alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Jermaine COLSTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-11921

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 3, 2011.

Maria Chapa Lopez, Robert E. O’Neill, David Paul Rhodes, Judy K. Hunt, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Michael Jermaine Colston, Coleman, FL, pro se.

Before BARKETT, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Michael Jermaine Colston appeals the district court’s denial of his *pro se*post-conviction motion, made pursuant to Fed. R.Crim.P. 36, to correct a purported error in the pre-sentence investigation report (PSI). Colston was sentenced as a career offender, under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, in part because his PSI reflected that one of his predicate offenses was for battery on a police officer. After sentencing, Colston requested that the PSI be changed to reflect that he had merely pushed a police officer backwards, and not that he pushed the officer down. On appeal, Colston argues that the error in the PSI was an inadvertent “clerical error” that can be corrected by Rule 36. The government responds that Colston’s proposed change to the PSI “seeks to recharacterize the conduct underlying his conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer.” Further, the government notes that this sort of correction is beyond the purview of Rule 36 because the rule should be used to correct undisputed errors and not, as is the case here, to substantively alter a sentence.

We review *de novo*the application of Fed.R.Crim.P. 36 to correct a district *766court’s sentencing judgment. *United States v. Portillo,*363 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir.2004). Rule 36 allows the court, after giving appropriate notice, to “correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 36. But Rule 36 cannot be used to make a substantive alteration to a criminal sentence. *Portillo,*363 F.3d at 1164. Moreover, a defendant who alleges that his PSI contains incorrect information must usually raise that argument at sentencing and on direct appeal, rather than for the first time in a post-conviction proceeding. *See United States v. Peloso,*824 F.2d 914, 915 (11th Cir.1987).

Here, Colston effectively seeks to modify the district court’s guideline calculation, and the factual conclusions on which it relied, so that he will not be characterized as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Although at sentencing Colston objected to his base offense level, his career offender status, and the calculation of his criminal history score, he did not object to the facts in the PSI. Thus, he is not seeking to alter a “clerical error” in the facts of the PSI under Rule 36. The district court is

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 31.1

I, Michael Frank Connor, certify that:

          1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A, and all reports
on Form 8-K and Form 8-K/A containing distribution or servicing reports filed in
respect of periods included in the year covered by this annual report, of
Merrill Lynch Depositor, Inc., on behalf of PreferredPLUS Trust Series ELP-1;

          2. Based on my knowledge, the information in these reports, taken as a
whole, does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state
a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading as of the
last day of the period covered by this annual report;

          3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicing information
required to be provided to the depositor by the trustee under the pooling and
servicing, or similar, agreement, for inclusion in these reports is included in
these reports;

          4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
depositor and the trustee under the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement
and based upon my knowledge and the annual compliance review required under that
agreement, and except as disclosed in the reports, the depositor and trustee
have each fulfilled its obligations under that agreement; and

          5. The reports disclose all significant deficiencies relating to the
compliance by the depositor or trustee with the minimum servicing or similar
standards based upon the report provided by an independent public accountant,
after conducting a review in compliance with the Uniform Single Attestation
Program for Mortgage Bankers or similar procedure, as set forth in the pooling
or servicing, or similar, agreement, that is included in these reports.

    In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information
provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: The Bank of New York and
its officers and agents.


      Date: March 30, 2004                  /s/Michael Frank Connor
                                            -----------------------
                                            Michael Frank Connor
                                            President
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER>    1,000

<S>                               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                     9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                    OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                      JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                  1,104
<SECURITIES>                                0
<RECEIVABLES>                             526
<ALLOWANCES>                               53
<INVENTORY>                             1,310
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                        3,105
<PP&E>                                  5,854
<DEPRECIATION>                          4,398
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                          4,561
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                     742
<BONDS>                                     0
<COMMON>                                  431
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       0
<PREFERRED>                                 0
<OTHER-SE>                              3,329
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>            4,561
<SALES>                                 5,037
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        5,037
<CGS>                                   3,061
<TOTAL-COSTS>                           4,913
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                            0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          2
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           160
<INCOME-TAX>                               55
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       105
<DISCONTINUED>                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                             0
<CHANGES>                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                              105
<EPS-BASIC>                             .03
<EPS-DILUTED>                             .03


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 99.1 

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Sinewire Networks, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Patrick Ward, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief: 

- The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
- The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 

/s/ Patrick Ward

___________________________

Patrick Ward

Principal Executive Officer

March 31, 2003
RECANTOAZUL,  S.A.
                                Apartado  90-1007
                           Centro  Colom,  Paseo  Colom,
                              San  Jose,  Costa  Rica


                                December  22,  2000



United  Trading.Com
c/o  Myers  Porter,  LLP
380Technology  Blvd.,  Suite  250
Irvine,  CA  92618

Attn:  Mr.  Norman  Wright.

Re:  United  Trading.Com  Casino  Software license agreement dated September 30,
2000

Dear  Mr.  Wright:

On  September  30, 2000, Recantoazul S.A. entered into a casino software license
agreement  with  United  Trading.Com  (formerly  United  Casino  Corp.).  Due to
Recantoazul's  current  inability  to  provide  and bring on to the Internet the
Internet  site which was planned to be used to make the casino software provided
by  the subject agreement available to players over the Internet, Recantoazul is
hereby  canceling  the  subject agreement effective immediately.  It is hoped by
Recantoazul that when the required Internet site is finally available that a new
contract  can  be  negotiated.

Yours  truly,

Recantoazul  S.A.



By:   s/  Darren  Wright
     ---------------------------

Name:  Darren  Wright
     ---------------------------

Title:  President
     ---------------------------



















                                     112
S. 846 

One Hundred Twelfth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE FIRST SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday, 

the fifth day of January, two thousand and eleven 

An Act 

To designate the United States courthouse located at 80 Lafayette Street in Jefferson 

City, Missouri, as the Christopher S. Bond United States Courthouse. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE. 

(a) DESIGNATION.—The United States courthouse located at 

80 Lafayette Street in Jefferson City, Missouri, shall be known 

and designated as the ‘‘Christopher S. Bond United States Courthouse’’. 

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 

document, paper, or other record of the United States to the United 

States courthouse referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed 

to be a reference to the ‘‘Christopher S. Bond United States Courthouse’’. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
##### 



Exhibit 14.11 CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS To the Board of Directors of
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in (i) the
Registration Statement on Form F-4 (File Nos. 333-109610; 333-109610-01) of
CVRD and Vale Overseas Limited (Vale Overseas); and (ii) the Registration
Statement on Form F-3 (File Nos. 333-110867; 333-10867-01) of CVRD and Vale
Overseas of our report dated January 16, 2004 on the consolidated financial
statements of Companhia Coreano Brasileira de Pelotização  KOBRASCO which
appears in the Annual Report on Form 20-F of CVRD and Vale Overseas for the
year ended December 31, 2003. June 4, 2004 /s/ Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Opinion issued April 30, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-18-00639-CV

———————————

LORUHAMAH DICKEY, Appellant

V.

HARRIS COUNTY, CITY OF HOUSTON, HOUSTON COMMUNITY 

COLLEGE SYSTEM, HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Appellees

On Appeal from the 125th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2016-02269

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Loruhamah Dickey, proceeding pro se, timely filed a notice of 

appeal from the June 15, 2018 final judgment in this property tax case. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 26.1.
2

This Court’s March 19, 2019 Order struck the March 11, 2019 pro se 

appellant’s brief as non-compliant and ordered appellant to file a compliant amended 

brief within 10 days. It also denied without prejudice appellees’ motion to dismiss 

for want of prosecution.

Then this Court’s April 9, 2019 Order denied appellant’s construed motion 

for notice of removal to federal court and ordered her to file an amended brief that 

complied with Rule 38.1 within 10 days of that Order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(a)-

(k), 38.9(a). The Order further notified appellant that, because appellees’ brief had 

been filed on March 15, 2019, the Court might affirm the trial court’s judgment upon 

the appellees’ brief without examining the record if no appellant’s brief were timely 

filed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(3).

On April 8 and 25, 2019, the appellees filed a second and third motion to 

dismiss for want of prosecution. Appellant failed to timely file her amended brief.

When an appellant fails to file a brief in a civil appeal, as here, the appellate 

court may: (1) dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution; (2) decline to dismiss the 

appeal and give further direction to the case as it considers proper; or (3) regard an 

appellee’s brief as correctly presenting the case and affirm the trial court’s judgment 

on that brief without examining the record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a). On March 

15, 2019, the appellees filed a brief on the merits requesting that this Court affirm 

the trial court’s judgment. Because the appellees filed a brief on the merits, this 
3

Court accepts the appellees’ brief as correctly presenting the case and we affirm the 

judgment upon that brief without examining the record. See TEX. R. APP. P.

38.8(a)(3); Harkins v. Dever Nursing Home, 999 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (affirming trial court’s respective summary 

judgments based on appellees’ briefs alone without examining record, under Rule 

38.8(a)(3), because appellants’ amended brief had not substantially complied with 

rules).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s final judgment upon the appellees’ 

brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(3), 43.2(a). We dismiss all pending motions as 

moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Landau.
#### SULLIVANT V. THE STATE.

*Misdemeanor.*

(Decided May 15, 1907.)

Appeal from Tuscaloosa County Court.

Heard before Hon. H. B. Foster.

No counsel marked for appellant.

Alexander M. Garber, Attorney General, for the State.

Simpson, J.

Reversed and remanded for proper sentence on the authority of *Freeman v. The*State, 151 Ala. 10; 44 South. 46.

Tyson, C. J., Haralson and Denson, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1


                      Statement of Chief Executive Officer
         Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code


Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the undersigned,
Denis A.  Krusos,  the  Chairman  of the Board and Chief  Executive  Officer  of
CopyTele, Inc., hereby certifies that:

1.       The Company's Form 10-Q  Quarterly  Report for the period ended January
         31, 2007 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section
         13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.       The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.


                                 /s/ Denis A. Krusos
                                 -------------------
                                 Denis A. Krusos
                                 Chairman of the Board and
March 12, 2007                   Chief Executive Officer
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### General Services Administration

          - [Notice-PBS-2021-03; Docket No. 2021-0002; Sequence No. 13]

# AGENCY:

Public Buildings Service (PBS), General Services Administration (GSA).

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This bulletin announces the designation of a Federal building.

# DATES:

This bulletin expires January 17, 2022. The building designation remains in effect until canceled or superseded by another bulletin.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        General Services Administration, Public Buildings Service (PBS), Office of Portfolio Management, Attn: Chandra Kelley, 77 Forsyth Street SW, Atlanta, GA 30303, at 404-562-2763, or by email at                         *chandra.kelley@gsa.gov.*

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

This bulletin announces the designation of a Federal building. Public Law 109-331, dated October 12, 2006, designated Building No. SC0017ZZ, located at 250 E North Street in Greenville, SC, as the “Carroll A. Campbell Jr. United States Courthouse.”

Katy Kale,

Acting Administrator.

[FR Doc. 2021-15090 Filed 7-14-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6820-Y1-P
**CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**




To
      the
      Board of Directors


Optigenex,
      Inc.




We
      hereby
      consent to the incorporation of our report dated, April 13, 2007 included in
      this Form 10-KSB, on the financial statements of Optigenex, Inc. as of December
      31, 2006 and 2005 and for each of the two years ended December 31, 2006, into
      the Company’s previously filed Registration Statement on Form S-8 (Nos.
      333-133942).




**GOLDSTEIN
      GOLUB KESSLER LLP**


New
      York,
      New York




April
      13,
      2007
#### Alicia M. Gibson, Respondent, v Sean James Levine et al., Appellants.

[944 NYS2d 610]—

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the de*1072fendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), entered September 7, 2011, which granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

“[T]he operator of a motor vehicle has a duty to see what should be seen and to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid an accident” *(Maragos v Sakurai,*92 AD3d 922, 923 [2012]; *see Balducci v Velasquez,*92 AD3d 626, 628 [2012]). “ *‘A*driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle’ ” *(Ortiz v Hub Truck Rental Corp.,*82 AD3d 725, 726 [2011], quoting *Nsiah-Ababio v Hunter,*78 AD3d 672, 672 [2010]; *see*Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]; *Napolitano v Galletta,*85 AD3d 881, 882 [2011]). “Accordingly, a rear-end collision establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision” *(Ortiz v Hub Truck Rental Corp.,*82 AD3d at 726; *see Tutrani v County of Suffolk,*10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008]; *Klopchin v Masri,*45 AD3d 737, 737 [2007]; *see also Abbott v Picture Cars E., Inc.,*78 AD3d 869, 869 [2010]; *DeLouise v S.K.I. Wholesale Beer Corp.,*75 AD3d 489, 490 [2010]; *Tutrani v County of Suffolk,*64 AD3d 53, 59 [2009]).

Here, in support of her motion, the plaintiff relied on, among other things, her deposition testimony and that of the defendant Sean James Levine. The plaintiff testified that, while her vehicle was stopped at a stop sign, her vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle owned by the defendant Bellmore Radiator & Collision Co., Inc., and operated by Levine. Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, under the circumstances of this case, Levine’s own deposition testimony established that his inattentiveness in not looking in the direction he was driving when he began to accelerate was the sole proximate cause of the accident *(see Giangrasso v Callahan,*87 AD3d 521, 522 [2011]). Thus, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Skelos, J.E, Dickerson, Eng and Austin, JJ., concur.
WAYLAND H. SULLIVAN

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 1252

____ _________________________/

Opinion filed December 6, 2016.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Gilchrist County

. David P. Kreider , Judge

.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender,
Tallahassee , for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF

, RAY

, and MAKAR

, J J

. , CONCUR.
#### Atenafu Abeyu ABAYU, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-70982.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 17, 2008.*

Filed Dec. 30, 2008.

Martha E. Garza, Bellaire, TX, pro se.

Regional Counsel, Western Region Immigration & Naturalization Service, Laguna Niguel, CA, Ronald E. LeFevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Hillel Smith, Anthony W. Norwood, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

*369Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. Petr. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Atenafu Abeyu Abayu, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order summarily affirming his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence adverse credibility findings. *Singh-Kaur v. INS,*188 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir.1999). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination because the inconsistency between Abayu’s testimony and documentary evidence regarding his ethnic identity and membership in the Eritrean social group, goes to the heart of his claim. *See Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003). Moreover, the record does not compel reversal of the IJ’s demeanor finding based on Abayu’s failure to convey any subjective sense of fear, and on his nonresponsiveness. *See Singh-Kaur,*183 F.3d at 1151 (9th Cir.1999) (demeanor-based adverse credibility determinations are entitled to “special deference”). Accordingly, Abayu’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. *See Farah,*348 F.3d at 1156.

Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s denial of Abayu’s CAT claim because this claim is based on the same statements that the IJ found to be not credible, and Abayu points to no other evidence he claims the agency should have considered in making its CAT determination. *See id.*at 1157.

Lastly, we lack jurisdiction to review Abayu’s contention regarding firm resettlement because it was not raised to the BIA. *See Abebe v. Mukasey,*548 F.3d 787, 2008 WL 4937003, at *2 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc); *Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir.2004).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. Therefore, the request for oral argument is denied.