* The Honor able Ha rold A. Ackerman, Senior United S tates Dist rict J udg e for the District of New Jersey , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0688n.06 F iled: Septem ber 24, 2007 No. 06-4470 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT FRED JOHNSON, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. TRENT WEAVER; EARL WOG L EMUTH; OHI O DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES DI VI SI ON OF WI L DL I FE; SAMUELW. S PECK; S C OTT ZOD Y; and J A M E S R
. T U

NN E LL, De fe nd a nts -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE S O U T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

Be fore : MOORE and COOK, Circuit Judges; and A CKERMAN, District J udg e. *
CO OK , Ci rc uit

Judg e . F re d Joh ns on

fi le d th is a c tio n und e r 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 a g a ins t O hio Dep artment of Natura l Resource s (ODNR) of fice rs, claiming violation of the Four th Amendment in sear ching his house, barns, and farm. The dist rict court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of the ODNR off

icer s, and we aff

irm.No. 06-4470

Johnson v. W

eave r

The a rre st ga ve rise to a

separ ate law suit, dism issed for f ailure to prose cute. 1 - 2 - I The disputed sea rche s’ g enesis wa s a dee r che ck-in station’s ca ll to ODNR office r Tre nt Wea ve r, re po rt ing the de liv e ry of a g un -s ho t carc a ss dur ing Oh io ar c he ry se a so n. Sus pe c tin g a n o utof -s e a so n kil l, Oh io Re v. Cod e §§ 15 31 .0 2, 15 31 .9 9, Wea ve r a nd fe llo w of

fi c e r E rr y l Wol g e mut

h thought it a prudent fir st investigator y step to visit t he hunter

responsible—c onspicuously identified on the dee r’s tagas Jeremy MacIntosh, livi ng at 10240 Carlisle Pike in Germa ntown, Ohio. Arriving at the prope rty

the next morning , they found their investig ation immediately stalled by the l o c k e d g a t e a n d “ N o T r e s p a s s i n g ” s i g n s a qu a rt e r m i l e u p t h e d r i v e w a y . A s i ttur ne d o ut, MacIntosh’s addre ss was a te nant house on Johnson’s seventy -ac re f ence d-in far

m. And soon after the offic ers a

rrived, Johnson appear ed, coming down the drive way on his way to work. He claimed that MacIntosh was g one and r efuse d W ea v er a nd Wolgemuth’s entr

y onto the far

m. J ohnson
re pe a te dly

de nie d en tr

y a nd be c a me inc re a sin g ly be lli g e re nt, sp a rk ing a n a lte rc a tio n th a t r e su lte d in Wea ve r a nd Wolg e mut

h a rr e sti ng him
. 1
Wit h J ohnson in jail, W eav er an d Wolgemuth re turned to the fa rm, now ac companied by ODNR I nvestig ator James Tunnell , and wa lked to MacIntosh’s house, wher e they met and qu e sti on e d M a c I nto sh(Joh ns on hav in g lie d a

bo ut h is a

bs e nc e ). Ma c I nto sh , w ho ide nti fi e d h is rela tionship t o J ohnson as stepson, claimed that he shot the deer with a bow and a

rrow. Weaver,No. 06-4470

Johnson v. W

eave r

- 3 - sp ott ingthe lie , s ug g e ste d th a t Mac I nto sh sh ow the m the sc e ne of the kil l. Af te r the g ro up br ie fl y enter ed Johnson’s barns, they walked the far

m’s fields, where W eave r noticed a 12-g aug e shotg un
s lu g c a s in g tw e n ty
- f

iv e y a r d s f

r o m a b lo o d y s p o t o n th e g r a s s . A t th is p o in t, M a c I n to s h rec anted his earlier story , told the officers that J ohnson, not he, shot the dee r, and me morialized his st atement in w ri tin g :
On Sat u rday

07 October

2000 my step dad F red Johnson kil led a 16 point buck on the fa rm in Ge rm a n To wn sh ip Mo ntg ome ry County
. He tol d me that he kil le d it w ith a shotg un. He didn’t wa

nt to take it and che ck it in. I wanted it so Fr ed and Itook it to the deer c heckingstation. I g ave f alse infor mation to the person who computed the dee r har

vest form. I told them that I killed it with a bow and arrow. L ater my dad a nd Itoo k it to P a y ne ’s De e r P ro c e sso r. Th e he a d wen t to Mil lard ’s Ta xide rm y in Carlisle.
Wit h this statement, Weaver a nd Wolgemuth soug ht and obtained a sear ch wa

rra nt
. And althoug h the war

rant listed the tena

nt house’s addr ess, 10240 Carlisle Pike, t h at ev en i n g Weaver , Wolg e mut

h, a nd se ve ra l ot her offic e rs e xec ute d th e wa rr a nt at John so n’ s h ou se a t 10 23 2 Ca rl isl e Pik e . T he re , th e y

se ize d th re e sh otgun s a nd se ve ra l sh e lls ; te sti ng la te r m a tc he d o ne of the g un s to t h e e ar l i er -f

o u n d s p en tca s i n g.
John so n f

ile d a c omp la int

in d ist ri ct cou rt

un de r 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 a lle g ingmul tip le violations of his Fourth Amendment r ights. In September 2006, th e dis trict court g rante d the defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt.
IINo. 06-4470

Johnson v. W

eave r

- 4 - We reviewa district cour t’s order g ranting summary

judgme nt de novo, Daughenbaugh v

. City of T iff in , 1 50 F .3 d 5 94 , 59 7 (6 th Cir
. 19 98 ), a nd wi ll a ff ir m if “ the re is no g e nu ine iss ue a s to any materia l fac t and . . . t he movi ng party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of l aw,” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
A
J ohn son bases his first F ourth Amendment c laim on the alleg ation that the offic ers tre spassed wh e n th e y

de fi e d h is o rd e r t o s tay

ou t and ne ve rt he le ss p ro c e e de d u

p th e dr ivewa

y . Wh ile it i s
a xiomatic tha

t th e F ourt

h A me ndme nt p ro te c ts the ho me a nd its c ur ti la g e , th e “ land

imm e diate ly surrounding and assoc iated with the home,” United States v. Olive r , 4 66 U. S. 1 70 , 1 80 (1 98 4) , it is
e qu a lly c le a r that thi s pr ote c tio n do e s no t e xten d to the ho me ’s ne ig hb or ing op en fi eld s bec a us e tho se a re a s “ do no t pro vid e the se tti ng fo r tho se int imate a c tiv iti e s th a t th e [F ourt h] A me ndme nt i s intended to shelter,” id. a t 17 9; see also He ster v. United States , 265 U.S
. 5 7 , 5 9 (1 924) (“ [T] he specia l protection ac co rd ed by the Four th Amendment . . . is not ex tended to the ope n fields.”)
. Be cause the drivewa

y constitutes an “ope n field,” Johnson holds no reasonable pr ivacy expectation in i t, a nd his e ff or ts t o s hie ld t

ha t ar e a fr om a

ny mann e r o f u

nw e lc ome g ue st p ro ve inc on se qu e nti a l. See U nited States v. Rapanos , 115 F.3d 367, 372–73 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the “pr esenc e of fe nces, c losed or locke d g ates, and ‘No Trespa ssing’ signs on an otherwise open field
. . . has no constitutional im port”). T rue, the office rs trespa ssed, but the Ol iv e r Court confirme d that this statelaw v iol a tio n is of

no c on sti tut ion a l mo me nt:No. 06-4470

Johnson v. W

eave r

- 5 - Th e la w o f tr e s p a s s . . . f

o r b id s in tr u s io n s u p o n la n d th a t th e F o u rth A mendment would not proscribe . For

trespass law

extends to i nstance s where the exercise of the rig ht to ex clude vindicates no leg itimate pr ivacy interest. Thus, in the case of open fields, t he gene ral rights of proper ty protec ted by the common law of trespass have lit tle or no re le va nc e to t he a pp lic a bil ity of the F ourt h A me ndme nt. 466 U.S. at 183–84 (footnotes omitted). I n light of these principles, the office rs did not violate the Four th Amendment in trave rsing the drivew ay . J ohnson attempts to distinguish his case f rom the ave rag e open f

ields case , citing his prior ref usal to allow the ODN R office rs entry . But a landowner

who is prese nt and at t empting to ba r
en t ry h as at most “a subjective e xp e c tati o n o f p r iv a c y , ” a n d

th e Su p r e me Co u rt r e

je c ts “ the
su g g e sti on

that st e ps ta ke n to p ro te c t pr iva c y e sta bli shthat e xpe c ta tio ns of

pr iva c y in a n o pe n f ie ld
are leg itimate.” Rapanos , 1 1 5 F. 3 d at 3 7 3 (q u o t i n g Oliver , 466 U.S. at 182). This additional fa ctor there fore does not g ive rise to a F ourth Amendment violation. Id.
Nor did the off

icer s violate J ohnson’s Four th Amendment rig hts when they knocked on the te na nt h ou se do or . Mac I nto sh liv e d the re ; J oh ns on ’s ow ne rs hip a lon e do e s n ot c re a te a re a so na ble expectation of privac y . See, e .g. , Ra k as v . I lli no is , 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (c ollecting case s); Sto ne r v . Ca lif

or nia , 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Chapman v. United States , 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
B
John so n c o u n t e rs that th e of

fi c e rs e xce e de d th e op e n f

ie lds ru le wh e n th e y

se a rc he d h is b a rn s. For summary

judgme nt, we take as true that the office rs sea rche d the bar

ns and that the ba

rnsNo. 06-4470

Johnson v. W

eave r

- 6 - constitute curtilag e. The district court nonethe less found that the off icer s were qualifiedly

immune for lac k of a c lear ly

established rig ht, based on the S u p reme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Randolph , 547 U.S. 103 (2006), and w e ag ree . The pre liminary

question i s wh ether

MacIntosh had authority to consent to a sea

rch of J ohnson’s barns. A n exception to the Fourth Ame ndmen t ’s p rohibition on warra ntless searc hes
a pp lie s w he re of

fi c e rs ob ta in v olu

nta ry c on se nt to se a rc h, e ith e r fr om t he pe rs on wh os e pr op e rt

y is
sear ched, Illinois v. R o d

r i g u ez , 4 9 7 U. S
. 1 7 7 , 1 8 1 (1 9 9 0 ) ( ci t i n g Sc hn e c k lot h v . B us tam on te , 412 U.S. 218 (1973)), or

“fr om a third party

who possessed common authority over or other suff

icient rela tionship to the premises or eff ects soug ht to be inspected,” United St ates v. Matlock , 4 15 U. S. 16 4, 17 1 ( 19 74 ). Com mon a uth or ity e na

ble s a thi rd pa

rt y to c on se nt to a

se a rc h if that th ir d p a rt

y has “joint ac cess or

control for

most purposes.” 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. Even if third-pa rty consent
c ome s f ro m a pe rs on wi tho ut ac tua l aut ho ri ty , the se a rc h is none the le ss va lid if the po lic e re lie d, in g ood faith, on the third par ty ’s appa rent authority

to consent to the sea

rch. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. at 18 8– 89 . A n o bje c tiv e sta nd a rd a pp lie s, and the s e a rc h is va lid if the of fi c e rs re a so na

bly c ou ld conclude from the f

acts available to the m that the third party had author ity

to consent to the sea

rch. See id. a t 18 6– 89 ; se e als o United St ates v. Ay oub , No. 06-1610, 2007 WL2323848, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug . 16, 2007).
Th e fa c ts a

va ila ble to t he of fi c e rs in thi s ca se sh ow that Mac I nto sh ha d ap pa re nt, if no t a c tua l, authority to c onsent to a sear ch of the barns. F irst, the deer tag listed MacI ntosh as the dee r’s owne rNo. 06-4470

Johnson v. W

eave r

- 7 - and 10240 Carlisle Pike, a r esidential house located on J ohnson’s far m, as MacI

ntosh’s addre ss. Cf. Un ite d Stat es v . M

oo re , 13 0 F
. Ap p’ x 728 , 7 35 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) (f ind inga c tua l and

a pp a re nt a uth or ity wher e third par

ty “had sig ned the lea se ag ree ment, had a ke y to the apar

tment, was unconstra ined i n h er m o v ement within and to and f rom the apa

rtment, and the r ental conta ined her persona l proper ty ”). Sec ond, MacIntosh’s unrebutted wr itten sta tement informed the of fice rs of his stepson rela tionship t o J ohnson. We have re cog nized that, “[ a]s a g ener al consider ation, there is every
rea son to suppose t hat m ature family members possess the a uthority to admit police to look about the family

residenc e, since in comm o n experience family members have the r

un of the house.” United States v. Clutter , 914 F.2d 775, 777 (6th Cir. 1990) (twe lve and f ourtee n y ear -old children could conse nt to searc h of mother’s bedroom). And we have no difficulty apply ing this re asoning to the barns, whic h, J ohn s o n ad m i t s , functioned f or food a nd livestock storag e, and a s a sec ond g ara g e—in other w ords, as “ are as of usa g e common to all member s of the fa mily .” Id. Fur

ther, “abse nt special c ircumstance s, all rooms in the residenc e can be said to be a rea s of usag e common to a ll me mb e r s o f th e f

amily .” Id. Those spec ial circ umstances e mbrac e only situations where

“ fa mil y me mbe rs . . . e xclu de fr om t his c omm on

a ut ho ri ty a c c e ss t o a

re a s w he re the y

wi shto maintain an expectation of privac y , even from other members of the fa mily .” Id .; see also United St at es v. Gi lli

s , 3 5 8 F
. 3 d

3 8 6 , 3 9 1 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 4 ) ( “ G u e s ts a n d

c o - r e s id e n ts in

a h o u s e ma

y have privac y interests in spe cific proper ty which ca nnot be waive d by

a third par

ty ’s conse nt to a g ener al
s ea rc h o f t h e p re m i s es . ” ( ci t i n g United States v. Block , 590 F.2d 535, 541–42 ( 4th Cir. 1978))) . But the re cord inc ludes no clues that Johnson lock ed t h e bar ns, or that he other

wise re strictedNo. 06-4470

Johnson v. W

eave r

- 8 - Mac I ntosh’s acc ess to them. Under these c ircumstance s, the g overnme nt car ries its burden of demonstrating that the war rantless sea

rch of the bar ns was by consent be cause MacIntosh “enjoy ed that de g re e of acc e ss a

nd c on tr ol o ve r [the se a re a s] th a t a ff or de d [hi m] th e ri g ht t o p e rm it inspection,” Clutt er , 914 F.2d at 778, an d b ec ause the deer tag listed 10240 Carlisle Pike as MacIntosh’s addre ss and the off icer s understood him to be J ohnson’s stepson.
Th a t le a ve s u s to c on sid e r t he e ff e c t of John so n’ s p ri or r efusa l in lig ht o f t

he Sup re me Court’s rec ent hol ding in Randolph that if a po te nti a l de fe nd a nt w ithse lf -i nte re st i n o bje c tin g is prese nt and ac tually o b

j ects, a third party ’s conse nt does not suffice for a rea sonable sea

rch. 547 U.S. at 121. The Randolph Court a lso c ondemned third-par ty consent whe re the re is “e vidence that the police have remove d the potentially objecting tenant from the entra nce for the sa

ke of a voiding a possible objection.” Id. Assuming that t h e o ffice rs violated the F ourth Amendment unde r Randolph , qualified immunity —specific ally , its “ cl ea rl y established” pr ong—shields them from p e r s o n a l l i a

b i l i t y.
To deter mine whether

qualified immunity p ro t ects an officia l whose conduc t violated a constitutional right, the c ourt must c onsider whether that rig ht w as clea rly established. Saucier v

. Kat z , 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). I f the c onstitut ional rig ht was not clea rly established at the time of the cha lleng ed conduc t, qua lified immunit y is proper be cause “an of

ficial c ould not reasona

bly be expected to an t i ci p at e subsequent leg al deve lopments.” Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld , 457 U.S. 800, 818No. 06-4470

Johnson v. W

eave r

The Randolph Court itself n o t ed t h e split of authority on whether

one occ upant may

g ive 2 va lid c on se nt t o a

se a rc h o f s ha

re d p re mis e s w he n a

c o- te na nt w a s p re se nt a

nd ob je c tin g : All four Courts of Appe als to have c onsidered this question have co ncluded that consent re mains eff

ective in the f

ace of an e x press ob

j ection. S ee United States v. Morning , 6 4 F . 3 d 5 31 , 5 33 –5 36 (C A9 19 95 ); Un ite d S tat es v . D on lin , 982 F. 2d 31, 33 (CA1 1 992) ; Un ite d S tat es v . H e nd rix , 595 F. 2d 883, 885 ( CAD.C. 1979) ( per curiam ); Un ite d S

tat es v . S um lin , 5 67 F
. 2d

68 4, 68 7– 68 8 ( CA 6 1 97 7) . O f t he state courts that have addre ssed the question, the majority have rea ched that conclusion as well. See, e .g ., Lov e v . S tat e , 355 Ark. 334, 34 2 , 1 3 8 S
. W
. 3d 676, 680 (2003); Laramie v. Hy

song , 808 P. 2d 199, 203–205 (Wy o. 1991); but cf. State v. Leach , 113 Was h. 2d 73 5, 74 4, 78 2 P. 2d 10 35 , 104 0 (19 89 ) (e n ba nc ) (r e qu ir ingc on se nt o f a ll prese nt co-oc cupants). 547 U.S. at 108 n.1. - 9 - (1982). Randolph , far

from apply

ing clea rly established law, was a depar ture. I n fac t, the upshot 2 of som e o f our pre- Randolph case s was the e x act opposite—we found valid conse nt from third parties’ common authority over shared premises even afte r a potential defe ndant had alrea dy ref used the sea rch. See, e .g. , Un ite d Stat es v . S um lin , 567 F.2d 684, 688 ( 6th Cir. 1977) (“We ca nnot see how the additional fa ct of Appe llant’s initial re fusal to c onsent in any way lessened the risk assumed that his c o- oc c up a nt w ou ld c on se nt. ” ); J.L. Foti Const r. Co. v. Donovan , 786 F.2d 714, 717 (6th Cir. 1986) (same). Thus, be cause the offic ers did not violate a r ight c lear ly established at the time of the challenged c onduct , their cla im to qualified immuni ty preva ils.
C
J ohnson next targ ets two defe cts in the sear ch wa rra nt the o ff i ce rs executed at his house. Firs t , J o hnson points out t hat eve ry fac t cited in the af

fidavit to establish probable c ause r esulted from the of

fice rs’ intervie w with MacIntosh, sug g esting that this information somehow poisoned theNo. 06-4470

Johnson v. W

eave r

- 10 - war rant. Tr ue, the officer s relied solely on MacIntosh’s tip in obt aining the sea rch w arr ant, but, as
we e xpla ine d a

bo ve , the ini tia l tr e sp a ss on to John so n’ s fa rm a nd the dis c us sio ns wi th MacI nto sh
wer e per missibl e under

the Four th Amendment. I n the absence of a F ourth Amendment violation, the trespa ss d o es not undermine the ma g istrate’s pr obable- cause finding
. Cf. United States v. Hopper , 58 F. App’ x 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2003). Second, J o h n son arg ues that the sea rch w arr ant violated the F ourth Amendment’s particula rity require ment beca

use it listed an incorrec t house number a nd did not adequate ly

descr ibe the contra band to be se ized. To determine whe ther a war rant’s de s cription passes c onstitut ional muster, we do not a sk whether it “is technica lly

acc urate in ever

y detail,” but whether it is “sufficient to e na ble the e xec uti ng of

fi c e r to loc a te a nd ide nti fy the pr e mis e s wi th re a so na ble e ff or t [ so that ] there is [ no] reasonable probability that another

premises m i gh t b e mistakenly sear ched.” United Sta te s v . D ur k , 149 F.3d 464, 465 (6th Cir. 1998) (interna l citations and quotation marks omitted). Despite the inc orre ct addr ess, the wa rra nt satisfies this standard: the af fidavit ac curately

descr ibed the house (“ a 2-story

Br own B rick with attac hed g ara g e” and “br own roof” ); descr ibed an unusua l feature (“ House ha s a black cattle fenc e on the east, south, a nd west side”) ; and identified Johnson
a s th e oc c up a nt. Plu s, the wa rr a nt’ s a ff iant h a d v isi te d Joh ns on ’s fa rm th at day , w he n M a c I nto sh d i s cl o s ed the shotg un’s location. See id. a t 46 5 ( wa rr a nt v a lid

de sp ite inc or

re c t a dd re ss) ; United Sta te s v . P e lay o-

Lan de ro , 285 F.3d 491, 495–96 ( 6th Cir. 2002) (same) . And the wa rra nt specific ally

identified the items soug ht, which wer e the a lleg ed cr ime’s tools and fruits. See U nited States v. He nson , 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 ( 6th Cir. 1988).No. 06-4470

Johnson v. W

eave r

- 11 - D Finally , J ohnson contests the scope of the sear ch at his home , appea ring simply to arg ue that beca use “the g uns and ammunition sought wer e immediately acc essible,” the office rs’ sear ch wa s overbr oad bec ause it lasted a n hour and i ncluded looking throug h private a rea s such as be droom draw ers a nd medicine c abinets. I n other words, “once the shells were found,” Johnson arg ues, the office rs wer e not permitted to c ontinue sear ching in “ private are as.” We disa g ree . Obviously more sh otgun sh e lls c ou ld be hid de n e lse wh e re . Th is is pa rt ic ula rl y the c a se a s the of

ficers ’ affi davit s ref lect that they saw J ohnson hurry into the hous e upon returning from jail. To find the shells—a small, e a s y - to
- c o n c e a l i te m— th e o f f ic e r s c o u ld

r e a s o n a b ly lo o k in me d ic in e c a

b in e ts o r b e droom draw ers whe re suc h items could b e h i dden. Unde r these c ircumstance s, we c onclude that the office rs’ searc h of J ohnson’s home wa s rea sonable. Se e Br ind le yv . B est , 1 92 F .3 d 5 25 , 5 31 –3 2 ( 6th Cir. 1999).
III
We affir m the district court’s judg ment.No. 06-4470

Johnson v. W

eave r

- 12 - KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge, concurr ing in the judgm ent. Ic on c ur in the jud g me nt o f t

he c ourt
.