If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 19, 2019

v No. 340031

Wayne Circuit Court

TODD GREGORY HODGES, LC No. 17-001788-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a bench trial, the circuit court convicted defendant of armed robbery and 

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm). Defendant contends 

that his trial counsel was ineffective, that the police withheld exculpatory evidence, and that the 

court erroneously scored two offense variables when calculating his sentence. We discern no 

error and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant answered a Facebook advertisement posted by Tayjona Smith, who was 

selling an iPhone 7 for $375. Smith drove to meet defendant near defendant’s house to finalize 

the purchase. Defendant took the cell phone and exited the vehicle without paying. He then

pulled out a gun and instructed Smith, “[G]et off my block before I shoot this bitch up.” At trial, 

defendant admitted to stealing the phone, but adamantly denied using a gun. 

II. ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request the court to 

consider the lesser offense of larceny by conversion. Defendant further asserts that his counsel 

should have sought the exclusion of any statements made by defendant during his police 

interrogation as the prosecution did not present the recorded police interview into evidence.
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Defendant moved in this Court for a Ginther1 hearing, but this Court denied that motion. 

People v Hodges, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 25, 2018 (Docket 

No. 340031). Because we agree that a Ginther hearing is unnecessary, we limit our review to 

mistakes apparent on the existing record. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 38; 755 NW2d 212 

(2008).

“Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of 

fact and constitutional law.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). 

“ ‘[I]t has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of 

counsel.’ ” United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 654; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984), 

quoting McMann v Richardson, 397 US 759, 777 n 14; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763 (1970). In 

Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), the United 

States Supreme Court held that a convicted defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

includes two components: “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” To establish the first component, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. People 

v Solomonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004). To establish prejudice, the 

defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors the result of the 

proceedings would have differed. Id. at 663-664. The defendant must overcome the strong 

presumptions that his “counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of professional assistance,” 

and that his counsel’s actions represented “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 US at 689.

We cannot conclude on this record that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 

request that the court consider a lesser offense; counsel’s decision was obviously strategic. The 

prosecutor charged defendant with armed robbery and felony-firearm and no lesser included 

robbery charges. In order to convict, the prosecutor had to convince the trial court that defendant 

used a gun in the course of the robbery based solely on the word of the victim. Defense counsel 

likely employed an “all or nothing” strategy, which made sense under the circumstances. If the 

court did not believe the victim’s version of events, specifically that defendant had produced a 

gun, it would have to acquit defendant of the charged offenses. This backfired as the court found 

Smith credible. However, a strategy’s failure does not mean that the strategist was 

constitutionally ineffective. People v Stewart (On Remand), 219 Mich App 38, 42; 555 NW2d 

715 (1996).

Defense counsel also was not ineffective for failing to seek exclusion of defendant’s 

statements during his police interrogation. Defendant contends that he requested an attorney, but 

that the police continued the inquiry without counsel, violating his Fifth Amendment rights. 

Defendant’s claim fails for two reasons: defendant failed to establish that the police actually 

violated his rights and even if the police did, defendant’s statements were admissible for 

impeachment purposes. 

 1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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“A statement obtained from a defendant during a custodial interrogation is admissible 

only if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment 

rights.” People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 564; 675 NW2d 863 (2003), citing Miranda v 

Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). If a statement is obtained in 

violation of a defendant’s right to counsel, the prosecution may not use that statement in its casein-chief. People v Frazier, 270 Mich App 172, 179; 715 NW2d 341 (2006), rev’d in part on 

other grounds 478 Mich 231 (2007). However, those statements may be used for impeachment 

purposes on cross-examination as long as the defendant made the statements voluntarily. Id. at 

181. 

Defendant has not supported his claim that he requested counsel during his custodial 

interrogation or that the police continued the questioning after he made such a request. 

However, even if defendant had requested counsel, the prosecution would be able to use his 

statements to impeach his testimony. The prosecutor did not elicit testimony about defendant’s 

custodial statements during the state’s case-in-chief; rather, the chief investigating officer 

testified only that he spoke to defendant and “collect[ed] [his] personal information,” including

his phone number. Only during cross-examination of defendant did the prosecutor recite 

statements allegedly made by defendant during his interrogation. As the prosecutor was free to 

use these statements for impeachment purposes, defense counsel had no ground to object. 

Counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise meritless objections or motions. People v Unger, 

278 Mich App 210, 255; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).

III. BRADY VIOLATION

At trial, the prosecution presented into evidence screenshots from the text message 

conversation defendant had with Smith. Smith testified regarding other messages that were not 

included in the presented screenshots. Defendant contends that these additional text messages 

could have been exculpatory and that the police and the prosecutor violated Brady v Maryland, 

373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), by failing to disclose them during discovery. 

Defendant failed to preserve his challenge by raising it in the trial court, limiting our review to 

plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 448; 709 

NW2d 152 (2005).

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution 

of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 

prosecution.” Brady, 373 US at 87. To establish that a Brady violation occurred, the defendant 

must show that “(1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; 

and (3) that is material.” People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 150; 845 NW2d 731 (2014).

The prosecution in this case could not have suppressed the subject evidence because the 

evidence was also in defendant’s control. The evidence was text messages between defendant 

and Smith. Smith provided to the police screenshots of the text messages from the phones she 

used. She sent these messages directly to defendant’s phone. Defendant therefore should have

had a copy of each message in the possession of the police and the prosecution. Yet, defendant 

never presented those messages, either as an offer of proof or to impeach Smith’s testimony.
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Moreover, defendant did not establish that the “suppressed” screenshots were 

exculpatory. Rather, the text messages that were presented revealed that defendant and Smith 

arranged a meeting for the purchase of a cell phone. In a final exchange presented at trial, Smith 

advised defendant that she had contacted the police and defendant claimed, “I ain[’]t do shit” and 

“Why they coming to me.” Smith testified that other messages showed that defendant thought 

his conduct was “funny,” that he would not return the phone to Smith, and that defendant 

threatened to “shoot that bitch up” if Smith returned to his neighborhood. If these messages 

were actually sent, they were not exculpatory. And if the messages read as described by Smith, 

they would not have changed the outcome of defendant’s trial; they would have been another 

nail in his convictions. Further, Smith’s testimony standing alone was not as strong as her earlier 

corroborated testimony about the text messages

Overall, defendant has not established that the prosecution suppressed any evidence, let 

alone exculpatory evidence, or that he was prejudiced by the prosecution’s actions. He is 

therefore not entitled to relief.

IV. OFFENSE VARIABLES 

Defendant also challenges the trial court’s assessment of 15 points for offense variable 

(OV) 1 and 10 points for OV 13 when calculating his sentence. “Under the sentencing 

guidelines, the circuit court’s factual determinations are reviewed for clear error and must be 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 

340 (2013). “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions 

prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory 

interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo.” Id.

OV 1 is scored for the aggravated use of a weapon. MCL 777.31(1). The assessment of 

15 points is warranted if “[a] firearm was pointed at or toward a victim . . . .” MCL 777.31(1)(c). 

The record evidence supports this score. Smith testified that defendant exited her car with a gun 

in his hand and threatened to shoot her. She pantomimed defendant’s motions and the prosecutor 

described on the record that Smith demonstrated that defendant was “holding a gun toward [the] 

seat area.” The court could reasonably infer from the testimony and demonstration that 

defendant pointed a gun at Smith and therefore did not err in scoring this variable. 

An assessment of 10 points is required for OV 13 when the sentencing “offense was part 

of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving a combination of 3 or more crimes against a 

person or property.” MCL 777.43(1)(d). “For determining the appropriate points under this 

variable, all crimes within a 5-year period, including the sentencing offense, shall be counted 

regardless of whether the offense resulted in a conviction.” MCL 777.43(2)(a). “[T]he plain 

language of the statute does not require a criminal conviction to score 10 points, but only 

requires ‘criminal activity.’ ” People v Harverson, 291 Mich App 171, 180; 804 NW2d 757 

(2010). Criminal activity includes offenses committed as a juvenile that resulted in a juvenile 

adjudication, as well as offenses that did not result in a conviction. Id.

Within the five years preceding the crimes underlying this case, defendant committed two 

others. On August 26, 2012, defendant committed second-degree home invasion as a juvenile, a

crime against a person. MCL 777.16f. On February 14, 2015, defendant was charged with 
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receiving and concealing stolen property, a crime against property. MCL 777.16z. Defendant 

then committed the offense in this case, armed robbery, which is a crime against a person. MCL 

777.16y. These offenses were sufficient to establish a pattern of criminal behavior and support 

defendant’s OV 13 score.

We affirm. 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Anica Letica