1

Filed 3/16/23 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

MAKE UC A GOOD NEIGHBOR et 

al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et 

al.,

Defendants and Respondents,

RESOURCES FOR COMMUNITY 

DEVELOPMENT et al.,

 Real Parties in Interest. 

A165451

(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 

RG21110142)

ORDER GRANTING PETITION 

FOR MODIFICATION AND 

MODIFYING OPINION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

Respondents’ petition for modification is GRANTED. The 

opinion filed on February 24, 2023, shall be MODIFIED as 

follows:

1. On page 3, the first sentence in Background A. is replaced in 

its entirety as follows: “Each UC campus periodically adopts a 

long range development plan, a high-level planning document 

that helps guide the university’s decisions on land and 

infrastructure development. (See Ed. Code, § 67504, subd. 

(a)(1).)”
2

2. On page 16, in the second full paragraph, the second sentence 

is replaced in its entirety as follows: “Moreover, Good 

Neighbor’s argument ignores the problem that the rejected 

alternative in this case (capping future enrollment) would 

change the nature and scope of the project.”

3. On page 29, in the last sentence of the second full paragraph, 

the word “their” is substituted for the word “its,” so that the 

sentence reads: “While the Regents could have chosen to 

include all their properties in a single plan, that is far 

different from saying that separate plans serve no logical 

purpose or could not be implemented independently.” 

4. On page 34, in the first sentence of the first full paragraph of 

subsection 3, the phrase “will cause a potential noise increase” 

is deleted and replaced with “may potentially cause a noise 

increase.” 

5. On page 36, in the final sentence of the first partial 

paragraph, the word “waved” is substituted for the word 

“waived,” so that the sentence reads as follows: “None of this 

can be waved away as speculation, unsubstantiated opinion, 

or bias.”

6. On pages 44-45, in the second sentence of the Disposition, the 

words “and displacement” are deleted, so that the sentence 

reads as follows: “The matter is remanded to the superior 

court with directions to vacate its order and judgment denying 

Good Neighbor’s petition for writ of mandate and enter a 

modified judgment consistent with our conclusions that the 

EIR inadequately analyzed potential alternatives to Housing 
3

03/16/2023 Jackson, P.J.

Project No. 2 and impacts from noise. (CEQA, § 21168.9, 

subd. (a).)”

The modifications make no change to the judgment.

Dated: _____________ __________________________, P.J.
4

Alameda County Superior Court, No. RG21110142, Hon. Frank 

Roesch.

Law Offices of Thomas N. Lippe, APC, Thomas N. Lippe; Soluri 

Meserve, A Law Corporation, Patrick M. Soluri, Osha R. 

Meserve, and James C. Crowder, for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

The Sohagi Law Group, PLC, Nicole H. Gordon, Margaret M. 

Sohagi, Mark J.G. Desrosiers; Lubin Olson & Niewiadomski LLP, 

Charles R. Olson, Philip J. Sciranka; Office of The General 

Counsel – University of California, Charles F. Robinson, Alison 

L. Krumbein; UC Berkeley, Office of Legal Affairs, David M. 

Robinson, for Defendants and Respondents. 

Buchalter, A Professional Corporation, Douglas C. Straus, Alicia 

Cristina Guerra, for Real Party in Interest Resources for 

Community Development. 
1

Filed 2/24/23 (unmodified opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

MAKE UC A GOOD NEIGHBOR et 

al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et 

al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

RESOURCES FOR COMMUNITY 

DEVELOPMENT et al.,

 Real Parties in Interest. 

 A165451

(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 

RG21110142)

This case concerns the adequacy of an environmental 

impact report, or EIR, for (1) the long range development plan for 

the University of California, Berkeley through the 2036-2037 

academic year; and (2) the university’s immediate plan to build 

student housing on the current site of People’s Park, a historic 

landmark and the well-known locus of political activity and 

protest. Appellants Make UC a Good Neighbor and The People’s 

Park Historic District Advocacy Group (collectively, Good 

Neighbor) challenge the EIR’s sufficiency as to both. 

As we will explain, we are unpersuaded by Good Neighbor’s 

contention that the EIR was required to analyze an alternative to 

the long range development plan that would limit student 

enrollment. We also reject Good Neighbor’s view that the EIR 
2

improperly restricted the geographic scope of the plan to the 

campus and nearby properties, excluding several more distant 

properties. Nor did the EIR fail to adequately assess and 

mitigate environmental impacts related to population growth and 

displacement of existing residents. 

Two of Good Neighbor’s arguments, however, find more 

traction. The EIR failed to justify the decision not to consider 

alternative locations to the People’s Park project. In addition, it 

failed to assess potential noise impacts from loud student parties 

in residential neighborhoods near the campus, a longstanding 

problem that the EIR improperly dismissed as speculative. 

We are, of course, aware of the public interest in this case—

the controversy around developing People’s Park, the university’s 

urgent need for student housing, the town-versus-gown conflicts 

in Berkeley on noise, displacement, and other issues, and the 

broader public debate about legal obstacles to housing 

construction. We do not take sides on policy issues. Our task is 

limited. We must apply the laws that the Legislature has written 

to the facts in the record. In each area where the EIR is 

deficient, the EIR skipped a legal requirement, or the record did 

not support the EIR’s conclusions, or both. 

Finally, our decision does not require the Regents to 

abandon the People’s Park project. However, they must return to 

the trial court and fix the errors in the EIR. As explained more 

below, whether CEQA will require further changes to the project 

depends on how the Regents choose to proceed and the results of 

the analyses they conduct. Ultimately, CEQA allows an agency 

to approve a project, even if the project will cause significant 

environmental harm, if the agency discloses the harm and makes 

required findings. The point of an EIR is to inform 

decisionmakers and the public about the environmental 

consequences of a project before approving it. 
3

BACKGROUND

A.

Each UC campus is required periodically to adopt a long 

range development plan, a high-level planning document that 

helps guide the university’s decisions on land and infrastructure 

development. (See Ed. Code, § 67504, subd. (a)(1).) The plan at 

issue here, adopted in 2021, estimates future enrollment for 

planning purposes but does not determine future enrollment 

levels or set a limit on the campus’s future population. It does, 

however, establish a maximum amount of new growth that the 

university may not substantially exceed without amending the 

plan and conducting additional environmental review. 

UC Berkeley provides housing for only 23 percent of its 

students, by far the lowest percentage in the UC system. For 

years, enrollment increases have outpaced new student housing 

(or “beds”). The prior long range development plan, adopted in 

2005, called for construction of just 2,600 beds through 2021. 

This was 10,000 beds short of the projected enrollment increases 

over the same period. The university only constructed 1,119 of 

those planned beds. Making matters worse, within two years of 

adopting the 2005 plan, the university increased enrollment 

beyond the plan’s 2021 projection. By the 2018-2019 academic 

year, student enrollment exceeded the 2005 projections by more 

than 6,000 students. With a population of 39,708 students, the 

university provides housing for fewer than 9,000. 

This has transpired in the midst of a decades-long regional 

housing crisis. A report by a UC Berkeley task force convened to 

address this “matter of urgent concern” identified a menu of 

options that could significantly expand student and faculty 

housing, including numerous potential housing development 

sites. Informed by the report, the UC Berkeley chancellor’s office 

launched a housing initiative to improve existing housing and 

construct new housing for students, faculty, and staff. 
4

The 2021 plan encompasses a general strategy for meeting 

the housing goals identified in the chancellor’s initiative. The 

university anticipates (but is not committed to) constructing up to 

11,731 net new beds to accommodate a projected increase in the 

campus population (students, faculty, and staff) of up to 13,902 

new residents. In addition, the plan projects that another 8,173 

students, faculty and staff will be added to the population by the 

2036-2037 academic year who will not be provided with 

university housing. 

B.

Good Neighbor’s lawsuit is based on the California 

Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).1 The “foremost principle” 

under CEQA is that the Legislature intended that it “ ‘be 

interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible 

protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the 

statutory language.’ ” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. 

Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 390 

(Laurel Heights).)

An EIR, the “heart of CEQA,” (Guidelines, § 15003, subd. 

(a)), is, with narrow exceptions, required whenever a public 

agency proposes to undertake or approve a project that may have 

a significant effect on the environment. (Laurel Heights, supra, 

47 Cal.3d at p. 390.) Its purpose is to provide public agencies and 

the general public with detailed information about the proposed 

project’s likely environmental impacts; to list ways those effects 

might be minimized; and to identify alternatives to the project as 

proposed. (CEQA, § 21061; Save Berkeley’s Neighborhoods v. 

Regents of University of California (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 226, 

1 All references to “CEQA” are to the California 

Environmental Quality Act. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et 

seq.) All references to “Guidelines” are to the state CEQA 

Guidelines, which implement the provisions of CEQA. (Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et seq.) 
5

235 (Save Berkeley’s Neighborhoods).) The EIR protects the 

environment and helps ensure enlightened public debate by “ ‘ 

“inform[ing] the public and its responsible officials of the 

environmental consequences of their decisions before they are 

made.” ’ ” (Save Berkeley’s Neighborhoods, at pp. 235-236;

Friends of College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County 

Community College Dist. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 937, 944.) 

The most common type of EIR, a project EIR, examines the 

environmental impacts of all phases of a specific development 

project, including planning, construction, and operation. 

(Guidelines, § 15161; In re Bay-Delta etc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143, 

1169 (Bay-Delta).) A program EIR, in contrast, is often used at a 

relatively early stage of the planning process, before specific 

components of the program are ready for approval. (See 

Guidelines, § 15168, subds. (a)-(c).) “An advantage of using a 

program EIR is that it can ‘[a]llow the lead agency to consider 

broad policy alternatives and program wide mitigation measures 

at an early time when the agency has greater flexibility to deal 

with basic problems or cumulative impacts.’ ” (Bay-Delta, at p. 

1169; Guidelines, § 15168, subds. (a), (b)(4).) Program EIRs are 

commonly employed in conjunction with “tiering,” the use of 

project EIRs to analyze the environmental impacts of detailed 

proposals that were not addressed by the program-level planning 

document. (Bay-Delta, at p. 1170.) 

C.

The EIR at issue here is a hybrid: it encompasses both a 

program EIR intended to identify and assess potential 

environmental impacts from the approval and implementation of 

the long range development plan and a more detailed, projectlevel environmental review to analyze the potential impacts of 

two specific developments proposed for People’s Park (Housing 

Project No. 2) and a site not at issue in this appeal, the Helen 

Diller Anchor House (Housing Project No. 1). While these 
6

housing projects are conceptually part of the university’s long 

range development plan, they are also separate projects for 

purposes of CEQA (see CEQA, § 21065) and are analyzed 

separately in the EIR when required. 

Respondents Regents of the University of California 

certified the EIR and approved the housing projects in July and 

September 2021. In October 2021, Good Neighbor filed a (first 

amended) petition for writ of mandate naming the Regents, 

University of California President Michael Drake, and UC 

Berkeley Chancellor Carol Christ (collectively, Regents). The 

writ petition alleges multiple CEQA violations and asks the court 

to void the approvals of the development plan and housing 

projects, void the certification of the EIR, and suspend all related 

activities pending compliance with CEQA. 

Following various procedural skirmishes, in August 2022 

the trial court denied the writ petition and entered judgment in 

favor of the Regents. Good Neighbor appealed and filed a 

petition for writ of supersedeas and request for immediate stay in 

this court, seeking to preserve People’s Park from demolition 

pending resolution of its appeal. We granted the stay and 

subsequently issued a writ of supersedeas ordering that all 

construction and further demolition, tree-cutting, and landscape 

alteration activities at People’s Park be stayed pending resolution 

of the appeal. We now turn to Good Neighbor’s appellate 

challenges to the adequacy of the EIR.

DISCUSSION

A.

Alternatives to the development plan

Good Neighbor argues the Regents violated CEQA by 

failing to analyze an alternative to the development plan that 

would limit student enrollment. We disagree. 
7

1.

As noted, the purpose of an EIR is to provide the 

government and the public with enough information to make 

informed decisions about the environmental consequences of a 

project and ways to avoid or reduce its environmental damage. 

(Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 

553, 564-565 (Goleta).) 

To that end, an EIR must consider potentially feasible 

alternatives to a project. (Goleta, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 565; see 

Guidelines, §§ 15126.6, subd. (a), 15364.) The lead agency—not 

the public—is responsible for proposing the alternatives. (Goleta,

at p. 568.) The lead agency need not consider every conceivable 

alternative but instead a reasonable range of alternatives to the 

project, or to the project’s location, that could reduce a project’s 

significant environmental impacts, meet most of the project’s 

basic objectives, and are at least potentially feasible. (Guidelines, 

§ 15126.6, subds. (a)-(c), (f); see generally, 1 Kostka & Zischke, 

Practice Under the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar 

2022) §§ 15.7-15.9 (Kostka & Zischke).)

When reviewing a challenge to the alternatives, courts 

apply the rule of reason: “ ‘the EIR [must] set forth only those 

alternatives necessary to permit a reasoned choice’ and . . . 

‘examine in detail only the ones that the lead agency determines 

could feasibly attain most of the basic objectives of the project.’ ” 

(Bay-Delta, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1163, quoting Guidelines, § 

15126.6, subd. (f).) Courts presume an EIR complies with this 

rule; it is a petitioner’s burden to demonstrate it does not. 

(California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 

Cal.App.4th 957, 987 (California Native Plant Society).) We must 

defer to the Regents’ selection of alternatives unless Good 

Neighbor (1) demonstrates the alternatives selected by the 

Regents are “ ‘ “ ‘ manifestly unreasonable and . . . do not 

contribute to a reasonable range of alternatives’ ” ’ ” and (2) 
8

identifies evidence of a potentially feasible alternative that meets 

most of the basic project objectives. (South of Market Community 

Action Network v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 

Cal.App.5th 321, 345 (South of Market).) The inquiry concerns 

predominantly factual issues, to which we apply the substantial 

evidence standard. (Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. 

San Diego Assn. of Governments (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 413, 435 

(Cleveland National Forest).) 

2.

Below, we provide further background on the alternatives 

evaluated in the EIR as well as information on the university’s 

enrollment process. 

The development plan will provide general guidance for the 

campus’s land development and physical infrastructure. (See Ed. 

Code, § 67504, subd. (a)(1) [Legislature intends long range 

development plans to “guid[e] . . . physical development, 

including land use designations, the location of buildings, and 

infrastructure systems, for an established time horizon”].) The 

plan includes an estimate of future enrollment but does not set 

enrollment levels, require enrollment increases, or commit to any 

amount of enrollment or development. The EIR lists 14 

objectives, mostly comprising broad goals for land use, 

landscapes, open space, mobility, and infrastructure. 

Based on the purpose and objectives, the EIR identifies 

eight alternatives for the plan. It excluded four alternatives from 

full consideration for various reasons, and it fully analyzed the 

remaining four. 

In the fully analyzed group, alternative A (the no project 

alternative) would entail continuing to implement the old (2005) 

development plan. That plan includes constructing up to 1,530 

additional beds as well as 2,476,929 square feet of academic and 

other space—far less than the proposed development plan (11,731 
9

beds and over three million square feet of other space). The old 

plan omits Housing Project Nos. 1 and 2 as well as features in the 

proposed plan to reduce vehicle miles traveled, upgrade utilities, 

increase energy efficiency, and add renewable energy systems. 

Alternative B is described as a reduced development plan. 

It envisions a 25 percent reduction in new undergraduate beds 

and academic square footage (9,479 total new beds and 1,713,441 

square feet of academic space) compared with the proposed plan. 

The two housing projects would be included but would be 

reconfigured and smaller, with a commensurate reduction in 

beds. 

Alternative C focuses on features that would reduce vehicle 

miles traveled and greenhouse gas emissions through numerous 

projects to increase remote learning and working, limit parking, 

and build 500 more faculty and staff beds to reduce commuting. 

Alternative D prioritizes more housing for faculty and staff 

compared to the proposed development plan—an additional 1,000 

beds in two campus locations. 

The EIR analyzes each alternative’s environmental impacts 

topic-by-topic, compares them to the proposed plan, measures 

them against the objectives, and determines which alternative is 

environmentally superior. The EIR concludes that alternative A 

(no project) would be the environmentally superior alternative, 

followed by alternative C (reduced vehicle miles). Except for 

alternative A, which would conflict with many of the plan’s 

objectives, the remaining alternatives would meet most of the 

objectives. 

Among the four alternatives that were eliminated from 

consideration without a detailed analysis in the EIR, the Regents 

considered an alternative that focused on reducing the number of 

future graduate students. This alternative was rejected because, 

according to the EIR, it would undercut a “core” project 
10

objective—to support and enhance UC Berkeley’s status as a 

leading public research institution. 

In comments on the draft EIR, members of the public urged 

the Regents to consider an alternative that reduced, capped, or 

otherwise limited undergraduate enrollment. The Regents 

responded, in the final EIR, that the plan does not set 

undergraduate enrollment, increase enrollment, or commit the 

campus to any particular enrollment level; enrollment is 

determined annually in a separate process. 

As the EIR explains, the process for setting enrollment 

levels in the UC system is complicated, with multiple players, 

interests, and trade-offs. By statute, the UC system (as a whole) 

must plan for adequate space to accept all eligible California 

resident students who apply as well as eligible transfer students. 

(See Ed. Code, §§ 66011, subd. (a), 66202.5, 66741.) The 

California Master Plan for Higher Education requires the system 

to accept the top 12.5 percent of the state’s public high school 

graduates and eligible transfer students from community 

colleges. The Legislature sometimes uses the budget process to 

inject itself into the enrollment debate, as it did in 2016, 

prompting the largest annual enrollment increase in resident 

students since World War II, and in 2017, when the university 

agreed to cap enrollment of nonresident students. 

To find places for these students, the university’s Office of 

the President coordinates enrollment annually in an iterative 

process with 10 UC campuses, each of which has different 

enrollment goals and different demands for its academic 

programs. UC Berkeley is the second-largest campus in the 

system. The physical capacity of a campus is just one factor in 

setting enrollment levels; in recent years, four UC campuses, 

including UC Berkeley, together exceeded their planned capacity 

by 12,000 students. The Office of the President tracks existing 

and projected enrollment data, as well as annual and long-term 
11

plans for the numbers and types of students that can be 

accommodated at each campus. The university prepared its last 

long-term enrollment plan in 2008 for a 13-year period; it is 

currently developing a new long-term plan. 

3. 

The main issue is whether Good Neighbor has 

demonstrated that the range of alternatives in the EIR is 

manifestly unreasonable. (South of Market, supra, 33 

Cal.App.5th at p. 345.) Good Neighbor does not really quarrel 

with the EIR’s alternatives as far as they go. Rather, it argues 

that the EIR’s range is too narrow without at least one 

alternative that would limit student enrollment. It observes that

the number of students is a major driver of environmental 

impacts. Fewer students would mean, for example, fewer cars 

and new buildings, which, in turn, would mean fewer impacts to 

resources protected by CEQA such as air, water, and cultural 

resources. Good Neighbor also points to other UC campuses that 

have settled disputes with neighboring communities by agreeing 

to link enrollment increases to housing—for example, UC Davis’s 

agreement to provide on-campus housing for new students over a 

baseline figure. 

The problem with Good Neighbor’s argument is that it 

ignores the plan’s limited purpose and scope. The plan 

deliberately keeps separate the complex annual process for 

setting student enrollment levels. 

An agency is generally not required to consider alternatives 

that would change the nature of the project. (Marin Mun. Water 

Dist. v. KG Land California Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1652 

(Marin Municipal); see Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 15.8.) In 

Marin Municipal, a water agency adopted a moratorium on new 

water connections in response to a drought that caused an acute 

water shortage. In its EIR, aside from the no-project alternative, 

the agency considered just one alternative to address the crisis—
12

mandatory water conservation. (Id. at pp. 1657, 1665.) The 

petitioners argued the agency should have considered more 

comprehensive alternatives such as adopting a tiered rate 

system, developing reclaimed water, or securing other new 

supplies. The court rejected the argument, emphasizing that the 

agency’s objective was “not to solve the [agency’s] long-term 

water supply problems; rather, its more modest goal was to 

prevent an immediate over-commitment of the [agency’s] water 

supply.” (Id. at p. 1666.) It held that the range of alternatives 

was reasonable. (Ibid.; compare Cleveland National Forest, 

supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 435-437 [concluding range of 

alternatives was unreasonable when the purpose of a plan was to 

reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the EIR included no 

alternative designed to reduce driving, the primary source of 

emissions].)

Rio Vista Farm Bureau Center v. County of Solano (1992) 5 

Cal.App.4th 351 (Rio Vista) is also helpful. A county adopted a 

program EIR for a hazardous waste management plan. The 

county limited the scope of the plan to a high-level assessment of 

its need for new facilities and siting criteria for potential 

facilities. It deliberately stopped short of proposing specific sites 

or development of actual facilities. (Id. at pp. 370-372.) The EIR 

analyzed three similarly high-level alternatives. (Id. at p. 378.) 

The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the county must 

consider more detailed alternative plans relating to site-specific 

issues, such as locating facilities outside the county or limiting 

the size of facilities. (Ibid.) The court observed that the 

alternatives in the EIR were “tailored to the nature of the Plan, 

in which site selection criteria, not specific sites, were proposed.” 

(Id. at pp. 378-379.) It held that the high-level alternatives in the 

EIR offered decisionmakers sufficient information to make a 

reasoned choice. (Id. at p. 379.)
13

The holdings in Marin Municipal and Rio Vista are 

reinforced by the process that agencies use to develop the 

alternatives. A lead agency begins by determining the project’s 

purpose and objectives. (Guidelines, § 15124, subd. (b).) It then 

uses the purpose and objectives to develop a reasonable range of 

alternatives to analyze in the EIR. (Ibid.; Bay-Delta, supra, 43 

Cal.4th at p. 1163.) This exercise would be meaningless if, long 

after the EIR is certified, a court tells the agency that it was also 

required to consider alternatives that serve different purposes 

and objectives. Generally, when an agency has deliberately 

limited the scope and nature of the problem that it wants to 

solve, the agency should not be required to consider alternatives 

that address a much bigger problem (Marin Municipal) or that 

add difficult issues the agency has chosen not to tackle (Rio 

Vista). The EIR’s purpose and objectives will often reflect these 

kinds of limits. 

Here, like in Rio Vista, the Regents adopted a program EIR 

for a limited, high-level land use plan and made a reasoned 

decision to exclude the enrollment process from the scope of the 

project. The EIR is quite clear that setting enrollment levels is 

not the plan’s purpose. The purpose is to guide future 

development regardless of the actual amount of future 

enrollment. The plan leaves enrollment decisions to the existing 

long range and annual planning processes. It estimates future 

enrollment only for purposes of developing a land use and 

infrastructure plan that could meet its future needs, consistent 

with the Legislature’s instruction to develop long range plans 

based on the campus’s “academic goals and projected enrollment 

levels.” (Ed. Code, § 67504, subd. (a)(1).) 

Likewise, nearly all of the 14 project objectives in the EIR 

relate to land use and development goals, not enrollment policy 
14

for a public university.2 None of the objectives would have helped 

the Regents craft alternatives that address the public policy 

considerations, institutional values, and tradeoffs involved in 

limiting enrollment at its premier campus. (See Guidelines, § 

15124, subd. (b).) Given the complexity of, and the competing 

interests in, setting annual enrollment levels, the Regents would 

presumably need to add objectives to the EIR to develop 

workable alternatives for limiting enrollment—which only 

emphasizes that Good Neighbor’s favored alternative is a horse of 

a different color. 

Notably, Good Neighbor does not argue that the objectives 

themselves are too narrowly drawn, which could certainly expand 

the nature and scope of the alternatives. (See, e.g., We Advocate 

Through Environmental Review v. County of Siskiyou (2022) 78 

Cal.App.5th 683, 691-693; North Coast Rivers Alliance v. 

Kawamura (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 647, 669.) Nor does it argue 

that CEQA requires the Regents to combine the two processes 

(development and enrollment planning) into a single project. In 

any case, we would reject that argument. (See Aptos Council v. 

County of Santa Cruz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 266, 279-282 

[agencies may separate related projects when they serve different 

2 A typical objective is: “Maintain natural areas as well as 

generous natural and built open spaces on the Campus Park and 

the Clark Kerr Campus.” Other objectives concern bicycle and 

pedestrian networks and mobility; car access and parking; 

designing facilities for sustainability, efficiency, and seismic 

safety; efficient use of resources; open space; improving the 

housing portfolio; infrastructure; and historic landscapes and 

architecture. The only objective arguably relevant to 

enrollment—at least for graduate students—calls for supporting 

UC Berkeley’s status as an internationally renowned public 

research university by expanding its graduate schools and 

research programs. 
15

purposes or can be implemented independently]; Rio Vista, supra, 

5 Cal.App.4th at pp. 371-373.)

As in Rio Vista and Marin Municipal, the alternatives in 

the EIR are tailored to the plan’s limited purpose. The 

alternatives presented the Regents with a variety of ways to meet 

the plan’s objectives while reducing the plan’s significant 

impacts. The range of alternatives include less development 

(Alternative B); strategies to reduce carbon emissions by building 

more housing near the campus, reducing parking, and increasing 

remote instruction and working (Alternative C); and more 

housing for faculty and staff located on the campus itself 

(Alternative D). Importantly, although the alternatives do not 

include reducing the total campus population, they do include 

managing the campus population in ways that could lessen or 

avoid its impacts by, for example, reducing car travel to the 

campus; providing more housing for people on campus rather 

than the surrounding community; and reducing the daily campus 

population through remote working and instruction. In text, 

tables, and charts, the EIR explains how, to varying degrees, the 

alternatives would meet or conflict with different objectives, 

analyzes the impacts, and proposes mitigation measures. Other 

than making the general point that some impacts could also be 

mitigated or avoided by an alternative that reduces the future 

campus population, Good Neighbor does not explain what is 

wrong with the alternatives in the EIR. 

We do not find Good Neighbor’s remaining arguments 

persuasive. 

First, Good Neighbor attacks the Regents’ contention that 

the Regents were excused from evaluating enrollment 

alternatives because either the alternatives would conflict with 

the objectives or they are infeasible. We need not reach those 

issues. Even assuming that an enrollment alternative poses no 

such conflict and is potentially feasible, we still must determine 
16

whether the range of alternatives that the EIR did analyze meets 

the rule of reason. (See South of Market, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 345; City of Maywood v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. 

(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 362, 420-421; Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. 

(f).) Put another way, if the range of alternatives is reasonable, it 

does not become unreasonable simply because another potential 

alternative exists. 

Second, Good Neighbor argues that the EIR must consider 

reducing enrollment as a means of reducing development and the 

impacts associated with development. It cites Watsonville Pilots 

Assn. v. City of Watsonville (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1087-

1090 (Watsonville Pilots), in which a city rejected, without 

analysis, a reduced development alternative in its EIR for a 

general plan update. The court held that a reduced development 

alternative should have been included because it would meet 

most of the project objectives, reduce many of the project’s 

environmental impacts (largely caused by growth), and address a 

gap in the range of alternatives. (Ibid.) 

Unlike Watsonville Pilots, however, this EIR did include a 

reduced development alternative—alternative B, which would 

reduce housing and academic space development by 25 percent. 

Moreover, Good Neighborhood’s argument ignores the problem 

that capping future enrollment levels would change the nature 

and scope of the project. That was not an issue in Watsonville 

Pilots. (See Watsonville Pilots, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

1087-1088.) 

Third, and finally, Good Neighbor notes that CEQA 

requires the Regents to consider future campus population 

estimates when they prepare an EIR for a long range 

development plan and to mitigate significant impacts. (See 

CEQA, § 21080.09, subds. (b), (d); Ed. Code, § 67504, subds. 

(a)(1), (b)(1).) Good Neighbor then suggests that, because the 

Legislature requires the Regents to mitigate impacts from 
17

campus population increases, it must also consider alternative 

ways to avoid or reduce impacts when setting enrollment levels. 

We do not see it that way. We agree that the Regents must 

consider, and mitigate, projected campus population increases 

when the Regents prepare an EIR for a long range development 

plan, as we held in Save Berkeley’s Neighborhoods, supra, 51 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 237-241. The EIR does so. But nothing in 

CEQA section 21080.09 indicates that the Legislature intended to 

force the Regents to consider alternatives to its process for setting 

enrollment levels whenever they adopt a new development plan. 

Indeed, in a recent amendment to the statute, the Legislature 

exempted enrollment and enrollment increases from the 

definition of a project under CEQA.3 (Sen. Bill No. 118 (2021-

2022 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2022, ch. 10, § 1, eff. March 14, 2022; 

CEQA, § 21080.09, subd. (d).) 

Good Neighbor has not met its burden of demonstrating 

that the range of alternatives for the long range development 

plan is manifestly unreasonable. 

B.

Alternatives to Housing Project No. 2

(People’s Park)

We now turn to Good Neighbor’s challenge to the 

alternatives analysis for Housing Project No. 2, which would be 

built on the present site of People’s Park. As noted, although this 

3 For clarity, we note that the Legislature also recently 

exempted from CEQA student and faculty housing projects that 

meet certain criteria. (CEQA, § 21080.58.) The legislation 

(which became effective January 1, 2023) applies to site-specific 

housing projects that are consistent with a long range 

development plan. (CEQA, § 21080.58, subd. (b)(1)(A)(i).) It does 

not exempt long range development plans, which remain subject 

to CEQA. (CEQA, § 21080.09, subd. (b).) 
18

site-specific project is related to the long range development plan, 

and part of the same EIR, it is a separate project (for CEQA 

purposes) from the plan, and the EIR separately discusses 

alternatives to the plan and the housing project. 

As explained in the previous section, CEQA requires that 

an EIR consider and analyze a reasonable range of potentially 

feasible alternatives to the project, or its location, that would 

attain most of its basic objectives but reduce its environmental 

impacts. (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a); Bay-Delta, supra, 43 

Cal.4th at p. 1163.) Good Neighbor contends the EIR violated 

this mandate by failing to analyze any alternative locations for 

Housing Project No. 2 that would spare People’s Park from 

demolition. 

We agree, to a point. We do not hold the Regents must 

necessarily study an alternative site or sites for the People’s Park 

project. We are mindful that an analysis of alternative sites is 

not required in all cases. (California Native Plant Society, supra, 

177 Cal.App.4th at p. 993.) Here, however, the Regents not only 

declined to analyze any alternative locations; they failed to 

provide a valid reason for that decision. (Guidelines, § 15126.6, 

subd. (f)(2)(B).) There is plenty of evidence that alternative sites 

exist—the development plan identifies several other universityowned properties as potential student housing sites. (See Goleta, 

supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 574 [public agency’s access to alternative 

sites may expand the range of feasible alternative locations].) 

Under these circumstances, we are constrained to find the EIR 

failed to consider and analyze a reasonable range of alternatives.

1.

In the 1960’s, the university acquired and cleared the 

parcel that eventually became People’s Park, intending to develop 

it for parking, student housing, and office space. Funding for the 

project ran short, and the site remained undeveloped. Over the 

following year, residents, students, and community organizers 
19

transformed it into an unofficial community gathering space—

People’s Park. 

The park’s historic significance stems from its association 

with social and political activism in Berkeley. A hub of protest 

against the Vietnam War, in 1969 the park was the site of both 

violent confrontations between protesters and law enforcement 

and peaceful demonstrations. Through the early 1970’s, People’s 

Park grew to symbolize anti-war activism and suppression of the 

counterculture movement. Since those times, various proposals 

by the Regents to develop the site have been met with protest 

and/or community opposition. 

The park is currently used as a venue for occasional special 

events, including concerts, fairs, basketball tournaments, and 

theatrical performances. Its predominant use, however, is by 

transient and unhoused people in multiple encampments. The 

park is also afflicted with crime, ranging from disturbing the 

peace and drug and alcohol violations to much more serious 

offenses including sexual assault, arson, and attempted murder. 

The City of Berkeley designated the park as a landmark in 

1984. There are 10 historic structures in its immediate vicinity, 

buildings of two to four stories dating from the 19th- and early 

20th-century. These include two National Register-listed 

resources: the First Church of Christ, Scientist, and Anna Head 

School for Girls. 

To build the housing project, the Regents propose 

demolishing the park and its amenities and constructing two new 

buildings. The new buildings would provide approximately 1,113 

student beds, eight staff and faculty beds, and 125 beds for lowerincome and formerly homeless persons. The project would 

include a public market, a clinic, and some 1.7 acres of publicly 

accessible, landscaped green space that would commemorate the 

history and legacy of People’s Park. 
20

The EIR determined the project would result in a 

substantial adverse change to a historic resource: “Housing 

Project [No.] 2 would require demolition of existing structures, 

which currently include a public restroom, basketball courts, and 

stage, and would reconfigure the existing open space. . . . These 

proposed changes would leave the park without integrity of 

design, materials, workmanship, feeling, or association, that is, it 

would remove its ability to convey its historic significance. 

Therefore, demolition of the site would result in a significant 

impact.” Nobody disputes that, under CEQA, the Regents 

properly identified this as a significant impact on the 

environment. (Guidelines, § 15064.5, subds. (a)(2), (b)(2)(A)-

(b)(2)(B).)

In addition, Housing Project No. 2 could have significant 

and unavoidable impacts on the 10 historic resources in the 

vicinity because its proposed scale and proportion, with a larger 

footprint and height of up to 17 stories, would likely be 

incompatible with the smaller structures. 

The EIR does not analyze in detail any alternatives to 

Housing Project No. 2. In the EIR scoping process, the staff 

identified two alternatives before rejecting them. The first was 

intended to preserve the park by designing buildings that would 

maintain the park’s key features. The EIR explains that staff 

concluded this was not possible and rejected the idea. The 

parties focus on the second rejected alternative, which suggested 

locating the housing project on one of the many other universityowned properties in the area. 

The EIR gives three reasons for rejecting the alternative 

location proposal. First, “[l]ocating [the project] on other UC 

Berkeley properties in the City Environs Properties or the Clark 

Kerr Campus that are designated for future student housing 

could reduce the total projected number of beds within the 

proposed LRDP Update development program . . . , or could 
21

require UC Berkeley to identify additional housing sites that are 

not currently UC Berkeley properties for housing.” 

Second, development of the project at a different location 

“would be constrained by site access and parcel size, as many of 

the eligible sites are smaller than the proposed development 

sites. Therefore, the development programs would need to either 

be reduced, or the housing projects would require multiple sites, 

further diminishing the total number of beds described in the 

proposed [long range] development program.” 

Third, relocating the project would not avoid adverse 

historical impacts: “While a potential alternate site alternative 

would reduce the significant historic resource impacts at both 

[Anchor House and People’s Park] sites, they would also have the 

potential to introduce new historic resource impacts at many of 

the sites in the City Environs Properties and the Clark Kerr 

Campus, as both contain historic resources or are adjacent to 

such resources.” 

In comments on the draft EIR, members of the public asked 

what specific sites were considered as potential alternatives for 

Housing Project No. 2. The final EIR responded by identifying 

numerous potential housing sites that the plan also proposes for 

new development, redevelopment, and renovation. Like the draft 

EIR, the final EIR stated that developing Housing Project No. 2 

on one or more of those sites would result in fewer beds and 

potentially introduce new historic resource impacts. In addition, 

the final EIR stated that “accommodating the same number of 

beds on multiple sites would cause greater potential for ground 

disturbance and thus consequently, greater construction 

impacts.” The Regents adopted the conclusions stated in the 

draft EIR. 
22

2.

The Regents’ strategy is puzzling. It can be risky to adopt 

an EIR that analyzes no potentially feasible alternatives. It is 

especially risky here given that the university owns several other 

nearby properties that it has designated, in its development plan, 

as sites for student housing. So if the Regents wanted to consider 

potentially feasible sites for student housing that would avoid 

impacts to the park, there are some obvious candidates. 

Moreover, the Regents concede that, if there are no feasible 

alternative locations for the project, the EIR should state the 

reasons for that conclusion. (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subds. (c), 

(f)(2)(B); Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 404 [agency 

cannot expect the public to accept its determination on blind 

trust].) But the record does not support the reasons stated in the 

EIR, and the Regents do not try to defend them. Instead, in their 

brief, they offer new reasons that contradict their earlier reasons 

and that are nowhere found in the EIR. 

The EIR’s first reason, again, is that developing an 

alternative site instead of People’s Park “could” either reduce the 

total number of beds that would be built under the long range 

development plan or require the university to acquire additional 

properties. This vague, equivocal statement—maybe an 

alternative site would reduce the total beds, maybe not—falls 

short of a conclusion, based on facts and analysis, that no 

potentially feasible sites exist. (See Guidelines, §§ 15126.6, 

subds. (c), (f)(2)(B) [“If the Lead Agency concludes that no feasible 

alternative locations exist, it must disclose the reasons for this 

conclusion”], 15364 [defining feasibility as “capable of being 

accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period 

of time, taking into account economic, environmental, legal, 

social, and technological factors”], 15126.6, subd. (f)(1) [feasibility 

includes assessing whether the developer “can reasonably 

acquire, control or otherwise have access to [an] alternative site” 
23

or already owns one].) Nor do the Regents point to evidence in 

the record that would shore up this assertion. 

Moreover, the rationale is based on a nonexistent conflict 

with the long range plan. The plan sets no minimum number of 

beds to be built. Its objective for housing is to “[i]mprove the 

existing housing portfolio” and “support” the Chancellor’s housing 

initiative by providing “additional” beds. The total number of 

beds discussed in the plan—11,731—is not a hard number but, 

instead, merely “the estimated potential envelope of net new 

development that may occur over time,” depending on actual 

enrollment growth, available financing, and other factors. The 

EIR acknowledges as much in considering a reduced development 

alternative—alternative B—that proposed 2,500 fewer beds. The 

Regents are careful to say, repeatedly, that the plan is not a 

commitment to build anything, much less 11,731 beds. Similarly, 

the Regents cite no evidence that acquiring new properties 

conflicts with the plan or is infeasible. (See Goleta, supra, 52 

Cal.3d at p. 574; Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (f)(1).) The plan 

expressly contemplates acquiring additional properties in the 

future; it even sets guidelines for doing so. In short, the alleged 

conflict with the plan does not support an infeasibility finding. 

The second reason also is a non-starter. The EIR explained 

that relocating the project to an alternate site or sites would 

result in fewer new beds, or require multiple sites, because 

“many” of the eligible sites are smaller than People’s Park. 

(Italics added.) Again, this is not a finding that there are no 

alternative sites that could support an equivalent project. Nor 

does the EIR or administrative record supply evidence to support 

such an assertion. (See Goleta, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 569; 

Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (c).) In fact, the EIR indicates that 

at least three of the nearby sites identified for student housing 

could provide more beds than the 1,113 beds at the People’s Park 
24

site: Clark Kerr – Central (1,439 net new beds); Channing 

Ellsworth (2,980 beds); and Fulton-Bancroft (1,200 beds). 

The third reason is similarly flawed. The EIR ruled out 

consideration of alternate locations in part because re-siting the 

project from People’s Park would “have the potential” to adversely 

affect other historic resources at “many of the sites in the City 

Environs Properties and the Clark Kerr Campus,” as both areas 

“contain . . . or are adjacent to [historic] resources.” (Italics 

added.) In other words, relocating Housing Project No. 2 from 

People’s Park, where it will definitely destroy a significant 

historic resource, to many (but not all) of the sites in those areas 

might (but might not) affect some different historical resource 

because such a resource might (or might not) be on or near the 

site. This artfully drafted language, yet again, cannot substitute 

for a conclusion based on facts in the record that there are no 

potentially feasible alternative sites where the project would 

cause less damage to historic resources. 

The EIR’s rationale here is questionable for another reason 

as well: it treats potential adverse environmental impacts on 

People’s Park and various other, unnamed historical resources as 

if they were interchangeable. Historical places and structures 

are rarely, if ever, fungible items of equivalent historical 

significance and value. Even were we to assume re-siting the 

project would cause adverse impacts to some other historic 

resource, those impacts would almost necessarily differ in quality 

and degree from Housing Project No. 2’s impacts on People’s 

Park. 

The Regents cite no evidence to support the final EIR’s 

additional reason that alternative sites would have a “greater 

potential for ground disturbance.” We deem this point 

abandoned. (See State Water Resources Control Bd. Cases (2006) 

136 Cal.App.4th 674, 836.)
25

While an EIR need not exhaustively explain its reasons for 

excluding an alternative from analysis (Guidelines, § 15126.6, 

subds. (c), (f)(2)(B)), unsupported conclusory statements do not 

suffice. (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 404.) The 

Regents’ explanation, premised as it is on ambiguous 

generalizations rather than analysis and evidence, failed to serve 

the purpose of enabling informed decision-making and public 

discussion. (See San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society, Inc. v. 

County of San Bernardino (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 738, 750-751 

[EIR’s statement that development at another site “may” result 

in similar adverse impacts without discussing whether there 

actually were other potentially suitable sites held insufficient]; 

San Joaquin Raptor/Wildlife Rescue Center v. County of 

Stanislaus (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 713, 735-736 (San Joaquin 

Raptor).)

3.

In their briefs, the Regents spend most of their time 

developing new reasons for declining to analyze any alternative 

sites for Housing Project No. 2. 

First, they argue that a “primary objective” of the project is 

to revitalize the People’s Park site, and therefore developing any 

other site would conflict with that objective. (See Guidelines, § 

15152, subd. (a); Jones v. Regents of University of California

(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 818, 827-828 (Jones) [upholding rejection 

of alternative site because it would conflict with most project 

objectives].) The Regents point to one of the EIR’s seven 

objectives for Housing Project No. 2: “[r]edevelop and revitalize a 

UC Berkeley property to provide safe, secure, high quality, and 

high density student housing to help meet the student housing 

needs of UC Berkeley.” While they acknowledge the reference to 

“a” UC Berkeley property does not convey a site-specific objective 

of addressing problems unique to People’s Park, they maintain 

the record “clearly” demonstrates that this is what it meant. 
26

We disagree. The objective applies equally to many of the 

potential sites that the university has identified for 

redevelopment in its long range development plan. This is 

unsurprising. One of the plan’s objectives is to provide 

“renovated safe, secure, accessible, and high-quality housing.” 

The plan therefore identifies a host of underutilized, universityowned properties as potential sites to redevelop as student 

housing, including the three alternative properties mentioned 

above (Clark Kerr – Central, Channing Ellsworth and FultonBancroft) and Housing Projects Nos. 1 and 2, all of which the EIR 

categorizes as redevelopment housing projects. The record simply 

does not support the Regents’ position that its objective to 

redevelop “a” UC Berkeley property fatally conflicts with 

redeveloping all other UC Berkeley properties.

The Regents summarily assert it is infeasible to construct 

Housing Project No. 2 on a different site because the university 

must utilize all of the proposed housing sites near Campus Park 

to achieve its objective of maintaining that area as the central 

location for academic, research and student life uses. The 

Regents identify nothing in the EIR or the record supporting 

their claim that the objective cannot be achieved without 

developing every potential site in the area. As noted, the Regents 

disclaimed any commitment to build anything other than the two 

housing projects; the other proposed sites, according to the EIR, 

are simply a “menu of possible options” for future development. 

In any event, the Regents may not exclude a potentially feasible 

alternative from analysis simply because it does not fully meet all 

project objectives. (Habitat & Watershed Caretakers v. City of 

Santa Cruz (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1304; Watsonville 

Pilots, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087.) 

Finally, we would find the EIR flawed even if we accepted 

the Regents’ argument. The primary explanation they offer now 

but omitted from the EIR (i.e., they did not consider other sites 
27

because they want to fix the problems at this particular site) 

contradicts the explanation they gave to the public in the EIR 

(they considered other sites but found them infeasible because 

they were too small, etc.). In the chapter on alternatives, where 

the Regents stated their reasons for rejecting alternative sites, 

the Regents gave the latter explanation, not the former. When 

squarely asked by public commentors why they rejected other 

sites, they did so again. And again in the findings. Hiding the 

ball is unacceptable. In the seminal Laurel Heights case, in 

which the Regents failed to explain why they rejected alternative 

sites for a development project, our Supreme Court observed: 

“The Regents miss the critical point that the public must be 

equally informed” of the reasons. (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 

Cal.3d at p. 404, italics omitted.) They missed that point here, 

too. 

In sum, we conclude that, absent a viable explanation for 

declining to consider alternative locations, the range of 

alternatives in the EIR was unreasonable. (See Watsonville 

Pilots, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1087-1090.) Because the 

Regent’s explanation was incomplete and inaccurate, it precluded 

informed public participation and decision-making, so it is 

prejudicial regardless of whether a different outcome would 

otherwise have resulted.4 (CEQA, § 21005, subd. (a).)

4 We note, again, that recent legislation exempts certain 

student and faculty housing projects from CEQA. (CEQA, § 

21080.58, added by Sen. Bill No. 886 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), 

Stats. 2022, ch. 663, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023.) Among other 

limitations, the legislation does not apply to student housing 

projects that would require the demolition of a structure listed on 

a local historic register. (CEQA, § 21080.58, subd. (d)(1)(D).) 

People’s Park is a local historic landmark. 
28

C.

Piecemealing

We reject Good Neighbor’s argument that the Regents 

improperly “piecemealed” the long range development plan by 

limiting its scope geographically to the campus and neighboring 

properties, thereby excluding several properties further away. We 

review piecemealing claims de novo. (Banning Ranch 

Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 

1209, 1224 (Banning Ranch).) 

Piecemealing concerns the scope of the project analyzed in 

the EIR. CEQA requires that a lead agency describe and analyze 

the entire project rather than split one large project into smaller 

ones, resulting in piecemeal environmental review that obscures 

the project’s full environmental consequences. (Guidelines, § 

15378; Banning Ranch, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222.) It is 

not simply a matter of whether two projects are related. The 

projects must be linked in a way that logically makes them one 

project, not two. A classic example is Laurel Heights, where a 

university described the project only as its initial plan to occupy 

part of a building, omitting its future plan to occupy the entire 

building. (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 396.) Another 

example is a county’s truncated description of a housing 

development that neglected to include the sewer lines and related 

facilities designed to serve the project. (San Joaquin Raptor, 

supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 729-731.) 

But two projects may be kept separate when, although the 

projects are related in some ways, they serve different purposes 

or can be implemented independently. (See Banning Ranch, 

supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1223-1224 [summarizing the case 

law]. An example is Communities for a Better Environment v. 

City of Richmond (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 70, 99, where the court 

concluded that a proposed hydrogen production facility at an oil 

refinery served a different purpose than a pipeline to transport 
29

excess hydrogen from same facility, and thus could be evaluated 

in a separate EIR. 

Here, Good Neighbor argues that the geographic distinction 

is “arbitrary” and that there is no “independent utility” to 

adopting separate plans for the remote properties because 

ultimately they are all part of the UC Berkeley campus and serve 

its educational mission. 

In our view, however, it is perfectly rational for the 

university to develop a coherent vision for the campus and its 

adjacent properties while developing separate plans for more 

remote properties. When a group of projects are related 

geographically, the Guidelines encourage agencies to analyze 

them together as one large project in a program EIR, which is 

precisely what the Regents have done. (See Guidelines, § 15168, 

subd. (a)(1) [agency may prepare program EIR for a series of 

actions that can be characterized as one large project and are 

related geographically].) While the Regents could have chosen to 

include all its properties in a single plan, that is far different 

from saying that separate plans serve no logical purpose or could 

not be implemented independently. 

As the EIR explains, the properties in the plan comprise all 

of UC Berkeley’s major instructional facilities and are the 

primary locations used by nearly all the members of the campus 

population for instruction, research, and extracurricular 

activities. The plan itself sets goals and principles that focus on 

how the campus and adjacent properties function together (e.g., 

accessibility, connectivity), contribute to the university’s 

institutional objectives (e.g., fostering collaboration), and will be 

used by the university community. We won’t second guess the 

Regents’ decision to group the campus-area properties together 

for planning purposes. (Cf. Jones, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 

829 [rejecting argument that university was required to consider 

off-site alternative locations for campus laboratory, given 
30

university’s goals to foster collaboration and a culture of 

interdisciplinary problem-solving].)

Good Neighbor suggests that, because the Legislature 

requires each UC “campus” to have a long range development 

plan (Ed. Code, § 67504, subd. (a)(1)), all of UC Berkeley’s 

properties must be included in a single plan, regardless of their 

proximity to the actual campus. The statute does not say so. 

(See Ed. Code, § 67504, subd. (a)(1).) We think it allows the 

Regents a measure of discretion on this point. 

D.

Noise

We agree with Good Neighbor that—as to both the 

development plan and Housing Project No. 2—the EIR failed to 

analyze potential noise impacts from loud student parties in 

residential areas near the campus, where student parties have 

been a problem for years.

1.

CEQA includes “noise” as part of the “ ‘[e]nvironment.’ ” 

(CEQA, §§ 21060.5, 21068.) The Legislature has declared that it 

is the state’s policy to “[t]ake all action necessary to provide the 

people of this state with . . . freedom from excessive noise.” 

(CEQA, § 21001, subd. (b).) As a general matter, the Regents 

concede that CEQA applies to the type of noise at issue here—

crowds of people talking, laughing, shouting, and playing music 

that disturbs neighboring residents. (See, e.g., Keep Our 

Mountains Quiet v. County of Santa Clara (2015) 236 

Cal.App.4th 714, 732-734 [EIR required for crowd noise and 

music at wedding venue].) 

In preparing an EIR, the lead agency must “consider and 

resolve every fair argument that can be made about the possible 

significant environmental effects of a project.” (Protect the 
31

Historic Amador Waterways v. Amador Water Agency (2004) 116 

Cal.App.4th 1099, 1109 (Amador).) The agency must make 

findings in the EIR that such an effect either is, or is not, 

significant. (Ibid.; CEQA ̧ § 21100, subds. (b)(1), (c).) A finding of 

insignificance requires only a brief statement of reasons, but a 

finding of significance triggers the requirement to consider 

mitigation measures. (CEQA, §§ 21002.1, subds. (a), (b), 21100, 

subds. (b)(3), (c).) Because the Regents did not consider and 

resolve whether noisy parties are a significant effect of the 

projects, the initial question for us is whether there is a fair 

argument, based on substantial evidence in the record as a whole, 

that they may be significant effects. (See Visalia Retail, LP v. 

City of Visalia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1, 13, 17 (Visalia).) If so, 

the Regent’s failure to make findings one way or the other may 

have violated CEQA’s procedural requirements. (See Amador, 

supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1111-1112.)

The fair argument standard is a low threshold, which 

reflects CEQA’s preference for resolving doubts in favor of 

environmental review. (Taxpayers for Accountable School Bond 

Spending v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2013) 215 

Cal.App.4th 1013, 1035 (Taxpayers).) The lead agency cannot 

weigh conflicting evidence: if any substantial evidence exists of a 

potential significant effect, the agency must analyze the issue 

even if other evidence indicates that that the project will not have 

a significant effect. (Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a).) Substantial 

evidence may include personal observations of residents, expert 

opinions, and reasonable inferences based on facts, but not 

argument, speculation, or unsubstantiated opinions. (Guidelines, 

§ 15384, subds. (a)-(b); Taxpayers, supra, at pp. 1035-1036.) We 

owe no deference to the lead agency on its decision to forgo an 

analysis although we will give them some deference on disputed 

issues of credibility. (Taxpayers, at p. 1035.) Our standard of 

review is de novo. (Ibid.)
32

2.

At oral argument, the Regents conceded that noise from 

student parties is a problem in Berkeley’s residential 

neighborhoods near the campus. The record indicates it is a 

longstanding problem. 

In 2007, the City of Berkeley found that parties in 

residential areas “frequently become loud and unruly,” cause 

“excessive noise,” and constitute a public nuisance, and it added a 

set of warnings and fines to its municipal code. (Berkeley Mun. 

Code, §§ 13.48.010–13.48.070). The city and university police 

implemented a joint public safety patrol and weekly reporting 

process to discourage such parties. Neighborhood groups 

submitted data of hundreds of citations under the ordinance but 

stated that enforcement efforts have flagged in recent years and 

that the parties and noise have increased. 

In 2016, the City of Berkeley took further steps to mitigate 

noisy parties in these neighborhoods when it adopted an 

ordinance restricting so-called mini-dorms—private homes 

converted to high-density student housing (e.g., four-bedroom 

homes housing 12 to 14 students). The city found that these 

mini-dorms were disrupting the neighborhoods near the campus 

in numerous ways, including “loud and unruly parties” that 

“frequently” require police officers to respond. The city found the 

disturbances had “become much more severe and intolerable 

because they are no longer occasional, but have become chronic.” 

For several years, the university has engaged with 

neighbors and the city on the noise issue through an advisory 

body that, according to the EIR, “is dedicated to improving the 

quality of life in the neighborhoods adjacent to UC Berkeley 

properties.” It has “launched and supported good-neighbor 

initiatives, campaigns, and programs” aimed at reducing noise 

from parties, as well as other conflicts. The advisory body “meets 

regularly” with the city and community stakeholders to hear 
33

updates on the work they have done together and to plan new 

initiatives. Other materials in the record explain that neighbor 

groups have been meeting with the university since 2008 

specifically to address noisy parties, and the university has 

provided funding for their efforts, beginning in 2011. 

The EIR defines a significant noise impact as an increase in 

ambient noise that would exceed local standards, including 

Berkeley’s noise ordinances. But the EIR does not analyze the 

issue: it does not address the relevant baseline noise conditions in 

the neighborhoods afflicted with loud parties, the effect of 

increasing the student population in those neighborhoods, or the 

efficacy of the noise reduction efforts it identified, and it makes 

no findings on whether adding thousands more students to the 

area would cause a significant noise increase. 

Multiple individuals and organizations objected to the 

EIR’s failure to address impacts from loud parties. The 

commentors include neighborhood groups that, in partnership 

with the university, have been trying to mitigate student noise 

for more than a decade. They submitted surveys, reports, and 

data indicating that the effort had been largely unsuccessful and 

that the number of such incidents had stayed the same or 

increased in all but one member neighborhood since 2011. They 

complained that the development plan proposes to triple the 

number of undergraduates living at the Clark Kerr campus 

without studying the potential noise impacts on the surrounding 

neighborhoods. 

The Regents refused to analyze the issue because, 

according to the final EIR, it is “speculative to assume that an 

addition of students would generate substantial late night noise 

impacts simply because they are students.” 
34

3.

Although the Regents concede that loud student parties are 

a real problem in the residential neighborhoods, they insist there 

is no substantial evidence in the record that adding thousands 

more students will cause a potential noise increase. Instead, the 

record contains only opinions and speculation that reflect an antistudent bias. They say that “[n]ewer students could just as well 

spend more time studying or socializing quietly on the internet 

compared to prior students.” 

Similarly, their partner in the People’s Park project, 

Resources for Community Development (RCD), says that Good 

Neighbor’s argument is based on prejudice, stereotypes, and 

“tales from NIMBY neighbors” rather than evidence. RCD warns 

that a ruling for Good Neighborhood will allow “NIMBY project 

opponents” to force affordable housing proponents to conduct 

noise studies based solely on biased opinions that poor and 

formerly homeless people are noisier than other neighbors. 

As a general matter, we agree with the Regents and RCD 

that stereotypes, prejudice, and biased assumptions about people 

served by a CEQA project—such as a church, school, gym, or 

housing project—are not substantial evidence that can support a 

CEQA claim under the fair argument standard. (See Guidelines, 

§ 15384, subd. (a) [substantial evidence does not include 

argument, speculation, and unsubstantiated opinion].) And we 

agree that the Legislature did not intend CEQA to be used as a 

redlining weapon by neighbors who oppose projects based on 

prejudice rather than environmental concerns. (See Guidelines, 

§§ 15002, subd. (a) [purpose of CEQA is to prevent environmental

damage], 15131 [CEQA applies to environmental, not social, 

impacts]; cf., Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan 

Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155, 169-170 & fn. 5 (Save the Plastic 

Bag) [CEQA petitioner with “no demonstrable concern for 

protecting the environment” may lack standing].) 
35

But here, this is a straw man argument. The Regents and 

RCD focus on isolated statements from a noise expert who 

referred to the movie “Animal House,” offered colorful opinions 

about student attitudes toward drinking, and suggested the vast 

majority of loud and unruly drunk college students are male, not 

female. We will set those statements aside. 

As the lead agency, the Regents are required to consider 

the entire record. (Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a).) Quite a bit of

proper evidence remains. We have no reason to assume, for 

example, that the City of Berkeley’s noise ordinances are based 

on anti-student bias. The city found that “loud and unruly” 

student parties have gone from an “occasional” problem to one 

that is “chronic” and “intolerable.” It has declared noise from 

parties to be a public nuisance. Data from enforcement efforts 

indicates that student parties consistently violate these 

ordinances. Neighborhood groups have worked for years to 

mitigate loud student parties. Based on their experience, 

observations, and neighborhood surveys, they say the mitigation 

efforts have been largely unsuccessful and that the noise problem 

has increased. The record also includes public comments based 

on personal observations that loud parties are an increasing 

problem. (See Taxpayers, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1035-

1036 [substantial evidence includes “ ‘[r]elevant personal 

observations of area residents on nontechnical subjects’ ”], 1054-

1055 [neighbors’ observations of traffic problems established fair 

argument of potential impact].) 

Indeed, the Regents’ argument is hard to square with their 

concession that loud student parties in these neighborhoods are a 

problem. For more than a decade, the university has partnered 

with the city and with neighborhood groups to discourage loud 

parties. It provided funding to neighborhood groups for this 

purpose. It collects data on the issue and meets regularly with 

the city and neighborhood groups to discuss progress and 
36

potential new initiatives. Presumably the university said and did 

these things because the university agrees that student noise is a 

genuine problem and not because the university is prejudiced 

against its students. None of this can be waived away as 

speculation, unsubstantiated opinion, or bias. 

The evidence meets the fair argument standard. Given the 

long track record of loud student parties that violate the city’s 

noise ordinances (the threshold for significance), there is a 

reasonable possibility that adding thousands more students to 

these same residential neighborhoods would make the problem 

worse. (See Guidelines, Appendix G, XIII, subd. (a), § 15384, 

subd. (b) [substantial evidence includes reasonable assumptions 

predicated on facts].) The Regents’ suggestion that new students 

might instead “socializ[e] quietly on the internet” is conjecture, 

unsupported by the record. (See City of Hayward v. Trustees of 

California State University (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 833, 858-859 

[no substantial evidence supported university’s assumption that 

5,500 new students would not use regional parks].) New 

students arrive every year, yet the noise problem has persisted 

since at least 2007. 

The Regents’ additional arguments have no merit. 

First, in a supplemental brief, the Regents assert that 

CEQA only applies to crowd noise generated at a “discrete 

facility” that is designed to host noisy crowds. (See, e.g., Keep 

Our Mountains Quiet v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 236 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 732-734 [crowd noise at wedding venue].) 

They cite no authority for this sweeping rule. CEQA applies 

when it is reasonably foreseeable that a project may cause an 

impact, directly or indirectly. (CEQA, § 21065; Union of Medical 

Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 

1171, 1198-1199; Guidelines, §§ 15064, subd. (d)(2), 15358, subd. 

(a)(2).) The geographic area of a potential impact is not limited to 

discrete facilities but includes any area where direct or indirect 
37

impacts may occur. (Guidelines, § 15360; Save the Plastic Bag, 

supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 173-174; e.g., Mission Bay Alliance v. 

Office of Community Investment & Infrastructure (2016) 6 

Cal.App.5th 160, 210 [EIR for sports arena considered indirect 

impacts on nearby neighborhoods of noise from crowds after they 

leave the arena].) These are settled principles of law, grounded 

in statutes, the CEQA Guidelines, and Supreme Court cases. 

The Regents make no attempt to explain why they do not apply 

here. 

Second, the Regents assert Good Neighbor waived any 

challenge to the EIR’s noise analysis because it presented some of 

its materials after the Regents approved the plan (but before they 

approved Housing Project No. 2). That is incorrect. Petitioners 

raised the noise issue in timely comments on the draft EIR and 

thus preserved the issue. (CEQA, § 21177, subds. (a), (b).) 

Third, and finally, the Regents warn that this case will 

encourage existing homeowners to oppose “development of a 

single family home on the empty lot next door” unless the lead 

agency studies and mitigates “typical household noise” like 

“children playing or dogs barking.” We are not sure what they 

mean. The scenario they posit is a frivolous CEQA claim under 

existing case law: the alleged impact is obviously insignificant 

(see Guidelines, Appendix G, XIII, subd. (a)), and it affects only 

isolated individuals rather than the environment of people 

generally. (Clews Land & Livestock, LLC v. City of San Diego 

(2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 161, 196 [dismissing as insignificant 

CEQA claim by neighboring horse ranch that school project must 

address noise from “children laughing and playing”]; Dunning v. 

Clews (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 156, 173-175 [malicious prosecution 

action for frivolous CEQA noise claim].) Nothing in this case 

suggests otherwise.

The Regents must analyze the potential noise impacts 

relating to loud student parties. Their decision to skip the issue, 
38

based on the unfounded notion that the impacts are speculative, 

was a prejudicial abuse of discretion and requires them now to do 

the analysis that they should have done at the outset. (See 

Amador, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1111-1112; CEQA, § 

21100, subds. (b)(1), (c).) We express no opinion on the outcome 

of a noise analysis. The Regents must determine whether the 

potential noise impacts are in fact significant, and, if so, whether 

mitigation is appropriate; ultimately, CEQA provides discretion 

to proceed with a project even if some impacts cannot be 

mitigated. (CEQA, §§ 21002, 21002.1, subds. (a)-(c), 21100, 

subds. (b), (c); see also, § 21168.9.) 

E.

Population Growth

Good Neighbor contends the EIR violates CEQA because it 

failed to address properly the impacts of population growth and 

the consequent displacement of existing residents. We disagree.

1.

The EIR estimates that the long range development plan 

will add up to 13,902 residents to Berkeley for whom the 

university plans to provide housing. This population is 

comprised primarily of undergraduate and graduate students, 

graduate student family members, faculty, and staff. In addition 

to this “[d]irect” population growth, the EIR anticipated 

“[i]ndirect” population growth of another 8,173 residents in 

Berkeley and surrounding cities—students, faculty, staff and 

family members for whom the university would not provide 

housing. 

The EIR’s Population and Housing analysis concluded this 

influx of residents would result in two significant impacts if 
39

unmitigated.5 First, the plan would induce substantial 

unplanned population growth “either directly (for example, by 

proposing new homes and businesses) or indirectly (for example, 

through extension of roads or other infrastructure).” (“Impact 

POP-1.”) As mitigation, the university would provide Berkeley 

and the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) with 

annual summaries of enrollment projections and housing 

production data to “ensur[e] that local and regional planning 

projections account for UC Berkeley-related population changes.” 

As so mitigated, the impacts of unplanned population growth 

would be less than significant. 

Second, the EIR found the development projects anticipated 

by the plan could result in displacing substantial numbers of 

existing residents, houses or businesses. (“Impact POP-2.”) This 

impact was also found to be significant, but less than significant 

if mitigated by implementing the UC Relocation Assistance Act 

Policy to help displaced residents find replacement housing. 

Pursuant to that policy, the university would survey and analyze 

relocation needs, employ minimum notice requirements, pay 

moving expenses and relocation payments, and provide “other 

aspects of relocation assistance” including, in some cases, “lastresort housing.” 

2.

Good Neighbor asserts the mitigation measure for POP-1 

impacts (substantial unplanned population growth) is 

unenforceable. “Mitigation measures must be fully enforceable 

through permit conditions, agreements, or other legally-binding 

instruments.” (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(2); CEQA, § 

5 The EIR noted that other consequences of project-driven 

growth such as impacts on transportation infrastructure, 

utilities, public services, recreational facilities, noise levels, air 

and water pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions were 

evaluated elsewhere in the document. 
40

21081.6, subd. (b); Federation of Hillside & Canyon Associations 

v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1261.) While 

the Regents can ensure the university provides the City of 

Berkeley and ABAG with summaries of annual enrollment and 

construction information, they have no authority to compel either 

entity to undertake planning for university-driven population 

growth. (See Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 35 

Cal.4th 839, 859 [CEQA does not expand the authority of public 

agencies; agencies must rely on their existing powers to mitigate 

environmental impacts].) Good Neighbor argues such planning is 

unlikely to occur because “Berkeley’s General Plan is twenty 

years old” and the university’s population is “ ‘not formally 

coordinated’ ” with ABAG. 

The argument misses its mark. ABAG is required by 

statute to allocate responsibility for the Bay Area’s regional 

housing needs among its constituent cities and counties, 

including Berkeley. (Gov. Code, § 65584.04.) In devising its 

methodology for that allocation, it must consider multiple factors 

based on data from its constituent local governments. Those 

factors specifically include “[t]he housing needs generated by the 

presence of . . a campus of . . the University of California within 

any member jurisdiction.” (Gov. Code, § 65584.04, subd. (e)(9).) 

Berkeley, in turn, is required to include its allocated share of 

regional housing in its general plan’s housing element, which it 

must review and revise every eight years. (Gov. Code, §§ 65583, 

subd. (a)(1), 65588, subd. (e)(3)(A). In view of these statutory 

obligations, there is no reason to believe either entity will fail in 

the future to plan for the population growth projected in the long 

range development plan. (See CEQA, § 21081, subd. (a)(2); City 

of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California State University 

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 341, 365 [payment of share of improvement 

costs was valid mitigation measure where statutory directives 

indicated recipient agency would construct the needed 

infrastructure].) 
41

We reject Good Neighbor’s argument that the city will not 

actually do the planning. Good Neighbor cites a single sentence 

in the EIR stating that the population projections in the city’s 

general plan EIR do not go beyond 2020, which in turn cites a 

“Draft General Plan EIR” dated 2001 that is not in our record. 

This is thin stuff. It does not tell us when the next housing 

element update is due or the status of any update in progress. 

We will not infer from it that the city will violate its statutory 

planning deadlines.

3.

We now turn to displacement. Impact POP-2, as noted 

above, concerned the “direct” displacement of existing tenants 

when university-owned buildings were demolished to make way 

for new development. “Though the proposed LRDP Update, at 

full development, would result in a substantial net increase in 

housing at UC Berkeley (11,731 beds), it is possible that housing 

development will be less than the total projected, or that 

individual future housing projects may involve the displacement 

of existing people or housing.” Therefore, “this impact is 

considered significant.” However, the impact would be reduced to 

less than significant when mitigated by adherence to the 

Relocation Assistance Policy’s procedures for helping displaced 

residents obtain new housing. 

Good Neighbor contends this analysis is legally inadequate 

for two related reasons. First, it fails to address potential 

environmental impacts caused by “indirect” displacement, i.e., 

displacement of existing residents caused by adding 8,173 people 

for whom the university will not provide housing. Second, it fails 

to assess the environmental impacts of direct and indirect 

displacement, including health and safety effects of crowding and 

homelessness and the need for construction of replacement 

housing. 
42

Good Neighbor’s first theory illustrates CEQA’s long reach. 

CEQA does not treat a project’s social and economic effects (such 

as displacement) as significant environmental impacts. 

(Guidelines, §§ 15064, subd. (e), 15131, subd. (a).) However, if a 

project may cause social or economic impacts that, in turn, cause 

physical effects on the environment, the EIR may be required to 

trace this chain of causation and analyze the resulting indirect 

environmental impacts. (Guidelines, §§ 15064, subd. (e), 15131, 

subd. (a).) The issue has arisen, for example, in cases where a 

proposed regional shopping center threatens to put downtown 

stores out of business and leave them vacant (economic effects), 

eventually leading to boarded up stores and urban blight 

(environmental effects). (See Citizens Assn. for Sensible 

Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo (1985) 172 

Cal.App.3d 151, 169-170.)

More recent cases have emphasized how difficult it can be 

to establish a factual foundation for this sort of theory, even 

under the fair argument standard. In Joshua Tree Downtown 

Business Alliance v. County of San Bernardino (2016) 1 

Cal.App.5th 677 (Joshua Tree), the petitioner cited testimony of a 

prominent local business owner that a proposed Dollar General 

store would take business away from existing local businesses, 

leading to urban blight. (Id. at pp. 686-688, 690-692.) 

The court of appeal concluded the evidence failed to show a 

potential environmental effect. While members of the public may 

provide opinion evidence where the issue does not require special 

expertise, it explained, the same is not true for technical or 

scientific information. (Joshua Tree, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 

690-691.) “ ‘[I]n the absence of a specific factual foundation in the 

record, dire predictions by nonexperts regarding the 

consequences of a project do not constitute substantial evidence.’ 

” (Id. at p. 691.) The business owner was not an economist or 

otherwise qualified to opine on whether the new store would 
43

cause urban decay; moreover, she offered no particular factual 

basis for her conclusion that it would. (Ibid.) Her conclusion was 

thus speculative and, although it made a certain amount of sense, 

did not constitute substantial evidence of an environmental 

impact. (See Joshua Tree, at p. 690; see also, Visalia, supra, 20 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 9-17, 14-15.) 

Good Neighbor relies principally on comments by 

Berkeley’s planning director that, in the context of a housing 

shortage, displacement of residents resulting from unplanned 

and unmitigated population growth would exacerbate the city’s 

existing homeless crisis. Homelessness, in turn, whether 

resulting from students unable to afford housing6 or residents 

displaced by students, “leads to physical impacts on parks, 

streets and other public spaces, public safety issues related to 

homeless encampments locating in unsafe locations, and an 

increase in public health problems.” In addition, the record 

includes a San Francisco Department of Public Health report on 

impacts of inadequate housing, which observes generally that a 

lack of affordable housing and displacement may result in 

homelessness. Comments on the draft EIR from members of the 

public summarily asserted the university’s growth contributed to 

homelessness in Berkeley. 

In view of Joshua Tree and Visalia, this evidence is 

insufficient. The displacement theory is more complicated than 

the blight scenario: new residents compete for housing, which 

drives up prices to a point that existing residents cannot afford, 

which causes them to become homeless, which leads to 

environmental impacts relating to homelessness (e.g., impacts to 

parks). Each of those steps requires expertise, a factual 

6 According to the university’s housing survey, 

approximately 10 percent of undergraduates and approximately 

20 percent of doctoral students had experienced homelessness 

while attending the university. 
44

foundation, and analysis that does not exist in our record. There 

is no evidence whatever on the magnitude of any potential 

environmental impacts. The theory may appeal to common 

sense, and it may ring true in a region with crazy housing costs 

and rampant homelessness. But as Joshua Tree and Visalia 

explain, when a theory requires expert opinion, courts cannot 

substitute common sense, lay opinion, fears, or suspicions. 

(Joshua Tree, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 690-691; Visalia, supra, 

20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 15-17; CEQA, § 21080, subd. (e); see also, 

Jensen v. City of Santa Rosa (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 877, 894.) 

Finally, Good Neighbor asserts the EIR failed to assess 

whether indirect displacement will necessitate the construction of 

replacement housing elsewhere, which the EIR identified as a 

standard of significance for housing and population impacts. Not 

so. The “replacement housing” standard of significance refers to 

new housing constructed for tenants whose university-owned 

housing will be demolished to make way for new development, 

not to indirect displacement. It is within the lead agency’s 

discretion to formulate standards of significance. (King & 

Gardiner Farms, LLC v. County of Kern (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 

814, 884; Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 13.8.)

To the extent Good Neighbor is suggesting the EIR failed to 

adequately address the growth-inducing impacts of indirect 

displacement (see Guidelines § 15126.2, subd. (e)), we also 

disagree. The EIR analyzes the growth-inducing impacts at a 

general level of detail, as CEQA requires. (Napa Citizens for 

Honest Government v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 91 

Cal.App.4th 342, 369; Clover Valley Foundation v. City of Rocklin 

(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 200, 227-228.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the 

superior court with directions to vacate its order and judgment 

denying Good Neighbor’s petition for writ of mandate and enter a 
45

modified judgment consistent with our conclusions that the EIR 

inadequately analyzed potential alternatives to Housing Project 

No. 2 and impacts from noise and displacement. (CEQA, § 

21168.9, subd. (a).) 

Good Neighbor is entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.278.)
46

______________________

BURNS, J. 

We concur:

____________________________

JACKSON, P.J.

____________________________

SIMONS, J.

A165451
47

Alameda County Superior Court, No. RG21110142, Hon. Frank 

Roesch.

Law Offices of Thomas N. Lippe, APC, Thomas N. Lippe; Soluri 

Meserve, A Law Corporation, Patrick M. Soluri, Osha R. 

Meserve, and James C. Crowder, for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

The Sohagi Law Group, PLC, Nicole H. Gordon, Margaret M. 

Sohagi, Mark J.G. Desrosiers; Lubin Olson & Niewiadomski LLP, 

Charles R. Olson, Philip J. Sciranka; Office of The General 

Counsel – University of California, Charles F. Robinson, Alison 

L. Krumbein; UC Berkeley, Office of Legal Affairs, David M. 

Robinson, for Defendants and Respondents. 

Buchalter, A Professional Corporation, Douglas C. Straus, Alicia 

Cristina Guerra, for Real Party in Interest Resources for 

Community Development.