NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARLOS RIVERA-RUEDA, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFREY A. ROSEN, Acting Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-72993 

Agency No. A200-568-437 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 13, 2021**

Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,*** District 

Judge.

Carlos Rivera-Rueda petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals’ (BIA) decision dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

JAN 15 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Page 2 of 4

denial of his application for withholding of removal under § 241(b)(3) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT). Because the BIA’s determinations were 

supported by substantial evidence, we deny Rivera-Rueda’s petition for review.

1. We review adverse credibility findings under a substantial evidence 

standard, considering the totality of circumstances and applying a “rule-of-reason 

analysis” to ensure the agency’s determination is supported by “specific and cogent 

reasons” and considers all relevant factors in accordance with the REAL ID Act. 

Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039–40, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the BIA 

did not err in affirming the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. The BIA relied on 

Rivera-Rueda’s failure to inform immigration officials of his past harm in Mexico

during numerous interactions at the border and his willingness to return to Mexico 

following these apprehensions, both of which are valid bases for an adverse 

credibility finding. See id. at 1039–40 (identifying implausibility and 

inconsistencies as relevant considerations); Loho v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1016, 

1017–18 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an IJ’s reliance on petitioner’s voluntary 

return in rendering an adverse credibility finding was appropriate). During the 

withholding hearing, the IJ provided Rivera-Rueda with an opportunity to explain 

these discrepancies, as the IJ asked Rivera-Rueda about his failure to inform 
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immigration officials of his fear of returning to Mexico and his willingness to 

return. Substantial evidence therefore supports the BIA’s conclusions.

2. Although the adverse credibility finding itself provides a sufficient basis 

for denying Rivera-Rueda’s eligibility for withholding of removal, we also find no 

error in the BIA’s determination that he would not be entitled to withholding even 

if he had been found credible. Rivera-Rueda seeks withholding on the basis of his 

membership in three particular social groups: “kinship,” “crime witness subjected 

to police,” and “criminal extortion.” Even if one or more of these were cognizable 

social groups under the INA, there is no nexus between these groups and RiveraRueda’s alleged fear. Rivera-Rueda repeatedly indicated that his fear of harm is 

based on his status as someone who recently returned from the United States, 

appears American, and thus might be assumed to have money. We have held, 

however, that this is not a cognizable particular social group. See Delgado-Ortiz v. 

Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that “returning Mexicans 

from the United States” was not a cognizable social group for purposes of 

establishing a protected ground); see also Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 887 

(9th Cir. 2019) (holding substantial evidence supported BIA’s denial of 

withholding where claimed reason for targeting was “because people in Mexico 

would know he came from the United States and would assume his family had 

money for a ransom”).
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3. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that RiveraRueda is not eligible for protection under CAT. Although an “adverse credibility 

determination is not necessarily a death knell to CAT protection,” Rivera-Rueda 

needed to provide reports that alone compel the conclusion that he is more likely 

than not to be tortured if returned to Mexico. Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048–49

(citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). Rivera-Rueda provided country conditions 

evidence demonstrating that police corruption and violence are widespread in 

Mexico, but he has not shown a risk particular to him and thus has failed to

establish his entitlement to protection under CAT. See Delgado-Ortiz, 600 F.3d at

1152 (“Petitioners’ generalized evidence of violence and crime in Mexico is not 

particular to Petitioners and is insufficient to meet [the CAT] standard.”). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 

Rivera-Rueda’s motion for stay of removal (Dkt. 1) is DENIED as moot.