IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

DIANA N. HUFFMAN, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:16-CV-446 

 ) 

DENIS DRAGHICI and ) 

OLERO, INC., ) 

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on Motion for Remand, filed 

by the plaintiff, Diana N. Huffman, on November 15, 2016. (DE 

#10.) For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Remand is 

GRANTED, and this case is REMANDED back to the Lake Superior Court 

of Indiana. 

BACKGROUND 

 On October 6, 2015, the plaintiff, Diana N. Huffman 

(“Plaintiff”) filed her Complaint for Damages and Jury Demand 

(“Complaint”) against the defendants, Denis Draghici and Olero, 

Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), in the Lake Superior Court of 

Indiana. (DE #6.) The case was assigned cause number 45D04-1510-
2

CT-00193. (Id.) Plaintiff’s negligence claims arise from a 

vehicle collision on May 9, 2015. (Id.) The Complaint alleges 

that Plaintiff “sustained injuries, some of which may be permanent, 

incurred medical expenses and was otherwise damaged.” (Id.) 

Defendants filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff’s 

Complaint for Damages (“Answer”) with the Lake Superior Court on 

December 9, 2015. (DE #9.) On October 17, 2016, Defendants filed 

a Notice of Removal premised on diversity jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(a).1 (DE #1.) In it, Defendants state that the 

action was removable pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 

1441(a) because Plaintiff issued a Qualified Settlement Offer 

Pursuant to I.C. § 34-50-1-1 et. seq. (“Settlement Offer”) to 

Defendants on September 23, 2016, offering to settle the case for 

$375,000. (Id.; see also DE #1-3.) 

 On November 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for 

Remand, arguing that the Notice of Removal was untimely because it 

was filed more than one year after the filing of the Complaint. 

(DE #10.) Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Motion 

for Remand arguing that Plaintiff acted in bad faith by failing to 

disclose the amount in controversy, which prevented Defendants 

                                                            

1 It is undisputed that Defendants are citizens of Illinois and Plaintiff is 

a citizen of Indiana. 
3

from removing the action sooner. (DE #14.) On November 28, 2016, 

Plaintiff filed her reply, pointing out that the Settlement Offer 

was sent prior to the expiration of the one year limitation. (DE 

#15.) The motion is ripe for adjudication. 

DISCUSSION 

 A civil case brought in state court may be removed to federal 

court as long as the district court has original jurisdiction and 

the notice of removal is timely. See Boyd v. Phoenix Funding 

Corp., 366 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 

1446). Defendants who wish to remove a civil action from state 

court to federal court must file a “notice of removal signed 

pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 

containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal 

. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The basic requirements for removal 

are as follows: 

The notice of removal of a civil action or 

proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after 

the receipt by the defendant, through service 

or otherwise, of a copy of the initial 

pleading setting forth the claim for relief 

upon which such action or proceeding is based, 

or within 30 days after the service of summons 

upon the defendant if such initial pleading 

has then been filed in court and is not 

required to be served on the defendant, 

whichever period is shorter. 
4

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). However, if the initial complaint does 

not provide an immediate basis for removal, a notice of removal 

may be filed within 30 days of service of a pleading, motion, 

order, or “other paper”2 from which it can first be ascertained 

that the action is removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). That said, 

a case may not be removed under section 1446(b)(3) on the basis of 

diversity jurisdiction more than one year after the commencement 

of the action unless it can be shown that the plaintiff acted in 

bad faith to prevent removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1). “If the 

notice of removal is filed more than 1 year after commencement of 

the action and the district court finds that the plaintiff 

deliberately failed to disclose the actual amount in controversy 

to prevent removal, that finding shall be deemed bad faith under 

paragraph (1).” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3)(B). 

A party who believes removal was improper may file a motion 

to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1447, and unless the defect 

relates to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the motion 

must be made within thirty days of the filing of the notice of 

                                                            

2 When a complaint fails to specify the amount in controversy, discovery 

responses or other information in the state court record related to the 

amount in controversy is considered an “other paper.” See 28 U.S.C. § 

1446(c)(3)(A). 

 
5

removal.3 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In any event, “[t]he party seeking 

removal bears the burden of proving the propriety of removal; 

doubts regarding removal are resolved in favor of the plaintiff’s 

choice of forum in state court.” Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 

668 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Centers, 

Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Chase v. Shop 

‘N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1997) 

(a party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must support her 

jurisdictional allegations with “competent proof”). 

 Here, in addition to the relevant background information 

described above, the following additional facts are undisputed:4 

On April 27, 2016, approximately seven months after the Complaint 

was filed in the Lake County Superior Court, Defendants’ attorney, 

Bruce D. Jones (“Attorney Jones”), sent a letter to Plaintiff’s 

counsel to express an interest in early resolution of the matter 

and to request a mutual extension of time with respect to written 

discovery. In response, on or about June 6, 2016, Plaintiff’s 

                                                            

3 It is undisputed that the instant Motion for Remand was filed within 

thirty days of the Notice of Removal. 

4 The Court has borrowed liberally from Defendants’ response brief for this 

section of the facts. (DE #14, pp. 3-5.) The Court notes that Defendants do 

not provide competent documentary evidence for most of these assertions. 

However, because Plaintiff agrees with Defendants’ recitation of the facts 

related to early discovery and settlement discussions (see DE #15, p. 1), and 

because these facts are not dispositive of the issue, the Court assumes they 

are true for purposes of the instant motion. 
6

counsel indicated that Plaintiff was also interested in early 

resolution and that Plaintiff would further evaluate the matter. 

On or about June 29, 2016, Attorney Jones sent a follow-up email 

to Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the status of this case. On 

August 25, 2016, Attorney Jones filed an unopposed motion to 

continue the discovery deadlines in this case with the Lake County 

Superior Court. On September 28, 2016, after receiving Plaintiff’s 

Settlement Offer with a demand of $375,000, Attorney Jones 

requested some preliminary information and documentation regarding 

Plaintiff’s alleged injuries and alleged special damages, as 

Plaintiff had not yet responded to Defendants’ Interrogatories and 

Requests for Production. On or about October 3, 2016, Plaintiff’s 

counsel responded via email stating that Plaintiff would extend 

the Settlement Offer deadline until after written discovery had 

been exchanged and defense counsel had an opportunity to depose 

Plaintiff. Defendants filed their Notice of Removal on October 

17, 2016, after receipt of this correspondence. 

 Based on the foregoing, Defendants argue that, because 

Plaintiff failed to disclose the amount of her alleged damages 

prior to her Settlement Offer, she acted in bad faith to prevent 

removal, so the Motion for Remand should be denied. Plaintiff 

replies by arguing that there is no indication of bad faith because 
7

the Settlement Offer was provided to Defendants before October 6, 

2016, the one year anniversary of the date the Complaint was filed. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. It is undisputed that 

Plaintiff tendered her Settlement Offer, which indicates a desire 

to settle the case for $375,000, to Defendants by September 23, 

2016. Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff dragged her heels 

in submitting specific discovery responses and documentation 

related to her alleged injuries and special damages, Defendants 

were on sufficient notice that the amount in controversy exceeded 

the amount required to establish diversity jurisdiction via 

section 1446(b) prior to the expiration of the one year deadline 

referenced in section 1446(c)(1). Although both parties proceed 

upon the assumption that the “commencement of the action” was 

October 6, 2015, the record indicates otherwise. Federal courts 

must look to applicable state law to determine when a suit is 

commenced. See e.g. Schorsch v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 417 F.3d 

748, 750 (7th Cir. 2005). In Indiana, a civil suit is commenced 

“when the initiating party files the original and necessary copies 

of the complaint, the prescribed filing fee, and the original and 

necessary copies of the summons.” Holmes v. Celadon Trucking 

Services of Indiana, Inc., 936 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (Ind. App. 2010) 

(citing Indiana Trial Rule 3). Evidence that the required summons 
8

documents were sent to the clerk via certified or registered mail 

is sufficient to show that “filing” was complete. Id. (citing 

Indiana Trial Rule 5(F)). Although neither party addresses this 

issue in detail, a review of the state court docket shows that, at 

the latest, the suit was commenced by October 15, 2015. See Diana 

N. Huffman v. Denis Draghici and Olero, Inc., Cause No. 45D04-

1510-CT-00193 (Complaint filed October 6, 2015; $100 filing fee 

paid on October 15, 2015; additional state and county fees paid on 

October 15, 2015; summons issued to Defendants via certified mail 

on October 15, 2015). Either way, whether October 6th or October 

15th is credited for commencement purposes, by the time Defendants 

filed their Notice of Removal on October 17, 2016, it was too late. 

Defendants offer no explanation for the delay between the date of 

the Settlement Offer and the date of the filing of the Notice of 

Removal. In reality, it matters little what the reason was. 

Removal more than one year after the commencement of the suit is 

only proper under section 1446(c) if the Court finds that Plaintiff 

acted in bad faith to prevent removal. Despite Defendants’ 

assertion that Plaintiff did so by failing to disclose the amount 

in controversy in a timely manner, there is absolutely no evidence 

of bad faith in the record. Defendants argue that Attorney Jones 

“attempted to inquire as to removability through their numerous 
9

correspondence regarding early resolution of this case.” However, 

even crediting Defendants’ recitation of the facts as outlined 

above,5 the Court finds nothing untoward in the sequence of events; 

rather, the timeline suggests nothing more than typical discovery 

extensions and early settlement communications. Defendants do not 

present evidence that they specifically asked Plaintiff about the 

amount in controversy or about removal, nor have they shown that 

Plaintiff declined to furnish them with that information upon 

request. According to Defendants, the extensions of the discovery 

deadlines were mutual, and there is no indication that Plaintiff 

missed any court ordered deadlines. Had Defendants provided 

evidence to the contrary, the Court might be more willing to credit 

their argument that Plaintiff acted in bad faith by deliberately 

failing to disclose the actual amount in controversy in order to 

prevent removal. As it stands, however, the fact that Plaintiff 

did disclose her Settlement Offer in advance of the one year 

deadline cuts heavily against any argument of bad faith advanced 

by Defendants. If Plaintiff had truly wanted to prevent removal, 

she could have waited until the deadline had passed altogether 

and/or provided Defendants with misleading information to downplay 

                                                            

5 Again, the Court notes that Defendants do not cite to documentary evidence 

to support their argument. 
10

the amount in controversy. She did neither of those things. There 

is simply no reasonable basis upon which to make a finding of bad 

faith in this case. As such, Defendants have failed to show by 

competent evidence that the Notice of Removal, which was filed 

more than one year after the commencement of the action, was 

proper. See Morris, 718 F.3d at 668; Schur, 577 F.3d at 758–59; 

see also Chase, 110 F.3d at 427. Accordingly, the Court finds 

that remand is appropriate. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Remand (DE 

#10) is GRANTED, and this case is REMANDED back to the Lake 

Superior Court of Indiana. 

DATED: September 28, 2017 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court