First Division May 21, 2007

No. 1-07-0700 JOHN F. CI

NKUS, Petitioner-Appellee,

v. THE VIL LAGE OF STICKNEY MUNICI PAL OFF IC ERS ELE CTO RAL BOA RD, DON

ALD J. TABOR, ARTHUR RAWERS, Clerk, RICHARD E. McDONALD, Senior Trustee , SAM ESPOSITO, Objector, and DAVI

D ORR, Cook County Clerk, Responde nts-Appe llants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook Cou

nty

07 COEL 29

Honorable Paul A. Karkula, Judge Presiding PRESID ING

JUSTICE

McBRI DE delive

red the o pinion of t

he court : Petitioner, John F. Cink

us, filed nomination

papers t o be a ca ndidate f or villag e trustee

in the Village of Stickney . Respondent Sam Esposito objected to petitioner's candidacy based on an allega tion that pe

titioner i s inelig ible for o ffice u nder sec tion 3.1-1 0-5(b) o f the Illinois Municipal Code (65 IL CS 5/3.1-10-5(b) (West 2004)) because petitioner owed $100 to the Village of Stickney . Respondent Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board ( Board) sustained Esposito's objection under section 3.1-10-5(b) and found petitioner ine ligible. Petitioner sought judicial review, arguing that the Board’s decision was contrary to law and violated due process. The trial court agr eed with petitioner and reversed the Boa rd’s decision. Esposito a

ppeals, a rguing that the B oard cor

rectly ruled tha t petitione

r was ine ligible t

o run for village trustee because he was in arrears of a debt owe d to the Village of Stickney at the time petitioner filed his nomination papers, pursuant to section 3.1-10-5(b). On February

5, 2007, petitioner filed his nomination papers for the office of trustee in the1-07-0700

2

Village of Stickney

for the April 17, 2007, consolidated election. On Februar y 12, 2007, Esposito filed a verified objector’s petition, alleging that pe titioner is ineligible to run for trustee in the Village of Stickney under section 3.1-10-5(b) because “[t]he Candidate is in arre ars in the payment of indebtedne ss in the amount of $100.00 to the Village of Stickney .” Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the obj ection, w hich was taken wit h the cas e. Petitioner inclu ded his af fidavit with the motion to dismiss, which claimed that petitioner attempted to pay the $100 debt on Februa ry 14, 200 7, but the Vi llage e mplo yee refused his t ender. He was r eferred to a Vi llage poli ce offi cer, wh o also refuse d to ac cept p ayment an d tol d to s peak wi th th e mayor or V illa ge tr ea su re r. Pe ti ti on er at te mp te d t o p ay t he tr ea su re r, bu t p aym en t w as ag ai n r ef us ed . E ve nt ua ll y, petitioner made out a check to the Village for the $100 judgment and inserted it into the pay ment window at

the Villa ge business offic e, stating that he wa s pay

ing his de bt. On February

16 and 22, 2007, the Board conducted a hea ring on Esposito’s objection. Esposito offered a notice of judgment for $100 ente red against petitioner on November 16, 2006. Attac hed to the no tice o f judgm ent wa s a cit ation for di sorde rly condu ct, pu rsuan t to t he Vil lage of Stickney Municipal Code, issued against petitioner on April 27, 2006. The Board sustained Esposito’ s objectio

n and fou nd: “[T]he candidate is not eligible to be a candidate for the e lected municipal office sought under the Illinois Municipal Code, 65 IL CS 5/3.1-10 -5(b), a s he is inde bted to the

Village of Stickne

y in the amoun

t of $100.0 0 by

virtue of a judgme nt enter ed aga inst him in that amount which, as of the date of the filing of the candida te’s1-07-0700

3 nomination papers and as of the date of the filing of the O bjector’s Petition, was unpaid.” The Board declared petitioner’ s nomination papers to be invalid and his name shall not be printed on the ballot for the April 17, 2007, consolidated election. Petitioner sought judicial review in the circuit court of Cook County . On March 15, 2007, the circuit c ourt rev ersed the Boar d’s deci sion as “c ontrary

to law, ar bitrary and capricious, and violated Due Process and is against the manifest we ight of the evidence.” The circ uit court ordered petitioner’s name to be placed on the Apr il 17, 2007, ballot. This appeal followed. On appea l, Esposito

argue s that the B oard cor rectly ruled tha t petitione

r is not eli gible to run for the office of trustee in the Villag e of Stickney due to his being in arrears of a debt owed to the Village of Stickney at the time petitioner filed his nomination papers. Petitioner responds that the section 3.1-10-5(b) applies to ineligibility to hold elected office, not ineligibility to run for elected office. We review the Board’s decision on appea l rather than the circuit court’s decision. Berg man v. Va

chata , 347 Ill. App. 3d 339, 344 (2004). The sole question prese nted on appeal involves the interpretation of section 3.1-10-5(b) of the I llinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1- 10-5(b) (West 2004)). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law a nd is reviewed de

novo . Bergman , 347 Ill. App. 3d at 344. Section 3. 1-10-5(

b) provid es: “A pers on is not el igible f or an ele ctive mun

icipal of fice if that person is in arrears in the pay ment of a tax or other1-07-0700

4 indebtedness due to the municipality or ha s been convicted in any

co ur t l oc at ed in th e U ni te d S ta te s o f a ny i nf am ou s c ri me , b ri be ry, perjury, or othe

r felony.” 65 IL CS 5/3.1-10-5(b) (West 2004). “The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent.” Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc . v. Rockford School Dist. No. 205 , 216 Ill. 2d 455, 473 (2005). “The plain lang uage of a statute remains the best indication of this intent.” Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc

. , 216 Ill . 2d at 473. “ Where the la nguage of a statute is clear, we may not read into it exceptions that the legislature did not express, and we will give it effect as written.” Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc

. , 216 Ill. 2d at 473. “We also will give undefined statutory terms their ordinary

meanings.” Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc. , 216 Ill. 2d at 473-74. Although no Illinois court has addresse d the eligibility of a c andidate who is in arrears of a tax or other indebtedness, Illinois courts have consider ed the second part of section 3.1-10-5(b), where a person is not eligible for elec tive municipal office because of a felony conviction. See Pappas v. Calumet City Municipal Officers’ Electoral Board , 288 I ll. App. 3d 787 (1997 ); Brya

nt v. Boar d of El ectio n Com miss ioner s of th e Cit y of Chica go , 224 I ll. 2d 473 (2007); Delgado v. Board o f Elect ion C ommi ssio ners o f the C ity of Ch icago , 224 Ill. 2d 481 (2007). In Pappas , the candidate asserted that the court should consider sec tion 3.1-10-5 in para materiawith section 29-15 of the Election Code (10 IL CS 5/29-15 (West 1994)), which allows for the restoration of the ability to run for office for those convicted of an inf amous crime. Pappas , 288 Ill. App. 3d at 790. The reviewing court found no conflict and pointed out that the1-07-0700

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legisla ture inte nded to limi

t eligibi lity

of felon s seeking

municipa l office when it fa

iled to enact a restoring clause during the 1992 ame ndments of section 3.1-10-5. Pappas , 288 Ill. App. 3d at 790. The Pappas court found "no ambiguity in the clear language

of section 3.1-10-5 prohibiting felons from seeking muni cipal office. " Pappas , 288 Ill. App. 3d at 790. Recently, the I

llinois Supreme Court in Brya ntand Delgado considered the eligibility of two convicted felons who attempted to run for the office of alderman in the City of Chicago. Brya nt , 224 I ll. 2d at 47 4; Delgado , 224 Ill. 2d at 482 The supreme court he ld that “[s]ection 3.1-10-5 (b) of th e Municip al Code expressly provides that a pe rson who ‘ has been

convicte d in any court loc ated in th e United S tates of a ny i nfamous c

rime, bri bery , perjur

y or other fe lony ’ is ‘not eligible for an elective municipal office .’ 65 IL CS 5/3.1-10-5 (West 2004). This bar is not necessarily

permanent. Under the Election Code (10 I LCS 5/1-1, et seq. (West 2004)), convicted felons may re cover their right to run for office through ‘the terms of a pardon for the of fense or otherwise according to law.’ 10 I LCS 5/29-15 (West 2004).” Brya nt , 224 Ill. 2d at 474-75; Delgado , 224 I ll. 2d at 48 2-83 The supreme court concluded t

hat neither cand

idate wa s eligib le for elective municipal office in this State. Brya nt , 224 I ll. 2d at 47 5; Delgado , 224 Ill. 2d at 483. The supreme court ordered the circ uit court in the respective cases to vacate the de cision of the Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago and to declare both candidate s “ineligible to run

for the o ffice o f alder

man pursu

ant to section 3.1-1 0-5(b) o f the Illinois Municipal Code (65 IL CS 5/3.1-10-5(b) (West 2004)),” reject their nomination papers, and remove their names from the ballot or discount any votes cast for them. Brya nt , 224 Ill. 2d at 480; Delgado , 224 Ill. 2d at 489.1-07-0700

6

While these cases did not address a candidate’s ineligibility for elective municipal office based on a candidate’s indebtedness, the disqualify ing language in subsection (b) remains the same for both felons and debtors and should be applied consistently . “When the legislature uses identica l langua ge to pr escribe identica l provision s, absent

evidenc e of a contrary

intent, the

only logical conclusion to be drawn is that the legislature intende d that the two provisions have the same meaning and be interpreted identica lly.” In re

S.P. , 323 Ill. App. 3d 352, 357 (2001). I f a prior felony c onviction is bar to a candidate’s eligibility to run for office, then it follows that the legisla ture inte nded that being in arrea rs of a de bt to the mun

icipality also pre cludes e ligibility to run for office. We are not persuaded by

petitioner’s reliance on People v. Hamilton , 24 Ill. App. 609 (1886). First, this case is not binding on this court and has no precede ntial value as it was decided prior to 1935. Sklodowski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 358 Ill. App. 3d 696, 701 (2005); see also Graham v. White-Phillips Co. , 296 U.S. 2 7, 31, 80 L . Ed. 2d 20, 24, 56 S. Ct. 21, 22 (1935). Second, Hamilton is not an election case and does not consider the statute at issue in the ca se, but ins tead it int erpret ed the la nguag e of the provision in effect in 1886. F or these reasons, we find petitioner’s reliance to be misplace d. Additiona

lly, as in the c ase of a

felon’s ineligib ility , a debtor ’s ineligibility is not a permane nt bar to r un for mun

icipal of fice. The candid

ate is eli gible to

run in fut ure ele ctions, provided that a ll debts in a

rrea rs ar e sat isfie d at the time

the nomina

tion p apers are

file d. We also point out that petitioner failed to offer any evidence that he was not in arrears of the $100 judgment at the time he filed his nomination papers nor does he contest on appea l that he had not1-07-0700

7

paid the $100 judgment prior to filing his nomination papers. Accordingly, we hold that the Board’s decision was correct and that pursuant to section 3.1-10-5(b) of the I llinois Municipal Code, pet itioner is not elig ible to run

for trust ee in the Village of Stickne

y be cause he

was in

arrea rs of a de bt at the ti

me he file d his nomina

tion pape rs. Petitioner also asserts on appeal that the Board’s dec ision is fatally flawed in that it found that petitioner was “indebted” to the Village of Stickney when he filed his nomination papers, but failed to state that the debt was in arrears. We are not persuaded by

this argument. While the Board’ s finding s does not s pecific ally

state tha t the debt was in “a rrear s,” the B oard doe s cite to section 3.1-10-5(b) of the I llinois Municipal Code in its conclusion that petitioner was not eligi ble to run in the el ectio n. We do not find t hat th is fai lure t o use p recis e stat utory lan guage rendered the Board’s dec ision insufficient. For the f orego ing rea sons, we r

everse the deci sion of the

circuit c ourt of Cook County and rein state the

decision of the B oard. The court' s judgme nt shall fu rther pr ovide tha t if removal of Mr. Cinkus' name from the ballot cannot be ac complished prior to election day , the Board shall be required to disrega rd any votes c ast for him in determining the winner of the election. Reversed. GARCIA and R. GORDON, JJ., concur.