RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0213-16T2

JAMES SCOTT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LEILA SCOTT,

Defendant-Respondent.

_________________________________

Submitted June 19, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Accurso.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, 

Docket No. FM-12-0751-16.

James Scott, appellant pro se.

Leila Scott, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, James Scott, appeals from the parties' final judgment of divorce 

(FJOD). He also appeals from an order entered the following month denying 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 29, 2018
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him this relief: modification of his spousal support obligation; a change of 

venue; an order compelling his older daughter to resume visitation with him; 

and an order nullifying the bar against his girlfriend having contact with the 

parties' children during his parenting time. Defendant, Leila Scott, opposes the 

appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the FJOD as well as the 

subsequent order.

The parties married in July 2008 and were divorced from bed and board 

in June 2016. They have two daughters, neither of whom is emancipated. 

On June 17, 2016, the parties appeared before the court. The court 

announced the "matter had been scheduled to be put through as a judgment of 

divorce from bed and board pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-3." The court stated its 

understanding that all issues had been resolved, although neither party "got what 

they wanted." Rather, the parties compromised. 

Plaintiff's counsel informed the court he had drafted "the potential 

judgment of divorce from bed and board," and though he had hoped it was 

"something that everyone could live with," plaintiff still had "a couple of issues 

that he was still unhappy with." Plaintiff was seeking "either a small 

accommodation with the alimony and/or a small accommodation" concerning 

parenting time. The court responded: "this is what I am going to tell you, and 

you've heard what I told you in chambers . . . and I am sure you shared them 
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with your client. Next - - it's just a trial and I will tell you at trial I don’t know 

if the number will be the same. That's all I am going to tell you." The court 

attempted to continue, but the attorney interrupted: "Yeah, let a word to the wise 

be sufficient, as it were." The court responded, "yeah, and then we're talking 

about, you know, assessing the counsel fees because I know where you're at at 

this point." 

The court refused to vacate a prohibition against plaintiff's girlfriend 

being present during his parenting time. The court said it would not reconsider

the prohibition until plaintiff was prepared to marry his girlfriend, but also said

it would rely upon the recommendation of "the therapist." 

During a recess, the parties apparently revised and approved the draft 

Judgment of Divorce from Bed and Board. When the parties returned to the 

courtroom, each party, under oath, in response to questions from each attorney, 

acknowledged voluntarily agreeing to the terms set forth in the judgment. 

Significantly, plaintiff acknowledged the document reflected his understanding 

of the terms and agreements binding upon the parties in the future. Plaintiff also 

said he understood that neither party got everything he or she was looking for 

but the agreement they signed was one they both could live with. The court 

entered the judgment the same day.
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Two months later, the parties returned to "convert" the Judgment of 

Divorce from Bed and Board to a FJOD. The FJOD was entered that day. 

During the proceeding, plaintiff testified the FJOD represented his 

understanding of the parties' mutual obligations. Plaintiff also acknowledged 

that during the negotiations of the FJOD's terms, he had to give some, and . . . 

had to get some," but "[a]t the end of the day, [he was] willing to be found [sic]" 

by the FJOD. Defendant stated specifically, "I didn't get anything but, yeah, I'm 

bound by the document." 

The FJOD provided, among other things, that plaintiff was to pay alimony 

to defendant at the rate of $340 weekly for a period of four years. Plaintiff's 

parenting time with the children was every other weekend from 5:00 p.m. Friday 

until 5:00 Sunday, and on alternating weeks, Wednesday evening dinner. The 

Wednesday parenting time changed slightly during summer months. The FJOD 

also provided for summer and holiday parenting time. The FJOD precluded 

plaintiff's girlfriend from having any contact with the children during plaintiff's 

parenting time absent further court order. 

The FJOD also memorialized the court's finding that both parties had 

voluntarily entered into the agreement reflected in the FJOD and accepted the 

terms thereof as fair, reasonable, and equitable. The FJOD provided for child 

support, a matter not at issue on this appeal. 
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The FJOD was entered on August 1, 2016. A month later, on September 

2, plaintiff filed a motion seeking a reduction in spousal support, a change of 

venue, an order requiring the parties' older daughter to resume visitation with 

plaintiff because the daughter had refused to do so, and an order vacating the 

prohibition against plaintiff's girlfriend having any contact with the children.

The court denied the motion. The court determined plaintiff had not 

demonstrated a significant change in circumstances warranting a modification 

of spousal support. The court found no basis for changing venue. The court 

rejected plaintiff's argument that he had been treated unfairly. Concerning 

visiting time with plaintiff's older daughter, the court noted the daughter was 

"refusing to go on visits with [p]laintiff." The court declined to force the 

daughter to do so, but granted defendant's request that the daughter continue 

counselling as required by the FJOD. The court directed the parties to follow 

all recommendations of the child's therapist. Last, the court denied plaintiff's 

application to have the court vacate the prohibition against his girlfriend having 

contact with the children. 

On appeal, plaintiff claims he never agreed to the terms of the divorce, 

"especially the Visitation, Alimony, Past Debts Owed," and the provision 

concerning his girlfriend. He claims the trial judge told his lawyer "off the 
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record" to let plaintiff know that if plaintiff went to trial the judge would make 

him pay his wife's attorney's fees. 

Plaintiff asks that we revise the custody order in many ways. He asks for 

more visitation with his daughters, including resumption of visitation with his 

older daughter. He also asks that the bar against his girlfriend having contact 

with his children be lifted. Last, he asks that we enforce the terms of the FJOD 

permitting him to speak to his children on holidays. 

Plaintiff also contends he cannot afford the alimony and is thus "[l]ooking 

for a review of Alimony." Next, plaintiff argues that the allocation between him 

and defendant for responsibility for certain debts be changed to terms more 

favorable to him. Last, plaintiff asks that his matter be returned to another judge 

for trial.

It is important for the parties to understand the limited scope of our review 

of the trial court's orders. We do not conduct a de novo review, that is, we do 

not begin anew and revisit each and every term of the parties' agreement. When 

conducting our review of trial court orders, we give considerable deference to the 

discretionary decisions of Family Part judges. Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. 

Super. 117, 127 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 

(App. Div. 2006)). This is so because the Family Part judge is familiar with the case, 

has had an opportunity to make credibility judgments based on live testimony, and 
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has expertise in family matters. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411–13 (1998). 

We will not interfere with a family court's decision that is supported by “adequate, 

substantial, credible evidence.” Id. at 412.

The issues in the case before us involve a marital agreement. Marital 

agreements are contractual by nature. See Massar v. Massar, 279 N.J. Super. 

89, 93 (App. Div. 1995). As is the case with other contracts, our courts value 

the settlement of family disputes, particularly in view of "the interpersonal strife 

and myriad factual issues that complicate judicial resolution" of such matters. 

Slawinski v. Nicholas, 448 N.J. Super. 25, 32 (App. Div. 2016). For that reason, 

as with any other contract, we will generally enforce marital agreements absent 

fraud or unconscionability. Ibid. (citing Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 266 

(2007). Here, the record does not demonstrate the elements of fraud or 

unconscionability. To the contrary, the record demonstrates plaintiff voluntarily 

entered into terms incorporated into the FJOD. Although he would have 

preferred a better result, he attested that he could live with the settlement terms.

During the proceeding resulting in the judgment of divorce from bed and 

board, plaintiff acknowledged that he had voluntarily entered into the terms set 

forth in the judgment. He also acknowledged the judgment reflected his 

understanding of the terms and agreements that would bind the parties in the 

future. Additionally, he said under oath that he understood neither party got 
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everything they were looking for, but the agreement they signed was one they 

could both live with. Two months later, during the proceeding resulting in the 

FJOD, plaintiff again testified under oath the terms of the FJOD represented his 

understanding of the parties' mutual obligations. He affirmed that "[a]t the end 

of the day," he was willing to be bound by the terms of the FJOD. 

Plaintiff contends he was coerced into signing the agreement by the trial 

court's "off-the-record" discussion with his attorney. According to plaintiff, the 

trial judge threatened to assess counsel fees against him if he did not agree to 

the terms of the divorce. Although there is some evidence to support plaintiff's 

argument, namely, the court's comment on the record to plaintiff's attorney about 

their in-chambers discussion concerning counsel fees, plaintiff did not raise the 

issue at that time. By failing to raise the issue before the trial court, he has not 

properly preserved it for appeal. Nieder v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 

229, 234 (1973) (citing Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Somer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 

548 (App. Div. 1959) (explaining the "well-settled principle that our appellate 

courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the 

trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available 'unless the 

questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern 

matters of great public interest'")).
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Having voluntarily entered into a marital settlement agreement that was 

not unconscionable, plaintiff had the right to ask for a modification of its terms 

upon a change of circumstances. "A 'trial court has the discretion to modify the 

agreement upon a showing of changed circumstances.'" Quinn, 225 N.J. at 49 

(citing Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 55 N.J. 564, 569 (1970)). In Quinn, the court 

explained that "[c]hanged circumstances include 'an increase in the cost of 

living, an increase or decrease in the income of the supporting or supported 

spouse, cohabitation of the dependent spouse, illness or disability arising after 

the entry of the judgment, and changes in federal tax law.'" Ibid. (citing J.B. v. 

W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 327 (2013)). 

Here, the month after the divorce, when the court denied plaintiff's motion 

seeking a reduction in spousal support and other relief, the court determined 

plaintiff had not "provide[d] proof of any significant change in circumstances to 

warrant a modification." The trial court's finding is amply supported by the 

record. Absent such a change in circumstances, the trial court did not err by 

denying the relief. 

We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be 

without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.