IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) NO. 2:16-CR-30

) 

ROBERT E. STOCHEL, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Renewed Motion

for a Judgment of Acquittal, filed on December 21, 2016 (DE #78).

For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

During trial, after the close of the Government’s case, the

Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 29(a). (DE #71). This Court denied the

motion. On December 16, 2016, this Court declared a mistrial

because the jury could not come to a unanimous verdict. Defendant

timely filed the instant Motion for Acquittal on December 21, 2016. 

The Government filed a response on January 4, 2017 (DE #80). 

Defendant did not file a reply. Thus, the motion is fully briefed

and ripe for adjudication.
DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) provides that a

defendant may renew a motion for judgment of acquittal after a

guilty verdict or after the court discharged the jury, and “the

court may enter a judgment of acquittal.” Fed. R. Crim. P.

29(c)(1), (2). Thus, Stochel may renew his motion even though this

Court already denied a previous motion made during trial at the

close of the Government’s case in chief. In ruling on a motion for

acquittal, the Court must determine whether, at the time of the

motion, there is relevant evidence from which a jury could

reasonably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. 

See United States v. Studley, 892 F.2d 518, 526 (7th Cir. 1989). 

The Court must “bear in mind that it is the exclusive function of

the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve

evidentiary conflicts and draw reasonable inferences.” United

States v. Hagan, 913 F.2d 1278, 1281 (7th Cir. 1990) (quotation

omitted). The inference of guilt of a criminal offense may be

created by either direct or circumstantial evidence, and

circumstantial evidence is of equal probative value to direct

evidence. Studley, 892 F.2d at 526. All reasonable inferences

that can be drawn from the evidence are viewed in the light most

favorable to the Government. Id. In other words, a motion for

judgment of acquittal must be granted when the evidence, viewed in

2
the light most favorable to the Government, is so scant that the

jury could only speculate as to the defendant’s guilt, and is such

that a reasonably-minded jury must have a reasonable doubt as to

the defendant’s guilt. See United States v. Heberman, 583 F.2d

222, 231 (5th Cir. 1978).

Here, the Government presented sufficient relevant evidence

from which a reasonable jury could find that Stochel was guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of mail fraud, as charged. As this Court

recited in its jury instructions, in order to find Stochel guilty,

the Government had to prove each of the following elements of mail

fraud beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant knowingly

devised a scheme to defraud, as described in Count One of the

indictment; (2) the defendant did so with the intent to defraud;

(3) the scheme to defraud involved a materially false or fraudulent

pretense, representation, or promise; and (4) for the purpose of

carrying out the scheme or attempting to do so, the defendant used

or caused the use of the United States Mails in the manner charged

in Count One of the indictment. (DE #73, Court’s Instruction No.

17). 

In the instant motion, Stochel argues - yet again - that the

Government failed to prove that the indictment was timely under the

five year statute of limitations for mail fraud. This argument was

addressed by the Court in ruling on Stochel’s motion to dismiss the

indictment. (DE #21 at 6). The crime Stochel was charged with is

3
based on a mailing on or about March 13, 2012, and Stochel was

indicted on March 16, 2016. The mailing that provides the basis

for the indictment occurred within five years of the indictment. 

Thus, there is not a statute of limitations problem. See United

States of America v. McGowan, No. 02 CR 350, 2004 WL 909745, at *1-

2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2004). Even if, as Stochel argues, the

evidence establishes that the scheme ended more than five years

prior to March 13, 2012, there is still not a statute of

limitations problem. 

Stochel’s only other argument is that the Government failed to

produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that the mailing was sent to further the scheme. 

According to Stochel, the scheme concluded long before the March

2012 mailing, and thus did not include the March 13, 2012, mailing. 

The Government, however, presented evidence from which a reasonable

jury could conclude otherwise. The evidence established that

Stochel remained the receiver in the Tip Top litigation until after

the March 2012, mailing occurred. And, there is evidence from

which a reasonable jury could conclude that the scheme was broader

than the mere taking of money from the receivership account. There

was evidence that, when the receivership incurred a debt, Stochel

deposited his own funds in the receivership account and then wrote

checks from the receivership account to pay for those expenses. 

There were also court filings and transcripts of court proceedings

4
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Stochel was

attempting to lull the beneficiaries of the receivership into

believing the receivership funds were available. Furthermore,

there was evidence that, after the receivership account had been

drained, the parties were mediating their dispute when there was no

money left to distribute, but Stochel allowed the mediation to

occur because he intended to make up the shortfall with his own

funds. 

Based on the evidence introduced at trial, a reasonable jury

could conclude that the scheme to defraud contained an element of

lulling. And, furthermore, a reasonable jury could find, under the

unique facts of this case, both Stochel’s position as receiver and

the lulling activity continued for years after the receivership

account had been drained, up to and including the mailing in 2012

that served as the basis for the indictment. 

Here, little has changed since this Court ruled on Stochel’s

previously filed motion for judgment of acquittal. The only

additional evidence submitted during the defendant’s case was the

testimony of Attorney Robert Peters, and two exhibits (both court

filings from the underlying litigation). This additional evidence

does nothing to alter the outcome of the instant motion. 

Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth previously, the motion

is DENIED. 

5
CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant’s Renewed Motion for

a Judgment of Acquittal (DE #78) is DENIED.

DATED: January 23, 2017 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

6