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Filed 11/16/22 In re Jesse Y. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re JESSE Y., A Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B320613

(Super. Ct. No. J072972)

(Ventura County)

VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES AGENCY,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JUAN C., 

 Defendant and Appellant.

Juan C. appeals orders of the juvenile court denying his

status as a presumed father, declaring that his biological minor 
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child is adoptable, and terminating parental rights. (Fam. Code, 

§ 7611, subd. (d); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)1

This appeal concerns Juan C.’s presumed father status and 

the adequacy of initial inquiries regarding Indian ancestry of

dependent child Jesse Y. We conclude that substantial evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s denial of Juan C.’s presumed father 

status. We also decide that error in failing to make initial 

inquiries of extended family members pursuant to the Indian 

Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and 

related California law was error, and we conditionally reverse. 

(In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 744 [discussing 

the “readily obtainable information” rule].)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

S.S. (Mother) gave birth to Jesse Y. in October 2021. When 

she gave birth, Mother had positive toxicology results for 

amphetamine. In 2019, Mother’s two older children became 

dependents of the juvenile court due to her substance abuse and 

incidents of domestic violence. Mother then failed to engage in 

family reunification services and her parental rights to the two 

older children were terminated. 

The Ventura County Human Services Agency (HSA) took 

Jesse Y. into protective custody at birth. In response to questions 

from the HSA social worker, Mother declined to name the 

biological father of Jesse Y. The social worker also questioned 

Mother regarding possible Indian ancestry. Mother denied that 

either she or Jesse Y. were members or eligible to become 

members of an Indian tribe. The social worker later signed and 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
3

submitted an ICWA-020 form, on behalf of Mother, in which 

Mother denied any Indian membership or ancestry.

On October 19, 2021, the juvenile court held a detention 

hearing. Mother did not appear at the hearing or at any further 

court hearings regarding Jesse Y. The court ordered Jesse Y. 

detained and granted temporary custody and care of the infant to 

HSA. The juvenile court judge also stated: “[W]e have a history 

with this mother, and . . . we need to check the siblings’ files on 

the issue of ICWA given that mom is not present and that there 

may be relatives that we have contact with or can contact to 

gather that information. But right now, there’s no reason to 

believe this is an Indian child, and right now, ICWA does not 

apply.” 

Although Mother refused to name Jesse Y.’s biological 

father, she informed the HSA social worker that the father’s first 

name was “Juan,” and that he was incarcerated. Through 

research of Mother’s arrest records, the social worker learned 

that Mother had resided with Juan C. and they had been 

involved in a domestic dispute.

Prior to the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the HSA

social worker contacted Juan C. who confirmed that he had been 

in a relationship with Mother, had lived with her during her 

pregnancy, and could be Jesse Y.’s biological father. Juan C. was 

not present at Jesse Y.’s birth because he was incarcerated from 

July 2021 through November 2021. He requested that the 

juvenile court order a paternity test and appoint an attorney to 

represent him. Juan C. informed the social worker that he would 

like to be involved in Jesse Y.’s life if paternity was confirmed.

On December 20, 2021, the juvenile court held a 

jurisdiction and disposition hearing at which Juan C. attended as 
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an alleged father. The court ordered a paternity test and

appointed counsel for Juan C., but denied visitation with Jesse Y. 

pending paternity test results. The court then sustained the 

allegations of the dependency petition. (§ 300, subds. (b), (j).) 

The court also found that Mother and Juan C. each had two other 

minor children (with different partners) who were dependent 

children and with whom they had failed to reunify. The court 

then ordered that family reunification services not be provided to 

Mother and a permanent plan hearing for Jesse Y. be scheduled. 

(§§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10), (11), (13) [reunification services bypass 

provisions], 366.26.) 

During the pendency of the permanent plan hearing, the 

paternity test revealed that Juan C. was Jesse Y.’s biological 

father. Juan C.’s attorney informed the juvenile court that 

Juan C. did not “have any facts to present to the court at the time 

regarding presumed father status.” The attorney added that 

Juan C. would file a modification petition prior to the permanent 

plan hearing. The court then found that Juan C. was Jesse Y.’s 

biological father and, based upon an ICWA-20 form signed and 

submitted on Juan C.’s behalf, that neither he nor Jesse Y. are 

members of or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe. The 

juvenile court judge stated: “[T]here’s no reason to believe this is 

an Indian child and that ICWA does not apply.”

On April 13, 2022, the juvenile court intended to hold a 

permanent plan hearing. Juan C. was present and requested a 

contested hearing. The court denied his request because he was 

a biological, not a presumed father. The court continued the 

hearing, however, to allow Juan C. to file a modification petition

regarding presumed father status.
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On April 22, 2022, Juan C. filed a modification petition 

alleging changed circumstances. (§ 388.) Among other things, he 

stated that he had visited Jesse Y. seven times, during which he 

fed him, provided clothing and toys, and changed his diapers. 

Juan C. also stated that he had complied with his probation 

terms, including drug testing. He requested presumed father 

status and reunification services. 

During an evidentiary hearing prior to the permanent plan 

hearing, the juvenile court addressed Juan C.’s modification 

petition. Juan C. testified that he learned that Mother was 

pregnant while he was incarcerated. She gave birth while he 

remained incarcerated. When Juan C. was released from jail, he

contacted Mother but she would not provide information about 

Jesse Y., who was then detained and living in foster care. 

Juan C. requested a paternity test after the HSA social worker 

contacted him. He admitted that he had recently failed two drug 

tests for methamphetamine and had missed three drug tests. 

Also, Juan C. was again confined in local custody.

The juvenile court denied Juan C.’s modification petition, 

deciding that he did not meet the statutory requirements to be 

declared a presumed father and that providing him with 

reunification services would not be in Jesse Y.’s best interests. 

The court then proceeded to the permanent plan hearing, found 

that Jesse Y. was adoptable, and terminated parental rights. 

(§ 366.26.) Jesse Y. had been placed with a non-relative extended 

family member who had adopted Mother’s two older children 

(half-siblings of Jesse Y.) and the family member intended to 

adopt Jesse Y.
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ICWA Compliance

During HSA’s investigation of the events giving rise to the 

dependency, Mother and Juan C. informed the HSA social worker 

that neither they nor Jesse Y. nor any lineal ancestors were 

enrolled in an Indian tribe or eligible for membership in an 

Indian tribe. The HSA social worker filed completed ICWA-020 

forms on behalf of Mother and Juan C. to that effect. At the 

conclusion of the detention hearing, the juvenile court found that 

ICWA did not apply to Jesse Y., but that HSA should check the 

dependency files of the half-siblings “on the issue of ICWA 

[because] . . . there may be relatives that we have contact with or 

can contact to gather that information.” Neither Mother nor 

other family members appeared at the detention hearing. One 

month later, the court commented that the extended family 

caretaker for the half-siblings had not yet been interviewed and it 

was unknown whether the half-siblings’ dependency files had 

been reviewed. Approximately five months later, however, the 

court found that “[n]o new information [regarding ICWA] has 

been discovered to change the previous finding that there’s no 

reason to believe or know that this is an Indian child.” 

Juan C. appeals and contends that the juvenile court erred 

by: 1) denying his request for presumed father status, and 2)

finding that ICWA was not applicable because HSA and the court 

did not fully comply with their initial duties of inquiry regarding 

Indian ancestry. (§§ 224.2, subd. (b), 224, subd. (c).) 

DISCUSSION

I.

Juan C. argues that the juvenile court erred by denying his 

petition for presumed father status. (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. 

(d) [“presumed parent” is one who “receives the child into their 
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home and openly holds out the child as their natural child”].) He 

points out that Mother delayed in revealing his identity but that 

following the finding of paternity, he visited Jesse Y. weekly, 

purchased him toys and supplies, and cared for him during the 

visits.

The Uniform Parentage Act (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.)

provides the statutory framework by which California courts 

make paternity determinations. (In re J.L. (2008) 159 

Cal.App.4th 1010, 1018, superseded by statute on other grounds, 

as stated in In re Alexander P. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1274.) 

Pursuant to this statutory scheme, California law distinguishes 

“alleged,” “biological,” and “presumed” fathers. (Ibid.) A father

whose biological paternity has not been established or who has 

not achieved presumed father status is an “alleged” father. 

(Ibid.) “Presumed” fathers are accorded greater parental rights 

than “alleged” or “biological” fathers. (Ibid.) Biological 

fatherhood does not in and of itself qualify a person for presumed 

father status. (Ibid.) Rather, “[a] man who has held the child out 

as his own and received the child into his home is a ‘presumed 

father.’ ” (In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801.) 

Presumed fatherhood for purposes of dependency proceedings 

denotes a man who promptly comes forward and demonstrates a 

full commitment to his paternal responsibilities – emotional, 

financial, and otherwise. (Id. at pp. 801-802.) A statutorily

presumed father and the child’s mother are entitled to family 

reunification services in juvenile dependency proceedings. 

(§ 361.5, subd. (a); Jerry P., at p. 801.) 

A man who claims presumed father status has the burden 

of establishing that status by a preponderance of the evidence. 

(In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1210.) In determining 
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whether presumed father status has been established, courts 

consider whether the father: actively helped the mother in 

prenatal care, paid pregnancy and birth expenses consistent with 

his financial abilities, sought to have his name placed on the 

child’s birth certificate, cared for the child and for how long, 

acknowledged the child and to whom, or provided for the child, 

among other things. (Id. at p. 1211.) We review the juvenile 

court’s paternity finding for substantial evidence. (In re 

Cheyenne B. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1371.) 

The juvenile court properly found that Father did not 

establish that he is a presumed father. Juan C. never received 

Jesse Y. into his home for even temporary visits and did not 

request the juvenile court to enter a voluntary declaration of 

parentage. Juan C. informed the court that he did not have 

appropriate housing for Jesse Y. or the means to provide for him. 

Juan C. did not provide evidence that he helped Mother pay for 

prenatal care or birth expenses despite living with her for many 

months before Jesse Y.’s birth and knowing that she was 

pregnant. He also made no attempt to have his name placed on 

Jesse Y.’s birth certificate or provide evidence that he 

acknowledged Jesse Y. as his son. Juan C.’s visits with Jesse Y. 

were limited to weekly one-hour supervised visits in a 

department store. This presumed father evidence falls short of 

proof of “a fully developed parental relationship” with a child. 

(R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 776.) 

Although Mother may have withheld birth information 

from Juan C., Jesse Y. was removed at birth by HSA and placed 

in a confidential foster home. Juan C. was not released from 

incarceration until approximately one month following Jesse Y.’s 

birth. Based upon the HSA social worker’s sleuthing, Juan C. 
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learned of Jesse Y.’s birth and dependency approximately one 

month following release from incarceration. Any delay 

occasioned by Mother’s refusal to name Jesse Y.’s father was 

minimal and could not have prejudiced Juan C.

II.

Juan C. argues that insufficient evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s ICWA finding because HSA and the court did not 

fully comply with their initial duties of inquiry. He asserts that 

the court and HSA should have inquired of him when he

appeared in court, reviewed the maternal and paternal halfsiblings’ dependency case files, and inquired of the pre-adoptive 

parent who has adopted the maternal half-siblings. Juan C. 

contends that the termination of parental rights order must be 

conditionally reversed to ensure compliance with the initial 

inquiry requirements of ICWA and related California law.

An “Indian child” is defined as an unmarried individual 

under 18 years of age who is either 1) a member of a federally 

recognized Indian tribe, or 2) eligible for membership in a 

federally recognized tribe and is the biological child of a member 

of a federally recognized tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) & (8); 

§§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) The juvenile court and the county child 

welfare department have an affirmative and continuing duty to 

inquire whether a child subject to dependency proceedings is or 

may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 5.481.) The duty includes asking the child, parents, 

extended family members, and others who have an interest in the 

child whether the child is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, 

subd. (b).) The court must also inquire of the parties and 

participants appearing in court whether the child may be an 

Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) We examine the juvenile court’s 
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ICWA findings for substantial evidence. (In re H.V. (2022) 75 

Cal.App.5th 433, 438.)

Here the HSA social worker completed and signed the 

ICWA-020 forms on behalf of Mother and Juan C., but neither 

HSA nor the juvenile court queried Juan C. when he appeared in 

court; the pre-adoptive mother when she briefly appeared in court

at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing; or reviewed the 

dependency files of the half-siblings.

The failure to inquire constitutes reversible error only if 

there was readily available information that was likely to bear 

meaningfully upon whether the child is an Indian child. (E.g., In 

re Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 744 [“the readily 

obtainable information” rule].) Here the information was readily 

available from juvenile court appearances and the court and HSA 

dependency files. 

DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is conditionally 

reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with 

directions to comply with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and 

sections 224.2 and 224.3. Following the inquiry, if neither HSA 

nor the court has reason to believe or to know that the minor 

child is an Indian child, the order terminating parental rights 

shall be reinstated. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

I concur:

BALTODANO, J.
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YEGAN, J., Dissenting:

I agree with the determination that affirms the order 

regarding “presumed father” status. But I dissent from the 

conditional reversal for the reasons stated in In re J.K. (2022) 83 

Cal.App.5th 498 (dis. opn. of Yegan, J.). 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.
Manuel J. Covarrubias, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Tiffany N. North, County Counsel, Joseph J. Randazzo, 

Principal Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.