137

2016

VII.

APPENDICES
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
2016

APPENDICES 139

A. KEY STATISTICS

FDIC ACTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS APPLICATIONS 

2014–2016

2016 2015 2014

Deposit Insurance 7 5 2

Approved1 7 5 2

Denied 0 0 0

New Branches 507 548 520

Approved 507 548 520

Denied 0 0 0

Mergers 245 270 251

Approved 245 270 251

Denied 0 0 0

Requests for Consent to Serve2 167 240 327

Approved 164 239 327

Section 19 9 7 7

Section 32 155 232 320

Denied 3 1 0

Section 19 0 0 0

Section 32 3 1 0

Notices of Change in Control 14 20 15

Letters of Intent Not to Disapprove 14 20 15

Disapproved 0 0 0

Brokered Deposit Waivers 14 20 46

Approved 13 20 46

Denied 1 0 0

Savings Association Activities 0 1 4

Approved 0 1 4

Denied 0 0 0

State Bank Activities/Investments3 5 10 14

Approved 5 10 14

Denied 0 0 0

Conversion of Mutual Institutions 5 4 4

Non-Objection 5 4 4

Objection 0 0 0

1

 Includes deposit insurance application filed on behalf of (1) newly organized institutions, (2) existing uninsured financial services companies seeking 

establishment as an insured institution, and (3) interim institutions established to facilitate merger or conversion transactions, and applications to 

facilitate the establishment of thrift holding companies.

2

 Under Section 19 of the Federal Deposit Insurance (FDI) Act, an insured institution must receive FDIC approval before employing a person convicted 

of dishonesty or breach of trust. Under Section 32, the FDIC must approve any change of directors or senior executive officers at a state nonmember 

bank that is not in compliance with capital requirements or is otherwise in troubled condition. 

3

 Section 24 of the FDI Act, in general, prohibits a federally-insured state bank from engaging in an activity not permissible for a national bank and 

requires notices to be filed with the FDIC.
ANNUAL REPORT

140 APPENDICES

COMBINED RISK AND CONSUMER ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 

2014–2016

2016 2015 2014

Total Number of Actions Initiated by the FDIC 259 268 320

Termination of Insurance 0 11 3

Involuntary Termination 0 0 0

Sec. 8a For Violations, Unsafe/Unsound Practices or Conditions 0 0 0

Voluntary Termination 5 11 3

Sec. 8a By Order Upon Request 0 0 0

Sec. 8p No Deposits 5 6 3

Sec. 8q Deposits Assumed 0 5 0

Sec. 8b Cease-and-Desist Actions 30 48 57

Notices of Charges Issued 2 3 1

Orders to Pay Restitution 0 9 7

Consent Orders 26 36 48

Personal Cease and Desist Orders 2 0 1

Sec. 8e Removal/Prohibition of Director or Officer 97 88 101

Notices of Intention to Remove/Prohibit 8 4 4

Consent Orders 89 84 97

Sec. 8g Suspension/Removal When Charged With Crime 0 0 2

Civil Money Penalties Issued 37 45 66

Sec. 7a Call Report Penalties 0 0 0

Sec. 8i Civil Money Penalties 34 36 62

Sec. 8i Civil Money Penalty Notices of Assessment 3 9 4

Sec. 10c Orders of Investigation 10 19 16

Sec. 19 Waiver Orders 72 51 69

Approved Section 19 Waiver Orders 72 51 68

Denied Section 19 Waiver Orders 0 0 1

Sec. 32 Notices Disapproving Officer/Director’s Request for Review 1 0 0

Truth-in-Lending Act Reimbursement Actions 83 64 69

Denials of Requests for Relief 0 0 0

Grants of Relief 0 0 0

Banks Making Reimbursement* 83 64 69

Suspicious Activity Reports (Open and closed institutions)* 222,836 189,505 164,777

Other Actions Not Listed 7 6 6

* These actions do not constitute the initiation of a formal enforcement action and, therefore, are not included in the total 

number of actions initiated.
2016

APPENDICES 141

ESTIMATED INSURED DEPOSITS AND THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND, 

DECEMBER 31, 1934, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 20161

Dollars in Millions (except Insurance Coverage)

Deposits in Insured 

Institutions2

Insurance Fund as 

a Percentage of

Year

Insurance 

Coverage2

Total Domestic 

Deposits

Est. Insured

Deposits

Percentage 

of Domestic 

Deposits

Deposit 

Insurance

Fund

Total Domestic 

Deposits

Est. Insured

Deposits

2016 $250,000 $11,505,053 $6,822,885 59.3 80,704.0 0.70 1.18 

2015 250,000 10,950,090 6,528,125 59.6 72,600.2 0.66 1.11 

2014 250,000 10,408,187 6,201,915 59.6 62,780.2 0.60 1.01 

2013 250,000 9,825,479 5,999,191 61.1 47,190.8 0.48 0.79 

2012 250,000 9,474,720 7,402,053 78.1 32,957.8 0.35 0.45 

2011 250,000 8,782,292 6,973,483 79.4 11,826.5 0.13 0.17 

2010 250,000 7,887,858 6,301,542 79.9 (7,352.2) (0.09) (0.12)

2009 250,000 7,705,353 5,407,773 70.2 (20,861.8) (0.27) (0.39)

2008 100,000 7,505,408 4,750,783 63.3 17,276.3 0.23 0.36 

2007 100,000 6,921,678 4,292,211 62.0 52,413.0 0.76 1.22 

2006 100,000 6,640,097 4,153,808 62.6 50,165.3 0.76 1.21 

2005 100,000 6,229,753 3,890,930 62.5 48,596.6 0.78 1.25 

2004 100,000 5,724,621 3,622,059 63.3 47,506.8 0.83 1.31 

2003 100,000 5,223,922 3,452,497 66.1 46,022.3 0.88 1.33 

2002 100,000 4,916,078 3,383,598 68.8 43,797.0 0.89 1.29 

2001 100,000 4,564,064 3,215,581 70.5 41,373.8 0.91 1.29 

2000 100,000 4,211,895 3,055,108 72.5 41,733.8 0.99 1.37 

1999 100,000 3,885,826 2,869,208 73.8 39,694.9 1.02 1.38 

1998 100,000 3,817,150 2,850,452 74.7 39,452.1 1.03 1.38 

1997 100,000 3,602,189 2,746,477 76.2 37,660.8 1.05 1.37 

1996 100,000 3,454,556 2,690,439 77.9 35,742.8 1.03 1.33 

1995 100,000 3,318,595 2,663,873 80.3 28,811.5 0.87 1.08 

1994 100,000 3,184,410 2,588,619 81.3 23,784.5 0.75 0.92 

1993 100,000 3,220,302 2,602,781 80.8 14,277.3 0.44 0.55 

1992 100,000 3,275,530 2,677,709 81.7 178.4 0.01 0.01 

1991 100,000 3,331,312 2,733,387 82.1 (6,934.0) (0.21) (0.25)

1990 100,000 3,415,464 2,784,838 81.5 4,062.7 0.12 0.15 

1989 100,000 3,412,503 2,755,471 80.7 13,209.5 0.39 0.48 

1988 100,000 2,337,080 1,756,771 75.2 14,061.1 0.60 0.80 

1987 100,000 2,198,648 1,657,291 75.4 18,301.8 0.83 1.10 

1986 100,000 2,162,687 1,636,915 75.7 18,253.3 0.84 1.12 

1985 100,000 1,975,030 1,510,496 76.5 17,956.9 0.91 1.19 

1984 100,000 1,805,334 1,393,421 77.2 16,529.4 0.92 1.19 
ANNUAL REPORT

142 APPENDICES

ESTIMATED INSURED DEPOSITS AND THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND, 

DECEMBER 31, 1934, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 20161 (continued)

Dollars in Millions (except Insurance Coverage) 

Deposits in Insured 

Institutions2

Insurance Fund as 

a Percentage of

Year

Insurance 

Coverage2

Total Domestic 

Deposits

Est. Insured

Deposits

Percentage 

of Domestic 

Deposits

Deposit 

Insurance

Fund

Total

Domestic 

Deposits

Est. Insured

Deposits

1983 100,000 1,690,576 1,268,332 75.0 15,429.1 0.91 1.22 

1982 100,000 1,544,697 1,134,221 73.4 13,770.9 0.89 1.21 

1981 100,000 1,409,322 988,898 70.2 12,246.1 0.87 1.24 

1980 100,000 1,324,463 948,717 71.6 11,019.5 0.83 1.16 

1979 40,000 1,226,943 808,555 65.9 9,792.7 0.80 1.21 

1978 40,000 1,145,835 760,706 66.4 8,796.0 0.77 1.16 

1977 40,000 1,050,435 692,533 65.9 7,992.8 0.76 1.15 

1976 40,000 941,923 628,263 66.7 7,268.8 0.77 1.16 

1975 40,000 875,985 569,101 65.0 6,716.0 0.77 1.18 

1974 40,000 833,277 520,309 62.4 6,124.2 0.73 1.18 

1973 20,000 766,509 465,600 60.7 5,615.3 0.73 1.21 

1972 20,000 697,480 419,756 60.2 5,158.7 0.74 1.23 

1971 20,000 610,685 374,568 61.3 4,739.9 0.78 1.27 

1970 20,000 545,198 349,581 64.1 4,379.6 0.80 1.25 

1969 20,000 495,858 313,085 63.1 4,051.1 0.82 1.29 

1968 15,000 491,513 296,701 60.4 3,749.2 0.76 1.26 

1967 15,000 448,709 261,149 58.2 3,485.5 0.78 1.33 

1966 15,000 401,096 234,150 58.4 3,252.0 0.81 1.39 

1965 10,000 377,400 209,690 55.6 3,036.3 0.80 1.45 

1964 10,000 348,981 191,787 55.0 2,844.7 0.82 1.48 

1963 10,000 313,304 177,381 56.6 2,667.9 0.85 1.50 

1962 10,000 297,548 170,210 57.2 2,502.0 0.84 1.47 

1961 10,000 281,304 160,309 57.0 2,353.8 0.84 1.47 

1960 10,000 260,495 149,684 57.5 2,222.2 0.85 1.48 

1959 10,000 247,589 142,131 57.4 2,089.8 0.84 1.47 

1958 10,000 242,445 137,698 56.8 1,965.4 0.81 1.43 

1957 10,000 225,507 127,055 56.3 1,850.5 0.82 1.46 

1956 10,000 219,393 121,008 55.2 1,742.1 0.79 1.44 

1955 10,000 212,226 116,380 54.8 1,639.6 0.77 1.41 

1954 10,000 203,195 110,973 54.6 1,542.7 0.76 1.39 

1953 10,000 193,466 105,610 54.6 1,450.7 0.75 1.37 

1952 10,000 188,142 101,841 54.1 1,363.5 0.72 1.34 

1951 10,000 178,540 96,713 54.2 1,282.2 0.72 1.33 
2016

APPENDICES 143

ESTIMATED INSURED DEPOSITS AND THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND, 

DECEMBER 31, 1934, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 20161 (continued)

Dollars in Millions (except Insurance Coverage) 

Deposits in Insured 

Institutions2

Insurance Fund as 

a Percentage of

Year

Insurance 

Coverage2

Total Domestic 

Deposits

Est. Insured

Deposits

Percentage 

of Domestic 

Deposits

Deposit 

Insurance

Fund

Total

Domestic 

Deposits

Est. Insured

Deposits

1950 10,000 167,818 91,359 54.4 1,243.9 0.74 1.36 

1949 5,000 156,786 76,589 48.8 1,203.9 0.77 1.57 

1948 5,000 153,454 75,320 49.1 1,065.9 0.69 1.42 

1947 5,000 154,096 76,254 49.5 1,006.1 0.65 1.32 

1946 5,000 148,458 73,759 49.7 1,058.5 0.71 1.44 

1945 5,000 157,174 67,021 42.6 929.2 0.59 1.39 

1944 5,000 134,662 56,398 41.9 804.3 0.60 1.43 

1943 5,000 111,650 48,440 43.4 703.1 0.63 1.45 

1942 5,000 89,869 32,837 36.5 616.9 0.69 1.88 

1941 5,000 71,209 28,249 39.7 553.5 0.78 1.96 

1940 5,000 65,288 26,638 40.8 496.0 0.76 1.86 

1939 5,000 57,485 24,650 42.9 452.7 0.79 1.84 

1938 5,000 50,791 23,121 45.5 420.5 0.83 1.82 

1937 5,000 48,228 22,557 46.8 383.1 0.79 1.70 

1936 5,000 50,281 22,330 44.4 343.4 0.68 1.54 

1935 5,000 45,125 20,158 44.7 306.0 0.68 1.52 

1934 5,000 40,060 18,075 45.1 291.7 0.73 1.61 

1 For 2016, figures are as of September 30; all other prior years are as of December 31. Prior to 1989, figures are for the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) 

only and exclude insured branches of foreign banks. For 1989 to 2005, figures represent the sum of the BIF and Savings Association Insurance Fund 

(SAIF) amounts; for 2006 to 2016, figures are for DIF. Amounts for 1989-2016 include insured branches of foreign banks. Prior to year-end 1991, 

insured deposits were estimated using percentages determined from June Call and Thrift Financial Reports.

2

 The year-end 2008 coverage limit and estimated insured deposits do not reflect the temporary increase to $250,000 then in effect under the 

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) Act made this 

coverage limit permanent. The year-end 2009 coverage limit and estimated insured deposits reflect the $250,000 coverage limit. The Dodd-Frank Act 

also temporarily provided unlimited coverage for non-interest bearing transaction accounts for two years beginning December 31, 2010. Coverage for 

certain retirement accounts increased to $250,000 in 2006. Initial coverage limit was $2,500 from January 1 to June 30, 1934.
ANNUAL REPORT

144 APPENDICES

INCOME AND EXPENSES, DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND, FROM BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS, 

SEPTEMBER 11, 1933, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2016 

Dollars in Millions

Income Expenses and Losses

Year Total

Assessment 

Income

Assessment 

Credits

Investment 

and Other

Effective

Assessment 

Rate1 Total

Provision 

for 

Ins. Losses

Admin.

and 

Operating 

Expenses2

Interest

& Other 

Ins. 

Expenses

Funding 

Transfer

from the 

FSLIC 

Resolution Fund

Net 

Income/

(Loss)

Total $230,629.4 $165,000.2 $11,392.9 $77,022.1 $147,747.9 $108,474.3 $29,809.6 $9,464.0 $139.5 $83,021.0

2016 10,674.1 9,986.6 0.0 687.5 0.0699% 150.6 (1,567.9) 1,715.0 3.5 0 10,523.5 

2015 9,303.5 8,846.8 0.0 456.7 0.0647% (553.2) (2,251.3) 1,687.2 10.9 0 9,856.7 

2014 8,965.1 8,656.1 0.0 309.0 0.0663% (6,634.7) (8,305.5) 1,664.3 6.5 0 15,599.8 

2013 10,458.9 9,734.2 0.0 724.7 0.0775% (4,045.9) (5,659.4) 1,608.7 4.8 0 14,504.8 

2012 18,522.3 12,397.2 0.2 6,125.3 0.1012% (2,599.0) (4,222.6) 1,777.5 (153.9) 0 21,121.3 

2011 16,342.0 13,499.5 0.9 2,843.4 0.1115% (2,915.4) (4,413.6) 1,625.4 (127.2) 0 19,257.4 

2010 13,379.9 13,611.2 0.8 (230.5) 0.1772% 75.0 (847.8) 1,592.6 (669.8) 0 13,304.9 

2009 24,706.4 17,865.4 148.0 6,989.0 0.2330% 60,709.0 57,711.8 1,271.1 1,726.1 0 (36,002.6)

2008 7,306.3 4,410.4 1,445.9 4,341.8 0.0418% 44,339.5 41,838.8 1,033.5 1,467.2 0 (37,033.2)

2007 3,196.2 3,730.9 3,088.0 2,553.3 0.0093% 1,090.9 95.0 992.6 3.3 0 2,105.3 

2006 2,643.5 31.9 0.0 2,611.6 0.0005% 904.3 (52.1) 950.6 5.8 0 1,739.2 

2005 2,420.5 60.9 0.0 2,359.6 0.0010% 809.3 (160.2) 965.7 3.8 0 1,611.2 

2004 2,240.3 104.2 0.0 2,136.1 0.0019% 607.6 (353.4) 941.3 19.7 0 1,632.7 

2003 2,173.6 94.8 0.0 2,078.8 0.0019% (67.7) (1,010.5) 935.5 7.3 0 2,241.3 

2002 2,384.7 107.8 0.0 2,276.9 0.0023% 719.6 (243.0) 945.1 17.5 0 1,665.1 

2001 2,730.1 83.2 0.0 2,646.9 0.0019% 3,123.4 2,199.3 887.9 36.2 0 (393.3)

2000 2,570.1 64.3 0.0 2,505.8 0.0016% 945.2 28.0 883.9 33.3 0 1,624.9 

1999 2,416.7 48.4 0.0 2,368.3 0.0013% 2,047.0 1,199.7 823.4 23.9 0 369.7 

1998 2,584.6 37.0 0.0 2,547.6 0.0010% 817.5 (5.7) 782.6 40.6 0 1,767.1 

1997 2,165.5 38.6 0.0 2,126.9 0.0011% 247.3 (505.7) 677.2 75.8 0 1,918.2 

1996 7,156.8 5,294.2 0.0 1,862.6 0.1622% 353.6 (417.2) 568.3 202.5 0 6,803.2 

1995 5,229.2 3,877.0 0.0 1,352.2 0.1238% 202.2 (354.2) 510.6 45.8 0 5,027.0 

1994 7,682.1 6,722.7 0.0 959.4 0.2192% (1,825.1) (2,459.4) 443.2 191.1 0 9,507.2 

1993 7,354.5 6,682.0 0.0 672.5 0.2157% (6,744.4) (7,660.4) 418.5 497.5 0 14,098.9 

1992 6,479.3 5,758.6 0.0 720.7 0.1815% (596.8) (2,274.7) 614.83 1,063.1 35.4 7,111.5 

1991 5,886.5 5,254.0 0.0 632.5 0.1613% 16,925.3 15,496.2 326.1 1,103.0 42.4 (10,996.4)

1990 3,855.3 2,872.3 0.0 983.0 0.0868% 13,059.3 12,133.1 275.6 650.6 56.1 (9,147.9)

1989 3,494.8 1,885.0 0.0 1,609.8 0.0816% 4,352.2 3,811.3 219.9 321.0 5.6 (851.8)

1988 3,347.7 1,773.0 0.0 1,574.7 0.0825% 7,588.4 6,298.3 223.9 1,066.2 0 (4,240.7)

1987 3,319.4 1,696.0 0.0 1,623.4 0.0833% 3,270.9 2,996.9 204.9 69.1 0 48.5 

1986 3,260.1 1,516.9 0.0 1,743.2 0.0787% 2,963.7 2,827.7 180.3 (44.3) 0 296.4 

1985 3,385.5 1,433.5 0.0 1,952.0 0.0815% 1,957.9 1,569.0 179.2 209.7 0 1,427.6 

1984 3,099.5 1,321.5 0.0 1,778.0 0.0800% 1,999.2 1,633.4 151.2 214.6 0 1,100.3 

1983 2,628.1 1,214.9 164.0 1,577.2 0.0714% 969.9 675.1 135.7 159.1 0 1,658.2 

1982 2,524.6 1,108.9 96.2 1,511.9 0.0769% 999.8 126.4 129.9 743.5 0 1,524.8 

1981 2,074.7 1,039.0 117.1 1,152.8 0.0714% 848.1 320.4 127.2 400.5 0 1,226.6 

1980 1,310.4 951.9 521.1 879.6 0.0370% 83.6 (38.1) 118.2 3.5 0 1,226.8 
2016

APPENDICES 145

INCOME AND EXPENSES, DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND, FROM BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS, 

SEPTEMBER 11, 1933, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2016 (continued)

Dollars in Millions

Income Expenses and Losses

Year Total

Assessment 

Income

Assessment 

Credits

Investment 

and Other

Effective

Assessment 

Rate1 Total

Provision 

for 

Ins. Losses

Admin.

and 

Operating 

Expenses2

Interest

& Other 

Ins. 

Expenses

Funding 

Transfer

from the 

FSLIC 

Resolution Fund

Net 

Income/

(Loss)

1979 1,090.4 881.0 524.6 734.0 0.0333% 93.7 (17.2) 106.8 4.1 0 996.7 

1978 952.1 810.1 443.1 585.1 0.0385% 148.9 36.5 103.3 9.1 0 803.2 

1977 837.8 731.3 411.9 518.4 0.0370% 113.6 20.8 89.3 3.5 0 724.2 

1976 764.9 676.1 379.6 468.4 0.0370% 212.3 28.0 180.44 3.9 0 552.6 

1975 689.3 641.3 362.4 410.4 0.0357% 97.5 27.6 67.7 2.2 0 591.8 

1974 668.1 587.4 285.4 366.1 0.0435% 159.2 97.9 59.2 2.1 0 508.9 

1973 561.0 529.4 283.4 315.0 0.0385% 108.2 52.5 54.4 1.3 0 452.8 

1972 467.0 468.8 280.3 278.5 0.0333% 65.7 10.1 49.6 6.05 0 401.3 

1971 415.3 417.2 241.4 239.5 0.0345% 60.3 13.4 46.9 0.0 0 355.0 

1970 382.7 369.3 210.0 223.4 0.0357% 46.0 3.8 42.2 0.0 0 336.7 

1969 335.8 364.2 220.2 191.8 0.0333% 34.5 1.0 33.5 0.0 0 301.3 

1968 295.0 334.5 202.1 162.6 0.0333% 29.1 0.1 29.0 0.0 0 265.9 

1967 263.0 303.1 182.4 142.3 0.0333% 27.3 2.9 24.4 0.0 0 235.7 

1966 241.0 284.3 172.6 129.3 0.0323% 19.9 0.1 19.8 0.0 0 221.1 

1965 214.6 260.5 158.3 112.4 0.0323% 22.9 5.2 17.7 0.0 0 191.7 

1964 197.1 238.2 145.2 104.1 0.0323% 18.4 2.9 15.5 0.0 0 178.7 

1963 181.9 220.6 136.4 97.7 0.0313% 15.1 0.7 14.4 0.0 0 166.8 

1962 161.1 203.4 126.9 84.6 0.0313% 13.8 0.1 13.7 0.0 0 147.3 

1961 147.3 188.9 115.5 73.9 0.0323% 14.8 1.6 13.2 0.0 0 132.5 

1960 144.6 180.4 100.8 65.0 0.0370% 12.5 0.1 12.4 0.0 0 132.1 

1959 136.5 178.2 99.6 57.9 0.0370% 12.1 0.2 11.9 0.0 0 124.4 

1958 126.8 166.8 93.0 53.0 0.0370% 11.6 0.0 11.6 0.0 0 115.2 

1957 117.3 159.3 90.2 48.2 0.0357% 9.7 0.1 9.6 0.0 0 107.6 

1956 111.9 155.5 87.3 43.7 0.0370% 9.4 0.3 9.1 0.0 0 102.5 

1955 105.8 151.5 85.4 39.7 0.0370% 9.0 0.3 8.7 0.0 0 96.8 

1954 99.7 144.2 81.8 37.3 0.0357% 7.8 0.1 7.7 0.0 0 91.9 

1953 94.2 138.7 78.5 34.0 0.0357% 7.3 0.1 7.2 0.0 0 86.9 

1952 88.6 131.0 73.7 31.3 0.0370% 7.8 0.8 7.0 0.0 0 80.8 

1951 83.5 124.3 70.0 29.2 0.0370% 6.6 0.0 6.6 0.0 0 76.9 

1950 84.8 122.9 68.7 30.6 0.0370% 7.8 1.4 6.4 0.0 0 77.0 

1949 151.1 122.7 0.0 28.4 0.0833% 6.4 0.3 6.1 0.0 0 144.7 

1948 145.6 119.3 0.0 26.3 0.0833% 7.0 0.7 6.36 0.0 0 138.6 

1947 157.5 114.4 0.0 43.1 0.0833% 9.9 0.1 9.8 0.0 0 147.6 

1946 130.7 107.0 0.0 23.7 0.0833% 10.0 0.1 9.9 0.0 0 120.7 

1945 121.0 93.7 0.0 27.3 0.0833% 9.4 0.1 9.3 0.0 0 111.6 

1944 99.3 80.9 0.0 18.4 0.0833% 9.3 0.1 9.2 0.0 0 90.0 

1943 86.6 70.0 0.0 16.6 0.0833% 9.8 0.2 9.6 0.0 0 76.8 

1942 69.1 56.5 0.0 12.6 0.0833% 10.1 0.5 9.6 0.0 0 59.0 
ANNUAL REPORT

146 APPENDICES

INCOME AND EXPENSES, DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND, FROM BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS, 

SEPTEMBER 11, 1933, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2016 (continued)

Dollars in Millions

Income Expenses and Losses

Year Total

Assessment 

Income

Assessment 

Credits

Investment 

and Other

Effective

Assessment 

Rate1 Total

Provision 

for 

Ins. Losses

Admin.

and 

Operating 

Expenses2

Interest

& Other 

Ins. 

Expenses

Funding 

Transfer

from the 

FSLIC 

Resolution Fund

Net 

Income/

(Loss)

1941 62.0 51.4 0.0 10.6 0.0833% 10.1 0.6 9.5 0.0 0 51.9 

1940 55.9 46.2 0.0 9.7 0.0833% 12.9 3.5 9.4 0.0 0 43.0 

1939 51.2 40.7 0.0 10.5 0.0833% 16.4 7.2 9.2 0.0 0 34.8 

1938 47.7 38.3 0.0 9.4 0.0833% 11.3 2.5 8.8 0.0 0 36.4 

1937 48.2 38.8 0.0 9.4 0.0833% 12.2 3.7 8.5 0.0 0 36.0 

1936 43.8 35.6 0.0 8.2 0.0833% 10.9 2.6 8.3 0.0 0 32.9 

1935 20.8 11.5 0.0 9.3 0.0833% 11.3 2.8 8.5 0.0 0 9.5 

1933-34 7.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 N/A 10.0 0.2 9.8 0.0 0 (3.0)

1

 Figures represent only BIF-insured institutions prior to 1990, BIF- and SAIF-insured institutions from 1990 through 2005, and DIF-insured institutions 

beginning in 2006. After 1995, all thrift closings became the responsibility of the FDIC and amounts are reflected in the SAIF. The effective assessment 

rate is calculated from annual assessment income (net of assessment credits), excluding transfers to the Financing Corporation (FICO), Resolution 

Funding Corporation (REFCORP) and FSLIC Resolution Fund, divided by the four quarter average assessment base. The effective rates from 1950 

through 1984 varied from the statutory rate of 0.0833 percent due to assessment credits provided in those years. The statutory rate increased to 

0.12 percent in 1990 and to a minimum of 0.15 percent in 1991. The effective rates in 1991 and 1992 varied because the FDIC exercised new 

authority to increase assessments above the statutory minimum rate when needed. Beginning in 1993, the effective rate was based on a risk-related 

premium system under which institutions paid assessments in the range of 0.23 percent to 0.31 percent. In May 1995, the BIF reached the mandatory 

recapitalization level of 1.25 percent. As a result, BIF assessment rates were reduced to a range of 0.04 percent to 0.31 percent of assessable 

deposits, effective June 1995, and assessments totaling $1.5 billion were refunded in September 1995. Assessment rates for the BIF were lowered 

again to a range of 0 to 0.27 percent of assessable deposits, effective the start of 1996. In 1996, the SAIF collected a one-time special assessment 

of $4.5 billion. Subsequently, assessment rates for the SAIF were lowered to the same range as the BIF, effective October 1996. This range of rates 

remained unchanged for both funds through 2006. As part of the implementation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005, assessment 

rates were increased to a range of 0.05 percent to 0.43 percent of assessable deposits effective at the start of 2007, but many institutions received 

a one-time assessment credit ($4.7 billion in total) to offset the new assessments. For the first quarter of 2009, assessment rates were increased to a 

range of 0.12 to 0.50 percent of assessable deposits. On June 30, 2009, a special assessment was imposed on all insured banks and thrifts, which 

amounted in aggregate to approximately $5.4 billion. For 8,106 institutions, with $9.3 trillion in assets, the special assessment was 5 basis points of 

each institution’s assets minus tier one capital; 89 other institutions, with assets of $4.0 trillion, had their special assessment capped at 10 basis points 

of their second quarter assessment base. From the second quarter of 2009 through the first quarter of 2011, initial assessment rates ranged between 

0.12 and 0.45 percent of assessable deposits. Initial rates are subject to further adjustments. Beginning in the second quarter of 2011, the assessment 

base changed to average total consolidated assets less average tangible equity (with certain adjustments for banker’s banks and custodial banks), as 

required by the Dodd-Frank Act. The FDIC implemented a new assessment rate schedule at the same time to conform to the larger assessment base. 

Initial assessment rates were lowered to a range of 0.05 to 0.35 percent of the new base. The annualized assessment rates averaged approximately 

17.6 cents per $100 of assessable deposits for the first quarter of 2011 and 11.1 cents per $100 of the new base for the last three quarters of 2011 

(which is the figure shown in the table). The annualized assessment rate for 2016 is based on full year assessment income divided by a four quarter 

average of 2016 quarterly assessment base amounts. The assessment base for fourth quarter 2016 was estimated using the third quarter 2016 

assessment base and an assumed quarterly growth rate of one percent. Beginning July 1, 2016 initial assessment rates were lowered from a range of 

5 basis points to 35 basis points to a range of 3 basis points to 30 basis points, and an additional surcharge was imposed on large banks (generally 

institutions with $10 billion or more in assets) of 4.5 basis points of their assessment base (after making adjustments).

2

 These expenses, which are presented as operating expenses in the Statement of Income and Fund Balance, pertain to the FDIC in its corporate 

capacity only and do not include costs that are charged to the failed bank receiverships that are managed by the FDIC. The receivership expenses are 

presented as part of the “Receivables from Resolutions, net” line on the Balance Sheet. The narrative and graph presented on page 89 of this report 

shows the aggregate (corporate and receivership) expenditures of the FDIC.

3

 Includes $210 million for the cumulative effect of an accounting change for certain postretirement benefits (1992).

4

 Includes a $106 million net loss on government securities (1976).

5

 This amount represents interest and other insurance expenses from 1933 to 1972.

6

 Includes the aggregate amount of $81 million of interest paid on capital stock between 1933 and 1948.
2016

APPENDICES 147

FDIC INSURED INSTITUTIONS CLOSED DURING 2016

Dollars in Thousands

Codes for Bank Class:

NM = State-chartered bank that is not a 

 member of the Federal Reserve System

N = National Bank 

SB = Savings Bank

SI = Stock and Mutual 

Savings Bank

SM= State-chartered bank that is a 

member of the Federal Reserve System

SA = Savings Association

Name and Location

Bank 

Class

Number

of 

Deposit 

Accounts

Total 

Assets1 Total Deposits1

Insured 

Deposit Funding 

and Other 

Disbursements

Estimated Loss 

to 

the DIF2

Date of 

Closing 

or Acquisition

Receiver/Assuming 

Bank and Location

Purchase and Assumption - All Deposits

Trust Company Bank

Memphis, TN

NM 614 $18,998 $20,148 $21,119 $10,931 04/29/16 The Bank of 

Fayette County

Piperton, TN

Whole Bank Purchase and Assumption - All Deposits

North Milwaukee 

State Bank

Milwaukee, WI

NM 2,548 $67,115 $61,493 $59,864 11,846 03/11/16 First-Citizens Bank 

& Trust Company

Raleigh, NC

First CornerStone 

Bank

King of Prussia, PA

NM 2,372 $103,307 $101,040 $97,455 12,482 05/06/16 First-Citizens Bank 

& Trust Company

Raleigh, NC

The Woodbury 

Banking Company

Woodbury, GA

NM 1,358 $21,426 $21,122 $20,475 $5,225 08/19/16 United Bank

Zebulon, GA

Allied Bank

Mulberry, AR

SM 4,081 $66,336 $64,713 $61,271 $6,880 09/23/16 Today’s Bank

Huntsville, AR

1

 Total Assets and Total Deposits data are based upon the last Call Report filed by the institution prior to failure.

2

 Estimated losses are as of December 31, 2016. Estimated losses are routinely adjusted with updated information from new appraisals and asset 

sales, which ultimately affect the asset values and projected recoveries. Represents the estimated loss to the DIF from deposit insurance obligations.
ANNUAL REPORT

148 APPENDICES

RECOVERIES AND LOSSES BY THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND ON DISBURSEMENTS 

FOR THE PROTECTION OF DEPOSITORS, 1934 - 2016

Dollars in Thousands

Bank and Thrift Failures1

Year2

Number 

of Banks/

Thrifts

Total 

Assets3

Total 

Deposits3 Funding4 Recoveries5

Estimated 

Additional 

Recoveries

Final and 

Estimated 

Losses6

2,615 $941,561,675 $708,551,440 $582,315,734 $412,100,104 $63,283,794 $106,931,836 

2016 5 $277,182 $268,516 260,184 0 212,820 47,364 

2015 8 6,706,038 4,870,464 4,559,009 730,994 2,921,111 906,904 

2014 18 2,913,503 2,691,485 2,679,230 387,559 1,899,750 391,921 

2013 24 6,044,051 5,132,246 5,019,216 217,015 3,549,064 1,253,137 

2012 51 11,617,348 11,009,630 11,035,242 1,647,257 6,913,768 2,474,217 

2011 92 34,922,997 31,071,862 30,705,964 2,847,739 21,329,461 6,528,764 

20107 157 92,084,988 78,290,185 82,295,469 55,153,961 10,678,036 16,463,472 

20097 140 169,709,160 137,835,121 136,056,847 94,312,538 14,205,363 27,538,946 

20087 25 371,945,480 234,321,715 205,822,476 184,374,984 3,146,441 18,301,051 

2007 3 2,614,928 2,424,187 1,920,576 1,461,932 297,359 161,285

2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2004 4 170,099 156,733 139,182 134,978 287 3,917 

2003 3 947,317 901,978 883,772 812,933 8,192 62,647 

2002 11 2,872,720 2,512,834 1,567,805 1,711,173 (493,685) 350,317 

2001 4 1,821,760 1,661,214 21,131 1,138,677 (1,410,011) 292,465 

2000 7 410,160 342,584 297,313 265,175 0 32,138 

1999 8 1,592,189 1,320,573 1,308,225 711,758 9,324 587,143 

1998 3 290,238 260,675 292,921 58,248 11,819 222,854 

1997 1 27,923 27,511 25,546 20,520 0 5,026 

1996 6 232,634 230,390 201,533 140,918 0 60,615 

1995 6 802,124 776,387 609,043 524,571 0 84,472 

1994 13 1,463,874 1,397,018 1,224,769 1,045,718 0 179,051 

1993 41 3,828,939 3,509,341 3,841,658 3,209,012 0 632,646 

1992 120 45,357,237 39,921,310 14,541,476 10,866,760 567 3,674,149 

1991 124 64,556,512 52,972,034 21,501,145 15,496,730 4,128 6,000,287

1990 168 16,923,462 15,124,454 10,812,484 8,040,995 0 2,771,489 

1989 206 28,930,572 24,152,468 11,443,281 5,247,995 0 6,195,286 

1988 200 38,402,475 26,524,014 10,432,655 5,055,158 0 5,377,497 

1987 184 6,928,889 6,599,180 4,876,994 3,014,502 0 1,862,492 

1986 138 7,356,544 6,638,903 4,632,121 2,949,583 0 1,682,538 

1985 116 3,090,897 2,889,801 2,154,955 1,506,776 0 648,179 

1984 78 2,962,179 2,665,797 2,165,036 1,641,157 0 523,879 

1983 44 3,580,132 2,832,184 3,042,392 1,973,037 0 1,069,355 

1982 32 1,213,316 1,056,483 545,612 419,825 0 125,787 

1981 7 108,749 100,154 114,944 105,956 0 8,988 

1980 10 239,316 219,890 152,355 121,675 0 30,680 

1934 - 1979 558 8,615,743 5,842,119 5,133,173 4,752,295 0 380,878
2016

APPENDICES 149

RECOVERIES AND LOSSES BY THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND ON DISBURSEMENTS 

FOR THE PROTECTION OF DEPOSITORS, 1934 - 2016

Dollars in Thousands

Assistance Transactions1

Year2

Number 

of Banks/

Thrifts

Total 

Assets3

Total 

Deposits3 Funding4 Recoveries5

Estimated 

Additional 

Recoveries

Final and 

Estimated 

Losses6

154 $3,317,099,253 $1,442,173,417 $11,630,356 $6,199,875 0 $5,430,481 

2016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

20098 8 1,917,482,183 1,090,318,282 0 0 0 0 

20088 5 1,306,041,994 280,806,966 0 0 0 0 

2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

1992 2 33,831 33,117 1,486 1,236 0 250 

1991 3 78,524 75,720 6,117 3,093 0 3,024 

1990 1 14,206 14,628 4,935 2,597 0 2,338 

1989 1 4,438 6,396 2,548 252 0 2,296 

1988 80 15,493,939 11,793,702 1,730,351 189,709 0 1,540,642 

1987 19 2,478,124 2,275,642 160,877 713 0 160,164 

1986 7 712,558 585,248 158,848 65,669 0 93,179 

1985 4 5,886,381 5,580,359 765,732 406,676 0 359,056 
ANNUAL REPORT

150 APPENDICES

RECOVERIES AND LOSSES BY THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND ON DISBURSEMENTS 

FOR THE PROTECTION OF DEPOSITORS, 1934 - 2016 (continued)

Dollars in Thousands

Assistance Transactions1

Year2

Number 

of Banks/

Thrifts

Total 

Assets3

Total 

Deposits3 Funding4 Recoveries5

Estimated 

Additional 

Recoveries

Final and 

Estimated 

Losses6

1984 2 40,470,332 29,088,247 5,531,179 4,414,904 0 1,116,275 

1983 4 3,611,549 3,011,406 764,690 427,007 0 337,683 

1982 10 10,509,286 9,118,382 1,729,538 686,754 0 1,042,784 

1981 3 4,838,612 3,914,268 774,055 1,265 0 772,790 

1980 1 7,953,042 5,001,755 0 0 0 0 

1934 - 1979 4 1,490,254 549,299 0 0 0 0

1

 Institutions for which the FDIC is appointed receiver, including deposit payoff, insured deposit transfer, and deposit assumption cases.

2

 For 1990 through 2005, amounts represent the sum of BIF and SAIF failures (excluding those handled by the RTC); prior to 1990, figures are only 

for the BIF. After 1995, all thrift closings became the responsibility of the FDIC and amounts are reflected in the SAIF. For 2006 to 2016, figures are 

for the DIF.

3

 Assets and deposit data are based on the last Call Report or TFR filed before failure.

4

 Funding represents the amounts provided by the DIF to receiverships for subrogated claims, advances for working capital, and administrative 

expenses paid on their behalf. Beginning in 2008, the DIF resolves failures using whole-bank purchase and assumption transactions, most with an 

accompanying shared-loss agreement (SLA). The DIF satifies any resulting liabilities by offsetting receivables from resolutions when receiverships 

declare a dividend and/or sending cash directly to receiverships to fund an SLA and other expenses.

5

 Recoveries represent cash received and dividends (cash and non-cash) declared by receiverships.

6

 Final losses represent actual losses for unreimbursed subrogated claims of inactivated receiverships. Estimated losses represent the difference 

between the amount paid by the DIF to cover obligations to insured depositors and the estimated recoveries from the liquidation of receivership 

assets. 

7

 Includes amounts related to transaction account coverage under the Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TAG). The estimated losses as of 

December 31, 2016, for TAG accounts in 2010, 2009, and 2008 are $381 million, $1.1 billion, and $13 million, respectively.

8

 Includes institutions where assistance was provided under a systemic risk determination.
2016

APPENDICES 151

NUMBER, ASSETS, DEPOSITS, LOSSES, AND LOSS TO FUNDS OF INSURED THRIFTS 

TAKEN OVER OR CLOSED BECAUSE OF FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES, 1989 THROUGH 19951

Dollars in Thousands

Year Total Assets Deposits

Estimated 

Receivership 

Loss2

Loss to 

Fund3

Total 748 $393,986,574 $318,328,770 $75,977,846 $81,581,578

1995 2 423,819 414,692 28,192 27,750 

1994 2 136,815 127,508 11,472 14,599 

1993 10 6,147,962 5,708,253 267,595 65,212 

1992 59 44,196,946 34,773,224 3,286,908 3,832,145 

1991 144 78,898,904 65,173,122 9,235,967 9,734,263 

1990 213 129,662,498 98,963,962 16,062,685 19,257,578 

19894 318 134,519,630 113,168,009 47,085,027 48,650,031

1

 Beginning in 1989 through July 1, 1995, all thrift closings were the responsibility of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Since the RTC was 

terminated on December 31, 1995, and all assets and liabilities transferred to the FSLIC Resolution Fund (FRF), all the results of the thrift closing activity 

from 1989 through 1995 are now reflected on the FRF’s books. Year is the year of failure, not the year of resolution.

2

 The Estimated Receivership Loss represents the projected loss at the fund level from receiverships for unreimbursed subrogated claims of the FRF and 

unpaid advances to receiverships from the FRF.

3

 The Final Loss to Fund represents the total resolution cost of the failed thrifts in the FRF-RTC fund. In addition to the estimated losses for 

receiverships, the final loss includes corporate revenue and expense items, such as interest expense on Federal Financing Bank debt, interest expense 

on escrowed funds, and interest revenue on advances to receiverships.

4

 Total for 1989 excludes nine failures of the former FSLIC.
ANNUAL REPORT

152 APPENDICES

B. MORE ABOUT THE FDIC

FDIC BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Martin J. Gruenberg 

Martin J. Gruenberg is the 20th Chairman of the 

FDIC, receiving Senate confirmation on November 

15, 2012, for a five-year term. Mr. Gruenberg 

served as Vice Chairman and Member of the FDIC 

Board of Directors from August 22, 2005, until his 

confirmation as Chairman. He served as Acting 

Chairman from July 9, 2011, to November 15, 2012, 

and also from November 16, 2005, to June 26, 2006.

Mr. Gruenberg joined the FDIC Board after broad 

congressional experience in the financial services and 

regulatory areas. He served as Senior Counsel to 

Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD) on the staff of the 

Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 

Affairs from 1993 to 2005. Mr. Gruenberg advised 

the Senator on issues of domestic and international 

financial regulation, monetary policy, and trade. 

He also served as Staff Director of the Banking 

Committee’s Subcommittee on International Finance 

and Monetary Policy from 1987 to 1992. Major 

legislation in which Mr. Gruenberg played an active 

role during his service on the Committee includes 

the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 

Seated (left to right): Thomas M. Hoenig and Martin J. Gruenberg.

Standing (left to right): Thomas J. Curry and Richard Cordray.
2016

APPENDICES 153

Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA); the Federal 

Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 

1991 (FDICIA); the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act; and 

the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

Mr. Gruenberg served as Chairman of the Executive 

Council and President of the International Association 

of Deposit Insurers (IADI) from November 2007 to 

November 2012.

Mr. Gruenberg holds a J.D. from Case Western 

Reserve Law School and an A.B. from Princeton 

University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 

International Affairs.

Thomas M. Hoenig

Thomas M. Hoenig was confirmed by the Senate as 

Vice Chairman of the FDIC on November 15, 2012. 

He joined the FDIC on April 16, 2012, as a member 

of the Board of Directors of the FDIC for a six-year 

term. He is also a member of the Executive Board of 

the International Association of Deposit Insurers.

Prior to serving on the FDIC Board, Mr. Hoenig was 

the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 

City and a member of the Federal Reserve System’s 

Federal Open Market Committee from 1991 to 2011.

Mr. Hoenig was with the Federal Reserve for 38 

years, beginning as an economist, and then as a 

senior officer in banking supervision during the U.S. 

banking crisis of the 1980s. In 1986, he led the 

Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank’s Division of Bank 

Supervision and Structure, directing the oversight of 

more than 1,000 banks and bank holding companies 

with assets ranging from less than $100 million to 

$20 billion. He became President of the Kansas City 

Federal Reserve Bank on October 1, 1991.

Mr. Hoenig is a native of Fort Madison, Iowa, 

and received a doctorate in economics from Iowa 

State University.

Thomas J. Curry

Thomas J. Curry was sworn in as the 30th 

Comptroller of the Currency on April 9, 2012.

The Comptroller of the Currency is the administrator 

of national banks and federal savings associations, 

and chief officer of the Office of the Comptroller 

of the Currency (OCC). The OCC supervises 

approximately 1,700 national banks and federal 

savings associations and about 50 federal branches and 

agencies of foreign banks in the United States. These 

institutions comprise nearly two-thirds of the assets 

of the commercial banking system. The Comptroller 

is a Director of NeighborWorks® America where he 

served as Chairman from March 2014 through June 

2016, and also a member of the Federal Financial 

Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) where he 

served as Chairman for a two-year term from April 

2013 until April 2015. 

Prior to becoming Comptroller of the Currency, 

Mr. Curry served as a Director of the FDIC Board 

since January 2004, and as the Chairman of the 

NeighborWorks® America Board of Directors. 

Prior to joining the FDIC’s Board of Directors, Mr. 

Curry served five Massachusetts Governors as the 

Commonwealth’s Commissioner of Banks from 1990 

to 1991 and from 1995 to 2003. He served as Acting 

Commissioner from February 1994 to June 1995. He 

previously served as First Deputy Commissioner and 

Assistant General Counsel within the Massachusetts 

Division of Banks. He entered state government in 

1982 as an attorney with the Massachusetts’ Secretary 

of State’s Office.

Mr. Curry served as the Chairman of the Conference 

of State Bank Supervisors from 2000 to 2001, and 

served two terms on the State Liaison Committee 

of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 

Council, including a term as Committee Chairman.

He is a graduate of Manhattan College (summa cum 

laude), where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He 

received his law degree from the New England School 

of Law. 
ANNUAL REPORT

154 APPENDICES

Richard Cordray 

Richard Cordray serves as the first Director of 

the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. He 

previously led the Bureau’s Enforcement Division.

Prior to joining the Bureau, Mr. Cordray served 

on the front lines of consumer protection as Ohio’s 

Attorney General. Mr. Cordray recovered more than 

$2 billion for Ohio’s retirees, investors, and business 

owners, and took major steps to help protect its 

consumers from fraudulent foreclosures and financial 

predators. In 2010, his office responded to a record 

number of consumer complaints, but Mr. Cordray 

went further and opened that process for the first 

time to small businesses and nonprofit organizations 

to ensure protections for even more Ohioans. To 

recognize his work on behalf of consumers as Attorney 

General, the Better Business Bureau presented 

Mr. Cordray with an award for promoting an 

ethical marketplace.

Mr. Cordray also served as Ohio Treasurer and 

Franklin County Treasurer, two elected positions in 

which he led state and county banking, investment, 

debt, and financing activities. As Ohio Treasurer, he 

resurrected a defunct economic development program 

that provides low-interest loan assistance to small 

businesses to create jobs, re-launched the original 

concept as GrowNOW, and pumped hundreds of 

millions of dollars into access for credit to small 

businesses. Mr. Cordray simultaneously created a 

Bankers Advisory Council to share ideas about the 

program with community bankers across Ohio.

Earlier in his career, Mr. Cordray was an adjunct 

professor at the Ohio State University College of 

Law, served as a State Representative for the 33rd 

Ohio House District, was the first Solicitor General 

in Ohio’s history, and was a sole practitioner and 

Counsel to Kirkland & Ellis. Mr. Cordray has 

argued seven cases before the United States Supreme 

Court, by special appointment of both the Clinton 

and Bush Justice Departments. He is a graduate of 

Michigan State University, Oxford University, and 

the University of Chicago Law School. Mr. Cordray 

was Editor-in-Chief of the University of Chicago Law 

Review and later clerked for U.S. Supreme Court 

Justices Byron White and Anthony Kennedy.

Mr. Cordray lives in Grove City, Ohio, with his wife 

Peggy—a Professor at Capital University Law School 

in Columbus—and twin children Danny and Holly.
2016

APPENDICES 155

FDIC ORGANIZATION CHART/OFFICIALS

DIVISION OF INFORMATION 

TECHOLOGY

Russell G. Pittman

Director

INFORMATION SECURITY

AND PRIVACY STAFF

Noreen Padilla

 Acting Chief Information 

Security Officer

DEPUTY TO THE CHAIRMAN 

AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,

CHIEF OF STAFF

Barbara A. Ryan

CHIEF RISK OFFICER

Lee Price

Acting Chief Risk Officer 

SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR

SUPERVISORY MATTERS

Jason C. Cave

DEPUTY TO THE CHAIRMAN

Kymberly K. Copa

CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER 

AND PRIVACY OFFICER

Lawrence Gross, Jr.

DEPUTY TO THE CHAIRMAN 

AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

Steven O. App

SENIOR ADVISOR

INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTION POLICY

David S. Hoelscher

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Fred W. Gibson

DEPUTY TO THE CHAIRMAN

Acting Inspector General

FOR COMMUNICATIONS

Barbara Hagenbaugh

INTERNAL OMBUDSMAN

Robert D. Harris

WRITER-EDITOR

Michele A. Heller

OFFICE OF 

COMMUNICATIONS

DIVISION OF RESOLUTION 

AND RECEIVERSHIPS

Bret D. Edwards

Director

LEGAL DIVISION

Charles Yi

General Counsel

DIVISION OF INSURANCE 

AND RESEARCH

Diane Ellis

Director

DIVISION OF DEPOSITOR 

AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

Mark E. Pearce

Director

OFFICE OF COMPLEX

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Arthur J. Murton

Director

DIVISION OF RISK 

MANAGEMENT SUPERVISION

Doreen R. Eberley

Director

DIVISION OF 

ADMINISTRATION

Arleas Upton Kea

Director

DIVISION OF FINANCE

Craig R. Jarvill

Director

CORPORATE UNIVERSITY

Suzannah L. Susser

Chief Learning Officer and Director

OFFICE OF 

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

Andy Jiminez

Director

OFFICE OF 

THE OMBUDSMAN

Gordon Talbot

Acting Ombudsman

OFFICE OF MINORITY AND 

WOMEN INCLUSION

Avelino Rodriguez

 Acting Director 

OFFICE OF FINANCIAL 

INSTITUTION ADJUDICATION

C. Richard Miserendino

 Administrative Law Judge

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Martin J. Gruenberg

FDIC

Chairman

Vacant

FDIC

Board Member

Thomas M. Hoenig

FDIC

Vice Chairman, Board Member

Thomas J. Curry

OCC

Board Member

Richard Cordray

CFPB

Board Member
ANNUAL REPORT

156 APPENDICES

Note: 2007–2016 staffing totals reflect year-end full time equivalent staff. Prior to 2008, staffing totals reflect total employees 

on-board. 

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

9000

6000

3000

0

4,532 4,988 6,557 8,150 7,973 7,476

FDIC Year–End On-Board Staffing

7,254 6,631 6,385 6,096

CORPORATE STAFFING 

STAFFING TRENDS 2007-2016
2016

APPENDICES 157

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES BY DIVISION/OFFICE 2015 AND 2016 (YEAR-END)1

Total Washington Regional/Field

Division or Office: 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015

Division of Risk Management Supervision 2,627 2,683 204 208 2,423 2,475

Division of Depositor and Consumer Protection 838 841 116 122 722 719

Division of Resolutions and Receiverships 537 719 138 149 399 570

Legal Division 531 564 340 356 191 208

Division of Administration 370 367 256 251 114 116

Division of Information Technology 301 319 237 252 64 67

Corporate University 210 194 202 187 8 7

Division of Insurance and Research 193 205 153 163 40 42

Division of Finance 167 171 164 169 3 2

Information Security and Privacy Staff 34 36 34 36 0 0

Office of Inspector General 122 119 76 74 47 46

Office of Complex Financial Institutions 67 62 50 52 17 10

Executive Offices2 22 22 22 22 0 0

Executive Support Offices 3 79 84 72 76 7 8

TOTAL 6,096 6,385 2,062 2,115 4,034 4,270

1 The FDIC reports staffing totals using a full-time equivalent methodology, which is based on an employee’s scheduled work hours. Division/Office 

staffing has been rounded to the nearest whole FTE. Totals may not foot due to rounding.

2

 Includes the Offices of the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Director (Appointive), Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and Chief Information Officer. 

3 Includes the Offices of Legislative Affairs, Communications, Ombudsman, Minority and Women Inclusion, and Corporate Risk Management.
ANNUAL REPORT

158 APPENDICES

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

FDIC Website

www.fdic.gov

A wide range of banking, consumer, and financial 

information is available on the FDIC’s website. This 

includes the FDIC’s Electronic Deposit Insurance 

Estimator (EDIE), which estimates an individual’s 

deposit insurance coverage; the Institution Directory, 

which contains financial profiles of FDIC-insured 

institutions; Community Reinvestment Act 

evaluations and ratings for institutions supervised by 

the FDIC; Call Reports, which are bank reports of 

condition and income; and Money Smart, a training 

program to help individuals outside the financial 

mainstream enhance their money management skills 

and create positive banking relationships. Readers 

also can access a variety of consumer pamphlets, 

FDIC press releases, speeches, and other updates on 

the agency’s activities, as well as corporate databases 

and customized reports of FDIC and banking 

industry information. 

FDIC Call Center

Phone: 877-275-3342 (877-ASK-FDIC) 

703-562-2222 

Hearing Impaired: 800-925-4618 

703-562-2289

The FDIC Call Center in Washington, DC, is the 

primary telephone point of contact for general 

questions from the banking community, the public, 

and FDIC employees. The Call Center directly, or 

with other FDIC subject matter experts, responds to 

questions about deposit insurance and other consumer 

issues and concerns, as well as questions about FDIC 

programs and activities. The Call Center also refers 

callers to other federal and state agencies as needed. 

Hours of operation are 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., 

Eastern Time, Monday – Friday, and 9:00 a.m. to 

5:00 p.m., Saturday – Sunday. Recorded information 

about deposit insurance and other topics is available 

24 hours a day at the same telephone number.

As a customer service, the FDIC Call Center has 

many bilingual Spanish agents on staff and has access 

to a translation service, which is able to assist with 

over 40 different languages.

Public Information Center

3501 Fairfax Drive

Room E-1021

Arlington, VA 22226

Phone: 877-275-3342 (877-ASK-FDIC),

703-562-2200

Fax: 703-562-2296

FDIC Online Catalog: https://catalog.fdic.gov

E-mail: publicinfo@fdic.gov

Publications such as FDIC Quarterly and Consumer 

News and a variety of deposit insurance and 

consumer pamphlets are available at www.fdic.gov

or may be ordered in hard copy through the 

FDIC online catalog. Other information, press 

releases, speeches and congressional testimony, 

directives to financial institutions, policy 

manuals, and FDIC documents are available 

on request through the Public Information 

Center. Hours of operation are 9:00 a.m. to 

4:00 p.m., Eastern Time, Monday – Friday.

Office of the Ombudsman

3501 Fairfax Drive

Room E-2022

Arlington, VA 22226

Phone: 877-275-3342 (877-ASK-FDIC) 

Fax: 703-562-6057

E-mail: ombudsman@fdic.gov

The Office of the Ombudsman (OO) is an 

independent, neutral, and confidential resource and 

liaison for the banking industry and the general 

public. The OO responds to inquiries about the 

FDIC in a fair, impartial, and timely manner. It 

researches questions and fields complaints from 

bankers and bank customers. OO representatives 

are present at all bank closings to provide accurate 

information to bank customers, the media, bank 

employees, and the general public. The OO also 

recommends ways to improve FDIC operations, 

regulations, and customer service.
2016

APPENDICES 159

REGIONAL AND AREA OFFICES

Atlanta Regional Office

Michael J. Dean, Regional Director

10 Tenth Street, NE

Suite 800

Atlanta, Georgia 30309

(678) 916-2200

Alabama

Florida

Georgia

North Carolina

South Carolina

Virginia

West Virginia

Dallas Regional Office

Kristie K. Elmquist, Regional Director

1601 Bryan Street

Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 754-0098

Colorado

New Mexico

Oklahoma

Texas

Kansas City Regional Office

James D. LaPierre, Regional Director

1100 Walnut Street

Suite 2100

Kansas City, Missouri 64106

(816) 234-8000

Iowa

Kansas

Minnesota

Missouri

Nebraska

North Dakota

South Dakota

Chicago Regional Office

M. Anthony Lowe, Regional Director

300 South Riverside Plaza

Suite 1700

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 382-6000

Illinois

Indiana

Kentucky

Michigan

Ohio

Wisconsin

Memphis Area Office

Kristie K. Elmquist, Director

6060 Primacy Parkway

Suite 300

Memphis, Tennessee 38119

(901) 685-1603

Arkansas

Louisiana

Mississippi

Tennessee

New York Regional Office

John F. Vogel, Regional Director

350 Fifth Avenue

Suite 1200

New York, New York 10118

(917) 320-2500

Delaware

District of Columbia

Maryland

New Jersey

New York

Pennsylvania

Puerto Rico

Virgin Islands
ANNUAL REPORT

160 APPENDICES

Boston Area Office

John F. Vogel, Director

15 Braintree Hill Office Park

Suite 100

Braintree, Massachusetts 02184

(781) 794-5500

Connecticut

Maine

Massachusetts

New Hampshire

Rhode Island

Vermont

San Francisco Regional Office

Kathy L. Moe, Acting Regional Director

25 Jessie Street at Ecker Square

Suite 2300

San Francisco, California 94105

(415) 546-0160

Alaska

American Samoa

Arizona

California

Federated States of Micronesia

Guam

Hawaii

Idaho

Montana

Nevada

Oregon

Utah

Washington

Wyoming
2016

APPENDICES 161

C. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S 

ASSESSMENT OF THE MANAGEMENT 

AND PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES 

FACING THE FDIC

Under the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, 

the Office of Inspector General (OIG) identifies 

the management and performance challenges 

facing the FDIC and provides its assessment to the 

Corporation for inclusion in the FDIC’s annual 

performance and accountability report. In doing 

so, we keep in mind the FDIC’s overall program 

and operational responsibilities; financial industry, 

economic, and technological conditions and trends; 

areas of congressional interest and concern; relevant 

laws and regulations; the Chairman’s priorities and 

corresponding corporate goals; and ongoing activities 

to address the issues involved. The OIG believes that 

for the foreseeable future, the FDIC faces challenges 

in the critical areas listed below, a number of which 

carry over from past years. A challenge of particular 

emphasis this year is Maintaining Strong Information 

Security and Governance Practices. We would point 

out that all of these challenges may well be impacted 

by changes brought on by a new Administration 

during 2017. 

Maintaining Strong Information Security 

and Governance Practices

Essential to achieving the FDIC’s mission of 

maintaining stability and public confidence in the 

nation’s financial system is safeguarding sensitive 

information, including personally identifiable 

information that the FDIC collects and manages 

in its role as employer, federal deposit insurer, 

regulator of state nonmember financial institutions, 

and receiver of failed institutions. Materials that 

the FDIC possesses related to its Dodd-Frank 

Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 

(Dodd-Frank Act) responsibilities contain some 

of the most sensitive information that the FDIC 

maintains and safeguarding it from unauthorized 

access or disclosure is critically important. Equally 

important to the FDIC and the Nation is the defense 

of critical infrastructure, which includes financial 

systems and associated computer network operations. 

In that regard, the Federal Information Security 

Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 establishes 

standards to assess information security government 

wide. The OIG’s FISMA work is intended not only 

to ensure compliance with those standards but also 

to help defend the critical infrastructure against those 

who would attack it. 

The FDIC has recently come under increased scrutiny 

by the Congress for specific actions it has taken 

related to protecting sensitive information and has 

been criticized for its reporting of breaches of such 

information, as required by FISMA and related Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. The 

Corporation’s continuing challenge will be to restore 

confidence both in its ability to protect the sensitive 

information it possesses and its actions to fully report 

major security incidents within prescribed timeframes, 

as required by law. Our office reported and testified 

before the Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, on our 

work in two areas in this regard, and we continue to 

conduct work on related matters.

One audit dealt with the FDIC’s process for 

identifying and reporting major information security 

incidents and focused on an incident where a former 

FDIC employee copied a large quantity of sensitive 

FDIC information, including personally identifiable 

information, to removable media and took this 

information when departing the FDIC’s employment 

in October 2015. The FDIC detected the incident 

through its Data Loss Prevention tool. Although 

the FDIC had established various incident response 

policies, procedures, guidelines, and processes, these 

controls did not provide reasonable assurance that 

major incidents were identified and reported in a 

timely manner. We recommended actions to provide 

the FDIC with greater assurance that major incidents 

are identified and reported consistent with relevant 

guidance. 
ANNUAL REPORT

162 APPENDICES

In a second audit, we reviewed the Corporation’s 

controls for mitigating the risk of an unauthorized 

release of highly sensitive resolution plans. In 

September 2015, an FDIC employee abruptly 

resigned from the Corporation and took copies of 

sensitive components of resolution plans without 

authorization and in violation of FDIC policy. A 

number of factors contributed to this security 

incident. Most notably, an insider threat program 

was not in place that would have better enabled the 

FDIC to deter, detect, and mitigate the risks posed 

by the employee. Additionally, a key security control 

designed to prevent employees with access to sensitive 

resolution plans from copying electronic information 

to removable media failed to operate as intended. 

To address these concerns, we recommended that 

the FDIC establish a corporate-wide insider threat 

program and take other steps to better protect 

sensitive resolution plans. On September 20, 

2016, the Corporation issued a policy formally 

establishing its Insider Threat and Counterintelligence 

Program and finalized a governance charter and 

implementation plan for the program.

As noted earlier, more broadly speaking, the OIG 

looks to its annual work under FISMA to identify 

the Corporation’s information security successes and 

its ongoing challenges. Our most recent FISMA 

work determined that the FDIC had established a 

number of information security program controls 

and practices that were generally consistent with 

FISMA requirements, OMB policy and guidelines, 

and applicable National Institute of Standards 

and Technology (NIST) standards and guidelines. 

The FDIC had also taken steps to strengthen its 

security program controls following our 2015 

FISMA work. Among other things, the FDIC: 

restricted (with limited exceptions) the ability 

of employees and contractor personnel to copy 

information to removable media in response to the 

major information security incidents involving the 

unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive information by 

departing employees; identified and reported its high 

value assets to the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS); and updated its security control framework 

to address changes introduced by NIST guidance 

related to security and privacy controls for federal 

information systems and organizations. 

Notwithstanding these actions, our FISMA audit 

found security control weaknesses that impaired 

the effectiveness of the FDIC’s information security 

program and practices and placed the confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability of the FDIC’s information 

systems and data at elevated risk. Some findings were 

identified during the current year and others were 

identified in prior reports issued by the OIG or the 

Government Accountability Office. Areas of notable 

weakness that continue to pose challenges for the 

Corporation include strategic planning, vulnerability 

scanning, the FDIC’s information security manager 

program, configuration management, third-party 

software patching, multifactor authentication, and 

contingency planning.

The FDIC is working to strengthen the effectiveness 

of its information security program controls in a 

number of other areas. For example, the FDIC is 

working to improve its incident response capabilities; 

more effectively protect its sensitive information 

by improving the effectiveness of its Data Loss 

Prevention tool and adopting Digital Rights 

Management software; complete an end-to-end 

assessment of its information security and privacy 

programs; hire a permanent Chief Information 

Security Officer (CISO); and begin addressing action 

items identified during a Cyber Stat Review with 

OMB and DHS officials aimed at improving the 

FDIC’s cybersecurity posture.

Other ongoing challenges for the Corporation that we 

pointed out involve a risk related to the performance 

of the vendor that supports the FDIC’s infrastructure 

services and an observation on the frequent turnover 

in the CISO position and whether the CISO’s 

authorities enable the CISO to effectively address the 

responsibilities defined in FISMA. 

Going forward, a challenging priority for the FDIC 

will be to maintain effective communication with 

the Congress and collaboration among all parties 
2016

APPENDICES 163

involved in protecting sensitive information and the 

Nation’s critical infrastructure. Doing so will require 

strong leadership and an effective IT governance 

structure. In addition, in confronting its information 

security challenges, competing priorities must be 

carefully considered, and sound decision-making will 

be critical to the Corporation’s success. Given the 

substantial financial investment in FDIC systems, 

security features, and related human resources, the 

Corporation needs to consider the cost-effectiveness 

and measurable business value outcomes in its 

decisions to fund major IT projects to ensure proper 

stewardship of millions of dollars in IT investments.

Carrying Out Dodd-Frank Act Responsibilities

The Dodd-Frank Act created a comprehensive new 

regulatory and resolution framework designed to 

avoid the severe consequences of financial instability. 

Under current law, Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act 

provides tools for regulators to impose enhanced 

supervision and prudential standards on systemically 

important financial institutions (SIFI). Title II 

provides the FDIC with a new orderly liquidation 

authority for SIFIs, subject to a systemic risk 

determination by statutorily designated regulators. 

The FDIC has made progress toward implementing 

its systemic resolution authorities under the 

Dodd-Frank Act, but challenges remain. These 

challenges involve the FDIC fulfilling its insurance, 

supervisory, receivership management, and resolution 

responsibilities as it meets the requirements of the 

Dodd-Frank Act. These responsibilities are crosscutting and require collaborative efforts among staff 

throughout the Corporation’s headquarters and 

regional divisions and offices in implementing Titles 

I and II, including the Office of Complex Financial 

Institutions (OCFI), Division of Risk Management 

Supervision (RMS), Division of Resolutions and 

Receiverships (DRR), and Legal Division. 

Of note with respect to the challenge of Dodd-Frank 

Act responsibilities, in April 2016, the FDIC and the 

Federal Reserve Board (FRB) announced a significant 

step forward in the use of the “living will” authority 

to require systemically important financial institutions 

to demonstrate they can fail in an orderly way at no 

cost to taxpayers. Specifically, following eight firms’ 

submission of their living wills or resolution plans 

in July 2015, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve 

announced findings based on their review of the plans 

and conveyed required actions that firms needed 

to take for remediation. For five firms, the agencies 

jointly determined that the plans were not credible 

or would not facilitate an orderly resolution under 

bankruptcy. The FDIC and FRB jointly identified 

a number of deficiencies in those plans, as required 

by statute. Those five firms were required to remedy 

the deficiencies by October 1, 2016. If not, the firms 

could be subject to more stringent capital, leverage, 

or liquidity requirements, or restrictions on growth, 

activities, or operations. On December 13, 2016, the 

FDIC and the FRB announced that four of the five 

firms had adequately remediated deficiencies in their 

2015 plans. 

For two other firms, the FDIC and the FRB did not 

make a joint determination, but did find separately 

that in the two cases, the plans were not credible 

and would not facilitate an orderly resolution under 

bankruptcy. For the eighth and final firm, the 

shortcomings did not rise to the level of the statutory 

standard for a joint determination of non-credibility. 

In addition to the October deadline for the five plans 

referenced above, all shortcomings in the plans must 

be addressed by July 1, 2017. 

Those involved in Dodd-Frank Act activities will 

continue to evaluate the resolution plans submitted 

by the largest bank holding companies and other 

SIFIs under Title I, develop strategies for resolving 

SIFIs under Title II, work to promote cross-border 

coordination and cooperation for the orderly 

resolution of a global SIFI, and coordinate with the 

other regulators in developing policy to implement 

the provisions of the Act.

Also, the FDIC will need to ensure that staff have 

the needed knowledge and experience to continue 
ANNUAL REPORT

164 APPENDICES

to carry out risk assessments to identify supervisory, 

resolution, and insurance pricing-related risks in all 

insured depository institutions with more than $10 

billion in assets, including those for which the FDIC 

is not the primary federal regulator, in addition to 

systemically important bank holding companies and 

nonbank financial companies subject to Title I of the 

Dodd-Frank Act.

Maintaining Effective Supervision and 

Preserving Community Banking

The FDIC’s supervision program promotes the 

safety and soundness of FDIC-supervised insured 

depository institutions. The FDIC is the primary 

federal regulator for 3,790 FDIC-insured, statechartered institutions that are not members of the 

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 

As such, the FDIC is the lead federal regulator for 

the majority of community banks. In the case of “de 

novo” institutions, the FDIC needs to continue to 

emphasize that these new banks satisfactorily address 

statutory factors, including adequacy of capital, future 

earnings prospects, and the general character and 

fitness of bank management. 

We have pointed out in our past work that a key 

lesson from the crisis is the need for earlier regulatory 

response when risks are building. Even now, for 

example, as they operate in a post-crisis environment, 

banks may be tempted to take additional risks, engage 

in imprudent concentrations, or loosen underwriting 

standards. Some banks are also introducing new 

products or lines of business or seeking new sources 

for non-interest income, all of which can lead to 

interest rate risk, credit risk, operational risk, and 

reputational risk. Such risks need to be managed and 

addressed early-on during the “good times” before a 

period of downturn. RMS has continued to reinforce 

the importance of forward-looking supervision to 

assess the potential impact of an institution’s new and/

or growing risks and ensure early mitigation when 

necessary. 

FDIC examiners need to continue to identify 

problems; bring them to bank management’s 

attention; follow up on problems; bring enforcement 

actions as needed; ban individuals from banking, as 

appropriate; and be alert to such risks as Bank Secrecy 

Act and anti-money-laundering issues. In doing 

so, the Corporation needs to execute its supervisory 

authority in a fair, consistent manner. With respect 

to important international concerns, the FDIC 

also needs to support development of sound global 

regulatory policy through participation on the Basel 

Committee on Bank Supervision and other related 

sub-groups.

In light of technological changes, increased use of 

technology service providers (TSP), new delivery 

channels, and cyber threats, we have pointed out in 

past work that the FDIC’s IT examination program 

needs to be proactive and bankers and Boards of 

Directors need to ensure a strong control environment 

and sound risk management and governance practices 

in their institutions. Importantly, with respect 

to TSPs, one TSP can service hundreds or even 

thousands of financial institutions, so the impact of 

security incidents in one TSP can have devastating 

ripple effects on those institutions. Controls need to 

be designed not only to protect sensitive customer 

information at banks and TSPs, but also to guard 

against intrusions that can compromise the integrity 

and availability of operations, information and 

transaction processing systems, data, and business 

continuity. Given the complexities of the range 

of cyber threats, the FDIC needs to ensure its 

examination workforce has the needed expertise to 

effectively carry out its IT examination function.

An article in the FDIC’s Winter 2015 issue of 

Supervisory Insights highlights a number of steps the 

Corporation has taken to increase industry awareness 

of cyber risks and to provide practical tools to help 

mitigate the risk of cyber attacks. Among those, 

the FDIC has urged institutions to avail themselves 

of existing resources to identify and mitigate cyber 

risks; developed the “Cyber Challenge” exercise 

for community banks to use in assessing their 

preparedness for a cyber-related incident; offered a 

cybersecurity awareness training program for FDICsupervised institutions and FDIC supervision staff 
2016

APPENDICES 165

and management in each of the FDIC’s regional 

offices; continued participation on the Federal 

Financial Institutions Examination Council’s (FFIEC) 

Cybersecurity Critical Infrastructure Working Group 

to determine how well banks manage cyber security 

and assess banks’ preparedness to mitigate cyber risks; 

and assisted in updating the FFIEC’s IT Examination 

Handbook and related guidance. 

In the coming months, the Corporation needs to 

continue efforts, along with the other regulators, to 

address these and other emerging risks and use all 

available supervisory and legal authorities to ensure 

the continued safety and soundness of financial 

institutions and affiliated third-party entities. It also 

needs to ensure effective information-sharing about 

security incidents with regulatory parties and other 

federal groups established to combat cyber threats in 

an increasingly interconnected world.

The FDIC Chairman continues to emphasize that one 

of the FDIC’s most important priorities is the future 

of community banks and the critical role they play in 

the financial system and the U.S. economy as a whole. 

Local communities and small businesses rely heavily 

on community banks for credit and other essential 

financial services. These banks foster economic 

growth and help to ensure that the financial resources 

of the local community are put to work on its behalf. 

Consolidations and other far-reaching changes in 

the U.S. financial sector in recent decades have made 

community banks a smaller part of the U.S. financial 

system. Still, over the last several years, they have 

made up a larger percentage of all FDIC-insured 

banks and thrifts than at any other time over the last 

three decades. Their share of total industry loans has 

also remained relatively constant over the past decade.

The FDIC has sought to identify and implement 

changes to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 

of the community bank risk management and 

compliance examination processes, while still 

maintaining supervisory standards. To ensure the 

continued strength of the community banks, the 

Corporation will also need to sustain initiatives such 

as ongoing research, technical assistance to the banks 

by way of training videos on key risk management 

and consumer compliance matters, continuous 

outreach and dialogue with community banking 

groups, and attention to strengthening minority 

depository institutions. 

Maintaining a strong examination program, 

conducting forward-looking supervisory activities for 

both small and large banks, applying lessons learned, 

being attuned to harmful cyber threats in financial 

institutions and technology service providers, and 

preserving community banking will be critical to 

ensuring stability and continued confidence in the 

financial system going forward. 

Carrying Out Current and Future Resolution 

and Receivership Responsibilities

One of the FDIC’s most important roles is acting 

as the receiver or liquidating agent for failed FDICinsured institutions. The FDIC’s responsibilities 

include planning and efficiently handling the 

resolutions of failing FDIC-insured institutions 

and providing prompt, responsive, and efficient 

administration of failing and failed financial 

institutions in order to maintain confidence and 

stability in our financial system. 

As part of the resolution process, the FDIC values 

a failing federally insured depository institution, 

markets it, solicits and accepts bids for the sale of 

the institution, considers the least costly resolution 

method, determines which bid to accept, and works 

with the acquiring institution through the closing 

process. The receivership process involves performing 

the closing function at the failed bank; liquidating 

any remaining assets; and distributing any proceeds to 

the FDIC, the bank customers, general creditors, and 

those with approved claims. The FDIC seeks to close 

out or pursue professional liability claims within 18 

months of an insured institution’s failure, which can 

prove challenging as well. 

The FDIC places great emphasis on promptly 

marketing and selling the assets of failed institutions 

and terminating the receivership quickly. Although 
ANNUAL REPORT

166 APPENDICES

the number of institution failures has fallen 

dramatically since the crisis, these activities still pose 

challenges to the Corporation. As of December 31, 

2016, DRR was managing 378 active receiverships 

with assets in liquidation totaling about $3.3 billion. 

In addition, through purchase and assumption 

agreements with acquiring institutions, the 

Corporation has entered into shared-loss agreements 

(SLA). Since loss sharing began during the most 

recent crisis in November 2008, the Corporation 

has resolved 304 failures with accompanying 

SLAs. Under these agreements, the FDIC agrees 

to absorb a portion of the loss—generally 80 to 95 

percent—which may be experienced by the acquiring 

institution with regard to those assets, for a period 

of up to 10 years. The FDIC entered into 304 SLAs 

from November 2008 through September 30, 2013, 

with an initial asset base of $216.5 billion. As of 

December 31, 2016, FDIC recoveries totaled $5.2 

billion, representing 15.2 percent of the $34.1 billion 

in FDIC SLA payments. 

As another resolution strategy, the FDIC entered 

into 35 structured sales transactions involving 

43,315 assets with a total unpaid principal balance 

of $26.2 billion. Under these arrangements, the 

FDIC receiverships retain a participation interest 

in future net positive cash flows derived from thirdparty management of these assets. As of December 

31, 2016, the unpaid principal balance in 26 active 

arrangements was $1.5 billion. The Corporation will 

continue to evaluate termination offers from limited 

liability company (LLC) managing members in 

deciding whether to pursue dissolution of the LLCs if 

in the best economic interest of the receiverships. 

As time passes and recovery from the crisis continues, 

these risk sharing agreements will continue to 

wind down and certain active receiverships will be 

terminated. Given the substantial dollar value and 

risks associated with the risk-sharing activities and 

other receivership operations, the FDIC needs to 

ensure continuous monitoring and effective oversight 

to protect the FDIC’s financial interests. As an 

example, a large number of commercial SLAs have 

reached their 5-year mark, resulting in the end of 

FDIC loss-share coverage but not the end of the 

commercial SLAs, which last 8 years. The last 3 years 

of commercial SLA coverage is for recoveries only. 

Acquiring institutions may not pursue recoveries 

as vigorously as they should because they may only 

share in a relatively small percentage of recoveries. 

The FDIC needs to be sure that acquiring institutions 

identify and remit recoveries to the Corporation.

While conditions in the economy and financial system 

have improved since the peak of the financial crisis, 

bank failures continue to occur. The Corporation has 

reshaped its workforce and adjusted its budget and 

resources in line with the trend of far fewer failures. 

Notably, in the case of the FDIC’s resolutions and 

receiverships workforce, authorized staffing decreased 

dramatically from a peak of 2,460 in 2010 to 

authorized staffing of 564 for 2016. As of December 

31, 2016, DRR on-board staffing totaled 537. DRR 

will continue to substantially reduce its nonpermanent 

staff each year, based on declining workload. 

These staff reductions bring with them a loss of 

specialized experience and expertise that could impact 

the success of future, large-scale resolution and 

receivership activities. As discussed in connection 

with Dodd-Frank Act responsibilities, for example, 

the Corporation must continue to review the 

resolution plans of large bank holding companies and 

designated nonbank holding companies to ensure 

their resolvability under the Bankruptcy Code, if 

necessary, and in cases where their failure would 

threaten financial stability, administer their orderly 

liquidation. Carrying out such activities could pose 

significant challenges to those remaining staff in DRR 

who could be called upon to lead critical resolution 

activities.

Ensuring the Continued Strength 

of the Deposit Insurance Fund 

Insuring deposits remains at the heart of the 

FDIC’s commitment to maintain stability and 

public confidence in the nation’s financial system. 
2016

APPENDICES 167

Continuing to replenish the Deposit Insurance Fund 

(DIF) in a post-crisis environment is a critical activity 

for the FDIC. To maintain sufficient DIF balances, 

the FDIC collects risk-based insurance premiums 

from insured institutions and invests deposit 

insurance funds. A broad goal for the FDIC is that 

institutions that pose the greatest risk to the DIF have 

deposit insurance rates that are commensurate with 

that risk. 

The DIF balance had dropped below negative $20 

billion during the worst time of the crisis. As of 

December 31, 2016, the DIF balance had risen to 

$83.2 billion. While the fund is considerably stronger 

than it has been, the FDIC must continue to monitor 

the emerging risks that can threaten fund solvency in 

the interest of continuing to provide and administer 

the insurance coverage that depositors have come 

to rely upon. This is true for insured depositors at 

small banks as well as for claims at large depository 

institutions. 

In response to the Dodd-Frank Act and in the interest 

of protecting and insuring depositors, the Corporation 

has designed a long-term DIF management plan. 

This plan complements the Restoration Plan, which 

is designed to ensure that the DIF reserve ratio will 

reach 1.35 percent by September 30, 2020. As of 

September 30, 2016, the reserve ratio had reached 

1.18 percent, the highest reserve ratio in 8 years. 

In February 2011, the FDIC Board decided to reduce 

overall assessment rates when the reserve ratio reached 

1.15 and the Board reaffirmed that position in April 

2016. Now a large majority of banks will pay lower 

deposit insurance assessments. Assessment rates for 

approximately 93 percent of banks with less than 

$10 billion in assets declined. Regular quarterly 

assessments declined on average by about one-third 

for these smaller institutions.

Additionally, since the ratio has reached 1.15 percent, 

banks with $10 billion or more in assets began paying 

temporary surcharges to bring the reserve ratio up 

to statutory minimums. Even with the surcharges, 

about one-third of large banks still pay lower total 

assessments because of the reduction in regular 

assessment rates. The FDIC is taking a balanced 

approach to restoring the health of the DIF as it 

seeks to reduce the risk that it will need to raise rates 

unexpectedly to address a future crisis and to help 

ensure stable and predictable assessments across the 

board.

Given the volatility of the global markets and financial 

systems, new risks can emerge without warning and 

threaten the safety and soundness of U.S. financial 

institutions and the viability of the DIF. The FDIC 

must be prepared for such a possibility. In the face 

of such threats, the FDIC needs to continue to 

disseminate data and analysis on issues and risks 

affecting the financial services industry to bankers, 

supervisors, and the public.

As part of its efforts, the FDIC also needs to continue 

collaborating with others involved in helping to 

ensure financial stability and protect the DIF. One 

important means of doing so is through participation 

with other financial regulators on the Financial 

Stability Oversight Council, created under the DoddFrank Act. This Council was established to provide 

comprehensive monitoring of stability in the U.S. 

financial system by identifying and responding to 

emerging risks to U.S. financial stability and by 

promoting market discipline. 

The FDIC will also be challenged to contribute to 

global financial stability by continuing its engagement 

with strategically important foreign jurisdictions and 

playing a leadership role in international organizations 

that support robust, effective deposit insurance 

systems, crisis management and resolution programs, 

and bank supervision practices around the globe. 

Promoting Consumer Protections and 

Economic Inclusion

The FDIC carries out its consumer protection role by 

providing consumers with access to information about 

their rights and disclosures that are required by federal 

laws and regulations. Its Consumer Response Center 

serves an important function in this regard. Similarly, 
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168 APPENDICES

initiatives like the FDIC’s Money Smart and Youth 

Savings programs go a long way towards educating 

the public about important consumer and financial 

matters. Importantly, the FDIC also examines the 

banks for which it is the primary federal regulator 

to determine the institutions’ compliance with laws 

and regulations governing consumer protection, fair 

lending, and community investment. These activities 

require effective examiner training and regular 

collaboration with other regulatory agencies. 

The Dodd-Frank Act consolidated many of the 

consumer financial protection authorities previously 

shared by several federal agencies into the Consumer 

Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and granted the 

CFPB authority to conduct rulemaking, supervision, 

and enforcement with respect to federal consumer 

financial laws; handle consumer complaints and 

inquiries; promote financial education; research 

consumer behavior; and monitor financial markets for 

risks to consumers. The FDIC coordinates with the 

CFPB on consumer issues of mutual interest and to 

meet statutory requirements for consultation relating 

to rulemakings in mortgage lending and other types of 

consumer financial services and products. The FDIC 

will need to continue to assess the impact of such 

rulemakings on supervised institutions, communicate 

key changes to stakeholders, and train examination 

staff accordingly. 

The FDIC continues to work with the Congress and 

others to ensure that the banking system remains 

sound and that the broader financial system is 

positioned to meet the credit needs of consumers and 

the economy, especially the needs of creditworthy 

households that may experience distress. One of the 

challenges articulated by the FDIC Chairman is to 

continue to develop and implement targeted strategies 

to expand access to mainstream financial institutions 

by populations that are disproportionately likely to be 

unbanked or underbanked. 

The FDIC conducts national surveys of unbanked 

and underbanked households every 2 years, in 

conjunction with the Census Bureau, to inform 

those strategies. The most recent survey, for example, 

determined that the share of unbanked households in 

the U.S. dropped in 2015 to 7.0 percent, representing 

a significant decline from the 7.7 unbanked rate 

reported in 2013 and the 8.2 unbanked rate in 2011. 

The survey also revealed a growth pattern in consumer 

use of mobile and online banking. For the unbanked 

households, smart phones are often the primary 

means of managing their accounts. The FDIC is 

further exploring the economic inclusion potential of 

mobile financial services. 

In addition, the FDIC’s Advisory Committee 

on Economic Inclusion, composed of bankers, 

community and consumer organizations, and 

academics, will continue to explore ways of bringing 

the unbanked into the financial mainstream. The 

FDIC’s Alliance for Economic Inclusion initiative 

seeks to collaborate with financial institutions; 

community organizations; local, state, and federal 

agencies; and other partners to form broad-based 

coalitions to bring unbanked and underbanked 

consumers and small businesses into the financial 

mainstream. 

The FDIC will need to sustain ongoing efforts to 

carry out required compliance and community 

reinvestment examinations, coordinate with the 

other financial regulators and CFPB on regulatory 

matters involving financial products and services, and 

pursue and measure the success of economic inclusion 

initiatives to the benefit of the American public. 

Implementing Workforce Changes 

and Budget Reductions 

The Corporation continues to reassess its current 

and projected workload along with trends within the 

banking industry and the broader economy.  Based 

on that review, the FDIC expects a continuation 

of steady improvements in the global economy, a 

small number of insured institution failures, gradual 

reductions in post-failure receivership management 

workload, and further reductions in the number of 

3-, 4-, and 5-rated institutions.  While the FDIC 

will continue to need some temporary and term 
2016

APPENDICES 169

employees over the next several years to complete the 

residual workload from the financial crisis, industry 

trends continue to confirm that there will be a steadily 

decreasing need for nonpermanent employees over the 

next several years.

Given those circumstances, the FDIC Board of 

Directors approved a $2.16 billion FDIC Operating 

Budget for 2017, 2.4 percent lower than the 2016 

budget. In conjunction with its approval of the 

2017 budget, the Board also approved an authorized 

2017 staffing level of 6,363 positions for 2017, a 2.6 

percent decrease from 2016 and 32 percent lower than 

the peak in 2011. This was the seventh consecutive 

reduction in the FDIC’s annual operating budget.

As conditions improve throughout the industry and 

the economy, the FDIC will continue its efforts to 

achieve the appropriate level of resources; at the 

same time, however, it needs to remain mindful 

of ever-present risks and other uncertainties in the 

economy that may prompt the need for additional 

resources and new skill sets and expertise that may be 

challenging to obtain. The need for these new skill 

sets comes at a time when the Corporation is focusing 

on succession management, in light of a substantial 

number of FDIC staff, many “baby boomers,” who 

are retiring. In that regard, the FDIC is continuing 

to work toward integrated workforce development 

processes as it seeks to bring on the best people to 

meet its changing needs and priorities, and do so 

in a timely manner. In all of its hiring efforts, the 

Corporation needs to ensure fairness and integrity 

in its processes and hiring practices and decisions. 

Most recently, the Corporation has emphasized its 

Workforce Development Initiative as a means of 

fulfilling the FDIC’s future leadership and workforce 

capability needs. It has also focused on addressing 

resource needs to address the many challenges 

in divisions such as OCFI, RMS, and DRR, as 

previously discussed.

With respect to leadership at the uppermost levels of 

the Corporation, it is important to note that a vacancy 

currently exists on the FDIC Board of Directors—

Jeremiah Norton left the FDIC in June 2015 and his 

seat on the Board remains vacant. The current FDIC 

Chairman’s term is set to expire in November 2017, 

which would leave another position vacant. The 

FDIC Board has experienced such vacancies in the 

past and the FDIC IG at the time strongly advocated 

filling those Board positions. Now, given the myriad 

financial and economic concerns, emerging risks, 

Dodd-Frank Act responsibilities, important priorities 

and challenges facing the FDIC, and the advent of 

a new Administration, strong and sustained senior 

leadership is even more essential. 

The FDIC has long promoted diversity and 

inclusion initiatives in the workplace. Section 342 

of the Dodd-Frank Act reiterates the importance 

of standards for assessing diversity policies and 

practices and developing procedures to ensure the fair 

inclusion and utilization of women and minorities 

in the FDIC’s contractor workforce. The DoddFrank Act also points to the Office of Minority and 

Women Inclusion as being instrumental in diversity 

and inclusion initiatives within the FDIC working 

environment. This office needs to ensure that it has 

the proper staff, expertise, and organizational structure 

to successfully carry out its advisory responsibilities 

to ensure diversity and inclusion throughout the 

Corporation.

The FDIC needs to sustain its emphasis on fostering 

employee engagement and morale on the part of all 

staff in headquarters, regions, and field locations. It 

looks to the annual Federal Employee Viewpoint 

Survey to provide a candid assessment of employee 

views of the FDIC workplace. The Corporation’s 

diversity and inclusion goals and initiatives, 

Workplace Excellence Program, and Workforce 

Development Initiative are positive steps that should 

continue to help create a workplace that promotes 

diversity and equal opportunity.

Finally, an organization’s overall corporate culture 

is essential to its success and, in July/August 2016, 

prompted in part by earlier OIG work, the FDIC 

Board of Directors reaffirmed the Corporation’s 
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170 APPENDICES

Code of Conduct and the six core values that 

underlie it: integrity, competence, teamwork, 

effectiveness, accountability, and fairness. The 

Chairman emphasized that these values apply not 

only to internal conduct but also externally, as FDIC 

leadership and staff interact with bankers, consumers, 

and other members of the public. In further support 

of these values, the Board prohibits retaliation against 

an employee who raises concern about conduct 

that appears to violate laws, rules, or the FDIC’s 

supervisory policy. In that connection, the Chairman 

also underscored the importance of whistleblower 

protection in a message to all FDIC staff on the 

occasion of the U.S. Senate passing Resolution 522 

on July 7, 2016, designating July 30, 2016, National 

Whistleblower Appreciation Day.  This Resolution 

acknowledges and commemorates the contributions 

of whistleblowers to combat waste, fraud, and 

violations of law. As noted by the Chairman, the 

Resolution encouraged executive federal agencies to 

inform employees and contractors about the legal 

rights to “blow the whistle” by honest and good faith 

reporting of misconduct, fraud, misdemeanors, or 

other crimes to the appropriate authorities. 

Ensuring Effective Enterprise Risk 

Management Practices

Enterprise risk management is a critical aspect of 

governance at the FDIC. Notwithstanding a stronger 

economy and financial services industry, the FDIC’s 

enterprise risk management framework and related 

activities need to be attuned to emerging risks, both 

internal and external to the FDIC, that can threaten 

key business processes and corporate success. As 

evidenced in the challenges discussed above, certain 

difficult issues may fall within the purview of a single 

division or office, while many others are cross-cutting 

within the FDIC, and still others involve coordination 

with the other financial regulators and other external 

parties. 

The Corporation needs to maintain effective controls, 

mechanisms, and risk models that can address a wide 

range of concerns—from specific, everyday risks such 

as those posed by use of corporate purchase or travel 

cards and records management activities, for example, 

to the far broader concerns of the ramifications of 

an unwanted and harmful cyber attack or the failure 

of a large bank or systemically important financial 

institution. 

In July 2016, the Office of Management and 

Budget updated Circular A-123, Management’s 

Responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management and 

Internal Control. This circular defines management’s 

responsibility for enterprise risk management (ERM) 

and internal control. It emphasizes the need to 

coordinate risk management and strong and effective 

internal control into existing business activities 

as an integral part of governing and managing an 

agency. Notwithstanding existing corporate risk 

management resources and mechanisms in place, the 

Corporation would be well served to examine and 

adopt those principles and practices embodied in the 

circular that make sense for the FDIC and ensure 

they are institutionalized, as intended by the circular. 

Doing so can help ensure that the Corporation’s 

risk management processes and systems identify 

challenges early on, bring them to the attention of 

corporate leadership, and develop solutions. Given 

the range, complexity, and importance of many of the 

Corporation’s current endeavors—for example, the 

personal identification validation project, email and 

hard copy records management practices, data breach 

prevention measures, personnel security initiatives, 

and the like, such an approach could help ensure 

more effective project management and other controls 

and strengthen oversight of often costly investments 

and mission-critical activities. 

The Corporation’s stakeholders—including the 

Congress, American people, media, and others— 

expect effective governance, sound risk management 

practices, and vigilant regulatory oversight of the 

financial services industry. The Corporation needs to 

maintain the trust and confidence that it has instilled 

over the years. The FDIC Board of Directors, senior 
2016

APPENDICES 171

management, and individuals at every working 

level throughout the FDIC need to acknowledge, 

understand, and take ownership of current and 

emerging risks to the FDIC mission and be prepared 

to take necessary steps to mitigate those risks as 

changes occur and challenging scenarios that can 

undermine the FDIC’s short- and long-term success 

present themselves. A corporate culture marked by 

integrity, efficiency, and transparency is essential to 

that end. 
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172 APPENDICES

D. ACRONYMS 

ACP Access Control Program

AHDP Affordable Housing Disposition Program

AEI Alliance for Economic Inclusion

AFS Available for Sale 

AIG American International Group, Inc.

AML Anti-Money Laundering

ASBA Association of Supervisors of Banks of the 

Americas

ASC Accounting Standards Codification

ASU Accounting Standards Update 

BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

BOE Bank of England

BSA Bank Secrecy Act

Call Report Consolidated Reports of Condition and 

Income

CAMELS 

rating scale Capital adequacy; Asset quality; Management 

quality; Earnings; Liquidity; Sensitivity to 

market risks

CCIWG Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure 

Working Group

CCP Central Counterparties

CDFI Community Development Financial 

Institution

CDOs Collateralized Debt Obligations

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CEP Corporate Employee Program

CFI Complex Financial Institution

CFO Act Chief Financial Officers’ Act

CFPB Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

CFR Center for Financial Research

CFTC Commodity Futures Trading Commission

CIP Customer Identification Program

CISO Chief Information Security Officer

CMG Crisis Management Group

CMP Civil Money Penalty

ComE-IN Advisory Committee on Economic Inclusion

CPI-U Consumer Price Index for All Urban 

Consumers 

CRA Community Reinvestment Act

CSRS Civil Service Retirement System 

DCP Division of Depositor and Consumer 

Protection

DFA Dodd-Frank Act

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DIF Deposit Insurance Fund

DIR Division of Insurance and Research

DIT Division of Information Technology

DOA Division of Administration

DOJ Department of Justice 

DRM Digital Rights Management

DRR Designated Reserve Ratio

DRR (FDIC) Division of Resolution and Receiverships

EDIE Electronic Deposit Insurance Estimator

EGRPRA Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1996

ERM Enterprise Risk Management

FAQs Frequently Asked Questions

FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board 

FBO Foreign Bank Organization

FDI Act Federal Deposit Insurance Act

FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

FEHB Federal Employees Health Benefits

FERS Federal Employees Retirement System

FFB Federal Financing Bank

FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination 

Council

FFMIA Federal Financial Management 

Improvement Act

FHFA Federal Housing Finance Agency

FICO Financing Corporation

FIL Financial Institution Letters

FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

FIRREA Financial Institution Reform, Recovery 

and Enforcement Act of 1989

FIS Financial Institution Specialist

FISMA Federal Information Security Modernization 

Act of 2014

FMFIA Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act

FMSP Financial Management Scholars Program

FRB Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 

System
2016

APPENDICES 173

FRF FSLIC Resolution Fund

FRF-FSLIC Assets & Liabilities of FSLIC transferred to 

the FRF Upon the Dissolution of FSLIC

FRF-RTC RTC Assets & Liabilities

FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program

FSB Financial Stability Board

FS-ISAC Financial Services Information Sharing and 

Analysis Center

FSLIC Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 

Corporation

FSOC Financial Stability Oversight Council

FSVC Financial Services Volunteer Corps

FTE Full-time employee

GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office

GECC General Electric Capital Corporation, Inc.

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

GSA General Services Administration

GSEs Government Sponsored Entities

G-SIFIs Global SIFIs

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive

HVRE High Volatility Commercial Real Estate

IADI International Association of Deposit Insurers

IDI Insured depository institution

IMF International Monetary Fund

InTREx Information Technology Risk Examination

IRS Internal Revenue Service

ISDA International Swaps and Derivatives 

Association

IT Information technology

ITCIP Insider Threat and Counterintelligence 

Program

LCR Liquidity coverage ratio

LIDI Large Insured Depository Institution

LLC Limited Liability Company

LMI Low- or moderate-income

LURAs Land Use Restriction Agreements 

MDIs Minority depository institutions

MFA Multifactor Authentication

MLA Military Lending Act of 2006

MOL Maximum Obligation Limitation

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MRBA Matters Requiring Board Attention

MWOB Minority- and women-owned business

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NCUA National Credit Union Administration

NIST National Institute of Standards and 

Technology

NPR Notice of proposed rulemaking

OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

OCFI Office of Complex Financial Institutions

OCRM Office of Corporate Risk Management

O&G Oil and Gas

OIG Office of Inspector General

OLA Orderly Liquidation Authority

OLF Orderly Liquidation Fund 

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OMWI Office of Minority and Women Inclusion

OO Office of the Ombudsman

OPM Office of Personnel Management 

ORE Owned Real Estate

OTC Over-the-counter

OTS Office of Thrift Supervision

P&A Purchase and assumption

PDG Policy Development Group

PFR Primary federal regulator

PIV Personal Identity Verification

QBP Quarterly Banking Profile

REFCORP Resolution Funding Corporation

ReSG FSB’s Resolution Steering Committee

RMS Division of Risk Management Supervision

RTC Resolution Trust Corporation

SBA Small Business Administration

SEC Securities and Exchange Commission

SIFI Systemically important financial institution 

SLA Shared-loss agreement

SMS Systemic Monitoring System

SNC Program Shared National Credit Program

SNM State Nonmember

SRAC Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee

SSGNs Securitizations, and Structured Sale of 

Guaranteed Notes
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174 APPENDICES

TIPS Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities

TSP Federal Thrift Savings Plan 

TSP (IT-related) Technology service providers

URSIT Uniform Rating System for Information 

Technology

U.S. United States

VIEs Variable Interest Entities 

WE Workplace Excellence

WIOA Workforce Innovation Opportunity Act

YSP Youth Savings Program