### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 14, 200 4
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . BENNIE NELSO N THOMAS , JR.

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Gibson Coun ty No. 7219 Clayburn L . P eeples, Judge

No. W2004-00498-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Novem ber 1, 2004

The de fenda nt, Be nnie Nelson Thomas, Jr., was convic ted o f s ale of a Schedule I I

controlled substance, cra ck cocaine, a C lass C felony , and sentenced as a R ang e I , standard offende r to six y ear s in the Depa

rtment of Corre ction. He wa s also fined $2000. He rai s es two issues on appea l: (1) whether the evidenc e wa s sufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) whether the trial court erre d in re fu s i n g t o d ec l are a mistrial afte r the improper ref ere nce at trial to a prior drug sale by an underc over informant. B ased on our revie w, we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt but remand for e ntry of a c orre cted judg ment to refle ct the def endant’ s fine of $2000.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of the Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d and Re m ande d forEnt r y o f Co r r e c te d Judg m e nt
A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., joined.
Clifford K. McG own, J r., Waverly , Tenne ssee ( on appea l) ; T o m W

. Cr id e r , D is trict Public Defe nder; a ndPe ri a nn S. H ou g hto n, As sis ta nt P ub lic De fe nd e r ( a t tria l a ndon app e a l) , f or th e ap pe lla nt, Be nnie Nelson Thomas, Jr.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Ra c he l E . Wil lis , A ss ist a nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Gar ry G. B rown, District Attorne y Gene ral; and L arry

Har d i s t er an d Elaine G. Todd, A ssistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION
F AC TS
The de fendan ts o l d a t we n t y -d o l l ar“r o ck ” o f c ra ckco ca i n e t o De b o ra h Hu ff man in Humboldt on May 31, 2002. Unknown to the defe ndant at the time, H uffman was working as an under cover informant for

the West Te nnessee Violent Crime and Drug Task F orce . The de fenda nt was indicted-2-

by the Gibson County

Gra nd J ury

on J uly 29, 2002. At his jury

trial on Fe b ru ar y 1 2 , 2003, the defe ndant was c onvicted of sa le of a Schedule I I

controlled substanc e, cr ack c ocaine

. Huffma n testified that on May 3 1 , 2 0 02, she wa s involved in an underc over ope ration making “stree t level” buy s of cr ack c ocaine in H umboldt. She wa s driving he r vehic le when the defe ndant dr ov e up in h is v e hic le , an d eithe r “h on ke d his horn or fl a g g e d” he r d ow n. She pa rk e d h e r v e hic le in an atte mpt to g e t the de fe nd a nt t o e xit hi s c ar andapp ro a c h h e rs . H ow e ve r, he wo uldno t e xit hi s vehicle, so she g ot out of hers a nd approa ched him. Huf fman said he r ca

r had audio and video equipment inside and whe n she ex ited her vehicle, she turned the video camera , located in her purse , to fac e the de fenda nt and his car throug h her open door. She testified, “I asked [ the def endant] about a purc hase of

a twenty

. He supplied what appea red to be a twenty

dollar roc k of cr ack c ocaine and I pa id f or that pu rc ha se wi th m on e y su pp lie d b y

the Ta sk F or c e .” She a ndthe de fe nd a nt a g re e d to meet an hour

later at a B urg er King in or der f or her to purcha se a larg er a mount of cra ck coc aine. I mmediately afte r the transac tion, Huf fman drove to me et the member s of the Ta sk Forc e, including Of fi c e r Da nn y L e wi s, a nd turne d the c ra c k co c a ine ov e r to him. Th e of fi c e rs c on du c te d a

fi e ld t e st on the substance , which te s t ed p o s i t i v e for cocaine. She g ave the office rs a state ment of wha t transpire d and a description of the def endant. The Task F orce office rs also re trieved the videotape fr o mt h e c am er a in h er p u rs e an d l ab el ed i tfo r i d en t i fi ca t i o n
. I n co u rt , Hu ff m an i d en t i fi ed t h e b ag, marke d with her initials, containing the cr ack c ocaine

. She also testified t he defenda nt was driving a mar oon Buic k Sky lark, with a w ide ar ea o f s i l v er -c o lored trim along the bottom and “[v] ery distinctive hubcaps.” Sometime af ter the dr u g t ra n s ac t ion, Huffman w as ente ring the Task F orce of fi c e a ndsa w the sa me ve hic le in the imp ou ndg ara g e a nd ide nti fi e d it to Of fi c e r L e wi s a s the sa me vehicle the defe ndant was driving when he sold her crac k cocaine. Prior to the drug transac tion on May 31, 2002, she ha d seen the defe ndant on two occ asions ear lier in the day and had be en about tw o f e e t a way fr om the de fe nd a nt on ea c h oc c a sio n. Th e de fe nd a nt ha d a dis tin c tiv e g oldtoo th i n the fr on t of

his mou th and“ c orn r ow br a ids ” a t th e tim e of the tr a ns a c tio n. Re g ard ing the de fe nd a nt, Huffma n stated, “[T]hat is wit hout a doubt the same g entleman that I purcha sed cr ack c ocaine from in a maroon B uick Sky lark on the 31 .” st
On cr oss-examinatio n , Hu ff m an reiterate d the distinctive color and sty ling of the B uick Sky lark but ac knowledg ed that “[g ]ol d teeth are quit e prominent in the i ndividuals selling coc aine.” S h e a l s o t e s t i f

i e d t h e d e f

e n d a n tn e v e r

c a m e t o t h e arr a n g e d b u y a tt h e B u r g e r K i n g l a t e r

i n t h e d a y. On re direc t, Huffman sta ted, “I have a bsolutely no doubts that the g entleman se ated ther e and the g entleman that I

spoke with and had this transa ction with on the 31 – absolutely no doubt that they st
are one and the same pe rson.”
Humboldt Pol ice Of

fice r Da nny

L ewis testified he was a ssigne d to the Drug Task For ce a nd ha d w or ke d in na rc oti c s sinc e 19 90

. On Ma y 31 , 200 2, the Ta sk F or c e wa s wor kin g in a “ hig h c ri me and drug traff

icking are a” of Humboldt known as the “Crossing .” The vehicle H uffman w as driving was “ wired f

or audio a nd video,” a nd “the audio was a transmitt er w ith a repe ater wher e [they ] were actua lly able to stay more than a couple of blocks aw ay ” and c ould “hea r little bit about what’s g oing on also.” The video ca mera allowed the of

fice rs to “see what wa s g oing on with the transac tion – wh o th e y we re bu y ing fr om s o w e c ou ld i de nti fy the m.” Af

te r h e r t rans a c tio n w ith the de fe nd a nt,-3-

Hu ff ma n me t w ith the of

fi c e rs a nd turne d the dr

ug ov e r t o th e m. O ff

ic e r L e wi s p e rf

orme d a fi e ld test which was positive f

or cocaine. He later took the rock to the Tenne ssee Bur eau of I nvestig ation Crime L ab in Jackson for testing. Ag ain, the rock tested positive f or cocaine, with a total w eig ht of .10 g ram. The videotape of the transa ction was then pla y ed for the jury

. Offic er L ewis also testified as to the distinctiveness of the B uick Sky lark drive n by the def endant at the t ime of the tra nsaction a ndthat th e de fe nd a nt h a d b e e n ar re ste d in tha t veh ic le abo ut a mon th la te r. Al tho ug h th e ve hic le was not re g istered to the de fenda nt, the reg istration addre ss was the same as the de fenda nt’s.
On cr oss-examination, Office r L ewis admitted he ne ver sa w the def endant’ s vehicle on Ma y 31 , 20 02 , bu t ide nti fi e d the c ar on the vid e ota pe a s th e sa me on e drive n b y the de fe nd a nt at th e tim e of his arr est and c onfisca t ed b y t h e T ask F orce . He wa s also able to identify the def endant a fter examining the videotape “quite a f ew times.”
L e on ard Mi ll er testif

ie d a s a n a lib i w itn e ss f

or the de fe nd a nt. He te sti fi e d th a t he wa s a friend of the def endant a nd that he, the defe ndant, and “ J erry ” all drove to Memphis on Friday , May 31, 20 0 2

. H e r e me mb e r e d th e d a te b e c a u s e it w a s h is d a u g h te r ’ s b irth d a y
. T h e y le f t H u mboldt around 6:30 a.m. and went to downtown Memphis, “down on B eale Street and stuff like that.” The y returne d to Humboldt around 9:30 p.m. that night. He testified the def endant wa s not in Humboldt at the time of the dr

ug transac tion, stating, “I know he wa sn’t. I ’ll put that on ever y t h ing I love. That’s fr om God.”
On c r o s s
- e xa mi n a ti o n , M il le r a d mi tt e d h e h a d n o r e c o r d s u c h a s a r e c e ip t o r diaryand no other indepe ndent per son who could verify their pre sence in Memphis. He furthe r testified that he ini tia lly fo un d o ut a

bo ut the de fe nd a nt’ s a

rr e st the Mo nd a y

a ft e r the y

re turne d f

ro m Me mph is, althoug h the State pointed out the def endant wa s not actually

arr est ed u n t il a month later. Miller a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he ha d p ri or con vi cti on s f or a ssa ult a ndbatte ry

a nd“ lik e bu rg lary , r e fu sin g to return r ental prope rty

back to a place and stuff like that.” Miller sa id he was se ntence d to thirteen y e ars fo r tho se c on vic tio ns a ndha d b e e n o ut o f p ri so n f or fi ve y e ars
. T h e d e f e n d a n te l e c t e d n o tt o t e s t i f y. AN AL YSI S
I. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence
The de fe n d a n t ar g u e s th a t th e e v id e n c e is in s u f f ic ie n t to s u p p o r t h is c o n v ic ti o n f o r s a le of a Schedule I I

controlled substanc e.
I n considering this iss ue, we apply the fa miliar rule that wher e suff iciency of the c onvicting evidenc e is cha lleng ed, the releva nt question of the re viewing court is “whe ther, a fter vie wing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, any rational trier of fac t c ould have f ound the essential e lements of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt.” J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 3 1 9 , 9 9 S

. C t

. 2 7 8 1 , 2 7 8 9 , 6 1 L

. E d

. 2 d 5 6 0 , 5 7 3 (1 9 7 9 ); s ee al s o T en n
. R

. Ap p
. P

. 1 3 (e ) ( “F i n d i n gs-4-

of g uil t in c ri min a l a c tio ns wh e the r b y the tr ia l c ou rt

or jury sh a ll b e se t a sid e if

the e vid e nc e is ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the fi nd ing s b y

the tr ie r o f f

a c t of g uil t be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.” ); Sta te v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Ander s o n , 835 S.W .2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All que stions invol ving the cre dibilit y of witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be g iven the evide nce, and all fac tual issues are resolved by the t rier of fac t. See S tate v. Pappas, 754 S.W .2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) . “A g uiltyverdic t by the jury , approve d by

the trial judg e, acc redits the testimony

of the witnesse s for the St ate and resolves all conflicts in favor of the the ory of the State.” State v. Gra ce, 4 9 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 7 4 , 476 (Tenn. 1973) . Our supre me court stated the rationale for this rule:
This w ell-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial

judge and the jury see the witnesses fac e to fac e, hea r their testimony and obser ve t h eir de meanor on the stand. Thus the trial judg e and jury are the primary

instrumentality

of justice to determine the weig ht and cr edibility to be given to the t estimony of wit nesses. I n the trial forum alone is there human atmosphere a nd the totality of the e vid e nc e c a nn ot b e re pr od uc e d w ith a writt e n r e c or d in thi s Co urt.
Bolin v. State, 219 Tenn. 4, 11, 405 S.W .2d 768, 771 (1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W .2d 523 (1963)) . A jury conviction re moves the pre sumption of innocence with which a defe ndan t is ini tially

cloake d and re place s it with one of g uilt, so t hat on appe al, a c onvicted defe ndant has the bur den of de monstrating that the evidenc e is insufficient. See State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)

. Her e, ther e was ample evidence to show that the defe ndant was the person who sold c rac k cocaine to the under cover informant. The informant, Ms. Huffma n, testified t hat t here was no doubt in her mind that the def endant wa s the perso n who sold her the c ocaine . She rec ounted the defe ndant’s desc ription an d t h e dis tinctive char acte ristics of the vehic le he wa s driving. O ffice r L e wi s te sti fi e d th a t he ide nti fi e d th e de fe nd a nt ba se d on the vid e ota pe a ndthe state me nt g ive n to him by Ms. Huffman. H e also testified tha t the vehicle the defe ndant was driving when he was a rre sted was the sa me vehicle in the videotape and was reg istered at the defe ndant’s addre ss. T he jury was g iven an opportunityto assess the cr edibilityof t he defenda nt’s alibi witness, L eonar d Miller, whom they appar ently

did not believe. F inally , the jury viewed the videotape and made its own judg ment conce rning the identity

of the person selling drug s on the videotape . We conclude that the evidenc e was suff icient to sustain the defe ndant’s convic tion.
II. Im pr ope rTe st im ony
The de fenda nt also contends that beca use Ms. Huff

man re fer ence d on cross-e x amination a prior drug transac tion with the defenda nt, which was not the subject of any criminal cha

rg es, the trial court should have decla

red a mistrial. The S tate contends the defendant has not shown prejudice by th e s tate me n t a n d th e tria l c o u r t di d n o t ab u s e it s d is c r e ti o n b y d e c li n in g to d e c la r e a mi s tria l. We will review the manner

in which this issue arose.-5-

Be fore the trial commenc ed, the tria l court conducte d a jury -out hearing and dealt with the question of whethe r to allow Ms. Huff man to testify

conce rning h er p ri or mee tings with the defe ndant. The trial c ourt determined that Ms. Huffman w ould be allowed to testify that she had me t and talked to the de fenda nt on prior occ asions, but not as to the fact that the def endant ha d sold her dr ug s o n th os e oc c a sio ns
. During the trial, on cr oss-examination of Ms

. Huffma n, the foll owing exchang e took place c on c e rn ing the e arl ie r m e e tin g s w ith the de fe nd a nt:

Q. Okay , and I

think y ou just said that prior to May 31 y ou don’t st be lie ve that y ou ha d e ve r s e e n [th e de fe nd a nt]. I s th a t c or re c t?
A. No, ma’a m. To the best of my kn o wl ed ge prior to May 31 st I ha d n ot s e e n th is i nd ivi du a l. Q. And did I

understand c orre ctly that the ac tual sale that we ’re he re tod a y , w a s th a t th e mos t pr otr a c te d c on ve rs a tio n y ou ha d w ith [ t h e d e f e n d a n t ] t h a td a y?
A

. Was th a t th e mo s t p r o tr a c te d c o n v e r s a ti o n I ’ d h a d w ith [t he d e f e n d a n t ] t h a td a y? Q. Ye s.
A. No, ma’a m. Actually , during the previous sale, I believe w e spoke quite a bit long er tha n the one that we ’re here for right now.
A benc h confe renc e wa s held during which the f ollowing e x chang e took place : [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: I don’t think I

opened the door to that and I tho ug ht that sh e ha d b e e n w arn e d n ot t o s a y tha t.
THE COURT: Well, she was, and y ou did ask her a question about the pre vious conversation. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: I just asked if that wa s the most protracte d le ng th o f t ime sh e ha d h a d w ith him

. THE COURT: I

understand w hat y ou asked he r, bu t

– what do y ou want me to do?-6- [DEFENSE COUNS E L ] : W ell, we be lieve that that pre judices the jury . T he y

c e rt a inl y kn ow that th e re wa s ano th er s a le that day wi th the same –
THE C OU R T : I ’m not g oing to de clar e a mistrial bec ause of that state me nt. I ’l l ig no re it o r I ’l l te ll the jury to d isr e g ardit. [THE STATE] : W ell, Your Honor , our position would be that she did open the door. She a sked her the question and Ms. Huff man – THE COURT: The que stion was – I ag ree – her question was
. . . that the mos t pr otr a c te d c on ve rs a tio n that sh e ha d wi th h im a ndsh e sa id – she then de scribed w hat was or was a bout to or whateve r. [TH E ST AT E]: Well , You r Ho no r, I be lie ve that’ s a

fair re sp on se to [defense c ounsel’s] question.
T H E CO U RT : I th in k th a t w h e n [d e f e n s e c o u n s e l] a s k ed her anything at all that calls for a n – when y ou said compa re t h e two conver sations, y ou did ask her a question that the o nly

way she ca n a ns we r i s to c omp are the tw o c on ve rs a tio ns
. [D E F E N SE CO U N SE L ]: Sh e d id n ’ t h a v e to s a y w h a t th e s u b

ject wa s.
THE COURT: I

understand s h e didn’t and she shouldn’t have, but she did. Now, I ’m g oing to either advise the jury to disreg ard that or make no c omment, whicheve r y ou pref er. [DE F EN SE C OU NSE L ]: W e’re stu c k. I g ue ss w e ’l l di sr e g ardit, won’t we ?
TH E CO UR T: Al l r ig ht.
Whe the r t o d e c lare a

mis tr ia l li e s w ith in the so un d d isc re tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt , a nd we wi ll not disturb the court' s decision abs en t a cle ar showing of abuse of discre tion. St ate v. L and, 34 S.W. 3d51 6, 52 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 00 ). A m ist ri a l sh ou ld b e de c lare d in a c ri min a l c a se on ly when something has o cc u rre d that would preve nt an impartial ver dict, there by resulting in a miscarriag e of justice if

a mistrial is not declare d. See id. (c iting S tate v. McPherson, 882 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) ); Sta te v. J ones, 15 S.W.3d 880, 893 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (c iti ng Arno ld v . St a te , 563 S.W. 2d 79 2, 79 4 (T e nn . Crim . App . 197 7) ). " Ge ne ra lly a mis tr ia l w ill be dec lare d in a criminal case only when ther e is a ' manifest nec essity ' requiring such ac tion by the trial judg e." State v. Millbrooks, 819 S .W.2d 441, 443 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (quoting Arnold,-7-

563 S.W .2d at 794). The burden t o show the necessity for a mistrial falls upon the party seeking the mistrial. L and, 34 S.W.3d at 527 (citing State v. Williams, 929 S .W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)). We respec tfully

disag ree with the defe ndant’s ar g uments on appea l that the “paid informant . . . blurted out a stateme nt in an effort to secur e conviction” and that the testimony “pre judiced the Def endant s u ch t hat a mistrial was a ppropriate and should have been g rante d.” I n State v. Paul Hay e s, No

. W 2 0 0 1

- 0 2 6 3 7

- C C A

- R 3

- C D , 2 0 0 2 W L 31 74 66 93 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. De c . 6 , 2 00 2) pe rm
. to appea l denied (Te nn. May 27, 2 0 0 3 ), we expl ained the f actor s to be consider ed in dec iding wh e the r a mis tr ia l sh ou ld b e de c lare d f oll ow ing imp ro pe r t e sti mon y by a wi tne ss: When determining whether a mistrial is nec essary afte r a w itness had injected imprope r testimony , this court has often c onsidered: (1) whether the improper te stimonyresulted f rom questioning by

the State, rathe r than ha ving be en a gr atuitous declar ation; (2) the r elative stre n g th o r w e ak n e s s o f th e St a te ’ s p r o o f ; a n d ( 3 ) w h e th e r the trial court promptly

g ave a curative instruction.
I d. at *4 (c iting State v. De m etrius Holm es, No. E2000- 02263-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1538517 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2 0 0 1)). In Holmes, we pointed out that these fac tors wer e “nonexclus i v e” an d “m aynot be pertinent in every case .” Holmes, 2001 WL 1538517, at *4 n.1. Howeve r, in the pre sent ca se, all three fac tors are pertinent. First, the improper te stimonywas on c ro ss- e xami natio n, rathe r tha n d ir e c t qu e sti on ing fr om the Sta te . Se c on d, the re c or d s ho ws the Sta te prese nted re latively

strong proof. Finally , the trial court offe red to give a cur ative instruction, which defe nse counse l waived. B ased upon the fac ts of this c ase a nd our re view of the rec ord, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deny ing the motion for a mistrial.
CO NC LU SION
Ba sed on our r eview, w e af firm the judg ment of the trial c ourt; howeve r, bec ause the judgme nt form does not reflec t the jury -imposed fine of $2000, we r emand f

or entry of a c orre cted jud g me nt.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE