UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

ROBERT L. PEACHER, 

 Plaintiff, 

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 v. CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-701-TLS 

GEORGE PAYNE, MARK SEVIER, DR. 

TAYLOR, AND DR. EICHMAN, 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Robert L. Peacher, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed an amended complaint [ECF No. 

28], alleging that he has been psychologically unable to eat the food served to him by prison 

officials since June 23, 2016, when he was transferred to the Westville Correctional Facility. He 

alleges that he can only eat food that is served in a factory sealed container because he is afraid 

that guards might have poisoned food prepared in the prison. He alleges that he is not receiving 

mental health treatment for this disorder and is starving. He states that there is very little food 

that he is able to eat. He denies that he is on a hunger strike or that he is voluntarily starving 

himself in an attempt to manipulate officials to transfer him to a different prison. He alleges that 

because of his mental illness, he is sincerely unable to eat the food they are providing. He alleges 

that he has not been properly diagnosed or treated for his mental illness. He is seeking both 

monetary damages and injunctive relief. 

 “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers . . . .” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A, this court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, 
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fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. “In order to state a claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that 

defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under 

color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). 

 The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials ensure that inmates receive 

adequate food, clothing, and shelter. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth 

Amendment is violated when a defendant is deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious 

medical needs. “[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional 

or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at 

serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring 

even though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 

2005) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). However, “[a] layperson’s failure to tell 

the medical staff how to do its job cannot be called deliberate indifference . . . .” Burks v. 

Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). 

 Here, Peacher is suing two medical and two non-medical defendants. He alleges that he 

has not been properly diagnosed and treated. Nevertheless, he is under the care of two 

physicians. Neither have diagnosed him as being unable to eat unsealed food. Neither have 

diagnosed him as suffering physical injury as result of his weight loss. As a result, the nonmedical defendants cannot be deliberately indifferent for not feeding him a special diet merely 

because he demands it. Therefore the monetary damages claims against George Payne and Mark 

Sevier will be dismissed. 

 As for the two doctor defendants, “[f]or a medical professional to be liable for deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, he must make a decision that represents such a 
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substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to 

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” 

Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted). A 

“disagreement with medical professionals [does not] state a cognizable Eighth Amendment 

Claim under the deliberate indifference standard of Estelle v. Gamble [429 U.S. 97 (1976)].” 

Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003). 

 Here, Peacher clearly disagrees with his doctors and wants to be transferred to a different 

prison. He reports mental health symptoms to them, but they do not agree that he is unable to eat 

the food provided by prison officials. He wants treatment for undiagnosed mental health 

conditions. He has lost weight, but they have not diagnosed him with any physical injury as a 

result. It is unclear whether there is anything more to this case than a disagreement over how to 

respond to his behavioral problems in the prison. However, that is not a question that can be 

resolved at the pleading stage. Therefore Peacher will be allowed to proceed on a claim for 

compensatory and punitive damages against Dr. Taylor and Dr. Eichman. 

 In addition to monetary damages for past Constitutional violations, Peacher is also asking 

for a permanent injunction requiring that he receive mental health treatment for PTSD, panic 

disorders, delusion disorder, and OCD. He also wants to never be housed in the Westville or 

Wabash Valley Correctional Facilities. 

The PLRA circumscribes the scope of the court’s authority to enter an injunction 

in the corrections context. Where prison conditions are found to violate federal 

rights, remedial injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than 

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and use the least intrusive 

means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. This section of the 

PLRA enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging 

prison conditions: Prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary 

authority over the institutions they manage. 
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Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). 

However, “[u]nder the Eighth Amendment, [a prisoner] is not entitled to demand specific care 

[nor] entitled to the best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). 

Moreover, the specific requests made by Preacher go well beyond what the PLRA permits. 

Nevertheless, he may be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to a narrowly tailored injunction 

limited to requiring that he receive medical care as required by the Eighth Amendment. 

 For these reasons, the Court: 

 (1) GRANTS Robert L. Peacher leave to proceed against Dr. Taylor and Dr. Eichman in 

their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for denying him adequate 

medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment; 

 (2) GRANTS Robert L. Peacher leave to proceed against Mark Sevier in his official 

capacity for injunctive relief to obtain adequate medical care; 

 (3) DISMISSES all other claims; 

 (4) DISMISSES George Payne; 

 (5) DIRECTS the Clerk to serve a copy of this Order on counsel for Mark Sevier via 

CM/ECF; 

 (6) DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to issue and serve process 

on Dr. Taylor and Dr. Eichman with a copy of this Order and the amended complaint [ECF No. 

28] as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and 

 (7) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Mark Sevier, Dr. Taylor and Dr. 

Eichman respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-

1(b), only to the claims for which the Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening 

order. 
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SO ORDERED on February 13, 2017. 

s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT