J-S25020-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KENNETH C. HOCKENBERRY

Appellant No. 1047 WDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 8, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-CR-0000535-2011

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 6, 2016

Appellant, Kenneth C. Hockenberry, appeals from the June 8, 2015 

order dismissing, as untimely, his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful 

review, we affirm.

We summarize the relevant procedural history of this case as follows. 

On January 5, 2012, Appellant entered a guilty plea to two counts each of 

indecent assault and endangering the welfare of a child.1 On May 1, 2012, 

the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of one to four years’ 

imprisonment on each count. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(7) and 4304(a)(1), respectively.
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on May 10, 2012, which the trial court denied on May 30, 2012. Appellant 

did not file a notice of appeal to this Court.

On January 9, 2015, Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition. 

The PCRA court appointed counsel and conducted a hearing on June 5, 2015, 

limited to the issue of timeliness. On June 8, 2015, the PCRA court entered 

an order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely. On July 7, 2015, 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.2

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review.

[I.] Whether the [PCRA c]ourt erred in its 

finding/conclusion that the [PCRA p]etition filed 

by []Appellant was untimely and the [PCRA 

c]ourt was therefore without jurisdiction to 

hear the same?

[II.] Whether the [PCRA c]ourt erred in its 

finding/conclusion that []Appellant failed to 

meet any of the exceptions to any timeliness 

requirement that may have been applicable?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review. “In reviewing 

the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “The scope of review is limited to the findings 

____________________________________________

2 Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925.
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of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.” Commonwealth v. 

Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “It is well-settled 

that a PCRA court’s credibility determinations are binding upon an appellate 

court so long as they are supported by the record.” Commonwealth v. 

Robinson, 82 A.3d 998, 1013 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). However, this 

Court reviews the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth 

v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

We address Appellant’s issues together, as they both pertain to the 

timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition, which implicates the jurisdiction of 

this Court and the PCRA court. Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883, 

887 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Pennsylvania law makes clear that 

when “a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the trial court has 

jurisdiction over the petition.” Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 

241 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 103 (Pa. 

2014). The “period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of 

equitable tolling; instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be extended 

only if the PCRA permits it to be extended[.]” Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 

A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), 

cert. denied, Ali v. Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 707 (2014). This is to “accord 

finality to the collateral review process.” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 

A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). “However, an untimely petition 
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may be received when the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that 

any of the three limited exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set 

forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), are met.” 

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). The PCRA provides, in relevant part, as follows.

§ 9545. Jurisdiction and proceedings

...

(b) Time for filing petition.—

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, 

including a second or subsequent petition, shall 

be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final, unless the petition 

alleges and the petitioner proves that: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim 

previously was the result of interference 

by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of 

the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is 

predicated were unknown to the 

petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due 

diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional 

right that was recognized by the 

Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after 

the time period provided in this section 

and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively. 
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(2) Any petition invoking an exception 

provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 

60 days of the date the claim could have been 

presented. 

...

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).

In the instant case, Appellant was sentenced on May 1, 2012 and filed 

a timely post-sentence motion on May 10, 2012, which was denied on May 

30, 2012. As a result, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on 

June 29, 2012, when the filing period for a notice of appeal to this Court 

expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “a judgment becomes final 

at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review[]”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 

720(A)(2)(a) (stating that a notice of appeal shall be filed “within 30 days of 

the entry of the order deciding the [post-sentence] motion[]”). Appellant 

therefore had until July 1, 2013 to timely file his PCRA petition.3 See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (stating, “[a]ny petition under this subchapter, 

including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of 

____________________________________________

3 We observe that June 29, 2013 was a Saturday; therefore, as weekends 

are excluded from the computation of filing periods, Appellant’s PCRA 

petition was due by Monday, July 1, 2013. See generally 1 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 1908.
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the date the judgment becomes final[]”). Appellant filed the instant petition 

on January 9, 2015; as a result, it was facially untimely.

However, Appellant avers that the governmental interference 

exception applies to his petition.4 Appellant’s Brief at 16. In order to meet 

the statutory requirements of the governmental interference exception, 

“Appellant was required to plead and prove that his failure to raise the claim 

previously was the result of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim [or claims] in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States ....” 

Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa. 2006) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis in original). A defendant 

claiming this exception must also show that “the information could not have 

been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth 

v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted).

Additionally, as this Court has often explained, all of the time-bar 

exceptions are subject to a separate deadline.

The statutory exceptions to the timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA are also subject to a 

separate time limitation and must be filed within 

____________________________________________

4 Appellant acknowledges that this exception was not raised in his PCRA 

petition. Appellant’s Brief at 16. However, the PCRA court allowed Appellant 

to argue this exception at the June 5, 2015 hearing. N.T., 6/5/15, at 12-29. 

As it was properly before the PCRA court, and in light of the jurisdictional 

nature of the PCRA time-bar, Appellant’s issue is preserved. See generally 

Seskey, supra.
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sixty (60) days of the time the claim could first have 

been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 

The sixty (60) day time limit ... runs from the date 

the petitioner first learned of the alleged afterdiscovered facts. A petitioner must explain when he 

first learned of the facts underlying his PCRA claims 

and show that he brought his claim within sixty (60) 

days thereafter.

Id. (some citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has held that Section 

9545(b)(2) also requires a showing of due diligence insofar that a petitioner 

must file the petition within 60 days that the claim could have first been 

presented. Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 350 (Pa. 2013), 

cert. denied, Edmiston v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 639 (2013).

In this case, Appellant’s governmental interference exception 

argument consists of the following.

Based on the underlying facts of this matter, 

including, but not necessarily limited to []Appellant’s 

underlying medical condition, the absence of 

appropriate medical treatment from jail staff while in 

the County jail and in advance of his being 

incarcerated within the state correctional system, 

and particularly, resulting in the untimely occurrence 

of his seizure shortly before the entrance of his plea 

that left him without glasses, unable to read the 

relevant documents, in a state of “confusion” or “fog” 

that lasted throughout his plea and sentencing and 

until his ultimate receipt of appropriate medical 

treatment at the state correctional system, as well as 

his limited education, his absence of legal 

knowledge, particularly as to how the system works, 

and his assertion as to the absence of any response 

from the staff at the state correctional facility to his 

request for legal assistance to address his claim as to 

ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, []Appellant 

believes and maintains that at a minimum, such 

circumstances are sufficient and warrant the 
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invoking of the “governmental interference” 

exception to [the] one (1) year time deadline.

Appellant’s Brief at 16.

After careful review of the certified record, we conclude Appellant is 

not entitled to relief. This Court has explained that “the general rule 

remains that mental illness or psychological condition, absent more, will not 

serve as an exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time requirements.” 

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1081 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 20 A.3d 1210 (Pa. 2011). The only part of 

Appellant’s argument that arguably alleges interference by governmental 

officials is “the absence of appropriate medical treatment from jail staff while 

in the County jail and in advance of his being incarcerated within the state 

correctional system[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant’s brief does not 

explain which government officials denied him medical treatment, what 

treatment he needed, and how the absence of said treatment prevented him 

from timely filing his PCRA petition. 

However, even if Appellant did explain all of the above, he would still 

not be entitled to invoke Section 9545(b)(1). During Appellant’s testimony 

at the PCRA hearing, Appellant conceded he was aware of the substantive 

basis for his petition at the time of the plea and sentencing in 2012; 

specifically, that plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance. N.T., 6/5/15, 

at 19-20. Furthermore, Appellant testified that he began to receive the 

appropriate medication from SCI Somerset “a couple years” before the filing 
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of his PCRA petition. Id. at 21-22. Therefore, Appellant’s PCRA petition, 

filed on January 9, 2015, was filed beyond 60 days that his claims could 

have first been presented. Edmiston, supra. As a result, Appellant has 

not carried his burden to show that there was governmental interference in 

this case, and even if he could show said interference, Appellant’s petition 

did not comply with the 60-day rule at Section 9545(b)(2).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. Accordingly, the PCRA court’s 

June 8, 2015 order is affirmed.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2016