alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Broe.

No. 2192,

Okla. T.

Opinion Filed March 9, 1909.

(100 Pac. 523.)

1. APPEAL AND ERROR — Review—Questions of Fact — Verdict When there was evidence introduced on the trial of a cause reasonably tending to establish the negligence of the defendant, the verdict of the jury on that point is conclusive and will not be set aside by the Supreme Court.

2. SAME — Determination and Disposition of Cause — New Trial. If, upon a .cause being remanded for a new trial, the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity with the directions of the appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second trial.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

*Error from District Cowl, Comanche County; F. E. Gillette, Judge.*

Replevin by George W. Broe against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific' .Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

*C. O. Blahe, II. B. Low,*and *Stevens & Myers,*for plaintiff in error.

*James A. Morris,*for defendant in error.

Kane, C. J.

This was an action in replevin, commenced by the defendant in error, plaintiff below, against the plaintiff in error, defendant below, for the possession of certain specific personal property, and to recover damages for its detection. The cause was tried to the court, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff *397for the return of the property and $150 damages for its detention. The ease was in this court before, and will be found reported in 16 Okla. 25, 86 Pac. 441. As the facts are fully set out there by Mr. Justice Burwell, who delivered the opinion of the court, that it is obvious that the evidence at both trials was substantially the same, we do not deem it necessary to repeat them here.

When the case was here before, it was held there was sufficient evidence to justify the jury in finding that the company was guilty of negligence. The cause was reversed upon the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish the measure of damages; the court holding that by “market value” as used in section 2746, Wilson’s Rev. *&*Ann. St. 1903, is meant the value at which the article shipped would sell in the open market in the quantities carried, and where the articles shipped are merchandise, and shipped in large quantities, it is error to measure the damages sustained by the market value of such merchandise when sold at retail. As the plaintiff remedied this defect in his proof and did establish his measure of damages pursuant to the rule laid down on the former appeal, we see no reason for departing from the law of the case thus established by the Supreme Court of the territory. If, upon a cause being remanded for a new trial, the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity with the directions of the appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second trial. *Oklahoma City*Electric, *Gas & Power Co. et al v. Baumhoff,*21 Okla. 503, 96 Pac. 758.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

All the Justices concur.
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Malley, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-7387.] 

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. O’MALLEY. 

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Malley, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 

2016-Ohio-7387.] 

(No. 2012-2070—Submitted October 11, 2016—Decided October 20, 2016.) 

ON PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT. 

____________________ 

{¶ 1} This cause came on for further consideration upon the filing on 

January 27, 2016, of a petition for reinstatement by respondent, Joseph Patrick 

O'Malley, Attorney Registration No. 0060087. In accordance with Gov.Bar R. 

V(25)(E), respondent’s petition for reinstatement was referred to the Board of 

Professional Conduct. The board filed its final report in this court on August 8, 

2016, recommending that respondent be reinstated to the practice of law in Ohio. 

No objections to the final report were filed, and this cause was considered by the 

court. 

{¶ 2} Upon consideration thereof, it is ordered by this court that the 

petition for reinstatement of respondent is granted and that respondent, Joseph 

Patrick O'Malley, last known address in Westlake, Ohio, is reinstated to the 

practice of law in Ohio. 

{¶ 3} It is further ordered by the court that respondent be taxed the costs of 

these proceedings in the amount of $1,228.55, less the deposit of $500.00, for a 

total balance due of $728.55 payable, by cashier’s check or money order, by 

respondent on or before 90 days from the date of this order. If costs are not paid 

on or before 90 days from the date of this order, interest at the rate of 10 per cent 

per annum will accrue until costs are paid in full. It is further ordered that if costs 

are not paid in full on or before 90 days from the date of this order, the matter 

may be referred to the attorney general for collection and respondent may be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

found in contempt and suspended until all costs and accrued interest are paid in 

full. It is further ordered that respondent is liable for all collections costs pursuant 

to R.C. 131.02 if the debt is certified to the attorney general for collection. 

{¶ 4} It is further ordered by the court that within 90 days of the date of 

this order respondent shall reimburse any amounts that have been awarded against 

respondent by the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection pursuant to Gov.Bar R. 

VIII(7)(F). It is further ordered by the court that if after the date of this order the 

Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection awards any amount against respondent 

pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F), respondent shall reimburse that amount to the 

Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection within 90 days of the notice of such award. 

{¶ 5} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies 

of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(1) and that publication be 

made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2). 

{¶ 6} For earlier case, see Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Malley, 137 Ohio 

St.3d 161, 2013-Ohio-4566, 998 N.E.2d 470. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY,

FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

________________________
#### JOYCE, Appellant, v. CURTIS, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

March 20, 1912.)

Action by Joseph B. Joyce against Harriet S. Curtis. No opinion. Order affirmed, with costs.
<PAGE>


                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I,  Gordon  F.  Burley,  certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant  to  Section  906  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual
Report  on  Form  10-KSB  of  Merritt Ventures Corp. for the annual period ended
December 31, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the
Annual  Report  on  Form  10-KSB  fairly  presents  in all material respects the
financial  condition  and  results  of  operations  of  Merritt  Ventures  Corp.


                           By:    /s/ Gordon  F.  Burley
                                  ----------------------
                           Name:  Gordon  F.  Burley
                           Title: Chief  Financial  Officer
                           Date:  April 10, 2003
#### In the Matter of Mary Murphy Pardoe, an Attorney, Admitted Under the Name Mary Murphy, Respondent. Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District, Petitioner.

— In this proceeding to discipline an attorney upon charges of professional misconduct, respondent has failed to appear or to answer the petition herein containing the charges although the time to do so has expired. By order of this court dated October 19,1984, a copy of the petition and notice of petition were served on respondent’s daughter on November 14, 1984, said substituted service having been ordered due to the disappearance and abandonment by respondent of her law practice. Petitioner further moved for a default judgment based upon her failure to answer the aforementioned petition.

The respondent was admitted to practice by the Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department, on January 10,1945. The charges, generally stated, are that respondent (1) abandoned her law practice, (2) neglected a divorce action, and (3) converted moneys held in escrow pending closing on four real estate matters.

The charges, if established, would require respondent’s disbarment. Since she has chosen not to deny the charges and not even to appear in this proceeding, the charges must be deemed established. Petitioner’s motion is therefore granted. Respondent is unfit to be a member of the Bar. She is disbarred and her name is ordered removed from the roll of attorneys and counselors at law, effective forthwith. Titone, J. P., Lazer, Mangano, Gibbons and Niehoff, JJ., concur.
#### Southport Manor Convalescent Center, Inc., et al. *v.*Brian Foley

The plaintiffs Southport Manor Convalescent Center, Inc., and Albert A. Garofalo’s petition for certifi*812cation for appeal from the Appellate Court, 20 Conn. App. 223, is granted, limited to the following issues:

*Dwight F. Fanton, James T. Shearin*and *Dion W. Moore,*in support of the petition.

*James G. Green, Jr.,*in opposition.

Decided January 2, 1990

> “1. Did the Appellate Court err in concluding that a prior dismissal of a suit raising the same claims as those asserted in the present action had resulted in a judgment having ‘the same effect as if the case had been tried on the merits’ (20 Conn. App. 223, 228) for the purpose of invoking the defense of res judicata, when the dismissal of the prior suit was based upon a motion to dismiss for improper venue and the pen-dency of a prior action, to the granting of which the plaintiff was deemed to have consented because of its failure to file a memorandum opposing the motion within the time allowed by Practice Book § 143?

> “2. Did the Appellate Court err in affirming a judgment of dismissal based upon the defense of res judicata when Practice Book § 164 expressly includes such a defense among those to be specially pleaded?”
Exhibit 31.1

Certification of the Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended

CERTIFICATION

I, Anthony Bonelli, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-KSB of Optigenex Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business
issuer as of, and for, the period presented in this report;

4. The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the small business issuer and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the small business issuer, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business
issuer's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and

(5) The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of
the small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting.

Date: February 7, 2006

/s/ Anthony Bonelli,
----------------------
Anthony Bonelli
Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)
Optigenex Inc.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-1447

BISHOP COAL COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

NORA L. HORNE, Surviving Spouse of David Horne; DIRECTOR,

OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board.

(04-0460-BLA)

Submitted: September 5, 2008 Decided: September 17, 2008

Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Douglas A. Smoot, William S. Mattingly, Kathy L. Snyder, JACKSON

KELLY PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Petitioner. Howard M.

Radzely, Solicitor of Labor, Donald S. Shire, Associate Solicitor,

Christian P. Barber, Barry H. Joyner, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR, Washington, D.C.; Joseph E. Wolfe, W. Andrew Delph, Jr.,

WOLFE, WILLIAMS & RUTHERFORD, Norton, Virginia, for Respondents.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Bishop Coal Company seeks review of the Benefits Review

Board’s decision and order affirming the administrative law judge’s

award of survivor’s black lung benefits pursuant to 30 U.S.C.

§§ 901-945 (2000). Our review of the record discloses that the

Board’s decision is based upon substantial evidence and is without

reversible error. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review for

the reasons stated by the Board. Bishop Coal Co. v. Horne, No. 04-

0460-BLA (B.R.B. Feb. 24, 2005). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
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###### Department of State

          - [Public Notice 11454]

# SUMMARY:

                        Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: I hereby determine that certain objects being imported from abroad pursuant to agreements with their foreign owners or custodians for temporary display in the exhibition “A Superb Baroque: Art in Genoa, 1600-1750” at the National Gallery of Art, Washington, District of Columbia, and at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, are of cultural significance, and, further, that their temporary exhibition or display within the United States as aforementioned is in the national interest. I have ordered that Public Notice of these determinations be published in the                         **Federal Register**                        .                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Chi D. Tran, Program Administrator, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202-632-6471; email:                               ( print page 36174)    *section2459@state.gov*). The mailing address is U.S. Department of State, L/PD, 2200 C Street NW (SA-5), Suite 5H03, Washington, DC 20522-0505.                    

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The foregoing determinations were made pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681,                     *et seq.;*22 U.S.C. 6501 note,                     *et seq.*), Delegation of Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, and Delegation of Authority No. 236-3 of August 28, 2000.                

Matthew R. Lussenhop,

Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

[FR Doc. 2021-14491 Filed 7-7-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Ishmael Muhammad, Respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Haft, J.), entered on March 12, 1982, granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, reversed, on the law, and the indictment reinstated.

Defendant was indicted on December 18, 1980, charged with five counts relating to forgery, possession of stolen property, and drug possession. On February 24, 1982, the case was adjourned to March 11, 1982, and marked “final for trial”. On that date, the case appeared in the Calendar Part. The People announced their readiness for trial, stating that they were awaiting the return of an analysis of a handwriting exemplar which had been supplied by defendant, pursuant to order. The People further stated that they would proceed to trial even if the analysis were not received in time. The defense made an oral application to dismiss the indictment stating that it had intended to use the possible exculpatory nature of the said analysis. The court categorized the latter assertion as “nonsensical” and questioned the defendant’s failure to seek an expert opinion.

At a further call of the case, later the same day, defense counsel informed the court that, on February 24,1982, there had been “a promise” to dismiss the case if the handwriting analysis was not produced. The court referred the case for suppression and trial on the following day, before another judge, “subject to any prior ruling that I have made promising a dismissal of this action.”

The following day the matter was returned to the Calendar Judge with a copy of the minutes of February 24, wherein the *622court had indicated its intention to dismiss the case if the People did not produce the handwriting analysis by March 11. The People asserted their readiness for trial, stating that the analysis was not needed. The court thereupon dismissed the indictment.

As the defendant candidly concedes, dismissal of the indictment, in the absence of a,proper written motion, was a clear violation of CPL 210.45 (1). *(People v Kitt,*93 AD2d 77 [1st Dept 1983].) The Court of Appeals has also held, in *People v Douglass*(60 NY2d 194,197 [1983]), that there is no inherent power in the courts to dismiss a criminal case for “ ‘failure to prosecute”’ or “‘calendar control.’” Concur — Kupferman, J.P., Sandler, Carro and Rosenberger, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report of Falcon Natural Gas Corp. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Massimiliano Pozzoni, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that;

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

      A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

/s/ Massimiliano Pozzoni
------------------------
Name:  Massimiliano Pozzoni
Title: Chief Financial Officer
Date:  May 9, 2006