### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15

– 0328
Filed June 16 , 2017

TOM BRAKKE and RHONDA BRAKKE d/b/a/ PINE RIDGE HUNTING LODGE, and McBRA, INC., Appellees,

vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES and IOWA NATURAL RESOURCE COMMISSION, Appellants.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Dennis J. Stovall, Judge.

The Iowa Department of Natural Resources appeals from a district court order ruling an emergency order was outside of its legislative grant of authority. AFFIRMED.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David L. Dorff, Assistant Attorney General, for appel lants.

Rebecca A. Brommel and Douglas E. Gross of Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross, Baskerville and Schoenebaum, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellees.2
APPEL, Justice. This case presents a challenge by land owners to an emergency order issued by the Iowa Depart ment of Natural Resources (DNR) to order the landowners to quarantine land formerly used as a whitetail deer preserve for five years after whitetail deer harvested on the property tested positive for chronic wasting disease, or CWD. The DNR emergency
orde r required the landowners to repair and maintain an electric fence around the property for the quarantine period. The landowners challenged the DNR emergency order in an administrative appeal under the Iowa Administrative Procedures Act , Iowa Code s ection 17A.19(10) (2013 ) . An administrative law judge issued a proposed decision , finding the DNR lacked the statutory authority to issue the emergency order imposing a quarantine on the land. Upon review by the Iowa Natural Resources Commission (NRC), the NRC reversed the ruling, finding instead that the DNR had sufficient statutory authority to support the order. The landowners appealed.
The district court reversed the NRC. The court held the DNR’s emergency order was irrational, illogical, and wholly unjustifiable unde r Iowa Code s ect ion 17A.19(10) ( l ) because the DNR was acting outside the legislature’s grant of authority. The court, however, rejected the landowners’ argument that th e DNR’s emergency order amounted to a compensable taking under the United S tates and Iowa Constitutions. Upon entering its judgment, the court also refused to reopen the record
to allow the DNR to present additional evidence that the landowners
received c ertain indemnity payments from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)

. The DNR ap pealed , and the landowners cross

- appealed. For the reasons expressed below, we conclude the DNR lacked statutory3 authority to issue an emergency order that impose d a quarantine o n land
used as a whitetail deer

- hunting preserve. We also conclude the action of the DNR did not amount to an impermissible taking of pr operty under
the United States Constitution or the Iowa C onstitution. In light of these rulings, we co nclude the DNR’s challenge of the district court’s failure to reopen the record to receive additional evidence is moot. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
A. Introduction: Positive CWD Test fro m Deer Harvested at the Pine Ridge Hunting Lodge. In the 1990s, Tom and Rhonda Brakke (the Brakke s) established a whitetail deer

- breeding farm in Clear Lake, Iowa. In 2005, they bought Pine Ridge Hunting Lodge (Pine Ridge) in Davis County, Iowa , for $575 ,000. 1 The Brakkes’ pur pose in purchasing the hunting l odge was to provide an “end market” for the deer they raised on the Clear Lake property. After the purchase, the Brakkes spent an additional $200,000 to improve the property by constructing a cabin a nd investing in additional fencing, including a fence to separate the north ern and southern halves of the property , which prevented deer from the north side from entering the south side of the preserve and vice versa. The property was licensed as a whiteta il deer

- hunting preserve under Iowa Code chapter 484C. The majority of the deer the Brakkes placed at Pine Ridge came from their Clear Lake breeding farm. Whitetail deer are susceptible to CWD. CWD is a type of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, al so known as prion disease. The DNR seeks to prevent the spread of CWD through voluntary

1 The north half of the property was purchased by McBra , Inc. through a 1031 exchange, while Tom and Rhonda personally purchased the south half of the property. For the purposes of this appeal, the owners will be referred to as the Brakkes.4 agreements with breeding farms and statutory regulation of whitetail
deer

- hunting preserves. See Iowa Code § 484C.12. Originally, the Brakkes participated in a volunt ary CWD program at their Clear Lake breeding farm so they could transport and sell their deer to others. With the success of their hunting operations at Pine Ridge, in 2012 the Brakkes ceased enrollment of the Clear Lake breeding farm in the voluntary CWD program because they were no longer in the business of selling deer to other operations. The Brakkes, however, continued to submit samples for testing from all deer harvested from Pine Ridge as required by Iowa Code section 484C.12. On June 16, the DNR received notification from a CWD testing lab that a deer from Pine Ridge tested positive for CWD. The CWD

- positive deer originally came from the Brakkes ’ breeding farm in Clear Lake. After confirming the diagnosis, the DNR notified the Brakkes on July 19. Prior to this case, no captive or wild deer had ever tested positive for
CWD in Iowa. Under Iowa law, the Iowa Department of Agri culture and Land
Ste wardship (IDALS) regulates whitetail deer on deer farms, while the DNR regul ates deer on whitetail deer

- h unting preserves. Iowa Code § 170.1A (2) ; id. § 484C.2 (2)

. On August 29 , IDALS received permission
from the Brakkes to kill and test some deer at the Clear Lake farm. One deer at the Clear Lake farm tested positive for CWD. At some point, IDALS issued a notice of quarantine to the Brakkes for the Clear Lake
farm.
B. September 7, 2012 Agreement. On September 7, the Brakkes and the DNR signed an “Agr eement for Chronic Wasting Disease Recovery Plan at Pine Ridge Hunting Lodge” (Agreement). Under the Agreement, the Brakkes were allowed to carry out planned hunts at Pine5 Ridge scheduled between September 8, 2012 , and December 25, 2012.
The Brakkes , how ever, w ere required to install jointly with the DNR an electronic fence inside the perimeter of the existing fence surrounding Pine Ridge, with the costs split evenly between the DNR and Pine Ridge. After construction of the electric fence, the Brakkes we re solely responsible for fence repair and maintenance. DNR staff was to conduct weekly perimeter and fence inspections, with all repairs identified by DNR staff to be submitted to the Brakkes in writing and completed by
the Brakkes w ithin twenty

- four hou rs. Further, the Agreement provided that Pine Ridge be completely depopulated of all deer and elk no later than January 31, 2013. All animals were to be tested for CWD and disposed of in accordance with applicable regulations at the Brakkes’ cost. Once the depopulation of Pine Ridge was complete, the Brakkes , at their expense , agreed to clean and disinfect the facility in compliance with DNR rules. Finally, the parties agree d to a future operational plan to “ be developed in conjunction with the DNR afte r depopulation was complete.” The term of the Agreement was from the date of execution until January 31, 2013.
One a dditional deer harvested at Pine Ridge in December 2012 tested positive for CWD. After the conclusion of the hunts, Pine Ridge depo pulate d all its deer. In April 2013 , all feeders were disinfected with bleach, excess feed was buried, and all the terms of the Agreement were fulfilled with one exception

— the parties did not reach an agreement on a “future operational plan” after depopulation of the animals.
C. April 26, 2013 Letter. On April 26 , the Brakkes wrote a letter to the DNR. In the letter, the Brakkes stated, “As you know, the area utilized by Pine Ridge Hunting Lodge as a hunting preserve is subject to a five (5) year quarantine. ” The letter noted that the Brakkes had6 “complied with all requirements of the September 7, 2012 agreement.” The letter announced that if no response were received from the DNR, the Brakkes would regard all requirements of the Agreement as satisfied.
Th e Brakkes further announced they would no longer be operating Pine Ridge as a whitetail deer

- hunting preserve. By June 5 , the DNR discovered the gates at Pine Ridge were standing open and that portions of the fence were damaged or had been
removed.
D. The Emergency Order. On June 6 , the DNR issued an emergency order to require the Brakkes to stop their deconstruction of the fence surrounding Pine Ridge and to immediately restore the portions of the fence that were damaged. The emergency order also required the Brakkes to close and keep closed all of the gates and to authorize the DNR to access Pine Ridge for a limited duration in order to kill any deer that may be present o n the pro perty. Finally, the emergency order required the Brakkes submit an d agree to execute a plan designed to ensure that CWD be quarantined within , and not spread beyond , Pine Ridge. On June 7, the Brakkes closed the gates at Pine Ridge and repaired the fence. On June 11, however, wild deer were seen inside the
fence.
E. Th e Administrative Hearing and the Natural Resource Commission Appeal.
1. Introduction . The Brakkes appealed the emergency order on June 25. In the letter initiating the appeal, the Brakkes claimed the

e mergency order violated their United S tates and Iowa constitutional rights and other property rights because (1) the DNR lacked jurisdiction over Pine Ridge once it w as no longer a hunting preserve; (2) the terms of7 the quarantine and emergency order without compensation w ere an unconstitutional taking; and (3) the DNR’s actions were arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The Brakkes cited six reasons why the DNR’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. First, they claimed only a limited number of deer species may contract CWD and CWD does not m eaningfully limit the growth of the species. Second, the Brakkes asserted that CWD is not highly infectious and there is a reservoir of CWD in the wild that cannot
be fully eliminated. Third, the Brakkes claimed there are more harmful
diseases which affe ct deer for which the DNR does not impose such drastic measures. Fourth, the Brakkes asserted the emergency order would not materially affect the spread of CWD. Fifth, the Brakkes claimed the DNR previously told them that it had no issues with removing t he fence. Finally, the Brakkes alleged that Pine Ridge was separated into two sections and about half of the property was never exposed to CWD.
2. Contested case hearing

. A contested case hearing was held beginning on November 18. Dale Garner of the DN R testifie d he
understood that the USDA indemnification plan for compensating owners
of deer killed as a result of positive CWD test s was no longer available. Neither Iowa in general nor the DNR or the IDALS had an indemnification plan. The DNR presented evidence that, as a result of the quarantine, the market value of Pine Ridge as real property had declined by $165,000. The DNR’s appraiser testified that she had not calculated the value of the Brakkes’ lost business in not being able to operate the
prop erty as a hunting preserve.8 The Brakkes presented evidence from a finance expert with experience in hunting leases that the operating income for Pine Ridge for the year 2013, without any quarantine or restrictions, would have been $157,537. If the Brakkes had operated Pine Ridge as a farm ins tead of a hunting preserve the y would have lost $22,021. The fin ance expert calculated the five

- year total income of Pine Ridge as a hunting preserve
at $917,309 , while the five

- year total income of Pine Ridge as a farm
would be negative $100,465. If the Brakkes operated Pine Ridge as a
free

- range hunting operation, with no fenci ng or captive animals, the
five

- year income would be $143,307. On cross

- examination, the finance expert admitted he was not a certified public account ant or a licensed appraiser, and he conducted an analysis that was not a business
valuation.
After the final hearing on January 8, 2014, the Brakkes and the DNR entered a stipulation to submit additional evidence. T he stipul ation
stated that in December 2013, the Brakkes had killed all the remaining deer at Pine Ridge and the DNR collected samples from all of the adult deer. CWD was not detected in any of the samples. On February 26, the administrative law judge (ALJ) issued her proposed decision. The ALJ ruled the DNR lacked jurisdiction to issue the emergency order. The ALJ determined Iowa Code chapter 484C only authorized the DNR to quarantine “diseased preserve whitetail,” not the
land. Thus , the DNR’s interpretation o f 48 4C.12 granting them the power to impose a five

- year quarantine on “the preserve and all remaining animals located within the infected preserve” was irrational, illogical, and wholly unjustifiable because the interpretation extended, enlarged, and ch ang ed the legislature’s intent.9

3. Appeal to NRC . On February 28, the DNR appealed the proposed decision. On April 16, the parties submitted a second joint stipulation regarding the submission of additional evidence. The parties noted they “disagree [d] ab out the relevancy of this finding,” but “[a] wild deer harvested in Allamakee County, Iowa in early December 2013 tested positive for Chronic Wasting Disease.” The parties submitted briefs to the NRC, and an unreco rded hearing was held on May 8. On May 28 , the NRC upheld the DNR’s emergency order. The
commission found the Brakkes had not met their burden in demonstrating that I owa Administrative Code rule 571

— 115.10 , authorizing the five

- year quarantine “on the preserve and all remaining
animals located w ithin the infected preserve,” was not authorized by chapter 484C. The commission admitted that chapter 484C does not explicitly state that the preserve land is to be quarantined, but it did not need to because the statute also gave the DNR the duty to pre vent the spread of CWD. The commi ssion held, as a matter of common sense and given the scientific evidence, a quarantine on the land is required to prevent the spread of CWD.
F. Judicial Review of NRC Action. The Brakkes petitioned for judicial review o f the NRC’s decision on June 27. On December 1, the DNR moved for leave to present additional evidence to the NRC. The DNR alleged the Brakkes had voluntarily depopulated their deer at the Clear Lake farm in August of 2014 and were paid $917,100 in
indem nification by the USDA. The Brakkes resisted the motion. The district court denied the motion on December 18, stating it did not anticipate the need for any additional evidence in order for it to address
the issues.10 The district court issued its ruling o n February 13, 2015, reversing the commission and additionally ruling the DNR’s action s were not a taking under the United S tates or Iowa Constitutions. The court found the DNR had been vested with interpretive authority and thus the DNR’s interpretation of the law would only be reversed if it was “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” The court, however, found it was irrational, illogical, and wholly unjustifiable for the DNR to have interpreted the statute to give it the authority to quaranti ne a hunting preserve when chapter 484C only specified the authority to quarantine “diseased preserve whitetail.” See Iowa Code § 484C.12(1). While the legislature intended to prevent the spread of CWD, the legislature clearly did not intend to give the DNR unfettered authority to quarantine any
land that came into contact with infected deer. The court also held that the DNR’s actions were not a taking because the invasion to the Brakkes’ property was temporary, bo th specifically as a taking per se and a lso as a taking involving the Penn Central 2 factors. The DNR appealed the district court’s decision , and the Brakkes

cross

- appealed.
II. Standard of Review.
“Judicial review of agency decisions is governed by Iowa Code
section 17A.19. ” Kay

- Decker v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 857 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Iowa 2014). We “ apply the standards of section 17A.19(10) to determine if we reach the same result s as the district
court. ” Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’ n , 784 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa 2010). The district court may properly grant relief if the agency action prejudiced the substantial rights of the petitioner and if the agency

2 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York , 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978).11 action falls within one of the criteria listed in section 17A.19(10)( a ) though ( n ). Id.

“ We defer to the agency’s interpretation of law when the legislature has clearly vested that interpretation in the agency’s discretion. ” Kay

Decker , 847 N.W.2d at 222; Renda , 7 84 N.W.2d at 11 ; see also Iowa Code § 17A.19(11)( c ). We will overturn an agency’s interpretation of law
when it has discre tion only if the agency’s interpretation is “ irrational , illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. ” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)( l ); Renda , 784
N.W.2d at 11

. The standard of review for constitutional claims, including with respect to takings, is de novo. Harms v. City of Sibley , 702 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 2005); Blumenthal Inv. Trusts v. City of W est Des Moines , 636 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Iowa 2001).

III. Statutory Authority of the DNR to Quarantine Land Where Whitetail Deer Test Positive for CWD.

A. Introduction. The parties contest the scope of DNR “quarant ine” authority under Iowa Code s ection 484C.12. The Brakkes point out the quarantine authority extends only to preserve whitetail deer, while the DNR suggests the power to quarantine preserve whitetail
deer necessa rily includes the power to exclude deer from reserve property
where CWD has been discovered.
B. Statutory Framework.
1. Relevant provisions of the Iowa Administrative Procedures Act. This appeal is brought under the Iowa Administrative Pr ocedures Act.
Under Iowa Code s ection 17A.23 (3), “[a] n agency shall have only that authority or discretion delegated to or conferred upon the agency by law and shall not expand or enlarge its authority or discretion beyond the powers delegated to or conferred upon the agency.”12

2. Statutory authority of NRC and DNR. Iowa Code c hapter 484C generally grants DNR the authority to regulate preserve whitetail. Iowa
Code § 484C.2(2). The statute defines “preserve whitetail” as a “whitetail kept on a hunting preserve.” Id

. § 484C.1( 8 ). The statute defines a hunting preserve as “land where a landowner keeps preserve whitetail as part of a business, if the business’s purpose is to provide persons with the opportunity to hunt the preserve whitetail.” Id. § 484C.1(6 ).
Iowa Code section 484C.12 concerns testing for CWD. S ection
484C

. 12(1) provides, Preserve whitetail that are purchased, propagated, confined, released, or sold by a hunting preserve shall be free of diseases considered reportable for wildlife .

. . . The dep artment may provide for the quarantine of diseased preserve whitetail that threaten the health of animal populations.
Id. § 484C.12(1). S ection 484C.12(2) relates to plans for eradic ation of diseases. It provides,
The landowner , or the landowner’ s veterinarian, and an epidemiologist designated by the department shall develop a plan for eradicating a reportable disease among the preserve whitetail population. The plan shall be designed to reduce and then eliminate the reportable disease, and to prev ent the spread of the disease to other animals. The plan must be developed and signed within sixty days after a determination that the preserve whitetail population is affected with the disease. The plan must address population management and adhere to r ules adopted by the department. The plan must be formalized as a memorandum of agreement execute d by the landowner or landowner’ s veterinarian and the epidemiologist. The plan must be approved by the department.
Id. § 484C.12(2).
3. Rules related to qu arantine arising from CWD . The DNR has promulgated a rule related to its power to impose a quarantine as a
result of an outbre ak of CWD. The rule provides,13 A positive test result for chronic wasting disease will result in a minimum of a five

- year quarant ine on the preserve and all remaining animals located within t he infected preserve. No animal movement in or out of the preserve shall occu r during the quarantine period.
Iowa Admin. Code r. 571

— 115.10. The language of the rule is different than that under Iowa Code section 484C.12(1). Iowa Code section 484C.12(1) provides the DNR may provide for the quarantine of “ diseased preserve whitetail , ” while the rule provides for a five

- year “quarantine on the p reserve and all remaining animals located within the infected preserve.” Compare Iowa Code § 484.12(1), with Iowa Admin. Code r. 571

— 115.10.
C. Positions of the Parties . The DNR 3 argues the district court
erred when it concluded that the DNR was irrati onal, illogical, and wholly unjustifiable to interpret Iowa Code section 484C.12 as granting the DNR authority to quarantine Pine Ridge. The DNR argues that the word “quarantine” in Iowa Code section 484C.12(1) must be understood as not only applying to t he whitetail deer that were originally at Pine Ridge, but also to the physical property itself , even when no deer are present. According to the DNR, prions that cause CWD are known to persist in the environment for some time even after
all infected deer h ave been removed or the property has ceased operating as a hunting preserve. The DNR asserts that killing all deer and then cleaning and disinfecting the premises are only part of a fully effective response to an outbreak of CWD. The DNR maintains that i n order to provide effective containment of CWD, wild deer must be kept out of the

3 Both the DNR and the NRC were named as parties in the litigation. For convenience, we will collectively refer to both parties as the DNR unless context suggests the singular usage.14 premises for an extended period of time in order to prevent them from becoming infected. Interpreting a q uarantine otherwise, the DNR asserts, is itself
irrational , illogic al, and wholly unjustifiable because it ignores the express intent of the legislature to combat CWD due to the particular threat it poses to the health of Iowa’s animal populations, including the wild populations. The DNR points out no other particular di sease is mentioned in chapter 484C but CWD, indicating this disease was of special concern to the legis lature. See Iowa Code § 484C.12. According to the DNR, i t would make no sense for a legislature so concerned with CWD to deny the state regulatory auth orities the ability to protect t he whitetail population from a primary pathway for transmission of the
diseas e, namely exposure to prion

- contaminated land. In response to the Brakkes ’ argument that the plain meaning of Iowa Code section 484C.12 clearly deprives the DNR of jurisdiction in this case, the DNR argues we must view the statute as a whole

. I n context, the legislature ’ s use of “hunting preserve” and “preserve
whitetail” do n ot reveal the legislature’s intent with respect to the term “quarantine.” See id. The DNR asserts that restricting access to a space
is inherent in the term “ quarantine. ” The DNR also points to the scientific evidence it introduced showing the continuin g virulence of prion

- contaminated areas. The DNR concludes by disputing the Brakkes’ characterization of CWD as a disease with low impact on deer populations and the hunting industry. The Brakkes state that when an agency exceeds its authority, it
acts w ithout jurisdiction , and such acts are therefore void. Here, the Brakkes argue that under the language of Iowa Code section 4 84C.12, the DNR has jurisdiction only over “preserve whitetail” and “hunting15 preserves,” which the statute defines

. See id. § 484 C.1(6 ), (8 ). The
Brakkes assert the DNR only has the power to impose a “quarantine of diseased preserve whitetail” that threaten the health of animal populations. Id. § 484C.12(1). The Brakkes dispute the DNR’s focus on the word “quarantine.”
The Brakk es suggest the focus cannot be on the word “quarantine” but instead on “quarantine of diseased preserve whitetail” under section 484C.12(1). The Brakkes note that as of June 6, 2013, the date of the emergency order, they did not have any “diseased preserv e whitetail” at Pine Ridge, which itself was no longer a hunting preserve. According to the Brakkes, agencies lose jurisdiction over licenses when the license ends, with the only exception being when the legislature expressly provides for continuing juris diction. The Brakkes also dispute the significance of CWD on the health of Iowa’s population of whitetail deer. According to the Brakkes, CWD already exists at a low level in the wild deer population, with no scientific evidence showing a negative aggreg ate effect of CWD on deer populations. The Brakkes also argue that any harm CWD causes can be mitig ated by ordinary, animal disease

- management techniques

— a five

year quarantine is not scientifically justified. The Brakkes stress that, before the emergenc y order, the DNR had never issued a quarantine nor any instructions to the Brakkes indicating there was a quarantine on the property. Under the agreement the parties signed, deer were permitted to enter and leave Pine Ridge, thereby suggesting a quarantin e was not in place. The Brakkes also argue that because the DNR believed it did not have the ability to close the gates at Pine Ridge once it learned the gates were open, DNR did not believe it had a quarantine on Pine Ridge or jurisdiction to take action on its own16 against Pine Ridge. The DNR’s claim that the quarantine existed as a matter of law prior to the Brakkes’ surrender of their license is, according
to the Brakke s , belied by the facts.
D. Framework for Assessment of the Validity of the
Substan tive Agency Rule. An agency rule is “ presumed valid unless the party challenging the rule proves ‘ a “ rational agency ” could not conclude the rule was within its delegated authority. ’ ” Meredith Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp. , 648 N.W.2d 109, 117 (Iowa 2002) (quoting
Milholin v. Vorhies , 320 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa 1982)); see also Iowa Med. Soc. v. Iowa Bd. of Nursing , 831 N.W.2d 826, 839 (Iowa 2013) . The party seeking to invalidate a rule is required to show by clear and

conv incing evidence that the rule making was beyond the agency’s statutory authority. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Iowa Civil Rights
Comm’ n , 277 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 1979) (suggesting the standard is the same as “substantial evidence”); Schmitt v. Iowa Dep’t o f Soc . Serv s
. , 263 N.W.2d 739 , 744 (Iowa 1978) (analyzing whether agency’s
administrative rule w as “beyond the authority delegated to it”) ; Arthur
Earl Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act: Background , Construction, Applicability, Public Acces s to Agency Law, the Rulemaking
Process , 60 Iowa L. Rev. 731, 908

– 09 (1975). While we grant deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute when the legislature has clearly vested that interpretation in the agency, ultimately the interpretation an d construction of a statute is an
issue for the court to decide. Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iow a Util s
. Bd. , 744 N.W.2d 640, 643 (Iowa 2008); accord Schmitt , 263 N.W.2d at 745. In interpreting the grant of statutory authority to the agency, we

“ will not look beyond the express terms of the statute if the text of the statute is plain and its meaning clear. ” Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc. , 81417 N.W.2d 512, 519 (Iowa 2012). A statute is not plain or clear “ if
reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to the meaning of the
statute. ” Carolan v. Hill , 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996). “ The plain provisions of a statute cannot be altered by administrative rule. ”
Schmitt , 263 N.W.2d at 745. An agency possesses no common law or inherent powers. Branderhorst v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n , 202 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Iowa 1972) . The power of the agency is limited to the power granted by
statute. Id. at 4 0 ; see also Holland v. State , 115 N.W.2d 161, 163

– 64 (Iowa 1962). Likewise, a court may not ignore the clear language of a statute and impose its own ideas through the guise of construction, even if it is the best way to promote public welfare and achieve a desirable
result. Holland , 115 N.W.2d at 164.
E. Discussion.
1. Straightforward interpretation o f legislative language . A straightforward reading of the language of Iowa Code section 484C.12 supports the Brakkes’ position. The term “quarantine” cannot be wrenched from the statutory language that follows it. The term

“ quarantine ” is modified by the phrase “of diseased preserve whitetail.”
See Iowa Code § 484C.12(1). It does not allow for quarantine of

non diseased whitetail or whitetail that are not preserve whitetail. The DNR argues the natural and logical reading would produce
absurd results. T he question arises whether the absurdity doctrine should be invoked here to support the DNR’s administrative rule and the DNR emergency order upon which it is based.
2. Overview of the doctrine of absurdity . The doctrine of absurdity has a good pedigree . Sutherland Statutory Construction , for instance, notes that ordinarily, ambiguous statutory language should be construed18 in a fashion that produces a reasonable result. 2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Statute s & Statutory Construction § 45:12 , at 10 4

– 0 6 (7th ed. rev. 2014 ) [hereinafter Statutory Construction ] . But Sutherland goes further. According to Sutherland, courts may use a “ variant of the

‘ reasonableness ’ rule even absent ambiguity

. . . when an act’s plain, clear, literal meaning produces an unintended, absurd result. ” Id

. at
115

. Sutherland instructs that courts find it “fundamental” that departure from a literal construction is justified “when such a construction would produce an ‘unreaso nable’ or ‘absurd’ or ‘unworkable’ or ‘unjust’ or ‘unlikely’ result clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.” Id. at 115

– 19 (footnotes omitted). It is important at the outset to distinguish between interpreting ambiguou s s tatutes to avoid absurd results and declining to enforce the literal terms of a statute to avoid absurdity. It is universally accepted that where statutory terms are ambiguous, courts should interpret the
statute in a reasonable fashion to avoid absurd results. See id. § 46:7 , at 279 (“All courts apparently agree that a finding of ambiguity opens statutory construction to the full range of familiar, interpretive tools.”). The true absurdity doctrine involves a different scenario. Under the absurdity doctrine, a court declines to follow the literal terms of the
statute to avoid absurd results. See id. § 45:12, at 115. As noted by Sutherland, this is a different question from how courts proceed upon a finding of ambiguity. I d. Here is where the absu rdity doctrine becomes controversial. To what extent may a court evade or ignore the literal terms of a statute to avoid a result that is not simply poor public policy, but is so unreasonable that it could not have been intended by the19 legislature and ref lects the inherent limit of the legislative process to foresee various applications of a statute?
3. Caselaw from other jurisdictions applying absurdity doctrine

. The cases of the United States Supreme Court have oscillated between a textual approach th at hews to a close parsing of legislative texts and a more purposeful approach to the construction of statutes. Support for the absurdity doctrine goes back as far as 1868. In United States v. Kirby , the Supreme Court had occasion to ponder the absurdity doctrine. 74 U.S. 482, 486 (1868). In that case, a statute
made it a crime to “ ‘knowing[ly] and wi l [l] fully’ obstruct or retard the passage of the mail.” Id. at 485. The question was whether a law
enforcement officer who arrested a mail carrier for m urder violated the
statute. Id. at 487 . The Kirby Court said no. Id. It cited the
E nlight en ment philosopher Puf f endorf, who concluded that a law stating “whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity” did not apply to a surgeon who was trying to perform therapeutic bloodletting on a person who fell down in the street in a fit.
Id. ; see David M. Sollors, The War on Error: The Scrivener’s Error Doctrine and Textual Criticism: Confronting Errors in Statutes and Literary Tex ts , 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 459, 463 n. 19 (2009) (noting the Kirby Court was referencing the work of the German jurist Samuel von Pufendorf). The Court also cited an Edwardian example that a prisoner is not guilty of escape when the prisoner breaks out of a prison on fire. Kirby , 7 4 U.S.
at 487. Kirby and the examples it cites stand for the proposition that a broadly worded and apparently unqualif ied statute may be narrowly construed to avoid absurd results notwithstanding the literal terms of
the statute.20 The Supreme Court considered another departure from the literal
terms of a statute in Holy Trinity Church v. United States , 143 U.S. 457,
12 S. Ct. 511 (1892). In Holy Trinity , the Supreme Court considered whether a statute that on its face prohibited importation of foreigners into the United States “to perform labor or service of any kind” applied to a church who hired an English rector. Id. a t 458, 12 S. Ct. at 511. The statutory language was unqualified. Id. Yet, the Supreme Court held the statute did not apply to the hiring of the rector. Id. at 465, 12 S. Ct. at 514. The Court’s refusal to apply the statute to the transaction was parti cularly striking as the statute contained a specific exception for “actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic servants” but did not include clergy in the exception. Id. at 458

– 59, 12 S. Ct. at 512. The Court recognized the linguistic argument had “great force, ” yet stated that “we cannot think congress intended to denounce” the hiring of a religious rector. Id. at 459, 12 S. Ct. at 512. The Court declared the purpose of the statute was to prevent the influx of “cheap, unskilled
labor.” Id. at 4 64, 12 S. Ct. at 513. Further, the Court declared that a purpose against religion could not be imputed to the legislation. Id. at 465, 12 S. Ct. at 514. The Supreme Court revisited the absurdity doctrine in Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice , 491 U.S. 440, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989). The question in that case was whether the Federal Advisory Committee Act applied to the j ustice d epartment’s solicitation of
the views of committees of the American Bar Association on various judicial nominee s. Id. at 443, 109 S. Ct. at 2561. The literal terms of the statute would have drawn within its scope any group of two or more persons who advised the President or the executive branch. Id. at 452 , 109 S. Ct. at 2566 . Justice Bre nnan , writing for the C ourt, declared this21 result was not the intention of Congress as it would prevent political
actors from the freedom to conduct their affairs. Id. at 453, 109 S. Ct. at 2566. In escaping the literal words of the statute, Justice Brennan cited Learned Hand, who once wrote , “ [I] t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary.” Id. at 454, 109 S. Ct. at 2567 (quoting Cabell v. Markham , 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff’d , 326 U.S. 404, 66 S. Ct. 193 (1945) )

. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy presented a narrower version of the absurdity doctrine. Id. at 470

– 71, 109 S. Ct. at 2575 (Kennedy, J., concurring). According to Justice Kennedy, the plain
words of a statute could be avoided on ly if the literal interpretation would lead to “patently absurd consequences” under circumstances where “it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended the result .

. . and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Brown , 333 U.S. 18, 27, 68 S. Ct. 376, 380 (1948)); see Glen Staszewski , Avoiding Absurdity , 81 Ind. L. J. 1001, 1047 (2006) [hereinafter Staszewski]. Finally, although not labeled as the absurdity doctrine, the Supreme Cour t applied concepts similar to it in King v. Burwell , 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). In the Affordable Care Act, the meaning of the phrase “an Exchange established by the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031]” was not particularly ambiguous, at least on i ts face. Id. at ___,

___, 135 S. Ct. at 2482 , 2489 . The term “by the S tate” does not seem to
include by “the Federal G overnment.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2490. As noted by Chief Justice Roberts, “Petitioners’ arg uments about the plain meaning of [ the section] are strong.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2495. Yet, Chief Justice Roberts concluded the narrow and specific phrase should be read more broadly to include any exchange under the A ct, including22 those established by the Federal G overnment. Id. at _ __, 135 S. Ct. at 2496. The Chief Justice noted that the purpose of the Affordable Care Act was to improve the health insurance markets, not to destroy them.
Id.
In King

— unlike in Kirby , Holy Trinity , and Public Citizen where the
broad terms of a statut e were narrowly construed

— the meaning of the statute was seemingly expanded beyond its literal meaning to save the
statute from self

- destruction

. See id. The compelling gist of King is that
statutes do not commit suicide. King thus amounted to a recognition that although “the plain language interpretation of a statute enjoys a robust presumption in its favor, it is also true that [a legislative body] cannot, in every instance, be counted on to have said what it meant or to
have meant what it said.” FBI v. Abramson , 456 U.S. 615, 638, 102
S. Ct. 2054, 2068 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). A factor pulsating through some federal absurdity cases is the
desire to avoid constitutional conflict. Holy Trinity at least implies that the application of the statute to the hiring of the rector might raise First Amendment issues, see 143 U.S. at 465, 12 S. Ct. at 514, and the Public
Citizen majority discusses the need of the executive branch to engage in meaningful political communications free from pub lic disclosure , see 491
U.S. at 453 , 109 S. Ct. at 256 6 (majority opinion) . As noted by one appellate court, whe n the statute’s plain meaning is absurd , and perhaps unconstitutional, resort to extrinsic materials is appropriate

. United
States v. Romero

- Bustamente , 337 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003). This tendency is supported by the notion that if the legislative branch wishes
to trench on constitutional rights or separation of powers, it must do so only with the clearest of intentions. Such an approach tends to use less
confrontational statutory construction as a tool to strengthen23

underenforced constitutional norms. See Staszewski, 81 Ind. L. J. at
1045.
A s noted in commentary, although application of the absurdity princip le is contested in federal courts, even those who advocate textual or literal approaches endorse the principle in at least some contexts. See Veronica M. Doughert y, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism : Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation , 44 Am. U . L. Rev

. 127, 128 & n.6 (1994) [hereinafter Dougherty]. For instance , in Green v

. B ock Laundry Machine Co. , staunch textualist Justice Scalia rejected literal interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) because it would produce absurd results. 490 U.S. 504, 527, 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Doughtery, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. at 153

– 58. Similarly, Judge Easterbrook has written that th e language of a statute may be bent only when the text produces absurd results. Neal v. Honeywell Inc

. , 33 F.3d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 1994) , abrogated by Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wils on , 545
U.S. 409 , 415 , 125 S. Ct. 2444 , 2449 (2005) ; see Doughtery, 44 Am. U.
L. Rev. at 128 n.6. As noted by Judge Posner, even interpretive literalists realize that “the interpreter is free (we would say compelled) to depart in
the direction of sense” w here strict interpretatio n would yield absurd
results. Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore
Foods , Inc. , 9 60 F.2d 1339 , 1345 (7th Cir. 1992)

. There is case law in many states that support s some form of the absurdity doctrine. Se e, e.g. , Brock v. Townsell , 309 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Ark. 2009); Prof’l Collection Consultants v. Lauron , 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419,
433 (Ct. App. 2017); People v. Johnson , ___ N.E.3d ___, ___ , 2017 WL
243396 , at *3 (Ill. 2017); Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Mini , 304 N.E.2d 75, 78 (Ill. 1973); Commonwealth v. Peterson , 65 N.E.3d 1166,24 1169 (Mass. 2017); State ex rel. Z.C. , 165 P.3d 1206, 1209 (Utah 2007). Many of the cases, no doubt, are really cases of ambiguity and the
avoidance of unreasonable results is a conventional interpretive strategy. But this is not always true. As noted by the Hawaii Supreme Court, “departure from literal construction is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result, ” clearly inconsistent with the p urposes of the statute. Pac. Ins. v. Or. Auto. Ins. , 490 P.2d 899, 901 (Haw. 1971). There are many state court cases utilizing the absurdity
doctrine whe n the plain meaning of the language does not seem ambiguous, some of which are quite remarkable. See , e.g. , Maddox v.
State , 923 So. 2d 442, 445, 448 (Fla. 2006) ( holding statute prohibiting introduction of traffic citations “in any trial” limited to any trial dealing directly with the traffic offense); Commonwealth v

. Wallace , 730 N.E.2d
275 , 278 (Mass

. 2000) (interpreting the phrase “trial on the merits” to include a default judgment); State v. Spencer , 1 73 S.E.2d 7 65 , 774 (N.C. 1970) ( finding “standing” in the street obstructing traffic inc ludes walking in the street); In re Falstaff Brewing Co. re : Narragansett Brewery
Fire , 637 A.2d 1047 , 1050 (R.I. 1994) ( holding statute authorizing release of “name and address” of juvenile also authorizes release of underlyin g record). If anything, the case for the absurdity doctrine may well be stronger in state courts than in federal courts. State legislatures generally meet on a part

- time basis. They do not generally employ the mechanisms of extensive public hearings, ma rkups, and staff review that
have characterized c ong ressional action in the past. Fu rther, large volumes of state legislation are often passed in the waning hours of a legislative session, with a flurry of last minute amendments, thus25 increasing the possibility that legislation may be passed without a full linguistic vetting.
4. Iowa c a selaw r egarding a bsurdity . Some of our cases invoke the absurdity principle primarily as a tool of statutory interpretation.
See Mall Real Estate, L

. L

. C

. v

. City of Hamburg , 818 N.W.2d 190, 199 (Iowa 2012). The use of interpretive tools to determine whi ch of a
number of textually plausible options the court should choose is not really application of the absurdity doctrine, but represents a conventional approach endorsed even by textualist opponents of the absurdity doctrine. See John F. Manning, The Abs urdity Doctrine , 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2419

– 20 & nn .122

– 23

. A recent survey in the Drake Law Review demonstrates that members of this court frequently look beyond the text of the statute in the interpretation of statutes. Karen L. Wallace, Does the Past Predict the Future?: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Iowa Supreme Court Use of Legislative History as a Window i nto Statutory Construction in Iowa , 63 Drake L. Rev. 239, 266

– 67 ( 2015) (“The court has exhibited a willingness to consider a wide range of sources that might help it interpret a statute consistent with legislative intent.”)

. As an apparent response to suggestions that we cannot use tools of construction to depart from clear legislative text, we have sometimes
utilized a circular wo rk

- around in which we declare that if the statute produces absurd results, it must be “ambiguous.” See Sherwin

- Williams
Co. v

. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue , 78 9 N.W.2d 417, 427 & n.8 (Iowa 2010 )

. But it is doubtful that a clear text is really transformed into a n ambiguous one solely based on the consequences of application. In cases where we employ circular ambiguity, we are really applying the true absurdity doctrine, namely, overriding the text of a statute to avoid26 an intolerable result, just as the United S tates Supreme Court did in Kirby, Holy Trinity , and Public Citizen , and just as many other state

cour ts have done over the decades. A more straightforward description of the absurdity doctrine was presented in Case v. Olsen , where we declared,
The court should give effect to the spirit of the law rather than the letter, especially so where adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, or injustice, or would lead to contradiction, or would defeat the plain purpose of the act, or where the provision wa s inserted through inadvertence. 234 Iowa 869, 873, 14 N.W.2d 717, 719 (1944). Kirby, Holy Trinity , and
Public Citizen utilize what one scholar has called “ specific absurdity. ”
See Linda D. Jellum, Why Specific Absurdity Undermines Textualism , 76
Brook

. L. Rev. 917, 92 9 (2011). S pecific absurdity is when the literal terms of a broadly framed statue have been narrowed to avoid an absurd
result in specific instances

. Id. at 928. We have engaged in a specific absurdity analysis on a number of
occasions. For instance, in State v. Hoyman , we invoked the absurdity doctrine to narrow the scope of a statute that criminalized fraudulent practices in the context of public records. 863 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Iowa 2015). The statutory language seemed to criminalize any k nowingly incorrect entry, regardless of significance and whether the maker intended to
deceive. Id. at 8. We concluded that when read literally, the scope of the statute “would be breathtakingly broad.” Id. at 13. We thus interpreted
the term “false” i n the statute to mean that the entry was made with
intent to deceive. Id. at 15. We thus used the absurdity doctrine to
narrow the scope of a criminal statute. Similarly, in Bearinger v. Iowa Department of Transportation , we considered whether a dri ver could invoke a prescription

- drug defense27 before an administrative tribunal seeking to revoke her driver’s license. 844 N.W.2d 104, 106 (2014). We noted that in criminal matters, the legislature expres sly provided for a prescription

- drug defense. Id. at
107

– 08. Yet, a similar defense was not provided for in the administrative process related to license revocation. Id. at 10 9

. Under the driver’s
license revocation s tatute, revocation could occur when “ any amount of a controlled substance is present in t he person .” Id. at 107 (quoting Iowa
Code § 321J.2(1)( c ) (emphasis added ) )

. In order to avoid absurd results, we narrowed the scope of the term “any amount” to exclude amounts in the body as a result of duly prescribed and ingested prescription drugs.
Id. at 110. Finally, in Iowa Insurance Institute v

. Core Group of Iowa Association for Justice , we construed the term “all inform ation ” to exclude work product, attorney work product, attorney

– c l ient, and other privileged materials. 867 N.W.2d 58, 79 (20 15). The literal terms of the statute did not have any qualification. Id. at 69. We declared “all information” to be ambiguous, but the language was plain enough. Id. at
73. We narrowed the statute to avoid untoward results. Id. at 76.
In this case , however, we are not asked to narrow the scope of a statute, but to expand the scope beyond its plain meaning. This is the scenario presented in King , 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2480

. We have, on occasion, expanded the meaning of a statute through interpre tation in
order to avoid an absurd result. See Hutchison v. Shull , 878 N.W.2d 221,
23 3 (Iowa 2016) ( favoring expansive interpretation of the term “meeting” to promote underlying goals of statute); Mall Real Estate , 818 N.W.2d at
199 ( applying expansive in terpretation of the term “material” to ac hieve statutory consistency ) . Nonetheless, it seems fair to say avoiding the28 literal terms of a statute in order to extend the power of the state occurs with less frequency than a narrowing construction.
We also seem to have recognized that statutes should not contain the seeds of their own destruction. For instance, we have stated that “when a literal interpretation of a statute results in absurd consequences that undermine the clear purpose of the statute, an a mbiguity arises. ”
Sher win

- Williams , 789 N.W.2d at 427 n. 8; s ee also State v

. Hopkins , 465 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Iowa 1991) (noting we strive to arrive at a construction
that will best effect uate its purpose rather than defe at it); Crow v

. Shaeffer , 199 N

. W

. 2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1972). In a similar vein, our older cases have recognized what some have called the common law equity or “spirit” of the statute. Case , 234 Iowa at 873, 14 N.W.2d at 719 . Our
invocation of the spirit of the statu t e is usually in conjunction with a finding that the statute is ambiguous

. See id. at 872, 14 N.W.2d at 719. We have also recognized narrow construction to avoid constitutional problems. State v

. Mc G uire , 200 N.W.2d 832, 833 ( Iowa 1972); Carroll v

. City of Cedar Falls , 221 Iowa 2 7 7, 283

– 84, 261 N.W. 652, 655

– 56 (1935). A possible unconstitutional result is a factor that might tip statutory interpretation away from a literal reading of the
statute. In the end, we find the teaching of Sherwin

- Williams is consistent with the vast majority of state and federal law and has continued vitality today. In Sherwin

- Williams , we noted that “the absurd results doctrine should be used sparingly because it entails the risk that the judiciary will displace legislat ive policy on the basis of speculation that the legislature could not have m eant what it unmistakably said.” 789
N.W.2d at 427 (quoting 2A Statutory Construction § 45:12 , at 105

– 0729 (7th ed. 2007) )

. Yet, in Sherwin

- Williams , we also cited with approval a
Hawaii case which states, [ E ] ven in the absence of statutory ambiguity, departure from literal construction is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and the literal construction in the particular action is clearly inco nsistent with the purposes and policies of the act.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pac. Ins. , 490 P.2d at 901)

. The bottom line is that the absurdity doctrine is well established in Iowa and elsewhere, though n ot always clearly articulated. It can be utilized, in rare cases, to overcome the plain meaning of the words of a statute. The doctrine, however, must be used sparingly and only in
circumstances when the court is confident the legislature did not intend the result required by literal appli cation of the statutory terms.
5. Discussion of applying the a bsurdity d octrine in this case. In light of these cases, we now turn to consid ering the meaning of Iowa
Code s ection 484C.12. It express ly authorizes the DNR to engage in quarantine of “diseased preserve whitetail.” Iowa Code § 484C.12. There does not seem to be a lot of ambiguity here. The quarantine applies only if three requirements are present: diseased, preserve, and whitetail. Id.
It would be a blue

- is

- red

- type of interpretati on to claim that the statute applies to nondiseased whitetail . And, the quarantine appl ies to whitetail, not to land. We could, perhaps, escape the plain meaning of the words through an application of the absurdity principle. That is the fighting issue in
this case. The DNR seeks through the absurdity doctrine to br oaden inclusion of coverage. It is then akin to King , 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct.
at 2496

. The DNR seeks to release itself from the verbal chains of the30

statute to achieve what it views as a better, more thorough, and more comprehensive result.
Bu t we do not see absurdity here. Indeed, it is not uncommon that the legislative proc ess results in half measures. Further, the plain meaning of the statute, namely that quarantine applies only to “diseased preserve whitetail , ” is not absurd. The DNR itself admits that a quarantine of the diseased animals is one step in a program of control of CWD. The record in this case established that CWD is of grea t concern in the game

- hunting community, but there seems to be no clear consensus about the efficacy of various eradication efforts. After reviewing the record in this case, one does not emerge thinking , “Oh my gosh, that can’t be!” when considering the plain legislative language. The linguistic f ocus in the Iowa statute on the animals rather than the land is found in other CWD regulatory regimes. For example, Illinois
law a uthorizes a quarantine of a CWD

- infected herd until either the herd has been depopulated or there has be en no evidence of CW D in the he rd for five years from the date of the last case, and all animals that have died, been euthanized or been slaughtered in the herd during that pe riod were examined for CWD.
Ill. Admin

. Code tit. 8, § 85.120(e) (2) (Westlaw current through Ill. R eg. vol. 41, issue 21) . There is no provis ion for quarantine after the he rd has been depopulated. We further note that at the time Iowa Code chapter 484C was enacted, there were other legislative models that distinguished between quarantine of animals an d quarantin e of land. For example, the North Carolina statute expressly authorize s the quarantine of exposed animals and affected premises within the state. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106

- 401 (West, Westlaw current through S.L. 2017

- 17 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.)

. S ection31 ( a ) of the statute authorizes the state veterinarian to “quarantine any
animal affected with or exposed to a contagious disease.” Id. § 106

- 401(a). Under this provision, the quarantine remains in effect “until any
sick or diseased animal has been properly disposed of and the premises have been pro perly cleaned and disinfected. ” Id. Section ( b ) authorizes
the state veterinarian , in consultation with the c ommissioner of agriculture and with approval of the g overnor, to quarantine “areas
within the State

. ” Id. § 106

- 401(b) ; s ee Andrew H. Nelson, High S takes: Defending North Carolina’s Response to Contagious Animal Diseases , 83
N.C. L. Rev. 238 , 263

– 71 (200 4 ). Further, a survey of administrative regulations related to CWD for ce r vids show s that some do not expressly authorize quarantines, some authorize quarantines but only of herds, and some authorize quarantines of both herds and premises. See, e.g. , Ariz. Admin. Code § R3

- 2

- 405 (Westlaw current through Ariz. Admin. Reg. vol. 23, issue ( 7 ) ) (providing for depopulation of animals exposed to
CWD but no mention of a quarantine); Kan. Admin. Regs. 9

- 3

- 17 (a) (Westlaw current through Vol. 36, No. 17, Apr. 27, 2017) (authorizing a “herd quarantine”); 2

- 4 Vt. Code R. § 316 :XI (Westlaw current thr ough May 2017) (providing for a quarantine of herd and premises). We decline to write a passage related to quarantine of the premises into the Iowa
law , which authorizes only the quarantine of animals. See Iowa Code § 484C.12. The fact that more might have been done does not make the grant of limited authority the legislature gave to the DNR absurd. Our task is to interpret the statute, not improve it. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Super.
C t

. , 811 P.2d 1025, 1034 (Cal. 1991) (en ban c); In re Matthew D

. , 88 0 N.W.2d 107, 114 ( Wis. 2016). Indeed, while more might need to be done in a specific case, the legislature may well have relied on Iowa Code32 section 484C.12(2), which requires the landowner, or the landowner’s veterinarian, and a DNR epidemiologist to develop a plan for eradicating the disease among the preserve whitetail population. This pr ovision suggests a reliance on mutual agreement on a case

- by

- case basis for
further remedies , rather than the expansive government quarantin e authority suggested by the DNR. We also observe some of the features that may tend to support application of the absurdity doctrine are not present in this case. We
note that the DNR asks us to expand , rather than retract , government power. While we hav e on occ asion done so in the past under th e absurdity doctrine, we think it is a more difficult argument to make than when a statute is narrowed. If the legislature wants to assert new regulatory powers over private landowners, it should do so expressly. Further, to the extent there are constitutional issues at stake here, they cut against a broad interpretation of the statute in light of the prop erty interests of deer farmers.
F. Conclusion. We therefore conclude that Iowa Code section
484C.12 should be read according to its ordinary meaning. The consequence of this interpretation is that the agency lacked the statutory authority to promulgate the administrative rule expanding the scope of quarantines to incl ude fencing of lands for a five

- year period when all diseased preserve wildlife have been eradicated. As a result, the agency was without authority to issue the emergency order in this case. 4 If the

4 Like the district court, we decline to consi der whether the DNR or NRC is entitled to deference in the interpretation of the statute under Renda , 784 N.W.2d at 11

– 14. Even if deference were afforded, we would nonetheless rule the DNR was without authority to issue the emergency order in this case.33 legislature wishes to expand quarantine powers as suggested by the DNR rule, it is, of course, fre e to do so.

IV. Taking Under the Due Process Clauses of the United States or Iowa Constitutions.

A. Introduction. Under both the United States and Iowa
C onstitutions, the government is required to pay just compensation when it “takes” private property for public use. U.S. Const. amend. V; Iowa Const. art. I, § 18. The overarching purpose of the Takings Clause
of the United State s Constitution is “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Yancey v

. United
States , 915 F.2d 1534, 1539 (Fed. Cir

. 1990) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States , 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S. Ct. 1563, 1569 (1960) )

. The United States Supreme Court has recognized two different types of takings. The first type involves direct government seizure of property that amounts to “ a practical ouster of [ the owner’s ] poss ession. ” Lingle v. C hevron U.S.A., Inc. , 544 U.S. 528, 537, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal
Council , 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892 (1992))

. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized a second kind of ta king which occurs as a result of gover nment regulation which becomes sufficiently
onerous that “ its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or
ouster.” Id.
In their cross

- appeal in this case, the Brakke s assert the district
court erred in not find ing the emergency order amounted to a regulatory taking under the United States and Iowa C onstitution s that enti tled them to just compensation.34

B. Constitutional Provisions. The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution pro vides that “private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
U.S. Const. amend. V. Article I, section 18 of the Iowa C onstitution provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation first being made, or secured to be made to the owner thereof, as soon as the damages shall be assessed by a jury. ” Iowa Const. art. I, § 18.
The Brakkes do not assert that the standard on takings under the
Iowa C onstitution is different than that under the federal takings constitutional counterpart. We therefore apply the established federal standards regarding takings, but reserve the right to apply these
standards in a fashion differ ent than the federal courts. State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 2013); Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald , 675 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2004).
C. Positions of the Parties. Citing federal case law, the Brakkes point out that regulatory takings occ ur when the government (1) requires the owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion, no matter how minor; (2) completely deprives the owner of all economically beneficial use of her property; or (3) without sufficient justification requires an owner to
d edicate a portion of property in exchange for a building permit

. See Lingle , 544 U.S. at 538, 125 S. Ct. at 2081 (describing the first two types of takings as “per se regulatory takings”) ; Dolan v. City of Tigard , 512 U.S. 374, 388, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2318 (1994) (involving permit conditions imposed on property owner) . A taking may also occur when the balancing factors of Penn Central Transportation Co

. v. City of New York indicate a taking has occurred . 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978) . The factors to be balanced under the familiar Penn Central test35

are ( 1) the economic impact of the regulation on th e claimant, ( 2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct investment

- backed expectations, and ( 3) the character of the governm ent action. Id. The Brakkes argue t he emergency order was a p er se regulatory taking because the order required the Brakkes to maintain both the fence and the gates at Pine Ridge. In support of their argument, the
Brakke s cite Loretto v. Teleprompter Ma nhattan CATV Corp. , 458 U.S. 419, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982). In Loretto , a landlord was forced to allow a cable television company to install cable and co nnection boxes on her property

. Id. at 421

– 22 , 102 S. Ct. at 3168

– 69

. The United States Supreme Court found a permanent physical occupation of real property that amounted to compensable taking. Id. at 4 38, 102 S. Ct. at 3177 . In
addition to the requirement to maintain the fence and gate, t he Brakkes note the emergency or der authorized the DNR to physically invade their property to kill wild d eer. Further, the Brakkes observe that any future operational plan would necessarily prohibit the Brakkes from excluding DNR personnel and property. These physical invasions, accord ing to the Brakkes, are takings that entitle them to just compensation. The Brakkes recognize the DNR ’s physical invasions are not permanent. Nonetheless, the Brakkes point to two World War II era cases where the government’s condemnation of company prem ises amounted to compensable taking s despite the temporary nature. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States , 338 U.S. 1, 7 , 69 S. Ct. 1434, 1438 (1949); United States v. Petty Motor Co. , 327 U.S. 372, 375

– 76 , 66 S. Ct. 596, 598

– 99 (1946). The Brakkes cite a recent case, Arkansas Game &
Fish Commission v. United States , which suggests that government

induced flooding may be compensable

. 568 U.S. 23, ___, 133 S. Ct. 511,
519

– 20 (2012).36 The Brakkes also argue that the emergency order is a regulatory taking bec ause it is the functional equivalent of ousting the Brakkes from their property for a five

- year period , or at least as long as the emergency order is in place. According to the Brakkes, the emergency order h ollows out its right to “possess, use and dispos e” of their property. Loretto , 458
U .S. 419, 435, 102 S. Ct. at 3176

. The Brakkes repeat that the emergency order forces them to maintain the fence, precludes them from conducting hun ting on the property, and requires them to submit an operational plan that will effectively permit the DNR to control all
activities at all times during the five

- year quarantine. According to the Brakkes, they cannot sell their property to escape the tentacles of the
DNR because t he DNR restrictions wil l scare away potential buyers. Next, the Bra k kes argue the emergency order qualifies as a taking because it strips the property of all economically beneficial use. The Brakkes point to Lucas , in which the Supreme Court stated that a property owner called upon “to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle , . . . has suffered a taking.” 505 U.S. at 1019, 112
S. Ct. at 2895. According to the Brakke s, th e record in this case demonstrates there is no other use of the land other than as a hunting
preserve, which the DNR order prohibits. Finally, and because it satisfies the Penn Central test, t he Brakkes assert the economic impact of the emergency order ha s been extensive, the regulation has interfered with their investment

- based expectations, and the order was a product of political c onsiderations and not the law.
See 438 U.S. at 124 , 98 S. Ct. at 2659

. According to the Brakkes, the
district court erred by declining to find a taking under Penn Central

.37 The DNR focuses its response on the question of whether a

c ompensable taking occurred. With respect to the per se regulatory takings, the DNR assert s the record did not establish a permanent physical invasion and did not deprive the Brakke s of all economic
benefit. On the question of permanent physical invasion, the DNR emph asizes a parade of federal case law that stress physical invasions must be perm anen t, and not temporary, to be per se compensa ble under the Takings Clause. In particular, the DNR notes that in Loretto , the United States Supreme Court expressly distinguished between permanent and temporar y invasions and held that a per se taking was present only when an invasion was permanent. 458 U.S. at 432

– 35 , 102
S. Ct. at 317 4

– 75 . The DNR recognizes that the World War II era cases
of Kimball and Petty Motor allow for compensation for temporary takings,
but the DNR suggests that later case law ha s clarified that in order to be a per se taking under current doctrine, the taking must be permanent

. Loretto , 458 U.S. at 435, 102 S. Ct. at 3175

. The DNR next addresses the question of whether the emergency order amounted to a per se taking because it deprived the Brakkes of all productive use of the hunting preserve. Citing Tahoe

- Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency , the DNR asserts that in order to be a per se taking under this theory, the government action must deprive the property owner of “all economically beneficial use .” 5 35 U.S. 302, 319, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1477 (2002). In Tahoe

- Sierra , the Supreme Court held that a moratorium on development of property for thirty

- two months did not create a per se taking. Id. at 306, 321, 122
S. Ct. at 1470, 1478. DNR argues that Tahoe

- Sierra recognizes that anything less than a complete elimination of value or total loss must be38 analyzed under Penn Central and cannot be treated as per se takings.
See id. at 321, 122 S. Ct. at 1 478. The DNR notes that according to the United States Supreme Court, such a finding that “all economically
beneficial use [] ” has been eliminated as a result of government action is “relatively rare.” Lucas , 505 U.S. at 1018 , 112 S. Ct. at 289 4

. The DNR argues that the Brakkes fail to show a deprivation of “all economically beneficial use” for two reasons. First, the DNR notes that a temporary taking is insufficient. In addition, the DNR points out that

even o n a temporary basis, the Brakke s hav e not been deprived of all
economic interests , as the property can still be used for non cervid species, fishing, row crops, hay ground, timber harvest, bed and breakfast, or cattle pasture, among other uses. The DNR also point s to an appraisal , which indi cat ed the value of the Brakke s ’ property due to
the DNR’s regulatory effort fe ll from $1,056,000 to $891,000. Having argued t hat the Brakke s failed to show a per se taking, the DNR turns to the question of whether the emergency order amounted to a regulat ory taking under Penn Central. The DNR asserts that under the
first Penn Central factor, the Brakkes failed to show the e conomic impact of the emergency order weighed in favor of fin ding a taking. The DNR stresses the relatively small diminution in the v alue of the property and the fact the diminution in value will abate as the end of the quarantine period approaches. According to the DNR, in order for the economic impact to weigh in favor of a taking, the diminution in value has to be much gre ater , at l east by fifty percent or more
. See CCA Assoc s
. v

. United States , 667 F.3d 1239, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ) (stating it was

“ aware of no case in which a court has found a taking where diminution in value was less than 50 percent ” ). To the extent the Brakke s claimed lost profits was the proper measure of economic impact, the DNR cited3 9

cases sta nding for the proposition that c onsequential damages are not recoverable in takings cases and thus should not be the standard for determining if a taking occurred. See , e.g. , Kurth v

. Iowa Dep’t of
Trans p
. , 628 N.W.2d 1, 6

– 7 (Iowa 2001).
Under the second Penn Central factor, the DNR suggests that
investment

- backed expectations do not weigh in favor of a taking. The DNR argue s the Brakke s knew that hunting reserves wer e subject to regulation. The DNR notes that for purposes of considering investmen t

backed expectation, the test is not whether a specific government regulation existed at the time of investment, but “[t]he critical question is
whether extension of existin g law could be foreseen as reasonably possible.” Cienega Gardens v. United States , 503 F.3d 1266, 1288

– 89 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Commw. Edison Co. v. United States , 271 F.3d 1327, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (en banc)).
On the last Penn Central factor, the DNR argues that the character of the government action does not weigh in favor of a taking. The DNR points out that the Brakkes maintained possession of their proper ty and maintained the right to possess, lease, or sell the property

. The DNR points to the beneficent purpose of the regulation, namely, to prevent the spread of CWD. Finally, the DNR argue s the duration of the quarantine was relatively brief and the diminution in the property value was modest.
D. Discussion.
1. Overv iew of r egulatory t akings t heories. The classic government taking requiring compensation is a direct appropriation of physical property , “ or the function al equivalent of ‘ a practical ouster of [ the
owner’s ] possession. ’ ” Lucas , 505 U.S. at 1014, 112 S. Ct. at 2892 (alteration in original) (quoting Transp. Co. v. Chicago , 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878)) . A regulatory taking, on the other hand, occurs when a40 regulation becomes so burdensome that its effect is “tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.” Li ngle , 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S. Ct. at
2081 ; Penn

. Coal Co. v. Mahon , 260 U.S . 393, 415 , 43 S. Ct. 158, 1 60 (1922) (recognizing regulatory takings for the first time); see also Easter Lake Estates, Inc. v. Polk C ounty , 444 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Iowa 1989) (“[G] overnment action that substantially deprives a person of the use of property, in whole or in part, may be a compensable taking.”). This case focuses solely on regulatory takings. As can be seen by the positions of the parties, there are three types of regulatory takings at play: ( 1) a per se t aking arising from a permanent physical invasion of property, ( 2) a per se taking arising from re gulation
that denies the owner all economically beneficial ownership , and ( 3) a regulatory taking based on the bal ancing of the three Penn Central
factors. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors , 584 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Iowa 1998); see Craig A. Peterson, Land Use Regulatory ‘Takings’ Revisited: The New Supreme Court Approaches , 39 Hastings L. J. 335, 336

– 39 (1988) (sketching the development of the Court’s regulatory takings
caselaw since Penn Central ).
2. Merits of a per se taking s claim involving “physical invasions of property” or deprivation of “all economically beneficial or productive use of
land.” We begin with a revie w o f the takings law involving p hysical
invasions by government regulation. A key case is Loretto , 458 U.S. 419,
102 S. Ct. 3164. In Loretto , the owner of a New York City apartment building challenged a New York law requiring that landlords not interfere
wi th the installation of cable television facilities on their premises, not demand payments fro m tenants for permitting cable television, and not demand payment from a cable television company in excess of an amount set by regulation. Id. at 423, 102 S. Ct. at 3169. The Loretto41 Court noted that lower courts had found the law served a legitimate public purpose, but held that when there is a “permanent physical occupation authorized by government,” the action is a taking whether or not it serves the public in terest. Id. a t 425

– 26, 102 S. Ct. at 3170

– 71

. The Loretto Court turned to the question of whether there was a permanent physical invas ion under the facts presented. Id. at 438, 102
S. Ct. at 3177. The Court noted that landlords suffered a permanent physical occupation in the form of the plates, boxes, wires, and bolts that affix the cable television installment to the roof of the building

. Id. Such a permanent installation on the landlord’s property was, therefore, a taking. Id. at 438, 102 S. Ct. at 3178

. The concept that a regulation that deprived a property owner “of all economically beneficial or productive use” amounted to a per se taking was explored in Lucas , 505 U.S. at 1015 , 112 S. Ct. at 2893

. In Lucas , a land developer purchased coast al property intending to develop single

family residences. Id. at 1008, 112 S. Ct. at 2889. A coastal council, however, prohibited construction of any habitable improvements on the property. Id. The land developer sought compensation, arguing the regul ation, though enacted pursuant to a valid law, was a taking because it denied him all economically beneficial or productive use of the land.
Id. at 1009, 112 S. Ct. at 2890

. The Lucas Court recognized that a compensable taking occurs when a regulation “ d enies an owner of all economically viable use of his
land. ” Id. at 1016, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon , 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2141 (1980) , abrogated on other grounds by Lingle , 544 U.S. at 545, 125 S. Ct. at 2087 ) . Th is position is justified, the Court explained, because from a landowner ’ s point of view, being totally deprived of all of the beneficial use of the land is the42 equivalent of a physical appropriation. Id. at 1017, 112 S. Ct. at 2894

. While the government must be allowed to a ffect property values by regulation without compensation, the Court recognized that takings could occur under “the relatively rare situations where the government had deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses.” Id. at
10 18, 112 S. Ct. at 2894

. The Supreme Court con sidered the question of whether a temporary taking that for a period of time deprived the owner of all
economic benefit could be a per se taking. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles , the Supreme Court
held for the first time that a landowner could recover d amages for the temporary period during which a land

- use regulation w as effective. 482 U.S. 304, 322 , 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987).
In First English , the appe llant church’s campground was flooded and its buildings destroyed. 482 U.S. at 307, 107 S. Ct. at 2381. In response to the flood, the county adopted an interim ordinance that prohibited the construction or reconstruction of any building in an
interim flo od protection area, which included the campground. Id. at 307, 107 S. Ct. at 2381

– 82. There is no indication in the opinion of the stated duration of the “interim ordinance,” if the ordinance in fact
included a duration. Id. at 307, 107 S. Ct. at 2382. The church brought a claim in California state court, arguing that the ordinance denied the church of all use of the campground and asking for just compensation. Id. at 308, 107 S. Ct. at 2382. The California courts rejected the claim under California p recedent , which established the only remedy for an ordinance that deprived a landowner of the total use of their lands was declaratory relief or mandamus. Id. at 309, 107
S. Ct. at 2382. This California precedent held that compensation was43 only available if a landowner had sought declaratory relief, the ordinance was held excessive, and the government persisted in enforcing the regulation. Id. The church appealed to the U nited States Supreme Court, arguing that t emporary regulatory takings require just
compensa tion under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 310, 107 S. Ct. at
2383. After a lengthy analysis of prior precedent, the Supreme Court
foun d that where takings deny landowners all use of property, there is no real difference between temporary takings and permanent takings. I d. at 318, 107 S. Ct. at 2388 (“ ‘[T]emporary ’ takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.”); see also S an Diego Gas & Elec. Co. , 450 U.S. 621, 657,
101 S. Ct. 1287, 1307 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that ‘takings’ must be permanent and irrevocable.”).
The First English Court emphasized that its decision was l imited to ordinances that deny the property owner all use of their property and not “normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which are not before us.” 482 U.S. at 321, 107 S. Ct. at 2389. Additio nally, the Court explained, once a determination has been made that a taking has occurred, the government retains the ability to choose to amend the regulation, withdraw the regulation, or exercise eminent domain. Id. But when the government has already taken all use of a property, it has a duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective. Id.44

While First English seems to stand for the proposition that temporary government actions that eliminate all economically viable u se of the property are subject to a Fifth Amendment per se taking analysis,
t he Court significantly narrowed the holding of First English in Tahoe

Sierra , 535 U.S. at 328

– 29 , 122 S. Ct. at 1482 . In Tahoe

- Sierra , the Supreme Court considered a land o wners group’s challenge to a two

- year , eight

- month moratorium on new development around Lake Tahoe. Id. at 306, 122 S. Ct. at 1470. These moratoria were enacted so that land

- use planners could develop a plan to preserve the lake while allowing new development. Id. at 310

– 11, 122 S. Ct. at 1472

– 73. The land owners claimed the moratoria were both per se taki ngs and takings under the
multi factored Penn Central approach. Id. at 3 14

– 15, 122 S. Ct. at 1474

– 75

. The district court had concluded the Penn Central fact ors were not met, but that under First English , 482 U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378, and
Lucas , 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886, the land owners were entitled to compensation for the thirty

- two m onths of the moratoria because the y were temporarily deprived of all economically viable use of their land.
Tahoe

- Sierra , 535 U.S. at 316

– 17, 122 S. Ct. at 1475

– 76. When the parties appeal ed and cross

- appealed, the land owners did not appeal the
Penn Central issue. Id. at 317, 122 S. Ct. at 1476.
The Tahoe

- Sierra Court r ejected a categorical, per se rule that temporary deprivations of all viable economic uses of the land necessarily gives rise to a takings claim. Id. at 321, 122 S. Ct. at 1478. In stead, the
Court stated temporary deprivations of use of property must be analyzed
under the fact

- specific Penn Central framework. Id. The Tahoe

- Sierra Court distinguished First English by emphasizing that the issue in First English was not whether a taking had occurred, but only whether45 compensation was required because the taking was temporary. Id. at 328, 122 S. Ct. at 1482; see First English , 482 U.S. at 321, 107 S. Ct. at 2389 (“We merely hold that where the government’s activities have
alr eady worked a taking .

. . .” ). As a result , the Tahoe

- Sierra Court
stated First English did not stand for the proposition that a taking had
occurred. 535 U.S. at 328, 122 S. Ct. at 1482. The Court also emphasized that Lucas did not support the petitioners because the
statute in Lucas eliminating all value of the land was “unconditional and permanent,” not temporary. Id. at 329 , 122 S. Ct. at 1483 (quoting
Lucas , 505 U.S. at 1012, 112 S. Ct. at 2891)

. Based on the above authoriti es, we conclude the Brakke s have failed to establish a per se regul atory taking b ased on either a physical

invasion theory or an all economic

- benefit theory. While the World War II vintage cases, buttressed by First English , might imply or suggest that a per se taking can arise from temporary takings, the more recent cas e of
Tahoe

- Sierra holds that temporary takings are not per se violations but
are i nstead analyzed under the multi factor Penn Central test. Id. at 321,
122 S. Ct. at 1478. We therefore reject the Brakke s ’ per se taking s claim and procee d to consider wheth er the Brakke s have a takings claim under
the Penn Central test.
3. Merits of a t akings c laim u nder a m ulti f

actored Penn Central balancing test

. Penn Central involved the application of New York City’s landmark preservation law to the Grand Central Terminal. 438 U.S. at 115, 98 S. Ct. at 2654. Under the law, the owner of a piece of property designated as a landmark was required to maintain the building in a good state of repair and was prevented from altering the exterior of the building absent the approval of the Landmarks Preservation
Commission. Id. at 111

– 12, 98 S. Ct. at 26 53.46

The Penn Central Court, in summarizing its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, emphasized there is no “set formula” for determining when concerns of “justice and fairness” r equire a private property owner to be compensated for economic injuries caused by a public action. Id. at 124, 98 S. Ct. at 2659 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead , 369 U.S. 590,
5 94, 82 S. Ct. 987, 990 (1960)). The Court emphasized that whether the
governm ent is required to pay just compensation depends “upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co. , 357 U.S. 155, 168 , 78
S. Ct. 1097, 1104 (1958)). According to the C ourt, the inquiry is ad hoc and fact specific. Id. Nevertheless, the Penn Central Court identified several factors of “particular significance.” Id. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation h as interfered with distinct investment

- backed expectations are, of c ourse, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the government action. A “taking” may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a phy sical invasion by government , tha n when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
Id. (citations omitted) ; accord Fitzgarrald v. City of Iowa City , 492 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Iowa 1992); Iowa

- Ill

. Gas & Elec. Co

. v. Iowa State Commerce
Comm’n , 412 N.W.2d 600, 607 (Iowa 1987). Even when a regulation furthers important public policies, it may nevertheless “so frustrate
distinct investment

- backed expectatio ns as to amount to a taking. ” Penn
Cent. , 438 U.S. at 127, 98 S. Ct. at 2661; see Penn

. Coal , 260 U.S. at
415 , 43 S. Ct. at 160 . A taking may be found if the regulation destroys the “primary expectation” of the owners of and investors in the parcel.
Pen n Cent. , 438 U.S. at 136, 98 S. Ct. at 2665; see also Kasparek v.47 Johnson Cty. Bd. of Health , 288 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Iowa 1980) (emphasizing this element of Penn Central ).
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States , the Court summarized the Penn
Central factors as “t he economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the government action.” 444 U.S. 164, 175, 100 S. Ct. 383, 390 (1979); accord Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. , 475 U.S. 211 , 224

– 25,
106 S. Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986). Kaiser Aetna and its progeny have given rise to descriptions of Penn Central as involving a three

- part balancing
test. See Adam R. Pomeroy, Penn Central After 35 Years: A Three Part Balancing Test or a One Strike R ule? , 22 Fed. Cir

. B. J. 677, 677 (2013). We, however , have generally considered the Penn Central test to be
a two

- part test, merging the first two factors described in Kaiser Aetna

— (1) “ ‘ [t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment

- backed expectations[,] ’ ” and (2) “ the ‘ character of the government action ’

— for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property i nterests through ‘ some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.’ ”

Harms , 702 N.W.2d at 98 (alteration in original) (quoting Lingle , 544 U.S. at 539, 125 S. C t. at 2082). We now turn to apply the Penn Central test to the case before us. There is no doubt there has been an economic impact from the emergency order in this case

. B ut the value of the land, as testified to by
the DNR’s expert, has declined only 16.4%, generally not enough to weigh heavily i n support of finding a taking. See CCA Ass ocs. , 667 F.3d
at 1246. Although the land cannot be used as a hunting preserve, it had
valu e and other uses prior to becoming a hunting preserve and has value
and other uses during the quarantine period.48

While there is little doubt the Brakke s may have lost profits, the yardstick in a takings case is ordinarily lost value of the property taken.
See Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States , 559 F.3d 1260, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2009) . We have held that consequenti al damages are not recoverable in takings cases. Kurth , 628 N.W.2d at 6

– 7. We have further stated that “the profits of a business are too uncertain, and depend upon too many contingencies to safely be a ccepted as any evidence of the
usable value of the p roperty upon which the business is carried on. ”
Wilson v

. Iowa State Highway Comm’n , 249 Iowa 994, 1006, 90 N.W.2d
1 61, 169 (Iowa 1958). We conclude that claims of los t profits may be

co nsidered only as a factor in determining the lost value of the land which has allegedly be en taken. See Rose Acre , 559 F.3d at 1272. Based on the evidence, we find the economic harm simply does not weigh in favor of a taking under Penn Central . The Penn Central approach is designed to give government authorities fairly wide berth in the regulation in the public interest. See 438 U.S. at 144

– 45, 98 S. Ct.
at 2669

– 70. The applicable case law does not support the Brakke s ’ assertion that the economic impact of the regulation on the Brakke s cuts in favor of the finding of a taking. We now turn to the question of whether th e DNR’s action interfered
with d istinct investment

- backed e xpectations. The investment

- ba c k ed expectations test is an objective one. Ciegna Gardens , 331 F.3d at 1346

. The Brakkes were in the business of operating a hunting preserve. A reasonable investor would be aware that hunting preserves are subject to state regulation, including regulation related to CWD. See Iowa Code ch.
484C ; see also Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v . Vilsack , 486 F.3d 430, 442 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that investment

- backed expectations did not weigh in favor of a taking in heavily regulated gambling industry).49 Further, a reasonable investor would understand the presence of CWD in a hunting p reserve could give rise to aggressive government action to curtail the spread of the disease. Notably, in Kafka v . Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks , the Supreme Court of Montana noted that in considering investment

- ba cked expectations in the conte xt of a takings claim, “the regulated and speculative nature of a particular industry should be considered in determining whether investment

backed expectations a re reasonable.” 201 P.3d 8, 31 (Mont. 2008). The Kafka court concluded “appellants should ha ve reasonably anticipated
that the G ame F arm industry might be phased out due to health and safety

- related concerns over CWD.” Id. at 32 ; s ee also Buhmann v

. State , 201 P.3d 70 , 94 (Mont. 2008) (noting dangers of CWD to deer and elk population were “public ly known and very controversial among many members of the public ” ) ; see generally Ronald W. Opsahl, Chronic Wasting Disease of Deer and Elk, A Call for National Action , 33 Envtl. L.
1059 , 1061

– 62 (2003) (providing history of CWD including endemic
pr esence in northeastern Colorado, southeastern Wyoming, and western Nebraska and presence in a number of other states). As a result, we do not conclude the investment

- backed expectations have been dramatically upset here. One of the downsides of entering a regulated field is that more intense regulation, particularly when threatening diseases are i nvolved, may be in the offing. When diseases threaten industries, it is reasonable to expect that government may be awakened from its regulatory slumber.
Final ly, we consider, as Penn Central directs, the character of government action. The purpose and importance of the government
action are relevant under this Penn Central factor. See Rose Acre , 559 F.3d at 1283. Here, the purpose of the government action wa s to protect50 wildlife in Iowa from a potentially contagious disease by imposing a quarantine on land where the diseased deer had been present. Th ere is
no doubt the Brakke s felt the brunt of the government’s action. Yet there is nothing in the re cord to suggest the Brakke s were arbitrarily sing led out for special treatment. Further, the testimony at the hearing indicated the action taken by the government wa s not substantially out of proportion to the purpose and importance behind the regulatory regime. Any physical invasion of the land was minimal. In light of all the facts and circumstances, the government has not taken “regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or outs the owner from his domain.” Lingle , 544 U.S. at 539, 125 S. Ct. at 2082.
VI. Conclusion. For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED. All justices concur except Mansfield and Waterman, JJ., who concur in par t and dissent in part.51 #15

– 0328, Brakke v. Iowa DNR MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent with respect to Part III of the court’s opinion. I believe the court is taking an overly technical view of the underlying statutory authority provided to the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR). I do not share the majority’s view that the statute is clear and unambiguous. We read statutes as a whole. See In re Estate of Gantner , 893 N.W.2d 896, 902 (Iowa 2017). Iowa Code section 484C.12(1) (2013) says the DNR “may provide for the quarantine of diseased preserve
whitetail th at threaten the health of animal populations.” Yet the next subsection, 484C.12(2), states “[t]he landowner, or the landowner’s veterinarian, and an epidemiologist designated by [DNR] shall develop a plan,” which “shall be designed to reduce and then elim inate the reportable disease, and to prevent the spread of the disease to other animals.” Iowa Code § 484C.12(2). Both subsections need to be read together. If we read subsection 1 as limiting DNR’s authority strictly to the diseased deer themselves, we cannot account for subsection 2, which gives the DNR broader authority over a “landowner” to implement a plan to “eliminate the reportable disease” and prevent its spread “to other animals.” When we interpret a statute, we try to harmonize its parts.
Iow a Individual Health Benefit Reins. Ass’n v. State Univ. of Iowa , 876 N.W.2d 800, 805 (Iowa 2016). Doing so here, I would conclude that the term “quarantine” gives DNR authority to do what medical science would regard as a reasonable quarantine in response to the outbreak of disease, which may include measures that affect the land as well as the
animals.52 The majority’s hypertechnical interpretation of the statute proves too much. Note that the statute says “quarantine of diseased preserve whitetail,” not “ quarantine of whitetail that may have been exposed to the disease.” Thus, under the majority’s view, DNR could only take action with respect to deer that currently have the disease, not to other deer on
the farm that have been exposed to the disease. Tha t is not all. Under the majority’s view, DNR could not require the landowner to disinfect areas of the farm where the diseased deer have been recently. Furthermore, once the diseased deer have died and their carcasses have been removed, DNR would be with out authority altogether. If the majority is right, DNR’s authority would be limited strictly to the sick animals themselves and nothing else. 5 Although I do not think we need to reach the absurd

- results doctrine in light of the ambiguity of section 484C. 12 taken as a whole, the majority’s reading of the statute is indeed absurd. If a hospital has authority to “quarantine” a patient, does that mean it can’t keep people out of the patient’s room when the patient is not there? Any infectious disease quaran tine has to have some connection to a place where an infected individual has been, not just to that individual. 6 Furthermore, DNR has issued a regulation that clearly empowers DNR to do what it did. It provides, “A positive test result for chronic wasting disease will result in a minimum of a five

- year quarantine on the preserve and all remaining animals located within the infected preserve.”

5 Under the majority’s view that Iowa Code section 484C.12 only authorizes DNR to isolate the diseased animals and do nothing else, I question whether DNR could even direct the landowner to kill the animals.

6 I agree with DNR: “A spatial component is theref ore implicit in the definition of quarantine.”53

Iowa Admin. Code r. 571

— 115.10. While Iowa Code section 484C.3 is a general grant of rulemaking authority, 7 rathe r than a specific grant of interpretive authority, it is fair to characterize “quarantine” as “specialized language” and “ a substantive term within the special expertise of the agency.” See Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n , 784 N.W.2d 8, 13

– 14 (Iowa 2010 ). Hence, I would defer to DNR’s interpretation unless it is “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)( l ). Both sides in this appeal ag ree that this deferential standard of review is appropriate here.
I do not think it is “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable” to interpret section 484C.12 as giving DNR authority to require reasonable actions to prevent the spread of the disease based upon where the animals previously were in addition to simply moving the diseased
animals themselves. Additionally, this law operates in a public health area where the State historically has broad authority to act. “ Unquestionably, the
inherent police power of a state allows a state to establish quarantines to control disease in animal s.” Johansson v. Bd. of Animal Health , 601
F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 1985).
In Shinrone Farms, Inc. v. Gosch , we were asked to interpret an Iowa Code section relating to brucellosis control. See 319 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1982). At the time the relevant Code section provided, Whenever the balance of [the county brucellosis eradication] fund becomes less than twenty

- five hundred dollars, the county auditor shall notify the department [of agriculture] in writing of such fact, and n o expense shall be incurred on such account in excess of the cash available in such fund.

7 Iowa Code section 484C.3 provides, “ The department shall adopt rules pursuant to chapter 17A as necessary to administer this chapter.”54
Iowa Code § 164.27 (1975). In 1977, the Sac County brucellosis eradication fund lacked sufficient funds to indemnify Shinrone in full for
a brucellosis control claim

. Id. at 300. Following the farm’s commencement of litigation, the farm and the county entered into a settlement whereby levies for the benefit of the fund in the maximum
amount would continue in future years and the fund would make payments to Shinrone in future years, until Shinrone’s indemnity claim was paid off. Id. The attorney general, however, issued an opinion that

“ the county could not commit the fund, for successive years, to payment
of the claim.” Id. We found the settlement was binding and enforceable notwithstanding Iowa Code section 164.27 and other Code provisions. We first observed, “ Because chapter 164 is a health regulation within the state’s police power, it is to be liberally construed.” Id. at 302. We then
held that section 164.2 7, “if interpreted to foster the public health objectives of chapter 164, permits the settlement entered into in this
case.” Id. at 304. In our view, the section only prohibited current cash payments once the fund balance fell below $2500, not binding

ag reements to make payments in future years. Id. at 304

– 05. Courts must be sensitive to regulatory overreach. Government agencies should not issue a quarantine order that affects a landowner’s livelihood without a legitimate medical and scientific basis fo r doing so. Although the parties strongly disagree as to the need for the measures ordered here, the conflicting scientific evidence was presented to the commission, which upheld DNR’s order. The district court’s order, like today’s opinion, is based sol ely on DNR’s alleged lack of legal authority due to a crabbed reading of a statute. I’m not qualified to evaluate the science, but on the law I disagree with my colleagues.55 For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the district court’s judicial review or der and reinstate the decision of the Natural Resource
Commission. Waterman, J., joins this concurrence in part and dissent in part.