alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Gayle Aronson, Respondent, v City of Mount Vernon et al., Appellants.

s. In anaction, *inter alia,*to recover damages for libel, slander, breach of contract, etc., arising out of the discharge of plaintiff from her employment, defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Isseks, J.), dated January 23, 1985, which ordered four of the individual defendants to appear for an examination before trial.

Appeal by defendant Wiersma dismissed. Defendant Wiersma was not aggrieved by the order appealed from since it did not apply to him (CPLR 5511; *see, Kipbea Baking Co. v Strauss,*10 AD2d 987).

On the appeal by the remaining defendants, order affirmed.

Respondent is awarded one bill of costs.

Appellants have failed to sustain their burden of showing that they are immune from disclosure *(see, Koump v Smith,*25 NY2d 287). The mere fact that they are members of a legislative body does not exempt them from a requirement to appear at an examination before trial *(cf. Supan v Michelfeld,*97 AD2d 755; *Consolidated Petroleum Term, v Incorporated Vil. of Port Jefferson,*75 AD2d 611).

The issues raised by appellants concerning their entitlement to dismissal of the complaint were not presented to Special Term in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon and *614therefore will not be considered by this court on appeal *(see, Randall-Smith, Inc. v 43rd St. Estates Corp.,*23 AD2d 835, *revd on other grounds*17 NY2d 99). Our decision is without prejudice to their right *to*assert these contentions before Special Term in an appropriate motion. Thompson, J. P., Brown, Weinstein and Eiber, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

       
<S>                            <C>               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                      3-MOS             3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              DEC-31-1996         DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                 JAN-01-1996         JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                   MAR-31-1996         MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                         282,442             149,403
<SECURITIES>                   0                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                  562,179             1,915,901
<ALLOWANCES>                   198,000             291,385
<INVENTORY>                    9,152               309,130
<CURRENT-ASSETS>               556,692             2,344,729
<PP&E>                         433,398             492,734
<DEPRECIATION>                 88,609              107,617
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                 3,474,958           3,130,708
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>          2,263,307           2,628,882
<BONDS>                        137,369             111,959
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>          0                   0
<PREFERRED>                    0                   0
<COMMON>                       25,000              25,000
<OTHER-SE>                     1,049,282           476,826
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>   3,474,958           3,130,708
<SALES>                        368,728             693,060
<TOTAL-REVENUES>               368,728             793,060
<CGS>                          114,133             802,644
<TOTAL-COSTS>                  256,386             440,186
<OTHER-EXPENSES>               0                   0
<LOSS-PROVISION>               0                   100,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>             2,733               22,686
<INCOME-PRETAX>               (4,514)             (572,456)
<INCOME-TAX>                   0                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           (4,514)             (572,456)
<DISCONTINUED>                 0                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                0                   0
<CHANGES>                      0                   0
<NET-INCOME>                  (4,514)             (572,456)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                  0                   .23
<EPS-DILUTED>                  0                   .23
        


</TABLE>
# C_2019182EN.01002201.xml

| 27.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 182/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/22

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 6 March 2019 — TN v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal

(Case C-210/19)

(2019/C 182/26)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: TN

Defendant: Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal

Questions referred

| 1. | Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/3[2]/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that it is possible for effective judicial protection to be guaranteed in a Member State even if its courts cannot amend decisions given in asylum procedures but may only annul them and order that a new procedure be conducted? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/3[2]/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that it is possible for effective judicial protection to be guaranteed in a Member State even if its courts cannot amend decisions given in asylum procedures but may only annul them and order that a new procedure be conducted?

| 2. | Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/3[2]/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, again in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that legislation of a Member State which lays down a single mandatory time limit of 60 days in total for judicial proceedings in asylum matters, irrespective of any individual circumstances and without regard to the particular features of the case or any potential difficulties in relation to evidence, is compatible with those provisions? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/3[2]/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, again in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that legislation of a Member State which lays down a single mandatory time limit of 60 days in total for judicial proceedings in asylum matters, irrespective of any individual circumstances and without regard to the particular features of the case or any potential difficulties in relation to evidence, is compatible with those provisions?

---

(1)  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).

---
# C_2020390EN.01003402.xml

| 16.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 390/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 390/34

---

Judgment of the General Court of 23 September 2020 — FF v Commission

(Case T-654/19) (1)

(Non-contractual liability - Manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products - Directive 2014/40/EU - Use of a photograph in a library of warnings with pictures to be used for tobacco products - Directive 2014/109/EU - Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals)

(2020/C 390/49)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: FF (represented by: A. Fittante, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: I. Rubene and D. Martin, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application based on Article 268 TFEU seeking compensation in respect of the harm allegedly suffered by the applicant because of the unauthorised use of a photograph that he regards as representing him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders FF to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission in the present action and in the proceedings for interim measures. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders FF to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission in the present action and in the proceedings for interim measures.

---

(1)  OJ C 399, 25.11.2019.

---
**Exhibit31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Joseph Lambert,certify that:

 

1.    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of J.L. HalseyCorporation;

 

2.    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.    The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant andhave:

 

a)   Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b)  (Notapplicable)

 

c)   Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and

 

d)  Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.    The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

a)   Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

b)  Any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal controls over financialreporting.

 

Dated:  October 29,2007

 

 
|   |   | /s/ Joseph Lambert                      |
|--------|--------|-----------------------------------------|
|   |   | Joseph Lambert Chief  Financial Officer |

 

 

----
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

I, Amy E. Miles, certify that:

 

1.                             I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 1 of Regal Entertainment Group;

 

2.                             Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; and

 

3.                             Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

 
| Date:   March 14, 2014 | /s/ AMY   E. MILES         |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|
|                        | Amy   E. Miles                  |
|                        | *Chief Executive Officer*       |
|                        | *(Principal Executive Officer)* |

 

----
Deloitte & Touche LLP

Certified Public Accounts

Suite 400

200 South Biscayne Boulevard

Miami, Florida 33131 2310

Ph: (305) 372 3100

Fax: (305) 372 3160

www.us.deloitte.com

Deloitte

& Touche

 

INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANT'S REPORT

 

To the Board of Director of

Lennar Partners, Inc.:

We have examined management's assertion about Lennar Partners, Inc.'s (the "Company") compliance with the minimum servicing standards identified in the Mortgage Bankers Association of America's*Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers* (USAP) as applicable to the special servicing of commercial and multifamily mortgage loans as of and for the year ended December 31, 2002 included in the accompanying management assertion. Management is responsible for the Company's compliance with those minimum servicing standards. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion about the entity's compliance based on our examination.

Our examination was made in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company's compliance with the minimum servicing standards and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company's compliance with the minimum servicing standards.
In our opinion, management's assertion that the Company complied with the aforementioned minimum servicing standards as of and for the year ended December 31, 2002 is fairly stated, in all material respects.

 
***Deloitte & Touche LLP

February 15, 2003

 

 

 

 

 

 

Deloitte

Touche

Tohmatsu

 ***
#### BOTTOM, Respondent, v. CHAMBERLAIN, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

February 6, 1898.)

Action by Mary Bottom against Chandler A. Chamberlain, impleaded, etc.

No opinion. Interlocutory judgment affirmed, with costs. See 47 N. Y. Supp. 733.
Certification
of Principal Executive Officer


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. 1350


(Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)





I,
Yonglin Du, President and Chief Executive Officer of Dahua Inc. (the "Company")
do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
knowledge, based upon a review of the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year
ended December 31, 2008 of the Company, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"):





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.





By:Yonglin
      Du, President & CEO(Principal
      Executive
Officer)





March 23,
2009
#### Joseph HAMILTON, Appellant, v. Gregory PALM; Toni Palm, Appellees.

No. 11-1907.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 22, 2011.

Filed: Dec. 14, 2011.

Before LOKEN, BYE, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In this diversity damage action, Joseph Hamilton sued Gregory and Toni Palm for injuries incurred when Hamilton fell while performing roofing work on the Palms’ property. The critical issue under Missouri law is whether Hamilton was working as the Palms’ employee, as he alleged, or as an independent contractor. The district court initially dismissed the complaint, concluding Hamilton had not plausibly alleged employee status. We reversed and remanded for further proceedings, concluding the “complaint raised plausible inferences of both employee and independent contractor status” that should not be determined by a motion to dismiss. *Hamilton v. Palm,*621 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir.2010). On remand, after full discovery, the district court1 granted the Palms summary judgment, concluding “that the undisputed facts establish that [Hamilton] was not an employee of the Palms.” Hamilton appeals, arguing that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on this issue.

As the district court recognized, in determining whether a person acted as an employee or as an independent contractor, Missouri courts apply the multi-factor common law test set forth in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220, under which “the critical right-to-control issue is affected by many factors ‘none of which is itself controlling.’ ” *Hamilton,*621 F.3d at 818, citing *Howard v. Winebrenner,*499 S.W.2d 389, 395 (Mo.1973). Whether that ultimate issue is one of fact or of law has engendered considerable debate in various contexts. *See Ernster v. Luxco, Inc.,*596 F.3d 1000, 1004-07 (8th Cir.2010). Missouri courts quite clearly consider it an issue of fact, but one that is often suitable for summary judgment resolution. *See Trinity Lutheran Church v. Lipps,*68 S.W.3d 552, 559 (Mo.App.2001). This is consistent with a Restatement comment that, if its multiple relevant factors provide a clear inference that there was, or was not, an employer-employee relationship, the issue is properly determined by the court. Restatement § 220 cmt. c.

Here, the district court applied the undisputed facts to the relevant Restatement factors and concluded that summary judgment was appropriate. Having reviewed this determination *de novo,*we agree for the reasons stated in the court’s thorough Memorandum Opinion. Accordingly, we affirm. *See*8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Mary Ann L. Medler, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the patties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Exhibit 32.2

NANOGEN, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with
the accompanying Quarterly Report of Nanogen Incorporated (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the three months ended June 30, 2007 (the Report), I, Robert Saltmarsh, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|               |  |                                         
|-------------- |  | ----------------------------------------
|August 9, 2007 |  | /s/    ROBERT SALTMARSH                 
|               |  | Robert Saltmarsh Chief Financial
Officer
**Exhibit 32.1**

** **

**Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as Adopted Pursuant to**

 

**Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002**

 

I, Hal M. Krisbergh, the Principal Executive Officer of WorldGateCommunications, Inc., hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that(1) the Form 10-Q/A of WorldGate Communications, Inc., for thequarterly period ended March 31, 2004 (the “Form 10-Q/A”), fullycomplies with requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and (2) theinformation contained in the Form 10-Q/A fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of WorldGateCommunications, Inc.

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906has been provided to WorldGate and will be retained by WorldGate and furnishedto the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

 
| Dated: | January 23, 2006              | /s/ HAL M. KRISBERGH |   |
|--------|-------------------------------|----------------------|--------|
|   |                          |
|   | Hal M. Krisbergh              |
|   | Chief Executive Officer       |
|   | (Principal Executive Officer) |

 

----
# C_2020045EN.01001402.xml

| 10.2.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 45/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.2.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 45/14

---

Appeal brought on 24 September 2019 by Ramón Guiral Broto against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 12 July 2019 in Case T-774/17 Café del Mar and Others v EUIPO — Guiral Broto (C del M)

(Case C-715/19 P)

(2020/C 45/12)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Ramón Guiral Broto (represented by: A. Sirimarco, abogado)

Other parties to the proceedings: Café del Mar, SC, José Les Viamonte, Carlos Andrea González and European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 12 December 2019, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) ruled that the appeal should not be allowed to proceed and ordered Ramón Guiral Broto to bear his own costs.

---
#### Donald P. WATSON, Christine H. Watson, Plaintiffs-Appellants. v. Lake COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11-11531

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 7, 2011.

Alex Finch, Attorney at Law, Dennis F. Wells, Webb, Wells *&*Williams, PA, Long-wood, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Joshua T. Frick, Henry W. Jewett, II, Rissman, Barrett, Hurt, Donahue & McLain, PA, Orlando, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before HULL, PRYOR, and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The summary judgment in favor of the appellee is affirmed for the reasons set forth in the Memoranda and Orders of the District Court dated February 22, 2011 and March 7, 2011.

AFFIRMED.