Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-11-00696-CV

Jaime P. MARTINEZ and Hector Carrillo,

Appellants

v.

Margaret MORAN, 

Margaret MORAN, Purported National President of 

the League of United Latin American Citizens aka (LULAC), et al.,

Appellees

From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2010-CI-19501

Honorable David A. Berchelmann, Jr., Judge Presiding1

Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 22, 2013

AFFIRMED

The controversy underlying this appeal centers on the 2010 election of the national 

president of the League of United Latin American Citizens (“LULAC”). At the time of the 

election, LULAC’s right to conduct affairs in the State of Texas had been forfeited. Jaime P. 

Martinez and Hector Carrillo filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief relating to the election and 

the forfeiture of LULAC’s right to conduct affairs in Texas. The trial court granted two separate 

 1 Appellants appeal two separate orders granting pleas to the jurisdiction. The Honorable Peter Sakai signed the 

order granting the first plea to the jurisdiction, and the Honorable David A. Berchelmann, Jr. signed the order 

granting the second plea to the jurisdiction.
pleas to the jurisdiction which dismissed all of Martinez’s and Carrillo’s claims. Martinez and 

Carrillo contend on appeal that the trial court erred in granting the pleas and in failing to enter 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the trial court’s orders.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

If an appellant properly requests findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance 

with Rules 296 and 297 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and the trial court fails to comply, 

an appellant is presumed to be harmed if the appellant is forced to guess the basis of the trial 

court’s decision and thereby prevented from properly presenting her appeal. Tenery v. Tenery, 

932 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. 1996). In order to properly request findings of fact and conclusions of 

law, the appellant must have: (1) filed a timely request for the findings of fact and conclusions of 

law pursuant to Rule 296; and (2) filed a timely “Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law” pursuant to Rule 297. TEX. R. CIV. P. 296, 297.

In this case, Martinez and Carrillo timely filed a request for findings of fact and 

conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 296. Although the clerk’s record initially filed in this appeal 

did not contain a “Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,” Martinez and 

Carrillo attached a file-stamped copy of their notice to their reply brief, and this court ordered a 

supplemental clerk’s record containing the document. Although the trial court clerk initially 

informed this court that a supplemental clerk’s record would promptly be filed containing the 

notice, the trial court clerk subsequently filed a letter in this court stating that the notice could not 

be located. Even if we assume for purposes of this decision that Martinez and Carrillo properly 

requested the findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Rules 296 and 297, the 

trial court had no duty to file findings of fact and conclusions of law because the underlying 

cause was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and no evidentiary hearing was held. 

See U. Lawrence Boze’ & Associates, P.C. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 368 S.W.3d 17, 32-

33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); F-Star Socorro, L.P. v. El Paso Cent. 
Appraisal Dist., 324 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.); Ford ex rel. Williams 

v. City of Lubbock, 76 S.W.3d 795, 796-98 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.). Therefore, this 

complaint is overruled.

FIRST PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

In their first issue, Martinez and Carrillo assert that the trial court erred in granting the 

appellees’ first plea to the jurisdiction. After citing case law regarding the standard of review 

and standing, the only argument Martinez and Carrillo make in their brief is the following:

At the time of the decision on the Plea to the Jurisdiction, there was an existing 

controversy and Plaintiffs sought damages and attorneys’ fees. There existed a 

question as to these damages, aside from the declaratory relief sought. For these 

reasons, the Court should reverse the rulings on the pleas to the jurisdiction in 

whole or in part and remand to the trial court for a trial on the merits.

It appears that Martinez and Carrillo may be arguing that their pleading contained a claim for 

damages that the trial court did not recognize in ruling on the first plea to the jurisdiction. We 

note, however, that Martinez’s and Carrillo’s Original Petition for Declaratory Relief and 

Appointment of Receiver (which was the live pleading at the time of the hearing on the first 

plea) did not contain a claim for damages.

At the conclusion of the hearing on the first plea, the trial court announced its ruling and 

granted LULAC’s plea as to the declaratory relief sought by Martinez and Carrillo in paragraphs 

A, B, and E of the petition.2

 The trial court stated that it was “persuaded that the plaintiff’s [sic] 

do not have standing to dissolve the LULAC Corporation pursuant to the cases and the law that 

was presented to the Court.” One of those cases, Saenz v. Garza, No. 03-05-00318-CV, 2007 

WL 74279, at *3, 5 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 12, 2007, no pet.), held that only the Attorney 

 2 Paragraphs A, B, and E requested the following declaratory relief:

A. That the Court enter a judgment holding that LULAC, a Non Profit Corporation was involuntarily 

dissolved on or about April 8, 2005 until on or about October 14, 2010;

B. That the Court enter a Judgment holding that Defendant, LULAC had no authority to conduct any 

business nor take any action as LULAC since Defendant’s legal entity and existence had been forfeited, dissolved, 

and terminated by the Texas Secretary of State on April 8, 2005;

E. That the Court appoint a Receiver to conduct the affairs of LULAC, a Texas the [sic] Non-Profit 

Corporation to assure compliance with the laws under the Texas Business Organizations Code.
General in a quo warranto proceeding could obtain a declaratory judgment that a corporation was 

dissolved and did not validly exist. Martinez’s and Carrillo’s brief contains no argument 

addressing this ruling or the law relied upon by the trial court in making its ruling. Accordingly, 

we also do not address the merits of the trial court’s ruling.3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) 

(requiring brief to contain a clear and concise argument for contentions made with appropriate 

citations to authorities); Prize Energy Resources, L.P. v. Cliff Hoskins, Inc., 345 S.W.3d 537, 562 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (failure “to provide a clear argument or supporting 

authority waives the claimed error”); Brown v. Hearthwood II Owners Ass’n, Inc., 201 S.W.3d 

153, 161 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (failure to “advance substantive 

analysis waives the issue on appeal”).

SECOND PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

In their second issue, Martinez and Carrillo assert the trial court erred in granting the 

second plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the case. After briefly summarizing the arguments 

made in the plea and their response, the only argument Martinez and Carrillo make in their brief 

regarding the trial court’s granting of the second plea is as follows:

Contrary to Judge Sakai’s ruling and ignoring the Plaintiffs/Appellants[’] request 

for damages and attorneys[’] fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Judge 

Berchelmann dismissed the case. The trial court ignored the prior caselaw set out 

above and ignored Plaintiffs/Appellants[’] entitlement to and request for damages.

The only case law “set out above” in the brief addressed the standard of review and standing. As 

Martinez and Carrillo recognize in their brief, however, “Defendants/Appellees argued at the 

hearing that because the terms of the office had already ended, all of the issues were moot.” 

Martinez and Carrillo do not discuss in their brief how the trial court erred in dismissing their 

 3 With regard to the relief requested in Paragraph B, we note that the record establishes that LULAC also was 

organized or incorporated under the laws of other states. We also note section 22.362(c)(1) of the Texas Business 

Organizations Code states that the forfeiture of the right to conduct affairs in Texas does not impair the validity of 

an act of the corporation. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.362(c)(1) (West 2012).
claims on the ground that they were moot.4

 Moreover, the appellees also argued at the hearing 

that Martinez and Carrillo failed to exhaust their administrative remedies regarding their claim 

for damages for the election expenses they incurred and the dues they paid.5 Martinez and 

Carrillo do not raise any challenge in their brief with regard to this possible basis for the trial 

court’s ruling. Because Martinez and Carrillo do not analyze the alternative grounds for the trial 

court’s ruling, we also do not address the merits of the trial court’s ruling. See TEX. R. APP. P.

38.1(i); Prize Energy Resources, L.P., 345 S.W.3d at 562; Brown, 201 S.W.3d at 161.

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s orders are affirmed.

Karen Angelini, Justice

 4 For example, Martinez and Carrillo sought a declaratory judgment that “a new election be ordered as soon as 

possible and conducted by a neutral third party trustee appointed by the court.” In their second plea, the appellees 

asserted that a new election was held on July 2, 2011. The trial court held its hearing on the second plea on July 20, 

2011.

5 In their second plea, the appellees asserted Martinez and Carrillo “did not exhaust their administrative remedy of 

appeal to either the National Board or the National Assembly.” The only evidence of any administrative action 

pursued by Martinez or Carrillo was a formal complaint dated August 13, 2010, that Carrillo filed with the National 

Board of Directors, seeking to remove the national president from office for misfeasance and malfeasance based on

irregularities in the 2010 election because unqualified people were allowed to vote and some of the delegates were 

improperly paid.