J-S01019-19

2019 PA Super 55

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

IN THE MATTER OF: M.P., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1371 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 20, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 42-AD-2018, 

43-AD-2018, CP-22-DP-295-2016, 

CP-22-DP-296-2016

IN THE MATTER OF: M.P., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1372 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Dated July 20, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 42-AD-2018, 

43-AD-2018, CP-22-DP-0000295-2016, 

CP-22-DP-0000296-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2019

S.L. (Mother) appeals from the decrees involuntarily terminating her 

parental rights to her minor children, Ma.P. (born July 2011) and M.P. (born 

January 2013) (collectively Children), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), 
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(5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption Act.1 Mother also appeals from the orders

entered the same day, which changed Children’s permanency goal from 

reunification to adoption pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. Mindful of our 

Supreme Court’s directive in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 

2018), and upon careful consideration, we affirm the trial court, and with this 

decision, remind, advise and emphasize to all litigants who seek appellate 

review with this Court – whether in criminal, civil or family cases – that 

Walker is the law of the Commonwealth, and shall be applied prospectively 

and uniformly by this Court.

Facts

Instantly, Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth (the 

Agency) became involved with Mother and Children in November 2016, after 

receiving a report that Mother had delivered a stillborn child and used drugs 

prior to delivery. See N.T., 7/19/18, at 8-13. While Mother was still 

hospitalized, Children were removed from the home and placed in kinship 

foster care with a maternal aunt and uncle. Id. 

On January 18, 2017, Children were adjudicated dependent. Over the 

next year, Mother remained noncompliant with her parenting objectives. 

Accordingly, on April 26, 2018, the Agency petitioned to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights and change Children’s permanency goal from reunification to 

____________________________________________

1 The court also terminated the parental rights of B.P., the father of Ma.P., 

and J.H., the father of M.P. B.P. filed an appeal and we address his issues in 

a separate memorandum docketed at 1373 MDA 2018. J.H. has not appealed.
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adoption. The court convened a hearing on the petitions on July 19, 2018. 

Children were represented by counsel, as guardian ad litem and legal counsel. 

Mother, represented by counsel, testified on her own behalf.

At the conclusion of testimony, the court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights and changed Children’s permanency goal to adoption. N.T., 7/19/18, 

at 96-102. On August 17, 2018, Mother timely appealed and complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Mother filed two notices of appeal – one for 

each child – challenging the court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights

and the change of permanency goal to adoption.

Commonwealth v. Walker

As mandated by Walker, we address the fact that Mother filed a single 

notice of appeal for each child, with separate issues – termination and goal 

change – that relate to two different docket numbers. The Official Note to 

Rule 341 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides in relevant 

part:

Where, however, one or more orders resolves issues arising on 

more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment,

separate notices of appeals must be filed. Commonwealth v. 

C.M.K., 932 A.2d 111, 113 & n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quashing 

appeal taken by single notice of appeal from order on remand for 

consideration under Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 of two persons’ judgments 

of sentence).

Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note.

Until recently, it was common practice for courts of this Commonwealth 

to allow appeals to proceed, even if they failed to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 341. 
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While our Supreme Court recognized that the practice of appealing 

multiple orders in a single appeal is discouraged under Pa.R.A.P. 

512 (joint appeals), it previously determined that “appellate 

courts have not generally quashed [such] appeals, provided that 

the issues involved are nearly identical, no objection to the appeal 

has been raised, and the period for appeal has expired.” K.H. v. 

J.R., 826 A.2d 863, 870 (Pa. 2003) (citation omitted).

In the Interest of: P.S., 158 A.3d 643, 648 (Pa. Super. 2017) (footnote 

omitted). 

However, on June 1, 2018, our Supreme Court in Walker held that the 

practice violated Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341, and the failure 

to file separate notices of appeal for separate dockets must result in quashal 

of the appeal. See Walker, 185 A.3d at 977. The Court stated 

unequivocally: “The Official Note to Rule 341 provides a bright-line mandatory 

instruction to practitioners to file separate notices of appeal. . . . The failure 

to do so requires the appellate court to quash the appeal.” Id. at 976-77. 

Because the mandate in the Official Note was contrary to “decades of 

case law from this Court and the intermediate appellate courts,” the Walker

Court announced that its holding would apply prospectively only. Id. at 

977. Accordingly, Walker applies to appeals filed after June 1, 2018, the date 

Walker was filed. Id.

Mother’s notices of appeal were filed on August 17, 2018. Although the 

court addressed the merits of Mother’s issues in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, our 

Supreme Court requires “when a single order resolves issues arising on more 

than one lower court docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed. The 
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failure to do so will result in quashal of the appeal.” Id. It appears that 

Mother attempted to comply with Walker’s mandate by filing separate notices 

of appeal for each child. However, she failed to file separate notices of appeal 

for her discrete challenges to the termination decree and goal change for each 

child. Thus, because Mother filed her notices of appeal from two separate 

dockets (dependency and adoption), Walker compels quashal.

2

To the extent decisional law may have been unclear to this point, we 

further recognize the two substantive issues Mother presents for review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, or commit an error of 

law in changing the goal for the children from reunification to 

adoption?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, or commit an error of 

law in terminating [Mother’s] parental rights?

Mother’s Brief at 9. 

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2 We recognize the harsh – perhaps draconian – consequence of quashing any 

appeal, and in particular an appeal involving a party’s parental rights. 

However, our role as an intermediate appellate court is clear. “It is not the 

prerogative of an intermediate appellate court to enunciate new precepts of 

law or to expand existing legal doctrines. Such is a province reserved to the 

Supreme Court.” Moses v. T.N.T. Red Star Exp., 725 A.2d 792, 801 (Pa. 

Super. 1999). It is well-settled that “the Superior Court is an error correcting

court and we are obliged to apply the decisional law as determined by the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.” Commonwealth v. Montini, 712 A.2d 

761, 769 (Pa. Super. 1998).
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Termination

With regard to the termination of Mother’s parental rights:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted).

Termination requires a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). As the 

Agency argues that it proved by clear and convincing evidence that grounds 

for termination existed under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), we focus our analysis 

on subsection (a)(2) and (b).
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The relevant subsections of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 provide:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” 

See In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 1998). The 

grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but concern 
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parental incapacity that cannot be remedied. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 

1117 (Pa. Super. 2010). Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward 

the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties. Id. 

The essence of Mother’s argument is that her parental rights should not 

have been terminated because she was “addressing the issues,” including her 

drug, alcohol, and mental health issues. See Mother’s Brief at 12, 22-23. 

This argument lacks merit.

The court primarily analyzed the evidence under Section (a)(8), but also 

stated that it found clear and convincing evidence to terminate under Section 

(a)(2). See Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/18, at 10-11. The court explained:

although Mother complied with some of the objectives, she had 

failed to demonstrate sustained commitment caring for Children 

and recovery from her drug addiction. In spite of the services

made available to her, she has yielded to devastating drug abuse. 

As a result, she lacks employment and a suitable home for 

Children.

Id. at 11.

The record supports the trial court’s determination. Children were 

originally placed into care in November 2016 as a result of Mother’s drug 

addiction, and failure to prevent the father of one of the Children from giving 

both Children marijuana-laced cookies. When M.P. was diagnosed with acute 

myeloid leukemia, Mother was uninvolved in M.P.’s care, such that the Agency 

had to obtain a court order for consent to M.P.’s medical treatment. While 

M.P. was hospitalized, Mother visited a total of 60 times during the 160 days 
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M.P. was hospitalized; again, a court order was required to prevent Mother 

from arriving at times disruptive to M.P.’s care. 

Initially, Mother was non-compliant with her drug treatment. She was 

discharged from one program in August 2017 for lack of attendance and 

submitted a total of 31 drug screens, 26 of which were positive for drugs or 

alcohol. At the time of the hearing, Mother had accrued new criminal charges

which remained unresolved. Although there was evidence that Mother had 

been compliant as of December 2017 and was making progress with drug and 

alcohol treatment, her recovery was new and fragile. As Mother herself 

testified, she was unable to seek employment because she was focused on 

her recovery, and she resided in a halfway house where Children could not 

join her. This Court has stated that “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance 

while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting 

responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s 

need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope 

for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 

2006). Accordingly, we discern no error in the court’s finding that competent, 

clear, and convincing evidence supported the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), based upon Mother’s continued 

incapacity – her long history of addiction, lack of timely compliance with 

parental objectives, and accrual of new criminal charges – that resulted in 

Children being without essential parental care, the cause of which “cannot or 

will not be remedied.” See Lilley, 719 A.2d at 330; Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117.
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Next, we consider Children’s needs and welfare pursuant to subsection 

(b). See Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. “In this context, the court must take into 

account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and whether 

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” 

Id. The court is not required to use expert testimony, and social workers and 

caseworkers may offer evaluations as well. Id. Ultimately, the concern is the 

needs and welfare of a child. Id.

We have explained:

Before granting a petition to terminate parental rights, it is 

imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible 

dimension of the needs and welfare of a child—the love, comfort, 

security, and closeness—entailed in a parent-child relationship, as 

well as the tangible dimension. Continuity of the relationships is 

also important to a child, for whom severance of close parental 

ties is usually extremely painful. The trial court, in considering 

what situation would best serve the child[ren]’s needs and 

welfare, must examine the status of the natural parental bond to 

consider whether terminating the natural parent’s rights would 

destroy something in existence that is necessary and beneficial.

Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super. 

2000)). The court may equally emphasize the safety needs of the child and 

may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the 

child might have with the foster parent. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 

(Pa. Super. 2011). Where there is no evidence of a bond between the parent 

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. Id. “[A] parent’s basic 

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted, 

upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have 
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proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, 

healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (internal citations omitted).

Again, Mother makes a general argument of trial court error in asserting 

that the best interests of Children were not served by the termination of her 

parental rights. See Mother’s Brief at 23. Mother does not discuss her bond 

with Children, or Children’s needs and welfare. Accordingly, she risks waiver. 

See In re Adoption of R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669, 679 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(declining to address subsection 2511(b) where the appellant did not make an 

argument concerning that subsection).

Further, no evidence was introduced to show a parental bond between 

Children and Mother beyond Mother’s testimony that Children loved her. See, 

e.g., K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763. Here, the court observed:

We do not doubt that Mother loves her children. However, we see 

no evidence of a bond with Mother which, if broken, would cause 

detriment to them. Mother visited gravely ill M.P. only 

sporadically. Mother failed to maintain communication with the 

Agency and Hershey Medical Center to address urgent requests 

for M.P.’s leukemia treatment. Mother failed to visit Ma.P. 

regularly.

We recognize that Mother seeks additional time within which to 

pursue drug treatment and demonstrate the ability to care for the 

children. However, a continued lack of permanency with the 

potential of removal from a capable and loving home would be 

contrary to their best interests . . . 

Children have resided with the kinship foster family since 

November 2016. In that home they have received the love, care, 

and attention needed to address all of their needs. Their bond 

with the foster parents is evidenced by their happiness and 
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affection toward the foster parents. Significantly, Foster Mother 

took a leave of absence from her employment to ensure she could 

stay with M.P. during her hospitalization. Foster Mother has 

returned to work, but takes time off as needed to take M.P. to 

follow-up doctor’s appointments. The kinship foster parents have 

provided all of the devotion and stability Children require and 

deserve.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/18, at 12-13 (citations to the record omitted).

We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusions. Clear and 

convincing evidence supports the court’s termination of Mother’s parental 

rights under Sections 2511(a)(2), as well as the court’s Section 2511(b) 

findings as to Children’s needs and welfare. See Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1126-27; 

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763.

Goal Change

Mother also challenges the Children’s goal change to adoption.

The standard of review which this Court employs in cases of 

dependency is broad. However, the scope of review is limited in 

a fundamental manner by our inability to nullify the fact-finding of 

the lower court. We accord great weight to this function of the 

hearing judge because he is in the position to observe and rule 

upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who appear 

before him. Relying upon his unique posture, we will not overrule 

his findings if they are supported by competent evidence.

In re N.A., 116 A.3d 1144, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2015). We thus review this 

claim for an abuse of discretion. In re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015).

Regarding the disposition of dependent children, the Juvenile Act, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6351(e)-(g), provides the criteria for a permanency plan. The 

court must determine a disposition best suited to the safety and protection, 
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as well as the physical, mental, and moral welfare of children. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(g). In considering a petition for goal change, the court:

considers the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement; the extent of compliance with the service plan 

developed for the child; the extent of progress made towards 

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original 

placement; the appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child; and, a likely date by which the goal 

for the child might be achieved.

In Interest of A.N.P., 155 A.3d 55, 67 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting In re 

A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2007).

In addition:

When a child is adjudicated dependent, the child’s proper 

placement turns on what is in the child’s best interest, not on what 

the parent wants or which goals the parent has achieved. 

Moreover, although preserving the unity of the family is a purpose 

of the [Juvenile] Act, another purpose is to “provide for the care, 

protection, safety, and wholesome mental and physical 

development of children coming within the provisions of this 

chapter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1.1). Indeed, “[t]he relationship 

of parent and child is a status and not a property right, and one 

in which the state has an interest to protect the best interest of 

the child.”

In re K.C., 903 A.2d 12, 14-15 (Pa. Super. 2006) (some citations omitted).

Mother’s argument regarding goal change is not clear, although she 

appears to allege that the Agency did not provide appropriate or sufficient 

reunification services. See Mother’s Brief at 14-18. However, Mother also 

concedes that the Agency had difficulty contacting Mother, and Mother was 

still abusing drugs during that time period. Id. at 16-17. Nonetheless, Mother 

claims that “very little was done to facilitate visits between Mother and the 
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Children,” and her caseworker did not assist Mother in scheduling visits, 

ensuring that visits occurred, or “check on the quality of the visits that were 

occurring.” Id. at 17-18.

Although Mother attempts to argue that appropriate reunification 

services were not provided, the record reflects otherwise. Mother was either 

non or minimally compliant with her family service plan objectives. While she 

completed some drug and alcohol and mental health counseling by the time 

of the final hearings, such efforts occurred after the Agency’s extensive and 

unsuccessful efforts to get Mother treatment, and when Mother, on 26 

occasions, tested positive for drugs.

Further, Mother had issues with visitation throughout the pendency of 

the case. It was Mother’s responsibility, as one of her objectives, to apprise 

the Agency of her addresses, contact information, and whereabouts. She did 

not do so and admits that she was “difficult to contact.” Mother’s Brief at 16. 

As recently as May 2018, Mother had not given the Agency a forwarding 

address. When visitation was provided, Mother did not appear, or when she 

did, she caused strife. For example, when visiting the M.P. in the hospital, 

Mother had to be ordered to come at appropriate times because her presence 

disrupted M.P.’s ability to sleep. Mother did not visit with Ma.P., and when 

she did, her interactions with the foster family were acrimonious. After a 

bench warrant was issued for Mother’s arrest, visitation was suspended.
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At the time of the final permanency review hearing, Mother had not 

obtained employment, had not obtained stable housing, had accrued new 

criminal charges, and was not visiting with Children. These were Mother’s 

service objectives. The record reveals that Mother was not compliant with her

family service plan, made little progress towards alleviating the circumstances 

that had led to Children’s placement, and showed no indication that the 

circumstances would be remedied in a reasonable amount of time. See, e.g., 

A.N.P., 155 A.3d at 67. Therefore, the court did not err in changing Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption.

Conclusion

After careful consideration, we affirm the trial court. We note that this 

ruling, like all of our rulings, may not be disposition-driven. We are bound by 

decisional and statutory legal authority, even when equitable considerations 

may compel a contrary result. We underscore our role as an intermediate 

appellate court, recognizing that “the Superior Court is an error correcting

court and we are obliged to apply the decisional law as determined by the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.” Commonwealth v. Montini, 712 A.2d at 

769. “It is not the prerogative of an intermediate appellate court to enunciate 

new precepts of law or to expand existing legal doctrines. Such is a province 

reserved to the Supreme Court.” Moses v. T.N.T. Red Star Exp., 725 A.2d 

at 801. Accordingly, we issue this decision with the following order.

ORDER
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AND NOW, it is ORDERED that all parties seeking review with the 

Superior Court shall file notices of appeal as mandated by Pennsylvania Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 341 and Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969

(Pa. 2018). Failure to comply will result in quashal of the appeal.

Termination and goal change affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

P.J. Panella joins the Opinion.

Judge Pellegrini files a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/22/2019