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- A02038

- 23

2023 PA SUPER 49

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AJANAY WATSON

Appellant :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1209 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at CP

- 02

- CR

- 0012596

- 2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J. *

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: MARCH 24, 2023

Ajanay Watson (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after the trial court found her guilty of robbery of a motor vehicle,

criminal attempt (to commit robbery of a motor vehicle), firearms not to be

carried without a license, theft by unlawful taking, simple assault, and fleeing

or attempting to elude a police officer. 1 Appellant c laims the trial court erred

in discredit ing her defense that she was legally insane when she committ ed

the crimes. We affirm.

Appellant stipulated to the facts at her non

- jury trial , which t he trial

court summarized as follows :

[O]n October 8, 2019, Dana Wallace [( “ Wallace ” or “ Ms.

Wallace ” )] was sitting in her vehicle in the parking lot of a Sunoco

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3702(a), 901(a), 6106(a)(1), 3921(a), 2701(a)(3) ; 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a).J

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gas station when [Appellant , a pedestrian, ] opened [Wallace’s] passenger door and got into the passenger seat. [Appellant] said

“ you don ’ t remember me, do you? ” [Appellant exited the car ]

when Wa llace told [Appellant] to get out of her vehicle. Later [,] Kelly Remmy [(Deputy Remmy)] , an off

- duty Allegheny County Deputy Sheriff, was sitting in her vehicle at a traffic light at the intersection of Borland Street and East Liberty Boulevard in the

Eas t Liberty section of the City of Pittsburgh. There was one

vehicle in front of [ Deputy Remmy] at the red light [;] that driver

was also an off

- duty police officer, City of Pittsburgh [Police]

Officer Christine Mitchell.

... [According to Deputy Remmy, Appellant approached her car on foot

, while ] grabbing at her waist in a manner that someone would when trying to conceal a firearm. Deputy Remmy attempted to pull away from [Appellant] by pulling forward into the intersection, but [Appellant] persisted. Deputy [Remmy pointed] her firearm [ at Appellant] from inside the

vehicle. [Appellant] then fled on foot.

While [police] officers were [at] the scene

... [of the ] attempted carjacking of [Deputy] Remmy ’ s vehicle [,] they received a call about a successful carjacking on Beatty Street

. [ 2 ] James McLaughlin had parked his 2016 Subaru Forester behind [the nearby] Obama Academy and was waiting to pick up his daughter when [Appellant] jumped into his passenger seat, point ed a black handgun [at] his face and told him to “ get the fuck

out. ” He left the vehicle and ran inside the Obama Academy to

call 911. With [in] 10 minutes [,] Officers located [Appellant] driving McLaughlin ’ s 2016 Forester in the Homewood section of

the [ C ity of Pittsburgh, ] and attempted a traffic stop. [Appellant]

fled [in the vehicle] and led police on a chase into the Penn Hills neighborhood [,] where she crashed the vehicle. Police recovered

a Smith & Wesson M&P 40 caliber pistol on the front driver ’ s side

floor of the vehicle. [Appellant] was taken into custody and waived her right to remain silent. [Appellant] gave a recorded [video] statement to police regarding the incidents that was

admitted into evidence.

In [Appellant’s police] statem ent [,] she told detectives that the gun never had a magazine in it. [Appellant claimed she had ]

obtained [the gun] by breaking into a car and [ stated ] that she

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

2 Beatty Street runs parallel beside Borland Street

. See Affidavit of Probable Cause, 10/8/19, at 2.J

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carries it for protection. [Appellant claimed she could not]

remember [exactly] where she got [the gun] or how long ago, but [ ] it had not been a very long time. When [police] asked [Appellant] about the incident with Ms. Wallace (the [first] incident) [, Appellant ] stated that she did not know [Ms. Wallace

, and that Appellant’s] intention was to take [Ms. Wallace’s] car but [Ms. Wallace did not] cooperate. After that incident [, Appellant told police, she] went into the street trying to stop cars. [Appellant] ran up the street to Deputy Re [m] my ’ s car. [Appellant ] smiled and eve n laughed [during the police interview]

when [Appellant] stated that she did not realize that [Deputy Remmy] was a police officer. [Appellant told the police that she]

then ran down the street to the Obama Academy middle school [,] where she pointed the gu n at James McLaughlin and stole his

vehicle. [Appellant] stated that she decided she was going to steal a car that day because she couldn ’ t get a job. She stated that she

didn ’ t want to get caught, didn ’ t plan on getting caught, and was tired of being on the street. [Appellant] was cooperative and polite during the interview.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/22, a t 2

- 3 (footnote added) ; see also N.T., 8/4/21

,

at 17

- 18 (Appellant stipulating to facts)

.

T he Commonwealt h charged Appellant with the a fore mentioned crimes

,

as well as receiving stolen property 3 (RSP) and driving without a license. 4

Prior to trial, Appellant’s counsel filed a Notice of Mental Infirmity Defense

.

Appellant stated h er intention to present at trial expert testimony from Sara

West, M.D. (Dr. West) , a b oard

- certified psychiatrist

. A ccording to Appellant

,

Dr. Wes t specifically maintains that as a result of [Appellant’s] schizophrenia, at the time of the commission of the offense s , she did not know the nature and quality of the acts she was doing or, if she did know the quality of the acts, that she did not know what she was doing was wrong.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925 (a).

4 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 (a)

.J

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- 4

-

Notice, 3/1/21, at 1

- 2 ; see also Stipulation to Supplement Certified Record,

7/19/22, Ex. A (Dr. West’s report)

.

The Commonwealth filed a Reciprocal Notice Regarding Mental Health

Defense , notifying A ppellant of its intent to present at trial expert testimony

from psychiatrist Bruce Wr ight, M.D. (Dr. Wright). Reciprocal Notice, 6 /30/21

,

at ¶¶ 5

- 7

. “ Dr. Wright evaluated [Appellant] on May 15, 2021

, ” and thereafter

issued a report. I

d. at ¶ 8; see also Stipulation to Supplement Certified

Record, 7/19/22, Ex. B (Dr. Wright’s report).

Th e trial court convened a stipulated non

- jury trial on August 4 , 2021.

The defense ’s case consisted solely of Dr. West’s expert testimony in support

of Appellant’s legal i nsanity defense

. The Commonwealth presented Dr.

Wright ’s expert t estimony

. Both D r. West and Dr. Wright testifi ed to Appellant

being diagnos ed with schizophreni a

. N.T., 8/4/21, at 21

- 22

, 36, 71.

However, t he experts disagreed as to whether Appellant understood the

wrongfulness of her crim inal acts

. See i d. at 37.

Prior to issuing its verdict, t he trial court stated:

[T]here’s no doubt [Appellant] is mentally ill, and as the parties acknowledge [, Appellant] ... understood the nature and quality of

her actions. The only question is whether or not [Appellant] understood the wrongfulness of her actions.

* * *

It’s always difficult when people are suffering from mental illness, because it’s kind of ... an explanation or a reason for

... why

we’re here .... It

... puts you in a position where you’re ... strugglingJ

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to understand why people act in a manner that you just can’t explain.

Particularly in [Appellant’s] case, when [she] was making

her [recorded] statement to the police, they were repeating over and over how cooperative and respectful [Appellant] was with

them

....

* * *

But the one thing that I kept noting to myself was [Appellant] was at times tearful. At one point[, the police] handed her tissues or paper towels[.] ... And I noted ... [the police] kept trying to specifically ask her ... why this occurred. And I noted [App ellant] had said that she figured why not? I can’t find a job, no one will hire me, and I needed to get to Penn Hills.

And it struck me, at least in [Appellant’s police] interview, that when I was processing the things that both ... Dr. West and Dr. Wright [testified to], ... [Appellant] seemed to understand the wrongfulness of her actions when she was being interviewed by the police that day.

So I cannot say that the defense is able to establish at least that [Appellant] did not understand the wrongfulness of her actions on that day, and it seemed she did.

So I agree with [the Commonwealth ] that although [Appellant] is clearly severely mentally ill, [she] was not legally insane on th [e] date [of the crimes ]

.

N.T., 8/10/21, at 13

- 16 (emphasis added)

.

The trial court found Appellant guilty of the a forementioned crimes, a nd

acquitted h er of RSP. 5 Appellant waived her right to a pre

- sentence

investigation report, and t he court immediately sentenced her to an aggregate

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

5 The Commonwealth withdrew the charge of driving without a license

. N.T., 8/10/21, at 23

- 24 (Commonwealth stating its desire to withdraw the charge

to avoid the imposition of a $200 fine on Appellant, who was indigent )

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-

seven years of probation

. The court imposed as a condition of probation that

Appellant “ comply with [her] mental

- health treatment and, if deemed

appropriate, have an updated mental

- health evaluation and comply with any

recommendations. ” N.T., 8/10/21, at 23.

O n August 26, 2021, Appellant filed a counseled “Emergency Petition

Requesting Permission to File Post

- Sentence Motion Nunc Pro Tunc

. ” The trial

court granted relief

, and Appellant thereafter filed a motion raising a single

claim challeng ing the weight of the evidence. T he trial court denied

Appellant’s motion and th is timely appeal followed. 6 Appellant and the trial

court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents a single issue for review: “Whether the trial court

erred by finding [A]ppellant failed to prove that she was legally insane at the

time of her illegal acts?” Appellant’s Brief at 3.

In reviewing this issue

,

we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as verdict winner

, giving it the benefit of all

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

6 T he filing of a post

- sentence motion nunc pro tunc may toll the appeal period

if two conditions are met :

First, within 30 days of imposition of sentence, a defendant must request the trial court to consider a post

- sentence motion nunc pro

tunc

. The request for nunc pro tunc relief is separate and distinct from the merits of the underlying post

- sentence motion. Second, the

trial court must expressly permit the filing of a post

- sentence motion

nunc pro tunc

, also within 30 days of imposition of sentence

.

Commonwealth v. Capaldi , 112 A.3d 1242, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations and emphasis omitted). Here

, both conditions have been met. Id.J

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reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence

will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes

each material element of the crime charged and the commission

t hereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Any doubt

about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact

- finder

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter
of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the

combined ci rcumstances. Additionally, the Commonwealth may
sustain its burden solely by means of circumstantial evidence.

Commonwealth v. Lake , 281 A.3d 341, 346 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations

and quotations omitted).

The defense of insanity is defined by statute:

(a) General rule.

— The mental soundness of an actor engaged

in conduct charged to constitute an offense shall only be a defense

to the charged offense when the actor proves by a preponderance

of evidence that the actor was legally insane at the time of the

commission of the offense.

(b) Definition.

— For purposes of this section, the phrase “legally insane” means that, at the time of the commission of the offense, the actor was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality

of the act he [or s he] was doing or, if the actor did know the quality of the act, that [s] he did not know that what [s] he

was doing was wrong

.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315 (emphasis added) . Our Supreme Court has defined

“ preponderance of the evidence” as “ tantamount to a more likely than not

inquiry .” Samuel

- Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc. , 34 A.3d 1, 35 (Pa.

2011) (citation omitted) ; see also Commonwealth v. Rabold , 951 A.2d

329, 341 (Pa. 2008) (“the placement of the burden with the defendant to

prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence does not offend

constitutional norms.”).J

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This Court has explained:

To plead the defense of insanity suggests that the defendant

committed the act, but was not legally culpable. An insanity

defense focuses upon a defendant ’ s capacity, at the time of the offense, to understand the nature and quality of h [er] actions or whe ther [s] he knew that h [er] actions were wrong. It has long

been accepted that criminal defendants may be presumed

sane for purposes of determining their criminal liability

. Thus, under the clear language of section 315(a), the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence is upon the

defendant. Moreover, we have long stated that the

Commonwealth can prove an accused ’ s sanity not only by psychiatric testimony but also by lay testimony which shows that

he or she knew the nature and quality of the act committed and

knew that what had been done was wrong. Furthermore, it is

within the factfinder ’ s right to disbelieve an insanity

defense and credit the testimony of the eyewitnesses

.

Commonwealth v. Yasipour , 957 A.2d 734, 738

- 39 (Pa. Super. 2008)

( emphasis added; citations and break omitted )

.

Appellant argues the trial court erred in rejecting her insanity defense

because she established by a preponderance of the evidence that her mental

health condition made her “unable to distinguish moral right from wrong at

the time of commission of her acts.” Appellant’s Brief at 27 (emphasis

omitted). 7 Appellant contends she was “under the influence of a ‘delusion or

hallucination, controlling [ her ] will,’ which was ‘so great as [ to ] entirely []

destroy [her] perception of right [and] wrong.’” Id. at 32

- 33 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Mosler , 4 Pa. 264, 266 (1846) ). Appellan t relies on the

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

7 As stated above, Appellant does not dispute that she understood the nature
and quality of her actions when she committed the crimes

. Appellan t’s Brief

at 23; N.T., 8/4/21, at 37 ; s ee also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315 (b), supra

.J

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-

expert report and testimony of Dr. West. Id. at 27

- 28, 31; see also id. at

33

- 38 (challenging Dr. Wright’s contrary testimony and expert report).

According to Appellant, “no Pennsylvania court has expressly held

whether the word ‘wrong’ co ntained in [ 18 Pa.C.S.A. § ] 315(b) refers to a

moral wrong or a legal wrong.” Id. at 24

. Appellant asserts the “statute’s

definition of ‘wrong’ must be an individual’s inability to sort what is morally

right from wrong; not legal literacy but the lack of a conscience.” Id. at 26

(emphasis omit ted ) ; see also id. at 33 (c omplain ing the “Commonwealth’s

evidence focused on [Appellant’s] ability to discern legal wrong, ‘trouble ,’ and

her ability to connect cause and effect.” (underline in original))

. Appellant

claims

, “ E vidence of [Appellant’s] account of what happened on October 8,

2019, made clear that she was barely acting with any will of her own, let alone

someone with the capacity to make moral judgments.” Id. at 27.

The Commonwealth defends the trial court’s rejection o f the insanity

defense

, claiming Appellant failed t o meet her burden of proving her mental

illness caused her to be unable to understand the wrongfulness of her acts.

See Commonwealth’s Brief at 9

- 20. The Commonwealth relies on the report

and testimony of its expert, Dr. Wright. Id. at 12

- 14. The Commonwealth

challenges Dr. West’s description of Appellant “as acting out of a primal

instinct to survive,” which the Commonwealth claims has “no basis in the

record.” Id. at 14 ; see also id. ( arguing the trial court, as fact

- finder, “wasJ

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free to accept the testimony of Dr. Wright and reject the explanations offered

by Dr. West.” ).

The Commonwealth counters, “ I nstead, the record revealed [A] ppellant

was methodical in achieving her ends by wrongful means and that she was

aware of the consequences of such wrongful actions.” Id. The

Commonwealth emphasizes that when “faced with the potential

consequences , [A]ppellant decided that she did not w ant to get in trouble for

her wrongful actions and immediately fled police. ” Id. at 16 (footnote

omitted). Finally, the Commonwealth claims “Appellant makes no argument,

and the Commonwealth submits that she cannot, that she believed she was

morally justified in her actions despite knowing they were contrary to the law

or public morality .” Id. at 16 n.2. Upon review, we agree.

Dr. West tes tified for the defense that she conducted a psychiatric

examination of Appellant shortly after her arrest. N.T., 8/4/21, at 19. Dr.

West stated Appellant has “a long history of mental illness,” “had multiple

[involuntary] hospitalizations brought about by her family members,” and

“has been treated with appropriate medications for the diagnosis of

schizophrenia.” Id. at 21, 22. Dr . West testifi ed : “I am of the opinion that

[Appellant]

, because of her mental illness, did not know the

wrongfulness of her actions on the date of

... October 8th, 2019. ” Id. at

29 (emphasis added)

. Dr. West expounded on her reasons for this conclusion:

[O]n the day of the incident,

... [Appellant] was experiencing multiple symptoms that would have been associated withJ

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schizophrenia. She describe [d] hallucinations that were

consistent with schizophrenia, she noted that she was hearing stuff, quote, unquote, and that she had command auditory hallucinations to take vehicles, noting [the hallucinations] were quite powerful, to the point where they were overwhelming.

[Appellant] also had visual hallucinations. When she was looking at a vehicle, she described it as being sparkly. That suggests that her perception of reality was altered at that time.

[Appellant] also described delusional thinking. Delusions are a primary symptom of schizophrenia. She felt that she was

inde structible or invincible, that she could do whatever she wanted that day.

* * *

[Appellant] also demonstrated disorganization, another hallmark of schizophrenia, on this date. The evidence to suggest [ disorganization ] was [ that Appellant] attempted to take multiple vehicles in a disorganized fashion. By that I mean that she did this without a plan, without the cover of darkness. There were multiple things that she could have done to [accomplish her goal]

in a much more organized plan or fashion.

[Appellant] also made some nonsensical statements to the police, such as going to her mother ’ s house for Wi

- Fi, which in
retrospect [, Appellant] said made no sense to her. And, further

, in [Appellant’s] video [

- ] recorded [statement

, ] when she was discussing the matter with the police, she acknowledged that she had been answering to the wrong name the entire time. They

called [Appellant] Nicole, [which] happens to be her middle name,

but [Appellant] did not correct them until much later in her

interactions with them.

[Appellant] also noted that her psychiatric medications, while she was compliant with them at the time of this event, were not working and that her care providers were actually attempting

to find the right medication.J

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Id. at 22

- 24 ; see also id. at 26 (Dr. West stating Appellant’s behavior in the

video taped interview was “associated with schizophrenia,” including

Appellant’s “poor eye contact, a flat affect , [and] odd emotional responses” ).

Dr. West further disagre e d with Dr. Wright’s expert opinion as to

Appellant’s awareness of the “wrongfulness” of her actions :

We disagree. So Dr. Wright puts forth the idea that simply fleeing from the police would suggest knowledge of wrongfulness. My take

on that is that one is going to flee when one feels one ’ s life is in danger. That is simply self

- preservation, not a higher level of acknowledging and

... considering wrongfulness

....

* * *

The police noted [Appellant’s] confusion [during the interview], and I really think in this complete fog of schizophrenia

and symptoms that [Appellant] was confused and did not have the opportunity to even consider wrongfulness when she was responding to so much internal stimulation.

[Appellant] did continue these attempts even despite being confronted with a weapon by an off

- duty police

... officer. [Appellant] had no rational motive for attempting any of these things. She had a ride t hat day. She didn ’ t need a ride anywhere.

... She doesn ’ t have a driver ’ s license to drive a car. And she really had no logical destination where she was headed.

[Appellant] didn ’ t make any great effort to avoid detection in

that she did this in broad d aylight, [and] she cooperated with the police upon arrest....

Id. at 30

- 31.

On cross

- examination, Dr. West opined flight by an accused “ is not

exclusively an indication that someone knows what they are doing is wrong.”

Id. at 45 ; see also i d. at 46 (Dr. West stating Appellant “did know that she

was fleeing” police before her arrest ) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Perez , 220J

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A.3d 1069, 1078 (Pa. Super. 2019) ( en banc ) (flight from the scene of a crime

can constitute circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt). Dr. West

further conced ed “a well

- orchestrated plan is not a requirement” for an

accused to be aware of the wrongfulness of her actions. N.T., 8/4/21, at 55.

T o the contrary, Dr. Wright testified for the Commonwealth

, stat ing: “ I t

is my opinion [A ppellant] did know the wrongfulness of her actions at the time

of this offense.” Id. at 74. I n response to the prosecutor asking , “What

specifically stands out to you in ... forming your opinion?” , Dr. Wright

answered:

That opinion is based on a number of factors. [Appellant] told me ... after the second attempted ... carjacking, [Appellant] didn’t want to get in troubl e, she was trying to get away from the police, and she said during her police interview that she did not want to go to jail and did not dispose of [her handgun] because she did not think she would get caught.

To me, those [statements] all indicate [Appellant] knew that what she was doing was wrong. People who don’t do something wrong don’t go to jail. People who don’t do something wrong don ’ t think they’re going to get caught. That is what that is based on.

So in contrast to Dr. West, who felt it was for [Appellant’s]

self

- preservation [that Appellant fled police ] , ... it’s my opinion based on the information I reviewed that [Appellant] was trying to flee because she knew she would get in trouble, as she told me.

Id. at 74

- 75 (emphasis added) ; see also id. at 76 (Dr. Wright stating

, “ it’s

my opinion [Appellant] was fleeing because she had done something

wrong, despite psychiatric factors .” (emphasis added)). Dr. Wright

expressed his disagreement with Dr. West “on the ultimate opinion. [Dr.J

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West] thinks this was disorganized behavior. I think it was behavior that was

a result of [Appellant’s] desire not to get caught because she knew she was

wrong.” Id. at 77.

In rejecting Appellant’s insanity defense , the trial court stated :

This court [, as fact

- finder,] carefully considered the testimony of both doctors, their expert reports, and all of the evidence submitted at trial. The Commonwealth established beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] committed the crimes with which she was charged. I was also con vinced [Appellant] had the capacity to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law.

I further found [Appellant] not only had the capacity to understand the wrongfulness of her conduct, but that she did

understand the wrongfulness of her conduct despite the fact that she suffers from schizophrenia.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/22, at 5.

The trial court’s reasoning is supported by the record and prevailing law

.

We thus discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court i n find ing Appellant

failed to prove her insanity defense b y a preponderance of the evidence

. See

id. ; see also Yasipour , 957 A.2d at 739 (fact

- finders are free to reject or

accept an insanity defense) , and Commonwealth v. Sanchez , 262 A.3d

1283, 1288

- 89 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“it is not the function of the appellate court

to substitute its judgment based on a cold record for that of the trial court.

The weight to be accorded conflicting evidence is exclusively for the

fact finder , wh ose findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they are

supported by the record.” ( emphasis added; citations omitted))

.

Further, we are persuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument that,J

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-

t o the extent [A]ppellant acknowledges that she knew her acts were illegal, such knowledge supports the logical inference of awareness that society also deems that act to be immoral. In

Commonwealth v. Banks , 521 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1987), our Supreme

Court found no error in the followin g jury instructions by the trial

court:

An individual is unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the particular act charged if, at the time of the commission of the offense, he is unable to tell that his act is one which he ought not to do. If the accused knew his act was wrong, either legally or morally,

then he cannot be excused for his crime ... [under] the test for insanity.

Morality here would reflect societal standards and

not those of a particular individual. An accused ’ s knowledge that an act is illegal will permit the inference of knowledge that the act is wrong, according to generally accepted moral standards of a community.

Banks

, supra , 521 A.2d at 22

- 23[] (Emphasis added) [(superseded by statute on other grounds, as stated in

Commonwealth v. Jermyn , 709 A.2d 849, 855 (Pa. 1998) )

. ]

Commonwealth Brief at 17 ; see also id. (citing Commonwealth v. Bruno

,

407 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa. Super. 1979) (stating the standard for insanity “ is a

legal test, not a medical or theological one.” ))

.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in rejecting

Appellant’s insanity defense and her claim to the contrary lacks merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.J

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-

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 3/24/2023