NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

TOBY HARRIS, 

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

GODADDY.COM, INC., an Arizona corporation, 

Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0151

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2010-016149

The Honorable Randall H. Warner, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Toby Allen Harris, Phoenix

Plaintiff/Appellant in Propria Persona

BurnsBarton LLP, Phoenix

By David T. Barton, C. Christine Burns, Benjamin J. Naylor 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
HARRIS v. GODADDY.COM

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Toby Harris, a former employee of defendant GoDaddy.Com, 

Inc. (“GoDaddy”), appeals the superior court’s decision granting 

GoDaddy’s motion for summary judgment on Harris’s claims related to his 

employment termination. Finding no error, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 GoDaddy hired Harris in November 2009 as a sales and 

support representative. In February 2010, GoDaddy dismissed Harris for 

security breaches that violated GoDaddy’s policies. One of the breaches

occurred when Harris transmitted to his personal e-mail account a “CRM 

screenshot” depicting confidential information regarding Harris’s sales

over a ten-day period. 

¶3 Harris and other plaintiffs filed a putative class action in 

superior court, alleging (in one federal law claim and various Arizona law 

claims) GoDaddy failed to compensate them for overtime work and pay 

bonuses, and as to Harris, wrongfully terminated him. GoDaddy removed 

the case to federal district court. Although plaintiffs amended the 

complaint twice, the district court subsequently dismissed all claims except

Harris’s claims under Arizona law alleging a violation of the Minimum 

Wage Act and retaliatory discharge. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) §§ 23-

362 to -365, -1501. Because the federal law claim had been finally resolved, 

the district court then remanded the case back to superior court. 

¶4 Following remand, GoDaddy successfully moved for 

summary judgment, and Harris filed a post-judgment motion to alter and 

modify the judgment, which the superior court denied. Harris timely 

appealed. 

DISCUSSION

¶5 Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 
HARRIS v. GODADDY.COM

Decision of the Court

3

judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A plaintiff bears the 

burden of showing available, competent evidence that would justify a trial 

once the defendant establishes it is entitled to summary judgment. Ulibarri 

v. Gerstenberger, 178 Ariz. 151, 156, 871 P.2d 698, 703 (App. 1993). We review 

de novo the grant of a motion for summary judgment. Tierra Ranchos 

Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 199, ¶ 15, 165 P.3d 173, 177 

(App. 2007). 

A. Minimum Wage Act Claim

¶6 Arizona’s Minimum Wage Act (“Act”) requires employers to 

pay employees a certain hourly wage. A.R.S. § 23-363. The Act also 

requires employers to maintain payroll records reflecting daily hours 

worked and wages paid to all employees for a period of four years. A.R.S. 

§ 23-364(D). Employers must permit an employee to inspect and copy his 

or her records. Id. 

¶7 Employers are prohibited from discharging an employee who 

asserts a claim or right under the Act. A.R.S. § 23-364(B). If an employer 

discharges an employee within ninety days of the employee asserting a 

claim under the Act, a presumption arises that the discharge was 

retaliatory. Id. The employer may rebut the presumption with clear and 

convincing evidence that the discharge occurred for other permissible 

reasons. Id.

¶8 Harris argues the CRM screenshot is a payroll record, and he 

was terminated for possessing it, in violation of the Act. Thus, Harris 

contends the superior court should have presumed GoDaddy retaliated 

against him because GoDaddy dismissed him six days after he asserted his 

rights under the Act. According to Harris, GoDaddy’s reason for 

terminating his employment was pretextual. 

¶9 The record, however, fails to support Harris’s arguments. 

Harris failed to provide any evidence that GoDaddy prohibited him from 

inspecting and copying any of his payroll records. In fact, Harris did not 

make this allegation in the original complaint, the first amended complaint 

or the second amended complaint.1 Thus, on these undisputed facts, 

summary judgment in GoDaddy’s favor was proper. 

 

1 Harris first raised this allegation in his statement of controverting 

facts in response to GoDaddy’s motion for summary judgment. 
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¶10 Moreover, GoDaddy rebutted the presumption of retaliation 

by clear and convincing evidence that Harris was terminated not for 

inspecting or copying the CRM screenshot, but for—in part—his “taking 

[it] out of the company[]” in violation of GoDaddy’s security policy. Harris 

conceded that this was the reason given for his termination. And although 

Harris contends the “security breach” basis for his dismissal was a 

“pretext,” he never asserted that the security breaches were an improper 

basis for his termination. Nor did Harris offer any evidence to support his 

assertion that he “was fired for having a copy of the [document].” See State 

v. Mecham, 173 Ariz. 474, 478, 844 P.2d 641, 645 (App. 1992) (noting a party

cannot solely rely “on unsupported contentions that a dispute exists to 

create a factual issue that would defeat summary judgment”).

¶11 Harris also argues GoDaddy presented no evidence of the 

written policy that he was terminated for violating. This argument is 

unavailing. First, Harris points to no authority prohibiting employers from 

discharging employees for violating unwritten policies. Second, GoDaddy 

submitted evidence showing Harris was aware of, and agreed to adhere to, 

written security policies. GoDaddy also provided evidence that it notified 

Harris in writing of his violations of those policies. Harris admitted that he 

“was required to follow strict security protocols detailed in GoDaddy’s 

‘Vault’ articles, and he signed several polices [sic] agreeing not to disclose 

any confidential information during or after his employment.” For these 

reasons, the superior court did not err in granting GoDaddy’s motion for 

summary judgment on Harris’s claim under the Act.2

 

2 Without citing to the record or any supporting authority, Harris 

makes general assertions regarding “breach of confidentiality” and “a bulk 

of” whistleblower cases. Harris also refers to a news article that was 

released after the superior court’s ruling. Whatever arguments Harris 

attempts to raise along these lines, we do not address them. An appellant 

must present significant arguments, set forth his or her position on the 

issues raised, and include citations to relevant authorities, statutes, and 

portions of the record. See ARCAP 13(a)(6), (b)(1). The failure to do so may 

constitute, as it does here, an abandonment and a waiver of that issue. State 

v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 452 n.9, ¶ 101, 94 P.3d 1119, 1147 n.9 (2004); see also 

Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352, 355 n.5, ¶ 14, 160 P.3d 231, 234 n.5 (App. 

2007) (holding that appellate courts “will not consider argument posited 

without authority”). 
HARRIS v. GODADDY.COM

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B. Employment Protection Act Claim

¶12 Arizona’s Employment Protection Act (“AEPA”) provides a 

discharged employee with a cause of action against his or her employer for 

terminating the employee in retaliation for the employee’s reasonable 

disclosure of the employer’s violation of state law. A.R.S. § 23-

1501(A)(3)(c); see also Galati v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz. 290, 292, ¶ 5, 

69 P.3d 1011, 1013 (App. 2003). Harris argues he sufficiently pled 

GoDaddy’s purported violation of state law in his response to the motion 

for summary judgment. We disagree. 

¶13 As an initial matter, the disclosure of a possible violation of 

state law must occur before the employee’s discharge in order for the 

discharge to be retaliatory. See A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii).

3 Here, nothing 

in the record indicates Harris notified GoDaddy of a possible violation of 

state law prior to his termination. Instead, Harris’s controverting statement 

of facts reflects he disclosed a potential violation of “Federal Law Statutes 

for discretionary bonuses.” AEPA is expressly limited to disclosures of 

state law violations; a purported violation of federal law is insufficient. 

A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i-x); see Galati, 205 Ariz. at 294, ¶ 15, 69 P.3d at 1015 

(“After a review of the clear and unequivocal language of A.R.S. § 23–1501 

 

3 This statutory provision provides, in relevant part:

An employee has a claim against an employer for termination 

of employment . . . if [t]he employer has terminated the 

employment relationship of an employee in retaliation for . . . 

[t]he disclosure by the employee in a reasonable manner that 

the employee has information or a reasonable belief that the 

employer, or an employee of the employer, has violated, is 

violating or will violate the Constitution of Arizona or the 

statutes of this state to either the employer or a representative 

of the employer who the employee reasonably believes is in a 

managerial or supervisory position and has the authority to 

investigate the information provided by the employee and to 

take action to prevent further violations of the Constitution of 

Arizona or statutes of this state or an employee of a public 

body or political subdivision of this state or any agency of a 

public body or political subdivision.

A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(ii).
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. . . , we do not find that a statutory public policy exception exists for 

whistleblowing associated with federal regulations.”). Finally, the 

evidence submitted establishes that Harris was discharged for one reason 

that was non-retaliatory—his violations of GoDaddy’s security policies. 

Thus, the superior court properly ruled in favor of GoDaddy on Harris’s 

AEPA claim. 

C. Prior Agreement Regarding “No Disciplinary Action”

¶14 Finally, Harris contends summary judgment in GoDaddy’s

favor was improper because the parties had agreed before Harris was 

terminated that Harris would not be subject to discipline. In support of this 

argument, Harris relies on a copy of an e-mail he attached to his 

controverting statement of facts and his post-judgment motions,4 the latter 

being when Harris admits he “then raised the issue of the pre-existing 

contract[.]” The referenced e-mail was sent from GoDaddy’s employee 

relations manager to Harris and stated that an impending meeting between 

the two “is not an investigative meeting, where there could be possible 

disciplinary action, [but] is regarding policy interpretation[.]” Harris 

contends the trial court erred in “not applying the terms of the agreement[.]” 

Harris also suggests that GoDaddy breached the “agreement” because he 

“was terminated [as a] direct result of attending the meeting in which both 

parties previously agreed to ‘no disciplinary action.’” 

¶15 This argument fails. Harris did not include a breach of 

contract claim in the second amended complaint (or in the previous 

versions thereof), and claims made for the first time in a motion for new 

trial are generally waived. See Conant v. Whitney, 190 Ariz. 290, 293, 947 

P.2d 864, 867 (App. 1997) (concluding that appellant waived issue by first 

raising it in a motion for new trial). 

¶16 Even assuming that Harris timely raised this claim, the record 

fails to show GoDaddy breached the agreement by disciplining him 

because he attended the meeting at issue. The termination letter establishes 

that Harris presented a copy of the CRM screenshot at the meeting, and, at 

a subsequent meeting, Harris admitted e-mailing the screenshot to himself 

at an external e-mail address. Further investigation by GoDaddy revealed 

two more instances in which Harris improperly e-mailed items outside the 

company in violation of various GoDaddy policies, and Harris was 

 

4 One of the motions was filed after the court granted GoDaddy’s 

motion for summary judgment but before entry of final judgment. 
HARRIS v. GODADDY.COM

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thereafter terminated. Thus, the evidence does not establish that Harris’s

discharge resulted from his mere attendance at the meeting. Harris has 

failed to meet his burden of showing the existence of a material dispute of 

fact that GoDaddy breached the “agreement” to refrain from imposing 

discipline as a result of Harris’s meeting with the employee relations 

manager. See Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, 207 Ariz. 162, 170, ¶ 30, 83 P.3d 1103, 

1111 (App. 2004) (noting, “in an action based on breach of contract, the 

plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence of a contract, breach of the 

contract, and resulting damages”).

CONCLUSION

¶17 The superior court’s order granting GoDaddy’s motion for 

summary judgment is affirmed.