United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted March 18, 2016*

Decided March 18, 2016 

Before 

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15-2534 

JOHN R. GARCIA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 14 C 10512 

Joan B. Gottschall, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

John Garcia appeals the dismissal of his employment-discrimination suit on claim 

preclusion grounds. We affirm. 

In 2008 Garcia, a Mexican-American postal employee, first sued the United States 

Postal Service on claims that he had been fired four years earlier based on his national 

 

*

 The United States Postal Service was not served with process in the district 

court and is not participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and 

the record, we have concluded that the case is appropriate for summary disposition. 

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 15-2534 Page 2 

origin and in retaliation for filing complaints with the agency’s Equal Employment 

Opportunity office. The district court granted summary judgment for the Postal Service 

after concluding that Garcia had not produced evidence that his termination resulted 

from discrimination, and we affirmed. Garcia v. United States Postal Serv., 414 F. App’x. 

855, 856–59 (7th Cir. 2011). 

In 2015 Garcia filed a form complaint for employment discrimination claims, 

checking off boxes that he had been fired because of his national origin and race, and 

stating that the Postal Service had fired him for “no reason.” The district court dismissed 

his complaint at screening, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), because Garcia stated on the 

complaint that he had not pursued administrative remedies before filing suit. The court 

also noted Garcia’s 2008 lawsuit and concluded that, to the extent his claims arose from 

the same job termination, the doctrine of claim preclusion would bar relitigation of his 

previously denied claims. He amended his complaint, insisting that he was not 

attempting to relitigate previously decided claims, but attached documents which made 

clear that he was, in fact, continuing to contest the grounds for his 2004 termination. The 

district court dismissed the amended complaint, concluding that his suit was barred by 

the doctrine of claim preclusion. Garcia filed several subsequent motions seeking 

appointment of counsel or reconsideration, eventually adding a new theory—that he 

was denied due process when the Postal Service rejected his request for mediation 

before he was fired. The district court denied each motion. 

On appeal, Garcia does not challenge the district court’s claim-preclusion ruling, 

but instead continues to assert that he was denied a due-process right to engage in 

mediation before being fired. Regardless of the underlying merits of Garcia’s claim, 

however, the district court correctly concluded that the doctrine of claim preclusion bars 

this suit. Claim preclusion prevents the relitigation of claims that were—or could have 

been—determined in an earlier proceeding, and applies when the first suit resulted in a 

final decision, the disputes arise from the same transaction, and involve the same parties. 

See Czarniecki v. City of Chi., 633 F.3d 545, 548–50 (7th Cir. 2011); Hayes v. City of Chi., 670 

F.3d 810, 813–16 (7th Cir. 2012). In 2008 Garcia litigated and lost his discrimination case 

and he may not now assert new theories to alter the preclusive effect of the earlier 

judgment. See Czarniecki, 633 F.3d at 550. 

AFFIRMED.