Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2391 | April 3, 2020 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Shannon R. Mears

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Angelica Ramirez Gonzalez,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 3, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2391

Appeal from the Hendricks 

Superior Court

The Honorable Mark A. Smith, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

32D04-1808-CM-1195

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2391 | April 3, 2020 Page 2 of 9

Case Summary

[1] Angelica Ramirez Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) appeals her convictions for 

Operating a Vehicle with a Blood Alcohol Content of .08% per 100 milliliters of 

blood, a Class C misdemeanor,1 and a Class C traffic infraction for failure to 

use a turn signal when changing lanes.

2

 We affirm.

Issues

[2] Gonzalez presents two issues for review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting 

evidence obtained in violation of Gonzalez’s rights under 

the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution; and

II. Whether sufficient evidence supports the traffic infraction 

conviction. 

1

Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1. 

2

I.C. § 9-21-8-24(3). Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24 provides: “A person may not:

(1) slow down or stop a vehicle;

(2) turn a vehicle from a direct course upon a highway; or

(3) change from one (1) traffic lane to another;

unless the movement can be made with reasonable safety. Before making a movement described in this 

section, a person shall give a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn if any pedestrian may be affected by 

the movement and give an appropriate stop or turn signal in the manner provided in sections 27 through 28 

of this chapter if any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2391 | April 3, 2020 Page 3 of 9

Facts and Procedural History

[3] At around 2:30 a.m. on August 14, 2018, Hendricks County Sheriff’s Deputy 

Travis Kahl (“Deputy Kahl”) was traveling westbound on U.S. 40 in Plainfield 

when he observed Gonzalez move her vehicle from the left traffic lane into a 

turn lane without first activating her turn signal.

3

 Deputy Kahl initiated a traffic 

stop. He detected an odor of alcohol emanating from Gonzalez’s vehicle and 

observed that Gonzalez had bloodshot eyes. Deputy Kahl administered three 

field sobriety tests, two of which Gonzalez failed. After Gonzalez provided an 

insufficient breath sample for testing, she consented to a blood draw. The 

results indicated that her blood alcohol content was 0.119 per 100 milliliters of 

blood.

[4] The State charged Gonzalez with Operating While Intoxicated, with 

endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor,4 Operating a Vehicle with a Blood 

Alcohol Content of .08 or more, and failure to signal a lane change. On August 

13, 2019, Gonzalez was tried in a bench trial.

[5] Gonzalez moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of her detention, 

arguing that Deputy Kahl lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. 

At the conclusion of Deputy Kahl’s testimony, the trial court denied the motion 

to suppress and proceeded with the trial. Gonzalez was acquitted of the Class 

3 After the lane change, Gonzalez used a turn signal and turned into a gas station.

4

I.C. § 9-30-5-2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2391 | April 3, 2020 Page 4 of 9

A misdemeanor and convicted of the Class C misdemeanor and infraction as 

charged. She was sentenced to 60 days imprisonment, with 58 days suspended. 

Gonzalez filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. 

Gonzalez now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Admission of Evidence

[6] The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. 

Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). Generally, evidentiary rulings 

are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and reversed when admission is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. However, when 

a challenge to an evidentiary ruling is predicated on the constitutionality of a 

search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that is reviewed de 

novo. Id. The State has the burden to demonstrate that the measures it used to 

seize information or evidence were constitutional. State v. Rager, 883 N.E.2d 

136, 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We review conflicting evidence most favorable 

to the trial court’s ruling. Hansbrough v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1112, 1114 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2016), trans. denied.

[7] Gonzalez claims that the circumstances known to Deputy Kahl when he 

initiated the traffic stop failed to provide reasonable suspicion of criminality as 

required by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. She 

acknowledges that Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24 requires that lane changing

be accompanied by a turn signal if any other vehicle may be affected.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2391 | April 3, 2020 Page 5 of 9

Additionally, Gonzalez acknowledges Deputy Kahl’s testimony that he 

personally observed her change lanes without first signaling. However, 

Gonzalez suggests that she was operating her vehicle adequately under the 

circumstances, that is, there was a concrete median leading up to the turn lane 

(so no traffic could approach on that side), and there was significant space 

between her vehicle and Deputy Kahl’s vehicle, the sole vehicle nearby.

[8] The Fourth Amendment “regulates all nonconsensual encounters between 

citizens and law enforcement officials.” Thomas, 81 N.E.3d at 625. The Fourth 

Amendment guarantees that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 

or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

[9] The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and a

traffic stop is a seizure that must comply with the Fourth Amendment. McLain 

v. State, 963 N.E.2d 662, 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. To conduct a 

traffic stop, an officer needs “at least reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has 

been violated.” Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869-70 (Ind. 2009) (citing 

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)). Reasonable suspicion 

entails a minimum level of objective justification for a stop that is more than an 

inchoate and unparticularized hunch. Cardwell v. State, 666 N.E.2d 420, 422 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2391 | April 3, 2020 Page 6 of 9

(Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. The “decision to stop a vehicle is valid so 

long as [the officer’s] on-the-spot evaluation reasonably suggests that 

lawbreaking occurred.” Id. at 870. “[E]ven a minor traffic violation is 

sufficient to give an officer probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.” 

Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013).

[10] Deputy Kahl testified that he observed Gonzalez make a lane change without 

signaling, and that he was driving in proximity such that he could have been 

affected. The State established that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable 

suspicion.

[11] Also, Gonzalez argues that the traffic stop was an unreasonable intrusion 

conducted in violation of her rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 

Constitution, which provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall 

not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable 

cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 

seized.

[12] “Although this language tracks the Fourth Amendment verbatim, we proceed 

somewhat differently when analyzing the language under the Indiana 

Constitution than when considering the same language under the Federal 

Constitution.” Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 803 (Ind. 2006). “Instead of 

focusing on the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, we focus on the 

actions of the police officer, concluding that the search is legitimate where it is 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2391 | April 3, 2020 Page 7 of 9

reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.” Id. The State has the 

burden to demonstrate that the police intrusion was reasonable. D.F. v. State, 34 

N.E.3d 686, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[13] When reviewing whether the police intrusion was reasonable, we will consider 

the following factors in assessing reasonableness: “1) the degree of concern, 

suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion 

the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, 

and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 

361 (Ind. 2005).

[14] The degree of intrusion is viewed from the point of view of the defendant. See 

Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 19 (Ind. 2010). Gonzalez characterizes the 

intrusion into her activities as “minimal,” but argues that Deputy Kahl did not 

reasonably have a “high degree of concern” because Gonzalez did not commit 

“an egregious offense.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. We would agree with 

Gonzalez that failure to employ a traffic signal in these circumstances is not an 

egregious offense. However, concern that a violation has been committed is not 

dependent upon the severity of the violation. Deputy Kahl personally observed 

Gonzalez change lanes without a signal. As for the extent of law enforcement 

needs, Deputy Kahl was assigned to patrol the public highway during early 

morning hours and look out for public safety. Again, his focus was not 

constrained to severe offenses. Given the totality of the circumstances, Deputy

Kahl did not act unreasonably, in violation of the Indiana Constitution, when 

he initiated the instant traffic stop.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2391 | April 3, 2020 Page 8 of 9

Sufficiency of the Evidence

[15] Gonzalez claims that she was found guilty of a violation of Indiana Code 

Section 9-21-8-24(1) (pertaining to unsafe slowing or stopping of a vehicle) and 

that the conviction lacks sufficient evidentiary support. Notwithstanding the 

apparent scrivener error in the Chronological Case Summary, Gonzalez was 

charged with, and convicted of, a violation of Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-

24(3) (pertaining to lane change without a signal).

[16] To establish this offense, which was reflected in the Complaint and Summons5

served upon Gonzalez, the State had to show beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Gonzalez changed lanes but failed to give a signal when another vehicle may 

have been affected. See Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24(3).

[17] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal 

conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Henley v. 

State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind.2008). “We consider only the evidence 

supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 

such evidence.” Id. We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative 

value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant 

was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

5

Indiana Code Section 34-28-5-1 provides that a complaint and summons described in Indiana Code Section 

9-30-3-1 may be used to allege a traffic infraction or ordinance violation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2391 | April 3, 2020 Page 9 of 9

[18] Deputy Kahl testified that he observed Gonzalez driving in the left lane and 

move into the turn lane without using a signal. He testified that he was driving 

in proximity to Gonzalez such that his vehicle could have been affected. 

Gonzalez’s suggestion that Deputy Kahl was confused about which infraction 

was implicated is, at most, an invitation to reweigh the evidence. Sufficient 

evidence supports Gonzalez’s conviction for the traffic infraction of failure to 

use a signal when changing lanes. 

Conclusion

[19] The trial court did not admit evidence obtained in violation of Gonzalez’s rights 

under the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 

Constitution. Sufficient evidence supports her conviction of the charged traffic 

infraction.

[20] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Altice, J., concur.