### *The H on. Richard H. Battey, Chief Judge, United State s

District Court for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation. 

# United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 96-2483EA

_____________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * v. * On Appeal from the United * States District Court * for the Eastern District Michael Bruce Armstead, also * of Arkansas. known as Michael B. Pfarr, * also known as Michael B. Pharr, * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: February 11, 1997 Filed: April 23, 1997

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge , HANSEN, Circuit Judge, and BATTEY, * Chief District Judge.

___________ RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge. A jury co nvicted Michael Armstead of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession wit h intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine base, 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

### The Hon. Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judg e 1 

### for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The Hon. Henry L . Jones, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge 2 

### for the Eastern District of Arkansas. -2- The D istrict Court sentenced Armstead to 151 months in prison on eac h 1 count, to be served concurrently. Before trial, Armstead moved to suppres s the pr incipal evidence against him, approximately 650 grams of cocain e base, on the ground that no probable cause to search the hotel room i n which it was found existed. The District Court, acting on th e recomme ndationof a magistrate judge, denied the motion. Armstead too k 2 this appeal, challenging only the denial of the suppression motion. W e affirm. An agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), who ha d been tipped by a reservation agent for an airline, alerted the Little Roc k Police th at Michael Armstead had paid cash the day before for a one-wa y ticket on the overnight flight from Los Angeles to Little Rock, via Dallas
. Because the information the DEA provided fit its drug-courier profile, the Little Rock Police di spatched two agents to the airport to greet Armstead uponarrival and ask him questions. One officer approached Armstead and asked for identification or his airline ticket, which the officer looked at to con firm that it was in Armstead’s name. Armstead then told th e officer that he was “kind of” travelling alone, and shortly thereafte r stated that he was travelling alone. A woman (who DEA had reported ha d purchased a ticket and travelled with Armstead) indicated to the othe r offi cer that she was travelling with Armstead. Armstead refused th e officer’s request to search his bag and soon thereafter advised the woman tha t she could likewise refuse. Although he told the officers he wa s visiting his family, Armstead departed by taxi, which the police learned took him to a nearby motel.

### Ar mstead contends that the airline agent’s tip was mad e 3 

### anonymously and is therefore so unreliable as to preclude its use toward obtaining a search warr ant. See Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990). We disagree. The exact identity of the ai rline’s agent is unimportant: it is enough that she or he worked for the airline, a fact that Armstead does not challenge, and woul d ther efore have accurate information. Moreover, the informatio n provid eddid not predict criminal activity; rather, it recounte d onlyfacts about Armstead’s ticket purchase. Finally, a lowe r deg ree of reliability does not foreclose the use of information , but instead only makes necessary a greater amount of other r eliable information to establish probable cause. Id. at 330. -3- The police subsequently determined t hat no one with the name Michael Armstead was registered as a guest of the motel, but later observed hi m leave the motel. An officer questioned Armstead again, who responded firs t that h e had not been in the motel and then that he had gone into a n unoccupied and unlocked room to take a nap. Armstead consented to a searc h of his bag and presented an identification card bearing the name Michael Pharr (Pharr is now explained by Armstead to be his mother’s new surname uponher remarriage). Telephone records for the room which Armstead had visited indicated that calls had been placed to the same telephone numbers as tho se listed for verification on his travelling companion’s airlin e ticket, despite Armstead’s earlier contention that he was travelling alone
. An office r submitted an affidavit that included facts substantially similar to those abov e in support of a warrant to search Armstead’s motel room. A state judge issued the warrant, and the subsequent search reveale d app roximately650 grams of cocaine base and several thousand dollars i n cash. A search of Ar mstead revealed more currency, a key to the searched room, and rubber band s that matched those used to wrap the currency found in the room.
Armsteadcontends on appeal that the District Court should hav e grante d his suppression motion because the warrant was issued withou t probable cause. We think Armstead’s inconsisten t answers to the officers’ questions and his cur ious explanation for his presence in the motel, when combined with the travel information, 3

### -4-

sup port a finding of probable cause to search the room. A reasonabl e issu ing judge could determine that there was a fair probability tha t evi dence of a crime would be found in Armstead’s motel room, and tha t probable cause to iss ue a warrant therefore existed. E.g. , United States v. LaMorie , 100 F.3d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1996). Moreover, even if probable cause to issue the warrant did not exist, the searching officers ’ reasonable reliance on the judge’s neutral and d etached determination that probable cause existed counters any argument for exclusion of the seized evidenc e. See United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 914-17 (1984). Th e motion to suppress th e evidence was correctly denied, and the convictions therefore are
Affirmed.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.