No. 83-431 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1984 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF 

C.F.B., JR., a minor. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable John M. McCarvel, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

J. V. Barron, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Brett Asselstine, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted on briefs: November 3, 1983 

Decided: March 29, 1984 

Filed: 

?dAR 2 9 i984 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice L.C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

The natural father, C.F.B., Sr., appeals the Cascade 

County District Court's termination of his parental rights 

to C.F.B., Jr., a minor. We affirm. 

The natural mother and C.F.B., Sr., the natural 

father, were married in Great Falls, Montana, in 1977. One 

child, a son, was born as issue of the marriage. The 

marriage was dissolved on October 4, 1979. The natural 

mother was awarded custody of the minor child and the 

natural father was ordered to pay $100 per month for his 

support plus dental, hospital, optical and medical bills for 

the child. 

The natural mother married J.F.B., the adoptive 

father, on December 21, 1980. The adoptive father filed a 

petition to adopt C.F.B., Jr., on July 8, 1983. The 

petition alleged that the natural father had not contributed 

to the support of the child during the previous three years 

and was $4,200 in arrears in support payments. 

On July 10, 1983, the adoptive father filed a petition 

to terminate the parental rights of the natural father 

pursuant to Section 4-8-lll(l)(a)(v), MCA which provides 

that consent for adoption is not required from the natural 

father if he does not contribute to the support of the child 

during a period of one year before the filing of the 

petition for adoption. 

The natural father made a support payment of $100 to 

the Clerk of Court on July 8, 1983, the same date the 

adoptive father filed a petition for the adoption of the 
child. He also made a $150 payment on July 26, 1983, and a 

$100 payment on August 16, 1983. The record indicates no 

other support payments were made. 

A hearing on the motion to terminate the natural 

father's parental rights was held on August 22, 1983. The 

District Court found that the natural father was able to pay 

child support but failed to do so during the period of three 

years and nine months prior to the filing of the petition 

for adoption and his consent to the adoption was not 

required under the provisions of Section 40-8-lll(l)(a)(v), 

MCA. Hence, the District Court ordered that the natural 

father's parental rights be terminated. 

The natural father then applied to the District Court 

for a stay of execution of its order terminating his 

parental rights pending this appeal. The District Court 

granted the application and the natural father brings this 

appeal raising one issue for our consideration: Was there 

sufficient evidence to support a finding that the 

requirements of Section 4-8-lll(l)(a)(v), MCA, were 

satisfied, thus terminating the parental rights of 

appellant? 

Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence 

that he did not contribute to his son's support during the 

year preceding the filing of the petition for adoption. 

Appellant bases his assertion on the fact that he made a 

$100 payment to the Clerk of Court on the day the petition 

was filed and respondent has failed to carry his burden of 

proof that appellant has not contributed to the support of 

the child during the year preceding the filing of the 

petition. 
Section 40-8-lll(l)(a)(v), MCA, provides: 

"(1) An adoption of a child may be 

decreed when there have been filed 

written consents to adoption executed by: 

"(a) both parents, if living, or the 

surviving parent of a child, provided 

that consent is not required from a 

father or mother: 

"(v) if it is proven to the satisfaction 

of the court that the father or mother, 

if able, has not contributed to the 

support of the child during a period of 1 

year before the filing of a petition for 

adoption;" 

Thus, Section 4-8-lll(l)(a)(v), MCA, sets forth a 

two-pronged test to determine whether the natural parent's 

consent is required for adoption. First, it must be 

determined whether the nonconsenting parent has not 

contributed to the support of the child during a period of 

one year before the filing of the petition for adoption and, 

second, it must be determined whether the nonconsenting 

parent had the ability to contribute to the child's support. 

In the Matter of the Adoption of S.L.R. (Mont. 1982), 640 

P.2d 886, 39 St.Rep. 156. The burden rests on the 

petitioner to show that the requirements of Section 

4-8-lll(l)(a)(v), MCA, have been met and strict statutory 

compliance is required. In the Matter of Challeen (1977), 

172 Mont. 362, 563 P.2d 1120; In re Adoption of Biery 

(1974), 164 Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377. Our basic policy in 

adoption cases has been that a statute should not be 

interpreted in favor of a parent who seeks the benefit of 

parental rights but shuns the burden of parental 

I47 

obligations. In Re Burton's Adoption (1956), =Cal.App.2d 

125, 305 P.2d 185; cited with approval in In the Matter of 
the Adoption of R.A.S. (Mont. 1984), No. 83-175 and In the 

Matter of the Adoption of S.L.R., supra. 

In the recent case of In the Matter of the Adoption of 

R.A.S., supra, we decided a question that is dispositive of 

the issue presented in the case at bar. In holding that the 

consent of the natural father was not required for the 

adoption of the minor child we said: 

". . . We hold that to construe the 

statute as requiring the nonconsenting 

parent to remain current within one year 

on his or her support payments is in 

accord with the policy of the adoption 

statutes and the intent of the 

legislature." 

In the case at bar, appellant was three years and 

$4,200 behind on his child support payments. It is clear 

from the record that he had the ability to make support 

payments. Thus, it need only be determined whether he had 

not contributed to the support of the child during a period 

of one year prior to the filing of the petition for 

adoption. Since the natural father's payments of $100 on 

July 8, 1983, $150 on July 26, 1983 and $100 on August 16, 

1983 were insufficient to bring him current in support 

payments within one year prior to the filing of the petition 

for adoption our decision in In the Matter of the Adoption 

of R.A.S., supra, clearly indicates his consent to the 

adoption was not required. 

Affirmed. 
We concur: 

Chief Justice 

Justices 
M 1 . Chief Justice Haswell, d-issenting. 

I I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I am 

unable to approve the majori.tyls statutory construction of 

section 40-8-111(1), MCA. 

The statute provides in pertinent part: 

" (1) An adoption of a child may be decreed . . . 

" (v) if it is proven to the satisfaction 

of the court that the father . . . if 

able, has not contributed to the support 

of the child during a period of one year 

before the filing of a petition for 

adoption; . . ." 

Here the petition was filed on the same day that the 

natural father contributed $100 to the support of the minor 

child. Thus, the father contributed to the support of the 

child "during a period of one year before the filing of a 

petition for adoption" and his consent to the ad-option was 

required. 

This Court has long required strict compliance with the 

adoption statute because of the harshness of permanently 

terminating parental rights. Adoption of Biery (1974) , 164 

Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377; In the Matter of the Adoption of 

Smigaj (1977), 171 Mont. 537, 560 P.2d 141; In the Matter of 

Challeen (1977), 172 Mont. 362, 563 P.2d 1120; Matter of the 

Adoption of S.L.R. (Mont. 1982), 640 P.2d 886, 39 St.Rep. 

The decision in this case today and in the companion 

case of Adoption of RAS (1984), No. 83-175, indicate that 

only lip service will be given to this rule in the future in 

order to achieve result-oriented decisions. 

I would reverse the District Court. 

34 49.gq4 Chief Justice 

We join in the foregoing dissent of Chief Justice Baswell.