alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2019288EN.01001301.xml

| 26.8.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 288/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 288/13

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Constanța (Romania) lodged on 10 April 2019 — Agenția de Plăți și Intervenție pentru Agricultură — Centrul Județean Tulcea v SC Piscicola Tulcea SA

(Case C-294/19)

(2019/C 288/16)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Constanța

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant/defendant at first instance: Agenția de Plăți și Intervenție pentru Agricultură — Centrul Județean Tulcea

Respondent/applicant at first instance: SC Piscicola Tulcea SA

Question referred

Must Articles 2 and 34(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, (1) and Article 2 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1120/2009 of 29 October 2009 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of the single payment scheme provided for in Title III of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, (2) be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, in the conditions obtaining in the main proceedings, excludes a farmer from payment of the entitlements on the ground that the aquaculture facilities used as arable land do not constitute an ‘agricultural area’ for the purposes of Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1120/2009 since they are not regarded as eligible land under Article 34(2) of Regulation (EC) No 73/2009?

---

(1)  OJ 2009 L 30, p. 16.

(2)  OJ 2009 L 316, p. 1.

---
WACHOVIA        
SECURITIES	
8739 Research Drive

Charlotte, NC 28288
**Commercial Loan Servicing

 

Management's Assertion

As of and for the year ended December 31, 2002, Wachovia Bank National Association    (the Bank) has complied in all material respects with the minimum servicing standards set forth in the Mortgage Bankers Association of America's (MBA's) *Uniform Single**Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers* (USAP), except for minimum servicing standards V.4. and VI.I., which the MBA has interpreted as being inapplicable to the servicing of commercial and multifamily loans. As of and for this same period, the Bank                        had in effect a fidelity bond and errors and omissions policy in the amount of $200       million and $20 million, respectively.

 

 
*John M. Church					March 10, 2003
                  John M. Church					Date

Managing Director/ Senior Vice President

  Wachovia Bank National Association

 

 
*Timothy S. Ryan					March 10, 2003
                Timothy S. Ryan					Date

           Director/Vice President

  Wachovia Bank National Association

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wachovia Services is the trade name under which Wachovia Corporation conducts its investment banking, capital markets and institutional securities business 

Through First Union Securities, Inc. ("FUSI"), member NYSE, NASD, SIPC and through other bank and non bank and broker dealer subsidiaries of Wachovia Corporation,

Including Wachovia Bank, N.A. and First Union National Bank.****
#### William Glazier et al., Respondents, v Lyndon Harris et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[944 NYS2d 75]—

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Judith J. Gische, J.), entered March 1, 2011, which, to the extent appealed from, denied defendants Lyndon Harris, Lee Wesley, and St. John’s Lutheran Church’s motion to dismiss the causes of action for defamation as against them, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant the motion as to Wesley, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

The complaint states a cause of action for defamation as against defendants Harris and St. John’s Lutheran Church since it is pleaded with the required specificity (CPLR 3016 [a]), identifying “the particular words that were said, who said them and who heard them, when the speaker said them, and where the words were spoken” *(Amaranth LLC v J.P. Morgan Chase &*
      *539
      *Co.,*71 AD3d 40, 48 [2009], *lv dismissed in part and denied in part*14 NY3d 736 [2010]). That every alleged defamatory statement set forth in the complaint is not enclosed in quotation marks does not, without more, render the complaint defective *(see Moreira-Brown v City of New York,*71 AD3d 530 [2010]).

The challenged statements are actionable as “mixed opinions,” since they imply that the opinions are based upon facts unknown to the church council members who heard the statements *(see Guerrero v Carva,*10 AD3d 105, 112 [2004]). In the context of the entire publication, the unmistakable import of Harris’s statements is that plaintiffs engaged in inappropriate conduct, essentially amounting to exerting undue influence over a parishioner and stealing from the church, and accordingly cannot be trusted.

The alleged defamatory statements constitute slander per se, since they impugn plaintiffs’ reputations in their trade, business or profession, and therefore special damages need not be alleged or proven *(see Liberman v Gelstein,*80 NY2d 429, 434-435 [1992]).

The complaint fails, however, to state a cause of action for defamation as against Wesley, since it does not set forth *“in haec verba*the particular defamatory words claimed to have been uttered by [him]” *(see Gardner v Alexander Rent-A-Car,*28 AD2d 667 [1967]). The only allegedly defamatory statements attributed to Wesley are that “he had been present with defendant ] Harris, during [a] visit to Ms. Lilli Jaffe’s residence,” and that “plaintiffs had been visiting Ms. Jaffe and taking care of her to the exclusion of other parties such as himself.” Neither of these statements is actionable. Plaintiffs otherwise allege that Wesley “confirmed” Harris’s statements to the council members at the retreat. Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, there is no basis for waiting for discovery to learn the particular words that they failed to plead *(see BCRE 230 Riverside LLC v Fuchs,*59 AD3d 282, 283 [2009]). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Moskowitz, Renwick and Freedman, JJ.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-11030

Summary Calendar

JOSE LUIS BRIONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

VELPARITA IVORY, Federal Correctional Institution-Fort Worth; JERRY 

MCKINNEY, Federal Correctional Institution Fort Worth,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CV-689

Before KING, DAVIS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Proceeding in forma pauperis, Jose Luis Briones, federal prisoner 

# 39169-179, filed the instant civil rights suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to seek redress after one of the defendants 

insulted and threatened him while the other witnessed this behavior but did 

nothing to stop it. The district court dismissed the suit as frivolous and for 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 19, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 13-11030 Document: 00512635291 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/19/2014
No. 13-11030

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted in accordance with 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(b)(1). We review this dismissal de novo. See Geiger v. 

Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005). Our review of the record and 

pertinent authority shows no error in connection with the challenged 

judgment.

One who wishes to proceed under Bivens must show that a federal official 

infringed his constitutional rights. See Izen v. Catalina, 398 F.3d 363, 367 (5th 

Cir. 2005). Threats and verbal abuse, such as those alleged by Briones, are not 

constitutionally actionable. See Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271, 274 n.4 (5th 

Cir. 1993); McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1983). Similarly, 

Briones failed to raise a viable retaliation claim because the acts of which he 

complains are, as the district court concluded, de minimis. See Bibbs v. Early, 

541 F.3d 267, 270-72 (5th Cir. 2008); Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684-86

(5th Cir. 2006). Finally, to the extent Briones complains of the processing of 

his grievance against another prison official not party to this suit, these 

assertions do not raise a viable claim because he has no constitutional right to 

have his grievances resolved to his liking. See Geiger, 404 F.3d at 373-74. The 

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

The district court’s dismissal of Briones’s civil complaint as frivolous and

for failure to state a claim counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996). Briones is 

CAUTIONED that if he accumulates three strikes he will not be able to proceed 

IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in 

any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See

§ 1915(g).

2

 Case: 13-11030 Document: 00512635291 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/19/2014
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-QSB
FOR THE PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          19,542
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      248
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                20,458
<PP&E>                                             583
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  21,791
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,215
<BONDS>                                            241
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        32,641
<OTHER-SE>                                       4,194
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    21,791
<SALES>                                            414
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   414
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    4,100
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 295
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (3,983)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (3,983)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (3,983)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.79)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.79)


</TABLE>
# C_2019255EN.01001901.xml

| 29.7.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 255/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.7.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 255/19

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 23 April 2019 — Staatssecretaris van Financiën v X

(Case C-331/19)

(2019/C 255/27)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

Other party: X

Questions referred

| 1. | Must the term ‘foodstuffs for human consumption’ used in point 1 of Annex III to the 2006 VAT Directive (1) be interpreted as covering, in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, any substance or product, whether processed, partially processed or unprocessed, intended to be, or reasonably expected to be ingested by humans?
  If this question is answered in the negative, how must that term then be defined? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must the term ‘foodstuffs for human consumption’ used in point 1 of Annex III to the 2006 VAT Directive (1) be interpreted as covering, in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, any substance or product, whether processed, partially processed or unprocessed, intended to be, or reasonably expected to be ingested by humans?

If this question is answered in the negative, how must that term then be defined?

| 2. | If edible or potable products cannot be regarded as foodstuffs for human consumption, on the basis of which criteria must it then be assessed whether such products can be regarded as products normally used to supplement foodstuffs or as a substitute for foodstuffs? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If edible or potable products cannot be regarded as foodstuffs for human consumption, on the basis of which criteria must it then be assessed whether such products can be regarded as products normally used to supplement foodstuffs or as a substitute for foodstuffs?

---

(1)  Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).

(2)  Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ 2002 L 31, p. 1).

---
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Amendment to Change in Control Agreement - Sean M. Wirtjes



 Exhibit 10.36 
 AMENDMENT TO CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT 
 THIS
AMENDMENT TO CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT (“Amendment”) is entered into by and between VARIAN, INC., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and Sean M. Wirtjes, an employee of the Company (“Employee”). 
 The Company and Employee are parties to a Change in Control Agreement (the “Agreement”) dated as of November 8, 2007. On
July 26, 2009, the Company, Agilent Technologies, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Cobalt Acquisition Corp., a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Agilent, entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the “Merger
Agreement”), pursuant to which Merger Sub will, subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions set forth in the Merger Agreement, merge with and into the Company and the Company will survive the merger and continue as a wholly owned
subsidiary of Agilent (the “Merger”). In connection with approving entering into the Merger Agreement, the Board determined that it is in the best interest of the Company and its stockholders for the Company to amend the Agreement,
effective as of, and contingent upon, the closing of the Merger pursuant to the Merger Agreement. 
 In view of the foregoing,
the Company and Employee agree as follows: 
 1. Subsections (ii) and (iii) of the definition of “Good
Reason” set forth in Section 3(d) of the Agreement are hereby amended to read in their entirety as follows, effective as of, and contingent upon, the closing of the Merger: 
 “(ii) A reduction of Employee’s total compensation, as was provided to Employee as of July 26, 2009, as the
same may have been increased from time to time after the Change in Control Date other than (A) a reduction implemented with the consent of Employee or (B) a reduction that is generally comparable (proportionately) to compensation
reductions imposed on senior executives of the Company generally; or 
 (iii) The failure to provide to Employee
the benefits and perquisites, including participation on a comparable basis in the Company’s stock option, incentive, and other similar plans in which employees of the Company of comparable title and salary grade participate, as were provided
to Employee immediately prior to July 26, 2009, or with a package of benefits and perquisites that are substantially comparable in all material respects to such benefits and perquisites provided prior to July 26, 2009; or” 

2. This Amendment, taken together with the Agreement, to the extent not modified by this Amendment, supersedes any and all previous
contracts, arrangements or understandings between the parties with respect to the Agreement. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties
acknowledge that they have read and understand the terms of this Amendment and have executed this Amendment to be effective on the date that it is signed by both parties. 








									
	VARIAN, INC.	 		 	EMPLOYEE
			
	             /s/ Arthur W. Homan

	 		 	            /s/ Sean M.
Wirtjes

	By:	 	Arthur W. Homan	 		 	Sean M. Wirtjes
	Title:	 	Secretary	 		 		 	
					
	Date:	 	September 4, 2009	 		 	Date:	 	September 14, 2009

  

 2
#### Felicia Sprincenatu PFOUTS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MEASUREMENT INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee. *174Felicia Sprincenatu Pfouts, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Measurement Incorporated, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 11-1030, 11-1367.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 9, 2011.

Decided: June 28, 2011.

Felicia Sprincenatu Pfouts, Appellant Pro Se.

Daniel Palmieri, K & L GATES LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Felicia Sprincenatu Pfouts seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying her motion for review of the settlement agreement (No. 11-1030) and the court’s judgment dismissing her employment discrimination action (No. 11-1367). We affirm in part and dismiss in part.

With regard to the order in No. 11-1030, this court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Pfouts seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. *See In re Bryson,*406 F.3d 284, 287-89 (4th Cir.2005). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in No. 11-1030 for lack of jurisdiction.

Turning to Pfouts’s appeal of the district court’s final judgment, we have reviewed the record and find no error in the district court’s dismissal of the action. Accordingly, we affirm the order in No. 11-1367 for the reasons stated by the court. *Pfouts v. Measurement Inc.,*No. 1:09-cv-00846-WO-LPA (M.D.N.C. Mar. 15, 2011). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alonso RAMIREZ-ORNELAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-10004.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed July 1, 2011.

Glenn B. McCormick, Esq., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Alonso Ramirez-Ornelas, CADC-Cen-tral Arizona Detention Center, Florence, AZ, Sonja Solange Wolf, Esq., Law Offices of Sonja Wolf, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Alonso Ramirez-Ornelas appeals from his guilty-plea conviction and 87-month sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(l)(A)(vn). Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Ramirez-Ornelas’s counsel has filed a brief stating there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided the appellant with the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80-81, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal. We dismiss in light of the valid appeal waiver. *See United States v. Nguyen,*235 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.2000).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.