[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Buddenberg v. Weisdack , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3832.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -3832
B UDDENBERG v. W EISDACK ET AL
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Buddenberg v. Weisdack , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3832.]
Civil actions—Civil cause of action pursuant to R.C. 2307.60 for injuries based on a criminal act does not require an underlying criminal conviction— Criminal conviction for intimidation is not a condition precedent to civil claim pursuant to R.C. 2921.03(C). (No. 2018-1209—Submitted Novemb er 13, 2019—Decided July 29, 202 0.)
O N O RDER from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, Certifying Que stions of State Law, No. 1:18-c v-00522-DAP.

_____________________ O’C ONNOR , C.J. {¶ 1} This case is before us on the ce rtification of state-law questi ons by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. The federal court asks that we answer the following questions:S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 1. Does [R.C.] 2307.60’s creation of a civil cause of action for injuries based on a “criminal act” require an underlying cr iminal
conviction? 2. Is a criminal conviction a condition precedent to a civil claim pursuant to [R.C.] 2921.03?

{¶ 2} We answer the certified state-l aw questions in the negative. Relevant Background {¶ 3} The federal court provided the following facts and allegations from which the questions of law arise. Respondent, Rebecca Buddenbe rg, is the plaintiff in the underlying action filed in the United States District Co urt for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Divi sion. She brought a civil-rights action pursuant to federal and Ohio anti-discrimination laws against the petitione rs here, including: her former employer, the Geauga County Health District; her for mer supervisor, Geauga County Health Commissioner Robert K. Weisdack; the Geaug a County Health District’s attorney, James Budzik; and certain members o f the Geauga County Board of Health. {¶ 4} Relevant here, Buddenberg’s comp laint asserts claims for civil liability pursuant to R.C. 2307.60 for alleged violations of th ree criminal statutes: R.C. 2921.05 (retaliation); R.C. 2921.03 (intimidation); and R. C. 2921.45 (interfering with civil rights). The relevant defendants moved to dismiss those claims, arguing that Buddenber g cannot state a claim for relief because none of the defendants were convicted of the underlying criminal offenses. The federal court
denied the motions to dismiss without prejudice, “finding no cl ear authority on
whether a conviction is a cond ition precedent to civil liabilit y pursuant to [R.C.]
2307.60.”January Term, 2020

3 The State Law Questions {¶ 5} Following the denial of their motion to dismiss, the petitioner s moved to certify state-law questions to this court. The federal cour t certified the following questions:

1. Does [R.C.] 2307.60’s creation of a civil cause of action for injuries based on a “criminal act” require an underlying cr iminal
conviction? 2. Is a criminal conviction a condition precedent to a civil claim pursuant to [R.C.] 2921.03?

We agreed to answer the questions. 153 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2018-O hio-4288, 109
N.E.3d 1259. Analysis Does R.C. 2307.60 require an underlying criminal conviction? {¶ 6} In its decision certifying the questions, the federal court not ed that this court recently held that R.C . 2307.60 “independently authorizes a civil action for damages caused by criminal acts.” See Jacobson v. Kaforey , 149 Ohio St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio-8434, 75 N.E.3d 203. The federal court recognized, h owever, that
Jacobson left unanswered what a plaintiff must do to prove a claim unde r R.C. 2307.60. We are now presented the opportunity to answer whethe r a plaintiff must prove the existence of an underlying criminal conviction to sup port his or her claim for civil liability under R.C. 2307.60. {¶ 7} R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) states:

Anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, and may recover full damages i n, a civil action unless specific ally excepted by law, may recover the costs of maintaining the civilS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 action and attorney’s fees if aut horized by any provision of th e Rules
of Civil Procedure or another s ection of the Revised Code or un der the common law of this state, and may recover punitive or exemplary damages if authorized by section 2315.21 or another
section of the Revised Code.

(Emphasis added.) {¶ 8} Petitioners argue that a plain reading of the statute shows tha t the General Assembly intended for there to be an underlying convict ion before civil liability could be imposed. Petitioners also argue that the re quirement of an underlying conviction in R.C. 2307.60 is supported by a review of the legislative history. {¶ 9} Buddenberg counters that the sta tute predicates civil liability on a “criminal act” rather than a “c onviction” and that the plain me aning of those terms is distinct. Buddenberg also argues that the absence of a conv iction requirement is supported by the statute’s stru cture, history, and purpose. {¶ 10} When a court interprets the meanin g of a statute, “[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage,” R.C. 1.42, and the court must give effect to all of the statute’s words, Bryan v. Hudson , 77 Ohio St.3d 376, 380, 674 N.E.2d 678 (1997). “If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary.” State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996). Additionally, a court must give effect “ ‘ “to the natural and most obvious import of [a statute’s] language, without resorting to subtle and forc ed constructions.” ’ ” Lancaster v. Fairfield Cty. Budget Comm ., 83 Ohio St.3d 242, 244, 699 N.E.2d 473 (1998), quoting Slingluff v. Weaver , 66 Ohio St. 621, 627, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), quoting McCluskey v. Cromwell , 11 N.Y. 593, 601 (1854); see also OhioJanuary Term, 2020

5 Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott , 139 Ohio St.3d 536, 2014-Ohio-2440, 13 N.E.3d 1115, ¶ 22. {¶ 11} We agree with Buddenberg that the plain language of the statute does not require proof of an unde rlying criminal conviction. {¶ 12} First, the word “conviction” is noticeably absent from R.C. 2307.60(A)(1). That subdivision states that “[a]nyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, and may recover full dama ges in, a civil action unless specifically excepted by law * * *.” (Emphasis added.) Id . Petitioners argue that the use of the word “criminal” indicates the General Assembly i ntended that there must be an underlying conviction before an individual may recov er damages. They argue that “for a crime to ha ve been committed there must neces sarily be a conviction.” Petitioners also poi nt to the definition of “crim inal act” as an “unlawful act that subjects the actor to prosecution under crim inal law.” Black’s Law Dictionary 30 (10th Ed.2014). {¶ 13} But crimes can be committed wit hout a conviction. They often a re. The fact that a person’s actions subject him or her to prosecut ion in no way
establishes that he or she will in fact be prosecuted. And being subjected to prosecution, as mentioned in the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary , does not mean a conviction necessarily results. It is certainly possibl e for an individual to commit an unlawful act and be pro secuted, yet evade conviction for a variety of reasons. Thus, we do not read the phrase “a criminal act” to m ean “a criminal act
that resulted in a conviction.” {¶ 14} Second, reading a conviction re quirement into R.C. 2307.60(A)(1 ) renders R.C. 2307.60(A)(2) supe rfluous. R.C. 2307.60(A)(2) pro vides:

A final judgment of a trial court that has not been reversed on appeal or otherwise set aside, nullified, or vacated, entere d after a trial or upon a plea of guilty, but not upon a plea of no con test orS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 the equivalent plea from anothe r jurisdiction, that adjudges an offender guilty of an offense of violence punishable by death o r imprisonment in excess of one year, when entered as evidence in any subsequent civil proceeding based on the criminal act, shal l preclude the offender from deny ing in the subsequent civil proceeding any fact essential to sustaining that judgment, unle ss the offender can demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances prevented the offender from having a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the criminal proceeding or other extraord inary circumstances justify affording the offender an opportunity to relitigate the issue. The offender may introduce evidence of t he offender’s pending appeal of the final judgment of the trial co urt, if applicable, and the court may consider that evidence in determi ning the liability of the offender.

This language establishes that a final judgment of guilt as des cribed in the statute may provide a rebuttable evidentiary presumption. But if an un derlying conviction
was the only basis on which civil liability could be established for a “cri minal act,” there would be no need to carve out a presumption for evidence of a conviction. In other words, R.C. 2307.60(A)(2) pe rmits the use of a conviction as evidence, but does not require it. Is a criminal conviction a condition precedent to a civil claim pursuant to
R.C. 2921.03? {¶ 15} R.C. 2921.03(A) describes the ele ments required for the crimina l offense of intimidation, a third-degree felony. R.C. 2921.03(C ) provides:

A person who violates this sec tion is liable in a civil action to any person harmed by the violation for injury, death, or los s toJanuary Term, 2020

7 person or property incurred as a result of the commission of th e offense and for reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, and ot her expenses incurred as a result of prosecuting the civil action
commenced under this division. A civil action under this divisi on is not the exclusive remedy of a person who incurs injury, death, or loss to person or property as a res ult of a violation of this s ection.

{¶ 16} Petitioners argue that the plai n language of R.C. 2921.03(C) ma kes a criminal conviction a prerequi site for civil liability becaus e “[t]he only way to have a criminal violation and a committed offense is through a conviction.” Petitioners also argue that other uses of the word “offense” in the Revised Code require an underlying conviction. {¶ 17} Buddenberg counters that the text and the structure of the stat ute do
not demonstrate that the General Assembly intended for a convic tion to be a prerequisite to civil liability and that the legislative histor y and purpose support
such a conclusion. {¶ 18} For similar reasons as those discussed above with respect to th e language in R.C. 2307.60, we conc lude that civil liability unde r R.C. 2921.03(C) is not limited to a person convicted of intimidation. The word “c onviction” is absent from the statutory language. And we are not persuaded by petit ioners’ argument that the “commission of the offense” necessarily means that a f ormal declaration of criminal guilt has occurred. {¶ 19} R.C. 2921.03(C) provides for civ il liability against a “person who violates” the intimidation statute, but it does not say that li ability is limited to
someone who is found guilty of violating the statute. Petitioners point to R.C. 2921.13, which contains language similar to R.C. 2921.03(C) and attaches civil liability to a falsification offense. See R.C. 2921.13(G). In one case cited by petitioners, the Tenth District Court of Appeals declined to re cognize a civil claimS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 for falsification “without the i nitiation of criminal charges o r criminal proceedings”
under the statute. Hershey v. Edelman , 187 Ohio App.3d 400, 2010-Ohio-1992, 932 N.E.2d 386, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.). The court noted, “Here, the re is absolutely no evidence that defendant was arrested for or charged or indicted for a falsification
offense.” Id. But, as explained above with respect to R.C. 2307.60, the initiation of criminal proceedings does not necessarily mean a conviction results from those proceedings. Thus, Hershey does not support petitioners’ argument that the statute requires a conviction. {¶ 20} Petitioners also argue that the term “offense” as used in R.C. 2921.03(C) is synonymous with “crime ,” and that both terms are used to mean “acts that have been the subject of c riminal proceedings.” But, agai n, being the subject of a criminal proceeding is not the equivalent of being convict ed of the crimes charged. And the word conviction is not in the statute. Witho ut any clear indication from the legislature in the language of the statute that a conv iction is required, we
decline to read such int ent into the statute. {¶ 21} Reading R.C. 2921.03(C) as petitioners request would require us to add words to the statute. See Dodd v. Croskey , 143 Ohio St.3d 293, 2015-Ohio2362, 37 N.E.3d 147, ¶ 24

. We instead construe R.C. 2921.03(C) as written and conclude that the plain language does not require a criminal co nviction as a prerequisite for civil liability.
Conclusion {¶ 22} For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified state-law questions in the negative.
So answered.
F RENCH , F ISCHER , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and S TEWART , JJ., concur.
K ENNEDY , J., concurs in judgment only.

_________________January Term, 2020

9 The Chandra Law Firm, L.L.C., Subodh Chandra, and Donald P. Scr een, for respondent. Gallagher Sharp, L.L.P., Monica A. Sansalone, Timothy T. Brick, and Maia E. Jerin, for petitioner James Budzik. Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., Frank H. Scialdone, and To dd M. Raskin, for petitioners Robert Weisdack, Geauga County Health D istrict, Tim Goergen, David Gragg, Catherine Whitright, Christina Livers, an d Alta Wendell. Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Louis E. Grube; and Elizabeth Well, in support of respondent for amicus curiae Ohi o Crime Victim Justi ce Center Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., a nd Louis E. Grube; and Camille Cr ary, in support of respondent f or amicus curiae Ohio Alliance to End Se xual Violence. Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., a nd Louis E. Grube, in support of respondent
for amicus curiae Ohio Now Education and Legal Fund. Frantz Ward, L.L.P., and Kelley Barnett, in support of responde nt for
amicus curiae Clevela nd Rape Crisis Center. Bonezzi, Switzer, Polito & Hupp Co., L.P.A., and William A. Pes eski, in support of petitioners f or amicus curiae Oh io Association of Ci vil Trial Attorneys. Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor, L.L.C., Mark Landes, and Dal e D. Cook, in support of petitioners for amici curiae Ohio School Bo ards Association, Ohio Transit Risk Pool, and Count y Commissioners Association of Ohio. Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, State Solicit or, and Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy So licitor, in support of neither pa rty for amicus curiae
the State of Ohio.

_________________