IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

RAMAR DANIELS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-180 

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Petition under 28 U.S.C.

Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a person in State

Custody Seeking Review of a Prison Disciplinary Sanction, filed by

Ramar Daniels, a pro se prisoner, on March 25, 2015. Here, Daniels

challenges a disciplinary determination made by a hearing officer

at the Westville Correctional Facility (“Westville”) under case

number WCC 15-10-0291. For the reasons set forth below, the court

DENIES the petition (DE 1). The clerk is DIRECTED to close this

case.

BACKGROUND

On October 9, 2015, Correctional Officer Robinson prepared a

conduct report charging Daniels with threatening. (DE 8-1.) The

conduct report stated: 

On the date and time above I officer Robinson while

making my secured round I found Offender Daniels, Ramar

104542 making an unnessary [sic] fire in the microwave.

Offender was given a direct order to stop an[d] give it

up[. H]e failed to comply[.] Instead he ran with the fire
material and flushed it in the toilet[. H]e later came

back and got in my face and stated the following: “I’m

going to write your ass up again and get you fucked up

motherfucker, and get you out of here.” I officer

Robinson felt intimidated by Offender Daniels, Ramar

104542 and supervisor was notified.

(Id.)

On October 16, 2015, Daniels was notified of the charge of

threatening and served with a copy of the conduct report and the

screening report. (DE 8-2.) The screening report reflects that he

pled not guilty and requested lay advocate. He did not ask to call

any witnesses but he did request video evidence. (Id.) On October

20, 2015, after disciplinary hearing officer (“DHO”) Finn conducted

a video review:

Upon review of the video footage, I, Officer Finn,

observe Offender Daniels, Ramar 104542 make a fire at the

microwave near the entry door of PI. The offender then

goes to the restroom on the North hall. Officer Robinson

is then seen walking toward the restroom. Offender

Daniels and her are seen talking after he exits. Offender

Daniels walks toward the dayroom, turns around and heads

back towards the officers’ station. There is no audio

available.

(DE 8-6.)

On October 23, 2015, DHO Finn conducted a disciplinary hearing

and found Daniels guilty of the charge of threatening. (DE 8-5.) At

the hearing, Daniels’s comment was, “She wasn’t never taking to me.

I walked right past her. I’m in prison for killing her brother.

That’s why she keeps lying on me.” (Id.) 

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DISCUSSION

 When prisoners lose earned time credits in a prison

disciplinary hearing, they are entitled to certain protections

under the Due Process Clause: (1) advance written notice of the

charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial

decision maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence in defense when consistent with institutional

safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by a

fact finder of evidence relied on and the reasons for the

disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974).

To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence” to

support the hearing officer’s decision. Superintendent, Mass. Corr.

Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).

Here, Daniels raises two claims in his petition: (1) there was

insufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (2) the

disciplinary hearing officer was biased, which led him to

mischaracterize the video evidence.

 First, Daniels claims there was insufficient evidence to find

him guilty of threatening. In reviewing a disciplinary

determination for sufficiency of the evidence, “courts are not

required to conduct an examination of the entire record,

independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence,

but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board's decision

to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.” McPherson v.

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McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). “[T]he relevant

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). The court will

overturn the hearing officer’s decision only if “no reasonable

adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense

on the basis of the evidence presented.” Henderson v. United States

Parole Comm'n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994). Additionally, a

hearing officer is permitted to rely on circumstantial evidence to

establish guilt. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th

Cir. 1992).

Threatening, offense B-213, prohibits communicating to another

person a plan to physically harm, harass, or intimidate that person

or someone else. (DE 8 at 7.) (Citing the Adult Disciplinary

Process for Offenses within the Indiana Department of Corrections). 

In this case, it is clear that the record contains “some evidence”

to support the hearing officer’s determination that Daniels was

guilty of threatening. The conduct report is some evidence that

Daniels threatened Officer Robinson. McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786

(7th Cir. 1999) (conduct report alone provided some evidence to

support disciplinary determination). Indeed, the conduct report

shows that Daniels violated B-213 in two ways. First, he

communicated a plan to harass or intimidate Officer Robinson by

threatening to write her up. Second, he communicated a plan to harm

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her. Moreover, the video does generally corroborate Officer

Robinson’s account of the circumstances of what transpired;

however, because there is no audio it neither corroborates nor

undermines the contents of Daniels’ threats. Although Daniels

denies that he threatened Officer Robinson, it is not the province

of this court to re-weigh evidence. Because there is some evidence

to support the hearing officer’s determination, there is no basis

for granting habeas relief on this ground. 

Second, Daniels claims he was denied the right to an impartial

decision-maker. In the prison disciplinary context, adjudicators

are “entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity,” and “the

constitutional standard for improper bias is high.” Piggie v.

Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). Due process prohibits a

prison official who was personally and substantially involved in

the underlying incident from acting as a decision-maker in the

case. Id. However, due process is not violated simply because the

hearing officer knew the inmate, presided over a prior disciplinary

case, or had some limited involvement in the event underlying the

charge. Id. 

Here, Daniels alleges that the hearing officer was a personal

friend with the report writer. However, even if this is true, it

would not provide a basis for granting federal habeas relief.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Hester v. McBride,

966 F. Supp. 765, 774-75 (N.D. Ind. 1997). Moreover, there is no

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evidence that the hearing officer was in any way involved in the

conduct or investigation leading to the disciplinary charge. Nor do

any adverse rulings establish impermissible bias. Liteky v. United

States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994). Daniels complains that because

of the hearing officer’s friendship with Officer Robinson, the

hearing officer mischaracterized the video footage. However, the

court has reviewed the video, and it appears as though DHO Finn’s

summary is accurate. Thus, Daniels has failed to establish a

violation of his federal due process rights. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court DENIES the petition

(DE 1). The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.

DATED: March 31, 2017 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United State District Court

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