Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 40A01-1706-CR-1328 | May 10, 2018 Page 1 of 10

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Mark J. Dove

R. Patrick Magrath

Alcorn Sage Schwartz &

Magrath, LLP

Madison, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Larry O. Janes,

Appellee-Defendant.

May 10, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

40A01-1706-CR-1328

Appeal from the Jennings Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Jon W. Webster, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

40C01-1605-F2-5

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 40A01-1706-CR-1328 | May 10, 2018 Page 2 of 10

[1] The State appeals the trial court’s suppression of evidence found during a 

search of Larry Janes’s vehicle, arguing that the trial court erred by finding that 

because a Pirtle1 warning was not given, suppression was warranted. Finding 

no error, we affirm.

Facts2

[2] In the early morning of May 17, 2016, Janes and a passenger drove past 

Jennings County Sheriff’s Department Reserve Deputy Jason Littrell on a rural 

road. Deputy Littrell observed that Janes failed to dim his headlights. Deputy 

Littrell followed Janes’s vehicle for a minute so he could stop Janes in a well-lit 

area; during this time, the deputy observed Janes slow down so that he was 

driving under the posted speed limit, turn on his turn signal well before an 

intersection, stop well in front of the white line at the intersection, make a wide 

turn at the intersection, and drive on the emergency portion of the road.

[3] Once Deputy Littrell stopped the vehicle and approached Janes, he advised 

Janes why he stopped him, and Janes admitted that he did not dim his 

headlights for approaching traffic. Deputy Littrell observed that Janes was 

nervous and would not make eye contact with him, and when the deputy 

requested his driver’s license, Janes initially handed him a bank card. This 

 

1

Pirtle v. State, 263 Ind. 16, 323 N.E.2d 634 (1975). 

2 We heard oral argument at Lawrenceburg High School on April 13, 2018. We thank the school’s 

administration, faculty, and students, and the Dearborn County Bar Association, for their gracious 

hospitality. We also thank counsel for their informative and engaging oral advocacy and subsequent 

discussion with the students.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 40A01-1706-CR-1328 | May 10, 2018 Page 3 of 10

behavior, coupled with what the deputy had observed while following Janes, 

made Deputy Littrell suspect that Janes was impaired. He then requested 

additional officers to assist at the scene.

[4] Deputy Heilers and Sergeant Ritchie arrived shortly thereafter. Sergeant 

Ritchie testified that when he arrived, he “mentioned that [he] heard a lot of 

information about Larry Janes being involved in the drug world” or “with 

methamphetamine.” Tr. Vol. II p. 78. After Deputy Littrell ran Janes’s license, 

which came back clean, he returned to Janes’s vehicle on the driver’s side, 

while Deputy Heilers approached the vehicle on the passenger’s side. Deputy 

Littrell gave Janes a verbal warning for failure to dim his headlights. He then 

turned and stepped toward his patrol car. Deputy Littrell testified that he then 

“went back to the driver’s door and asked the driver if he would give consent to 

search the vehicle due to us trying to clean the streets up and recover stolen 

items and such.” Id. at 13. Deputy Littrell testified that Janes consented and 

then “I advised him if he agreed to giving us consent to search the vehicle, I 

asked him and the passenger to open the door and step out and walk to the rear 

of his vehicle and the front of mine and stand with Sargent [sic] Ritchie.” Id. 

Janes and the passenger complied.

[5] Deputy Littrell’s body camera recorded their exchange:

Deputy Littrell: All right, Larry, here’s your ID back. Like you 

said, you know why I pulled you over, right?

Janes: Yeah, it won’t happen again (inaudible) one thing 

(inaudible) hard to see anyway.
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Deputy Littrell: All right, you had anything to drink tonight, 

anything like that?

Janes: No sir.

Deputy Littrell: No.

Janes: No.

Deputy Littrell: Okay.

Janes: None.

Deputy Littrell: All right, well, I mean nothing illegal in the car?

Janes: Nothing.

Deputy Littrell: No.

Janes: Nope.

Deputy Littrell: Would you give us a chance to look in there?

Janes: Yes, you can look.

Deputy Littrell: Okay, well, if you’ll give us a consent to look, if 

you guys want to come out here for us, we’ll take a look real 

quick. No guns, knives, weapons, nothing like that?

Appellant’s Ex. 1 (partially transcribed at tr. vol. II p. 45-46).
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[6] Deputies Littrell and Heilers then searched the vehicle. Deputy Heilers found a 

methamphetamine pipe underneath the passenger seat. At some point during 

the stop, Janes told Deputy Littrell several times that the vehicle was not his. 

After the deputies found the pipe, they handcuffed Janes and the passenger. 

The deputies also discovered methamphetamine in the vehicle’s trunk and the 

passenger’s purse. 

[7] On May 26, 2016, the State charged Janes with Level 2 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine, Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, and Level 

4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. On 

December 13, 2016, Janes filed a motion to suppress all the evidence seized 

during the vehicle search, alleging that the vehicle search violated the federal 

and Indiana constitutions because no exception to the warrant requirement 

applied to the stop. 

[8] A suppression hearing took place on March 8 and May 9, 2017. Janes testified 

that the deputy had asked whether “they could look in” his vehicle, and that 

Janes had replied affirmatively, thinking that the deputy had wanted to “shine 

his flashlight through the window into the back seat and floorboards while we 

was sitting in the car.” Tr. Vol. II p. 61-62. Janes also testified that he had told 

the deputy several times that the vehicle was not his and that he could not give 

him permission to search it. Janes further testified that at no point did any of 

the officers tell him that he was free to go, and that at no point did he feel free 

to leave. 
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[9] On May 31, 2017, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, making the 

following findings:

5.) Because Littrell was aware Defendant “may have been 

involved in the drug trade”, and after Littrell returned 

Defendant’s license to him, Littrell then asked Defendant if he 

could “look in there”. Defendant said yes, and Littrell then 

asked Defendant and the passenger to get out of the car. After 

looking inside the vehicle, Heilers found a “methamphetamine 

smoking device” under the passenger seat and upon further 

search, other contraband.

6.) According to Littrell, Defendant never withdrew his consent 

but he did tell Littrell the vehicle wasn’t his.

7.) The question in this case requires a primary analysis of 

whether Defendant was or was not in custody at the time he 

allegedly consented to a search of the vehicle, because, whether 

Pirtle is required, depends on this answer.

***

9.) . . . Here, the facts were that three (3) uniformed officers in 

marked cars, with lights flashing, were on the scene of an 

infraction traffic stop, at least one on each side of the vehicle. 

Officer Littrell had completed the reason for his stop, but based 

on his own knowledge of Defendant’s reputation, decided to 

extend his investigation. The Court can only assume what would 

have occurred had Defendant driven off. Based on the totality of 

the circumstances, the Court finds Defendant was in custody 

when Littrell asked if he could “look in there”. Therefore, Pirtle

warnings were required and were not given, and the fruits of the 

search of the vehicle are suppressed.
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Appealed Order p. 2-3 (footnote omitted). On June 28, 2017, the State filed a 

motion to dismiss the charges based on the trial court’s order, and on July 6, 

2017, the trial court granted that motion. The State now appeals the trial 

court’s order suppressing the evidence.

Discussion and Decision

[10] The State argues that the trial court erred by suppressing evidence because 

Janes was not in custody for purposes of Pirtle and was not entitled to a Pirtle 

warning before a consensual search during a traffic stop.3

[11] When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we 

must determine whether substantial evidence of probative value supports the 

trial court’s decision. State v. Seidl, 939 N.E.2d 679, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 

Where a trial court grants a motion to suppress, the State appeals from a 

negative judgment and must show that the trial court’s grant of the motion was 

contrary to law. Id. We will reverse a negative judgment only when the 

evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences lead to a conclusion 

opposite that of the trial court. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence nor judge 

witnesses’ credibility, and will consider only the evidence most favorable to the 

trial court’s ruling. Id.

 

3 Although Janes moved to suppress the evidence under the federal and Indiana constitutions, the trial court 

granted Janes’s motion based on the Indiana constitution. Therefore, we will discuss the issue only under 

Indiana law.
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[12] Pursuant to the Indiana constitution, our Supreme Court held that “a person 

who is asked to give consent to search while in police custody is entitled to the 

presence and advice of counsel prior to making the decision whether to give 

such consent.” Pirtle v. State, 263 Ind. 16, 29, 323 N.E.2d 634, 640 (1975). 

When a person does not receive this warning, “whether the evidence must be 

suppressed turns on whether the defendant was in custody at the time consent 

was requested.” Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. 2009). In 

distinguishing between custodial encounters, where Pirtle applies, and noncustodial encounters, where it does not, the ultimate inquiry is whether there 

was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree 

associated with a formal arrest. Id. “In answering this question, courts consider 

all circumstances surrounding the encounter and ‘largely appl[y] an objective 

test asking whether a reasonable person under the same circumstances would 

believe that she was under arrest or not free to resist the entreaties of the 

police.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[13] Courts have considered a variety of factors in determining whether an 

encounter is custodial. One such factor is whether a reasonable person in the 

defendant’s position would feel free to leave. Id. The law is clear that in the 

context of a traffic stop a person is, at least temporarily, not free to leave, but 

that does not necessarily mean that a traffic stop is custodial. Id. Indeed, an 

officer making a traffic stop may detain a person upon reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity and ask questions to verify or disprove his suspicions. Id. 

Ordinarily, such detention is not considered custodial even though the person is 
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not free to leave. Id. Thus, courts must look to other factors as well to 

determine whether and when a traffic stop transforms into a custodial 

encounter. Other relevant factors include whether the defendant was read his 

Miranda4rights, handcuffed, restrained in any way, or told that he was a suspect 

in a crime; the vigorousness of the law enforcement interrogation; whether 

police suggested the defendant should cooperate, implied adverse consequences 

for noncooperation, or suggested that the defendant was not free to go about his 

business; and the length of the detention. Id. at 874. 

[14] Here, the State argues that because Janes was detained for a traffic stop, he was 

not in custody when he consented to the search and a Pirtle warning was not 

required. Viewed most favorably to the trial court’s decision, the record shows 

that three uniformed officers in three separate police cars with flashing lights 

came to a traffic stop on a rural highway in the middle of the night. When 

Deputy Littrell returned Janes’s license to him, he stood on the vehicle’s 

driver’s side, while Deputy Heilers stood on the passenger’s side. In our view, a

person who is stopped for a minor traffic violation for which there was an 

unusually high number of responding officers and whose vehicle is then 

surrounded by two police officers might reasonably feel that his freedom of 

movement was restrained.

 

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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[15] Moreover, the record also shows that after Deputy Littrell completed the traffic 

stop by giving Janes a verbal warning for failure to dim his headlights, he then

asked Janes whether he had had anything to drink that night, whether there was 

anything illegal in the vehicle, and whether there were any guns, knives, or 

other weapons in the vehicle. A reasonable person, asked incriminating 

questions about alcohol consumption, illegal items, and weapons—questions 

unrelated to the reason for the traffic stop—could reasonably conclude that he 

was not free to deny police permission to search his car. See Sellmer v. State, 842 

N.E.2d 358, 364 (Ind. 2006) (noting that a reasonable person, asked repeatedly 

about whether there were drugs in the vehicle, “might well conclude either that 

he or she was under arrest or, at least, that she was not free to deny police 

permission to search her car”). 

[16] The trial court, which was in the best position to weigh the evidence and judge 

witnesses’ credibility, found that Janes was in custody when he was asked to 

consent to a search of his vehicle. We agree that, considering the totality of the 

circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave this scene. As a 

result, Janes was entitled to a Pirtle warning, which he did not receive.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err by suppressing the evidence found in the 

search. 

[17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

May, J., and Altice, J., concur.