alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1

Certification of CEO Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of AMCORE Financial, Inc. (the
Company) for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), William R. McManaman, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby
certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        
|------------------------
|/s/ William R. McManaman
|William R. McManaman    
|Chief Executive Officer 
|May 11, 2009            

This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not,
except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to AMCORE Financial, Inc. and will be retained by AMCORE Financial, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of XRG, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB
Amendment No.1 for the period ending March 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange  Commission on September 9, 2002 (the "Report"),  I, Kevin Brennan,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


/s/ Kevin Brennan
-------------------------
Kevin Brennan
Chief Executive Officer
September 9, 2002
**Exhibit
      32.1**







SECTION
      1350 CERTIFICATION





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Med-Emerg International Inc. (the
      "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2007 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
      undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, , to the best of
      such officer’s knowledge, that:








1)         The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2)         The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





Dated:
      August 14, 2007





By:       /s/  Ramesh
      Zacharias


Name:
      Dr. Ramesh Zacharias


Title:
      Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Randy MacKeith DUNCANSON, a.k.a. Lorenzo McCloud, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-10732

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 2, 2011.

Robert G. Davies, Thomas F. Kirwin, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Pensacola, FL, J. *914Ryan Love, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Panama City, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jonathan Wesley Dingus, Attorney at Law, Panama City, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Randy MacKeith Duncanson, Panama City, FL, pro se.

Before BARKETT, MARCUS and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jonathan Dingus, appointed counsel for Randy MacKeith Duncanson in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Duncanson’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17
- 1886

KARL HEINZ KREY , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Defendant

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Greenbelt

. Deborah K. Chasanow , Senior District Judge. ( 8:15

- cv
- 03800

- DKC )

Submitted : July 30, 2018 Decided: August 17, 2018

Before GREGORY , Chief Judge , THACKER, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Dmitri A. Chernov, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Stephen M. Schenning, Acting United States Attorney, Sarah A. Marquardt, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Karl Heinz Krey appeals the district court’s order dismissing his case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the discretionary function exception to t he Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2680(a) (2012) . We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Krey v. United States , No. 8:15

- cv
- 03800

- DKC (D. Md. June 28, 2017) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Juan RODRIGUEZ PENCHEO, also known as Juan Rodriguez, Petitioner v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 11-60025

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 16, 2011.

Salvador Colon, Law Office of Salvador Colon, Houston, TX, for Petitioner.

Yedidya Cohen, Trial Attorney, David V. Bernal, Assistant Director, Tangerlia Cox, Anthony Cardozo Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, Arthur L. Rabin, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Im*267migration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before GARZA, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Juan Rodriguez Pencheo (Rodriguez), a native and citizen of Mexico, has filed a petition for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l). Rodriguez entered the United States illegally in 1998. Following a conviction for driving while intoxicated in 2001, Rodriguez voluntarily returned to Mexico after signing a “Notice of Rights and Request for Disposition” known as a Form 1-826. He then departed the United States but returned without permission shortly thereafter. The question, then, is whether this departure interrupts the continuous physical presence required under § 1229b for cancellation of removal.

Rodriguez contends that he did not fully understand the terms of his voluntary return to Mexico or knowingly waive his right to an immigration hearing and that counsel was ineffective in failing to make this and other arguments to the IJ. The respondent correctly argues that Rodriguez did not exhaust these claims because he did not argue them to the BIA. *See Ramos-Torres v. Holder,*637 F.3d 544, 547 (5th Cir.2011). This court is, therefore, without jurisdiction to review those arguments. *See id.*

Rodriguez also argues that *In re Romalez-Alcaide,*23 I. *&*N. Dec. 423, 424-29 (BIA 2002), on which the IJ and the BIA relied, is inapposite. He argues that under § 1229b(d)(l) and (2), his voluntary return to Mexico did not break his continuous physical presence in this country for purposes of cancellation of removal. The respondent moves for summary affir-mance, or alternatively, to extend the briefing schedule.

Rodriguez’s argument is foreclosed by *Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft,*349 F.3d 213, 217-19 (5th Cir.2003). A panel of this court may not reverse *Mireles-Valdez*absent circumstances that are not present in the instant case. *See United States v. Ruff,*984 F.2d 635, 640 (5th Cir.1993).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED; MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIR-MANCE GRANTED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit 23.1

To The Board of Directors
Tiens Biotech Group (USA), Inc.



                       Consent of Independent Accountants
                         Tiens Biotech Group (USA), Inc.
                          Audited Financial Statements
                           December 31, 2004 and 2003


We consent to the  incorporation  in the Annual  Report of Tiens  Biotech  Group
(USA),  Inc on Form 10-KSB/A of our report dated February 26, 2005 on our audits
of the financial  statements of Tiens Biotech Group (USA), Inc. and Subsidiaries
as of  December  31,  2004 and 2003,  and for the years  then  ended,  which our
reports are incorporated in the Form 10-KSB/A.



/s/ Moore Stephens Wurth Frazer and Torbet
------------------------------------------
Moore Stephens Wurth Frazer and Torbet, LLP


Walnut, California
August 11, 2005
WACHOVIA SECURITIES	

8739 Research Drive 

Charlotte, NC 28288

								WACHOVIA SECURITIES

 

 

Management's Assertion

As of and for the year ended December 31, 2003, the Commercial Real Estate Servicing Division of Wachovia Bank National Association (the Bank) has complied in all material respects with the minimum servicing standards set forth in the Mortgage Bankers Association of America's (MBA's) *Uniform Single**Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers*, except for minimum servicing standards V.4. and VI.1., which the MBA has interpreted as being inapplicable to the servicing of commercial and multifamily loans. As of and for this same period, the Bank had in effect a fidelity bond and errors and omissions policy in the amount of $200 million and $20 million, respectively.

 

 

Alan Kronovet					3/10/04
Alan Kronovet				Date

Director/ Vice President

Wachovia National Bank

 

 
*Steven Johnson					3/10/04
Steven Johnson				Date

Director

Wachovia National Bank

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 *
#### Sean A. Pimento et al., Appellants, v Stephanie Rojas, Respondent.

[941 NYS2d 517]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the *845Supreme Court, Queens County (McDonald, J.), entered September 27, 2011, which granted the defendant’s motion to vacate an order of the same court dated April 25, 2011, granting the plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for leave to enter a default judgment upon her failure to appear or answer the complaint, and directing an inquest on damages.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

A defendant seeking to vacate a default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense *(see Assael v 15 Broad St., LLC,*71 AD3d 802 [2010]; *Abdul v Hirschfield,*71 AD3d 707 [2010]; *Canty v Gregory, 37*AD3d 508 [2007]). The determination of what is a reasonable excuse is generally left to the sound discretion of the Supreme Court *(see Hageman v Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,*25 AD3d 760 [2006]; *Ruppell v Hair Plus Beauty,*288 AD2d 205 [2001]). Here, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in finding that the defendant had failed to present a reasonable excuse sufficient to warrant vacating her default under CPLR 5015 (a) (1).

However, the Supreme Court also did not improvidently exercise its discretion in vacating the defendant’s default pursuant to CPLR 317. That statutory provision permits a defendant who has been “served with a summons other than by personal delivery” to seek relief from a default upon a showing that it did not receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense (CPLR 317; *see Taieb v Hilton Hotels Corp.,*60 NY2d 725, 728 [1983]; *Franklin v 172 Aububon Corp.,*32 AD3d 454, 455 [2006]; *Brockington v Brookfield Dev. Corp.,*308 AD2d 498 [2003]; *Samet v Bedford Flushing Holding Corp.,*299 AD2d 404, 405 [2002]). The affidavits submitted by the defendant herein set forth sufficient facts to warrant relief from her default under CPLR 317. Rivera, J.P., Eng, Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit
      32.1**








CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








The
      undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that this Annual
      Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2005 fully complies with
      the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934, as amended, and the information contained in such report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
      of
      Seasons Bancshares, Inc.








This
                20th day of March, 2006./s/
                William L. SuttonWilliam
                L. SuttonChief
                Executive Officer
exhibit101.htm










EXHIBIT 10.1

THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE


BERRY PLASTICS GROUP, INC.


2006 EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN


 


This THIRD AMENDMENT is made this 4th day of March, 2015, by Berry Plastics Group, Inc. (hereinafter called the “Company”).


 


WITNESSETH:


 


WHEREAS, the Company maintains the Berry Plastics Group, Inc. 2006 Equity Incentive Plan (the “Plan”), which was adopted by the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”) in September 2006;


 


WHEREAS, the Company completed an initial public offering in October 2012;


 


WHEREAS, to align its incentive plans more closely with incentive plans maintained by similar public companies, the Company intends to adopt a new incentive plan (the Berry Plastics Group, Inc. 2015 Long-Term Incentive Plan or “2015 Plan”), subject to and effective upon receipt of stockholder approval thereof at the 2015 annual meeting (the “Annual Meeting”), to permit, among other things, for the granting of performance-based awards in compliance with Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”);


 


WHEREAS, subject to and effective upon receipt of stockholder approval of the 2015 Plan at the Annual Meeting, the Company intends to make no further grants of Awards under the Plan;


 


WHEREAS, subject to and effective upon receipt of stockholder approval of the 2015 Plan at the Annual Meeting, the Board desires to amend the Plan to prohibit the grant of any further Awards thereunder and to limit the number of shares of common stock of the Company (“Stock”) available for the grant of Awards under the Plan to the number of shares of Stock subject to then then-outstanding awards under the Plan as of the date of stockholder approval of the 2015 Plan; and


 


WHEREAS, the Board reserved the right to amend the Plan under Section 13.1 thereof.


 


NOW, THEREFORE, IT  IS RESOLVED that, subject to and effective upon receipt of stockholder approval of the 2015 Plan at the Annual Meeting, Section 4.1 of the Plan is hereby amended to add the following sentence at the end thereof:


 


“Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the maximum number of Shares that may be made subject to any form of Award hereunder is 1,600,084.  No further Awards will be granted hereunder on or after March 4, 2015.”


 


 


 



 









  





  











  






 


Except as specifically amended hereby, the Plan shall remain in full force and effect prior to this Third Amendment.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Third Amendment to be executed as of the day and year first above written.


 



	 	BERRY PLASTICS GROUP, INC.	 
	 	 	 	 
	
  

	
By: 

	/s/Mark W. Miles	 
	 	 	Mark. W. Miles	 
	 	Title: 	Chief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 32.2



Certification of Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code,

as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United
States Code, the undersigned, Michael V. Valenza, the Senior Vice President-Finance and Chief Financial Officer of Radnor Holdings Corporation (the Company), hereby certifies that:



The Companys quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the most recent fiscal
quarter (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                         |  | 
|------------------------ |  | 
|Dated: November 10, 2003 |  | 
|                         |  | 
|                         |  | 



A signed original of this written
statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Antonio GONZALEZ-VELASQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-10534

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 12, 2009.

*184Christy Lee Drake, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Amarillo, TX, 'for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Bonita L. Gunden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Amarillo, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before DAVIS, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Antonio Gonzalez-Velasquez (“Gonzalez”), a Mexican national, appeals the 80-month sentence he received following his guilty-plea conviction for being found unlawfully in the United States after having been previously deported following an aggravated felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. For the first time on appeal, Gonzalez challenges the calculation of his criminal history score, arguing that he was incorrectly assessed a total of three criminal history points for two June 1997 California convictions because those convictions were stale. Gonzalez asserts that, because he received sentences of less than 13 months in both cases and because both sentences were imposed more than 10 years prior to his commission of the instant offense (which he asserts was in August 2007, the date of his underlying arrest), the convictions could not be counted under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e).

As Gonzalez concedes, because he did not raise these arguments in the district court, review is for plain error only. *See United States v. Price,*516 F.3d 285, 286-87 (5th Cir.2008). To demonstrate plain error, Gonzalez must show an error that is clear or obvious and that affects his substantial rights. *United States v. Baker,*538 F.3d 324, 332 (5th Cir.2008). If he makes such a showing, this court has the discretion to correct the error but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. *Id.*

Gonzalez has failed to demonstrate any clear or obvious error in the calculation of his criminal history score. Because being found in the United States after having been previously deported is a continuing offense, the date of the “commencement of the instant offense” for purposes of § 4A1.2(e) is the date Gonzalez illegally entered the United States, not the date on *185which he was arrested. *See United States v. Santana-Castellano,*74 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir.1996); *see also*§ 4A1.2(e) *&*comment. (n.8); § lB1.3(a)(l)(A). The presentence report establishes that Gonzalez entered the United States illegally with his common-law wife in April 2007. Thus, although he was not arrested until August 2007, his offense “commenced” in April 2007, less than 10 years after his June 1997 California convictions. Therefore, the June 1997 convictions were properly counted under § 4A1.2(e). *See*§ 4A1.2(e) *&*comment, (n.8); § lB1.3(a)(l)(A).

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Galaxy General Contracting Corp., Appellant, v 2201 7th Avenue Realty LLC, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

[945 NYS2d 298]—

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Edmead, J.), entered March 28, 2011, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiffs motion for default judgment against defendant 2201 7th Avenue Realty LLC, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, and plaintiffs motion for the entry of default judgment granted in its entirety. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

It is uncontraverted that service of process was effected on defendant 2201 7th Avenue Realty LLC by delivery of the summons and complaint to the Secretary of State’s office (Business Corporation Law § 306), and that a courtesy copy was forwarded *790to defendant’s prior counsel. In order to avoid the entry of default judgment upon its failure to submit a timely answer, defendant was required to come forward with a reasonable excuse for its default and to demonstrate a meritorious defense to the action *(Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cervini,*84 AD3d 789 [2011]; *see Mutual Mar. Off., Inc. v Joy Constr. Corp.,*39 AD3d 417, 419 [2007]). Under certain circumstances, law office failure may constitute a reasonable excuse, as required to avoid or vacate default judgment (39 AD3d at 419). However, claims of law office failure which are “conclusory and unsubstantiated” cannot excuse default *(Wells Fargo Bank,*84 AD3d at 789; *Pichardo-Garcia v Josephine’s Spa Corp.,*91 AD3d 413 [2012]). If it is shown that a party has failed to proffer an acceptable excuse for its default, then it becomes unnecessary to determine whether a meritorious defense exists *(Wells Fargo Bank,*84 AD3d at 790; *see M.R. v 2526 Valentine LLC,*58 AD3d 530, 531-532 [2009]).

In seeking to avoid the entry of default judgment, defendant claimed law office failure, but its newly-retained counsel attested that he could not answer for prior counsel’s failure to submit a timely answer, as prior counsel had not responded to inquiries about plaintiff’s complaint. Accordingly, current counsel could only speculate as to why no timely answer was submitted. Defendant’s president could provide no additional insight, averring only that while he did not recall receiving personal service of the complaint, it was his practice to forward all legal papers to prior counsel. Defendant’s claim of law office failure being perfunctory and unsubstantiated, it was insufficient to avoid the entry of default judgment. Concur — Tom, J.E, Andrias, Saxe, Moskowitz and Acosta, JJ.
#### William H. Waite, Respondent, *v.*Nancy Harriet Simons et al., Defendants, Thos. W. Kiley, Purchaser, Appellant.

(Argued June 17, 1890;

decided June 24, 1890.)

Appeal from order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, made December 28, 1889, which affirmed an order of Special Term requiring the purchaser to complete his purchase of certain premises upon sale under a judgment of partition and sale herein.

*Joseph A. Jaekson, Jr.,*for appellant.

*Gharries*55 *Luscomb*for respondent.

Agree to affirm on opinion below.

All concur.

Order affirmed.