United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________

No. 22-40225

____________

Young Conservatives of Texas Foundation, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Neal Smatresk, President of the University of North Texas; Shannon 

Goodman, Vice President for Enrollment of the University of North Texas, 

Defendants—Appellants.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:20-CV-973

______________________________

Before Smith, Clement, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge:

States often charge their residents one price for public college and 

charge those who live elsewhere much more. Texas allows illegal aliens who 

satisfy residency requirements to pay that in-state, lower tuition. A Texas 

university student group of out-of-state students sued officials at the 

University of North Texas, arguing that Texas’ tuition scheme violated 

federal law. The district court agreed and barred the university from charging

out-of-state tuition. We now REVERSE the judgment and VACATE the 

injunction.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 10, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I

The facts here are undisputed. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal 

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. See Pub. L. No. 104-

208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). That act, among other things, 

restricts states’ authority to grant certain postsecondary education benefits 

to illegal aliens unless other conditions are met. It directs that “an alien who 

is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of 

residence within a State . . . for any postsecondary education benefit unless a 

citizen or national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit . . . without 

regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident.” 8 U.S.C. § 

1623(a).

Meanwhile, Texas charges students who satisfy certain residency 

requirements lower tuition than it charges to nonresident students. See Tex. 

Educ. Code §§ 54.051(c)–(d), 54.052. So long as they satisfy the statute’s 

residency requirements, illegal aliens are eligible for Texas resident tuition. 

Out-of-state, nonresident American citizens are not. Currently, Texas 

resident tuition is pegged at $50 per semester credit hour. See Tex. Educ. 

Code § 54.051(c). Nonresident tuition instead totals $458 per semester 

credit hour. 

Enter this lawsuit. The Young Conservatives of Texas Foundation 

(YCT) is a student group at the University of North Texas (UNT) 

comprising many nonresident members. YCT’s “core organizational 

purpose is to advance conservative values” through a variety of actions. It 

has also “repeatedly opposed the disparate treatment of aliens who are not 

lawfully present in the United States and United States citizens from other 

states with regard to tuition.” 

That latter goal collided with UNT’s tuition scheme. UNT, through 

its President, Neal Smatresk, and its Vice President for Enrollment, Shannon 

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Goodman, (the appellants here), charge illegal aliens who satisfied Texas’ 

residency requirements resident tuition, and charge U.S. citizens who failed 

to meet those requirements nonresident tuition. YCT, believing this 

disparity unlawful and harmful to its members, sued in state court for 

injunctive and declaratory relief. Though it expressly disclaimed any 

challenge to what UNT charges to illegal aliens, it argued that the UNT 

officials improperly charged its members out-of-state tuition per § 54.051(d), 

which YCT believed was preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a).

Sometime after removal, the parties cross-motioned for summary 

judgment and the district court sided with YCT. It found that YCT had 

associational standing to challenge § 54.051(d); that though UNT itself was 

not a proper defendant under Ex parte Young, Smatresk and Goodman were1;

that § 54.051(d) is both expressly and impliedly preempted by § 1623(a); and 

that YCT was entitled to a permanent injunction barring the UNT officials 

from enforcing § 54.051(d). The court then declared § 54.051(d) preempted 

and thus violative of the Constitution. It enjoined the UNT officials from

enforcing “the tuition rates prescribed by Section 54.051(d) of the Texas 

Education Code against United States citizens at the University of North 

Texas.” The UNT officials now appeal.

II

We review a grant (or denial) of summary judgment de novo. 

Davidson v. Fairchild Controls Corp., 882 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2018). A 

“court should grant summary judgment when ‘there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “We also review de novo the 

district court’s ruling on standing[.]” See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. 

_____________________

1 The UNT officials do not challenge this conclusion. 

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Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 37 F.4th 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 2022). And finally, we

review a grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. Scott v. 

Schedler, 826 F.3d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).

A

First, we must decide whether YCT has standing to challenge 

§ 54.051(d). We conclude they do.

To establish standing, YCT must demonstrate (1) an “injury in fact” 

that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent”; (2) is fairly 

traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) is likely to be redressed by a 

favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). But 

even if YCT has suffered no injury, it “may have standing to assert the claims 

of its members[.]” Tex. Ent. Ass’n. v. Hegar, 10 F.4th 495, 504 (5th Cir. 2021) 

(citation omitted). To have associational standing, YCT must demonstrate 

that its members would have standing to sue in their own right, that the 

interests it seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and that neither the 

claim nor the requested relief requires its members to participate in the 

lawsuit. Id. (citation omitted). It need only show that just one of its members 

would have standing. See Hunt v. Wash. St. Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 

333, 342 (1977).

The court below found that YCT’s out-of-state members would have 

standing; that the suit was germane to YCT’s interests of education reform 

and the treatment of illegal aliens; and that the suit did not require the 

involvement of YCT’s members. As for YCT’s members themselves, the 

court found that they were injured by paying nine times more than in-state 

residents; that their injury was traceable to the UNT officials’ enforcing § 

54.051(d); and that an injunction stopping such enforcement would redress 

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the injury. On appeal, the UNT officials question only whether YCT’s 

members have standing.2 

First, the UNT officials argue that YCT’s members are not injured. 

YCT and the district court’s theory of injury here is straightforward: in-state 

residents pay an amount for college; enforcement of § 54.051(d) improperly 

charges out-of-state citizens a far higher amount; and that far-higher amount 

is an economic injury sufficient for standing. 

In analyzing standing, we assume that YCT is correct on the merits 

such that § 54.051(d) is preempted by § 1623(a). See, e.g., Texas v. EEOC, 933 

F.3d 433, 447 (5th Cir. 2019) (“We assume, for purposes of the standing 

analysis, that Texas is correct on the merits of its claim that the Guidance 

was promulgated in violation of the APA.”). It’s also the case that an 

economic injury is the “quintessential injury upon which to base standing.” 

Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 586 (5th Cir. 2006). And to 

confer standing, such injury “need not measure more than an identifiable 

trifle.” OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 612 (5th Cir. 2017) 

(quotations and citation omitted). 

UNT argues first that any “injury” the students sustained was of their 

own making: out of all possible postsecondary options across the country, the 

students chose to buy—at an open, disclosed price—an out-of-state 

education where they are asked to pay more. In the UNT officials’ framing, 

the university offered a bargain—out-of-state tuition in exchange for a college 

education—which students accepted and got the benefit of. 

_____________________

2 Though the UNT officials do not challenge the other components of standing, we

must nevertheless satisfy ourselves that they have been met. See Cleartrac, LLC v. Lanrick 

Contractors, LLC, 53 F.4th 361, 364 (5th Cir. 2022). We conclude they have. Whether U.S. 

citizens (or illegal aliens) are eligible for benefits is clearly germane to YCT’s mission, and 

YCT’s members need not be involved in the pure legal question presented here. 

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Indeed, “standing cannot be conferred by a self-inflicted injury.” 

Zimmerman v. City of Austin, 881 F.3d 378, 389 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation 

omitted); see also Nat’l Fam. Plan. & Reprod. Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 

468 F.3d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“We have consistently held that selfinflicted harm doesn’t satisfy the basic requirements for standing. Such harm 

does not amount to an ‘injury’ cognizable under Article III.”). But, at base, 

the students are handing over money that, in the absence of Texas’

presumed-unlawful statute, they would happily retain. Cf. Maya v. Centex 

Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[P]laintiffs spent money that, 

absent defendants’ actions, they would not have spent. . . . This is a 

quintessential injury-in-fact.”). Just because they agreed to do so does not 

mean they are not, in fact, harmed by the 900% higher price UNT supposedly 

lacks power to impose. See also 13A Charles A. Wright & Arthur 

R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.5 (3d ed. 2008 

& Supp. 2022) (“Standing is not defeated merely because the plaintiff has in 

some sense contributed to his own injury. . . . Standing is defeated only if it is 

concluded that the injury is so completely due to the plaintiff’s own fault as to 

break the causal chain.” (emphasis added)); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n 

of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 373, 377 n.14 (1978) (standing to challenge nonresident 

pricing for hunting licenses). 

“Causation and redressability then flow naturally from th[at] injury.” 

Contender Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 779 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 

2015); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561–62 (explaining that when the plaintiff 

“is himself an object of the action . . . at issue,” “there is ordinarily little 

question that the action . . . has caused him injury, and that a judgment 

preventing . . . the action will redress it”). The harm is directly traceable to 

the UNT officials’ wrongfully enforcing § 54.051(d). That section sets outof-state tuition for these students (making them the statute’s indirect object), 

which is then implemented and enforced by the UNT officials here. See Tex. 

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Educ. Code § 54.051(d). That enforcement causes the students’ harm and 

will continue to do so as more payments are collected. That’s enough to 

establish traceability. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (“[T]he injury has to be fairly 

traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.” (cleaned up)). 

The UNT officials offer thin arguments in response. They insist that 

any duty to pay out-of-state tuition does not lie in a failure to properly apply 

§ 1623(a), but instead comes from Texas’ legislative choice to charge that 

tuition. They’re right in that, but the argument misunderstands YCT’s 

claim. YCT agrees that it’s Texas’ legislative choice to charge their members 

out-of-state tuition that caused their harm—but the entire point is that that 

legislative choice is preempted by § 1623(a) and is thus void. That must be 

assumed as true at this stage, and so we disagree with the UNT officials’ 

arguments to the contrary.

The future harm is also redressable by favorable action here. If the 

UNT officials may no longer enforce § 54.051(d), then they may no longer 

calculate and charge out-of-state tuition. That erases the students’ future 

harm. The UNT officials’ responses again miss the mark. They claim that an 

order enjoining § 54.051(d) cannot make these students suddenly eligible for 

in-state tuition, which the officials believe to be the injury. But that 

misunderstands YCT’s injury and, in turn, its desired remedy. YCT is not 

asking us to make its members categorically eligible for in-state tuition.

Rather, YCT is asking us to stop UNT officials from charging an improper

or unlawful price. The officials muddy the two.

In response, the officials insist that they only charge rates set by 

statute and the district court lacks any power to force Texas to change its 

statutes. But as YCT notes, that misunderstands redressability. While it’s 

true that no “provision in the Constitution permits a court to dictate to 

legislative bodies . . . what laws . . . they must promulgate,” Mi Familia Vota 

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v. Abbott, 977 F.3d 461, 469 (5th Cir. 2020), we need not do so here. As the

officials themselves explain, “[u]nder state law, a public university cannot 

assess a charge unless authorized by law, giving UNT no choice but to assess 

to out-of-state U.S. citizens the only tuition rate that was not enjoined: the instate tuition rate.” That’s exactly the fix that would—and so far, did—redress 

the students’ injury. Preventing application of the unlawful rate imposed by 

§ 54.051(d) is sufficient redress to establish standing.

Thus, YCT’s members have an injury in fact, traceable to the 

complained-of acts of the defendants, which is likely redressable by favorable 

action by this court. They therefore have standing. Because those members’ 

participation here is not needed, and because this suit is germane to YCT’s 

purpose, YCT also has standing to challenge § 54.051(d).

B

Next, we must decide whether the specific provision that YCT has 

chosen to challenge is preempted by federal law. We conclude it is not, even 

if other, unchallenged provisions in Texas’ scheme may be. 

Thanks to the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, state laws that 

conflict with federal law are without effect. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 

505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). Federal law can preempt state law when (1) 

Congress expressly commands it so; (2) the state law and federal law actually 

conflict; or (3) Congress “so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make 

reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 

supplement it.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). “In determining 

whether a state law or regulation is preempted, Congress’s intent is the 

ultimate touchstone.” Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. City of Palestine, 41 F.4th 696, 

704 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotations and citation omitted). Finding Congress’s 

intent requires “examin[ing] the explicit statutory language and the structure 

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and purpose of the statute.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 

138 (1990).

The district court first found that § 1623(a) expressly preempted 

§ 54.051(d). Then, in the alternative, the district court found that § 1623(a) 

and § 54.051(d) conflicted to such a degree that following them both was 

impossible. The UNT officials disagree on both fronts.

1

A federal statute expressly preempts a state law when Congress 

“adopts express language defining the existence and scope of pre-emption.” 

Est. of Miranda v. Navistar, Inc., 23 F.4th 500, 504 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation 

omitted). And when the statute contains an express preemption clause, the 

court does not indulge “any presumption against pre-emption but instead 

focus[es] on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the 

best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. 

Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. 115, 125 (2016) (quotations and citation omitted). 

“Evidence of pre-emptive purpose is sought in the text and structure of the 

statute at issue, and in the first instance we focus on the plain wording of the 

clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” United Motorcoach Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Austin, 851 F.3d 489, 

492 (5th Cir. 2017) (alterations adopted) (quotations and citation omitted). 

Section 1623(a) contains an express preemption clause. It directs that 

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” an illegal alien “shall not be 

eligible on the basis of residence within a State . . . for any postsecondary 

education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible 

for such a benefit . . . without regard to whether the citizen or national is such 

a resident.” 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a). To reach its conclusion, the district court 

framed the statute a different way. In § 1623(a) the district court found a 

“simple rule: If a State makes an unlawfully present alien eligible for a 

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postsecondary education benefit on the basis of state residency, it must make 

a United States citizen eligible for the same benefit regardless of whether the 

citizen is such a resident.” Thus, said the court, Congress meant to 

“invalidate state laws that deny United States citizens eligibility for a 

postsecondary education benefit . . . based on residency if unlawfully present 

aliens are eligible for that benefit based on residence within the State.” 

Because § 54.051(d) does exactly that (by charging nonresident tuition), it 

was found expressly preempted. 

The UNT officials balk at the court’s rewording. Rather than merely 

make the statute easier to read, they say, the court instead “converted 

Section 1623’s ‘unless’ clause—a condition precedent to granting a benefit 

to aliens—into an affirmative obligation to give citizens benefits granted to 

aliens.” This led the court to require states to grant benefits to citizens if they 

grant those benefits to illegal aliens. Per the UNT officials, this improperly 

rewrites Congress’s prohibitory statute and falsely implicates § 54.051(d). 

We agree. Start with the text. Section 1623(a) commands that an 

illegal alien “shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State . . . 

for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the 

United States is eligible for such a benefit . . . without regard to whether the 

citizen or national is such a resident.” 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (emphasis added). 

A preliminary question is what is meant by the chameleon “shall.” See Words 

of Authority, Bryan Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal 

Usage (3d ed. 2011) (explaining that “shall can bear five to eight senses 

even in a single document”). Typically, shall is meant to impose a duty (e.g., 

you shall file your taxes by April 15). But when followed by not, shall often 

instead means may (i.e., you shall not means you may not). See id. (“The 

word shall gives permission (as opposed to a duty), and shall not denies 

permission (i.e., it means ‘may not’)”—Garner laments the “pervasive 

problem” of shall/may misuse); see also Shall, Black’s Law 

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Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (explaining that shall can mean may, 

especially when paired with a negative word like not or no). 

That latter reading of “shall not” is the better understanding here: it 

denies permission. Otherwise, § 1623 would impose a duty on illegal aliens to 

not be eligible for benefits if citizens are not. That outcome wouldn’t make 

sense. Instead—with “shall not” given proper effect—the statute simply

requires that all U.S. citizens be eligible for a benefit, without regard to 

residency, before any alien be able to receive the same benefit (based on 

residency). Hence the title, “Limitation on eligibility for preferential 

treatment of aliens not lawfully present on basis of residence for higher 

education benefits.” In doing so, it merely targets offending laws.

That brings us to the district court’s rewrite. The district court’s new 

“rule” says, in essence, “that if a state says illegal aliens are eligible, it shall 

say that U.S. citizens are eligible.” This is wrong in several ways. First, unlike 

the statute, the district court imposes a duty—i.e., it uses the wrong 

definition of shall. Unlike the statute as written, which is entirely prohibitory 

and limits what can properly be done, the court’s rule demands action. 

Second, it moves shall to the wrong side of the sentence. Rather than using 

the statute’s proper “if A, then B” form (“if immigrants shall be eligible, 

U.S. citizens are”), the court has it backwards (“if immigrants are eligible,

U.S. citizens shall be”). Third, it changes the object of the statute’s 

regulation. Now, rather than declaring a limitation on illegal alien eligibility 

itself, the court’s rule regulates states directly. In short, the district court 

applied an entirely different rule than the one Congress passed. 

So, going instead with the proper reading of § 1623(a), the statute

expressly preempts state rules that grant illegal aliens benefits when U.S. 

citizens haven’t received the same. No matter what a state says, if a state did 

not make U.S. citizens eligible, illegal aliens cannot be eligible. But, to be 

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clear, § 1623(a) doesn’t impose any duty to grant the same benefits to U.S. 

citizens. Cf. Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1139 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Section 1623 

does not provide that ‘No nonresident citizen shall be denied a benefit’ 

afforded to an illegal alien, but rather imposes a limit on the authority of 

postsecondary educational institutions.”). Its sole focus is on improper 

benefits for illegal aliens. 

Section 54.051(d)—the one and only section challenged here—does 

not grant those benefits. It does nothing more than set the tuition price for 

nonresident students, citizens or not. It takes no stance on whether illegal 

aliens are eligible for a cheaper price.

3 Section 1623(a) has nothing to say 

about a rule like that. Therefore, § 54.051(d) is not expressly preempted by 

§ 1623(a).

2

The district court, relying again on its erroneous reading, also found 

that § 54.051(d) conflicted with § 1623(a) to such degree that it was impliedly 

preempted. It is not. 

Unlike express preemption, conflict preemption begins with the 

presumption “that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Maryland 

v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (citation omitted). Such preemption 

exists when “compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or 

where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 

execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Oneok, Inc. v. 

Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 377 (2015) (quotations and citation omitted).

Per the district court, it’s impossible to both (1) to charge out-of-state 

U.S. citizens the nonresident tuition rate (as § 54.051(d) requires of 

_____________________

3 Which we here assume is a postsecondary benefit.

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universities) and also (1) to charge out-of-state U.S. citizens the resident 

price (as, thought the court, was required by § 1623(a) since illegal aliens

could earn resident tuition). Unsurprisingly, then, the district court found § 

54.051(d) preempted. 

But again, § 1623(a) does not require what the district court insists it 

does. The court and YCT have it backwards: the problem with Texas’system 

relevant to § 1623(a) is that it grants illegal aliens in-state benefits, not that it 

denies those benefits to U.S. citizens. Section 1623(a) does not restrict the 

latter, and burdens Texas with no duty related to U.S. citizens. That 

§ 54.051(d) calculates and imposes a nonresident tuition rate (for U.S. 

citizens, foreign nationals, and immigrants alike) has nothing to do with 

§ 1623(a)’s mandate that illegal aliens are ineligible for in-state benefits 

unless U.S. citizens are. Thus, even though a different, unchallenged portion 

of Texas’ scheme seems to conflict with § 1623(a), it is entirely possible to 

follow both § 1623(a) and § 54.051(d) at the same time. 

YCT’s arguments generally track the district court’s reasoning and 

are wrong for the same reasons. But one warrants addressing. YCT contends 

that § 1623(a) requires that universities either make illegal aliens eligible for 

in-state tuition, or they can charge U.S. citizens out-of-state tuition. They 

cannot do both. And, says YCT, § 1623(a) is “wholly agnostic on how 

universities choose to comply with its terms.” Id. That is not correct. While 

it’s true that § 1623(a) disallows alien eligibility if paired with citizen 

ineligibility, the statute makes clear that if a state tries both, the former must 

give. The statute does not grant a choice—illegal alienssimply are not eligible 

if citizens aren’t. 

Further still, though the district court didn’t address the question, 

§ 54.051(d) does not hamper Congress’s § 1623(a) objectives. To start, 

declaring a statute enough of an obstacle for implied preemption is “a matter 

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of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and 

identifying its purpose and intended effects[.]” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 

Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). As luck would have it, Congress made 

explicit its aims for the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 

Responsibility Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1601. They include promoting immigrant 

self-sufficiency, reducing immigrant reliance on public assistance, and 

ensuring that public benefits aren’t incentives to enter illegally. Id. The 

strictures of § 54.051(d) are silent on those objectives. Section 54.051(d) only 

imposes nonresident tuition for those who do not qualify for Texas residency 

(alien or citizen alike). It does not offer a public benefit to illegal aliens, and 

thus cannot affect that class’s self-sufficiency, their reliance on public 

services, or their incentives to come to America. Unlike Texas’ rule allowing 

illegal aliens to qualify for resident tuition (which implicates every IIRIRA 

objective, often in the negative), § 54.051(d) speaks only to the price that 

nonresidents pay. Congress’s objectives are not thwarted by that higher 

price.

Since § 54.051(d) neither conflicts with, nor harms the objectives of, 

§ 1623(a), the latter does not impliedly preempt it. The district court was 

wrong to find otherwise.

C

With that conclusion in mind, we turn next to whether the district 

court abused its discretion in permanently enjoining the university officials 

from enforcing § 54.051(d). We conclude it did. 

The court reviews a grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of 

discretion. Scott, 826 F.3d at 211. A district court “abuses its discretion if (1) 

relies on clearly erroneous factual findings when deciding to grant or deny 

the permanent injunction (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law when 

deciding to grant or deny the permanent injunction, or (3) misapplies the 

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factual or legal conclusions when fashioning its injunctive relief.” Peaches 

Ent. Corp. v. Ent. Repertoire Assocs., 62 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1995). 

Because the district court awarded a permanent injunction by relying 

on its erroneous preemption analysis, it abused its discretion. 

III

There may be valid preemption challenges to Texas’scheme here. But 

this is not one of them. The district court’s judgment is REVERSED, and 

its permanent injunction is VACATED. 

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