alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 15

- 00029

- CV

THE STATE OF TEXAS FOR THE BEST INTEREST AND PROTECTION OF L.A.

On Appeal from the County Court Hopkins County, Texas Trial Court No. M15

- 00051

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.2 

### O R D E R

L.A. appeals from a June 9, 2015, order authorizing the administration of psychoactive

m edication. 1 L.A.’s notice of appeal was filed June 11, the clerk’s record was filed June 16, and
no reporter’s record is to be filed in this matter. 2 The Texas Health and Safety Code requires that
mental health commitment appeals be given absolute priori ty over all other cases and authorizes
this Court to adjust the briefing deadlines and docketing timetables to achieve that end. T EX

.

H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE A NN . § 574.070(e) (West 2010).
Due to the accelerated nature of this appeal, we establish the following briefing schedule
for this matter: (1) the appellant’s brief to be received by this Court on or before June 26, 2015,
and (2) the appellee’s brief to be received by this Court on or before July 3, 2015. See id. No
extensions of time will be granted.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Section 574.070(e) of the Texas Health
and Safety Code, the case will be submitted, without oral argument, to the panel of Chief Justi ce
Josh R. Morriss, III, Justice Bailey C. Moseley, and Justice Ralph K. Burgess one day after the
appellee’s brief is filed.

1 This order was entered contemporaneously with an order committing L.A. to a state mental health facility for extended in

- patient mental health services not to exceed ninety days. L.A. appeals from the commitment order under our cause number 06

- 15

- 00028

- CV.

2 Based on a letter f

rom court reporter Jana Atchison Rushing contained in the clerk’s record, it appears that an effort was made to create a record in this case by electronically recording the trial court proceedings. L.A. apparently requested the transcription of a small, b ut specific, excerpt of those proceedings, and Hopkins County retained Rushing to transcribe the requested portions. However, after Rushing reviewed the audio storage devices provided to her by the county, she discovered that the portion of the proceeding s requested by L.A. had not been captured. Rushing informed L.A. of the issue and advised that no reporter’s record would be prepared unless and until he made a further request for the transcription of other portions of the proceedings that actually had b een recorded. We are aware of no further request submitted to Rushing, and, to date, we have received no motion or other request for assistance with respect to the reporter’s record.3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT

Date: June 17, 2015
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11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Raul Ojinaga Reyes, * From the 118th District Court

of Howard County

Trial Court No. 14992.

Vs. No. 11-17-00356-CR * August 22, 2019

The State of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by Bailey, C.J.

(Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J., 

sitting by assignment)

 (Willson, J., not participating)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there 

is no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s 

opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
Exhibit
      32





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
        connection with the Annual Report of Bullion River Gold Corp. (the "Registrant")
        on Form 10-KSB/A for the year ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the
        Commission on the date hereof (the "Annual Report"), we, Peter M. Kuhn, Chief
        Executive Officer and Nancy Huber, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant,
        certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
        906
        of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
      The
      Annual Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Registrant.





Dated:
                April 4, 2007
            /s/
                Peter M. Kuhn


Peter
      M.
      Kuhn


Chief
      Executive Officer


and
      Director





Dated:
                April 4, 2007
            /s/
                Nancy Huber


Nancy
      Huber


Chief
      Financial Officer,


and
      Director
##### 



Exhibit 31.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Richard J. Townsend, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A of
Loral Orion, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;3.
    
    [Intentionally omitted];4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls
and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:  (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or
caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed
under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this report is
being prepared;(c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report
our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by
this report based on such evaluation; and(d)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the
registrants internal control over financial reporting that
occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over
financial reporting; and 5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control
over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):  (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses
in the design or operation of internal control over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the
registrants internal control over financial reporting.  /s/ Richard J. TownsendRichard J. TownsendChief Financial OfficerMay 12, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CHLOE WALLACE,

1

Respondent Below,

Appellant,

v.

VIVIAN DICKENS and MEGAN 

ROLAND,

Petitioners Below,

Appellees.

§

§ 

§ No. 66, 2019

§ 

§ Court Below—Family Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ File No. CN18-05978

§ Petition No. 18-31705

§

§

§

 Submitted: March 12, 2019

 Decided: March 28, 2019

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and SEITZ, Justices.

ORDER

After considering the notice of appeal from an interlocutory order under 

Supreme Court Rule 42, it appears to the Court that:

(1) On February 15, 2019, the appellant, Chloe Wallace, filed a notice of 

interlocutory appeal from a Family Court order, dated January 18, 2019 and 

docketed on January 22, 2019, finding there was probable cause to believe the 

appellant’s children would be dependent and/or neglected in the appellant’s care and 

that temporary guardianship should be granted to appellee Vivian Dickens until 

 

1 The Court assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
2

further order of the Family Court. A preliminary hearing was scheduled for January 

29, 2019, but was continued at the request of the appellant and is currently scheduled 

for March 28, 2019. On March 8, 2019, the Family Court treated the notice of appeal 

as an application for certification under Supreme Court Rule 42 and denied it as 

untimely.

(2) We refuse this interlocutory appeal, which fails to comply with Rule 

42. Under Rule 42, the appellant was required to file an application for certification 

of the January 18th order in the Family Court within ten days of that order.2 She was 

also required to file an application for certification in the Family Court before filing 

a notice of interlocutory appeal in this Court.3 Instead she filed a notice of 

interlocutory appeal in this Court without ever filing an application for certification 

in the Family Court. The appellant’s pro se status does not excuse her failure to 

comply with the requirements of Rule 42.4

 

2 Supr. Ct. R. 42(c)(i) (“Such application shall be served and filed within 10 days of the entry of 

the order from which the appeal is sought or such longer time as the trial court, in its discretion, 

may order for good cause shown.”).

3 Supr. Ct. R. 42(c) (providing that “[a]n application for certification of an interlocutory appeal 

shall be made in the first instance to the trial court”).

4

See, e.g., Hall v. Danberg, 2010 WL 2624382, at *1 (DeL. July 1, 2010) (rejecting pro se 

litigant's argument that his failure to comply with Rule 42 should be excused due to his pro se 

status).
3

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the interlocutory 

appeal is REFUSED. 

BY THE COURT:

/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.

Justice
Exhibit 10.10(b)



FIRST AMENDMENT

TO

ADVANCED MEDICAL OPTICS, INC.

401(K) PLAN



The ADVANCED MEDICAL OPTICS, INC. 401(k) Plan (the Plan) is hereby amended as follows:



|1. |  | Section 2.20(a) of the Plan is amended and restated as follows:
|-- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------



(a)    In the case of any Employee whose Employment Commencement Date is
both prior to July 1, 2007 and within five (5) years of his or her Severance Date from the Company (as each term is defined in the Allergan Savings Plan), he or she shall be credited with Credited Service under the Plan equal
to the period (if any) of Credited Service (as defined in the Allergan Savings Plan) credited to such Employee under the Allergan Savings Plan; except, however, for purposes of determining an Employees Profit Sharing
Percentage under Section 5.3(c), he or she shall be credited with Credited Service equal to the number of his or her Benefit Years (in whole years and fractions of a year) as determined under the terms of the Allergan, Inc. Pension
Plan as in effect immediately prior to the Effective Date.



|2. |  | This First Amendment shall be effective as of the Effective Date of the Plan.
|-- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Advanced Medical Optics, Inc. hereby executes this First Amendment to the Advanced
Medical Optics, Inc. 401(k) Plan on this 26th day of December, 2002.





|ADVANCED MEDICAL OPTICS, INC.
|-----------------------------
|BY:                          
|                             
|
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-7053

DE’MARION L. WILSON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

HAROLD W. CLARKE, Sir, Director, Virginia Dept. of 

Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District 

Judge. (3:14-cv-00358-HEH-RCY)

Submitted: December 17, 2015 Decided: December 22, 2015

Before DIAZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

De’Marion Wilson, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

De’Marion L. Wilson seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and 

dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition as an 

unauthorized, successive petition. The order is not appealable 

unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A 

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Wilson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny 

a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 
3

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
Exhibit 99.1        Officer's Certificate regarding Annual Statement of
                    Compliance of Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.

                   WASHINGTON MUTUAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP.
                              OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE

     The undersigned officer of Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp., a
Delaware corporation (the "Company") hereby certifies on behalf of the Company
and on his own behalf for purposes of the WAMU MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2002-AR2, as follows:

     1. I am the duly appointed, qualified and acting President of the Company.

     2. Capitalized terms used and not defined herein shall have the meanings
ascribed to such terms in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement related to the
above-referenced series of Certificates.

     3. I am duly authorized to execute and deliver this Officer's Certificate
on behalf of the Company.

     4. A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the preceding
calendar year and performance under this Agreement has been made under my
supervision.

     5. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer
has fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement throughout such year.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed my name as of March 15, 2004.





                   WASHINGTON MUTUAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP.


                     By: /s/ Michael L. Parker
                         Michael L. Parker,
                         President and Director
#### HELD v. FRANKLIN BREWING CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

November 15, 1907.)

Action by Herman J. Held against the Franklin Brewing Company.

No opinion. Motion denied, on payment of $10, and on condition that appellant be ready for January term. Order filed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-1328
In Re: ANTHONY E. STEPHENSON, Debtor.
ANTHONY E. STEPHENSON, Debtor - Appellant, versus JAMES H. LEE, Creditor - Appellee, and MARK M. MALAND, Trustee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (MC-98-36, BK-87-01521-MN2) Submitted: September 30, 1999 Decided: December 17, 1999 Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.2 Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Rosbon D. B. Whedbee, Ahoskie, North Carolina, for Appellant. Stephen L. Beaman, Richard S. Wright, BEAMAN & KING, P.A., Wilson, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).3 PER CURIAM: Anthony E. Stephenson seeks to appeal the district court's order dismissing in part his appeals from the bankruptcy court. The district court's order granted the creditor's motion to dismiss two notices of appeal filed by Stephenson (from the bankruptcy court's March 10 and April 9 orders) but denied the motion as to Stephenson's July 9 notice of appeal from the bankruptcy court's June 29, 1998, supplemental order directing transfer of assets. At the time Stephenson filed this notice of appeal, the district court had not yet entered a final order with respect to the July 9 noticeof appeal. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. George Stewart, Appellant, v Eugene S. LeFevre, as Superintendent of Clinton Correctional Facility, Respondent.

Kane, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Cerrito, J.), entered September 4, 1984 in Clinton County, which denied petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70, without a hearing.

In this application for a writ of habeas corpus, defendant contends that he was unlawfully and unconstitutionally sentenced as a persistent felony offender. Special Term denied the application without a hearing, and this appeal ensued.

We affirm. The same issue asserted herein was raised by defendant on appeal from his judgment of conviction and found by this court to be without merit *(People v Stewart,*96 AD2d 622, 623, *lv denied*60 NY2d 825). This being the case, habeas corpus does not lie (see, *People ex rel. Sales v LeFevre,*93 AD2d 945, 946, *lv denied*60 NY2d 558).

Judgment affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Levine, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 99.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Minera Andes Inc. (the Corporation), on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Allen V. Ambrose, President of the Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





| | 1. |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




| | 2. |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation.
| | -- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




MINERA ANDES INC.Date:

November 12, 2002



By:

/s/    Allen V. AmbroseAllen V. Ambrose President
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 11, 2009 

d0831 

Order 

 

September 11, 2009 

138368 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 138368 

 COA: 288693 

Oakland CC: 2007-217140-FH 

DANIEL JAMES MCKELVIE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 12, 2009 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. For purposes of 

MCR 6.502(G)(1), the Court notes that, contrary to the Court of Appeals characterization 

of the defendant’s application as relating to a motion for relief from judgment, the 

defendant’s application sought leave to appeal a judgment of conviction. The application 

was properly denied, however, due to the lack of merit in the grounds presented.
#### RANDEL v. FRANK.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

October 18, 1907.)

Action by Elias Randel against Louis Frank.

No opinion. Motion granted. Settle order on notice.