### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma y 16, 200 6 STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. WILLIAM AR THU R S HELTO N A KA JOHN SHELT ON
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Bradley County Nos. M-04- 096-M04- 103 R. Steve n Bebb , Judge

No. E2005-02014-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Novem ber 9, 2006

T h e appellant, W illiam Arthur Shelton aka John S helton, was c onvicted by a jury in the Br adley CountyCriminal Court of three c ounts of false imprisonment, t wo counts of vanda lism, and one count of pre m ed i t at ed fi rst deg ree murder. H e re ceive d a total ef fec tive sentenc e of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Depa rtment of Corre ction. On appe al, the appe llant challeng es the trial court’ s denial of a

motion for sever ance of the murde r counts fr om the rema ining c ounts, the trial court’s exclusion of a witness’s complete statement to police , and the suffic i en cy o f t he evidenc e. From our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm t he judgments of the trial court.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f theCr im ina l C our t a r e Affir m e d.
N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., d eli vere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined. Richard Hug hes, Cleveland, T ennesse e, for the appe llant, Wi lliam Arthur Shelton.
Paul G. Summers, A ttorney Gene ral and Reporter ; J . Ross Dy er, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; Jerry N. Estes, District Attorney Gene ral; and William A. Reedy and Shari Young , Assistant Dis t ri ct Attorney s Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee .

OP IN ION
I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound
I n J anuary

2004, the B radle y County Gra nd J ury returne d a multi-count indictment char g ing the appe llant with the espec ially ag g ravated kidnap p i n g o f Charlene Hy att; the vandalism of Charlene Hy att’s automobile in an amount betwe en $500 and $1000; the e specia lly ag g ravated kid na pp ing of Bria n H y a tt, Jr.; the e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d kidn app ing of She ra Ho lt; the e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated ki dnapping of Melis sa P roctor; the espec ially ag g ravated ki dnapping of B obby Holt; theSo m e o f t he wit ne sses i n thi s ca se sha re a surn am e. T he refo re, fo r c l arit y, w e h av e c ho sen t o uti l i ze t he i r f i rst 1

na m es. W e m ea n no d i sresp ec t t o t he se ind i vid ua l s. -2- espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping of Robin Holt; the vandalism of Sue Hy att’s automobil e i n an amount betwee n $500 and $1000; and the pr emeditated f irst deg ree murder of

Brian Hy att. The State’s pr oof at trial r evea led that Meliss a (M i s s y ) Proctor, w ho was the a ppellant’s c ou sin , a ndhe r bo y frie nd , Rob e rt Ho lt, liv e d a t13 41 Ov e rh e a d B ri dg e Roa d inCle ve la ndwi th the ir two minor children, Robin and B obby

. On the nig ht of Octobe r 20, 2003, Proctor and her c hildren 1 wer e home, and Robert was at work. Robert’s daug hter, Char lene Hy att (her einaf ter “ Mrs. Hy att”), broug ht her two minor childre n, Shera H olt and Brian Hy att, J r., to visit. Therea fter, the appellant and his w ife, Natalie Shelton ( here inafter “Mrs. Shelton”), also came to visit

. T h e a p p ell ant repe atedly

asked the wher eabouts of Mr s. Hy att’s husband, B rian Hy att. The a ppe ll an t thought B rian might be the re be cause two vehicles B rian ty pically drove, one of which he owned with his wife and the other his mot h er o wn ed, we re pa rked in fr ont of Proctor’s mobile home. Proc tor told the app e lla nt that B ri a n w a s st ill a t w or k with Rob e rt

. Th e app e llant sa id that he ha d b e e n to ld that hi s wife and Br

ian wer e having an af

fair, “and he had come to hurt him rea l bad” or “mess [him] up.” During the conve rsation, Mrs. Shelton appea red scare d and wa s crying. T he appe llant was “pa cing back and forth, g oing in and out of the trailer.” He told e very one prese nt that the y must stay in the ho me . Th e app e lla nt wo uld oc c a sio na lly c he c k to mak e su re e ve ry on e re ma ine d in the ho me . T ho se inside did not feel fr ee to lea ve. R o b er tca m e h o m e a tap p ro x i m at el y 9 : 0 0 o r 9 : 3 0 p . m . T h e a p p el l an twa s o u t s i d e, p ac i n g. Robert did not see the appellant’s car. When Robert asked about t he car, the appellant ex plained that he had hidde n it at the mobile home behind Robert’s. The appellant told Robert that he was g oing to kill B ri a n. Th e app e lla nt va nd a lize d Bria n’ s veh ic le s, re nd e ri ng the m inop e ra ble so Mr s. Hy a tt could not leave . The a

ppellant then ca lled the house of Mrs. Hy att’s mother a nd stepfathe r, whe re Mrs. Hy att and B rian we re living at that time. The a ppellant left a

messag e for

Brian, advising that Mrs. Hy att’s car was “messed up,” and Brian needed to pick her up at Robert’s home. A fterw ard, a neig hbor, Audre y

Conner, and Robe rt talked to t he appellant, attempting to c alm him. The eff ort seeme d to work. The a

ppellant left with his wife at 11:00 or 11: 3 0 p . m . R o b ert’s othe r two daug hters came by

the mobile home to take Mrs. H y att and her children home

. The ne x t morning, at 6 : 1 0 o r 6 :20 a.m., the appe llant, acc ompanied by his wife and two children, r eturne d to Proctor’s home. The appellant s ai d t h at he was waiting for B rian to ar rive, believing Brian would be riding to wor k with Robert. The appellant ag ain t hreatened to kil l Bria n. Robert left for work at just after 6:30 a.m., but the a ppellant stay ed until 8:30 a.m. Whi le there , he pa c e d c on stantl y

a c ro ss the fl oo r andwo uldno t si t. Wh e n the app e llant g ot re a dy to l e a ve , h e tol d Proctor, “We a

re g oing up on the hill.”
The a ppellant went to B rian’s house and beat on the kitchen door and windows. Brian g ot out of bed, picke d up a pair of bolt cutters, a nd started out of the bedroom. Mrs. Hy att told Brian to p ut t he bolt

c utt e rs do wn , a ndhe c omp lie d. B ri a n w e nt i nto they ard , w ithno we apo n inhis-3-

hands. The a

ppellant was standing in the y ard, an d h i s wi fe wa s in the driveway , sitti ng in the driver’ s side of the a

ppellant’s ca

r. Brian asked the appellant what he was doing there

. The appellant said, “You know what I ’m do ing he re .” Th e app e lla nt h it B ri a n on the sid e of his he a d wi th a ba se ba ll b a t th e n s ta

bb e d h im i n the c he st. B ri a n f

e ll b a c k in to the op e n kitc he n d oo r. Th e app e llant t oldMr s. Hy a tt “[ k]in d o f i n a smart a leck way ” to ca ll 911. The appellant left when he hear d sirens approa ching

. Brian died as a re su lt o f h is i nju ri e s. The de fense proof at trial was subst antially simil ar to the proof adduce d by the State. The only differ ence was the testimony of Natalie Shelton which reflec ted t hat t he appellant told her that Brian came toward him with a knife prior to the stabbing . Mrs. Shelton was unsure of whether Brian had a w eapon during the fig ht. The appe llant did not testi fy at trial.
Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the jury found the a

ppellant g uiltyof first deg ree preme ditated mur de r; the fa lse imp ri so nme nt o f Cha rl e ne Hy a tt, B ri a n Hy a tt, Jr., a ndShe ra Ho lt; a ndtw o c ou nts of vanda lism of property in an amount less than $500. On appe al, the appe llant challeng es the trial court’s de nial of a motion to sever the kidnapping counts from the m u rd er c ount, the trial court’ s failure to admit Mrs. Shelton’s “ complete” statement to police, a nd the suffic iency of the e vidence supporting his c onviction for first de g ree preme ditated murder . We will addre ss eac h of these issues in turn.
II. Ana lys is
A. Sever ance of Off

enses On appe al, the appe llant arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in denying his motion to sever the ag g ravated kidnapping and vanda lism offenses fr om the murder of fense . T h ea

p p e ll an t c o ntends that the offe nses did not constitute a common scheme or plan a nd that, reg ardle ss, the proof o f the ag g ravated kidnapping and vanda lism offenses would be prejudicia l to the appellant.
Tenne ssee Rul e of Criminal Procedur e 8(b) states t hat t wo or more off enses may

be joined in the same indictment if the of fense s constitute parts of a common scheme or pl an or if they are of the same or simil ar chara cter . See Te nn. R. Crim. P . 8(b)( 1) and ( 2). Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Procedur e 13(b) provides that the tria l court may order sever ance of off

enses prior to trial if such sever ance could be obtaine d on motion of a defe ndant or the State pursuant to Rul e 14. See T enn. R. Crim. P. 1 3 ( b )

. Ru le 1 4 ( b ) ( 1 ) p r o v id e s th a t “ [i ]f tw o o r mo r e o f f e n s e s h a v e b e e n jo in e d or consolidated for

trial pursuant to Rule 8(b), the defe ndant has the right to a se verance of the offe nses unless the offe nses ar e part of a c ommon scheme or plan and the evidence of one w ould be admissible in the trial of the other s.”
Our supreme c ourt has held that “ decisions to consolidate or se ver of fense s pursuant to Rules 8(b) a nd 14(b)( 1) ar e to be reviewe d for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243, 247-4-

(Tenn. 1999)

. “A holding of abuse of discretion re flec ts that the trial court’s log ic and r easoning was improper whe n viewed in lig ht of the fa ctual cir cumstance s and re levant leg al principles involved in a particular c ase.” State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 242 (Tenn. 1999).
As we ha ve noted, in the instant ca se the a ppellant filed a m o t i on to sever the ag g ravated kidnapping and vanda lism charg es fr om the murder c harg e. Ac cordin gl y , we must consider the motion bythe seve ranc e provisions of Rule 14(b) (1)

. S ee State v. Spice r, 12 S.W.3d 438, 443 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; se e a lso State v. De nto n, 14 9 S. W.3 d 1 , 13 (T e nn . 2 00 4) . In o the r w or ds , it wa s w ith in the tr ia l cou rt ’s dis c re tio n to re fu se to s e ve r the c a se s if the of fe ns e s w e repa

rt of a c omm on sc he me or plan a nd if evidenc e of one case would be admissible in the other( s).
I n e xami nin g a

tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n on a se ve ranc e iss ue , th e prima ry c on sid e ratio n is whether the e v id e n c e o f

o n e o f f e n s e w o u ldb e a d mi s s ib le inth e tria l o f th e o th e r if th e o f fense s rema ined seve red. See Spicer, 12 S.W .3d at 445. Essentially , “any question as to whether offe nses should be tried sepa

rate ly pursuant to Rule 14(b)( 1) is ‘re ally a question of e videntiary

rele vance .’” I d. (quoting Moore, 6 S.W.3d at 239). As such, the tria l court must determine f rom the ev i d ence pr e se nte d th a t: (1) the multiple offe nses co n s titute parts of a c ommon scheme or

plan, (2) evidenc e of eac h offe nse is rele vant to some materia l issue in the t rial of all the ot her offense s, and (3) the probative value of the evidenc e of othe r offe nses is not outweig hed by the pre judicial eff

ect that admission of the evidenc e would have on the def endant.
I d. (citations omitted).
We note t hat t his court has previously conclude d, “A c ommon scheme or pla n for se verance purposes is the same as a c ommon scheme or plan for e videntiary p u rp o s es . ” State v. Hoyt, 928 S.W .2d 935, 943 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overruled on othe r g rounds by Spicer, 12 S.W.3d at 447. Ty pic a lly , c omm on sc he me or plan e vid e nc e te nd s to fa ll i nto on e of thr e e c a te g orie s: (1 ) o ff e ns e s th a t r e ve a l a

dis tin c tiv e de sig n o r a

reso si mi lar a s to co n s t i t ute “sig nature ” crimes; (2) off enses that a

re pa rt of a la rg er, continuing pla n or conspira cy ; and (3) offe nses that ar e all part of the same c riminal transac tion. Moore, 6 S.W.3d at 240.
I n t h e i n s t an tca s e, t h e t ri al co u rt d en i ed t h e a p p el l an t ’s m o t i o n t o s ev er , ru l i n g: [I ]f in fact the state c an prove th e day befor e in the kidnapping scheme that he indicate d an intent to kill the person t hat he kill ed the next day then that ce rtainly

would be re levant and pa rt of a c ommon-5- scheme or plan, a nd those offe nses would be r eleva nt as to his intent in t h e m urder

trial. The only

question then would be the pr obative value of other off

enses not outweig hed by

the pre judicial eff

ects the admission would have on the [appellant].

. . . . The motion to sever is overruled at this t ime. . . . You know, I t h i n kwhen pe ople involve themselves in this kind of conduct a nd the issues are rele vant i n the homicide trial I ’m not inclined to g rant a seve ranc e. The y

put themselves in that position.
The trial c ourt noted that it did not believe that the a ppellant would be unf

airly prejudice d or denie d a fair trial by

proce eding with a joint trial.
I n analy zing the trial c ourt’s denial of t he mot ion to sever, we note that the off enses a lleg ed, ag g ravated kidn ap p i n g an d murder, did not re late to “sig nature ” crimes. Additionally , we do not believe that the offe nses ar e part of the same c riminal transac tion. Accor dingly , denial of the appellant’ s motion to sever was prope r only

if the off enses we re pa

rt of a la rg er, c ontinuing plan or conspirac y . Our supre me court ha s elucidate d that “a larg er, continuing plan or conspira cy ‘involves not the similarity

betwee n the c ri m es, but [rather] the common g oal or purpose at which they are direc ted.’” Denton, 149 S.W.3d at 15 (quoting Hoyt, 928 S.W .2d at 943). I n other words, “[a] larg er plan o r c onsp ir acy . . . c on te mpl a te s c ri me s c omm itt e d infu rthe ranc e of a plan th a t ha s a

re a dil y distinguishable g oal, not simplya string of similar offe nses.” I d. Moreo v er, the plan requir es “evide nce that the defe ndant had a worki n g p l an operating towards the f uture such a s to make probable the crime with which the def endant is cha

rg ed.” I d.
I n the instant c ase, the State’s theory at trial wa s that on the nig ht of Octobe r 20, 2003, the appellant de tained the oc cupants of P ro ct o r’ s home, including Mrs. Hy att and her children, in a n attempt to lure the victim, Brian Hy att, to the residenc e so he co uld kill hi m. The appe llant repe atedly

threatened the vic tim’s life while ref using to a llow any one to leave the re sidence

. Moreove r, the a

ppellant vanda liz ed the victim’s vehicles so Mrs. Hy att could not leave

. Then, the appellant lef

t a messag e for

Brian to pick up Mrs. Hy att at Robert’s h o m e. W hen his plan for the night of October 20 was foiled, the appellant woke early the next m o rn i n g an d ag ain soug ht out Brian wit h the s tated int ention of ki lling him

. On t he morning of October 21, 2003, the appe llant was succ essful in ca

rrying out his p l an. W e conc lude that the for eg oing f acts c onstitut e a c lear example of a lar g er, c ontinuing plan.
Ne xt, w e mus t de te rm ine wh e the r the e vid e nc e of the a g g ra vate d kidn app ing a ndva nd a lis m offe nses would be a dmis s i b l e in the murde r trial and e vidence of the murde r off ense w ould have b e e n a d m i s s i b l e i n t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n ap p i n g a n d v a n d a l i s mtr i a l i f t h e c a s e s h a d b e e n s e v e r e d

. InT e n n . R . E v id . 4 0 4 p ro v id e s: 2
(b ) O the r C rim e s, W ro n g s, o r A c ts. - E v id e n c e o f o the r c rim e s, w ro n g s, o r a c ts is
n o t ad m issib le to p ro v e the c h a ra c te r o f a p e rs o n in o rd e r to sh o w a c tio n in conformi t y wi t h t he cha r act er t r ai t

. I t may , howev er , be admi s s i bl e f or ot her pur po s es . T he condi t i o ns whi ch mus t be s at i s f i ed bef ore al l owi ng s uch ev i dence a re : (1 ) T h e c o u rt u p o n re q u e st m u st ho ld a he a rin g o u tsid e the ju ry’s p re se n c e ; ( 2) T he cour t mus t det er mi ne t hat a mat er i al issu e e xi s t s ot her t han conduc t co nfo rming wi t h a charact er t rai t and m ust upo n request sta te o n t he reco rd t he
m a te ria l i ssu e , t h e ru ling , an d the re a so n s fo r a d m itt ing the e v id e n c e ; (3) T he co urt m ust f

i nd pro o f

of t he o t her cri m e, wrong, o r act t o b e c lear and con v i n ci n g ; a n d (4) T he co urt m ust excl ud e t he evi d ence i f i t s p rob at i ve val ue i s o ut weighed b y t he d a n g e r o f un fair p reju d ic e .

-6- order to make this determination, we must re view the standard for admitting prior acts testimony as is outli ned in Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 404(b). 2 Rule 404(b) a llows evidence that a defenda nt committed a harmful act other than t he one f or wh ic h h e is o n tria l. S e e Ne il P. Coh e n, e t a l., Te nn e sse e L a w of Ev ide nc e , § 4. 04 [7][a], a t 4- 85 (5 th ed. 2005). In connec tion with thi s issue, we note that establishing the identity of an of fende r is the most common basis for prese nting evidenc e of a distinctive de sign. See Shirley , 6 S.W .3d at 248. Howeve r, identity

is not the only basis for presenting evidenc e of a distinctive design. O ther c rimes evidenc e is also admissible to s h ow, motive, intent, guilty knowledg e, abse nce of

mistake or acc ident, or a c ommon scheme or plan for commission of t wo or more crimes so related t o eac h other that proof of

one tends to establish the other . See Hoyt, 928 S.W .2d at 944. We ag ree with the trial court that the e v i d en ce o f both offense s was re levant to show the appellant’ s motive and intent for c ommitt ing t h e off enses. As w e pre viouslynoted, the off enses ag ainst the occupants of P roctor’ s home and the acts of vandalism were committed by the appe llant as part of his plan to lure the victim, Brian Hy att, to his death. Ther efor e, the e vidence ag ainst the appellant on the a g g ravated kidnapping and vanda lis m ch ar ges would be admissible in the appellant’ s murder trial and vice versa . See S tate v. Chivous S irrell Robinson, No. E2001-00865- CCA -R 3- CD , 2 00 3 WL

64 91 15 , at *4 (T e nn . Cr im . App . at K no xvill e , F e b. 28 , 2 00 3) ; se e a lso Denton, 149 S.W.3d at 15.
B . Ru le of Comple te ne ssW e n ot e t hat t he t r ans cr i pt of t he mo t i on for n ew t r i al he ar i ng s eemed t o i ndi cat e t hat t he appel l ant at t emp t ed 3
to m a k e S h e lto n ’s f

irst re c o rd e d s ta te m e n t a n d h e r w ritten s ta te m e n t e x h ib its to th e m o tio n fo r n e w trial. U p o n inq u iry, this c o u rt lea rn e d tha t t h e fi rs t re c o rd e d sta te m e n t an d the w r it te n s ta te m e n t w e re ne v e r su b m itt e d a s e x h ib its at tria l. W e ca u t i on t h at i t i s t h e appe l l an t ’ s bu r den t o en s u r e t h at t h e r ec or d on a ppea l i s c ompl et e; t h er ef or e, c ou n s el s h ou l d n ot re ly o n this c o u rt’s lar g e sse to e n su re tha t t h e re c o rd is sufficie n t f o r a re v ie w o f t h e a p p e llan t’s co m p la ints.
T h e appe l l an t doe s n ot c hal l eng e t h e s u f f i ci en cy of

t h e ev i den ce s u ppor t i n g h i s f al s e i mpr i s on men t or 4

va nd ali sm co nv i cti o ns. -7- As his ne xt i ssu e , the app e lla nt arg ue s that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inde nying his mot ionto a dmi t all portions o f Na t alie Shelton’s statements to police. As pa rt of his defe nse proof

, the appe llant c a lle d M rs . Sh e lto n a s a

wi tne ss. Du ri ng dir e c t e xami natio n, theapp e llant es ta bli sh e d th a t Mr s. Shelton ga ve a r ecor ded intervie w t o p olice. The proof indicated that at some point during the rec ording proce ss, police stopped the intervie w and a sked S h el t o n t o write in her own words he r rec ollection of eve nts. After the completion of the written statement, police agai n rec orded a statement g iven by

Mrs. Shelton.
On cr oss-examination, the St ate a sked S helton about ce rtain comments she ma de to police during the sec ond rec orded statem en t

. T h e S tate submitted a transc ript of this last recor ded state me nt a s a n e xhibi t a t tr ia l. Th e tr ia l c ou rt dis mis se d the jury fo r the day , a ndbe g a n tria l a g a in the following morning . The de fense called two mor e witnesses the n rested, and the trial court instructed the jury . After

the instructions, the appellant moved the court to submi t as exhibi ts to the jury She l t o n ’s first rec orded state ment and her written statement, a

rg uing that the rule of c omp le te ne ss re qu ir e d tha t the jury se e no t on ly She lto n’ s f

ina l r e c or de d s ta te me nt b ut a lso the fi rs t two statements. The tria l c ourt denied the motion, finding that Shelton was questioned only about her se cond re corde d s t at em en t

. On appeal, the appe llant contends that base d upon the rule of c o m p l e t e n e s s , a l l o f

S h e l t o n ’ s s t a t e m e n t s s h o u l d h a v e b e e n s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y. We note that the re cord on a ppeal doe s not contain S helton’s first recorde d statement or he r written statement. We ar e unable to determine the merits of the appellant’ s claim without reviewing the first and second st atements. There fore , the failure t o include the pertinent portions of the r ecor d on appea l results in waiver of the issue. See Te nn. R. App. P. 24(b). 3 C. Sufficiency

of the Evidenc e As hi s fi na l is su e , th e app e llant c on te sts thesu ff ic ie nc y of thee vid e nc e su pp ortin g his conviction for f

irst d egr ee p re meditated murde r. On appe al, a jury conviction re moves the 4 presumption of the a

ppellant’s innoce nce an d replaces it with one of g uilt, so t hat the appe llant car ries the bur den of demonstrating to this court why the evidenc e will not support the jury ’s finding s. See S tate v. Tug g le, 639 S .W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). The appellant must establish that no re a so na

ble tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the of fe ns e be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. S e e Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 , 9 9 S. Ct. 27 81 , 2 78 9 ( 19 79 ); Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 13(e)

.-8-

Acc ording ly , on appea l, the State is entitled to the stronge st leg itimate view of the e vidence and all re asonable infere nces which may be drawn t here from. See S tate v. Willi ams, 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983) . I n other wor ds, questions conce rning the cr edibility o f wi t n es s es and the weig ht and value to be g iven the evide nce, a s well as all fa ctual issues raised by the evidenc e, ar e resolved by

the trier of

fac t, and not the appe llate courts. See State v. Pruett, 788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990)

. I n o rd e r to ob ta in the app e lla nt’ s c on vic tio n fo r fi rs t de g re e pr e me dit a te d mur de r, the State was re quired to prove, bey ond a rea sonable doubt, that the appellant committed the “pre meditated and intentional killing of [the victim] .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( a)( 1) (2003) . Premeditation

“ is an a c t do ne a ft e r the e xer c ise of re fl e c tio n a nd jud g me nt” a nd “ me a ns that th e int e nt t o kill mus t have be en formed prior to the a ct itself. [However ,] [ i] t is not necessarythat the purpose to kill preexis t in the mind of the acc used for any definite pe riod of time.” I d. at (d). A lth o u gh t h ere is no concr ete test for

determining the e x istence of preme ditation, Tennessee cou rt s h av e relied upon certain circ umstances to infe r pre meditation. See State v. Pike, 978 S.W .2d 904, 914 (Tenn. 1998)

. Specifica lly , the following fac tors have be en used to support a jury ’s i nfer ence of pre meditation: (1) the appe llant’s prior re lationship to t he victim which mig ht sugg est a mot ive for the ki lling; (2) the appellant’ s decla

rations of intent to kill; (3) the appellant’ s planning activities befor e the killing; ( 4) the ma nn e r o f the kil lin g , inc lud ing the app e llant’ s usin g a de a dly we apo n upo n an un arm e d v ic tim , killing t h e v i ct i m while the victim is retrea ting or attempting e scape , or killing the vic tim in a pa rt ic ula rl y c ru e l ma nn e r; (5 ) the app e llant’ s de me a no r be fo rea nda ft e r the kil lin g , in c lud ing a c a lm demea nor immediately

afte r the killing. See Pike, 97 8 S

. W .2d at 914-915; State v. B land, 958 S.W .2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997)

. I n th e ins ta nt c a se , n ume ro us wi tne sse s te sti fi e d tha t the app e llant re pe a te dly thr e a te ne d to kill Brian be cause he believed Brian had been having an affair with the appellant’ s wife. The night prior to the mur de r, the app e lla nt atte mpt e d to lur e B ri a n to Proc tor ’s re sid e nc e by va nd a lizin g Mr s. Hy att’s ca

r then c alling to say

that Mrs. Hy att wanted B rian to pick her up at the Proctor’ s home. Un su c c e ssfu l in that a tte mpt , th e app e llant the n h un te d B ri a n d ow n th e ne xt mornin g , s til l threatening to kill hi m. The appe llant confronte d Brian about the a ffa ir. At trial, Mrs. Hy att testified that Brian went into the conf rontation un ar m ed. The appellant struc k Brian in the hea d with a baseba ll bat before stabbing him with a knife. B rian died a s a result of the injuries inflicted by the app e lla nt. Th e pr oo f i nd ic a te s that the app e llant we nt to B ri a n’ s ho us e arm e d inor de r t o kill him

. We conclude that the proof a mply supports the conviction for first deg ree preme ditated murder

. III. Conclusi on Finding no reve rsible er

ror, we aff

irm the judg ments of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE