Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2078 | February 21, 2019 Page 1 of 8

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Katherine A. Harmon

Jared S. Sunday

Mallor Grodner LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Christine Douglas

Harden Jackson LLC

Carmel, Indiana

I N THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ryan A. Benefiel,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Junko M. Stalker,

Appellee-Respondent

February 21, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JP-2078

Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Paul A. Felix, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

29C01-1703-JP-375 

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Ryan A. Benefiel (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order that he pay $20,000

of the nearly $40,000 in attorney’s fees incurred by Junko Makiah Stalker 

(“Mother”) in this paternity action. We affirm. 
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Facts and Procedural History

[2] In August 2016, E.B. was born out of wedlock to Mother and Father. Mother 

and Father lived together from E.B.’s birth until the end of February 2017, 

when Mother and E.B. moved out. Thereafter, Father filed a petition to 

establish paternity, custody, parenting time, and child support and requested an 

expedited hearing. After several continuances and other motions, the trial court 

ordered the parties to participate in mediation, which was unsuccessful. A 

preliminary hearing was held in October 2017, during which the trial court 

heard “evidence and argument on issues of parenting time only.” Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II p. 40. Following the hearing, the trial court ordered as follows:

3. The Court finds that Father’s request for additional parenting 

time above what is permitted in the Indiana Parenting Time 

Guidelines is unreasonable considering that for the first month 

after the parties separated, Father had no desire to provide care 

for or have any custody or control of [E.B.], and considering the 

multiple parenting time opportunities Father missed. 

Id. at 41. Accordingly, the court awarded Father parenting time consistent with 

the guidelines, which, based on E.B.’s age, was one overnight per week. Id. 

[3] Following the trial court’s order, the parties had many disputes about parenting 

time. In February 2018, Mother requested a parenting coordinator “to help 

improve the parties’ ability to communicate and to do so more effectively.” Id.

at 48. Thereafter, the trial court appointed a parenting coordinator. 
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[4] A final hearing was held in June 2018. Although the parties had stipulated to 

some of the issues, there were still many issues to be addressed at the hearing, 

including whether Father should receive additional parenting time, where the 

parties should meet to exchange E.B. for parenting time, the amount of Father’s 

child-support arrearage, and how much Father should pay toward Mother’s 

attorney’s fees. Ex. A. The parenting coordinator testified about the difficulties 

she had encountered with Father. She described an incident during one of the 

parenting-time exchanges where Father called Mother a racial epithet in the 

presence of E.B. The parenting coordinator also testified about a joint phone 

call she had with the parties. Based on Father’s demeanor during that call, she 

believed he needed anger-management counseling. Finally, the parenting 

coordinator testified that none of the issues Father raised with her had any 

merit. Tr. p. 14. 

[5] Evidence was also presented about Father’s income. Father made $31,746.13 

in 2017. However, he took a new job in January 2018, which has an annual 

salary of $47,923.20. Father acknowledged that this was “quite an increase in 

pay.” Id. at 45. In addition to his increased salary, Father received a company 

car and is eligible for bonuses. In contrast, Mother’s annual salary as a waitress 

is approximately $15,000. 

[6] Finally, Mother’s attorney, a certified family-law specialist, testified about her 

work in this case. She submitted her thirty-page attorney-fee statement, which 

reflects fees from March 2017 to June 2018 of $35,936 and expenses of $114.49. 

Ex. G. She testified that this case was “the most expensive case I have ever 
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done in 20 years.” Tr. p. 77. Mother’s attorney explained that the facts were 

not complicated and that it was the type of case that should have been resolved 

through the attorneys or mediation. However, neither worked in this case. 

Mother’s attorney explained that what “has made this case complicated is the 

overwhelming amount of requests for attorneys to get involved, specifically me, 

to work out issues with Father.” Id. She then highlighted some of Father’s 

behaviors that caused her to spend so much time on the case: (1) Father 

requested an expedited hearing and sought a preliminary injunction; (2) Father 

made allegations about Mother that involved the police; (2) Father alleged that 

Mother abused drugs; (3) Father did not cooperate in discovery; (4) Father 

alleged that Mother was physically and emotionally harming E.B., which got 

CPS involved; and (5) Mother twice sought a protective order. Id. at 77-83. In 

short, Mother’s attorney believed that her fees would have been “a lot less if 

there was some responsive cooperation from the other side.” Id. at 83. In 

contrast to Mother’s attorney’s fees of nearly $40,000, Father’s attorney’s fees 

for the same period were $11,960. Ex. 2. 

[7] At the end of the hearing, the trial court ordered, among other things, Father to 

have parenting time pursuant to the guidelines (but not any additional time), 

that the parties shall meet at a restaurant in Castleton to exchange E.B., that 

Father shall pay an extra $15 per week toward his child-support arrearage, and 

that Father must pay $20,000 of Mother’s attorney’s fees. As for attorney’s 

fees, the court explained:
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[It] is [Father’s] behavior that has caused [Mother] to incur a 

great deal of additional attorney fees than what would normally 

be appropriate. [Father] does earn a substantial amount more 

income than [Mother] does, nearly three times the amount of 

income as [Mother]. And will therefore find it appropriate based 

upon those things to require him to pay [$20,000] of her attorney 

fees.

Tr. p. 97; id. at 90 (trial court to Father’s attorney: “[Mother’s attorney] has 

been asking for formal discovery for a long period of time and has been getting 

back essentially nothing from your client, and your client is going to have to 

pay for the obstreperous way that he has behaved towards the resolution of the 

discovery matters in this case.”); Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 18 (written order). 

[8] Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Father contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $20,000 of 

Mother’s attorney’s fees. We review a decision to award attorney’s fees and the 

amount of any award for an abuse of discretion. Allen v. Proksch, 832 N.E.2d 

1080, 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 

[10] Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-14-18-2(a)(2), the trial court in 

a paternity action may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney’s

fees incurred by the other party. See also Ind. Code § 31-16-11-1 (providing that 

a trial court may periodically order a party to a child-support proceeding to pay 

a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees); Ind. Code § 31-17-7-1 (same for 
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proceedings for custody/custody modification and parenting time). In making 

such an award, the court must consider the parties’ resources, their economic 

conditions, their respective earning abilities, and other factors that bear on the 

reasonableness of the award. In re Paternity of S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d 879, 890 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2017); G.G.B.W. v. S.W., 80 N.E.3d 264, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), 

trans. denied. The court may also consider any misconduct by one party that 

causes the other party to directly incur fees. S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d at 890; 

G.G.B.W., 80 N.E.3d at 272. Moreover, when one party is in a superior 

position to pay fees over the other party, an award of attorney’s fees is proper. 

G.G.B.W., 80 N.E.3d at 272. 

[11] Here, the trial court ordered Father to pay $20,000 of Mother’s attorney’s fees

for two reasons: (1) Father earns a “substantial” amount more than Mother and 

(2) Father’s behavior caused Mother “to incur a great deal of additional 

attorney fees than what would normally be appropriate.” Father challenges 

each reason. First, Father argues that the trial court erred “by failing to receive 

or consider evidence of the parties’ respective economic conditions.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 11. But the trial court did. Evidence was presented that 

Father earns $47,923.20 per year in his new job, has a company car, and has the 

potential to earn bonuses. At the hearing, Father even acknowledged that his 

$17,000 pay raise was “quite an increase.” Mother, in comparison, earns

approximately $15,000 per year as a waitress. As the trial court found, Father 

earns three times more than Mother. In addition, the parties filed financial 

declarations, which set forth their incomes and expenses. See Appellant’s App. 
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Vol. II p. 52 (Mother’s financial declaration dated May 2018); Appellee’s App. 

Vol. II p. 3 (Father’s financial declaration dated October 2017, which was not 

updated to reflect his new salary). Although Father speculates about the 

existence of other assets and liabilities the parties may have, he does not cite 

any evidence that such assets or liabilities actually exist. The parties’ economic 

conditions support an award of attorney’s fees in this case. Cf. Montgomery v. 

Montgomery, 59 N.E.3d 343, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (in holding that the trial 

court abused its discretion in ordering Father to pay a portion of Mother’s 

attorney’s fees, we found that “[t]he only evidence presented [regarding the 

parties’ respective economic conditions] was that Mother earns $15 per hour at 

her job, while Father earns $17 per hour”), trans. denied. 

[12] Father next argues that the trial court erred “by awarding fees for Father’s 

misconduct without relating those fees to misconduct.” Appellant’s Br. p. 15. 

Father asserts that the trial court should have specifically identified what fees 

Mother incurred because of his misconduct. Mother’s attorney submitted a 

thirty-page attorney-fee statement, which sets forth her fees in detail. In 

addition, Mother’s attorney testified that this case was the most expensive case 

she had done in twenty years. She added that this case did not need to be so 

expensive and only was because of Father’s actions. She then testified in detail 

about Father’s actions that caused her to spend so much time on this case. See

Tr. pp. 77-83. Although Mother’s attorney did not put a specific dollar amount

on the attorney’s fees that were attributable to Father’s misconduct, the trial 

court, which was very familiar with this case, did not abuse its discretion in 
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determining that Father’s behavior caused Mother to incur “a great deal” of 

additional attorney’s fees. This is supported by Mother’s attorney’s fees of 

nearly $40,000 when compared to Father’s attorney’s fees of $11,960.

1

 We 

therefore affirm the trial court. 

[13] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Crone, J., concur.

 

1

Father notes that approximately $2200 of Mother’s attorney’s fees were attributable to her work in a smallclaims matter involving Mother and Father’s parents—but not Father. Mother’s attorney testified about this 

part of her fees during the hearing. Father’s attorney cross-examined her but did not object or ask any 

questions about the small-claims matter. In addition, the trial court ordered Father to pay only half of 

Mother’s attorney’s fees, which could have excluded the $2200.