UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

MICHAEL WILSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:16-CV-24-TLS

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael Wilson, by counsel, filed a habeas corpus petition to challenge his conviction for 

murder under Cause No. 49G04-704-MR-57737. Following a jury trial, on May 7, 2008, the 

Marion Superior Court sentenced Wilson to sixty years of incarceration with fifteen years 

suspended subject to five years of probation. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In deciding this habeas petition, the court must presume the facts set forth by the State 

courts are correct unless they are rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1). The Court of Appeals of Indiana summarized the evidence presented at trial:

The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal that thirty-two-year-old Wilson and 

thirty-three-year-old Nupur Srivastava met at a drug and alcohol rehabilitation 

center in New York in November 2006. After Nupur was discharged from the 

center, she joined Wilson at his father’s home in Indianapolis in January 2007, and 

later rented an apartment on the north side of town. In early April 2007, while 

Nupur was visiting her family in Maryland, her parents convinced her she needed 

to return to the rehabilitation center. Nupur briefly returned to Indianapolis to 

retrieve her belongings. The day before she was scheduled to leave Indianapolis, 

Nupur and Wilson were drinking whiskey and arguing on Wilson's father’s patio 

when Wilson splashed Nupur with gasoline and set her on fire.
2

Nupur ran through Wilson's father’s house to the bathroom where she filled up the 

bathtub and jumped into it to put out the flames. While she was in the bathtub, 

Wilson called 911 to report a fire. During the phone call, Nupur asked Wilson why 

he had done that. Wilson responded, “I didn't think it was going to be like that, I 

swear.” When paramedics arrived at the scene, Nupur walked unassisted out of the 

garage. Paramedic Jeff Brown ran to Nupur and escorted her to an ambulance. 

When Brown asked Nupur what had happened, she told the paramedic that Wilson 

had poured gas on her and set her on fire. Brown placed Nupur in the ambulance 

and turned to see a naked Wilson standing in the yard. Wilson had burns on his 

hands and portions of his forearms. Wilson told the paramedic that there had been 

an accident with the gas grill. On the way to the hospital, Nupur again told Brown 

as well as paramedic Shawn Grindstaff that she and Wilson were arguing when 

Wilson threw gasoline on her and lit her on fire. Wilson told another paramedic and 

a hospital nurse that the fire started when he and Nupur tried to light a grill using 

gasoline.

The following day, Indianapolis Police Department Sergeant John Breedlove went 

to the hospital to interview Wilson. Before the interview, Breedlove consulted with 

hospital staff who advised him that Wilson was taking Percocet for pain. Before 

questioning Wilson, Sergeant Breedlove read him his Miranda rights and had him 

sign a waiver of rights form. Wilson told the sergeant that he understood his rights, 

and the sergeant began to question him.

During the interview, Wilson asked to make a telephone phone call so that he could 

talk to someone because of the seriousness of the events. The sergeant told Wilson 

that he could stop answering questions at any time and allowed Wilson to make a 

telephone call. Wilson attempted to call his father, who he was unable to reach. 

After making the phone call, Wilson told the sergeant that the person he wanted to 

speak to was his father but that he was unable to reach him.

Sergeant Breedlove readvised Wilson of his rights, and Wilson told the sergeant 

that he understood those rights and was willing to continue answering questions. 

During the interview, Wilson appeared coherent, understood the questions the 

sergeant asked him, never became confused, and thought about and provided 

answers to the questions. Although Wilson delayed answering some of the 

questions about how Nupur became doused with gasoline and set on fire, Sergeant 

Breedlove interpreted Wilson’s responses to be deceitful rather than confused.

During the interview, Wilson admitted that his previous story about the grill 

accident was not true. Wilson explained that he told that story because he panicked. 

According to Wilson, he was holding a gas can while he and Nupur were arguing. 

Nupur pulled on the can and gas apparently splashed on her and ignited when one 

of them lit a cigarette. Wilson explained that when Nupur drank alcohol, “she 

always got very, very argumentative and wanted to put Wilson down and wanted 

to say things to push buttons.” The State subsequently charged Wilson with 

attempted murder and aggravated battery. Nupur, who had third degree burns on 
3

80% of her body, was placed in a drug-induced coma to allow for treatment and 

pain management. After she died from multi-organ failure resulting from her burns 

five weeks later, Wilson was charged with murder.

At trial, additional evidence revealed that in March 2007, while Nupur was staying 

at a hotel in Indianapolis, she and Wilson got into a physical altercation. Jimmy 

Barona, the hotel’s owner, testified that Nupur’s hair was messed up, and she had 

a black eye and scratches on her face. When Nupur and Barona told Wilson to leave 

Nupur’s hotel room, Wilson pushed Nupur and appeared ready to fight Barona. 

Barona and a hotel maintenance worker had to physically remove Wilson from the 

room.

In addition, a former neighbor testified that Wilson and Nupur argued every day. 

According to the neighbor, one night Wilson banged on Nupur’s apartment door 

for hours demanding to be let into the apartment. The following morning, the 

neighbor noticed plaster from the ceiling and the walls had been knocked to the 

floor by Wilson’s banging.

Also at trial, ATF Fire Research Engineer Brian Grove testified that he conducted 

nine tests where gas was splashed on a manikin wearing jeans and a sweater similar 

to those that Nupur was wearing. The tests revealed that Nupur was seated when 

she was doused with approximately one-half cup of gasoline below her waistband 

and above her knees. The gasoline was then ignited with a flame, not a cigarette, 

which had to have been placed one to two inches from the gasoline. Two lighters 

were found on the patio where Nupur was sitting. One of the lighters was found on 

a table, and the other was found on the ground.

Wilson testified that at the time he gave his statement to Sergeant Breedlove, 

Wilson was “pretty doped up,” and easily confused. He also testified that Nupur set 

herself on fire and asked him not to tell anyone what she had done. A jury convicted 

Wilson of murder, and he appeals.

(Wilson v. State, No. 49A05–0806–CR–329, 2009 WL 104183, at *1–*2 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 

2009) (internal citations omitted), ECF No. 9-7.)

Wilson argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief, alleging that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not introduce evidence related to his or 

the victim’s blood alcohol content. Wilson presented these claims to the Court of Appeals of 

Indiana and the Indiana Supreme Court. (See ECF No. 9-11; ECF No. 9-15.) Therefore, he has 

properly exhausted his State court remedies, and the court will consider his claims on the merits.
4

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Federal habeas review . . . exists as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state 

criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Woods v. 

Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (quotations and citation omitted). 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant 

to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that 

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of 

the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 

of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

[This] standard is intentionally difficult to meet. We have explained that clearly 

established Federal law for purposes of §2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as 

opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. And an unreasonable application of 

those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear 

error will not suffice. To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to 

show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was 

so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Criminal defendants are 

entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). To warrant 

relief, a state court’s decision must be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively 

unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). “A state court’s determination that a 

claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on 

the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) 

(quotation marks omitted).
5

ANALYSIS

Wilson argues that the State court made an unreasonable determination that trial counsel 

was not ineffective by failing to present evidence related to his and the victim’s blood alcohol 

content. He argues that such evidence would have discredited the victim’s statements and would 

have explained Wilson’s inability to consistently and accurately recount the events on the date of 

the crime. He also argues that such evidence would have made the defense theory that the victim 

set herself on fire more plausible.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the State courts, a petitioner 

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 

prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). There is “a strong presumption 

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, 

the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689. The test for prejudice is whether 

there was a reasonable probability that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. In assessing prejudice under Strickland, “[t]he 

likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). However, “[o]n habeas review, [the] inquiry is now whether the state 

court unreasonably applied Strickland.” McNary v. Lemke, 708 F.3d 905, 914 (7th Cir. 2013). 

“Given this high standard, even ‘egregious’ failures of counsel do not always warrant relief.” Id.

At trial, a medic testified that the victim told him that Wilson had poured gasoline on her 

and lit her on fire. Trial Tr. 147–48. A fire protection engineer testified that it was highly 

unlikely that a lit cigarette would ignite gasoline. Id. at 254. The engineer testified that the flame 

from a butane lighter could have caused the fire, but even then, a person would have to hold the 
6

lighter within one or two inches of gasoline-soaked fabric for ignition. Id. at 255, 266–67. The 

victim suffered substantial burn injuries affecting eighty percent of her body, but her face and 

hands were spared. Id. at 309–12, 477. Wilson suffered burn injuries as well, but they were 

mostly confined to his hands and forearms. Id. at 156–57. Wilson testified that he suffered the 

burns in an effort to extinguish the fire by “trying to beat the flames with [his] arms” and by 

carrying the victim to the bathroom. Id. at 439–42, 452. However, a physician, who had 

substantial experience with treating burns, testified that he would have expected an individual 

carrying another person with burning clothing to have more severe injuries. Id. at 308–09. At 

closing, the prosecution argued that the expert testimony and the nature of Wilson’s and the 

victim’s injuries suggested that Wilson ignited the gasoline, reasoning that a person igniting the 

fire would have burned his or her hands and that only Wilson had burned hands. Id. at 526–27. 

Trial counsel argued that the fire was likely caused by the victim playing with a lighter. Id. at 

501. Trial counsel also explained that the reason for advising Wilson to testify was to explain his 

burns and his reaction to the fire. Id. at 510.

At trial, a substantial amount of evidence was introduced to show that the victim had 

issues with alcohol and that Wilson and the victim had consumed a significant amount of alcohol 

on the day of the fire. For example, the victim’s mother testified that the victim had a drinking 

problem and that she went to Saint Jude Retreat House for rehabilitation and was planning to 

return. Id. at 9–13. A hotel owner testified that the victim had a half gallon of vodka in her hotel 

room two weeks before she was set to return to Saint Judge Retreat House. Id. at 224. Wilson 

and his mother also testified regarding the victim’s struggles with alcohol. Id. at 386, 422–24. A 

medic testified that, during the ambulance ride to the hospital, the victim stated that she had 

drank “a lot.” Id. at 151–52. A medic also testified that Wilson stated that he had drinking. Id. at 
7

129. Wilson also testified that he and the victim had been drinking “a lot” that day. Id. at 434–35. 

Trial counsel repeatedly asked questions about the victim’s consumption of alcohol that day and 

again alluded to it during closing arguments. Id. at 20, 141–42, 297–98, 352–53, 501, 513. 

The evidence at trial revealed that Wilson’s version of the events had various 

inconsistencies with the physical evidence and underwent several evolutions. When questioned 

by first responders immediately after the incident, Wilson told them that an outdoor grill had 

caused the burns. Id. at 119. However, it was discovered that the outdoor grill was covered and 

that it was a propane grill, which was inconsistent with the use of gasoline. Trial Ex. 73 at 19–20. 

When questioned by a detective on the following day, he stated that the victim spilled gasoline 

on herself when she jumped up and grabbed the gas container Wilson was carrying as he walked 

by her and that a short time later she was engulfed in flames. Id. at 6–7. By contrast, the fire 

engineer testified that, considering the location of the victim’s burn patterns, it was more likely 

that the gasoline was placed on her while she was sitting. Trial Tr. 364–65. When testifying at 

trial, Wilson stated that the victim spilled gasoline on herself when she was sitting and grabbed 

the gas container Wilson was carrying as he walked by her; she then grabbed a pack of cigarettes 

and lighter; and a short time later she was on fire. Id. at 436–39. However, photographs depicting 

the location of the pack of cigarettes, the lighter, and a cellphone suggested that the victim was 

instead holding the cellphone and the lighter but no pack of cigarettes. Trial Ex. 11, 12.

Trial counsel attempted to account for these inconsistencies by eliciting Wilson’s 

testimony that the victim had asked him to lie about the cause of the fire to avoid being perceived 

as mentally unstable and that he was on morphine during the interview with the detective. Trial 

Tr. 445–46, 456. At closing, trial counsel explained that Wilson’s mistaken recollection 
8

regarding the pack of cigarettes was because “everything was going so fast for [Wilson.]” Id. at 

498.

At the post-conviction relief stage, Wilson argued that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to present evidence of the victim’s blood alcohol content at the time of the fire and its 

effect on her behavior, memory, and perception. PCR App. 246–55. Wilson also argued that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of Wilson’s blood alcohol content at the 

time of the fire and its effect on his behavior, memory, and perception. Id. At an evidentiary 

hearing, Dr. Daniel McCoy reviewed the medical records and extrapolated that the victim’s 

blood alcohol content was between .303 and .334. PCR Tr. 180-82. He testified that this alcohol 

level would have affected the victim as follows:

Well, there are two features really basically that would be impacted. The sensory 

input itself. The functions of the eyes, the ears, the awareness, touch, feel, that sort 

of thing, all would be modified. So the sensory organs themselves at that kind of a 

high concentration level will be impacted so that they are not working as well. They 

will suffer decrease in their ability to perform. And then secondarily, the 

information that they’re sending although it’s not accurate, it even becomes less 

valuable for the brain because the brain has really been impacted to the point it will 

not process that information in a normal fashion. So it will be distorted. It will not 

really be representative of what’s actually taking place.

* * *

This kind of concentration of alcohol and the type of repetitive exposure that a 

person may have had to be able to tolerate this would impact both short and longterm memory. So their ability to recall past events and even current events would 

be modified considerably.

Id. Dr. McCoy testified that Wilson’s blood alcohol content was between .242 and .281 and that 

this alcohol level would have had a dramatic impact. Id. at 189-91. According to Dr. McCoy, a 

person at that alcohol level “would not have the normal ability to adequately perceive and 

process sensory information in a normal fashion.” Id.
9

The post-conviction relief court found no deficient performance, noting that trial counsel 

had hired a physician to review the medical records and decided not to hire an expert because the 

evidence sufficiently demonstrated that the victim was extremely intoxicated and because 

voluntary intoxication was not a valid defense for Wilson. PCR App. 83–86. The court further 

found no prejudice with respect to the effect of alcohol on the victim, reasoning that the evidence 

indicated that she “was an alcoholic, had previously been in rehab, and was planning to re-enter 

rehab imminently” and that a paramedic testified that the victim had said that she had drank “a 

lot.” Id. The court also found no prejudice with respect to the effect of alcohol on Wilson, 

reasoning that the defense strategy depended on the credibility of Wilson’s testimony about the 

events on the day of fire. Id. Additionally, the court questioned whether the hospital blood tests 

could have been authenticated. Id.

The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed the lower court’s decision with respect to the 

victim, reasoning that trial counsel presented evidence of the victim’s intoxication and that the 

jury likely had understanding of the effects of intoxication. (Opinion at 12–15, ECF No. 9-14.)

The appellate court also affirmed the decision with respect to Wilson, agreeing that trial strategy 

relied on the credibility of his testimony. (Id.)

After reviewing the record, the Court cannot conclude that the State court’s 

determinations on the ineffective counsel claims were objectively unreasonable. As an initial 

matter, courts have frequently suggested that expert testimony is not necessary to explain the 

effects of alcohol on memory and perception. See e.g., Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 

1221 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535, 551–52 (7th Cir. 1995); Mitchell v. 

Pszczolkowski, NO. 2:15-cv-12156, 2016 WL 5661196, at *7 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 29, 2016); 

Morris v. Clay, No. CIV S–08–1790, 2010 WL 2011583, at *12 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2010);
10

Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d 1022, 1044 (Ind. 2007). As detailed above, trial counsel 

presented a substantial amount of evidence regarding Wilson and the victim’s use of alcohol. 

Moreover, the trial strategy relied on Wilson’s credibility to present an exculpatory version of 

the events surrounding the fire to the jury and to explain the burns on his hands. Though trial 

counsel did not present blood alcohol content evidence to address the inconsistencies in Wilson’s 

stories to the first responders, the detective, and the jury, he addressed them by other means. 

Considering the record as a whole, the State court’s determination regarding deficient 

performance was not unreasonable.

Additionally, even if statements from the victim and Wilson were entirely omitted, the 

trial record would contain ample evidence of Wilson’s guilt. Specifically, the fire engineer’s 

expert testimony strongly implied that the person who set the victim on fire would have burned 

his or her hands. Further, the medical evidence indicated that the victim suffered burns on nearly 

every part of her body, except for her hands, and that Wilson suffered burns only to his hands 

and wrists. Finally, the burn specialist’s expert testimony cast doubt on the possibility that 

Wilson incurred his burns in an attempt to rescue the victim. Considering the significant 

probative value of the medical evidence and expert testimony and the minimal probative value of 

the proposed alcohol-related evidence, the State court’s determination regarding lack of 

prejudice was not unreasonable. Therefore, Wilson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

are not a basis for habeas relief.

Pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11, the Court must grant or deny a 

certificate of appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the 

petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right by establishing

“that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should 
11

have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For the 

reasons explained in this Opinion and Order for denying habeas corpus relief, there is no basis 

for encouraging Wilson to proceed further. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the court DENIES the habeas corpus petition; DENIES a certificate of 

appealability pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11; and DIRECTS the Clerk to enter 

judgment in favor of the Respondent and against the Petitioner.

SO ORDERED on June 22, 2018.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT