I.B. v. Frederick County Department of Social Services, No. 1497, September Term, 2016. 

Opinion by Sharer, J.

FAMILY LAW – INDICATED CHILD NEGLECT – IMPLIED ELEMENT OF 

SCIENTER 

The Family Law Article § 5-701 definition of “Neglect” is distinguishable from the 

statute’s definition of “Abuse” and does not imply the same element of scienter. The Court 

of Appeals’s decisions in Taylor v. Harford Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 384 Md. 213 (2004) 

and McClanahan v. Washington Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 445 Md. 691 (2015), holding 

the element of scienter is implicit in findings for both indicated child abuse – physical 

injury and for indicated child abuse – mental injury, respectively, do not extend to findings 

of indicated child neglect. The language of the COMAR provision that supported an 

implicit element of scienter for child abuse, where the contact was “accidental and 

unintended,” is not found under the same COMAR provision for child neglect regulations. 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – SUMMARY DECISION – HEARING 

REQUIREMENT – STATUTORY ESTOPPEL

The ALJ did not err in granting summary decision, dismissing father’s administrative 

appeal of an indicated child neglect finding, following his guilty plea to a related criminal 

charge that arose out of the indicated child neglect pursuant to Md. Code, Family Law § 5-

706.1(b)(3)(ii). Under the statute, when DSS moved for summary decision to dismiss the 

administrative appeal based on the finding of guilt of the related criminal charge and 

presented uncontroverted evidence that the finding of guilt of the related criminal charge 

arose out of the same finding of indicated neglect, the ALJ was deprived of the discretion 

to rule other than to dismiss the appeal. 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – SUMMARY DECISION – FACTUAL SUPPORT –

PRESERVATION

An issue alleging a dispute of material fact not presented to the ALJ for its initial 

consideration of a motion for summary decision of an administrative appeal may not later 

be asserted for the first time on judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
Circuit Court for Frederick County

Case No. 10-C-16-000236

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1497

September Term, 2016

______________________________________

I.B.

v.

FREDERICK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

SOCIAL SERVICES

______________________________________

Woodward, C.J.,

Reed,

Sharer, J. Frederick

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Sharer, J.

______________________________________

Filed: November 29, 2018

Woodward, J., now retired, participated in the 

hearing and preparation of this opinion, and 

participated in the Court’s decision to designate 

this opinion for publication pursuant to MD 

Rule 8-605.1, while an active member of this 

Court and as its Chief Judge.
Appellant, I.B.

1

, seeks reversal of an order of the Circuit Court for Frederick County 

affirming the grant of summary decision, entered by an Administrative Law Judge, finding 

an “indication of child neglect” sought by the Frederick County Department of Social 

Services (DSS), appellee. In his timely appeal, I.B., questions: (1) the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a summary decision by the ALJ; (2) the failure of the ALJ to hold a 

hearing on his motion; and (3) whether intent is a requisite element of neglect under 

Maryland Code (1984, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.), Family Law Article (FL) § 5-701.

2

I. BACKGROUND

The underlying facts are not in dispute. In July 2015, I.B. took his children to 

church, unintentionally leaving his infant daughter in her car seat in the back of the car, on 

a hot day with the front windows slightly open. Authorities were called, who removed the 

child from the car. I.B. acknowledged that, while attending to the other children, he had 

forgotten that his daughter was in the car. The incident was reported to DSS, which 

 

1

 In keeping with this Court’s policy of protecting privacy in cases involving children, and 

in response to appellant’s Motion to Reconsider/Revise, we identify appellant by initials 

only.

2 All subsequent statutory references, unless otherwise indicated, shall be to the Family 

Law Article of the Maryland Code (1984, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.), which reflects the 

version of the relevant statutes in effect at the time of the incident. Similarly, all references 

to the Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR), unless indicated otherwise, shall be to 

the 2015 version of COMAR, which reflects the version of the regulations in effect at the 

time of the incident.

(continued)
2

initiated an investigation, ultimately making a finding of indicated3child neglect.4 I.B.

requested a contested case hearing pursuant to FL § 5-706.1(b)(1), but, as provided by the 

statute, that proceeding was stayed pending the outcome of the pending criminal case, in 

which I.B. was charged with neglect of a minor5and confinement of a minor in an 

unattended vehicle.6 The State nol prossed the child neglect charge and I.B. pleaded guilty 

to confinement of a minor, a misdemeanor, subjecting the offender to both a monetary fine 

and imprisonment. He was afforded probation before judgment.7 

Following disposition of the criminal charges, the stay was lifted in the family law 

proceeding. DSS moved for summary decision to dismiss the request for hearing based on 

the finding of guilt in the criminal proceeding, pursuant to FL § 5-706.1(b)(3)(ii). I.B.

 

3 FL § 5-701 defines “Indicated” as “a finding that there is credible evidence, which has 

not been satisfactorily refuted, that ... neglect ... did occur.” FL § 5-701(m).

4 FL § 5-701 defines “Neglect” as the “leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give 

proper care and attention to a child by any parent ... of the child under circumstances that 

indicate ... that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk of 

harm[.]” FL § 5-701(s)(1).

5 Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Law Article § 3-602.1(b), Neglect of 

a Minor.

6 Pursuant to FL § 5-801(a), for the confinement of a minor:

A person who is charged with the care of a child under the age of 8 years 

may not allow the child to be locked or confined in a ... motor vehicle while 

the person charged is absent and the ... motor vehicle is out of the sight of 

the person charged ....

7

In granting I.B. probation before judgment, the District Judge observed: “You have no 

prior criminal record. I’m sure it was unintentional.”

(continued)
3

opposed the summary decision on the ground that the criminal charge was not similar to 

the family law neglect offense and that the criminal court did not find him guilty of neglect. 

The ALJ issued a summary decision granting DSS’s motion, relying on the fact that I.B.

(1) failed to dispute any evidence that the finding of indicated neglect was based on the 

same incident as the guilty plea charge,

8

and (2) the provisions of FL § 5-706.1(b)(3)(ii).9

ALJ’s Findings and Decision

The ALJ’s decision on the motion for summary decision was fully developed and 

supported in its written decision, but did not detail the sufficiency of the DSS’s finding of 

“indicated neglect.” Rather, the ALJ focused on what was undisputed and relevant to the 

question of whether dismissal of the administrative appeal was appropriate. The ALJ 

found:

1. On July 27 [sic], 2015, the Local Department [DSS] received a report 

of an unattended child found alone within a car at 9:30 a.m. The car 

with the unattended child inside was parked at [I.B.’s] family church 

parking lot.

2. The unattended child found inside the car is the biological child of 

[I.B.].

3. The unattended child resided with [I.B.], [its] biological mother and 

siblings. 

 

8 Several times in its written decision, the ALJ mentioned I.B.’s failure to “submit any 

affidavit or exhibits with [his] answer to the motion.” 

9 FL § 5-706.1(b)(3)(ii) provides: 

If after a final disposition of the criminal charge, the individual requesting 

the hearing is found guilty of any criminal charge arising out of the alleged 

abuse or neglect, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall dismiss the 

administrative appeal.
4

4. On August 12, 2015, the Local Department notified [I.B.] that it made 

a finding of indicated child neglect of the unattended child.

5. On September 22, 2015, the District Court for Frederick County, 

Maryland found [I.B.] guilty and convicted him for confining an 

unattended child, pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 5-801 

(2012). [I.B.] was sentenced to probation before judgment, with 

supervised probation ending on September 22, 2016.

Based on those factual findings and the lack of evidence to the contrary, the ALJ 

determined that 

the undisputed evidence shows that [I.B.] was found guilty of a criminal 

charge that arose out of the incident of July 26, 2015. The undisputed 

evidence also shows that the Local Department’s finding of indicated neglect 

was based upon the same incident. Family Law section 5-801; Family Law 

5-706.1(b)(3)(ii) (2012 Rpl. Vol.). I find, therefore, as a matter of law, that 

the Local Department’s motion for summary decision must be granted. 

COMAR 28.02.01.12D.

I.B. sought judicial review of the ALJ’s decision, which was affirmed by the circuit 

court. 

Appellant’s Questions

I.B. presents three questions for our review of the ALJ’s dismissal of the 

administrative appeal of the finding of “indicated” child neglect. First, I.B. challenges the 

sufficiency of the factual record to support the ALJ’s grant of the summary decision. 

Second, he questions whether Maryland law requires a hearing to be held when one of the 

requisite elements for a finding of abuse or neglect is contested, and when the element in 

question was not adjudicated in the related criminal proceeding. Finally, I.B. asks this 

Court to determine whether an implied element of intent or scienter, found by case law in 
5

the related child abuse statute of the Family Law Article, exists in the neglect statute of 

that same article.

Standard of Review

We have recently explained the appropriate standard for reviewing agency 

decisions:

It is “[b]ecause an appellate court reviews the agency decision under the same 

statutory standards as the circuit court,” Consumer Prot. Div. v. George, [383 

Md. 505, 512] (2004) (quotations and citation omitted), that “we analyze the 

agency’s decision, not the [circuit] court’s ruling.” Martin v. Allegany 

County Bd. of Educ., [212 Md. App. 596, 605] (2013) (citation omitted). We 

are “‘limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a 

whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if 

the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of 

law.’” W.R. Grace & Co. v. Swedo, [439 Md. 441, 453] (2014) (quoting Bd. 

of Physician Quality Assur. v. Banks, [354 Md. 59, 67–68] (1999)).

Mihailovich v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 234 Md. App. 217, 222 (2017), cert. 

denied, 457 Md. 396 (2018).

The entry of a summary decision is, in our view, akin to summary judgment on 

review of which “we are concerned with whether there was a dispute as to any material 

fact and, if not, whether the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Casey v. 

Grossman, 123 Md. App. 751, 765 (1998). It is to this end, that we must “construe the 

facts properly before the court, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from 

them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party[.]” Powell v. Breslin, 195 Md. 

App. 340, 346 (2010) (citations omitted), aff’d, 421 Md. 266 (2011). In our review of a 

grant of summary judgment “we examine ‘the same information from the record and 

determine the same issues of law as the trial court.’” Cent. Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Cent. GMC, 
6

Inc., 194 Md. App. 375, 387 (2010) (quoting La Belle Epoque, LLC v. Old Europe Antique 

Manor, 406 Md. 194, 209 (2008)). “If no material facts are in dispute, the appellate court 

must determine whether the trial court correctly entered summary judgment as a matter of 

law.” Id. (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

1. Factual Support

I.B. first argues that the factual record does not support the ALJ’s decision to enter 

a summary decision to dismiss the appeal. He contends that the exhibits relied upon by 

DSS to support its motion to dismiss were “wholly deficient regarding the conviction, and 

contain inconsistencies and inaccuracies that require a contested hearing[.]”

DSS responds, first, that I.B.’s dispute of material fact argument was not addressed 

in his response to the DSS’s motion for summary decision, hence, it was not preserved. It 

avers that the requirements of COMAR 28.02.01.12D, governing motions for summary 

decision, require a responding party to identify all disputed material facts at issue. Since 

I.B. failed to identify a dispute of material fact in his response, DSS argues, he has waived 

the ability to assert it later on judicial review. Alternatively, DSS argues that even had I.B.

not waived this argument, the disputed facts he proffers were not material to the ALJ’s 

decision. 

The COMAR motion for summary decision provisions are clear that a response to 

such a motion “shall identify the material facts that are disputed.” COMAR 

28.02.01.12D(2) (emphasis added). I.B. did not present any dispute of material facts before 

the ALJ; rather, he focused on how the criminal charge was not based on neglect and did 
7

not share the same elements. Judicial review of an agency decision is limited to evidence 

and issues presented from the record before it. See also Md. Code, State Gov’t § 10-214(a) 

(providing that, on judicial review “[f]indings of fact must be based exclusively on the 

evidence of record in the contested case proceeding and on matters officially noticed in 

that proceeding”). Therefore, I.B.’s belated attempt to challenge the previously 

uncontested facts and evidence presented to the ALJ, for the first time in his petition and 

memorandum in support of judicial review, is without merit. See Allmond v. Dep’t of 

Health & Mental Hygiene, 448 Md. 592, 606 (2016) (reiterating “that questions, including 

Constitutional issues, that could have been but were not presented to the administrative 

agency may not ordinarily be raised for the first time in an action for judicial review”

(quoting Bd. of Physician Quality Assur. v. Levitsky, 353 Md. 188, 207-08 (1999))).

Notwithstanding that failure, neither FL § 5-706.1(b)(3)(ii), nor the related COMAR 

provision, 07.02.26.06C(1), limit what criminal charges relating to the indicated neglect 

are dispositive of an administrative appeal based on a finding of guilt. See FL § 5-

706.1(b)(3)(ii) (“If after final disposition of the criminal charge, the individual requesting 

the hearing is found guilty of any criminal charge arising out of the alleged abuse or 

neglect, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall dismiss the administrative appeal.” 

(emphasis added)). See also COMAR 07.02.26.06C(1)10 (tracking the language of the 

 

10 COMAR 07.02.26.06C has since been amended to provide further clarification that, if 

appellant is “[f]ound guilty of any criminal charges arising out of the alleged child abuse 

or neglect, including being found guilty and receiving probation before judgment or taking 

an Alford plea, OAH shall dismiss the appeal.” COMAR 07.02.26.06C(1) (2018)

(emphasis added).
8

statute: “If, after final disposition of the criminal proceeding, the appellant is[ ] ... [f]ound 

guilty of any criminal charges arising out of the alleged child abuse or neglect, OAH shall

dismiss the appeal[.]” (emphasis added)). 

Therefore, when DSS moved for summary decision to dismiss the administrative 

appeal based on the finding of guilt of the related criminal charge and presented 

uncontroverted evidence that the finding of guilt of the related criminal charge arose out of 

the same finding of “indicated neglect,” the ALJ was deprived of the discretion to rule 

other than to dismiss the appeal. In his generic response, without particularity, to the DSS 

motion to dismiss, I.B. failed to assert the existence of any evidence to controvert that 

which was presented by DSS and cannot now challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 

relied on by the ALJ. 

2. Hearing Requirement

Next, I.B. argues that, if an element necessary for a finding of neglect is in dispute 

and was not adjudicated in the criminal proceeding, a hearing is required. In support, he

relies on Tabassi v. Carroll Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 182 Md. App. 80 (2008). Tabassi 

sought judicial review of an ALJ’s grant of DSS’s motion to dismiss based on the finding 

of guilt in a related criminal proceeding. 

While a search warrant was being executed at Tabassi’s home, loaded guns were 

located next to a bed where a 12-year-old girl, unrelated to Tabassi, was sleeping. 182 Md. 

App. at 83-84. DSS noted a finding of indicated neglect, and related criminal charges were 

filed arising out of those facts. Id. at 83. Tabassi was convicted of reckless endangerment 

and firearms access by minors. Id. at 85. Thereafter, DSS moved to dismiss his request 
9

for a contested hearing. Id. Based on the criminal conviction, the ALJ dismissed his 

request. Tabassi then sought judicial review, resulting in affirmance of the ALJ’s decision. 

Id. 

On appeal, we vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded with directions for the 

ALJ to hold further proceedings on the question of Tabassi’s status as a custodian of the 

child. Id. at 93. We held that

dismissal of an alleged abuser or neglector’s administrative appeal is 

warranted where an accused is found guilty of criminal charges stemming 

from the same conduct that serves as the basis for a finding of abuse or 

neglect and the requisite status of the individual to the child has been 

adjudicated or is not disputed.

Id. At the administrative level, Tabassi’s status as to the child was contested and had not 

been determined.

I.B. reads into our holding in Tabassi that, when the elements of the criminal charges 

are different from the Family Law offenses and if an element of the Family Law offense 

was not adjudicated in the criminal proceeding, a hearing should be afforded to adjudicate 

it in the ALJ’s proceeding. He fails, however, to recognize that his failure to timely contest

any of the facts asserted or evidence offered concerning the elements of indicated child 

neglect against him. His reliance on Tabassi is misplaced.

The essence of our Tabassi holding is that all elements of indicated neglect, said to 

be disputed, are to be resolved at the administrative stage of the proceedings. Because I.B.

raised no disputed facts, and because there is no dispute that he is the child’s parent, Tabassi

is factually inapposite to the arguments that he raises. 

3. Intent
10

I.B.’s final argument is that, even if all the elements of the confinement of a minor 

criminal charge were identical to the elements of neglect, there is an implicit requirement 

of some level of intent to neglect, which he lacked. To support this argument, he refers to 

Taylor v. Harford Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 384 Md. 213 (2004) and McClanahan v. 

Washington Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 445 Md. 691 (2015). It is important to note however, 

that both Taylor and McClanahan were cases dealing with findings of criminal child abuse

and did not involve dismissal of administrative appeals pursuant to FL § 5-706.1(b)(3). 

Taylor, in anger, kicked a stool which unintentionally struck his daughter resulting 

in injuries that required medical treatment. 384 Md. at 217. A DSS investigation ensued, 

which resulted in a finding of indicated child abuse. Id. at 216-218. Following a contested 

case hearing, the ALJ affirmed the finding of abuse. Id. at 218-20. Judicial review also 

resulted in affirming the finding of abuse. Id. at 221. On appeal, the Court of Appeals

noted that the ALJ failed to consider “an absence of intent to harm,” a consideration 

allowed under COMAR 07.02.07.12C(2)(a)(i) (2004)11 for “Ruled Out Child Abuse.” Id. 

at 226-27. Because of that provision, and Taylor’s lack of intent to harm his child when 

kicking a stool in anger, the Court held that “the intentional act must be shown to have 

 

11 The provisions for disposition of child abuse have since been amended and renumbered 

and are now found in COMAR 07.02.07.11. The provisions for “Ruled Out Child Abuse” 

have been amended to afford, in relevant part, that a finding of ruled out child abuse can 

be based on “[a] finding that the alleged maltreator was not responsible for the injury for 

reasons [that] ... [t]he injury resulted from accidental and unintended contact with the child 

and was not caused by a reckless disregard for the child’s health or welfare[.]” COMAR

07.02.07.11C(2)(c)(i) (2018).
11

been either reckless in its nature or deliberately intended to harm the child in order for a 

finding of ‘indicated child abuse’ to be made.” Id. at 232.

In McClanahan, supra, DSS was alerted to several repeated allegations of sexual 

abuse of a minor child by the father. 445 Md. at 695. DSS determined that in the course 

of a custody dispute, the child’s mother appeared to have been continuously manipulating 

the child into believing that she had been assaulted by the father. Id. at 696-97. As a result, 

the child developed behavioral and emotional problems, forming the basis of a finding of

indicated child abuse – mental injury – and indicated child neglect. Id. at 697. Following 

a hearing, the ALJ affirmed the DSS finding of indicated child abuse – mental injury – but 

modified the finding of indicated child neglect to “ruled out child neglect.” Id. at 696-97. 

On judicial review, the circuit court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 697-98. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeals engaged in an analysis of whether a parent can be 

liable for child abuse of the mental injury variety when there was no intent to harm the 

minor child. 445 Md. at 700. In its discussion, the Court addressed statutory interpretation, 

as well as its holding in Taylor, concluding that “[b]ecause FL § 5-701(b) does not 

differentiate between mental injury and physical injury, we do not interpret Subtitle 7 to 

sanction a regulation in which a parent can be deemed a child abuser for unintentionally 

causing mental injury but not liable for unintentionally causing physical injury.” Id. at 706

(footnote omitted). Because of the lack of distinction, the Court held that “to be included 

as a ‘child abuser’ in [the] central registry, a person must either intend to injure the child 

or at least act in reckless disregard of the child’s welfare.” Id. at 711. 
12

Relying on Taylor and McClanahan, I.B. posits that, because the child abuse and 

child neglect definitions are found under the same provision of the Family Law statute, 

intent is also an implicit requirement for a finding of child neglect. For support, he relies

on this Court’s legislative intent analysis in Tabassi and asserts, “[t]he fact that the 

definitions for ‘Abuse’ and ‘Neglect’ are housed in the same statute,12 suggest that they are 

to be interpreted together in the context, as one element of a whole ... in order to harmonize 

and reconcile the statutory provisions.” (Internal quotations omitted)]. 

DSS responds in a footnote that this argument was not preserved and that the ALJ 

did not “base [its] decision on an interpretation of what constitutes neglect.” 

Even if we were to find that the argument was preserved for review, we would find 

a significant distinction between the COMAR provisions for neglect and abuse in terms of 

intent. DSS need not prove intent in order to establish neglect. See In re Priscilla B., 214 

Md. App. 600, 621, 625 (2013) (discussing the identical definition of “neglect” in CINA 

cases, explaining that, while “neglect might not involve affirmative conduct ... [like 

abuse], the court assesses neglect by assessing the inaction of a parent[,]” because “a child 

can be harmed as severely by a failure to tend to her needs as by affirmative abuse”). To 

the contrary, a successful prosecution of child abuse must establish proof of intent. See

McClanahan, 445 Md. at 711 (holding that “a person must either intend to injure the child 

or at least act in reckless disregard of the child’s welfare”). Accord Taylor, 384 Md. at 232

 

12 The “same statute” I.B. refers to in this regard is FL § 5-701 – Definitions, which houses

over 20 definitions for various words used throughout Subtitle 7 of the Family Law Article. 

As such, we place no significance on the fact that the definitions for “Abuse” and “Neglect” 

are both found in the same statute that contains relevant definitions for the entire Subtitle. 
13

(holding that an “intentional act must be shown to have been either reckless in its nature or 

deliberately intended to harm the child in order for a finding of ‘indicated child abuse’ to 

be made”).

The COMAR provisions discussing neglect do not contain the same language as 

those discussing abuse, which the Court of Appeals had relied on in Taylor and

McClanahan to support its determination that intent was an implicit element of both 

physical and mental child abuse. See Taylor, 384 Md. at 226 (“accidental or unintentional 

and not reckless or deliberate” (quoting COMAR 07.02.07.12C(2)(a)(i) (2004)); 

McClanahan, 445 Md. at 704 (“accidental and unintended and ... the injury was not 

foreseeable” (quoting COMAR 07.02.07.12C(2)(a)(i) (2015)). 13

During an investigation of indicated child neglect, other than for mental injury, the 

considerations taken into account for the particular context and circumstances of the 

incident are “[t]he nature, extent, or cause of the failure to provide proper care and attention 

indicate that the child’s health or welfare was harmed or was at substantial risk of harm.” 

COMAR 07.02.07.13A(d). However, once the four elements of indicated child neglect, 

 

13 At the time of the incident and DSS findings, the COMAR provisions for disposition of 

child abuse were located under 07.02.07.12 and the language, “the act causing the injury 

was accidental or unintentional and not reckless or deliberate,” from the earlier version of

COMAR 07.02.07.12C(2)(a)(i) (2004), had been amended to provide, “[t]he contact with 

the child was accidental and unintended and under the circumstances, the injury was not 

foreseeable[.]” COMAR 07.02.07.12C(2)(a)(i)(2015) (emphasis added). The current 

version of this provision has been renumbered and amended, now located in COMAR 

07.02.07.11, providing in relevant part, “accidental and unintended contact with the child 

and was not caused by a reckless disregard for the child’s health or welfare[.]” COMAR 

07.02.07.11C(2)(c)(i) (2018).

(continued)
14

including the contextual considerations, have been found to exist, the Court of Appeals has 

explained, such a finding is only the beginning of the inquiry. See Taylor, 384 Md. at 231 

(finding that, “[i]n assessing the dispositions of investigation delineated in COMAR 

07.02.07.12, it is incumbent upon the ALJ to examine all the evaluative standards 

contained within this regulation[,]” to ensure that neither an “Unsubstantiated” nor a 

“Ruled–Out” finding apply).14

Within the COMAR provisions referring to “Ruled Out Child Neglect,” a decision 

that has ruled out a child neglect finding could be based on reliable evidence that: “(1) 

There was no failure to provide proper care and attention; (2) The child’s health or welfare 

was not harmed or at substantial risk of being harmed; (3) The individual alleged to be 

responsible ... was not a parent or a caretaker; or (4) The alleged victim was not a child at 

the time ....” COMAR 07.02.07.13C(1)-(3) (2015).

15

 It is clear from the four limited 

scenarios under which child neglect may be “ruled out,” the words “accidental and 

unintended,” as they were found in the equivalent child abuse provisions, are absent. 

Consequently, I.B.’s attempt to expand the definition of neglect to mirror the intent 

requirements established by the Court of Appeals for the definition of abuse, is to no avail.

 

14 As I.B. does not discuss the factors for an “Unsubstantiated” finding, we need not address 

those provisions. 

15 The COMAR provisions for disposition of child neglect are now located under 

07.02.07.12 and provide, in relevant part, that a decision that rules out a child neglect 

finding can be based on either “[a] lack of credible evidence supporting one or more 

elements of indicated child neglect; or ... [t]he credible refutation of one or more elements 

of indicated child neglect.” COMAR 07.02.07.12C(2)(a)-(b) (2018).
15

Because the standards of proof of neglect vis-à-vis abuse were, and continue to be,

demonstrably disparate regarding intent or scienter, neither Taylor nor McClanahan form 

a basis for the relief I.B. seeks. See also Tamara A. v. Montgomery Cty. Dep’t of Health 

& Human Servs., 407 Md. 180, 194 (2009) (clarifying the meaning of FL § 5-

706.1(b)(3)(ii), that a “[c]onviction, in other words, does act as an absolute statutory bar to 

further prosecution of the administrative appeal” (emphasis in original)).

Because the statute is clear that, following a criminal conviction based on the same 

facts that support indicated child neglect, dismissal of the administrative process “shall” be 

ordered, we are constrained to affirm.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR FREDERICK COUNTY AFFIRMED;

COSTS ASSESSED TO APPELLANT.