Filed 8/21/20 Salarkia v. Faghihi CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

SHAHRZAD SALARKIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JONAS FAGHIHI,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B296826

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 18STFL09867)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles

County, Mark Juhas, Judge. Affirmed. 

LA Law, Inc., and Fari Bari Nejadpour for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Law Office of Corey Evan Parker, Corey Evan Parker; The 

Appellate Law Firm and Berangere Allen-Blaine for Plaintiff and

Respondent.

____________________________
2

The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code1

§ 6200 et seq.) authorizes a court to issue a protective order to 

prevent a recurrence of domestic violence. (Conness v. Satram

(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 197, 200.) The DVPA broadly defines 

abuse to include not only acts causing bodily injury, but also acts 

placing a person in apprehension of injury, harassment, and 

disturbing a domestic partner’s peace. (§§ 6203, subd. (a) & 6320, 

subd. (a); Phillips v. Campbell (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 844, 852; see 

also In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 

1494.) 

Jonas Faghihi and Shahrzad Salarkia were married for 

20 years and have two children, an adult daughter, T.F. and a 

minor son. The family court issued a permanent restraining 

order protecting Salarkia from Faghihi and, at the same time,

denied Faghihi’s application for a restraining order, finding his 

testimony lacked credibility. The family court also indicated that 

Faghihi’s application for a temporary restraining order protecting 

himself and the couple’s children was based on fabricated 

evidence and constituted an additional example of domestic 

violence. 

Faghihi challenges the restraining order protecting 

Salarkia and the denial of a restraining order to protect him. 

Faghihi argues that no substantial evidence supported a 

restraining order protecting Salarkia. Faghihi fails to summarize 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the order as our 

standard of review requires. Applying the correct standard, we 

conclude the record reveals substantial evidence that Faghihi 

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Family Code. 
3

physically abused his wife over the course of their marriage as 

Salarkia and their daughter T.F., testified. 

Ignoring the family court’s credibility findings, Faghihi

argues that as a matter of law, the family court was required to 

issue a restraining order protecting him from Salarkia. Because 

the family court discredited Faghihi’s testimony that he was 

abused, no evidence supported his request for a restraining order,

and the family court properly denied it.

Finally, Faghihi argues that the family court erred in 

applying the wrong standard in issuing a restraining order 

because the family court found that Faghihi’s abuse of the legal 

process constituted domestic violence. Faghihi cites no legal 

support for his contention. The case law uniformly supports the 

conclusion that physical abuse is not required to support a 

domestic violence restraining order. (In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 

supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1496.) Faghihi does not argue, and 

no reasonable person could argue that Faghihi did not disturb his 

wife’s peace when he caused her arrest, forced her out of the 

family home, and prevented her from seeing her children based 

on what the family court found was a fabricated story. 

Disruption of a person’s peace is a ground for a domestic 

violence restraining order. (§§ 6203, subd. (a) & 6320, subd. (a); 

Phillips v. Campbell, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 852; see also 

In re Marriage of Nadkarni, at p. 1494.) Even if arguendo the 

family court applied the incorrect standard, Faghihi 

demonstrates no prejudice. The incidents of physical abuse over 

the couple’s marriage supported the restraining order protecting 

Salarkia. 

Faghihi relies solely on evidence the family court 

discredited and ignores the evidence supporting the family court’s 
4

orders. Accordingly, we affirm the domestic violence restraining 

order protecting Salarkia and affirm the denial of a restraining 

order protecting Faghihi. 

BACKGROUND

Apparently, both Salarkia and Faghihi applied for 

permanent restraining orders; those applications are not included 

in the record. Over three days, the family court heard testimony 

concerning Salarkia and Faghihi’s applications for permanent 

restraining orders. Both claimed that the other was abusive. At 

the conclusion of the three-day trial, the court made express 

credibility determinations, described in more detail below. 

1. Faghihi’s Testimony

The italicized testimony indicates testimony expressly 

discredited by the family court. 

Faghihi and Salarkia were married for 20 years. On 

July 13, 2018, Faghihi received a text from his girlfriend, and 

when Salarkia saw the text early in the next morning, Salarkia

became angry. Salarkia threatened to kill Faghihi. Salarkia hid 

Faghihi’s phone in their daughter’s bedroom. Faghihi eventually 

found his phone under his daughter’s bed. 

Later that day, Faghihi and his girlfriend went to a 

restaurant for lunch. Salarkia and her niece followed Faghihi to 

the restaurant, and Salarkia confronted Faghihi’s girlfriend. 

Salarkia told Faghihi not to come home because she was “ ‘going 

to get you killed.’ ” (Italics added.) Faghihi was afraid. Faghihi

did not spend the night in the family home, but instead stayed at 

a friend’s house. 

On July 15, 2018, Faghihi went to the family home at about 

11 a.m. “As soon as I came back to the house to get my clothes, I 
5

saw her in the kitchen with a pair of gloves, latex gloves, blue.” 

Salarkia held a knife and threatened to kill Faghihi. Salarkia

said, “I’m going to kill you, kill the kids, and kill myself.” Holding 

a kitchen knife, Salarkia said, “You mother fucker. I’m going 

to . . . cut your balls, your penis. I’m going to . . . kill you, kill the 

kids, kill myself.” (Italics added.) Salarkia approached Faghihi

with the knife. Faghihi feared for his safety. 

Faghihi initially testified that he called 911 and then went 

into a room in the house. During cross examination, Faghihi 

testified that he went into a guesthouse. Faghihi testified that 

when Salarkia came after him he was in the guesthouse. The 

court discredited the testimony that Faghihi went to the 

guesthouse because a tenant was living in the guesthouse at that 

time. 

Salarkia’s counsel impeached Faghihi concerning his 

testimony that Faghihi threatened to kill him. For example, 

when counsel asked Salarkia why he went to the house on July 

15, Faghihi testified that he “didn’t take it [Salarkia’s threat] 

that seriously.” During cross-examination, Faghihi testified that 

Salarkia called the police before threatening him with a knife. 

When counsel asked “so to believe your story, we’d have to believe 

that she called the police, knew that they were on the way, and 

then decided to grab a knife and threaten you with it,” Faghihi 

responded, “You can ask this question from her.” 

During cross-examination, Faghihi acknowledged that he 

told his children that Salarkia was going to call the police on him 

so he called first. 

2. Salarkia’s Testimony

Salarkia testified that over the course of her long-term 

marriage, Faghihi slapped her, hit her, and pushed her multiple 
6

times. Once Faghihi pushed her down the stairs. Salarkia

described Faghihi as controlling and “very physically abusive.” 

On July 14, 2018—the day before she applied for a 

restraining order—Faghihi grabbed her neck and told her,

“ ‘You’re dealing with the wrong person.’ ” Salarkia thought 

Faghihi was strangling her. 

The next day, Salarkia located Faghihi from a shared 

application on their cell phones and went to the restaurant where 

Faghihi and his girlfriend were eating lunch. After Salarkia left 

the restaurant, Faghihi told Salarkia, “ ‘You know, you’re dealing 

with the wrong person.’ ” Salarkia went to the police station and 

filed a report. She told the officer that Faghihi “always” abused 

her and hit her the night before. Officers told her she could not 

get a restraining order because it was the weekend. 

On July 15, 2018, Faghihi returned to the family home, and 

Salarkia asked him to leave. Salarkia told Faghihi that she 

reported him to the police, and Faghihi responded angrily. 

Faghihi refused to leave. Salarkia called 911. Salarkia told the 

911 operator that her husband had hit her two days earlier and 

she was afraid he would hit her again. Salarkia wanted to avoid 

Faghihi hitting her and wanted to avoid the children seeing 

Faghihi’s abusive conduct. 

Faghihi told Salarkia, “Let’s see who is going to go to jail. 

You made the wrong call.” Salarkia left the house and waited for 

police outside. Faghihi followed her outside. 

Salarkia testified that she did not retrieve a kitchen knife. 

Salarkia did not threaten Faghihi with a knife. Salarkia did not 

put on latex gloves. Salarkia heard Faghihi tell the police 

Salarkia had a knife. Salarkia testified, “I think he set me up.” 

Officers told Salarkia that she was arrested because she had a 
7

knife and attacked Faghihi. Salarkia testified that no criminal 

charges ensued. 

Salarkia testified that Faghihi did not go into the 

guesthouse because a tenant was living there. The tenant was 

Salarkia’s best friend. 

When officers arrived after her 911 called, Faghihi lied to 

officers causing Salarkia to be arrested and preventing Salarkia

from seeing her children. A criminal restraining order issued 

protecting Faghihi from Salarkia. It was undisputed that 

Faghihi extended the restraining order, and that the restraining 

order granted him exclusive possession of the family home. 

Salarkia told the court, “I have lost basically everything.” She 

purchased two mattresses. Faghihi changed the locks so 

Salarkia could not enter the house. 

T.F. testified that she observed Faghihi throw Salarkia

down the stairs. T.F. observed Faghihi hit Salarkia. T.F. 

observed Faghihi push Salarkia. T.F. testified that on 

July 14, 2018 at about 2:30 a.m. Salarkia told T.F. that Faghihi 

hit Salarkia. 

On July 15, 2018, a tenant lived in her parent’s guesthouse. 

T.F. testified that she observed her parents’ interactions from 

outside the house. T.F. testified that Faghihi did not enter the 

guesthouse. T.F. observed Salarkia stay outside the house and 

Faghihi “kept going in and out of the house.” T.F. did not observe 

Salarkia put on a latex glove. 

T.F. testified that after her mother was arrested, she asked 

Faghihi why he included her as a protected person on the 

restraining order. Faghihi did not respond that Salarkia 

threatened him with a knife. Faghihi never said that Salarkia 

threatened to kill him, T.F., or her brother with a knife. 
8

T.F. testified that Salarkia did not have much furniture 

since she moved out of the family home. When T.F. stayed with 

Salarkia, they shared a bed. 

3. Officer Raul Hernandez

On July 15, 2018, Officer Hernandez responded to a 911 

call from Salarkia and a subsequent 911 call from Faghihi. 

Salarkia did not report on that day—July 15, 2018—that Faghihi

touched her in any way, but reported that two days earlier,

Faghihi assaulted her. 

Faghihi had no injuries on July 15, 2018. Based on 

statements from Faghihi, Officer Hernandez arrested Salarkia

for criminal threats. Another officer transported Salarkia to 

county jail. Officer Hernandez issued an emergency protective 

order to protect Faghihi from Salarkia. 

4. Family Court’s Findings and Orders

The court indicated that Faghihi was the aggressor. The 

court stated, “I don’t find it credible at all that she threatened to 

cut—to physically attack him, to cut off his penis and his 

testicles.” The court also discredited Faghihi’s testimony that 

Salarkia “put[s] on a surgical glove, grabs the knife” and 

threatened Faghihi. The court concluded, “That story makes no 

sense to me. So I don’t find that story credible.” The court 

indicated that “I don’t believe it went down the way he said it 

went down.” The court found T.F. very credible and concluded 

that T.F.’s testimony further discredited Faghihi. 

The court further stated that Faghihi’s fabrication of a 

story about domestic violence and obtaining a restraining order 

against Salarkia based on that fabricated story constituted 

domestic violence. The court stated that Faghihi’s “misuse of the 
9

court system is domestic violence.” Faghihi’s conduct also caused 

Salarkia to be arrested. Faghihi recognized that the children 

were “very afraid of the mother going to go to jail, losing her 

license.” 

The court granted Salarkia a restraining order for a period 

of 5 years. The court denied Faghihi a restraining order. The 

court ordered Faghihi to attend a 52-week batterer intervention 

program. The court awarded Salarkia primary physical custody 

of the minor child and permitted Faghihi visitation. On appeal 

Faghihi does not challenge the child custody and visitation order. 

DISCUSSION

Faghihi argues that no substantial evidence supported the 

family court’s decision to award Salarkia a restraining order. 

Faghihi also appears to argue that the family court was required 

to award him a restraining order because his request was 

supported by substantial evidence. 

Section 6203 defines abuse as “intentionally or recklessly 

caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause bodily injury,” “[s]exual 

assault,” or placing a person in “reasonable apprehension of 

imminent serious bodily injury . . . .” (§ 6203, subd. (a).) 

Section 6203 also defines abuse as “engag[ing] in any behavior 

that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.” 

(§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).) Section 6320 authorizes the court to issue 

an ex parte order “enjoining a party from molesting, attacking, 

striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, 

credibly impersonating . . . harassing, telephoning, . . . destroying 

personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by 

mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or 

disturbing the peace of the other party, and, in the discretion of 
10

the court, on a showing of good cause, of other named family or 

household members. (§ 6320, subd. (a), italics added.) 

A. Substantial Evidence Supported the Restraining 

Order Identifying Salarkia as the Protected Person 

“We review issuance of a protective order for abuse of 

discretion, and the factual findings necessary to support the 

protective order are reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] 

‘We resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of respondent, 

the prevailing party, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable 

inferences in favor of upholding the trial court’s findings.’ ” 

(Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226, 

disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 

9 Cal.5th 989, 1003, fn. 7; see also Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 

156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420 [grant of protective order under the 

DVPA reviewed for abuse of discretion].) Under the substantial 

evidence standard, “[o]ur task ‘begins and ends with the 

determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is 

substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ ” that 

supports the challenged order. (Garcia v. Myllyla (2019) 

40 Cal.App.5th 990, 1000.) 

Faghihi’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the restraining order protecting Salarkia is premised on 

his claim that Salarkia’s testimony was not credible because it 

was inconsistent. Faghihi’s argument ignores the appropriate 

standard of review. This court does not reevaluate credibility. 

Instead, this court resolves all conflicts in the evidence in favor 

of respondent. (Parisi v. Mazzaferro, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 1226.) 

There was substantial evidence in support of a restraining 

order protecting Salarkia, which we now summarize. Faghihi 
11

hit, pushed and slapped Salarkia. Faghihi pushed Salarkia down 

the stairs. Salarkia described Faghihi as controlling and “very 

physically abusive.” On July 14, 2018, Faghihi grabbed 

Salarkia’s neck, and she thought he was trying to strangle her. 

T.F. corroborated Salarkia’s testimony that Faghihi engaged in 

abusive conduct, having observed Faghihi push Salarkia down 

the stairs and hit Salarkia. The testimony of one witness may 

constitute substantial evidence (In re Marriage of Fregoso & 

Hernadez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 703), and here multiple 

witnesses testified as to Faghihi’s abuse. The fact that it was 

undisputed that Faghihi did not physically abuse Salarkia on 

July 15, 2018 does not undermine the numerous incidents of 

abuse supporting the restraining order. He abused her on 

multiple other occasions. 

B. No Credible Evidence Supported a Restraining 

Order Protecting Faghihi

Faghihi argues that the family court was required to enter 

a restraining order protecting him. When a court determines the 

party with the burden of proof failed to carry that burden, an 

appellate court may reverse the decision only if the evidence 

compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. 

(Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 

218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838; Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, 

Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466.) 

Under this standard, a finding is compelled only if the appellant’s 

evidence was “ ‘ “(1) uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of 

such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial 

determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ”

(Ibid, but see Gonzalez v. Munoz, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 
12

at p. 420 [appellate court reviews the denial of a restraining 

order for abuse of discretion].)

In advancing his argument on appeal, Faghihi grossly 

mischaracterizes the record, ignores the family court’s credibility

findings, and ignores the well established principle that a 

trial court may discredit uncontested evidence. Faghihi’s entire 

argument on the merits of his claim is as follows: “Appellant’s 

testimony that Respondent threatened to castrate him [citation] 

and to murder Appellant and the couple’s children [citation] was 

unimpeached, uncontradicted and uncontested.” 

First, Faghihi ignores the family court’s credibility 

findings. The family court rejected Faghihi’s testimony that 

Salarkia threatened to castrate him and kill the couple’s 

children. The family court found that Faghihi lacked credibility. 

It is well established that the trier of fact is the exclusive judge 

of credibility. (Oldenburg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1957) 

152 Cal.App.2d 733, 742.)

Second, Faghihi mischaracterizes the record. Faghihi’s 

testimony was impeached, contradicted, and contested. His 

testimony was impeached during cross-examination; it was 

contradicted by Salarkia’s testimony and T.F.’s testimony, and it 

was contested throughout the three-day trial. Faghihi’s entire 

argument is irreconcilable with the record. 

Even if Faghihi could show that his testimony were

uncontested, uncontradicted and unimpeached, that showing 

would not entitle him to a restraining order. Faghihi ignores the 

bedrock principle that a trier of fact may discredit the testimony 

of a witness even if it is uncontested. (LandWatch San Luis 

Obispo County v. Cambria Community Services Dist. (2018) 

25 Cal.App.5th 638, 643; Palmieri v. State Personnel Bd. (2018) 
13

28 Cal.App.5th 845, 857; Hicks v. Reis (1943) 21 Cal.2d 654, 659–

660.) Here, the family court expressly discredited all of Faghihi’s 

claims that Salarkia threatened or otherwise abused him. 

Therefore, there was no basis to award Faghihi a restraining 

order. 

C. Faghihi Fails to Show the Family Court Applied the 

Wrong Legal Standard

Faghihi argues that the family court applied the wrong 

standard when it issued a restraining order identifying Salarkia

as the protected person. Faghihi’s argument is as follows: “In 

this case, the trial court invented the litigation-as-domesticviolence standard, and even that court had to acknowledge that 

no case or statute supports it. By fabricating a standard from 

whole cloth, the trial court engaged in ‘whimsy’ and ‘uncontrolled 

power’ that ‘transgresses the confines of the applicable principles 

of law.’ Appellate courts call such action abuse of discretion, and 

trial court’s abuse of discretion demands reversal.” Faghihi’s 

argument is unpersuasive for numerous, independent reasons.

1. Faghihi forfeited the argument by failing to 

cite relevant legal authority

Faghihi argues that the family court applied the wrong 

standard but fails to identify the correct standard. Faghihi cites

no authority supporting his claim that the family court deviated 

from the correct standard. He cites two cases—Gonzalez v. 

Munoz, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 420 and City of Sacramento v. 

Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297 that are irrelevant to the 

merits of his legal contention. 

In Gonzalez, Division Seven of this court considered 

whether the court erred in failing to award a mother custody of a 
14

child during the pendency of a restraining order. (Gonzalez v. 

Munoz, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 419.) The appellate court 

did not consider whether filing frivolous litigation based on a 

fabricated story could constitute domestic violence. City of 

Sacramento v. Drew, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, the other case 

Faghihi cites, concerns an appeal from the denial of an award of 

attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which 

governs attorney fees in an action for the enforcement of an 

important right affecting the public interest. (Id. at p. 1292.) It 

does not address an issue relevant to the merits of Faghihi claim. 

By failing to cite to legal authority in support of his 

argument, Faghihi forfeited the argument. (Ewald v. Nationstar 

Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948 [see also cases 

cited therein].) “Where a point is merely asserted by appellant’s 

counsel without any argument of or authority for the proposition, 

it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion 

by the reviewing court.” (Atchley v. City of Fresno (1984) 

151 Cal.App.3d 635, 647.) 

2. Assuming Faghihi preserved the argument, his 

argument is inconsistent with the uniform case 

law

We review de novo whether the family court applied the 

correct standard to the issue of its discretion to grant Salarkia

a restraining order. (N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, 

601–602.) A discretionary order based on an incorrect legal 

assumption is subject to reversal. (Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 

243 Cal.App.4th 816, 820.) “The DVPA’s ‘protective purpose is 

broad both in its stated intent and its breadth of persons 

protected.’ ” (N.T., supra, at p. 602.) It includes both physical 
15

abuse “as well as acts that ‘destroy[ ] the mental or emotional 

calm of the other party.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, at p. 820.) 

Section 6203 incorporates harassment and disturbing 

the peace into the definition of domestic violence. (§ 6203, 

subd. (a)(4) [incorporating section 6320].) As one court has 

explained: “ ‘Violence,’ as that word is commonly defined, is not a 

prerequisite for obtaining a restraining order under the DVPA. 

The dictionary definition of ‘violence’ is ‘the exertion of any 

physical force so as to injure or abuse.’ (Webster’s 3d New 

Internat. Dict. (1981) p. 2554.) The DVPA, however, defines 

‘domestic violence’ as ‘abuse.’ (§ 6211.) ‘Abuse is not limited to 

the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.’ (§ 6203, 

subd. (b).) For purposes of the DVPA, ‘abuse’ means, inter alia, 

‘[t]o engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined 

pursuant to Section 6320.’ (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).) Section 6320, 

subdivision (a) permits the court to enjoin a party from 

‘harassing . . . or disturbing the peace of the other party . . . .’ ” 

(Phillips v. Campbell, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 852; N.T. v. H.T.

(2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, 603; In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 

supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p.1494; Conness v. Satram, supra,

122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 201–202.) 

“ ‘[T]he plain meaning of the phrase “disturbing the peace 

of the other party” in section 6320 may be properly understood as 

conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other 

party.’ ” (N.T. v. H.T., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; see also 

In re Marriage of Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497.) 

No reasonable argument could be made that Faghihi did not 

disturb Salarkia’s peace when he fabricated a story to have a 

restraining order issued protecting Faghihi, which in turn caused 

Salarkia’s arrest, forced her to move out of the family home, and 
16

prevented her from seeing her children. (Cf. Parisi v. Mazzaferro, 

supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1219, 1225, 1228 [unfounded attempt 

to obtain a restraining order supports a civil harassment 

restraining order.]) Without explanation, Faghihi completely 

ignores section 6320 in arguing that the family court applied the 

incorrect legal standard in granting Salarkia request for a 

permanent restraining order.

3. Faghihi demonstrates no prejudice from the 

alleged application of the wrong standard

On appeal, it is the appellant’s responsibility affirmatively 

to demonstrate prejudicial error. (Denham v. Superior Court

(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “ ‘This is not only a general principle of 

appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine 

of reversible error.’ ” (Ibid; see also Jameson v. Desta (2018) 

5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) Even if arguendo the family court erred in 

concluding that Faghihi perpetuated the abuse by fabricating 

evidence leading to Salarkia’s arrest, ouster from her home and 

separation from her children, Faghihi demonstrates no prejudice. 

As detailed above, the record overwhelmingly supported granting 

Salarkia’s request for a permanent restraining order. 
17

DISPOSITION

The domestic violence restraining order protecting Salarkia 

is affirmed. The denial of a domestic violence restraining order 

protecting Faghihi is affirmed. Costs are awarded to Salarkia.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

SINANIAN, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.