alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Christopher F. GOAD, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William R. GRAY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11-1171.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 28, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 1, 2011.

Christopher Fred Goad, Sr., Appellant Pro Se.

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher F. Goad, Sr., appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his civil action for lack of diversity jurisdiction. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Goad v. Gray,*No. 3:10-cv-00326-REP, 2010 WL 4735816 (E.D.Va. Nov. 15, 2010). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Ralph SAQUELLA, a/k/a Michael Paloma, a/k/a Michael Blake, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-6238.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 29, 2011.

Decided: Aug. 15, 2011.

Jeffrey M. Brandt, Robinson & Brandt, P.S.C., Covington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, David B. Goodhand, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

*848Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Michael Ralph Saquella appeals the district court’s order denying his Motion to Amend Judgment. On appeal, Saquella contends that the district court erred in failing to give him notice and an opportunity to clarify his intent in filing the motion before declining to recharacterize it as a 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2011) motion. Finding no error, we affirm.

Federal courts may, but are not required to, “ignore the legal label that a *pro se*litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category.” *Castro v. United States,*540 U.S. 375, 381, 124 S.Ct. 786, 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2003); *see United States v. Blackstock,*513 F.3d 128, 132-33 (4th Cir.2008); *see also United States v. Valadez-Camarena,*402 F.3d 1259, 1261 (10th Cir.2005) (finding no abuse of discretion when district court elected not to recharacterize pro se litigant’s pleading as § 2255 motion). While a district court is required to give a litigant notice and an opportunity to withdraw or amend the motion before rechar-acterizing a pleading as a first § 2255 motion, *Castro,*540 U.S. at 383, 124 S.Ct. 786, we conclude that the district court did not err by declining to recharacterize Saquella’s motion without providing notice or an opportunity for Saquella to clarify the intent of his motion.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### In the Matter of Andrea C.B.B. Community Counseling & Mediation, Respondent. Tyshawn B. Sr., Appellant, et al., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Tyshawn C.B., Jr. Community Counseling & Mediation, Respondent; Tyshawn B., Sr., Appellant, et al., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 2.)

[944 NYS2d 906]-

In related proceedings pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Turbow, J.), dated April 26, 2011, which (1) denied his motion to vacate an order of disposition of the same court (McElrath, J.), dated January 19, 2011, which, after a dispositional hearing, and upon his default in appearing at that hearing, inter alia, terminated his parental rights and transferred guardianship and custody of the subject children to the petitioner, Community Counseling & Mediation, for the purpose of adoption, and (2) denied his application for post-termination visitation with the subject children.

Ordered that the order dated April 26, 2011, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

After the father defaulted at a dispositional hearing and his parental rights were terminated in 2010, the father moved to vacate the order entered upon his default. The petitioner consented to that relief, and the father’s default was vacated. When the matter subsequently appeared on the Family Court’s calendar for a new dispositional hearing in January 2011, the father again defaulted, and the Family Court again terminated *1309his parental rights after conducting a hearing. The father again moved to have his default vacated. This time, however, the Family Court denied his motion.

In order to vacate his default, the father was required to establish that he had a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the termination petition (see CPLR 5015 [a]; *Matter of Dominique Beyonce R. [Maria Isabel R.],*82 AD3d 984, 985 [2011]; *Matter of Princess M.,*58 AD3d 854 [2009]). He established neither. Consequently, the Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying his motion to vacate the order entered upon his default (see *Matter of Daniel Marcus Y. [Marilyn Y.],*77 AD3d 843, 843-844 [2010]; *Matter of Samantha B. [Arthur Eugene S.],*72 AD3d 682, 683 [2010]).

Under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the father’s application for contact with the subject children after the termination of his parental rights *(cf. Matter of Selena C. [Thelma C. ],*77 AD3d 659 [2010]; *Matter of April S.,*307 AD2d 204 [2003]; *Matter of Corinthian Marie S.,*297 AD2d 382 [2002]). Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Belen and Chambers, JJ., concur.
[No. 15570-6-III.

Division Three.

September 2, 1997.]

#### Patrick D. Perrault, *Appellant,*v. The City of Toppenish, et al., *Respondents.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Yakima County, No. 95-2-02022-3, Robert N. Hackett, J., entered February 9,1996. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Schultheis, J., concurred in by Thompson and Brown, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.1





Certification of Chief Executive Officer


Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted


Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002








In connection with the annual report of West Bancorporation, Inc. on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, David R. Milligan, Chief Executive Officer of West Bancorporation, Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that: (1) The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of West Bancorporation, Inc.








March 12, 2010








/s/ David R. Milligan


David R. Milligan


Chief Executive Officer






28
**EXHIBIT 31.1****CERTIFICATION**I, Darol Lindloff, certify that:1. I have reviewed this Amendment No. 2 on Form 10-K/A to the annual report on Form10-K, as amended, of Panda Ethanol, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleadingwith respect to the period covered by this report;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, theperiods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:     a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;     b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and     c. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case ofan annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors(or persons performing the equivalent functions):     a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and     b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting.        October 9, 2007 /s/ Darol Lindloff   Darol Lindloff   Chief Executive Officer and President
Exhibit 32

SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF

FINANCIAL OFFICER

Statement

Solely for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C.§1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and the Chief
Financial Officer of Sonic Foundry, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify, based on our knowledge, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2010 (the Report) fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: January 31, 2011



|       |  |                          |  | 
|------ |  | ------------------------ |  | 
|By:    |  | /s/ Rimas P. Buinevicius |  | 
|By:    |  | Rimas P. Buinevicius     |  | 
|Title: |  | Chief Executive Officer  |  | 
|       |  |                         
|By:    |  | /s/ Kenneth A. Minor     |  | 
|By:    |  | Kenneth A. Minor         |  | 
|Title: |  | Chief Financial Officer  |  | 



30
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<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

               CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT
               TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report of Quinton Cardiology Systems, Inc.
(the Company) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
John R. Hinson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
     or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
     Company.

                                          /s/ JOHN R. HINSON
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          John R. Hinson
                                          Chief Executive Officer

Date: March 12, 2004
#### O’GRADY, Appellant, v. McDONOUGH, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 11, 1907.)

Action by Cornelius E. O’Grady against Patrick H. McDonough.

PER CURIAM. .

Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements.

HOOKER and RICH, JJ., dissent.
#### Ebony Oil Corporation, Respondent, v Robert Brooks, Appellant.

— In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, defendant appeals from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rodell, J.), entered February 21, 1984, upon defendant’s default; (2) an order of the same court (Kassoff, J.)j dated April 2, 1984, which denied defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment, without prejudice to renewal upon proper papers; (3) an order of the same court (Cooperman, J.), dated March 20,1984, which referred defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment and restore the case to the calendar of Special Term for an immediate hearing to another Special Term Justice; and (4) an order of the same court (Graci, J.) dated June 11, 1984, which denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint and for an expedited trial and sanctions against plaintiff.

Appeal from the judgment entered February 21, 1984 dismissed. No appeal lies from a judgment entered upon default.

Order dated April 2, 1984 affirmed.

Appeal from the order dated March 20, 1984 dismissed. An order by a Supreme Court Justice referring a motion to another Justice for the purpose of a hearing is not appealable as of right (CPLR 5701 [a]; *Devine v Devine,*106 AD2d 487), and we decline to grant leave.

Order dated June 11, 1984 affirmed.

*777Respondent is awarded one bill of costs.

The issues on these appeals have been previously determined by this court *(see, Ebony Oil Corp. v Brooks,*96 AD2d 880). Lazer, J. P., Mangano, Bracken and Niehoff, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jose B. Carrasquillo, Appellant.

[944 NYS2d 713]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Frank E Geraci, Jr., A.J.), entered September 27, 2010. The order determined that defendant is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs. Present — Scudder, P.J., Centra, Bindley, Sconiers and Martoche, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Josephine D. Saenz DeViteri, Appellant, v Vincent Saldana, Respondent.

[944 NYS2d 635]—

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the mother appeals from so much of an order of the Family Court, Westchester County (Klein, J.), entered September 2, 2011, as, after a hearing, denied her petition for sole legal and physical custody of the subject child and granted that branch of the father’s petition which was for physical custody of the subject child to him.

*1222Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The mother waived her right to challenge the admission of the court-ordered forensic and probation reports, as she was represented by counsel when she stipulated to the admission of the reports into evidence (see *People v Green, 92*AD3d 953, 954 [2012]; *Matter of James Jerome C. v Mary Elizabeth J.,*31 AD3d 1184, 1185 [2006]).

“The essential consideration in any custody controversy is the best interests of the child” *(Matter of McDonough v McDonough,*73 AD3d 1067, 1068 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; *see Eschbach v Eschbach,*56 NY2d 167, 171 [1982]). “The best interests of the child are determined by a review of the totality of the circumstances” *(Matter of Garcia v Fountain, 82*AD3d 979, 980 [2011]). “Factors to be considered in determining the child’s best interests include the quality of the home environment and the parental guidance the custodial parent provides for the child, the ability of each parent to provide for the child’s emotional and intellectual development, the financial status and ability of each parent to provide for the child, the relative fitness of the respective parents, and the effect an award of custody to one parent might have on the child’s relationship with the other parent” *(Matter of McDonough v McDonough,*73 AD3d at 1068 [internal quotation marks omitted]; *see Miller v Pipia,*297 AD2d 362, 364 [2002]). “As a custody determination depends to a great extent upon an assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, the findings of the Family Court will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record” *(Matter of Tercjak v Tercjak,*49 AD3d 772, 772 [2008]; *see Matter of McCormick v Dixon,*78 AD3d 708 [2010]).

Contrary to the mother’s contention, the Family Court’s determination that it was in the best interests of the subject child to award physical custody of the child to the father was supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record. Although the evidence adduced at the hearing indicated that both parents were loving and competent caregivers, the evidence also demonstrated that the father had shown a greater ability and willingness than the mother to foster the child’s relationship with the other parent *(see Matter of Martinez v Hyatt,*86 AD3d 571, 572 [2011]; *McVeigh v Curry*74 AD3d 915, 916 [2010]; *Matter of Tori v Tori,*67 AD3d 1021 [2009]).

The mother’s remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly before this Court. Skelos, J.E, Dickerson, Eng and Austin, JJ., concur.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

N o. 04

- 18

- 00845

- CV

Raymond G. ROMERO

, Appellant

v.

Frank HERRERA , Jr., Appellee

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CI08392 Honorable Karen H. Pozza, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARION

, JUSTICE CHAPA , AND JUSTICE WATKINS

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion to compel arbitration is REVERSED. The case is REMANDED with

instruc tions for the trial court to order the parties to submit the claims at issue in the underlying suit to arbitration. Appellant’s appeal of the partial summary judgment order is DISMISSED FOR

LACK OF JURISDICTION. We ORDER that appellant recover from appelle e the costs he incurred related to this appeal.

SIGNED June 12, 2019.

_____________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
#### In re HICKEY. In the matter of Patrick J. Hickey, deceased.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

November Term, 1897.)

No opinion. Motion granted, with $10 costs.
```

[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 126 (Tuesday, July 6, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 35521]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-14281]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health

National Center for Complementary & Integrative Health; Notice of 
Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Center for Complementary and 
Integrative Health Special Emphasis Panel; Center of Excellence for 
Research on Complementary and Integrative Health (P01) (CERCIH).
    Date: July 30, 2021.
    Time: 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Center for Complementary and Integrative 
Democracy, 6707 Democracy Blvd., Bethesda, MD 20892 (Virtual 
Meeting).
    Contact Person: Martina Schmidt, Ph.D., Chief Office of 
Scientific Review, National Center for Complementary & Integrative 
Health, NIH, 6707 Democracy Blvd., Suite 401, Bethesda, MD 20892, 
301-594-3456, [email protected].

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.213, 
Research and Training in Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 
National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: June 29, 2021.
Tyeshia M. Roberson-Curtis,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2021-14281 Filed 7-2-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
```
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 654 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 654

                  For the relief of Djibril Coulibaly.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 28, 2011

 Ms. Landrieu introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
                  For the relief of Djibril Coulibaly.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR DJIBRIL COULIBALY.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of section 
201 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Djibril Coulibaly shall be 
eligible for issuance of an immigrant visa or for adjustment of status 
to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence upon 
filing an application for issuance of an immigrant visa under section 
204 of such Act or for adjustment of status to lawful permanent 
resident.
    (b) Adjustment of Status.--If Djibril Coulibaly enters the United 
States before the filing deadline specified in subsection (c), Djibril 
Coulibaly shall be considered to have entered and remained lawfully and 
shall, if otherwise eligible, be eligible for adjustment of status 
under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as of the date 
of the enactment of this Act.
    (c) Deadline for Application and Payment of Fees.--Subsections (a) 
and (b) shall apply only if the application for issuance of an 
immigrant visa or the application for adjustment of status is filed 
with appropriate fees within 2 years after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
    (d) Reduction of Immigrant Visa Number.--Upon the granting of an 
immigrant visa or permanent residence to Djibril Coulibaly, the 
Secretary of State shall instruct the proper officer to reduce by 1, 
during the current or next following fiscal year, the total number of 
immigrant visas that are made available to natives of the country of 
the alien's birth under section 203(a) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act or, if applicable, the total number of immigrant visas 
that are made available to natives of the country of the alien's birth 
under section 202(e) of such Act.
                                 <all>
```