alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN THE QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-QSB OF AUDIOHIGHWAY.COM
FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                           5,331
<SECURITIES>                                     3,012
<RECEIVABLES>                                      446
<ALLOWANCES>                                       125
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 8,901
<PP&E>                                           1,722
<DEPRECIATION>                                     460
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  11,199
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,502
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        34,593
<OTHER-SE>                                    (25,046)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    11,199
<SALES>                                            868
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   868
<CGS>                                              644
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      644
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,242
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (11)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (4,007)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (4,007)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (4,007)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.65)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.65)


</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**




Written
      Statement of Principal Financial Officer Furnished Pursuant to


18
      U.S.C.
      Section 1350,


as
      Adopted by


Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In
      connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A of HouseRaising, Inc. (the
      "Company") for the year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard A. von
      Gnechten, Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
      as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of
      my
      knowledge, that:




(1)
      the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition as of December 31, 2006 and results of operations for
      the year ended December 31, 2006 of the Company and its
      subsidiaries.






/s/
      Richard A. von Gnechten





Richard
      A. von Gnechten


Chief
      Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)





February
      6, 2008





This
      certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by
      the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of
      Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
      amended.
# C_2019432EN.01003001.xml

| 23.12.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 432/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.12.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 432/30

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) lodged on 4 October 2019 — KM v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Albacete

(Case C-731/19)

(2019/C 432/34)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: KM

Defendant: Subdelegación del Gobierno en Albacete

Question referred

Is an interpretation of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 23 April 2015 (Case C-38/14, Zaizoune) (1) as meaning the Spanish authorities and courts can directly apply Directive 2008/115/EC (2) to the detriment of the third-country national, thereby ignoring and disapplying more advantageous national penalty provisions, aggravating that national’s liability to a penalty and possibly disregarding the principle that criminal penalties must be defined by law, compatible with the case-law of the Court of Justice on the limits on the direct effect of directives, and should the fact that the Spanish legislation is not in conformity with that directive be resolved not in that way but by legislative reform or by the remedies provided by EU law whereby a State can be required properly to transpose directives?

---

(1)  EU:C:2015:260.

(2)  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).

---
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Cheryl Hahn, Respondent, v Brylin Hospital et al., Appellants. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

[942 NYS2d 909]—

Mercure, J.P

Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed December 24, 2010, which, among other things, established claimant’s average weekly wage.

Claimant, a part-time nurse, suffered a work-related shoulder injury in January 2009. The employer and its workers’ compensation carrier (hereinafter collectively referred to as the carrier) did not controvert the resulting claim for workers’ compensation benefits, but took issue with the method used to calculate *1408claimant’s benefits. Following a hearing, a Workers’ Compensation Law Judge determined that, inasmuch as claimant was employed part time, Workers’ Compensation Law § 14 (3) was appropriately used in the calculation of her average weekly wage. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed that determination, and the carrier now appeals.

We affirm. The calculations to be used in determining a claimant’s average weekly wage are set forth in Workers’ Compensation Law § 14 and include a provision applicable to part-time employees *(see*Workers’ Compensation Law § 14 [3]; *Matter of Servidio v North Shore Univ. Hosp.,*299 AD2d 685, 686-687 [2002]). This provision does not apply, however, where the claimant voluntarily limits his or her participation in the labor market *(see Matter of Kellish v Kellish Tire Sales, Inc.,*12 AD3d 804, 805 [2004]; *Matter of Servidio v North Shore Univ. Hosp.,*299 AD2d at 687). Although the carrier contends that claimant voluntarily limited her hours, the only evidence proffered on the subject was claimant’s testimony that her position as a recovery room nurse required her to work only three days a week. Claimant explained that she was not seeking to limit her hours and that she had never indicated to the employer that she was unavailable to work more hours. In light of that testimony, her statements that she did not want to work full time and felt “fortunate” to have a job that required her to work only three days a week did not disqualify her from the provisions of Workers’ Compensation Law § 14 (3). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination to use the method in Workers’ Compensation Law § 14 (3) to calculate claimant’s average weekly wage *(see Matter of Fletcher v Wegmans,*24 AD3d 1015, 1016 [2005], *lv denied*6 NY3d 710 [2006]; *Matter of Reasoner v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs.,*110 AD2d 962, 963 [1985]).

Lahtinen, Spain, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
#### ROSENFIELD et al., Respondents, v. SALMON, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

March 2, 1898.)

Action by Rosenfield Bros. & Co. against Frank Salmon.

No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### Ryan Damion COULBOURNE, aka Ryan Coulbourne, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 11-240-ag.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Dec. 19, 2011.

*816Nancy E. Martin, Collins & Martin, P.C., Wethersfield, CT, for Petitioner.

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Allen W. Hausman, Senior Litigation Counsel; Christina Bechak Parascandola, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for Respondent.

PRESENT: PETER W. HALL, GERARD E. LYNCH and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Ryan Damion Coulbourne, a native and citizen of Jamaica, seeks review of a January 18, 2011, order of the BIA dismissing his claim of derivative United States citizenship. *In re Ryan Damion Coulbourne,*No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 18, 2011). The BIA issued its decision and order on remand from this Court, which granted Coulbourne’s previous petition for review. *See Coulbourne v. Holder,*372 Fed.Appx. 156 (2d Cir.2010) (unpublished summary order).

Coulbourne argues that the BIA erred by concluding first that it does not have the power to grant derivative citizenship *nunc pro tunc*and second, that even if it had such authority, *nunc pro tunc*relief was unwarranted because he could not demonstrate that the government had engaged in affirmative misconduct. Finally, he contends that independent of the agency, this Court has the authority to grant derivative citizenship *nunc pro tunc.*We need not decide here whether we or the BIA have the equitable authority to grant such relief because, like the BIA, we conclude that Coulbourne has not presented evidence that the agency’s delay in processing his father’s naturalization application amounts to legal error. Accordingly, the BIA did not err in concluding that this would not be an appropriate case for the exercise of any such authority. *See generally INS v. Miranda,*459 U.S. 14, 19, 103 S.Ct. 281, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) (per curiam); *Iouri v. Ashcroft,*464 F.3d 172, 181-82 (2d Cir.2006); *Edwards v. INS,*393 F.3d 299, 308-10 (2d Cir.2004). The petition for review is therefore DENIED.
**Exhibit
      32.2**











**COMMUNITY
      BANKS, INC.**


**SECTION
      1350 CERTIFICATION**


**(Chief
      Financial Officer)**









In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Community Banks, Inc. (the "Company")
      on
      Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Donald F. Holt, Chief
      Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as
      adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that:





(1)
      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





The
      foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18U.S.C. §1350 and
      is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure
      document.





A
      signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
      provided to Community Banks, Inc., and will be retained by Community Banks,
      Inc., and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
      upon
      request.








/s/
      Donald F. Holt________


Donald
      F. Holt


Chief
      Financial Officer


August
      9, 2006
# C_2020433EN.01004401.xml

| 14.12.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 433/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.12.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 433/44

---

Judgment of the General Court of 15 October 2020 — smart things solutions v EUIPO — Samsung Electronics (smart:)things)

(Case T-48/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark smart:)things - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptiveness - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Article 59(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001)

(2020/C 433/54)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: smart things solutions GmbH (Seefeld, Germany) (represented by: R. Dissmann, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Söder, H. O’Neill and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Samsung Electronics GmbH (Schwalbach/Taunus, Germany) (represented by: T. Schmitz, M. Breuer and I. Dimitrov, lawyers)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 November 2018 (Case R 835/2018-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Samsung Electronics and smart things solutions.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders smart things solutions GmbH to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and by Samsung Electronics GmbH. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders smart things solutions GmbH to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and by Samsung Electronics GmbH.

---

(1)  OJ C 103, 18.3.2019.

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6124

SHERMAN A. THOMPSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

OFFICER RICHARDSON; TARACE CARSON, Officer,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:09-ct-03161-BO)

Submitted: August 30, 2011 Decided: September 9, 2011

Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sherman A. Thompson, Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth F. Parsons, 

Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Sherman A. Thompson appeals the district court’s order 

denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint. We 

have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district 

court. Thompson v. Richardson, No. 5:09-ct-03161-BO (E.D.N.C. 

Jan. 19, 2011). We deny Thompson’s motion to file an amended 

complaint and we dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 130 (Monday, July 12, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 36564]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-14737]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Mental Health; Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of a meeting of the National Advisory 
Mental Health Council.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and/or contract proposals 
and the discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or 
commercial property such as patentable material, and personal 
information concerning individuals associated with the grant 
applications and/or contract proposals, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Advisory Mental Health Council.
    Date: August 6, 2021.
    Time: 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications and/or 
proposals.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, Neuroscience Center, 6001 
Executive Boulevard, Rockville, MD 20852 (Virtual Meeting).
    Contact Person: Tracy Lynn Waldeck, Ph.D., Director, Division of 
Extramural Activities, National Institute of Mental Health, 
Neuroscience Center, 6001 Executive Boulevard, Room 4133, Rockville, 
MD 20892, (301) 480-6833, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4b3c2a272f2e28203f0b262a222765252223652c243d"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="94e3f5f8f0f1f7ffe0d4f9f5fdf8bafafdfcbaf3fbe2">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Information is also available on the Institute's/Center's home 
page: www.nimh.nih.gov/about/advisory-boards-and-groups/namhc/index.shtml, where an agenda and any additional information for the 
meeting will be posted when available.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program No. 93.242, Mental 
Health Research Grants, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: July 7, 2021.
Melanie J. Pantoja,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2021-14737 Filed 7-9-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


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Exhibit 32.1



NANOGEN, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)



In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of Nanogen Incorporated
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the three months ended March 31, 2005 (the Report), I, Howard C. Birndorf, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|             |  |  |  |                                                                      
|------------ |  |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|             |  | 
|May 10, 2005 |  |  |  | /s/ HOWARD C. BIRNDORF                                               
|             |  |  |  | Howard C. Birndorf Chairman of the Board, and Chief Executive Officer
# C_2020378EN.01003201.xml

| 9.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 378/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 378/32

---

Judgment of the General Court of 9 September 2020 — Novomatic v EUIPO — Brouwerij Haacht (PRIMUS)

(Case T-669/19) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for European Union word mark PRIMUS - Earlier EU word mark PRIMUS - Earlier Benelux word mark PRIMUS - Relative ground for refusal - Damage to reputation - Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2020/C 378/39)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Novomatic AG (Gumpoldskirchen, Austria) (represented by: W. Mosing, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Rampini, acting as Agent

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Brouwerij Haacht NV (Boortmeerbeek, Belgium) (represented by: G. Glas and E. Taelman, lawyers)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 19 July 2019 (Case R 2528/2018-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Brouwerij Haacht and Novomatic.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Novomatic AG to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Novomatic AG to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 399, 25.11.2019.

---
#### Hanah FAULKENBERY, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Bubba LEE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-40569

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 21, 2009.

Curtis B. Stuckey, Stuckey, Garrigan & Castetter, Nacogdoches, TX, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Robert Scott Davis, Flowers Davis, Tyler, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before WIENER, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-Appellant Bubba Lee, a deputy sheriff, appeals the district court’s de*814nial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. We affirm.

The § 1983 action filed by Plaintiff-Appellee Hanah Faulkenbery asserts a violation, by Lee as a public official, of her constitutional right to the care, custody, control and management of her three-year-old daughter. As extensively, correctly, and completely analyzed in the district court’s Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the version of facts as alleged by Faulkenbery as non-movant and supported by her summary judgment evidence — which we must credit at this stage of the proceedings— demonstrates that the discretionary acts of Lee in his capacity as a deputy sheriff were not objectively reasonable and violated Faulkenbery’s clearly established constitutional right.

Even if we were to assume without granting that, under Lee’s significantly divergent version of the facts, he would eventually be deemed to have acted with objective reasonableness, we still would not have appellate jurisdiction to entertain this interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity. This case quite literally presents a quintessential example of the classic “he said, she said” swearing match, making it obvious that Lee’s summary judgment motion turns entirely on a genuine issue of fact that clearly is material. Unlike our jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals of denial of qualified immunity motions that turn on materiality or other issues of law, we have no jurisdiction to hear appeals of such denials based solely on disputes of fact when, as here, the nonmovant’s version, if prevailing, would establish the violation of a clearly established constitutional right by the discretionary acts of a public official that were not objectively reasonable. *Johnson v. Jones,*515 U.S. 304, 310-13, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995); *Aucoin v. Haney,*306 F.3d 268, 271-72 (5th Cir.2002); *Cantu v. Rocha,*77 F.3d 795, 802-803 (5th Cir.1996).

For lack of appellate jurisdiction, Lee’s appeal is dismissed and this case is remanded to the district court for further consistent proceedings.

DISMISSED and REMANDED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *814published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.