IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JESSE McNEELEY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-1700

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Amended Petition under

28 U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Jesse

McNeeley on July 31, 2014. For the reasons set forth below the

petition is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

McNeeley was found guilty by the Disciplinary Hearing Body

(DHB) at the Westville Correctional Facility of possessing a

controlled substance in violation of B-202 on October 2, 2012. As 

a result of that hearing (WCC 12-09-348), he was deprived of 50

days earned credit time and demoted to Credit Class 2.

DISCUSSION

McNeeley argues that the DHB considered drug test results

which were classified confidential and not shown to him. The

Conduct Report (DE 5 at 8) does not indicate that any drug test

results were considered. The reason given for finding him guilty
was solely based on the conduct report. Therefore, the drug test

results are irrelevant to this case.1 Nevertheless, even if the DHB

had based its decision on a confidential report, McNeeley could not

obtain habeas corpus relief because “prison disciplinary boards are

entitled to receive, and act on, information that is withheld from

the prisoner and the public . . ..” White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266

F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the Screening Report (DE

5 at 10) indicates that McNeeley did not request the drug test

results or any other evidence. 

McNeeley argues that there was no evidence that he possessed

a controlled substance. In evaluating whether there is adequate

evidence to support the findings of a prison disciplinary hearing,

“the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion reached by the

disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56

(1985). “The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that

logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the

disciplinary board.” Id. at 457.

In reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are not

required to conduct an examination of the entire record,

independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the

evidence, but only determine whether the prison

1

McNeeley also objects that prison officials, rather than the hearing

officer, decided that the test results were confidential. However, even if the

test results had been considered, it would be irrelevant if their classification

was a violation of a prison rule because "[i]n conducting habeas review, a

federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 68 (1991).

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disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits

has some factual basis.

Id. (quotations marks and citation omitted). Even a conduct report

alone can provide evidence sufficient to support the finding of

guilt. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).

Here, the DHB relied solely on the Conduct Report which stated: 

On the day of 9-12-12 approx. time 11:10 AM, I Ofc.

A. Parham, watch offender McNeeley, Jesses 159364 run

into the bathroom area. He was attempting to hide 4 small

green leafy substance wrap up in paper, inside his pant

pocket. Evidence turn in to I.A. 

DE 5 at 12. To satisfy due process, there need only be “some

evidence” in the record to support the disciplinary decision.

Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455

(1985). “This is a lenient standard, requiring no more than a

modicum of evidence.” Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir.

2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, it was not

unreasonable for the DHB to have believed the officer’s eye witness

report that he saw McNeeley attempting to hide four small bags

which contained a green leafy substance. So too, it was not

unreasonable for the DHB to have inferred that the green leafy

substances which McNeeley was attempting to hide were a controlled

substance. This is more than sufficient evidence of McNeeley’s

guilt in this case. Cf. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

456-57 (1985) (disciplinary action supported when inmate was one of

three seen fleeing from scene of assault even when victim denied

fellow inmates had assaulted him) and Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d

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341, 346 (7th Cir. 1992) (discovery of weapon in area controlled by

four inmates created twenty-five percent chance of guilt supporting

disciplinary action).

Finally, McNeeley argues that he was not properly and timely

notified of the Superintendent’s denial of his appeal of the DHB’s

findings. However, the violation of a prison’s rules is not a basis

for habeas corpus relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68

(1991). Moreover, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part

of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a

defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Wolff identified rights related to the

disciplinary hearing itself, but it did not provide for any

procedural rights on appeal, nor even for a right to appeal at all.

The Seventh Circuit has explained that Wolff set the limits of due

process in prison disciplinary cases and they should not be

expanded. See White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 768 (7th Cir.

2001) (“Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), warns . . . not

to add to the procedures required by Wolff, which, Baxter held,

represents a balance of interests that should not be further

adjusted in favor of prisoners.”) Therefore McNeeley has not

presented any basis for habeas corpus relief. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition is DENIED. 

DATED: August 27, 2014 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United State District Court

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