NO. 96-102 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1996 

CATHERINE E. SATTERLEE, 

LUMBERMEN'S MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, i,// i j /,j ~~~~~~$~~ 

BUTTREY FOOD AND DRUG, 

Employer. 

APPEAL FROM: The Workers' Compensation Court, 

The Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Bernard J. "Ben" Everett; Knight, Dahood, 

McLean & Everett; Anaconda, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Thomas A. Marra; Marra, Wenz, Johnson 

& Hopkins; Great Falls, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: September 12, 1996 

Decided: December 10, 1996 
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Catherine E. Satterlee filed a petition in the Workers' 

Compensation Court for the State of Montana in which she alleged 

that she was totally disabled as a result of injuries sustained 

during the course of her employment at Buttrey Food and Drug at its 

Anaconda store, but that Buttrey's insurer, Lumbermen's Mutual 

Casualty Company, had wrongfully terminated her disability 

benefits. Lumbermen's admitted that Satterlee had been injured 

while working for Buttrey, but claimed that she had recovered from 

that injury a short time thereafter, and that any present 

disability is a result of unrelated mental and physical conditions. 

After consideration of evidence presented at trial and by 

deposition, the Workers' Compensation Court found that her 

disability was not a result of her work-related injury, and denied 

disability benefits. Satterlee appeals from that finding. We 

reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the Workers' 

Compensation Court. 

The claimant raises the following issues on appeal: 

1. Are the Workers' Compensation Court's findings supported 

by substantial credible evidence? 

2. Did the Workers' Compensation Court err when it denied 

Satterlee's requests for an award of attorney fees and the 

imposition of a twenty percent penalty in addition to her 

disability benefits? 

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Catherine Satterlee was born on September 30, 1934. On the 

date that her claim came before the Workers' Compensation Court for 

trial, she was sixty years old. She did not graduate from high 

school, but did receive her graduate equivalency degree. She has 

no other formal education. 

For fifteen years prior to the date of her work-related 

injury, Satterlee worked as a checker for Buttrey Food and Drug at 

its store in Anaconda. The evidence was, and the trial court 

found, that during that time Satterlee had developed degenerative 

arthritis in her cervical spine, but that she experienced no 

symptoms or disability from that condition. Until the date of her 

injury, she performed her duties, which included stocking shelves, 

dusting and cleaning floors, and checking out customers, without 

physical limitation. She missed no work due to her underlying 

cervical condition. 

In May 1990, Satterlee's adult son was killed in an automobile 

accident. As a result of that loss, she suffered severe depression 

and missed several months of work. However, following treatment 

for her condition, which was later diagnosed as post-traumatic 

stress disorder, she returned to work in 1991 and worked without 

any further loss of time until the date of her injury which is the 

subject of this appeal. 

On July 25, 1992, while waiting on a customer at Buttrey, 

Satterlee bent over and twisted her body in an attempt to rearrange 

a forty-five pound bag of dog food so that she could read the price 

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label. As a result of that effort, she experienced a pulling 

sensation in her left shoulder, followed by pain in that part of 

her body, as well as in her neck and down her left arm. She had 

experienced no similar pain at any time prior to that incident. 

She testified that since that incident she has had continuous pain 

in her left shoulder and neck. The Workers' Compensation Court 

found her to be a credible witness and did not question her 

testimony in that regard. 

Following her injury, Satterlee attempted to return to work on 

two consecutive days, but could not perform her duties, and has not 

worked in any capacity since July 28, 1992. 

Since her injury, Satterlee has been seen and treated or 

evaluated by numerous physicians. Her injury has been variously 

diagnosed as "left trapezius strain," "neck strain," and 

"degenerative disc disease and degenerative arthritis of the 

cervical spine." 

Satterlee was treated with medication and therapy for her 

cervical and shoulder pain. However, that treatment has been 

unsuccessful. 

Satterlee's pain is constant, it causes headaches, which are 

present most of the time, and her symptoms are worsened by 

activity. 

Due to her pain and discomfort, she is no longer capable of 

performing most of her household responsibilities. The majority of 

her waking hours are spent sitting in a recliner. 

4 
During 1993, while visiting her daughter in the state of 

Washington, Satterlee was examined by a physician who advised 

Lumbermen's that whatever soft tissue injury she had sustained at 

work should have healed within a six week period, and that any 

continuing disability was a result of her preexisting spinal 

disease. Following receipt of that correspondence, on February 23, 

1993, Lumbermen's terminated Satterlee's total disability benefits. 

During 1993, Satterlee's adult daughter died at the age of 33 

from cystic fibrosis after she was unable to obtain necessary organ 

transplants. During that same year, a foster daughter and her 

children died from a fire in their home, and Satterlee's sister was 

diagnosed with a terminal brain tumor. Satterlee's preexisting 

emotional condition worsened. After further psychiatric 

evaluation, she was against diagnosed with major depression and 

post-traumatic stress disorder. 

Satterlee applied for social security disability benefits, and 

was found vocationally disabled by the Social Security 

Administration on December 14, 1993. The SSA attributed her 

disability to both back pain and severe emotional trauma. 

It is, and has been, Lumbermen's position that any physical 

disability which resulted from Satterlee's work-related injury was 

temporary. Lumbermen's contends that she has fully recovered from 

any soft tissue injury and that, even though she experienced no 

symptoms from her underlying degenerative condition prior to that 

injury, any current pain or physical impairment that she currently 

5 
experiences is strictly a result of her preexisting degenerative 

condition. There was medical testimony to support that contention. 

Lumbermen's also contends that, to the extent Satterlee is 

disabled from gainful employment, the primary factor is not her 

physical impairment, but her emotional disorder which developed 

subsequent to her work-related injury, and that therefore, it is 

not responsible for any disability caused by that disorder. 

Satterlee has contended, and continues to assert on appeal, 

that she was free of pain prior to her injury, has been unable to 

function due to pain since her injury, and that the evidence does 

not support any finding other than that she is totally disabled due 

to her work-related injury. 

The Workers' Compensation Court did not completely accept 

either party's argument. Its findings, some of which are designated 

as "findings," some of which are included under "conclusions," and 

some of which are set forth in its order that denied Satterlee's 

post-trial motions, are summarized as follows: 

1. Satterlee was a credible witness. (Finding No. 7.) 

2. Satterlee was able to perform all of her job duties 

during the fifteen years prior to her injury, and testified that 

she suffered no neck or left shoulder pain prior to that date. 

Medical exams conducted after her injury showed that she suffered 

from preexisting cervical disc disease. However, that condition 

was asymptomatic prior to her injury. (Finding No. 8.) 

3. Although Satterlee's daughter died in the spring of 1993 

(Finding No. Zl), the internal medicine specialist from whom she 

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sought treatment for depression beginning on May 10, 1993, noted 

that that loss was only the latest in a series of personal losses, 

and that her son was killed in an automobile accident two years 

prior to her industrial injury. That loss also led to treatment 

for depression and insomnia. (Finding No. 22.) 

4. On December 14, 1993, the Social Security Administration 

concluded that Satterlee was totally disabled because of back pain 

and severe emotional trauma. (Findings No. 29 and 30.) 

5. When Satterlee testified that she had pain in her left 

shoulder, neck, and arm ever since 1992, the Court found her 

testimony credible. (Finding No. 33.) 

6. Based on the medical testimony, the court was persuaded 

that Satterlee's 1992 industrial injury aggravated a preexisting 

cervical disease and made her condition symptomatic, triggering 

pain and associated muscle spasm. (Finding No. 44.) 

7. Even though Satterlee suffers from shoulder and neck 

pain, her psychological condition amplifies her pain. (Finding 

No. 46.) 

8. If motivated, Satterlee could tolerate her pain and work 

on a regular basis in either of two positions identified by the 

insurer's vocational consultant. (Finding No. 49.) 

9. However, the court attributed Satterlee's lack of 

motivation to her depression and general mental condition, and 

found that, based on the combination of her circumstances, she 

would be unable to cope with her pain while working on a regular 

basis. (Finding No. 49.) The court was unpersuaded, however, that 
absent her personal losses, Satterlee would be unable to cope with 

her pain and work. (Finding No. 50.) 

10. The court agreed that at the time of trial Satterlee 

could not cope with her pain, and therefore return to work. 

However, the court was not persuaded that absent the psychological 

trauma associated with the death of her daughter and other close 

relatives, Satterlee's pain would preclude her from physically 

performing either of the two jobs which were medically approved by 

Dana Headapohl, M.D. The court did conclude that Satterlee had 

valid medical and psychological reasons for her inability to cope 

with pain, however, it further concluded that those reasons were 

attributable to subsequent unrelated events, and not to her 

industrial injury. (Conclusion of Law No. 12.) 

11. When the Workers' Compensation Court denied Satterlee's 

post-trial motions, it clarified that it did not find Satterlee's 

pain to be anything other than as she claimed, but believed that 

she truthfully reported her disabling pain. However, it stated 

that her underlying psychological condition is amplifying her pain, 

and that the losses which have led to her underlying psychological 

condition have occurred since her injury. The court recognized 

that pain which is amplified by a preexisting psychological 

condition is compensable, but in this case, concluded that the 

principle events which caused Satterlee's post-traumatic stress 

disorder occurred subsequent to her work-related injury. 
ISSUE 1 

Are the Workers' Compensation Court's findings supported by 

substantial credible evidence? 

We will uphold the Workers' Compensation Court's findings if 

they are supported by substantial credible evidence. Wunderlich v. 

Lumbermen’sMutualCas.Co. (1995), 270 Mont. 404, 408, 892 P.2d 563, 566. 

Following the entry of judgment for the defendant, Satterlee 

moved the Workers' Compensation Court to amend its findings based 

on her contention that they were not supported by substantial 

evidence. That motion was denied, and her appeal is from the 

denial of that motion. Lumbermen's has not cross-appealed, and 

therefore, we accept as true those findings which were favorable to 

Satterlee. Those findings were that, while Satterlee suffered from 

an underlying condition of degenerative disc disease prior to her 

work-related injury, she experienced no symptoms from that 

condition and was able to perform all of her job duties for fifteen 

years. Due to that injury, however, she aggravated the underlying 

degenerative disease in her neck, and has experienced continuous 

pain and muscle spasm since the date of her injury. The 

combination of her pain and her inability to deal with that pain 

due to her emotional condition, render her unable to work on a 

regular basis. However, absent her underlying emotional disorder, 

there are two jobs that Satterlee could perform. 

The Workers' Compensation Court correctly concluded that an 

employer takes its employee as it finds her, and that if her 

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disability is aggravated by an underlying physical or emotional 

condition, that the employer is liable for disability which results 

from that aggravation. Shumacher V. Empire Mfg. (197?), I?5 Mont. 411, 

413-14, 574 P.2d 987, 988. However, the critical finding, and the 

one on which the denial of Satterlee's benefits is based, was the 

court's finding that her emotional condition resulted from events 

which occurred subsequent to her work-related injury, and that that 

condition did not preexist her injury. We must, therefore, 

determine whether that finding is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

In the record, there are only three sources of information 

which relate to the onset of Satterlee's post-traumatic stress 

disorder. They include the claimant's own testimony at the time of 

trial, the medical records of Martin D. Cheatle, Ph.D., and the 

medical records of Kenneth C. Olson, M.D. 

When asked during trial, Satterlee stated that she believed 

her post-traumatic stress symptoms developed in May 1990 when her 

son was killed. She stated that she was out of work and involved 

in treatment for that condition for eight months after her son's 

death, but had been able to return to work following that period of 

treatment until this injury occurred. 

Dr. Cheatle was the psychologist who evaluated Satterlee for 

the St. Patrick Hospital Medical Panel to which she was referred 

for evaluation. His records indicate that, although her 

psychological condition declined after the death of her daughter, 

the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder was first made 

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following the death of her son in 1990, and that her treatment by 

psychotherapy first began following that incident. 

It was Dr. Cheatle's opinion that Satterlee's persistent 

cervical and left shoulder pain, and her ability to deal with that 

pain, were complicated by post-traumatic stress disorder and 

depression. However, he does not, at any point in his report, 

distinguish between the post-traumatic stress disorder that 

resulted from the death of her son and any worsening of that 

condition which occurred following the death of her daughter. 

Dr. Kenneth C. Olson is a psychiatrist to whom Satterlee was 

referred for evaluation in August 1993 by Dr. Michael Sadaj, her 

attending physician. His report to Dr. Sadaj indicates that the 

onset of Satterlee's emotional problems began following the death 

of her son in 1990, and that the emotional trauma was so severe 

that she lost her memory for a period of eight months. His report 

indicates that during his interview of her she cried and expressed 

anger when discussing the loss of her son. Similar emotional 

reactions are not related to any other event. He diagnosed major 

depression with unresolved pathological grief and post-traumatic 

stress disorder. Nowhere in his report does he relate those 

emotional conditions to events that occurred after Satterlee's 

work-related injury. Any inference that can be drawn from his 

report suggests that the primary factor related to those mental 

disorders is the death of her son, which occurred prior to her 

work-related injury. 

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There is no other evidence which suggests a cause for 

Satterlee's emotional disorder, other than the evidence set forth 

above. Therefore, we conclude that there was not substantial 

evidence to support the Workers' Compensation Court's finding that 

Satterlee's depression or post-traumatic stress disorder was caused 

by events which occurred subsequent to her work-related injury. 

We have previously held that: 

[I]t is well established that an employer takes his 

employee subject to the employee's physical and, 

logically, emotional condition at the time of his 

employment. Birnie \I. U.S. Gypsum Co., 134 Mont. 39, 328 P.2d 

13 3 ( 19 5 8 ) ; Peilz v. Industrial Accident Board, 12 7 Mont . 3 16 , 2 6 4 

P.2d 709 (1953). An employee who suffers from a 

pre-existing condition is entitled to compensation if the 

condition was aggravated by an industrial injury. Rumsey 

v. Cardinal Petroleum, 16 6 Mont. 17, 530 P.2d 433 (1975); Weakley 

11. Cook, 126 Mont. 332, 249 P.2d 926 (1952). 

Shumacher , 175 Mont. at 413-14, 574 P.2d at 988 

The Workers' Compensation Court correctly recognized this rule 

of law when, during trial, it stated: 

Sounds like we've got the principle that you take the 

worker as you find them, so if they are suffering from an 

underlying psychological condition and they've got pain 

that's triggered, even though that pain continues to be 

-- they continue to feel more severe pain than they would 

without the psychological condition, this sounds like a 

multi-factorial thing. You ' ve got some of the 

psychological condition arising before, some after, with 

the psychological condition probably amplifying the pain. 

It logically follows that if Satterlee's work-related injury 

in 1992 aggravated an underlying condition of degenerative 

arthritis or disc disease, and she experiences pain from that 

aggravation, which is made worse by physical activity, and which 

she cannot cope with due to a preexisting emotional condition, such 

12 
as depression or post-traumatic stress disorder, her employer is 

liable for the disability which results from that combination of 

physical and emotional conditions. In this case, the Workers' 

Compensation Court found and concluded that Satterlee was not a 

candidate for regular employment due to the combination of her 

physical and emotional impairment. 

Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Workers' 

Compensation Court to the extent that it denied Satterlee's claim 

for total disability benefits, and remand this case to that court 

for entry of judgment in favor of the claimant, Catherine 

Satterlee. 

ISSUE 2 

Did the Workers' Compensation Court err when it denied 

Satterlee's requests for an award of attorney fees and the 

imposition of a twenty percent penalty in addition to her 

disability benefits? 

Satterlee also contends that Lumbermen's termination of her 

total disability benefits was unreasonable and, therefore, that she 

is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to 5 39-71-611, 

MCA (1991), and the imposition of a twenty percent penalty pursuant 

to 5 39-71-2907(l), MCA (1991). Based on its conclusion that 

Lumbermen's was correct when it terminated her disability benefits, 

the Workers' Compensation Court held that the insurer had not acted 

unreasonably. 

Although we reverse that part of the Workers' Compensation 

Court's judgment which denied disability benefits to Satterlee, we 

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conclude that there was substantial evidence upon which the court 

could have found that the insurer did not act unreasonably when it 

terminated her benefits. Specifically, correspondence from 

Alvin J. Harris, M.D., dated February 1, 1993, created an issue 

with regard to the cause of her continuing physical complaints. We 

conclude that it was not unreasonable as a matter of law for the 

insurer to rely on that information as the basis for its 

termination of benefits. Therefore, the Workers' Compensation 

Court's denial of attorney fees and a twenty percent penalty is 

affirmed. 

This case is remanded to the Workers' Compensation Court for 

entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. 

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