UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

ERIC SANDERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 3:15-CV-578-TLS

)

SHARON GREY, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

The Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint alleging that the Defendant, an officer

with the Indiana Department of Corrections, failed to protect him from being attacked by another

prisoner on September 11, 2015. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro

se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers . . ..” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations

omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must review the complaint and

dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

In his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that he and his attacker were both housed in an

Administrative Segregation Unit. He alleges that the Defendant failed to secure the door to his

attacker’s cell after escorting the attacker back from the shower. An hour or so later, the

Defendant let the Plaintiff out of his cell. While walking with him to the shower, the Defendant

stopped to talk to another inmate, but the Plaintiff continued down the hallway. It was then that

the Plaintiff was attacked. 
“In order to state a claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that

defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under

color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). When an inmate is

attacked by another inmate, a constitutional violation is committed only “if deliberate

indifference by prison officials effectively condones the attack by allowing it to happen.” Haley

v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640 (7th Cir. 1996). The prison official “must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must

also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

[Because p]risons are dangerous places . . . some level of brutality . . . is

inevitable no matter what the guards do. Worse: because violence is inevitable

unless all prisoners are locked in their cells 24 hours a day and sedated (a

“solution” posing constitutional problems of its own) it will always be possible to

say that the guards “should have known” of the risk. Indeed they should, and do.

Applied to a prison, the objective “should have known” formula of tort law

approaches absolute liability, rather a long distance from the Supreme Court’s

standards [for liability in this area]. 

McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 345, 348 (7th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by

Haley, 86 F.3d at 640. Consequently, even general requests for help and expressions of fear are

insufficient to alert guards to the need for action. Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639–40

(7th Cir. 2008).

The facts of this case make clear our reason for requiring more than general allegations of

fear or the need to be removed. By Klebanowski’s own testimony, the officers knew only

that he had been involved in an altercation with three other inmates, and that he wanted a

transfer because he feared for his life. He did not tell them that he had actually been

threatened with future violence, nor that the [first attack he suffered] was inflicted by

gang members because of his non-gang status. Without these additional facts to rely on,

there was nothing leading the officers to believe that Klebanowski himself was not

speculating regarding the threat he faced out of fear based on the first attack he suffered.

This lack of specificity falls below the required notice an officer must have for liability to

attach for deliberate indifference.

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Id. (footnote omitted). 

Here, despite the Plaintiff’s allegation that the Defendant violated prison policies, his

complaint does not plausibly allege that the Defendant was deliberately indifferent. Specifically,

the Plaintiff does not allege that he expressed any concerns prior to the attack; nor does he

allege—or provide a factual basis indicating—that the Defendant had any idea that there was a

specific risk that he might be attacked. 

Nevertheless, because the Court cannot say that it would be futile for the Plaintiff to file

an amended complaint, he will be granted the opportunity to do so. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart,

722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013). If the Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must

allege facts from which it can be plausibly inferred that the Defendant had actual knowledge of

an impending attack or otherwise “condone[d] the attack” by acting with deliberate indifference. 

Haley, 86 F.3d at 640. 

For these reasons, the Court: 

(1) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to place this cause number on a blank Prisoner

Complaint 42 U.S.C. § 1983 form and send it to the Plaintiff; 

(2) GRANTS the Plaintiff until January 15, 2016, to file an amended complaint; and

(3) CAUTIONS the Plaintiff that if he does not respond by that deadline, this case will

be dismissed without further notice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because the current complaint

fails to state a claim. 

 SO ORDERED on December 17, 2015.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

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