1 Filed 5/8/13 Bluford v. Safeway Stores CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (San Joaquin)

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KENNETH BLUFORD, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC., Defendant and Respondent. C066074 (Super. Ct. No. CV028541)

This appeal concerns the trial court’s deni al of class certification in a wage and
hour action. Plaintiff Kenneth Bluford sought to certify a clas s of plaintiffs in his action against his employer, defendant Safeway, Inc. He claims Safeway violated statutory and regulatory laws requiring it to provide its empl oyees with paid rest periods, earned meal periods, and sufficiently ite mized wage statements. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to certify a class. It ruled individual issues predominated over common issues on the rest period and meal period claims, and that plaintiff failed to allege a common injury resulting from th e inadequate wage

statements.2 We reverse. Insufficient evidence supports the tria l court’s ruling, as common issues predominate over indivi dual issues, and plaintiff in fact alleged a common injury resulting from the wage statements. We order the trial court to grant plaintiff’s motion.
FACTS Since 2003, Safeway has managed the operati ons of a distribution center in Tracy. Plaintiff is employed by Safeway as a truc k driver who works out of the distribution center. He and the other drivers he sought to certify as a class deliver goods from the distribution center to Safeway stores in northern California and Nevada. 1 Safeway’s truck drivers are represented by General Teamsters Local 439, which has negotiated successive collective bargai ning agreements with Safeway. The agreements included provisions regarding rest periods and meal periods. Under those provisions, Safeway was required to provide tw o paid rest periods of 15 minutes each for every eight- or 10-hour shift worked. Empl oyees received an add itional 15-minute paid rest period if they worked in excess of two hours overtime. Also under the agreements, drivers were to take a 30-minute meal period on their own time. Drivers were required to take the meal period no later than five hours after their regular shift began. The first collec tive bargaining agreement, which ran from 2003 to 2008, did not require drivers to take a s econd meal period if the driver worked more
than 10 hours. The second agreement, however, effec tive September 28, 2008, to 2011, required drivers to take a sec ond meal period in addition to the first meal period if the

1 Prior to 2003, the distribution center was operated by a third party, Summit Logistics, Inc., for Safeway’s benefit. In Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 949 ( Cicairos ), we reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on a wage and hour claim in favor of Summit Logistics. We concluded the evidence established Summit Logistics did not provide the plainti ffs, truck drivers formerly employed by Summit Logistics, with their required meal peri ods, paid rest periods, and adequately itemized wage statements. In 2003, when Safeway took over control of the distribution center, it continued to utilize th e same compensation structure and policies we subsequently found wanting in Cicairos until after that decision’s release.3 driver worked more than 10 hours. The driver could waive this second meal period if he
had worked no more than 12 hours and had taken the first meal period. The collective bargaining agreements also obligated Safeway to utilize what it calls an activity based compensation system to determine the driver s’ wages. Pay was calculated based on (1) mileage rates applied according to the numb er of miles driven, the time of day the trips were taken, and th e locations where the trips began and ended; (2) fixed rates for certain tasks (e.g., rates fo r number of pallets deli vered and picked up); (3) an hourly rate for a predetermined amount of minutes for certain tasks (e.g., paid for 10 minutes at hourly rate for set-up time at each store); and (4) an hourly rate for delays (e.g., breakdowns, impassable highways, time sp ent at scales, or other causes beyond the driver’s control). Drivers logged their mileag e and activities for each trip manually on trip sheets. They also logged th eir activities into an onboard computer system known as the XATA system. Through XATA, Safeway tracked th e drivers’ moves, including their stops. The drivers input codes in to XATA to record specific reas ons for delays. Neither the trip sheets nor the XATA system, howev er, provided a place or mean s to record meal or rest periods. Beginning in 2005, after we issued our decision in Cicairos , Safeway took additional steps to ensure its drivers took th eir breaks. In December 2005, it required drivers to note on their daily tr ip sheets when they took their meal peri ods. In July 2006, it required each driver to sign a certification on the back of the trip sheets certifying he was “authorized and permitt ed” to take his rest periods, and that he took his meal periods. In 2007, Safeway informed driv ers that failing to sign the ce rtification on the trip sheet could result in discipline. At all relevant times, Safeway provided th e drivers with a “driver trip summary -- report of earnings” and an “earnings statement” with each paycheck. The driver trip summary listed each comp onent of a driver’s pay, and th e quantity of each component for4 which he was being paid. The components and quantities were paid based on the rates set in the collective bargaining agreements. The earnings statement itemized the actual components, and it expressed th em in an equivalent hourly pay. However, neither the driver trip summary nor the earnings statem ent stated the rates by which drivers were compensated for th eir mileage. Plaintiff filed his complaint as a class acti on in 2006. He alle ged Safeway violated pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and Industrial Welfare Commission wage orders by failing to provide him and other similarly situated empl oyees with paid rest periods, meal periods, and sufficiently itemized wage st atements. Specifically, plaintiff contends Safeway violated the law by (1) not paying for rest periods nor sp ecifically accounting for them on wage statements; (2) (a) not pr oviding until 2006 a se cond meal period for
drivers who worked more than 10 hours a day, and (b) not making adequate efforts until
2006 to relieve drivers of their duties fo r any required meal period; and (3) issuing inadequate wage statements omitting essentia l information that woul d allow a driver to determine if he had been paid the proper amount of wages owed him under the activity based compensation system. In April 2009, plaintiff filed his motion for class certification. He sought to certify three subclasses: those drivers denied paid rest periods; those denied required meal periods; and those who received inadequate wage statements. The trial court denied the motion in July 2010. It fou nd class members’ individual reasons for not taking rest or meal periods predominated over common issues. It believed it could resolve the rest and meal period claims only by inquiring into e ach episode where a cl ass member did not take a break. As to the wage statement clai m, the court ruled plaintiff could not show
common issues because class members did no t suffer any common inju ry from the wage

statements. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in refusing to certify th e class, subdivided
into three subclasses.5 DISCUSSION
I Standard of Review Our Supreme Court recently described the st andard of review we are to apply. “Drawing on the language of Code of Civ il Procedure section 382 and federal precedent, we have articulated clear requirements for the certification of a class. The party advocating class treatment must demonstrat e the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceedi ng as a class superior to the alternatives. (Code Civ. Proc., § 382; Fireside Bank [ v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069,] 1089; Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435; City of San Jose [ v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447,] 459.) ‘In turn, the “community of in terest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the cl ass; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” ’ ( Fireside Bank , at p. 1089, quoting Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.) “Here, only a single element of class suita bility, and a single aspect of the trial court's certification decision, is in dispute: whether individual ques tions or questions of common or general interest predominate. The ‘ultimate questio n’ the element of predominance presents is whether ‘the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the
maintenance of a class action w ould be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.’ ( Collins v. Rocha (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232, 238; accord, Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326.) Th e answer hinges on ‘whether the theory of recovery advanced by the proponents of certificati on is, as an analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment.’ ( Sav-On , at p. 327.) A court must examine the allegations of the complain t and supporting declarations ( ibid. ) and consider whether6 the legal and factual issues they present are such that their resolution in a single class proceeding would be both desirable and feasible. [ 2 ] ‘As a general rule if the defendant’s liability can be determin ed by facts common to all member s of the class, a class will be
certified even if the members must i ndividually prove their damages.’ ( Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4t h 908, 916; accord, Knapp v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.A pp.4th 932, 941.) “On review of a class certification order, an appellate court’s inquiry is narrowly
circumscribed. ‘The decision to certify a class rests squarely within the di scretion of the trial court, and we afford th at decision great deference on appeal, reversing only for a
manifest abuse of discretion: “Because trial courts are ideally situ ated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action, they are afforded great discretion in granting or de nying certification.” [Citati on.] A certification order generally will not be disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on erroneous legal assumptions. [Citations.]’ ( Fireside Bank v. Superior Court, supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 1089; see also Hamwi v. Citinational-Buckeye Inv. Co. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 462, 47 2 [‘So long as [the trial] court applies proper criteria and its action is founded on a rational basis, its ruling must be upheld.’].) Predominance is a factual que stion; accordingly, th e trial court’s finding that common issues predominate generally is reviewed for substantial evidence. ( Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 328–329.) We must ‘[p]resum[e] in favor of the certification order . . . the existence of every fact the trial

2 “As one commentator has put it, ‘what really matters to class certification’ is ‘not similarity at some unspecified level of gene rality but, rather, dissimilarity that has the capacity to undercut the prospects for joint re solution of class members’ claims through a unified proceeding.’ (Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof (2009) 84 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 97, 131.)7 court could reasonably deduce from the record . . . .’ ( Id . at p. 329.)” ( Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021-1022 ( Brinker).)
II Certification of Rest Period Subclass
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in refusing to certify the rest period subclass. He argues his theory of recovery is based on Safeway’s po licies and procedures that apply uniformly to all drivers. He a sserts Safeway did not pay its drivers for rest periods because its compensatio n system, based on miles driv en and the performance of specific tasks, did not account fo r rest periods or provide an ability to be paid for them. Safeway also provided no means by which an em ployee could verify he was paid for his rest periods. He argues these issues, common to each driver, predominate, and thus the trial court erred by concluding indivi dual issues would predominate. We agree with plaintiff. The trial court’ s denial of the rest period certification class is not supported by subs tantial evidence. Issues comm on to all drivers and Safeway predominate plaintiff’s claim for rest peri od compensation. Indeed, the common proof demonstrates Safeway did not separately compen sate drivers for their rest periods in the manner required by California law. Because th e only issue remaining to be resolved for this class is damages, the class is to be certified.
Under Industrial Welfare Commission wa ge orders, employers are required to “authorize and permit all employees to take rest periods” at the rate of at least 10 minutes for every four hours worked. (Cal. Code Re gs., tit. 8, §§ 11070, subd. 12; 11090, subd. 12.) “Authorized rest periods shall be counted as hours work ed for which there shall be no deduction from wages.” ( Ibid .) Safeway’s collective bargaining agreements required it to provide two 15-minute, paid rest peri ods for each eight- or 10-hour shif t worked. Plaintiff claims Safeway was required to compensate drivers se parately for their rest periods, and that it did not because its compensation system, based on miles driven8 and specific tasks performed, did not include rest periods as an item that would be reported by drivers and compensated. Safeway asserts it complied with the wa ge order. It argues the wage order requires only that pay not be deducted for rest periods, a nd Safeway never deducted pay from its drivers for taking rest periods. Itclaims the wage order does not require employers who use a piece-rate or incentiv e-based compensation system like Safeway’s to put employees on the clock just to pay fo r rest periods. Rather, Safeway claims, pay for rest periods is considered part of the overall piece-rate compensation. Even if pay for rest periods is not consid ered part of the piece-rate compensation, Safeway claims its policy, contained in th e collective bargaining agreements, was to provide paid rest periods, and that in fact it paid drivers for their rest periods. Safeway asserts the mileage rates negotia ted in the collective bargaini ng agreements included paid time for rest periods. There is no doubt Safeway was required to provide the drivers with paid rest periods. Employees are entitled to “a paid 10-minute rest peri od per four hours of work. [Citation.]” ( Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc . (2007) 40 Cal.4t h 1094, 1104.) The wage order’s requirement not to deduct wages for rest periods presumes the drivers are paid for their rest periods. And, as Safeway acknowledges, its policy was to provide paid rest periods. However, under the rule of Armenta v. Osmose, Inc . (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323 ( Armenta ), rest periods must be separately comp ensated in a piece-rate system. Rest periods are considered hours wo rked and must be compensated. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 11070, subd. 12; 110 90, subd. 12.) Under the California minimum wage law, employees must be compensate d for each hour worked at e ither the legal minimum wage or the contractual hourly rate, and complianc e cannot be determined by averaging hourly compensation. ( Ibid. ; Sheppard v. North Orange County Regional Occupational Program (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 289, 297, fn. 5.)9 Thus, contrary to Safeway’s argument, a piece-rate compensation formula that does not compensate separately for rest periods does not comply with California minimum wage law. (See Reinhardt v. Gemini Motor Transport (E.D. Cal. 2012) 869 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1168 [pi ece-rate pay system that did not separately pay truck drivers for non-driving duties violates California law re quiring compensation for each hour worked]; Cardenas v. McLane FoodServices, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2011) 796 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1252 [piece-rate pay system that did not separate ly pay truck drivers for non-driving duties and rest periods violates California law requiri ng compensation for ea ch hour worked].) There is no dispute that Safeway’s ac tivity based compensation system did not separately compensate drivers for their rest periods. Pay wa s calculated based on mileage rates applied according to the number of miles driven, th e time when the trips were made, and the locations where the trips began and e nded. None of these components directly compensated for rest periods. Driver pay was also based on fixed rates for certain tasks and hourly rates for other task s and delays. There is no dis pute that none of these fixed rates were applied to rest periods. Safeway counters that although it did not separately compensate for rest periods, the activity based compensation system did in clude compensation for rest periods. John Flanigan, one of the designers of the compen sation system, testified in a deposition that the system’s mileage rates a nd the activity rates were designed to include payment for expected rest periods. Even if that is so, it is akin to averaging pa y to comply with the minimum wage law instead of separately co mpensating employees for their rest periods at the minimum or contractual hourly rate, a nd, as we have explained, it is not allowed
under California labor law. Safeway hopes to raise a defense it claims requires individual resolution for each driver, but resolution of that issue is unnece ssary under controlling law. Safeway asserts plaintiff’s theory of recovery is grounded in an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements and their mileage ra tes, which provide for the driv ers’ rest periods and which10 allegedly include compensation for them. As a result, Safeway argues plaintiff’s claim is preempted by the federal Labor Management Rela tions Act (see 29 U.S.C. § 185). That act may preempt state law claims that are s ubstantially dependent on an analysis of a collective bargaining agreement. ( Department of Fair Employ ment & Housing v. Verizon California, Inc. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 160, 165.) By concluding Safeway was required to se parately compensate for rest periods and was precluded from building compensation in to its mileage rates for rest periods, we have foreclosed any need for the trial c ourt to interpret the collective bargaining agreements. Safeway does not dispute that the drivers’ rest periods were not separately compensated. Thus, on remand, the only issue remaining to be decided on the rest period claim is the drivers’ damages. Because Sa feway’s liability can be determined by law and facts common to all members of the class, th e class will be certified even if the class members must individually prove their damages. ( Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp. supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 916.) Safeway asserts our holding will seve rely disrupt piece-rate pay systems throughout the state. Yet Safeway itself alre ady pays drivers an hourly rate for certain
defined and recorded tasks. There is no evidence that its comp ensation system will collapse by complying with controlling law a nd having to include one additional element -- rest periods -- that must be sepa rately paid at an hourly rate.
The trial court’s conclusion that indi vidual issues will predominate is not supported by substantial eviden ce. Plaintiff’s theo ry of recovery does not concern the drivers’ subjective reasons for taking or not taking a rest period. Rather, it concerns Safeway’s compensation system and its failure to separately compensate drivers for their rest periods. All of the disputes on the mer its of this claim involve common evidence and argument, and individual damages. The rest period subclass must be certified.
III Certification of Meal Period Subclass11 Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by refusing to certify the subclass of drivers on his meal period claims. He raises two grounds of liability. He first asserts Safeway as a matter of policy failed to provide a require d second meal period, at least until 2006, for
drivers who worked shifts of 10 or more hour s. Second, he claims Safeway did not take sufficient action to relieve drivers of work duty so they could take a meal period, such as recording and scheduling meal periods, corre cting for drivers not taking meal periods, and paying meal period premiums to drivers who missed their meal periods. Plaintiff
claims common issues of law and fact will predominate both of these grounds for relief, making them amenable to class adjudication. We agree with plaintiff that his first gr ound for relief, Safeway’s alleged failure as a matter of policy to provide a second meal period, involves common issues of law and
fact and thus is suitable for class certification. The trial court’s conclusion that individual issues would predominate is not supported by substantial evidence. Because we conclude the meal period class must be certified for th is ground, we need not address plaintiff’s second ground. The issue for the trial court was whether any of pl aintiff’s meal period theories of recovery were am enable to class treatment. ( Brinker, supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 1032.) Having found one theo ry the trial court erred in finding not amenable, we may
reverse its order on that basis. Labor Code section 512, subdivision (a), and the applicable wage orders (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 11070, subd. 11; 11090, subd. 11) require an employer to provide meal periods to its employees. In general, an employer must provide at least one 30- minute meal period to an employee who works more than five hours per day. If an employee works more than 10 hours per day, the employer must provide a second meal period of at least 30 minutes, except that if the employee works no more than 12 hours,12 he and the employer may waive the second meal period so long as the first meal period was not waived. (Lab. Code, § 512, subd. (a).) 3 An employer satisfies its obligation to provide the required meal periods “if it relieves its employees of all duty, relinquish es control over their activities and permits them a reasonable opportunity to take an uninterrupted 30 -minute break, and does not impede or discourage them from doing so. . . . [¶] On the other hand, the employer is not obligated to police meal breaks and ensure no work thereafte r is performed. Bona fide relief from duty and the relinquish ing of control satisfies the employer’s obligations, and work by a relieved employee during a meal br eak does not thereby place the employer in violation of its obligations and create liability for premium pay . . . .” ( Brinker, supra , 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1040-1041.) Plaintiff alleges Safeway’s meal peri od policy until 2006 did not include the required second meal period fo r drivers who worked more than 10 hours. He claims the collective bargaining agreements contain Safe way’s only statements of policy authorizing meal periods, and the first of those agreemen ts, as noted earlier, did not provide for second meal periods. Safeway acknowledges the first collectiv e bargaining agreement did not address second meal periods. However, it introduced evidence at the trial court it claims establishes that Safeway did in fact authorize second meal periods for employees who
worked more than 10 hours. Three dispatchers, who served as the drivers’ daily

3 Labor Code section 512, subdivision (a) reads: “An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than five hours per day w ithout providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, exce pt that if the total work period per day of the employee is no more than six hours, the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of both the employer and employee. An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than 10 hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total hours worked is no more than 12 hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee only if the first meal pe riod was not waived.”13 supervisors, declared they prov ided enough time in their assi gnments for drivers to take a second meal period if their work would exceed 10 hours. One driver, when asked in a deposition if he could stop for a second meal period if he wanted, said he could stop for three or four. Based on this evidence, Safewa y asserts plaintiff’s claim is not suitable for class adjudication because there was no basis for the trial court to find that Safeway uniformly failed to provide second meal periods. This evidence, however, is in sufficient. “An employer is required to authorize and permit the amount of rest break time called fo r under the wage order for its industry. If it does not -- if, for example, it adopts a unifo rm policy authorizing and permitting only one rest break for employees working a seven- hour shift when two are required -- it has violated the wage order and is liable.” ( Brinker, supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 1033.) Safeway’s evidence does not establish Safeway in fa ct authorized and permitted second meal periods to drivers who worked longer than 10 hours. Ther e is no indication the drivers were aware they were entitled to take a seco nd meal period if their shifts exceeded 10
hours. And in fact, other evidence in the record indicates Safeway as a matter of policy
did not authorize second m eal periods. James Williams, Safeway’s transportation superintendent, declared that from 1996 until October 2004, he regularly provided a letter instructing on meal periods to each driver who worked out of the Tracy distribution
center. The letter informed the drivers: “You are entitled to a 30 min. break and 2 fifteen min. breaks, this time is yours and it must be logged off duty.” Th e letter did not inform the drivers they were also entitled to a second meal period if their shift exceeded 10
hours.
Williams distributed the letter often. He gave the letter to eac h new driver hired by Safeway. In August 2003, when Safeway to ok over the distribution center, he gave a copy of the same letter to every driver. He also posted the letter in the drivers’ break14 room at the distribution center. In addition, he periodically instruct ed the dispatchers to pass out the letter during a talk with the drivers at each dispatch time th roughout the day. Thus, at least through Octobe r 2004, the drivers were r outinely told by Safeway in the form of company policy th at they were entitled to on ly one meal period. The collective bargaining agreement provided only one meal period, and the policy enforced by Safeway’s transportation supe rintendent provided only on e meal period. This is
sufficient evidence of a uniform policy applied to a group of employees in violation of the wage and hour laws, and thus the claim ag ainst it is amenable to class treatment. No substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that this claim raises predominantly individual issues. No individu alized issue of waiver of a second meal period ever arises if a driver was not awar e he was authorized to take the break. ( Brinker,

supra , 53 Cal.4th, at p. 1033.) Resolving this claim will involve common evidence and proof, and thus can be accomplished most effici ently as a class action. The meal period
subclass of drivers must be certified.
IV Certification of Wage Statement Subclass Plaintiff claims Safeway failed to provid e wage statements, or paystubs, that comply with California law. He argues the statements do no t enable employees to verify they have been properly paid, as re quired by Labor Code section 226. The trial court determined plaintiff c ould not show commona lity on this issue because “class members did not suffer any co mmon injury from allegedly defective wage statements. Plaintiff does not allege that a ny defect in the wage statements deprived drivers of wages owed, and he has alleged no other common injury.” Plaintiff claims the trial court’s ruling is in error because wo rkers suffer a common injury when common el ements of a wage statement cause employees difficulty in reconstructing pay records and re quire them to engage in ma thematical computations to determine whether they were in fact paid for all hours worked. We conclude the trial15 court’s holding is not supported by substa ntial evidence, as pl aintiff alleges common injury. Labor Code section 226 requires employers to furnish employees “an accurate itemized statement in writing s howing (1) gross wages earned , (2) total hours worked by the employee [except for an exempt, salaried employee], (3) the nu mber of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate if the employee is paid on a piece-rate basis . . . , and (9) all applicable hourly ra tes in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee . . . .” (Lab. Code, § 226, subd. (a).) An employee suffering injury as a result of an employer’s knowing and intentional failure to provide the required statement may recover actual damages or a statutory rate of damages. (Lab. Code, § 226, subd. (e).) “Wh ile there must be some injury in order to recover damages, a very modestshowing will suffice.” ( Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, Inc

. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1306.) “ ‘These injuries included the po ssibility of not being paid overtime, employ ee confusion over whether they received all wages owed them, difficulty and expense involved in reconstructing pay re cords, and forcing employees to make mathematical computations to analyze whet her the wages paid in fact compensated them for all hours worked.’ ” ( Ibid ., quoting Elliot v. Spherion Pacific Work, LLC (C.D. Cal 2008) 572 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1181.) Both plaintiff and Safeway agree “the ‘injury’ [Labor Co de] Section 226 was intended to prevent is the employee’s inability to determine wh ether he has actually been paid for all work he performed.” Plaintiff alleges Safeway’s wage statemen ts do not allow a driver to determine whether the wages he was paid compensated him for all of the work he performed. Although the drivers’ pay is based primarily on miles driven, the statements do not identify the rates applied to the mileage. Because the wage statements do not disclose which rates were applied to any of the mile s driven, a driver, plaintiff claims, cannot determine whether he was paid accurate ly without engagi ng in cumbersome16 mathematical calculations. The driver must refer to his individual trip sheets and the mileage rates contained in the collective barg aining agreements to determine if he was paid correctly for each trip. The trip sheets record th e times, starting and ending locations, and distances of each segment of a trip. The collective ba rgaining agreements contain over 2,000 different ra tes that are applied based on the times and starting and ending locations of each segment of each trip. The driver must apply these rates to the information derived from the trip sheet fo r each segment of each trip in order to determine the pay he earned fo r each trip and whether he wa s in fact paid the correct amount. Moreover, plaintiff alleges, Safewa y updated the mileage rate annually without providing drivers with the new rates. Havi ng to recalculate mileage pay from sources outside the wage statement, plaintiff argues, is the type of injury Labor Code section 226 was enacted to prevent, and it is an injury common to all dr ivers due to the structure of Safeway’s wage statements. Safeway does not dispute the calculations the employees mu st do in order to verify their mileage pay. Rather, it argues plain tiff’s allegations are only that the wage statements are inaccurate, and no injury results from mere inaccuracy. (See Price v. Starbucks Corp. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1142 -1143.) This argument misstates plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff does not claim the statements are mere ly inaccurate. He
claims he and his fellow drivers cannot dete rmine whether the statements are accurate without relying on other docum ents to perform calculations because the statements do not include all of the information Labor Code section 226 requires. Plaintiff’s argument goes to the structure of the wage statements. As a result, his
and the other drivers’ claims of injury on account of the wage statements will be resolved by means of common proof. The structural om issions in the wage statements, and their alleged violation of La bor Code section 226, are, like employer policies, the types of matters best resolved by class adjudication.17 Safeway asserts there is no common injury. It claims that in th is instance, injury can be determined only on an individualized ba sis to learn whether each driver in fact had to engage in extra and cumbersome calculations to verify his mileage pay. It relies on deposition testimony by various drivers to asse rt that 75 percent of the drivers in fact were able to verify their mileage pay from the wage statements and thus suffered no injury. Plaintiff counters that the testimony c ited by Safeway does not support its contention. The drivers cited by Safeway tes tified they could calculate their pay, but could do so only by relying on other sources besides the wage statements, such as their trip sheets. They also clai med these extra calculations took from 10 to 20 minutes. We need not engage in this evidentiary battle. Plaintif f’s allegation of deficient wage statements applies uniformly to every wage statement issued by Safeway to its
drivers. None of them list the rates by which the drivers’ mileage pay was calculated. If Labor Code section 226 requires wage statem ents to include those rates in wage statements, perhaps as part of its requireme nt to include the number of piece-rate units earned and the piece-rate applie d, then plaintiff has allege d sufficient common injury for class adjudication. All of the drivers rece ived wage statements that contained the identical alleged defects and allege dly caused the same injury. The trial court’s conclusion that plainti ff failed to allege common injury for its wage statement subclass is not supported by the evidence. The wage statement subclass
must be certified.
DISPOSITION The order denying plaintiff’s mo tion for class certification is reversed. The matter
is remanded to the trial court with instructio ns to grant plaintiff’s motion to certify the18 class, subdivided into the three subclasses. Costs on appeal are awarded to plaintiff. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278, subd. (a).)

NICHOLSON , Acting P. J.

We concur:

MAURO , J.

HOCH , J.