J-S51043-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellee : 

: 

v. : 

: 

JAMEEL R. MINCEY, : 

: 

Appellant : No. 1505 MDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on July 18, 2013 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, 

Criminal Division, No. CP-41-CR-0001155-2012 

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2014 

 Jameel R. Mincey (“Mincey”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his convictions of one count each of possession with the 

intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, public intoxication and 

disorderly conduct.1

 We affirm. 

 The trial court set forth the underlying facts as follows: 

At approximately 2:41 a.m. on June 22, 2012, Williamsport 

police officers were dispatched to the Sheetz at 105 Maynard 

Street for a fight in progress. When the police arrived, they 

observed a white male, a white female, and [Mincey] involved in 

a verbal altercation. The police tried to separate the individuals. 

Officer Jonathan Deprenda spoke to [Mincey] and asked 

[Mincey] to tell him what happened. [Mincey] told Officer 

Deprenda that the white male had hit him in the mouth and then 

he stepped towards the white male. Officer Deprenda was 

between the two men and walked [Mincey] towards his vehicle. 

He noticed a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from 

[Mincey]’s person. [Mincey] also was very unsteady on his feet, 

 

1

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (32); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5503(a)(1), 5505. 
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nearly falling over as [he] got to Officer Deprenda’s vehicle. 

Officer Deprenda asked [Mincey] to identify himself or produce 

identification, but [Mincey] wouldn’t give his name or produce 

identification. Officer Deprenda took [Mincey] into custody for 

disorderly conduct and public drunkenness and transported him 

to City Hall where he was identified as ... Mincey. 

 Officer Deprenda searched [Mincey] incident to his arrest 

and discovered 19 baggies of cocaine contained within a larger 

“distribution” bag in [Mincey]’s left front pocket. The nineteen 

baggies of cocaine weighed 9.6 grams. 

 [Mincey] was charged with possession with intent to 

deliver a controlled substance, an ungraded felony; possession 

of drug paraphernalia, an ungraded misdemeanor; and the 

summary offenses of disorderly conduct and public drunkenness. 

Following a nonjury trial held on January 14, 2013, the court 

found [Mincey] guilty of all the charges. 

 On July 18, 2013, the court sentenced [Mincey] to 21⁄2 to 5 

years of incarceration in a state correctional institution for 

possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and a 

consecutive 6 months to 1 year of incarceration for possession of 

drug paraphernalia. [The court imposed no further punishment 

for each of the summary offenses.]

 [Mincey] filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence in 

which he asserted that[] the court’s sentence was unduly harsh 

and excessive; the possession of drug paraphernalia charge

should have run concurrently because the paraphernalia was the 

bags in which the cocaine was discovered; and the court failed to 

adequately consider [Mincey]’s need for drug and alcohol

treatment. The court denied this motion, and [Mincey] filed a 

timely appeal. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/26/13, at 1-2 (footnote omitted). 

 On appeal, Mincey raises the following questions for our review: 

1. Was the evidence presented at trial [] insufficient to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [Mincey] was guilty of 

possession of drug paraphernalia; specifically because 

evidence established that he purchased the controlled 
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substance as packaged and did not have separate implements 

for storage, ingestion, etc.? 

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when imposing 

consecutive sentences for possessing drug paraphernalia and 

possession with the intent to deliver? 

Brief for Appellant at 8. 

 In his first claim, Mincey contends that he did not have the requisite 

mens rea to be found guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia, as he 

bought the controlled substance “as is.” Id. at 12-13. Mincey argues that 

he had no intent to use the baggies and that his sole objective was to obtain 

the cocaine for personal use. Id. at 13-14. 

 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

evaluate the record “in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving 

the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence.” Commonwealth v. Bibbs, 970 A.2d 440, 445 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (citation omitted). 

 Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict 

when it established each element of the crime charged and the 

commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty, and may sustain its burden by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. Significantly, [we] may not 

substitute [our] judgment for that of the factfinder; if the record 

contains support for the convictions they may not be disturbed. 

Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Any doubt about the 

defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the factfinder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be 
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drawn from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Scott, 967 

A.2d 995, 998 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

 Relevantly, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32) prohibits the “use or possession 

with intent to use drug paraphernalia for the purpose of...packing, repacking, 

storing, containing, concealing, injecting, inhaling or otherwise introducing 

into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this act.” Drug 

paraphernalia is defined as “all equipment, products and materials of any 

kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use in storing, 

containing, concealing ... a controlled substance in violation of this act.” 35 

P.S. § 780-102. 

 The trial court addressed Mincey’s claim as follows: 

The law does not require the paraphernalia to be separate from 

the controlled substance. See Commonwealth v. Caban, 60 

A.3d 120 (Pa. Super. 2012) (Superior Court rejected a challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence for a paraphernalia conviction 

where the paraphernalia was the gift box and cellophane in 

which the marijuana was wrapped); Commonwealth v. 

Coleman, 984 A.2d 998, 1000-1002 (Pa. Super. 2009) (glass 

vials, glassine baggie and sock which contained crack cocaine 

constituted drug paraphernalia). In fact, determining whether 

an object is drug paraphernalia a court should consider the 

proximity of the object to controlled substances. 35 P.S. § 780-

102.

 In this case, the bags clearly were being used to store or 

contain the cocaine. In fact, [Mincey] called a witness, James 

Geddy, to dispute the Commonwealth’s characterization of the 

larger bag as a “distribution” bag. Mr. Geddy testified that there 

is no such thing as a distribution bag in the drug world. The bag 

was just a sandwich bag; its purpose was to keep the smaller 

bags of cocaine together so no one would lose any of them. 

[N.T., 7/18/13, at 69.] In other words, [Mincey]’s own evidence 
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showed that the bags were being used to store or contain the 

cocaine. Therefore, this issue lacks merit. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/26/13, at 3-4. We agree with the sound reasoning of 

the trial court and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict 

Mincey of possession of drug paraphernalia. See id. 

Mincey’s second claim implicates the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing. 

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four 

part test: 

[We] conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, 

see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal 

defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(quotation marks and some citations omitted). 

Here, Mincey filed a timely Notice of Appeal, preserved the issue in his 

Motion for Reconsideration, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his 

brief. In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Mincey claims that the trial court 

imposed consecutive sentences contrary to the fundamental norms of 

sentencing, as the sentence was “disproportionate to the nature of the 

offense,” and the trial court failed to discuss Mincey’s rehabilitative needs. 
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Brief for Appellant at 15. This claim raises a substantial question. See

Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

 The trial court addressed this claim as follows: 

The court could impose separate sentences on these offenses, 

because the crimes did not merge. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765 (“No 

crimes merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise

from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of 

one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other 

offense”). Furthermore, “Pennsylvania law affords the

sentencing court discretion to impose its sentences concurrently 

or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same 

time or to sentences already imposed.” Commonwealth v. 

Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013). A sentence will 

not be reversed on appeal unless the sentencing court abused its 

discretion. “[A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error 

of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its 

discretion unless ‘the record discloses that the judgment 

exercised was manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will.’” Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 A.2d 

957, 961 (Pa. 2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 543 

A.3d 893, 895 (Pa. 1996). 

The court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences in 

this case was neither unreasonable nor based on any partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will against [Mincey], but rather was 

motivated by a desire to protect the public. [N.T., 7/18/13, at 

26-29; N.T., 8/1/13, at 12.] Although in many cases the court 

would not impose a consecutive sentence for a paraphernalia 

charge when there was no additional paraphernalia for ingesting 

or packaging controlled substances, this was not a typical case. 

Generally speaking, from 1996 to the present [Mincey] had 

difficulty refraining from selling drugs, using drugs, or driving a 

vehicle while he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol 

while his license was suspended except when he was 

incarcerated. He had been in and out of the criminal justice 

system with escalating consequences and nothing seemed to 

work. Furthermore, [Mincey] had three other cases that were 

being sentenced at the same time as this case. He committed 

the offenses in this case about two months after his arrest for 

possession of Percocet[,] and within eight days of his arrest for 

DUI. Then he committed another DUI about two months after 
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he committed the offenses in this case. [N.T., 7/18/13, at 5; 

N.T., 8/1/13, at 11.] These factors could have justified a 

sentence in the aggravated range or a lengthier maximum 

sentence for possession with intent to deliver cocaine,[fn] but the 

court did not do that. Instead, the court simply imposed a 

consecutive sentence of six months to one year on the 

paraphernalia charge, which under all the facts and 

circumstances was neither an abuse of discretion nor an 

excessive sentence. 

[

fn] The statutory maximum sentence for possession with intent 

to deliver cocaine was 20 years, because [Mincey] had prior 

convictions for delivery or possession with intent to deliver a 

controlled substance. 35 P.S. § 780-115. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/26/13, at 5 (footnote in original); see also N.T., 

7/18/13, at 11-15, 26-29 (wherein the trial court discusses Mincey’s 

rehabilitative needs and his prior history of addiction in rendering the 

sentence). Furthermore, the trial court was informed by a pre-sentence 

investigation report. N.T., 7/18/13, at 8-13; see also Commonwealth v. 

Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that where trial 

court had the benefit of pre-sentence investigation report, the court satisfies 

its requirement that the reasons for the sentence be placed on the record 

and all relevant factors considered).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences and therefore adopt the 

sound reasoning of the trial court.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/22/2014