0,Suprrtur Court of tifUelhikV_I 

RENDERED: MARCH 17, 2016 

T (5' B 7P UOIS HnE D 

2015-SC-000105-MR 

STEPHEN BARTLEY APPELLANT 

ON APPEAL FROM McLEAN CIRCUIT COURT 

V. HONORABLE BRIAN WIGGINS, JUDGE 

NO. 14-CR-000016 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER 

AFFIRMING 

A McLean County jury convicted Stephen Bartley of two counts of firstdegree sodomy and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Pursuant to a 

post-verdict agreement between Bartley and the Commonwealth, the court 

sentenced Bartley to 25 years' imprisonment. On appeal, Bartley argues that 

the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his pre-trial motion to dismiss the 

indictment; (2) granted the Commonwealth's intra-trial motion to amend the 

indictment; (3) denied his motion for a mistrial; and (4) denied his motions for 

a directed verdict. Bartley also argues that he was substantially prejudiced by 

testimony about prior and uncharged bad acts and by testimony regarding the 

victim's behavior while in foster care. For the following reasons, we affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND. 

Bartley and his first wife, Laura, had three children and what was 

described as a tumultuous marriage. Laura left the marriage when their 

children were younger than school age, and the couple engaged in a lengthy 

and acrimonious custody battle. At some point after the dissolution of his 

marriage to Laura, Bartley remarried. During the majority of the time period at 

issue, Bartley lived with his three children, his second wife, and her two 

children.' 

Regina, 2the Bartleys' middle child, alleged that Bartley began sexually 

abusing her when she was three or four years old, and that the abuse 

continued until she was nine or ten. At trial, Regina, who was then 14 years 

old, testified about the following four specific incidents. When she was three 

or four years old, Bartley came into her bedroom, woke her, and told her to go 

into his bedroom. Bartley then removed Regina's panties and his shorts and 

digitally and orally manipulated and penetrated her vagina. When she was five 

or six years old, Regina accompanied Bartley to the garage where she 

performed oral sex on him. Regina testified that, after he ejaculated, Bartley 

gave her apple juice to rinse out her mouth. When Regina was eight, Bartley 

came into her bedroom and rubbed her vagina with his hand. Finally, when 

she was nine or ten, Bartley asked Regina to go into the home office, where 

1It is unclear from the record if one of the other two children was the biological 

child of Bartley and his second wife. However, the nature of that relationship is 

irrelevant to this appeal. 

2Regina is a pseudonym employed in this opinion to protect the child's true 

identity. 

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they engaged in mutual masturbation. We note that Regina testified in some 

detail about each of these incidents, describing the type of clothing each was 

wearing during two of the incidents, whether it was night or day, and, in some 

instances, the weather. However, Regina could not provide any specific dates. 

As a result of her parents' ongoing custody battle and accusations made 

during that litigation (none of which involved sexual abuse), Regina had 

frequent, if not continuous, contact with social workers and therapists from the 

Department of Family and Juvenile Services. Despite these contacts, as well as 

contact with teachers, school counselors, medical care providers, and family 

members, Regina testified on direct examination that she did not report 

Bartley's abuse to anyone in authority until March 2013. Regina explained 

that she delayed making a report because she was afraid of Bartley and did not 

want to bring attention to herself or suffer recrimination because she had not 

stopped Bartley. On cross-examination, Regina testified that she had forgotten 

that, sometime before March 2013, she had reported the abuse to her mother 

while they were in the midst of an argument. However, according to Regina, 

her mother did not believe any abuse had occurred. 

Bartley testified that he loved Regina and that he had not abused her. 

He could not explain why Regina was making false accusations and questioned 

her credibility because of her failure to report the abuse despite frequent 

opportunities to do so. He also noted that Regina did not make her 

accusations until after she had been charged with criminally assaulting her 

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mother. Bartley also testified that, because of the ongoing custody battle with 

his ex-wife, he tried not to be alone with any of his children. 

Based on the preceding, and additional testimony that we set forth 

below, the jury convicted Bartley of all charges. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 

The issues raised by Bartley have different standards of review. 

Therefore, we set forth the appropriate standard of review as we address each 

issue. 

III. ANALYSIS. 

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Denied Bartley's Motion to 

Dismiss the Indictment. 

On January 13, 2014, the grand jury returned an indictment charging, 

in pertinent part, 3that Bartley committed two counts of "sodomy in the firstdegree when he engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with [Regina], a female 

less than twelve (12) years of age" and two counts of "sex abuse in the firstdegree when he subjected a female child, [Regina], to sexual contact who was 

less than twelve (12) years of age" between "2004 and March, 2012, in McLean 

County, Kentucky." On March 24, 2014, Bartley's counsel filed a motion for a 

bill of particulars seeking additional information. At the hearing on that 

motion the Commonwealth indicated that it had provided a copy of a recorded 

interview of Regina to Bartley's counsel and that additional details were 

3The indictment also charged Bartley with two counts of first-degree rape. 

However, the Commonwealth dismissed those counts because the alleged offenses 

occurred outside of McLean County. 

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contained in that interview. When Bartley's counsel indicated he was having 

difficulty hearing the copy of the tape that he had, the Commonwealth agreed 

to provide him with another copy. Bartley's counsel then stated that if he 

needed any additional information after listening to the tape, he would advise 

the court and the Commonwealth accordingly. 

On August 11, 2014, Bartley notified the court that he had retained new 

counsel. On October 31, 2014, the Commonwealth sent correspondence to 

Bartley's new counsel advising him of additional facts regarding each of the 

counts in the indictment. The additional facts were consistent with Regina's 

ultimate testimony, except for the age range when the incident in the garage 

occurred. 

On the morning of trial, Bartley moved to dismiss all of the counts of the 

indictment due to lack of specificity. In particular, he noted that the offenses 

occurred within a range of seven years and, without more specific dates, he 

could not mount an adequate defense. The Commonwealth admitted that it 

was difficult to get specific dates, noting that Regina was between three or four 

and ten or eleven years old when the events took place. However, the 

Commonwealth advised the court that it had tried to be as specific as possible 

in its October 31, 2014 disclosure letter to Bartley. The Commonwealth also 

noted that it had provided an audio tape to Bartley several months earlier. 

Bartley again complained that he was unable to hear what Regina said on the 

tape; however, it does not appear that he had mentioned this to either the 

court or the Commonwealth in the months after he received the second copy of 

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the tape. The court noted that Bartley had a second copy of the tape for some 

time and had not complained about that tape earlier. Therefore, the court held 

that the tape was not an issue. The court then agreed with Bartley that the 

indictment was not specific and asked the Commonwealth if it wanted to move 

to amend it to conform with the anticipated testimony. The Commonwealth 

stated that it would wait to see what transpired at trial. The court then noted 

that the last count was the least specific and could be a problem; however, it 

denied Bartley's motion. 

During trial Bartley again moved to dismiss the indictment and he 

sought a new trial based, in part, on the alleged defects in the indictment. The 

court overruled those motions. 

Bartley continues to argue on appeal that the indictment was inadequate 

because it gave him "no notice whatsoever of the dates he was alleged to have 

committed the offenses." The Commonwealth argues that the indictment, as 

supplemented by the Commonwealth's provision of the audio tape and the 

October 31, 2014 letter, was sufficient. 

[An] indictment or information shall contain, and shall be 

sufficient if it contains, a plain, concise and definite statement of 

the essential facts constituting the specific offense with which the 

defendant is charged. It need not contain any other matter not 

necessary to such statement, nor need it negative any exception, 

excuse or proviso contained in any statute creating or defining the 

offense charged. 

Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 6.10(2). 

The sufficiency of an indictment is measured by two criteria under 

the Due Process Clause: first, it must "sufficiently apprise a 

defendant of the criminal conduct for which he is called to 

answer;" second, the indictment and instructions together must 

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provide adequate specificity so as to allow the defendant to "plead 

acquittal or conviction as a defense" against future indictment and 

punishment for the same offense. 

Alford v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 240, 248 (Ky. 2011) (citations omitted). 

The indictment herein was bare bones, containing only the specific 

crimes charged and the range of dates within which the offenses occurred. 

However, the Commonwealth supplemented the indictment with the recording 

of Regina's statement and the October 31, 2014 letter to Bartley's counsel. For 

counts one, two, and three the October 31, 2014 letter provided details 

regarding the locations where each offense occurred, a narrower time-frame for 

when each offense occurred, and what specific activities took place. 

Furthermore, for counts one and two the Commonwealth provided information 

regarding what clothes Regina and Bartley were wearing. For count four, the 

correspondence provided details regarding where the offense occurred and 

what activities took place; however, the Commonwealth did not provide a more 

specific time frame. These details were sufficient to apprise Bartley of the 

offenses with which he was charged and to permit him to plead prior conviction 

should he be charged with the same offense in the future. Therefore, the trial 

court did not err when it refused to dismiss the indictment. 

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Granted the Commonwealth's 

Motion to Amend the Indictment. 

The court may permit an indictment, information, complaint or 

citation to be amended any time before verdict or finding if no 

additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights 

of the defendant are not prejudiced. If justice requires, however, 

the court shall grant the defendant a continuance when such an 

amendment is permitted. 

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RCr 6.16. Because RCr 6.16 is permissive, we review a trial court's order 

permitting the Commonwealth to amend the indictment for abuse of discretion. 

See Riley v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 622, 631-32 (Ky. 2003). 

As noted above, the parties recognized before trial that the indictment 

lacked specificity. In order to address this deficiency in the indictment, the 

Commonwealth provided Bartley with two copies of Regina's taped statement 

and correspondence setting forth details regarding each of the charges. When 

asked by the court the morning of trial if it wanted to amend the indictment to 

conform with that correspondence, the Commonwealth stated that it would 

wait until testimony had been presented. It appears that the Commonwealth 

believed that the testimony might differ somewhat from what was in the 

correspondence, a belief that proved to be true with regard to how old Regina 

was when one of the charged acts occurred. Therefore, the Commonwealth did 

not move to amend the indictment until after the close of all evidence, when it 

submitted draft jury instructions. 4 

Initially, we note that Bartley does not argue that the amendment 

resulted in different or additional charges being levied. Therefore, we do not 

address that part of RCr 6.16. 

Bartley does argue that the amendment prejudiced his "right[s] to 

present a defense and . . . to confront the witnesses against him through 

4We note that the instructions submitted by the Commonwealth were 

consistent with Regina's testimony and the amended indictment. Although unanimity 

was not raised as an issue, the instructions in this case exemplify how to word 

instructions to avoid unanimity issues. 

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effective cross examination." In support of this argument, Bartley states that 

the amendment made it impossible to develop an alibi defense. However, 

Bartley was aware of the charges against him and the general time frame when 

the charged incidents occurred, and the Commonwealth took steps to advise 

him more specifically what the charges entailed. Therefore, we discern no 

prejudice to any of Bartley's substantial rights by amendment of the indictment 

to conform with the evidence. 

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Denied Bartley's Motion for a 

Mistrial and Evidence of Uncharged Crimes and Other Bad Acts Does 

Not Warrant Reversal. 

Bartley complains that Regina's testimony about uncharged sexual acts, 

other acts of physical abuse, and possible illegal drug use impermissibly 

prejudiced him. He admits that he did not properly preserve the majority of 

these alleged errors, which we address separately below. 

1. Uncharged Sexual Acts Testimony on Direct Examination. 

During direct examination, the Commonwealth asked Regina if anything 

had ever happened between her and Bartley in her bedroom. She said that it 

had and, when the Commonwealth asked her to describe what happened in 

detail, she said that Bartley lay in bed with her, put his hand down her 

panties, and rubbed her vagina. Regina stated that she was not sure how old 

she was when this happened, but she believed she may have been eight. 

During this portion of her testimony, Regina stated twice that Bartley did this 

more than once, and Bartley did not object. Thus, Bartley did not properly 

preserve any issues with regard to this testimony, and we examine its 
admission for palpable error. RCr 10.26. To be palpable, an error must be "so 

manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the 

judicial process." Baumia v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.3d 530, 542 (Ky. 2013). 

Regina's "testimony falls within the exceptions for evidence offered to 

prove intent, plan, or absence of mistake or accident . . . . [and] evidence of 

similar acts perpetrated against the same victim are almost always admissible 

for those reasons." Noel v. Commonwealth, 76 S.W.3d 923, 931 (Ky. 2002); 

Harp v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 813, 822 (Ky. 2008). Thus, Regina's short 

statements about uncharged sexual acts, made essentially in passing during 

her testimony on direct examination, did not rise to the level of palpable error. 

2. Uncharged Sexual Acts Testimony on Cross -Examination. 

On cross-examination, Bartley questioned Regina about the preceding 

incident and Regina stated that she was seven or eight years old but that it 

happened all the time. At that point Bartley's counsel asked to approach the 

bench, objected, and made a motion for a mistrial arguing that Regina had 

testified several times about uncharged acts. Thus, Bartley properly preserved 

issues with regard to Regina's third statement about uncharged sexual acts. 

In response to Bartley's objection and motion, the Commonwealth noted 

it had not solicited Regina's first two statements about uncharged sexual acts 

and that Bartley had not objected. The court noted that Regina's testimony 

about uncharged sexual acts was not proper; however, it also noted that 

Bartley's objection was not timely and that Regina's testimony was not grounds 

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for a mistrial. The court then admonished the Commonwealth to tell Regina to 

refrain from making any similar statements, which Regina did. 

The extraordinary relief of a mistrial will not be granted absent "a 

manifest necessity." Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Ky. 2002). 

A party claiming that the trial court erroneously denied a motion for a mistrial 

must show that any "prejudicial effect could be removed in no other way." Id. 

We review a trial court's decision to declare or deny a mistrial for abuse of 

discretion. Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Ky. 2004). We 

discern no abuse of discretion here. 

Regina's testimony on cross-examination about uncharged sexual acts 

was, like her testimony on direct, spontaneous and not in direct response to 

questioning. Bartley did timely object to this testimony; however, by the time 

he did so, the jury had already heard the complained of testimony twice, and 

Bartley had already suffered any prejudice he was going to suffer. Therefore, 

Regina's testimony during cross-examination was harmless error. 

Furthermore, Bartley, who did not ask the court to admonish the jury, has not 

shown how an admonition would not have removed any prejudicial effect from 

Regina's cross-examination testimony. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion when it denied Bartley's motion for a mistrial. 

3. Physical Abuse. 

Bartley's defense was that Regina was fabricating her allegations of 

abuse. In support of that defense, Bartley noted during his opening statement 

that, despite being involved with social workers, teachers, and counselors for 

11 
years, Regina did not disclose the abuse until she was facing criminal charges. 5 

 To refute that portion of Bartley's defense, the Commonwealth asked Regina if 

Bartley had ever told her not to tell anyone about the sexual abuse. Regina 

said, "Once I knew, like he said that if I did tell somebody, I probably wouldn't 

be here." She also stated that she had not told anyone because Bartley had hit 

her, her siblings and step siblings; that he scared her and the other children; 

and that he had nearly beaten her brother to death. 

On cross-examination, Bartley asked Regina about what she had told her 

teachers. She testified that she had not told them about any sexual abuse but 

that she had told them Bartley had hit her because she had "bruises and 

marks." Bartley did not object to any of Regina's testimony about physical 

abuse. Because Bartley did not object, we review the admission of this 

evidence for palpable error. RCr 10.26. 

Bartley argues that evidence of his physical abuse was not admissible 

because it was not probative of whether the sexual abuse and sodomy 

occurred. According to Bartley, the Commonwealth only introduced this 

evidence to "tip the scales in [Regina's] favor." Setting aside the fact that nearly 

all evidence is introduced in order to tip the scales in favor of the party offering 

it, we discern no error, let alone palpable error. 

Bartley is correct that evidence of his physical abuse of Regina and other 

members of his family would generally be inadmissible if offered only to prove 

5 It appears from the record that the criminal charges related to a physical 

altercation between Regina and her mother. 

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his bad character or criminal predisposition. See Alford v. Commonwealth, 338 

S.W.3d 240, 250 (Ky. 2011). Such evidence "is admissible only if probative of 

an issue independent of character or criminal predisposition, and only if its 

probative value on that issue outweighs the unfair prejudice with respect to 

character." Billings v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Ky. 1992). 

Bartley specifically raised as an issue Regina's failure to tell anyone 

about the sexual abuse and sodomy. Evidence of his physical abuse was 

relevant and admissible to explain why Regina waited several years to tell 

anyone, an issue independent of character and criminal predisposition. 

Therefore, we discern no error in the admission of evidence of Bartley's physical. 

abuse. 

4. Drug Use. 

When the Commonwealth questioned Regina about the incident in the 

office, she testified that Bartley called her into the house and asked her to get 

something from the office. She could not remember what Bartley wanted her to 

get but thought it might have been "pain pills." Bartley did not object. He now 

argues that this testimony was impermissible evidence of bad acts, presumably 

because the testimony implied that the "pain pills" were illegal. We disagree. 

Because Bartley did not object, we must determine whether the 

admission of this evidence, if error, rose to the level of palpable error. RCr 

10.26. Regina did not characterize the pills Bartley wanted her to get as being 

illegal substances. She merely stated that he wanted her to get pain pills, 

which could include both legally and illegally obtained substances. Thus, even 

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if this testimony was erroneously admitted, its admission did not threaten "the 

integrity of the judicial process," Baumia, 402 S.W.3d at 542, and was not 

palpable error. 

D. The Court Did Not Err When It Permitted Habit Testimony. 

During its case in chief, the Commonwealth called Keith Stratton, 

Regina's foster father. Stratton testified that Regina was apprehensive when 

she first came to live with his family, fearing that someone might try to get her. 

When the Commonwealth asked Stratton if he knew who Regina feared, he 

stated that Regina never told him but that she had discussed it with his wife. 

Bartley, without explanation, objected and the Commonwealth abandoned this 

line of questioning. The Commonwealth then asked Stratton whether, 

"[c]omparing [Regina] to all the other children that you've had placed in your 

home, how would you, with her apprehension, to use your word, how would 

you describe [Regina], compare her?" Stratton responded that most foster 

children are apprehensive but that Regina "was the most apprehensive child 

that I've had to this point." 

Bartley argues that this testimony was impermissible "flip habit 

evidence" that Regina acted differently from other foster children because she 

had been sexually abused by Bartley. According to Bartley, permitting such 

testimony, "remove[ed] the jury from its historic function of assessing 

credibility." Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Ky. 1996). 

Because Bartley did not raise this issue before the trial court, it is unpreserved, 

and we review it for palpable error. RCr 10.26. 

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In support of his argument, Bartley cites Sanderson v. Commonwealth, 

291 S.W.3d 610 (Ky. 2005) which sets forth the general rule against Child 

Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) testimony: 

[A] party cannot introduce evidence of the habit of a class of 

individuals either to prove that another member of the class acted 

the same way under similar circumstances or to prove that the 

person was a member of that class because he/she acted the same 

way under similar circumstances. 

Id. at 613 (emphasis in original) (citing Kurtz u. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 

409, 414 (Ky. 2005)). 

We are not convinced that Stratton's testimony reached the level of 

CSAAS testimony, nor are we convinced that its admission constituted 

manifest injustice. This Court found reversible error in Sanderson where a 

clinical psychologist testified that a child's addition of new allegations of sexual 

abuse was normal and in Newkirk where a psychiatrist testified that 

recantation was a common occurrence among sexually abused children. Both 

cases involved testimony by medical professionals offered to prove sexual abuse 

had occurred because the children acted like other sexually abused children. 

As the Court noted in Newkirk, such testimony does not account for the 

possibility that "other children who had not been similarly abused might also 

develop the same symptoms or traits." Id. at 690-91 (citing Lantrip v. 

Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 1986)). 

Stratton's testimony poses no such problem for seven reasons. First, 

Stratton was not a medical professional, and his testimony did not carry the 

weight assigned to such professionals. Second, Stratton was not comparing 

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Regina to other sexually abused children; he was comparing her to other foster 

children. Third, Stratton did not state that Regina was apprehensive because 

she had been sexually abused or even state that sexually abused children act 

apprehensively. Fourth, the jury had heard testimony that Bartley and 

Regina's mother had been engaged in a lengthy and acrimonious divorce and 

custody battle. Fifth, Regina had been treated medically and psychologically 

on an ongoing basis for issues related to that custody battle. Sixth, Regina had 

been arrested and charged with assaulting her mother. Seventh, Regina, who 

had been released from juvenile detention before being placed with the 

Strattons, stated that facility was "the worst place ever, except for having to 

live" with her mother. 

Certainly, the jury could have inferred that Regina's apprehension was 

the result of Bartley's sexual abuse; however, it could have as easily inferred 

that her apprehension was the result of her parents' ongoing legal battle, her 

own psychological and legal difficulties, and her fear of being returned to her 

mother's care or to juvenile detention. Therefore, we cannot say that Stratton's 

testimony resulted in manifest injustice or that it rose to the level of palpable 

error. 

E. Bartley Was Not Entitled to a Directed Verdict. 

On a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair 

and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the 

Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable 

juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 

guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purposes of 

ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the 

evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury 

questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such 

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testimony. On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if 

under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for 

a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed 

verdict of acquittal. 

Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 at 187 (Ky. 1991). 

Bartley argues that the trial court should have granted his motions for 

directed verdict because Regina's testimony was "uncorroborated and 

inherently improbable." In support of his argument, Bartley cites Garrett v. 

Commonwealth, 48 S.W.3d 6, 10 (Ky. 2001). In Garrett, the victim testified that 

her father began sexually abusing her at the age of six and continued abusing 

her for six years. Id. at 8. The victim's testimony was partially corroborated by 

her mother, a friend, and a neighbor who observed Garrett acting in a 

compromising way toward the victim. Id. at 8-9. This Court noted that the 

victim's testimony "occasionally contradicted her previous statements to the 

police" and that the trial court, based on those contradictions, granted 

Garrett's motion for directed verdict as to several of the charges. Id. at 10. 

However, the trial court did not direct a verdict on all of the charges, and this 

Court affirmed the trial court's determinations. Id. In doing so, this Court 

stated that "[c]orroboration in a child sexual abuse case is required only if the 

unsupported testimony of the victim is '. . . contradictory, incredible or 

inherently improbable." Id. (Citations omitted.) 

17 
Bartley argues that this was a classic case of "he said/ she said," with 

Regina testifying that Bartley abused her, with no corroborating evidence, 6 

 and Bartley testifying that no abuse occurred. Bartley notes that Regina 

testified on direct examination that she had not told anyone of the ongoing 

abuse, but testified on cross-examination that she had told her mother about 

the abuse during the course of an argument. Bartley argues that this 

inconsistent testimony, coupled with the fact that no one witnessed any sexual 

abuse during a time when Regina and the family were "under a microscope due 

to the divorce and custody battle" rendered her testimony incredible and 

inherently improbable. We disagree. 

It is fair to characterize Regina's testimony about when she disclosed the 

abuse as inconsistent, and Bartley was free to attack her credibility based on 

that testimony. However, Regina's testimony about the specific acts of abuse 

was not inconsistent. It contained detailed descriptions of what occurred, 

where each incident occurred, and, for two of the incidents, what she and 

Bartley were wearing. This evidence was as specific as, if not more specific 

than, evidence in other similar cases, and any inconsistency about when 

Regina disclosed the abuse was not so severe as to render the remainder of her 

testimony inherently improbable. 

Furthermore, even with this partial inconsistency, the evidence, taken in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was more than sufficient to 

6We note but will not further comment on the inconsistency of Bartley's 

arguments that Stratton's testimony impermissibly bolstered Regina's testimony while 

simultaneously arguing that there was no corroborating evidence. 

18 
support the trial court's finding that a reasonable jury could reasonably 

conclude that Bartley committed the charged offenses. Therefore, we discern 

no error in the trial court's denial of Bartley's motions for directed verdict. 

IV. CONCLUSION. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

All sitting. All concur. 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 

Emily Holt Rhorer 

Department of Public Advocacy 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: 

Andy Beshear 

Attorney General of Kentucky 

Julie Scott Jernigan 

Assistant Attorney General 

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