SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2152-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

THOMAS L. COAR,

a/k/a THOMAS COAR,

THOMAS PARKER and DEVINE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted March 23, 2021 – Decided April 9, 2021

Before Judges Yannotti and Mawla. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 14-03-0746 

and 14-03-0747.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E. 

Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

Defendant Thomas L. Coar appeals from an October 24, 2019 order

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.

We recounted the salient facts in a prior appeal affirming defendant's 

convictions and sentence as follows:

[A] jury convicted defendant on two counts of firstdegree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; one count of thirddegree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-5(b)[;] and two counts of third-degree 

possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-4(a). Subsequent to his conviction, defendant 

pled guilty to second-degree possession of a weapon by 

a convicted felon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a). . . .

. . . On October 6, 2013, Jose Tandazo and 

Rommel Bravo were standing outside of Tandazo's 

residence in Newark after their work shift ended at a 

local restaurant. As Tandazo and Bravo were parting 

ways, they were approached by two individuals, one of 

whom produced a gun, pointed it at Tandazo's head, and 

demanded money. Bravo noticed a Newark police 

vehicle approaching and flagged it down causing the 

two suspects to flee. Officer Miguel Ressurreicao 

exited his police vehicle and gave chase. Officer 

Ressurreicao saw that one of the two suspects was 

wearing camouflage and holding a gun.

During the foot chase the two suspects separated 

and Officer Ressurreicao testified he followed the one 

wearing camouflage to the parking lot of a nearby 

Walgreens. There, he discovered defendant who was 

wearing camouflage and "fumbling with the garbage" 

and arrested him. Officer John Stutz and a third officer 
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were dispatched to the scene. Officer Stutz testified he 

recovered a BB gun in an alleyway adjacent to the 

Walgreens parking lot. Subsequent testing of the gun 

did not yield any fingerprints of value.

At trial, Tandazo testified to the incident and

stated the man with the gun was clean shaven. 

Defendant's booking photo, introduced into evidence, 

showed him with a full beard. Bravo also testified and 

recounted the incident in a similar fashion to Tandazo. 

Neither Bravo nor Tandazo identified defendant as one 

of the two men who tried to rob them. Officer 

Ressurreicao was the only witness to link defendant to 

the robbery.

[State v. Coar, No. A-4378-15 (App. Div. Jan. 22, 

2018) (slip op. at 1-3).]

In August 2018, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition arguing ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, but failed to articulate a basis on which the court 

could grant him relief. Defendant's assigned PCR counsel filed a more formal 

petition and brief, and appeared with defendant for an initial hearing on March 

8, 2019. At the initial hearing, the judge understood defendant's claim was based 

on trial counsel's failure to investigate witnesses who would exculpate him. The 

PCR judge adjourned the hearing to enable defendant to confer with his counsel 

in order to file "an affidavit or a certification of the type required under the 

[Rules] in order for the [c]ourt to consider granting an [e]videntiary [h]earing 
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later on sounding of [i]neffective [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for failure to 

investigate witnesses . . . ." 

An evidentiary hearing occurred on August 5 and September 27, 2019. 

Defendant testified he had "quite a few disagreements about what [trial counsel] 

was doing, or whether or not he even knew what he was doing, actually. Because 

I wanted to have one of the guys [who] was . . . the manager of the Walgreens 

[testify]." Defendant claimed the Walgreens manager would have placed him 

"inside Walgreens, when the crime actually happened . . . [b]ecause we were 

standing at the counter talking. I was in there for cough medication . . . ." 

Defendant claimed the manager's name was Louis Mercado and he discussed 

calling the witness with trial counsel who "just kind of like ignored me. We had 

an argument . . . over it." 

On the second day of the evidentiary hearing, the State called defendant's 

trial counsel to testify. Trial counsel stated he spent approximately 1200 hours 

on the case, investigated the crime scene, and reviewed the entire file with 

defendant, which was provided by his prior trial counsel. However, trial counsel 

denied defendant provided any alibi or exculpatory information to him stating:

"As far as I know, both orally and written, directly and indirectly, I did not get 
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anything that would have led us to be able to exculpate [defendant]. I would 

have used it, . . . in my [m]otion to [d]ismiss [the] [i]ndictment." 

Trial counsel also testified he had no reason to visit the Walgreens or 

interview witnesses at the Walgreens because defendant informed counsel he 

was arrested in "an alley that he was running through" that was "very close to 

Walgreens." Counsel testified the discovery provided by the State contained no 

information about Mercado. Moreover, defendant did not identify any witnesses

and never mentioned Mercado's name "[f]rom November 12[], 2015, when 

[counsel] took up his case through April 22, 2016[,] when [it] was completed 

and [he] was sentenced, never one time." 

Trial counsel testified the first time he heard Mercado's name "was when 

[defendant] wrote [counsel] a letter, which was on August 18[], 2019." He 

testified he would have acted on the information if he received Mercado's name 

during the pre-trial or trial stage of the case because "it's significant, [an] alibi's 

big." Trial counsel explained the defense strategy was to put the State to its 

proofs, and assert that the State lacked the evidence to meet its burden of proof.

On October 24, 2019, the PCR judge issued a written decision denying 

defendant's petition. The judge found as follows:

This court granted an evidentiary hearing limited 

to the question of whether defendant told counsel that 
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there was an alibi witness whom counsel failed to "file 

a certification [from the alibi witness]. Here, 

[d]efendant argues that counsel was defective for 

failing to investigate and interview an alibi witness. 

Defendant did not, however, provide "affidavits or 

certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the 

affiant or the person making the certification[]" to 

assert the facts that an investigation would have 

revealed." [State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013).] 

. . . .

. . . . At the evidentiary hearing[, defendant's] 

trial attorney testified that he did not . . . interview any 

witnesses. He was not told of any alibi witnesses. . . . 

. . . . 

In addressing an ineffective assistance claim 

based on counsel's failure to call an absent witness, a 

PCR court must unavoidably consider whether the 

absent witness's testimony would address a significant 

fact in the case, and assess the absent witness's 

credibility. [See McCauley-Bey v. Delo,] 97 F.3d 

1104[,] 1106 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that the absent 

witness's credibility "is a part of determining 

prejudice") . . . .

However, the assessment of an absent witness's 

credibility is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a factor 

in the court's determination whether there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's failure 

to call the witness, the result would have been 

different[,] that is, there would have been reasonable 

doubt about the defendant's guilt. In considering the 

impact of the absent witness, a court should consider 

"[(]1) the credibility of all witnesses, including the 

likely impeachment of the uncalled defense witnesses; 
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(2) the interplay of the uncalled witnesses with the 

actual defense witnesses called[;] and (3) the strength 

of the evidence actually presented by the prosecution." 

[Ibid.] All three factors derive from the court's 

obligation under [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 695 (1984)] to consider the totality of the evidence 

in making its prejudice determination.

. . . . 

The testimony of [the Walgreens manager] would 

have been particularly vulnerable on cross examination. 

Defendant was arrested in the parking lot after having 

been seen standing near the trash can and rummaging 

in the trash. The arresting officer recovered a gun from 

this trash receptacle. The clothing description given by 

the victim(s) matched the clothing worn by the 

defendant. Had the manager been identified and 

interviewed there is nothing before the court that 

supports a finding that the manager would have had any 

reason to recall the defendant. The evidence adduced 

at trial was more than sufficient to establish beyond a 

reasonable doubt the guilt of the defendant. 

Defendant's allegation of ineffective assistance of 

counsel fails to support a finding that the result of the 

trial is unreliable because counsel's failures. [Id. at 

696.]

Defendant raises the following point on this appeal:

THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS MUST BE 

REVERSED BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED 

TO PURSUE AN ALIBI DEFENSE.

"Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of 

habeas corpus." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015) (quoting State v. 
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Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). It serves as a safeguard to ensure that a 

criminal defendant was not unfairly convicted and is the "last line of defense 

against a miscarriage of justice." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 526 (2013).

Our review of a PCR claim after a court has held an evidentiary hearing

"is necessarily deferential to [the] PCR court's factual findings based on its 

review of live witness testimony." Id. at 540. Where an evidentiary hearing has 

been held, we should not disturb "the PCR court's findings that are supported by 

sufficient credible evidence in the record." Pierre, 223 N.J. at 576 (quoting 

Nash, 212 N.J. at 540). We review any legal conclusions of the trial court de 

novo. Nash, 212 N.J. at 540-41; State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004).

When a petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for 

relief, he must satisfy two prongs: counsel's performance was deficient, and but 

for those errors, he would not have been convicted. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687, 694; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). As relevant here, one ground 

for post-conviction relief asks whether there has been a "[s]ubstantial denial in 

the conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the Constitution of the 

United States or the [c]onstitution or laws of the State of New Jersey." R. 3:22-

2(a). A criminal defendant's right to counsel, under the Sixth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution and article I, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey 
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Constitution, includes the right to adequate legal advice. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 686; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.

There is a strong presumption counsel "rendered adequate assistance and 

made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 

judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Further, because prejudice is not 

presumed, Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52, the defendant must demonstrate "how specific 

errors of counsel undermined the reliability" of the proceeding, United States v. 

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26 (1984).

Defendant asserts the PCR judge "egregiously downplayed the impact of 

the alibi defense," particularly since Tandazo and Bravo were unable to identify 

defendant and Officer Ressurreicao's testimony linking defendant to the crime 

was tenuous. We disagree and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in 

the PCR judge's opinion. We add the following observations.

The "[f]ailure to investigate an alibi defense is a serious deficiency that 

can result in the reversal of a conviction." Porter, 216 N.J. at 353. Indeed, "few 

defenses have greater potential for creating reasonable doubt as to a defendant's 

guilt in the minds of the jury [than an alibi]." Ibid. (alterations in original) 

(quoting State v. Mitchell, 149 N.J. Super. 259, 262 (App. Div. 1977)). "[W]hen 

a petitioner claims his trial attorney inadequately investigated his case, he must 
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assert the facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by 

affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or 

the person making the certification." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super 154, 

170 (1999). 

The sufficient credible evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing proves 

defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Mercado because 

there was no evidence presented establishing counsel knew of Mercado as a 

potential witness prior to or during the trial. Furthermore, defendant presented 

no certification from Mercado evidencing the alleged alibi. Most importantly, 

the record does not convince us the failure to adduce Mercado's testimony 

prejudiced the outcome of defendant's case. The State's evidence proved

defendant was the perpetrator based upon Officer Ressurreicao's testimony that 

he chased defendant, never lost sight of him, and arrested him in the Walgreens 

parking lot, as well as the testimony from Officer Stutz that the gun was 

recovered near the scene of the arrest. Therefore, the generalized assertion 

Mercado's purported testimony would be he interacted with defendant inside the 

Walgreens was unavailing and undermined the defense strategy the State lacked 

the proofs necessary to obtain a conviction. 
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Affirmed.