[Cite as State v. Glaze , 2020-Ohio-53.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )

STATE OF OHIO Appellee

v. MATTHEW GLAZE Appellant C.A. No. 18CA011289

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO CASE No. 16CR095318

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: January 13, 2020

CARR, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Appellant, Matthew Glaze, appeals the judgment of the Lorain Co unty Court of

Common Pleas. This Court affirms.

I. {¶2} The unfortunate circumstances of this case arise out of a traff ic accident that occurred in Amherst Township on the morning of July 2, 2016. A s Glaze was entering an intersection while driving his C hevy Suburban, he struck a Chev y Cruze containing three women. The Chevy Cruze then collided with a van stopped at the intersection. Two passengers in the Chevy Cruze died as a result of the accident. The drive r of the Chevy Cruze and the driver of the van suffered injuries. {¶3} On December 8, 2016, the Lorain County Grand Jury returned a 13 -count indictment against G laze. Glaze was charged with four counts o f aggravated vehicular homicide, one count of aggravated vehicular assault, one count of vehicul ar assault, one count of tampering2

with evidence, two counts of possession of drugs, one count of driving under suspension, two counts of driving under the influence, and one count of possess ion of drug paraphernalia. On February 17, 2017, the grand jury returned a supplemental indic tment charging Glaze with two

additional counts of vehicular a ssault. Thereafter, the grand jury again supplemented the indictment with one count of aggravated vehicular assault as we ll as another count of vehicular assault. Glaze pleaded not guilt y to the charges at arraignmen t. {¶4} The matter proceeded to a jury trial where Glaze was found guil ty of all the charges against him. After determining that a number of the co unts were allied offenses, the trial court imposed a total prison sentence of 14 years. {¶5} On appeal, Glaze raises five assignments of error.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE IS AGAINST THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE CONVICTIONS ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. {¶6} In his first assignment of error, Glaze contends the State fail ed to present

sufficient evidence to sustain h is convictions for aggravated v ehicular homicide. In his second assignment of error, Glaze conte nds that his convictions for ag gravated vehicular homicide were against the weight of the evide nce. This Court disagrees with both assertions.3

{¶7} Glaze was convicted of two count s of aggravated vehicular homic ide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a), which states, “[n]o person, while ope rating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle, * * * shall cause the death of an other * * * [a]s the proximate result of committing a violation of [R. C. 4511.19(A)].” Glaze was als o convicted of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicid e in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2 )(a), which provides that, “[n]o person, while operating or particip ating in the operation of a motor vehicle, * * * shall cause the death of another * * * [r]ecklessly[.]” Pursuant to R.C. 2901. 22(C), a person acts “recklessly” when “with heedless indifference to the consequences, the perso n disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumsta nces when, with heedless indifference to the consequences , the person disregards a subst antial and unjustifiable risk that

such circumstances are likely to exist.” Sufficiency Challenge {¶8} Glaze challenges his convictions for aggravated vehicular homic ide to the extent

that the State faile d to present sufficient evidence that he ac ted recklessly. 1 {¶9} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determ ine whether the evidence before

the trial court was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279 (1991). An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitt ed at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince th e average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The releva nt inquiry is

1 At sentencing, the trial court determined that Glaze’s convict ions under R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a) (counts four and five) merged with his convictions under R.C. 2 903.06(A)(1)(a) (counts one and two).4

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable t o the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential eleme nts of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶10} At trial, the State presented evidence supporting the following narrative. On the morning of July 2, 2016, Glaze was involved in a car accident a t the intersection of State Route

113 and State Route 58 in Amherst Township. Glaze was driving a Chevy Suburban when he drove into the back of a Chevy Cruze that was stopped at the in tersection. The Chevy Cruze

contained three women. L.V. was driving the sedan while I.C. a nd M.M. were passengers. After being struck from behind by the Suburban, the Chevy Cruze colli ded with a van driven by R.T.

I.C. and M.M. died as a result of the accident. L.V. and R.T. sustained injuries. {¶11} Ryon Berkel observed Glaze dr iving westbound on State Route 113 just prior to the accident. As Berkel was preparing to exit his driveway, he saw Glaze approaching at a high rate of speed. Berkel testified that Glaze’s vehicle was “goin g left of center as it was approaching me. That’s what made me hesitate.” Berkel further testified that in addition to veering outside of his lane, Glaze was “hauling ass[,]” traveli ng at an estimated speed of 70-75 miles per hour on road with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour. 2 Berkel observed that Glaze was not in a normal driving position. Instead, Glaze had a “slouch ed look” and “was up on top of the wheel.” Berkel saw “parts flying everywhere” when Glaze collid ed with another vehicle as he

entered the intersection of Sta te Route 113 and State Route 58. Berkel could not recall seeing the Suburban’s brake light s prior to the crash.

2 Berkel testified that his ability to gauge a vehicle’s “rate o f closure” was informed by his experience as a Division III driver in the National Hot Rod Ass ociation, where he races quick rod and super rod.5

{¶12} Stephen Konkiel, who drives a tru ck for Hillandale Farms, was t ravelling

southbound of State Route 58 on th e morning of the incident. A t the time of the collision, Konkiel was stopped at a red light as cars traveled from east t o west on State Route 113. Konkiel’s eyes were drawn to the van travelling westbound on St ate Route 113 that was stopped in the left hand turn lane. Konkiel noticed the van, driven by R.T, because it had a “rainbow flame” paint job. The Chevy Cruze, driven by L.V., was stopped behind the van. Out of the corner of his eye, Konkiel saw Glaze’s Suburban coming at a ver y high rate of speed. The

Suburban crashed into the rear o f L.V.’s car. Konkiel describe d the accident as a “violent impact” that “sounded like an explosion going off.” The collis ion propelled the Chevy Cruze into the van. Konkiel explained that the van ended up in the m iddle of the intersection while the Suburban went through the inters ection and off the road. R.T. saw the Suburban’s brake lights come on after it came to a stop in a field, suggesting that the brakes were functional. Both Konkiel and R.T. testified that they saw Glaze exit his Suburba n after the accident and throw an object into the bushes. {¶13} In recalling the incident, L.V. testified that she pulled into the left turn lane on State Route 113 as she prepared to turn onto State Route 58. T here was a red light and L.V. came to a complete stop behind th e van driven by R.T. L.V. did not remember the details of the accident, only that she was laughing with her friends before sh e suddenly “saw black.” When L.V. was taken to an ambulance at the scene, she observed the d amage to the back end of her vehicle and passed out. {¶14} First responders arrived on the s cene immediately after the acc ident. Konkiel

notified Officer Matthew Gramlich that Glaze had thrown somethi ng into the bushes. Thereafter, law enforcement discovered a pipe in that area that tested positive for cocaine.6

Officer Gramlich found an empty pill bottle with Glaze’s name o n it in the grass near Glaze’s vehicle. The prescription was for oxycodone. Upon approaching Glaze, Officer Gramlich noticed that Glaze had constricted pupils. Testing on the pill bottle indicated that it contained heroin residue. While Glaze was initially alert, he gradually became sluggish and started to “nod off” while answering questions. A paramedic at the scene also noticed that Glaze’s pupils were constricted and that his eyes did not respond to light or motio n. Based on their observations of Glaze, both Officer Gramlich and the paramedic suspected that G laze was under the influence of drugs. {¶15} Glaze was transported to the hos pital where urine and blood sam ples were collected. Dr. Gabrielle Morris, a neurological surgeon, exami ned Glaze in the emergency room. Glaze’s urine tested positive for cocaine, opiates, and benzodi azepines. The blood tests were negative for illegal substances. Dr. Morris concluded that Gla ze had a “polypharmacy induced

altered mental state” based on the urine test results. While D r. Morris did diagnose Glaze with a concussion, she emphasized that, “in the setting of a positive tox screen and a negative CT [scan,]” Glaze’s altered mental state could only have been caus ed by polypharmacy, not a

concussion. The State’s toxicol ogy expert, Dr. John Wyman, tes tified that a euphoric high from cocaine lasts for a relatively short period of time. The perio d of euphoria can be followed by a period of dysphoria where the user experiences a crash, charact erized by discomfort, fatigue, and agitation. Dr. Wyman noted that the blood sample in this case was collected two and a half

hours after the accident. Dr. W yman testified cocaine will onl y appear in the blood samples for a short period of time before the body metabolizes the substance and turns it into benzoylecgonine, which would appear in a urine sam ple for a longer period of tim e.7

{¶16} Lieutenant Robert Gable, who serves as a drug recognition exper t for the Ohio State Highway Patrol, evaluated Glaze at the hospital. Glaze t old Lieutenant Gable that his brakes failed as he approached the intersection. When Glaze st ruggled with certain field sobriety

tests, 3 Lieutenant Gable inquired as to why Glaze might be giving sign s of impairment. Glaze indicated that he ingested Xanax and Lithium prior to going to bed at 1:30 am. Upon further interrogation, Glaze “admitted that that morning, prior to the crash, he was arguing with his wife and that he may have taken one oxycodone, one Xanax, and one Li thium around 6:30 in the morning.” {¶17} The crux of Glaze’s argument on a ppeal is that the State failed to demonstrate that he acted recklessly because there was no evidence that he was u nder the influence at the time of the incident. Glaze emphasizes that while his blood test showe d no signs of drugs, his urine tested positive for cocaine. Glaze contends that “[i]t is clea r that any ingested cocaine was already through the blood, metabo lized, and in the urine[,]” me aning that “[t]here [was] no reckless conduct because there was no intoxication as the drug was in the metabolized waste form.” Glaze further points to his own medical history, noting that he has dealt with syncope and that he has a prescription to take opiates. {¶18} Glaze’s sufficiency challenge is without merit. We remain mind ful that we must

construe the evidence in favor o f the State when resolving a su fficiency challenge. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d at 279. The State pre sented evidence that, at the t ime of the deadly collision, Glaze was driving a Suburban at an ex cessive rate of speed and was we aving in and out of his lane.

3 While Glaze performed well on the horizontal and vertical gaze nystagmus tests, Lieutenant Gable had to continually remind Glaze to keep his eyes open dur ing those tests. Glaze gave clues of impairment on certain divided attention skills tests, including the walk-and-turn test and the one-leg-stand test.8

There was further evidence that Glaze was slouched over the whe el as he sped toward the intersection where, without braking, he plowed into a car stopp ed at the light and killed two people. Upon exiting the vehicle, he attempted to discard a pi pe with cocaine residue by throwing it into some nearby bushes. Law enforcement also foun d a pill bottle containing heroin residue near Glaze’s vehicle. Both law enforcement and emergen cy personnel were suspicious

that Glaze was under the influence. Glaze’s urine sample tested pos itive for a number of drugs, including cocaine and opioids. Dr. Wyman testified that after experiencing a high, cocaine users can experience a period of dysphoria that includes a number of negative physical symptoms. Multiple witnesses observed Glaze in an altered mental state af ter the accident and Dr. Morris

testified that the altered mental state could not have been a r esult of a concussion, but instead was the result of polypharmacy. The aforementioned evidence, w hen construed in the light most favorable to the State, demonstrated that Glaze acted recklessl y in causing the deaths of I.C. and

M.M. {¶19} The first assignment of error is overruled. Manifest Weight Challenge {¶20} Glaze’s manifest weight challenge also focuses on whether he ac ted recklessly. Glaze renews his position that his “body had already metabolize d the cocaine and the State’s own expert testified that once the cocaine is metabolized, the high would be gone.” Glaze further argues that he suffered a concussion during the crash, which could explain the symptoms he displayed as well as his poor performance on field sobriety tests. Finally, Glaze emphasizes

that he suffers from a number o f medical conditions, including syncopal episodes, which law

enforcement would not have bee n qualified to detect immediately following the accident.9

{¶21} A conviction that is supported by sufficient evidence may still be found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997); Eastley v. Volkman , 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12. In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the man ifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, wei gh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witn esses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of f act clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the con viction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

State v. Otten , 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is agai nst the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirt eenth juror’ and disagrees with the fact[-]finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida , 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). An appellate court should exercise t he power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional cases. Otten at 340. {¶22} Glaze’s manifest weight challe nge is without merit. Glaze corr ectly notes that the State’s toxicology expert, Dr. W yman, testified that once someo ne’s body metabolizes cocaine, the euphoric high is gone. Howev er, Dr. Wyman further testifie d that the period of euphoria can be followed by a period of “dys phoria and depression[.]” Dr. W yman indicated that based upon his review of the reports in this matter, it appeared Glaze was behaving in a manner consistent with opioid impairment after the crash. Moreover, while Glaze contends that his altered mental state may have been due to a concussion, Dr. Morris concluded t hat his altered mental state was due to polypharmacy. Dr. Morris specifically observed that whi le Glaze had a concussion, “[h]e did not have any brain injury that required admission, observat ion, or any further care.” Though

Glaze further contends that law enforcement was not qualified t o understand his various medical ailments, including syncopal episodes, the State presented ampl e evidence, independent of the10

observations of law enforcement, that Glaze was impaired at the time of the accident. Under these circumstances, we cannot s ay that this is the exceptional case where the jury clearly lost its

way. Conclusion {¶23} As Glaze’s convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide were s upported by sufficient evidence and were not against the weight of the evid ence, Glaze’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE STATE COULD PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY AT TRIAL OF THE DYSPHORIC AFFECTS OF COCAINE AS IT RELATES TO ACCIDENTS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS UNRELIABLE. {¶24} In his third assignment of error, Glaze contends that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Wyman to testify because the State failed to dem onstrate that his testimony regarding the dysphoric effects of cocaine was reliable. Glaze maintains that the trial court’s analysis fell short of the reliability standard set forth in Ev id.R. 702(C) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 (1993). This Court disagrees. {¶25} This Court reviews the admission of expert testimony for an abu se of discretion.

Wade v. Mancuso , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 16CA010978, 2018-Ohio-1563, ¶ 37. An ab use of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶26} Evid.R. 702 states: A witness may testify as an exp ert if all of the following appl y: (A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception common among lay persons;11

(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowle dge, skill, experience, training, or educati on regarding the subject matter of the testimony; (C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, tec hnical, or other specialized information. To the extent that the testimony repo rts the result of a procedure, test, or experiment, the testimony is reliable only if all of the following apply: (1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is based is objectively verifiable or is valid ly derived from widely accept ed knowledge, facts, or principles; (2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliably i mplements the theory; (3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in a way that will yield an accurate result. {¶27} “In evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence, several factors are to be considered: (1) whether the the ory or technique has been teste d, (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review, (3) whether there is a known or poten tial rate of error, and (4) whether the methodology has gained general acceptance.” State v. Schmidt , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 13CA010499, 2015-Ohio-146, ¶ 9, quoting Miller v. Bike Athletic Co. , 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 611 (1998), citing Daubert at 593-594. “A trial court’s role in determining whether an ex pert’s testimony is admissible under Evid.R. 702(C) focuses on whether the opinion is based upon scientifically valid principles, not whether the expert’s concl usions are correct or whether the testimony satisfies the proponent ’s burden of proof at trial.” Miller at paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶28} After the State gave notice of its intent to call Dr. Wyman as an expert witness, Glaze filed a request for a Daubert hearing to establish the reliability of Dr. Wyman’s testimony. The matter proceeded to a hearing. {¶29} At the outset of the hearing, th e trial court noted that the sc ope would be “the limited issue of dysphoria with co caine.” Dr. Wyman testified that he has a doctoral degree in12

toxicology and comparative pharmacology as well as a bachelor’s and master’s degrees in microbiology. Dr. Wyman is also board certified in general tox icology and forensic toxicology. With respect to this case, Dr. Wyman prepared a report after re viewing the State Highway Patrol’s lab report, crash repor t, and investigative report, as well as the report from the drug recognition expert. Dr. Wyman also reviewed witness statements and Glaze’s hospital records. Dr. Wyman acknowledged that he had to prepare an amended report , or a second report, due to

the fact that he mistook the uri ne test results for the blood t est results and initially concluded that Glaze must have been “repeatedly dosing[,]” or binging, on coca ine. Upon recognizing the issue, Dr. Wyman prepare d a corrected report. {¶30} In addition to opining that Glaze was under the influence of op ioids at the time he was driving, Dr. Wyman inferred that Glaze may have been experi encing dysphoria related to his

cocaine use. This inference wa s based on the fact that while t here was evidence that Glaze had used cocaine, the cocaine was no longer present in Glaze’s bloo d. Dr. Wyman explained that “when you’ve used cocaine, initia lly you have euphoria, but aft er it’s metabolized it reverts to a state of dysphoria.” In elaborating, Dr. Wyman explained that, as a central nervous system stimulant, cocaine causes neurotransmitters to be released into the body resulting in effects that last for a relatively brief period of time. W hen the body meta bolizes the cocaine and it leaves the blood, the user will experience dysphoria, or a “crash[.]” In a state of dysphoria, the user is “extremely uncomfortable[]” and can experience fatigue, drowsin ess, paranoia, and anxiousness. Based on the reports he reviewed, Dr. Wyman concluded that Glaz e may have been suffering from dysphoria associated with cocaine use and that Glaze was l ikely impaired at the time of the accident due to opioid exposure.13

{¶31} Dr. Wyman explained that toxicol ogists are aware of the notion of dysphoria associated with cocaine and that it has been the subject of sci entifically peer-reviewed articles. In the middle of the hearing, the trial court inquired as to wh ether Dr. Wyman would be testifying with respect to the results of tests he conducted in specific regard to Glaze. The State indicated that Dr. Wyman did not perform any tests and that oth er witnesses would be testifying regarding the results of toxicology tests. The State indicated that Dr. Wyman’s testimony would serve solely to educate the jury regarding the dysphoric effect s of cocaine. Dr. Wyman testified that his understanding of dysphoria as a result of cocaine elim ination stemmed from his education, experience, and trai ning, as well as scientific lite rature. Dr. Wyman referenced an article written by Daniel Isenschmid, Ph.D., that detailed the negative effects of dysphoria and how it can lead to impaired drivin g. Dr. Wyman noted that Isen schmid’s article referenced other scientific papers on the subject and was published in the Foren sic Science Review, a highly regarded toxicology journal. Dr. Wyman further testified that he was not aware of any criticisms

or addendums to the ar ticle’s findings in the years that follow ed its publication in 2002. {¶32} Following the hearing, the trial court issued a journal entry n oting that the stipulated purpose of the hearing was to determine if Dr. Wyman ’s testimony regarding the dysphoric effects of cocaine was reliable. The trial court ult imately concluded that the “dysphoria associated with cocaine use is well known and accept ed in the scientific community” and that Dr. Wyman’s testimony was based on reliable scientific , technical, and specialized

information. {¶33} On appeal, Glaze contends that the trial court’s analysis faile d to meet the reliability standard set forth in Daubert and Evid.R. 702(C) and, instead , appeared to be rooted in the lesser “general accepted” standard set forth in Frye v. United States , 293 F. 101314

(D.C.Cir.1923). Glaze emphasizes that Dr. Wyman never conducte d any tests himself and never examined Glaze. Glaze further argues that the reliability of D r. Wyman’s testimony was undermined when he had to prepare a second report because his f irst report was based on a mistaken understanding of the blood and urine test results. {¶34} To the extent that Glaze contends that the trial court disregar ded the Daubert standards, “the test of scientific reliability is a flexible on e, and the factors outlined in Daubert ‘neither necessarily nor exclusively app[ly] to all experts or in every case.’” State v. Jackson , 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27132, 27200, 27133, 27158, 2015-Ohio-5246, ¶ 74, quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd

. v. Carmichael , 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). A trial court has “considerable le eway” in determining how to evaluate the reliability of an expert’s test imony. Jackson at ¶ 74, quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd . at 152. {¶35} In this case, the trial court pressed the State on the requirem ents of Evid.R. 702 and participated in the examina tion of Dr. Wyman. The State ac knowledged that Dr. Wyman did not perform any testing on Glaze and that his testimony would b e limited to the dysphoric effects of cocaine. Dr. Wyman testified that in addition to his traini ng and education, his opinion regarding the dysphoric effects of cocaine was based on scienti fic literature that had been peer reviewed. Dr. Wyman further testified that he was not aware th at any findings in the Isenschmid article had been disputed in the years since its publication. Moreover, though Glaze notes that it was necessary for Dr. Wyman to prepare a second report, Dr. Wym an acknowledged the mistake in his initial report and noted that his testimony with respect to Glaze would be predicated on the corrected report. Under these ci rcumstances, Glaze cannot prev ail on his argument that the State failed to demonstrate that Dr. Wym an’s testimony was reliable. {¶36} The third assignment of error is overruled.15

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SENTENCING APPELLANT TO TWO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2929.14. {¶37} In his fourth assignment of error, Glaze contends that the tria l court abused its discretion in sentencing him t o consecutive sentences. This Co urt disagrees. {¶38} Glaze’s argument focuses on the first three counts in the indic tment. With respect to count one, Glaze was convicted of aggravated vehicular homic ide in relation to the death of M.M. and sentenced to a mandatory term of six years in prison. As to count two, Glaze was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide in relation to the d eath of I.C. and sentenced to a mandatory term of six years in prison. In regard to count thre e, Glaze was convicted of aggravated vehicular assault in relation to L.V. and sentenced to a mandatory term of two years in prison. The trial court orde red that the sentences for coun t one, count two, and count three were to be served consecutively fo r a total prison sentence of 14 years. {¶39} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides that “[i]f multiple prison terms ar e imposed on an offender for convictions of multip le offenses, the court may re quire the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if t he court finds that the consecut ive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the serious ness of the offender’s conduct a nd to the danger the offender poses to the public[.]” The court must also find “any” of the follow ing: (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, orwas under postrelease control for a prior offense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as par t of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the m ultiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the16

offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct ade quately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates tha t consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) {¶40} The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bonnell held that, “[i]n order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate it s findings into its sentencing entry, but it has no obligati on to state reasons to support its findings.” Bonnell , 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, at syllabus. {¶41} Glaze does not dispute that the trial court made a finding unde r R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) in support of its decision to impose consecuti ve sentences. Instead, Glaze

contends that his cond uct was not more egregious, and thus did not warrant consecutive sentences, simply because there were multiple passengers in the Chevy Cruze that he struck. Glaze maintains that if there had only been one occupant of the Chevy Cruze, “[his] behavior

would be the same but he would ha ve only had one sentence.” {¶42} “As long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial cour t engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evi dence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” State v. Kilmire , 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27319, 27320, 2015-Ohio-665, ¶ 16, quoting Bonnell at ¶ 29. {¶43} Given the record before us, we can only conclude that Glaze’s a rgument is without merit. “When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial c ourt must state the required findings as part of the sentencing hearing[; h]owever, a word-f or-word recitation of the language of the statute is not required[.]” Id . Here, the trial court made findings pursuant to R.C.17

2929.14(C)(4)(b) at the sentencing hearing in support of its de cision to impose consecutive

sentences. The trial court furth er incorporated these findings into its sentencing entry. While

Glaze maintains that his sentence would have been different if L.V. had not had passengers in

her vehicle on the date of the in cident, the unfortunate facts of this case are that Glaze’s conduct resulted in two people losing t heir lives and a third person su ffering serious injuries. Glaze has not pointed this Court to any authority indicating that a trial court errs by imposing consecutive sentences when a defendant causes a collision that injures or k ills multiple passengers in the

same vehicle. This Court’s own research reveals otherwise. See, e.g. , State v. Lambert, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2018-CA-28, 2019-Ohio-2837, ¶ 34; State v. Owens , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15- 1215, 2016-Ohio-3092, ¶ 34; State v. Long , 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2000-09-022, 2001 WL 433371, *2-3 (Apr. 30, 2001). Under these circumstances, the r ecord supports the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences. {¶44} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING, CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS, WHICH ARE DISPROPORTIONATE WITH THE SENTENCES IMPOSED ON SIMILAR DEFENDANTS. {¶45} In his fifth assignment of error, Glaze contends that the lengt h of his sentence

constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Ei ghth Amendment. Glaze points to two other defendants who were recently sentenced for aggravated vehicle homicide in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas and maintains that the sentence he received was grossly disproportionate to the sente nces handed down in those cases. This Court disagrees. {¶46} The Supreme Court of Ohio has he ld that, “[a]s a general rule, a sentence that

falls within the terms of a valid statute cannot amount to crue l and unusual punishment.”18

McDougle v. Maxwell , 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 69 (1964). Here, Glaze has neither demonstr ated that any of his individual sentences fell outside the accepted statu tory range, nor has he shown that the trial court failed to comply with statutory provisions in o rdering those sentences be served consecutively. Moreover, a review of the record reveals that G laze did not raise the constitutionality issue and present comparators below. Accordi ngly, he has forfeited the issue on appeal. See generally State v. White , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 94CA005936, 1995 WL 338423, *5 (June 7, 1995). It follows that Glaz e’s final assignment of er ror is overruled.

III. {¶47} Glaze’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County

Court of Common Pl eas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitu te the mandate, pursuant to Ap p.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file s tamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the pa rties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket , pursuant to App.R. 30.19

Costs taxed to Appellant.

DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, J. SCHAFER, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES: GIOVANNA V. BREMKE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and LINDSEY C. POPROCKI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.