SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1916-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GUNNAR WAHLSTROM,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted May 8, 2019 – Decided June 6, 2019

Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 

14-056.

Gunnar Wahlstrom, appellant pro se.

O'Donnell Mc Cord, PC, attorneys for respondent 

(Jason Andrew Cherchia, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Gunnar Wahlstrom appeals from the October 20, 2017 decision 

by the Honorable Thomas J. Critchley, Jr., after a trial de novo. The four 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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separate summonses charged defendant with various offenses arising from the 

Township of East Hanover's property maintenance code. We affirm.

The summonses charged defendant with the following: the storage of 

trailers and construction equipment on residential property, Municipal code § 

119A-13(F)(6) (complaint no. 391); the parking of an inoperable and 

unregistered vehicle on residential property, Municipal code § 119A-13(F)(8)

(complaint no. 392); the failure to maintain residential property contributing to 

a "blighting influence[]" because of the condition of exterior paint, gutters, and 

loose wires, Municipal code § 119A-13(E) (complaint no. 393); and the 

performance of mechanical or body repair work on vehicles on residential

property - Municipal code § 119A-13(F)(3) (complaint no. 394). Each 

complaint cites to the relevant section of the municipal ordinance. 

Without reciting the details of the tortuous history in this case, we note

that these complaints and summonses were issued on July 15, 2014. In the 

intervening years, the complaints were first dismissed as procedurally deficient, 

subsequently refiled, and defendant was convicted at the municipal court trial. 

On appeal, the Law Division remanded the case for a new trial because the 

municipal court proceedings had not been recorded. 
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When that second trial took place in 2015, the code enforcement officer 

testified regarding the ordinance violations, and produced photographs taken of

defendant's premises, depicting trailers, vehicles, and the dilapidated condition 

of the home. The municipal court judge convicted defendant, imposed $1432 in 

fines and court costs, and ordered him to remediate the violations within thirty 

days or pay a $50 per day assessment. 

On appeal to the Law Division, the judge dismissed the complaints 

without prejudice, finding they issued in a procedurally defective manner, in 

violation of defendant's due process rights. Defendant had not raised this issue, 

and when the State appealed the dismissal, we remanded the matter, finding the 

Law Division's sua sponte decision on due process grounds was improper.

On October 20, 2017, a second judge on remand convicted defendant and 

signed the order on November 9, 2017. Judge Critchley reinstated the 

convictions based on the code enforcement officer's earlier testimony and the 

exhibits introduced in support of the offenses. The judge further found the 

charging documents were adequate in terms of due process because they 

specifically alleged the violations depicted in the photos, and referred to the 

specific subsections of the code. 
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The judge detailed the exhibits introduced in support of the violations, 

describing the photographs in detail. He concluded that defendant's double 

jeopardy argument had no merit since the second trial was compelled by the

absence of a record of the first proceeding. The judge also noted that although 

the complaints did not specify a time for remediation, they stated that the 

conditions were to be corrected immediately. The judge rejected defendant's 

argument that the municipal court judge's initial communications with the 

construction officer, requiring him to refile the complaints, was improper. 

Those conversations did not adversely affect the outcome after a full trial on 

new complaints. Nor did the judge consider the proceedings to have violated 

fundamental fairness or due process: defendant had a number of years in which 

to correct the conditions, and had not done so. He opined:

And so I find that the State did not violate any 

considerations of double-jeopardy, due process, or 

fundamental fairness, and did prove the violations by 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There were trailers 

on the property in violation of the applicable code 

section, there were unregistered and inoperable 

vehicles, as established by the photos and the 

documentation. There were general maintenance 

issues, particularly with respect to deteriorating 

painting, peeling and gutters and soffits and things of 

that nature, and there were a large number of, it appears, 

or certainly several, vehicles that were not in operating 

condition that were being stored on the property and 

that appeared to be perhaps subject to more than minor 
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repair works. One photo showed a tire in front of a car 

and a piece of wood opening -- propping open the hood 

of the vehicle, and all of this is intended for the 

protection of the community, the property values, and 

the neighbors. And fairness to the neighbors requires 

that the Town be able to remediate this. This is not 

something that was done overnight and in an overlyhasty manner. It appears to have gone, according to the 

hearing officer, over several years. Certainly the 

records that I have go from the year 2014 into the year 

2015.

With respect to the fines, fees and penalties, in 

consideration of some of what I'll call the imperfections 

in the cases, I am going to myself remediate some of 

the penalties. I will leave intact the court costs, but 

reduce the fines for each summons to $125. I will ask 

the State to prepare an order documenting this and, of 

course, Mr. Wahlstrom, you would have, again -- and I 

know you're familiar with the process -- the right to an 

appeal of this determination. That should be done 

within 45 days.

On appeal, defendant raises the following nine points:

POINT 1: JUDGE CRITCHLEY MADE HARMFUL 

ERROR BY NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE 

CONTROLLING LAW, ORDINANCE §119A, 

INCLUDES MANDATORY DUE PROCESS 

SAFEGUARDS IN §119A-36 THROUGH §119A-39 

WHICH REQUIRE THAT NOTICE BE PROVIDED 

IDENTIFYING THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS, 

WHAT CORRECTIONS ARE NEEDED, AND 

REASONABLE TIME TO CORRECT, AND THAT 

THE OPERATION OF THE ORDINANCE 

REQUIRES EXHAUSTION OF TIME FOR 

CORRECTIONS BEFORE PROPERTY OWNER IS 
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IN VIOLATION OF THE ORDINANCE AND 

PENALTIES ARE TRIGGERED BY §119A-41.

POINT 2: JUDGE CRITCHLEY MADE HARMFUL 

ERROR AND ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY 

SUBSTITUTING THE MANDATORY DUE 

PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORDINANCE 

WITH HIS OWN ARBITRARY DEFINITIONS. HE 

THEREBY MISCONCEIVED AND MISAPPLIED 

THE APPLICABLE LAW CAUSING HIS EXERCISE 

OF LEGAL DISCRETION TO LACK FOUNDATION 

AND BECOME AN ARBITRARY ACT. IT IS 

THEREFORE THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO 

ADJUDICATE THE CONTROVERSY IN LIGHT OF 

THE APPLICABLE LAW IN ORDER THAT A 

MANIFEST DENIAL OF JUSTICE BE AVOIDED.

POINT 3: JUDGE CRITCHLEY MADE HARMFUL 

ERROR BY NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE 

ORDINANCE IN §119A-36 THROUGH §119A-39 

PROVIDES MANDATORY PROCEDURAL DUE 

PROCESS SAFEGUARDS WHICH ARE IN 

ADDITION TO OTHER STATE AND FEDERAL 

DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH DO NOT 

REPLACE THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS 

OF THE LOCAL ORDINANCE.

POINT 4: JUDGE CRITCHLEY MADE HARMFUL 

ERROR BY NOT RECOGNIZING THAT 

PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANT WAS INITIATED 

IN MUNICIPAL COURT WHILE DEFENDANT 

WAS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE ORDINANCE, 

CAUSING DEFENDANT TO SUSTAIN EXTENDED 

ABUSIVE LITIGATION INSTEAD OF BEING ABLE 

TO MAKE NECESSARY CORRECTIONS OF THE 

ALLEGED PROPERTY VIOLATIONS IN 

ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
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ORDINANCE, IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S 

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

POINT 5: JUDGE CRITCHLEY MADE HARMFUL 

ERROR IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT THE 

FAILURE OF ENFORCEMENT OFFICER TO ISSUE 

VALID NOTICE CONSTITUTED LACK OF 

FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND LEFT 

DEFENDANT WITHOUT A CLUE OF WHAT HE 

HAD DONE WRONG, WHAT HE WAS CHARGED 

WITH, HOW TO PREPARE A DEFENSE, AND 

MUCH LESS HOW TO REMEDY THE SITUATION, 

IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S PROCEDURAL 

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE 14[TH] 

AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.

POINT 6: THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE FAILED 

DURING TRIAL TO RULE ON THE ISSUE 

"DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATIONS 

OF A SPECIFICATION ORDINANCE" IN 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION, WHICH ARGUED THAT 

THE PENALTIES OF THE ORDINANCE ARE 

TRIGGERED BY §119A-41, AND NOT BY A 

SPECIFICATION SECTION UNDER §119A-13. 

JUDGE CRITCHLEY MADE HARMFUL ERROR IN 

NOT RECOGNIZING THAT §119A-41 IS 

TRIGGERED BY THE EXHAUSTION OF TIME 

GIVEN FOR CORRECTIONS IN NOTICE, AND 

NOT BY A SUMMONS WRITTEN ON A 

SPECIFICATION SECTION OF THE ORDINANCE, 

AND MISAPPLIED THE LAW BY SUBSTITUTING 

HIS OWN ARBITRARY VIEWS FOR THE DUE 

PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORDINANCE. 

THIS CAUSED HIS ENTIRE RULING TO LACK 

FOUNDATION AND BECOME AN ARBITRARY 

ACT AND THE COURT HAS A DUTY TO 

ADJUDICATE THE CONTROVERSY IN LIGHT OF 
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THE APPLICABLE LAW IN ORDER THAT A 

MANIFEST DENIAL OF JUSTICE BE AVOIDED.

POINT 7: JUDGE CRITCHLEY MADE HARMFUL 

ERROR BY NOT TAKING ISSUE WITH THAT 

DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER 

THE 14TH AMENDMENT WERE VIOLATED IN 

MANY INSTANCES THROUGHOUT THIS 

LITIGATION AS A RESULT OF A PERVASIVE 

LACK OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS.

POINT 8: JUDGE CRITCHLEY MADE HARMFUL 

ERROR IN NOT RECOGNIZING THAT 

CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT IS NOT 

SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.

POINT 9: JUDGE CRITCHLEY MADE HARMFUL 

ERROR IN FINDING DEFENDANT GUILTY BY 

DISREGARDING THE MANDATORY DUE 

PROCESS SAFEGUARDS §119A-36 THROUGH 

§119A-39. THIS IS A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION 

THAT ALSO VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION OF 

NEW JERSEY AND DEFENDANT MUST BE 

FOUND NOT GUILTY OF THE CHARGES.

In his reply brief, defendant, in violation of the relevant law,

1

raised seven 

more points:

POINT 1: THE RECORD SHOWS THAT JUDGE 

CRITCHLEY ACTED UNDER MISCONCEPTION 

OF THE APPLICABLE LAW RULING ON THE 

REMAND CAUSING HIS EXERCISE OF 

DISCRETION TO LACK FOUNDATION IN THE 

 

1 A reply brief may not raise new issues. See State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 488 

(1970); Sholtis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 238 N.J. Super. 8, 13-14 n.3 (App. Div. 

1989).
9

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APPLICABLE LAW AND BECOME AN 

ARBITRARY ACT. THE COURT INSTEAD MUST 

ADJUDICATE THE CONTROVERSY IN THE 

LIGHT OF THE APPLICABLE LAW IN ORDER 

THAT A MANIFEST DENIAL OF JUSTICE BE 

AVOIDED. 

POINT 2: JUDGE CRITCHLEY ERRED IN 

ADJUDICATING THE REMAND BY NOT 

RECOGNIZING THAT HE WAS CONVICTING 

DEFENDANT FOR OFFENSES NOT CHARGED BY 

SUMMONSES #391-394.

POINT 3: DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 

WERE VIOLATED; PLAINTIFF IS MISAPPLYING 

THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND USES 

INAPPLICABLE CASE LAW IN AN ATTEMPT TO 

ARGUE THAT DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS 

RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED.

POINT 4: JUDGE CRITCHLEY['S] RULING 

LEAVES MORE THAN REASONABLE DOUBT 

THAT DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 

WERE NOT VIOLATED UNDER THE 14TH 

AMENDMENT OF THE US CONSTITUTION, AND 

PLAINTIFF HAS ALSO NOT CONVINCED THE 

COURT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT 

THE ERROR(S) COMPLAINED OF HEREIN DID 

NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONVICTION AND 

THE COURT MUST THEREFORE REVERSE THE 

GUILTY RULING.

POINT 5: PLAINTIFF FALSELY ARGUES THAT 

HE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE 

MANDATORY DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS, 

SECTIONS 119A-36 THROUGH 39 WHEN THE 

FACT IS THAT HE DID NOT.
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POINT 6: PLAINTIFF MISUNDERSTANDS THE 

STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW AND HIS 

POINT IV IS IRRELEVANT AND MUST BE 

IGNORED.

POINT 7: PLAINTIFF MISUNDERSTANDS THE 

SCOPE OF APPELLATE COURT REVIEW, AND 

THE WAIVER ISSUE HAS ALREADY BEEN 

RULED ON BY THE APPELLATE COURT. 

THEREFORE PLAINTIFF'S POINT V HAS NO 

MERIT AND MUST BE IGNORED.

For the reasons stated by Judge Critchley, we affirm the conviction. 

Defendant's claims of error are so lacking in merit as to not warrant much 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

"[A]ppellate review of a municipal appeal to the Law Division is limited 

to 'the action of the Law Division and not that of the municipal court.'" State v. 

Palma, 219 N.J. 584, 591-92 (2014) (quoting State v. Joas, 34 N.J. 179, 184 

(1961); State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 2001)). In a trial 

de novo conducted on the record developed in the municipal court, the "Law 

Division judge [is] bound to give 'due, although not necessarily controlling, 

regard to the opportunity of a [municipal court judge] to judge the credibility of 

the witnesses.'" State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 

2005) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964)). 
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"[Appellate] review is limited to determining whether there is sufficient 

credible evidence present in the record to support the findings of the Law 

Division judge, not the municipal court." Ibid. (citing Johnson, 42 N.J. at 161-

62). Furthermore, 

[a]ppellate courts should defer to trial courts' credibility 

findings that are often influenced by matters such as 

observations of the character and demeanor of 

witnesses and common human experience that are not 

transmitted by the record. Moreover, the rule of 

deference is more compelling where, as in the present 

case, two lower courts have entered concurrent 

judgments on purely factual issues. Under the two-court 

rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to 

alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility 

determinations made by two lower courts absent a very 

obvious and exceptional showing of error.

[State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999) (citations 

omitted).] 

Judge Critchley's conclusion that the testimony of the code enforcement 

officer was credible is supported as to each summons by the photographs 

admitted as exhibits, which corroborated his description of the premises. Thus, 

the record contained ample credible evidence to support Judge Critchley's 

findings of fact. See Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474. Defendant's legal attacks on the 

judge's decision simply have no merit.

Affirmed.