alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
unaudited interim consolidated financial statements of Minera Andes Inc. for the
three-month period ended March 31, 1999 and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                           1,231,992
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       29,494
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,340,500
<PP&E>                                           3,990,709
<DEPRECIATION>                                     155,301
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   5,175,908
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              123,785
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                        16,414,666
<OTHER-SE>                                    (11,362,543)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     5,175,908
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         0
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   301,138
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (301,138)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (301,138)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (301,138)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 846 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 111
112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 846

   To designate the United States courthouse located at 80 Lafayette 
 Street in Jefferson City, Missouri, as the Christopher S. Bond United 
                           States Courthouse.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 14, 2011

  Mr. Blunt (for himself and Mrs. McCaskill) introduced the following 
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment 
                            and Public Works

                             July 22, 2011

               Reported by Mrs. Boxer, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To designate the United States courthouse located at 80 Lafayette 
 Street in Jefferson City, Missouri, as the Christopher S. Bond United 
                           States Courthouse.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE.

    (a) Designation.--The United States courthouse located at 80 
Lafayette Street in Jefferson City, Missouri, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Christopher S. Bond United States Courthouse''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the United States 
courthouse referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a 
reference to the ``Christopher S. Bond United States Courthouse''.
                                                       Calendar No. 111

112th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                 S. 846

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

   To designate the United States courthouse located at 80 Lafayette 
 Street in Jefferson City, Missouri, as the Christopher S. Bond United 
                           States Courthouse.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             July 22, 2011

                       Reported without amendment
```
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 99.1



                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Town Sports International, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert
Giardina, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
(Section Mark)1350, as adopted pursuant to (Section Mark)906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

                (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

                (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


/s/ ROBERT GIARDINA
Town Sports International, Inc.
Chief Executive Officer
August 6, 2002
EXHIBIT 31.2
 
      (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or
caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be
designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known
to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being
prepared;(b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial
reporting, or caused such internal control over
financial reporting to be designed under our
supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding
the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external
purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles;(c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in
this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; and(d)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the
registrants internal control over financial reporting
that occurred during the registrants most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter
in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrants internal control over
financial reporting; and
  (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have
a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
 Date: March 31, 2010
    By:
    /s/ Roman GregorigRoman GregorigVice President and Principal Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           6,911
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   60,540
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (1,650)
<INVENTORY>                                     44,831
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               115,932
<PP&E>                                          52,703
<DEPRECIATION>                                (32,478)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 369,040
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           53,124
<BONDS>                                        273,125
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                      11,417
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   369,040
<SALES>                                        244,378
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               244,378
<CGS>                                          153,992
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   64,671
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                25,220
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              25,166
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    495
<INCOME-TAX>                                     6,809
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (6,314)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (6,314)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0





</TABLE>
Exhibit 99.1

Written Statement of Co-Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officer
Pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)

The undersigned, the Co-Chief Executive Officers and the Chief Financial Officer of Regal Entertainment Group, a Delaware corporation (the "Company"),
each hereby certifies that, to his/her knowledge on the date hereof:



A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

| |  | /s/MICHAEL L. CAMPBELLMichael L. Campbell
Co-Chief Executive Officer
March 26, 2003
| |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |  | /s/KURT C. HALLKurt C. Hall
Co-Chief Executive Officer
March 26, 2003              
| |  | /s/AMY E. MILESAmy E. Miles
Chief Financial Officer
March 26, 2003                 

---

QuickLinks
VI 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 521 

For the relief of Tim Lowery and Paul Nettleton of Owyhee County, Idaho. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 9, 2011 

Mr. CRAPO (for himself and Mr. RISCH) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

For the relief of Tim Lowery and Paul Nettleton of Owyhee 

County, Idaho. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ELIGIBILITY OF TIM LOWERY AND PAUL 

4 NETTLETON FOR EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE 

5 AWARD. 

6 Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of section 

7 2412 of title 28, United States Code, Tim Lowery and 

8 Paul Nettleton of Owyhee County, Idaho, shall each be 

9 eligible for the award of fees and other expenses (including 

10 reasonable attorney fees) incurred to defend the stock 

11 water rights of Tim Lowery and Paul Nettleton unsuccessVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:43 Mar 10, 2011 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S521.IS S521

pwalker on DSKD5P82C1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 521 IS

1 fully claimed by the Bureau of Land Management in liti2 gation relating to the Snake River Basin Adjudication. 

Æ 


pwalker on DSKD5P82C1PROD with BILLS
#### Shairin Torres, Respondent-Appellant, v Merrill Lynch Purchasing et al., Defendants, Colliers ABR et al., Appellant, and ABM Janitorial et al., Appellants-Respondents. (And a Third-Party Action.) Merrill Lynch/WFC/L, Inc., Second Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, et al., Second Third-Party Plaintiff, v Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft, Second Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

[945 NYS2d 78]—

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lucindo Suarez, J.), entered July 15, 2011, which, inter alia, denied Merrill Lynch/ WFC/L motion for summary judgment on its indemnification *742claim against Commerzbank, granted ABM Janitorial’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, denied Colliers’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, denied Colliers’ motion to amend its answer to assert a cross claim for indemnification against Commerzbank and for summary judgment thereon, denied ABM Engineering’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it and denied ABM Janitorial’s and ABM Engineering’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Merrill Lynch’s and Colliers’ cross claims for indemnification against them, unanimously modified, on the law, to deny ABM Janitorial’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Colliers’ and ABM Engineering’s motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them were properly denied because they merely pointed to gaps in plaintiffs proof instead of carrying their burdens on their motions *(see Alvarez v 21st Century Renovations Ltd.,*66 AD3d 524, 525 [2009]).

However, the janitorial contract gave ABM Janitorial exclusive control over cleaning in the area where plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell, which was sufficient to impose upon it a duty of care toward the noncontracting plaintiff *(see Riley v ISS Intl. Serv. Sys.,*5 AD3d 754, 756-757 [2004]). There were issues of fact as to defendants’ notice of the condition on the day of the alleged accident.

The court properly interpreted the lease indemnification provisions in finding that the obligation thereunder did not extend to the common area ladies’ bathroom where plaintiff was allegedly injured.

We have considered the parties’ other contentions and find them unavailing. Concur — Friedman, J.E, Sweeny, Ren wick, Freedman and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.
# C_2019148EN.01002901.xml

| 29.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/29

---

Appeal brought on 21 February 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-684/14: Krka v Commission

(Case C-151/19 P)

(2019/C 148/27)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: B. Mongin, F. Castilla Contreras, C. Vollrath, Agents, D. Bailey, Barrister)

Other party to the proceedings: Krka Tovarna Zdravil d.d.

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| — | set aside points 1 to 4 of the operative part of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-684/14; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside points 1 to 4 of the operative part of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-684/14;

| — | refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union pursuant to Article 61 of the Statute; |
| --- | --- |

—

refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union pursuant to Article 61 of the Statute;

| — | order Krka to pay the Commission’s costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order Krka to pay the Commission’s costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The first plea alleges that the General Court erred in law in holding that Krka was not a source of competitive pressure on Servier at the time of the agreements in question.

The second plea alleges errors of law by the General Court in assessing the content and objectives of the licence agreement as an incentive for Krka to accept the restrictions of the settlement agreement.

The third plea alleges errors of law in the application of the concept of restriction of competition by object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.

The fourth plea alleges errors of law in the General Court’s analysis of the parties' intentions for the purposes of applying Article 101 TFEU.

The fifth plea alleges that the General Court erred in law by taking into account the pro-competitive effects of the licence in markets that are not within the scope of the infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU found by the Decision.

The sixth plea alleges that the General Court erred in law in assessing the object of the assignment agreement.

The seventh plea alleges General Court erred in law in the application of the concept of the restriction of competition by effect within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.

---
#### Donald Wilkinson, Appellant, v Francis J. Sukiennik et al., Defendants, and Robert Hoelscher, Respondent.

— Order unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and judgment declared, in accordance with the with the following memorandum: Plaintiff brought suit under RPAPL article 15 to compel the determination of claims to real property. After a nonjury trial, the court ruled that plaintiff could either obtain title to the property from defendant upon tendering the balance of the purchase price plus accrued interest or forfeit any interest he may have in the property.

The plaintiff entered into a contract with Richard Voight to purchase the property in question. The contract required the plaintiff to acquire a mortgage for the property by a certain date. If the plaintiff failed to obtain the mortgage, either party could rescind the contract by giving written notice and the plaintiff’s down payment would be refunded. The plaintiff moved into the premises and unsuccessfully sought to obtain a mortgage. In light of plaintiff’s inability to obtain a mortgage, Voight sold the property to defendant Sukiennik, who had notice of plaintiff’s interest in the property. Sukiennik, unable to evict plaintiff from the premises, sold the property to defendant Hoelscher. The 1977 sales contract gives plaintiff an *988equitable right in the property *(see, Bean v Walker,*95 AD2d 70).

The trial court was in error in directing plaintiff to forfeit his interest in the property and that defendant would be entitled to an order of ejectment if plaintiff did not tender the balance of the purchase price. Defendants have never given notice of cancellation, nor have they offered to return the down payment as required by the contract.

We hold that the trial court was limited to finding that the defendant Hoelscher has legal title to the property and plaintiff has an equitable interest in the amount of $15,000. Unless the contract is sooner terminated by notice of rescission, the plaintiff is entitled to a deed of the property upon tendering the balance of the purchase price, without interest, and should the contract be rescinded, plaintiff is entitled to the return of $15,000, without interest, and judgment is declared accordingly. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Joslin, J. — compel determination of claim to real property.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Denman, Boomer, Green and O’Donnell, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Samuel Bussey, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Beldock, J.), rendered October 6,1981, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree and attempted murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

Defendant’s contention that the People failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is without merit. The eyewitness and medical testimony adduced at trial clearly established defendant’s guilt in the fatal stabbing of the decedent and in the wounding of the complainant Jackson. Moreover, the minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses did *404not undermine their credibility. The jury was well aware of these discrepancies and decided the credibility issue in favor of the People. As such, it fulfilled its role as the finder of facts and its decision should not now be disturbed *(see, People v Kennedy,*47 NY2d 196; *People v Rosenfeld,*93 AD2d 872).

Likewise, defendant’s arguments as to the impropriety of the trial court’s instructions to the jury concerning the justification defense are unpersuasive. It should be noted that since no objection was made at the trial, these alleged errors have not been preserved for appellate review *(People v Charleston,*56 NY2d 886; *People v Gonzalez,*80 AD2d 543); nor do we find any basis in the record for reversal in the interest of justice *(see, People v Doctor,*98 AD2d 780). We note that the sentence imposed on each conviction was within the trial court’s discretion and was neither harsh nor excessive in light of the nature of the offenses *(see, People v Farrar,*52 NY2d 302; *People v Flores,*101 AD2d 657). We have examined defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J. P., Brown, Niehoff and Lawrence, JJ., concur.