alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alouis Levorge TAYLOR, a/k/a Alouise Levorge Taylor, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-5187.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 29, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 9, 2011.

J. Mitchell Lanier, J. Mitchell Lanier, PA, Moncks Corner, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Nathan S. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before KING, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Alouis Levorge Taylor pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base and a quantity of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)® (2006). The district court initially sentenced Taylor to a total of 106 months’ imprisonment. The Government, however, moved to correct the sentence under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a), arguing that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010(FSA), Pub.L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (reducing sentencing disparity between powder cocaine and cocaine base), was not retroactively applicable and that a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) could not be used to implement a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum. The district court determined that it had clearly erred in retroactively applying the FSA and resentenced Taylor to the pre-FSA statutory mandatory mínimums, totaling 180 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, counsel contends that the district court erred in correcting the judgment beyond the fourteen-day period permitted under Rule 35(a) and that the stated reason for correcting the sentence was beyond the scope of the rule. We conclude, and the Government concedes, that the district court did not have jurisdiction to amend the judgment under Rule 35(a). *875
      *See United States v. Shank,*395 F.3d 466, 469-70 (4th Cir.2005) (concluding time period in Rule 35(a) is jurisdictional); *United States v. Wisch,*275 F.3d 620, 626 (7th Cir.2001) (“[T]he motion must be *ruled on*by the district court within [fourteen] days, not simply *filed with*the clerk of court during that time.”). Accordingly, we vacate the 180-month sentence set forth in the amended judgment and remand to the district court with instructions to impose the sentence pronounced on September 27, 2010. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

*VACATED AND REMANDED.*
Exhibit 99.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Minera Andes Inc. (the Corporation), on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Bonnie L. Kuhn, Chief Financial Officer of the Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





| | 1. |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




| | 2. |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation.
| | -- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




MINERA ANDES INC.Date:

November 12, 2002



By:

/s/    Bonnie L. KuhnBonnie L. Kuhn Chief Financial Officer and Secretary
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 777 

To clarify the authority of the Secretary of Defense to provide for the 

pay of the military of the United States under the Feed and Forage 

Act of 1861. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 8, 2011 

Mrs. HUTCHISON introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To clarify the authority of the Secretary of Defense to provide for the pay of the military of the United States 

under the Feed and Forage Act of 1861. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Temporary Military 

5 Pay Act of 2011’’. 

6 SEC. 2. AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—During a funding gap impacting 

8 the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense shall under 

9 the authority provided under section 3732 of the Revised 


sroberts on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

S 777 IS 

1 Statutes (41 U.S.C. 11) provide pay and allowances (with2 out interruption) to the following: 

3 (1) Members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, 

4 Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including reserve 

5 components thereof, who perform active service 

6 through the funding gap. 

7 (2) At the discretion of the Secretary of De8 fense, such civilian personnel of the Department of 

9 Defense who are providing support to the members 

10 of the Armed Forces described in paragraph (1) as 

11 the Secretary considers appropriate. 

12 (3) At the discretion of the Secretary of De13 fense, such personnel of contractors of the Depart14 ment of Defense who are providing direct support to 

15 the members of the Armed Forces described in para16 graph (1) as the Secretary considers appropriate. 

17 (b) FUNDING GAP DEFINED.—In this Act, the term 

18 ‘‘funding gap’’ means any period of time after the begin19 ning of a fiscal year for which interim or full-year appro20 priations for the personnel accounts of the Armed Forces 

21 for that fiscal year have not been enacted. 

22 (c) EXPIRATION.—Authority under this Act expires 

23 on September 30, 2011. 

Æ 


sroberts on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 June 7, 2016

jam

Order 

Clerk

June 7, 2016

153771 (40)

TIM TREVINO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 153771

COA: 328362

ROBERT JAMESON, 

Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________________

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it 

is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be 

liable for filing fees. 

Within 21 days of the certification of this order, plaintiff shall pay to the 

Clerk of the Court the initial partial filing fee of $67.00, shall submit a copy of this order 

with the payment, and shall refile the copy of the pleadings which is being returned 

with this order. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the appeal not being 

filed in this Court.

If plaintiff timely files the partial fee and refiles the pleadings, monthly 

payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in an amount of 50 percent of 

the deposits made to plaintiff’s account until the payments equal the balance due of 

$308.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court.

Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8) plaintiff shall not file further appeals in civil 

actions in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. 

The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to plaintiff and 

return plaintiff’s pleadings with this order.
### NUMBER 13 - 1 3 - 00 016 - CR 

## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________ LARRY DONELL FARROW , Appellant,

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee.

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 329 th District Court of Wharton County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________



## MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam Appellant, Larry Don ell Farrow , attempted to perfect an appeal from a conviction for evading arrest . We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Sentence in this matter was imposed on April 20, 2011 . No motion for new trial was filed. Notice of appeal was filed on December 30, 2012 . On February 21 , 201 3 , the Clerk of this Court notified appellant that it appeared that the appeal was not timely2

perfected. Appellant was advised that the appeal would be dismissed if the defect was not corrected within ten days from the date of receipt of the Court = s direct ive. On March 4, 2013, counsel filed a letter brief with this Court. Counsel = s response does not
establish that an appeal was timely filed. Unless a motion for new trial has been timely filed, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after t he day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court, or after the day the trial court enters an appealable order. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.2(a)(1). Where a timely motion for new trial has been filed, the notice of appeal must be filed within ninety days afte r the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court. See id. 26.2(a)(2). The time within which to file the notice may be enlarged if, within fifteen days after the deadline for filing the notice, the party files the notice of appeal and a motion com plying with Rule 10.5(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. 26.3. Appellant = s notice of appeal, filed more than twenty months after sentence was imposed, was untimely, and accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal. See Slaton , 981 S.W.2d at 210. Appellant may be entitled to an out

- of

- time appeal by filing a post

- conviction writ of habeas corpus returnable to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals; however, the availability of that remedy is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. See T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN . art. 11.07, ' 3(a) (Vernon 2005); see also Ex parte Garcia , 988 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The appeal is DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. PER CURIAM Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 47.2(b).
D elivered and filed the 2 8th day of March , 20 13
Exhibit 13.1


PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In connection with this Annual Report of TORM A/S (the "Company") on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") on or about the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jacob Meldgaard, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.





Date: April 30, 2013











/s/ Jacob Meldgaard


Jacob Meldgaard


Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)
CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO




18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,




AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO




SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Dahua Inc. (the
“Company”) for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, I, Hua Meng, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to
the best of my knowledge and belief, that:




1.
            Such
      Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the year ending December 31, 2008 fully
      complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
            The
      information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the fiscal
      year ended December 31, 2008 fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.




Dated:
September 14, 2009




/s/
      Hua MengHua
      MengChief
      Financial Officer(Principal
      Financial Officer and Principal Accounting
  Officer)
Parraguirre 

court in the first instance.' NRS 34.724(2)(b); NRS 34.738(1). 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

J. 

aitta 

cc: John Francis Arpino 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

We express no opinion as to whether petitioner could meet the 

procedural requirements of NRS chapter 34. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 19474 Apip,
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-31019

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CESAR ALEJANDRO SORIANO, also known as Cesar Soriano, also known 

as Cesar Alejandro,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:13-CR-127-7

Before JOLLY, GRAVES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Cesar Alejandro Soriano has moved 

for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th 

Cir. 2011). Soriano has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief 

and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 18, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-31019 Document: 00513158517 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/18/2015
No. 14-31019

2

counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for 

appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is 

GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the 

APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 14-31019 Document: 00513158517 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/18/2015
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Rusty’s Oilfield Service Co., Inc., * From the County Court at Law

of Midland County,

Trial Court No. CC20894.

Vs. No. 11-19-00086-CV * March 26, 2020

Ruger Properties, LLC, * Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

(Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.,

sitting by assignment)

(Willson, J., not participating)

 This court has considered the parties’ joint motion to dismiss this appeal and 

concludes that the motion should be granted. Therefore, in accordance with this 

court’s opinion, the appeal is dismissed. The costs incurred by reason of this 

appeal are taxed against the party incurring same.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA F OURTH D ISTRICT

ROSE LANNQUIST GOULDY , Appellant,

v.

TIMOTHY M. CHIASSON , Appellee.

No. 4D 22

- 118

[ February 2, 2023 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fif teenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; John S. Kastrenakes , Judge; L.T. Case No. 50

- 2021

- CA

000123

- XXXX

- MB

.
Rose Lannquist Gouldy, Palm Beach Gardens, pro se.

Kai E. Jacobs of South Florida Business Law Group, Coral Gables, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.
Affirmed.

M AY , L EVINE and C ONNER , JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-7132
MELVIN P. DEUTSCH, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District Judge. (CA-95-408-2) Submitted: November 26, 1996 Decided: December 17, 1996 Before ERVIN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Melvin P. Deutsch, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order requiring him to pay a partial filing fee in order to pursue his complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). This issue has already been resolved against Appellant. Deutsch v. United States Dep't of Justice , No. 95-7928 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 1996) (unpublished). We have reviewed the record and the district court's order and find that this appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1994), as amended by Prison Reform Litigation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
(121 App. Div. 585.)

#### NORTON & GORMAN CONTRACTING CO. v. UNIQUE CONST. CO. et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 23, 1907.)

1. Mechanics’ Liens—Notice—Description of Services or Materials.

Under Laws 1897, p. 518, c. 418, § 9, subd. 4, providing for filing a notice of lien, such notice must specifically and definitely state the labor performed or to be performed, or the materials furnished or to be furnished.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, Mechanics’ Liens, §§ 234-236.]

2. Same.

A statement in a notice of lien that “the labor performed and the materials furnished was the moving of a building * * * and placing the same upon the premises hereinafter named, * * * and the agreed price thereof is $3,460,” is not sufficient to support a claim for the price of the building itself within Laws 1897, p. 518, c. 418, § 9, subd. 4, providing that such notice shall state the labor performed or to be performed, or materials furnished or to be furnished, and the agreed price or value thereof.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, Mechanics’ Liens, §§ 234r-236.]

Woodward and Gaynor,' JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Special .Term, Kings County.

Action on a mechanic’s lien by the Norton & Gorman Contracting Company against the Unique Construction Company and others. Erom a judgment for the plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed and new trial granted.

Argued before WOODWARD, JENKS, HOOKER, RICH, and GAYNOR, JJ.

Ralph K. Jacobs, for appellants.

J. Stewart Ross, for respondent.

HOOKER, J.

This is an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. The only reference in the notice of lien to the labor performed or the materials furnished was as follows :

> “(4) The labor performed and the materials furnished was the moving of a building from the north side of Pacific street and placing the same upon the premises hereinafter described and designated, and the agreed price thereof Is three thousand four-hundred and sixty dollars.”

*373It is to be observed that the only claim stated was for the moving of the building and the placing of it upon other premises. The com- ‘ plaint was somewhat broader, claiming for the same moving and placing upon other premises, and, in addition, for the completing of the erection thereof. The amount claimed to be due by the plaintiff and mentioned in the decision is $3,557.20, $3,000 of which, however, is for the building itself; the balance being for something else. It is evident that the notice of lien is not valid to support a claim for the price of the building itself. It is held that the statement in the notice of lien' as provided for in subdivision 4 of section 9 of the lien law (Laws 1897, p. 518, c. 418) must specifically and definitely state the labor performed or to be performed, or the materials furnished or to be furnished. Toop v. Smith, 181 N. Y. 283, 73 N. E. 1113; McKinney v. White, 15 App. Div. 423, 44 N. Y. Supp. 561. This has not been done in this case as far as the building is concerned.

Judgment should be reversed, and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.

All concur, except WOODWARD and GAYNOR, JJ., who dissent.
Dismissed and Opinion Filed December 6, 2018 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-01332-CV 

IN RE SUSAN HARRIMAN, Relator 

Original Proceeding from the 162nd Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-11994 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Bridges, Brown, and Boatright 

Opinion by Justice Bridges 

Before the Court are relator’s petition for writ of mandamus and relator’s “Motion to 

Vacate Trial Court Temporary Injunction Order, Implement Settlement Agreement and Dismiss.” 

In this original proceeding, relator complains of the trial court’s April 13, 2018 Agreed Temporary 

Injunction. The parties have now settled the underlying dispute, and the trial court has signed an 

“Order of Non-Suit with Prejudice” and dismissed all claims at issue in this original proceeding. 

In her motion, relator requests that this Court vacate the April 13, 2018 Agreed Temporary 

Injunction and order the parties to bear their own costs. Real parties in interest Julio Palmaz, M.D. 

and Steven Solomon filed a response to the motion. They oppose the relief requested by relator 

and maintain that the non-suit and dismissal order rendered this proceeding moot and, therefore, 

must be dismissed. 

When a trial court dismisses an action pursuant to a notice of non-suit, a temporary order 

rendered during the pendency of the cause automatically dissolves by operation of law without 
 –2– 

further order of the trial court and renders appellate proceedings related to the order moot. Gen. 

Land Office v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990) (when trial court dismisses 

lawsuit, temporary injunction is automatically dissolved); Goodman v. Hill, No. 05-13-01313-CV, 

2014 WL 1576969, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 21, 2014, no pet.) (“The trial court’s dismissal 

of the underlying action automatically dissolved the temporary injunction, rendering the issues in 

this appeal moot.”). 

Here, the trial court’s dismissal automatically dissolved the April 13, 2018 Agreed 

Temporary Injunction of which relator complains. This controversy is, therefore, moot and must 

be dismissed. See Gen. Land. Office, 789 S.W.2d at 572. Accordingly, we deny relator’s “Motion 

to Vacate Trial Court Temporary Injunction Order, Implement Settlement Agreement and 

Dismiss” and dismiss this original proceeding as moot without reaching the merits of the petition 

for writ of mandamus. 

181332F.P05 

/David L. Bridges/ 

DAVID L. BRIDGES 

JUSTICE