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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

September 2017 Term
 

No. 16-1131
 

SWN PRODUCTION COMPANY, LLC,
 

Defendant Below, Petitioner
 

v. 

RICHARD E. LONG and MARY D. LONG,
 

Plaintiffs Below, Respondents
 

FILED
 

November 7, 2017
 

released at 3:00 p.m. 

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marshall County
 

The Honorable David Hummel, Judge
 

Civil Action No. 16-C-67
 

REVERSED AND REMANDED
 

Submitted: October 18, 2017
 

Filed: November 7, 2017
 

Ancil G. Ramey, Esq. 

Steptoe & Johnson PLLC 

Huntington, West Virginia 

Kristen Andrews Wilson, Esq. 

Steptoe & Johnson PLLC 

Wheeling, West Virginia 

Allison J. Farrell, Esq. 

Steptoe & Johnson PLLC 

Bridgeport, West Virginia 

Counsel for the Petitioner 

James G Bordas, Jr., Esq. 

Jeremy M. McGraw, Esq. 

James B. Stoneking, Esq. 

Bordas & Bordas, PLLC 

Wheeling, West Virginia 

Counsel for the Respondents 

JUSTICE WALKER delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
 

1. “An order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an interlocutory 

ruling which is subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.” Syllabus 

Point 1, Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 231 W. Va. 518, 745 S.E.2d 556 (2013). 

2. “When an appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss and to 

compel arbitration is properly before this Court, our review is de novo.” Syllabus Point 1, 

West Virginia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. McDowell Pharmacy, Inc., 238 W. Va. 465, 796 

S.E.2d 574 (2017). 

3. “Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, parties are only 

bound to arbitrate those issues that by clear and unmistakable writing they have agreed to 

arbitrate. An agreement to arbitrate will not be extended by construction or implication.” 

Syllabus Point 10, Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 228 W. Va. 646, 724 S.E.2d 250 

(2011), overruled on other grounds by Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc v. Brown, 565 U.S. 

530 (2012). 

4. “Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, and the doctrine of 

severability, only if a party to a contract explicitly challenges the enforceability of an 

arbitration clause within the contract, as opposed to generally challenging the contract as 

a whole, is a trial court permitted to consider the challenge to the arbitration clause. 

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However, the trial court may rely on general principles of state contract law in 

determining the enforceability of the arbitration clause. If necessary, the trial court may 

consider the context of the arbitration clause within the four corners of the contract, or 

consider any extrinsic evidence detailing the formation and use of the contract.” Syllabus 

Point 4, State ex rel. Richmond American Homes of West Virginia, Inc. v. Sanders, 228 

W. Va. 125, 717 S.E.2d 909 (2011). 

5. “The mere fact that parties do not agree to the construction of a 

contract does not render it ambiguous. The question as to whether a contract is 

ambiguous is a question of law to be determined by the court.” Syllabus Point 1, Berkeley 

Co. Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Vitro Corp., 152 W. Va. 252, 162 S.E.2d 189 (1968). 

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WALKER, Justice: 

Petitioner SWN Production Company, LLC and Respondents Richard and 

Mary Long are parties to an oil and gas lease that includes an arbitration provision. 

When Respondents sued Petitioner to recover payments to which they claim to be entitled 

under the lease and various other damages, Petitioner urged the circuit court to dismiss 

the case and compel arbitration. Respondents countered that references in other parts of 

the lease to “any court of competent jurisdiction” or “a civil action” invalidated the 

arbitration provision. The circuit court agreed. However, we find that the arbitration 

provision is clear and unambiguous and thus reverse the circuit court’s order and remand 

with directions that the case be dismissed and referred to arbitration. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

This case involves a dispute between the parties regarding Respondents’ 

mineral interests underlying real property located in Marshall County, West Virginia. 

Respondents allege that pursuant to the provisions of an oil and gas lease (Lease) with 

Petitioner’s predecessor in interest executed on December 15, 2008, they are entitled to 

an up-front bonus payment of $113,710.00 ($1,000 per acre) in consideration for 

execution of the Lease but only received $44,544.00.1 Respondents’ complaint seeks (1) 

1 Petitioner represents in its brief that ALL Resources assigned its rights under the 

Lease to Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC (“Chesapeake”), who subsequently assigned all of 

(continued . . .) 

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a declaration that the Lease is invalid as a result of Petitioner’s failure to pay the full 

bonus amount; (2) rescission of the Lease and damages for unjust enrichment; (3) 

damages for trespass and conversion; (4) damages for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress; (5) an injunction to prohibit any re-entry onto their property; and (6) punitive 

damages. Petitioner filed a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss Respondents’ 

complaint, relying on the following arbitration provision in the Lease: 

ARBITRATION. In the event of a disagreement 

between Lessor and Lessee concerning this Lease, 

performance thereunder, or damages caused by Lessee’s 

operations, the resolution of all such disputes shall be 

determined by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the 

American Arbitration Association. All fees and costs 

associated with the arbitration shall be borne equally by 

Lessor and Lessee. 

In its order denying Petitioner’s motion to compel arbitration, the circuit 

court found ambiguity in the Lease’s arbitration provision, explaining: 

18. Upon review of the lease language . . . the Court has 

determined that the lease language regarding arbitration is 

indeed ambiguous. 

19. To be clear, the Plaintiffs have not argued that the entire 

lease is invalid, therefore the arbitration clause is invalid. 

The Plaintiffs’ underlying case may make that allegation, but 

the challenge to the arbitration clause does not. The 

challenge to the arbitration provision is limited to the issues 

of ambiguity and assent. 

its interests to Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner is now the party in interest with respect to the 

subject Lease. 

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20. The references to “courts of competent jurisdiction” and 

“civil actions” demonstrate ambiguity as to the ability to 

proceed with disputes in the civil court system as opposed to 

arbitration.2 

2 Specifically, the two provisions of the Lease relied upon by the circuit court state 

as follows: 

SEVERABILITY. This Lease is intended to be in conformity 

with all laws, rules, regulations and orders and interpreted as 

such. If any provision of this Lease is held invalid or 

unenforceable by any court of competent jurisdiction, the 

other provisions of this Agreement will remain in full force 

and effect. Any provision of this agreement held invalid or 

unenforceable only in part or degree will remain in full force 

and effect to the extent not held invalid or unenforceable. 

(B) LIMITATION ON FORFEITURE. This Lease shall 

never be subject to a civil action or proceeding to enforce a 

claim of termination, cancellation, expiration or forfeiture due 

to any action or inaction by the Lessee, including but not 

limited to making any prescribed payments, unless the Lessee 

has received written notice of Lessor’s demand and thereafter 

fails or refuses to satisfy or provide justification responding to 

Lessor’s demand within 60 days from the receipt of such 

notice. If Lessee timely responds to Lessor’s demand but in 

good faith disagrees with Lessor’s position and sets forth the 

reasons therefore, such a response shall be deemed to satisfy 

this provision, this Lease shall continue in full force and 

effect and no further damages (or other claims for relief) will 

accrue in Lessor’s favor during the pendency of the dispute, 

other than claims for payments that may be due under the 

terms of this Lease. 

(Emphasis added). 

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Finding that ambiguous contract provisions must be construed against the drafter, the 

circuit court held that “[t]he ambiguous contract language at issue here much like the 

ambiguous language in [State ex rel.] Richmond American Homes [of West Virginia, Inc. 

v. Sanders, 228 W. Va. 125, 717 S.E.2d 909 (2011)] demonstrates a failure of clear and 

unmistakable assent as to the issue of arbitration.” On this basis, the circuit court denied 

Petitioner’s motion to compel arbitration. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“An order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an interlocutory ruling 

which is subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.”3 With respect 

to the applicable standard of review, this Court has held that “[w]hen an appeal from an 

order denying a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration is properly before this Court, 

our review is de novo.”4 Additionally, with respect to our review of contractual issues, 

this Court has stated, “we apply a de novo standard of review to [a] circuit court’s 

3 Syl. Pt. 1, Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 231 W. Va. 518, 745 S.E.2d 556 

(2013). 

4 Syl. Pt. 1, West Virginia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. McDowell Pharmacy, Inc., 238 

W. Va. 465, 796 S.E.2d 574 (2017). 

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interpretation of [a] contract.”5 With these standards in mind, we proceed to consider the 

parties’ arguments. 

III. ANALYSIS 

The issue before us is whether the arbitration clause contained in the Lease 

is enforceable. This Court has stated, 

The [Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (FAA)] 

recognizes that an agreement to arbitrate is a contract. The 

rights and liabilities of the parties are controlled by the state 

law of contracts. If the parties have entered into a contract 

(which is valid under state law) to arbitrate a dispute, then the 

FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations and 

compel arbitration.6 

However, “[u]nder the [“FAA”], . . . parties are only bound to arbitrate those issues that 

by clear and unmistakable writing they have agreed to arbitrate. An agreement to 

arbitrate will not be extended by construction or implication.”7 In determining whether a 

motion to compel arbitration should be granted, courts are required under the FAA to 

5 Id. at 469, 796 S.E.2d at 578 (quoting Finch v. Inspectech, LLC, 229 W. Va. 

147, 153, 727 S.E.2d 823, 829 (2012)). 

6 Schumacher Homes of Circleville, Inc. v. Spencer, 237 W. Va. 379, 387, 787 

S.E.2d 650, 658 (2016) (“Schumacher Homes II”). 

7 Syl. Pt. 10, Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 228 W. Va. 646, 724 S.E.2d 250 

(2011), overruled on other grounds by Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc v. Brown, 565 U.S. 

530 (2012). 

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apply the doctrine of “severability” or “separability,” which this Court has explained as 

follows: 

The gist of the doctrine is that an arbitration clause in a 

larger contract must be carved out, severed from the larger 

contract, and examined separately. The doctrine “treats the 

arbitration clause as if it is a separate contract from the 

contract containing the arbitration clause, that is, the 

‘container contract.’” Under the doctrine, arbitration clauses 

must be severed from the remainder of a contract, and must 

be tested separately under state contract law for validity and 

enforceability.8 

Regarding the application of this doctrine, we have held: 

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, and 

the doctrine of severability, only if a party to a contract 

explicitly challenges the enforceability of an arbitration 

clause within the contract, as opposed to generally 

challenging the contract as a whole, is a trial court permitted 

to consider the challenge to the arbitration clause. However, 

the trial court may rely on general principles of state contract 

law in determining the enforceability of the arbitration clause. 

If necessary, the trial court may consider the context of the 

arbitration clause within the four corners of the contract, or 

consider any extrinsic evidence detailing the formation and 

9 use of the contract. 

In determining if the severed arbitration clause is enforceable under generic principles of 

contract law, this Court has further explained that “the trial court can look at other parts 

8 Schumacher Homes II, 237 W. Va. at 387-88, 787 S.E.2d at 658-59. 

9 Syl. Pt. 4, Richmond American Homes, 228 W. Va. 124, 717 S.E.2d 909 

(Emphasis added). 

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of the contract that relate to, support, or are otherwise entangled with the operation of 

the arbitration clause.”10 

Petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred by going outside the arbitration 

provision itself to find ambiguity; specifically, Petitioner challenges the holding that 

references to “any court of competent jurisdiction” in an unrelated severability clause and 

“a civil action” in an unrelated forfeiture clause created an ambiguity invalidating a clear 

and unambiguous arbitration provision. Petitioner distinguishes our decision in 

Richmond American Homes on the basis that the arbitration clause at issue in that case 

contained five references within the clause itself to plaintiff’s ability to bring suit in a 

court of law to resolve disputes. Petitioner maintains that, in this case, the severability 

and forfeiture clauses in the Lease do not create an ambiguity, as neither are inconsistent 

with the operation of the arbitration clause. Petitioner also maintains that the severability 

clause applies to an effort to have any provision of the Lease held invalid or 

unenforceable. However, the action filed in this case involves payment under the Lease, 

an issue Petitioner contends is clearly covered by the arbitration clause. Petitioner 

likewise contends that none of Respondents’ claims seek a forfeiture. 

10 Schumacher Homes II, 237 W. Va. at 388, 787 S.E.2d at 659 (Emphasis added). 

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Conversely, Respondents allege that the contract language is ambiguous 

because the terms are inconsistent. They assert that because the Lease fails to define the 

term “arbitration,” it is reasonable for an unsophisticated party to believe that court action 

is not foreclosed when other provisions in the Lease reference “any court of competent 

jurisdiction” and “civil action.” They contend that the arbitration clause, while severed 

for analysis, cannot be examined in a vacuum, but rather must be interpreted in light of 

the greater context of the entire Lease pursuant to our decision in Richmond American 

Homes and its progeny. We find Respondents’ arguments unconvincing and conclude 

that the circuit court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to compel arbitration was erroneous. 

In Richmond American Homes, a contractor sought to compel arbitration of 

claims made by various homeowners seeking damages for improper construction. This 

Court evaluated an arbitration provision that contained a subsection on mediation that the 

contractor argued was “part and parcel” of the arbitration provision.11 In five places 

within the arbitration provision itself, the mediation provision made reference to the 

possibility of the parties bringing “court action,” “civil action,” or relying upon the 

discretion of a “judge.”12 The circuit court found, and we agreed, that these repeated 

references to “court action” within the arbitration provision suggested that the plaintiffs 

11 228 W. Va. at 131, 717 S.E.2d at 915. 

12 Id. 

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“retain the ability to vindicate their claims in court,” and created an ambiguity with 

regard to arbitration that should be construed against the contractor, the drafter of the 

adhesion contract.13 

In this case, however, the arbitration provision at issue is clear: 

ARBITRATION. In the event of a disagreement 

between Lessor and Lessee concerning this Lease, 

performance thereunder, or damages caused by Lessee’s 

operations, the resolution of all such disputes shall be 

determined by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the 

American Arbitration Association. All fees and costs 

associated with the arbitration shall be borne equally by 

Lessor and Lessee. 

(Emphasis added). Given this clear and unmistakable language in the arbitration clause, 

it was unnecessary for the circuit court to consider the context of the clause within the 

four corners of the contract or consider any extrinsic evidence detailing the formation and 

use of the contract.14 Furthermore, as Petitioner aptly notes, the references within the 

severability and forfeiture clauses “do not relate to or support the operation of the 

arbitration clause, nor are they otherwise entangled with its operation.”15 Thus, 

Respondents’ reliance on Richmond American Homes is misplaced. 

13 Id.
 

14 Syl. Pt. 4, Richmond American Homes.
 

15 Schumacher Homes II, 237 W. Va. at 388, 787 S.E.2d at 659.
 

(continued . . .) 

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In Dytko v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:13CV150, 2014 WL 

2440496 (N.D.W.Va. May 31, 2014), the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia addressed this very same argument involving the same lease 

provisions and found that the severability clause and forfeiture clause did not render the 

arbitration clause ambiguous.16 With respect to the arbitration clause itself, the District 

Court determined that “[the] directive is clear and leaves no doubt concerning the setting 

of such disputes or the types of disputes that must be arbitrated.”17 

Furthermore, with respect to the references made to “court of competent 

jurisdiction” and “civil action” in the severability and forfeiture clauses, the District 

Court determined that the language in these clauses did not alter its finding that the lease 

was clear and unambiguous concerning the parties duty to arbitrate.18 The District Court 

reasoned: 

. . . [T]he arbitration clause makes clear that the 

parties’ disputes concerning the lease are subject to 

arbitration and, therefore, must be brought in that forum. The 

16 Although Respondents’ counsel also represented the plaintiffs in Dytko, 

Respondents failed to advise the circuit court of the District Court’s decision in that case. 

17 2014 WL 2440496 at *3. 

18 Id. 

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severability clause does not provide any rights to either party 

concerning the forum in which they may bring their disputes. 

As such, the mere reference to a court of competent 

jurisdiction does not render the arbitration clause’s directive 

that disputes must be decided in arbitration susceptible to any 

different meaning. 

* * * 

This Court further finds that the language of the 

limitation of forfeiture clause also does not render the 

arbitration clause ambiguous. . . . The entirety of the phrase in 

the limitation of forfeiture clause referencing a possible civil 

action states “civil action or proceeding[.]” Therefore, it 

clearly references the possibility of a proceeding rather than a 

civil action and never states that a civil action would be the 

correct forum. The arbitration clause itself makes it clear 

what the correct forum would be for any possible action 

concerning forfeiture. Thus, after reading all of the clauses in 

conjunction with one another, this Court finds that the 

arbitration clause is not rendered ambiguous based on either 

the limitation of forfeiture provision or the severability 

provision.19 

The District Court also rejected the same argument made by Respondents 

here regarding the applicability of our decision in Richmond American Homes. The 

District Court found that “in this action, the severability and forfeiture clause is separate 

and distinct from the arbitration provision. Further, neither clause at issue directs the 

plaintiffs that they have a right to file a civil action.”20 Accordingly, the District Court 

19 Id. 

20 2014 WL 2440496 at *4. 

(continued . . .) 

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found that the contract at issue in Richmond American was distinguishable from the lease 

under its consideration, and, thus, the finding in Richmond American was not 

applicable.21 

Respondents attempt to distinguish the District Court’s holding in Dytko, 

contending that the plaintiff in that case was actively engaged in negotiating the terms of 

the lease with Chesapeake Appalachia. They also argue that the District Court’s analysis 

in Dytko was flawed. However, we find their attempt to distinguish Dytko unpersuasive; 

Dytko’s holdings are instructive with respect to the issue before us in this case. 

“The mere fact that parties do not agree to the construction of a contract 

does not render it ambiguous. The question as to whether a contract is ambiguous is a 

question of law to be determined by the court.”22 As this Court recently stated: 

“[c]ontract language is considered ambiguous where an 

agreement’s terms are inconsistent on their face or where the 

phraseology can support reasonable differences of opinion as 

to the meaning of words employed and obligations 

undertaken.” Syl. pt. 6, State ex rel. Frazier & Oxley, L.C. v. 

Cummings, 212 W. Va. 275, 569 S.E.2d 796 (2002). Also, 

“[t]he term ‘ambiguity’ is defined as language reasonably 

21 Id. 

22 Syl. Pt. 1, Berkeley Co. Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Vitro Corp., 152 W. Va. 252, 162 

S.E.2d 189 (1968). 

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susceptible of two different meanings or language of such 

doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or 

disagree as to its meaning.” Syl. pt. 4, Estate of Tawney v. 

Columbia Nat. Res., 219 W. Va. 266, 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006).23 

Having found that the parties’ agreement to arbitrate in this case was clear 

and unmistakable, we reiterate that 

[i]n determining whether the language of an agreement to 

arbitrate covers a particular controversy, the federal policy 

favoring arbitration of disputes requires that a court construe 

liberally the arbitration clauses to find that they cover 

disputes reasonably contemplated by the language and to 

resolve doubts in favor of arbitration.24 

In this case, there is no question that the severability clause and forfeiture 

clause “do not relate to or support the operation of the arbitration clause, nor are they 

otherwise entangled with its operation.” Accordingly, it was improper for the circuit 

court to go outside of the provisions of the arbitration clause to find language to create an 

ambiguity. As Petitioner properly contends, “because the two references to civil action in 

the Lease . . . are not located within the same provision as the arbitration agreement” and 

neither clause directs Respondents that they have a right to file a civil action, the 

23 Salem International University, LLC v. Bates, 238 W. Va. 229, 235, 793 S.E.2d 

879, 885 (2016). 

24 State ex rel. City Holding Co. v. Kaufman, 216 W. Va. 594, 598, 609 S.E.2d 

855, 859 (2004) (citations omitted). 

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arbitration provision is not ambiguous and therefore should be enforced. For these 

reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s order denying Petitioner’s motion to compel 

arbitration and remand the case to the circuit court for entry of an order compelling 

arbitration and dismissing the civil action. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we reverse the October 31, 2016 order of the circuit court 

and remand this case with directions that it be dismissed and referred to arbitration. 

Reversed and remanded. 

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