Docket No. 91417–Agenda 15–January 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

 								DAVID BELCHER, Appellant.

Opinion filed April 4, 2002.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

	In the circuit court of Champaign County, defendant, David

Belcher, pled guilty to one count of first degree murder (720 ILCS

5/9–1(a)(2) (West 1996)) in exchange for the dismissal of other

charges and received a sentence of 60 years’ imprisonment. The

trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence. On

appeal, the appellate court declined to vacate defendant’s guilty

plea and sentence or allow him leave to file a motion to withdraw

his guilty plea in the trial court. However, the appellate court found

that the certificate defense counsel filed with the motion to

reconsider sentence did not meet the requirements of Supreme

Court Rule 604(d). The appellate court therefore remanded the

matter so that defense counsel could comply with Rule 604(d) and

file a new motion to reconsider sentence. People v. Belcher, No. 4–96–0959 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule

23). 

	On remand, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to

reconsider sentence. Defendant appealed and the appellate court

affirmed its previous order denying defendant leave to file a motion

to withdraw his guilty plea. No. 4–99–0755. We granted

defendant’s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and

for the reasons that follow we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

	In 1996, defendant was charged with seven counts of first

degree murder and two counts of residential burglary in connection

with the murder of Nathan Ehler on February 28, 1996. Prior to

trial, defendant moved for the appointment of a psychiatrist. The

court ordered Dr. Lawrence Jeckel to examine defendant as to his

sanity at the time of the alleged offense and his fitness to stand

trial.

	Dr. Jeckel found defendant fit to stand trial. He also found,

pursuant to section 6–2(a) of the Criminal Code, that defendant

was sane at the time of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/6–2(a) (West

1996).1 Specifically, Dr. Jeckel stated in his report, and in testimony later given at defendant’s sentencing hearing, that

defendant “appreciated the criminality of his conduct at the time of

the alleged crime.” Based on this evaluation, defendant stipulated

to being fit to stand trial. He also pled guilty to one count of first

degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(2) (West 1996)) in exchange

for the dismissal of all other charges, pursuant to a plea agreement

with the State. There was no agreement as to sentencing, and in

fact, the State gave notice that it was seeking the death penalty.

The trial court fully admonished defendant in accordance with

Supreme Court Rule 402 (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 402). The court

determined that there was a factual basis for the plea, noted the

plea agreement, and found defendant’s plea voluntary and

knowing. For these reasons the trial court accepted defendant’s

plea of guilty.

	Defendant’s sentencing hearing was held approximately 29

days after his plea was accepted by the trial court. At the hearing,

Dr. Jeckel testified that he would have found defendant insane at

the time of the alleged offense under the prior version of the

insanity statute. 720 ILCS 5/6–2(a) (West 1994). This was due to

the fact that defendant was unable to “conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” As noted above, at the close of the hearing

the trial court sentenced defendant to 60 years of imprisonment.

	On appeal, the appellate court found that the certificate

defense counsel filed with the motion to reconsider sentence did

not meet the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 604(d). The appellate court noted that the certificate requirements of Rule

604(d) must be strictly complied with, and that the remedy for

noncompliance is a remand to the trial court for the filing of a new

motion to withdraw the guilty plea or reconsider the sentence, and

a new hearing on the motion. The appellate court observed that

defense counsel could not have reviewed the transcript of the

sentencing hearing since the hearing on the motion to reconsider

was combined with the sentencing hearing. Further, the appellate

court observed that it appeared from the record that counsel did

not communicate with defendant to ascertain his contentions of

error in the sentence or entry of the guilty plea.

	During the pendency of this direct appeal, defendant alerted

the appellate court to the fact that Public Act 89–404 was

unconstitutional, citing this court’s decision in Johnson v. Edgar,, 176 Ill. 2d 499 (1997). The appellate court was also aware of its

holding in People v. Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d 182 (1998), that Public Act 89–404 was enacted in violation of the single subject rule, and

that the new version of the insanity statute could not stand.

Defendant requested that the appellate court vacate his guilty plea

and sentence or, in the alternative, grant him leave to file a motion

to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. The appellate court

declined this opportunity to grant either of defendant’s requests.

	Defendant’s appeal proceeded as noted at the outset of this

opinion. Additional facts will be set forth as needed in the analysis

portion of our discussion.

ANALYSIS

	Defendant contends that the appellate court erred in denying

his request to vacate his guilty plea. The State responds that

defendant cannot challenge the validity of his guilty plea because

he did not properly move to vacate his plea in the trial court, prior

to raising this issue on appeal. Defendant rejoins that he asked for leave to vacate his plea at the first available opportunity. The State

is correct in its assertion that defendant did not file a motion to

withdraw thehis guilty plea within the allotted time of Rule 604(d),

and, in the usual circumstances, such a failing would leave a

defendant without remedy. But this is not the usual case. While it

is true this court does not approve of any failure to comply strictly

with the explicitly stated requirements of Rule 604(d) (People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 103 (1988)), the unusual and fact -specific circumstances found in this case lead us to believe that the ends of

justice will be better served by permitting defendant leave to file a

motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court.

	As noted in the factsabove, Dr. Jeckel found defendant sane at the time

of the offense, pursuant to the insanity provisions enacted as part

of Public Act 89–404. It is important to understand that these

provisions made it more difficult for a defendant to assert the

affirmative defense of insanity than the former version of the law

with its broader definition of insanity. See People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154, 156 (2000) (Freeman, J., especially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.) (noting the differences between the two

versions of the insanity statute, and explaining that the provisions

of Public Act 89–404 narrowed the definition of insanity). “The

amended version of the law was significant because it altered the

definition of insanity.” People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 156 (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.). “Under the amendment, a defendant could no longer raise an insanity defense

based on his inability ‘to conform his conduct to the requirements

of the  law.’ ” People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 156, quoting 720 ILCS 5/6--–2(a) (West 1994).  (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.). Since the time of defendant’s guilty plea, the courts

of this Sstate have repeatedly held that Public Act 89–404 is

unconstitutional because it was enacted in contravention of the

single subject rule. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999); People v. Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d 182 (1998).

	The representation made by Dr. Jeckel to the court and to

defendant, foreclosed the availability of the affirmative defense of

insanity by defendant. In light of these circumstances, defendant

pled guilty to the murder. Defendant argues that Dr. Jeckel’s

conclusion led him to forego the opportunity this affirmative defense

offers. We now know that the insanity provisions used at trial were

enacted in contravention of the single subject rule. Had this fact

been known to defendant at that time, his decision to forego the affirmative defense and to enter a guilty plea might have been

different. In fact, Dr. Jeckel testified that under the former version

of the insanity statute, his opinion of defendant’s sanity at the time

of the offense would change. He would conclude that defendant

was insane at the time of the murder because defendant was unable

to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 

	We emphasize that Dr. Jeckel was a court -appointed

psychiatrist who opined that defendant was sane at the time of the

murder. The trial court relied upon that representation in accepting

defendant’s guilty plea. In light of the case law noted above, it now

appears that the court’s expert, the court and defendant may have

been operating under a misapprehension of law. We also note that

the appellate court limited the initial remand to the trial court to

matters of sentencing. This was done in spite of the appellate

court’s observation that counsel did not communicate with

defendant to ascertain his contentions of error in the sentence or

entry of the guilty plea. Lastly, we note

that defendant asked the appellate court to vacate his guilty plea at

the earliest opportunity, and did not wait until the eleventh hour to

raise the issue. 

	These unusual circumstances lead us to believe that defendant

should be given an opportunity to file a motion to vacate his guilty

plea. The basis for vacatur of the guilty plea, misapprehension of

the law, is well recognized in our jurisprudence. People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528 (1952).

CONCLUSION

	For the aforementioned reasons, the judgments of the circuit

and appellate courts isare reversed, and the cause is remanded to the

trial court.

Judgmentyts Rreversed;

cause  and remanded.