NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DONNA R. CAMP,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent.

______________________ 

2013-3008

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF0752120714-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: April 10, 2013

______________________ 

DONNA R. CAMP, of San Diego, California, pro se.

J. HUNTER BENNETT, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him 

on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and REGINALD T. BLADES, JR., Assistant Director. 

______________________ 
2 DONNA CAMP v. DVA

Before DYK, SCHALL, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Petitioner Donna Camp seeks review of a decision of 

the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dismissing 

her case for lack of jurisdiction. See Camp v. Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, No. SF0752120714-I-1, slip op. at 4

(M.S.P.B. Sept. 13, 2012) (“Initial Decision”). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Camp was an employee with the U.S. Department 

of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), working in a call center for the

San Diego Healthcare System. In February 2011, the VA

proposed removing Ms. Camp from her position for disrespectful behavior toward a veteran. She had previously 

been suspended twice for similar conduct. The VA provided Ms. Camp with an opportunity to respond, and she 

met with a Deciding Officer. After considering the evidence supporting the charges, her past discipline, and her 

years of service, the Deciding Officer decided to remove 

Ms. Camp from her position. 

In May 2011, Ms. Camp and the VA entered into a 

Last Chance Agreement (“Agreement”) under which Ms. 

Camp’s removal would be held in abeyance if she abided 

by the terms of the Agreement for one year. Among other 

provisions, Ms. Camp agreed that she would “not engage 

in any acts of misconduct,” and that if she “fail[ed] to 

comply with any term of th[e] Agreement on even one 

occasion during the period of one (1) calendar year,” the 

VA could “effect the previously proposed removal without 

prior notice.” Agreement ¶¶ 4.a, 4.i. Ms. Camp also 

“waive[d] her right to challenge her removal in the event 

that the Agency effects the previously proposed removal.” 

Id. ¶ 4.j. The waiver provision includes “a waiver of [Ms. 

Camp’s] right to appeal her removal to the MSPB [Merit 
 DONNA CAMP v. DVA 3

Systems Protection Board].” Id. The Agreement further 

recites: 

[Ms. Camp] has read this entire Agreement, has 

consulted with an attorney or representative or 

has freely decided not to consult with an attorney 

or representative, that she has not been induced 

to enter into this Agreement by any promises or 

representations other than those expressly stated 

in this Agreement, that she understands all terms 

of this Agreement, and that she has not been coerced into entering into this Agreement.

Id. ¶ 4.l. On the signature page, the Agreement further 

states that Ms. Camp “acknowledges that she has read 

and considered each of the provisions of this agreement 

and that she voluntarily enters into the agreement with 

full knowledge of the consequences,” and that “THE 

PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT HEREBY SIGNIFY 

THEIR VOLUNTARY, KNOWING AND 

UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF EACH AND 

EVERY TERM OF THIS AGREEMENT, WITHOUT 

RESERVATION.” Id. ¶ 8.k. Ms. Camp signed the 

Agreement, as did her union representative.

In October 2011, the VA removed Ms. Camp based on 

the terms of the Last Chance Agreement. Ms. Camp 

appealed her removal to the Board. The administrative 

judge who was assigned to the case advised Ms. Camp 

that the Board might not have jurisdiction to hear her 

appeal because of the waiver provision in her Agreement. 

Ms. Camp responded that she had not wanted to sign 

the Agreement. According to Ms. Camp, when the VA

proposed her removal, it gave her a choice of signing the 

Agreement or accepting a demotion, which would involve 

a transfer to another area at a lower pay grade. Ms. 

Camp said she told her union representative she wanted 

to choose the demotion, but her representative did not 

respond by the deadline for selecting that option. As a 
4 DONNA CAMP v. DVA

result, she was left with the option of signing the Agreement or being removed. In order to avoid losing her job, 

she signed the Agreement. 

After considering Ms. Camp’s response, the administrative judge held that Ms. Camp had failed to make a 

non-frivolous allegation that the waiver provision in her 

Last Chance Agreement was not enforceable, and that the 

Board therefore did not have jurisdiction to hear her 

appeal. Initial Decision at 3-4. Ms. Camp did not seek 

further review by the Board, and the administrative 

judge’s initial decision became final on October 18, 2012. 

Ms. Camp appealed the Board’s decision to this court.

DISCUSSION

This court’s review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board is limited. We must affirm a decision of the Board 

unless it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained 

without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation 

having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial 

evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Whether the Board has 

jurisdiction over an appeal is a question of law that this 

court reviews without deference, while underlying findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence. Parrott 

v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 519 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir.

2008).

It is settled law that a federal employee can waive the 

right to appeal removal in a last-chance agreement. 

Gibson v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 160 F.3d 722, 725 

(Fed. Cir. 1998). If the employee is later removed under 

the terms of the last-chance agreement, the Board will 

lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the removal. See

id. at 727. There is an exception to this rule, however. 

Ms. Camp can establish that her waiver of appeal is 

unenforceable and that the Board therefore has jurisdiction to hear her appeal if she can show one of the following: (1) that she complied with the terms of the Last 
 DONNA CAMP v. DVA 5

Chance Agreement; (2) that the VA breached the Agreement; or (3) that she did not knowingly and voluntarily 

enter into the Agreement. Buchanan v. Dep’t of Energy, 

247 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Ms. Camp has not alleged that she complied with the 

Last Chance Agreement or that the VA has breached the 

Agreement. Therefore, the only remaining question is 

whether Ms. Camp knowingly and voluntarily entered 

into the Agreement. The administrative judge found that 

Ms. Camp had not shown that her decision to sign the 

Agreement was involuntary or coerced. See Initial Decision at 3.

As described by Ms. Camp, the circumstances surrounding her decision to sign the Agreement are as follows. She claims she wanted to choose the demotion 

instead of signing the Agreement, but because her union 

representative failed to act before the deadline for selecting the demotion, she was left with no choice but to sign 

the Agreement. 

Unfortunately for Ms. Camp, any potential failings by 

her union representative leading up to her decision to sign 

the Agreement are not within the scope of our review on 

appeal. We are limited to reviewing whether, when Ms. 

Camp ultimately entered into the Agreement, she did so 

knowingly and voluntarily. Based on the record before us, 

we must conclude that she did.

Ms. Camp’s Agreement with the VA explicitly states 

that she “has read and considered each of the provisions 

of this agreement and that she voluntarily enters into the 

agreement with full knowledge of the consequences.” 

Agreement ¶ 8.k (emphasis added). This and similar 

provisions in the Agreement indicate that Ms. Camp did 

indeed sign the Agreement knowingly and voluntarily.

Of course, once the deadline for selecting a demotion 

had passed, Ms. Camp may have subjectively felt that she 
6 DONNA CAMP v. DVA

had no reasonable choice but to enter into the Agreement. 

However, it is not accurate to say that she had “no 

choice.” She had two options. She could in fact sign the 

Agreement and return to her job in the call center to work 

for a year under the strict terms of the Agreement. Or 

she could refuse to sign the Agreement, in which case she 

would face immediate removal but would also have the 

ability to appeal her removal to the Board. Both options 

may have been unattractive to Ms. Camp. But as this 

court has previously explained, “the fact that an employee 

is faced with an unpleasant situation or that his choice is 

limited to two unattractive options does not make the 

employee’s decision any less voluntary.” Staats v. U.S. 

Postal Serv., 99 F.3d 1120, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also

Rodriguez v. Dep’t of State, 450 F. App’x 965, 967-68 (Fed. 

Cir. 2011) (affirming the Board’s dismissal of a federal 

employee’s appeal in circumstances similar to those of Ms. 

Camp). Therefore, the fact that Ms. Camp faced an 

unpleasant choice—the prospect of immediate removal or 

returning to her previous job under the strict terms of the 

Agreement—does not mean her decision to accept the 

Agreement was involuntary.

Accordingly, Ms. Camp has failed to show that her decision to sign the Last Chance Agreement was involuntary or coerced. Therefore, we must affirm the 

administrative judge’s conclusions that Ms. Camp’s 

waiver of appeal in the Agreement is enforceable and that 

the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear her appeal.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.