[Cite as Hicks v. Safelite Group, Inc., 2021-Ohio-3044.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Shalonda Hicks, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 20AP-136 

 (C.P.C. No. 19CV-1007)

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Safelite Group, Inc., et al., : 

 Defendants-Appellees. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on September 2, 2021 

 

On brief: The Ivan Law Firm, and Katherine E. Ivan, for 

appellant. Argued: Katherine E. Ivan.

On brief: Thomas & Company, L.P.A., J. Michael 

Reidenbach, and Abigail I. Marchisio, for appellee Safelite 

Group, Inc. Argued: Abigail I. Marchisio.

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Natalie J. 

Tackett, for appellee Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation.

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

LUPER SCHUSTER, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Shalonda Hicks, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas granting the summary judgment motion of defendantappellee, Safelite Group, Inc. ("Safelite"). For the following reasons, we reverse and 

remand.

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} In February 2018, Hicks was employed with Safelite as a licensed insurance 

adjuster. She worked from a desk at Safelite's leased office building at 2400 Farmers Drive, 

in Columbus, Ohio. The performance of her duties as an adjuster did not require her to 
No. 20AP-136 2 

travel. Safelite leased the property from F.I.G. Holding Company for commercial use 

pursuant to a lease agreement. The lease began on January 1, 2014, and is effective until 

December 31, 2025. Pursuant to the lease agreement, Safelite has use of approximately 

178,052 square feet, or 97.57 percent of the rentable area of the building. "Common areas" 

of the premises include the building lobby, common corridors and hallways, restrooms, and 

the adjacent parking lot. The lease states Safelite has the "right to use, free-of-charge * * * 

all parking spaces in the surface parking area serving the Building other than" eight 

specified spaces located at the side of the building. (Office Building Lease, filed in support 

of Def.'s Nov. 7, 2019 Mot. for Summ. Jgmt.) F.I.G. Holding Company is responsible for 

repairing and maintaining the common areas of the leased premises, including the parking 

lot. 

{¶ 3} During the morning of February 8, 2018, Hicks drove approximately 40 

minutes to work at 2400 Farmers Drive. Hicks was in her third trimester of pregnancy at 

the time, and there had been a snowstorm the previous night. When she arrived, she parked 

her car in one of the five or six designated third trimester expectant mother parking spaces 

in the lot adjacent to the building. Hicks placed her expectant mother parking permit on 

her car's rear-view mirror. She received the parking permit from Safelite's human 

resources department, and the permit itself instructed its holder to return it when it was no 

longer necessary for the mother. Hicks had looked forward to receiving the permit because 

the reserved spaces were closer to the building's entrance, and oftentimes the Safelite 

parking lot was at or near its capacity. Previously, at her employment orientation, Hicks 

provided her license plate information to Safelite and was informed where she could park 

as a Safelite employee. She was also instructed that Safelite employees should park in 

Safelite's lot, and they were not permitted to park in the lot serving the comparably sized 

office building located next to the one Safelite leased. As Hicks stepped onto the sidewalk 

in her walk to the building's entrance, she slipped and fell to the ground. She alleges that, 

as a result of the fall, she sustained injuries to her left hip and lower back. 

{¶ 4} In June 2018, Hicks filed a claim for benefits with the Ohio Bureau of 

Workers' Compensation. In August 2018, an Ohio Industrial Commission ("commission") 

district hearing officer disallowed the claim in its entirety. Hicks appealed, and the matter 
No. 20AP-136 3 

was heard before a commission staff hearing officer in September 2018, who also 

disallowed the claim in its entirety. Hicks appealed, and the commission denied the appeal. 

{¶ 5} In January 2019, and pursuant to R.C. 4123.512, Hicks filed an appeal in the 

trial court alleging her right to participate in the workers' compensation fund. In November 

2019, Safelite moved for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B), asserting Hicks' 

alleged injuries did not occur "in the course of" and "arise out of" her employment with 

Safelite. In January 2020, the trial court granted Safelite's summary judgment motion. 

{¶ 6} Hicks timely appeals. 

II. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 7} Hicks assigns the following errors for our review: 

[1.] The trial court erred when granting summary judgment 

because Ms. Hicks meets the "totality of the circumstances" 

exception to the coming and going rule because it considered 

the lack of control and not the other factors of the exception. 

[2.] The trial court erred when granting summary judgment 

because Ms. Hicks meets the "zone of employment" exception 

to the coming and going rule because control is only one factor 

of this exception. 

III. Discussion 

{¶ 8} Hicks' first assignment of error alleges the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment in Safelite's favor because she meets the "totality of the circumstances" 

exception to the "coming-and-going" rule. In her second assignment of error, she alleges 

the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Safelite's favor because she meets 

the "zone of employment" exception to the "coming-and-going" rule. 

{¶ 9} Generally at issue is whether the trial court properly granted summary 

judgment in Safelite's favor. An appellate court reviews summary judgment under a de 

novo standard. Coventry Twp. v. Ecker, 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41 (9th Dist.1995); Koos v. 

Cent. Ohio Cellular, Inc., 94 Ohio App.3d 579, 588 (8th Dist.1994). Summary judgment is 

appropriate only when the moving party demonstrates (1) no genuine issue of material fact 

exists, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable 

minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against 

whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the 
No. 20AP-136 4 

evidence most strongly construed in its favor. Civ.R. 56(C); State ex rel. Grady v. State 

Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183 (1997). 

{¶ 10} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), the moving party bears the initial burden of 

informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the 

record demonstrating the absence of a material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 

293 (1996). However, the moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under this rule 

with a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case; the 

moving party must specifically point to evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) 

affirmatively demonstrating that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the 

nonmoving party's claims. Id.; Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429 (1997). Once the 

moving party discharges its initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate if the 

nonmoving party does not respond, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, with 

specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists for trial. Dresher at 293; Vahila at 430; 

Civ.R. 56(E). 

{¶ 11} Hicks alleges she is entitled to participate in the workers' compensation fund. 

For the purpose of Ohio's Workers' Compensation Act, R.C. Chapter 4123, "[i]njury" is 

generally defined as "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental 

in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's 

employment." R.C. 4123.01(C). Thus, for an employee's injury to be compensable under 

Ohio's workers' compensation system, the injury must be both (1) received in the course of, 

and (2) arising out of, the injured employee's employment. Friebel v. Visiting Nurse 

Assn. of Mid-Ohio, 142 Ohio St.3d 425, 2014-Ohio-4531, ¶ 12. There must be a sufficient 

nexus " 'between the employment relationship and the injurious activity.' " Cunningham 

v. Bone Dry Waterproofing, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-587, 2016-Ohio-3341, ¶ 9, quoting

Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc., 81 Ohio St.3d 117, 120 (1998). While workers' 

compensation statutes should be liberally construed in favor of employees, the employee 

bears the burden of establishing both prongs of this statutory requirement. Starkey v. 

Builders Firstsource Ohio Valley, L.L.C., 130 Ohio St.3d 114, 2011-Ohio-3278, ¶ 17, citing 

R.C. 4123.95; Fisher v. Mayfield, 49 Ohio St.3d 275, 279 (1990). 

{¶ 12} It is undisputed that Hicks was a fixed-situs employee. "As a general rule, an 

employee with a fixed place of employment, who is injured while traveling to or from his 
No. 20AP-136 5 

place of employment, is not entitled to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund 

because the requisite causal connection between the injury and the employment does not 

exist." MTD Prods., Inc. v. Robatin, 61 Ohio St.3d 66 (1991), syllabus. This rule, often 

referred to as the "coming-and-going" rule, has the following exceptions: "(1) the injury 

occurs within the 'zone of employment'; (2) the employment creates a 'special hazard'; 

(3) there is a causal connection between the employee's injury and employment based on 

the 'totality of the circumstances' surrounding the accident; and (4) the injury occurred 

while the employee was on a special mission, errand, service or task for the employer." 

Cunningham at ¶ 16; Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St.2d 302, 303 (1980). Hicks 

acknowledges that the "special hazard" and "special mission" exceptions do not apply. She 

contends both the "zone of employment" and "totality of the circumstances" exceptions 

apply. 

{¶ 13} Because the essential facts are undisputed, the applicability of the exceptions 

to the coming-and-going rule present questions of law. Mangan v. Texas Roadhouse Mgt. 

Corp., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-42, 2021-Ohio-2201, ¶ 18. We first address the "zone of 

employment" exception, which has been defined as " 'the place of employment and the area 

thereabout, including the means of ingress thereto and egress therefrom, under control of 

the employer. ' " Cunningham at ¶ 17, quoting Merz v. Indus. Comm., 134 Ohio St. 36, 39 

(1938). This zone "is not a fixed area, rather, its relative limits or expansion must be 

determined from the logical and close association of the surrounding area to the premises 

of employment, together with the particular circumstances and hazards existing in relation 

thereto." (Citations omitted.) Id. Application of this exception depends on the specific 

facts and circumstances of each case. Id. For example, in Baughman v. Eaton Corp., 62 

Ohio St.2d 62, 63 (1980), the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the claimant employee was 

entitled to workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained from his fall on a public 

street as he walked from the employer's parking lot to the employer's factory. The court 

reasoned: "Appellee parked his automobile in the only employer parking lot then available 

to him free of charge. His injuries occurred on the public street as he proceeded, without 

deviation, toward the plant entrance prior to the commencement of his shift. Finally, 

appellee could not reach the plant entrance without crossing the public street. On these 

facts, it would be unreasonable to deny appellee compensation." Id. The employee in 
No. 20AP-136 6 

Baughman effectively had "arrived at his place of employment" when he was injured. MTD 

Prods., Inc. at 69, citing Baughman. 

{¶ 14} "The zone of employment has been extended beyond the employer's 

immediate premises in a number of situations, most of which involve parking lots over 

which the employer has some control, and it has also been extended to the public road 

providing access to the employer's premises." Lemming v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 41 Ohio 

App.3d 194, 195 (1st Dist.1987). As to an injury occurring in a parking lot adjacent to a work 

situs, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held: "An employee who, on his way from the fixed 

situs of his duties after the close of his work day, is injured in a collision of his automobile 

and that of a fellow employee occurring in a parking lot located adjacent to such situs of 

duty and owned, maintained and controlled by his employer for the exclusive use of its 

employees, receives such injury 'in the course of, and arising out of' his employment, within 

the meaning of that phrase in the Work[ers'] Compensation Act, Section 4123.01(C), 

Revised Code." Marlow v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 10 Ohio St.2d 18 (1967), syllabus. 

Further, in Griffin v. Hydra-Matic Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 39 Ohio St.3d 79 (1988), the 

employee "had completed her employment for the day" and "slipped and fell on a wet or icy 

spot" while "traversing a driveway between the plant of appellant and its parking lot." Id. 

at 79. The court held that "an injury sustained by an employee upon the premises of her 

employer is compensable pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4123 irrespective of the presence or 

absence of a special hazard thereon which is distinctive in nature or quantitatively greater 

than hazards encountered by the public at large." Id. at 82. 

{¶ 15} Safelite argues this court's decision in Thephasith v. Automotive Specialty 

Co. Div., 10th Dist. No. 00AP-415, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5300 (Nov. 16, 2000), mandates 

a finding that the zone of employment exception does not apply. In Thephasith, the 

plaintiff's employer had leased a 26,000 square foot building at the Alum Creek Industrial 

Park. The lease provided that the employer could use a parking lot located at the industrial 

park and owned by the landlord. The plaintiff was struck by another employee's automobile 

as he walked to his own automobile in that parking lot. Pursuant to the lease, the landlord 

was responsible for the condition and repair of the parking lot, and the employer "had the 

'non-exclusive right to use of the parking and driveway areas.' " Id. The parking lot "was 

available to other tenants in the Industrial Park and to members of the public." (Internal 
No. 20AP-136 7 

quotation omitted.) Id. In addressing the plaintiff's contention that he was injured while 

within the zone of employment, this court noted that the employer "presented evidence that 

it did not own, maintain, or have control over the parking lot where appellant was injured. 

Appellee also presented evidence that appellant was not engaged in any activities relating 

to his employment except for the fact that he was walking to his car at the end of his 

workday." Id. This court found "these facts sufficiently establish that appellant was not 

within the 'zone of employment' when he was injured, and, therefore, he is not eligible for 

benefits pursuant to the 'zone of employment' test." Id. Safelite argues Thephasith is right 

on point because Hicks' slip and fall occurred in a parking lot Safelite does not own, 

maintain, or control, and Hicks was not engaged in any activities relating to her 

employment when she fell. We are unpersuaded and find Hicks was in the zone of 

employment when she slipped and fell. 

{¶ 16} First, we do not interpret Thephasith to hold that, for an injury to be covered, 

the employee must be actively engaged in his employment duties. The zone of employment 

test does not include such a requirement. See Ruckman at 120 (entitlement to workers' 

compensation coverage is not contingent on the injury occurring in the actual performance 

of work duties). 

{¶ 17} Second, we find Thephasith to be distinguishable on the issue of control. 

Unlike the employer in Thephasith, Safelite exerted control over the parking lot where 

Hicks slipped and fell. Despite Safelite not owning the parking lot, it demonstrated control 

by generally limiting usage of the parking lot serving the building it leased, and by further 

restricting usage of certain parking spaces in that lot. The lease agreement states: Safelite 

"shall have the non-exclusive right (unless otherwise provided herein) in common with 

Landlord, other tenants, subtenants and invitees to use the Common Areas," which 

includes the "parking area serving the [b]uilding." (Office Building Lease, filed in support 

of Def.'s Nov. 7, 2019 Mot. for Summ. Jgmt.) Even though the lease agreement identified 

the parking lot adjacent to the building as a "common area," Safelite had the right to use 

almost the entire parking lot as it leased over 97 percent of the 182,487 square feet of total 

rentable area of the five-story office building. There was no evidence of any intent of the 

parties to the lease agreement that this area would serve any purpose other than 

constituting the parking lot for the leased building. Consistent with these circumstances, 
No. 20AP-136 8 

Safelite collected employee license plate information, reflecting an effort to regulate and 

limit parking in the lot. Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that Safelite restricted the 

use of five or six prime spaces in the parking lot for expectant mothers in their third 

trimester. On the day of her slip and fall, Hicks, with the required permit displayed on her 

car, parked in one of those spaces. Thus, the record reflects Safelite exerted a degree of 

control over the parking lot and in particular the reserved space Hicks used immediately 

before her slip and fall. 

{¶ 18} We further note that while Safelite did not own the parking lot adjacent to the 

building it leased, employer ownership of a parking lot, which is the site of the accident, is 

not a prerequisite to coverage. Fitch v. Ameritech Corp., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1277, 2007-

Ohio-2725, ¶ 17, citing Jesse v. May Dept. Stores Co., 11th Dist. No. 2003-L-064, 2004-

Ohio-5313, ¶ 29 ("Ohio courts have found that the 'zone of employment' exception may be 

satisfied when an employer leases the parking lot where an employee was injured."). The 

lot was, in a practical sense, an integral aspect of Safelite's operations at the location as the 

lot served the parking needs of its employees. There was no evidence presented of another 

viable parking option for employees like Hicks who commuted to the building location. 

Although the evidence demonstrated the presence of a comparable office building next to 

the one Safelite leased, with its own sizeable parking area, Hicks was specifically instructed 

not to park in the lot serving the sister building. She was directed to park in the Safelite lot. 

Thus, the parking area was Hicks' "normal and customary means to and from [her] 

employer's premises to which such passageway was an indispensable appurtenance." 

Frishkorn v. Flowers, 26 Ohio App.2d 165, 168 (8th Dist.1971) ("this was tantamount to an 

essential expansion of [its] premises for the purpose of adequately serving and furthering 

[its] business interests"). Moreover, even though the lessor, F.I.G. Holding Company, was 

directly responsible for maintaining the parking lot under the terms of the lease agreement, 

Safelite, as the lessee, had the legal authority to ensure F.I.G. Holding Company was 

fulfilling this obligation for the benefit of Safelite's employees. 

{¶ 19} Under the particular facts of this case, we conclude that, as a matter of law, 

Hicks was within the zone of employment when she slipped and fell in the parking lot 

adjacent to Safelite's leased office building. Consequently, Hicks' alleged injuries arose out 
No. 20AP-136 9 

of, and in the course of, her employment, and the trial court erred in determining Hicks is 

not entitled to participate in the workers' compensation fund. 

{¶ 20} For these reasons, we sustain Hicks' second assignment of error. This 

disposition renders moot her first assignment of error. 

IV. Disposition 

{¶ 21} Having sustained Hicks' second assignment of error, and finding as moot her 

first assignment of error, we reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common 

Pleas and remand this matter for further proceedings in accordance with law and consistent 

with this decision. 

Judgment reversed; 

cause remanded. 

MENTEL and NELSON, JJ., concur. 

NELSON, J., retired, formerly of the Tenth Appellate District, 

assigned to active duty under authority of Ohio Constitution, 

Article IV, Section 6(C).