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08- 3510- cv D i xon v. Zenk UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT 

## SUMMA RY ORDER Ru li ng s b y su m m ar

y o r de r do no t h ave pr ece de nt ial eff ect . Ci ta ti onto a su m m ar y o r de r filed on or

after January 1, 2007, is permit ted and is gover ned by F ederal Rule of App e l l ate P r oc ed ur e 32 .1 a nd

th is c ou r t’ s Local Ru le 32. 1.1. Whe n c it in g asu m m ar y o r de r ina d oc um en t f

il ed with th is court, a par ty must cite e ither the F ederal Appendix or an electroni c database (with t he notati on “summ ary ord er”). A party citing a summar y order must serve a copy of it onany party not r epresented by cou nsel. At a stated term

of the Un ited Stat es Court of Appeals for t he Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Pat rick Moynihan Un ited Stat es Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the C ity of New Y ork, on the 19 day of January, two t housand ten .

th PR E SE NT: J OS É A. C AB R ANES ,

R OS EMARY S. P OO L ER , G ER A R D E. L

YN CH , Circuit Jud ges ,

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x E MI L E M

ARK D I X ON , Pl

aint iff -A ppella nt , v. No . 08 -3 510 -c v M I CHAEL M. Z EN K , et

al. , Defenda nts-App ellees.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x F OR AP P ELLAN T: Emile M ar k D ixo n, pro se , I nez , K Y. F OR AP P ELLEE : Gail A. M atthew s , As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney , (

B ent onJ . Cam pb ell , Unit ed St ate s At to r ney

fo r th e Eas te r n D is tr

ict of New York and V aruni Nelson, As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney , of counsel ), B r oo kly n, NY. App eal f r om a ju dgm ent

of th e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e Eas te r n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( J oh n G lees on , Judge

).2

UPON DUE CONSIDERAT ION , it is her eby ORDERED, ADJ UDGED AND DECREED th at the j ud gm ent of th e di s tr ict cou r t b e AF F IRME D

. App ell ant Emile M ar k D ixo n, pro se , appea ls the fr om the June 17, 2008 judg ment of the Distr ict Court granting defenda nt Michael M. Ze nk’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss ing Dixon’s action filed pursuant to Bivens v . Six Unknown Na med Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 40 3 U.S. 388 (1971 ). On appea l, Dixon argues that (1) the Distr ict Court erred in granting summary judgment bec ause there wa s a question of material fact as to whether Zenkprovided Dixon with adequa te procedural protections while in the S pecia l Housing Unit (“SHU”); (2) the Distr ict Court fa il ed to g iv e a de qu a te de fe re nc e t o h is pro se status ; (3) the Distr ict Court erred in denying

his motion fo r app oi ntmen t o f c ou ns el; and(4 ) the D is tr

ict Cou r t e r r ed i n d eny

in g hi s di s cov ery r equ es t. We as s um e the p ar ti es ’ f

amilia r it y with the u nd erlyi ng f

act s andth e pr oce du r al his to ry of th e cas e. I n his br ief , D ixo n f ail s to challen ge the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s di s mi s s al o f o th er clai ms andpar ti es prior t o Zenk’ s motion f

or s ummary judgment on the remaini ng cla im. Although we “gene rally do not hold pro se litigants rigidly to the formal briefing standards,” courts “need not ma nufacture cla ims of er r or fo r an ap pellan t p r oce edi ng pro se , especia lly whe n he has raised an issue below a nd elec ted not to pu r s ue i t o n ap peal .” LoSacco v. City of Middletown , 71 F. 3d88, 93 ( 2dCir . 19 95) . Acc or di ngl

y, we con s id er any c hallen ges to th e ear

lie r di s mi s s als aban do ned

. We revi ew a distr

ict court’s decision to grant s ummary judgment de novo , d r awing all fa ctual in fe r enc es infa

vo r of th e no n- mo ving pa r ty . See, e.g. , Paneccasio v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc. , 53 2 F .3d101 , 107 (2d Cir. 2008 ). Summary judgment is appropriate only “i f the pleading s, the discovery and di s clo s ur e ma te r

ial s onfile, andany a ff

id avi ts s ho w that

th er e is no gen ui ne i s s ue as to any m ate r ial fa ct and that the mova nt is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R . Civ. P. 56(c). A genui ne issue of material fact ex ists “if the evide nce is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the no nm ov in g pa r ty .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 47 7 U. S. 2 42, 248 (1 986 ). Firs t, Dixon argues that the Distr ict Court erred in granting Ze nk’s motion for summary judgment bec ause there wa s a genuine i ss ue of material fac t as to whether Dixon was afforded adequa te procedural protection of his due process rights. Along with his motion for summary judgment, Zenk provided an ex tensive record of the pris on’s compliance with the releva nt regulations, which provide adequa te process under the circumstances of this case. To r efute this r ecord, Dixon argue d, without suppor t, that the affidavits and exhibits support ing Ze nk’s motion for

summary judgment were falsified. Dixon’s bald assertion of falsified affidavits and exhibits, howeve r, is ins ufficient to overcome a mo ti onfo r

s um mar y ju dgm ent . Se e Car

ey v. Cr es ce nzi , 92 3 F .2d18, 21 (

2dCir . 19 91) . Acc or di ngl y, we con clu de that

Di xo n h as faile d t o i den ti fy any g enu in e is s ue o f m ate r

ial fa ct as to whe th er

Di xo n was afforded adequate procedural protections, and, therefore, we c onclude tha t the Distr ict Court did not err in granting Zenk’s motion for s ummary judgment.3

Ne xt , D ix on a rgu es t ha t th e D ist ric t C ou rt fa il ed to g iv e a de qu a te de fe re nc e t o D ix on ’s pro se s tatus . Wh en a p lai nt

if f i s pr oce edi ng pro se , a court will broadl y construe his mot ion papers and in te r pr et th em t o r ais e the s tr on ges t ar gum ent s th at they

s ugg es t. Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of the C ity of N. Y. , 28 7 F .3d138 , 14 6 (

2dCir . 20 02)

. Pro se

status , howeve r, “does not r eliev e plai ntiff of his duty to mee t the r equ

ir eme nt s nec es s ary t o d ef

eat a mo ti onfo r

s um mar y ju dgm ent .” Jo rg

en se n v. Epi

c/ So ny Rec o rds , 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d C ir. 2003). Here, the district court explicitly stated that it would, a nd subs equently di d, consider the alle gations in both the complaint a nd in Dixon’s opposition in r eac hing its conclusion on sum mary judgment. W e therefore conclude that the Distr ict Court gave suff

icient de fe re nc e t o D ix on ’s pro se sta tus. Di xo n al s o ch all eng es th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s denial

of hi s r equ es t f

or app oi ntmen t o f c ou ns el. The District Court failed to consider on the record the factors s et forth in Hodge v . Police Officers

, 80 2 F.2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir.1986 ), including the threshold question of whether Dixon’s claims had any subs tantive merit. Assuming, but not deciding, that this was error, we decline to remand the case on this basis beca use, after our independent review of the record, we conclude that Dixon should not r ecei ve co un s el, as hi s clai m l acks s ub s tan ti ve m er it

. Cf. He ndr

ic ks v. Co ug hli n , 11 4 F .3d390 , 39 3- 94 (

2d Cir . 19 97) (v acat

in g the j ud gm ent

andr ema ndin g the c aus e only af te r det er mi ni ng that

pl ain ti ff s ho ul d hav e r ecei vedth e as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el)

. Fi nally, Di xo n ar

gue s th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t e r r ed i n d eny

in g hi s di s cov ery r equ es t. Onapp eal, ho weve r , D ixo n f

ail s to des cr

ib e the dis cov ery that

he alleg edly s ought , h ow s uchdi s cov ery is mat er ial to the iss ues in the instant appeal, and how such discovery w ould have chang ed the result reached by th e Di s tr ict Cou r t. We de cli ne t o co ns id er this vagu e andun s up po r te d cl aim

. Se e N o rt o n v. S am’s Club , 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that “[i]ssues not s ufficiently argue d in [a] brief[] . . . will not be ad dr es s ed o n ap peal ”)

. CONCLUSI ON For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Distr ict Court is hereby

AF F IRME D

. FO R T HE CO URT : Ca therine O’Haga n Wolfe, C lerk By:

_______________________