UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

TYQUAN STEART, )

)

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:16-CV-138-TLS

)

ALLEN COUNTY JAIL, et al. )

ORDER

On April 2, 2018, Plaintiff Tyquan Stewart entered into a settlement agreement with 

Defendants Parkview Hospital, Inc., and Lakisha Houston after a settlement conference with 

Magistrate Judge Susan L. Collins. (See ECF No. 58.) The Plaintiff filed a pro se Motion for 

Rescission [ECF No. 59] on April 11, 2018. The Plaintiff also filed a Letter [ECF No. 61] to the 

Court requesting the same relief on April 16, 2018. Instead of filing a formal response to the 

Plaintiff’s Motion, the Defendants filed a Motion to Enforce [ECF No. 62] the settlement 

agreement on April 17, 2018. The Plaintiff filed a pro se1 Opposition [ECF No. 63] to the 

Defendants’ Motion on April 25, 2018.

The Court referred [ECF No. 64] the Motions to Magistrate Judge Susan L. Collins on 

May 10, 2018, to conduct any necessary hearings and to issue a report and recommendation that 

included proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of the Motions. On 

May 29, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 68], 

recommending that the Court deny the Plaintiff’s Motion for Rescission and grant the 

Defendants’ Motion to Enforce the settlement agreement.

 1 Due to the Plaintiff’s continued representation, the Court would have been on sound footing to strike the 

Plaintiff’s pro se Motion as well as his opposition to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.
2

Pursuant to the Federal Magistrate’s Act, Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)–(C), a 

Magistrate Judge does not have authority to issue a final order on these pending Motions.

Instead, the Magistrate Judge submits proposed findings of fact and recommendations to the

district court. See United States v. Sabo, No. 1:10-CR-21, 2010 WL 4628242, at *1 (N.D. Ind. 

Nov. 8, 2010). If a party files a timely objection to the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation, § 636(b)(1) provides that a district judge is to make a de novo determination of 

those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made. The Court may accept, reject, and/or modify, in whole or in part, the findings 

or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. The Court also may receive further evidence

or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions.

On May 31, 2018, the Plaintiff filed his objections [ECF No. 69] to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation.2

The Plaintiff does not appear to object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings of fact, which 

are as follows: After the appearance of counsel on his behalf, the Plaintiff filed a third amended 

complaint, alleging, among other things, that the Defendants violated the Emergency Medical 

Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, by refusing him emergency 

treatment. On April 2, 2018, the Magistrate Judge conducted a settlement conference with the 

parties, during which the parties reached a resolution of this matter and executed a written 

settlement agreement. Counsel for the Plaintiff, David Frank; in-house counsel for Defendant 

Parkview, David Stack; outside counsel to the Defendants, Mark Baeverstad; and the Plaintiff all 

appeared in person at the conference, which lasted for four hours. After reaching a resolution, the 

parties executed a one-page, handwritten settlement agreement, signed by Attorney Stack, as 

 2 The time for filing objections has now passed, and counsel of record has not entered any objections on 

the Plaintiff’s behalf. 
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Director of Risk Management for Parkview, and the Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 62-1.) After the 

conference, the Magistrate Judge went on the record and asked each party, as well as counsel for 

the Plaintiff, in turn whether the settlement agreement reflected the parties’ intentions. Each 

party, as well as counsel for the Plaintiff, responded affirmatively. As there does not appear to be 

any objection to this factual recitation from either party, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s 

findings of fact regarding the parties’ Motions.

The Plaintiff does, however, object to the Magistrate Judge’s legal conclusions, and the 

Court must review those conclusions de novo. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge set forth 

the appropriate legal standard for resolving the parties’ Motions. A settlement agreement in a 

federal case is “just like any other contract.” Dillard v. Starcon Int’l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 506 (7th 

Cir. 2007). Therefore, Indiana law governs, and under Indiana law, an agreement to settle a 

lawsuit is generally enforceable. See Zimmerman v. McColley, 826 N.E.2d 71, 76–79 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005). “It is established that if a party agrees to settle a pending action, but then refuses to 

consummate his settlement agreement, the opposing party may obtain a judgment enforcing the 

agreement.” Id. at 76 (citing Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind. 2003)).

Settlement agreements are “enforceable against a plaintiff who knowingly and voluntarily 

agreed to the terms of the settlement or authorized his attorney to settle the dispute.” Glass v. 

Rock Island Ref. Corp., 788 F.2d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted) (applying 

Indiana law). Once the parties come to an agreement, none can “avoid the agreement merely 

because he subsequently believes the settlement insufficient . . . .” Id. That is, once a party has 

authorized a settlement agreement, he is bound to its terms even if he later changes his mind. Id.

at 454–55.
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The Plaintiff’s grounds for rescinding the settlement agreement are that his counsel (1) 

mistakenly told him that he needed an expert witness to prove his damages, and (2) failed to tell 

him that the maximum penalty under the EMTALA had increased from $50,000 to more than 

$100,000. The Plaintiff asserts that if he had known this information, he would not have agreed 

to a settlement amount of $23,000. The Plaintiff’s assertions amount to an argument that the 

settlement agreement is not enforceable based on his unilateral mistake. However, unilateral 

mistake is not sufficient grounds on which to rescind an agreement under Indiana law. See 

Carlson v. Sweeney Dabagia, Donoghue, Thorne, Janes & Pagos, 895 N.E.2d 1191, 1199 (Ind. 

2008) (collecting cases). More specifically, “[a] contract generally may not be avoided for 

unilateral mistake unless the mistake was induced by the misrepresentation of the opposite 

party.” Ball v. Versar, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 783, 807 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting 

Mid-States Gen. Mech. Contracting Corp. v. Town of Goodland, 811 N.E.2d 425, 435 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004)).

The Plaintiff did not allege any misrepresentation by an opposing party, but rather 

claimed that it was misrepresentations of his own counsel that caused him to enter into the 

settlement agreement. But, courts have held that misrepresentation of one’s own counsel are 

insufficient to void a settlement agreement. See, e.g., Qiang Wang v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc., 

686 F. App’x 890, 894–95 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (refusing to vacate settlement agreement where the 

plaintiff claimed it was based on erroneous legal advice); Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 

452 F.3d 1097, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A party will not be released from a poor litigation 

decision made because of inaccurate information or advice, even if provided by an attorney.”).

Therefore, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the Plaintiff 

entered into an enforceable settlement agreement, and his later change of heart and arguments
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regarding alleged erroneous advice from his counsel do not affect the settlement agreement’s 

validity or enforceability. Any matters the Plaintiff wishes to pursue as it relates to the 

sufficiency of his legal representation are not properly before this Court and are best addressed, 

if at all, by separate litigation.

It is worth noting that the Plaintiff does not appear to object to the Magistrate Judge’s 

conclusion that his assertions of unilateral mistake based on alleged misrepresentations of his 

counsel is insufficient to void the settlement agreement. Instead, he objects to the Magistrate 

Judge’s conclusion based on assertions of duress, coercion, and fraud on the part of the 

Defendants during the settlement conference. But the Plaintiff did not make any of these 

arguments in his original Motion. In the Seventh Circuit, “arguments not made before a 

magistrate judge are normally waived.” United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 

2000) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Moore, 375 F.3d 580, 584 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004) 

(noting that “the district court did not even pass on this question because [the defendant] failed to 

make this argument to the magistrate judge”); Felice v. Republic Airlines, Inc., No. 4:09-CV-71,

2012 WL 162559, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 17, 2012) (finding that “[c]ourts routinely have held that 

arguments not raised before a magistrate judge and instead raised for the first time in an 

objection before the district judge are waived” (collecting cases)); Maxwell v. South Bend Work

Release Ctr., No. 3:09-CV-8, 2010 WL 4318800, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 25, 2010) (terming the 

plaintiff’s argument a “non-starter because [the plaintiff] raise[d] it for the first time in his

objection”). Therefore, the Plaintiff has waived these arguments by failing to make them in his 

original Motion, and the Court will not consider them.

Accordingly, the Court adopts, in full, the Magistrate Judge’s analysis of the law that is 

applicable to the instant Motions, and the conclusion that the Plaintiff entered into an enforceable 
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settlement agreement. The Court further adopts the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions that the 

Plaintiff’s assertions of unilateral mistake based on alleged erroneous advice from his counsel 

are insufficient to void the settlement agreement.

CONCLUSION

As detailed above, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation [ECF No. 68], DENIES the Plaintiff’s Motion for Rescission [ECF No. 59],

and GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion for Enforcement [ECF No. 62]. The parties are 

DIRECTED to file dismissal papers no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.

SO ORDERED on July 3, 2018.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT