Affirmed and Majority and Concurring Opinions filed August 14, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00042-CV

CLAY EXPLORATION, INC., Appellant

V.

SANTA ROSA OPERATING, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 12th District Court

Grimes County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 28262-A

CONCURRING OPINION

I respectfully concur. Although I agree with the majority opinion conclusion 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in light of the limiting language in 

the order granting authority, I do not agree that we should consider whether the 

receivership in this underlying cause is or is not still in effect.

Under our appellate rules we should not reach the continued validity of the 

receivership. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require us to address “every 

issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.” Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. 
Specifically, the majority determines that “a claim of heirship communicated 

outside the judicial process did not alone invalidate either the receivership or the 

lease” and that “Santa Rosa failed to show the receivership was still in effect when 

Ketchum executed the Clay lease.” Such a discussion is unnecessary in light of 

our determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing a 

lease executed beyond the scope of the receiver’s authority. As the majority 

opinion states, we may affirm the judgment of the trial court on any basis presented 

because the trial court’s judgment does not state a basis relied upon. We fully 

resolve the appeal on the basis of receiver authority. The analysis requires no “belt 

and suspenders” determination because such determinations are unnecessary to the 

disposition of this appeal and, thus, approach advisory. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; 

S. Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 307 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) 

(courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions that decide abstract questions 

of law without binding the parties by Article II, section 1, of the Texas 

Constitution). 

Further, as a policy matter we should not decide the unnecessary question. 

As the majority opinion notes, there are not only multiple parties to the underlying 

proceeding by virtue of intervention and the competing motion herein, but also a 

separate petition by Tayland Resources for the trial court to appoint a receiver. 

Therefore, the broader legal question concerning the status of the receivership 

below will impact subsequent and collateral proceedings. I recognize that there are 

circumstances in which an appellate court may address additional issues that have 

been properly raised and presented but are not “necessary” to the final disposition 

of the appeal. See, e.g., Edinburgh Hosp. Auth. v. Trevino, 941 S.W.2d 76, 81 

(Tex. 1997) (addressing issue not essential to the disposition of appeal to provide 

trial court with guidance on retrial); Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 

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623, 626 (Tex. 1996) (appellate court may consider summary judgment grounds 

“that the movant preserved for review and trial court did not rule on in the interest 

of judicial economy”). But in this case, I would adhere to “‘the cardinal principle 

of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to 

decide more.’” VanDevender v. Woods, 222 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. 2007)

(quoting PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring)).

The majority is not faced with deciding a constitutional issue, as was present 

in VanDevender. See id. But here, there are both collateral and probable 

subsequent proceedings involved in this case: the receivership at issue is ongoing

and another related receivership is sought. I would therefore practice judicial 

restraint to go no further than necessary in affirming the trial court’s order to 

prevent the possibility of our holding impacting these proceedings. 

Accordingly, I do not join the majority’s discussion regarding the 

continuation of the receivership in Part II.A. Because I agree with the majority 

that the trial court’s order setting aside the Ketchum-Clay lease should be affirmed

because the receiver exceeded his authority, however, I respectfully concur. 

/s/ Sharon McCally

Justice

Panel consists of Justices McCally, Busby, and Donovan (Busby, J., Majority).

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