UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

David Pannell, 

 Petitioner, 

v. Case No. 3:16-CV-575 JVB 

Superintendent, 

 Respondent. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 David Pannell, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the prison 

disciplinary hearing (ISP 16-06-172) where a disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) found him guilty 

of Threatening in violation of B-213. As a result, he was sanctioned with the loss of 60 days earned 

credit time. Pannell presents five grounds in his petition. 

 In Ground One, Pannell argues that his hearing officer was biased because more than a 

year before, he had filed grievances against her and she had filed a conduct report on him which 

was subsequently overturned on appeal. 

An inmate facing disciplinary charges has the right to an impartial decisionmaker. 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571. But “the constitutional standard for impermissible bias is 

high,” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003), and an adjudicator is 

entitled to a presumption of “honesty and integrity” absent clear evidence to the 

contrary, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 

(1975). Due process requires disqualification of a decisionmaker who was directly 

or substantially involved in the underlying incident, Gaither, 236 F.3d at 820, and 

we have assumed that a decisionmaker might likewise be impermissibly biased if 

his spouse is a crucial witness in the proceeding, see Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 

729 (7th Cir. 2002). A hearing officer is not automatically deemed biased, however, 

simply because he adjudicated or was involved in a previous disciplinary charge 

against the prisoner. See Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666-67; Pannell, 306 F.3d at 502. 

 

Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx. 39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, the DHO did not write the 

Conduct Report or witness the incident. Pannell has not provided clear evidence that the DHO 
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was otherwise biased. The DHO was involved in a previous disciplinary charge with Pannell, but 

that is not enough. He had filed grievances against her, but that is not enough either. Therefore 

Ground One is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. 

 In Ground Two, Pannell argues that he did not receive adequate notice of the charge against 

him. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), requires that an inmate be given notice of the 

factual basis of the charges against him. Here, the Conduct Report explained that “Offender 

Pannell made the comment ‘We are going to meet up one day.’ When he went to set down, he 

repeated the same comment, ‘We are going to meet up one day’!” (DE 1 at 5.) Pannell does not 

believe that those words were threatening. However that is not relevant to whether he was 

adequately notified of the factual basis of the charge against him. He knew what he was charged 

with saying and he knew that he was charged with threatening. Based on that he was able to prepare 

his defense. That is all that due process required. Therefore Ground Two is not a basis for habeas 

corpus relief. 

 In Ground Three, Pannell argues that he was denied the right to call live witnesses. 

However, an inmate in a prison disciplinary hearing has no right to confront or cross-examine 

witnesses. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). “Prison disciplinary proceedings 

are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such 

proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). “The requirements 

of due process are considerably relaxed in the setting of prison discipline . . ..” Eads v. Hanks, 280 

F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002). “Prison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the 

hearing within reasonable limits.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Therefore 

Ground Three is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. 
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 In Ground Four, Pannell argues that he was denied documentary evidence. An inmate has 

a constitutional right to present relevant, exculpatory evidence during a prison disciplinary hearing 

which extends the duration of his confinement. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974); 

Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). Exculpatory in this context means 

evidence which “directly undermines the reliability of the evidence in the record pointing to [the 

prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996). Pannell wanted to present: 

“(1) a copy of the June 9, 2016, U.S. Supreme Court’s ‘Order’; (2) Pannell’s ‘Law Library’ 

Deadline Log for the month of June; and (3) Pannell’s June 13, 2016, ‘Photocopy Request’.” (DE 

1 at 8.) His goal was to demonstrate that the law librarian (whom he threatened) was wrong to have 

refused to grant him extended hours in the library, that he had no reason to be mad at her because 

he knew that he was entitled to additional hours in the library, and that she subsequently did grant 

him additional time in the library. However none of those documents were relevant to whether he 

threatened her immediately after she originally denied his request for additional time. Therefore 

Ground Four is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. 

 In Ground Five, Pannell argues that there was not sufficient evidence to find him guilty. In 

evaluating whether there was adequate evidence to support a finding of guilt in a prison 

disciplinary proceeding, “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that 

could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 

445, 455-56 (1985). 

[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the support of some 

evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no more than a modicum 

of evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the record is not so devoid 

of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or 

otherwise arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still must point to the 

accused’s guilt. It is not our province to assess the comparative weight of the 

evidence underlying the disciplinary board’s decision. 
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Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations, parenthesis, and 

ellipsis omitted). 

 Words can be tricky to interpret. Context, intonation, and inflection all matter. Code words 

and encrypted phrases can have meanings not readily understood by those unfamiliar with the 

environment in which they are used. So too, sarcasm and satire can mask threats or nefarious 

transactions. Some threats such as “I’m going to kill you” are obvious. Others such as “I’m going 

to get you” are more veiled but no less threatening. Here, Pannell was accused of saying “We are 

going to meet up one day.” He argues that is not what he said and that he meant they would meet 

in court. However, the DHO believed that was what he said, and it is not for this court to reweigh 

that credibility determination. “We are going to meet up one day” is a step removed from “I’m 

going to get you,” but it was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary for the DHO to have concluded 

that it was a threat. Therefore Ground Five is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. 

 If Pannell wants to appeal this decision, he does not need a certificate of appealability 

because he is challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. See Evans v. Circuit Court, 569 F.3d 

665, 666 (7th Cir. 2009). However, he may not proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because the 

court finds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal in this case could not be taken in 

good faith. 

 For these reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED. The clerk is DIRECTED to 

enter judgment and close this case. David Pannell is DENIED leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

on appeal. 

SO ORDERED on April 24, 2017. 

 s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE