alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the period
ending December 31, 2002, of Cedar Brakes II, L.L.C. (the "Company") as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Robert W. Baker, President (Principal Executive Officer), certify (i) that
the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and (ii) that the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.


                                              /s/ Robert W. Baker
                                          --------------------------
                                          Robert W. Baker
                                          President
                                          (Principal Executive Officer)

                                          May 15, 2003




A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Cedar Brakes II, L.L.C. and will be retained by Cedar Brakes II,
L.L.C. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
Weaks v. White

Request for Extension

 

PAGE 1

CASE NO. 12-14-00253-CV

JERRY WEAKS and § IN THE COURT OF

 JOYCE WEAKS, APPEALS FOR

 TWELFTH COURT OF

 APPELLANT APPEALS DISTRICT 

 OF TEXAS

 § 

 V.

 § 

KATHLEEN JEANETTE 

 WHITE, §

 

 APPELLEE § 

 

 CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

 This will certify and confirm that the undersigned attorney for the Appellants has 

forwarded notice to Ms. Jane Parreiras-Horta, the attorney for the Appellee, in regard to the 

Appellants’ motion for extension of time to file the motion for rehearing. Thus, the undersigned 

has attempted to confer with opposing counsel and is awaiting a response from same. 

 Respectfully submitted,

 /s/ Aubrey L. Jones, Jr.

___________________________________

Aubrey L. Jones, Jr.

Attorney at Law

State Bar No. 10859100

P.O. Box 168

106 W. Tyler St.

 FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 11/2/2015 11:12:03 AM PAM ESTES Clerk
Weaks v. White

Request for Extension

 

PAGE 2

Athens, Texas 75751

Telephone: (903) 675-7990

Fax: (903) 670-3424

 Email: aubreyjoneslaw@embarqmail.com

 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This will certify that a true and correct copy of the above Certificate of Conference has 

been served on Appellee’s attorney of record, Ms. Jane Parreiras-Horta, in accordance with the 

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Signed this __2nd____ day of November___, 2015.

 /s/ Aubrey L. Jones, Jr.

_________________________________

Aubrey L. Jones, Jr.
Exhibit 32

Written Statement of Co-Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officer
Pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)

The undersigned, the Co-Chief Executive Officers and the Chief Financial Officer of Regal Entertainment Group, a Delaware corporation (the "Company"),
each hereby certifies that, to his/her knowledge on the date hereof:



| | /s/MICHAEL L. CAMPBELLMichael L. Campbell Co-Chief Executive OfficerDecember 3, 2003 | 
| | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | 
| |                                                                                      | 
| | /s/KURT C. HALLKurt C. Hall Co-Chief Executive OfficerDecember 3, 2003               | 
| |                                                                                      | 
| | /s/AMY E. MILESAmy E. Miles Chief Financial OfficerDecember 3, 2003                  | 

---

QuickLinks
Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
  1)
    
    such Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for
the twelve months ended December 31, 2008, fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2)
    
    the information contained in such Annual Report on
Form 10-K of the Company for the twelve months ended
December 31, 2008, fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of Plumas Bancorp.
 Date: March 18, 2009
    
    /s/ Andrew Ryback

Andrew J. Ryback,Chief Financial Officer
#### Pedro Aldaba BARRIENTOS, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY,1 Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.

No. 05-1198.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 12, 2008.

Filed: Jan. 8, 2009.

*327Ta-Yu Yang, Des Moines, IA, for Petitioner.

Christian A. Martinez, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Omaha, NE, Richard M. Evans, Thomas W. Hussey, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Nancy E. Friedman, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before MELLOY, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

1

. Michael. B. Mukasey has been appointed to serve as Attorney General of the United States, and is substituted as respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c).

PER CURIAM.

Pedro Aldaba Barrientos petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of Barrientos’s motion to reopen removal proceedings. We deny the petition.

Barrientos, charged with being removable, was notified that his removal hearing was scheduled for January 21, 2004, in Council Bluffs, Iowa. Prior to the hearing, Barrientos moved for permission to participate by telephone from his attorney’s office in Des Moines, Iowa. On January 21, 2004, the IJ denied the motion for a telephonic hearing and entered an in absentia order finding Barrientos removable as charged. Barrientos moved to reopen, asserting that telephonic hearings were routinely granted, and that he had been present at his attorney’s office on the day of the hearing and had been ready to participate. The IJ denied the motion to reopen, and the BIA affirmed without opinion.

After careful review, we conclude the denial of the motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion because the mere submission of a motion for a telephonic hearing did not relieve Barrientos of the obligation to personally appear at the hearing, and Barrientos did not show exceptional circumstances to excuse his absence. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) (removal order issued in absentia may be rescinded upon motion to reopen, if alien demonstrates he did not receive proper notice of hearing or failure to appear was attributable to exceptional circumstances); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(l) (defining exceptional circumstances); *Alanwoko v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 908, 914 (8th Cir.2008) (standard of review); *cf. Tang v. Ashcroft,*354 F.3d 1192, 1195-96 (10th Cir.2003) (submission of motion for change of venue did not excuse alien’s failure to appear at hearing, and obligation to attend scheduled hearing continued unless and until IJ granted motion; burden of inquiry regarding status of motion remained on alien, and assuming that motion would be granted was not exceptional circumstance beyond alien’s control).

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
     Balance Sheet as of March 31, 1999 and the related Statement of Income
     for the year to date ended March 31, 1999.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                    1,000
<CURRENCY>                               U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                              MAR-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                     1
<CASH>                                          2,119
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 106,121
<ALLOWANCES>                                    2,585
<INVENTORY>                                   120,151
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              242,167
<PP&E>                                         61,776
<DEPRECIATION>                                 33,569
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                376,172
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          95,474
<BONDS>                                        60,000 <F1>
<COMMON>                                           72
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                         115,463 <F2>
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<OTHER-SE>                                     20,659
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  376,172
<SALES>                                       173,111
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              173,111
<CGS>                                         101,109
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  65,540
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                (220)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 350
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             2,063
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                1,561
<INCOME-TAX>                                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              905
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                     905
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   0.13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   0.13

        
<FN>
<F1> Bonds represents all long-term debt for Senior Notes.
<F2> Represents Guaranteed Preferred Beneficial Interests in the corporation's
     Junior Subordinated Debentures.
</FN>


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. §1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Vascular Solutions, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), I, Howard Root, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|1. |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|2. |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| |                                                    |  |                   |  | 
| | -------------------------------------------------- |  | ----------------- |  | 
| |                                                    |  | /s/   Howard Root | 
| |                                                   
| | Howard RootChief Executive OfficerOctober 22, 2004 | 

---
**Exhibit 31.2****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**I, Mary Jane Robertson, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Crum &Forster Holdings Corp., certify that:1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Crum & Forster Holdings Corp.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;  (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarterthat has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.        Date:  March 7, 2007 By:  /s/ *Mary Jane Robertson*    Mary Jane Robertson    Executive Vice President,Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer  
117
Exhibit 10.56
 SECOND AMENDMENT
TO THE
PLUMAS BANK
EXECUTIVE SALARY CONTINUATION AGREEMENT
DATED JUNE 4, 2002
AND AMENDED SEPTEMBER 15, 2004
FOR
ROBERT T. HERR
  RECITALS




---



##### 



- 2 -




---



##### 



Executive:
    
    
    
    Plumas Bank/s/ Robert T. Herr
    
    
    
    By:
    
    /s/ Daniel E. WestRobert T. Herr
    
    
    
    
    
    Title:
    
    Chairman of the Board
 
  - 3 -




---



##### 



EXHIBIT A
 NOTICE
 THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE COMPANY (BOARD) HAS RESOLVED AND DIRECTED THAT THE DEFERRED
COMPENSATION CREDITED TO THE ACCOUNT OF ROBERT T. HERR (EXECUTIVE) UNDER THE ATTACHED EXECUTIVE
SALARY CONTINUATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN COMPANY AND EXECUTIVE DATED JUNE 4, 1994, AND AMENDED
SEPTEMBER 15, 2004 (GRANDFATHERED AGREEMENT), AND EARNED AND VESTED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004 BE
SEGREGATED FROZEN AND GRANDFATHERED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE GRANDFATHERED AGREEMENT IN EFFECT
ON OCTOBER 3, 2004 AND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, AS AMENDED AND IN EFFECT PRIOR TO THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 409A AS ENACTED BY THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT
OF 2004; THAT TO PRESERVE SUCH GRANDFATHERING, THE PROVISIONS OF THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT AS IN
EFFECT ON OCTOBER 3, 2004, SHALL NOT BE MATERIALLY MODIFIED (AS THAT TERM IS DEFINED IN INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE NOTICE 2005-1) AFTER OCTOBER 3, 2004 WITH RESPECT TO DEFERRED COMPENSATION THAT WAS
CREDITED TO EXECUTIVES ACCOUNT AND EARNED AND VESTED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004; AND THAT ANY ATTEMPT
TO SO MATERIALLY MODIFY THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT AFTER THAT DATE SHALL BE NULL AND VOID.
 
  - 4 -
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 98-1784SI

_____________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Southern v. * District of Iowa. * Martin Wayne Stoner, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

_____________ Submitted: October 15, 1998

Filed: October 21, 1998

_____________ Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, FAGG and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

_____________ PER CURIAM.
Marti n Wayne Stoner appeals his drug-related convictions for conspiring t o di stribute and distributing methamphetamine. Stoner contends the evidence does no t support h is convictions. Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied sufficien t ev idence exists from which a reasonable jury could find Stoner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Ro gers , 91 F.3d 53, 57 (8th Cir. 1996). Stoner was present at two police-controlled drug deals, supplied his coconspirator with methamphet amine, and allowed his coconspirator to negotiate a drug deal from hi s residence. Stoner also contends the district court erroneously admitted into evidence marijuana discovered in his vehicle following his arres t. Stoner asserts the Government-2-

used this e vidence to prove his criminal disposition. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). W e disagree. The police testified marijuana was l inked with police-controlled purchases of methamphe tamine, and thus the quantities of marijuana offered to undercover polic e officers and found in Stoner’s vehicle were connected with the crimes charged and were not Rule 404(b) evidence of other crimes. See United States v. Luna , 94 F.3d 1156 , 1162 (8th Cir. 1996). Additionally, the evidence would be admissible under Rul e 404(b) to show Stoner’s knowledge and intent to distribute drugs, and the evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Stoner also argues the district court denied his Sixth Amendment confrontation rig ht when the district court prevented Stoner from cross examining a Governmen t witness about the identity of a confidential informant. S toner concedes the Government did not have to disclose the informant’s identity unless S toner showed the evidence was materi al. See United States v. Sykes , 977 F.2d 1242, 1245-46 (8th Cir. 1992)

. Altho ugh the informant conducted a controlled buy from Stoner’s residence, Stone r fail ed to establish materiality because the informant did not participate in the offenses for w hich Stoner was charged nor did the Government plan to call the informant t o testify agai nst Stoner. See United States v. Harrington , 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir

. 1991). We conclude the district court did not ab use its discretion because Stoner could not show the disclosure of the informant’s name would aid in Stoner’s defense. Se e Sykes , 977 F.2d at 1245-46. Finally, Stoner should raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim collaterally rather than on direct appeal. See United State s v. Rhodenizer , 106 F.3d 222, 227 (8th Cir. 1997).
We affirm Stoner’s convictions.-3-

A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
**Exhibit 32**

 

**Written Statement of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)**

 

The undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of Regal Entertainment Group, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), each hereby certifies that, to his/her knowledge on the date hereof:

 

(a) the Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 1 of the Company for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016, filed on the date hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(b) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|   | /s/ AMY E. MILES       |
|--------|-----------------------------|
|   | Amy E. Miles                |
|   | *Chief   Executive Officer* |
|   | March 22, 2017         |
|   |                        |
|   | /s/ DAVID H. OWNBY     |
|   | David H. Ownby              |
|   | *Chief   Financial Officer* |
|   | March 22, 2017         |

 

----
#### PEOPLE ex rel. HADSELL, Respondent, v. TOMPKINS, Sheriff, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

March 26, 1912.)

Proceeding by the People of the State of New York, on the relation of Jerome B. Hadsell, against Maurice Tompkins, as Sheriff of Broome County.

PER CURIAM.

Order affirmed, with costs.

SMITH, P. J., concurs, upon the authority of People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N. Y. 383, 79 N. E. 330, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 159, 9 Ann. Cas. 972.

HOUGHTON, J., concurs, on the ground that the witness was privileged from answering the questions, because they might tend to incriminate him.

KELLOGG, J., votes for reversal.

LYON, J-., not sitting.
(June 11, 1985)

#### In the Matter of Marion Spearman, Petitioner, v D. Bruce Crew, III, as Supreme Court Justice, et al., Respondents.

Motion to dismiss proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, for judgment in the nature of prohibition, granted. We conclude that the denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment is not subject to review at this time by way of collateral proceeding *(see, Matter ofMasin v County Ct.,*97 AD2d 643). In light of this decision, the motion for a stay is denied as academic. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Yesawich, Jr., Levine and Harvey, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gilbert Oliva DIAZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50525.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*472Submitted June 15, 2011.*

Filed July 1, 2011.

Timothy C. Perry, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Inge E. Brauer, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Gilbert Oliva Diaz appeals from the 77-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for attempted entry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and fraud and misuse of an entry document, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Diaz first contends that in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions, *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), has been overruled and that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) is unconstitutional. As Diaz concedes, these contentions are foreclosed. *See United States v. Beng-Salazar,*452 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir.2006); *United States v. Rodriguez-Lara,*421 F.3d 932, 949-50 (9th Cir.2005).

Diaz also contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of his mitigating personal circumstances and the age and nature of the prior conviction that was the basis for a 16-level enhancement. The sentence imposed is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); *United States v. Orozco-Acosta,*607 F.3d 1156, 1167 (9th Cir.2010).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.