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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

DEXTER ROGERS, Individually and as )

Personal Representative of the )

ESTATE OF CARRIE BELL ROGERS )

and as Personal Representative of the )

ESTATE OF PREMIUS ROGERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:16-CV-364-TLS

)

INDIANA SUPREME COURT, )

JUSTICE LORETTA H. RUSH, )

JUSTICE ROBERT D. RUCKER, )

JUSTICE STEPHEN H. DAVID, )

JUSTICE MARK MASSA )

JUSTICE GEOFFREY G. SLAUGHTER )

PARKVIEW HOSPITAL INC., )

JOHN WHITELEATHER, JR., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 20], filed by Defendant 

Parkview Hospital, Inc. The pro se Plaintiff, Dexter Rogers, Individually and as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of Carrie Bell Rogers, and as Personal Representative of the Estate 

of Premius Rogers, filed his Complaint [ECF No. 1] on October 17, 2016, against the Defendant, 

John Whiteleather, Jr., chairman of the medical review panel, and all five justices of the Indiana 

Supreme Court, where he pursued a motion to transfer that was denied in a medical malpractice 

claim in the Allen County Superior Court. The Plaintiff’s Complaint invokes Title VI of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. as the grounds for relief. The statute provides that 

“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be 
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excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under 

any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

For the reasons stated in this Opinion and Order, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s 

claims against Parkview are barred because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and because his 

Complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although pro se 

complaints are to be liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than pleadings 

drafted by lawyers, Luevano v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013), the 

factual allegations in the complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative 

level, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A plaintiff can also plead himself out of court if his allegations 

clearly establish all the elements of an affirmative defense, including the defense that the action 

was filed after the statute of limitations period expired. Chi. Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian 

House, Inc., 770 F.3d 610, 613–14 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 582 

(7th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen the allegations of the complaint reveal that relief is barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a 

claim.”); United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing exception to the rule 

that complaints do not have to anticipate affirmative defenses to survive a motion to dismiss 

where “the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the 

affirmative defense, such as when a complaint plainly reveals that an action is untimely under the 

governing statute of limitations”); Tregenza v. Great Am. Comm’ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 718 (7th 
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Cir. 1993) (noting that even though a plaintiff is not required to a negate statute of limitations 

affirmative defense in his complaint, “if he pleads facts that show that his suit is time-barred or 

otherwise without merit, he has pleaded himself out of court”). 

Rule 12(b) requires that a court treat motions to dismiss as one for summary judgment 

under Rule 56 when “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the 

court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Despite the language of Rule 12(b), the court may also take judicial 

notice of matters of public record without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for 

summary judgment. Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 

United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991)). A court may also consider facts 

alleged in a pro se plaintiff’s brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss when considering the 

sufficiency of the complaint, as long as the facts are “consistent with the allegations in the 

complaint.” Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 311 (7th Cir. 2015); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 

1367 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997).

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

The Plaintiff’s mother, Carrie Bell Rogers, died on August 23, 2011. (Comp. ¶ 9; ECF 

No. 1.) The Plaintiff filed a claim with the Indiana Department of Insurance, as required by 

Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act, on June 25, 2013. (Id. ¶ 10.) The Plaintiff claims that 

Parkview was negligent in its care of his mother, resulting in her death. The Plaintiff also alleges 

that Parkview violated Title VI when Parkview allegedly denied care and treatment to his mother 

while she was a patient of the hospital. The Plaintiff alleges that the care she received was 

inferior to the care that white patients in similar circumstances received. (Id.)

A discovery dispute arose between the Plaintiff and Parkview in the state court 

proceedings, which led the Plaintiff to file a motion to compel. (Id. ¶ 10–12.) The Allen County 
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Superior Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion and ordered Parkview to produce certain 

documents and make available its CEO, Michael Packnett, for a discovery deposition. (Id. Ex. 

A 88–89.) Parkview did not produce its CEO, incurred sanctions, and then appealed the Allen 

County Superior Court’s decision to the Indiana Court of Appeals. (Id. ¶ 13.)

The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the Allen Superior Court’s decision and found 

that the Plaintiff’s requested discovery deposition was outside the scope of Indiana Trial 

Rule 26.1 (Id. ¶ 13.) The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant failed to justify its refusal to produce 

its CEO for a deposition. The Plaintiff also claims that the Court of Appeal’s decision was 

erroneous and violated his due process rights. (Id. ¶ 34.)

The Plaintiff then filed a petition to transfer, which the Indiana Supreme Court denied. 

(Id. ¶¶ 13, 34.) The Plaintiff alleges that the Indiana Supreme Court should have granted his 

petition to transfer, and that its failure to do so violated the Plaintiff’s due process rights. 

(Id. ¶ 34.) After the Indiana Supreme Court denied the transfer, counsel for Parkview contacted 

Whiteleather, whom the parties had selected as chairman of the medical review panel that was to 

review the Plaintiff’s claim, and ask him to set a schedule for evidentiary submissions to the 

medical review panel. (Id. ¶ 46.) The Plaintiff claims he was not ready to proceed to the panel 

based on the Court of Appeals’ decision holding that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the 

discovery sought. (Id. ¶¶ 48–49.) The Plaintiff claims that Whiteleather attempted to move the 

panel proceedings forward because the Plaintiff is African-American and Parkview’s counsel in 

the state court proceedings is white. (Id. ¶ 49.)

 1 The Plaintiff has also filed a suit against various judges of the Allen County Superior Court and 

Parkview Hospital, Inc. That case was dismissed on March 27, 2017 (1:16-CV-40-TLS-SLC).
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The Plaintiff asks the Court to issue a judgment declaring that the acts of the Defendants 

were unlawful and unconstitutional, award him damages, restrain the Defendants from violating 

the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and issue a preliminary injunction. (Id. 21.)

ANALYSIS

Parkview argues several theories to dispose of the case. Parkview first argues that the 

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under the doctrine, this Court does 

not have jurisdiction to review or reverse orders issued in state court or state administrative 

proceedings. See Gilbert v. Ill. Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2010); Lewis v. 

Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 771–72 (7th Cir. 2002). In essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

“prevents a state-court loser from bringing suit in federal court in order to effectively set aside 

the state-court judgment.” Gilbert, 591 F.3d at 900. The doctrine applies “even though the state 

court judgment might be erroneous or even unconstitutional.” Id. “[A] plaintiff may not seek a 

reversal of a state court judgment simply by casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights 

action.” Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993). A federal court is free to entertain 

claims that are independent of any state court proceedings. Gilbert, 591 F.3d at 900.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s Complaint is nothing more than a de facto 

appeal in federal court of the state court proceedings that this Court cannot address. The 

Defendant also argues that the Court cannot grant relief for unambiguous damages for injuries 

allegedly caused by a state court. The Plaintiff asserts this Court has jurisdiction by generally

invoking Article III of the Constitution.

The Court cannot discern any independent claims from the Plaintiff’s Complaint—at 

least not any that give fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests—that 

would provide a jurisdictional basis independent of redressing the outcome of the state court 
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proceedings. “There is no recognized civil cause of action for the failure or refusal of a party to 

provide discovery.” Marozsan v. United States, 849 F. Supp. 617, 645 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 

Accordingly, because the Plaintiff’s claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the 

Court dismisses the Complaint for failure to state a claim against Parkview.

Even if the Plaintiff’s claims were not barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the 

Plaintiff’s claims against Parkview would also be barred because the Plaintiff has not sufficiently 

pled his Complaint. The Plaintiff has brought the Complaint under Title VI, which provides in 

relevant part that no person shall, “on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded 

from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 

program or activity” covered by Title VI. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title VI “prohibits only 

intentional discrimination.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001). To establish the 

elements of a prima facie case under Title VI, “a complaining party must demonstrate that [his] 

race, color, or national origin was the motive for the discriminatory conduct.” C.S. v. Couch, 843 

F. Supp. 2d 894, 915 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (quoting Thompson v. Bd. of the Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 

144 F.3d 574, 581 (8th Cir. 1998)).

The Plaintiff alleges that Parkview’s actions were racially motivated when it sought

reversal of the Plaintiff’s discovery request to have its CEO deposed. The Complaint must 

“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Kolbe & Kolbe Health & Wealthfare Benefit Plan v. Med. Coll. of Wis. Inc., 657 F.3d 

496, 502 (7th Cir. 2011). But, even with the relaxed standards that apply to pro se litigants, see 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the Complaint does not set forth factual allegations 

that raise the Plaintiff’s right to relief above the speculative level. The Plaintiff’s allegations of 

Parkview’s discriminatory intent alone are as insufficient. “The complaint needs to allege some 
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facts tending to support a plausible inference” that Parkview acted with a discriminatory intent.

McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, 694 F.3d 873, 887 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, the Plaintiff makes an 

unsupported and speculative leap, alleging that Parkview took actions regarding discovery 

procedures because of an alleged racial animus towards him. The Indiana Court of Appeal’s 

decision finding that Parkview was not required to produce its CEO for a deposition is strong 

evidence that Parkview refused to produce its CEO for legitimate objections under Indiana 

discovery rules, and not because of racial animus.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s claims against Parkview are barred 

because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and because the Complaint does not state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Parkview Hospital, Inc.’s Motion to 

Dismiss [ECF No. 20].

SO ORDERED on May 17, 2017.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann

CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT