No. 14962 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1980 

CHARLES L. CRABTREE, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

VS. 

THE STATE OF MONTANA and 

MARVIN DAGEL, Sheriff, 

Respondents and Appellants. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Third Judicial District, 

Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellants: 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Chris Tweeten, Assistant Attorney General, argued, 

Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Richardson and Richardson, Butte, Montana 

William Richardson argued, Butte, Montana 

Submitted: January 14, 1980 

Decided: MAR 1 0 1.w 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

c his is an appeal by the State of Montana from an order 

of the District Court, Third Judicial District, in and for 

Granite County, which released the petitioner, Charles L. 

Crabtree, from custody of the County Sheriff who was holding 

him pursuant to an extradition request from the State of 

Oregon. 

The issue before this Court is whether the trial judge 

erred in considering the merits of the Oregon charges against 

Crabtree when deciding whether or not he should be extradited 

to the State of Oregon. 

The petitioner and his wife Corrine A. Melton (Crabtree) 

were divorced on February 27, 1970 in the Clackamas County 

Circuit Court. That court ordered petitioner to pay $225 

per month for the support of the parties' three children. 

The wife had difficulty collecting the support payments from 

the petitioner. In July 1970, she sought the assistance of 

the Clackamas County District Attorney in contacting the 

petitioner to collect payments. Petitioner was located in 

Phillipsburg, Montana, where he resided. He owns and operates a logging company in Granite County. Petitioner agreed 

to pay the wife $150 per month for child suppport, but in 

the first ten months of 1972, the wife reported that she 

received only five support payments. In September 1973, the 

Clackamas County Circuit Court determined that the petitioner 

was $1500 in arrears for support payments. 

In 1975, a Clackamas County grand jury returned a three 

count indictment for nonpayment of child support against the 

petitioner. Warrants for petitioner's arrest were sent to the 

Granite County Sheriff. Although no arrest was made, on 
October 31, 1976, the Granite County District Court entered 

an order requiring the petitioner to pay $150 per month for 

the support of the three children. 

Petitioner made only three payments between August 1976 

and January 1977, and on August 22, 1978, the Clackamas 

County grand jury indicted the petitioner for two counts of 

criminal nonsupport, a class C felony in Oregon. The records 

of the Clackamas County Circuit Court show that in 1978 only 

one payment was received from the petitioner. 

The Governor of Oregon signed a requisition seeking 

extradition of the petitioner to Oregon for a trial in 

Clackamas County on two counts of criminal nonsupport. Upon 

receipt of the requisition, Governor Thomas Judge of Montana 

issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioner and for his 

deliverance to the authorized agent of the Governor of 

Oregon. 

Petitioner was arrested by the Granite County Sheriff 

on April 19, 1979, and filed a petition with the District 

Court in which he named the State of Montana as plaintiff 

and himself as defendant, and sought relief by means of a 

writ of habeas corpus. Each party filed a brief and memorandum in support of its position, and the District Court held 

a show cause hearing on July 24, 1979. The court's order of 

August 7, 1979 ordered the release of petitioner from the 

custody of the Granite County Sheriff and required the 

petitioner to pay $100 per month for the support of his two 

sons. It is from this order that the State of Montana 

appeals. 

This case involves an interpretation of the interaction 

between Montana's Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 

Act and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. This appears 
to be a case of first impression in Montana. 

The appellant State's argument is based on its contention that the extradition of petitioner is for a criminal 

charge and that a judicial review of the propriety of the 

extradition order must be limited to the inquiry permitted 

by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Michigan 

v. Doran (1978), - U.S. 99 S.Ct. 530. See also State 

v. Booth (1958), 134 Mont. 235, 328 P.2d 1104; In re Hart 

(1978) I - Mont. , 583 P.2d 411, 35 St.Rep. 1234. In 

Doran, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in 

order to avoid extradition for charges of theft of a motor 

vehicle and theft by embezzlement. The United States Supreme 

Court held that the Michigan Supreme Court erred when it 

reversed the trial court's denial of the habeas corpus 

petition. 

The Doran decision is based on the Court's interpretation of Article IV, Section 2 of the United States Constitution which provides: 

"A Person charged in any State with Treason, 

Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from 

Justice, and be found in another State, shall 

on Demand of the executive authority of the 

State from which he fled, be delivered up, to 

be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of 

the Crime." 

The Supreme Court held that Article IV, Section 2 prohibited 

courts in the asylum state from reviewing the determination 

of a neutral magistrate in the demanding state that probable 

cause to support the extradition demand existed. The Court 

stated that once the governor of the asylum state granted 

extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus 

can do no more than decide "(a) whether the extradition 

documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; 
(c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a 

fugitive." Doran, supra, at 535. 

In the present case, Winston L. Bradshaw, presiding 

judge of the Clackamas County Circuit Court, certified that 

he investigated the facts and circumstances of the case, and 

that the merits of the case warrant application for requisition. The Governor of the State of Montana has determined 

that the copy of the requisition and other duly authenticated 

papers filed with the demand justify the exercise of his 

discretion in granting extradition. Therefore, the State 

. - 

argues that Suran,' supra, limits the inquiry of the Montana 

courts to the four points stated within the opinion. 

The petitioner argues that Duran does not apply to his 

petition because the charge against him is based on his alleged failure to comply with the child support order, which 

is civil and not criminal. He analogizes his duty of support 

to other duties involving family matters, such as custody 

matters. He argues that the petition for habeas corpus of a 

child detained contrary to a custody order is treated as a 

civil matter, and that the court in determining the merits 

of the petition has determined that the child is illegally 

detained, relying upon In re Thompson (1926), 77 Mont. 466, 

251 P. 163. 

We find no merit in this argument. Here the petitioner 

was indicted for a criminal offense, criminal nonsupport, 

which is listed as a class C felony in the State of Oregon. 

The State of Oregon clearly contemplates criminal proceedings 

against petitioner as its requisition for extradition stated 

that he had committed a crime in the State of Oregon and 

that there was no hope of success in initiating further pro- 
ceedings against him under URESA. Even the petitioner's own 

petition seeks release from extradition for criminal charges 

and is clearly distinguishable from cases he cites where the 

habeas corpus proceeding was determined to be civil. 

Petitioner has given us no case authority, nor does 

there appear to be any reason from those cases cited by him 

for distinguishing'Ba.xim from the present case. 

We find that section 46-30-225, MCA, as well as the 

$0 

holding of the United States Supreme Court in Buran, require 

the reversal of the ~istrict Court's order granting release 

of the petitioner. The matter is returned to the District 

Court of Granite County reinstating the proceeding and 

granting the Oregon request for extradition. 

We concur: 

a4~ae Chief Justice 

CM- e.a // Justices 

C/ 

Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea will file an opinion later.