United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 15-3787

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jason Brandon Schultz

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Ft. Dodge

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 Submitted: September 23, 2016

 Filed: January 10, 2017

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Before COLLOTON, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Jason Brandon Schultz challenges three special conditions of supervised

release the district court imposed when sentencing him on a supervised release

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The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

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the Northern District of Iowa. 
revocation to 22 months imprisonment to be followed by one year of supervised

release. We affirm. 

I.

In October 2007, Schultz was convicted in Maryland state court ofthird-degree

sexual assault. This conviction stemmed from a consensual relationship with a 14-

year-old girl when Schultz was 23 years of age. Under federal law, Schultz was

required to register as a sex offender in his state of residence. In November 2008,

Schultz wasresiding in Iowa without having registered as a sex offender in thatstate. 

As a result, he pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, and the district court

sentenced him to 30 months imprisonment to be followed by 5 years of supervised

release. He began his supervised release term in June 2011. 

In December 2012, the district court revoked Schultz’s supervised release

based on multiple violations, including failure to comply with residential reentry

center rules, disorderly conduct, excessive use of alcohol, and use of illegal drugs. 

The court sentenced Schultz to 21 months imprisonment to be followed by 3 years of

supervised release. 

After his release, Schultz again violated the terms of his supervised release by

associating with persons involved in criminal activity and having contact with

children under the age of 18. As a result, the district court modified the terms of the

supervised release and ordered Schultz to serve two consecutive weekends in jail. 

In November 2015, the district court again revoked Schultz’s supervised

release. At the revocation hearing, Schultz admitted he used cocaine, twice failed to

submit a urine sample for testing, and possessed cocaine. The district court also

found Schultz had engaged in cocaine distribution. The court sentenced Schultz to

22 months imprisonment to be followed by 1 year of supervised release. 

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As part of the sentence, the court imposed three special conditions of

supervised release relevant to this appeal. Special Condition 4 prohibited Schultz

“from owning or having in his possession any pornographic materials” or from

“enter[ing] any establishment where pornography or erotica can be obtained or

viewed.” Special Condition 5 directed Schultz to make any computer or electronic

devices available for search or monitoring by a United States probation officer. 

Special Condition 6 prohibited Schultz from having contact with any children under

the age of 18 without prior written consent of the probation office. 

Each of these conditions had been part of the original sentence and the first

revocation sentence. At the latest revocation hearing, Schultz only objected to

Special Condition 6, arguing for a change in that condition because he had a oneyear-old son with whom he desired regular contact. In response to the objection, the

district court added to Special Condition 6 that “[t]he United States Probation Office

will work with you and your family to set up supervised communications and visits

with your biological and legally adopted children.” Schultz now appeals the three

special conditions. 

II.

Generally, we review “the imposition of special conditions for abuse of

discretion, but when a defendant has failed to properly object to the imposition of the

condition at the sentencing hearing,” we review for plain error. United States v.

Roberts, 687 F.3d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 2012). Therefore, we will review the district

court’s continuation of Special Conditions 4 and 5 for plain error and the

continuation, with modification, of Special Condition 6 for abuse of discretion. 

“To obtain relief under a plain-error standard ofreview, the party seeking relief

must show that there was an error, the error is clear or obvious under current law, the

error affected the party’s substantial rights, and the error seriously affects the fairness,

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integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Poitra, 648

F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2011). 

A district court has broad discretion to order special conditions of supervised

release so long as “the conditions are reasonably related to the sentencing factors set

forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a), involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is

reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in § 3553(a), and are consistent with

any pertinent policy statementsissued by the Sentencing Commission.” UnitedStates

v. Morais, 670 F.3d 889, 895 (8th Cir. 2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)-(3). 

As to Special Condition 4, Schultz argues the condition is not reasonably

related to his crime and the district court failed to conduct an individualized inquiry

before imposing this condition. Further, he argues the provisions are overbroad and

vague, such that he has no clear notice as to what he can view or what businesses he

can enter without violating his supervised release. 

When the district court firstsentenced Schultz, it noted “a number of things. . .

of concern, . . . the two most serious” being his conviction for sexual contact with a

minor female and his three convictions for violating a no-contact order as to a minor

female. The court noted there “seems to be a pattern of interest in inappropriately

aged females.” Without objection, the court imposed Special Condition 4 at the

original sentencing and reimposed the condition at the revocation sentencing. We

hold Schultz has not shown the district court plainly erred in imposing this condition. 

At the original sentencing, the court expressed its concern about Schultz’s prior

sexual involvement with underaged females and indicated he had developed a

“pattern” of inappropriate behavior in that regard. As we have previously held, “the

need to protect children fromfuture exploitation” justifies banning a defendant “from

possessing any pornography.” See United States v. Mefford, 711 F.3d 923, 927 (8th

Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Ristine, 335

F.3d 692, 694-95 (8th Cir. 2003)). Further, after reviewing the record, we conclude

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the condition is appropriately tailored to Schultz’s circumstances in light of his

original sex offense and the court’s finding of a “pattern” of inappropriate behavior

towards minors. Additionally, we have previously rejected the overbreadth challenge

Schultz makes here. See id. at 928 (rejecting overbreadth challenge where the special

condition banned the defendant from “enter[ing] any location where pornography,

erotica, or adult entertainment can be obtained or viewed” (alteration in original)). 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in imposing Special Condition 4. For the

same reasons, we affirm the district court’s imposition of Special Condition 5, which

does not prohibit Schultz’s access to computers, rather it only allows the United

States Probation Office the ability to monitor his computer usage. This condition is

reasonably necessary to monitor whether Schultz is violating the pornography

restriction and to monitor whether Schultz is violating the restriction concerning his

contact with minors—a restriction he has had difficulty complying with in the past. 

Schultz only objected to the imposition and terms of Special Condition 6,

which prohibits him from having contact with any minor children without written

consent from the probation office. Due to concerns Schultz expressed about his

desire to maintain contact with his infant son, the district court added language

directing the probation office to “work with [Schultz] and [his] family to set up

supervised communications and visits with [his] biological and legally adopted

children.” 

Schultz argues the district court abused its discretion in imposing this special

condition because the district court did not make individualized inquiry into the need

to prevent Schultz from having contact with his own children. Further, Schultz

claims the restriction is not narrowly tailored to meet the considerations of § 3553(a). 

We addressed a similar challenge in United States v. Simons, 614 F.3d 475 (8th

Cir. 2010). There a defendant, who like Schultz was convicted of failing to register

as a sex offender, challenged the special condition prohibiting him from having

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contact with children under the age of 18, including his own children, unless the

contact was approved in advance by the defendant’s probation officer. Id. at 481. 

We upheld the special condition, noting, “[i]n many of our cases affirming no-contact

conditions, we have cited a defendant’s history of sexual abuse of minors as a factor

in our decisions.” Id. Looking at Schultz’s personal history, he was originally

convicted in state court of having a sexual relationship with a 14-year-old girl when

he was 23 years of age. At the original sentencing, the district court took notice of

the prior conviction and convictions for violating no-contact orders with other minor

females. 

In light of this history and the district court’s recognition of the need for

Schultz to maintain a relationship with his children, the district court made

individualized findings and the restriction is narrowly tailored to address the

circumstances of Schultz’s criminal history as well as his family situation. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Special

Condition 6. 

III.

We affirm the sentence. 

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