Docket No . 106511.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

__________________

SUE CARTER, Speci

al A dm ’r of th e E sta te of Joy ce Gott , Deceased, Appel le e (Lisa Mad igan, Att or ney Gene ra l of t he St at e o f Illino is , Interv enor-App el

l ee), v. SSC ODIN OPERATING COMPA NY, LL C, d/ b /a Od i n He al th ca reCe n ter , A pp el l an t.
Opinion filed April 15, 2010

.

JUSTICE TH OM

A S d el i v ered th e j udgm

en t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Justice Fi tzgerald an

d Justice s Ki

lb ride, Garm

an, and B urke
co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. Jus t ices Fr eeman a nd Kar meier t oo k no par t in the d ecisio n.

OPINI ON

The narrow question presen ted in thi

s case is whet her t he antiwai ver pro vi sions of the Nursin g Home Care Act (21 0 ILCS 45/3–606, 3–607 (West 2006)) are “groun ds as ex is t at law o rin eq ui ty fo rt he r ev o ca t io n o f an y co nt r ac t ” w it hin th e m ea ni ng of
se cti on 2 of the Federal Arbi

trat ion Act (FAA

) (9 U. S.C. §2 (2000 )). The appe l l ate court

answ er ed t his que st ion in t he affirmat ive, finding that the anti

wai ver pr ovisio ns avo id t he pr eempt ive effect of t he FAA
on that basi s. For

the rea sons th

at f ol l ow, w e re

ve rs e the j udg

men t of-2- t he appe l l ate court an

d rem and the caus e so tha

t the ap pel l ate court
ma y consider is sues rai sed by

the partiesbut not previousl y a ddressed.

BACK GROUND Pla int if f, Sue Ca rter , i s th e s pe ci al ad m i ni stra tor of the es tateof Joyce Gott . Defen

dant, SSC Odin

Operating C ompa

ny, LLC , is a
nur sing ho me lo ca t ed in O din , I lli n oi s, th at do es bu sine ss as Od in He al thc are Cente r. G ott wa s a

res i de nt of

defendant’s nu r sing ho me f rom May 20, 200 5, unt il July

29, 200 5, and agai

n f rom Jan uary 12, 2006, until

her death on Jan

uary 31, 2006. Plai

ntif f, acti ng asthe le gal
re pr ese nt at iveof

Gott , enteredi

nto a wri tten “ He al th C are A rb i trati on A gr eemen

t” with de fen

dant on May

20, 2005, up on G ot t’s in itial admissio n. Gott

h er se l f si gn ed a “ He al th Ca reA rb i tra ti on A gr eemen

t” six day s af

ter her seco nd adm

i ss i on. Plai

nti f f ’s si gnatu re d oesnot appear on t his seco nd ag re ement , a nd b oth agreem ents are comprised of the sa me, iden tic al term s. In bot h agr eement s, t he part ies ag re ed t o s ubmit t o bind ing arbi trati on “al l di sputes with e ach other and thei r representative s ar ising o ut o f o rin a ny w ay r el ate d or c onn ec ted to the A rb i trati on Agr eement and a ll m

at t er s re late d t her et o includ ing mat t er s involving t he Resid ent ’ssta

y and ca r e p r o vid ed at t he Fa cilit y.” Sp ec ifica lly in cl uded withi n the scope o f the agreem ents were “a

ny dis putes
co ncer ningwhether any statu to ry pro visi ons re lating to the Resident ’s ri gh ts un de rI llino is la w w er e v io lat ed

. ” T he ag r ee me nts al so stat ed t ha t ea ch pa r t y wa ive d it s r igh t t o a t r ial by ju ry, s t at ing in all c api tal letters: “YOU

CANNOT BE REQUIRED T O SIGN THIS AGREEMENT IN OR

DER TORECEIV

E TREA TMENT, BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, YOUR RIGHT T O TR IAL BY JURY OR A JUDG E IN COURT WILL BE BA RREDAS T O AN Y DIS PUTE REL ATIN G TO INJU RIES THAT MAY RESULT FROM NEGLI GENCE DURINGYOUR

TREATMENT OR

CARE, AND WILL BE REPL AC ED BY

AN AR BITRA TION PR OCED URE. THIS AG REEMENT PROV

IDES TH AT AN

Y CL AIM WHICH MAY ARISE OUT OF YOUR HE ALTH CARE WILL BE SU BMITT ED T O A PANEL O F-3- ARB ITRATOR S, RATHER THAN TO A COURT FOR DETE RMINATION. THIS AGREE MENT REQUI RES ALL PAR TIES SIGNING IT TO ABIDE BY THE DECISION OF THE A RBITR ATIO N PA NEL.” The agreem

ents f urther stat ed, however, that t he y do n ot ap pl y to “a ny dis pute where the am

ount in controversy

is le ss than *** $200,0 00.”The parties a ls o agreed that t he resi dent or leg a l
re pr ese nt at ivewo uld have a righ t t o rescin d the agreem

ent wi thin 30 da ys of si gni ng an d t ha t th e ex ecuti

on of th e a gr eemen t wa s n ot a pre con di ti on fo rad miss io n t o t he fa cili t y. The a gr eemen ts ad dit io na lly provided that defenda

nt would pay

all a rbi trat or fees an

d up to $5,000 in reasonabl

e “attorney f

ees and c os t s for t he Re sident in a ny cla ims agains t the Fac i l i

ty.” Fi na l l y , the a greem en ts noted th

at they were go ve rne d b y t he FAA an d t ha t if an y po r t io n w as de t er mined inva lid
orunen forceabl e, the remai

nder of the terms woul d c on t inue t o be bi ndi ng. Fo llowing Go t t ’s d ea t h, pla int iff fil ed a t wo -c ou nt co mplaint in t he cir cu it court of Marion County agai nst def en dan t. Count I was a statutory su rviva l cla im

that all eged vio lat io ns o f t he Nu r sing Ho me Care Act (210 I LCS 45/ 2–1 07, 1–1 17 ( West 200 6) ) a nd r egu latio ns prom ul ga ted by the Ill i noi s D ep artm

en t of Pu blic Healt h pur sua nt to that Act. Count IIwas a

sta tutor y ac ti on un der the W ron gf ul De ath Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 20 06 )). In b oth co unt s, pla int iff alle ged t ha t de fen da nt ha d fa iled t o pr o vid e a de qu at e a nd pr o pe r ly supervised

ca r e a s ne ed ed by G o t t

. I n c o un t I , pla in t iff all eged that defendant’s acts and omi ssions resul

ted in Got t suff

erin g in juri es between January 12, 2006, and J anuar

y 31, 2006 , dur ing Got t’s
sec ond st ay at t he facility. I n t hewron gfu l-d ea t h co unt , p laint iff alle ged that defenda

nt’s acts and om

is si ons resul

ted i nGott ’s

de ath and therefore t he loss o f compan ionsh ip an d society for her hei

rs. Defend ant fil

ed a n answ er t o t he co mplaint, denying t he al legat ions therein and assertin g various aff

irm ative defen

ses, including t hat bot h co unt s o f the lawsu it w er e pr eclud ed by t he
ar b i tra ti on ag re em en ts that we re si gne d by Gott and p l ai

ntif f . Later, defend ant f

i l ed a m oti on to com pe l arbi trati on, rel y i ng on s ec ti on 2of the FAA, whi

ch provides i

n relev ant part as foll

ows: “A w ri tte n provi si on in

*** a contract eviden

ci ng a t ra ns ac ti on

involving co mmerce t o s et t le by arbit ra t ion a-4- con tr ov ersy the reaf ter a ri si ng out of such con tract or t ra nsac t ion, or t he r efusa l to per for m the w ho l e or an y part t her eo f, or an ag re ement in writ ingt o su bmit to arbi trat ion a n exist ingcontr oversy

arisi n g ou t of such a c on tra ct, t ran sac t ion, or re fusal, shall be valid, ir re voc able, and enf or ceabl e, sa ve up o n su ch gr o un ds as ex ist at law o rin eq ui ty f or the revocation of an y c ontract .” 9 U.S.C. §2 (2000 ). Defend ant atta ch

ed to hi s m oti on a mem oran dum of l aw , a c opy

of each o f t he ag r ee me nts, an d t he affidavit of Ma ry Ann Smith, defendant’s ch ief a dmin is t r at o r , se t t ing fo r t h fa ct s t ha t alle ge dly establ is hed t hat t he ar bitr at ion ag re ement s involved int erst ate
co mmerce w ithin t he meaning o f sect ion 2 of t he FAA. Pla int iff fi le d a m em or an du m o f law ( an d s up ple men t ) in oppos i ti on t o t he mot ion t o c omp el arbit ra t ion, ar guing , a mong ot her t hin gs , tha

t the agree men ts w ere i n v i ol ati on of the publ i c p ol i cy

of t his state, as expressed i

n sections 3–606 and 3–607 o f the Nu rsing Ho me Care Act, and were theref ore void. Section 3–606 of the A ct provides t hat “[a] ny

waiver by

a re si de nt or hi s l eg al repres en tati ve of t he righ t t o comme

ncean act ion un

der Sections 3–601 through 3–607, whether

o r al o rin w r it ing , sha ll be n ull and v oid, and wi

thout le g al f orc e or e f

f ec t.” 2 10 I LC S 45 /3–

606 (Wes t 200 6). Sec

ti on 3–607 of t he Act pr ovid es t hat “[a] ny par t y to an ac ti onbro ught under Se ct io ns 3 –6 01 t hr o ug h 3 –6 07 sha ll be en ti tl ed to a tria l by j ury and an y wai v er of th e ri gh t to a t r ial by a jur y, w he t he ro r al o rin writi ng, pri or to com men cemen t of an ac t ion, shall be null andvoid, and without lega

l f orce oref f ect.” 21 0 ILC S 45/3 –607 (We st 2006 ). Pla int iff con ten de d th at the pub li

c poli cy beh in d the anti

wai ver pr ovisio ns o f se ct io ns 3–6 06 an d 3 –6 07 is a ge ne r ally a pp lica ble defense to all c o ntract s in Ill

in ois and therefore t hat po li cy is a “groundsa s e x i st a

t l aw ** * f or th e rev oca ti on of an y con tra ct” sufficient to ne gate FAA

preem pti on. See 9 U.S.C . §2 (20 00). Pla int iff also rais ed three addi

tional contentions i

n he r effo r t t o av o id
ar bitr at ion: (1) the FAA did n ot appl

y be ca us e the a

rb i trati on ag re em en ts di d n ot in volv e i nterstate co mm

erce; (2) th e a

gr eemen ts
were v oid f

or a lack of a m

utual obl iga tion to arbitrate; and (3) because she did n

ot sign t he se co nd ar bit r at io n a gr ee men t , she co uld not be compel

le d to arbi trat e.-5- The ci rcu i t cou rt de ni ed the moti on to com pe l arbi trati on without
an evi den tia ry h ea ri n g. F i rs t, the c our

t f oun d th at wi th re spe ct t o t he
wrongf ul -d ea th cl ai m, the ri ght to pr oce ed to r ecovery through arbi trati on is c o nsid er ed a “ r igh t o f ac t io n. ” T hu s, ev en if Go t t wo uld have h ad to proce ed

to ar b i tra ti on h ad sh e l i v ed an d w an ted to
r ec o ve rfo rhe rinju r ies , she no ne t he les s s t ill had a “ caus e of

action.” Acco rd ingto th e c i

rc ui t court , a ltho ugh G ot t was bou nd by t he ag re em en ts f or h er ow n c l ai m s, a pl ai nti f f br i ngi ng cl ai m s on be ha l f of t he estate i s n ot b oun d b y th e a gr eemen ts. Se con d, w i th re spe ct t o t he
s urvi val count , t he court found that t he claim was val id b ecause th e arbi trati on agr eement wa s “

un en f orc ea b l e b oth because it i s i n di rect vi ol ati on of em phati cal l y sta ted publ i c p ol i cy

an d f or lac k of
m utual i ty.” Fi nal ly , the circui

t cour t seemed

to be address in

g whether t he tran sacti on i nv ol ve d “ i nte rs tatecom

merc e”wi

thi n th e m ea ni ng of the FAA when it m ade the f oll owing f in din g: “F urthe r, t he underl

yi ng contractual rel

ationsh ip was between
an el derly Mari on County resi

dent and a

Ma rion Coun ty c are fa cili t y. The contract wa s f orpe r so na l ca r e w it hint his co un t y. The ac ti on

re late s t o t he ca re pr ovid ed. The statut e i nvol ved here i s a pu b l i c s af ety sta tu te that affects the rel

ationsh ips between the c ontracti

ng p arti es. Th

i s tri al courtbel ie vesthat in t he ag gr ega t e t he ec ono mic act ivity do es no t r epr ese nt gen eral practi ce s ubj ect to fe deral

control .” The appe l l ate court

affir med t he cir cu it co ur t ’s de cis io n, bu t did
so on th e b as i s of a s ing le q ue st io n o f law –w he t he rt he “p ub lic po licy” expresse d in the Nursi ng Home Care A ct was an ordi

nary state-law contract defen

se appl ic abl e to all contracts, and thus beyond t he pr eempt iveef

f ect of t he FAA. 381 Ill. App . 3 d 71 7, 721 . T he appe l l ate court found that secti ons 3–606 and 3–607 em bodie d a pu blic policy

that applied to all

co ntrac ts g en

era l l y an d di d n ot “sp ec ifica lly

target arbi

trat ion.” 381 Il

l. A pp. 3d at 722-2 3. The

court
c onc lude d

that t hi s public poli

cy was a l

egitim ate co ntract defense wit hin th e l an gu ag e of se cti on 2 of th e FAA ( i.e. , “sav

e upon such grounds asex

i st a t l aw or eq ui ty f ort he revocation of an

y c ontract ”) that can v oid an arb i tration agree men t. In re aching t his co nclusio n, t he courtfound def

endan t’s reli ance up on Perry v. Thomas , 482 U.S. 4 83, 96 L. Ed. 2d 426, 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987), and Doctor’ s Associa tes, Inc. v. C

asaro tto , 517 U.S. 681, 134 L. Ed. 2d 902, 1161 We no te that subs equent to the release of this pu blished opinion in Fosler , the Second Dis tr ict, on Mar ch 1, 201 0, filed amodified opinion upon denial of r ehearing. It did not, however, r evise its p revious holding.
-6- S. Ct. 1652 (1996), to be m is pla ced because t he ant iwaiver p ro visions in t he Nursi ng Home Care Act do not spe cifically mentio n ar bitr at ion, and al so be caus e, un

der the Il l i

noi s statute , a c ontr

ac t tha t doe s n ot
men ti on arbi trat ion b ut requires a

ben ch trial would be voide d t o t he
sa me ex t en t as a c o nt r ac t r eq uir ing ar bit rat ion. 381 Il l. A pp. 3d at 722. T his co ur t init ially

denied defendant’s petition f or leave to appeal
on Septembe

r 24, 2008. De f

en da nt th en f i l ed a p eti ti on f ora w ri t of certio rariin the U nited St at es S upr eme Co ur t . T her e, defend ant argued th at th e a pp ella t e c o ur t misr ea d t he h o lding s o f Perry and Casar otto , and that i

ts decis ion c onfl

icted wit h Preston v. Ferrer , 522 U.S. 346, 169 L. Ed. 2d 917, 128 S. Ct. 978 ( 2008), and Southland Corp. v. Keating , 465 U.S. 1, 79 L . Ed. 2d 1, 1 04 S. C t. 852 (198 4),
as we ll as wit h t he ho ldin gs in fo ur fed er al c irc uit s. I n it s br ief in oppos i ti on to the moti on fo r a wr it o f certiorari , p laint iff argued that t he i n ter med i ate na ture of the appe l l atecou

rt’ s dec i si on wasa f

ac tor that wei ghed agai

nst allowi

ng the pe t itio n. Plaint iff not ed t he pos si b i l i ty t ha t a c o nflic t co uld ar ise amo ng pa ne ls o f t he I llino is appe l l ate co ur t on t he issue , t her eby req uiring r eso lut ion by t he I llino is Su pr eme Court. The

ref ore , pla in

tif f as serted, t he Un

ited States Su pr eme Court, as a

courtof l ast re sor t, s h oul d n ot gran t certiorari because the is sue has

not been f

in ally settled by Ill in ois i n the ab sence of a d ec isio n by t he I llino is S up r eme Court . On Ma y 8, 20 09 , sho r t ly after pl ai n ti f f f i l ed h er b rief i n opp osi ti on to th e wr it , t he I llino is A pp el l ate Court , Second District, file d Fosler v. Midw est Care Ce

nter II, Inc. , 391 Ill . App. 3d 397 (2009), wh ic hheld t hat t he FAA preempted

t he ant iwaiver p ro visions o f the Nu rs i n g H om e C are A ct. 1 Fosler ex pr es sly rej ected th

e con trary ho ldin g o f t he Fift h D ist r ict in t he present case . Fosler , 391 Il l . Ap p. 3d at 39 9 ( f

oun d th at Carter
was wr ong ly decided and c ou ld no t be r eco nciled wit h Perry )

. De fendant’s pe t it io n fo r a wr it o f certiorari was denied on J une 1 , 2009. Citing a confl

ict bet wee n t he Se co nd Dist rict ’s de cision in Fosler-7- and t he Fift h D ist r ict ’s de cis io n in t his cas e, defend ant f i l ed a m oti on i n th i s c ourt f or re consi de rati on of the deni

al of it s pe t itio n for leave to appeal . On August 7, 2009, t his cou rt gran ted de f en da nt’ s m oti on and allowed the peti

tion f or leave to appeal . 210 Ill . 2d R. 315 . We exercise j urisd i cti on in th i s c as e pur suan

t to our su pervi sor y au th ori ty
over t he I llino is c o ur t sys t em. See I ll . Co nst. 197 0, a rt . VI , §1 6; In re Estate of Funk , 221 Ill . 2d 30, 97-98 (2006 ); People v. Lyles , 21 7 I ll. 2d 210, 21 6 (2 005 ) ( ou r su per visor y aut hor ity is a bro ad a nd unl im ited pow er th at g ra n ts j uri sd i cti on wi th out n ee d to ar ti cul ate i ts i n str um en ts or agenci es). We also all owed the Attor ney

General of t he Sta te of Il l i n oi s l ea v e to in tervene as an additi onal appellee. 735 ILCS 5/2–408(c) (Wes t 200 8). For the reasons that

follow , w e r ever se t he judg ment of the appel

la te court on the is sue that it addressed, an d we
re mand t he ca use t o t he ap pellat e co ur t so t hat it may co nsider and deci de is sues n

ot reached b

y i t previousl

y. See Schw

artz v. Cortelloni , 177 Il l . 2d 166 , 172 (1 997).

AN AL YSIS At the outse

t, we note that the

appe l l ate court

di d n ot co nsider t he que st ion o f whet her t he pa rt ies’ ag re ement ev i de nc ed “ a tra ns ac ti on involvingcomm

erce ” w ithi

n the m eani ng of the F

AA (9 U.S.C. §2 (2000)), and it i s not entirel y c le ar that the c i

rcui t court r ea ch ed t his is sue ei ther. We a ssume arguendo t hat t he t ra nsac t ion sa t isfied the i n ter sta te com merc e re qui

rem en t of t he FAA , bu t t his is

an i ssue that should be address ed by

the appella

te court on reman

d. We no w t ur n t o t he so le is su e a dd r es se d b y t h e a pp el l ate
co ur t –whe t her t he ant iwaiver p olicy expr esse d in t he Nu r sing Ho me Care Act is a ge ner ally applicable co nt ra ct defens e t hat nega t es FAA pre e mpt ion. Ques

tions of f edera l preem pti on an d statutory i nte rpreta ti on present questions

of law t hat are s ub

j ec t to de novo review. Board of Education, Joliet Tow nship High School District No. 204 v. B oard

of Education, Lincoln Way Community High School District No. 210 , 231 Il

l . 2d 184 , 194 (2 008). The preemption doctr in

e i s deri ved fro m the su

pre mac y cl au se of article VI of the Uni

ted St ates Co nst itu t ion, which pr ovid es t hat t he la ws of the Uni

ted St ates “sh

all b e the suprem

e Law of t he Land *** any T hin g i n t he Co ns t it ut io n o rLa ws o f a ny S tate to the Con trary-8- notwi thstan di ng.” U.S. Const., art. VI, cl . 2. Thus , st at e la w is nu ll and vo id i f i t conf l i cts wi th f edera l l aw. Sprietsma v. M

ercuryMarine , 197 Il l . 2d 112 , 117 (2 001). Federal law pr eempt s st at e law u nder t he su pr emacy clau se in any
one o f t he fo llo win g thre e ci rcumstan ces : (1 ) express preem pti on–w here Congress has ex pr es sly preempted state action; (2) im pli ed f i eld pree m pti on–w here Con

gre s s has

im ple me nted a
co mpre hensive re gulat or y scheme in an ar ea, t hus r emoving the e nti re field f rom th e state re al

m ; or (3) i

m pli ed con f l i ct preem pti on–w here sta te action actuall

y conf l i cts wi th f edera l l aw. Sprietsma , 197 Ill . 2d at 117 . T he ke y inquiry in any pr eem pti on an al y sis is to det er mine the intent of C ongre ss. C

ity of Chi cago v. Comca st Cable Holdi ngs, L.L. C. , 231 Il

l . 2d 399 , 405 (2 008). In the present case, onl

y c onfl ict pree mp t io n is a t iss ue

. T his is because t he FAA co nt ain s no ex pr es s p r ee mpt io n p r o visio n, an d it does not indi

cate acon

gre ss i ona l i nte nt to oc cu

py the en ti re f i el d of
ar bitr at ion. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jun ior Univ

ersit y , 489 U.S. 468, 477, 103 L. Ed. 2d 488, 49 9, 1 09 S. Ct. 1 24 8, 1 25 5 ( 19 89 ). Th us , s tate la wis preempted by t he FAAt o t he ext ent that it actuall y c onfl icts with state law , that is, to the extent that it “ ‘s tands as a n obs t acle t o t he acc omp lishm ent and execution

of the f ull purposes and obj ectives of Congress .’ ” Volt Information Sciences , 489 U.S. at 477, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 499, 109 S. Ct. at 1255, quo ting Hines v. Davidow itz , 312 U.S. 52, 67, 85 L. Ed. 581, 587 , 6 1 S . C t . 3 99, 404 (1 941 ). Thi s in qui ry re qui re s u s to consider th e r elati onsh

i p be tween state an d f edera l l awsas they

are in ter preted and app l i ed an

d not si m pl y as they are w ri tten. Jones v. Rath Packing Co. , 430 U.S. 519, 526, 51 L. Ed. 2d 604, 614, 97 S. Ct. 13 05 , 13 10 ( 19 77 )

. Mo r eo ve r , it is w ell settl ed tha t un i f orm i ty of de ci si on is an i mportant consi deration whe n state court s i

nterpret federal st at ut es, and w e will give “co nsider able we ight ” to t he de cis ions of

federal court s that have addres sed preem ption under
se cti on 2 of the FA

A. See Sprietsma , 197 Il l . 2 d at 12 0 ( citing Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Sys tems, Inc. , 188 Ill . 2d 415, 422 (1999) , Wilso n v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. , 187 Ill . 2d 369, 383 (1999 ), and Busch v. Gr aph ic Color Corp. , 169 Ill . 2d 325, 335 (1996 )). We also rec ogniz e t hat deci si ons of the Un ited States Su pr eme Cou

rt a dd re ss i n g FA A pr eem pti on are b i n di n g on th i s c our t.-9- See Bowman v

. American River Transportation Co. , 217 Ill . 2d 75, 91 (20 05). The basic purpose of the FAA is to overcome the h

is to rical reluctanc e of

cou rtsto en f orc e a gr eemen ts to arbi trate. Allied-Bruce Termini xCos. v. Dobson , 513 U.S. 265, 270, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753, 762, 115 S. Ct. 834, 838 (1995). When Congress pass ed

t he FAA in

1925, it i n ten de d c our ts t o e nfor ce a gr eement s by par t ies t o a rbit ra t e and to pla ce such agree men ts on the sa

me f ootin g asother con

tracts. AlliedBruce , 513 U.S. at 270-71, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 762, 115 S. Ct. at 838. A sta te sta tute st an ds as an o bst ac le t o t he pu r po se s o f t he FAA if it t ar get s ar bitr at ion p ro visions for di sf avored tre atm en t n ot ap pl i ed to ot her co nt r ac t ua l t er ms gen

eral l y
. Allied-Bruce , 513 U.S. at 281, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 769, 115 S. Ct. at 843. Si m i l arl y , state prov

i sions f orm an obstacle i f they “ta ke t heir meaning fr om t he f ac t th at a con tra ct to
ar b i tra te is at i ssue, or f

rustrate a rbi tration, or provi

de a d ef en se to i t.” SecuritiesIndustry Ass’n v. Connolly , 883 F.2d1114, 1 123 (1 st Ci r. 1989)

. Here, defend ant argues thatt he ap pellat e co ur t miscons t ru ed t he Uni ted St at es S upr eme Co ur t ’s de cisions in Perry and Casar

otto , a nd f ail ed t o c ons ider t he mor e fact ually and ana lytically pert inent dec isions o f Southland Corp. v. Keating , 465 U.S. 1, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1, 104 S. Ct. 852 ( 1984), and Prestonv. Ferrer , 552 U.S . 346 , 169 L. Ed. 2d 917, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008). We agree. Over 25 y ea rs ag o, in Southland , t he Su pr eme Court fi rst hel d that t he FA A app l i es

i n sta te a s w el l as f ederal cou rt a n d p re em pts
co nfli ct ingstate l

aws

. Southland , 465 U.S. at 16, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 15, 104 S. Ct. at 861

. Southland invo lved a p ro visio n o f the Cal ifo rnia Franchise Investme n t Law t hat pr ovid ed t hat “ ‘[a ]ny co ndit ion, st ipulat ion o r p ro vision pu rp or t ing t o bind any per so n acq uiring a ny franch ise to wai ve com pli ance wit h any pr ovisio n of t his law o r a ny rule or o rder hereunder is voi d.’ ” Southland , 465 U. S. at 10, 7 9 L. Ed. 2d at 11, 104 S. Ct. at 858, quot in g Cal . Corp. Co de An

n. §31512 (West 1977) . The

Cal i f orni a Supr em e Court i n ter pr ete d th i s statu te to requi re j udicial cons i derati

on of clai m s brough

t unde r i t and there f ore refuse d t o e nfor ce t he pa rt ies’ co nt rac t t o arbitrat e such claim s. Southland , 465 U.S. at 10 , 79L. Ed. 2d at 1 1, 1 04 S. Ct. at 858. In
revers ing t he Ca lifo rnia Su pr eme Co ur t , t he Un it ed St at es Su pr eme Courtbe ga n it s a na lysis by n ot ing “a nat ional po licy f avo ring-10- ar bitr at ion” that withdrew the power of th e state s to “requi

re a judi ci al forum for the resoluti on of clai

ms whi ch the contractin

g parties agreed to resolve by

arbi trat ion.” Southland , 465 U.S. at 10, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 12, 104 S. Ct. at 858. In

hold ing t hat t he Ca lif

or nia law violat ed t he suprem acy cla use , the C our

t f oun d th at C ongr es s “

i n ten de d to foreclose state legi sl ative

attempts to undercut the enf orceab ili ty

of arbi trati on agreem ents.” Southland , 465 U.S. at 16, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 15, 104 S. Ct . a t 861 . Finally, t he major ity in Southland addressed

t he partial di ss en t of Ju sti ceStev en s, w hi ch rel i ed on the fact t hat

se cti on 2 o f the FAA

“perm i ts a pa rty to n ul l i f y an ag re em en t to arbi trate on ‘such gr ou nds a s exist at law o r in eq uit y for t he r evo cat ion o f any contrac t.’ ” Southland , 465 U.S . at 16 n.11 , 79 L. Ed. 2d at 15 n.11, 104 S. Ct. at 861 n.11. In that regard, the ma jori ty statedas foll

ows: “We a gre e, of course, that a part y m ay assert a general
co nt ract de f

ense s s uc h as f ra ud to av oi d en f orc em en t o f a n arbi trat io n agreement. We conclude, however, t hat the defense to arbi trat ion f oun d in t he Ca lif

or nia Fra nchise I nvest ment Law i s n ot a groun

d that e xi sts at l aw or in equit y ‘for t he
rev oca ti on o f anycontract’ but merel y a ground that ex

i sts f or t he re v oca

ti on of ar b i tra ti on pr ov i si on s i n con tra cts su b j ect to t he Calif ornia F ranchi se Inves tm e nt Law. Moreover, under t hi s dis senti

ng vi ew, ‘a state poli cy

of provi din

g special prote cti on for franc hisees .

.. can b e recogniz ed wi thout impairingt he b asic purpo ses of t he federal stat ut e.’ Post , at 21. If we ac ce pt ed t his a na lysis, st at es co uld wh oll y ev i sc erate congressional

in tent t o place

ar bitr at ion ag re ement s ‘up on t he
sa me f ootin g asother con

tracts,’ H.R. R

ep. No. 96, 68 th Cong ., 1st Sess ., 1 (192 4), si mpl y b y passi ng statutes such as t he Fra nchise I nvest ment L aw. We have reje cted t his a na lysis because it is in c o nflic t wit h t he [ FAA ] an d w o uld pe rmit states to override the dec la redpol i cy req ui ri ng en f orce men t of arbi trati on ag r ee me n ts.” (Em

phasi s i n ori gi na l .) Southland , 465 U.S. at 16 n.11 , 79 L. E d . 2d at 15 n.11, 104 S. Ct. at 861 n.11. The Su pr eme Co ur t next co nsider ed FAA p re empt ion in Perr y , hold ingtha

t se cti on 2 o f the FA

A , “ wh i ch man da tesen f orce men t of arbi trati on agreem ents, pre-empts §229 of the C alif ornia L abor Code, whi ch pr ov i de s th

a t act ions fo r t he co llectio n of w age s may be-11- ma in taine d‘wi thou t reg ard to the ex i ste nc e of an y pri v ate agr eement to arb i trate.’ ” Perry , 482 U. S. a t 48 4, 9 6 L . Ed . 2d

at 4 32 , 10 7 S . C t. at 2522-23, quot in

g Cal . Lab. Code An

n. §229 (West 1971) . Th e Courtbegan

its an al ys is by strongly em phasi zi ng that sec t ion 2 of t he FAA em bod i ed a “ l i be ral f ed era l pol icy f av ori ng arbi trati on agreem ents, notwithstandi

ng an y s tate substantive

or pro cedural polici es to the contrary.” Perry , 482 U.S. at 489, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 435, 107 S. Ct. at 2525 (court al so stat ed th at section 2 “de cl ared a nat iona lpo l i cy

f av ori ng arbi trati on” an d i s a “ cl ea r f ed era l pol i cy of
re quir ing arb i tration ”). The Court addressedt he viabilit y o f ge ne r al, state-co ntract-law

defens es, like unco ns c iona bi lty, to attack agreem ents to arbitrate. The Court noted that “ sta te l aw , wh ether of l eg i sl ati ve orjudi ci al origi n, i s appl ic abl e if that law arose to govern is sues con

cerni ng the va l i di ty , revoc ab i l i

ty , an d e nf or cea bi lit y o f
con tra cts gene ra lly. A st at e- law pr inc ipl e th at t ake s its meaning pr ec ise ly f rom the f ac t tha t a c ontr ac t to arb i trate i s a t i ss uedoe s n ot
com port wi th thi s req ui rem en t ***.” (Em

phasi s i n ori gi na l .) P er ry , 482 U.S. at 492 n.9, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 437 n.9, 107 S. Ct. at 2527 n.9. The Co ur t co nt inu ed t ha t co ur t s ma y no t co nst rue ar bit r at io n ag re em en ts dif feren tly from what i t would ot herwi se construe
non arbi trati on agr eement s, no r may t hey “rely on t he uniqueness of an agr eement to arbitrate as a basis f or a st ate- la

w holdi ng that
en fo r ce men t wo uld be unconsci onabl e.” Perry , 482 U.S. at 492 n.9, 96 L. E d. 2d a

t 437 n .9, 107 S . Ct. at 2527n.9. In Casar otto , the C ourt wa s fa ced wi th a Montana statute t hat decl ar ed an ar bitr at ion clau se u nenfo rc eable u nless “ ‘[ n]o t ice t ha t [ t he ] co nt r ac t is su

b j ec t to arbi

trat ion’ is ‘typed i n unde rli ned capi tal l etters on the fi

rst page of the contract. ’ ” Casar otto , 517 U.S. at 683, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 116 S. Ct . a t 165 4, quo t ing Mo nt . C od e Ann. §27–5–114(4) (1995 ). The Courthad no t ro uble ho lding t hat t he sta te
enac t ment confl

icted with the F

AA and was theref

ore displ aced by the federal l aw. Casar

otto , 517 U.S. at 683, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 116 S. Ct. at 1654

. Casar

otto reiterated the prin

ci ple s se t f orth in Southland and Perry . It t hen

concl uded that the Montana statut e was preem pted because it “plac es a rbit ra t ion ag re ement s in a class apa rt fro m ‘any contrac t,’ and si ngu l arl y l i m i ts thei r va l i di ty.” Casar

otto , 517 U.S. at 688, 13 4 L. Ed . 2d at 91 0, 116 S . Ct. at 1657

. The Supreme C ourt most recentl y a ddressed FA A pre em ption in-12- Preston

. There, t he Court held that the FAA al lows parties to choose
an arbi tralfor um t o d ecide t heir d isput es a nd t hat t he FAA supersedes anystate law that lodges pri ma ry j urisdi ction i n an ot her f orum , wh ethe r j udicial or adm i nistrati ve

. Preston , 552 U.S. at 349-50, 169 L. Ed. 2d at 923, 128 S. Ct . a t 981 . T he pa rt ies in Preston had agreed to arbi trat e di sputes that mi

ght aris e under a m

anag em en t con

tra ct. Pre ston cl ai me d that he was owed

fees as a personal

ma nager under t he con tract, but F errer c l ai

med the con tract wa s v

oi d b ec au se

Pre ston
was ac ti ng asan un l i cens ed tal en t ag en t i n v i ol ati on of a state statut e. Fo llowing the proced u res prescri bed b y s tate law, Ferrer petitioned t he sta te l ab or c om m i ss i on er to de ci de wh eth er th e c ontract was enfo rc eable be cau se it violat ed a law r equ iringt he licensing o f ta lent agents. Li ke t he I lli nois N ur sing Home Care A ct, t he statute at is sue in Preston did not m

en tion arb i tra ti on , sta

ti ng : “ In ca se s of contr oversy

aris in g under thi s chapter, the partiesinvo lve d s ha ll refer t he mat t er s indis pu t e t o t he La bo rCo mmiss io ne r , wh o sha ll hear and det er mine th e s am e, su b j ec t to an appeal

withi n 10 day s af ter det er minatio n, to the sup erior court whe re the sam e sh al l be he ard de
novo.” Preston , 552 U.S. at 355, 169 L. Ed. 2d at 926, 128 S. Ct. at 985, quot in

g Cal . Lab. Code An

n. §1700.44 (We st 2003 ). The d i spute
ev en t ua lly fou nd i ts way to s tate su perior c our

t, where Preston move d to com pe l ar b i tra ti on , but th

e c our t re f us ed h i s req ue st b ecause i

t bel ie ved t he FAA did no t pr ee mpt ac t io ns b efo r e a n a dmi n i str at ive agency wit h e xc lus ive jur isd ict io n o ve rt he dis pu t e. T he Ca lifo rnia Courto f Ap pe al a ff

irm ed. The Suprem

e Court o f the Un

ited States reversed, st at in g that t he i ssue was s im ply “wh o decides wh

ether Preston acted as p erson

al manager or a s tal

en t agen t.” Preston , 552 U.S. at 352, 169 L . Ed. 2d a t 925, 128 S. Ct. at 983 . The Courtfou nd th a t the moti on to c om

pe l arbi trati on r ai se d s ol el

y the que sti on of whi ch f orum would h

ear th e p ar ti es ’ d i spute and that the parties h

ad not lost any subst ant ive right s und er t he statut e. Preston , 552 U.S. at 3 5 9, 169 L. E d. 2d a t 929 , 1 28 S . C t . a t 987 . I n ot her wo rd s, t he partieshad n

ot wai ved cause s of action un

der the statut e; in

stead, they had ag reed w

ho would deci

de such i ssues, an d that “who” was an arb i trator. W e be li ev e t ha t t he an t iwa ive rpr o visio ns o f t he Nu r sing Ho me Care Act reli ed upon by the pl ai nti f f are l eg al l y i nd i sti ng ui sh ab l e f rom t he pr ovisio ns st ru ck d ow n by t he Su pr eme Co ur t in Southland , Perry2 T he St at e, as intervenor , cont ends that Preston ’s holding was dependent
on the con clusion that ano the r provi sio n w ithi n th e Californ

ia st atu tory sc heme “s ingled out ar bitr at ion f or uniq ue restricti ons.” The

State’s argum en t, however, seeks t o impose a limita tion on Prestontha t is not
su pp or ted by the cl

ear language of that deci sio n. Pr eston fo

und that b oth sta tut ory pr ovisions were pr eempted by the FAA, giving no indica tionthat itsholding with resp ect to the fi rst sta tut ory sect ion was dependent on the Court’s holdin

g wit h re spe ct to t

he se co nd statu to ry s ec tio n. Preston , 552 U.S. at 356, 169 L. Ed . 2d at 927, 128 S. Ct. at 985.
-13- and Preston . H er e, just like t he st at ut es in Southland and Preston , t he I llino is statut e required res olution of the dis pute in a non-arbi

tral fo rum. M or eover, nei

ther of the actual s

tatut ory provi si ons i

nva li dated in Southland

and Prestoneven

me ntion arbitration. The app e l l ate courterrone ousl

y be l i ev ed th at the N

ursi ng H ome Care A ct h ad to sp ec if ic al ly “ta rg et ” o r single o ut ar bitr at ion ag re ement s for FAA pr ee mpt io n t o ap ply. Th is is a misr ea ding o f Perry and Casar

otto

. To be sure Perry

and Casar

otto do stand f

or t he proposition tha

t
se cti on 2 o f t he FAA pr ee mpt s t ho se st at e la ws th at “ si n gl e ou t” arbi trati on agree men ts f or spec i al treatm en t. Southland

and Preston , how ev er, demon strate

th at Perry

and Casar

otto cann ot be read

t o st and f or th e c on

verse p ro po sitio n t hat st at e laws avo id FAA pre em ption so l ong asthe y do n ot “ si n gl e ou t” ar b i tra ti on ag re em en ts f orspecial treat me nt. Instead, Southland

and Prestonma

ke cl ear that sta te statut es are p re em

pte d by the FAA if the statut es as appl

ie d preclude the enf orcemen t o f f ederally prot ected ar bi trat ion rights,
re ga rdl es s of wh eth er th e state statut es sp ec i f

i cal l y targ et a rb i trati on agreements. The statutes involved in Southland and Prestondi

d n ot sing le out o rt ar ge t ar bit r at io n a gr ee men t s e xp licit y, a s t he st at ut e in Southland

required “

judi ci al co nsider at ion” of clai

ms brought under it ( Southland , 46 5 U .S. at 1 0, 7 9 L . Ed . 2d at 1 1, 1 04 S. Ct. at 858), and t he st at ut e in Prestonsi m pl y pl ac ed j urisd i cti on of labor dis

putes wit h a n a dm inis t r at ive ag en cy ( Preston , 552 U.S. at 351, 169 L. Ed. 2d at 924 , 128 S. Ct. at 982; Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §1700.44 (West 2003) ). 2 S imila r ly, any

dis tinction between

t he ant iwaiver p ro visions o f the Nur sing Home Care Act and the st atut e at iss ue in Pe rry is inc o nse qu en t ial. Perry , 482 U.S. at 484, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 432, 107 S.-14- Ct

. at 2 52 2- 23 (p rov

i di n g a j udi ci al f oru m f or l ab or di spute s

“‘wi thout regard to the exi stence of an y pr i v ate ag re em en t to arbi trat e’ ”), quot in

g Cal . Lab. Code Ann . §229 ( West 197 1) . As t he ap pe l l ate co ur t in Fosler

no t ed , t he Ca lifo rnia st at ut e in Perr y operated no dif

feren tly than sec t ions 3–6 06 a nd 3– 607 of t he Nu rsing Ho me Care

Act. See Fosler, 391 Ill . App. 3d at 407. With or wi thout the men ti on of ar bitr at ion, t he Calif

ornia statut e stil

l gua ranteed that
a j udi ci al ac ti on f ora wagedi sputecoul d b e m ai nta i ne d. Inc l us i on of t he “ph ra se ‘w i th out reg ard to th e ex i ste

n ce of an y pri v ate agr eement to arbi trat e’ does not mean

that t he statute applies o nly wh en t he r e is
an agreem ent to ar bi trat e.” See Fosler, 39 1 I ll. App. 3d at 407. Thus, just l i kethe Ill i noi s p rovi si ons , th e C al

i f orni a statut e provided a pla int iff with a judi ci al f orum regardl ess of wh

ether the contract
ma ndated arbi

trat ion. See Fosler, 391 Ill . App. 3d at 407. The appell

ate co urt ’s i

nterpr etat ion i

n the present case also
con f l i cts wit h t he pl

ai n l anguage of

section 2 of

the FAA, which perm i ts voi di ng of an arbi trati on agreem ent only on “such grounds as exi st at l aw or i n eq ui ty f or th e re voc ati on of any contr act. ” 9 U.S. C. §2 (2000). St ate laws

t hat ar e ap plicable t o a rbit ra t ion co nt ra ct s and
so me ot her types of contract s, bu t no t all contracts, ar e not “grounds
*** f or th e re voc ati on of anycontrac

t.” See, e.g. , Bradley v

. Harris Research, Inc. , 275 F .3d 884 , 890 (9 th Ci r. 20 01 ) (C al

i f orn i a statu te preempted

because it appl ie s only to forum-sel ection cl

auses an d o nly to fran chi se agreem

ents, and ther e for e it d oe s no t app ly to “any contrac t”); OPE International LP v. Chet Morrison Contr actors, Inc. , 258 F.3 d 44 3, 447 (5 t h Cir . 2001) (Louisiana statute inv alida ted because it co ndit ioned ar bitr at ion ag re ement ’s enfo rc eability on a Lo uisianafo rum, a r eq uir eme nt no t ap plic ab le to co n tra cts gen eral l y ); Doct or’s Asso ciate

s, Inc . v. H

amilto n , 150 F .3d 157 , 163 (2 d Ci r. 1998) (New Jersey case l aw i n v al i da ted b ec au se i t ap pl i ed to “on e sort of co nt r ac t pr o visio n ( fo rum s ele ct io n) in only o ne typ e of

contract (a franch ise agr eement ), ” and so was p ree mpted by the FAA); KK W Enterprises, Inc. v. Gloria Jean’s Gourmet Coffees Franchis ing Corp. , 184 F.3d 42, 50-51 (1st Cir. 1999) (Rhode Isla nd statute was not a g en er ally

applic abl e contract de fen se be ca us e it ap plie d t o o nly
one ty pe of pr ov i si on , v en ue cl au se s, i n on e ty pe of ag re em en t, franch ise agree men ts); see al so C. Dra

hoza l , Federal Arbitration Act Preemption , 79 Ind. L.J. 393, 409 (2004), citin g Allied -B ru ce , 513-15- U.S. at 281, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 769, 115 S. Ct . at 843, citing 9 U.S.C. §2 (19 94) . He

re, the an ti wai ve r provi si ons of t he Nu r sing Ho me Care A ct pur por t to i n v al i da te a rb i tra ti on ag re em en ts in a sp ec ific ty

peof contr act–t hose involving nur sing ca re– an d f orthat reason alone they
are n ot a def en se g eneral

l y appl i cab l e to “an

y contrac t.” The app ellate co ur t fou nd it i mportant that “a contract t hat never mentio ns arbi

trat ion b ut ins tead requires a b ench

trial *** rather than
a t r ial by a jur y, w o uld be v oided b y *** s ections [3–606 an

d 3–607] to the sa me e xte nt as a con tract con tai ni ng an arbi trati on agree men t.” 381 Ill. App . 3 d at 722 . B ut we d o no t find tha t t hi s f act req uire s a different resul

t. The Ill in ois en actmen ts at issue are m

erely pro-judi ci al forum leg isla t io n t ha t is the “f

unctiona l eq ui va l en t” of an ti arbi trati on legislat ion, whi

ch i s preem

pted by the FAA

and t he ho ldin g in Southland

. See Fosler , 39 1 I ll. A pp

. 3d at 40 7. T he Ca lifo rnia Su pr eme Co ur t in Southland he ld tha t the an ti wai ve r provi si on in that
case preclude d th e a

rb i tra ti on of di spute s u

n der the state

sta tute ( Southland , 465 U.S. at 17, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 15-16, 104 S. Ct. at 861), buti t di d n ot pu rp ort to l i m i t th e reach

of th e statute to arbi

trati on agreements. To t he contrary , an tiwai ver provi si ons i

n such statut es have be en ap plie d in Ca lifo rnia an d e lse wh er e t o in valida t e a wide
v ari ety of contr act pr ovisi

ons in addition to ar bi

trat ion cl auses. See 79 I nd. L. J. at 409(coll ecti

ng c ase s). Th

us, Southland

es se nt ially he ld that state laws that m

ay appl y to more than arb itration cl aus es a re nonetheless

preem pted. Ap pli ca t io n o f t he “sin glin g o ut ” t he o ry in such ca se s w o uld be

nothi ng m ore t han a “ba ckd oo r a t t empt t o ha ve t he Su pr eme Court overrule Southland , which i t already has ref used to do.” 79 Ind. L.J. at 410, citin g Allied-Bruce , 513 U.S. at 272, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 763, 115 S. Ct. at 838-39. Fin ally, we r eje ct t he St at e’ s a r gu men t t ha t t he FAA sho uld not be
re ad to pr ee mpt st at e p r o visio ns p r ec lud ing t he wa ive ro f jur y t r ials because the righ

t t o a jury trial is a fun dam ental constitut ional r ight and jur y t r ial g ua r an t ee s d o no t “sin gle o ut ” a r bit ra t ion cl

au se s f or elim in at io n. There a re a number o f problems wi th t he St ate ’s
argu men t. First , w e no t e t hat it is axio matic t hat a pa rt y may waive t he ri g ht to a tr

i al b y j ur y i n a c i v i l ca se b y en ter i n g i n to a c on tra ct to arbi trat e. See, e.g. , Sherw

ood v. Marquette Transportation Co. , 587 F.3d 841, 84 2 (7th C i

r. 2009 ), ci ting Carbajal v. H& R Block Tax Services, Inc. , 372 F.3d 90 3 , 905-0 6 (7th C i r. 2004 ). Moreover,-16- I llino is publ

ic policy fav ors ar b i tra ti on as a m ea n s of di spute
re so lut ion, gen

eral l y (710 IL CS 5/2 (a) (W

est 200 6)) , b ut s ect ions 3–606 an d 3 –6 07 as se r t a c o nt r ar y pu blic p o li cy a ffo rd ing nur sing ho me resi dents a j udic ia

l f orum, in cl udin g the righ t t o a jury trial in a dispu t e wit h a nur sing ho me. As t he ap pellat e co ur t in Fosler noted, t he in congruity il lus trat es why

sections 3–606 and 3 –60 7 di

d n ot

“‘a r[i ]s e to g ov er

n i ss ue s c on cern

i n g th e v al i di ty , rev oc ability, and
en f orc ea b i l i ty of contr acts gener

ally .’ ” (Em

phasi s i n ori gi na l .) Fosler, 391 I ll. App. 3d at 409-10, quo ting Perry , 482 U.S. at 492 n.9 , 96 L. Ed. 2d at 437 n.9, 107 S. Ct . at 2527 n.9. The Stat e’ s argum ent ign ores t he fa ct t ha t t he jur y-t r ial r eq uir eme nt do es no t ap ply t o all
con tra cts ge ne r ally, bu t o nly t o nu r sing ho me contracts. S econd, if the St ate ’s argumen

t were a ccep ted , i

t woul d m ea n th at al l arbi trati on ag re em en ts sought to be en

forced i n Il li nois would be in val id, gi ven that t he r equ irement wo uld have to apply to “al l contract s” t o av o id FAA pre em ption. Suc

h a con stru cti on wou l d w

h oll y ev i sc erate arbi trati on agr eement s and wo uld co nfli ct wit h and o ver ride t he decl ared f ed era l pol i cy req ui ri ng en f orce men t of arbi trati on agreements. By

de f i n i ti on ar b i tra ti on con tra cts call f or anarb i trator, ratherthan

a j ury, to resol

ve the p arti es’ di spute. I

n su m, we simp ly do not beli

eve that thi s i s the k in

d of def ense Co ngr ess ha d in mind when it p ro vided fo r a defens e t o p re empt ion bas ed o n “gr ou nd s a s exi st at l aw orin equit y for t he revocat ion of any contr act. ” 9 U.S. C. §2 (20 00). Rat her , t he pu rp os e o f this sa vings clau se is t o p re ser ve general contract def

en ses such a s lack of

m utual i ty, la ck of
co nsider at ion, fr au d, du r es s, un co ns cio na bilit y, and the li ke, that can tru l y appl y to an y con tra ct.

CONCLUSION For t he f oreg oing reasons, we ho ld t hat t he pu blic policy behind t he ant iwaiver p ro visions of se ct ions 3–6 06 a nd 3– 607 of t he Nu rsing Ho me Care Act are not “grounds asexi st at law o r in eq uit y for t he
rev oca ti on of a ny cont ra ct ” wit hin the mea ning o f sect ion 2 of t he FAA (9 U.S .C. §2 ( 2000)) . The part ies rai se a num ber of other

is sues be f ore th i s c our

t, including whe t her t he pa rt ies ar bitr at ion ag re ement evi ncea tra nsact ion “involving [ inter st at e] co mmerce” wit hin the meaning of s ection 2 of

the FAA . See 9U.S.C. § 2 (200 0). Be cause t he appella

te court erroneously

determi ned that the publ

ic policy-17- behind t he Nu r sing Ho me C ar e A ct ’s an t iwa iv er p rov isi ons was a val id, gene ra l cont ra ct defens e t o F AA pr eempt ion, it did n ot consider any ot her i ssuesi

n th e c as e. As s

uc h, i t i s a ppr opri atef orth i s c our

t to
re mand the cause to the appell ate court for considerat i on a nd
res ol ution of the rem

ai ni ng i ssue s. County o

f Du Page v. Illin ois Labor Relatio ns Board , 231 I ll. 2d 5 93, 619 (20 08) ; Schw artz , 177 I ll. 2d at 184. Acco rd ingly, we r ever se t he judg ment o f the appe l l ate courtand rem

and the caus e to t he appel la te co urt f

or f urther pr oc eed ings co nsist ent wit h t his op inion.
Appellate court judgment revers ed;

cause remanded.

JUSTICES FREEMAN and KARME IE R t oo k no par t in the consideration or decis ion of this case.