J-S30031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KEVIN S. MINES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 559 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 7, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0330991-1983

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 31, 2024

Kevin S. Mines (“Mines”) appeals pro se from the trial court’s order 

denying his “Petition to Compel Discovery.” Upon review, we quash.

The relevant factual and procedural history of this case follows. A jury 

convicted Mines of first-degree murder in 1983. The trial court sentenced him 

to life in prison. Mines’s direct appeal was unsuccessful, as were his numerous 

state and federal collateral attacks on his conviction. Mines filed a pro se 

petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

9541-9546, on May 2, 2018. The PCRA court dismissed the petition as 

untimely, and this Court affirmed the dismissal. See Commonwealth v. 

Mines, 270 A.3d 1123 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum). Mines 

filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on 

December 30, 2021.
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 While his petition for allowance of appeal was pending, Mines filed a 

“Petition to Compel Discovery” in the PCRA court, seeking over forty items 

related to his 1983 conviction. See Petition to Compel Discovery, 4/5/22, at 

1-9. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Mines’s petition for allowance 

of appeal June 7, 2022. See Order, No. 540 EAL 2021, 6/7/22. The PCRA 

court then issued an opinion and order denying Mines’s petition to compel 

discovery. See, e.g., Order, 2/7/23. The instant appeal followed.1 

On appeal, Mines raises the following questions:

I. Did the [PCRA] court have subject-matter jurisdiction over 

[Mines’s] motion to compel discovery?

II. Did the PCRA judge abuse his discretion in covertly, 

arbitrarily, and retroactively transforming Mines’s 

“Mandamus” petition into a PCRA petition?

III. Did the PCRA judge abuse his discretion in failing to give 

[Mines] notice of intent to dismiss required under Rule 

907(1)?

IV. Does [Mines] have a due process and equal protection right 

to discovery material especially where he has never been 

privy to discovery material and related transcript(s) of voir 

dire and jury instructions for [forty] years?

Mines’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization and bolding omitted).

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1 The PCRA court did not order Mines to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement

and did not issue an additional opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

2 Mines’s first and second issues are less than clear. In his brief, Mines claims 

to have filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court. See Mines’s Brief at 5. Mines contends the Court forwarded it to the 

PCRA court and this “triggered” the court’s order denying “post-conviction 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Mines argues the PCRA court abused its discretion in denying his petition 

to compel discovery. Id. at 6-11.3 The Commonwealth counters the appeal 

should be quashed as moot. Commonwealth Brief at 6. Based on our review, 

we likewise conclude this appeal is moot. It is well-settled an issue “is moot 

if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal 

force or effect.” Commonwealth v. Nava, 966 A.2d 630, 633 (Pa. Super. 

2009); see also Commonwealth v. Barr, 79 A.3d 668, 677 n. 15 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (holding that this Court will not decide moot or abstract questions). 

Here, the record reflects the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied leave to 

appeal the dismissal of Mines’s 2018 PCRA petition. Mines has filed no 

subsequent PCRA petitions to invoke the lower court’s jurisdiction. Thus, there 

is no case pending before any court in which Mines can compel discovery. Cf. 

supra n.3 and Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(2) (providing that for PCRA proceedings, 

except for limited circumstances that are inapplicable here, “no discovery shall 

be permitted at any stage of the proceedings, except upon leave of court after 

a showing of exceptional circumstances”). Thus, Mines’s request is moot. To 

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relief.” Id. There is no petition for a writ of mandamus contained in the 

certified record and the appealed-from PCRA court order did not deny a PCRA 

petition. See Order, 2/7/23.

3 Mines argues the PCRA court should have treated his petition to compel 

discovery as a post-sentence motion. See Mines’s Brief at 6-11. However, 

Mines filed his petition to compel discovery in 2022, long after the ten-day 

period to file post-sentence motions expired. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1). 

 
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the extent that Mines may be seeking to compel discovery as the basis for a 

future PCRA petition, we have long held, “[t]his Court may not provide 

advisory opinions to address issues that may arise in future cases.” 

Commonwealth v. Enix, 192 A.3d 78, 84 n. 5 (Pa. Super. 2018).

4

 

Appeal quashed. 

Date: 1/31/2024

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4 Additionally, as the Commonwealth has observed, the PCRA court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over Mines’s discovery motion because his petition 

for allowance of appeal was pending at the Supreme Court when he filed it. 

See Commonwealth’s Brief at 6-7; Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a); Commonwealth v. 

Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 961-64 (Pa. Super. 2019) (applying Rule 1701 to PCRA 

filings).