IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

THE WILLIAMS COMPANIES STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION Consolidated C.A. No. 2020

- 0707

- KSJM

MEMORANDUM OPINION Date Submitted: February 5, 2021 Date Decided: February 26 , 2021 Gregory V. Varallo, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, Wilmington, DE; Michael J. Barry, Christine M. Mackintosh, Kelly L. Tucker, GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A., Wilmington, DE; Mark Lebovitch , Thomas G. James, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, New York, NY; Jeremy S. Friedman, David F.E. Tejtel, FRIEDMAN OSTER & TEJTEL PLLC, Bedford Hills, NY; Counsel for Plaintiffs

. William M. Lafferty, Kevin M. Coen, Lauren K. Neal, Sabrina M. Hendershot, MORRIS, NICH OLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP , Wilmington, DE; Andrew Ditchfield, Brian M. Burnovski, Mari Byrne, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, New York, NY; Counsel for Defendants The Williams Companies, Inc., Alan S. Armstrong, Stephen W. Bergstrom, Nancy K. Buese, Stephen I. C hazen, Charles I. Cogut, Michael A. Creel, Vicki L. Fuller, Peter A. Ragauss, Scott D. Sheffield, Murray D. Smith, and William H. Spence. Patricia R. Urban, Michael A. Weidinger, Megan Ix Brison, PINCKNEY, WEIDINGER, URBAN & JOYCE LLC, Wilmington, DE; Coun sel for Defendant Computershare Trust Company, N.A.

McCORMICK, V.C.This litigation concerns the validity of a stockholder rights plan , or so - called “poison pill,” a device that came to popularity in the 1980s as a response to front

- end loaded, two

tiered tender offers. Coercive tender offers of the 1980s were “to takeovers what the forward pass was to Notre Dame football in the days of Knute Rockne, ” 1 and a powerful offense required a powerful defense. Of all the defenses developed to fend off hostile takeovers, the poison pill was among the most muscular. 2 These bulwarks gained judicial imprimatur in 1985 when the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a poison pill as an anti

takeover device in Moran v. Household International, Inc. 3 Moran also established intermediate scrutiny under Unocal as the legal framework for reviewing stockholder challenges to poison pills. 4 Poison pills metamorphosed post

- Moran . The flip

- over feature of the Moran pill was augmented by a flip

- in feature. 5 After the adoption of state anti

- takeover statutes, 6 trigger thresholds crept down from the 20% threshold of Moran to 15% and then to 10%

1 Robert A. Prentice, Front

- End Loaded, Two

- Tiered Tender Offers: An Examination of the Counterproductive Effects of a Mighty Offensive Weapon , 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 389, 392 (1989).
2 See generally Martin Lipton & Erica H. Steinberger, 1 Takeovers & F reezeouts § 6.03[4], at 6

- 58 (L. J. Press 2009); Prentice, supra note 1 at 412

– 13.
3 Moran v. Household Int’l., Inc. ( Moran II ), 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
4 Id. at 1357; see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. , 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
5 See generally Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc. , 1990 WL 114222 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) (validating flip

- in poison pill).
6 See, e.g. , 8 Del. C. § 203 (preventing stockholders from engaging in a tender or exchange offer for a period of three years after buying more than 15% of a corporation’s stock unless certain criteria are met). See generally E. Norman Veasey, Jesse A. Finkelstein & Robert J. Shaughnessy, The Delaware Takeover Law: Some Issues, Strategies and Comparisons , 43 Bus. Law. 865, 868 (1988).2 in some ins tances. 7 The pill’s initial success engendered mission creep. O riginally conceived as anti

- takeover armament s , poison pills were redirected to address other corporate purposes such as protecting net operating loss assets. 8 Recently, pills have been de ployed to defend against stockholder activism. The plaintiffs in this litigation challenge an anti

- activist pill adopted by the board of directors of The Williams Companies, Inc. (“Williams” or the “Company”) at the outset of the COVID

- 19 pandemic and amid a global oil pric e war. The Williams pill is unprecedented in that it contains a more extreme combination of features than any pill previously evaluated by this c ourt

— a 5% trigger threshold, an expansive de finition of “acting in concert,” and a narrow definition of “passive investor

. ” Unocal calls for a two

- part inquiry, asking first whether the board had reasonable grounds for identifying a threat to the corporate enterprise and second whether the response

was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 9 The defendants identify three supposed threats : first, the desire to prevent stockholder activism during a time of market uncertainty and a low stock price , although the Williams board was not aware of any specific activist

7 See gen erally Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Anti

- Activist Poison Pills , 99 B.U. L. Rev. 915, 922 (2019) [hereinafter Anti

- Activist Poison Pills ]. 8 See, e.g. , Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc. , 5 A.3d 586, 607 (Del. 2010) (“ Selectica II ”) (validating an NOL pill).
9 The second prong of Unocal looks first to whether the defensive measure is draconian, in the sense of being preclusive or coercive, before addressing whether the measure is in the range of reasonableness. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. , 651 A.2d 1361, 1387

– 88 (Del. 1995) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. , 637 A.2d 34, 45

– 46 (Del. 1994)). In this case, the plaintiffs do not argue that the rights plan is draconian, and thus this decision goes right to the proportionality analy sis.3 plays afoot ; second, the apprehension that hypothetical activists might pursue “short

- term” agendas or distract management from guiding Williams through uncertain tim es ; and third, the concern that activists might stealthily and rapidly accumulate over 5% of Williams stock. Of these three threats, t he first two run contrary the tenet of Delaware law that d irectors can not justify their actions by arguing that , without board intervention , the stockholders would vote erroneously out of ignorance or mistaken belief. This decision assumes for the sake of analysis that the third threat presents a legitimate corporate objective but concludes that the C ompany’s respo nse was not proportiona l and enjoins the Williams pill.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Trial took place over three days. The record comprises 206 trial exhibits, live testimony from four fact and three expert witnesses, deposition testimony from eight fact and three expert witnesses, and one - hundred stipulations of fact. These are the facts as the court finds them after trial. 10

10 The Factual Background cites to: C.A. No. 2020

- 0707

- KSJM docket entries (by docket “Dkt.” number); trial exhibits (by “JX” number); the trial transcript (Dkts. 111

– 13) (“Trial Tr.”); and stipulated facts set forth in the Parties’ Joint Pre

- T rial Order (Dkt. 101) (“PTO”). The following witnesses testified at trial: Plaintiff Steven Wolosky; Defendants Charles I. Cogut, Murray D. Smith, Nancy K. Buese; Plaintiffs’ expert Joseph Mills; and Defendants’ experts Guhan Subramanian and Bruce Goldfa rb. The parties relied on the deposition transcripts of the following witnesses: Williams ’ Chief Financial Officer John Chandler and Defendants Stephen W. Bergstrom, Vicki L. Fuller, and Murray D. Smith. See Dkt. 88, Notice of Lodging of Dep. Trs. Exs. C

– G. The deposition transcripts using the witnesses’ last names and “Dep. Tr.”4 A. Williams and Its Board Williams is a publicly traded Delaware corporation with its headquarter s in Tulsa, Oklahoma. 11 It owns and operates natural gas infrastructure assets, including over 30,000 miles of pipelines and 28 processing facilities, and handles approximately 30 % of the nation’s natural gas volumes. 12
At all times relevant to this decision, there were approxi mately 1.2 billion shares of Williams common stock outstanding . Based on the stock’s trading price from March 2020 through the time of trial, Williams’ market capitalization ranged from approximately $11.22 to $27.54 billion. A bout 50% of Williams’ outst anding shares are owned by approximately twenty institutional investors. 13 Williams’ largest three stockholders

— Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Stree t

— collectively h old almost a quarter of the Company’s common s tock

. 14
Williams ’ certificat e of incorporation establishes a straight Board of Directors (the “Board”) and provid es “that directors shall be elected annually for terms of one year .” 15 Williams stockholders have the right to remove directors without cause and to act by written consent

. 16

11 PTO ¶ 14.
12 JX

- 32 at 5; PTO ¶ 14.
13 JX

- 156 (“Goldfarb Report”) ¶¶ 22

– 24.
14 Goldfarb Report ¶ 24. Each of BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street filed a Schedule 13G with the SEC in connection with its stake in Williams. Id.
15 JX

- 8 Art. FIFTH ¶ B , at 28 (May 20, 2010 Form 8

- K).
16 See id. ¶ C , at 28 (stating that the “stockholders shall not have the right to remove any one or all of the Directors except for cause and by . . . a ffirmative vote,” but then stating5 As of March 2020, the Board comprised twelve members

— CEO Alan Armstrong and eleven outside directors

. The complaint names as defendants Armstrong and ten of the outside directors

— Stephen W. Bergstrom, Nancy K. Buese, Stephen I. Chazen , Charles I. Cogut, Michael A. Creel, Vicki L. Fuller, Peter A. Ragauss, Scott D. Sheffield, Murray D. Smith, and William H. Spence ( collectively, the “Director Defendants”). 17
B. Williams’ Prior Experience with Stockholder Activism In late 2011, Soroban Ca pital Partners LLC (led by Eric Mandelblatt) (“Soroban”) and Corvex Management LP (led by Keith Meister) (“Corvex”) each acquired slightly less than 5% of Williams stock

. 18 Through a February 2014 agreement with Williams, Mandelblatt and Meister joined the Board. 19 During their tenure, Mandelblatt and Meister were instrumental in pressing for a merger with Energy Transfer Equity LP

. 20 After the merger was terminated , six of the Board’s thirteen members

— including Mandelblatt and Meister

— attempted to remove and

that “[t]he first sentence of this Paragraph C, shall be of no force and effect after the annual meeting of stockholder [sic] in 2013”); see also PTO ¶ 109 (“Williams’ By

- laws permit stockholders to remove members of the Board of Directors by written consent.”).
17 Dkt. 1, Unsworn Verified Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief (“Wolosky Compl.”); JX

- 60 at 10

– 11, 16; PTO ¶¶ 15

– 25. The eleventh outside director, non

- party Kathleen Cooper, retired from the board and is not a defendant. JX

- 60 at 16; Trial Tr. at 308:8

– 11 (Smith).
18 PTO ¶ 27; JX

- 104; Trial Tr. 309:17

– 310:8 (Smith); Bergstrom Dep. Tr. 37:6

– 38:6

. 19 PTO ¶ 29. 20 Smith Dep. Tr. 9:13

– 18, 87:7

– 88:14; Chandler Dep. Tr. at 104:23

– 105:11; Fuller Dep. Tr. at 83:7

– 9.6 replace Armstrong as CEO. 21 When this effort failed, th os e six directors resign ed. 22
Meister then threatened a proxy fight to replace the entire Board, 23 but he agreed to stand down when Williams named three new independent directors

— Bergstrom, Sheffield, and Spence. 24 Bergstrom became Chair.
M anagement also underwent significant change. Armstrong remained as CEO, but the Company hired several new executives, including CFO John D. Chandler and General Counsel T. Lane Wilson

. 25 Armstrong and Smith are the only two Director Defendants who served on the Board during the Soroban and Corvex era; the others joined the Board in either 2016 or 2018. 26 Smith found Soroban and Corvex’s activism detrimental to the Company. 27 Smith further felt that Soroban and Corvex pushed for short

- term

- value

- enhancing agendas tha t were not aligned with the Board’s long

- term goals. 28
C. Williams Stock Price Plummets Before 2020, Williams stock price traded at a high of $24.04 and had been relatively stable over the preceding months. In early 2020, however, t he COVID

- 19 pandemic and

21 PTO ¶ 30.
22 Id. ; Trial Tr. 312:7

– 23 (Smith).
23 PTO ¶ 31; Trial Tr. 312:24

– 313:11 (Smith).
24 PTO ¶ 31; Trial Tr. 313:12

– 19 (Smith); id. at 129:15

– 20 (Cogut).
25 Trial Tr. 136:14

– 138:10 (Cogut); see JX

- 162 at 1

– 3. 26 PTO ¶¶ 15

– 25 (listing the Director Defendants and the year in which each joined the Board).
27 See, e.g. , Trial Tr. at 311:7

– 16, 314:1

– 17, 349:14

– 350:20 (Smith).
28 Id. at 311:10

– 16 (Smith).7 the ensuing oil pric e war between Saudi Arabia and Russia shocked the oil market and sent stock prices plummeting

. The COVID

- 19 pandemic hit first. On January 31, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services “declared a public health eme rgency in response to the COVID

- 19 pandemic.” 29 Williams stock price fell to $18.90 by the end of February 2020. 30 During this period, trading volume in Williams stock was high and fluctuated dramatically from day to day , indicating “a lot of unusual and short

- term

- type trading

. ” 31
The Board met on March 2, 2020, to discuss solutions for the declining stock price. Management and representatives from Morgan Stanley explained that the stock was approaching lows similar to those in 2010 and 2016, despite the fact that earnings were 25% higher and the Company was carrying significantly less debt. 32 The Board discussed a share repurchase program but opted to preserve liquidity and contin ue to de

- leverage instead

. 33
Then came the oil pric e war. On March 8, 2020, Saudi Arabia cut prices in reaction to Russia’s conduct at a March 2020 meeting of the Organization of the Petroleum

29 PTO ¶ 34.
30 Id. ¶ 36.
31 Trial Tr. 538:19

– 539:1 (Buese).
32 JX

- 34 at 1

– 2; JX

- 35 at 4 (noting that the Company’s stock price was “approaching lows realized in 2010 and 2016 despite 25% higher earnings and >1 turn less of leverage during other market stresses”).
33 PTO ¶ 37; JX

- 34 at 1; JX

- 35 at 3

– 4; Trial Tr. 140:14

– 141:20 (Cogut); Chandler Dep. Tr. at 203:21

– 204:4; Fuller Dep. Tr. at 278:16

– 280:13; Bergstrom Dep. Tr. at 216:11

– 16.8 Exporting Countries

. 34 The following day energy stocks “fell to their lowest levels in 15 years, dropping 20% in a single day.” 35 Williams stock price closed at $14.99 on March 9 , 2020. 36 By March 19, Williams stock price had falle n to approximately $11 , which was close to a 55% decline since January 2020. 37
D. Cogut ’s Plan Around early March 2020, outside director Cogut conceived of an alternative to the repurchase program

— a stockholder rights plan (the “Plan”)

. 38 Cogut, a retired lawyer who had led the M&A and private equity practices of a prominent New York law firm, had joined the Board in 2016. 39 Cogut had helped clients adopt rights plans roughly a dozen times beginning in the 1980s. 40 Cogut witnesse d the evolution of poison pills throughout his career and described them at trial as “the nuclear weapon of corporate governance.” 41 He explained his understanding that the poison pill was historically designed to protect companies from

34 PTO ¶¶ 38, 83.
35 Id. ¶ 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 Id. ¶ 40; PTO Ex. A.
37 PTO Ex. A; JX

- 157 (“Subramanian Report”) ¶ 22 & n.48.
38 A flip

- in poison pill generally works as follows: A company issues its stockholders rights that have nominal value unless somebody acquires an amount of shares above a specified triggering threshold, at which poin t the rights become exercisable, for everyone other than the acquiring persons, into common or equivalent shares worth more than the exercise price. JX

- 155 (“Mills Report”) ¶ 28.
39 PTO ¶ 19; JX

- 60 at 27.
40 JX

- 60 at 27; Trial Tr. at 53:5

– 17 (Cogut).
41 Tria l Tr. at 53:18

– 55:1, 114:10

– 12 (Cogut).9 hostile takeovers and that they originated in response to f r ont

- end loaded, two

- tier tender offers

. 42 Cogut knew that acceptable trigger thresholds had declined from 20% to 15% , with the occasional 10 % trigger. 43 As trigger levels shrank, the pills’ uses expanded. Cogut observed that companies began using pills to protect their net operating losses (“NOLs”) and not just as a takeover deterrent. 44 Like many Delaware corporations, Williams had an “on

- the

- shelf” pill (the “Shelf Pill”)

— a rights plan that the Company could quickly adopt in the event a threat arose. The Board considered a “refreshment” of the Shelf Pill every so often; the last such refreshment took pla c e in October 2019. 45 The Shelf Pill was geared towards a traditional change of control situation. 46 None of the Company representatives could testify as to details of the Shelf Pill other than its existence, though Cogut testified that it likely had a trigger of 15% and certainly greater than 5%. 47 Cogut was not concerned with a potential takeover or with NOLs

. 48 He felt that the “circumstances that existed because of the pandemic” warranted “a different type of pill.” 49

42 Id. at 53:10

– 54:4 (Cogut).
43 Id . at 54:15

– 18 (Cogut).
44 Id . at 55:2

– 10 (Cogut).
45 JX

- 27 at 1; JX

- 29 at 2.
46 Trial Tr. at 563:17

– 564:6 (Buese).
47 Id. at 58:15

– 59:5 (Cogut).
48 Id. at 64:19

– 23, 69:12

– 70:16, 93:16

– 19 (Cogut).
49 Trial Tr. at 65:5

– 8 (Cogut).10 The “uncertainty ” in the market required a solution that could “insulat[e]” management from activists “who were trying to influence the control of the company.” 50 Cogut suggested a rights plan to Wilson around March 2 when management was considering its share repurchase propos al. 51 Cogut’s proposal “was not meant to deal with the same issues as the stock buyback” and was not fully developed

— he simply recommended that “the concept [of a pill] should be considered” by management. 52 The goal was to prevent “[a]ny activism that would influence control over the company at an aggregate level above 5 percent.” 53 Cogut made no distinction s among types of activism. 54 He hoped to impose a “ one year moratorium ” on activism of any type. 55 To accomplish this goal, he proposed “a shareholder rights agreement with a 5% triggering threshold, a one

- year duration, and an exclusion for passive investors.” 56

50 Id. at 69:8

– 70:16 (Cogut).
51 Id. at 66:4

– 10 (Cogut).
52 Id. at 65:19

– 24, 66:11

– 67:1 (Cogut).
53 Id. at 70:20

– 71:5 (Cogut).
54 Id. at 72:21

– 75:2 (Cogut).
55 Id. at 118:11

– 18 (Cogut); see also id. at 154:22

– 155:23 (Cogut) (“I thought that the company would be best off if there was a limitation on the ability of opportunistic investors . . . who were interested in influencing control of the company, if there was a limitation on what they could do, limit their voice over this period of uncertainty.”).
56 PTO ¶ 44.11 E. Williams Management Proposes the Plan to the Board After Cogut proposed the Plan , Wilson consulted with Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (“Davis Polk”), the Company’s outside counsel. 57 Davis Polk then revised the Shelf Pill and sent a draft to Wilson on March 11, 2020

. 58
After receiving the draft from Davis Polk, Wilson socialized the Plan among senior management including Armstrong . Cogut expected Armstrong to support the idea because he had “barely survived” Soroban and Corvex’s “attempt to get him fired

. ” 59
M anagement liked the pill

. At the time, Williams Director of Investor Relations & Treasury Brett Krieg had been looking for a way to “monitor the potential emergence of activists in this low price environment.” 60 On March 17, Wilson forwarded a draft pil l to Cogut, along with Davis Polk’s “explanation of changes.” 61 Wilson noted that he, Armstrong, and Chandler were “all supportive of moving forward proactively.” 62
Wilson also asked Cogut to discuss the Plan with Bergstrom, who lacked any experience with poison pills. 63 Cogut emailed Bergstrom to express his “view that [Williams] should adopt a shareholders’ rights plan with a 1 year term, a 5% threshold, and

57 See JX

- 42 at 1

– 2.
58 Id. at 1; JX

- 42 ; see also JX

- 176 at 1. 59 Trial Tr. at 137:8

– 15 (Cogut); JX

- 40; JX

- 174.
60 JX

- 172 at 3; see also JX

- 171 at 2. 61 JX

- 42 at 1.
62 Id. ; see also JX

- 175. 63 Trial Tr. at 75:3

– 77:17 (Cogut); Bergstrom Dep. Tr. at 29:16

– 30:7; JX

- 176 at 1.12 an exception for 13g holders.” 64 Bergstrom agreed to discuss the Plan with Cogut the following morning. 65 In the meantime, Armstrong, B ergstrom, and Wilson schedul e d an emergency Board meeting to further evaluate Cogut’s Plan

. 66 Wilson had also advised that holding two meetings would look better; he recommended scheduling a “second board meeting to approve, at least a day later, to show appropriate consideration by the Board.” 67 Cogut and Bergstrom spoke by phone on the morning of March 18. 68 Bergstrom expressed concern about the Plan’s novelty. He was wary of the 5% trigger 69 and “had not joined the enthusiasm of management to procee d

. ” 70 During a call later tha t morning, Bergstrom expressed similar concerns to Wilson. 71
F. The Board Calls an Urgent Meeting The Board scheduled its first meeting for the evening of March 18. 72 An agenda distributed to the Board prior to the meeting identified two discussion topics: ( i ) the Plan , which the agenda gave forty minutes, and ( ii ) whether to hold the an nual stockholder

64 JX

- 41.
65 Id.
66 JX

- 176 at 1.
67 JX

- 43 at 1; see also JX

- 47 at 1.
68 See JX

- 41. 69 Trial Tr. at 79:19

– 82:20 (Cogut).
70 Id. at 76:14

– 21 (Cogut).
71 JX

- 50; JX

- 52. 72 PTO ¶ 46. In the lead up to the meeting, stockholder activism was a topic of discussion in emails between Wilson, Davis Polk, and Morgan Stanley. JX

- 50; JX

- 52.13 me eting virtually , which the agenda gave twenty minutes

. 73 The agenda attached a presentation titled “Rights Plan Overview

. ” 74 The Board did not receive a draft of the Plan before or during the March 18 meeting. 75 The meeting lasted approximately seventy

- five minutes , with m ost of that time spent on the P lan. 76 Representatives from Davis Polk and Morgan Stanley attended the meeting. 77 During the meeting, Armstrong and Wilson delivered the presentation. 78 The presentation identified the purpose s of stockholder rights plans generally , the mechanics of rights plans , and the ir dilutive effects. 79 Management’s presentation explained that, generally, rights plans seek to:

• “Discourage unsolicited takeover attempts that do not offer an adequate price to all stockhol ders or are otherwise not in the best interests of the company and its stockholders;”

• “Discourage or prevent coercive or unfair takeover tactics” such as “acquisitions of control through open market purchases[,] ‘street sweeps , ’ ” or “coercive tender offers , including partial and two

- tiered tender offers;”

• “Encourage bidders to negotiate with the Board;” and

73 JX

- 54 at 1.
74 Id. at 1

– 2.
75 See PTO ¶ 55. 76 JX

- 55 at 1, 4; PTO ¶ 51 ; s ee also Trial Tr. at 152:4

– 7 (Cogut); id. at 326:18

– 327:11 (Smith); id. at 551:11

– 17 (Buese)

. 77 JX

- 56 at 1

– 2

. 78 Trial Tr. 554:4

– 9 (Buese); JX

- 54 at 1. 79 Id. at 3

– 10.14 • “Provide the Board with [the] opportunity to preserve existing, more advantageous strategies or to develop and implement superior alternatives.” 80 The next slide of the presentation explained that, generally, rights plans are not intended to :

• “Prevent all acquisitions;”

• “Deter fully priced and fairly structured offers;”

• “Prevent proxy contests for representation on Board;” or

• “[P]revent a group of unaffiliated hedge funds from acquiring meaningful positions . . . so long as they remain below the threshold.” 81 The presentation went on to identify “the board’s duties

. ” 82 It also noted certain “corporate governance matters,” including the possibility of negative reactions from Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (“ ISS ”) and the press. 83
The presentation did not discuss any proposed features specific to the Plan, although the minutes of the March 18 meeting reflect that the Board discu ssed a 5% trigger

. 84 In addition, the minutes of the March 18 meeting state that:

• Morgan Stanley “advised that, given the extremely unusual market volatility primarily arising from the uncertainty relating to the coronavirus outbreak and the disproportionate impact on the Company’s common stock price . . . a Rights Plan is a valid cons ideration.”

• Morgan Stanley advised that “in light of existing disclosure regimes , and high, volatile trading volumes, before the Company would have any insight

80 Id. at 3.
81 Id. at 4. 82 Id. at 11

– 15.
83 Id. at 16. 84 JX

- 56 at 2.15 or knowledge, an opportunistic investor could acquire a sizable position in the Company’s comm on stock.”

• Armstrong stated “that the adoption of a Rights Plan would protect and preserve the interests of long

- term shareholders.”

• The Board discussed “protecting long

- term shareholders (especially by exempting all passive investors from the contemplate d plan).” 85
T he Board also discussed the “market perception” and the anticipated reaction of its stockholders, the press, and proxy advisory firms to the proposed Plan

. 86 The directors concluded that “further explanation to shareholders” could overcome ba d publicity given “the one year term and other . . . mitigating factors in respect of any potential negative investor reaction.” 87 Although the Board had not yet seen a draft of the Plan, b y the end of the March 18 meeting , the Board had decided to adopt i t

. Buese stated that the Board had “unanimously” decided that its “fiduciary duty required [it] to take action in light of the significant dislocation of the stock” despite the “risk that shareholders could vote out a director” in
response. 88 The only open issues were logistical questions and a formal vote

. 89 As recommended by Wilson, the Board scheduled a second meeting for the following day, the evening of March 19. 90 T he Board briefly discussed transitioning its

85 Id.
86 Id. ; JX

- 53 at 16; Trial Tr. at 550:20

– 551:10 (Buese); Fuller Dep. Tr. at 49:11

– 24, 59:13

– 60:24.
87 JX

- 56 at 2; Trial Tr. at 546:11

– 16 (Buese).
88 Trial Tr. at 551:4

– 10 (Buese).
89 See id. at 550:20

– 551:10 (Buese).
90 Trial Tr. at 153:4

– 11 (Cogut).16 2020 Annual Meeting of Sto ckholders to a virtual setting before adjourning for the evening

. 91
G. The Board Adopts the Plan . I mmediately after the March 18 Board meeting , Williams corporate secretary Bob Riley emailed Computershare Trust Company, N.A. (“Computershare Trust”) noting that “our Board will tomorrow adopt a shareholder rights plan” and asking to “chat tomorrow about Computershare’s role as the rights agent.” 92 Later that evening, Riley emailed the agenda and materials for the meeting to the Board , including the P lan

. 93 On the morning of March 19, Williams filed its 2020 Proxy Statement in anticipation of its April 28, 2020 annual stockholder meeting

. 94 The Proxy Statement did not disclose that the Board was considering the P lan

. 95 An agenda was sent to the Board a few hours before the meeting

. 96 The agenda allocated sixty minutes to “[a]pproval ” of a “Shareholder Rights Plan,” including: Morgan Stanley’s presentation, discussion of the Plan , review of a draft Form 8

- K and a Form 8A

91 JX

- 56 at 2

– 4; Trial Tr. at 83:23

– 84:3, 1 52:4

– 7 (Cogut); id. at 551:11

– 17 (Buese)

. 92 JX

- 58 at 1.
93 JX

- 59; PTO ¶ 55. 94 JX

- 60 at 4

– 5. 95 See JX

- 60 at 7 (listing agenda items but not including information about the Plan).
96 JX

- 65 at 1

– 2.17 registration statement, adoption of resolutions approving the Plan , and review of a draft press release. 97
The e mail also included a presentation prepared by Morgan Stanley. 98 Buese testified that she reviewed these materials and “touch[ed] base” with Bergstrom and Wilson prior to the March 19 Board meeting

. 99 She did not review every detai l but focused instead

on key terms and provisions.
Th e March 19 Board meeting began at 6 p.m. with the full Board and representatives from Morgan Stanley and Davis Polk in attendance. 100 The Morgan Stanley team opened the meeting, beginning its presentation with an executive summary of the Plan before turning to “Considerations Regarding a 5% Trigger.” 101 The executive summary stated : The key benefit of a rights plan is to prevent an opportunistic party from achieving a position of substantial influence or con trol without paying a control premium to other shareholders. A shareholder rights plan does not deter friendly or hostile M&A; however, an acquiror would be forced to negotiate with the Board. A n activist would be limited in its ability to accumulate a lar ge stake. 102

97 Id. at 2. The agenda is dated March 18, 2020. Id. Given its distribution on March 19, and the numerous differences from the March 18 agenda, this was likely a typo. See Buese Dep. Tr. at 205:10

– 206:13. 98 JX

- 65 at 3; see Trial Tr. at 153:12

– 16 (Cogut); id. at 596:18

– 597:4 (Buese).
99 Trial Tr. at 552:7

– 553:6 (Buese).
100 JX

- 67 at 1.
101 JX

- 65 at 4

– 5. 102 Id. at 4 (emphasis added) (formatting altered).18 The executive summary stated that “campaigns from well

- known activists are expected to continue at a reasonable pace in the current market.” 103 In connection with this prediction, the presentation stated that: The rights plan would deter an act ivist from taking advantage of the current market dislocation and challenges in monitoring un u sual trading patterns that results in a rapid accumulation of a >5% stake. 104 The presentation displayed a chart signaling an upward trend in stockholder activism and predicting that such activism would not decline as significantly as it did in response to the market downturn of 2008. 105 As to the trigger, the presentation informed the Board that : (a) only 2% of rights plans had triggers below 10% ; (b) 76% of rights plans “set the trigger” between 15% and 20%; and ( c ) “[n]o precedents exist below 5%

. ” 106 The presentation did not cover any other provisions of the Plan. 107 Morgan Stanley walked the Board through its generation of an exercise price for the warrants included in the Plan and the impact that triggering the P lan at that price would have on Company stock. 108

103 Id.
104 Id

. 105 Id. at 8. 106 Id. at 5. 107 PTO ¶ 57; Chandler Dep. Tr. 146:15

– 148:3; see also Trial Tr. at 553:12

– 563:1 (Buese).
108 Id. at 6

– 7.19 The Morgan Stanley team concluded its presentation with some general market data regarding exercise price multiples. 109 It f urther identified a substantial decline in active rights plans among public companies

— only 55 at the end of 2019, down from a high of 946 at the end of 2009. 110 After delivering the presentation, the Morgan Stanley and Davis Polk representatives left the room to allow the Board to deliberate. 111 The minutes indicate that the Board discussed “recent market events and the impact on the Company’s stock price.” 112 Cogut confirmed at trial that Morgan Stanley relayed the above information at the March 19 Board meeting . He regarded the information about other rights plan triggers “irrelevant” because “this was not a traditional shareholder rights plan.” 113
Buese recalled that the Board discussed the potential impact the Plan would have on the trading volu me of Williams stock. 114 She further noted that the Board revisited “several levels of thresholds” and “the acting in concert concept.” 115 Buese also recalled that the Board discussed the “the fact that ISS has a reasonably dim view of rights plans

. ” 116

109 Id. at 11

– 14.
110 Id. at 10.
111 JX

- 67 at 1.
112 Id. at 2.
113 Trial Tr. at 87:22

– 90:1 (Cogut).
114 Id. at 555:20

– 556:6 (Buese).
115 Id. at 556:16

– 557:11 (Buese).
116 Id. at 560:2

– 11 (Buese).20 Ac cording to Buese, the Board collectively felt that “outreach and engagement and education” would temper any investor dissatisfaction. 117 Following discussion, the Board unanimously resolved to adopt a stockholder rights plan “in substantially the form prese nted at the meeting.” 118 The March 19 meeting, initially scheduled to last for one hour, adjourned after forty minutes. 119 On March 20, 2020, t he Company issued a press release that publicly disclosed the Board’s adoption of the Plan (the “March 20 Press Release”). 120 On March 30, 2020, the Company supplemented the 2020 Proxy Statement to disclose the Plan’s adoption (the “March 30 Proxy Supplement”). 121
T he Board elected not to subject the Plan to a stockholder vote

. Cogut testified that the idea of allowing stockholders to vote on the Plan “was not raised” by Morgan Stanley, Davis Polk, or any of the Board members. 122 At trial, the Director Defendants cited time constraints as a n additional consideration , 123 contending that the 202 0 Proxy Statement “was at the printer” by the time the Board began discussing the Plan

. 124

117 Id. at 561:21

– 562:6 (Buese).
118 JX

- 67 at 2; Trial Tr. at 154:14

– 19 (Cogut); id. at 337:5

– 9 (Smith).
119 JX

- 67 at 5. 120 JX

- 69.
121 JX

- 82.
122 Trial Tr. at 118:8

– 119:8 (Cogut).
123 Id. at 563:10

– 16 (Buese).
124 Id. at 117:24

– 118:4 (Cogut).21 H. The Plan’s Features The Plan will expire at the end of one year and has four key features: (i) a 5% trigger; (ii) a definition of “acquiring person” that captures b eneficial ownership as well as ownership of certain derivative interests, such as warrants and options; (iii) a n “acting in concert” provision that extends to parallel conduct and includes a “daisy chain” concept (the “AIC Provision”); and (i v ) a limited “ passive investor” exemption

. While the Plan’s features were a focal point of trial, they received little attention during the March 18 and March 19 Board meetings. The Director Defendants confirmed that Board discussions focused almost exclusively on th e 5% trigger. 125 Although Buese recalls having discussed the concept of the AIC Provision, 126 other directors testified that the Board was informed only that the Plan would apply to groups of investors but did not review or discuss the actual terms of the AIC Provision. 127 M ost directors admitted that they had not even read the key features of the Plan before this litigation began. 128 The Plan operates in conjunction with regulatory requirements established by fede ral and state law. Understanding the Plan’s features requires a quick refresher of certain of those requirements.

125 See id. at 329:21

– 331:5 (Smit h).
126 Id. at 548:8

– 22 (Buese); see also id. at 568:8

– 569:8 (Buese) (testifying that she reviewed the AIC Provision prior to voting on the Plan). But see Buese Dep. Tr. at 225:1

– 228:21 (testifying that she has no recollection of having reviewed the AIC Pro vision but assumes that she did because it was her “common practice” to review Board materials).
127 Trial Tr. at 95:17

– 96:13 (Cogut) ; id. at 345:5

– 21 (Smith); Bergstrom Dep. Tr. at 254:5

– 22, 293:6

– 294:10; Fuller Dep. Tr. at 74:5

– 77:7, 80:3

– 21. 128 Trial Tr. at 87:1

– 15, (Cogut); id . at 345:2

– 7 (Smith); Bergstrom Dep. Tr. at 253:9

– 24, 272:6

– 273:13; Fuller Dep. Tr. at 74:5

– 77:7, 80:3

– 21.22 • Section 13 ( d ) of the Securities Exchange Act (the “Exchange Act”) requires that non

- passive investors report “beneficial ownership” of more t han 5% of a class of stock but gives investors a ten

- day window to report ownership levels using a Schedule 13D form. During that window, the investor is permitted to continue accumulating stock.

• Section 13 ( d ) does not include derivative securities in t he definition of “beneficial ownership.”

• Section 13 ( d ) aggregates the beneficial ownership of investors who are acting in concert, which under the Exchange Act occurs where “two or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of equity securities of an issuer.” 129 Section 13 ( d ) ’s definition of “acting in concer t ” does not capture “parallel conduct” (discussed below) nor a “daisy chain” concept (discussed below).

• Section 13 ( d ) excludes “passive investors,” defined as persons who acquired “securities in the ordinary course of [their] business and not with the purpose nor with the effect of changing or influence the control of the issuer.” 130 1. The 5% Trigger The Plan established a trigger threshold of “5% or more.” 131 The P lan is triggered, and the rights distributed, on “the close of business on the tenth Business Day after” a
“Person” (defined as an individual, firm, or entity) 132 acquire s “ beneficial ownership ” of 5% or more of Williams stock or commences “a tender or exchange offer” that would result in their ownership reaching that threshold

. 133 Given Williams’ market capitali zation in March 2020, triggering the 5% threshold at the time the Plan was adopted would have

129 17 C. F.R. § 240.13d

– 5(b)(1); see also Subramanian Report ¶ 41.
130 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d

- 1. 131 JX

- 69 at 22.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 21.23 required an economic investment (sometimes referred to as a “toehold” ) of approximately $650 million. 134
2. Beneficial Ownership Definition The Plan ’ s definition of “beneficial ownership” starts with the definition found in Rule 13d

– 3 of the Exchange Act, then extends more broadly to include “[c]ertain synthetic interests in securities created by derivative positions , ” such as warrants and options. 135
3. The AIC Provision The AIC Provision deems a Person to be “Acting in Concert” with another Person if : such Person knowingly acts (whether or not pursuant to an express agreement, arrangement or understanding) at any time after the first public announcement of the adoption of this Right Agreement, in concert or in parallel with such other Person, or towards a common goal with such other Person, relating to changing or influencing the control of the Company or in connection with or as a participan t in any transaction having that purpose or effect, where (i) each Person is conscious of the other Person’s conduct and this awareness is an element in their respective decision

- making processes and (ii) at least one additional factor supports a determina tion by the Board that such Persons intended to act in concert or in parallel, which additional factors may include exchanging information, attending meetings, conducting discussions, or making or soliciting invitations to act in concert or in parallel

. 136 Breaking it down, the AIC Provision deems a Person to be “Acting in Concert” with another where the Person: (1) “knowingly acts . . . in concert or in parallel

. . . or towards

134 Subramanian Report ¶ 94.
135 JX

- 69 at 3, 19. 136 PTO ¶ 70 ; JX

- 69 at 18.24 a common goal” with an other ; (2) if the goal “relat [e s ] to changing or influen cing the control of the Company or [is] in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having that purpose or effect ; ” (3) where e ach Person is “conscious of the other Person’s conduct” and “this awareness is an element in their respective decis ion

- making processes ; ” and (4) t here is the presence of at least one additional facto r to be determined by the Board,

“ which additional factors may include exchanging information, attending meetings, conducting discussions, or making or soliciting invitations to act in concert or in parallel .” 137 The fourth factor of this definition gives the Board “a great amount of latitude” for making the “ A cting in C oncert” determination. 138
The “parallel

- conduct ” dimension of the “ acting in concert” p rovision ( sometimes referred to as a “wolfpack ” provision ) 139 is a feature of modern pills, 140 as Defendants’ expert witness Professor Guhan Subramanian of Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School explained

. 141 According to Subramanian, poison pills have always

137 PTO ¶ 70 ; JX

- 69 at 18. 138 Smith Dep. Tr. at 231:3

– 21, 248:15

– 24; Trial Tr. at 96:14

– 22 (Cogut); Mills Report ¶¶ 67

– 68. 139 The phrase “wolfpacks” in this context refers to “a loose association of hedge funds that employs parallel activist strategies toward a target corporation while intentionally avoiding group status under [S]ection 13(d).” Subramanian Report ¶ 45 n.90 (quoting William R. Tevlin, The Conscious Parallelism of Wolf Packs: Applying the Antitrust Conspiracy Framework to Section 13(D) Activist Group Formation , 84 Fordh am L. Rev. 2335, 2337 (2016)).
140 Subramanian Report ¶¶ 48

– 49.
141 Professor Subramanian is a recognized expert in corporate affairs and has been helpful to this court on many occasions. In re Starz Appraisal , 2018 WL 4922095, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2018). His published work concerning policy questions of corporate law fills the footnotes of many decisions of Delaware courts. See, e.g. , In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holder25 included an acting

- in

- concert concept. Early poison pills required express agreement s, using language that tracked the definiti ons of a “group,” “affiliate , ” and “associate” under Section 13(d) and Rule 12b

- 2 of the Exchange Act. 142 E xpress agreement provisions d o not capture so - called wolfpack activism achieved through “‘conscious parallelism’ that deliberately stop[s] short of a n explicit agreement.” 143
The AIC Provision includes a “daisy chain” concept, provid ing that “ [a] P erson who is Acting in Concert with another Person shall be deemed to be Acting in Concert with any third party who is also Acting in Concert with such other Person

. ” 144 Put differently, stockholders act in concert with one another by separately and independently “ A cting in
C oncert” with th e same third party.

Litig. , 2010 WL 2291842, at *7 n.4, *10 n.5 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010); In re CNX Gas Corp. S’ holder Litig. , 2010 WL 2705147, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 5, 2010); In re MFW S’holders Litig. , 67 A.3d 496, 501 n.3, 530 n.162 (Del. 2013); In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig. , 2011 WL 6382523, at *22 n.11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011); In re Del Monte Fo ods Co. S’holders Litig. , 25 A.3d 813, 840 n.5, 844 n.6 (Del. Ch. 2011); In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. S’holder Litig. , 115 A.3d 1173, 1184 nn.44

– 45 (Del. 2015).
142 Subramanian Report ¶ 41. Professor Subramanian notes that “under the Hart

- Scott

Rodin o (HSR) Act, any person wishing to buy more than $94 million of Williams common stock would have to disclose its position,” thus imposing a constraint on “activist shareholders’ trading of Williams stock well before the Williams Pill became relevant.” Id. ¶ 96; see 15 U.S.C

. § 18a. But HSR does not include a group concept and does not apply to the acquisition of nonvoting, derivative securities, such as stock options; the Plan thus casts a wider net than federal antitrust law.
143 Subramanian Report ¶ 45.
144 JX

- 69 at 18.26 The AIC Provision does not apply to a public proxy solicitation or tender offer. 145
Persons are not deemed to be “ A cting in C oncert” solely as a result of soliciting proxi e s in connection with a “public proxy or consent solicitation m ade to more than 10 holders of shares of a class of stock” or when soliciting tenders pursuant to a “public tender or exchange offer.” 146 While this provision allows stockholders to initiate a proxy contest and solicit proxies without triggering the Plan, it does not exempt routine communications among stockholder before the launch of a proxy contest or tender offer

. The AIC Provision is a lso asymmetrical . It excludes “actions by an officer or director of the Company acting in such capacities , ” such that incumbents can act in concert without suffering the consequences of the Plan. 147
4. The Passive Investor Definition The Plan carves out “Passive Investors” from the definition of “Acquiring Persons

. ” The Plan defines “Passive Investor” to mean : [A] Person who (i) is the Beneficial Owner of Common Shares of the Company and either (a) has a Schedule 13G on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the requirements of Rule 13d

- 1(b) or (c) under the Exchange Act with respect to such holdings (and does not subsequently convert such filing to a Schedule 13D) or (b) has a Schedule 13D on file with the Securi ties and Exchange Commission and either has stated in its filing that it has no plan or proposal that

145 Id . (excluding from the AIC Provision Persons “(a) making or receiving a solicitation of, or granting or receiving, revocable proxies or consents given in response to a public proxy or consent solicitation made to more than 10 [stockholders ] . . . , or (b) soliciting or being solicited for tenders of, or tendering or receiving tenders of, securities in a public tender or exchange offer”).
146 Id.
147 JX

- 69 at 18.27 relates to or would result in any of the actions or events set forth in Item 4 of Schedule 13D or otherwise has no intent to seek control of the Company o r has certified to the Company that it has no such plan, proposal or intent (other than by voting the shares of the Common Shares of the Company over which such Person has voting power), (ii) acquires Beneficial Ownership of Common Shares of the Company pu rsuant to trading activities undertaken in the ordinary course of such Person’s business and not with the purpose nor the effect, either alone or in concert with any Person, of exercising the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and pol icies of the Company or of otherwise changing or influencing the control of the Company, nor in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect, including any transaction subject to Rule 13d

- 3(b) of the Exchange Act, an d (iii) in the case of clause (i)(b) only, does not amend either its Schedule 13D on file or its certification to the Company in a manner inconsistent with its representation that it has no plan or proposal that relates to or would result in any of the act ions or events set forth in Item 4 of Schedule 13D or otherwise has no intent to seek control of the Company (other than by voting the Common Shares of the Company over which such Person has voting power). 148 This carve

- out was intended to ensure that truly passive investors w ould be exempt from the definition of Acquiring Person under the Plan. 149 Director Defendants testified as to their belief that the definition excludes Schedule 13G filers , defined under the Exchange Act as an investor that “acquir ed such securities in the ordinary course of his

148 PTO ¶ 69; JX

- 69 at 22. 149 Trial Tr. at 106:11

– 16 (Cogut); id. at 546:20

– 547:5, 567:11

– 19 (Buese); Fuller Dep. Tr. at 151:10

– 153:12; Chandler Dep. Tr. at 270:24

– 271:2, 286:24

– 288:23, 302:6

– 305:7; Bergstrom Dep. Tr. at 272:23

– 273:2; PTO ¶ 44.28 business and not with the purpose nor with the effect of changing or influenc ing the control of the issuer .” 150 As drafted, however, the carve

- out is far more exclusive

. The definition uses “and” before ro manette (iii), which makes the three requirements of the provision conjunctive. Thus , a stockholder must meet all three conditions to qualify as an exempt “Passive
Investor.” 151 Consequently, the definition excludes any investor that seeks to “ direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of the Company ” as provided in romanette (ii) of the definition. The “management and policies” qualifier of the AIC Provision captures a broader range of activity other than the “changing or influencing . . . control” language applicable to Schedule 13G filers. 152 As most of the defense witnesses testified, this conjunctive language appears to have been a mistake. 153 The intent was for the provisions to present two options : “(i) or (ii) and (iii).” 154 Yet, the Board never discussed nor correct ed this error. 155

150 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d

- 1(b)(1)(i) (emphas is added); see Trial Tr. at 106:11

– 16 (Cogut); id. at 566:23

– 567:19 (Buese); Smith Dep. Tr. at 215:21

– 216:3, 218:18

– 219:18; see also JX

- 161 ¶ 46 (Goldfarb Rebuttal Report).
151 JX

- 159 (“Mills Rebuttal Report”) ¶ 29.
152 See Mills Report ¶¶ 28

– 33 (describing v arious forms of stockholder activism).
153 See Trial Tr. at 107:3

– 109:15 (Cogut); id. at 606:9

– 607:13 (Buese) ; s ee also id. at 698:21

– 700:15 (Goldfarb). Subramanian stood out as the sole witness to read the Passive Investor Definition disjunctively, contend ing that the provision should be read as “(i) or (ii) and (iii).” Id. at 505:6

– 506:1 (Subramanian) (emphasis added). When confronted with its language he stood his ground, referring to a conjunctive reading of the provision as “just a red herring.” Id. at 421:16

– 423:17, 504:21

– 506:20 (Subramanian).
154 Trial Tr. at 505:6

– 506:1 (Subramanian) (emphasis added).
155 Id. at 110:11

– 111:21 (Cogut).29 E ven a disjunctive reading of the Rights Plan’s Passive Investor Definition is quite

narrow
. 156 At the time the Board adopted the Plan, Williams had only three 13G filers in its stock: BlackRock, Vanguard , and State Street

. 157 R ead disjunctively, the Passive Investor Definition would include at most those three investors. 158
I. Public Reaction to the Plan The Board correctly anticipated that the market and stockholders would react negatively to the Plan

. 159 Two of Williams’ largest stockholders reached out regarding the Plan shortly after its announcement, 160 and ISS recommend ed in an April 8 report that stockholders vote against Bergstrom’s re

- election at the Company’s annual meeting

. In recommending against Berg s trom’s re

- election, ISS cited “ The board’s adoption of a poison pill with a 5 percent trigger is problematic, as it is highly rest rictive and could

156 Id. at 109:11

– 110:4 (Cogut).
157 Id. at 109:2

– 7 (Cogut); id. at 506:21

– 507:8 (Subramanian); see also Mills Report ¶¶ 37

– 39 (observing that the Plan’s passive investor definition “impedes a wide range of socially beneficial and/or value

- enhancing behavior common to many of the largest institutional investors, as well as routine discourse between and engagement among stoc kholders and management”).
158 Trial Tr

. at 506:21

– 507:8 (Subramanian).
159 See JX

- 56 at 2 (noting that the Board discussed a “potential negative investor reaction” to the Plan) ; Trial Tr. at 550:20

– 551:10 (Buese); see also JX

- 63 (Williams’ management and investor relations teams anticipating the negative reaction to the Plan).
160 See JX

- 73 at 2

– 3 (Blackrock emailing Krieg the same day that the Plan was publicly announced, stating that the Plan “doesn’t look good from an ESG perspective. Has there been approaches? I think shareholders deserve to have transparency into any potential discussions even if they don’t make LT [long

- term] value creation sense

. . . .”); JX

- 80 at 2

– 3 (Vanguard emailing Krieg on March 24, 2020, four days after the Pla n was publicly announced, asking to “talk with the appropriate company representative about Vanguard’s holdings as they relate to your company’s Rights Agreement”).30 negatively impact the market for the company’s shares as the market recovers. ” 161 ISS noted, “the pill was not a reaction to an actual threat

– real or perceived

– of an activist investor or hostile bidder.” 162 ISS further opined that “th e board did not appear to consider other alternatives,” that “[w]hen ISS asked the company whether it had considered a shorter term, the answer appeared to be ‘no,’” and that “[w]hen ISS asked the company whether it had considered adopting a more standard pill with a higher trigger and using its upcoming annual meeting to seek shareholder ratification of its 5 percent plan, the answer appeared to be ‘no.’” 163 After recognizing on April 7, 2020, that “initial votes [were] trending against” Bergstrom due to anti

- Plan backlash, 164 Williams launched a stockholder outreach campaign to preserve Bergstrom’s seat. 165 Williams engaged proxy soliciting firm Okapi
Partners and met with stockholders in an attempt “to turn around some of the votes that ha[d] been cast an d shore up the vote

. ” 166 On April 14, 2020, Williams management held an investors call. The talking points and agenda addressed the Plan’s adoption :

161 JX

- 91 at 15. Williams and ISS had communicated regarding the Plan between March 24 and A pril, and ISS shared a draft of its report with Williams on April 1.
162 Id . at 16. 163 Id . at 18.
164 Id. at 1. 165 Id. ; JX

- 88; JX

- 90. 166 JX

- 91 at 1; see also JX

- 108 (April 13, 2020 email from Wilson detailing a stockholder engagement game plan).31 • Their stated “ Rationale for Adoption” wa s to “[p]revent an opportunistic party from achieving substantial influence or control without paying a control premium to other stockholders

. ” 167

• They selected the 5% threshold because with “stock market prices so dislocated from fundamental values, a threshold above 5% would allow enormous accumulations by non

- passive investors (all passive investors are exempt)” and because of the Company’s “ recent past experiences with activism , ” when “ Corvex and Sorobon [sic] owned, either as beneficial owners or as economic interest owners, 9.96% of the Company’s outstanding shares. Neither owned more than 5%.” 168

• “Many activist campaigns are conducted at levels below 10% ownership ; a level higher than 5% simply does not protect a company against an opportunist.” 169

• “The Rights plan is intended to . . . reduce the likelihood of those seeking short

- term gains taking advantage of current market conditions at the expense of the long

- term interests of stockholders, or of any person or group gaining control of Williams through open market accumulation or other tactics without paying an appropriate control premium.” 170

• The Board selected a one

- year duration because “ [n] o one can pred i ct the duration of the current crisis and the Board wants the management focused solely on the business, which the Rights Plan is intended to facilitate.” 171 In handwritten notes made to a print

- out of the investors call agenda, Chandler wrote:

“ limited scope  just activist.” 172 Wilson circulated the talking points and agenda to Bergstrom and others on April 14. In response, Bergstrom wrote:

167 JX

- 187 at 3. 168 Id.
169 Id. at 6. 170 Id.
171 Id. at 7. 172 Id. at 1.32 Only thing is [sic] would add is we saw a 50 plus percent in stock price and a minimal decline in cash flow and business fundamentals. We don’t talk about how our business didn’t change. I use the term you hav e heard of throw the baby out with the bath water. In our case they threw the bathtub out as well. That is why we put it in place at that level because that is exactly the kind of situation people with bad intentions look for. Dislocation in market wher e fundamentals are incongruent with that situation. 173 Williams gave a slide presentation during the April 14 investors call and disclosed the presentation the next day as a proxy supplement (the “April 15 Proxy Supplement”). The presentation stated that the disclosure was intended to explain “the Board’s rationale for ad opting the [Plan], the [Plan’s] key terms, the Boa r d’s process in adopting the [Plan], and [the Company’s] corporate governance practices generally.” 174 It state d :

• “Our Board adopted a Rights Plan on March 19, 2020 after careful consideration. This action was taken: [i]n light of unprecedented market conditions and severe market declines [and] [i]n the best long

- term interest of our stockholders.”

• “Rationale and purpose of adoption: To prevent an opportunistic party from achieving substantial influence or control without paying a control premium to other stockholders.” 175

• “Company experience in recent past reinforced Board’s view that 5% is the right threshold in this environment.” 176 At the April 28, 2020 annual meeting, t he stockholders re

- elected Bergstrom to the Board, but by a slim margin

— only 67% of the shares were cast in favor of Bergstrom

. 177

173 JX

- 114 at 10

– 11.
174 JX

- 117 at 3. 175 Id. at 5 (formatting altered).
176 Id. at 7. 177 Mills Report ¶ 76; JX

- 123 at 2.33 As Director Chazen noted shortly after the vote, “no one should take great solace from the voting results,” as “[a] third of the vote against [Bergstrom] is much larger than I would have guessed.” 178 Fidelity Investments, which voted in support of all directors, emailed the Company to note that its support was cautionary: “I would encourage you to put the pill up for a shareholder vote next year if it is extended or we likely will hold directors accountable.” 179
J. The Board Fails to Redeem the Plan. T he Board has the authority to redeem or amend the Plan , but it remains in place. 180
At t rial, Buese offered one reason for why the Board did not redeem the Plan. She

s peculated that doing so could send a signal “that the board believed we have achieved full and fair value for the s hare price,” effectively setting “an artificial ceiling” on the value of Williams stock. 181 Buese admitted that she did not discuss this justification with any other director, vet it through advisors, or submit it for Board discussion

. 182

178 JX

- 126 at 1.
179 JX

- 127 at 3

– 4. 180 JX

- 69 at 48

– 49; Trial Tr. at 611:3

– 6 ( Buese)

. 181 Trial Tr. at 571:21

– 572:9 (Buese). Professor Subramanian made the same claim. See Subramanian Report ¶ 76 (stating that “pills have signaling effects, and eliminating a pill when there is no clear reason to do so could fuel speculation in the marketplace, thus creating unnecessary disruption to the company”). The plaintiffs’ expert disputes this. See Mills Rebuttal Report ¶ 46. The Board never considered the issue, so the experts’ dispute is irrelevant.
182 Trial Tr. at 611:21

– 612:14 (Buese)

.34 In fact, o utside of the context of privileged discussions concerning this litigation, 183 the Board never considered redeeming the Plan. 184 In post

- t rial briefing, the d efendants claimed that maintaining the Plan was a business judgment duly considered by the Board

— t hey asserted that “the evidence shows that members of the Board, and on one occasion, the Board as a whole, have considered whether to red eem the Plan and decided that it was not in the Company’s best interests to do so.” 185 The d efendants, however, asserted privilege over the “one occasion” when the “Board as a whole” supposedly considered whether to redeem the Plan. Consequently, there is no factual record to support the defendants’ claim. 186 Meanwhile, Williams stock price has substantially recover ed . By June 8, 2020, Williams stock price had returned to $21.58; it closed at $21.68 on August 24, 2020. 187
T hird

- quarter financial results f or 2020 noted the “stability and predictability of business,”

183 PTO ¶ 109, see also Trial Tr. at 120:22

– 121:15 (Cogut); id. at 355:21

– 356:9 (Smith); id. at 611:13

– 20 (Buese); Bergstrom Dep. Tr. at 84:7

– 85:18; Fuller Dep. Tr. 183:19

– 184:13, 202:16

– 203:17.
184 PTO ¶ 109. 185 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 56.
186 Id . Plaintiffs fi led a motion in limine to preclude Defendants from relying on the Board communications over which Defendants asserted privilege. That motion is denied as unnecessary. Because Defendants blocked testimony as to this Board meeting at trial and in discovery , there is no factual record on which to base the finding they seek

— that the Board considered whether to redeem the Plan and determined that not doing so was in the best interest of the Company.
187 PTO ¶¶ 103

– 104.35 and Armstrong touted the Company’s strong performance “during a year marked by disruption and uncertainty.” 188
K. This Litigation Plaintiff Steven Wolosky filed this litigation on August 27, 2020

. Plaintiff City of St. Clair Shores Police and Fire Retirement System (with Wolosky, “Plaintiffs”) filed a similar action on September 3, 2020. The court granted expedition o n September 8 and consolidated the two actions on September 15. The operative complaint asserts a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the Director Defendants seek ing declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the validity and enforceability of the Plan. The Complaint also names as defendants the Company and Computershare Trust solely in its capacity as the rights agent for the Plan (together with the Director Defend ants, “Defendants”). 189 On November 11, 2020, over Defendants’ objection, the court certified a class defined as: “all record and beneficial holders of company common stock who held stock as of March 20, 2020, and who continue to hold stock through and including the date on which the rights plan expires or is withdrawn, redeemed, exercised or otherwise

188 Id. ¶ 105. 189 PTO ¶ 26.36 eliminated,” excluding Defendants. 190 A three

- day trial was held from January 12 to 14,
2021. Post

- trial briefing concluded on February 5, 2021. 191
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS Plaintiffs claim that the Director Defendants breached their fiduciary duties when adopting and maintainin g the Plan. This decision agrees and issues a mandatory injunction requiring redemption.
A. Direct Versus Derivative The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs’ claim is derivative or direct. Plaintiffs argue that their claim is direct. Defendants argue that P laintiffs’ claim is derivative and thus subject to Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, which require s Plaintiffs to either make a pre

- suit demand on the Board or to demonstrate that demand would have been futile. Plaintiffs did not make a pre

- suit demand, and Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate demand futility , requiring judgment in Defendants’ favor. In 2004, the Delaware Supreme Court established a two

- part test for determining whether cl aims are direct or derivative in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc

. 192

190 Dkt. 78, Tr. of 11.18.20 Oral Arg. and Rulings of the Ct. on Pls.’ Mot. for Class Certification Held Via Zoom at 41.
191 See Dkt. 106, The Williams Defs.’ Opening Post

- Trial Br. (“Defs.’ Opening Br.”); Dkt. 107, Pls.’ Post

- Trial Br. (“Pls.’ Opening Br.”); Dkt. 115, The Williams Defs.’ Answering Post

- Trial Br. (“Defs.’ Answering Br.”); Dkt. 117, Pls.’ Post

- Trial Answering Br. (“Pls.’ Answering Br.”). Computershare Trust filed memoranda with the court joining in the Williams Defendants’ post

- trial briefing. See Dkt . 108, Def. Computershare Trust Company, N.A.’s Post

- Trial Mem. or, Alternatively, Joinder in The Williams’ Defs.’ Opening Post

- Trial Opening Br.; Dkt. 118, Def. Computershare Trust Company, N.A.’s Joinder in The Williams Defs.’ Answering Post

- Trial Br.
192 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004).37 Tooley involved a third

- party, two

- step acquisition in which the target corporation consented to the acquirer postponing the closing of the first

- step tender offer by twenty

two days. 193 Stockholder plaintiffs sued, claiming that the stockholders of the target corporation had a contractual right to have the offer close on time. The plaintiffs claimed that had the offer closed on time, the stockholders would have gotten their money faster. As damages, the plaintiffs sought the time value of money that they had lost from the delay. 194 The Court of Chancery held that the claims were derivative and dismissed them under Rule 23.1. 195 In reaching this conclusion, the trial court rel ied on Delaware decisions employing the concept of “special injury” to determine when a plaintiff could sue directly. 196 Those decisions defined special injury as a wrong “separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders . . . or a wrong invo lving a contractual right of a shareholder.” 197 Applying the special

- injury test, the trial court held that there was no meaningful distinction between the contract rights of the tendering and non

- tendering stockholders, such that they all held parallel c ontract rights. 198 The decision then reasoned that

193 Id. at 1034.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1033.
196 Id. at 1035; s ee Lipton v. News Int’l, Plc , 514 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Del. 1986).
197 Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc. , 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch. 1985) (“ Moran I ”) , aff’d , 500 A.2d 1346 (Del . 1985) (internal citations omitted).
198 Tooley , 845 A.2d at 1035.38 “[b]ecause this delay affected all

. . . shareholders equally, plaintiffs’ injury was not a special injury, and this action is, thus, a derivative action at most.” 199 In other words, the trial court accepted the argument that it was appropriate to treat a claim

— there, a contractual claim

— as deri vative if all of the stockholders held the same right and all suffered the same injury to th eir parallel right. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed

. The high c ourt recognized that the concept of special injury had become “amorphous and confusing” 200 and t raced much of the uncertainty to Bokat v. Getty Oil Co. , where it held that “[w]hen an injury to corporate stock falls equally upon all stockholders, then an individual stockholder may not recover for the injury to his stock alone, but must seek recovery d erivatively in [sic] behalf of the corporation.” 201 The Tooley c ourt described Bokat as “confusing and inaccurate” for the following reasons: It is confusing because it appears to have been intended to address the fact that an injury to the corporation tends to diminish each share of stock equally because corporate assets or their value are diminished. In that sense, the indirect injury to the stockholders arising out of the harm to the corporation comes about solely by virtue of their stockholdings. It does not arise out of any independent or direct harm to the stockholders, individually. That concept is also inaccurate because a direct, indi vidual claim of stockholders that does not depend on harm to the corporation can also fall on all stockholders equally, without the claim thereby becoming a derivative claim. 202

199 Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. , 2003 WL 203060, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 2003).
200 Tooley , 845 A.2d at 1035.
201 262 A.2d 246, 249 (Del. 1970) , abrogated by Tooley , 845 A.2d at 1038

– 39. 202 Tooley , 845 A.2d at 1037 (emphasis added).39 In this passage, Tooley reframed the analysis in a way intended to remedy the confusion caused by Bokat by distinguishing between (i) an injury that fell indirectly on all stockholders equally, which supported a derivative claim, and (ii) an injury that affected stockholders dire ctly , even if all stockholders suffered the same injury, which gave rise to a direct claim. 203 Tooley then expressly reject ed the special

- injury test in favor of a new,
two

- part standard , asking : “(1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually) ? ” 204
No decision since Tooley has addressed whether a claim seeking to enjoin a stockholder rights plan is derivative. In one decision, this court dismissed under Rule 23.1 a claim for damages challenging a defensive action, but the defensive action did not involve a rights plan and the plaintiff did not dispute that the claim was derivative. 205 In an other decision considering a challenge to a series of anti

- takeover measures, the court deemed the direct

- derivative distinction immaterial to the outcome and thus declined to determine whether the claims were solely derivative. 206

203 See generally In re El Paso Pipeline P’rs, L.P. Derivative Litig. , 132 A.3d 67, 97

– 99 (Del. Ch. 2015) (describing Tooley ’s treatment of the analysis in Bokat ), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, El Pa so Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C. v. Brinckerhoff , 152 A.3d 1248 (Del. 2016).
204 Tooley , 845 A.2d at 1033.
205 Ryan v. Armstrong , 2017 WL 2062902, at *10, *18 (Del. Ch. May 15, 2017) (dismissing a concededly derivative stockholder challenge to a defensive measure wh ere the plaintiff failed to plead that a majority of the board was interested in the transaction and instead relied on “ Unocal to get around the demand requirement”).
206 In re Ebix, Inc. S’holder Litig. , 2014 WL 3696655, at *14

– 16 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss claims challenging, in part, a golden parachute award as an40 Tooley , however, did not expressly overrule the cases applying the special

- injury test, and the decision suggested that some of those cases might have reached the right outcome, thus opening the door for litigants to rely on decisions predating Tooley

. 207 In bri efing, Defendants rely on this court’s pre - Tooley decision in Moran (“ Moran I ”) for the proposition that poison pill challenges must be brought derivatively.
In Moran I , the board of Household International, Inc. (“Household”) adopted a rights plan with 20% and 30% triggers as a preventive measure to fend off a potential takeover by an entity affiliated with one of Household’s own directors

. 208 Applying the special

- injury test, the trial court concluded that the stockholder plaintiff’s challenge was deriv ative : [W]here, as here, no shareholder is presently engaged in a proxy battle, and the alleged manipulation of corporate machinery does not directly prohibit proxy contests, such an action must be brought derivatively on behalf of the corporation.” 209

unreasonable anti

- takeover device, concluding that “whether this claim is direct or derivative is immaterial” to the outcome on a motion to dismiss); see also In re Gayl ord Container Corp. S’holders Litig. , 747 A.2d 71, 81 (Del. Ch. 1999) (finding under the pre

Tooley special

- injury test that a claim challenging a rights plan was direct in nature, but observing that claims “implicating the heightened scrutiny required by Unocal ” will pass the demand futility test under Aronson ); In re Chrysler Corp. S’holders Litig. , 1992 WL 181024, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 27, 1992) (concluding under the pre

- Tooley special

- injury test that the court “need not (and therefore does not) decide w hether the plaintiffs’ recission claims [challenging a rights plan] are solely derivative” because they satisfied the Aronson test).
207 See Tooley 845 A.2d at 1039.
208 Moran I , 490 A.2d at 1066.
209 Id. at 1070.41 De fendants interpret the above

- quoted language as creating a rule that all poison pill challenges are derivative subject to a narrow exception that applies during an active proxy
contest

. 210 For simplicity, this decision refers to this characterization of Mo ran I as the “derivative presumption.” Based on this presumption, Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs are not engaged in a proxy contest, they cannot pursue their claims directly. As with any pre

- Tooley holding, a court must determine whether the rul ing resulted from the now

- defunct special

- injury test. 211 The derivative presumption of Moran I suffers from this flaw, as language found just two sentences after the above

- quoted language reveals: “ Because the plaintiffs are not engaged in a proxy battle, they suffer no injury distinct from that suffered by other shareholders as a result of this alleged restraint on the ability to gain control of Household through a proxy contest.” 212 The emphasized language reflects that the Moran I court viewed th e exception

— a stockholder’s active pursuit of a proxy battle

— as a “separate and distinct” feature giving rise to a special injury. Absent that special injury, the Moran I court saw the pill as affecting the rights of all stockholders to the same degree. T he derivative presumption of Moran I thus appears to be a direct application of the special

- injury test , and this aspect of Moran I was thus impliedly abrogated by Tooley

. Even before Tooley , the derivative presumption of Moran I drew criticism. Just a few months after the Delaware Supreme Court issued Moran II , which affirmed Moran I

210 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 22.
211 See Tooley , 845 A.2d at 1039.
212 Moran I , 490 A.2d at 1070 (emphasis added).42 without addressing the derivative question , a federal court rejected a pleading

- stage argument that a claim challenging a poison pill adopted by the board of Crown Zellerbach Corporation was derivative in nature. 213 In 1994, the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance highlighte d the issue, comment ing that “[c]ases have divided as to whether the issuance of a ‘poison pill’ security can be challenged by a direct action on the grounds that it chills voting rights or restricts the alienability of the shareholder’s stock.” 214 Foresha dowing the law’s development in Tooley , the passage criticized Moran I because its “ focus on the similarly of treatment misses the central point that fundamental shareholder rights (e.g., voting and alienability) can be infringed by a variety of board acti ons that treat existing shareholders alike.” 215 In 1999, this court in Gaylord criticized the derivative presumption in Moran I

. 216 There, management owned a majority of the company’s Class B, super

- voting stock, which gave management control of the company. 217 A Chapter 11 restructuring required that the company reclassify its Class B stock and issue additional equity, which would reduce management’s voting power from 7 4 % to 20%. 218 Planning ahead, t he management

213 See Duman v. Crown Zellerbach Corp. , 107 F.R.D. 761, 764

– 65 (E.D. Ill. 1985).
214 2 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.01 n.3 , at 29 (Am. L. Inst. 1994).
215 S ee i d.
216 See Gaylord , 747 A.2d at 76

– 79.
217 Id. at 72

– 73. 218 Id. at 73.43 dominated board developed a strategy to maintain their control. First, the board adopt ed a poison pill with a 15% trigger that made it economically impractical for any one to accumulate a meaningful block without the board’s approval. Second, management exercised its power at both the board and stockholder levels to adopt a series of defensive charter and bylaw amendments before their voting control expired

. 219 The stockholders challenged the defensive measures and the claims survived a motion to dismiss. 220 On a motion for class certification, then

- Vice Chancellor Strine was required to deter mine whether the complaint pled derivative or direct claims. 221 He criticized the reasoning of the rule of Moran I on multiple grounds , centering on Moran I ’s failure to acknowledge who suffered the harm. 222 He pointedly asked “why a board’s action to interpose itself between stockholders who are ordinarily free to sell their shares, and purchasers who are ordinarily free to buy those shares

— if improper

— works an injury on the corporation as an entity. ” 223 By contrast, he though t it was “obvious” that the plan infringed on stockholders’ fundamental rights to sell and vote

. 224 In the end, the Vice Chancellor followed the derivative presumption of Moran I but observed that the ruling

219 Id.
220 Then

- Vice Chancellor Balick denied the motion, concluding that Unocal applied without analyzing whether the plaintiff’s claims were direct or derivative in nature, reasoning that invocation of Unocal sufficed to defeat a motion to dismiss. In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig. , 1996 WL 752356, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 1996).
221 See Gaylord , 747 A.2d at 74

– 75.
222 See i d. at 76

– 79.
223 Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
224 Id

.44 was immaterial on the facts of the case

. 225 The Vice Chancellor explained that if the plaintiff stated a claim implicating Unocal , then the practical effect was “automatic demand excusal” under Aronson

. 226 Tooley addressed the faulty logic of Moran I ’s derivative presumption . It is now possible to embrace the reasoning of Gaylord and acknowledge that poison pills , if improper , work an injury on stockholders directly by interfering with at least two fundamental stockholder rights. “Modern corporate law recognizes that stock holders have three fundamental, substantive rights: to vote, to sell, and to sue.” 227 From these fundamental rights flow

225 Id. at 82

– 83; see Moran I , 490 A.2d at 1069

– 71. 226 Gaylord , 747 A.2d at 83; id. at 81 (observing that “[s]o long as the plaintiff states a claim implicating the heightened scrutiny required by Unocal , demand has been excused under” Aronson ). At the time, that statement accurate ly descri bed of Delaware law. The Aronson test announced in 1984 used “the standard of review for the challenged decision as a proxy for whether directors face a substantial likelihood of liability sufficient to render demand futile.” United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. Zuckerberg , 2020 WL 6266162, at *15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2020). For many years following Aronson , application of enhanced scrutiny or entire fairness had the collateral effect of satisfying the pleading

- stage demand futility analysis. Id. at *9

– 11. Delaware law subsequently evolved to i mbue the derivative

- direct distinction with greater practical import. As Vice Chancellor Laster explained in his recent Zuckerberg decision, the standard of review no longer serves as a proxy for determining whether demand will be futile, and the hair

- spl itting direct

derivative distinction now has greater significance in the current jurisprudential landscape of Delaware law. Id. at *15

– 16; see also Armstrong , 2017 WL 2062902, at *13 (rejecting a per se rule that a well

- pled Unocal claim is sufficient to survive a Rule 23.1 demand futility analysis).
227 Strougo v. Hollander , 111 A.3d 590, 595 n.21 (Del. Ch. 2015); see also EMAK Worldwide, Inc. v. Kurz , 50 A.3d 429, 433 (Del. 2012); Unitrin , 651 A.2d at 1379 (affirming stockholders’ fundamental right to vote ).45 subsidiary rights , including the right to communicate with other stockholders, 228 nominate directors, 229 and communicate with (and even oppose) management and the Board. 230 As this court has observed, “[o]ne of the basic rights of a stockholder is to be able to communicate with his fellow stockholders on matters germane to such stock, and, if necessary, to organize other stockholders for c orporate action.” 231 All rights plans interfere to a some degree with the right to sell and the right to vote, but Moran held that the level of interference is nominal in the traditional anti

- takeover pill that has both a relatively high trigger and an ex ception for soliciting revocable proxies. A traditional pill did not attempt to restrict stockholder communications. As discussed below,
t he Plan goes beyond a traditional pill by combining a parsimonious trigger of 5% with the AIC Provision and a limite d passive ownership exception. Through this combination of provisions, the Plan limits the act of communicating itself, whether with other stockholders or management. It also restricts the stockholder’s ability to nominate directors. It thus infringe s on the stockholders’ ability to communicate freely in connection with the stockholder franchise, much of which occurs outside the context of proxy contest s
. 232 This articulation of the harm flows to stockholders and not the Company

. 233 In this way,

228 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Nw. Indus., Inc. , 1969 WL 2932, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 26, 1969).
229 Harrah’s Ent., Inc. v. JCC Hldg. Co. , 802 A.2d 294, 310

– 11 (Del. Ch. 2002).
230 Abajian v. Kennedy , 1992 WL 8794, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 17, 1992).
231 B.F. Goodrich, 196 9 WL 2932, at *2.
232 Trial Tr. 189:13

– 190:14 (Mills).
233 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot show injury because Wolosky testified that he does not intend on running a proxy contest, replacing any director, acquiring more than 5% of Williams stock, engaging in a takeover transaction, or engaging with other stockholders,46 e njoin ing the Plan is a remedy that affects stockholders alone and not the Company . Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim is direct under Tooley

. 234
B. The Standard of Review The parties also dispute the applicable standard of review. Plaintiffs contend that Unocal governs the court’s analysis. Defendants argue that the more deferential business judgment standard applies. Since the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Moran , this court “and the Supreme Court have used Unocal exclusively as the lens through which the validity of a contested rights plan is analyzed.” 235 Defendants nevertheless argue that the Board’s adoption and maintenance of the Plan should be subject to business judgment review. Defendants say that the sole

and he is not aware of any Williams stockholders who h ave refrained from taking this action because of the Rights Plan. See Defs.’ Opening Br. at 21

– 22. They portray Wolosky’s harm as entirely speculative. But it is not incumbent on a class representative to prove a negative . Given the Plan’s features, th e absence of stockholder activism could be a consequence of the Plan. And the fact that the Plan is alleged to have impeded the stockholder franchise suffices to render Plaintiffs’ claims direct.
234 At trial, Wolosky testified that the Plan impairs the val ue of the Company as a whole by stifling value

- enhancing activities. Trial Tr. at 28:21

– 23 (Wolosky). Defendants seize on this testimony to argue that any damages would flow to the Company as a whole and not its stockholders directly. See Defs.’ Opening Br. at 20 (quoting Trial Tr. at 28:11

– 23 (Wolosky)). Defendants’ argument might have merit if Plaintiffs were pursuing a claim for damages, but Plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief. See Wolosky Compl., Prayer for Relief at 20

– 21. Because Plaintiffs a re not seeking damages, this court need not resolve whether such a claim would be derivative in nature.
235 Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht , 2014 WL 1922029, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014); see also eBay Domestic Hldgs., Inc. v. Newmark , 16 A.3d 1, 28 (Del. Ch. 2 010) (“Enhanced scrutiny has been applied universally when stockholders challenge a board’s use of a rights plan as a defensive device.”).47 justification for Unocal’s enhanced standard is “the omnipresent specter that a board may be ac ting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders.” 236 Defendants argue that this specter is not present where a poison pill is designed to address stockholder activism as opposed to hostile takeover attempts.
T here are many possible responses to Defendants’ attempt to parse finely the concept of entrenchment , but it suffices for present purposes to say that Defendants’ contention runs contrary to the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Selectica II

. 237 There, t he poison pill was adopted for the purpose of preserving NOL assets and not warding off hostile takeover attempts. 238 The court held that the Unocal standard nevertheless applied because all poisons pills, “by

. . . nature,” have a potentially entrenching “effect.” 239 It is therefore settled law that the Board’s compliance with their

236 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 27 (quoting Unocal , 493 A.2d at 954 (Del. 1985)); see also Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig. , 753 A.2d 462, 474 (Del. Ch. 2000) (observing the “omnipresent specter” implicated “[w]hen a board adopts measures designed to deter or defend against an acquisition offer and thereby also against the possibility that the board and management will l ose their positions after the acquisition”).
237 5 A.3d 586.
238 Selectica II , 5 A.3d at 599.
239 Id. (“Any NOL poison pill’s principal intent . . . is to prevent the inadvertent forfeiture of potentially valuable assets, not to protect against hostile takeover attempts. Even so, any Shareholder Rights Plan, by its nature, operates as an antitakeover device. Consequently, notwithstanding i t s primary purpose, a NOL poison pill must also be analyzed under Unocal because of its effect and its direct implications f or hostile takeovers.” (emphasis added)); see also Third Point , 2014 WL 1922029, at *15 & n.10 (applying Unocal to an anti

- activist poison pill, observing that Delaware courts have “used Unocal exclusively as the lens through which the validity of a contes ted rights plan is analyzed” and that “[t]his includes cases in which a rights plan has been used outside of the hostile takeover context”); Air Prods. and Chems. v. Airgas, Inc. , 16 A.3d 48, 94 (Del. Ch. 2011) (observing that “[t]he Unocal standard of enh anced judicial scrutiny

— not the business judgment rule

— is the standard of review that applies to a board’s defensive48 fiduciary duties in adopting and then failing to redeem the Plan must be assessed under Unocal

. 240
C. The Unocal Analysis Having addressed the two threshold issues, this decision now turns to the merits of the enhanced scrutiny analysis. Unocal calls for a two

- part inquiry. “The first part of Unocal review requires a board to show that it had reasonable grounds for concluding that a threat to the corporate enterprise existed.” 241 Framed more broadly, directors must demonstrate that they acted in good faith to achieve a “legitimate corporate objective .” 242

actions taken in response to a hostile takeover,” and that “[t]his is how Delaware has always interpreted the Unocal standard”); eBay , 16 A .3d at 28 (observing that “[e]nhanced scrutiny has been applied universally when stockholders challenge a board’s use of a rights plan as a defensive device”); Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio , 1 A.3d 310, 330

– 36 (Del. Ch. 2010) (applying Unoca l to an anti

- activist poison pill).
240 Defendants attempt to meet Selectica with an overly narrow concept of entrenchment. “Entrench” means to fortify a position

— to make change difficult or unlikely. See, e.g., Entrench , Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam

- webster.com/dictionary/entrench (defining “entrench’ as “to place within or surround with a trench especially for defense,” “to place (oneself) in a strong defensive position,” and “to establish solidly”); Entrench , Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/entrench (defining “entrench” as “to fi rmly establish something . . . so that it cannot be changed”); Entrench , Lexico, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/entrench (defining “entrench” as to “[e]stablish (a person or their authority) in a position of great strength or security,” noting that t he word originates from “the sense ‘place within a trench’”). As discussed below, the Board in this case acted with the purpose of insulating the Board and management from stockholder influence during a time of uncertainty. This conduct thus seems to fit the definition of entrenchment.
241 Selectica II , 5 A.3d at 599.
242 See Mercier v. Inter

- Tel (Del.), Inc. , 929 A.2d 786, 807

– 810 (Del. Ch. 2007) (cautioning against placing “too much emphasis on the word ‘threat’” when conducting a Unocal review); id. (sta ting that “[t]he core of Unocal ’s utility really rests in the burden it asserts on directors to: (1) identify the proper corporate objectives served by their actions; and (2) justify their actions as reasonable in relationship to those objectives”).49 To satisfy the first part of Unocal , D efendant s must demonstrate that the Board conducted a “good faith and reasonable investigation.” 243 The reasonableness of the investigation is “materially enhanced” 244 where the corporate decision is approved by a board comprising a majority of outside, nonemployee directors “coupled with a showing of reliance on advice by legal and financial advisors.” 245
To meet their burden under the first part of Unocal , however, Defendants must do more than show good faith a nd reasonable investigation. “[T]he first part of Unocal review requires more than that; it require s the board to show that its good faith and reasonable investigation ultimately gave the board ‘grounds for concluding that a threat to the corporate enterp rise existed

. ’ ” 246 In other words, after conducting a reasonable investigation and acting in good faith, the board must show that it sought to serve a legitimate corporate objective by responding to a legitimate threat. If the threat is not legitimate, then a reasonable inve stigation into the illegitimate threat, or a good faith belief that the threat warranted a response, will not be enough to save the board. The second part of Unocal requires a board to show that the defensive measures were “reasonable in relation to the t hreat posed.” 247 This element of the Unocal test

243 Uno cal , 493 A.2d at 955.
244 Id.
245 Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc. , 2010 WL 703062, at *12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010) (“ Selectica I ”).
246 Air Prods. , 16 A.3d at 104 (quoting Selectica II , 5 A.3d at 599 ) (emphasis added).
247 4 93 A.2d at 949. By adopting the nomenclature of Unocal , this court does not place “too much emphasis on the word ‘threat.’” Mercier , 929 A.2d at 807.50 recognizes that a board ’ s powers to act “are not absolute” and that a board “does not have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any Draconian means available.” 248 When applying the reasonabl eness standard, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the board. The court instead determines whether the measure falls within “the range of reasonableness.” 249 When conducting the proportionality analysis, the court also examines the rel ationship between the defensive action that the directors took and the problem they sought to address. 250 The court thus examines “the reasonableness of the end that the directors chose to pursue, the path that they took to get there, and the fit between t he means and the end.” 251 It is the specific nature of the threat that “sets the parameters for the range

248 493 A.2d at 949.
249 Unitrin , 651 A.2d at 1387

– 88 (quoting Paramount , 637 A.2d at 45

– 46).
250 See Mercier , 929 A.2d at 808.
251 See Obeid v. Hogan , 2016 WL 3356851, at *13 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016) (providing overview of enhanced scrutiny); Mercier, 929 A.2d at 810

– 811 (explaining that when directors take action that affects stockholder voting, enhanced s crutiny requires that the defendant fiduciaries bear the burden of proving (i) that “their motivations were proper and not selfish,” (ii) that they “did not preclude the stockholders from exercising their right to vote or coerce them into voting a particul ar way,” and (iii) that the directors' actions “were reasonable in relation to their legitimate objective”); id. at 811 (“If for some reason, the fit between means and ends is not reasonable, the directors would also come up short.”); see also In re Dolla r Thrifty S ’ holder Litig. , 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch.2010) (explaining that when applying enhanced scrutiny, “the court seeks to assure itself that the board acted reasonably, in the sense of taking a logical and reasoned approach for the purpose of advanc ing a proper objective, and to thereby smoke out mere pretextual justifications for improperly motivated decisions”); id. at 599

– 600 (“[T]he reasonableness standard requires the court to consider for itself whether the board is truly well motivated (i.e., is it acting for the proper ends?) before ultimately determining whether its means were themselves a reasonable way of advancing those ends.”); cf. Yucaipa , 1 A.3d at 337 (“ Unitrin left room51 of permissible defensive tactics” and a “reasonableness analysis requires an evaluation of the importance of the corporate objective threatened; alter native methods for protecting that objective; impacts of the defensive action and other relevant factors.” 252
1. The Director Defendants’ Reasons for Acting The Director Defendants’ actual and articulated reason for taking action figures prominently in the Unocal analysis. In the traditional language of Unocal , the directors must have identified and responded to a legitimate corporate threat. They cannot justify their conduct based on threats that they never identified or belief s they did not hold. 253 Before turning to the question of whether the threat is legitimate, the court must determine why the Director Defendants acted. This decision therefore starts by making factual findings concerning the threat or corporate objective t o which the Board was responding when adopting the Plan.

a. The Actual Threats That the Board Identified It is often difficult to distill a unified purpose behind a decision made by a group of people ; often , members of the group have different reasons for sup porting a decision. It is particularly difficult to discern such a purpose in the context of litigation, where there is

for a determination that a non

- preclusive, non

- coercive defensive measure was nonetheless unreasonable in light of the threat faced by the corporation.”).
252 Selectica I , 2010 WL 703062, at *19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Unitrin , 651 A.2d at 1384, and then quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time I nc. , 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
253 See, e.g. , Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore , 771 A.2d 293, 332 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding that board did not identify and consider a threat it later relied on at trial).52 always the risk that fact witnesses will recall events that occurred prior to litigation through the lens of newly crafted litigation p ositions. This challenging task is further complicated here because the lawyer

- drafted documents to which one would typically look for a statement of a board’s purpose

— e.g., board resolutions, board minutes, company disclosures

— do not reflect the Board’s actual intent. The materials from the March 19 Board meeting , including the resolution , the March 20 P ress R elease, and the March 30 Proxy Supplement , all state that the Plan was intended in part to serve as a takeover deterrent

. 254 But the Plan was not designed for that

254 JX

- 67 at 2 (March 19 Board meeting minutes) (“The Board deems it desirable and in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders that steps be taken to preserve for the Company’s stockholders the long

- term value of the Company in the case of a coe rcive or inadequate takeover or rapid accumulations of large positions by persons not having a passive intent .” (emphasis added)); JX

- 69 at 2 (March 20 Williams press release) (“The Board . . . has adopted the [Plan] to reduce the likelihood that a potenti al acquirer would gain (or seek to influence or change) control of the Company by open market accumulation or other tactics without paying an appropriate premium for the Company’s shares

. (emphasis added)); JX

- 82 at 3 (March 30 Proxy Supplement) (“The Boar d determined that the adoption of the [Plan] is appropriate in light of the extreme market dislocation that has resulted in the company’s stock being fundamentally undervalued. The conditions stemming from the impact of COVID

- 19 on the economy and the vol atility of the oil market have resulted in significant decline in the company’s stock price. The [Plan] is intended to enable all Williams stockholders to realize the full value of their equity investment and to reduce the likelihood of those seeking shor t

- term gains taking advantage of current market conditions at the expense of the long

- term interests of stockholders or of any person or group gaining control of Williams through open market accumulation or other tactics (especially in volatile markets) wi thout paying an appropriate control premium.” (emphasis added)); id. (“The company has, as of the date of this supplement, reached out to all of our major stockholders regarding our rights plan. Most of the stockholders we have engaged with to date have i nformed us that they understand the need for the adoption of our [Plan] in the context of the highly unusual and extreme circumstances that led to the current severe market conditions and the need to protect the interests of the company and its long

- term s tockholders.” (emphasis added)).53 purpose, and some of the directors did not have that in mind when adopting the Plan. 255 The Plan was not adopted with the objective of deterring takeover attempts. In fact, the Plan was not adopted to protect against any specific threat at all

. 256 The

255 See Trial Tr. at 93:16

– 19 (Cogut) (confirming that “the pill wasn’t intended or designed to deal with the risk of a takeover at all”); id. at 515:1

– 7 (Subramanian) (opining that “this rights plan was not meant to be a hos tile takeover deterrent” and that “the pill would have been virtually irrelevant for that kind of hostile bid” because the company was vulnerable to takeover activity for other reasons). Other witnesses were more qualified in their statements, testifying that the Plan was not intended to deal with a specific takeover threat. See, e.g. , id. at 599:7

– 10 (Buese) (confirming that “the pill was not adopted in response to any person or group attempting to take control of the company”); Bergstrom Dep. Tr. at 179 :23

– 180:16 (testifying that he was “not aware of any specific takeover threat at the time”). But see Fuller Dep. Tr. at 56:8

– 20 (testifying that “we were doing something to protect the long

- term shareholders and prevent someone coming in and, you know, so rt of acquiring stock at very low levels and possibly . . . forcing a sale of the company below its long

- term value” (emphasis added)).
256 PTO ¶ 82; Trial Tr. at 544:8

– 15 (Buese) (testifying that “there was no actual threat”); Bergstrom Dep. Tr. at 181:13

– 1 9 (testifying that “we were not aware of any specific threat, as I earlier testified”); Fuller Dep. Tr. at 234:22

– 235:5 (testifying that she perceived no “current threat” to Williams when the Plan was adopted); see also JX

- 78 at 11 ( Chandler telling invest ors during a Mar. 25, 2020 business update call: “we did not adopt that [rights] plan

. . . in response to any specific threat”); JX

- 187 at 12 (Krieg emailing Wilson and Chandler on Apr. 13, 2020, with points for Apr

. 15, 2020 investor relationship call, stating that the “[p] lan was not adopted in response to any known / specific threat”); JX

- 62 at 1 (Chandler writing in a Mar. 19, 2020 email: “I do think it is important to leave the reader with the belief this [adoption of the Plan] is not being done bec ause of some ominous business results that will be coming out . . . . But purely because we don’t think the market price is reflective of our value.” (ellipses in original)); id. at 2 (Chandler writing in a Mar. 18, 2020 email: “We will want to alleviate fears that we are doing this because something ominous is coming.”); id. (Krieg writing in a Mar. 18, 2020 email that “the strong position of our business is not being recognized by the market; we don’t want opportunist [sic] to swoop in and claim the tru e value of the business at an artificially low value”); Trial Tr. at 92:5

– 10 (Cogut) (“I think it’s an open question as to whether or not there needed to be a threat for us to have taken this action.”); id. at 353:6

– 354:2 (Smith) (testifying that he was no t aware of any activists, or persons generally, seeking to take advantage of Williams stock price at the time the Plan was adopted).54 Board was not concerned about any specific activist threat. 257 Nor was the Board acting to
preserve any specific asset like an NOL

. 258 Instead, t he Board was acting pre - emptively to interdict hypothetical future threats. 259
T h e Plan was also not adopted in light of the Company’s prior experience with activism , although Defendants took that position throughout this litigation

. 260 It is true that

257 See Trial Tr. at 321:8

– 10 (Smith) (testifying that he was not aware of “any particular risks with respect to shareholder activism”); id. at 93:20

– 94:7 (Cogut) (“There was, to the best of our knowledge at that point, very little activist involvement, but there was . . . a market opportunity for people who might want to come in and exercise influence and control over the compa ny. . . .”); id. at 599:11

– 14 (Buese) (confirming that the Plan “was not adopted in response to any person or group attempting to exercise influence over the company”); Bergstrom Dep. Tr. at 182:5

– 9 (testifying that “[t]here was not any specific activist investor threat”); Fuller Dep. Tr. at 196:3

– 13 (testifying that the “danger” was that “someone could amass a fair amount of stock and put itself in a position of forcing the board to take action that was not in the best interest of the long

- term s hareholders”).
258 Trial Tr. at 598:23

– 599:2 (Buese); id. at 346:19

– 22 (Smith); Chandler Dep. Tr. at 195:17

– 21. 259 See JX

- 73 at 1 (Wilson emailing management on Mar. 20, 2020: “I think I can help convince [Blackrock] that this was solely a proactive effort, that we monitor our positions frequently and that we have no indication of anyone being in our stock . We can also be very definitive that we have not received an offer. I also think its fair game to point out that the company has been through this once b efore recently and saw how an activist can destroy long term value

– again purely proactive.” (emphasis added)); id. at 2 (Wilson emailing management on Mar. 20, 2020: “I think we can craft a very good argument that this should be viewed by our long term investors as good governance. . . . Activists always push the needle in the wrong direction on those issues, so we are being proactive to prevent an activist from making a lot of short term money at the cost of the very things Blackrock views as most impo rtant.” (emphasis added)).
260 JX

- 144 at Response to Interrogatory No. 1 (“The Board’s views and conclusions were also reinforced by Williams’ experience during the 2013 to 2016 time period with two shareholder activists, each of whom held less than 5% of Wi lliams stock but who acted together in a coordinated attempt to exert substantial influence over Williams.”); Subramanian Report ¶ 16 (“I understand from my review of deposition testimony taken in this action that one of the factors that motivated the Boar d’s adoption of a poison pill in55 Williams m anagement cited prior activism as a justification for the Plan when communicating with stockholders in advance of the annual meeting. 261 It is also true that Smith’s prior experience appear s to have contributed to his support of the Plan

. 262 B ut there is no evidence that it was a motivating factor of the Board as a whole. T he Board simply did not discuss the Company’s prior experience with activism during the March 18 or March 19 meetings. 263 This justification appears to have emerged at the Board level after the Plan had been adopted

. 264 Indeed, Cogut testified that “the fact that the company

March 2020 was Williams’ past experience with shareholder activists several years earlier.”).
261 See, e.g., JX

- 117 at 7 (communicating to stockholders that “Company experience in recent past reinforced Board’s view that 5% i s the right threshold in this environment”); JX

- 70 at 1 (strategizing a response to Blackrock’s concerns, Wilson noting that “it’s fair game to point out that the company has been through this once before recently and saw how an activist can destroy long t erm value”); JX

- 187 at 3 (noting, in a document containing talking points for conversations with investors, that Company representatives should discuss: “Company recent past experiences with activism

– Corvex and Sorobon [sic] owned, either as beneficial owners or as economic interest owners, 9.96% of the Company’s outstanding shares. Neither owned more than 5%.”).
262 See JX

- 46 (Smith emailing Wilson on the evening of March 17 that he was “[v]ery happy about the upcoming discussion on a shareholders rights plan especially after recounting to [Cogut] what we went thru [sic] in 2015/16”); see also Trial Tr. at 322:9

– 323:12 (Smith) (testifying that his email referred to the activism Williams had previously faced, but that he had not discussed that experience “ at this particular time”); id . at 351:23

– 352:24 (Smith).
263 Trial Tr. at 334:1

– 10 (Smith); id. at 548:23

– 549:3 (Buese); id. at 143:21

– 144:4 (Cogut).
264 For example, Cogut’s first mention of the prior activism appears in an April 9, 2020 email exchange with Wilson where Wilson suggested adding to the “talking points” to be discussed with stockholders that “Corvex and Sorobon [sic] owned, either as beneficial owners or as economic interest owners, 9.96% of our outstanding shares. We’ll have that in the talkin g points or facts. It goes to the very reason we did 5%.” JX

- 104. But see Trial Tr. at 169:5

– 12 (Cogut) (testifying that the 5% trigger “was there for a number of reasons, but not because the Corvex and other guys had 9.6”). And testimony by the Direct or Defendants unequivocally confirms that the subject was never discussed by the Board in56 had to deal with activists before was not a motivating force” 265 and that he “would have had the same idea whether or not the company had ever had activist experience.” 266
T he record is clear that the Company’s declining stock price was the initial catalyst for the Board’s decision. Testimony and contemporaneous emails align on this fact

. 267
T he context and timing of the Plan ’s adoption further corroborates it , as t he Board called an “urgent” meeting as its stock price continue d to decline in the wake of the market disruption caused by COVID

- 19 and the oil pricing war. 268 When asked during trial and at their respective depositions about the reasons for adopting the Plan, Cogut, Smith, Buese, Bergstrom , and Fuller testified generally that the

connection with its pill deliberations. Id. at 143:21

– 144:4 (Cogut); id. at 334:1

– 19; 352:15

– 353:5 (Smith); id. at 548:23

– 549:15, 577:23

– 579:11 (Buese).
265 Trial Tr. at 143:21

– 24 (Cogut).
266 Id. at 144:2

– 4 (Cogut).
267 See JX

- 50; JX

- 62; JX

- 171; Trial Tr. at 320:1

– 24 (Smith); id. at 551:7

– 10, 554:18

– 555:3 (Buese); Bergstrom Dep. Tr. at 182:5

– 14; see also Trial Tr. at 147:20

– 148:5 (Cogut) (“And, obviously, other than being concerned that there would be market dislocation because of COVID, you know, I had no expectation that, you know, over the course of the next two to three weeks that the stock would fall the way it did.”).
268 See JX

- 45 at 1 (proposing “an urgent special telephonic board meeting to discuss the possibility of a shareholder rights plan”); PTO ¶ 83 (“The conditions that caused the significant decline in Williams stock price stemmed from the impact of COVID

- 19 on the economy and the volatility of the oil market relating to the pricing war . . . .”); PTO Ex. A (noting Williams ’ declining stock price during March 2020). In briefing, Plaintiffs made much of the fact that Cogut testified that he “wasn’t really concerned that the [stock] price was low,” see Pls.’ Opening Br. at 20, but Cogut made this statement almost immediately after affirming his concern that “the stock price would create a certain amount of opportunism and availability” for act ivism to emerge. Trial Tr. at 143:9

– 20 (Cogut). Cogut’s testimony, therefore, does not undermine the weight of evidence reflecting that the market

- wide dislocation was the impetus behind the Plan.57 intent of the Plan was to deter stockholder activism, although they all added their own gloss when articulating this purpose. Cogut’s testimony was the most unadorned and refreshingly candid. He testified that he proposed the Plan to insulate the Board and management from all forms of stockholder activism during the uncertainty of the p andemic. In Cogut’s words:

• The Rights Plan w as a “novel concept” that used “the technology of shareholder rights plans to provide insulation [for] management during the uncertainty created by the pandemic .” 269

• The Plan’s objective was agnostic regarding different kinds of activism. When asked whether Cogut was “drawing distinctions between different kinds of activism” the Plan was trying to halt, he responded : “ A ny activism that would influence control over the company at an aggregate level above 5 per cent, yeah.” 270

• The Plan’s value was its ability “to prevent against an activist buying a toehold of 5 percent or more or acting in concert with other activists so that our management could be freed up .
. . to run a company during COVID .” 271

• The Plan’s power was immense : “ [T] he shareholder rights plan is the nuclear weapon of corporate governance , ” and “nuclear weapons are deterrents” that would force activists to deal with the Board instead of talking to each other. 272

• The Plan’s objective was to impose a “ one - year mo ratorium ” on activism. 273

269 Trial Tr. at 69:8

– 11 (Cogut) (emphasis added); see also id. 69:22

– 70:1 (Cogut) (confirming his view that the purpose of the pill was to “protect against activists during COVID”); JX

- 41 (Cogut writing in a March 17, 2020 email that “[t]he goal is to prevent a raider from taking advantage of the current situatio n”).
270 Trial Tr. at 70:20

– 71:5 (Cogut) (emphasis added).
271 Id. at 114:24

– 125:13 (Cogut) (emphasis added).
272 Id. at 114:10

– 20 (Cogut) (emphasis added).
273 Id. at 118:11

– 18 (Cogut) (emphasis added).58 Smith similarly testified that he hoped to protect the company from outside pressures to allow the Board and management to “get our job done.” 274 Smith expressed a desire to protect long

- term interests. Smith also expressed a desi re to force stockholders seeking to accumulate stock in excess of 5% to negotiate with the Board. In Smith’s words:

• He described the rights plan as “one more arrow in the quiver” to “ protect the company from more outside pressures so we can get our job do ne.” 275

• His concern was: “[H]ow do we protect our long
- term shareholders ? And how do we protect this company?” 276

• He was not focused on “any particular risks with respect to shareholder activism,” but he instead sought to “creat[e] a pathway that would all ow us to move forward.” 277

• He viewed the Plan as a form of buffer

— “ guardrails along the track so that we could have a map to be able to rationally deal with any type of event that might occur under a shareholder rights plan.” 278 Buese too was concerned about stockholder activism , but she focused more specifically on “short

- term

- oriented investors.” 279 She also expressed concerns about the “rapid accumulation by shareholders.” 280 In Buese’s words:

• “[I]n the energy space, and the MLP sector in particular, the re were a number of well
- known short
- termist parties and hedge funds who were

274 Id. at 320:19

– 20 (Smith).
275 Id. at 320:15

– 321:5 (Smith) (emphasis added).
276 Id. at 320:21

– 24 (Smith) (emphasis added).
277 Id. at 321:8

– 10 (Smith); see also JX

- 46 (Smith writing in a March 17, 2020 email that he was “[v]ery happy about the upcoming discussion on a shareholders rights plan especially after recounting to [Cogut] what we went thru [sic] in 2015/16”).
278 Trial Tr. at 354:19

– 23 (Smith) (emphasis added).
279 Id. at 539:22 (Buese).
280 Id. at 601:16

– 17 (Buese).59 known to work together in certain circumstances and had done so in the past.” 281

• The volatility in Williams stock price “was creating a lot of uncertainty and risk for the long
- term value of the company that was completely unwarranted and not borne out by the performance of the company.” 282

• “[ S]hort
- term - oriented investors not infrequently will take the opportunity to build up, accumulate shares, and may act in a way or attempt to act in a way that is not consistent with the long
- term , best interests of the overall shareholder group.” 283

• “[T]he rapid accumulation and the very low share price, even in jus t raw dollars, would potentially invite short
- termism and hedge funds to jump in. ” 284

• “[Y]ou see the short
- termism come out of the woodwork” where “the market was reacting to the macro conditions with a great deal of velocity.” 285

• The Board discussed the t hreat of a rapid accumulation of stock at the March 19 meeting and Morgan Stanley advised that the Plan “ would deter an activist from taking advantage of the current market dislocation and challenges in monitoring unusual trading patterns that results in a rapid accumulation of a >5% stake.” 286

• “[P]art of the fiduciary duty of the board members is that . . . if an offer is provided to the board and/or to management, that it’s our job to consider it and give it due course. The entire purpose of the [P]lan is to make sure that that was not done in a way that is only for the interests of the short
- term investor taking that action and not in the overall best interests of the entire shareholder group for the longer term .” 287

281 Id. at 548:12

– 16 (Buese) (emphasis added).
282 Id. at 539:5

– 18 (Buese) (em phasis added).
283 Id. at 539:21

– 540:2 (Buese) (emphasis added).
284 Id. at 556:23

– 557:6 (Buese) (emphasis added).
285 Id. at 539:5

– 13 (Buese) (emphasis added).
286 Id. at 556:7

– 23 (Buese) (emphasis added).
287 Id. at 566:9

– 21 (Buese) (emphasis added).60 • But the Board was not aware of a “rapid accumulation of Williams stock by any particular investor” at the time the Plan: “ [T]here was no actual threat

. . . . [I]t was a perceived threat

. . . . ” 288 Bergstrom testified that the Plan specifically targeted activists. He echoed the “guardrails” and “rapid accumulation” concerns raised by Smith and Buese. In Bergstrom’s words:

• The Plan was “being used to avoid raiders

– activists getting involved at the compan y because the stock had dropped from $24 to eight and made it much, much easier for som ebody to come in who wanted to disrupt the company at that point in time. And that was the . . . concern that I had.” 289

• Activist activity was the “big concern from my perspective . I’m not sure how widely

-- how wide that was a concern of the rest of the board. That was clearly mine.” 290

• The Plan “ allows the company to
-- the board to negotiate and talk to the shareholder who jumps in the middle and wants to do something different dramatically or different than what the company currently is doing.” 291

• W hen the Plan was adopted, “[t]here was not any specific activist investor threat,” but “the result in stock price decline certainly made it much, much easier for that to occur.” 292

• He further explained that “we thought if we did nothing, that the company wa s at risk for activist investors to do things that were not in the best interest of the total shareholder base. . . . Plus, at that point, you know, the stock price, our cash flow had not changed materially and the stock price had dropped . . . by threefo ld. And the price was not representative of the value

288 Id. at 544:8

– 15 (Buese) (emphasis added).
289 Bergstrom Dep. Tr. at 52:19

– 53:2 (emphasis added).
290 Id. at 50:11

– 14 (emphasis added).
291 Id. at 31:9

– 25 (emphasis added).
292 Id. at 182:5

– 9.61 of the cash flows going forward. And so we felt like as a board we needed to do something

. . . to protect it.” 293 Fuller testified that the Plan was intended to avoid disruption by insulating the

mana gement team to allow them to focus on long

- term interests. She too testified as to her desire to protect the Company against short

- termism and the rapid accumulation of stock

. In Fuller’s words:

• “The company is dealing with a whole host of very significa nt and serious, serious issues at this time. And what’s being discussed is something to put in place for the short

- term to at least make sure that a group of activists don’t just take a position without having to declare themselves and their intention.

. . . And I really wanted this excellent management team to at least be focused on making sure that we weren’t vulnerable. ” 294

• “What was foremost in my mind was making sure that we got the best value for shareholders. And that . . . the management team was focused on making sure the company navigated and that shareholders, long
- term shareholders . . . would not be in a position w here there was a sale that was way below what the company was truly worth.” 295

• The “danger” posed was that the stock “was so underpriced that someone could amass a fair amount of stock and put itself in a position of forcing the board to take action that wa s not in the best interest of the long

- term shareholders .” 296

• When asked about threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, she responded that she was “aware of . . . what had happened in a generic sense in 2013. And that it had been pretty really disrup tive to the management of the company. And thinking about disruption, we are already in a disruptive environment, hugely disruptive, was something that I was concerned would have a negative effect on the operations of the company .” 297

293 Id. at 184:10

– 185:7.
294 Fuller Dep. Tr. at 233:3

– 234:19 (emphasis added).
295 Id. at 57:25

– 58:13 (emphasis added).
296 Id. at 196:3

– 13 (emphasis added).
297 Id. at 225:16

– 25 (emphasis added).62 A few themes emerge from the Director Defendants ’ testimony. First, they all expressed the sentiment that the Plan was intended to deter stockholder activis m
. 298 Second, t hey desired to insulate the board from activists pursuing “short

- term” agendas and from distraction and disruption generally. Third, they were concerned that a stockholder might stealthily and rapidly accumulate large amounts of stock

. 299
b. The Legitimacy of the Actual Threats T he first prong of Unocal requires evaluating whether the Board has demonstrated that it conducted a good faith reasonable investigation and had “ grounds for concluding that a threat to the corporate enterprise existed. ” 300 Defendants have demonstrated that the Board conducted a good faith , reasonable investigation when adopting the Plan. The Director Defendants are nearly all independent, outside directors. They considered the Plan over the course of two meetings. Although aspects of the record create the impression that the second Boar d meeting was window dressing, it is clear that there was genuine

298 See also JX

- 187 at 1 (Chandler writing: “limited scope  just activist”).
299 This last purpose features prominently in the documentary record as well. See JX

- 171 at 2 (Krieg writing: “One thing we are interested in is folks who may be getting close to the 5% ownership line in real

- time (so surveillance data). Could you all prod uce a report that shows folks where [sic] are close to crossing the 5% ownership line or folks who look like they might be ramping up their position (close to that line)?”); JX

- 172 at 3 (Krieg writing: “ [C] ould you all take a look at the surveillance data with a view to who might be working their position upward, towards a 5% ownership position?”); JX

- 65 at 4 (Morgan Stanley March 19 Board presentation stating that “[t]he rights plan would deter an activist from taking advantage of the current market dislo cation and challenges in monitoring unusual trading patterns that results in a rapid accumulation of a >5% stake”); JX

- 117 at 5 (April 15 disclosure stating that the goal was “[t]o prevent an opportunistic party from achieving substantial influence or cont rol without paying a control premium to other stockholders”).
300 Air Prods. , 16 A.3d at 104 (quoting Selectica II , 5 A.3d at 599).63 deliberation concerning the Plan. Defendants were advised by outside legal and financial advisors who were available to answer questions. Certainly, aspects of the process were less than perfect

. 301 S till , n othing about the process jumps out as unreasonable. 302 The real problem is not the process that Defendants followed, but the threats they identified. The first threat was quite general

— the desire t o prevent stockholder activism during a time of market uncertainty and a low stock price. The second threat was only slightly more specific

— the concern that activists might pursue “short

- term” agendas or distract management. The third threat was just a hair more particularized

— the concern that activist s might rapidly accumulat e over 5% of the stock and the possibility that the Plan could serve as an early detection devi c e to plug the gaps in the federal disclosure regime. 303 Each of the three thre ats were purely hypothetical; the Board was not aware of

301 See generally Pls.’ Answering Br. at 23

– 26. 302 See Gaylord , 753 A.2d at 478

– 79 (finding a good faith, reasonable investigatio n under similar circumstances); Moran II , 500 A.2d at 1356 (finding a good faith reasonable investigation where the board received information from advisors, was informed as to “the essentials of the [p]lan , ” and had a “three

- page summary” of the plan). T o be sure, it would have been better if the Director Defendants read the Plan or at least had a more meaningful discussion of its features before adopting it. But these defects are not fatal. It is generally true that a director does not need to read every work of a dense legal document to demonstrate that the investigation was reasonable. See Moran I , 490 A.2d at 1068, 1083 (upholding rights plan even though “some directors were not conversant with the implications of the plan”); Yucaipa , 1 A.3d at 343, 361 (upho lding plan even though “some directors admittedly had difficulty interpreting” it and observing that such difficulty was “understandable because it [was] a complex agreement”). “Delaware law does not require that a senior decision

- maker . . . read every a greement in haec verba .” ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC , 2012 WL 1869416, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 16, 2012), aff’d , 68 A.3d 665 (Del. 2013).
303 See Subramanian Report ¶¶ 79

– 81.64 any specific activist plays afoot. The question presented is whether these hypothetical threats present legitimate corporate objectives under Delaware law.
i. Stockholder Activism “S tockholder activi sm” is a broad concept that refers to a range of stockholder activities intended to change or influence a corporation’s direction

. 304 Activists may pressure a corporation to make management changes, implement operational improvements, or pursue a sale transaction . They may seek to catalyze or halt a merger or acquisition . More recently, “ESG activism” has come to the fore, and stockholders have begun pressuring corporations to adopt or modify policies to accomplish environmental, social, and governance goals. 305 Many forms of stockholder activism can be beneficial to a corporation, as Defendants themselves recognize. 306 Under Delaware law, the bo ard of directors manage s the business and affairs of the corporation. 307 Thus, stockholder activism is directed to the board. And a ctivists’ ability

304 Mills Report ¶ 31; accord

. Goldfarb Report ¶ 16 (“An activist investor is a shareholder that seeks to induce management and the board of directors to make changes at a company.”).
305 See Mills Report ¶ 31; see also Omari Scott Simmons, Chancery’s Greatest Decision: Historical Insights on Civ il Rights and the Future of Shareholder Activism , 76 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1259, 1289

– 90 (2019) (referring to ESG activism as “[t]he new wave of corporate social activism” involving “the public

- private spheres, evolution of corporate social responsibility ef forts, and expansion of corporate political rights”). Former

- Chief Justice Strine has also suggested that the “E” in “ESG” refers to employee

- related action. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism 6 (U. Pa. Inst. For L. & Econ. Res

. , Paper No. 19

- 39, 2019) (reframing ESG as “EESG,” noting “the vital missing ‘E’

— the interests of companies’ employees”).
306 See Trial Tr. at 73:7

– 10 (Cogut); id . at 536:2

– 16, 581:17

– 23 (Buese).
307 8 Del. C. § 141(a).65 to replace directors through the stockholder franchise is the reason why boards listen to activists . Most activists hold far less than a hard majority of a corporation’s stock, making the main lever at an activist’s disposal a proxy fight. In this way, stockholder activism is intertwined with the stockholder franchise. Under Delaware law, d irectors can not justify their actions by arguing that “without their intervention, the stockholders would vote erroneously out of ignorance or mistaken belief” in an uncoerced, fully informed election. 308 “T he notion that directors know better than the stockholders about who should be on the board is no justification at all.” 309 Viewing all stockholder activis m as a threat is an extreme manifestation of the proscribed we

- know

- better justification for interfering with the franchise

. That is, categorical ly concluding that all stockholder effort s to change or influence corporat e direction constitute a threat to the corporation runs directly contrary to the ideological underpinning s of Delaware law. The broad category of conduct referred to as stockholder activism, therefore, cannot constitute a cognizable threat under the first prong of Unocal

. To be sure, Delaware law does not categorically foreclose the possibility that certain conduct by activis t stockholders might give rise to a cognizable threat. D efendants cite to four cases where a Delaware court upheld defensive action s take n in response to types of stockholder activism. 310 All involved different scenarios and more specific threats.

308 Pell v. Kill , 135 A.3d 764, 788 (Del . Ch. 2016).
309 Mercier , 929 A.2d at 811.
310 See Defs.’ Opening Br. at 32

– 36 (citing Third Point , 2014 WL 1922029, at *21

– 22; Yucaipa , 1 A.3d at 343; Polk v. Good , 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986); Cheff v. Mathes , 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964)).66 Defendants first cite to Polk , a stockholder challenge to Texaco’s agreement to repurchase the shares of the Bass B rothers, well

- known takeover artists and greenmailers , 311 and who had acquired just under 10% of the company’s stock. 312 The Bass brothers were poised to launch “some host ile . . . move” on Texaco at a time when the company was “vulnerable” because “management was consumed with . . . obtaining government and shareholder approval” of its $10 billion acquisition of Getty Oil Company

— at the time, “one of the biggest corporate acquisitions in history.” 313 The purchase of the Bass Brothers’ shares drew multiple stockholder lawsuits. T he company settled the lawsuits by agreeing to provide extensive supplemental disclosures and modify

a standstill agreement that was part of the tr ansaction. 314 This court approved the settlement over the objection of certain Texaco stockholders, and the objectors appealed. On appeal, the high c ourt found that the board reasonably identified a cognizable threat under Unocal based on the “disruptive effect and the potential long

- term threat” posed by the Bass Brothers

. 315 In support of this conclusion, the high c ourt simply cited

311 See Peter Applebome, Texas Deal Maker: Robert M. Bass; A Younger Brother Steps Out on His Own , N.Y. Times (June 5, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/05/ business/texas

- deal

- maker

- robert

- m - bass

- a - younger - brother

- steps

- out

- on - his

- own.html; see also Michael H.Q.L. Lau, Adequate Remedies For Tender Offer Abuse: Resurrecting Manipulation and Reforming The Business Judgment Rule , 9 U. Haw. L. Rev. 209, 216 n.59 ( 1987 ) (referring to the Bass Brothers as “examples of major investors who profited greatly in 1984 from tremendous greenmail profits”).
312 Polk , 507 A.2d at 533.
313 Id. at 533

– 34.
314 Id. at 535. 315 Id. at 537.67 Unocal , which inv olved defensive measures adopted in response to takeover activity. The high court’s abbreviated reference to Unocal suggests that the Delaware Supreme Court credited that the Bass Brothers presented a takeover threat. The lack of more extensive analysis also is not surprising because Polk involved an appeal from a decision approving a negotiated settlement. T he court thus applied a doubly

- deferential legal standard : settlements are approved at the discretion of the trial court, and those decisions are reviewed on appeal with deference. 316 The Polk case does no validate a generalized concern about activism as a threat that supports a defensive response. Defendants next cite to Cheff , where the board of Holland Furnace Company (“Holland”) rejected a merger proposal from Arnold H. Maremont of Maremont Automotive Product, Inc. (“Motor Products”). 317 Un be know n st to the Holland board at the time, Motor Products had acquired a large block of Holland shares on the open market , and

a fter Holland rebuffed Maremont’s merger proposal, Maremont began using his stock holding to agitate for control and a restructuring of the company. He demanded that he be named to the Holland board, “threat[ened] to liquidate the company,” and threatened to “substanti ally alter” Holland’s sales force, which Holland viewed as a “vital factor in the company’s success.” 318 Maremont’s threats caused operational disruption

— “substantial

316 Polk , 507 A.2d at 536 (observing that “our standard of review is whether under all the facts and circumstances the Chancellor abused his discretio n ” and “ we must find the evidence so strongly to the contrary as to amount to an abuse of discretion” (citing Rome v. Archer , 197 A.2d 49, 54 (Del. 1964)).
317 Cheff , 199 A.2d at 551

– 53. 318 Id.68 unrest . . . among the employees” that caused twenty

- five of the Holland’s “key men” to resign

. 319
As in Polk , t he Holland board responded to Maremont’s activity by repurchasing his shares at a premium, and the repurchase precipitated derivative stockholder actions alleging that the repurchase constituted a breach of fiduciary duties

. 320 T he trial court held in the plaintiffs’ favor. On appeal, the Supreme C ourt found that the Holland board acted with justification in response to a reasonable threat to Holland’s existence: “ [T] he board

. . . believed, with justification, that there was a re asonable threat to the continued existence of Holland, or at least existence in its present form, by the plan of Maremont to continue building up his stock holdings.” 321 Like Polk , Cheff did not involve generalized concern about activism. It involved a con crete takeover attempt and a specific and on

- going threat. Defendants further cite to Yucaipa , where Ron Burkle’s activist hedge fund Yucaipa had acquired a 17.8% stake in Barnes & Noble and disclosed in its 13D that it might acquire as much as 50%. 322 A no ther hedge fund with a history of piggybacking on Yucaipa’s investments increased its stake from 6.37% to 17.44% of the company. 323 In response, the

319 Id. at 551

– 52.
320 Id. at 552

– 53. 321 Id. at 556.
322 Yucaipa , 1 A.3d at 318, 323.
323 Id. at 324

– 25.69 company adopted a pill with a 20% threshold whi le grandfather i n g the 30% stake of the company’s founder and CEO. 324 Yucaipa brought litigation challenging the pill. After trial, the court upheld the pill under Unocal . When evaluating the first prong of Unocal , the court found that the board acted with justification in response to the threat of a “creeping acquisition” and that the pill was a reasonable response. 325 Like Polk and Chef , Yucaipa involved a specific takeover attempt

— there through a creeping acquisition

— that manifested as a concrete threat. Nothing in Yuc aipa validates a general concern regarding stockholder activism

. Defendants lastly cite to Third Point , as case that resembles Yucaipa

. Dan Loeb’s activist hedge fund Third Point acquired just under 10% of Sotheby’s stock, publicly filed a “poison pen” letter decrying various board decisions, began spreading rumors that he intended to replace management, and launched a proxy contest to rep lace three incumbents on Sotheby’s twelve

- person board. 326 Sotheby’s also detected “several hedge funds” in addition to Third Point “accumulating its stock simultaneously.” 327 Sotheby’s board adopted a pill with a 10% threshold. 328 Loeb requested a waiver of the pill, which the board refused. 329 Third Point brought litigation challenging the adoption and refusal to waive the pill and sought to preliminarily enjoin the annual meeting pending resolution of its claims.

324 Id. at 320

– 21. 325 Id. at 352

– 53, 359

– 60.
326 Third Point , 2014 WL 1922029, at *6

– 9

. 327 Id. at *17.
328 Id. at *10.
329 Id. at *14.70 On a decision denying the motion for pr eliminary injunction, this court concluded that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on their claims. When evaluating the first prong of Unocal , the court found that the board was justified in adopting the pill for the purpose of defending against “c reeping control.” 330 The court acknowledged, however, that the creeping

- control threat was no longer present when the board determined not to waive the pill at Loeb’s request. By that time, the threat had morphed into a concern that Third Point would improperly exercise “ef fective, rather than explicit, negative control” as Sotheby’s largest stockholder. 331 The court cautioned against viewing “effective negative control” as “a license for corporations to deploy defensive measures unreasonably” and observed that the circumsta nces in Third Point rendered the threat legitimate in part because Loeb had acted in an “aggressive and domineering manner.” 332 Third Point thus involved a specific takeover attempt that started as an effort to obtain creeping control. The Third Point deci sion does not validate a general concern about activism as a legitimate threat. None of these decisions support the notion that generalized concern about stockholder activism constitutes a cognizable threat under Unocal . Rather, these cases demonstrate th at a board has authority to respond to a specific takeover attempt, even when the attempt does not involve a traditional tender offer. Read broadly, the cases support the proposition that a Board can adopt defensive measures in response to concrete action by a

330 Id. at *17.
331 Id. at *22.
332 Id.71 stockholder activist. The Board’s general concern about stockholder activism is insufficient

. ii. Short
- Termism and Distraction The Board’s second concern was that activists might pursue short

- term agendas or disrupt or distract management. The “short

- termism” justification refers to the concern that “a particular activist seeks short

- term profit without regard to the impact on the company’s long

- term prospects.” 333 The “disruption” justification typically refers to the concern that the actions of the a ctivists might cause operational disruption, as in Cheff

. Here, the Director Defendants instead frame this concern as a desire to insulate the management team from distraction. 334
No case has evaluated under Unocal whether these types of particularized activist concerns constitute cognizable threats. The threats validated in Defendants’ four cases discussed above involved threats that differed materially from the factual context here.
E ach of Defendants’ c ases, u nlike this case , involved takeover threats. In Polk , the Bass Brothers had obtained a substantial equity stake in the company. 335 In Cheff , an

333 Anti

- Activist Poison Pills at 931 (internal quotation marks omitted).
334 See supra notes 269, 271, 275, 294, 295 and accompanying text

. 335 See Polk , 507 A.2d at 533

– 34. As discussed above, the Polk court found the “disruptive effect and the potential long

- term threat” posed by a stockholder as cognizable under the first prong of Unocal

. Id . at 537. Although this passing language seems supportive of Defendants’ position, the facts of this case revea l that the board of Texaco acted in response to a takeover threat. Also, the court’s reasoning on this point was underdeveloped, perhaps because Unocal was nascent and the court was applying a highly deferential legal standard. Consequently, this court d oes not view reference to a “potential long

- term threat” and “disruptive effect” in Polk as supporting of a holding that such threats standing alone are cognizable under Delaware law. See id.72 acquirer had made a merger proposal and acquired a substantial bock, then used that block to advocate for a take over, resulting in operational disruptions were so severe as to threaten the corporation’s existence

. 336 In Yucaipa an d Third Point , the directors responded to creeping takeovers, which in Third Point could have left the activist with “effective negative control.” 337 None of the cases involve d a response to activism per se . 338 Moreover, e ach of Defendants’ cases, unlike this case , involved defensive measure s adopted in response to a specific activist or group of activists. T he threat was not hypo thetical. 339 Reasonable minds can dispute whether short

- termism or distraction could be deemed cognizable threats under Delaware law. These sorts of justifications, particularly short

- termism, are conspicuous in the policy debate, 340 but they become nebulous when

336 Cheff , 199 A.2d at 551, 556.
337 See Third Point , 2014 WL 19220 29, at *21

– 22; Yucaipa , 1 A.3d at 352

– 53. 338 See, e.g., Anti

- Activist Poison Pills at 934

– 36 (discussing the presence of “creeping control” concerns in Third Point and Yucaipa ).
339 See Third Point , 2014 WL 1922029, at *18, 21

– 22; Yucaipa , 1 A.3d at 348; Polk , 507 A.2d at 537; Cheff , 199 A.2d at 551

– 52, 556. Although Cheff was decided in 1964, over twenty years before Unocal , it was cited favorably in Unocal and thus bears continued relevance on the application of intermediate scrutiny. See Unocal , 493 A.2d at 953

– 54 (citing Cheff for the proposition that, when adopting defensive measures, “a Delaware corporation may deal selectively with stockholders, provided the directors have not acted out of a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office”).
340 See, e.g. , Martin Lipton, The Threat to the Economy and Society from Activism and Short

- Termism Updated , Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Gov ernance (Jan. 27, 2015) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/27/the

- threat

- to

- the

- economy - and

- society

- from

activism

- an d

- short

- termism

- updated/; Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed For The Long Term Unless their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term? , 66 Bus. Law. 1 (2010)

. See generally Anti

- Activist Poison Pills at 93 0

.73 viewed through a doctrinal lens. The central criticism of short

- termism is that “shareholders who favor short

- termism . . . are hurting themselves as much as they are hurting their fellow shareholders.” 341 This is a valid po licy argument, but as one group of scholars have commented, the “‘short

- termism’ argument just particularizes the concern that shareholders will cast votes in a mistaken assessment of their own best interests.” 342 That is, short

- termism and distraction con cerns boil down to the sort of we

- know

- better justification that Delaware law eschews in the voting context. Although there is room to disagree as to whether short

- termism or distraction could be deemed cognizable threats under Delaware law, this decisio n does not resolve th at issue. Even if justifications of short

- termism or disruption could rise to the level of a cognizable threat , hypothetical versions of these justifications cannot . The concerns in this case are raised in the abstract

— th ere is no “s pecific, immediate” activist play seeking short

- term profit or threatening disruption. 343 When used in the hypothetical sense untethered to any concrete event, the phrases “short

- termism” and “disruption” amount to mere euphemisms for stereotypes of stockh older activism generally and thus are not cognizable threats

.

341 Anti

- Activist Poison Pills at 931

– 32. 342 Id. at 931. 343 Trial Tr. at 544:12

– 15 (Buese) (“No, there was no actual threat. From our perspective, it was a perceived threat . . . .”).74 iii. Rapid Accumulation of Stock The third justification for the Plan is the concern that activists might rapidly accumulate over 5% of the stock and the belief that the Plan could serve as an early

detection devise to plug the gaps in the federal disclosure regime. In his March 2015 Harvard Business Review article, Corporate Governance 2.0 , Professor Subramanian advocates for boards of public companies to adopt what he calls an “advance notice” pill with a 5% threshold. 344 He argues that “when an activist investor threatens a proxy contest or a strategic buyer makes a hostile tender offer,” boards often react with a “no

- holds

- bar red , scorched

- earth ” defense rather than providing stockholders with an “orderly shareholder vo ice.” 345 As a contributing factor to this problem, he cites “lightning strike attacks , ” which are rapid, undetected accumulation of stock in a short period of time , the precise concern articulated by the Board in this action

. 346 Corporate
Governance 2.0 ci tes to one instance of a lightning

- strike raid in 2010 involving J.C. Penney, where two activist groups acquire d more than a quarter of the company’s shares before the ten

- day disclosure requirement expired. 347 Lightning strikes go undetected under the fe deral disclosure regime, which requires stockholders to disclose their ownership position after crossing the 5% threshold but gives

344 JX

- 169 ( “ Corporate Governance 2.0 ” ) a t 15. 345 Id. at 12

– 14.
346 Id. at 15. 347 Corporate Governance 2.0 at 14

– 15. The J.C. Penney anecdote demonstrates that lightning

- strike attacks can happen, though the record lacks empirical evidence of their frequency or likelihood generally or Williams’ su sceptibility to such an event.75 stockholders ten days to do so . The federal disclosure regime does not prohibit stockholders from continuing to acquire sto ck during that ten

- day period and does not capture “wolf pack” activity. 348 To avoid lightning strikes and promote an “orderly shareholder voice,” Subramanian recommends that boards effectuate a private

- ordering response in the form of an advance

- notice p ill. 349 A similar private

- ordering solution to perceived defects in the federal disclosure regime was endorsed by Professors John Coffee and Dairus Palia in their Spring 2016 article, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Gov ernance (“ Wolf at the Door ”). 350 This decision refers to the private

ordering solutions discussed in both Corporate Governance 2.0 and Wolf at the Door as “gap

- filling pills.” This decision need not address whether a true gap

- filling pill would be permissible. As discussed below, the features of the Plan are more extreme than any of the gap - filling pills discussed in Corporate Governance 2.0 or Wolf at the Door

. At this stage of the analysis, the question is whether the desire to fill gaps in federal disclosure laws through private ordering constitutes a legitimate corporate objective under Unocal . A related question is whether the gap

- filling objective becomes more viable in the face of market

348 Corporate Governance 2.0 at 15. 349 Id.
350 John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance , 41 J. Corp. L. 545, 601

– 02 (2015)

.76 uncertainty or a precipitous stock drop resulting in a stock price that undervalues the corporation

. Reasonable minds can dispute whether a gap - filling purpose standing alone is a legitimate corporate purpose under Unocal

. The main co ncern is that if gap filling were a legitimate corporate objective that justified the adoption of a poison pill, then all Delaware corporations subject to the federal disclosure regime would have a ready

- made basis for adopting a pill. These policy concer ns are only slightly mitigated by a precipitous stock drop, which is not an uncommon occurrence

. Recognizing an omnipresent justification for poison pills would constitute a dramatic turn in Delaware law, which has consistently held that a pill’s adoptio n and maintenance raises concerns sufficient to give rise to enhance d scrutiny . This court routinely views poison pills as situationally specific defenses and has conducted fact

intensive inquiries to determine whether the action is justifiable under the unique circumstances of the case. Put differently, Delaware law has handled these “nuclear
weapon [s] of corporate governance” with the delicacy they deserve. 351 Delaware’s approach has created an ap propriate culture of caution in the board room. For example, last year prominent defense firms recommended against the reflexive adoption of a pill in response to COVID

- 19, noting the need for “[c]ompany

- specific circumstances as well as indicia of emergi ng or present threats” to justify a pill’s adoption. 352

351 See Trial Tr. at 53:18

– 55:10, 114:10

– 12 (Cogut).
352 See, e.g. , David Katz & Sebastian V. Niles, Rights Plans (“Poison Pills”) in the COVID

- 19 Environment

— “On the Shelf and Ready to Go”? , Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Gov ernance (Apr. 2, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/20 20/04/02/rights

- plans

-77 Just as this decision need not decide in the abstract whether a gap

- filling pill is permissible, this decision also need not address whether gap

- filling represents a legitimate corporate objective. Thi s decision instead assumes for the purposes of analysis that gap filling to detect lightning strikes at a time when stock price undervalues the corporation is a legitimate corporate purpose under the first prong of Unocal . The question becomes whether the adoption of the Plan was a proportional response to that assumedly valid threat

. 2. The Proportionality of the Response Because Plaintiffs do not claim that the Plan is coercive or preclusive, 353 the second
prong of the Unocal inquiry requires the court to evaluate whether Defendants proved that adopting the Plan fell within a range of reasonable responses to the lightning

- strike threat posed. 354 The thirty

- thousand

- foot view looks bad for Defendants. As Morgan Stanley advised t he Board at the March 19 Meeting, the 5% trigger alone distinguished the Plan; only 2% of all plans identified by Morgan Stanley had a trigger lower than 10%. 355 Even among pills with 5% triggers, the Plan ranked as one of only nine pills to ever utilize a 5%

poison

- pills

- in

- the

- covid

- 19

- environment

- on - the

- shelf

- and

- ready

- to

- go/ (issuing general guidance to companies initially responding to the COVID

- 19 pandemic).
353 Plaintiffs failed to brief and thus waived these arguments. See Emerald P ’rs v. Berlin , 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del. 1999) (“Issues not briefed are deemed waived.”); accord

. Adams v. Calvarese Farms Maint

. Corp., 2010 WL 3944961, at *21 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2010) (“Because [plaintiff] did not address these items in her post

- trial b riefs or otherwise cogently present evidence and argument regarding them in connection with the trial, she has waived them.”).
354 See Unitrin , 651 A.2d at 1387

– 88 (quoting Paramount , 637 A.2d at 45

– 46).
355 JX

- 57 at 4 (noting that “[n]o precedents exist below 5%”).78 trigger outside the NOL context. 356 Among Delaware corporations, it was one of only two. The other Delaware corporation to adopt a 5% trigger for a non

- NOL pill did so in distinguishable circumstances

— in the face of a campaign launched by an activist who held 7% of the company’s outstanding shares at the time the pill was adopted. 357 Of the twenty

one pills adopted between March 13 and April 6, 2020, only the Plan had a 5% triggering threshold. 358 Of th e twenty

- one companies that adopted pills during that time , thirteen faced ongoing activist campaigns when adopting their pill

. 359 The Plan’s other key features are also extreme. The Plan’s “beneficial ownership” definition goes beyond the default federal definitions to captu re synthetic equity , such as options

. 360 The Plan’s definition of “acting in concert” goes beyond the express

- agreement default of federal law to capture “parallel conduct” and add the daisy

- chain concept. The Plan’s “passive investor” definition goes bey ond the influence

- control default of federal law to exclude persons who seek to direct corporate policies. In sum, the Plan increases the range of Williams’ nuclear missile range by a considerable distance beyond the ordinary poison pill. 361

356 Mills Report ¶ 47.
357 Id.
358 JX

- 92 at 3. 359 Id

. 360 See Anti

- Activist Poison Pills at 949

– 50. 361 See Mills Report ¶¶ 35, 47 (“Among the COVID Pills, the Williams Pill is by far the most restrictive. The Williams Pill contains a suite of features that , in combination, appears to be unprecedented.”).79 The fact that the Plan’s feature s depart from the default federal disclosure regulations is consistent with a gap

- filling purpose, but the Plan’s features do not compare well against those of gap

- filling pills. As discussed above, in 201 5 and 2016 , Professor Subra manian in Corporate Governance 2.0 and Professors Coffee and Palia in Wolf at the
Door each endorsed different versions of a gap

- filling pill. The Plan’s features exceed what commentators have proposed

. Professor Subramanian described one gap - filling pi ll in Corporate Governance 2.0

. His advance

- notice pill had a 5% threshold tempered by an exemption for stockholders that disclose their position within two days of crossing the threshold. 362
The authors of Wolf at the Door discuss two gap

- filing pills. The first proposal is a “standing” poison pill that defines a “group” more broadly than the express

- agreement default of federal disclosure law. 363 This standing pill would “preclude any shareholder

— with some possible exemption for ‘passive’ shareholders

— from exceeding a specified level (either 15% or possibl y 10%)” and would include an “acting in concert” provision defined broadly so as to capture persons acting “‘in conscious parallelism’ with the leader of the ‘wolf pack.’” 364 The authors observe, however, that the standing pill “will create considerable uncertainty and place high demand s on courts.” 365

362 Corporate Governance 2.0 at 15. Although the article is silent as to the pill’s other features, one can assume that the designer had parallel

- conduct AIC provisions and other expansive features in mind. See Subramanian Report ¶¶ 37

– 39, 50, 81. 363 Wolf at the Door at 601

– 02.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 602.80 The authors’ second proposal is a window

- closing pill, which builds off of a proposal made in 2010 by a New York law firm fo llowing the J.C. Penney lightning

- strike attack. 366 This pill would maintain the express

- agreement acting in concert default of the federal disclosure regime but include a lower trigger threshold “of as little as 5.1% of the target’s stock if the acquirer did not file a Schedule 13D before purchas ing stock in excess of the specified threshold.” 367 The window

- closing pill “has a limited objective . . . of compelling disclosure so that a board of directors, stockholder s and the trading markets

366 See id. ; Peter S. Golden, The Window Closing Pill

– One Response to Stealth Stock Acquisitions , Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Gov ernance (Jan. 6, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/01/06/the

- window

- closing

- pill

- one - response - to

stealth

- stock

- acquisitions/ [hereinafter The Window Closing Pill ]. The concept of a window

- closing pill has been endorsed by commentators, including former Chief Justice Strine in his extra

- judicial writing. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh

- and

- Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System , 126 Yale L.J. 1870, 1963

– 64 (2017); Arthur Fl eischer, Jr., Alexander R. Sussman & Gail Weinstein, Takeover Defense: Mergers and Acquisitions § 5.01[A][1] (8th ed. 2018) (describing the window

- closing pill as “essentially benign, since the acquiror is not precluded from acquiring more than 5% of the target’s outstanding voting securities once position disclosure has been made”); Simon M. Lorne and Joy Marlene Bryan, 11A Acquisitions & Mergers: Negotiated and Contested Transactions § 5:68.60 (2020) (“The plan is benign because the acquirer is not prec luded from acquiring more than a five percent voting or financial interest in a company and it would not create an impediment to purchasing shares pursuant to a tender offer.”); William R. Tevlin, Note, The Conscious Parallelism of Wolf Packs: Applying th e Antitrust Conspiracy Framework to Section 13(D) Activist Group Formation , 84 Fordham L. Rev. 2335, 2349 (2016) (noting that “corporations may utilize” a window pill “to fight off wolf packs”). But see Maria Lucia Passador, The Woeful Inadequacy of Secti on 13(D): Time for a Paradigm Shift? , 13 Va. L & Bus. Rev. 279, 295 (2019) (commenting that “shortening the reporting window would affect the ability of investors to launch campaigns for corporate control, reducing the staggering profits accumulated as a result of their toehold, and making the accumulation of shares more expensive”).
367 Wolf at the Door at 602 (emphasis added).81 can evaluate th e ownership position of a substantial non

- passive investor.” 368 As originally conceived, the window

- closing pill would have a “transitory five plus percent flip

- in trigger,” meaning that it is only triggered if a stockholder exceeds 5% ownership within the ten

- day window before disclosing the triggering acquisition. 369 The authors recognize that the window

- closing pill too “would be subject to legal challenge” and would “anger the proxy advisors (who would then recommend that institutions withhold their vote s for the directors of this corporation).” 370 Accordingly, they identify a series of “compromises” designed to mitigate the impact of the window

closing pill. 371 For example, the window

- closing pill “might compensate for its short fuse by allowing the bidd er to accumulate a greater level of stock (say, 15 or 20%), so long as it filed with the SEC immediately after crossing 5%.” 372 Alternatively, it “might permit a 100% bid to be made” upon the bidder’s disclosure. 373 In the authors’ view, “[e]ither concessi on should lead the Delaware courts to accept such a pill because neither pill is ‘preclusive.’” 374

368 The Window Closing Pill

. 369 Id.
370 Wolf at the Door at 602.
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id. (quoting Unitrin , 651 A.2d at 1387).82 The Plan includes more aggressive features than any of the gap

- filling pills. The standing pill includes a higher trigger threshold of “either 15% or possibl y 10%.” 375 The window

- closing pill contemplates a comparable threshold (“as little as 5.1%.”), but a less inclusive acting

- in

- concert provision (an express

- agreement provision). 376 To that structure, the authors recommended a series of potential compromises. Even the most extreme of the gap

- filling pills, the advance

- notice pill, contemplates an exemption for

“ shareholders that disclosed their positions within two days of crossing the threshold.” 377
Had the Board desired to close some of the gaps in the federal di sclosure regime, the Board might have considered one of the less extreme options aim ed at detection and designed to compel stockholder disclosure. Instead, the Board selected a Plan with features that went beyond those of gap

- filling pills

. Regardless of whether the Board intended to
gap fill federal disclosure regulations

— and whether that intent is permissible

— the Plan’s combination of features created a response that was disproportionate to its stated hypothetical threat

. The Plan’s features also raise concerns when evaluated independently and divorced from comparisons. As Plaintiffs’ proxy solicitor testified at trial, the Plan’s combination of features are likely to chill a wide range of anodyne stockholder communications. 378

375 Id. at 601

– 02. 376 Id. at 602.
377 Corporate Governance 2.0 at 15. 378 See Trial Tr. at 209:7

– 23, 231:6

– 14, 233:4

– 11, 255:7

– 12 (Mills); see also Mills Report ¶¶ 55

– 56, 64

– 68, 73 (describing various forms of pre

- proxy contest stockholder activism that the Plan’s combination of features deters).83 Although the 5% tri gger is a marked departure from market norms, it is not the most problematic aspect of the Plan , because a 5% ownership limit still permits an activist to buy a larger dollar value toehold in Williams than the vast majority of other poison pills with highe r triggers. 379 The primary offender is the AIC Provision, whose broad language
sweep s up potentially benign stockholder communications “relating to changing or influencing the control of the Company.” 380 The definition gives the Board discretion to determi ne whether “plus” factors as innocuous as “exchanging information, attending meetings, [or] conducting discussions ” can trigger the Plan. 381 This language encompasses routine activities such as attending investor conferences and advocating for the same

cor porate action. 382 It gloms on to this broad scope the daisy

- chain concept that operates to aggregate stockholders even if members of the group have no idea that the other stockholders exist. 383
In their 2019 doctrinal and policy analysis of anti

- activist poison pills, Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock express concerns over the breadth of a nearly acting

- in

concert provision. 384 In their view, “wolf

- pack provisions suffer from two fatal flaws, each

379 See Trial Tr. 369:15

– 371:20, 377:9

– 24 (Subramanian).
380 See JX

- 69 at 18 (emphasis added).
381 Id.
382 Trial Tr. at 190:8

– 14, 196:2

– 15, 266:8

– 267:5 (Mills); Mills Report ¶¶ 58

– 59. 383 See Trial Tr. 103:14

– 18 (Cogut) (agree ing that stockholders have no way to know with any certainty with whom they are aggregated); id. 608:4

– 610:14 (Buese) (same); Fuller Dep. Tr. at 139:24

– 140:6 (same).
384 See Anti

- Activist Poison Pills at 962

– 66. In a blog posted at the beginning of the pand emic and after Williams had adopted the Plan, Professor Rock wrote that the pandemic presented “a time to put the ordinary debate [about rights plans] aside” and for stockholders84 of which would on its own be sufficient to render th em invalid.” 385 First, they “ do not clearly specif y what activities would result in aggregation.” 386 Key terms like “parallel,” “relating to,” and “influenc ing ” are hard to apply , and “plus factors like ‘exchanging information’ and ‘attending meeting s ’” ar e quite broad. 387 “Because triggering a pill would have severe adverse consequences, such vague provisions would have a chilling effect on an activist’s ability to communicate with other shareholders.” 388 Second, “the very purpose of wolf

- pack provisions

— t o make illicit parallel actions that are not the product of an agreement

— is based on a fundamental misconception of how shareholder s ou gh t to interact.” 389 Expounding on this last criticism, the authors explain that “[t]hese sorts of

and proxy advisory firms “to provide boards with space to respond to the mult iple challenges of protecting firms, employees, consumers, and the country” without “worrying that they will soon find an activist on their doorstep demanding answers.” JX

- 94 at 2

– 3. Professor Rock then forwarded this blog to Cogut. Id. at 1. Defendant s treat this exchange as a recantation of the conclusions drawn by Professors Kahan and Rock in their 2019 article, but that is an exaggeration. Professor Rock’s blog is best understood as an appeal to activists and boards alike to use common sense during a global emergency. See, e.g. , id. (cautioning that “boards shouldn’t take advantage of this crisis to erect entrenched defensive measures like staggered boards that shareholders have clearly rejected”).
385 Anti

- Activist Poison Pills at 964. 386 Id.
387 Id.
388 Id. ; see also In re Versum Materials, Inc. S’holder Litig. , C.A. No. 2019

- 0206

- JTL, at 53

– 54 (Del. Ch. July 16, 2020) (TRANSCRIPT) (expressing concern over the breadth of a nearly identical AIC provision and explaining: “What the act[ing]

- in

- concert prov ision attempts to cut off, or at least threaten, is all of the activities that lead up to the giving of the revocable proxy or the making of the revocable tender. So it nominally preserves the end product . . . but . . . interdicts all of the preliminary steps that lead to the customary rendering of that proxy . . . .”).
389 Anti

- Activist Poison Pills at 964.85 provisions threaten to chill the sort of shareholder interaction upon which sound corporate governance depends and that decades of reform have sought to encourage.” 390 To illustrate both fatal flaws and the effect of wolfpack provisions on stockholder activity, the authors prese nt a hypothetical about Remus and Lupin, which t his decision takes the liberty of altering to illustrate the same points. 391 Imagine that Remus and Lupin each own 3% of Williams stock. Each is aware of the other’s activities solely from rumors and public disclosures. Remus sends a letter to Williams asking for ESG initiatives and threatening to buy up stock and run a proxy contest if the Board does not a dopt his proposal. Lupin has reviewed and agrees with Remus’s proposal.
Can Lupin meet with the Board, Remus , or other Williams stockholders to discuss
Remus’s ESG proposal without triggering the Plan? Probably not. Can Remus communicate with other st ockholders to determine whether there is support for his ESG proposal before launching the proxy context without fear of triggering the Plan? Not without risk of aggregating those stockholders under the AIC Provision

. Defendants have a few responses to these criticism s of the AIC Provision. First, they say that the Plan does not preclude any stockholder from launching a proxy contest, and that “[a]ny purported impact the Plan might have on routine activism, short of a proxy contest, is irrelevant under Unocal .” 392 That argument misunderstands the proportionality inquiry of Unocal , which is not limited to the analysis conducted in Moran ; rather, the

390 Id. at 964

– 65.
391 See id. at 965. 392 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 43.86 proportionality analysis is tied to a pill’s purpose, and with new purposes come new considerations. 393 Moreover, a s Plaintiffs’ expert opined, activity leading up to a proxy
contest can impede a stockholder ’ s ability to launch a proxy conte st by cutting off private communications in advance of proxy contests. 394 Mills explained that stockholders frequently “take the temperature” of other stockholders in advance of launching a proxy contest in light of the risk of financial and reputational damage resulting from a failed
conte s t. 395 Second, Defendants observe that the AIC Provision is limited to actions that “relating to changing or influencing control” of Williams. 396 Defendants contend that most routine forms of stockholder activism do not involve changing or influenc ing control of a company. Defendants argue that the AIC Provision contains several other “ guardrails” limiting its applicability even when stockholders’ do act in ways “relating to changing or

393 See, e.g., eBay , 16 A.3d at 31 (stating that “[t]he intermediate standard of review is not limited to the historic and now classic paradigm”).
394 See generally Trial Tr. at 190:3

– 14, 212:10

– 13, 276:9

– 277:10 (Mills); see also Mills Report ¶¶ 64

– 66. 395 Mills Report ¶ 64. Defendants’ expert proxy solicitor disputes these conclusions. In his view, the AIC Provision would not substantially impede a stockholders’ ability to obtain information to assess the likelihood of success before launching a proxy contest. Goldfarb Report ¶ 45. Goldfarb argues that proxy solicitors could aid in th is effort , in part by reaching out stockholders who fall within the definition of “passive investor

. ” Id. Goldfarb was a highly qualified and credible witness, but this aspect of his testimony ignores the possibility that proxy solicitors would trigger t he daisy chain provision, see Trial Tr. 196 :16

– 197:8 (Mills), and relies on a definition of “passive investor” that this decision h as rejected.
396 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 47, 51; Trial Tr. at 566:23

– 567:19 (Buese); id. 396:10

– 16 (Subramanian).87 influencing control” of the Company. 397 T o echo the concerns of Professors Kahan and Rock, however, terms like “relating to” and “influencing,” along wit h the other broad guardrails, are nebulous and broad. Moreover, Cogut conceded at trial that facts similar to the above hypothetical would change or influence control of a company and be included within the AIC Provision. 398 Third, Defendants argue that the Board would never trigger the Plan in response to an activist play like the Remus Lupin hypothetical. 399 They describe such an outcome is “farfetched,” and they say that the court should not presume that the Board would misuse its power under the Plan. 400 But this line of logic would excuse nearly any combination of poison pill terms and does not support a finding that the Plan’s terms were reasonable in relation to the threat posed

. 401 It also provides cold comfort to Remus and Lupin , and

397 Defs.’ Openin g Br. at 52

– 54.
398 Trial Tr. 169:20

– 170:20 (Cogut).
399 See Defs.’ Opening Br. at 49

– 52. 400 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 49 (quoting Trial Tr. at 254:13

– 258:4 (Mills) (“[I]t might be farfetched that they would trigger. But it’s not farfetched that they would call [a n activist] on their behavior and say, ‘look what our pill says and look what you’re doing.

. . . [Y]ou should shut up or bring your position below 5 percent.’”)).
401 Defendants’ argument overlooks the stifling impact the Plan has on stockholder communications, a chilling effect that exists whether the Board triggers the Plan or not. See, e.g., id. ; Mills Report ¶¶ 68, 73 (concluding that the Plan is likely to stifle normal stockholder communications); Mills Rebuttal Report ¶¶ 48

– 51 (concluding that the “guardrails” in the AIC Provision place investors at the mercy of the Board’s broad discretion, noting that Board discretion and after

- the

- fact litigious remedies don’t “address or mitigate the current chilling effect of the Wolfpack Provisions on stockholder activism and the free exercise of the stockholder franchise”).88 stockhol ders like them, who cannot rely on the Board’s benevolence and must regulate their behavior based on what the Board could do. 402 The Passive Investor Definition sets another easily activated tripwire. Mills cites to a concrete example of this concern. On the day the Plan was announced, a representative of BlackRock, which holds over 5% of Williams’ outstanding common stock [and a 13G filer], criticized Williams for failing to be fully transparent concerning the adoption of the Plan, stating “[t]his doesn’t look good from an ESG perspective.” 403 This email reflects BlackRock “exercising the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of the Company” and thus excludes BlackRock from the Passive Investor Definition. 404 While it is pro bably true that the Board would exempt Blackrock and not risk angering a major stockholder player, other stockholders may not be so fortunate. In the end, Defendants “bear the burden to show their actions were reasonable.” 405 They have failed to show that this extreme, unprecedented collection of features bear s a

402 See, e.g., id. ; Mills Report ¶¶ 68, 73 (concluding that the Plan is likely to stifle normal stockh older communications); Mills Rebuttal Report ¶¶ 48

– 51 (concluding that the “guardrails” in the AIC Provision place investors at the mercy of the Board’s broad discretion, noting that Board discretion and after

- the

- fact litigious remedies don’t “address or mitigate the current chilling effect of the Wolfpack Provisions on stockholder activism and the free exercise of the stockholder franchise”).
403 JX

- 73 at 3.
404 See JX

- 69 at 22. 405 Mercier , 929 A.2d at 807 (citing Unocal , 493 A.2d at 955); eBay , 16 A.3d at 35 (holding that where a rights plan “falls outside the range of reasonableness” the defendants fail “to meet their burden of proof under the second prong of Unocal ”); accord Air Prods. , 16 A.3d at 92, 113 (holding that “the target board must show . . . that any board action . . . is ‘reasonable in relation to the threat posed” and that the “Defendants bear the burden of showing that their defenses . . . fall within a ‘range of reasonableness.’” (quoting Unitrin ,89 reasonable relationship to the ir stated corporate objective. Because Defendants failed to prove that the Plan falls within the range of reasonable responses, the Plan is invalid

. III. CONCLUSION For th e foregoing reasons, judgment is entered in favor of the certified class declaring the Plan unenforceable and permanently enjoining the continued operation of the Plan

. Having concluded that the Plan is unenforceable because the Director Defendants breach ed their fiduciary duties under Unocal when adopting it, this decision need not resolve whether the Director Defendants independently breached their fiduciary duties by failing to redeem the Plan.

651 A.2d at 1388)); Yucaipa , 1 A.3d at 331 (“[T]he board bears the burden to show that the pill is reasonable”).