Filed 6/24/14 In re G.C. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re G.C., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B249155

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK98135)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RIGOBERTO C. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Marguerite D. 

Downing, Judge. Affirmed.

Frank H. Free, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant Rigoberto C.

Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant Mary C.
2

Judy Weissberg-Ortiz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant,

the Minor.

John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and 

William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

INTRODUCTION

Rigoberto C. (Father), Mary C. (Mother), and G.C. (the minor) appeal from the 

jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court of April 25, 2013, declaring 

G.C. a dependent of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 360, subd. (d)),1 allowing him 

to remain in his parents’ physical custody, and ordering the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to provide family maintenance 

services. Appellants contend the court abused its discretion by declaring G.C. a 

dependent of the court at disposition, and should have instead ordered six months of 

informal supervision by DCFS pursuant to section 360, subdivision (b), under which G.C. 

and his family would not be subject to court supervision. We find no abuse of discretion 

and affirm the challenged orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. DCFS’s Provision of Voluntary Services

In 2009, DCFS received a referral alleging Mother and Father were neglecting 

G.C. At the age of 11, G.C. weighed 320 pounds, had been diagnosed with morbid 

obesity, and had not been seen by a doctor in four years. His school attempted to 

intervene but the parents were unresponsive. DCFS opened a family maintenance case 

pursuant to section 301 and provided the family with voluntary services from June 2010 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

through June 2011. The family complied with medical referrals and made progress in 

managing G.C.’s weight, but they needed constant monitoring. They failed to obtain an 

Up-Front Assessment as requested by DCFS.2

II. Events Subsequent to Cessation of Voluntary Services

In August 2011, DCFS received a report that G.C. was being severely neglected. 

A dependency investigator found the allegations inconclusive. 

In May 2012, DCFS received a letter from St. John’s Well Child and Family 

Center, where G.C. had been receiving medical treatment since January 2010. St. John’s 

reported regarding the history of G.C.’s care as follows. At the time of his initial visit, 

G.C. weighed 336 pounds and had a body mass index of 56. The child was examined by 

an endocrinologist in August 2010, but he was unable to return for follow-up care for a 

time because his parents lost his Medi-Cal coverage. Seven months later, G.C. returned

to St. John’s and had blood work done, but Mother did not return with G.C. as instructed. 

She did keep an appointment with a nutritionist, but G.C. failed to follow through with 

most of the recommendations made by the nutritionist. In May 2011, an endocrinologist 

diagnosed G.C. with morbid obesity and elevated LDL cholesterol, and other blood test 

results indicated possible liver damage and poor management of diabetes. He was 

prescribed diabetes medication, and he was instructed to exercise for two hours daily and 

to monitor his diet. He did not return one month later for additional lab work as 

instructed. He continued to meet with a nutritionist until July 2011, when he stopped 

attending appointments.3 The nutritionist attributed G.C.’s inability to meet treatment 

goals to a lack of support from his parents. G.C. had been referred to UCLA’s fitness 

program, but Mother never took him. 

 

2 Up-Front Assessments are performed by family preservation agencies at the 

request of DCFS and use a standardized assessment tool to evaluate caretaker capacity. 

Participation is voluntary. (See http://lacdcfs.org/reunitingfamilies/docs/UpFront%20Assessments%20(UFA)%20Info%20list.pdf (as of June 23, 2014).)

3 This timing coincided with the end of the voluntary family maintenance contract.
4

G.C. returned to St. John’s in March 2012. At the time of that visit, unbeknownst 

to Mother he had gained 17 pounds in three months. Thereafter, St. John’s staff 

attempted several times to schedule appointments but received no response. The parents 

did not make appointments with the cardiologist, the ear nose and throat specialist, or the

endocrinologist to whom G.C. was referred. 

Although the May 2012 letter from St. John’s requested DCFS assistance in 

dealing with G.C., the record reflects that the social worker had lost contact with the 

family. 

III. The Section 300 Petition

DCFS received a new referral regarding G.C. in December 2012. He had not been 

to the medical clinic in five months. A social worker at his school stated he was teased at 

school and got winded just walking across campus. She scheduled an appointment with 

Mother, but Mother said there was nothing medically wrong with G.C. and did not attend 

the appointment. 

In January 2013, G.C. returned to see the nutritionist. At 14 years old, he weighed 

425 pounds and had a body mass index of 64.91. He had gained 29 pounds in the 

preceding nine months since he was last seen. 

St. John’s medical staff opined that G.C.’s obesity resulted from parental neglect. 

G.C.’s primary care physician said that if the child did not lose a dramatic amount of 

weight soon he would not live long past the age of 20. A public health nurse who had 

worked with the family providing voluntary family maintenance services expressed 

concern because Mother did not follow through on efforts to help G.C. make the drastic 

changes necessary for him to lose weight. The DCFS social worker assigned to the case 

said the parents let G.C. do whatever he wanted and they required constant monitoring. 

She believed Mother used G.C. as her substitute husband to get the attention she was not 

receiving from Father. 

Mother said she did not follow through with the referral to a weight loss clinic 

because it was too far away and she worked long hours. She admitted she had not 
5

followed through on seeking mental health treatment for G.C., but promised she would 

do so. She said G.C. saw the doctor regularly. She maintained that the doctor said there 

was no medical issue. 

On March 6, 2013, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), 

alleging that G.C. had suffered or there was a substantial risk he would suffer serious 

physical harm or illness as a result of the failure or inability of his parents to supervise or 

protect him. The petition alleged that G.C. had gained 70 pounds since voluntary family 

maintenance services ended, that the parents failed to ensure G.C. ate healthy food, and 

that they failed to take him to medical appointments. DCFS did not seek to detain G.C. 

from his parents’ custody. It reported that the family had been compliant with voluntary 

case services provided in 2010 through 2011, but the family stopped complying as soon 

as the case was closed. DCFS noted that G.C. denied Mother and Father were neglectful 

of his medical care and said he was to blame for his weight. Mother denied she was 

neglectful of G.C.’s medical needs and stated he was responsible for overeating and not 

engaging in physical activity. Mother said she had not followed through with medical 

appointments due to time constraints caused by having two jobs and because she lacked 

transportation. The social worker opined that G.C. should not be solely responsible for 

managing his own serious health conditions. The juvenile court found a prima facie case 

had been established and scheduled an adjudication hearing for April 25, 2013. 

A team decision making meeting was held on March 26, 2013. The parties agreed 

to the following: DCFS and the parents would find an inpatient weight loss program for

G.C.; DCFS would submit a referral for an Up-Front Assessment; DCFS would provide 

bus passes or tokens for transportation; G.C. would keep his appointment with Dr. Clark

at Specialized Foster Care; the parents would request a student study team or 

individualized education plan for G.C.; the parents would ensure G.C. attended all of his 

medical appointments; the parents would provide G.C. with healthier food choices and an 

exercise regimen; and the parents would participate in family preservation services. The 

parents stated they understood that if they did not meet the objectives of the safety plan 

they risked losing custody of G.C. 
6

At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held on April 25, 2013, the 

dependency investigator testified that when she met with the parents in early April, they 

had made an appointment for G.C. to be evaluated at an inpatient weight loss program 

through UCLA Fit. G.C. had kept his appointment with Dr. Clark, a specialist at the 

foster care office. Since the team decision making meeting one month earlier, G.C. had 

attended all of his medical and specialist appointments. DCFS had made a referral for an 

Up-Front Assessment for Mother, but she had not followed through. In that regard, the 

dependency investigator explained that Mother presented with a flat affect and there was 

concern that she might be suffering from depression, which would compromise her 

ability to care for G.C. The parents had requested a student study team or an 

individualized education plan for G.C. The dependency investigator did not know if the 

parents had been providing healthier food options for G.C. She stated the parents had 

been supporting him in his exercise program. G.C. was participating in individual 

therapy and seeing a nutritionist. He began participating in an exercise class at the 

Salvation Army in March 2013. His weight at the time of the jurisdictional hearing was 

406 pounds, representing a loss of 17 pounds since early March 2013.

The dependency investigator testified that family preservation services would 

involve a social worker visiting the family once a week to support them in maintaining 

G.C.’s exercise and food regimen. The social worker also would assist with scheduling

and keeping G.C.’s medical appointments, and determine any other assistance the family 

might require to meet his weight loss goals. She opined that G.C.’s parents had 

previously demonstrated their inability to continue with services without DCFS 

supervision. A family preservation referral had been made but those services were not 

yet in place. 

The dependency investigator testified that if the court did not take jurisdiction over 

G.C., there was a risk that the parents would repeat the behavior that followed the

cessation of voluntary services, and G.C.’s weight would continue to increase. Court 

intervention was required so DCFS would have the authority to supervise G.C.’s weight 

loss regimen. 
7

Mother testified that she did not take G.C. to a podiatrist appointment in August 

2012 because she had to work. She was working two jobs at the time, but she took a 

leave of absence from one of her jobs in January 2013 in order to have more time to 

devote to G.C.’s care. She was making sure he ate healthier food, and kept an eye on him 

to be sure he did not sneak food. He exercised at the gym five days a week, and she 

walked with him for 30 minutes on weekends. She baked food for family meals rather 

than serving fried food, and prepared G.C.’s school lunches. She said she had been 

trying to cook healthier meals for a long time. She had not had junk food or soda in the 

home for about six months. She and Father had been more responsible about keeping 

G.C.’s appointments by keeping a calendar since the juvenile court case was opened in 

March 2013. Mother did not agree that G.C.’s health had gotten worse in the last year 

because the doctor said G.C. was fine. She understood that if he did not get his weight 

under control he could die early, that he had diabetes, and that his cholesterol level was 

elevated but was improving. Mother did not feel she needed DCFS to supervise her 

family. 

Father testified he had been unemployed since January 2013. After the case was 

opened, he had begun taking G.C. to the gym every day. They took everything more 

seriously after the case was initiated. Father had become more involved in G.C.’s 

medical care since he stopped working. He was looking for other work and although he 

remained committed to G.C.’s well-being, he acknowledged a new job might not permit 

flexibility. 

Counsel for G.C., Mother, and Father all argued that juvenile court supervision

was not required or appropriate in this case. Counsel for Mother argued that in the 

alternative the court should sustain the petition under section 360, subdivision (b). 

The court specifically took note of Father’s comment that the family took 

everything more seriously since coming to court. It found that without DCFS 

supervision, the family was not doing what needed to be done to control G.C.’s weight.

Between the time the voluntary services ended and the new case was initiated, G.C. 

gained 70 pounds, “a huge amount of weight.” The court sustained the section 300 
8

petition as amended, found G.C. to be a person described by section 300, and declared 

him to be a dependent of the juvenile court. The court ordered DCFS to comply with the 

terms of the case plan, which included the following orders: G.C. was to participate in 

individual counseling and the family was to participate in conjoint counseling; DCFS was 

to provide a referral for family preservation services; DCFS was given discretion to make 

unannounced home visits; DCFS was to provide transportation assistance for the parents;

and DCFS was to provide the parents with low cost or no cost referrals for services. 

This appeal by Mother, Father, and G.C. followed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdictional Order

Mother and Father do not take issue with the juvenile court’s finding that G.C. is a 

person described by section 300, subdivision (b), because G.C. had suffered or there was 

a substantial risk he would suffer serious physical harm or illness as a result of the failure 

or inability of his parents to supervise or protect him by ensuring he lost weight and 

attended all medical appointments. G.C. asks this court to reverse the jurisdictional 

finding, but fails to provide any argument or legal authority to support that request. He 

has therefore forfeited any claim of error on appeal as to the jurisdictional finding. (See 

In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 410.) Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

jurisdictional finding that G.C. is a person described by section 300. We next consider 

the court’s dispositional order.

II. Dispositional Order

Appellants argue on appeal that the juvenile court abused its discretion by 

declining to order informal supervision for the family under section 360, subdivision (b),

because this option would adequately ensure G.C.’s well-being without the necessity of 

formal court supervision. As we shall explain, we disagree.
9

A. The Applicable Law

After finding that a child is a person described by section 300, the court then must 

consider the evidence on the proper disposition of the case. It may enter judgment 

adjudging the child to be a dependent child of the court, pursuant to section 360, 

subdivision (d). Alternatively, it may, without adjudicating the child a dependent of the 

court, order that services be provided to keep the family together and place the child and 

the child’s parents under the supervision of DCFS pursuant to section 360, subdivision 

(b). As explained by the court in In re Adam D. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1250 (Adam D.): 

“Seiser and Kumli, California Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2009), discusses

informal supervision as follows: ‘In some cases the parties may resolve an in-home case 

at disposition by recommending an order for informal supervision pursuant to Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 301(a). The court may also determine on its own or following a request by 

one of the parties that even though it has jurisdiction, the child is placed in the home, and 

the family is cooperative and able to work with the social services department in a 

program of informal services without court supervision that can be successfully 

completed within six to 12 months and which does not place the child at an unacceptable 

level of risk. In such cases the court may order informal services and supervision by the 

social services department instead of declaring the child a dependent [Welf. & Inst. Code 

§ 360(b); see Welf. & Inst. Code § 301].’ (Id., § 2.124[2], pp. 2-283 to 2-284.)

“‘If informal supervision is ordered pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code § 360(b), the 

court “has no authority to take any further role in overseeing the services or the family 

unless the matter is brought back before the court” pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code 

§ 360(c) [California Ctr. for Jud. Educ. and Research, Cal. Judge’s Benchguides, 

Benchguide 102: Juvenile Dependency Disposition Hearing (March 2006) § 102.37 

(Decision Process—Declaring Dependency), p. 102-30]. The court’s lack of authority to 

take a further role in overseeing the services or the family is understandable, since if the 

court felt a need to supervise the matter it would have declared dependency.

“‘If the court agrees to or orders a program of informal supervision, it does not 

dismiss the dependency petition or otherwise set it aside. The true finding of jurisdiction 
10

remains. It is only the dispositional alternative of declaring the child a dependent that is 

not made. This is because if the family is unwilling or unable to cooperate with the 

services being provided, the social worker may institute proceedings pursuant to Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 332 (petition to commence proceedings), alleging that a previous petition 

has been sustained and that informal supervision was ineffective. [Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 360, subd. (c).] After hearing the petition, the court may either dismiss it or order a 

new disposition hearing . . . . ’ (Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and 

Procedure, supra, § 2.124[2], pp. 2-283 to 2-284.)” (Adam D., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1259-1260.)

Thus, after making a finding that a child is a person described by section 300, the 

court must make a dispositional decision either to declare the child a dependent of the 

court, or not do so if it finds that informal supervision by DCFS, without court 

supervision, will be adequate to protect the child. “Once the juvenile court finds 

jurisdiction under section 300, it must adjudicate the child a dependent unless the severity 

of the case warrants nothing more than Agency’s supervision of family maintenance 

services. Under section 360, subdivision (b), if appropriate, the court may, without 

adjudicating the child a dependent, order that services be provided to keep the family 

together under the informal supervision of the child welfare agency. (§§ 360, subd. (b), 

301; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(a)(2).)

“Whether to exercise this option under section 360, subdivision (b), is a 

discretionary call for the juvenile court to make; it may opt to do so, but it need not. ‘The 

court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s 

interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion.’ (In re 

Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.) As an appellate court, we cannot 

reverse the court’s dispositional order absent a clear abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) A court 

exceeds the limits of legal discretion if its determination is arbitrary, capricious or 

patently absurd. The appropriate test is whether the court exceeded the bounds of reason. 

(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 

Cal.App.4th 159, 171, italics added.) 
11

B. Discussion

Appellants contend that the court abused its discretion by declaring G.C. a 

dependent of the court and making the family subject to the court’s supervision. They 

contend that because the family had complied with DCFS’s requirements during the time 

they were subject to a voluntary service contract (pursuant to § 301), they had 

demonstrated that court supervision was not necessary to gain their compliance. Indeed, 

Mother contends that the court perhaps confused the statutory alternatives regarding 

informal supervision because in pronouncing judgment it stressed that the family needed 

DCFS’s supervision, not the court’s. 

We find no abuse of discretion. The record on appeal supports the juvenile court’s 

determination that formal court supervision was necessary and appropriate. It had before 

it evidence that the seriousness of the case warranted court supervision. 

The year-long period of voluntary supervision in which the family participated 

from June 2010 to June 2011 was governed by section 301, which authorizes DCFS to 

engage in informal supervision where the social worker “determines that a child is within 

the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or will probably soon be within that jurisdiction.” 

(§ 301, subd. (a).) Through the informal supervision, “the social worker shall attempt to 

ameliorate the situation which brings the child within, or creates the probability that the 

child will be within, the jurisdiction of Section 300 by providing or arranging to contract 

for all appropriate child welfare services . . . .” (Ibid.) These services generally do not 

extend beyond a period of twelve months. (See §§ 16506, 16507.3.) Thereafter, “[i]f the 

family has refused to cooperate with the services being provided, the social worker may 

file a petition with the juvenile court pursuant to Section 332.” (Id., § 301, subd. (a).) 

Similarly, if informal services provided pursuant to section 360, subdivision (b) 

are ineffective, DCFS would then file a petition pursuant to section 332. The difference 

is that by proceeding under section 360, subdivision (b), DCFS would not first have to 

establish that the child is described by section 300, because that already would have been 

established. (Adam D., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1260.) Here, DCFS tried the least
12

intrusive option first (§ 301), and it proved to be ineffective over time. Indeed, the 

evidence showed that the parents’ compliance during the period of informal supervision 

was deficient. The family made progress in managing G.C.’s weight, but they needed 

constant monitoring, and their follow-through with medical referrals was inconsistent.

As soon as the period of informal supervision ended, the parents failed to monitor G.C.’s 

weight, and he gained 70 pounds after cessation of voluntary services. The parents did 

not seem to comprehend the gravity of the situation. Despite G.C.’s 70-pound weight 

gain, Mother insisted that his health had not gotten worse in the last year because the 

doctor said G.C. was fine. She said she understood that if he did not get his weight under 

control he could die early, but her actions were not congruent with that reality. Mother 

did not feel she needed DCFS to supervise and assist her family, even though she failed 

to follow through with G.C.’s medical care because she was overwhelmed by work 

demands and transportation difficulties. Granted, as of April 2013 she no longer had two 

jobs, but Father was not working and presumably the family would be subject to financial 

strain as a result. Given these circumstances, it was not arbitrary or capricious for the 

court to decide that its supervision of the family, and of DCFS’s provision of services, 

would be appropriate and even helpful. 

We flatly reject mother’s contention that “the court’s involvement with G.C. and 

his family added nothing to ensuring G.C.’s safety and well-being.” In ruling, the court 

began its comments by noting that Father said the family had been taking the matter of 

G.C.’s health more seriously since they began coming to court. It is probable that the 

family’s feeling of accountability was considerably heightened by the knowledge that 

their progress would be monitored by the court as well as DCFS. While the court did not 

want G.C. to be fearful of being taken away from his family, the court also recognized 

the possibility of that happening was a highly motivating circumstance for G.C. The 

court’s supervision of the case made the gravity of the situation more of a reality for 

everyone. The court also recognized that the level of DCFS involvement that it was 

ordering would provide important emotional support to the parents as they faced the 

challenge of making drastic, permanent changes in G.C.’s lifestyle. The lack of any 
13

lasting change as a result of the year of voluntary services supported the court’s decision 

to declare G.C. a dependent of the court. It is not too dramatic to say that effecting a 

permanent lifestyle change for G.C. is a matter of life or death. It is evident that the court 

did not abuse its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EDMON, J.*

We concur:

WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

MANELLA, J.

 

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.