T.C. Memo. 1996-535

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

JACQUELINE SABLE, a.k.a. JACQUELINE SABAL, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 18478-96. Filed December 4, 1996.

Jacqueline Sable, pro se.

Alison W. Lehr, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RUWE, Judge: This matter is before the Court on

respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The

sole issue for decision is whether the petition in this case was
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1Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

the Internal Revenue Code as amended.

2The petition was mailed to the Court by certified mail. 

However, this does not afford petitioner any relief, since the

regulation dealing with certified mail, sec. 301.7502-1(c)(2),

Proced. & Admin. Regs., applies only if the taxpayer has an

employee of the U.S. Postal Service postmark the sender's

receipt. There is no evidence that this was done here.

3The petition lists petitioner's residence as Pompano Beach,

Florida.

filed within the 90-day period prescribed by section 6213(a)1 as

augmented by section 7502 and the regulations thereunder.

The notice of deficiency in this case was mailed on May 24,

1996. The 90-day period under section 6213(a) for timely filing

a petition expired on Thursday, August 22, 1996. Petitioner's

petition was properly addressed and mailed2 to the Tax Court in a

large envelope bearing a privately metered postmark dated August

20, 1996. The postmark also indicates the origin of mailing as

Fort Lauderdale, Florida.3 The petition was received and filed

by the Court on August 26, 1996, 4 days beyond the period for

filing prescribed by section 6213(a).

Generally, the Court does not have jurisdiction over a case

unless the petition is filed within the 90 days allowed by

section 6213(a). Under section 7502, however, some relief is

provided in those cases where the petition is mailed within the

90-day period but received for filing after the expiration of

that period. Section 7502(a) provides that the date of the U.S.
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postmark stamped on the envelope, in which such petition is

mailed, shall be deemed to be the date of delivery if certain

requirements are met. With respect to privately metered mail,

section 7502(b) states that the provisions of section 7502 will

apply "only if and to the extent provided by regulations

prescribed by the Secretary."

Regulations have been promulgated pursuant to section

7502(b) to govern cases involving privately metered mail. 

Section 301.7502-1(c)(1)(iii)(b), Proced. & Admin. Regs.,

provides in part:

(b) If the postmark on the envelope or wrapper is

made other than by the United States Post Office, (1)

the postmark so made must bear a date on or before the

last date, or the last day of the period, prescribed

for filing the document, and (2) the document must be

received by the agency, officer, or office with which

it is required to be filed not later than the time when

a document contained in an envelope or other

appropriate wrapper which is properly addressed and

mailed and sent by the same class of mail would

ordinarily be received if it were postmarked at the

same point of origin by the United States Post Office

on the last date, or the last day of the period,

prescribed for filing the document. * * *

Thus, section 7502 applies to privately metered mail if: (1) The

postmark bears a timely date, and (2) delivery occurs within the

time that it ordinarily takes for delivery of an envelope,

bearing a postmark of the U.S. Postal Service, properly mailed on

the last day prescribed for filing.

The petition in issue was mailed in an envelope bearing a

privately metered postmark with the timely date of August 20,
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4Whether the petition was received by the Tax Court within

the time that a document mailed on the 90th day would have

ordinarily been received is purely a factual question. Stotter

v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 896, 898 (1978). Although we apply

respondent's allegation of ordinary delivery time for purposes of

this case, we make no independent finding of fact regarding this

(continued...)

1996. Therefore, petitioner satisfies the first element of

section 301.7502-1(c)(1)(iii)(b), Proced. & Admin. Regs. 

However, respondent argues that petitioner does not satisfy the

second element of this section because a properly addressed

envelope "mailed by regular mail from the Boca Raton area and

bearing a United States postmark with a date of August 20, 1996

would have ordinarily been received on August 23, 1996 at the Tax

Court." Since the petition was not filed until August 26, 1996,

respondent concludes that it was not timely.

Respondent misinterprets the requirement of section

301.7502-1(c)(1)(iii)(b), Proced. & Admin. Regs. The regulation

clearly states that the ordinary period of time it takes for

delivery starts on the last day prescribed for filing, not, as

respondent contends, the date indicated on the privately metered

postmark.

The last day for filing the petition was August 22, 1996. 

For purposes of deciding this motion, we accept respondent's

allegation that the ordinary delivery period for properly

addressed regular mail from the Boca Raton area to the Tax Court

is approximately 3 days.4 Therefore, had the petition been
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4(...continued)

matter.

mailed on Thursday, August 22, 1996, 3 days later would have been

Sunday, August 25, 1996. Since there is no mail delivery to the

Tax Court on weekends, weekend mail deliveries are held until the

following Monday morning. Thus, the petition would not have

reached the Tax Court until Monday, August 26, 1996. 

The petition in issue was received by the Court on August

26, 1996. Therefore, we find that the petition was timely filed

under section 7502 and the regulations thereunder, since it

reached the Court at the same time an envelope properly

addressed, mailed, and postmarked by the U.S. Postal Service on

August 22, 1996, ordinarily would have reached the Court. 

McCurry v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-68.

An appropriate order

will be issued.