UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4989

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOSE FREDY DELCID, a/k/a Franklin, a/k/a Oscar Salgado, 

a/k/a Matador, a/k/a Chami,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:12-cr-00320-LO-1)

Submitted: July 10, 2013 Decided: August 6, 2013

Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Elita C. Amato, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. 

MacBride, United States Attorney, Sarah Devlin, Special 

Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Jose Fredy Delcid appeals his conviction after 

pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or 

more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 

(2006). On appeal, Delcid raises the issue of whether his 

“entry of a guilty plea [was] involuntary as the District Court 

did not review the elements of the offense with him prior to the 

Court having accepted the guilty plea, nor inquire as to whether 

he knew those elements, and understood them, as required 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.” He contends 

that the district court plainly erred in violation of Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11 and the Due Process Clause. We affirm.

In federal cases, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure “governs the duty of the trial judge before 

accepting a guilty plea.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 

n.5 (1969). Rule 11 “requires a judge to address a defendant 

about to enter a plea of guilty, to ensure that he understands 

the law of his crime in relation to the facts of his case, as 

well as his rights as a criminal defendant.” United States v. 

Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62 (2002). We “accord deference to the trial 

court’s decision as to how best to conduct the mandated 

colloquy.” United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th 

Cir. 1991). In explaining the nature of the charge, “a trial 
3

court must take into account both the complexity of the charge 

and the sophistication of the defendant.” Id. at 117.

Although a defendant must receive notice of the true 

nature of the charge rather than rote recitation of the elements 

of the offense, the defendant need not receive this information 

at the plea hearing but may enter a valid guilty plea based on 

information received before the hearing. Id. (citations and 

quotation marks omitted); see also Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 

175, 183 (2005) (trial court may rely on “counsel’s assurance 

that the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and 

elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty”). 

While the Supreme Court has “never held that the judge 

must himself explain the elements of each charge to the 

defendant on the record,” a trial court “is responsible for 

ensuring a record adequate for any review that may be later 

sought.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. at 183 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). We have likewise refused to 

require that district courts “recite the elements of the offense 

in every circumstance,” as in many cases, such a procedure would 

be “a formality and a needless repetition of the indictment, 

which often tracks the essential elements of the offense.” 

United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1307 (4th Cir. 1996).

“A federal court of appeals normally will not correct 

a legal error made in criminal trial court proceedings unless 
4

the defendant first brought the error to the trial court’s 

attention.” Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1124 

(2013) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 

(1993)). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) creates an 

exception to the normal rule, providing “[a] plain error that 

affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was 

not brought to the court’s attention.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

Because Delcid’s claims are raised for the first time 

on appeal, this Court’s review is for plain error. See Vonn, 

535 U.S. at 71; Olano, 507 U.S. at 731-33; United States v. 

Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). It is therefore

Delcid’s burden to show (1) error; (2) that was plain; (3) 

affecting his substantial rights; and that (4) this Court should 

exercise its discretion to notice the error. Martinez, 277 F.3d 

at 529, 532. “[A] defendant who seeks reversal of his 

conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district 

court committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a 

reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not 

have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 

U.S. 74, 83 (2004); see also Martinez, 277 F.3d at 532.

We have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, 

and we conclude that Delcid has failed to make the required 

showing. Delcid does not show a reasonable probability that, 

but for any error that potentially may have occurred, he would 
5

not have entered the plea. Delcid does not claim that he was 

not in fact advised of, or misunderstood, the elements of the 

crime to which he pled guilty prior to entering his plea. He 

does not claim he was innocent of the crime or that he would not 

have pled guilty if the district court had recited the elements 

of the crime at the guilty plea hearing or explicitly confirmed 

that his attorney had done so. Finally, he points to nothing in 

the record showing that his rights were substantially affected 

by the alleged errors of the district court.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED