### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 220 -CV

Cl ar e nc e Da vis , A ppe lla nt

v. Mary Ellen Davis, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF LLANO COUNTY , 33 RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 14, 237 , HO NORAB LE DONALD V. HAM MO ND , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Clare nce D avis appe als a fina l decr ee of divorce

. The case was tried to the court without a jury . After hear ing the evidenc e, the tria l court ente red judg ment g ranting the divorce and dividing the marital estate in the manner reque sted by

appellee Mary

Ellen Davis. At the re quest of Clare nce D avis, the trial cour t also entere d finding s of fa ct and co n clusions of law
su pp or tin g the fi na l de c re e . T he se fi nd ing s and c on c lus io ns als o fa

vo re d M ary

El le n D a vis

. Clarenc e Da

vis asserts er

ror on two g rounds: (1) the tr ial court e rre d in setting a side a “ Gift Dee d” signe d by Mary Ellen Davis in August 2002 c o n v ey i n g h er one-half community

interest in the couple’ s homestead to Clare nce; a nd (2) the tr ial court a

bused its discretion by failing to divide the

mari ta l e state in a

mann e r t hat is jus t and

ri g ht. We a ff

ir m. Clarenc e and Ma

ry Ellen Davis wer e marrie d on J anuar y 8, 1947. They

have thr ee
a du lt c hil dr e n. I n 2 00 2, Mary El le n f ile d f or div or c e and

le ft the ho me ste a d, takin g $7 4, 00 0 in c a shThe trial c ourt also set aside the bill of sale as the product of undue influence . Clarenc e 1 does not cha lleng e this finding on a ppeal. 2 out of the couple’s joint bank acc ounts. W ithin a few months, Mary Ellen dec ided to return to the ho me ste a d a nd re c on c ile wi th Cla re nc e . Ma

ry El le n te sti fi e d that, a t that tim e , sh e ha d se ri ou s h e a lth problems, and ha d rec eived a diag nosis that she likely had ovaria n canc er. She said that she “f elt like she wa s g oing to die.” Both Cl are nce and M ary Ellen testified that as a condition of rec onciling a nd allowing her to re turn t o t h e h o m es t ead, Clar ence require d Mary Ellen to sign a

“Gift De ed” convey ing he r community

interest in the homestea d to Clarenc e and rese rving a li fe estate for Mary Ellen. Mary

Ellen also ag ree d to return $64,800 of the cash she had taken from their acc ounts. A t trial, Clarenc e testified that, in ex ch an ge for the g ift deed a nd rec onciliation, he ag ree d to pay her living expenses and allow her “to keep her soc ial secur ity ” che cks. On August 7, 2002, Clarence and Mary Ellen went to the off

ice of an attorn ey h i re d b y C l arence to draft the g ift deed. Ma ry Ellen testified that, althoug h the attorne y was a way from his office, s h e s i gn ed the dee d. Mary Ellen neither soug ht nor rec eived c ounsel reg ardingher inter est in th e co uple’s homestea d, nor did she have the g ift deed e x plained to her by any one other

than Clarenc e. I n September 2002, also at the reque st of Clarenc e, Mar

y Ellen signe d a bill of sale transfe rring her interest in most of the c ouple’s oth e r c omm

un ity a sse ts— inc lud ingve hic le s, liv e sto c k, and a ll c a shhold in gs—t o Cl are nc e in
e xch ang e fo r t

he state d c on sid e ratio n o f t e n d oll ars . Mary Ellen did not seek or o b t ain advice 1 reg ardingthe execution of the bill of sale.

Cir c ums tanc e s be tw e e n the tw o de te ri or a te d, and Mary El le n f ile d f or div or c e a g a in in September 2004. This time Clar ence filed a counter petition a s well. After

a benc h trial, the trialAppellant’s br ief doe s not state whether h e challenge s the fac tual or leg al suffic iency of 2 the evidenc e of undue influence

. His stated challeng e is simply to the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence to s up po rt the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing

. Ho we ve r, he se e ks a re mand ra the r tha n a re nd iti on

of jud g me nt. I n light of this re quested relief, we interpre t his complaint as one r eg ardingthe fa ctual suff iciency of t he evidence. See National Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. B lagg , 438 S.W .2d 905, 909 (Tex. 1969). As a pra ctical matter , our disposition of the fac tual sufficie ncy issue, by impl i ca t i o n, sug g ests the result of a leg al suffic iency

point had it been ra ised by the brief ing. 3 court set a side the A u gu s t 2 0 0 2 g ift deed a nd September 2002 bill of sale finding that Clarenc e “exerc ised undue influence ag ainst and upon” Ma ry Ellen. The c ourt then included the homestead and other proper ty that had bee n the subject of the g ift deed a nd bill of sale as part of the c ouple’s community proper

ty and divi ded the marital estate. The c ourt awa rded Ma ry Ellen a ve hicle value d at $1000, all amounts in one joint chec king a ccount totaling $ 3 1 3
. 9 7 , an d h alf of two othe r joint

a c c ounts tot a lin g $3 0, 79 7. 34 . T he c ourt awa rd e d Cl are nc e the ba lanc e of the c omm un ity pr op e rt y inc lud ingthe c ou

ple ’s ho me ste a d a

nd mos t of the pe rs on a l pro pe rt y . F ind ing that the c omm un ity estate ha d a cumulative value of $367,545.65—$250,000 of whic h was a llocated to the homeste ad proper ty —the cour

t ordere d Clarenc e to pay M ar y E l l en $151,661 to equa liz e the division of the estate. The trial court also require d Clarenc e to return to Mary Ellen separ ate property in the amount of $14,000 ca sh.

Clarenc e first c ontends that “[t] he trial c ourt err ed in findi ng that the dee d from Ap pe lle e to t

he Ap pe lla

nt w a s a re su lt o f u

nd ue i nfl uen ce.” He a

rgue s th a t th e re is f

a c tua lly insufficient e v idence to support the trial court’ s finding that the g ift deed of Aug ust 2002 was the result of undue influence

. A par ty seekingto s et as i d e an othe rwise va lid deed on the g round of 2

un du e inf lue nc e mus t pr ov e : ( 1) the ex is ten ce and e xer tio n o f a n in fl ue nc e ; ( 2) that op e rate d to subvert or ove rpowe r the g rantor’ s mind whe n the deed was e x ecute d; and (3) the g rantor w ould not4

have executed the deed but f or the i n fl uence . Dulak v. D ulak , 513 S.W .2d 205, 209 (Tex. 1974) (quoting Rothermel v . Duncan , 369 S.W .2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963)) (a ctions to set aside testamenta ry g ra nts in w ill s) ; Bradshaw v. Naumann , 5 28 S.W. 2d 86 9, 87 1 ( Te x. Civ . App .— Au sti n 1 97 5, wr it dis m’ d) (r

ule s g uidin g d eter

min a tio n o f e xiste nc e of

un du e inf

lue nc e a pp ly su bs tanti a lly

a lik e to wills, deeds, and other i n s t rum ents). Undue influence may be esta blished by

circ umstantial evidenc e as w ell as by

direc t testimony

. Rothermel , 369 S.W .2d at 922. Clarenc e cha lleng es the fa ctual suff iciency of the e vidence to support the finding of undue influenc e. In revie wing the fa ctual suff iciency of the evidenc e, we we igh a nd consider a ll the evidenc e in the re cord. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v . Heine , 835 S.W .2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992). When revie wing a finding on which appe llant bore the bur den of proof, we will r eview the rec ord to see if so m e evidence suppor ts the finding, the n deter mine whether

the finding is so contrary to the
overw helming w eig ht and prepondera nce of the evidence as to rende r the findingclea rly wrongand manifestly

unjust. Do w Ch e m. Co. v . F ra nc is , 4 6 S. W.3 d 2 37 , 24 2 (T e x. 20 01 ). We m ay no t pa ss upon the witn es s es ’ cre dibilit y or substitute our judgme nt for that of the trier of fac t, even if w e believe the evidenc e cle arly supports a differe nt result. Ma rit im e Ov e rse as Cor p. v . E lli s , 971 S.W .2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1998).

The re cord r efle cts that when Mary Ellen soug ht to reconc ile with Clarence in 2002 and re turn to the couple’ s homestead she was suff eringfrom seve re he alth problems. She testified that she had a

hear t attack at ag e 42 in 1976, two multipl e by pass surg erie s, and in the pre vious two y ear s befor e trial, a

hy sterec tomy

and an a ortic ane ury sm. Her health was deter iorating in 2002, and she had r ece ntly

rec eived a

diag nosis of likely

ovarian ca n cer . She believed she was dy ing. H erClarenc e conte nds that the “Gift De ed” w as not a ctually a g ift. He take s the position that 3 Mary El le n’ s in te re st i n th e ho me ste a d w a s c on ve y e d to him in exc han ge fo r h is a g re e me nt t o re c on c ile and

c on tin ue the marr ia g e . Th e re fo re , he argue s, the tr a ns fe r of he r r e a l pr op e rt

y int e re st to him was not purely

g ratuitous beca

use he co n v ey ed consideration to Mary Ellen in the form of ag ree ing to c ontinue to be marrie d to her. Clare nce’ s char acte rization of the “Gift De ed” tr ansac tion, howeve r, does not cha

ng e the a naly sis with respect to undue inf luence in obtaining the de ed. 5 summa ry was, “Iwas just sick and I just felt like if Iwas g oing to die I wanted to c ome home.” Mary Ellen also testified that Clare nce w as ver y co n t rol ling a

nd that “his word wa s the g ospel.” There was e vidence that Clarenc e had a history of violence both with Mary Ellen and the c ouple’s
c hil dr e n, and

tha t Ma ry El le n w a s a fr a id of him . H e ha d thre a te ne d f a mil y me mbe rs wi th f

ir e a rm s and phy sically

assaulted Ma

ry Ellen on sever al occ asions. I t is undisput ed that whe n M ar y Ellen
so ug ht t o r e tur

n to the ho me ste a d Cl are nc e re qu ir e d her to si g n th e g if t de e d a nd bil l of sa le a s a condition of allowing her to return. Mary Ellen stated that she did not understand the documents or tr y to be fo re sh e sig ne d the m. Cla re nc e ’s re sp on se is that Ma ry El le n s ig ne d th e g if

t de e d a nd bil l of sale voluntarily in e x chang e for his a g ree ment to r econc ile and allow he r to live in the homestead. 3 He do e s no t dis pu te , ho we ve r, that the “ a g re e me nts ” we re his c on dit ion of a llo wi ng he r to re tur n to the homestea d. This evidence does not overw helm the counter vailing e vidence supporting the trial court’s f inding of undue influenc e. There is sufficie nt evidenc e for the trial cour t to have found that Mary E ll e nw a s in

a p arti c u la r ly v u ln e r a b le s ta te w h e ns h e s o u g h t t o r e tu r nan d th a t C la r e n ce exploi ted Mary

Ellen’s illness, her ig noranc e of community proper ty rig hts, her fear of him, and her desire to be i nh e r

li f e lo n g h o me a t t

h a t t im e in

o r d e r to o b ta in h e r s ig n a tu r e o nth e c o n v e y ance documents. We conc lude that fa ctually sufficie nt e vidence supports the finding of undue influe nce and that the f

inding is not manifestly

unjust. W e over

rule the f irst point of error

.6 I n his s e c ond point of err or, Clare nce c ontends that the trial cour t abused its discretion b y f a il in g to o r d e r a ju s t an d r ig h t d iv is io n o f th e c o mm u n it y e s tate. See T ex . Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001 (West 1998). I n making a just and rig ht divisi on of the e state, t h e t ri al j udg e has w ide discretion in dividing the pr operty
. Mu rff v . M ur ff , 6 15 S.W. 2d

69 6, 69 8 ( Te x. 19 81 ). On a pp e a l, t h e r e i s a p r e s u mp t i o n t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u rtc o r r e c t l y e x e r c i s e d

i t s d i s c r e t i o ni nd i v i d i n g t h e p r o p e rt y,
and the burd e n r e sts up on

a pp e lla nt t o s ho w f

ro m th e re c or d th a t th e div isi on wa s so dis pr op or

tio nate as t o be manifestly unfair. Law v. Law , 51 7 S.W. 2d 37 9, 38 4 (T e x. Civ

. Ap p. —A us tin 19 74 , w ri t d i s m ’d ) ( ci t i n g Hedtkev. He dtke , 248 S.W . 21 (Tex. 1923) ). I n revie wing the trial cour t’s judgme nt for a buse of discretion, we examine whether the cour t acted in a

n unrea sonable or a

rbitrar y manner . Beaumont Bank

, N.A. v. Buller , 806 S.W .2d 223, 226 (Tex

. 1 9 9 1). The tr ial court, in per forming its fact-f inding duties, is t he sole judg e of the cre dibilit y of the witnesse s and must make such deter minations in order to make its dec isions. Raymond v . Rahme , 7 8 S. W. 3 d 5 5 2 , 556 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).

Clarenc e complains that ke y comp o n en t s of the mar ital estate, spec ifically the re al pr op e rt y , w e re ov e rv a lue d b y the tr ia l c ourt and , the re fo re , Ma ry El le n r e c e ive d a

dis pr op or

tio nate allocation of a ssets beca

use she was awarde d cash rather than the re al prope rty . The c ourt awa rded the bulk of the tang ible community proper ty (both re al and pe rsonal) to Clare nce, a nd require d Clarenc e to pay

Mary Ellen $151,661.51 to equalize the division of the community estate in a ddition to reimbursing her $14,000 a s her se parate prope rty
. C l ar en ce co ntends that the trial cour t’s
ov e rv a luatio n o f a sse ts a

wa rd e d to him c a

us e d the c a sh pa

y me nts re qu ir e d of him

to “ e qu a lize ” the ir7

share s of the community

proper ty to be too hig h. He complains specific ally about the valuation of the ho me ste a d, tw o h or se s, pr oc e e ds of a liv e sto c k s a le , a

nd the ir ba nk a c c ounts
. Th e mos t si gn if

ic ant d isp ari ty

in t he pa rt ie s’ va luatio n o f t

he c omm un ity a sse ts i s their valuation of the rea l property

. The proper ty is r oug hly twenty acr es of land on the edg e of the
so uth e a st q

ua dr ant of L lano , T e xas. I t c on ta ins a ho us e , gue st h ou se , b arn s, and oth e r i mpr ov e me nts
. I t is also platted with a

g rid of stree ts that have not bee n clea red or paved. Ma

ry Ellen claims that the re a l pr op e rt

y is w or th $ 25 0, 00 0 b a se d o n w hat sh e ov e rh e ard Cla re nc e te ll a rea lto r h e wo uld take f or the proper

ty
. Clarenc e claims that it is worth $111,780 based, he te stified, on the valuation by the appr aisal district. He testified that one pe rson made a tentative off

er of $175,000, but did not follow throug h and buy

the prope rty . Neither

party offe red a n appra isal of t he market value of the proper t y done by an expert. The r ecor d is, theref ore, me ag er on this issue. Nonethe less, the trial court ha s g reat discretion in deter mining the weig ht to be g iven to a witness’s testimony

. Raymond , 78 S.W .3d at 555-56. We ca nnot rewe igh the evidenc e. El lis , 971 S.W .2d at 407. The tria l court was fa ced w ith two proffe red va luations, both alleg edly coming fr o m C l ar ence, and ne ither supported by

customary

expert valuation evidenc e. Unde r such c ircumstance s, we c annot say that the cour t abused its discretion by acc epting Mary Ellen’s testimony over that of Clare nce. N either is conclusive and the trial court wa s within it s discretion to weig h the cr edibility of the two. Th e c ourt ’s va luatio n o f t wo ho rs e s— Gr a ssh op pe r a nd an unn ame d ma

re —is a lso supported on thi s rec ord. Mary Ellen testified t hat Clarenc e said Gr asshopper was wor th $10,000. She te sti fi e d th a t sh e ha d le arn e d o nly in t he pr e vio us we e k that Cla re nc e ha d tr ans fe rr e d th e ho rs e to their daug hter, Ka

y . Mary Ellen also testified t hat s he and Clar ence had owne d a re g istered mar e8

that w a s o n th e pr op e rt

y wh e n sh e le ft , tho ug h s he did no t kn owthe mare ’s wh e re a bo uts a t th e tim e of trial. She testified that she had hea rd Clare nce va lue the mar e “some wher e in th[e] neig hborhood” of $5500. Clare nce de nied valuing Grasshopper so highly and testi fied that he value d the horse at his purchase price of $1500. At trial, Clare nce testified that he would have acc epted a hy pothetical $5000 offe r for

Gra sshopper, but that he had g iven the horse to their daug hter. Clare nce a dmitted that he sold a mar e for $750, put the money into his lockbox, and might have spent the $750 by the time of trial. Kay

testified that she did not know what value to place on G rasshoppe r, that she ha d not hear d her f

ather do so, and that her mother was prese nt mor e than a y ear befor e trial when he r fathe r g ave the horse to Kay and her husband for se rvice s rende red. A lthough e quivocal, this rec ord does not requir e over

turning the trial cour

t’s fac t-finding on either va luation. Clarenc e complains that the trial court twice counted the valuation of four calve s he sold. He testified that he sold the calve s for $2719 and either deposited the cas h o r k ep t i t
. He contends that the pr ocee ds should be part of the divi s i o n of the ba nk acc ounts rather

than being assig ned a se parate value. Ma ry Ellen counter s that there is no e vidence that Clarenc e put the money into the bank. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial c ourt assig ning a value to the pr ocee ds of the sa le se pa

rate fr om t

he va lue a ssi g ne d to the ba nk a c c ounts
. Finally , Clarenc e complains that the ba nk acc ounts w ere assig ned g reater value than they contained at the time of trial. When Mary Ellen filed this divorce suit in S ep t em b er 2004, state me nts sh owtha

t th e c ou ple ha d $ 25 ,2 76 a t Cit

y Natio na l B ank

and $5 3, 50 1 at F ir st St a te Ba nk—a total of $78,777. At the time of tr ial in J une 2005, Clare nce t estified that they had $18,620.50 at City National and $10,031.55 at First State Ba nk—a total of $28,652.05. C l ar ence9

te sti fi e d th a t he ha d w ith dr awn a t le a st $3 6, 00 0 that he ke pt in a loc kb ox, to wh ic h h e ha d p os sib ly added the mare and ca lves s al e m o n ey . He had spent some of that money . I n its findings and conclusions suppo rt i n g the dec ree , the cour t assigne d values of $22,094.68 to the City National

a c c ount a nd $3 9, 50 0 to the F ir st St a te a c c ount— a tot a l of $6 1, 59 4. 68 . T he re is n o amou nt e xpre ssl y attributed to the ca sh in Clarence ’s lockbox. The differ ence b et we en t h e st atement va lues of the
acc ounts on the trial date and the va lues assig ned to the ac counts by the trial cour

t is $32,942.63, which is less than the amount Cl are nce a dmitted to having remove d from the a ccounts a nd hidden in t he loc kb ox. T he se fi g ur e s in dic a te that the tr ia l c ourt inc lud e d in

the a c c ount f

ig ur e s amou

nts that Clarenc e re moved from the acc ounts. To the extent the tria l court depa rted fr om the evidenc e of the pa rties’ c ash asse ts, it did so in a manner t hat favored Cl are nce. The c ourt’s asse ssment of the valuation of the a ccounts is not ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of th e evide nce in the
re c or d o f t

he ir c a shho ldi ng s. We conclude that the trial court’ s division of the communit y est ate is not
unrea sonable or a

rbitrar y . We overrule Clarenc e’s se cond point of er ror. We affir m the judgme nt of the trial cour t.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Waldrop Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 15, 2007