### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 22
- 00038
- CR

Roy Wright Vaughan, Jr. , Appellant

v. The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY NO. CR2020
- 243 , THE HONORABLE DIB WALDRIP , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Robert Wright Vaughan, Jr., was convicted of the offense of harassment by a person in a correctional facility and was sentenced to thirteen years ’ imprisonment

. See Tex. Penal Code § § 12.42, 22.11

. On appeal, Vaughan c o nten ds that the trial court erred by failing

to sua sponte conduct a h earing regarding his competency. We will affirm the trial court ’ s judgment o f conviction.

BACKGROUND

In S eptember 2019, Vaugha n was charged with the offense of aggravated assault

w ith a deadly weapon. W hile in jail pending trial in that case , Vaughan allegedly sp i t on one of
the detention officers and was subsequently charged with the offense of har assment by a person in a correctional facility.2 Prior to trial in the harassment c as e, Vaughan ’ s appointed trial attorney filed a motion asking the trial court to order that Vaughan ’ s competency be evaluated . The t rial court granted the motion and appointed two forensic psychologists to evaluate Vaughan ’ s competency

to s tand trial

. Th e first evaluation occ urred in Oc tober 2020, and the second evaluation occurred
in December 2020. Both psychologists concluded that Vaughan was competent to stand trial.

At voir dire in January 2022 , a transport officer from the jail inform ed the tria l

co urt that Va ughan r efused to come to court. After being sworn, t he officer testified tha t h e spoke with Vaughan and g ave him every opportunity to attend his trial but that Vaughan
declined . Further, in response to questioning by the t rial co urt, the o ffic er explained that Vaughan made the personal choice not to go . The trial court then inquired about whether Vaughan had “ a factual and ratio nal understanding of his surroundings and the p urpose of the discussion, ” and the officer explained t hat Vaughan “ see med pretty rational. ”

Vaughan ’ s trial attorney informed the trial court that Vaughan had be en very abus ive to her and had mental

- health issues that “ impact his behavior quite neg atively ” ; however, the attorney also opined that Vaughan was competen t t o st and trial and explained th at

t he two psycho logists concluded that he was competent to stand tr ial. Fur ther, the attorney related that she sent clothes to the jail for Vaughan to wear at trial but that he refus ed to wear them. In addition, she explain ed t hat Vaughan want ed a different attorney appointed but that she

wa s ready to proceed with trial. T he trial court instructed the transport officer to arrange for Vaughan to be brought to court. After Vaughan arrived at court , the trial cour t asked if h e wo uld
like to change into regular clothes, but V aughan stated that he was fine wearing his jail attire.

Du r i ng a lengthy exchange outside the presen ce of the jury panel, Vaughan referred to his attorney by using expletives multiple times , spoke to her in a disre spe ctful3

manner, and stated that he wanted a new attorney. Vaughan informed the trial court that he had recently undergone psychological eva luations an d that the results showed that he was “ not
crazy. ” The trial court then asked Vaugha n if he had a “ factu al and rational understanding ” of the proceedings, and he respond ed that he did by saying , “ I ’ m not a fucking idiot ” an d “ I
know enough. ” The trial court inquired if Vaugha n ’ s plea would change with a different lawyer, and Vaughan stat ed that his p lea wou ld not change because he wa s innocen t . Va ughan also
indicat ed that he wa nted to participate in the trial but was being disagreeab le and misbeh aving
because he did not want his trial counsel to represent him anymore and because he wante d
anothe r a t t orney a ppointed.

The trial court then reviewed the reports prepared by the two psychologists

. Once
the trial court finished its review , Vaughan repeated his prior assertion that he was competent

. The trial court noted that both doctors had conclud ed t hat Vaug han could behave if he chose

to do so, and Vaughan agreed with that as sessment but also stated that he will do what he feels like doing. The trial court directed the jury panel to enter the court room , and Vaugh an made
the following comment s to the p anel, to the trial court, and to his trial counsel :

I tried t o fire this attorney, but the Judge wouldn ’ t let me ; Well, I tried to fire this attorney. This Judge wouldn ’ t let me. I don ’ t trust this attor ney. Please help me. My name is Roy Wri ght Vaugha n, Jr. Help me. I don ’ t trust this atto rney and the Judge w on ’ t let me get another one ; I ’ m telling the truth

. What, are you scared of the truth? ; and Shut t he fuck up and get on with it. How do you like that, [trial counsel] ?4 Following th ese exch an ges, t he tr ia l court explained to the panel the purpose of
voir dire , and Vaughan mention ed the Bill of Rights and how United States citizens have the right “ to a fair trial . . . bitch. This ain ’ t a fair trial. ” Throughout the S t ate ’ s voir dir e, V aughan interrupted the State multipl e t imes and responded to comments made by ju ry panel ists , in cluding making the following comments:
(In response to the S t ate ’s expla nation that voir dire helps make su re those chose n as jurors can do what is asked of the m): Th a t sounds lik e a good idea to me , folks. First let ’s start with a m ovie. Well, goddamn, at least they spelled my fucking name right. (In response to the S tate ’ s explanation that it spelled Vaughan ’s name right): Well, that ’s without a birth cer tif icat e an y way. (In respo nse to the S t ate ’ s exp la n ation that voir dire is a len gthy process): Let ’s go. (In response to the State ’ s expla nation of how panelists can be deselected): That sound[s] good to me. (In response to the S t ate ’ s asking the panelists if they un der stoo d the strike proces s): Everybody got a fifth grade education? ( I n response to the S t ate ’ s explaining that trial s were bi f urcated with the guilt

inn ocence phase being first and the punishment ph ase being second if needed): So you ’re guilty first and then you ’ re inn ocent, huh? . . . I thought it wa s innocent until proven guilty. (In response to the S t ate ’ s explai ning how defendant s can ele ct to have the ju dge or the jury assess punishment): I ask ed for y ’all to do it. (I n response to the S t ate ’ s exp lai ning tha t a punishment election was no t an admission of guilt): Hey , thank you for saying t hat. . . . Thank you for clarifying that. (In response to the S t ate ’ s saying that punishment will on ly be addressed if Vaughan is found guilty ): My life is in y ’all ’ s hands. (In response to the S t ate ’ s d escribing the nature of the alleged offense ): Oh, yeah. That ’s when they came in my cell and attacked me while I was sleeping. . . . I had a blindfold and earplugs in when I was attacked.5 At that point , the t rial c ourt interv ened and told Vaughan that he needed to be quie t. Vaug han replied, “ Hey , man, I s aid I would cooperate if you got me a new attorney and you said no. ” The trial court excused th e jury panel and then discuss ed Vaughan ’ s behavior.
V aughan again r elated tha t he was behaving that way because he want ed a new attorney. The trial court explained that if Vaughan continued to be disruptive, the court would require him to be gagged. During this exchange, Vaug han explain ed his version of th e events in qu estion and
exp ressed his desire to sp eed up th e process of jury selection . The trial court asked several times if Vaughan would be qui et and behave when the jury panel returned, and V aughan responded , “ I will. I mean, I ’ m a man of my word. I wil l. . . . When the y co me back, yeah, I will

. Okay. ” Vaughan also remarked, “ You have a lot of patience with me, by the w ay. ”

When the S tate continued its presentation to t he panel, Vaughan made the following interruptions:

(In r esponse to the S t at e ’ s asking the panel if any one knew Vaughan or the attorney s ): Me and my dog Ladybug used to fly signs at W a l

- Mart or out here by Ruecke l Road. We ’d stand there and hold signs saying anything will help, God bless

. ( In response to a panelist ’ s saying Va ughan was innocen t until p rove n guilty): Thank you. ( In r espon se to the S t ate ’ s saying that Vaughan had the right to remain silent): It ’s not working. . . . I ’m going to get on the stand. (In response to the S t ate ’ s asking the p anel if they understood t hat a j ury cannot c on sider a def

enda nt ’s choice not to test ify): Wha t are you doing, online shopping during this? (In response to the S t ate ’ s informing the panel that the jury would have to use the common meaning s for some of the charge elements): Which di ction ary are you go ing to use? (In res ponse to the S t ate ’ s ans w ering a q uestion about evidence that could be conside red at punishment): If I take the stand, then they ’ ll bring up my past6

history. . . . Well, I went to prison fo r a DWI. I had a DWI I went to prison for, but I didn ’t hurt an ybod y.
During his trial a ttorney ’ s presentation, Vaughan made the following interruptions:

(I n response to his attorney ’ s discussing Vaughan ’s prior inter ruptions) : I spe ak my mind. (In response to his attorney saying Vaughan may testify ): You ’re damn righ t. ( In response to his atto rney ’ s expl aining that Vaughan deserves the protection of the law even if the panel did not personally l ike him): I ’m an asshole. . . . To be honest, I ’m a smartass. (In response to panelist s indicating that t hey would hold Vaugha n ’s behavior against him): Thanks fo r being honest. (In response to his attorn ey ’ s saying Vaughan might testify): Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. (In response to his attorney ’ s answering a panelist ’s question about mental

- healt h treatment in pris on): They medi cate you. ( In r esponse to his attorney ’ s asking a pan elist i f people experie ncing homelessness have a different perspective): Do you know the difference between a homeless person and a houseless person? (In response to his attor ney ’ s inquirin g if any of the panelists cou ld n ot be fair because of h ow Vaugha n was behaving): Don ’t worry. I ’m goin g to tell you the truth. (In response to his attorney ’ s emp hasizing the imp ortance of finding someone not guilty if the State does no t prove its case): It means so mebody lied.

When the trial court and the att orneys ha d in dividual conversations with some of the p anelists , Vaughan m ade the following interruptions:
(In response to a panelist ’ s saying her relative is a police officer): Th ank you. Grandfathe r was a Texas Ranger . . . . Lo ok h i m up. ( I n response to a panelis t ’ s saying that his son was just released from prison and that he was not sure he could be fair): Yoda said do or do not. There is no try. Try gives you doubt.7

(In re sponse to a panelist ’ s saying she could not b e fair bec a use of her memory issues): Th an k you, ma ’am. Thank you. (In response to a panelist ’ s saying his children have depression and post

- traumatic stress disorder and saying that may affect him): Apprec iate it. I suffer from P TSD from law enforcement. (In respons e to the trial court ’ s dismis si ng members of the panel that were not c hosen ): Thanks for being honest.
After the jury was chosen, the trial cou rt asked Vaughan how he w a nted t o plead, and Vaughan responded, “ I said fr om the beginning I ’ m not guilty. They came in here and
attacked m e. . . . I ’ ve been asking to go to a j ury trial for a while now. ” The trial court then
relea sed the jury for the day . Vaughan ’ s trial attorney informed the court that there we re clothes

a t the jail for Vaughan if he wante d to wear them, and Vaughan resp onded , “ Oh, I ain ’ t fixing to change, goddamn it, bitch . I already told you I ’ m going just like this. I ’ m just going to get up
ther e and tell my damn story.

. . . Wel l, just for the recor d, I still don ’ t want her for an attorn ey. ” Vaughan continued by sayin g that he was going to testify that the guards assaulted him. Vaughan then stated to the court, “ Okay . Boy, you are a real patient man. I ’ ll tell you that. I
ap preciate your patien ce. ” Vaughan explained again that he di d no t want to wear the clot hes
p rovided and would show up wearing his jail attire. The trial court instructed Vaughan not to
be di sruptive or else additional measures would have to be taken, and Vaughan st ated that he would try.
W hen the trial reconve n ed a few days later, Vaugh an ar rived in jail clothes. The trial court explained that being present in jail clothes could affect the presumption of innoce nce, and V aughan agreed to go change afte r talking with the t rial court . The trial court again asked
Vau ghan if he understood t he al legations against him, and Vaughan stated that he did. The
trial court info rmed Vaughan that the re w ere plexiglass barriers around him to prevent him8

from spitting on anyone and that the c ourt would like to remove those if Vaug han promised to
behave becau se those also co uld affect the presum ption of innocence

. Vaughan indicated that he
understood what the trial court was saying and agree d to condu ct himself appro pr iately.

During the guil t

- innocence phase , the S ta te call ed a detention officer who testi fied
that he performed a security ch eck at the jail on the day in question , that he ordered Vaughan to stand up so that he coul d search under the bed, that Vaughan refused, that Vaughan spat at him and his partner , and that the spit landed on his face and shirt

. The officer related that he had to
have his blood tested for nine months following the in cident

. During t he officer ’ s testimony, a recording from his body camera was admitted into ev idence, and the recording is cons i ste nt
with his testim ony. A f

ter th e officer finished testifying , his partner was called to the stand and
testified that Vaughan sp a t at his partner and him during a security check . The partner related that Vaughan could be very aggressive but admitted t hat he ha d learned bet ter w ays to int eract with Vaughan and in hindsight would have chosen a dif ferent way to interact with him

. After

cons idering the evidence, the jury found Vaughan guilty of t he charged offense. During this phase of the trial, Vaughan mad e no interruptions , and his on ly exchange s occurred outside the presence of the jury when he thanked deputies for their hel p and when he informed the trial court that he had been and planned t o continue behaving appro pr iately at trial.

During the pun ishm ent phase, several law

- enf orceme nt officials testified regarding other criminal conduct that Vaughan committed before he was arrested and whi le he was in jail

. As in the earlier phase, Vaugha n made no int erruptions, and his onl y exc hange
occurred at t he e nd of the t rial wh en he told the jury members to remembe r to vote.

Vaughan appeals the trial court ’ s judgment o f conviction.9 DISC USSION
In his issue on appeal, Vaughan contends that t he trial court erred by failing t o sua sponte convene an inf

orma l inqui ry into whe ther he was competent to stand trial. See Turner v.
State , 422 S.W.3d 676, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (explaining that person who is not competent may not be put on trial wi thout violating due process); see also Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art . 46B.004(b) (stat ing t hat “[i]f evidence suggesting the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial comes to the attention of the court, the court o n its own motion shall suggest that the
def endant may be incompetent to stan d trial”).

As support for this assertion, Vaugha n hi g hlights that the tri al court asked to review the competency reports and suggest s this shows that there was an i ndication that he was not competent

. Additionally, Vaugha n points to his interruptions and his exchanges during voir
dire and argues that t he be havior he exhibited warranted an informal competency inquiry
because the behavior could “ easily [be] described a s bizarre

. ” Because no inq uiry was alle gedly performed, Vaughan urges that he was denied t he right to a fair trial a nd t hat this Court sho uld

r everse his conviction and remand for a new trial. 1

1 In its brief, the S t ate assert s that Vaughan did not preserve h is issue for appellate consid erat io n because he did not raise the issue of his competency after the two psychologi sts found him competent or a sk for a compe tency hearing, and the State points to c ases by two of our sister c ourts of appeals that determined that similar issue s reg arding com pe te ncy need ed to be pr eserved to be ad dressed on appeal. See , e.g. , Means v. State , 955 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 1997, pet. ref ’ d , untimely filed ) (concluding that “ any purporte d error fro m the trial court ’ s fa ilure to convene ” pretr ial co mpet en cy “ proceedi ng was wa ived ” ); Dickson v. State , No. 13

- 97

- 00693

- CR, 1999 WL 3375 741 8, at * 1 (T ex. App.

— Corpus Christi

- Edin burg May 13, 1 999, no pet. ) (op., not designated for publication) ( noting th at trial counsel ’ s decis ion not to object to fa ilure to hol d hearing on d efendant ’ s competenc y in response to motion “ waived error ” ). I n contrast, Vaughan highlights that other intermediate cou rts have addressed the issue even when a defendant di d not raise the issue with the tr ial court. See , e.g. , Flagg v. Sta te , Nos. 05

- 0 8

- 00019

— 00 024

- CR, 2009 WL 242527, at * 2 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Feb. 3, 2009, pet. dism ’ d , unt imely filed ) (mem. op., n ot designated for publication) (assuming that defendant10 Generally speaking, a “defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial un less proved incompetent by a prep ond erance of the
evi dence.” Te x. Code Crim. Proc

. art . 46B.003(b) . “A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have”:
(1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonabl e degree of rational understandin g; or (2) a ration al as wel l as factual understan ding of the proceedings against the person.

Id. art. 46B.003(a) . Moreover, the defendant, the State, or the trial court may suggest that
the defendant is not competent to st and trial. Id. art. 46B.004(a)

. In addition, “[ o]n suggest ion
that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall determine by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the
defenda nt may be incompetent to stand tr ial .” Id. art. 46B.004(c)

. Fu rther, a “suggesti on of incompetency is the threshold requirement for an informal inquiry . . . and may consist solely
of a representation from any credible source that the defendant may be in competent.” Id.

art. 46B.004(c

- 1 ) ; see also id. (explaining tha t trial court “is not r equired to have a bona fide doubt about the competency of the defendant” before inquiry may be initiated). Among other factors, competency determinations may be based o n the ability of the defendant to :
(A) rationally understan d th e charges against the d efendant and the potential consequences of the pending criminal proceedings;

could raise issue of failure to conduc t sua sponte competency hearing for fi rst time on appeal) ; Higgins v. State , No. 08

- 03

- 00171

- CR, 2004 WL 1535609, at *2 (Tex. App.

— El Paso July 8, 2004, no pet.) (op., not designated for publication) (addressing argument eve n though defendant did not r aise issue by pre trial motio n or req uest h earing) . Fo r purpose s of resolving this issue, we will assume that this issue is prope rly before this Court.11

(B) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; (C) engage in a reason ed choice of legal strategies and o ptions; (D) understand th e ad versarial nature o f cri minal proceedings; (E) exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior; and (F) testify.

Id. art. 46B.024(1) ; see also id. art. 46B.004(c

- 1) (providing that trial court may consi der factors
listed in article 46B .0 24 when deciding competen cy). In making a dete rmina tion, the court may also consider whether the defendant has a mental illness, how long the condition is expected to last, how much the condition impairs the defendant, a nd whether the defendant is t akin g medication. Id. art. 46B .024 (2)

- (5) . Although evid ence of a history of mental illness might bear on this determination, that type of evidence will only compel further action by the trial court if it
indicates that the d efendant is currently incapab le o f understanding the proceed ings against him
or of cons ulting with his attorney. See Iniquez v. State , 374 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2012, no pet.) (applying bona

- fide standard from previous version of statute).

The decision by a trial cou rt no t to “ conduct further inqui ry i nto the” defendant ’s

co mpetency is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Luna v. State , 268 S.W.3d 594, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) . Under that standard, a trial court’s ruling will only b e deemed an abuse
of discret ion i f it i s so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zo ne of reasonable disagreement, Lopez
v. State , 86 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) , or is arbitrary or unreasonable, State v.
Mechler , 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2005) . Moreover, the tr ial c ourt’s ruling will be uphel d pr ovided that the de cisio n “is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case

. ” Carrasco v. State , 154 S.W.3d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)

. A trial court ’ s assessment of a defend ant ’ s ability to rati onal ly and factually12

u nders tand the pr oceedings and to assist counsel is “entitled to great deference” by the reviewing

court , s ee McDaniel v. State , 98 S.W.3d 704, 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) , bec ause a trial court is

“ in a bette r posi tion to determine whe ther [the defendant] w as pr esently competent, ” Montoya v.
State , 291 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) , superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Turner , 422 S.W.3d at 692

. Appella te courts should not substitute t heir j udgment for
that of t he t rial court. Id.

As an initial matter, we note that arguabl y the trial court did convene an informal
in quiry into Vaughan ’ s competency and found him to be competent. See George v. State , 446 S.W.3d 490, 501 (Tex. App.

— Ho uston [1 st Dist.] 2014, pet

. re f ’ d) (noting that d urin g informal inquiry, “ the trial court [ i ] s not required to follow specif ic protocols ” ). Upon learning that Vaughan refused to come to court, the trial court asked the tr a nsport officer if Vaughan
made t hat deci sion voluntarily an d if he appeared to ha ve a factual and rational understanding
of what was occurring

. In addition, t he trial court asked to review the reports by the two psychologists and liste ne d to Va u g han ’ s at torney ’ s assessment of Vaughan ’ s compete ncy
. Further, t he t rial court asked Vaugh an if he understood the nature of the pro ceedings and the
alle gations against him.

I n light of the preceding, the trial court arguably did conduct an informal inquiry
reg arding Vaughan ’ s competency. See Luna , 268 S.W.3d at 598

- 60 0 (d etermining that tr ial

c ourt did not abuse its discretion by failing to further inquire into defendant ’ s competency where defense counsel repeatedly s tated belief that def endant was competent a nd where trial court informally i nquired by asking defendant if he understood cons equen ces of his plea and right

to testify before jury and where record showed defendant made choices after thought and
deliberati on ) ; Jackson v. State , 391 S.W.3d 139, 142 (T ex. App.

— Texarkana 2012, no pet.)13

(conclud ing that trial cou rt ’ s inquiry to de fense cou nsel coupled with its own observations of
defe ndant constituted sufficient informal inquiry into defendant ’ s competenc y )

.

E ven if the trial court did not co nduct an informal inquiry as Vaug han suggest s,

we wou ld be u nabl e to conclude that the tria l court abused its discretion. As set out above, the
trial court review ed th e reports by the t wo psychologists , who determin ed that Vaughan was competent before tri al and made those assessments bas ed on the c ompetency factors lis ted in the
Cod e of Crim inal Procedure

. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.024

. In the first report , the psychologist discussed Vaughan ’ s history of mental

- health treatment , his prior convic tions , and his history of drug an d alcohol u se . Furt her , the ps y chologist stat ed that V aughan be came hostile during the ev aluation and paranoid but that his “ [t]hought processes were lucid, clear , and goal directed without evidence of psychosis ” and that “ [h]e was adequate in his discuss ion s. ” The psycholo gist det ermi ned that Vaugh an ha d a personality dis o rd er affe ct ing his co gnitive, emotional, and behavior al functioning ; presented evidence of an ant isocial personality disorder
resul ting in impulsivity and irresponsib ility ; and ha d parano id p erson ality fea tures c aus ing him to
distr us t others and perceiv e people as having malevolent intentions against him.

However , the expert concluded that Vaughan did not show evidence of a mental
illness or intellectual im pairment , that medication was not necessa ry to main tain hi s co mpetency,
and that he w as competent to stand trial after e xplaining as follows:
Mr. Vaugh a n does not possess any significant evidence of a mental disorder or psychiatric diagnosis. He is abl e to rationally understand the ch arges again st him and potenti al c onsequences of the pend ing criminal proceedings; he is able to disclose the accounts of pertinent facts, events, and states of mind and would be able to rationally do so in court through tes timony; he is able to engage in a reasoned c hoice of l egal str ateg ies and option s and has a rational understanding of the adversarial nature of the court proceedings. He would be able to exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior. He has a r ational capacity to engage with counsel.14 The sec ond report also detai l ed Vaug han ’ s history of m ental

- hea l th treatment and
h is drug and al cohol use and explained that Vaughan may act out due to some of his personality features, b ut the psychologis t determined that Vaughan could conform his behavior to wh at is
ap pr opr iate if he choos es t o do so , that he did no t have a mental i llness or intellectual impairment
tha t would impede his capacity to cons ult with his attorney , and that medication was not necessary to maintain his c ompetency . Further, the psycholo gist concl uded that V aughan w as

c ompetent to st and trial after explaining as follows:
Mr. Vaughan is capable of rationally understanding his charges and possib le consequences, relaying pertinent information to Counse l, sele cting legal strategy, understandi ng the adv e rsarial sy stem, te stif ying, and b eha ving appr opriately in court. While li kely to present challenges to Counsel due to his personality featu res, Mr. Vaughan is capable of rationally ass isting with his defense.
It is this evaluator ’ s opinion, wit h a reason able degree of psyc holo gical certain t y, that R oy Vaughan, Jr. possesses both the rational and factua l understanding of the charges and proceedings aga inst him. Further, he possesses sufficient capacity to consult competently with counsel regardi ng his cas e.

In add ition, t he t ransport offic er inform ed the trial court that Vaughan was acting rationally , and Vaughan ’ s attorney also explained th at he was competent to stand trial. Similarly, Vaugha n informed the tri al court that he understood the n ature of th e proceedin g s , tha t he was innocen t , that he wanted to partici pate in the trial , and that he agreed with the psychologists ’ assessment that he could behave if he wanted

. Further, Vaughan communicated
to the tria l court on multiple occasions tha t he wa s pu rpos efully acting out because the tr ial court denied his request for a new attorney and acknowledged how pat ie nt the trial court was being regarding his inappro priate behavior

.

Moreover, although the exchange s were hostile, the trial court w as able to ob serve Vaug h an in tera ct with his at torney an d his ability to tell his version of events

. See Turner ,15

422 S.W.3d at 696 ( explaining that trial court need not conduct competency inquiry when “there
is some eviden ce that the defendant obstinately refuses to c ooperate wi th co unse l but nothing
from wh ic h to rationally infer that his obstinacy is fueled by mental illness”) ; see also DeWitt v.
State , No s . 05

- 12

- 00583

— 00585

- CR, 2013 WL 3389055, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Dallas J uly 3, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designate d for publi catio n) ( noting that “ a failure to consult with
counsel do es not demonstrate a lack of competence; instead, a defendant must be unable to
consult with counsel ”)

. Similarly, the court engaged Va ughan about how he changed his prior
b e havior and a greed to we ar no njai l cloth ing aft er th inki ng about how wearing jail att ire and being forced to sit behind plexiglass might impact the presumption of innocence.

Additionally, although Vaughan correctly points o ut that he made repeated interrup tions during voir dire, his i nter ruptions were responsiv e to th e topics being discussed at the time, a nd Vaughan repeatedly explained his reasons for his conduct

. See Johnson v. State , 429 S.W.3d 13, 18 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ( stat ing that “ [b] izarre,
obs cene, or disruptive com ments by a defendant during court proc eedings do not necessarily constitute evidence supporting a finding of incompetency ”) ; Rojas v. State , 228 S.W.3d 770,
772 , 773 (Tex. App.

— Ama rillo 2007, no pet.) (noting that “ courts look to the cont ent of the

stateme nt, not m erely the fact the defendant violated rules of procedure or courtroom decorum ”
and noting that defendant ’ s “ co mme nts were relevant to the issue being addressed ” ) ; see also
Moore v. State , 999 S.W.2d 3 85, 3 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999 ) (r ejecting conte nti on tha t
defendant ’ s “ unruly and disruptive courtroom demeanor are probative o f incompetence to stand
trial ” because a contrary conclusion would allow one to “ effectively avoid criminal justice through immatur e behavior ” ); Lopez v. S tate , No. 04

- 12

- 00568

- C R, 2013 W L 6533183, at *7 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Dec. 11, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)16

( explaining that “ w hile there is evi dence that [the defendan t] refused to cooperate with his attorney pr io r to tria l, and some times interrup ted the p roceedings by speaking out loud, and sometimes failed to follow instructions, nothing in the record supports a rational inference that
his conduct

. . . was a product of mental illness rather than mer e obstinacy ” (internal q uota tion
marks omitted ) )

.

Even tho ugh Vaughan highlights that he was evaluated by psychologists and points to the portion s of the record in which he interrupted the p roceedi ngs , given the

co nclusio ns reached by the psycholo gists , the natur e an d cause o f hi s interruption s , and th e remainder of the information before the trial court , we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to co nclude that there was a current su ggestion that he had ne ither a

su fficient ability to rationall y co nsult with his attorney n or a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. For those same reasons, we also cannot conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion b y failing to conduct an informal inquiry into his com petency. C f.
Hobbs v. Stat e , 359 S. W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (noting that history of mental illness was insufficient “to warrant a competency inquiry absent evidence

o f a present inability to communic ate with his attorne y or unde rs ta nd the proceed ings”)

.

For these reasons, we ov errule Vaughan ’ s issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION Having overruled Vaughan ’ s issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court ’ s judgment
of convi ctio n.17 _________________________ _________________ Thomas J. Baker , Justice
Before Justices Baker, Theofanis , and Jones*
Affirmed
Fil ed: March 30 , 2023
Do N ot Publis h *Before J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice (Retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. See Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 74.003(b)

.