alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2019164EN.01001901.xml

| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/19

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n.o 9 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 6 February 2019 — SL v Vueling Airlines S.A.

(Case C-86/19)

(2019/C 164/21)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Mercantil n.o 9 de Barcelona

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SL

Defendant: Vueling Airlines S.A.

Question referred

Where the loss of a suitcase has been established, must the airline compensate the passenger in each and every case with the maximum compensation limit of SDR 1 131, since that is the most serious of the situations provided for in Articles 17(2) and 22(2) of the Montreal Convention of 28 May 1999, or is that maximum compensation limit one which can be adjusted by the court, including in the event of loss of a suitcase, in the light of the circumstances, so that the amount of SDR 1 131 will be awarded only if the passenger establishes, by whatever means are permitted in law, that the value of the items and personal effects he was carrying in the checked baggage, and of those which he had to purchase to replace them, came to that limit, or, failing that, may other criteria be taken into account, such as, for example, the weight of the suitcase or whether the baggage was lost on the outbound or return journey, for the purposes of assessing the non-material damage caused by the inconvenience arising from the loss of the passenger’s baggage?

---
**Exhibit 13.01**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Genetic Technologies Limited (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2015, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Eutillio Buccilli, Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

 

(i)    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(ii)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/   Eutillio Buccilli |                    |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Name:                   | Eutillio Buccilli       |   |
|                    | Chief Executive Officer |   |
|                    |                    |
|                    |                    |
| November 13, 2015  |                    |

 

----
#### Stennett *v.*City of Bessemer.

*Damages for Pollution of Stream-.*

(Decided Feb. 6, 1908.

45 South. 890.)

1. *Juror; Qualification; Bias.*— A juror who has a suit against a defendant arising out of the same alleged wrong made the basis for the cause on trial, is impliedly biased, and subject to challenge for cause.

2. *Evidence; Opinion Evidence; NomEaipert Testimoivy.*— As to whether or not the pollution of a stream rendered the px’emises involved uninhabitable and unhealthful, being one for the jury, a non-expert witness was not competent to give an opinion thereon.

Appeal from Bessemer City Court.

Heard before Hon. William Jackson.

Action by M. L. Stennett against the city of Bessemer. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Montgomery & Smith, for appellants.

The court erred in permitting Bailey to be challenged for cause as a juror. — Thompson & Merc, on Juries, p. 170; *Strong v.*Sogswell, 28 111. 457; *Commonwealth v. Boston R. R. Co. ,*3 Cush. 25; *Calhoun v.*Hanna, 87 Ala 277 . Counsel discuss other questions but without citation of authority.

*638T. T. Huey, B. G. Perry, and Pinkney Scott, for appellee. No brief came to the Reporter.

McCLELLAN, J.

The appellant instituted this action for damages for the alleged pollution of a stream by the defending municipality.

One J. W. Rainey was of the panel of jurors, and the court, upon investigation, ascertained that the. juror “was a plaintiff in a suit against the defendant for damages growing out of the same alleged wrong of defendant as the cause at issue.” Thereupon the court sustained a challenge of this proposed juror for cause. There was no error in this action. Under these circumstances, the law implies bias, which renders the party_ incompetent as a juror, in the cause in which he is called to *serve.*— Jefferson *Co. v. Lewis,*20 Fla. 980; 24 Cyc. pp. 284, 285, and citations in note 70.

The court properly disallowed, on appropriate objection, those questions seeking to elicit the mere opinion of nonexpert witnesses upon the inquiry whether the alleged pollution rendered the premises in question unhealthy or uninhabitable. That vas for the jury’s determination from all the evidence in the case; and, unless the witnesses wrnre shown to be expert, they could not depose to their conclusion from the conditions involved.

The foregoing disposes of all the errors assigned and insisted on in argument; and, no error appearing, the judgment of the city court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Tyson, C. J., and Dowdell and Anderson, JJ., concur.
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 926 

To amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to permanently prohibit 

the conduct of offshore drilling on the outer Continental Shelf in the 

Mid-Atlantic and North Atlantic planning areas. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 9, 2011 

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Ms. MIKULSKI, and Mr. 

CARDIN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to permanently prohibit the conduct of offshore drilling on the 

outer Continental Shelf in the Mid-Atlantic and North 

Atlantic planning areas. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Clean Ocean and Safe 

5 Tourism Anti-Drilling Act’’ or the ‘‘COAST Anti-Drilling 

6 Act’’. 


pwalker on DSKD5P82C1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 926 IS

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF OIL AND GAS LEASING IN CER2 TAIN AREAS OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL 

3 SHELF. 

4 Section 8 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 

5 (43 U.S.C. 1337) is amended by adding at the end the 

6 following: 

7 ‘‘(q) PROHIBITION OF OIL AND GAS LEASING IN

8 CERTAIN AREAS OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF.— 

9 Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or any 

10 other law, the Secretary of the Interior shall not issue a 

11 lease for the exploration, development, or production of 

12 oil, natural gas, or any other mineral in— 

13 ‘‘(1) the Mid-Atlantic planning area; or 

14 ‘‘(2) the North Atlantic planning area.’’. 

Æ 


pwalker on DSKD5P82C1PROD with BILLS
# C_2019255EN.01002501.xml

| 29.7.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 255/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.7.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 255/25

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from International Protection Appeals Tribunal (Ireland) made on 16 May 2019 — Ms R.A.T., Mr D.S. v Minister for Justice and Equality

(Case C-385/19)

(2019/C 255/33)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

International Protection Appeals Tribunal

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Ms R.A.T. and Mr D.S.

Respondent: Minister for Justice and Equality

Questions referred

| 1) | Are there separate categories of ‘Applicant’ envisaged in Article 15 of Directive 2013/33/EU (1)? |
| --- | --- |

1)

Are there separate categories of ‘Applicant’ envisaged in Article 15 of Directive 2013/33/EU (1)?

| 2) | What type of conduct will amount to delay attributable to the applicant within the meaning of Article 15(1) of Directive 2013/33/EU? |
| --- | --- |

2)

What type of conduct will amount to delay attributable to the applicant within the meaning of Article 15(1) of Directive 2013/33/EU?

---

(1)  Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (OJ 2013, L 180, p. 96).

---
#### Jean Marie Frey et al., Appellants, v Ming C. Chiou et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

[941 NYS2d 522]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (McGuirk, J.), dated April 18, 2011, which denied their motion (a), in effect, to vacate so much of a judgment of the same court entered November 15, 2010, as, upon the denial of the plaintiffs’ application for an adjournment of trial and upon an order of the same court dated May 7, 2010, granting the separate applications of the defendants Ming C. Chiou and Warwick Anesthesia and Pain Management, and the defendant St. Anthony’s Community Hospital, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 (b), inter alia, to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted *811against each of them upon the plaintiffs’ failure to proceed with trial, was in favor of those defendants and against the plaintiffs dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against those defendants, and (b) to restore the action to the trial calendar.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs awarded to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

The plaintiffs moved, in effect, to vacate so much of a judgment entered November 15, 2010, as dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Ming C. Chiou, Warwick Anesthesia and Pain Management, and St. Anthony’s Community Hospital (hereinafter the defendants), and to restore the action to the trial calendar. The complaint was dismissed against these defendants pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 (b) due to the plaintiffs’ failure to proceed with trial. The plaintiffs had requested a three-month adjournment of trial, but that application had been denied.

An action dismissed pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 (b) may be restored if the plaintiff demonstrates both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious cause of action *(see Santiago v Santana,*54 AD3d 929, 930 [2008]). Here, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their failure to proceed with trial *(see Schmitt v Jeyalingam,*71 AD3d 757 [2010]; *Santiago v Santana,*54 AD3d at 930; *Frangione v Daniels,*44 AD3d 708 [2007]; *Psomatithis v Transoceanic Cable Ship Co., Inc.,*39 AD3d 837, 838 [2007]). The plaintiffs had notice of the scheduled trial date more than 10 months before trial and they failed to demonstrate that the need for a three-month adjournment was not due to their lack of due diligence *(see Matter of Paulino v Camacho,*36 AD3d 821, 822 [2007]; *Colon v Bailey,*26 AD3d 454, 455 [2006]; *Herbert v Edwards Super Food Stores-Finast Supermarkets,*253 AD2d 789 [1998]). The plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate a potentially meritorious cause of action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion, in effect, to vacate so much of the judgment as dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants and to restore the action to the trial calendar. Rivera, J.P., Eng, Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE AUDITED
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND STATEMENTS OF INCOME, WHICH ARE IN THE COMPANY'S
FORM 10-KSB FILED HEREWITH AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                              47
<SECURITIES>                                        32
<RECEIVABLES>                                      480
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (22)
<INVENTORY>                                        513
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,252
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,256
<BONDS>                                            488
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           873
<OTHER-SE>                                        (87)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     2,596
<SALES>                                          6,222
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 6,222
<CGS>                                            3,800
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    3,800
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,067
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    12
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 133
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (790)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        13
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (803)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.65)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.65)


</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Jesica Del Canto, Respondent, v Steven Behrens, Appellant.

[945 NYS2d 148]—

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Steven Behrens appeals from an order of protection of the Family Court, Queens County (Lebwohl, J.), dated August 23, 2011, which, after a hearing, and upon a finding that he had committed a family offense within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812, directed him, inter alia, to stay away from the petitioner for a period of three years until and including August 23, 2014.

Ordered that the order of protection is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof directing that the order of protection shall remain in effect until and including August 23, 2014, and substituting therefor a provision directing that the order of protection shall remain in effect until and including August 23, 2013; as so modified, the order of protection is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the Family Court, and any credibility determination made in connection therewith is entitled to deference on appeal *(see Matter of Brito v Vasquez,*93 AD3d 842 [2012]; *Matter of Greener v Greener,*77 AD3d 664 [2010]; *Matter of Holder v Francis,*67 AD3d 679 [2009]; *Matter of Fiore v Fiore,*34 AD3d 803 [2006]; *Matter of Willis v Watson,*27 AD3d 760 [2006]). Here, the evidence adduced at the hearing established, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the appellant committed the family offenses of harassment in the second degree and aggravated harassment in the second degree, warranting the issuance of an order of protection *(see*Family Ct Act §§ 812, 832; Eenal Law § 240.26 [3]; § 240.30 [1]; *Matter of Drury v Drury,*90 AD3d 754, 755 [2011]; *Matter of Testman v Roman,*78 AD3d 719, 720 [2010]; *Matter of Larson v Gilliam,*49 AD3d 650 [2008]; *Matter of Fiore v Fiore,*34 AD3d at 803).

However, the Family Court failed to set forth any finding of aggravating circumstances “on the record and upon the order of protection,” as is required to issue an order of protection with a duration exceeding two years (Family Ct Act § 842), and insufficient evidence was presented at the hearing to support any finding of aggravating circumstances *(see*Family Ct Act § 827 [a] [vii]; *Matter of Drury v Drury,*90 AD3d at 755). Accordingly, *1212the duration of the order of protection may not exceed two years (see *Matter of Brito v Vasquez,*93 AD3d 842 [2012]; *Matter of Drury v Drury,*90 AD3d at 755; *Matter of Gelardi v Gelardi,*62 AD3d 701, 702 [2009]), and we modify the order to direct that it remain in effect until and including August 23, 2013. Angiolillo, J.E, Eng, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<LEGEND>

This schedule contains  summary information extracted from the condensed
consolidated   balance   sheet   at  March 31,  1999  and  the condensed
consolidated statements of income for the  twelve months ended March 31,
1999 and March 31, 1998, and  is  qualified in its entirety by reference
to such financial statements.



<S>                          <C>                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS                12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              MAR-31-1999          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                   MAR-31-1999          MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                             509,418              303,960
<SECURITIES>                             0                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   39,923,471           32,424,411
<ALLOWANCES>                     8,548,550            6,137,140
<INVENTORY>                              0                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         0                    0
<PP&E>                             532,379              616,283
<DEPRECIATION>                     315,086              392,797
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  42,257,014           34,172,885
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           33,716,313           27,197,058
<BONDS>                                  0                    0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                    0                    0
<PREFERRED>                              0                    0
<COMMON>                         3,702,587            3,740,069
<OTHER-SE>                       4,838,114            3,235,758
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    42,257,014           34,172,885
<SALES>                            495,849              443,392
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                10,418,538            7,937,022
<CGS>                              102,368              105,924
<TOTAL-COSTS>                    4,320,807            3,321,715
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                    90,005               82,758
<LOSS-PROVISION>                   940,922              848,641
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>               2,358,838            2,080,337
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  2,605,598            1,497,647
<INCOME-TAX>                     1,003,242              583,957
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              1,602,356              913,690
<DISCONTINUED>                           0                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                          0                    0
<CHANGES>                                0                    0
<NET-INCOME>                     1,602,356              913,690
<EPS-BASIC>                          .68                  .39
<EPS-DILUTED>                          .65                  .39

        <FN>

<F1> RECEIVABLES ARE  PRESENTED  NET  OF UNEARNED FINANCE CHARGES,
NON-REFUNDABLE DEALER RESERVE AND ALLOWANCE FOR DOUBTFUL ACCOUNTS.

<F2> RECEIVABLES ARE PRESENTED  AS  TOTAL  RESERVES ,  COMPRISED OF
NON-REFUNDABLE DEALER RESERVE AND ALLOWANCE FOR DOUBTFUL ACCOUNTS.





</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Jill R., Respondent, v Eugene C., Appellant.

[942 NYS2d 787]

Order, Family Court, New York County (Fiordaliza A. Rodriguez, Ref.), entered on or about August 16, 2011, which denied respondent father’s motion to vacate an order of protection and an order suspending visitation, upon the father’s default, and to restore the proceeding to the trial calendar, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Application by the father’s assigned counsel to be relieved as counsel is granted (see *Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833 [1976]). We have reviewed the record and agree with counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues that could be raised on this appeal. Concur — Andrias, J.E, Saxe, Catterson, Renwick and Román, JJ.
#### TAYLOR V. THE STATE.

*Grime.*

(Decided July 2, 1907.)

Appeal from Bessemer City Court.

Heard before Hon. William Jackson.

Pinkney Scott, for appellant.

Alexander M. Garber, Attorney General, for the State.

Per curiam.

Dismissed on motion of appellant.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001030418
<NAME> BIONX IMPLANTS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
<CURRENCY> US DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           6,926
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,647
<ALLOWANCES>                                       387
<INVENTORY>                                      7,661
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                18,854
<PP&E>                                           2,397
<DEPRECIATION>                                     301
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  25,257
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,901
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            21
<OTHER-SE>                                      20,855
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    25,257
<SALES>                                          9,368
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 9,542
<CGS>                                            3,411
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   10,811
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 109
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,160)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,160)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.11)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.11)


</TABLE>
**Exhibit 32**

 

**Written Statement of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)**

 

The undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of Regal Entertainment Group, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), each hereby certifies that, to his/her knowledge on the date hereof:

 

(a) the Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 1 of the Company for the fiscal year ended December 27, 2012, filed on the date hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(b) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|   | /s/ AMY   E. MILES   |
|--------|---------------------------|
|   | Amy   E. Miles            |
|   | *Chief Executive Officer* |
|   | March 26,   2013     |
|   |                      |
|   | /s/ DAVID   H. OWNBY |
|   | David   H. Ownby          |
|   | *Chief Financial Officer* |
|   | March 26,   2013     |

 

----