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*********************************************** 
CHARLES D. GIANETTI v. ADAM DUNSBY ET AL.

(AC 40419)

Keller, Elgo and Bright, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant members of the

Easton Board of Selectmen for the alleged wrongful denial of certain

tax relief to which the plaintiff claimed that he was entitled for elderly

homeowners under a municipal ordinance. The ordinance provided that

the determination as to whether an applicant’s income qualified for tax

relief and whether an application was bona fide would be made by the

town tax assessor and that an applicant who was denied relief could

appeal to the board. Following the denial of his application for tax relief

pursuant to the ordinance, the plaintiff appealed to the board, which

denied the appeal. The plaintiff thereafter commenced the present

action, claiming that the tax assessor and the board wrongfully had

denied him tax relief pursuant to the ordinance. The trial court denied

the defendants’ motion to dismiss, in which they claimed that the trial

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s action

because there was no statutory right to appeal from the board’s decision

to the Superior Court. Thereafter, following a hearing during which the

defendants again raised the issue of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court render judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff’s claim failed on its merits. On appeal to this court,

the plaintiff raised various challenges to the factual findings and evidentiary determinations of the trial court. Held that the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s action, as the plaintiff was

not authorized by statute to commence an administrative appeal in the

Superior Court challenging the propriety of the board’s decision on

his tax relief appeal: this court construed the plaintiff’s action as an

administrative appeal, which is permitted only under statutory authority,

and because the plaintiff failed to identify any statutory authority permitting his appeal and the subject ordinance expressly was enacted pursuant

to certain enumerated statutes, none of which provided an applicant

for municipal tax relief an avenue of appeal in the Superior Court,

the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff’s appeal;

moreover, the plaintiff was not entitled to judicial review of the board’s

decision under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (§ 4-166 et

seq.), as that act applies only to state agencies and the plaintiff could

not satisfy the contested case requirement of the act because the board

was not statutorily obligated to determine the plaintiff’s rights and privileges with respect to his tax relief appeal; accordingly, because the trial

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s action, it

should have rendered judgment dismissing the action rather than rendering judgment on the merits.

Submitted on briefs March 19—officially released June 26, 2018

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for the defendants’ alleged

wrongful denial of certain tax relief, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and

tried to the court, Hon. Edward F. Stodolink, judge

trial referee; judgment for the defendants, from which

the plaintiff appealed to this court. Improper form of

judgment; judgment directed.

Charles D. Gianetti, self-represented, the appellant

(plaintiff) filed a brief.

Peter V. Gelderman filed a brief for the appellees

(defendants).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Charles D.

Gianetti, appeals from the judgment of the Superior

Court rendered in favor of the defendants, Adam Dunsby, Robert Lesser, and Scott Centrella, in this action

concerning the plaintiff’s eligibility for tax relief under

a municipal ordinance.1 On appeal, the plaintiff raises

a bevy of challenges to the factual findings and evidentiary determinations of the court. In response, the defendants contend, inter alia, that the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to entertain the present action. We

agree with the defendants and, accordingly, reverse

the judgment of the court and remand the case with

direction to dismiss the plaintiff’s action for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

This appeal concerns the ‘‘2009 Tax Relief For The

Elderly Ordinance’’ (ordinance) enacted by the town of

Easton, the stated purpose of which is to assist ‘‘elderly

homeowners with a portion of the costs of property

(real estate) taxation.’’ The ordinance specifies various

criteria for relief thereunder. The determination as to

whether an applicant’s ‘‘income qualifies for tax relief,’’

as well as whether the ‘‘application is bona fide,’’ is

made by the Easton tax assessor (assessor) pursuant

to §§ 14 and 15 of the ordinance. The ordinance also

provides a mechanism by which an applicant who is

denied relief may appeal the assessor’s determination.

Section 14 (g) states in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny person

refused relief for any reason may appeal to the Board

of Selectmen whose decision shall be final.’’

On April 23, 2009, the plaintiff filed an application

for tax relief pursuant to the ordinance. After receiving

notice that his application had been denied, the plaintiff

appealed to the Easton Board of Selectmen (board), on

which the defendants served, in accordance with § 14

(g) of the ordinance. Following a hearing, the board

sent a letter to the plaintiff, in which the board indicated

that it was prepared to deny the plaintiff’s appeal. That

letter further advised the plaintiff that, if he had any

additional information or documentation regarding his

eligibility for tax relief under the ordinance, the board

would reconsider its determination. When the plaintiff

did not respond in any manner, the board sent him

another letter informing him that his appeal was denied.

By complaint dated August 31, 2011, the plaintiff commenced a mandamus action against the members of

the board stemming from their denial of his appeal.

Following a hearing, the court, Hon. Michael Hartmere,

judge trial referee, rendered a judgment of dismissal in

favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff

had ‘‘failed to establish the essential elements of [his]

mandamus action.’’ Gianetti v. Herrmann, Superior

Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-11-

5029623-S (October 30, 2014). The plaintiff did not
appeal from that judgment.

The plaintiff commenced the present action against

the defendants on June 22, 2015, approximately six

years after the denial of his tax relief appeal by the

board. The operative complaint, the plaintiff’s August

3, 2015 amended complaint, contains one count titled

‘‘Wrongful Denial of Relief Pursuant to the Senior Tax

Relief Program Ordinance.’’ In that count, the plaintiff

alleged that although he had applied for tax relief pursuant to the ordinance and satisfied the requirements

thereof, the assessor ‘‘refused the tax relief.’’ The plaintiff further alleged that the board, in denying his appeal,

‘‘erroneously and wrongfully denied the relief provided

by the [ordinance], and the plaintiff has been harmed

thereby.’’2

After filing their answer and special defenses,3the

defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the

court ‘‘does not have subject matter jurisdiction in this

matter because there is no statutory right or authorization to appeal the [board’s] decision to the Superior

Court.’’ The court, Radcliffe, J., heard argument on the

motion on August 22, 2016, and thereafter denied the

motion to dismiss. The defendants filed a motion for

reargument or reconsideration of that determination,

which the court denied. In addition, the defendants filed

a motion for summary judgment, claiming that ‘‘there

are no genuine issues of material fact to be tried with

respect to the [plaintiff’s] complaint.’’ In denying that

motion, the court in its order clarified that ‘‘relief in

this case is not sought nor can it be awarded based

upon a claim of mandamus. The only issue here is the

action of the [board] in denying the [plaintiff’s request

for] senior citizen tax relief for the year 2009.’’

A one day hearing on that issue was held before the

court, Hon. Edward F. Stodolink, judge trial referee, on

January 5, 2017. At that hearing, the plaintiff introduced

certain documents into evidence, including copies of

the ordinance, his April 23, 2009 application for tax

relief, and his 2008 federal income tax return. The plaintiff also testified briefly at that hearing. During his testimony, a colloquy ensued as to the precise nature of the

plaintiff’s action. The court at that time observed that,

‘‘[a]s I understand it, we’re testing the propriety of an

administrative procedure of the town of Easton for

the year 2009; correct?’’ In response, the defendants’

attorney stated: ‘‘Testing the propriety? I guess that’s

correct, Your Honor.’’ The plaintiff then informed the

court that his action pertained to ‘‘the erroneousness

of’’ the board’s decision to deny his appeal. Later in the

hearing, the defendants again raised the issue of the

court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s

action.4 The defendants also advanced that claim in

their posttrial brief.

In its memorandum of decision, the court did not

resolve the question of subject matter jurisdiction.
Instead, it stated in relevant part: ‘‘The court has examined the evidence submitted in this case and the arguments raised by the briefs of the parties. It is the court’s

determination that the plaintiff’s claim fails on its merits.’’ Following a discussion of the merits of the plaintiff’s claim of entitlement to tax relief under the

ordinance, the court rendered judgment in favor of the

defendants, and this appeal followed.

Although the plaintiff raises various challenges to the

factual findings and evidentiary determinations of the

trial court, ‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be immediately

acted upon by the court.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, 280

Conn. 514, 533, 911 A.2d 712 (2006). As our Supreme

Court observed more than a century ago, ‘‘[w]henever

the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice of

the court . . . cognizance of it must be taken and the

matter passed upon before it can move one further

step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the

exercise of jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Woodmont Assn. v. Milford, 85 Conn. 517,

524, 84 A. 307 (1912). Indeed, ‘‘[o]nce it becomes clear

that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

to hear the plaintiffs’ complaint, any further discussion

of the merits is pure dicta. Lacking jurisdiction, neither

the trial court nor this court should deliver an advisory

opinion on matters entirely beyond our power to adjudicate.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide

Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 246,

558 A.2d 986 (1989). For that reason, ‘‘as soon as the

jurisdiction of the court to decide an issue is called into

question, all other action in the case must come to a

halt until such a determination is made.’’ Gurliacci v.

Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 545, 590 A.2d 914 (1991). In the

present case, the court did not comply with that well

established precept but, rather, issued a memorandum

of decision in which it concluded that the plaintiff’s

claim failed on its merits.

On appeal, the defendants renew their claim that

the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

plaintiff’s complaint. ‘‘A determination regarding a trial

court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law

over which we exercise plenary review. . . . Subject

matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court

to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the

action before it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without

jurisdiction . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Reinke v. Sing, 328 Conn. 376,

382, 179 A.3d 769 (2018).

As a preliminary matter, the defendants submit that

the present action can be construed only as an administrative appeal from the decision of the board denying

the appeal, brought by the plaintiff pursuant to § 14 (g)
of the ordinance, from the tax relief determination of

the assessor. They argue that the operative complaint

does not allege any cognizable cause of action and

emphasize that the plaintiff’s prior mandamus action

against the board was dismissed years ago. See Gianetti

v. Herrmann, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV11-5029623-S. Furthermore, in denying the defendants’

motion for summary judgment, the court in the present

case specifically found that ‘‘relief in this case is not

sought nor can it be awarded based upon a claim of

mandamus. The only issue here is the action of the

[board] in denying the [plaintiff’s request for] senior

citizen tax relief for the year 2009.’’ Because the operative complaint names the board’s members as defendants and alleges that the board ‘‘erroneously and

wrongly’’ denied the plaintiff’s appeal, the defendants

maintain that the present action may ‘‘only be characterized as an administrative appeal.’’ We agree with that

assessment. Our task, therefore, is to determine

whether the plaintiff was authorized under Connecticut

law to commence an administrative appeal in the Superior Court from the decision of the board on this municipal tax relief matter.

We begin by noting that, ‘‘with respect to administrative appeals generally, there is no absolute right of

appeal to the courts from a decision of an administrative

[body]. . . . Appeals to the courts from administrative

[bodies] exist only under statutory authority . . . .

Appellate jurisdiction is derived from the . . . statutory provisions by which it is created . . . and can be

acquired and exercised only in the manner prescribed.

. . . In the absence of statutory authority, therefore,

there is no right of appeal from [an administrative

body’s] decision.’’5

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn.

751, 756, 900 A.2d 1 (2006); accord Delagorges v. Board

of Education, 176 Conn. 630, 633, 410 A.2d 461 (1979)

(‘‘[our Supreme Court] has repeatedly held that appeals

to the courts from administrative officers or [bodies]

may be taken only when a statute provides authority

for judicial intervention’’).

The plaintiff has not identified, and we have not discovered, any statutory authority permitting him to

appeal from the decision of the board on this municipal

tax relief matter to the Superior Court.6 The ordinance

in question expressly was enacted pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes §§ 12-129n, 12-170aa, and 12-

129b through 12-129d.7 None of those statutes provides

an applicant for municipal tax relief an avenue of appeal

in the Superior Court.8 The Superior Court, therefore,

lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal commenced

pursuant thereto. See Tazza v. Planning & Zoning

Commission, 164 Conn. 187, 190, 319 A.2d 393 (1972)

(‘‘unless a statute provides for such [administrative]

appeals courts are without jurisdiction to entertain

them’’).
Resort to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act

(UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., is equally

unavailing. The UAPA ‘‘applies only to state agencies

. . . .’’ Edwards v. Code Enforcement Committee, 13

Conn. App. 1, 3, 534 A.2d 617 (1987). In Maresca v.

Ridgefield, 35 Conn. App. 769, 772 n.2, 647 A.2d 751

(1994), this court held that, because a ‘‘board of selectmen . . . does not meet the statutory definition of an

agency’’ set forth in § 4-166 (1), the plaintiff could not

commence an administrative appeal against that board

pursuant to the UAPA. Furthermore, even if the plaintiff

could surmount that shortcoming, he still could not

satisfy the contested case requirement of the UAPA.

See Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434,

442–43, 870 A.2d 448 (2005). As our Supreme Court

explained in Lewis v. Gaming Policy Board, 224 Conn.

693, 705, 620 A.2d 780 (1993), even when an administrative body conducts a hearing on a given matter, ‘‘that

does not constitute a matter as a ‘contested case’ under

§ 4-166 (2) unless the plaintiff’s rights or privileges are

‘statutorily’ required to be determined by the agency.

If the plaintiff’s rights or privileges are not ‘statutorily’

required to be determined by the agency, a ‘contested

case’ does not exist and a plaintiff would have no right

to appeal pursuant to [General Statutes] § 4-183 (a).’’

Because the General Statutes contain no provision obligating the board to determine the plaintiff’s rights and

privileges with respect to his municipal tax relief

appeal, a contested case does not exist pursuant to § 4-

166 (2). For those reasons, the plaintiff in the present

case is not entitled to judicial review under the UAPA.

Neither § 4-183 (a) of the UAPA nor any other provision of the General Statutes provides applicants for

municipal tax relief an avenue of appellate review in

the Superior Court. We therefore conclude that the

Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

the plaintiff’s action challenging the propriety of the

board’s decision on his tax relief appeal.

The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment

is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to

dismiss the plaintiff’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Oral argument on this appeal was scheduled for the morning of March

19, 2018. The plaintiff did not appear at that time and did not contact the

court or the clerk’s office regarding his failure to appear. Counsel for the

defendants did appear and indicated on the record that he had not heard

from the plaintiff. Attempts made by both the clerk of court and opposing

counsel to reach the plaintiff by telephone that morning were unsuccessful.

With the consent of the defendants’ counsel, this court, therefore, took the

matter on the record and the briefs submitted.

2

In the sole count of his complaint, the plaintiff alleged in full:

‘‘1. [The plaintiff] is a resident of Easton, Connecticut.

‘‘2. [The defendants] at all times hereinafter mentioned are the selectmen

of [Easton].

‘‘3. [Easton] has a Senior Tax Relief Program ordinance.

‘‘4. The plaintiff applied for tax relief for tax year 2009.

‘‘5. The plaintiff met all qualifying provisions of the ordinance.
‘‘6. The plaintiff submitted the financial information required by the

ordinance.

‘‘7. The [assessor] refused the tax relief.

‘‘8. The [board] denied the plaintiff’s appeal.

‘‘9. The plaintiff has a clear legal right to the relief provided by the

ordinance.

‘‘10. The [board] erroneously and wrongfully denied the relief provided

by the tax relief ordinance, and the plaintiff has been harmed thereby.’’

3

In their special defenses, the defendants raised the doctrines of collateral

estoppel and res judicata, alleging in relevant part that the present action

‘‘should be barred in its entirety as a matter of law because the exact same

claim for tax relief as pleaded here was fully adjudicated on the merits in

Gianetti v. Herrmann, [supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-11-5029623-

S].’’ The defendants also alleged that the plaintiff’s action was untimely and

subject to preclusion pursuant to the doctrine of laches.

4 When the plaintiff concluded his testimony, the defendants’ attorney

reiterated the subject matter jurisdiction claim raised by the defendants,

stating in relevant part: ‘‘[The plaintiff’s action is] an appeal from the decision

of the [board], since he names the selectmen as the defendants in this case,

[and] I don’t think the court has any jurisdiction over that, because in order

to be able to take an appeal from an administrative act . . . that right has

to be set forth in the statute. There has to be a statutory right to take an

appeal. There is none either in the ordinance or in the enabling legislation . . . .’’

5

‘‘In hearing administrative appeals . . . the Superior Court acts as an

appellate body.’’ Fagan v. Stamford, 179 Conn. App. 440, 443 n.2, 180 A.3d

1 (2018).

6 We note that although he is not a lawyer licensed to practice in this

state, the plaintiff is not an inexperienced litigant. See, e.g., Gianetti v.

Norwalk Hospital, 304 Conn. 754, 43 A.3d 567 (2012); Gianetti v. Siglinger,

279 Conn. 130, 900 A.2d 520 (2006); Gianetti v. Rutkin, 142 Conn. App. 641,

70 A.3d 104 (2013); Gianetti v. Gombos, 142 Conn. App. 197, 64 A.3d 369,

cert. denied, 309 Conn. 918, 70 A.3d 40 (2013); Gianetti v. Riether, 139 Conn.

App. 909, 56 A.3d 474 (2012), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 921, 94 A.3d 638 (2013);

Gianetti v. Connecticut Newspapers Publishing Co., 136 Conn. App. 67, 44

A.3d 191, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 923, 55 A.3d 567 (2012); Gianetti v. Gerardi,

133 Conn. App. 858, 38 A.3d 1211 (2012); Gianetti v. Anthem Blue Cross &

Blue Shield of Connecticut, 111 Conn. App. 68, 957 A.2d 541 (2008), cert.

denied, 290 Conn. 915, 965 A.2d 553 (2009); Gianetti v. American Fabrics

Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-02-0394671-

S (April 15, 2004).

7 Section 12-129n is titled ‘‘Optional municipal property tax relief program

for certain homeowners age sixty-five or over or permanently and totally

disabled.’’ Section 12-170aa is titled ‘‘Tax relief for certain elderly or totally

disabled homeowners. Reductions in real property taxes.’’ Section 12-129b

is titled ‘‘Real property tax relief for certain persons sixty-five years of age

or over.’’ Section 12-129c is titled ‘‘Application for real property tax relief

for certain persons sixty-five years of age or over. Biennial requirements.

Penalty for false affidavit or false statement.’’ Section 12-129d is titled ‘‘State

payment in lieu of tax revenue.’’

8 We note that our General Statutes expressly provide a right of appeal

to the Superior Court from particular decisions of a municipal board of

selectmen. For example, General Statutes § 13a-39 authorizes a board of

selectmen to define the boundaries of a highway in their municipality that

‘‘have been lost or become uncertain . . . .’’ Pursuant to General Statutes

§ 13a-40, ‘‘[a]ny person aggrieved by such decision may appeal to the superior

court for the judicial district where such highway is situated within ten days

after notice of such decision has been given . . . .’’