Filed 2/5/24 P. v. Leon CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JENNIFER MARIE LEON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D083426 

 (Super. Ct. No. FVI20002857)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino

County, Charlie Hill, Judge. Affirmed.

Deanna L. Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Melissa A. Mandel and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Jennifer Marie Leon pled no contest to transportation of a controlled 

substance in violation of Health and Safety Code1 section 11379, subdivision

(a). On appeal, Leon argues the trial court wrongly denied her motion to

suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of her vehicle 

following a traffic stop that led to Leon’s arrest. We conclude the officers had 

reasonable suspicion to detain Leon, probable cause to arrest her, and a 

reasonable basis to search her vehicle incident to the arrest. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In fall 2020, two sheriff’s deputies initiated a traffic stop of Leon after 

she parked in front of her home. Leon does not challenge the validity of the 

traffic stop. One of the deputies observed Leon exit and “quickly” re-enter 

her vehicle after they initiated the stop and activated the lights on the patrol 

car. He observed Leon close the driver-side door behind her then reach over 

to the passenger’s side before getting out of the car again. 

The deputy approached Leon and soon concluded she “was under the 

influence.” He immediately noticed her “bloodshot red eyes,” “rapid . . . body 

movement,” and a “white coating around her mouth.” He also observed she 

“avoided making eye contact,” her eyes were “rapidly moving side to side,” 

and her pupils were “constricted.” The deputy testified during his “training 

at the academy” he was taught to look for signs that someone is under the 

influence of a controlled substance, including “[r]apid eye movement, 

bloodshot eyes, a white coating around the mouth,” “[c]ontinuous body 

movement[,] [a]nd avoiding eye contact.” He also testified he had conducted 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Health and Safety 

Code.
3

five to ten prior investigations into whether someone was under the influence 

of a controlled substance and had been in contact with someone under the 

influence more than five times. 

Leon began to walk to her house and the deputy asked her to stop. The 

deputy and his partner questioned Leon for several minutes, although the 

record does not establish the exact duration of the interaction. They asked if 

she had been arrested before, whether she was on probation or parole, and 

whether she had guns, drugs, or anything illegal in her car. They told her 

she was “acting strange,” and she said she had smoked marijuana “ ‘a little 

while ago.’ ” She also told them she had “low blood sugar.” 

After questioning her, the deputy handcuffed Leon, who “briefly 

resisted,” and placed her in the back seat of his patrol car. He then searched 

her vehicle for “controlled substances” and discovered “[a] white crystal 

substance located inside her purse.” 

Leon was charged with transportation of amphetamine, a controlled 

substance, in violation of section 11379, subdivision (a) and possession of 

amphetamine for sale in violation of section 11378. She filed a motion to 

suppress the evidence recovered in the search pursuant to Penal Code section 

1538.5. Leon argued, among other things: the traffic stop was 

unconstitutionally prolonged; the officers did not have reasonable suspicion 

that Leon was under the influence of a controlled substance; the officers did 

not have probable cause to arrest her for being under the influence of a 

controlled substance; and the search of the vehicle was not a proper search 

incident to arrest and not supported by probable cause. The arresting deputy 

and Leon testified at the suppression hearing. 

The court denied Leon’s motion. The court credited the deputy’s 

testimony that he “saw that [Leon] was under the influence” once he made 
4

contact with her and found at that point the investigation “bec[a]me an under 

the influence investigation.” The court found it was “reasonable” in such an 

investigation to search for “paraphernalia” or “controlled substances” in the 

vehicle.

DISCUSSION

Leon makes four principal arguments on appeal. First, she claims the 

traffic stop “was unlawfully prolonged” beyond the time it would reasonably 

take to investigate and resolve the traffic offense, failing to have a front 

license plate.2 Second, she argues the officers did not have reasonable 

suspicion to detain and question her for any other offense. Third, she 

contends the officers lacked probable cause to support an arrest. And fourth, 

she argues even if she was lawfully arrested, the vehicle search was 

constitutionally impermissible. As explained below, none of these arguments 

supports reversal.

In reviewing a court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we 

review “the trial court's express and implied factual findings” for “substantial 

evidence,” “considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 

court’s order.” (People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 860–861; citing 

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 975, and People v. Tully (2012) 54 

Cal.4th 952, 979.) We “independently determine whether the search was 

constitutional.” (Lee, at p. 860.)

“The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops . . . when a 

law enforcement officer has [reasonable suspicion, which comprises] ‘a 

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 

2 “Since California issues two license plates for motor vehicles other than 

motorcycles [Veh. Code, § 4850], the absence of a California license plate on 

the front of a vehicle is an established basis for a traffic stop.” (People v. 

Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 860.) 
5

stopped of criminal activity.’ ” (Navarette v. California (2014) 572 U.S. 393, 

396–397.) Here, the officers had reasonable suspicion to support at least a 

brief seizure almost as soon as the traffic stop began, as she appeared to be 

under the influence of a controlled substance. (Cf. People v. Campuzano 

(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 14, 21 [“Under the totality of the 

circumstances, there was no prolonged detention because immediately after 

the stop and detention for [an] infraction, the officer observed the defendant’s 

objective symptoms of drug intoxication and had probable cause to arrest 

defendant for being under the influence of a controlled substance.”].) 

Leon claims there is no substantial evidence in support of the trial 

court’s conclusion that she was observed to be under the influence. However, 

the deputy testified once he approached Leon, he saw objective “signs and 

symptoms” that she was under the influence of a controlled substance,

consistent with his law enforcement training. These included bloodshot 

eyes, rapid body and eye movement, constricted pupils, a white coating 

around her mouth, and avoidance of eye contact. Leon claims the deputy was 

not sufficiently experienced to determine whether a person is under the 

influence based on demeanor and appearance. However, she ignores that the 

deputy testified he received specific training on identifying whether a person 

is under the influence. Although he did not have extensive experience, the 

deputy had applied his training on multiple prior occasions. Given that Leon 

displayed numerous signs of intoxication consistent with the deputy’s 

training, his unrebutted testimony is substantial evidence that Leon was 

apparently under the influence of a controlled substance. 

Leon argues her use of marijuana and her low blood sugar could have 

“contribute[d] to her appearance and demeanor.” But the record suggests the 

deputies learned of these circumstances somewhat late in the interaction, 
6

after the majority of the questioning was complete. In any case, Leon does 

not claim all of the symptoms the deputy observed could have resulted from 

low blood sugar or marijuana use. Nor is there any record evidence bearing 

on the symptoms of low blood sugar or marijuana use. Accordingly, we need 

not conclude that this information would dispel a reasonable officer’s belief 

that Leon was under the influence. “In urging us to reject [the trial court’s] 

findings and disbelieve the testifying officer, [Leon] asks us to reweigh the 

evidence and substitute our findings for those of the trial court. We decline 

[her] invitation, which runs contrary to well-settled principles of appellate 

review.” (People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943, 954.)

Leon also contends the questioning was more significant than 

necessary to confirm she was under the influence, claiming it strayed into 

topics unrelated to her drug use. Given that the deputy was relying on 

Leon’s demeanor as evidence of intoxication, it was reasonable to confirm the 

suspicion by continuing to talk to her and observe her behavior. The record 

does not support that the detention was longer than necessary, as the officers 

appear to have asked fewer than a dozen questions, and the thrust of the 

questioning was not obviously beyond the scope of a reasonable investigation. 

For example, a suspect’s potential criminal history and possession of guns are 

circumstances that can indicate involvement in commercial drug offenses. 

(See, e.g., People v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776, 793 [evidence that 

defendant was carrying a gun supported conviction for selling drugs]; People 

v. Aho (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 984, 992 [“defendant’s arrest and conviction 

record” relevant to whether search warrant for suspected drug trafficker’s 

residence was supported by probable cause].) 

Leon next claims her arrest was not supported by probable cause. 

“[A]n officer must have probable cause before making an arrest.” (In re J.G. 
7

(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1505.) “ ‘[P]robable cause exists if the facts and 

circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that 

the offense has been committed.’ ” (People v. Ingle (1960) 53 Cal.2d 407, 414.) 

As already discussed, the deputy reasonably concluded, based on objective 

indicia and his training and experience, that Leon was under the influence of 

a controlled substance. He continued to observe Leon over the course of the 

questioning, noted she “was acting strange,” and continued to believe her

appearance and demeanor were consistent with being under the influence. 

(See People v. Sanchez (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 42, 48 [“plain-sight 

observations” of defendant’s “demeanor,” including droopy eyelids, slurred 

speech and constricted pupils, “clearly furnished probable cause to arrest 

[him] for being under the influence of a controlled substance”].) In addition, 

Leon admitted to the deputies she had recently smoked marijuana, which, 

because the deputies had just observed her driving a car, provided probable 

cause to believe she was unlawfully driving under the influence of a drug.

(See Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f) [“It is unlawful for a person who is under 

the influence of any drug to drive a vehicle.”].)

Leon argues the deputy’s testimony was inconsistent as to whether he 

had “arrested” her before the search. She also notes he “did not claim 

probable cause to arrest prior to the vehicle search.” But the deputy clearly 

testified, after refreshing his recollection with his contemporaneous incident 

report, he had in fact arrested Leon by placing her in handcuffs in the back of 

his patrol car before searching her vehicle. And we do not need the deputy to 

testify he had concluded probable cause existed. “An action is ‘reasonable’ 

under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of 

mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’ ” 

(Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 404.) Thus, even when a 
8

law enforcement official contends there was no probable cause, which is not 

the case here, a court may find to the contrary. (See Florida v. Royer (1983) 

460 U.S. 491, 507 (plurality opinion) [although officer testified “there was no 

probable cause to arrest until [defendant’s] bags were opened” this did “not 

foreclose the State from justifying [the] custody by proving probable cause”].) 

Leon relies on In re Antonio B. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 435 for the 

proposition that “the deputy’s observations fell far short of probable cause to 

make an arrest for unlawful drug use.” In In re Antonio B. there was “no 

dispute that the police officers had cause to conduct an investigative 

detention of appellant, but they did not have probable cause to arrest him at 

the time of the stop.” (Id. at 441.) Even if probable cause had been in dispute 

in In re Antonio B., the facts are not similar: the defendant was detained 

solely because he had been walking with someone who was smoking 

marijuana. (Ibid.) Unlike Leon, there were no signs he was under the 

influence of a controlled substance.

Finally, Leon argues the search of her car was impermissible even if 

she was properly arrested. “Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent 

occupant’s arrest only if . . . it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 

evidence of the offense of arrest.” (Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 351

(Gant).) When the occupant of a car is arrested for a “drug offense[ ],” it “will 

supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s 

vehicle and any containers therein.” (Id. at 344; see also People v. Evans 

(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 750 (Evans) [“[A]bsent unusual circumstances, 

when a driver is arrested for driving under the influence, or being under the 

influence, it will generally be reasonable for an officer to believe evidence 

related to that crime might be found in the vehicle.”].)
9

Leon relies heavily on a federal district court case from Tennessee, 

United States v. Reagan (E.D. Tenn. 2010) 713 F.Supp.2d 724 (Reagan). In 

Reagan, the court found it was not reasonable for the officer to believe there 

was evidence of the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol “inside the 

passenger compartment of a vehicle based solely upon the nature of the 

charge or the existence of evidence that the vehicle’s driver is intoxicated.” 

(Id. at p. 733.) According to Reagan, neither the driver’s intoxication nor the 

officer’s testimony that “he had sometimes discovered open containers of 

alcohol when searching some vehicles following the arrest of their drivers for 

DUI” was sufficiently particularized to support a reasonable belief that there 

was evidence of the offense in the defendant’s car. (Ibid.) 

Two California courts have discussed Reagan and have disagreed with 

this view. (See People v. Nottoli (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 553 [noting 

“Gant indicated that the nature of the crime of arrest was determinative” and 

thus finding an “arrest for ‘being under the influence of a controlled 

substance’ supplied a reasonable basis for believing that evidence ‘relevant’ to 

that type of offense might be in his vehicle”]; Evans, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 750 & fn. 9 [“part[ing] company” with Reagan and concluding “[i]t is 

certainly logical and reasonable to expect that items related to alcohol or 

drug consumption, such as alcoholic beverage bottles or drug paraphernalia, 

might readily be contained in the intoxicated driver’s car”].) As applied to 

arrests for being under the influence of a controlled substance, we think these 

cases better comport with Gant, which itself suggests arresting a driver for a 

drug offense will support a search of the vehicle. (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 

344; see also People v. Quick (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1012 [“In accordance 

with Gant, ‘the focus of the inquiry is entirely upon the nature of the offense 

of arrest, rather than the particular facts of the case.’ ”].) There are no 
10

circumstances here that would make it unreasonable to believe that Leon’s 

car contained evidence. In fact, after they initiated the stop and activated 

their patrol car lights, the deputies observed Leon park, exit her car, quickly 

re-enter after they initiated the traffic stop, and reach over to the passenger’s 

side. There was additional reason to believe that the passenger compartment 

contained evidence beyond the nature of the offense of arrest. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.