### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Brie fs N ove m be r 10, 200 5 S es sio n M. D. v. R .L. H. Appeal f romthe Juvenile Court for Anderson County No. J-20395 P at Hess, Judge

No. E2005-00324-COA- R3-P T - F ILED NOVEMBER 22, 2005

M.D. (“Mothe r”) filed a pe tition s eeking to terminate the pa renta l rig hts of R.L .H. (“ Father” ) to the parties’ seven y ear

old son. Following a hea ring , the J uvenile Court held t hat g rounds for terminati n g Fa ther’s pa

renta l rig hts had bee n established by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Howeve r, the Juvenile Court made no fa ctual finding s or conc lusions of l aw as to whethe r terminating Father’s pa

renta l rig hts was in t h e b es t i n t erest of the child. The judg ment of the Juve nil e Cou rt

is a ff irme d inpa

rt , v a c a te d inpa

rt , a ndre ma nd e d f

or fu rthe r p ro c e e din g s.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Juv e nileCo ur t A ffirm e d in P ar t a nd V ac at e d in P ar t; Ca se Re m ande d

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., joined.

Br ennan P. L enihan, Clinton, Tennessee , for the A ppellant R.L .H.

Sam F. L ain, Oak Ridg e, Te nnessee , for the A ppellee M.D

.-2- OP IN ION
Bac kgr ound
This c ase involves the termination of Father’s pare ntal rig hts to his minor son who wa s born in Nov emb er of 19 98 . In M arc h o f 2 00 2, Mo the r f ile d a pe tit ionse e kin g to t e rm inate Father’s pare ntal rig hts on the sole g round that F ather was inca rce rate d under a

sentenc e of te n or more y ear s and the child was unde r the a g e of e ight at the time the sentenc e wa s imposed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(6)

. A g uardia n ad litem was a ppointed on the child' s behalf, and an attorney was a ppointed to repre s en t Fathe r af ter F ather

filed an a ffidavit of indig ency which indicated, among othe r thing s, that he had be en sente nced to ten y ear s in p ri s o n sometime during 2000. The Juvenile Court la t er en t er ed an orde r direc ting the D epartment of Correc tion to make Father a vailable via tel ep h o ne for the hea ring on Mother' s petition. Following the hearing, the Juve nil e Cou rt

e nte re d it s o rd e r w hic h s tate d: Upon re viewing the leng thy history of thi s case and upon te sti mon y pr e se nte d in c ou rt , theCou rt fi nd s th a t th e pa

re nta l rig hts of [Father ]... shoul d be terminated and that ba sed on Section 36-1- 113, there are multipl e grounds on which to g rant the te rmination.... [F a the r] p le a de d g uil ty

in the Kn ox Cou nty Cr imi na l Cou rt on Ap ri l 14, 2000, to the offe nse of ag g ravated sexual battery of a c hild under the ag e of 6 y ears . I n addition to being g uiltyof abandonment, ... [Father] committed sever e child abuse as defined i n Tenne ssee Code Annotated 37- 1-102(b) (21)( c) and 39-13-504. The Court further finds that

... [Father] was sentenc ed to te n (10) y ea rs confine ment and is, at the date of the he aring , still serving that sentenc e. Ba sed on the for eg oing, the J uvenile Court t e rminated Father' s pare ntal rig hts. Fathe r no w a pp e a ls. F a the r a

rg ue s th e Juve nil e Cou rt ' s f a c tua l f ind ing s w e reins uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt a conclusion that g rounds for te rminating his parenta l rig hts had been es t ab l i s h ed by clea r and c on vin c ing e vid e nc e . F a the r al so c la ims theJuve nil e Cou rt e rr e d inte rm inatin g his pa re nta l rig hts absent a finding by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that terminating his par ental rig hts was in the child' s best interests.
Discussion

Th e fa c tua l f

ind ing s of the Juve nil e Cou rt are a c c or de d a pre su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss, and we will not overturn those fac tual finding s unless the evidenc e preponde rate s ag ainst them. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001) . Wit h respe ct to leg al issues, our review i s conducte d “under a pure de novo standard of revie w, ac cording no defe renc e to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” So uth e rn Con str uc tor s, In c . v. Lou do n Co un ty Bd. Of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001) . I n In re Adoption of T.A.M. , No. M2003-02247--3-

COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 1085228 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2004), no appl. perm. appeal filed , th is Cou rt ob se rv e d th a t:
Be cause of the heig htened burden of proof require d by Tenn. C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -1 -1 1 3 (c ), we m u s tad a p tT en n . R

. Ap p . P

. 1 3 (d )'s c us tom ary

stand ardof

re vie w f or c a ses of th is so rt . F ir st, we mus t revie w the trial c ourt' s specific finding s of fac t de novo in acc ordanc e wi th T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) . T hu s, e a c h o f the tria l c ou rt ' s sp e c if ic fac tual finding s will be presumed to be corr ect unless the e vidence preponde rate s otherwise. Sec ond, we must determine whether the fact s , either a s found by the trial court or as supported by the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, cle arly and convinc ingly

establish the g rounds for terminating the bi ologic al parent' s pare ntal rig hts. Jones v . G ar re tt , 9 2 S. W.3 d at 83 8; In re Valentine , 79 S. W.3 d at 54 6; Ray v. Ray , 83 S.W. 3d at 7 33; I n r e L

. S

. W. , No. M2000-01935- COA-R3-JV, 2001 W L

1013079, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2001), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. D ec. 27, 2001)

. In re Adoption of T.A.M., 2004 WL 1085228, at *3 (footnote omitted).
I n De p't o f Ch ild re n's S e rv s. v . D .G .S .L. , this Court discussed the re levant burde n of proof in ca ses involving termination of pare ntal rig hts. Specifically , we obse rved:

I t i s w e ll e s ta

b li s h e d th a t “ p ar e n ts h a v e a f u n d a me n ta l r ig h t to the car e, custody , and contr ol of their children.” In re Drinnon , 776 S

. W

. 2 d 9 6 , 9 7 (T en n . C t

. Ap p . 1 9 8 8 ) ( ci t i n g Sta nle y v . I lli no is , 405 U. S. 6 45 , 9 2 S. Ct. 12 08 , 3 1 L . Ed. 2d55 1 ( 19 72 )) . " Ho we ve r, thi s ri g ht i s n ot a

bs olu te a nd pa

re nta l rig hts ma y

be te rm inate d if

the reis clea r and c onvincing evidenc e justify ing suc h termination under the app li cabl e st atu te. " Id. (c i t i n g Santosky v . Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct . 1388, 71 L . Ed. 2d 599 (1982))

. Termination of pa

renta l or g uardia nship rights must be base d upo n a f in d in g b y th e c o u rt th a t: ( 1 ) th e g r o u n d s f o r te r mi n ation of pare ntal or g uardia nship rights ha v e bee n established by clea r and co n v i n ci n g ev i d en ce ; an d (2 ) t er m i n at i o n o f th e pa re n t 's o r gu ar d i an 's rig ht s i s i n the best intere sts of the child. Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-1-113( c). B efor e a pa rent' s rig hts can be terminated, it mustbe sh ow n th a t th e pa

re nt i s u nf

it o r s ub stanti a l ha

rm to the child w ill result i f parental rights are not terminated. In re Swanson , 2 S.W .3d 18 0, 18 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; In re M. W .A ., J r. , 980 S.W .2d 620, 622 (T e nn . Ct. Ap p. 19 98 ). Simi larl y , b e fo rethec ou rt ma y inq uir e a s to whether termination of par ental rig hts is in t he best intere s t s of theW e not e t hat M ot her obt ai ned n ew c ouns el t o re pres ent he r on appeal an d her ne w at t orn ey appare nt l y was 1

u n a b le to o b ta in a tra n sc rip t o f t h e he a rin g d e sp ite re p e a te d a ttem p ts to d o so . -4- child, the court must first determine that the g rounds for te rmination have be en esta

blished by clea

r and convincing evidenc e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( c)....
De p't o f Ch ild re n's S e rv s. v . D .G .S .L. , No. E2001-00742- COA-R3-JV, 2001 W L 1660838, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 28, 2001), no appl. perm. appeal filed.

It is important to e mphasize that the rec ord on appe al contains one technica l rec ord and four ex h i b i t s which, whe n combined, comprise a g rand total of twe nty -two (22) pag es. The rec ord does not contain a t ransc ript from the hearing. Having said that, we now a ddress F ather ’s 1 fi rs t i s s u e re g arding whether g rounds for te rminating his parenta l rig hts were established by clea r a ndc on vin c ing e vid e nc e . A lth ou g h n ot e nti re ly c le ar f ro m th e re c or d, it a

pp e ars that theJuve nil e Court terminated F ather ’s parental rights on the three g rounds set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1- 113(g )(1) , (g )(4) , and (g )(6) , which permit p ar en t al rights to be terminate d under the following c ir c ums ta nc e s: (1 ) A ba nd on me nt b y thepa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n, a s defi ne d in § 36-1-102, ha s occur

red;
* * * (4) The pare nt or g uardia n has been found to have c ommitt ed seve re child abuse a s defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a c ourt or is found by

the court hearing the petition to term i n at e parental ri g hts or thepe tit ionfo r a do pti on to h ave com mitte d s e ve rec hil d abu se a g a ins t the c hil d w ho is the su bje c t of thepe tit ionor

a g a ins t any sibling or ha lf-sibling of such child, or any

other c hild r es i d i ng temporarily

or permanently

in the home of such pa

rent or g uardia n; * * * (6) The parent has bee n confine d in a cor rec tional or detention fa c ili ty of a ny ty

pe , by or de r of the c ou rt a s a re su lt o f a

c ri min a l a c t, under a sentenc e of te n (10) or

more y ear s, and t h e child is under ei g h t ( 8 ) y e ar s o f a g e a t th e ti me th e s e n te n c e is e n te r ed bythe court.... Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36- 1-113(g )(1) , (g )(4) , and (g )(6)

.-5- Although the J u v en i l e C ourt found g rounds exist ed to terminate Father’s pa renta l ri g hts un de r e a c h o f the se thr e e se c tio ns , th e on ly g ro un d a lle g e d b y

Mo the r i n h e r pet it ion to terminate pare ntal rig hts was the g round set forth in § 36-1-113(g )(6) . The re cord c ontains nothing sh ow ing that th e pe tit ione ve r w a s a me nd e d to a lle g e a ny a dd iti on a l gr ou nd up on wh ic h to te rm inate F a the r’ s p are nta l rig hts . Abs e nt e vid e nc e sh ow ing that Fath er was pr op e rl y app ri se d th a t th e se a dd iti on a l g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatin g his pa rent al ri g hts we rea t is su e , w e mus t va c a te theJuve nil e Court’s judgme nt insofar as it terminates Father ’s parental rig hts pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113( g )(1) and (g )(4)

. See In Re: W .B. IV , No. M2004-00999-COA- R3-PT, 2005 W L 1021618 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr . 29, 2005), no appl. perm. appeal filed , wher e we reve rsed a trial court’ s order te rm inatin g pa

re nta l rig hts on g ro un ds that ha d n ot b e e n a lle g e d inthec omp la int , s tatin g : [W ]e have re viewed t h e p et ition and find no alleg ation of a g round based on willful f

ailure to support during the four months pre ceding F a th e r ' s in c ar c e r a ti o n . T h e p e ti ti o n s p e c if ic a ll y a ll e g e s o n ly

one g r o u n d : ab a n d o n me n t b y w il lf u l f a il u r e to s u p p o rt o r v is it f o r the four month period immediately prec eding the fil i n g o f the petition. Thi s pleading limit ed the r uling to that g round bec ause to find o t h er wi s e w o u l d p l ac e t h e p ar en tata d i s ad v an t age i n p re p ar i n g a defe nse. See I

n re M.J .B. , 140 S.W .3d 643, 651 (Te n n. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that beca use of the f

undamental nature of pa

renta l rig hts, courts must take a very strict view of procedur al omissions t hat could put a par ent at a disa dvantag e in pre paring for tria l).
In re: W .B. IV , 2005 WL

1021618, at *10 (footnote omitted).
I n cas es i n v o lving termination of pare ntal rig hts, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(k) re qu ir e s a tria l c ou rt to e nte r an or de r makin g “ sp e c if ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t a ndc on c lus ion s o f l a w w ith in thirty (30) day s of t he conclusion of t he hearing .” This require ment fac ilitates “appe llate re view and pr omo t e [s ] j u s t a n d s p e e d y r e s o l u t i o n o f ap p e a l s . W h e n a l o w e r c o u rt h a s f a i l e d t o c o m ply

wi th Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( k), t he appellate courts must remand the ca se with direc tions to prepare the require d finding s of fac t and conclusions of law.” In re M. J .B . & M. W

.S ., J r. , 140 S.W .3d 643, 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)( citations omitt ed).

We now must decide whether the Juvenile Court complied with the requir ements of Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( k) a nd , if so , w he the r the rewa s c lear a ndc on vin c ing e vid e nc e to te r mi n a teF a th e r ’ s p ar e n ta l rig h ts p u r s u a n t t o § 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 ( g ) ( 6 )

. T h e Ju v e n il e Co u rt’ s o rder admittedly is quite sparse . The J uvenile C ourt did, howeve r, specifically find that Father “ pleade d g uiltyin the Knox C ounty Criminal Court on April 14, 20 0 0 , t o t h e offense of ag g ravated sexual battery of a c hild u n d er t h e age of 6 y ear s ... [and Father ] was sentence d to ten (10) y ear s confine ment and is, at the date of the he aring , still serving that sentenc e.” Although a trial court’ s fac tual finding s and conc lusions of law should be as de tailed as possible, whe n terminating pare ntal rig hts pursuant to § 36-1-113(g )(6 ) t h er e are only two nece ssary

finding s relative to that statutory g round. Specific ally , that the par ent “ha s been c onfined in a corr ectional or dete ntion facility of anyB ecause t here are onl y t wo f i nd i ngs rel evant t o T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 (g) (6), in t he p res ent case we are 2 abl e t o concl ude t her e wa s cl ear an d convi nci ng ev i dence p r es ent ed t o t he Juv eni l e C our t o n t hi s par t i cul ar gr ound, ev en in the a b se n c e o f a tr a n sc rip t. T h is r e su lt like ly w o u ld b e d iff e re n t if p a re n ta l righ ts ha d b e e n ter m ina te d o n a n o the r b a sis a n d th e re w a s n o tr a n sc rip t o r th e re c o rd o the rw ise w a s n o t sufficie n tly c o m p le te to p e rm it a p p e llate re v ie w . S e e , e.g ., In r e : Ad o p t i o n o

f J

. D. W. , N o . M 2 0 0 0 -0 0 1 5 1 -C O A -R 3 -C V , 2 0 0 0 W L 1 1 5 6 6 2 8 (T e n n . C t. A p p . A u g .1 6 , 2 0 0 0 ), n o ap p l. per m . appe al f

i l ed (r e v e rs ing the ter m ina tio n o f a fa the r’s p a re n ta l rig h ts b a se d o n a b a n d o n m e n t wh e n a n inc o m p le te r ecor d and l ack of

a t r ans cr i pt p r eve nt ed t hi s C our t f r om det er mi ni ng wh et her t he evi dence s uppo r t ed or pr epondera t ed agai nst t he t ri al co urt ' s f i nd i ngs)

. -6- type, by order of the c ourt as a result of a criminal act, under a se ntence of ten (10) or more y ear s,” and that the c hild was “unde r eig ht (8) y ea rs o f age at the time the sente nce [was] entere d by the court.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(6)

. Her e, at the time of the hea ring Father e ither wa s or was not serving a ten y ear

prison sentenc e, and herea dily admitted in his aff

idavit that hewas. Likewise, the child either

was or w as not eig ht y ear s old when Father ’s criminal sentenc e was imposed. Given that the child was born in November of 1998, he unquestionably was less than eight y ear s old when Father wa s s en t enced to ten y ear s in prison on April 14, 2000. We believe the Juvenile Court’s fac tual finding s and conc lusion s o f l aw were suffic ient for pur poses of Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(k) and that there was clea r and convincing evidenc e pre sented to the Juvenile Court for Father’s pare ntal rig hts to be terminated p ursuant to Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-1-113( g )(6) . We, theref ore, a ffirm the J u v en i l e Court’s judg ment insofar a s it concluded that g rounds had be en prove n by clea r and convincing evidenc e to terminate Father’s pa renta l rig hts pursuant to § 36-1-113(g )(6)

. 2
The next issue is whether Mothe r prove d by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that it was in the child’s best interest for Father’s parenta l rig hts to be terminated. F ather ’s assertion that the J uvenile Court’s orde r is altog ether silent a s to w hat is in the child’s best intere st is correc t. L acking this necessa

ry finding , we must vac ate the T rial C o u rt ’s judgme nt terminating Father’s pa renta l rig hts and remand this c ase to the J uvenile Court for de tailed finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law on wh e the r t e rm inatin g F a the r’ s p are nta l rig hts is i n th e c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st.

I n summary , we va cate the J uvenile Court’s judg ment that g rounds exist ed for te r mi n a ti n g F a th e r ’ s p ar e n ta l r ig h ts p u r s u a n t to T e n n . Co d e A n n . § § 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 ( g ) ( 1 ) a n d ( g ) ( 4 )

. We af f irm th e Ju v e n il e Co u rts ’ s ju d g me n t i n s o f ar a s it h o ld s th a t g r o u n d s f

o r te r mi n a ti n g F a the r’s p ar e n ta l rig h ts p u r s u a n t t o § 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 ( g ) ( 6 ) w e r e p r o v e n b y clear and con v in c in g e v id e n c e . We va c a te theTria l Co urt’ s ju dg me nt t e rm inatin g F a the r’ s p are nta l rig hts , an d this c a se is r e ma nd e d to the J uvenile Co u rt fo r d etailed findings of f act and conclusions of law on whether terminating F a the r’ s p are nta l rig hts is i n th e c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st.-7- Conclusion
Th e jud g me nt o f the Juve nil e Cou rt is a ff irme d inpa

rt a nd va c a te d in part, andthi s c aus e is r e ma nd e d to theJuve nil e Cou rt fo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s a s n e c e ssa ry a ndc on sis te nt w iththi s Opinion, and for c ollection of the c osts below. Costs on appeal ar e taxed one-ha lf ag ainst the Appellant R.L .H. and his sure ty , if any , and one- half a g ainst the Appellee M.D.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW INEY, JUDGE