IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Rehabilitation & Community :

Providers Association; Cori’s :

Place, Inc.; Scott Howard Schwartz :

by and through Linda Schwartz and :

Karen Newman, CO Guardians, :

Ryan Brett by and through his :

Guardian Francis Brett; Danielle :

DeCarlo by and through Daniel :

DeCarlo and Mary Jean DeCarlo, :

CO Guardians; and Maya Ester :

Saadoun through Elisabeth and :

Fabrice Saadoun, CO Guardians, :

Petitioners :

: No. 564 M.D. 2022

 v. :

: Argued: December 4, 2023

Department of Human Services, :

Office of Developmental :

Programs, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE DUMAS FILED: January 26, 2024

The Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, Office of 

Developmental Programs (DHS), filed preliminary objections to the petition for 

review filed by Rehabilitation & Community Providers Association (Rehab

Association), Cori’s Place, Inc., Scott Howard Schwartz by and through Linda 

Schwartz and Karen Newman (co-guardians), Ryan Brett by and through his 

guardian Francis Brett, Danielle DeCarlo by and through Daniel DeCarlo and Mary 
2

Jean DeCarlo (co-guardians), and Maya Ester Saadoun through Elisabeth and 

Fabrice Saadoun (co-guardians) (collectively, Petitioners).

1

 DHS asserts, inter alia, 

that Cori’s Place and Rehab Association failed to exhaust their administrative 

remedies, and that Petitioners, including Individual Petitioners, lack standing. We 

sustain DHS’s first, second, and fifth preliminary objections, dismiss as moot DHS’s 

remaining preliminary objections, and dismiss Petitioners’ petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND2

Because we write for the parties, we do not detail the background.

3

 

Briefly, in February 2022, DHS published two notices announcing the fees it would 

reimburse organizations providing certain services to autistic and other 

developmentally disabled individuals.4 See Pet. for Review ¶ 32 (citing 52 Pa. B. 

1 We collectively refer to the four individuals as Individual Petitioners.

2

“[W]e accept as true all well-pleaded material facts set forth in the petition for review and 

all inferences fairly deducible from those facts.” Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 

917 (Pa. 2013) (Robinson) (cleaned up). We may also consider documents or exhibits attached to 

the petition for review. Diess v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 935 A.2d 895, 903 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). We 

may reject “conclusions of law or argumentative allegations.” Small v. Horn, 722 A.2d 664, 668 

(Pa. 1998) (citation omitted). We may also cite directly to the Pennsylvania Bulletin notices that 

were attached to Petitioners’ petition for review.

3

See generally Rehab & Cmty. Providers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Off. of 

Developmental Programs, 283 A.3d 260, 262 (Pa. 2022) (Rehab I) (resolving Rehab’s similar 

challenge for community services); see also DHS’s Br. at 28 (asserting the instant case is “nearly 

identical”). Cf. Pet. for Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 543 M.D. 2019, filed Sept. 27, 2019).

4 The first bulletin lists various adult autism services and the amount that DHS would 

reimburse the providers for those listed services. 52 Pa. B. 1326 (2022). The bulletin states that 

the fees would be effective July 1, 2021, i.e., prior to the bulletin’s publication. Id. The second 

bulletin lists other similar services and the fees that would be in effect on various dates throughout 

2022. 52 Pa. B. 1328 (2022). The second bulletin also discusses certain fees that would be in 

effect six months after a federal public health emergency expired. Id.; see also DHS’s Br. at 24 

n.5 (stating that DHS “no longer intends to implement the” announced fees that would apply after 

the expiration of a public health emergency and would “instead continue to use” the fees previously 

announced in a prior bulletin (citing 53 Pa. B. 2902 (2023))). To recap, the second bulletin includes 

(1) fees that are currently in effect, and (2) fees that would have been in effect (but for 53 Pa. B. 

2902) six months after expiration of a federal public health emergency. The federal health 

emergency expired on May 11, 2023. DHS’s Br. at 24-25. Thus, but for DHS’s subsequent 
3

1326, 1328 (2022)); accord Exs. 1-2 to Pet. for Review. 

Petitioners filed the instant petition for review raising two claims. First, 

Petitioners request (1) a declaratory judgment that DHS’s new fees are unlawful and 

(2) injunctive relief. Pet. for Review, at 38-39 (citing the Declaratory Judgments 

Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531-7541). Specifically, Petitioners request an injunction 

prohibiting DHS from implementing the new fees and requiring DHS to “properly 

redetermine [fees] in compliance with state and federal law.” Id. Second, Petitioners 

seek the identical relief as a separate claim invoking equity. Id. at 39.

In support of their claims, Petitioners allege DHS supervises and funds 

certain organizations that provide services to developmentally disabled individuals. 

Id. ¶ 14. As noted above, in February 2022, DHS published two Pennsylvania

Bulletin notices revising the fees that DHS would pay for such services. Id. ¶ 32. In 

Petitioners’ view, the new fees are “unsustainable” and “will result in the curtailment 

of essential services.” See, e.g., id. ¶ 67.5

Petitioners reason that DHS has a “mandatory obligation to provide 

adequate mental health and intellectual disability funding” under the Mental Health 

and Intellectual Disability Act of 1966.6 Id. ¶ 70. Per Petitioners, “the 

Commonwealth must discharge its funding duty” by complying with 55 Pa. Code § 

6100.571, which obligates DHS to establish “fee schedule rates,” i.e., the fees that 

DHS will pay for services. Id. ¶ 71. Petitioners allege that because DHS “failed to 

gather sufficient or valid data on the provider costs,” DHS violated its duty under 55 

announcement cancelling the new fees for “community participation support services, see 53 Pa. 

B. 2902 (2023), those fees would have become effective around November 11, 2023. See 52 Pa. 

B. 1328 (2022).

5 Petitioners identified various services, the alleged costs for providing such services by 

“efficient and economically run . . . providers,” and DHS’s new fees. See, e.g., Pet. for Review ¶¶

66-68.

6 Act of October 20, 1966, Special Sess. No. 3, P.L. 96, as amended, 50 P.S. §§ 4101-4704.
4

Pa. Code § 6100.571.

7

 Id. ¶¶ 72, 79-91.

For example, Petitioners reason that the February 2022 revised fees did 

not account for or failed to sufficiently account for, among other factors, inflation

and overtime. Id. ¶¶ 73-74. Further, they maintain that DHS arbitrarily “capped 

administrative costs” at 10%. Id. ¶ 75. Petitioners claim that DHS “creatively used” 

various assumptions to decrease the fees. Id. ¶ 76. As a result, Petitioners maintain 

that Individual Petitioners (1) are unable to find a willing provider or (2) face the 

“uncertainty” of losing currently provided services because their providers cannot 

afford to render such services under the revised fee schedule. Id. ¶ 79. For these 

reasons, Petitioners request declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.8 Id. at 38-39

7 Section 6100.571(a) states that DHS “will establish fee schedule rates, based on the factors 

in subsection (b), using a market-based approach so that payments are consistent with efficiency, 

economy and quality of care and sufficient to enlist enough providers so that services are available 

to at least the extent that such services are available to the general population in the geographic 

area.” 55 Pa. Code § 6100.571(a). Subsection (b) lists ten factors DHS would use to calculate the 

fees. Id. § 6100.571(b). For example, one factor is the “cost of implementing applicable Federal 

and State statutes and regulations and local ordinances.” Id. § 6100.571(b)(9). Petitioners, 

somewhat summarily, allege DHS violated all ten Section 6100.571(b) factors.

8

In addition, Petitioners allege that DHS violated a federal requirement that Pennsylvania 

“publish public notice of any significant proposed changes” in the fees. Pet. for Review ¶ 92. 

Petitioners contend that under both 55 Pa. Code § 6100.571, and the Administrative Agency Law, 

2 Pa.C.S. §§ 501-508, 701-704, DHS must comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (Section 13(A)) 

of the federal Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 to 1396w-7. Id. ¶ 93. Per Petitioners, Section 13(A) 

obligates DHS to “engage in a public process for determining [fees and] interested parties are given 

reasonable opportunity to comment” before DHS publishes the final fees. Id. ¶ 92 (cleaned up). 

Petitioners conclude that because DHS did not comply with 55 Pa. Code § 6100.571, DHS 

necessarily violated Section 13(A). Id. ¶ 94.

Petitioners similarly allege that DHS violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c). Id. ¶¶ 99-100; see also

Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 262 (explaining Section 1396n further). By way of background, Petitioners 

assert that under Section 1396n(c), the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, an agency of 

the United States Department of Health and Human Services, had to approve amendments to 

Pennsylvania’s Medicaid plan. Pet. for Review ¶ 98. Petitioners maintain “that the Commonwealth 

dictated” that DHS revise its fees to conform to an arbitrary $400 million cap. Id. ¶ 101. Per 

Petitioners, (1) the arbitrary figure, (2) DHS’s failure to submit its fee revision methodology to the 

federal agency for approval, and (3) DHS’s revision methodology violated Section 1396n(c). Id.
5

(prayers for relief).

Although invoking this Court’s equitable jurisdiction for declaratory 

and injunctive relief, Petitioners acknowledge that organizations that provide such 

services “have an administrative remedy available in the form of an appeal to” 

DHS’s Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (BHA). Id. ¶ 3.9 Petitioners claim that 

“small providers” of services cannot afford the cost of administrative litigation, 

which in their view means “the administrative remedy is inadequate.” Id. ¶ 4. For 

example, Petitioners specifically identify Cori’s Place as a smaller provider that had 

to withdraw its BHA appeal regarding DHS’s 2019-2020 fees. Id. ¶ 8.10 Because 

Petitioners allege the inadequacy of any administrative remedy, they filed the instant 

lawsuit. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8.

In response, DHS filed nine preliminary objections. Prelim. Objs., 

2/2/23. First, DHS contends that we should decline to exercise our “original 

jurisdiction”

11 because Cori’s Place failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Id.

¶¶ 102, 106-08. Unlike Rehab I, however, Petitioners do not claim the revised fees are 

unconstitutional.

9 We acknowledge Petitioners’ contention that the “unlawful nature” of the fees “negatively 

impacted BHA’s ability to render timely adjudication of provider reimbursement appeals such that 

the BHA administrative remedy is no longer adequate under law.” Pet. for Review ¶ 3. Petitioners, 

however, did not address this contention in their brief in opposition to DHS’s preliminary 

objections. In any event, our Supreme Court rejected Petitioners’ contention. Rehab I, 283 A.3d 

at 271 (holding that because an administrative remedy existed, the petitioners could not invoke this 

Court’s equitable jurisdiction “solely on the basis that it may reach a more expeditious resolution” 

(citation omitted)).

10 Cori’s Place does not raise any similar allegation for the February 2022 revised fees, i.e., 

it appealed the fees to the BHA but lacked sufficient resources to maintain its appeal.

11 Our Supreme Court explained that “the requirement of administrative exhaustion is a 

judge-made rule and does not pertain to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, but to whether 

such jurisdiction is properly exercised.” Beattie v. Allegheny Cnty., 907 A.2d 519, 526 n.5 (Pa. 

2006). Subsequently, our Supreme Court clarified that a party must “exhaust all the adequate and 

available administrative remedies” before invoking this Court’s equitable jurisdiction. Glenn 

Hawbaker, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 304 A.3d 1067, 1081 (Pa. 2023) (Hawbaker) (cleaned up); Rehab 

I, 283 A.3d at 262. Thus, it would be more accurate to construe DHS’s contention as a challenge 
6

at 1. Second, and somewhat similarly, DHS raises the same contention as to Rehab 

Association “because its members have an available administrative remedy.” Id. at 

3. Third, DHS asserts that Petitioners’ claims lack sufficient specificity that would 

permit DHS “to determine which [fees Petitioners] are challenging.” Id. at 4. 

Fourth, DHS maintains this Court lacks jurisdiction because the claims are unripe. 

Id. at 7. Fifth, DHS challenges Individual Petitioners’ standing because they have 

not alleged any immediate harm or cannot be harmed by any change in fees. Id. at 

8-10. Sixth, DHS disputes whether Rehab Association “has standing in its own 

right” or “as a representative of its members.” Id. at 10-13. Seventh, DHS raises a 

demurrer because the methodology it used to revise the fees does not violate federal 

law. Id. at 13-14. Eighth, DHS states a general demurrer that Petitioners have no 

“privately enforceable right to challenge” DHS’s “administration of a program that 

operates under a waiver granted by the Federal government.” Id. at 15. Ninth, DHS 

raises a demurrer that Petitioners failed to allege all “the elements necessary for 

injunctive relief.”12 Id. at 16. Petitioners filed a responsive pleading.

II. ISSUES

In support of its preliminary objections, DHS raises nine issues, 

corresponding to its nine preliminary objections although presented in a different 

to this Court’s equitable—not original—jurisdiction.

12 DHS’s preliminary objections did not always cite to the Rules of Civil Procedure. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1517. We construe DHS’s first and second preliminary objections as invoking a “failure 

to exercise or exhaust a statutory remedy.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(7). Similarly, we construe DHS’s 

fifth preliminary objection, i.e., standing, as a lack of capacity to sue under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(5). 

C.G. v. J.H., 172 A.3d 43, 54 (Pa. Super. 2017). Although “standing issues sometimes can turn on 

pure questions of law, they more commonly turn on questions of fact,” and in the latter 

circumstance, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(2) governs. Id. (cleaned up); see Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 272 n.19; 

Citizens Against Gambling Subsidies, Inc. v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 916 A.2d 624, 627 (Pa. 2007) 

(Citizens). Rule 1028(c)(2) provides that if “an issue of fact is raised, the court shall consider 

evidence by depositions or otherwise.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(2). We may conditionally cite to 

Superior Court decisions. Pa. State Police v. Madden, 284 A.3d 272, 278 n.13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). 
7

order. DHS’s Br. at i-ii.

III. DISCUSSION13

A. First and Second Preliminary Objections -

Cori’s Place and Rehab Association

We begin with DHS’s arguments in support of their initial two 

preliminary objections: the failure of Cori’s Place and Rehab Association to exhaust 

their administrative remedies. Id. at 25-31. In support, DHS argues that before 

seeking judicial relief, Cori’s Place and Rehab Association must initially “exhaust 

all adequate and available administrative remedies.” Id. at 25. DHS states that under 

55 Pa. Code § 6100.41, an aggrieved provider of services may appeal to BHA. Id. at 

26 (discussing Rehab I); see also Pet. for Review ¶¶ 3 (acknowledging 

administrative remedy), 8. DHS maintains those petitioners cannot sidestep the 

exhaustion doctrine by including a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief unless 

the remedy was inadequate. DHS’s Br. at 26-27. To that end, DHS asserts that Cori’s 

Place and Rehab Association have an adequate administrative remedy. Id. at 28.

Per DHS, Cori’s Place and Rehab Association contend that the 

administrative remedy is inadequate for two reasons. Id. First, the administrative 

process is too long. Id. Second, the administrative process is too expensive. Id. at 

29. DHS maintains that the Rehab I Court rejected both arguments as a basis for an 

inadequate administrative remedy. Id. DHS relatedly reasons that Rehab 

Association cannot invoke this Court’s “original jurisdiction” because Rehab 

Association’s claims are identical to its members’ claims and its members have not 

13 Generally, “a court must decide whether it is clear from the well-pleaded facts and 

reasonable inferences from those facts that the claimant has not established a right to relief.” 

Yocum v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 161 A.3d 228, 233-34 (Pa. 2017) (cleaned up). “A court 

considering a preliminary objection may take evidence and create a factual record, but it need not 

do so if it has sufficient information to rule on the objection.” Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 271 (cleaned 

up) (holding this Court acted within its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing because 

of the availability of an adequate agency factfinding process); see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(2).
8

yet exhausted their administrative remedies. Id. at 30-31.14

As an initial matter, it is “fundamental that prior to resorting to judicial 

remedies, litigants must exhaust all the adequate and available administrative 

remedies which the legislature has provided.” Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1081 (cleaned 

up); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1504 (requiring pursuit of statutory remedies over common law). 

“Under the exhaustion requirement, a party must pursue the administrative remedies

[it] has against an agency before challenging [the agency’s] action in court.” Del.

Valley Convalescent Ctr. v. Beal, 412 A.2d 514, 515 (Pa. 1980) (cleaned up).

15

 The 

14 Although DHS does not directly challenge the absence of a constitutional challenge in 

Petitioners’ petition for review, DHS has consistently maintained that Petitioners failed to invoke 

this Court’s equitable jurisdiction properly. See Prelim. Objs. at 2-3; DHS’s Br. at 28; see also 

Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1081.

Petitioners counter that their purported failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a 

prudential—and not a jurisdictional—issue. Pet’rs’ Br. at 9 n.3, 22-24 (contending that the 

Declaratory Judgments Act supersedes the “judge-made prudential doctrine of exhaustion of 

administrative remedies”). Building on that premise, Petitioners contend they have properly 

invoked this Court’s equitable jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments Act. Id. at 12. 

Petitioners frame DHS’s exhaustion argument as a contention “that if all [Rehab 

Association] members have an administrative remedy, and if [Rehab Association’s] association 

standing is derived solely from these providers, [Rehab Association] lacks association standing.” 

Id. at 14 (emphases omitted). Petitioners disagree with that contention, reasoning that at this 

procedural stage, this Court must accept as true Petitioners’ factual averments that Rehab 

Association “is a heterogeneous state association” with members that (1) “do not receive 

reimbursement under the [fees] at issue” and (2) are harmed by the “unlawful” fees. Id.; accord 

id. at 25 (asserting that “determination of whether a party failed to exhaust an administrative 

remedy, as a matter of fact, requires the development of a factual record”), 27. In Petitioners’ view, 

Rehab Association has standing because of its relationship to county government entities that have 

“statutory responsibilities to provide care and services” to intellectually disabled persons. Id. at 9, 

12-13. By extension, Petitioners reason they have standing under the Declaratory Judgments Act. 

Id. at 14-21. As for DHS’s argument about the cost of pursuing administrative relief, Petitioners 

maintain “there is no authority holding that litigation expense cannot be used to determine whether 

an administrative remedy is adequate.” Id. at 25 (emphasis omitted).

15 In defining “party,” if an individual party has an administrative remedy and that party is 

also a member of an association, then that association cannot bring an identical claim. Pa. Ass’n 

of State Mental Hosp. Physicians v. Dep’t of Corr., 520 A.2d 909, 913 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) 

(Physicians). In Physicians, an association sued an agency challenging the “improper furlough” 

of four of the association’s members. Id. at 912. The Physicians Court pointed out that the four 
9

Beal Court explained that the doctrine promotes judicial efficiency because if the 

party prevails before the agency, then a court may not need to intervene. Beal, 412 

A.2d at 516; accord Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1081. The doctrine also permits the 

agency (1) an “opportunity to develop an adequate factual record,” (2) to exercise its 

expertise, particularly in technical subjects, and (3) to promote “the development of 

a cohesive body of law in that area.” Shenango Valley Osteopathic Hosp. v. Dep’t of 

Health, 451 A.2d 434, 438 (Pa. 1982) (Shenango).

16

A party, however, need not exhaust its administrative remedies and may 

attempt to invoke this Court’s equitable jurisdiction under the Declaratory 

Judgments Act subject to two conditions. Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1083 n.17; 

Commonwealth ex rel. Nicholas v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 681 A.2d 157, 161 (Pa. 1996). 

A party must show “both a substantial question of constitutionality and the absence 

of an adequate statutory remedy.” Nicholas, 681 A.2d at 161 (emphasis in original 

and cleaned up).

17

 

members had an administrative remedy. Id. at 912-13. The association countered that “it has an 

interest, independent” of its members in challenging the agency’s furlough. Id. at 913. The 

Physicians Court disagreed, reasoning that the association “lacks standing to substitute itself for 

specific members having individual” administrative remedies. Id. Any benefit that the association 

would have “derives primarily from the relief granted to the individual” members. Id. Because 

those four members were pursuing their administrative remedies, this Court declined to exercise 

its equitable jurisdiction before the agency completed “its essential factfinding and analytical 

functions . . . .” Id.

16

“Exhaustion is concerned with agency autonomy.” Merriam v. Phila. Historical 

Comm’n, 777 A.2d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (cleaned up); accord Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dep’t 

of Lab. & Indus., 8 A.3d 866, 875 (Pa. 2010). In contrast, although similar to exhaustion “in that 

they both deal with timing of judicial review,” ripeness is a distinct concept. Merriam, 777 A.2d 

at 1219 (citation omitted). In the administrative law context, ripeness “arises out of a judicial 

concern not to become involved in abstract disagreements of administrative policies.” Id. (cleaned 

up).

17 Accord Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1083 n.17; Beattie, 907 A.2d at 525; Shenango, 451 A.2d 

at 438. The reason for both conditions is because “it would be a simple matter for any litigant to 

avoid the rulings of an administrative agency merely by challenging its authority on a 

constitutional basis.” Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1084 (citation omitted).
10

In turn, a party can establish an inadequate administrative remedy “if it 

either (1) does not allow for adjudication of the issue raised or (2) allows irreparable 

harm to occur to the plaintiffs during the pursuit of the statutory remedy.” Id. 

(cleaned up); accord Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1083 & n.17 (holding that “our precedent 

is clear that raising a substantial constitutional or validity challenge alone is not 

enough to forgo application of the exhaustion doctrine and that, in asserting such 

challenges, a litigant must also demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of an 

administrative remedy” (emphases added)). The Hawbaker Court explained that 

when “injunctive relief is sought,” the court’s “initial focus should be on the 

threshold question regarding whether equity jurisdiction is appropriate.” Hawbaker, 

304 A.3d at 1084 (reiterating that “equity will not intervene where there is available 

an adequate statutorily prescribed remedy at law is a principle well established in 

this Commonwealth” (cleaned up)).18

18 Proof of irreparable harm is an element necessary for preliminary injunctive relief. 

Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1074. But in resolving the exhaustion doctrine, a party cannot succeed in 

its request for preliminary injunctive relief unless that party would suffer irreparable harm from 

the statutory procedure. Sch. Dist. of Borough of W. Homestead v. Allegheny Cnty. Bd. of Sch. 

Dirs., 269 A.2d 904, 907 (Pa. 1970) (construing the substantially identical statutory predecessor to 

1 Pa.C.S. § 1504). In Hawbaker, this Court granted a preliminary injunction, reasoning that 

“alleged violations of constitutional rights and statutory mandates constitute irreparable harm per 

se.” Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1076 (cleaned up). Our Supreme Court reversed because the petitioner 

conceded it would “sustain no harm” during any administrative proceedings, i.e., the statutory 

procedure. Id. at 1087, 1090. Plainly, the irreparable harm must flow from the statutory procedure 

and not merely from an alleged violation of a legal right. See id. at 1076, 1084 (noting that in Dep’t 

of Pub. Welfare v. Eisenberg, 454 A.2d 513 (Pa. 1982) (plurality), this Court “erred in exercising 

equitable jurisdiction and awarding [preliminary] injunctive relief because the [litigant] had 

available legal means of redress which he did not fully pursue before resorting to equitable 

jurisdiction” (cleaned up)); see also Eisenberg, 454 A.2d at 514 n.6 (citing Sameric Corp. of Mkt. 

St. v. Goss, 295 A.2d 277, 278-79 (Pa. 1972), which resolved the propriety of a preliminary 

injunction). But for that critical qualification, “it would [apparently] be a simple matter for any 

litigant to avoid the rulings of an administrative agency merely by” alleging “violations of 

constitutional rights and statutory mandates,” i.e., the irreparable harm necessary for a preliminary 

injunction. See Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1076, 1084.
11

For example, in Nicholas, this Court had sustained the agency’s 

preliminary objections and dismissed the petitioner’s action because the petitioner 

failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Nicholas, 681 A.2d at 158. Our 

Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the petitioner raised both “a substantial 

constitutional question” and established the inadequacy of the administrative 

remedy. Id. at 161. Further, the agency’s “fact-finding expertise” was unnecessary 

to resolve the constitutional issue.19 Id.

In contrast to Nicholas, which reversed this Court, in Beal, our Supreme 

Court affirmed this Court. Beal, 412 A.2d at 515. Beal, like Nicholas, involved a 

similar procedural posture although different facts. Specifically, in Beal, this Court 

had also sustained DHS’s preliminary objections based on the exhaustion doctrine. 

Id. The petitioner—a nursing home facility—appealed to our Supreme Court. Id. 

Per Beal, DHS had set a “reimbursement ceiling” on fees that DHS 

would reimburse the facility for providing certain services. Id. & n.3. The facility 

challenged the ceiling “on the basis that it was not reasonably cost related and thus 

a clear violation of federal law . . . .” Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 270 (summarizing Beal). 

Cf. Pet. for Review (challenging “the legal adequacy of the new fee schedule,” see 

19 Very simply, Nicholas resolved a complex dispute between, inter alia, the Pennsylvania 

Labor Relations Board (Labor Board) and a county. Nicholas, 681 A.2d at 158. The Labor Board 

had filed an order, which the county contended was invalid under a particular law. Id. at 158-59. 

The order at issue provided that the county could file exceptions and pursue administrative 

remedies. Id. at 159. The county, however, opted to file suit in this Court, which sustained the 

Labor Board’s preliminary objections based on the exhaustion doctrine. Id.

The county appealed to our Supreme Court, arguing that the particular law at issue was 

unconstitutional as applied. Id. In reversing this Court, the Nicholas Court reasoned that no 

administrative remedies could resolve the constitutionality of the law at issue. Id. at 161 (stating 

there was “no provision in” the law at issue “granting the [Labor] Board the authority to rule on 

this constitutional issue” (citation omitted)). Thus, our Supreme Court concluded that because the 

agency could not adjudicate the constitutional issue, the county demonstrated the inadequacy of 

the remedy and reversed this Court. Id.
12

Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 269, on the basis that, inter alia, it violates federal law and was 

inadequate to reimburse the providers’ costs). In the facility’s view, factfinding was 

unnecessary because the ceiling was in “clear violation of federal law.” Beal, 412 

A.2d at 515 (cleaned up). Further, the facility argued it would be an “exercise in 

futility” to seek agency relief because DHS could only adjust reimbursements if the 

cost of services was below the ceiling. Id.

The Beal Court rejected the facility’s arguments as “unpersuasive.” Id. 

Specifically, our Supreme Court reasoned that the facility needed to establish that 

DHS’s fees would not actually compensate the facility for its costs. Id. The Beal

Court pointed out that there was “nothing on this record” that demonstrated that the 

facility’s “actual costs” exceeded DHS’s reimbursement ceiling. Id. The Court 

reasoned that “until it has been established, rather than presumed, that [the facility’s] 

actual, legitimate costs exceed [DHS’s reimbursement] ceiling, [the facility] poses 

only a conjectural, speculative claim.” Id. Further, “nothing on this record” 

indicated that a DHS hearing “would not afford [the facility] a full opportunity to 

establish its actual, legitimate costs and any claimed failure to reimburse properly.” 

Id. at 516 (emphasis added).20 Thus, the Beal Court affirmed this Court’s order that 

sustained DHS’s preliminary objections and dismissed the facility’s petition for 

review. Id. at 515.

Most recently, the Rehab I Court—a case raising nearly identical facts 

and parties as the instant case—approved of the Beal Court’s reasoning in holding 

that certain providers failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Rehab I, 283 

A.3d at 270, 272. By way of background, in 2019, DHS had published a new list of 

fees in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. Id. at 263. Rehab Association, Schwartz, Brett, 

20 The Beal Court did not explicitly address the absence of a “substantial constitutional 

question.” See Nicholas, 681 A.2d at 161.
13

and other parties filed a similar petition for review challenging “the adequacy of 

state funding for community participation support services, which are designed to 

help individuals with autism or intellectual disabilities . . . .” Id. at 262. 

The Rehab I petitioners claimed, inter alia, that the 2019 fees “did not 

reflect reasonable costs relating to . . . service delivery sufficient to ensure access, 

encourage provider participation, and promote provider choice as required by federal 

law . . . .” Id. at 264. Plainly, the fees were insufficient. See id.; Pet. for Review ¶¶

67 (challenging the fees as “unsustainable” to reimburse providers properly), 79

(contending providers cannot afford to render services under the proposed fees). The 

Rehab I petitioners sought (1) a declaration that the new list of fees was an

unpromulgated regulation, and (2) injunctive relief preventing DHS “from 

implementing the new [fees] and directing the agency to establish [fees] sufficient 

to meet reasonable provider costs.” Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 264-65. Cf. Pet. for 

Review, at 38-39 (requesting, in the prayers for relief, (1) a declaration that the new 

fees violate the law, and (2) an injunction preventing DHS “from implementing the 

[fees] at issue . . . and requiring [DHS] to properly redetermine [fees] in compliance 

with state and federal law”). 

In response, in Rehab I, DHS filed preliminary objections contending, 

inter alia, that certain providers failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. 

Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 265.21 This Court sustained DHS’s preliminary objection that 

certain providers failed to exhaust their administrative remedies but then dismissed 

the entire petition “notwithstanding that the preliminary objection in question only 

21 In Rehab I, DHS also challenged whether (1) Rehab Association, Schwartz, and Brett

had standing; (2) the petitioners had a private right of action “to challenge DHS’s administration 

of a program operating under a waiver granted by the federal government;” and (3) the petitioners 

alleged the elements necessary for injunctive relief. Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 265. Cf. Prelim. Objs. 

(objecting to (1) the standing of Rehab Association and Individual Petitioners; (2) the absence of a 

private right of action by Petitioners; and (3) the failure to allege the elements for an injunction). 
14

pertained to the [selected providers] and not [Rehab Association] or [Schwartz and 

Brett].” Id. at 267. The aggrieved providers appealed. Id. at 262.

In resolving the issue, our Supreme Court began by construing the 

Rehab I petition for review. Id. at 269. In the Rehab I Court’s view, the petition for 

review primarily averred that the Pennsylvania Bulletin notice was “an 

unpromulgated regulation and its provisions are inconsistent with legal mandates 

requiring adequate funding for the services involved.” Id. “[A]t its core,” the Rehab 

I providers “challenge[d] the legal adequacy of the new fee schedule.” Id.22 

Our Supreme Court next rejected the providers’ argument that because 

they would suffer irreparable injury pursuing administrative relief, they should be 

able to invoke this Court’s equitable jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments 

Act. Id. at 270. The Rehab I Court pointed out that the providers “had an 

administrative avenue to challenge the new fee schedule in accordance with” 55 Pa. 

Code § 6100.41. Id. Cf. Pet. for Review ¶ 3 (challenging the fee schedule enacted 

under 55 Pa. Code § 6100.571, which is also subject to Section 6100.41). In pursuing 

administrative relief, our Supreme Court noted that the providers could recover any 

monetary shortfall should they prevail before the BHA. Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 271. 

The Rehab I Court explained that because the shortfall would be temporary if the 

providers prevailed, the shortfall could not constitute an irreparable injury to excuse 

the exhaustion doctrine. Id. Thus, the Rehab I Court rejected any argument that the 

providers would suffer irreparable harm. Id. For these reasons, our Supreme Court 

22 In other words, the Rehab I Court rejected the petitioners’ constitutional challenge to the 

DHS regulation. Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 269 (stating that “[t]his is not the kind of facial attack on 

the enabling statute’s constitutionality [that] is generally required to bypass statutory remedies”); 

accord Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1082; Nicholas, 681 A.2d at 161 (requiring a petitioner to establish 

“a substantial question of constitutionality” (cleaned up)).
15

affirmed this Court’s order sustaining the preliminary objection at issue. Id. at 272.23

Instantly, unlike Rehab I, Petitioners do not raise any constitutional 

challenge in their petition for review. Cf. id. at 269. Because our jurisprudence 

requires “both a substantial question of constitutionality and the absence of an 

adequate statutory remedy,” we hold Petitioners failed to invoke this Court’s 

equitable jurisdiction properly. See Nicholas, 681 A.2d at 161 (emphasis in original 

and cleaned up); accord Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1082-83 & n.17; see generally 

Prelim. Objs. at 2-3; DHS’s Br. at 28. Accordingly, we reject Petitioners’ attempt to 

bypass the exhaustion doctrine and invoke this Court’s equitable jurisdiction under 

the Declaratory Judgments Act. See Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1084-85. Nevertheless, 

identical to the Hawbaker and Rehab I Courts, we also address the adequacy of the 

administrative remedy.24

In that regard, this case is remarkably similar to Rehab I and Beal. 

Much like the Rehab I petition for review, the instant petition for review also 

challenges “the adequacy of state funding” for rehabilitative services to 

developmentally disabled individuals. Compare Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 262, 270 

(summarizing Beal), with Pet. for Review. Indeed, Rehab Association, Schwartz, 

and Brett are identical petitioners in both Rehab I and the case at bar. Compare 

Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 262, with Pet. for Review. Rehab I and Beal also had services 

providers much like Cori’s Place. Compare Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 264, and Beal, 412 

A.2d at 515, with Pet. for Review. Identical to the petitioners in Rehab I and similar 

to the facility in Beal, the instant Petitioners also seek a declaration that the new fees

23 The Rehab I Court also remanded to this Court to address the unresolved preliminary 

objections, where they remain pending. Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 271-72; Petr’s’ Br. at 23 n.4.

24 In Hawbaker, our Supreme Court similarly proceeded to analyze whether the petitioner 

demonstrated “the absence of an adequate administrative remedy” by assuming that the petitioner 

“raised a substantial constitutional or validity challenge to” the agency regulations at issue. 

Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1085; see Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 270.
16

violate the law and injunctive relief directing DHS to revise the fees in compliance 

with the law. Compare Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 264-65, and Beal, 412 A.2d at 515, with

Pet. for Review. Finally, as observed by the Rehab I Court, Petitioners concede that 

service providers have an administrative remedy under 55 Pa. Code § 6100.41. 

Compare Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 270 (stating that providers have “an administrative 

avenue to challenge the new fee schedule in accordance with” 55 Pa. Code § 

6100.41), with Pet. for Review ¶ 3 (averring that providers “have an administrative 

remedy available in the form of an appeal to” BHA).

Given the substantial overlap of parties, claims, and forms of relief in 

both Rehab I and the instant case, we are persuaded by the Rehab I and Beal Courts’

reasoning to the extent it applies to Cori’s Place. Identical to the service providers 

in Rehab I and the facility in Beal, Cori’s Place contended that DHS’s reimbursement 

fees are insufficient. See Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 264-65; Beal, 412 A.2d at 515. To 

paraphrase the Rehab I and Beal Courts, to determine the adequacy of DHS’s fees, 

there is a “need for factual development at the administrative level.” See Rehab I, 

283 A.3d at 270 (citation omitted); Beal, 412 A.2d at 515. DHS must “be allowed to 

develop the factual background and apply its expertise before the courts get 

involved[.]” See Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 270 (cleaned up) (holding there is “no reason 

to create an exception to the exhaustion requirement” (citation omitted)); Beal, 412 

A.2d at 515.25

25 At oral argument on this matter, DHS’s counsel represented to this Court that numerous 

providers are appealing the revised fees to BHA. As noted by the Rehab I Court, it was undisputed 

that at least one of the Rehab I petitioners “had already filed an administrative appeal with the 

BHA challenging the new reimbursement” fees. Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 270 (holding that the 

petitioners failed to show the inadequacy of the administrative remedy). Assuming the accuracy 

of DHS’s representation, the fact that providers are pursuing administrative relief further militates 

against this Court exercising its equitable jurisdiction prematurely. Cf. Physicians, 520 A.2d at 

912-13.
17

Because of the need for factual development at the administrative level 

to resolve Cori’s Place’s claim before DHS, it follows we should decline to exercise 

our equitable jurisdiction over Rehab Association. See Physicians, 520 A.2d at 912-

13. In Physicians, this Court reasoned that because members of the association were 

actually pursuing their administrative remedies, it would be premature for this Court 

to act on the association’s claim before the agency completed its review. See id. 

Although Cori’s Place has not yet appealed to DHS, we agree that because Cori’s 

Place has an available, adequate administrative remedy, we must also decline Rehab 

Association’s premature invitation to exercise our equitable jurisdiction. See id.

Additionally, to the extent that Petitioners maintain that litigation 

expenses cannot be used as a factor in resolving the adequacy of an administrative 

remedy, we disagree for two reasons. First, Petitioners failed to raise a substantial 

constitutional question. See Nicholas, 681 A.2d at 161; accord Hawbaker, 304 A.3d 

at 1083 n.17. In other words, even if Petitioners established the inadequacy of their 

administrative remedy because of litigation expenses, they cannot invoke this 

Court’s equitable jurisdiction properly. See Nicholas, 681 A.2d at 161; accord 

Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1083 n.17. Second, our Supreme Court rejected an analogous 

argument that the costs of litigating an agency appeal “or the deprivation of 

earnings” constituted sufficient irreparable injury to trigger this Court’s equitable 

jurisdiction. See Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 271. 

Finally, the Rehab I Court rejected Petitioners’ arguments that this 

Court, instead of the BHA, must establish a factual record to resolve preliminary 

objections. See id. Identical to the Beal Court, we also hold that “nothing on this 

record” indicates that a DHS hearing “would not afford [Cori’s Place and Rehab 

Association] a full opportunity to establish its actual, legitimate costs and any 
18

claimed failure to reimburse properly.” See Beal, 412 A.2d at 516 (cleaned up and 

emphasis added). For all these reasons, we sustain DHS’s first and second 

preliminary objections, which assert that Cori’s Place and Rehab Association failed 

to exhaust their administrative remedies.

B. Fifth Preliminary Objection - Individual Petitioners

In support of its fifth preliminary objection, DHS contends that 

Individual Petitioners have no standing. DHS’s Br. at 36. Specifically, per DHS, 

Schwartz and Brett lack standing because they failed to allege they would “be 

harmed by the challenged” fees. Id. To the extent that Schwartz and Brett contend 

that their providers could cease operations/providing services, DHS asserts their 

contention is too speculative to confer standing. Id. at 36-37. DHS also construes 

as speculative any assertion by Schwartz and Brett that they would have to change 

providers before their current providers ceased operations. Id. at 37. DHS maintains 

that Schwartz and Brett are not directly harmed by any change in fees. Id. at 38. 

With respect to DeCarlo and Saadoun, DHS notes that because they failed to identify 

the services they cannot receive, they may not have been harmed. Id. at 38-39.26

Initially, parties “may raise questions regarding standing . . . by filing 

preliminary objections to a petition for review filed in the original jurisdiction of the 

26 DHS adds that to the extent that DeCarlo and Saadoun dispute access to “community 

participation support services,” 52 Pa. B. 1328 (2022), those fees are not in effect. See DHS’s Br. 

at 24. DHS noted that those fees would have been in effect in November 2023, which is six months 

after the federal health emergency expired. Id. at 24 n.5. Subsequently, DHS announced that it 

would not be effectuating the fees announced at 52 Pa. B. 1328 (2022). Id.

Individual Petitioners counter by declaring this Court must accept their factual averments 

that they are harmed by DHS’s fees. Pet’rs’Br. at 42-43. In their view, they set forth “sufficiently 

specific” factual averments such that we should overrule DHS’s preliminary objections. Id. at 43-

44. They summarily maintain that (1) their entitlement to the services at issue, and (2) the 

deprivation of such services, establish their standing. Id. at 44-45. Individual Petitioners insist 

that we should reject DHS’s “suggestion that [their] harm is insufficient to confer standing . . . .” 

Id. at 45.
19

Commonwealth Court, similar to those permitted in a civil action.” Robinson, 83 

A.3d at 917 (cleaned up). The “doctrine of standing is an inquiry into whether the 

petitioner filing suit has demonstrated aggrievement, by establishing a substantial, 

direct and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Id. (cleaned up). 

“[M]atters of standing may involve factual questions . . . .” Citizens, 916 A.2d at 

627; C.G., 172 A.3d at 54; see also Robinson, 83 A.3d at 917; Small, 722 A.2d at 668. 

Thus, when factual questions exist as to “threshold issues such as standing,” remand 

may be appropriate to develop the record further. Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 272 n.19; see 

C.G., 172 A.3d at 54.

In Rehab I, this Court did not address the standing of Schwartz and 

Brett, i.e., the individual petitioners who are also petitioners in the instant case. 

Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 271. This Court’s failure prompted our Supreme Court to 

remand the matter to this Court “to pass fully upon the remaining preliminary 

objections . . . .” Id. Further, our Supreme Court instructed that if this Court decided 

that “any material facts are at issue in relation” to, inter alia, the standing of 

Schwartz and Brett, then we should establish an adequate record. Id. at 271-72 & 

n.19. 

In that regard, the Rehab I concurrence observed that “there are factual 

questions surrounding the threshold issue of standing: DHS argues [that Schwartz’s 

and Brett’s] alleged harm is too remote, but [they] argue they have standing because 

they will certainly lose their services due to the allegedly inadequate” fees. Id. at 

274 (Dougherty, J., concurring). Accordingly, Justice Dougherty reasoned that any 

“factual inquiry” regarding Schwartz’s and Brett’s standing “would significantly 

overlap with one of the issues pertaining to the [p]roviders, i.e., whether the [fees] 

set by DHS are so insufficient that the [p]roviders can no longer supply their 
20

services. [DHS] will likely also have to address that issue when adjudicating the 

[p]roviders’ claims.” Id.

Instantly, as noted above, Petitioners failed to raise a constitutional 

challenge and thus, even if Individual Petitioners had standing, they failed to invoke 

this Court’s equitable jurisdiction properly. See Nicholas, 681 A.2d at 161 (explaining 

that a party must establish “both a substantial question of constitutionality and the 

absence of an adequate statutory remedy” to bypass the exhaustion doctrine

(emphasis in original and cleaned up)); accord Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1083-84 & 

n.17. Regardless, we observe the following. 

The instant petition for review parallels the petition for review in Rehab 

I. Compare Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 262, with Pet. for Review. With respect to the 

Individual Petitioners before this Court, to quote our Supreme Court, “there may be 

factual issues surrounding threshold issues such as standing” of the Individual 

Petitioners. Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 272 n.19 (acknowledging the individual petitioners’

arguments that they would lose access to services). To paraphrase the concurrence, 

any factual inquiry into Individual Petitioners’ standing significantly overlaps with 

the issue of whether DHS’s fees are so insufficient that Cori’s Place and Rehab 

Association can no longer provide their services to Individual Petitioners. See id. at 

274 (Dougherty, J., concurring). For these reasons, we sustain DHS’s fifth 

preliminary objection directed to Individual Petitioners’standing.27

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we sustain DHS’s first, second, and fifth preliminary 

27 Due to the overlapping issues, further factual development before the agency best suited 

for the task is necessary. Following development of the record, DHS may then address, if raised, 

the standing of any petitioner, including Individual Petitioners and Rehab Association.

Because no party addressed primary jurisdiction, we cannot raise the issue. See Gibraltar 

Rock, Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 286 A.3d 713, 725 (Pa. 2022). However, one Justice suggested 
21

objections and dismiss as moot DHS’s remaining preliminary objections. We 

dismiss Petitioners’ petition for review without prejudice.

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

that Pennsylvania “courts may raise the primary jurisdiction doctrine sua sponte since the doctrine 

functions to ensure proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies (and 

not for the convenience of the parties).” Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 273 n.2 (Dougherty, J., concurring) 

(cleaned up).

In any event, the “primary jurisdiction doctrine applies where the administrative agency 

cannot provide a means of complete redress to the complaining party and yet the dispute involves 

issues that are clearly better resolved in the first instance by the administrative agency charged 

with regulating the subject matter of the dispute.” Id. at 273 (cleaned up). “The doctrine requires 

judicial abstention in cases where protection of the integrity of a regulatory scheme dictates 

preliminary resort to the agency which administers the scheme.” Id. (cleaned up). The 

concurrence pointed out the practical difficulties involved and “risk of inconsistent rulings” if both 

this Court and DHS “were to simultaneously adjudicate the same issues . . . .” Id. at 274-75.

In the context of Rehab I, the concurrence acknowledged that “the General Assembly has 

empowered DHS to set provider [fees] . . . and an aggrieved provider to request a hearing before 

the [BHA] to challenge those [fees].” Id. at 274 (cleaned up). Because the providers, Rehab 

Association, and Schwartz and Brett (two of the individual petitioners in the instant case), had 

filed a single petition raising the same allegations, “it is foreseeable that both [BHA] and the 

Commonwealth Court on remand might be tasked with evaluating the same issues on dual tracks.” 

Id.

Although not binding on this Court, to the extent this Court may invoke primary 

jurisdiction sua sponte, we agree with the concurrence’s observations. Mindful of DHS’s 

regulatory authority and expertise over fee reimbursement, as well as the concerns of res judicata

and premature or inconsistent rulings, we would alternatively dismiss Petitioners’ petition for 

review without prejudice on this ground. See id.; see also id. at 270 n.17 (noting that the “premature 

interruption of the administrative process restricts the agency’s opportunity to develop an adequate 

factual record, limits the agency in the exercise of its expertise and impedes the development of a 

cohesive body of law in that area” (citation omitted)); Physicians, 520 A.2d at 912-13 (declining to 

exercise equitable jurisdiction before the agency completed its factfinding). As our Supreme Court 

held, “it is our expectation that [DHS] will discharge its adjudicatory functions in good faith by 

allowing [Petitioners] to raise and develop every issue it chooses to advance and by giving each 

issue its due consideration, so that an adequate record is created should appellate review become 

necessary.” Hawbaker, 304 A.3d at 1090. Further, pursuing simultaneous judicial and 

administrative relief risks “inconsistent rulings between the Commonwealth Court and the 

agency,” particularly when an administrative remedy exists and, per DHS’s counsel, providers are 

currently appealing to BHA. See Rehab I, 283 A.3d at 275 (Dougherty, J., concurring); id. at 271.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Rehabilitation & Community :

Providers Association; Cori’s :

Place, Inc.; Scott Howard Schwartz :

by and through Linda Schwartz and :

Karen Newman, CO Guardians, :

Ryan Brett by and through his :

Guardian Francis Brett; Danielle :

DeCarlo by and through Daniel :

DeCarlo and Mary Jean DeCarlo, :

CO Guardians; and Maya Ester :

Saadoun through Elisabeth and :

Fabrice Saadoun, CO Guardians, :

Petitioners :

: No. 564 M.D. 2022

 v. :

:

Department of Human Services, :

Office of Developmental :

Programs, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26th day of January, 2024, we SUSTAIN the first, 

second, and fifth preliminary objections filed by Department of Human Services, 

Office of Developmental Programs (DHS). We DISMISS as moot DHS’s remaining 

preliminary objections. We DISMISS without prejudice the petition for review filed 

by Rehabilitation & Community Providers Association, Cori’s Place, Inc., Scott 

Howard Schwartz by and through Linda Schwartz and Karen Newman (coguardians), Ryan Brett by and through his guardian Francis Brett, Danielle DeCarlo 

by and through Daniel DeCarlo and Mary Jean DeCarlo (co-guardians), and Maya 

Ester Saadoun through Elisabeth and Fabrice Saadoun (co-guardians).

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge