IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Nadia Engel, :

Appellant :

: No. 1278 C.D. 2021

v. : Argued: October 11, 2022

:

Ellwood City Area School District :

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE DUMAS FILED: February 8, 2023

Nadia Engel (Engel) appeals from the order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Lawrence County (trial court), which affirmed the adjudication of the Board 

of Directors (Board) of the Ellwood City Area School District (District), which held 

that substantial evidence establishes that Engel was furloughed for a permissible 

reason and not entitled to reinstatement under the Public School Code of 1949 

(Code).1 After careful consideration, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND2

In August 2014, Engel began working as an assistant principal at the 

District. Engel holds Secondary English Teacher and Level II PK-12 Principal 

certifications. Accordingly, she is qualified to serve as both assistant principal and 

principal of a school building. For the 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 academic years, 

Engel received “proficient” ratings on her most recent performance evaluations. 

During a June 29, 2020 meeting, the Board voted to restructure its 

administration by removing one principal. However, the District solicitor advised 

1 Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 1-101-27-2702.

2 Unless stated otherwise, we adopt the factual background for this case from the Decision 

of the Board, which is supported by substantial evidence of record. See Bd.’s Decision, 3/12/21.
2

the Board that it was impermissible to “restructure” the administration but that the 

Board could instead furlough employees based on reasons enumerated in the Code. 

No action was taken against Engel at this time.

3 Thereafter, in a July 9, 2020

meeting, the Board passed a resolution to suspend4the necessary number of 

employees to address a substantial decline in student enrollment under Section 

1124(a) of the Code, 24 P.S. § 11-1124(a). See Exhibit D-9, District Resolution No. 

07092020 (Resolution). Under the Resolution, the Board voted to furlough Engel, 

who was subsequently suspended from her position as assistant principal. 

Thereafter, in August 2020, a District principal retired, leaving a vacancy. Engel 

was not reinstated to this position. 

Following a Loudermill5 hearing timely requested by Engel, the Board 

concluded that Engel was properly furloughed under Section 1124(a)(1) of the Code. 

24 P.S. § 11-1124(a)(1). In support of its decision, the Board found that the District 

had experienced a 7.9% decline in student enrollment, which constituted a 

“substantial decrease” under Section 1124(a)(1) of the Code.

6 Further, it determined 

that Engel was one of two assistant principals who had received “proficient” 

3

In a separate motion, the Board also voted to hire three elementary school teachers. In its 

adjudication, the Board noted the absence of evidence connecting these two decisions. See Bd.’s 

Decision at 13-17 (further noting that a recording of the meeting held on June 29, 2020, suggests 

that the teachers would be hired to replace other, retiring teachers). 

4

In this context, suspension is “an impermanent separation: a furlough or layoff.” Filoon 

v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational-Tech. Sch., 634 A.2d 726, 729 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). 

5 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).

6 The Board calculated the 7.9% decrease based on the following data: 

School Year Total Student Enrollment 

2015-2016 1763

2016-2017 1656

2017-2018 1663

2018-2019 1641

2019-2020 1623

Bd.’s Decision, 3/12/21, at 6.
3

performance ratings and the least senior instructional administrator at the high 

school. The Board further determined that Engel was not entitled to reinstatement 

to a vacant principal position under Section 1125.1(d)(2) of the Code, 24 P.S. § 11-

1125.1(d)(2),7 because it would effectively result in her promotion. Engel appealed, 

and the trial court affirmed. Engel now petitions this Court for review.8 

II. ISSUES

Engel contends that the reason offered by the Board for her furlough, 

i.e., a substantial decline in student enrollment under Section 1124(a)(1) of the Code,

24 P.S. § 11-1124(a)(1), is inaccurate and unsupported by substantial evidence. 

Engel’s Br. at 11-21.

9

 Alternatively, she asserts that she was entitled to reinstatement 

under Section 1125.1(d)(2) of the Code to the vacant principal position. Id. at 21-

28. The District responds that Engel’s furlough was lawful and that substantial 

evidence supports the Board’s finding of a substantial decrease in enrollment. 

District’s Br. at 10-25. Further, it maintains that Engel is not entitled to 

reinstatement into a promoted position. Id. at 25-31. 

III. DISCUSSION

The Code governs a school board’s actions as it pertains to furlough, 

realignment, and reinstatement, which we explain as follows. The Code identifies 

five exclusive reasons to furlough a professional employee, including a substantial 

decline in student enrollment. 24 P.S. § 11-1124; Kemp v. City of Pittsburgh Pub. 

Sch. Dist., 933 A.2d 130, 132 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). The Code also establishes a 

7 Section 1125.1 of the Code was added by the Act of November 20, 1979, P.L.456, as 

amended, 24 P.S. § 11-1125.1.

8 Where the trial court takes no additional evidence from the agency’s developed record, 

“our scope of review is limited to determining whether the [] agency’s adjudication violated any 

constitutional rights, constituted an error of law, or lacked substantial evidence in support of 

findings of fact necessary for the adjudication.” Medina v. Harrisburg Sch. Dist., 273 A.3d 33, 39 

n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).

9 We combine Engel’s first three issues for ease of analysis. See Engel’s Br. at 2.
4

hierarchy of professional employees that ensures that the most senior professional 

employees are furloughed last. See generally 24 P.S. § 11-1125.1; see Bd. of Sch. 

Dirs. of Chester-Upland Sch. Dist. v. Ashby, 495 A.2d 665, 666 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). 

For example, the Code requires a school board to “realign” professional staff to 

retain its most senior, qualified employees in positions presently filled by less senior 

employees. 24 P.S. § 11-1125.1(c.1). Once an employee has been furloughed, the 

Code obligates the board to “reinstate” its most senior and highest performing 

furloughed employees to vacant positions within their area of certification. 24 P.S. 

§ 11-1125.1(d)(2).

A. Furlough

Engel presents three arguments challenging her furlough. First, she 

contends that the Board failed to furlough her for a permissible reason under Section 

1124 of the Code. Engel’s Br. at 11. However, the record does not support this

argument. The Board furloughed Engel due to a substantial decrease in student

enrollment, which is a permissible justification under Section 1124(a) of the Code, 

24 P.S. § 11-1124(a).

10

 See Bd.’s Decision, 3/12/21, at 4-5; Notes of Testimony

(N.T.) Loudermill Hr’g, 11/24/20, Exhibit D-9, Resolution. 

Second, Engel maintains that the Board’s finding of a substantial 

decrease in student enrollment lacks substantial evidentiary support. According to 

Engel, the evidence, at most, established a “mere 4.3%” enrollment decline, and the 

10 Engel suggests that the Board’s decision to furlough her was improperly motivated by 

its intention to hire three new teachers. Engel’s Br. at 12, 14. Yet, Engel has not placed this 

argument within the context of a constitutional claim. Further, her references to the Board’s initial 

desire to restructure its administrative staff ignores the substantial evidence of record that the 

District solicitor properly advised that “restructuring” was not permissible. Bd.’s Decision, 

3/12/21, at 4. Therefore, we decline to consider Engel’s suggestion as it is outside the scope of 

our appellate review. See Medina, 273 A.3d at 39 n.10; see generally Com. v. Vartan, 733 A.2d 

1258, 1265 (Pa. 1999) (courts do not sit in judgment on the motives of administrative officers).
5

Board relied on unofficial enrollment data in “a transparent attempt . . . to manipulate 

the numbers.” Engel’s Br. at 15, 19. We disagree. 

Section 1124(a)(1) of the Code remains silent on how to calculate

student enrollment, and this Court has expressly declined to recognize a “precise 

definition” that is “sufficient to justify a given number of job eliminations.” See 

generally 24 P.S. § 11-1124(a)(1); Wyoming Valley West Educ. Ass’n v. Wyoming 

Valley West Sch. Dist., 500 A.2d 907, 908 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). Instead, we have

found that a board can prove a substantial enrollment decrease through (a) evidence 

of a “general, cumulative enrollment decline over a reasonably justifiable period of 

time,” or (b) a decline from one year to the next, “so prominent it does not require 

additional statistics.” Bachak v. Lakeland Sch. Dist., 655 A.2d 12, 14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1995). Consequently, there is no statutory or precedential basis to support Engel’s 

argument that the Board used “unofficial” data. Likewise, there is no evidentiary

support in the record for Engel’s assertion that the District, at most, incurred a 4.3% 

student enrollment decline. Based on our thorough review of the record, the 

evidence supports the trial court’s decision to affirm the Board’s finding of a District 

enrollment decrease from 1,763 students in 2015-2016 to 1,623 students in 2019-

2020, a decline of 7.9% or 140 students. Bd.’s Decision, 3/12/21, at 6; N.T. 

Loudermill Hr’g, Exhibit D-4, Enrollment History Rep.

School boards are afforded the discretion to determine whether there 

has been a substantial enrollment decline. Newell v. Wilkes-Barre Area Vocational 

Tech. Sch., 670 A.2d 1190, 1192 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). Absent an abuse of discretion, 

arbitrary decision, misconception of law, or ignorance of fact, this Court will not 

disturb such findings on appeal. Id.

11

 We have previously recognized a substantial 

11 We acknowledge that this Court has found existence of a substantial enrollment decrease 

in cases with greater enrollment declines than that of the present matter. See Newell (36.6% over 

ten years). However, whether another board would deem a 7.9% five-year decrease as 

“substantial” is irrelevant. This finding is within the sole discretion of this Board. Id.
6

decrease in student enrollment with comparable rates. See Phillippi v. Sch. Dist. of 

Springfield Twp., 367 A.2d 1133, 1137-38 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977) (recognizing a 5.7% 

student enrollment decrease as substantial); Tressler v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 373 

A.2d 755, 758, 759 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977) (holding a decline of 250 students over three 

years with a projected decline of 450 students to be substantial); Smith v. Bd. of Sch. 

Dir., 328 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974) (treating a 114-student enrollment 

decline over ten years as substantial). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of 

discretion with the Board’s finding of a substantial decrease in student enrollment 

and we refrain on appeal from disturbing this decision. Newell, 670 A.2d at 1192. 

Third, Engel maintains that the Board erred by considering her 

compensation in its decision to furlough her employment. Engel’s Br. at 20-21. This

contention is unsupported by the record. At its July 9, 2020 meeting, the Board 

passed a Resolution, titled in part, “suspending staff due to a substantial decline in 

student enrollment.” Bd.’s Decision, 3/12/21, at 4; Exhibit D-9, Resolution. The 

Resolution stated that pursuant to Section 1124(a)(1) of the Code, 24 P.S. § 11-

1124(a)(1), the Board may suspend the necessary number of professional employees 

following the student enrollment decline from 2015-2016 to 2019-2020. Bd.’s 

Decision, 3/12/21, at 4-5. Thereafter, in accordance with the Resolution, the Board

subsequently furloughed Engel, effective July 30, 2020.12 Id. at 5. The Resolution 

neither mentions Engel’s salary nor suggests that she was furloughed for any nonenumerated reason under Section 1124(a) of the Code. Thus, the Board’s actions to 

furlough Engel were justified. 

12 Although the Resolution referenced a 15% decline in enrollment for the Junior/High 

school building, the District presented evidence of the 7.9% data at the Loudermill hearing, 

sufficient to satisfy a substantial decrease in pupil enrollment within the entire District under 

Section 1124(a) of the Code, 24 P.S. § 11-1124(a).
7

B. Reinstatement

Alternatively, Engel maintains that even if her furlough was proper, the 

Board erred by failing to reinstate her because she possessed proper certification for 

the vacant principal position. Engel’s Br. at 21-25. In support of this assertion, 

Engel presents two arguments. 

First, Engel asserts that the plain language of Section 1125.1(d)(2) of 

the Code obligated the Board to reinstate her to the vacant principal position. 

Engel’s Br. at 23. We disagree.13 “The touchstone of interpreting statutory language 

‘is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.’” Crown 

Castle NG E. LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 188 A.3d 617, 630 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) 

(Crown Castle I), aff’d, 234 A.3d 665 (Pa. 2020) (Crown Castle II) (internal citation 

omitted). In matters of statutory interpretation, our “duty is to give effect to the 

legislature’s intent,” which is best ascertained through the statute’s plain language.

Crown Castle II, 234 A.3d at 674. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, 

we simply “give effect to the words of the statute and must not disregard the text to 

implement its objective.” Id.

Our analysis begins with the relevant statutory language. Crown Castle 

I, 188 A.3d at 613. Section 1125.1(d)(2) of the Code defines the order in which 

suspended professional employees shall be reinstated. It further provides:

Suspended professional employes or professional 

employes demoted for the reasons set forth in section 1124 

shall be reinstated in the following order,

[14] within the area 

of certification required by law for the vacancy being filled 

and within the school entity.

13 Our standard of review involving issues of statutory interpretation “is de novo, and our 

scope of review is plenary and non-deferential.” Crown Castle NG E. LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. 

Comm’n, 234 A.3d 665, 674 (Pa. 2020) (Crown Castle II). Statutory interpretation “is a question 

of law for the court,” therefore, we “do[] not defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of 

the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute.” Id. at 677. 

14 This order is based on seniority and recent performance ratings. 24 P.S. § 11-

1125.1(d)(2).
8

***

No new appointment shall be made while there is such a 

suspended or demoted professional employe available 

who is properly certificated to fill such vacancy.

24 P.S. § 11-1125.1(d)(2) (emphasis added). 

The key term “such” is not defined by the Code. Therefore, we review 

the statute in context and afford incorporated words and phrases their ‘“common and 

approved usage.”’ Crown Castle II, 234 A.3d at 674. Merriam-Webster’s 

Dictionary defines “such” as “the character, quality, or extent previously indicated 

or implied” or “of the same class, type, or sort.” See https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/such (last visited February 7, 2023). With this definition in 

mind, Section 1125.1(d)(2), in part, reads as follows, “[n]o new appointment shall 

be made while there is a suspended or demoted professional employe [of the “same 

class, type, or sort”] available who is properly certificated to fill such vacancy.” See 

24 P.S. 11-1125.1(d)(2). Further deconstruction of the statutory language reveals 

the five factors necessary to qualify a furloughed employee for reinstatement: (1) an 

available, vacant position exists within the tenured employee’s area of certification; 

(2) a tenured employee has been suspended, furloughed or demoted under Section 

1124 of the Code, (3) the tenured employee is of the “same class, type, or sort” as 

the vacancy; (4) the tenured employee is available for employment; and (5) the 

tenured employee possesses the necessary certification for the position. 24 P.S. § 

11-1125.1(d)(2). 

Here, Engel meets four out of five criteria: a vacant position opened in 

her area of certification; she was furloughed under Section 1124 of the Code; she

presumably remains available for employment; and she possesses the requisite 

certification required for the vacancy principal position. However, Engel focuses on 

her suspension rather than the position from which she was suspended. In so doing, 

she presents no evidence that her prior assistant principal position is the “same ... 
9

type” of role as principal. See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/such

(last visited February 7, 2023). Based on our interpretation of the statutory 

language, Section 1125.1(d)(2) facilitates reinstatement of similarly held positions. 

The record does not support that assistant principal is the “same” position as 

principal to trigger the reinstatement provision of subsection (d)(2). 24 P.S. § 11-

1125.1(d)(2). Accordingly, a plain meaning interpretation of Section 1125.1(d)(2) 

does not support Engel’s reinstatement to the vacant principal position.

15, 16

Second, Engel contends that the Board was required to reinstate her

regardless of whether the appointment constituted a promotion. Engel’s Br. at 26-

28. The precise issue of whether promotions are permissible reinstatements under

Section 1125.1(d)(2) of the Code is a matter of first impression for this Court. 

However, we have long recognized that the tenure provisions of the Code,17

including realignment under Section 1125.1 (formerly Section 1125 (repealed))18

15 Our analysis is further supported by the overall statutory framework of Section 1125.1 

of the Code. See Ashby, 495 A.2d at 667 (when reviewing the statute as a whole, where the words 

are unambiguous, the letter of the law “cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its 

spirit”). Although not at issue here, reinstatement also requires that furloughed employees express

intention to “accept the same or similar position,” 24 P.S. § 11-1125.1(d)(3), and Section 1168 of 

the Code provides that employees on sabbatical must return to the “same position.” 24 P.S. 11-

1168(b). 

16 In the context of Engel’s plain language argument, she attempts to analogize her 

circumstances with a suspended teacher in Colonial Education Association v. Colonial School 

District, 644 A.2d 211 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (Colonial Education). See Engel’s Br. at 22-23. The 

comparison is not persuasive. In Colonial Education, a district suspended a certificated health and 

physical education teacher due to declining enrollment. 644 A.2d at 212. Thereafter, a similarly 

placed teacher retired. Id. Rather than reinstating the suspended teacher to fill the newly vacant 

position, the district reassigned a special education teacher with less seniority, giving preference 

to the special education teacher because of his “active” employment status. Id. Rejecting the 

district’s arguments, this Court affirmed a trial court decision reinstating the suspended teacher. 

Id. at 214. However, the circumstances in Colonial Education are notably different than those 

present here. Unlike the teacher in Colonial Education, Engel seeks reinstatement into a role 

different than her former position. Thus, Engel’s reliance on Colonial Education is misplaced.

17 The tenure provisions include Sections 1121 through 1133 of the Code, 24 P.S. §§ 11-

1121 - 11-1133. See Ginocchi v. Burrell Sch. Dist., 522 A.2d 707, 709 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).

18 Formerly 24 P.S. § 11–1125, repealed by Act of November 20, 1979, P.L. 465, § 2.
10

and subsection (c.1) (formerly subsection (c)), cannot be used as a vehicle for 

obtaining promotions. Ginocchi v. Burrell Sch. Dist., 522 A.2d 707, 709 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1987).

When interpreting former Section 1125 of the Code, this Court held that 

promotions are inconsistent with the purpose of the Code’s tenure sections, which is 

to protect employees from unjust or improper employment action. Ginocchi, 522 

A.2d at 709; Gibbons v. New Castle Area Sch. Dist., 543 A.2d 1087, 1090 (Pa. 1988)

(holding that former Section 1125 of the Code “operates to allocate only the adverse 

effects of employment change”). It would be “incredible to suppose that the 

legislature intended [the tenure sections] to apply to a situation in which a 

professional is being ‘raised in position.’” Ginocchi, 522 A.2d. at 710 (internal 

citation omitted). It is “beyond the purpose” of former Section 1125 of the Code “to 

require a professional employee to be promoted or advanced in status.” Gibbons, 

543 A.2d at 1090. In accordance with our long-standing precedent, Section 11-

1125.1 of the Code is not a pathway for promotions. Thus, the Board did not err in 

finding that Engel was not entitled to reinstatement under Section 1125.1(d)(2) of 

the Code.

19

IV. CONCLUSION

The District experienced a substantial decline in student enrollment and 

chose to furlough Engel based on her seniority level and performance evaluations. 

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. Thus, her furlough was 

19 Engel also suggests “a number of ways” in which she believes the District could have 

met the requirements of Section 1125.1(d)(2) of the Code that did not result in her promotion. 

Engel’s Br. at 24-25 (suggesting, e.g., that the District “could have” promoted another assistant 

principal to the vacant principal position, then recalled Engel into the newly vacant, assistant 

principal position). We agree that the Code does not prohibit the Board from exercising its 

discretion to reinstate Engel. However, we decline to entertain these possibilities as Engel cites 

no authority requiring the District to shuffle its professional employees to facilitate her 

reinstatement. 
11

permissible pursuant to Sections 1124(a)(1) and 1125.1(a), (a.1) of the Code. 24 

P.S. §§ 11-1124(a)(1), 11-1125.1(a), (a.1). Moreover, the District was not required 

to reinstate Engel’s employment, placing her in a newly vacant principal position, 

based on the plain meaning of the statutory language. Further, it is beyond the 

purpose of Section 1125.1(d)(2) of the Code to require the promotion of a furloughed 

professional employee. 24 P.S. §1125.1(d)(2). See Gibbons, 543 A.2d at 1090. For 

these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Nadia Engel, :

Appellant :

: No. 1278 C.D. 2021

v. :

:

Ellwood City Area School District :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 8

th day of February, 2023, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Lawrence County, dated October 26, 2021, is AFFIRMED.

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge