UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

AJANINEA T. PATTERSON, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:16-CV-270-TLS 

 ) 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) 

SECURITY, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s 

Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 8], filed on November 17, 2016. Plaintiff Ajaninea T. Patterson 

filed a pro se Complaint [ECF No. 1] on July 12, 2016. The Defendant moved to dismiss 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. The Plaintiff responded to the Defendant’s Motion on May 18, 2017. [ECF No. 

12]. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 This case involves the Plaintiff’s claim for social security benefits. The relevant 

background is taken from the Defendant’s Declaration [ECF No. 8-1], attached to its Motion to 

Dismiss: 

On February 6, 2015, an Administrative Law Judge issued a decision denying the 

[P]laintiff’s claim for benefits under Titles II and XVI [of the Social Security 

Act], and mailed a copy thereof to the [P]laintiff. Thereafter, the [P]laintiff 

requested review of this decision. On April 4, 2016, the Appeals Council sent, by 

mail addressed to the [P]laintiff at 2917 Euclid St., Fort Wayne, IN 46806, with a 

copy to the representative, notice of its action on the [P]laintiff’s request for 

review and of the right to commence a civil action within sixty (60) days from the 

date of receipt.
2 

(Chung Decl. ¶ (3)(a), ECF No. 8-1.) The Plaintiff filed this Complaint in the Northern District 

of Indiana on July 12, 2016, asking this Court to “reverse the decision of the Commissioner and 

order the Commissioner to pay benefits, the costs of this action, and other relief.” (Compl. ¶ 2, 

ECF No. 1.)1

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 

sufficiency of the complaint and not the merits of the suit. Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 

1520 (7th Cir. 1990). The court presumes all well-pleaded allegations to be true, views them in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepts as true all reasonable inferences to be drawn 

from the allegations. Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 

1995). 

 The Supreme Court has articulated the following standard regarding factual allegations 

that are required to survive dismissal: 

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need 

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of his 

“entitlement to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption 

that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation marks, ellipsis, citations, and 

footnote omitted). A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual 

content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

 1

 Paragraph 2 of the Complaint form states “2. The Commissioner’s decision to deny the 

[P]laintiff’s application was erroneous and not supported by substantial evidence in the administrative 

record because:” (Compl. ¶ 2.) However, the Plaintiff has left the space after “because:” blank. 
3 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). Although the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and draw all permissible 

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, it need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements 

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly at 

555). Legal conclusions can provide a complaint’s framework, but unless well-pleaded factual 

allegations move the claims from conceivable to plausible, they are insufficient to state a claim. 

Id. at 680. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief requires a 

reviewing court to “draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 

Plaintiffs can also plead themselves out of court if the allegations clearly establish all the 

elements of an affirmative defense, including the defense that the action was filed after the 

statute of limitations period expired. Chi. Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian House, Inc., 770 F.3d 

610, 613–14 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(“[W]hen the allegations of the complaint reveal that relief is barred by the applicable statute of 

limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.”); United States v. 

Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing exception to the rule that complaints do not have 

to anticipate affirmative defenses to survive a motion to dismiss where “the allegations of the 

complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense, such as when a 

complaint plainly reveals that an action is untimely under the governing statute of limitations”); 

Tregenza v. Great Am. Comm’ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that even though 

a plaintiff is not required to negate a statute of limitations affirmative defense in his complaint, 

“if he pleads facts that show that his suit is time-barred or otherwise without merit, he has 

pleaded himself out of court”). 

 
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ANALYSIS 

 The Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim on the grounds 

that the Plaintiff’s civil action was untimely filed. The Plaintiff does not respond to the 

Defendant’s contentions. (See Pl.’s Reply 1, ECF No. 12.) 

The Social Security Act establishes a remedial structure for persons alleging disability 

and entitlement to benefits. The Appeals Council’s decision to deny an individual’s request for 

review of the ALJ’s decision is a final decision of the Commissioner, 20 C.F.R. § 404.981, and 

subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). An individual must commence a civil action 

“within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of [the Commissioner’s final] decision.” 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). The sixty day time period begins when the person receives the notice. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.981, 422.210(c). The date of receipt is presumed to be five days after the date on the 

notice. Id. §§ 404.901, 422.210(c). A person can overcome the five day presumption by a 

reasonable showing that the notice was received on a different date. Id. §§ 404.901, 422.210(c). 

The sixty day time period is a statute of limitations. Loyd v. Sullivan, 882 F.2d 218, 219 

(7th Cir. 1989) (citing Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986)). “[I]t is a condition on 

the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus must be strictly construed.” Bowen, 476 U.S. at 479. 

With a showing of good cause, an individual can request an extension of time to file the civil 

action from the Appeals Council. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.911 (listing the factors the Appeals 

Council utilizes to evaluate whether good cause for missing a filing deadline exists and examples 

of circumstances that may create good cause), 404.982 (noting that the standards explained in 

§ 404.911 will be used to determine whether good cause has been shown for missing a deadline 

for filing an action in Federal district court); Bowen, 476 U.S. at 480 (“Congress has authorized 

the [Commissioner] to toll the 60-day limit”). 

Here, the Defendant’s Declaration establishes that the Plaintiff filed his Complaint after 

the 60-day limit had expired: 
5 

On February 6, 2015, an Administrative Law Judge issued a decision denying 

Plaintiff’s claim for benefits. Plaintiff requested review, and on April 4, 2016, the 

Appeals Council sent a notice of its decision and Plaintiff’s right to commence a 

civil action within 60 days from the date of receipt. 

(Mot. Dismiss 3, ECF No. 8 (citing Chung Decl.).) Presuming a date of receipt of five days from 

the date on the notice, the Plaintiff received the mailing on April 9, 2016. For the Plaintiff’s civil 

action to be timely, he was required to file on or before June 8, 2016. The Complaint in this case 

was filed on July 12, 2016, over a month later. There is no evidence that the Plaintiff requested 

an extension of time to file the civil action from the Appeals Council, nor has the Plaintiff 

attempted to demonstrate good cause for his delay in filing this lawsuit. Accordingly, the 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by the sixty-day limitation under § 405(g). 

In addition, the Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations. Accordingly, the 

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) is a separate grounds for 

dismissal of this civil action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief 

must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.”) 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s Motion to 

Dismiss [ECF No. 8] is GRANTED. The Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED. 

 SO ORDERED on June 7, 2017. 

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

 CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT