NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 16

- 2910

JAHMAL PHOENIX ,

Appellant v. COATESVILLE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the East ern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2: 1 5

- cv - 00072 ) District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert

____________________________________ Submitted U nder Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on Tuesday March 7, 2017
Before: SMITH , Chief Judge , HARDIMA N, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges (F iled : March 20, 2017)

OPINION *

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
In an employment discrimination action alleging constructive discharge on the
basis of race , Jahmal Phoenix appeals the District Court’s evidentiary rulings and denial

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

of his motion for a new t rial following a jury verdict in favor of his former employer, the
C oatesville Area School District (“ Coatesville ” )

. For the reasons that follow , we will
affirm.
I. Background
P hoenix, an African

- American male, began working for Coates ville in 2007 as a computer applications teacher of middle school students

. In 2011, Coatesville eliminated
th e computer applications program from its middle school curriculum , and , as a result, Phoenix was reassigned to teach math, despite being untraine d to do so . Although he excelled as a computer teacher, h e struggled to meet expectations in his math courses

. In late 2012, Phoenix was placed on a performance improvement plan , and i n January 2013 , the P rincipal of the middle school gave Phoenix an uns atisfactory performance review , the first he had received during his tenure with Coatesville

. When he learned a few
months later that he would soon receive another unsatisfactory performance review and
would be terminate d, Phoenix resigned. That August , a Coatesville employee discovered racist text message s on the cell phone of Richard Como, the Superintendent of Coatesville and the official primarily responsible for the decision to terminate Phoenix

. In addition to being highly offensive,
Como’s text m essage exchange s with another administrator suggested Como was fraudulently misusing Coatesville funds , which prompted a grand jury investigation into
Como and certain other high

- ranking administrators

. After learning of the text s when the story w as repor ted in the newspaper , Phoenix brought race discrimination claims against3

Coatesville under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e to 2000e

17 , and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) , 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 951

- 963

. 1 These claims w ere tried in the District Court; the jury returned a verdict in Coatesville’s favor ; and t he District Court denied Phoenix’s motion for a new trial

. Phoenix now appeals, challenging the District Court’s evidentiary rulings and its denial
of his mo tion for a new trial

. II. Discussion 2
Phoenix contends the District Court erred in (1) excluding admissible evidence
central to his claims , (2) permitting hearsay and speculative testimony by Coatesville ’s
sole witness , and (3) denying Phoenix’s motion f or a new trial. We address each ruling
in turn.
A. Excluded Evidence
Phoenix first argues the District Court erred in exclud ing four categories of
documents: all but one of Como’s text exchanges, an independent internal report commissioned by the Board of Coatesville ( the “Board Report”), a grand jury report on Coatesville administrators ( the “Grand Jury Report”), and evidence of spoliation efforts by Coatesville

. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative va lue is substantially outweighed by [ the ] danger of . . . unfair prejudice,

1 Phoenix also brought a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 that is not at issue in this appeal.

2 The Dist rict Court had subject

- matter jurisdiction over Phoenix’s Title VII claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and over Phoenix’s P HRA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 13 67

. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291

.4

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. We review a district c ourt’s evidentiary r u lings for abuse of discretion, Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. , 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002) , and we find none here. We begin with Como’s text messages. T he District Court allowed into evidence

one exchange between Como and another administr ator that expressly referenced
Phoenix

— an exchange that contained offensive racial epithets and reflected Como’s involvement in Coatesville’s firing decisions. But the District Court excluded the other exchanges, agreeing with Phoenix that they were “vile ” and “racist,” App. 5, but concluding that they were not directly relevant to Phoenix’s discharge and that, under Rule 403, any probative value was substantially outweighed by the likelihood of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues

. 3 In making th at determination, the District Court considered that “[t]he jury heard plenty of evidence of Como’s use of racial epithets, in relation to Phoenix as well as others, and his control of Coatesville’ s hiring and firing process. ” App. 14

. That
evidence incl uded testimony from Coatesville’s Director of Middle School Education that
Como used racial epithets frequently , and that Phoenix was terminated , in her opinion,

3 Although Phoenix cont ends the District Court erred in performing its Rule 403 balancing regarding the text messages before trial , Phoenix fails to assert the District Court did not have a complete record before it on this issue

. S ee Brown v. Monsanto Co. ( In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. ) , 91 6 F.2d 829, 859

- 60 (3d Cir. 1990)

. In fact, the District Court reviewed and considered all of Como’s racist text messages and, as discussed, allowed one exchange into evidence. T hus , we perceive no error in the District Court’s decision to rule pre

- trial

.5

because of his race , as well as documentary evidence and witness testimony that Como
was in ch arge of person nel decisions in Coatesville , a point Coatesville did not refute

. Having “carefully balanced the relevance, probative value and likely prejudicial impact of Como’s overall conduct and allowed into evidence everything Phoenix needed to make
h is point ” that Como was racist and responsible generally for employment decisions, App. 14, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding racist text s that were not directly relevant to the decision to terminate Phoenix , s ee United States v. Bailey , 840 F.3d 99, 118 (3d Cir. 2016)

. Phoenix’s challenges to the exclusion of the Board Report and the Grand Jury Report fare no better. 4 Both reports related to criminal investigation s into the conduct of
senior Coatesville administrators , including , inter alia , their misuse and misappropriation
of Coatesville funds and obstruction of justice . T he Board Report also evaluate d the Board’s response following its discovery of Como’s offensive text messages

. As the District Court observed, tho se issues are irrelevant to whether Coatesville terminated
Phoenix due to racial animus and would likely have confused the jury and unduly prejudiced Coatesville if admitted. W e therefore perceive no abuse of discretion in their
exclusion. See Forrest v. Beloit Co rp. , 424 F.3d 344, 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2005).

4 As further evidence of the careful balancing it conducted in this case, t he District Court did admit two small excerpts from these reports : (1) the text message exchange above, excerpted from the Grand Jury Report for ease of authentication, and (2) one sentence from the Board Report admitted for the purpose of demonstrating Como’s decision

- making power

.6

Finally, Phoenix argues the District Court erred in pre cluding evidence of spoliation, that is, Coatesville ’s “efforts to conceal and destroy the text messages” after they were originally discovered. App. 19

. H owever, we agree with the District Court
that “[ a ] ny purported efforts to conceal or destroy the text messages, the essential contents of which were repeated for the jury ad nauseum , were completely irrelevant to
whether or not Coatesville terminated or co nstructively discharged Phoenix because of his race.” App. 19. The District Court thus was well within its discretion in excluding testimony and documentary evidence concerning spoliation

. See Forrest , 424 F.3d at
355.
B. Testimonial Evidence
Phoenix ne xt asserts the District Court erred by permitting hearsay and speculative testimony from Coatesville ’s sole witness, the middle school Principal, relating to complaints the Principal had heard about Phoenix failing to superv ise students on a bus
and show in g frustration in the classroom on a particular occasion that caused a student to
cry. Even a ssuming this testimony was admitted in error, however, we see no reason to question the jury’s verdict because “it is highly probable that the error[ ] did not aff ect the
outcome of the case. ” Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp. , 544 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 61

. We conclude any error here was harmless for two reasons. First, the majority of

t he Principal’s contested testimony is cumulative of two disciplinary memoranda that

were admitted as evidence at trial and that are not challenged on appeal . The7

memoranda, both addressed from the witness to Phoenix, portray the school bus incident
and th e subsequent classroom episode as they were described at trial

. The only testimony not encompassed by the memoranda is the witness’s description of the crying student
who reported the classroom incident , an inconsequential detail that cannot be said to be

“ substantively important, inflammatory, repeated, emph asized, or unfairly self

- serving”
to Coatesville. Hirst , 544 F.3d at 228 n.10 (quoting Doty v. Sewall , 908 F.2d 1053, 1057 (1st Cir. 1990) ).
Second , considering the record as a whole, Coatesville intr oduced more than enough other evidence regarding Phoenix’s poor performance and unprofessional
behavior for “us to conclude that [Coatesville] was able to clearly and convincingly prove
the elements of its case without reliance on the tainted evidence

. ” L angbord v. U.S. Dep’ t of Treasury , 832 F.3d 170, 196 (3d Cir. 2016)

. Indeed, t wo of Phoenix’s supervisors testified at length about these issues, and Phoenix himself conceded at trial
that h e underperformed as a math teacher and was once suspended for unp rofessional
behavior

. Given the “ substantial amount of other evidence ” that Coatesville ’s decision to discharg e Phoenix was not motivated by racial animus , Walker v. Horn , 385 F.3d 321, 336 (3d Cir. 2004), there is a “high probability” the District Court ’ s admission of the Principal’s testimony “di d not contribute to the verdict, ” Langbord , 832 F.3d at 196

. Thus, even if error, it would not warrant relief

.8

C. Motion for a New Trial Lastly , Phoenix contests the District Court’s denia l of his motion for a new trial,
which we review for abuse of discretion, see Mancini v. Northampton Cty. , 836 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2016) , afford ing “[p]articular deference” where , as here, the decision rests on evidentiary rulings that were themselves “entrusted to the tria l court’s discretion,” Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 922 F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1990) . B ecause Phoenix’ s motion was premised on precisely the same evidentiary rulings he challenges on appeal , his final argument is unavailing

. In its thorough and car efully reasoned opinion, the District Court addressed each of Phoenix’s evidentiary contentions , and thus,
for the reasons previously stated, we perceive no abuse of discretion. See id.
III . Conclusion For the foregoing reasons , w e will affirm the orders of the District Court.