NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 18-1455

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DORA GEYSEL ALVARENGA DE RODRIGUEZ; H. A. R.-A.,

Petitioners

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

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On Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency Numbers: A208-455-092 & A208-455-093)

Immigration Judge: John B. Carle

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on September 16, 2019

Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 27, 2019)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.
2

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Dora Alvarenga de Rodriguez and her minor daughter, aliens from El Salvador, 

petition for review of a final administrative order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(BIA) affirming both their removability and the rejection of their application for asylum. 

We will deny the petition.

Discussion1

On appeal, Alvarenga de Rodriguez challenges her removability under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and the denial of her asylum application.2 We review legal and 

constitutional issues de novo, see Duhaney v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 621 F.3d 340, 

345 (3d Cir. 2010), and we will uphold the BIA’s factual findings if they are supported 

by “substantial evidence,” Gomez-Zuluaga v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 527 F.3d 330, 

340 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Where, as here, 

“the BIA has affirmed the IJ’s decision, and adopted the analysis as its own, we will 

review both decisions.” Quao Lin Dong v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 638 F.3d 223, 227 

(3d Cir. 2011). 

A. Removability

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that “any immigrant at the time of 

application for admission . . . who is not in possession of a . . . valid entry document . . . 

 

1 This Court has jurisdiction over Alvarenga de Rodriguez’s petition for review 

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 

2 Alvarenga de Rodriguez does not challenge the BIA’s denial of her applications 

for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture.
3

is inadmissible.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i). Alvarenga argues that she never made an 

“application for admission” because she entered without inspection. Pet. 8–9. This 

argument is belied by the plain text of the statute: “An alien present in the United States 

who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a 

designated port of arrival . . . ) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant 

for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). When Alvarenga arrived in the United States 

without being admitted, she was an “applicant for admission.” Id. Accordingly, because 

she was not in possession of a valid entry document at the time of her arrival, she is

removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).3

B. Asylum

To establish that she is a refugee and thus eligible for asylum, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1), a petitioner must prove four elements: “(1) a particular social group that is 

legally cognizable; 4(2) membership in that group; (3) a well-founded fear of 

persecution, which must be subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable; and (4) a 

 

3 Alvarenga de Rodriguez argues that Congress intended 8 U.S.C. § 

1182(a)(6)(A)(i) to be the exclusive basis for removal for “alien[s] present in the United 

States without being admitted or paroled.” Pet. 11. However, 8 U.S.C. § 

1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—unlike 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)—is not listed as a basis for 

expedited removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Therefore, the two statutory bases 

for removal serve different purposes. 

4 A particular social group is a group that is “(1) composed of members who share 

a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially 

distinct within the society in question.” S.E.R.L. v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 894 F.3d 

535, 540 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
4

nexus, or causal link, between the persecution and membership in the particular social 

group.” S.E.R.L. v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir. 2018).

In removal proceedings, Alvarenga de Rodriguez argued that she and her daughter 

were entitled to asylum because she would face persecution on a protected ground: Her 

membership in a particular social group of “women in El Salvador who have close family 

members in the United States.” Pet. 13. The IJ found that even assuming Alvarenga de 

Rodriguez established a cognizable particular social group, she “did not establish a nexus 

between the harm she fears and her membership in the group,” A.R. 59–60, and the BIA 

affirmed. We conclude that this determination was supported by substantial evidence. 

We also perceive no error in the BIA’s determination that Alvarenga de Rodriguez 

lacked a well-founded fear of persecution, or that any such persecution would not have 

been related to her proposed social group. We have observed that “ordinary criminal 

activity does not rise to the level of persecution necessary to establish eligibility for 

asylum.” Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, there is no record 

evidence that the gang’s extortion of Alvarenga de Rodriguez was more than a “mere 

act[] of random lawlessness,” id. at 495. For example, Alvarenga de Rodriguez was not 

extorted during the first four years her husband lived in the United States. Additionally, 

there is no evidence that when she was extorted by gang members, the gang members 

knew her husband lived in the United States and sent her money, or that she was targeted 

because of those circumstances. Although Alvarenga de Rodriguez asks us to accept that 

the gang members must have known her husband lived in the United States because they 

asked her for the relatively large amount of $500, Pet. 22, that is not a necessary 
5

inference: The fact that the gang members asked her for $500 suggests they knew she had 

access to money, but not necessarily that this money came from family in the United 

States. Thus, the BIA and the IJ reasonably concluded that the gang members were 

motivated by a “desire to increase their own wealth” and not by Alvarenga de 

Rodriguez’s “husband’s residence in the United States.” A.R. 6.

The other incident to which Alvarenga de Rodriguez points as past persecution—a 

strange man hiding in her shower and attempting to attack her—also lacks sufficient 

nexus to Alvarenga de Rodriguez’s status as a woman in El Salvador with family in the 

United States. Alvarenga de Rodriguez never learned the identity of this man, and there 

is no evidence in the record that this man was part of the gang that extorted her or that he 

tried to attack her because her husband lived in the United States. In short, substantial 

evidence supported the BIA’s finding that there was no nexus between any past 

persecution suffered by Alvarenga de Rodriguez and her membership in her proposed 

particular social group. See Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 340; see also 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, we will deny Alvarenga de Rodriguez’s and her 

daughter’s petition for review.