IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 01-31039

Summary Calendar

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ALBERT MACKLIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, Etc; ET AL

Defendants

THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, a municipal corporation; RICHARD PENNINGTON, New

Orleans Police Chief, in his individual and official capacity; MARC MORIAL, Mayor of the City

of New Orleans, in his official and individual capacity,

Defendants-Appellees

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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

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July 25, 2002

Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

In this case, we issued an order directing Appellant Albert Macklin (“Macklin”) and his

counsel, Kenneth M. Plaisance (“Plaisance”), to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for

making frivolous arguments on appeal. Macklin and Plaisance responded to the show cause order,

arguing that they should not be sanctioned because the appeal as a whole was not totally without
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merit. Because they fail to adequately explain the abysmal quality of the briefing and the frivolous

nature of the arguments, we conclude that sanctions are appropriate. 

Macklin’s case was a § 1983 action alleging several violations of his rights arising out of his

dismissal from the New Orleans police force following an off-duty incident in which he struck a man

over the head with his police baton and then lied to investigators about it. After the district court

granted summary judgment against him, he argued on appeal that its application of the local rules

violated “principles of right and justice” and equal protection. He also contended, without citation

or argument, that Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 facially violated equal protection and the Seventh Amendment

right to a jury trial. Regarding his dismissal from the police force, he argued that his due process

rights were violated because he was not given a pre-suspension hearing or a name clearing hearing.

In a previous opinion, we rejected all of these contentions and, unable to overlook the sloppiness of

the brief and the obvious lack of support for the arguments, issued the show cause order. See

Macklin v. City of New Orleans, 2002 WL 1155441 (5th Cir. May 31, 2002) (affirming district court

and detailing failings of brief). 

In the response to our show cause order, Plaisance notes that he has represented plaintiffsin

two similar cases, both of which involve the dismissal of officers from the police force. Although

these other appeals were both unsuccessful, they did not give rise to sanctions. A review of these

briefs reveals that Plaisance made some of the identical, unsupported claims in these cases as in the

present case. For example, in Brooks v. City of New Orleans, No. 01-31013, he argued that the

summary judgment proceedings violated the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Of course,

asin the present case, he offered no support for that discredited theory. See Plaisance v. Phelps, 845

F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he right to trial by jury does not prevent a court from granting
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summary judgment.”). Moreover, in both cases, he made vague and unsupported arguments that the

district court applied its local rules inconsistently with “the principles of right and justice.” He cited

no instance ofunequaltreatment or discrimination in either case, referring merelyto isolated instances

in which he received unfavorable rulings or the opposing party received favorable rulings.

In all three cases–the present case, Brooks, and Lee v. Morial, No. 01-30875–Plaisance

argued that the district court erred in denying his clients’ claims for a name clearing hearing despite

the fact that there was no evidence that any of his clients ever requested one. This practice is

particularly troubling. In Macklin’s case, as our opinion noted, the district court held that he was not

entitled to a name clearing hearing because he did not request one. In so holding, the district court

was on solid legal ground, asthe requirement that such a hearing be requested by the claimant is wellestablished in Fifth Circuit law. See Rosenstein v. City of Dallas, 876 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 1989).

Moreover, a panel in another one of Plaisance’s cases alerted him to this unfavorable caselaw. See

Lee v. Morial, No. 01-30875 (listing Fifth Circuit cases holding that plaintiff must request a name

clearing hearing). Nevertheless, rather than disclosing this contrary authority and attempting to

distinguish it, Plaisance simply ignored it and urged his discredited argument yet again in Macklin’s

case.

Unfortunately, the briefs Plaisance submitted in support of the response to our show cause

order offer even more examples of histendency to advance argumentsin the face of contrary binding

authority. He argued that his clients were all denied due process because they were suspended

without the benefit of a pre-suspension hearing. Under settled Fifth Circuit precedent, however, it

is sufficient that the officers were given post-suspension hearings. See, e.g., Caine v. M.D. Hardy,

943 F.2d 1406, 1412 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc). In his briefs, Plaisance did not mention this contrary
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authority, relying instead on general holdingsthat the termination of public employeesimplicates due

process concerns. This pattern of conduct, in which Plaisance repeatedly filed appeals that he knew

had been foreclosed by our prior caselaw, merits sanctions.

In an attempt to avoid sanctions for this indefensible behavior, Macklin and Plaisance argue

that we cannot impose sanctions unless we find that the appeal as a whole is frivolous. In other

words, they suggest that we must determine that each and every argument in the appeal is frivolous.

This is not the standard. See In re Perry, 918 F.3d 931, 934-35 (6th Cir. 1990); Hill v. Norfolk & W.

Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (“It would be strange if by the happenstance ofincluding

one colorable (though losing) claim amidst an ocean of frivolous ones, a litigant could ward off all

sanctions.”). Even if this were the proper standard, sanctions are appropriate in this case, as Macklin

has identified no nonfrivolous arguments. Drawing on the court’s euphemistic characterization of

his frivolous arguments as “novel”, Plaisance contends that sanctioning new arguments on account

of their novelty is inappropriate. Certainly, sanctioning a party for presenting an issue of first

impression would not be permissible, asit would unduly chill advocacy. See Estiverne v. Sak’s Fifth

Avenue, 9 F.3d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (declining to levy sanctions for appeal

involving issue offirst impression). Euphemism aside, however, Plaisance’s arguments are not novel;

they have been rejected by well-established law. In any case, to the extent that Plaisance wants to

advance a new argument, he mayalert the court to contrary precedent and explain why the law should

be changed. Repeatedly ignoring the unfavorable precedent, even after being alerted to it by a district

court ruling, is not the proper way to proceed. Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 1988)

(per curiam) (holding that although novel theories should not be chilled, sanctions “are merited for

a frivolous appeal the result of which is obvious from the comprehensive and decisive exposition of
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the law by the judge below”); see also Olympia Co. v. Celotex Corp., 771 F.2d 888, 893 (5th Cir.

1985)(per curiam)(awarding sanctions where appellant failed to address district court’slegalreasons

for denying summary judgment).

In sum, we hold that Plaisance has repeatedly advanced arguments on appeal that have been

squarely rejected by FifthCircuit caselaw, even after being alerted to the unfavorable authority by the

district court. We therefore conclude that pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38, sanctions are appropriate

to redress this abuse of the appellate process. Furthermore, because the quality of the research and

briefing is within the province of the attorney, we think it appropriate to place the primary burden of

the sanctions on Plaisance. See Coghlan, 852 F.2d at 816-17 (holding although client is ultimately

responsible for single costs, burden of sanctions would be placed on attorney). Accordingly, we

direct Plaisance to pay appellee sanctions in the amount of $700 plus double costs, to be determined

on remand to the district court. We also warn Plaisance that any future abuse of the appellate process

in cases he files with this court will surely result in harsher sanctions and disciplinary action.