[Cite as Lazor v. Souders, 2024-Ohio-774.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

WARREN COUNTY

ANNA N. LAZOR,

Appellee,

 - vs -

STEPHEN T. SOUDERS,

Appellant.

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CASE NO. CA2023-10-080

O P I N I O N

3/4/2024

CIVIL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Case No. 23CS004455

Reminger Co., LPA, and Nathan A. Lennon, for appellee.

Stephen T. Souders, pro se.

M. POWELL, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Stephen T. Souders, appeals a decision of the Warren County 

Court of Common Pleas granting a civil stalking protection order to appellee, Anna Lazor.1

{¶ 2} On or about May 18, 2023, appellant and Lazor began talking on the online 

1. Pursuant to Loc.R. 6(A), we sua sponte remove this appeal from the accelerated calendar.
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dating app "Hinge." As their communications progressed in a positive manner, appellant 

asked that they move their conversation to Facebook. In response, Lazor asked for 

appellant's last name so she could conduct a Google search on him. Appellant told Lazor 

that his last name was Sowders. After a Google search yielded no results, Lazor agreed 

to communicate with appellant on Facebook. After interacting for a while on Facebook, 

appellant asked Lazor for a date. Prior to responding, Lazor decided to investigate 

appellant further to make sure she was safe going on a date with him. Consequently, 

Lazor posted appellant's photograph on a "private Facebook community for women." The 

Facebook group was created for women to post photographs of men and for other women 

in the group to provide any information, including "red flags," they may have on the 

individual depicted. 

{¶ 3} Lazor posted appellant's photograph on May 20, 2023. Several women in

the private Facebook group reported negative interactions with appellant, and some 

indicated he was hostile and dangerous. Upon receiving this information, Lazor blocked 

appellant on Hinge and Facebook. Appellant then found Lazor on Instagram on May 21 

or May 22, 2023, even though Lazor had never provided appellant her Instagram name 

or handle. Upon finding Lazor on Instagram, appellant messaged her and called her out 

for blocking him on Hinge and Facebook. Lazor did not respond to appellant's message 

and instead instantly blocked him on Instagram. 

{¶ 4} On June 7, 2023, Lazor received a message on Facebook from Tatiana 

Koblinski. It is undisputed that the Tatiana Koblinski Facebook account was a fake 

Facebook account appellant had created and which he used to message Lazor. Using 

that Facebook account, appellant messaged Lazor, claiming that the information she had 

received from the private Facebook group was not true. Appellant also used the fake 

Facebook account to "text yell" at Lazor for blocking him on other social media platforms. 
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Appellant's messages began on the morning of June 7, 2023, and continued into the early 

morning hours of June 8, 2023. Appellant called Lazor on Facebook at 12:30 a.m. on 

June 8, 2023, and last messaged her at 2:30 a.m. on June 8, 2023. Lazor did not respond 

to appellant's numerous messages or his call. Sometime on June 8, 2023, Lazor 

eventually told appellant to stop contacting her or she would call the police. On June 15, 

2023, Lazor was served with a defamation lawsuit appellant had filed in Hamilton County. 

A few days later, Lazor received a cease-and-desist letter appellant had mailed on June 

8, 2023.

{¶ 5} On June 20, 2023, Lazor petitioned the trial court for and was granted an 

ex parte civil stalking protection order ("CSPO"). On July 5, 2023, the matter proceeded 

to a full hearing before a magistrate. Both parties testified. Lazor admitted that appellant 

had never threatened her. She testified to the effect appellant's conduct had on her, 

stating she was not sleeping well, she had trouble focusing at work, she feared for her 

safety because appellant knew where she lives, and she was terrified of being contacted 

via other fake accounts, including from appellant. Lazor further testified that the incident 

caused her to change her behavior because she is now reluctant to respond to people 

reaching out to her online unsolicited. 

{¶ 6} Appellant testified he never made implicit or explicit threats to Lazor and 

simply asked that she take down the photograph she had posted on the private Facebook 

group page. Appellant testified that Lazor did not tell him to stop contacting her until he 

messaged her on the fake Facebook account. Prior to that time, Lazor had concocted a 

story about her sister's cancer diagnosis, and whether Lazor had blocked him on

Facebook or had deleted her Facebook account due to her sister's "illness," he reached 

out to her on Instagram out of concern. Appellant denied stalking Lazor and testified he 

did not have any intent to cause her harm or mental distress.
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{¶ 7} On July 12, 2023, the magistrate issued a decision granting Lazor a oneyear CSPO and prohibiting appellant from possessing, using, carrying, or obtaining any 

deadly weapon for the duration of the order. The trial court adopted the magistrate's 

decision that same day. On July 20, 2023, appellant filed objections to the magistrate's 

decision. On September 11, 2023, the trial court issued a decision overruling appellant's 

objections and finding no error in granting Lazor a one-year CSPO. Regarding the 

objections, the trial court first found that appellant improperly objected to the magistrate's 

decision and not to the trial court's adoption of the magistrate's decision as mandated by 

Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i) and overruled the objections on that basis. Nevertheless, the trial 

court also considered the merits of the objections and overruled them. The trial court 

found that appellant knowingly engaged in conduct constituting menacing by stalking and 

that Lazor suffered mental distress because of appellant's conduct. 

{¶ 8} Appellant now appeals, pro se, raising seven assignments of error. For 

purposes of readability, several assignments of error will be addressed out of order; 

appellant's third and fourth assignments of error will be addressed together.

{¶ 9} At the outset, we address Lazor's claim that appellant's appeal should be 

dismissed because it was not filed within 30 days of the trial court's decision as required 

by App.R. 4. The trial court's decision was journalized on September 11, 2023; appellant 

filed his notice of appeal 32 days later, on October 13, 2023.

{¶ 10} App.R. 4(A)(1) provides that an appeal must be filed within 30 days of a 

final order. However, pursuant to App.R. 4(A)(3), "[i]n a civil case, if the clerk has not 

completed service of the order within the three-day period prescribed in Civ.R. 58(B), the 

30-day periods referenced in App.R. 4(A)(1) and 4(A)(2) begin to run on the date when 

the clerk actually completes service." "Hence, it is clear that service by the clerk is the 

triggering event that starts the 30-day appeal period." Clermont Cty. Transp. 
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Improvement Dist. v. Gator Milford, L.L.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 542, 2015-Ohio-241, ¶ 6.

{¶ 11} Civ.R. 58(B) "requires that service be made by the clerk of courts; there is 

no stated exception." Id. at ¶ 2. "W]hen a trial court issues a judgment, it must also issue 

a directive to the clerk of courts to serve all interested parties and attorneys with that 

judgment. Pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B), the clerk must then indicate on the docket the names 

and addresses of the parties it is serving the judgment upon, the method of service, and 

the costs associated with the service." (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 3. "When these steps 

are followed, there is no question whether service was perfected according to rule." Id.

{¶ 12} Here, within the trial court's decision, there was no instruction to the clerk of 

courts to serve the entry in accordance with Civ.R. 58(B). Moreover, the docket shows 

only a September 11, 2023 notice mailed to the parties indicating that "a final appealable 

judgment was entered in the above case on September 11, 2023." Thus, neither the trial 

court's decision nor the September 11, 2023 notice comply with Gator Milford. "Civ.R.

58(B) mandates that the clerk of court's office serve the order with an accompanying 

notation on the appearance docket. * * * The 30-day time period to file a notice of appeal 

begins upon service and notation of service on the docket by the clerk of courts regardless 

of actual knowledge by the parties." Id. at ¶ 11. Because the trial court's decision does 

not contain a notation to the clerk to serve appellant with notice of the judgment, and the 

clerk did not enter an entry in the appearance docket noting the service of the entry on 

appellant in violation of Civ.R. 58(B) and Gator Milford, appellant's appeal is deemed 

timely under App.R. 4.

{¶ 13} Assignment of Error No. 1:

{¶ 14} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING PETITIONER AN EX PARTE 

"EMERGENCY" CIVIL STALKING PROTECTION ORDER. FAILING TO RECOGNIZE 

PETITIONER'S BLATANT ABUSE OF PROCESS BOTH OBTAINING THE ORDER EX 
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PARTE AND SUBSEQUENT PERMANENT ORDER.

{¶ 15} Appellant challenges the issuance of the ex parte CSPO, arguing that (1) 

an emergency ex parte CSPO is only for emergency and a risk of violent behavior; (2) it 

is an abuse of process to file for an emergency ex parte CSPO when no imminent threat 

exists; (3) a trial court must recognize and acknowledge perjury; and (4) Lazor's petition 

for an ex parte CSPO was based upon inadmissible hearsay statements from women in 

the private Facebook group. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled on the 

ground that the trial court's issuance of the full CSPO superseded the ex parte order, 

rendering claims based on the ex parte order moot. See Brown v. Grauman, 2d Dist. 

Champaign No. 2013 CA 14, 2013-Ohio-4814.

{¶ 16} Assignment of Error No. 7:

{¶ 17} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ALLOW RESPONDENT 

SAME RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES DURING THE CASE AS THAT OF OPPOSING 

COUNSEL.

{¶ 18} Appellant argues that a trial court's local rules must allow pro se litigants 

"the right to e-filing and case access when allowing the same to attorneys." We decline 

to address this argument because appellant did not raise it below. It is well established 

that a party may not raise new issues or legal theories for the first time on appeal; failure 

to raise an issue before the trial court results in waiver of that issue for appellate purposes. 

Wightman v. Darty, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2023-03-003, 2023-Ohio-3748, ¶ 17.

{¶ 19} Furthermore, appellant does not indicate how a lack of access to e-filing 

prejudiced him in this proceeding. App.R. 16(A)(7) requires an appellant's brief to contain 

"[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each 

assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, 

with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant 
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relies." The burden of affirmatively demonstrating error on appeal rests with the party 

asserting error. Sparks v. Sparks, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-10-096, 2011-Ohio5746, ¶ 17. It is not an appellate court's duty to "root out" or develop an argument that 

can support an assigned error, even if one exists. Lebanon v. Ballinger, 12th Dist. 

Warren No. CA2014-08-107, 2015-Ohio-3522, ¶ 27.

{¶ 20} Appellant also challenges the trial court's failure "to perfect service upon 

him in the final appealable decision by the court on 9-11-2023, only doing so upon his 

inquiry on 10-02-2023." We have accepted appellant's appeal as timely filed under Gator 

Milford, 2015-Ohio-241, and therefore find no prejudice.

{¶ 21} Appellant's seventh assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 22} Assignment of Error No. 5:

{¶ 23} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING AND/OR DENYING 

EVIDENCE THAT WAS INADMISSIBLE AND/OR ADMISSIBLE.

{¶ 24} Appellant challenges the magistrate's refusal to admit Exhibit 2 at the full 

hearing, arguing the exhibit was admissible because it was "indeed very applicable and 

relevant." The record shows that appellant sought to have two exhibits admitted at the 

end of his case. The magistrate admitted the cease-and-desist letter but excluded the 

other exhibit for lack of foundation. Appellant also asserts that Lazor testified "she did 

not have a Facebook Group with her associates to all file CSPO in conjunction, then 

changed her testimony, admitting that she had a group, but they had all received 

independent counseling on what to do."

{¶ 25} Appellant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error on appeal 

and substantiating his arguments in support thereof. Ostigny v. Brubaker, 12th Dist. 

Warren No. CA2023-03-026, 2024-Ohio-384, ¶ 38. As stated above, App.R. 16(A)(7) 

requires an appellate brief to include reasons in support of an assignment of error with 
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citations to authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied upon. If a party fails to 

identify the error in the record upon which the assignment is based or argue an 

assignment as required by App.R. 16(A), an appellate court may disregard the 

assignment of error. App.R. 12(A)(2).

{¶ 26} Exhibit 2 is not identified in the record beyond its designation as "Exhibit 2." 

Appellant did not proffer Exhibit 2 into evidence at the full hearing. Pages 129 through 

136 of the appendix to appellant's brief include what appears to be screenshots of 

responses to Lazor's posting of appellant's photograph on the private Facebook group. 

Appellant's brief refers to these pages of the appendix as "Exhibit 2." However, because 

appellant did not proffer "Exhibit 2" into evidence, it is not part of the record on appeal 

and appellant may not make it part of the record by attaching it to his brief. See App.R. 

9(A); Day v. Baker, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2003-06-140, 2004-Ohio-5529. Therefore, 

we disregard pages 129 through 136 of the appendix to appellant's brief.2 Because 

Exhibit 2 is not part of our record on appeal, we cannot determine whether it was "very 

applicable and relevant." 

{¶ 27} Appellant does not offer any analysis of the assigned error. Once again, it 

is not an appellate court's duty to "root out" or develop an argument that can support an 

assigned error, even if one exists. Ballinger, 2015-Ohio-3522 at ¶ 27. Nor is it the duty 

of an appellate court to search the record for evidence to support an appellant's argument 

as to alleged error. Hellmuth v. Stephens, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2022-04-034, 2023-

Ohio-4592, ¶ 23.

{¶ 28} Appellant's fifth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 29} Assignment of Error No. 6:

2. Indeed, without a proffer of "Exhibit 2," there is no way for this court to verify that the "Exhibit 2" included 

in the appendix is the same "Exhibit 2" the trial court declined to admit into evidence.
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{¶ 30} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO REVIEW THE ENTIRETY OF 

RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION, FURTHER 

FAILING TO ACKNOWLEDGE RESPONDENT OBJECTED TO BOTH THE DECISION 

AND THE ORDER OF THE MAGISTRATE.

{¶ 31} Appellant's objections to the magistrate's decision spanned 47 pages. 

Three attachments were inserted in the objections on pages 5 through 8. Attachment A 

was the photograph of appellant that Lazor posted online and some screenshots of 

comments she received after the posting; attachment B was the cease-and-desist letter 

appellant mailed to Lazor; and attachment C was additional screenshots. Applying Loc.R. 

7.10(A) regarding page limitation and noting that appellant had failed to request leave of 

court to exceed the 20-page limitation, the trial court declined to review appellant's 

objections after page 23.

{¶ 32} Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to review his objections in 

their entirety because (1) an objection to a magistrate's decision is not a motion and is 

therefore not subject to a page limitation; (2) the trial court cited the 20-page limitation 

rule, then broke that rule by considering the first 23 pages of his objections; and (3) the 

trial court did not address his objection to the firearm restriction provision. 

{¶ 33} Loc.R. 7.10(A) governs the format of motions and filings and provides that 

"[o]riginal motions and memoranda in support shall be no longer than twenty (20) doublespaced pages in length, excluding attachments." Loc.R. 7.10(A)(5). "A party may request 

leave of Court to exceed the page limitations. Any filing which exceeds the page 

limitations shall contain a summary which is no greater than two double-spaced pages in 

length." Loc.R. 7.10(A)(6).

{¶ 34} Although an objection is technically not a motion, it is a filing. While Loc.R. 

7.10 is titled "Motions," it refers to motions, memoranda/memorandum, and responses,
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all filings. Even if appellant may be technically correct he should not have been limited 

to 20 pages, his objections were remarkably lengthy, spanning 47 pages. The first three 

objections, found on pages 9 through 26, included several repetitive arguments, and the 

sixth and seventh objections were largely redundant of earlier arguments. Page limitation 

"has a purpose—it assists parties with the presentation of arguments without surplusage 

and it assists the court in disposing of disputed matters in an economical manner." Sheil 

v. Horton, Ct. of Cl. No. 2017-00772PQ, 2018-Ohio-2355, ¶ 7. "Page limitations 'exist for 

good reason, to protect litigants and judicial resources alike, and [they] are neither 

aspirational nor advisory.' * * * '[S]trict adherence to page limits is essential to proper[] 

marshal[ing] of judicial resources.'" Id., quoting Beining v. Commr. of Soc. Sec., W.D.Pa. 

No. 13-305, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42765, *1-2 (Mar. 31, 2014). Moreover, a trial court 

has the inherent power to manage the course of its proceedings and 

docket. See Paramount Parks, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2007-

05-066, 2008-Ohio-1351, ¶ 37. We therefore find no error in the trial court's decision to 

subject appellant's objections to the 20-page limitation.

{¶ 35} Contrary to appellant's assertion, the trial court did not break the 20-page 

rule when it considered the first 23 pages of appellant's objections. The trial court reached 

that determination by striking pages 5, 6, and 8 of the objections because these pages 

improperly included two exhibits–Attachments A and C– that were neither introduced nor 

admitted at the full hearing. We find no merit to appellant's argument.

{¶ 36} As for the trial court's failure to address appellant's objection to the firearm 

restriction provision, it is well settled that a motion not expressly decided by a trial court 

is presumed to have been overruled. Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio2985, ¶ 13. Accordingly, the objection is presumed overruled. See Pemberton v. 

Woodford, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2012-01-001, 2013-Ohio-214, ¶ 15. As we are 
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addressing the merits of the firearm restriction provision under appellant's second 

assignment of error, we find no prejudice based on the lack of an explicit denial of 

appellant's objection to the firearm restriction. 

{¶ 37} In its September 11, 2023 decision, the trial court initially overruled 

appellant's objections on the ground they improperly challenged the magistrate's decision 

rather than the trial court's adoption of the magistrate's decision. The court also noted 

that the objections did not cite to the transcript of the full hearing. Appellant takes issue 

with these statements, arguing that (1) the local rules only require an objecting party to 

file a transcript, and (2) his objections to the magistrate's decision were also properly

directed to the trial court's adoption of the magistrate's decision because the trial court 

adopted the magistrate's decision the same day it was issued.

{¶ 38} The trial court did not overrule appellant's objections because he did not 

cite to the record. Rather, the trial court simply mentioned appellant's failure to cite to the 

full hearing transcript in conjunction with other factors–appellant's failure to argue with 

specificity or apply case law, his mere recitation of the magistrate's decision–in finding 

that he did not make cogent arguments in support of his objections.

{¶ 39} Contrary to appellant's assertion, his objections were only to the 

magistrate's decision, as evidenced by the caption, appellant's challenge to several of the 

magistrate's findings and statements, and the summary at the end of the objections. 

Civ.R. 65.1 governs civil protection orders. A magistrate's order granting a protection 

order after a full hearing is not effective unless adopted by the trial court. Civ.R. 

65.1(F)(3)(c)(i). A trial court may only adopt the magistrate's grant or denial of a protection 

order "upon review of the order and a determination that there is no error of law or other 

defect evident on the face of the order." Becker v. Harnar, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2019-

06-044, 2020-Ohio-3234, ¶ 8, quoting Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(ii). A party may then file written 
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objections "to a court's adoption, modification, or rejection of a magistrate's denial or 

granting of a protection order after a full hearing, or any terms of such an order, within 

fourteen days of the court's filing of the order." Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i). 

{¶ 40} The objecting party "has the burden of showing that an error of law or other 

defect is evident on the face of the order, or that the credible evidence of record is 

insufficient to support the granting or denial of the protection order, or that the magistrate 

abused the magistrate's discretion in including or failing to include specific terms in the 

protection order." Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iii). "Objections based upon evidence of record 

shall be supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate or an 

affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available." Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iv).

{¶ 41} Although the trial court initially overruled appellant's objections on the 

ground they improperly challenged the magistrate's decision rather than the trial court's 

adoption of the magistrate's decision, the court nevertheless proceeded to address the 

merits of appellant's objections. We likewise address the merits of appellant's appeal. 

Appellant was therefore not prejudiced and we find no merit to his arguments.

{¶ 42} Appellant's sixth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 43} Assignment of Error No. 3:

{¶ 44} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DETERMINING RESPONDENT HAD 

COMMITTED THE ACTS OF MENACING BY STALKING TOWARD PETITIONER. IN 

DETERMINING RESPONDENT HAD THE INTENT TO CAUSE PETITIONER MENTAL 

DISTRESS AS DEFINED UNDER RC § 2903.

{¶ 45} Assignment of Error No. 4:

{¶ 46} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING RESPONDENT'S 

CONDUCT CAUSED PETITIONER MENTAL DISTRESS TO SUCH A DEGREE SHE 

WOULD HAVE REQUIRED MEDICAL TREATMENT.
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{¶ 47} Appellant argues the trial court erred by granting Lazor a CSPO because 

the evidence presented at the full hearing does not support the trial court's findings that 

appellant acted knowingly to cause Lazor mental distress and that Lazor suffered mental 

distress. In particular, appellant asserts that all his contacts before June 7, 2023, were 

simply regarding dating and well-being checks on Lazor given her sister's "illness," and 

that all his contacts after June 7, 2023, were simply an inquiry and request to remove his 

photograph.3 

{¶ 48} A petition for a CSPO is governed by R.C. 2903.214. It requires the 

petitioner to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent engaged 

in conduct constituting menacing by stalking. Bartells v. Bertel, 12th Dist. Butler No. 

CA2016-11-216, 2018-Ohio-21, ¶ 54. "When assessing whether a civil stalking protection 

order should have been issued, the reviewing court must determine whether there was 

sufficient credible evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

petitioner was entitled to relief." Harnar v. Becker, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-10-

068, 2021-Ohio-784, ¶ 10. "Preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight 

of the evidence, or evidence that leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of the 

contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. Id. 

{¶ 49} Menacing by stalking is defined as "engaging in a pattern of conduct [that] 

knowingly cause[s] another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm 

to the other person * * * or cause mental distress to the other person[.]" R.C. 

2903.211(A)(1). In determining whether to grant a CSPO, the trial court must view the 

3. Under his third assignment of error, appellant also asserts that neither sending a cease-and-desist letter 

nor filing a civil lawsuit as a private citizen constitutes menacing by stalking under R.C. 2903.211. In his 

July 12, 2023 decision, the magistrate explicitly stated that sending a cease-and-desist letter and the threat 

of or the commencement of a lawsuit do not constitute menacing by stalking. While the trial court briefly 

referred to the letter and lawsuit in its factual findings, it did not rely upon either fact in approving the 

issuance of the CSPO. 
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actions with respect to their effect on the petitioner. Ziegler v. Tameris, 11th Dist. Lake 

No. 2022-L-042, 2022-Ohio-4044, ¶ 9.

{¶ 50} A person acts knowingly "when the person is aware that [his] conduct will 

probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has 

knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably 

exist." R.C. 2901.22(B). To act "knowingly" is not to act "purposely," or with a specific 

intent to do the prohibited act. M.D. v. M.D., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 106581 and 

106758, 2018-Ohio-4218, ¶ 97. "Absent an admission, '[w]hether a person acts 

knowingly can only be determined from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, 

including the doing of the act itself.'" Id.

{¶ 51} A pattern of conduct requires only two or more actions closely related in 

time. R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). In determining what constitutes a pattern of conduct, a trial 

court must take every action of the respondent into consideration even if some of the 

actions, considered in isolation, do not seem particularly threatening. Bartells, 2018-

Ohio-21 at ¶ 56. Explicit threats are not necessary to establish menacing by stalking 

under R.C. 2903.211. Id. 

{¶ 52} Mental distress means either: (1) any mental illness or condition that 

involves some temporary substantial incapacity; or (2) any mental illness or condition that 

would normally require psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental 

health services, whether or not any person requested or received psychiatric treatment, 

psychological treatment, or other mental health services. R.C. 2903.211(D)(2). 

{¶ 53} "Expert testimony is not required to establish mental distress, and a victim's 

testimony may be sufficient to establish mental distress." M.J.W. v. T.S., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 108014, 2019-Ohio-3573, ¶ 25. "The mental distress does not need to be 

'incapacitating or debilitating' and a person does not need to request or receive 
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psychiatric, psychological, or mental-health treatment to establish mental distress." Id. 

{¶ 54} Upon reviewing the record, we find that the evidence presented was 

sufficient to establish that appellant knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct that would 

cause Lazor mental distress. During the hearing, Lazor testified that after she blocked 

appellant on Hinge and Facebook on May 20, 2023, and on Instagram the following day, 

thereby taking significant steps to ensure appellant could not contact her, he 

subsequently used a fake Facebook account to message her multiple times and call her 

once throughout June 7, 2023, through the early morning hours of June 8, 2023. Lazor 

testified that while the fake Facebook account ostensibly belonged to a woman, she knew 

the messages and Facebook call came from appellant. Lazor testified that appellant used 

the fake Facebook account to "text yell" and confront her about her post. 

{¶ 55} While appellant testified he did not know Lazor had blocked him on Hinge

prior to contacting her on Instagram, he admitted he knew he could not contact her on 

Facebook because he had either been blocked or Lazor had deleted her Facebook 

account. Appellant did not rebut Lazor's testimony that his Instagram message 

confronted her about blocking him. Appellant claimed that all his contacts on social 

media platforms were either regarding dating and well-being checks on Lazor given her 

sister's "illness" or to request that she remove her post from the private Facebook group. 

Appellant admitted he knew Lazor had blocked him on Facebook and Instagram prior to 

utilizing the fake Facebook account. Appellant claimed the fake Facebook account was 

an old account he had created for private investigation purposes. 

{¶ 56} It is not unusual for a trial court to hear conflicting testimony from two

different parties. Bartells, 2018-Ohio-21 at ¶ 63. While we acknowledge appellant's

testimony explaining or denying his conduct, it was up to the trial court to determine the

weight and credibility to afford Lazor's version of the events versus appellant's
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version. Id. "A trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each

witness." In re S.C.T., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2004-04-095, 2005-Ohio-2498, ¶

24. Appellate courts typically defer to trial courts on issues of weight and credibility

because, as the trier of fact, the trial court is better able to view the witnesses and observe

their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and then use those observations in

weighing credibility." Bartells at id. Upon review of the record, we decline to substitute 

our judgment for that of the trial court. Appellant had knowledge he had been blocked on 

several social media platforms and knowingly used a fake Facebook account to contact 

Lazor and "text yell" and confront her about her post.

{¶ 57} We further find that the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that 

appellant's actions caused Lazor mental distress. Contrary to appellant's assertion, the 

trial court's finding that Lazor suffered mental distress was not solely based upon her 

testimony that she had trouble focusing at work and was not sleeping well. In addition to 

this testimony, Lazor also testified that she is scared for her safety as appellant knows 

where she lives, and is terrified of being contacted via other fake social media accounts, 

including from appellant. Lazor further testified to changing her behavior on how she 

communicates with others online as she is more apprehensive to respond.

{¶ 58} In light of the foregoing, we find that Lazor met her burden under R.C. 

2903.214 of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant engaged 

in conduct constituting menacing by stalking. The trial court, therefore, did not err in 

issuing the CSPO. 

{¶ 59} Appellant's third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

{¶ 60} Assignment of Error No. 2:

{¶ 61} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RESTRICTING RESPONDENT'S CIVIL 

RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN CREATING AN ORDER WHICH 
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DEPRIVED RESPONDENT OF HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS, TO BE FREE FROM 

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (FIREARM SEIZED) AND TO BE FREE 

FROM UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT/DETENTION WHEN THEY HAD NO LAWFUL OR 

LEGAL AUTHORITY TO DO SO UNDER OHIO LAW GIVEN RESPONDENT AND 

PETITIONER DO NOT HAVE A QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP UNDER RC § 2903.

{¶ 62} Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it imposed a firearm 

restriction prohibiting him from possessing, using, carrying, or obtaining any deadly 

weapon for the duration of the CSPO because (1) there is no nexus between appellant's 

conduct and the firearm restriction, and (2) he does not qualify as a family or household 

member. Appellant cites R.C. 2903.214(E)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) in support of his 

argument.

{¶ 63} An appellate court reviews a challenge to the scope of a CSPO under an 

abuse of discretion standard. Coleman v. Razete, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180232, 

2019-Ohio-2106, ¶ 30. Following a full hearing on a petition for a CSPO, R.C. 

2903.214(E)(1) permits a trial court to issue a CSPO containing "terms designed to 

ensure the safety and protection of the person to be protected by the protection order." 

Restrictions placed on the respondent in the CSPO must bear a sufficient nexus to the 

conduct that the trial court is attempting to prevent. Id. at ¶ 29; Elkins v. Reed, 5th Dist. 

Stark No. 2013CA0090, 2014-Ohio-1216, ¶ 45. 

{¶ 64} Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), it is unlawful for any person "who is subject 

to a court order that restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an 

intimate partner" to possess any firearm or ammunition. We recently upheld the 

imposition of a firearm restriction in a domestic violence civil protection order as follows:

Although the General Assembly has not made it a 

requirement that any respondent who is subject to a DVCPO 

be restricted from possessing a firearm, we find no error in the 
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trial court's decision to include the firearm restrictions in the 

DVCPO at issue here. Appellant is currently subject to a CPO 

and the trial court was within its discretion to incorporate the 

remedy provided by congress in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8).

Wilson v. Wilson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2023-01-009, 2023-Ohio-4243, ¶ 38.

{¶ 65} We find that the trial court erred in including the firearm restriction in the 

CSPO against appellant. It is undisputed that the parties have never met in person and 

that the only personal contact between them occurred during the full hearing. Under any 

definition of the term, Lazor is not and never was an "intimate partner" of appellant. 

Therefore, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) does not apply and does not support the imposition of the 

firearm restriction. We further find that the evidence in the record does not support the 

imposition of the firearm restriction under R.C. 2903.214(E)(1). No evidence was 

presented that appellant used or threatened to use a weapon to cause mental distress to 

Lazor. No evidence was presented that appellant even owned a firearm. The firearm

restriction therefore does not bear a sufficient nexus to the conduct the trial court was 

attempting to prevent. Wallace v. Masten, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 02CA13, 2003-Ohio1081, ¶ 41.

{¶ 66} Appellant's second assignment is sustained.

{¶ 67} In light of all of the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err in issuing 

the CSPO against appellant. We, however, find that the trial court erred in imposing the 

firearm restriction for the duration of the order. We therefore affirm the trial court's 

decision to issue the CSPO against appellant but modify that judgment pursuant to App.R. 

12(B), thereby vacating the firearm restriction prohibiting appellant from possessing, 

using, carrying, or obtaining any deadly weapon for the duration of the order. Id. at ¶ 44-

45.
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{¶ 68} Judgment affirmed as modified.

S. POWELL, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.