UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 99-794
KEN NE TH M. C ARPENTER , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(Argued January

17, 2001 Dec ided J une 21, 2001 )

Michae l E. W

ildhaber, of

Was hin g ton , D C, f

or the a pp e lla nt. Edward V. Cassidy , w ithwh om Leigh A. Bradley , G e ne ra l Co un se l; Ro n G arv in , Assistant Gene ral Counsel; and Mi c ha e l A. Le on ar d , D e puty As sis tant G e ne ra l Co un se l, w e re on the br ie f, a ll of Washington, DC, for

the appe llee.
Be fore KRAMER, Chief Judge , and FARL EY, HOL DAWAY, IVERS, STEI NB ERG, and GREENE, Judges

. FARL EY, Judge , filed the opinion of the Cou rt

. S T E I NB ERG, Judge , filed an opinion concur ringin part and dissentingin part. KRAMER, Chief Judge , filed a dissentingopinion.
FARL EY, Judge : T his is a n a pp e a l f ro m th e Ap ri l 6, 1999 , de c isi on of the B oa rd of Ve te ra ns ' Appea ls (B VA or Boa

rd) which found t hat t he tot al attorney fee s char g ed by the appe llant, attorney Kenne th M. Carpente r, for his repre sentation of vete ran V ictor S. Weatherspoon, we re " excessive and unre asonable ." T he BVA reduce d the appe llant's f ee to 20% of the pa st-due bene fits awar ded to h is c l i e n t

. T h e B o ar d a l s o c o n c l u d e d th at th e a p p e l l an t w a s l e g a l l y b o un d t o r e fu ndto Mr. Weather spoon the fee s awa rded to him pursuant to the Equa l Acce s s t o J u s t i ce Act (EA J A), 28 U. S.C. § 2 41 2( d) . F or the re a so ns that fol low , the Court wi ll af fi rm the de c isi on

of the B oa rd in pa rt and re ve rs e in p art

.2 I

. BACK GR OUND The ve tera

n serve d on active duty

in the United States Army from Jul y

1979 to September 1980. Record ( R.) at 13. VA denied his claim for se rvice connec tion for a ne rvous disorder in May 19 81 . R. at 35 . In F e br

ua ry 19 93 , Mr

. Weathe rs po on so ught t o r e op e n h is s e rv ic e c onne c tio n c la im. R. at 79. In Fe bruar

y 1994, he filed a

VA F orm 22a with t h e re gi o n al o ff ice ( RO) appointingthe appellant, K e n n e th

M

. Ca r p e n te r , a s h is r e p r e s e n tati v e
. R. at 4 6

. T h e RO aw ar d e d th e v e te r an service connec tion for bipolar a ffe ctive dis order with chronic undiffer entiated sc hizophrenia in May 1994, eff ective f rom Fe bruar

y 12, 1993. R. at 79. In Fe bruar

y 1995, the appe llant filed, on beha lf of t he veteran, a claim for an ea rlier e ffe ctive date f or his ser v i ce connection awar d on the basis of c lear and unmistakable e rror

(CUE) in the Marc h 1981 RO decision. R. at 49-51. In April 1995, the R O determined that there was no CUE in the May

1981 RO decision and the B oard a ffirme d. R. at 53-56, 76-86. On May 1, 1997, the appe llant filed a No t i ce o f Appea l with this Court on behalf of the veter an. On t he same date he filed wit h the Court a copy of a f ee a g ree ment enter ed into betwee n him and the ve te ra

n. Th e a g re e me nt p ro vid e d in pe rt ine nt p art : 2. SCO PE AN D DU TI ES. Clie nt [the ve te ra n] hir e s Atto rn e y

[the a pp e lla nt] to p ro vid e le g a l se rv ic e s in c onne c tio n wi th a

pp e a l to U. S. Court of Ve te ra ns Ap pe a ls [now the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veter ans Claims (Court)]. Attorney shall provide the followingservice s: All services ne cessa ry to prosecute appea l to the [C ourt]. As a re sult of a dec ision by

the [Court] , the veter an' s case m ay be re manded a

nd the B oa rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls p re vio us de c isi on va c ate d. In th e even t of a c ourt

order ed re mand this ag ree ment shall i n cl u d e repr esentation of the veter an by the Attorney at both the B oard of

Veter ans' Appea ls as well as a ny Reg ional Offic e of the Depa rtment of Ve tera

ns Affa irs. . . .
3. CO NT I

NG EN T F EE (D EPA RTM EN T O F VE TERANS AF F AI RS CASES). Client a g ree s to pa y a fe e equa l to thirty

perc ent (30%) of the total amount of any past-due be nefits awa

rded to Cl ient, to include veteran, depende nt or survivor be ne fi ts; on

the ba sis of the Clie nt' s c la im wi th the De pa rtme nt of Ve te ra

ns Af fa ir s.

. . . T his re pr e se ntatio n is un de rt ake n u po n th e fo llo wi ngc on dit ion s:

. . . . c. The ser

vices c ontemplated under thi s contra ct bef

ore the [Court ], F e de ra l Cir c uit

Court of Ap pe a ls, B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns '3 Appea ls, or Depa

rtment of Ve tera

ns aff airs Reg ional Offic e relate spec ifically

to the claim or c laims previously dec i ded by the B oa rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls.

. . . . 4. EQ UA LAC CES S TO JUSTI CE A CT ( EA JA) F EE S. It is un de rs too d that in actions bef

ore the [C ourt], an application for attorney fee s, costs and expenses may be filed on behalf of Client unde r EAJA in order to r eimburse Client for at torney fee s, costs and expenses which w ere required t o b e paid to protec t Cli ent from unre a so na

ble g ov e rnme nta l a c tio n. Th e re c ov e ry of re a so na

ble atto rn e y

fe e s, c os ts and expenses for

work pe rfor

med on beha lf of Client at t h e C ourt may be orde red. In the eve nt of such Court-or dere d awa rd, such attorney

fee s, costs and expenses shall be payable dire ctly

to Attorney . I t is understood and agree d that any attorney fee s awa rd ed under

EAJA shall be the sole and exclusive proper ty and entitlement of Attorney , for the se rvice s rende red to the Cli en t fo r re prese ntation before the Court

. . . . Attor

ne y a g re e s that in the e ve nt the Court g ra nts an aw ard of

be ne fi ts, if there is ultimate succe ssful rec overy of past-due benef its for Cl ient, an offset will be made ag ainst the entitlement paid under the Attorney /Cli ent Continge nt Fee Contract of Attorney' s perc entag e of pa st-due bene fits, in the am o u n t of the sum of the attorney fee s awa

rded by the Court under the provisions of EAJA. C lient ag ree s that in the event the Court r emands ve tera n' s case , no offse t will be ma d e against t he en t i t l em en tp ai d

un d er th e A t t o rn ey

/ C l i en tC o n t i n gen tFe e C o n tra cto f A t t o rn ey 's perc entag e of pa st-due bene fits in the amount of the sum of the attorney fee s awa rded by the Court under the provisions of EAJA, if there is ultimate succe ssful rec overy of pa st- du e be ne fi ts f

or Clie nt. R. at 89-90. By letter dated May

1, 1997, the appe llant also sent a copy of t his fee ag ree ment to the Boa rd. The a ppellant' s letter stated that the fee agr eeme nt was being submitted to the B oard " in the event of a r emand f

rom the [Court] ." R. at 88. On J u l y 3 , 1 9 9 7 , the Deputy Chief Counsel for L eg al Affa irs o f t h e BV A, by

direc tion of the Chairman of the BV A, sent a le tter to the appe llant acknow ledg ing r ece ipt of the fee ag ree ment. R. at 96. The letter also stated: As we have pr e vio us ly

dis c us se d w ithy ou , pa

ra g ra ph 4 o f your a g re e me nt, r e l at i n gt o f

e e s un d e r th e [E A JA ], a

p p e ar s t o p r o v i d e th at f

e e s aw ar d e d

un d e r E A JA wi l l n o tb e o ff

s etaga i n s ty o ur c l i en t 's fe es i f t h e [ C o urt ] re m an d s M r. W ea th er s p o o n 's case and past-due benef

its are a war ded. This provision appea rs t o be in violation of § 506(c) of Pub. L . No. 102-572 (O ct. 29, 1992), whic h provides that, whe n an attorney rec eives fe es for

the s am e wo rk under both 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) a nd 38 U.S.C. § 5904, the attorney shall ref und the smaller amount to the client. The la w do e s n ot a

pp e ar t o p ro vid e an e xce pti on wh e re a c a se is r e mand e d f

ro m th e Court

.4 I f you rec eive a

n EAJA fee a

nd y our client is awar ded past-due benef its, we wi ll t ake a

pp ro pr iate ste ps to r e vie w your f e e a g re e me nt f

or re a so na ble ne ss. Id

. In F e br

ua ry 19 98 , th e Court

g ra nte d th e pa

rt ie s' joi nt m oti on

fo r re mand

of the ve te ra n' s c la im for a n ear lier ef

fec tive date. R. at 110. On May 8, 1998, the Court a war ded the veter an $2,473.17 in attorney

fee s and expenses pursua nt to EAJ A. SeeR. at 137. In August 1998, the Boa rd found that there was CUE in the May 6, 1981, RO decision and aw arde d the veter an an e ffe ctive date of Janu ary 20 , 1 98 1, fo r h is s e rv ic e -c onne c te d p syc ho sis

. R. at 11 6- 26 . In Se pte mbe r 1 99 8, the RO implemented the B oard' s decision and awa rded the appellant $206,017.00 in past-due be nefits. R. at 128-29, 141-42. In a letter dated Nove mber 17, 1998, the O ffice o f t h e C h ai rman of the BV A notified the appellant that be cause his fee a g ree ment did not provide that his continge nt fee b e o ff s et by the EAJA award, the Boa

rd wa s beingdirec ted to revie w his fee ag ree ment for r easona bleness pursua

nt to 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c) (2). The appellant filed a response in which he a rgued that the B oard ha d no jurisdiction to review his fe e agree ment pursuant to 38 U.S .C. § 5904(c) a nd that, even if

the B oard did have jurisdiction, his fee , including the rete ntion of t he EAJ A award, was rea sonable. R. at 146- 48. The appellant also argued that " the work pe rfor med by [hi s] office to sec ure the joint remand [was] entirely s eparate a

nd apar t from the wor

k perf ormed at the Boa

rd on re mand." R. at 147. Thus, the appe llant argued, " The wor k perf ormed at the [BVA] is not, and c annot as a matter of la

w, be c on sid e re d th e same wo rk a s p e rf or me d b e fo re th e Co urt." R. at 14 8. Th e a pp e lla nt a lso submitt ed a le tter fr om the veter an statingthat he conside red the appellant' s fee to be fa ir, just, and

rea sonable unde r the c ircumstance s. R. at 144. In the B VA dec ision here on appea l, the Board found that the 30% conting ency fee char g ed by the appellant was ex cessive and unreasonable and t here fore reduc ed the appellant' s fee to 20% of past-due benef

its. The Boa

rd also found that the appellant's retention of the EA J A fe e aw arde d to the veter an for

attorney fee s for wor

k perf ormed be fore th i s Court, in addition to collecting the conting ency

fee , was unre asonable

.5 II. JU RI SDI CT ION AL ISSU ES Th e a pp e lla nt p ro po se s se ve ra l di ff

e re nt the or ie s in ar guin gthat th e B oa rd ' s d e c isi on

sh ou ld be vacated beca

use the Boa

rd lacke d jurisdiction to revie w his f ee ag ree ment. First, he contends that the fe e ag ree ment revie wed by the Boa rd wa s initi ated pur suant to 38 U.S.C. § 7263 which pertains to r epre sentation befor e the Court, rather than § 5904( c) which addr esses re prese ntation before the Boa rd and V A. Acc ording ly , he ar gues that t h e fe e agr eeme nt is controlled by § 7263, and the Boa rd, there fore , did not have jurisdiction to revie w it pur suant to § 5904( c). Sec ond, the appe llant urg es that since the Court gr anted the parties' joint motion f or rema nd and aw arde d EAJA fees, the C o urtp re s um ab l y

re v i ew edth e f

ee agr ee m en tfo r re as o n ab l en es s p urs u an t t o § 7 2 6 3 an d , th ro u gh its sil e nc e , im

pli c itl y de c re e d th e a g re e me nt r e a so na ble . T he a

pp e lla nt c onte nd s th at th is i mpl ic it conclusion is "the law of th e ca s e. " Finally , the appe llant argues that eve n if the B oard ha d the authority to reviewth e fe e agree ment for r easona bleness pursua

nt to § 5904(c)( 2), the B oard

e xce e de d th at a

uth or ity by c on sid e ri nghis " e lig ibi lity " fo r a fe e wh e n it

de te rm ine d th at he mus t return the EAJA fee a

war ded by

the Court to the veter an. A. Sec tion 5904(

c) and Section 7263 Se c tio n 5 90 4( c ) o f t itl e 38 , U .S. Cod e pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art : (2) A per son who, ac ting as ag ent or attorney in a case ref err ed to in para g raph (1) of this subsection, represe nts an appellant befor e the De partment or the Boa rd of Veter ans' Appea ls afte r t he Board first makes a final decision in the case shall file a copy of any fee ag ree ment betwee n them with the Boa rd at such time a s may

be s p e c i f i e d b y th e B o ar d

. T h e B o ar d , u p o ni t s o w n m o t i o n o r th e r e qu e s t o f e i th e r p arty, may revie w such fe e agree ment and may order a re duction in the fee called f or in the ag ree ment if it finds that the fee is ex cessive or unrea sonable. A findi ng or orde r of the Boa rd under the prec eding sentenc e may be revie wed by the United States Court of Appe als for V eter ans Claims under sec tion 7263(d) of this title. Se c tio n 7 26 3 o f t itl e 38 , U .S. Cod e pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art : (c) A per son who repr esents an appellant before the Court shall file a c opy of any fee ag ree ment betwee n the appellant a nd that person with the Court at the time the appea l is filed. The Court, on its own motion o r o n the motion of any party , may re vie w s uc h f

e e a g re e me nt. (d) In revie winga fe e agree ment under subse ction (c) of this section or under section 5904(c )(2) of this titl e, the Court m ay aff irm the findingof the B oard a nd6

may or de r a re du c tio n in

the fe e c a lle d f

or in the a g re e me nt i f i t f

ind s th at th e fe e is excessive or unre asonable

. The fe e agree ment at iss u e i n this matter was e ntere d into after the Boa rd made a fina l decision in the vete ran' s case and wa s filed with this Court at the tim e the a ppeal w as fi l ed . The ag ree m en t n ot only

addre ssed re prese ntation before this Court, butalso specif ically provided for repr esentation before the B oard a nd the Depa

rtment of Ve t er an s Affa irs in the event this Court

rema nded the ve tera

n' s claim. In contemplation of that possibility , the appe llant filed a c opy of the fee ag ree ment with the Boa rd on the same date he filed the ag ree ment with the Court, "in the e vent of a rem an d fr o m t h e [ Court] ." R. at 88. By filing this one f

ee a g ree ment with the Court and the Boa rd, t he appellant complied wit h the requirements of both § 5904(c) and § 7263(c). B eca use the fee ag ree ment filed with the Bo ar d s at isfied the re quirements of § 5904( c), the Boa rd had the authority to reviewthe fe e agree ment pursuant to that subsection. The fa ct that t his Court had the opportunity to revie w t he fee ag ree ment pursuant to § 7263 is not a bar to the Boa

rd' s revie w of the ag ree ment. Section 7263 authorizes the Court, on its own motion or on the motion of a n y p ar t y , to reviewa fe e agree ment filed with the Court; it does not require us to do so. See 3 8 U

. S. C. § 7 2 6 3 ( c ) ( T h e Court . . . may revi ew s uch fee agreem ent .") (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; se e als o Le wis v . B ro wn , 5 Ve t.A pp
. 15 1, 15 4 ( " [T]he Court wi ll n ot o rd ina

ri ly revie w sua sponte e very

fee ag ree ment.") . Neither party made suc h a motion, and the Court did not undertake a r eview on its own. The Court ag ree s that had the Court re viewed the fee ag ree ment as it pertained to wor

k befor e this Court pur suant to § 7263(d), the B oard w ould have be en pre cluded from re viewingat l east that portion of the fe e agree ment. Cf. Sm ith v . B ro wn , 35 F.3d 1516, 1526 (F ed. C i r. 1994) (de clining to inter pret a regulation in such a wa

y that would, "oddly , permit an inferior to collatera lly

revie w th e actions of a superior." ). Howe ver, the Court's silenc e on the

re a so na ble ne ss o f t

he fe e a g re e me nt c ann ot b e sa id to be an im pli c it h old ingtha

t th e a g re e me nt w a s, in f a c t, r e a so na

ble and the B oa rd wa s f re e to r e vie w th e a g re e me nt p ro pe rl y be fo re it p ur su ant t o 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c). Additionally , the Boa

rd was fre e to re view the e nti re fee ag ree ment proper ly befor e it , and was not re quired to limit i ts review to only that portion that pertaine d to work bef ore the BV A. Section 5904(c) (2) r equire s that an attorney repr esenting a claimant befor e the Boa rd or VAfile a7

copy of his or her

fee ag ree ment with the Boa rd. The statute further authorizes the Board to re view "suc h ag ree ment" f

or re asonable ness. S uch fee ag ree ments will often encompa ss work per formed be fo re the B oa

rd , VA , an d the Court (a s wa s the c a se wi th thi s fe e a g re e me nt) . We fi nd no thi ngin the langua g e of § 59 04 (c ) or § 72 63 to re qu ir e the B oa rd to d iss e c t a

fe e a g re e me nt t o r e vie w o nly that portion pertainingto work per formed be fore the B oard or to so lim it the B oard' s scope of revie w. In f a c t, whe n r e a d to g e th er, the se tw o s e c tio ns op e ra te to e ns ur e that if

the Court

do e s n ot f

ir st revie w a f ee a g ree ment, the B oard ma y revie w t he agr eeme nt upon a re mand of the c laim, and that decision will be subject to de novo revie w by this Court. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5904(c), 7252, 7263(d) ; In re Ve rnon , 8 Vet.App. 457, 459 (1996) (" [I ]n conducting a revie w of a

fee ag ree ment, a finding by the B oard r eg ardingthe excessiveness or unrea sonablene ss of the fe e is entitled to no de fe re nc e ." ); se e als o 38 C.F.R. § 20.609(i) (a reduc tion in fee s may be orde red by

the B oard e ven afte r pay ment has bee n made to the att o rn ey ; i n such a c ase, the attorney must refund a

ny overpa y ment to the client). B. Re as on ab le ne ss v s. El igi bil ity The a ppellant contends that, even if the B oard did have jurisdiction to reviewthis fee

a g re e me nt p ur su ant to § 59 04 (c ), the B oa rd e xce e de d its jur isd ic tio n b e c a us e it c on sid e re d n ot o nly the re as on ab le ne

ss of his fe e but a lso his e lig ibi lit yto collect a f

ee. I n Scates v . Gober , this Court held that " all issues involving entit l em en t o r elig ibilit y for attorney

fee s under direct-pay ment
c ontin g e nc y -f

e e a g re e me nts , a s c o nt

r a s t e d w iththe iss ue s o f r e a so na ble ne ss a nd e xce ssi ve ne ss, mus t first be a ddresse d by

the RO in acc ordanc e with the normal adjudication proce dures." 14 Vet.App. 62 , 6 4 ( 20 00 ) ( e n b anc ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Th e a pp e lla nt u rg e s th is C ourt

to e xten d o ur

ho ldi ngin Scates to non-direct-

payme nt conting ency-fe e agree ments, like the one at issue in this matter. As the appe llant points out , t h e j u ri s d i cti on of the B oard a nd the Court to review

fee ag ree ments pursuant to §§ 5904(c ) and 7263 is nar row. Se e, e .g., Cox

v . W est , 149 F.3d 1360, 1364 (F ed. Cir. 1998) (" By its terms, s ection 5904(c)(2) only g ives the B oard limited jurisdiction to review the re as on ab le ne

ss of a fe e and to r e du c e the fe e ." ); In re W ick, 40 F.3d 367, 371 ( Fe d. Cir. 1994) (" [T] he cour

t's r eview of

fee ag ree ments u nder § 7263 is strictly limit ed by

the languag e of the statute. .

. . [T] he court is a uthorized only to ' order a reduc tion in the fee called for if it f inds the fee is e xce ssi ve or unr e a so na ble .' " ); Sc ate

s, su pra . In Cox, W

ick, and Scates , th is C ourt and the U. S.8

Court of Appea ls for the F eder al C ircuit held t hat, because the rea sonablene ss of t he fee c harg ed by

eac h attorney was not at i ssue, neither § 5904(c) nor § 7263 could s erve as a jurisdictional ba sis for the B oard or

the Court' s review

of the fe e agree ments. In eac h o f t h o s e ca ses, the issue pre sented was the attorney ' s elig ibilit y to collect a f

ee. An attorne y

can be e lig ible to collect a f ee pur suant to a fe e agree ment an d s t i l l p u rsue a n award of statutory

fee s on his client's be half. Se e Ve ne ga s v . M itc he ll , 495 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1990) ( th e a t t o rn e y f

e e p r o v i s i o no f

th e C i v i l R i g h t s A c t , 4 2 U

. S

. C

. § 1 9 8 8 , d o e s n o tp r e c l u d e at t o r n e ys from contr actingwith t h ei r clients for fee s in addition to t he amount aw arde d by the cour t). Howeve r, this Court has fo u n d t h at fe e agree ments which do not provide f or an of fset of attorney fee s paid by

the veter an by

the amoun t o f an y EAJA award f or the same work a

re un re as on ab le

. Shaw v. Gober , 10 Vet.App. 498, 505 (1997) (holding that a fee ag ree ment was " ' unrea sonable' on its face to the extent that itmay be re ad as pre cludingan off set wher e the Court re mands with a dir e c tio n that the B VA awa rd be ne fi ts that the Court fi nd s are re qu ir e d a s a matte r o f l aw" ); se e als o In re M ason , 11 Vet.App. 514, 516 (1998) (Court found" ' unrea sonable' on its face " a fee ag ree ment pr ov isi on pr e c lud ingre imb ur se me nt of c os ts and e xpe ns e s to c lie nt whe n E AJA s e ttl e me nt i s le ss tha n th e fu ll a

mou nt) ; W ingo v. W est , 11 Vet.App. 307, 312-13 (1998) (same) . The B oard did not fi nd that th e atto rn e y

wa s ine lig ible to collect a f ee pursuant to his fee ag ree ment or EAJA, but

co n s i d er edi n s t ea d

wh et h er th e p o rt i o no f t h e f ee agr ee m en twh i ch p ro v i d edfo r t h e a t t o rn ey 's

re te nti on of bo th f e e s w a s un re as on ab le

. Ac c or din g ly , the B oa rd ' s re vie w o f t

he fe e a g re e me nt i n this matter did not ex cee d its jurisdi ction to reviewthe fee agr eeme nt for re asonable ness pursuant to § 5904(c), and there fore we f ind no occa sion to consider the a ppellant' s reque st for an e x tension of Scates

. C. Th e J ur isd ic tio n o f th e Cou rt The jurisdiction of the Court of [ Appea ls for Vetera ns Claims] is specifica lly

define d by statute at 38 U.S.C. § 7252, in a provision entitled "Jurisdiction; fi n al i t y of de c isi on s. " Th at pr ov isi on state s: " Th e Cou

rt of [Ap pe a ls f

or Ve te ra ns Cla ims ] sha ll have e x clusive jurisdiction to review de c isi on s o f th e Bo ar

d o f V e te ra ns ' Ap

pe als

. . . . Th e Court sh all

ha v e po we r to aff

irm , m od ify , o r re v e rse

a d e c isi on of t

heBo ar d or to remand the matter , a s a p p r o p r i at e
. " 3 8 U

. S

. C

. § 7 2 5 2 ( e mp h a s i s s u p p l i e d )

. In deter mining the jurisdi c ti o n

c o n f e r r e d b y § 7252, we a

re mindful that " [j ]urisdi ctional statutes are to be constru ed 'wi th prec ision and with fidelity to the terms by

which Co ngres s h as ex pres sedit s w is hes '." Palmore v. U nited States , 411 U.S. 389, 396,9

9 3 S

. C t

. 1 6 7 0 , 1 6 7 5 , 3 6 L

. E d

. 2 d 3 4 2 (1 9 7 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Che ng Fa n Kw ok

v . I NS , 392 U.S. 206, 212, 88 S.C t. 1970, 1974, 20 L .Ed.2d 1037 (1968))

. In re W ick, 4 0 F .3 d at 37 0; se e als o 3 8 U

. S

. C

. § 7 2 6 1 ( d e f i n i n gth e C o urt ' s s c o p e o f r e v i e w )

. In addition, Congre ss authorized this C ourt to "' revie w' fee agree ments betwee n an appe llant and a person r epre sentingthe appe llant before the [C] ourt when a n appea l is proper ly

befor e the [C] ourt and when a copy of the fe e agree ment has bee n filed with the [C] ourt at the time the a ppeal is filed." In re W ick, 40 F.3d at 3 7 1 ; 3 8 U.S.C. § 7263. I n such instance s, § 7263(d) g ives the Court the additional authority

to "a ffirm the finding of t he Board and .

. . order a re duction in the fee called f or in th e agreeme ntif

itfi nd s t hatth e fee i s ex cess iv e or u nrea so nab le. " "[F]ee a g ree ments are proper ly befor e the c ourt . . . when it re views decisions of the B oard

con cern in g an agreeme ntor on any ot her mat ter deci dedby

th e Board ." In re W

ick, 40 F.3d at 371. Be fore this Court i s an April 6, 1999, dec ision of the Boa rd re g ardingthe re asonable ness of the f ee
c a lle d f or in a fe e a g re e me nt be tw e e n the a pp e lla nt an d the ve te ra

n. Th at de c isi on

wa s a pp e a le d to this Court by the appellant. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction ove r the April 6, 1999, BV A dec ision purs ua nt t o 38 U.S. C. § 7252 and the fe e a g re e me nt b e tw e e n th e a pp e lla nt a nd his c lie nt i s " pr op e rl y befor e the [C] ourt" for our revie w. Id

.

III . TH E REA SON AB LEN ESS OF NO OF F SET F OR EA JAF EES The fe e ag ree ment at issue in this m atter state d that in the event the Court or dere d an aw ard of bene fits, the attorney' s fee would be offset by any fee s awa rded to the ve tera

n pursuant to EAJA. Howeve r, if the Court re manded the claim, t he agree ment stated that no such of fset would be ma de. Since the vete ran' s claim was indee d rema nded, pursuant to the fee ag ree ment no offse t of the fe e was to be ma de. Relying upon section 506(c ) of the F eder al Courts Administration Act of 1992 (F CAA), the Boa rd found that whe n an attorne y rec eives fe es for

the same w ork under both 38 U.S.C. § 5904 a nd EAJA, the attorney must ref und the smaller f

ee to his or he r client. See Pub. L

. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (Although "[s]ection 5904( d) of title 38, United States Code, shall not prevent a n awa rd of fe e s un de r [E AJA],

. . . whe re a c la ima nt' s atto rn e y

re c e ive s f

e e s f or the same wo rk

un de r b oth section 5904 . . . an d [ EAJA] the claimant' s attorney ref unds to the claimant the amount of the10

s m a l l e r f e e
. )

. T h e r e f

o r e , th e B o ar d

c o n c l u d e d

th atth e a p p e l l an tmu s tr e f

un d t o th e v e t e r anth e E A JA fe e awa rd e d b y the Court

. Although the app l i ca b i l i t y of § 506(c ) of the F CAA is "doubtful" with respec t to a fee ag ree ment revie wed pursuant to §5904(c) , as opposed to § 5904(d) , which is specif ically mentioned in § 506(c), the policy underlying the proscr iption in s ection 506 aga inst double pay ment for the same le g a l w or

k is inh e re nt i n th e po lic y a g a ins t an ' unre a so na

ble ' fe e e mbo die d in s ec t i o n s 5 9 0 4 (c )( 2 ) a n d

7 2 6 3 (d ) a n d

thu s wo u l d

b e e n fo rc eab l e b y

th e C o urtth ro u gh a fi nd ingtha

t a fe e -a g re e me nt p ro vis ion pr ov idi ngfo r s uc h d ou bl e payment is unrea sonable. Shaw v. Gober , 10 Vet.App. 498, 503- 04 (1997). Theref ore, while the B oard' s direct r eliance upon § 506 (c) of the F CA A m ay have be e n e rr or , th is C ourt ha s h e ld t

hat th e c oll e c tio n o f d ou ble pay ments for the same work w ould be unre asonable and a f ee a g ree ment permitting suc h a collec tion would be unenf

orce able. Se e id

. [E] ven if sec tion 506 does not apply to a fe e agree ment, such as is involved in this case, that does not provide , under se ction 5904(d), f or direc t pay

ment by the Se c r e ta r y o f a c o n ti n g e n t f

e e o f 2 0 % o r le s s o f p a s t- d u e V A b e n e f

it s , th e policy underlying the proscr iption in section 506 ag ainst double pay ment for the sa

me leg al work is inhere nt i n t h e policy ag ainst an " unrea sonable" fee embodied in sec tions 5904(c) (2) a

nd 7263(d) a

nd thus would be enfor cea ble by the Court throug h a finding that a fe e -a g re e me nt pr ov isi on pr ov idi ng fo r su c h do ub le pa y me nt is u nrea so na

ble un d e r 3 8 U

. S. C. § 7 2 6 3 ( d )

. T h at p o li c y is d iv in e d f r o m th e le g is lati v e history of section 206 of Pub. L . No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2321, 2330 (1980), a s amende d by Pub. L . No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 183, 186 (1985) (found at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 note) relating to t he Soc ia l Se c ur ity

Ac t (S SA) [he re ina ft e r s e c tio n 2 06 re latin gto S SA]. Th at SSA provision contains languag e that es s en t i ally mirrors that found in F CAA § 506(c)

. Th e le g isl ativ e his tor

y of se c tio n 2 06 rel ati ngto S SA e xpla ine d: " With out th is ame ndme nt [pr e c lud ing an att or ne y fo r a Soc ia l Se c ur ity

or Sup ple me nta l Se c ur ity Income ( SSI ) cl aim ant from r ece iving both EAJA and SSA fees] it was argued,

' double dipping' was possible. Such double pa y ments are i nappropr iate and de pr ive [ ] the pla int if

f o f t he be ne fi ts i nte nd e d b y EA JA." H. R. R EP
. N O . 9 9- 12 0, pt. 1, a t 14 8- 49 (1 98 5) (E AJA Ex ten si onandAm end men t) (S ect io n-b y -S ect io n An aly sis de sc ri bin gse c tio n 3 of

H. R. 2 37 8, wh ic h w a s id e nti c a l to pr ov isi on ult imate ly e na cte d in P ub . L . N o. 99 -8 0) ; see W ells v. Bowen , 855 F.2d 37, 42 ( 2d Cir. 1988) (" Congr ess clea

rly intended the two statutes to work in conjunction and that dual fee applications [under the SSA and EAJ A] are not improper as long as the l esser of any two amounts awa

rded g oes to the attorne y ' s client" ; indeed, "a ttorney workingunder conting ent-fe e agr eeme nt can best defr ay the client's cost of l eg al s ervic es by seeking11

both EAJA and S SA fee s".)

. The House Commi ttee re port stated that, althoug h the at t o r n e y w o u l d b e p e r m i t t e d " t o s e e k r e c o v e r

y un d e r b o tha u th o r i z at i o n s [t

h e E A JA and S SA]

. . . [, t] he attorney

. . . may keep the larg er f

ee, but must retur

n the amount of the sma lle r f

e e to t he c la ima nt. " H. R. R EP . 99-120, pt. 1, at 149. Shaw , 10 Vet.App. at 504. Thus, a fee ag ree ment allowing an attorney to c ollect and reta in both an EA JA f e e a s w e ll a s a

fe e fr om t

he c lie nt f or the same wo rk

is " unre a so na

ble " purs ua

nt t o 3 8 U .S. C. §§ 5904 and 7263. In Shaw , the fe e agree ment at is s u e, l i k e t h e fee ag ree ment in this m atter, state d that there would be no off

set of an EAJA award where the Court rema nded the c laim. The Court held that the fee ag ree ment was " ' unrea sonable' on its face to the extent itmay b e re ad as precludingan off set wher e the Court rema

nds with a direc tion that the BVAawa rd bene fits that the Court finds are requir ed as a matter of law ." 10 V et.App. at 505. How ever , the Court also held that " the double-pa y ment proscr iption would have no application to the pay ment of fe es under

the EAJA and under the fee ag ree ment wher e the leg al work done in connec tion with thos e fe es is not the same." Id . at 50 4. Th e Court the n c on c lud e d that it wa s " c le ar o n th e fa c e of

the a pp e lla nt' s c onte nti on s in his substantive brief that a ny leg al re prese ntation on remand [would] be differe nt from that p e r f o r m e d [ atth e C o urt ] b e c a

u s e i nth e C o urtp r o c e e d i n g s th e a p p e l l an t ' s c o un s e l s o u g h to n l y a
rem and to th e Boardanddi d n otseekreve rsa l o f the Bo ard d eci si on ." Id . "A ccor dingly , [t he Court fo und th at] th e of

fs e t is su e wa s n ot p re se nte d b y the fa c ts o f t

his c a se be c a

us e [it w a s] no t a

c a se wher e the a

ppell an t's c ounsel [was] s eekingfee s, under the f ee a g ree ment and the EA J A, for the 'sam e wo rk. '" Id

. Th e c on c e pt t

hat wo rk pe rf

or me d be fo re thi s Co ur

t and on re mand to t he B oa rd and VAis not nece ssarily

the " same wor

k" w as the subjec t of this Court's dec ision in Fr itz v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 190 (1999). In Fr itz , the Court a g ain considere d the rea sonablene ss of a provision in a fee ag ree ment that no off

se t of an EA JA awa

rd wo uld be ma de wh e re the Court

re mand e d th e c la im. On

the me ri ts of the ve tera

n' s appea l, the Court had g rante d the par ties' joint mot io n fo r re mand, vac ated the B oa rd ' s d e c isi on , a

nd re mand e d th e c la im f

or re a dju dic atio n. 13 Ve t.A pp at 191. Th e Court

he ld that the fe e agree ment was not unre asonable on its face pursuant to Sh aw, su pra , beca use the fe e
a g re e me nt d id n ot p re c lud e an o ff se t w he re the Court

re ve rs e s and

re mand s f

or an a wa rd of be ne fi ts. Id . at 194. The Court noted that "[u]nder Shaw , an attorne y g en er al l y

may reta in an entire12

conting ency-fe e amount if the r epre sentation provi d ed befor e the B VA/VA subseque nt to the attorney ' s work befor e the Court involves obtaining more relief from the depa rtment than what the app ell ant recei ved fro m th e Co urt ." Id

. The S ecr etar y had argued that the EAJ A award required a n offse t beca

use " inasmuch as the c ontinge nt fee contemplates a single sum in pay ment for se rvice s provided both bef

ore the Court and in any post-rema nd proce eding s befor e VA, it is not clear to what extent the continge ncy

fee may be duplicat i v e o f the EAJA awa rd for service s befor e the Court

on ly ." Id . The Court re

jected this ar gument. Relying upon this Court' s decision in In re M ason , (13 Ve t.App. 79 (1999)) the Court held: [W]here th e attorn e y

c la ims the c ontin g e nc y

fe e fo r t he re pr e se ntatio n p ro vid e d in thi s Cour t, it wou ld ap pe ar that any EA JA awa rd fo r s uc h r e pr e se ntatio n w ou ld r e su lt in an offse t ag ainst the conting ency fee owed un d erthe agree ment. On the other hand, if the attorney

claims the conting ency

fee for the r e p r e s e ntation provided bef ore the B VA/VA, r esulting in a n awa rd of be nefits beyond the re lief aw arde d by the Court, it would appear

that no offse t would be re quired. 13 Vet.App. at 194. The Court, in Fr itz , there fore held that the attorne y -fe e-of fset provisions in the fee ag ree ment wer e not objectionable in the context of that case. Id . at 194. Thus, it appea rs that we have by

our dec isions in Shawand Fr itz cra fted a narr ow interpre tati o n o f t h e term "wor k," leavingopen an oppor

tunity for the subve rsion of the ve ry purpose of

EAJA. "Congress p as s ed the EAJA in response to its concer n that persons ' may

be dete rre d from

se e kin gre vie w of

, or de fe nd ing a g a ins t, unr e a so na ble g ov e rnme nta l a c tio n b e c a us e of the e xpe ns e in vo lv ed i n s ecur in g vin di cat io n o f thei r ri ghts .'" Sullivan v. Hudson , 490 U.S

. 8 7 7 , 8 8 3 (1989).

"' The objec ti v e o f EAJA is to eliminate financ ial deter rents to individuals attempting to def end themselves ag ainst unjustified gove rnment action. Veter ans ar e amongthe ty pes of individuals the st atu te w as i nt end ed t o h elp .'" Abbs v. Principi , 237 F .3 d 134 2, 13 47 (F e d. Cir . 200 1) (q uo tin gH. R. R e p
. N o
. 1 0 2

- 1 0 0 6 , at2 5 ( 1 9 9 2 ) )

. E A J Aaw ar d s b e l o n gt o th e c l a i m an t , n o th i s o r h e r at t o r n e y. "[T]he law gi v es t h e E AJ A ca use of a ction and standingto the client, not the attorne y , and the att orn ey cann ot ame nd th e law by bes to wi ng su ch st and in g on th e at to rney ." Shaw , 10 Vet.App. at 5 0 6 ( h o l d i n gth ata fe e -a g r e e m e n tp r o v i s i o nr e qu i r i n gc l i e n tt o e xe c u t e " an y an d a l l " E A JA documents nece ssary to pe rmit rece ipt of the EAJA award by the attorne y

"' unrea sonable' on its face " beca use it conflicted w ith the plain languag e of EA J A which pr ovides awa rds to a " part y , " n ot an

atto rn e y ); se e als o Cu rti

s v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App 104, 108- 09 (1995) ( "E AJ A fe es aw arde d wher e the13

attorney wa s p ai dby

fee ag ree ment . . . g o first to reimburse the appellant the a mount paid to the attorney pursuant to t he agr eeme nt.")

. The purpose of EAJ A is not to provide an attorne y a g reater f e e th an c o n t e mp l at e d b y h i s f e e a g r e e m e n t

. " [ T ] h e p o l i c y o f [ E A J A ] i s t o p ay non-enhanc ed fee s for legal servi ces actu all y rend ered ." Phillips v. General Serv ices Admin. , 924 F.2d 1577, 1583 ( Fe d. Cir. 1991) (empha sis added). Mor eover , we must be constantly mindful that in this "uniquelyproclaimant adjudicatory sy stem," protecting the i ntere sts of t he veteran is paramount. Se e, e .g., Ha y re
v . W est , 1 88 F .3 d 1 32 7, 13 33 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 0) ; c f. H od ge v. W est , 155 F.3d 1356, 1362 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998) (" [The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fe dera l Circuit] and the Supre me Court both have long

re c ogni z e d

t h e c ha ra c te r o f v e te ra

ns ' be ne fi ts s tatut e s is str on g ly and un iqu e ly pr o- c la ima

nt. " ). Thus , we must be pa

rticularly vigilant in construing fee ag ree ments to protect the ve tera n from the dr afting of a f ee a g ree ment which might unintentionally , or intentionally , deprive a veter an of his rig hts under the law. The c ompensation the appe llant ag ree d to acc ept for his ser vices wa s "thirty perc ent (30%) of the tot a l amo unt of any pa st- du e be ne fi ts aw ard e d to Clie nt . . . on the ba sis of the Clie nt' s c lai m with the Depa

rtment of Ve tera

ns Affa irs." R. at 90 (empha sis added)

. He ag ree d "to pr ovide leg al service s [t o the veteran] in connec tion with [hi s] appea l to the [ Court] ." R. at 89. The fe e agree ment sp e c if ic a lly pr ov ide d that the wo rk to be pe rf or me d wo uld inc lud e " [a]ll se rv ic e s ne cess ary to pr os e c ute a

pp e a l to the [Court

and ] . . . [i]n th e e ve nt o f a c ourt -o rd e re d r e mand

thi s a g re e me nt s ha ll inc lud e re pr e se ntatio n of the ve te ra n by the Attor

ne y at bo th the B oa

rd of Ve te ra

ns ' Ap pe a ls a s w e ll

as an y Re gion al O ffi ce of

th e Dep art men t o f Vet eran s A ffai rs. " Id

. The portion of the ag ree ment discussing the cont i n gency fee repe atedly

descr ibed the pay ment as it pertaine d to the veter an' s "c laim or claims," and made no differ entiations as to work to b e pe rf

or me d b e fo re the Court , B oa rd , o r V A. In th e EA J A po rt io n of th e fe e a g re e me nt, howeve r, t he agr eeme nt did make such differ entiations. Although the cost to the veter an of the 30% fee would be def

err ed by any amount awa

rded by the Court pursuant to EAJA in the event the Cou rt
awa rded pa st-due bene fits, the ag ree ment car ved out an e x ception whe re, in the ev en t the Court

rema nded the c laim, the 30% fe e would ac tually be supplemented by any EAJA fe e aw arde d. The Court did remand the ve tera n' s claim, and pa st-due bene fit s we re awa rded on r emand. Thus, the appellant co l l ected a fe e equa l to 30% of the past-due benef its plus t he EAJA fee awa rded to the14

veter an. This, of course , resulted in no g reater cost to the veter an; howeve r, it stripped the vete ran of his rig ht pursuant to EAJA to have his leg al fe es paid, at least in part, by the United States. To be ultimately

succe ssful on the veter an' s claim, i.e., sec uringan aw ard of past -due benef its, the attorney

contemplated a

nd advised his client of the possibili ty of a re m an dand the agr ee m en tp ro v i d edfo r r ep re s en t at i o no nre m an d

. I f w e w er e t o co n s i d er th e ap p el l an t 's repr esentation of the veter an before the Boa rd on rema

nd differ ent " work" than that per formed he re,
we wo uld

imp ro pe rl y

be a llo wi ngthe EA JA f e e to e nh anc e the a

pp e lla nt' s f e e , r ather tha n to reimburse the veter an for the cost of r epre sentation. Se e Cu rt is , sup ra . I f there is any room for int e rp re tiv e do ub t a s to wh at c on sti tut e s th e " same wo rk " fo r the purp os e s of EA JA, s uc h d ou bt m us t be re solved in the veter ans' favor

. See B rown v. Gardner , 1 15 U. S. 1 15 , 1 18 (1 99 4) . T hu s, we mus t conclude that the re prese ntation of a claimant in pur suit of a claim at all stag es of the adjudication proce ss is the "same work," reg ardle ss of the tribunal bef ore which it is perf

ormed. There fore , the Court holds that a fee which includes both a n EAJA aw ard plus a conting ency fe e f o r work perf ormed be fore the Court, Boa rd, and VA on the s ame claim such t hat t he fe e is enha nced by an EAJA award is unre asonable pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 5904(c) a nd 7263. Any

previous dec isions of this Court to the contrary are here by overr

uled. To the extent the fee a g ree ment here provides that any portion of t he EAJ A award will not be offse t ag ainst the fee paid, or to be pa id, by the veter an to t he a pp e lla nt, the a pp e lla nt' s f e e is " e xce ssi ve and

unre a so na

ble ." Ac c or dingly , pu rsua nt t o 38 U. S.C. § 7 26 3, the Court wi ll a ff ir m th e B oa

rd ' s f ind ingthat th e atto rn e y

is n ot e nti tle d to r e ta in the EAJA awar d.

IV . TH E REA SON AB LEN ESS OF THE 3 0% CO NT IN G EN CYF EE The Court, like the B oard, is veste d with the power to reviewfee ag ree ments; however , the Court ha s c on c lud e d that it " sh ou ld i ntr ud e up on su c h a fr e e a nd vo luntary

c ontr a c t on ly

upon the i nv it ati onof t he p art ies or w here th e fee agreem entis pat ent ly un reas on abl e on it s fa ce." Le wis , 5 Vet .App . at 15 4 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also In ReMason , 12 Vet.App. 135, 136- 38 (1999) (Ne beker , Chief Judge , c on c ur ri ng .) . In a

n atte mpt to e nti c e atto rn ey s to repr e se nt v e te ra ns , 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d) made it p o s s i b l e for the attorne y s to be paid direc tly by the Secr etar

y , but limi te d th e f e e th e att o r

n e y c o u ld c h ar g e un d e r

a § 5 9 0 4 ( d ) a g r e e me n t t o 2 0 % o f an y p a st-due15

benef its awarde d to the veter an. Howe ver, the provisions of § 5904(d) we re ma de neither exclusive

no r m and ator

y and atto rn e y s are fr e e to e nte r i nto fe e a g re e me nts that do no t mee t the re qu ir e me nts of § 5904(d) , but in such instances they must collect their fees di rec tly from their clients without the assistance of the Sec reta ry . The only

s t atut ory limit s on fee s pursuant to non-dire ct-pa y fee ag ree ments are that an attorney cannot char g e for service s perf ormed prior to e ntry of a final dec ision by th e Boardandth e fee can no t b e "ex cess iv e or u nrea so nab le. " See38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) and (2)

. Howeve r, the mer e fa ct that a f ee pur suant to a non-dire ct-pa y fee ag ree ment exceeds the 20% does not make it "patently

unrea sonable on its fac e" such that t h er e s h o u l d b e an " intru[s ion] " into the ag ree ment enter ed int o by the attorney and his client. Com pa re Sil v e rm an v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 487 (1995) ( Court review ed fe e agree ment callingfor a fee "not to excee d 50% of be nefits awa rded" plus "a dditional reasona

ble compensation") with Ma tte r o f F e e Ag re e me nt o f Sm ith , 4 Vet.App. 487, 499 (1993) ( Court found fee of $1,000 plus a 20% co n t i n gen cy fee not "e x cessive or unrea sonable" ). Wit h respe ct to the B VA' s review of fe e agree ments, the Court commented soon af ter its inception that [i ]n a very

rea l sense, the pa

rties to a review of a fee ag ree ment are the claimant on the one ha

nd and the attorney on the other. Rather than pe rfor ming a s an advoc ate, the B VA ser

ves in a qua si-judicial role. Unde r these c ircumstance s, when re view of a f e e a g r e e m e n ti s s t atu t o r i l y a u th o r i z e d , w e th i n k

i ta p p r o p r i at e , i n d e e d

n e c e s s ar y, that the B VA provide notice to the claimant as well as to the claimant' s attorney of its int ention to reviewa fe e agree ment and of its ultimate decision. Nagler v. Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 297, 304 ( 1991). The re cord in this matter indi cate s that the appe llant was advised that the Boa rd' s review

of the fe e a g re e me nt wa s initi ate d be c a us e of a c on c e rn that the a pp e lla nt wa s att e mpt ingto r e ta in b oth the conting ency

fee and the EA J A fe e aw arde d to the veteran. In the J uly 3, 1997, letter, Thomas D

. Roberts, Deputy

Chief Counsel for L eg al Aff airs, conc luded: "I f you rec eive a n EAJA fee a

nd y our client is awa

rded pa st-due bene fits, we will take ap p ro p ri ate steps to re view your agree ment for

rea sonablene ss." R. at 96. In his letter of Nove mber 17, 1998, Mr. Thoma s wrote: Be cause y our fe e agree ment does not provide that your conting ent fe e pay ment from past-due be nefits is to be offse t by an EAJA a

war d conce rning your Court work, we are askingthe B o ard to review your fe e agree ment with Mr. Weatherspoon f or rea sonablene ss on its own mot ion, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(2)

.16

R. at 141. On the re cord be fore the Court, at no time was the a ppellant advised that t he fe e ag ree ment was g oing to be revie wed f or re asonable ness of the 30% conting ency fee

. A s d e m o n s tr at e d i n P art I I I o f th i s o p i n i o n , th e B o ar d ' s c o n c e r na b o u tth e l a c k

o f anE A JA offse t was leg itimate and its review in t h at reg ard pr oper. An artfully or inartf ully draf ted

c ontin g e nc y fe e a g re e me nt wh ic h wo uld c ir c umv e nt the le tte r and sp ir it o f E AJA w ou ld b e " pate ntl y
unre a so na

ble on its fa c e ." Ho we ve r, the B oa rd ' s a c tua l r e vie w o f t

he fe e a g re e me nt a

nd its ult imate de c isi on we re fa r m or e e xpans ive tha

n th at di re c te d b y

the Cha ir man o r d e sc ri be d in

the le tte rs to the a pp e lla nt. The Boa rd fo u n dthat the 30% c ontinge ncy fee provided for

by the fe e agree ment was
e x c e s s i v e an d

un r e a s o n a

b l e an d th e r e f o r e r e d u c e d th e f e e t o 2 0 % o f

p a s t

- d u e b e n e f i t s aw ar d e d

. In deter mining that the 30% conting ency fee was unre asonable , the B oard state d: A re view of the rec ord demonstrates that the extent and ty pe of se rvice s the attorney perf ormed since Marc h 1997 included neg otiating a nd assisting in dra ftinga joint motion for rema

nd, wr i t i n g a letter dated F ebrua ry 26, 1998, to the Adjudication Offic er at the R O, and writing a J une 2, 1998[ ,] five-pag e docume nt with additional argume nt in sup po rt of the ve te ra n' s app e a l and su

bmi tti ng it to the B oa

rd . I t is a lso very likely that in the mont h s b etween the Mar ch 1997 B oard de cision and the August 1998 Boa

rd decision, the attorney had sever al contac ts wi t h t h e veteran. Howeve r, in the additional ar guments from the attorney , contained in the l etter dated Dec ember 11, 1998, the attorne y does not itemiz e or othe rwise indicate that any other leg al servic es we re pe rfor med to justify

fee s over $60,000.00. R. at 6. The appellant argued that there was no fac tual or leg al basis to c onclud e t h at h i s fe e w as
un re as o n ab l e; th e B o ar d

d i s agr ee d , s t at i n g: As noted above , there is no evidence of leg al servic es provided a fter the Marc h 1997 Boa rd dec ision which justify such an excessive fee . There is no evidence of re cord as to the number of

hours the attorne y

and his staff w orked on this ca se fr om March 1997 to August 1998. In his Dec ember 1998 letter, the attorney has notalleg ed that he and his staf

f worke d an inordinate amount of hours on this case . In assessingthe rea sonablene ss of his fee , the B oard notes that if an attorne y wer e to cha

rg e $200 per hour for leg al services , it would require 309 hour s of work to c onstitut e a f ee of $61,800.00. The e vidence available of the leg al servic es the attorn ey provided the veter an betwe en the f

inal Boa rd dec ision in March 1997 and the August 1998 Boar d de c isi on do e s n ot j us tif

y a fe e of $6 1, 80 5. 10 , an d th e B oa rd fi nd s th at th e fe e is "e x cessive a

nd unrea sonable."17

R. at 7. Noting that VA re gulations provide that a f ee of 2 0 % o f p as t -due be nefits is presumed

re as o n able, the Boa

rd then c oncluded that, in this matter, " [a] lthough the e vidence does not d em o n s t ra t e t hat the attorne y and his staff spe nt a g reat deal of time on this case betwee n Marc h 19 97 and Au gus t 19 98 , th e oth e r f a c tor s in de te rm ini ngwh e the r f

e e s are re a so nab le su ppor t a det erm in ati onth at afee o f 20 perc entof p ast -du e ben efi ts is reas on abl e." Id

. Pursu an t to 38 C.F.R. § 20.609(e), f actor s to be consider ed by the B oard in de termining whether fee s are rea sonable include : (1 ) T he e xtent and

ty pe of se rv ic e s th e re pr e se ntativ e pe rf or ms; (2) The complexit y

of the c ase; (3) The level of skill and compe tence require d of the re prese ntat i v e in givingthe se rv ic e s; (4) The amount of time the re prese ntative spent on the c ase; (5 ) T he re su lts the re pr e se ntativ e a c hie ve d, in clu dingthe amou nt o f a ny be ne fi ts rec overe d; (6) The level of r eview to which the claim was taken a nd the level of

the re view at which the r epre sentative wa s retaine d; (7) Rate s char g ed by

other re prese ntatives for similar ser vices; and (8 ) Wh e the r, and

to wh at exte nt, the pa

y me nt o f f e e s is c ontin g e nt u

po n th e re su lts obtained. The Court re views the B oard' s decisions reg arding the re asonable ness of a fee ag ree ment de novo. See In re Vernon , 8 Vet.App. at 459 (" [I ]n conducting a revie w of a

fee ag ree ment, a findingby the Boa rd re g ardingthe excessiveness or unrea sonablene ss of the fe e is entitled to no defe renc e." ). The a ppellant ar gues that the B oard imprope rly interpre ted 3 8 C

. F. R. § 20.609(f) a s
e sta bli sh inga pr e sumpt ion

that a re a so na ble fe e is limited to no mor e tha n 2 0% of pa st- du e be ne fi ts, and that in orde r t o char g e a g reater fee, the attorney must rebut that presumption. The Court agree s that this would be an improper application of 38 C.F.R. § 20.609(f) (" Fe es which total no more than 20 perc ent of a

ny past-due be nefits awa

rded . . . w ill be presume d re as onable." ). Howe ver, upon
c los e ins pe c tio n of the B oa rd ' s de c isi on , it a

pp e ars the B oa

rd did no t a pp ly § 2 0. 60 9( f) until after

it

r e d u c e d th e 3 0 % f

e e to 2 0 %

. T h e B o ar d

th e na c kn o w le d g e d

th at a 2 0 % f e e w o u ld b e p r esumed

rea sonable, but applied the fac tors set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 20.609(e ) to determ i n e whether the presumption had been rebutted a nd a fe e eve n lower tha

n 20% wa s ju sti fi e d. In c on sid e ri ngthe se fa c tor s th e B oa

rd fo un d th at ( 1) " the c a se wa s quit e c omp le x"; (2 ) " the atto rn e y de mon str ate d s kil l and compe tency "; ( 3) " the re sults, including the amount of bene fits rec overe d, wer e ver y benef icial18

to the veter an" ; and (4) " the amount of benefits rec overe d was a very larg e sum." R. at 8. The B oard there fore conclude d that the ot her factor s supported a deter mination that a fee of 20% of past-due benef its wa s rea sonable, and that the § 20.609(f) presumption that a 20% f ee is re asonable had not be e n re butte d. R. at 7 -8; se e als o 38 C.F.R. § 20.609(f) . Thus, beca use the a ppellant was not prejudice d by

the Boa rd' s use of § 20.609(f) , we ne ed not addr ess whethe r it was cor rec tly applied. Turn in g t o th e B oa

rd ' s r e du c tio n o f t

he fe e fr om 3 0% to 2 0% of pa st- du e be ne fi ts, it i s
a pp are nt t o th e Court

that th e B oa

rd wa s str uc k by the tot a l amo unt of the fe e and fo c us e d p ri mari ly on the num ber of hours t he attorney and his staff spe nt on this case. Althoug h the number of hours spent is one fa ctor to be c onsidered in de terminingwhether a fee is rea sonable, pa

rticularly wher e an agree ment calls for

an hourly

fee , it is notthe onl y or i ndeed the primary fac tor in the ca se of a conting ency

fee ag ree ment. An attorne y takinga ca se on a c ontinge nt basis may ear n a lar g e fe e for

ve ry fe w h ours ; ho we ve r, that sa me atto rn e y

a lso take s th e ri sk

tha t he wi ll r e c e ive no fe e , r e g ard le ss of the number

of hours sp en t o n a ca s e. In essenc e, the attorney ag ree s to share the risk of not preva iling on the c laim with his client. Base d upon nothing more than a lac k of evide nce that the ap p el l an t s p ent an " inordinate" amount of time on this matter, the B oard de termined that the appellant' s fee should be reduce d to 20% of the pa st-due bene fits awar ded. In doing so, the Boa rd

err ed. There is simpl y

no basis in the rec ord for the B oard' s reduc tion of the ap p ell ant' s fee from 30% to 20%. On the contrar y , as the B oard e x plained in support of its decision not to reduc e the 20% fe e even lower, sever al of the 38 C.F.R. § 20.609(e) fac tors actua lly support the conc lusion that th e a p p e ll an t' s 3 0 % c o n ti n g e n c y f e e is n o t " e xc e s s iv e an d

un r e a s o n a

b le , " e
. g
. , th e c a s e w a s c o mp le x; the attorne y

was quit e competent; he achieved a gre at deal of success for his client; and the amount

awa rded was a ve ry

larg e sum. See R. at 8. Moreove r, the pa y ment of fe es wa s entirely

"c ontinge nt up onth e res ul ts achi eved ." See38 C.F.R. § 20.609(e) (8). There fore , pursuant to 38 U .S.C. § 7263, the Court holds on de novo revie w that the 30% conting ency fee contemplated by

the fe e agree ment
e nte re d int o by the a

pp e lla nt and his c lie nt is no t " e xce ssi ve or unre a so na ble." S ee In re Ve rnon,
su pra . Acc ording ly , the April 6, 1999, dec ision of the Board will be and is re verse d to the extent that it re du c e d th e a

pp e lla nt' s fe e be low the 30 % of pa st- du e be ne fi ts c a lle d fo r i n th e fe e a g re e me nt. See38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). Although t he Board, like the C ourt, is vested with the power to revie w fe e19

a g re e me nts , th e Court

tr us ts that the B oa

rd wi ll in the futur e e xer c ise its a uth or ity jud ic iou sly , w ith attention to the seriousness of the intrusion that such a revie w entails and full notice to a ll concer ned, and "only upon the invitation of the parties or wher e the f

ee a g ree ment is patently

unrea sonable." Se e Le wis , 5 Ve t.A

pp . at 15 4; se e als o Nag le r, su pra .

V. CO NC LU SION Upon consider ation of t he foreg oing, the April 6, 1999, dec ision of the Boa rd is AFF I RMED I N PART and REVERSED I N PART.

STEI NB ERG, Judge , co n cu rr i n g i np artan d d i s s en t i n g i np art : Ico n cu r i nth e C o urt 's

a ff ir manc e of the Ap ri l 6, 19 99 , de c isi on of the B oa rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls ( B oa

rd or B VA ) a s to whether or not there should be an off set of fees awa

rded unde r the Equa l Acce ss to J ustice Ac t (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)( 2)(F ), although not the rationale stated i n support of that re sult and not

nece ssarily

the full amount of the of

fset imposed. I

dissent from the Court' s reve rsal of that portion of the B oa rd ' s d e c isi on that found that the 30 % c ontin g e nc y fe e wa s unr e a so na

ble and e xce ssi ve in this case. I

also disag ree with the manner in which the Court has g one about r eac hing its dec ision in t his c a se . M any

of my c on c e rn s are c a st in prel im in ary te rm s, be c a

us e Ibe lie ve , a s d oe s my dissenting colleague, Chief J udg e Kramer, with whose opinion Iam in substantial ag ree ment, that a number of par ticular matter s have be en inade quately addre ssed.

I. Deficient Court P roce sses First, the Court either

g losses over or

ignor es entire ly

a number of important issues (for example, the ana ly sis of pertinent ana logous a uthority , such as the attorney -fe e jurisprude nce in the fe de ra l c ourt s p e rt a ini ngto t he EA JA and

Soc ia l Sec ur ity Ac t (SSA )) tha t sh ou ld b e pa

rt of the ba sis fo r j ud ic ia l de c isi onmakin gin thi s ca se
. Th e a bs e nc e of su c h a n a pp ro a c h is pa

rt ic ula rl y re g re tta ble when the Court is sitt ing e n banc. E qually defic ient is the proce ss of the majority here in issuing an en banc opinion that overrules pa st prece dent (1) with out briefingfrom the pa

rties (including possible amicus curia e) on whether that prec edent should be a bandoned a

nd on cer tain issu es not addre ssed in the opinion; (2) with out en banc oral a

rgument; and (3) with out

a c on fe re nc e of

the fu ll" If e n b a n c c o n sid e ra tio n o r re v ie w is o rd e re d , t h e C h ie f J u d g e
. . . . usu a lly c o n v e n e s a c o n fer e n c e o r d ire c ts 1 the C le rk to sc h e d u le o ra l ar g u m e n t." U .S . V ET
. A PP
. I N T E R N A L O PE RAT I NG P RO CED U RES V .(a )( 4 ); see M o rt o n v. W est , 13 V et

. App. 205, 213 ( 1999) ( en ban c or der ) ( St ei n ber g an d K r ame r , J. J. , di s s en t i n g f r om den i al of en b anc co nsid era t i o n) (a d m o nishi ng " t ha t t he C o urt sho uld ha ve t he b en efi t o f f ull b rief i ng fro m the S ec retary an d ap p ell an t s' ad vo cat es a n d ful l oral argument b efo re d e c id ing the kn o tty q u e stio n s inv o lve d in this c a se " ); L a ru a n v. W est , 11 V et

. A pp
. 80, 91 ( 19 98 ) (en b anc ) ( K r amer an d St ei nber g, J. J. , conc ur r i ng i n par t an d di s s ent i ng i n par t ) ( not i ng t hat

" t he m ajo ri t y i nexp l i cab l y renders i t s wi sdo m wi t ho ut be nef i t of a co nf

erence o f t he judge s, b ri ef

i ng, or o ral argument");
see a lso M ee ks v

. W

est , 13 V et

. App. 40, 41- 48 (1999) (e n ban c or der ) ( St ei n ber g a n d K r ame r , J

. J. , di s s en t i n g f r om pr i or re v o k e d o rd e r d e n ying e n b a n c c o n sid e ra tio n ) (p ro te sting p a n e l o p inio n ' s " failu re to se t f o rth a re a so n e d a n a lysis" ).

See M or t on a n d Lar uan , bo t h su p ra no te 1 ; B ai l ey v. G ob er , 1 0 V et

. A p p
. 45 4 , 45 6 (19 9 7 ) ( en b anc o rder) 2 (S te inb e rg , J., d isse n ting ) (" I w o u ld p re fer to r e c e ive fu ll b rie fing

. . . a t t h is p o int" ), re v 'd , B a i l ey v. W est , 160 F. 3d 1360 (F e d . C ir. 1 9 9 8 ) (e n b a n c ); In re M o tio n o f S m ith , 7 V et

. A p p
. 92 , 95 (19 9 4 ) ( en b anc o rder) ( Stei nb erg, J. , dis sent i ng) ("B y de ci d i ng t hi s case "' wi t ho ut be nef i t of o ral argument and f ul l b ri ef i ng,
. . . t hi s C o urt runs a great ri sk o f renderi ng erroneo us o r i l l

- ad vi sed decis i o ns t hat m ay co nf use [t he D ep art m ent of V et erans A f f ai rs (V A ) and t he C o urt ' s b ar]: t here i s n o r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s C o u r t i s i m m u n e f r o m m a k i n g m i s t a k e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y u n d e r t h e s e k i n d s o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s
. '" Al l en v. H ar dy , 4 7 8 U

. S. 2 5 5 , 26 1

- 6 2 (19 8 6 ) ( M ars hal l and Stevens , JJ. , dis sent i ng) ( q uo t i ng H a rri s v. R i ve ra , 454 U

. S. 339, 349 ( 1981) ( M ar s h al l , J

. , di s s en t i n g ) )

. ")
.

S ee a lso B a i l ey v. W

est , su p ra n ot e 2. 3
20 Court. I have long decr ied this pra ctice, and find it most unfortunate that the Court is continuing

1 2 down the path that most rec ently led to the over

rulingby the U.S. Court of

Appea ls for the F eder al Circuit ( Fe dera l Circ uit) in D'A mi c o v . W est , 2 0 9 F. 3 d

1 3 2 2 , 1 3 2 7 (F ed

. C i r. 2 0 0 0 ), o f t h i s C o urt 's misguided a

nd conclusory

holdings in Larua n v . W

est , 11 Vet.App. 80 ( 1998) (e n banc)

. 3

II. Mer its On the mer its, Iwill outli ne first the nature of the appellant' s repr esentat i o n of the ve tera n in the p r o c e e d in g s b e f

o r e a D e p artm e n t o f V e te r an s A f f a ir s ( V A ) r e g io n a l o f

f ic e ( RO ) , an d

then discuss my

rea sons for disagree ing w ith the Court's re versa l of the BV A decision re ducingthe 30% conting ency

fee to 20%. Iwill conclude with my analy sis of the EAJA-offset matter

. A. Int roduction Be fore turningto the analy sis of t h es e two is sues, howeve r, I want to express my

conce rn that the majority

opinion is m ore a

n exercise in policy

making , that is, in judi cial l egi slation, than jud ic ia l r e vie w o f p oli c ie s e sta bli sh e d b y

the po pu larl y -e le c te d and the re fo re pu

bli c ly a c c ounta ble le g isl ativ e and e xec uti ve br anc he s. Ire a c h th is c on c lus ion be c a us e the ma

jor ity a pp e ars to b e int e nt, without any exploration of what may have be en the unde rlying le g islative intent, on reac hing aonesize -f its -a ll h old inga s to EA JA of fs e t, d e sp ite the re c e nt i nc antatio n b y thr e e of the f

our m a jor ityBes tv
. Pr i nci pi , __ V et

. A pp
. __, __, N o. 99- 11 44 , 200 1 W L 52 67 58 , at * 1 (M ay 1 5 , 2 0 0 1 ) (p er cu r i am 4
o rd e r)

. But s ee M ahl v
. Pr i nci pi , __V et

. App. __, __, N o. 99- 1678, or der at 8- 10, 2001 W L 640170 at * 3- 9 ( Ju n e 7, 2001) (S t einb erg , J., d i ssen t i ng ) (p o i nti ng o ut t ha t C o urt has ne ve r f o l l o w ed p rac t i c e o f d e c id in g c ase s o n " t he na rro w est p o ss i b l e ground s").

See V et erans C l ai m s A ss i st ance Ac t o f 20 0 0 , P ub

. L. N o
. 10 6

- 4 7 5 , 11 4 Stat

. 20 9 6 (N o v. 9, 20 0 0 ) ( V C A A ); 5 Expl an at or y St at eme n t of Commi t t ee s on V et er an s ' A f f ai r s on V CAA ( B ac k g r ou n d) , 146 Con g
. Rec

. H 9913 ( dai l y e d. O ct

. 17 , 20 0 0 ) (exp res sl y d i sapp roving o f t hi s C o urt ' s o p i ni o n i n M o rt o n v. W est , 1 2 V e t.A p p . 4 7 7 (1 9 9 9 ), r em an ded on ot hergr ounds , 243 F. 3d 557 ( Fe d. Ci r
. 2000) ( t abl e) ) ; H

. R. Rep. N o. 106- 781, 106t h Cong

. , 2d Se s s
. 11 ( Ju l y 24, 2 0 0 0 ) ("C o m m i t t ee' s i nt ent i s t o ove rr ul e t hat po rt i o n of t he d eci si o n i n M or t on t h a t f o u n d a n i m p l i e d l i m i t a t i o n o n V A 's a u tho rity to p ro v id e a ssista n c e to c la im a n ts w h o h a d n o t su b m itt e d ' w e ll- g ro u n d e d ' c la im s" ); S . R e p . N o . 1 0 6 -3 9 7 , 1 0 6 th C ong. , 2d Sess

. 72 (Se p t

. 6, 200 0) ( "C om mi t t ee bi l l

. . . mo di f i es t he pert i nen t s t at ut es t o re i ns t at e V A ' s t r adi t i onal p ra c tice o f a ssistin g v e te ra n s a t th e b e g inn ing o f t h e c la im s p ro c e ss" ); see a lso D ' A m i co v. W

est , 209 F. 3d 1322, 1327 (Fed

. C i r. 20 0 0 ) ( o verrul i ng Lar uan , su p ra no t e 1 , and noti ng t hat i n Lar uan t hi s "[C]our t di d not r el y on an y s t at ut es o r re g u la tio n s t o s up p o rt i t s p o si t i o n" and "c i t ed t he l egi sl at i ve hi st o ry " pe rt i nent t o t he st at ut es at i ss ue t here no t wi t hst and i ng t hat "no s t at em ent i n t he l egi sl at i ve hi st o ry s up p o rt [ed] t he co urt ' s i nt erpret at i o n of t ho se s ect i o ns"). 21 judge s that the Court should de cide case s on "the narr owest possible grounds" ; and on issuing the 4 ominous warningto the Boa rd, at the conclusion of t he majority ' s opinion, that "the Court trusts that the Boa rd will in the future exercise its a uthority judiciously , with attention to the seriousness of the intrusion that such a re view enta ils a nd

. . . only

upon the invitation of the parties or wher e the f

ee ag ree ment is patently

unrea sonable"

. An te at

_ _ , slip op. at 19 (citations and interna l quotation marks omitted). I also conclude that there has been a rush to judg ment in g ener al here beca use, as noted above , the Court issues it s p ro n o unceme nts in each of these instance s without providing detailed a naly sis of the statutory

words, under lying le g isl at i v e i n t ent, or a nalog ous prec edent a

nd

re fu se s to re c og nize , le t a lon e c on fr ont, a su bs tanti a l juri sd ic tio na l iss ue
. I t se e ms e sp e c ia lly ir on ic that su c h le g isl atin gfr om t he be nc h come s so so on a ft e r t he Cou rt ' s ultra vires exercises we re reje cted by

Congr ess and the F eder al Circuit, respe ctively , last y ear
. 5 B. B ackg

ro und At the outset, Iwill set forth the fa cts of this case , which, in the main, the majority opinion does not s e t f

o rth to th e e xte n t th at I b e li e v e is n e c e s s ar y to d e c id e th e r e a s o n a

b le n e s s an d offse t issues, discussed in parts I I .C. and I I .D., below. The fa cts are : In the Court' s merits disposit ion, the parties submitted a five -pag e joint motion for r emand in F ebrua

ry 1998. Record (R.) at 98-103. That motion, which the Court gr anted via a n unpublished Fe bruar

y 18, 1 9 9 8 , o rder

signe d by

the Clerk of the Court, was base d on an asse rted clea r and unmistakable err or (CUE) by the B oard in failing to consider in its March 1997 de cisionIt is a p p a re n t t h a t t h e B o a rd so c o n c lud e d

. See R eco rd (R

. ) at 1 1 4 (1 9 9 8 B o ard o f V et erans' A p p eal s (B o ard 6

o r B V A ) d e c isio n sta ting tha t t h e q u e stio n b e fo re it w a s " w h e the r t h e
. . . fa ilure [b y a V A re g io n a l o ff ic e (R O )] to con s i der or f

ol l ow appl i ca bl e r eg u l at i on s i n i t s M ay 1981 r at i n g de ci s i on c onst i t ut e[d] cl ea r a n d u n mi s t ak abl e er r or (C U E )" ); Tob l er v. D er w i nsk i , 2 V et

. App. 8 ( 1991)

. T h e j oi n t mot i on f or r ema n d s t at ed:
B ecause t he vet eran was s o und be f o re s ervi ce, was di agno sed wit h a dis o rder i n s ervi ce, and h a d sym p to m s o f a n e rv o u s c o n d iti o n b e g inn ing in se rv ic e a n d c o n tinu ing a fter d isc h a rg e , h e c o u ld have been el

i gi bl e for ser vi ce conn ecti on i n accordance w ith 38 C. F. R. §§ 3. 303( a) , ( b) a n d 3. 304( b) (19 8 0 ).
H o wever, t he M ay 1 9 8 1 rat i ng de ci si o n did no t ap p l y a ny o f thes e regul at i o ns. T hi s C o urt h a s ru le d tha t an R O ha s " u n d e b a ta b ly co m m itt e d e rr o r" w h e n it " fail[e d ] to fo ll o w a n a p p lica b le reg ulati o n" an d wh en i t " i n ef f ec t [d en i ed ] t he ex i st en ce o f ev i d en ce t ha t d i d i nd ee d ex i st an d wa s a par t of t h e cl ai ms f

i l e. " R u sse ll , 3 V et

. App. [ 310, ] 319 [ ( 1992) ( en ba n c) ]

. W h et h er s u ch e r r or co nst i t ut es cl ear and unm i st akab l e error as co nt em p l at ed i n 38 C

. F.R

. § 3

. 1 0 5 (a) i s a m at t er f o r t he B o a rd , no t t h e C o u rt, to d e te rm ine

. R u sse ll[ 3 V et

. App. ] a t 320.
A cco rdingl y , t hi s case s ho ul d be remand ed to a l l o w t he B V A t o co nsi d er al l t he rel evant r egu l at i ons an d det er mi ne whe t her t he reg io n a l o ff ic e 's fa ilu re to c o n sid e r o r fo llo w a p p lic a b le
r egu l at i ons i n i t s M ay 1 9 8 1 rat i ng de ci si o n co nst i t ut es cl ear and unm i st akab l e error.
R. at 101- 02 ( emph as i s adde d)

. T h e mot i on ' s ci t at i on t o t h e t wo- s t ep appr oac h adopt ed i n R u sse lld e m o n stra te s tha t, in g r a n ti n g th e jo int m o tio n , t h e C o u rt w a s d e te rm inin g in the w o rd s o f R u sse ll , t hat "t he R O un debat abl y comm i t t ed e rr o r .
. . in fa ili n g to fo llo w a n a p p lica b le re g u la tio n " , id

. at 319 , an d t hat i t was "a t as k f or t he B oard i n t he f

i r s t i ns t anc e

. . . . t o d e t e r mi n e w h e t h e r t h e err or ma de by t h e RO i n 19 [ 81 ] w a s a ' c l e a r a n d u n mi s t a k a bl e e r r or ' u n de r 38 C. F. R. § 3 .1 0 5 (a )" , t h a t i s, w h e the r " c o rr e c tio n o f t h e e rr o r w o u ld ha v e [m a n ifestly] c h a n g e d the o u tc o m e " , id . at 3 2 0

.

See R u sse ll , 3 V e t.A p p . at 3 1 3 -1 4 (h o ld ing tha t C U E is " the so rt o f e rr o r wh ic h , h a d it n o t b e e n m a d e , w o u ld 7 have m ani f

est l y changed t he o ut co m e" ); see a l so B u st o s v. W est , 1 7 9 F .3 d 1 3 7 8 , 1 3 8 0 (F e d . C ir. 1 9 9 9 ) (e x p re ssly 22 th e V A R O ' s e r

r o r , i ni t s M ay

1 9 8 1 d e c i s i o n( R

. at3 5 ) , o f n o tc o n s i d e r i n gc e rt a i np o t e nti a lly

a pp lic a ble re gulatio ns in 38 C.F .R. §§ 3. 30 3( a ), (b ) and 3. 30 4( b) (1 98 0) (p re sumpt ion of so un dn e ss and continuity

of sy mptomatology

). B y g rantingthe j o i n t motion for remand, the Court decided specific ally

that those VA re gulations were applicable and had not be en applied, and that decision of the Court wa s binding on the Boa rd. After the Court issued its remand orde r, counse l sent to the 6 Boa rd a June 1998 four- and-one -half- pag e letter in which the argument beg inning on pa g e 2 (R. at 106) wa s prac tically a ver

batim rec itation (except for a fewsentenc es dele ted and two ne w sentenc es
a dd e d on pa g e s 4- 5, wh ic h a re , in fa c t, i nv a lid

argume nts ) o f t

he F e br ua ry 19 98 joi nt m oti on

that th is Court had g rante d. Com

pa reR. at 106-09 with R. at 98 -1 01 . M or e ov e r, c ouns e l di d n ot p re se nt t o the B oard e ven one

argument as to how the outcome in 1981 would have be en manife stly chang ed if the RO had a

pplied the o v er l o o k ed re gulations, even thoug h that was the only issue rema ining be fo re the B oa

rd a s to the CU E c la im r e mand e d b y the Court

. 7ad o p t i ng t he " m ani f est l y changed t he o ut co m e" l anguage i n R u sse ll , su p ra ), cer t

. deni ed , 12 0 S.Ct. 40 5 (19 9 9 ).

R u sse ll , su

p ra n ot e 7. 8

See 3 8 U .S .C

. § 1 1 1 2 (a )( 1 ) (p re su m p tio n o f se rv ic e c o n n e c tio n fo r " c h ro n ic d ise a se b e c o m ing m a n ifest to 9 a deg r ee of

10 p er cen t or mo r e wi t hi n one y ear f r om the d ate o f

se p ara t i on f

r om
. . . s er vi ce") ; 38 C

. F. R

. § 3. 30 9(a) (19 8 0 ) ( d ef

i ni ng "p sy cho ses " as chronic di seas es f o r purpo ses of sect i o n 11 1 2 ). In general , t he C o urt has juri sdi ct i o n t o revi ew a f i nal B V A d eci si o n o nl y where a N o t i ce o f D i sagr eem ent 10 ( N O D ) w as f

i l ed u n der 38 U

. S. C. § 7105 on or af t er N ov embe r 18, 1988, a s t o t h e u n der l y i n g de ci s i on of a n a g en cy of o rig ina l ju risd ic tio n , usu a lly a n R O

. See V et er an s ' Ju di ci al Rev i ew Act , Pub. L. N o. 100- 687 § 402, 102 St at

. 4105, 4122 (1 9 8 8 ) (fo u n d a t 3 8 U .S .C . § 7 2 5 1 no te ) [h e re ina fter V J R A § 4 0 2 ]; V elez v. W est , 1 1 V et

. A p p
. 1 4 8 , 1 5 7 (19 9 8 ) ( " C o urt h a s n o j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a n i s s u e a b s e n t a p o s t

- N o v e m b e r [ 1 7 ] , 1 9 8 8 , N O D , e x p r e s s i n g d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h a n R O 's d e c isio n o n th a t issu e o r w ith a n R O ' s failu re to a d ju d ic a te tha t [issu e ]" ); s ee als o B arr er a v. G ob er , 122 F. 3d 1030, 1031 (F e d . C ir. 1 9 9 7 ); G r an t ha m v
. Br own , 1 1 4 F .3 d 1 1 5 6 , 1 1 5 7 ( F e d . C ir. 1 9 9 7 ). G e n e ra lly, a n N O D " sh a ll b e fi le d w ithin o ne y ear f

rom t he d at e o f

m ai l i ng of no t i ce o f

t he res ul t of i ni t i al revi ew or d et erm i nat i o n" wi t h whi ch i t i s d i sagr eei ng. 3 8 U

. S.C

. § 7 1 0 5 (b)(1).

T h e i s s u e wa s av oi ded i n I n t he M at t er of

t he Fee Agr ee m ent

of M as on ( Fee Agr ee m ent of M as on ), 11 1 3 V e t.A p p . 7 9 (1 9 9 9 ), in th e c o n te x t o f an a p p e a l to the C o u rt fro m a B V A d e c isio n tha t h a d b e e n issu e d o n the b a sis of a s ua s po nt e B V A revi ew o f

a dir ect

- p ayment f

ee agreem ent carri ed out und er 38 U

. S.C

. §§ 59 0 4 (c)( 2 ) and (d). 23 The B oard the n denied the CUE c laims that had bee n rema nded by the Court; the Boa

rd found that the application of the regulations that the Court remand ha d identified as e rrone ously not applied by

the 1981 RO dec ision would not have " manif e stl y c ha ng e d the outc ome " of th e case 8 based on the evidenc e of rec ord in May 1981. See R. at 120, 122. The Boar d then went on to find CUE on an en t i re l y

new ba sis -- fa ilure to apply 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307 and 3.309 (1980) , reg arding presumptive ser

vice connection -- bec ause the evidenc e in May 1981 had showe d clea

rly that the veter an had be en diagnosed as having ha d a psychosis within one year afte r dischar g e and that it was then manife sted to at last a 10% de g ree of disability (R. at 123-24). 9 I t is in the contex t of t he for eg oing f acts a bout the merits litigation and a djudication and the attorney ' s repr esentation before the Court and VA that this appeal should be dec ided.

C. BV A Decision on Unr easonableness of 30% Cont ingency Fee 1. Jurisd ic tio n of the Cour t In this case, the majority does not predic ate its jurisdiction upon a Notice of Disagree ment (NOD ). Ibelieve that this i s an issue t h at needs to be addre ssed and r esolved by the en ba

nc 10 Court, espec ially

beca us e the appe llant has specif ically raised the absenc e of a jurisdiction- 11 confe rringNOD in support of his a rgument that the BV A decision must be vac ated. B rief a t 14-15.S ee su p ra n ot e 10. 12

Suc h a holdi ng co ul d be ba sed o n t he d o ct ri ne t hat t he l aw d o es not requi re t he i m p o ss i b l e b ecause t here 13 gen er al l y coul d not be a deci s i on of an RO as t o whi ch an N O D coul d be f i l ed t o i ni t i at e a n a

p p e a l t o t he B oard wh en t he B o ard i t self

und ertak es su a sp o n te revi ew o f a f ee agreem ent unde r 38 U

. S.C

. § 5 9 0 4 (c)( 2 ), unles s t he C o urt were t o r equ i r e t h at be f

or e t h e B V A wou l d h av e t h e au t h or i t y t o u n der t ake such r ev i ew i t w ou l d h av e t o r ef er t h e i s s u e of e ligib ili ty to a n R O fo r a d e c isio n
. C om pa r e Ca r pent er v. G ob er , 1 4 V et

. A p p
. 1 9 5 (20 0 0 ) (per curi am o rder) ( vacati ng f or w an t of

or i g i n al j u r i s di ct i on u n der 38 U

. S. C. § 5904( c) ( 2) B V A dec i s i on t h at h ad con du ct ed s ua s po nt e r ev i ew of reasonab l eness of at t o rney f ees i n non-di rect

- p ayment f ee agreem ent , and dir ect i ng B V A t o dis m i ss t hat m at t er, whi ch,
a fter n o tice to p a rtie s, " sh o u ld b e d e c id e d b y the R O " ), a n d C o x v
. W est , 1 4 9 F

. 3 d 1 3 6 0 , 1 3 6 4 (Fed

. C i r. 19 9 8 ) ( ho l d i ng t hat " s ect i on 5 90 4(c) ( 2) onl y gi ves t he B oard l i mi t ed j ur i s di ct i on t o re vi ew t he rea so n a b l en ess of a f ee a n d t o r educe t he f ee" ), wi t h In t he M at t er of t he F ee A gre em ent of

St an l ey , 10 V et

. App. 104, 105 ( 1997) ( ci t i n g 38 U

. S. C. § 7263( d)
a n d 7 26 6( a ) a s ba s i s f or Cou r t ' s j ur i s di c t i on ov e r BV A su a sp o n te r ev i ew , u n der 38 U

. S. C. § 5904( c) ( 2) , of re a so n a b le n e ss o f atto rn e y fee s in n o n -d ire c t-p a ym e n t f e e a g re e m e n t, a n d a ff

irm ing B V A d e c isio n fi n d ing no e ligib ili ty o f att o rne y f

o r f ee s f ro m p ast- d ue b en efi t s). E ve n then , i f such referra l we re m ad e, t he re w o uld no t b e a n N O D unless the ve te ra n o r a tto rn e y fi le d o n e , an d thu s, re a listi c a lly, su a sp o n te r e v i e w wo u l d n ot s e e m p os s i bl e e x c e pt w h e r e t h e RO fo u n d ine ligib ili ty. 24 Perhaps the ma

jority is of the view that there is no need for an NOD in orde r for the Court to have jurisdiction over this matter under c hapter 72 of title 38, U.S. Code, notwithst andingthe re quirement in se ction 402 of the Veter ans' J udicial Review Act [hereinaf ter VJRA § 402] , that there be such 12

an N OD in or de r fo r the Court to c arr y out un de r c ha

pte r 7 2 ju dic ia l r e vie w o f " any c a se " ? Ic ou ld support such a holdingthat no NOD is needed in orde r for this Court t o revie w a B VA dec ision on the re a so na

ble ne ss o f a

fe e a g re e me nt. 13 Rather than a ddress this jurisdictional pr oblem, the Court me rely relies on 38 U.S.C. § 7252 and the F eder al Circuit' s opinion in In the Matter of the Fee Agreem ent of W ick, 40 F.3d 367, 370 (F ed. Cir. 1994). Ante at __, slip op. at 9. Howeve r, the W ick opinion does not deal with the NOD require ment of VJRA § 402, and the quote s in the majority ' s opinion, ante at __, slip op. at 8-9, do not addre ss that critical matter

. Moreove r, the misplaced re liance on W ick is made without ref

ere nce to the fa c t th at W

ick, as we ll as the Fe dera l Circuit's opinion in Cox v . W est , 149 F.3d 1360 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998), and our

opinion in Scates v . Gober , 1 4 Ve t

. Ap p
. 6 2 (2 0 0 0 ) (e nb an c) , co n ce rn edth i s C o urt 's and the B oard' s jurisdiction over a dire c t- pa yment f e eag re e ment un de r s e c tio n 5 90 4( d) . In th is

case , we are prese nted with a non -direc t-pay ment fee -agree ment situation under section 5904(c) (2). Be cause of the sig nificant diff ere nces be tween the statutory provisions conce rningdirec t-pay ment and non-dire ct-pa

y ment fee ag ree m en t s where the B oard ha s undertake n su a s po nterevie w of

re a so na ble ne ss, I be lie ve that the Court sh ou ld a dd

re ss whe the r t

he F e de ra l Cir c uit ' s W

ick and CoxR el at ed t o t hi s jur i s di ct i onal i nqui r y i s o ne as t o t he j ur i s di ct i on of t he B o a rd t o a dd r es s i n t he f i r s t i ns t anc e 14 t he q ue st i o n o f t he ap p ell an t ' s e lig ib ili ty , o n the fac ts o f t h is c a se , t o re c e ive a c o n ting e n c y fee un d e r th e no n -d ire c tp a ym e n t f

e e a g re e m e n t he re inv o lve d . R

. a t 4 (B V A find ing tha t " the c rite ria fo r ch a rg ing a n d b e ing p a id a fee in this case have be en m et " ). U nd er Cox , 14 9 F. 3d at 13 64 , whi ch hel d t hat "se ct i on 590 4(c) ( 2) onl y gi ves t he B oard l i mi t ed j ur i s di ct i on t o re vi ew t he rea so n a b l en ess of a f ee a n d t o r educe t h e f

ee ", i t a ppea r s t h at t h e B oar d h ad n o j u r i s di ct i on o v e r th a t i ssu e
.

See ant e at _ _, s l i p op
. at 19 (ca l l i ng f or "f ul l not i ce t o al l conc er ned" bef ore f ee agr eement s ar e r evi ewed 15 b y t he B o ard); c

f. Th ur be r v
. Br own , 5 V et

. App. 119, 126 ( 1993) ( di s cu s s i n g due pr oce s s i n t er ms of , i n t er a l i a, U

. S. C o n stitutio n a n d no n a d v e rs a ria l na tur e o f V A c la im s a d ju d ic a tio n ).

S ee M a g g i t tv. W

est , 20 2 F. 3d 13 70 , 13 77 ( Fe d. Ci r
. 20 00 ) ( a l t h ou g h t h i s Cou r t "m a y he ar l ega l 16 arg um en t sraised f

o r t he f i rst t i m e w i t h re ga rd t o a c l aim t ha t i s p ro p erly b efo re the [C ]o urt, i t i s n o t c o m p ell ed to d o so i n e ver y i ns t anc e")

. I not e i n t hi s r ega r d t hat t he appel l ant di d pres ent a D ece mb er 11, 1 9 9 8 , l ett er t o t he B oard t hat def ended t he r eas onabl ene s s of t he 30 % f

ee. R

. at 146

- 48

. Al t houg h t he B oard' s N ovemb er 17, 199 8, l et t er ha d not i f i ed t he appel l ant onl y t hat t he f ee agr eement woul d be re vi ewed by t he B V A b eca us e of i t s f ai l ur e t o provi de f

or a n of f s et o f t he co nt i ngent f

ee b y any f

ee award ed und er t he E q ual A ccess t o Just i ce A ct (E A JA ), 28 U

. S.C

. § 2 4 1 2 (d)(2)(F), any d e ficie n t n o tice m igh t ha v e b e e n c u re d b y the o p p o rtu n ity tha t t h e a p p e llan t t o o k , su a sp o n te , t o present a de f ense of t he 25 opinions a

nd our Scates opinion can be r elied upon to find jurisdiction in the Court over this matter under se ction 7252(a) and whe ther thi s can properly be done without reg ard to resolution of t he NOD question under VJRA § 402. 14 2. Fai r P ro c ess As sumin gthat th e Court

ha s juri sd ic tio n to re vie w t he B oa rd de cisi on on a pp e a l, I wo uld

vacate the Boa

rd decision on the rea sonablene ss of the 30% conting ency fee and re mand this matter

on a pure fa ir -p ro c e ss gro un d. Th e ma jor ity no te s that "[o ]n the re c or d be fo re the Court , at no tim e was the a ppellant advised that the fee ag ree ment was g oing to be revie wed for rea sonablene ss of the 30 % con ti ngency

fee. " An te at __, slip op. at 16. Notwithstandingthe Court' s impli cit rec og nition that the B oard' s decision to reduc e the 30% conting ency attorney fee in this case wa s made without the atto rn e y ' s b e ingaffo rded adequ ate no tic e on that is su e , the ma

jor ity ne ve r s ub sta

nti ve ly 15 addre sses the ramifications of such a defic iency . In this reg ard, I note that sec tion 5904(c)( 2)

a uth or ize s th e B oa

rd to c on du c t a

re vie w o f f

e e re a so na

ble ne ss " on

its own mo tio n" , an d that th e us e
o f t h e w o rd"m o t i o n " - - a s o p p o s edt o , fo r e x amp l e, "i n i t i at i v e" - - m ay b e r ea d as ev i d en ci n g a le g isl ative int e nt t

hat w he n s uc h B VAre vie w i s to be un de rt ake n th e B VAmus t f oll owa pr oc e ss akin to lit i gati on and allow the attorney time to respond, just as a cour t ge nera lly

would allow reg ardinga motion filed by anoth er pa

rty . Thus, Iwould rema

nd to the Boa

rd on the 30%- fee

rea sonablene ss issue in or der for the BV A to a ddress, in the first instance, the fairn es s o f t he 163 0 % fee

.
T he C o urt ' s wi l l i ngness t o f i ness e t hi s i ss ue f

urt her s uggest s an eagerness t o re a c h th e m e rit s o f t he 17

re a so n a b le n e ss issu e a n d re n d e r a p o licy a d m o n iti o n to the B o a rd

. See part I I

. A

. , above.

T ha t reg ulati o n, 3 8 C .F.R

. § 2 0 .60 9 (e) (2 0 0 0 ), p ro vid es: 18 (e) F ees per m i t t ed . F e e s p e rm itt e d fo r se rv ic e s o f an a tto rn e y-at-law o r a g e n t ad m itt e d to prac t i ce bef

ore t he D epar t ment o f

V et er ans A f

f ai r s m us t b e rea s onabl e. T hey m ay be bas ed on a f i xed f ee, hourl y rat e, a pe rcent age o f be nefit s re c o v e red , or a co m b i nat i o n of such bases. Factors cons i dere d i n det er mi ni ng wh et her f ees ar e r eas onabl e i ncl ude: ( 1) T h e ex t en t a n d t y pe of s er v i ce s t h e r epr es en t at i v e per f or med; ( 2) T he com pl exi t y of

t he cas e; (3 ) T he l ev el o f

skil l an d co m p eten ce req uired o f t he rep rese ntati ve i n giving the se rvice s; ( 4) T he amo un t of

t i me t he r epre s ent at i ve s pent on t he cas e; ( 5) T h e r es u l t s t h e r epr es en t at i v e ac h i ev ed, i n cl u di n g t h e amou n t of an y be n ef i t s r ec ov er ed; (6) T he l evel of revi ew t o w hi ch t he cl ai m was t aken and t he l evel of t he revi ew at whi ch t he
r epr es en t at i v e w as r et ai n ed;

( 7) Rat es c h ar g ed by ot h er r epr es en t at i v es f or s i mi l ar s er v i ce s ; a n d (8 ) W h e the r, a n d to w h a t ex te n t, the p a ym e n t o f f e e s is c o n ting e n t up o n the re su lts ac h ie v e d

. 26 proce ss it followed in this case in order ing the attorney to ref und to his client one third of the fee he had bee n paid by his client under their contingenc y -fe e agr eeme nt. Ibelieve that it is important not to slough ove r that possible fair -proc ess def iciency in order to rea ch the merits of the 30%- to-20% reduc tion by

the B oard. 17 3. Me rit s o f B oa rd 's R e duc tio n Al tho ug h I wo uld no t re a c h thi s iss ue be c a us e Iwo uld

va c ate fo r c on sid e ra

tio n o f t he fa ir ne ss of the proc ess (a g ain, assumingCourt jurisdiction over the merits), the ma jority does re ach this iss ue
-- a lbeit premature ly

-- a nd reve rses the B oard' s decision re ducingthe attorne y 's co n t i n gency fee from 30% to 20%. I

believe that this result is pla inly and demonstrably wrong
. The fa cts outlined in p art I I .B ., a bo ve , il lus tr ate that th e fol lowin gc on c lus ion in t he Cou rt ' s o pin ion

dr amatic a lly overstate s the quality

and ef fec t of the attorne y ' s repr esentation: [S ]everal of

the 38 C.F.R. § 20.609(e ) [(2000)] fa ct ors ac tually support the conclusi o n that the appe llant's 30% conting ency fee is not "excessive a nd unrea sonable," e.g ., the ca se wa s complex; the attorne y was quite c ompe te nt ; [ and] he achieve d

a g reat deal of suc cess f

or his client . . . . An teat __ , s lip op . at 18 (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T hat outli ne of the fa c ts s ho ws ve ry

cle arl y th at a reduc tion of the 30% fee is not only rea sonable (a lbeit essentially not for the r easons state d by the Boa rd) but is requir ed under VA' s regul at i on. This is so (1) beca use the a ppellant' s written 18S ee su p ra n ot es 6 a n d 7. 19

I n ad d i t i o n, as t o whether t he ap p el l ant co ul d , af t er a d eci si o n reduc i ng hi s f ee t o 20 % , cl ai m t hat he s eeks 20 30 % s ol el y f

or r epre s ent at i on bef

ore th e C o u rt

pu r s u an t t o Fee Agr ee m ent of M as on , su

p ra not e 1 1, I h aza r d no vi ew. I n ot e, h owe v er , t h at ( 1) u n der pa r ag r aph 3 of t h e f ee a g r ee men t , qu ot ed a n te at __ , s l i p op
. at 2, i t i s no t c l ear that t he p ast

- d ue b enef

i t s were award ed "o n t he b asi s o f t he cl i ent' s c lai m " (beca use CU E was f o und on an enti rel y dif f erent t h eor y ) a n d ( 2) a f

ee - ag r ee men t "r ea s on abl en es s " r ev i ew c ou l d s t i l l be u n der t ak en by t h e B oar d, w h i ch i n i t s de ci s i on o n ap p eal purp o rt ed t o co nsi d er al l represent at i o n pro vi d ed "b et ween t he f i nal B o ard d eci si o n i n D ecem b er 19 9 7 and the A u g u st 1 9 9 8 B o a rd d e c isio n " (R . at 7 ). I fu rth e r n o te th a t th e a p p e llan t sta te d in h is D e c e m b e r 1 1 , 1 9 9 8 , l e tter to t he B oard: "T he C our t ac t i on di d not r es ul t i n a n a war d of pas t [

- ] due ben ef

i t s
. T her ef

ore, u nd er t he t er ms of t he f ee agreem ent , no f

ee was d ue and o wi ng, o r o t herwi se p ayabl e, b y M r. W eat hers p o o n for the wo rk p erf o rme d a t the Co urt i n o rd er to sec ure a re m an d ." R

. at 1 4 8

. In an y eve nt, t ha t i s no t a m att er p rese ntl y be f o re u s.
S e c tio n 2 0 6 (b )( 1 ) o f t h e S o c ia l S e c u rity A c t p ro v id e s, in p e rtine n t p a rt: 21

W hen eve r a c our t r ender s a j udgment f avor abl e t o a cl ai mant un der t hi s s ubcha pter who was represent ed be f

o re t he co urt b y an at t o rney , t he co urt m ay d et erm i ne and al l o w as p art o f i t s judgm ent a re a so n a b le fee fo r su c h re p re se n ta tio n , no t in e x c e ss o f 2 5 p e rc e n t o f t h e to ta l o f t h e p a st-d u e b e n e fit s to w h ic h the c la im a n t i s e n tit le d b y re a so n o f suc h ju d g m e n t, a n d the C o m m issio n e r o f S o c ia l S e c u rity
m a y, no tw ithsta n d ing the p ro v isio n s o f sec tio n 4 0 5 (i) o f t h is ti tle, b u t sub je c t t o su b se c tio n (d ) o f t h is sect i o n, cert i f

y t he am o unt of such f

ee f o r p ayment t o s uch at t o rney out o f , and not i n ad d i t i o n t o , t he
am o un t o f

such p ast- d ue b en efi t s. 27 submissi on (and the rec ord on appeal contains no others) was a larg ely verbatim reiter ation of the Fe bruar y 1998 joint motion a

nd prese nted to the Boa

rd on rema

nd only the wrongarguments -- not be ing dir e c te d to the on ly iss ue be fo re the B oa rd of wh e the r c or

re c tio n of the RO ' s e rr or s ma nif e stl y
wo uld have re su lte d in

an a wa rd of se rv ic e c onne c tio n; (2 ) be c a us e his a rgume nts we re re late d to 19 theories that we re totally unsucce ssful -- having been e x plicitly reje cted by

the B oard ( R. at 120-22); and (3) beca

use he f ailed to identify

to t h e Boa

rd or the Court the CUE the ory that the B oard ultimately

found justified a C UE aw ard ( R. at 123-25). The VA re gulation mandates that the " extent and ty pe of se rvice s", the attorney 's "l ev el o f skill and competenc e" , and " the amount of time . . . spent" all be considered "in determining whether fees are reasona ble"

. 38 C.F.R. § 20.609(e) (1), ( 3), (4 ). Ye t th e ma

jor ity do e s n ot a dd

re ss t ho se fa c tor s, the c on sid e ratio n o f wh ic h wou ld a ll t e nd to 20 support the B VA' s reduc tion. In this reg ard, the Court's a naly sis not only fa ils to consider ade quately eac h of the fa ctors set forth in the VAregulation but fails to consider at a ll the VJ RA leg islative history in terms of fe erea sonablene ss reviewand the f actor s that fede ral c ourts have pr escr ibed for a ssessing the

rea sonablene ss of conting ency-fe e ag ree ments in Socia l Sec urity case s, wher e a cour t may order that

a fe e up to 2 5% be pa id o ut o f a pa st- du e be ne fi ts awa rd

. F or e xamp le , the U. S. Court of Ap pe a ls 214 2 U

. S.C

. § 4 0 6 (b)(1).

T he f act o rs de scr i b ed b y th e e n b a n c U .S

. C o urt of A p p eal s f o r t he Sixt h C i rcui t i n Rodr igu e z v
. Br own , 22 86 5 F. 2d 739 , 746 ( 6t h Ci r
. 198 9) ( en banc) , s eem t o be re pres ent at i ve of t hos e t hat are gene r al l y appl i ed i n ot her ju risd ic tio n s a s w e ll. S e e , e.g ., W el ls v
. Sul l i van , 90 7 F.2d 36 7 , 37 2 (2d C i r. 19 9 0 ); M cGui r e v. Sul l i van , 873 F. 2d 974, 9 8 1 -8 3 (7 th C ir. 1 9 8 9 ); H ul l v. B ow en , 7 4 8 F .S u p p . 5 1 4 , 5 2 2 (N .D . O h io 1 9 9 0 ); see a lso C ot t er v. B ow en , 879 F. 2d 359, 3 6 3 (8t h C i r. 19 8 9 ) ( ad o p t i ng l o d est ar hourl y - rat e anal y si s, an ap p roac h mo re r est ri ct i ve t han R od r igu ez ).

S . R EP
. N O . 1 0 0 -4 1 8 , 1 0 0 th C o n g ., 2 d S e ss
. 6 7 (J u l. 7 , 1 9 8 8 ) (n o ting tha t co n ting e n c y-f e e p ro v isio n is 23

" si m i l ar t o t hat pro vi d ed f o r i n s ect i o n 20 6 (a) o f

t he So ci al Sec uri t y A ct (42 U

. S.C

. [§] 40 6 (a)) " ).
S e e , e.g ., W

e lls , 9 0 7 F

. 2 d a t 372 ( cou r t "ou g h t n ot bl i n dl y a ppr ov e ev er y f ee r equ es t ma de pu r s u an t t o a 24
co nt i ngent agreem ent " and "sho ul d

. . . co nsi d er . . . whether t he reque st ed a m o unt is so lar ge as t o b e a wi nd f al l t o t he at t o rney " (ci t i ng R od r igu ez , i n f ra )) ; M cG u i re , 87 3 F.2d at 98 1 ("co urt s ho ul d co nsi d er t he reasonab l eness o f t he cont i ng enc y per cen t age t o m ake s ur e t he a t t o rne y d o es not r ece i ve f ees wh i ch ar e out of

proport i on t o t he s er vi ce 28 fo r t h e S i x thC i rc u i t(S i x thC i rc u i t ) c o n cl u d ed i n as s es s i n g th e re as o n ab l en es s o f a fe e p er ce n t age
so ught b y an atto rn e y

to b e pa id o ut o f p a st- du e Soc ia l Se c ur ity be ne fi ts a

wa rd e d: Deduc tions should gene rally fall into two cate g ories: 1 ) t h ose occ asioned by improper c onduct or ineffec tiveness of c ouns el ; and 2) situations in which counse l would enjoy

a windfa ll because of either an inordinate ly

larg e bene fit awa

rd or f rom m inim al effort e

xpended

. Ro dr igu e z v . B ro wn , 8 65 F .2 d 7 39 , 7 46 (6 th C ir . 1 98 9) (e n b anc ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Th e Sixth 22 Circui t t h en went on to amplify the sec ond cate g ory , in terms that resonate as to the fa cts of the instant case, a s follows: "Where a ca s e h as b ee n s ubmitted on boilerplate plea dings, in whic h no issues of mater ial fac t are prese nt and wher e no leg al re sear ch is appa rent, the be nchmar

k twenty -five perc entof aw ards [ si c] fee wo ul d o bv io us ly be i nap pro pri ate ." Id. at 747. I t seems almost impossi b l e t o believe that Congre ss intended the extraordinar y "r easona bleness" revie w, authorized to be c o nducted by the B VA and this Court to protect ve tera ns --
e ve n if the y do no t r e quest s uc h p ro te c tio n - - t o b e any le ss c omp re he ns ive tha

n th e pr ov isi on

to protec t S o ci al S ecur ity

rec ipients on which the conting ent-fe e provisions of sec tion 5904(d) wer e g e ne ra lly mod e le d in 1988

. I t app e ars that f e de ra l c ourt s ro utinely re du c e Soc ia l Se c ur ity dir e c t- 23 pay conting ency-fe e-a g ree ment amounts (per missibl e only up to 25% , as contra sted with the more protec tive 20% maxim um for direct-pa y conting ency-fe e agr eeme nts permitted by section 5904(d) as to VA be nefits) ba sed on re asonable ness re view whe re the court be lieves that the hours w orked divided into the c ontinge ncy -fe e amount ca nnot be justified based on the actua l work per formed by th e at t o r n e y. 24p e rfo rm e d , th e r isk o f lo ss[ ,] a n d the o the r re le v a n t co n sid e ra tio n s" ); id

. at 982 ( "we do n ot pr opos e a bl i n d a ppr ov al of

c o n ting e n c y fee s" ); C ot t er , 879 F. 2d at 365 ( "a l t h ou g h "c on t i n g en t f ee ag r ee men t

. . . mu s t al s o be con s i der ed as a f ac t or i n det er mi ni ng a ' r eas onabl e f ee'

. . . [ , ] we can not s ay t he di s t r i ct cour t abus ed i t s di s cr et i on i n h ol di ng t he l od es t ar [ hour l y - r at e] f

ee f ul l y c om pensat ed f

or t h e con t i n g en t n at u r e of t h e f ee a g r ee men t i n thi s c as e" ( ci t at i on s omi t t ed) (e m p h a sis a d d e d )) ; R od r igu ez , 865 F. 2d at 747 ( "du e def er en ce s h ou l d be g i v en t o t h [ e] ex pr es s i on of t h e i n t en t i on s of t he p art i es [ co nt ai ned i n a f ee agreem ent ; ] .

. . [h] o wever .
. . a co urt i s no t bo und t o award recov e ry a c co rding t o t he sta te d a g re e m e n t" ).

See ca s es c i t ed su

p ra no te 2 4

. See gener al l y J .F . G h e n t, C on s t r uct i on and A pp l i cat i on of A t t orney'

s F ee 25 P r ovi s i on (

42 U

. S. C

. A

. § 40 6(

b) ( 1) ) of F eder al Soci al Secur i t y Act , 22 A

. L. R

. 3d 1 08 1 (1968 & Suppl

. 200 0). I n v i ew o f t h e fo re g o ing , I b e liev e th a t th e re is a n e e d fo r tho ro u g h r e se a rc h o n th is s u b je c t, w h ic h is still a n o the r re a so n w h y this c a se sh o u ld no t ha v e b e e n d e c id e d w itho u t f u rth e r b rie fing a n d o ra l ar g u m e n t b e fo re the full C o u rt.
See s upr a no t e 1 8

. In d esc ribing the f ee - ag ree m en t rev i ew p ro ce ss i nc l ud ed i n t h e V JR A co m p ro m i se 26 ag r ee men t , Se n at or Cr an s t on s t at ed:
I n ou r m ee t i n g s t o re s ol v e t h e di f f er en ce s be t we en t h e Se n at e- pas s ed an d H ou s e- pas s ed v er s i on s of S . 1 1 , t h e H o u se c o m m itt e e e x p re sse d c o n c e rn tha t t h e c a p a s a rtic u la te d in t h e S e n a te b ill c o u ld re su lt in v e te ra n s b e ing a b le to re ta in e ff e c tive c o u n se l. T o q u o te a n o ld c lich e : " Y o u ge t wh a t yo u p a y fo r." C e rta inly, if

w e a re g o ing to g ive v e te ra n s re a l a c c e ss to j u d ic ia l r e v ie w , w e m u st g ive th e m a c c e ss to go o d , q ua l i f

i ed att o rne ys. I b eli ev e t ha t all o w i ng att o rne ys t o ch arg e re aso na b l e fee s wil l ac co m p l i sh tha t go a l an d w a s c o n v inc e d b y the p o sitio n o f t h e H o u se tha t i ts p ro v isio n s o n this p o int a re p re fer a b le to the hig h ly re stric tive p ro v isio n s o f t h e S e n a te -p a sse d m e a su re [lim ited to a $ 5 0 0 fl a t f e e ].
A dd i t i onal l y , I bel i eve t hat , al ong w i t h f i nal l y gr ant i ng ve t er ans t he r i gh t t o ob t ai n j udi ci al 29 Be cause the g rounds s tated by the m ajority (re lating to the c ase' s complexi ty , the compete ncy of the atto rn e y ' s w or

k, and the su c c e ss t

hat he a c hie ve d) are wi tho ut fo un datio n on the fa c ts o f t his

ca s e, th e o n l y

re m ai n i n g b as i s un d e r V A ' s re gu l at i o n(2 0 C

. F. R

. § 2 0

. 6 0 9 (e )( 8 )) fo r t h e C o urt 's decision not to reduc e the 30% fee is the Court's a naly sis of the risk-taking/risk-sharingnature of conting ency-fe e agree ments in ge nera l. An teat __, slip op. at 18. Howeve r, t hat basis alone doe s not seem suffic ient t o j u s t i fy a 30% f ee unde r VA r egulations that specify eig ht fac tors to be considere d in assessing fee rea sonablene ss. Com pa re38 C.F.R. § 20.609(e) (1)- (7) with 38 C.F .R. § 20 .6 09 (e )( 8)

. Mo re ov e r, Soc ia l Se c ur ity c a se law se e ms re ple te wi th state me nts that a contingency arrangem ent is on ly one fac tor to be co n s i d ered -- and no t the onl

y fa c tor

. Ibe lie ve that it is 25 imp os sib le to r e a d th e se c a se s and c on c lud e tha

t th e B oa rd ' s r e du c tio n in

the ins tant c a se is

unwa rr ante d, g ive n th e fa c ts h e re (e ve n th ou g h pa rt of the B oa

rd ' s re a so nin g wa s in c or

re c t) , unle ss it was Congr ess' intention to protect veter ans less than Social Sec urity re ci p i en t s i n their fe e ag ree ments with attorney s. I know of no basis for rea ching such a conclusion, and the languag e of § 2 0. 60 9( e ) c e rt a inl y

e vin c e s n o s uc h inte nti on on the Se c re tary' s p art

. 26re v ie w , w e sh o u ld gr a n t t h e m a s m u c h la tit u d e a s p o ssib le to m a k e d e te rm ina tio n s a b o u t t h e ir
r epr es en t at i on
. I al s o n ot e t h at t h e compr omi s e i n cl u ded pr ovis i ons t hat al l ow ei the r t he B VA or the C o u rt o f V etera n s Ap

p ea l s t o rev i ew a fe e a g ree m en t fo r " rea so n a b l en ess" -- eit h er u p o n a req u est f r om a par t

y or on t he Boar d'

s or Cour t '

s own i ni t i at i ve . Thi s s hould pr ovi de pr ot ec t i on agai ns t any o v e rre a c h in g o n th e p a rt o f a tto rn e y s.
1 3 4 C o n g . R e c . S 3 1 4 6 1 , S 3 1 4 6 9 -7 0 (1 9 8 8 ) (e m p h a sis a d d e d ).

Al t h ou g h i t i s t r u e t hat t h e cl i en t v et er an doe s n ot c h al l en g e t h e f ee a n d i n dee d e n dor s es i t ( R. a t 144 27 ( D ec embe r 1998 l et t er f r om v et er an ) ) , i t i s n ot c l ea r t h at h e h as be en a wa r e of e x ac t l y w h at t h e appe l l an t ' s r epr es en t at i on b ef o re t he R O act ual l y was r espo nsi b l e f o r achi evi ng.
134 Con g
. Rec

. a t S31470. 28
30 Fu rt hermore , this is ex actly the kind of ca se for

which I believe that a B VA su a s po nte revie w under

38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)( 2 ) wa s d es igne d, in order to pr otect a V A claimant. Yet, the 27 Court has selec ted just such a ca se in which to admonish the B oard againstintruding into the attorney -c l i en t re l ationship, ante at __, slip op. at 18-19, despite Cong ressional intent to " provide pr ote c tio n a g a ins t any ov e rr e a c hin g on the pa rt of atto rn e y s. " An d, a g a in, the Court ha s ma de thi s 28

rathe r d ra c on ian p ro no un c e me nt w ith out r e fe re nc e to l e g isl ativ e his tor y or ana lo g o u s S o c i a l S e c u

r ity

c a se s and wi tho ut p ro vid ingan ade qu ate op po rt un ity fo r t he Se c re tary

or a pp e lla nts ' a dv oc ate s in g ener al to addre ss the issue. The Court's failure t o take into acc ount the extent to which the fede ral courts examine t he reasonable ness of attorney fee s in Social Security case s even where the par ties have e ntered in to a

c ontin g e nc y -f

e e a g re e me nt, and

the fa c tor s th at th e c ourt s c on sid e r i n deter mining re asonable ness, hig hlights the de fec tive proce ss used by the en banc Court in deciding this case without furthe r brief ing, or al ar gument, and a c ase c onfer ence
. Finally , Iwant to stress that I would not deprive the appellant of a re as o n ab l e attorney

fee despite the for eg oing a

naly sis of the nature of t he represe ntation provided be fore the B oard. Under VAre gulatio ns , a

20 % c ontin g e ncy

fe e is g e ne ra lly

pr e sume d to be re a so na ble (3 8 C. F .R. § 20.609(f) (2000)) . Iag ree with the majority that it i s en d em i c i n the nature of conting ency ag ree ments that an " attorney taking a case on a conting ent basis may ear n a larg e fee for a

very few hours; howeve r, that same attorney also takes the r isk that he will rece ive no fe e, re g ardle ss of the

nu mb er of

ho urs sp entona cas e." An teat __, slip op. at 18. On the fac ts of this c ase, the 20% fe e, g iving due reg ard to it s conting ent nature, cer tainly provides adequate r ecompe nse for the nature and extent of the repr esentation that the appellant provide d befor e the B oard.Cf

. Cox , 1 4 9 F.3d at 13 6 4 ("sect i o n 59 0 4 (c)( 2 ) onl y gi ves t he B o ard l i m i t ed jur i sdi ct i o n t o revi ew t he 29

rea so n a b l en ess of

a f ee an d t o r educe t h e f

ee " ( emph as i s a dded) )

. I n t h i s r eg ar d, i t i s n ot ew or t h y t h at

- s ec t i on 7263( d) is ve ry sim ilar to se c tio n 5 9 0 4 (c )( 2 ) o f t itl e 3 8 , U .S . C o d e
. 31 4. Basis for Reversal A conc luding jurisdictional matter: I am concerne d about t he C ourt' s stating that its rever sal of th e Board 's 30 %-t o-2 0% r edu cti onis mad e "pur su antto 38 U.S .C . § 72 63 " ( an teat __, slip op. at 18), rather then the Court's r ever sing the Boa rd under section 7252(a ). I

cannot f ind in section 7263 any authority for the Court to re verse . Rather, se ction 7263(d) seems to a uthorize the Court only to "a ffirm the f

inding or order of the B oard" or to " order a reduc tion in the f

ee c alled for

in the fee called f

or in the agree ment". One is left to wonde r whe ther the Court's re fe re n ce to se ction 29 7263 is designe d to preve nt the Secre tary from appe alingto t h e Federa l Circuit. See 38 U. S.C. § 7263(d) (" [a] n order of the Court unde r this subsec tion is final and may not be revie wed i n any ot her C ou rt ") D. EAJA Offset/"Sam e Work" As to the majority ' s conce rn about our prior case law on the offse t que stion, I would, as noted in part I I .A., above , pref

er that the Court a dhere to a full adver sarial proce ss with the participation of the pa rties bef ore the Court overrule s our prior prec edent. How ever , Ido tend to ag ree with the Court that the se nte nc e s that it qu ote s f ro m Fr itz v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 190, 194 ( 1999), an teat __, slip op. at 11-12 -- the first re fer ence as a c hara cter ization of Shaw v . Gober , 10 Vet.App. 498 ( 1997) -- that s e e me d to dr aw th e li n e at th e att o r n e y ' s w o r k inv o lv in g " o b ta in in g mo r e r e li e f from the Depa rtment than what the appellant r ece ived from the Court" may be ov erb road and should be

ree x amined. Howe ver, the analy sis should proce ed from an allocation of the hours w orked by the attorney betwee n Court and VA r epre sentation, as I now tend to believe was c orre ctly argued by

the Secre tary in Fr itz , s up ra , a nd , if th at all oc atio n d oe s n ot r e su lt i n a tot a l of fs e t, o nly the n mu st a compar ison be made of

the " work" done at the two stag es to se e if it is essentially "the same" -- a s my analy sis will s how that it clear ly was he re. Th e ma jor ity , in ste a d, c ho os e s to a do pt a on e -s ize -f

its -a ll holding "that the repr esentation of

a c la ima nt in pur su it of a c la im at al l sta g e s of the a dju dic atio n p ro c e ss i s th e ' same wo rk ,' re g ard le ss of the tribunal be fore which it is perfor med"

. An teat __, slip op. at 1 4

. I h av e seve ral ser iousPub. L. N o. 102- 572, § 506( c) , 106 St at

. 4506, 4513 ( 1992) ( f ound at 2 8 U .S.C . § 2 4 1 2 not e)

. T hat 30 p ro visi o n stat es: (c) F EE A GREEM ENTS
. – Sect i on 59 04 ( d) of t i t l e 38, U ni t ed St at es Co de, sh a ll n o t p re v e n t an a w a rd o f fee s a n d o the r ex p e n se s u n d e r sec tio n 2 4 1 2 (d ) o f t itl e 28, U n i t ed St at es Code. Se ct i on 5904( d) of t i t l e 38, U n i t ed St at es Code, s h al l n ot appl y wi t h r es pect t o any s uch awa rd b ut o nl y i f , wh er e t he cl ai mant ' s at t orn ey r ece i ves f

ees f or t he s ame work un der bo t h s ect i on 590 4 of t i t l e 38, U ni t ed St at es C od e, and s ect i on 2 41 2(d) o f t i t l e 28, U ni t ed St at es Co de, t he cl ai mant ' s at t orn ey r ef un ds t o t he cl ai mant t he amo un t of t he s mal l er f

ee. 32 pr ob le ms w iththi s h old ing . F ir st, by wa y of pr e fa c e , altho ugh sec tio n 506 (c ) of the F e de ra l Co ur ts Administration Act of 1992 [he re i n af t erFCAA § 506( c)], may not be direc tly

applicable , as the 30 B oa rd c on c lud e d it

wa s, the ma

jor ity a do pts ve rb atim( an teat __, slip op. at 10-11) the analy sis from Shaw , 10 Vet.App. at 504, that the policy of the F CAA § 506(c) prohibition ag ainst double pay ment for the sa

me work a

pplies equally

t o n o n -di rec t-pay

ment fee ag ree ments throug h the

" unre a so na

ble " -f e e pr oh ibi tio n e mbo die d in 38 U. S.C. §§ 59 04 (c )( 2) and 72 63 (d ). He nc e , it

mus t be borne in mind that the Court's opinion here would apply with full force to a 20% direct-pay ment conting ency-fe e agree ment under se ction 5904(d), a nd my ensuinganaly sis procee ds, theref ore, a s th o u ghFC AA § 5 0 6 (c ) w er e b ei n g ap p l i edd i re ct l y i nth i s ca s e. T hu s , th e i mp ac to f t h e C o urt 's holding on this point is gre ater than might be appar ent upon initial ex amination. I t is especially

problematic, the ref

ore, that the Court's opinion e schew s any analy sis of the nature of the actual

work pe rfor

med by the atto rn ey b ef

ore the Court in comparison to the work perf ormed before the B VA and me rely , ips e dix it , decla res them "the same" as a matter of law " for the purposes of

EAJA" bec ause the work here and below r elate to the " same c laim". An teat __ , s lip op . at 13 -1 4. Th is c on c lus ion se e ms t o me to re a d "s ame wo rk " out of the statut e ; th at is , th e re su lt

rea c he d w ou ld b e the same if Con g re ss h a d ju st p ro vid e d f or an o ff se t whenever E A JA f

ees are
awa rded a nd a conting ency

fee is pa id in connec tion with the same c laim. But the statute doe s not
say that. M or e ov e r, Con g re ss d id n ot say that in the vir tua lly ide nti c a l SSAlangua g e e na c te d in 1 9 8 5 i n th e EA J A ex t en s i o n an d am en dm en t s i nwh i ch s ec t i o n3 ex p re s s l y p ro h i b i t ed"th e c l ai m an t 's attorney [from] rec eiv[ing] fees for the sa me work unde r both [S SA direct-pa y ment provision fromP ub

. L. N o
. 99

- 8 0 , § 3 , 99 Stat

. 18 3 , 18 6 (19 8 5 ) ( f o und at 28 U

. S.C

. § 2 4 1 2 note)

. 31

B r ow n v. G ardner , 5 1 3 U

. S

. 1 1 5 , 1 1 7

- 1 8 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ( " i n t e r p r e t i v e d o u b t i s t o b e c o n s t r u e d i n t h e v e t e r a n 's 32 f avo r").
"[W ] hen a s t at ut e' s l ang uag e i s pl ai n, t he s ol e f un ct i on of t he cour t s - - at l eas t wh er e t he di s po s i t i on r equi r ed 33 by t h e t ex t i s not abs u r d -

- i s t o e n f or ce i t a cc or di n g t o i t s t er ms
. " H a rt f o rd Un d erw ri t ers v. Un i o n P l a n t ers , 1 2 0 S .C t. 1 9 4 2 , 1 9 4 7 (2 0 0 0 ) (c itatio n s a n d inte rn a l q u o ta tio n m a rk s o m itt e d ). " W h e n the w o rd s o f a sta tute a re un a m b igu o u s, .

. . t h i s f i r s t c an on i s a l s o t h e l as t : j u di ci al i n qu i r y i s c ompl et e. " C o n n e c ticu t N a tio n a l B a n kv . G e rm a in , 503 U

. S. 249, 25 4 (1992 ) (c i t ati o ns an d int er nal quot at i on mar ks om i t t ed). "I f t he s t at ut e' s meani ng i s cl ear , we wi l l not cons i der l eg i s l at i v e h i s t or y . " Uni t ed St at es v. O ne 19 97 Toyot a La nd Crui s er , 2 4 8 F .3 d 8 9 9 , 9 0 3 (9 C ir. 2 0 0 1 ). th 33 a past-due awa

rd] .

. . and [ the EAJ A unl ess]

. . . the claimant's attorney ref unds to the claimant the amount of the smaller

fee ." 31 The opinion' s principal stated justification f or the interpre tive leap of

equating"sa

me work" wi th " same c la im" se e ms t o b e a c itatio n to Brown v. Gardner , but Gardner ha s a pp lic a bil ity on ly 32 wh e n th e re is s ome int e rp re tiv e do ub t. Ido n' t se e any in t he statut or

y langua g e
. But if

the re is 33

so me , th e n I be lie ve that it i s in c umb e nt o n th e Cou rt to e xplor e bo th t

he le g isl ativ e his tor

y a s w e ll as the c asela

w re lating to the se ction 3 provision rega rd ing SSA awa rds. The ma

jority , howeve r, do e s not dis c us s eithe r of the se po te nti a l sour c e s of en lighte nme nt in re nd e ri ng the int e rp re tatio n it has re ache d out to impos e. In addition, the opinion appear s larg ely to ignor e the distinction betwee n collectingthe fe e for

work in the Court or for work at the Depa rtment, which wa s emphasized in In the Matter of the Fe e Agree ment of Mason , 13 Vet.App. 79, 86 ( 1999)

. Neve rtheless, I

do tend t o agr ee with the Court's c onclusion as to offse t here and that gene ra lly EAJA fees should be off

set when only

a re mand i s won here. Henc e, I believe that the fee

a g re e me nt p ro vis ion

in q ue sti on is inv a lid in that it atte mpt s to mak e a bla nk e t of fs e t a pp lic a ble to
e v e r y non awa rd re mand and that such a blanket approa ch violates F CAA § 506(c) , which, I believe, calls for a fa ct-spec ific compa

rison in eac h case

. Suc h a fa c t- ba se d a

na ly sis wo uld

a c c omp lis h th e re su lt that th e ma jor ity a pp are ntl y se e ks , but w ou ld d o s o w ith out

resor ting to a one -size -f

i t s -a ll holding. That holdingis counterintuitive be c aus ethere are clea

rly fac t circumstanc es whe re the work be fore the Boa rd or RO will not be "the same" as the wor

k befor e the Court (suc h as whe n t h e at torney argues only

for a rea sons-or-ba ses or duty -to-assist rema

nd here and does entirely differ ent work be low in arguing a s to the weig hing of the evidenc e befor e VA on rema nd, perha ps most c lear ly illust rate d wher e the application of theC o nsid er the fo l l o w i ng hyp o t he t i ca l : R ep rese ntati o n in t he C o urt o f 2 0 ho urs resu l t s i n a d uty

- t o - assist 34

r emand f or w hi ch a $3, 00 0 E A JA awar d i s made. T he r epre s ent at i on bel ow occur s at t he R O and B V A , an d, af t er much d evel o p m ent of t he evi d ence and a de ni al b y th e R O , res ul t s i n t he award of ser vi ce co nnect i o n wi t h a 50 % rat i ng (awarde d by t he R O af

t er t he B V A award s ser vi ce co nnect i o n). T he at t o rney wo rks 9 0 ho urs i n t he 3 pro ceed i ngs b ef o re V A , and a pa st

- d ue b enef i t s award o f

$ 4 0 , 0 0 0 i s ul t i m at el y m ad e. T here i s a 20 % dir ect

- p ayment f ee agreem ent , and t h u s t h er e wou l d be a c on t i n g en cy f ee of $8, 000. H ow mu ch of t h e $3, 000 E AJA awa r d i s t o be of f s et i n c on s i der at i on o f t he wo rk perf

o rme d be f

o re t he C o urt ? I f

t he wo rk perf

o rme d be l o w i s i n f

act ent i rel y dif

f ere n t fro m th e wo rk p erfo rm ed b efo re the C o urt (as is t he case bec ause t he l i t i gat i o n i nvo l ved o nl y whether t he B o ard had f ai l ed t o requi re t h at t h e du t y t o a s s i s t be pr oper l y e x ec u t ed an d t h e wor k be l ow con s i s t ed t ot al l y of t h e dev el opmen t a n d ma r s h al i n g of evi d ence and the argum ent m ad e f rom the evidence f

o r t he award of ser vi ce co nnect i o n and t he hi ghest po ss i b l e rat i ng), t hen t here s ho ul d be no of f set o f t he $ 3 , 0 0 0 E A JA f ee award

. If

, ho wever, t he at t o rney had exp end ed 10 hours on t he sa m e su b je c t t h a t he ha d a rg u e d to the C o u rt, the n o n e -ha lf o f t h e $ 3 ,0 0 0 a w a rd e d , fo r 2 0 h o u rs o f w o rk b e fo re the C o u rt,
w o u ld b e o ff

se t an d re tur n e d to the c lien t.
Ind ee d , t his i s wha t t he appel l ant appear s t o h ave cont ended t o t he B oard i n h i s D ece mb er 11, 199 8, l et t er 35 to the B o a rd , as q u o te d a t t h e e n d o f no te 2 0 , su p ra .
Se e ge ne r al l

y Swi ne y v
. G ob er , 14 V et

. A pp
. 65, 75 (200 0) ( awar di ng E A JA f ees f or l i t i gat i ng E A JA f

ee 36

a p p lica tio n b e c a u se a m o u n t o f " fee s fo r fee s" s o u g h t w a s re a so n a b le ); M cN ee l y (A l a n ) v. W est , 12 V et

. App. 162, 164 (19 9 9 ) ( same ). 34 du ty to a s s is t o n r e ma

n d r e s u lt s in n e w me d ic a l e v id e n c e th at c o u ld n o t h av e b e e n p art of the

ar gum en t i n th e C o urt b u t mu s t b e ar gu ed fr o mo nre m an d ). E v en we re an at t o rn ey t o s ee k t o al i gn 34 the conting ency

fee only with repre sentation below (for ex ample, by a fe e agree ment providing that ther e wi ll b e no c ontin g e nc y fe e pa id f

or re pr e se ntatio n in

the Cou rt un le ss a be ne fi ts a

wa rd is obtained from t

he Cour t ), the inquiry

would sti ll be whether the attorney is g etting paid that fee 35 for " the same w ork" for whic h he had be en paid a n attorney fee under the EAJA. Howeve r, we n eed not he re c oncer n ourselves w ith any

question as to whether

any part of th e 30 % co n t i n gen cy fe e sh o u l d b e co n s i d er ed as h av i n g b ee n ea rn ed b y t h e ap p el l an t 's

re p r e s e n t at i o n b e f

o r e th i s C o ur

t , b e c a u s e , o n th e f

a c t s o f th i s c a s e , th e an s w e r i s c l e ar , fr om a compar ison of the Fe bruar y 1998 joint mot ion for re mand (R. at 98-103) and the June 2, 1998, letter to the Boa rd (R. at 105-09), that the work be low was the " same wor k" a nd that an off

set would occ ur
un de r t he te rm s o f F CAA § 506( c ) ( fo r a dir e c t- pa y me nt s e c tio n 5 90 4( d) fe e a g re e me nt) or its underlying policy

as embodied in the r easona ble-fe e limitation in sections 5904(c)(2) a nd 7263(d). Be cause we know that the attorney did at least $2,400.00 worth of work here, it follows, with one

cave at, that $2,400.00 of the $62,000.00 must be of fset. The cave at is that any fee s-for- fee s work 36 inc lud e d in

the EA JA awa

rd pe rh a ps sh ou ld n ot b e of

fs e t; th at matter

wa s e xpre ssl y

le ft op e n inA n te at __, __, s l i p op. a t 13, 16 ( r ef er r i n g t o "dr af

t i n g of a f ee a g r ee men t w h i ch mi g h t u n i n t en t i on al l y or 37 i nt ent i onal l y depri ve a v et er an of hi s [ s i c] r i gh t s un der t he l aw"; r ef er r i ng t o "ar t f

ul l y or i nar t f

ul l y dra f t ed cont i ng enc y f ee agreem ent whi ch co ul d ci rcum vent t he l et t er and spir i t of E A JA " ).

See s upr a n o te 4

. 38
35 Shaw , 1 0 V e t.A

pp
. at 50 4- 05

. I t is sti ll on e mor e matte r that th e op ini on ne e ds to d e a l w ithbe c a

us e the Court order s that the total E AJ A fe e b e o ffset and, ac cordingto the EAJA application in the underlying c ase of W

e ath e rsp oo n v . W

est , U .S. Ve t. A

pp . No. 97 -6 75 , the EA JA fe e s awa rd e d d id include two hours for prepa ring the fee application itself. Fe bruar y 25, 1998, E AJ A A p p l i ca tion, Ex hibit 2 at 3. Ag a in, I st res s th at th e on e -s ize -f its -a ll h old ingla id d own b y the ma jor ity is l arg e ly

unnece ssary

to a chieve the policy result that the majority appar ently seeks (of not le tting attorne y s -- by virtue of c lever ly

draf ted fe e agree ments -- e scape offse t , i

. e. , re cover double pay ment for the

same wor k). I t is certainly

unnece ssary

on the fa cts of this ca s e, an d one would think that the 37 majority , in acc ordanc e with the maxim i n Best v. Principi , would want to deter mine first whethe r 38 the ca se ca

n be dec ided on a more narr ow basis. Acc ording ly , althoug h Iwould ag ree with the majority that the total amount of t he EAJ A award in t his case f or the mer its repre sentation (putting to one side the two hours reimburse d for fee s for fee s) should be offse t ag ainst the permissible fe e paid by the veter an under

the fe e agree ment, Ibelieve that the one-siz e-f its-all holding r eac hed by the Court (re quiringtotal EAJ A offse t in all case s ) is unsustainable on the f ace of the statutory langua g e and

e sp e c ia lly

in l ig ht o f the de art

h of ana ly sis and

a uth or ity pr ov ide d f

or it i n th e ma

jor ity opinion.

III. Conclusi on For the fore g oing r easons, I

am unable to join in the opi nion of t he C ourt, althoug h Iag ree g ener ally with the result re ache d on the fac ts of this case on the E AJ A-off set question. As to the Boa rd' s decision reducing the 30% conting ency fee to 20%, Idisag ree with the Court's r ever sal of that portion of the B oard de cision.36

KRAMER, Chief Judge , dis se nti ng : I c ann ot c on c ur in t he ma jor ity op ini on be c a us e it f a ils t o ad dre s s s ev er al re qu i s i t e i s s u es
. Al th o u ghIam n o ti nagr ee m en twi ths ev er al m at t er s i nJ u d ge S t ei n b er g's separ ate opinion, I note that he a

nd Iare in substantial ag ree ment as to many of the matters discussed in this opinion. First, the majority holds that the C ourt has jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) to review the re a so na

ble ne ss of a

fe e a g re e me nt u

nd e r 3 8 U .S. C. § 72 63 (d ) t hat th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls (B VA or Boa

rd) has revie wed sua sponte under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(2)

. An teat __, slip op. at 8-9. Pursuant to the Veter ans' J udicial Review A ct, Pub. L . No. 100-68 7 , § 4 0 2 , 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1 98 8) (f ound at 38 U. S.C. § 725 1 n ote ) ( VJRA ), thi s Co ur t ha s juri sd ic tio n o ve r o nly tho se a pp e a ls in which a Notice of Disagree ment (NOD ) wa s filed on or a fter N ovember 18, 1988, as to an a ction of a VA ag ency of original jurisdi ction (normally a VA r eg ional office (RO)) that underlies the B VA decision that an a

ppellant see ks to appea l. Se e Ve le z v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 148, 157 ( 1998). Although Congress has expressly rec og nized one ex ception to this NOD requireme nt, that exception is not applicable in this ca se. See The Revision of Ve tera ns' Be nefits Dec isions Based on Clea r and Unmis taka

ble Er ro r A c t, P ub . L . N o. 10 5- 11 1, § 1 (c )( 2) , 111 Stat. 227 1 (19 97 ) ( fo un d at 38 U. S.C. § 7251 note) (notwithstandingVJ RA, Court ha s jurisdiction ove r claims, pending or filed on or af ter No ve mbe r 2 1, 19 97 , o f c le ar a nd un mi st akab le e rr or

in B VAde c isi on s p ur su ant t o 3 8 U .S. C. § 7111). B eca

use the re cord on a

ppeal in this case contains no jurisdicti o n -c o n fe rr i n gNOD, I believe that there is a le g itimate question as to whether this Court i n fac t does have jurisdiction. The majority appea rs to allow for jurisdiction he re w ithout a jurisdiction-confer ringNOD on the ground that the Court has " additional authority " unde r sec tion 7263(d). An teat_

_ , s l i p o p
. at9

. Al th o u gh the U.S. Court of Appea ls f or the F eder al Circuit (F eder al Circuit) has state d that section 5904(c )(2) g ives the B oard limited jurisdiction t o re v i ew the rea sonablene ss of a fe e, se e Cox v . W est , 149 F.3d 1360, 1364 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998), this Cou rthas neve r expressly considere d whether

without any NOD the Court ha s jurisdiction unde r section 7263(d) over such a B VA dec ision. Nor does the majority here addre ss that important jurisdictional matter. Second, in the B VA dec ision here on a ppeal, the B oard de termined in the fir st instance that the appe llant was elig ible under 38 U .S.C. § 5904(c) (1) to re ceive an attorne y fee (Recor d (R.) at 3-4) and then pr ocee ded to consider the reasonablene ss of t he fee (R. at 4-8). This Court has37

held that the B oard doe s not have jurisdiction to consider eligibility under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) unless an RO has first made that deter mination. See Carpente r v. Gobe r , 14 Vet.App. 195 (2000) (per curiam order) (holding that neither B oard nor Court has origi n al jurisdiction under section 5904(c)(2) to consider eligibility of appe llant for attorne y fee s), gran ting m ot. for

re c on s. in In the Matter of the Fe e Agree ment of Carpenter , No. 97-676, 1999 WL 978670 (Ve t. App. Oct. 15, 1999). But see In the Matter of the Fee Agreem ent of Stanley , 10 V e t.A pp . 1 04 , 1 05 (1 99 7) (i n c a se wh e re B oa

rd ha d s ua sp onte ra ise d un de r 38 U. S.C. § 5 90 4( c )( 2) iss ue of e lig ibi lity

un de r 3 8 U .S. C. § 5 9 0 4 ( c ) ( 1 ) , C o urts t at e d th at C o urth a d j ur i s d i c t i o nun d e r

3 8 U

. S

. C

. § § 7 2 6 3 ( d ) an d 7 2 6 6 ( a ) )

. In

a dd iti on , th is C ourt

ha s st ate d th at any

re vie w o f re a so na

ble ne ss wo uld be pr e matur e until e lig ibi lity is first determined. See Sny der v. G ober , 1 4 V e t. Ap p
. 1 5 4 , 1 6 7 ( 2 0 00), mo t

. f o r r econs. filed (Nov. 13, 2000). A ssuming that ther e is a s eq u en t ial relationship between e ligibility and

rea sonablene ss, Ibelieve that before the C ourt can a ddress re asonable ness, it must first address the

un de rl yingthr e sh old is su e of e lig ibi lity . In r e a c hin gits de c isi on , h ow e ve r, the ma jor ity fa ils to addre ss this m atter. Third, I am concerne d that the m ajority , without adequate analy sis as to why it is appropriate,

a pp e ars to r e verse th e B oa rd in t he c onte xt of

38 U. S.C. § 7 26 3( d) . T he Cou rt state s th at it

is

rev ie w in gun d e r

3 8 U

. S. C. § 7 2 6 3 ( d ) th e B V Ad e c is io nth at r e d u c e d th e att o r

n e y f e e s on
rea sonablene ss gr ounds but is reve rsing that decision under 38 U .S.C. § 7252(a). An teat __, slip op. at 18. Althoug h section 7252(a ) provides the Court with the authority to "r ever se a de cision of the Boa rd," section 7263(d) provides that " [i ]n reviewinga fe e agree ment . . . under se ction 5904(c) (2), the Court may

aff irm the findingor orde r of the Boa rd and may

order a re duction in the fee called f o r i n th e a g r e e m e n ti f

i tf i n d s th atth e f

e e i s e x c e s s i v e o r

un r e a s o n a

b l e , " 3 8 U

. S

. C

. § 7 2 6 3 ( d )

. In that r e g ard , th e F e de ra l Cir c uit ha s c le arl y

state d th at th e Court ' s aut ho ri ty to re vie w f

e e a g re e me nts
un der s ect io n 7 2 6 3 (d) "is st ri ctl y li mi tedby

th e la nguage of

th e st atu te. " In the Matter of the Fe e Agreem ent of W

ick, 40 F.3d 367, 371 ( Fe d. Cir. 1994) ( FeeAgreem ent of W

ick ); cf

. Cox , 149 F.3d at 1364 (sec tion 5904(c)( 2) provides Boa rd wit h limit ed jurisdi ction to revie w reasonablene ss of fe e and to re duce f

ee)

. Four th, the majority

makes a holding that ove rrules pr evious Court prec edent, se e Fr itz

v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 190, 194-95 (1999), as to the meaningof " same wor k" in the c ontextof whe ther38

to offset the attorney

fee s with the fee s awa

rded unde r the Equal Acce ss to J ustice Ac t (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). As to that offse t determination, the majority , in my opinion, fails to provide

a de qu ate ana ly sis and

le g a l su pp or t for its ho ldi ng
. F or e xamp le , th e ma jor ity ' s d isc us sio n a

br up tly

mov e s f ro m the te rm s of the fe e a g re e me nt to a c on c lus or y ho ldi ngthat " same wo rk " me ans " same claim" without making a ny connec tion between the t er m s and the holding

. An teat __, slip op.

a t 13- 1 4

. M o r e o v e r , th e m a j o r i ty m ak e s th ath o l d i n g , o s t e n s i b l y b a s e d o nth e v e t e r an s b e ne fi ts prec ept that any interpre tive doubt a s to the meaningof the statute- -that is, cong ressional intent as to "same work" --must be re solved in favor of the ve tera

n, without discussing per tine n t leg islative history . In that reg ard, I note that the " same wor k" la nguag e tha t ap p l i es t o t his Court, see the Fe dera l Courts Administ ration Ac t of 1992 (F CAA), Pub. L . No. 102-572, § 506, 106 Stat. 4506, 4513 (1992) ( found at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 note), is exactly t h e s am e (e x cept f or the attorney -fe e statutes aff

ecte d, 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d) versus 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)) as the " same wor k" la nguag e that applies to attorney

fee s awa rded in Social Sec urity

Act ca ses, see the Eq

ua l Ac c e ss t o Just ic e Ac t, Exte ns ion and Am e ndme nt, Pub . L . N o. 99 -8 0, § 3 , 9 9 St at. 1 83 , 18 6 ( 19 85 ) ( fo un d at 28 U. S.C. § 2412 note). The legislative hist ory supporting the "sa me work" langua g e as to S ocial Secur ity Act

c a se s p ro vid e s in

pe rt ine nt p art : The bill clarif

ies that an EAJA awa

rd in Socia l Sec urity case s is not precluded by the fe e pr ov isi on

in t he Soc ia l Se c ur ity

Ac t, 4 2 U .S. C. § 406(b ). Th e bil l a lso pr oh ibi ts atto rn e y s f

rom col lec tin gbo th E AJA f e e s and § 4 06 (b ) f

e e s in the same case . In the situation of dual entitlement, the attorne y must re fund the amount of the sma lle r f e e to t he c la ima nt.

. . . .

. . . This pr ovision a

nd related ones, when rea d toge ther, allow a court or the Secre tary to authorize pay

ment o f attorne y

fee s and re lated expenses under the [EAJA] , n o tw it

h s ta n d in g th e p r o v is io n s in th e So c ia l Se c ur it y A c t. H o w e v e r , an atto rn e y c oll e c tin gatto rn e y

fe e s under th e EA JA wo uld have to u se su c h f

e e s to reduc e the liability , if any rema ins, of the claimant f or any p o rt i o n of the pa st-due be ne fi ts. Court s and

the Se c re tary

wo uld be e xpe c te d to scrut ini ze s uc h a wa rd s to ensure that the attorney is r educing the liability of the c laimant so that the claimant is the primary

benef iciary of the EAJA awa

rd.

. . . .39 I t is the Committee' s intent . . . that the EAJA award should be use d as a se t o f f t o r e d u c e th e p ay

m e n tw h i c hth e c l a i m an tw o u l d o th e r w i s e o w e th e at t o r

n e y. Thus, under the amendment an attorney for a Social Security

. . . claimant would be pr e c lud e d f

ro m r e c e ivi ngbo th E AJA a nd Soc ia l Se c ur ity Ac t f

e e s. With out th is amendment it was argued, "double dipping" was possible. Such double pa y ments are ina pp ro pr iate and de pr ive [] the pla int if f o f t he be ne fi ts i nte nd e d b y

EA JA. B e c a

us e the Committe e is awa

re of the imp or

tant f un c tio n s e rv e d b y

c ouns e l in

the se c a se s, the Commit tee permits the attorney to seek recove ry under both a uthorizations. The attorney , howeve r, may

keep the larg er fee , but must return the amount of the smaller fe e to t he c la ima nt. H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, Part I , at 7, 19-20 (1985) (B ackground; Ex p l an atory Statement), reprinted in 19 85 U. S.C. C.A .N . 1 32 , 1 35 -3 6, 14 8- 49 . T he re fo re , a lth ou g h th e ma jority vie w o f o ff

se t, assuming it ca

n p ro p er l y reach that issue, may be cor rec t, see id. , Icannot support its conc lusory p r o n o un c e m e n t

. In o t e a l s o th atth e m a j o r i ty h a s n o t a d dr e s s e d th e qu e s t i o no f w h e th e r th e E A JA offse t should include any supplemental E AJ A aw ar d s of fe es for fee s, se e Mc

Ne e ly v . W est , 12 Ve t.A pp . 1 62 , 1 63 -6 4 ( 19 99 ) (pe r c ur iam or de r) (c ourt s are " pe rm itt e d to allo w pay me nt f or tim e spent litigatingthe fe e applications"). F if th, in d e te rm ini nge rr or

in t he B VAre du c tio n o f t

he c ontin g e nt atto rn e y

fe e fr om 3 0% to 20%, the majority

has not addre ssed fully either the applicable VA regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 20.609(e) (2000), or

all of the pe rtinent fac ts of this case. Sec tion 20.609( e) i n cl u d es ei ght fac tors to be

c on sid e re d in

de te rm ini ngwh e the r f

e e s are re a so na

ble . In r e nd e ri ngits op ini on , th e ma jor ity addre sses only four of those eig ht; the m ajority fails t o consider othe r appr opriate f actor s, see an te at __, slip o p
. at 1 8 , s uch as " [t ]he ex tent and ty pe of se rvice s the repr esentative perf ormed," "the amount of time the re prese ntative spent on the ca se," and " [r] ates c harg ed by other re prese ntatives for similar ser v i ce s ," 38 C.F .R. § 20.609(e)( 1), (4) , (7). And, in de terminingthat "the case was complex; t he attorne y

was quite competent; [and] he achie ved a g reat de al of succ ess for his c lient," the ma jor ity fa ils to c on sid e r t

hat th e B oa

rd fo un d c le ar a

nd unmis taka

ble e rr or (a s th e ba sis of

its

aw ar d ) on a ba sis other than that which the appellant ha d argued ( compare R. at 1 0 1-02 with R. at 120-25), see an teat __, slip op. at 18. Finally , Ifirmly

believe that attorney s make signific ant contributions to this C ourt' s review

o f ap p ea l s fr o mBV A d ec i s i o n s
. T h a t s ai d , th e i s s u es gen er at edb y th e s t atu t o ry

s ch em e, th ro u gh which appellants' attorney s are compensated, over time have become increa singly complex and have40

resulted in a substantial de g ree of confusion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); 38 U.S.C. §§ 5904, 7263(c), (d); F CAA § 506; VJ RA §§ 402, 403. That complex ity and conf usion have c aused the Fe dera l Cir c uit , th is C ourt , a

nd VA , a s w e ll a s th e a

pp e lla nts ' atto rn e y s th e mse lve s, to d e vo te an in or din ate amount of t ime and resource s to litigating these iss ues. Acc ording ly , as m ay be obvious from the fo llo wi ngc a se s and

the e xtra or din ary

jud ic ia l histo ry of so me of the m (se ve n of the te n c a se s are sti ll pendingeither on a

ppeal be fore the Fe dera l Circuit or on postdecisional matters bef ore this Court), it may be time for Congress to examine the pre sent sy stem to determine whe ther it s h o u l dbe modified in whole or in par t. See , e.g. , FeeAgreem ent of W ick, 40 F.3d at 373, vacating in part In theMa tte r o

f th eFe e Ag

re e me nt o f Sm ith , 4 Vet.App. 487 ( 1993), mot. for en ba n c rev. de nied , 5 V e t.A pp . 307 (1 99 3) (e n banc ) (w ith dis se nti ngop ini on ); Cullens v. Gober , 14 Vet.App. 234, 239 (2001) ( en banc ) (holdingthat, in case s where parties hav e s et t l ed merits issue, Court will look b e y o n d s e t t l e m e n t

a g r e e m e n tan d

w i l l c o n s i d e r

r e c or d on a

p p e a l w h e nd e t e r

m i n i n gE A JA substantial-justification question; with concurringand dissentingopinions), s u p p le m e n ta l E

A JA application fil ed

(M ar. 14 , 2 00 1) ; Snyder , 14 Vet.App. at 168 (vac atingBV A dec ision for lack of jurisdiction, denying pe tition for pay ment of atto rn ey

fee s under se ction 5904(d), a nd denying f

or lack of jurisdiction Secreta

ry ' s motion t o revie w fe e agree ment), mot. for en banc rev. filed (Nov. 13, 20 00 ); Cox v. Gobe r , 14 Vet.App. 148 ( 2000) (r ever sing B VA dec ision and orderi n g VA to pay attorney fee s pursuant to section 5904(d) wher e attorne y fee s had bee n paid er

roneously to vetera n), on remand from Cox , 149 F.3d at 1366, vacating in part In the Matter of the FeeAgreem ent of Cox , 10 Vet.App. 361 ( 1997), mot. for recons. filed (N o v . 7 , 2 00 0) ; Sca te s v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 304 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ( e nb an c ) ( g r an ti n gmo ti o nf o r f u ll Co urt r e v ie wan d

w it h dr aw in gp an e l o p in io n), dec i ded sub nom. Scates v . Gober , 14 Vet.App. 62 ( 2000) (e n banc) (as to sec tion 5 9 0 4 (d) c ase, va cating BV A dec ision for lack of BV A jurisdiction and dismissi ng appea l f or Court's lack of jurisdiction), appeal filed sub nom. Scates v . Principi , F e d. Ci r. N o. 00 -7 03 3 ( No v. 16 , 2 00 0) ; Fr itz

v . W est , 1 3 Ve t

. Ap p
. 1 9 0 , 1 9 6 (1 9 9 9 ) ( h o l d i n g E AJ A d et erm i n at i o ni nab ey an ce p en d i n g ap p el l an t 's "ve rification as to wh et her or not he appr oves of submission of EAJA application") , 13 Vet.App. 439, 441 (2000) ( g rantingEAJA application a nd denying supplemental EAJA application for f ees for fee s reg arding Court's sua sponte revie w of fe e agree ment for r easona bleness), appeal filed sub nom. Fritz v. Principi , F e d. Cir

. No . 0 0- 71 39 (Jun e 14 , 2 00 0) ; Ba rre ra v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 139, 14041

(1999) ( based on r es judicata , denying E AJ A fe es fo r wo rk done be fore Fe dera l Circuit), mot. for en banc rev. de nied , 13 Vet.App. 418 (2000) ( en banc ) (with conc urring and dissentingopinions), appeal filed sub nom. Barrera v. Princ ipi , Fe d. Cir. No. 00-7115 (Apr . 18, 2000); In the Matter of the Fee Agreem ent of

Ma son , 13 Vet.App. 79, 86 ( 1999) (holdingthat "where an attorne y
succe ssfully repr esents a VA claimant befor e this Court and has filed a qualify ing attorney -client fe e ag ree ment which dire cts pay ment by the Secr etar

y from an awa

rd of pa st-due bene fits awar ded on the basis of the c laim filed with VA, the Secre tary is oblig ated to pa y direc tly to the attorney

20% of the pa st- du e be ne fi ts aw ard e d on th e ba sis of the c la im o r a

pp lic atio n f

or be ne fi ts underlying the iss ue s su c c essf ull yap peale d to thi

s Co ur t " r ather

than on basis of wor

k done bef

ore V A), appeal filed sub nom. Mason v. Principi , F e d. Cir . N o. 00 -7 11 3 ( Ma y 21 , 2 00 0) ; Ba

za lo v . W est , 9 Vet.App. 304 (1996) ( en banc ) (holding that there are four elements that must be met within 30 day s of whe n judgme nt i s fi nal in order for Court to have jurisdiction over EAJA application), mo t. f or re c on s. denied, 10 Vet.App. 154 (1997) ( en banc ), r e v 'd , 150 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fe d. Cir. 1998) (holdingthat

at le a st j ur isd ic tio na l ele me nt of state me nt that app e lla nt' s net wo rt

h doe s not e xce e d $ 2, 00 0, 00 0 is

su bs ume d in

a pp e lla nt' s ave rm e nt o f e lig ibi lity fo r E AJA a

wa rd ) ( wi th di ss ent ing op ini on ); Shaw v. Gobe r , 10 Vet.App. 498, 503-05 (1997) (statingthat "double -pay ment proscr iption would have no application to the pay

ment of fe es under

the EAJA and under the fee ag ree ment wher e the leg al work done in c onnection with those fee s is not the same" ; holding unrea sonable o n i t s fa ce a fee

a g re e me nt that may be re a d a s p re c lud ingan o ff se t w he re Cou

rt re mand s w ithdir e c tio n to B oa rd to
awa rd bene fits).