FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

GREGORY F. ZOELLER DARREN BEDWELL

Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

ANDREW A. KOBE

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellant-Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1206-CR-526

)

WILLIAM COATS, )

)

Appellee-Defendant. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Barbara Collins, Judge

Cause No. 49F08-1004-FD-30232

February 7, 2013

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge
2

Case Summary

The State appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion to commit William Coats to 

the Indiana Division of Mental Health and Addiction (“DMHA”). We affirm.

Issue

The State raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly 

denied the State’s motion to commit Coats to the DMHA for competency restoration 

services.

Facts

On April 15, 2010, the State charged Coats, who was born in 1943, with Class D 

felony sexual battery against his granddaughter. Coats had been diagnosed with 

Alzheimer’s disease, and Coats’s counsel filed a motion to determine Coats’s 

competency to stand trial. The trial court assigned two doctors to examine Coats. Both 

doctors diagnosed Coats with dementia. Noting that dementia is a progressive disease, 

both doctors found that Coats would not improve over time and that there was little 

chance of Coats being restored to competency. 

At a hearing on February 7, 2012, the trial court found that Coats was incompetent 

and “will not return to competency.” Tr. p. 6; see also Appellant’s App. p. 31. The trial 

court noted that Coats was residing with his wife and was not a public safety risk at that 

time. The State requested that Coats be committed to the DMHA, but the trial court 

denied the motion.

On February 29, 2012, the State filed a written request that Coats be committed to 

the DMHA pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1. The State argued that Coats’s 
3

commitment was required due to the trial court’s finding that Coats was incompetent. On 

March 20, 2012, Coats filed a motion to dismiss the charges due to his incompetency. 

Coats argued that, since he could not be returned to competency, his commitment would 

result in a violation of his constitutional rights.

At another hearing on June 15, 2012, Coats’s counsel again argued that Coats was 

incompetent and could not be restored to competency. Coats’s counsel asked that the 

charges be dismissed. The State again asked that Coats be committed to the DMHA. 

The trial court denied both motions and reset the matter for another hearing in three 

months. The trial court granted the State’s motion to certify the order for interlocutory 

appeal, and this court accepted jurisdiction pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B). 

Analysis

The issue is whether the trial court properly denied the State’s motion to commit 

Coats to the DMHA.1 According to the State, the trial court failed to follow the relevant 

competency statutes when it denied the State’s request to commit Coats. Coats argues

that his commitment would violate his constitutional rights.

“Statutes control the appropriate way to determine a defendant’s competency and, 

if necessary, to commit the defendant and provide restoration services.” Curtis v. State, 

948 N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. 2011). “In the interpretation of statutes, the trial court’s ‘goal is to 

determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature in promulgating it.ʼ” Ryan v. 

State, 900 N.E.2d 43, 44-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Porter Dev., LLC v. First Nat’l 

 

1 Coats does not appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.
4

Bank of Valparaiso, 866 N.E.2d 775, 778 (Ind. 2007)). Our primary resource for this 

determination is the language used by the legislature. Id. Thus, “our interpretation 

begins with an examination of the statute’s language.” Id. “We presume that the words 

of an enactment were selected to express their common and ordinary meanings.” Id. 

“Where the statute is unambiguous,” we “read each word and phrase in this plain, 

ordinary, and usual sense, without having to resort to rules of construction to decipher 

meanings.” Id. Statutory interpretation is a question of law reserved for the court and is 

reviewed de novo. Shaffer v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1072, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). De 

novo review allows us to decide an issue without affording any deference to the trial 

court’s decision. Id.

The State sought to have Coats committed to the DMHA pursuant to Indiana Code 

Chapter 35-36-3, which governs comprehension to stand trial. Indiana Code Section 35-

36-3-1 provides that, if the trial court finds the defendant lacks the ability to understand 

the proceedings and assist in the preparation of his or her defense, the trial court:

shall delay or continue the trial and order the defendant 

committed to the division of mental health and addiction. 

The division of mental health and addiction shall provide 

competency restoration services or enter into a contract for 

the provision of competency restoration services by a third 

party in the:

(1) location where the defendant currently resides; or

(2) least restrictive setting appropriate to the needs of the 

defendant and the safety of the defendant and others.

Within ninety days, the superintendent of the institution where the defendant is 

committed must certify to the trial court whether the defendant has a “substantial 
5

probability” of attaining competency “within the foreseeable future.” Ind. Code § 35-36-

3-3(a); see also Curtis, 948 N.E.2d at 1153. If a “substantial probability does not exist,”

the DMHA “shall initiate regular commitment proceedings under IC 12-26.” I.C. § 35-

36-3-3(b). If there is a substantial probability, the DMHA has six months from the 

original admission or initiation of services to continue providing competency restoration 

services. Id.; Curtis, 948 N.E.2d at 1153. At the end of those six months, if the 

defendant has still not attained competency, the DMHA must initiate regular commitment 

proceedings. I.C. § 35-36-3-4.

The trial court here found that Coats was incompetent, and the State does not 

dispute that finding. The State argues, however, that once an incompetency finding was 

made, the trial court was statutorily required to commit Coats to the DMHA. Instead, the 

trial court found that Coats would not return to competency and denied the request to 

commit him. The State contends that the statutory framework does not allow the trial 

court to make a determination as to whether Coats can be returned to competency; rather, 

that decision is left to the DMHA. Coats argues that the State’s interpretation of the 

statute conflicts with Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845 (1972). According 

to Coats, in light of the trial court’s finding that he cannot be returned to competency, his 

commitment for competency restoration services would violate his equal protection and 

due process rights. 

We begin by discussing the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Jackson. 

There, the defendant was charged with two robberies but was found to be incompetent. 

He was committed to the Department of Mental Health until the Department could certify 
6

that he was “sane.” Jackson, 406 U.S. at 719, 92 S. Ct. at 1848. Defendant’s counsel 

contended that the trial court’s order amounted to a life sentence without ever being 

convicted of a crime because the defendant would never be competent. The Indiana 

statutory scheme at that time made “no statutory provision for periodic review of the 

defendant’s condition by either the court or mental health authorities.” Id. at 720, 92 S. 

Ct. at 1849. 

The Supreme Court noted that the statute did not make the likelihood of the 

defendant’s improvement a relevant factor and that the record established that the 

defendant’s chances of “ever meeting the competency standards” were “at best minimal, 

if not nonexistent.” Id. at 727, 92 S. Ct. at 1852. Further, the defendant’s long-term 

commitment under the competency statute subjected him “to a more lenient commitment 

standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all 

others not charged with offenses . . . .” Id. at 730, 92 S. Ct. at 1854. As a result, the 

Court concluded that the defendant’s commitment deprived him of his equal protection 

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held:

[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is 

committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to 

trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time 

necessary to determine whether there is a substantial 

probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable 

future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the 

State must either institute the customary civil commitment 

proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any 

other citizen, or release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it 

is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to 

stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by 

progress toward that goal.
7

Id. at 738, 92 S. Ct. at 1858 (footnote omitted). 

The statutes at issue here do not raise the same concerns that the court addressed 

in Jackson. The current competency statutes require a report to the trial court within 

ninety days regarding whether the defendant has a substantial probability of attaining 

competency. I.C. § 35-36-3-3(a). If a substantial probability does not exist, the DMHA 

must institute regular commitment proceedings. I.C. § 35-36-3-3(b). If a substantial 

probability does exist, the DMHA must again report to the trial court within six months 

of the original admission or initiation of competency restoration services. Id. If the 

defendant does not attain competency during those six months, the DMHA must institute 

regular commitment proceedings. I.C. § 35-36-3-4. Coats makes no argument that the 

ninety day and six month reporting requirements in the current statutory scheme exceed 

the “reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial 

probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” Jackson, 406 U.S. 

at 738, 92 S. Ct. at 1858. Thus, the concerns addressed by Jackson are not evident here.

It is clear that the competency statute required the trial court to commit Coats to 

the DMHA for competency restoration services once the trial court found Coats 

incompetent. See I.C. § 35-36-3-3. However, it is also clear that, in this case, those 

competency restoration services would be ineffective given Coats’s progressive 

dementia. Our supreme court addressed the competency statutes in Curtis v. State, 948 

N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. 2011). There, the defendant was diagnosed with dementia, and one 

doctor concluded that he would “never be restored” to competency and another 

concluded that it was “unlikely” he would be restored to competency. Curtis, 948 N.E.2d 
8

at 1146. The trial court stated that the defendant would “never become competent,” but 

the trial court then denied the State’s request to commit him to the DMHA and denied the 

defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges. Id.

The defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss. In discussing the 

defendant’s due process rights, our supreme court noted that the statutory procedures 

“establish a comprehensive method that balances the various interests at stake.” Id. at 

1153. “Involuntary commitment is a clear deprivation of the defendant’s liberty that can 

be justified only on the basis of legitimate state interests.” Id.

The State has dual interests in committing an incompetent 

defendant: (1) to restore the accused to competency due to the 

“right of the public and the defendant to the prompt 

disposition of criminal charges pending against him” and (2) 

to protect the defendant “against being required to answer to 

charges that she lacks the capacity to understand or assist her 

attorney in defending against.”

Id. at 1154 (quoting State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Ind. 2008)). “Of course, the 

State’s interests cannot be realized if there is a finding that a defendant cannot be restored 

to competency.” Id. Noting that the trial court had never found the defendant 

incompetent nor committed him, our supreme court held: “There is no viable 

fundamental-fairness argument when [the defendant] has not been involuntarily 

committed and when there has been no appropriate finding that he will never be restored 

to competency.” Id. at 1154.

This court’s opinion in State v. J.S., 937 N.E.2d 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. 

denied, is also relevant here. There, a sixteen-year-old juvenile had multiple social and 

developmental disorders. The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that the juvenile 
9

had committed various sex offenses, and the trial court eventually found that he was 

incompetent. The trial court then dismissed the delinquency petition. 

The appeal concerned the dismissal of the delinquency petition, not the failure to 

commit the juvenile. This court noted that, although the trial court did not make a finding 

regarding whether the juvenile would regain competency, the record showed that he was 

“unlikely to regain competency before he reaches the age of eighteen, if ever.” J.S., 937 

N.E.2d at 834. After reviewing the circumstances and the purposes of the juvenile justice 

system, this court held that “it is clear that J.S. is receiving the care, protection, treatment, 

and rehabilitation that he needs.” Id. at 835. This court found that the juvenile court’s 

decision to dismiss the delinquency petition did not unduly endanger the public. 

Although neither Curtis nor J.S. addressed the exact situation and issues here, both 

emphasized the purposes of the relevant statutes. Our supreme court has also emphasized 

the purposes of the competency statutes in Davis, where it noted:

Justification for the commitment of an incompetent accused is 

found in the State’s interest in the restoration of the accused 

to competency because of the right of the public and the 

defendant to the prompt disposition of criminal charges 

pending against him, Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 

439 n. 2, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973), and the 

protection of the accused against being required to answer to 

charges that she lacks the capacity to understand or to assist 

her attorney in defending against. Drope [v. Missouri, 420 

U.S. 162, 171, 95 S. Ct. 896 (1975)]. Commitment of an 

accused thus focuses on the State’s interest in the accused’s 

restoration to competency and necessarily entails a finding of 

probability that the accused can be so restored. 

Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 289. 
10

Here, the trial court expressly found that restoration to competency is improbable 

and unlikely, and the report supports that finding. Although the better practice in most 

cases is to follow the statutory commitment procedures, given Coats’s progressive 

dementia and the trial court’s finding that he will not be restored to competency, the 

purposes of the competency restoration process cannot be met by following those 

procedures here. It is clear that Coats’s dementia will progress, and there simply is no 

hope nor medical reason to believe that competency will be restored. The discussion in 

Curtis informs and instructs us that “the State’s interests cannot be realized if there is a 

finding that a defendant cannot be restored to competency.” Curtis, 948 N.E.2d at 1154. 

We conclude that the trial court properly denied the State’s motion to commit Coats.2 

Conclusion

The trial court properly denied the State’s motion to commit Coats to the DMHA. 

We affirm.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., concurs.

RILEY, J., dissents with opinion.

 

2 We also note Coats’s argument that the denial of the motion to commit Coats under the competency 

restoration statute does not prevent the prosecutor from bringing regular commitment proceedings under 

Indiana Code Chapter 12-26-7. That chapter applies to the commitment of an individual alleged to be 

mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled whose commitment is expected to last more than 

ninety days. I.C. § 12-26-7-1. The chapter contains a list of those that may file regular commitment 

procedures, including a health officer, police officer, friend, relative, spouse, or guardian of the 

individual, the superintendent of the facility where the individual is present, or the prosecuting attorney 

under certain circumstances. I.C. § 12-16-7-2. Those circumstances are not present here, and the State 

correctly notes that the prosecuting attorney would be unable to file for a regular commitment. However, 

the temporary commitment procedures do not have the same requirements as to who may file. See I.C. § 

12-26-6-2(b) (noting that a petitioner must be at least eighteen years old). Thus, if appropriate, a 

prosecutor could file for temporary commitment.
11

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellant-Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1206-CR-526

)

WILLIAM COATS, )

)

Appellee-Defendant. )

RILEY, Judge, dissenting

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s denial 

of the State’s motion to commit Coats to the Department of Mental Health and Addiction 

(DMHA). The statutory scheme does not allow the trial court discretion over the 

statutory commitment procedures. If the trial court finds that a defendant lacks the ability 

to understand the proceedings and assist with the preparation of his defense, “it shall

delay or continue the trial and order the defendant committed” to the DMHA. Ind. Code

§ 35-36-3-1(b) (emphasis added). Consequently, the statute does not give the trial court 

discretion to decline to order commitment even where it concludes that the defendant 

could never be returned to competency. 
12

In support of its conclusion, the majority latches on to one sentence in Curtis v. 

State, 948 N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. 2011). There, the supreme court noted that the State’s dual 

interests of competency restoration and protection of the accused “cannot be realized if 

there is a finding that a defendant cannot be restored to competency.” Id. at 1159. From 

this premise, the majority reasons that if “the purposes of the competency restoration 

process cannot be met” there is no need to follow the statutory commitment procedures. 

Slip Op. at *10. Yet, it is a stretch to conclude that the process itself must be abandoned 

where the trial court has determined that the defendant lacks competency. 

Indeed, that result is expressly foreclosed by I.C. § 35-36-3-1(b), which requires 

the trial court to take the additional step of ordering commitment following its 

determination that the defendant lacks competency. Following commitment, the DMHA 

superintendent or authorized third party contractor has ninety days to observe and provide 

treatment to an incompetent defendant. I.C. § 35-36-3-3. If there is a substantial 

probability that the defendant will attain the ability to understand and assist with his 

defense, DMHA has up to six months to provide further competency restoration services. 

I.C. § 35-36-3-3(b). However, if substantial probability does not exist, whether at the 

outset or after a six month interim provision of competency restoration services, DMHA 

must institute regular commitment proceedings under I.C. art. 12-26. I.C. § 35-36-3-3(b); 

-4. 

The majority concedes as much. Its admission that “[a]lthough the better practice 

in most cases is to follow the statutory commitment procedures” is nothing more than a 

concession that procedures should be followed. Slip Op. *10. Indeed, there are 
13

compelling reasons why this is so. Foremost is the clear duties assigned to the trial court 

and the DMHA. The trial court determines whether the defendant is incompetent in the 

first instance, but the statutory scheme entrusts the ultimate determination on competency 

to the superintendent, who has not only the skills to make such observations but also the 

time within which to do so. In sum, the express statutory directive and the 

comprehensive nature of the statutory commitment scheme overcome even those cases

where a progressive illness renders no hope nor medical reason to believe competency 

will be restored. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s denial.