NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEFFREY PETERSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

GANNETT COMPANY, INC.; PHOENIX 

NEWSPAPERS, INC., DBA Arizona 

Republic, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

DENNIS K. BURKE; MARCO A. LOPEZ, 

Jr.; LUIS BORBON HOLGUIN; VICTOR 

FLORES; LISA FLORES; MARIO E. 

DIAZ; SUZANNE BARR; DAVID LOPEZ; 

CRAIG HARRIS; DEMOCRATIC 

NATIONAL COMMITTEE; DIAZ, 

Unknown; named as Jane Doe Diaz, 

Defendants.

No. 21-15057 

D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00106-MTL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 16, 2021

Phoenix, Arizona

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

NOV 24 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

Before: GILMAN,** BRESS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Jeffrey Peterson appeals the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of Peterson’s defamation claim against Gannett Company 

and Phoenix Newspapers, regarding an article that defendants published on 

Peterson’s business dealings. We review the district court’s grant of a motion to 

dismiss de novo. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. To determine the legal standard that applies to Peterson’s defamation 

claim, we must first determine if he was a limited public figure. If he is, Peterson 

must show that the article was published with actual malice, “that is, with knowledge 

that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” N.Y. Times 

Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 

The district court correctly concluded that, based on the allegations of 

Peterson’s operative complaint, Peterson is a limited public figure with respect to 

the subject of the news article. “Whether an individual is a public figure is a question 

of law that must be assessed through a totality of the circumstances.” Manzari v. 

Associated Newspapers Ltd., 830 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2016). “In undertaking 

** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
3

this inquiry, we consider whether (i) a public controversy existed when the 

statements were made, (ii) whether the alleged defamation is related to the plaintiff’s 

participation in the controversy, and (iii) whether the plaintiff voluntarily injected 

[him]self into the controversy for the purpose of influencing the controversy’s 

ultimate resolution.” Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 266 (9th Cir. 

2013). 

By these standards, Peterson is a limited-purpose public figure. Peterson’s 

complaint describes himself as a “well-known technology entrepreneur” who 

founded Quepasa.com (“a national sensation”) and who has developed and 

maintained a network of political connections to further his business enterprises. 

The article discusses Peterson’s business dealings at Quepasa and controversies 

concerning Peterson’s role in Mobile, another business venture. Given “the nature 

and extent of [Peterson’s] participation in the particular controversy giving rise to 

the defamation,” Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 266 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)—as well as the public nature of that controversy, which involved various 

other public figures and resulted in a state investigation of Peterson’s business 

practices—we conclude that Peterson is a limited public figure with respect to the 

business dealings discussed in the article. Peterson’s claim that his public-figure 

status ended long ago is inconsistent with the allegations in his complaint. 

Regardless, as we have previously noted, “every court of appeals that has 
4

specifically decided this question has concluded that the passage of time does not 

alter an individual’s status as a limited purpose public figure.” Partington v. 

Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1152 n.8 (9th Cir. 1995). 

2. Because Peterson is a limited public figure, he “must demonstrate by 

clear and convincing evidence” that appellees made their allegedly defamatory 

statements with actual malice. Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 265. We have carefully 

reviewed Peterson’s operative complaint and conclude that he has not alleged actual 

malice. Peterson’s conclusory allegations do not “permit the conclusion that 

[appellees] in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [their] publication.” 

Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1971).1

 

AFFIRMED.

1 Peterson does not dispute the district court’s conclusion that he failed to allege 

actual malice with respect to his false-light claim. Peterson has therefore abandoned

this claim. See United States v. Williamson, 439 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006).

Regardless, Peterson did not plead actual malice as to his false-light claim for the 

same reasons articulated above.