alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 134 (Friday, July 16, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 37750]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-15156]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission


Combined Notice of Filings

    Take notice that the Commission has received the following Natural 
Gas Pipeline Rate and Refund Report filings:

    Docket Numbers: RP21-961-000.
    Applicants: Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: GT&C Section 50--PTR 
Replacement on ICTS to be effective 8/8/2021.
    Filed Date: 7/8/21.
    Accession Number: 20210708-5060.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 7/20/21.

    Docket Numbers: RP21-962-000.
    Applicants: Eastern Gas Transmission and Storage, Inc.
    Description: Sec.  4(d) Rate Filing: EGTS--July 8, 2021 
Administrative Changes to be effective 8/9/2021.
    Filed Date: 7/8/21.
    Accession Number: 20210708-5062.
    Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 7/20/21.

    The filings are accessible in the Commission's eLibrary system 
(https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercgensearch.asp) by querying 
the docket number.
    Any person desiring to intervene or protest in any of the above 
proceedings must file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the 
Commission's Regulations (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214) on or before 5:00 
p.m. Eastern time on the specified comment date. Protests may be 
considered, but intervention is necessary to become a party to the 
proceeding.
    eFiling is encouraged. More detailed information relating to filing 
requirements, interventions, protests, service, and qualifying 
facilities filings can be found at: http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling/filing-req.pdf. For other information, call (866) 208-3676 
(toll free). For TTY, call (202) 502-8659.

    Dated: July 12, 2021.
Debbie-Anne A. Reese,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-15156 Filed 7-15-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
SPLS EX 10.31 013115




Exhibit  10.31


Amendment to Severance Benefits Agreement (Amendment B)


Ronald L. Sargent
c/o Staples, Inc.
500 Staples Drive
Framingham, MA 01702
 
Dear Mr. Sargent,
 
You are a party to that certain Second Amended and Restated Severance Benefits Agreement, dated March 10, 2006 and amended on December 22, 2008 (the “Agreement”) with Staples, Inc. and/or one of its subsidiaries (“Staples”). Under the Agreement, Staples agrees to provide you with the severance benefits set forth in the Agreement if your employment is terminated under the circumstances described in the Agreement.
 
This Amendment memorializes our discussions in the Fall of 2014 relating to changes to your Agreement.  You hereby agree that the Agreement shall be revised as set forth below, and shall otherwise remain in full force and effect in accordance with its terms.  This Amendment shall be effective as of January 13, 2015.


Specifically, you and Staples agree to delete the language of Section 3(e) of the Agreement in its entirety and replace it with the following:


		
	(i)
	You expressly waive any right to receive from Staples any gross-up payments in connection with this Agreement, including, without limitation, (i) in the event that you become entitled to payments and/or benefits provided by this Agreement as a result of a Change in Control, and such Company Payments will be subject to the tax imposed by Section 4999 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”), and (ii) in the event that, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 3(f) below, any payments and/or benefits provided by this Agreement constitute nonqualified deferred compensation under Section 409A of the Code (collectively, the “Deferred Payments”) and you become subject to the tax and interest imposed under Section 409A (the “409A Liability”). 




If this letter sets forth our agreement, kindly sign and return to Staples the enclosed copy of this letter no later than January 13, 2015.
 





	
			
	 
	Sincerely,

	 
	 

	 
	STAPLES, INC.

	 
	 
	 

	 
	 
	    /s/ Paul F. Walsh

	 
	By:
	 

	 
	 
	  Chairman of the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors




I have been advised of my right to consult with counsel regarding this letter and the Agreement and have decided to sign below knowingly, voluntarily, and free from duress or coercion.
 
Agreed to this 13th day of January, 2015.




 /s/ Ronald L. Sargent
	
		
	 
	 

	Ronald L. Sargent
# C_2020209EN.01000201.xml

| 22.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 209/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 209/2

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de commerce de Bordeaux (France) lodged on 18 November 2019 — Boé Aquitaine SELARL v Mercialys SA

(Case C-838/19)

(2020/C 209/02)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal de commerce de Bordeaux

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Boé Aquitaine SELARL

Defendant: Mercialys SA

By order of 19 March 2020, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) declared the request for a preliminary ruling manifestly inadmissible.

---
---

CERTIFICATIONS

I, George Drazenovic, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Tornado
Gold International Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and I have:

a) designed such disclosure controls
and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the small
business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this
report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the
small business issuers disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this
report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change
in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting that
occurred during the small business issuers most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small
business issuers internal control over financial reporting.

5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of
internal controls over financial reporting, to the small business issuers
auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuers board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) all significant deficiencies and
material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small
business issuers ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material,
that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the
small business issuers internal control over financial reporting.

Date: April 14, 2008

/s/ George Drazenovic
  George Drazenovic
  Chief Financial Officer
  (Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Brian Pino, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Sharpe, J.), rendered November 1, 1983, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon, upon his plea of guilty, and sentencing him to concurrent indeterminate terms of 2 to 4 years’ imprisonment on the robbery conviction and 1 to 3 years’ imprisonment on the assault conviction, and a concurrent definite one-year term of imprisonment on the weapon possession conviction, the sentences to run concurrently with a sentence defendant was already serving on an unrelated conviction. The appeal brings up for review the denial (Berkowitz, J.), of those branches of defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress an in-court identification of him by the complaining witness and a statement made by him to the police.

Judgment affirmed.

The victim identified defendant from a photo array and at a *602lineup. Defendant alleges both identifications were suggestive because the photos and the participants resembled defendant rather than the perpetrator described in the police report. The description given in the report is rather general and differs from that of defendant only with respect to height. This argument is one that is properly raised at trial rather than at a *Wade*hearing where the issue is whether the identification procedures were unduly suggestive.

Defendant also contends that his statement should have been suppressed because there was no evidence that he waived his *Miranda*rights. An express waiver is not necessary and a course of conduct indicating waiver coupled with evidence that defendant understood his rights may support a conclusion of waiver *(People v Norris,*75 AD2d 650). Thus where a defendant indicates he understands his rights, gives an oral statement, and has had prior contacts with the police, this will be sufficient to find that he knew what he was doing and waived his rights *(People v Harris,*79 AD2d 615; *People v Rooney,*82 AD2d 840). Here defendant indicated he understood his rights and then discussed the incident with the police officer. Defendant’s probation report reveals an extensive criminal record; thus there was no error in finding a waiver and denying the branch of defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statement.

Defendant’s contention that his sentence was unduly harsh and excessive is without merit. Mangano, J. P., Gibbons, Thompson and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ricky P. HICKS, Appellant.

No. 11-1886.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 1, 2011.

Filed: Nov. 2, 2011.

Jennifer D. Akre, Akre Law, Springfield, MO, for appellant.

Ricky P. Hicks, Oklahoma City, OK, pro se.

Randall D. Eggert, Asst. U.S. Atty., Springfield, MO, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to a written plea agreement that contained an appeal waiver, Ricky P. Hicks pled guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine mixture, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The district court1 imposed a sentence of 84 months in prison, above the Guidelines range of 24-30 months, but below the 20-year statutory maximum, *see*21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Hicks’s counsel seeks to withdraw and has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), in which she questions whether this court should enforce the appeal waiver. Hicks has filed a pro se brief arguing, among other things, that his counsel was ineffective.

This court concludes that Hicks’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not barred by the appeal waiver, but also is not appropriate for consideration on direct appeal. *See United States v. McAdory,*501 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir.2007). This court further concludes that the appeal waiver should be enforced as to all other issues in this appeal. *See United States v. Andis,*333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.2003) (en banc) (setting forth criteria for enforcing appeal waiver); *see also United States v. Estrada-Bahena,*201 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (enforcing appeal waiver in *Anders*case).

This court independently reviewed the record under *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) and found no nonfrivolous issue not covered by the appeal waiver. Accordingly, this court declines to consider Hicks’s ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal; dismisses the appeal; and grants counsel leave to withdraw, subject to her informing Hicks about procedures for seeking rehearing or filing a petition for certiorari.

1

. The Honorable Greg Kays, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
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#### Ascher Katz et al., Respondents, v Knoesel Service Center, Inc., et al., Appellants.

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Meehan, J.), entered April 10, 1985, which denied their motion to dismiss the action and *sua sponte*directed them to accept the untimely service of the complaint and to serve an answer within 20 days after service upon them of a copy of the order appealed from, with notice of entry.

Order modified, as a matter of discretion, by adding thereto a provision directing the plaintiffs’ attorneys to personally pay the defendants $500. As so modified, order affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ time to pay $500 is extended to 15 days after service upon them of a copy of the order to be made hereon, with notice of entry.

Inasmuch as this is not a case of neglect or abandonment but, rather, a situation wherein the plaintiffs’ good-faith efforts to pursue settlement negotiations with the defendants’ insurance carrier constituted a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving the complaint, Special Term did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants’ application *(see, Temkin v New York Prop. Ins. Underwriters Assn.,*92 AD2d 758). Where, as here, the action appears to have some merit, the delay in the service of the complaint was neither inordinately protracted nor willful and the defendants have not been prejudiced thereby, the plaintiffs should not be deprived of their day in court *(see, Gordon v Shore Park Pharmacy,*70 AD2d 651). However, in view of the dilatoriness of plaintiffs’ attorneys and their failure to move pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) for an extension of time in which to serve the complaint, we have fixed an appropriate sanction. Lazer, J. P., Thompson, Weinstein and Eiber, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Curtis Ferguson, Appellant.

[944 NYS2d 712]

An appeal having been taken to this Court by the above-named appellant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Renee White, J.), rendered on or about July 6, 2010, and said appeal having been argued by counsel for the respective parties, due deliberation having been had thereon, and finding the sentence not excessive, it is unanimously ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and . the same is hereby affirmed. Concur— Friedman, J.E, DeGrasse, Freedman and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.
#### Russell HUDLER, Plaintiff, v. Francis C. WILSON, also known as F. C. Wilson, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. C-5458.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

June 6, 1974.

As Amended June 11, 1974.

Robert B. Emerson, Mulford & Love, Granby, Colo., for plaintiff.

Herbert A. Delap, Grant, Shafroth, Toll & McHendrie, Denver, Colo., for defendants, Francis C. Wilson and Charla H. Wilson.

Franklin C. Douglas, Denver, Colo., for The Denver Evangelical Foundation, Inc., defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

CHILSON, Judge.

This action was brought in £he Grand County District Court to quiet title to certain real property situate therein.

At the time of filing the action, plaintiff was a citizen of Missouri; the defendants, Francis C. Wilson and Charla H. Wilson, were residents of Texas; the defendant, Douglas, and the corporate defendant were citizens of Colorado.

The Wilsons and Douglas removed this action to this court alleging that this court had original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity) and asserted that right to remove pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Plaintiff has moved for remand to the state court urging that 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) is applicable and does not permit removal if one or more of the defendants is a citizen of the state in which the action was brought.

The plaintiff’s contention is correct. An action which does not involve a federal question may be removed to Federal Court only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as a defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action is brought. Volume 1, Federal Practice and Procedure, Barron and Holtzoff, Wright’s Edition § 103 P. 474. The supporting case law is: Martin v. Snyder, 1893, 148 U.S. 663, 13 S.Ct. 706, 37 L.Ed. 602; Handley-Mack Co. v. Godchaux Sugar Co., C.C.A. 6th, 1925, 2 F.2d 435; Wichita Nat. Bank v. Smith, C.C.A. 8th, 1896, 72 F. 568, 19 C.C.A. 42, error dismissed 18 S.Ct. 946, 42 L.Ed. 1214; Arcady Farms Milling Co. v. Northcutt, D.C.S.C.1949, 87 F.Supp. 373; Kearney v. Dollar, D.C.Del.1953, 111 F.Supp. 738; Mills v. Newell, C.C.Minn. 1890, 41 F. 529; Anderson v. Appleton, C.C.N.Y.1887, 32 F. 855; Visayan Refining Co. v. Standard Transp. Co., D.C. N.Y.1927, 17 F.2d 642; Morrison v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., D.C.Okl.1971, 328 F.Supp. 580.

Although the defendant, Douglas, appears to have disclaimed any interest *593in the subject matter of the action, a question which we do not here answer, the corporate defendant was properly joined and served as the defendant in this action and admittedly for the purposes of jurisdiction, is a citizen of the State of Colorado in which this action was brought.

The motion to remand should be granted.

The corporate defendant’s motion to quash should be determined by the state court when this action is remanded to it.

It is therefore ordered that the plaintiff’s motion to remand is hereby granted and the Clerk of the Court shall with all convenient speed remand this case to the District Court in and for the County of Grand and State of Colorado for further proceedings.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Amber Latrease MITCHELL, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 08-10024.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*63Submitted Dec. 17, 2008.*

Filed Jan. 7, 2009.

Robin R. Taylor, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John Paul Balazs, Law Offices of John P. Balazs, Katie Putman, Esquire, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Amber Latrease Mitchell appeals from the 63-month sentence imposed following a remand for resentencing. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Mitchell contends that the district court’s reimposition of the same 63-month sentence on remand violates her due process right against vindictive sentencing. This contention fails because there is no presumption of vindictiveness when there is no net increase in punishment. *See United States v. Bay,*820 F.2d 1511, 1513 (9th Cir.1987); *see also United States v. Hagler,*709 F.2d 578, 579 (9th Cir.1983).

Mitchell also contends that the sentence is unreasonable because the district court failed to consider mitigating evidence presented on her behalf, and mistakenly relied on the probation officer’s recommendation from the original presentence investigation report. We conclude that the district court did not proeedurally err, and that the sentence is substantively reasonable. *See Gall v. United States,*— U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596-97, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); *see also United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 991-94 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**Exhibit 13.1**
CertificationPursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)
Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350,chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of Companhia Vale doRio Doce (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that:
The Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2004 of the Company fully complieswith the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 andinformation contained in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.
Date: June 2, 2005                           /s/ Roger Agnelli   Name:  Roger Agnelli   Title:  Chief Executive Officer   
Date: June 2, 2005                                 /s/ Fabio de Oliveira Barbosa   Name:  Fabio de Oliveira Barbosa   Title:  Chief Financial Officer