Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Noonan v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2016 IL App (1st) 152300WC

Appellate Court 

Caption

TERRY NOONAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (City of 

Chicago, Appellee).

District & No. First District, Workers’ Compensation Commission Division

Docket No. 1-15-2300WC

Filed October 21, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 13-L-50026, 

13-L-50029; the Hon. Robert Lopez Cepero, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed in part and vacated in part; original Commission decision 

reinstated.

Counsel on

Appeal

Mark Schechter and Larry Coven, both of Coven Law Group, of 

Chicago, for appellant.

Christopher L. Jarchow, of Hennessy & Roach, P.C., of Chicago, for 

appellee.

Panel JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Hoffman and Hudson concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

Presiding Justice Holdridge specially concurred, with opinion.

Justice Stewart dissented, with opinion.
- 2 - 

 OPINION 

¶ 1 In April 2008, claimant, Terry Noonan, filed an application for adjustment of claim 

pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 to 30 (West 2006)), 

alleging he sustained a work-related injury to his right wrist on March 31, 2008, and seeking 

benefits from the employer, the City of Chicago. Following a hearing, the arbitrator 

determined claimant failed to prove that he sustained an injury arising out of his employment 

and denied him benefits. The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) 

affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s decision; however, on judicial review, the circuit court of 

Cook County reversed and remanded to the Commission for an award of benefits to claimant. 

¶ 2 On remand, the Commission, again, affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s denial of 

benefits. It also provided a more detailed explanation of its decision. On review, the circuit 

court entered an order finding its previous order “was in error” and the Commission’s initial 

decision should have been confirmed. The court held its previous remand order was “of no 

consequence.” Claimant filed a motion to reconsider the court’s decision, which the court 

denied. He now appeals, arguing the Commission’s finding that he failed to prove he sustained 

an injury arising out of his employment and its denial of benefits was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and reinstate the Commission’s 

original decision. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 At arbitration, claimant testified he initially worked for the employer as a “motor truck 

driver.” However, he sustained a work-related injury to his back that resulted in permanent 

restrictions and rendered him unable to perform the job duties for that position. Approximately 

three months prior to the accidental injury at issue on appeal, claimant began working for the 

employer as a “clerk.” He testified the duties associated with that position included filling out 

forms called “truck driver sheets” and answering the phone when no one else was available. It 

took him approximately five minutes to fill out each form, and he typically worked each day 

from 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. 

¶ 5 Claimant asserted that on March 31, 2008, he was injured while working for the employer 

as a clerk. He described the incident resulting in his injury as follows: 

“I was filling out a truck sheet and I made a mistake. I got out of my chair, grabbed 

another sheet, sat down, and I believe when I sat down, I put my elbow on the desk, 

knocked the pen off, pen fell to my right. So I put my left hand on top of the desk, and 

I’m sitting in a chair just like [the court reporter] here, and when I went and reached to 

my right, I didn’t know that the chair got up on its wheel. So[,] just as I was maybe 

about two inches or [an] inch from picking the pen up off the floor, the chair went out 

from underneath me. I stuck my right hand out to brace my fall.” 

Claimant testified his right hand came into contact with the floor and “it felt like [he] jammed 

it.” He felt pain and ultimately sought and received medical treatment, including surgery, for 

an injury to his right wrist. 

¶ 6 On cross-examination, claimant denied that the rolling chair he had been sitting in had been 

positioned on a slope or a slant. He stated he “went over sideways to [his] right” when 

attempting to retrieve the pen he dropped, noting he could not bend forward because he had 
- 3 - 

undergone disk replacement surgery. Further, he stated he thought the incident involved an 

ordinary fall. 

¶ 7 On April 20, 2012, the arbitrator issued a decision, finding claimant failed to prove his 

right wrist injury arose out of his employment and denying him benefits under the Act. 

Specifically, the arbitrator determined claimant “failed to prove that the simple act of sitting in 

a rolling chair and reaching for a pen exposed him to an increased risk of injury that was 

beyond what members of the general public are regularly exposed to.” On December 26, 2012, 

the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s decision without further comment. 

Claimant appealed, and on March 14, 2014, the circuit court entered an order reversing the 

Commission’s decision based on its “arising out of” analysis and remanding the matter for an 

award of benefits to claimant. 

¶ 8 On December 26, 2014, the Commission issued a decision and opinion on remand. It 

persisted in affirming and adopting the arbitrator’s denial of benefits but provided additional 

reasoning for its finding that claimant failed to prove that his right wrist injury arose out of his 

employment. Again, claimant sought judicial review. On March 12, 2015, the circuit court 

ordered as follows: 

“A. The [circuit court’s] Order of March 14, 2014[,] was in error. The 

Commission’s decision should have been affirmed. 

 B. The March 14, 2014[,] Remand Order is of no consequence.” 

The circuit court did not address the Commission’s December 2014 decision and opinion on 

remand. Claimant filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. 

¶ 9 This appeal followed. 

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 11 On appeal, claimant challenges the Commission’s finding that he failed to establish an 

accidental injury arising out of his employment. However, prior to considering claimant’s 

arguments, we are compelled to comment on two portions of the path this claim has traveled. 

First, we address the Commission’s decision to ignore the circuit court’s March 14, 2014, 

remand order. In its decision dated December 26, 2014, the Commission addressed the circuit 

court’s remand order as follows:

“The Commission concludes the Circuit Court did not make any findings based on 

the correct legal standard in determining the Commission’s decision finding [claimant] 

failed to prove he sustained an injury arising out of his employment was against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. As the Circuit Court mistakenly applied erroneous 

legal standards in contradiction of the Act and well established case law in determining 

that the Commission’s December 26, 2012[,] Decision was against the manifest weight 

of the evidence, the Commission is foreclosed from applying the Order of the Circuit 

Court here, as doing so would require us to depart from well established existing 

authority.” 

Its frustration notwithstanding, the Commission could not simply ignore the circuit court’s 

order. No matter how defective the circuit court’s reasoning may have been, the Commission 

was charged with following the court’s order, reversing the Commission and ordering it to 

award benefits. See Northwestern University v. Industrial Comm’n, 409 Ill. 216, 219, 99 

N.E.2d 18, 20 (1951) (“The [C]ommission was, of course, required to follow the directions of 
- 4 - 

the [circuit] court, but upon review in this court the whole record is open, and we have 

jurisdiction to pass upon the correctness of the order remanding the case to the *** 

Commission.”); People ex rel. Campo v. Matchett, 394 Ill. 464, 469, 68 N.E.2d 747, 749 

(1946) (“Where a cause is remanded by a court of review to a lower court with directions to 

enter a certain order or decree, the latter court has no discretion but to enter the decree as 

directed.”).

¶ 12 Second we address the circuit court’s March 12, 2015, order from which claimant appeals. 

The court entered that order after claimant sought judicial review of the Commission’s 

December 2014 decision and opinion on remand. In the order, the court found the 

Commission’s original decision should have been upheld and held its previous order, reversing 

and remanding to the Commission, was “of no consequence.” 

¶ 13 We note “[a] circuit court’s jurisdiction to review a decision of the Commission is a 

‘special statutory power’ ” and “must be exercised within the limits prescribed by the relevant 

statute.” Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL App 

(1st) 120549WC, ¶ 27, 2 N.E.3d 351. Under the Act, a circuit court “may confirm or set aside 

the decision of the Commission” on judicial review. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2006). 

¶ 14 In this instance, the circuit court acted without authority when ordering that the 

Commission’s original decision should have been upheld and its previous order was “of no 

consequence.” The matter was before the court for purposes of reviewing the Commission’s 

decision and opinion on remand, and the court was limited by the Act to confirming or setting 

aside that decision. The court should not have addressed previous orders entered in the matter 

by either it or the Commission. 

¶ 15 Although we find the circuit court committed error in connection with its March 2015 

order, that error does not affect our review of the matter. “Where, as here, the [circuit] court 

reverses the Commission’s initial decision and the Commission enters a new decision on 

remand, this court must decide whether the Commission’s initial decision was proper.” Vogel 

v. Industrial Comm’n, 354 Ill. App. 3d 780, 785-86, 821 N.E.2d 807, 812 (2005). Thus, we 

turn to the merits of claimant’s appeal and consider the propriety of the Commission’s initial 

decision. 

¶ 16 “To obtain compensation under the Act, a claimant bears the burden of showing, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that he has suffered a disabling injury which arose out of and in 

the course of his employment.” Sisbro, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 207 Ill. 2d 193, 203, 797 

N.E.2d 665, 671 (2003). “Whether an injury arises out of and in the course of the claimant’s 

employment is a question of fact to be resolved by the Commission, and we will not disturb its 

determination unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Metropolitan Water 

Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 407 Ill. 

App. 3d 1010, 1013, 944 N.E.2d 800, 803 (2011). “A finding of fact is contrary to the manifest 

weight of the evidence only where an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.” Id. 

¶ 17 “ ‘In the course of employment’ refers to the time, place and circumstances surrounding 

the injury.” Sisbro, 207 Ill. 2d at 203, 797 N.E.2d at 671. In this instance, there is no dispute 

that claimant’s accident occurred “in the course” of his employment. The sole issue presented 

on appeal is whether the Commission erred in finding claimant’s accident was not one “arising 

out of” of his employment. 

¶ 18 “The ‘arising out of’ component is primarily concerned with causal connection” and is 

satisfied when the claimant shows “that the injury had its origin in some risk connected with, 
- 5 - 

or incidental to, the employment so as to create a causal connection between the employment 

and the accidental injury.” Id. at 203, 797 N.E.2d at 672. 

“Stated otherwise, ‘an injury arises out of one’s employment if, at the time of the 

occurrence, the employee was performing acts he was instructed to perform by his 

employer, acts which he had a common law or statutory duty to perform, or acts which 

the employee might reasonably be expected to perform incident to his assigned duties. 

[Citation.] A risk is incidental to the employment where it belongs to or is connected 

with what an employee has to do in fulfilling his duties.’ ” Id. at 204, 797 N.E.2d at 672 

(quoting Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 129 Ill. 2d 52, 58, 541 N.E.2d 

at 667 (1989)). 

“For an injury to have arisen out of the employment, the risk of injury must be a risk peculiar to 

the work or a risk to which the employee is exposed to a greater degree than the general public 

by reason of his employment.” Orsini v. Industrial Comm’n, 117 Ill. 2d 38, 45, 509 N.E.2d 

1005, 1008 (1987). “[I]f the injury results from a hazard to which the employee would have 

been equally exposed apart from the employment, or a risk personal to the employee, it is not 

compensable.” Caterpillar, 129 Ill. 2d at 59, 541 N.E.2d at 667. 

¶ 19 Consistent with these principles, this court has categorized the risks to which an employee 

may be exposed as “(1) risks that are distinctly associated with the employment; (2) risks that 

are personal to the employee; and (3) neutral risks that do not have any particular employment 

or personal characteristics.” Metropolitan, 407 Ill. App. 3d at 1014, 944 N.E.2d at 804. As 

indicated by the relevant case authority, employment-related risks are compensable while 

personal risks typically are not. Further, “[i]njuries resulting from a neutral risk generally do 

not arise out of the employment and are compensable under the Act only where the employee 

was exposed to the risk to a greater degree than the general public.” Id. “Such an increased risk 

may be either qualitative, such as some aspect of the employment which contributes to the risk, 

or quantitative, such as when the employee is exposed to a common risk more frequently than 

the general public.” Id. 

¶ 20 Initially, claimant maintains his right wrist injury was compensable because it resulted 

from an employment-related risk. Specifically, he contends his accidental injuries arose out of 

his employment because the act he was performing at the time of his accident—attempting to 

retrieve a pen he had been using to fill out forms—was “in furtherance of his duties” for the 

employer. Claimant maintains this act was “incidental to his employment.” We disagree. 

¶ 21 Here, claimant’s job duties as a clerk required him to fill out forms and occasionally 

answer telephone calls. He was injured at work when the rolling chair he was sitting in “went 

out from underneath” him as he reached to retrieve a dropped pen. Although claimant was at 

work, the act he was performing when injured—reaching for a dropped item while sitting in a 

chair—was not one he was instructed to perform or had a duty to perform. Contrary to 

claimant’s assertions, we also find the act described was not incidental to his assigned duties. 

In particular, the act of reaching to the floor while sitting in a chair was not required by 

claimant’s job duties. The fact that he was reaching to retrieve a dropped pen and used a pen to 

fill out forms does not warrant an opposite conclusion. The risk of injury at issue was simply 

not one “distinctly associated” with claimant’s employment. 

¶ 22 We note claimant primarily relies on four cases to support his position that his injury 

resulted from an employment-related risk. In Young v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation 

Comm’n, 2014 IL App (4th) 130392WC, ¶¶ 4-5, 13 N.E.3d 1252, the claimant was a parts 
- 6 - 

inspector who injured his shoulder while reaching into a deep, narrow box to retrieve a part for 

inspection. Ultimately, this court found the claimant’s injury resulted from an 

employment-related risk and reversed the Commission’s denial of benefits. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. In so 

holding, we determined the claimant’s actions when injured—reaching and stretching his arm 

into a deep, narrow box to retrieve a part for inspection—were necessary for the fulfillment of 

his job duties and, thus, distinctly associated with the claimant’s employment. Id. ¶ 28. 

¶ 23 In Autumn Accolade v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL App (3d) 

120588WC, ¶ 3, 990 N.E.2d 901, the claimant worked for the employer as a caregiver at its 

assisted-care facility and was responsible for helping residents with the activities of daily 

living. While assisting a resident in the shower and holding onto the resident, the claimant 

reached to remove a soap dish that she believed posed a safety hazard and felt a “pop” in her 

neck. Id. ¶ 4. We upheld the Commission’s finding that the claimant’s injury arose out of her 

employment, stating the “claimant sustained the injury at issue while attempting to ensure the 

safety of a resident at the assisted living facility, an act which claimant might reasonably be 

expected to perform incident to her assigned duties.” Id. ¶ 18. 

¶ 24 In O’Fallon School District No. 90 v. Industrial Comm’n, 313 Ill. App. 3d 413, 414-15, 

729 N.E.2d 523, 524 (2000), the claimant was a teacher who was assigned to hall duty. She 

was responsible for “insuring the safety” of students and teachers in the hallways and “was 

assigned specifically the task of stopping children from running in the hallways.” Id. at 416, 

729 N.E.2d at 526. The claimant was injured when she noticed a student running in the hall and 

turned and twisted her body to pursue the student. Id. This court determined the claimant’s 

injury had its origin in a risk arising out of her employment, in that she had been “ordered 

specifically to undertake the risk of pursuing a running student.” Id. at 417, 729 N.E.2d at 526. 

¶ 25 Finally, in Homerding v. Industrial Comm’n, 327 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1052, 765 N.E.2d 

1064, 1066 (2002), the claimant worked for the employer as a nail technician and was injured 

when she slipped on ice in a parking lot while retrieving work-related supplies from her 

vehicle. We held the claimant’s accident arose out of her employment, stating she “was 

required to park in the rear of employer’s business on a lot employer financially contributed to 

maintain, and she needed certain supplies to perform her job.” Id. at 1054, 765 N.E.2d at 

1068-69. Further, we stated that: “But for the demands of her job, [the claimant] would not 

have needed to make a second trip to her car or negotiate the ice between her car and the salon 

door while carrying a large case. Her risk of injury accordingly was greater than that of the 

general public.” Id. at 1054, 765 N.E.2d at 1069. 

¶ 26 We find each of these cases factually distinguishable from the present case. Initially, we 

note Homerding appears to have been based on a neutral-risk analysis as we described the 

claimant’s risk of injury as being greater than that of the general public. Thus, it does not 

advance claimant’s position that he was injured as the result of an employment risk. Further, 

the facts in Young, Autumn Accolade, and O’Fallon each show that the claimant was 

performing acts his or her employer might reasonably have expected the claimant to perform 

when fulfilling his or her job duties—a parts inspector reaching into a box to retrieve a part for 

inspection (Young), a caregiver reaching to remove a safety hazard while holding onto an 

individual in the shower (Autumn Accolade), and a hall monitor turning and twisting to pursue 

a running student (O’Fallon). Evidence presented in this case failed to similarly establish 

claimant’s actions—reaching to retrieve a dropped object while sitting in a chair—were acts 

the employer might reasonably have expected him to perform incident to his clerk duties. 
- 7 - 

¶ 27 We decline to find claimant’s risk of injury in the present case was distinctly associated 

with his work for the employer. Instead, we find the risk of falling from a chair while reaching 

to the floor is one which claimant would have been equally exposed to apart from his work for 

the employer. Thus, it presents a neutral risk and is compensable only when claimant 

establishes he was quantitatively or qualitatively exposed to the risk to a greater degree than 

the general public. On appeal, claimant argues he was qualitatively subjected to a greater risk 

than that of the general public because he was injured while attempting to pick up a writing 

instrument that was essential to the completion of his job duties. Again, we disagree. 

¶ 28 Initially, we note that when addressing the neutral-risk analysis, claimant cites to several 

Commission decisions to support his argument. However, decisions of the Commission in 

unrelated cases are not precedential authority in cases before this court. S&H Floor Covering, 

Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 373 Ill. App. 3d 259, 266, 870 N.E.2d 821, 826 

(2007). They should not be cited by the parties on appeal, and we decline to consider them. 

¶ 29 This court has stated that “[e]mployment-related risks associated with injuries sustained as 

a consequence of a fall are those to which the general public is not exposed such as the risk of 

tripping on a defect at the employer’s premises, falling on uneven or slippery ground at the 

work site, or performing some work-related task which contributes to the risk of falling.” First 

Cash Financial Services v. Industrial Comm’n, 367 Ill. App. 3d 102, 106, 853 N.E.2d 799, 804 

(2006). Here, no evidence was presented as to any defective condition on the employer’s 

premises which would have contributed to claimant’s injury. Specifically, the evidence 

reflected only that claimant had been sitting in an ordinary chair and on an ordinary surface. 

¶ 30 Additionally, we do not find any work-related task contributed to his risk of falling. In this 

instance, claimant points to the fact that he was reaching for a pen to use in filling out forms as 

an aspect of his employment which contributed to his risk of injury. However, the risk posed 

from reaching for a pen while sitting in a rolling chair is no greater than if claimant had been 

reaching to retrieve any other object, including one wholly personal to him. As a result, we find 

claimant’s employment did not expose him to a neutral risk to a greater degree than the general 

public. 

¶ 31 Claimant further argues he was “clearly exposed to a risk that was greater than that of the 

general public” because he suffered a previous work-related back injury, which he testified 

prohibited him from bending forward and required him to bend “sideways to [his] right” to 

pick up the dropped pen. He maintains these facts clearly connect his right wrist injury to his 

employment. Claimant cites Interlake, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 161 Ill. App. 3d 704, 515 

N.E.2d 202 (1987), to support his argument. 

¶ 32 In that case, the claimant worked for the employer as a motor inspector and injured his back 

in a work-related accident. Id. at 706, 515 N.E.2d at 203. The claimant testified that after 

returning to work following that initial accident, he sustained a further injury to his back when 

he bent over to pick up a screwdriver at his foreman’s request. Id. Ultimately, this court 

determined the claimant’s accident arose out of his employment. Id. at 711, 515 N.E.2d at 206. 

In so holding, we rejected an argument by the employer that “the act of bending over is a 

personal, routine activity and that we should not consider claimant’s prior work-related 

accident.” Id. at 711-12, 515 N.E.2d at 207. We concluded the second accident could not be 

considered in isolation and since the claimant’s first accident appeared “to be a compensable, 

work-related injury, ‘the subsequent progression of that condition remains compensable so 

long as the worsening is not shown to have been produced by an independent nonindustrial 
- 8 - 

cause.’ ” Id. at 712, 515 N.E.2d at 207 (quoting 1 Arthur Larson, Larson’s Workers’

Compensation Law § 13.11(a), at 3-354 (1985)). 

¶ 33 Again, we find Interlake distinguishable from the facts presented here. Notably, this case 

does not involve multiple injuries to the same body part. Rather, evidence showed claimant’s 

previous work injury concerned a condition of ill-being in his back while his second injury 

involved his right wrist. Thus, unlike Interlake, the claim at issue on appeal does not involve 

the “progression” of a work-related injury. Additionally, although claimant testified his back 

injury caused him to bend to the right rather than forward to pick up the pen he dropped, no 

evidence was presented that bending to the right increased claimant’s risk of falling over in the 

rolling chair when reaching to the floor. Without such evidence, we cannot say claimant’s 

previous work-related back injury was causally related to his subsequent accident and right 

wrist injury. 

¶ 34 Finally, we find the circumstances of this case more similar to cases relied upon by the 

employer. First, in Board of Trustees v. Industrial Comm’n, 44 Ill. 2d 207, 209, 254 N.E.2d 

522, 523 (1969), the claimant was a teaching assistant who heard a noise while seated at his 

desk, turned in his chair, and “heard ‘something snap’ in his back.” On review, the supreme 

court found no evidence of a causal connection between the claimant’s employment and his 

accidental injury, stating as follows: 

“The appellant simply turned in his chair and suffered the injury. There was no 

suggestion that the chair was defective or unusual in any way. The medical evidence 

was that because of its degenerated condition any simple and normal activity would 

have caused the appellant’s disc to rupture. The injury was not caused by a risk 

incidental to the employment.” Id. at 214-15, 254 N.E.2d at 526. 

¶ 35 Second, in Hopkins v. Industrial Comm’n, 196 Ill. App. 3d 347, 348, 553 N.E.2d 732, 733 

(1990), the claimant worked for the employer as a police sergeant and was responsible for 

training another officer. He injured his back when the trainee officer asked him a question and 

the claimant turned in his chair to answer. Id. In finding the claimant’s back injury did not arise 

out of his employment, we stated as follows: 

“This case is very similar to [Board of Trustees]. Here, claimant ‘simply turned in 

his chair and suffered injury. There was no suggestion that the chair was defective or 

unusual in any way.’ There is no definite proof that claimant’s gun and holster caught 

on the chair as he turned. More is required than the fact that an accident occurred at 

claimant’s workplace.” Id. at 351-52, 553 N.E.2d at 735. 

Ultimately, we found the claimant’s injury resulted from a noncompensable personal risk. Id.

at 352, 553 N.E.2d at 735. 

¶ 36 In both Board of Trustees and Hopkins, the act of turning in a chair, without more, was 

insufficient to warrant a finding of compensability. Similarly, claimant’s action of bending 

over or reaching while seated in his work chair, without more, is insufficient to establish a 

work-related cause to his accidental injury. Under the circumstances presented we find no 

error in the Commission’s finding that claimant failed to establish an injury arising out of his 

employment. Its decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
- 9 - 

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court’s March 14, 2014, judgment, reversing 

the Commission’s initial decision and remanding to the Commission for an award of benefits 

to claimant; vacate the Commission’s December 26, 2014, decision and opinion on remand; 

vacate the circuit court’s March 12, 2014, decision, finding its previous remand order was “of 

no consequence”; and reinstate the Commission’s initial December 26, 2012, decision.

¶ 39 Reversed in part and vacated in part; original Commission decision reinstated. 

¶ 40 PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring. 

¶ 41 I join in the majority’s judgment and analysis. I write separately to expand upon the 

majority’s discussion of our decisions in Young v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 

2014 IL App (4th) 130392WC, and Autumn Accolade v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation 

Comm’n, 2013 IL App (3d) 120588WC (see supra ¶¶ 22-23, 26), and to clarify the legal 

analysis that should have been applied in those cases. The majority concludes that Young and 

Autumn Accolade are distinguishable from the instant case because, in each of those cases, the 

claimant was injured while performing acts that the employer might reasonably have expected 

the claimant to perform incidental to his or her job duties. Supra ¶ 26. However, even if I were 

to reject that distinction and find this case analogous to Young and Autumn Accolade, I would 

nevertheless decline to rely upon those cases because, in my view, they apply an incorrect 

analysis. A claimant may not obtain benefits for injuries caused by activities of everyday living 

(such as bending, reaching, or stooping), even if he was ordered or instructed to perform those 

activities as part of his job duties, unless the claimant’s job “required him to perform those 

activities more frequently than members of the general public or in a manner that increased the 

risk.” Adcock v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2015 IL App (2d) 130884WC, ¶ 39. 

In other words, such injuries should be analyzed under neutral risk principles. Although both 

Young and Autumn Accolade involved injuries stemming from the performance of everyday 

activities, neither case applied a neutral risk analysis. Accordingly, I am now of the opinion 

that Young and Autumn Accolade were wrongly decided, and I would decline to follow them. 

See Adcock, 2015 IL App (2d) 130884WC, ¶ 41 n.2.

¶ 42 JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting. 

¶ 43 I respectfully dissent from the opinion of my distinguished colleagues. 

¶ 44 As the majority notes, a risk is distinctly associated with a worker’s employment “if, at the 

time of the occurrence, the employee was performing acts he was instructed to perform by his 

employer, acts which he had a common law or statutory duty to perform, or acts which the 

employee might reasonably be expected to perform incident to his assigned duties.” 

Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 129 Ill. 2d 52, 58, 541 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1989).

However, the majority then determines that an employer would not reasonably expect a 

clerical worker to bend over to pick up a dropped pen. This finding defies common sense. In 

my view, any employer should reasonably expect a clerical employee to bend over and pick up 

a dropped pen. Accordingly, I would find that the acts that resulted in the claimant’s injury 

were distinctly associated with his employment. 
- 10 - 

¶ 45 I must also note that I disagree with Justice Holdridge’s special concurrence. Despite my 

disagreement with the majority’s categorization of the risk involved in this case, I believe that 

the majority employed the correct analysis by first determining whether the claimant’s injury 

resulted from an employment risk. See Young v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 

2014 IL App (4th) 130392WC, ¶ 23, 13 N.E.3d 1252 (“when a claimant is injured due to an 

employment-related risk *** it is unnecessary to perform a neutral-risk analysis”). Further, in 

my view, if a worker is injured performing an everyday activity, such as “bending over,” and 

that activity is incidental to his employment, the injury results from an employment risk, and a 

neutral-risk analysis should not be employed. In other words, I adhere to the views expressed 

in my special concurrence in Adcock v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2015 IL App 

(2d) 130884WC, ¶¶ 48-66, 38 N.E.3d 587 (Stewart, J., specially concurring). 

¶ 46 Accordingly, I would reverse the original decision of the Commission and remand to the 

Commission for an award of benefits.