United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 18-3669

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Michael Wayne Parsons

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln

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 Submitted: November 11, 2019

Filed: January 7, 2020

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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.

Michael Parsons appeals after a jury found him guilty of being a felon in

possession of a firearm, claiming that the the district court1

erred by denying his Rule

1The Honorable John M. Gerrard, Chief United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.
29 motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to sustain

his conviction. Because we find the evidence was sufficient to support Parson’s

conviction, we affirm.

I. Background

Parsons claimsto be an ambassador and diplomat of the Tsilhqot'in (Chilcotin)

Nation, located in British Columbia, Canada. In 2009, Parsons was convicted of

aggravated assault – a felony offense – in Tipton County, Tennessee. In January

2017, Parsons absconded while on pretrial release awaiting trial on new Tennessee

state charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm. A warrant was issued in

Tennessee for his failure to appear. 

On January 11, 2017, Parsons piloted a small plane to the Arapahoe Airport

located in Furnas County, Nebraska. It appears that Parsons was en route to the

Tsilhqot'in Nation in Canada. That same day, law enforcement officers triangulated

Parsons’ cell phone activity to the area surrounding the Arapahoe Airport. Parsons

elected to sleep in the airport overnight and was arrested at the airport the next

morning by officers from several state and federal agencies. Because the law

enforcement officers mistakenly believed that Parsons had arrived by motor vehicle,

they did not impound or search Parsons’ plane at the time of Parsons’ arrest. It is

undisputed that the plane remained in the hangar for approximately two months, and

that several people had access to the plane during this time. 

On March 22, 2017, officers from the Federal Bureau of Investigation

searched the plane pursuant to a warrant and discovered an AR-15 style rifle, three

fully-loaded 30-round magazines and additional ammunition. Items bearing Parsons’

name, including an insurance application and a hangar receipt, were found near the

gun. Parsons was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

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Parsons elected to proceed to trial pro se. The jury heard evidence related to

the plane and its contents. The evidence included excerpts from three recorded jail

calls made by Parsons prior to the search of the plane. During the recorded calls

Parsons alluded to items(which he referred to as “gifts” and the “nation’sitems”) that

were left in the plane and that needed to be removed from the plane immediately. 

Law enforcement traced and testified about the provenance of the gun,

showing an original purchase in Alabama in 2006 by Matthew Lovan. Lovan

testified that he sold the gun to Parsons in 2008 and he never saw it again. Parsons

himself testified that he purchased a gun fromLovan, and he admitted that the firearm

found in the plane appeared to be the same gun that he purchased from Lovan. 

Notwithstanding this admission, Parsons claimed to have traded the gun to a friend

who later passed away. 

After the government rested, Parsons moved for a judgment of acquittal under

Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, which the district court denied. Parsons was convicted, and the

district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment. 

Parsons now appeals, contending insufficiency of the evidence. He assertsthe district

court erred when it denied his Rule 29 motion. Parsons claims the evidence failed to

establish he “knowingly” possessed a firearm because the airplane where the gun was

found had been left unlocked and unattended before law enforcement officers found

the gun.

II. Discussion

We review sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case de novo, viewing the

evidence “in the light most favorable to the government, resolving conflicts in the

government’sfavor, and accepting allreasonable inferencesthatsupport the verdict.” 

United States v. Morris, 723 F.3d 934, 938 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted).

Reversal is warranted only when “no reasonable jury could find all the elements

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beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .” United States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir.

2010). 

Until recently, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon required the

Government to prove three elements: “(1) previous conviction of a crime punishable

by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, (2) knowing possession of a firearm,

and (3) the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.” United States v.

Montgomery, 701 F.3d 1218, 1221 (8th Cir. 2012). See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The

Supreme Court has added a fourth element: (4) that the defendant “knew he belonged

to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif v.

United States, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019).2Parsons challenges only the

second element, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove he knowingly

possessed the firearm.

Possession of a firearmmay be actual or constructive. United States v. Garrett,

648 F.3d 618, 622 (8th Cir. 2011). To show constructive possession, the government

must prove that the defendant had “dominion over the premises where the firearm

2Rehaif was decided after the filing of this appeal, and Parsons has not raised

a Rehaif argument here. Nevertheless, we find that such an argument would be

without merit. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734

(1993) (elements of plain error review); United States v. Hollingshed, 940 F.3d 410,

415 (8th Cir. 2019) (considering a Rehaif argument raised while the direct appeal was

pending because “Supreme Court decisions in criminal cases apply to all cases

pending on direct review”). At the time of his arrest, Parsons had absconded from

pretrial release in Tennessee, while awaiting trial on state charges for being a felon

in possession of a firearm. He served more than two years in prison for the

underlying aggravated felony assault conviction. Thus, even assuming that Rehaif

applies and some error occurred, Parsons cannotshow a “reasonable probability that,

but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” United

States v. Valquier, 936 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 2019); see Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 2198

(doubting that the obligation to prove a defendant’s knowledge of his status will be

burdensome because knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence).

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[was] located, or control, ownership, or dominion over the firearm itself.” United

States v. Maxwell, 363 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1154,

125 S.Ct. 1293 (2005). “Constructive possession may be established by

circumstantial evidence alone, but the government must show a sufficient nexus

between the defendant and the firearm.” United States v. Evans, 431 F.3d 342, 345

(8th Cir. 2005). Indeed, “a jury rarely has direct evidence of a defendant’s

knowledge, [and]it is generallyestablished through circumstantial evidence.” United

States v. Smith, 508 F.3d 861, 867 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Ojeda,

23 F.3d 1473, 1476 (8th Cir. 1994)). This is true even if other people had access to

the location where the firearm was found. See, e.g., United States v. White, 816 F.3d

976 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding constructive possession where others had a key to the

storage unit where the gun wasfound and circumstantial evidence showed defendant

had knowledge of the storage units contents).

Here, on two occasions, Parsons himself provided evidence to support a finding

that he knowingly possessed the gun: first, in the recorded jail calls when he

referenced items that needed to be removed from the plane; and, second, when he

admitted at trial that the gun looked like the firearmhe purchased fromLovan. Lovan

testified that it was the same gun he sold to Parsons in Alabama in 2008. 

Parsons’ claim that the firearm’s presence on the plane piloted by him to

Nebraska is a surprising and inexplicable coincidence strains credulity. Parsons had

dominion over the plane when he flew from Tennessee to Nebraska. The gun was

found near personal items that belonged to Parsons. And, Parsons had recently

absconded from Tennessee while awaiting trial on a state charge for being a felon in

possession of a firearm. 

Taken together, there was sufficient evidence to establish a nexus between

Parsons and the gun. The district court did not err in denying Parson’s Rule 29

motion for judgment of acquittal.

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III. Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Parsons’ remaining motionsfor

stay, for release from custody, and for return of his property are denied.

KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur in all aspects of the opinion except footnote 2.

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