alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 802 

To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to allow the storage and conveyance 

of nonproject water at the Norman project in Oklahoma, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 13, 2011 

Mr. INHOFE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to allow the storage and conveyance of nonproject water at the Norman 

project in Oklahoma, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Lake Thunderbird Ef5 ficient Use Act of 2011’’. 

6 SEC. 2. NORMAN PROJECT, OKLAHOMA. 

7 Public Law 86–529 (74 Stat. 225) is amended by 

8 adding at the end the following: 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 802 IS

1 ‘‘SEC. 10. LAKE THUNDERBIRD. 

2 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—If the Secretary of the Interior 

3 determines that there is enough excess capacity in the res4 ervoir on the Little River known as ‘Lake Thunderbird’ 

5 that nonproject water can be stored in Lake Thunderbird, 

6 the Secretary of the Interior may, in accordance with the 

7 reclamation laws, amend an existing contract, or enter 

8 into 1 or more new contracts, with the Central Oklahoma 

9 Master Conservancy District for the storage and convey10 ance of nonproject water in Norman project facilities to 

11 augment municipal and industrial supplies for the cities 

12 served by the Central Oklahoma Master Conservancy Dis13 trict. 

14 ‘‘(b) COSTS.—If any additional infrastructure is 

15 needed to enable the storage and conveyance of non16 project water in Norman project facilities under sub17 section (a) or any other provision of this Act, the costs 

18 of constructing, operating, and maintaining the infrastruc19 ture shall be the responsibility of the non-Federal entity 

20 contracting with the Secretary of the Interior for storage 

21 and conveyance rights.’’. 

22 SEC. 3. EFFECT. 

23 Nothing in this Act or an amendment made by this 

24 Act authorizes any expansion of the storage capacity of 

25 Lake Thunderbird. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                        |   |   |   |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Dated:  April 15, 2011 |   |   |   | By: |   | /s/ Eddie Vakser |
|                        |   |   |   |   |   | Eddie VakserChief Financial Officer |

----
#### THE STATE VS. KIDD.

*Hateas Corpus.*

(Decided July 2, 1907.)

Appeal from Wilcox Probate Court.

Heard *before*Hon. J. N. Stanford.

Alexander M. Garrbr, Attorney General, for the State.

J. N. Miller, for appellee.

Per curiam.

Affirmed on the facts.
#### In the Matter of Rosamond March, Petitioner, v New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development et al., Respondents.

[942 NYS2d 336]

Determination of respondent New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, dated April 6, 2010, *533which issued a certificate of eviction as to petitioner, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, New York County [Jane S. Solomon, J.], entered January 11, 2010), dismissed, without costs.

The determination to issue a certificate of eviction is supported by substantial evidence *(see Matter of Verdell v Lincoln Amsterdam House, Inc.,*27 AD3d 388, 390 [2006]). The hearing testimony shows that petitioner breached the stipulation in which she agreed to keep her apartment clean and free of unsanitary conditions and odor. Further, in view of the condition of the apartment, we do not find the penalty of eviction shocking to the conscience.

Petitioner did not raise at the hearing her argument that she was entitled to an accommodation. Indeed, in the stipulation, she explicitly withdrew her request for a reasonable accommodation *(see Matter of Seril v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal,*205 AD2d 347 [1994]).

We have considered petitioner’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur — Saxe, J.E, Sweeny, Moskowitz, Renwick and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.
0

i-- : 1 ,-,,, 

irk VI' 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

L 

PR 21-0005 

IN RE THE MOTION OF GREGORY N. 

WOODS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 

OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

AUG 2 it 2021 

Bowen Greenwooa 

Clerk of Supreme Cour/ 

State nf hAnntar,:a 

ORDER 

Gregory N. Woods has filed a motion for admission to the Bar of the State of 

Montana pursuant to Rule V of the Rules for Admission, Admission on Motion. The Bar 

Admissions Administrator of the State Bar of Montana has informed the Court that the 

Commission on Character and Fitness has certified that Woods has provided the necessary 

documentation and has satisfied the requirements prerequisite to adrnission on motion 

under Rule V. Therefore, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that upon payment of any application fees and 

completion of any other processing requirements as set forth by the Bar Admissions 

Adrninistrator, Gregory N. Woods may be sworn in to the practice of law in the State of 

Montana. Arrangements for swearing in may be made by contacting the office of the Clerk 

of the Montana Suprerne Court. 

The Clerk is directed to provide copies of this order to Petitioner and to the State 

Bar o f Montana. 

DATED this ¿LI63 of August, 2021. 

Chief Justice 

08/24/2021

Case Number: PR 21-0005
/';U -•41. 1L 

Justices
#### Leslie SCOTT, a married man; Briana Scott, wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PHOENIX, CITY OF, a body politic, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-16544.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed July 7, 2011.

Anthony Paul Griffin, Esquire, A Griffin Lawyers, Galveston, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Bradley D. Gardner, David Richard Schwartz, Udall, Shumway & Lyons, Mesa, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: FERNANDEZ and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and SINGLETON,** Senior District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable James K. Singleton, Jr., Senior District Judge, District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Plaintiffs-Appellants Leslie Scott (hereinafter “Mr. Scott”), an employee of the City of Phoenix (hereinafter “City”), and *260his wife, Briana (collectively “Scotts”), brought this action against the City alleging that Mr. Scott’s immediate supervisor obtained and disclosed confidential medical information concerning Mr. Scott, in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12111, *et seq.,*and his common-law right of privacy.1 The Scotts do not allege that Mr. Scott suffered from any disability, or that the City took any adverse discriminatory employment action against him. The Scotts only seek monetary damages for emotional distress. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact and granted summary judgment to the City. Having reviewed the record, we find no error and affirm.

On appeal, the Scotts contend that Mr. Scott’s supervisor made disability-related inquiries of both Scotts concerning Mr. Scott’s medical condition, the information provided in response to those inquiries was confidential, and its subsequent disclosure violated Mr. Scott’s right of privacy under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3), (4).

We are satisfied that no inquiries covered by the ADA were ever made. The regulations clarify that general expressions of friendliness to a hospitalized coworker, accompanied by expressions of concern, are not the kind of “inquiries” prohibited by the ADA. *See Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),*(EEOC, July 27, 2000) [EEOC Notice 915.002, 2000 WL 33407181, at *3]. Construing the record in the light most favorable to the Scotts, the inquiries were nothing more than expressions of friendliness and concern.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. The Scotts abandoned their common-law invasion of privacy claim and proceeded solely on the basis of the alleged violation of the ADA.
#### VANCE V. L. & N. R. R. CO.

*Damages.*

(Decided Nov. 21, 1907.)

Appeal from Tuscaloosa County Court.

*669Heard before Hon. H. B. Foster.

Robert N, Bell, and Robison Brown, for appellant.

Foster & Oliver, for appellee.

Affirmed.

Opinion by

Denson, J.

Tyson, C. J., Haralson and Simpson, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. §1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Vascular
Solutions, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2006, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Howard Root, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify to my
knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:



1.
        The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


2.
        The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




| |  | 
| |  | 
| |  | 
| |  | 

---
EXHIBIT 99.1




 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
                      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


Each of the undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that this
Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2002 fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended, and the information contained in such report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.


This 31st day of March, 2003.



____________________________________
Chief Executive Officer


____________________________________
Chief Financial Officer


<PAGE>
# C_2020019EN.01000602.xml

| 20.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 19/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 19/6

---

Appeal brought on 30 July 2019 by Belén Bernaldo de Quirós against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 5 June 2019 in Case T-273/18 Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission

(Case C-583/19 P)

(2020/C 19/08)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Belén Bernaldo de Quirós (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, avocate)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the judgment of 5 June 2019, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission (T-273/18); |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the judgment of 5 June 2019, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission (T-273/18);

| — | Uphold the forms of order sought at first instance; |
| --- | --- |

—

Uphold the forms of order sought at first instance;

| — | Order the Commission to pay all of the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Commission to pay all of the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on a single ground of appeal, alleging a distortion of the facts, a manifest error of assessment and an imprecise reasoning in law.

In the context of the second plea in law submitted before the General Court, the appellant relied on the infringement of the principle of the rights of the defence within the framework of Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. The General Court ruled on that plea in paragraphs 81 to 94 of the judgment under appeal.

The appellant argues that the General Court’s findings are substantially incorrect. She submits that the judgment under appeal is vitiated by an error in law and a manifest error of assessment in that, first, the internal rules cannot justify non-compliance with a statutory provision and, secondly, the general implementing provisions in question do not provide the delegation of powers of the appointing authority, Lastly, the interpretation of the provisions of Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and Article 4(4) of the general implementing provisions resulted in an imprecise reasoning in law.

---
#### American Express Centurion Bank, Respondent, v Jack Gabay, Appellant.

[941 NYS2d 863]

In an action to recover on an account stated, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brandveen, J.), dated August 30, 2010, which granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint, and (2) a judgment of the same court entered September 14, 2010, which, upon the order, is in favor of the plaintiff and against him in the principal sum of $55,799.24.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the judgment in the action *(see Matter of Aho,*39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment *(see*CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

“An account stated is an agreement between parties to an account based upon prior transactions between them with respect to the correctness of the account items and balance due” *(Fleetwood Agency, Inc. v Verde Elec. Corp.,*85 AD3d 850, 851 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]). “An agreement may be implied where a defendant retains bills without objecting to them within a reasonable period of time, or makes partial payment on the account” *(American Express Centurion Bank v Cutler,*81 AD3d 761, 762 [2011]).

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint. The plaintiff met its prima facie burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering evidence that it generated account statements for the defendant in the regular course of business, that it mailed those statements to the defendant on a monthly basis, and that the defendant accepted and retained these statements for a reasonable period of time without objection, and made partial payments thereon *(see American Express Centurion Bank v Williams,*24 AD3d 577 [2005]; *Citibank [S.D.] v Jones,*272 AD2d 815, 816-817 [2000]; *Sullivan v REJ Corp.,*255 AD2d 308 [1998]). The evidence submitted by the defendant in opposition was conclusory and did not contain the necessary evidentiary details regarding his alleged objection to the account statements. *796Accordingly, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact *(see J.B.H., Inc. v Godinez,*34 AD3d 873, 875 [2006]; *Jovee Contr. Corp. v AIA Envtl. Corp.,*283 AD2d 398, 400 [2001]; *Sullivan- v REJ Corp.,*255 AD2d at 308). Balkin, J.P., Chambers, Hall and Austin, JJ., concur.
#### HERMAN v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

November 22, 1907.)

Attorney and Client—Discontinuance by Parties.

Where a case was commenced without the authority of an infant and for whom no guardian ad litem was appointed, her motion to dismiss should be granted, though opposed by the attorney of record.

Appeal from Special Term, Kings County.

Action by Lottie Herman against the New York City Railway Company. From an order denying a discontinuance, defendant appeals. Order reversed.

Argued before WOODWARD, JENKS, HOOKER, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.

Bayard H. Ames (Walter Henry Wood, on the brief), for appellant.

Joseph Cans, for respondent. ,

MILLER, J.

This case is like the case of Kelly v. New York City Railway Company, 106 N. Y. Supp. 894 (decided herewith), except that the plaintiff is an infant and. that the clerk of the attorney of record for the plaintiff procured her to sign a writing authorizing said attorney to bring suit. She says that she did not understand the contents of the paper signed by her, and that she wishes the action discontinued. . Said clerk states that he was informed by the plaintiff that she was over *21*years of age. Her reason for deceiving her attorney, if she understood that she was employing one, is not apparent. But,irrespective of that," we think the court should not compel an infant, for whom no guardian ad litem has been appointed, to prosecute an action which she wishes to discontinue.

The motion should be granted.

Order reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and motion granted, with $10 costs, payable by the attorney for the respondent All concur.
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Annual Report of Noble Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Mark A.
Jackson, Senior Vice President - Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

          (1)       The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
                    13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2)       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                    all material respects, the financial condition and results
                    of operations of the Company.


March 17, 2003                              /s/ MARK A. JACKSON
                                            -----------------------------------
                                            Mark A. Jackson
                                            Senior Vice President - Finance and
                                            Chief Financial Officer
                                            of Noble Corporation
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Zaldiva, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the year ending September 30, 2005, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Annual Report"),
We, Robert B. Lees, President, and John A. Palmer, Jr., Treasurer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:

     (1) The Annual Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

Dated: 12/28/2005                      /s/Robert B. Lees
      -----------                      -----------------
                                       Robert B. Lees
                                       President

Dated: 12/27/2005                      /s/John A. Palmer, Jr.
      -----------                      ----------------------
                                       John A. Palmer, Jr.
                                       Treasurer
                                       Director
1 The district court granted Hartfield’s request to proceed in form

pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). That status continues on appeal. See Fed.

R. App. P. 24(a)(3). 

2 On appeal, Hartfield specifically argues that his trial attorney was

ineffective for failing to 1) use Officer Naasz’s police report to impeach the

officer’s testimony; 2) object to Nurses Schunn’s and Rosenberg’s testimony;

3) use police reports to rebut Detective Trollope’s testimony; 4) object to the

prosecutor’s remarks made during closing argument; and 5) recall the victim as a

(continued...)

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 28, 2005

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

KENNETH HARTFIELD,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES SIMMONS; PHIL KLINE,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 04-3352

(D.C. No. 03-CV-3191-JTM)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER

Before EBEL, McKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner-Appellant Kenneth Hartfield appeals1

 the district court’s decision

denying him habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, from his Kansas convictions for

aggravated kidnapping, aggravated criminal sodomy and rape. On appeal,

Hartfield argues that 1) there was insufficient evidence to support any of his

convictions; 2) his attorney provided ineffective representation;2

 and 3) the trial
2

(...continued)

rebuttal witness. In his § 2254 petition, Hartfield argued that his trial counsel

was ineffective for 1) allowing Officer Naasz, Detective Trollope and Nurses

Schunn and Rosenberg to give false testimony; 2) permitting trial court and

prosecutorial misconduct; and 3) failing to call an eyewitness. 

- 2 -

judge failed to hold a hearing to determine whether Hartfield’s seven-year-old

daughter’s testimony was in accord with Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-460(dd). 

To pursue this appeal, Hartfield must first obtain a certificate of

appealability (COA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To be entitled to a COA,

Hartfield must make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). And to make this showing, he must establish that

“reasonable jurists could debate whether (or for that matter, agree that) the

petition should have been resolved [by the district court] in a different manner or

that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (quotations omitted).

After carefully considering Hartfield’s arguments and the entire record, we

conclude Hartfield has failed to make a sufficient showing that he is entitled to

COA on any of his claims. Therefore, we DISMISS this appeal. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

David M. Ebel

Circuit Judge