Interim Decision #1348 

MATTER OF AWADALLA 

In VISA PETITION Proceedings 

A-12935982 

Decided by Board May 98, 1984 

An unauthenticated Jordanian judgment of divorce obtained in aesenvki by the 

wife in Jordan while the husband was in Colombia lacks essential proof of 

due process for recognition as valid in Puerto Rico for the purposes of a 

subsequent marriage in that jurisdiction since neither party was before the 

court, there were no witnesses, and the court apparently considered no evidence except the es parts statements of Iplaintiff/wife's attorney and assumed 

defendant/husband's concurrence because of his absence. Consequently, the 

subsequent-marriage of the husband in Puerto Rico to a native and citizen 

thereof is not valid for immigration purposes and does not serve to confer 

nonquota status. 

The district director denied this visa petition on the ground that the 

evidence fails to establish sufficiently that petitioner and beneficiary 

are validly married. He certified the case to us for final decision. 

Except for one point, the reasons underlying our decision differ completely from those on which the district director relies. We reach the 

same conclusion, however. Therefore we affirm the district director's 

order. 

Beneficiary is a 43-year-old native and national of Jordan 'of the 

Islamic faith. He entered the United States on June 14, 1961, at 

San Juan, Puerto Rico as a visitor. Prior to that entry he resided in 

Colombia for about a year and a half. 

Beneficiary was married in Jordan. He says that in October of 

1960 he was divorced in Jordan from his Jordanian wife. Six children of that marriage—four girls and two boys—live in Jordan. 

Petitioner married the beneficiary at San Juan, Puerto Rico, on September 29, 1961. She is a native of Puerto Rico, 50 years old, who has 

not been previously married. 

The petition was filed on December 20, 1961, and has been before 

us twice prior to this certification. Originally, petitioner submitted a 

declaration by beneficiary's Jordanian wife_ That declaration states 

in Arabic and English that beneficiary has been declarant's lawful 

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Interim Decision #1348 

husband, that he divorced her on the 11th day of October 1960, that he 

left her from that date, and that there has been no relation between 

them at all after that date. Both the Arabic and English versions 

contain an obvious erasure in the year of divorce. 

The district director had the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 

laboratory examine the document. The laboratory on March 14, 1962, 

reported that the original date on the English version has been 

changed from 1961 to 1960 and that the "1" on the typewriter making 

the change differed from the "l's" on the document. The laboratory 

also reported that the last digit in the year in the typewritten Arabic 

text. has been erased and an Arabic "0" written in ink. The laboratory 

could not determine the erased character. 

Apparently the Service either had checked on the document before 

submitting it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or had information on the results of the laboratory findings before receiving the 

formal report. Tri a sworn statement taken almost two months before 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation's report, a Service officer confronted beneficiary with the information that the declaration had 

been altered. The officer said experts on documents had determined 

the year of the divorce had been changed from 1961 to 1960. Beneficiary denied any changes had been made in the document. 

The district director initially held petitioner had failed to establish 

that her marriage to beneficiary occurred subsequent to his divorce. 

He based his conclusion on the evidenee that the date of petitioner's 

marriage, September 29, 1961, preceded the date October 11, 1961, 

originally given for the divorce on the declaration. Petitioner appealed from that decision, but offered nothing to rebut the evidence 

of the erasure and alteration on the declaration. Our decision of 

September 28, 1962, upheld the district director's analysis of the 

evidence. 

Subsequently petitioner submitted directly to us a "Court Notice in 

Absentia" by the Qadi of Ramallah, a religious judge, which confirmed 

that beneficiary divorced his Jordanian wife on October 11, 1960. On 

October 26, 1962, we certified the case to ourselves, withdrew our order 

of September 28, 1962, reopened the proceedings, remanded the case to 

the district director for consideration of the new evidence, and directed 

the district director to certify the case to us for review if his decision 

were adverse. The district director again denied the petition bringing 

the ease to its present posture. 

The district director contends that the later evidence of the court 

notice does not alter the fact that the year of divorce was changed 

from 1961 to 1960 on the declaration originally submitted. Ho asserts 

that the court notice, issued on September 9, 1962, granted a retroactive 

divorce to the wife. He concludes, therefore, that beneficiary and his 

581 
Interim Decision *134b 

Jordanian wife were not finally divorced until September 9, 1962, 

because the retroactive effect of that divorce should be disregarded. 

Thus, he argues that the divorce granted by the Qadi of Ramallah 

failed to cure the invalidity of petitioner's marriage to the beneficiary. 

Counsel for petitioner, in his brief in opposition to the district director's decision, argues that the change in the date on the declaration 

merely corrected. a clerical error. In any event, he contends, the 

judgment of the Court of Ramallah establishes that beneficiary was 

divorced in October of 1960. 

The district director and petitioner's counsel each recognize the 

basic issue—the validity of the marriage performed on September 29, 

1961, at San Juan, Puerto Rico, between petitioner and beneficiary. 

In this proceeding petitioner has the burden of establishing the validity of the relationship upon which the petition is based. Therefore, 

the rule presuming validity of the most recent marriage has no applicability hero? Ordinarily, we follow the general rule that the validity 

of a marriage depends upon the law of the place where the marriage 

was contracted? We shall consider the validity of the marriage here 

under the law of Puerto Rico wherever that law is applicable. 

Several questions arise under the primary issue here, however. We 

shall consider first the one which has primarily occupied the parties

up to this point. 

L The effect of the alteration of the date of divorce in beneficiary's Jordanian 

wife's declaration 

Close examination of the declaration executed before the Mukhtar 

of Ein Yabroud village by beneficiary's Jordanian wife reveals that 

the Service's theory of this ease has been erroneous from the beginMatter of 7 I. & N. Dec. 582, cf. Petition. or Sam Soo, 06 F. Sapp. 

439 (N.D. Calif., 1945) ; Petition. of Lu)an, 144 P. Supp. 150 (Guam, 1956). 

A second marriage has been presumed valid in a deportation proceeding in which 

the burden of proof was on the Government. The Government charged deportability on the ground of bigamy. U.S. ex rel. Kazanos v. Murff, 170 F. Sapp. 

182 (S.D. N.Y., 1959). (Matter of T—S—Y—, supra, arose in deportation 

proceedings but the issue was respondent's eligibility for preexamination.) 

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has held that where the right of a party 

to the relief sought depends upon a marriage, either ceremonial or common law, 

the burden is upon that party to establish the facts essential to constitute the 

marriage. Hawkins v. Hitchook, 365 P. 2d 971 (1961)—petition for letters of 

administration. 

'The Acting Attorney General so ruled in Matter of P—, 4 I. & N. Dee. 010. 

That decision arose under prior law but also applies to the Immigration and Nationality Act. Matter of Hoehne, Int. Dee. No. 1282. 

Circumstances under which we have departed from this rule are not present 

here. See, for example, Hatter of 0—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 337; Matter of Napello, 

Int. Dec. No. 1303. 

582 
Interim Decision #1348 

ning. The declaration bears on its face evidence which demonstrates 

conclusively that the - divorce to which the document refers could not 

have occurred in October of 1961. A rubber stamp impression in 

Arabic, which authenticates the signature of the district governor, 

bears the date of February 22 and a year which, although somewhat 

indistinct, is either 1960 or 1961. The revenue stamp affixed to the 

document distinctly bears the date February 22, 1961, written upon 

it. Thus, the declaration was executed prior to beneficiary's marriage 

in Puerto Rico. Obviously, when the document was originally prepared, the year in which the document was executed was used erroneously for the year of the divorce. Later, the dates in the Arabic and 

English texts were changed to correct that error. 

Although there is actually no conflict as to the date of divorce between the declaration and beneficiary's testimony, the record does contain serious conflicts. The district director's opinion says that whether 

beneficiary renounced his first wife at all is highly questionable. That 

is the one point in his opinion with which we agree. Certainly, 

beneficiary's own testimony casts doubt upon the fact of his divorce. 

IL Effect of evidentiary conflicts in beneficiary's testimony, his Jordanian wife's 

declaration, and the Court Notice in Absentia, taking such evidence at face 

value 

According to beneficiary's Jordanian wife's declaration—confirmed 

by the Qadi's court notice—beneficiary exercised his right under 

Moslem law to divorce his wife unilaterally, by declaring to her that 

she was divorced from him.' Appa rently he made a single statement, 

which, under certain conditions, he could revoke.' Apparently, also, 

there were no witnesses to the divorce. Moslem law does not require 

witnesses or any particular procedure, although the husband may, if 

he desires, declare his divorce under more formal circumstances than 

in beneficiary's case. Jordan recognizes Moslem law as the personal 

law of a Moslem. 

The district director notes that, although petitioner presented the 

declaration of the Jordanian wife and the Court Notice in Absentia 

as evidence that beneficiary divorced his first wife, beneficiary says 

that his Jordanian wife divorced him.5The immigration officer who 

3 The wife evidently made the declaration to comply with the Palestinian Law 

of Marriage and Divorce Registration, of July 23, 1919, which is in force in 

beneficiary's area in Jordan. 

See Appendix "A." 

'Petitioner's counsel refers to the declaration and court notice as evidence 

that the beneadury was divorced from his first wife but does not discuss the 

discrepancy between beneficiary's statements that his wife divorced him and 

the statement in the documents that beneficiary divorced his wife. 

583 
Interim Decision #1348 

took beneficiary's statement had the declaration before him at the time 

but failed to call beneficiary's attention to his wife's statements that 

he divorced her. 

The question who divorced whom ordinarily would not be important 

to us so long as we were satisfied a divorce occurred. That question, 

however, becomes important to the issue whether a divorce under Moslem law occurred at all. A wife in Jordan may divorce her husband 

if he delegates to her the right of divorce. In the absence of such 

right, she can, in certain circumstances, request a divorce from a 

religious judge. 

There is no evidence that the wife received a judicial divorce on 

October 11, 1960—the date both parties say the divorce occurred.° 

Therefore, unless beneficiary had specifically delegated to his Jordanian wife the right of divorce, he would have had to be the moving party 

in a divorce which occurred in the manner here set forth. There is 

also no evidence here of any such delegation. In these circumstances, 

beneficiary's denial that he divorced his wife raises a serious question 

whether the divorce occurred at all. 

Beneficiary's Jordanian wife's declaration does not show whether 

beneficiary was in the village at the time of the divorce. The language 

in both the Arabic and English versions is consistent with either his 

presence or absence. • 

The court notice does indicate that beneficiary came to this hemisphere after divorcing his wife.' The judge, however, appears to have 

merely repeated what the wife's lawyer told him. Therefore, it is possible the statement of fasts in the court notice does not accurately 

reflect all of the details. 

Beneficiary's sworn statement of January 26, 1962, contains confusing information. Aceording to that statement, beneficiary was in 

Colombia for a year and a half before entering Puerto Rico in June 

° Beneficiary says that his wife sent him "a paper from the court," referring 

to the declaration. The declaration became an official record under Jordanian 

law through registration. It is not a judicial document, however. 

The translation given in the record reads in part : 

Since the claimant Amira claimed through her lawyer that the accused Awadallah in absentia, whose place of residence is unknown and whom has been decided 

to be judged in the courts in absentia, was her husband and carried with her 

marital relations, according to the Islamic Religion, and divorced her at her 

village, Ein Yabroud, on the 11th of October 1960, by telling her (You are divorced 

from me) and abstained thereafter from marital relations, and departed to an 

unknown destination in the United States, requested the confirmation of divorce. 

(Emphasis supplied.) 

This version of the Arabic text is somewhat ambiguous, since it is not clear 

• whether "thereafter" modifies "departed" as well as "abstained." The critical 

portion of the original text may be translated more accurately, however, to read : 

* * After he divorced her, he left for an unknown place * * *. 

584 
Interim Decision #1348 

of 1961. On that basis, he would have left Jordan. in about December 

of 1959 or January 1960. The immigration officer who took the statement referred to beneficiary's presentation of an air line ticket from 

Avianca (Colombian Airlines) for round-trip transportation from 

Beirut to San Juan. and return. The record does not show where or 

when the ticket was issued or whether any of the transportation covered thereby had been used. Thus, the possibility arises that beneficiary had returned to the Near East after he took up residence in 

Colombia!' 

The evidence that the declaration was executed in February of 1961 

conflicts with beneficiary's testimony that he received that document 

six, seven, or eight months after he arrived in Colombia, or about June 

to August 1960, if his statement about 18 months' residence in Colombia 

is accurate. Thus, either some of beneficiary's statements are in error 

or the facts are not as he represents them. 

As the record now stands, however, we find that beneficiary was in 

Colombia at the time the divorce is said to have occurred. Under Jordanian law beneficiary could have divorced his wife by a unilateral 

pronouncement of divorce in Colombia. Beneficiary, of course, denies 

that he divorced his wife at all, but the record otherwise discredits 

that statement. As we have seen, both the documentary evidence and 

the circumstances here refute beneficiary's statement that his Jordanian wife divorced him. Therefore, the evidence is inconclusive on 

the question whether an absentee divorce occurred. • 

In view of the discrepancies in the record and the highly informal 

circumstances under which the alleged divorce occurred, however, the 

possibility arises that beneficiary did repudiate his Jordanian wife 

after coming to this hemisphere and then arranged with her to pre8 The record does not contain any information from beneficiary's passport showing where and when he obtained his Colombian visa, departures from or entries 

into any country, or the place and date of issuance of his nonimmigrant visa 

for this country. Avianca operates to Europe via San Juan. Perhaps the officer 

misstated the information on the ticket. It may have read Bogota to Beirut 

( with a connecting carrier) via San Juan and return or simply Bogota to San 

Juan and return. Either of these situations would lit more logically into 

beneficiary's testimony. Moreover, beneficiary also presented a reentry permit 

issued on May 4, 1961, by the "Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores." The immigration officer did not note the country of issuance, but presumably it was 

Colombia. Thus beneficiary's round-trip ticket could be expected to provide 

transportation to that country. 

Although we think It unlikely, the ticket may have covered the beneficiary's 

initial trip from the Near East to this hemisphere. In that event the destination instead of Puerto Rico should have been Colombia. Another possibility, 

but one which we also think unlikely, is that beneficiary had previously returned 

to the Near East and in June of 1961 had traveled from Beirut to San Juan 

with a ticket providing for return transportation to Beirut. 

585 
Interim Decision #1348 

pare the declaration showing their status as divorced. 9On the basis 

of this record, we believe that if the divorce occurred at all it probably 

occurred under these circumstances. 

If by any chance, however, beneficiary divorced his wife by a single 

pronouncement of repudiation while he was in the village in Jordan, 

the record also raises a question on the finality of the divorce under 

Jordanian law. Beneficiary said in his sworn statement that he wrote 

to his Jordanian wife, presumably from Colombia, asking her to join 

him. Attempts by beneficiary at reconciliation, if they occurred during the idela period, would nullify such a repudiation. 10 

Thus, this highly unsatisfactory record does not establish that a 

divorce under Moslem law occurred at all. If, however, such a divorce 

did occur, we find that it was an absentee divorce pronounced in Colombia. A. Moslem divorce pronounced in a jurisdiction which does not 

ordinarily apply Moslem law raises a serious question of its validity.'t 

In the unlikely possibility a divorce occurred while beneficiary was 

in Jordan, the record does not establish that the divorce is final and 

valid under Jordanian law. 

Moreover, for reasons other than conflicting, statements, we accord 

little or no weight to the Jordanian wife's declaration and no weight 

to the court notice. Deficiencies in those documents further strengthen 

our conclusion that the record fails to establish a valid divorce. 

III. Evaluation of the documentary evidence of divorce 

We have shown that beneficiary's testimony conflicts in certain 

particulars with documentary evidence submitted by petitioner. We 

now consider the effect of that documentary evidence apart from any 

such conflict. Solely for purposes of discussing that effect, we shall 

assume that Puerto Rico would recognize a divorce pronounced under 

the circumstances alleged here. 

Regardless of objections which might be raised against beneficiary's 

Jordanian wife's declaration as unsworn, hearsay, or lacking proper 

authentication, we may accept it for our purposes for whatever probative value we might attach to it. We should then consider it simply 

as a statement by the wife, divesting it of any official character. 

That document would probably not be acceptable under Puerto 

Rican law, however. Apart from any question of lack of proper 

° The Palestinian Law of Marriage and Divorce Registration, adopted by Jordan, does not prescribe any particular formalities for the registration. Supra' 

" See Appendix "A." (Idda is the period during which a woman is prohibited 

from remarrying after dissolution of a marriage, i.e., the period of waiting for 

ascertainment of pregnancy.) 

"Compare Matter of If—, 7 I. & N. Dee. 556. See also Slaikoh v. Mutt', 257 

F. 2d 306 (C.A. 2, 1958). 

586 
Interim Decision #1348 

authentication and hearsay, the Code of Civil Procedure of 1933 contains specific provisions for conditions under which affidavits may be 

used." The use for which petitioner offers the declaration is not included.13In all cases not covered by the provisions for use of affidavits, a written declaration under oath must be a deposition as prescribed by the Code." The Puerto Rican Rules of Civil Procedure 

of 1958 have preserved the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 

of 1933 pertaining to affidavits and depositions. 

The Court Notice in Absentia handed down on September 9, 1962, 

by the religious court at Ramallah has in Jordan the effect of a judgment. The district director, as we have seen, contends that, even 

assuming beneficiary divorced Ms Jordanian wife on October 11, 1960, 

beneficiary was not free to marry petitioner at the time of their marriage because the divorce did not become final until the court's action 

hi 1962. The district director believes that the court attempted to 

grant a retroactive divorce to beneficiary's first wife. He argues that 

the retroactive effect of the judgment should be disregarded. On 

the other hand, petitioner's counsel argues that the judgment of the 

Qadi is similar to an appellate court's judgment affirming a decree 

of divorce. He says the decree would become final as of the time the 

lower court decision would be final in absence of an appeal. 

Neither of -these views correctly applies Jordanian law. The judgment is not in any way a judgment or decree of divorce and does not 

attempt to grant a retroactive divorce. It merely confirms a divorced 

status which. it recognizes already exists. Taking the facts as the 

court found them, the divorce became final as to both parties when the 

idda period elapsed without a resumption of the marital status. Assuming that the divorce could be satisfactorily established, it already 

bad full legal effect in. Jordan. 

Therefore, petitioner's counsel's contention that the Qadi's judgment 

does not affect the date upon which the divorce became final is correct, 

although his analogy to an appealed judgment of divorce is inappropriate. There has never been any decree of divorce here. The reli- 

" Sec. 490, 32 L.P.R.A. Sec. 2001. That provishin derived from the Act of 

March 9;1905 and 'Calif. Code of Civil Proc., See. 2009. 

Although the declaration registers the divorce under Jordanian law, it is, for 

our purposes, more in the nature of an affidavit. Even though unsworn the 

document might be given the effect of an affidavit, if its official character were 

recognized. 

" California law at the time of adoption of the Puerto Rican Code provided 

that Sec. 2009 applies only to matters of procedure and has no relation to proof 

of facts necessary to establish a fact in sustaining a cause of action. Leerabere v. Wise, 141 Cal. 554, 75 P. 185 (1904). This case still represents California 

law. 

" Code of Civil Proc., 1933, Sec. 406, 32 L.P.R.A. See. 2081. (Calif. Code of 

Civil Proc., Sec. 2019. 

587 
Interim Decision #1348 

gious court did not review any divorce proceedings, but merely determined for its purposes that a divorce had occurred as alleged. 

We consider the authenticity of the Qadi's judgment has not been 

established sufficiently for us to consider it as official evidence of beneficiary's status as a divorced person." The judgment of the religious 

judge has not been authenticated in a manner acceptable in Federal 

judicial proceedings." The certification of our vice consul in Jerusalem is merely an aclmowledgment of execution of the translation of 

the document. It serves to identify the translator. There is nothing 

to authenticate the signature of the judge or to certify that he is the 

official custodian of the record. Although the Federal Rules do not 

control our proceedings, we may be guided by them. 

The Puerto Rican Rules of Civil Procedure of 1943 contained a Rule 

44 identical, except for one slight variation, with Federal Rule 44. 

That rule was not continued in the 1958 edition of the Puerto Rican 

Rules. Section 431.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure remains in effect, 

however.' That section prescribes a form of authentication similar 

to the provisions of Rule 44. Thus the evidence of the judgment of the 

religious court in Ramallah is unacceptable in its present form for 

our purposes and probably would be unacceptable as evidence in a 

judicial proceeding in Puerto Rico." 

Even if the evidence of this judgment were in proper form, however, 

more fundamental objections to its evidentiary value arise. Neither 

of the parties were before the court. Beneficiary's Jordanian wife 

appeared only by her attorney. The judgment itself is described as 

a notice in absentia as to the defendant and recites that he had departed 

to an unknown destination in the United States. Service of the defendant was by publication only, probably by posting a notice at the 

Of. Ohms, Young vnetv v. Boyd, 809 F. Id 05T (0.A.. 0, 1082) ; Voich v_ r R., 

283 F. 2d 613 (C.A. 9, 1960) ; U.S. v. Grabina, 118 F. 2d 803 (CA. 2, 1941) ; 

Botazinski v. Lebi4, 65 N.J. Super. 483, 168 A. 2d (1961). 

Our order which, because of petitioner's submission of the Court Notice in 

Absentia, remanded these proceedings antedated the decision in Olotng Young 

Chow. 

F.R.O.P. Rule 44. 28 CSC 1741. 

3. * * Documents of any other class in a foreign country by the original or 

by a copy, certified by the legal keeper thereof, under, his seal if he has one, with 

a certificate of the minister or ambassador, or a consul, vice consul, or consular 

agent of the United States in such foreign country, to the effect that the document is a valid and subsisting document of such country, and that the copy is 

duly certified by the officer having the custody of the original. 89 See. 

1803.8. 

"We might consider evidence of this type, however, even though not properly 

authenticated, if it was accepted without objection into the record in adversary 

proceedings before a special inquiry officer. Mutter of OlEfuliivan., znt. Dec. No. 

1294. 

588 
Interim Decision #1348 

court or by inserting a notice in the local press. Moreover, no witnesses appeared. The court apparently considere.d no evidence except 

the ex parte statements of plaintiff's attorney. The court assumed defendant's concurrence because of his absence. 

Under these circumstances, minimum standards of due process of 

law have not been met. Generally, before extending recognition to 

foreign judgments, our courts require the judgments to reflect satisfaction of such minimum standards. Even jurisdictions which authorize service by publication in their own proceedings generally require personal service upon a party as a condition for recognition of a 

foreign judgment?' Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments on the basis of international comity are subject to much stronger 

inhibitions than applications of foreign law in genera1. 2° 

Even if there is no question about the propriety of the judgment 

here, proceedings of the type underlying that judgment may he conducive to fraud or collusion. For our purposes—irrespective of formal requirements—the judgment adds little or no probative force to 

the other evidence of record bearing upon beneficiary's status as a 

divorced person. 

The Puerto Rican Code of Civil Procedure—after providing specifically for foreign courts of admiralty and judgments against a specific 

thing—provides that in all other cases the judgment of any tribunal 

of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment, 

is presumptive evidence of a right between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title, and can only he repelled by 

evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, 

fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. 21This provision derived from 

the California Code of Civil Procedure. 22Such provisions indicate 

a legislative policy in favor of recognizing foreign judgments. Courts, 

however, in determining whether a particular judgment will be recognized, are apt to be guided by fundamental legal principles and 

to give effect to the legislative policy where application of the statutory directive would not conflict with those principles. 23Moreover, 

"People v. Baker, 76 N.Y. 78 (1870)—decree of divorce. Hilton v. Gupot, 159 

U.S. 113 (1895). See also 3 Freeman, Judgments Secs. 1497-98 (5th Ed., 1925). 

2°Cheatham, Dowling, Goodrich, Cams on Conflict of Laws 274 (1936). 

2' Sec. 428, 32 L.P.R.A. Sec. 1800. 

12Calif. Code of Civil Proc. Sec.1915. 

Cf. Lichtic v. Ziehtip, 81 P.R.R. 718 (1800) ; Pence v. F. Badrena and Hijos, 

74 P.R.R. 210 (1952). 

See also, R. B. Perez Mercado, .Reconociniiento Validez y Medios pare hewer 

Electives Bentencias Extranjeras en Puerto Rico, 20 Rev. Jun U.P.R. 345 (1951) ; 

Comment, "Recognition of Foreign Country Divorces : Is Domicile Really Necessary?" 40 Calif. L. Rev. 93 (1952) ; Nete, "Recognition of Foreign Country 

Divorce Decrees in California," 2 Hastings L.S. 86 (1950). 

589 
Interim Decision #1348 

the statutes recognize lack of jurisdiction and want of personal service as grounds for possible nonrecognition. We believe a court in 

Puerto Rico, regardless of any question of compliance with formal 

requirements of authentication and certification, would not give effect 

to the Qadi's judgment. 

IV. Validity of the Puerto Rican marriage 

Generally, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico relies upon the principle of nationality, rather than domicile or place of marriage, in 

choosing the law to be applied to determine the effect of a marriage. 24 

The nationality rule applies most clearly where both spouses are citizens or both are noncitizens of Puerto Rico." Moreover, the cases 

we have found applied the national law of tho noncitizens not to the 

marriages themselves, which occurred outside Puerto Rico, but to the 

controversy's subject matter—located within Puerto Rico. 

Apparently the application of the nationality principle where one 

spouse is a citizen and the other a noncitizen of Puerto Rico has not 

been authoritatively decided. Ordinarily, in such a situation we 

would expect the court to follow the husband's law—except for Puerto 

Rican requirements for the form of celebration of the marriage if the 

marriage occurred there. Quite clearly, however, a Puerto Rican 

court would not apply beneficiary's national substantive law, which 

recognizes polygamy. 

We are positive, therefore, that, regardless of beneficiary's alien 

status, and regardless of his domicile, Puerto Rico would apply its 

own substantive law to the marriage which occurred there, especially 

since petitioner is Puerto Rican. 

Marriage in. Puerto Rico is a social institution, regulated and controlled by public authority." Puerto Rican statutory provisions exaCabana v. Nadal, 23 P.R.R. 691 (1916) ; Antongiorgi v. Registrar of Property, 6 P.R.R. 493 (1904) ; Cothran r. Registrar of Arecibo, 25 P.R:R. 602 (1917) ; 

Los Ooniiictos De Leyes En Materia De Matrimonio, Inmuebles Gananciales V 

Divorcio Begun La Doctrine Puertorriguena, 9 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 95 (1939). For 

nationals of the United States the court applies a modified nationality doctrine 

referring to citizens of Puerto Rico or of the individual states. 

In our jurisprudence the rule that the place of marriage governs the marriage's validity applies particularly to the celebration of the marriage whereas 

the law of the domicile frequently affects the validity of the resulting marital 

status. Er parte Suzanne, 295 F. 713 (Mass., 1924) . 

aCases cited supra". 

aU.S. v. Vega, 3 P.R. Fed. 480 (1908) ; Bravo v. _Franco, 1 D.P.U. 242 (1902) ; 

Perez v. Leon, 52 P.R.R. 496 (1938), appeal dismissed 99 F. 2d 851 (1938) sub nom. 

Leon v. Tomcats. 

Sec. 68, Civil Code, 1930, 31 L.P.R.A. Sec. 221, provides:- 

Marriage is a civil institution, originating in a civil contract whereby a man 

and a woman mutually agree to become husband and wife and to discharge toward 

590 
Interim Decision #1348 

pressly declare that a marriage not contracted and solemnized in 

accordance with the provisions of law is invalid." The Civil Code of 

Puerto Rico also specifically provides that a marriage is invalid if 

contracted by a person who is already legally married. 28 

Moreover, the public attorney may bring an action for a declaration 

of nullity of a marriage.29The Puerto Rican Law of evidence contains a presumption that a man and woman deporting themselves as 

husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, 

but that presumption may be overconle. 3° In any event, as we have 

seen, such a presumption is inapplicable here. A certified copy of a 

record of the civil registry constitutes only prima facie evidence of 

its contents and may be rebutted. 31 

Although the Puerto Rican Code provisions declaring the invalidity 

of marriages not complying with the statutory requirements are express and in mandatory terms, the courts have determined whether 

noncompliance with particular requirements of the statutes renders a 

marriage void ab initio or merely voidable. The Supreme Court of 

Puerto Rico, has held, however, that a marriage contracted by a person 

already legally married is void and not merely voidable. 32 

The Puerto Rican legislature and Judiciary have each expressed a 

strong public policy against marriage without termination of a prior 

marriage. Petitioner has not established that beneficiary has the legal 

capacity to contract marriage with her. Therefore, on the evidence 

here, the marriage between petitioner and beneficiary is not valid in 

Puerto Rico. 

The petition depends upon the validity of that marriage. Therefore, it must fail. For the reasons discussed herein, we approve the 

district director's order denying the petition. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the order of the district director denying the petition be, and hereby is, approved. 

each other the duties imposed by law. It is valid only when contracted and 

solemnized in accordance with the provisions of law ; and it may be dissolved 

before the death of either party only in the cases expressly provided for in this 

title. 

2TAmong the requisites for validity of a marriage the Civil Code prescribes : 

* * * authorization and celebration of a matrimonial contract according to 

the forms' and solemnities prescribed by law. Civil Code, 1930, Sec. 69(3), 31 

L.P.R.A. Sec. 231(3). 

When a marriage has not been contracted according to the requirements of this 

title, the same is null and void. Civil Code, 1930, Sec. 110. 31 L.P.R.A. See. 411. 

Civil Code, 1930, Sees. 69 and 70, 31 L.P.R.A. Sees. 231 and 232. 

Civil Code, 1930, See. 111, 31 L.P.R.A. Sec. 412. 

3° Code of Civil Pros., 1933, Sec. 464 (29), 32 L.P.R.A. Sec. 1887(29). 

"Code of Civil Pros., 1D33, Sec. 433, 32 L.P.R.A. Sec. 1805; Rotate of Felix 

Halos, 63 P.R.R. 72 (1244). 

Cruz v. Ramos, 70 P.R.R. 681 (1949). 

591 
'Interim Decision #18=18 

APPENDIX A 

Jordanian Law No. 92 of 1951 on. Faimly Rights provides in part: 

Art. 66—A husband of sound mind has the right to divorce his wife. 

Art. 67—During a valid marriage, or during the idda period, a wife is sub- . 

ject to divorce. The wife whose marriage has been annulled is not subject 

to divorce even during the idda -period. 

Art. 68—A divorce pronounced under the influence of intoxication or compulsion is not valid. 

Art. 69—Every husband is entitled to three pronouncements of divorce 

against his wife. 

Art. 70—A contingent revocable repudiation conditioned on performing an 

act or refraining from performing such act is not valid. 

Art. 71—A divorce is not valid unless the pronouncement of repudiation is 

addressed or directed to the wife. 

Art. 72—Any pronouncement of repudiation made by number or number sign 

in excess of one shall be considered as one pronouncement only. 

Art. 78—A wife may return to her husband after the first or second pronouncement, but after the third pronouncement she becomes irrevocably 

divorced. 

Art. 74—Every divorce is revocable except : the one where repudiation has 

been pronounced three times ; one made before consummation of marriage; 

one conditioned on a payable sum of money; and every divorce mentioned 

in this law as irrevocable. 1 Art. 76—A conditional divorce is valid. 

Art. 76—A divorce pronouncement conditioned to become effective in the 

future is valid. 

Art. 77—A complaint by the husband seeking a judicial divorce cannot be 

entertained unless the divorce is registered with the religious judge. 

However, any evidence presented to the court by the wife related to a 

divorce not initiated in the presence of the religious judge is accepted. 

Art. 78—The revocable divorce does not dissolve the marriage tie immediately. The husband is entitled to his martial rights which can be displayed by statement or action during the idda. This right is irrevocable. 

Art 79--If a husband returns to his repudiated wife during her idda period, 

he preserves his marriage and his returning is not contingent on the wife's 

consent or on a new dower. 

Art. 80—Any return intended for the future or made subject to a condition 

will not be valid. 

Art. 81—The irrevocable repudiation terminates immediately the marital 

life. However, if the irrevocable repudiation was made by one or two 

pronouncements, the renewal of the marriage contract is not prohibited. 

If it was made after the third declaration, the prohibition is final. 

Art. 82—The irrevocable divorce can be ended by the wife observing the 

idda, being lawfully married to another man, and the marriage consummated. 

592