alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Pamela MELVIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; United States of America, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-2409.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 29, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 9, 2011.

*871Pamela Melvin, Appellant Pro Se. Edward D. Gray, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina; Marian Ashley Harder, Cassia W. Parson, Social Security Administration, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Pamela Melvin appeals the district court’s order adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing her complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Melvin v. SSA,*No. 5:09-cv-00235-FL (E.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2010).* We deny Melvin’s motion to reconsider our denial of her motions to unseal and compel, as well as her motion for stay. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*

*

 Contrary to Melvin's court permitted her Privacy district court’s dismissal Melvin's complaint. assertion on appeal, the district Act claims to proceed, despite the of Claims One through Three of Melvin’s complaint.
# C_2019155EN.01003201.xml

| 6.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 155/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 155/32

---

Appeal brought on 23 February 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Joined Cases T-339/16, T-352/16 and T-391/16 Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid v European Commission

(Case C-179/19 P)

(2019/C 155/38)

Languages of the case: Spanish and French

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: J.F. Brakeland, Agent)

Other parties to the proceedings: Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles, Ayuntamiento de Madrid

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018, of which the Commission was notified on the same date, in Joined Cases T-339/16, T-352/16 and T-391/16 Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid v European Commission, dismiss the action at first instance and order the applicants to pay the costs;
  or, in the alternative, |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018, of which the Commission was notified on the same date, in Joined Cases T-339/16, T-352/16 and T-391/16 Ville de Paris, Ville de Bruxelles and Ayuntamiento de Madrid v European Commission, dismiss the action at first instance and order the applicants to pay the costs;

or, in the alternative,

| — | set aside the judgment and refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment and refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appeal is founded on a single ground of appeal. The Commission submits that, in paragraphs 121 to 151 of its judgment, the General Court erred in law in concluding that Regulation 2016/646 (1) modifies an essential element of Regulation 715/2007. (2) That error is due, first, to the General Court’s incorrect interpretation of the concept of modification, illustrated by its recourse to the concept of ‘de facto’ modification, and, secondly, to an incorrect interpretation of the scope of Regulation 2016/646. In doing so, the judgment endangers the inter-institutional balance of the European Union.

---

(1)  Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/646 of 20 April 2016 amending Regulation (EC) No 692/2008 as regards emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 6) (OJ 2016 L 109, p. 1)

(2)  Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2007 on type approval of motor vehicles with respect to emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) and on access to vehicle repair and maintenance information (OJ L 2007 L 171, p. 1)

---
# C_2019164EN.01002701.xml

| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/27

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 27 February 2019 — Rensen Shipbuilding BV, other party: Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane

(Case C-192/19)

(2019/C 164/29)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Gerechtshof te Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Rensen Shipbuilding BV

Other party: Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane

Question referred

Additional note 1 to Chapter 89 of the Combined Nomenclature provides that (inter alia) the CN subheadings 89012010 and 89019010, entitled ‘Seagoing’, are to be taken to apply only to vessels that are designed as seagoing. What should be understood by the term ‘seagoing’ in this context?

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1943

NISHAN SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: January 27, 2016 Decided: February 12, 2016

Before GREGORY and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Nishan Singh, Petitioner Pro Se. Linda Y. Cheng, Sheri Robyn

Glaser, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., 

for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Nishan Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for 

review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 

dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of 

Singh’s requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture.

We have reviewed the record, including the transcript of 

Singh’s merits hearing, the applications for relief, and all 

supporting evidence. We conclude that the record evidence does 

not compel a ruling contrary to any of the administrative 

factual findings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012), and that 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. See INS v. 

Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Particularly, as 

relevant to Singh’s applications for asylum and withholding of 

removal, we find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

affirmance of the immigration judge’s conclusion that Singh’s 

membership in either of the proposed social groups was not “one 

central reason” for the past harm he sustained or the future 

harm he feared. See Hui Pan v. Holder, 737 F.3d 921, 926 (4th 

Cir. 2013) (noting that this court reviews factual findings for 

“substantial evidence”); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 

117, 127-28 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a persecutor’s 

motive is “a classic factual question” that the Board reviews 

for clear error). 
3

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review for the 

reasons stated by the Board. See In re: Singh (B.I.A. July 21, 

2015). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

PETITION DENIED
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

I, David H. Ownby, certify that:

 

1.                             I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 1 of Regal Entertainment Group;

 

2.                             Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; and

 

3.                             Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

 
| Date:   March 26, 2013 | /s/ DAVID   H. OWNBY       |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|
|                        | David   H. Ownby                |
|                        | *Chief Financial Officer*       |
|                        | *(Principal Financial Officer)* |

 

----
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Allen Walker, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Rothwax, J.), rendered on September 28, 1983, unanimously affirmed. Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted. *(See, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Sandler, Bloom, Kassal and Rosenberger, JJ.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

January 13, 2015

N o. 04

- 14

- 00893

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.C. AND T.C., Children,

From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014

- PA

- 00142

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

The Appellant ’ s Motion to Withdraw and Substitute Attorney Ad Litem is DENIED AS

MOOT.

_________________________________ Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WH EREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 13th day of January, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
# C_2020215EN.01004001.xml

| 29.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 215/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 215/40

---

Judgment of the General Court of 13 May 2020 — Divaro v EUIPO — Grendene (IPANEMA)

(Case T-288/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark IPANEMA - Earlier EU figurative mark Ipanema - Relative ground for refusal - Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2020/C 215/50)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Divaro, SA (Oviedo, Spain) (represented by: M. Santos Quintana and M. A. Fernández Munárriz, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Grendene, SA (Sobral, Brazil)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 February 2019 (Case R 1785/2018-2) relating to opposition proceedings between Grendene and Divaro.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 22 February 2019 (Case R 1785/2018-2) in so far as it dismissed the action of Divaro, SA for ‘protective glasses’ in Class 9; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 22 February 2019 (Case R 1785/2018-2) in so far as it dismissed the action of Divaro, SA for ‘protective glasses’ in Class 9;

| 2. | Rejects the opposition for all the goods covered in the application for registration, except for ‘glasses (optical)’, ‘frames for the latter (lenses)’ and ‘sports glasses’ in Class 9; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rejects the opposition for all the goods covered in the application for registration, except for ‘glasses (optical)’, ‘frames for the latter (lenses)’ and ‘sports glasses’ in Class 9;

| 3. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 4. | Orders each party to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Orders each party to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 213, 24.6.2019.

---
**Exhibit 23.1**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMWe hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (No.333-131885) and Form S-8 (Nos. 333-133601, 333-133599, 33-18966-99, 33-46724-99, 33-50270-99,33-57675-99, 33-62394-99, 333-17407-99, 333-25857-99, 333-53912-99, 333-80511-99, 333-107450, and333-107451) of Noble Corporation of our report dated February 29, 2008 relating to the consolidatedfinancial statements and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, whichappears in this Form 10-K./s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLPHouston, Texas
# C_2020087EN.01000501.xml

| 16.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 87/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 87/5

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 28 November 2019 — L v Banco de Caja España de Inversiones, Salamanca y Soria, S.A.U.

(Case C-869/19)

(2020/C 87/06)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: L

Defendant: Banco de Caja España de Inversiones, Salamanca y Soria, S.A.U.

Question referred

Does Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC (1) preclude the application of the procedural principles of delimitation of the subject matter of an action by the parties, correlation between the claims put forward in the action and the rulings contained in the operative part and prohibition of reformatio in peius that prevent the court seised of the appeal lodged by the bank against a judgment that placed a temporal limit on repayment of the amounts overpaid by the consumer under a ‘floor clause’ subsequently declared void from ordering repayment in full of the said overpayments, thereby placing the appellant in a worse position, because the consumer has not appealed against the said limit?

---

(1)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

---
# C_2021310EN.01001802.xml

| 2.8.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 310/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.8.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 310/18

---

Judgment of the General Court of 16 June 2021 — Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza Chłodnictwa i Klimatyzacji v Commission

(Case T-126/19) (1)

(Environment - Regulation (EU) No 517/2014 - Fluorinated greenhouse gases - Allocation of quotas for placing hydrofluorocarbons on the market - Plea of illegality - Article 16 of Regulation No 517/2014 and Annexes V and VI thereto - Principle of non-discrimination - Obligation to state reasons)

(2021/C 310/21)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza Chłodnictwa i Klimatyzacji (Warsaw, Poland) (represented by: A. Galos, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: J.-F. Brakeland, A. Becker, K. Herrmann and M. Jáuregui Gómez, acting as Agents)

Interveners in support of the defendant: European Parliament (represented by: L. Visaggio, A. Tamás and W. Kuzmienko, acting as Agents) and Council of the European Union (represented by: K. Michoel and I. Tchórzewska, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application based on Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of the Commission’s decision of 11 December 2018 allocating the applicant a quota of 4 096 tonnes of CO2 equivalent of hydrofluorocarbons for 2019.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza Chłodnictwa i Klimatyzacji to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza Chłodnictwa i Klimatyzacji to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

| 3. | Orders the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 148, 29.4.2019.

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Jason Emmanuel WILKERSON, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 08-7414.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 17, 2008.

Decided: Jan. 13, 2009.

Jason Emmanuel Wilkerson, Appellant Pro Se. Scott W. Putney, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Jason Emmanuel Wilkerson appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (2006). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Wilkerson,*No. 4:04-er-00092-RAJ-TEM-1 (E.D. Va. June 23 & July 11, 2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

ARACELI NAVA A/K/A ARACELI

MARRUFO

- NAVA,

Appellant

,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

,

State

. §

§

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 1 4

- 00 226

- C R

Appeal from the

346 th District Court

of El Paso C ounty, Texas

(TC# 20140D01257 )

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the Appellant’s f ifth motion for extension of time within which to

file the brief until March 13 , 2015. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

TO F ILE THE APPELLANT ’ S B R IEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that the Hon. Ruben P. Morales

, the Appellant’s attorney,

prepare the Appellant’s brief and forward the same to this Court on or before March 13 , 2015

.

If the Appellant ’ s brief i s not filed with this Court by March 1 3 , 201 5 , this Court will

find it necessary to send this case back to the trial court for a hearing as to why the Appellant ’ s

brief has not been filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 10 th day of March , 20 1 5

.

PER CURIAM

Before McClure , C.J., R odriguez and Hughes , JJ.
# C_2019213EN.01000501.xml

| 24.6.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 213/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.6.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/5

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 27 February 2019 — MG, NH v Germanwings GmbH

(Case C-190/19)

(2019/C 213/05)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: MG, NH

Defendant: Germanwings GmbH

Question referred

Can a right to compensation under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) also exist when a passenger does not catch a directly connecting flight due to a relatively minor delay in arrival, with the result that there is a delay in arrival at the final destination of three hours or more, but the two flights were operated by different air carriers and the booking confirmation was issued by a travel agency who combined the flights for its customer?

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).

---
Exhibit 32.1

NANOGEN, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of Nanogen Incorporated (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the three months ended
March 31, 2007 (the Report), I, Howard C. Birndorf, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|             |  |                                                                      
|------------ |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|             | 
|May 10, 2007 |  | /s/    HOWARD C. BIRNDORF                                            
|             |  | Howard C. Birndorf Chairman of the Board, and
Chief Executive Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Harold J. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-30015

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 28, 2011.

Cristina Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Cytheria Jernigan, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.

Betty Lee Marak, Esq., Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Shreveport, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before BENAVIDES, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Harold J. Jackson has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493*908(1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Jackson has filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Jackson’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no non-frivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under *908the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.