*The Hon. Richard H. Battey, Chief Judge, United States

District Court for the District of South Dakota, sitting by

designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 96-2483EA

_____________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * On Appeal from the United

* States District Court

* for the Eastern District

Michael Bruce Armstead, also * of Arkansas.

known as Michael B. Pfarr, *

also known as Michael B. Pharr, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: February 11, 1997

 Filed: April 23, 1997

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HANSEN, Circuit Judge, and BATTEY,*

Chief District Judge.

___________

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

A jury convicted Michael Armstead of conspiracy to possess with the

intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with

intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine

base, 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 
The Hon. Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge

1

for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

The Hon. Henry L. Jones, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge 2

for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

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The District Court sentenced Armstead to 151 months in prison on each

1

count, to be served concurrently. Before trial, Armstead moved to suppress

the principal evidence against him, approximately 650 grams of cocaine

base, on the ground that no probable cause to search the hotel room in

which it was found existed. The District Court, acting on the

recommendation of a magistrate judge, denied the motion. Armstead took

2

this appeal, challenging only the denial of the suppression motion. We

affirm.

An agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), who had been

tipped by a reservation agent for an airline, alerted the Little Rock

Police that Michael Armstead had paid cash the day before for a one-way

ticket on the overnight flight from Los Angeles to Little Rock, via Dallas.

Because the information the DEA provided fit its drug-courier profile, the

Little Rock Police dispatched two agents to the airport to greet Armstead

upon arrival and ask him questions. One officer approached Armstead and

asked for identification or his airline ticket, which the officer looked

at to confirm that it was in Armstead’s name. Armstead then told the

officer that he was “kind of” travelling alone, and shortly thereafter

stated that he was travelling alone. A woman (who DEA had reported had

purchased a ticket and travelled with Armstead) indicated to the other

officer that she was travelling with Armstead. Armstead refused the

officer’s request to search his bag and soon thereafter advised the woman

that she could likewise refuse. Although he told the officers he was

visiting his family, Armstead departed by taxi, which the police learned

took him to a nearby motel.
Armstead contends that the airline agent’s tip was made

3

anonymously and is therefore so unreliable as to preclude its use

toward obtaining a search warrant. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.

325, 332 (1990). We disagree. The exact identity of the airline’s

agent is unimportant: it is enough that she or he worked for the

airline, a fact that Armstead does not challenge, and would

therefore have accurate information. Moreover, the information

provided did not predict criminal activity; rather, it recounted

only facts about Armstead’s ticket purchase. Finally, a lower

degree of reliability does not foreclose the use of information,

but instead only makes necessary a greater amount of other reliable

information to establish probable cause. Id. at 330.

-3-

The police subsequently determined that no one with the name Michael

Armstead was registered as a guest of the motel, but later observed him

leave the motel. An officer questioned Armstead again, who responded first

that he had not been in the motel and then that he had gone into an

unoccupied and unlocked room to take a nap. Armstead consented to a search

of his bag and presented an identification card bearing the name Michael

Pharr (Pharr is now explained by Armstead to be his mother’s new surname

upon her remarriage). Telephone records for the room which Armstead had

visited indicated that calls had been placed to the same telephone numbers

as those listed for verification on his travelling companion’s airline

ticket, despite Armstead’s earlier contention that he was travelling alone.

An officer submitted an affidavit that included facts substantially

similar to those above in support of a warrant to search Armstead’s motel

room. A state judge issued the warrant, and the subsequent search revealed

approximately 650 grams of cocaine base and several thousand dollars in

cash. A search of Armstead revealed more currency, a key to the searched

room, and rubber bands that matched those used to wrap the currency found

in the room.

Armstead contends on appeal that the District Court should have

granted his suppression motion because the warrant was issued without

probable cause. We think Armstead’s inconsistent answers to the officers’

questions and his curious explanation for his presence in the motel, when

combined with the travel information,3
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support a finding of probable cause to search the room. A reasonable

issuing judge could determine that there was a fair probability that

evidence of a crime would be found in Armstead’s motel room, and that

probable cause to issue a warrant therefore existed. E.g., United States

v. LaMorie, 100 F.3d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1996). Moreover, even if probable

cause to issue the warrant did not exist, the searching officers’

reasonable reliance on the judge’s neutral and detached determination that

probable cause existed counters any argument for exclusion of the seized

evidence. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914-17 (1984). The

motion to suppress the evidence was correctly denied, and the convictions

therefore are

Affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.