IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA20-132

Filed: 3 November 2020

Harnett County, No. 17 CRS 52700

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

LORRIE LASHANN RAY

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 28 August 2019 by Judge Gale M. 

Adams in Harnett County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 October 

2020.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Ronald D. 

Williams, II, for the State-Appellee.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Candace 

Washington, for Defendant-Appellant.

COLLINS, Judge.

Defendant Lorrie Lashann Ray appeals from judgment entered upon guilty 

verdicts for insurance fraud and obtaining property by false pretenses. Defendant 

argues that the trial court erred by (1) imposing a sentence based on both offenses 

and (2) improperly delegating authority to Defendant’s probation officer by failing to 

set a completion deadline for the active term of the sentence as a condition of special 

probation. We discern no error.
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I. Procedural History

Defendant was indicted on charges of insurance fraud, obtaining property by 

false pretenses, and attempting to obtain property by false pretenses. At trial, the 

State voluntarily dismissed the attempt charge. The jury found Defendant guilty of 

insurance fraud and obtaining property by false pretenses. The trial court 

consolidated the convictions for judgment and sentenced Defendant to 10 to 21 

months of imprisonment, suspended for 24 months of supervised probation. As a 

condition of probation, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve a 60-day active 

term. 

Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.

II. Factual Background

The State’s evidence tended to show the following: Defendant’s home in Dunn, 

North Carolina, was damaged in the fall of 2016 by Hurricane Matthew. Defendant 

filed a claim on 24 October 2016 with her home insurance company, Universal 

Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Insurer”). Defendant claimed her roof, 

windows, doors, porch, and electronics were damaged; there were leaks throughout 

the home due to the roof damage; she was living in her barn; and she lost all of the 

food in her refrigerator due to spoilage. An insurance adjustor inspected the home

on 2 November and completed a report the next day, which included photographs and

stated that Hurricane Matthew caused wind damage to the exterior and interior of 
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the home estimated at $1,578.99, that the house was habitable, and that living 

expenses would not be expected. The insurance adjustor issued a final report on 

21 November showing the gross claim of $1,578.99 less the deductible, resulting in 

an amount payable to Defendant of $452.99. The Insurer issued a check for $452.99 

to Defendant.

Defendant contacted the Insurer on 6 December by phone, disputing the 

amount awarded on her claim and requesting that the Insurer perform another home 

inspection. The next day, Defendant submitted to the Insurer an inventory of food 

loss totaling $1,350. On 21 December, Defendant submitted estimates for roof 

repairs for $6,240, window repairs for $1,520, and a door repair for $427. Defendant 

also submitted (1) a handwritten lease agreement signed by Defendant and her 

stepfather, Robert McEachin, stating that Defendant would pay $100 per day to

McEachin to stay in his home; and (2) handwritten documents purporting to be 76

paid daily receipts beginning 11 October 2016 for $100 each, signed by McEachin and

stating that Defendant was living in his home. Twice in January 2017, Defendant 

contacted the Insurer claiming reimbursement for living expenses in the amount of 

$8,300. Defendant faxed the handwritten lease agreement and receipts totaling 

$8,300, explained that she was paying cash to McEachin, and gave the Insurer 

McEachin’s phone number. On 1 February, Defendant called the Insurer explaining 
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that she was going to be evicted from where she was staying and would need to spend 

$150 per night on a hotel.

After reviewing Defendant’s claims, the Insurer made three additional 

payments to Defendant: $5,608.01 for additional home repairs; $500 for spoiled food; 

and $2,000 for living expenses, based on 20 days under the lease agreement that 

Defendant provided to the Insurer.

Defendant called McEachin and told him that the Insurer was going to call him 

to ask him a few questions, and that “all [he] had to do was just tell them yes.” 

McEachin received a phone call from the Insurer but did not answer or return it. A

representative of the Insurer visited McEachin at his home; showed him the receipts

that Defendant had submitted; asked him if he had signed them, to which he replied 

“no”; and had him sign his name on a piece of paper. McEachin told the insurance 

representative that he did not have a lease agreement with Defendant and that 

Defendant had not stayed with him between October 2016 and January 2017. 

McEachin testified at trial that he did not write or sign the purported receipts and 

that Defendant did not stay in his house.

III. Discussion

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by sentencing her for both 

obtaining property by false pretenses and insurance fraud for the same alleged 

misrepresentation. Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly delegated 
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its authority to Defendant’s probation officer by failing to set a completion deadline 

for the active term of Defendant’s split sentence.

We reject the State’s argument that these issues are not properly preserved for 

appellate review. When a defendant alleges that a trial court erred by imposing a 

sentence that is invalid as a matter of law, the defendant’s argument is preserved for 

appellate review, even if the defendant failed to object on this basis at sentencing. 

See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(18) (2019); State v. Meadows, 371 N.C. 742, 747, 

821 S.E.2d 402, 406 (2018) (“Although this Court has held several subdivisions of 

subsection 15A-1446(d) to be unconstitutional encroachments on the rulemaking 

authority of the Court, subdivision (18) is not one of them.”); State v. Mumford, 364 

N.C. 394, 403, 699 S.E.2d 911, 917 (2010) (“[N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(18)] does 

not conflict with any specific provision in our appellate rules and operates as a ‘rule 

or law’ under [North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure] 10(a)(1), which permits 

review of this issue”).

1

 

1 Embedded within the discussion in Defendant’s appellate brief of her challenge to sentencing 

is a separate argument that legislative intent bars two convictions in this case. Defendant failed to 

preserve this argument for appellate review by failing to object to the jury instruction on both charges 

at trial. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). Further, we decline to grant Defendant’s request that we invoke 

Rule 2 in order to review this argument. See N.C. R. App. P. 2. Declining review of this argument 

does not result in manifest injustice in this case because we would uphold both convictions for similar 

reasons we uphold the trial court’s sentence, as discussed below. 
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A. Sentencing Based on Both Convictions

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by sentencing her based on both

the conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses and the conviction for

insurance fraud, arising from the same alleged misrepresentation. Defendant argues

that the “General Assembly did not intend to doubly punish defendants for making a 

single misrepresentation merely because the victim happened to be an insurance 

company.”

“Whether . . . multiple punishments may be imposed when a defendant, in a 

single trial, is convicted of multiple offenses when some are fully, factually embraced 

within others is to be determined on the basis of legislative intent.” State v. Gardner, 

315 N.C. 444, 460, 340 S.E.2d 701, 712 (1986). Where the legislature “clearly 

expresses its intent to proscribe and punish exactly the same conduct under two 

separate statutes, a trial court in a single trial may impose cumulative punishments 

under the statutes.” State v. Pipkins, 337 N.C. 431, 433-34, 446 S.E.2d 360, 362 

(1994) (citations omitted). “Whether multiple punishments were imposed contrary to 

legislative intent presents a question of law, reviewed de novo by this Court.” State 

v. Hendricksen, 257 N.C. App. 345, 347, 809 S.E.2d 391, 393 (2018) (citations 

omitted). 

“The traditional means of determining the intent of the legislature where the 

concern is . . . one of multiple punishments for two convictions in the same trial 
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include the examination of the subject, language, and history of the statutes.” 

Gardner, 315 N.C. at 461, 340 S.E.2d at 712. 

With regard to language, “[t]he legislative intent of the statutes defining the 

offenses in question can be extrapolated from the provisions of each statute.” State 

v. Banks, 367 N.C. 652, 657, 766 S.E.2d 334, 338 (2014) (citations omitted). “When a 

statute is unambiguous, this Court will give effect to the plain meaning of the words 

without resorting to judicial construction.” Id. (citations omitted). 

The elements of insurance fraud are: “(1) a defendant presents a statement for 

a claim under an insurance policy; (2) that statement contained false or misleading 

information; (3) the defendant knows the statement is false or misleading; and, 

(4) the defendant acted with the intent to defraud.” State v. Koke, 264 N.C. App. 101, 

107, 824 S.E.2d 887, 892 (2019) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-2-161(b)) (other citation 

omitted). The elements of obtaining property by false pretenses are: “(1) A false 

representation of a past or subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which 

is calculated and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by which 

the defendant obtains or attempts to obtain anything of value from another person.” 

State v. Saunders, 126 N.C. App. 524, 528, 485 S.E.2d 853, 855-56 (1997) (brackets 

and citation omitted). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(a) (2019). 

While both offenses require a misrepresentation intended to deceive, they each 

require an element not required by the other. Insurance fraud requires proving that 
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the defendant presented a statement in support of a claim for payment under an 

insurance policy; obtaining property by false pretenses requires proving that the 

defendant’s misrepresentation did in fact deceive. Based on the separate and distinct 

elements that must be proven, the legislature clearly expressed its intent to proscribe 

and punish a misrepresentation intended to deceive under both statutes. See Banks, 

367 N.C. at 659, 766 S.E.2d at 339 (Given the separate and distinct elements of 

second-degree rape and statutory rape, “it is clear that the legislature intended to 

separately punish the act of intercourse with a victim who, because of her age, is 

unable to consent to the act, and the act of intercourse with a victim who, because of 

a mental disability or mental incapacity, is unable to consent to the act” (citations 

omitted)). 

With regard to the subject of the two crimes, “it is clear that the conduct of the 

defendant is violative of two separate and distinct social norms.” Gardner, 315 N.C. 

at 461, 340 S.E.2d at 712. Where obtaining property by false pretenses is generally 

likely to harm a single victim, a broader class of victims is harmed by insurance fraud. 

Fraud perpetrated on insurers through the submission of false claims increases

insurers’ cost of doing business—beyond simply the financial loss of having paid an 

insured a finite amount on a fraudulent claim—because it requires insurers to 

investigate fraudulent claims and establish ongoing processes for avoiding future 

fraudulent claims. These costs must be passed on to consumers of insurance through 
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increased premiums. Hence, there are policy concerns unique to insurance fraud that 

the legislature seeks to achieve by criminalizing this activity. 

Finally, regarding the history of the treatment of the two crimes for sentencing 

purposes, this Court has sustained sentencing for convictions of obtaining property 

by false pretenses and insurance fraud arising from the same misrepresentation. See, 

e.g., Koke, 264 N.C. App. at 105, 824 S.E.2d at 890; State v. Locklear, 259 N.C. App. 

374, 816 S.E.2d 197 (2018); State v. Pittman, 219 N.C. App. 512, 725 S.E.2d 25 (2012). 

“Had conviction and punishment of both crimes in a single trial not been intended by 

our legislature, it could have addressed the matter during the course of these many 

years.” Gardner, 315 N.C. at 462-63, 340 S.E.2d at 713.

Accordingly, because our legislature has expressed its intent to proscribe and 

punish the same misrepresentation under both insurance fraud and obtaining 

property by false pretenses, the trial court did not err by consolidating both Class H 

felony convictions for judgment and sentencing Defendant in the high presumptive 

range for one Class H felony. 

B. Active Term of Sentence

Defendant argues that the trial court improperly delegated its authority to 

Defendant’s probation officer by failing to set a completion deadline for the active 

term of Defendant’s split sentence. Defendant contends that this delegation of 

authority is not permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1351(a).
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Although “[a] challenge to a trial court’s decision to impose a condition of 

probation is reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard,” State v. 

Chadwick, 843 S.E.2d 263, 264 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020) (citation omitted), “[a]n alleged 

error in statutory interpretation is an error of law, and thus our standard of review 

for this question is de novo,” State v. Wainwright, 240 N.C. App. 77, 79, 770 S.E.2d 

99, 102 (2015) (citation omitted).

Under North Carolina’s criminal statutes, a trial court may sentence a 

defendant to special probation as a form of intermediate punishment, under certain 

circumstances. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1351(a) (2019). When doing so,

the court may suspend the term of imprisonment and place 

the defendant on probation . . . and in addition require that 

the defendant submit to a period or periods of 

imprisonment . . . at whatever time or intervals within the 

period of probation, consecutive or nonconsecutive, the 

court determines. . . . [T]he total of all periods of 

confinement imposed as an incident of special probation, 

but not including an activated suspended sentence, may 

not exceed one-fourth the maximum sentence of 

imprisonment imposed for the offense, and no confinement 

other than an activated suspended sentence may be 

required beyond two years of conviction.

Id.

Thus, under the statute, a period or periods of imprisonment must be “within 

the period of probation,” and no portion of this imprisonment “may be required 

beyond two years of conviction.” Id. Accordingly, the statute itself sets the outer 

limit, or completion deadline, of an active term as a condition of special probation as 
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the end of the period of probation or two years after the date of conviction, whichever 

comes first.

In this case, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 10 to 21 months of 

imprisonment, and suspended that sentence for 24 months of supervised probation. 

As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve a 60-day active 

term. On the Judgment Suspending Sentence form (AOC-CR-603D), under 

Intermediate Punishments, the trial court selected Special Probation and checked 

box A, ordering an active term of 60 days to be served in the custody of the Sheriff of 

Harnett County. The trial court also checked box H, labeled “Other,” and inserted 

the following: “TO SERVE 30 DAYS AT ONE TIME AND 30 DAYS AT ANOTHER 

TIME AS SCHEDULED BY PROBATION.”

The trial court appropriately determined the “intervals within the period of 

probation” as two thirty-day periods, and the completion date is set by statute as 

27 August 2021—which, in this case, is both the end of the two-year probationary 

period and two years from the date of conviction.

IV. Conclusion

We conclude that the trial court did not err by imposing a sentence based on 

convictions for both obtaining property by false pretenses and insurance fraud based 

on the same misrepresentation, and the trial court did not err by failing to set a 
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completion deadline for the active term of Defendant’s sentence as a condition of 

special probation.

NO ERROR.

Judges BRYANT and TYSON concur.