No. 13200 

IN THE SUPREME COUKT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1976 

LINDA J. LaPTANT, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-VS - 

DOLVALI) L . La PLANT, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

Honorable W. W. Less ley, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record : 

For Appellant : 

McKinley Anderson argued, Bozeman, Montana 

For ~espondent: 

Hartelius and Lewin, Great Falls, Montana 

Alan Jay Lerner argued, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted: April 19, 1976 

Decided : - <SUN 2 

Filed : 

- Jt! 2 
Honorable Arnold Olsen, District Judge, sitting in place of 

Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison, delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Plaintiff Linda J. LaPlant filed an action for divorce 

against defendant Donald L. LaPlant. The district court dissolved 

the bonds of matrimony between the parties. The district court 

also decreed plaintiff had made monetary and other contributions 

to the marriage and helped to acquire the real and personal property owned by the parties. The district court decreed to plaintiff some personal property, including the mobile home of the 

parties and ten acres of real property upon which the mobile 

home was situated. From the decree, defendant Donald L. LaPlant 

appeals only as to that portion of the decree awarding plaintiff 

the real property. 

Defendant alleges the court abused its discretion in 

awarding one fourth of defendant's real property acquired by 

him before the marriage to plaintiff. Further, he challenges 

that the decree does not provide a sufficient description of the 

property required to be conveyed by plaintiff to defendant and 

does not provide as to how the parties shall pro rate the payments of indebtedness against the real property, and the decree 

is therefore so indefinite as to be void. 

We look to the findings of fact and conclusions of law 

of the district court. It is clear the court did find that 

"while living with the plaintiff, but prior to their marriage 

the husband purchased in his own name certain real property 

consisting of forty acres, more or less, located in Gallatin 

County, Montana. " Further the court found plaintiff and 

defendant were living together as husband and wife during the 

years of 1970 and 1971 in Alaska. That immediately following 

their marriage in 1971, plaintiff and defendant set up a joint 

account out of which all household bills were paid, and during 
the years 1972, 1973, and 1974, plaintiff earned a total of 

$6,513 which was deposited into the parties' joint account 

and used for the payment of various household bills. Further, 

the court found plaintiff had an income before their marriage 

and while living together in Alaska, her income was used for 

the payment of the domestic bills accrued by the parties there. 

The parties made joint tax returns and received tax refunds 

jointly. 

The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 

district court are upheld by a reading of the transcript. 

In Libra v. Libra, 157 Mont. 252, 258, 484 P.2d 748, 

this Court held: 

" * * * a district court in a divorce action 

has equitable powers to adjust property interests 

of the parties, and in so doing we affirm Johnson 

and overrule Emery on this point. * * *" 

Since Libra, this Court has repeatedly confirmed the 

power of the district court in dealing with adjustment of property rights between the parties in a divorce action. 

In Cook v. Cook, 159 Mont. 98, 102, 495 P.2d 591, this 

Court stated: 

"Libra and Hodsson should have laid to rest the d ---- - - - - 

husband's argument on appeal here. It has already 

been at least twice decided in this State that the 

trial court may make an equitable division of the 

litigants' property in a divorce action regardless 

of the state of title to that property and regardless of actual financial contribution." Emphasis added.) 

Counsel for defendant seems to contend there is some 

requirement that the property of the divorced parties must have 

been acquired jointly, failing that, the court has no jurisdiction or is powerless to divide the property between the litigants. 

The rule is best stated in Hunnewell v. Hunnewell, 160 

Mont. 125, 129, 500 P.2d 1198: 

"It is a well established principle of law in 

this state that in determining a property settlement pursuant to the granting of a divorce, the 
court will consider the contributions made by 

the parties in acquiring the property in 

question." 

From the record, it would appear plaintiff and defendant sustained a common law marriage at the time defendant 

first incurred the obligation for the land at issue here. Indeed, the district court found that plaintiff and defendant 

lived together during the years 1970 and 1971 as husband and 

wife in Alaska. 

The property involved was acquired during the marriage. 

Plaintiff contributed to the acquisition of the land 

by wages deposited in the joint account and in her efforts in 

taking care of the real estate when defendant was in Alaska 

to earn the money which was used to pay for the land. 

Clearly, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in awarding only one fourth of the real estate and a small portion 

of the personal property to plaintiff. This award was not out 

of proportion to her contribution in money and labor to the 

property acquired by the efforts of the marriage. 

In Johnson v. Johnson, 137 Mont. 11, 17, 349 P.2d 310, 

this Court stated: 

" * * * (t)he better reasoned cases support the 

view stated in 27B C.J.S., Divorce, section 294(3), 

page 280, as follows: 

"'In some jurisdictions the court granting divorce 

may divide or adjust rights in property accumulated by the joint efforts of the spouses. Property acquired jointly during the marriage may be 

divided whether the title thereto is in either or 

both of the parties.' 

"And, equal division under normal conditions of 

property accumulated through joint efforts is not 

regarded as unreasonable. 27B C.J.S., Divorce, 

section 295(5), page 304, et seq." (Emphasis added.) 

The findings of fact and judgment do not describe the 

real property by metes and bounds. However, the ten acres 

granted plaintiff by the court are those ten acres upon which 
the Nashua mobile home is located. There is nothing in the 

law that requires a metes and bounds description of land in 

the decree. Certainly no other ten acres would fit the 

description. 

In Kottas v. Kottas, 164 Mont. 30, 32, 518 P.2d 1404, 

this Court held the district court had jurisdiction to clarify 

the decree of divorce and to make it read what the court 

intended judgment to be: 

"We base our holding on the distinction between 

actual modification of a judgment and clarification or interpretation of a judgment. This 

Court in State ex rel. Kruletz v. District 

Court, 110 Mont. 36, 41, 98 P.2d 883, 885, said: 

"'The test is whether on the one hand the change 

will make the record speak the truth as to what 

was actually determined or done or intended to 

be determined or done by the court, or whether 

on the other hand, it will alter such action or 

intended action.' 

"h%& instant case does not present such a clear 

cut case of scrivner's error, or inadvertent 

ommission; nevertheless, we think the problem 

is of such a nature that the court rendering the 

decree should take jurisdiction to resolve the 

issue. Such a resolution will not change the 

rights of the parties as set forth in the original 

decree, rather it will be a further declaration 

and amplification of what was originally held. 

"In 27B C.J.S., Divorce, § 300(4a), it is said: 

"'The interpretation or clarification of an 

ambiguous judgment does not involve amendment 

thereof, so that even though power to modify is 

lacking, a court may construe and clarify a decree 

disposing of property, or enforce it.' 

"That application is exactly what is called for in 

the instant case." (Emphasis added.) 

In the instant case the district court obviously, from 

the findings of fact and conclusions of law, knew the ten acres 

granted plaintiff was that ten acres upon which the mobile home 

is located. 

In this instance, the parties should request the district 

court to supervise the direction to the parties to obtain a metes 
and bounds description by survey of the property conveyed. 

The judgment of the district court refused to burden 

plaintiff with a portion of the debt against the land. Consequently, the entire remaining debt remains with the defendant 

who received seventy-five percent of the real estate. 

Again, it is obvious the district court did not abuse 

its discretion, such an adjustment is not unreasonable. 

The judgment and decree of the district court is 

affirmed, with directions to specifically require a mete.s and 

bounds description in a deed conveying the real property herein 

from defendant to plaintiff. / 

Hon. Arnold Olsen, District Judge, 

sitting in place of Mr. Chief Justice 

James T. Harrison. 

We concur: 

Justices