NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 

ASSOCIATION, 

Plaintiff-counterdefendant-Appellee, 

 v. 

CASA MESA VILLAS HOMEOWNERS 

ASSOCIATION, 

Defendant, 

and 

SATICOY BAY LLC SERIES 6671 W. 

TROPICANA 103, 

Defendant-counter-claimantAppellant.

No. 19-17133 

D.C. No. 

2:17-cv-01758-RFB-EJY 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Richard F. Boulware II, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 17, 2020**

Pasadena, California

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as 

provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 3 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Before: RAWLINSON, HUNSAKER, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Saticoy Bay appeals from the district court’s summary judgment order in 

favor of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we review the grant of summary judgment de 

novo, Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 927 (9th Cir. 2017), and we affirm. 

1. For purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) (the Federal Foreclosure Bar) and 

Nevada law, Fannie Mae provided sufficient evidence to establish its interest in the 

Las Vegas residential property located at 6671 W. Tropicana Ave # 103 (Property)

at and before the date of the Casa Mesa Villas Homeowners Association’s (HOA) 

foreclosure sale. See Daisy Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 445 P.3d 846, 849 n.3, 

850–51 (Nev. 2019) (finding that business records supported by employee 

declarations and the judicially noticeable loan servicing guide sufficiently 

established Freddie Mac’s property interest even where it was omitted from the 

recorded deed of trust); Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 932–33 (same). Here, Fannie Mae 

retained a secured interest in the Property because the deed’s recorded beneficiary, 

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), had authority to foreclose 

on Fannie Mae’s behalf, and Fannie Mae could compel MERS to assign the deed to 

Fannie Mae. See In re Montierth, 354 P.3d 648, 650–51 (Nev. 2015); see also 

Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Guberland LLC-Series 3, 2018 WL 3025919, at *2 (Nev. 
3 

June 15, 2018) (unpublished disposition)

1

(applying Montierth’s rationale to facts 

nearly identical to those here). 

Saticoy Bay’s statute of frauds arguments likewise fail. Saticoy Bay was not 

party to Fannie Mae’s acquisition of the note and deed, so under current Nevada law, 

it may not invoke the statute of frauds. See Easton Bus. Opportunities, Inc. v. Town 

Exec. Suites, 230 P.3d 827, 832 n.4 (Nev. 2010) (discussing “the general law that ... 

statue of frauds ... cannot ordinarily be asserted by third persons” (quoting 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 324 cmt. b (1981))). And the transaction 

Saticoy Bay impugns—Fannie Mae’s April 2007 purchase of the note and deed—

fully closed long ago, which also renders Nevada’s statute of frauds inapplicable. 

See Edwards Indus., Inc. v. DTE/BTE, Inc., 923 P.2d 569, 574 (Nev. 1996) (noting 

that full performance can render the statute of frauds inapplicable). 

There is moreover no evidence in the record that the Federal Housing Finance 

Agency (FHFA), which holds Fannie Mae and its assets in conservatorship, 

affirmatively consented to the extinguishment of the interest in the Property. See

Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 929 (rejecting that Freddie Mac and the FHFA could 

“implicitly consent[]” to the foreclosure of a property interest). In fact, the evidence 

1 Under Nevada’s appellate rules, unpublished dispositions may “establish mandatory precedent 

... in a related case ....” Nev. R. App. P. 36(c)(2). The Nevada Supreme Court also permits 

citation to its unpublished dispositions for “persuasive value, if any ....” Id. at 36(c)(3). The 

unpublished Nevada Supreme Court dispositions we cite herein grapple with issuesin all important 

respects identical to those before us, and therefore possess especially persuasive value. 
4 

runs contrary: “FHFA confirms that it has not consented, and will not consent in the 

future, to the foreclosure or other extinguishment of any Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac 

lien or other property interest in connection with HOA foreclosures of super-priority 

liens.” 

Clear precedent likewise forecloses Saticoy Bay’s remaining arguments that 

Fannie Mae failed to properly establish its property interest under Nevada law. See, 

e.g., Daisy Tr., 445 P.3d at 849 (“Nevada’s recording statutes did not require Freddie 

Mac to publicly record its ownership interest as a prerequisite for establishing that 

interest”); see also Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 930–31 (“The Federal Foreclosure Bar’s 

declaration ... supersede[s] any contrary law, including state law, that would allow 

foreclosure of Agency property without its consent.”). 

The Federal Foreclosure Bar accordingly applies, and the HOA foreclosure 

sale did not extinguish Fannie Mae’s interest in the Property.2 

2. Saticoy Bay cannot seek refuge under the bona fide purchaser doctrine

because it is not a bona fide purchaser—it had constructive notice of Fannie Mae’s 

interest in the property. See Shadow Wood HOA v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp., 366 P.3d 

2 Saticoy Bay’s “conclusive statutory presumption” arguments that MERS—not Fannie Mae—is 

the beneficial owner of the deed also fail. Saticoy Bay was not party either to the deed of trust or 

its subsequent transfer to Fannie Mae, so it cannot invoke the presumption in NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 47.240(2). But § 47.240(2)’s presumption is inapplicable because Nevada law permits Fannie 

Mae to record its property interest as it did here. Daisy Tr., 445 P.3d at 849. And § 47.240(2) is 

similarly inapplicable because there’s no evidence Fannie Mae intentionally misled Saticoy Bay 

(or anyone) and falsified the deed. 
5 

1105, 1115 (Nev. 2016) (a purchaser is bona fide if it makes a purchase “without 

notice of facts which upon diligent inquiry would be indicated and from which notice 

would be imputed to him, if he failed to make such inquiry” (citation omitted)). 

We’ve already noted that Nevada law does not require Fannie Mae “to publicly 

record its ownership interest as a prerequisite for establishing [its property] interest.” 

Daisy Tr., 445 P.3d at 849; Berezovsky, 869 F.3d at 932–33. And the 2007 Deed of 

Trust contains a footer on every page that says: “NEVADA – Single Family – Fannie 

Mae/Freddie Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT – MERS.” This indicator of Fannie 

Mae’s potential interest provides sufficient notice to later purchasers under Nevada 

law. See CitiMortgage, Inc. v. TRP Fund VI, LLC, 2019 WL 1245886, at *1 (Nev. 

Mar. 14, 2019) (unpublished disposition).3 

3. Saticoy Bay’s remaining argument that the district court improperly granted 

Fannie Mae equitable relief is beside the point and lacks merit. When a court 

determines that a deed of trust survives a foreclosure sale by virtue of the Federal 

Foreclosure Bar, it grants relief “by operation of law.” Collegium Fund LLC Series 

7 v. Ditech Fin., LLC, 2020 WL 3469189, at *1 n.2 (Nev. June 24, 2020)

(unpublished disposition). That is precisely what happened here. 

AFFIRMED.

3 Because Saticoy Bay is not a bona fide purchaser, we need not consider whether NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 111.325 is preempted by the Federal Foreclosure Bar.