alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ex10-25.htm


Exhibit 10.25

 

FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE

 

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN

QUAD CITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY

AND JOHN H. ANDERSON

 

This Amendment (the “Amendment”) is made this 18th day of December, 2012 (the “Effective Date”) by and between Quad City Bank and Trust Company (the “Bank”) and John H. Anderson (the “Employee”).

 

WHEREAS, the Bank and the Employee have entered into that certain amended and restated Employment Agreement dated October 30, 2009 (the “Agreement”);

 

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 12(d) of the Agreement, the Agreement may be amended in writing with the signature of each party; and

 

WHEREAS, the parties now desire to amend the Agreement on the terms hereinafter set forth. 

 

NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which is agreed and acknowledged by the parties hereto, effective as of the Effective Date, the Agreement be and is hereby amended in the following particulars:

 

	 	
1.
	
The existing first sentence of Section 4(c)(vi) of the Agreement shall be deleted and replaced with the following new sentence:



 

“Term life insurance of two (2) times Base Salary and Average Annual Bonus as of the date of this Agreement; which insurance may be provided through a group term carve-out plan at the Bank’s election.”

 

2.           The existing first sentence of Section 10(c) of the Agreement shall be deleted and replaced with the following new sentence:

 

“If a Change in Control (as defined below) occurs and the Employee is terminated within one (1) year following the Change in Control or the Employee elects within six (6) months following the Change in Control to terminate his employment, a severance payment will be made within fifteen (15) days of termination equal to two (2) years Base Salary and Average Annual Bonus.”

 

3.           The existing definition of “Change in Duties” set forth in Section 10(c) of the Agreement shall be deleted and not replaced. 

 

4.           The existing definition of “Change in Control” set forth in Section 10(c) of the Agreement shall be modified by replacing the existing clause (i) with the following new clause (i):

  


 

 




 


 

“(i) The consummation of the acquisition by any person (as such term is defined in Section 13(d) or 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the ‘1934 Act’)) of beneficial ownership (within the meaning of Rule 13d-3 promulgated under the 1934 Act) of thirty-three percent (33%) or more of the combined voting power of the then outstanding voting securities of QCR Holdings, Inc. (the ‘Company’); or”

 

5.           The existing Section 10(iv) of the Agreement shall be redesignated as “Section 10(d).”

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as of the date and year first above set forth.

 

	
QUAD CITY BANK AND                          

TRUST COMPANY 
	
 
	
 

	
 
	
 
	
 
	
 

	
By: 
	
/s/ Douglas M. Hultquist 
	
 
	
/s/ John H Anderson 

	
 
	
Douglas M. Hultquist  
	
 
	
John H. Anderson 

	
 
	
QCR Holdings, Inc. CEO
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 683 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 683

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To provide for the conveyance of certain parcels of land to the town of 
                             Mantua, Utah.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Box Elder Utah Land Conveyance 
Act''.

SEC. 2. CONVEYANCE.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Map.--The term ``map'' means the map entitled ``Box 
        Elder Utah Land Conveyance Act'' and dated June 23, 2011.
            (2) National forest system land.--The term ``National 
        Forest System land'' means the approximately 31.5 acres of 
        National Forest System land in Box Elder County, Utah, that is 
        generally depicted on the map as parcels A, B, and C.
            (3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of Agriculture.
            (4) Town.--The term ``Town'' means the town of Mantua, 
        Utah.
    (b) Conveyance.--On the request of the Town submitted to the 
Secretary by the date that is not later than 1 year after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall convey to the Town, without 
consideration and by quitclaim deed, all right, title, and interest of 
the United States in and to the National Forest System land.
    (c) Survey; Costs.--
            (1) In general.--If determined by the Secretary to be 
        necessary, the exact acreage and legal description of the 
        National Forest System land shall be determined by a survey 
        approved by the Secretary.
            (2) Costs.--The Town shall pay the reasonable survey and 
        other administrative costs associated with the conveyance.
    (d) Use of National Forest System Land.--As a condition of the 
conveyance under subsection (b), the Town shall use the National Forest 
System land only for public purposes.
    (e) Reversionary Interest.--In the quitclaim deed to the Town, the 
Secretary shall provide that the National Forest System land shall 
revert to the Secretary, at the election of the Secretary, if the 
National Forest System land is used for a purpose other than a public 
purpose.
    (f) Additional Terms and Conditions.--With respect to the 
conveyance under subsection (b), the Secretary may require such 
additional terms and conditions as the Secretary determines to be 
appropriate to protect the interests of the United States.

            Passed the Senate November 2, 2011.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
112th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                 S. 683

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

To provide for the conveyance of certain parcels of land to the town of 
                             Mantua, Utah.
```
# C_2019319EN.01002301.xml

| 23.9.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 319/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 319/23

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Koszalinie (Poland) lodged on 21 February 2019 — V.C. Sp. z. o. o. v P.K.

(Case C-150/19)

(2019/C 319/25)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy w Koszalinie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: V.C. Sp. z. o. o.

Defendant: P.K.

By order of 4 June 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union has held that Case C-150/19 is to be removed from the register of the Court.

---
#### In the Matter of Trevor L. Phillips, Appellant, v “John Doe” McGann, as Deputy Superintendent of Administration at Wallkill Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents.

Harvey, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Cobb, J.), entered June 19,1984 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Petitioner sought to commence a CPLR article 78 proceeding to vacate the determination at a disciplinary hearing, expunge all evidence thereof from his record and restore good time lost as a result of the decision. In an effort to commence the proceeding, he caused to be mailed to Supreme Court and respondents a group of papers apparently prepared by him without the assistance of counsel. The first paper was entitled “Notice of Petition Pursuant to CPLR article 78”. However, the relief sought by the *989notice was an order to show cause why the disciplinary determination should not be annulled. The second paper was entitled “Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause”, which was an affidavit signed by petitioner setting forth factual statements ostensibly entitling him to the ultimate relief demanded. The third paper was a proposed “Order to Show Cause” leaving blanks to be filled in by the court in the event that a determination was made to grant the order to show cause.

Petitioner’s affidavit of service is stamped by the Albany County Clerk indicating the filing of the papers on March 12, 1984. A handwritten notation on the affidavit of service indicates that a return date was established at the April 27, 1984 Special Term. On that date, Special Term dismissed the petition, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over respondents because they had been served by ordinary mail.

Obviously the papers were inartfully drafted but, nevertheless, it is most apparent that petitioner was making an application for an order to show cause to commence his proceeding rather than seeking ultimate relief by notice of petition and petition. Special Term concluded that the papers constituted a notice of petition and petition and dismissed them for failure to personally serve respondents. An application for an order to show cause is ex parte and no notice is required to be given (10 Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac § 70.28). Had the show cause order been executed, Special Term could have prescribed the method of service of that order upon respondents *(see, Matter of Davis v Coughlin,*96 AD2d 682).

The matter must be remitted to Special Term to accept petitioner’s notice and supporting papers as an application for an order to show cause as of April 26,1984 *(see, Matter of Hanson v Coughlin,*103 AD2d 949; *Matter of King v Gregorie,*90 AD2d 922, 922-923, *lv dismissed*58 NY2d 822).

Judgment reversed, on the law, with costs, motion denied and matter remitted to Special Term for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. Main, J. P., Weiss, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr. and Harvey, JJ., concur.
Dismissed and Opinion Filed December 6, 2018 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-01332-CV IN RE SUSAN HARRIMAN, Relator Original Proceeding from the 162nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-11994 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Brown, and Boatright Opinion by Justice Bridges Before the Court are relator’s p etition for writ of mandamus an d relator’s “Motion to Vacate Trial Court Temporary Inj unction Order, Implement Settle ment Agreement and Dismiss.” In this original proceeding, relator complains of the trial cou rt’s April 13, 2018 Agreed Temporary Injunction. The parties have now settled the und erlying disput e, and the trial court has signed an “Order of Non-Suit with Prejudice” and dismissed all claims at issue in this original proceeding. In her motion, relator requests that this Court vacate the Apri l 13, 2018 Agreed Temporary Injunction and order the partie s to bear their own costs. Real parties in interest Julio Palmaz, M.D. and Steven Solomon filed a response to the motion. They oppose the relief requested by relator and maintain that the non-suit and dismissal order rendered thi s proceeding moot and, therefore, must be dismissed. When a trial court dismisses an action pursuant to a notice of non-suit, a temporary order rendered during the pendency of the cause automatically dissolv es by operation of law without–2– further order of the trial court and renders appellate proceedi ngs related to the order moot. Gen. Land Office v. OXY U.S.A., Inc. , 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990) (when trial court dismisses lawsuit, temporary injunction is automatically dissolved); Goodman v. Hill , No. 05-13-01313-CV, 2014 WL 1576969, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 21, 2014, no pet. ) (“The trial court’s dismissal of the underlying action automati cally dissolved the temporary injunction, rendering the issues in this appeal moot.”). Here, the trial court’s dismissal automatically dissolved the A pril 13, 2018 Agreed Temporary Injunction of which rel ator complains. This controve rsy is, therefore, moot and must be dismissed. See Gen. Land. Office , 789 S.W.2d at 572. Accordingly, we deny relator’s “Motion to Vacate Trial Court Temporary Injunction Order, Implement Set tlement Agreement and Dismiss” and dismiss this original proceeding as moot without r eaching the merits of the petition for writ of mandamus.

181332F.P05 /David L. Bridges/ DAVID L. BRIDGES JUSTICE
Exhibit 21.1

Subsidiaries of Regal Entertainment Group

Jurisdiction of
OrganizationA 3 Theatres of San Antonio, Ltd.

TexasA 3 Theatres of Texas, Inc.

DelawareCDP Limited Liability Company

CaliforniaCinebarre, LLC

DelawareDigital Cinema Implementation Partners, LLC

DelawareEastgate Theatre, Inc.

OregonEdwards Theatres, Inc.

DelawareFrederick Plaza Cinemas, Inc.

MarylandGreen Hills Commons, LLC

TennesseeHoyts Cinemas Corporation

DelawareInterstate Theatres Corporation

MassachusettsNational CineMedia, LLC

DelawareNext Generation Network, Inc.

DelawareOchtel Partnership

New YorkOrix RAM Montgomery Venture General Partnership

IllinoisPalace Suite, Inc.

New YorkRAM/UA-KOP, LLC

DelawareR and S Theaters, Inc.

MississippiR.C. Cobb, Inc.

AlabamaRCI/FSSC, LLC

New YorkRCI/RMS, LLC

DelawareRegal/Cinebarre Holdings, LLC

DelawareRegal Cinemas Corporation

DelawareRegal Cinemas Holdings, Inc.

DelawareRegal Cinemas, Inc.

TennesseeRegal CineMedia Corporation

VirginiaRegal CineMedia Holdings, LLC

DelawareRegal/DCIP Holdings, LLC

DelawareRegal Entertainment Holdings, Inc.

DelawareRegal Entertainment Holdings II, LLC

DelawareRegal Gallery Place, LLC

District of ColumbiaRegal Investment Company

ColoradoRegal Stratford, Inc.

TennesseeSan Francisco Theatres, Inc.

CaliforniaStaten Theatre Group

New YorkStaten Theatre Group II

New YorkUA SHOR LLC

DelawareUA Swansea, LLC

TennesseeUnited Artists/Pacific Media Joint Venture

ColoradoUnited Artists Properties I Corp.

ColoradoUnited Artists Realty Company

DelawareUnited Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.

MarylandUnited Artists Theatre Company

Delaware


---



QuickLinks
**Exhibit 10.40****GUARANTY**     This GUARANTY is made as of October 27, 2006 by NOBLE CORPORATION, a Cayman Islands exemptedcompany limited by shares (the “Company”), for the benefit of David W. Williams (the “Executive”);WITNESSETH:     WHEREAS, Noble Drilling Services Inc., a Delaware corporation and an indirect, wholly ownedsubsidiary of the Company (“Noble-Subsidiary”), has entered into an Employment Agreement with theExecutive dated as of the date hereof (the “Employment Agreement”); and     WHEREAS, the Company desires to guarantee the performance by Noble-Subsidiary of itsobligations under the Employment Agreement, and the Board of Directors of the Company hasdetermined that it is reasonable and prudent for the Company to deliver this Guaranty and necessaryto promote and ensure the best interests of the Company and its Members;     NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the Company hereby irrevocably andunconditionally guarantees, as primary obligor, the due and punctual performance byNoble-Subsidiary of its agreements and obligations, all and singular, under the EmploymentAgreement. This Guaranty shall survive any liquidation of Noble-Subsidiary or any of itssubsidiaries. This Guaranty shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of theState of Texas.     The obligations of the Company hereunder shall be absolute and unconditional and shall remainin full force and effect until the termination of the Employment Agreement or the completeperformance by Noble-Subsidiary of its obligations thereunder, irrespective of the validity,regularity or enforceability of the Employment Agreement, any change or amendment thereto, theabsence of any action to enforce the same, any waiver or consent by the Executive orNoble-Subsidiary with respect to any provision of the Employment Agreement, the recovery of anyjudgment against Noble-Subsidiary or any action to enforce the same, or any other circumstancesthat may otherwise constitute a legal or equitable discharge or defense of the Company. TheCompany waives any right of set-off or counterclaim it may have against the Executive arising fromany other obligations the Executive may have to Noble-Subsidiary or the Company.     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Agreement to be executed on its behalf by itsduly authorized officer as of the date first above set forth.      NOBLE CORPORATION
### C OURT OF 

### A PPEALS FOR THE



### F IRST 

### D ISTRICT OF 

### T EXAS AT 

### H OUSTON



### O RDER ON 

### M OTION



### November 7, 2008 Revision Cause number: 01

- 1 3

- 0 0 510

- C V

Style: Giovanny Laguan

v. Hillary J. Lloyd and Kimberly A. Lloyd

Date motion filed * : July 19 , 201 3

Type of motion: Motion for extension of time to file meritorious response

Party filing motion: Appellant

Document to be filed: Response to Court’s notice of intent to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction

Is appeal accelerated? No

If motion to extend time:

Original due date: July 22 , 2013

Number of previous extensions granted: 0 Current Due date: July 22 , 2013

Date Requested: August 5 , 2013

Ordered that motion is:

 Granted

If document is to be filed, document due: August 5 , 2013

 T he Court will not grant additional motions to extend time

 Denied

 Dismissed ( e.g. , want of jurisdiction, moot )

 Other: _____________________________________

Judge's signature: /s/ Laura C. Higley

Panel consists of

____________________________________________

Date: July 29, 2013
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Elveria RODRIGUEZ-QUIROS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-10482.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 14, 2011.

Amber Marie Craig, Assistant U.S., USLV-Offiee of the U.S. Attorney, Las Vegas, NV, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Brenda Weksler, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: SILVERMAN and GRABER, Circuit Judges, and WRIGHT, District Judge.**

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Otis D. Wright, II, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Defendant Elveria Rodriguez-Quiros appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress the drugs found in her car’s bumper. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

*348The record does not support the defendant’s claim that the district judge improperly rejected the magistrate judge’s factual findings. The district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s findings, but reached a different legal conclusion regarding probable cause.

Having obtained the defendant’s lawful consent to search the vehicle, the troopers were within their rights to inspect and probe a pre-existing hole in the bumper. Upon discovering white powder and observing what looked like tape, the troopers had probable cause to believe that the normally empty bumper contained drugs. *See United States v. Ewing,*638 F.3d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir.2011).

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 684 

AN ACT 

To provide for the conveyance of certain parcels of land 

to the town of Alta, Utah. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

†S 684 ES

1 SECTION 1. CONVEYANCE. 

2 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act: 

3 (1) NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LAND.—The 

4 term ‘‘National Forest System land’’ means the par5 cels of National Forest System land that— 

6 (A) are located— 

7 (i) in sec. 5, T. 3 S., R. 3 E., Salt 

8 Lake meridian; 

9 (ii) in, and adjacent to, parcels of 

10 land subject to special use permit 

11 SLC102708, the authority of which expires 

12 on December 30, 2026; 

13 (iii) in the Wasatch-Cache National 

14 Forest in Salt Lake County, Utah; and 

15 (iv) in the incorporated boundary of 

16 the town of Alta, Utah; and 

17 (B) consist of approximately 2 acres (in18 cluding appurtenances). 

19 (2) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 

20 the Secretary of Agriculture. 

21 (3) TOWN.—The term ‘‘Town’’ means the town 

22 of Alta, Utah. 

23 (b) CONVEYANCE.—On the request of the Town sub24 mitted to the Secretary by the date that is not later than 

25 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Sec26 retary shall convey to the Town, without consideration, all 
3 

†S 684 ES

1 right, title, and interest of the United States in and to 

2 the National Forest System land. 

3 (c) SURVEY; COSTS.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—In accordance with para5 graphs (2) and (3), the exact acreage and legal de6 scription of the National Forest System land shall 

7 be determined by a survey approved by the Sec8 retary. 

9 (2) MAXIMUM AREA.—The acreage of the Na10 tional Forest System land determined under para11 graph (1) may not exceed 2 acres. 

12 (3) COSTS.—The Town shall pay the reasonable 

13 survey and other administrative costs associated 

14 with the conveyance. 

15 (d) USE OF NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LAND.—As 

16 a condition of the conveyance under subsection (b), the 

17 Town shall use the National Forest System land only for 

18 public purposes. 

19 (e) REVERSIONARY INTEREST.—In the deed to the 

20 Town, the Secretary shall provide that the National Forest 

21 System land shall revert to the Secretary, at the election 

22 of the Secretary based on the best interests of the United 

23 States, if the National Forest System land is used for a 

24 purpose other than a public purpose. 
4 

†S 684 ES

1 (f) ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—With re2 spect to the conveyance under subsection (b), the Sec3 retary may require such additional terms and conditions 

4 as the Secretary determines to be appropriate to protect 

5 the interests of the United States. 

Passed the Senate November 2, 2011. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 684 

AN ACT 

To provide for the conveyance of certain parcels of 

land to the town of Alta, Utah.
**Exhibit 32 (i)**

 

CERTIFICATION SECTION 1350

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Penns Woods Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”)on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2010, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, RonaldA. Walko, Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

(1)           the Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           the information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresult of operations of the Company.

 
| /s/  Ronald A. Walko     |   |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Ronald  A. Walko         |   |
| Chief  Executive Officer |   |
|                     |   |
| May 10, 2010        |   |

 

1

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