alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 In The



### Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09

- 12

- 00579

- CR



### ________________

PAMELA BREEDING , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 252nd District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 11

- 12940

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On October 29 , 20 12 , the trial court sentenced Pamela Breeding on a conviction

for felony possession of a controlled substance

. Breeding filed a notice of appeal on

November 15 , 20 12 . The trial court entered a certification of the defendant’s right to

appeal in which the court certified that this is a plea

- bargain case and the defendant has

no right of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The district clerk has provided the

trial court’s certification to the Court of Appeals. On December 4 , 20 12 , we notified the

parties that we would dismiss the appeal unless the appellant established grounds for

continuing the appeal. No response has been filed. Because the record does not contain a2 certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal, we must dismiss the appeal.

See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). Acc ordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

___________________________ STEVE McKEITHEN

Chief Justice

Opinion Delivered January 23, 2013

Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Gaultney and Horton , JJ.
EXHIBIT 13.1



                                  Certification
              Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
                   (Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350,
                  Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and
(b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), each of the
undersigned officers of GROHE Aktiengesellschaft ("Grohe AG") does hereby
certify that: the annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31,
2003 (the "Form 20-F") of Grohe AG fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
information contained in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial conditions and results of operations of Grohe AG.

Dated:  April 29, 2004



/s/ Peter Koerfer-Schuen
------------------------
Mr. Peter Koerfer-Schuen
Chief Executive Officer



/s/ Michel Grimm
----------------------
Mr. Michael Grimm
Chief Financial Officer
#### BEN HUI CHEN, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.

No. 07-5786-ag.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Jan. 13, 2009.

*674Steven A. Mundie, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General; Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director; Manuel A. Palau, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

PRESENT: Hon. GUIDO CALABRESI, Hon. ROBERT D. SACK, and Hon. B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges.

*SUMMARY ORDER*

Petitioner Ben Hui Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the November 30, 2007 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. *In re Ben Hui Chen,*No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Nov. 30, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. *Alt v. Gonzales,*448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). Here, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion.

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is entitled to one motion to reopen and must file his motion no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Chen’s July 2007 motion was both untimely and numerically barred. *Id.*Moreover, the BIA properly found that Chen’s motion did not qualify for any exception to the time and numerical limitations. *See*8 C.F.R. § lOOS^c)®)©.1 It is well-settled that a change in personal circumstances, such as the birth of Chen’s two U.S. citizen daughters, is not evidence of changed conditions in China. *See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA,*437 F.3d 270, 273-274 (2d Cir.2006); *Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,*416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005).

The balance of Chen’s arguments are entirely foreclosed by our decision in *Yuen Jin v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 143, 156 (2d Cir.2008).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is *675DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).

1

. To the extent Chen argues that the BIA should have reopened his case under its *sua sponte*authority pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), we lack jurisdiction to consider his argument. *See Azmond Ali v. Gonzales,*448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006); *Cyrus v. Keisler,*505 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir.2007).
Amendment to Change in Control Agreement - Robert W. Dean II



 Exhibit 10.38 
 AMENDMENT TO CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT 
 THIS
AMENDMENT TO CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT (“Amendment”) is entered into by and between VARIAN, INC., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and Robert W. Dean II, an employee of the Company (“Employee”). 
 The Company and Employee are parties to a Change in Control Agreement (the “Agreement”) dated as of September 15, 2008. On
July 26, 2009, the Company, Agilent Technologies, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Cobalt Acquisition Corp., a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Agilent, entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the “Merger
Agreement”), pursuant to which Merger Sub will, subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions set forth in the Merger Agreement, merge with and into the Company and the Company will survive the merger and continue as a wholly owned
subsidiary of Agilent (the “Merger”). In connection with approving entering into the Merger Agreement, the Board determined that it is in the best interest of the Company and its stockholders for the Company to amend the Agreement,
effective as of, and contingent upon, the closing of the Merger pursuant to the Merger Agreement. 
 In view of the foregoing,
the Company and Employee agree as follows: 
 1. Subsections (ii) and (iii) of the definition of “Good
Reason” set forth in Section 3(d) of the Agreement are hereby amended to read in their entirety as follows, effective as of, and contingent upon, the closing of the Merger: 
 “(ii) A reduction of Employee’s total compensation, as was provided to Employee as of July 26, 2009, as the
same may have been increased from time to time after the Change in Control Date other than (A) a reduction implemented with the consent of Employee or (B) a reduction that is generally comparable (proportionately) to compensation
reductions imposed on senior executives of the Company generally; or 
 (iii) The failure to provide to Employee
the benefits and perquisites, including participation on a comparable basis in the Company’s stock option, incentive, and other similar plans in which employees of the Company of comparable title and salary grade participate, as were provided
to Employee immediately prior to July 26, 2009, or with a package of benefits and perquisites that are substantially comparable in all material respects to such benefits and perquisites provided prior to July 26, 2009; or” 

2. This Amendment, taken together with the Agreement, to the extent not modified by this Amendment, supersedes any and all previous
contracts, arrangements or understandings between the parties with respect to the Agreement. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties
acknowledge that they have read and understand the terms of this Amendment and have executed this Amendment to be effective on the date that it is signed by both parties. 








									
	VARIAN, INC.	 		 	EMPLOYEE
			
	           /s/ Arthur W.
Homan
	 		 	            /s/ Robert W. Dean
II

	By:	 	Arthur W. Homan	 		 	Robert W. Dean II
	Title:	 	Secretary	 		 		 	
					
	Date:	 	September 4, 2009	 		 	Date:	 	September 8, 2009

  

 2
Exhibit
32                      Section
1350 Certifications
 
 In connection with the Annual Report on
Form 10-K of Pinnacle Airlines Corp. (the “Company”) for the year ended December
31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the “Report”), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated
below, each hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Report fully
complies with requirements of Section 13(a) of 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.
 
 
 
 
 Date:
      March 12, 2009
              /s/
      Philip H. TrenaryPhilip
      H. TrenaryPresident
      and Chief Executive Officer
 
 
 Date:
      March 12, 2009
              /s/
      Peter D. HuntPeter
      D. HuntVice
      President and Chief Financial
Officer
f8kex10v_pioneer.htm


    


    Exihibit
10.5

     

    
 

    RESIGNATION

    


    I, David
Davis, hereby resign from all officer and director positions that I hold with
Pioneer Power Solutions, Inc. and any of its direct or indirect subsidiaries,
except for Sierra Concepts Holdings, Inc., effective immediately.

     

    
 

    /s/ David
Davis

    David
Davis

    Dated:
December 2, 2009
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. James Pearce, Appellant, v Robert A. Kirkpatrick, Superintendent, Wende Correctional Facility, Respondent.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[944 NYS2d 712]

Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Penny M. Wolfgang, J.), entered November 30, 2010 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70. The judgment granted the motion of petitioner for leave to reargue, and upon reargument, adhered to the prior determination denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs. Present — Scudder, P.J., Smith, Fahey and Sconiers, JJ.
#### Robert Cy MANN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Patricia R. STANSBERRY, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 10-7582.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 30, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 5, 2011.

Robert Cy Mann, Appellant Pro Se. Robert P. McIntosh, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Robert Cy Mann, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006 & Supp.2011) petition and denying reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Mann v. Stansberry,*No. 3:09-cv-464, 2010 WL 3666973 (E.D.Va. Sept. 14, 2010). We deny Mann’s motion for appointment of counsel and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                           5,942
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                             322
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 5,500
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     21,365
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          50,347
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            50,560
<LOANS>                                        139,362
<ALLOWANCE>                                      1,859
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 229,066
<DEPOSITS>                                     195,635
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              3,395
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,400
<OTHER-SE>                                      28,636
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 229,066
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  6,319
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                1,909
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   238
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 8,466
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               3,941
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,941
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            4,525
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       90
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  2,736
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,007
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       2,007
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,519
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.10
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.89
<LOANS-NON>                                        113
<LOANS-PAST>                                       109
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                    639
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 1,803
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                       41
<RECOVERIES>                                         7
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                1,859
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clinton TURNER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-6558.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Oct. 27, 2011.

Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; MARTIN and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge.

Clinton Turner argues that the district court miscalculated his recommended sentence when it applied a cross reference to attempted second-degree murder based on a depraved heart. The United States agrees. The parties are right, so we vacate Turner’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

The facts, as the district court found them, show that on August 9, 2009, Turner — while under the influence of alcohol, prescription medication, and crack cocaine — came out of his home wielding a shotgun. There he met his wife, Bonnie Ruffin, and two others. Turner fired the shotgun once into the air and then pointed it at Ruffin and the others, but did not fire. Another man, James Gates, attempted to wrestle the gun away from Turner. In the ensuing struggle, the gun went off and severely injured Ruffin. The district court found at sentencing that Turner’s actions were extremely reckless, but that Turner did not intend to kill Ruffin (or anyone else).

Turner pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. His presentence investigation report calculated a base offense level of 38 based on a cross reference to attempted first-degree murder under § 2A2.1(a)(l) of the Guidelines. The district court rejected that cross reference in light of its finding that Turner did not intend to kill Ruffin. At the government’s urging, however, the court applied a cross reference to attempted second-degree murder under § 2A2.1 (a)(2), on the theory that Turner acted with a depraved heart.

The government has since changed its mind, conceding that Turner should not have received the cross reference to § 2A2.1(a)(2). The government is correct. Under federal law, a defendant cannot be guilty of attempted murder without a specific intent to kill. *See Braxton v. United States,*500 U.S. 344, 351 n. *, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 114 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (quoting 4 C. Torcia, *Wharton’s Criminal Law*§ 743, p. 522 (14th ed. 1981)) (“Although murder may be committed without an intent to kill, an attempt to commit murder requires a specific intent to kill”). The same is true under Tennessee state law. *See State v. Kimbrough,*924 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Tenn. 1996). Simply stated, the cross reference here was to a crime that does not exist. *See generally*2 Wayne R. Lafave, *Substantive Criminal Law*§ 11.3(a), at 212-13 (2d ed.2003) (footnotes omitted).

The erroneous cross reference caused the district court to miscalculate Turner’s Guidelines range, which in turn makes his sentence procedurally unreasonable. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Thus, we vacate Turner’s sentence and remand for re-sentencing.
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk November 21, 2011

t1114 

# Order

November 21, 2011

143551

RONALD G. BERGLUND, Petitioner-Appellant,

v SC: 143551 COA: 298227 Wayne CC: 08-119311-AE INDUSTRIAL TECHNO LOGY INSTITUTE, Respondent-Appellee, and

DEPARTMENT OF EN ERGY, LABOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AGENCY, Appellee.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 21, 2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

September 4, 2012

d0827

Order 

September 4, 2012

144894

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 144894

COA: 301186

Wayne CC: 09-024407-FC

MARK GERALD ELLIOTT,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 16, 2012 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
  1)
    
    such Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the twelve months
ended December 31, 2005, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2)
    
    the information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K of the
Company for the twelve months ended December 31, 2005, fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Plumas
Bancorp.
 Date: March 13, 2006
    
    
    
    /s/ Andrew RybackAndrew J. Ryback, Chief Financial Officer
#### In re VILLAROSA.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

March 29, 1912.)

In the matter of Nicola Villarosa. No opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. Order filed.
#### In the Matter of Lord L.B. MercyFirst et al., Respondents; Melissa N., Appellant, et al., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Lianu B. MercyFirst et al., Respondents; Melissa N., Appellant, et al., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 2.) In the Matter of Lionel B., Jr. MercyFirst et al., Respondents; Melissa N., Appellant, et al., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 3.)

[943 NYS2d 777] —

In three related proceedings to terminate parental rights pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b on the ground of permanent neglect, the mother appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of three orders of fact-finding and disposition (one as to each child) of the Family Court, Kings County (Danoff, J), each dated November 8, 2010, as, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, found that she permanently neglected the children, terminated her parental rights, and transferred custody and guardianship of the children to the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York and the petitioner MercyFirst, for the purposes of adoption.

Ordered that the orders of fact-finding and disposition are affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearings established by clear and convincing proof that, for a period of one year following each child’s placement with an authorized agency, the *1114mother failed to plan for the future of each child, although physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency’s diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship *(see*Social Services Law § 384-b [7] [a]; Family Ct Act § 622; *Matter of Star Leslie W.,*63 NY2d 136, 142 [1984]; *Matter of Peter C., Jr. [Peter C.],*88 AD3d 702, 703 [2011]; *Matter of Jonathan B. [Linda S.],*84 AD3d 1078 [2011]). Further, the evidence adduced at the dispositional hearing established that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children *(see*Family Ct Act § 631; *Matter of Walter D.H. [Zaire L.],*91 AD3d 950, 950-951 [2012]; *Matter of Peter C., Jr. [Peter C.],*88 AD3d at 703; *Matter of Amber D.C. [Angelica C.],*79 AD3d 865, 866 [2010]).

The mother’s remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.E, Florio, Belen and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, John J. Dolan, of First Commonwealth Financial Corporation (First Commonwealth), certify that the Quarterly Report of
First Commonwealth on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition of First Commonwealth at the end of such period and the results of operations of First Commonwealth for such period.



|                    |  |                                      
|------------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|DATED: May 10, 2011 |  | /s/ John J. Dolan                    
|                    |  | John J. Dolan                        
|                    |  | President and Chief Executive Officer