### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT NASHVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 19, 200 6

TER RY M. OD OM V . S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt of Davidson County No 2003-C- 1884 Mark F ishb urn, Jud ge

No. M2005- 02564-CCA -R3-P C - F iled October 12, 2006

Pe tit ion e r, Te rry

M. Od om, wa s in dic te d on thr e e c ou nts of a g g ra va te d s e xua l batte ry . Pu rs ua nt t o a plea ag ree ment, peti t i o n er pled g uiltyto one count and r ece ived an e ight- y ear sentenc e at 100% while the two re maining c ounts were dismiss ed. Petitioner filed a pe tition for post-conviction relief

an d af t er the appointment of c ounsel filed an a mended pe tition. Following an e videntiary hearing on Aug ust 3, 2005, the trial court de nied the petition. On appe al, petitioner cl aims the trial court

err ed in denying r elief. U pon revie w, we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d

J.S. D ANI EL , S R .J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON , P.J ., and A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., joined.

Ry an C. Caldwell, Nashville, Te nnessee , Attorney for the Petitioner, Te rry

M. Odom.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tt orn ey Gen e ra l a ndRe po rt e r; L e sli e E. Pr ic e , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, Vi c tor S. J oh ns on , Dis tr ic t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Ka thy Mo ra nte , A ssi sta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; for Appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.



### OPIN ION

BACK GR OUND

Pe tit ion e r, Te rry

M. Od om, wa s ind ic te d b y the Da vid so n Co un ty

g ra ndjury

on thr e e c ou nts of a g g ra va te d s e xua l batte ry in v iol a tio n o f T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -5 04 . D ue to a conf lict with the P ublic Def

ender ’s Office, J im McNamar a wa s appointed to repr esent pe titioner

o n t h e o ri gi n al ch ar ges

. Ac co rd i n g t o t es t i m o n y p re s en t ed at a po s t -c o n v i ct i o n ev i d en t i ar y h ea ri n g,

c ou ns e l me t w ith pe tit ion e r o n f ive or six occasi on s. Ea c h me e tin g la ste d a pp ro xima te ly

thi rt y to2

forty -five minutes.

During pre- trial prepa

rations, counse l learne d that petitioner cla ime d h e wa s bipolar and

sc hizo ph re nic a nd wa s takin g a t le a st thr e e ty pe s of me dic a tio n re la te d to the se me nta l c on dit ion s. As a result, counsel filed a motion for a mental eva luation, including c laims of mental def ects a nd/or
ment al re tarda tion. However , following the orde red e x aminations, the results indicated pe titioner

was c ompetent to stand trial and ha d no mental condition defe nse.

B a se d o n d isc us sio ns wi th c ou ns e l a bo ut the of

fe ns e s a ndpo ssi ble ra ng e s o f p un ish me nt, petitioner dec ided to acc ept a plea ag ree ment wher eby

he would ente r a ple a of g uiltyto Count One of the indictment (a g g ravated sexual battery ) and r ece ive an e ight- y ear sentenc e. The plea a g ree ment also provided that the two r emaining counts would be dismissed.

On M arc h 25, 2004, the petitioner e x ecute d a written petition to enter plea of g uilty . The
p et i t i o n i n cl u d ed t h e r i gh t s af fo rd ed p et i t i o n er , h i s u n d er s t an d i n g o f t h e i n d i ct ed o ff en s es an d ra n ge of punishment (and fine) for the offenses. P ursuant to this petition, petitioner ente red a g uiltyplea to ag g ravat ed s ex u al battery and re ceive d the eig ht-y ear sentenc e at 100 pe rce nt as rec ommended in the ple a

a g re e me nt.

On Marc h 10, 2005, petitioner caused to be filed a pro s e petition for post-conviction re lief. I n h is p e tit ion , pe tit ion e r cl a ime d his g uil ty ple a wa s not kno wi ng a nd vo lun tary du e in l arg e pa

rt to the ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel.

At the post-conviction evide ntiary hearing, the petitioner testified that he met with appointed

c ou ns e l on fi ve or

six oc c a sio ns bu t r are ly

ha d th e op po rtun ity

to d isc us s th e fa c ts o f the c a se wi th counsel. Petitioner stated tha t he neve r re ceive d a copy of the indictment or di s co v ery and that counsel did not discuss the re lative streng ths and wea knesses of the case . He sa id counsel also fa iled to reque st any type of pre- trial hearing to c halleng e the State’s evidenc e throug h suppression or other motions.

Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t w he n h e wa s sixtee n- y e ars old he wa s dia g no se d as bip ola r, pa ra no id

sc hizo ph re nic a nd me nta lly re tard e d. He sa id that at the tim e of takin g the ple a he wa s o n H a ldo l, Depa kote, Risperdal, Cog entin, and Te g retol. Petitioner said that even though he did not know the

e ff e c ts o f the se me dic a tio ns , he wa s no t in his ri g ht fr a me of min d a t th e tim e of

the ple a . H e sa id he wa s suffering f

rom dizz y

spells and was nauseous.

When asked if he was for ced or threa tened to plead g uilty
, petitioner responded t hat hi s father

a n d s t e p

- m o t h e r t o l d h i mi f h e d i d n o tt a k e t h e p l e a s o m e t h i n g w o u l d h ap p e n t o h i m

. F i n a l l y, petitioner said he a sked counse l to file for a bond reduc tion but that counsel failed to do so.

On cross-examination, petitioner t estified that he was on two medications at the t ime of the evidentiary

hearing but wa s suffering f rom no dizz y spells. He stated he could not rec all whether the trial court a sked him about his me ntal condition at the time of the plea. Petitioner a cknowledg ed that h e f a c e d th r e e c o u n ts o f

a g g r a v a te d s e xu a l b a tt e r y w ith a p o s s ib le p u n is h me n t o f

e ig h t t o twelve3

y ear s for e ach. H e further c oncede d he re ceive d the m inimum sentenc e within the ra ng e as pa rt of the plea a nd that at a se parate sentenc ing he aring he proba bly would have g otten more time.

At the conc lusion of petitioner’s direc t and cr oss examinati o n s , th e tr ia l c o u r t a s ked petitioner if he re called the colloquy that occur

red be tween the court and petitioner at the taking of the plea. The court asked petitioner about eac h question asked during the plea he aring . Petitioner responde d that he did not rec all any

of these que stions asked by the court.

Petitioner’s trial counse l testified that he se rved a s appointed trial counse l for petitioner a nd ha d b e e n p r a c t i c i n g l a w s i n c e 1 9 9 6

. H e a g r e e d w i t h p e t i t i o n e r t h a t t h e y m e t f i v e o r s i x time s to discuss the case with eac h meeting lasting be tween thirty and forty -five minutes e ach. H e noted that

one mee ting wa s a bit longe r than the othe rs.
When counsel and pe titioner beg anto d isc uss the defe nse, counse l sought to use a diminis hed
capa city defe nse or a

defe nse of menta l defe ct. To that end, he assembled a ll of petitioner’s re cords and obtained a

court- o rder ed eva luation. Pursuant to this order , the petitioner wa s evalua ted for mental illness relating to his competency to stand trial or for a possible insa nity defe nse. Petitioner

was a lso ex amined by a mental reta rdation specia list. Howe ver, the evalua tion revea led petitioner

was c ompete n t a n d h a d n o b a s is f o r a n in s a n it y o r d im in is h e d c ap a c it y d e f e n s e

. Co u n s e l s a id he discussed the re sults with t he petitioner.

Trial counse l testified that he advise d petitioner of his right to a jury trial. He a lso discussed the plea offe r. Had petitioner told him he did not want to ac cept the ple a off er, c ounsel would have

move d f o r a tria l. A s to th e g u il ty p le a , c o u n s e l r e it e r a te d h is b e li e f th a t p e ti ti o n e r u n d e r s tood the plea of fer and that he w as plea ding g uilty

.

O nc r o s s

- e xa

m i n at i o n, c ou ns e l sa id h e re c a lle d d isc us sin g pe tit ion e r’ s me dic a tio ns wi th h im. He r eca lled an episode during the re prese ntation during which petitioner se emed unor g anized and had diffic ulty

communicating . Ba sed on counse l’s experience with petitioner, the medication aided in their communication.

DI SCU SSIO N

Pe tit ion e r c la ims the t

ri a l c ou rt e rr e d in de ny ing po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f. On app e a l, h is primary arg ument is that his guilty plea wa s not knowi n g an d v o l u ntary due in part to ineffec tive counsel. As discusse d below, we find no merit in this contention.

Burden of Proof

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-30-103 (2003) pr ovides that in order for a petitioner
t o o b t a i n p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f
, t h e p e t i t i o n e r m u s t s h o w t h a t h i s o r h e r c o n v i c t i o n o r s e n te nc e is void or voidable beca

use of the abridg ement of a constitutional rig ht. The petitioner be ars the bur den of proving the fac tual alleg ations in the Petition for Post-Convi ction Relief by clea r and c onvincing4

e vid e nc e . T e nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 30 -1 10 (f ) (2 00 3) . Evi de nc e is cl e ar an d c on vin c ing wh e n th e re is no serious or substantial doubt about the a ccur acy of the conclusion dra wn from the e vidence . Hicks v. State, 983 S.W .2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) . On appe al i t is the burden of the pe titioner to show that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the lower c ourt’s finding s. C l en n y v . State, 576 S.W .2d 12, 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)

. When a petitioner see ks post- co n v iction relief on the basis of ineff ective a ssistance of

co u n s el
, h e m u s t fi rs t es t ab l i s h t h at t h e se rv i ce s re n d er ed o r t h e ad v i ce gi v en we re b el o w t h e "r an ge of compe tence dema n d ed o f attorney s in criminal case s." B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . Second, he must show that t h e def iciencie s "a ctually

had an a dverse eff

ect on the de fe ns e ." Str ic kla nd v. Was hin g ton , 46 6 U. S. 66 8, 69 3 (1 98 4)

. Sho uldthe pe tit ion e r f a il t o e sta bli sh either f actor , he is not entitled to relief.

I n the pr e se nt c a se , pe tit ion e r’ s c la im that his g uil ty ple a wa s n ot kno wi ng a ndvo lun tary is tie d c los e ly to his c la im tha t cou ns e l wa s ine ff e c tiv e . Be c a us e the thr

us t of his c la im r e la te s to his g uiltyplea, the Court f

inds it useful to analy ze the claim base d on the following standard.

Stan dard of Revie w
Appellate r eview of

a trial c ourt’s dete rmination of whethe r a petitioner has enter ed a ple a knowing ly

and voluntarily

is under a de novo standard of revie w consistent with the standards se t forth in Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Procedur e 13(d). As suc h, the trial court’s finding s of fa ct on the under ly ing c laim are revie wed upon a de novo standard acc ompanied with the pre sumption t hat those fi n d i n gs ar e correc t unless a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e is otherwise . Fields v. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 456 (Tenn. 2001) . Howeve r, a tri al court’s c onclusions of law a re r eviewe d under a
pu re ly de no vo sta nd ardwi th n o p re su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss g ive n to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion s. I d. at 457.

A d e fe nd a nt w ho e nte rs a ple a of g uil ty sim ult a ne ou sly wa ive s se ve ra l c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts including his privileg es ag ainst compulsory self-inc rimination, his rig ht to trial by jury and his rig ht to confront his ac cuser s. For this wa iver to be valid under due pr ocess, it must be " an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privil eg e." J ohnson v. Z erbst, 304 U. S . 458, 464 (1938). Conseque ntly , if a defe ndant’s g uilty plea is not e qually voluntary

and knowing , it has been obtain ed i n v i olation of due proc ess and is there fore void. Moreover , beca use a g uiltyplea is an admission of all the eleme nts of a formal criminal cha rg e, it cannot be truly

voluntary

unless the de fe nd a nt p os se sse s a n u nd e rs ta nd ing of la w i n re la tio n to the fa c ts. B oy kin v. Al aba ma , 3 95 U. S. 238, 244 (1968).

I n order to find that a plea

was e ntere d "intentionally " or "know ingly ," Boy kin r equire s that the trial court "c anvas the matter with the ac cused to make sure he has a f ull understanding of wha t the plea c onnotes and of its c onsequenc es." I d. at 244. Our Supreme Court has adopted the principles

e n u n c i a t e d i n t h e B o yk i n a n a l ys i s i n d e t e r m i n i n g v o l u n t ar y a n d i n t e n t i o n a l p l e a s o f g u i l t y. Bla nkenship v. State, 858 S.W .2d 897, 903 (Tenn. 1993)

.5

Petitioner claims counsel wa s ineffe ctive, and the ref ore, his plea

was not knowing ly

and

vo lun tari ly

e nte re d. Ho we ve r, wi thi n th is a rg ume nt, pe tit ion e r a dd iti on a lly c la ims the e ntry

of his plea wa s flawe d due to the influenc e of various medications and due to threa ts from his father and stepmother.

First, petitioner dire cts his attack on tria l counsel’s pe rformance

. Petitioner claimed, a mong other thing s, that counsel failed t o adequately meet with him, failed to a dvise him of his right to a jury trial, failed to pr ovide copies of the indictment and discovery , and fa iled to advise him of the

re la t i v e s t r e n g t h s a n d w e ak n e s s e s o f t h e c a s e

. H o w e v e r , v i e w i n g t h e r e c o r d a s a w h o l e , th e se

c on te nti on s a

re wi tho ut m e ri t.

B othpe tit ion e r and c ou ns e l ag re e d th a t th e y me t f ive or six tim e s p ri or

to e ntry of the g uil ty p le a

. F r o m th e b e g in n in g , c o u n s e l kn e w o f p e ti ti o n e r ’ s me n ta l c o n d it io n a n d h a d h o p e d to c ap it a li ze

on it. I n f a c t, h e so ug ht a ndob ta ine d a c ou rt or de r f or a n ev a luatio n not onl y fo r c omp e te nc e bu t a lso

a s to me nta l r e tard a tio n. On ly whe n the re su lts re ve a le d n o c omp e te nc e or me nta l r e tard a tio n d id counsel turn to thoug hts of a plea offe r or a lternative strateg y

. The indictment alleg ed sexual contac t by petitioner and a

two-y ear -old child. Petitioner g ave

a statement in w hich he said he did not masturbate at the time he touched the child but did so late r while thinking of

it. The ca se also involved the pr oposed testimony of a state witness who was the eleve n-y ear -old brother

of the victim. Acc ording to the discovery , the brother walked in on the petitioner touching the victim. Counsel noted the d i fficulty and nec essity

of cr oss-examining the minor witness.

Ev e n th ough pe tit ion e r m a de va ri ou s g e ne ra l c la ims a g a ins t tria l c ou ns e l a ndhis
pe rf or ma nc e , n on e ro se to th e leve l of ine ff e c tiv e c ou ns e l c on te mpl a te d b y Str ic kla nd . M os t i m p o rt antly , nothing in counse l’s perf ormanc e indicate s petitioner’s plea was involuntary

or unknowing beca

use of some f

ailure on the part of c ounsel. Be cause this Court finds no evidence of a def icient per formanc e, it is unnece ssary to addre ss Strickland’s prejudice prong

.

Ne xt, pe tit ion e r c la ims he wa s u nd e r the inf lue nc e of va

ri ou s med ic a tio ns a t th e tim e of his plea a nd there fore the re sulting plea was not knowing and voluntary . Petitioner testified that he wa s taking four or

five medic ations at the time of his plea. He also said he was suffe ring dizz y spells and

was nauseous on t he day of the plea . Counsel acknowle dg ed the medic ations taken by petitioner but did not see a ma

rked diff ere nce on the day

of the plea . Trial counse l t es t i fi ed that he had see n the eff ects on pe titioner when he had not taken his medic ation.

During the plea c olloquy , the trial court specifica lly inquired into the use of any medication. The petitioner informe d the court of his mental condition diag noses and of his medication. Howe ver, he re sp on de d th a t th e y

didno t a ff

e c t hi s a bil ity to e ng a g e in the ple a

dis c us si on wi th the c ou rt

. Pe tit ion e r fu rthe r re sp on de d tha t he wa s not und e r the inf lue nc e of a ny int oxic a nt. Pe tit ion e r’ s c la im that the medication rend er ed h i s plea involuntary and unknowing is simpl y unsupported by

the evidenc e.6

I n h is n e xt ba sis , p e tit ion e r ma int a ins he wa s thr e a te ne d or co e rc e d in to e nte ri ng the g uil ty ple a . H e te sti fi e d th a t hi s fa the r an d ste pmo the r tol d him some thi ng wo uld ha pp e n to him if

he did
not ac ce p t t h e o ff

er. No specific threa ts were ever adduce d at the hea

ring . The c laim was not develope d with further

testimony . Wit hout some type of evide nce to support suc h a cla im, this Court has no ability

to addre ss its m erits.

F ina lly , e ve n tho ug h pe tit ion e r ra ise d va ri ou s oth e r g e ne ra l c la ims
, he ha s fa ile d to e sta bli sh their existence by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Ac cording ly , we find that the trial court’s denial of post-convic tion relief must be a ffirme d.

J

. S

. Da n i el
, S en i o r J u d ge