alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Amelia B. Clement, Respondent, *v.*Nathaniel W. Burtis et al., Appellants.

(Submitted June 16, 1890;

decided June 24, 1890.)

A provision in a deed that the conveyance is “ upon the express condition " that the grantee “his heirs or assigns,” shall not “ erect, place or permit, * * * upon the said premises * * * any building or erection, or carry on any business which shall or may cause or become a nuisance to others owning lands or contiguous thereto,” does not create a condition subsequent; it is simply a covenant running with the land.

Such a covenant does not create a defect in the title; it hinds the owner no further than he would he hound by law in the absence of the covenant.

Appeal from order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, made May 12, 1890, which affirmed an order of Special Term requiring purchaser *709to complete purchase of premises bid off at sale in pursuance of a judgment of foreclosure rendered herein.

The following is the opinion:

“ Edward J. O’Flynn became the purchaser on a foreclosure sale of certain real estate and subsequently refused to complete his purchase on the ground, as stated by him, that *‘*the title to a portion of said lands is derived through a deed of conveyance, bearing date December 24, 1851, made by Eichard L. Crook and his wife to Samuel Baldwin Chapman, and recorded in the Kings County Eegister’s office, in Liber 267 of Conveyances, at page 171, January 9, 1852, and that such lands were conveyed by said deed upon a condition subsequent therein expressed.’

“ The *habendum*in the deed from Crook and wife contains the following clause: ‘ Upon the express condition, nevertheless, that the said party of the second part, his heirs or assigns, shall not at any time or times hereafter erect,.place or permit, or suffer to be erected, placed or put or remain in or upon the said premises or any part or parcel thereof any building or erection, or carry on any business which shall or may cause or become a nuisance to others owning lands or contiguous thereto.’

“ The claim of the purchaser is that this clause in the deed creates a condition subsequent, and that there is, therefore, such a defect in the title that he should not be compelled to complete his purchase.

“We are of opinion that this clause does not create a condition subsequent, but that it is a covenant running with the land. It is unnecessary for us now to give our reasons for so holding, as they are found in our recent decisions in the cases of *Avery*v. *N. T~. G. & H. It. It. It. Go.*(106 N. Y. 142) and *Post*v. *Weil*(115 id. 361). We do not understand that the purchaser makes any complaint of this clause in the deed provided it be simply a covenant running with the land. In that event it could not be harmful because it would not bind the owner of the land further than he would be bound by the law in the absence of any covenant.

“ We are, therefore, of opinion that the order below should be affirmed, with costs.”

*710
      *II, G. Gonrad/y*for appellants.

*H. G, M, Ingraham*for respondent.

Earl, J.,

reads for affirmance.

All concur.

Order affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Raymond Christie, Appellant.

[942 NYS2d 664]

Stein, J.

Appeal from an order of the County Court of Rensselaer County (Jacon, J.), entered March 24, 2011, which classified defendant as a risk level two sex offender and a sexually violent offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.

In October 1994, defendant was convicted of multiple crimes involving sexual contact with an eight-year-old boy and was thereafter sentenced to a term of SVs to 25 years in prison. In anticipation of defendant’s expected release, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders prepared a risk assessment instrument presumptively classifying him as a risk level one sex offender, but recommended an upward departure to a level two. At a subsequent hearing, the People advocated for assessing defendant 20 additional points for engaging in a continuing course of sexual conduct toward the victim. County Court agreed, assessed defendant the additional points and, in accord with the presumptive classification, classified defendant as a risk level two sexually violent offender. Defendant now appeals.

We affirm. The burden rests with the People to produce clear and convincing evidence to establish the proper risk classification *(see People v Kruger,*88 AD3d 1169, 1170 [2011], *lv denied*18 NY3d 806 [2012]; *People v Rhodehouse,*88 AD3d *1030,*1031 [2011]). The People did so here with the introduction of a statement by the victim that detailed that defendant had engaged in sexual contact with him on at least five different occasions while defendant was babysitting him. This account was corroborated by defendant’s own voluntary statement to police, in which he recounted that the sexual contact had occurred twice at his house and at least twice at the victim’s house. Inasmuch as County Court may consider reliable hearsay evidence, such as a victim’s statement and admissions by the defendant, we find that its determination was supported by clear and convincing evidence *(see People v Burch,*90 AD3d 1429, 1430-1431 [2011]; *People v Good,*88 AD3d 1037, 1037 [2011], *lv denied*18 NY3d 802 [2011]; *People v Gleason,*85 AD3d 1508 [2011], *lv denied*17 NY3d 711 [2011]; *see generally*Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary [2006]). Defendant’s remaining contentions have been examined and found to be without merit.

Peters, PJ., Malone Jr., Kavanagh and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
Exhibit 32.2

THANKSGIVING COFFEE COMPANY, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Thanksgiving Coffee Company, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, the undersigned President of the Company hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (i) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for the periods presented
therein.
| | ---- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Joan KatzeffPresident March 31, 2009
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIGUEL PULIDO-ROMERO,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 13-70687

Agency No. A073-859-319

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 23, 2014** 

Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Miguel Pulido-Romero, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 

FILED

OCT 2 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence

the agency’s factual findings, Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th

Cir. 2006), and we deny the petition for review.

Pulido-Romero testified that a narcotics criminal threatened to kill PulidoRomero’s policeman brother and his brother’s family, and subsequently hired hitmen who killed his brother. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s

determination that Pulido-Romero failed to establish he suffered harm rising to the

level of persecution. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009)

(requiring a showing that harm to others was “part of ‘a pattern of persecution

closely tied to’” petitioner himself); see also Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148,

1153-54 (9th Cir. 2005) (vague threats did not compel finding of past persecution

where the petitioner never had a personal confrontation with the people threatening

him). Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determinations that PulidoRomero failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. 

See Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding

BIA’s determination that petitioner failed to establish it was unreasonable to

relocate within Mexico). Thus, Pulido-Romero’s asylum claim fails.

Because Pulido-Romero failed to meet the lower burden of proof for asylum,

his withholding of removal claim necessarily fails. See Zehatye, 453 F.3d at 1190.

2 13-70687
Finally, substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief

because Pulido-Romero failed to establish it is more likely than not that he would

be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to

Mexico. See Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 13-70687
SPLS EX 10.37 013115




Exhibit 10.37
Staples, Inc.
Senior Executive Long Term Disability
Supplemental Coverage Reimbursement Policy
 
Coverage under the Company's Group Long Term Disability (LTD) Plan, which only covers base salary, and Supplemental LTD Plan, which covers any excess base salary and bonus, are fully paid for by our associates.  For senior executives earning an annual base salary in excess of $400,000 and electing supplemental LTD coverage prior to certain changes reducing the maximum monthly benefit,  the Company annually reimburses through bonuses (on a grossed up basis) premiums related to any supplemental LTD coverage due to base salary, and the Company expects such annual aggregate bonuses to be approximately $32,000.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Lease Equity Appreciation Fund I, L.P. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert K. Moskovitz, Chief Financial Officer of the General Partner, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|               |  |  |  |                                               
|-------------- |  |  |  | ----------------------------------------------
|March 31, 2010 |  |  |  | /s/ Robert K. Moskovitz                       
|               |  |  |  | Robert K. Moskovitz                           
|               |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer of the General Partner
# C_2008178EN.01000501.xml

| 15.7.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 178/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.7.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 178/5

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.5108 — Sofinco/Agos)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2008/C 178/04)

On 22 May 2008, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in French and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32008M5108. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law (http://eur-lex.europa.eu). |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32008M5108. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law (http://eur-lex.europa.eu).

---
# C_2019372EN.01001701.xml

| 4.11.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 372/17 |
| --------- | -- | -------------------------------------- | -------- |

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) lodged on 25 July 2019 — LP v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo (Case C-567/19) (2019/C 372/18) Language of the case: Spanish Referring court Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha Parties to the main proceedings Applicant: LP Defendant: Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo Question referred Is an interpretation such as that set out in judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court No 191/2019 of 19 February 2019, appeal in cassation 5607/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:580), and No 257/2019 of 27 February 2019, appeal in cassation 5809/2017 (ECLI:ES:TS:2019:663), according to which, through an interpretation of Directive 2001/40/EC, ( 1 ) it is possible to come to the conclusion that any third-country national holding a long-term residence permit who has committed an offence punishable by a sentence of at least one year in duration can and should be ‘automatically’ removed, that is to say, [without] needing to give any consideration to his personal, family, social or employment circumstances, compatible with Article 12 of Council [Directive] 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, ( 2 ) and with — inter alia — the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 7 December 2017 (Case C-636/16 ( 3 )) and of 8 December 2011 (Case C-371/08 ( 4 ))? ( 1 )  Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals (OJ 2001 L 149, p. 34). ( 2 )  OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44. ( 3 )  Judgment of 7 December 2017, López Pastuzano (C-636/16, EU:C:2017:949). ( 4 )  Judgment of 8 December 2011, Ziebell (C-371/08, EU:C:2011:809).

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Adrian Pagan, Appellant.

— Appeal by defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Feldman, J.), *853both rendered October 17, 1983, each convicting him of attempted burglary in the second degree, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.

Judgments affirmed.

Defendant failed to preserve the issue of the sufficiency of the plea allocutions for appellate review *(People v Pellegrino,*60 NY2d 636; *People v Santiago,*100 AD2d 857). In any event, the plea allocution was sufficient *(People v Harris,*61 NY2d 9). The sentences imposed, pursuant to agreement and justified by defendant’s noncooperation, were neither unduly harsh nor excessive. Gibbons, J. P., Bracken, O’Connor and Brown, JJ., concur.
lcpm8k20091201ex10-2.htm


    
      

      

    

    Exhibit
No. 10.2

     

    Liberty
Capital Asset Management Inc.

    2470 St
Rose Parkway, Suite 314

    Henderson,
Nevada 89074

     

    Gentlemen:

     

    I
herewith tender my resignation as Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer, Secretary
and a Director of Liberty Capital Asset Management, Inc. due to personal
reasons, to take affect as of the date this resignation document is executed by
my hand herein and/or upon the acceptance by the Board of Directors and/or upon
the Election of my Successor.  My resignation is not the result of any
disagreements or disputes with the Company.

     

    Very
truly yours,

    


    Dated
this 1st day of December, 2009.

    By: /s/Lee
Shorey

    Lee
Shorey
**Exhibit 32 (i)**

 

CERTIFICATION SECTION 1350

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Penns Woods Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”)on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2010, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,Ronald A. Walko, Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

(1)           the Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           the information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresult of operations of the Company.

 
| /s/  Ronald A. Walko     |   |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Ronald  A. Walko         |
| Chief  Executive Officer |
|                     |
| August 9,  2010     |

 

----
<PAGE>

                                  Exhibit 99.2

                        CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT


I, Barry J. Susson, Chief Financial Officer of Deb Shops, Inc. (the "Company"),
certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that:


         (1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly
period ended April 30, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m
or 78o(d)); and

         (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.




Dated: June 13, 2003



                                                        Barry J. Susson, CPA
                                                        -----------------------
                                                        Barry J. Susson
                                                        Chief Financial Officer




  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
    provided to Deb Shops, Inc. and will be retained by Deb Shops, Inc. and
 furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### NAUGHTON, Appellant, v. INTERURBAN ST. RY. CO., Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

November 8, 1907.)

Action by John Naughton against the- Interurban Street Railway Company. O. H. Droege, for appellant. C. F. Brown, for respondent.

No opinion. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. Order filed.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 6124** 

SHERMAN A. THOMPSON , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,
v. OFFICER RICHARDSON; TARACE CARSON, Officer , Defendants

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District C ourt for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh
. Terrence W. Boyle , District Judge. ( 5:09

- ct

- 03161

- BO )

Submitted : August 30 , 2011 Decided: September 9, 2011

Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge
.
Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Sherman A. Thompson, Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth F. Parsons, Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CUR IAM: Sherman A. Thompson appeals the district court ’ s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (200 6 ) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district
court. Thompson v. Richardson , No. 5:09

- ct

- 03161

- BO (E.D.N.C. Jan. 19, 2011) . We deny Thompson’s motion to file an amended complaint and we dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 598 

To repeal the Defense of Marriage Act and ensure respect for State regulation 

of marriage. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 16, 2011 

Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. LEAHY, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. 

BLUMENTHAL, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. COONS, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. FRANKEN, 

Mr. INOUYE, Mr. KERRY, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mrs. MURRAY, Mr. 

MERKLEY, Mr. SCHUMER, Mrs. SHAHEEN, Mr. UDALL of Colorado, Mr. 

WHITEHOUSE, and Mr. WYDEN) introduced the following bill; which was 

read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To repeal the Defense of Marriage Act and ensure respect 

for State regulation of marriage. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Respect for Marriage 

5 Act of 2011’’. 


rfrederick on DSKD9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 598 IS

1 SEC. 2. REPEAL OF SECTION ADDED TO TITLE 28, UNITED 

2 STATES CODE, BY SECTION 2 OF THE DE3 FENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT. 

4 Section 1738C of title 28, United States Code, is re5 pealed, and the table of sections at the beginning of chap6 ter 115 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 

7 striking the item relating to that section. 

8 SEC. 3. MARRIAGE RECOGNITION. 

9 Section 7 of title 1, United States Code, is amended 

10 to read as follows: 

11 ‘‘§ 7. Marriage 

12 ‘‘(a) For the purposes of any Federal law in which 

13 marital status is a factor, an individual shall be considered 

14 married if that individual’s marriage is valid in the State 

15 where the marriage was entered into or, in the case of 

16 a marriage entered into outside any State, if the marriage 

17 is valid in the place where entered into and the marriage 

18 could have been entered into in a State. 

19 ‘‘(b) In this section, the term ‘State’ means a State, 

20 the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 

21 Rico, or any other territory or possession of the United 

22 States.’’. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSKD9S0YB1PROD with BILLS