J-S25009-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LAURENSAU JOSEPH 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3090 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 8, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-64-CR-0000092-1998

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2024

Appellant Laurensau Joseph appeals pro se from the November 8, 2023 

order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition 

filed on December 6, 2000, pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm. 

A. 

A previous panel of this Court summarized the relevant factual and 

procedural history as follows:

In April of 1998, Appellant, then 24 years old, believed his former 

foster brother, Michael Smith, stole his necklace and vandalized 

his car. They argued in [Smith]’s bedroom. [Smith] picked up a 

machete and Appellant pulled out a hand[-]gun and shot [Smith]

in the face. [Smith], bleeding profusely, dropped the machete 

and went downstairs. Appellant followed and fired a second shot 

striking [him] in the forehead, immediately killing him. The next 

day, Appellant went to the Pennsylvania State Police barracks and 

gave a 34-page statement admitting that he shot [Smith] twice.
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Commonwealth v. Joseph, 2023 WL 2441945 at *1 (Pa. Super. Mar. 10, 

2023) (unpublished memorandum) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets

omitted). 

On August 20, 1998, a jury convicted Appellant of First-Degree Murder, 

and, on August 28, 1998, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment 

without parole. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on 

December 3, 1999.1 Appellant did not seek review from the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court.

On December 6, 2000, Appellant timely filed the instant pro se PCRA 

petition, and the court appointed Alfred Howell, Esq., as PCRA counsel. 

Attorney Howell then filed a motion to withdraw. The PCRA court took no 

action on Attorney Howell’s motion to withdraw. There was no subsequent

docket activity, other than two pro se letters Appellant sent to the court, until 

November 2021.

On November 23, 2021, the Office of the Attorney General, while

representing the Commonwealth in a federal habeas action filed by Appellant, 

informed the PCRA court of the outstanding PCRA petition. On January 4, 

2022, Appellant filed a pro se amended petition, which the court ultimately 

dismissed on February 18, 2022.

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1 On direct appeal, this Court addressed several claims of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, as was permitted at the time. Commonwealth v. Joseph,

141 EDA 1999 at 6-10 (Dec. 3, 1999).
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On appeal, a panel of this Court concluded that that the PCRA court 

erred in denying Appellant’s petition because Attorney Howell had abandoned 

him, which denied him effective assistance of PCRA counsel. Joseph, 2023 

WL 2441945 at *3. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded for the 

appointment of new counsel to file either an amended petition or a 

Turner/Finley letter.2 Id.

On April 25, 2023, the PCRA Court appointed Christine Rechner, Esq., 

who filed a Turner/Finley letter and a motion to withdraw as counsel on 

September 19, 2023. On October 4, 2023, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907

notice and granted Attorney Rechner’s motion to withdraw. Appellant did not 

respond. The court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition on November 8, 2023.

B.

Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal. Both he and the PCRA 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).3

Appellant pro se raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether [the PCRA court] erred in dismissing [] Appellant’s 

First Post-Conviction Relief Act and Pro Se Amended PCRA Nunc 

Pro Tunc Where the original PCRA decision was delayed for over 

(21) [sic] years and forced [] Appellant who was abandoned to 

file the Amended PCRA Nunc Pro Tunc to develope [sic] the 

record?

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2Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

3The PCRA court filed a Statement of Reasons directing this Court to its 

October 4, 2023 Opinion and Order. Statement of Reasons, 1/10/24, at 1 

(unpaginated)
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2. Whether this Common Pleas Court erred in dismissing the 

Appellant’s first PCRA and Amended PCRA Nunc Pro Tunc

without a hearing where there was newly[-]discovered facts 

evidence on the develpped [sic] record?

Appellant’s Br. at 1 (some capitalization altered). 

C.

Appellant first claims that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition

because his original PCRA counsel, Attorney Howell, had abandoned him,

delaying a decision on his PCRA by over 20 years. Id. Although we are deeply 

troubled that the Court of Common Pleas permitted a PCRA petition to languish 

for over 20 years, we have found no legal basis to conclude that this 

unreasonable delay is a basis to grant a PCRA petition. Moreover, and more 

importantly, Appellant has not addressed this issue in his brief beyond the 

Statement of Questions Involved. Accordingly, Appellant has waived this 

claim. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 815 A.2d 598, 604 n.3 (Pa. 

2002) (finding claims raised in the Statement of Questions Involved but not 

pursued in the body of the brief waived); Commonwealth v. Miller, 721 

A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. Super. 1998) (explaining “[w]hen issues are not 

properly raised and developed in briefs. . . a court will not consider the merits 

thereof.”) (citations omitted).

D.

Appellant next asserts that the PCRA court erred when it dismissed his 

PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant’s Br. at 1. In his brief, Appellant 

references supposed after-discovered evidence of his alleged mental 

infirmities and a letter from his foster mother exposing the bias of his foster 
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father, a witness at trial. Id. at 22-40. He also purports to assert ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims, including that his trial counsel failed to both 

object to the admission of prior bad acts evidence and to recall Appellant to 

testify about his lack of defensive wounds. Id. However, the substantial 

defects in Appellant’s brief preclude us from conducting meaningful appellate 

review.

Appellate briefs must materially conform to the requirements set forth 

in our Rules of Appellate Procedure, and we may quash or dismiss an appeal 

if the defect in the brief is substantial. Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d

496, 497 (Pa. Super. 2005); Pa.R.A.P. 2101. “[A]lthough this Court is willing 

to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally 

confers no special benefit upon an appellant.” Commonwealth v. Lyons,

833 A.2d 245, 251–52 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

“When issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when the 

briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review[,] a Court 

will not consider the merits thereof.” Branch Banking and Trust v. 

Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942-43 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). See 

also Pa.R.A.P. 2111 (listing briefing requirements for appellate briefs) and 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (listing argument requirements for appellate briefs). It is 

axiomatic that the argument portion of an appellate brief must be developed 

with citations to the record and relevant authority. Pa.R.A.P 2119(a)-(c); see 

also Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 371–72 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(finding waiver where appellant failed to cite any pertinent authority to 
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support his argument). As this Court has made clear, we “will not act as 

counsel[.]” Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

“We shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour the 

record to find evidence to support an argument[.]” Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 

1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018). 

Here, Appellant’s argument section is substantially underdeveloped, 

and, thus, precludes meaningful appellate review. First, he has failed to 

address each issue raised under a separate heading as required by Rule 

2119(a) and, instead, combines multiple different arguments of ineffective 

assistance of counsel and after-discovered evidence into one section. 

Furthermore, Appellant’s argument section is substantially underdeveloped 

because he fails to provide citations to the record and fails to apply the law he 

has cited to the facts of this case in a meaningful and coherent manner as 

required by our Rules of Appellate Procedure and caselaw. See Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a); B.D.G., 959 A.2d at 371–72. Appellant has, thus, not provided a 

cogent argument establishing how the trial court erred in dismissing his PCRA 

petition. Accordingly, Appellant’s brief fatally impedes our review, and this 

claim is waived.4

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4 Even if Appellant had not waived both claims, we would affirm the PCRA

court’s decision. We have reviewed the court’s Opinion and Order analyzing 

the claims it could identify from Appellant’s PCRA petition, and we discern no 

abuse of discretion. We would adopt the PCRA court’s reasoning as our own. 

Appellant is directed to annex the Opinion and Order dated October 4, 2023

to all future filings.
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Appellant has waived both of his claims. We, thus, affirm the dismissal 

of Appellant’s PCRA petition. 

Order affirmed. 

Judge Beck joins the memorandum.

Judge McLaughlin concurs in result.

Date: 9/25/2024
Circulated 09/24/2024 01:45 PM