alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2019328EN.01002301.xml

| 30.9.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 328/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.9.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 328/23

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Ostravě (Czech Republic) lodged on 9 July 2019 — ARMOSTAV MÍSTEK s.r.o. v Odvolací finanční ředitelství

(Case C-520/19)

(2019/C 328/25)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Krajský soud v Ostravě

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: ARMOSTAV MÍSTEK s.r.o.

Defendant: Odvolací finanční ředitelství

Question referred

Does the existence of express national legislation relating to [joint and several] liability for missing tax in a fraudulent chain preclude tax administration authorities from refusing the person held liable under that legislation the right to deduct value added tax in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on VAT fraud? Is such a practice in that situation precluded by Article 17(1), Article 20, Article 52(1), Article 52(6), and Article 54 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?

---
CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO
 18
        U.S.C.SECTION 1350
 AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In
        connection with the Annual Report of Global Links Corp. (the "Company")on
        Form
        10-KSB for the year ending December 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities
        and
        Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Frank J. Dobrucki,
        Chief Executive Officer, President, and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
        certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
        906
        of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge and belief:
        (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
        of
        the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in
        the
        Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
        and
        result of operations of the Company.
  Dated:
                    August 15, 2006
                /s/
                    Frank J. DobruckiFrank
                    J. Dobrucki, ChiefExecutive
                    Officer, President, and Chief Financial
                    Officer
##### 



Exhibit 12 LORAL ORION, INC AND SUBSIDIARIES, A DEBTOR IN POSSESSION
COMPUTATION OF DEFICIENCY OF EARNINGS TO COVER FIXED CHARGES Six Months Ended June 30,2004
    
    2003(In millions)(Unaudited)Loss before income taxes
    
    $
    (46,392
    )
    
    $
    (7,842
    )Plus fixed charges:Interest expense
    
    
    427
    
    
    
    6,467Less: capitalized interest
    
    
    (207
    )
    
    
    (819
    )Earnings available to cover fixed charges
    
    
    (46,172
    )
    
    
    (2,194
    )Fixed charges (1)
    
    
    (427
    )
    
    
    (6,467
    )Deficiency of earnings to cover fixed charges
    
    $
    (46,599
    )
    
    $
    (8,661
    )
   (1)
    
    Fixed charges includes the accrual of interest on all debt obligations
through July 15, 2003, the date of our Chapter 11 filing. 30
1

The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 98-4121

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

Coauthemoc Munoz, also known as *

Javier, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: June 2, 1999

 Filed: June 9, 1999

___________

Before HANSEN, FAGG, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Coauthemoc Munoz, a citizen of the Republic of Mexico, appeals following the

district court’s1

 imposition of sentence upon his guilty plea to conspiring to distribute

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). At

sentencing, Mr. Munoz requested a 2-level downward departure from the applicable

Guidelines range under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.0 (1998), based on
-2-

his consent to an administrative deportation and his agreement not to appeal the

deportation order. The court denied Mr. Munoz’s request and sentenced him at the

bottom of the range to 151 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. This

appeal followed, in which Mr. Munoz challenges the district court’s refusal to depart.

We conclude that the district court’s remarks at sentencing clearly evince

recognition of its authority to depart under section 5K2.0, and that the court simply

declined to exercise its discretion in this case. See United States v. Hernandez-Reyes,

114 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 1997) (when district court correctly understands it has

authority to depart on particular basis from applicable Guidelines range, and makes

discretionary decision not to do so, decision is unreviewable on appeal absent

unconstitutional motive). Mr. Munoz contends that his sentence is reviewable because

the court sentenced him mechanically, in violation of his constitutional rights. The

sentencing transcript belies this argument. The court adopted the presentence report’s

(PSR’s) uncontested findings; refrained from imposing a fine, citing Mr. Munoz’s

financial circumstances; sentenced him at the bottom of the Guidelines range; and made

clear that his case was unlike those in which the court had granted departure,

particularly in that he had illegally reentered the country and had violated the law, after

being deported following a prior robbery conviction. Thus, we conclude that the

district court’s decision is unreviewable. See id. at 802-03.

Mr. Munoz also argues that the district court improperly relied on the PSR in

denying his motion for departure. This argument fails. In making its ruling, the court

relied on the PSR’s uncontested findings that Mr. Munoz was previously convicted of

armed robbery and had been deported; the court stated at the beginning of the hearing

that it would not consider those matters to which Mr. Munoz had lodged objections.

See United States v. Garrett, 161 F.3d 1131, 1132 (8th Cir. 1998).

Accordingly, we affirm.
-3-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 520 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 520

          To repeal the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 9, 2011

Mr. Coburn (for himself and Mr. Cardin) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
          To repeal the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit 
Repeal Act''.

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF VEETC.

    (a) Elimination of Excise Tax Credit or Payment.--
            (1) Section 6426(b)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
        is amended by striking ``December 31, 2011'' and inserting 
        ``the date of the enactment of the Volumetric Ethanol Excise 
        Tax Credit Repeal Act)''.
            (2) Section 6427(e)(6)(A) of such Code is amended by 
        striking ``December 31, 2011'' and inserting ``the date of the 
        enactment the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit Repeal 
        Act''.
    (b) Elimination of Income Tax Credit.--The table contained in 
section 40(h)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended--
            (1) by striking ``2011'' and inserting ``the enactment date 
        of the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit Repeal Act'',
            (2) by adding at the end the following:

``After such enactment date...............  zero.............  zero''.
 

    (c) Repeal of Deadwood.--
            (1) Section 40(h) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is 
        amended by striking paragraph (3).
            (2) Section 6426(b)(2) of such Code is amended by striking 
        subparagraph (C).
    (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to any sale, use, or removal for any period after the date of the 
enactment of the Act.
                                 <all>
```
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 887 

To increase the portion of community development block grants that may 

be used to provide public services, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 4, 2011 

Mr. NELSON of Florida introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

A BILL 

To increase the portion of community development block 

grants that may be used to provide public services, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘CDBG Public Services 

5 Flexibility Act of 2011’’. 

6 SEC. 2. INCREASE IN PUBLIC SERVICES CAP. 

7 Section 105(a)(8) of the Housing and Community 

8 Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5305(a)(8)) is 

9 amended— 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 887 IS

1 (1) by striking ‘‘15 per centum’’ each place it 

2 appears and inserting ‘‘25 percent’’; and 

3 (2) by striking ‘‘amount, except’’ and all that 

4 follows through the semicolon at the end and insert5 ing ‘‘amount;’’. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
#### In the Matter of Stanley J. Kimiecik, on Behalf of Sandra T., Appellant, v Jesse U., Respondent.

Casey, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Chenango County (Humphreys, J.), entered May 2, 1984, which dismissed a petition seeking a declaration that respondent was the father of a child born to Sandra T.

The only witnesses to testify in this paternity proceeding were the mother and the alleged father. Their testimony conflicted on most of the relevant issues, with respondent denying that he ever had intercourse with the mother. The mother offered the results of blood tests indicating a 94.96% and a 99.52% probability that respondent fathered the child, but Family Court refused to accept the results into evidence without proper certification *(see,*CPLR 4518 [c]). Following the close of the parties’ proof, *977Family Court dismissed the petition, concluding that petitioner had not carried the burden of clear and convincing evidence of paternity. Family Court noted that it would have reached the same conclusion even if it considered the results of the blood tests. We affirm.

In view of the parties’ conflicting testimony, creating questions of credibility, we see no basis for disturbing Family Court’s findings, despite evidence of blood test results indicating the probability that respondent fathered the child (see, *Matter of Julie UU. v Joseph VV.,*108 AD2d 1038; *see also, Matter of Moon v Mark A.,*109 AD2d 1017). Contrary to petitioner’s claim, Family Court’s findings in its decision from the Bench are sufficient to allow adequate appellate review and, therefore, comply with CPLR 4213 (b) (see, Siegel, 1965 Supplementary Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 4213 [1984-1985 Supp], p 136). Petitioner also contends that Family Court erred in ruling that the blood test results were not properly certified. As noted above, however, Family Court found petitioner’s evidence insufficient to establish paternity even if the results of the blood tests were considered, and we agree. The order should, therefore, be affirmed.

Order affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Levine, JJ., concur.
```

EXHIBIT 99.1

            **STATEMENT REQUIRED BY 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of AMERICARE HEALTH SCAN,
INC. (the "Company") for the quarter ended June 30, 2003, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, DR.
JOSEPH P. D'ANGELO, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify that

(1)    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
       of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2)    information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
       respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
       Company.

/s/ Dr. Joseph P. D'Angelo
---------------------------
    DR. JOSEPH P. D'ANGELO

August 12, 2003
```
ex10_18.htm


    

    Exhibit
10.18

    


    Description of Employment Arrangement between Overhill
Farms, Inc. and Richard A. Horvath

    


    Mr.
Horvath receives an annual base salary of $150,000 and an automobile allowance
of $600 per month.  The board of directors determines Mr. Horvath’s
discretionary bonus based on performance and his contributions to Overhill
Farms’ success.
#### EUGENE CALLAHAN, Jr., AN INFANT, BY HIS GUARDIAN *AD LITEM,*MARY CALLAHAN, AND MARY CALLAHAN AND EUGENE CALLAHAN, HER HUSBAND, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. DEARBORN DEVELOPMENTS, INC., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Argued March 7, 1960

Decided March 21, 1960.

*28*Mr. John W. Leyden, Jr.,*argued the cause for plaintiffs-appellants *(Messrs. Leyden & Monaghan,*attorneys).

*Mr. George A. Brown*argued the cause for defendant-respondent *(Messrs. Morrison, Lloyd & Griggs,*attorneys).

Pee Cueiam.

We have examined the record and briefs in this matter and, after considering the proof in the most favorable light to the plaintiffs, have concluded that the judgment should be affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the majority opinion of the Appellate Division. We limit the affirmance, however, to a determination that the evidence submitted failed to make out a case within conditions (,a) and (b) of Section 339 of the *Restatement, Torts,*which is cited in that opinion.

*For*affirmance—Chief Justice Weinteaub, and Justices Bueldstg, Jacobs, Peaüstcis, Peoctoe, Hall and Schet-TI3STO—-7.

*For*reversal—Hone.
null

436.489
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 27 , 2011
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14
- 1 1
- 00 660
- CV

____________ IN THE INTEREST OF C.R.L ., a Child

On Appeal from the 247th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2006
- 58779



### M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N This is an attempted appeal from a judgment signed September 8, 200 9

. No motion for new trial was filed

. Appellant ' s notice of appeal was filed July 28, 2011

. The notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the judgment is signed when appellant has not filed a timely motion for new trial, motion to modify the judgment, motion to reinstate, or request for findings of fact and conclusion of law. See T ex. R. App. P. 26.1. Appellant ' s notice of appeal was not filed timely. A motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant, acting in good faith, files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by rule 26.1, but within the fifteen

- day grace period provided by Rule2

26.3 for filing a motion for extension of time. See Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615, 617

- 18 (1997) (construing the predecessor to Rule 26). Appellant ' s notice of appeal was not filed within the fifteen

- day period provide d by rule 26.3
On September 19 , 2011 , notification was transmitted to all parties of the court ' s intention to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). Appellant filed no response. Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismi ssed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges, Justices Anderson and Christopher

.
**Exhibit 32.2** **CERTIFICATION    PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**     In connection with the annual report on    Form 10-K    of Crum & Forster Holdings Corp. (the    “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2007    (the “Report”) as filed with the Securities and    Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Mary Jane    Robertson, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and    Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.    Section 1350, as enacted pursuant to Section 906 of    the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:     1.     This Report fully complies with the requirements of    Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of    1934; and     2.     The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all    material respects, the financial condition and results of    operations of the Company.          By:  */s/  Mary    Jane Robertson*    Mary Jane Robertson    Executive Vice President,    Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer     Dated: February 28, 2008     A signed original of this written statement required by    Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be    retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and    Exchange Commission, or its staff, upon request.
**EXHIBIT
32.1**
 
 Written
Statement of Principal Executive Officer Furnished Pursuant to
 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350,
 as
Adopted by
 Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 
 In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of HouseRaising, Inc. (the
"Company") for the year ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Charles M. Skibo,
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:
 
 (1) the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition as of December 31, 2004 and results of operations for
the year ended December 31, 2004 of the Company and its
subsidiaries.
 
 ****Date: March 30,
2005
    By:
    /s/ Charles M.
  SkiboName: Charles M. SkiboTitle:  Chairman of the
      Board and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive
  Officer)
 
 This
certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-11323 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JAIME LUNA RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:97-CR-158-32-P

- - - - - - - - - - August 19, 1998 Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and JONES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Jaime Luna Rodriguez appeals his guilty-plea conviction and sentence for conspiracy to import marijuana, to distribute marijuana, and to possess marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Rodriguez argues that the district court erred in determining that he was responsible for transporting 9000 pounds of marijuana. Rodriguez’ plea agreement contains a provision in which Rodriguez waived his right to appeal his sentence unless the sentence was imposed in excess ofNo. 97-11323 -2- the statutory maximum, was the result of an upward departure, or was the result of an arithmetic error in the calculation of his offense level. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the waiver was informed and voluntary and is therefore binding on Rodriguez. See United States v. Portillo , 18 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1994). Rodriguez’ claim that the district court erred in calculating the amount of marijuana attributable to him is barred by the waiver-of-appeal provision. Because Rodriguez’ sentence was not in excess of the statutory maximum, was not imposed as a result of an upward departure, and was not imposed as a result of an arithmetic error in the calculation of his offense level, he may not challenge his sentence on appeal. Rodriguez’ appeal is without arguable merit. Accordingly, it is DISMISSED. 5th Cir. R. 42.2. APPEAL DISMISSED.
(a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to
the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control
over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for
external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principals;(c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(d)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants
fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial
reporting; and
  (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have
a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
 Date: March 31, 2009
    By:
    /s/ Roman GregorigRoman GregorigVice President and Principal Financial Officer