UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

SCOTT R. BLEVINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-009 PS

vs. )

)

MARTIN A. MALEY, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Scott R. Blevins, a pro se plaintiff, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1.)

He also moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (DE 2.) Under the in forma pauperis statute,

I must screen the complaint prior to service on the defendant, and must dismiss it if the action is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In

determining whether the complaint states a claim, I apply the same standard as when addressing a

motion to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). See Lagerstrom v. Kingston,

463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal,

[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few

words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has

happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403

(7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).
Here, the complaint is not a model of clarity, but it can be discerned that Blevins is suing

Martin A. Maley, a judge in Vermont family court who is presiding over a case in which Blevins

was ordered to pay child support.1 Blevins claims that during the pendency of the case, Judge Maley

has failed to “hear my side,” deprived him of contact with his child, refused to grant his request for

a “change of venue,” and improperly entered rulings “without [a] DNA test.” (DE 1 at 2.) 

This claim cannot be permitted to proceed, because Judge Maley is entitled to absolute

immunity for acts performed within his judicial capacity. See Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656,

660-61 (7th Cir. 2005). If the judge’s orders were erroneous as Blevins asserts, his remedy would

be “through appellate process,” not a federal civil rights suit. Id. at 661. Furthermore, under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the decisions of state

courts in civil cases. Gilbert v. Ill. Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2010). In essence, the

doctrine “prevents a state-court loser from bringing suit in federal court in order effectively to set

aside the state-court judgment,” and it applies “even though the state court judgment might be

erroneous or even unconstitutional.” Id. Again, Blevins may have some appeal rights available in

Vermont if he believes Judge Maley’s orders were erroneous, but under Rooker-Feldman I have no

authority to review or reverse those orders. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a plausible

claim for relief.

1

 On the same day Blevins filed this case, he filed a separate suit against the prosecutor

assigned to the child support case. See Blevins v. Hadden, No. 3:13-CV-008 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2013).

2
For these reasons, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (DE 2) is DENIED and

the complaint (DE 1) is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: February 13, 2013

s/ Philip P. Simon

PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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