[Cite as Gales v. Ohio Dept. of Public Safety, 2021-Ohio-216.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Timothy Gales, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 Nos. 19AP-720 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 19CV-3311)

Ohio Department of Public Safety, et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendants-Appellees. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on January 28, 2021 

 

On brief: Timothy Gales, pro se. Argued: Timothy Gales. 

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Matthew J. 

Karam, for appellees. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

BEATTY BLUNT, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Timothy Gales, appeals from a decision of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to dismiss of defendants-appellees, 

Ohio Department of Public Safety ("ODPS") and Ohio State Highway Patrol ("OSHP") 

(collectively "appellees"). For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} Gales is a former employee of the OSHP, which is a division of the ODPS. 

(May 20, 2019 Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) While employed by the OSHP, Gales was a member 

of the Fraternal Order of Police ("FOP"). (Apr. 22, 2019 App. to Vacate at 1.) Although not 

directly relevant to the matter presently before the court, we begin with a brief summary 

of the prior history of the parties and events leading up to the instant matter to provide 

context to our analysis of Gales' appeal. 
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{¶ 3} Effective July 1, 2012, the State of Ohio ("the state") and FOP entered into 

a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") which permitted the parties to submit certain 

disputes to arbitration. State v. FOP of Ohio, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-457, 2017-Ohio1382, ¶ 2. On March 1, 2013, the director of ODPS issued a letter to Gales informing him 

that his employment had been terminated for violation of workplace rules, violation of 

Ohio law, and "actions that brought discredit" upon ODPS. Id. The termination was the 

culmination of a workplace investigation into allegations that Gales had sold numerous 

vehicles that he purchased at auction to members of the public without obtaining a dealer 

or salvage license from the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles. Id. 

{¶ 4} Pursuant to the terms of the CBA, Gales filed a grievance challenging his 

termination. Id. at ¶ 3. Subsequently, the parties submitted the matter to arbitration. Id. 

Following a two-day hearing in September 2014, the arbitrator1 issued a decision and 

award dated November 24, 2014 which modified Gales' termination to a one-month 

suspension without pay. Id. 

{¶ 5} On February 20, 2015, the state filed an "application and motion to vacate 

arbitration award" in the trial court. Id. at ¶ 4. On March 20, 2015, FOP responded in an 

"answer and counterclaim" asserting the trial court should deny the state's motion to 

vacate and seeking an order (1) confirming the arbitration award, (2) requiring the state 

to pay Gales any and all back pay and benefits, (3) awarding interest to Gales, and 

(4) requiring the state to pay all costs. Id. 

{¶ 6} On May 19, 2016, the trial court issued a decision and entry denying the 

state's motion to vacate the arbitration award and granting FOP's motion to confirm the 

arbitration award. Id. at ¶ 7. The trial court also awarded both prejudgment and 

postjudgment interest on the back pay due to Gales from November 24, 2014 until the 

date of Gales' reinstatement. Id. at ¶ 9. 

{¶ 7} The state filed a timely appeal of the judgment of the trial court. Id. at ¶ 9. 

On April 13, 2017, this court issued a decision which affirmed the judgment of the trial 

court in its entirety. Id. at ¶ 31. 

{¶ 8} On May 15, 2017, Gales was reinstated to his position as an enforcement 

agent with OSHP/ODPS. (App. to Vacate at 6.) On January 11, 2018, Gales became the 

 

1 The arbitrator was E. William Lewis. (App. to Vacate at 5.) 
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subject of an administrative investigation. Id. The investigation concerned allegations 

by ODPS that Gales breached his obligation offset as provided for in the November 24, 

2014 arbitration award by failing to disclose all income earned from other employment 

during his absence subsequent to his previous termination. Id. at 6-7. Ultimately, on 

March 20, 2018, Gales was terminated from his employment for being untruthful 

regarding secondary employment. (Id. at 8; Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) 

{¶ 9} Gales' termination was grieved and proceeded to arbitration on 

September 10, 2018. (App. to Vacate at 9; Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) The parties to the 

arbitration included the FOP and appellees. (App. to Vacate at 9.) On January 25, 2019, 

the arbitrator2 issued an arbitration award denying the grievance and upholding Gales' 

termination. Id. at 13. 

{¶ 10} On April 22, 2019, Gales filed his "application to vacate arbitration award, to 

non-party" in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, seeking to vacate the arbitration 

award issued on January 25, 2019 which denied Gales' grievance and upheld Gales' 

termination from employment.3 On May 20, 2019, appellees responded to Gales' 

application to vacate by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing the trial court should dismiss 

the complaint in its entirety pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. On June 4, 2019, Gales filed an "answer" in response to appellees' motion to 

dismiss. 

{¶ 11} In a September 19, 2019 entry, the trial court granted appellees' motion to 

dismiss, finding that Gales lacked standing to petition the court to vacate the January 25, 

2019 arbitration award. More specifically, after first determining that the motion should 

be evaluated under the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standard as opposed to the Civ.R. 12(B)(1) standard, 

the trial court reviewed the CBA attached to Gales' application to vacate and found that the 

CBA failed to confer the requisite standing under R.C. 2711.10 to file such an application. 

(Sept. 19, 2019 Decision and Entry at 1, 6.) Thus, the court dismissed Gales' application to 

vacate arbitration award pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). (Id. at 7.) 

{¶ 12} This timely appeal followed. 

 

2 The arbitrator of Gales' grievance of the second termination was David Stanton. (App. to Vacate at 9.) 

3 Gales also filed an unfair labor practice charge with the State Employment Relation Board ("SERB") against 

ODPS, OSHP, the FOP and the Office of Collective Bargaining. (Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) SERB dismissed the 

charge on November 22, 2019. (Brief of Appellees at 1.) 
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II. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 13} Gales asserts the following nine assignments of error for our review: 

[1.] Trial Court erred in dismissing the appellant action and 

abused its discretion in dismissing appellant's action 

[2.] Trial Court erred by dismissing appellant's action 

pursuant to Ohio civil rule 12 (B-6) failure to state a claim. and 

abused its discretion 

[3.] trial court erred by dismissing appellant's application to 

vacate in violation of 2711.13 and by doing so abused its 

discretion when it dismissed the action on a 12 (B -6) which is 

not part of the Ohio Revised Code 2711. 

[4.] Trial court erred, and abused its discretion, by ruling the 

defendants were parties to a collective bargaining agreement 

pursuant to ORC 4117.10 (D) Then ruled, the Office of 

Collective Bargaining were not a party to the agreement 

between the state of Ohio and Fraternal Order of Police. 

pursuant to orc 4117 (D) The appellee's, namely, State Patrol, 

and Public safety, clearly were not ever meant to be included 

into the laws by the general assembly 

[5.] Trial Court erred by dismissing appellant's application that 

alleged fraud, corruption, bias, and misconduct on the part of 

the arbitrator Ohio Revised code 2711.10 . And that, the 

Appellee's unlawfully and without leave of the court reversed 

the appellant from being Judgment creditor and real person in 

interest to judgment debtor. Which was confirmed by the 

franklin county common pleas court on May 19, 2016 

(15MS00119). The appellee's operated off a confirmed award 

and a contract which had expired some three years ago. 

[6.] Trial court erred and abused its discretion, by dismissing 

appellant's application based on arbitrator and appellee's 

public policy violations. The arbitrator violated public policy 

by reviewing an award issued on November 24, 2014. The 

arbitrator violated public policy when he ignored the fact he 

was reviewing an award which was confirmed by the court. The 

arbitrator to satisfy the will of the appellee's and fop crafted a 

remedy to support issuing a fraudulent award of dishonesty. 

When in fact it was the appellee's who were dishonest and acted 

in bad faith when the appellee's unlawfully revisited a closed 

award. 
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[7.] Trial Court erred by dismissing Appellant's motion which 

cited award not enforceable due arbitrator misconduct and 

expired contract 2012-2015 and based on same set of facts from 

previous arbitration. Arbitrator making rulings on disputes 

not before him. 

[8.] Trial Court erred by dismissing appellant's case due to 

previous award confirmed by the courts May 2016 Appeals 

Court April 14, 2017. 

[9.] Trial court erred by dismissing appellant's application to 

vacate due the appellee's lack of standings with a collective 

bargaining agreement 

(Sic passim.) 

III. Discussion 

{¶ 14} Gales has presented nine assignments of error, many of which are difficult to 

parse as being unclear, indecipherable, and/or somewhat incoherent. Nevertheless, based 

on our construction of the assignments of error as stated, each of Gales' assignments of 

error asserts, in essence, either that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion to 

dismiss generally, or that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion to dismiss 

specifically by finding that Gales lacked standing to petition the court to vacate the 

arbitration award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10. As explained below, we disagree. 

{¶ 15} " 'An arbitration award may be challenged only through the procedure set 

forth in R.C. 2711.13 and on the grounds enumerated in R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.11.' " State 

v. FOP of Ohio at ¶ 14, quoting Miller v. Gunckle, 96 Ohio St.3d 359, 2002-Ohio-4932, ¶ 

10, citing Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 708, 711 (1992). As set forth in R.C. 

2711.13, "[a]fter an award in an arbitration proceeding is made, any party to the arbitration 

may file a motion in the court of common pleas for an order vacating, modifying, or 

correcting the award as prescribed in sections 2711.10 and 2711.11 of the Revised Code." 

R.C. 2711.13. Furthermore, " 'the language of R.C. 2711.13 is clear, unmistakable, and, above 

all, mandatory.' " FOP of Ohio at ¶ 14, quoting Galion v. Am. Fedn. & Mun. Emps., Local 

No. 2243, 71 Ohio St.3d 620, 622 (1995). 

{¶ 16} As we have previously stated, a motion filed pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2711 

" 'is not a full complaint initiating a civil matter.' " FOP of Ohio at ¶ 15, quoting Geiger v. 

Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-608, 2010-Ohio-2850, ¶ 19. Instead, a 
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motion filed under R.C. Chapter 2711 " 'occupies a hybrid procedural position, only vaguely 

defined by the statues that provide for it.' " Reynoldsburg City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 

Licking Hts. Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-173, 2011-Ohio-5063, ¶ 16 

("Reynoldsburg I"), quoting Geiger at ¶ 19. Therefore, in cases brought pursuant to 

R.C.2711, " 'the applicable rules in both the local rules and Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure 

are those pertaining to motions rather than those pertaining to the commencement of an 

action.' " FOP of Ohio at ¶ 15, quoting Reynoldsburg at ¶ 15. 

{¶ 17} We have previously held "that Civ.R. 13(A), pertaining to compulsory 

counterclaims, does not apply to proceedings on a motion to vacate, modify or correct an 

arbitration award brought pursuant to R.C. 2711.10." Licking Hts. Local School Dist. Bd. 

of Edn. v. Reynoldsburg City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-579, 2013-Ohio3211, ¶ 22 ("Reynoldsburg II"). We arrived at this conclusion after an analysis that began 

with a discussion of the applicability of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Rules") to 

special statutory proceedings as provided for in Civ.R. 1. In Reynoldsburg II, we first noted 

that pursuant to Civ.R. 1(C)(7), the Rules, 

to the extent that they would by their nature be clearly 

inapplicable, shall not apply to procedure * * * in all other 

special statutory proceedings; provided, that where any statute 

provides for procedure by a general or specific reference to all 

the statutes governing procedure in civil actions such 

procedure shall be in accordance with these rules. 

Reynoldsburg II at ¶ 18, quoting Civ.R. 1(C)(7). 

{¶ 18} We next cited favorably to a decision of our sister court in the Fifth Appellate 

District which addressed the applicability of the Rules in a case brought under R.C. 2711.09. 

In MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Anthony, 5th Dist. No. 05AP09-0059, 2006-Ohio-2032, the 

losing party had filed a motion for definite statement pursuant to Civ.R. 12(E) in response 

to the prevailing parties' motion to confirm an arbitration award. Without ruling on the 

motion brought pursuant to Civ.R. 12(E), the trial court confirmed the arbitration award. 

The Fifth District affirmed the judgment of the trial court, stating: 

Proceedings involving the confirmation or vacation of an 

arbitration award are special statutory proceedings. Civil Rule 

1(C)(7) provides the civil rules are by definition not to apply to 

procedural matters in special statutory proceedings "to the 

extent that they would by their nature be clearly inapplicable." 
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Pursuant to R.C. 2711.09, when a motion is made to confirm an 

arbitration award * * * [t]he applicable civil rule provisions are 

those pertaining to motions, rather than those pertaining to 

commencement of an action. The Civil Rules do not provide for 

an answer and counterclaim to a motion in such proceedings. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err in entering final judgment 

prior to the alleged answer date. 

Reynoldsburg at ¶ 19, quoting Anthony at ¶ 12-13. 

{¶ 19} We then noted that we applied the same reasoning in our review of the trial 

court's decision in Reynoldsburg I, which concerned the applicability of the discovery cutoff date established by Loc.R. 39.05 to cases brought pursuant to R.C. 2711. In 

Reynoldsburg I, we rejected appellant's argument that the trial court erred in denying the 

motion to vacate the arbitration award prior to the expiration of the discovery cut-off date, 

finding instead that the time limits set forth in the case schedule pursuant to Loc.R. 39.01 

were inapplicable to a proceeding brought under R.C. 2711 because Loc.R. 39.01 applied 

only to initial pleadings filed in order to open a new case, and hence commence an action, 

and cases brought pursuant to R.C. 2711 did not involve the commencement of an action. 

Reynoldsburg I at ¶ 15. 

{¶ 20} Ultimately, we found in Reynoldsburg II that "[b]oth the Anthony case and 

our opinion in Reynoldsburg I recognize, that by operation of Civ.R. 1(C)(7), the civil rules 

that apply to special proceedings brought pursuant to R.C. 2711.05 et seq., are those 

pertaining to motions, not pleadings. Civ.R. 13(A) applies only to counterclaims and crossclaims, both of which are "pleadings" under the Civil Rules." Reynoldsburg II at ¶ 21, citing 

Civ.R. 7(A). Thus, we found that based upon the foregoing reasoning, Civ.R. 13(A) is 

inapplicable to proceedings brought pursuant to R.C. 2711.10. Id. at ¶ 22. 

{¶ 21} Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Rules are clear that Civ.R. 12 applies 

only in cases involving pleadings, and hence cases where an action has been commenced, 

and not to special statutory proceedings such as cases like the instant matter brought 

pursuant to R.C. 2711. Specifically, Civ.R. 12(B) provides as follows: 

Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any 

pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 

third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 

pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following 

defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: 

(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
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jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) 

insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, 

(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) 

failure to join a party under Rule 19 or Rule 19.1. A motion 

making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading

if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is 

waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or 

objections in a responsive pleading or motion. If a 

pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 

party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may 

assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 

relief. When a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted presents matters outside the 

pleading and such matters are not excluded by the court, the 

motion shall be treated as a motion for summary judgment and 

disposed of as provided in Rule 56. Provided, however, that the 

court shall consider only such matters outside the pleadings

as are specifically enumerated in Rule 56. All parties shall be 

given reasonable opportunity to present all materials made 

pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 

(Emphasis added) Civ.R. 12(B). 

{¶ 22} Furthermore, the tests for reviewing motions made pursuant to Civ.R. 

12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) confirm that a court considers such motions by reviewing the 

complaint, a pleading present only in actions which have been commenced. See Civ.R. 

3(A); Civ.R. 7(A). A court presented with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction made pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) must determine whether the complaint

states any cause of action cognizable by the forum. State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio 

St.3d 77, 80 (1989); PNC Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Botts, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-256, 2012-Ohio5383, ¶ 21. A motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim on which 

relief can be granted tests the sufficiency of the complaint, Volbers-Klarich v. 

Middletown Mgt., 125 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010-Ohio-2057, ¶ 11, and in order for a court to 

dismiss a case pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) "it must appear beyond doubt from the 

complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery." (Emphasis 

added) O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975), 

syllabus. In a proceeding brought pursuant to Chapter 2711 of the Revised Code, there 

simply is no complaint, and thus no action which has been commenced. 

{¶ 23} As set forth above, this court has consistently held that in cases brought 

pursuant to R.C. 2711, " 'the applicable rules in both the local rules and Ohio Rules of Civil 
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Procedure are those pertaining to motions rather than those pertaining to the 

commencement of an action.' " FOP of Ohio at ¶ 15, quoting Reynoldsburg I at ¶ 15. 

Because motions filed pursuant to Civ.R. 12 are applicable only in cases pertaining to the 

commencement of an action, we find that motions filed pursuant to Civ.R. 12, including 

motions filed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) or 12(B)(6), are inapplicable in a proceeding 

brought under Chapter 2711 of the Revised Code. 

{¶ 24} Notwithstanding the foregoing, the inapplicability of Civ.R. 12(B)(6) to 

proceedings brought pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2711 does not preclude a defendant from 

moving for dismissal on the ground that a plaintiff lacks standing. See Lupo v. Columbus, 

10th Dist. No. 13AP-1063, 2014-Ohio-2792, ¶ 19.4 This is so because Civ.R. 7(B)(1) permits 

parties to file motions seeking court orders. Id. Furthermore, "trial courts * * * possess the 

innate ability to rule on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing." Id. at ¶ 20. Therefore, 

Civ.R. 7(B)(1) permits a party to file a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, and the trial 

court's inherent power imbues the court with the authority to entertain and rule on that 

motion. Id.

{¶ 25} " ' "The question of standing is whether a litigant is entitled to have a court 

determine the merits of the issues presented." ' " Koehring v. Ohio State Dept. of Rehab. 

& Corr., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-396, 2007-Ohio-2652, ¶ 8, quoting Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs. v. State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, ¶ 22, quoting Ohio Contrs. Assn. v. 

Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320 (1994), reconsideration denied (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 1459. 

" 'Whether established facts confer standing to assert a claim is a matter of law.' " Id., 

quoting Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 2006-Ohio-954, ¶ 90, 

reconsideration denied, 109 Ohio St.3d 1427, 2006-Ohio-1967 (further citations omitted). 

{¶ 26} Because the question of standing is a matter of law, therefore, the standard 

of judicial review to be applied in this case is de novo. Id., citing Portage Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs. at ¶ 90, citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio 

St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, ¶ 4, reconsideration denied, 96 Ohio St.3d 1489, 2002-

Ohio-4478; Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. at ¶ 23 (further citations omitted). " '[D]e 

novo appellate review means that the court of appeals independently reviews the record 

 

4 In Lupo, this court specifically found that "[t]he inapplicability of Civ.R. 12(B)(6) to R.C. 2506.01 appeals 

does not preclude an appellee from moving for dismissal, or the trial court from granting such a motion, on 

the ground that the appellant lacks standing." Lupo at ¶ 19. 
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and affords no deference to the trial court's decision.' " Koehring, 2007-Ohio-2652, at 

¶ 10, quoting BP Communications Alaska, Inc. v. Cent. Collection Agency, 136 Ohio 

App.3d 807, 812 (8th Dist.2000), dismissed, appeal not allowed, 89 Ohio St.3d 1464, 

citing Hall v. Ft. Frye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 111 Ohio App.3d 690, 694 (4th 

Dist.1996) (citation omitted). 

{¶ 27} In the case before us, the trial court relied upon Leon v. Boardman Twp., 100 

Ohio St.3d 335, 2003-Ohio-6466 in finding that Gales was not a proper party to pursue a 

proceeding to vacate the arbitration award issued on January 25, 2019. In Leon, the 

Supreme Court of Ohio held that "when an employee's discharge or grievance is arbitrated 

between an employer and a union under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, 

the aggrieved employee does not have standing to petition a court to vacate the award 

pursuant to R.C. 2711.10, unless the collective bargaining agreement expressly gives the 

employee an independent right to submit disputes to arbitration." Leon at ¶ 18, syllabus.5 

In reaching this conclusion, the high court found that "sound labor policy disfavors an 

individualized right of action because it tends to vitiate the exclusivity of the union 

representation, disrupt harmony, and in particular, impede the efforts of the employer and 

union to establish a uniform method for the orderly administration of employee 

grievances." Leon at ¶ 17. 

{¶ 28} After reviewing the CBA attached by Gales to his application to vacate, the 

trial court determined that it did not expressly give Gales the independent right to submit 

his dispute to arbitration. Consequently, the court granted appellees' motion to dismiss 

Gales' application to vacate for lack of standing under the standard applicable to Civ.R. 

12(B)(6). 

{¶ 29} As set forth above, Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is inapplicable in a proceeding brought 

pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2711; therefore, it was error for the trial court to have applied 

the standard used for motions brought pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) in reviewing and ruling 

upon appellees' motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, as stated previously, a motion to dismiss 

 

5 We note that in Leon, the Supreme Court of Ohio also specifically rejected the argument Gales makes 

regarding being the "real party in interest." In Leon, the court found that our prior decision of Barksdale v. 

Ohio Dept. of Adm. Servs., 78 Ohio App.3d 325 (10th Dist.1992), wherein we found that an employee-union 

member had standing to challenge an arbitration award despite not being a party to the arbitration 

proceeding, was a "legal anomaly" and improperly disregarded the terms of the collective bargaining contract. 

Leon at ¶ 7-10. 
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upon the grounds that Gales lacked standing could have been properly filed pursuant to 

Civ.R. 7(B)(1) in any event. Accordingly, we find the trial court's error in applying Civ.R. 

12(B)(6) was harmless error. 

{¶ 30} Moreover, we have reviewed the copy of the CBA between the FOP and the 

state attached by Gales to his application to vacate, and we agree with the trial court that 

it does not contain any provision which expressly give Gales the independent right to 

submit his dispute to arbitration or otherwise challenge the arbitration award. Therefore, 

pursuant to the authority set forth in Leon, the trial court properly granted appellees' 

motion dismiss for lack of standing under R.C. 2711.10. Accordingly, we overrule Gales' 

nine assignments of error. 

IV. Disposition 

{¶ 31} Having overruled all of Gales' assignments of error, we affirm the judgment 

of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed. 

NELSON, J.J., concurs. 

LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concurs in judgment only.