[Cite as Buck v. Milano , 2014-Ohio-5640.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

JEFFREY BUCK Appellant

v. STEVE MILANO, et al. Appellees C.A. No. 26463

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. 2010 11 7647

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: December 23, 2014

CARR, Judge. {¶ 1} Jeffrey Buck has appealed the trial court’s May 2, 2012 decision, which granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on his defamation complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.

I. {¶ 2} On November 15, 2010, Jeffrey Buck file d a complaint for defamation against two Village of Reminderv ille councilmen, Steve Mila no and Edward Walter, alleging that they “falsely and maliciously accused [him] of committing criminal acts and other disreputable acts and spread those false allegations [to the public ], resulting in both job- related and reputational damages * * *.” One year earlier, Buck had filed a related lawsuit against the Village of Reminderville and a police sergeant, Michael Varga, also alleging defamation. Both lawsuits arose out of an email written by Varga about Bu ck’s performance as Police Chief for the Village

of Reminderville.2

{¶ 3} On April 25, 2012, Buck moved the trial court to consolidate the two cases, arguing that consolidation was necessary because the cases involved the same set of facts and discovery in the two cases had been consolidated. The trial court implicitly denied that motion when it issued its final judgment granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Buck appealed and presented one assignment of error for review.

II. Assignment of Error

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. {¶ 4} Buck argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Upon review of the record and briefs in this matte r, this Court asked the parties for further briefing pursuant to State v. Tate , 140 Ohio St.3d 442, 2014-Ohio-3667. Specifically, we questioned whether the trial court’s failure to consolidate the two related cases

was reversible error. {¶ 5} The parties have now responded. While bot h agree that consolidation is within

the trial court’s discre tion, they disagree as to whether an abuse of discretion occurred. Appellees contend that the trial court properly declined to consolidate the two cases because no risk of inconsistent adjudications exists. They reason that the two alleged acts of defamation occurred at different times and, therefore, are di stinct from one another. Buck, in contrast, contends that the motion should have been granted to avoid the risk of inco nsistent adjudications. According to Buck, the issues yet to be resolved in the first case are intertwined with the current

matter and should be determined as one. {¶ 6} Under Civ.R. 42, “when actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before a court, that court after a hearing may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all3

the matters in issue in the actions; it may order some or all of the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings th erein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” See, also, Loc.R. 16.01 of the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, General Division (requiring civil cases to be consolidated into the lowest case number after a

determination that consolidation is appropriate under Civ.R. 42). {¶ 7} In determining whether claims should be heard separately or together, various issues are considered, including judicial resources, expense to the parties, and the risk of inconsistent adjudications. See, e.g., Parkstone Capital Partners v. Solon , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99241, 2013-Ohio-3149, ¶ 14, citing Transcon Builders, Inc. v. Lorain , 49 Ohio App.2d 145, 150 (9th Dist.1976). See generally 9A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 2383, Consolidation—Discretion of Court (3d ed.); see also George, Parallel Litigation , 51 Baylor L. Rev. 769, 775-76 (1999) (discussing duplicative litigation). See also McCoid, II, Inconsistent Judgments , 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 487 (1991) (addressing the concerns involved with inconsistent adjudications as a result of parallel litigation.). Ge nerally, courts favor consolidation whenever possible. See Annotation, Propriety of Consolidation for Trial of Actions for Personal Injuries, Death, or Property Damages Arising out of Same Accident . 68 A.L.R.2d 1372 (1959). {¶ 8} Here, the issues and parties in the two cases overlap considerably, so much so that discovery had been consolidated. Given the de gree to which these cases are intertwined, we conclude that the failure to consolidate them created a significant risk of inconsistent adjudications. Accordingly, we hold that the tr ial court abused its discretion when it did not grant Buck’s April 25, 2012 motion to consolidate. This Court reverses the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of appellees and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.4

III. {¶ 9} The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the manda te, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof, this docum ent shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22 (C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellee.

DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT

WHITMORE, P. J. MOORE, J. CONCUR.5

APPEARANCES: KENNETH D. MYERS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. JOHN D. LATCHNEY, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.