SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3270-22 

CHARLES A. WILLIAMS and 

DEANNA WILLIAMS, husband 

and wife, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

MICHAEL J. GULOTTA, THE 

WISHING STONE SYNDICATE, 

DEO VOLENTE FARMS, LLC, 

and DEO VOLENTE 

INTERNATIONAL, LLC, 

 Defendants-Respondents, 

and 

SUGAR VALLEY FARMS, 

 Defendant. 

______________________________

Argued September 12, 2024 – Decided September 30, 2024 

Before Judges Sabatino, Gummer, and Berdote Byrne. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-1750-20.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Michael R. Paglione argued the cause for appellants

(Szaferman, Lakind, Blumstein & Blader, PC, 

attorneys; Marc A. Brotman, on the briefs).

David S. Osterman argued the cause for respondent 

(Goldberg Segalla, LLP, attorneys; David S. Osterman 

and Leo Capoferri, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

In this personal-injury action, where plaintiff Charles Williams was 

injured by a stallion ("Wishing Stone"), plaintiffs1 appeal from a May 31, 2023 

order awarding defendants Deo Volente Farms ("Deo Volente") and Michael J. 

Gulotta summary judgment and dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. Appealing 

only the dismissal of the claim for strict liability, plaintiffs ask us to consider 

whether the trial court erred in finding they had failed to present evidence of a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to Wishing Stone's natural inclination or 

habitual tendency towards aggressive behavior, relying upon Model Civil Jury 

Charge 5.60B. They also assert the trial court erred in analogizing the Equine 

Activities Liability Act ("EALA" or "the Act"), N.J.S.A. 5:15-1 to -12, to the 

facts of this case to find further support in immunizing defendants from liability. 

1

 Plaintiffs are Williams and his wife. 
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Although we agree the trial court improperly analogized this case to the 

EALA, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate any genuine issue of fact showing Wishing 

Stone had any natural inclination or habitual tendency towards aggression that 

would expose defendant-owners to common-law strict liability. Their reliance 

on an expert opinion as to the aggression of stallions in general contravenes our 

requirements for applying strict liability to domesticated animals, and the 

evidence otherwise fails to surmount the summary-judgment standard. As such, 

we disagree with plaintiffs and affirm the trial court's dismissal of their 

complaint. 

I.

Wishing Stone is a retired, standardbred racehorse, owned in part by 

defendant Deo Volente, where defendant Gulotta is the chief executive officer. 

Deo Volente breeds standardbred racehorses and purchased a fractional interest 

in Wishing Stone to sell his semen to other horse owners. Wishing Stone is the 

subject of a syndication agreement that grants Deo Volente full custody, control, 

and management over the stallion. 

As part of the syndication agreement, Wishing Stone's semen was 

collected at several different farms from 2014 to 2017, including Deo Volente's 
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farm in 2014, Sugar Valley Farms2 in 2015 and 2016, and Southwind Farms 

("Southwind") in 2017 and 2018. During this time, Williams was employed as 

a stallion manager at Southwind and was responsible for taking care of the 

stallions boarded at Southwind, including feeding them, cleaning them, and 

taking them to their paddocks and stables. He was also responsible for taking 

the stallions to and from Southwind's breeding shed. 

Williams first interacted with Wishing Stone in 2017 during the stallion's 

first stay at Southwind, which passed without incident. According to Williams, 

when Wishing Stone returned to Southwind in 2018 the stallion was "different" 

and unlike any other horse Williams had encountered over the years. Williams 

had watched Wishing Stone while the stallion was in his paddock and observed 

"how he charged the fences when people drove the golf cart around his paddock" 

and "showed anger and everything like that there." Based on his observations, 

Williams told Laura Young, Southwind's manager, that Wishing Stone "wasn't 

right in the head" and warned other Southwind employees to be cautious around 

the horse. 

2

 Sugar Valley was dismissed from the complaint on January 25, 2021, for lack 

of personal jurisdiction. 
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The parties agree defendants never witnessed or were made aware of this 

alleged behavior. Discovery also revealed none of the other farms where 

Wishing Stone had previously boarded for semen extraction ever communicated 

any concerns to defendants regarding Wishing Stone's alleged aggression. 

Wishing Stone did have a specific proclivity -- he was difficult to catch in 

his paddock. Plaintiff testified at deposition he had to entice Wishing Stone 

with a bucket of grain or get assistance from another Southwind employee to 

help catch the stallion. 

Wishing Stone also had a history of difficulty in performing the 

requirements of semen collection. In the standardbred-breeding industry, 

stallions are taken to the breeding shed usually three to four days a week, where 

they mount a "phantom" mare, and the semen is collected in an artificial vagina. 

Deviations from this schedule are made when stallions are unable to ejaculate 

or are fatigued or when staff is unable to get the stallion to mount the phantom 

mare. 

At Southwind, Wishing Stone was given four breaks from the semencollection schedule: from August 21, 2017 through September 1, 2017; August 

10, 2018 through August 24, 2018; August 24, 2018 through August 31, 2018; 
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and September 26, 2018 through October 3, 2018. The last time Wishing Stone's 

semen was successfully collected before the accident was September 26, 2018. 

On the morning of October 3, 2018, plaintiff fed, groomed, and led 

Wishing Stone to his paddock without incident. Some time later, plaintiff caught 

Wishing Stone in the paddock and began taking the stallion, unaccompanied, to 

the breeding shed. Just before plaintiff reached the shed, Wishing Stone 

suddenly attacked him, knocked him down, and struck Williams with his hooves. 

A farmhand at Southwind overheard the incident and intervened by tossing a 

bucket of water at Wishing Stone, causing the stallion to back away. Williams 

was sent to the hospital and discharged the same day. He has not worked since 

the attack. 

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Gulotta, Deo Volente, and Sugar 

Valley Farms claiming negligence. Defendants timely answered plaintiffs' 

complaint and raised the EALA as an affirmative defense. In response, plaintiffs 

moved to dismiss the EALA defense, which the court dismissed with prejudice 

on September 10, 2021. Plaintiffs were then granted leave to file an amended 

complaint to add a cause of action for common-law strict liability against 

defendants. 
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After the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, 

which the trial court granted on May 31, 2023, and dismissed plaintiffs' amended 

complaint in full. In opposition to defendants' summary-judgment motion, 

plaintiffs had argued common-law strict liability required a jury be allowed to 

ascertain whether defendants had knowledge of Wishing Stone's natural 

inclination towards dangerous behavior or the stallion's individual proclivity 

towards aggression. The trial court disagreed with plaintiffs' natural-inclination 

hypothesis, finding it was "not prepared to issue a blanket statement on the 

inherently vicious nature of stallions in general." The court also found no 

evidence defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous trait 

or propensity possessed by Wishing Stone that would subject defendants to strict 

liability and dismissed plaintiffs' amended complaint. 

The court additionally found imposing strict liability "would be against 

the [EALA's] legislative intent." Although it noted its prior order ruled the 

EALA did not apply "because the incident did not occur on [d]efendants' farm 

. . . and, therefore, [defendants] were not 'operators' as defined" by the EALA, 

the court nevertheless analyzed the meaning of the terms "participant" and 

"equine animal activities" as defined in the EALA to determine if the Act would 

otherwise have been applicable. After reviewing similar statutes from other 
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jurisdictions and our case law regarding the EALA, the court found plaintiff, as 

an employee, was a "participant" and breeding was an "equine animal activity" 

as defined by the Act. As such, the court concluded it "would seem incongruent" 

to hold defendants strictly liable "when an absolute immunity would have been 

available under the [EALA] had . . . [d]efendants been deemed operators." 

II. 

 We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment as the trial court 

does, viewing the motion record in a light most favorable to the non-moving 

party, here plaintiffs. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 528-

29 (1995); see also R. 4:46-1 to -6; Statewide Ins. Fund v. Star Ins. Co., 253 N.J. 

119, 124-25 (2023). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. 

Statewide Ins. Fund, 253 N.J. at 124-25. 

A.

As an initial matter, we note the trial court erred in concluding that a 

finding of common-law strict liability against defendants "would be 

incongruent" with the EALA. Not only do the parties agree the EALA does not 

apply to the circumstances of this case, nothing in the Act's language suggests 

it applies to an employee of a for-profit semen-collection farm, for injuries 

imparted by a stallion against the owner of that horse. 
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The Legislature passed the Act in 1979 with the express purpose of 

limiting liability for personal injury arising from a recreational participant's 

assumption of the risk inherent in some horse-related activities. N.J.S.A. 5:15-

1. The Legislature declared "equine animal activities involve risks that are 

essentially impractical or impossible for the operator to eliminate" and "those 

risks must be borne by those who engage in those activities." Ibid. The Act 

expresses "an overall intent to support and protect equine activities because of 

their importance to our economy and to open space preservation." Hubner v. 

Spring Valley Equestrian Ctr., 203 N.J. 184, 196 (2010). 

The Act provides "participant[s]" and "spectator[s]" assume the inherent 

risks of "equine animal activities" and provides a complete defense from a 

lawsuit brought by a participant against an equine activity "operator." N.J.S.A. 

5:15-3, -5. The trial court found plaintiff would be a "participant" and horse 

breeding an "equine animal activity" within the EALA's meaning and would 

otherwise entitle defendants to EALA immunity. It then concluded it "would 

seem incongruent to this [c]ourt for [d]efendants to be held strictly liable for 

[p]laintiff's horse [attack] when an absolute immunity would have been available 

under the [EALA] had . . . [d]efendants been deemed the operators of the farm." 
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As noted by the trial court, the EALA provides immunity only to 

"operators" of farms, not owners of horses such as defendants. Because 

defendants are not "operators" within the EALA's ambit, it is inconsequential 

whether plaintiff would otherwise be a "participant" and breeding an "equine 

animal activity." We are limited to the EALA's plain meaning and cannot 

expand immunity beyond what the Act explicitly permits. See W.S. v. Hildreth, 

252 N.J. 506, 518-19 (2023). 

Moreover, the legislative protection is constrained to recreational 

activities involving horses where third parties may be injured and does not apply 

to other for-profit activities involving horses. For example, the horse-racing 

industry in New Jersey is specifically excluded. See N.J.S.A. 5:15-12. 

Defendants' public-policy argument, raised for the first time on appeal and 

focusing on the economic impact of potential liability in urging us to expand the 

Act's protection, lacks merit. The EALA is designed "to allocate responsibility 

for injuries sustained in inherently dangerous recreational activities." Hubner, 

203 N.J. at 198. Liability for injuries associated with the boarding of horses 

between the horse's owner and a farm may easily be negotiated by contract. In 

fact, in this case, defendants signed a waiver addressing the parties' respective 

responsibilities for any injury to Wishing Stone during the semen-collection 
11 A-3270-22

process. There is no similar agreement in the record regarding liability for 

injuries sustained by the breeding farm's employees caused by the horse, 

although the parties could have negotiated an appropriate contractual provision. 

If, as defendants posit, the Legislature intended the EALA to insulate horse 

owners for purely economic purposes, it would have made little sense to exempt 

the entire horse-racing industry from the Act's protection. 

B.

Although we conclude the trial court erred in finding support in the EALA, 

we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants because 

plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact showing defendants 

knew or should have known Wishing Stone had either an inherent natural 

tendency towards dangerous behavior or a specific proclivity towards 

aggression that would allow the imposition of strict liability upon Wishing 

Stone's owners. 

Plaintiffs' appeal is limited solely to their claim for strict liability against 

defendants. They contend our common law and Model Jury Charges (Civil), 

5.60B, "Animal with Vicious or Dangerous Trait or Propensity (Other than an 

Owner Dog Bite Case)" (approved Sept. 1980), "provide[] a strict liability cause 

of action, other than 'negligence,' stemming from injuries caused by an animal 
12 A-3270-22

alleged to have vicious propensities." Plaintiffs contend the charge "defines 

'vicious or dangerous trait or propensity' in the disjunctive," permitting them to 

establish defendants' liability with evidence of either a natural inclination in the 

breed or a habitual tendency in the specific animal, and assert they proffered 

sufficient evidence of both. 

 Plaintiffs posit the question before the trial court was "whether a

reasonable jury could conclude that [d]efendants, as professional stallion 

breeders, knew or should have known that Wishing Stone had a natural 

inclination for dangerous and aggressive behavior toward people around him 

. . . ." In support, they direct us to Hyun Na Seo v. Yozgadlian, 320 N.J. Super. 

68, 72 (App. Div. 1999), where we commented that a landlord's responsibility 

for injuries resulting from a dog's attack "should be determined by ordinary 

principles of negligence," rather than strict liability, "in the absence of proof 

that the landlord was aware of the [animal's] vicious propensities, or perhaps 

that the dog was inherently vicious." 

1. Common-law strict liability based upon an animal's natural inclination. 

Plaintiffs rely upon the expert testimony of Susan McDonnell, Ph.D., who 

opined stallions, as a class of horse, "are inherently dangerous and have a natural 

propensity to express violent behavior." These characteristics, according to 
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McDonnell, render stallions distinct from other classes of horses. According to 

McDonnell, every stallion is capable of this kind of attack. At her deposition, 

McDonnell stated she had never met or examined Wishing Stone and confirmed 

her report "addresses the . . . nature of stallions and the inherent risks associated 

with breeding stallions in general." 

This reliance on the general nature of stallions would obviate the 

common-law scienter requirement for injuries caused by domestic animals. 

Plaintiffs ask us to treat all stallions as wild animals, where a dangerous 

propensity is presumed "and liability does not rest upon any experience with the 

particular animal." Eyrich v. Earl, 203 N.J. Super. 144, 147 (App. Div. 1985) 

(quoting Prosser & Keeton, Torts, § 76, at 542 (5th ed. 1984)). There is no legal 

basis to support such a departure from our caselaw. Pursuant to common-law 

strict liability, plaintiffs must demonstrate scienter on the part of the animal’s 

owners, requiring them to show defendants knew or should have known Wishing 

Stone specifically had a dangerous trait or propensity, not all stallions in general. 

See, e.g., Yozgadlian, 320 N.J. Super. at 73 (affirming award of summary 

judgment when plaintiff failed to offer proof "Yoon's dog" was known to have 

vicious propensities); Jannuzzelli v. Wilkens, 158 N.J. Super. 36, 39 (App. Div. 
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1978) (describing one of the issues on appeal as whether the defendants knew 

of their dog's vicious propensities). 

Plaintiffs' additional claim, that the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Am. 

L. Inst. 1965) has been "superseded" by the Restatement (Third) of Torts (Am. 

L. Inst. 2010), is both factually incorrect and unavailing. Comment (e) of 

Restatement (Third) of Torts § 23 explicitly states: "In the future, courts might 

wish to give consideration to particular genders or breeds of a species that 

involve danger levels uncommon for the species itself. If so, it might be 

appropriate to impose strict liability, without individualized scienter, on the 

owner of such an animal." Ibid. (emphasis added). The section still requires the 

animal's owner to know or have reason to know the animal "has dangerous 

tendencies abnormal for [its] category" for strict liability to apply. Id. § 23. The 

comment is also expressed in tentative terms and does not purport to be 

authoritative.3 McDonnell's expert report fails to raise a material issue that 

would defeat summary judgment. 

3

 We note although our Supreme Court has adopted some of the provisions 

within the Third Restatement, see, e.g., Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494, 505-06 & 

n.7 (2015) (applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts to assess liability for 

private nuisance, which remains unchanged by the Third Restatement); Jerista 

v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 198 n.3 (2005) (adopting the Third Restatement 

approach for strict products liability cases), the Court has not endorsed the Third 
15 A-3270-22

2. Common-law strict liability based upon an animal's habitual tendency. 

Plaintiffs alternately posit a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 

whether defendants had actual knowledge of Wishing Stone’s specific 

dangerous characteristics, relying upon emails from Southwind's staff to Deo 

Volente personnel. That argument is belied by the record. 

First, plaintiffs rely upon an October 9, 2017 email from Young to Deo 

Volente personnel stating Wishing Stone "was fine this morning" and "he was a 

lot calmer" as evidence of defendants' knowledge of the horse's alleged 

aggression. Linda Petrenko, the stallion and breeding administrator for Deo 

Volente, testified she had received the email but did not inquire further. She 

testified she had told Gulotta Wishing Stone had been "a lot calmer," but he did 

not direct her to make further inquiries. Importantly, the email was sent in 2017; 

plaintiff testified Wishing Stone was an "easy" horse in 2017, but behaved in a 

markedly different manner when he returned in 2018. Young stated in a 

September 18, 2017 email that Wishing Stone was "one of the easiest horses"

from which she had ever collected semen. 

Restatement in its entirety. See, e.g., Fowler v. Akzo Nobel Chems., Inc., 215 

N.J. 300, 331 (2022) (declining to apply the Third Restatement: Products 

Liability to cases involving asbestos). 
16 A-3270-22

Secondly, plaintiffs rely on emails from 2018 regarding the semencollection breaks. However, when read in context, the emails refer to the 

stallion’s low libido as the reason for the scheduled breaks in the collection 

schedule. In fact, plaintiffs admitted defendants had no prior knowledge of 

Wishing Stone's alleged dangerous behavior in their responses to defendants' 

material statement of facts relative to the summary-judgment motion. 

Lastly, even assuming defendants had some basic knowledge of the 

"absence of calm" in Wishing Stone at times, all of the information plaintiffs 

rely upon was imparted to defendants by plaintiffs' own employer. Plaintiffs 

cannot show defendants had any information regarding an alleged dangerous 

propensity in Wishing Stone unknown to Southwind. As such, Williams' 

employer was in the superior position of putting in place any precautions that 

may have prevented the accident. 

Affirmed.