J-A21007-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.M., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 744 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered February 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000650-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.M., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 745 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000160-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.C.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.M., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 746 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 16, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000161-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
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MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 21, 2022

J.M. (Mother) appeals1from the decrees, entered in the Court Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, Juvenile Division involuntarily terminating her 

parental rights to A.M (born August 2009) and N.C.S. (born August 2019) 

(collectively, Children),

2 and the order changing A.M.’s dependency goal from 

reunification to adoption. After careful review, we affirm.

On March 24, 2016, A.M. was adjudicated dependent following a petition 

filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) due to safety 

and welfare concerns regarding Children.

3

 On October 20, 2016, the court 

entered an order reunifying Mother and A.M. prior to the next court date, and 

conditioned upon Mother providing proof of income to Community Umbrella 

Agency (CUA), submitting to drug screenings, as well as by agreement of the 

parties. See DHS Exhibit 4, at 54. On January 17, 2017, A.M. was reunited 

____________________________________________

1 Mother has filed three separate notices of appeal with one docket number 

on each notice. Thus, Mother has complied with the dictates of 

Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), which held that 

“where a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, 

separate notices of appeal must be filed for each of those cases.” See also

Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). We have consolidated the appeals sua sponte for ease of 

disposition. See Pa.R.A.P. 513 (consolidation of appeals). 

2 A.M., A.L.M., and A.L. are used in the caption and briefs to refer to the same 

child. N.C.S. and N.M. are used to refer to the other child. Here, we use the 

initials used by the trial court which are A.M. and N.C.S. 

3 This Court was not provided with further facts on this matter as the 2016 

adjudication is not on appeal. 
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with Mother. N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/16/21, at 80. Court supervision 

was terminated on January 19, 2017. DHS Exhibit 4, at 54. 

However, on July 27, 2017, DHS received a General Protective Services 

Report (GPS Report) citing concerns about Mother’s substance abuse and 

mental health, the family’s access to appropriate housing and adequate food, 

and A.M.’s truancy. N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/16/21, at 80. The GPS 

Report also alleged that Mother and two of A.M.’s siblings were attacked by 

the paramour of A.M.’s sibling’s father. Trial Court Opinion, 4/28/22, at 2. 

On October 17, 2017, DHS obtained an order of protective custody for A.M. 

N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/16/21, at 80. Upon learning of the order, Mother 

fled with A.M. On November 7, 2017, A.M. was again adjudicated dependent 

and has remained in DHS’ care ever since. DHS Exhibit 4, at 57. Mother and 

Mother’s counsel appeared for adjudication. Id. An initial permanency review 

hearing was held on March 19, 2018, at which time the permanency goal for 

A.M. was reunification. Id. at 59-60. 

On August 27, 2019, N.C.S. was born at 34-weeks’ gestation. On 

September 5, 2019, DHS received a GPS report alleging that Mother tested 

positive for methadone at N.C.S.’s birth, fell asleep while holding N.C.S., 

accused the hospital of abusing N.C.S., and almost knocked over N.C.S.’s crib. 

N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/6/21, at 88-89. On December 9, 2019, at five 

months old, N.C.S. was adjudicated dependent and has remained in DHS’ care 

since then. Id., 12/17/21, at 42. An initial permanency review hearing was 
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held on January 21, 2020, at which time the permanency goal for N.C.S. was 

reunification.4 DHS Exhibit 6, at 23. 

On March 23, 2021, DHS filed petitions to change A.M.’s permanency 

goal from reunification to adoption and to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

to both Children. Termination hearings took place over four days on June 16, 

2021, September 22, 2021, December 17, 2021, and February 22, 2022.

Joshua Hage,

5 a CUA case management supervisor, and Sakina Gaines, 

a case manager director at Turning Points for Children, each testified 

regarding Mother’s compliance with her case plan objectives. C.C., A.M.’s preadoptive resource parent, testified regarding C.C.’s bond with A.M. William 

Calandra, Esquire, A.M.’s child advocate, appointed to represent her wishes 

and best interests, testified regarding A.M.’s understanding of adoption and 

relationship with C.C. Y.B., one of N.C.S.’s pre-adoptive resource parents,

testified regarding N.C.S.’s bond with both Y.B. and A.F., Y.B.’s fiancé.6 

Tracey Chambers-Coleman acted as the guardian ad litem (GAL) for Children. 

Hage testified that Mother’s single case plan objectives are to: (1) 

address drug and alcohol concerns and submit random drug screens at the 

____________________________________________

4 N.C.S.’s permanency goal was not changed to adoption as M.S. had been 

identified as her biological father. The DNA test result was distributed at the 

February 22, 2022 hearing. N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/22/22, at 9. 

5 Hage was the CUA case management supervisor for Mother and Children 

from November 11, 2019 to November 2020, and was reassigned this case on 

May 14, 2021. N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/16/21, at 78-79. 

6 A.F. is also N.C.S.’s pre-adoptive resource parent. N.T. Termination Hearing, 

2/22/22, at 5. A.F. did not testify at the termination hearings. 
J-A21007-22

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Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU); (2) address mental health concerns and 

medication management; (3) attend Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) for 

domestic violence and anger management; (4) obtain stable housing; and (5) 

comply with supervised visitation. N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/16/21, at 83. 

Gaines testified that Mother has an extensive drug history. Id., 

10/17/21, at 39. Gaines also testified that she was concerned that Mother is 

not currently enrolled in a drug and alcohol treatment program because 

without proper support relapse is possible. Id., 12/17/21, at 41. Indeed, 

Hage testified that Mother had relapsed and used PCP in December 2019; 

Mother resisted treatment at this time. Id., 6/16/21, at 85, 100. 

Additionally, according to Hage, Mother has completed drug screening 

through Gaudenzia,

7 but CUA is unable to determine if these screens were 

random because Mother retracted a previously signed release. Id. at 85-86.

Mother also retracted previously signed releases from Best Behavioral

Healthcare [BBH]. Id. at 124. Additionally, although Mother has stated that 

there are times when she is compliant with services, Hage has not noticed any 

progress or positive change in Mother. Id. at 101. 

Regarding Mother’s mental health diagnosis, Gaines testified that 

Mother has major depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and bipolar 

disorder. Id. at 42. Additionally, Hage testified that Mother also has been 

diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. Id. at 121. 

____________________________________________

7 Gaudenzia is facility offering substance abuse treatment programs. 
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Gaines noted that she is concerned about consistency in treatment 

because Mother has received treatment from many different facilities. Id.,

12/17/21, at 38. Indeed, Gaines testified that Mother has been at various

behavioral health treatment facilities, including: Gaudenzia; Community 

Behavioral Health; Greater Philadelphia Health Action; BBH; Al-Assist; and 

NorthEast Treatment Center.

8 Id. at 38-39. Additionally, Mother has been at 

the Wedge Recovery Centers (the Wedge) since August 2021. Id. 

Moreover, Gaines stated: “[M]other has not been extremely consistent 

with her mental health. Her response behaviors in some visits have been 

concerning.” Id. Specifically, during a visit, Mother threatened a case aide

who was unable to see Mother and N.C.S. The case aide asked Mother to 

reposition herself to allow the aide to observe her. Mother’s response to the 

case aide was, “You must know where [I am] from. [You have] got to read 

about me. You must know what [I am] capable of doing.” Id. at 79-80.

Additionally, Mother keyed a supervisor’s car and followed case workers out 

to their cars after court hearings. Id. at 97, 117. 

Hage testified that due to Mother’s behavior, visits were moved from 

CUA to DHS. Id., 6/16/21, at 91-92 (“So, due to [Mother’s] erratic behaviors 

and threats that were made to the [] CUA case mangers[, ] we decided to 

request that the visits not be held [at] the CUA agency any longer, and moved 

____________________________________________

8 These facilities, as well as the Wedge, support and advocate for individuals 

with behavioral health challenges, including drug and alcohol addiction and 

mental illness. 
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to DHS, [because] it has more security there.”). N.C.S.’s visits with Mother 

are still supervised at DHS. Id. 

Mother’s erratic behavior also prevented her from having a bonding 

evaluation completed, something that was court ordered and scheduled at 

Assessment & Treatment Alternatives (ATA) in April 2019. According to 

Gaines, this evaluation was not completed due to Mother’s conduct. Id., 

12/17/21, at 37 (“[M]other was in an irate state, and [Mother] was essentially 

banned from ATA, and no longer allowed to come back.”).

Hage and Gaines each testified that Mother has not completed a 

domestic violence program despite past domestic violence issues between 

Mother and Father. Id. at 26; id., 6/16/21, at 119-121. Additionally, 

although Mother testified that she was approved for housing, beginning 

December 22, 2021, the home was conditioned on Mother being reunified with 

all seven of her children. Id., at 12/17/21, at 68-69. CUA was provided with 

an unsigned lease and CUA has been unable to contact the landlord to confirm 

that housing has been acquired. Id. at 70, 96.

9

 Further, although Mother 

testified that she is employed part-time and receives social security disability 

payments, Hage testified that CUA does not have documentation of either. 

Id. at 159-60, 162, 176; id., 6/6/17, at 119-21. 

____________________________________________

9 “Mother’s counsel represented to the trial court that although the lease 

provided to CUA was not signed by the landlord, the lease had since been 

signed. The trial court accepted counsel’s representation, as an officer of the 

court, that the lease was signed by the landlord later.” Trial Court Opinion, 

supra, at n. 5. 
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Hage also testified regarding Mother’s compliance with visits. Mother 

has missed visits with Children alleging that she was in the hospital:

So, typically [Mother] would say that she was hospitalized during 

[] the visit that she had missed. Typically, [Mother] would let us 

know about 15 [to] 20 minutes before the visits would happen. 

We requested documentation for those hospital stays, so we were

able to make up the time that she had missed, but she had stated

that the documentation was sent to her attorney. When we tried 

getting the documentation from the attorneys, we either did not 

get a response or the attorney said that they did not receive the 

documentation. 

Id. at 91. Additionally, Hage testified that during a visit on October 13, 2021, 

Mother was observed, “telling A.M. [] that she needs to come home, she wants 

to come home.” Id. at 92-93. 

C.C., who has been A.M.’s resource parent for the past three years,

testified regarding her bond with A.M. Id., 12/17/21, at 24. C.C. views A.M. 

“[l]ike [she is] my child. [She is] part of the family ... [we are] a dynamic duo. 

She loves me and I love her. Id., 9/22/21, at 22. Additionally, C.C. stated, 

“[w]e don’t have any concerns with her in school. Like I said when I went to 

back[-]to[-]school night, her teachers had nothing but pleasant things to say 

about her.” Id. at 24-25. C.C. also testified that, “[W]hen [A.M.] first came, 

she was still tell[ing] a lot of stories, and she used to steal. I used to get 

phone calls everyday from school and after care.” Id. at 21-22. Moreover, 

according to C.C., A.M. feels comfortable enough with C.C. to discuss the 

foster care process and that “[s]ometimes we sit down, and we talk about 

everything.” Id. at 30.
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Further, Gaines testified that A.M. is “thriving” in her current placement. 

Id., 12/17/21, at 26. For example, while in C.C.’s care, A.M. has “stabilized” 

through participation in therapy, dance, and musical theatre. Id., 10/22/21, 

at 29. Conversely, A.M. exhibits behavioral issues for approximately a week 

following visits with Mother. Id. at 31. Indeed, A.M.’s visits with Mother are 

virtual because in-person visitation would lead to decompensation of A.M.’s 

behavior. Id., 12/17/21, at 35. C.C. testified that she has concerns about 

A.M. continuing to visit with Mother, “[b]ecause it changes [A.M.’s] mood and 

[it is] not a good mood.” Id., 9/22/21, at 33. 

Calandra, who was appointed as A.M.’s legal counsel in late 2020 has 

had “several opportunities to meet with [A.M.] with regard to her 

understanding of permanency.” Id., 12/17/21, at 102. Counsel testified as 

follows:

What I have found is that [A.M.] is an extremely bright, thoughtful 

child, and [is] capable of grasping the understanding of what 

permanency mean[s] in her life. [A.M.] indicated to me that she 

is extremely happy in [C.C.’s home].

[A.M.] shares a terrific relationship with [C.C.] . . . and feels loved 

by [C.C]. [A.M.] feels well cared for and protected by [C.C.], and 

safe when she is with [C.C.] 

[A.M] wishes to remain in the care of [C.C.], and to be adopted 

by [C.C]. [A.M.] also wishes to maintain discretion over further 

contact with [Mother] going forward.

But it was clear to me that [A.M.] requests permanency. This has 

been [] five years that have been extremely difficult for her. And, 

as a 12-year-old, she is capable of making that decision, and I 

would ask that the [c]ourt accept her position. 
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Id. at 102-03. Similarly, C.C. testified that “[A.M] keeps thanking me 

for adopting her.” Id., 9/22/21, at 24. 

Y.B., N.C.S.’s pre-adoptive parent, testified regarding the bond among 

him, A.F., and N.C.S. Y.B. testified that, “[N.C.S.] is like our best friend. 

[A.F.] loves [N.C.S.] more than she loves me. [That is] for sure[.] [We are] 

mommy and daddy to [N.C.S.]” Id., 10/22/21, at 29. Indeed, N.C.S., now 

two years old, has been living with Y.B. since N.C.S was five months old. Id.

at 42; id., 6/16/21, at 96. Additionally, N.C.S. refers to Y.B. and A.F. as 

“mom and dad”. Id., 12/17/21, at 42. Y.B. also testified that after visits with 

Mother, N.C.S. “would just be crying, having a fit. When she comes out, she 

is soaked [in] urine. Her diaper [is not] changed. She has food, candy[,] in 

her teeth. [She is] stinky.” Id. at 52. 

The court terminated Mother’s parental rights to A.M. (decree entered 

on February 22, 2022)10 and N.C.S. (decree entered on March 16, 2022) 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption 

Act.11 On February 22, 2022, the court changed A.M.’s permanency goal from 

reunification to adoption. Mother filed timely notices of appeal. Both Mother 

and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Mother identifies the 

following issues for our review:

____________________________________________

10 A.M.’s Father’s parental rights were also involuntary terminated on February 

22, 2022. 

11 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.
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1. The [trial court] erred in changing [A.M.’s permanency] goal 

from reunification to adoption. 

2. The [trial court] erred in dismissing the Petition and Rule to 

Show Cause without any evidentiary hearing.

3. The [trial court] erred in determining that DHS/CUA used 

reasonable efforts to reunify [Mother and Children] when there 

have been 11 CUA workers during this matter[,] [DHS/CUA]

did not conduct family finding and place the child with a kinship 

provider [and where] Mother was told that they would not 

move [Children]. 

4. The [trial court] erred in [its] rulings when Mother was fully 

compliant with her single case plan objectives [and] Mother

completed her objectives prior to the filing of the Petition for 

Termination of Parental Rights. 

5. The [trial court] erred in making a final ruling without the 

results of the bonding evaluation which had been ordered but 

never completed. 

6. The [trial court] erred in disregarding the [Behavioral Health 

System (BHS)] evaluation [where there was no expert 

testimony that any issues presented a nexus between Mother’s 

mental health and Mother’s ability to parent [C]hildren [and 

where the evaluation] did not state that Mother was not able 

to parent [C]hildren due to any underlying mental health issues 

of Mother [and where] BHS’ evaluation only stated that Mother 

could benefit from therapy which Mother was compliant with. 

7. The [trial court] erred in not considering the bond that exists 

with Mother and [Children] as well as both of [Children’s] bonds 

with [their siblings]. 

8. The [trial court] erred in disregarding [Children’s] and Mother’s 

rights to due process and their constitutional rights to have 

reasonable efforts used to reunify each other them with the 

other and the other children. 

9. The [trial court] erred in not interviewing [A.M.] to ensure that 

her wishes were taken in to account. 

10. The [trial court] was given inaccurate information as to 

Mother’s criminal record [insofar as] her criminal charges were 

dismissed. 
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11. Because of the turnover in case managers/CUA workers, there 

has been no continuity in services and assistance to Mother. 

Despite this and during the pandemic of 2020, Mother 

[completed] all of her single case plan objectives. Her 

permanency worker has reviewed all of Mother’s documents 

which were entered into evidence and has stated that Mother 

has been fully compliant. 

Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5 (reworded for clarity).

12

This Court reviews a trial court’s decision in a dependency case for an 

abuse of discretion or an error of law. In re J.T.R., 9 A.3d 1179, 1181 (Pa. 

2010). We must accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of 

the trial court if they are supported in the record. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 

267 (Pa. 2013). We emphasize that the trial court was in the best position to 

view the evidence and we give great deference to the trial court’s 

determinations that are supported in the record. Indeed, our job as an 

appellate court is to review for an abuse of discretion, not to reweigh the 

evidence. See In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

In a proceeding to involuntarily terminate parental rights, the burden of 

proof is on the party seeking termination to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence the existence of the grounds for doing so. In re Adoption of G.L.L., 

124 A.3d 344, 346 (Pa. Super. 2015); In re Adoption of S.M., 816 A.2d 

1117, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2003). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

____________________________________________

12 Mother lists issue 10, concerning inaccurate information provided to the 

court regarding her criminal convictions, in her Rule 1925(b) statement and 

in her appellate brief. However, she omits the issue from the argument 

section of her appellate brief. As such, we find this claim waived. See Pa. 

R.A.P. 302(a). 
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testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty[,] and convincing as to enable the 

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of 

the precise facts in issue.” Id. A court examines whether the totality of the 

circumstances, including the individual circumstances of each case and all 

explanations offered by the parents, clearly warrants termination. Id. The 

trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is 

likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the 

evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

Sections 2511(a)13 and (b) of the Adoption Act14 govern involuntary 

termination of parental rights. The relevant subsections are as follows:

(a)(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either 

has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to 

a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

(a)(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

parent.

* * *

____________________________________________

13 We can affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental 

rights with regard to any single subsection of 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 

A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 

14 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) (Grounds for involuntary termination); id. at 

2511(b) (Other considerations).
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(a)(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by 

the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a 

period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent 

cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to 

the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of 

time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(a)(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by 

the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 

months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement 

of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent 

shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental 

factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing 

and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), 

(6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent 

to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

First, our review of the record reveals that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in involuntary terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children 

under section 2511(a) and (b). Second, the trial court did not err in changing 

A.M.’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption. Third, we find that 
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DHS/CUA made reasonable efforts to reunite the family due to their ongoing 

support of Mother. 

In issues 4 and 6, Mother argues the trial court erred in terminating her 

parental rights under sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8) because she was 

fully compliant with her single case plan objectives before DHS filed the 

petitions to involuntary terminate her parental rights. Appellant Brief, at 18. 

This argument is belied by the record. 

Here, the trial court explained its decision to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights under section 2511(a)(1) as follows:

Mother has an extensive substance abuse health history. While 

Mother is engaged in mental health treatment at [t]he Wedge, []

Gaines testified that she was unsure if they had a full picture of 

Mother’s mental health history and diagnosis due to Mother’s 

previous refusal to sign mental health releases for her treatment 

at [BBH], and Mother’s refusal to sign releases allowing CUA to 

speak with the Wedge about Mother’s treatment. Additionally, 

[Gaines] testified that because of Mother’s inconsistent mental 

health treatment and persistent threatening behaviors, she had 

concerns regarding Mother’s mental stability. []Gaines testified 

that she had concerns regarding Mother’s aggressive and erratic 

behavior despite completing an anger management course. 

[Hage] and [Gaines] testified that Mother never completed her 

SCP objective of completing a domestic violence course. 

Additionally, Mother has not visited the Children consistently and 

her visits never progressed further than supervised at CUA/DHS. 

[Hage] testified that due to Mother’s aggressive behaviors and 

threats made to CUA staff, Mother’s visits were moved from 

supervised at CUA to supervised at DHS because DHS is able to 

provide more security than the CUA agency. 

Fully complying with her objectives would have demonstrated 

Mother’s interest in caring for A.M. and N.C.S. However, Mother 

failed to make a substantial effort to fulfill these objectives. 

Accordingly, this [c]ourt found that termination of Mother’s 
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parental rights was warranted pursuant to [subsection] 

2511(a)(1).

Trial Court Opinion, supra, at 17-18. 

The record fully supports the trial court’s determination that there exists 

clear and convincing evidence that termination is appropriate under section 

2511(a)(1). Concerns still exist regarding Mother’s drug and alcohol use 

because CUA is unable to determine if Mother has been compliant with random 

drug screenings, Mother is resistant to treatment, Mother’s sobriety has been 

inconsistent, and Mother is not currently enrolled in a drug treatment 

program. N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/16/21, at 41, 85-86, 100, 104. 

Additionally, Mother has not completed a domestic violence or anger 

management course15 and still exhibits aggressive an erratic behavior during 

visits with Children. Id. at 97, 117, 119-20. Mother has also not completed 

her objectives of consistently attending supervised visitation, obtaining stable 

housing, or providing CUA with documentation of employment and benefit 

programs she is allegedly enrolled in. Id. at 121; id., 12/17/21, at 70, 96. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental 

rights under section 2511(a)(1) because Mother has failed to make a 

substantial effort to fulfill her single case plan objectives and, thus, as failed 

to perform her parental duties.

____________________________________________

15 It is noted that Mother’s brief demonstrates that she has competed an anger 

management workshop through Community Council Health Systems. See 

Appellant’s Brief, at Appendix B (Certificate of achievement for completion of 

manger management workshop dated 5/3/21). 
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In issues 5 and 7, Mother argues the trial court erred in terminating her 

parental rights under section 2511(b)16 where no bonding evaluation was 

completed, A.M. did not express her wishes regarding adoption directly to the 

trial court,

17 and the Children’s bonds with their five other siblings were not 

considered. Appellant’s Brief, at 60-63. This argument is meritless. 

Indeed, the trial court did not err in proceeding without the results of a 

bonding evaluation. There is no requirement that a formal bonding evolution 

be performed under section 2511(b). In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (“[s]ection 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 

analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act.”).

Nevertheless, a bonding evaluation was scheduled in April 2019, but was not 

____________________________________________

16 Section 2511(b) requires the court to give “adequate consideration [] to the 

needs and the welfare of the child.” In re J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa. 

Super. 2002). Specifically, the court determines whether “a bond exists 

between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, 

necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). In cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent 

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 

753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008).

17 The relevant consents necessary for adoption are as follows: 

(a) General Rule. – Except as otherwise provided in this part, 

consent to an adoption shall be required of the following:

(1) The adoptee, if over 12 years of age. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711. A.M. is over 12 and, thus, A.M. must consent to the 

adoption. N.C.S. is under 12 and, thus, her consent is not necessary under 

section 2711. 
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completed due to Moher’s erratic conduct at ATA. N.T. Termination Hearing, 

12/17/21, at 37. Further, the trial court properly determined that A.M.

understands adoption and, consistent with Calandra’s testimony, wants to be 

adopted. Id. at 102-03. Moreover, although Mother argues that the trial 

court should have interviewed A.M. regarding her wishes, Mother’s counsel 

did not request that A.M. be present at the termination hearings. Trial Court 

Opinion, supra, at 26. 

Additionally, the trial court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

would not cause irreparable harm to the Children because the Children do not 

look to Mother for Children’s needs to be met. Trial Court Opinion, supra, at 

25-26. Indeed, Mother negatively impacts A.M., as evidenced by 

decompensation of A.M.’s behavior following visits with Mother. N.T. 

Termination Hearing, 12/17/21, at 35. By contrast, A.M.’s behavior has 

improved in school and after-care since under C.C.’s care. Id., 9/22/21, at 

21-22. Similarly, termination of Mother’s parental rights to N.C.S. will not 

destroy an existing beneficial relationship between them because N.C.S. often 

cries the entire visit with Mother. Id., 12/17/21, at 100. By contrast, N.C.S. 

calls Y.B. and A.F. “mom and dad.” Id. at 42. 

Moreover, the trial court considered the bond between Children and their 

five other siblings who are also currently in DHS’ care: 

[The trial court] is mindful that siblings have a right to see each 

other. On February 22, 2022, Mother’s parental rights were 

terminated. [The trial court] did not issue an order stating that 

the siblings are not permitted to visit each other. Testimony 

reflects that some of the resource parents of [] Children have a 
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relationship. Visits between the siblings have been occurring 

separate from Mother’s visitation with the children because the 

different resource parents have social engagements. 

Trial Court Opinion, supra, at 27. This is supported by Gaines’ testimony: 

LINDA WALTERS, ESQUIRE:18 And how many times, outside of 

the visits, do all seven children–since you came on, from 

September 1 to now, how many times have all of the resource 

parents gotten together to have the seven kids see each other? 

GAINES: I [cannot] say all seven, but, for the most part, majority 

of them, often. It can be at least twice or once a month, aside 

from what we essentially had put in place to ensure that it does 

occur.

They are very close in proximity to one another, so, they make 

sure that they go to whatever engagements of another sibling, 

and that is something that those particular resource parents 

ensure that occurs. 

See N.T. Termination Hearing, 10/17/22, at 75-76. In light of the foregoing, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would be in the Children’s best interest because there 

is no evidence demonstrating a beneficial bond between Mother and Children. 

In re J.D.W.M, supra; In re Z.P., supra. 

In issues 1, 9, and 11, Mother argues that by denying Mother’s motion 

entitled “Preliminary Objections to Petition for Involuntary 

Termination/Petition to Return Custody to Natural Biological Mother/Finding 

No Reasonable Efforts”

19 the trial court did not consider all information 

____________________________________________

18 Linda Walters, Esquire, served as counsel for Mother at the termination 

hearings. 

19 The motion was filed on December 16, 2021 and, thus, was timely appealed. 
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regarding whether to change the goal from reunification to adoption as 

required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act. This argument as no 

merit. 

The trial court held its decision regarding the motion in abeyance after 

the December 17, 2021 hearing until February 22, 2022, to allow DHS counsel

to review the motion. Trial Court Opinion, supra, at 15; N.T. Termination 

Hearing, 2/22/22, at 7. Additionally, the trial court determined that the 

exhibits attached to the motion “mirrored” the exhibits Mother presented at 

the prior termination hearings and, thus, testimony elicited at “an evidentiary 

hearing on the [m]otion would be substantially similar, if not the same, as the 

testimony that was elicited throughout the [prior termination hearings].” Id.

at 15-16; see N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/22/22, at 8. We agree that a 

separate hearing on the motion would be superfluous. Thus, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the motion without a hearing. 

Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by changing 

A.M.’s permanency goal under section 6351(f)20 where A.M. is “thriving” in 

____________________________________________

20 In relevant part, section 6351(f) requires that the court consider the 

following factors during permanency proceedings: 

(1) [] the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement; 

(2) [] the appropriateness, feasibility and extent of compliance 

with the permanency plan developed for the child; 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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her current placement and Mother has not made consistent progress with her 

single case plan objectives. Id., 12/17/21, at 26. Indeed, A.M. has 

“stabilized” while with C.C. through participating in therapy, dance, and 

musical theatre. Id., 10/22/21, at 29. Conversely, A.M. exhibits behavioral 

concerns for approximately a week following visits with Mother. Id. at 31. 

Further, as discussed supra, the concerns necessitating the original 

placement have not been alleviated, including Mother’s drug and alcohol 

dependency, anger management, and lack of housing. Indeed, Hage has not 

noticed any progress or positive change in Mother. N.T. Termination Hearing, 

6/16/21, at 101. Finally, Mother’s visitation with A.M. is inconsistent. Id., 

12/17/21, at 35. As such, the trial court did not err in changing A.M.’s goal 

from reunification to adoption. 

____________________________________________

(3) [] the extent of progress made toward alleviating the 

circumstances which necessitated the original placement; 

(4) [] the appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement 

goal for the child; 

(5) [a] project[ed] likely date by which the goal for the child might 

be achieved; 

* * *

(6) [] whether the child is safe. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f); see also In re: S.B., 943 A.2d 973 (Pa. Super. 

2008).
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Finally, in issues 2, 3, and 8, Mother argues that CUA/DHS did not use 

reasonable efforts to reunify the family or place Children in a kinship home 

and, thus, violated Mother’s and Children’s due process and constitutional 

rights to reunification. Specifically, Mother claims there has been turnover in 

case managers and CUA workers and a lack of continuity in services provided. 

Appellant’s Brief, at 64, 67. This argument is unsupported by the record. 

Although there has been turnover in case workers, Mother has received 

appropriate assistance from CUA throughout this process. Gaines testified 

that “[Mother] had permanency specialists working with her, hand[-in-]hand 

with her objectives.” N.T. Termination Hearing, 10/17/21, at 44. For 

example, Mother was driven to Friends Rehabilitation Program, a drug 

treatment facility, by a permanency specialist. Id. at 58. Gaines also testified 

that although Mother has been resistant to assistance, support has always 

been in place for Mother. Id. For example, Mother was referred to Addiction 

Recovery Center (ARC) for treatment but was discharged due to 

noncompliance. After discharge, a parent must enroll in services on their own; 

Mother never re-enrolled. Id. at 50. Additionally, Hage testified that CUA 

tried to help Mother get assessed for inpatient therapy when she admitted to 

using PCP in December 2019; Mother failed to do so. Id., 6/16/21, at 100. 

Indeed, a review of the record shows that Mother has been continuously 

supported by DHS/CUA. 

Regarding kinship placement, Mother’s argument is similarity belied by 

the record. Testimony shows that CUA explored the list of possible placements 
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for Children but was not able to find appropriate caregivers. Id., 12/17/21, 

at 53-54. For example, although Children’s maternal grandmother had once 

taken care of Children, DHS determined she was not an appropriate resource

because under her care, Children were not dressed appropriately, and

grandmother’s house contained “bugs.” Id., 10/22/21, at 122. Additionally, 

CUA attempted to assess maternal grandmother’s home on January 3, 2020, 

but were unable to assess the whole home because some doors were locked. 

Id., 6/16/21, at 87. Thus, the record indicates that, despite the turnover in 

caseworkers, reasonable efforts were made by DHS/CUA to support Mother 

and place the Children in kinship care. Therefore, Mother is entitled to no 

relief on this claim. 

This Court has painstakingly reviewed the record herein and concludes 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Mother’s parental 

rights to be terminated to both A.M. and N.C.S. Additionally, the trial court 

did not err in changing A.M. permanency goal from reunification to adoption. 

In re T.S.M., supra; In re J.T.R., supra. 

Order and decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/21/2022