1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DONALD J. TRUMP, Plainti ff

, v. Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-02173 (CJN) COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.,
De f

endants

.

MEMORANDUM OPINION On July 8, 2019, New York’s governor s igned the Tax Returns Re leased Under Specific Terms Act (“TRUST Act”) in to law. Am. Compl., Dkt. 30, ¶ 61; see also N.Y. Tax Law § 697(f-1), (f-2) (2019) (codifying t he TRUST Act). The TRUST Act amends New York’s tax laws to authorize the chairper son of one of three congressional committees, including the House Committee on Ways and Means, to re quest the New York state tax returns of the President of the United States, among other elect ed officials. Tax § 697(f-1). If that request is made in writing and certain requirements are me t, the Commissioner of the New Y ork State Department of Taxation and Finance (“Commissi oner”) is required to produce th e records to the relevant committee. Id. To date, no committee chairperson has made such a request. On July 23, 2019, however, citing concerns that the Chairm an of the House Ways and Means C ommittee might soon attempt to employ the TRUST Act to procure his New York returns, Donald J. Trump filed this action. See generally Compl., Dkt. 1. Mr. Trump alleges that any request made for hi s state tax returns would violate Article I of the U.S. Constitution and the Rules of the U.S. House of2 Representatives. Id. ¶¶ 69–72. And he alleges that the TRUST Act violates the Firs t Amendment because it was enacted to discriminate and retaliate against his politics and speech.
Id. ¶¶ 73–76. Mr. Trump also filed an Emergen cy Application for Relief Under the All Writs Act. Dkt. 6; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018) (permitting c ourts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respe ctive jurisdic tions”). Mr. Tr ump’s Emergency Application seeks to preserve the status quo by prev enting the disclosure of his state tax returns while the Parties litigate the legality of a reque st for them, if and when such arequest is made. Following briefing and argument on the Emergency Application, as well as submissions from the Parties regarding how the case should proceed, the Cou rt largely adopted the New York Defendants’ proposal that the C ourt “rule on [their personal ju risdiction and venue] defenses as a threshold matter in considerati on for which the Commissioner [w ould] voluntarily agree to defer responding to any Committee reque st for a period of one week fo llowing the Court’s ruling.” Joint Status Report, Dkt. 22, a t 4. The Court thus ordered tha t (1) the New York Defendants could, on an expedited basis, move t o dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue; (2) the New York Defendants would not transmit any of Mr. Trump’s tax information that Chairman Neal might request while that motion is pending and for a period of one week from the day of the Court’s decision on the motion; an d (3) the New Y ork Defendants would notify the Court if Chairma n Neal made such a request dur ing that same period. Order (Aug. 1, 2019), Dkt. 25, at 3–4. Thereafte r, the New York Defe ndants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and imp roper venue, and that motion is fully briefed. See generally N.Y. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl . for Lack of Personal Jurisdic tion & Improper Venue3 (“Mot.”), Dkt. 36; Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to N.Y. Defs. ’ Mot. (“Opp’n”), Dkt. 37; N.Y. Defs.’ Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Their Mot. (“ Reply”), Dkt. 39. For the reasons that follow, t he Court concludes that it does not presently have jurisdiction over eith er New York Defendant. Mr. Trump bears t he burden of establishing personal jurisdiction, but his allegations do not establish tha t the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute is satisfied here with r espect to either Defendant. Mr . Trump has also not demonstrated that jurisdictional discovery is warranted. Mr. Trump may rene w his claims against the New York Defendants should future events trigger one or more provis ions of the D.C. long-arm statute, and he may, of course, s ue either New York Defendant i n another forum (presumably in New York). Background New York law generally requires that state tax returns be held confidentially and permits their disclosure in only certain enumerated exceptions. See, e.g. , Tax § 697(e) (secrecy requirement); id. § 697(f) (permitting disclosure to cooperate with certain U.S. and state proceedings). The TRUST Act adds another exception. It author izes the chairpersons of the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representative s (“Committee”), the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate, and the Joint Committe e on Taxation to request from the Commissioner “any current or prior year [state tax] reports or returns” of “the president of the United States, vice-president of the United States, member of the United States Congress representing New York state” o r other public official enumerate d in the statute. Id. § 697(f-1). Such a request must “certif[y] in writing”: (1) that the reque sted tax “reports or returns have been requested related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress”; (2) that the requesting committee has “made a written request to the United States secretary of the treasury4 for related federal returns or return information, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. [§] 6103(f) ”; and (3) that any inspection or submission to ano ther committee or to the ful l U.S. House of Representatives or Senate be done “in a manner c onsistent with federal law.” Id. § 697(f-2). Assuming the request includes those certifi cations, the Commissioner must pr oduce the requested returns with redactions for “any copy of a fed eral return (or portion thereo f) attached to, or any information on a federal return that is refl ected on, such report or return .” Id. § 697(f-1). On July 23, 2019, following media reports of increasing pressur e on Chairman Neal to request Mr. Trump’s state tax returns, see Compl. ¶¶ 6, 62–68, Mr. Trump filed this action against New York Attorney Gener al Letitia James, Commissioner M ichael R. Schmidt (collectively, “New York Defendants”), and the Committee. See generally id. Mr. Trump asserts two claims. In Count I, he claims that a request under the TRUST Act would violate Article I of the U.S. Constitution and the Rules of the House b ecause the request for his New York state tax returns would lack a legitimate legislative purp ose. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73–76. In Count II, Mr. Trump claims that the TRUST Act itself violates t he First Amendment and that the Committee and New York Defendants would violate his First Amend ment rights by employing it to produce his state tax returns to the Committee. Id. ¶¶ 77–81. Count II is the only claim asserted against the N ew York Defendants. Id. Mr. Trump also filed an Emergenc y Application for Relief Under the All Writs Act, asking the Court “to preserve the status quo” to prevent his cl aims from becoming ripe and then moot almost instantaneously without notice to him or the Court, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction

. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Pl.’s Emergency Appl. for Relief Under the All Writs Act, Dkt. 6-1, at 5–6. Following br iefing and oral argument onthe Emergency Application, the Court ordered the Parties to m eet and confer in light of the Co urt’s stated goals of (1) “ensuring5 that Mr. Trump’s claims do not b ecome moot before they can be l itigated”; (2) “treading as lightly as possible, if at a ll, on separation of powers and Spe ech or Debate Clause concerns”; and (3) “adjudicating . . . this disput e only when it is actually r ipe and has a fuller record than presently exists.” Jul y 29, 2019 Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 23, at 53–54; see Min. Order (July 29, 2019). The Parties were unable to reac h agreement and instead filed al ternative proposals for how the case should proceed. The N ew York Defendants, for thei r part, proposed that the Commissioner would not respond to a ny request for Mr. Trump’s t ax returns while the Court considered and ruled on their fo rthcoming motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. Joint Status Report, Dkt. 22, at 4. The Court largely adopted this proposal and, on August 1, 2019, ordered that (1) the New York Defendants cou ld move to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over them and for i mproper venue on an expedited basis; (2) “during the pendency of the New York Defendants’ Mot ion and for a period of one week from the Court’s decisi on . . . , the New York Defendants shall not deliver to the Committee any information concerni ng Mr. Trump that may be requ ested by Chairman Neal under the TRUST Act”; and (3) the New York Defendants shall not ify the Court if Chairman Neal made a request during that same one-week time period. Ord er (Aug. 1, 2019), Dkt. 25,
at 3–4. After the New York Defendants filed their initial Motion to Dis miss, Mr. Trump filed an Amended Complaint that asserts th e same two substantive claims as his original Complaint, but adds as defendants Chairman N eal and Andrew Grossman, the Commi ttee’s Chief Tax Counsel, and adds factual allegations relat ed to the New York Defendants ’ connections to this forum. See generally Am. Compl. The New York Defendant s renewed their Motion to Dis miss on August 29, 2019.6 Legal Standard A federal court has jurisdiction over a defendant “who is subj ect to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district c ourt is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Thus, if a District of Columbia court could exerci se jurisdiction over the New York Defendants, then so can this Court. E.g. , West v. Holder , 60 F. Supp. 3d 190, 193 (D.D.C. 2014). There are two types of persona l jurisdiction: “[1] general or all-purpose jurisdiction[] and [2] specific or case-linked jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). “For an individual, the paradigm for um for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.” Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, “aris[es] out of or r elate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Id. at 127 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)). With respect to specific jurisdi ction, the Court “must engage in a two-part inquiry: . . . first examine whether jurisdiction is applicable under the [D.C .] long-arm statute and then determine whether a finding of jurisdiction satisfies the const itutional requirements of due process.” GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp. , 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The D.C. long- arm statute authorizes speci fic jurisdiction “over a person, who acts directly or by an agent , as to a claim for relief aris ing from” certain contacts that person may have with the forum. D.C. Code § 13-423(a) (2019). As rel evant here, a defendant’s contacts with the District of Columbia can establish specific j urisdiction if the claim arises from7 the defendant’s: (1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;

. . . (3) causing tortious injury in the D istrict of Columbia by an act or omission in the Distric t of Columbia; [or] (4) causing tortious injury in the D istrict of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he [i] regularly does or solicits business, [ii] engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or [iii] derives substantia l revenue from goods used or consume, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia. § 13-423(a). “When jurisdiction ove r a person is based solely upon this section, only a claim for relief arising from acts enum erated in [subsection 13-423(a)] m ay be asserted against him.” § 13-423(b). Even if a plaintiff satisfies the D.C. long-arm statute, juris diction over a defendant must still fall “within the permissible bounds of the Due Process Cl ause.” GTE New Media , 199 F.3d at 1347. “In other words, a plainti ff must show ‘minimum conta cts’ between the defendant and the forum establishing that ‘the maintenance of the suit does n ot offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). A plaintiff bears the burden of e stablishing personal jurisdic tional over each defendant.
First Chi. Int’l v. United Exch. Co. , 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Pinkett v. Dr. Leonard’s Healthcare Corp. , No. 18-1656, 2019 WL 1992904, at *2 ( D.D.C. May 6, 2019) (“[T]he requirements for personal jurisdiction ‘must be met as to each defendant.’” (quoting
Rush v. Savchuk , 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980)). “In determining whether such a ba sis exists, factual discrepancies appearing in the r ecord must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y , 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (c itation omitted). Howev er, “a court8 need not accept the plaintiff’s ‘conclusory statements’ or ‘bar e allegations’ regarding the defendant’s actions in a selected forum.” Shaheen v. Smith , 994 F. Supp. 2d 77, 81 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing GTE New Media , 199 F.3d at 1349). Analysis Mr. Trump concedes that the allegations in the Amended Complai nt do not establish general jurisdiction for the New York Defendants. See Sept. 18, 2019 Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 40, at 64. Mr. Trump must therefore establish that specific jurisdiction e xists for each Defendant. It is an open question in this Ci rcuit whether, for jurisdicti onal purposes, a suit like this one against state officers sued in their official capacities fo r prospective relief, see Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908), should be considered a suit agai nst state officers in their individual capacities or instead as a suit against the state it self. See West , 60 F. Supp. 3d at 196 (noting the open question). But the D.C. Circuit has held that the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute does not appl y to states themselves. United States v. Ferrara , 54 F.3d 825, 831–32 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 1 Accordingly, Mr. Trump’s only avenue to satisfy the long-arm statute is to demonstrate that, if treated as individuals, each New York Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia.
A. Subsection (a)(1) Mr. Trump contends that subsection (a)(1) of the long-arm stat ute—which permits a D.C. court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a claim arising ou t of a person’s “transacting any business in the District of Col umbia,” D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1) —is satisfied here with respect to both the Commissioner and th e Attorney General. To invoke t his provision, a plaintiff must

1 If treated as the state for jurisdictional purposes, the New Y ork Defendants might “retain their sovereign immunity from privat e suits brought in [D.C. courts]. ” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt , 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019).9 show that a defendant has i ntentionally engaged in a “ commercial or business-related activity ” that was directed at D.C. residents. Capel v. Capel , 272 F. Supp. 3d 33, 39 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Holder v. Haarmann & Reimer Corp. , 779 A.2d 264, 270–71 (D.C. 2001)). 2 Mr. Trump has not alleged such activities. Mr. Trump’s First Amendment claim focuses primarily on the pas sage of the TRUST
Act. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77–81 (asserting that the TRUST Act “was enacted to retaliate against [Mr. Trump] because of his policy positions, his political beli efs, and his protected speech”). But Mr. Trump does not argue that the Commissioner or Attorney General transacted business in the District of Columbia through the New York legislature’s ena ctment of the TRUST Act. Nor could he. Mr. Trump does not allege that either New York Defen dant had any involvement whatsoever in the legislative pr ocess that led to the TRUST Act . And even if Mr. Trump alleged that either New York Defendant w as involved in the legislative process, he cites no authority for the proposition that enacting or he lping to enact a state statute in another state would constitute “transacting business” in the Di strict of Columbia under subsec tion (a)(1). Mr. Trump instead argues that the Commissioner would transact business in the District of Columbia by “[c]orresponding w ith Congress and sending tax r eturns to a committee.” See Opp’n at 19. The Commissioner ha s not taken any such actions—a t least not yet. But more importantly, the acts of corresponding with the Committee and t ransmitting Mr. Trump’s state tax returns would not constitute transacting business under sec tion (a)(1). In Holder v.

2 “[F]or cases that fit within its description,” subsection (a)( 1) “has been held ‘to be coextensive . . . with the Constitution’s due process limit.” Forras v. Rauf , 812 F.3d 1102, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Crane v. Carr , 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). In other words, if a defendant “has purposefully engaged in some type of commercial or business-related activity directed at District residents,” Holder , 779 A.2d at 270–71 (citation omitte d), then a D.C. court may exercise jurisdiction over thatdefendant to the full extent of what the Due Process Clause permits.10 Haarmann & Reimer Corp. , the D.C. Court of Appeals made c lear that to satisfy section (a)(1) “the plaintiff must show that th e defendant has purposefully en gaged in some type of commercial or business-related activitydirected at Distr ict residents.” 779 A.2d at 270–71 (citing Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno , 746 A.2d 320, 330–31 (D.C. 2000) (en banc)). The D.C. Circui t echoed this requirement in Forras v. Rauf , 812 F.3d at 1106, and D.C. and federal courts have consistently interpreted section (a)(1) to require a commercial or business activity. For example, subsection (a)(1) applies t o negotiating or performing contract s, e.g. , Helmer v. Doletskaya , 393 F.3d 201, 206–07 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (compiling cases), contra ctual activities that occur outside the district if they cause some consequence here, Mouzavires v. Baxter , 434 A.2d 988, 992 (D.C. 1981), and advertising inside the District, Shoppers Food Warehouse , 746 A.2d at
330–32. See also IMAPizza, LLC v. At Pizza Ltd. , 334 F. Supp. 3d 95, 111 (D.D.C. 2018) (surveying acts that fall inside and outside the scope of subse ction (a)(1)). Mr. Trump has not pointed to any decision holding tha t corresponding with a congr essional committee and sending it information (or any similar act) would constitute a commerci al or business activity. 3

3 The D.C. Court of Appeals, whos e decisions on the long-arm sta tute bind this Court, has recognized a “government contacts ” exception to the long-arm st atute. See Envtl. Research Int’l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng’rs, Inc. , 355 A.2d 808, 813 (D.C. 1976) (en banc) (“To permit our local courts to asse rt personal juri sdiction over no nresidents whose sole contact with the District consists of dealing with a federal instrumentality not only would pose a threat to free public participation in governme nt, but also would threaten to convert the District of Columbia into a national judicial forum.” (footnote omitted)); see also Capel , 272 F. Supp. 3d at 40 (precluding “the assertion of pe rsonal jurisdiction over a non- resident whose only contact with the District of Columbia is with Congress or a federal agency” (quoting Dooley v. United Techs. Corp. , 786 F. Supp. 65, 75 (D.D.C. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd. , 529 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2008))). Even if corresponding withCongress and sending tax returns to a congressional committee constituted “transacting business,” the government contacts exception w ould likely apply. But because Mr. Trump does not meet his burden of establishing that subs ection (a)(1) is satisfied here , the Court need not reach the government-contacts question.11 Mr. Trump argues that Attorney G eneral James’s role in enforci ng the TRUST Act falls within subsection (a)(1). See Opp’n at 19. But the Attorney G eneral does not appear to have a role in responding to a request unde r the statute, which is the only act that Mr. Trump contends would constitute a commercial or b usiness activity sufficient t o satisfy subsection (a)(1). Id. at 18–19. Instead, the sole responsibility to respond to a req uest from Congress lies with the Commissioner. See Tax § 697(f-1). To be sure, Mr. Trump attempts to connect Attorney General Jam es to the TRUST Act by emphasizing that there are other provisions in “New York tax la w generally, and its disclosure rules specifically,” that “are enforced by the Attorney General .” Opp’n at 5 (citing to various provisions of New York tax law ). None of those provisions, how ever, requires Attorney General James to take any part in the po ssible transmission of Mr. Trum p’s state tax returns to Congress. 4
B. Subsection (a)(3) Mr. Trump also attempts to est ablish personal jurisdiction ove r the New York Defendants under subsection (a)(3), which is satisfied if a defendant “cau s[es] tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission i n the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(3). “Subsection (a)(3) ‘is a precise and intentionally restricted t ort section, . . . which stops short of the outer limits of due process , . . . and which confers jurisd iction only over a defendant who
commits an act in the District which causes injury in the District , without regard to any other

4 In his Amended Complaint, Mr. T rump also points to Attorney Ge neral James’s litigation activity in the District, which a rguably satisfies subsection ( a)(1). See, e.g. , Turner v. Abbott , 53 F. Supp. 3d 61, 67 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Defendant’s participationin litigation in the District of Columbia District Court argua bly constitutes ‘transacting busin ess’ in the District of Columbia . . . .”). But to satisfy the long-arm statute, Mr. Trump’s al leged injury would have to arise out of that litigation, see D.C. Code § 13-423(b), a claim he does not make. See Turner , 53 F. Supp. 3d at 67–68 (“[T]his Court does not ha ve specific jurisdiction ove r Defendant because Plaintiff’s claim did not arise from [Defenda nt’s participation in litigati on] in the District.”).12 contacts.” Forras , 812 F.3d at 1107 (second emphasis added) (quoting Moncrief v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co. , 807 F.2d 217, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). As to the Commissioner, Mr. Trump argues that if the Commissio ner produces his state tax returns to the Committee, Mr. Trump would be injured in the District of Columbia. Even assuming that Mr. Trump would suffer that injury here, 5 subsection (a)(3) also requires that the injury be caused by an “act or omi ssion in the District of Colu mbia.” D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(3). At this time, Mr. Trump does not (and cannot) allege that the C ommissioner’s act of transmitting information to the Committee will definitely occur in the Distr ict. Mr. Trump correctly notes the Commissioner might take certain acts in the Distr ict, such as by “personally deliv er[ing his] returns to the Committee or tes tif[ying] about them here.” Opp ’n at 21. Such acts, if taken, could be enough to satisfy subsect ion (a)(3). But speculation that they might occur is insufficient to exercise jurisdiction over the Commissioner now . See GTE New Media , 199 F.3d at 1349 (rejecting “conclusory statement s and intimations” as the basis of meeting the requirements of the D.C. long-arm statute); cf. Capital Bank Int’l Ltd. v. Citigroup, Inc. , 276 F. Supp. 2d 72, 77 (D.D.C. 2003) (“Nor does the plai ntiff indicate how its claims relate to any activities by defendants . . . in the District ot her than a single hopeful st atement that check-processing by defendants . . . ‘could very well’ occur in the District [and f ulfill D.C. Code subsection 13-423(b)’s requirements]. Such a speculative statement does n ot satisfy the requirements of the

5 The New York Defendants argue t hat the transmission of Mr. Trump’s tax records to the Committee would not injure him at all, see Reply at 12–13, but do not argue that if Mr. Trump suffers an injury it would occur in some other jurisdiction. The Court does note that Mr. Tru mp apparently has changed his p rimary residence from New York to Florida. Andrew Restuccia, Trump Says He Is Adopting Fl orida as Primary Residence , Wall St. J. (Oct. 31, 2019, 11:28 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/a rticles/trump-says-he-isadopting-florida-as-primary -residence-11572574793. But he also lists the White House as one of his residences. Id.13 District’s long-arm statute.” (citations omitted)). And as to Attorney General James, Mr. Trump does not allege that she will be involved in providing his tax records to the Committee, let alone that she would do so through an act taken in the District.
C. Subsection (a)(4) Finally, Mr. Trump contends that his allegations satisfy subsec tion (a)(4) of the long-arm statute. Unlike subsection (a)(3 ), which applies when a tortio us act occurs within the District, subsection (a)(4) “permits an exe rcise of jurisdiction over a t ortious act or omission committed
outside the District that causes injury within the District .” Forras , 812 F.3d at 1107 (emphasis added) (citing D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(4)). But subs ection (a)(4) has a signifi cant limitation: it applies “if, and only if, the defe ndant ‘[i] regularly does or solicits business, [ ii] engages in any other persistent course of c onduct, or [iii] derives substantia l revenue from . . . services rendered in the District.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting D.C. Code § 13-432(a)(4)). [U]nder (a)(4), the act outside/ impact inside the forum is the basis for drawing the case into the court, but because the harm-gener ating act (or omission) occurred outside , the statute calls for something more. The ‘something more’ or ‘plus factor’ does not itself su pply the basis for the assertion of j urisdiction, but it does serve to filter out cases in which the inforum impact is an isolated event and the defendant otherwise has no, or scant, affiliations with the for um. Carr , 814 F.2d at 763 (citations omitted). Mr. Trump has not alleged that Attorney General James will take an act outside of the District that would cause him in jury here, so subsection (a)(4) is not satisfied as to James. With respect to the Commissioner, Mr . Trump has certainly pleaded th at, by sending his state tax returns to Congress, the Commissioner would “caus[e] tortious i njury in the District of Columbia by an act . . . outside the Distric t of Columbia.” Opp’n at 22 (quoting D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(4)). But Mr. Trump als o must meet the requirements of the subsection’s “plus factors.”14 Mr. Trump argues that the persis tent-course-of-conduct “plus fa ctor” is satisfied. Id. at 22–23. But despite subsection (a) (4)’s lenient standard, Mr . Trump does not meet his burden. To be sure, “[u]nder (a)(4), the business done or persistent co urse of conduct ‘plus factor’ is satisfied by connections considerab ly less substantial than tho se it takes to e stablish general, all-purpose ‘doing business’- or ‘ presence’-based jurisdiction. ” Carr , 814 F.2d at 763 (citations omitted). Further, “subsection (a)(4) contemplates a connectio n that may be un related to the claim in suit.” Id. (citation omitted). But Mr. Tru mp’s brief on this point is wh olly conclusory; it does not identify a single act taken by the Commissioner that would satisfy t his plus factor.
See Opp’n at 22–23. Looking past Mr. Trump’s brief, the allegations in the Amended Complaint also do not establish a persistent course of conduct by the Commissioner inthe District. Mr. Trump alleges that the Commissioner resided a nd worked in the District betwee n 2011 and 2012 when he served as a policy analyst in the U.S. Department of Treasury and that the Commissioner served as an economic policy advisor to the 2016 Clinton campaign. Am . Compl. ¶ 17. Mr. Trump does not allege that the Commi ssioner had any connection whatso ever to the District of Columbia while he served as an economic policy advisor for the 2016 Clinton campaign headquartered in Brooklyn, NewYork. And living and working inthe District of Columbia for the Department of the Treasury s even years prior to the passage of the TRUST Act and the present lawsuit can hardly be cons idered a persistent course of conduct here because those acts have long since ended. See Burman v. Phx. Worldwide Indus., Inc. , 437 F. Supp. 2d 142, 153 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The minimum cont acts that are required for . . . engaging in a persistent course of conduct should ‘at least be con tinuing in character.’” (quot ing McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine , No. 92-0711, 1994 WL 510088, at *4 ( D.D.C. June 8, 1994)). T hat the15 Commissioner may act in 2019 or later renders his t emporary residence in the Dis trict between 2011 and 2012 remote and hardly “persistent.” 6 In sum, these allegations , taken together, do not establish a persistent course of conduct by the Commissioner inthe District of Columbia sufficient to satisfy subsection (a)(4).
D. Conspiracy Jurisdiction Mr. Trump also argues that he can establish pers onal jurisdict ion under subsection (a)(3) through a “conspiracy jurisdi ction” theory. Opp’n at 22. Assu ming this theory of jurisdiction is available under D.C. law, 7 to satisfy it, “the plaintiff mu st allege ‘(1) the existence o f a civil conspiracy . . . , (2) the defenda nt’s participation in the con spiracy, and (3) an overt act by a co-conspirator within the forum , subject to the long-arm statut e, and in furtherance of the conspiracy.’” FC Inv. Grp. , 529 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Kopff v. Battaglia , 425 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 n.4 (D.D.C. 2006)). Mr. Trump argues that the New Y ork Defendants “are the Congress ional Defendants’ co-conspirators” and that, as a result, “the New York Defendant s will have ‘caus[ed] tortious

6 Mr. Trump points to the litigat ion activities of Attorney Gene ral James when discussing the persistent-course-of-conduct “p lus factor” under subsection (a) (4). Opp’n at 23. However, with no act by the Attorney General tha t would cause Mr. Trump’s all eged harm (the production of his state tax returns to the C ommittee), it does not matter tha t the Attorney General may have engaged in a persistent course of conduct in the District.

7 The D.C. Court of Appeals has no t expressly recognized the con spiracy theory of personal jurisdiction. See Eric T. v. Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc. , 700 A.2d 749, 756 n.12 (D.C. 1997) (“Federal courts in the District‘have applied the conspiracy t heory of the jurisdiction warily,’ and there is a substantial que stion, which we do not attempt to resolve, as to whether the Superior Court has personal j urisdiction over certain defendant s in these cases.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel , 949 F.2d 415, 427 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Silberman, J., c oncurring in part and dissent ing in part) (“We have not yet been told by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals—whose interpr etations of the D.C. long-arm statute are of course binding—w hether [subsection] 13-423(a)(3) encompasses the conspiracy theory . . . .”). But because Mr. Trump has not adequately ple aded such a conspiracy, the Court need not decide whether it is a viable theory under D.C. law.16 injury in the District of Col umbia by an act . . . in the Distr ict of Columbia.’” Opp’n at 22 (quoting D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(3)) . But nowhere in his Amended Complaint does Mr. Trump allege the existence of a conspi racy; in fact, the word “conspi racy” does not eve n appear in his pleadings. See Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan , 115 F.3d 1020, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (establishing pers onal jurisdiction under a co nspiracy theory requires that “the plaintiff . . . plead with particula rity ‘the conspiracy as wel l as the overt acts within the forum taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.’” (quoting Dooley , 786 F. Supp. at 78)); LG Display Co. v. Obayashi Seikou Co. , 919 F. Supp. 2d 17, 27 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Here, LG . . . makes n o mention of conspiracy in its complaint , and it is doubtful whether the facts alleged therein might support the inference that a conspiracy existed.”). See generally Am. Compl. In any event, the Amended Compl aint’s factual allegations do n ot establish conspiracy jurisdiction under subsection (a)( 3). Mr. Trump argues that a conspiracy can be inferred from his allegations that “Chairman N eal must submit a request [to the Commissioner], Chairman Neal must certify that certain c onditions are satisfied, the Co mmissioner must prepare the returns and make the necessary redacti ons, and the parties must work to gether to deliver and discuss the returns.” Opp’n at 22. But thes e allegations merely establisha relationship creat ed via statutory authority, which, without more, does not amount to a conspiracy

. Cf. FC Inv. Grp. , 529 F.3d at 1098 (holding that allegations that only establish a business r elationship between defendants— without demonstrating any further e vidence of a conspiracy—fail ed to establish personal jurisdiction).17 * * * For these reasons, Mr. Trump ha s not established that any prov ision of the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute is s atisfied as to e ither New York Defendant. 8
E. Jurisdictional Discovery Mr. Trump also argues that he is entitled to jurisdictional dis covery. “[I]n order to get jurisdictional discov ery a plaintiff must have at least a good faith belief that such discovery will enable it to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Caribbean Broad. Sys. Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless, PLC , 148 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998). “[A] request for jurisdictional disc overy cannot be based on mere conjecture or speculation,” FC Inv. Grp. , 529 F.3d at 1094 (citing Bastin v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n , 104 F.3d 1392, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1997)), and “[a] plaintiff may not use jurisdictional discoveryto ‘conduct a fishing expedition in the hopes of discovering some basis of jurisdiction,’” Nuevos Destinos, LLC v. Peck, No. 15-cv-1846, 2019 WL 78780, at *13 (D. D.C. Jan. 2, 2019) (quotin g In re Papst Licensing GmbH

8 Exercising jurisdiction over Ne w York state officials would al so raise state sovereignty and federalism concerns. Mr. Trump —who apparently considered New Y ork his primary residence until recently, when he changed it to Florida, Restuccia, supra —seeks to hale New York state officials into federal court in the District of Columbia to lit igate the constitutionality of a New York state tax statute. Other c ourts have been cautious to per mit similar suits to proceed. See, e.g. , Marshall v. Labor & Indus., Wash. , 89 F. Supp. 2d 4, 10 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Principles of comity dictate that [determini ng whether a Washington State age ncy properly administrated Washington State’s workers’ com pensation law] should be decided by a Washington court, not the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.” ). And some courts have gone so far as to hold that haling offici als from other states into fed eral courts outside of their home states violates the Due Process Clause. E.g. , Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski , 513 F.3d 476, 489 (5th Cir. 2008) (reversing the di strict court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident Arizona official in holding that th e Due Process Clause not onl y “‘protect[s] the defendant against the burdens of litiga ting in a distant or inconvenient forum’; [it] also ‘ensure[s] that the States through their courts , do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.’” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980))). Because Mr. Trump has not demonstr ated that any provision of the District’s long-arm statute is satisfied here, the Court need n ot reach this question.18 & Co. KG Litig. , 590 F. Supp. 2d 94, 101 (D.D.C. 2008)). Further, “a plaintif f must make a ‘detailed showing of what discovery it wishes to conduct or wha t results it thinks such discovery would produce.’” Williams v. ROMARM , 187 F. Supp. 3d 63, 72 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc. , 290 F. Supp. 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 2003)). Mr. Trump has not established that jurisdictional discovery is warranted. Mr. Trump’s strongest case is that subsections (a)(3) or (a)(4) of the D.C. long-arm statute would be satisfied in the event that the Commissioner takes certain steps to compl y with a request from Chairman Neal. See supra pp. 11–15. But with respect to subsection (a)(4), Mr. Trump h as not made a sufficiently strong claim that that subsection’s “plus factors” are met, such that discovery into those plus factors would be wa rranted. And with respect to sub section (a)(3), jurisdiction over the Commissioner will turn entirely on how the Commissioner res ponds in the future to a request. Discovery, at this time , is unlikely to shed any ligh t on that question. Mr. Trump also fails to “make a ‘ detailed showing of what disco very [he] wishes to conduct or what results [he] thinks such discovery would produc e.’” Williams , 187 F. Supp. 3d at 72 (quoting Atlantigas , 290 F. Supp. 2d at 53). Instead, he makes general statements about wishing to conduct discovery into the New York Defendants’ pote ntial contacts with the District and into the alleged coordination between Attorney General Jame s and the House to disclose Mr. Trump’s financial information. See Opp’n at 9–11. “Such ‘generalized’ requests and ‘predictions are not enough to jus tify jurisdictional discovery .’” Nuevos , 2019 WL 78780, at *14 (quoting Atlantigas , 290 F. Supp. 2d at 53).
Conclusion Based on the current allegations, Mr. Trump has not met his bur den of establishing personal jurisdiction over either of the New York Defendants. The Court therefore need not19 reach the question of proper venue. Accordingly, the New York Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED , and Mr. Trump’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice as to them. Mr. Trump may press his cl aims against the New York Defe ndants in this Court should future events support the exercise of personal jurisdiction ove r them, or he may opt to pursue those claims in an appropriate forum. An Order will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.

DATE: November 11, 2019 CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge