### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on

Briefs O ctober 2, 2001
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LUIS ANTH ONY RAMON
Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for He nry County No. 12937 Julian P. Guinn, Judge

No. W2001-00389-CCA-R3-CD - Filed August 9, 2002

J OSEPH M. T IPTON , J., dissenting.

Give n the present state of the law, I respectfully disagree with the result reach ed in th e m ajor ity opinion. I believe that it was the jury’s prerogative to discredit some or all of the defendant’s experts’ testimony and to conclude that their testimony did not prov e by clear and convinci ng eviden

ce that th e defen dant coul d not appr eciate the wron gfulness of his con duct.

The 1995 amendment to the insanity defense statute dramatically altered the insan ity defe nse in Tennessee in two ways. Although sanity was presumed, once the e vidence rais ed a rea sonable doubt, the burden of proof shifted to the state, which had to prove a def endant’s sanity beyond a
rea sonable

doubt. See Graham v . State , 547 S.W.2d 531, 544 (Tenn. 1977). Also, the insanit y standard provided that a person was not responsible if as a result of mental disease or defect he or she lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the condu ct or

to conform the conduct t

o the req uiremen ts of law. See id. at 543. Since the 1995 amendment, a defendant has the burden o f proving

insanity by clear and convincing evidence. As importa nt, it is no def

ense to crime to prove that a defendant’s mental disease or defect prevented the de fendant from conforming conduct to the requ

irements of the la

w. Instea d, the def endant mu st

prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she, “as a result of a severe mental dis ease or

defect ,” was un able toapprec iate the nature or wrongfulness of such defenda nt’s acts.

I believe that shifting the burden of proof to the defendant means that the st ate has n o duty to prove sanity, just the duty to prove the existence of the elementsof the of

fense charged beyond
a reaso nable

doubt. When the jury rejects insanity as a defense, I be lieve the appropriate standard of review on appeal is whether, after vie wing the evidence in t

he light mos t favorable to the prosecution, any rati onal trie r of fac t could

have failed to

find that t he defe ndant’s c riminal in sanity at the time of

the offe nse was e stablishe d by clea r and con vincing e vid ence. This is the standard used under the federal statute re quiring the d efendant to prove insanity by clear and convincing-2-

evi dence. See State v. Barton , 992 F.2d 66, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1993). In this respect, we should no t reweigh the evidence but presume that the jury has resolved all conflicts in the testimony and drawn all reasonable inferences from the evide nce in favor of the state. This also includes appreciating the fact that a jury may rightfully reject an expert’s opinion.

In determining the issue of insanity, the trier of factmay consider bothlay and expert tes timony and may discount expert testimony which it finds to be in conflict with the facts of the case. Where there is a conflict between expert testimony and testimony as to the facts, the trier of

fact is no t require d to accept expert testimony over other testimony and must de

termine t he weigh t and cre dib ility of each

in light of all the facts and circumstances of the case

. State v. Holder , 15 S.W.3d 905, 912 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citations omitted).
Along with her t

estimony q

uoted in the ma

jori ty opinion, Dr. Ann Quinn Phyfer testified regard ing schiz ophrenia

and the de

fendant ’s condit

ion as fol lows:
Schizoph renia is characterized by a positive and negative symptom. Positive symptoms are hallucination and/or delusions. Those arethe essential features that

have to be there for the diagnosis to be made. [The defendant] had delusions, that is, beliefs that have n o basis in reality, but which are nevertheless he ld rigidly by the person. You can’t be talked out of them, and th e delusion is such that it governs their behav ior. And they respond to the delusional false belief and don’t have any contact , or much contact, with reality. The delusion is more real to them than what’s out there in the world. When th e delusion is--well the delusion can take any kind of cont ent. The person can believe that he’s king of a small country, he can believe that he’s God. In the case of the persec utory del

usion, the paranoi d delusion, the person believes that somebody is out to get him, that he is in danger. And that was the nature of [the defendant’s] belief . He believ ed th at there

were a group of p eople wh o were g oing to kill him, and he was powerless against this group of people. And he was constant ly think, ah, that this fearful delusion just occupied him and made him unable to function in other areas, because he wa s so afraid, he couldn’t do anything but respond to thi s delusion. And it was a delusion that made him believe--he thought that he was going to be killed unless he could somehow protect himself.

I believe that

Dr. Phyfer’ s testimony lends itself more logically to a person who cannot conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Although both e xperts te st ified that the defenda nt was una

ble to app reciate the wron gfulness of his acts at the time of the killing, I do not-3-

believe the ju ry was required to accept their testimony as fact. The very fact that the defendant called9-1-1 and explained what he had do ne, a nd to whom, reflects an awareness of wha t had occurred. Moreover, his history of plans to kill others, including the use of a knife be cause he

could not conceal a gun, does not reflect an incapa city to know right from wrong.
Unquestionably, the defendant suffers from severe mental illness. However, the Tennessee legislature has chosen to limit exoneration for criminal conduct by the mentally ill. I would affirm the conviction.

_____________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE