[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13404

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

NATHANIEL HARRINGTON, 

a.k.a. Nathaniel Cannon, Jr., 

a.k.a. Nay Nay, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13404

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cr-00345-WFJ-SPF-1

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Nathaniel Harrington appeals his 104-month sentence for 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. 

He contends the district court’s upward variance from the 

60-month mandatory minimum sentence resulted in a substantively unreasonable sentence. After review,1 we affirm Harrington’s sentence. 

When examining the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we consider the totality of the circumstances and the 

§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 936 (11th 

Cir. 2016). The district court abuses its discretion if, among other 

things, it commits a clear error of judgment when considering the 

proper factors or gives significant weight to improper or irrelevant 

factors. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(en banc). 

1 We review for abuse of discretion the reasonableness of a district court’s 

sentence. United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 935-36 (11th Cir. 2016).

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The district court must impose a sentence that is sufficient, 

but not greater than necessary, to comply with the sentencing purposes listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, provide just punishment, and afford adequate 

deterrence to criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court 

must also consider factors such as the nature and circumstances of 

the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the 

Guidelines range. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (4). The weight given to any 

§ 3553(a) factor is left to the sound discretion of the district court, 

and we will not substitute our own judgment by reweighing those

factors. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 

2013).

The district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence by varying upward and sentencing Harrington to 104 

months’ imprisonment. See Trailer, 827 F.3d at 935-36. Although 

the district court emphasized Harrington’s criminal history, it was

entitled to place more weight on this factor than the Guidelines 

did. See United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814 F.3d 1282, 1287-88

(11th Cir. 2016) (stating a district court does not abuse its discretion 

by varying upward and placing more weight on a defendant’s criminal history than on the Guidelines). This Court has upheld even 

larger upward variances based solely on a defendant’s criminal history. See id. at 1288; see also United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 

1241 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding a 120-month statutory maximum 

sentence despite a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months for a defendant who had been arrested 26 times). 

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The district court stated it considered the § 3553(a) factors 

and provided analysis. It highlighted the nature and circumstances

of the offense and Harrington’s characteristics when it discussed his 

extensive criminal history, including his five previous drug-related 

offenses. It concluded an upward variance was needed to protect 

the public and provide adequate deterrence, as his prior sentences 

had not adequately deterred him from committing subsequent 

crimes. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in its § 3553(a) analysis. See United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 

1241 (11th Cir. 2021) (stating a district court need not address every 

factor; rather, simply acknowledging that it considered the 

§ 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments is sufficient).

As to Harrington’s argument the district court improperly 

considered certain information outside of the plea agreement, the 

district court was authorized to consider such evidence. See 

18 U.S.C. § 3661 (providing there are no limitations on the information a sentencing court may receive and consider concerning 

the background, character, and conduct of the person convicted of 

an offense); United States v. Maitre, 898 F.3d 1151, 1160 n.6 (11th 

Cir. 2018) (explaining the sentencing court may consider uncharged and acquitted conduct when determining the appropriate 

sentence). While the government must prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence a disputed fact contained in the PSI, Harrington 

agreed to the drug quantities and factual proffer contained in the 

plea agreement, which were later used in the PSI. SeeUnited States 

v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining once a 

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defendant objects to a fact in the presentence investigation report, 

the government must prove that disputed fact by a preponderance 

of the evidence). Further, although he objected to the PSI’s inclusion of the Guidelines calculation for all of his charged offenses, he 

did not object to the district court’s determination of the potential 

Guidelines range of 117 months, which was higher than the PSI’s 

60-month mandatory minimum Guideline sentences. His sentence 

of 104 months’ imprisonment is lower than the statutory maximum for his offense, indicating reasonableness. See United States 

v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021) (stating an upward 

variance well below the statutory maximum sentence indicates a 

sentence is reasonable); United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 1196, 1215 

(11th Cir. 2020) (providing the statutory maximum sentence for 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), is life imprisonment). 

Thus, because Harrington agreed to the drug quantities 

through his plea agreement, did not object to the district court’s 

Guidelines-range calculation of his charged conduct, and conceded 

the court could consider his criminal history, the court did not consider any disputed fact. The court was within its authority to consider uncharged and acquitted conduct, as well as conduct unrelated to his offense of conviction as part of his history and characteristics and other § 3553(a) factors. As such, it did not err in considering his extensive criminal history and the drug quantities in 

the underlying offense conduct when it imposed the 44-month upward variance. Maitre, 898 F.3d at 1160 n.6; United States v. 

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Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 638 n.14 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining even 

if a defendant’s conduct is completely unrelated to his offense of 

conviction, it may be considered as part of his history and characteristics and other factors under § 3553(a) and, therefore, it may be 

considered when imposing a variance). Accordingly, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED. 

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