TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-22-00038-CR

Roy Wright Vaughan, Jr., Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY

NO. CR2020-243, THE HONORABLE DIB WALDRIP, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Robert Wright Vaughan, Jr., was convicted of the offense of harassment by a 

person in a correctional facility and was sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment. See Tex. 

Penal Code §§ 12.42, 22.11. On appeal, Vaughan contends that the trial court erred by failing 

to sua sponte conduct a hearing regarding his competency. We will affirm the trial court’s 

judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

In September 2019, Vaughan was charged with the offense of aggravated assault 

with a deadly weapon. While in jail pending trial in that case, Vaughan allegedly spit on one of 

the detention officers and was subsequently charged with the offense of harassment by a person 

in a correctional facility.
2

Prior to trial in the harassment case, Vaughan’s appointed trial attorney filed a 

motion asking the trial court to order that Vaughan’s competency be evaluated. The trial court 

granted the motion and appointed two forensic psychologists to evaluate Vaughan’s competency

to stand trial. The first evaluation occurred in October 2020, and the second evaluation occurred 

in December 2020. Both psychologists concluded that Vaughan was competent to stand trial.

At voir dire in January 2022, a transport officer from the jail informed the trial 

court that Vaughan refused to come to court. After being sworn, the officer testified that he 

spoke with Vaughan and gave him every opportunity to attend his trial but that Vaughan 

declined. Further, in response to questioning by the trial court, the officer explained that 

Vaughan made the personal choice not to go. The trial court then inquired about whether 

Vaughan had “a factual and rational understanding of his surroundings and the purpose of the 

discussion,” and the officer explained that Vaughan “seemed pretty rational.”

Vaughan’s trial attorney informed the trial court that Vaughan had been very 

abusive to her and had mental-health issues that “impact his behavior quite negatively”; 

however, the attorney also opined that Vaughan was competent to stand trial and explained that 

the two psychologists concluded that he was competent to stand trial. Further, the attorney 

related that she sent clothes to the jail for Vaughan to wear at trial but that he refused to wear 

them. In addition, she explained that Vaughan wanted a different attorney appointed but that she 

was ready to proceed with trial. The trial court instructed the transport officer to arrange for 

Vaughan to be brought to court. After Vaughan arrived at court, the trial court asked if he would 

like to change into regular clothes, but Vaughan stated that he was fine wearing his jail attire.

During a lengthy exchange outside the presence of the jury panel, Vaughan 

referred to his attorney by using expletives multiple times, spoke to her in a disrespectful 
3

manner, and stated that he wanted a new attorney. Vaughan informed the trial court that he had 

recently undergone psychological evaluations and that the results showed that he was “not 

crazy.” The trial court then asked Vaughan if he had a “factual and rational understanding” of 

the proceedings, and he responded that he did by saying, “I’m not a fucking idiot” and “I 

know enough.” The trial court inquired if Vaughan’s plea would change with a different lawyer, 

and Vaughan stated that his plea would not change because he was innocent. Vaughan also 

indicated that he wanted to participate in the trial but was being disagreeable and misbehaving

because he did not want his trial counsel to represent him anymore and because he wanted 

another attorney appointed.

The trial court then reviewed the reports prepared by the two psychologists. Once

the trial court finished its review, Vaughan repeated his prior assertion that he was competent. 

The trial court noted that both doctors had concluded that Vaughan could behave if he chose 

to do so, and Vaughan agreed with that assessment but also stated that he will do what he feels 

like doing.

The trial court directed the jury panel to enter the court room, and Vaughan made 

the following comments to the panel, to the trial court, and to his trial counsel:

I tried to fire this attorney, but the Judge wouldn’t let me;

Well, I tried to fire this attorney. This Judge wouldn’t let me. I don’t trust this 

attorney. Please help me. My name is Roy Wright Vaughan, Jr. Help me. I 

don’t trust this attorney and the Judge won’t let me get another one;

I’m telling the truth. What, are you scared of the truth?; and 

Shut the fuck up and get on with it. How do you like that, [trial counsel]?
4

Following these exchanges, the trial court explained to the panel the purpose of 

voir dire, and Vaughan mentioned the Bill of Rights and how United States citizens have the 

right “to a fair trial . . . bitch. This ain’t a fair trial.” Throughout the State’s voir dire, Vaughan

interrupted the State multiple times and responded to comments made by jury panelists, 

including making the following comments:

(In response to the State’s explanation that voir dire helps make sure those chosen 

as jurors can do what is asked of them): That sounds like a good idea to me, folks. 

First let’s start with a movie. Well, goddamn, at least they spelled my fucking 

name right.

(In response to the State’s explanation that it spelled Vaughan’s name right): 

Well, that’s without a birth certificate anyway.

(In response to the State’s explanation that voir dire is a lengthy process): Let’s 

go.

(In response to the State’s explanation of how panelists can be deselected): That 

sound[s] good to me.

(In response to the State’s asking the panelists if they understood the strike 

process): Everybody got a fifth grade education?

(In response to the State’s explaining that trials were bifurcated with the guiltinnocence phase being first and the punishment phase being second if needed): So 

you’re guilty first and then you’re innocent, huh? . . . I thought it was innocent 

until proven guilty.

(In response to the State’s explaining how defendants can elect to have the judge 

or the jury assess punishment): I asked for y’all to do it.

(In response to the State’s explaining that a punishment election was not an

admission of guilt): Hey, thank you for saying that. . . . Thank you for clarifying 

that.

(In response to the State’s saying that punishment will only be addressed if 

Vaughan is found guilty): My life is in y’all’s hands.

(In response to the State’s describing the nature of the alleged offense): Oh, yeah. 

That’s when they came in my cell and attacked me while I was sleeping. . . . I 

had a blindfold and earplugs in when I was attacked.
5

At that point, the trial court intervened and told Vaughan that he needed to be 

quiet. Vaughan replied, “Hey, man, I said I would cooperate if you got me a new attorney and 

you said no.” The trial court excused the jury panel and then discussed Vaughan’s behavior. 

Vaughan again related that he was behaving that way because he wanted a new attorney. The 

trial court explained that if Vaughan continued to be disruptive, the court would require him to 

be gagged. During this exchange, Vaughan explained his version of the events in question and

expressed his desire to speed up the process of jury selection. The trial court asked several times 

if Vaughan would be quiet and behave when the jury panel returned, and Vaughan responded, “I 

will. I mean, I’m a man of my word. I will. . . . When they come back, yeah, I will. Okay.”

Vaughan also remarked, “You have a lot of patience with me, by the way.”

When the State continued its presentation to the panel, Vaughan made the

following interruptions:

(In response to the State’s asking the panel if anyone knew Vaughan or the

attorneys): Me and my dog Ladybug used to fly signs at Wal-Mart or out here by 

Rueckel Road. We’d stand there and hold signs saying anything will help, God 

bless.

(In response to a panelist’s saying Vaughan was innocent until proven guilty): 

Thank you.

(In response to the State’s saying that Vaughan had the right to remain silent): It’s 

not working. . . . I’m going to get on the stand.

(In response to the State’s asking the panel if they understood that a jury cannot

consider a defendant’s choice not to testify): What are you doing, online shopping 

during this?

(In response to the State’s informing the panel that the jury would have to use the 

common meanings for some of the charge elements): Which dictionary are you 

going to use?

(In response to the State’s answering a question about evidence that could be 

considered at punishment): If I take the stand, then they’ll bring up my past 
6

history. . . . Well, I went to prison for a DWI. I had a DWI I went to prison for, 

but I didn’t hurt anybody.

During his trial attorney’s presentation, Vaughan made the following interruptions:

(In response to his attorney’s discussing Vaughan’s prior interruptions): I speak 

my mind.

(In response to his attorney saying Vaughan may testify): You’re damn right.

(In response to his attorney’s explaining that Vaughan deserves the protection of 

the law even if the panel did not personally like him): I’m an asshole. . . . To be 

honest, I’m a smartass.

(In response to panelists indicating that they would hold Vaughan’s behavior 

against him): Thanks for being honest.

(In response to his attorney’s saying Vaughan might testify): Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah.

(In response to his attorney’s answering a panelist’s question about mental-health 

treatment in prison): They medicate you.

(In response to his attorney’s asking a panelist if people experiencing 

homelessness have a different perspective): Do you know the difference between 

a homeless person and a houseless person?

(In response to his attorney’s inquiring if any of the panelists could not be fair 

because of how Vaughan was behaving): Don’t worry. I’m going to tell you the 

truth.

(In response to his attorney’s emphasizing the importance of finding someone not 

guilty if the State does not prove its case): It means somebody lied.

When the trial court and the attorneys had individual conversations with some of 

the panelists, Vaughan made the following interruptions:

(In response to a panelist’s saying her relative is a police officer): Thank you. 

Grandfather was a Texas Ranger . . . . Look him up.

(In response to a panelist’s saying that his son was just released from prison and 

that he was not sure he could be fair): Yoda said do or do not. There is no try. 

Try gives you doubt.
7

(In response to a panelist’s saying she could not be fair because of her memory 

issues): Thank you, ma’am. Thank you.

(In response to a panelist’s saying his children have depression and post-traumatic 

stress disorder and saying that may affect him): Appreciate it. I suffer from PTSD 

from law enforcement.

(In response to the trial court’s dismissing members of the panel that were not 

chosen): Thanks for being honest.

After the jury was chosen, the trial court asked Vaughan how he wanted to plead, 

and Vaughan responded, “I said from the beginning I’m not guilty. They came in here and 

attacked me. . . . I’ve been asking to go to a jury trial for a while now.” The trial court then 

released the jury for the day. Vaughan’s trial attorney informed the court that there were clothes

at the jail for Vaughan if he wanted to wear them, and Vaughan responded, “Oh, I ain’t fixing to 

change, goddamn it, bitch. I already told you I’m going just like this. I’m just going to get up 

there and tell my damn story. . . . Well, just for the record, I still don’t want her for an attorney.”

Vaughan continued by saying that he was going to testify that the guards assaulted him. 

Vaughan then stated to the court, “Okay. Boy, you are a real patient man. I’ll tell you that. I 

appreciate your patience.” Vaughan explained again that he did not want to wear the clothes 

provided and would show up wearing his jail attire. The trial court instructed Vaughan not to 

be disruptive or else additional measures would have to be taken, and Vaughan stated that he 

would try.

When the trial reconvened a few days later, Vaughan arrived in jail clothes. The 

trial court explained that being present in jail clothes could affect the presumption of innocence, 

and Vaughan agreed to go change after talking with the trial court. The trial court again asked

Vaughan if he understood the allegations against him, and Vaughan stated that he did. The 

trial court informed Vaughan that there were plexiglass barriers around him to prevent him 
8

from spitting on anyone and that the court would like to remove those if Vaughan promised to 

behave because those also could affect the presumption of innocence. Vaughan indicated that he 

understood what the trial court was saying and agreed to conduct himself appropriately.

During the guilt-innocence phase, the State called a detention officer who testified 

that he performed a security check at the jail on the day in question, that he ordered Vaughan to 

stand up so that he could search under the bed, that Vaughan refused, that Vaughan spat at him 

and his partner, and that the spit landed on his face and shirt. The officer related that he had to 

have his blood tested for nine months following the incident. During the officer’s testimony, a 

recording from his body camera was admitted into evidence, and the recording is consistent 

with his testimony. After the officer finished testifying, his partner was called to the stand and

testified that Vaughan spat at his partner and him during a security check. The partner related 

that Vaughan could be very aggressive but admitted that he had learned better ways to interact 

with Vaughan and in hindsight would have chosen a different way to interact with him. After 

considering the evidence, the jury found Vaughan guilty of the charged offense. During this 

phase of the trial, Vaughan made no interruptions, and his only exchanges occurred outside the 

presence of the jury when he thanked deputies for their help and when he informed the trial court 

that he had been and planned to continue behaving appropriately at trial.

During the punishment phase, several law-enforcement officials testified

regarding other criminal conduct that Vaughan committed before he was arrested and while he 

was in jail. As in the earlier phase, Vaughan made no interruptions, and his only exchange

occurred at the end of the trial when he told the jury members to remember to vote.

Vaughan appeals the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
9

DISCUSSION

In his issue on appeal, Vaughan contends that the trial court erred by failing to sua 

sponte convene an informal inquiry into whether he was competent to stand trial. See Turner v. 

State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (explaining that person who is not 

competent may not be put on trial without violating due process); see also Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. art. 46B.004(b) (stating that “[i]f evidence suggesting the defendant may be incompetent to 

stand trial comes to the attention of the court, the court on its own motion shall suggest that the 

defendant may be incompetent to stand trial”).

As support for this assertion, Vaughan highlights that the trial court asked to 

review the competency reports and suggests this shows that there was an indication that he was 

not competent. Additionally, Vaughan points to his interruptions and his exchanges during voir 

dire and argues that the behavior he exhibited warranted an informal competency inquiry

because the behavior could “easily [be] described as bizarre.” Because no inquiry was allegedly 

performed, Vaughan urges that he was denied the right to a fair trial and that this Court should 

reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial.1

1

In its brief, the State asserts that Vaughan did not preserve his issue for appellate 

consideration because he did not raise the issue of his competency after the two psychologists 

found him competent or ask for a competency hearing, and the State points to cases by two of 

our sister courts of appeals that determined that similar issues regarding competency needed to 

be preserved to be addressed on appeal. See, e.g., Means v. State, 955 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo 1997, pet. ref’d, untimely filed) (concluding that “any purported error from the 

trial court’s failure to convene” pretrial competency “proceeding was waived”); Dickson v. State, 

No. 13-97-00693-CR, 1999 WL 33757418, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg May 13, 

1999, no pet.) (op., not designated for publication) (noting that trial counsel’s decision not to 

object to failure to hold hearing on defendant’s competency in response to motion “waived 

error”). In contrast, Vaughan highlights that other intermediate courts have addressed the issue 

even when a defendant did not raise the issue with the trial court. See, e.g., Flagg v. State, 

Nos. 05-08-00019—00024-CR, 2009 WL 242527, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 3, 2009, pet. 

dism’d, untimely filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (assuming that defendant 
10

Generally speaking, a “defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall 

be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.003(b). “A person is incompetent to stand trial if the 

person does not have”: 

(1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable 

degree of rational understanding; or

(2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the 

person.

Id. art. 46B.003(a). Moreover, the defendant, the State, or the trial court may suggest that 

the defendant is not competent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004(a). In addition, “[o]n suggestion 

that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall determine by informal 

inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the 

defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.” Id. art. 46B.004(c). Further, a “suggestion of

incompetency is the threshold requirement for an informal inquiry . . . and may consist solely 

of a representation from any credible source that the defendant may be incompetent.” Id.

art. 46B.004(c-1); see also id. (explaining that trial court “is not required to have a bona fide 

doubt about the competency of the defendant” before inquiry may be initiated). Among other 

factors, competency determinations may be based on the ability of the defendant to: 

(A) rationally understand the charges against the defendant and the potential 

consequences of the pending criminal proceedings; 

could raise issue of failure to conduct sua sponte competency hearing for first time on appeal); 

Higgins v. State, No. 08-03-00171-CR, 2004 WL 1535609, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 8, 

2004, no pet.) (op., not designated for publication) (addressing argument even though defendant 

did not raise issue by pretrial motion or request hearing). For purposes of resolving this issue, 

we will assume that this issue is properly before this Court.
11

(B) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind;

(C) engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options;

(D) understand the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings;

(E) exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior; and

(F) testify.

Id. art. 46B.024(1); see also id. art. 46B.004(c-1) (providing that trial court may consider factors 

listed in article 46B.024 when deciding competency). In making a determination, the court may 

also consider whether the defendant has a mental illness, how long the condition is expected to 

last, how much the condition impairs the defendant, and whether the defendant is taking 

medication. Id. art. 46B.024(2)-(5). Although evidence of a history of mental illness might bear 

on this determination, that type of evidence will only compel further action by the trial court if it 

indicates that the defendant is currently incapable of understanding the proceedings against him 

or of consulting with his attorney. See Iniquez v. State, 374 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2012, no pet.) (applying bona-fide standard from previous version of statute).

The decision by a trial court not to “conduct further inquiry into the” defendant’s 

competency is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 600

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Under that standard, a trial court’s ruling will only be deemed an abuse 

of discretion if it is so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone of reasonable disagreement, Lopez 

v. State, 86 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), or is arbitrary or unreasonable, State v. 

Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Moreover, the trial court’s ruling will 

be upheld provided that the decision “is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under 

any theory of law applicable to the case.” Carrasco v. State, 154 S.W.3d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2005). A trial court’s assessment of a defendant’s ability to rationally and factually 
12

understand the proceedings and to assist counsel is “entitled to great deference” by the reviewing 

court, see McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), because a trial court is 

“in a better position to determine whether [the defendant] was presently competent,” Montoya v. 

State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), superseded by statute on other grounds as 

stated in Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 692. Appellate courts should not substitute their judgment for

that of the trial court. Id.

As an initial matter, we note that arguably the trial court did convene an informal

inquiry into Vaughan’s competency and found him to be competent. See George v. State, 

446 S.W.3d 490, 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (noting that during 

informal inquiry, “the trial court [i]s not required to follow specific protocols”). Upon learning 

that Vaughan refused to come to court, the trial court asked the transport officer if Vaughan 

made that decision voluntarily and if he appeared to have a factual and rational understanding 

of what was occurring. In addition, the trial court asked to review the reports by the two 

psychologists and listened to Vaughan’s attorney’s assessment of Vaughan’s competency. 

Further, the trial court asked Vaughan if he understood the nature of the proceedings and the 

allegations against him.

In light of the preceding, the trial court arguably did conduct an informal inquiry 

regarding Vaughan’s competency. See Luna, 268 S.W.3d at 598-600 (determining that trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by failing to further inquire into defendant’s competency where

defense counsel repeatedly stated belief that defendant was competent and where trial court 

informally inquired by asking defendant if he understood consequences of his plea and right 

to testify before jury and where record showed defendant made choices after thought and 

deliberation); Jackson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 139, 142 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.)
13

(concluding that trial court’s inquiry to defense counsel coupled with its own observations of 

defendant constituted sufficient informal inquiry into defendant’s competency).

Even if the trial court did not conduct an informal inquiry as Vaughan suggests, 

we would be unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. As set out above, the 

trial court reviewed the reports by the two psychologists, who determined that Vaughan was 

competent before trial and made those assessments based on the competency factors listed in the 

Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.024. In the first report, the 

psychologist discussed Vaughan’s history of mental-health treatment, his prior convictions, and 

his history of drug and alcohol use. Further, the psychologist stated that Vaughan became hostile 

during the evaluation and paranoid but that his “[t]hought processes were lucid, clear, and goal 

directed without evidence of psychosis” and that “[h]e was adequate in his discussions.” The

psychologist determined that Vaughan had a personality disorder affecting his cognitive, 

emotional, and behavioral functioning; presented evidence of an antisocial personality disorder 

resulting in impulsivity and irresponsibility; and had paranoid personality features causing him to 

distrust others and perceive people as having malevolent intentions against him.

However, the expert concluded that Vaughan did not show evidence of a mental 

illness or intellectual impairment, that medication was not necessary to maintain his competency, 

and that he was competent to stand trial after explaining as follows:

Mr. Vaughan does not possess any significant evidence of a mental disorder or 

psychiatric diagnosis. He is able to rationally understand the charges against him

and potential consequences of the pending criminal proceedings; he is able to

disclose the accounts of pertinent facts, events, and states of mind and would be

able to rationally do so in court through testimony; he is able to engage in a

reasoned choice of legal strategies and options and has a rational understanding 

of the adversarial nature of the court proceedings. He would be able to exhibit

appropriate courtroom behavior. He has a rational capacity to engage with counsel.
14

The second report also detailed Vaughan’s history of mental-health treatment and 

his drug and alcohol use and explained that Vaughan may act out due to some of his personality 

features, but the psychologist determined that Vaughan could conform his behavior to what is 

appropriate if he chooses to do so, that he did not have a mental illness or intellectual impairment 

that would impede his capacity to consult with his attorney, and that medication was not 

necessary to maintain his competency. Further, the psychologist concluded that Vaughan was 

competent to stand trial after explaining as follows:

Mr. Vaughan is capable of rationally understanding his charges and possible 

consequences, relaying pertinent information to Counsel, selecting legal strategy, 

understanding the adversarial system, testifying, and behaving appropriately in 

court. While likely to present challenges to Counsel due to his personality 

features, Mr. Vaughan is capable of rationally assisting with his defense.

It is this evaluator’s opinion, with a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, 

that Roy Vaughan, Jr. possesses both the rational and factual understanding of the 

charges and proceedings against him. Further, he possesses sufficient capacity to 

consult competently with counsel regarding his case.

In addition, the transport officer informed the trial court that Vaughan was 

acting rationally, and Vaughan’s attorney also explained that he was competent to stand trial. 

Similarly, Vaughan informed the trial court that he understood the nature of the proceedings,

that he was innocent, that he wanted to participate in the trial, and that he agreed with the 

psychologists’ assessment that he could behave if he wanted. Further, Vaughan communicated 

to the trial court on multiple occasions that he was purposefully acting out because the trial court

denied his request for a new attorney and acknowledged how patient the trial court was being 

regarding his inappropriate behavior.

Moreover, although the exchanges were hostile, the trial court was able to observe 

Vaughan interact with his attorney and his ability to tell his version of events. See Turner, 
15

422 S.W.3d at 696 (explaining that trial court need not conduct competency inquiry when “there 

is some evidence that the defendant obstinately refuses to cooperate with counsel but nothing 

from which to rationally infer that his obstinacy is fueled by mental illness”); see also DeWitt v. 

State, Nos. 05-12-00583—00585-CR, 2013 WL 3389055, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 3, 

2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that “a failure to consult with 

counsel does not demonstrate a lack of competence; instead, a defendant must be unable to 

consult with counsel”). Similarly, the court engaged Vaughan about how he changed his prior 

behavior and agreed to wear nonjail clothing after thinking about how wearing jail attire and 

being forced to sit behind plexiglass might impact the presumption of innocence.

Additionally, although Vaughan correctly points out that he made repeated

interruptions during voir dire, his interruptions were responsive to the topics being discussed at 

the time, and Vaughan repeatedly explained his reasons for his conduct. See Johnson v. State, 

429 S.W.3d 13, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (stating that “[b]izarre, 

obscene, or disruptive comments by a defendant during court proceedings do not necessarily 

constitute evidence supporting a finding of incompetency”); Rojas v. State, 228 S.W.3d 770, 

772, 773 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, no pet.) (noting that “courts look to the content of the 

statement, not merely the fact the defendant violated rules of procedure or courtroom decorum”

and noting that defendant’s “comments were relevant to the issue being addressed”); see also 

Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (rejecting contention that 

defendant’s “unruly and disruptive courtroom demeanor are probative of incompetence to stand 

trial” because a contrary conclusion would allow one to “effectively avoid criminal justice 

through immature behavior”); Lopez v. State, No. 04-12-00568-CR, 2013 WL 6533183, at *7 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 11, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) 
16

(explaining that “while there is evidence that [the defendant] refused to cooperate with his 

attorney prior to trial, and sometimes interrupted the proceedings by speaking out loud, and 

sometimes failed to follow instructions, nothing in the record supports a rational inference that 

his conduct . . . was a product of mental illness rather than mere obstinacy” (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

Even though Vaughan highlights that he was evaluated by psychologists and 

points to the portions of the record in which he interrupted the proceedings, given the 

conclusions reached by the psychologists, the nature and cause of his interruptions, and the 

remainder of the information before the trial court, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused 

its discretion by failing to conclude that there was a current suggestion that he had neither a 

sufficient ability to rationally consult with his attorney nor a rational and factual understanding 

of the proceedings against him. For those same reasons, we also cannot conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an informal inquiry into his competency. Cf.

Hobbs v. State, 359 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (noting 

that history of mental illness was insufficient “to warrant a competency inquiry absent evidence 

of a present inability to communicate with his attorney or understand the proceedings”).

For these reasons, we overrule Vaughan’s issue on appeal. 

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Vaughan’s issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment 

of conviction.
17

__________________________________________

Thomas J. Baker, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Theofanis, and Jones*

Affirmed

Filed: March 30, 2023

Do Not Publish

*Before J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice (Retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by 

assignment. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.003(b).