UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) MARY L. COLTRANE , ) ) Plaintiff

- Administratrix , ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 11

- 117 (RBW) ) HARLEY G. LAPPIN , 1 et al., ) ) Defendant s . ) ____________________________________) MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Mary L. Colt rane, proceeding pro se , brings this action on behalf of her self and
her deceased son, Carlton Coltrane, who was allegedly “ murdered on January 18, 2010, while under the care, custody, and control of the [d]efendants at the United States Penitentiary, Pollock, Louisiana (“USP Polloc k”).” First Ame nded Complaint for Monetary Damages, Declaratory Relief, Jury and Bench Trial (“Am. Compl.”) at 2

- 3. Currently before the Court is
the d efendants’ motion to dismiss C ounts 1 through 3 of the amended complaint or, in the alternative, to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana (“Defs.’ Mot.”) . Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, 2 the Court

1 Because defendant Lappin is sued in his individual rather than his official capacity, the Court will not substitute his successor - in

- office pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) (“ An action does no t abate when a public officer who is a party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending. The officer’ s successor is automatically substituted as a party. Later proceedings shou ld be in the substi tuted party’s name .” (emphasis added)).

2 In addition to the filings already identified, the Court considered the following submissions in rendering its decision: (1) the Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 through 3 of Plainti ff’s First Amended Complaint or in the Alternative Transfer (“Defs.’ Mem.”); (2) the Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 through 3 or in the Alternative Transfer (“Pl.’s Opp’n”); and (3) the Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 through 3 of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint or in the Alternative Transfer (“Defs.’ Reply”).2 concludes for the following reasons that the defendants’ alternative motion to transfer must be
g ranted.
I. BACKGROUND The amended complaint con tains the following pertinent allegations. The plaintiff is a
resident of t he District of Columbia and the mother of the decedent, Carlton Coltrane, Am. Compl. ¶ 3, who was a federal pri soner detained at U SP Pollock, i d. at 1

- 2. “On various occasions before January 18, 2010, Mr. Coltrane had informed USP Pollock staff, verbally and in writing, that he should be separated from the assailant or assailants involved in his murder, but [they] ignored these noti ces” and generally failed to comply with Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) policies in handling his complaints. Id. ¶ 18. Then, “[o] n January 18, 2010, [Mr.] Coltrane was stabbed and murdered by one or more assailants at USP Pollock.” Id. ¶ 15. The pl aintiff was notified of her son’s death on January 20, 2010. Id. The plaintiff instituted this action on January 18, 2011, and subsequently amended her complaint on December 16, 2011. The amended complaint names ten indi vidual defendants, id.
at 1

- 2, in cluding Harley G. Lappin, former Director of the BOP, and Gerardo Maldonado, Jr., the Regional Director of the BOP charged with overseeing USP Pollock , see id. ¶¶ 4

- 5. The remaining eight individual defendants were employees of USP Pollock at the time of Mr. Coltrane’s death. See id. ¶¶ 6

- 13. They are Joe Keffer; Newton E. Kendig, M.D.; Joel Alexander; John Doe or Jane Doe Operations Lieutenant; Willis Steortz, R.N.; Andre Molina Ossers, M.D.; Willie Vasquez, P.A.; and Dalynn Lentz, R.N. Id. at 1

- 2. A l l of these defendants are sued “in their personal and individual capacities.” Id. at 2; see also ¶ ¶ 4

- 13. The United
States is also named as a defendant. Id

. ¶ 14.3 The amended complaint sets forth three counts against the individual defendants: Count 1 asserts that the “individual [d]efendants engaged in a cover

- up and c onspiracy and continue to cover[] up the true facts of the murder of Carlton Coltrane in violation of [the plaintiff’s] right to due process pursuant to [the] Fifth Amendment to the Uni ted States Constitution and the laws of
the District of Columbia; Count 2 asserts that “[d]efendants Lappin, Maldonado , Keffer, John Doe or Jane Doe Operations Lieutenant, and Alexander maliciously deprived Carlton Coltrane of his life through their purpos eful and deliberate failure to separate and protect him from the assailant or assailants that they knew or should have known were intent on doing him grievous bodily harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the laws

o f the District of Columbia”; and Count 3 asserts that “[d]efendants Kendig, Alexander, Steortz, Molina Ossers, Vasquez, and Lentz maliciously deprived Carlton Coltrane of his life through their purposeful and deliberate failure to provide adequate medical care and transportation in a timely manner to the proper medical facilities in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the laws of the District of Columbia.” Id. ¶¶ 21

- 23. Count 4 of the amended complaint asserts a tort cl aim against the United States for Mr. Coltrane’s “personal inj ury and death ,” id. ¶ ¶ 24, 14, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), id. ¶ 1. The defendants have now moved to dismiss Counts 1 through 3 of the amended complaint for lack of subje ct matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) , lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), improper venue under 12(b)(3), improper service of process under Rule 12(b)(5) , and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be4 grante d under Rule 12(b)(6). See Defs.’ Mot. at 1. In the alternative, the defendants request that
the Court transfer this case to the Western District of Louisiana. Id. 3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) authorizes a par ty to move for dismissal of a complaint for “improper venue.” “‘ In considering a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff's well

- pled factual allegations regarding venue as true, draws all reasonable inferences
from thos e allegations in the p laintiff’s favor, and resolves any factual conflicts in the plai ntiff’s
favor.’” Sierra Club v. Johnson , 623 F. Supp. 2d 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Darby v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy , 231 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 (D.D.C. 2002) ). “Nevertheless, a plaintiff ‘ bea rs the
burden of est ablishing that venue is proper.’” Id. (quoting Varma v. Gutierrez , 421 F. Supp. 2d 110, 113 (D.D.C. 2006) ). If a district court determines that venue is improper, i t may either
dismiss the case, “or if it be in the interest of justice , transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). III. ANALYSIS A. The Plaintiff’s Claims Against the Individual Defendants 1. Venue Counts 1 through 3 of the amended complaint assert constitu tional claims under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments against the individual defendants. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21

- 23. The
defendants move to dismiss these claims on the ground of improper venue. Defs.’ Mem. at 34. The parties initially dispute which venue provision applies here. The defendants contend

3 The Court will only address the defendants’ arguments regarding improper venue because it presents the most straightforward ground upon which to resolve the defendants’ motion.5 that the general ven ue provision , 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) , 4 applies because Counts 1 through 3 of
the amended complaint seek money damages from the defendants in their individual capacities pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971) , Defs.’ Mem. at 34, and because “[v] enue in a Bivens case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b),” Simpson v. BOP , 496 F. Supp. 2d 187, 193 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing, among others,
Cam eron v. Thornburgh , 983 F.2d 253, 257 (D.C.Cir.1993)). The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that t he venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391( e) applies because she is suing the
individual defendants in their “ official capacities. ” 5 See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2

- 4

. Even giving her the benefit of her pro se status, the Court finds the plaintiff’s position
meritless. First, her amended complaint premises venue in this Court solely on § 1391(b); it does not mention § 1391(e). See Am. C ompl. ¶ 2. Second, although th e plaintiff now argues that she is suing the individual defendants i n their official capacities and apparently is not advancing

4 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) provides as follows: (b) Venue in general.

— A civil action may be brought in

— (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in whic h an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

5 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) provides as follows:
A civil action in w hich a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be b rought in any judicial district in which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. Additional persons may be joined as parties to any such action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other venue requirements as would be applicable if the Un ited States or one of its officers, employees, or agencies were not a party.6 Bivens claim s , her amended complaint asserts constitutional claims against the defendants only
in their “ individual capacities,” i d. at 2 , ¶¶ 4

- 13, and requests “[c]ompensatory damages from each individual [d]efendant,” id. at 12. 6 These are quintessential Bivens claims. See Scinto v.
BOP , 608 F. Supp. 2d 4, 8 (D.D.C. 2009) (“ Bivens by its very nature is a private damages action against individual federal em ployees for violating a citizen’ s constitutional rights ”). B ecause “§ 1391(e) applies only to suits against government officers in their official capacities, [and] not to Bivens actions,” Cameron , 983 F.2d at 256, the controll ing venue provision here is § 1391(b)

. 7
See Joyner v. Reno , 466 F. Supp. 2d 31, 41 (D.D.C. 2006) (“ While § 1391(e) applies to suits against government officials acting in their official capacities, . . . the proper venue provision for
this and other cases in which federal officials are sued in their individual capacities based on federal question jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)

. ” (internal citation and footnote omitted)). Having determined the applicable venue provision, the question now becomes whethe r venue properly lies in this District under § 1391(b) with respect to the plaintiff’s Bivens claims. Section 1391(b) provides that a civil action may be brought in any judicial district (1) “in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located”; (2) “in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated”; or (3) “if there is no

6 Even assuming the plaintiff had asserted claims for money damages against the individual defendants in their official capacities, the Court would lack subject matter jurisdicti on over those claims due to sovereign immunity. See Clark v. Library of Congress , 750 F.2d 89, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“ So vereign immunity . . . bar [s] suits for money damages against officials in their official capacity absent a specific waiver by the gove rnment. ” (emphasis in original)).

7 In addition to seeking money damages, the amended complaint requests a declaratory judgment pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 2201 that “the practices, acts, and omissions complained of herein violate[d]” the plaintiff’s rights. Am. Compl. at 12. Assuming that this request for declaratory relief could be construed as a non

- monetary claim against the individual defendants in their official capacities, § 1391(e) would indeed be the controlling venue provision for this claim. See Cameron , 983 F.2d at 256

- 57. Nevertheless, the Court would lack subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because an official capacity suit against a federal employee is deemed a suit against the United States, and “the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C . § 2201, does not waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity.” Scinto , 608 F. Supp. 2d at 9 n.2.7 distric t in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)

- (3). As the defendants argue and the plaintiff does not contest ,

see Defs.’ Mem. at 34

- 35; Pl.’s Opp’n at 2

- 4, none of the provisions of § 1391(b) authorize
venue in this District because: (1) all of the individual defendants do not reside in the District of Columbia; (2) a substantial pa rt of the events or omissions giving rise to the plaintiff’s claims ( all
of which relate to the treatment and murder of her son at USP Pollock ) did not occur in the District of Columbia; and (3) there is a judicial district in which venue would be proper u nder § 1391(b) (2)

— the Western District of Louisiana. 8 While not disputing the impropriety of venue in this District under § 13 91(b), the plaintiff asserts, without elaboration, that this Court should entertain her Bivens claims against the
individual defen dants pursuant to the doctrine of “pendent venue.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. Generally, a plaintiff must “demonstrate proper venue with respect to each cause of action and each [defendant].” Lamont v. Haig , 590 F.2d 1124, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1978). But when venue lies for

some of a plaintiff’s claims, the doctrine of pendent venue may allow the court to entertain other
claims that are not properly venued in the court. Reuber v. United States , 750 F.2d 1039, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Kauf fman v. Anglo

- Am. Sch. of Sofia , 28 F.3d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1994). “P ursuant to pendent venue, federal courts may exercise their discretion to hear claims as to which venue is lacking if those claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts as th e cl aims that are appropriately venued and the interests of judicial economy
are furthered by hearing the claims together.” Sierra Club , 623 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (emphasis in original) (citing Beattie v. United States , 756 F .2d 91, 102

- 03 (D.C. Cir. 1984), abrog ated on

8 The Court explains the propriety of venue in the Western District of Louisiana infra

.8 other grounds by Smith v. United States , 507 U.S. 197 (1993)). “ The judicial efficiency rationale for pen dent venue makes it clear that ‘ a district court has wide discretion to refuse to hear a pendent claim.’” Reuber , 750 F.2d at 1048 (citation omitted). Here, t he Court declines to exercise pendent venue over the plaintiff’s Bivens claims agai nst the individual defendants. To be sure, venue is proper in this Court as to the plaintiff’s FTCA claim against the United States because the plaintiff r esides in the District of Columbia.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (“ Any civil action on a tort claim against the United States under subsection (b) of section 1346 of this title may be prosecuted only in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wher ein the act or omission complained of occurred. ” (emphasis added)); Defs.’ Reply at 8 (conceding that “this District is the proper venue for [the p]laintiff’s claim
under t he Federal Tort Claims Act”). The plaintiff’s FTCA claim could, therefore, serve as the requisite “hook” for the Court to exercise pendent venue over the plaintiffs’ Bivens claims. The
Court finds for the following reasons , however, that exercising pendent venue here would not “‘further[] the goals of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants. ’” Beattie , 756 F.2d at 103 (citation omitted). First, considerations of convenience , such as prox imity to witnesses and evidence, indicate that the Western District of Louisiana would be a more suitable
forum for this case, giv en that the events that form the basis for the plaintiff’s clai ms occurred at USP Pollock in Louisiana. Second, i t would be inefficient to retain venue over the plaintiffs’
Bivens claims because, without reaching the merits of the issue, this Court deems it highly unlikely that it has personal jurisdiction over at least seve n of the individual defendants due to
their lack of contact s with the District of Columbia. See Defs.’ Reply at 2

- 4 (discussing personal jurisdiction challenges). Needless to say, i t would be futile to exercise pendent venue with9 respect to claims asserted against defendants over which this Co urt lacks personal jurisdiction.
These considerations caution against invoking pendent venue in this case.
2. Transfer or Dismissal Having det ermined that venue is improper as to the plaintiff’s Bivens claims and that pendent venue is inappropriate, the Court m ay either dismiss the case, “or if it be in the in terest of justice, transfer [the] case to any district or division in which it could ha ve been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Before transferring a c ase pursuant to § 1406(a), a “ district court [must] decide as a preliminary matter that venue and jurisdiction would be pr o per as to all defendants ”
in the transferee court. Sharp Elecs. Corp . v. Hayman Cash Register Co. , 655 F.2d 1228, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam). O nce these prerequisites are satisfied, “[t] he decision whether a
transfer or a dismissal is in th e interest of ju stice

. . . rests within the sound discretion of the
distri ct court. ” Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt , 722 F.2d 779, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The District of Columbia Circuit favors transfer under § 1406(a) “when procedural obstacles”

— such
as “ lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue and statute of limitation s bars ”

— “‘impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication . . . on the merits.’” Sincla i r v. Kleindienst , 711 F.2d 291,
293

- 94 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman , 369 U.S. 463, 466

- 67 (1962)). And transfer is particularly favored over dism issal when the plaintiff is proceeding pro se . See James v. Verizon Servs. Corp. , 639 F . Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 2009). The defendants argue that if the Court decides not to dismiss the plaintiff’s Bivens claims, the claims should be transferred to the We stern District of Louisiana. See Defs.’ Mem. at
35. In evaluating whether this case is even eligible for transfer under § 1406(a) , the Court must
first determine that the transferee court would possess both venue and personal jurisdiction. See Sharp Ele cs. Corp. , 655 F.2d at 1230. The Court finds that both con ditions are satisfied here. To10 begin with, v enue for the plaintiff’s Bivens claims is proper in the Western District of Louisiana
because that is the “judicial district in which a substantia l part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim [s] occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391( b)(2); see also Defs.’ Reply at 14 (conceding that “venue for this entire case is proper in the We s tern District of Louisiana”). In addition, the allegations in the amend ed complaint indicate that the Western District of Louisiana could
exercise personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants based on the injuries they allegedly
caused in Louisiana and their minimum contacts with that state. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4

- 13; L a. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:3201(A) (3) (Louisiana Long

- Arm Statute) (“ A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from any . . . [ act ivity ] performed by the nonresident . . . [c] ausing injury or damage by an offense or quasi offense committed through a n act or omission in this state.”); see also id. § 13:3201(B) (“[A] court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any
basis consistent with the cons titution of this state and of the Constitution of the United States. ”).
The defendants appear to concede this point. See Defs.’ Mem. at 37 (The “[p]laintiff alleges that [the individual d]efendants caused injuries within Louisiana either through an act o r omission in
that state or outside of it

. Therefore, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana would have personal jurisdiction over these [d]efendants .” (internal citations omitted and emphasis added)). With the prerequisit es of ven ue and personal jurisdiction in the transferee court being satisfied, the Court has discretion to transfer this case to the W estern District of Louisiana if it is “in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Upon consideration of the relevant facto rs, t he
Court finds that transferring this case would indeed be in the interest of justice for the following

reasons. First, “ procedural obstacles” such as “improper venue” and “lack of personal11 jurisdiction” will “ impede an expeditious and orderly adj udi cation . . . on the merits’” in this District, but not in the Western District of Louisiana. Sinclai r , 711 F.2d at 293

- 94. Second, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se and transfer is therefore favored over dismissal. See James , 639 F. Supp. 2d at 15. Th ird, the Western District of Louisiana is the appropriate forum for this case because, as already noted, the plaintiff’s claims arise principally out of events that occurred at USP Pollock in Louisiana, and c onvenience factors consequently weigh in favor o f litigating this case in that District. Fourth, this lawsuit has no discernible connection to the District of
Columbia. See Cameron , 983 F.2d at 256 ( instru cting that “[c] ourts in this circuit must examine challenges to personal jurisdiction and venue carefully to guard against the danger that a plaintiff might manufacture venue in the District of Columbia ,” particularly when a plaintiff “bring[s] a suit here that proper ly should be pursued e lsewhere” merely “[b]y naming high government
officials as defendants ”). 9 Accordingly, the Court will transfer the plaintiff’s Bivens claims to the Western District of Louisiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
B. The Pl aintiff’s FTC A Claim Against the United States
The plaintiff’s FTCA claim is properly venued in this Court because the plaintiff resides
in the District of Columbia. See 28 U.S.C. § 1402 (b). But venue for her FTCA claim would also be proper in the West ern District of Louisiana under § 1402(b) because that was the “judicial
district . . . wherein the act or omission complained of occurred.” Id. Thus, r ather than bifurcating the litigation of the case by transferring only the plaintiff’s Bivens claims, t he Court
will transfer the entire case to th e Western District of Louisiana. Such an approach is common in

9 The plaintiff attempts to invent some connection to this Dis trict by arguing that she “takes issue” with a “BOP Program Statement” which was “formulated at the BOP’s Central Office in Washington, D.C.” and that the defendants supposedly “utilized to improperly transfer Mr. Coltrane to USP Pollack.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. But the plaintiff's challenge to the BOP policy is really an “ attack on the impl ementation of that policy,” rather than its formulation. Zakiya v. United States , 267 F. Supp. 2d 47, 59 (D.D.C. 2003). And since “ the actual implementation by the BOP of ficials occ urred at the facilities where [the plaintiff’s son] was incarcerated and not in this district, venue is not appropriate here .” Id.12 this Circuit. See , e.g. , Sierra Club , 623 F. Supp. 2d at 38 n.4 (“Although two of Plaintiff’ s claim are otherwise subject to proper venue in the D istrict of Columbia, courts in this district have consistently transferred an entire case to another judicial district, rather than bifurcate the litigation. ”); Khalil v. L

- 3 Comm’ns Titan Group , 656 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (“ Given venue for Kha lil’ s Title VII claim is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia, it is in the interests of justice and judicial efficiency to transfer a l l of Khalil’ s claims [, even the properly venued ones,] to that venue. ” (emphasis added) ); Saran v. Harvey , No. 04

- c v - 1847, 2005 WL 1106347, at *4 (D.D.C. May 9, 2005) (“ When venue is improper for a Title VII claim, courts have consistently transferred the entire case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), to a judicial district where venue is appropriate for all claims, rat her than split a case apart. ”). As in Sierra Club , this
Court “ finds that transferring all of the claims to the same forum assures that they will be heard together, preventing the unnecessary expenditure of judicial and party resources that would
otherwis e occur if the claims were heard in multiple judicial districts. ” 623 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ alternative motion to transfer is granted. SO ORDERED this 15th day of August, 2012. 10
REGGIE B. WALTON United States District Judge

10 The Court will contemporaneously issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.