[Cite as Dowdy v. Jones, 2011-Ohio-3168.]

STATE OF OHIO, COLUMBIANA COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

JAMES DOWDY, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

VS. 

TAMMIE JONES, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

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 CASE NO. 10-CO-21 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio 

Case No. 2010-CV-207 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant James H. Dowdy, Pro Se 

1048 1⁄2 S. Arch Avenue (Rear) 

Alliance, Ohio 44601 

For Defendant-Appellee Attorney Jeremy S. Young 

Attorney Bradley L. Snyder 

PNC Plaza, Twelfth Floor 

155 East B road Street 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

 

 

 Dated: June 24, 2011 
[Cite as Dowdy v. Jones, 2011-Ohio-3168.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, James Dowdy, appeals from a Columbiana County 

Common Pleas Court judgment dismissing his complaint against defendant-appellee, 

Columbiana County Assistant Prosecutor Tammie Jones. 

{¶2} On March 1, 2010, appellant, acting pro se, filed a complaint against 

appellee alleging in its entirety: 

{¶3} “Whereas the afore [sic.] mentioned plaintiff, Mr. James H. Dowdy, is 

claiming that the Columbiana Prosecuter’s [sic.] Office has showed misfeasance, 

malfeasance, and nonfeasance. Tammy [sic.] Jones, the assistant prosecutor in 

Columbiana County has intentionally and without prejudice stalled the investigation 

into my wife’s murder on May 10th 1991. She has not done her job in that she is 

supposed to be a representative for the State of Ohio and moreover the County of 

Columbiana. She has failed to meet all requirements of this position by refusing to 

help a citizen of Ohio. She mentions numerous times and sent a letter, copy 

attached, stating that there is nothing at all she can do about this case. She has not 

even taken time to investigate this case. 

{¶4} “WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands punitive damages in the amount of 

$500,000.00 and an immediate disbarment.” 

{¶5} Attached to appellant’s complaint was a letter dated February 2, 2010, 

from appellee to him stating: 

{¶6} “Please be advised that I have reviewed all of the materials that you 

dropped off at this office concerning the traffic crash of May 10, 1991. I have also 

contacted Trooper McElroy of the Ohio State Highway Patrol and confirmed that no 

records relative to the crash are available either locally or at the State Headquarters. 

Such crash reports and photographs are only retained for a five year period after the 

incident. 

{¶7} “Unfortunately, there is insufficient evidence to support any criminal 

charge or even merit any further investigation. As a result, no further action will be 

taken by this office.” 

{¶8} In response to appellant’s complaint, appellee filed a motion to dismiss. 
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She asserted that, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6), the complaint should be 

dismissed because (1) it failed to state a cognizable claim for relief, (2) she is 

protected by prosecutorial immunity, and (3) it failed to state a claim for relief that is 

within the court’s power to grant because punitive damages are not recoverable in 

the absence of any claimed compensatory damages and a court has no power to 

disbar an attorney. 

{¶9} The trial court granted appellee’s motion and dismissed appellant’s 

complaint. It stated that its decision was based on the authorities set forth in 

appellee’s motion. 

{¶10} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 28, 2010. 

{¶11} In his brief, appellant, still acting pro se, sets out the “facts” of the 

underlying traffic crash that claimed the life of his wife. He asserts that the driver of 

the vehicle that struck the motorcycle on which he and his wife were riding acted with 

the purpose to kill them. He claims that he took this information to appellee and she 

failed to investigate the matter and prosecute those responsible for the crash. 

Appellant cites a slew of Ohio Jurisprudence sections, Ohio Revised Code sections, 

and cases in an attempt to support his position. Finally, he attached unsworn 

statements by two people which do not appear anywhere in the record and, 

therefore, cannot be considered by this court. 

{¶12} What appellant’s brief lacks is an argument in support of reversing the 

trial court’s decision to dismiss his complaint based on Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6). 

{¶13} A trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction raises questions of law. Thus, an appellate court 

reviews the decision anew. Crosby-Edwards v. Ohio Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral 

Directors, 175 Ohio App.3d 213, 2008-Ohio-762, at ¶21, citing Groza-Vance v. 

Vance, 162 Ohio App.3d 510, 2005-Ohio-3815, at ¶13. 

{¶14} Likewise, the standard of review for a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss 

requires the appellate court to independently review the complaint to determine if the 

dismissal was appropriate. Ferreri v. The Plain Dealer Publishing Co. (2001), 142 
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Ohio App.3d 629, 639. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted is a procedural motion that tests the sufficiency of the complaint. 

State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 

548. In order to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted, the court must find beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 

facts warranting relief after it presumes all factual allegations in the complaint are 

true, and construes all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. State ex rel. 

Seikbert v. Wilkinson (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 490. 

{¶15} The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant’s complaint for several 

reasons. 

{¶16} First, the complaint fails to set forth a legal theory that might entitle 

appellant to relief under the law. A complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief.” Civ.R. 8(A). 

Appellant’s complaint does not comply with Civ.R. 8(A) because it does not include 

any information that, if true, would entitle him to recover against appellee. 

{¶17} Second, appellee enjoys prosecutorial immunity that protects her from 

liability in cases such as this. A prosecuting attorney is a quasi-judicial officer who 

enjoys absolute immunity from a civil action for damages. Harman v. Gessner (Sept. 

9, 1997), 7th Dist. 96 C.A. 123, citing Hunter v. City of Middletown (1986), 31 Ohio 

App.3d 109. The Ohio Supreme Court set forth the rationale for absolute immunity: 

{¶18} “ ‘Privileges of the first class [absolute privileges] are based chiefly 

upon a recognition of the necessity that certain officials and others charged with the 

performance of important public functions shall be as free as possible from fear that 

their actions may have an adverse effect upon their own personal interests. To 

accomplish this, it is necessary for them to be protected not only from liability but 

from the danger of even an unsuccessful civil action. This being so, it is necessary 

that the propriety of their conduct shall not be indirectly inquired into either by court or 

jury in civil proceedings brought against them for misconduct in office. Therefore, the 

privilege is absolute and the protection which it affords is complete.’ ” Bigelow v. 
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Brumley (1941), 138 Ohio St. 574, 583-84, quoting 3 Restatements of Torts, 224, 

Section 584. 

{¶19} Furthermore, the decision whether or not to file criminal charges and 

prosecute a criminal offense is solely up to the prosecutor’s discretion. State v. 

LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, at ¶43; State ex rel. Nagle v. Olin

(1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 341, 347. 

{¶20} Thus, even if appellant had asserted a cognizable claim for relief, 

appellee is immune from any type of liability. 

{¶21} Third, appellant’s complaint does not assert a valid claim for relief. 

Appellant’s complaint asserts no claim for compensatory damages, only punitive 

damages. A plaintiff in a tort action may not be awarded punitive damages unless 

“(1) the defendant acted with malice or aggravated or egregious fraud, and (2) the 

trier of fact awards the plaintiff compensatory damages.” (Emphasis added.) 

Pierson v. Rion, 2d Dist. No. CA23498, 2010-Ohio-1793, at ¶46, citing R.C. 

2315.21(C); See also Little Beaver Creek Valley R.R. and Historical Soc., Inc. v. P.L. 

& W. R.R., Inc. (1998), 7th Dist. No. 95-CO-76. Consequently, since appellant did 

not seek compensatory damages, punitive damages are not an available remedy. 

{¶22} Fourth and finally, the trial court has no jurisdiction to disbar appellee as 

appellant requests in his prayer for relief. The discipline of attorneys, which includes 

disbarment, lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ohio Supreme Court. Shimko 

v. Lobe, 103 Ohio St.3d 59, 2004-Ohio-4202, at ¶15, citing Smith v. Kates (1976), 46 

Ohio St.2d 263, 265-66; Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko (1958), 168 Ohio St. 17; 

Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Pleasant (1958), 167 Ohio St. 325; In re McBride (1956), 164 

Ohio St. 419; Judd v. City Trust & Sav. Bank (1937), 133 Ohio St. 81, paragraph one 

of the syllabus; In re Thatcher (1909), 80 Ohio St. 492; Swisher, Professional 

Responsibility in Ohio (1981) 1.15-1.35. 

{¶23} In sum, appellant has not presented any legal reasons upon which this 

court can reverse the trial court’s judgment dismissing his complaint. While we may 

be sympathetic to appellant’s situation, after a thorough review, we have no choice 
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but to conclude that the trial court’s decision to dismiss was proper. 

{¶24} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby 

affirmed. 

Waite, P.J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, J., concurs.