United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

Nos. 17-1181, 18-1047

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM NOEL MORALES-NEGRÓN,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge] 

Before

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Torruella and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

Franco L. Pérez Redondo, with whom Eric Alexander Vos, Federal 

Public Defender, Vivianne M. Marrero, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, Supervisor, Appeals Section, and Liza L. RosadoRodríguez, Research and Writing Specialist, were on brief, for 

appellant.

Kaitlin E. Paulson, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, 

U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Mainon A. Schwartz, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States 

Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.

September 8, 2020
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HOWARD, Chief Judge. William Noel Morales-Negrón 

("Morales") was apprehended in February 2016 by Drug Enforcement 

Administration agents and U.S. Marshal Service deputies during a 

search for fugitives in Yauco, Puerto Rico. In the course of the 

apprehension, Morales fled from the agents, throwing a fanny pack 

onto the roof of a nearby residence as he tried to escape by 

running across adjacent rooftops. 

The agents arrested Morales and seized the fanny pack, 

which contained one loaded Glock pistol modified to fire as a 

machinegun. Agents also seized four Glock magazines (including 

one high-capacity magazine), fifty-seven rounds of ammunition, 

various drugs, and 700 dollars. A background check revealed that 

Morales had an outstanding arrest warrant for a state probation 

violation. 

A federal grand jury indicted Morales for being a felon 

in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 

and for unlawfully possessing a machinegun, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). 

He pled guilty to both counts without a plea agreement.

At sentencing, the district court noted that Morales 

faced a total offense level of seventeen, a criminal history 

category of IV, and a guideline sentencing range ("GSR") of thirtyseven to forty-six months' imprisonment. The government advocated 

for forty-six months, stressing that Morales had been apprehended 
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with a loaded machinegun "capable of inflicting damage beyond . . . 

other types of firearms." Morales requested a thirty-seven-month 

sentence, emphasizing his traumatic upbringing and violent 

episodes between his parents, his struggles with substance abuse, 

his physical and mental health issues, and his need to provide for 

his children. 

The court determined that an above-guidelines sentence 

was warranted for "plenty of reasons": Morales had "[t]wice [been] 

given very lenient sentences" for previous offenses and twice had 

his supervised release revoked; Morales had abandoned his last 

court-ordered treatment program and was a fugitive at the time of 

his arrest; Morales's crime had facilitated the use of dangerous 

weapons "in the streets by members of a drug organization"; and, 

in light of Puerto Rico's rising homicide rate, his conduct was 

particularly grave. 

The court also emphasized that the evidence contradicted 

Morales's claims that, by the time of his arrest, he had 

rehabilitated himself and ceased engaging in illegal conduct or 

associating with individuals in the drug or weapons business. The

court ultimately sentenced Morales to seventy months in prison.

Six months later, Morales filed a motion in the district 

court to access the written Statement of Reasons ("SOR") in order 

to prepare his appeal. Eventually, the district court denied the 

request, explaining that "[f]or sentencing and appeal purposes the 
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grounds upon which a sentence is based are specifically outlined 

on the record and not reflected within the SOR." The court added 

that any "technical discrepancies within the SOR or even the 

judgment entered are corrected based on the record of in court 

proceedings which controls and specifies the criteria for and the 

sentence imposed." 

Morales appeals his sentence on procedural and 

substantive grounds and challenges the district court's denial of 

his motion to access the SOR.

First, Morales argues that the district court "committed 

procedural error by unduly relying on conjecture to impose an 

upward variant sentence." Specifically, Morales challenges the 

district court's factual findings concerning Morales's connection 

to a video, which Morales says the court relied on in rejecting 

his claim that he had rehabilitated himself already. 

Selecting a sentence "based on clearly erroneous facts" 

constitutes a significant procedural error. See United States v. 

Millán-Isaac, 749 F.3d 57, 66 (1st Cir. 2014). Morales and the 

government dispute whether Morales properly preserved this 

procedural objection, but Morales's claim fails even under the 

clear-error standard of review applicable to preserved claims. 

See United States v. Molloy, 324 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2003). 

The video at issue, obtained from Morales's cell phone, 

depicts two men sleeping on a rooftop and a rifle resting against 
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a nearby wall. An unidentified male is heard off-screen saying in 

Spanish, "in spite of the fact of what I had told you last night, 

you didn't even safe keep it." The video was taken six months 

before Morales's arrest. 

The district judge said that the two men sleeping 

appeared to be keeping guard with the rifle on the rooftop and 

that another photo from Morales's cell phone showed Morales holding 

the same rifle on the same rooftop just two months before his 

arrest. Morales, the court inferred, plainly had contact with the 

people, the premises, and the rifle shown in the video. 

Morales contests that there is sufficient evidence to 

support this inference. The "inferences [a sentencing court] draws 

from th[e] evidence need not be compelled but, rather, need only 

be plausible." United States v. Nuñez, 852 F.3d 141, 146 (1st 

Cir. 2017). 

Here, based on a visual comparison, the court plausibly 

found that the rifle and the rooftop in the photo and video were 

the same. And from the presence of the video on Morales's cell 

phone, as well as his admissions to law enforcement that he had 

delivered weapons to and associated with individuals in the drug 

and weapons business, the court also plausibly inferred that 

Morales had contact with the men depicted in the video. 

Any error would also be harmless, see United States v. 

Fernández-Garay, 788 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2015), because other 
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recent photos of Morales posing with weapons, the weapons and 

ammunition seized from Morales after his arrest, and his admissions 

to law enforcement gave the court ample reason to reject his 

assertions that he had rehabilitated himself already. 

Second, Morales contends his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable because the district court "did not properly 

balance[] the § 3553(a) factors." Review is for abuse of 

discretion, United States v. Vargas-García, 794 F.3d 162, 165 (1st 

Cir. 2015), and here there was none. 

Morales alleges that the district court mis-weighed 

relevant factors, giving too much weight to his prior convictions 

and too little weight to his personal circumstances, 

rehabilitation efforts, and role in the instant offense. But "a 

disagreement with the district court's weighing of the different 

sentencing factors" does not alone constitute error. United States

v. Contreras-Delgado, 913 F.3d 232, 242 (1st Cir. 2019) (quotations 

omitted). The "hallmarks of a substantively reasonable sentence 

are a plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible result." 

United States v. Caballero-Vázquez, 896 F.3d 115, 122 (1st Cir. 

2018) (quotations omitted). 

Here, the district court provided several plausible 

rationales for the upward variance. These included the substantial 

amount of ammunition and multiple-high-capacity magazines involved 

in the offense, the lenience shown toward Morales at his prior 
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sentencings, the need for specific deterrence, given Morales's

repeated flouting of court-imposed conditions, and the prevalence 

of gun violence in Puerto Rico. 

As the district court noted, we previously have upheld 

similarly sized variances on similar facts. See, e.g., United 

States v. Vázquez, 854 F.3d 126, 129-130 (1st Cir. 2017); United 

States v. Díaz-Arroyo, 797 F.3d 125, 129-130 (1st Cir. 2015).

Thus, Morales's sentence is within the "universe of reasonable 

sentences." United States v. Alejandro-Rosado, 878 F.3d 435, 440 

(1st Cir. 2017).

Morales also appeals from the district court's order 

denying him access to the SOR. Given the adequacy of the court's 

oral explanation at sentencing, the court's failure to grant access 

to the SOR does not provide grounds to vacate Morales's sentence 

or stay the merits portion of this appeal. On the other hand, we 

see no basis for withholding the document from Morales here. So 

we remand for the limited purpose of having the district court 

docket the SOR and grant defense counsel's request for access. 

The SOR is an outgrowth of the statutory framework 

governing the United States Sentencing Commission. 28 U.S.C.

§ 991. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1)(B) provides that:

The Chief Judge of each district court shall ensure 

that, within 30 days following entry of judgment in 

every criminal case, the sentencing court submits 

to the Commission, in a format approved and 

required by the Commission, a written report of the 
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sentence, the offense for which it is imposed, the 

age, race, sex of the offender, and information 

regarding factors made relevant by the guidelines. 

The report shall also include . . . the written 

statement of reasons for the sentence imposed 

(which shall include the reason for any departure 

from the otherwise applicable guideline range and 

which shall be stated on the written statement of 

reasons form issued by the Judicial Conference and 

approved by the United States Sentencing 

Commission). 

The federal sentencing statute incorporates this 

requirement, noting that a court imposing a non-Guidelines 

sentence must state the reasons for the sentence "with specificity 

in a statement of reasons form." 18 U.S.C § 3553(c)(2). 

Historically the SOR was publicly available as part of 

the judgment; but, in 2001, the Judicial Conference determined 

that SORs should no longer be disclosed to the public to protect 

the identity of cooperating defendants. See United States Judicial 

Conference Report, March 14, 2001, at 17 (available at

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2001-03.pdf); see 

also Administrative Office of US Courts, Memorandum re: Policy 

Change Restricting Routine Public Disclosure of Statement of 

Reasons, at 2 (Aug. 13, 2001). In 2010, Congress decoupled the 

SOR from the judgment to facilitate the 2001 change. See Federal 

Judiciary Administrative Improvements Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 

111-174, § 4, 124 Stat. 1216. As part of its determination, the

Judicial Conference specified that "the Statement of Reasons[] 

will continue to be forwarded to appropriate entities, such as the 
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United States Sentencing Commission, the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons, defense counsel, government attorneys, and the appellate 

courts." United States Judicial Conference Report, at 17. 

The standing order in the District of Puerto Rico also 

presumes that, upon request, defense counsel can obtain access to 

the SOR. Standing Order No. 17-205 (April 28, 2017), 

https://www.prd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/88/ge

neral%20standing%20order_0.pdf. This order provides that, once 

finalized, the SOR shall be docketed electronically under seal and 

that "[r]equests for access by the United States Attorney or by 

trial or appellate counsel shall be granted by order of the Court." 

Id. (emphasis added).

An SOR "serves a largely administrative purpose," United 

States v. Vazquez-Martinez, 812 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2016), by 

helping the Commission gather data on criminal sentences in order 

to make recommendations to Congress. Accord, e.g., United States

v. Lee, 897 F.3d 870, 874–75 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. 

Jackson, 848 F.3d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 

A district court's failure to docket, or even complete,

an SOR "does not require vacation of the sentence absent a showing 

of prejudice." United States v. Fields, 858 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 

2017); see also United States v. Pagán-Walker, 877 F.3d 415, 417 

(1st Cir. 2017). When a defendant receives an adequate in-court

explanation for the sentence, this Court has repeatedly held that 
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showing cannot be made. See United States v. Pedroza-Orengo, 817 

F.3d 829, 837 (1st Cir. 2016); see also Vazquez-Martinez, 812 F.3d 

at 25. 

Here, there is nothing to suggest that the contents of 

the SOR--even if they contained some discrepancy or error, as 

Morales alleges they might--in any way affected or undercut the 

district court's sentencing decision. Indeed, when "the district 

court's oral expression of its sentencing rationale varies 

materially from its subsequent written expression of that 

rationale, appellate courts have tended to honor the former at the 

expense of the latter." United States v. Muniz, 49 F.3d 36, 42 

n.5 (1st Cir. 1995). This makes particular sense here because the 

SOR, though ultimately sent to the sentencing judge for final 

approval, is prepared by the U.S. Probation Office, after 

sentencing, based on the judge's prior in-court statements. 

Standing Order No. 17-205 (April 28, 2017).

Accordingly, because Morales cannot establish how any 

error in the SOR would invalidate his otherwise justifiable 

sentence and therefore prejudice his case, Morales cannot show

that the district court's denial was erroneous because the document 

was necessary for his appeal. 

Morales offers an alternative argument, however: that, 

even if the SOR is immaterial to his sentence and his appeal, the 

district court cannot simply deny him access to a document 
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associated with his own criminal case. 

Decisions are seemingly rare, if any exist, as to whether 

a district court can deny defense counsel access to the SOR. But 

the Second Circuit has said that even if the SOR has no bearing on 

a defendant's sentencing appeal, denying defense counsel access to 

the SOR would nonetheless be "cause for concern." United States

v. Espinoza, 514 F.3d 209, 212 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008). 

In Puerto Rico, the practice is that the SOR be made 

available to defense counsel upon request. Standing Order No. 17-

205 (April 28, 2017). Judicial Conference policy also indicates 

that the SOR will be available to counsel directly involved in the 

case. United States Judicial Conference Report, at 17; see also

In re Sony BMG Music Ent., 564 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining 

that Judicial Conference policy, "even if not binding in the 

strictest sense, is not lightly to be discounted, disregarded, or 

dismissed"). And concealment without a given reason or a reason 

that otherwise should be obvious to the defendant invites avoidable 

suspicion. We affirm the sentence, but remand for the district 

court to docket a sealed copy of the SOR and grant defense 

counsel's request for access. 

It is so ordered.