FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J ULY 07, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO N OT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 08- 1024 8 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 0 6- 61 44 9- CV-PAS LU SORO, d.b .a. Cit ig ro up , Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us CITIGROUP, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll ee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J ul y 7, 200 8) Be fo re T JO FL A T , BL A CK a nd W IL SO N , Ci rc uit

Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: Lu Sor o d/b/ a Citigroup (“ Soro”), proceeding pro se, appeals the district2

co urt’ s di sm iss al , on the gr ound s of r es j udi cataa nd c oll at er al e sto ppe l, of his co m p l ai n t , wh i ch s o u g h tt o o v er tu rn t h e T ra d emarkTr i al an dAp p ea l Bo ar d ’s (“ TT AB” ) denial of his petition for cancellation of defendant Citigroup ’ s federa l registration of the CIT IG ROU P m ark, 15 U. S. C. § 107 1(b)(1), (4). So ro a rg ue s th at

ne ith er r es j udi catanor

c oll at er al e sto ppe l a

ppl ie d to the claim s he raised in the district court. S oro contends that because differ ent issues ar ise in inf

ri nge m en t pr oc ee din gs and c an ce llatio n pr oc ee din gs, the de ci sio ns i n the prior infringem ent suit do not bar the instant cancellation lit igation . Soro not es that the or igi na l pe rm an en t i nj unc tio n di d no t r el at e to the use of the CIT IG ROU P m ark, only

the CIT ICO RP m ark. Soro also asserts that he had priority use of the CIT IG ROU P m ark, and that the m ark is generic. W e rev ie w de n ov o a gra nt of a m ot io n t o d is m is s. Spai n v . B row n & W ill iam son To bac co Co rp. , 363 F . 3d 1 183, 118 7 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) . W e re vie wde no vo a di st ric t co ur t’s re s ju di cat a o r co ll at eral est op pe l d et erm in at io n. EE OC v . Pe mc o Aer

oplex, I nc. , 383 F .3d 1280, 1285 (1 1th Cir . 2004). A party to a canc el la tio n pr oc ee din g w ho i s di ssatis fi ed w iththe de ci sio n of the TT AB m ay bring sui t in federal district court. 15 U. S. C. § 107 1(a)( 1), ( b)(1); Coach House Rest. v

. C oach & Six Rests., Inc. , 934 F . 2d 1 551, 155 6 n. 3 ( 1 1thCi r . 1991 ). “ A district court m ay not reverse f

indin gs of the TT

AB, unless th e contrary3

is e sta bli she d by

te sti m ony

w hic h inc hara ct er

a nd am ount

c ar ri es tho ro ugh co nvi ct ion . T he dis tr ic t c ourt c anr ev er se if it c onc lud es that the lawappl ie d by th e TT AB was in co rrec t. Mo reo ve r, any equ it ab le rul in gs ren de redby the TT AB m ay be rever sed if the T T

AB abused its d iscretion.” Id . at 1557 (internal quot ation m arks and footnot es om itted).

“ In order to prosecute successfully a petition for cancellation, petitioner m ust pr ove : ( 1) [ t] ha t i t ha s st an din g to pe tit ionf or c an ce llatio n be ca

use it is lik el y to be dam aged, and (2) that there ar e valid ground s for discontin uing registration.” Id . a t 15 57; see 15 U. S. C. § 106 4. Am ark m ay be cance lled on th e basis of, am ong oth er

thi ngs, ( 1) if

the pe tit ionto canc el w as f ile d w ith in f

ive y ears of

the registration, any

rea son th at the m ark should not have been registered; or (2) at an y ti m e if , int er a lia , the m ar

k ha s be co m e ge ne ri c, f

unc tio na l, or

abandon ed , or th e m arkwas o bt ai ne d o r is be in g u se d fr au du le nt ly. 15 U.S.C. § 1 06 4( 1) , (3) . T o canc el r eg istratio n un de r 15 U . S. C. § 10 52( d) , ape tit ion er m ust sho w“ (1 ) that the re gis te re d m ar

k r es em ble s pe tit ion er ’ s m ar

k, ( 2) that pe tit ion er

a cquir ed tr ad e ide nti ty r igh ts i n th e m ar

k be fo re the r eg istrant u se d th e m ar k, a nd ( 3) that the re gis te re d m ar

k is li ke ly to ca use c onf usi on whe n us ed

in co nne ct ionw iththe services of r egistrant.” Co ac h H ouse , 934 F .2d at 1559 (footno tes om itted). Res j udicata, or claim

preclusion, bars the filing of a cla im that wa s raised4

or c oul d have be enr ai se d inpr ior li tig at ionw he re ( 1) the re is a fi na l j udgm en t on the m er its ; ( 2) r en de re d by ac ourt of

c om pe te nt j ur isd ic tio n; ( 3) that i nvol ve d th e sa m e part ie s or

ind ivi dua ls i n pr ivi ty

w iththe m ; and ( 4) inv olv ed the sam e ca

use of act io n. Ragsdale v

. R ubbermaid, Inc. , 193 F . 3d 1 235, 123 8- 39 ( 1 1thCi r . 1999 ). “ [T ] he pr inc ipa l t es t f or de te rm ini ng whe the r the c au se s of a ct iona re the sam e is whether

the prim ary

right and dut y

are the sam e in each c ase. In de te rm ini ng whe the r the c au se s of a ct ion s are the sam e, ac ourt m ust c om pare the subs tanc e of

the a ct ion s, not

the ir f orm . I t i s no wsa id, in ge ne ra l, that i f a ca se arises out of the sam e nucleus of operative fac t, or is based upon the sam e fa ctual pr ed ic at e, a s af

orm er a ct ion , that the tw o c as es a re r ea lly the sam e ‘ cl ai m ’ or

‘ cause of ac tion’ f

or purposes of res j udicata.” Id . a t 12 39 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ). T he onl y a spe ct of r es j udi catain que sti on h er e is w he the r the pr ior

li tig at ionbe tw ee n S or o and C iti gr oup inv olv ed the sam e cl ai m or c au se of a ct ion . Co llate ra l e sto ppe l, or

iss ue pr ec lus ion , bars r e- lit igatio n of iss ue s a ct

ua lly lit igate d and n ec es sary

to the j udgm en t of

pr ior li tig at ionw he n th e party a ga ins t w hom the e ar lie r de ci sio n is a sse rt ed ha d af ull a nd f ai r oppo rt uni ty to lit igate in th e ear li er p ro ceed in g. Pr ec isi on A ir Part

s, I nc . v . A vc o C orp. , 736 F . 2d 1 499, 1501 ( 1 1thCi r . 198 4) . “ T he re a re se ve ra l pr er equis ite s to the appl ic at ionof5

co llate ra l e sto ppe l: (1 ) the iss ue a t st ak e m ust be ide nti ca l t o th e one inv olv ed in the pr ior li tig at ion ; ( 2) the iss ue m ust ha ve be ena ct

ua lly li tig at ed in the pr ior

sui t; (3) the deter

m ination of the issue in the prior litig ation m ust have been a critical an d ne ce ssary

part of the j udgm en t i n th at

a ct ion ; and ( 4) the party

a ga ins t w hom the e ar lie r de ci sio n is a sse rt ed m ust ha ve ha d af

ull a nd f ai r oppo rt uni ty to lit igate the issue in th e ear lier procee ding .” I. A . D urbi n, I nc . v . J ef fe rso n N at’ l B ank, 793 F . 2d 1 541, 154 9 ( 1 1thCi r . 198 6) . T he onl y a spe ct of c oll at er al e sto ppe l i n que sti on h er e is whe the r the iss ue s inthe pr ior pr oc ee din gs w er e ide nti ca l t o th e issues in the instant case. Af ter careful consideration of the briefs of the parties, and thorough review of the rec ord, w e find no reversible err or. Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt erre di n d et er m i n i n g t h at re s ju d i ca t a b arre dSo ro ’s com plaint. T he prior litigation regar ded onlywhether trade nam es used by

Soro inf ri nge d onthe CI T IC O RP m ar k and an in

j unc tio n di re ct ing S or o no t t o us e tr ad e nam es sim ilar to the CIT ICO RP m ark. T he instant case concerns w hether Ci tig ro up h ad

the r igh t t o f

ed er al ly r eg ist er the CI T IG RO U P m ar

k. T he se a re not the sam e causes of a ction and, therefore , r es j udicata is not app licable. The district court cor

rectly determ ined that collateral estoppel was ap pli ca ble to the iss ue of

pr ior ity use , but e rr ed in de te rm ini ng tha t this barr ed the6

entirety of Soro’ s com

plaint. T he issue of priority use wa s collaterally

estopped as a re sul t of the 200 3 c ont em

pt o rd er in the pr ior

li tig at ionbe tw ee n S or o and Ci tig ro up. H ow ev er, in the ins tant c as e So ro a sse rt ed that r eg istratio n of

the CIT IG ROU P m ark should be cance lled because the term wa s generic, an ind ep en de nt b as is f

or c an ce llatio n th at

ha d no t be en

pr ev iou sly

li tig at ed by the se tw o part ie s. W e m ay a f fi rm on any gr ound sup porte d by

the r ec or d. B ir

co ll v . M iam i-D ade Co unt

y , 48 0 F .3d10 72 , 10 88 n.2 1 (1 1t h C ir . 20 07 ). Here, t he TT AB co rr ec tly de te rm ine d th at

S or o di d no t have standi ng t o f ile the or igi na l pe tit ion fo r canc el la tio n, a nd the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al of S or o’ s c om

pla int m ay be af firm ed on this ground. T o prevail on a petition for cancellation, a petitioner m ust sho wthat “ it ha s st an din g to pe tit ionf or c an ce llatio n be ca

use it is lik el y to be dam aged.” Co ac h H

ouse , 934 F . 2d a t 15 58; see 15 U. S. C. § 106 4. Apetition er ha s to sho wthat he ha s ar ea l c om m er ci al int er es t i n th e dis put ed m ar k, a nd a re as ona ble ba sis f

or the be lie f that he w oul d be da m ag ed by the r eg istratio n of

the m ark . Chem. New Y

ork Corp. v

. C onmar Form Sys, Inc. , 1 U . S. P . Q . 2d 1 139, 1 142 (T T A B 1 986) . H er e, S or o is the sub j ec t of ape rm an en t i nj unc tio n th at pr ohi bit s him f ro m usi ng the w or d “ Ci tig ro up” in pr ovi din g f inanc ia l se rv ic es . B ec au se of th is pro hi bi ti on , Sor o l ack eda le gi ti m at e co m m erci al in te res t i n t he CITIGROUPSor o a dd iti on a lly argue s th e a

pp lic a bil ity to t he TTA B o f the 1 0- da

y pe ri od ide nti fi e d in 1 F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ). In li g ht o f S or o’ s la c k o f s tand ing , a ny e rr or in t his re g a rd wa s h arm le ss. 7 ma rk . A c c o r d i n g l y

, w e a ff i rm. 1 AFFIRMED.