UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE

STANLEY R. KINDER, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 4:16-CV-76-JVB-PRC

)

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of the )

Social Security Administration, )

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 

[DE 22], filed by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on October 5, 2018. 

Plaintiff Stanley R. Kinder filed a response on October 19, 2018. No reply was filed.

In the motion, the Commissioner asks the Court to alter the Judgment entered on September 

27, 2018, and to affirm the Commissioner’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s applications for disability 

insurance benefits and supplemental security income.

The Commissioner’s request is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Relief 

is available under Rule 59(e) “only where the movant clearly establishes: ‘(1) that the court 

committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded entry 

of judgment.’” Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Blue 

v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012)). A motion to reconsider 

“is not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or arguing matters that 

could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion.” Caisse Nationale De Credit 

Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1996).
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The Commissioner asserts that the Court, in its Opinion and Order reversing the 

Commissioner’s decision, did not address the Commissioner’s argument regarding the opinion of 

reviewing cardiologist Dr. Wenzler.

The Court reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded this matter for further 

proceedings on the basis that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not properly weigh the 

opinion of Dr. Joyce Hubbard, Plaintiff’s treating physician. (Op. & Order 5, ECF No. 20). The 

Court determined that the ALJ’s stated reasons for not assigning controlling weight under the 

treating physician rule were insufficient. As the Court recounted in its order, the ALJ’s reasons 

were that Dr. Hubbard’s findings were unsupported by her previous treatment records and that the 

findings of consultative examining physician Dr. Stuart Knapp did not support Dr. Hubbard’s 

opinion. The Court found that neither Dr. Hubbard’s previous records nor the findings of Dr. 

Knapp were inconsistent with Dr. Hubbard’s opinion.

The Court, having found that these reasons did not support the ALJ’s decision to not apply 

the treating physician rule, determined that reversal and remand were necessary. Because the 

treating physician rule, if it applies, would mandate assignment of controlling weight to Dr. 

Hubbard’s opinion, it was unnecessary for the Court to determine if other aspects of the record, 

including Dr. Wenzler’s opinion, supported the ALJ’s decision.

Nothing in the Commissioner’s motion to reconsider argues that the Court committed a 

manifest error of fact or law in determining that the ALJ erred in applying the treating physician 

rule. Instead, the Commissioner assets that the Court did not address a matter that the 

Commissioner raised in the response brief on the merits. The Court did not address that matter 

because the ALJ mistaken analysis regarding the treating physician rule is outcome determinative.
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On this issue, the Court has only found that the stated reasons for not giving the treating 

physician controlling weight do not support the conclusion. The Court makes no finding as to 

whether the treating physician rule should have applied or whether the ALJ could have properly 

decided to not apply the rule and to adopt the opinion of Dr. Wenzler over that of Dr. Hubbard. 

The Commissioner appears to argue that the Court should take up those matters here. However, 

the weighing of opinions is left to the ALJ. The question for the Court to resolve was whether the 

ALJ “uses the correct legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” 

Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2017); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court determined 

that the ALJ improperly applied the treating physician rule and that the evidence cited by the ALJ 

did not support his decision, so the Court reversed on that basis. The Commissioner has not shown 

that reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is proper.

Therefore, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 

[DE 22].

SO ORDERED on November 25, 2019.

s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen

JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT