*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted August 21, 2008*

Decided August 27, 2008

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No.  07‐3470

GLENN J. HOPKINS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JESSE WHITE, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 05‐3231

Richard Mills,

Judge.

O R D E R

In 2002 Leroy Neff rear‐ended Glenn Hopkins’s 1983 Ford Thunderbird.  Hopkins

had retrofitted the car with what he calls an Electronic Fuel Injection Preheater, a prototype

device that he says improves fuel economy. Neff, who has since died, was insured by State

Farm. Hopkins, though, was uninsured (a violation of Illinois law, see 625 ILCS 5/3‐707)

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐3470 Page 2

1 Claim preclusion was the basis for one of these dismissals. Curiously, State Farm

did not argue that all of the claims against it were barred, even though claim preclusion

applies to claims that could have been raised in the original suit but were not, so long as

they are based on the same set of operative facts. See Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Illinois,

497 F.3d 770, 772‐73 (7th Cir. 2007). Although the Illinois Secretary of State was also a

defendant in the earlier litigation, the State appropriately makes no claim preclusion

argument in this suit because no final judgment on the merits was entered in its favor in the

first lawsuit.

because no insurance company, including State Farm, would agree to cover the risks posed

by his device. As a result, the state of Illinois fined Hopkins $600 and suspended his license.

According to Hopkins, Illinois’s confiscation of his license and State Farm’s refusal to insure

him “denied [him] ownership” of a new car, thereby preventing him from continuing to test

or transport the prototype fuel device.  

Hopkins brought suit against Illinois, its Secretary of State in his official and personal

capacity, State Farm, and Neff’s estate, alleging an assortment of injustices. (This is his

second suit arising from the 2002 collision; his first suit was dismissed. See Hopkins v. State

Farm Ins. Co.,139 F. App’x 756 (7th Cir. 2005.)) The district court dismissed a number of

those claims, among them Hopkins’s claim that Illinois’s automobile‐insurance requirement

violated the Commerce Clause, and allowed the rest to proceed.1 Several months later,

without first trying to procure discovery informally, Hopkins filed a motion to compel the

defendants to answer his interrogatories and produce documents. The district court denied

the motion, noting that Hopkins had neglected to include with it a certification that he had

attempted to obtain discovery from the defendants before resorting to the court as required

by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(1). Hopkins did not refile his motion with the

required certification.

One year later the defendants moved for summary judgment. In response, Hopkins

moved to amend his complaint and extend the discovery period, which had ended five

months earlier, so that he could depose unnamed witnesses. The court, observing that

Hopkins’s amended complaint was virtually identical to his original complaint, denied the

motion and proceeded to summary judgment. As relevant to this appeal, the court

concluded that Hopkins’s claim that State Farm had violated the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing could go nowhere because there was no contract between State Farm

and Hopkins creating such an obligation. The court concluded that Hopkins’s remaining

federal claims against State Farm and Illinois were meritless as well. Finally, because no

federal claims remained, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Hopkins’s state‐law claim that Neff had been negligent in colliding with him and dismissed

the rest of the suit.  
No. 07‐3470 Page 3

On appeal, Hopkins first contends that the district court erred in dismissing his

claim that the Illinois automobile‐insurance requirement impermissibly burdened his right

to engage in commerce, a decision we review de novo. See Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d

1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court has soundly rejected Commerce Clause

challenges to state automobile‐insurance requirements, albeit not recently. See Bradley v.

Pub. Util. Comm. of Ohio, 289 U.S, 92, 96 (1933); Cont’l Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352,

365‐66 (1932); Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 171‐72 (1928); see also Rowe v. New

Hampshire Motor Transport Assʹn, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008) (discussing federal regulation of state

roads). And the district court, observing that the automobile‐insurance requirement applies

only to Illinois residents driving on Illinois roads, see People v. Benton, 751 N.E.2d 1257,

1260‐61 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), correctly concluded that the statute regulated intrastate

commerce alone, which states are free to do without violating the Commerce Clause, Alliant

Energy Corp. v. Bie, 330 F.3d 904, 915 (7th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). The district court

appropriately dismissed this claim.  

Hopkins next contests the district court’s denial of his discovery motions, which, he

says, deprived him of due process by preventing him from gathering evidence with which

he could have opposed the defendants’ summary judgment motions. We review discovery

rulings for an abuse of discretion. Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2008). A

court’s denial of a motion to compel is not an abuse of discretion when, as here, a party

neglects to certify that he has attempted to obtain discovery before resorting to court action.

See Kalis v. Colgate‐Palmolive Co., 231 F.3d 1049, 1059 (7th Cir. 2000). Indeed, Hopkins not

only failed to submit the required certification, he also neglected to comply with the

substance of the rule. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Hopkins’s

motion to extend discovery. A party who wishes to extend discovery before responding to a

summary judgment motion must state its reasons and support them by affidavit, see

Waterloo Furniture Components, Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f)), and Hopkins did not submit an affidavit. Moreover, his reason for

extending discovery was that his amended complaint advanced new legal theories that

required him to depose new witnesses. But the district court declined to permit Hopkins to

amend his complaint, and with that refusal his need for more time evaporated.

   

Hopkins also challenges the district court’s conclusion that he could not succeed on

his claim that State Farm violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a

claim governed by Illinois state law. We review a district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo and affirm if the record shows there is no genuine issue of material fact.

Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 544‐45 (7th Cir. 2008). Although his argument is

confusing, Hopkins appears to contend that the district court misinterpreted Illinois state

law discussing the covenant. The district court correctly concluded, though, that no duty of
No. 07‐3470 Page 4

good faith or fair dealing arises unless the parties have contracted with each other. See

Cramer v. Ins. Exch. Agency, 675 N.E.2d 897, 903 (Ill. 1996) (observing that covenant exists

between insurer and policy‐holder); Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 808 N.E.2d 47,

51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that duty of good faith and fair dealing did not extend to

third‐party claimant). Hopkins’s complaint stems from the fact that State Farm would not

insure him, and so the district court properly granted summary judgment for State Farm on

this claim.

Finally, Hopkins argues that the district court should have remanded his state‐law

negligence claim against Neff to an Illinois court because the two‐year statute of limitations

had expired between the time he filed suit and the dismissal of the negligence claim. See

Wheaton v. Steward, 817 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). District courts may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state‐law claims if all federal claims have been

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Dargis v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 981, 990 (7th Cir. 2008).

And section 1367(d), which grants the plaintiff an additional 30 days to re‐file dismissed

supplemental claims in state court, “removes the principal reason”—the expired statute of

limitations—“for retaining a case in federal court when the federal claim belatedly

disappears.” Myers v. County of Lake, 30 F.3d 847, 848‐49 (7th Cir. 1994). Even if federal law

did not toll the statute of limitations, Illinois law gives Hopkins one year from the dismissal

of his claim to refile in state court. See 735 ILCS 5/13‐217; Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650,

654 (7th Cir. 2008).  The district court did not err in dismissing Hopkins’s state‐law

negligence claim.

AFFIRMED.