2015 UT App 295

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CASSANDRA MARTIN,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES,

Respondent.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20150763-CA

Filed December 17, 2015

Original Proceedings in this Court

Cassandra Martin, Petitioner Pro Se

Suzan Pixton, Attorney for Respondent

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, and

KATE A. TOOMEY.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Cassandra Martin petitions for review of the final order of 

the Workforce Appeals Board (the Board), which determined 

that Martin’s appeal of the Department of Workforce Service’s 

(the Department) initial decision was untimely without good 

cause, thereby depriving the agency of jurisdiction. This matter 

is before the court on its own motion for summary disposition 

based on the lack of a substantial question for review. 

¶2 An appeal from the Department’s initial ruling must be 

filed or postmarked within ten calendar days of the date of the 

decision, unless the decision is mailed, in which case an 

additional five calendar days is added to the period to file an 

appeal. See Utah Admin. Code R994-508-102. A late appeal may 

be considered by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) if a 

claimant can show good cause for the delay. See Autoliv ASP, Inc. 

v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2000 UT App 223, ¶ 12, 8 P.3d 1033. 

Good cause for delay in filing an appeal is limited to 
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20150763-CA 2 2015 UT App 295

circumstances where the claimant received the determination 

after the time to appeal had run, the delay was caused by 

circumstances beyond the claimant’s control, or the claimant 

filed late under circumstances that were compelling and 

reasonable. See Utah Admin. Code R994-508-104.

¶3 The Department issued its decision on May 1, 2015. The 

decision indicated that Martin had until May 18, 2015, to appeal 

the decision to an ALJ. Martin did not file her appeal until May 

19, 2015, one day late. Martin testified before the ALJ that she 

did not know why she filed the appeal late. She speculated that 

she must have thought that she could not file an appeal until 

May 18, 2015. Both the ALJ and the Board determined that this 

did not constitute good cause, because Martin controlled 

whether or not she filed an appeal, and because it was her own 

neglect that resulted in the untimely appeal.

¶4 “The ultimate decision as to whether good cause exists is 

a mixed question of law and fact.” Armstrong v. Department of 

Emp't Sec., 834 P.2d 562, 565 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Board’s 

decision concerning whether a person establishes good cause for 

filing an untimely appeal is more fact-like because the case “does 

not lend itself to consistent resolution by a uniform body of 

appellate precedent.” Carbon County v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 

2013 UT 41, ¶ 7, 308 P.3d 477 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). “Because of the fact-intensive conclusions 

involved at the agency level,” the Board’s determination in such 

matters is entitled to deference. Id. “When a petitioner challenges 

an agency’s findings of fact, we are required to uphold the 

findings if they are supported by substantial evidence when 

viewed in light of the whole record before the court.” Stauffer v. 

Department of Workforce Servs., 2014 UT App 63, ¶ 5, 325 P.3d 109 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶5 Based upon the totality of facts presented to the ALJ, we 

cannot say that the Board’s determination that Martin lacked 

good cause for filing an untimely appeal was unreasonable. Cf.

Armstrong, 834 P.2d at 567 (determining that a party who filed an 

appeal one day late because she confused working days and 
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20150763-CA 3 2015 UT App 295

calendar days did not demonstrate good cause for the untimely 

filing); Kirkwood v. Department of Emp’t Sec., 709 P.2d 1158 (Utah 

1985) (per curiam) (affirming the Board’s decision that the 

claimant’s claim of stress from family issues was insufficient to 

demonstrate good cause for filing an untimely appeal). 

Therefore, because Martin failed to demonstrate that she had 

good cause for the late filing, the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to hear 

the merits of her appeal. See Utah Admin. Code R994-508-103; 

Autoliv ASP, 2000 UT App 223, ¶ 12.

¶6 In both her argument to the Board and in her 

memorandum to this court, Martin appears to be confused as to 

the reasoning of the ALJ’s decision. Martin argues that the ALJ 

accepted her appeal after she was unavailable for an initial 

hearing. Thus, she believes that she had a valid appeal. It is true 

that after Martin failed to appear for her initial appeal date, the 

ALJ dismissed the appeal. However, Martin requested that the 

hearing be re-opened due to her inability to attend the hearing. 

The ALJ then set a new hearing date to allow Martin to present 

evidence concerning her reason for missing the appeal hearing 

and to present evidence to support her claim. After hearing the 

evidence, the ALJ determined that Martin had demonstrated that 

the hearing should be re-opened, i.e., she had a valid reason for 

missing the appeal hearing and she was entitled to have her 

arguments adjudicated. However, after determining that it 

should hear Martin’s appeal of the Department’s decision, the 

ALJ concluded that Martin failed to demonstrate good cause as 

to why her appeal of the Department’s decision, due May 18, 

2015, was one day late. Thus, it is the ALJ’s decision concerning 

Martin’s timeliness of her appeal from the Department’s May 1, 

2015 decision that is relevant to this proceeding, not Martin’s 

failure to attend the June 2, 2015 hearing, which the ALJ 

ultimately excused. 

¶7 Accordingly, we decline to disturb the decision of the 

Board.