UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

EDWARD SCOTT, ) 

 ) 

Petitioner, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CAUSE NO.: 3:16-CV-639-TLS 

 ) 

SUPERINTENDENT, ) 

 ) 

Respondent. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Edward Scott, a pro se prisoner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] 

challenging the prison disciplinary hearing (ISP 16-04-227) at which the Disciplinary Hearing 

Officer (DHO) found him guilty of trafficking in violation of Indiana Department of Correction 

(IDOC) policy A-113. As a result, he was sanctioned with the loss of 120 days earned credit time 

and was demoted from Credit Class 1 to Credit Class 2. 

 On December 8, 2016, Scott filed a Letter [ECF No. 9] with this Court and stated that he 

had retained private counsel in this case. Scott sought leave to amend his Petition in light of his 

retention of counsel. However, nearly five months have passed and no attorney has filed an 

appearance on behalf of Scott and no amended petition has been filed. The Court notes that at the 

time he requested leave, Scott did not require leave of court to file an amended petition. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 15(a). Rule 15(a) permits a party to amend its pleading on one occasion as a matter of 

course within 21 days after service of the responsive pleading. Respondent filed his Response 

[ECF No. 5] to the Order to Show Cause on December 5, 2016. Scott’s deadline to file an 

amended petition was December 27, 2016. He did not file an amended petition, and did not seek 

additional time to do so. Therefore, the Court considers this matter fully briefed. 
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 In his Petition, Scott raises one issue: he argues that he requested “all physical evidence,” 

but that no physical evidence was produced to him at the hearing. (Pet. 2, ECF No. 1.) 

Respondent contends that there was sufficient evidence on which to find Scott guilty of 

trafficking, and also argues that Scott did not have a right to personally review all of the 

evidence. It is unclear whether Scott challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to find him 

guilty or whether he challenges the fact that he did not personally review all of the evidence 

presented to the DHO. The Court will therefore address each of these issues. 

The imposition of prison discipline will be upheld so long as there is some evidence to 

support the finding. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1985). “[T]he relevant 

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached 

by the disciplinary board.” Id. “In reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are not 

required to conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, 

or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision to 

revoke good time credits has some factual basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th 

Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). 

[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the support of some 

evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no more than a 

modicum of evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the record is not 

so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without 

support or otherwise arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still must 

point to the accused’s guilt. It is not our province to assess the comparative 

weight of the evidence underlying the disciplinary board’s decision. 

Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations, parenthesis, 

and ellipsis omitted). The Court will overturn the hearing officer’s decision only if “no 

reasonable adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the 
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evidence presented.” Henderson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 

1994). 

 Here, the DHO had sufficient evidence to find Scott guilty of violating IDOC A-113. The 

IDOC defines this offense as “[e]ngaging in trafficking (as defined in IC 35-44.1-3-5) with 

anyone who is not an offender residing in the same facility.” Adult Disciplinary Process, 

Appendix I, http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-

2015(1).pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2017). Indiana law defines the offense of trafficking as: 

(b) A person who, without the prior authorization of the person in charge of a 

penal facility or juvenile facility, knowingly or intentionally: 

(1) delivers, or carries into the penal facility or juvenile facility with 

intent to deliver, an article to an inmate or child of the facility; 

(2) carries, or receives with intent to carry out of the penal facility or 

juvenile facility, an article from an inmate or child of the facility; 

or 

(3) delivers, or carries to a worksite with the intent to deliver, 

alcoholic beverages to an inmate or child of a jail work crew or 

community work crew; 

Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-5. The Conduct Report [ECF No. 1-1] states that 

[o]n 04/28/2016 at approx. 7:50 am Bennie Wolfinger was droped (sic) off by 

Shauna Whitaker just south of the facility. Correctional Police, Investigators and 

local law enforcement found an object wrapped in black electrical tape in the 

possession of Bennie Wolfiner. Bennie Wolfinger was interviewed by 

Investigators where it was discovered that the package was to be thrown over the 

IDO recreation fence to be delivered to Offender Seth Barnhart # 996204 and 

Edward Scott # 996330 when he returned from work later that day. Case report 

16-ISP-0067 found substantiated for trafficking. Contents of the package were 7 

Suboxone strips still in packaging, 3 Suboxone pills, 2.05 oz of tobacco, 1 lighter, 

rolling papers and 1 smart phone. 

(Conduct Report 1, ECF No. 1-1.) In finding Scott guilty, the DHO relied on that Conduct 

Report, the confidential internal affairs file, and the internal affairs investigation report. A 

conduct report alone can be sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt. McPherson, 188 
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F.3d at 786. Such is the case here. Moreover, the Court has reviewed the evidence filed under 

seal and is satisfied that there is more than “some evidence” linking Scott to trafficking there, 

too. In light of the conduct report and evidence contained in the IA file, the DHO’s determination 

was not unreasonable or arbitrary. 

 To the extent that Scott argues that he had a right to review all of the evidence that the 

DHO reviewed, he is mistaken. “[P]rison disciplinary boards are entitled to receive, and act on, 

information that is withheld from the prisoner and the public . . . .” White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 

F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 2001). Scott had a right to have the DHO review the evidence he 

requested, but he did not have the right to personally review all of the evidence himself. Id. The 

IDOC determined that the internal affairs file contains information that, if disclosed, would pose 

a threat to the safety and security of the institution. The Court has no reason to disagree. 

Accordingly, there has been no showing of a due process violation, and therefore Scott’s Petition 

is denied. 

 For these reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF no. 1] is DENIED. The 

Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. 

 SO ORDERED on April 28, 2017. 

 /s Theresa L. Springmann 

 CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT