IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-1599

Filed March 3, 2021

IN THE INTEREST OF A.D. and S.D.,

Minor Children,

D.D., Father,

Appellant,

A.L., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Deborah Farmer

Minot, District Associate Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the juvenile court order terminating 

their parental rights to their minor children. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Jeannette Keller of Bowman, DePree & Murphy, West Liberty, for appellant 

father.

Sue Kirk of Arnott & Kirk, PLLC, Coralville, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Anthony A. Haughton of Linn County Advocate, Inc., Cedar Rapids, attorney 

and guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Ahlers, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

The mother and father separately appeal the district court order terminating 

their parental rights to their minor children, A.D. and S.D. The juvenile court 

terminated both parents’ rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2020). On 

appeal, the mother and father each argue (1) the juvenile court erred by not 

granting additional time to work towards reunification and (2) the juvenile court 

erred by not declining to terminate the parents’ rights under section 232.116(3)(c) 

due to the closeness of the parents’ relationship with the children.1

“We review termination of parental rights proceedings de novo.” In re J.H., 

952 N.W.2d 157, 166 (Iowa 2020). “We are not bound by the juvenile court's

findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility 

of witnesses.” In re Z.P., 948 N.W.2d 518, 522–23 (Iowa 2020) (per curiam) 

(quoting In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014)).

The parents do not dispute either that the statutory grounds for termination 

have been shown2 or that termination is in the children’s best interest. Instead, 

 

1 The mother raises a third issue on appeal, namely, that the safety precautions 

implemented in response to the COVID-19 health emergency prevented her from 

having regular meaningful contact the children. She does not, however, point to 

any specific places in the record to demonstrate how the restrictions imposed 

prevented her from having contact with the children, nor does she explain how the 

legal authorities she cites relate to her argument. As such, we consider this 

argument waived. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (“Failure to cite authority in 

support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”).

2 The mother makes a reference to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) in her 

statement of the issues, suggesting she may be challenging the statutory grounds 

for termination. However, her citation to the statutory ground is blended with her 

challenge to the failure to grant additional time. To the extent the mother’s passing 

reference to section 232.116(1)(f) was a challenge to the statutory grounds for 

termination, we find the challenge waived due to failure to cite authority or develop

an argument in support of the challenge. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3); State 
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both argue that, despite these findings, the juvenile court erred by declining to 

provide them six additional months to work towards reunification. See Iowa Code 

§§ 232.117(5) (permitting the juvenile court to enter a permanency order pursuant 

to section 232.104 if the court does not terminate parental rights); 232.104(2)(b) 

(allowing the juvenile court to grant the parents an additional six months to work 

towards reunification if it finds “the need for removal of the child from the child’s 

home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period”). 

We agree with the juvenile court and conclude an additional six months 

would not resolve the parents’ mental-health and substance-abuse problems that 

led to the removal. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012) (“We have 

long recognized that an unresolved, severe, and chronic drug addiction can render 

a parent unfit to raise children.”); In re D.H., No. 18-1552, 2019 WL 156668, at *2 

(Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2019) (collecting cases citing a parent’s failure to address 

their mental-health issues as a reason to affirm termination). A.D. and S.D. were 

originally removed from the parents’ care in August 2019 following reports the 

mother was using methamphetamine in their presence. Both parents admitted to 

using methamphetamine in the home. Despite acknowledging their drug use, 

neither has been able to adequately address it. Since drug testing was requested 

in August 2019, each parent has only returned one drug patch and each of those 

patches tested positive for methamphetamine. The father completed intensive 

outpatient treatment, but he admitted to relapsing during treatment. The father 

admitted he had used methamphetamine about six to eight weeks before the 

 

v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 166 n.14 (Iowa 2015) (noting a “passing reference” in a 

brief is insufficient).
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termination hearing and had only been sober about six months out of the past 

fifteen. The mother had not completed intensive outpatient treatment, and she did 

not have any concrete plans to address substance-abuse issues in a meaningful 

way.

The parents’ mental-health issues are similarly unresolved. Neither parent 

has addressed the parent’s mental-health issues apart from taking medication. 

Even the taking of medication has been haphazard, as the record indicates the 

parents have not consistently taken their medications as prescribed. Both parents 

report that they have sought treatment and attended counseling, but nothing in the 

record corroborates their claims and their past history of repeated lying about their 

actions caused the juvenile court not to believe any claims that could not be 

corroborated.

Our review of the record causes us to agree with these observations and 

findings by the juvenile court regarding the parents’ request for a six-month 

extension of their reunification window:

Finally, the Court finds that [it] is not in the best interests of [the 

children] to grant the parents more time in light of [the parents’] failure 

to take advantage of services, their poor history of response to 

services, and their long history of serious problems with substance 

abuse and dishonesty. It is significant to the Court that [the parents] 

failed and refused to take advantage of the services they were 

offered in 2016 after [the younger child] was born testing positive for 

marijuana. . . .

The Court cannot find any convincing evidence to indicate that 

either parent will make any significant or sustained progress, such 

that the children could be returned within the foreseeable future. 

Since the removal, [the parents] have had fifteen months to work 

toward the goal of reunification. They admit that they will not be 

ready to have the children returned to them for at least two more 

months. In the judgment of the Court, this is wildly unrealistic. There 

is simply no way the Court would consider returning the children until 
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the parent(s) had shown the ability to complete treatment, develop a 

plan for sobriety, and stick to it for at least several months.

In simple terms, the parents have not made adequate efforts to address the issues 

that keep the children from returning to their care. Based on their performance in 

the fifteen months since the children were originally removed, there is no indication 

that the reasons for removal will no longer exist after an additional six months. As 

such, an extension is not warranted.

Finally, both parents urge us to decline to terminate their parental rights 

under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c), which permits us to avoid termination in 

situations where “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination 

would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parentchild relationship.” We apply the section 232.116(3) factors at our discretion. In 

re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa 2016). The parents “bear[] the burden to 

prove the permissive—not mandatory—factor applies to prevent termination.” In 

re A.H., 950 N.W.2d 27, 42 (Iowa 2020). The juvenile court addressed section 

232.116(3)(c) in its termination order, noting that, while the children enjoy their 

visits with their parents, the children “now look to others” to fulfill their needs and 

“[a]ny harm to the children from the loss of their parents” would be reduced by 

placing them in a stable home. Based on our de novo review, we agree. We thus 

decline to apply section 232.116(3)(c) to avoid terminating the parents’ parental 

rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.