UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

MICHAEL HALE, )

 )

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-573 WL

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael Hale, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging a prison

disciplinary hearing (ISP 15-08-0019) that was held at the Indiana State Prison on August 14, 2015.

The Disciplinary Hearing Body (DHB) found him guilty of Battery in violation of B-212 and

sanctioned him with the loss of phone and commissary privileges, $25 restitution, 60 days of

disciplinary segregation, loss of 60 days earned credit time and demoted him to Credit Class 3. The

charges were initiated when Sergeant W. Springfield wrote a conduct report stating:

On 8/3/15 @ approx. 4:35 PM during CCH chow lines, I Sgt. W. Springfield

witnessed offender Hale 884687 fighting with offender Washington 197749 on Main

Street in front of ACH. I Sgt. W. Springfield called a 10-10 then proceeded to stop

the two offenders from fighting. I gave the offenders an order to stop fighting, they

did not stop[.] I then applied a 1 second burst of my chemical agent. The two

offenders then stopped fighting[.] At that time they were both cuffed. This report was

written.

(DE 11-1.)

The screening report reflects that Hale was notified of the offense on August 6, 2015, and

pled not guilty, and did not request any witnesses or physical evidence. (DE 11-2.) A summary of

the security video was prepared, which states, “At approx. 4:30pm, offender[s] are walking down

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the main street. At approx. 4:35pm offender Hale and offender Washington are walking side by side

up main street talking. Offender Hale then hits offender Washington, and they begin fighting while

on main street.” (DE 11-4.) A disciplinary hearing was conducted on August 14, 2015, where the

hearing officer took Hale’s statement, “He has been harassing me since I’ve been here. He comes

by my cell, and looks in. He asks me if I’m selling anything. He aggravates me.” (DE 11-7.) After

considering the evidence, the hearing officer found Hale guilty.(Id.) Hale’s appeals to the facility

head and the final reviewing authority were denied. (DE 11-8, 11-9.) 

Here, Hale raises four claims in his petition: (1) he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

against him; (2) he was denied an impartial hearing officer; and (3) his contact visits were taken

away; and (4) restitution was imposed without sufficient notice.

When prisoners lose earned time credits in a prison disciplinary hearing, they are entitled to

certain protections under the Due Process Clause: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) an

opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and

present documentary evidence in defense when consistent with institutional safety and correctional

goals; and (4) a written statement by a fact finder of evidence relied on and the reasons for the

disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974). To satisfy due process, there

must also be “some evidence” to support the hearing officer’s decision. Superintendent, Mass. Corr.

Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).

First, Hale argues the evidence is insufficient to support a battery charge. “[T]he findings of

a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the support of some evidence in the record. This is a

lenient standard, requiring no more than a modicum of evidence.” Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649,

652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Even a Conduct Report alone can be

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sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir.

1999). Here the Conduct Report and the Video Review Form are some evidence that Hale is guilty

of battery. 

Hale argues that this is inadequate to find him guilty of Battery because it shows that he and

the other offender were both fighting. Perhaps he thinks that a battery has to be a one-way activity

and that it cannot be done by two people to each other. If so, this is incorrect. Two people can batter

each other at the same time. Alternatively, perhaps he is arguing that he was acting in self-defense.

However, 

inmates do not have a constitutional right to raise self-defense as a defense in the

context of prison disciplinary proceedings. As such, the [DHB] was under no

constitutional obligation to allow [the] claim that he was merely defending himself

to serve as a complete defense to the charge of assault.

Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 848 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Both the Conduct Report and

the video show that he battered the other inmate. Again, there is more than sufficient evidence to

have found him guilty of battery.

Second, Hale complains that he was denied an impartial hearing officer. In the prison

disciplinary context, adjudicators are “entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity,” and “the

constitutional standard for improper bias is high.” Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. Due process prohibits

a prison official who was personally and substantially involved in the underlying incident from

acting as a decision-maker in the case. Id. However, due process is not violated simply because the

hearing officer knew the inmate, presided over a prior disciplinary case, or had some limited

involvement in the event underlying the charge. Id. Here, Hale does not clearly explain why he

believes the hearing officer was biased, but there is no indication that he was involved in any way

in the events underlying the charge. Hale appears to believe the hearing officer was impartial

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because the officer ruled against him and did not notify him at the hearing that there may be

restitution ordered due to an injury suffered by the other inmate. But adverse rulings alone do not

establish impermissible bias. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994).

Third, Hale complains that contact visits were taken away from him. He argues that this

punishment is unconstitutional because it is unrelated to the battery. However, “[t]he denial of prison

access to a particular visitor is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a

prison sentence, and therefore is not independently protected by the Due Process Clause.” Kentucky

Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Because Hale had no right to due process before his visitation was restricted, doing so after he was

afforded a hearing is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.

Finally, Hale complains that he was not told about having to pay restitution during the

disciplinary hearing. He does not dispute the amount of the restitution, he merely argues that he

should not have been ordered to pay it. However, habeas corpus relief is not available for

restitution because “[s]ection 2254 is the appropriate remedy only when the prisoner attacks the

fact or duration of ‘custody.’” Sylvester v. Hanks, 140 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 1998). See also

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487, (1995) (distinguishing between a prison disciplinary

sanction that will inevitably affect the duration of the inmate’s sentence and disciplinary

sanctions, such as placement in disciplinary segregation, that do not affect the duration of his

sentence).

Not only is there sufficient evidence to find Hale guilty of the charged offense, but there

has been no showing that he was deprived any due process along the way. Based on the record,

there is sufficient evidence to find Hale guilty of battery, and Hale has not made a showing that

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his due process rights have been violated.

For these reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED. 

SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED: March 23, 2017 s/William C. Lee 

William C. Lee, Judge

United States District Court

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