UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

GLORIA SPICE, on behalf of herself )

and all others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:16-CV-366-TLS

)

BLATT, HASENMILLER, LIEBSKER )

& MOORE LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Gloria Spice, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, has brought this 

class action against Blatt, Hasenmiller, Liebsker & Moore LLC, asserting a violation of the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. This matter is before the Court 

on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification [ECF No. 28]. For reasons stated herein, the 

Court grants class certification. 

BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff seeks to certify the following class:

All individuals in the State of Indiana to whom Defendant sent, within one year 

before the date of the original complaint1and in connection with the collection of 

a debt, a letter based upon the Template. The Template is defined as the form debt 

collection letter upon which the April 20, 2016 and April 21, 2016 letters that the 

Defendant sent to the Plaintiff are based, containing the language: “As of the date 

of this letter, you owe [dollar amount].”

 

1 The Plaintiff filed her original complaint on October 18, 2016. The proposed class therefore has a time 

period between October 18, 2015, and October 18, 2016.
2

(Pl. Mot. for Class Cert. 1.) The crux of the Plaintiff’s argument is that the Defendant used this 

language (“As of the date of this letter, you owe [dollar amount].”) for both consumer debts 

subject to the accrual of interest and those not subject to the interest accrual. The language in the 

Template, therefore, can be reasonably interpreted in multiple ways and thus violates the 

FDCPA.

The Defendant is an entity that, in some instances and for some purposes, uses the mail 

and telephone to collect debts. (Class Action Compl. ¶¶ 20–21, ECF No. 1; Def. Answer ¶¶ 20–

21, ECF No. 12.) The Plaintiff allegedly owed consumer debts to two creditors, neither of which

are the Defendant. (Class Action Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23.) The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant 

mailed three letters to her in an attempt to collect the debts, and these three letters form the basis 

of the Plaintiff’s suit. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 33, 42.)

The first letter involved a debt allegedly owed to a Midland Funding, LLC account 

number ending -0557 (MF-0557 Debt). (Id. at ¶ 25.) The Defendant sent the Plaintiff a letter, 

dated April 20, 2016, which states: “As of the date of this letter, you owe $14,599.73.” (Id. at ¶¶ 

26, 28; id., Ex. A.) The April 20, 2016, letter was the initial communication between the 

Defendant and the Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the MF-0557 Debt. (Id. at ¶ 27; 

Pl. Mot. for Class Cert., Ex. B ¶ 5.) As well, the MF-0557 Debt is reduced to judgment, which 

provides that the debt will accrue interest at 8% per annum. (Class Action Compl., ¶¶ 29–31; id., 

Ex. B.)

The second letter involved a debt allegedly owed to Bank of America, with an account 

number ending -3344 (BoA-3344 Debt). (Id. at ¶ 33.) The Defendant sent the Plaintiff a letter, 

dated April 21, 2016, which states: “As of the date of this letter, you owe $33,230.90.” (Id. at ¶¶

34, 36; id., Ex. C.) The April 21, 2016, letter was the initial communication between the 
3

Defendant and the Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the BoA-3344 Debt. (Id. at ¶ 35; 

Pl. Mot. for Class Cert., Ex. B ¶ 5.) Additionally, the BoA-3344 Debt is reduced to judgment, 

which provides that the debt will not accrue any interest. (Class Action Compl., ¶¶ 37–39; id., 

Ex. D.)

The third letter involved another debt allegedly owed to Bank of America, with an 

account number ending -6122 (BoA-6122 Debt). (Id. at ¶ 42.) The Defendant sent the Plaintiff a 

letter, also dated April 21, 2016, which states: “As of the date of this letter, you owe $4,735.80.” 

(Id. at ¶¶ 34, 36; id., Ex. E.) This April 21, 2016, letter was the initial communication between 

the Defendant and the Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the BoA-6122 Debt. (Id. at ¶ 

44; Pl. Mot. for Class Cert., Ex. B ¶ 5.) The BoA-6122 Debt is reduced to judgment, which 

provides that interest on the debt will accrue “as provided by law until paid in full.” (Class 

Action Compl., ¶¶ 46–48; id., Ex. F.)

The Plaintiff was not the only person to receive this type of letter from the Defendant. 

During the proposed class period—October 18, 2015, through October 18, 2016—the Defendant 

estimates that it mailed a letter based on the same template or form as the April 2016 letters to 

approximately 86,106 individuals2 within the proposed class definition. (Def. Opp’n to Mot. for 

Class Cert. 14.) The Defendant possesses the names, addresses, and phone numbers of each 

potential member of the class as defined, and has agreed to preserve such information. (Pl. Mot. 

for Class Cert., Ex. A ¶ 18.)

 

2 The Defendant originally estimated that the proposed class contained a minimum of 55,000 members. 

(Pl. Mot. for Class Cert., Ex. A ¶ 18.) The Defendant attributes the change in estimate to a clerical error. 

(Def. Opp’n to Mot. for Class Cert. 14 n.5.)
4

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Class Certification

If a proposed class meets all of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) 

and one of the requirements of Rule 23(b), then class certification is proper. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23; Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 1992). Rule 23(a) is satisfied if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 

defenses of the class; and 

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 

class. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4); Kress v. CCA of Tenn., LLC, 694 F.3d 890, 892–93 (7th Cir. 2012). 

If all of these prerequisites are met, the Court must also find that at least one of the subsections 

of Rule 23(b) is satisfied. As relevant here, Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied if:

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members 

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 

action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 

the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:

(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the 

prosecution or defense of separate actions; 

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 

controversy already begun by or against class members; 

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the 

claims in the particular forum; and 

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Harper v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 581 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 2009). 
5

A plaintiff who fulfills both conditions of Rule 23 is entitled to class certification. See 

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010) (“[Rule 23] 

creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his 

claim as a class action.”). However, Rule 23 “does not set forth a mere pleading standard”; 

rather, a plaintiff “must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule [and] be 

prepared to prove” its requirements. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). 

In deciding whether Rule 23 has been satisfied, the district court undertakes “a rigorous analysis” 

by making the necessary factual and legal inquiries. Id.; Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 

F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001). This analysis may require some overlap with the merits of the 

Plaintiff’s underlying claim. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351.

B. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)

The FDCPA provides that “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or

misleading representation or means in collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Section 1692e

furnishes a nonexclusive list of prohibited practices, including the following: false representation

of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt, § 1692e(2)(A); threat to take any action that

cannot legally be taken, § 1692e(5); and use of any false representation or deceptive means to

collect or attempt to collect any debt, § 1692e(10). Section 1692f further prohibits debt collectors

from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1692f.

The court asks “whether a person of modest education and limited commercial savvy 

would be likely to be deceived” when it examines whether a debt collection letter violates 

§ 1692e or § 1692f. McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1019 (7th Cir. 2014) 
6

(quoting Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 774 (7th Cir. 2007)). In other 

words, the court views the letter as if it were an “unsophisticated consumer.” Id. (citing Lox v. 

CDA, Ltd., 689 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2012)).

ANALYSIS

The Plaintiff seeks to certify the following class:

All individuals in the State of Indiana to whom Defendant sent, within one year 

before the date of the original complaint and in connection with the collection of a 

debt, a letter based upon the Template. The Template is defined as the form debt 

collection letter upon which the April 20, 2016 and April 21, 2016 letters that the 

Defendant sent to the Plaintiff are based, containing the language: “As of the date 

of this letter, you owe [dollar amount].”

(Pl. Mot. for Class Cert. 1.) The Plaintiff asserts that the proposed class satisfies the requirements 

of Rule 23(a), and also satisfies Rule 23(b)(3). The Plaintiff also requests the Court appoint 

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC as class counsel. 

The Defendant objects to class certification. First, the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff 

is not an adequate class representative because she agreed to class action waiver provisions in the 

terms and conditions for two of the accounts at issue. Second, the Defendant maintains that the

proposed class is not readily ascertainable and that each proposed class member is subject to 

differing arbitration and class action waiver provisions. Third, the Defendant argues that a class 

action is not a superior means of adjudicating the Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim. Finally, the 

Defendant claims that the Plaintiff is not represented by adequate class counsel. The Court finds 

the Defendant’s positions unpersuasive, for the reasons that follow.
7

A. The Arbitration Agreements

The Defendant insists that the Plaintiff must arbitrate her claims against the Defendant 

because the Plaintiff’s two Bank of America accounts include an arbitration clause in their terms 

and conditions. (Def. Opp’n to Mot. for Class Cert., Ex. A 14–15, ECF No. 42-1; see also Def. 

Opp’n to Mot. for Class Cert., Ex. B 15, ECF No. 42-2.) 3 According to the Defendant, this 

precludes the Plaintiff from serving as a class representative. See, e.g., A.D. v. Credit One Bank, 

N.A., No. 14 C 10106, 2016 WL 4417077, at *10–11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2016) (denying class 

certification by applying the estoppel doctrine to bind the named plaintiff, a non-signatory minor 

child, to an arbitration agreement entered into by her mother); Korea Week, Inc. v. Got Capital, 

LLC, NO. 15-6351, 2016 WL 3049490, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2016) (denying class 

certification where the named plaintiff agreed not to be a representative plaintiff in a class action 

when it signed a commercial financing contract with the defendant). This would be true if the 

Plaintiff brought an action against Bank of America. However, the Plaintiff has not. Further, the 

Defendant has not argued that an exception applies to the general rule that an arbitration 

agreement binds only the parties to the arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. 

Watts Indus., Inc., 417 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Fyrnetics (H.K.) Ltd. v. Quantum 

Grp., 293 F.3d 1023, 1029 (7th Cir. 2002)).

A debt collector is not an employee, agent, or assignee of a creditor, but rather an 

independent contractor. See Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 729 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[D]ebt 

collectors are independent contractors[.]”). As such, there is no contractual relationship between 

the Plaintiff and the Defendant to arbitrate any dispute between the parties. See Pierre v. 

Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No. 16 C 2895, 2017 WL 1427070, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2017).

 

3 Bank of America is the successor-in-interest by acquisition of MBNA America Bank, N.A. and FIA 

Card Services, N.A.
8

Therefore, the arbitration agreements between the Plaintiff and Bank of America do not preclude 

her from representing the proposed class.

B. Objectively Identifiable Class

To properly certify a class, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that “class members can be 

ascertained based on objective criteria.” Ramirez v. Palisades Collection LLC, 250 F.R.D. 366, 

369 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citing Foreman v. PRA III, LLC, No. 05 C 3372, 2007 WL 704478, at *5 

(N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2007)). The Court should deny certification if it must conduct individual minitrials to determine whether a potential class member falls within the proposed class. Id.

The Defendant asserts that the Court will need to conduct individualized inquiries to 

determine whether potential class members are subject to either arbitration clauses or class 

actions waivers through agreements with their original creditors. This concern, however, is better 

addressed as a predominance issue, and as such the Court will elaborate on this argument when it 

discusses Rule 23(b)(3) later in this Opinion and Order.

The Plaintiff has shown that the proposed class is sufficiently identifiable. In written 

discovery responses, the Defendant estimates that the proposed class includes approximately

86,106 individuals, states that the Defendant possesses the names, addresses, and phone numbers 

of each potential member of the class as defined, and agrees to preserve such information. The 

parties can determine whether potential class members possess a consumer debt through either 

the Defendant’s business records (such as the credit card terms and service agreements), or by 

asking potential class members if their respective debts stem from a consumer credit account. 

See Selburg v. Virtuoso Sourcing Grp., LLC, No. 1:11-CV-1458, 2012 WL 4514152, at *3 (S.D. 

Ind. Sept. 29, 2012). Additionally, while the Defendant contends otherwise, class members do 
9

not need to have had a judgment entered against them to be a part of the proposed class. See

Ruge v. Delta Outsource Grp., Inc., No. 15 CV 10865, 2017 WL 959017, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 

13, 2017). Accordingly, the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an objectively identifiable class, and 

the Court proceeds to the next portion of its analysis.

C. Rule 23(a)

1. Numerosity—Rule 23(a)(1)

To meet the numerosity requirement, the class must be so large “that joinder of all 

members is impracticable.” Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “[T]here is no magic number needed to establish numerosity.” Donovan v. St. 

Joseph Cty. Sheriff, No. 3:11-CV-133, 2012 WL 1601314, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 3, 2012)

(citation omitted). Accordingly, a plaintiff need not plead or prove the exact number of class 

members to establish numerosity under Rule 23(a)(1). Marcial v. Coronet Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 

954, 957 (7th Cir. 1989). Moreover, a court may make common sense assumptions to determine 

numerosity. See Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 797 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding numerosity after 

the plaintiff introduced evidence that “support[ed] a much larger estimate”). Generally, joinder 

of forty or more members satisfies the numerosity requirement. See Swanson v. Am. Consumer 

Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 n.9 (7th Cir. 1969).

In this case, the Defendant admitted that it sent materially identical letters based on the 

Template to over 86,000 individuals in Indiana within a year before the Plaintiff filed its original 

complaint. The Plaintiff alleges that the language contained in these letters violates the FDCPA. 

The Court finds this class size of over 86,000 sufficiently numerous to make joinder 

impracticable. See Jackson v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., 227 F.R.D. 284, 287 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
10

2. Commonality—Rule 23(a)(2)

Subsection (a)(2) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit has clarified that, “[a]lthough a court need only 

find a single common question of law or fact, the mere occurrence of all plaintiffs suffering as a 

result of a violation of the same provision of law is not enough. The claims must depend upon a 

common contention that is capable of class-wide resolution,” Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 800 

F.3d 360, 374 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), which “means that determination of its truth or 

falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke,” 

Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. This common contention exists where “the defendants have engaged in 

standardized conduct towards members of the proposed class.” Chandler v. Sw. Jeep-Eagle, Inc., 

162 F.R.D. 302, 308 (N.D. Ill. 1995).

Standard form collection letters are often present in FDCPA class actions, and also often 

satisfy the commonality requirement in Rule 23(a). See, e.g., Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 

(7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he defendants have engaged in standardized conduct towards members of 

the proposed class by mailing to them allegedly illegal form letters or documents.”) (citations 

omitted); Quiroz v. Revenue Prod. Mgmt., Inc., 252 F.R.D. 438, 442 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“The 

requisite common nucleus of operative fact exists in FDCPA cases when the controversy arises 

from a standard form debt collection letter.”) (citations omitted); Jackson, 227 F.R.D. at 287

(“Courts have consistently found there to be a common nucleus of operative fact where a class’s 

claims arise out of standardized or form documents.”) (citations omitted). The instant case is no 

different.

The Plaintiff’s claims, and those of the class, originate from the same common practice of 

the Defendant. The Defendant sent over 86,000 potential class members a standardized debt 
11

collection letter. The standardized letter failed to indicate whether interest would accrue on the 

consumer debt, and the Defendant used the same standardized letter to collect consumer debts 

that would accrue interest and those that would not. Each class member therefore has an identical 

FDCPA claim. The Court, therefore, finds that there are questions of law or fact common to the 

class.

3. Typicality—Rule 23(a)(3)

Under the typicality requirement in Rule 23, “the named representatives’ claims [must] 

have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” De La Fuente v. 

Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983). This question—whether claims are 

typical of those of the class members the Plaintiff represents—is “closely related to the 

commonality inquiry.” Keele, 149 F.3d at 595. The Seventh Circuit has summarized the 

typicality analysis as follows:

A claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct 

that gives rise to the claims of other class members and . . . [it is] based on the same 

legal theory. Even though some factual variations may not defeat typicality, the 

requirement is meant to ensure that the named representative’s claims have the 

same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.

Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted); see also De La Fuente, 713 F.2d at 232 (“The typicality requirement may be 

satisfied even if there are factual differences between” class member’s claims, so long as those 

claims “arise[] from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims 

of other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.”).

Once again, the standard form collection letters that are often present in FDCPA class 

actions usually satisfy the typicality requirement in Rule 23(a). See, e.g., Hale v. AFNI, Inc., 264 
12

F.R.D. 402, 405 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“[The plaintiff’s] claim is typical to the class because it arises 

from the same form letter allegedly received by all class members, and it is based on the same 

legal theory that the letter violates the FDCPA.”) (citing De La Fuente, 713 F.2d at 232); 

Chapman v. Worldwide Asset Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 04 C 7625, 2005 WL 2171168, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 

Aug. 30, 2005) (“[A]ll members of the class will be persons who received the form notice. There 

is no indication that named plaintiff is situated differently than other members of the class. The 

typicality requirement is satisfied.”).

Here, the Plaintiff and the proposed class members possess the same interests and 

suffered the same injury as a result of the Defendant’s common practice. The Plaintiff seeks the 

same relief on behalf of the proposed class members as she seeks for herself. She is a member of 

the proposed class, and her claims are typical of the claims of the class.

4. Adequacy of Representation—Rule 23(a)(4)

The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff failed to satisfy the adequacy requirement of Rule 

23(a). Rule 23(a)(4) requires that a class representative “fairly and adequately protect the 

interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) 

serves to uncover conflicts of interest between the named parties and the class they seek to 

represent.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). To adequately represent 

the class, a named plaintiff must have a sufficient stake in the outcome of the case to ensure 

zealous advocacy and must not have antagonistic or conflicting claims with other class members. 

Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1018. A plaintiff must also show that their legal counsel is experienced and 

competent. Id.
13

The Plaintiff alleges that she experienced the same injury as the other members of the 

proposed class, and she signed a sworn affidavit stating that she has no adverse interests to the 

class and that she will vigorously pursue the class members’ claims with their best interests in 

mind. (Pl. Mot. for Class Cert., Ex. B ¶¶ 7–9.) The Defendant has not produced any evidence to 

show a conflict of interest between the Plaintiff and the proposed class members. Instead, the 

Defendant counters that the Plaintiff cannot adequately represent the class because she agreed to 

class action waiver provisions in the terms and conditions of her Bank of America accounts. As 

stated previously, the Court disagrees; the agreements produced by the Defendant only apply to 

disputes between the Plaintiff and Bank of America. The agreements, therefore, have no bearing 

on whether the Plaintiff will adequately represent the class. See Pierre, 2017 WL 1427070, at *9

(explaining that “the benefits of any class action waiver or arbitration provision contained in 

underlying credit agreements do not redound to [the debt collector]” but instead remain with the 

original lender).

Next, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff is not represented by adequate counsel. 

Again, the Court disagrees. Rule 23 requires that the Court certifying a class also appoint class 

counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B), (g). Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the 

interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4). In appointing class counsel, the Court must 

consider the following: 

(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the 

action; (ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, 

and the types of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the 

applicable law; and (iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the 

class. 
14

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). The Court may also consider “any other matter pertinent to 

counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(g)(1)(B). 

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC has overseen multiple FDCPA class actions. 

See, e.g., Jordan v. Freedom Nat’l Ins. Servs. Inc., No. CV-16-00362, 2016 WL 5363752 (D. 

Ariz. Sept. 26, 2016); see also Pl. Mot. for Class Cert. Ex. C ¶¶ 2–9. And, contrary to 

Defendant’s assertions, Attorney Joseph Panvini has previously been appointed as a lead counsel 

for a certified class. (Pl. Reply re Mot. for Class Cert. 35–36, ECF No. 46.) Attorney Panvini has 

also represented the Plaintiff thus far, and assisted in identifying the legal issues and other 

potential class members through discovery. As such, the Plaintiff has produced sufficient 

evidence to convince the Court that Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC is experienced 

handling FDCPA class actions, has knowledge of the applicable law, and has the appropriate 

resources to commit to representing both the Plaintiff and the proposed class in this action.

The Plaintiff has carried her burden to show that she and her counsel will fairly and 

adequately protect the interests of the class. As the Plaintiff has satisfied all requirements of Rule 

23(a), the Court will proceed to the next portion of its analysis.

D. Rule 23(b)

Because the Rule 23(a) requirements are met, the Court must next assess whether class 

action is appropriate under at least one of the provisions of Rule 23(b). The Plaintiff asserts that 

she can appropriately maintain the proposed class action under Rule 23(b)(3). 

Rule 23(b)(3) applies to most classes seeking monetary relief. The Rule requires that 

“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting 
15

only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676. The Supreme Court 

has explained that the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) serve to limit 

class certification to cases where “a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and 

expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without 

sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.” Amchem Prods., 521 

U.S. at 615 (quotations and citation omitted). The Court examines each of these requirements in 

turn.

1. Predominance

The Supreme Court has described predominance in broad terms, explaining that the Rule 

23(b)(3) inquiry “trains on the legal or factual questions that qualify each class member’s case as 

a genuine controversy,” with the purpose being to determine “whether a proposed class is 

sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Id. at 623, 625. This “requires a 

showing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions will be 

answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 

U.S. 455, 459 (2013). In other words, a plaintiff must show that common evidence, as opposed to 

evidence that is individual to each class member, could suffice to show the alleged violation. 

Messner v. Northshore Univ. HelathSys., 669 F.3d 802, 818 (7th Cir. 2012). Though the 

predominance analysis “call[s] for caution when individual stakes are high and disparities among 

class members [are] great,” Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 625, the Seventh Circuit has also 

warned that, “[t]he office of a Rule 23(b)(3) certification ruling is not to adjudicate the case; 

rather it is to select the method best suited to adjudication of the controversy fairly and 

efficiently,” Bell, 800 F.3d at 376 (citing Amgen Inc., 568 U.S. at 459). “In conducting this 
16

analysis, the court should not turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for the 

trial on the merits.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

The Defendant contends that arbitration and class action waiver provisions are included 

in many of the putative class members’ original agreements, and these provisions require 

individualized inquiries into each class member. Therefore, common issues do not predominate 

over individual issues. The Court, once again, disagrees. The Court finds that any arbitration or 

class action waiver provisions included in the putative class members’ original agreements are 

irrelevant to the predominance inquiry. See Pierre, 2017 WL 1427070, at *9. The original 

agreements bind individual class members and their respective original lender; the Defendant 

cannot appropriate any benefit in these agreements from the original lenders. The Plaintiff sued

only the Defendant for its role as a debt collector, and has not brought suit against any entity that 

was a party to the credit agreements that the Defendant alleges contain arbitration and class 

action provisions. The Court need not make these individualized inquiries to resolve the 

proposed class members’ claims.

4

See Quiroz, 252 F.R.D. at 444.

Further, the Court finds that common issues predominate in the instant case. The 

Plaintiff’s claims stem from specific conduct related to a specific thing: a letter based on the 

Template, and the Defendant’s mailing of such a letter to the Plaintiff. Proposed class members’ 

claims stem from the same specific conduct and the same specific thing. This identical conduct, 

involving a letter based on the same Template, results in several specific issues that are common

to all proposed class members. These issues include, but are not limited to: Whether the 

Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined in the FDCPA; whether mailing the form letter is an 

“attempt[] to collect debts” under the FDCPA; and whether the form letter included “any false, 

 

4 While the Defendant has not indicated that this is the case, any class member who has signed a class 

action waiver or arbitration agreement with the Defendant may be barred from joining the proposed class.
17

deceptive, or misleading representation” under the FDCPA when the form letter stated: “as of the 

date of this letter, you owe [amount].” Additionally, the FDCPA is a strict liability statute with 

an objective standard and, therefore, individual consumers’ subjective understanding of the form 

letter is irrelevant to the analysis. See Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 800 (7th Cir. 

2009). Resolving the common questions in this case will involve objective and class wide proof. 

The Court is satisfied that common issues predominate over individualized inquiries.

2. Superiority 

Under the superiority requirement, a class action should proceed under Rule 23(b)(3) 

only if it is superior to other methods for adjudicating the claims of the members of the proposed 

class. Considerations relevant to the superiority of the class action device include: 

(A) the class members’ interest in individually controlling the prosecution or 

defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning 

the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or 

undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; 

and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). 

“FDCPA class actions are usually superior for reasons of judicial economy.” Pawelczak 

v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc., 286 F.R.D. 381, 387 (N.D. Ill. 2012). This is a usual case. There is 

no suggestion that any class member has initiated separate litigation on these issues or that the 

federal district court in the Northern District of Indiana is a less desirable or appropriate forum 

than another. The Defendant counters that a class action is not the superior means of adjudicating 

the claims of the proposed class because each class member’s recovery will be de minimis

compared to the potential recovery in an individual action. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)

(class recovery “not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt 
18

collector”), with 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) (permitting individual action recovery up to 

$1,000). 5

The Court disagrees. The plain language of the FDCPA supports class certification even 

where individual class member recovery is likely de minimis. The statutory language provides 

that class damages are to be awarded “without regard to a minimum individual recovery . . . .” 15 

U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(ii). Additionally, proposed class members may not be aware of their 

rights, or may not be willing to take on the burden of an individual action. As such, in the 

Seventh Circuit, “[w]hen individual class members are offered the right and opportunity to opt 

out of the class action, the statutory language ‘without regard to a minimum individual recovery’ 

generally controls.” Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting 15 

U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(ii)). The personal notice and opt-out requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) 

protect the interests of those who qualify as class members and desire to bring their claims 

separately. See Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Rule 23 

allows district courts to devise imaginative solutions to problems created by the presence in a 

class action litigation of individual damages issues.”). The Court, therefore, finds that proceeding 

as a class is superior to other methods for adjudicating the claims of the members of the 

proposed class, even if individual class member recovery is likely de minimis.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court certifies the following class:

All individuals in the State of Indiana to whom Defendant sent—between October 

18, 2015, and October 18, 2016—in connection with the collection of a debt, a letter 

based upon the Template. The Template is defined as the form debt collection letter 

upon which the April 20, 2016, and April 21, 2016, letters that the Defendant sent 

to the Plaintiff are based, containing the language: “As of the date of this letter, you 

owe [dollar amount].”

 

5 The Defendant estimates that 1% of its net worth is approximately $16,000. (Def. Opp’n to Mot. for 

Class Cert. 15.) Under this estimate, an individual class for the proposed class of 86,000 would recover

approximately $0.19.
19

CONCLUSION

The Plaintiff has satisfied the requisite elements of Rule 23(a)(1)–(4), Rule 23(b)(3), and 

Rule 23(g). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification [ECF 

No. 28]. 

The Court appoints Thompson Consumer Law Group PLLC as Class Counsel. 

SO ORDERED on January 24, 2018.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann

CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT