alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Stephen YAGMAN, Attorney; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Michael COLELLO, Defendant-Appellee. *116Yagman, Yagman & Reichmann, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael Colello, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 07-55582, 07-55741.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 10, 2008.*

Filed Jan. 13, 2009.

Stephen Yagman, Esq., Yagman & Yagman & Reichmann, Venice Beach, CA, pro se.

J. Curtis Edmondson Law Offices, Ontario, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: FARRIS and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable William W. Schwarzer, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Stephen Yagman and his law firm, Yagman *&*Yagman *&*Reichmann, appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for attorney fees and sanctions against Michael Colello. The firm also appeals the district court’s dismissal of its malicious prosecution action against Colello. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Whether or not Colello’s removal of the action against him was improper, it did not mandate sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court’s inherent sanctioning power, or 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Colello based his arguments on reasonable factual investigations and plausible interpretations of the law. His conduct lacked the objective unreasonableness necessary for Rule 11 sanctions. *See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,*501 U.S. 32, 47, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991); *G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc. v. Wilson,*326 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir.2003). The district court reasonably found that Colello’s tactical motivation did not constitute the bad faith necessary for sanctions under the court’s inherent powers. *See Fink v. Gomez,*239 F.3d 989, 992-93 (9th Cir.2001). The court supported this conclusion with a brief explanation. *See Trulis v. Barton,*107 F.3d 685, 695-96 (9th Cir.1997). Colello did not act with the recklessness necessary for § 1927 sanctions in the absence of bad faith. *See In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig.,*78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir.1996); *Estate of Blas v. Winkler,*792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir.1986).

Yagman and his firm present no tenable argument in favor of reversing the district court’s denial of attorney fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The district court appropriately dismissed the malicious prosecution action against Colello. The removal proceedings initiated by Colello were not an “action” separate and distinct from the underlying lawsuit. *See Merlet v. Rizzo,*64 Cal. App.4th 53, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 83, 86 (1998) (“[Sjubsidiary procedural actions or purely *117defensive actions cannot be the basis for malicious prosecution claims.”).

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined th a t

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-31027

NOOR BEGUM KARIM, Wife of Fazal Karim; FAZAL KARIM,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

VERSUS

FINCH SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,

Defendants

BARWIL AGENCIES (N.A.) LTD.; BPE INC;

FINCH SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD.

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(95-CV-4169-L)

March 22, 1999

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

We have carefully considered the briefs, the record excerpts

and relevant portions of the record itself. For the reasons stated

by the district court in its Memorandum and Order filed under date

of July 31, 1997, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor2

of Barwil Agencies (N.A.) Ltd. and BPE, Inc. on the cross-claims

filed by Finch Shipping Company, Ltd. as "in rem defendant" and

tendered for the benefits of the plaintiffs pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 14(c).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of appellee, Barwil

Agencies, Ltd., for award of damages and costs pursuant to Fed. R.

App. P. 38 is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of appellee, Barwil

Agencies, Ltd., for sanctions against appellants is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of appellee, Barwil

Agencies, Ltd. for award of attorneys’ fees is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appellant’s pending moti ons are

DENIED as moot.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 

LOWELL TIMOTHY SKUNBERG,

Deceased.

)

)

)

)

)

)

) 

Case No. DA 22-0493

ORDER GRANTING SECOND 

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 

TIME

Appellant Craig Backen has filed a Second Motion for Extension of Time to 

file Appellant’s Opening Brief. Appellant has requested 46 days, or until march 

13th, 2023. Appellant’s counsel has represented to the Court that Appellee’s 

counsel has been contacted and has no objection to the Motion. Therefore, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is given an additional 46-day 

extension of time up to and including March 13th, 2023, to prepare, file and serve 

his Opening Brief.

DATED this ______ day of January, 2023.

_______________________________

Clerk of the Montana Supreme Court

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

January 18 2023

01/18/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0493
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 70 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 70

 To restore the traditional day of observance of Memorial Day, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

             January 25 (legislative day, January 5), 2011

  Mr. Inouye introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To restore the traditional day of observance of Memorial Day, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RESTORATION OF TRADITIONAL DAY OF OBSERVANCE OF MEMORIAL 
              DAY.

    (a) Designation of Legal Public Holiday.--Section 6103(a) of title 
5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``Memorial Day, the last 
Monday in May.'' and inserting the following:
            ``Memorial Day, May 30.''.
    (b) Observances and Ceremonies.--Section 116 of title 36, United 
States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``The last Monday in 
        May'' and inserting ``May 30''; and
            (2) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph 
                (3);
                    (B) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph 
                (5); and
                    (C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
            ``(4) calling on the people of the United States to observe 
        Memorial Day as a day of ceremonies to show respect for United 
        States veterans of wars and other military conflicts; and''.
    (c) Display of Flag.--
            (1) Time and occasions for flag display.--Section 6(d) of 
        title 4, United States Code, is amended by striking ``the last 
        Monday in May;'' and inserting ``May 30;''.
            (2) National league of families pow/mia flag.--Section 
        902(c)(1)(B) of title 36, United States Code, is amended by 
        striking ``the last Monday in May'' and inserting ``May 30''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 31.1**CERTIFICATION**I, E. Wayne Jackson, III, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Sourcefire, Inc. for the fiscal yearended December 31, 2007;     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:               a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;               b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and               c. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter that has materially affected,or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting; and     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):               a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and               b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.        Date: February 28, 2008 By:  /s/ E. Wayne Jackson, III    Name:  E. Wayne Jackson, III    Title:  Chief Executive Officer
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER OF ABATEMENT 

Appellate case name: In re Elite Specialty Welding, LLC

Appellate case number: 01-18-00788-CV

Trial court case number: 2017-36068

Trial court: 190th District Court of Harris County

Relator, Elite Specialty Welding, LLC, filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to 

vacate the Honorable Debra Ibarra Mayfield’s May 4, 2018 order denying relator’s motion to 

dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.2(b), the 

Court “must abate the [original] proceeding to allow the successor to reconsider the original party’s 

decision.” TEX. R. APP. P. 7.2(b). 

The proceeding is ABATED and REMANDED to the trial court. Within 15 days of the 

date of this order, relator is directed to obtain a hearing date, if necessary, from the trial court 

coordinator and to notify all parties of such date. The hearing shall be set for a date no later than 

30 days after the date of this order. The trial court coordinator shall advise the Clerk of this Court 

of the hearing date as soon as it is set.

Within 40 days of the date of this order, the district clerk shall file a supplemental clerk’s 

record and reporter’s record, if any, with the ruling by the successor, the Honorable Beau A. Miller.

This case is abated, treated as a closed case, and removed from this Court’s active docket. 

This original proceeding will be reinstated on this Court’s active docket when the successor 

respondent has reconsidered the original respondent’s decision and either party informs the Clerk 

of this Court of the ruling with a certified copy of the order. This Court will also consider a motion 

to reinstate by either party.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: ___/s/ Justice Peter Kelly___________________

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: ___January 7, 2019___
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY C. BONTEMPS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

D. HICKS, Sgt., 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-15583 

D.C. No. 1:16-cv-01854-EPG 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Erica P. Grosjean, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 13, 2018**

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Gregory C. Bontemps appeals pro se from the 

magistrate judge’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that he 

was subjected to an inappropriate unclothed body search. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo whether the magistrate judge validly 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 22 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-15583 

entered judgment on behalf of the district court. Allen v. Meyer, 755 F.3d 866, 

867-68 (9th Cir. 2014). We vacate and remand.

Bontemps consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c). The magistrate judge then denied in forma pauperis status on the basis 

that Bontemps had accrued three strikes and dismissed Bontemps’ action for 

failure to pay the filing fee before the named defendants had been served. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g) (prisoner cannot bring a civil action if he has accrued three 

strikes). Because all parties, including unserved defendants, must consent to 

proceed before the magistrate judge for jurisdiction to vest, Williams v. King, 875 

F.3d 500, 503-04 (9th Cir. 2017), we vacate the magistrate judge’s order and 

remand for further proceedings.

Bontemps’ second request to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket Entry No. 

10) is denied as unnecessary.

VACATED and REMANDED.
Exhibit 31

SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION

SERIES 2002-1G WST TRUST

I, Peter Walden, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report for the period July 1 to September 30, 2006 on Form 10-K, and the report
on Form 8-K containing distribution or servicing report filed in respect of the period covered by this report of Series 2002-1G WST Trust;

2. Based on my
knowledge, the information in these reports, taken as a whole, does not contain any untrue statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading as of the last day of the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicing information
required to be provided to the trustee by the servicer under the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement, for inclusion in these reports is included in these reports;

4. Based on my knowledge and upon the annual compliance statement included in the report and required to be delivered to the trustee in accordance with the terms of the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement,
and except as disclosed in the reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement; and

5. The reports disclose all
significant deficiencies relating to the servicers compliance with the minimum servicing standards based upon the report provided by an independent public accountant, after conducting a review in compliance with the Uniform Single Attestation
Program for Mortgage Bankers or similar procedure, as set forth in the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement, that is included in these reports.

In
giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: EDS (Business Process Administration) Pty Limited and PricewaterhouseCoopers.



|                                             
|---------------------------------------------
|Signature:                                   
|                                             
|/s/ Peter Walden                             
|Peter Walden                                 
|22 November 2006                             
|                                             
|Title: Principal Financial Officer           
|Westpac Securitisation Management Pty Limited
**CERTIFICATION OF    OFFICERS**
**OF      ARTFEST INTERNATIONAL, INC.**

**PURSUANT      TO 18 USC & 1350**

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION      906 OF THE**

**SARBANES-OXLEY**

**ACT      OF 2002**

|                                      |                                             |                                    |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
|                                      | **Artfest                  International, Inc.** |
|                                 |                                        |                               |
| Dated:                  December 29, 2005 | By:                                    | /s/ Joseph                  Walsh, |
|                                      | Joseph                  Walsh,                   |
|                                      | President&                    CEO            |

|                                          |                                                                                                     |                                        |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
|                                          | **Artfest                      International, Inc.**                                                     |
|                                     |                                                                                                |                                   |
| Dated:                      December 29, 2005 | By:                                                                                            | /s/ Joseph                      Walsh, |
|                                          | Joseph                      Walsh,                                                                       |
|                                          | Treasurer                        (Chief                        Financial                        Officer) |
#### Tim O’Leary, Respondent, v Do-Mor Realty, LLC, Appellant.

[943 NYS2d 905] —

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Martin, J), dated June 29, 2011, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On its motion for summary judgment, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it neither created the conditions that allegedly caused the plaintiff to fall, nor had actual or constructive notice of such conditions prior to the occurrence in question *(see Kokin v Key Food Supermarket, Inc.,*90 AD3d 850 [2011]; *Tavares v City of New York,*88 AD3d 689 [2011]). The Supreme Court properly concluded that, in opposition, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to the defendant’s creation and constructive notice of the conditions that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s fall. Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion. Skelos, J.P., Florio, Belen and Sgroi, JJ, concur.
#### PLACE v. PLACE.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

November 22, 1907.)

1. Executors—Liabilities of Estate—Services Rendered to Decedent-Evidence.

Where plaintiff sued an executrix for services rendered her testator, evidence that plaintiff was worEing at his own trade during the time he claimed to have been employed and independently of any employment by testator, was admissible.

2. Same.

Where plaintiff sued an executrix for services rendered her testator, evidence that, after the rendition of such services, other services were performed and a bill rendered for them, without including a charge for the services sued for, was admissible.

3. Appeal—Presentation op Questions in Trial Court—Scope op Objection.

An objection to testimony that, after the rendition of services sued for, other services were performed and a bill rendered for the same, without including a charge for the services sued for, as irrelevant and immaterial merely, does not present, on appeal, the objection that the bill itself was the best evidence.

Appeal from Trial Term, Suffolk County.

Action by Charles Place against Susan F.° Place, as executrix of the last will and testament of William H. Place, deceased. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Argued before JENKS, HOOKER, GAYNOR, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.

Willard N. Baylis, for appellant.

Timothy M. Griffing, for respondent.

*782PER CURIAM.

The record contains exceptions which we think require a reversal of the judgment. The defendant should have been permitted to show that the plaintiff was working at his own trade, independently of any employment by the defendant’s testator, during the time that he claims to have been employed by said testator. The defendant should also have been permitted to show that after the rendition of the services sued for other services were performed and a bill rendered for the same which did not include any charge for the services sued for. No objection was made to the testimony offered on this head on the ground that the bill was the best evidence, but the objection was made on the ground that the testimony was irrelevant and immaterial. An objection that the bill itself was the best evidence might have been obviated by the production of the bill.

Judgment and order reversed, and new trial granted; costs to abide the event.