COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Frank and Agee 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

DIRK WILLIAMS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2620-00-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK 

 DECEMBER 4, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge 

 Jon M. Babineau (Saunders, Babineau & 

Brewbaker, on brief), for appellant. 

 H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General (Randolph A. Beales, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Dirk Williams (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial of 

distribution of cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-248,1 and 

distribution of cocaine within 1000 feet of school property, in 

violation of Code § 18.2-255.2. On appeal, he contends the 

evidence was insufficient to prove the transaction took place 

"within 1000 feet" of school property, as required by Code 

§ 18.2-255.2, and insufficient to prove the building was a 

"school." For the reasons stated herein, we affirm appellant's 

conviction. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

1

 This conviction is not before us. 
ANALYSIS 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record; therefore, 

this memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 

 Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to 

prove he distributed cocaine (1) within 1000 feet (2) of an 

elementary school. "On appeal, we review the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all 

reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, "it 

is our duty to look to that evidence which tends to support the 

verdict and to permit the verdict to stand unless plainly wrong." 

Snyder v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 1016, 121 S.E.2d 452, 457 

(1961). "The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is 

entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be set 

aside unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Martin, 4 Va. 

App. at 443, 358 S.E.2d at 418. 

Code § 18.2-255.2(A) provides in part: 

It shall be unlawful for any person to 

manufacture, sell or distribute or possess 

with intent to sell, give or distribute any 

controlled substance, imitation controlled 

substance or marijuana while (i) upon the 

property, including buildings and grounds, 

of any public or private elementary, 

secondary, or post secondary school, or any 

public or private two-year or four-year 

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institution of higher education; (ii) upon 

public property or any property open to 

public use within 1,000 feet of such school 

property . . . . 

 This case involves the weight of the evidence and not 

admissibility. While appellant raised the issue of the rolling 

measuring device's calibration during cross-examination of 

Investigator Michael Maslow, appellant did not object to the 

admissibility of the investigator's testimony regarding 

distance. Additionally, the trial court did not have to rely 

exclusively on the rolling device measurement. Maslow testified 

he did not remember the exact distance shown on the device, but 

he remembered the purchase of cocaine took place within 800 feet 

of the school. 

 Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to meet its 

burden of proof because "no specific testimony was offered as to 

the number of feet or any testimony with respect to the accuracy 

of the measuring device to determine the distance." He also 

maintains no evidence proved where the school property began or 

ended. Appellant further argues the investigator did not record 

the distance measured by the device. 

 Appellant miscontrues Maslow's testimony. Maslow testified 

the sale was made within 1000 feet from the "edge" of the school 

building. On re-direct, he testified the distance was "[a] 

little over two football fields" and indicated a football field 

was 300 feet. Clearly, the trial court found Maslow's testimony 

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credible. "The credibility of the witnesses and the weight 

accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who 

has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is 

presented." Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 

S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995) (citing Schneider v. Commonwealth, 230 

Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1985); Carter v. 

Commonwealth, 223 Va. 528, 532, 290 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1982)). 

 Appellant also argues the evidence did not indicate the 

type of school, who owned it, whether it was public or private, 

and whether it was a "school" as intended by the legislature. 

 However, Maslow testified, without objection, that the 

school was "Ingleside Elementary School." Under the facts of 

this case, the Commonwealth needed to prove that the accused 

sold a controlled substance on property open to public use and 

within 1000 feet of any public or private elementary school. 

Maslow's testimony, obviously believed by the trial court, 

proved appellant sold cocaine on an open sidewalk within 1000 

feet of Ingleside Elementary School. 

 The Commonwealth's evidence was competent, was not 

inherently incredible, and was sufficient to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of distribution of 

cocaine within 1000 feet of an elementary school. 

 We, therefore, affirm the conviction. 

Affirmed.

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