UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

LORENA E. BOSTIC, )

 Plaintiff, )

 )

 v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:15-CV-429-PRC

)

SALVADOR VASQUEZ, CLARENCE D. )

MURRAY, DIANE ROSS BOSWELL, THOMAS )

P. STEFANIAK, JR., SAMUEL L. CAPPAS, )

JAN PARSONS, and MIROSLAV RADICESKI, )

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum [DE 125] and

a Motion for Protective Order [DE 126], filed by Defendants Salvador Vasquez, Clarence D.

Murray, Diane Ross Boswell, Thomas P. Stefaniak, Jr., and Samuel L. Cappas (collectively “Lake

County Superior Court Judges”) on July 31, 2018. Plaintiff Lorena E. Bostic filed a response to both

motions, and the Lake County Superior Court Judges filed a reply in support of both motions. 

Both motions raise the question of whether Plaintiff can obtain through discovery the

personal financial information of the individual Defendant Lake County Superior Court Judges sued

in their individual capacities and indemnified by the State of Indiana. In this case, Plaintiff sued the

Lake County Superior Court Judges in their individual capacities based on the Judges’ alleged

knowledge of a bad actor (Defendant Miroslav Radiceski) over whom they allegedly had control as

part of their official duties as criminal court judges. Plaintiff has not sued the judges in their official

capacities, which would be a suit against the State of Indiana. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

167, n. 14 (1985). 

Chapter 12 of Indiana Code Title 33, Article 38, is titled “Defense and Indemnification of

Judges for Civil Damages.” Indiana Code § 33-38-12-4 provides:
Sec. 4. The state shall pay the expenses incurred by a judge from a threatened,

pending, or completed action or proceeding that arises from:

(1) making;

(2) performing; or

(3) failing to make or perform;

a decision, a duty, an obligation, a privilege, or a responsibility of the judge’s office.

Ind. Code § 33-38-12-4 (emphasis added). The code defines “expenses” for use in Chapter 12 as

including the following:

(1) Reasonable attorney’s fees, if the attorney general has authorized the chief

administrative officer of the office of judicial administration to hire private counsel

to provide the defense.

(2) A judgment.

(3) A settlement.

(4) Court costs.

(5) Discovery costs.

(6) Expert witness fees.

(7) Any other expense incurred as a result of an action or a proceeding.

Ind. Code § 33-38-12-2 (emphasis added). Contrary to Indiana Code § 34-13-4-1, which governs

indemnification of state employees and which gives the state discretion to indemnify for punitive

damages, see Ind. Code § 34-13-4-1, the provision for indemnification of judges grants no such

discretion as to punitive damages, see Ind. Code § 38-38-12-4. Thus, as argued by Defendant Lake

County Superior Court Judges, who are represented by the Office of the Indiana Attorney General,

the State of Indiana would indemnify the judges sued in their individual capacities for a judgment

for damages, including punitive damages, for the alleged misconduct that occurred in this case in

the performance of a decision, duty, obligation, privilege, or responsibility “of the judge’s office.”

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that when an individual defendant is to be

fully indemnified, evidence of the defendant’s net worth is inadmissible for purposes of calculating

punitive damages. Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 37 (7th Cir. 1996) (considering the admissibility

of personal financial information in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against an Indiana police

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officer). Because the Lake County Superior Court Judges, sued in their individual capacities, will

be fully indemnified by the State of Indiana, evidence of their net worth would be inadmissible.

Therefore, discovery of the judge’s personal financial information is not relevant, and discovery of

their personal financial information is overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated

to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 

As a result, the Court quashes the subpoenas duces tecum issued to Defendants Judges

Clarence D. Murray and Diane Ross Boswell on July 23, 2018, and July 27, 2018, respectively, as

both subpoenas seek only personal financial information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii).

Likewise, finding good cause shown, the Court grants the request for a protective order and orders

that Plaintiff is prohibited from seeking personal financial information from the Defendant Lake

County Superior Court Judges and that the Judges are not required to respond to Plaintiff’s July 3,

2018 requests for production of documents and interrogatories, which request only the individual

Judges’ personal financial information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A) (providing that a court may,

for good cause shown, issue an order to protect a person from annoyance, embarrassment,

oppression, or undue burden or expense by forbidding the disclosure or discovery).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces

Tecum [DE 125] and the Motion for Protective Order [DE 126]. The Court QUASHES the July 23,

2018 and July 27, 2018 subpoenas duces tecum issued to Defendants Clarence D. Murray and Diane

Ross Boswell. See (ECF 125-1, 125-2). The Court further ORDERS that Plaintiff is forbidden from

seeking discovery from the individual Defendant Judges Salvador Vasquez, Clarence D. Murray,

Diane Ross Boswell, Thomas P. Stefaniak, Jr., and Samuel L. Cappas regarding their personal

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financial information and that these Defendant Judges need not respond to Plaintiff’s July 3, 2018

discovery requests. See (ECF 126-1).

SO ORDERED this 23rd day of August, 2018.

s/ Paul R. Cherry 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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