had been stored in the center console of his vehicle. Bonnie initially stated 

that the phone was his and then that he found it outside. Bonnie and his 

codefendant became upset. The general manager of the bar testified that 

he went outside with Bonnie and did not notice any damage to Cole's 

vehicle at the time. The manager left Bonnie and his codefendant outside. 

Shortly thereafter, Cole left the bar and discovered that a large stone had 

been thrown through his windshield. A police officer arrived on the scene 

and noticed footprints in the ground that he later determined to be 

visually consistent with Bonnie's. Accordingly, we conclude that a 

reasonable juror could have found that Bonnie was responsible for the 

injury to Cole's vehicle. NRS 205.274(1). 

Second, Bonnie argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by allowing evidence of prior bad acts when the arresting police 

officer, unprompted by the State, testified that he recognized Bonnie's 

name and another officer testified that he recognized Bonnie's 

codefendant. Bonnie submits that this signaled to the jury that he had 

prior contact with law enforcement. We conclude that the district court 

did not err because the prosecutor did not act in bad faith and the 

statements did not necessarily imply that Bonnie had a history of criminal 

activity. See Domingues v. State, 112 Nev. 683, 695, 917 P.2d 1364, 1373 

(1996). We further conclude that, in light of the substantial evidence 

against Bonnie, any error in admitting the statements was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. 

Third, Bonnie argues that the district court erred by denying 

his motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendant. Bonnie failed to 

provide this court with transcripts from arguments related to his motion 

to sever or the district court's denial of said motion which we believe are 

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relevant to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion. 

NRAP 30(b)(1). "It is [the] appellant's responsibility to make an adequate 

appellate record." Johnson v. State,113 Nev. 772, 776, 942 P.2d 167, 170 

(1997). Because the record provided does not properly establish any lower 

court error or prejudice to Bonnie, we conclude that he failed to 

demonstrate that he is entitled to relief. See id. 

Fourth, Bonnie argues that the district court erred by allowing 

police officers to testify as experts without proper notice from the State. 

"A district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence rests within its 

sound discretion and will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly wrong." 

Libby v. State, 115 Nev. 45, 52, 975 P.2d 833, 837 (1999). Bonnie submits 

that a police officer's testimony that he did not conduct a fingerprint 

analysis on the stolen vehicle because he did not believe it would be 

conducive for prints, and that the tread on Bonnie's shoes was similar to 

the imprint he saw near the stolen vehicle, constituted improper expert 

testimony. The district court did not abuse its discretion because the 

testimony was within the police officer's lay experience and did not 

constitute expert testimony, thus no notice was required from the State. 

See NRS 50.265. 

Fifth, Bonnie argues that cumulative error deprived him of a 

fair trial. Because Bonnie has demonstrated only one possible error, we 

conclude that Bonnie is not entitled to relief on this claim. See U.S. v. 

Sager,227 F.3d 1138, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) ("One error is not cumulative 

error."); see also, Hoxsie v. Kerby,108 F.3d 1239, 1245 (10th Cir. 1997) 

("Cumulative-error analysis applies where there are two or more actual 

errors."). 

3 
Hardesty 

Having considered Bonnie's contentions and determined that 

they do not warrant relief, we 2 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

' J. 

Parraguirre ') Cherry 

cc: Hon. Ronald J. Israel, District Judge 

Law Offices of Morton-Myles 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2Bonnie's fast track statement does not comply with NRAP 3C(h)(1) 

and 32(a)(4) because it does not have 1-inch margins on all four sides. We 

caution counsel that future failure to comply with formatting 

requirements when filing briefs with this court may result in the 

imposition of sanctions. NRAP 3C(n); NRAP 32(e). 

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