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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

March 17, 2015 

v No. 318642 

Oakland Circuit Court 

MELVIN JAMES WOFFORD, LC No. 2012-241569-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: DONOFRIO, P.J., and RIORDAN and GADOLA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant, Melvin James Wofford, appeals as of right his conviction of first-degree 

premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a) and (b). During the course of burglarizing the 

victim’s, Thomas Gilmore’s, place of business on June 22 or 23, 1993, defendant fatally 

strangled Gilmore. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison. We affirm. 

I. JURY DELIBERATIONS 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Defendant first contends that he was denied due process when the trial court removed a 

juror during deliberations and replaced her with an alternate instead of granting a mistrial. We 

review the trial court’s decision on a motion for a mistrial and decision to remove a juror for an 

abuse of discretion. People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 17; 669 NW2d 831 (2003); People v Tate, 

244 Mich App 553, 559-560; 624 NW2d 524 (2001). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the 

court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” 

People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). “A trial court should grant a 

mistrial only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant and impairs his 

ability to get a fair trial.” People v Schaw, 288 Mich App 231, 236; 791 NW2d 743 (2010) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). 

B. ANALYSIS 

 On the second day of jury deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court indicating that 

the jurors were 11 to 1, with no chance of the one changing his or her view. The court instructed 

the jury to resume deliberations in the hope that further discussion would result in a verdict. An 

hour later, the court received another note in which the jury indicated that the doubts of one of 
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the jurors were unreasonable, and requested advice regarding how to proceed. The court 

instructed the jury that, if it wished to communicate with the court, any note had to come from 

the foreperson. The court also reminded the jury that it must not let anyone know how the voting 

stands. 

 The next day, the court received several notes from the jury. The first noted stated that 

one juror was not cooperating, refused to deliberate or prove her vote, “she just wants a hung 

jury,” and she had “looked up the phrase to see what it meant before” deliberations started. 

Another note stated: “We have a [juror] who SERIOUSLY doesn’t understand what Reasonable 

Doubt is!! We have a hung jury [a]nd we need instructions!!! HELP!!!” The trial court reread 

the reasonable doubt instruction, reread the aiding and abetting instruction, and instructed the 

jury that it must follow the law and not obtain information from any outside source. The court 

also read a second deadlock instruction, encouraging the jurors to continue deliberations. 

 Two days later, an attorney appeared at court and indicated that one of the jurors—Ms. 

McGraw—had contacted him and said that she was being harassed and verbally abused. 

Defendant stated that he assumed McGraw was the holdout, and requested a mistrial because of 

the potential for a coercive verdict. Yet, the court noted that no one knew if McGraw was the 

holdout, and that for all they knew the vote could be equally divided at that point. The court 

noted that McGraw violated its explicit instructions about contacting anyone about the case, 

which constituted good cause to remove her. The court then replaced McGraw with an alternate, 

and gave the following instruction: 

 We now have a reconstituted jury pool. A juror has been excused for 

cause and replaced with an alternate. This has nothing to do with your 

deliberations and you should not allow this fact to influence your deliberations in 

any way. You must start your deliberations from the beginning. You should not 

discuss among you, nor with the new juror, any of your prior deliberations. 

Again, you must begin your deliberations anew. 

More than an hour and a half later, the jury returned its guilty verdict. 

 Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in removing the juror because, unlike 

other cases involving the removal of a juror, McGraw was not sick. See, e.g., People v Tate, 244 

Mich App 553; 624 NW2d 524 (2001). However, defendant has not supported his argument that 

only severe sickness can serve as the basis for juror removal after deliberations have begun. See, 

e.g., People v Harvey, 167 Mich App 734, 744; 423 NW2d 335 (1988) (reasons for discharging a 

juror include “personal disability or legal disqualification.”). In fact, MCL 768.18 provides: 

“Should any condition arise during the trial of the cause which in the opinion of the trial court 

justifies the excusal of any of the jurors so impaneled from further service, he may do so and the 

trial shall proceed, unless the number of jurors be reduced to less than 12.” As this Court 

explained in Tate: 

 [W]hile a defendant has a fundamental interest in retaining the 

composition of the jury as originally chosen, he has an equally fundamental right 

to have a fair and impartial jury made up of persons able and willing to cooperate, 

a right that is protected by removing a juror unable or unwilling to cooperate. 
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Removal of a juror under Michigan law is therefore at the discretion of the trial 

court, weighing a defendant’s fundamental right to a fair and impartial jury with 

his right to retain the jury originally chosen to decide his fate. [244 Mich App at 

562 (quotation marks and citation omitted).] 

Also, the court rules broadly permit the trial court to retain alternate jurors during deliberations, 

presumably in case of removal. MCR 6.411. 

Contrary to defendant’s assertion on appeal, the trial court did not remove McGraw 

because she was a lone hold-out who was standing in the way of conviction. In fact, defendant’s 

basic premise is flawed. Early on in the deliberations, the jury informed the court that they were 

11 to 1. However, the jury did not reveal which way the majority was leaning or the identity of 

the hold-out. Several days of continued deliberation then ensued. As the trial court found, there 

was no evidence at the time of McGraw’s removal what way the jury was leaning, or the 

potential division. 

Moreover, the record clearly demonstrates that the trial court removed this juror because 

she flagrantly violated the court’s instructions by discussing the deliberations with a non-juror. 

Neither party contests McGraw’s blatant disregard for the court’s instructions, nor that it 

implicated her ability to follow jury instructions. Thus, the trial court protected defendant’s right 

to a fair and impartial jury “by removing a juror unable or unwilling to cooperate.” Tate, 244 

Mich App at 562. 

Defendant, however, contends that the trial court still should have granted a mistrial 

because of the danger that the alternate juror would be influenced when faced with 11 jurors who 

were convinced of his guilt. Yet, as discussed supra, there is no evidence regarding what way 

the jury was leaning at the time of McGraw’s removal. Thus, to conclude that there was only 

one hold-out, or that it was McGraw, is mere speculation. Significantly, the trial court properly 

instructed the newly configured jury that it must deliberate anew, and disregard its prior 

deliberations. See MCR 6.411; Tate, 244 Mich App at 567 (“the jury in such situations should 

be instructed to begin deliberations anew.”). As we have recognized, “[j]urors are presumed to 

follow their instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most errors.” People v Abraham, 

256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). “Because it is . . . pure speculation that the 

alternate juror was coerced, we conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the substitution of 

the alternate juror.” People v Mahone, 294 Mich App 208, 218; 816 NW2d 436 (2011). 

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We 

review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 

192, 195; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). “In determining whether the prosecutor has presented 

sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, an appellate court is required to take the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecutor” to ascertain “whether a rational trier of fact could find 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Tennyson, 487 Mich 730, 735; 790 

NW2d 354 (2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted). We resolve conflicts of the evidence 
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in favor of the prosecution, “and we will not interfere with the jury’s determinations regarding 

the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 222. 

Furthermore, circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from them can constitute 

sufficient proof of the elements of a crime. People v Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 100; 505 NW2d 

869 (1993). 

B. ANALYSIS 

 The only element defendant challenges regarding his first-degree murder conviction is 

identity. “[I]t is well settled that identity is an element of every offense.” People v Yost, 278 

Mich App 341, 356; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). 

 The prosecutor’s theory at trial was that the person who broke into the building also 

killed the victim. Although this theory involves multiple layers of inferences, it is supported 

with evidence. After the break-in, the victim was not seen or heard from until his body was 

discovered. Moreover, the DNA from the blood found on the workbench and tool room wall 

matched defendant’s DNA. The hair on the duct tape near the point of entry also matched 

defendant’s DNA. The jury could infer from this evidence that defendant entered through the 

metal-covered window, cut himself on the broken glass fragments, caught his hair on the duct 

tape that had secured the metal to the window, removed the saw, and dripped small quantities of 

blood on the workbench and wall. The DNA evidence established defendant’s identity as the 

perpetrator of the break-in. 

 The similarity of footwear impressions near the victim’s body, on the shovel found near 

the bent metal covering, and the metal covering further establish the common identity of the 

perpetrator. Furthermore, as the perpetrator of the break-in, defendant had a motive to kill the 

victim because the victim could identify him. The jury could infer that a stranger would have 

chosen immediate flight instead of murder, as the victim would not have recognized the 

perpetrator. Additionally, defendant had a motive to steal because the testimony indicated that 

he was chronically short of money in 1993. Defendant often borrowed money from coworkers 

and others. He also admitted to the grand jury that he might have given his car to his brother in 

payment of a loan. The victim’s wallet was never found. 

 Moreover, although defendant was with another employee the night of the break-in, he 

left that person’s house claiming he had something to do. When the coworker woke up in the 

morning, he found defendant asleep on the living room floor. The jury could infer that defendant 

committed the offenses between the time he left the house and returned. The jury also could 

have found relevant that defendant missed work after the murder, he was uninterested in a 

coworker’s distress over the victim’s death, and he was uncharacteristically ingratiating toward 

the police. 

 On appeal, defendant highlights contrary evidence, such as the fact that other DNA 

samples collected from the building did not match his DNA, he was excluded as the person who 

left the fingerprint or palm print on the vestibule door, the footwear he was wearing at the time 

of the police interview was not a match to the footwear impressions at the scene, the lack of 

eyewitnesses, and that the coworker—whose house defendant slept at—was intoxicated. 

However, these arguments involve the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses. “We 
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do not interfere with the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of witnesses or the 

evidence[.]” People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 582; 831 NW2d 243 (2013). “[T]he 

prosecution is only required to produce sufficient evidence to establish guilt; it is not required to 

negate every reasonable theory consistent with a defendant's innocence.” People v Hardiman, 

466 Mich 417, 430; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). 

III. CONCLUSION 

 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in replacing a juror with an alternate or in 

declining to grant a mistrial. Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction. We affirm. 

/s/ Pat M. Donofrio 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola