IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-15-00244-CR

EX PARTE AMBER HOPE HALFORD

From the 87th District Court

Freestone County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15-065-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Amber Halford appeals an order from a pretrial habeas corpus proceeding that 

reduced her bail from $1,000,000 to $250,000. Halford has been indicted for the offense 

of capital murder.1 Halford complains that the trial court abused its discretion by 

setting the bail amount in an arbitrary manner and failing to set the bail in a lower 

amount. Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

We review a trial court's decision that sets a bail amount for an abuse of 

discretion. See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); 

 

1 Halford also has a pending burglary of a habitation charge which occurred the day before the murder 

against the same victim with bail set at $40,000, but that bail amount is not at issue in this proceeding.
Ex parte Halford Page 2

Ex parte Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d 160, 161 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref'd). We 

examine the record to determine whether the trial court considered the relevant 

statutory and common law factors and set a bail amount that was not excessive. See 

Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d at 161-62; Montalvo v. State, 315 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). The appellant has the burden to show that the 

amount of bail is excessive. Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849; Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d at 161. If our 

review shows the trial court exercised its discretion within the constraints of the 

Constitution, the Texas Constitution, the statutory requirements, and the common law 

factors, we will not overturn its decision. See Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d at 161-62; Ex parte 

Hunt, 138 S.W.3d 503, 505 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd) (citing Montgomery v. 

State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).

The amount of bail in any case must adhere to these rules:

1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the 

undertaking will be complied with.

2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an 

instrument of oppression.

3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was 

committed are to be considered.

4. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken upon 

this point.

5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community 

shall be considered.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.15 (West 2005).
Ex parte Halford Page 3

Courts may also consider the following set of factors when assessing whether the 

amount of bail is reasonable: (1) the defendant's work record; (2) the defendant's family 

and community ties; (3) the defendant's length of residency; (4) the defendant's prior 

criminal record; (5) the defendant's conformity with previous bond conditions; (6) the 

existence of other outstanding bonds, if any; and (7) the aggravating circumstances 

alleged to have been involved in the charged offense. See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 

848, 849-50 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). 

The evidence presented at the hearing showed that Halford is twenty years old 

and was working as a waitress prior to her arrest. Halford had resided in Freestone or 

Limestone County her entire life. Halford had no assets of any kind. Halford had no 

prior criminal history other than the pending burglary charge. Halford’s mother had 

passed away while Halford was in jail. If released, Halford intended to live with either 

her sister or the man she considers to be her father. Halford’s sister was presently 

living in Whitehouse but was in the process of moving to an unknown location in 

Groesbeck. Halford’s father lived in Groesbeck. Halford stated that she would wear an 

ankle monitor and abide by a curfew as a condition of her bail.

Halford’s father testified that he thought he would be able to raise $10,000 to 

$15,000 by getting a loan or selling property to post bail for Halford, but could not raise 

the $100,000 to $250,000 the bond companies required to pay for the $1,000,000 bail set 

for the capital murder.
Ex parte Halford Page 4

No evidence was presented by the State regarding the circumstances of the 

capital murder. However, it was alleged that Halford participated in a burglary of the 

murder victim’s residence the night before the murder, during which four firearms 

were stolen. One of the stolen firearms was used in the murder which was also 

committed at the victim’s residence. At the time of the habeas corpus hearing two of 

the firearms had not been recovered.

At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court announced that Halford’s bail 

would be reduced to $500,000, which the trial court believed was the same amount to 

which a co-defendant’s bail had been reduced. The State advised the trial court that the 

co-defendant’s bail had actually been reduced to $250,000, and the trial court stated that 

Halford’s bail would be reduced to the same amount. 

Although Halford has no criminal history and has lived in the community for her 

entire life, the testimony showed that she has no assets or future employment prospects 

in the area. Halford testified to having one job as a waitress but no other job history. 

Halford was not sure where she would reside if released. Halford has a second charge 

pending involving the same victim. Two of the four firearms stolen in the burglary 

were still missing, although Halford denied knowing where they were.

Halford argues that because no evidence was presented as to the exact 

circumstances of the capital murder and because the only evidence regarding the 
Ex parte Halford Page 5

appropriate amount of bail was that her father could pay only $10,000 to $15,000, the 

trial court abused its discretion by setting her bail in the amount of $250,000.

It is not necessary for the exact circumstances of the offense to be presented for 

this Court to consider the nature of the offense of capital murder and its mandatory 

sentence if Halford is convicted. In assessing the reasonableness of the amount of bail, 

the nature of the offense is a primary consideration. See Ex parte Durst, 148 S.W.3d 496, 

500 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. refused) (majority op. on reh'g) (citing 

Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849 ("The primary factors are the length of the sentence 

and the nature of the offense")); Aviles v. State, 26 S.W.3d 696, 698-99 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. refused) ("Two factors should be given great weight 

when determining the amount of bail: the nature of the offense and the length of the 

sentence"); Ex parte Hulin, 31 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no 

pet.) ("The primary factors to be considered in determining what constitutes reasonable 

bail are the punishment that can be imposed and the nature of the offense). Capital 

murder is punishable by life in prison without parole or death.2 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 

§ 12.31(a) (West 2011). 

Additionally, the accused's ability to make a certain amount of bail is not 

controlling; otherwise, "the role of the trial court in setting bond would be completely 

 

2 The State is not seeking the death penalty.
Ex parte Halford Page 6

eliminated and the accused would be in the position to determine what his bond should 

be." Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 150 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

Viewing the evidence presented and by considering the factors as set forth in the 

Code of Criminal Procedure and Ex Parte Rubac, we do not find that the trial court’s 

decision to reduce Halford’s bail amount to $250,000 was outside of the zone of 

reasonable disagreement. We overrule Halford’s sole issue.

Conclusion

Having found no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed September 24, 2015

Do not publish

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