(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2012 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

HILLMAN v. MARETTA 

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 

No. 11–1221. Argued April 22, 2013—Decided June 3, 2013 

The Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA)

establishes an insurance program for federal employees. FEGLIA 

permits an employee to name a beneficiary of life insurance proceeds, 

and specifies an “order of precedence” providing that an employee’s 

death benefits accrue first to that beneficiary ahead of other potential 

recipients. 5 U. S. C. §8705(a). A Virginia statute revokes a beneficiary designation in any contract that provides a death benefit to a

former spouse where there has been a change in the decedent’s marital status. Va. Code Ann. §20–111.1(A) (Section A). In the event that 

this provision is pre-empted by federal law, a separate provision of 

Virginia law, Section D, provides a cause of action rendering the former spouse liable for the principal amount of the proceeds to the party who would have received them were Section A not pre-empted.

§20–111.1(D). 

Warren Hillman named then-spouse, respondent Judy Maretta, as

the beneficiary of his Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance

(FEGLI) policy. After their divorce, he married petitioner Jacqueline 

Hillman but never changed his named FEGLI beneficiary. After 

Warren’s death, Maretta, still the named beneficiary, filed a claim for 

the FEGLI proceeds and collected them. Hillman sued in Virginia

court, seeking recovery of the proceeds under Section D. Maretta argued in response that Section D is pre-empted by federal law. The 

parties agreed that Section A is pre-empted. The Virginia Circuit 

Court found Maretta liable to Hillman under Section D for the 

FEGLI policy proceeds. The State Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Section D is pre-empted by FEGLIA because it conflicts with

the purposes and objectives of Congress. 

Held: Section D of the Virginia statute is pre-empted by FEGLIA.

Pp. 6–15. 
 

 

2 HILLMAN v. MARETTA 

Syllabus 

(a) State law is pre-empted “to the extent of any conflict with a

federal statute.” Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 

363, 372. This case raises the question whether Virginia law “stands

as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 

67. Pp. 6–13.

(1) To determine whether a state law conflicts with Congress’ 

purposes and objectives, the nature of the federal interest must first 

be ascertained. Crosby, 530 U. S., at 372–373. Two previous cases 

govern the analysis of the relationship between Section D and 

FEGLIA here. In Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655, a California 

court granted a decedent’s widow, who was not the named beneficiary

of a policy under the federal National Service Life Insurance Act of

1940 (NSLIA), an interest in the insurance proceeds as community

property under state law. This Court reversed. Because NSLIA provided that the insured had a right to designate a beneficiary and 

could change that designation at any time, the Court reasoned that

Congress had “spoken with force and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.” Id., at 658. The 

Court addressed a similar question regarding the federal Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act of 1965 (SGLIA) in Ridgway v. 

Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46. There, a Maine court imposed a constructive

trust on insurance proceeds paid to a servicemember’s widow, the 

named beneficiary, and ordered that they be paid to the decedent’s

first wife as required by a divorce decree. Holding the constructive 

trust pre-empted, the Ridgway Court explained that Wissner controlled and that SGLIA made clear that “the insured service member 

possesses the right freely to designate the beneficiary and to alter

that choice at any time by communicating the decision in writing to

the proper office.” Id., at 56. Pp. 7–9.

(2) The reasoning in Wissner and Ridgway applies with equal 

force here. NSLIA and SGLIA are strikingly similar to FEGLIA,

which creates a scheme that gives highest priority to an insured’s 

designated beneficiary, §8705(a), and which underscores that the 

employee’s “right” of designation “cannot be waived or restricted,” 5 

CFR §843.205(e). Section D interferes with this scheme, because it 

directs that the proceeds actually belong to someone other than the 

named beneficiary by creating a cause of action for their recovery by

a third party. FEGLIA establishes a clear and predictable procedure

for an employee to indicate who the intended beneficiary shall be and

evinces Congress’ decision to accord federal employees an unfettered 

freedom of choice in selecting a beneficiary and to ensure the proceeds actually belong to that beneficiary. This conclusion is confirmed by another provision of FEGLIA, §8705(e), which creates a 
 

 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 

Syllabus 

limited exception to the order of precedence by allowing proceeds to

be paid to someone other than the named beneficiary, if, and only if, 

the requisite documentation is filed with the Government before the 

employee’s death, so that any departure from the beneficiary designation is managed within, not outside, the federal system. If States 

could make alternative distributions outside the clear procedure 

Congress established, §8705(e)’s narrow exception would be transformed into a general license for state law to override FEGLIA.

Pp. 9–13.

(b) Hillman’s additional arguments in support of a different result

are unpersuasive. Pp. 13–15. 

283 Va. 34, 722 S. E. 2d 32, affirmed. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in 

which SCALIA, J., joined as to all but footnote 4. THOMAS, J., and ALITO, 

J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 11–1221 

JACQUELINE HILLMAN, PETITIONER v. JUDY A.
 

MARETTA
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 

VIRGINIA
 

[June 3, 2013]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.* 

The Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of

1954 (FEGLIA), 5 U. S. C. §8701 et seq., establishes a life 

insurance program for federal employees. FEGLIA provides that an employee may designate a beneficiary to

receive the proceeds of his life insurance at the time of his

death. §8705(a). Separately, a Virginia statute addresses 

the situation in which an employee’s marital status has 

changed, but he did not update his beneficiary designation 

before his death. Section 20–111.1(D) of the Virginia Code

renders a former spouse liable for insurance proceeds to 

whoever would have received them under applicable law,

usually a widow or widower, but for the beneficiary designation. Va. Code Ann. §20–111.1(D) (Lexis Supp. 2012). 

This case presents the question whether the remedy created by §20–111.1(D) is pre-empted by FEGLIA and its 

implementing regulations. We hold that it is. 

—————— 

* JUSTICE SCALIA joins all but footnote 4 of this opinion. 
 

 

 

2 HILLMAN v. MARETTA 

Opinion of the Court 

I 

A 

In 1954, Congress enacted FEGLIA to “provide low-cost 

group life insurance to Federal employees.” H. R. Rep. No. 

2579, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1954). The program is administered by the federal Office of Personnel Management 

(OPM). 5 U. S. C. §8716. Pursuant to the authority

granted to it by FEGLIA, OPM entered into a life insurance contract with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. See §8709; 5 CFR §870.102 (2013). Individual 

employees enrolled in the Federal Employees’ Group Life

Insurance (FEGLI) Program receive coverage through this 

contract. The program is of substantial size. In 2010, the 

total amount of FEGLI insurance coverage in force was 

$824 billion. GAO, Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance: Retirement Benefit and Retained Asset Account 

Disclosures Could Be Improved 1 (GAO–12–94, 2011).

FEGLIA provides that, upon an employee’s death, life

insurance benefits are paid in accordance with a specified

“order of precedence.” 5 U. S. C. §8705(a). The proceeds

accrue “[f]irst, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the employee in a signed and witnessed writing 

received before death.” Ibid. “[I]f there is no designated 

beneficiary,” the benefits are paid “to the widow or widower 

of the employee.” Ibid. Absent a widow or widower, the 

benefits accrue to “the child or children of the employee

and descendants of [the] deceased children”; “the parents

of the employee” or their survivors; the “executor or administrator of the estate of the employee”; and last, to

“other next of kin.” Ibid. 

To be effective, the beneficiary designation and any

accompanying revisions to it must be in writing and duly

filed with the Government. See ibid. (“[A] designation,

change, or cancellation of beneficiary in a will or other

document not so executed and filed has no force or effect”).

An OPM regulation provides that an employee may 
 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

“change [a] beneficiary at any time without the knowledge 

or consent of the previous beneficiary,” and makes clear 

that “[t]his right cannot be waived or restricted.” 5 CFR 

§870.802(f). Employees are informed of these requirements through materials that OPM disseminates in 

connection with the program. See, e.g., OPM, FEGLI Program Booklet 21–22 (rev. Aug. 2004) (setting forth the

order of precedence and stating that OPM “will pay benefits” “[f]irst, to the beneficiary [the employee] designate[s]”). The order of precedence is also described on the

form that employees use to designate a beneficiary. See 

Designation of Beneficiary, FEGLI Program, SF 2823 (rev.

Mar. 2011) (Back of Part 2). And the enrollment form 

advises employees to update their designations if their 

“[i]ntentions [c]hange” as a result of, for example, “marriage [or] divorce.” Ibid. 

In 1998, Congress amended FEGLIA to create a limited

exception to an employee’s right of designation. The statute now provides that “[a]ny amount which would otherwise be paid to a person determined under the order of

precedence . . . shall be paid (in whole or in part) by [OPM] 

to another person if and to the extent expressly provided 

for in the terms of any court decree of divorce, annulment, 

or legal separation” or related settlement, but only in the 

event the “decree, order, or agreement” is received by 

OPM or the employing agency before the employee’s 

death. 5 U. S. C. §§8705(e)(1)–(2).

FEGLIA also includes an express pre-emption provision. 

That provision states in relevant part that “[t]he provisions of any contract under [FEGLIA] which relate to the 

nature or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits) shall supersede and 

preempt any law of any State . . . , which relates to group 

life insurance to the extent that the law or regulation is

inconsistent with the contractual provisions.” §8709(d)(1).

This case turns on the interaction between these provi-
 

 

4 HILLMAN v. MARETTA 

Opinion of the Court 

sions of FEGLIA and a Virginia statute. Section 20– 

111.1(A) (Section A) of the Virginia Code provides that a

divorce or annulment “revoke[s]” a “beneficiary designation contained in a then existing written contract owned 

by one party that provides for the payment of any death 

benefit to the other party.” A “death benefit” includes 

“payments under a life insurance contract.” §20.111.1(B). 

In the event that Section A is pre-empted by federal law, 

§20–111.1(D) (Section D) of the Virginia Code applies.

Section D provides as follows: 

“If [Va. Code Ann. §20–111.1] is preempted by federal law with respect to the payment of any death 

benefit, a former spouse who, not for value, receives 

the payment of any death benefit that the former

spouse is not entitled to under [§20–111.1] is personally liable for the amount of the payment to the person who would have been entitled to it were 

[§20.111.1] not preempted.” 

In other words, where Section A is pre-empted, Section D 

creates a cause of action rendering a former spouse liable 

for the principal amount of the insurance proceeds to the 

person who would have received them had Section A

continued in effect. 

B 

Warren Hillman (Warren) and respondent Judy Maretta 

were married. In 1996, Warren named Maretta as the 

beneficiary of his FEGLI policy. Warren and Maretta 

divorced in 1998 and, four years later, he married petitioner Jacqueline Hillman. Warren died unexpectedly in 

2008. Because Warren had never changed the named 

beneficiary under his FEGLI policy, it continued to identify Maretta as the beneficiary at the time of his death

despite his divorce and subsequent remarriage to Hillman. 

Hillman filed a claim for the proceeds of Warren’s life 
Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

insurance, but the FEGLI administrator informed her that 

the proceeds would accrue to Maretta, because she had 

been named as the beneficiary. Maretta filed a claim for 

the benefits with OPM and collected the FEGLI proceeds

in the amount of $124,558.03. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a.

Hillman then filed a lawsuit in Virginia Circuit Court,

arguing that Maretta was liable to her under Section D for

the proceeds of her deceased husband’s FEGLI policy. The 

parties agreed that Section A, which directly reallocates the benefits, is pre-empted by FEGLIA. Id., at 36a. 

Maretta contended that Section D is also pre-empted by

federal law and that she should keep the insurance proceeds. The Circuit Court rejected Maretta’s argument and

granted summary judgment to Hillman, finding Maretta 

liable to Hillman under Section D for the proceeds of

Warren’s policy. Id., at 58a. 

The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and entered

judgment for Maretta. 283 Va. 34, 46, 722 S. E. 2d 32, 38

(2012). The court found that FEGLIA clearly instructed 

that the insurance proceeds should be paid to a named 

beneficiary. Id., at 44–46, 722 S. E. 2d, at 36–38. The 

court reasoned that “Congress did not intend merely for

the named beneficiary in a FEGLI policy to receive the 

proceeds, only then to have them subject to recovery by a

third party under state law.” Id., at 44, 722 S. E. 2d, at 

37. It therefore concluded that Section D is pre-empted by

FEGLIA, because it “stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id., at 45, 722 S. E. 2d, at 37 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

We granted certiorari, 568 U. S. ___ (2013), to resolve a 

conflict among the state and federal courts over whether

FEGLIA pre-empts a rule of state law that automatically 

assigns an interest in the proceeds of a FEGLI policy to a 

person other than the named beneficiary or grants that 
 

6 HILLMAN v. MARETTA 

Opinion of the Court 

person a right to recover such proceeds.1 We now affirm. 

II 

Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress has the power 

to pre-empt state law expressly. See Brown v. Hotel 

Employees, 468 U. S. 491, 500–501 (1984). Although

FEGLIA contains an express pre-emption provision, see 

§8709(d)(1), the court below considered only whether

Section D is pre-empted under conflict pre-emption principles. We limit our analysis here to that holding. State 

law is pre-empted “to the extent of any conflict with a 

federal statute.” Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 372 (2000) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 

312 U. S. 52, 66–67 (1941)). Such a conflict occurs when 

compliance with both federal and state regulations is

impossible, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 

373 U. S. 132, 142–143 (1963), or when the state law 

“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” 

Hines, 312 U. S., at 67. This case raises a question of 

purposes and objectives pre-emption.

The regulation of domestic relations is traditionally the

domain of state law. See In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593– 

594 (1890). There is therefore a “presumption against preemption” of state laws governing domestic relations, 

Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U. S. 141, 151 (2001), and “family 

and family-property law must do ‘major damage’ to ‘clear

and substantial’ federal interests before the Supremacy 

—————— 

1Compare, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F. 3d 119 

(CA1 2005) (FEGLIA pre-empted state-law rule); Metropolitan Life Ins. 

Co. v. Sullivan, 96 F. 3d 18 (CA2 1996) (per curiam) (same); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McMorris, 786 F. 2d 379 (CA10 1986) (same); O’Neal 

v. Gonzalez, 839 F. 2d 1437 (CA11 1988), with Hardy v. Hardy, 963 

N. E. 2d 470 (Ind. 2012) (not pre-empted); McCord v. Spradling, 830 

So. 2d 1188 (Miss. 2002) (same); Kidd v. Pritzel, 821 S. W. 2d 566 (Mo. 

App. 1991) (same). 
 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

Clause will demand that state law will be overridden,” 

Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U. S. 572, 581 (1979). But 

family law is not entirely insulated from conflict preemption principles, and so we have recognized that state 

laws “governing the economic aspects of domestic relations 

. . . must give way to clearly conflicting federal enactments.” Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46, 55 (1981). 

A 

To determine whether a state law conflicts with Congress’ purposes and objectives, we must first ascertain

the nature of the federal interest. Crosby, 530 U. S., at 

372–373. 

Hillman contends that Congress’ purpose in enacting 

FEGLIA was to advance administrative convenience by 

establishing a clear rule to dictate where the Government

should direct insurance proceeds. See Brief for Petitioner 

25. There is some force to Hillman’s argument that a 

significant legislative interest in a large federal program 

like FEGLIA is to enable its efficient administration. If 

Hillman is correct that administrative convenience was 

Congress’ only purpose, then there might be no conflict

between Section D and FEGLIA: Section D’s cause of 

action takes effect only after benefits have been paid, and 

so would not necessarily impact the Government’s distribution of insurance proceeds. Cf. Hardy v. Hardy, 963 

N. E. 2d 470, 477–478 (Ind. 2012). 

For her part, Maretta insists that Congress had a more 

substantial purpose in enacting FEGLIA: to ensure that a

duly named beneficiary will receive the insurance proceeds and be able to make use of them. Brief for Respondent 21–22. If Maretta is correct, then Section D would 

directly conflict with that objective, because its cause of

action would take the insurance proceeds away from the

named beneficiary and reallocate them to someone else. 

We must therefore determine which understanding of 
 

 

 

 

8 HILLMAN v. MARETTA 

Opinion of the Court 

FEGLIA’s purpose is correct.

We do not write on a clean slate. In two previous cases,

we considered federal insurance statutes requiring that 

insurance proceeds be paid to a named beneficiary and 

held they pre-empted state laws that mandated a different 

distribution of benefits. The statutes we addressed in 

these cases are similar to FEGLIA. And the impediments

to the federal interests in these prior cases are analogous

to the one created by Section D of the Virginia statute.

These precedents accordingly govern our analysis of the

relationship between Section D and FEGLIA in this case. 

In Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655 (1950), we considered whether the National Service Life Insurance Act of 

1940 (NSLIA), 54 Stat. 1008, pre-empted a rule of state 

marital property law. Congress had enacted NSLIA to

“affor[d] a uniform and comprehensive system of life insurance for members and veterans of the armed forces of 

the United States.” Wissner, 338 U. S., at 658. A California court granted the decedent’s widow, who was not the

named beneficiary, an interest in the insurance proceeds 

as community property under state law. Id., at 657. 

We reversed, holding that NSLIA pre-empted the widow’s state-law action to recover the proceeds. Id., at 658. 

In pertinent part, NSLIA provided that the insured “‘shall 

have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries 

of the insurance [within a designated class], . . . and shall 

. . . at all times have the right to change the beneficiary or 

beneficiaries.’” Ibid. (quoting 38 U. S. C. §802(g) (1946 

ed.)). We reasoned that “Congress has spoken with force

and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the

named beneficiary and no other.” 338 U. S., at 658. The 

California court’s decision could not stand, we found, 

because it “substitute[d] the widow for the mother, who

was the beneficiary Congress directed shall receive the

insurance money.” Id., at 659. 

In Ridgway, we considered a similar question regarding 
Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

the federal Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act of 1965

(SGLIA), Pub. L. 89–214, 79 Stat. 880, another insurance 

scheme for members of the armed services. 454 U. S., at 

50–53. A Maine court imposed a constructive trust on

insurance proceeds paid to a servicemember’s widow, who 

was the named beneficiary, and ordered they be paid to

the decedent’s first wife as required by the terms of a 

divorce decree. Id., at 49–50. 

In holding the constructive trust pre-empted, we explained that the issue was “controlled by Wissner.” Id., at 

55. As in Wissner, the applicable provisions of SGLIA 

made clear that “the insured service member possesses the 

right freely to designate the beneficiary and to alter that 

choice at any time by communicating the decision in writing to the proper office.” 454 U. S., at 56 (citing Wissner, 

338 U. S., at 658). We also noted that SGLIA established an “‘order of precedence,’” which provided that the 

benefits would be first paid to “ such ‘beneficiary or beneficiaries as the member . . . may have designated by [an

appropriately filed] writing received prior to death.’” 454 

U. S., at 52 (quoting 38 U. S. C. §770(a) (1976 ed.)). Notwithstanding “some small differences” between SGLIA

and NSLIA, we concluded that SGLIA’s “unqualified directive to pay the proceeds to the properly designated beneficiary clearly suggest[ed] that no different result was 

intended by Congress.” 454 U. S., at 57. 

B 

Our reasoning in Wissner and Ridgway applies with

equal force here. The statutes we considered in these 

earlier cases are strikingly similar to FEGLIA. Like 

NSLIA and SGLIA, FEGLIA creates a scheme that gives 

highest priority to an insured’s designated beneficiary. 5 

U. S. C. §8705(a). Indeed, FEGLIA includes an “order of 

precedence” that is nearly identical to the one in SGLIA: 

Both require that the insurance proceeds be paid first to 
 

 

10 HILLMAN v. MARETTA 

Opinion of the Court 

the named beneficiary ahead of any other potential recipient. Compare ibid. with 38 U. S. C. §770(a) (1976 ed.) 

(now §1970(a) (2006 ed.)). FEGLIA’s implementing regulations further underscore that the employee’s “right” of 

designation “cannot be waived or restricted.” 5 CFR 

§843.205(e). In FEGLIA, as in these other statutes, Congress “‘spok[e] with force and clarity in directing that the

proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.’” 

Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 55 (quoting Wissner, 338 U. S., at 

658; emphasis added). 2 

Section D interferes with Congress’ scheme, because it

directs that the proceeds actually “belong” to someone 

other than the named beneficiary by creating a cause of

action for their recovery by a third party. Ridgway, 454 

U. S., at 55; see Va. Code Ann. §20–111.1(D). It makes no 

difference whether state law requires the transfer of the 

proceeds, as Section A does, or creates a cause of action,

like Section D, that enables another person to receive the 

proceeds upon filing an action in state court. In either 

case, state law displaces the beneficiary selected by the 

insured in accordance with FEGLIA and places someone 

else in her stead. As in Wissner, applicable state law

“substitutes the widow” for the “beneficiary Congress

directed shall receive the insurance money,” 338 U. S., at 

659, and thereby “frustrates the deliberate purpose of

Congress” to ensure that a federal employee’s named 

beneficiary receives the proceeds. Ibid. 

One can imagine plausible reasons to favor a different 

—————— 

2Hillman points to some textual differences among NSLIA, SGLIA, 

and FEGLIA. She suggests, for example, that the provision of NSLIA

enabling the appointment of a beneficiary does not use precisely the

“ ‘same language’ ” as FEGLIA’s order of precedence. Reply Brief 21.

Even if there are “some small differences” in the statutory language, 

however, they do not diminish the critical similarity shared by the 

three statutes: Each reflects Congress’ “unqualified directive” that the

proceeds accrue to a named beneficiary. Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 57. 
 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

policy. Many employees perhaps neglect to update their

beneficiary designations after a change in marital status.

As a result, a legislature could have thought that a default 

rule providing that insurance proceeds accrue to a widow

or widower, and not a named beneficiary, would be more 

likely to align with most people’s intentions. Or, similarly,

a legislature might have reasonably believed that an

employee’s will is more reliable evidence of his intent than

a beneficiary designation form executed years earlier.

But that is not the judgment Congress made.3 Rather 

than draw an inference about an employee’s probable 

intent from a range of sources, Congress established a 

clear and predictable procedure for an employee to indicate who the intended beneficiary of his life insurance

shall be. Like the statutes at issue in Ridgway and 

Wissner, FEGLIA evinces Congress’ decision to accord

federal employees an unfettered “freedom of choice” in

selecting the beneficiary of the insurance proceeds and to

ensure the proceeds would actually “belong” to that beneficiary. Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 56. An employee’s ability 

to name a beneficiary acts as a “guarantee of the complete 

and full performance of the contract to the exclusion of 

conflicting claims.” Wissner, 338 U. S., at 660. With that 

promise comes the expectation that the insurance proceeds will be paid to the named beneficiary and that the 

beneficiary can use them.

There is further confirmation that Congress intended 

—————— 

3 In his concurrence, JUSTICE ALITO argues that one of FEGLIA’s purposes is to “effectuat[e] . . . the insured’s expressed intent” and that 

evidence beyond an employee’s named beneficiary could therefore be 

relevant in some circumstances to determining that intent. Post, at 2–3 

(opinion concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original). For the 

reasons explained, however, that statement of Congress’ purpose is

incomplete. See supra, at 9–10. Congress sought to ensure that an

employee’s intent would be given effect only through the designation of 

a beneficiary or through the narrow exceptions specifically provided in

the statute, see infra, at 12–13. 
 

12 HILLMAN v. MARETTA 

Opinion of the Court 

the insurance proceeds be paid in accordance with 

FEGLIA’s procedures. Section 8705(e)(1) of FEGLIA 

provides that “[a]ny amount which would otherwise be 

paid . . . under the order of precedence” shall be paid to 

another person “if and to the extent expressly provided for 

in the terms of any court decree of divorce, annulment, or 

legal separation.” This exception, however, only applies if

the “decree, order, or agreement . . . is received, before the

date of the covered employee’s death, by the employing 

agency.” §8705(e)(2). This provision allows the proceeds 

to be paid to someone other than the named beneficiary,

but if and only if the requisite documentation is filed with

the Government, so that any departure from the beneficiary designation is managed within, not outside, the 

federal system.4 

We have explained that “[w]here Congress explicitly

enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition,

additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence

of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” Andrus v. 

Glover Constr. Co., 446 U. S. 608, 616–617 (1980). Section 

8705(e) creates a limited exception to the order of precedence. If States could make alternative distributions 

outside the clear procedure Congress established, that 

—————— 

4Congress enacted 5 U. S. C. §8705(e) following federal-court decisions that found FEGLIA to pre-empt state-court constructive trust

actions predicated upon divorce decrees. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 839 F. 2d, 

at 1439–1440. Reflecting this backdrop, the House Report noted that

“Under current law, . . . divorce decrees . . . do not affect the payment of

life insurance proceeds. Instead, when the policyholder dies, the 

proceeds are paid to the beneficiary designated by the policyholder, if 

any, or to other individuals as specified by statute.” H. R. Rep. No. 

105–134, p. 2 (1997). To address the issue raised by these lower court 

cases, Congress could have amended FEGLIA to allow state law to take

precedence over the named beneficiary when there is any conflict with 

a divorce decree or annulment. But Congress did not do so, and instead 

described the precise conditions under which a divorce decree could

displace an employee’s named beneficiary. 
 

 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

would transform this narrow exception into a general 

license for state law to override FEGLIA. See TRW Inc. v. 

Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 28–29 (2001).5 

In short, where a beneficiary has been duly named, the

insurance proceeds she is owed under FEGLIA cannot be

allocated to another person by operation of state law.

Section D does exactly that. We therefore agree with the 

Virginia Supreme Court that it is pre-empted. 

III 

We are not persuaded by Hillman’s additional arguments in support of a different result. 

Hillman contends that Ridgway and Wissner can be 

distinguished because, unlike the statutes we considered 

in those cases, FEGLIA does not include an “antiattachment provision.” Brief for Petitioner 38–41. The 

anti-attachment provisions in NSLIA and SGLIA were 

identical, and each broadly prohibited the “attachment,

levy, or seizure” of insurance proceeds by any legal process. 38 U. S. C. §454a (1946 ed.) (incorporated by reference in §816); §770(g) (1976 ed.). In Wissner and Ridgway, 

we found that the relevant state laws violated these provisions and that this further conflict supported our conclusion that the state laws were pre-empted.

These discussions of the anti-attachment provisions, 

however, were alternative grounds to support the judgment in each case, and not necessary components of the 

holdings. See Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 60–61 (describing 

—————— 

5Hillman contends that §8705(e) of FEGLIA indicates that Congress

contemplated that the proceeds could be paid to someone other than the 

named beneficiary and that Section D is consistent with that broad 

principle. Brief for Petitioner 43. As noted, however, §8705(e) has the

opposite implication, because it is framed as a specific exception to the 

rule that the proceeds accrue in all cases to the named beneficiary. It is 

not, as Hillman suggests, a general rule authorizing state law to

supersede FEGLIA. 
 

 

 

14 HILLMAN v. MARETTA 

Opinion of the Court 

separately the anti-attachment provision and noting that 

the state law “also” conflicted with it); id., at 60 (noting 

that in Wissner we found an “anti-attachment provision 

. . . as an independent ground for the result reached in 

that case” (emphasis added)); see also Rose v. Rose, 481 

U. S. 619, 631 (1987) (describing Wissner’s treatment of 

the anti-attachment provision as “clearly an alternative

holding”). The absence of an anti-attachment provision in 

FEGLIA does not render Ridgway’s and Wissner’s primary 

holdings any less applicable here.

Next, Hillman suggests that Wissner and Ridgway can 

be set aside because FEGLIA contains an express preemption provision and that conflict pre-emption principles

ordinarily do not apply when that is so. Brief for Petitioner 

45–47. As noted, the court below did not pass on the 

parties’ express pre-emption arguments, and thus we similarly address only conflict pre-emption. See supra, at 7. 

And we need not consider whether Section D is expressly 

pre-empted, because Hillman is incorrect to suggest 

that FEGLIA’s express pre-emption provision renders 

conflict pre-emption inapplicable. Rather, we have made 

clear that the existence of a separate pre-emption provision “‘does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption principles.’” Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 

U. S. 51, 65 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 

Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip 

op., at 14).

Hillman further argues that Ridgway is not controlling

because a provision of FEGLIA specifically authorizes an

employee to assign a FEGLI policy, whereas SGLIA’s

implementing regulations prohibit such an assignment. 

See 5 U. S. C. §8706(f)(1) (2006 ed., Supp. V); 38 CFR §9.6

(2012). The premise of Hillman’s argument is that 

FEGLIA’s assignment provision suggests that an employee

has a less substantial interest in who ultimately receives the proceeds. But an employee’s ability to assign a 
 

 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

FEGLI policy in fact highlights Congress’ intent to allow 

an employee wide latitude to determine how the proceeds

should be paid, whether that is to a named beneficiary 

that he selects, or indirectly through the assignment of the 

policy itself to someone else.

Finally, Hillman attempts to distinguish Ridgway and 

Wissner because Congress enacted the statutes at issue in

those cases with the goal of improving military morale.

Brief for Petitioner 47–51. Congress’ aim of increasing the 

morale of the armed services, however, was not the basis 

of our pre-emption analysis in either case. See Wissner, 

338 U. S., at 658–659; Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 53–56. 

* * * 

Section D is in direct conflict with FEGLIA because it 

interferes with Congress’ objective that insurance proceeds belong to the named beneficiary. Accordingly, we

hold that Section D is pre-empted by federal law. The 

judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court is affirmed. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 1 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 11–1221 

JACQUELINE HILLMAN, PETITIONER v. JUDY A.
 

MARETTA
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 

VIRGINIA
 

[June 3, 2013]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment. 

The Court correctly concludes that §20–111.1(D) of the

Virginia Code (Section D) is pre-empted by the Federal 

Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA), 5 

U. S. C. §8701 et seq. But I cannot join the “purposes and

objectives” framework that the majority uses to reach this 

conclusion. Ante, at 6. That framework is an illegitimate

basis for finding the pre-emption of state law, see Wyeth v. 

Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 583 (2009) (THOMAS, J., concurring

in judgment), and is entirely unnecessary to the result in

this case, because the ordinary meanings of FEGLIA and 

Section D directly conflict. Accordingly, I concur only in 

the judgment. 

The Supremacy Clause establishes that federal law 

“shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in 

the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary 

nothwithstanding.” Art. VI, cl. 2. “Where state and federal law ‘directly conflict,’ state law must give way.” PLIVA, 

Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 11) 

(quoting Wyeth, 555 U. S., at 583). As I have noted before, 

courts assessing whether state and federal law conflict

should not engage in a freewheeling inquiry into whether 

state law undermines supposed federal purposes and objectives. Id., at 588. Such an approach looks beyond the 

text of enacted federal law and thereby permits the Fed-
 

 

2 HILLMAN v. MARETTA 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

eral Government to displace state law without satisfying 

an essential precondition to pre-emption, namely, the Bicameral and Presentment Clause. Id., at 586–587. Preemption analysis should, therefore, instead hew closely to

the text and structure of the provisions at issue, and a

court should find pre-emption only when the “‘ordinary 

meaning’” of duly enacted federal law “effectively repeal[s]

contrary state law.” PLIVA, supra, at ___–___ (slip op., at 

14–15, 17).

Applying these principles, it is clear that the ordinary 

meaning of FEGLIA directly conflicts with Section D.

FEGLIA provides that life insurance benefits are paid

according to a particular “order of precedence.” 5 U. S. C. 

§8705(a); see also 5 CFR §870.801(a) (2013). The benefits 

are distributed first to “the beneficiary or beneficiaries

designated by the employee in a signed and witnessed 

writing received before death.” 5 U. S. C. §8705(a). If the 

insured fails to designate a beneficiary, FEGLIA provides

a specific order in which benefits must be distributed: next 

to “the widow or widower of the employee”; absent a widow

or widower, to “the child or children of the employee and 

descendants of [the] deceased children”; and so on. Ibid.; 

ante, at 2. The insured has the right to change his beneficiary designation “at any time without the knowledge or 

consent of the previous beneficiary,” and “[t]his right 

cannot be waived or restricted.” 5 CFR §870.802(f). 

Section D directly conflicts with this statutory scheme, 

because it nullifies the insured’s statutory right to designate a beneficiary. The right to designate a beneficiary 

encompasses a corresponding right in the named beneficiary not only to receive the proceeds, but also to retain

them. Indeed, the “right” to designate a beneficiary—as

well as the term “beneficiary” itself—would be meaningless if the only effect of a designation were to saddle the 

nominal beneficiary with liability under state law for the 

full value of the proceeds. But Section D accomplishes 
Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

exactly that: It transforms the designated beneficiary into 

a defendant in state court, a defendant who is now liable 

to the individual the State has designated as the true 

beneficiary. While Hillman does not insist that the insurer should have mailed the check to her (as opposed to 

Maretta, the designated beneficiary), Section D requires,

in effect, this very result. See ante, at 10 (“[Section D]

displaces the beneficiary selected by the insured in accordance with FEGLIA and places someone else in her 

stead”). If the right to designate a beneficiary means

anything, we must conclude that Section D directly conflicts with FEGLIA’s order of precedence.

The direct conflict between Section D and FEGLIA is 

also evident in the fact that Section D’s only function is to 

accomplish what Section A would have achieved, had 

Section A not been pre-empted. Section A provides that, 

“upon the entry of a decree of annulment or divorce

from the bond of matrimony . . . , any revocable beneficiary designation contained in a then existing written contract owned by one party that provides for the 

payment of any death benefit to the other party is revoked. A death benefit prevented from passing to

a former spouse by this section shall be paid as if 

the former spouse had predeceased the decedent.” Va. 

Code Ann. §20–111.1(A) (Lexis Cum. Supp. 2012). 

Both parties agree that FEGLIA pre-empts this provision. 

Brief for Petitioner 4–5; Brief for Respondent 2; see also

283 Va. 34, 52, 722 S. E. 2d 32, 35 (2012). And for good 

reason: if an insured has designated his former spouse as

the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, Section A purports to “revok[e]” that designation in the event of divorce 

or annulment. By purporting to so alter FEGLIA’s statutory order of precedence, Section A is clearly pre-empted

by federal law. Tellingly, it is precisely in this context—

and only in this context—that Section D operates. See 
 

 

4 HILLMAN v. MARETTA 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

§20–111.1(D). Of course, Section D does not preclude the 

direct payment of benefits to the designated beneficiary;

however, it accomplishes the same prohibited result by

transforming the designated party into little more than

a passthrough for the true beneficiary. This cannot be 

squared with FEGLIA. Consequently, Section D must 

yield. 

* * * 

For these reasons, I agree with the Court’s conclusion 

that Section D is pre-empted and, therefore, concur in the

judgment. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 1 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 11–1221 

JACQUELINE HILLMAN, PETITIONER v. JUDY A.
 

MARETTA
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 

VIRGINIA
 

[June 3, 2013]

 JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment. 

I concur in the judgment. Because one of the purposes

of the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 

1954 (FEGLIA) is to implement the expressed wishes of

the insured, I would hold that a state law is pre-empted 

if it effectively overrides an insured’s actual, articulated 

choice of beneficiary. The challenged provision of Virginia 

law has that effect. 

By way of background, Va. Code Ann. §20–111.1(A) 

(Lexis Supp. 2012) provides that the entry of a divorce decree automatically revokes an insured’s prior designation of his or her former spouse as the beneficiary of the

policy. And where, as in this case, the insured remarries 

after the divorce and dies before making a new FEGLIA

designation, the proceeds, under 5 U. S. C. §8705(a), are 

automatically paid to the insured’s former spouse. Under 

the provision of Virginia law at issue here, the surviving 

spouse is entitled to recover those proceeds from the former spouse. See Va. Code Ann. §20–111.1(D). Section 

20–111.1(D) apparently requires this result even if the insured manifests a clear contrary intent, such as by providing specifically in a recent will that the proceeds are to go 

to another party—for example, the insured’s children by

the former marriage. Because §20–111.1(D) overrides the 

insured’s express intent (whether that intent is expressed 
 

 

2 HILLMAN v. MARETTA 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

via a beneficiary designation or through other reliable

means), I agree that it is pre-empted by FEGLIA. 

Interpreted in light of our prior decisions in Wissner v. 

Wissner, 338 U. S. 655 (1950), and Ridgway v. Ridgway, 

454 U. S. 46 (1981), FEGLIA seems to me to have two 

primary purposes or objectives. 

The first is administrative convenience. It is easier for 

an insurance administrator to pay insurance proceeds to 

the person whom the insured has designated on a specified 

form without having to consider claims made by others

based on some other ground. But §20–111.1(D) does not

affect the initial payment of proceeds. It operates after 

the funds are received by the designated beneficiary, and it

thus causes no inconvenience for those who administer the 

payment of FEGLIA proceeds.

The second purpose or objective is the effectuation of the

insured’s expressed intent above all other considerations. 

That was the basis for the decisions in Wissner and Ridgway, as I understand them. In both cases, there was a 

conflict between a person whom the insured had designated as his beneficiary and another person whose claim to

the proceeds was not based on the insured’s expressed

intent, and in both cases, the Court held in favor of the 

designated beneficiary.

The present case bears a similarity to Wissner and 

Ridgway in that petitioner’s claim depends upon a state statute that automatically alters the ultimate recipient of 

a divorced employee’s insurance proceeds. To be sure, 

Virginia’s provision may well reflect the unexpressed

preferences of the majority of insureds whose situations

are similar to that of the insured in this case—that is, 

individuals who, after divorce and remarriage, fail to 

change a prior designation of a former spouse as the beneficiary of the policy. But FEGLIA prioritizes the insured’s 

expressed intent. And it is telling that, on petitioner’s

theory, she would still be entitled to the insurance pro-
Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

ceeds even if, for example, the insured had died shortly 

after executing a new will leaving those proceeds to someone else. This shows that her claim is based on something 

other than a manifestation of the insured’s intent. Because §20–111.1(D) operates as a blunt tool to override the

insured’s express declaration of his or her intent, it conflicts with FEGLIA’s purpose of prioritizing an insured’s

articulated wishes above all other considerations. 

In affirming the decision below, the Court goes well 

beyond what is necessary and opines that the party designated as the beneficiary under a FEGLIA policy must 

be allowed to keep the insurance proceeds even if the insured’s contrary and expressed intent is indisputable—for 

example, when the insured writes a postdivorce will specifically leaving the proceeds to someone else. See ante, 

at 11. The Court’s explanation is as follows: “Congress

sought to ensure that an employee’s intent would be given 

effect only through the designation of a beneficiary or 

through the narrow exceptions specifically provided in the 

statute.” Ibid., n. 3. In other words, Congress wanted the 

designated beneficiary—rather than the person named 

in a later will—to keep the proceeds because Congress 

wanted the named beneficiary to keep the proceeds. Needless the say, this circular reasoning does not explain why

Congress might have wanted the designated beneficiary to 

keep the proceeds even when that is indisputably contrary

to the insured’s expressed wishes at the time of death. I 

am doubtful that any purpose or objective of FEGLIA

would be honored by such a holding, but it is not necessary 

to resolve that question in this case.

For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.