[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-13742

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 0:16-cr-60043-WJZ-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

SEBASTIAN GIL-RAMIREZ, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(April 20, 2017)

Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 16-13742 Date Filed: 04/20/2017 Page: 1 of 9 
2

Sebastian Gil-Ramirez appeals his 48-month sentence after pleading guilty 

to one count of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation of 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1). He argues that he was improperly denied safety-valve 

relief and a minor role reduction, and that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, 

we affirm. 

I

Mr. Gil-Ramirez was arrested in February of 2016 at Fort 

Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport when Customs and Border Patrol 

officers discovered 2,414 grams of cocaine in the false bottom of his suitcase. 

Mr. Gil-Ramirez, who is a Colombian citizen and permanent legal resident of the 

United States, claimed that he received a call from someone named “Andres” in 

Colombia who asked him if he was interested in traveling to that country to make 

some money. Mr. Gil-Ramirez knew he was likely to be involved in illegal 

activity, and brought along his girlfriend to minimize suspicion. “Andres” paid for 

all of Mr. Gil-Ramirez’s transportation and hotel costs, and told him that he would 

be carrying a suitcase containing cocaine back to the United States. After 

examining the suitcase, Mr. Gil-Ramirez agreed to transport the drugs in exchange 

for $5,000. He was arrested when the drugs were discovered upon his arrival at the 

airport. 

Case: 16-13742 Date Filed: 04/20/2017 Page: 2 of 9 
3

A grand jury indicted Mr. Gil-Ramirez on charges of importing cocaine into 

the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C.§§ 952(a) and 960(b)(3) (Count One),

and possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count Two). Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled 

guilty to Count Two, and Count One was dismissed. Mr. Gil-Ramirez agreed to 

provide the government with a written statement truthfully setting forth all 

information and evidence he had concerning the offense.

The PSI recommended a base-offense level of 26 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, as 

well as a three-level decrease under § 3E1.1(a) and (b) for acceptance of 

responsibility. The PSI recommended a total offense level of 23 and a criminal 

history category of I, resulting in an advisory guideline range of 46 to 57 months’ 

imprisonment. 

In his objections to the PSI, Mr. Gil-Ramirez requested a two-level reduction 

under the “safety-valve” provision of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, and a minor-role 

reduction. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Gil-Ramirez also requested that the 

district court grant a downward variance from the advisory guideline range. The 

district court ultimately denied his request for the reductions and sentenced him to 

48 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. 

Case: 16-13742 Date Filed: 04/20/2017 Page: 3 of 9 
4

II

“When reviewing the denial of safety-valve relief, we review for clear error 

a district court’s factual determinations.” United States v. Johnson, 375 F.3d 1300, 

1301 (11th Cir. 2004). The safety-valve provision implements 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)

and requires a district court to sentence a defendant “without regard to any 

statutory minimum sentence” if the defendant meets five criteria. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 5C1.2. A defendant’s base offense level may also be reduced by two levels if all 

five of the criteria are met. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(17). The burden is on the 

defendant to show that he has met each of the safety-valve factors. See 

Johnson, 375 F.3d at 1302. The fifth factor—the only one at issue here—requires 

that:

(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has 

truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence 

the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of 

the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the 

fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to 

provide or that the Government is already aware of the information 

shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has 

complied with this requirement. 

U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5). 

“This final factor is a ‘tell-all’ provision: to meet its requirements, the 

defendant has an affirmative responsibility to truthfully disclose to the government 

all information and evidence that he has about the offense and all relevant 

conduct.” Johnson, 375 F.3d at 1302 (internal quotation marks and citation 

Case: 16-13742 Date Filed: 04/20/2017 Page: 4 of 9 
5

omitted) (emphasis in original). The defendant has a burden to come forward and 

supply the government with all the information that he possesses about his 

involvement in the crime, including information relating to the involvement of 

others and the chain of the narcotics distribution. See id.

Mr. Gil-Ramirez argues that the district court did not fulfill its duty as 

factfinder and instead merely relied on the government’s assessment of his factual 

proffer. The record shows, however, that the district court considered at length 

both the government’s and Mr. Gil-Ramirez’s arguments at the sentencing hearing. 

See D.E. 33 at 5–12. After independent review of Mr. Gil-Ramirez’s written 

statement and the record, the court found—by a preponderance of the evidence—

that Mr. Gil-Ramirez had not truthfully provided to the government all the 

information that he possessed concerning the offense. See id. at 12. Nothing in the 

record suggests that the district court clearly erred in making this determination 

and, as a result, we affirm its denial of safety-valve relief.

III 

We review for clear error the district court’s denial of a minor role 

reduction. See United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 980 (11th Cir. 2015). A

defendant may receive a two-level decrease under the Sentencing Guidelines if he 

was “a minor participant in any criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A minor 

participant “is less culpable than most other participants, but [his] role could not be 

Case: 16-13742 Date Filed: 04/20/2017 Page: 5 of 9 
6

described as minimal.” U.S.S.G .§ 3B1.2, comment. (n.5). A defendant bears the 

burden of proving his minor role by a preponderance of the evidence. See Moran, 

778 F.3d at 980.

To determine whether a minor role adjustment applies, the court should 

consider (1) “the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct for which he has been 

held accountable at sentencing,” and (2) “his role as compared to that of other 

participants in his relevant conduct.” Id. “[A] defendant’s status as a drug courier 

does not alter the principle that the district court must assess the defendant’s role in 

light of the relevant conduct attributed to [him]” and is not itself dispositive of 

whether a defendant is entitled to receive a minor role adjustment. United States v. 

Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 942 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). “[W]hen a 

drug courier’s relevant conduct is limited to [his] own act of importation, a district 

court may legitimately conclude that the courier played an important or essential 

role in the importation of those drugs.” Id. at 942–43. “Only if the defendant can 

establish that [he] played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which [he] has 

already been held accountable—not a minor role in any larger criminal 

conspiracy—should the district court grant a downward adjustment for minor role 

in the offense.” Id. at 944.

Mr. Gil-Ramirez argues that he was merely a courier in a broader

importation scheme of which he had little knowledge, and is therefore entitled to a 

Case: 16-13742 Date Filed: 04/20/2017 Page: 6 of 9 
7

downward sentencing adjustment. The relevant criminal conduct here, however, is

possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Mr. Gil-Ramirez admitted that he 

knew he would be involved in illegal activity from the start, that he brought his 

girlfriend along on the trip as a cover-up, and that he inspected the suitcase and 

agreed to carry it into the United States. The district court did not clearly err in 

finding that Mr. Gil-Ramirez played a significant role in the commission of the 

crime for which he is held accountable, and we therefore affirm its denial of his 

request for a two-level minor role reduction.

IV

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of 

discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Mr. Gil-Ramirez, as 

the party challenging the sentence, has the burden of demonstrating that it is 

unreasonable in light of the record and the facts enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 355(a). 

See United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). “A district court 

abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that 

were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or 

irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper 

factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

Under our deferential standard of review, “we are to vacate the sentence if, but 

only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court 

Case: 16-13742 Date Filed: 04/20/2017 Page: 7 of 9 
8

committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving 

at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the 

facts of the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

We examine whether a sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 

totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The district court must 

impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 

purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the need to reflect the seriousness of the 

offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, and 

deter criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The fact that a sentence is within 

the advisory guideline range and well below the statutory maximum are both 

factors indicative of reasonableness. See United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 

898 (11th Cir. 2014).

Mr. Gil-Ramirez argues that his 48-month sentence is substantively 

unreasonable and that the court did not properly consider his family circumstances, 

gambling addiction, and impending deportation when deciding the duration of his 

term of imprisonment. He argues that, had the district court adequately considered 

these factors, it would have granted his request for a 24-month sentence. 

The record shows that the district court did in fact consider these particular 

aspects of Mr. Gil-Ramirez’s life at sentencing. See D.E. 33 at 19–26. After a 

review of the record, the PSI, and the § 3553(a) factors, the district court 

Case: 16-13742 Date Filed: 04/20/2017 Page: 8 of 9 
9

determined that a 48-month sentence was appropriate. The district court did not 

abuse its discretion because there is no indication that it failed to consider the 

relevant factors, gave weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or committed a 

clear error of judgment. Moreover, the sentence falls at the low end of the advisory 

guideline range, which indicates reasonableness. See Cubero, 754 F.3d at 898.

Accordingly, Mr. Gil-Ramirez has not demonstrated that his 48-month sentence 

was unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. 

V 

The district court did not err in denying the request for safety valve relief

because Mr. Gil-Ramirez failed to prove that he truthfully provided the 

government all the information he had concerning the offense. The district court 

also did not err when it denied Mr. Gil-Ramirez’s request for a minor role 

reduction. Finally, the district court’s imposition of a 48-month sentence was not 

substantively unreasonable and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 

Mr. Gil-Ramirez’s sentence is therefore affirmed. 

AFFIRMED.

Case: 16-13742 Date Filed: 04/20/2017 Page: 9 of 9