alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 31.1

                      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     I, David Moskowitz, Chief Executive Officer of GenoMed, Inc., certify that:

     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of GenoMed, Inc.;

     2. Based on my  knowledge,  this annual  report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements
were made,  not  misleading  with  respect to the period  covered by this annual
report;

     3. Based on my knowledge,  the financial  statements,  and other  financial
information  included  in this annual  report,  fairly  present in all  material
respects the financial  condition,  results of operations  and cash flows of the
small  business  issuer as of, and for,  the  periods  presented  in this annual
report.

     4. The  registrant's  other  certifying  officer and I are  responsible for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules  13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))  for the small business  issuer and
have:

          a. designed such disclosure  controls and  procedures,  or caused such
     disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
     ensure that material  information  relating to the small  business  issuer,
     including  its  consolidated  subsidiaries,  is made  known to us by others
     within those entities,  particularly during the period in which this annual
     report is being prepared;

          b.  evaluated  the   effectiveness  of  the  small  business  issuer's
     disclosure  controls  and  procedures  and  presented  in this  report  our
     conclusions  about  the  effectiveness  of  the  disclosure   controls  and
     procedures,  as of the end of the period  covered by this  report  based on
     such evaluation; and

     5.  The  small  business  issuer's  other  certifying  officer  and I  have
disclosed,  based  on our  most  recent  evaluation  of  internal  control  over
financial  reporting,  to the small  business  issuer's  auditors  and the audit
committee  of the  small  business  issuer's  board  of  directors  (or  persons
performing the equivalent functions):

          a. all significant  deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
     or operation of internal  controls which are reasonably likely to adversely
     affect the small business  issuer's ability to record,  process,  summarize
     and report financial information; and

          b. any fraud,  whether or not material,  that  involves  management or
     other employees who have a significant role in the small business  issuer's
     internal control over financial reporting.

Date:    April 1, 2005

/s/ David Moskowitz
-----------------------------
David Moskowitz
President and Chief Executive Officer
#### In the Matter of DeWitt Gibson, Petitioner, v Brian Fischer, Commissioner, New York State Department of Correctional Services, Respondent.

[944 NYS2d 713]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department by order of the Supreme Court, Wyoming County [Mark H. Dadd, A.J.], entered November 15, 2011) to review a determination of respondent. The determination found after a tier III hearing that petitioner had violated various inmate rules.

It is hereby ordered that the determination is unanimously confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed. Present — Smith, J.E, Lindley, Sconiers and Martoche, JJ. *[See*96 AD3d 703.]
1 Circuit Judge of the 8th Circuit, sitting by designation.

2 Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has deter mined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the lim ited circumstances set forth in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________ No. 96-11411

____________

ALINDA FRANCINE CARTER-THOMAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

DALLAS COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT; EL CE NTRO COLLEGE; JANET CHARLOTTE JAMES; BROOKHAVEN COLLEGE,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas

(3:95-CV-0546-D)

October 8, 1997

Before JOHN R. GIBSON 1
, JOLLY, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 2

AFFIRMED. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.6. All pending motions DENIED.
#### Taran Furs, Inc., Respondent, v Champagne Bridals, Inc., et al., Appellants.

— Order unanimously affirmed, with costs. Memorandum: Plaintiff sold fur coats valued at $53,325 to the defendants. Plaintiff alleges defendants represented at the time of sale that the coats were being purchased by Coles of Newark, Inc. (Coles), when in fact the merchandise was being supplied to defendant Champagne Bridals, Inc. (Champagne). Although defendants Mr. and Mrs. Nusbaum own and control both Coles and Champagne, they acknowledge that Coles is a corporation separate and distinct from Champagne. Coles filed for bankruptcy shortly after the sale of the fur coats. Plaintiff sued Champagne and the Nusbaums alleging causes of action for breach of contract, misrepresentation and related claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the United States Bankruptcy Court has exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s lawsuit (CPLR 3211 [a] [2], [4], [5]) and that Coles is a necessary party (CPLR 3211 [a] [10]). Special Term properly rejected these arguments and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Only actions against the debtor and the property of the debtor’s estate are automatically stayed upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy (11 USC § 362 [a]). Plaintiff’s action is not against Coles but against Champagne. Actions against parties other than the debtor in bankruptcy are not stayed *(In re Larmar Estates,*5 Bankr 328, 330 [EDNY 1980]).

Special Term also properly rejected defendant’s claim that this action could not proceed without joinder of Coles as a necessary party. Plaintiff has made no allegations against Coles. At most, Coles may be a joint tort-feasor or coobligor of the sales contract, but would not be a necessary party in either event *(see, Sarubbi v Rinaldo,*98 AD2d 837; *Littanzi v State of New York,*54 AD2d 1043, 1044; *cf. Lottes v Slater,*114 AD2d 580).

We have considered defendants’ remaining claims and find them lacking in merit. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Davis, J. — dismiss complaint.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Boomer, Green and Pine, JJ.
# C_2020378EN.01003601.xml

| 9.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 378/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 378/36

---

Order of the General Court of 25 August 2020 — Frank Recruitment Group Services Ltd v EUIPO — Pearson (PEARSON FRANK)

(Case T-735/19) (1)

(European Union trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Withdrawal of the application for registration - No need to adjudicate)

(2020/C 378/45)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Frank Recruitment Group Services Ltd (Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom) (represented by: J. Dennis, Solicitor)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Gája, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Pearson Plc (London, United Kingdom)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 August 2019 (Case R 1884/2018-4) regarding opposition proceedings between Pearson Plc and Frank Recruitment Group Services Ltd.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

| 2. | Frank Recruitment Group Services Ltd and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) are ordered to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Frank Recruitment Group Services Ltd and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) are ordered to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 432, 23.12.2019.

---
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 23 - 0709 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, vs. CISSY DEEN MANYHIDES,

Defendant and Appellant .

**G RANT**  Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the Appellant is given an extension of time until March 18 , 2024 , to prepare, file, and serve the Appellant’s opening brief.

Electronically signed by: Bowen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court February 12 2024

02/12/2024
Case Number: DA 23-0709
#### Carl Berg, Appellant, v Eisner LLP et al., Respondents.

[941 NYS2d 616]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Melvin L. Schweitzer, J.), entered February 28, 2011, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion denied.

Plaintiff claims that defendants committed accounting malpractice by failing to inform him of a possible tax election that would have allowed him to write off a large portion of his securities trading losses. Given the parties’ accountant-client relationship, the scope of defendants’ duty to plaintiff is no narrower than the terms of the parties’ agreement, and may be broader, based on professional accounting standards *(see Ulico Cas. Co. v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker,*56 AD3d 1, 8 [2008] [the attorney-client relationship is both contractual and inherently fiduciary]). The allegations that defendants provided plaintiff with tax planning advice concerning his trading income establish that the parties’ agreement encompassed the election issue. These allegations also present the question whether defendants’ failure to raise the election issue with plaintiff was a departure from professional accounting standards, which is a question that requires expert evidence for its resolution *(see e.g. Menard M. Gertler, M.D., P.C. v Sol Masch & Co.,*40 AD3d 282 [2007]).

Contrary to defendants’ contention, plaintiff adequately pleaded proximate cause *(see Fielding v Kupferman,*65 AD3d 437, 442 [2009]). Concur — Andrias, J.P., Friedman, Acosta and Richter, JJ.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Salvador ONTANON-MALDONADO, a.k.a. Chava a.k.a. Oaxaco, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-10404

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 8, 2009.

Byung J. Pak, Amy Levin Weil, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Atlanta, GA, for Appellee.

Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Patrick D. Deering, appointed counsel for Salvador Ontanon-Maldonado in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the record reveals *538that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Therefore,' as independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Ontanon-Maldonado’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION

In connection with this Annual Report of Hewitt Associates, Inc. (the Company) on Form
10-K for the period ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of the Company hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that: 1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 2) the information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods covered in the Report.



|                        |  |     |  |                  |  |                        
|----------------------- |  | --- |  | ---------------- |  | -----------------------
|Date: November 17, 2008 |  | By: |  | /s/ John J. Park
|                        |  |     |  |                  |  | John J. Park           
|                        |  |     |  |                  |  | Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Hewitt Associates, Inc. and will be retained by Hewitt
Associates, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

The foregoing certification is being furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the Form 10-K and shall not be considered filed as part of the Form 10-K.
EXHIBIT 23.2



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



We have issued our report dated January 30, 2004 (except for Note B, as to which the date is October 7, 2005), accompanying
the consolidated financial statements included in the Amended Annual Report of Texas United Bancshares, Inc. and Subsidiaries on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2003. We do hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said report
in the Registration Statements of Texas United Bancshares, Inc. on Form S-8, File Nos. 333-100162, 333-100163 and 333-124055.



/s/ Grant Thornton LLP



|               
|---------------
|Houston, Texas 
|October 7, 2005
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, January 02, 2019. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, January 02, 2019 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A19D0215. CHARLIE JORDAN v. THE STATE. Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: SU16CR0858
# C_2020114EN.01000702.xml

| 6.4.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 114/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.4.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 114/7

---

Judgment of the General Court of 27 February 2020 — Knaus Tabbert v EUIPO — Carado (CaraTour)

(Case T-202/19) (1)

(European Union trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for European Union word mark CaraTour - Earlier European Union word mark Carado - Relative ground for refusal - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2020/C 114/05)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Knaus Tabbert GmbH (Jandelsbrunn, Germany) (represented by: N. Maenz, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Carado GmbH (Leutkirch im Allgäu, Germany (represented by: A. Otto, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 January 2019 (Case R 506/2018-5) relating to opposition proceedings between Carado and Knaus Tabbert.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | dismisses the application; |
| --- | --- |

1.

dismisses the application;

| 2. | orders Knaus Tabbert GmbH to bear the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

orders Knaus Tabbert GmbH to bear the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 182, 27. 5. 2019.

---
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of the Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, I, the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of Nicholas Financial, Inc. (the Company),
hereby certify that the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2008 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Ralph T. FinkenbrinkRalph T. FinkenbrinkSenior Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerJune 16, 2008
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

April 16, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-50617

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaint iffAppellee,

versus

MARCO GARCIA,

DefendantAppellant.

---------------------------------------------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. DR-01-CR-388-1-OG

----------------------------------------------------------

Before JONES, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Marco Garcia appeals his conviction on one count of obstructing the administration of justice.

18 U.S.C. § 1503. He argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, (2) the

district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on the insufficiency of the evidence,

and (3) the district court’s jury instructions constructively amended his indictment.-2-

To prove that Garcia obstructed justice, the Government had to establish that: (1) a judicial

proceeding was pending; (2) Garcia knew of the judicial proceeding; and (3) Garcia acted corruptly

with the specific intent to influence, obstruct, or impede that proceeding in its due administration of

justice. S ee United States v. Sharpe

, 193 F.3d 852, 864 (5th Cir. 1999); 18 U.S.C. § 1503.

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, a reasonable trier of fact

could have found that the evidence established Garcia’s knowledge of a pending judicial proceeding

invo lving Terry Sparkman. See United States v. Mendoza

, 226 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 2000); United

States v. Howard

, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336-37 (5th Cir. 1978). The evidence was also sufficient to allow

a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that, by informing Sparkman that his name was before a grand

jury, Garcia had the specific intent to obstruct the due administration of justice. See Sharpe

, 193 F.3d

at 865.

Because we have determined that the evidence was sufficient to support Garcia’s conviction,

the district court’s denial of Garcia’s motion for a new trial based on the alleged insufficiency of the

evidence was not an abuse of its discretion.

See United States v. Ortiz , 942 F.2d 903, 913 (5th Cir. 1991).

Due to Garcia’s failure to raise the issue in t he district court, our review of Garcia’s

constructive amendment argument is limit ed to plain error. S ee United States v. Fletcher

, 121 F.3d

187, 192-93 (5th Cir. 1997). Our review o f the indictment and the jury charge fails to show such

error. See United States v. Mikolajczyk , 137 F.3d 237, 244 (5th Cir. 1998).

AFFIRMED.
# C_2019357EN.01000901.xml

| 21.10.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 357/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.10.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 357/9

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 19 June 2019 — UBS Real Estate Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH v Agenzia delle Entrate

(Case C-478/19)

(2019/C 357/12)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: UBS Real Estate Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH

Respondent: Agenzia delle Entrate

Question referred

Does EU law — in particular the provisions of the Treaty concerning freedom of establishment and free movement of capital, as interpreted by the Court — preclude the application of a provision of national law, such as Article 35(10-ter) of Decree Law No 223/2006 (in so far as it grants relief on mortgage registration tax and the Land Registry fee only in respect of closed-end real estate investment funds)?

---
Exhibit
32.2





Certification Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to


Section 906 of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





I, Joel Boyarski, the Principal
Financial Officer of WorldGate Communications, Inc., hereby certify, pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Form 10-Q of WorldGate
Communications, Inc., for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2010, which this
certification accompanies, fully complies with requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and
information contained in the Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2010
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of WorldGate Communications, Inc.





A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to WorldGate and will be
retained by WorldGate and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.





Dated:
      August 13, 2010
                  /s/Joel
      BoyarskiJoel
      BoyarskiPrincipal
      Financial and Accounting
Officer
#### HEVENOR, Appellant, v. JUDGE CO., Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

October 9, 1907.)

Action by Harvey H. Hevenor against the Judge Company.

PER CURIAM.

Order appealed from modified, so as to provide: “So much of defendant’s motion as asks that the preliminary words of the statement of facts constituting each of the alleged. causes of action set forth in the complaint, other than the first, be stricken out, is granted, with leave to the plaintiff within 10 days to serve an amended complaint omitting said words, and inserting in place thereof the following: ‘Repeats all the allegations contained in the first five subdivisions of the first alleged cause of action’—or make such other amendment as plaintiff may be advised. In all other respects defendant’s motion is denied.” As so modified, the order appealed from is affirmed, without costs to either party.