alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 23.1

|KPMG LLP1900 Nashville City Center
511 Union Street
Nashville, TN 37219-1735 |  |  |  | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  |  |  | 

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

The
Board of Directors
Regal Entertainment Group:

We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos. 333-87958 and 333-127367) on Form S-8 of Regal Entertainment Group
of our report dated March 13, 2006 with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Regal Entertainment Group and subsidiaries as of December 29, 2005 and December 30, 2004, and
the related consolidated statements of income, stockholders' equity and comprehensive income, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 29,
2005, management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 29, 2005, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of
December 29, 2005, which reports appear in the December 29, 2005 annual report on Form 10-K of Regal Entertainment Group.

|/s/ KPMG LLPNashville, Tennessee
March 13, 2006 |  | 
|----------------------------------------------- |  | 

---



QuickLinks
#### FLORENCE PISANO, PETITIONER-PETITIONER, v. SCHNEIDER PAINTING & DECORATING CO., RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

*Mr. Seymour B. Jacobs*for the petitioner.

*Messrs. O’Brien, Brett & O’Brien*for the respondent.

March 28, 1960.

Denied.
Exhibit 23.1
**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS**
We consent to the incorporation by reference in Amendment No. 1 to theRegistration Statement on Form S-4 (No. 333-82540) and in the relatedprospectus supplement dated December 30, 2002 of IPC Acquisition Corp. for$150 million in aggregate principal amount of 11.50% Senior Subordinated Notesdue 2009, and to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statementon Form S-8 (No. 333-88770) pertaining to the IPC Acquisition Corp. 2002 StockOption Plan and Key Employee Equity Investment Plan, of our report datedDecember 4, 2002 with respect to the consolidated financial statements andschedule of IPC Acquisition Corp. included in this Annual Report on Form 10-Kfor the period from November 15, 2001 (date of initial capitalization) toSeptember 30, 2002.
 /s/ERNST & YOUNG LLP
MetroPark, New Jersey
#### In re Louis WATLEY, Petitioner.

No. 11-2068.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. RApp. P. July 14, 2011.

Opinion filed: Aug. 1, 2011.

Louis Watley, Rahway, NJ, pro se.

Atty. Gen. NJ, Esq., Office of Attorney General of New Jersey, Trenton, NJ, U.S. Atty Newark, Office of United States Attorney, Newark, NJ, for Respondent.

Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Louis Watley seeks a writ of mandamus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651, directing the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to rule on his habeas corpus petition. Subsequent to the filing of this mandamus petition, however, the District Court dismissed Watley’s habeas petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies.1 Accordingly, to the extent Watley seeks to have this Court order the District Court to rule on the habeas petition, his mandamus petition will be denied as moot. See *Blandak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp.,*77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir.1996) (“If developments occur during the course of adjudication that ... prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.”). And to the extent Wat-ley requests that we “declare” as “arbitrary, capricious, and [an] abuse of power” the District Court’s seven-month delay in adjudicating the habeas petition, that request is denied; mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal. *See In re Chambers Dev. Co.,*148 F.3d 214, 226 (3d Cir.1998).

1

. Watley's appeal of that decision is pending before this Court. *See*CA No. 11-2808.
#### Lawrence Pollard, Respondent, v Independent Beauty & Barber Supply Co. et al., Appellants.

[942 NYS2d 360]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lewis, J.), dated March 4, 2011, as granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is denied.

A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates *846a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision *(see Tutrani v County of Suffolk,*10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008]; *Parra v Hughes,*79 AD3d 1113, 1114 [2010]; *DeLouise v S.K.I. Wholesale Beer Corp.,*75 AD3d 489, 490 *[2010]; Volpe v Limoncelli,*74 AD3d 795 [2010]; *Staton v Ilic,*69 AD3d 606 [2010]; *Lampkin v Chan,*68 AD3d 727 [2009]). Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting evidence that the defendants’ vehicle struck his vehicle in the rear as it was stopped at a red light. However, in opposition, the defendants raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s negligence caused or contributed to the accident through the affidavit of the defendant Jerome Ford, the driver of the defendants’ vehicle. Ford averred that the plaintiffs vehicle began to proceed when the light turned green, but then stopped suddenly and without warning in the intersection despite the fact that it was clear of traffic and pedestrians *(see Vargas v Luxury Family Corp.,*77 AD3d 820, 821 [2010]; *Delayhaye v Caledonia Limo & Car Serv., Inc.,*49 AD3d 588 [2008]; *Richards v Manley Driving School, Inc.,*27 AD3d 443, 444 [2006]; *Taveras v Amir,*24 AD3d 655 [2005]; *Brodie v Global Asset Recovery, Inc.,*12 AD3d 390 [2004]; *Moran v Singh,*10 AD3d 707, 708 [2004]). Contrary to the plaintiffs assertions, the statements contained in Ford’s affidavit were not an attempt to create a feigned issue of fact *(see Jahangir v Logan Bus Co., Inc.,*89 AD3d 1064 [2011]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Skelos, J.P., Dillon, Eng and Austin, JJ., concur.
#### Ludwign H. Zambrana, Appellant, v Robert J. Timothy et al., Respondents.

[943 NYS2d 92]—

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Julia Rodriguez, J.), entered September 21, 2011, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint alleging serious injuries under the “permanent consequential limitation of use,” “significant limitation of use” and 90/180-day categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

On January 9, 2008, then 26-year-old plaintiff was driving on the Van Wyck Expressway when a vehicle owned by defendant Clifford C. Hay, Inc. and driven by defendant Timothy J. Robert collided with his car. Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that he sustained serious injuries to his right knee.

Defendants established prima facie absence of a serious injury by submitting the report of an orthopedist who examined plaintiff on November 18, 2010, and found full range of motion, and absence of disability, permanency, or residuals *{see De La Cruz v Hernandez,*84 AD3d 652, 652 [2011]).

Notwithstanding plaintiffs arguments that his medical records contain objective evidence of injuries, that he had adequately explained his cessation of treatment, and that he need not submit contemporaneous quantitative evidence of limitations to sustain his claims, he failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to existence of a permanent serious injury since he did not submit any objective evidence of limitations based on a recent examination of his knee *(see Perl v Meher,*18 NY3d 208, 219-220 [2011]; *Harrigan v Kemmaj,*85 AD3d 559 [2011]; *Thompson v Abbasi,*15 AD3d 95, 97-98 [2005]). The most current medical evidence upon which plaintiff relies is the operative report dated October 18, 2008, which was prepared more than two years before defendants’ expert’s findings of full range of motion and resolved symptoms.

Defendants met their burden of proof as to plaintiffs’ 90/180-day claim by relying on plaintiffs medical records, and his deposition testimony, which are insufficient to establish that he was unable to perform substantially all of the material acts which constitute his usual and customary daily activities during *423the requisite period *(see Uddin v Cooper,*32 AD3d 270, 271 [2006], *lv denied*8 NY3d 808 [2007]).

Plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact. The medical records upon which he relies indicate that, as of February 7, 2008, he was only “temporarily partially disabled” and, if he were working, would have been able to return to work with light duty restrictions *(see Perl,*18 NY3d at 220; *Williams v Perez,*92 AD3d 528 [2012]). Without any corroborating objective medical evidence, his affidavit, which simply repeats that he was curtailed from job hunting and confined to home during the requisite period, is insufficient to sustain a 90/180-day claim *(see Rosa-Diaz v Maria Auto Corp.,*79 AD3d 463 [2010]; *Blake v Portexit Corp.,*69 AD3d 426 [2010]). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Acosta, Renwick and Richter, JJ.
Exhibit 32   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002    In connection with the Annual Report of Zaldiva, Inc. (the Registrant) on Form 10-K for the year ending September 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Annual Report), we, Nicole Leigh, President, and Robert B. Lees, CFO of the Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) The Annual Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Registrant.  Date:December 28, 2010By:/s/Nicole LeighNicole Leigh, President and Director  Date:December 28, 2010By:/s/Robert B. LeesRobert B. Lees, CFO and Director
#### In the Matter of the Application of John McCall et al., Respondents, The Villiage of Saratoga Springs, Appellant.

(Argued June 16, 1890;

decided June 24, 1890.)

Appeal from order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, made February 14, 1890, which affirmed an order of Special Term appointing *705commissioners to appraise the damages to lands and buildings of the petitioners caused by the change and alteration of the grade of certain streets in the village of Saratoga Springs.

*L. B. Piles*for appellant.

*William H. McCall*for respondents.

Agree to affirm on opinion below.

All concur.

Order affirmed.
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###### Department of Health and Human Services

# AGENCY:

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

# ACTION:

Notice; correction.

# SUMMARY:

The Office of the Secretary has extended the application period for accepting application submissions from qualified individuals who wish to be considered for membership on the National Advisory Committee on Individuals with Disabilities and Disasters (NACIDD). Up to seven new voting members with expertise disability accessibility, medical disaster planning, preparedness, response, or recovery will be selected for the Committee. Please visit the NACIDD website at *www.phe.gov/​nacidd* for all application submission information and       ( print page 35097)    instructions. Application submissions will be accepted until July 12, 2021.

# DATES:

The application period has been extended and will now end on July 12, 2021.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Maxine Kellman, DVM, Ph.D., PMP, Designated Federal Official for National Advisory Committees, Washington, DC, Office (202) 260-0447 or email *maxine.kellman@hhs.gov.*

## Corrections

1. Correction to final notice published in the **Federal Register** on May 13, 2021 entitled “National Advisory Committee on Individuals with Disabilities and Disasters.”

Amendment to the application period which has been extended and applications will be accepted until July 12, 2021.

Karuna Seshasai,

Executive Secretary to the Department, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

[FR Doc. 2021-14059 Filed 6-30-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4150-37-P
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

In connection with the Annual Report of Hewitt Associates, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-K for the period ended September 30, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company
hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. (S)1350, as adopted pursuant to (S)906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that: 1) the Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 2) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for
the periods covered in the Report.


Date: November 22, 2002                    /s/ DALE L. GIFFORD
                                           -------------------------
                                           Dale L. Gifford
                                           Chief Executive Officer

                                           /s/ DAN A. DECANNIERE
                                           -------------------------
                                           Dan A. Decanniere
                                           Chief Financial Officer
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43360

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JADEAN BINGHAM,

Defendant-Appellant.

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)

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)

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2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 382

Filed: February 10, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Minidoka County. Hon. Michael R. Crabtree, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and order retaining jurisdiction, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; GRATTON, Judge;

and HUSKEY, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Jadean Bingham pled guilty to burglary, Idaho Code § 18-1401 and possession of a 

controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). The district court imposed concurrent unified 

sentences of seven years with two years determinate, and retained jurisdiction. Bingham appeals

asserting that the district court abused its discretion by retaining jurisdiction rather than placing 

her on probation.

A trial court’s decision whether to retain jurisdiction is, like the original sentencing 

decision, a matter committed to the trial court’s discretion. State v. Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227, 

230, 832 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Ct. App. 1992). Retained jurisdiction allows the trial court an 

extended time to evaluate a defendant’s suitability for probation. State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 
2

379, 924 P.2d 637, 641 (Ct. App. 1996). The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a 

sentence is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the defendant’s rehabilitation 

potential and suitability for probation. State v. Atwood, 122 Idaho 199, 201, 832 P.2d 1134, 

1136 (Ct. App. 1992).

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Bingham’s judgment of conviction and order retaining jurisdiction are 

affirmed.
EXHIBIT 31.1



SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION



I, Harry Chew, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Bi-Optic Ventures Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The Registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure

controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that

material information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated

subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,

particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrants disclosure controls and

procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the

effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of

the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrants internal control

over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrants most recent

fiscal quarter (the Registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an

annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to

materially affect, the Registrants internal control over financial

reporting; and



5. The Registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrants auditors and the audit committee of the Registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or

operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably

likely to adversely affect the Registrants ability to record, process,

summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other

employees who have a significant role in the Registrants internal control

over financial reporting.



/s/ Harry Chew

Harry Chew

Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

May 26, 2006











1
#### William H. Cromwell et al., Respondents, *v.*George L. Burr, Appellant.

(Argued June 2, 1890;

decided June 10, 1890.)

Motion to dismiss an appeal from an order of the General Term of the Court of Common Pleas for the city and county of New York, made December 9, 1881, which affirmed a judgment of the General Term of the City Court of New York, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiffs entered upon a verdict.

*William J. Lynch*for motion.

*Wakemam, & Latiimg*opposed.

Agree to dismiss appeal; no opinion.

All concur.

Appeal dismissed.
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the

amended

 Annual Report on Form 10-K of Bi-Optic Ventures Inc.(the Company) for the fiscal year ended February 28, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Harry Chew, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:  February 6, 2012



/s/ Harry Chew

Harry Chew

Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and Director

(Principal Executive Officer)





1
#### KUYAN, Appellant, v. ROCKLAND LAKE TRAP ROCK CO., Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 4, 1907.)

Action by Clara Kuyan, as administratrix, etc., of Philip Kuyan, deceased, against the Rockland Lake Trap Rock Company.

No opinion. Order setting aside verdict and granting new trial affirmed, with costs.