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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 122,418

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

JUSTIN W. STEINERT,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN, judge. Opinion filed June 24, 2022. 

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.

Kai Tate Mann, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, 

attorney general, for appellee. 

Before HURST, P.J., BRUNS and GARDNER, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Justin W. Steinert entered an Alford plea to one count each of 

aggravated robbery, contributing to a child's misconduct, distribution of marijuana, and 

possession of distribution paraphernalia. As agreed to in the plea agreement, the State 

asked the district court to find that Steinert had committed aggravated robbery, a person 

felony, with a firearm. At sentencing, the district court found Steinert's criminal history 

score to be H, and Steinert agreed. The district court informed Steinert at both the plea 

and sentencing hearings that he would need to register as a violent offender because of 
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his aggravated robbery conviction, and it sentenced Steinert to 71 months of 

imprisonment. 

Steinert appeals, raising multiple challenges to his sentence. He argues the district 

court failed to make specific findings triggering the registration requirement, and that 

substantial competent evidence does not support the district court's finding. He contends 

the district court imposed an illegal sentence, and that the Kansas Offender Registration 

Act (KORA) violates both Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. 

Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And 

finally, he argues the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA) violates section 5 of the 

Kansas Constitution and that the district court violated Apprendi by making judicial factfindings of his prior convictions rather than have a jury consider those facts. But the 

Kansas Supreme Court has rejected all of these constitutional arguments. And our review 

of the record shows that the district court made the necessary finding to trigger the 

registration requirement, and that substantial competent evidence supports that finding. 

Nor do we find that Steinert’s criminal history score renders his sentence illegal. We thus 

find no reversible error.

Factual and Procedural Background

In November 2018, the State charged Justin W. Steinert with kidnapping, 

aggravated assault, contributing to a child's misconduct or deprivation, distribution of 

marijuana, and possession of distribution paraphernalia. In November 2019, under a plea 

agreement, Steinert entered Alford pleas to one count each of aggravated robbery, 

contributing to a child's misconduct, distribution of marijuana, and possession of 

distribution paraphernalia. The plea agreement said the State would ask the district court 

to find that Steinert committed the crimes with a firearm. It also included a provision 

stating Steinert acknowledged his duty to register under the KORA because of the 

aggravated robbery conviction. 
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During the plea hearing, the State proffered a factual basis for the crimes. That 

factual basis alleged Steinert pointed a gun at J.B., a 15-year-old boy who was walking 

by a residence, and escorted him into the residence at gun point. Steinert made J.B. sit on 

the couch, then took his cellphone to find J.B.'s phone number and address. Steinert left 

the boy momentarily and returned with a Tupperware container containing a "green 

botanical substance, . . . later confirmed [to be] marijuana" and a small baggie of the 

same. Steinert gave the items to J.B. and instructed him to go sell the marijuana substance 

and return with the money. Steinert then allowed J.B. to leave.

Rather than complying with Steinert’s demands, J.B. went straight home and 

reported the events to his stepfather. When law enforcement officers responded to the 

scene they found Steinert and saw a disassembled firearm in plain view on the couch J.B. 

said he had been told to sit on. Steinert later admitted to law enforcement that he had 

given J.B. a scale and marijuana to sell. 

The district court accepted Steinert's plea, finding it was knowingly and 

voluntarily made. The State asked the court to make the firearm finding, and it did so. 

The district court told Steinert that he needed to register his current address at all times 

under KORA. The district court ensured Steinert had read and understood the written 

notice of his duty to register. 

Steinert's Presentence Investigation report (PSI) showed his criminal history score 

was H based on a classification of two nonperson adult misdemeanors: one Kansas 

conviction for driving while suspended; and one Arkansas municipal violation of 

ordinance "5-36-116", described as "Theft/Shoplifting" in Cleburne County, Arkansas. 

The PSI also showed that if the district court found Steinert committed a person felony 

with a deadly weapon, the sentencing statute would require presumptive imprisonment 

and Steinert would need to register as a violent offender.
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At sentencing, the district court found Steinert's criminal history score to be H. 

Neither Steinert nor the State objected. The district court asked Steinert personally 

whether he agreed with his criminal history score on the PSI, and Steinert replied 

affirmatively. The district court then sentenced Steinert to a controlling 71-month term of 

imprisonment for the primary crime of conviction and ordered all other sentences to run 

concurrently. 

Steinert timely appeals, challenging his sentence. 

Did the District Court Err in Sentencing Steinert with the Incorrect Criminal History 

Score?

We first address Steinert's assertion that the district court erred because it used a 

criminal history score that may have been incorrect because it depended on his Arkansas 

conviction. If his Arkansas conviction is not used, his criminal history score would have 

been I instead of H.

Steinert entered an Alford plea, got a presumptive sentence, and failed to raise this 

issue to the district court. Any one of those facts would ordinarily preclude us from 

addressing the merits of this argument on appeal. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3602(a) (this 

court generally lacks jurisdiction to review an appeal from a judgment of conviction upon 

a guilty or no contest plea); K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-6820(c) (this court lacks jurisdiction to 

review a presumptive sentence); State v. Kelly, 298 Kan. 965, 971, 318 P.3d 987 (2014) 

(a party generally cannot raise issues on appeal not raised before the district court). But 

general rules have exceptions, and the Kansas Supreme Court liberally construes the laws 

in this context, so we choose to address this claim on the merits. State v. Gray, 311 Kan. 

164, 170, 459 P.3d 165 (2020).
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Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law over which we have unlimited 

review. State v. Sartin, 310 Kan. 367, 369, 446 P.3d 1068 (2019). Similarly, statutory 

interpretation of the revised KSGA is a question of law subject to our unlimited review. 

State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 552, 555, 412 P.3d 984 (2018).

Steinert argues his Arkansas conviction cannot be scored against him because: 

(1) K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6811(e)(4) does not account for prior out-of-state municipal 

convictions; (2) the State did not meet its burden to prove his Arkansas conviction was 

properly classified under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6811(e)(2); and (3) the Kansas Supreme 

Court decision in State v. Youngblood, 288 Kan. 659, Syl. ¶ 3, 206 P.3d 518 (2009), 

requires all prior convictions in which a district court imposes jailtime to have been 

"counseled" as required by the Sixth Amendment. We are not persuaded.

1. Out-of-state municipal convictions are properly counted in criminal history 

scores

Steinert committed his crimes in November 2018, so K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6811 

controls his sentence. See State v. Rice, 308 Kan. 1510, 1512, 430 P.3d 430 (2018) 

("Criminal statutes and penalties in effect at the time of the criminal act are controlling."). 

K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6811(e)(4) defines out-of-state convictions as "[c]onvictions or 

adjudications occurring within the federal system, other state systems, the District of 

Columbia, foreign, tribal or military courts." Steinert contends this statute fails to 

mention municipal convictions so his out-of-state municipal conviction cannot be 

considered.

But it is unclear that Steinert's Arkansas conviction was a municipal conviction. 

True, the PSI shows the jurisdiction is "M" for "Municipal" for Steinert's violation of the 

"Statute/Ordinance" number "5-36-116," described as "Theft/Shoplifting." But it also

shows Steinert's conviction was in Cleburne County, in the city of Heber Springs, in 
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"Cleburne Co. District" court, and the Arkansas code provides that the Cleburne County 

District Court is an Arkansas state court and part of the overall Arkansas state court 

system. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-17-1110 (2015). 

But even if Steinert's Arkansas conviction was a municipal conviction, we find no 

merit to his argument. Our court has repeatedly and correctly rejected the argument that 

out-of-state municipal convictions do not count in a defendant's criminal history. See 

State v. Herrelson, No. 123,346, 2022 WL 68122, at *2-3 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished 

opinion) (finding a Missouri municipal ordinance violation counts as a misdemeanor 

because it is an "out-of-state" conviction under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6811(e)(4); State v. 

Keith, No. 122,456, 2021 WL 2387240, at *5 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion) 

(finding Missouri municipal courts are part of Missouri 'state system' so they are in 'other 

state systems' category in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6811[e][4]), rev. denied 314 Kan. 857

(2021); State v. Cross, No. 121,517, 2020 WL 5079891, at *2-3 (Kan. App. 2020) 

(unpublished opinion) (holding "state systems" include out-of-state municipal 

misdemeanors). These cases are soundly reasoned and are persuasive.

When determining legislative intent, we must consider various provisions of an act 

in pari materia with a view of reconciling and bringing the provisions into workable 

harmony if possible. And we must construe statutes to avoid unreasonable results, 

presuming the Legislature does not enact meaningless or redundant legislation. State v. 

Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 573-74, 357 P.3d 251 (2015). These standards, applied here, require 

us to consider a statute that Steinert ignores—K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6810.

K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6810(a) provides that criminal history includes "convictions 

and adjudications for violations of municipal ordinances or county resolutions which are 

comparable to any crime classified under the state law of Kansas as a person 

misdemeanor." And subsection (d)(6) of that statute provides that "all municipal 

ordinance and county resolution violations comparable to such [class A nonperson and 
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class B select nonperson] misdemeanors, shall be considered and scored." These statutes 

provide for the inclusion of municipal violations as prior convictions, as other panels of 

this court have found. We join them in finding that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6811(e)(4) 

includes out-of-state municipal convictions as convictions from "other state systems." 

See Herrelson, 2022 WL 68122, at *2-3. 

2. The State met its burden under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6811(e)(2)

Steinert next argues that the State failed to carry its burden of proof to establish 

that his Arkansas conviction is appropriately scored under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-

6811(e)(2). Steinert relies on Wetrich, 307 Kan. at 562, to argue the State failed to meet 

its burden to prove at sentencing that his Arkansas conviction was identical to, or 

narrower than, a comparable Kansas crime. 

But the State correctly argues that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6814, rather than K.S.A. 

2018 Supp. 21-6811(e)(2), establishes the applicable burdens of proof and procedure for 

determining a defendant's criminal history score: 

"(a) The offender's criminal history shall be admitted in open court by the 

offender or determined by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing hearing by 

the sentencing judge.

"(b) Except to the extent disputed in accordance with subsection (c), the 

summary of the offender's criminal history prepared for the court by the state shall satisfy 

the state's burden of proof regarding an offender's criminal history.

"(c) Upon receipt of the criminal history worksheet prepared for the court, the 

offender shall immediately notify the district attorney and the court with written notice of 

any error in the proposed criminal history worksheet. . . . The state shall have the burden 

of proving the disputed portion of the offender's criminal history. . . . If the offender later 

challenges such offender's criminal history, which has been previously established, the 

burden of proof shall shift to the offender to prove such offender's criminal history by a 

preponderance of the evidence." (Emphases added.) K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6814.
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Steinert did not dispute his criminal history at the sentencing hearing in 

accordance with subsection (c). Steinert did not object to his criminal history score, nor 

did he give written notice of an error on the PSI. Rather, he stipulated to his criminal 

history score, then personally agreed it was correct when the court asked him about it. 

Thus, under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6814(b), the summary of Steinert's criminal history 

prepared for the court satisfied the state's burden of proof of Steinert's criminal history. 

See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6814(a); State v. Corby, 314 Kan. 794, 798, 502 P.3d 111 

(2022) (following plain language of K.S.A. 21-6814 and finding Corby's admission to his 

criminal history score at sentencing relieved State of its burden even though PSI failed to 

state which subsection of a statute Corby had violated). Here, as in State v. Roberts, 314 

Kan. 316, 334-36, 498 P.3d 725 (2021), the defendant's admission to his criminal history 

score relieved the State of its burden to prove that the defendant's prior misdemeanor 

convictions in his criminal history score were counseled. 

We note that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6814(c) permits a defendant to "later"

challenge one's previously established criminal history by proving criminal history by a 

preponderance of the evidence. After Steinert received the State's Rule 6.09 letter 

focusing on Corby, Steinert apparently tried to meet his burden of proof by moving to 

add an alleged journal entry of his Arkansas conviction to the record on appeal. But 

Kansas Court of Appeals Chief Judge Arnold-Burger denied his motion because that 

journal entry was not part of the record in the district court and did not comply with 

Kansas Supreme Court Rule 3.01 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 20). Steinert then moved for 

reconsideration, but this court denied it. Undeterred, Steinert petitioned for review to the 

Kansas Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court denied review. 

Steinert then tried for his fourth bite at the apple. He filed, for the first time, in this 

court, a motion for an illegal sentence and appended to his brief a copy of the same 

Arkansas journal entry that this court had ruled he could not add to the record on appeal. 

(That motion asks this court to retain jurisdiction but "remand" his illegal sentence 
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motion to the district court for a hearing before we decide his direct appeal.) Some may 

say these acts raise the spectre of judge shopping. See Steward v. Dow Corning Corp., 

No. 92-1105-K, 1992 WL 75195, at *1 (D. Kan. 1992) ("[J]udge shopping has been 

described as the situation existing where plaintiffs 'see a storm brewing in the first court 

[and] try to weigh anchor and set sail for the hopefully more favorable waters of another 

district.'" [citing Telesco v. Telesco Fuel & Masons' Material, Inc., 765 F.2d 356, 360 n 4 

(2d Cir.1985)]). 

But even if not, our rules do not sanction attaching to a brief documents that are 

not part of the record. See, e.g., In re Hawver, 300 Kan. 1023, 1048, 339 P.3d 573 (2014) 

(finding document attached to Hawver's brief "is not properly before this court because it 

is not part of the record" as required by Supreme Court Rule 6.02[b] [2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. 

at 35]). Because Steinert did not submit this document to the district court and it is not 

part of the appellate record, we do not consider it. See Supreme Court Rule 6.03(b) (2022 

Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36); Pittman v. Bliss, No. 113,577 2015 WL 9302708, at *4 (Kan. App. 

2015) (unpublished opinion). And neither our rules nor the controlling statute permit a 

defendant to file a motion for an illegal sentence with an appellate court, in the first 

instance. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3504. To say that an illegal sentence may be 

corrected "at any time" does not mean that one may file that motion "in any court." We 

are a court of review, not a fact-finding court. State v. Hutto, 313 Kan. 741, 746-47, 490 

P.3d 43 (2021); see State v. Vonachen, 312 Kan. 451, 457-58, 476 P.3d 774 (2020). 

Steinert's admission at the sentencing hearing satisfied the state's burden of proof 

regarding his criminal history, and Steinert failed to meet his later burden to prove his 

criminal history score was erroneous. Accordingly, Steinert's claim that his sentence may 

be illegal based on misclassification of his prior out-of-state conviction is dismissed, 

consistent with the disposition of the appeals in Corby and Roberts. See Corby, 314 Kan. 

at 798; Roberts, 314 Kan. at 336.
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3. State v. Youngblood "uncounseled" convictions

Steinert next contends that his Arkansas misdemeanor conviction may have been 

uncounseled.

An uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for which a district court sentenced a 

defendant to prison time is unconstitutional and cannot be used in a later criminal 

proceeding for sentence enhancement. State v. Tims, 302 Kan. 536, 541, 355 P.3d 660 

(2015) (affirming Youngblood). But as Roberts held, the burden to prove the invalidity of 

such a prior conviction rests on the defendant who did not object at sentencing:

"[A] defendant who fails to object under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6814(c) at sentencing to 

the constitutional validity of a prior conviction used to enhance a current sentence, based 

on a claim of the absence of counsel without a valid waiver, has the burden to show the 

prior conviction is invalid, regardless of whether the defendant's constitutional challenge 

to the allegedly uncounseled conviction in criminal history is brought on direct appeal of 

the current sentence or in a proceeding collaterally attacking that sentence." 314 Kan. at 

334-35.

Steinert did not object at sentencing. He now argues that his Arkansas conviction 

may have been uncounseled, yet he does not prove that it was uncounseled. He contends 

that the document he erroneously attached to his brief suggests that his Arkansas 

conviction may have been uncounseled. Yet the documents of record fail to show that 

Steinert's Arkansas conviction was uncounseled. Because Steinert fails to meet his 

"burden to show his prior conviction is invalid," Roberts, 314 Kan. at 334-35, his 

Youngblood argument fails.
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Did the District Court Make the Necessary Violent Offender Finding, and if so, Does 

Substantial Competent Evidence Support Those Findings?

We next consider Steinert's argument that the district court failed to make the 

necessary violent offender finding, and that even if it made that finding, that finding is 

unsupported by substantial competent evidence.

Generally, appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review convictions stemming from 

a plea, but appellate courts have jurisdiction under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3602(a) to 

consider a direct appeal by a defendant who pleaded guilty and challenges a district 

court's order that the defendant comply with KORA. See State v. Marinelli, 307 Kan. 

768, 788, 415 P.3d 405 (2018). As a result, this court has jurisdiction to review this issue.

The Journal Entry Suffices for the Factual Finding

Steinert argues that he does not have a duty to register because the duty springs 

into existence only if (a) the defendant is convicted of a person felony, and (b) the district 

court makes a factual finding on the record that a deadly weapon was used in the 

commission of the crime. We review the KORA registration statute de novo.

Generally, the KORA requires the district court make a deadly weapon finding on 

the record and inform the offender at the time of conviction about the need to register. 

Marinelli, 307 Kan. at 769. Yet in Marinelli, the court failed to make explicit findings on 

the record. Still, the Kansas Supreme Court held the district court satisfied K.S.A. 2017

Supp. 22-4902(e)(2) because (1) the court checked a box labeled "'Yes'" next to the 

question asking whether an offender committed the current crime with a deadly weapon; 

(2) the journal entry reflected that the court informed Marinelli of his duty to register; and 

(3) the supplement attached to the journal entry revealed the offender needed to register 
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as a violent offender for "'[a]ny conviction for a comparable person felony committed 

with a DEADLY WEAPON.'" 307 Kan. at 788-89.

Just like in Marinelli, the district court here indicated on the journal entry of 

conviction that (1) the district court made a finding that Count 1, aggravated robbery, was 

committed with a firearm; (2) Steinert was convicted of a person felony that he 

committed while using a deadly weapon; and (3) the law required Steinert to register due 

to his violent offender status. Steinert's signed plea agreement showed the State would 

ask the court to order that the offenses were committed with a firearm. And when the 

State asked the district court during the plea hearing to find Steinert committed the crimes 

for which he was found guilty with a firearm, the district court responded, "I will make 

those findings." 

Though not explicitly stated on the record, the district court showed in the journal 

entry its factual finding that Steinert committed an aggravated robbery using a firearm. 

And appellate courts may rely on the journal entry to make this finding. See State v. 

Carter, 311 Kan. 206, 210-211, 459 P.3d 186 (2020) (finding the general rule that 

statements from the bench control over the contents of the journal entry inapplicable 

because registration is not part of a defendant's sentence). The journal entry is thus 

sufficient for this court to determine the district court made the necessary findings under 

K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-4902(e)(2). See Marinelli, 307 Kan. at 788-89.

Substantial Competent Evidence Supports the Deadly Weapon Finding

Steinert alternatively argues that substantial competent evidence fails to support 

the district court's findings that Steinert used a deadly weapon in the commission of a 

person felony. We review the record to determine whether substantial competent 

evidence supports the district court's decision. Carter, 311 Kan. at 211.
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At the plea hearing during the State's factual basis, the State proffered that Steinert 

approached J.B. outside a residence, pointed a gun at him, and then escorted him into the 

residence before demanding J.B. sit on the couch and hand over his phone. But Steinert's 

trial counsel argued at sentencing that the firearm was disassembled and that Steinert had 

not used it when committing the alleged offenses. Steinert's trial counsel speculated that 

the victim had used that gun to somehow justify to his stepfather why he was in 

possession of drugs. Steinert always maintained he did not brandish a firearm, and relied 

on that same argument to support a motion for a downward or dispositional departure. 

Steinert suggests that this conflicting evidence defeats the district court's factual 

findings. But in reviewing the record for substantial competent evidence, this court 

cannot reweigh evidence or reassess credibility. State v. Rinke, 313 Kan. 888, 892, 491 

P.3d 1260 (2021). 

Steinert's argument that the firearm was not a deadly weapon because it had been 

disassembled by the time officers arrived is unpersuasive—it may have been fully 

assembled when J.B. was in the home earlier that day. And a disassembled firearm is still 

a firearm.

But even if the firearm were disassembled when the child was present, the fact that 

it was present and somehow "used" is enough under the plain reading of the registration 

statute. That statute provides that a violent offender is one who "is convicted of any 

person felony and the court makes a finding on the record that a deadly weapon was used 

in the commission of such person felony." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-4902(e)(2). Steinert 

here concedes that the district court found that a firearm was used in the commission of 

his crimes, but he contends this is not a finding that a firearm was used in the commission 

of a person felony as required by K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-4902(e)(2). But though there is 

contrary evidence on whether Steinert used the firearm to force the victim to hand over 
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his phone, the fact still stands that this court cannot reweigh evidence, and the evidence 

presented by the State is enough to make that finding.

Substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding that Steinert 

used the firearm to commit his crimes. We thus affirm the district court's order of 

registration. See Carter, 311 Kan. at 211.

KORA Does Not Violate Due Process by Failing to Provide an Explicit Burden of Proof 

or Procedure to Contest Discretionary Findings.

Steinert next contends that KORA violates due process by failing to provide an 

explicit burden of proof or procedure to contest discretionary findings. He concedes that 

he failed to raise this issue to the district court. So he cannot raise this constitutional issue 

for the first time on appeal, absent some exception. And even then, this court may choose 

not to review the issue under its prudential doctrine. See Gray, 311 Kan. at 170. 

Steinert argues this court should review this issue because it implicates the denial 

of his fundamental due process rights. We note that other panels of our court have 

considered these types of claims even though the defendant did not first raise it in the 

district court. See State v. Unruh, No. 122,472, 2021 WL 4808279, at *4-5 (Kan. App. 

2021) (unpublished opinion); State v. Epp, No. 121,872, 2020 WL 6930597, at *2 (Kan. 

App. 2020) (unpublished opinion); State v. Ford, No. 119,328, 2019 WL 3242420, at *2 

(Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 311 Kan. 1048 (2020). As a result, 

we choose to review the issue.

Appellate courts presume statutes are constitutional and must resolve all doubts in 

favor of a statute's validity. Courts must interpret a statute in a way that makes it 

constitutional if there is any reasonable construction that would maintain the Legislature's 

apparent intent. State v. Gonzalez, 307 Kan. 575, 579, 412 P.3d 968 (2018); but see 
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Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 309 Kan. 1127, 1132-33, 442 P.3d 509 (2019) (finding that the 

presumption of constitutionality does not apply to a statute dealing with "'fundamental 

interests'" protected by the Kansas Constitution).

Discussion

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution precludes the government from "depriv[ing] a person of a property right or a 

liberty interest without affording that person the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful 

way and at a meaningful time to avert a wrongful deprivation of that right or interest." 

State v. Gonzalez, 57 Kan. App. 2d 618, Syl. ¶ 1, 457 P.3d 938 (2019); see Mathews v. 

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) ("'The fundamental 

requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.'"). Despite its fundamental character, "[c]onstitutional due process is 

an especially elastic concept in that the protections required vary depending upon the 

importance of the specific property right or liberty interest at stake." Gonzalez, 57 Kan. 

App. 2d 618, Syl. ¶ 2.

Steinert argues the KORA impinges on his liberty and takes his property because 

it requires him to, among other matters, pay $20 in each county in which he lives, works, 

and goes to school. We agree that Steinert has a liberty or property interest warranting 

some level of due process.

1. Opportunity to contest the district court's deadly weapon finding

Steinert first argues that KORA violates his due process rights by not giving him 

an opportunity to contest the court's discretionary finding in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-

4902(e)(2) that he used a deadly weapon in committing a person felony. He maintains 

that regulatory schemes like those regulating driver's licenses and law licenses require 
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due process, so KORA should afford defendants the same. Steinert asks this court to find 

that the fact KORA lists no explicit method violates a defendant's procedural due process.

Several other panels of this court have rejected this same argument about KORA's 

discretionary findings. See Unruh, 2021 WL 4808279, at *5-8; State v. Ruwart, No. 

121,621, 2021 WL 1703646, at *3 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion); Epp, 2020 

WL 6930597, at *2; Ford, 2019 WL 3242420, at *2-3. Each case finds that the defendant 

had meaningful opportunities to object or challenge his registration and failed to show the 

district court violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. For 

example, in Epp, the panel held Epp had many meaningful opportunities to be heard on 

the issue of whether he used a deadly weapon in committing the crime of criminal threat. 

Those opportunities included (1) at the plea hearing, (2) after the PSI was issued, and (3) 

at sentencing. Epp, 2020 WL 6930597, at *3-5. 

Like the defendants in Unruh, Ruwart, and Epp, Steinert had the opportunity to 

challenge his duty to register (1) at the plea hearing, (2) after the PSI was issued, and (3) 

at sentencing. At Steinert's plea hearing, after the district court told Steinert of his duty to 

register and asked whether he had read the registration form, Steinert asked the district 

court whether he still had to register if he moved out of Kansas. This colloquy shows, at a 

minimum, that Steinert had a meaningful opportunity to be heard at his plea hearing. And 

in fact, he was heard because the district court recommended Steinert visit with a lawyer 

before deciding whether to move out of state. Similarly, Steinert's attorney addressed the 

issue at the sentencing hearing—to support a downward departure motion he argued that 

Steinert had not brandished a gun or pointed it at the victim and that it was merely 

disassembled and lying on a table. So Steinert had a meaningful opportunity to contest 

the district court's deadly weapon finding.
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2. No heightened standard of proof is necessary

Steinert also challenges the KORA as unconstitutional because K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 

22-4902(e)(2) contains no explicit standard of proof for offender registration. He 

contends that due process requires the district court to find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that he used a deadly weapon. Steinert concedes this court rejected this argument in Ford, 

which found that the proper burden of proof for discretionary registration findings is 

preponderance of the evidence. But he argues the Ford panel erred because it discounts 

the impact on the fundamental interest in liberty KORA imposes on registrants.

The Ford panel held: "A preponderance of the evidence standard is presumptively 

applicable to civil actions unless 'particularly important individual interests or rights are 

at stake.'" 2019 WL 3242420, at *5. But a defendant's private interests are far outweighed 

by the government's considerable interest in protecting the public from reoffenders. And 

"whether a defendant used a deadly weapon is an objective, black-and-white standard not 

particularly susceptible to subjective values or biases of a judge. . . . The purpose of 

KORA is to protect the public from designated offenders whom the Legislature has 

concluded are likely to reoffend." 2019 WL 3242420, at *6. Thus, due process does not 

require the district court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant used a deadly 

weapon to determine that person is a violent offender under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-

4902(e)(2). 2019 WL 3242420, at *6. See also Unruh, 2021 WL 4808279, at *8-10

(same); Epp, 2020 WL 6930597, at *7 (same).

We agree with the reasoning of the Ford, Epp, and Unruh panels and find that the 

impact KORA imposes on an offender's private interests does not rise to the level of a 

fundamental interest that warrants application of a stricter standard of proof. The risk of 

depriving defendants required to register under KORA of their private interests by using 

a preponderance of the evidence standard is low. And such a defendant's privacy interest 

is outweighed by the government's considerable interest in protecting the public. 
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As a result, we find KORA does not violate an offender's due process rights by 

failing to outline a process by which to contest discretionary findings under K.S.A. 2018

Supp. 22-4902(e)(2) or by failing to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Violent Offender Registration, When Imposed by Judicial Fact-finding, Does Not Violate

Apprendi.

Steinert next contends that imposing violent offender registration based on facts 

found by a judge rather than by a jury violates Apprendi.

In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that any fact other than the 

existence of a prior conviction that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 

prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490. Steinert argues that his registration requirement 

violates Apprendi because it allows the district court—rather than a jury—to find that he 

used a deadly weapon in the commission of his person felony. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-

4902(e)(2). That finding is necessary to impose registration on him as a violent offender. 

K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-4906(a)(1)(P).

But the Kansas Supreme Court has consistently held that a district court judge's 

deadly weapon finding under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-4902(e)(2) does not constitute 

impermissible judicial fact-finding prohibited by Apprendi. See, e.g., Carter, 311 Kan. at 

217; State v. Perez-Medina, 310 Kan. 525, 539-40, 448 P.3d 446 (2019); Huey, 306 Kan. 

at 1010.

Steinert concedes that the Kansas Supreme Court in Carter rejected his argument 

on this issue. But he argues that Kansas appellate courts have not yet analyzed this 

question under State v. Anderson, 12 Kan. App. 2d 342, 344-45, 744 P.2d 143 (1987). He 

argues the Anderson court found that denying a criminal defendant the ability to expunge 
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a conviction constitutes punishment for ex post facto purposes because it stigmatizes that 

person as a law breaker. We need not analyze this issue, however, because Carter is 

controlling.

Carter held judicial fact-finding to impose registration requirements does not 

violate Apprendi. 311 Kan. at 217. And this court is duty bound to follow Supreme Court 

precedent absent some indication the Court intends to stray from its previous position. 

State v. Rodriguez, 305 Kan. 1139, 1144, 390 P.3d 903 (2017). We find no such 

indication, so Steinert's argument necessarily fails. The district court's imposition of the 

registration requirement did not violate Apprendi.

Judicial Fact-finding of Prior Convictions Does Not Violate Section 5 of the Kansas 

Constitution Bill of Rights.

Steinert next argues that the KSGA violates section 5 of the Kansas Constitution 

Bill of Rights because it permits judicial fact-finding of prior convictions. 

Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides that "[t]he right of 

trial by jury shall be inviolate." Steinert argues section 5 requires a jury to determine 

penalty-enhancing prior conviction findings. Steinert concedes other panels of this court 

have rejected this argument, but he argues these decisions were wrongly decided. See 

State v. Albano, 58 Kan. App. 2d 117, 464 P.3d 332 (2020), and State v. Valentine, No. 

119, 164, 2019 WL 2306626 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished). 

After Steinert filed his brief, the Kansas Supreme Court definitively rejected in 

State v. Albano, 313 Kan. 638, 640-41, 487 P.3d 750 (2021), the very argument Steinert 

makes here. Albano argued to the Kansas Supreme Court that section 5 of the Bill of 

Rights required a jury to determine her prior convictions for sentencing purposes because 

the right to a jury trial is "inviolate." 313 Kan. at 640-41. But Albano held that section 5 
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preserves the jury trial right as it existed at common law in 1859 when the Kansas 

Constitution was ratified and that Kansas juries have traditionally determined guilt while 

the court determined punishment, which included the defendant's criminal history. 313 

Kan. at 640-41.

Similarly, in State v. Pearce, 314 Kan. 475, 484, 500 P.3d 528 (2021), the Kansas 

Supreme Court rejected Pearce's same section 5 argument:

"Finding no authority to support the contention that Kansas had adopted a common-law 

rule inconsistent with this traditional division of functions when the Kansas Constitution 

was adopted in 1859, [the Kansas Supreme Court] held that '[s]ection 5 of the Kansas 

Constitution Bill of Rights does not guarantee defendants the right to have a jury 

determine the existence of sentence-enhancing prior convictions under the revised 

[KSGA].'" 314 Kan. at 484-85 (quoting Albano, 313 Kan. 638, Syl. ¶ 4.)

Because Kansas courts historically made criminal history findings to impose punishment, 

"the KSGA's method of determining a defendant's criminal history does not implicate a 

defendant's right to a jury trial under section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights." 

314 Kan. at 485.

This court is duty bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent absent some 

indication the Kansas Supreme Court is straying from its previous position. See 

Rodriguez, 305 Kan. at 1144. Because we find no such indication, we follow Albano and 

Pearce and reject Steinert's constitutional challenge to the KSGA.

Judicial Fact-finding of Prior Convictions Does Not Violate Apprendi.

For the first time on appeal, Steinert argues that the district court violated his Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Apprendi by basing his sentence on his prior 
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convictions without requiring the State to prove those convictions to a jury beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

But the Kansas Supreme Court has held that the use of criminal history to 

calculate the presumptive KSGA sentence does not violate due process as interpreted by

Apprendi. State v. Sullivan, 307 Kan. 697, 708, 414 P.3d 737 (2018) (reaffirming State v. 

Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 46-47, 41 P.3d 781 [2002]). Steinert concedes Ivory rejected this 

argument, and he merely raises it to preserve it for federal review. 

We follow our precedent and find the district court did not violate Steinert's 

constitutional rights by relying on his prior convictions to determine his sentence under 

the KSGA. See Sullivan, 307 Kan. at 708; see Rodriguez, 305 Kan. at 1144 (Kansas 

appellate courts are duty bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent).

Appeal affirmed in part and dismissed in part. Motion for illegal sentence denied.