alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Salvatore Niosi, Petitioner, v Gregory J. Blass, as Commissioner of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services, et al., Respondents.

[942 NYS2d 358]

*893Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of a designee of the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health dated March 9, 2010, which, after a fair hearing, affirmed a determination of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services dated March 24, 2009, denying the petitioner’s application for medical assistance benefits on the ground that he failed to provide certain documentation necessary to determine his eligibility to receive such benefits.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, without costs or disbursements.

The petitioner has been residing in a nursing home since 2006, and applied for medical assistance benefits to defray the cost of such residence. However, the Suffolk County Department of Social Services (hereinafter the DSS) denied his application on the ground that he failed to provide certain documentation necessary to determine his eligibility to receive such benefits. The petitioner claims, inter alia, that he was not able to obtain the requested documentation despite good-faith efforts, that the DSS failed to conduct a collateral investigation as requested, and that without the grant of medical assistance benefits he will suffer undue hardship.

Initially, since the determination of the New York State Department of Health (hereinafter the DOH), made after a hearing, affirming the DSS’s determination denying the petitioner’s application, is final and binding upon the DSS *(see*18 NYCRR 358-6.1 [b]), the proceeding must be dismissed insofar as asserted against Gregory J. Blass, as Commissioner of the DSS, since he is not a proper party to the proceeding *(see Matter of LoBlanco v Hansell,*83 AD3d 1072 [2011]; *Matter of Fells v Hansell,*77 AD3d 941 [2010]; *Matter of Baker v Mahon,*72 AD3d 811 [2010]).

Turning to the merits, the determination of the DOH, made after a hearing, affirming the determination of the DSS denying the petitioner’s application for medical assistance benefits, is supported by substantial evidence *(see Matter of Cogeos v Novello,*29 AD3d 692 [2006]; *Matter of Estate of Rossman v Novella,*300 AD2d 483 [2002]; *Matter of Neunie v Perales,*193 AD2d 681 [1993]). Moreover, as the petitioner did not establish that he was unable to provide documentation of the information requested, the DSS had no obligation to conduct a collateral investigation *(see*18 NYCRR 360-2.3 [a] [1], [2], [3]; *Matter of Chase v New York State Dept. of Social Servs.,*252 AD2d 612 [1998]; *cf. Southside Hosp. v Kirby,*123 AD2d 430 [1986]; *Matter of Gary G. v D’Elia,*88 AD2d 975 [1982]).

*894The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.E, Florio, Chambers and Lott, JJ., concur.
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</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(18 U.S.C. §1350)
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of Oriental.
 In witness whereof, I execute this certification in San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 6th
day of May, 2011.
 By:
    /s/  José Rafael FernándezJosé Rafael FernándezPresident and Chief Executive Officer
#### INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA *ET AL.,*PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v. METROPOLITAN CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

See same case below: 59 *N. J. Super.*547.

*Messrs.*Schneider, *Lustbader & Morgan*and *Mr. M. Marvin Soperstwin*for the petitioners.

*Messrs. Zimmer & Selilcojf*for the respondent.

May 4, 1960.

Granted.
# C_2021028EN.01005101.xml

| 25.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 28/51 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/51

---

Order of the General Court of 22 October 2020 — Grammer v EUIPO (Representation of a geometric figure)

(Case T-833/19) (1)

(Action for annulment - EU trade mark - Application for an EU figurative mark representing a geometric figure - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

(2021/C 28/78)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Grammer AG (Ursensollen, Germany) (represented by: J. Bühling and D. Graetsch, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Fischer, acting as Agent)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 19 September 2019 (Case R 1478/2019-2), relating to the application for registration of a figurative sign representing a geometric figure as a European Union trade mark.

Operative part of the order

| 1) | The action is dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law. |
| --- | --- |

1)

The action is dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.

| 2) | Grammer AG shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Grammer AG shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 45, 10.2.2020.

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-7878

RAY WASHINGTON, JR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GENE M. JOHNSON, Director of the Department of

Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Jerome B. Friedman, District

Judge. (2:06-cv-00134-JBF)

Submitted: March 22, 2007 Decided: March 29, 2007

Before WIDENER and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ray Washington, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Karen Misbach, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Ray Washington, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s

order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order

is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Washington has

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate

of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
December 14, 2009 Annual General Meeting Shareholder Presentation

 
	 

 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING
 December 14, 2009
 Exhibit 10.1
 






 
	 

 SAFE HARBOR STATEMENT
 This contains statements that may be considered 'forward-looking
statements' 
 within the meaning of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act.  Forward-
 looking statements by
their nature involve substantial uncertainty, and actual 
 results
 may
 differ
 materially
 from
 those
 that
 might
 be
 suggested
 by
 such 
 statements. Important factors identified by the Company that it believes
could 
 result in such material differences are described in the
Company's Annual 
 Report on Form 10-K for the year 2008.
However, the Company necessarily 
 can give no assurance that it
has identified or will identify all of the factors that 
 may
result in any particular forward-looking statement materially differing 
 from actual results, and the Company assumes no obligation to correct or

 update any forward-looking statements which may prove to be
inaccurate, 
 whether as a result of new information, future
events or otherwise.
 






 
	 

 •
 On October 23, 2009 Senetek’s Board Engages 
 Miller Tabak as Strategic and Financial 
 Consultants
 PHASE  I
 






 
	 

 •
 Miller Tabak Completes Review of Company, 
 Direction, Existing Technology and 
 Management
 PHASE  II
 






 
	 

 •
 Miller Tabak Reports on Findings and Makes 
 the Following Recommendations
 –
 Change the Focus and Direction of the Company and its 
 Business Model
 –
 Identify Potential Business Partners for Merger and/or 
 Acquisitions
 –
 Do a Capital Raise
 PHASE  III
 






 
	 

 •
 Execution . . . Currently in Discussions with 
 Multiple Investors and Partners.   However, 
 there is no Assurance that this will Culminate 
 in a Completed Transaction.
 PHASE  IV
 






 
	 

 “THANK YOU FOR YOUR 
 CONTINUED SUPPORT”
exv10w1






Exhibit 10.1




UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20220




December 16, 2009




Ladies and Gentlemen:




     Reference is made to that certain letter agreement (the “Repurchase Letter Agreement”), dated
as of the date set forth on Schedule A hereto, between the United States Department of the Treasury
(the “Investor”) and the company set forth on Schedule A hereto (the “Company”). Capitalized terms
used but not defined herein shall have the meanings assigned to them in the Repurchase Letter
Agreement.



     As documented by the Repurchase Letter Agreement, the Company has completed the repurchase
from the Investor of all of the Preferred Shares issued to the Investor pursuant to the Securities
Purchase Agreement. Following such time, the Company delivered a Warrant Repurchase Notice dated
as of the date set forth on Schedule A hereto to the Investor. In connection with the
consummation, on the date hereof, of the repurchase of the Warrant by the Company from the
Investor, as contemplated by the Warrant Repurchase Notice and Section 4.9 of the Securities
Purchase Agreement:




     (a) The Company hereby acknowledges receipt from the Investor of the Warrant;
and




     (b) The Investor hereby acknowledges receipt from the Company of a wire transfer to the
account of the Investor set forth on Schedule A hereto in immediately available funds of the
aggregate purchase price set forth on Schedule A hereto, representing payment in full for
the Warrant, determined in accordance with Section 4.9 of the Securities Purchase Agreement.



     This letter agreement will be governed by and construed in accordance with the federal law of
the United States if and to the extent such law is applicable, and otherwise in accordance with the
laws of the State of New York applicable to contracts made and to be performed entirely within such
State.



     This letter agreement may be executed in any number of separate counterparts, each such
counterpart being deemed to be an original instrument, and all such counterparts will together
constitute the same agreement. Executed signature pages to this letter agreement may be delivered
by facsimile and such facsimiles will be deemed sufficient as if actual signature pages had been
delivered.



UST Sequence No. 267




 









 





     In witness whereof, the parties have duly executed this letter agreement as of the date first
written above.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
THE TREASURY

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ Herbert M. Allison, Jr.
 	 
	 	 	Name:  	Herbert M. Allison, Jr. 	 
	 	 	Title:  	Assistant Secretary for
Financial Stability 	 
	 
	 	COMPANY: LSB Corporation

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ Gerald T. Mulligan
 	 
	 	 	Name:  	Gerald T. Mulligan 	 
	 	 	Title:  	President & Chief Executive
Officer
Exhibit 32.1



NANOGEN, INC.



CERTIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY

RULE
13a-14(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934



I, Howard C. Birndorf,
Chief Executive Officer of Nanogen, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company), hereby certify that, based on my knowledge:



|(1) | The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                |  |  |  |                                           
|--------------- |  |  |  | ------------------------------------------
|                |  | 
|August 16, 2004 |  |  |  | /s/ HOWARD C.BIRNDORF                     
|                |  |  |  | Howard C. Birndorf Chief Executive Officer
**Exhibit (32(i)**

 

 

**CERTIFICATION SECTION 1350**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Penns Woods Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q forthe period ending June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Ronald A. Walko, ChiefExecutive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)           the Report fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           the informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Ronald  A. Walko     |   |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Ronald A.  Walko         |
| Chief  Executive Officer |
|                     |
| August 9,  2004          |

 

1

----
**EXHIBIT 31.1****CERTIFICATION**I, Darol Lindloff, Chief Executive Officer of Panda Ethanol, Inc., certify that:1. I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-K/A to the annual report onForm 10-K of Panda Ethanol, Inc.; and2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleadingwith respect to the period covered by this report.        April 29, 2008 /s/ Darol Lindloff   Darol Lindloff   Chief Executive Officer and President
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Alan B. CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-2075-cr.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Dec. 8, 2011.

*607Steven Y. Yurowitz, Esq., New York, NY, for Appellant.

Wendy L. Fuller, Paul J. Van de Graaf, Assistant United States Attorneys, on behalf of Tristram J. Coffin, United States Attorney for the District of Vermont, Burlington, VT, for Appellee.

PRESENT: WALKER, REENA RAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant Alan B. Clark, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, *see*21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 846, appeals his 60-month prison sentence, the mandated statutory minimum but a considerable variance from his Guidelines range of 120 to 151 months. Clark submits that the district court erred in finding him ineligible for safety valve relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a), based on (1) his failure truthfully to provide all information regarding his offense conduct, *see*18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5), and (2) his use of threats of violence “in connection with” his offense, *id.*§ 3553(f)(2). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review the district court’s interpretation of the legal criteria for safety valve relief *de novo*and its related factual findings for clear error. *See United States v. Ortiz,*136 F.3d 882, 883 (2d Cir.1997). Because we identify no error, let alone clear error, in the findings supporting the district court’s determination that Clark was ineligible under § 3553(f)(5), we need not here determine whether he was also ineligible under § 3553(f)(2).

To qualify for relief from a statutorily mandated minimum sentence, a defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he has satisfied all five criteria, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). *See United States v. Tang,*214 F.3d 365, 371 (2d Cir.2000). The district court found that Clark failed to carry this burden with respect to § 3553(f)(5) because his pre-sentence proffer statement minimized the quantity of drugs he dealt in the course of the charged conspiracy in a way inconsistent -with both his recorded statements intercepted in the course of the conspiracy and his post-arrest admissions. The recorded statements and admissions supported the Pre-Sentence Report finding, adopted by the district court, that Clark’s offense conduct involved at least five kilograms of cocaine, well above the approximately one kilogram he maintained in his proffer statement. On this record, the district court acted well within its discretion in rejecting Clark’s explanation that his earlier statements were self-serving exaggerations and in finding that Clark failed to carry his preponderance burden with respect to § 3553(f)(5). *See United States v. Conde,*178 F.3d 616, 620-21 (2d Cir.1999).

Because we identify no merit in Clark’s sentencing challenge, the district court’s amended judgment is AFFIRMED.