alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Citizens Insurance Co. of America, Doing Business as Hanover Insurance Group, Appellant, v Aristotle Hatzigeorgiou, Individually and Doing Business as Play, et al., Respondents.

[942 NYS2d 109]

Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Joan A. Madden, J.), entered July 9, 2010, which denied plaintiff insurer’s motion for summary judgment, and, upon searching the record, granted summary judgment to defendant insureds declaring that plaintiff is obligated to defend and indemnify defendant insureds in an underlying personal injury action, and order, same court and Justice, entered July 18, 2011, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to renew, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In its motion for summary judgment, plaintiff asserted that it *587timely disclaimed coverage for the underlying accident by letter dated July 9, 2008. In opposition, defendants asserted that the July 9, 2008 letter was not a notice of disclaimer, but a reservation of rights, and that plaintiff did not disclaim coverage until commencing this declaratory judgment action more than two months after receiving notice of the underlying action, which was untimely as a matter of law. Supreme Court agreed with defendants and denied plaintiffs motion. Plaintiff then moved to renew based on the “new facts” that it actually sent a letter disclaiming coverage on July 16, 2008 and that it never sent the “draft” letter dated July 9, 2008.

Supreme Court properly denied the motion to renew, as plaintiff did not provide a reasonable justification for failing to present the July 16, 2008 letter on the prior motion *(see*CPLR 2221 [e] [3]; *Whalen v New York City Dept. of Envtl. Protection,*89 AD3d 416, 417 [2011]). Plaintiffs excuse that its counsel inadvertently attached the wrong letter in its prior motion papers is unreasonable, given that, in reply to defendants’ opposition to the original motion, plaintiff submitted a sworn affidavit from its agent attesting to the fact that the July 9, 2008 letter was the disclaimer letter sent to defendants. The agent’s affidavit on renewal asserting that the July 16, 2008 letter is the actual disclaimer letter contradicts her prior sworn affidavit; accordingly, Supreme Court properly determined that the failure to submit the July 16, 2008 letter was more than mere law office failure.

Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment, as the July 9, 2008 letter was the only letter before the court on the original motion, and plaintiff asserts that the letter was never sent. Concur — Gonzalez, RJ., Saxe, Sweeny, Acosta and Renwick, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Andrea C.B.B. Community Counseling & Mediation, Respondent. Tyshawn B., Sr., Respondent, and Estelle B., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Tyshawn C.B., Jr. Community Counseling & Mediation, Respondent; Tyshawn B., Sr., Respondent, and Estelle B., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 2.)

[944 NYS2d 907]—

In related proceedings pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Turbow, J.), dated July 6, 2011, which (1) denied that branch of her motion which was to vacate an order of disposition of the same court (McElrath, J.), dated January 19, 2011, which, after a dispositional hearing, and upon her default in appearing at that hearing, inter alia, terminated her parental rights and transferred guardianship and custody of the subject children to the petitioner, Community Counseling & Mediation, for the purpose of adoption, and (2), in effect, denied that branch of her motion which was for post-termination visitation with the subject children.

Ordered that the order dated July 6, 2011, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

*1310After the mother defaulted at a dispositional hearing and her parental rights were terminated in 2010, the mother moved to vacate her default. The petitioner consented to that relief, and the order entered upon the mother’s default was vacated. When the matter subsequently appeared on the Family Court’s calendar for a new dispositional hearing in January 2011, the mother again defaulted, and the Family Court again terminated her parental rights after conducting a hearing. The mother again moved, inter alia, to vacate the order entered upon her default. This time, however, the Family Court denied her motion.

In order to vacate the order entered upon her default, the mother was required to establish that she had a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the termination petition *(see*CPLR 5015 [a]; *Matter of Dominique Beyonce R. [Maria Isabel R.],*82 AD3d 984, 985 [2011]; *Matter of Princess M.,*58 AD3d 854 [2009]). She established neither. Consequently, the Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying her motion to vacate her default *(see Matter of Daniel Marcus Y. [Marilyn Y.],*77 AD3d 843, 843-844 [2010]; *Matter of Samantha B. [Arthur Eugene S.],*72 AD3d 682, 683 [2010]).

Under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion, in effect, denying that branch of the mother’s motion which was for contact with the subject children after the termination of her parental rights *(cf. Matter of Selena C. [Thelma C.],*77 AD3d 659 [2010]; *Matter of Kahlil S.,*35 AD3d 1164 [2006]). Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Belen and Chambers, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 10.1

SECOND AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

This Second Amendment to Employment Agreement ("Amendment"), effective as of July 1, 2001, is made by and between NANOGEN, INC., a Delaware
corporation (the "Company"), and MICHAEL D. MOORE (the "Executive").

RECITALS

WHEREAS, the Company and Executive have entered into an Employment Agreement dated December 6, 1999, superceded by an Employment Agreement dated
June 15, 2000 and a First Amendment to Employment Agreement dated July 28, 2000 (collectively the "Employment Agreement"); and

WHEREAS,
the Company and Executive wish to amend the Employment Agreement as described herein.

NOW,
THEREFORE, the Company and Executive, in consideration of the Executive's continued employment with the Company, agree as follows:

TERMS

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| |  | NANOGEN, INC.
| |  | -------------
| |  | By:          
| |  |              
| |  |              
| |  | EXECUTIVE    
| |  | By:          
| |  |              
| |  |              

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QuickLinks
EXHIBIT 31.1



CERTIFICATIONS



CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION



I, Steven Dinetz, Chief Executive Officer of NextMedia Operating, Inc., certify that:



1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of NextMedia Operating, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:



(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the
registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions based upon the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
and



(c) Disclosed in this report any change
in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or
is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,
to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting.



|                     |  |                               
|-------------------- |  | ------------------------------
|Date: March 28, 2005 |  | /s/  Steven Dinetz            
|                     |  | Name: Steven Dinetz           
|                     |  | Title: Chief Executive Officer
# C_2021035EN.01004402.xml

| 1.2.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 35/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.2.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 35/44

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Judgment of the General Court of 9 December 2020 — Ace of spades v EUIPO — Krupp and Borrmann (JC JEAN CALL Champagne ROSÉ)

(Case T-620/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the three-dimensional EU trade mark JC JEAN CALL Champagne ROSÉ - Earlier three-dimensional EU trade marks - Relative grounds for refusal - Similarity of the signs - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - No damage to reputation - Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001))

(2021/C 35/57)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Ace of spades Holdings LLC (New York, New York, United States) (represented by: A. Gómez López, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent)

Other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Gerhard Ernst Krupp (Munich, Germany), Elmar Borrmann (Reith, Austria)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 June 2019 (Case R 1/2019-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Ace of spades Holdings and Messrs Krupp and Borrmann.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 26 June 2019 (Case R 1/2019-5) in so far as it dismissed the appeal brought by Ace of spades Holdings LLC and rejected the opposition based on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 26 June 2019 (Case R 1/2019-5) in so far as it dismissed the appeal brought by Ace of spades Holdings LLC and rejected the opposition based on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009;

| 2. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 3. | Orders each party to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders each party to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 399, 25.11.2019.

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# C_2019357EN.01001301.xml

| 21.10.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 357/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.10.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 357/13

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 3 July 2019 — Go Sun Srl, Malby Energy 4 Srl v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico and Others

(Case C-512/19)

(2019/C 357/19)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Go Sun Srl, Malby Energy 4 Srl

Defendants: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Autorità di Regolazione per l’Energia, Reti e Ambiente, Gestore dei Servizi Energetici SpA — GSE

Questions referred

Does EU law preclude the application of a provision of national law, such as that in Article 26(3) of Decree-Law No 91/2014, as converted by Law No 116/2014, which significantly reduces the payment of incentives already granted by law and defined on the basis of corresponding agreements concluded by undertakings generating electrical energy by means of photovoltaic conversion with Gestore dei servizi energetici s.p.a, a public company responsible for that process?

In particular, is that provision of national law compatible with the general principles of EU law relating to legitimate expectation, legal certainty, sincere cooperation and effectiveness, with Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, with Directive 2009/28/EC (1) and with the rules governing support schemes laid down in that directive, and with Article 216(2) TFEU, in particular in relation to the European Energy Charter Treaty?

---

(1)  Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009 L 140, p. 16).

---
EXHIBIT 23.1

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We consent to the incorporation by
reference in the registration statement of Texas United Bancshares, Inc., on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-100162, 333-100163, 333-124055 and 333-130574) of our reports dated March 6, 2006, on our audits of the consolidated financial statements of Texas
United Bancshares, Inc., as of December 31, 2005 and 2004, and for the two years then ended, which report is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K. We also consent to the incorporation by reference of our report dated March 6, 2006, on our
audit of the internal control over financial reporting of Texas United Bancshares, Inc., as of December 31, 2005, which report is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.



/s/ BKD, LLP


Houston, Texas

March 14, 2006
II 

Calendar No. 77 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 978 

To amend the criminal penalty provision for criminal infringement of a 

copyright, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 12, 2011 

Ms. KLOBUCHAR (for herself, Mr. CORNYN, and Mr. COONS) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the 

Judiciary 

JUNE 20 (legislative day, JUNE 16), 2011 

Reported by Mr. LEAHY, without amendment 

A BILL 

To amend the criminal penalty provision for criminal 

infringement of a copyright, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CRIMINAL INFRINGEMENT OF A COPYRIGHT. 

4 (a) AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 2319 OF TITLE 18.— 

5 Section 2319 of title 18, United States Code, is amend6 ed— 

7 (1) in subsection (b)— 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 978 RS

1 (A) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and 

2 (3) as paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively; and 

3 (B) by inserting after paragraph (1) the 

4 following: 

5 ‘‘(2) shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years, 

6 fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, 

7 if— 

8 ‘‘(A) the offense consists of 10 or more 

9 public performances by electronic means, during 

10 any 180-day period, of 1 or more copyrighted 

11 works; and 

12 ‘‘(B)(i) the total retail value of the per13 formances, or the total economic value of such 

14 public performances to the infringer or to the 

15 copyright owner, would exceed $2,500; or 

16 ‘‘(ii) the total fair market value of licenses 

17 to offer performances of those works would ex18 ceed $5,000;’’; and 

19 (2) in subsection (f), by striking paragraph (2) 

20 and inserting the following: 

21 ‘‘(2) the terms ‘reproduction’, ‘distribution’, 

22 and ‘public performance’ refer to the exclusive rights 

23 of a copyright owner under clauses (1), (3), (4), and 

24 (6), respectively of section 106 (relating to exclusive 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 978 RS

1 rights in copyrighted works), as limited by sections 

2 107 through 122, of title 17;’’. 

3 (b) AMENDMENT TO SECTION 506 OF TITLE 17.— 

4 Section 506(a) of title 17, United States Code, is amend5 ed— 

6 (1) in paragraph (1)(C), by inserting ‘‘or public 

7 performance’’ after ‘‘distribution’’ the first place it 

8 appears; and 

9 (2) in paragraph (3)— 

10 (A) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ‘‘or 

11 public performance’’ after ‘‘unauthorized dis12 tribution’’; and 

13 (B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ‘‘or 

14 public performance’’ after ‘‘distribution’’. 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 77 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 978 

A BILL 

To amend the criminal penalty provision for crimipurposes. nal infringement of a copyright, and for other 

JUNE 20 (legislative day, JUNE 16), 2011 

Reported without amendment 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
**Exhibit32.1**

**Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as Adopted Pursuant to**

**Section906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

I, Hal M. Krisbergh, thePrincipal Executive Officer of WorldGate Communications, Inc., hereby certify,pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Form 10-Qof WorldGate Communications, Inc., for the quarterly period ended June 30,2007, which this certification accompanies, fully complies with requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or78o(d)) and information contained in the June 30, 2007 Form 10-Q fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of WorldGate Communications, Inc.

A signed originalof this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided toWorldGate and will be retained by WorldGate and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.
| Dated: August 9, 2007 |   | /s/ HAL M.  KRISBERGH          |
|-----------------------|--------|--------------------------------|
|                  |   | Hal M. Krisbergh               |
|                  |   | Chief Executive  Officer       |
|                  |   | (Principal  Executive Officer) |

 

----
# C_2020054EN.01002901.xml

| 17.2.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 54/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.2.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 54/29

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia (Romania) lodged on 5 November 2019 — Flavourstream SRL v Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Brașov, Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală — Direcția Generală a Vămilor — Direcția Regională Vamală Brașov — Biroul Vamal de Interior Sibiu

(Case C-822/19)

(2020/C 54/31)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants, defendants at first instance: Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Brașov, Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală — Direcția Generală a Vămilor — Direcția Regională Vamală Brașov — Biroul Vamal de Interior Sibiu

Respondent, applicant at first instance: Flavourstream SRL

Question referred

Must the nomenclature in Annex I to Regulation No 2658/87, as amended by Implementing Regulation 2016/1821, (1) be interpreted as meaning that the product ‘AURIC GMO FREE’, which is at issue in the present case, is to be classified under tariff subheading 17 029 095 or subheading 29 124 900 of that nomenclature?

---

(1)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1821 of 6 October 2016 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ 2016 L 294, p. 1).

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# C_2020077EN.01001102.xml

| 9.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 77/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 77/11

---

Appeal brought on 15 March 2019 by István Szécsi and Nóra Somossy against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) made on 16 January 2019 in Case T-331/18, István Szécsi und Nóra Somossy v European Commission

(Case C-236/19 P)

(2020/C 77/15)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellants: István Szécsi and Nóra Somossy (represented by: D. Lázár, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 1 October 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly unfounded and ordered Mr István Szécsi and Ms Nóra Somossy to bear their own costs.

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<PAGE>


                                  EXHIBIT 32.2

                        CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT


I, Barry J. Susson, Chief Financial Officer of Deb Shops, Inc. (the "Company"),
certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that:

     (1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly
period ended July 31, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m
or 78o(d)); and

     (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



Date: September 7, 2005










                                                         Barry J. Susson, CPA
                                                         --------------------
                                                         Barry J. Susson, CPA
                                                         Chief Financial Officer
#### In the Matter of Lena Cochran, Petitioner, v Cesar Perales, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, et al., Respondents.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of respondent Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, dated November 1, 1983, which, after a fair hearing, *inter alia,*affirmed the determination of respondent Commissioner of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services to discontinue petitioner’s homemaker services.

Determination confirmed and proceeding dismissed on the merits, without costs or disbursements.

The determination of the State Commissioner finds ample support in the record and, thus, is supported by substantial evidence *(see, Matter of Pell v Board of Educ.,*34 NY2d 222).

The remaining contention raised by petitioner, that respondent County Commissioner has failed to comply with the State Commissioner’s determination, is not properly before us. Before being permitted to raise this issue in a court of law, petitioner was required to exhaust her administrative remedies *(see, Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth.,*46 NY2d 52, 57). Mollen, P. J., Mangano, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.