UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 96-4344

GERALD ANTHONY HALL,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.

Graham C. Mullen, District Judge.

(CR-94-195-MU)

Submitted: February 10, 1998

Decided: March 17, 1998

Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS,

Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Randolph Marshall Lee, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Mark T. Calloway, United States Attorney, David C. Keesler, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Gerald Anthony Hall appeals from his convictions of conspiracy to

commit carjacking, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994); aiding and abetting carjacking, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2119 (1994); aiding and abetting the use and

carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,

924(c) (1994); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g) (1994), for which he was sentenced to a total term of 240

months imprisonment. Hall's only claim on appeal is that the district

court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, Fed. R.

Crim. P. 29, based on the Government's alleged failure to establish

an interstate commerce nexus to support the conviction for carjacking

charged in Count Two of the indictment. For the reasons that follow,

we affirm.

The evidence presented at Hall's trial, viewed in the light most

favorable to the Government, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.

60, 80 (1942), established that on October 29, 1994, Hall and a juvenile male attempted to carjack a Jeep Cherokee in a convenience store

parking lot in Lowell, North Carolina. Prior to trial, Hall and the Government entered into the following stipulation, which was read to the

jury after the Government's opening statement:

[T]he Jeep Cherokee vehicle that was the subject of the

attempted carjacking at England's Carload Market in Lowell, North Carolina on October 29, 1994 was not manufactured in North Carolina, and therefore, had previously been

transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign commerce.

Hall claims that, despite this stipulation, the Government failed to

present evidence sufficient to establish an interstate commerce nexus

because the car was purchased in North Carolina and only driven in

North Carolina and, therefore, "there was no showing of any connection with interstate commerce beyond the fact that the car had been

manufactured outside of North Carolina." (App. Br. at 4).

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Hall waived the requirement that the Government produce evidence with respect to the interstate commerce nexus by virtue of his

stipulation to that element of the crime. See United States v. Clark,

993 F.2d 402, 406 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Reedy, 990 F.2d

167, 169 (4th Cir. 1993). We find that the facts as stipulated were sufficient evidence as to the interstate commerce element of the crime of

carjacking. See United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1112 (4th Cir.

1995) ("`where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation

to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising

under that statute is of no consequence.'") (quoting United States v.

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)). To the extent that Hall challenges

the carjacking statute in light of the Supreme Court's decision in

Lopez (invalidating a provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of

1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994)), we reject this claim as has every

circuit to address the issue. See United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d

125, 126 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W.

3570 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1997) (No. 96-7188); United States v. Coleman,

78 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W.

3263 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 96-5304); United States v. Hutchinson,

75 F.3d 626, 627 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W.

3264 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 96-5397); United States v. Bishop, 66

F.3d 569, 585 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, #6D 6D6D# U.S. ___, 64 U.S.L.W. 3416

(U.S. Dec. 11, 1995) (No. 95-6678); United States v. Robinson, 62

F.3d 234, 236 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547,

550 (9th Cir. 1995).

Accordingly, we affirm Hall's convictions. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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