[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Buddenberg v. Weisdack, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3832.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-3832

BUDDENBERG v. WEISDACK ET AL. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Buddenberg v. Weisdack, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3832.] 

Civil actions—Civil cause of action pursuant to R.C. 2307.60 for injuries based on 

a criminal act does not require an underlying criminal conviction—

Criminal conviction for intimidation is not a condition precedent to civil 

claim pursuant to R.C. 2921.03(C). 

(No. 2018-1209—Submitted November 13, 2019—Decided July 29, 2020.) 

ON ORDER from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 

Eastern Division, Certifying Questions of State Law, No. 1:18-cv-00522-DAP. 

_____________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J.

{¶ 1} This case is before us on the certification of state-law questions by the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. 

The federal court asks that we answer the following questions: 
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1. Does [R.C.] 2307.60’s creation of a civil cause of action 

for injuries based on a “criminal act” require an underlying criminal 

conviction? 

2. Is a criminal conviction a condition precedent to a civil 

claim pursuant to [R.C.] 2921.03? 

{¶ 2} We answer the certified state-law questions in the negative. 

Relevant Background 

{¶ 3} The federal court provided the following facts and allegations from 

which the questions of law arise. Respondent, Rebecca Buddenberg, is the plaintiff 

in the underlying action filed in the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Ohio, Eastern Division. She brought a civil-rights action pursuant to 

federal and Ohio anti-discrimination laws against the petitioners here, including: 

her former employer, the Geauga County Health District; her former supervisor, 

Geauga County Health Commissioner Robert K. Weisdack; the Geauga County 

Health District’s attorney, James Budzik; and certain members of the Geauga 

County Board of Health. 

{¶ 4} Relevant here, Buddenberg’s complaint asserts claims for civil 

liability pursuant to R.C. 2307.60 for alleged violations of three criminal statutes: 

R.C. 2921.05 (retaliation); R.C. 2921.03 (intimidation); and R.C. 2921.45 

(interfering with civil rights). The relevant defendants moved to dismiss those 

claims, arguing that Buddenberg cannot state a claim for relief because none of the 

defendants were convicted of the underlying criminal offenses. The federal court 

denied the motions to dismiss without prejudice, “finding no clear authority on 

whether a conviction is a condition precedent to civil liability pursuant to [R.C.] 

2307.60.” 

 
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The State Law Questions 

{¶ 5} Following the denial of their motion to dismiss, the petitioners moved 

to certify state-law questions to this court. The federal court certified the following 

questions: 

1. Does [R.C.] 2307.60’s creation of a civil cause of action 

for injuries based on a “criminal act” require an underlying criminal 

conviction? 

2. Is a criminal conviction a condition precedent to a civil 

claim pursuant to [R.C.] 2921.03? 

We agreed to answer the questions. 153 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2018-Ohio-4288, 109 

N.E.3d 1259. 

Analysis 

Does R.C. 2307.60 require an underlying criminal conviction?

{¶ 6} In its decision certifying the questions, the federal court noted that this 

court recently held that R.C. 2307.60 “independently authorizes a civil action for 

damages caused by criminal acts.” See Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio St.3d 398, 

2016-Ohio-8434, 75 N.E.3d 203. The federal court recognized, however, that 

Jacobson left unanswered what a plaintiff must do to prove a claim under R.C. 

2307.60. We are now presented the opportunity to answer whether a plaintiff must 

prove the existence of an underlying criminal conviction to support his or her claim 

for civil liability under R.C. 2307.60. 

{¶ 7} R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) states: 

Anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, 

and may recover full damages in, a civil action unless specifically 

excepted by law, may recover the costs of maintaining the civil
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action and attorney’s fees if authorized by any provision of the Rules 

of Civil Procedure or another section of the Revised Code or under 

the common law of this state, and may recover punitive or 

exemplary damages if authorized by section 2315.21 or another 

section of the Revised Code. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 8} Petitioners argue that a plain reading of the statute shows that the 

General Assembly intended for there to be an underlying conviction before civil 

liability could be imposed. Petitioners also argue that the requirement of an 

underlying conviction in R.C. 2307.60 is supported by a review of the legislative 

history. 

{¶ 9} Buddenberg counters that the statute predicates civil liability on a 

“criminal act” rather than a “conviction” and that the plain meaning of those terms 

is distinct. Buddenberg also argues that the absence of a conviction requirement is 

supported by the statute’s structure, history, and purpose. 

{¶ 10} When a court interprets the meaning of a statute, “[w]ords and 

phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar 

and common usage,” R.C. 1.42, and the court must give effect to all of the statute’s 

words, Bryan v. Hudson, 77 Ohio St.3d 376, 380, 674 N.E.2d 678 (1997). “If the 

meaning of the statute is unambiguous and definite, it must be applied as written 

and no further interpretation is necessary.” State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local 

School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996). 

Additionally, a court must give effect “ ‘ “to the natural and most obvious import 

of [a statute’s] language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions.” ’ ” 

Lancaster v. Fairfield Cty. Budget Comm., 83 Ohio St.3d 242, 244, 699 N.E.2d 473 

(1998), quoting Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 627, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), 

quoting McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 593, 601 (1854); see also Ohio 
January Term, 2020 

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Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott, 139 Ohio St.3d 536, 2014-Ohio-2440, 13 N.E.3d 

1115, ¶ 22. 

{¶ 11} We agree with Buddenberg that the plain language of the statute does 

not require proof of an underlying criminal conviction. 

{¶ 12} First, the word “conviction” is noticeably absent from R.C. 

2307.60(A)(1). That subdivision states that “[a]nyone injured in person or property 

by a criminal act has, and may recover full damages in, a civil action unless 

specifically excepted by law * * *.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Petitioners argue that 

the use of the word “criminal” indicates the General Assembly intended that there 

must be an underlying conviction before an individual may recover damages. They 

argue that “for a crime to have been committed there must necessarily be a 

conviction.” Petitioners also point to the definition of “criminal act” as an 

“unlawful act that subjects the actor to prosecution under criminal law.” Black’s 

Law Dictionary 30 (10th Ed.2014). 

{¶ 13} But crimes can be committed without a conviction. They often are. 

The fact that a person’s actions subject him or her to prosecution in no way 

establishes that he or she will in fact be prosecuted. And being subjected to 

prosecution, as mentioned in the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary, does not 

mean a conviction necessarily results. It is certainly possible for an individual to 

commit an unlawful act and be prosecuted, yet evade conviction for a variety of 

reasons. Thus, we do not read the phrase “a criminal act” to mean “a criminal act 

that resulted in a conviction.” 

{¶ 14} Second, reading a conviction requirement into R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) 

renders R.C. 2307.60(A)(2) superfluous. R.C. 2307.60(A)(2) provides: 

A final judgment of a trial court that has not been reversed 

on appeal or otherwise set aside, nullified, or vacated, entered after 

a trial or upon a plea of guilty, but not upon a plea of no contest or 
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the equivalent plea from another jurisdiction, that adjudges an

offender guilty of an offense of violence punishable by death or 

imprisonment in excess of one year, when entered as evidence in

any subsequent civil proceeding based on the criminal act, shall 

preclude the offender from denying in the subsequent civil 

proceeding any fact essential to sustaining that judgment, unless the 

offender can demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances 

prevented the offender from having a full and fair opportunity to 

litigate the issue in the criminal proceeding or other extraordinary 

circumstances justify affording the offender an opportunity to 

relitigate the issue. The offender may introduce evidence of the 

offender’s pending appeal of the final judgment of the trial court, if 

applicable, and the court may consider that evidence in determining 

the liability of the offender. 

This language establishes that a final judgment of guilt as described in the statute 

may provide a rebuttable evidentiary presumption. But if an underlying conviction 

was the only basis on which civil liability could be established for a “criminal act,” 

there would be no need to carve out a presumption for evidence of a conviction. In 

other words, R.C. 2307.60(A)(2) permits the use of a conviction as evidence, but 

does not require it. 

Is a criminal conviction a condition precedent to a civil claim pursuant to 

R.C. 2921.03?

{¶ 15} R.C. 2921.03(A) describes the elements required for the criminal 

offense of intimidation, a third-degree felony. R.C. 2921.03(C) provides: 

A person who violates this section is liable in a civil action 

to any person harmed by the violation for injury, death, or loss to 
January Term, 2020 

7

person or property incurred as a result of the commission of the 

offense and for reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, and other 

expenses incurred as a result of prosecuting the civil action 

commenced under this division. A civil action under this division is 

not the exclusive remedy of a person who incurs injury, death, or 

loss to person or property as a result of a violation of this section. 

{¶ 16} Petitioners argue that the plain language of R.C. 2921.03(C) makes 

a criminal conviction a prerequisite for civil liability because “[t]he only way to 

have a criminal violation and a committed offense is through a conviction.” 

Petitioners also argue that other uses of the word “offense” in the Revised Code 

require an underlying conviction. 

{¶ 17} Buddenberg counters that the text and the structure of the statute do 

not demonstrate that the General Assembly intended for a conviction to be a 

prerequisite to civil liability and that the legislative history and purpose support 

such a conclusion. 

{¶ 18} For similar reasons as those discussed above with respect to the 

language in R.C. 2307.60, we conclude that civil liability under R.C. 2921.03(C) is 

not limited to a person convicted of intimidation. The word “conviction” is absent 

from the statutory language. And we are not persuaded by petitioners’ argument 

that the “commission of the offense” necessarily means that a formal declaration of 

criminal guilt has occurred. 

{¶ 19} R.C. 2921.03(C) provides for civil liability against a “person who 

violates” the intimidation statute, but it does not say that liability is limited to 

someone who is found guilty of violating the statute. Petitioners point to R.C. 

2921.13, which contains language similar to R.C. 2921.03(C) and attaches civil 

liability to a falsification offense. See R.C. 2921.13(G). In one case cited by 

petitioners, the Tenth District Court of Appeals declined to recognize a civil claim 
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for falsification “without the initiation of criminal charges or criminal proceedings” 

under the statute. Hershey v. Edelman, 187 Ohio App.3d 400, 2010-Ohio-1992, 

932 N.E.2d 386, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.). The court noted, “Here, there is absolutely no 

evidence that defendant was arrested for or charged or indicted for a falsification 

offense.” Id. But, as explained above with respect to R.C. 2307.60, the initiation 

of criminal proceedings does not necessarily mean a conviction results from those 

proceedings. Thus, Hershey does not support petitioners’ argument that the statute 

requires a conviction. 

{¶ 20} Petitioners also argue that the term “offense” as used in R.C. 

2921.03(C) is synonymous with “crime,” and that both terms are used to mean “acts 

that have been the subject of criminal proceedings.” But, again, being the subject 

of a criminal proceeding is not the equivalent of being convicted of the crimes 

charged. And the word conviction is not in the statute. Without any clear indication 

from the legislature in the language of the statute that a conviction is required, we 

decline to read such intent into the statute. 

{¶ 21} Reading R.C. 2921.03(C) as petitioners request would require us to 

add words to the statute. See Dodd v. Croskey, 143 Ohio St.3d 293, 2015-Ohio2362, 37 N.E.3d 147, ¶ 24. We instead construe R.C. 2921.03(C) as written and 

conclude that the plain language does not require a criminal conviction as a 

prerequisite for civil liability. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 22} For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified state-law 

questions in the negative. 

So answered. 

FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 

_________________ 
January Term, 2020 

9

The Chandra Law Firm, L.L.C., Subodh Chandra, and Donald P. Screen, 

for respondent. 

Gallagher Sharp, L.L.P., Monica A. Sansalone, Timothy T. Brick, and Maia 

E. Jerin, for petitioner James Budzik. 

Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., Frank H. Scialdone, and Todd M. 

Raskin, for petitioners Robert Weisdack, Geauga County Health District, Tim 

Goergen, David Gragg, Catherine Whitright, Christina Livers, and Alta Wendell. 

Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Louis E. Grube; and Elizabeth Well, in 

support of respondent for amicus curiae Ohio Crime Victim Justice Center 

Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Louis E. Grube; and Camille Crary, in 

support of respondent for amicus curiae Ohio Alliance to End Sexual Violence. 

Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Louis E. Grube, in support of respondent 

for amicus curiae Ohio Now Education and Legal Fund. 

Frantz Ward, L.L.P., and Kelley Barnett, in support of respondent for 

amicus curiae Cleveland Rape Crisis Center. 

Bonezzi, Switzer, Polito & Hupp Co., L.P.A., and William A. Peseski, in 

support of petitioners for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 

Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor, L.L.C., Mark Landes, and Dale D. 

Cook, in support of petitioners for amici curiae Ohio School Boards Association, 

Ohio Transit Risk Pool, and County Commissioners Association of Ohio. 

Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, State Solicitor, and Michael 

J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, in support of neither party for amicus curiae 

the State of Ohio. 

_________________