J-S78041-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF G.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: W.S., FATHER

No. 824 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order May 12, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Domestic Relations

at No(s): No. 189 of 2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD,*J.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED DECEMBER 19, 2016

W.S. (“Father”) appeals from the order of the Erie County Court of 

Common Pleas that directed the Office of Children and Youth (“OCY”) to 

discontinue services and visitation regarding his dependent, non-biological 

child, G.S. (“Child”).1 Father claims the trial court erred when it suspended 

services and visitation pending the results of a paternity test and found the 

concurrent permanency goals of reunification and adoption were no longer 

feasible. We affirm.

On August 6, 2015, OCY obtained an emergency protective order to 

ensure Child’s safety after Child’s mother (“Mother”) was admitted to a 

hospital for a report of chest pain. Child was with Mother at the time, and 

they were homeless. OCY learned of Mother’s mental health problems, 

history of substance abuse, unstable housing, and lack of necessities for 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Child was born in June of 2012.
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Child. Father was not known to OCY at the time and Mother refused to 

cooperate with OCY. Child was placed in the legal and physical custody of 

OCY. 

OCY filed a dependency petition on August 10, 2015, which listed 

Mother as the only parent. On August 14, 2015, OCY amended its petition 

to include Father. As to Father, OCY alleged he was not an active caregiver 

for Child, might not be Child’s biological parent, and was the subject of a 

protection from abuse (“PFA”) order for multiple domestic violence incidents 

against Mother. At least one of the domestic violence incidents occurred in 

the presence of Child.2 

At an August 18, 2015 adjudication hearing before a master, the 

parties agreed to amend the dependency petition to reflect that Father and 

Mother married in May of 2012—approximately one month before Child’s 

birth—and Father participated in the upbringing of Child until he and Mother 

separated in April of 2015. At the hearing, Mother asserted Child’s biological 

father was E.A. OCY requested paternity testing, but Father objected based 

on estoppel. The master concluded paternity testing was not required at 

that time and found Child dependent. The trial court adopted the master’s 

recommendations on August 21, 2015. 

 

2

Father later acknowledged that Child was present when he punched Mother 

in the head multiple times after Mother blamed him for damage to the car. 

See Addendum to Psychological Evaluation, 12/10/15, at 5. 
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Following a permanency review hearing on September 16, 2015, the 

trial court entered a dispositional order on September 22, 2015. The court 

indicated the current placement goal for Child was “return to parent or 

guardian.” Order, 9/22/15, at 2. The court ordered Father to (1) cooperate 

with OCY, (2) attend and complete a domestic violence/anger management 

program, (3) provide for the health and safety of Child during visitation, (4) 

alternate attendance at Child’s medical appointments with Child’s mother, 

and (5) demonstrate an understanding of the information provided by 

healthcare professionals.3 Id. The court directed Father to undergo a 

psychological assessment. Id.

On December 16, 2015, the trial court convened a permanency review 

hearing. OCY called Dr. Peter von Korff to testify regarding his psychological 

evaluations of Father. According to Dr. von Korff, Father exhibited a 

schizotypal personality disorder that affected his ability to care for Child4and 

 

3 We note that there was an issue regarding Mother and Father’s consent to 

vaccinate Child. Mother was willing to have some vaccinations administered. 

Father asserted a religious belief arguing Child was not an “animal.” 

4 Specifically, Dr. von Korrf opined: 

The present assessment indicates that [Father] has a 

number of deficits that draw into question his ability to 

function as an independent caregiver to [Child]. From a 

diagnostic perspective he would appear to present with 

chronic personality and socialization problems that best fit 

the pattern of Schizotypal Personality Disorder. From an 

attachment perspective he presents with a preoccupied 

state of mind, so that despite his valuing of relationships
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would need an anger management program, as well as years of individual 

mental health treatment, before he could safely parent Child.5 See N.T. 

12/16/15, at 19-21. The doctor noted that Father did not acknowledge 

having mental health issues or a need for treatment. Id. at 11. 

Mother maintained that E.A. was Child’s biological father. Id. at 70. 

Mother acknowledged that in November 2015, one month before the 

hearing, she attempted to reconcile with Father and withdraw or amend the 

PFA to permit them to seek counseling. Id. at 71-72. She testified she and 

Father had at least one counseling session, but she did “not intend to stay 

 

he is unprepared at this point in time to develop secure 

attachments with his significant others, including [Child]. . 

. . 

It is the writer’s opinion that if [Father] were to resume 

a primary parental role with [Child] that he would need 

ongoing individual counseling and parent-child attachment 

oriented psychotherapy. . . . [Father] has a degree of 

extended family support, however his own interpersonal 

adjustment and parenting skills are currently insufficient 

for the task of managing [Child’s] developmental 

requirements. . . .

Psychological Evaluation, 11/19/15, at 14.

5

In an addendum report, Doctor Kroff asserted an additional interview with 

Father indicated “very significant problems” with anger management. 

Addendum to the Psychological Evaluation, 12/10/15, at 6. According to the 

doctor, Father “gave little thought to the impact of his behavior upon 

[Child]” when discussing the incidents of domestic abuse against Mother. 

Id. The doctor concluded that “the anger interview with [Father] raised

serious concerns about his suitability as a primary caregiver for [Child].” Id.

at 7.
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married” to Father. Id. at 72. Mother asserted a PFA was not necessary. 

Id. 

OCY’s counsel informed the trial court that Father was excluded as 

Child’s biological Father at a prior support proceeding, but was found to be 

Child’s legal parent. Id. at 54. Father’s counsel averred she was unaware 

of a prior paternity test. Id. at 82. 

OCY requested the addition of a concurrent goal of adoption. OCY 

further requested Father receive no services. Father’s counsel objected to 

the cessation of visitation. 

On December 29, 2015, the trial court entered its permanency review 

order. The court permitted Father one supervised visit with Child and 

granted OCY’s request to add the concurrent goal of adoption. The court did 

not order services for Father, but directed the parties to address whether a 

paternity test was performed and whether it was in Child’s best interest to 

continue providing services to Father. See Order, 12/29/15, at 2-3.

At the permanency review hearing on February 1, 2016, the trial court 

indicated DNA testing confirmed that Father was not Child’s biological 

parent. N.T., 2/1/16, at 3. OCY again requested cessation of services to 

Father, arguing that it did “not want to look at [Father] as a resource” 

because he was not a natural parent, he exposed Child to domestic violence, 

and he continued to have serious mental health issues that remained 

untreated. Id. at 5. OCY and Child’s guardian ad litem asserted it would be 
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in Child’s best interest to discontinue Father’s visitation. Id. at 5, 9. 

Father’s counsel requested a bonding assessment. Id. at 11-12. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court questioned Father. Father denied 

having mental health issues and requested a new mental health evaluation. 

Id. at 24, 26. The court denied the request for an independent mental 

health evaluation. Id. at 27.

The trial court entered its permanency review order on February 11, 

2016. The court directed OCY to discontinue services to Father until a 

bonding assessment was completed. Order, 2/11/16, at 3. However, the 

goal of reunification concurrent with adoption remained unchanged. See id.

at 1-2. The court indicated Father made “moderate progress” toward 

alleviating the circumstances necessitating placement. Id. at 1. 

The trial court held a permanency review hearing on May 11, 2016.6 

Father was not present, but was represented by counsel. The court noted 

E.A. was determined to be the biological father of Child, but was not present 

for the hearing. N.T., 5/11/16, at 2. OCY asserted it was exploring kinship 

care out-of-state with E.A.’s family. Id. at 10. OCY requested to have 

 

6 The hearing was initially scheduled for April of 2016, but was continued on 

Father’s counsel’s request.
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Father “removed from the case” and asserted it would pursue termination of 

his rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(3).7 

Dr. von Korff’s bonding assessment was made part of the record of the 

May 11, 2016 hearing without objection or additional testimony from the 

doctor, who was present at the hearing.8 Id. at 3. 

In his report, Dr. von Korff opined:

The assessment evidenced a tenuous and troubled 

attachment between [Father] and [Child]. Observations 

obtained in the office setting were consistent with an 

insecure attachment. [Child’s] preference was for 

independent play. She used [Father] mainly as a 

facilitator, a companion, and admirer, and a provider. 

There was generally little eye contact and very little sense 

of developing shared ideas. His departure from the room 

and his subsequent return did nothing to alter [Child’s] 

pattern of behavior. [Child] simply carried on with her 

independent play interests. 

A mixture of affectionate feeling, emotional strain and 

remoteness was observed. Examples of confusion and 

uncertainty in the emotional relationship included the 

contrast between [Child’s] very slow warming to [Father] 

and her tearful request to go with him at the close of the 

meeting.

A comparison between the video clips [of Father’s 

interactions with Child before the adjudication of 

dependency] and the observed behavior in the session 

revealed a very noteworthy degradation of the father-

 

7 Section 2511(a)(3) permits the termination of the rights of a parent on the 

grounds that “[t]he parent is the presumptive but not the natural father of 

the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(3). OCY filed a petition to terminate 

Father’s parental rights while this appeal was pending. 

8 Dr. von Korff was available for examination, but was not called to testify by 

any of the parties.
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daughter relationship. It was clear that extended 

separation has had an obstructive impact on their way of 

being together. Remnants of a more affectionate 

relationship survive despite their being apart, but the 

quality of relaxed and joyful association observed in the 

videos was never present during the office visit. 

The writer’s observations suggested that a sub-optimal 

and insecure early attachment relationship between parent 

and child has been significantly degraded by their 

protracted separation. The examiner would urge that 

every effort be made to provide [Child] with attachment 

permanency as soon as possible. 

Bonding Assessment, 3/23/16, at 7-8. 

The trial court entered its permanency review order on May 12, 2016, 

indicating Father was noncompliant and made no progress in alleviating the 

problems that necessitated the original placement. Order, 5/12/16, at 1. 

The court discontinued OCY’s services to Father. Id. at 2. Child’s goal, 

however, remained reunification concurrent with adoption. Id. at 1-2. 

On May 13, 2016, Father’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw the May 

12th order and reopen the record based on Father’s nonattendance at the 

May 11th hearing. The court denied the motion. The court emphasized Dr. 

von Korff was available for examination at the May 11th hearing and the 

doctor’s bonding assessment was made part of the record without objection. 

On June 8, 2016, Father timely filed his notice of appeal and statement 

of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a responsive opinion, 

suggesting that Father’s procedural defaults precluded review, but also 
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indicating that it found Father was an inappropriate resource for placement 

planning based on Dr. von Korff’s testimony. 

Father presents the following questions for our review:

Whether the [trial] court committed an abuse of discretion 

and/or error of law when it determined that services 

and/or visitation should cease between [Father] and 

[Child] following the permanency review hearing on 

December 16, 2015, pending the results of a paternity test 

for [Father].

Whether the [trial court] committed an abuse of discretion 

and/or error of law when it determined that the concurrent 

permanency goal of reunification/adoption was no longer 

feasible, dispensed with the current goal of reunification 

after only nine (9) months and directed [OCY] to provide 

no further services to [Father] or provide visitation with 

[Child].

Father’s Brief at 2 (some capitalization removed).9

Preliminarily, we must address whether we have jurisdiction over this 

appeal. See Mensch v. Mensch, 713 A.2d 690, 691 (Pa. Super. 1998). 

Both the trial court and OCY suggest that Father’s appeal should be quashed 

because the appeal is either untimely or interlocutory. Specifically, they 

assert Father should have appealed the December 29, 2015 order adding the 

concurrent goal of adoption, and the May 12, 2016 order directing the 

 

9 OCY notes Father’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement included a claim that the 

trial court erred in refusing to reopen the May 11th hearing due to Father’s 

nonattendance. Father’s brief does not address this issue in any meaningful 

fashion. Accordingly, we conclude Father has abandoned any issue arising 

from his failure to appear at the May 11th hearing. See In re W.H., 25 

A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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cessation of services and visitation was interlocutory and not appealable.10 

We disagree. 

It is well settled that jurisdictional issues, such as the appealability of 

an order, raise legal question over which our review is de novo and plenary, 

and which may be considered sua sponte. See id. This Court has held that 

an order suspending visitation is final and appealable. See In re C.B., 861 

A.2d 287, 289 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2004). Moreover, Pennsylvania courts hold 

that an order granting or denying a goal change, even if it maintains the 

status quo, is appealable. See In re H.S.W.C.-B, 836 A.2d 908, 909 (Pa. 

2003); In re C.M., 882 A.2d 507, 513 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

Instantly, the December 29, 2015 order initially added a goal of 

adoption concurrent with reunification and permitted Father one supervised 

visit. However, the trial court scheduled a further permanency review, at 

which the parties were to address whether it was in Child’s best interest for 

Father to receive services. Accordingly, the December 29th order was not a 

final determination that Father was an inappropriate resource for services 

and/or reunification. 

In contrast, the May 12, 2016 order purported to end Father’s services 

and visitation, even as the order maintained the concurrent goals of 

reunification and adoption. The May 12th order, in effect, determined Father 

 

10 OCY filed a separate motion in this Court to quash the appeal on the 

above-stated grounds. 
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was not a viable resource in the goal of reunification and granted OCY’s 

request to “remove him” from the dependency proceedings while OCY took 

steps to terminate his parental rights. Accordingly, we deem the order of 

May 12, 2016 to be final and appealable. In re H.S.W.C.-B, 836 A.2d at 

909; In re C.M., 882 A.2d at 513; In re C.B., 861 A.2d at 289 n.1.

Father first argues that it was not in Child’s best interests to cease 

services and visitation and there was no indication he posed a grave threat 

to Child. He contends that he has held himself out as Child’s father, Child 

knows and accepts him as her father, he was Child’s legal father for the 

purposes of support, and Child and Father share a loving bond.11 Father’s 

Brief at 11-13. Second, Father argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it determined the permanency goal of reunification 

concurrent with adoption was “no longer feasible.” Id. at 13. He claims 

that he was making progress toward achieving reunification and the court’s 

finding, as memorialized in the May 12, 2016 order, that he was 

noncompliant and made no progress toward reunification lacked support in 

the record. Id. at 13. Father observes that OCY filed a petition to terminate 

 

11 We note that Father challenges the trial court’s decision to “put on hold” 

his services and visitation in the December 16, 2015 permanency review 

hearing. Father’s arguments with respect to the December 16, 2015 order 

are either waived due to his failure to timely appeal that order or meritless 

in light of the provisional nature of that order. However, given the practical 

effects of the May 12, 2016 permanency review order, we will consider the 

trial court’s ruling to terminate Father’s services and visitation.
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his parental rights and requests that we direct the withdrawal of the petition. 

Id. at 15. We address these claims jointly.

The following standards govern our review: 

When reviewing [the trial] court’s order in a case involving 

a minor child, we review for an abuse of discretion with a 

focus on the best interests of the child; an abuse of 

discretion “is more than just an error in judgment . . . 

[the trial court] will not be found to have abused its 

discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment 

exercised was manifestly unreasonable or the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.”

In re M.B., 869 A.2d 542, 546 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). 

In dependency proceedings our scope of review is broad. 

Nevertheless, we will accept those factual findings of the 

trial court that are supported by the record because the 

trial judge is in the best position to observe the witnesses 

and evaluate their credibility. We accord great weight to 

the trial judge’s credibility determinations. Although 

bound by the facts, we are not bound by the trial court’s 

inferences, deductions, and conclusions therefrom; we 

must exercise our independent judgment in reviewing the 

court’s determination, as opposed to its findings of fact, 

and must order whatever right and justice dictate.

In re C.B., 861 A.2d at 294 (citation omitted). 

This Court has noted:

Placement of and custody issues pertaining to 

dependent children are controlled by the Juvenile Act,[ ]

which was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal 

Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”).[ ] The policy 

underlying these statutes is to prevent children from 

languishing indefinitely in foster care, with its inherent lack 

of permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental 

commitment. Consistent with this underlying policy, the 

1998 amendments to the Juvenile Act, as required by the 

ASFA, place the focus of dependency proceedings, 

including change of goal proceedings, on the child. Safety, 
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permanency, and well-being of the child must take 

precedence over all other considerations, including the 

rights of the parents.

At each review hearing for a dependent child who has 

been removed from the parental home, the court must 

consider the following, statutorily-mandated factors:

the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of 

the placement; the extent of compliance with the 

service plan developed for the child; the extent of 

progress made towards alleviating the circumstances 

which necessitated the original placement; the 

appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child; and, a likely date by 

which the goal for the child might be achieved.

Matters of custody and placement for a dependent child 

must be decided under the standard of the child’s best 

interests, not those of his or her parents.

When the child welfare agency has made reasonable 

efforts to return a foster child to his or her biological 

parent, but those efforts have failed, then the agency must 

redirect its efforts towards placing the child in an adoptive 

home. This Court has held that the placement process 

should be completed within 18 months. As this Court has 

stated previously,

Pennsylvania . . . [is] required to return the child to 

[his or her] home following foster placement, but 

failing to accomplish this due to the failure of the 

parent to benefit by . . . reasonable efforts, [the 

Commonwealth is then required] to move toward 

termination of parental rights and placement of the 

child through adoption. . . . [W]hen a child is placed 

in foster care, after reasonable efforts have been 

made to reestablish the biological relationship,[12]the 

 

12 The Juvenile Act traditionally focused on consanguinity or a formal legal 

relationship. Cf. In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 619 (Pa. 1983) (plurality) 

(noting “[t]here is no indication that the legislature intended ‘parents’ to 

include anything other than natural, blood relationship parents, and adoptive 
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needs and welfare of the child require [the child 

welfare agency] and foster care institutions to work 

toward termination of parental rights, placing the 

child with adoptive parents. 

In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 823-24 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted).

The record reveals that at the December 11, 2015 hearing, the trial 

court initially expressed concerns about providing services to Father because 

he was not a natural parent. However, the court found Dr. von Korff’s 

psychological assessment of Father’s mental health issues and his need for 

treatment credible. The court also determined that there was “not a strong 

bond between [Father] and [C]hild, and that [Father] needed a lengthy 

amount of time to stabilize his own behavior.” See Trial Ct. Op., 7/18/16, at 

19. The court concluded that Child “needed permanency and stability and, 

because of her young and vulnerable age, waiting for [Father] to stabilize 

 

parents . . . .”); Ellerbe v. Hooks, 416 A.2d 512, 514-515 (Pa. 1980) 

(noting “the blood relationship of parenthood has traditionally served and 

continues to serve as our society’s fundamental criterion for allocating 

control over and responsibility for our children . . . ”). However, the doctrine 

of in loco parentis applies

to a person who puts oneself in the situation of a lawful 

parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental 

relationship without going through the formality of a legal 

adoption. The status of in loco parentis embodies two 

ideas; first, the assumption of a parental status, and, 

second, the discharge of parental duties. The rights and 

liabilities arising out of an in loco parentis relationship are, 

as the words imply, exactly the same as between parent 

and child.

In re C.B., 861 A.2d at 296 (citation omitted).
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and also create a meaningful bond with her was not in her best interest.” 

Id.

We find adequate support for the trial court’s decision to cease 

services and visitation based on its findings that Father was not a viable 

resource in placement planning for Child. The court considered and found 

credible the record evidence that Father was unable to parent Child on his 

own and would not be able to do so without years of treatment. Mother no 

longer wished to reconcile with Father. Lastly, although Father made some 

progress to the goal of reunification by complying with visitation and 

undergoing a mental health evaluation, Father consistently denied the need 

for further mental health treatment.13 

Moreover, although only nine months passed between Child’s removal 

from Mother’s custody and the trial court’s May 2016 decision to stop 

services and visitation, the trial court appropriately focused on Child’s best 

interests rather than Father’s parental rights. See In re N.C., 909 A.2d at 

823-24. 

 

13 We note the trial court asserts Father waived any objection to its finding 

that he was noncompliant and failed to make progress. See Trial Ct. Op. at 

17. At the May 11, 2016, hearing the trial court summarized OCY’s request 

to terminate services as follows: “But for the purposes of dependency, your 

argument is that it’s not in the best interest for [Child] to view [Father] as 

either a father or a reunification resource, which is also generated by the 

fact he’s noncompliant.” N.T., 5/11/16, at 3. Thus, the court did not make 

a finding of fact and we disagree with its suggestion that Father’s failure to 

object should result in waiver. 
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Thus, we decline to disturb the order of the trial court directing OCY to 

cease services and visitation to Father and file a petition to terminate 

Father’s parental rights. 

Order affirmed. OCY’s motion to quash denied. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/19/2016