UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

COREY TREUNAS GREEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:16-cv-127

)

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1 )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on petition for judicial review of the decision of the 

Commissioner filed by the plaintiff, Corey Treunas Green, on April 14, 2016. For the following 

reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

Background

The plaintiff, Corey Treunas Green, filed an application for Supplemental Security 

Income on November 19, 2014, alleging a disability onset date of November 23, 2013. (Tr. 14). 

The Disability Determination Bureau denied Green’s application on January 27, 2015, and again 

upon reconsideration on March 10, 2015. (Tr. 14). Green subsequently filed a timely request for 

a hearing on March 16, 2015. (Tr. 14). A video hearing was held on October 16, 2015, before 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) William E. Sampson, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable 

decision on January 21, 2016. (Tr. 14-26). Vocational Expert (VE) Sarah Gibson, Medical 

Expert (ME) Charles D. Auvenshine, and Green testified at the hearing. (Tr. 14). The Appeals 

 1 Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy A. Berryhill should be substituted for Acting Commissioner Carolyn W. 

Colvin as the defendant in this suit. No further action needs to be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last 

sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
2

Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 

1-4). 

At step one of the five step sequential analysis for determining whether an individual is 

disabled, the ALJ found that Green had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

November 19, 2014, the application date. (Tr. 16). At step two, the ALJ determined that Green 

had the following severe impairments: schizoaffective disorder, depressive disorder, learning 

disability, NOS, and history of substance abuse disorder in partial remission. (Tr. 16). At step 

three, the ALJ concluded that Green did not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 16). 

Specifically, the ALJ determined that Green did not meet Listing 12.05 C, Intellectual Disability, 

because there was no evidence in the record to support that the onset of Green’s impairment 

began before the age of 22, as required. (Tr. 17). 

The ALJ found that Green’s mental impairments did not meet or medically equal listings 

12.02, 12.03, and 12.04. (Tr. 17). In finding that Green did not meet the above listings, the ALJ 

considered the paragraph B criteria for mental impairments, which required at least two of the 

following:

marked restriction of activities of daily living; marked difficulties in 

maintaining social functioning; marked difficulties in maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of 

decompensation, each of extended duration.

(Tr. 17). The ALJ defined a marked limitation as more than moderate but less than extreme and 

repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration, as three episodes within one 

year or once every four months with each episode lasting at least two weeks. (Tr. 17). 

The ALJ determined that Green had mild restrictions in activities of daily living. (Tr. 

17). Green testified that he lived with his mother, sister, and his sister’s infant daughter. (Tr. 
3

17). He indicated that he wore the same clothes daily and that he fed himself every other day. 

(Tr. 17). However, Green reported that he could prepare sandwiches and simple meals for 

himself. (Tr. 17). Green’s mother contradicted his report that he could not perform household 

chores. (Tr. 17). She indicated that Green would start household chores but that he was unable 

to finish the tasks. (Tr. 17). Also, she reported that Green would leave the house two to three 

times a week. (Tr. 17). Green reported that his interests included talking to himself, while his 

mother indicated that he could watch television all day. (Tr. 17). Green also testified that he 

read headlines on Facebook and that he used Twitter. (Tr. 17). 

The ALJ found that Green had mild difficulties in social functioning. (Tr. 18). Green 

reported that he stayed home daily. (Tr. 18). However, the ALJ noted that Green’s self-report 

and his mother’s report indicated that he went outside the home at least two to three times a 

week. (Tr. 18). Green reported that he felt like people were trying to harm him when he was

around them and that he did not have any social skills. (Tr. 18). However, Green testified that 

he had worked as a part-time cashier at Dollar General and as a package handler for FedEx. (Tr. 

18). Further, Green reported at the psychological consultative examination that he drank and 

smoked with friends during the day and that he would return home the next day or a few days 

later. (Tr. 18). 

The ALJ concluded that Green had moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or 

pace. (Tr. 18). Green reported that he could not comprehend most things, which he indicated 

affected his ability to talk, hear, see, understand, follow instructions, complete tasks, concentrate, 

and remember things. (Tr. 18). However, the ALJ indicated that Green had obtained a GED.

(Tr. 18). Further, the ALJ indicated that Green had participated in psychiatric treatment in 

November of 2014. (Tr. 18). Also, Green was able to pay attention to work-related tasks while 
4

employed at Dollar General and FedEx. (Tr. 18). The ALJ indicated that Green was attentive 

during the hearing and that he responded to questions without a need for redirection. (Tr. 18). 

The ALJ found that Green had not experienced any extended episodes of 

decompensation. (Tr. 18). Because Green did not have two marked limitations or one marked 

limitation and repeated episodes of decompensation, the ALJ determined that Green did not 

satisfy the paragraph B criteria. (Tr. 18). Additionally, the ALJ found that Green did not satisfy 

the paragraph C criteria. (Tr. 18). 

The ALJ then assessed Green’s residual functional capacity (RFC) as follows:

the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of 

work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations 

the claimant is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks; he can have 

occasional interaction with coworkers, and supervisors, but no interaction 

with the public; he can have no production pace work. 

(Tr. 19). The ALJ explained that in considering Green’s symptoms he followed a two-step 

process. (Tr. 19). First, he determined whether there was an underlying medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment that was shown by a medically acceptable clinical or laboratory 

diagnostic technique that reasonably could be expected to produce Green’s pain or other 

symptoms. (Tr. 19). Then, he evaluated the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the 

symptoms to determine the extent to which they limited Green’s functioning. (Tr. 20).

Green has alleged symptoms that are consistent with schizoaffective disorder, depressive 

disorder, learning disability, NOS, and history of a substance abuse disorder in partial remission. 

(Tr. 20). He reported that he heard voices every day and that the voices told him to harm himself 

and others. (Tr. 20). Green also reported that he was depressed to the point that he was unable 

to do anything during the day. (Tr. 20). He indicated that he was unable to perform household 

chores or personal care activities without the assistance of his mother and his sister. (Tr. 20). 
5

The ALJ found that Green’s impairments could cause his alleged symptoms, but he did not find 

Green credible regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms. (Tr. 

20). 

At Green’s psychological consultative examination in March of 2014, he reported that he 

was filing for disability based upon a learning disorder, anger, bad hygiene, depression, and 

hearing voices. (Tr. 20). He indicated that he had been depressed for a year since being fired 

from his job. (Tr. 20). Later, Green claimed that he had been depressed since he dropped out of 

high school his junior year. (Tr. 20). Green indicated that he heard voices when he drank 

heavily and smoked marijuana. (Tr. 20). He reported that he began smoking marijuana in the 8th

grade. (Tr. 20). Green indicated that he had smoked marijuana prior to attending the 

consultative examination. (Tr. 20). He also indicated that he began drinking heavily at the age 

of 16. (Tr. 20). Green reported that when he partied he used Ecstasy, Mali, Xanax, and Codeine 

mixed with beer. (Tr. 20).

The findings at the clinical interview indicated that Green had poor personal hygiene and

his cooperation was variable, but that he displayed fair social skills and etiquette. (Tr. 21). 

Green also had good eye contact and his speech was intact. (Tr. 21). There were no delusions or 

hallucinations observed. (Tr. 21). Green reported that he smoked marijuana daily. (Tr. 21).

Also, he reported that he smoked a large sum of marijuana the night before the examination and 

that he had used Ecstasy, Xanax, and Codeine to the point that he passed out. (Tr. 21). 

During his mental status examination, Green displayed poor immediate memory and poor 

recent memory. (Tr. 21). He was unable to recall three words after five minutes and failed the 

serial seven exercise. (Tr. 21). However, the ALJ noted that he was oriented to time, person, 

and place, and that his speech was relevant, coherent, and goal-oriented. (Tr. 21). Green was 
6

diagnosed with cannabis dependence, alcohol dependence, and a learning disability NOS. (Tr. 

21). The examiners noted that Green arrived at the examination carrying a bag of marijuana and 

shoes. (Tr. 21). The examiners concluded that his visual and auditory hallucinations were 

induced by heavy drinking and substance abuse. (Tr. 21). Green was assessed to have a global 

assessment of functioning (GAF) score of 59, which reflected moderate difficulties in social, 

occupational, or school functioning. (Tr. 21).

In November of 2014, Green was admitted to the emergency room at Methodist Hospital

Northlake for feeling suicidal. (Tr. 21). He indicated that he heard voices that told him to kill 

himself and to harm others. (Tr. 21). At the hospital, Green denied using alcohol or drugs, and 

reported that he never had used alcohol or drugs. (Tr. 21). Green exhibited disordered thought 

content, but he had normal new learning ability, recent memory, and remote memory. (Tr. 21-

22). Methodist Hospital Northlake admitted Green for further evaluation. (Tr. 22).

Green underwent a psychiatric evaluation and was diagnosed with chronic paranoid 

schizophrenia with an acute exacerbation. (Tr. 22). At the evaluation, Green displayed fair 

hygiene and grooming. (Tr. 22). The ALJ noted that he had a poor attention span, displayed 

little eye contact, and his affect was guarded. (Tr. 22). Green was reported as having delusional 

thinking with paranoid ideation, but suicidal or homicidal ideations were not present. (Tr. 22). 

Green was assessed with a GAF of over 20, which reflected serious impairment in 

communication and judgment. (Tr. 22). 

A week after Green was admitted to the hospital, Dr. Mohammad Butt, M.D. diagnosed 

Green with major depression with psychotic features and schizoaffective disorder, depressive 

type. (Tr. 22). The ALJ noted that Green’s GAF score had risen to 50, reflecting someone with 

serious difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. (Tr. 22). Green had benefited 
7

from the group and unit activity while at the hospital, and it was determined that he was stable 

enough to be discharged back to the community. (Tr. 22). At discharge, his prognosis was fair 

to guarded. (Tr. 22). 

In December of 2014, Green underwent counseling and was diagnosed with a 

schizoaffective disorder. (Tr. 22). At the mental status examination, Green was reported as 

having normal appearance, mood, and affect. (Tr. 22). Also, his cognition, memory, and 

concentration were normal, and he did not display any hallucinations or delusions. (Tr. 22). 

Green reported that he was compliant with his medications and that he was not experiencing side 

effects. (Tr. 22). The ALJ noted that Green canceled his next two appointments. (Tr. 22). 

In January of 2015, Green reported at the psychological consultative examination that he 

had been stressed and depressed since his father’s death in October of 2014. (Tr. 22). He 

indicated that he was seeing a counselor at Edgewater once a month and receiving medication 

management from Dr. Butt. (Tr. 22). Green reported that he had daily suicidal thoughts and that 

he heard voices on a daily basis. (Tr. 22). He claimed that his medications were not effective. 

(Tr. 22). 

Dr. Roger Parks, PsyD, performed a mental status examination and found that Green was 

capable of comprehending and remembering simple instructions, but that he had difficulty with 

concentration. (Tr. 23). Dr. Parks diagnosed Green with major depressive disorder with 

psychotic features. (Tr. 23). In October of 2015, Dr. Candice Anderson, M.D. completed a 

physical assessment of Green and diagnosed him with depression. (Tr. 23). She found that 

Green’s depression would cause him to have extreme functional limitations in a competitive 

work environment. (Tr. 23). However, the ALJ indicated that he gave no weight to her opinion 

because diagnosing Green with depression was outside her professional purview as a primary 
8

care physician. (Tr. 23). Also, the ALJ indicated that Green had seen her only once prior to the 

hearing and that those records were not submitted as medical evidence. (Tr. 23).

Dr. Auvenshine (ME) testified that Green’s impairments equaled listings 12.03, 

Schizophrenia, and 12.04, Affective Disorders. (Tr. 23). The ALJ indicated that he gave no 

weight to Dr. Auvenshine’s opinion. (Tr. 23). The ALJ discredited Dr. Auvenshine’s testimony 

because when questioned about Green’s substantial history of substance abuse, Dr. Auvenshine 

indicated that he believed Green’s testimony that he was sober from all substances. (Tr. 23). 

Also, the ALJ indicated that he questioned the scrutiny of Dr. Auvenshine’s review of the entire 

medical record based on his responses during the questioning at the hearing. (Tr. 23). The ALJ 

concluded that Dr. Auvenshine had not thoroughly reviewed the consultative examination report 

from March of 2014. (Tr. 23).

The ALJ found that Green was not fully credible. (Tr. 24). Green testified that he never 

had engaged in nor had any problems with smoking, alcohol, or illicit drugs. (Tr. 24). However, 

his testimony was contrary to what he reported at the consultative examination and his testimony 

at the hearing that he had stopped using marijuana a year prior to the hearing. (Tr. 24). Also, the

ALJ found that his allegation of not being able to do anything during the day was not supported 

by his statement that he would go out with his friends to party. (Tr. 24). The ALJ noted that at 

the hearing Green repeatedly mentioned his disability but that he had an unwillingness to 

describe his symptoms. (Tr. 24). Further, the ALJ noted that Green had canceled counseling 

appointments. (Tr. 24). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Green’s allegations were less than 

fully credible. (Tr. 24).

The ALJ granted great weight to the opinions of the consultative examiners because their 

opinions were based on standardized tests, personal observations, and face-to-face examinations. 
9

(Tr. 24). The ALJ granted some weight to the State agency psychological consultants, Drs.

Benetta Johnson and Joelle Larson, who opined that Green could understand, remember, and 

carry out simple tasks, could relate at least on a superficial basis, and could manage unskilled 

tasks. (Tr. 24). Also, Drs. Johnson and Larson reviewed the medical evidence and determined 

that Green did not satisfy the paragraph B and C criteria of the listings. (Tr. 24). The ALJ 

granted some weight to Green’s mother’s opinion because she observed his daily living

activities. (Tr. 24).

At step four, the ALJ found that Green had no past relevant work. (Tr. 25). Considering 

Green’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded that there were jobs in 

the national economy that he could perform, including hand packer (4,000 jobs statewide and 

5,000,000 nationwide), sorter (1,500 jobs statewide and 200,000 nationwide), and salvage 

laborer (2,000 statewide and 90,000 nationwide). (Tr. 25). 

Discussion

The standard for judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act is limited to a determination of whether those findings are 

supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of 

Social Security, as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”); 

Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120–21 (7th Cir. 2014); Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1097 

(7th Cir. 2013) (“We will uphold the Commissioner’s final decision if the ALJ applied the 

correct legal standards and supported his decision with substantial evidence.”). Courts have 

defined substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to 

support such a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 

L. Ed. 2d 852 (1972) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 
10

217, 83 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1938)); see Bates, 736 F.3d at 1098. A court must affirm an ALJ’s 

decision if the ALJ supported his findings with substantial evidence and if there have been no 

errors of law. Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). However, 

“the decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate discussion of the issues.” 

Lopez ex rel Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003).

Supplemental insurance benefits are available only to those individuals who can establish 

“disability” under the terms of the Social Security Act. The claimant must show that he is unable 

“to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical 

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

The Social Security regulations enumerate the five-step sequential evaluation to be followed 

when determining whether a claimant has met the burden of establishing disability. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920. The ALJ first considers whether the claimant is presently employed or “engaged in 

substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If he is, the claimant is not disabled and 

the evaluation process is over. If he is not, the ALJ next addresses whether the claimant has a 

severe impairment or combination of impairments that “significantly limits . . . physical or 

mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c); see Williams v. Colvin, 757 

F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing that the ALJ must consider the combined effects of the 

claimant’s impairments). Third, the ALJ determines whether that severe impairment meets any 

of the impairments listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 401, pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. If it 

does, then the impairment is acknowledged by the Commissioner to be conclusively disabling. 

However, if the impairment does not so limit the claimant’s remaining capabilities, the ALJ 

reviews the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” and the physical and mental demands of his
11

past work. If, at this fourth step, the claimant can perform his past relevant work, he will be 

found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). However, if the claimant shows that his 

impairment is so severe that he is unable to engage in his past relevant work, then the burden of 

proof shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant, in light of his age, education, job 

experience, and functional capacity to work, is capable of performing other work and that such 

work exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f).

Green has argued that the ALJ failed at Step three to properly evaluate listings 12.03 and 

12.04. At step three, “in considering whether a claimant's condition meets or equals a listed 

impairment, an ALJ must discuss the listing by name and offer more than a perfunctory analysis 

of the listing.” Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding the ALJ's 

“two sentence consideration of the Listing of Impairments was inadequate and warrants 

remand”). For a claimant to show that he met a listed impairment, he is required to demonstrate

that his impairment met each required criterion. Maggard v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 

1999). A condition that met only some of the required medical criteria, “no matter how 

severely,” cannot qualify as meeting a listing. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530, 110 S. Ct. 

885, 107 L. Ed. 2d 967 (1990). 

In this case, the ALJ specifically considered 12.02 (neurocognitive disorders), 12.03 

(schizophrenic, paranoid, and other psychotic disorders), and 12.04 (depressive, bipolar, and 

related disorders). Listings 12.03 and 12.04 are part of the CFR's broader Listing for mental 

disorders. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Each of these listings consists of paragraph A 

criteria (a set of medical findings), paragraph B criteria (a set of impairment-related functional 

limitations), and paragraph C criteria (additional functional criteria). 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1. To satisfy any of these three listings, a claimant must show that his 
12

impairment satisfies “the diagnostic description in the introductory paragraph and the criteria of 

both paragraphs A and B (or A and C, when appropriate) of the listed impairment.” 

20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.

Paragraph B sets forth the impairment-related functional limitations that are incompatible 

with the ability to do any gainful activity. The claimant’s functional limitations are assessed by 

using the four criteria set forth in paragraph B of the listings: activities of daily living; social 

functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520a(c)(3). Each functional limitation must be evaluated to determine the severity, taking 

into consideration “all relevant and available clinical signs and laboratory findings, the effects of 

the symptoms, and how the claimant’s functioning may be affected by factors including, but not 

limited to, chronic mental disorders, structured settings, medication, and other treatment.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(1). To satisfy the paragraph B criteria of Listing 12.03 or 12.04, the 

claimant must establish “marked” limitations in two of the first three areas, or “marked” 

limitations in one of these areas in addition to “repeated” episodes of decompensation of 

extended duration. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.

The ALJ discussed Green’s functional areas and determined that he had mild restrictions

in daily living, mild difficulties in social functioning, and moderate difficulties in concentration, 

persistence, or pace. (Tr. 18). Further, the ALJ found that Green had not experienced episodes

of decompensation, which had been of extended duration. (Tr. 18). The ALJ concluded that 

because Green’s mental impairments did not cause at least two marked limitations or one marked 

limitation and repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration, paragraph B was 

not satisfied. (Tr. 18). Also, the ALJ determined that Green did not satisfy paragraph C criteria 

for listings 12.03 and 12.04. (Tr. 18-19). 
13

The ALJ assigned some weight to the State agency psychological consultants who 

concluded that Green had mild restrictions in activities of daily living, mild limitations in 

maintaining social functioning, and moderate limitations in maintaining concentration, 

persistence, or pace, and no episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. (Tr. 24). 

The consultants also did not find evidence that Green’s mental impairments satisfied the 

paragraph C criteria. (Tr. 24). Therefore, the ALJ discussed listings 12.03 and 12.04 by name 

and offered more than a perfunctory analysis, as required. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668–69.

However, Green has argued that the ALJ’s analysis at Step three was inadequate because 

the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Dr. Auvenshine’s (ME) testimony. In determining whether a 

claimant is disabled, the ALJ “will always consider the medical opinions in the case record 

together with the rest of the relevant evidence ... received.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b).2 And, the 

ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion received. 20 C.F.R. § 405.1527(c). This includes the 

opinions of non-examining sources such as state agency medical and psychological consultants,

as well as outside medical experts consulted by the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 405.1527(e)(2). The Code 

of Federal Regulations expressly permits an ALJ to employ a medical expert to review the 

evidence and render an opinion as to the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments and 

whether those impairments met or equaled any listings when making a disability determination. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

The ALJ is responsible for deciding whether a listing is met or equaled. SSR 96–6p.

Whether a claimant's condition equals a listed impairment is “strictly a medical determination” 

and “the focus must be on medical evidence.” Florence v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3724806, at *9 

 2 The Social Security Administration recently adopted regulations that change the standards applicable to the 

review of medical opinion evidence for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 

416.920c. Because the plaintiff’s claim was filed before that date, those regulations do not apply here.
14

(S.D. Ind. 2013) (citing Hickman v. Apfel, 187 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 1999)). “[L]ongstanding 

policy requires that the judgment of a physician ... designated by the Commissioner on the issue 

of equivalence ... must be received into the record as expert opinion evidence and given 

appropriate weight.” SSR 96–6p. The ALJ may not ignore these opinions and must explain the 

weight given to these opinions in his decision. SSR 96-6p. The better an explanation a source 

provides for an opinion, the more weight the ALJ should give that opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(d)(3). However, an ALJ may give less weight to the conclusions of medical sources to 

the extent they are inconsistent with other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). If an ALJ 

does so, he must “provide a sound explanation for rejecting” the medical source's opinion. 

Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Dr. Auvenshine testified that Green met listings 12.03 and 12.04, singly and in 

combination. The ALJ indicated that he granted no weight to Dr. Auvenshine’s opinion because 

when questioned about the March 2014 consultative examination, which indicated that Green 

had a substantial history of substance abuse, he testified that “he took Green at his word” that he 

was sober from all substances. (Tr. 23). Dr. Auvenshine found that although the medical 

evidence initially showed substance abuse, the abuse did not affect whether Green met or 

equaled a listing because subsequent medical evidence showed sparse, if any, substance use or 

full denial of substance abuse. (Tr. 50-51). 

However, the Commissioner contends that Green’s evidence of treatment the year prior 

to the hearing was limited. The treatment record included a hospitalization in November of 2014 

and one therapy session. In November of 2014, the Methodist Hospital Northlake reported that 

the possible causes of Green’s medical complaint included but were not limited to schizophrenia 

v. major depression with psychiatric features v. borderline personality disorder v. drug abuse v. 
15

metabolic disturbance v. infectious process v. neoplasm of the brain. (Tr. 252). The ALJ also 

concluded that based on Dr. Auvenshine’s responses to questioning at the hearing it appeared 

that he had not thoroughly reviewed the medical record, specifically the 2014 consultative 

examination report. (Tr. 23). 

The ALJ need only “minimally articulate his reasons for crediting or rejecting evidence 

of disability.” Scivally v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1995). Under this standard, 

the ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence, but “the ALJ may not ignore an entire line of 

evidence that is contrary to the ruling.” Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009). If 

the ALJ rejects relevant and uncontradicted evidence, he must explain his reasons for doing so. 

Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1985). Remand is appropriate at Step 3 only 

when “the Commissioner's decision lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to 

prevent meaningful review.” Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002). The ALJ 

considered Dr. Auvenshine’s testimony, and therefore he did not ignore any line of evidence. 

Further, he articulated his reasoning for not assigning weight to Dr. Auvenshine’s opinion.

The Commissioner contends it was proper for the ALJ to question the medical expert’s 

opinion on Green’s substance abuse given that Dr. Auvenshine’s justification was that he took 

Green at his word that he was not using drugs. The bottom line is that an ALJ can reject a 

medical opinion if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record so long as he 

explains his reasons for doing so. Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2011). The 

record contained objective medical evidence that Green had a history of substantial substance 

abuse issues. Further, Dr. Auvenshine’s opinion was not consistent with other evidence in the 

record, including the State agency psychological consultants’ opinions. Therefore, the ALJ’s 
16

decision to reject Dr. Auvenshine’s finding that Green met listing 12.03 and 12.04 was supported

by substantial evidence.

Moreover, the Commissioner contends that Dr. Auvenshine’s testimony did not explain 

how Green satisfied the requirements of the listings, specifically that Green satisfied paragraph B 

of the listings. These are not reasons that appeared in the ALJ's opinion, and thus they cannot be 

used here. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87–88, 63 S. Ct. 454, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1943). 

However, Green had the burden of proof at step 3 that he met the listing requirements. Ribaudo 

v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2006).

Next, Green has argued that the ALJ erred in discounting the opinion of treating 

physician, Dr. Anderson. Thus, the RFC was unsupported by substantial evidence. A treating 

source’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight if the “opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and 

severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in 

the record. 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1527(c)(2); see Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 

2013); Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2011); Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 

842 (7th Cir. 2007). The ALJ must “minimally articulate his reasons for crediting or rejecting 

evidence of disability.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Scivally v. 

Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1992)); see 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1527(c)(2) (“We will 

always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your 

treating source’s opinion.”).

However, Dr. Anderson did not qualify as a treating physician. At the hearing, Green 

testified that he had just been assigned to Dr. Anderson and that he had seen her only once. (Tr. 

39). A non-treating source means a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source 
17

who has examined the claimant but does not have, or did not have, an ongoing treatment 

relationship with him. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. Given Green’s testimony, Dr. Anderson and 

Green had not establish an ongoing treatment relationship. Therefore, as a non-treating source, 

the ALJ was not required to assign controlling weight to Dr. Anderson’s opinion. See White v. 

Barnhart, 415 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that a doctor that examined claimant once 

fits the definition of a non-treating source and the ALJ is not required to assign controlling to 

weight to the opinion). A medical source's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight if it does 

not provide a longitudinal view, “the very reasons the Social Security regulations set out for 

giving substantial weight to a treating physician's opinion are absent.” Scheck v. Barnhart, 357

F.3d 697, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2004).

The ALJ indicated that he granted Dr. Anderson’s opinion no weight because her treating 

records were not submitted as medical evidence. Further, the ALJ indicated that Dr. Anderson 

was a primary care physician, therefore, her diagnosis of depression was outside her professional 

purview. Green contends that both reasons are erroneous. 

Green has argued that it was the ALJ’s duty to obtain Dr. Anderson’s treatment records. 

However, the Commissioner contends that it was Green’s duty to bring to the ALJ's attention 

everything that showed that he was disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). This means that Green 

needed to supply medical and other evidence that the ALJ may have used to reach conclusions 

about his medical impairment and its effect on his ability to work on a sustained basis. Scheck v. 

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 702 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(c). ("You must 

provide medical evidence showing that you have an impairment and how severe it is during the 

time you say that you were disabled."); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146, n.5, 96 L. Ed. 2d 
18

119, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987) ("It is not unreasonable to require the claimant, who is in a better 

position to provide information about his own medical condition, to do so.").

Although a claimant has the burden to prove disability, the ALJ has a duty to develop a 

full and fair record. Thompson v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 1991). The Seventh 

Circuit has held that the ALJ has not failed to adequately develop the record where the claimant 

does not show he was prejudiced by a lack of development. Martin v. Astrue, 345 Fed. Appx.

197, 202 (7th Cir. 2009). “An omission is significant only if it is prejudicial” and the plaintiff 

cites “specific, relevant facts—such as medical evidence—that the ALJ did not consider.” 

Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2009). Courts “generally respect the ALJ's 

reasoned judgment” with respect to how much evidence to gather. Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 

687, 692 (7th Cir. 1994). Therefore, as long as the ALJ has enough evidence before him to make 

a disability determination that is supported by substantial evidence, the record has been 

adequately developed. Thomas v. Barnhart, 54 Fed. Appx. 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2003). An ALJ is 

entitled to presume that a claimant represented by counsel in the administrative hearings has 

made his best case. Sears v. Bowen, 840 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Glenn v. 

Secretary of Health and Human Services, 814 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1987)).

Green has not shown that the ALJ’s failure to obtain Dr. Anderson’s treatment records 

prejudiced him. To reiterate, under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a) it was Green’s duty to bring to the 

ALJ's attention everything that showed that he was disabled. The ALJ’s failure to obtain Dr.

Anderson’s treatment notes was not a significant omission that was prejudicial. Further, the ALJ 

indicated that Dr. Anderson was a primary care physician, therefore her diagnosis of depression 

was not within her professional purview. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5) (“We generally give 

more weight to the opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to her area of specialty 
19

than to the opinion of a source who is not a specialist.”). The ALJ considered Dr. Anderson’s

medical specialty and her expertise, along with any supporting evidence in the record and

considered the consistency of the evidence with the record as a whole. Therefore, the ALJ 

properly evaluated Dr. Anderson’s opinion.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

ENTERED this 26th day of September, 2017.

/s/ Andrew P. Rodovich

United States Magistrate Judge