CRYSTAL SUE NICOLE LOWERY, MOTHER , Appellant,

v. NICHOLAS J. CARNEY, FATHER , Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

C ASE NO. 1D 15

- 3357

_____________________________/ Opinion filed June 3, 2016. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County

. Terrance R. Ketchel , Judge

. Clark H. Henderson of Campbell & Henderson, PLLC, Shalimar , for Appellant.

Anna F. Foster o f Pennington, P.A., Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM. Appellant, the mother, seeks review of the May 5, 2015, order transferring custody of the parties’ minor child to Appellee, the father, as well as the order denying her motion to set aside the May 5 order pursuant to Florida Family Law2 Rule of Procedure 12.540. Among other things, the mother argues that her due process rights were violated because she was not given notice of the hearing that resulted in the May 5 order. We affirm that issue f or the reasons that follow, and we affirm the other issues raised by the mother without discussion. The May 5 order resulted from an April 20, 2015, hearing at which the then pro se mother failed to appear. 1 The order found that the mother was given prop er
notic e of the hearing based in part on the fact that the notice was served by mail on

the mother at “ 144 Pinecone Court, Pembroke, NC . . . which was an address Mother provided at the January 16, 2015 hearing ” (emphasis added). The trial

court’s findin g that the mother provided this address was supported by the transcript of the April 20 hearing, which reflects that the father ’s attorney represented to the court that: in anticipation for this hearing, I served the last known address in North Carolina, 1 47 Pine Cone Court. [ 2 ] And

1 The mother was represented by an attorney from June 2014 to some point in December 2014 or early January 2015, and although the record does not contain an order authorizing the mother’s attorney to withdraw, the mother has n ot argued

– below or on appeal

– that notice of the April 20 hearing should have been served on the attorney. 2 Th is was the address provided for service of court papers on the mother in the Notice of Limited Appearance filed by the mother’s attorney on J anuary 7, 2015, which stated that the attorney was r epresenting the mother solely on the issue of attorney’s fees. Interestingly, although the record contains several orders predating this N otice that were sent to the 147 Pinecone Court address and were r eturned as undeliverable, the May 5 order reflects (in the “copies to” section) that it was sent to that address and there is no indication in the record that it was returned as undeliverable.3 during [the January 16] hearing she actually gave us another address, I believe it was 144 Pine Cone Court, which was a new address . I attempted service on both of those. Both of those came back returned, recipient not there.
(e mphasis added).

As she did below , the mother argues on appeal that she was not properly

serv ed with notice of the April 20 hearing because the address she gave the court at the January 16 hearing was 149 Pinecone Court, not 144 Pinecone Court. In

supp ort of this argument, the mother relies solely on the “copies to” portion of the

order result ing from the January 16 hearing, which reflects that the order was sent

to the mother at 149 Pinecone Court. The father responds that the record supports
the tria l court’s finding that the mother’s failure to appear at the April 20 hearing was not the result of inadequate notice.

Our resolution of the due process argument raised by the mother boils down
to whether, as a matter of fact, th e 144 Pinecone Court addre ss wa s the address provided by the mother at the January 16 hearing. 3 The trial court found that it

3 Although the father also attempted to serve notice of the Ap ril 20 hearing on the mother by mail and process server at her last known Florida address, that would not have provided the mother adequate notice of the hearing because the father testified at the April 20 hearing that it was his understanding that the mo ther was living in North Carolina and the record contained the 147 Pinecone Court address in North Carolina that mother’s attorney provided for s ervice of court papers on the mother. Additionally, t he fact that the father mailed notice of the April 20 hea ring to th e mother’s North Carolina address provided by her attorney was not necessarily adequate notice of the hearing under the circumstances of this case4 was, and that fin ding comes to this court with a presumption of correctness. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee , 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 197 9) (“ In appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appel lant to demonstrate error. ”) . Al though the “copies to” portion of the order resulting from the January 16 hearing arguably
support s the inference that the address provided by the mother at that hearing was

149 (not 144) Pinecone Court, without a transcript of that hearing, 4 we cannot
know for sure. It was the mother’s burden to demonstrate reversible error in the

trial court’s findi ng that the address she provided at the January 16 hearing was
144 (not 149) Pinecone Court, and without a transcript of that hearing, the mother

is unable to meet that burden. Id. (“ The trial court should have been affirmed because the record brought for ward by the appellant is inadequate to demonstrate

reversible error. ”); see also J P Morgan Chase Bank v. Combee , 883 S o . 2d 330, 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“The burden is on the appellant to demonstrate reversible error and present an adequate record for re view.”).

b ecause it i s undisputed that the mother provided a different address at the January 16 hearing (ei ther 144 or 149 Pinecone Court) , and the record contained court orders sent to the 147 Pinecone Court address that were returned as undeliverable. 4 We directed the mother to supplement the record with a transcript of the January 16 hearing , but she filed a response stating that the hearing was not transcribed. S ee Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(f)(2) (“ If the court finds the record is incomplete, it shall direct a party to supply the omitted parts of the record. No proceeding shall be determined, because of an i ncomplete record, until an opportunity to supplement the record has been given. ”)

.5 Accordingly, because the mother has not presented an adequate record to

demonstrate reversible error in the May 5 order, we affirm that order as well as the order denying the mother’s motion to set aside th e May 5 order.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF , WETHERE LL , and KELSEY , J J

. , CONCUR.