alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
PARTNERSHIP'S STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS AND BALANCE SHEETS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                       3,566,456
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,566,456
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,111,871
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,964
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     458,323
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,111,871
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               129,991
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               510,722
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (380,731)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (380,731)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (380,731)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### State of Connecticut *v.*Gary Blackwell

*G. Douglas Nash*and *Donald D. Dakers,*public defenders, in support of the petition.

*Julia DiCocco Dewey,*assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided December 14, 1989

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 20 Conn. App. 193, is denied.
Exhibit 10.23

 



 

April 29, 2014

 

Re: Amendments to December 31, 2013 Employment Agreement

 

Dear Steve,

 

This letter agreement serves to confirm our agreement and understanding with respect to amendments to the Employment Agreement between you and InVivo Therapeutics Holdings Corp. (the “Company”)  dated December 31, 2013 (the “Agreement”).  Defined terms used in this agreement and not otherwise defined have the meanings given to such terms in the Agreement.

 

We hereby agree that the Agreement Term is extended until May 30,2014 (the “Extension Period”), provided that the Company may elect, at any time prior to the expiration of the Extension Period, to terminate the Agreement, subject to the terms of this letter agreement.  During the Extension Period, Executive will continue to serve as Interim Chief Financial Officer of the Company at the pleasure of the Board of Directors and may be removed at any time from that office during the Extension Period. The Company will, promptly following the date of this Agreement, pay to Executive the bonus under the Agreement for services through April 30.  During the Extension Period, Executive will continue to receive his regular salary and, if the Company elects to terminate the Agreement prior to the expiration of the Extension Period, the Company will continue to pay Executive’s salary and bonus through the end of the Extension Period.  If the Executive decides to end his employment prior to May 30, 2014, the Company will continue to pay Executive’s salary and bonus through his last date of employment.

 

Except as otherwise expressly modified by this letter agreement, the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect and is hereby confirmed and ratified in all respects, and as so amended by this letter agreement, shall be read, taken and construed as one instrument.  Except as expressly provided for in this letter agreement, nothing in this letter agreement shall be construed as a waiver of any rights or obligations of the Executive or the Company under the Agreement.

 

One Kendall Square, Building 1400

Floor 4, Suite B14402

Cambridge, MA 02139 

(617) 863-5500

 











 

If the foregoing correctly sets forth the entire understanding and agreement between you and the Company with respect to the subject matter of this letter agreement and the Agreement, please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided for that purpose below and return an executed copy to us.

 

 

	
Best Regards,
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
/s/ Mark D. Perrin
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
Mark D. Perrin
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
Chief Executive Officer
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
Acknowledged and Agreed:
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
/s/ Steven F. McAllister
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
Steven F. McAllister
    


 

One Kendall Square, Building 1400

Floor 4, Suite B14402

Cambridge, MA 02139 

(617) 863-5500

 

2
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Gail Sapp, Appellant. Lillian Roberts, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

Harvey, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed May 10, 1984, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits because her employment was terminated due to misconduct.

Claimant worked for Dry Dock Savings Bank in New York City from mid-February until the latter part of March 1982. On December 23, 1982, she filled out an employment application seeking a position at Amalgamated Bank of New York. On the application, she listed a number of temporary positions she held over the past five or six years but omitted the fact that she had worked for Dry Dock. Claimant was hired by Amalgamated and worked until a routine check with Federal Bureau of Investigation agents disclosed that claimant had been arrested for grand larceny while employed by Dry Dock. Upon discovering that claimant had failed to disclose her employment at Dry Dock in completing her application questionnaire, Amalgamated terminated her employment.

An employee dismissed for misconduct is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits as set forth in Labor Law § 593 (3). In order to be disqualified for unemployment benefit *978purposes, misconduct must be “in connection with [a claimant’s] employment” *(id.).*While not every violation of a company rule may give rise to a finding of misconduct sufficient to disqualify a claimant for benefits *(see, Matter of McHugh [Levine],*47 AD2d 676), there was testimony in the record that it was routine policy to dismiss employees who made material misrepresentations or omissions on their applications for employment. Claimant was employed by Amalgamated in a semi-secure position. Because of the sensitivity of the bank’s operation and its need to employ only trustworthy people, it was not unreasonable to adopt a policy of eliminating anyone in its employ who is guilty of a misrepresentation. Misconduct which bears materially on a claimant’s fitness and integrity to serve in the capacity in which employed is cause for dismissal *(Matter of Punter*[Ross], 43 NY2d 743), Here, as in *Matter of Rosedietcher*(Levine) (33 NY2d 377, 380), claimant’s misrepresentation and omission were material.

Decision affirmed, without costs. Main, J. P., Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Levine and Harvey, JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 99.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Hillman Companies, Inc.
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending
March 31, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
I, James P. Waters, Chief Financial Officer of The Hillman Companies, Inc.,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.

|                                                                       
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ James P. WatersJames P. Waters
Chief Financial Officer
May 14, 2003

This certification
accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for the
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended. A signed original of this written statement required by
Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
#### Ralph Fine, Appellant, v Charles Spierer, Respondent.

— Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Felice Shea, J.), entered October 9, 1984, which denied plaintiff’s motion for an order of attachment, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion for an order of attachment is granted.

On May 19, 1984 plaintiff secured a default judgment in Florida in the sum of $31,460.54, plus interest, based upon the failure of defendant, now a California domiciliary, to pay some 31 promissory notes in the sum of $1,000 each. By order to show cause pursuant to CPLR 6201 (4), which authorizes an order of attachment in any action “based on a judgment, decree or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state”, plaintiff commenced this action against defendant and sought an order of attachment. The property sought to be attached was defendant’s *612interest in his mother’s estate under a will probated in the New York County Surrogate’s Court.

Special Term denied plaintiff’s application for attachment, holding that New York lacked jurisdiction under the principle set forth by the United States Supreme Court in *Shaffer v Heitner*(433 US 186). As formulated by the New York Court of Appeals in *Banco Ambrosiano v Artoc Bank & Trust*(62 NY2d 65, 71), the *Shaffer*rule provides: “[W]hen the property serving as the jurisdictional basis has no relationship to the cause of action and there are no other ties among the defendant, the forum and the litigation, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction will be lacking”.

It is, however, apparent that Special Term’s attention had not been invited to the following observations of the Supreme Court in *Shaffer,*which apply directly to the situation presented (433 US, at p 210): “[W]e know of nothing to justify the assumption that a debtor can avoid paying his obligations by removing his property to a State in which his creditor cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over him. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, after all, makes the valid *in personam*judgment of one State enforceable in all other States.” In footnote 36 on pages 210-211, the Supreme Court went on to say: “Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original matter”.

The situation presented here appears clearly to fall within the scope of this principle. Accordingly it was error to deny plaintiff’s application for an order of attachment. Concur — Sandler, J. P., Asch, Fein and Kassal, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-7630

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ANTHONY MARK WILSON, a/k/a T-Bird,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District

Judge. (1:04-cr-00379-LDW; 1:07-cv-00804-LDW)

Submitted: January 30, 2008 Decided: February 15, 2008

Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony Mark Wilson, Appellant Pro Se. G. David Hackney, Assistant

United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
*Because the district court failed to provide Wilson notice

and an opportunity to amend his motion for enlargement of time

prior to recharacterization, Wilson need not seek this court’s

- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Mark Wilson seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying his motion for enlargement of time to file a 28

U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion, and construing the motion as his first

§ 2255 motion and denying that motion, as well as its order denying

Wilson’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. The orders are not

appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate

of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); Reid v.

Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004) (requiring a

certificate of appealability in Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) context). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. See Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001).

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Wilson

has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a

certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.* We dispense
authorization to file a future § 2255 motion raising additional

claims. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381-83 (2003).

We express no opinion, however, regarding whether such a motion

would be timely.

- 3 -

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
EX-10.3



 Exhibit 10.3 

AMENDMENT TO TRANSLOADING SERVICES 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN ASSOCIATED ENERGY SERVICES, LP 

AND MARLIN LOGISTICS, LLC 

This Amendment to Transloading Services Agreement (“Amendment”) is made and entered into effective as of the 27th day
of February, 2015 (the “Execution Date”), by and between Marlin Logistics, LLC (“Marlin”) and Associated Energy Services, LP (“AES”). Hereinafter Marlin and AES may sometimes be
collective referred to as the “Parties” and individually as a “Party.” 
 WITNESSETH 

WHEREAS, Marlin and AES are parties to that certain Transloading Services Agreement (“Agreement”) entered into
by the Parties, dated as of July 31, 2013, covering the Wildcat Transloading Facility; 
 WHEREAS, Marlin and AES now desire to
amend the Agreement in certain respects; 
 NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements set forth in this
Amendment and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties hereto agree as follows: 

1. Section 2.2 of the Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 

 

	 	2.2	This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until February 27, 2020 (the “Initial Term”), and shall automatically renew from year to year thereafter (each an “Extension Period”) until
terminated by either Party as of the end of the Initial Term, or any Extension Period thereafter, on no less than one hundred eighty (180) days advance written notice prior to the end of the Initial Term or any Extension Period thereafter. The
Initial Term and all Extension Periods, if any, shall be referred to in this Agreement collectively as the “Term.” 


2. All capitalized words that are not defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Agreement. Except as modified and amended
herein, the remaining terms and provisions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect 
 3. This Amendment may be executed in
multiple counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original agreement upon the signature by each of the Parties on at least one counterpart, but all of which shall be deemed to be one and the same document. Delivery of an executed version of
this Agreement by facsimile transmission, email or other electronic means shall be effective as delivery of a manually executed counterpart hereof. 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment is executed as of the date first above written. 

 

									
	 Marlin:
 Marlin Logistics,
LLC
				 AES:
 Associated Energy
Services, LP

				
							 By: Spark Energy Holdings, LLC
 its
general partner

					
	By:		/s/ W. Keith Maxwell, III				By:		/s/ W. Keith Maxwell, III
	Name:  W. Keith Maxwell, III				Name:  W. Keith Maxwell, III
	Title:    President and Chief Executive Officer				Title:    Chief Executive Officer

 SIGNATURE PAGE TO 

AMENDMENT TO TRANSLOADING SERVICES AGREEMENT
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

           SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report of 1st Colonial
Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period
ended December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of
the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated
below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to his knowledge:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operation of the Company.



/s/ Gerard M. Banmiller,
-------------------------------------
President and Chief Executive Officer



/s/ Robert C. Faix,
-------------------------------------
Senior Vice President and
  Chief Financial Officer

Dated: March 25, 2003






03/28/03/SL1 340627v1/90470.001
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Javonne L. Scott, Appellant.

[944 NYS2d 713]

Motion for wnt of *1481error coram nobis denied. Present — Centra, J.E, Fahey, Lindley and Martoche, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1   Certification of CEO
and CFOPursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350,As Adopted Pursuant
toSection 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002    In connection with the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A No. 1 of
Real Estate Associates Limited VI (the "Partnership"), for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the "Report"), Martha L. Long, as the equivalent of the chief
executive officer of the Partnership, and Stephen B. Waters, as the equivalent
of the chief financial officer of the Partnership, each hereby certifies,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:  (1)   The Report
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2)   The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.   /s/Martha L. LongName: Martha L.
LongDate: January 22, 2009/s/Stephen B. WatersName: Stephen B.
WatersDate: January 22,
2009   This certification is
furnished with this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Partnership for purposes of Section 18
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended.
Exhibit 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of J.A.B. International, Inc., (the
"Company")  on Form 10-QSB for the period  ending  September  30, 2002, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, Jefferson Bootes, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

     (1) the Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.



                              /s/ Jefferson Bootes
                              -------------------------
                              Jefferson Bootes
                              Chief Executive Officer
                              November 26, 2002