### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 6, 200 6

NA NC I I. HOL DEN v. P AU L D . H OLD EN
Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 01 D 202 Jacqueline E. Schu lten, Judge

No. E2006-00902-COA- R3-CV- F ILED MAY 31, 2007

This is a post-divorc e ca se. Paul D. Holden ( “Husba nd”) f iled a petition ag ainst his former spouse , Na nc i I . H old e n ( “ Wif

e ” ), se e kin g to m od if

y the pa rt ie s’ re sid e nti a l par e nti ng pla n pe rt a ini ngto t

he ir minor children. Ar ound the same time, the Depa rtment of Children’s Service s (“D CS”) rec eived a n anony mous refe rra l reg ardingthe childre n’s “saf ety and possible sexual abuse” a t Wi fe’ s residenc e. The trial c ourt subsequently appointed a guardia

n ad li tem for the children. The court found, a s was rec ommended by

the guar dian ad litem, that Husband w as entitled to more pa renting time with the
c hil dr e n. Th e c ourt

a lso fo un d th a t th e re wa s n o f ound a tio n f

or the c omp la int mad e to D CS
re g ard ingthe c hil dr en. Th e co ur t or de re d H us ba

nd to p ay the fe e s o f t

he g ua rd ian a d li te m. Husband a

ppeals that orde r. We aff irm.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed; Case R em anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY and S HAR ON G. L EE , J J ., joined. Cara C. Welsh, Chattanoog a, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Paul D. Holden.

J ohn M. Hig g ason, Jr., Chattanooga , Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, N anci I . Holden.

OP IN ION

I. The pa rties wer e divorc ed in J une 2001. They have two minor children, B rian Joseph Holden and Emily Pearl Holden. At the time of the divorc e, B rian wa s seven y ear s old and Emily was e ight months old. The judg ment of di vorce desig nated W ife a s the primary residential pa

rent. I t incorporated the re sid e ntia l sc he du le s se t f or th i n th e pa

rt ie s’ pe rm ane nt p are nti ngpla n. Hu sb and ’s tim e wi th-2-

Br ian beg an eve ry

other F riday

at 6:30 p.m. and extended to 8:00 p.m. on Saturday . Due to Emily ’s ag e, Husba

nd’s time with her wa s limi ted. I t beg an at 10:00 a.m. on e very other Saturda

y and lasted until 8:00 p.m. the same da y . Husband wa s also g iven time with the children e very Tuesday from 6 : 0 0 p

. m

. u n t i l 8 : 0 0 p

. m

. T h e pa re n t i n g p l an s t at es t h at “[ s ] ai d s ch edu l e sh al l b e in cr ea s ed as age appropr iate for

the childre n upon ag ree ment of t he parties or further order of the C ourt.” The plan
a lso div ide d th e c hil dr e n’ s h oli da y sc he du le s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. Following t h e divorc e, Wife and the children c ontinued to live in Chattanooga . Husband, on the other ha

nd, moved to Calhoun, Geor g ia. He curr ently resides the re w ith his new wife a nd her two minor children. To his cr edit, the re cord r efle cts that Husband has not missed a child support pay ment since the e ntry

of the divorc e judg ment.

I n J anuar y 2002, the par

ties ag ree d that Husband would pick up both c hi ldren e very other Fr iday at 6 : 0 0 p

. m

. and re turn them on Sunday at 4:00 p.m. Wi fe a g ree d to this arrang ement be c a us e , und e r t

he or ig ina l r e sid e nti a l sc he du le , H us ba nd wa s f orce d to drive fr om C a lho un to Chattanoog a on F riday

evening to pick up Brian a nd then ag ain on Saturday morning to pick up Emily . Acc ording to H usband, the parties followed the new sc hedule until April 2004, when Wife
e le c te d to re tur

n to the sc he du le mand a te d b y the div or c e jud g me nt.

Husband filed a

petition to modi fy the permanent parenting plan on J une 3, 2004. Husba nd’s pe tit ion inc lud e d a

ne w pr op os e d plan, wh ic h g a ve him tim e wi th t

he c hil dr e n b e g inn inga t 6: 00 p. m. ever y other F riday

to Sunday

at 6:00 p.m., three wee ks during the summer, and va rious other holiday s. I n her answe r to H usband’s petition, Wife admitted that she had prev i o u s l y al lowed Husb an d to h a v e a d d it io n a l ti me w it h th e c h il dr e n b u t s tate d th a t s h e h a d r e tu r n e d to th e orig inal
sc he du le be c a

us e Hu sb and

ha d a bu se d h is e xpand e d ti me “ by dis re sp e c tin g [he r] and c ur sin g he r i n the vilest f

orms of lang uag e in the prese nce of the parties’ children.” Wife also filed a c o u n terpetition in which she reque sted, among other thi ng s, that Husband be f ound in contempt and

“ a pp ro pr ia te ly

punis he d f

or his vil e and

ob sc e ne langua g e to [h e r] i n th e pr e se nc e of the pa rt ie s’ minor children.” Sometime prior to October 2004, DCS rece ived an a nony mous refe rra l reg ardingthe living conditions at Wi fe’ s home. Acc ording to the DCS employ ee w ho investigated th e re fer ral, the anony mous c aller indicated that the house was filthy and dang erous for the childre n. Wife secur ed the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for the not es/repor t of the DCS investigator. DCS filed a motion to quash the subpoena and f or a pr otective order to prevent the disclosure of information and materia ls used in its i nvestig ation. Wife respond ed b y stating that T.C.A. § 37-1-612(h) (2005) provides that disclosure of such infor mation was allowe d “for the purpose of protecting a child or children f rom child abuse or

neg lect or c hild sex ual abuse .” Id. Wife denied that she was guilty of
su c h a bu se or ne g le c t and

argue d th a t, i f s uc h c on du c t w a s b e ingpe rp e tr a te d u po n th e c hil dr e n, it was imperative that she know the spe cifics so she c ould protect the c hildren.

The trial c ourt held a he aringon DCS’s mot i o n

. At that hear ing, H usband denie d making the anony mous refe rral to DCS . Howeve r, he “ did admit in open Court that he was a war e of the-3-

ref err al.” Ac cordingto the Statement of Eviden ce ad o p t ed by the trial cour

t, the court a dvised Hu sb and a t this hearin g that “ if

no pr oo f o r e vid e nc e wa s p ro du c e d to su sta in t he

. . . r e fe rr a l [to DCS] that [Husband] would be re sponsible for the Gua rdian Ad L item fee s.” T h e trial court ult imate ly g ra

nte d DC S’ s mot ion to qu a sh , statin g that it ha d fo un d “ no a lle g a tio ns of c hil d a bu se or neg lect or c hild sex ual abuse upon which to make a dete rm i nation as to the disclosure of any pending investigation by

[DCS ].” The cour

t also found that the appointment of a g uardia n ad litem
was a ppropriate

. The court then appointed Robin Mil ler (“ the GAL ”) a s the children’ s g uardia n ad lit e m and state d th a t the GA L wa s “to a sse ss the min or c hil dr e n’ s situ a tio n w ithre g ard to a ny c hil d abuse, ne g lect, or child sexual a buse, including discussion w ith the [DCS ] investig ator and re view of the investig ator’s f

ile as provided by

[s] tatute.”

The GA Lsubseq u en t l y s u b mitted her re port and re commendations to the trial cour t. The repor t states that, though Wife’ s home was somew hat cluttere d from re modeling pr o j ec t s , it was clea n and had a dequate play

are as, sleeping are as, cooking and eating are as, and a nice y ard f

or the children. The repor

t also provides that the GAL spoke with the DCS investigator. The GA Lnoted that it was her unde rstanding that the investig ator wa s go i n g t o report that the complaint was unfounded.

Th e GA Lre c omm e nd e d th a t th e pa rt ie s’ or ig ina l r e sid e nti a l pa re nti ngpla

n b e mod if

ie d to allow Husband additional time with children. I n particula r, the GA Lrec ommended that Husba nd have the children on the first and third we ekends of ever y month beg inning at 6:00 p.m. on Fr iday and endingat 6:00 p.m. on Sunday

. The GAL also rec ommended that Husband be g iven three wee ks of par enting time during the s ummer, one w eek at Christm as, alter nate Spring Br eaks, a

nd a division of t h e T h an k s g iving holiday that would acc ommodate family plans. The GA Lalso found that Husband’s pr oposed sche dule for othe r holiday s was re asonable

. Th e tr ia l c ourt

e nte re d a n o rd e r, wh ic h s e t f

or th t he fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s a

nd c on c lus ion s: The pa rties her ein ar e the pa

rents of the m i n o r ch ildren, B rian a nd Emily , and they

do not like eac h other;

Th e re a pp e ars no fo un datio n to the c omp la int ma de to [D CS] a g a ins t [Wife ] an d th e c os t of

the [GA L ] wil l th e refore be a sse sse d a g a ins t [H u s b an d ].

* * *

That many of the rec ommendations made by the [GAL ], who perf ormed a valuable se rvice to the Court o n b ehalf of the minor children, should be adopted a nd incorporated into the Parenting Plan. . . . (Para g raph numbe ring in orig inal omitted).T e n n . R . C iv. P . 5 4 .0 4 (2 ), w h ic h p e rm its th e c o u rt to a w a rd d isc re tio n a ry c o sts, p ro v id e s, in p e rtine n t p a rt, 1 as foll o w s:

C o st s no t i ncl ud ed i n t he b i l l of co st s p repa red b y t he cl erk are al l o wab l e o nl y i n t he

co urt ’ s d i scr et i o n. D i scr et i o nary co st s al l o wab l e are: reasonab l e an d ne c e ssary
co urt re por t er e x pen s es f or de pos i t i on s or t r i al s , r ea s on abl e an d n ec es s ar y e x per t wi t ness f

ees fo r d e p o si t i o ns (or s t i p ul at ed repo rt s) and f o r t ri al s, reas o nab l e and (c o n tinu e d ...)
-4- Husband filed a

motion to alter or amend the trial court’s order, arg uing that the court had
err ed in or dering him to pay the fe es of the G AL . Wife responde d by arguing that Husband’s motion should be denied beca

use “on the date [the GAL ] was appointed, [the trial judge ] announced in open Court that if [Husband] could not substantiate the alleg ations of abuse as to the par ties’ childre n that he would be r esponsible for the fee s of t he [ GAL ].” The trial court denied H usband’s motion. The GAL subsequently

filed a motion for the pay ment of her f

ees, a motion which documented $5,750 in fee s. The trial c ourt awa rded the GAL

a judg ment against Husband in the a mount $3,500. Husband a

ppeals this judgme nt ag ainst him.

II.

I n this no n-

jur y c a se , our sta

nd ard of re vie w i s de novo u

p o nt h e r ec o rdo f t h e p ro ce ed i n gs below; howeve r, the re cord c omes to us with a p re s u m ption of corr ectne ss as to the trial cour t’s fa c tua l f in di ngs, a p re su mpt ion

we mus t ho no r u

nle ss t he pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e is oth e rw ise

. Te nn . R. App . P. 13 (d ); Wri ght v . City of Knox v ill e , 898 S.W .2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995)

. Our re vie w of qu e sti on s o f l aw i s de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss attaching to the trial court’s c onclusions of law . Cam pbell v. Florida St

eel Corp. , 919 S.W .2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996)

.
III

. Husband’s pr imary

issue on appea l is whether or not the trial court e rre d by adjudgi ng the fee s of the GA Lag ainst him. He contends that the tr ial court should not have or dere d him to pay the fe es be cause (1) he was the “ preva iling par ty ” with re spect to his petition to modi fy the residential pa

renting plan; and (2) “ther e were no equitable considerations present in this case whic h would justify

disreg arding the g ener al rule [t hat the court should a war d discretionar

y costs to, rather than ag ainst, the “pre vailing pa rty ”].” Husband a sserts that t h e t ri al court orde red him to pay the GA L fe e s be c a

us e the c ourt be lie ve d H us ba nd wa s r e sp on sib le fo r t

he ano ny mou s r e fe rr a l to DC S
re g ard ingthe c hil dr e n’ s li vin g c on dit ion s at Wif e ’s ho me . H us ba

nd argue s th a t th is r ati on ale violates the spirit of T.C

. A. § 37-1-409 ( 2005) – i.e. , the statute that re quires re ports of suspec ted child abuse, a

nd the identity

of the re porter, to be kept conf idential in order to pr otect the c hild or
c hil dr e n a nd to e nc oura g e ind ivi du a ls to make su c h re po rt s to the a uth or iti e s. Th e se argume nts mis s the mark in this case

. Rule 54.04(2) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure specific ally includes g uardia

n ad lit e m fe e s in the c la ss o f a llo wa ble dis c re tio na

ry c os ts. Th e a sse ssm e nt o f s uc h c os ts f a lls wi thi n 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1

n ec es s ar y i n t er pr et er f ee s f or depos i t i on s or t r i al s , a n d gu ardi an ad l i t em f ees ; t r ave l

e x p e n se s a re no t allo w a b le d isc re tio n a ry c o sts. . .

. (E m p hasi s ad d ed ).
-5- the re a s o n a

b l e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u rt , w h i c h m ay a l l o c a t e t h e c o s t s b e t w e e n t h e p art i e s a s it fee ls the equities require

. Perdue v. Gree n Branch M in. C o. , 8 3 7 S

. W

. 2 d

5 6 , 6 0 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 2 )

. In revie wing the trial cour

t’s assessment of the se costs, we employ an abuse of d i s cre tion standard. M a s s . M ut
. L if eI ns. Co

. v . Jeff erson , 1 0 4 S.W .3d 13, 35 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). We c annot substitut e our judg ment for that o f t h e t ri al court. Id. A tri a l c ourt a bu se s it s d isc re tio n w he n it

“ a pp lie s an in c or

re c t le g a l st and ard , r e a c he s a de c isi on that is ill og ic a l, b a se s it s de c isi on on a c le a rl y err oneous asse ssment of t h e evidenc e, or e mploy s rea soning that cause s an injustice to the complaining party .” Id.

Th e tr ia l c ourt

he ld m ult ipl e he ari ng s in

thi s c a se . T he State me nt of Ev id ence re fl e c ts “[e]x tensive hea

ring s on the matter we re he ld on J une 7, 2005, and on J uly 27, 2005.” Howe ver, w e have no rec ord of the testimony of the witnesses at those hear ings. Whil e the Statement of Evidenc e is four page s long, it is basica lly a re citation of the proc edura l history of the c ase r ather

than a statement of the evidenc e. Be cause of the pa ucity of the re cord, w e do not know what prompted the trial court’ s decision to burden H usband with a portion of the GAL ’s fee s. I t may well have been the state me nt o f H us ba

nd in o pe n c ourt that he wa s “ awa re ” of the c omp la int to D CS. I n a ny e ve nt, the sparse rec ord bef

ore us make s it im possible for us to assess the pr opriety of the trial court’s f

ee decision. In the abse nce of the evidenc e prese nted to the trial court, we must presume that the trial court wa s prese nted with evidenc e to support its decision. See Taylor v. Allstate Ins. C o. , 158 S.W. 3d 92 9, 93 1 ( Te nn . Ct . App. 2 00 4) ; She rro d v . W ix , 849 S.W .2d 780, 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Ac cording ly , we uphold the tria l court’s a ssessment of the GA Lfee s ag ainst Husband.

I V. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med. This case is remande d to the tr i al co u rt for
e nf or c e me nt o f t

hat court ’s jud g me nt a

nd fo r c oll e c tio n o f c os ts a sse sse d b e low , a ll p ur su a nt t o applicable law. Costs on appea l are taxed to the appellant, Paul D. Holden.

_______________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE