COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Clements, Kelsey and Senior Judge Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

DONALD LEE CAISON, JR. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1405-07-4 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS 

 JULY 29, 2008 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Gaylord L. Finch, Jr., Judge 

 Dawn M. Butorac, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant. 

 Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. 

McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Donald Lee Caison, Jr., (appellant) was convicted in a jury trial of manslaughter, in 

violation of Code § 18.2-35. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in admitting into 

evidence a recording of a 911 call and in finding the evidence sufficient to support his 

conviction. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and appellant’s conviction. 

I. BACKGROUND 

“On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.” Zoretic v. Commonwealth, 

13 Va. App. 241, 242, 409 S.E.2d 832, 833 (1991) (citing Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 

Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975)). Viewed by that standard, the evidence demonstrates 

that around 2:00 a.m. on May 24, 2006, appellant met Katie McLachlan in front of her home at 

1103 Clarke Street in Herndon, Virginia. In his pocket, appellant carried an unopened 40-ounce 

beer bottle. As appellant and McLachlan walked toward her house, they encountered 

McLachlan’s roommate, Maria Gann, and her boyfriend, William Green. After McLachlan 
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introduced appellant to Green, Green punched appellant in the nose. Appellant then fled, and 

Green pursued him. McLachlan and Gann followed the two men. During the chase, appellant 

dropped the 40-ounce beer bottle on the street. Moments later, Green caught up to appellant and 

a struggle ensued between the men. At some point during the affray, appellant stabbed Green 

with a knife. Appellant immediately fled from the scene. 

After appellant fled, McLachlan and Gann carried Green, who appeared unconscious, 

back to the front yard of their residence. Within minutes, McLachlan called 911 and spoke to an 

operator employed by the Fairfax County Police. The dialogue between McLachlan and the 911 

operator, in relevant part, transpired as follows: 

911 OPERATOR: What’s the problem? 

CALLER: I don’t know. My friend was hit in the stomach 

with a beer bottle. 

* * * * * * * 

911 OPERATOR: Okay. How did it happen? 

CALLER: I don’t know. I don’t know. He was here, then 

one of my friends came and they just started fighting, and then he 

hit him with a beer bottle. 

911 OPERATOR: Okay. Ma’am. Ma’am, I cannot 

understand a word that you’re saying. You need to settle down 

and take the phone away from – like further away from your 

mouth; it’s mumbled. 

You said that he hit him with it? 

CALLER: Yes. 

911 OPERATOR: Okay. Is he bleeding? 

CALLER: Yes. 

911 OPERATOR: Is he conscious? 

CALLER: No. 

911 OPERATOR: Okay. Is he breathing? 
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CALLER: He’s breathing, yes. 

* * * * * * * 

911 OPERATOR: Okay. Where is the guy that cut him? 

CALLER: He ran. 

911 OPERATOR: Okay. What does he look like? 

CALLER: A tall black male, about 6 foot, 6 foot 1. 

911 OPERATOR: Does anybody know who he is? 

CALLER: Yes. He’s Donald Lee Caison. 

* * * * * * * 

911 OPERATOR: Okay. All right. What’s he wearing? 

CALLER: A black hoodie. 

911 OPERATOR: Say that— 

CALLER: A white tee-shirt. 

911 OPERATOR: I’m sorry—a black hoodie? 

CALLER: White tee-shirt. 

911 OPERATOR: And a white tee-shirt? 

CALLER: And black Dickies. 

* * * * * * * 

911 OPERATOR: Does he have any weapons on him still? 

CALLER: No, I don’t know. 

911 OPERATOR: And do you know which way he ran? 

CALLER: He ran towards Herndon Parkway. 

911 OPERATOR: How many minutes ago? 

CALLER: About five minutes ago. 
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911 OPERATOR: Okay. All right. You’re—okay, you’re 

outside there with your friends? 

CALLER: Yes. 

911 OPERATOR: Okay. Let me stay on the phone with 

you to make sure his condition doesn’t get worse, and I’ve got to 

get somebody to call Herndon. Okay? Hold on just one second. 

CALLER: Okay. 

* * * * * * * 

911 OPERATOR: Is he awake? 

CALLER: Yes. 

911 OPERATOR: Okay. Tell him—do you have a cloth 

or something you can hold on his stomach? You need to get a 

clean shirt or a clean towel and hold it on the bleeding. Okay? 

CALLER: Okay. 

Following the incident, Green died as a result of stab wounds inflicted with a knife during 

the altercation. Subsequently, a jury convicted appellant of manslaughter and this appeal 

followed. 

II. 911 CALL 

On appeal, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 911 

recording into evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. We disagree 

with appellant. 

“As a general rule, hearsay evidence is incompetent and inadmissible,” and “the party 

seeking to rely upon an exception to the hearsay rule has the burden of establishing 

admissibility.” Neal v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 416, 420-21, 425 S.E.2d 521, 524 (1992). 

“There is no fixed rule by which the question whether the statement is admissible as an 

excited utterance can be decided.” Clark v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 287, 292, 367 S.E.2d 483, 

486 (1988). “Resolution of the issue depends [upon] the circumstances of each case.” Id.
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“A statement comes within the excited utterance exception 

to the hearsay rule and is admissible to prove the truth of the 

matter stated, when the statement is spontaneous and impulsive, 

thus guaranteeing its reliability. . . . The statement must be 

prompted by a startling event and be made at such time and under 

such circumstances as to preclude the presumption that it was 

made as the result of deliberation. In addition, the declarant must 

have firsthand knowledge of the startling event. The decision 

whether the statement qualifies as an excited utterance lies within 

the discretion of the trial court.” 

Esser v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 520, 525, 566 S.E.2d 876, 879 (2002) (quoting Braxton v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 176, 184, 493 S.E.2d 688, 691 (1997)). 

Here, during rebuttal, the Commonwealth moved to admit into evidence the recording of 

McLachlan’s dialogue with the 911 operator. Out of the jury’s presence, the trial court heard the 

911 recording. In resolving that the recording qualified as an excited utterance, the trial court 

found McLachlan, a witness to the event, made “spontaneous” statements, under the influence of 

and contemporaneous with the “very startling event,” and without “any time for reflection” or 

“premeditation.” Appellant claims, nonetheless, that the call does not qualify as an excited 

utterance because McLachlan’s statements were made “in response to questions from the 911 

operator.” 

We addressed the same argument in Bowling v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 166, 403 

S.E.2d 375 (1991). In that case, the victim, who was mortally wounded from gunshot wounds to 

the stomach, called 911 about ten minutes after the shooting. Id. at 177, 403 S.E.2d at 381. 

During the exchange with the 911 operator, the victim disclosed that he was shot “with a .25 or 

.32” by “one black male” who “was running” and “headed to the Fort Cinema.” Id. at 175, 403 

S.E.2d at 380. Bowling argued, like appellant, that because the victim’s statements were made 

“in response to questions” by the 911 operator, they were not sufficiently spontaneous to be 

admitted under the excited utterance exception. Id. We rejected Bowling’s argument, noting as 

follows: 
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“To pivot the admissibility of a subsequent statement, 

however spontaneous, on the question[] of whether it was 

prompted by an equally spontaneous inquiry would serve no useful 

purpose. If the question or questioner suggested or influenced the 

response, then the declaration may lack the necessary reliability to 

be admitted.” 

Id. at 176, 403 S.E.2d at 380 (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 442, 358 

S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)). Concluding that the victim’s statements to the 911 operator “were not 

the result of premeditation, reflection or design, but a reaction to the startling events” which 

resulted in the victim’s death several hours later, we held the trial court properly admitted the 

911 recording pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 177, 403 

S.E.2d at 381. 

The same rationale applies here. McLachlan, who had just witnessed a violent 

confrontation, aided the victim who lay mortally wounded from the stabbings. McLachlan also 

faced the threat that the assailant would return to the scene to perpetrate further harm. 

McLachlan spoke to the 911 operator and described the incident and the assailant within minutes 

of the event. The operator responded to McLachlan’s initial report of the confrontation to 

quickly ascertain the gravity of peril McLachlan faced and by directing McLachlan to render aid 

to a dying man. Considering the reliability of the statements in accord with Bowling, we 

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McLachlan’s responses to the 

911 operator’s questions were not suggested or influenced by the questions posed by the 911 

operator. 

Thus, the fact that McLachlan was answering questions, rather than relaying a 

spontaneous narrative, does not indicate her statements were not excited utterances. See United 

States v. Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 766-67 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the fact that the witness’ 

statements to a 911 operator were responses to questions did not mean they were not 

“spontaneous, exited, and impulsive”). Compare Clark, 235 Va. at 293, 367 S.E.2d at 486 
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(holding that statements made by a gunshot victim as to his assailant’s identity, while the victim 

was mortally wounded and suffering from the trauma of the shooting, were admissible as excited 

utterances even though the statement was prompted by a question some five to ten minutes after 

the shooting), and Harris v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 424, 430, 382 S.E.2d 292, 295-96 

(1989) (holding that statements made by gunshot victim within ten minutes of the shooting while 

victim lay fatally wounded are admissible as excited utterances even though the victim made the 

statements in response to questions), and Martin, 4 Va. App. at 442, 358 S.E.2d at 418 (holding 

that statements made by child rape victim are admissible as excited utterances even though the 

victim made the statements in response to questions), with Goins v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 

285, 288, 237 S.E.2d 136, 138 (1977) (holding that a victim’s statement identifying assailant, 

made ten to fifteen minutes after police had interviewed the victim, when police led the victim to 

the police vehicle for the purpose of observing assailant, did not qualify as an excited utterance), 

and Nicholaou v. Harrington, 217 Va. 618, 622, 231 S.E.2d 318, 322 (1977) (holding that a 

statement made by a witness at least six or seven minutes after an automobile-motorcycle 

collision, when the investigating officer was questioning one of the parties to the accident, lacked 

the characteristics of a spontaneous utterance). Indeed, “it is possible for someone to be too 

excited to volunteer pertinent information . . . , and thus the inherent ‘guarantee of truthfulness’ 

supporting the admission of excited utterances applies equally to declarations made in response 

to an inquiry.” Joy, 192 F.3d at 767. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the 911 

recording into evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 

Appellant next contends the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment precluded 

admission of the 911 recording. Relying on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and its 

progeny, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), appellant claims that McLachlan’s 

statements were testimonial in nature and, therefore, inadmissible. We disagree. 
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Although we will not disturb on appeal decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence 

absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, Breeden v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 169, 184, 

596 S.E.2d 563, 570 (2004), we review de novo whether a particular category of proffered 

evidence is “testimonial hearsay,” Jasper v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 749, 755, 644 S.E.2d 

406, 409 (2007). 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution, a “procedural guarantee” that also 

“applies to state prosecutions,” Michels v. Commonwealth, 47 

Va. App. 461, 466, 624 S.E.2d 675, 678 (2006), provides that, “In 

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him,” U.S. Const. amend. 

VI. 

Id. at 753, 644 S.E.2d at 409. Recently, the United States Supreme Court considered the right of 

confrontation in Crawford, clarifying that “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . the Sixth 

Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for 

cross-examination.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. “Now, under Crawford, the question whether 

admission of a hearsay statement against a criminal defendant violates the Confrontation Clause 

turns on whether the statement is ‘testimonial’ in nature.” Magruder v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 

283, 294-95, 657 S.E.2d 113, 118 (2008). 

Subsequently, in Davis, the United States Supreme Court expounded on what Crawford

characterized as “testimonial” statements in the context of an interrogation during a 911 call. In 

doing so, the Court announced the primary purpose doctrine, as follows: 

Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 

interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 

primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance 

to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 

circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 

emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 

establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 

prosecution. 
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Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. Examining the call in question under this framework, the Court noted, as 

follows: 

(1) the caller was describing the events as they were happening; 

(2) the caller was facing an ongoing emergency; (3) the nature of 

what was asked and answered was necessary to resolve the present 

emergency rather than learn what happened in the past; and (4) the 

caller’s answers were frantic[, provided over the phone, in an 

environment that was not tranquil, or even (as far as any 

reasonable 911 operator could make out) safe]. 

United States v. Proctor, 505 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 827); see 

also United States v. Cadieux, 500 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2007). Because the caller was not 

testifying as a witness, but rather, was “enabl[ing] police assistance to meet an ongoing 

emergency,” the Court concluded the 911 call did not produce testimonial statements. Davis, 

547 U.S. at 828. 

Applying the primary purpose doctrine to the facts of this case, we conclude that 

McLachlan’s statements to the 911 operator were not testimonial in nature. Viewing the 

circumstances objectively, it is clear that McLachlan faced an ongoing emergency manifested by 

two sources of distress: Green’s life-threatening condition and the present and proximate danger 

that appellant, a potentially armed assailant who had stabbed Green and fled into the 

neighborhood, would return to the scene to injure Green, McLachlan, or Gann. 

McLachlan described the events as they were happening. She spoke of whether Green 

was conscious, bleeding, and breathing as the deteriorating condition was actually occurring. 

The operator responded to the trauma by directing McLachlan to apply pressure to the wounds 

with a clean towel to slow the bleeding and kept her on the phone “to make sure [Green’s] 

condition [did not] get worse.” Asked by the operator how Green was injured, who committed 

the stabbing, whether the perpetrator was armed, and where the perpetrator fled, McLachlan 

replied that appellant hit Green in the stomach with a beer bottle, she did not know if he was 
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armed, and he fled “towards Herndon Parkway.” In addition, the emergency was ongoing 

throughout the interrogation. The nature of what was asked and answered was necessary to 

enable the police to arrange for the arrival of the appropriate medical services to treat Green’s 

injuries and to warn police that appellant, a dangerous and potentially armed man, ran at-large in 

the neighborhood. Because McLachlan rendered aid to a dying man while facing the threat of 

appellant’s return to the scene, she was “in an environment that was neither tranquil nor safe.” 

Cadieux, 500 F.3d at 41 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 826-27). 

Appellant claims, however, that McLachlan’s statements were testimonial because the 

original emergency ended when the altercation between appellant and Green ceased. Thus, he 

argues, the call focused on a criminal investigation of a completed event evident from the 

operator’s questions as to “who was the cause of the wounds, where that person went and what 

he was wearing.” Appellant’s contention has no merit. 

In Proctor, a witness called 911 immediately following the crime, recounting that the 

defendant stole a gun, fired it twice, and fled into a nightclub with the loaded weapon. Proctor, 

505 F.3d at 371-72. The caller described the defendant and his criminal history as a convicted 

felon, reported that he was on drugs, and described his location. Id. On appeal, the defendant 

argued “the emergency had already passed, because he had run away with the weapon at the time 

of the 911 call and, therefore, the 911 conversation was testimonial.” Id. at 372. Rejecting the 

defendant’s claim, the court reasoned that his retreat into a nightclub “provided no assurances 

that he would not momentarily return” to confront the caller and other witness. Id. Moreover, as 

the court noted, the caller “could have reasonably feared that the people inside the nightclub 

were in danger.” Id. The court concluded that a “reasonable viewing” of the 911 call was that 

the caller and operator “were dealing with an ongoing emergency involving a dangerous felon, 

and that the 911 operator’s questions were related to the resolution of that emergency.” Id.
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The same conclusion is equally applicable in this case. The emergency had not ended 

and was not limited to rendering aid to Green. Rather, the emergency also involved a dangerous 

assailant who had just stabbed Green, was potentially armed, and fled into the surrounding 

neighborhood with no guarantee that he would not return and cause further harm to Green, 

McLachlan, Gann, or other residents of the neighborhood. McLachlan could have “reasonably 

feared” that she, Green, and Gann were in danger. In fact, the operator’s questions showed that 

she was trying to resolve the emergency by attempting to compose McLachlan, asking her to 

“settle down,” and then by seeking to understand the seriousness of the peril McLachlan faced. 

Here, as in Proctor, the operator’s effort to resolve the ongoing emergency by 

establishing the identity of the assailant, including his location and physical description, so that 

the officers might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon, did not render 

McLachlan’s responses testimonial. See also Cadieux, 500 F.3d at 41 (concluding that the caller 

responded to the dispatcher’s questions tailored to identify the location of the emergency, its 

nature, and the perpetrator, and the emergency did not end until the perpetrator was 

apprehended); United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 189 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the 

“exigency of the moment” had not ended even though the victim left the house where assailant 

remained, went around the corner, and called 911); United States v. Clemmons, 461 F.3d 1057, 

1060-61 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the gunshot victim’s statements made just after the 

shooting in response to the police officer’s questions as to who shot him were nontestimonial); 

United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the caller’s answers 

were nontestimonial even though made in response to the 911 operator’s questions as to “who 

had the gun” and where the victim lay injured). 

Appellant further contends that the “prejudice of the 911 call” to appellant “far 

outweighed any probative value.” Specifically, he claims that “the crying of Ms. Gann and 
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Ms. McLachlan” and the “moaning noises being made by Mr. Green in the background” had a 

prejudicial effect. We disagree with appellant. 

“In determining whether evidence should be admitted, the trial court must apply a 

balancing test in assessing the probative value of the evidence and its prejudicial effect.” 

Dandridge v. Marshall, 267 Va. 591, 596, 594 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2004). “This determination is 

left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on appeal only upon a showing 

of an abuse of discretion.” Lombard v. Rohrbaugh, 262 Va. 484, 492, 551 S.E.2d 349, 353 

(2001). 

In a sense, all “evidence tending to prove guilt is prejudicial”—at 

least from the point of view of the person standing trial. Virginia 

law, however, intervenes only when the alleged prejudice tends to 

inflame irrational emotions or leads to illegitimate inferences. And 

even then, it becomes a matter of degree. . . . We generally defer to 

trial judges on this subject because they, unlike us, participate first 

person in the evidentiary process and acquire competencies on the 

subject that we can rarely duplicate merely by reading briefs and 

transcripts. 

Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 757-58, 607 S.E.2d 738, 746 (citations omitted) 

(quoting Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 141, 590 S.E.2d 537, 558 (2004)), aff’d on 

reh’g en banc, 45 Va. App. 811, 613 S.E.2d 870 (2005). 

In this case, the trial court judge implicitly found no prejudice when he made a finding of 

fact that he “couldn’t hear Mr. Green say anything” on the 911 recording. “Principles of 

appellate review require that we affirm determinations of fact made by the trial court unless there 

is no support for such determinations in the record.” Commercial Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Hunt 

& Calderone, P.C., 261 Va. 38, 44, 540 S.E.2d 491, 494 (2001). Based on our review, we cannot 

conclude that this factual finding of the trial court is without support in the record. In addition, 

we cannot say that the crying of Ms. Gann and Ms. McLachlan, clearly a natural reaction to the 

violent stabbing of their friend, rendered the recording prejudicial. See Joseph v. 
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Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 85-86, 452 S.E.2d 862, 867 (1995) (concluding that a videotape 

was not inadmissible on its second playing merely because “the jury could hear the gunshot and 

the victim’s short scream”). Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion in finding no prejudice. 

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

Appellant asserts the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for voluntary 

manslaughter because he claims he acted in self-defense. We disagree. 

 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “‘we must discard 

the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the 

credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn 

therefrom.’” Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998) 

(quoting Cirios v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 292, 295, 373 S.E.2d 164, 165 (1988)). “In a jury 

trial, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded to their testimony are matters solely 

within the province of the jury.” Lynn v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 336, 351, 499 S.E.2d 1, 8 

(1998). “We will not disturb the conviction unless it is plainly wrong or unsupported by the 

evidence.” Banks v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 539, 545-46, 586 S.E.2d 876, 879 (2003). 

A defendant claiming self-defense “implicitly admits the killing was intentional.” 

McGhee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 560, 562, 248 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1978). “To justify the use 

of deadly force, the defendant must have reasonably feared death or serious bodily injury from 

his victim, and there must have been an overt threat.” Peeples v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 

626, 634, 519 S.E.2d 382, 386 (1999) (en banc). “[T]he amount of force used must be 

reasonable in relation to the harm threatened.” Diffendal v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 417, 

421, 382 S.E.2d 24, 26 (1989). Furthermore, an individual’s right to self-defend “begins where 

the necessity begins and ends where it ends.” Thomason v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 489, 498, 
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17 S.E.2d 374, 378 (1941). “Although undisputed facts may establish self-defense as a matter of 

law, whether the accused establishes that he or she acted in [self-defense] is generally a question 

of fact.” Lynn, 27 Va. App. at 353, 499 S.E.2d at 9 (citations omitted). 

At trial, appellant testified that Green introduced the knife into the altercation and 

wielded it in appellant’s direction. Appellant further claimed that he believed Green was going 

to stab him and stated that he pried the knife from Green’s hand. Appellant also admitted that he 

swung the knife at Green as Green continued to punch him. Gann testified that during the 

altercation, she saw nothing in Green’s hand. A forensic pathology expert testified that Green 

sustained three stab wounds to the chest and one stab wound to the back. 

Considering the evidence adduced at trial, the jury could have concluded that appellant 

lied during his testimony and could have found that he, in fact, introduced the knife into the 

affray and stabbed Green. Indeed, the jury was entitled to credit the Commonwealth’s evidence 

that Gann did not see Green with a knife. In the alternative, the jury could have found that Green 

originally had the knife but that appellant wrestled it from him and then stabbed Green. Upon 

either plausible explanation, the jury, acting within its fact finding discretion, could have found 

that the amount of force appellant used, as evidenced by the four stab wounds to Green, was not 

reasonable against Green, who either never possessed the knife, or no longer had the knife. 

Thus, the jury “resolv[ed] the conflicts and inconsistencies [therein] against [appellant] and 

[found] ultimately that the evidence constituted proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Lockhart v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 329, 343, 542 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2001). We hold, therefore, 

that the evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of voluntary manslaughter. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and appellant’s conviction. 

Affirmed.