UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

MUNSTER STEEL CO., INC., )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

CRANE 1 SERVICES, INC., et al., )

Defendants, )

____________________________________) CAUSE NO. 2:16-CV-345-TLS-JEM

)

CRANE 1 SERVICES, INC., )

Third-Party Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

CINCINNATI CRANE & HOIST, LLC, )

Third-Party Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant, Crane 1 Services, Inc., an Ohio Corporation

n/k/a RNM Holdings, Inc.’s Partial Motion to Reconsider [DE 196], filed October 22, 2019.

Defendant RNM asks the Court to reconsider in part its Opinion and Order compelling it to produce

documents in response to Munster Steel’s motion to compel. Munster filed a response on October

30, 2019, and RNM filed a reply on November 4, 2019.

I. Background

On October 1, 2013, Munster signed a contract with an entity called “Crane 1 Services” that

required Crane 1 Services to design, supply, and install cranes and related equipment to Munster’s

new facility. According to Munster, by October 2014, Munster had identified “serious deficiencies”

with the cranes and the manner in which they were installed. Munster filed its initial complaint on

July 26, 2016, alleging breach of contract. Defendant “Crane 1 Services” answered, identified itself

as a Delaware corporation, and admitted that it had contracted with Munster. During discovery,
Defendant disclosed that Plaintiff had in fact contracted with “Crane 1 Ohio,” and that Crane 1

Delaware purchased the majority of Crane 1 Ohio’s assets in October 2015. Munster then filed an

amended complaint, adding a fraudulent misrepresentation claim against RNM (the entity formerly

known as Crane 1 Ohio), and claims of fraudulent concealment and fraudulent transfer and

conveyance against Crane 1 Delaware and RNM.

On August 23, 2019, Munster filed a motion to compel RNM to produce documents “relating

to the asset purchase agreement as well as Crane 1 Ohio’s financial condition.” Munster did not list

its corresponding requests for production (#38-55, 58-61, and 63) in its prayer for relief, but referred

to them in a citation within the motion. In its response, RNM indicated that it was “uncertain of the

specific document requests [to] which Plaintiff is attempting to compel responses.” In its reply,

Munster’s prayer for relief sought “documents in response to request nos. 38-55, 58-61 and 63.” The

Court found that RNM did not satisfy its burden to show that Munster’s discovery requests were

improper, and ordered RNM to “produce documents in response to [Munster’s] requests for

production #38-55, #58-61, and #63.”

RNM now asks the Court to reconsider its order. RNM argues that three of the requests (#46,

52, and 54) seek privileged information, and claims that it was not able to present its objections

because those individual requests were not explicitly discussed in the original motion. (RNM does

not address the fact that the requests were listed in a citation within the motion.) Munster argues that

the Court’s order should stand, because RNM never asserted privilege objections in its initial

responses to those requests, and states that the motion provided adequate detail as to what it was

requesting. 

II. Analysis

A request for reconsideration is not appropriate “for rehashing previously rejected arguments

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or arguing matters that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion.” Caisse

Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir.1996). Instead, 

a motion to reconsider is only appropriate where a court has

misunderstood a party, where the court has made a decision outside

the adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties, where the

court has made an error of apprehension (not of reasoning), where a

significant change in the law has occurred, or where significant new

facts have been discovered. 

Broaddus v. Shields, 665 F.3d 846, 860 (7th Cir. 2011) (overruled on other grounds by Hill v.

Tangherini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th Cir.2013)) (citing Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese

Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.1990)). “Such problems [appropriate for reconsideration]

rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare.” Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at

1191 (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101

(E.D.Va.1983)). 

In brief, the requests disputed in this motion (#46, 52, and 54) sought communications

between the Crane 1 entities, and between RNM (formerly Crane 1 Ohio) and related company

Pfingsten Partners LLC, relating to this lawsuit. RNM argues that the disputed requests did not

directly seek financial information, and were therefore “beyond the scope” of the motion to compel.

However, some of those communications almost certainly “relate to the asset purchase agreement”

and to Crane 1 Ohio’s financial condition, which was what Munster explicitly requested in the

motion. Munster highlighted this in prior correspondence among counsel, after RNM responded that

no relevant communications existed. See Ex. C to Mot. to Compel [DE 179-3] (“As we discussed,

given the transfer of assets between Crane 1 Delaware and RNM as well as the breadth of the asset

purchase agreement, we find it hard to believe that no communications exist between these parties.”)

(specifically addressing #46 and 52 among other requests). 

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Munster’s motion to compel referred specifically to that correspondence. Although the

prayer for relief did not list the document requests by number, the motion stated Munster’s demands

for documents “in connection with the transfer of assets and current finances,” and (contrary to

RNM’s contention) listed what Munster saw as the corresponding requests: “With respect to the

documents Munster Steel sought in connection with the transfer of assets and current finances, Crane

1 Ohio objected to those Requests claiming they were ‘irrelevant’. (See Ex. B, ¶¶ 38-55, 58-61,

63).” Mot. to Compel [DE 179] at 3 (emphasis added).

However, the Court agrees with RNM that Munster’s prayer for relief was ambiguous. The

prayer requested documents “relating to the asset purchase agreement as well as Crane 1 Ohio’s

financial condition,” and it was not entirely clear whether this phrase referred specifically to requests

38-55, 58-61, and 63, or to some broader (or narrower) set of requests. The ambiguity put RNM in

the position of having to guess which requests it needed to address in its response brief. As the party

seeking discovery, it was Munster’s burden to be clear about what it was asking for. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 7(b)(1)(B) (a motion must “state with particularity the grounds for seeking the order”). The issue

was not clarified until Munster filed its reply, so this is not a “matter[] that could have been heard

during the pendency of the previous motion,” nor a “rehashing [of] previously rejected arguments.”

Caisse Nationale, 90 F.3d at 1270. In the interest of justice, and of protecting any legitimately

privileged information from disclosure, the Court finds that RNM should not have to produce

documents in response to requests #46, 52 and 54 at this stage. 

To the extent RNM’s motion seeks a ruling on its privilege objections, that request is

premature. The privilege allegedly applying to communications between RNM and Pfingsten

(request #46) is the subject of another pending discovery motion, and will be addressed when that

order is adjudicated. As for the communications between RNM and Crane 1 Delaware (#52 and 54),

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the motion does not provide enough information to conclude, as RNM argues, that all of the

requested communications are protected by the joint defense privilege. The joint defense privilege

applies to “communications passing from one party to the attorney for another party where a joint

defense effort or strategy has been decided upon and undertaken by the parties and their respective

counsel. . . . Only those communications made in the course of an ongoing common enterprise and

intended to further the enterprise are protected.” United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1467 (7th

Cir. 1997). RNM’s argument is based in part on the existence of a joint defense agreement that “was

just recently executed by the parties.” On the basis of the arguments presented, the Court cannot

assume that all relevant communications related to the lawsuit would be protected. To the extent a

dispute remains regarding production of those documents, the parties must confer about that issue

and – if necessary – file the appropriate motion. 

Finally, RNM asks that the Court reconsider permitting Munster to seek fees for the motion

to compel, because Munster never requested fees. However, when a motion to compel is granted,

the Court “must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the [responsible] party” to pay the

movant’s reasonable expenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) (emphasis added). Even if the Court had

denied the motion to compel as to the disputed requests, it could still, “after giving an opportunity

to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B).

Therefore, Munster was appropriately permitted to file a request for fees, and RNM’s argument in

opposition will be considered contemporaneously with that request.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons described above, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 

Defendant, Crane 1 Services, Inc., an Ohio Corporation n/k/a RNM Holdings, Inc.’s Partial Motion

to Reconsider [DE 196]. The Court ORDERS that RNM need not produce documents in response

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to Munster’s requests for production #46, #52, and #54 until further order of Court. Any renewed

motion to compel addressing these requests must be filed by November 22, 2019. 

SO ORDERED this 7th day of November, 2019.

s/ John E. Martin 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record

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