NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

IVE SULLIVAN, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0817 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-455906-001

The Honorable Warren J. Granville, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Diane Meloche

Counsel for Respondent

Ive Sullivan, Tucson

Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge James P. Beene joined.
STATE v. SULLIVAN

Decision of the Court

2

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Ive Sullivan seeks review of the superior court’s 

order denying his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 (2017).

1 Absent an abuse of 

discretion or error of law, this court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling 

on a petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577 

¶ 19 (2012). Finding no such error, this court grants review but denies relief.

¶2 In 2014, Sullivan pled guilty to one charge of misconduct 

involving weapons, a Class 4 felony.

2 After a priors trial, the superior court 

found that Sullivan had two prior historical felony convictions and 

sentenced him to 10 years in prison, a presumptive sentence.

¶3 Sullivan filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief,

claiming trial counsel was deficient in four respects: (1) failing to challenge

the grand jury proceeding in a timely manner; (2) failing to seek an appeal 

after the superior court denied a suppression motion, which Sullivan 

believes to have forced him to enter a plea; (3) providing erroneous and 

incomplete advice, which Sullivan asserts caused him to reject a more 

favorable plea; and (4) misleading Sullivan into entering a plea, the terms 

of which he claims were unknown to him and unfavorable. The superior 

court dismissed the petition. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 32.6(c). It is from this 

dismissal that Sullivan seeks relief. 

¶4 On review, Sullivan re-argues the same four claims. Sullivan 

provides no new law or fact to succeed on a Sixth Amendment claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. A defendant must show that there is a 

“reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 

 

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

2 The State originally indicted Sullivan on two additional drug-related 

counts that were dismissed following a suppression hearing. After a 

settlement conference, Sullivan pled guilty to the remaining charge.

Although the resulting minute entry states the offense was non-repetitive, 

the transcript shows the plea was to the offense, leaving to the priors trial 

whether it was repetitive or non-repetitive. See State v. James, 239 Ariz. 367, 

368 ¶ 7 (App. 2012) (“When there is a discrepancy between the trial court's 

oral statements at a sentencing hearing and its written minute entry, the 

oral statements control.”).
STATE v. SULLIVAN

Decision of the Court

3

466 U.S. 668, 694, 695 (1984). Sullivan does not establish both that trial 

counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable professional 

standard and that the deficient performance caused prejudice to the 

defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 (1985).

¶5 A review of the record details the procedural history of the 

case and is not supportive of Sullivan’s claims. After substantial motion 

practice and an advisement pursuant to State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406 (App. 

2000) on a prior plea that Sullivan rejected, before accepting Sullivan’s 

guilty plea, the superior court engaged in a lengthy settlement conference 

with Sullivan. This included a discussion regarding the State’s anticipated 

sentencing recommendation. The State, unequivocally, agreed that if 

Sullivan pled guilty, the recommendation would be that Sullivan serve 10 

years in prison. The court assured Sullivan that if the State proved that he 

had two historical prior felony convictions and was on supervised release 

at the time of the offense, it still would sentence him to 10 years in prison. 

If Sullivan were convicted at trial, the superior court explained, he would 

face up to 15 years in prison.

¶6 Sullivan subsequently pled guilty to the charge. While 

Sullivan had no constitutional right to a settlement conference, he also had 

no need for one once he decided to plead guilty. There would also have 

been no purpose for trial counsel to appeal any superior court ruling. At the 

change of plea hearing, Sullivan indicated he understood that the State 

would attempt to prove that Sullivan had two historical priors and that 

Sullivan was on release at the time of the offense. The court accepted 

Sullivan’s admission. Then the State proved Sullivan had two historical 

prior felony convictions. A discussion was held again to explain the plea 

history, Sullivan’s rejection of the initial plea offer, the suppression hearing 

results, and the State’s decision not to allege an aggravator which would 

require a sentence in excess of 10 years. The superior court sentenced 

Sullivan to the statutory presumptive term of 10 years in prison. Claims 

regarding the voluntariness of a plea are meritless if the record shows the 

superior court questioned the defendant in accordance with Boykin v. 

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and the defendant’s responses to those 

questions indicate the defendant entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily

and intelligently. State v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 93 (1984). On this record, 

this standard was met.

¶7 Similarly, Sullivan has not shown trial counsel’s performance 

was deficient and that but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been 

different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, the superior court 

properly dismissed Sullivan’s petition.
STATE v. SULLIVAN

Decision of the Court

4

¶8 For these reasons, this court grants review but denies relief.