IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1605

Filed September 11, 2019

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JOYCE CAROL GRIFFITH

AND SCOTT REID GRIFFITH

Upon the Petition of

JOYCE CAROL GRIFFITH,

Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning

SCOTT REID GRIFFITH,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Emmet County, Don E. Courtney, 

Judge.

Scott Griffith appeals from the decree dissolving his marriage to Joyce 

Griffith. AFFIRMED.

Michael H. Johnson of Johnson Law Firm, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

Matthew T.E. Early of Fitzgibbons Law Firm, L.L.C., Estherville, for 

appellee.

Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and May, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.

Scott Griffith appeals from the decree dissolving his marriage to Joyce 

Griffith. Scott argues the district court erred in failing to order continued conciliation 

efforts, in finding Joyce was capable of establishing the breakdown of the 

marriage, and in refusing to grant Scott’s motion to compel discovery of mental 

health records. We affirm.

Scott and Joyce were married on July 6, 1979. On May 25, 2017, Joyce 

filed a dissolution petition. On July 5, Scott filed an answer denying there had been 

a breakdown of the marriage relationship and prayed the court dismiss the petition 

and order conciliation. Trial was scheduled for December 5. 

On November 17, counsel for Scott filed a motion to continue the trial and 

order conciliation, noting Joyce had refused to voluntarily participate in conciliation. 

Joyce resisted. Following a hearing, the court ordered conciliation and continued 

the trial.

On February 8, 2018, Scott filed a motion to enforce court-ordered 

conciliation. Joyce responded, noting she had attended one meeting and the 

conciliator had indicated she need not attend further conciliation sessions as they 

would be futile. Later, Joyce filed an affidavit from Tina Friesner, Joyce’s daughter, 

who opined further conciliation or counseling sessions were not in Joyce’s best 

interest: “My mother suffers from dementia and has indicated to me that she never 

wants to see Scott Griffith again and is in fear of him. She gets very tearful and 

upset when we discuss the possibility of continued counseling sessions with her 

husband.” Also filed was a letter from the person selected by Scott to be the 

conciliator, Chelsi Jahn, who wrote she met with Joyce on December 28, 2017, 
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and Joyce stated “she wishes to get divorced and she has felt this way for a long 

time” and she no longer wanted to attend sessions. 

On March 1, Scott filed a motion to compel discovery of Joyce’s medical 

records for the past five years. Joyce resisted, asserting the motion was 

technically deficient and without merit. 

The district court denied the motions to compel further conciliation and to 

compel discovery. 

Trial was held on March 20. Scott asked that the court find Joyce was not 

competent to request dissolution due to dementia. Joyce and Scott both testified. 

Joyce stated she wanted a dissolution of the marriage and there had been a 

breakdown of the marriage. Scott testified it was not Joyce’s desire but the 

dementia speaking. The court accepted Joyce’s testimony as credible and found 

there had been a “breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the 

legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed, and that there remains no 

reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved.” A decree of dissolution 

was entered, incorporating the parties’ stipulated property division. Scott appeals.

We review dissolution proceedings de novo. In re Marriage of McDermott, 

827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). Nonetheless, we give weight to the findings of 

the trial court, particularly with respect to credibility determinations. Iowa R. App. 

P. 6.904(3)(g). 

Scott first contends the court erred in failing to order continued conciliation 

efforts. Because an initial order of conciliation had already been entered, we look 

to Iowa Code section 598.16(3) (2018), which states, “At any time upon its own 

motion or upon the application of a party the court may require the parties to 
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participate in conciliation efforts for sixty days or less following the issue of such 

an order.” The emphasized language indicates the district court has discretion in 

conciliation matters following the initial order of conciliation.

1

 Conciliation efforts 

were ordered. Joyce attended one session and decided she did not wish to 

proceed with further efforts. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 

order denying Scott’s motion to compel further conciliation.

Next, we turn to Scott’s claim the court erred in denying his motion to compel 

discovery of Joyce’s medical records. “Discovery decisions are typically reviewed 

for [an] abuse of discretion.” Ashenfelter v. Mulligan, 792 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Iowa 

2010). “Mental health and medical records are protected by a constitutional right 

to privacy.” Id. at 672. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of 

Scott’s motion to compel discovery of Joyce’s medical records. See id. (“This is a 

civil case. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.503 prohibits discovery of privileged 

materials. Therefore, because the medical records are privileged materials under 

section 622.10, they are not discoverable under rule 1.503.”); see also In re 

Marriage of Mulligan, No. 10-1752, 2011 WL 2420005, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. June 

15, 2011) (noting the only type of civil case Ashenfelter may have left open the 

ability to order disclosure of medical and mental health records for is a child-inneed-of-assistance action). 

 

1 Pursuant to subsection 2—until July 1, 2019—a conciliation order was mandatory when

requested by either party during a specific timeframe. Iowa Code § 598.16(2); see In re 

Marriage of Schroeder, 393 N.W.2d 808, 809 (Iowa 1986) (statutory language—“court 

shall require parties to participate”—imposes a duty). However, Iowa Code section 

598.16(2) recently has been amended: “The court may on its own motion or upon the 

motion of a party require the parties to participate in conciliation efforts for a period of sixty 

days or less following the issuance of an order setting forth the conciliation procedure and 

the conciliator.” 2019 Iowa Acts, ch. 63 §1 (codified at Iowa Code § 698.16(2)) (effective 

July 1, 2019) (emphasis added). 
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Upon our de novo review, we find Joyce has established the necessary 

breakdown of the marital relationship. We affirm the entry of the decree dissolving 

the parties’ marriage. 

Joyce requests an award of appellate attorney fees. “Appellate attorney 

fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this court’s discretion.” In re 

Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005). We consider “the needs 

of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative 

merits of the appeal.” Id. (citation omitted). Joyce’s request for attorney fees is 

denied.

AFFIRMED.