IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs March 27, 2024

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MARCUS TERRELL BRADFORD

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Bradley County

No. 21-CR-495 Andrew M. Freiberg, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2023-00922-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

The Defendant, Marcus Terrell Bradford, was convicted by a Bradley County Criminal 

Court Jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor; and disorderly conduct, a Class C 

misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of 11 months, 29 

days for the assault conviction and 30 days for the disorderly conduct conviction, to be 

served at 75% in the county jail. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred

by imposing the maximum sentences for the offenses, by ordering that the sentences run 

consecutively, and by not allowing any alternative sentencing options. Based on our 

review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER and MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

Brennan M. Wingerter, Assistant Public Defender, Franklin, Tennessee (on appeal) and J. 

Abigail Burke Carroll and Paul D. Rush, Assistant Public Defenders, Cleveland, Tennessee 

(at trial), for the appellant, Marcus Terrell Bradford.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Assistant 

Attorney General; Shari Tayloe, District Attorney General; and Lydia A. Braun and Krista 

R. Cochran, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 

OPINION

04/09/2024
- 2 -

FACTS

This case arises out of the Defendant’s March 12, 2021 threatening behavior toward 

a stranger, Jeff Hunt, who greeted the Defendant as he was walking past the Defendant to 

enter a Cleveland Circle K convenience store. The angry Defendant began a confrontation 

with the victim by demanding to know why he was staring at him. The victim replied that 

he had not been staring, that he was there with his wife and stepdaughter, and that he did 

not want any trouble. The belligerent Defendant continued to argue and yell and eventually 

took his shirt off and threw it on the ground in a move that witnesses described as an 

invitation to fight. When the victim repeated that he did not want any trouble, the 

Defendant threatened that he was going to kill the victim and the victim’s wife and 

daughter. The Defendant then walked to his vehicle, reached under the driver’s seat, and 

brought out what the victim identified as a gun. Other store patrons heard the Defendant 

threaten the victim and saw the Defendant appearing to reach for something inside his 

vehicle but did not see a gun. When one of them yelled out that the police had been called, 

the Defendant got into his vehicle and left the store. He was subsequently indicted by the 

Bradley County Grand Jury for the aggravated assault of the victim, possession of a firearm 

having been previously convicted of the violent felony of attempted second degree murder, 

and disorderly conduct. 

The first evidence presented at the Defendant’s May 24, 2023 trial was a stipulation 

by the parties that the Defendant had previously been convicted of a felony involving 

violence. The State then presented a total of four witnesses: Jessica Kitts, the manager of 

the store, who testified that the store did not have outside surveillance cameras at the time 

of the incident; Mark Jeffrey Tippett, a customer who witnessed the altercation as he was 

entering and exiting the store; Mr. Tippett’s wife, Tansy Tippet, who witnessed the 

altercation from her vehicle at the gasoline pumps and called 911; and the victim. 

Mr. Tippett noticed as he walked into the store that the Defendant was arguing with 

the victim and the victim’s wife, and that the Defendant was being “real aggressive with 

[the victim].” The argument began inside but continued outside the store, with the men 

“bickering back and forth a little bit” before the Defendant, who seemed very angry, took 

his shirt off and said the word “gun” and “I got something for your a**[,]” or words to that 

effect. Although Mr. Tippett was certain he heard the Defendant say the word “gun,” he 

never saw a gun. However, he was so concerned that he immediately went to his wife, 

sitting in their vehicle, to tell her to call the police. When he reached her, he learned that 

she had already called 911. 

Mrs. Tippett was at the gasoline pumps sitting in her vehicle with the window down 

when she heard loud arguing, looked toward the store, and saw the victim’s wife helping 

her disabled daughter walk into the store as the Defendant was “just cussing and raising 
- 3 -

Cain.” After the victim’s wife and daughter entered the store, Mrs. Tippett did not hear 

anything for a few minutes, but then “it was back outside[.]” She saw the victim, the 

victim’s wife and daughter, and the Defendant outside the store. The Defendant was 

“pacing around and doing his arms and, and cussing [the victim] and telling him that . . . 

he had something for him.” The victim was “shaking his head, and . . . saying that he didn’t 

want any trouble and . . . trying to walk on, but the [Defendant] just kind of kept on at 

him[.]” 

As the victim walked toward the victim’s vehicle, the Defendant pulled his shirt off, 

threw it to the ground, and said, “I’ve got something for you.” Mrs. Tippett thought that 

the Defendant “was, like, wanting to fight maybe,” and it was at that point that she became 

so alarmed that she called 911. Based on her observation of the victim’s gestures, she 

thought that the victim, again, indicated to the Defendant that he did not want any trouble. 

As she watched, she saw the Defendant walk to his vehicle, open his driver’s door, and 

appear to reach for something inside his vehicle. Meanwhile, the Defendant’s male 

companion was standing on the passenger side of the Defendant’s vehicle shaking his head 

as he talked to the Defendant. Because she believed that the Defendant was about to shoot 

the victim, Mrs. Tippett yelled out to let him know that she had called the police. The 

Defendant then got into the driver’s side of his vehicle and left the store with his 

companion. Mrs. Tippett never saw a gun. 

The victim and his wife and stepdaughter were waiting for a pizza they had ordered 

from a nearby pizza restaurant when the victim’s wife pulled their vehicle into the Circle 

K lot so that the victim could use its restroom. The Defendant, whom the victim had never 

seen before, was leaning against the Defendant’s vehicle parked near the store’s front door. 

As the victim walked past the Defendant to enter the store, he greeted the Defendant with,

“Hi, how are you doing?” After using the restroom, he walked out to be immediately 

confronted by the Defendant “screaming and ranting and raving and why was [the victim] 

staring anyone down[.]” The victim replied that he was not staring anyone down, and that 

he “just had to go to the restroom, dude[.]” 

The victim recalled that the Defendant might have pushed him “a little bit” but said 

it was not a big deal to him at the time. When asked to describe the Defendant’s demeanor, 

he responded that the Defendant was “absolutely belligerent,” “ranting and raving” and 

“throwing his arms” as if he was “just mad and hated the world[.]” He never threatened 

the Defendant but instead kept telling him that he was with his family and did not want any 

problems. The Defendant’s male companion approached, and the victim repeated that he 

was with his wife and daughter and did not want any trouble. The Defendant then “ripped” 

off his shirt and said, “Well, you should have thought about that before[,]” followed by, 

“I’ll kill you, your wife, and your daughter.” 
- 4 -

The victim walked to the passenger side of his vehicle to protect his stepdaughter, 

and the Defendant walked to the driver’s side of the Defendant’s vehicle, reached 

underneath the driver’s seat, and brought out a gun before taking a couple of steps that hid 

him from the victim’s view. At that point, the victim’s wife, who had gone into the store, 

came outside and called out in a panicky voice that the Defendant had a gun and that the 

police were on their way. The Defendant then got into his vehicle and left the store with 

his companion. Moments later, the police arrived. 

The victim acknowledged that he was familiar with firearms and had his own gun 

in the glove box of his vehicle. He denied that he threatened to get his gun or attempted to 

retrieve it from the glove box. He acknowledged that his conversation with the Defendant 

got “heated” and that the Defendant’s removal of his shirt was “in the quintessential comefight-me gesture[.]” He conceded that he never saw the Defendant point his gun or wave 

it in the air. He estimated that he was twenty-five to thirty feet from the Defendant when 

the Defendant brought out his gun and said he was unable to identify whether it was a 

“Glock or if it was a Beretta or whatever[,]” despite his fourteen years of experience as an 

employee of a shooting supply store. He said he was aware that some air pellet and BB 

guns look like handguns. He could not remember if he told the officers who first 

interviewed him, that he saw the Defendant with a gun, or his wife’s having told the officers 

that she never saw the gun. He did recall that he testified about seeing the gun during the 

preliminary hearing. 

After the State rested its case, the Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on the 

aggravated assault count, arguing that there was no proof of the display of a weapon. The 

trial court granted the motion in part by reducing the aggravated assault count of the 

indictment to attempted aggravated assault. The Defendant elected not to testify and did 

not present any witnesses. During his Momon hearing, the Defendant stated that he had 

been diagnosed with “Bipolar schizophrenia.” He said that for the past three years, “[u]p 

until the time that [he] caught Covid,” he had been consistently taking two prescribed 

mental health medications, which provided him with “an emotional stability” and 

“clearness of mind” that he might not otherwise possess. 

Following deliberations, the jury found the Defendant guilty of the lesser included 

offense of simple assault in count one, not guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon in count two, and guilty of disorderly conduct as charged in count three. After 

affirming the jury’s verdicts, the trial court discharged the jury and held a sentencing 

hearing. 

Admitted as an exhibit to the sentencing hearing were certified copies of the 

Defendant’s September 14, 2006 McMinn County jury trial convictions for two counts of 

attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class A 
- 5 -

misdemeanor, for which the Defendant received an effective ten-year sentence at 30% in 

the Tennessee Department of Correction. Also admitted were certified copies of the 

Defendant’s three misdemeanor drug-related convictions, for which the Defendant 

received either a fine or a suspended sentence. Defense counsel pointed out that the State 

had not shown proof of any violations of probation, and argued that the Defendant had 

demonstrated that “he is very much capable of engaging in probation and successfully 

completing it.” The State, on the other hand, requested “a sentence to serve, an 11-29 at 

75 percent.” 

In determining the appropriate sentences, the trial court noted that the principles of 

sentencing call for “the least severe measure necessary to achieve justice,” a sentence 

“proportional as a reflection of the conduct[,]” and for the trial court “to foster and 

encourage alternatives to incarceration that elicit voluntary cooperation of offenders.” 

However, the trial court also noted that there was no presumption that a defendant 

convicted of a misdemeanor is eligible for an alternative sentence. The trial court 

expressed “grave concerns about [the Defendant’s] fitness for society” given his two prior 

attempted second degree murder convictions, his “significant mental health issue[,]” and 

the circumstances of the instant case, in which the Defendant reacted violently without 

provocation to an imagined slight. The trial court found applicable as an enhancement 

factor the Defendant’s history of criminal behavior and criminal convictions, see Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1), and that there were no applicable factors in mitigation. The 

trial court further found that confinement was necessary to protect the public from the 

Defendant’s dangerous behavior, as well as to serve as a “specific deterrence against [the 

Defendant.]” 

With respect to consecutive sentencing, the trial court found that the Defendant was 

a dangerous offender whose behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and no 

hesitation about committing crimes in which the risk to human life was high. See id. at § 

40-35-115(b)(4). Addressing the Wilkerson factors, the court found that the Defendant’s 

“entire course of action and conduct was that of dangerousness and violence” and that the 

Defendant’s prior convictions for attempted second degree murder demonstrated that it was 

“just a pattern or conduct that indicate[d] [the Defendant’s] willingness to just engage in 

violence [and], fighting behaviors[.]” The trial court’s ruling states in pertinent part: 

The Wilkerson factors say that there needs to be something tangible. 

I agree that his entire course of action and conduct was that of dangerousness 

and violence at bar. I also tangibly find that, since you’d been to prison on a 

ten-year term for two counts of attempted second degree murder, this is just 

a pattern of conduct that indicates one’s willingness to just engage in 

violence, fighting behaviors, and I do think that consecutive sentencing of 30 

days on top of 11-29 at the maximum 75 percent is proportional. And, quite 
- 6 -

honestly, it’s just about restraining an individual and trying to shock a 

conscience that people do not behave like gorillas out in polite society, and 

it doesn’t matter who you are or where you are. Families need gas too. 

Families just want to go home and eat meals. You don’t know these people. 

You’ve got no business talking to them.

He’s dangerous, and so I find 30 days jail consecutive to 11-29 days 

jail to be appropriate. 

ANALYSIS

The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing

because it did not “act in accordance with the principles, purposes, or goals of sentencing

when it ordered [the Defendant] to serve the maximum possible sentences, consecutively,

in custody.” He first argues that the proof does not support the trial court’s findings that

he engaged in “very dangerous conduct” and qualified as a dangerous offender under the

consecutive sentencing statute, asserting that the trial court’s description of his “pounding

[his] chest like a gorilla” “did not reflect an accurate assessment of the proof.” He points

out that the jury acquitted him of the gun charge and asserts that the proof, at most, shows

only that he verbally threatened the victim while attempting to initiate a physical fight. He

next argues that the trial court overemphasized his felony convictions while “neglecting

the fact that there was no evidence of [his] failing to comply with any conditions of his

prior probationary sentences” in its finding that he had an extensive criminal history. He

additionally argues that the trial court’s finding that nothing has deterred him from his

dangerous conduct was contrary to the proof, presented outside the jury’s presence, of his

having said just before disengaging from the encounter that he was not “going back to

prison for this sh*t.” The Defendant argues that his willingness to disengage without

physical violence demonstrates that further incarceration is unnecessary as a deterrence. 

Finally, the Defendant argues that his mental health needs will be best addressed by a

sentence of probation. 

The State responds that the trial court considered the appropriate sentencing 

considerations and acted within its broad discretion in sentencing the Defendant. We agree 

with the State. 

A sentence imposed for a misdemeanor offense must be specific and in accordance 

with the principles, purposes, and goals of the Sentencing Act. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-

35-104, -302(b); State v. Cooper, 336 S.W.3d 522, 524 (Tenn. 2011); State v. Palmer, 902 

S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. 1995). The trial court is granted considerable latitude in 

misdemeanor sentencing, and a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor has no presumption 

of entitlement to a minimum sentence. State v. Johnson, 15 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tenn. Crim. 
- 7 -

App. 1999) (citations omitted); see also State v. Lambert, No. E2018-02882-CCA-R3-CD, 

2020 WL 2036651, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2020), (noting that a trial court has 

“considerable flexibility in setting the length and manner of service of the misdemeanor 

sentence.”), no perm app. filed. Nor is a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor entitled to 

a presumption regarding an alternative sentence to incarceration. State v. Troutman, 979 

S.W. 2d 271, 273 (Tenn. 1998) (citation omitted). The defendant bears the burden of 

proving that the sentence is improper. id. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts. This 

court has held that the abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness standard 

of review announced in State v. Bise, 380 S.W. 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012), applies to our review 

of misdemeanor sentencing determinations. See, e.g., Lambert, 2020 WL 2036651, at *10; 

State v. Miller, No. M2019-00214-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 526094, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. Feb. 3, 2020), no perm. app. filed; State v. Hampton, No. W2018-00623-CCA-R3-

CD, 2019 WL 1167807, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 2019), no perm. app. filed. “A 

trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical 

conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies 

reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 

436, 443 (Tenn. 2010). 

Sentences involving confinement should be based on the following considerations:

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a 

defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of 

the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective 

deterrent to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or 

recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1). In addition, “[t]he sentence imposed should be no 

greater than that deserved for the offense committed” and “should be the least severe 

measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is imposed[.]” Id. at § 

40-35-103(2), (4).

A trial court may order multiple sentences to run consecutively if it finds by a 

preponderance of evidence that any one of the seven factors listed in Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 40-35-115(b) applies, including the one that the trial court found to be 

applicable in this case: the Defendant was a dangerous offender whose behavior indicated 

little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the 

risk to human life was high. See Id. § 40-35-115(b)(4). When the court bases consecutive 
- 8 -

sentencing upon its classification of the defendant as a dangerous offender, it must also 

find that an extended sentence is necessary to protect the public against further criminal 

conduct by the defendant and that the consecutive sentences reasonably relate to the 

severity of the offense committed. State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 460-61 (Tenn. 1999); State

v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 937-38 (Tenn. 1995). We review the trial court’s order of 

consecutive sentencing under the same Bise abuse of discretion with a presumption of 

reasonableness standard by which we review its other sentencing determinations. See State

v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 860 (Tenn. 2013).

We first address the Defendant’s contention that the trial court’s findings did not

reflect an accurate assessment of the proof. In his reply brief, the Defendant faults the State

for not addressing the “zoomorphism that permeated the trial court’s reasons for ordering

[the Defendant] to serve maximum consecutive sentences in confinement.” Citing the trial

court’s comparison of the Defendant’s ripping off his shirt to a gorilla’s territorial beating

of its chest, the Defendant argues that “the State, like the trial court, has exaggerated the

circumstances of this case in an attempt to shore up the conclusion that [the Defendant] is

a ‘dangerous offender’ deserving of consecutive sentences.” 

We respectfully disagree that either the State or the trial court exaggerated the

circumstances of the case. Regardless of the Defendant’s acquittal on the gun charge, the

proof at trial showed that the Defendant became enraged at an imagined slight by the

victim, aggressively confronted him, ripped off his shirt in a move that witnesses described

as an invitation to fight, threatened to kill the victim and the victim’s family when the

victim repeated that he wanted no trouble, announced that he had something for the

victim’s “a**,” and went to his vehicle to retrieve what the victim saw to be a gun. Another

store patron was so alarmed by the victim’s behavior that she called 911. That same store

patron testified that, although she never saw a gun, she saw the Defendant retrieve

something from his vehicle and was prompted to alert the Defendant of her call to the police

by her belief that the Defendant was about to shoot the victim. It was only then that the

Defendant disengaged and left the store. Thus, although we in no way condone the trial

court’s comparison of the Defendant’s actions to those of a gorilla, we conclude that the

circumstances support the trial court’s finding that the Defendant was a dangerous

offender. 

In his reply brief, the Defendant also complains of the State’s failure to address State

v. Flippo, No. M2006-01182-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1628868 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6,

2007), which he cited in his principal brief in support of his contention that the trial court

improperly classified the Defendant as a dangerous offender. The defendant in that case

was convicted of two counts of attempted aggravated assault based on his actions of

pointing his gun at a man and his son during a roadside altercation. Id. at *1-2. The trial

court sentenced the defendant to three years and three years and six months, respectively,
- 9 -

and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively based on its finding that the

defendant was a dangerous offender. Reviewing the order of consecutive sentencing de

novo due to the trial court’s failure to address the Wilkerson factors, this Court concluded

that the record did not support consecutive sentencing under the dangerous offender

classification because the crime of attempted aggravated assault is inherently dangerous

and “[t]he circumstances surrounding this crime are not aggravated beyond that generally

occurring in crimes of this nature.” Id. at *13. 

The circumstances in Flippo are distinguishable from those of the case at bar. 

Unlike the defendant and the victim in Flippo, who had a history of animosity and a prior

contentious roadside encounter, id. at *2-5, the victim was a complete stranger to the

Defendant and did nothing to warrant the Defendant’s outrageous reaction. Moreover,

unlike the defendant in Flippo, who had no felony record, the Defendant has two prior

felony convictions for attempted second degree murder. We disagree with the Defendant’s

claim that his disengagement from the altercation following his statement that he was not

about to go back to prison demonstrates that he was already sufficiently deterred from

violence by his prior incarceration. Given that the Defendant did not disengage until he

learned that the police were on their way, the proof suggests that the Defendant was

deterred from physical violence by his fear of immediate arrest, and not that his prior

incarceration deterred him from engaging in violent behavior. 

The record reflects that the trial court appropriately considered the evidence and the 

principles and purposes of sentencing, based its classification of the Defendant as a 

dangerous offender on the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, and made the 

appropriate Wilkerson findings. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court acted within

its discretion in its sentencing determinations, and we affirm the sentences as imposed by 

the trial court. 

CONCLUSION

Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

_______________________________

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JUDGE