### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE O ct obe r 28, 200 4 S es sio n ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E, D EP A R TM EN T O F C HI LD R EN 'S S ER V IC ES v. B.F., ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Juvenile Court for Sevier C ounty No. 94-M 3-496 Dwigh t E. Stokes, Jud ge

No. E2004-00338-COA- R3-P T - F ILED DECEMBE R 2, 2004
This pare ntal termination ca se pre sents the Court with two issues: (1) whethe r a case manag er c an testify reg arding fac ts about which she ha s no persona l knowledg e but which a re doc umented in a case file not made an exhibi t, and (2) w hether the g uardia n ad litem of a minor child can testify as a witness. At the tria l of this case, t h e S t ate of Tennesse e, De partment of Children’ s Services pr e se nte d o nly

tw o w itn e sse s: the c a se ma na g e r w ho ha d o nly be e n w or

kin g on the fi le f

or six mon ths a ndthe c hil d’ s g ua rd ia n ad lit e m. Th e c a se ma na g e r ha d no f ir sth a ndkn ow le dg e of

the fa c ts e xce pt w hat sh e ha d r e a d inthe c a se fi le wh ic h wa s no t pr e se nt a t the tr ia l a ndno t in tr od uc e d in to e vid e nc e . T he de fe nd a nt ob je c te d o n th e ba sis of

he ars a y a ndthe tr ia l c ou rt

a llo we d th e c a se manag er to testify under the business rec ords exception to the hear say rule. The g uardia n ad litem testified conc erning her inve stigation into t he matter over the Def

endant’ s objection. We hold that the ca se mana g er’ s testimonywas he arsay and wa s not admi s sible under the busine ss rec ords e xce pti on to the he ars a y ru le

. We ho ld that the g ua rd ia n a d lit e m’ s te sti mon y was no t ad mi ssibl e pursuant to Tenne ssee Supre me Court R u l e 4 0 which for bids such testimony . Be cause of the exclusion of the testimonyof these w itnesses, the trial court should have gra nted Def endant’ s motion for a direc ted ver dict. Acc ording ly , we va cate th e judgment of the tria l court and r emand to the J uvenile Court for Sevie r County for a new tria l.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Juv e nileCo ur t V ac at e d; Ca use Re m ande d
S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined.
J ame s R . Hi ckm an, J r., S evi ervi ll e, T enn ess ee, f or t he A pp ell ant , B.F. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter , and E l i z ab et h C. Driver, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral, Na shville, Tennessee , for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION
I n Jan ua ry of 20 02 , th e Ap pe lle e , St ate of Ten ne sse e , D e pa rt me nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s, (h e re ina ft e r “ DC S” ) f

ile d a pe tit ionin the Juve nil e Cou rt fo r S e vie r Cou nty , Te nn e sse e , to te rm inate the parental rig hts of the Appellant, B .F., ( here inafter “the f ather ”), and L .F. ( here inafter “the mother”) with respec t to their minor son, D.F. (he reina fter “the child”). A hearing was he ld on the petition to terminate the mother’s rig hts in April of 2002. There afte r, an or der w as ente red g ranting the petition a s to he r and no appea l w as taken. On Marc h 5, 2003, a hearing w as held on the pe tition as to the father a nd the trial court enter ed its orde r terminating the father’s pa renta l rig hts on October 8, 2003. The father a

ppeale d.
We addre ss the following issues in this case: 1) Whether a

case manag er can te stify reg arding fac ts about which she ha s no persona l kn ow le dg e bu t w hic h a

re do c ume nte d ina

c a se fi le that is no t ma de a n e xhibi t. 2) Whe the r the g ua

rd ia n a d li te m of

a min or c hil d c a n te sti fy

a s a wi tne ss . 3) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d infaili ng to g rant the fathe r’ s mo tio n to dis mis s at th e c los e of DCS’s proof.
The issues prese nted in this appea l a re matters of law, not f

act, a nd are revie wed de novo wi th no presumption as to the cor rec tness of the trial c ourt’s dec ision. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp. , 919 S.W .2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996)

. Th e fi rs t is su e we a dd re ss i s w he the r thetr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in a llo wi ng the c a se ma na g e r t o testify

. At the he ari ng on the pet it io n to te rm inate the fa the r’ s p are nta l r ig hts , D CS c a lle d it s employ ee, L aura

Sane, as the first of two witnesses te stify ing in s u p p o rt of the pe tition. M s. Sane attested that she had been the child’s case manag er for approximately six months a nd that she wa s
“ the ke e pe r o f the re c or ds

. . .” fo r the chi ld . Whenthe c a se ma na g e r w a s q ue sti on e d a s to inf orma tio n c on ta ine d inthe c hil d’ s f ile , c ou ns e l f

or the fathe r o bje c te d a s f

oll ow s: MR. HI CKMA N: Yo ur

Ho no r, I thi nk I ’m g oin g to ha ve to o bje c t to thi s Wit ness’s entire testimony

. She’s testified that she’s only been the case manag er fo r the la st s ix mon ths , a nda s th e te rm inatio n p ro c e e din g is i n r e la tio n to a c tiv iti e s with in the fo ur mon ths pr e c e din g the fi lin g , whi c h w a s Jan ua ry of la st y ear , this W itness has no knowledg e of the rele vant infor m at i o n reg arding the termination.-3- MS. RU SH IN G [D CS c o u n s e l] : Y o u r H o n o r , s h e is th e k e e per of the business rec ord. As the business-rec ord exception, the Court is awar e and understands that she ca n testify about the conte nts of the file.
THE COURT: It does appe ar that y our objection is ba sed upon her having no knowledg e. Based on the business-re cords e x ception, it’s her testimonythat she is the kee per of

those rec ords, then that objec tion would be overr uled.
MR. HI CKMAN: Well, Your Honor, I would ask, thoug h, if she’s g oing t o b e t e s t i f

yi n g f r o m t h e r e c o r d a n d t h a t ’ s g o i n g t o b e t h e b a s i s o f h e r t e s t i m o n y, she doesn’ t have any

rec ord with her today . She certainly would need it. I f she’ s g oin g to t e sti fy

a s th e re c or ds -k e e pe r s he wo uldne e d to ha ve the re c or ds

. THE COURT: You can take up a ny objection spec ifically

to any testimony , but as far as the testimony at this point in time is established everything is competent at this point.

Th e c a se ma na g e r the n p ro c e e de d to te sti fy fr om h e r m e mory

a s to no tatio ns in the fi le reg arding such matters as the fathe r’s failure to visit the child, pay child support, and send c ards a nd g ifts. The ca se mana g er did not have firsthand knowledg e of these f acts since she wa s not working as ca s e m an age r w h en t h e e v en t s o cc u rr ed

. T h e on l y fa ct s t h e cas e m an age r h ad p er s o n al k n o wl ed ge of all occ urre d afte r the termination petition was filed.
Th e F a the r a

rg ue s th a t th e c a se manag e r’ s te sti mon y re g ard ing c a se fi le inf

orma tio n a s to m a t t e r s o f w h i c h s h e h a d n o p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e s h o u l d h a v e b e e n e x c l u d e d a s i n a d m i s s i b l e h e ar s a y. We ag ree . Hea rsay is defined in Te nn. R. Evid. 801(c) a s “a state ment, other than one m ad e bythe decla rant while testify ing at the trial or hearing, offe red in e vidence to pr ove the truth of the matter a sse rt e d. ” Te nn . R. Ev id. 80 2 p ro vid e s th a t he ars a y is “ no t a dmi ssi ble e xce pt a s p ro vid e d b y the se rules or othe rwise by

law.” The case manag er’ s testimony was he arsay and ther efor e only

admissible under a n exception to the hearsay rule. DCS arg ues t hat t he case manag er’ s testimony is admissibl e hea rsay under the business rec ords exception which is set forth in Te nn. R. Evid. 803(6): (6) Rec ords of Regularly Conducted Ac tivity - A memorandum, report, r ecor d, or data c ompilation, in any

form, of a cts, eve nts, conditions, opini ons, or diag noses ma de a t or

ne ar the tim e by or from in fo rm a tio n tr a ns mit te d b y a pe rs on wi th knowledg e and a

business duty

to rec ord or transmit i f kep t i n t h e co urse of a reg ularly cond u cted business a ctivity and if it was the r eg ular pra ctice of that bu sin e ss a c tiv ity

to m ake the me mor a nd um, re po rt , r e c or d or da ta c omp ilatio n, a ll-4-

as sho wn b ythe testimony of the c ustodian or other qua lified witness or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11)or a st atute permitti ng certification, unless the source o f i n formation or the method or circ umstances of prepa ration indicate lac k of trustworthiness. T h e t er m “business” a s used in this parag raph includes business, institut ion, profe ssion, occupation, and ca lling of e very kind, whether or not conduc ted for pr ofit.
Th e pu rp os e of

the ru le is to fa c ili ta te the us e of bu sin e ss r e c or ds by

e lim inatin g the e xpe ns e and inconve nience of ca lling numer ous witnesses involved in the pre paration a n d maintenanc e of the re cords. Alexande r v. Inman , 903 S.W . 2d 686 (Tenn Ct. App. 1995).
F ir st, we ob se rv e that th is e xce pti on sp e c if ica ll y re fe rs to “ re c or ds ” a ndind ic a te s th a t a “re cord” consists of “[a] memorandum, report, record or data compilation, in any form.” It is clear from this lang uag e that thi s exception perta ins solely to the admis sion of i nformation in the form of tang ible documentation. The rule provides for the admission of re c or ds

. It does not provide for the admission of the testimony of a w itness as to his or her me mo ry of what the rec ord stated. The g round for

this ex ception to the hear say rule is “ the fac t that reg ularly kept re cords ty

pically have a high de g ree of ac cura cy .” M C C OR MI C K ON E VI DENCE §286 (John W . Strong, e d. 1999).
A r e sp e c te d tr e a tis e on e vid e nc e la w i n T e nn e sse e e la bo rate s a s f

oll ow s: Historically , business rec ords have been a dmissibl e as a hear say exception beca use they are viewed a s sufficiently trustworthy

to be used by

the trier of

fac t a s e vid e nc e . Th e y are c on sid e re d re lia ble be c aus e bu sin e sse s r e ly on the m in the ir day to d a y bu sin e ss d e c isi on s, c le ri c a l e mpl oy e e s’ job s hing e on the ir c apa c ity to keep a ccur ate r ecor ds, and the business has c ountless opportunities to rece ive fe e db a c k o n th e acc ur a c y of its re c or ds a ndto m ake the ne c e ssa ry c ha ng e s to e ns ur e the re c or ds are c or re c t.
N EIL P. C OHEN , S AR AH Y. S HE PP EA R D & D ONAL D F. P AI NE , T ENNES S EE LA W O F E VI DENCE § 8.11 (4 ed. 2000). th
I t is not r easona

ble to a ssume that a witness testify ing f rom memory

exhibi ts the “hig h deg ree of ac cura cy ” attributed to a reg ularly kept re cord.
F urthe r, e ve n ha d the re c or ds be e n pr e se nt in the tr ia l c ou rt a ndbe e n o ff

e re d a s a n e xhibi t, the pr op e r fo un datio n pu rs ua nt to Te nn . R. Ev id. 80 3( 6) wa s n ot l a id b y the of fe ri ng pa rty . T he on ly fo un datio n p re se nte d w a s th e fo llo wi ng wh ic h w a s n ot s uf fi c ie nt: Q. Okay . And ar e y ou the kee per of the re cords f

or Da niel Floy d?
A. Ye s, I a m.-5- Q. An d d o y ou re c or d c a se re c or din g s in his fi le on a re g ula r b a sis ?
A. Ye s. Q. An d a re tho se re vie we d b y

y ou r s up e rv iso r o n a

re g ula r b a sis ? A. Yes, the y

are . Q. Are y ou disciplined to acc urate ly rec ord?
A. Ye s. Q. An d is thi s th e po lic y

that is fo llo we d b y

pr e vio us c a se ma na g e rs ?
A. Ye s. Q. An d y ou re vie we d th e ir c a se fi le s?
A. Ye s. DCS contends that in State v. Hay nes, No. 01C01-9611-CC-00494, 1998 WL 307949 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, J une 12, 1998) the Tenne ssee Court of Criminal Appe als “ha s ruled that there is no distinction i n the business rec ords hea rsay exception betwee n admission of the ac tual re c or ds a nda dmi ssi on of te sti mon y

ba se d o n th e reco rds .” Th e c ou rt in that c a se didstate that it s re vie w o f the rel evan t c a se la w i nd ic a te d th a t c ou rt s d o n ot m ake a dis tin c tio n u nd e r the bu sin e ss re c or ds e xce ption bet ween the a dmi ssi on of re c or ds a ndte sti mon y

ba se d u po n th os e re c or ds

. Howeve r, the Ha

y ne s court did not addres s the merits of the business r ecor ds issue beca use the Appellant wa ived the issue by failing to make appr opriate r efe re n ce s to the rec ord. Ther efor e, beca use the c ourt in Hayne s did not address the issue now bef ore us, a ny

comments it made in that reg ard a re obiter dictum and as suc h, do not constitute bindi n g p rec edential authority

. Sh e ph e rd Fleets, Inc . v. Opry land USA , 7 5 9 S.W .2d 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). In any event, we have revie wed the c ases r elied on by the Hayne s c ou rt

a ndfi ndthat th os e c a se s a re fa c tua lly distinguishable f

rom the ca se bef

ore us. Our de termination that the t rial court should have excluded the c ase ma nag er’ s testimony with respect t o the content of rec ords that wer e not broug ht to the hearing is supporte d by our decision in Perlberg v. Brencor Asset Managem ent, Inc ., 6 3 S

. W

. 3 d 3 9 0 ( T e n n . C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 1 )

. In that case , an employ ee w hose job was terminated sued his forme r employ er f or handic ap discrimination alleg ing that the employ er ha d violated the Te nnessee Human Rig hts Act by not rea sonably

acc ommodating him in employ ment which wa s compatible with his condition after he suffe red an on-the-job injury . The tr i al co u rt conclude d that the employ er ha d not violated Tenn. Code A n n . § 8

- 5 0

- 1 0 3 a s a ll e g e d b y th e Pl a in ti f f b e c au s e th e s tatu te w a s n o t ap p li c able when the hand icap pr evente d the employ ee f rom perf orming the duties requir ed by the employ ment or-6-

impaired the pe rformance of t he work in question. The trial court’s determination that the plaintiff employ ee did not mee t the phy sical qualifications for the job was ba s ed upon an af fidavit of the employ er’ s d i s t rict mana g er w hich purporte d to establish that phy sical problems suff ere d by the plaintiff pre vented him from pe rforming duties require d by the j ob or impaired his pe rformance of the wo rk. The a ffidavit included by attachme nt a letter f

rom the district manag er to the pla intiff re fe re nc ing a le tte r fr om a do c tor wh ic h a lle g e dly ind ic a te d the plaint if f’ s pe rm a ne nt res tr ic tio ns . The doctor’s letter wa s not in the recor d and the plaintiff c ontended that the a lleg ed stateme nts of the doctor a s set forth in the abse nt letter were inadmissi ble hearsay

. The trial court dec ree d that the attestation as to what the doc tor’s letter indicated was a dmissibl e under the b u siness rec ords exception. We disagr eed w ith the trial court and he ld that the business rec ords exception did not app ly ba se d u po n th e fo llo wi ng a na ly sis : Th e a ff ida vit inc lud e s a s a n atta c hme nt a letter from [t he district manag er] to [t he plaintiff] stating ag ain that [the employ er] “has r ece ived the doctor’s letter indicating perma nent re strictions ....” This is the totality of the e vidence relating to [the plaint if

f’ s] a lle g e d r e stric tio ns ; the doctor’s letter is n o t i n t h e rec ord. Henc e, there i s no “memorandum, report, rec ord, or data compilation” fr om the doctor. Obviously , such a doc ument must e x i s t t o i m plicate the pr ovisions of Rule 803(6).
Pe rlb e rg , 63 S.W .3d at 396. (Emphasis in orig inal.)
Th e c a se ma na g e r w as not a ssi g ne d th e c hil d’ s c a se un til a ft e r the pe tit ionto t e rm inate pare ntal rig hts was filed. The re is no indication that she has pe rsonal knowledg e of w hat transpire d in the case befor e the pe tition was filed. Acc ording ly , it is our determination that the only evidenc e s h e c o u l d h a v e o f

f e r e d i n s u p p o r to f

t h e p e t i t i o n a tt h e h e ar i n g c o n s i s t e d o f i n a d m i s s i b l e h e ar s a y. The ne x t issue presente d for our re v i ew i s whether the trial court erre d in admitting the te sti mon y of the c hil d’ s g ua

rd ia n a d li te m. At the conc lusion of the testimony of the case manag er, DCS c alled the child’s g uardia n ad litem, R e b e c c a

M c C o y, as an a dditional witness in support of its petit ion to terminate the father’s pa re nta l r ig hts

. Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 40, adopted on F ebrua ry 5, 2002, provides in pertinent part a s f oll ow s: (f) Guar dian ad litem to function as law y er, not a s a witness or spe cial master

. (1) A g uardia n ad li tem may not be a witness or testify in any proce eding in which he or she serve s as g uardia n ad litem, except in those ext raor dinary circ umstances specifie d by

Supreme Court Rule 8, §§ EC 5-9, 5-10 a nd DR 5-101.-7-

DCS does not alleg e that extraordinary circ umstances e x isted which would have authorized testimonyby

the g uardia n ad litem. Acc ording ly , we hold that the testimony of the c hild’s gua

rdian ad litem was improperly

admitted and should have been e x cluded a s evidenc e in this matter.
The fina l issue addre ssed is whether the trial court shou l d h av e granted the fathe r’s ora l motion to di smiss at the close of DCS’s proof. The sole pr oof off

ere d by DC S i n support of its petition to t erminate the father’s pa renta l rig hts consisted of the testimony of the case manag er and the g uardia n ad litem. As we have note d, this testim ony

was e rrone ously

admi tted into evidence and should have been e x cluded. Upon our determination that all evidence supporting the petition to terminate pare ntal rig hts should have been excluded, we are compelled to the nece ssary conclusion that the trial court erre d in not gr anting the fathe r’ s mo tio n to dis mis s at th e c los e of pr oo f b y DC S.
Al th ou gh th e fathe r r a ise s a dd iti on a l is su e s in his brie f, we fi ndit u nn e c e ssa ry to a dd re ss these upon our de termination that they are prete rmitted by

our dec ision herein.
For the foreg oing rea sons, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is vacated and the c ase is re manded to the J uvenile Court for Sevie r County for a new tria l. Costs of appe al ar e adjudg ed a gainst the State of Te nn e sse e , D e pa

rt me nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s.

___________________________ S HA RO N G. L EE , J UDGE