Filed 9/29/20 Williams v. Board of Civil Service etc. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JEANNE K. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF CIVIL SERVICE 

COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF 

LOS ANGELES,

Defendant and Respondent;

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant, Real Party in Interest 

and Respondent.

B290974

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BS165992)
2

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, James C. Chalfant and Deirdre H. Hill, 

Judges. Affirmed.

Jeanne K. Williams, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Vivienne A. Swanigan, 

Assistant City Attorney, and Janis Levart Barquist, Deputy City 

Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent, and Defendant, Real 

Party in Interest and Respondent.

_________________________

Plaintiff and appellant Jeanne K. Williams (Williams) 

appeals a judgment entered after the trial court (1) denied her 

petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 1094.5), by which she sought to set aside a decision by the 

Board of Civil Service Commissioners (Board) of the City of Los 

Angeles (City) upholding the termination of her employment, and 

(2) granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings on Williams’s 

remaining cause of action against the City for damages under 

42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983). 

Williams has not met her burden to show the trial court 

erred in denying her petition for writ of mandate and granting 

the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Therefore, the 

judgment is affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Events leading up to Williams’s termination.

Williams worked for the Los Angeles Police Department 

(LAPD or Department) for nearly 27 years. She commenced her 
3

employment in January 1988 as a clerk typist, and later was 

promoted to senior clerk typist. 

In July 2012, Williams was administratively transferred to 

the LAPD training center. Captain Michelle Veenstra

(Veenstra), the commanding officer of the Training Division, did 

not know why Williams had been transferred, but welcomed her 

and told her she would have a fresh start. Williams’s initial 

assignment was to assemble supply bags for recruits and to serve 

as backup to the divisional timekeeper, Danielle Ramirez. 

However, Williams did not learn the timekeeping job and never 

became the backup timekeeper. In December 2012, Williams was 

assigned to auditing, which required comparing employees’ signin sheets with the time entered by the timekeeper in DPS, the 

computerized timekeeping system.

Laura Rangel (Rangel) was Williams’s supervisor, and 

found her loud, disruptive, confrontational, and difficult to train. 

At times, Rangel felt unsafe with Williams due to confrontations 

with her. Rangel issued two evaluations to Williams: one from 

July 15, 2012 to November 8, 2012, and the other from November

8, 2012 to November 7, 2013. On both occasions, Rangel gave 

Williams an overall rating of “Meets Standard” without any 

adverse comments, but Williams refused to sign the evaluations.

Police Officer Enrique Ceja (Ceja) was assigned to the 

training division and was Williams’s co-worker. On Monday 

mornings, the staff would gather to discuss their weekends. One 

such conversation took place in December 2013. Ceja was a 

single father who had custody of his five-year-old son. The 

neighborhood children would come over to Ceja’s house because 

his son had toys and a freezer stocked with ice cream that he 

shared with the other children. During a conversation, Williams 
4

revealed that she had been molested as a child. Williams then 

opined that Ceja was going to do the same thing to one of the 

girls that visited his son. Ceja told her not to say that because 

“ ‘next thing you know someone is walking around saying they 

heard I was having sex with some kid.’ ” Ceja was offended by 

the comment, but felt it was made out of ignorance and decided to 

let it pass.

Two months later, in February 2014, while Ceja was seated 

at his cubicle, near Sharon Smith’s (Smith) cubicle, Williams 

approached Ceja and asked him if he remembered the name of 

the girl, “[y]ou know, the one you’re going to have sex with?” 

Ceja became angry and told Williams “she needed to shut the 

fuck up.” The following day, Williams kept prodding Ceja about 

the girl’s name. 

Smith, who observed the incident that occurred near her 

cubicle, reported it to Rangel. Rangel then spoke with Ceja. Ceja 

confirmed to Rangel that Williams had been accusing him of 

trying to have sex with a minor. 

On March 4 or 5, 2014, Rangel spoke to Lt. Thomas Murrell 

(Murrell) about Williams’s statements to Ceja that he was going 

to have sexual relations with a child. Murrell found the situation 

egregious, because “if anybody accuses somebody of committing a 

felony, that automatically means there is going to be a crime 

report, and we’re going to do a big investigation,” and the 

accusation could cost the officer his job, his reputation, and 

custody of his child. Rangel also discussed her frustration with 

Williams’s performance, and complained that Williams had 

become unmanageable and regularly confrontational, to the point 

where some employees were fearful of her.
5

Murrell then questioned Ceja about the incidents. Ceja 

told Murrell that he did not want to get Williams in trouble “and 

he wanted it just to stop.” Murrell spoke to Veenstra about 

Williams, and on March 6, 2014, Williams was assigned to her 

home pending the outcome of an investigation. Murrell then

initiated a complaint that was sent to Internal Affairs for 

investigation.

Meanwhile, on March 4, 2014, Williams sent an email to 

Rangel requesting an investigation “regarding misconduct for 

being dressed gym clothes [sic] at my desk.” The email also 

requested that Ceja be investigated “for mis conduct [sic] mis use 

[sic] of City time and falsifying a report. . . . Officer Ceja alleges 

he comes to work at 6:00 to work however most time [sic] he is no 

where [sic] to be found. Officer Ceja is a long time [sic] friend of 

Laura Rangel and this practice has been going on for years 

according to co worker [sic]. [¶] I ask that Internal Affairs 

review view [sic] cameras to check proper times and review or 

audit time book to see what time he says he is at work.”

Williams’s allegations against Ceja were investigated by 

Internal Affairs, which found no misconduct. The nature of 

Ceja’s job, which included managing the maintenance of the 

building, acting as the vehicle coordinator, and being the master 

key holder, required him to attend to issues at work even before 

he could sign in at his office.

On July 16, 2014, Internal Affairs completed its 

investigation into Williams’s actions and sustained three counts 

arising out of her improper remarks to Ceja. The three counts 

against Williams were as follows: “Count 1. On or about 

December 2013, you, while on duty, made an improper remark 

when you accused Officer E. Ceja of attempting to have sex with 
6

an underage female. [¶] Count 2. On or about February of 2014, 

you, while on duty, made an improper remark when you asked 

Officer E. Ceja what was the name of the underage female who 

he was attempting to have sex with. [¶] Count 3. On or about 

February of 2014, you while on duty, (the day after Allegation 

No. 2) taunted Officer E. Ceja by repeatedly asking if the name of 

the underage girl he was going to have sex with was ‘Emily.’ ”

Following receipt of Williams’s Skelly response to the 

charges against her (Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 

Cal.3d 194), Captain Veenstra continued to recommend 

Williams’s termination. Chief of Police Charlie Beck accepted 

that recommendation and terminated Williams, effective 

November 6, 2014. Williams appealed her discharge to the City’s 

Civil Service Commission.

A five-day evidentiary hearing was held before a hearing 

examiner, who tendered his 41-page report to the Board on June 

10, 2016. The hearing examiner found that the charges had been 

proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and recommended 

that the Board make the following findings: the Department had 

complied with the due process requirements of Skelly; all three 

charges against Williams were sustained; and the penalty of 

discharge was appropriate.

On August 11, 2016, the matter came before the Board, 

which heard from representatives of Williams and the 

Department. The Board unanimously accepted the hearing 

examiner’s recommendations and sustained the three counts 

against Williams as well as the penalty of discharge, effective 

November 6, 2014.
7

2. Judicial proceedings.

On November 3, 2016, Williams filed a petition for writ of 

mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, 

seeking to set aside the Board’s decision upholding her discharge, 

combined with a complaint for declaratory relief and damages 

pursuant to section 1983. In seeking to overturn the Board’s 

decision, Williams argued: (1) the allegations against her were 

discovered by the Department a year before the charges against 

her were filed, (2) the hearing officer abused his discretion in 

admitting evidence of her 30-year-old divorce and child custody 

dispute, and (3) the Department failed to prove the allegations 

against her.

In response, the Department contended the Board’s 

findings were supported by the weight of the evidence, Williams’s 

termination was not based on her divorce and custody dispute, 

and the penalty of discharge was within the City’s disciplinary 

guidelines and was not an abuse of discretion.

a. Denial of mandamus relief.

The trial court admitted the administrative record into 

evidence. After considering the moving, opposition and reply 

papers, and hearing the matter, the trial court denied Williams’s 

petition for writ of mandate. The trial court ruled as follows:

Delay by the Department. Williams argued the evidence 

showed that Murrell, Rangel, and others knew of misconduct 

allegations against her in March 2013 but no complaint was filed 

against her at that time, and the delay was unprofessional and 

prejudicial. The trial court ruled “[I]t is not clear what William’s 

contention is about a delay in reporting and initiating the 

investigation. She does not cite to a pertinent statute of 

limitations for the charges against her or claim that a limitations 
8

period passed before the investigation was completed. Instead 

her argument is that there was a delay in beginning the 

investigation that was unprofessional. This argument is not 

accompanied by any showing of prejudice to her, such as a loss of 

testimony or documentary evidence that would have disproved 

the charges. [¶] In any event, there was no delay in commencing 

the investigation because Williams’s argument that LAPD knew 

about her misconduct in March 2013 is not supported. 

Lt. Murrell did testify that he became aware of Ceja’s complaints 

against Williams in March 2013, and initiated the complaint at 

that time. However, as the LAPD correctly points out, 

Lt. Murrell’s testimony about the year was clearly in error. 

When he was shown the complaint he initiated, Murrell’s 

memory was refreshed that he became aware of Williams’s

misconduct and initiated the complaint on March 6, 2014. The 

investigation report states that Murrell initiated the 

investigation on March 6, 2014. Murrell obviously misspoke at 

the hearing, and his memory was refreshed as to the year. 

[¶] [Senior clerk typist April] Broussard testified that she heard 

Williams tell Ceja in the Summer of 2013 ‘that's why you're going 

to end up sleeping with that little girl’, but did not report it. 

Broussard was not a supervisor and her failure to report 

misconduct cannot be attributed to LAPD management. In any 

event, the hearing officer did not credit Broussard’s testimony on 

the timing of events.” The trial court concluded that “LAPD did 

not delay in commencing the investigation to Williams’s 

prejudice.”

Evidence of divorce-related complaints. Williams argued 

the Board committed prejudicial error by admitting into evidence 

old personnel complaints stemming from Williams’s divorce, 
9

which were unrelated to the allegations at issue in the hearing 

and were prejudicial to Williams. The trial court ruled: 

“Williams misunderstands the relevance of this historical 

information. It has nothing to do with the charges against 

Williams, but is relevant to penalty. As part of LAPD’s 

presentation of the case, Williams’s personnel file was entered 

into evidence at the hearing. This was done because Lt. Murrell 

and Captain Veenstra had considered Williams’s entire personnel 

file, including the personnel complaints made by Williams’s exhusband, in determining the appropriate penalty. Following an 

objection by Williams’s counsel, the hearing officer stated that 

the personnel file would be considered solely on the issue of 

penalty, and that Williams could certainly argue that the 

information was too stale to be worthy of consideration. [¶] The 

hearing officer was correct. The prior discipline and complaints 

against Williams in her personnel file are relevant evidence for 

purposes of determining whether discharge is appropriate. One 

of the factors when considering penalty is the likelihood that the 

misconduct will recur. (Skelly v. State Personnel Board, [supra,] 

15 Cal.3d [at pp.] 217-218.) The hearing officer properly 

considered the discipline and complaints in Williams’s personnel 

file as evidence supporting LAPD’s claim that progressive 

discipline would not be effective in correcting Williams’s

behavior. [¶] In addition, there is no evidence that the hearing 

officer was prejudiced by the evidence or testimony relating to 

Williams’s divorce. The hearing officer’s report acknowledged 

that there were a great many subjects raised at the hearing that 

were unrelated to the allegations, and stated that he did not 

consider those issues. The hearing officer’s conclusion that the 
10

allegations against Williams were proven by LAPD was based 

solely on the testimony related to those allegations.”

Proof of the charges. Williams contended that the 

Department failed to prove the allegations against her, the 

allegations against her were made in retaliation for her refusal to 

falsify timekeeping records, and there was no proof of improper 

statements by her. The trial court rejected the contention, 

stating: “Ceja testified that Williams accused [him] of wanting to 

have sex with a minor in December 2013. In February 2014, 

Williams asked Ceja about the girl’s name, and again stated that 

Ceja wanted to have sex with the girl. The next day, Williams 

continued to ask about the girl, and started trying to guess the 

name. [Monica] Lewis, who described herself as Williams’s 

friend, testified that Williams told Lewis that Ceja was having 

sex with one of the girls in his neighborhood. Lewis did not think 

that Williams was joking. Williams herself admitted that she 

asked Ceja about the name of a girl, although she claimed she 

was asking because she was concerned about the girl’s welfare. 

Ceja’s version of events was corroborated by Lewis and Williams, 

and the hearing officer found Ceja to be credible because he had 

no reason to fabricate a scenario that placed him in a negative 

light. [¶] In contrast, no employee corroborated Williams’s

version of events. . . . The weight of the evidence supports the 

hearing officer’s findings that Williams did make the improper 

statements described in the allegations. [¶] Williams claims that 

the allegations were in retaliation for her refusal to falsify time 

records. The evidence presented at the hearing did not support 

this argument. . . . Aside from Williams’s testimony, no evidence 

of improper timekeeping methods or falsification of the time 

keeping records was ever introduced. Moreover, there was no 
11

evidence of a link between Williams’s claim that she refused to 

falsify time records and the charges. While Rangel was 

Williams’s supervisor, Murrell initiated the investigation and 

complaint and he had nothing to do with the time records. [¶] 

The weight of the evidence supports the hearing officer’s findings 

that Williams made the improper comments to Ceja.”

Upon the denial of the petition for writ of mandate, the 

matter was transferred to another department of the superior 

court for resolution of the remaining claim under section 1983.

b. Motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

On February 2, 2018, the City filed a motion for judgment 

on the pleadings with respect to Williams’s cause of action under 

section 1983. The City argued that because Williams did not 

prevail on her petition for writ of mandate to overturn her 

discharge, she was precluded from suing the City for damages 

under section 1983; Williams could not establish that her 

termination was based on discriminatory reasons because the 

trial court’s order upholding the discharge was binding, and 

Williams could not sue for damages without first successfully 

overturning the administrative decision. Additionally, the 

doctrine of issue preclusion barred Williams from relitigating the 

issues that were decided in the administrative proceeding. 

Further, Williams’s cause of action under section 1983 failed as a 

matter of law because Williams could not establish that her 

termination was based on an official municipal policy.

Williams filed an opposition which, as the City pointed out 

in its reply, failed to respond to the legal arguments in the City’s 

moving papers. 

On June 1, 2018, after hearing the matter, the trial court 

entered an order granting the motion for judgment on the 
12

pleadings without leave to amend. The trial court ruled that 

because Williams’s section 1983 cause of action for damages 

“relies upon the same factual allegations as her unsuccessful 

petition for writ of mandate, the findings of the Hearing Officer 

are binding and [Williams’s] section 1983 claims are precluded 

from further relitigation.” Additionally, Williams did not present 

any evidence or argument that she suffered a discriminatory 

discharge as the result of an official municipal policy. “Rather, 

the evidence shows that it was determined that [Williams] was 

terminated because of her improper comments made to her 

coworker.”

On June 27, 2018, Williams filed a premature but timely 

notice of appeal from the judgment entered on October 26, 2018. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d).)

CONTENTIONS

Williams’s opening brief does not articulate a specific series 

of contentions. However, we construe the brief as a challenge to 

the order denying Williams’s petition for writ of mandate and the 

order granting the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 

and proceed to review the trial court’s rulings.1

1 As pointed out in the respondents’ brief, the “cardinal rule” 

of appellate review is that appealed judgments and orders are 

presumed correct (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 

198 Cal.App.4th 181,187), and the burden of affirmatively 

demonstrating prejudicial error is on the appellant. 

(Fundamental Investment etc. Realty Fund v. Gradow (l994) 28 

Cal.App.4th 966, 971.) Williams has failed to meet her burden. 

As the appellant, Williams was required to provide an intelligible 

argument supported by legal authority. This burden requires 

more than a mere assertion that the judgment is wrong because 
13

DISCUSSION

1. No error shown in denial of petition for writ of 

administrative mandate. 

a. Standard of review. 

Discipline imposed on public employees affects their 

fundamental vested right in employment. (McMillen v. Civil 

Service Com. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 125, 129 (McMillen).) When a 

fundamental vested right is at issue, the trial court exercises its 

independent judgment to determine whether the administrative 

findings are supported by the weight of the evidence. (Ibid.; 

Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143, fn. 10.) After the trial 

court exercises its independent judgment, the appellate court 

reviews the record to determine whether the trial court’s findings 

are supported by substantial evidence based on the whole record. 

(McMillen, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) 

The Board’s decision to impose the penalty of discharge is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion, as neither the trial court nor 

this court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the 

administrative agency as to the appropriate degree of discipline. 

(Barber v. State Personnel Bd. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 404.)

Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. (Schafer 

v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1261.)

“[i]ssues do not have a life of their own,” and if issues are not 

raised or developed with a legal argument supported by citation 

to authority, they may be treated as waived. (Jones v. Superior 

Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99.) Although an appellate court 

may treat an improperly briefed issue “as waived and pass on it 

without consideration” (Trinkle v. California State Lottery (2003) 

105 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413), we attempt to review the matter 

guided by the issues that were articulated in the trial court’s 

rulings.
14

b. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

findings that Williams made the improper remarks to Ceja. 

The administrative record shows the following: In 

December 2013, in a Monday morning conversation at work, 

Williams stated that Ceja was going to molest a neighborhood 

girl who had befriended his five-year-old son. In February 2014, 

Williams interjected herself into another conversation at work 

and asked Ceja about the identity of the underage girl “that was 

visiting his home and he was going to have sex with.” The 

following day, Williams kept prodding Ceja about the girl’s name. 

Ceja’s testimony was corroborated by others. Broussard, a 

senior clerk typist who was Williams’s coworker, testified that 

she overheard Williams telling Ceja “ ‘[t]hat’s why you’re going to 

end up sleeping with that little girl.’ ” Lewis, who had been 

Williams’s colleague and close friend, testified that Williams told 

her she believed that Ceja was having sex with a young girl in 

the neighborhood, and Williams also told Lewis that she had 

discussed the matter with Ceja. Smith, who worked in the same 

office as Williams, was present at the end of a conversation 

between Williams and Ceja, at which time Ceja interrupted 

Williams and told her not to repeat the story.

Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

determination that “[t]he weight of the evidence supports the 

hearing officer’s findings that Williams made the improper 

comments to Ceja.”

c. No abuse of discretion in imposition of penalty of 

discharge. 

As indicated, we review the Board’s imposition of the 

penalty of discharge for an abuse of discretion. (Barber v. State 

Personnel Bd., supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 404.) 
15

The hearing examiner’s decision, which was upheld by the 

Board, stated in relevant part: “Making the statements that 

Officer Ceja ‘was going to’ have sex with an underage female and 

repeating that statement on at least one subsequent occasion and 

using the reference to that allegation as a means of taunting 

Officer Ceja on a third occasion by asking was her name Emily, 

represents serious misconduct. The comments not only are 

clearly inappropriate, but for a police officer and a single parent 

with custody of a minor child, the comments could have farreaching, negative consequences, as several witnesses testified. 

“[Williams] is a long-term employee who has no 

suspensions on her record. Lt. Murrell testified, however, that he 

considered [Williams’s] misconduct sufficiently egregious that the 

misconduct justified immediate discharge without progressive 

discipline and without even taking into account any aspects of 

her past record. Captain Veenstra agreed. [Williams] has denied 

any misconduct and cited numerous either insignificant or 

unsubstantiated reasons why these charges are retaliation or 

discrimination against her. Given [Williams’s] response, the 

likelihood that progressive discipline would be effective in 

correcting [Williams’s] conduct is extremely low. Based on the 

record, the Department’s decision to terminate [Williams’s]

employment is appropriate.”

On appeal, Williams contends that the penalty of discharge 

was excessive and that progressive discipline should have been 

imposed instead. However, the hearing examiner’s decision, 

which was upheld by the Board, expressly found that a penalty 

short of termination would have been inadequate, given the 

egregiousness of Williams’s misconduct and her denial that any 

misconduct occurred. Neither the trial court nor this court is free 
16

to substitute its judgment for that of the Board with respect to 

the severity of punishment (Barber v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 

18 Cal.3d at p. 404), and on the record presented, we perceive no 

abuse of discretion in the Board’s determination that Williams’s 

misconduct warranted termination. 

d. No merit to Williams’s claim of undue delay by the 

Department in investigating and filing charges against her. 

Williams asserted the allegations against her were 

discovered by the Department one year before it filed charges 

against her, and suggested by her argument that this delay 

somehow precluded the Department from bringing charges 

against her.

As the trial court found, Williams’s assertion there was a 

one-year delay is not supported by the record. The record 

reflects: the first incident occurred in December 2013; the second 

incident took place in February 2014; the third incident followed 

the very next day; and Murrell initiated the administrative 

complaint on March 6, 2014. This chronology demonstrates that 

the Department proceeded expeditiously, and it negates 

Williams’s argument there was undue delay by the Department 

in investigating the matter and in filing administrative charges

against her. 

e. Admission of evidence of old personnel complaints 

against Williams stemming from her divorce. 

Williams contended the Board erred in admitting into 

evidence old personnel complaints against her stemming from 

her divorce because the records were irrelevant to the charges 

against her and were remote in time. For example, one of the 

exhibits was a 1998 complaint that alleged Williams had violated 
17

a court order by making phone calls to her ex-husband’s place of 

employment.

After Williams’s counsel objected to this evidence, the 

hearing examiner ruled the disciplinary history was relevant to 

whether the penalty of termination was appropriate, and stated 

“you certainly have preserved your argument that it’s stale 

information, . . . but you’re free to argue that I shouldn’t give that 

much consideration.”

In the end, however, the hearing examiner did not base his 

decision that termination was appropriate on Williams’s past 

personnel complaints. To the contrary, the hearing examiner 

noted that Williams “is a long-term employee who has no 

suspensions on her record.” Nonetheless, given Williams’s denial 

that any misconduct occurred, the hearing examiner concluded 

that progressive discipline would be ineffective, and that the 

Department appropriately had decided to terminate Williams.

Consequently, there is no merit to Williams’s argument that the 

hearing examiner’s admission of evidence of old personnel 

complaints relating to her divorce constituted prejudicial error. 

In sum, the trial court properly denied Williams’s petition 

for writ of administrative mandate.
18

2. Trial court properly granted the City’s motion for 

judgment on the pleadings with respect to Williams’s section 1983 

claim.

2

a. Standard of appellate review.

Like a general demurrer, a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings tests the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of 

action. The court must assume the truth of all factual allegations 

in the complaint, along with matters subject to judicial notice. 

(Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton (2012) 

210 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491.) A judgment on the pleadings in 

favor of the defendant is appropriate when the complaint fails to 

allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (York v. City of 

Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1193.) The trial court’s 

order granting judgment on the pleadings is subject to this 

court’s de novo review. (Ibid.)

b. Trial court properly held Williams failed to state a 

cause of action under section 1983. 

The caption of Williams’s complaint included a reference to 

section 1983, but the pleading, which primarily sought to set 

aside the Board’s decision, lacked any allegations with respect to 

a cause of action under section 1983. It appears, however, that 

Williams’s theory was that as a result of her termination she 

sustained damages remediable pursuant to section 1983.

2 Section 1983 provides in relevant part: “Every person who, 

under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 

to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 

proper proceeding for redress[.]” (42 U.S.C. § 1983.)
19

As the trial court found, the problem for Williams is that 

before pursuing her section 1983 claim against the City for 

damages, she was required to have succeeded in overturning the 

Board’s quasi-judicial decision upholding her discharge. 

(Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 

465, 482–484 [physician could not pursue a tort action for 

damages resulting from the revocation of her staff privileges 

without first succeeding in overturning the revocation in a 

mandamus proceeding] (Westlake); Johnson v. City of Loma 

Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 76 [when a public employee pursues 

administrative civil service remedies, receives an adverse finding, 

and fails to have the finding set aside through judicial review 

procedures, the adverse finding is binding on discrimination 

claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act]; Schifando 

v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1090 (Schifando)

[same].) Here, Williams’s failure to overturn the Board’s adverse 

decision on her petition for writ of administrative mandate has 

the effect of establishing the propriety of the Department’s 

decision (Westlake, at p. 484), and thus precludes her from 

stating a cause of action against the City under section 1983. 

Further, as the trial court ruled, pursuant to Monell v. 

Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City of New York (1978) 436 U.S. 658 [56 

L.Ed.2d 611], a local government may not be held liable for its 

employees’ violations of section 1983 unless “ ‘the constitutional 

violation was caused by its official policy, practice, or custom.’ ” 

(Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 

1455, 1465, fn. 3.) Here, Williams’s section 1983 claim did not 

allege that the City had an official policy, practice, or custom that 

resulted in her termination.
20

Finally, to show the trial court abused its discretion in 

granting judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, the 

plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that “there is a 

reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect with an 

amendment.” (Schifando, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081; accord, 

Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Nextel 

Communications, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 131, 135.) 

Williams has not shown in what manner she could amend her

complaint and how that amendment would change the legal effect 

of her pleading with respect to the deficiencies discussed above.

For these reasons, the trial court properly granted the 

City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on Williams’s section 

1983 claim without leave to amend.
21

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their 

appellate costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

DHANIDINA, J.