Hayes v. State, No. 500, September Term, 2019 & Winston v. State, No. 556, September 

Term, 2019 (consolidated). Opinion by Nazarian, J.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – VOIR DIRE

Under Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1 (2020), a trial court must, on request, ask during voir dire

whether any prospective jurors are unwilling or unable to comply with the jury instructions 

on the long-standing fundamental principles of the presumption of innocence, the State’s 

burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify. 

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – VOIR DIRE – PRESERVATION

A criminal defendant must preserve for appellate review their request for voir dire

questions relating to prospective jurors’ willingness or ability to comply with the jury 

instructions on the long-standing fundamental principles of the presumption of innocence, 

the State’s burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify. 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case Nos. 117354034, 117354033

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Nos. 500 & 556

September Term, 2019

_________________________

CONSOLIDATED CASES

ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

______________________________________

No. 500

TONYA HAYES 

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________

No. 556

MARQUESE WINSTON

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________

Nazarian,

Beachley,

Battaglia, Lynne A.

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Nazarian, J.

______________________________________

Filed: August 25, 2020
A popular bartender, Alex Wroblewski, was shot and killed at a Royal Farms store 

in Locust Point, where he had stopped on his way home after a shift. After a joint trial in 

the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a jury found Tonya Hayes guilty of transporting a 

handgun in a vehicle and conspiracy to transport a handgun in a vehicle and Marquese

Winston guilty of second-degree murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime 

of violence, transporting a handgun in a vehicle, conspiracy to transport a handgun in a 

vehicle, and carrying a handgun on his person. Ms. Hayes and Mr. Winston raise numerous 

challenges to their convictions. We reverse the convictions and remand both cases for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. BACKGROUND

We recount the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

State, the prevailing party. Surveillance cameras captured the incident, and the jury heard 

eyewitness testimony alongside the footage. 

On November 14, 2017, Lawrence Greene worked the graveyard shift at the Royal 

Farms. That night, Mr. Wroblewski, who was a regular, came in at around 1:00 a.m.,

whereas he “normally [came] in between 2:30 and 3:00 in the morning.” According to 

Mr. Greene, Mr. Wroblewski “was toasted when he came in.” He remained in the store for 

about fifteen minutes and ordered food, but as he was leaving, “[h]e was stumbling all over 

the place.” At that point, Mr. Greene saw “a young boy and then a older woman, the 

woman, heavyset, light skinned” come into Royal Farms. When the two saw 

Mr. Wroblewski, “the young man got really happy” and “was jumping up and down, 

skipping.” When Mr. Wroblewski left the store, the two followed him. Video surveillance 
2

at Royal Farms confirmed everything to this point. 

Mr. Wroblewski’s condition and the behavior of the young man and older woman

led Mr. Greene to go check on Mr. Wroblewski. As he approached, he heard a “bang” and 

went “all the way up by [Mr. Wroblewski],” saw that he was “laying on his back,” and 

“checked his pulse and [saw] that he was still living, he was still breathing and everything.” 

Mr. Greene observed that Mr. Wroblewski still had “his food, his bag, his cell phone and 

[] his wallet . . . beside him.” He went back in the store and told another employee to 

call 911. 

Kiara Giddons was the cashier on duty that night. She described Mr. Wroblewski as 

“wasted” when he arrived. She testified that after he paid for his food, he went towards the 

window where there was a bar stool, and he sat there for a minute. Ms. Giddons saw “three 

people—two people getting out the car, [] a lady and a man getting out the car. And the 

other guy [] just sat in the car. They parked [near] the gas station.” Ms. Giddons saw the 

woman and the man come into the store, and when Mr. Wroblewski left, the pair

immediately left as well. Ms. Giddons testified that she walked outside and saw 

Mr. Wroblewski walking up the street, then she “heard one gunshot.” She and Mr. Greene 

ran to where Mr. Wroblewski was lying, and Ms. Giddons then ran back in the store to 

call 911. 

Lasheka Moore was the manager on duty. She testified that Mr. Wroblewski “was 

a regular” at the Royal Farms, but that night, “he spent a little bit more time than usual in 

the deli area” and “[a]ctually laid his head on top of the deli.” Ms. Moore “walked over to 

[Mr. Wroblewski] and was, like, hey, why don’t you go ahead and sit down, eat your food, 
3

wait for your friends to come[,]” and he replied “that he was okay.” She testified that 

Mr. Wroblewski was in the store for about “10, 15 minutes” and when he left, “he was 

staggering on his way out the door.” She observed that the Black male and the Black female 

to whom Mr. Greene and Ms. Giddons referred in their testimony seemed “a little off” 

because “they came and pulled up to the gas pump, but didn’t purchase anything.” 

Ms. Moore identified Mr. Winston as the Black man and Ms. Hayes as the Black woman. 

Ms. Moore testified further that Mr. Wroblewski left the store and walked “towards 

the Bank of America ATM machine.” Mr. Winston then walked out ahead of Ms. Hayes,

but when Ms. Hayes “was exiting the store, she looked in the direction of 

[Mr. Wroblewski], then looked back at the car.” Ms. Moore saw Mr. Winston go to the 

back seat of the car, where “another male pops up out the car.” Mr. Winston walked off a 

little bit, “and then the male that’s in the backseat gets out the car and throws his hood over 

his head.” They both “went walking across the parking lot towards the direction that 

[Mr. Wroblewski] was going in.” Ms. Hayes “jumped in the driver’s side, pulled off slow, 

like as if she was behind them.” 

Ms. Moore testified that at that point, she “grabbed a broom and [] went outside to 

sweep the sidewalk, [] made it to about the Bank of America ATM machine, [when she] 

heard a gunshot.” She later identified all individuals involved through a photo array. 

Dr. Patricia Aronica was the medical examiner who performed Mr. Wroblewski’s 

autopsy. She testified that Mr. Wroblewski had “an entrance gunshot wound to the 

abdomen and there were also some additional injuries which were multiple abrasions which 

are like scrapes and scratches where the top layer of the skin comes off and then some 
4

bruising were also noted.” She assigned the cause of death as the gunshot wound and the 

manner of death as homicide. Dr. Aronica described how the gunshot wound killed him:

[THE STATE]: And what type of wound would you have 

considered this as far as—would it have been considered a 

rapidly fatal wound or not so rapid, how would you describe 

this wound?

[DR. ARONICA]: Well, this is a fatal wound but because it 

hit—the bullet hit all these veins, it’s a slower bleeding wound 

then say if it hit arteries. It’s going to bleed slower, it’s also 

going to cause intestinal contents to come out into the abdomen 

so it has great potential for infection, if they were able to stop 

all of the bleeding, but there was massive amount of blood loss 

but it would be slower and very difficult because of all the 

injuries that it did create to the veins. 

She opined that there was “no evidence of close range firing” and that “[t]he level of 

alcohol had no effect on [Mr. Wroblewski’s] death.” 

Tivontre Gatling-Mouzon,

1 who pled guilty to conspiracy to commit armed robbery 

for his involvement in the killing of Mr. Wroblewski, testified on behalf of the State. 

Mr. Mouzon is Ms. Hayes’s son. He testified that Ms. Hayes picked him and Mr. Winston 

up in Richmond, Virginia to drive to Baltimore to pick up his younger sister, 

Tiana Witherspoon, who was living there with her father. They stopped that night at 

Royal Farms to get gas after picking up Ms. Witherspoon. 

Mr. Mouzon testified that Mr. Winston and Ms. Hayes went into the store while he 

sat in the car with his sister. While they waited, Mr. Winston came back to the car and 

“reached down by [his] leg.” Mr. Winston asked Mr. Mouzon “to come with him around 

 

1 Although he has a hyphenated last name, Mr. Mouzon testified that he preferred to be 

called “Mr. Mouzon.” 
5

the corner . . . .” Mr. Mouzon followed Mr. Winston and saw him “conversating with the 

victim, arguing . . . .” He described this encounter as “a confrontation.” Then Mr. Winston 

approached Mr. Wroblewski, and Mr. Mouzon “s[aw] the gun[]” in Mr. Winston’s hand. 

After more confrontation, he began to head back to the car, but before he got in he “heard 

a shot.” By then, Mr. Winston “was already coming to the passenger side to get in.” They 

all left the area and went back to Richmond. 

Detective Jonathan Riker was the homicide detective assigned to the case. He

testified that he put the Royal Farms surveillance video on social media to try to locate the 

individuals responsible for killing Mr. Wroblewski. Through social media, Detective Riker 

was able to identify the woman as Ms. Hayes. He then reached out to Ms. Witherspoon’s 

father, Steven Witherspoon. Mr. Witherspoon identified Mr. Winston as the male in the 

video and he also was able to identify Mr. Mouzon. Detective Riker located Mr. Mouzon 

in Richmond. The Detective put Ms. Hayes’s vehicle information in the National Crime 

Information Center database and was able to locate her and Mr. Winston in Atlanta, 

Georgia; Officer Justin Hartsfield, a police officer in Atlanta, pulled Ms. Hayes over in her 

vehicle in response to a “Be On The Lookout” (“BOLO”) alert identifying her as “armed 

and dangerous.” The Atlanta Police then contacted Detective Riker, who along with 

Detective Dave Moynihan, flew to Atlanta to interview Ms. Hayes and Mr. Winston.

No gun was ever recovered. 

Mr. Winston testified in his own defense. He testified that on the evening of 

November 14, 2017, Ms. Hayes drove up from Atlanta, where she was living, and picked 

him up to drive to Baltimore to “pick up her daughter.” According to Mr. Winston, they 
6

did not intend to stay the night in Baltimore and planned to travel immediately back to 

Richmond after picking up Ms. Witherspoon. He testified that before and while heading to 

Baltimore, he had been drinking vodka and beer, had used cocaine and marijuana, and was 

intoxicated. 

Mr. Winston testified that after they picked up Ms. Witherspoon, they stopped at

Royal Farms. When they approached the store, he saw “Mr. Wroblewski coming out the 

store, [and] witnessed [Mr. Wroblewski] hock spit in [Ms. Hayes’s] direction.” This made 

him feel “disrespected.” He said that he did not immediately confront Mr. Wroblewski 

because he was “under the influence, it didn’t sink in right then and there.” He was 

“carrying [his] gun” into the Royal Farms because he did not want “to leave a gun inside 

of a car with the kids.” He left the store to “catch up” with Mr. Wroblewski “[t]o make him 

aware of his actions and to get an apology.” Mr. Winston “confront[ed] [Mr. Wroblewski] 

and let[] [Mr. Wroblewski] know that he just spit at [Ms. Hayes] and he needed to 

give . . . an apology.” Mr. Winston testified that during the confrontation, Mr. Wroblewski 

“started to swing with his [right] hand.” Mr. Winston then “backed up,” “pull[ed] a gun 

from [his] right hand and fir[ed]” “[o]ne time.” After he shot Mr. Wroblewski, he “ran to 

the car” and “told [Ms. Hayes] to drive.” 

The jury found Ms. Hayes guilty of transporting a handgun in a vehicle and 

conspiracy to transport a handgun in a vehicle. The jury acquitted Ms. Hayes of attempted 

robbery with a dangerous weapon, attempted robbery, conspiracy to use a handgun in the 

commission of a crime of violence, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous 

weapon, and conspiracy to commit robbery. The court sentenced her to three years’
7

incarceration for transporting a handgun in a vehicle and three years’ incarceration for 

conspiracy to transport a handgun in a vehicle, all but one year suspended, consecutive to 

the sentence for transporting a handgun in a vehicle. The court also imposed a probation 

period of thirty days. 

The jury found Mr. Winston guilty of second-degree murder, use of a handgun in 

the commission of a crime of violence, transporting a handgun in a vehicle, conspiracy to 

transport a handgun in a vehicle, and carrying a handgun on his person. The court sentenced 

Mr. Winston to forty years’ incarceration, suspending all but thirty, for second-degree 

murder; ten years’ incarceration for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of 

violence, consecutive to the sentence for second-degree murder; three years’ incarceration 

for transporting a handgun in a vehicle, concurrent with all other sentences; three years’

incarceration for conspiracy to carry a handgun in a vehicle, to run concurrent with all other 

sentences; and three years’ incarceration for carrying a handgun, concurrent with all other 

sentences. 

Ms. Hayes and Mr. Winston filed timely notices of appeal. We consolidated their 

appeals because they present overlapping issues, arise from the same operative facts, and 

were tried together in the circuit court. We supply additional facts as needed below. 

II. DISCUSSION

Ms. Hayes and Mr. Winston raise various issues that we rephrase.2 First, both

 

2 Ms. Hayes frames the questions presented in her brief as follows:

1. Is the evidence sufficient to convict Ms. Hayes?

2. Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct on necessity?
8

Ms. Hayes and Mr. Winston argue that the circuit court abused its discretion in declining 

to ask voir dire questions about the State’s burden of proof and the defendant’s right not to 

testify. Second, both Ms. Hayes and Mr. Winston raise challenges to certain jury 

instructions the court gave, or declined to give, before deliberation. Third, Mr. Winston 

lodges a constitutional challenge, asserting that his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth

Amendment was violated. Fourth, Ms. Hayes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support her convictions. Finally, Ms. Hayes asserts that she received ineffective assistance 

of counsel at trial. We reverse the convictions on the ground that the circuit court abused 

its discretion when it failed to propound the voir dire questions regarding the State’s burden 

of proof and the defendant’s right not to testify.

A. The Voir Dire Questions.

During voir dire, Mr. Winston’s counsel requested that the court ask the potential 

 

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to ask 

requested voir dire questions?

4. Did the trial court ask voir dire questions in such a manner 

that improperly shifted the burden of determining the 

juror’s bias to the juror and was trial counsel ineffective for 

failing to object?

5. Did the trial court err in giving a flight instruction? 

Mr. Winston frames the questions presented in his brief as follows:

1. Did the trial court err by refusing to ask the voir dire 

questions requested by the defense?

2. Did the trial court err by refusing to instruct the jury on 

imperfect self-defense?

3. Did the trial court err by denying Appellant’s motion to 

dismiss for lack of a speedy trial? 
9

jurors two questions about the burden of proof and presumption of innocence. The court 

denied the request: 

[MR. WINSTON’S COUNSEL]: Yes. The next request would 

be, as far as defense voir dire would be question number 20, 

defense’s proposed voir dire for Mr. Winston, “In a criminal 

case like this one, each side may present arguments about 

the evidence but only the State has the burden of proof. The 

defendant need not testify on his own behalf nor present 

any evidence. Would you hold it against the defendant if he 

were to exercise his Constitutional right to remain silent 

and/or his right to not present evidence?” I would ask that 

this question be asked, included in the Court’s voir dire. I 

would also point out that during jury selection in this case, the 

last time there were individuals that answered this question. 

THE COURT: Okay. That is covered by the instructions, it is 

a classic catechizing voir dire question and the case law is 

again clear that not only is not required but it’s disfavored so 

I’m not going to ask that. 

[MR. WINSTON’S COUNSEL]: All right. Just but again note 

my objection for the record. I would also request defense jury 

voir dire question number 21, “You must presume the 

defendant innocent of the charges now and throughout the 

trial unless and until after you have heard all of the 

evidence, the State convinces you of his guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. If you do not consider the defendant 

innocent now or if you are not sure you will require the 

State to convince you of his guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt, please stand.” I would again ask that this question be 

read and again indicate that people did answer this question 

when it was on the proposed voir dire during our last jury 

selection. 

THE COURT: All right. Again, that is a classic catechizing 

question, believe me, the jurors when they come up for their 

individual responses will be reminded repeatedly that your 

client and Ms. Hayes are presumed to be innocent and that the 

burden rests with the State but I’m not going to ask that 

question.

[MR. WINSTON’S COUNSEL]: And again, I just note my 

objection. . . . 
10

(emphasis added). Both Ms. Hayes and Mr. Winston assert that the circuit court was 

required to ask this question, and that reversal is required in light of the Court of Appeals’s 

recent decision in Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1 (2020), which reversed Twining v. State, 234 

Md. 97 (1964). We review “for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision as to whether to 

ask a voir dire question,” Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 356 (2014), and we agree that the 

court’s decision not to ask the question compels reversal for any defendant who requested 

it.

1. Ms. Hayes preserved this contention for appellate review. 

This last point is important, and harder than usual to resolve in this case. Because 

Kazadi was decided in the midst of the briefing, the parties filed supplemental briefs 

addressing the impact and application of that decision to these defendants. In its 

supplemental briefs in both cases, the State acknowledged that Kazadi, by its own terms, 

applied to “‘any other cases that are pending on direct appeal when th[at] opinion was filed, 

where the relevant question has been preserved for appellate review’” (quoting Kazadi, 

467 Md. at 47). The State also conceded that both Mr. Winston and Ms. Hayes are entitled 

to reversal and a new trial under Kazadi. When we read the transcript in preparing our 

initial opinion, we determined that during the court’s review of proposed voir dire

questions, Mr. Winston’s counsel objected to the court’s refusal to ask questions 20 and 

21, but Ms. Hayes’s counsel didn’t. And because the preservation requirement identified 

in Kazadi was not met as to Ms. Hayes, we held that she was not entitled to relief under 

Kazadi. 

After our initial opinion was released on August 3, 2020, Ms. Hayes moved for 
11

reconsideration. Her motion raised two arguments. We can dispose quickly of the second, 

that the State’s concession that Ms. Hayes had preserved the Kazadi argument waived any 

preservation objection. The State’s concession of error does not bind us. Coley v. State, 

215 Md. App. 570, 572 n.2 (2013) (an appellate court is not bound by a party’s erroneous 

concession of error on a legal issue). Under Maryland Rule 8-131, we “will not decide any 

[] issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial 

court. . . .” 

As the ensuing discussion details, it takes a lot of careful parsing of the trial 

transcript and record to figure out what Ms. Hayes raised during voir dire and when. Mr. 

Winston asked twice for the Kazadi questions, and Ms. Hayes never joined those requests, 

despite joining other objections on other occasions. She argues now that she joined the 

Kazadi requests retroactively, but that doesn’t work. She did ultimately ask for the 

questions herself, but only when she submitted a complete list of requested voir dire 

questions to the court in writing. As we’ll explain, though, that request isn’t discernible 

from the transcript, which reveals only the fact of a list and a direction from the court to 

file it. It is only after pulling the filing from the record that we can see that Ms. Hayes did 

include them—perhaps unintentionally, but they’re there. 

Rule 4-323(c) requires parties to raise objections during voir dire and jury selection:

[I]t is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order is 

made or sought, makes known to the court the action that the 

party desires the court to take or the objection to the action of 

the court. The grounds for objection need not be stated unless 

these rules expressly provide otherwise or the court so directs. 

If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the 

time it is made, the absence of an objection at that time does 
12

not constitute a waiver of the objection.

If an opportunity to object presents itself and a defendant fails to object to a court’s refusal 

to read a proposed question, the objection is waived. Brice v. State, 225 Md. App. 666, 679 

(2015). And in cases involving multiple defendants, “each defendant must lodge his own 

objection in order to preserve it for appellate review and may not rely, for preservation 

purposes, on the mere fact that a co-defendant objected.” Williams v. State, 216 Md. App. 

235, 254 (2014). A defendant “may expressly join in an objection made by a co-defendant 

but he must expressly do so.” Id.

The parties’ opening briefs and supplemental briefs—understandably, in light of the 

State’s concession—say almost nothing about when and how Ms. Hayes raised the Kazadi

issue or joined Mr. Winston’s request. Ms. Hayes claimed in her opening brief that her 

counsel joined Mr. Winston’s request for the two voir dire questions, but the transcript 

reveals unequivocally that she didn’t join at the time Mr. Winston asked the court to read 

the questions. We noted in our original opinion that the only citation in Ms. Hayes’s brief 

identified a statement by counsel a day later in which counsel did say at that point in the 

transcript “I just want to say I want to incorporate the arguments of my co-counsel,” but 

the brief offered no discussion or context, and we found that the statement came after a 

discussion of voir dire question number 10. We also found, on our own, a passing (and 

uncited) mention (by Mr. Winston’s counsel) of questions 20 and 21 shortly after, but no 

reaction or joining then by Ms. Hayes’s counsel either. Even on reconsideration, nobody 

cites, and we still haven’t found, any omnibus statement that both defendants joined each 

other’s objections or any other way to bring Ms. Hayes within Mr. Winston’s objection. 
13

Ms. Hayes’s motion for reconsideration identifies a couple of additional places in 

the transcript, including the one we had found on our own, and contends that on two 

occasions during the second and third days of jury selection, she joined Mr. Winston’s 

counsel when he restated and reiterated all of his objections to that point. She also contends, 

for the first time, that before the close of voir dire, her counsel submitted a written set of 

voir dire questions that included the Kazadi questions. Her argument requires some fairly 

high-degree-of-difficulty gymnastics to follow and apply, so we now recount, in full, the 

voir dire in this case, both the portions Ms. Hayes cites and a number that she doesn’t.

The initial request for the court to include questions 20 and 21 came, as described

above, on the first morning of jury selection. We won’t quote it again, but as everyone 

acknowledges, counsel for Mr. Winston asked the court to include these questions, the 

court denied the request, and counsel for Ms. Hayes neither joined the objection nor said

anything else. Mr. Winston’s counsel was the defense side’s primary spokesperson on the 

voir dire questions, but not to the exclusion of Ms. Hayes’s counsel—the colloquy about 

questions 20 and 21 appears on pages 16–18 of that morning’s transcript, and on three other 

occasions in the immediately preceding eight pages, Ms. Hayes’s counsel specifically 

joined objections Mr. Winston had made:

THE COURT: Okay. So I’m inclined to stick with the pattern 

voir dire and I’m going to keep one and two the way they are.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Okay.

THE COURT: But your concerns are noted.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Okay. I just note my 

objection for the record.

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: Your Honor, for purposes of 
14

the record, I’ll join this objection as well.

3

* * *

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: For the record, defense 

counsel would request that these three questions be asked.

THE COURT: [Counsel for Ms. Hayes], I assume you’re 

joining in that?

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: Yes, I am.

4

* * *

THE COURT: So how about, “The State alleges that the 

defendants killed another individual using a firearm. Do you 

have strong feelings about murder or handguns?” You okay 

with that?

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: That would be 

acceptable, thank you, Your Honor.

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: That’s acceptable to Ms. 

Hayes, Your Honor.

5

Immediately before the discussion of questions 20 and 21, Mr. Winston raised 

objections that Ms. Hayes did not join:

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Just for the record, Your 

Honor, I would again and I’ve already read them into the 

record, just so the record is clear, we would be asking for our 

questions to be read as written. I think they--

THE COURT: I’m not trying to be obstreperous, is there any 

case law that says that any one of these questions are actually 

required questions?

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: I don’t have any case 

law[.] I would only put using it as just a fairness argument, 

there were people since we did begin jury selection in this case 

that did answer that they were involved with victim’s rights 

 

3 March 26, 2019 Transcript at 8:11–21 (discussion of proposed revisions to pattern voir 

dire questions 1 and 2) (emphasis added).

4

Id. at 10:19–11:20 (discussion of proposed questions 11, 12, and 13) (emphasis added).

5

Id. at 13:21–14:4 (in response to colloquy regarding the “strong feelings” question) 

(emphasis added).
15

groups specifically for—specific to this incident.

THE COURT: Okay.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Therefore, I think that in 

this particular case, it is important that those two questions be 

asked.

THE COURT: Well, again, I will ask the organizational bias 

question which I think gets to the exact same thing and is just 

as likely to uncover any basis for a strike for cause.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: I just would again note 

my objections for the record that our request is for defense’s 

jury instructions listed number 14 and 15, which have already 

been read into the record.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Yes. The next request 

would be, as far as defense voir dire would be question number 

20 . . . .

6

After the court denied Mr. Winston’s request to ask questions 20 and 21, 

Mr. Winston asked the court to ask question 22. Ms. Hayes did not join that request and 

the court denied it. Then, after colloquy about two mandatory questions, Mr. Winston asked 

the court to ask pattern question 15, which Ms. Hayes joined and the court granted (it too 

was mandatory):

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: We would ask for the 

pattern instruction 15, defendant’s person traits.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: “The defendant has 

identified himself as African American.”

THE COURT: Okay.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: “Do you have any strong 

feelings about the defendant’s race.”

THE COURT: All right. Again—

 

6

Id. at 15:20-16:25.
16

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: We will join in that request, 

Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I can say the defendants have identified 

themselves, I can do it that way?

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. That’s fine. All right. That’s a 

mandatory, I have no problem giving that if you want it.

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: Thank you.7

The parties and the court wrapped up their discussion of the voir dire questions, and 

when asked in so many words if she had anything else to raise, counsel for Ms. Hayes said 

no:

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: I think I’m just about 

done, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It’s easier to do it like this than having you 

huddled while the venire comes in so I’m glad we can get to it 

first thing. All right. [Counsel for Ms. Hayes], anything else?

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: No, Your Honor.

8

At that point, the venire entered the room, and the process of jury selection began. 

Throughout the discussion of the voir dire questions, though, Ms. Hayes’s counsel was 

involved and engaged, and appeared to make conscious decisions about when to join 

Mr. Winston’s objections and when not to. We’re not blessed with clairvoyance, nor is it 

our role to determine what motivates trial counsel, but counsel’s decisions not to join 

Mr. Winston’s objections in toto and to join individual objections selectively doesn’t look 

inadvertent. 

Over the rest of that day and the two that followed, questions 20 and 21 came up 

 

7

Id. at 20:11-21:3 (emphasis added).

8

Id. at 21:4-10 (emphasis added).
17

only one other time, on the second day. Rather than jumping ahead to that, though, we need 

to continue working chronologically to place Ms. Hayes’s current argument in context.

Later on the first day of jury selection, in an exchange Ms. Hayes cites in her motion 

for reconsideration, counsel for Mr. Winston renewed his objections relating to voir dire

generally. This occurred just as the court and parties were preparing to begin questioning 

individual jurors and, as Ms. Hayes notes, her counsel did join the renewal:

THE COURT: I’m sorry, you have a motion?

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Yes. I wanted to renew 

my objections to the Court voir dire, I will—ask to incorporate 

my arguments that have already been made.

THE COURT: Okay. Objection is noted for the record.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Thank you.

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: I join the objection.

THE COURT: Okay.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Thank you.9

Jury selection continued for the rest of the day and resumed the next morning. Right 

at the beginning of the second day, before Mr. Winston and Ms. Hayes returned to the 

courtroom, counsel for Mr. Winston renewed his motion as to the phrasing of questions 1 

and 2, which the court denied, then moved on to discuss question 10. During the discussion 

of question 10, and after the court directed the parties to submit copies of their voir dire

requests in writing for the court file, counsel for Ms. Hayes spoke up to join co-counsel’s 

arguments about questions 1 and 2:

THE COURT: Wait—[counsel for Ms. Hayes] wants to say 

something.

 

9

Id. at 361:19-362:4.
18

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: Thank you. I just want to say 

that I incorporate the arguments of my co-counsel. And I just 

wanted to point out to the Court that I think there were at least 

a few instances where individual jurors came up and said, you 

know, now that you have said this, I am now thinking of that 

incident.

I think the phraseology of those two questions, we need to have 

the repetition of “Are you familiar with the incident?” We had 

a couple of people that remembered it later on. I incorporate 

what co-counsel is requesting and I as that they be—those two 

questions as they have been phrased and as we as—worked 

with the original jurors in terms of phrasing the incident and 

the description of the location, be asked of our original panel 

coming back on Thursday again.

THE COURT: Okay. Denied.10

Ms. Hayes claims in her motion for reconsideration that this exchange included 

Mr. Winston’s request to ask questions 20 and 21. It didn’t. Counsel for Mr. Winston only 

brought up questions 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20 and 21 in the exchange that followed. And 

contrary to the claim in her motion, counsel for Ms. Hayes did not join or say anything 

when counsel for Mr. Winston reiterated his objections as to those questions, including the 

questions the court was not asking:

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Okay. And just so—and 

I will not reread the instructions, but I will make sure that a 

copy of the defense’s jury instruction requests (indiscernible 

9:29:40 a.m.) admitted into the record. But just to be clear, 

what I was asking for in lieu of the Court’s number 10 is 

defense under—with Mr. Winston’s voir dire, our number 11, 

12 and 13.

THE COURT: Okay.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Then moving on again, I 

believe we could—so as far as the charges, I believe the Court 

 

10 March 27, 2019 Transcript at 8:23-9:17 (emphasis added).
19

has made changes to those that are—

THE COURT: Yes.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: —compliant with—and I 

would be in agreement on that point. With the Court’s number 

16, I have or would again request, which I requested yesterday, 

which would be defense’s—under again, Marquese Winston’s 

voir dire, number 14, 15, 20 and 21.

And I did—I believe we also addressed this yesterday, there 

was—when we got—and I believe the Court added this and 

we’ll most—I believe the Court intends to add it again, when 

we get to the question—

Where’s the final question?

Court’s indulgence.

THE COURT: Right. The two I added yesterday about 

defense—defendant’s identification—self identification was 

African-American—

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Yes.

THE COURT: —and organizational bias, the—I will be 

reading the pattern voir dire questions on those two topics.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Thank you, Your Honor.

And I can go in—as far as—the one where—the question 

where Your Honor asks whether anyone’s been a victim of 

similar crimes, the Court will be making the addition of all the 

crimes—

THE COURT: Right.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: —that it listed 

yesterday—

THE COURT: Right.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: —before all three?

THE COURT: We’ll be saying, a victim of crimes similar to 

the crimes charged, which include homicide, robbery, armed 

robbery, assault, and handgun violence.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Thank you. We 

appreciate that.

So I would note that all those other objections of the questions 

I stated that the Court is not asking.
20

THE COURT: Okay.

11

 After handling some logistics, the court began the second day of voir dire. As 

the lunch recess approached, counsel for Mr. Winston renewed his objections to voir dire. 

At the court’s prompting, counsel for Ms. Hayes joined: 

[COUNSEL FOR MR. WINSTON]: Yes, for the record, Your 

Honor, I would renew all of my objections I made earlier to the 

Court’s voir dire, incorporate all further argument—all the 

arguments I made earlier.

THE COURT: All right.

And [counsel for Ms. Hayes] joins in your objection?

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: I join, yes.

THE COURT: And for the reason stated for the last two days, 

the objections are noted but overruled.12

Questions 20 and 21 were never discussed again, and to that point, Ms. Hayes had 

not preserved her Kazadi claim. Despite objecting or joining objections throughout the 

discussion of voir dire questions, she didn’t object or join Mr. Winston’s objections either 

time questions 20 and 21 were discussed specifically. We obviously can’t say what 

motivated these omissions, but counsel was present, engaged, and made objections before 

and after the court considered these questions. And although the transcripts do reveal two 

occasions when Ms. Hayes joined Mr. Winston’s objections en masse, those omnibus 

joinders happened only after counsel failed to object specifically as to questions 20 

and 21—indeed, each general joinder follows a failure to join the specific objection. 

Whether or not they were intended specifically to backfill counsel’s earlier decisions not 

 

11 Id. at 9:18-11:23 (emphasis added).

12 Id. at 119:9-20.
21

to ask for the Kazadi questions, those joinders cannot relate back to resurrect a request she 

hadn’t made. Williams, 216 Md. App. at 254 (“The appellant’s eleventh-hour piggybacking 

on [the co-defendant’s] renewal of his earlier objection does not, for the appellant, relate 

back to that earlier objection.”) (citing Md. Rule 4-323(a)). 

Ultimately, though, Ms. Hayes did raise the issue before voir dire ended, if just 

barely. On the morning of the third day, her counsel passed up to the court a copy of the 

voir dire questions that, she said, encompassed the objections of Mr. Winston’s that she 

had joined:

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: Your Honor, I have a copy 

of voir dire that encompasses the questions that I joined in 

Mr. Winston’s objections for the specific questions. So I’m just 

going to submit a copy so we have a written copy of the 

questions that you’re proposing in the court file, if I may 

please?

THE COURT: Okay.

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: I’ll approach.

THE COURT: Yes, you can put that in the file.

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: Oh, in the file? Okay.13

And although she identified this submission for the first time in her motion for 

reconsideration, she’s right that it included the two Kazadi questions—it is a cut-and-paste 

from Mr. Winston, but, intentionally or not, questions 20 and 21 were there.14 Note that 

counsel’s statement to the court (“Your Honor, I have a copy of voir dire that encompasses 

 

13 March 28, 2019 Transcript at 20:7-18.

14 The filing begins “NOW COMES the Defendant, Marquese Winston, by and through his 

attorneys,” and names Mr. Winston’s counsel. Nevertheless, the caption is the caption for 

Ms. Hayes’s case, the signature block and signature name Ms. Hayes’s counsel, and it was 

submitted in Ms. Hayes’s case.
22

the questions that I joined in Mr. Winston’s objections for the specific questions”) didn’t 

itself preserve anything beyond what counsel already had preserved to that point. But the 

written filing did—it’s the first, and only time Ms. Hayes herself pressed questions 20 and 

21, and, in the context of this case, it’s close enough. Although most of the jury selection 

had been completed at that point, it wasn’t yet over. The court had one more day of culling 

the venire to the final list of candidates, and the court could, had it chosen to, have 

reconsidered its earlier decision and asked questions 20 and 21 to the distilled panel before 

the final strikes. Moreover, the undeniably late request didn’t sandbag the trial judge. The 

court made its decision not to ask these questions based on its view of a then-unresolved 

legal question, and there is no suggestion (or any rational reason we can discern) why its 

decision would have changed had Ms. Hayes asked it earlier.

This tactical approach does not represent best voir dire practice. It would have been 

a lot clearer had the parties declared on the record that they joined each other’s objections 

or for counsel to have objected the two other times that Mr. Winston objected. The decision 

not to join Mr. Winston’s objections nearly deprived Ms. Hayes of the benefit of Kazadi. 

And it was not, as her motion claims, remotely “plain from this record that this issue was, 

in fact, preserved by counsel for Ms. Hayes,” nor from the citations in the motion papers. 

To the contrary, as the reader can see, it took more than 4,000 words worth of analysis to 

reach the conclusion, as we now do, that Ms. Hayes preserved her Kazadi claims.15

 

15 Ms. Hayes’s reply in support of the motion for reconsideration also takes shots at the 

State for not defending its earlier concession to her satisfaction in its response brief. Her 

umbrage is misplaced. Our initial opinion put the State in a challenging position on 

reconsideration. Although the State could have taken a different position, it seems unfair 
23

2. The circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to ask the requested

voir dire questions. 

Although decided after the trial in this case, Kazadi held that “on request, during 

voir dire, a trial court must ask whether any prospective jurors are unwilling or unable to 

comply with the jury instructions on the long-standing fundamental principles of the 

presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to 

testify.” Kazadi, 467 Md. at 48. Failure to ask the question on request is an abuse of 

discretion. Id. And Kazadi applies to “any other cases that are pending on direct appeal 

when” the opinion was filed. Because they asked for these questions in the circuit court

and the court declined to ask them, Mr. Winston and Ms. Hayes get the benefit of Kazadi’s

holding. Id. at 47. We reverse their convictions, remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion, and address other issues as necessary or to guide those proceedings on 

remand.

16

B. Jury Instruction Challenges.

Both Ms. Hayes and Mr. Winston take issue with certain jury instructions. 

Ms. Hayes asserts that she was entitled to a defense of necessity instruction. She contends 

as well that the circuit court should not have instructed the jury on flight. Mr. Winston 

asserts that he was entitled to an imperfect self-defense instruction. We hold that the circuit 

 

to expect the State to do the difficult work of parsing the record to prove preservation that 

Ms. Hayes hadn’t done herself. 

16 We need not, and do not, address Ms. Hayes’s claim that her trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to object to the court’s decision to ask the venire whether any moral, religious, 

or ethical conviction or belief would prevent them from weighing the evidence and 

reaching an impartial verdict.
24

court did not abuse in its handling of these jury instructions. 

Maryland Rule 4-325 governs jury instructions, and subsection (c) addresses 

instructions that the parties request: 

(c) The court may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct 

the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the 

instructions are binding. The court may give its instructions 

orally or, with the consent of the parties, in writing instead of 

orally. The court need not grant a requested instruction if the 

matter is fairly covered by the instructions actually given.

Rule 4-325(c) requires a trial court to give a requested instruction when (1) it “is a correct 

statement of the law”; (2) it “is applicable under the facts of the case”; and (3) its 

“content . . . was not fairly covered elsewhere in the jury instruction[s] actually given.” 

Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 291, 302 (2006) (quoting Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 58 

(1997)). Unless the trial court has made an error of law, we review its decision to give a 

jury instruction for abuse of discretion. Id. at 311; Preston v. State, 444 Md. 67, 82 (2015). 

A requested instruction applies to the facts of the case “if the evidence is sufficient 

to permit a jury to find its factual predicate.” Bazzle v. State, 426 Md. 541, 550 (2012). 

And “[t]he threshold determination of whether the evidence is sufficient to generate the 

desired instruction is a question of law for the judge.” Id. (quoting Dishman v. State, 352 

Md. 279, 292–93 (1998)). On review, we determine whether the requesting party produced 

the minimum amount of evidence necessary to generate the instruction. Id.; Page v. State, 

222 Md. App. 648, 668 (2015). This threshold is low, and the requesting party need only 

produce “‘some evidence’ to support the requested instruction.” Page, 222 Md. App. at 

668 (quoting Bazzle, 42 Md. at 551)). In reviewing whether “some evidence” existed, we 
25

examine the facts in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction. Id. at 

669 (citing Hoerauf v. State, 178 Md. App. 292, 326 (2008)). 

1. The circuit court did not err in declining to give Ms. Hayes’s proposed 

duress/necessity instruction.

Ms. Hayes asked the circuit court to include an instruction on the defense of 

necessity, Maryland Pattern Jury Instruction—Criminal 5:03:

You have heard evidence that the defendant acted under the 

influence of an overpowering force. This is called duress. You 

are required to find the defendant not guilty if all of the 

following four factors are present:

(1) the defendant actually believed that the duress placed [him] 

[her] in immediate or impending danger of death or serious 

bodily harm;

(2) the defendant’s belief was reasonable;

(3) the defendant had no reasonable opportunity for escape; 

and

(4) the defendant committed the crime because of duress.

The defense of duress is not established by proof that the 

defendant had been threatened with violence at an earlier time. 

[He] [she] must have been under a present threat at the time of 

the commission of the crime charged.

In order to convict the defendant, the State must prove that the 

defendant did not act under duress. This means that you are 

required to find the defendant not guilty unless the State has 

persuaded you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least one of 

the four factors of duress was absent. 

Ms. Hayes argued that the duress/necessity instruction was generated when Mr. Winston 

got in the car and told her to move:

[MS. HAYES’S COUNSEL]: The testimony that we have now 

I think has generated the possibility that Ms. Hayes had no 

option but to move the vehicle with the gun in it under fear at 

that point.
26

THE COURT: Testimony from whom?

[MS. HAYES’S COUNSEL]: Well, if we have testimony from 

[Mr. Winston] that he gets in the car and then he orders the car 

to move at that point and he has a gun, that it’s reasonable for 

a jury to find that Ms. Hayes had no choice but to transport the 

gun at that point. I think it’s been generated enough to make an 

argument to the jury, that’s the only reason why she leaves the 

scene at that point.

THE COURT [TO THE STATE]: [Do] you think that there is 

a necessity instruction here independent of the perfect and 

imperfect self-defense instruction?

[THE STATE]: I don’t think it’s appropriate. In this instance, 

the victim did not have a weapon. The victim didn’t approach 

the defendant, Winston. Winston approached the victim. The 

victim was not being aggressive, the victim was walking 

minding his own business. He did not bring any source of 

violence to this situation, Winston initiated all of it. And in this 

instruction, you have to be in immediate fear of death or bodily 

injury and if you go by [Mr. Mouzon’s] statement that Winston 

came up to the victim with the gun pointed out, then he’s the 

aggressor in this situation. 

The court denied Ms. Hayes’s request to give the duress/necessity instruction. 

Ms. Hayes argues that the circuit court should have instructed the jury on the 

duress/necessity17 defense. She asserts that there was “some” evidence supporting those 

instructions because the facts “establish[ed] that there was no ‘reasonable’ opportunity for 

Ms. Hayes to escape as Mr. Winston had just jumped into her car carrying a loaded 

handgun, she was in ‘shock[,]’ shaking and crying as her son was yelling for her to pull 

away from the scene.” In response, the State argues that although the evidence showed 

 

17 In Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State, the Court noted that necessity and duress 

are closely related defenses, so we refer to both and use them interchangeably. 297 Md. 

660, 675 (1983) (“When the pressure is from human beings, the defense, if applicable, is 

called duress rather than necessity.”).
27

Ms. Hayes was upset after Mr. Winston came back to the car, he “made no threats, did not 

order [Ms.] Hayes to leave the scene, or otherwise put her ‘in immediate or impending 

danger of death or serious bodily harm.’” The State notes further that there was evidence 

Ms. Hayes “knowingly transport[ed] a firearm before the shooting occurred.” As a result, 

the State asserts, no evidence was generated to support the requested instruction. 

Again, not much evidence is needed to support a requested duress instruction:

The defendant must show “some evidence” and then the 

burden shifts to the State to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, 

that the defense does not apply. The “some evidence” standard 

is that of the common usage of “some,” and is well short of the 

showing required by the “beyond a reasonable doubt,” “clear 

and convincing,” or “preponderance” standards. There must be 

some evidence to support each element of the defense, 

however. The evidence presented is viewed in the light most 

favorable to the defendant. The existence of contrary evidence 

of duress does not foreclose use of the defense. . . . It is of no 

matter that the claim is overwhelmed by evidence to the 

contrary. If there is any evidence relied on by the defendant 

which, if believed, would support his claim[,] the defendant 

has met his burden. 

McMillan v. State, 428 Md. 333, 355–56 (2012) (cleaned up). But a defendant bears a fairly 

steep burden to establish duress as a defense:

[P]resent, imminent, and impending, and of such a nature as to 

induce well grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily 

injury if the act is not done. It must be of such a character as to 

leave no opportunity to the accused to escape. Mere fear or 

threat by another is not sufficient nor is a threat of violence at 

some prior time[.]

Id. at 354–55. The duress defense applies when a criminal defendant is compelled by duress 

to commit the crime. Id. at 355. Duress is premised on the notion that when a person faces 

a “choice of evils, the law prefers that he avoid the greater evil by bringing about the lesser 
28

evil.” Sigma Reproductive Health Ctr. v. State, 297 Md. 660, 676 (1983). 

The circuit court concluded correctly that the evidence did not generate a 

duress/necessity instruction. When reviewing the jury instructions, Ms. Hayes’s counsel 

argued that the instruction was supported by “testimony from [Mr. Winston] that he gets 

in the car and then he orders the car to move at that point and he has a gun,” and it’s 

therefore “reasonable for a jury to find that Ms. Hayes had no choice but to transport the 

gun at that point.” But there was no testimony to support a finding that Ms. Hayes was in 

imminent danger of serious bodily harm or death if she did not drive the car and transport 

the gun. Mr. Winston’s “order” to move the car did not, by itself, put Ms. Hayes in 

imminent danger. And although she may have been afraid at the time, “[m]ere fear” is 

insufficient, and Mr. Winston never threatened her. See McMillan, 428 Md. at 355 (quoting 

Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439 (1970)). The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to instruct the jury on the duress/necessity defense. 

2. The circuit court did not err in giving a flight instruction.

At trial, the circuit court instructed the jury on flight. Before instructing the jury, the 

court heard argument on whether it should give the flight instruction:

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: The evidence has been 

uncontradicted that Ms. Hayes was arrested in Atlanta and that 

she had a home in Atlanta. That car was registered in Georgia, 

that it was purchased in Atlanta, that the address of the 

registration—

THE COURT: I know what the evidence said.

[COUNSEL FOR MS. HAYES]: So first of all, the question is 

whether [or] not there’s even flight. I think if the Court were to 

try to say that driving away from the scene of the shooting 

constitutes flight, then I would reference the case . . . where 
29

there was some individuals that were on bikes and after the 

alleged incident happened in that case, they went through the 

woods. Simply leaving the scene of an incident does not induce 

flight itself. . . . The evidence is that [Ms. Hayes] went to her 

home. There is absolutely no evidence that she was aware that 

they were on the look out for her, that they even put out a 

BOLO for her. Certainly it was on the news but there’s no 

evidence that she was aware that there was some sort of 

looking for her, that she somehow concealed herself. 

The car itself was found five minutes from her home and the 

information from the occupants are readily like here she is, and 

she was arrested without incident[.] 

Maryland Pattern Jury Instruction—Criminal 3:24 instructs the jury that although flight 

cannot establish guilt in itself, the jury may consider flight evidence of guilt:

A person’s flight immediately after the commission of a crime 

or after being accused of committing a crime is not enough by 

itself to establish guilt but it is a fact that may be considered by 

you as evidence of guilt. Flight under these circumstances may 

be considered by you as evidence of guilt. Flight under these 

circumstances may be motivated by a variety of factors. Some 

of which are fully consistent with innocence. You must first 

decide whether there is evidence of flight. If you decide there 

is evidence of flight, you then must decide whether this flight 

shows a consciousness of guilt. 

The court gave the pattern jury instruction verbatim. 

Ms. Hayes argues that the circuit court erred in giving the jury the flight instruction 

“[b]ecause it is not clear that Ms. Hayes’s conduct suggested flight or that the flight 

suggests a consciousness of guilt[.]” She asserts that her “conduct of driving from the scene 

of the shooting after Mr. Winston jumped into her car was just as likely motivated by fear 

after hearing a gunshot in an effort to protect herself and her two children who were also 

in the car.” The State responds that the evidence was sufficient at trial to generate the 

instruction because “[s]he fled the state by car, and the jury could draw the reasonable 
30

inference that it would be far harder for detectives to find and question her if she were in 

another state than if she remained nearby[,]” which would also allow the jury to infer that 

she fled the scene out of a consciousness of guilt. 

In Hallowell v. State, we defined the circumstances under which a flight instruction 

is appropriate:

The Court of Appeals has adopted the four-prong test from 

United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1040 (5th Cir. 1977), 

in assessing whether a flight instruction is appropriate under 

the circumstances of a given case. [Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 

291, 311 (2006) (citing Thomas v. State, 372 Md. 342 (2002)).]

A flight instruction is permissible only if “the following four 

inferences” may reasonably be drawn “from the facts of the 

case as ultimately tried”:

(1) “that the behavior of the defendant suggests flight”;

(2) “that the flight suggests a consciousness of guilt”;

(3) “that the consciousness of guilt is related to the crime 

charged or a closely related crime”; and

(4) “that the consciousness of guilt of the crime charged 

suggests actual guilt of the crime charged or a closely 

related crime.” Id. at 312. 

235 Md. App. 484, 511 (2018). 

There is a distinction between “flight” and “departure.” Hoerauf v. State, 178 Md. 

App. 292, 323–26 (2008). “[E]vidence of flight is defined by two factors: first, that the 

defendant has moved from one location to another [i.e., “departure”]; second, some 

additional proof to suggest that this movement is not simply normal human locomotion.” 

Id. at 323. “[A]n accused’s departure from the scene of a crime, without any attendant 

circumstances that reasonably justify an inference that the leaving was done with a 

consciousness of guilt and pursuant to an effort to avoid apprehension or prosecution based 
31

on that guilt, does not constitute ‘flight,’ and thus does not warrant the giving of a flight

instruction.” Id. at 325–26. “[T]he classic case of flight is where a defendant leaves the 

scene shortly after the crime is committed and is running, rather than walking, or is driving 

a speeding motor vehicle.” Id. at 324 (emphasis added). 

This was a “classic case of flight.” See id. Ms. Hayes (and the others) were on the 

scene, the shooting occurred, and she drove away in her vehicle. See id. Although police 

had not yet arrived at the scene when Ms. Hayes drove away, the gunshot being fired in a 

public place undoubtedly would draw their attention. See Page v. State, 222 Md. App. 648, 

670 (2015) (“[A]lthough the police had not arrived when Appellant began running away, 

it would be fair to presume that authorities would be arriving to the scene shortly, given 

the number of gunshots fired in a public place.”). A jury could have concluded that 

Ms. Hayes “departed” the scene and that departure was motivated by fear. The jury could 

also have concluded, based on the testimony, that Ms. Hayes followed Mr. Winston slowly 

as he approached Mr. Wroblewski and then fled the scene by driving away after 

Mr. Winston shot Mr. Wroblewski, and that her flight signified consciousness of guilt for 

the shooting and its aftermath. We see no abuse of the court’s discretion in its decision to 

give the flight instruction.

3. The circuit court did not err in declining Mr. Winston’s request to instruct 

the jury on imperfect self-defense.

Mr. Winston’s counsel asked the court to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense. 

The Jury Instruction, 5:06, provides: 

You have heard evidence that the defendant’s actions were 

based on a mistake of fact. Mistake of fact is a defense. You 
32

are required to find the defendant not guilty if:

(1) the defendant actually believed (alleged mistake);

(2) the defendant’s belief and actions were reasonable under 

the circumstances; and

(3) the defendant did not intend to commit the crime [] and the 

defendant’s conduct would not have amounted to the crime 

[] if the mistaken belief had been correct, meaning that, if 

the true facts were what the defendant thought them to be, 

the [defendant’s conduct would not have been criminal] 

[defendant would have the defense of (defense)]. 

The court then heard argument on whether to give the instruction:

[MR. WINSTON’S COUNSEL]: I would argue that based on 

the video footage that was shown and explained briefly by 

[Mr. Mouzon] who testified on the stand, the video in 

particular shows that the actual incident on Lawrence Street or 

the shooting, what that video shows and what [Mr. Mouzon] 

testified to under cross-examination, that that was Mr. Winston 

backing up from the video, that that was Mr. Wroblewski 

lunging forward, and that then Mr. Wroblewski falls to the 

ground.

There is, I guess, [] obviously the inference that the shot 

happens at that point. Arguably, Your Honor, that is enough 

for self-defense, that is also enough for imperfect self-defense. 

All the defense has to do is generate any iota of evidence, not 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not a preponderance, an iota

[]

***

THE COURT: What about the requirement that he not be the 

aggressor? Didn’t he arm himself and follow him down the 

street?

[MR. WINSTON’S COUNSEL]: The testimony that’s come 

out thus far, there is no one that has seen him arm himself. 

There is testimony at this point in the trial that he went back to 

the car.

THE COURT: And then he has a gun in his hand seconds later.

[MR. WINSTON’S COUNSEL]: At some point he has a gun 

in his hand. There’s no testimony that he has the gun in his 
33

hand and the video, the Royal Farm video which shows no gun. 

The only testimony and evidence is that the gun is at some 

point out, because again, [Mr. Mouzon] does not see the 

shooting but he does testify that he gets some glimpse of this 

weapon. . . . 

The court denied Mr. Winston’s request for an imperfect self-defense instruction. 

Mr. Winston asserts that his “testimony, along with surveillance footage of the 

incident, provided some evidence that he was not the initial aggressor in his confrontation 

with [Mr.] Wroblewski” and highlights the fact that “surveillance footage shows 

[Mr.] Wroblewski spit as he exits the store [while] [Ms.] Hayes can be seen stopping after 

he does so.” The State responds that Mr. Winston was the initial aggressor and “one cannot 

claim self-defense when one has ‘provoked the conflict.’” The State argues further that 

there was no evidence at trial that Mr. Winston believed he was in danger of death or 

serious bodily injury from Mr. Wroblewski, and thus that the evidence was insufficient to 

generate the instruction. 

The defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to generate a mitigation or 

self-defense instruction:

In Maryland, the defendant has the burden of initially 

producing “some evidence” on the issue or mitigation or selfdefense. Once the issue has been generated by the evidence, 

the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction explaining the 

elements of perfect or imperfect self-defense. The Court 

fleshed out the meaning of “some evidence” [] in which we 

explained that this standard calls for no more than what it 

says—“some,” as that word is understood in common, 

everyday usage. . . . It need not rise to the level of “beyond 

reasonable doubt” or “clear and convincing” or 

“preponderance.” Furthermore, it does not matter if the 

evidence of self-defense emanates solely from the defendant or 

is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary. The defendant’s 
34

burden is minimal—if there is any evidence relied on by the 

defendant, which, if believed, would support his claim that he 

acted in self-defense, the defendant has met his burden. 

Porter v. State, 455 Md. 220, 240 (2017) (cleaned up). 

In the same case, the Court of Appeals explained the elements of imperfect selfdefense:

Imperfect self-defense [] does not require the defendant to 

demonstrate that he had reasonable grounds to believe that he 

was in imminent danger. Rather, he must only show that he 

actually believed that he was in danger, even if that belief was 

unreasonable. Additionally, to assert imperfect self-defense, 

the defendant is not required to show that he used a reasonable 

amount of force against his attacker—only that he actually 

believed the amount of force used was necessary. Lastly, to 

have acted in imperfect self-defense, a defendant must have 

only subjectively believed that retreat was not safe—that belief 

need not be reasonable. . . . [A] defendant’s actual, though 

unreasonable, belief that he is in imminent danger negates the 

presence of malice, a prerequisite to a finding of murder. But 

[] the defendant is nevertheless to blame for the homicide and 

should not be rewarded for his unreasonable conduct.

Id. at 235–36 (cleaned up). An aggressor is not entitled the defense of self-defense, nor, as 

we have here, an instruction on imperfect self-defense. See Cunningham v. State, 58 Md. 

App. 249, 257 (1984). 

The circuit court concluded correctly that there was insufficient evidence to generate 

a jury instruction of imperfect self-defense. Mr. Winston himself testified that he went to 

confront Mr. Wroblewski because he felt disrespected when Mr. Wroblewski spit in 

Ms. Hayes’s direction, and, without using those exact words, the circuit court seemed to 

conclude that Mr. Winston was the initial aggressor (a finding that would preclude this jury 

instruction by itself). His aggressor status aside, Mr. Winston testified that Mr. Wroblewski 
35

swung at him, but never claimed to feel immediate and imminent danger or that he believed 

he had to shoot Mr. Wroblewski to protect himself. Instead, in response to the State’s 

question of how he “knew to pull that gun out on [Mr. Wroblewski,]” Mr. Winston 

responded that he pulled the gun out “[a]s a reflex of when somebody is lunging at [him] 

and swinging at [him] in self-defense.” He testified as well that he “d[idn’t] know whether 

[he] had to pull it out or not, [because he] was intoxicated.” Because there was no evidence 

that Mr. Winston ever had a genuine belief that he was in imminent danger, the circuit 

court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the instruction on imperfect selfdefense. 

C. Mr. Winston’s Right To A Speedy Trial Was Not Violated.

Mr. Winston asserts that his right to a speedy trial was violated because sixteen 

months elapsed between his arrest and trial and “[t]he postponements were largely due to 

the State’s delays in turning over discovery and making plea offers, and even the final 

delay, triggered by the parties’ inability to select a jury, was triggered in part by the State 

only making plea offers to the three codefendants on the very eve of the scheduled trial.” 

He argues that this delay prejudiced him because he was not from Maryland and 

“experienced heightened shame, fear, and notoriety” due to being “accused of a highprofile crime[.]” The State responds that there were delays due to “a murder trial involving 

multiple defendants,” and although Mr. Winston attributes the delays to the State, “he does 

not argue that they were done deliberately to hamper the defense.” Finally, the State asserts 

that Mr. Winston failed to allege any “specific allegations of prejudice, i.e. that the delay 

actually hampered the defense.”
36

We recount the chronology as summarized in Mr. Winston’s brief:

• He was arrested on November 15, 2017 and indicted on 

December 20, 2017.

• Defense counsel filed an omnibus motion on January 

16, 2018, which included an assertion of his right to a 

speedy trial. Trial was initially scheduled for May 15, 

2018. 

• On April 19, 2018, the State requested an advance 

postponement. At a hearing on April 26, 2018, the State 

indicated that it had very recently provided discovery to 

defense counsel, who needed further time to prepare. 

The Circuit Court postponed the trial until October 3, 

2018 and charged the postponement to both sides.

• On September 19, 2018, the State requested another 

advance postponement. At a hearing on September 24, 

2018, the State cited ongoing plea negotiations, which 

would result in further discovery. [Mr. Winston] 

objected to the postponement. The Circuit Court 

postponed the case to February 1, 2019. . . .

• On the night of January 31, 2019, the State conveyed its 

first plea offers to [Mr. Winston], [Ms.] Hayes, and 

[Mr.] Mouzon. February 1st was taken up with the 

defendants considering their plea offers. [Mr.] Mouzon 

pled guilty, and juror selection was postponed until the 

ensuing Monday, February 4th. Due in part to media 

coverage, including coverage of [Mr.] Mouzon’s lastminute plea deal, it was impossible to pick a jury by the 

end of February 5th. A new jury panel was requested. At 

that point, the administrative judge informed the parties 

that the trial would be postponed again. She cited 

unavailability of jurors and the fact that prosecutor 

assigned to this case was assigned to several others that 

had been pending “500 and some days plus.” [Mr. 

Winston] objected to the postponement. 

• Trial then proceeded on the next scheduled trial date, 

March 26, 2019. At that point, [Mr. Winston] had been 

detained for over sixteen months. 

Omitted from Mr. Winston’s brief, but included in his motion to dismiss, was that jury 
37

selection began on February 4, 2019 but was unfruitful because “[n]umerous venirepersons 

were struck for cause due to their familiarity with the incident, that weekend’s press, and 

their inability to be fair[,]” and by the end of the next day, there were not enough jurors left 

to begin peremptory strikes. 

We make our own independent constitutional analysis when reviewing the denial of 

a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Vaise v. State, 246 Md. App. 188, 216 (2020). 

“We perform a de novo constitutional appraisal in light of the particular facts of the case at 

hand; in so doing, we accept a lower court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.” 

Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 221 (2002). 

When addressing whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, as prescribed by the 

Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland 

Declaration of Rights, Maryland courts apply the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. 

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Those factors are: “Length of delay, the reason for the delay, 

the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at 530. None of 

these factors is “either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of 

the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together 

with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 413–14 

(1990) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). 

1. Length of delay

Before delving into the analysis, we must determine first whether the delay was long 

enough to trigger the more in-depth constitutional analysis required by Barker. State v. 

Kanneh, 403 Md. 678, 687–88 (2008). We measure “the gross period of time between the 
38

arrest and the trial or the hearing on the motion.” Ratchford v. State, 141 Md. App. 354, 

360 (2001). Although “no specific duration of delay constitutes a per se delay of 

constitutional dimension . . . we have employed the proposition that a pre-trial delay greater 

than one year and fourteen days was ‘presumptively prejudicial’ on several occasions.” 

Glover, 368 Md. at 223. Here, the delay of one year and 131 days between Mr. Winston’s 

arrest (on November 15, 2017) and the first day of trial when the motion to dismiss was 

made (on March 26, 2019) was long enough to trigger a speedy trial analysis under Barker. 

Mr. Winston is correct that a delay of more than sixteen months weighs in his favor, 

but by itself, that factor is not particularly weighty. Instead, “it is a factor to be ‘closely 

correlated to the other factors, such as the reasonableness of the State’s explanation for the 

delay, the likelihood that the delay may cause the defendant to more pronouncedly assert 

his speedy trial right, and the presumption that a longer delay may cause the defendant 

greater harm.” Phillips v. State, 246 Md. App. 40, 58 (2020) (quoting Glover, 368 Md. at

225). “The length of the delay . . . appears to be significant principally as it affects the 

legitimacy of the reasons for delay and the likelihood it had prejudicial effects.” Glover, 

368 Md. at 225 (quoting Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 48 n.12 (1970) (Brennan, J., 

concurring)). 

2. Reasons for delay

“Closely related to length of delay is the State’s reason justifying a delay with 

different weights being assigned different reasons.” Phillips, 246 Md. App. at 59 (citing 

Henry v. State, 204 Md. App. 509 (2012)). “A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order 

to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government[,]” but “[a] more 
39

neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily 

but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such 

circumstances must rest with the [State] rather than with the defendant.” Kanneh, 403 Md. 

at 690 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). 

The trial date was postponed three times, and the trial court found that none of the 

postponements had the purpose or effect of impeding the defense. The original trial date of 

May 15, 2018 was postponed until October 3, 2018 because the State had just turned over 

discovery and defense counsel needed more time to prepare. The trial court found that that 

postponement cut both ways, that it would have been unusual to try a three-defendant 

murder case four months after the initial appearance, and that both sides were working 

diligently to prepare.

The October 3, 2018 trial date was changed to February 1, 2019 because the State 

was involved in ongoing plea negotiations with the other defendants, which would result 

in further discovery. During that time period, the trial court found that the delays reflected 

a lack of diligence on the part of the State, that the proffers related to Ms. Hayes and a 

dismissed co-defendant and didn’t advance Mr. Winston’s case and delayed some of the 

State’s responses to discovery. But the court also found that the delays were not egregious 

and weren’t done to impede the defense, and may even have helped Ms. Hayes. The court 

weighed that postponement somewhat more heavily against the State.

The postponement until the final trial date, March 26, 2019, arose in an unusual 

way. The parties had begun jury selection, but ran out of prospective jurors after two days 

because of extensive media coverage of the case. The State’s Attorney objected to 
40

postponing, but the administrative judge rescheduled the case because the court did not 

have enough prospective jurors available for this trial and the others, and because the 

prosecutor had other trials coming up involving defendants, including murder defendants, 

whose cases had been pending longer. The trial court weighed this delay “somewhat

lightly” against the State, and viewed it (correctly, in our view) as mirroring a delay for a 

shortage of courtrooms or prosecutors. So although the trial court empathized with these 

defendants and acknowledged the baseline prejudice to a defendant incarcerated for sixteen 

months before trial, the court acknowledged that there were no better solutions available. 

3. Assertion of the right

The defendant bears the responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial. Henry, 

204 Md. App. at 554. “Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to 

the other factors . . . .” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. For example, “[t]he strength of a 

defendant’s assertion, and not just its occurrence, may ‘indicate whether the delay has been 

lengthy and whether the defendant begins to experience prejudice from that delay.’” 

Phillips, 246 Md. App. at 66 (quoting Glover, 368 Md. at 228). 

Before he filed his motion to dismiss on March 15, 2019, Mr. Winston had asserted 

his right to a speedy trial in an omnibus motion filed by his counsel on January 16, 2018. 

He asserted it again when he objected to the second postponement on September 24, 2018. 

And he asserted it for a final time when he objected to the last postponement on February 

5, 2019. The State does not dispute that Mr. Winston pursued his right to a speedy trial

diligently. We weigh this factor in favor of Mr. Winston, but because he cited no specific 

instances of impairment, we do not weigh it heavily. See Hallowell v. State, 235 Md. App. 
41

484, 518 (2018). 

4. Prejudice

The most important factor in the Barker analysis is whether Mr. Winston suffered 

actual prejudice. Henry, 204 Md. App. at 554. The speedy trial right advances three 

interests: “preventing an oppressive pretrial incarceration; minimizing the anxiety and 

concern of the accused; and limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” 

Phillips, 246 Md. App. at 67. The burden to show actual prejudice rests on the defendant,

Henry, 204 Md. App. at 554, and the failure to do so weighs against the defendant. 

See Wilson v. State, 148 Md. App. 601, 639 (2002) (“accord[ing] great weight to the lack 

of any significant prejudice resulting from the delay” where the only prejudice was from 

pre-trial incarceration). 

Mr. Winston focuses exclusively on the first two interests: oppressive pretrial 

incarceration (one year and 131 days) in Maryland, where he was “far away from his 

family, friends, and community[,]” and the attendant anxiety and concern accompanied by 

the “heightened shame, fear, and notoriety” because of the infamy of the case, but he asserts 

no other specific instances of prejudice. But “[o]ppressive pretrial incarceration with its 

attendant anxiety and concern to the accused is generally afforded only slight weight.” 

Hallowell, 235 Md. App. at 518. And the shame, fear, and notoriety stemming from the 

infamy of the case is not an interest the right to a speedy trial protects. This factor weighs 

slightly in Mr. Winston’s favor. 

5. Balancing the factors

Although the delay of one year and 131 days between arrest and trial qualifies as a
42

delay of constitutional dimension, delays of this length or greater have frequently been held 

not to cause a speedy trial violation. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533–36 (no speedy trial violation 

for delay greater than five years); Phillips, 246 Md. App. at 57, 68 (no speedy trial violation 

for delay of approximately four years); Kanneh, 403 Md. at 688–89 (no speedy trial 

violation for delay of thirty-five months); Hallowell, 235 Md. App. at 518 (no speedy trial 

violation for eighteen-month-twenty-two-day delay); Fields, 172 Md. App. at 549–50 (no 

speedy trial violation for twenty-month delay). Our independent review of the Barker 

factors leads us to conclude that (1) the length of delay between arrest and trial was not 

egregious under the circumstances; (2) the reasons for the delay, although weighing slightly 

against the State because of failure to manage its heavy case load, were not intended to

undermine Mr. Winston’s case; (3) Mr. Winston asserted his speedy-trial right diligently; 

and (4) Mr. Winston failed to identify any specific prejudice other than pre-trial 

incarceration. This is a complicated multi-defendant murder case that had drawn a great

deal of public attention, and the delay in bringing these cases to trial did not violate 

Mr. Winston’s right to a speedy trial. 

D. The Evidence Was Sufficient To Support Ms. Hayes’s 

Convictions.

Although we are reversing her convictions on other grounds, we nevertheless must 

address Ms. Hayes’s contention that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict her; if 

it wasn’t, the State could not re-try her. See Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 708-09 (2000).

She argues that “the [S]tate produced no direct evidence to suggest that [she] knew Mr. 

Winston had a gun in her car and thus, she could not be guilty of knowingly transporting a 
43

handgun or conspiring to knowingly transport a handgun in her car.” She asserts that 

“[o]nly pure speculation supports the jury’s convictions.” The State responds that the 

evidence was sufficient because “[a]fter the shooting, [Mr.] Winston returned to the car 

with the gun and told [Ms.] Hayes to drive away.” At that point in time, the State says, she 

knew that there was a handgun in her car and she drove off anyway. 

When reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether “any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Spell v. State, 239 Md. App. 495, 510 (2018) (quoting Fuentes v. State, 

454 Md. 296, 307–08 (2017)). “In examining the record, we view the State’s evidence, 

including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to 

the State.” Id. It is not our role to retry the case. Id. “Because the fact-finder possesses the 

unique opportunity to view the evidence and to observe first-hand the demeanor and to 

assess the credibility of witnesses during their live testimony, we do not re-weigh the 

credibility of witnesses or attempt to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” Smith v. State, 

415 Md. 174, 185 (2010). “[T]he finder of fact has the ‘ability to choose among differing 

inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation . . . .’” Id. at 183 (quoting 

State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 534 (2003)). 

Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp), § 4-203(a) of the Criminal Law 

Article (“CL”) prohibits a person from wearing, carrying, or transporting “a handgun, 

whether concealed or open, in a vehicle traveling on a road or parking lot generally used 

by the public, highway, waterway, or airway of the State.” To be convicted of a possessory 

offense, one must “exercise actual or constructive dominion or control over a thing . . . .” 
44

State v. Gutierrez, 446 Md. 221, 233 (2016). Knowledge of contraband found in a vehicle, 

which can be proven through direct or circumstantial evidence, is imputed to the driver of 

the vehicle. State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 550 (2003); see also Samba v. State, 206 Md. 

App. 508, 537 (2012) (evidence was sufficient to sustain transporting conviction where the 

gun was found underneath the driver’s seat and within the defendant’s reach); Jefferson v. 

State, 194 Md. App. 190, 215–16 (2010) (evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for 

transporting a handgun where the gun was recovered underneath the passenger seat in close 

proximity to the defendant driver and was available for immediate use). 

The evidence at trial was sufficient to support Ms. Hayes’s conviction for 

transporting a handgun. Her status as the driver and owner of the car charged her with 

knowledge that Mr. Winston carried a gun. Even if she hadn’t known about his gun 

initially, Ms. Hayes indisputably knew that Mr. Winston had a gun after the shooting 

occurred, and with that knowledge she drove Mr. Winston (and his gun) away from Royal 

Farms and possibly as far as Atlanta. On that record, a reasonable jury could have found 

Ms. Hayes guilty of transporting a handgun in violation of CL § 4-203(a). 

Having found the evidence sufficient for the predicate offense, we ask the same 

question with regard to conspiracy to commit the offense. To prove criminal conspiracy, 

the State must prove that two people reached a meeting of the minds to commit a criminal 

act:

Criminal conspiracy is a common-law crime that consists of 

the combination of two or more persons to accomplish some 

unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by 

unlawful means. The essence of a criminal conspiracy is, 

therefore, an unlawful agreement, which need not be formal or 
45

spoken, provided there is a meeting of the minds reflecting a 

unity of purpose and design. To prove conspiracy, the State 

may rely on circumstantial evidence, from which a common 

scheme may be inferred. The State does not have to show an 

overt act in furtherance of the agreement because the 

conspiracy is complete when the unlawful agreement is 

reached. 

Molina v. State, 244 Md. App. 67, 167–68 (2019) (cleaned up). The defendant “must have 

a specific intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy.” Alston v. 

State, 414 Md. 92, 114–15 (2010). 

The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support Ms. Hayes’s conviction for 

conspiracy to transport a handgun. At trial, Mr. Winston testified that after he shot 

Mr. Wroblewski, he got in Ms. Hayes’s car and told her to drive, and she did. Although 

Ms. Hayes may have been shocked or scared, she still drove after Mr. Winston told her to 

drive, and a jury could find from this the “meeting of the minds” required for an unlawful 

agreement. She also committed the overt act in furtherance of that agreement when she 

drove Mr. Winston and his gun away from Royal Farms. Just as a reasonable jury could 

have found Ms. Hayes guilty of transporting a handgun, a reasonable jury also could find 

her guilty of conspiracy to transport a handgun.

JUDGMENTS REVERSED AND CASES

REMANDED FOR FURTHER 

PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH 

THIS OPINION. THE MAYOR AND CITY 

COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE TO PAY THE 

COSTS.