MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2019 ME	126

Docket: Yor-18-277

Argued: April	9,	2019

Decided: August	6,	2019

Revised: November	21,	2019

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

CHRISTOPHER	TODD	HALL

SAUFLEY,	C.J.

[¶1]		The	jury	in	this	case	was	presented	with	evidence	that	Christopher	

Todd	Hall,	angry about	the	results	of	a	court	proceeding involving	his	children,	

lured	the	woman	who	had	served	as	the guardian	ad	litem	in	that	matter	to	a	

house—under	 false	pretenses	and	disguised	with	 a	gray	wig	 and	 a	walker—

where he	attacked	the	woman with	a	cane	that	had	a	stun	device	in	its	handle,	

in	an	attempt	to	kidnap	her.		Hall	now	appeals	from	the judgment	of	conviction

entered	by	the	court	(York	County,	Delahanty,	J.)	after	the	jury	found	him	guilty

of	aggravated	assault	(Class	B),	17-A	M.R.S.	§ 208(1)(B)	(2018); assault	(Class	

C),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §§ 207(1)(A),	 1252(4-A)	 (2018); and	 attempted	 kidnapping	

with	 the	 intent	 to	 hold	 for	 ransom	 or	 reward	 (Class	 B),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	

§§ 152(1)(B),	301(1)(A)(1),	301(3) (2018).		
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[¶2]		We	are	asked	to	construe	several	statutes	to	determine whether	the	

court erred	 in	 its	 instructions to	 the	 jury and	 whether	 there	 was	 sufficient	

evidence	for	the	jury	to	find,	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt,	every	element	of	each	

of	the	crimes	of	which	Hall	was	convicted.		We	affirm	the	judgment and	remand	

only	for	further	action	by the	State	and	the	court	to	dismiss	a	fourth	count	on	

which the	parties	intended	a	dismissal	after the	court	declared	a	mistrial.		

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶3]		Viewed	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	 verdicts,	 the	jury	could	

rationally	have	found	the	following facts	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.		See	State	

v.	Hansley,	2019	ME	35,	¶	2,	203 A.3d	827.		On	the	evening	of	October	8,	2015,	

Hall	used	a	woman’s	voice	when	he	repeatedly	called	a	professional	mediator

to	lure	her	to	a	house	in	Arundel	under	the	pretext	of	hiring	her	to	mediate	a	

family	dispute.		Hall	was	upset	with	the	mediator,	who	had, years	earlier, served	

as	guardian	ad	litem	in	a	matter	involving	Hall’s	family.		Hall	had	spoken	to	a	

friend	about	a	plan	to	kidnap	people	involved	in	that	matter	using	an	electric	

shock	device	so	that	he	could	extort	money	from	them	and	use	the	money	to	

leave	the	country	with	his	children	and	their	mother.		

[¶4]	 	 When	 the	 mediator arrived	 at	 the	 house	 in	 Arundel,	 Hall was	

disguised	as	an	elderly	man;	he	wore	a	wig	and	blazer	and	used	a	walker	and	
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cane.	 	 He	 stood	 behind	 his	 van,	 which	 was	 parked	 in	 the	 driveway,	 and	 he	

gestured	for	her	to	park	next	to	the	van.		Hall	had	a	friend	in	the	van	who, by	

that	point, had	moved	to the	driver’s	seat.		When	the	mediator opened	the	door	

to	her	car	and	swung her	legs	out,	Hall	attacked	her	with	a	cane	that	had	a	stun	

device in	its	handle	capable	 of	delivering	an	electric	charge	measuring	up	 to	

2,000	volts.		He	placed	the	cane	between her	legs,	activated	it	one	or	more	times,	

and	put	it	in	contact	with	her	legs	multiple	times	as	she	screamed	and	kicked.		

Leaning	into	the	car,	he	tried	to	cover	her	mouth	to	prevent	her	screaming,	and	

she	grabbed	the	wig	off	his	head,	kicking	until	he	took	the	wig	and	fled.		Hall	got	

into the	passenger	side	of his	van	at	the	end	of	the	driveway,	his	friend	having	

already	driven	it	toward	the	road,	and	he fled the	premises with	his	friend.		

[¶5]		In	December 2015,	Hall	was	charged	by	indictment with	aggravated	

assault	 (Class	 B),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 208(1)(B);	 assault	 (Class	 C),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	

§§ 207(1)(A),	1252(4-A);1 and	two	counts	of	attempted	kidnapping—one	count	

for	 attempted	 kidnapping	 with	 the	 intent	 to	 hold	 for	 ransom	 or	 reward	

(Class B),	 17-A	M.R.S.	 §§	 152(1)(B),	 301(1)(A)(1),	301(3),	 and	one	 count	 for	

attempted	kidnapping	by	secreting and	holding the	victim	in	a	place	where	she	

 1		The	court	granted	the	State’s	later-filed	motions	to	amend	the	indictment	to	provide	accurate	

information	 regarding	Hall’s	 prior	 convictions	 alleged	 for	 purposes	 of	increasing	 the	 class	 of	 the	

assault	charge.		
4

was	not	likely	 to	be	 found	 (Class	 B),	17-A	M.R.S.	 §§ 152(1)(B),	301(1)(B)(2),	

301(3) (2018).		

[¶6]		At	Hall’s	jury	trial in	2018,	Hall	chose	to	represent himself, but	he	

had	two	attorneys	acting	as	standby	counsel.		The	mediator testified	regarding	

the	events	at	issue	as	well	as	her	injuries	and	recovery,	including	the	effect	of	

the	 attack	 on	 her	 mental	 health.	 	 The	 State	 offered	 testimony	 from several	

witnesses,	 including	 a detective	 from	 the	 York	 County	 Sheriff’s	 Office	 who

testified	 about	 the	 stun	 cane	 device	 he	 had	 recovered	 using	 information	

provided	by	the	person	who	had	driven Hall’s	van	on	the	night	of	the	alleged	

crimes.2

[¶7]	 	 Hall	 presented the	 testimony	 of several	 witnesses	 and	 his	 own	

testimony denying	that	he	intended	to	kidnap	the	victim	but	expounding	about	

how she	and	others	had	“stolen”	his	children	based	on	lies.		He	also	 testified	

that	the voltage	of	the	stun cane device	was	not	deadly; that	the	back	of	his	van	

had	been full	of	items	such	that	he	could	not	have	fit	a	person	inside; that	he	

 2		At	trial,	the	State,	without	any	objection	 from	Hall	at	 the	 time,	had the	detective	activate	 the	

device	 one	 time	 in	 the	 courtroom,	 without	 bringing	 it	 in	 contact	 with	 anything,	 for	 purposes	 of	

demonstration.		Hall	later	moved for	the	court	to	instruct	the	jury	to	disregard	the	demonstration	

because	the	device	had	been	taken	apart	and	examined after the	events	in	question.		Hall	also	moved	

for	a	mistrial	based	on	the	risk	of	unfair	prejudice	that,	he	argued,	arose	from	the	demonstration.		We	

discern	no	error	or	abuse	of	discretion	in	the	court’s	rulings,	which	denied	these	motions,	and	we	do	

not	discuss	the	issue	further.		See	State	v.	Nobles,	2018	ME	26,	¶	17,	179	A.3d	910;	State	v.	Boobar,	

637	A.2d	1162,	1166-67	(Me.	1994); State	v.	Rich,	395	A.2d	1123,	1131	(Me.	1978).		
5

had	worn a	 gray	 wig	 and	 carried the cane	 but had also	 used	 a	 walker	 as	“a	

barrier	so	that	she	could	never	say	that	[he]	went	into	her	space”; and	that	the	

victim	had	come at	him	with	an	open	hand	and	tried	to	kick	him,	resulting	in	

the	marks	on	her	legs.	

[¶8]		The court’s jury	instructions	included	statutory	definitions	of	two	

terms	at	issue	here.		The definition	of	“bodily	injury” was	provided	because	that	

term	is	part	of	the	definitions of	assault and	aggravated	assault.		See 17-A	M.R.S.	

§	2(5)	(2018);	see	also	id. §	207(1)(A)	(“A	person	is	guilty	of	assault	if .	.	. [t]he	

person	intentionally,	knowingly	or	recklessly	causes	bodily	injury or	offensive	

physical	 contact	 to	 another	 person.”	 (emphasis	 added));	 id. § 208(1)(B)	 (“A	

person	is	guilty	of	aggravated	assault	if	that	person	intentionally,	knowingly	or	

recklessly	causes .	.	. [b]odily	injury to	another	with	use	of	a	dangerous	weapon.”	

(emphasis	added)).		

[¶9]		The	definition	of “serious	bodily	injury” was	also	provided	because

the	aggravated	assault	statute employs the	term	“use	of	a	dangerous	weapon,”	

which	 is	 defined	 as	 “use	 of	 a	 firearm	 or	 other	 weapon, device,	 instrument,	

material	or	substance,	whether	animate	or	inanimate,	which,	in	the	manner	it	

is	used	or	threatened	to	be	used	is	capable	of	producing	death	or	serious	bodily	

injury.”	 	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 2(9)(A),	 (23) (2018) (emphasis	 added);	 see	 also id.
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§ 208(1)(B)	 (“A	 person	 is	 guilty	 of	 aggravated	 assault	 if	 that	 person	

intentionally,	knowingly	or	recklessly	causes	.	.	.	[b]odily	injury	to	another	with	

use	of	a	dangerous	weapon.”	(emphasis	added)).

[¶10]		At	the	end	of	the	court’s	instructions to	the	jury,	Hall	requested an	

additional	instruction	concerning	the	definition	of	“serious	bodily	injury.”		Id.

§ 2(23).	 Specifically,	he	asked	the	court	to	instruct	the	jury	that	the	definition	

of	“serious	bodily	injury,” which includes “bodily	injury	.	 .	 .	which	causes	 .	 .	 .

extended	 convalescence	 necessary	 for	 recovery	 of	 physical health,”	 id.

(emphasis	added),	precludes	extended	convalescence	necessary	for	recovery	of	

mental	or	emotional	health.		The	court	denied	the	request,	concluding	that	its	

instruction	had	been	complete	and	consistent	with	the	statute.		

[¶11]	 	 During	 deliberations,	 the	 jury	 sent	 a	 note	 asking	 for	 further	

definition	of	“serious	bodily	injury,” including	as	to	the	meaning	of	“extended	

convalescence	 necessary	 for	 the	 recovery	 of	 physical	 health,” and	 for	

instruction as	to whether	the	use	of	any weapon	would	warrant	a	conviction	of	

aggravated	assault.		Id. The	court	repeated	the	pertinent	statutory	definitions	

and	 informed	 the	 jury	 that	 it	 should	 rely	 on	 common	 sense	 in	 determining	

whether	the	conduct	at	issue	met	those	definitions.		It	also	instructed	the	jury,	

based	on	our interpretation	of	“extended	convalescence”	in	State	v.	Bowman,	
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611	A.2d	560,	562	(Me.	1992),	that,	although	no	specific	duration	was	provided	

in	statute,	convalescence	meant	“a	gradual	return	to	health	after	an	injury	or	

illness, or	 a	 period	 of	 time	 that	 is	 required	 .	 .	 .	 to	 regain	 your	 health.”	 	 Hall	

objected	to	this	instruction	before	and	after	it	was	delivered and	argued	that	

physical	 health	 should	 have	 been	 distinguished	 from	 mental	 or	 emotional	

health.		The	court	overruled	his	objections.		

[¶12]	 	 Later,	 the	 jury	 reported	 that	it	was	 having	 difficulty	 reaching	 a	

verdict	on	the	fourth	count,	namely, attempted	kidnapping	with	the	intent	to	

secret	and	hold	the	victim	in	a	place	where	she	was	not	likely	to	be	found,	but	

it	had	reached	verdicts	on	the	first	three	counts.		The	State	and	Hall	agreed	that	

the	jury	could	deliver	its	verdicts	on	the	first	three	counts	and	then	the	court	

would,	if	the	jury	found	Hall	guilty	of	the	attempted	kidnapping	charge alleged	

in	Count	3,	declare	a	mistrial	on	Count	4.		The	jury	found	Hall	guilty	of	Counts	

1,	 2,	 and	 3	 (aggravated	 assault,	 assault,	 and	 attempted	 kidnapping),	 and	 the	

court	declared	a	mistrial	on	Count 4.		

[¶13]		After	a	sentencing	hearing,	the	court	sentenced	Hall	to	ten	years’	

incarceration	for	aggravated	assault,	with	a	concurrent	five-year	term	for	the	

assault	conviction,	and	it	sentenced	Hall	to	a	consecutive	ten-year	term	for	the	
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attempted	kidnapping	conviction.		The	court	also	ordered	Hall	to	pay	multiple	

Victims’ Compensation	Fund	payments	totaling $105.		

[¶14]	 	 Although	 the	 State	 did	 not	 confirm the	 dismissal	 of	 Count	 4,	 it	

appears	to	have	been	the	intent	of	all	involved	that	Count	4	be	dismissed	after	

the	mistrial	was	declared.		Thus,	we	regard	the	lack	of	a	formal	dismissal	as	an	

oversight	that	can	be	corrected	on	remand, and we	treat	the	judgment	entered	

by	the	court	as	a	final judgment	ready	for	our	review.

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶15]		Hall	argues	that	(A)	the	evidence	does	not	support	the	convictions	

and	 (B)	 the	 court’s	 jury	 instructions	 were	 inadequate.	 	 We	 consider	 each	

argument	in	turn.

A. Sufficiency	of	the	Evidence	to	Support	the	Convictions

[¶16]		“When	reviewing	a	judgment	 for	sufficiency	of	 the	evidence,	we

view	the	evidence	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	State	to	determine	whether	

the	fact-finder	could	rationally	have	found	each	element	of	the	offense	beyond	

a	reasonable	doubt.		We defer	to	all	credibility	determinations	and	reasonable	

inferences	drawn	by	the	fact-finder,	even	if	those	inferences	are	contradicted	

by	 parts	 of	 the	 direct	 evidence.”	 	Hansley,	 2019	 ME	 35,	 ¶	 19,	 203 A.3d	 827

(quotation	marks	omitted).
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1. Aggravated	Assault

[¶17]		As	charged	here,	“A	person	is	guilty	of	aggravated	assault	if	that	

person	 intentionally,	 knowingly	 or	 recklessly	 causes	 .	 .	 .	 [b]odily	 injury	 to	

another	with	use	of	a	dangerous	weapon.”		17-A	M.R.S.	§	208(1)(B).		“‘Use	of	a	

dangerous	 weapon’	 means	 the	 use	 of	 a	 firearm	 or	 other	 weapon,	 device,	

instrument,	material	or	substance,	whether	animate	or	inanimate,	which,	in	the	

manner	it	is	 used	 or	 threatened	 to	be	used	is	capable	 of	producing	 death	 or	

serious	bodily	injury.”		Id. §	2(9)(A)	(emphasis	added).		“‘Serious	bodily	injury’	

means	a	bodily	injury	which	creates	a	substantial	risk	of	death	or	which	causes	

serious,	 permanent	 disfigurement	 or	 loss	 or	 substantial	 impairment	 of	 the	

function	of	any	bodily	member	or	organ,	or	extended	convalescence	necessary	

for	recovery	of physical	health.”		Id. §	2(23)	(emphasis	added).

[¶18]		The	undefined	term	at	issue with	respect	to	the	aggravated	assault	

conviction	 is	 “physical	 health.”	 	 In	 reviewing	 the	 language	 of	 a	 statute	 to	

determine	the	elements	of	a	crime,	“we first	look	to	the	plain	language	of	the	

provisions	 to	determine	 their	meaning.”		State	v.	Hastey,	2018	ME	147,	¶	23,	

196	A.3d	432 (quotation	marks	omitted).		“In	considering	the	plain	language	of	

a	 statute,	 we	 construe	 any	 undefined	 words	 and	 phrases	 according	 to	 their	

common	meaning.”		State	v.	Murphy,	2016	ME	5,	¶	7,	130	A.3d	401.		“Physical”	
10

means	 “of	 or	 relating	 to	 the	 body	 .	 .	 .	 often	 opposed	 to	 mental,”	 Physical,	

Webster’s	 Third	 New	 International	 Dictionary	 of	 the	 English	 Language	

Unabridged	 (2002),	 or	 “Having	 a	 physiological	 basis	 or	 origin,”	 Physical,	

American	Heritage	Dictionary	of	the	English	Language (5th	ed.	2016).

[¶19]	 	 Thus,	finding Hall	 guilty	 of	 aggravated	 assault	 based	 on	 section	

208(1)(B)	required	a	finding	that	the stun	device,	in	the	manner	in	which	Hall	

used	it,	was	capable of	causing	death	or	either	of	the	following:

• “serious,	permanent	disfigurement	or	loss	or	substantial	impairment	of	

the	function	of	any	bodily	member	or	organ,” or

• extended	convalescence	necessary	 for	recovery	of	bodily,	physiological	

health.

17-A	M.R.S.	§ 2(23);	see	id. §	2(9)(A).

[¶20]		Had	 the	State	charged	Hall	with	 aggravated	 assault	pursuant	 to	

17-A M.R.S.	§ 208(1)(A),	the	State	would	have	been	required	to	prove	that	the	

defendant	actually	caused “[b]odily	injury	to	another	that	creates	a	substantial	

risk	 of	 death	 or	 extended	 convalescence	 necessary	 for	 recovery	 of	 physical	

health.”	 	 Here,	 however,	 the	 State	 charged	 Hall	 with	 aggravated	 assault	

pursuant	to	section	208(1)(B)	and	therefore	had	to	prove	only	“bodily	injury,”	

meaning,	 “physical	 pain,	 physical	 illness	 or	 any	 impairment	 of	 physical	

condition,”	id. § 2(5),	resulting	from	the	use	of	a	weapon	that	was	“capable of	
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producing	death	 or	 serious	bodily	injury”	in	 the	manner	 that	it was	used,	id.

§ 2(9)(A) (emphasis	added).		

[¶21]		As	 to	 the	weapon	at	issue	here—the	stun	cane	device—the	jury	

received	evidence	that	included	the	following:

• The	manufacturer’s information	indicated	the	device’s	capacity	to	deliver	

up	to	1,000,000	volts.		

• Tested	in	the	laboratory,	the	device,	after	having	been	disassembled	and	

reassembled,	 delivered	 between	 850	 and	 2,000	 volts,	with	 the	 highest	

voltage	being	delivered	upon	initial	activation.		

• The	scientist	who	tested	the	device	used	extensive	safety	precautions	to	

protect	himself	from	the	device,	which	was	“very	dangerous”	even	at	the	

measured	voltage	of	240.		

• The	 victim	 experienced	 repeated	 contacts	with	 the	 device,	 resulting	in	

multiple	burns	on	her	body	that	did	not	heal	for	three	weeks.		

From	this	evidence,3 the	jury	could	rationally	have	found	that the	stun	device	

used	in	the	assault	was	a	dangerous	weapon	capable, in	the	manner	it	was	used,	

of	causing	either	(1) “serious,	permanent	disfigurement	or	loss	or	substantial	

impairment	of	 the	 function	of	any	bodily	member	or	organ” or	(2) “extended	

convalescence	 necessary	 for	 recovery	 of	 physical	 health.”	 	Id. § 2(23);	see	id.

§ 2(9).

 3	 	 Although	 Hall	 argued	 that	 the	 alteration	 of	 the	 stun	 device	 by	 opening	 it	 before	 testing	

undermined	the	proof	of	its	voltage,	the	court	properly	left	to	the	jury	the	task	of	assessing	the	weight	

and	credibility	of	the evidence.		See	State	v.	Davis,	2018	ME	116,	¶	29,	191	A.3d	1147.
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2. Assault

[¶22]	 	“A	 person	 is	 guilty	 of	 assault	 if	 .	 .	 .	 [t]he	 person	 intentionally,	

knowingly	 or	 recklessly	causes	bodily	injury	 or	 offensive	physical	contact	 to	

another	person.”		Id. §	207(1)(A).		“‘Bodily	injury’	means	physical	pain,	physical	

illness	or	any	impairment	of	physical	condition.”		Id. §	2(5).		Here,	there	is	more	

than	 enough	 evidence	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 Hall	 intentionally—i.e.,	 with	 the	

conscious	object	to	do	so,	see 17-A	M.R.S.	§	35(1)(A)(2018)—caused	the	victim	

physical pain	and	impairment	of	her physical	condition.		Id. §§ 2(5),	207(1)(A).

3. Attempted	Kidnapping

[¶23]		Pertinent	here,	a person	is	guilty	of	attempted	kidnapping	if	 the	

person	 engages	 in	 conduct	 that	in	 fact	 constitutes	 a	 substantial	 step	 toward	

“restrain[ing]	another	person	with	the	intent	to	.	.	.	[h]old	the	other	person	for	

ransom	 or	 reward,”	 with	 awareness	 that	 it	 is	 practically	 certain	 that	 the	

person’s	conduct	will	result	in	the	restraint	and	holding	for	ransom	and	reward.		

Id. § 301(1)(A)(1);	see	17-A	M.R.S.	§§	35(2)(A),	152(1)	(2018).		Here,	there	was

evidence	that	Hall	had	planned	to	restrain	the	victim	and	hold	her	for	ransom	

to	raise	money	so	that	he	could gather	his	biological	children	and	their	mother	

and	 abscond	 to	 another	 country.	 	 Combined	with	 evidence	 that	 he	lured	 the	

victim	to	a	specific	location, attacked	her	in	her	car	beside	his	van,	and	fled only	
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after	she	fought	him	off,	there	was	sufficient	evidence	for	the	jury	to	have	found	

beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt	 that	 he	 had	 taken	 substantial	 steps	 toward	 the

kidnapping as	charged	in	Count	3.		See id. §§	35(2)(A),	152(1),	301(1)(A)(1).		

B. Jury	Instructions

[¶24]	 	 Hall	 argues	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 in	 denying	 his	 requested	

instructions	regarding	the	meaning	of	(1)	physical	health	and	(2)	the	use	of	a	

dangerous	weapon.		

1. Instruction	on	the	Meaning	of	“Physical	Health”

[¶25]		Hall	contends that	the	court	erred	in	refusing	to	instruct	the	jury	

that	“extended	convalescence	necessary	for	recovery	of	physical	health”—part	

of	 the	 definition	 of	 “serious	 bodily	 injury,”	 id. §	 2(23)—does	 not	 include	

convalescence	to	recover	emotional	or	mental	health.		

[¶26]		“We	will	vacate	a	judgment	based	on	a	denied	request	for	a	jury	

instruction	 if	 the	 appellant	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 requested	 instruction	

(1) stated	 the	law	 correctly;	 (2)	was	 generated	 by	 the	 evidence;	 (3)	was	 not	

misleading	or	confusing;	and	(4)	was	not	sufficiently	covered	in	the	instructions	

the	court	gave.		In	addition,	the	court’s	refusal	to	give	the	requested	instruction	

must	have	been	prejudicial	to	the	requesting	party.”		State	v.	Hanaman,	2012	

ME	40,	¶	16,	38	A.3d	1278	(citation	omitted).
14

[¶27]		As	noted above,	Hall	was	charged	with	aggravated	assault	based	

on	the	use	of	a	dangerous	weapon—a	weapon	that,	“in	the	manner	it	is	used	or	

threatened	 to	be	used	is	capable	of	producing	death	or	serious	 bodily	injury.”		

17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 2(9)(A)	 (emphasis	 added).	 “Serious	 bodily	 injury” means	 “a	

bodily	injury	which	creates	a	substantial	risk	of	death	or	which	causes	serious,	

permanent	disfigurement	or	loss	or	substantial	impairment	of	the	function	of

any	bodily	member	or	organ,	or	extended	convalescence	necessary	for	recovery	

of	physical	health.”		Id. § 2(23)	(emphasis	added).

[¶28]		“Physical	health”	is	not	defined	by	statute.		“Not	every	statutory	

phrase	requires	explanation,”	however.		State	v.	Smith,	618	A.2d	208,	210	(Me.	

1992).		The	focus	is	on	“whether	the	jury	would	have	reasonably	understood	

the	common	sense	meaning	of	the	term.”		Id.	(quotation	marks	omitted).		The	

jury	is	ordinarily	entrusted	 to	determine	 the	common	meaning	of	words,	see	

State	v.	Siracusa,	2017	ME	84,	¶	12,	160	A.3d	531;	when	a	term	is	not	defined	in	

a	statute,	a	jury	can	generally	determine	the	meaning	of	the	term	by	common	

sense,	see	State	v.	Deering,	611	A.2d	972,	974	(Me.	1992).

[¶29]	 	 Here,	 the	 statutory	 terms	 were “sufficiently	 covered”	 by	 the	

instruction	 that	 the	 court	 gave,	 which	 provided	 the	 statutory	 language	

regarding	 physical health—a	 term	 for	 which	 the	 jury	 could	 determine	 the	
15

meaning	by	using	common	sense.4		Hanaman,	2012	ME	40,	¶	16,	38	A.3d	1278.		

Furthermore,	Hall	has	not	shown	prejudice	arising	from	the	court’s	refusal	to	

give	the	requested	instruction.		See	id.

2. Instruction	on	the	Use	of	a	Dangerous	Weapon

[¶30]		Hall	contends	 that	 the	court	erred	in	instructing	on	 the	use	of	a	

dangerous	weapon because	the	stun	cane	device is	not	a	dangerous	weapon	as	

a	matter	of	law.		He	contends	that, because the	cane is	an	“electronic	weapon”	

as	 defined	 in	 a	 separate	 criminal	 statute, it cannot	 also	 be	 a	 “dangerous	

weapon”	 because, by	 definition, an	 electronic	 weapon	 emits	 an	 “electrical	

current, impulse,	 wave	 or	 beam”	 that	 is	 “designed	 to	 have	 a	 disabling effect	

upon	human	beings.”		17-A M.R.S.	§	1004(2)	(2018) (emphasis	added).		

[¶31]	 	 Use	 of	 an	 electronic	 weapon	 may	 also	 constitute	 the use	 of	 a	

dangerous	weapon	if	it	meets	 the	 statutory	definition regarding	 the	use	 of	a	

dangerous	weapon.		“‘Use	of	a	dangerous	weapon’	means	the	use	of	a	firearm	

or	other	weapon,	device,	instrument,	material	or	substance,	whether	animate	

or	inanimate,	which,	in	the	manner	it	is	used	or	threatened	to	be	used	is	capable	

of	producing	death	or	serious	bodily	injury.”		Id. §	2(9)(A).		Conflicting	evidence	

was	 offered	 regarding whether	 the	 stun	 device,	 as	 used,	 had	 the	 capacity	 to	

 4		See	supra ¶¶ 18-19.
16

“create[]	 a	 substantial	 risk	 of	 death	 or	 .	 .	 .	 cause[]	 serious,	 permanent	

disfigurement	or	loss	or	substantial	impairment	of	the	function	of	any	bodily	

member	 or	 organ,	 or	 extended	 convalescence	 necessary	 for	 recovery	 of	

physical	 health.”	 	 Id.	 §	 2(23). Because	 some	 of	 that	 evidence,	 if	 believed,	

satisfied	 the	 definition	 of	 “dangerous	 weapon,”	 the	 court	 did	 not	 err	 in	

determining	that	the	evidence	generated	the	instruction	on aggravated	assault	

with	use	of	a	dangerous	weapon.		See	id. §§	2(9)(A),	(23),	208(1)(B);	Hansley,	

2019	ME	35,	¶	9, 203	A.3d	827.

[¶32]	 	 The	 existence	 of	 a	 separate	 crime—not	 charged	 here—for	

intentionally,	knowingly,	or	recklessly	using	an	electronic	weapon	on	another	

person,	17-A M.R.S.	§	1004(1)	(2018),	does	not	preclude	the jury’s finding	that	

the	stun	cane	as	Hall	used	it was	a	dangerous	weapon.		The	stun	cane	could	be

both “a	portable	device	or	weapon	from	which	an	electrical	current,	impulse,	

wave	 or	 beam	 may	 be	 directed,	 which	 current,	 impulse,	 wave	 or	 beam	 is	

designed	to	have	a	disabling	effect upon	human	beings,”	and	an	item	that	could,	

as	 used,	 constitute	 a	 dangerous	 weapon	 capable	 of	 inflicting	 serious	 bodily	

injury.	 	 Id. § 1004(2);	see	 id. §§	 2(9)(A),	 208(1)(B) (emphasis	 added).	 	 For	

instance,	 although	 the	 single	 administration	 of	 a	 shock	 to	 disable	 a	 person	

would	 satisfy	 section	 1004,	 the	 repeated	 administration	 of	 shocks,	 possibly	
17

with	reactivation	between	those	shocks	that	would	increase	the	voltage	initially	

delivered	 upon	 the	 next contact	 with	 the	 person,	 would	 also	 satisfy	 section	

208(1)(B)—the	aggravated	assault	statute.

[¶33]	 	 The	 court	 did	 not	 err	 in	 its	 instructions,	 and	 the	 jury	 could

rationally reach	its	findings	based	on	the	instructions	given	and	the	evidence	

presented	at	trial.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	 affirmed.	 Remanded	 for further	

proceedings	to	dismiss Count	4.

David	Paris,	Esq. (orally),	Bath,	for	appellant	Christopher	Todd Hall

Kathryn	 L.	 Slattery,	 District	 Attorney, and	 Kyle	 M.	 Myska,	 Asst.	 Dist.	 Atty.

(orally),	Prosecutorial	District	1,	Alfred,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

York	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2015-420

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY