UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRY DONALD RUTLEDGE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) Cause No. 3:15-CV-401-TLS 

)

R. THOMAS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Terry Donald Rutledge, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. The Court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. To survive dismissal, the complaint must state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602–03 (7th Cir.

2009). “A claim has facial plasibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id. at 603. Thus, the plaintiff “must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands

of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that might be

redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010).

Nevertheless, the court must bear in mind that “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,

must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendants

deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) the defendants acted under color of state

law. Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). 
Rutledge is currently incarcerated at the Indiana State Prison. Here, he alleges that on

May 28, 2015, Officer Thomas left a gate unlocked that separated the mentally ill inmates from

those in general population. Rutledge alleges that Officer Thomas is aware that the mentally ill

inmates are to be segregated from the general population, but regularly leaves the gate between

the two unlocked. When Officer Thomas left the gate unlocked on May 28, 2015, a mentally ill

inmate came into the general population unit and assaulted Rutledge. Rutledge sues Officer

Thomas and the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC) for money damages as a result of the

injuries he received.

As an initial matter, “the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a suit in federal court in which

the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant.” Moore v. State of Ind.,

999 F.2d 1125, 1128 (7th Cir. 1993). Since the IDOC is a state agency, it will be dismissed. 

As for Officer Thomas, Rutledge alleges that she failed to protect him from a mentally ill

inmate. Correctional officials have a constitutional duty to protect inmates “from violence at the

hand of other inmates.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir. 2008). But, “prisons

are dangerous places. Inmates get there by violent acts, and many prisoners have a propensity to

commit more.” Id. Therefore, a failure-to-protect claim cannot be predicated “merely on

knowledge of general risks of violence in a detention facility.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 913

(7th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff must establish that “the defendant had actual knowledge of an

impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can

be inferred from the defendant’s failure to prevent it.” Santiago v. Wells, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th

Cir. 2010). This is a high bar:

To establish deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants sued

individually, Klebanowski needed to show that the officers acted with the

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equivalent of criminal recklessness, in this context meaning they were actually

aware of a substantial harm to Klebanowski’s health or safety, yet failed to take

appropriate steps to protect him from the specific danger. Klebanowski testified

during his deposition that he told officers twice on September 8 that he was afraid

for his life and he wanted to be transferred off the tier. Those statements, and the

officers’ knowledge of the first beating, are the only pieces of evidence in the

record that can assist Klebanowski in his attempt to show that the officers were

aware of any risk to him. We have previously held that statements like those made

by Klebanowski are insufficient to alert officers to a specific threat. Butera, 285

F.3d at 606 (deeming insufficient to establish deliberate indifference statements

by a prisoner that he was “having problems in the block” and “needed to be

removed”). In Butera, we deemed the inmate’s statements insufficient to give

notice to the officers because they did not provide the identities of those who

threatened the inmate, nor state what the threats were. Id.

The facts of this case make clear our reason for requiring more than general

allegations of fear or the need to be removed. By Klebanowski’s own testimony,

the officers knew only that he had been involved in an altercation with three other

inmates, and that he wanted a transfer because he feared for his life. He did not

tell them that he had actually been threatened with future violence, nor that the

attack on September 8 was inflicted by gang members because of his non-gang

status. Without these additional facts to rely on, there was nothing leading the

officers to believe that Klebanowski himself was not speculating regarding the

threat he faced out of fear based on the first attack he suffered. This lack of

specificity falls below the required notice an officer must have for liability to

attach for deliberate indifference. 

Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2008) (footnote omitted). 

Rutledge has not met this standard. He did not communicate any specific or direct threat

to Officer Thomas regarding mentally ill inmates who could pass through the gate. Nor did

Rutledge provide the identities of any mentally ill inmates who ever posed a threat to him, or to

any other inmates. Instead, he alleges that Officer Thomas failed to protect him by allowing

mentally ill inmates to cross over into general population. Such an assertion, even if true, would

establish only that Officer Thomas was negligent in her duties of keeping inmates segregated.

Negligence, however, does not violate the Constitution. Instead, Officer Thomas must have been

aware of and disregarded a specific, impending and substantial threat to Rutledge’s safety. No

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such allegation is present in the current Complaint.

Although this Complaint does not state a claim, and while it seems unlikely that Rutledge

will be able to state a claim against any of these Defendants based on him being assaulted by

another inmate, it is not possible to definitively say that he could not do so. Therefore he will be

permitted time to file an amend complaint if he believes that addressing the issues raised in this

Order will allow him to present the facts necessary to state a claim. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart,

722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013).

For these reasons, the Court:

(1) DIRECTS the Clerk to place this cause number on a blank Prisoner Complaint 42

U.S.C. § 1983 form and send it to the Plaintiff;

(2) GRANTS the Plaintiff until December 7, 2015, to file an amended complaint; and

(3) CAUTIONS him that if he does not respond by the deadline, this case will be

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because the current Complaint does not state a claim

for which relief can be granted. 

SO ORDERED on November 5, 2015.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

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