Cite as 2022 Ark. 12

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

No. CR-21-17

SAMMIE L. THOMAS, JR.

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered: January 27, 2022

PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE

FAULKNER COUNTY CIRCUIT 

COURT

[NOS. 23CR-16-832; 23CR-16-834]

HONORABLE CHARLES E. 

CLAWSON, JR., JUDGE

AFFIRMED.

SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice

Sammie L. Thomas appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for 

postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal 

Procedure (2018). Thomas listed the following circuit court case numbers in the style of his 

petition for Rule 37.1 relief: 23CR-16-8321and 23CR-16-834. However, in the petition filed 

below and in his arguments on appeal, Thomas raised claims pertaining solely to his 

 

1Case number 23CR-16-832 involved Thomas’s guilty plea and conviction of 

additional offenses. As stated above, Thomas made no claims in his petition with respect to 

these convictions. However, the trial court issued a letter order that was filed on September 

22, 2020, denying Thomas’s Rule 37.1 petition with respect to convictions resulting from 

his guilty plea on the basis that the petition was untimely. While Thomas filed a separate 

notice of appeal as to this letter order, he made no argument on appeal regarding the 

timeliness of his petition in case number 23CR-16-832, and he has waived consideration of 

any claims for postconviction relief pertaining to his guilty plea in that case. Lowery v. State, 

2021 Ark. 97, 621 S.W.3d 140 (Arguments not included in the arguments on appeal are 

considered abandoned.).
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convictions for capital murder and possession of a firearm in case number 23CR-16-834.

Those claims are as follows: (1) the trial court failed to inform him of his right to file a motion 

for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and other 

postconviction remedies; (2) counsel failed to object to a defective information that allegedly

deprived him of an opportunity to raise a defense; (3) counsel failed to move for a dismissal 

of the allegedly defective information during his pretrial arraignment; (4) the Arkansas 

legislature and the Arkansas Supreme Court violated the Arkansas Constitution by enacting 

statutes and rules outlining pretrial procedures that expanded the jurisdiction of the trial 

court; (5) judicial, prosecutorial, and clerical misconduct occurred during the course of his 

trial and conviction because the deputy prosecutor was not approved by court order and did 

not have the authority to sign the criminal information.

On appeal, Thomas raises additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that 

were not raised below. We will not consider arguments that are raised for the first time on 

appeal, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 

309, 607 S.W.3d 491. With respect to the claims set forth above that have been reasserted 

on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that they lack merit.

I. Background

A Faulkner County jury convicted Thomas of capital murder for the death of Robert 

Lee Givens, and he was sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment without parole.

We affirmed. Thomas v. State, 2020 Ark. 154, 598 S.W.3d 41. The evidence adduced at trial 

demonstrated that Thomas fatally shot Givens when he pulled his vehicle alongside Givens’s 
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vehicle and fired his gun into the driver’s side, striking Givens in the head. The mandate 

was issued from the direct appeal on May 14, 2020, and Thomas filed a timely petition for 

Rule 37.1 relief on July 9, 2020. Thereafter, Thomas filed a supplemental Rule 37.1 petition 

together with multiple motions asking the trial court to consider the supplemental petition.

The trial court issued a letter order on September 24, 2020, stating that no order had been 

entered allowing Thomas to supplement his Rule 37.1 petition; consequently, the trial court 

dismissed the supplemental petition. The trial court denied Thomas’s original petition on 

the basis that it lacked merit. The trial court subsequently filed a formal order that mirrored 

the findings and conclusions set forth in the court’s letter order.

II. Standard of Review

A decision on a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37.1 will not be 

reversed unless the trial court’s ruling is clearly erroneous. Wesley v. State, 2019 Ark. 270, 

585 S.W.3d 156. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support 

it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. 

III. Strickland Standard

Our standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is the two-prong analysis set 

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Reynolds v. State, 2020 Ark. 174, 599 

S.W.3d 120. Under the Strickland standard, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the 

deficient performance prejudiced petitioner’s defense. Id. Unless a petitioner makes both 
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showings, the allegations do not meet the benchmark on review for granting relief on a claim 

of ineffective assistance. Id.

Counsel is presumed effective, and allegations without factual substantiation are 

insufficient to overcome that presumption. Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, 403 S.W.3d 

55. A petitioner has the burden of overcoming the presumption by identifying specific acts 

and omissions that, when viewed from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial, could not 

have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id.

A court need not address both components of the inquiry if the petitioner makes an 

insufficient showing on one. Williams v. State, 2019 Ark. 289, 586 S.W.3d 148. To 

demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Id.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome 

of the trial. Id. Conclusory statements that counsel was ineffective cannot be the basis for 

postconviction relief. Id.

IV. Claims Raised in Rule 37.1 Petition

In his first claim for relief, Thomas contends that the trial court failed to advise him 

of either his right to file a motion for a new trial pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 33.3 (2018) or his other postconviction rights. Thomas provides no authority for 

the proposition that a trial court has a duty to provide legal advice to defendants on matters 

that do not involve constitutional rights. This court does not address arguments that are not 

supported by authority or convincing argument. Rayford v. State, 2020 Ark. 299.
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For his second claim, Thomas contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the information and amended information filed in his case. According to Thomas,

the allegedly defective information deprived him of the opportunity to formulate a defense.

Specifically, Thomas alleged that the information failed to set forth a “mens rea” or an “actus 

reus” for the charge of capital murder and that the information failed to set forth an 

“essential element” of the charge for possession of a firearm. The record demonstrates that 

the State amended the information on three occasions and filed the final amended 

information in September 2018, shortly before Thomas’s trial. The original information and 

the three amended informations charged Thomas with capital murder and possession of a 

firearm.

A criminal information is sufficient if it names the defendant, the offense charged, 

the statute under which the charge was made, the court, and the county where the alleged 

offense was committed, and, if it sets forth the principal language of the statute and the 

asserted facts constituting the offense. Collier v. Kelley, 2020 Ark. 77, 594 S.W.3d 50. The 

final amended information named Thomas as the defendant being charged with capital 

murder pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-101 and that the offense 

occurred in Faulkner County. The information tracks the statutory language by alleging that 

Thomas purposely discharged a firearm from a vehicle at another vehicle that was occupied, 

causing the death of another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference 

to the value of human life. The amended information further charged Thomas with violating 

Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-103 by possessing a firearm after being convicted of 
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a prior violent felony and involving the commission of another crime. In addition, the

information sets forth the principal language of section 5-73-103 and designates the location

of the offense. Thomas does not describe which possession-of-a-firearm element is missing 

from the original information or the subsequent amended informations. In sum, Thomas 

has failed to demonstrate that the amended information was defective.

Thomas complains that his counsel failed to move for a dismissal of the information 

and allowed Thomas’s criminal case to move forward for two years without notice of the 

exact nature of the charges against him. The record demonstrates that prior informations 

filed in 2016 had charged Thomas with capital murder in furtherance of a felony, but as 

described above, the 2018 amended information properly described the manner in which 

the capital-murder offense was committed. To the extent that Thomas alleges that counsel 

was ineffective by failing to object to and quash the amended information due to the change 

in the description of the manner in which the crime was committed, he is mistaken.

It is well settled that a felony information may be amended by permission of the trial 

court up to a certain point after the jury has been sworn, but before the case has been 

submitted to it, as long as the amendment does not change the nature of the crime charged 

or create an unfair surprise for the defendant. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-85-407 (Repl. 2005); 

Glaze v. State, 2011 Ark. 464, 385 S.W.3d 203 (citing Baumgarner v. State, 316 Ark. 373, 872 

S.W.2d 380 (1994)). Here, the amended information provided Thomas with sufficient 

notice of the charges against him, and the amendment did not change the nature and degree 

of the offense or create unfair surprise. Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 918 S.W.2d 114 (1996)
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(Pretrial amendment of an information that charged capital murder on the basis of felony 

murder to add the charge of capital murder on the basis of premeditated and deliberated 

purpose does not change the nature of the crime charged.); see also Baumgarner, 316 Ark. 

373, 872 S.W.2d 380 (It was not error to allow State to add an allegation to a kidnapping 

charge that the crime was committed for purpose of terrorizing another.).

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the amended information and for 

failing to move for its dismissal. It is not ineffective assistance of counsel if counsel fails to 

file a motion that would not be meritorious. Rayburn v. State, 2021 Ark. 98, 622 S.W.3d 155.

Furthermore, the record shows that a probable-cause affidavit was filed in the Faulkner 

County Circuit Court in connection with Thomas’s arrest warrant, and the affidavit set forth 

the particulars of the offense with which Thomas was being charged. There is no evidence 

that Thomas was surprised by facts alleged in the amended information. Thomas did not 

meet his burden of stating facts to affirmatively support his allegation that the inconsistencies 

in the amended information regarding the manner in which the offense was committed 

prejudiced his defense under the standard set forth in Strickland. See Carter v. State, 2015 Ark. 

166, 460 S.W.3d 781. In sum, Thomas failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s performance 

was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Reynolds, 2020 Ark. 

174, 599 S.W.3d 120.

Thomas’s fourth claim for relief involves conclusory allegations that the Arkansas 

legislature and this court violated the Arkansas Constitution by enacting Arkansas Code 

Annotated section 16-81-104(a)(3) (Repl. 2005) and Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 
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1.6 (2018). Section 16-81-104(a)(3) provides the prosecuting attorney with the authority to 

file an information charging a person with the commission of an offense. Rule 1.6(b)(i) of 

the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure defines “prosecuting attorney” as including 

deputies or assistants. According to Thomas, both the statute and the rule “modify the 

procedural substantive due process and equal protection of law and the right to a fair and 

impartial jury.” Thomas fails to present any authority or factual support for his claim that 

the above-cited statute and criminal procedural rule violate the Arkansas Constitution or 

prevent defendants from receiving fair trials. This court will not consider an argument not 

supported by any legal authority. Brown v. State, 2021 Ark. 16, 614 S.W.3d 820. A conclusory 

claim without factual substantiation will not support a basis for postconviction relief. Dennis 

v. State, 2020 Ark. 28, 592 S.W.3d 646.

Thomas’s final argument on appeal is that the deputy prosecutor was not sworn in by 

the court and did not have authority to sign the information. Thomas provides no factual 

support that the deputy prosecutor was not properly authorized by the court or by the senior 

prosecutor. It is well settled that a deputy prosecutor is authorized to sign an information on 

behalf of the prosecutor. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-21-113 (Repl. 1999); see also State v. Eason, 

200 Ark. 1112, 143 S.W.2d 22 (1940) (There is a presumption that a deputy prosecuting 

attorney acts under the direction of his superior, and until there is failure of the prosecuting 

attorney to affirm, the information is sufficient to bring the defendant before the court; in 

consequence, such court acquires jurisdiction.).

Affirmed.
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Sammie L. Thomas, Jr., pro se appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Jacob H. Jones, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.