alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2019182EN.01000501.xml

| 27.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 182/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/5

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 17 January 2019 — Telecom Italia SpA v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze

(Case C-34/19)

(2019/C 182/06)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Telecom Italia SpA

Defendants: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze

Questions referred

| 1. | May Article 22(3) of Directive 97/13/EC (1) be interpreted as permitting, including for 1998, the maintenance of an obligation to pay a fee or a charge corresponding (insofar as it is based on the same proportion of turnover) to that which had to be paid under the regime which existed prior to that directive? |
| --- | --- |

1.

May Article 22(3) of Directive 97/13/EC (1) be interpreted as permitting, including for 1998, the maintenance of an obligation to pay a fee or a charge corresponding (insofar as it is based on the same proportion of turnover) to that which had to be paid under the regime which existed prior to that directive?

| 2. | In light of the Court’s judgments of 18 September 2003 in Joined Cases C-292/01 and C-293/01 and of 21 February 2008 in Case C-296/06, does Directive 97/13/EC preclude a final national judgment given on the basis of an incorrect interpretation or misconstruction of that directive, with the result that the ruling in that judgment may be disapplied by a different court hearing a dispute which concerns the same substantive legal relationship but is different in that it concerns a demand for payment that is merely ancillary by comparison with that which was the subject of the case which led to the incorrect ruling? |
| --- | --- |

2.

In light of the Court’s judgments of 18 September 2003 in Joined Cases C-292/01 and C-293/01 and of 21 February 2008 in Case C-296/06, does Directive 97/13/EC preclude a final national judgment given on the basis of an incorrect interpretation or misconstruction of that directive, with the result that the ruling in that judgment may be disapplied by a different court hearing a dispute which concerns the same substantive legal relationship but is different in that it concerns a demand for payment that is merely ancillary by comparison with that which was the subject of the case which led to the incorrect ruling?

---

(1)  Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common framework for general authorizations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services (OJ 1997 L 117, p. 15).

---
OF TEXAS 

AUWTIN. TExAI3 mswla 

January 22, 1975 

The Honorable Joe Reswcber 

County Attorney 

?Iarrim County Courthouee 

Houston, Texae 77002 

Opinion No. H- 503 

Re: County Clerk’n acceptance 

of waiver of certain marriage 

licenee requirement0 under 

the Family Code, as amended. 

Dear Mr. Reeweber: 

You have requented our opinion ar to whether or not “the County 

Clerk [in] obligated or permitted to accept a court ordered waiver of 

the furnishing of the information concerning age, identification of the 

applicant or identification of the parent required on the marriage license 

applicatiofi. 1’ 

Prior to January 1, 1974, eection 1.05 of the Family Code read 

as followr: 

Any information pertaining to an applicant, 

other than the applicant’r name, may be omitted 

from the application, and any formality required 

by Subchapters A, B, and D of thie chapter may be 

waived on the county judge!0 written order, issued 

for good cause ehown, and eubmitted to the county 

clerk at the time the application ie made. 

As rewritten, eection 1.05 omits entirely thin provision regarding 

waiver. Furthermore, rection 1.07 specifically prohibits the iseuance of 

8 licenee unless certain conditions are fulfilled: 

(a) The county clerk may not issue a license 

to the applicant if: 

p. 2271 
The Honorable Joe Resweber page 2 (H-503) 

(1) either applicant fails to provide informatim 

as required by Sections 1.02 and 1.05 of the code; 

[and1 

(2) either applicant fails to submit proof of age 

and identity: . . . . 

Both of these conditions were ‘ins’erfed for the first time in the amended 

code that took effect on January 1, 1974. 

Finally, a reference in former section 1.02 to the county judge’s 

waiver order, requiring an applicant to submit the order “if applicable, ” 

was deleted from section 1.02 of the amended code. This deletion would 

seem to indicate ‘that the Legislature did not contemplate the continued 

existence of such an order. 

It would appear, therefore, that on three .separate’.occasions in 

the amended Family Code, the,Legislature expresses its intention to 

abrogate the waiver provision of former section 1.05. As a result, 

the County Clerk is neither obligated nor even permitted to accept a 

court-oidered waiver of the furnishing of the information concerning 

age, identification of the applicant or identification of the parent 

required on. the marriage license application. Compare Attorney 

General Opinion H-216 (1974) which discueaes waiver of age requirements by a district court. 

SUMMARY 

A County Clerk is neither obligated nor 

permitted to accept a court ordered waiver 

Of the furnishing of the information concerning age,. identification of the applicant .or 

identification of the parent required on. the 

marriage license application. 

ours very truly, 

< 

Jiizdifs . ti1 

I/ Attorney General of Texas 

. p. 2272 
. f 

:, . 

\ 

* 

:~ . . 

‘I 

.f 1 

The Honorable Joe Reeweber page 3 (H-503) 

APPROVED: 

DAVID M. KENDALL, First Asdistant 

Opinion Committee 

p. 2273
# C_2019288EN.01001902.xml

| 26.8.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 288/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 288/19

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Galați (Romania) lodged on 7 May 2019 — XU and Others v S.C. Credit Europe Ipotecar IFN S.A. and Credit Europe Bank NV

(Case C-364/19)

(2019/C 288/25)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Tribunalul Galați

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: XU, YV, ZW, AU, BZ, CA, DB, EC

Respondents and cross-appellants: S.C. Credit Europe Ipotecar IFN S.A., Credit Europe Bank NV

Questions referred

| 1. | Are Article 1(2) and Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC, (1) as interpreted in Case C-186/16, Andriciuc and Others, to be interpreted as meaning that, where the contract contains a term relating to exchange rate risk that reflects a provision of national law, national courts are required to examine as a first priority the relevance of the exclusion laid down in Article 1(2) of the directive, or instead the trader’s compliance with the obligation to provide information governed by Article 4(2) of the directive, without first assessing the relevance of the provisions of Article 1(2) of the directive? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Are Article 1(2) and Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC, (1) as interpreted in Case C-186/16, Andriciuc and Others, to be interpreted as meaning that, where the contract contains a term relating to exchange rate risk that reflects a provision of national law, national courts are required to examine as a first priority the relevance of the exclusion laid down in Article 1(2) of the directive, or instead the trader’s compliance with the obligation to provide information governed by Article 4(2) of the directive, without first assessing the relevance of the provisions of Article 1(2) of the directive?

| 2. | Are Article 1(2) and Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of a failure to comply with the obligation to inform the consumer prior to the conclusion of the loan agreement, the trader may rely on the provisions of Article 1(2) of the directive, so that a contractual term relating to exchange rate risk that reflects a provision of national law is excluded from any assessment of whether the contractual terms are unfair? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Are Article 1(2) and Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of a failure to comply with the obligation to inform the consumer prior to the conclusion of the loan agreement, the trader may rely on the provisions of Article 1(2) of the directive, so that a contractual term relating to exchange rate risk that reflects a provision of national law is excluded from any assessment of whether the contractual terms are unfair?

---

(1)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

---
EXHIBIT 32.1

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350

Solely for the purpose of complying with 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, the
undersigned President and Chief Executive Officer of Nicholas Financial, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify, based on my knowledge, that the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended March 31, 2006 (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/ Peter L Vosotas                  
|Peter L. Vosotas                     
|President and Chief Executive Officer

Dated: June 29, 2006
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Optical Cable Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended October 31, 2007 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that: (1) the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company as of October 31, 2007, and for the period then ended.



|                                          
|------------------------------------------
|/s/ Tracy G. Smith                        
|Tracy G. Smith                            
|Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|                                          
|January 29, 2008
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Kentucky Bancshares, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Louis Prichard, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

 

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 
|   | /s/   Louis Prichard      |
|--------|---------------------------|
|   | Chief   Executive Officer |
|   |                      |
|   | March 31,   2011     |

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Kentucky Bancshares, Inc. and will be retained by Kentucky Bancshares, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.25

February 2, 2000


Dear Larry,

         This letter will confirm our understanding regarding the disposition of
the November 1, 1996 Promissory Note of $500,000, plus accrued interest of
$138,750 (collectively the "Note") payable by you to the Company. META hereby
agrees to waive the repayment of the Note in exchange for the Note being
converted into additional consideration for the purchase of DeBoever
Architectures, Inc., provided the Company's Enterprise Architecture Strategies
(EAS) service * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * or if * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * prior to December 31, 2001. So long as either the annual
growth is achieved or the total gross billings is achieved, one-third of the
Note will be extinguished in each respective year ($212,916.67/yr.). In the
event the growth is not achieved, the remaining balance of the Note will be
payable by you to the Company at the end of the three years.

Sincerely yours,

/s/: Dale Kutnick

Dale Kutnick
President, CEO and
Co-Research Director

                                                  Accepted Agreement:


                                                  /s/: Larry R. DeBoever
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                  Larry R. DeBoever
                                                  Executive Vice President
                                                  META Group Research Fellow
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 990 Engrossed Amendment Senate (EAS)]

                  In the Senate of the United States,

                                                          May 26, 2011.
    Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives (S. 990) 
entitled ``An Act to provide for an additional temporary extension of 
programs under the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment 
Act of 1958, and for other purposes.'', do pass with the following

                  SENATE AMENDMENT TO HOUSE AMENDMENT:

            In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted, insert the 
      following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 
2011''.

SEC. 2. SUNSET EXTENSIONS.

    (a) USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.--
Section 102(b)(1) of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization 
Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-177; 50 U.S.C. 1805 note, 50 U.S.C. 1861 
note, and 50 U.S.C. 1862 note) is amended by striking ``May 27, 2011'' 
and inserting ``June 1, 2015''.
    (b) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.--
Section 6001(b)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 50 U.S.C. 1801 note) is amended by 
striking ``May 27, 2011'' and inserting ``June 1, 2015''.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
112th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                 S. 990

_______________________________________________________________________

                  SENATE AMENDMENT TO HOUSE AMENDMENT
```
# C_2019263EN.01003601.xml

| 5.8.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 263/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.8.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 263/36

---

Appeal brought on 18 June 2019 by Qualcomm, Inc., Qualcomm Europe, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 9 April 2019 in Case T-371/17: Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission

(Case C-466/19 P)

(2019/C 263/41)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Qualcomm, Inc., Qualcomm Europe, Inc. (represented by: M. Pinto de Lemos Fermiano Rato, advogado, M. Davilla, dikigoros)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

| — | set aside the judgment under appeal; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment under appeal;

| — | annul Commission Decision C(2017) 2258 final of 31 March 2017 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 18(3) and to Article 24(1)(d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (1) in Case AT.39711 — Qualcomm (Predation) (the ‘Decision’); |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Commission Decision C(2017) 2258 final of 31 March 2017 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 18(3) and to Article 24(1)(d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (1) in Case AT.39711 — Qualcomm (Predation) (the ‘Decision’);

| — | in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for determination in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Justice, and |
| --- | --- |

—

in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for determination in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Justice, and

| — | order the European Commission to pay the appellant’s costs before the Court of Justice and the General Court. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Commission to pay the appellant’s costs before the Court of Justice and the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law: the General Court failed to address arguments raised by the appellant.

Second plea in law: the finding that the Decision was adequately reasoned is based on manifest errors of fact, of law and inadequate reasoning.

Third plea in law: the finding that the information requested by the Decision was necessary is based on manifest errors of law and fact, a distortion of the evidence, inadequate reasoning, and a failure to consider all the relevant evidence.

Fourth plea in law: the finding that the information requested by the Decision was proportionate is based on manifest errors of fact, a distortion of the evidence, and inadequate reasoning.

Fifth plea in law: the General Court misapplied the rules governing the burden of proof regarding alleged infringements of Article 102 TFEU.

Sixth plea in law: the General Court made findings that infringe the right to avoid self-incrimination.

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003, L 1, p. 1).

---
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.2 SECTION 1350 -- CFO CERTIFICATION

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Yearly Report of Patriot Bank Corp. ("Patriot")
on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31,2003, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, James
G. Blume, Chief Financial Officer of Patriot, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

                  (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of
                           section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
                           of 1934; and

                  (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly
                           presents, in all in material respects, the financial
                           condition and result of operations of Patriot.

                                                   /s/ James G. Blume
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                   James G. Blume
                                                   Chief Financial Officer
                                                   March 15, 2004

                                       97
Exhibit 31.2







PURSUANT TO SECTION 302

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002







I, Hua Meng, certify that:



1.

I have reviewed this Form 10-KSB of Dahua Inc.



2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.

The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5.

The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants Board of Directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.





Date:   March 27, 2007



|                                  | 
|--------------------------------- | 
|/s/ Hua Meng                      | 
|Hua Meng, Chief Financial Officer |