****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service andinthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************IN RE PAYTON V.*
IN RE MADDY V. (AC 37294)
Gruendel, Alvord and Mullins, Js. Argued April 6—officially released June 10, 2015** (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Juvenile Matters at Waterford, Driscoll, J.)
David J. Reich, for the appellant (respondent).
Joshua Michtom, assistant public defender, for the appellee (petitioner).Opinion MULLINS, J. The respondent father appeals from the judgments of the trial court terminating his parental rights as to his children, Payton and Maddy. On appeal, the respondent claims that (1) the court’s factual findings did not support its legal conclusion pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-717 (g) (2) (B), and (2) therewas insufficient evidence to support the court’s conclusion that it was in the best interest ofthe children to terminate his parental rights because the petitioner, the children’s mother, did nottestify.1 We affirmthejudgments of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and relevant procedural history inform our review. The respondent andthe petitionermarried on May 14, 2006, when the petitioner was eighteen years old and the respondent was twenty-seven years old. Two children
were born of the marriage, a daughter, Payton, who
was born in July, 2006, and a son, Maddy, who was born in September, 2007. The marriage of the parties
was dissolved on February 18, 2011, and the parties
were awardedjoint legal custody of the children, with primary physical custody awarded to the petitioner. Both parties have since remarried.
The respondent ‘‘visited regularly with his children until March 24, 2012.

. . . On March 24, 2012, Maddy [who was four years old] and Payton [who was five years old] were in [the respondent’s] home during their regularly scheduledvisit. At some point during the day, the children were alone with [the respondent] and Maddy was subjected to what [the respondent] told the police, the Department of Children and Families’

. . . worker (department), and the court was corporal punishment for sneaking out ofthe house, running into the road, andalmostbeingstruckbyacar. [Therespondent] claimed he spanked the child, and he told the police that he may have hit Maddy too hard. The child told the police, in a very incomplete way, that he was punished for looking into a dresser drawer. [The respondent] beathischildseverely [on] thebuttocksandlower back. Hedidsowithabelt. PaytonheardMaddyscreaming, though she was not present to watch the beating. [The respondent] did not disclose the incident to his wife untilthe night ofMarch 24, 2012. [The respondent]
was bathing Maddy and brought his wife in to observe the severe bruising on the boy’s buttocks and back. [His wife] made [the respondent] call [the petitioner]. [The respondent] crying, told [the petitioner that] he’d hurt Maddy. [The petitioner went to the respondent’s] residenceaftercallingthepolice. Severalpolice officers responded, and [the respondent] was observed crying and remorseful. [The respondent] admitted causing Maddy’s injury

. . . [and he] was arrested. [The petitioner] accompanied Maddy to the hospital [where] Maddywasseen,treated, andreleased. Maddywasdiag-nosed with contusions on his buttocks and back, and both were tender to palpation. ‘‘[The respondent] claimed [to the police that] he only struck Maddy with his hand three times on [the] buttocks. He was distraught in the presence of the police, and said he did not think he hit Maddy so hard.

. . . [Maddy] told the police that his father hit him with
a belt, and [the respondent] coached him to blame the injury on the cats. Payton told [the department that the respondent] hit Maddy with abelt.

. . . The emergency
room physician told the police that ‘it looks like this kid got the tar beat out ofhim. There is no way he was onlyhitthree times.’ [Maddy’s] pediatrician opinedthat the bruises across Maddy’s buttocks and back were consistent with being beaten numerous times with a metal belt.’’2 The respondent has not seen Maddy or Payton since March 24, 2012.
On November 6, 2012, the petitioner filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of the respondent in the NewLondon Regional Children’s Probate Court. An attorney was appointed for the children, and he filed a motion to transfer the case to the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. That motion was granted on December 19, 2012. All parties were represented by counsel. The petitioner sought termination of the respondent’s parental rights as to both children onthe basis of§ 45a717 (g) (2) (B).3 Following a hearing on the merits, the court granted the petition, concluding that the respondent had administered an intentional, nonaccidental
severebeatingtoMaddythatamountedto ‘‘severephysical abuse caused by an act of parental commission.’’ The court further found that, as a result ofthe respondent’s severe physical abuse of Maddy, perpetrated as Payton listened to her brother’s screams, he was arrested, convicted and sentto prison, andthatthis has resulted in his denial of ‘‘financial support

. . . emotional support

. . . [and] guidance

. . . .’’ The court stated that the respondent ‘‘was removed from his children’s lives because of [his] intentional act of severe physical abuse and for no other cause.’’4 Accordingly, the court concluded that the adjudicatory ground of § 45a-717 (g) (2) (B) had been established by clear and convincing evidence.
The court then considered whether it was in the best interest of the children for the respondent’s parental rightstobeterminated. The courtexaminedandconsidered the factors set forth in § 45a-717 (h). The court found, in relevantpart, thatthe children no longerhave
a relationship with the respondent, that Payton is extremely anxious and is caused considerable distress at the mention ofthe respondent, and that the children do not want the respondent in their lives. Additionally, the court found that, although the respondent engaged in individual counseling and a course in anger management, he consistently has attempted to minimize andmisrepresent the severity of his physical abuse. Ultimately, on the basis of its factual findings, the court concludedthatterminationoftherespondent’sparental rights was in the children’s best interest.5 Accordingly, the court granted the petitions. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. The respondent claims that the court’s factual findings did not support its legal conclusion pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (B), and that there was insufficient evidence for the court to have concluded that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the children. After setting forth the relevant law, we will consider each of these claims.
Section 45a-717 (g) provides in relevant part: ‘‘At the adjourned hearing or at the initial hearing where no investigation and report has been requested, the court may approve a petition terminating the parental rights and may appoint a guardian ofthe person ofthe child, or, if the petitioner requests, the court may appoint a statutory parent, if it finds, upon clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the termination is in the best interest ofthe child, and (2)

. . . (B) the child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission, including, but not limited to sexual molestationandexploitation, severephysicalabuse orapattern of abuse, the care, guidance or control necessary for the child’s physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being. Nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury to a child shall constitute prima facie evidence ofacts ofparental commission or omission sufficient for the termination of parental rights

. . . .’’
‘‘A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists oftwo phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatoryphase, the trial court must determine whether one or more grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in General Statutes §§ 17a-112 or 45a-717 (g) (2) has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.’’ In reBrian T., 134 Conn. App. 1, 11, 38 A.3d 114 (2012).
‘‘In the dispositional phase

. . . the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest ofthe child.

. . . The best interests ofthe child include the child’s interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [her] environment.

. . . [T]he trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding [the] factors delineated in [§ 45a-717 (h)].

. . . [These] factors
serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered.

. . . There is no require-mentthateachfactorbeprovenbyclearandconvincing evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mindy F., 153 Conn. App. 786, 796–97, 105 A.3d 331 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 913, 106A.3d307 (2015). ‘‘Ourstandardofreviewonappealfromatermination ofparentalrights iswhetherthe challengedfindings are clearly erroneous.

. . . The determinations reached by the trial court that the evidence is clear and convincing will be disturbed only if [the challenged] finding is not supported by the evidence and [is], in light of the evidence in the whole record, clearly erroneous.

. . . ‘‘On appeal, our function is to determine whetherthe trialcourt’s conclusionwaslegallycorrectandfactually supported.

. . . We do not examine the recordto determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached

. . . nor do we retry the case or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.

. . . Rather, on review by this court every reasonablepresumptionismade infavorofthetrial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) InreKylik A., 153 Conn. App. 584, 594, 102 A.3d 141, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 902, 104 A.3d 106 (2014).
The respondent claims that the court’s factual findings did not support its legal conclusion pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (B). He argues that the petitioner needed to prove that there was an act ofparental omission or commission and that the children were denied care, guidance or control as a result of that act. In this case, he argues, the children were provided care, guidance and control by the petitioner and, therefore, they never were without such care. Accordingly, he argues, the court erred as amatter oflaw in concluding that the requirements of § 45a-717 (g) (2) (B) had been established by the petitioner. We disagree.
As we have explained previously: ‘‘The [deprivation of care, guidance or control] statute rests on two distinct and often contradictory interests [of the child]. The first is a basic interest in safety; the second is the important interest

. . . in having a stable family environment.

. . . In re ValerieD., 223 Conn. 492, 512, 613 A.2d 748 (1992).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Brian T., supra, 134 Conn. App. 18; id. (affirming trial court’s decision that, due to respondent’s criminal history, incarceration and lack ofvisits with child, respondent had denied child parental care, guidance or control necessary for child’s well-being).
In the present case, the court found that the respondent’s act of commission was that he inflicted severe physical abuse on Maddy, and, as the abuse was inflicted, Payton listenedto herbrother’s screams. As a result ofthis act ofcommission, the children ultimately
were denied the care, guidance or control necessary for their physical, educational, moral and emotional well-being, because the respondent was sentenced toprison and arestraining order and acriminalprotective order were put in place barring him from seeing the children.6Although the respondent argues thatthe childrenwere not deprived ofthe care, guidance or control necessary for their well-being because, in his absence, the petitioner provided the children’s necessary care,
we do not agree. The statute does not exempt a parent whofailstoprovidethe care, guidance orcontrolnecessary for his children’s well-being simply because some otherpersonsteps in duringhis absence toprovide that
care. This is especially true where, as here, the reason that parent no longer provides for his children’s wellbeingisthatheisimprisonedandrestrainedfromseeing his children because of the severe physical abuse he, personally, administered to one of the children, while the other child helplessly listened to her four year old brother’s screams, causing her to suffer lasting emotional distress and anxiety.
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the courtproperly appliedthe law andthat its legal conclusion that the petitioner established the elements of § 45a-717 (g) (2) (B) is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the respondent’s position is without merit.
The respondent next claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s conclusion that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate his parental rights. In his brief, the respondent spends considerable time asserting that the court could only have made an informed decision ifthe petitioner testified about herparenting skills and abilities in this case. He arguesthatthepetitionershouldhavebeenrequired to testify in order to prove that she is a fit parent. He also argues: ‘‘The flaw in the trial court’s analysis is that critical parts of the court’s reasoning were not properly supported due to [the petitioner’s] failure to testify,’’ and that we should reverse the court’s judgment because ‘‘[t]here are too many unanswered questions for which only [the petitioner] can answer.’’7 We conclude that the court conducted a thorough and proper analysis, using the required statutory factors, and that its conclusion that it was in the best interest of the children for the respondent’s parental rights to be terminated was supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Section 45a-717 (h) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whetherto terminate parentalrights underthis section, the courtshall considerandshallmake writtenfindings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent ofservicesoffered,providedandmadeavailabletotheparent and the child by a child-placing agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2) the terms of anyapplicablecourtorderenteredintoandagreedupon byanyindividualorchild-placingagencyandtheparent,and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (3) the feelings and emotionaltiesofthechildwithrespecttothechild’sparents, any guardian ofthe child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (4) the age ofthe child; (5) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest ofthe child to return the child to the parent’s home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the courtmaygive weightto incidentalvisitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or othercustodian ofthe child; and (6) the extentto which
a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.’’
In conducting its best interest analysis, the court made the necessary factual findings required by § 45a717 (h). Reviewing each of the statutory factors, the court made the following relevant findings. Although the department was involved in this case initially, it
was the petitioner who filed the petition, so there was
no child placement agency involved. Still, in its limited role of assessing the fitness of the petitioner to be the sole guardian of the children, the department opined that it saw no child protection issues with placing the children inthe petitioner’s sole physical custody. There
were criminal and civil ‘‘no contact’’ orders issued against the respondent as to the children. The children have no relationship with the respondent, and Payton is distressed at the mention of the respondent. The children are bonded with the petitioner and her husband. At the time of the trial court’s decision, Payton
was eight years old, and Maddy was seven years old. The respondent engaged in individual counseling and in an anger management course, but he had not acknowledged the nature or severity of his physical abuse, and he has attempted to minimize or misrepresent it. The respondent has had no contact with the children since March 24, 2012, as a result of court orders, which resulted from the respondent’s severe physical abuse of Maddy. Although both the petitioner and the respondent appear to have attempted to coach the children—the petitioner in her attempts have Payton state that the respondent hit Maddy with a ‘‘metal’’ belt and the respondent in his attempts to have Maddy give the police astatementthat wouldblame the family catandexculpatetherespondent—the courtconcluded that there was no persuasive evidence that the peti-tioner had acted to the children’s detriment.
The court also credited and found ‘‘very persuasive’’ the findings ofKellyF. Rogers, Ph.D., aclinicalpsychologist who had conducted apsychological evaluation of the respondent and the children at the request of the court. The court stated that Dr. Rogers found Payton to be one of the most anxious children he had ever observed. Additionally, although Dr. Rogers was aware that the respondent had completed an anger managementprogram, he, nonetheless, was againstreintroductionoftherespondenttothechildren. Dr. Rogersopined that the respondent has apoor handle on his anger and his expression of his anger. Finally, the court credited Dr. Rogers’ opinionthatthe respondentwouldbe likely to act similarly in the future. The court found that Dr. Rogers’ opinions ‘‘confirm[ed] that the children would be at serious risk of physical harm if [the respondent]
were reintroduced into their lives

. . . .’’
The court then found that it also would be emotionally damaging to the children to be reintroduced to the respondent, and that Payton, despite years of therapy, still becomes distressed at the mere mention of the respondent. The court stated that Dr. Rogers, the department, and the children’s attorney all recommend termination of the respondent’s parental rights. In determining that it was in the best interest of the children for the parental rights of the respondent to be terminated, the court found: ‘‘The children are entitled to a secure, safe, nurturing home environment [which] [t]hey will not obtain

. . . if [the respondent] persists in their lives.’’
Our review of the court’s memorandum of decision reveals that the court examined each of the factors delineated in § 45a-717 (h), as well as considered other important factors approved by our case law, including the children’s entitlement to a safe, secure and nurturing home environment, and the court concluded that it
was in the children’s best interest for the respondent’s parental rights to be terminated.8 We conclude thatthis determination was supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the otherjudges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers ofthis case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the Appellate Court.

** June 10, 2015, the date thatthis decision was released as aslip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1 The attorney for the minor children has adopted the brief of the petitioner. The Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut (tribe) filed a motion to intervene in this matter, which the Probate Court granted. The tribe did not oppose the termination of the respondent’s parental rights, nor did it participate in this appeal. We refer to the petitioner and the respondent as the parties in this appeal.

2 As a result ofthese acts, the respondent was convicted by the SuperiorCourt of assault in the second degree and risk of injury to a child. On January 11, 2013, the respondent was sentenced to five years incarceration, execution suspended after one year, with three years probation. The court also imposed a protective order barring contact with Maddy, effective until January 11, 2026.

3 Thepetitioneralsosoughtterminationoftherespondent’sparentalrights

on the basis of § 45a-717 (g) (2) (F). The court determined that this ground

was not proven because, although the respondent ‘‘administered an intentional, nonaccidentalseverebeatingtohis son,’’ Maddydidnotsufferserious bodily harm. The merits of this ruling are not challenged in this appeal.

4 The court also explained that a criminal protective order was in place that prevents the respondent from having contact with Maddy at any time prior to January 11, 2026. See footnote 2 of this opinion. Additionally, at the time ofthe trial court hearing in this matter, there was a civil restraining order in place that the petitioner had secured after a hearing, preventing the respondent from having any contact with her or the children. At the time ofthe trial in this matter, the respondent had a motion pending in the familycourtseeking amodification ofthat order. Thefamilycourt, however, deferredrulingontherespondent’smotion,pendingtheoutcomeofthiscase.
5 The court also found that the provisions ofthe Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; were satisfied. There is no claim on appeal regarding the propriety of this determination.

6 The respondent also argues that even if the court properly determined that Maddy was denied care, guidance or control, the court made no such findings concerning Payton. We do not credit this argument. It is clear from reading the court’s memorandum of decision in its entirety that it found that the respondent’s actions of abusing Maddy, while Payton listened to heryoungerbrother’s screams, ultimatelyresultedinthe respondent’s incarceration and the children being denied the care, guidance or control necessary for their physical, education, moral or emotional well-being. See In re JasonR., 306 Conn. 438, 453, 51 A.3d 334 (2012) (‘‘an opinion must be read

as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

7 In this case, the petitioner brought a petition to terminate the parental rights of the respondent, and she bore the burden of proof. We are aware ofno statutory or otherrequirementthat apetitionertestifyin atermination proceedinginordertomeetthatburden, andtherespondenthasnotdirected

us to any such authority.

8 Although not raised by the parties, we also note that the court stated that it found ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt’’ that it was in the children’s best interestto terminatethe respondent’sparental rights. Althoughthe standard ofproofnecessaryforsuchadeterminationisclearandconvincingevidence;

see In re ChristinaM., 90 Conn. App. 565, 583, 877 A.2d 941 (2005) (legislature’s choice of proof by clear and convincing evidence in termination of parentalrightsproceedingsisconsistentwithstateandfederalconstitutional mandates), aff’d, 280 Conn. 474, 908 A.2d 1073 (2006); the court’s use of this higher standard ofproofcould notprejudice the respondent. ‘‘The clear and convincing standard ofproofis substantially greaterthan the usual civil standard ofapreponderance ofthe evidence, but less than the highest legal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Dylan C., 126 Conn. App. 71, 87, 10 A.3d 100 (2011).