IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 2:15-CR-60

)

RALPHAEL CASSIBERRY, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress and Quash Arrest, filed by Defendant, Ralphael Cassiberry,

on April 22, 2016. (DE #39). For the reasons set forth below, the

motion is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

Defendant, Ralphael Cassiberry (“Cassiberry”), is charged with

identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1028(a)(7) and

committing a crime while on release in violation of 18 U.S.C.

section 3147. Cassiberry has moved to quash his arrest and

suppress all evidence obtained in the search and seizure of his

person on or about May 16, 2015, claiming violations of his Fourth

and Fifth Amendment rights. In his motion, Cassiberry claims that

the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Cassiberry’s

wallet contained contraband or evidence of a crime, and that “the
quantum of facts did not amount to probable cause to believe the

Defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a

crime.” (DE #39 at 4). 

This Court held an evidentiary hearing on this matter on May

17, 2016, at which Officer Kenneth Williams (“Officer Williams”),

an officer with the Hobart Police Department, testified. Agent

Clint Yarges of the United States Secret Service also testified. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the instant motion

under advisement.

FINDINGS OF FACT

In making the following findings of fact, the Court has

considered the briefs of the parties, the evidence presented, and

the credibility of the witnesses. Therefore, the Court finds as

follows:

On May 16, 2015, Officer Williams was working in Jasper

County, Indiana. He was on I-65 when he saw a black, Chrysler 300

following too closely behind a semi-truck. He initiated a traffic

stop and, after the vehicle pulled over, approached the vehicle on

the passenger’s side. He found the passenger, later identified as

Cassiberry, asleep and woke him up. Officer Williams immediately

detected an odor of burnt marijuana. Officer Williams was told

that the car was rented and asked the driver if he had the rental

agreement. Cassiberry, however, answered. Cassiberry indicated

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that they did not have the rental agreement. Officer Williams,

knowing that rentals are typically short-term and require that the

rental agreement be in the car, thought it was odd that they were

not looking for the rental agreement and that they did not have it.

Officer Williams asked Cassiberry if he rented the vehicle, and he

indicated that he had rented it. He then asked to see Cassiberry’s

identification. When Cassiberry opened his wallet, Officer

Williams saw that he had a military ID and several credit cards. 

At this point, Officer Williams was not suspicious of the credit

cards. He inquired about firearms, however, because he saw the

military ID and, in his experience, many people who have served in

the military carry guns in Indiana. 

Officer Williams then asked the driver, Jamal Campbell

(“Campbell”), to come back towards his car with him. Officer

Williams explained the reason for the stop (following too closely)

and indicated that, if Campbell’s license was not expired, he would

give him a written warning. Campbell did not deny that he was

following too closely but did attempt to explain his actions. 

Officer Williams asked Campbell where he was coming from. He

indicated he was coming from Cincinnati. He also asked him about

the smell of marijuana. Campbell initially denied that both he and

Cassiberry smoked marijuana, but then he indicated that marijuana

had been smoked in the vehicle earlier. He further clarified that

by earlier he meant the previous night. While Campbell did not

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clearly state that he smoked the marijuana personally, it can

reasonably be inferred from his statement that either he, or he and

Cassiberry, had smoked marijuana in the vehicle the previous

evening. He denied that there was marijuana in the car.

Campbell then clarified that they left from Chicago early that

morning. Officer Williams had already run Campbell’s license and

knew he had a warrant out of Louisiana for fraud. Campbell,

however, claimed that he had not yet been charged with a crime, but 

that he had a court date on the 25th of June. At this point,

Officer Williams felt Campbell was being deceptive because he would

not have either a warrant or a court date if he had not yet been

charged. Furthermore, when he asked Campbell what the original

charge was, he just stated that he had a warrant. During this

conversation with Campbell, Officer Williams witnessed Cassiberry

reaching around the front portion of the vehicle. 

Officer William decided to search the vehicle. At this point,

Officer Ciesielski had arrived to assist. Officer Williams

approached the passenger side again and asked Cassiberry to step

out, explaining that the car smelled like marijuana. Cassiberry

denied that the car smelled like marijuana but complied with

Officer Williams’ request that he exit the vehicle. Cassiberry sat

in the police vehicle while the car was searched. 

Officer Williams retrieved his canine and took him around the

vehicle. Officer Williams was not relying on the canine to

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establish probable cause for the search; rather, it was a new dog,

and they were having issues with him on the highway, especially

when working on the street side of a vehicle. This was an

opportunity to give the dog exposure in a real life scenario. He

was, however, a trained canine, and he did alert to the presence of

narcotics. 

During the search, Officer Ciesielski located a small bag of

what appeared to be marijuana in the driver’s door area - the same

area where Cassiberry was seen reaching while Officer Williams was

discussing the traffic violation with Campbell. Officer Williams

testified, after reviewing one of his reports, that Campbell told

him that the marijuana was his. 

The search also revealed numerous gift cards in a black

luggage bag in the trunk. Those cards were run though a magnetic

card reader, and they were determined to be legitimate, meaning

that the numbers on the front of the cards matched the numbers

encoded on the magnetic strip. Officer Williams knew from his

experience that people who engage in credit card fraud buy gift

cards with the fraudulent credit cards because they can then be

used as cash instead of using the fraudulent card. Campbell claimed

that these gift cards were from his mom. 

The search also revealed a wallet tucked up under the

passenger’s seat. This wallet contained cards with the driver’s

name on them. These cards were run through the magnetic card

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reader too, and it was determined that they were fraudulent - the

numbers on the front of the cards did not match the numbers encoded

in the magnetic strips on the back of the cards. 

Officer Williams initially testified that he first searched

Cassiberry’s wallet after he was placed in handcuffs. Later in the

hearing, however, it became clear from video taken from the

interior of Officer Williams’ vehicle that he actually looked

through the wallet prior to Cassiberry being handcuffed. 

Cassiberry was removed briefly from the squad car, and the officer

patted him down searching for marijuana. No marijuana was found. 

He also took Cassiberry’s wallet and looked through it for several

seconds before returning it. 

Shortly thereafter, both Campbell and Cassiberry were placed

under arrest. It was only after Cassiberry’s arrest that the cards

located in Cassiberry’s wallet were run through the magnetic strip

reader. Following Cassiberry’s arrest, it was determined that some

of the cards in his wallet were fraudulent. 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable

searches and seizures, and this protection has been extended to the

states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); U.S. Const.

Amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless search,

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unless the search falls under one of the recognized exceptions to

the warrant requirement. U.S. v. Denney, 771 F.2d 318, 320 (7th

Cir. 1985). If a search is conducted without a warrant, the

Government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at

the time of the search. United States v. Taylor, 776 F.3d 513, 518

(7th Cir. 2015). Ultimately, the Fourth Amendment’s touchstone is

reasonableness. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 

This Court has considered the evidence, the briefs, and the oral

arguments of counsel and finds no violation of Cassiberry’s Fourth

Amendment rights.1 

The Initial Traffic Stop

 Cassiberry’s motion to suppress does not dispute that the

original traffic stop, premised on the fact that the vehicle was

following too closely, was lawful. At the hearing, Cassiberry

attempted to elicit evidence that might suggest the initial stop

was unwarranted, but this Court sustained the Government’s

objection on the basis that it was outside the scope of the motion

1

 Cassiberry’s motion also claims a violation of the Fifth Amendment of

the United States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person

“be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." 

U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. The Fifth Amendment “[p]rotects a person only against

being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications.” Doe v.

U.S., 487 U.S. 201, 207 (1988). When an individual is taken into custody and

is subject to interrogation, the individual must be advised of these rights. 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Cassiberry has not developed any

arguments in support of a Fifth Amendment violation in either his brief or at

the hearing on the motion to suppress.

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to suppress.2

Cassiberry’s Detention Prior to Arrest

This Court does not believe that Cassiberry’s motion to

suppress can be fairly construed as a challenge to the lawfulness

of his detention prior to his arrest. At the hearing, however,

there was some attempt to broaden the scope of the motion. The

Government objected to inquiries by Cassiberry’s counsel that

challenged the lawfulness of Cassiberry’s temporary detention, and

that objection was sustained. Nonetheless, the lawfulness of

Cassiberry’s detention will be addressed briefly. The Supreme

Court has made it clear that “[a] seizure justified only by a

police-observed traffic violation . . . becomes unlawful if it is

prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the

mission of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015) (emphasis added)

(internal brackets and quotation marks deleted). However, “when

2 Probable cause to initiate a traffic stop exists when “the

circumstances confronting a police officer support the reasonable belief that

a driver has committed even a minor traffic offense.” United States v.

Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). “Ulterior motives do not

invalidate a police stop for a traffic violation, no matter how minor, if a

motor vehicle law infraction is detected.” United States v. Murray, 89 F.3d

459, 461 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tipton, 3 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir.

1993); see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)(holding that the

“decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable

cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”). The evidence before

this Court shows that, when Cassiberry was told the reason for the stop, he

did not deny that he was driving too closely but instead attempted to explain

his behavior. Even if not waived, any argument that the initial traffic stop

was without probable cause would almost certainly fail. 

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there is reasonable suspicion that the occupants of a vehicle are

engaged in other illegal activity, an officer may prolong a traffic

stop to investigate that activity.” United States v. Walden, 146

F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1998). 

Here, Officer Williams observed the smell of marijuana

immediately upon approaching the vehicle. Based on the odor of

marijuana emitting from the vehicle, even when the reason for the

initial stop was resolved, Officer Williams had reasonable

suspicion to believe one or both of the vehicle’s occupants may

have possessed marijuana. This justified an extension of the

traffic stop and Cassiberry’s continued detention.

The Search of the Vehicle

It does not appear that Cassiberry is challenging the search

of the vehicle, but in the interest of thoroughness this Court will

briefly address that search. Officers may search an automobile

without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe it

contains contraband. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721

(2009)(“If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains

evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,

820-21, 102 S.Ct. 2057, 72 L.Ed.2d. 572 (1982), authorizes a search

of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.”).

The smell of marijuana alone provided probable cause to believe the

vehicle contained contraband. See United States v. Franklin, 547

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F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2008)(“A police officer who smells marijuana

coming from a car has probable cause to search that car.”); United

States v. Mosby, 541 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir. 2008) (“smell [of

marijuana] alone was enough to give rise to probable cause to

search the entire vehicle, including closed container like the

garbage bag.”). Thus, the search of the vehicle was supported by

probable cause.

The Search of Cassiberry’s Wallet Prior to His Arrest

At the hearing it became apparent that Officer Williams

requested Cassiberry’s wallet and looked through it carefully

before arresting him. By the time Officer Williams examined

Cassiberry’s wallet, Officer Williams had noted that Cassiberry had

numerous cards in his wallet, smelled marijuana in the car, and

heard Campbell both deny that either he or Cassiberry had smoked

marijuana and then concede that marijuana had been smoked in the

car. Additionally, Officer Williams had located marijuana in the

vehicle that Campbell said was his, had located gift cards that

Campbell said his mother gave him, and had located fraudulent

credit cards in Campbell’s wallet. Officer Williams was not

required to accept Campbell’s statements that the gift cards were

his at face value given that he had lied twice. Based on these

facts, there was probable cause to believe that one or both of the

occupants of the vehicle were involved in credit card fraud, and

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the search of Cassiberry’s wallet was therefore supported by

probable cause.3 In fact, at this point, this Court believes

Officer Williams had sufficient probable cause to arrest

Cassiberry, as is explained below.4

Cassiberry’s Arrest

Cassiberry further contends that his arrest was unlawful

because there was not sufficient probable cause to believe that

Cassiberry had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a

crime. The Government, on the other hand, argues that Officer

Williams had more than sufficient probable cause to arrest

Cassiberry and, in fact, had probable cause to arrest him well

before he was actually arrested. The Court agrees with the

Government. 

A suspect may be arrested without a warrant only if the

officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has

committed a crime. United States v. Sawyer, 224 F.3d 675, 678 (7th

Cir. 2000); United States v. Rucker, 138 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir.

3 It does not appear that Officer Williams’ brief look inside

Cassiberry’s wallet meaningfully contributed to the decision to arrest him. 

Officer Williams already knew the wallet contained credit cards. At the

hearing on the motion to suppress, the Government indicated that they were not

attempting to admit any evidence from this search of the wallet, rather, they

intended to admit evidence of what the later post-arrest search of the wallet

revealed. 

4 To the extent that Cassiberry’s argument that he was arrested for his

mere presence in the vehicle apply to the search of his wallet prior to his

arrest, that argument fails for the reasons set forth in the following

section. 

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1998). Probable cause to make an arrest is present when “the facts

and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which the

officer has reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient to

warrant a prudent person in believing the suspect has committed or

is committing an offense.” Sawyer, 224 F.3d at 678-79. Probable

cause is to be determined by an analysis of the totality of the

circumstances. Rucker, 138 F.3d at 700. Probable cause “does not

require evidence sufficient to support a conviction, nor evidence

demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the suspect

committed a crime.” Sawyer, 224 F.3d at 679. “So long as the

totality of the circumstances, viewed in a common sense manner,

reveals a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity on

the suspect’s part, probable cause exists.” Id.

As a result of the search of the vehicle, a small bag of what

appeared to be marijuana was found. After the marijuana was found,

a large number gift cards were located in the trunk. And,

Campbell’s wallet was retrieved from the vehicle. The officers

scanned credit cards from Campbell’s wallet and determined that

they were fraudulent.5 Cassiberry argues that the only evidence

5 Although Cassiberry suggests that the scanning of the cards was a

separate search and was unjustified, his cards were not scanned until after

his arrest. Furthermore, Cassiberry does not develop this argument or cite

any supporting authority. The Sixth Circuit, in a well-reasoned opinion, has

found that scanning cards obtained through an otherwise lawful search did not

violate a defendant’s constitutional rights because it was not a separate

search and the cardholder did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in

such information. United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617, 629-30 (July 24, 2015).

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of criminal activity at the time of his arrest was associated with

Campbell, and that he was just a passenger who was arrested for his

mere association with Campbell. Cassiberry relies on United States

v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), in support of his argument. In Di

Re, the Supreme Court held that probable cause to search a car does

not extend to a search of each of the car’s occupants. Id. at 587

(“We are not convinced that a person, by mere presence in a

suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which

he would otherwise be entitled.”). In Di Re, a vehicle was

approached based on information from an informant that the

informant planned to buy counterfeit ration coupons from the driver

of the vehicle. Id. at 583. The informant was found holding the

counterfeit coupons and, when questioned, indicated that he

obtained them from the driver. Id. The informant did not

implicate the passenger, yet the passenger was also arrested. Id.

Following his arrest, a search revealed that he too had possession

of counterfeit ration coupons. Id. The Supreme Court found that,

under these particular circumstances, an inference of conspiracy

was unwarranted. Id. at 228. 

The argument that one who “accompanies a

criminal to a crime rendezvous” cannot be

assumed to be a bystander, forceful enough in

some circumstances, is farfetched when the

meeting is not secretive or in a suspicious

hide-out but in broad daylight, in plain sight

of passersby, in a public street of a large

city, and where the alleged substantive crime

is one which does not necessarily involve any

act visibly criminal. If Di Re had witnessed

the passing of papers from hand to hand, it

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would not follow that he knew they were ration

coupons, and if he saw that they were ration

coupons, it would not follow that he would

know them to be counterfeit. Indeed it

appeared at the trial to require an expert to

establish that fact. Presumptions of guilt

are not lightly to be indulged from mere

meetings.

Id.

The Government, on the other hand, points to Maryland v.

Pringle, 124 S.Ct. 795 (2003), where the Supreme Court

distinguished Di Re and held that, under the facts before it, the

officer could reasonably infer a common enterprise among the three

occupants of the car. Id. at 373. In Pringle, an officer stopped

a vehicle for speeding at 3:16 in the morning. Id. at 386. When

the driver opened the glove compartment to get his vehicle

registration, the officer saw a large amount of rolled-up money. 

Id. Upon obtaining consent from the driver, the vehicle was

searched and cocaine was located behind the back-seat armrest. Id.

The occupants of the vehicle were each questioned but all denied

ownership of both the money and the cocaine. Id. at 368-69. The

officer placed all three occupants of the vehicle under arrest. 

The Supreme Court noted that, 

We think it an entirely reasonable inference

from these facts that any or all three of the

occupants had knowledge of, and exercised

dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus,

a reasonable officer would conclude that there

was probable cause to believe Pringle

committed the crime of possession of cocaine,

either solely or jointly.

Id. at 372. In concluding that the arrest was supported by

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probable cause, the Supreme Court quoted its earlier decision in

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 2985 (1999), where the Supreme Court

noted that passengers “will often be engaged in a common enterprise

with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the

fruits of the evidence of their wrongdoing.” Id. 

The facts of the instant case fall somewhere between Di Re and

Pringle. Unlike Pringle, this is not a circumstance where the

occupants both denied that the contraband belonged to them;

Campbell claimed ownership of both the marijuana and the gift cards

found in the trunk of the car. But, Cassiberry is not positioned

precisely like the passenger in Di Re either. Here, several facts

other than Cassiberry’s mere presence in the vehicle suggest

involvement in criminal activity, including but not limited to the

failure to produce a rental agreement, the furtive movements, and

the presence of numerous credit cards in his wallet. 

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed the

interplay between Di Re and Pringle in United States v. Gary, 790

F.3d 704 (2015). In Gary, a vehicle was pulled over at the

direction of a narcotics detective investigating a drug trafficking

organization. Id. at 706. A pat-down search revealed heroin on

the driver, but nothing on Gary. Id. Gary was, however, taken to

the station because his parole officer wanted to see him, which

amounted to an arrest. Id. After noting that the question of

whether there is probable cause is an objective determination that

is separate from the officer’s enunciated reason, the court found

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that there was in fact probable cause to arrest Gary. Id. Earlier

that day, the narcotics detective who directed the stop purchased

heroin from the driver while Gary was present in the car, and the

driver made no effort to conceal his illegal activities from Gary. 

Id. at 706-07. Based on these facts, the court found that it was

reasonable to infer a common enterprise between the driver and

Gary. Id. at 707. Relying on Pringle, the court noted that the

holding in Pringle that passengers will often be engaged in common

criminal enterprises with the driver is “particularly true when the

driver is engaged in drug dealing,” where allowing an innocent

person to have knowledge of the illegal activity would put the

individual at greater risk of arrest. Id. The court noted that:

In contrast to Di Re, where the passenger

would not necessarily have known about the

illegal nature of the contraband the driver

was selling (counterfeit ration coupons) and

had not been present when the driver sold the

contraband, the illegality of the driver’s

conduct here was apparent. The sale of heroin

is unmistakably illegal, and Gary was very

close by when the driver sold heroin to an

undercover agent. It is hard to imagine that

the driver would have made no attempt to hide

this from Gary unless he was involved in the

drug-dealing enterprise.

Id.

After consideration of Di Re, Pringle, and Gary, this Court

concludes that the facts of this case are more akin to Pringle than

Di Re. Like in Pringle, Cassiberry was not arrested for his mere

presence in the vehicle. Many factors would allow an experienced

officer to infer that it was at least as probable that Cassiberry

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was engaged in illegal conduct as any innocent inference. See

United States v. Funches, 327 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.

2003)(finding, based on the totality of the circumstances, that

“the inference of illegal conduct by trained and experienced

officers is at least as probable as any innocent inference.”). 

First, Officer Williams immediately smelled marijuana upon

approaching the car. Cassiberry indicated that he, the passenger,

rented the car but stated that he did not have the rental

agreement. The officer observed numerous credit cards in

Cassiberry’s wallet when he retrieved his identification. Campbell

offered evasive and deceptive answers to some of Officer Williams’

questions about the nature of his travels. Officer Williams

witnessed furtive movements by Cassiberry in the front seat of the

vehicle while he was talking with Campbell about the traffic

violation. Officer Williams had knowledge that Campbell had a

warrant for fraud. Campbell initially denied that either he or

Cassiberry smoked marijuana, but then upon only slight prodding,

offered a somewhat ambiguous admission that marijuana was smoked in

the car. He then denied that there was any marijuana in the car,

but a search turned up a substance that appeared to be marijuana. 

Campbell claimed responsibility for the marijuana, but at that

point, Campbell had already lied twice - telling the officer that

he did not smoke marijuana and telling the officer that there was

no marijuana in the car. Numerous gift cards were found, and

Campbell claimed these belonged to him, but again, Campbell had

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already lied and his credibility was therefore questionable. Then,

Campbell’s wallet was found, and the credit cards within it turned

out to be fraudulent. 

This Court must look at the totality of the circumstances. 

Rucker, 138 F.3d at 700. The fact that Campbell was evasive about

his trip, had been caught lying, and claimed responsibility for

both the marijuana and the gift cards are relevant to determining

if the officer had probable cause to arrest Cassiberry. However,

even if this Court focused only on Cassiberry’s actions, there were

enough facts to support probable cause for Cassiberry’s arrest: the

smell of marijuana, the fact that he claimed he rented the car but

did not have the rental agreement, the furtive movements which

would make it possible that he placed the marijuana where it was

found in the driver’s door, and the fact that the officer had

witnessed many credit cards in Cassiberry’s wallet. Campbell did

claim responsibility for the contraband, but, as noted above,

Campbell had lied twice, and Officer Williams had no obligation to

accept Campbell’s claims of responsibility for the contraband as

true, especially where he had seen many credit cards in

Cassiberry’s wallet. Cassiberry’s argument that this is a merepresence case would require the officer to have accepted Campbell’s

statements regarding the ownership of the contraband at face value.

It would also require this Court to ignore other suspicious

behaviors that suggested joint involvement in criminal activity. 

Here, like in Pringle, the totality of the circumstances support a

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finding that probable cause existed to arrest Cassiberry.6

The Search of Cassiberry’s Wallet Following Arrest

 To the extent Cassiberry is challenging the search of his

wallet after his arrest, this Court has determined that the arrest

was lawful. As such, the search of the wallet subsequent to the

arrest was also lawful as a search incident to the lawful arrest. 

United States v. Jackson, 377 F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 2004)(“[I]t

is reasonable for the police to search the body, clothing, and

immediate possessions of anyone in custody following an arrest on

probable cause.”) 

CONCLUSION

The evidence before this Court shows that, at every stage, the

search, seizure and arrest of Cassiberry was lawful. For the

reasons set forth above, Cassiberry’s Fourth Amendment rights were

not violated and Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and Quash Arrest,

filed on April 22, 2016 (DE #39) is DENIED.

DATED: May 31, 2016 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

6 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, counsel for Cassiberry

suggested that the fact that Cassiberry and Campbell have been charged in

different cases was relevant to determining whether this is a mere-presence

case like Di Re or a case like Pringle where the likelihood of joint criminal

activity supported probable cause. The fact that the Government decided to

charge Cassiberry with identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. section

1028(a)(7) and committing a crime while on release in violation of 18 U.S.C.

section 3147 rather than a crime such as conspiracy or aiding and abetting is

irrelevant. The prosecutor’s charging decisions have nothing to do with

whether the officer at the scene had probable cause to believe a crime was

afoot at the time of Cassiberry’s arrest.

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