UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ROBERT A.C. MURPHY,

 Petitioner,

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v. Cause No. 3:16-CV-606-PPS-MGG

SUPERINTENDENT,

 Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

Robert A. C. Murphy, a prisoner without a lawyer, seeks habeas corpus relief

from his conviction at a bench trial for murder for which he was sentenced to sixty-five

years of incarceration. In deciding this petition, I must presume the facts set forth by the

state courts are correct unless they are rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Here’s how the Court of Appeals of Indiana summarized the

evidence presented at trial:

In late February or early March of 2009, Jason Osborne (Osborne) and

Jennifer Stafford (Stafford) were in a relationship. They rented a trailer

together in Muncie, Indiana. Osborne met Murphy when Murphy was

looking for work. They started talking and eventually began spending

time together. Both Osborne and Murphy bought their drugs from Jeffrey

Allen (Allen).

Stafford owned a Wii game system and a Play Station 2, which were both

kept in the trailer. Murphy indicated to Osborne that he wanted the Wii

and told Osborne that he could buy it from him and “make it look like a

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robbery.” Osborne declined. However, unbeknownst to Stafford, Osborne

sold some of her Wii and Play Station 2 games and used the money to

purchase cocaine. Over time, Osborne incurred a thirty dollar drug debt

with Allen. Stafford did not know about the drug purchases or the debt.

From March 15 to March 21, 2009, Osborne was living at his mother's

home in Baltimore, Ohio, and working for his uncle and cousin. During

this time, Murphy contacted Osborne inquiring about the money to pay

off the drug debt. Osborne promised to get him the money that weekend.

On March 18, 2009, Murphy left a voicemail for Osborne’s mother and

father respectively indicating that Osborne owed money and that Murphy

was stuck with it. Believing that he and Murphy had made plans by

phone to make the payment, Osborne asked Stafford to wire him some

money. It was Osborne’s plan to give Murphy the money because he did

not know how to reach Allen.

That same night, March 18, 2009 at around 7:55 p.m., Stafford spoke on

the phone with her mother, Deborah Stafford (Deborah). She told Deborah

that Murphy was at her trailer looking for Osborne because of the money

owed and was playing with the Wii system. This was Deborah’s last

conversation with her daughter. Even though she attempted to reach

Stafford the next day, she never received an answer. That same night,

Stafford’s brother, Clyde Stafford, Jr. (Clyde), also called Stafford's

residence. He spoke with Murphy who wanted to know how to reach

Osborne, and Clyde informed Murphy that Osborne was in Ohio. When

the receiver was returned to Stafford, Clyde asked her to call him later

that night to ensure that she was all right. She never contacted him.

Later that evening and early the next morning, Stafford made money

withdrawals from two different banks. Both times, the transactions were

recorded. Sometime after 1 a.m., Stafford, together with Murphy, drove

to the Speedway Gas Station in her car, a Grand Am, to send a money

gram for sixty dollars to Osborne. She was upset and was crying. Osborne

received the money gram at approximately 4:30 a.m. in Ohio.

The morning of March 19, 2009, Murphy returned to the residence where

he was living with his fiancée and her family, including her son, Kenneth

Watson (Watson). While Watson was in the shower, Murphy asked to

borrow his car. It was the first time Murphy had made such a request, and

he did not say why he needed the car or where he was going. Watson

called Murphy later that day, asking him to return the vehicle as he

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needed his car. Even later, Murphy contacted Watson asking him for a

ride to pick up another car. When Watson saw Murphy, he was upset and

crying and was speaking with his pastor. Murphy was in possession of a

Play Station 2 game, which Watson thought belonged to his younger

brother, so Watson took it and put it in his brother’s room. When Watson

took Murphy to the other car, he noticed that it was Stafford’s Grand Am.

Murphy entered Stafford’s car and sped away. Watson did not see

Murphy again until Murphy returned to the residence that Murphy

shared with his fiancée and her family. Murphy parked the Grand Am

behind the home and packed his belongings in the vehicle. He informed

Watson he was taking the car to a “chop shop” and driving to Michigan.

Later on March 19, 2009, Murphy spoke with Allen by phone. He told

Allen that he had a Wii game system for sale and would bring it to Allen’s

residence, who was on house arrest. Murphy sold Allen the Wii for fifty

dollars, with a thirty dollar down payment. It was later determined that

the Wii belonged to Stafford.

Meanwhile, Stafford had failed to show for work on the morning of March

19, 2009. At 8 a.m., Stafford’s employer called her home and cell phone

lines but received no reply. Other employees also unsuccessfully tried to

contact Stafford. The next morning, March 20, 2009, Stafford again failed

to show for work and Stafford’s employer contacted Stafford’s mother.

That same morning, Stafford’s parents went to Stafford’s trailer. When

they arrived, they saw that Stafford’s car was not in the driveway. Upon

entering the trailer, they noticed several items missing: the Wii game

system, the Play Station 2; the shower curtain, and a candle holder from

the table in the front room. Walking into Stafford’s bedroom, they saw

blood all over the wall and Stafford laying on her bed with her head

smashed in. There was no sign of a forced entry and there were no broken

windows. Stafford’s parents called 911.

During the ensuing police investigation, police officers contacted Osborne

in Ohio who advised them that he believed Murphy had murdered

Stafford. Osborne returned to Muncie to show the officers where they

might find Murphy and Allen. When the officers talked with Allen, Allen

provided them with the Wii game system while admitting that he thought

it was stolen. The officers also retrieved the Play Station 2 from Watson.

In the meantime, police officers in Michigan retrieved Stafford’s car. The

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contents of the car were missing, all that remained was dirt and traces of

blood, as revealed by the officers’ use of luminol.

The police officers took samples for DNA testing and blood evidence from

Stafford’s home and car. Sergeant Rodney Frazier with the Muncie Police

Department (Officer Frazier) found blood traces in Stafford’s bedroom

consistent with blood dispersed through forceful impact upon Stafford,

onto another surface, indicative of multiple blows inflicted. The patterns

were also consistent in shape and size with an exact replica of Stafford’s

candleholder. No fingerprints or DNA evidence of Murphy was found.

Linda McDonald (McDonald), a DNA analyst with the Indiana State

Police DNA Unit, explained that “Stafford’s blood overwhelmed just

about everything I tested.” Pathologist Dr. Paul Mellen (Dr. Mellen)

opined that Stafford had suffered more than twenty blunt force injuries

caused with a heavy, blunt instrument consistent with the candlestick

holder from Stafford’s home. He concluded Stafford’s manner of death to

be homicide.

On March 21, 2009, Murphy turned himself in to the Muncie Police

Department. Officers James Johnson (Officer Johnson) and Al Williams

(Officer Williams) led Murphy’s interrogation. After having advised

Murphy of his Miranda rights, the officers verified that Murphy

understood these rights. Initially interrogating Murphy about his personal

information, the officers turned the conversation to Stafford and her

death. At that point, Murphy asked to “get an attorney here because this

is about to get real deep.” The officers replied that they would “stop

talking then” and asked him if he had an attorney. Murphy denied having

an attorney nor could he provide the officers with the name of an attorney

he wanted to talk to. Upon stopping the interview, the officers placed

Murphy in a holding cell until they could process the appropriate

paperwork to arrest him. They told him that he would be charged with

Stafford’s murder.

While they were drafting the paperwork, Murphy banged on the wall

between the holding cell and the officers’ office. When the officers entered

the holding area, they informed Murphy that they could not talk to him

because he had requested an attorney. However, Murphy indicated that

he wanted to resume talking. Officer Williams advised Murphy that his

Miranda rights still applied; the officers then resumed the interview.

Later, during the interview, Murphy admitted to beating Stafford.

4
Murphy v. State, 941 N.E.2d 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); ECF 9-5 at 4-8. 

Murphy argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief, alleging that the trial

court erred by denying the motion to suppress his confession and by convicting him

based on insufficient evidence. He also alleges that he was denied effective assistance of

counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the charge of murder; and when appellate

counsel failed to raise the exculpatory value of the DNA evidence; failed to raise the

exculpatory value of eyewitness testimony that another individual was seen near the

victim’s house; and failed to withdraw even though appellate counsel had a lifethreatening illness; and when the trial court allowed only one defense attorney to

question witnesses. He further alleges that his due process rights were violated when

the prosecution failed to turn over cell phone information and introduced perjured

testimony; and when the post-conviction relief appellate court denied a motion to stay,

which deprived him of the complete record.

The first issue to consider is whether Murphy has exhausted all available

remedies in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025

(7th Cir. 2004). I can’t get to the merits of the petition unless Murphy has fully and fairly

presented his federal claims to the state courts. Boyko v. Parke, 259 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir.

2001). Fair presentment “does not require a hypertechnical congruence between the

claims made in the federal and state courts; it merely requires that the factual and legal

substance remain the same.” Anderson v. Brevik, 471 F.3d 811, 814–15 (7th Cir. 2006)

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(citing Boyko, 259 F.3d at 788). It does, however, require “the petitioner to assert his

federal claim through one complete round of state-court review, either on direct appeal

of his conviction or in post-conviction proceedings.” Lewis, 390 F.3d at 1025 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). “This means that the petitioner must raise the issue at

each and every level in the state court system, including levels at which review is

discretionary rather than mandatory.” Id. “A habeas petitioner who has exhausted his

state court remedies without properly asserting his federal claim at each level of state

court review has procedurally defaulted that claim.” Id.

Murphy presented his claims that the trial court erred by denying the motion to

suppress his confession and by convicting him based on insufficient evidence to the

Indiana Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of Indiana on direct appeal. ECF 9-3 at

23-27; ECF 9-6. He also presented his claim that appellate counsel failed to raise the

exculpatory value of the DNA evidence to the Indiana Supreme Court and the Court of

Appeals of Indiana at the post-conviction relief stage. ECF 9-9 at 19; ECF 9-13 at 11. So I

will consider the merits of these claims. 

But Murphy did not fully and fairly present the remaining claims to the Indiana

courts. He presented to the Indiana Supreme Court his objection to the Court of

Appeals’ denial of a motion to stay. ECF 9-13 at 12-13. But this is an error — if it is an

error at all — of state procedural matters having nothing to do with the federal

constitution. It is only when “errors in state collateral review . . . violates some other

constitutional right” that the habeas mechanism can come into play. Jackson v.

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Duckworth, 112 F.3d 878, 880 (7th Cir. 1997); Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th

Cir. 1996). So Murphy’s claim regarding the denial of the stay is not a cognizable habeas

claim.1 Additionally, he did not present to the Indiana Supreme Court his claims of

prosecutorial misconduct or his claim that trial counsel failed to object to the murder

charge. ECF 9-13.

Further, Murphy did not present to the Court of Appeals his claim that his

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the exculpatory value of eyewitness

testimony that another individual was seen near the victim’s house; or his claim that he

was deprived of his right to counsel when the trial court allowed only one defense

attorney to question witnesses. ECF 9-9. He presented his claim that his appellate

counsel should have withdrawn due to illness to the Court of Appeals, but only in a

reply brief. ECF 9-11 at 13. Under Indiana law, “a party that raises an argument for the

first time in its reply brief waives the argument on appeal.” Bd. of Works of City of Lake

Station v. I.A.E., Inc., 956 N.E.2d 86, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Ind. R. App. 46(c). Because

he did not fully and fairly present these claims through one full round of state court

review, they are procedurally defaulted. 

A habeas petitioner can overcome a procedural default by showing both cause

for failing to abide by state procedural rules and a resulting prejudice from that failure.

1

Moreover, Murphy requested the stay to obtain the trial stipulation for the lab

findings of Serafina Salmo, the State serologist, and a pro se motion for DNA testing

filed at the post-conviction relief stage. ECF 1 at 5. These documents were not material

to Murphy’s claims on appeal during the post-conviction relief stage. See ECF 9-9.

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Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977); Wrinkles v. Buss, 537 F.3d 804, 812 (7th Cir.

2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2382 (2009). Cause sufficient to excuse procedural default is

defined as “some objective factor external to the defense” which prevented a petitioner

from pursuing his constitutional claim in state court. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492

(1986). 

To excuse procedural bar, Murphy asserts that he did not have counsel during

the post-conviction relief stage. As a general rule, “[n]egligence on the part of a

prisoner’s postconviction attorney does not qualify as cause.” Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S.

266, 280 (2012). However, “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral

proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of

ineffective assistance at trial.” Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012); Brown v. Brown, 847

F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2017). Sensibly, for purposes of the Martinez exception, “inadequate

assistance of counsel” includes having no counsel at all. Id. at 14. 

Two of Murphy’s claims arguably constitute ineffective assistance of trial counsel

claims: his claim that trial counsel failed to object to the charge of murder and that he

was deprived of counsel when the trial court allowed only one defense attorney to

question witnesses. “[A] prisoner must also demonstrate that the underlying

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the

prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Martinez, 566 U.S. 1, 14

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(2012). I will assume without deciding that these two claims have some merit and will

consider the claims.2

Standard of Review

Federal habeas review serves as an important error-correction tool to help ensure

the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. But the available relief is very

limited. “Federal habeas review . . . exists as a guard against extreme malfunctions in

the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through

appeal.” Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (quotations and citation omitted).

Habeas relief can only be granted in one of two ways: if it is shown that the adjudication

of the claim by the state court resulted “in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or if the state court decision was based “on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

This is a demanding standard that has been described by the Supreme Court as

follows: “[This] standard is intentionally difficult to meet. We have explained that

clearly established Federal law for purposes of §2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings . .

. of this Court’s decisions. And an unreasonable application of those holdings must be

2

 Notably, federal courts have the discretion to consider claims for habeas relief

under certain circumstances even if such claims are procedurally barred. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2).

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objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” Woods,

135 S.Ct. at 1376 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, to obtain

relief, the state court’s ruling must be “so lacking in justification that there was an error

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Id. 

Criminal defendants are entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. Rose v. Clark,

478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). To warrant relief, a state court’s decision must be more than

incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.

510, 520 (2003). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal

habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state

court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quotation marks

omitted).

With these standards in mind I will turn to the various claims for relief asserted

by Mr. Murphy. 

Discussion

Admissibility of the Confession 

Murphy argues that the State court made an objectively unreasonable decision to

deny his motion to suppress his confession. In that motion, Murphy argued that the

police officers violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by continuing to

question him after he requested an attorney. Direct Appeal App. 325-34. He also argued

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that the police induced the confession by threatening to arrest his children and that the

admission of the confession at trial violated his Due Process rights. Id.

To protect an individual’s right against self-incrimination, an individual must be

warned prior to a custodial interrogation that he has the right to remain silent and that

any statement he makes may be used against him. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444

(1966). When the prosecution alleges that an individual waived the protections afforded

by Miranda, the central inquiry is whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily

waived his rights. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). “The waiver inquiry

‘has two distinct dimensions’: waiver must be ‘voluntary in the sense that it was the

product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,’

and ‘made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and

the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370,

382-83 (2010).

The Due Process analysis for the voluntariness of confessions is “whether a

defendant’s will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a

confession.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000). “The due process test

takes into consideration the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the

characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id. “A confession is

voluntary if, considering the totality of the circumstances, it is the product of a rational

intellect and free will, and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation,

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or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant’s free will.” Pole v.

Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 941 (7th Cir. 2009). “Courts may consider, among other things,

the age, experience, education, background and intelligence of the accused, the length

of the questioning, and other circumstances surrounding the interrogation when

evaluating whether a confession was voluntarily given.” Id.

At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court heard the

testimony of the officers who obtained the confession and considered the confession

transcript and the written statements from Murphy’s son and his son’s girlfriend. Trial

Tr. 61-249. According to the record, Murphy went to the police station to turn himself

in, and he was accompanied by his son and his son’s girlfriend. Id. at 68-70. He was then

interviewed by Lieutenant Al Williams and Investigator James Johnson, who advised

Murphy of his Miranda rights and obtained a signed waiver. Id. at 78-81. Shortly

thereafter, Murphy asked for an attorney. Id. at 88-91. Williams and Johnson stopped

the interview and moved Murphy to a holding cell. Id. As they prepared paperwork,

they heard Murphy banging on the cell door. Id. Murphy asked what his charges would

be, and they told him that he was under arrest for murder. Id. He then told them that he

wanted to continue talking to them despite his earlier request for an attorney. Id.

Williams and Johnson continued the interview after confirming that Murphy’s

participation in the interview was voluntary and again reminding Murphy of his

Miranda rights. Id.

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Murphy then described his version of the events, which included admitting that

he struck the victim with a large glass object in her home and stole her video games and

that he was attempting to collect a debt owed by the victim’s boyfriend. Hearing Ex. 2 at

14-89. He also indicated that, after he left the victim’s house in Muncie, he got a ride to

Fort Wayne, where his son picked him up and took him to Michigan. Id. at 41-42. As the

interview continued, Williams and Johnson apparently detected a discrepancy in

Murphy’s statements on what happened with the victim’s car. Id. at 92-93. They told

Murphy that they would question his son about his story and that, if his son lied, his

son could be charged with obstruction of justice. Id. at 94. Later, Murphy asked where

his son was at, and Williams told him that his son was being questioned but was not in

trouble and again told Murphy that his son’s lying would constitute a felony. Id. at 118-

20.

As Williams and Johnson questioned Murphy, Investigator Melissa Pease

obtained statements from Murphy’s son and his son’s girlfriend. Trial Tr. 201-04.

Murphy’s son corroborated Murphy’s version of the events by stating that he picked

Murphy up in Fort Wayne. Hearing Ex. 7. However, the girlfriend stated that she and

Murphy’s son met with Murphy in Flint, Michigan, rather than Fort Wayne and that

Murphy had coached them to say that they had picked him up from Fort Wayne.

Hearing Ex. 5. After obtaining these statements, Pease joined Williams and Johnson and

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presented these statements to Murphy, who then agreed to provide more information

regarding the location of the victim’s vehicle. Hearing Ex. 2 at 155-161.

The Court of Appeals of Indiana concluded that there was no Miranda violation,

finding that Williams and Johnson stopped the interview when Murphy asked for an

attorney; that they continued the interview at Murphy’s request, and that Murphy was

aware of his rights when the interview resumed. ECF 9-5 at 12-13. The appellate court

further concluded Murphy confessed voluntarily because the officers’ statements

regarding Murphy’s son did not constitute a threat, emphasizing that they informed

Murphy that his son was not in trouble and correctly advised Murphy regarding the

legal risks to his son. Id.

After reviewing the record, I cannot find that the appellate court’s determination

that there was no Miranda violation was objectively unreasonable. Notably, Murphy did

not introduce evidence at the suppression hearing to contradict the officers’ version of

events, and the officers’ testimony provides ample support to find that Murphy

knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. Additionally, the appellate court’s

conclusion that Murphy’s confession was voluntary was also not unreasonable. Murphy

went to the police station to turn himself in on his own accord, and he waived his

Miranda rights on two separate occasions. It is true that at some point Murphy invoked

his rights under Miranda. But it is permissible for law enforcement officers to continue

an interview of a subject who previously invoked his rights under Miranda provided

that it is the defendant who reinitiates the conversation. United States v. Hampton, 675

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F.3d 720, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2012). And that’s what happened here. When Murphy started

banging on his cell door and telling the officers he wanted to talk, they were within

their rights to continue the interview with him. 

What’s more, Murphy knew the ropes; he had been subjected to custodial

interrogation and criminal proceedings on at least one other occasion, and the officers

provided Murphy with cigarettes, water, food, and time to collect himself upon request.

Moreover, by the time the officers’ mentioned Murphy’s son, Murphy had already

confessed to striking the victim with glass objects in her home in an attempt to collect a

debt and stealing her video games. Considering the totality of the circumstances, I

cannot find that the appellate court’s determination that the confession was voluntary

was objectively unreasonable. Therefore, Murphy’s claim regarding the admission of

his confession is not a basis for habeas relief.

One Counsel Rule

Murphy argues that he was deprived of his right to counsel when the trial court

allowed only one defense attorney to question witnesses. He argues that, as a result, his

attorney L. Ross Rowland did not speak at trial, which denied him the assistance of

counsel. Because no State court has addressed this claim, I will review this claim de

novo. See Thomas v. Clements, 789 F.3d 760, 767 (7th Cir. 2015). At the suppression

hearing, the trial court instructed all counsel, two prosecutors and two defense

attorneys, to limit questioning of witnesses to one attorney per side but also encouraged

15
the attorneys on each side to confer prior to questioning. Trial Tr. 134. To Murphy’s

point, Rowland did not question any witnesses during the bench trial.

For this claim, Murphy relies on Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975),

which holds that the right to assistance of counsel included the right to make closing

arguments even in bench trials. Id. at 865. Similarly, the right to assistance of counsel

likely includes the right to have witnesses questioned by counsel. See Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). Though

the Constitution prohibits “restrictions upon the function of counsel in defending a

criminal prosecution in accord with the traditions of the adversary factfinding process,”

Herring, 422 U.S. at 857, courts retain the discretion to place reasonable limits on how

such functions are executed. Id. at 862; Delaware, 475 U.S. at 679. Here, Murphy was not

deprived of his right to have witnesses questioned by counsel. Rather, Murphy’s

defense team had the opportunity to question each witness, and Murphy’s other

defense attorney, John H. Brooke, did so throughout the bench trial. Further, Murphy

has not shown how the trial court’s limitation was unreasonable, nor has he shown any

prejudice. Therefore, I find that Murphy’s claim that the trial court’s instruction to

defense counsel deprived him of assistance of counsel is not a basis for habeas

relief.9425198435893

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Mr. Murphy’s remaining claims are that his conviction was not supported by

sufficient evidence and that appellate counsel failed to raise the exculpatory value of

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DNA evidence. These claims are related as they focus on the absence of DNA or

fingerprint evidence linking Murphy to the scene of the murder. For sufficiency of the

evidence claims, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979). “[A] federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts

that supports conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not affirmatively

appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced

him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). There is “a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that

is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689. The test for

prejudice is whether there was a reasonable probability that “but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694. A reasonable probability is a probability “sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. at 693. In assessing prejudice under Strickland “[t]he likelihood of a

different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.

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86, 112 (2011). The Strickland analysis also applies to ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel claims. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000).

At trial, Murphy was charged with murder and felony murder. Trial Tr. 281. The

prosecution introduced evidence to show that Murphy and the victim were together

until at least 2:20 a.m. on the morning of March 19, 2009, the date of the murder. Id. at

771-80. This evidence consisted of testimony from the victim’s family, bank records, and

video surveillance from local businesses. Id. at 463-64, 548-53, 739-80. Dr. Paul Mellon,

who performed the autopsy, testified that the victim died due to suffering more than

twenty blunt force injuries to the head and neck. Id. at 572-77. The victim’s parents

testified that they noticed that the victim’s Playstation 2, Nintendo Wii, car, and a glass

candlestick holder were missing from the victim’s residence. Id. at 467-68, 478-79.

Kenneth Watson, Murphy’s girlfriend’s son, testified that he saw Murphy with a

Playstation 2 later on the same morning; he also saw Murphy in the victim’s car. Id. at

620, 626. Bradley Weimer, a police officer, testified that he found the victim’s car eight

minutes away from Murphy’s mother’s residence in Flint, Michigan. Id. at 813-20.

Similarly, Jeffrey Allen, an associate of Murphy, testified that Murphy sold him a

Nintendo Wii also on that morning. Id. at 905-21. The evidence also demonstrated that

Murphy had previously tried to steal and sell the victim’s Nintendo Wii and was

concerned about money on the date of the murder. Id. at 352-55, 435-40, 442-49, 463, 549.

The trial court also considered Murphy’s confession in which he admitted to being with

the victim on the morning of the murder; to hitting the victim with a large glass object;

18
and to taking the video games, the car, and the large glass object from the victim’s

residence. Trial Ex. 87. 

Linda McDonald, a DNA analyst, testified that Murphy’s DNA was not found on

the crime scene but that she detected the DNA of an unknown individual. Id. at 846-47.

She also testified that the overwhelming presence of the victim’s blood made it difficult

for her to detect any other DNA. Id. at 845. Rodney Frasier, an evidence technician,

testified that he was unable to detect Murphy’s fingerprints at the crime scene. Id. at

1017-20. Melinda Hargis, a neighbor of the victim, testified that she observed a

suspicious Caucasian man at the victim’s residence on the evening of March 19, 2009. Id.

at 1109-14. Notwithstanding these shortcomings in the evidence, the trial court found

sufficient evidence to support both counts but entered judgment only on the count of

murder. Id. at 1215-17.

On direct appeal, Murphy, through appellate counsel, argued that the trial court

had insufficient evidence for the murder conviction because Murphy’s DNA and

fingerprints were not found at the victim’s residence. ECF 9-3 at 26-27. The Court of

Appeals of Indiana found that the evidence demonstrated that Murphy was with the

victim on the date of the murder, struck the victim, and had possession of the victim’s

property immediately after the murder. ECF 9-5 at 13-14. The appellate court concluded

that the evidence was sufficient to support the murder conviction even in the absence of

any incriminating DNA or fingerprints. Id.

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On appeal at the post-conviction relief stage, Murphy argued that his trial

counsel and appellate counsel3 were ineffective for failing to raise the exculpatory value

of the DNA evidence. ECF 9-9 at 27-28. Though the Court of Appeals of Indiana did not

address the arguments regarding appellate counsel, it found no deficient performance

for trial counsel because trial counsel, in fact, raised the absence of incriminating DNA.

ECF 9-12 at 6-7.

After reviewing the record, I cannot conclude that the State court’s determination

that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of murder was objectively

unreasonable. The medical evidence regarding the nature of the victim’s death provides

ample evidence that her killing was intentional. There is overwhelming evidence that

Murphy had the opportunity to commit the murder and also evidence showing that

Murphy had a financial motive to do so. Additionally, Murphy confessed that he

assaulted the victim with the glass candlestick holder at her residence on the date of the

murder. Moreover, appellate counsel expressly raised the lack of DNA evidence on

direct appeal. Therefore, Murphy’s claims that his conviction was not supported by

sufficient evidence and that appellate counsel failed to raise the exculpatory value of

DNA evidence are not a basis for habeas relief.

Murder Charge

3

At trial and on direct appeal, John H. Brooke and L. Ross Rowland from the

Public Defender Office represented Murphy. PCR Tr. 71-72.

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Murphy also argues that trial counsel failed to object to the charge of murder on

the basis of insufficient evidence because he was never charged or convicted of robbery.

However, the State is not required to prove robbery for a murder conviction. See Ind.

Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (“A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human

being commits murder”). Murphy may be referring to the charge of felony murder, but

because the trial court entered judgment only on the count of murder, he suffered no

prejudice from the charge of felony murder. Moreover, Indiana law would not have

required the prosecution to charge or convict Murphy with robbery in order to obtain a

felony murder conviction. Douglass v. State, 466 N.E.2d 721, 722 (Ind. 1984) (“[C]harging

a person with felony murder also, in effect, necessarily charges him with the underlying

felony. In terms of its legal effect, a separate underlying felony count adds nothing to

the case.). Therefore, Murphy’s claim that trial counsel failed to object to the murder

charge is not a basis for habeas relief.

Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11, I must grant or deny a

certificate of appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c), the petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right by establishing “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter,

agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the

issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.

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McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For the reasons explained in this opinion for denying

habeas corpus relief, there is no basis for encouraging Murphy to proceed further. For

the same reasons, he may not appeal in forma pauperis because an appeal could not be

taken in good faith.

ACCORDINGLY:

The Court DENIES the habeas corpus petition; DENIES a certificate of

appealability pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11; DENIES leave to appeal

in forma pauperis; and DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of the Respondent

and against the Petitioner.

SO ORDERED on April 17, 2018.

s/ Philip P. Simon

Judge

United States District Court

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