NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-5065

CLARENCE JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee. Clarence Jackson , of Decatur, Illinois, pro se. Michael J. Dierberg , Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. With him on the brief were Peter D. Keisler , Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson , Director, and Steven J. Gillingham , Assistant Director. Appealed from: United States Court of Federal Claims Judge Charles F. LettowNOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-5065 CLARENCE JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________ DECIDED: July 10, 2007

___________________________ Before MICHEL, Chief Judge , LOURIE and BRYSON, Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM. DECISION Clarence Jackson appeals from a decision of the Court of F ederal Claims, No. 06–CV–686, dismissing his lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm

. BACKGROUND On October 3, 2006, Mr. Jackson filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims as a
pro se litigant. Interpreted liberally, Mr. Jackson’ s complaint alleges that he is entitled to worker’s compensation benefits for injuries suffered while he was working for various employers, both public and priv ate. He also alleges that he was wrongfully denied social security benefits, that the Department of Veterans Affairs wrongfully denied him2007-5065 2 veterans benefits related to an injury he su ffered in 1967, and that he is entitled to reinstatement and back pay based on wrongful removal from his position with the National Labor Relations Board because of raci al bias. Last, he claims that property valued at $5,400 was stolen from him, “most likely by government agents.” The government moved to dismiss the acti on for lack of jurisdiction and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Finding that Mr. Jackson did not allege a claim over which it possessed jurisdiction, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the action. In the alternative, the court found that, with the exception of the denial of veterans benef its by the Department of Ve terans Affairs, none of Mr. Jackson’s claims accrued within the applic able statute of lim itations period. Mr. Jackson appeals, alleging that the government concealed military medical records that prove the existenc e of some of the injuries claimed to be compensable by workers’ compensation and veterans benefits. He argues that the ac ts of concealment confer jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims and toll the stat ute of limitations. DISCUSSION The Tucker Act defines the subject matte r jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. It states, in pertinent part: The United States Court of Federal Cla ims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the Un ited States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congre ss or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or im plied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidat ed damages in cases not sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Accord ingly, the jurisdiction of t he Court of Federal Claims is limited to cases in which "the constitutional pr ovision, statute, or regulation in question expressly creates a substant ive right enforceable against the federal government for2007-5065 3 money damages." LeBlanc v. United States , 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Testan , 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976)). The trial court properly held that it la cks jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. Jackson’s workers’ compensation claims. Those claims are entrusted to the Secretary of Labor,

see 5 U.S.C. § 8121, and the Secr etary’s decisions are not re viewable in federal court, “by mandamus or otherwise,” Thaxton v. United States , 11 Cl. Ct. 181, 182 (1986) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b)(2)). The Court of Federal Claims is also without jurisdiction to hear Mr. Jackson’s claims for social securi ty benefits. While the Social Security Administration’s decisions regarding claims are subject to judicial review, those decisions are reviewable by the federal district courts, not the Court of Federal Claims. Marcus v. United States , 909 F.2d 1470, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)–(h)). The Court of Federal Claims also lacks jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Jackson’s claim for veterans benefits. Those claims are decided by the Department of Veterans Affairs in the first instance, and the Departm ent’s decisions can be appealed only to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, not to the Court of Federal Claims. Van Allen v. United States , 66 Fed. Cl. 294, 295-96 (2005) (citing 38 U.S.C. §§ 511, 7105, 7252(a)). Nor can Mr. Jackson’s claims of wrongful termination be adjudicate d in the Court of Federal Claims, as that cour t “is not an ‘appropriate authority’ to review an agency’s personnel determination.” United States v. Fausto , 484 U.S. 439, 454 (1988). Those determinations are governed by the “comprehensive and integr ated review scheme” of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, whic h vests reviewing authority for designated adverse employment actions in the Merit Systems Protection Board. Id.2007-5065 4 Last, the Court of Federal Claims lacks juri sdiction over Mr. Jackson’s claim that the federal government st ole his property, a tort claim. The Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction over tort acti ons against the United States. Brown v. United States , 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (cit ing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) and Keene Corp. v. United States , 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993)). Acco rdingly, the trial court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over any of Mr. Jackson’s claims. Mr. Jackson’s allegation that the government concealed his medical records, and therefore caused him to fail to file his claims within the pertinent limitations period, does nothing to change the trial court’s jurisdic tional determination. Mr. Jackson has still failed to state a claim under a money-mandating constitutional provision, statute, or regulation for which Congress has not assigned re view to a different tribunal. For that reason, we do not address the trial court’s ru ling regarding the statut e of limitations and Mr. Jackson’s argument as to why the limitat ions period should be tolled. We sustain the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction.