IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 57252-4-II

Respondent,

v.

JAMAAL NATHANIEL WRIGHT, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

GLASGOW, C.J. — Jamaal Nathaniel Wright committed multiple assaults and no contact 

order violations against Mariah Gutierrez, with whom he was in an on-and-off dating relationship. 

Wright pleaded guilty to second degree assault, fourth degree assault, residential burglary, felony 

domestic violence court order violation, and two counts of postsentence violation of a no contact 

order. Each conviction included a domestic violence designation. Wright argues the trial court 

erred by accepting his guilty plea without determining whether he understood that each conviction 

included the domestic violence designation, which would impact his offender score. Thus, he 

argues his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Wright also asserts the trial court failed 

to ensure he understood the direct consequences of pleading guilty to domestic violence charges.

We affirm.

FACTS

Wright was in an on-and-off dating relationship with Gutierrez for several years. Wright 

and Gutierrez had a child in common. In 2021, no contact orders prohibited Wright from contacting 

Gutierrez in any way. That year, police responded to four separate incidents involving Wright and 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

September 26, 2023
No. 57252-4-II

2

Gutierrez. In January, Wright strangled Gutierrez and punched her in the face. In March, Wright 

struck Gutierrez in the face. In September, Wright broke into Gutierrez’s home, punched her, and 

suffocated her to the point where she lost consciousness. In December, Wright assaulted Gutierrez 

and then followed her to her place of work. During December 2021 and January 2022, while

Wright was in jail, he contacted Gutierrez through other people, attempting to convince Gutierrez 

to get the charges against him dropped. 

Wright ultimately pleaded guilty to second degree assault, fourth degree assault, residential

burglary, felony domestic violence court order violation, and two counts of postsentence violation 

of a no contact order. Both Wright’s signed statement of defendant on plea of guilty and his offer 

and sentencing worksheet listed these charges, and next to each charge was the notation “DV/IP.”

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 70, 80. Wright’s signed statement also said that he had a dating relationship 

with Gutierrez. Wright initialed next to the section stating, “If this is a crime of domestic violence, 

I may be ordered to pay a domestic violence assessment of up to $100.00.” CP at 75. The document

provided that Wright and the trial court judge would initial only the sections that applied to Wright. 

Along with his signed statement, Wright filed a stipulation acknowledging three prior 

convictions from 2018, including fourth degree assault, interfering with the reporting of a domestic 

violation, and a no contact order violation. All of these offenses were designated “DV.” CP at 83. 

Wright further stipulated that his offender score was 9 based on past and current offenses. 

An offer and sentencing worksheet was also submitted as part of the plea agreement. In the 

worksheet, under the “Special Verdict/Findings” section, the box next to “crime of domestic 

violence” was checked. CP at 81. The worksheet also indicated that Wright agreed to the State 

recommending a domestic violence evaluation and follow-up treatment as part of his sentence. 
No. 57252-4-II

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The sentencing range was listed as follows: “87-116 months i/c (State would be adding DV 

Aggravator to all felony charges[)].” Id. The box indicating “DV doubler present” was also 

checked. Id.

At Wright’s plea hearing, the trial court verified that Wright understood the rights he was

giving up by pleading guilty. The trial court reviewed the standard sentencing ranges and 

maximum penalties for all six counts, and Wright agreed he understood them. Wright also verbally 

stipulated to his criminal history and offender score:

THE COURT: I have a stipulation on prior record and offender score. On Page 3 

of this document, I have the initials J.W. over the typed name of Jamaal Wright; is 

that your signature?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And did you go over this with your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And this is -- you agree that this is a correct and accurate assessment 

of your criminal history?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (June 30, 2022) at 15. The trial court also confirmed that the State 

was charging second degree assault as a domestic violence crime: “And since this appears to be 

charged as a crime of domestic violence, do you understand that you may be required to pay a 

domestic violence assessment up to $100; do you understand that?” VRP (June 30, 2022) at 12. 

Wright replied, “Yes.” Id.

The trial court confirmed that Wright reviewed the statement on plea of guilty with his

attorney, stating, “Now, Mr. Wright, did you read this document or did your lawyer read it to you 

or was it a combination of both?” VRP (June 30, 2022) at 14. Wright responded, “Both.” Id. The 

trial court also confirmed that Wright intended to stipulate to his criminal history and offender 

score and that both were correctly reflected in the plea. 
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The trial court found Wright’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and accepted 

the plea. Since Wright stipulated to prior domestic violence offenses and pleaded guilty to current 

domestic violence charges, this significantly increased his offender score. The trial court accepted 

the State’s recommendation and sentenced Wright to 72 months of incarceration and 18 months of 

community custody with domestic violence treatment. 

Wright appeals.

ANALYSIS

Wright argues that the trial court erred by accepting his guilty plea because it was not made 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Specifically, Wright argues that the trial court failed to 

ensure that he knew he was pleading guilty to domestic violence charges and that he understood 

the direct consequences of the domestic violence designations. We affirm the trial court’s 

acceptance of Wright’s guilty plea.

Generally, we “may refuse to review any claim of error [that] was not raised in the trial 

court.” RAP 2.5(a). However, voluntariness of a guilty plea is a constitutional error that a 

defendant can raise for the first time on appeal. State v. Knotek, 136 Wn. App. 412, 422-23, 149 

P.3d 676 (2006).

Due process requires that guilty pleas be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 

State v. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d 582, 587, 141 P.3d 49 (2006). A defendant must be correctly 

informed of all direct, but not collateral, consequences of their guilty plea. State v. Ross, 129 Wn.2d 

279, 284, 916 P.2d 405 (1996). A guilty plea “based on misinformation regarding a direct 

consequence” of the plea can be considered involuntary. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 591. A direct 

consequence is one that “‘represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the 
No. 57252-4-II

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range of the defendant’s punishment.’” Id. at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ross, 

129 Wn.2d at 284). The defendant’s knowledge of the direct consequences of the guilty plea can 

be ascertained “from the record of the plea hearing or clear and convincing extrinsic evidence.”

Ross, 129 Wn.2d at 287. We consider the totality of the circumstances. State v. Snider, 199 Wn.2d 

435, 444, 508 P.3d 1014 (2022).

For example, where the State incorrectly told a defendant who pleaded guilty that

mandatory community placement would not apply to him, the Washington Supreme Court held 

that mandatory community placement was a direct consequence, and the mistake rendered the

guilty plea invalid. In re Pers. Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wn.2d 294, 302, 88 P.3d 390 (2004).

Similarly, where a defendant’s correct standard range was actually higher than that stated in the

guilty plea, the court held the plea was involuntary. State v. Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1, 4-5, 8, 17 P.3d 

591 (2001).

In contrast, the possibility of habitual criminal proceedings was a collateral, as opposed to 

direct, consequence of the plea because the State had discretion as to whether to initiate the 

proceeding, which involved a later, independent trial. State v. Barton, 93 Wn.2d 301, 305-06, 609 

P.2d 1353 (1980). Similarly, in State v. Ward, the Washington Supreme Court held that the duty 

to register as a sex offender was a collateral consequence of a guilty plea because this duty did not 

“alter the standard of punishment.” 123 Wn.2d 488, 514, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994).

Here, the totality of the circumstances show that Wright’s guilty plea was entered 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Specifically, the signed statement on plea of guilty, offer 

and sentencing worksheet, written stipulation, and plea hearing all show that Wright understood 

he was pleading guilty to domestic violence charges. In Wright’s signed statement and in the 
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written stipulation, a “DV” designation accompanied every current and past offense listed. CP at 

70, 83. Even if Wright did not know that “DV” stood for domestic violence, the offer and 

sentencing worksheet also had the box next to “crime of domestic violence” checked. CP at 81. It 

indicated a “DV doubler” applied. Id. The worksheet also indicated that Wright agreed to the State

recommending a domestic violence evaluation and follow-up treatment as part of his sentence. 

Wright initialed next to the section of the plea agreement stating, “If this is a crime of domestic 

violence, I may be ordered to pay a domestic violence assessment of up to $100.00.” CP at 75. 

Further, at the plea hearing, the trial court specifically stated, in regards to the second degree 

assault charge, “And since this appears to be charged as a crime of domestic violence, do you 

understand that you may be required to pay a domestic violence assessment up to $100; do you 

understand that?” VRP (June 30, 2022) at 12. Wright responded, “Yes.” Id. Thus, the record shows 

that Wright understood that he was pleading guilty to domestic violence charges. 

The record also shows that Wright understood the direct consequences of pleading guilty 

to domestic violence charges. In the offer and sentencing worksheet and at the plea hearing, Wright 

stipulated to his offender score, which included additional points because of the domestic violence 

designations. The trial court also reviewed the standard sentencing range and maximum penalty 

for each offense, and Wright agreed he understood each. Wright does not argue that the standard 

range in the plea agreement was incorrect. He also does not argue that the offender score he 

stipulated to was incorrect. He asserts that because he pleaded guilty to domestic violence charges,

his offender score increased substantially. See former RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a) (2021) (requiring 

certain prior domestic violence convictions to count for two points if the current conviction is for 
No. 57252-4-II

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a felony domestic violence offense). But Wright does not dispute that he stipulated that 9 was his

correct offender score. See CP at 83; VRP (June 30, 2022) at 15.

Unlike a defendant who is misinformed about mandatory community placement or misled 

as to the correct standard range, Wright’s lack of knowledge regarding how the score was 

calculated did not have “‘a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of’” his 

punishment. Ross, 129 Wn.2d at 284 (quoting Barton, 93 Wn.2d at 305). Wright was never 

misinformed about his offender score or the standard sentencing ranges. The offender score and 

sentence the trial court imposed were the ones he was fully informed about. Therefore, his plea 

was not involuntary. 

CONCLUSION

Because the trial court did not err in accepting Wright’s guilty plea, we affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Glasgow, C.J.

We concur:

Lee, J.

Veljacic, J.