alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Emily Vega, Appellant.

[945 NYS2d 288]—

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Colleen Duffy, J.), rendered September 20, 2010, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of attempted criminal contempt in the second degree and harassment in the second degree, and sentencing her to a conditional discharge and a fine of $125, unanimously affirmed.

The information charging defendant with harassment in the second degree was facially sufficient (CPL 100.40). The information set out that defendant approached the victim and stated, “[W]hat happened before ain’t over and I’m going to finish what I started.” The information also stated that the victim had a valid order of protection against defendant, which provided proof that “tend[ed] to support the charges” (CPL 100.15 [3]; *cf. People v Todaro,*26 NY2d 325, 329-330 [1970]).

The evidence was legally sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt of harassment in the second degree. The victim testified that defendant walked “very close” to her face, and threatened that “this wasn’t over yet,” “that it was going to get worse” and that she “was going to finish off what she had started.” The victim perceived these statements as a threat because of the way defendant said them, and because defendant had hurt her on a prior occasion *(see*Penal Law § 240.26 [1]; *compare People v Dietze,*75 NY2d 47, 53-54 [1989]). We also find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the credibility determinations of the trial court.

Defendant failed to preserve her constitutional claim that she was denied her right to the assistance of counsel when counsel’s request to make a closing argument was denied *(see People v Lane,*7 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]; *People v Kello,*96 NY2d 740, 743 [2001]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we reject it on the merits. While a defendant sentenced to a conditional discharge has the right to assistance of counsel *(Alabama v Shelton,*535 US 654, 658 [2002]), that right was not infringed in this matter. The record shows *774that counsel presented what, in effect, was a summation, in moving to dismiss the charges at the close of the People’s case and again at the close of the evidence. Counsel presented all of the arguments ultimately presented on appeal in challenging the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court, therefore, received the benefit of counsel’s distillation of the evidence and highlighting of weaknesses in the prosecution’s case *(cf. Herring v New*York, 422 US 853, 864 [1975]). Concur— Mazzarelli, J.P., Catterson, DeGrasse, Richter and ManzanetDaniels, JJ.
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-31187 Conference Calendar

__________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus HENRY LEE, SR., Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. CR-89-295-I - - - - - - - - - - April 17, 1996 Before DUHÉ, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Henry Lee, Sr., appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Lee has not identified a retroactive guideline amendment that would lower his sentencing range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Accordingly, the district court's denial of Lee's motion is AFFIRMED. AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000701345
<NAME> US AIRWAYS GROUP, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                           1,015
<SECURITIES>                                       353
<RECEIVABLES>                                      425<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0<F1>
<INVENTORY>                                        229
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,676
<PP&E>                                           7,322
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,985
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   8,541
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,511
<BONDS>                                          2,080
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           101
<OTHER-SE>                                        (433)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     8,541
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 2,098
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,237
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  57
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (175)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       (60)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (115)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                         (103)
<NET-INCOME>                                      (218)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (3.27)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (3.27)
<FN>
<F1>Receivables are presented net of allowances.
</FN>


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. §1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Vascular Solutions, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, James Hennen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify to my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  | 
| |  | 
| |  | 
| |  | 

---
**Exhibit
      32.1**


SECTION
      1350 CERTIFICATION





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Med-Emerg International Inc. (the
      "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2007 as filed with
      the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
      undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, , to the best of
      such officer’s knowledge, that:




1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.











Date:May
                15, 2007By:
            /s/
                Dr. Ramesh ZachariasDr.
                Ramesh ZachariasChief
                Executive Officer(Principal
                Executive Officer)
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 18

- 00586

- CV

Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, Province Sigma Council of Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, James Balandrán, Michael Sophir,

Clark Brown, and John Kovalan, Appellant s

v.

Sigma Alpha Epsilon, Texas Rho Corporation and Sigma Alpha Epsilon Texas Rho House Corporation, Appellee s

FROM THE 261ST DISTR ICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D

- 1

- GN

- 18

- 001839 , THE HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDG E PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

T he parties have filed a joint moti on to dismiss this appeal. We g rant the motion

and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a) (2)

.

__________________________________________ Thomas J. Baker, Justice

Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Triana

Dismissed on Joint Motion

Filed: February 6, 2019
|   | (1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  /s/      Douglas N.      Bolen                              |
| Douglas      N. Bolen                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| Chief      Executive Officer                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| March      30, 2009                                                                                                                                                                                                |
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-30504 Conference Calendar

DAVID L. DAVIES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus RICHARD EDWARDS, JR., Sheriff, Jefferson Davis Parish, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 96-CV-1603

- - - - - - - - - - June 17, 1998 Before DAVIS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * David L. Davies, Louisiana inmate #361176, appeals the district court’s dismissal, with prejudice, for frivolousness of his claims concerning unlawful detention and deprivation of property. Davies argues the following issues which were presented to the district court: the claims had not prescribed because accrual occurred within the year from the date on which he filed his suit, and the doctrine of contra non valentem agereNo. 97-30504 -2-

non currit praescripto applies to his case and prevented prescription from running. For the first time on appeal Davies argues the following: prescription cannot run against a plaintiff who is incarcerated, and his claims involve continuing torts which prevented prescription from running. We have carefully reviewed these arguments and the appellate record. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Davies’ claims are frivolous because they have prescribed. See McCormick v. Stalder , 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997). The issues raised for the first time on appeal do not amount to plain error. See Highlands Ins. v. National Union Fire Ins. , 27 F.3d 1027, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1994).
AFFIRMED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTHONY HILL,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

DOMINGO URIBE, Jr., Warden; JERRY

BROWN,

 Respondents - Appellees.

No. 11-55559

D.C. No. 3:09-cv-01327-LABCAB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 7, 2014** 

Pasadena, California

Before: THOMAS, M. SMITH, JR., and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Anthony Hill appeals from the district court’s denial of his federal

habeas petition. We remand the case for further proceedings. Because the parties

are familiar with the history of this case, we need not recount it here.

FILED

APR 15 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1. We grant Hill’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability as to

the issue of whether he is entitled to equitable tolling due to attorney abandonment. 

Because that question may involve development of the record and because the

district court has not had the opportunity to consider it fully, we remand to the

district court for its determination of the question in the first instance. 

2. Following the entry of judgment in the district court, we decided Lee

v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), which affects the principle on

which the district court based its decision. The Warden has requested that we

remand to the district court the certified issue of whether Hill’s actual innocence

claim saves his untimely federal habeas petition in light of the standards enunciated

in Lee. In Lee, we held that “where an otherwise time-barred habeas petitioner

demonstrates that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the petitioner may pass through the

Schlup [v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)] gateway and have his constitutional claims

heard on the merits.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 937. Therefore, pursuant to the Warden’s

-2-
request, we also remand the question of whether Hill’s claim of actual innocence

excuses the untimely petition under Lee.

1

 

Each party shall bear its own costs.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

1

 We note that in its December 16, 2011 order denying Hill’s motion for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, the district court acknowledged our

decision in Lee and stated that Hill’s actual innocence argument would still fail

under that case. We leave the question of whether to order additional briefing or

development of the record on this question to the district court. 

-3-
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-31253

Conference Calendar

 

RODNEY C. CURRY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DAVID M. DICKSON, Attorney at Law, Public

Defender’s Office,

Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 96-CV-3158

- - - - - - - - - -

June 18, 1997

Before SMITH, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Rodney C. Curry, Louisiana inmate #180222, appeals the

dismissal, without prejudice, as frivolous of his civil rights

complaint against his former court-appointed counsel. For the

first time on appeal, Curry argues that the defendant conspired

with individuals, acting under color of state law, to deprive him

of his constitutional rights. We have carefully reviewed the
No. 96-31253

- 2 -

appellate record. For essentially the same reasons as relied

upon by the district court by adopting the magistrate judge’s

report, see Curry v. Dickson, No. 96-3158 (E.D. La. Nov. 18,

1996), we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in dismissing the complaint as frivolous. See Denton

v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Curry’s conspiracy claim

is conclusional and thus, does not amount to plain error.

The appeal is without merit and is frivolous. See 5th Cir.

R. 42.2. Therefore, the appeal is DISMISSED. We caution Curry

that any additional frivolous appeals filed by him will invite

the imposition of sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Curry is

further cautioned to review all pending appeals to ensure that

they do not raise arguments that are frivolous because they have

been previously decided by this court.

APPEAL DISMISSED. SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 592 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 592

 To amend title 46, United States Code, to remove the cap on punitive 
 damages established by the Supreme Court in Exxon Shipping Company v. 
                                 Baker.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 16, 2011

 Mr. Whitehouse (for himself, Mr. Menendez, Mr. Sanders, Mr. Schumer, 
Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Franken, Mr. Leahy, and Mrs. Shaheen) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
           Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 46, United States Code, to remove the cap on punitive 
 damages established by the Supreme Court in Exxon Shipping Company v. 
                                 Baker.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Maritime Liability Fairness Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds that--
            (1) in the case styled Exxon Shipping Co. v Baker, 128 S. 
        Ct. 2605 (2008), the Supreme Court held that when reviewing 
        jury awards for punitive damages under maritime law, courts 
        should limit the punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio to 1:1;
            (2) in that decision, the Court conceded that discretion to 
        award punitive damages has not mass-produced runaway awards, 
        and although some studies show the dollar amounts of punitive-
        damages awards growing over time, even in real terms, by most 
        accounts the median ratio of punitive-to-compensatory awards 
        has remained less than 1:1;
            (3) district and appellate courts have the authority under 
        common law to reduce excessively large punitive awards; and
            (4) punitive damages serve to punish reckless or worse 
        behavior, deter future similar offenses, and compensate for 
        intangible injuries that would not otherwise be available to 1 
        or more plaintiffs.

SEC. 3. REMOVAL OF CAP FOR MARITIME PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

    (a) In General.--Chapter 301 of title 46, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 30107. Punitive damages in maritime law
    ``Except as otherwise provided in this title, in a civil action for 
damages arising out of a maritime tort, punitive damages may be 
assessed without regard to the amount of compensatory damages assessed 
in the action.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 301 of title 
46, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 30107. Punitive damages in maritime law.''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 13.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002






In connection with the annual report on Form 20-F/A of LiveReel Media Corporation. for the year ended June 30, 2015, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, I hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.  The annual report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2.  The information contained in the annual report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.








Date:  February 18, 2016








/s/ Ashish Kapoor


Ashish Kapoor


Principal Financial Officer











A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the registrant and will be retained by the registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON MOTION

November 7, 2008 Revision

Cause number: 01-14-00871-CV

Style: Playa Vista LP, Morgan-Multi Family LLC, and Scott Morgan

v. Lakeside Re, LP, GSRE, Inc., and Avi Ron

Date motion filed*: January 21, 2015

Type of motion: Motion to Reinstate Case and Extension of Time to File Brief

Party filing motion: Appellant

Document to be filed: Appellant’s Brief

Is appeal accelerated? No

If motion to extend time:

Original due date: December 22, 2014

Number of extensions granted: 0 Current due date: N/A

Date Requested: N/A (30 days from date of Order)

Ordered that motion is:

 Granted

If document is to be filed, document due: February 26, 2015.

 Denied

 Dismissed (e.g., want of jurisdiction, moot)

 Other: _____________________________________ 

On December 23, 2014, this Court granted appellant’s motion to stay in part and abated

the case until after a supplemental clerk’s record containing a final judgment was filed

in this Court. Although the trial clerk filed a supplemental clerk’s record containing a 

final judgment on January 6, 2015, a second supplemental clerk’s record containing 

an amended notice of hearing was just filed on January 20, 2015, as requested by 

appellees on December 23, 2014. See TEX. R. APP. P. 27.2. Accordingly, appellant’s 

motion to reinstate this case and to set appellant’s briefing deadline 30 days from the 

date of this Order is granted. See TEX. R. APP. P. 2, 38.6(a)(1).

Judge’s signature: /s/ Laura C. Higley

  

Date: January 27, 2015