United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________

No. 23-30810

____________

Stacie Dellucky; Frank Dellucky, 

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

St. George Fire Protection District; Gerard C. 

Tarleton, in his Official Capacity as Chief, and Individually, 

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:21-CV-287

______________________________

Before Clement, Graves, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

*

Stacie and Frank Dellucky (“Appellants”) sued the St. George Fire 

Protection District (“St. George”) and St. George Fire Chief Gerard C. 

Tarleton (“the Chief”) (“Appellees”) based on Stacie’s termination from 

St. George. The district court granted Appellees’ motion for summary 

judgment as to each of Appellants’ claims. We AFFIRM.

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 7, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I

St. George provides fire protection services in East Baton Rouge 

Parish. The Chief manages St. George’s daily operations, including 

personnel matters. Stacie was employed by St. George in an administrative 

role in 2014. She was married to Chad Roberson (“Roberson”), who had 

worked at St. George since 1992. Frank had begun working for St. George as 

a firefighter in 1999. For most of his time at St. George, Frank was married 

to Nichole Dellucky, who was never employed by St. George. 

In 2016, when the events giving rise to this suit began, Roberson was 

the Assistant Fire Chief. He and Stacie both worked on the second floor of 

St. George’s administrative building. Although Roberson now serves as the 

Assistant Chief of Operations, he is slated to succeed the Chief. Frank had 

been promoted several times and eventually became the District Fire Chief

for the A Shift, and his office was on the same floor as Stacie’s and 

Roberson’s. 

Stacie and Frank began spending significant amounts of time together

and were rumored to be in an intimate relationship. Nichole and Roberson 

began to suspect Stacie and Frank were having an affair, and Roberson hired 

a private investigator. In October 2016, Nichole and Roberson separately

discovered Frank and Stacie together, in various states of undress, at their 

respective homes. Nichole called the Chief to complain about the situation. 

The Chief testified in his deposition that regardless of its nature,1

Stacie’s and Frank’s personal relationship had disrupted the workplace. For 

example, Frank spent significant time in Stacie’s office although his position 

generally required him to be in the field. The relationship “was creating a 

_____________________

1 One of the primary factual disputes Appellants emphasize is whether Stacie and 

Frank were in an intimate relationship before their divorces.

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problem” for St. George and had led to “an unbelievable situation in the 

office[.]” Roberson similarly testified that the relationship had caused 

tension among the St. George leadership. After Nichole called the Chief, he 

met with Stacie and Frank and told them that they needed to stop allowing 

their personal relationship to interfere with work. Stacie and Frank 

maintained that their relationship was not sexual in nature; the Chief

informed them that if they got married or entered into a long-term 

relationship, they could no longer work at St. George. The Chief did not bring 

the issue up again for quite some time. 

In August of 2017, another St. George employee accused Frank of 

making sexually explicit comments to her. The Chief launched an 

investigation and, as a result, Frank agreed to resign and entered into a 

settlement agreement with St. George. In the settlement agreement, Frank 

maintained that he had done nothing wrong, but the parties expressed their 

“desire to fully settle any and all disputes between them[.]” Frank and St. 

George agreed to “hereby forever release, discharge, compromise and settle 

all claims and causes of action against each other, whether known [or] 

unknown, and whether asserted or unasserted.” Frank began working for a 

different fire department. 

Meanwhile, Roberson and Nichole each filed a petition for divorce 

from Stacie and Frank, respectively, in early 2017. Both divorces were 

finalized in 2018. 

After their divorces were finalized, Stacie and Frank formalized their 

relationship, and they married in late June 2020. On July 7th, the Chief called 

Stacie into his office, and Stacie surreptitiously recorded the meeting on her 

phone. The Chief told Stacie that her marriage to Frank was 

“problematic[.]” He expressed concern regarding her ability to work with 

Roberson and reminded her about the conversation he had with her and 

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Frank in 2016, recounting that he told Stacie then that if she and Frank “got 

hooked up that neither one of [them] could work” at St. George. He also 

noted that Stacie’s position was starting to become obsolete. Ultimately, he 

said, he was “following through on the discussion [they] had in the past” that 

Stacie’s relationship with Frank was “a problem for [St. George]” and that 

Stacie and St. George would “need to part ways.” Stacie was placed on 

administrative leave until August 16th, when her employment was officially 

terminated.

Following Stacie’s termination, Appellants sued St. George and the 

Chief in his individual and official capacities.2 They alleged that Appellees 

violated their rights under the First and Ninth Amendments,

3 “particularly 

their rights to Freedom of Association, Freedom of Religion, Freedom of 

sexual intimacy, Freedom from Religious Tests, and Freedoms to Privacy[.]”

They also asserted claims under the “Due Process Clause, Equal Protection 

Clause, and Article VI, § 3 of the U.S. Constitution.”4

_____________________

2 Appellants also sued Jeff Landry, Attorney General for the State of Louisiana.

Attorney General Landry moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on sovereign 

immunity. Appellants did not oppose the motion, it was granted, and their claims against 

Attorney General Landry were dismissed.

3 “The Ninth Amendment does not confer substantive rights upon which civil 

rights claims may be based.” Johnson v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Just., 281 F. App’x 319, 320 (5th 

Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Froehlich v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 196 F.3d 800, 801 (7th Cir. 

1999)). In any event, Appellants did not refer to any claim under the Ninth Amendment on 

appeal. “A party forfeits an argument . . . by failing to adequately brief the argument on 

appeal.” Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021). Appellants’ Ninth 

Amendment claim, to the extent it was asserted, is therefore not before us. 

4 Appellants do not challenge the dismissal of their Article VI, § 3 claim or their 

free exercise claim. Those claims are also forfeited. Rollins, 8 F.4th at 397. Appellantsfailed 

to address the equal protection argument that they raised before the district court and

instead raise a new equal protection issue for the first time on appeal. As discussed below, 

that is insufficient to challenge the district court’s equal protection holding. Id. 

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In February 2023, Appellees moved for summary judgment as to 

Frank’s claims, arguing that they were time-barred and foreclosed by the 

parties’ settlement agreement. Appellees filed a second motion for summary 

judgment as to Stacie’s claims. Appellants filed separate responses to the two 

motions. In an order noting that local rules required a party to seek leave of 

court before filing a second summary judgment motion, the district court 

denied Appellees’ motions in part but permitted them to refile one 

consolidated motion for summary judgment within seven days of the order. 

It also struck the two motions for summary judgment and all related 

pleadings, including Appellants’ responses, from the docket. But it gave 

Appellants 21 days to respond to Appellees’ consolidated motion for 

summary judgment—the typical period to respond as provided by local rules. 

Appellees filed their motion for summary judgment as to all claims. 

Appellants responded and purported to incorporate their previous responses 

to Appellees’ original motions for summary judgment.

The district court held that there was no evidence that Appellees had 

an official policy prohibiting one class of employees from marrying another

and that the Chief’s decision to fire Stacie survived rational basis review. The 

district court rejected Stacie’s due process claim because she did not present 

evidence of a property interest of which she had been deprived, her equal 

protection claim because such claims are precluded in cases involving public 

employment, and her free exercise claim because she had failed to adduce any 

evidence of her maintaining sincerely held religious beliefs. The district court 

declined to consider Appellants’ stricken responses to Appellees’ original 

summary judgment motions. Accordingly, the district court granted 

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Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint in 

full.5 This appeal followed.

We first address Appellants’ objection to the district court’s 

procedural handling of the summary judgment motions. We then discuss 

Appellants’ challenge to the district court’s summary judgment ruling, 

which is two-fold: first, Appellants contend that the district court improperly 

resolved certain factual disputes in Appellees’ favor. Second, Appellants 

maintain that the district court misapplied the law to the facts as established 

by the summary judgment record to incorrectly conclude that summary 

judgment was appropriate. 

II

Appellants argue that the district court employed unfair procedures 

because it allowed Appellees to refile their improper motions for summary 

judgment as one consolidated motion but neglected to consider Appellants’ 

responses to those motions. Specifically, Appellants object to the district 

court’s declining to consider the arguments raised in their stricken responses 

despite the fact that Appellants purported to “incorporate in toto” those 

arguments into their response to the consolidated summary judgment 

motion.

“Discretionary matters, including the district court’s application of 

local rules in disposing of motions, are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 

standard.” Valderas v. City of Lubbock, 937 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2019) 

_____________________

5 Additionally, the district court held that Frank’s claims were barred by the 

settlement agreement. The district court next held that Stacie had abandoned her Article 

VI, § 3 claim, and in any event, there was no evidence “that [Appellees’] actions ran afoul 

of the Constitution’s prohibition against demanding a ‘religious Test . . . as a Qualification 

to any Office or public Trust under the United States.’” Appellants do not challenge these

holdings on appeal.

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(citing Victor F., by Gene F. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 793 F.2d 633, 635 

(5th Cir. 1986)); see also Victor F., 793 F.2d at 635 (reviewing a district court’s 

decision to strike a motion that did not comply with local rules for abuse of 

discretion).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit courts to establish their 

own local rules, and Rule 83(b) permits a judge to “regulate practice in any 

manner consistent with . . . the district’s local rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

83(b). And federal courts have the inherent authority to “manage their own 

affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” 

Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. 

Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)). The local rules applicable to this case 

dictate that a party may file only one motion for summary judgment unless 

he seeks leave of court and demonstrates good cause for submitting multiple 

motions. See M.D. La. Local Rule 56(h). The local rules also provide 

that a party opposing a motion will have 21 days to respond to that motion.

See M.D. La. Local Rule 7(f).

Here, the district court noted Appellees’ failure to comply with local 

rules by filing a second motion for summary judgment without leave of court. 

It struck both motions and related pleadings, and it also expressly struck 

“[Appellants’] memoranda opposing [Appellees’] motions” from the 

docket. The district court then exercised its discretion to permit Appellees 

to file one summary judgment motion within seven days incorporating the 

arguments set out in their two motions. Finally, it provided Appellants 21 

days to file a new response to Appellees’ consolidated motion.

Nothing in the district court’s handling of the motions constitutes an 

abuse of discretion. The district court was clear with respect to what 

documents would be stricken from the record. It gave Appellants the full 

response time provided by the local rules, even though they had already 

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prepared substantive responses to the arguments raised in Appellees’ 

original motions. And it deliberately struck a reasonable balance between 

admonishing Appellees’ counsel for violating the local rules while also 

avoiding any undue prejudice to either party. Although Appellants contend 

that the district court’s procedures were unfair, they do not point to any 

prejudice that they suffered as a result. Accordingly, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion by permitting Appellees to file a consolidated summary 

judgment motion within seven days, striking all pleadings related to 

Appellees’ improper motions, and providing Appellants 21 days to respond, 

or by consequently declining to consider Appellants’ responses to the 

improperly filed motions. 

III

Appellants contend that the district court erred in granting Appellees’ 

motion for summary judgment for two reasons. First, they claim it misapplied 

the standard for resolving a motion for summary judgment because it 

incorrectly assumed that certain facts presented by Appellees were 

undisputed. Second, Appellants maintain that genuine disputes of material 

facts remain or that the district court erred in applying the relevant law as to 

several of their constitutional claims, thereby precluding summary judgment.

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, 

applying the same standard on appeal as that applied below.” Rogers v. 

Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014). “This Court 

may affirm on grounds other than those relied upon by the district court when 

the record contains an adequate and independent basis for that result.” Britt 

v. Grocers Supply Co., Inc., 978 F.2d 1441, 1449 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations 

omitted). 

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A

Appellants contend that the district court improperly applied the 

summary judgment standard because it wrongly understood certain material 

facts to be undisputed.

Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute 

as to a material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Rogers, 755 F.3d at 353 (quoting 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). We must draw all 

reasonable inferences and construe all evidence in the light most favorable to 

Appellants as the nonmoving party. See id. But “[o]nce a movant who does 

not have the burden of proof at trial makes a properly supported motion, the 

burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that a summary judgment should not 

be granted.” Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) 

(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321–25 (1986)). And the 

nonmovant cannot satisfy that burden with “conclusional allegations, 

unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of evidence.” 

Rogers, 755 F.3d at 353 (quoting McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th 

Cir. 2012)). 

Here, Appellants do not identify which specific disputed facts the 

district court arguably resolved in reaching its decision, and they do not cite 

to any evidence in the summary judgment record calling any factual 

conclusions into question. Appellees made a properly supported summary 

judgment motion. It was therefore Appellants’ burden to submit evidence 

showing that they are entitled to relief, see Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458, but instead 

Appellants did nothing more than attack Appellees’ evidence with 

“conclusional allegations” and “unsupported assertions,” Rogers, 755 F.3d 

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at 353. That is not sufficient. Appellants failed to satisfy their burden of 

pointing to evidence calling Appellees’ version of events into question, at 

least with respect to the facts upon which Appellants’ claims turn. The 

district court did not err in its handling of the factual issues relevant to 

resolving Appellees’ summary judgment motion. 

B

Appellants maintain that genuine disputes of material fact preclude 

summary judgment or that the district court misapplied the law with respect 

to several of Stacie’s constitutional claims.

1

Appellants contend the district court’s dismissal of their right-tomarry claim was erroneous for two reasons. First, they argue that the district 

court incorrectly determined that the rational basis standard of review applies 

to their claim. Second, they apparently argue that the Chief’s proffered 

justification for firing Stacie was pretextual.

“The right to marry is both a fundamental substantive due process 

and associational right.” Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117, 1124 (6th Cir. 

1996) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 

468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)). The first step in resolving a right-to-marry 

challenge to government conduct is determining which standard of review 

applies. In Montgomery, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s 

opinion in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978), in establishing a twopart test for determining whether government action unconstitutionally 

impedes the exercise of the right to marry. 101 F.3d at 1124; see also Lewis v. 

Smith, 2022 WL 10965839, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2022) (per curiam) 

(endorsing Montgomery’s approach).

[F]irst, a court must ask whether the policy or action is a direct 

or substantial interference with the right of marriage; second, 

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if the policy or action is a direct and substantial interference 

with the right of marriage, apply strict scrutiny, otherwise 

apply rational basis scrutiny. 

Montgomery, 101 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388). 

Policies that directly and substantially interfere with the right to marry 

generally involve prohibiting whole classes of people from marrying. See id. 

at 1124–25 (comparing cases). In Zablocki, the Supreme Court struck down a 

statute requiring non-custodial parents with child support obligations to seek 

court permission to marry. 434 U.S. at 387. Similarly, in Loving, the Supreme 

Court held that anti-miscegenation laws were unconstitutional. 388 U.S. at 

1823. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has rejected constitutional 

right-to-marry challenges where the relevant government action “placed no 

direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married” or where 

“there was no evidence that the laws significantly discouraged, let alone 

made practically impossible, any marriages.” Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n.12

(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 98 

(1977)).

Here, the challenged government action—the Chief’s termination of 

Stacie—did not prohibit whole classes of people from marrying. Appellants 

adduced no evidence of a St. George policy barring co-workers from marrying 

or banning marriages between members of management and their 

subordinates. The evidence shows that the Chief’s decision was motivated 

by the fact that Stacie married Frank; there is no evidence that the outcome 

would have been the same if the marriage had been between two other 

employees. Moreover, Stacie’s termination clearly did not discourage or 

render practically impossible her marriage to Frank: the record indicates that 

they remain married today. The challenged government action did not 

directly and substantially interfere with Stacie’s or Frank’s right to marry. 

The district court correctly determined that the appropriate standard of 

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review, therefore, is rational basis review. See Montgomery, 101 F.3d at 1129–

30.

“Under the deferential rational basis test, we ask ‘whether a rational 

relationship exists between the policy and a conceivable legitimate 

objective.” Lewis, 2022 WL 10965839, at *3 (alterations adopted) (quoting 

Simi Inv. Co. v. Harris County, 236 F.3d 240, 251 (5th Cir. 2000)). “The 

interest the government asserts to show rationality need not be the actual or 

proven interest, as long as there is a connection between the policy and a 

‘conceivable’ interest.” Reyes v. N. Tex. Tollway Auth. (NTTA), 861 F.3d 558, 

563 (5th Cir. 2017). 

Here, the Chief justified terminating Stacie in their conversation in 

July 2020: Stacie’s and Frank’s relationship had caused trouble in the 

workplace in the past, and the Chief had warned them that if their 

relationship became permanent, they would not be able to work at St. George. 

Maintaining workplace order and morale and ensuring that the chain-ofcommand operates effectively is a legitimate objective. And Appellants’ 

unsupported assertions notwithstanding, the summary judgment record 

suggests that Stacie’s and Frank’s relationship threatened the Chief’s ability 

to accomplish that objective. Appellees have proffered summary judgment 

evidence showing that the Chief’s decision to terminate Stacie bore a 

“rational relationship” to a legitimate objective. Lewis, 2022 WL 10965839, 

at *3. Accordingly, the Chief’s decision to terminate Stacie’s employment 

passes the rational basis test. 

Appellants also argue that genuine factual disputes persist as to 

whether the Chief’s proffered justification for firing Stacie was pretextual. 

But it does not matter if the proffered justification is pretextual under the 

rational basis standard of review because the legitimate objective cited during 

the litigation proceedings “need not be the actual or proven” objective. 

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Reyes, 861 F.3d at 563. Appellants failed to meet their burden to adduce 

evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to their 

right-to-marry claim.

2

Appellants next apparently contend that the district court wrongly 

dismissed their equal protection selective enforcement or “class-of-one” 

claim. This argument was not raised before the district court. “A party 

forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in the first instance in the district 

court[.]” Thomas v. Ameritas Life Ins. Corp., 34 F.4th 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2022) 

(quoting Rollins, 8 F.4th at 397). Although we have “considerable discretion 

in deciding whether to consider an issue that was not raised below,” we will 

generally only exercise that discretion to address a purely legal question when 

failure to do so “will result in a miscarriage of justice.” Rollins, 8 F.4th at 

398 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Essinger v. Liberty Mut. Fire 

Ins. Co., 534 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2008)). Appellants have forfeited this 

argument and had ample opportunity to present it to the district court, so we 

do not consider it here.

3

Finally, Appellants maintain that summary judgment was not 

warranted as to their claim that Appellees unconstitutionally deprived them 

of their liberty interests. They contend that Appellees’ handling of the 

situation stigmatized Stacie and Frank in violation of their rights.

Appellants rely on Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101, 105 (5th 

Cir. 1997), in which we rejected an employee’s claim that he was terminated 

in a way ostracizing him from his “close knit” community. There, we set out 

the test for such a claim: 

A public employee is deprived of a protected liberty interest 

either if terminated for a reason which was (i) false, (ii) 

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publicized, and (iii) stigmatizing to his standing or reputation 

in his community or if terminated for a reason that was (i) false 

and (ii) had a stigmatizing effect such that (iii) he was denied 

other employment opportunities as a result.

Id. at 107 (emphasis in original). “The employee must also show that ‘the 

governmental agency has made or is likely to make the . . . stigmatizing charges 

public ‘in any official or intentional manner, other than in connection with 

the defense of [related legal] action.’” Wells v. Hico Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 

243, 256 (5th Cir. 1984) (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 

Ortwein v. Mackey, 511 F.2d 696, 699 (5th Cir. 1975)). 

Here, Appellants take issue with (1) Appellees apparent publication of 

the reason for Stacie’s firing, which caused Stacie’s and Frank’s

ostracization; and (2) Appellees inclusion of an embarrassing photograph of 

Stacie in their filings with the district court. The district court focused on 

Appellants’ claim, not renewed on appeal, for deprivation of a property 

interest without addressing their claim for deprivation of their liberty 

interests. When a plaintiff alleges that she is deprived of her liberty interests, 

“loss of a property interest (such as tenured employment) is not required.” 

Id. (citing Dennis v. S. & S. Consol. Rural High Sch. Dist., 577 F.2d 338, 340 

(5th Cir. 1978)). But, as noted, we may affirm on any ground supported by 

the record. Britt, 978 F.2d at 1449. 

Appellants failed to point to any evidence that the Chief’s reason for 

firing Stacie was publicized by Appellees, much less that it was done in an 

“official or intentional” way. Wells, 736 F.2d at 256. Indeed, the record 

suggests that individuals other than the Chief—that is, individuals who were 

not representatives of St. George—were responsible for spreading that 

information to other employees.Appellants also did not show that the rumors 

about their relationship prevented either of them from obtaining new 

employment. As to the photograph, Appellants adduced no evidence that it 

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was falsified or used in any misleading way by Appellees. And to the extent it 

was publicized by Appellees, it was publicized “in connection with the 

defense” of this lawsuit, and so its publication is not actionable. Id. The 

district court properly granted summary judgment against Appellants on 

their claim that they were deprived of a protected liberty interest.

* * *

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

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