UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

TONY REED, )

)

Petitioner, )

) CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-621 RL 

vs. )

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Petition under 28

U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by Tony

Reed, a pro se prisoner, on October 1, 2016 (DE #9). For the

reasons set forth below, the petition (DE #9) is DENIED pursuant to

Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and the motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (DE #7) is DENIED as MOOT. The clerk is DIRECTED to close

this case.

BACKGROUND

In the petition, Reed is challenging the prison disciplinary

hearing (WCC 16-03-0227) where he was found guilty on March 28,

2016, of possessing a deadly weapon in violation of A-106 by the

Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO). Reed was sanctioned with the

loss of 60 days earned credit time. 

The Conduct Report charges, “On 3/10/2016 at approximately

5:40 am, during an E Squad shakedown I, Sgt. M. Dombrowski

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conducted a search of Offender Reed, Tony 902503 and his property.

As I searched Offender Reed, Tony, I observed Offender Reed, Tony

remove a small package containing two razor blades from his oral

cavity. While searching Offender Reed’s property box, I found an

unauthorized lock.” (DE #9-1 at 3.) 

DISCUSSION

When prisoners lose earned time credits in a prison

disciplinary hearing, they are entitled to certain protections

under the Due Process Clause: (1) advance written notice of the

charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial

decision maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence in defense when consistent with institutional

safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by a

fact finder of evidence relied on and the reasons for the

disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974).

To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence” to

support the hearing officer’s decision. Superintendent, Mass.

Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).

Reed argues that there was insufficient evidence to have found

him guilty because he used the razors to cut hair. He also

complains that the report mentioned him possessing both a lock and

a razor, but he was only found guilty of possessing the razor. In

evaluating whether there is adequate evidence to support the

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findings of a prison disciplinary hearing, “the relevant question

is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support

the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). Even a conduct report alone

can provide evidence sufficient to support the finding of guilt.

McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). 

In reviewing a decision for some evidence,

courts are not required to conduct an

examination of the entire record,

independently assess witness credibility, or

weigh the evidence, but only determine whether

the prison disciplinary board’s decision to

revoke good time credits has some factual

basis.

Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 (quotations marks and citation omitted). 

[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board

[need only] have the support of some evidence

in the record. This is a lenient standard, 

requiring no more than a modicum of evidence.

Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the

record is not so devoid of evidence that the

findings of the disciplinary board were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.

Although some evidence is not much, it still

must point to the accused’s guilt. It is not

our province to assess the comparative weight

of the evidence underlying the disciplinary

board’s decision. 

Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation

marks, citations, parenthesis, and ellipsis omitted). 

Here, there was sufficient evidence to find Reed guilty of

possessing a dangerous weapon. Though he argues that the razors

were merely going to used to cut hair, the hearing officer was not 

required to accept his version of events. It was not unreasonable

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for the hearing officer to have concluded that it could have been

used as a weapon. Surely, a disposable razor - like many common

items - can be fashioned into a weapon by a creative inmate, but

that does not mean that every inmate with a disposable razor is

guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon. Without more, it is

merely a disposable razor. Here, though, Reed altered the

disposable razor by removing the razor blades and then hiding them

in his mouth in an attempt to avoid their detection. The DHO heard

Reed’s arguments, weighed the facts, and found against him. There

is no indication that the decision was arbitrary. “The Federal

Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any

conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.”

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985). It is not for

this court to re-weigh the evidence. 

Reed’s complaint about the conduct report fares no better. 

The purpose of a conduct report is to inform the inmate of the

charge against him. Wolff requires advance notice of sufficient

facts to inform the accused of the behavior with which he is

charged. 418 U.S. at 570. Here, the conduct report identifies the

offense as “Possession of a Deadly Weapon.” The offense code is

identified as “A-106". The conduct report contained a description

of the weapons found in the area. (DE #9-1 at 3.) This clearly

notified Reed that he was charged with possession of a deadly

weapon. It does not matter that he was only found guilty of

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possessing one deadly weapon and not two.

Because the factual basis of the investigation

report gave [him] all the information he

needed to defend against the . . . charge, the

reviewing authority's modification did not

deprive [him] of his due process rights.

Northern v. Hanks, 326 F.3d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 2003). Thus, this

is not a basis for habeas relief.

As a final matter, Reed has moved to proceed in forma

pauperis. (DE #7.) Upon review of the financial records, the

filing fee has been paid in full. As such, there is no need for

Reed to proceed in forma pauperis. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE #9) is

DENIED pursuant to Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and the motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (DE #7) is DENIED as MOOT. The clerk is

DIRECTED to close this case. 

DATED: November 21, 2016 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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