UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

GEORGE HORD, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:15-CV-155-JVB-PRC

)

U-HAUL CORP. CHICAGO ASSEMBLY DIV., )

TYREE HAMPTON, and JIM NEEDHAM, )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss

or Stay Judicial Proceedings Pending Arbitration [DE 9], filed by Defendants U-Haul Co. of Indiana

Inc. (erroneously identified by Plaintiff as U-Haul Corp. Chicago Assembly Division), Tyree

Hampton, and Jim Needham on July 2, 2015. Plaintiff filed a response on July 21, 2015. Defendants

have not filed a reply, and the time to do so has passed.

On April 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint against his former employer U-Haul

Co. of Indiana Inc. (“U-Haul”), his former supervisor Tyree Hampton, and U-Haul Chicago

Assembly Division President Jim Needham based upon his termination from U-Haul. Plaintiff

alleges that U-Haul violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and numerous common laws. 

In the instant motion, Defendants seek an order compelling arbitration and staying or

dismissing this matter pending arbitration because all of Plaintiff’s claims are subject to mandatory

arbitration under a dispute resolution policy that Plaintiff accepted as a U-Haul employee.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 18, 2004, Plaintiff began his employment with U-Haul as an Assembler B. As

an Assembler, Plaintiff had the responsibility to work under the direction of a supervisor to perform

assembly line functions necessary for the fabrication, conversion, or other assembly of trailers, van
bodies, and rental items. As part of Plaintiff’s job responsibilities, he had to read and write in

English, which he was able to do. At the time of his hire, Plaintiff had a high school diploma.

In February 2006, U-Haul implemented a new arbitration policy for existing and future

employees. The arbitration policy consisted of two documents: (1) a “Notice to Employees About

U-Haul’s Employment Dispute Resolution Policy” (“EDR Policy”), which contained the arbitration

policy terms, and (2) the “U-Haul Employee Agreement to Arbitrate” (“Arbitration Agreement”).

The EDR Policy was a condition of employment and if the employee agreed to the terms of the EDR

Policy, he or she was instructed to execute the Arbitration Agreement. Plaintiff signed the

Arbitration Agreement electronically on November 7, 2007.

By its terms, the EDR Policy requires mandatory binding arbitration of “all existing or future

disputes between [Plaintiff] and U-Haul Co. of Indiana, Inc. or its parent, subsidiary, sister or

affiliated companies or entities, and each of its and/or other employees, officers, directors, or agents

. . . that are related in any way to [Plaintiff’s] employment with U-Haul Co. of Indiana, Inc.” (Def.

Mot. Ex. A). In relevant part, the EDR Policy provides as follows:

The EDR applies to all U-Haul Co. of Indiana, Inc. employees regardless of length

of service or status, and covers all disputes relating to or arising out of employee’s

employment with U-Haul Co. of Indiana, Inc. or the termination of that employment.

Examples of the type of disputes or claims covered by the EDR include, but are not

limited to, claims for wrongful termination of employment, breach of contract, fraud,

employment discrimination, harassment or retaliation under the Americans With

Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 and its amendments, state fair employment and housing acts or

any other state or local anti-discrimination laws, tort claims, wage or overtime claims

or other claims under the Labor Code, or any other legal or equitable claims and

causes of action recognized by local, state or federal law or regulations. . . . 

Your decision to accept employment or to continue employment with U-Haul Co. of

Indiana, Inc. constitutes your agreement to be bound by the EDR . . . . This mutual

obligation to arbitrate claims means that both you and U-Haul are bound to use the

EDR as the only means of resolving any employment-related disputes. This mutual

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agreement to arbitrate claims also means that both you and U-Haul forego any right

either may have to a jury trial on claims relating in any way to your employment. .

. . No remedies that otherwise would be available to you individually or to U-Haul

in a court of law, however, will be forfeited by virtue of this agreement to use and

be bound by the EDR. The EDR changes the forum and process for resolving

disputes, but does not change the potential legal remedies you have. 

The EDR shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1,

et seq.

Id. By the policy terms, any disputes are to be resolved by an “impartial and independent” arbitrator

chosen by mutual agreement of the employee and U-Haul. Further, the employee’s share of the

arbitration fees “shall not exceed the maximum fee established by the applicable AAA rules or the

amount equal to [the employee’s local court civil filing fee, whichever is less.”

The EDR Policy and the Arbitration Agreement were placed on the U-Haul Human

Resources Service Center website for existing employees. Employees were requested to review these

materials, with the assistance of a lawyer or other advisor if desired, and to accept the EDR Policy

as a condition of continued employment. If an employee agreed to the terms of the EDR Policy, he

or she was instructed to execute the EDR Agreement by electronically signing it in the electronic

human resources document processing system and submitting it. Plaintiff was familiar with the

electronic human resources website and was trained in its use. Plaintiff was required to enter his

social security number or System Member Identification Number along with a self-selected,

confidential password in order to access the cite and then was required to input his name to verify

his signature. As noted above, on November 7, 2007, Plaintiff electronically signed and submitted

the Arbitration Agreement. Plaintiff thereby acknowledged and understood his obligation to “submit

to final and binding arbitration any and all claims and disputes.”

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Following his execution of the EDR Agreement in November 2007, Plaintiff continued his

employment as an Assembler for just under seven years. On or about October 20, 2014, Plaintiff was

terminated for insubordination.

On April 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a four-count Complaint against Defendants in the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana alleging a violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act as well as harassment, false accusation, and termination with unjust cause. All of

the claims are related to his employment with U-Haul and are lodged against U-Haul or its

employees Jim Needham and Tyree Hampton.

ANALYSIS

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, was enacted in 1925 to “reverse the

longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements on

the same footing as other contracts.” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,

500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). “The Supreme Court has repeatedly counseled that the FAA leaves no room

for judicial hostility to arbitration proceedings and that courts should not presume, absent concrete

proof to the contrary, that arbitration systems will be unfair or biased.” Penn v. Ryan’s Family Steak

House, Inc., 269 F.3d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l

Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be

addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitrations.”); Livingston v. Assocs.

Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 556-56 (7th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of motion to compel arbitration

and explaining that “[i]t is beyond peradventure that the [FAA] embodies a strong federal policy in

favor of arbitration”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Recently, the Supreme Court held that

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“the Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that

the district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration

agreement has been signed.” KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25-26 (2011).

An arbitration agreement must meet two basic conditions for the FAA to apply: (1) the

agreement must be in writing; and (2) the agreement must be in a contract “evidencing a transaction

involving commerce.” See 9 U.S.C. § 2. In this case, both requirements are met. The FAA “provides

two parallel devices for enforcing an arbitration agreement: a stay of litigation in any case raising

a dispute referable to arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 3, and an affirmative order to engage in arbitration, §

4.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 22. Both are sought by the Defendants in their motion.

Under § 4, arbitration agreements covered by the FAA are specifically enforceable: “A party

aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement

for arbitration may petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such

arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. Regarding a stay

of litigation pending arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 3 provides: 

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon

any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration,

the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved

in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall

on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration

has been had . . . .

9 U.S.C. § 3. “For arbitrable issues, a § 3 stay is mandatory.” Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Sud’s of

Peoria, Inc., 474 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.McMahon, 482

U.S. 220, 226 (1987)).

Whether this dispute is subject to arbitration is a question of contract interpretation. Welborn

Clinic v. MedQuist, Inc., 301 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Kiefer Specialty Flooring, Inc.

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v. Tarkett, Inc., 174 F.3d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1999)). The presumption of arbitrability requires the

Court to compel arbitration “unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause

is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” AT&T Techs., Inc. v.

Commc’n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Any “doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” 

Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25. Nevertheless, parties should only be required to arbitrate those

matters the parties agreed to submit to arbitration. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S.

79, 82 (2002).

In this case, Plaintiff’s claims fall within the EDR Policy. Plaintiff signed the Arbitration 

Agreement and continued employment with U-Haul for seven years thereafter. The EDR Policy

provides that the EDR “covers all disputes relating to or arising out of employee’s employment with

[U-Haul]” and explains that “[t]his mutual obligation to arbitrate claims means that both you and

U-Haul are bound to use the EDR as the only means of resolving any employment-related disputes.”

Both the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit have found that the phrase “arising out of or relating to” signifies “a broad arbitration

clause.” See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 398 (1967); Sweet

Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress Int’l, Ltd., 1 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1993). In Sweet

Dreams, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that

“arising out of” reaches all disputes having their origin or genesis in the contract. .

. In fact, any dispute between contracting parties that is in any way connected with

their contract could be said to “arise out of” their agreement and thus be subject to

arbitration under a provision employing this language. 

1 F.3d at 642. Moreover, the arbitration provision expressly references “claims for wrongful

termination of employment, . . . employment discrimination, harassment, or retaliation under the

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Americans with Disabilities Act, . . . or any other state or local anti-discrimination laws.” Plaintiff’s

ADA and common law claims are subject to arbitration.

Plaintiff argues in his response brief that he “did not sign an arbitration agreement, in person

or electronically” and that “[t]he U-Haul Employee Agreement to Arbitration with my name typed

is fraudulent.” First, Plaintiff’s response brief is not sworn nor does it comply with the requirements

of 28 U.S.C. § 1746 for an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury. Second, Defendants have

offered evidence of the secure procedure by which Plaintiff’s signature was placed on the

Arbitration Agreement, and Plaintiff neither acknowledges that evidence nor draws it into question.

Even if Plaintiff did not read the arbitration provision, he is bound by it. James v. McDonald’s

Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2005).

In his response, Plaintiff also argues that he “would never sign an arbitration agreement

waiving [his] rights granted by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990.” Plaintiff has

not waived his rights granted by the ADA, as the EDR Policy provides that “[n]o remedies that

otherwise would be available to you individually or to U-Haul in a court of law, however, will be

forfeited by virtue of this agreement to use and be bound by the EDR. The EDR changes the forum

and process for resolving the disputes, but does not change the potential legal remedies you have.”

Rather, he has only waived his right to a jury trial. See Janiga v. Questar Capital Corp., 615 F.3d

735, 743 (7th Cir. 2010); Ernst & Young LLP v. Baker O’Neal Holdings, Inc., 304 F.3d 753, 756

(7th Cir. 2002).

As a final matter, Defendants ask the Court to either stay or dismiss this action pending

arbitration. Section § 3 of the FAA provides for a stay of litigation, and the Seventh Circuit Court

of Appeals has held that the § 3 stay is mandatory. See Volkswagen of Am., 474 F.3d at 971; see also

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Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 288 F.3d 313, 318 (7th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, a stay, and not dismissal,

is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Compel

Arbitration and Dismiss or Stay Judicial Proceedings Pending Arbitration [DE 9] and ORDERS that

the parties arbitrate this dispute pursuant to the EDR Policy. 

The Court further ORDERS that this matter be STAYED pending the outcome of

arbitration. The Clerk of Court is to MARK this action CLOSED for statistical purposes. The Court

shall retain jurisdiction and the case shall be restored to the trial docket upon motion of a party if

circumstances change, so that it may proceed to final disposition. This order shall not prejudice the

rights of the parties to this litigation.

SO ORDERED this 19th day of August, 2015. 

s/ Paul R. Cherry 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAUL R. CHERRY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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