alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 14.1

# Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

The Board of DirectorsAlcon, Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-11145, 333-100746 and 333-86882) of Alcon, Inc. of our report dated January 28, 2005, except for note 19 which is as of February 9, 2005, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Alcon, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2004 and 2003, and the related consolidated statements of earnings, shareholders equity and comprehensive income, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2004, which report appears in the December 31, 2004 annual report on Form 20-F of Alcon, Inc.

KPMG LLP

Fort Worth, TexasMarch 14, 2005
112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 655 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 95 Dogwood Street in Cary, Mississippi, as 

the ‘‘Spencer Byrd Powers, Jr. Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

†S 655 ES

1 SECTION 1. SPENCER BYRD POWERS, JR. POST OFFICE. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 95 Dogwood Street in Cary, Mis4 sissippi, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Spencer 

5 Byrd Powers, Jr. Post Office’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

8 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

9 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Spencer Byrd Powers, 

10 Jr. Post Office’’. 

Passed the Senate May 16, 2011. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 655 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostPost Office’’. Mississippi, as the ‘‘Spencer Byrd Powers, Jr. al Service located at 95 Dogwood Street in Cary,
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Stacy BASS, Appellant.

No. 11-1474.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 4, 2011.

Filed: Nov. 10, 2011.

Shawn Wehde, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Sioux City, IA, for Appellee.

Stacy Bass, Waseca, MN, pro se.

Richard Scott Rhinehart, Rhinehart Law, Sioux City, IA, for Appellant.

Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

*731PER CURIAM.

Stacy Bass pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute 500 grams of a mixture containing at least 50 grams of pure methamphetamine, *see*21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (10-year minimum prison term), and 846; and distributing, and aiding and abetting others in the distribution of, approximately 27.77 grams of a mixture containing 11.66 grams of pure methamphetamine, *see*21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court1 sentenced Bass to concurrent terms of 120 months in prison. Her counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), asserting that the government acted in bad faith in refusing to move under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a sentence reduction based on Bass’s substantial assistance.

The challenge is unavailing because there is no indication in the record that the government’s decision not to move for a sentence reduction was improper. *See United States v. Perez,*526 F.3d 1135, 1138-39 (8th Cir.2008); *United States v. Wattree,*431 F.3d 618, 624 (8th Cir.2005); *United States v. Chacon,*330 F.3d 1065, 1066 (8th Cir.2003).

Having reviewed the record under *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfriv-olous issues. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion, and affirm the judgment.

1

. The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 621 

To amend the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 to 

provide for use of excess funds available under that Act to provide 

for certain benefits, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 17, 2011 

Mr. ROCKEFELLER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To amend the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 

of 1977 to provide for use of excess funds available 

under that Act to provide for certain benefits, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Coal Accountability 

5 and Retired Employee Act of 2011’’ or the ‘‘CARE Act’’. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 621 IS

1 SEC. 2. AMENDMENT OF SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND 

2 RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977. 

3 Section 402(i)(2) of the Surface Mining Control and 

4 Reclamation Act of 1977 (30 U.S.C. 1232(i)(2)) is 

5 amended— 

6 (1) by striking ‘‘Subject to’’ and inserting the 

7 following: 

8 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to’’; and 

9 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

10 ‘‘(B) EXCESS AMOUNTS.— 

11 ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Subject to para12 graph (3), and after all transfers referred 

13 to in paragraph (1) and subparagraph (A) 

14 of this paragraph have been made, any 

15 amounts remaining after the application of 

16 paragraph (3)(A) (without regard to this 

17 subparagraph) shall be transferred to the 

18 trustees of the 1974 UMWA Pension Plan 

19 and used solely to pay pension benefits re20 quired under such plan. 

21 ‘‘(ii) 1974 UMWA PENSION PLAN.—In 

22 this subparagraph, the term ‘1974 UMWA 

23 Pension Plan’ means a pension plan re24 ferred to in section 9701(a)(3) of the In25 ternal Revenue Code of 1986 but without 

26 regard to whether participation in such 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 621 IS

1 plan is limited to individuals who retired in 

2 1976 and thereafter.’’. 

Æ 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with BILLS
#### PEOPLE, Respondent, v. DUNHAM, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

November 25, 1907.)

Proceedings by the people of the state of New York against Ansel W. Dunham.

PER CURIAM.

Order affirmed.

SMITH, P. J.,

not voting. KELLOGG, J., dissents, upon the ground that the county judge should resettle the case by certifying what actually took place upon the rendition of the verdict.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Consumer Product Safety Commission

# TIME AND DATE: 

Wednesday, June 30, 2021—10:00 a.m.

# PLACE: 

This meeting will be conducted by remote means.

# STATUS: 

Commission Meeting—Closed to the Public.

# MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: 

Decisional Matter.

# CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: 

Alberta E. Mills, Secretary, Division of the Secretariat, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 4330 East West Highway, Bethesda, MD 20814, (301) 504-7479 (Office) or 240-863-8938 (cell).

Dated: June 23, 2021.

Alberta E. Mills,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2021-13797 Filed 6-24-21; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE 6355-01-P
IC 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3698 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 20, 2012 

Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

AN ACT 

To amend title 40, United States Code, to improve veterans 

service organizations access to Federal surplus personal 

property. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with 
2 

S 3698 RFH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Formerly Owned Re3 sources for Veterans to Express Thanks for Service Act 

4 of 2012’’ or the ‘‘FOR VETS Act of 2012’’. 

5 SEC. 2. VETERANS ACCESS TO FEDERAL EXCESS AND SUR6 PLUS PERSONAL PROPERTY. 

7 Section 549(c)(3) of title 40, United States Code, is 

8 amended— 

9 (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘or’’ at 

10 the end; 

11 (2) in subparagraph (B)— 

12 (A) in clause (viii), by adding ‘‘or’’ at the 

13 end; and 

14 (B) by striking clause (x); and 

15 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

16 ‘‘(C) for purposes of providing services to 

17 veterans (as defined in section 101 of title 38), 

18 to an organization whose— 

19 ‘‘(i) membership comprises substan20 tially veterans; and 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with 
3 

S 3698 RFH

1 ‘‘(ii) representatives are recognized by 

2 the Secretary of Veterans Affairs under 

3 section 5902 of title 38.’’. 

Passed the Senate December 19, 2012. 

Attest: NANCY ERICKSON, 

Secretary. 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1248

KAREN MOORE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

GOOGLE, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Bristow Marchant, Magistrate

Judge. (2:13-cv-03034-RMG-BM)

Submitted: April 30, 2014 Decided: May 23, 2014

Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Karen Moore, Appellant Pro Se. David Spence Cox, WOMBLE CARLYLE 

SANDRIDGE & RICE, PLLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Karen Moore seeks to appeal the magistrate judge’s 

orders requiring her to bring her case into proper order, and 

denying several pretrial motions. This court may exercise 

jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), 

and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. 

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). The orders Moore seeks 

to appeal are neither final orders nor appealable interlocutory 

or collateral orders. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction. We deny Moore’s motion to expedite as 

moot. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED
NUMBER 13-15-00214-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

RONALDO MITCHELL RANGEL CHAVEZ, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 430th District Court 

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Appellant, Ronaldo Mitchell Rangel Chavez, attempted to perfect an appeal from 

a conviction for indecency with a child. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Sentence in this matter was imposed on March 9, 2015. No motion for new trial 

was filed. Notice of appeal was filed on April 9, 2015. On May 7, 2015, the Clerk of this 

Court notified appellant that it appeared that the appeal was not timely perfected. 
2

Appellant was advised that the appeal would be dismissed if the defect was not corrected 

within ten days from the date of receipt of the Court’s directive. Appellant has not 

responded to this notice. 

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.2 provides that an appeal is perfected when 

notice of appeal is filed within thirty days after the day sentence is imposed or suspended 

in open court unless a motion for new trial is timely filed. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1). The 

time within which to file the notice may be enlarged if, within fifteen days after the deadline 

for filing the notice, the party files the notice of appeal and a motion complying with Rule 

10.5(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. 26.3. Although the notice 

of appeal herein was filed within the 15-day time period for filing a motion for extension 

of time to file notice of appeal, no such motion for extension of time was filed. See id.

This Court's appellate jurisdiction in a criminal case is invoked by a timely filed 

notice of appeal. Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). “When 

a notice of appeal is filed within the fifteen-day period but no timely motion for extension 

of time is filed, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction.” Olivo, 918 S.W.2d at 522. Absent 

a timely filed notice of appeal, a court of appeals does not obtain jurisdiction to address 

the merits of the appeal in a criminal case and can take no action other than to dismiss 

the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1998). 

Appellant may be entitled to an out-of-time appeal by filing a post-conviction writ 

of habeas corpus returnable to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals; however, the 

availability of that remedy is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
3

PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, § 3(a) (Vernon 2005); see also Ex parte Garcia, 988 S.W.2d 240 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

The appeal is DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. 

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

4th day of June, 2015.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

June 16, 2022

No. 04-22-00271-CV

BRACKENRIDGE HEALTHCARE, INC. d/b/a Sonterra Health Center,

Appellant

v.

Susana CAMERO,

Appellee

From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2021CI08010

Honorable Monique Diaz, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant’s motion for extension of time to file its brief is granted.

_________________________________

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 16th day of June, 2022.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-20401 Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. LEONEL GARCIA JUAREZ, also known as Leonel Juarez Garcia, also known as Leonel Garcia-Juarez, also known as Leonel Garcia, also known as Leonel J. Garcia, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:10-CR-894-1
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, GARZA, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Leonel Garcia Juarez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders

v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Garcia Juarez has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Februa ry 17 , 20 12 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm inedt hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t for th in 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-20401 Document: 00511761958 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2012No. 11-20401

counsel’s assessment that th e a p p e a l p r e s e nt s n o n onfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APP E A L IS DISMISSED. See5 T H C I R
. R. 42.2.

2 Case: 11-20401 Document: 00511761958 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/17/2012
#### Richard Leland NEAL; Rex Carl Sagely, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. State of ARIZONA; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-15364.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2011.*

Filed June 8, 2011.

*812Richard Leland Neal, Las Vegas, AZ, pro se.

Rex Carl Sagely, Las Vegas, NV, pro se.

William H. Doyle, Esquire, The Doyle Firm, P.C., Daniel Patrick Schaack, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Michele M. Iaf-rate, Courtney Rachel Cloman, Iafrate & Associates, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: PREGERSON, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Richard Leland Neal and Rex Carl Sagely (“plaintiffs”) appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging that defendants unlawfully refused to recognize as valid for use in Arizona their purported Indian tribe-issued driver’s licenses, vehicle registrations, and vehicle titles. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc.,*504 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir.2007). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, *Thompson v. Paul,*547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.2008), and we affirm.

Dismissal of plaintiffs’ Indian tribal sovereignty and Indian Commerce Clause claims was proper because the group whose purported rights plaintiffs are asserting is not an Indian tribe or band. *See Kahawaiolaa v. Norton,*386 F.3d 1271, 1272-74 (9th Cir.2004) (recognizing that members of a tribe are of a same or similar race); *Navajo Tribal Utility Auth. v. Aria. Dep’t of Revenue,*608 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (9th Cir.1979) (“Indian tribes or bands are separate communities of citizens of Indian descent, possibly with a common racial origin, possessing the power of a sovereign to regulate their internal and social relations.”); *see also Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana,*650 F.2d 1104, 1108-10 (9th Cir.1981) (discussing tribal sovereignty claims), *amended on denial of reh’g,*665 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.1982). Plaintiffs’ treaty-based claims also fail. *See Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States,*410 F.3d 506, 512, 515-16 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (addressing treaty-based claims).

Dismissal of plaintiffs’ equal protection claims was proper because their group is not situated similarly to governmental entities that issue driver licenses, vehicle registrations, and vehicle titles. *See Thornton v. City of St. Helens,*425 F.3d 1158, 1167-68 (9th Cir.2005). Plaintiffs’ due process claims also fail. *See Miller v. Reed,*176 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir.1999) (holding no constitutional right to drive).

Plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Donovan Passley, Appellant.

— Appeal by defendant from a *898judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Owens, J.), rendered December 15, 1983, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

Defendant contends that Criminal Term erred in accepting his plea of guilty because it failed to apprise him of his right to testify in his own behalf. The defendant did not raise this objection in the court of first instance and thus has failed, as a matter of law, to preserve his claim for appellate review *(People v Pellegrino,*60 NY2d 636). In any event, the record discloses that defendant’s plea was both knowing and voluntary. The Trial Judge is not required to elicit a detailed set of specific waivers prior to accepting a plea of guilty from a defendant *(People v Harris,*61 NY2d 9, 16).

Defendant’s contention that the sentence imposed is unduly harsh is without merit *(People v Kazepis,*101 AD2d 816, 817). Mangano, J. P., Brown, Rubin and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
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EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection  with the Annual Report of Amincor,  Inc. (the  "Company") on Form
10-K/A for the period ended  December 31, 2011 as filed with the  Securities and
Exchange  Commission on April 30, 2012 (the "Report"),  the undersigned,  in the
capacity and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that:

     1.   The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     2.   The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of
          the Company.


Date: April 30, 2012                    /s/ Robert L. Olson
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Robert L. Olson, Chief Financial Officer
#### CONCORDIA FIRE INS. CO. OF MILWAUKEE, Respondent, v. STOWELL, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

March 6, 1912.)

Action by the Concordia Fire Insurance Company of Milwaukee against Calvin L. Stowell.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment affirmed, with ■costs.

FOOTE, J., not sitting.