he received an honest response when he inquired into

the possibility of an employment contract. Thus, Ludwick's conclusory allegations of misrepresentation are insufficient as a matter of law.5

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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2 Lockhart, 247 Va. at 102, 439 S.E. 2d at 330.

3 See Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 98-99,

465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1996).

4 See Sea-Land Serv. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. 343, 353-54, 297 S.E.2d 647,

652-53 (1982).

5 See Evaluation Research Corp. v. Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 439 S.E.2d

387 (1994).

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