NO. 07-06-00279-CV 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL A 

MAY 20, 2010 

IN THE INTEREST OF A. N. B., A CHILD 

 FROM THE 349TH DISTRICT COURT OF ANDERSON COUNTY; 

NO. 349-5615; HONORABLE PAM FLETCHER, JUDGE 

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Appellant, Sheila K. Barnes, attempts to appeal an order denying her pro se

“Notice of Appeal to Motion to Extend Time to File Motion for Rehearing.” Finding that 

no appealable order has been entered in the cause before this Court, we dismiss for 

want of jurisdiction. 

The clerk’s record in this cause reflects that the suit upon which this appeal is 

predicated was originated when Ronald Duane Barnes filed his Petition to Modify 

Parent-Child Relationship and Motion to Transfer in the 326th District Court of Taylor 

County on June 23, 2005. The Motion to Transfer was granted by the 326th District 

Court on September 2, 2005, transferring the cause to Anderson County. Upon 
2 

transfer, the suit was assigned cause number 349-5615 and assigned to the 349th

District Court in Anderson County. On February 10, 2006, Zollie C. Steakley, Barnes’s 

counsel, filed a “Motion for Withdraw of Counsel.” On March 17, 2006, the 349th District 

Court entered its Order Granting Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel. On April 18, 2006, 

Barnes filed a pro se Motion to Extend Time to File Motion for Rehearing relating to the 

trial court’s March 17 order granting Steakley’s motion to withdraw, which was denied 

by the trial court by order of May 9, 2006. On May 24, 2006, Barnes filed the pro se

“Notice of Appeal to Motion to Extend Time to File Motion for Rehearing,” which stated 

that it was an attempt to appeal the trial court’s May 9, 2006 denial of Barnes’s motion 

to extend time to file motion for rehearing. This “Notice of Appeal” was apparently 

treated as a notice of appeal from a final, appealable order by the 12th District Court of 

Appeals. On June 12, 2006, Barnes filed a Motion for Rehearing requesting the trial 

court reverse its March 17, 2006 Order Granting Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel. The 

trial court entered its Order denying this Motion for Rehearing on July 5, 2006. On July 

19, 2006, this cause was transferred from the 12th District Court of Appeals to this Court 

by the Texas Supreme Court.1

 The jurisdiction of all Texas courts is conferred solely by the Texas Constitution 

and state statutes. Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex. 1996). A Texas 

court does not have jurisdiction to decide any case absent an express constitutional or 

statutory grant. Id. Courts of appeals have appellate jurisdiction as specified in section 

6 of the Texas Constitution, together with such other original and appellate jurisdiction 

 1 This case was transferred to this Court pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s 

docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 2005).
3 

as may be prescribed by law. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6. Generally, a Texas appellate 

court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal only if it is from a final judgment. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.012 (Vernon Supp. 2009); Kaplan v. Tiffany Dev. Corp., 

69 S.W.3d 212, 217 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). Appellate courts have 

jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute 

explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction. Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352-53 (Tex. 

1998). 

By letter dated April 22, 2010, this Court notified Barnes that it appeared that the 

clerk’s record in this cause did not contain a final, appealable order and that Barnes had 

failed to identify any statute that provides for this Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction 

over the trial court’s May 9, 2006 interlocutory order denying Barnes’s motion to extend 

time to file motion for rehearing.2

 Consequently, we directed Barnes to show cause why 

the appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3. 

Barnes filed a response on May 13, 2010. 

In her response, Barnes references three documents to establish that her notice 

of appeal was made on a final, appealable order: a Final Decree of Divorce; a Motion 

for New Trial; and Appeals for Motion for New Trial, Motion for Enforcement, and 

Appeal for Protective Order. However, each of these documents relate to trial court 

cause number 33,638-C, which was appealed to the 11th District Court of Appeals, and 

dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Barnes v. Barnes, No. 11-04-00082-CV, 2004 

 2 The record reflects that the trial court did consider and rule on Barnes’s 

apparently untimely filed Motion for Rehearing. Thus, the relief requested by Barnes’s 

Notice of Appeal to Motion to Extend Time to File Motion for Rehearing has been 

granted and, therefore, the issue is moot. 
4 

Tex.App. LEXIS 5513, at *1-*2 (Tex.App.—Eastland June 18, 2004, no pet.) (per 

curiam). Subsequently, Barnes filed an appeal of an April 8, 2004 order granting her 

ex-husband’s motion to modify parent-child relationship, which was affirmed by the 11th

District Court of Appeals. See In the Interest of A.N.B., No. 11-04-00148-CV, 2007 

Tex.App. LEXIS 3200 (Tex.App.—Eastland April 26, 2007, pet. denied). In its opinion, 

the 11th Court addressed Barnes’s contention that the 2003 divorce decree, entered in 

trial court cause number 33,638-C, was void because it was entered while the case was 

under an automatic bankruptcy stay. See id. at *2-*4. After careful review of Barnes’s 

response to our letter, it appears that Barnes is attempting to attack the Final Decree of 

Divorce that was entered in trial court cause number 33,638-C collaterally through 

subsequently filed motions to modify. However, Barnes has failed to identify any 

authority that would authorize such a collateral attack. 

The appeal that was transferred to this Court by the Supreme Court’s order was 

an appeal of the proceedings in trial court cause number 349-5615, initiated by Ronald 

Barnes’s Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship and Motion to Transfer, filed in the 

326th District Court of Taylor County on June 23, 2005. As Barnes has wholly failed to 

identify any final, appealable order entered in that cause or any statutory authority 

authorizing our exercise of jurisdiction over any interlocutory order entered in that 

cause, as well as our failure to discover any basis for our jurisdiction in the cause that is 

before us, we must dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Kaplan, 69 S.W.3d 

at 217. 
5 

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Barnes’s appeal for want of jurisdiction. 

 

 Mackey K. Hancock 

 Justice