alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2020027EN.01002501.xml

| 27.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 27/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 27/25

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de première instance de Namur (Belgium) lodged on 15 November 2019 — C.J. v Région wallonne

(Case C-830/19)

(2020/C 27/32)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal de première instance de Namur

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: C.J.

Defendant: Région wallonne

Question referred

Do Articles 2, 5 and 19 of Regulation (EU) No 135/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, (1) read in conjunction with Article 2 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 807/2014 of 11 March 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and introducing transitional provisions, (2) preclude, in the implementation of those provisions, Member States from taking account of the entire holding and not only the share of the young farmer in it and/or of work units in order to determine the upper and lower thresholds where the agricultural holding is operated in the form of an unincorporated association in which the young farmer acquires an undivided share and exercises joint control over the holding?

---

(1)  OJ 2013 L 347, p. 487.

(2)  OJ 2014 L 227, p. 1.

---
Exhibit 32.2



NANOGEN, INC.



CERTIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY

RULE
13a-14(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934



I, David Ludvigson,
Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Nanogen, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company), hereby certify that, based on my knowledge:



|(1) |  | The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2003 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
|--- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
|--- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|November 13, 2003 |  |  |  | DAVID LUDVIGSON                                                                
|----------------- |  |  |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                  |  |  |  | David Ludvigson Executive Vice President,
Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
#### BENEDICT et al., Respondents, v. STANFORD, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

October 25, 1907.)

Appeal from Special Term. Action by Seelye Benedict and others against Joseph M. Stanford. From an order granting an injunction, defendant appeals. Modified. C. E. Ftancis, for appellant. D. W. Richards, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

The order should be modified, by striking out the word “taking” from the enjoining clause, and by adding a clause to the effect that the injunction is granted upon condition that the plaintiffs increase their undertaking to $2,500 within five days from the *1117service of the order, as modified by this court, and that upon their failure so to do the motion Eor the injunction be denied, and, as modified, affirmed, without costs.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 430 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 430

To modify the naturalization requirements related to physical presence 
 in the United States for alien translators granted special immigrant 
                    status, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 2, 2011

 Mr. Levin (for himself and Mr. Leahy) introduced the following bill; 
  which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To modify the naturalization requirements related to physical presence 
 in the United States for alien translators granted special immigrant 
                    status, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MODIFICATION OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALIENS 
              SERVING AS TRANSLATORS.

    Section 1059(e)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163; 8 U.S.C. 1101 note) is amended to 
read as follows:
            ``(1) In general.--
                    ``(A) Continuous residence.--An absence from the 
                United States described in paragraph (2) shall not be 
                considered to break any period for which continuous 
                residence in the United States is required for 
                naturalization under title III of the Immigration and 
                Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1401 et seq.).
                    ``(B) Physical presence.--In the case of a lawful 
                permanent resident, for an absence from the United 
                States described in paragraph (2), the time spent 
                outside of the United States in the capacity described 
                in paragraph (2) shall be counted towards the 
                accumulation of the required physical presence in the 
                United States.''.

SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    The amendment made by section 1 shall take effect as if included in 
the amendment made by section 1(c)(2) of the Act entitled ``An Act to 
increase the number of Iraqi and Afghani translators and interpreters 
who may be admitted to the United States as special immigrants, and for 
other purposes'', approved June 15, 2007 (Public Law 110-36; 121 Stat. 
227).
                                 <all>
```
#### In re: Jodi B. HUSSEY, Mark A. Hussey, Debtors. Mary Alice Gwynn, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jodi B. Hussey, Mark A. Hussey, Deborah Menotte, U.S. Trustee Office, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 07-14294.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 15, 2009.

Mary Alice Gwynn, Delray Beach, FL, pro se.

Gary J. Rotella, Jay Lewis Farrow, Gary J. Rotella *&*Associates, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.

*399Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and COHILL,* District Judge.

*

 Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

After oral argument and careful consideration, we conclude that the judgment of the district court is due to be affirmed. The district court initially imposed sanctions upon Gwynn on two grounds: first, that her appeal from the bankruptcy court was without support in the evidence or the law; and second, that she misrepresented to the district court that she had informed the bankruptcy judge that she had a copy of the tape. The transcript of the June 29, 2007, oral argument before the district court does not clearly indicate that Gwynn actually misrepresented to the district court what she had told the bankruptcy court. Indeed, on reconsideration, the district court indicated that Gwynn may have only inadvertently implied that she had told the bankruptcy judge she had a copy of the tape. We agree that there probably was only a misunderstanding, rather than a misrepresentation. However, that was only an alternative ground of the sanctions order. Even if the misrepresentation ground would not itself support the sanctions imposed by the district court, the sanction is nevertheless amply supported on the basis of the district court’s alternative ground — i.e., the lack of legal and factual support for Gwynn’s appeal from the bankruptcy court to the district court. The district court’s order on reeonsideration indicates that the sanctions order could properly be based solely on this ground. We agree, especially in light of the minimal nature of both the monetary and the non-monetary sanctions imposed.

Because the result would not differ in any event, and in light of the inadequate briefing in this appeal, we decline to address the precise source of the district court’s authority to grant sanctions under these circumstances. Whether the district court’s authority derives from one of the rules discussed in the briefs, or from the district court’s inherent authority, it is clear that the district court did have inherent authority to impose the sanctions at issue here.

AFFIRMED.1

1

. Appellant's pending motion to strike certain pages of the appellee's brief is denied as moot in light of the fact the panel disregarded same.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Gilberti, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Owens, J.), rendered October 20, 1981, convicting him of murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree (two counts), and robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

We have considered defendant’s contentions and find them to be either without merit or unpreserved for our review. Mangano, J. P., Gibbons, Niehoff and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
# C_2019280EN.01002702.xml

| 19.8.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 280/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.8.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 280/27

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Svea Hovrätt — (Sweden) lodged on 14 June 2019 — Östgötatrafiken AB v Patent- och registreringsverket

(Case C-456/19)

(2019/C 280/37)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Svea Hovrätt

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Östgötatrafiken AB

Respondent: Patent- och registreringsverket

Questions referred

The questions concern the application of Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (1) and are as follows:

| 1. | Must Article 4(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Directive be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of an application for registration of a trade mark which characterises services and where the application relates to a sign, placed in a particular position, which covers large areas of the physical objects used to perform the services, it must be assessed whether the mark is not independent of the appearance of the objects concerned? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must Article 4(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Directive be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of an application for registration of a trade mark which characterises services and where the application relates to a sign, placed in a particular position, which covers large areas of the physical objects used to perform the services, it must be assessed whether the mark is not independent of the appearance of the objects concerned?

| 2. | If question I is answered in the affirmative, is it necessary for the trade mark to depart significantly from the norm or customs of the economic sector concerned in order for the mark to be regarded as having distinctive character? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If question I is answered in the affirmative, is it necessary for the trade mark to depart significantly from the norm or customs of the economic sector concerned in order for the mark to be regarded as having distinctive character?

---

(1)  OJ 2015 L 336, p. 1.

---
FHLB Pit ex10.9 10K 2014






AMENDMENT TO THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
SEVERANCE AGREEMENT 


This Amendment to the Executive Officer Severance Agreement dated as of _____________     (“Severance Agreement”) by and between the Federal Home Loan Bank of Pittsburgh and ________________________________________ (“Executive”) is made and entered into as of         January 1, 2015.  Capitalized terms used herein but not otherwise defined shall have the         meanings ascribed to them in the Severance Agreement.  


WHEREAS, under the Severance Agreement in the event of a Compensated Termination, the Bank has agreed to contribute to Executive’s participation in the Bank’s medical plan for a     period of eighteen (18) months; and


WHEREAS, this provision does not meet tax compliance requirements applicable to a self-funded medical plan and the provision needs to be modified to ensure compliance with     applicable tax requirements.    


NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants contained herein and intending to be legally bound hereby, the Bank and the Executive agree to modify the Severance Agreement as follows:


		
	1.
	Section 4(c) shall be replaced with the following:




		
	(c)
	(i) For a period of eighteen (18) months, the Bank or any successor pursuant to this Section 4 shall pay the Executive, as taxable compensation, a monthly cash payment equivalent to the Bank’s contribution to medical coverage for its active employees.  The Executive may use this monthly amount to pay for continuation coverage under the Bank’s medical plan.   




(ii) After a Compensated Termination, the Executive shall, if such Executive elects medical continuation coverage, continue to be covered by the Bank’s applicable medical insurance plan consistent with the Executive’s elections then in effect immediately prior to the Compensated Termination for a period of eighteen (18) months, subject to the Executive’s payment of the entire cost of such continuation coverage as is then charged by the Bank for all other terminated employees electing such coverage.    


		
	2.
	All other terms and conditions of the Severance Agreement remain unchanged and in full force and effect.




THE EXECUTIVE:                FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK OF 
PITTSBURGH:


__________________________            By:  ____________________________________    
Chair of the Board of Directors




By:  ____________________________________    
Chair of the Human Resources Committee
Exhibit 23.1

Independent Auditors' Consent

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No. 333-106804 and 333-107609) of our report dated
January 26, 2004, except as to note 15, which is as of February 24, 2004, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Pacific Energy Partners, L.P. and subsidiaries as of
December 31, 2003 and 2002, and the related consolidated statements of income, partners' capital, comprehensive income, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year
period ended December 31, 2003, which report appears in the December 31, 2003 annual report on Form 10-K of Pacific Energy Partners, L.P.

Los
Angeles, California
March 10, 2004



QuickLinks
EXHIBIT 31.2
**Certification Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**
I, Thomas N. Adams, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of theregistrant, certify that:
1.     I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Texas UnitedBancshares, Inc.;
2.     Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement ofa material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements weremade, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4.     The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
   (a)     Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, includingits consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;    (b)     Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end ofthe period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and    (c)     Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in thecase of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and
5.     The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
   (a)     All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and    (b)     Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.     Date: March 26, 2004
#### WILLS V. SMITH, ET AL.

*Equity.*

(Decided Nov. 28, 1907.)

Appeal from Lamar Chancery Court.

Heard before Hon. W. H. Simpson.

J. C. Millner, for appellant.

Walter Nesmith, for appellee.

Per curiam.

Affirmed for want of assignment of errors.
# C_2021098EN.01001901.xml

| 22.3.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 98/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.3.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 98/19

---

Judgment of the General Court of 3 February 2021 — Kazembe Musonda v Council

(Case T-110/19) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures adopted in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Obligation to state reasons - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures - Right to private and family life - Presumption of innocence - Proportionality - Plea of illegality)

(2021/C 98/19)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda (Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: J.-P. Hix, H. Marcos Fraile, S. Van Overmeire and M.-C. Cadilhac, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1940 of 10 December 2018 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2018 L 134, p. 47) and, second, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1931 of 10 December 2018 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2018 L 314, p. 1), in so far as those acts concern the applicant.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mr Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 139, 15.4.2019.

---
Exhibit 31.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO RULES 13a-14 AND 15d-14
                     OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934


I, Stephen  Couture,  Chief  Financial  Officer of XRG,  Inc.  (the  "Company"),
certify that:

         I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of XRG, Inc.

         Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report.

         Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in the report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of,
and for, the periods, presented in the report.

         The Company's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the Company and have:

         (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the Company, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which the periodic report is being prepared;

         (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the Company's disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this annual report based on such evaluation; and

         (c) disclosed in this annual report any change in the Company's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Company's
most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely
to materially affect, the Company's internal control over financial reporting;
and

         The Company's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
Company's auditors and to the audit committee of the board of directors (or
persons fulfilling the equivalent function):


<PAGE>

         (i) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the Company's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and

         (ii) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the Company's internal control
over financial reporting.

Dated:    July 12, 2004


/s/  Stephen Couture
-----------------------------
Stephen Couture,
Chief Financial Officer
#### Richard Rios et al., Respondents, v Long Island Realty Co., Appellant.

Judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cromarty, J.), dated January 25, 1985, affirmed, without costs or disbursements, for reasons stated in the memorandum decision of Justice DeLuca at Special Term dated December 14, 1984 *(see also, Da Silva v Musso,*53 NY2d 543). Mangano, J. P., Bracken, Weinstein, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.