2020 WI 25

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2017AP2510

COMPLETE TITLE: Antoinette Lang and Jim Lang,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Wisconsin State Department of Health & Human 

Services,

 Involuntary-Plaintiff,

 v.

Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc., Ace 

American Insurance Company, Rhythm Method, LLC 

and Administrator of Health Care Financing 

Administration,

 Defendants,

State Farm Fire & Casualty Company,

 Defendant-Respondent,

Fryed Audio, LLC,

 Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

Reported at 384 Wis. 2d 520,920 N.W.2d 329

PDC No:2018 WI App 69 - Published

OPINION FILED: March 5, 2020 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: November 4, 2019 

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: Circuit 

COUNTY: Milwaukee 

JUDGE: William Sosnay 

JUSTICES:

ROGGENSACK, C.J., announced the mandate of the Court, and delivered 

an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 

J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined. 

DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 

J., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

 

ATTORNEYS:
2

For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 

filed by Neal C. Schellinger and Schellinger & Associates, LLC, 

Waukesha. There was an oral argument by Neal C. Schellinger.

For the plaintiffs-appellants, there was a brief filed by 

Anthony J. Skemp and Martin Law Office, S.C., Oak Creek. There was 

an oral argument by Anthony J. Skemp.

An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 

Association for Justice by William C. Gleisner, III, Brookfield.

An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 

Defense Counsel by Brian D. Anderson and Everson, Whitney, Everson 

& Brehm, S.C., Green Bay; Monte Weiss and Weiss Law Office, Mequon; 

and Timothy Johnson and Crivello Carlson, Eau Claire.
2020 WI 25

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2017AP2510

(L.C. No. 2014CV3866

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

Antoinette Lang and Jim Lang, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Wisconsin State Dept. of Health & Human 

Services, 

Involuntary-Plaintiff,

v.

Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc., Ace 

American Insurance Company, Rhythm Method, LLC 

and Administrator of Health Care Financing 

Administration, 

Defendants,

State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 

Defendant-Respondent,

Fryed Audio, LLC, 

Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 

FILED

MAR 5, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Supreme Court

ROGGENSACK, C.J., announced the mandate of the Court, and delivered 

an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 

J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined. 

DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 

J., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed.
No. 2017AP2510 

2

¶1 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. We review a decision 

of the court of appeals1 reversing an order of the circuit court2

that granted summary judgment in favor of Fryed Audio, LLC on the 

ground that it was entitled to recreational immunity pursuant to 

Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2) (2017–18).3 Fryed Audio is a member of 

Rhythm Method, LLC, with whom the Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, 

Inc. contracted to provide music for its 2012 festival at a 

Milwaukee County park. The sole member of Fryed Audio, Steven 

Fry, laid Rhythm Method's electronic and electric cords on the 

floor of the music tent for the Lions Club event. Antoinette Lang 

allegedly tripped on a cord, which led to this lawsuit. 

¶2 Because the Lions Club is a statutory owner pursuant to 

Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1., Fryed Audio moved for summary 

judgment citing § 895.52(2), which provides that agents of owners 

have immunity from claims by those who enter land of a statutory 

owner to engage in recreational activity. The circuit court 

concluded that Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions Club and 

therefore entitled to recreational immunity. The court of appeals 

reversed, reasoning that the Lions Club lacked the right to control 

Fryed Audio.

 

1 Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wis., Inc., 2018 WI App 69, 

384 Wis. 2d 520, 920 N.W.2d 329 (2018).

2 The Honorable William Sosnay of Milwaukee County presided.

3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 

the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated.
No. 2017AP2510 

3

¶3 We conclude that there are no issues of material fact in 

regard to the Lions Club's right to control Fryed Audio in regard 

to laying the cords for Rhythm Method's amplified sound and that 

Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions Club who lawfully acted 

through its subagent, Steven Fry. Because the Lions Club was a 

statutory owner, Fryed Audio, as its agent, is entitled immunity 

pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2). Accordingly, we reverse the 

court of appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The Lions Club is a nonprofit entity. Annually, it has 

organized a fundraising event called the Sweet Applewood Festival. 

The Festival has been a Lions Club event for fourteen years.

¶5 The Festival has operated similarly year-to-year and has 

involved many of the same participants. The event has used the 

same park, located in Milwaukee County. The tents, including the 

music tent, have been in approximately the same location. 

Furthermore, the inside of the music tent has been set up 

similarly. As a co-chair of the 2012 event, Frank Miller, a Lions 

Club member, testified: "We've used the same location for several 

years, so siting of the tents and other equipment is pretty 

straightforward. Everyone just knows where things go."

¶6 The Lions Club has controlled the grounds and determined 

how the Festival has run. Among other things, it controls how and 

where tents are placed; the selection of vendors; and ensures 

necessary services such as security, first responders, and garbage 

disposal are provided.
No. 2017AP2510 

4

¶7 The Lions Club decided where the band was located and it 

set up the stage. Furthermore, the Lions Club was responsible for 

general electrical work. To quote Miller's deposition:

The Lions Club has an electrical service that is run 

into the park with our own breakers and disconnects. We 

run wiring out of that service to both tents to supply 

power for lighting, food, and for the bands to connect 

to.

¶8 In 2012, Miller applied for a special event permit on 

behalf of the Lions Club. The event description stated, "COMMUNITY 

FESTIVAL FEATURING FOOD, BEVERAGES, MUSIC, CARNIVAL RIDES, 

RAFFLES. FESTIVAL IS RUN AS THE MAJOR ANNUAL FUNDRAISER FOR THE 

CUDAHY LIONS CLUB."

¶9 The application noted that the event would include 

"amplified sound," and the instructions on the application 

explained that the Lions Club would need to provide a copy of a 

Noise Variance Permit. Furthermore, the instructions stated: 

Amplified sound must be directed away from residences. 

Amplified sound must comply with Section 47.022, Noise, 

of Chapter 47 of the Milwaukee County Ordinances. It is 

the responsibility of the Event Organizer to provide 

electrical requirements to support the event.

¶10 The Lions Club contracted with Rhythm Method for music. 

The contract stated that "sound and lights" would be provided by 

Rhythm Method. It also stated, "[p]rofessional covered stage and 

power by purchaser." Additionally, the contract provided that 

each member of Rhythm Method was individually obligated to adhere 

to its terms and conditions and that the leader of Rhythm Method 

was an agent of the Lions Club:
No. 2017AP2510 

5

The Performer(s) are engaged severally on the terms and 

conditions of this agreement. The leader represents 

that the Performer(s) already designated have agreed to 

be bound by said terms and conditions. Each performer, 

not yet chosen, shall also be bound by said terms and 

conditions upon acceptance. 

. . . .

The leader shall, as the agent of the Purchaser, enforce 

disciplinary measures for just cause and carry out 

instructions as to selections and manner of performance.

(Emphasis added.)

¶11 Rhythm Method, LLC had five people as members plus Fryed 

Audio, another LLC. Steven Fry was the sole member of Fryed Audio. 

The contract with the Lions Club was signed, "Steven Fry," on 

behalf of Rhythm Method, LLC.

¶12 Mrs. Lang allegedly tripped on a cord run by Steven Fry 

between a sound board and the stage. She and her husband sued 

several parties for negligence. At this point, the only defendant 

remaining is Fryed Audio.

¶13 During a deposition, Steven Fry explained that he had 

not received specific instructions from the Lions Club on how to 

lay electric and electronic cords. Miller said he had not provided 

"any prohibitions, or specific instructions, or directives as to 

how [those who set up the bands' equipment] [a]re supposed to run 

their wires from that sound board in the middle of the tent to the 

stage at that time which they're performing." However, the Lions 

Club had the right to control how the electronic and electric cords 

were placed, as is apparent in the terms of the contract and from 
No. 2017AP2510 

6

the control the Lions Club exercised in Festivals subsequent to 

2012.4 

¶14 In years past, before a Festival began, a Lions Club 

official performed a walkthrough looking for, among other things, 

trip hazards. Miller testified he did not specifically recall 

performing a walkthrough in 2012; however, he testified that it 

had been his practice each year. His deposition provided a 

detailed description of the typical walkthrough:

I'm looking for issues with the pavement. The festival 

is held on a basketball court that needs to be 

resurfaced. I'm looking for any obvious holes or 

problems with the pavement, making sure we have the 

cooking areas where we have grills and fr[y]ers, making

sure that area is fenced off so the public can't wander 

through there. We have electrical service to feed 

lighting and music in the tents that we're responsible 

for and make sure that that wiring, the electrical 

 

4 In subsequent years, the Lions Club asserted more control 

over Rhythm Method, requiring that their electronic and electric 

cords be suspended from the ceiling. Fryed Audio cites this 

control to contend that it was subject to the Lions Club's control 

in 2012. Generally, courts hesitate to rely on subsequent remedial 

measures. Wisconsin Stat. § 904.07 provides:

When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken 

previously, would have made the event less likely to 

occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not 

admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in 

connection with the event. This section does not require 

the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when 

offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, 

control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if 

controverted, or impeachment or proving a violation of 

s. 101.11.

In this particular case, Fryed Audio sought to use evidence 

of subsequent remedial measures as evidence of "control," a 

permissible use under § 904.07. 
No. 2017AP2510 

7

wiring, is safe, and the electrical cabinets are secured 

and the public can't get access to those cabinets.

¶15 Steven Fry explained that a band's sound engineer and 

setting up a band's sound equipment were two different functions: 

[A] sound engineer is the guy who sits and turns 

knobs and everything else. You can be an engineer 

and not touch a piece of gear. . . . I can walk in 

and be an engineer and it's not my stuff. 

Q So you can walk into a gig that provides the 

equipment and you would still be considered an 

engineer?

A Yes sir.

¶16 Notably, Rhythm Method had a prior relationship with the 

Lions Club. It had played at the festival in past years, including 

2011. In the past, when the Lions Club determined that cords 

needed to be covered, it provided the mats to do that. It also 

placed orange cones to alert frequenters to a potential hazard. 

¶17 The circuit court concluded that Fryed Audio was an agent 

of the Lions Club; however, the court of appeals reversed the 

circuit court because it concluded that the absence of reasonably 

precise specifications regarding the placement of cords negated 

the possibility of an agency relationship. Lang v. Lions Club of 

Cudahy Wis., Inc., 2018 WI App 69, ¶4, 384 Wis. 2d 520, 920 

N.W.2d 329 (2018). We granted Fryed Audio's petition for review 

and now reverse.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

¶18 "We review a grant or denial of summary judgment 

independently, applying the same standards employed by the circuit 
No. 2017AP2510 

8

court and court of appeals, while benefitting from their 

discussions." Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 12, 

¶16, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68 (citing Dufour v. Progressive 

Classic Ins. Co., 2016 WI 59, ¶12, 370 Wis. 2d 313, 881 

N.W.2d 678). "Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is 

no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party has 

established his or her right to judgment as a matter of law." 

Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶16 (citing Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2013–

14); Wadzinski v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 75, ¶10, 342 

Wis. 2d 311, 818 N.W.2d 819). Here, the material facts are not in 

dispute. The outcome turns on statutory interpretation and 

application and whether the undisputed facts establish an agency 

relationship.

¶19 "Statutory interpretation and application are questions 

of law that we review independently." Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 

¶17 (citing Highland Manor Assoc. v. Bast, 2003 WI 152, ¶8, 268 

Wis. 2d 1, 672 N.W.2d 709). Notably, the statute at issue provides 

immunity to an "agent of an owner." 

¶20 At times, the existence of an agency relationship is a 

question of fact because the determination turns on "the 

understanding between the alleged principal and agent." Soczka v. 

Rechner, 73 Wis. 2d 157, 163, 242 N.W.2d 910 (1976) (citing Bigley 

v. Brandau, 57 Wis. 2d 198, 203 N.W.2d 735 (1973)). However, 

whether undisputed facts establish an agency relationship 

therefore entitling the agent to recreational immunity under Wis. 

Stat. § 895.52(2) is a question of law that we review 
No. 2017AP2510 

9

independently. Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶17 (citing Highland 

Manor Ass'n, 268 Wis. 2d 1, ¶8).

B. Statutory Interpretation

1. General Principles

¶21 "The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine

what the statute means so that it may be properly applied." 

Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶18 (citing State ex rel. Kalal v. 

Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 

N.W.2d 110). We look first to the language of the statute. 

Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶18 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 

¶45). "If the words chosen for the statute exhibit a 'plain, clear 

statutory meaning,' without ambiguity, the statute is applied 

according to the plain meaning of the statutory terms." Westmas, 

379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶18 (quoting State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶22, 

311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769). In determining the plain meaning 

of a statute, a court should consider the context of the language. 

Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶19 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 

¶46). A statute's purpose, as expressed in its text, can inform 

its plain meaning. Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶19 (citing Kalal, 

271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48). Additionally, "legislative history is 

sometimes consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning 

interpretation." Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51 (citing Seider v. 

O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶¶51–52, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).

2. Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52

¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52(2) states:
No. 2017AP2510 

10

[N]o owner and no officer, employee or agent of an owner 

owes to any person who enters the owner's property to 

engage in a recreational activity:

1. A duty to keep the property safe for 

recreational activities.

2. A duty to inspect the property, except as 

provided under s. 23.115(2).

3. A duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, 

use or activity on the property.

The statute provides a broad definition of both "owner" and 

"recreational activity." An owner can be a "nonprofit 

organization, that owns, leases or occupies property." 

§ 895.52(1)(d)1. Recreational activity means:

any outdoor activity undertaken for the purpose of 

exercise, relaxation or pleasure, including practice or 

instruction in any such activity. "Recreational 

activity" includes hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, 

picnicking, exploring caves, nature study, bicycling, 

horseback riding, bird-watching, motorcycling, 

operating an all-terrain vehicle or utility terrain 

vehicle, operating a vehicle, as defined in s. 340.01 

(74), on a road designated under s. 23.115, recreational 

aviation, ballooning, hang gliding, hiking, tobogganing, 

sledding, sleigh riding, snowmobiling, skiing, skating, 

water sports, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, cutting or 

removing wood, climbing observation towers, animal 

training, harvesting the products of nature, 

participating in an agricultural tourism activity, sport 

shooting and any other outdoor sport, game or 

educational activity. "Recreational activity" does not 

include any organized team sport activity sponsored by 

the owner of the property on which the activity takes 

place.

§ 895.52(1)(g).

¶23 "In 1983, the Wisconsin legislature enacted Wis. Stat. 

§ 895.52, which dramatically expanded liability protection for 

landowners who open their private property for public recreational 
No. 2017AP2510 

11

use." Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶21. The legislation included a 

purpose statement:

The legislature intends by this act to limit the 

liability of property owners toward others who use their 

property for recreational activities under circumstances 

in which the owner does not derive more than a minimal 

pecuniary benefit.

1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1. "As our cases have explained, 'the impetus 

for this law is the continual shrinkage of the public's access to 

recreational land in the ever more populated modern world.'" 

Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶22 (quoting Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 

2016 WI 20, ¶28, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492). In keeping 

with the goal of the legislature to protect property owners, courts 

have interpreted the statute broadly in their favor. Westmas, 379 

Wis. 2d 471, ¶22.

¶24 The parties do not dispute that the Lions Club was an 

owner under the statutory definition, nor do they dispute that the 

festival was a recreational activity in which Mrs. Lang was 

participating when she fell. Their dispute centers on whether 

Fryed Audio was an "agent of an owner," i.e., an agent of the Lions 

Club.

a. Agency

¶25 People and businesses sometimes act through others. As 

a general principle, a person or business acting on behalf of 

another, and subject to control of another, is an agent and the 

person or business they are acting on behalf of, a principal. 

Agency law provides a series of rules that apply to such 

relationships. Among these rules are provisions that govern when 
No. 2017AP2510 

12

a principal is liable for the actions of its agent. Ronald C. 

Wyse, A Framework of Analysis for the Law of Agency, 40 Mont. L. 

Rev. 31, 32 (1979) ("Agency analysis . . . is not concerned with 

whether there is any liability, but to whom the liability runs."). 

"The foundational principle of agency law is that the principal, 

who has chosen to conduct her business through an agent, must bear 

the foreseeable consequences created by that choice." Paula J. 

Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 495, 497 

(2011). This principle arises from the benefit that the principal 

derives from acting through the agent whom the principal controls. 

Id.

¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52 does not define agent. 

Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶26. Furthermore, we have had few 

occasions to address the concept of agency within the confines of 

recreational immunity. When we have, however, we have given the 

word "agent" its plain meaning as a legal concept. Westmas, 379 

Wis. 2d 471, ¶¶30-33. Our conclusion that agent should be given 

its meaning in the law is supported by the legislature's directive: 

In the construction of Wisconsin laws the words and 

phrases which follow shall be construed as indicated 

unless such construction would produce a result 

inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 

legislature:

(1) GENERAL RULE. All words and phrases shall be 

construed according to common and approved usage; but 

technical words and phrases and others that have a 

peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed according 

to such meaning. 

Wis. Stat. § 990.01. 
No. 2017AP2510 

13

¶27 Furthermore, the drafting file of 1983 Wisconsin Act 

418, which created the recreational immunity statute, includes a 

letter that confirms that agent, as that term is employed in Wis. 

Stat. § 895.52, has a particular meaning in the law. The letter 

discusses § 895.52(5), which states that a nonprofit organization 

may be liable, despite the immunity provided by § 895.52(2), for 

the "malicious acts" of its agents. The letter explains:

The intent is that a nonprofit organization is to be 

liable only for its malicious acts. It would be liable 

for the malicious acts of its agents only when they can 

be attributed to it by the regular law of agency. The 

agents of a nonprofit organization are liable only for 

their own malicious acts.

Letter to Ruth Reinl, Office of Senator David Helbach, from John 

R. Zillmer, Attorney, at 3 (Oct. 11, 1983) (Drafting File, 1983 

Wis. Act 418) (on file with the David T. Prosser, Jr. State Law 

Library). The reference to "the regular law of agency" confirms 

that it was expected that agent would be given its meaning in the 

law.

¶28 We have cited the Restatement Second's definition of 

agency with approval: "'[A]gency' [is] 'the fiduciary relation 

which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to 

another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his 

control, and consent by the other so to act.'" Westmas, 379 

Wis. 2d 471, ¶30 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1)

(1958)). 

¶29 We have concluded that an agency relationship "results 

from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that 

the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and 
No. 2017AP2510 

14

consent by the other so to act." Hoeft v. Friedel, 70 

Wis. 2d 1022, 1034, 235 N.W.2d 918 (1975); see also, Wyse, supra, 

at 38 (explaining an "assent, benefit, and control test"). An 

agent may be either an employee or an independent contractor; 

however, when "an independent contractor has no fiduciary 

obligations to and is not subject to control by the principal, no 

agency relationship has formed." Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶31 

(quoting Romero v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 WI App 59, ¶40, 

371 Wis. 2d 478, 885 N.W.2d 591). In the present dispute, the 

parties do not contest that the Lions Club assented to Rhythm 

Method acting on its behalf or the benefit of Rhythm Method's music 

for the Lions Club's festival. Instead, they focus on whether the 

Lions Club had the right to control Fryed Audio, a member of the 

independent contractor, Rhythm Method. 

¶30 The principal's right to control the injury causing 

conduct is crucial to both the existence of an agency relationship

and the scope of the agency. It does not matter whether the 

conduct that caused the injury is complex or simple. What matters 

in forming an agency relationship is that the principal has the 

right to control that conduct. Hoeft, 70 Wis. 2d at 1034. A 

principal is liable for the conduct of an agent when the injury 

causing conduct is "of the same general nature as authorized, or 

incidental to the conduct authorized." Restatement (Second) of 

Agency § 229(1). Stated otherwise, the principal is liable only 

if the principal had the "right to control" the injury causing 

conduct. Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶42. A principal does not 

have to exercise that right; however, without the right to control 
No. 2017AP2510 

15

the injury causing conduct, an agency cannot exist relative to 

that conduct. Id., ¶38. 

¶31 In Westmas, we interpreted the word agent within the 

context of recreational immunity. There, a property owner 

contracted with a tree-trimming service. Id., ¶39. The contract 

provided "[n]o means or methods" controlling how the trees were to 

be trimmed or whether safety precautions were to be employed. Id. 

We emphasized that the property owner had "no background or 

knowledge on how to perform tree-trimming." Id., ¶42. 

Furthermore, the property owner did not know that the tree-trimming 

service was working at the time its conduct caused an injury. Id., 

¶40. We quoted the court of appeals, which stated:

From the decision regarding whether or not to use a rope 

to bring down the branch that killed [the plaintiff], to 

where safety cones would be placed, to how "spotters" 

would be utilized, the record is clear that [the treetrimming service, not the property owner] maintained 

control over the details of its work, particularly the 

actions that led to [the plaintiff's] death.

Id., ¶41. 

¶32 In concluding that an agency relationship did not exist, 

we noted the lack of "reasonably precise specifications" for tasks 

that required knowledge about trimming trees and in regard to 

safety precautions that were needed for tree trimming. Id., ¶¶34, 

42, 43. The tree-trimming service argued that an emphasis on the 

lack of reasonably precise specifications would "deny agency 

status, and therefore immunity, to all independent contractors of 

a landowner who lacks employees with the expertise to control and 

supervise the details of the contractor's work." Id., ¶43. We 
No. 2017AP2510 

16

rejected this argument, noting it was unpersuasive because the 

question of agency is "fact-specific" and "fact-bound." Id., ¶¶36, 

43. To summarize, in Westmas the property owner merely had the 

right to expect a result as opposed to the right to control the 

injury causing conduct, i.e., the means by which tree-trimming was 

accomplished. 2A C.J.S. Agency § 18 (2019). Therefore, although 

there was a contract between the tree trimmer and the property 

owner, no agency relationship existed because the property owner 

did not have the right to control the tree trimmer's conduct that 

caused the injury. 

¶33 In the present case, the court of appeals split because 

of a difference of opinion regarding the proper reading of Westmas. 

The majority quoted Westmas for the assertion that "'absent 

reasonably precise specifications,' there can be 'neither control

nor the right to control the conduct that cause[s] the injury.'" 

Lang, 384 Wis. 2d 520, ¶25 (quoting Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶34). 

The dissent responded:

I believe the agency standard set forth in Westmas

involves an encompassing analysis of the level of 

control the principal exerted or had the right to exert 

over the injury-causing conduct of the proposed agent, 

which includes a determination of whether there was 

"reasonable precise control" of the conduct as evidenced 

by "reasonably precise specifications" provided by the 

principal. The determination of agency is a "factspecific" inquiry. Therefore, in my view, the Westmas

court's statement regarding its focus on "specific 

directions" provided by the property owner was not a 

separate inquiry, but rather a reflection of the fact 

set of that case.

Lang, 384 Wis. 2d 520, ¶41 (Brash, J., dissenting) (internal 

citations omitted). 
No. 2017AP2510 

17

¶34 We agree with Judge Brash's reading of Westmas. Westmas

emphasized that its inquiry was fact-specific, and its conclusion 

rested on several facts: (1) the written agreement did not 

contemplate control of the methods used to trim trees or safety 

precautions required of the tree trimmers who had caused the 

injury; rather, the contract provided a "vision and concept" and 

the property owner did not supplement the writing with more 

specific instructions, Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶42; (2) the 

property owner had "no background or knowledge on how to perform 

tree-trimming," id.; and (3) the property owner was not aware that 

the tree-trimming service was working on the day the injury 

occurred, id., ¶40. Together, these facts demonstrated that the 

property owner hired the tree-trimming service to achieve a result 

but did not have the right to control the injury causing conduct. 

Stated otherwise, the property owner did not have the right to 

control the process used to remove the tree limb that caused the 

injury at issue. 

¶35 The right to control the conduct that caused the injury 

is critical to evaluating whether an agency exists, and if so, the 

scope of the agency. However, whether the injury-causing task is 

simple or requires some degree of specific knowledge by the 

contracting party affects the weight we give to the absence or 

presence of "reasonably precise specifications." For example, in 

Geise v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 331 N.W.2d 585 

(1983), a father told his son to cut the lawn, and the son 

negligently injured a minor child while doing as his father asked. 

We concluded:
No. 2017AP2510 

18

[The son] was acting as [his father's] servant at the 

time of the accident. This finding does not rest on the 

domestic relationship between [father and son], or the 

fact that the activity can be labeled a "domestic chore." 

The finding of a master-servant relationship rests on 

the fact that [the father] directed [his son] to perform 

the task, he had the right to control [his son's] 

performance of the task and, [the 

father] . . . benefited from its performance.

Id. at 416–17. We did not discuss or emphasize the precision, or 

lack of precision, in the father's directions to his son. Doing 

so would have made little sense given the simple nature of the 

task. Instead, our emphasis was the father's right to control his 

son's actions, actions that resulted in injury. 

¶36 Fryed Audio's placement of electronic and electric cords 

was a simple task that Fryed Audio had performed at the Lyons 

Club's festivals in year's past, including the 2011 Festival. 

However, both the written contract and the testimony of Miller 

showed that the Lions Club had a right to control how the cords 

were placed and whether mats were used to cover them.

¶37 The contract specified that Rhythm Methods and its 

individual members, which included Fryed Audio, were "bound by the 

terms and conditions" of the contract, thereby subjecting them to 

the Lions Club's control.

The Performer(s) are engaged severally on the terms and 

conditions of this agreement. The leader represents 

that the Performer(s) already designated have agreed to 

be bound by said terms and conditions. Each performer, 

not yet chosen, shall also be bound by said terms and 

conditions upon acceptance. 

The contract, which bore the signature, "Steven Fry," on behalf of 

Rhythm Method, also specified that the leader of Rhythm Methods 

was "the agent" of the Lions Club: 
No. 2017AP2510 

19

The leader shall, as the agent of the Purchaser, enforce 

disciplinary measures for just cause and carry out 

instructions as to selections and manner of performance.

Here, Fryed Audio was the leader of Rhythm Method for purposes of 

setting up the sound system, and its sole member, Steven Fry, was 

the leader in regard to contracting on behalf of Rhythm Method. 

As an agent of the Lions Club, Fryed Audio was subject to the Lions 

Club's right to control the injury causing conduct. Westmas, 379 

Wis. 2d 471, ¶¶38, 42. 

¶38 The testimony of Miller demonstrated the control that 

the Lions Club had on placing of cords needed for the amplified 

sound of Rhythm Method. He said that, since Mrs. Lang's fall in 

2012 the Lions Club "require[s] sound companies to either cover 

their wiring or run it over head from the soundboards to the 

stages." Miller also testified as follows:

Q What, if anything do you do to protect your patrons 

from tripping on these cords?

A We have matting on the cords and orange cones.

Q From whom do you get the matting?

A We own the matting.

Q When you say we, do you mean the Cudahy Lions Club?

A The Cudahy Lions Club owns the matting.

Q And the Cudahy Lions Club is specifically 

responsible for putting the matting on the exposed 

wires?

A Yes. 

By contract, Fryed Audio, was individually bound to the contract's 

terms. As the leader of Rhythm Method in placing the electronic 

and electric cords, Fryed Audio was the "agent" of the Lions Club, 
No. 2017AP2510 

20

thereby giving the Lions Club the right to control the conduct 

that is alleged to have caused injury. Miller's testimony further 

explained the relationship between Rhythm Method and the Lions 

Club that gave the Lions Club the right to control the injury 

causing conduct, i.e., the placing and covering cords that were 

used to provide amplified sound. Fryed Audio was the agent of the 

Lions Club, because the Lions Club had the right to control Fryed 

Audio in many respects, including the placing of electronic and 

electrical cords for the amplified sound of Rhythm Method. 

b. Subagency

¶39 Sometimes, an agent hires people or businesses to 

perform tasks on behalf of its principal. The hired people or 

businesses are known as subagents. 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 7 (2019) 

("A subagent is a person employed by the agent to assist him or 

her in conducting the principal's affairs."). As the Restatement 

(Third) of Agency illustrates:

P Corporation retains A Corporation to manage its 

investment portfolio. S, a senior vice-president of A 

Corporation, is placed in charge of the management of P 

Corporation's portfolio. S is P Corporation's subagent.

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15 cmt. b, Ill. 2.

¶40 Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) of Agency provides:

(1) A subagent is a person appointed by an agent to 

perform functions that the agent has consented to 

perform on behalf of the agent's principal and for whose 

conduct the appointing agent is responsible to 

principal. The relationships between a subagent and the 

appointing agent and between the subagent and the 

appointing agent's principal are relationships of 

agency. . . .
No. 2017AP2510 

21

(2) An agent may appoint a subagent only if the 

agent has actual or apparent authority to do so.

Id., § 3.15; see also Booker v. United American Ins. Co., 700 

So. 2d 1333, 1335 (Ala. 1997) (quoting 3 C.J.S. Agency § 265 

(1973)) ("When one employs an agent who has either express or 

implied authority to employ a subagent, the subagent will also be 

the agent of the principal.").5

 

5 Though some of the most concise statements about subagency 

are found in the Restatement (Third) of Agency, the concept is 

decades old. See, e.g., Estes v. Crosby, 171 Wis. 73, 79, 175 

N.W. 933 (1920) (discussing subagency in the context of a real 

estate sale). 

Indeed, one article, reprinted in the Reporter's Notes of the 

Restatement (Second) of Agency, explains:

A principal as such is not, without special agreement, 

liable to a subagent for compensation. That the subagent 

is nevertheless his agent now seems clear beyond 

doubt. . . . [F]or many years the courts have been 

practically unanimous, whatever their dicta may say, in 

making the principal responsible for the subagent's 

conduct in all the ways in which the conduct of a 

nonservant agent may make a principal liable. Thus the 

courts now consistently hold that the principal is bound 

by the knowledge of the subagent as if he had been 

directly appointed, with only an occasional dictum to 

the contrary. . . .

[I]f at any time the subagent is in fact under the 

control of the principal, his conduct in obedience to 

the principal's directions would make him a servant for 

whose conduct the principal, now a master, would be 

responsible.

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 5, Reporter's Notes (Appendix 

vol. 3) (reprinting Warren A. Seavey, Subagents and Subservants, 

68 Harv. L. Rev. 658, 665–66 (1955)). 

The substance of the Restatement (Third) of Agency is similar 

to the Restatement (Second) of Agency. Restatement (Third) of 

Agency §3.15, Reporter's Notes at a.
No. 2017AP2510 

22

¶41 A subagent owes duties to both the principal and the 

appointing agent. 2A C.J.S. Agency § 263 (2019) ("[A] subagent 

who knows of the existence of the ultimate principal owes the 

principal the same duties owed by the agent."). In particular, 

"[a] subagent owes a duty of obedience to the principal as well as 

to the appointing agent." Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15

cmt. d. However, "the principal's rights as to the subagent are 

superior to rights of the appointing agent, even in the event of 

conflict or disagreement between principal and appointing agent." 

Id.

¶42 "An agent has actual authority to create a relationship 

of subagency when the agent reasonably believes, based on a 

manifestation from the principal, that the principal consents to 

the appointment of a subagent." Id. cmt. c. "The agent's 

authority to appoint a subagent may be inferred from those powers, 

customs, and usages positively established, but if the agent has 

no authority, express or implied, to make the person so appointed 

the agent of the principal, that person is simply the agent of the 

agent and not the principal." 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 7; see also

McKinnon v. Vollmar, 75 Wis. 82, 89, 43 N.W. 800 (1889) (concluding 

that an agent is assumed to have authority to appoint a subagent 

to perform tasks that are "purely executive or ministerial, and 

the principal is bound by the acts of such subagent.").

¶43 "When an agent is itself a corporation or other legal

person, its officers, employees, partners, or members who are 

designated to work on the principal's account are subagents." 

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15 cmt. b. Stated otherwise, 
No. 2017AP2510 

23

when a principal creates an agency relationship with a legal 

person, such as an LLC, the principal implicitly consents to 

someone other than the agent performing the work, i.e., a person 

that exists only as a matter of law must act through others. An 

LLC may act through its members, at least if it is member managed. 

Wis. Stat. § 183.0301(1)(a) ("Each member is an agent of the 

limited liability company, but not of the other members or any of 

them, for the purpose of its business."). Therefore, a contract 

that creates an agency relationship with an LLC necessarily implies

an agency relationship with at least some of its members, officers, 

employees, or other agents.

¶44 When a subagent is an agent of the principal, a principal 

is liable for the tortious actions of a subagent. To explain:

As between a principal and third parties, it is 

immaterial that an action was taken by a subagent as 

opposed to an agent directly appointed by the principal. 

In this respect, subagency is governed by a principle of 

transparency that looks from the subagent to the 

principal and through the appointing agent. As to third 

parties, an action taken by a subagent carries the legal 

consequences for the principal that would follow were 

the action instead taken by the appointing agent.

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark, 727 F. Supp. 2d 765, 774 (D. Minn. 

2010) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15 cmt. d (2006)). 

Stated otherwise, "[o]nce a third party is validly appointed a 

subagent, the principal is liable for the subagent's actions." 

3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 7.

3. Application

¶45 In the case-at-hand, Steven Fry laid the cables on which 

Mrs. Lang is alleged to have tripped. He is the sole member of 
No. 2017AP2510 

24

Fryed Audio, and Fryed Audio is a member of Rhythm Method, the 

band that the Lions Club contracted with to perform at the 2012 

festival. Fryed Audio, through the actions of Steven Fry, 

connected the sound system that Rhythm Method needed to fulfill 

its contract with the Lions Club. 

¶46 Fryed Audio had no other contract with the Lions Club 

because as a member of Rhythm Method, Fryed Audio was individually 

a party in the contract between the Lions Club and Rhythm Method. 

This is so because the written contract anticipated a contractual 

relationship with each individual member of Rhythm Method. It 

provided: 

The Performer(s) are engaged severally on the terms and 

conditions of this agreement. The leader represents 

that the Performer(s) already designated have agreed to 

be bound by said terms and conditions. Each performer, 

not yet chosen, shall also be bound by said terms and 

conditions upon acceptance. 

(Emphasis added.)

¶47 The terms and conditions of the contract also provided 

that:

The Performer(s) shall do everything necessary to 

prosecute the work in an expeditious and workman-like 

manner pursuant to the standards of the trade and all 

work performed will be in accordance with generally 

accepted trade practices. The Performer(s) shall 

perform said work at the time and place herein specified 

and will be punctual and will provide his own equipment 

for said work unless otherwise specified herein.

. . . .

The leader shall, as the agent of the Purchaser, enforce 

disciplinary measures for just cause and carry out 

instructions as to selections and manner of performance. 
No. 2017AP2510 

25

(Emphasis added.)

¶48 As we have explained above, an agency relationship is 

driven by "the manifestation of consent by one person to another 

that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, 

and consent by the other so to act." Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 

¶30 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1) (1958)); Hoeft, 

70 Wis. 2d at 1034-35. There is no dispute that the Lions Club 

requested Rhythm Method to act on its behalf to provide music for 

its 2012 festival and that Rhythm Method consented so to act. 

Furthermore, the Lions Club had broad contractual control. 

¶49 First, the language of the contract gave the Lions Club 

the right to control each member of Rhythm Method, as they are 

severally bound to its terms and conditions. Second, it gave the 

Lions Club the right to control Rhythm Method and its members for 

everything from showing-up on time, to selecting music and its 

manner of performance, to disciplining members of Rhythm Method 

when its leader was instructed by the Lions Club that discipline 

was requested.

¶50 As the dissent to the court of appeals opinion capably 

explained:

According to the record, the band had a contract with 

the Lions Club to play at the festival; Fryed did not 

have a separate contract with either the Lions Club or 

the band. Given these facts, Fryed's presence at the 

festival was directly related to his role as a member of 

the band, and the tasks he performed were linked to the 

band's contract with the Lions Club.

Lang, 384 Wis. 2d 520, ¶35 (Brash, J., dissenting).
No. 2017AP2510 

26

¶51 Steven Fry laid cords on the floor of the music tent 

that are alleged to be central to Mrs. Lang's injuries. Fryed 

Audio, while severally bound by the Lions Club contract, could not 

actually lay the cords upon which Mrs. Lang focuses. Fryed Audio, 

an LLC, is a legal person that required an actual person to place 

the cords for Rhythm Method's sound system. We conclude that 

Steven Fry was Fryed Audio's agent for that task and therefore, 

the subagent of the Lions Club for that task as well. Restatement 

(Third) of Agency § 3.15 cmt. d; see also Brennan v. Healy, 157 

Wis. 37, 46, 145 N.W.641 (1914) (reasoning that an instruction 

that the agent had authority to do what was necessary "to effect 

the main purpose of the agency, including the employment of a 

subagent" was a proper instruction). 

¶52 Although we can identify no express permission from the 

Lions Club to create a subagency, as we have explained, "Express 

authority to appoint subagents is not always necessary, as such 

authority is usually to be implied when the agency obviously and 

from its very nature is such as to make the employment of subagents 

necessary and proper." Halls v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 193 

Wis. 16, 19, 213 N.W.649 (1927) (quoting 2 Corp. Jur. 688). Fryed 

Audio had authority to create a subagency relationship with Steven 

Fry because the Lions Club created an agency with a legal person 

to perform tasks that required a natural person to perform. Id.

¶53 Furthermore, the Lions Club had legal responsibility, 

stemming from its permit from Milwaukee County, to provide sound 

in accordance with local ordinance. Neither Rhythm Method nor its 

members had authority to provide amplified sound independent of 
No. 2017AP2510 

27

its relationship with the Lions Club. As explained above, Rhythm 

Method's contract with the Lions Club subjected it and its 

individual members to the Lions Club's control. 

¶54 Mrs. Lang's primary assertion is that Fryed Audio 

provided sound engineering, which she characterizes as a 

complicated task. She argues the Lions Club lacked expertise to 

direct such a complicated task, as evidenced by the lack of 

reasonably precise specifications. Her argument is unpersuasive 

for at least three reasons.

¶55 First, the task that is alleged to have caused injury 

was the laying of cords on the floor of the music tent. It was 

not sound engineering, i.e., determining an electronic mix that 

was used to produce the requisite sound. While the Lions Club may 

have lacked sufficient knowledge to direct a sound engineer, it 

had the ability to require safety measures that attended the laying 

of cords on the music tent floor from the sound system to the 

stage. Indeed, the Lions Club owned mats for the purpose of 

covering cords, and it had the right to control their placement 

according to Miller's testimony. Furthermore, the Lions Club had 

the right to control placement of the electronic and electric cords 

by requiring that they be suspended at the ceiling of the tent, 

rather than running on the floor. In 2012, the Lions Club required 

suspension of the cords in the food tent. The Lions Club also 

possessed orange safety cones that it could have placed. These 

facts show the Lions Club's right to control and are far removed 

from the factual underpinnings in Westmas.
No. 2017AP2510 

28

¶56 In Westmas, we focused on the injury causing conduct, 

i.e., the methods chosen for removal of the tree branch and for 

the safety of persons on the ground. Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471,

¶40. We also focused on the agreement between Conference Point 

and Creekside, which described only general concepts. Id., ¶ 39. 

We concluded that "no facts were presented supportive of the 

conclusion that Conference Point either controlled or had the right 

to control the details of Creekside's work." Id., ¶38. 

¶57 Second, and relatedly, the absence of reasonably precise 

specifications cannot weigh significantly against the existence of 

an agency relationship when the task that is alleged to have caused 

the injury was the simple task of running cords from the sound 

equipment to the stage. Geise, 111 Wis. 2d at 416-17. The Lions 

Club believed that it had done a walk-through after the cords were 

placed, as had been its habit. It did not direct anyone associated 

with Rhythm Method to cover the cords, but it had the right to 

control where the cords were placed and whether they would be 

covered. 

¶58 Third, the Lions Club and Rhythm Method had a prior 

relationship, wherein Rhythm Method had provided music for other 

Sweet Applewood Festivals. Rhythm Method had performed the task 

of laying cords from the sound system to the stage in 2011. 

Detailed instructions were not needed in 2012, but the right to 

control where and how the cords were placed did exist, as Miller 

explained.

III. CONCLUSION
No. 2017AP2510 

29

¶59 We conclude that there are no issues of material fact in 

regard to the Lions Club's right to control Fryed Audio in regard 

to laying the cords for Rhythm Method's amplified sound and that 

Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions Club who lawfully acted 

through its subagent, Steven Fry. Because the Lions Club was a 

statutory owner, Fryed Audio, as its agent, is entitled immunity 

pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2).

¶60 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 

reversed.
No. 2017AP2510.rgb

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¶61 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. (concurring). I agree with 

the lead opinion that Fryed Audio, LLC was an agent of Lions Club 

of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc. and therefore entitled to immunity under 

Wisconsin's recreational immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.52 

(2015-16).1 I join the mandate reversing the court of appeals 

decision. I write separately because I disagree with the lead 

opinion's agency analysis, which derives from Westmas v. Creekside 

Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 12, ¶¶26-36, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 

N.W.2d 68. For purposes of recreational immunity, the court 

concluded in Westmas and the lead opinion concludes in this case 

that a property owner relinquishes the right to control the 

activities of third parties it hires to perform services on the 

property unless the property owner: (1) expressly reserves that 

right by detailing "reasonably precise specifications" the 

contractor must follow; and (2) has the expertise the court deems 

necessary to control the work. Because property owners have the 

right to control what happens on their own property even in the 

absence of a contractual reservation of rights or expertise in the 

subject matter of the contract, I cannot join the lead opinion's 

reasoning and I respectfully concur.

I

¶62 The parties agree on a number of undisputed facts:

 Lions Club is an "owner" within the meaning of the 

recreational immunity statute.

 

1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 

the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated.
No. 2017AP2510.rgb

2

 Antoinette Lang was engaged in recreational activity at 

the time she tripped on the electrical cords.

 Lions Club is immune from liability under the recreational 

immunity statute.

 Lions Club procured the tents, stages, and other festival 

activities and decided where and when the bands performed.

 Lions Club was responsible for providing electricity at 

the festival and it set up the power outlets used by the 

band for its equipment. A Lions Club member, Francis 

Miller, testified: "We have electrical service to feed 

lighting and music in the tents that we're responsible for 

and make sure that that wiring, the electrical wiring, is 

safe[.]"

 As it had in the past, Lions Club hired Rhythm Method, LLC 

to provide music for the festival.

 Fryed Audio is a member of Rhythm Method.

 Steven Fry is the sole member of Fryed Audio and he plugged 

the band's electrical cords into the outlet provided by 

Lions Club, running the cord along the ground to the band's 

equipment.

 Miller testified that a Lions Club official does a 

walkthrough before the festival begins to make sure there 

are no trip hazards after the band and vendors have set up 

their equipment.
No. 2017AP2510.rgb

3

 Lang tripped on Rhythm Method's electrical cord laid by 

Fry.2

¶63 Under these undisputed facts, the circuit court granted 

Lions Club's motion for summary judgment, concluding it was 

entitled to recreational immunity as an "owner" under Wis. Stat. 

§ 895.52. Subsequently, the circuit court also granted Fryed 

Audio's motion for summary judgment, applying the recreational 

immunity statute to Fryed Audio as an agent of Lions Club. Lang 

appealed the grant of summary judgment to Fryed Audio, and the 

court of appeals reversed in a 2-1 decision. The majority of the 

court of appeals applied its understanding of the "reasonably 

precise specifications" test from Westmas, under which it 

concluded that Fryed Audio was not an agent of Lions Club because 

"there is no evidence that Fryed 'was following [the owner's] 

specific directions' when it placed the cords[.]" Lang v. Lions 

Club, 2018 WI App 69, ¶4, 384 Wis. 2d 520, 920 N.W.2d 329. 

Interpreting Westmas' "reasonably precise specifications" test

differently, Judge William Brash dissented. Id., ¶¶33-46. Judge 

Brash determined the "reasonably precise specifications" 

requirement was "implicit in the [Lions] Club's extensive 

involvement in the set up of the stage and power sources." Id., 

¶43.

 

2 There is also no dispute that the electrical cord was a 

condition of the land under Carini v. ProHealth Care, Inc., 2015 

WI App 61, ¶¶15-22, 364 Wis. 2d 658, 869 N.W.2d 515 (concluding 

that alleged negligence relating to the temporary placement of an 

electrical cord on the ground for a band performance at a picnic 

was related to maintenance or a condition of the land).
No. 2017AP2510.rgb

4

¶64 Westmas imported the "reasonably precise specifications" 

agency test from our governmental immunity jurisprudence, under 

which it erroneously concluded that the property owner in Westmas

had no right to control the tree-trimmer it hired. Westmas, 379 

Wis. 2d 471, ¶34. As the Westmas dissent explained, a separate 

statute governs governmental immunity, and its principles are 

tailored to "the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 

judicial or quasi-judicial functions" which "have been 

collectively interpreted to include any act that involves the 

exercise of discretion" by the government. Westmas, 379 

Wis. 2d 471, ¶66 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Kelly, JJ., 

dissenting) (quoted source omitted). In determining whether 

governmental immunity extends to the government's agent, the 

"reasonably precise specifications" test identifies the extent to 

which the government exercised control over its agent's actions; 

if the government's contractor followed the government's 

"reasonably precise specifications" then governmental immunity 

extends to the contractor. Id., ¶¶66-67 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley 

and Kelly, JJ., dissenting). Because the "reasonably precise 

specifications" test examines the level of governmental discretion 

exercised by a government contractor, it should not have been used 

to decide whether the tree-trimmer was an agent of the owner in a 

recreational immunity case. Id., ¶¶66-67 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley 

and Kelly, JJ., dissenting). I would overrule Westmas and apply 
No. 2017AP2510.rgb

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the agency analysis set forth in the Westmas dissent. See id., 

¶¶58-77.3

II

¶65 Because Wis. Stat. § 895.52 does not define an "agent" 

entitled to recreational immunity, well-established legal 

principles governing agency control the analysis. Applied to the 

undisputed facts in this case, those principles establish Fryed 

Audio as an agent of Lions Club. This conclusion does not depend 

on whether the allegedly injury-causing task was simple or required 

expertise Lions Club lacked. Nor does it hinge on whether Lions 

Club provided "reasonably precise specifications" to Fryed Audio. 

An agency relationship exists when one person either controls or 

has the right to control the activity of another. Id., ¶60. 

Because Lions Club, the "owner," had the right to control Fryed 

 

3 Justice Rebecca F. Dallet's dissent would "respect Westmas

as binding precedent." Justice Dallet dissent, ¶75 n.2. "While 

adhering to precedent is an important doctrine for lending 

stability to the law, not every decision deserves stare decisis 

effect. After all, the purpose of stare decisis 'is to make us 

say that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be 

held to be true, all in the interest of stability.'" State v. 

Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶86, 380 Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214 

(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Antonin Scalia, 

A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 138-40 

(1997)). Adhering to Westmas perpetuates bad law and will result 

in arbitrary applications of the recreational immunity statute. 

"Reflexively cloaking every judicial opinion with the adornment of 

stare decisis threatens the rule of law, particularly when applied 

to interpretations wholly unsupported by the statute's text." 

Manitowoc Co., Inc. v. Lanning, 2018 WI 6, ¶81 n.5, 379 

Wis. 2d 189, 906 N.W.2d 130 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 

concurring). "The principle of stare decisis does not compel us 

to adhere to erroneous precedents or refuse to correct our own 

mistakes." State v. Outagamie Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 

¶31, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376.
No. 2017AP2510.rgb

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Audio's placement of the electrical cords, Fryed Audio was an agent 

of the owner and entitled to recreational immunity under § 895.52.

¶66 The same general agency principles discussed in the 

Westmas dissent apply equally in this case. See Westmas, 379 

Wis. 2d 471, ¶¶61-65 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Kelly, JJ., 

dissenting). Decades ago, this court adopted the definition for 

agent set forth in the Restatement of Agency. In Meyers v. 

Matthews, we determined an agent is "a person authorized by another 

to act on his account and under his control." 270 Wis. 453, 467, 

71 N.W.2d 368 (1955) (quoting Restatement (First) of Agency § 1 

cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1933)). The court applied this definition 

of agency consistently and frequently in a variety of factual 

contexts, regardless of whether the right to control was actually 

exercised by the owner. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Leary, 213 Wis. 587, 

590, 252 N.W. 151 (1934) (agency established because "[t]he 

plaintiff as the owner of the car had the right to control the 

actions of the driver in driving it on the trip, whether she had 

occasion to exercise it or not.").

¶67 The court reaches the correct conclusion: Fryed Audio 

is an agent of Lions Club, entitling it to recreational immunity 

under Wis. Stat. § 895.52. The record establishes that Lions Club 

had the right to control the placement of electrical cords running 

from the power outlet to the band equipment. Lions Club provided 

the location of the stage as well as the power sources and was in 

charge of electricity at the festival. The Lions Club member in 

charge walked through the grounds performing a safety check to 

identify and rectify potential tripping hazards. Lions Club often 
No. 2017AP2510.rgb

7

covered cords with mats to protect patrons from tripping. Lions 

Club hired the band, and the language of their contract establishes 

Lions Club's right to control where electrical cords were placed. 

Nothing in the contract relinquished this right to control to the 

band and nothing in the record evidences Lions Club otherwise 

surrendered it.

¶68 The lead opinion complicates the right-to-control 

analysis by considering the complexity or simplicity of the 

allegedly injury-causing task, a new element the lead opinion 

introduces in order to distinguish this case from Westmas. Whether 

an owner under the recreational immunity statute has the "right to 

control" another's act, however, has nothing to do with whether 

the act is simple or complicated. The lead opinion further 

distinguishes this case from Westmas by contrasting the experience 

of Lions Club personnel in laying electrical cords with the 

unfamiliarity of the owner in Westmas with tree-trimming. 

Assessing the relative knowledge or expertise of the owner 

regarding the task the owner hired its agent to perform likewise 

has no bearing on whether the owner retained the right to control 

the agent's execution of the work.

¶69 The owner in Westmas did not need expertise in treetrimming in order to control the tree-trimmer it hired to work on 

its property; "[i]f Conference Point had endeavored to tell 

Creekside how to trim trees, it is certainly possible, and maybe 

even likely, that its lack of expertise would cause it to exercise 

that control unwisely, or ineffectually. But lack of competency 

does not negate the right to control, it just makes it imprudent." 
No. 2017AP2510.rgb

8

Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶73 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Kelly, 

JJ., dissenting). Similarly, the lead opinion attempts to 

distinguish this case from Westmas by contrasting the simplicity 

of laying electrical cords with the complexity of trimming trees. 

As explained by the dissent in Westmas, "the danger presented in 

this case has nothing to do with expertise in tree-trimming. It 

is the danger of a heavy object falling on someone walking 

by. . . . This danger, and the means of avoiding it, are known to 

quite literally everyone: Do not be where the branch falls." Id. 

Preventing injury from falling branches is no more complicated 

than preventing injury from electrical cords; regardless, the 

degree of difficulty associated with each task has nothing to say 

about a property owner's right to control their execution.

III

¶70 The new agency analysis the court adopted in Westmas

forced the lead opinion to attempt to distinguish Westmas from 

this case. Instead, the court should abandon Westmas'

misapplication of the governmental immunity test and return to a 

traditional agency analysis in recreational immunity cases. Under 

well-established agency principles, Lions Club had the right to 

control where Fryed Audio placed the electrical cord; therefore, 

Fryed Audio was an agent of Lions Club and entitled to recreational 

immunity.

¶71 The court correctly reverses the court of appeals and 

holds that Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions Club because the 

undisputed facts demonstrate Lions Club had the right to control 

the placement of the electrical cord on which Lang tripped. 
No. 2017AP2510.rgb

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Importing the "reasonably precise specifications" test from 

governmental immunity cases muddied the right-to-control test in 

recreational immunity cases. In attempting to distinguish Westmas

from this case, the lead opinion further complicates the analysis 

by adding yet another ill-fitting consideration of the simplicity 

or complexity of the allegedly injury-causing task. None of this 

is necessary because well-established agency principles already 

answer the question of whether an owner has the right to control 

its agent, thereby entitling the agent to recreational immunity.

¶72 I join the mandate reversing the court of appeals because 

I agree that Fryed Audio was an agent of Lions Club based on Lions 

Club's right to control how Fryed Audio laid the electrical cord. 

The circuit court correctly granted summary judgment to Fryed 

Audio, which is immune from liability to Lang under Wis. Stat. 

§ 895.52. I cannot join the lead opinion's reasoning because it 

relies on the erroneous agency analysis of Westmas, while adding 

additional considerations irrelevant to the determination of 

whether an owner ceded the right to control its agent. The lead 

opinion erodes private property rights by determining that an owner 

loses its right to control the actions of a third party hired to 

perform services on the property unless the owner dictates the 

details of the work's execution and possesses the expertise to do 

so. I respectfully concur.

¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY joins 

this concurrence.
No. 2017AP2510.rfd

1

¶74 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J. (dissenting). Before this 

court is a straightforward question: is Fryed Audio, LLC an 

"agent" of the Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc., so as to be 

entitled to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52? Fryed 

Audio consists of one member, Steven Fry, who is also a member of 

the band Rhythm Method, LLC. Rhythm Method contracted to play at 

a festival hosted by the Lions Club and tasked Fryed Audio with 

setting up its sound equipment. Fryed Audio never entered into a 

separate contract with the Lions Club. Antoinette Lang allegedly 

tripped on an electric cord laid by Fryed Audio, which led to this 

lawsuit.1

¶75 The lead opinion concludes that Fryed Audio is an agent 

of the Lions Club because the Lions Club had the "right to control 

Fryed Audio in regard to laying the cords for Rhythm Method's 

amplified sound and that Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions 

Club who lawfully acted through its subagent, Steven Fry." Lead 

op., ¶3. Neither the lead opinion nor the concurrence provide a 

coherent stopping point for recreational immunity, and both go 

beyond the bounds of even a liberal statutory interpretation. 

Applying the plain statutory language and our controlling 

precedent, Westmas v. Creekside Tree Service, Inc., 2018 WI 12, 

379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68, I conclude that Fryed Audio is not 

 

1 As the lead opinion correctly notes, Lang sued several 

parties and Fryed Audio is the only remaining defendant. Lead op., 

¶12.
No. 2017AP2510.rfd

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entitled to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52.2 

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

¶76 The legislature enacted the recreational immunity 

statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.52, in light of "the continual shrinkage 

of the public's access to recreational land in the ever more 

populated modern world." Hall v. Turtle Lake Lions Club, 146 

Wis. 2d 486, 489, 431 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1988). The stated 

purpose of § 895.52 is to limit the liability of property owners, 

and their officers, employees, and agents, to encourage them to 

open their lands to the public for recreational activities. See

Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶28, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 

N.W.2d 492. Although the legislature has indicated that the 

recreational immunity statute should be construed liberally in 

favor of property owners, see 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1, this does 

not mean that it affords limitless immunity. As this court has 

explained: 

The benefits of granting immunity, i.e., encouraging 

landowners to open their lands to the public, comes from 

immunizing people or municipalities in their capacities 

as landowners . . . . Extending immunity to landowners 

for negligently performing in a capacity unrelated to 

the land . . . will not contribute to a landowner's 

decision to open the land for public use.

Roberts, 367 Wis. 2d 386, ¶36 (quoting Linville v. City of 

Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 719, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994)). 

 

2 The concurrence "would overrule Westmas and apply the agency 

analysis set forth in the Westmas dissent." Concurrence, ¶64. I 

respect Westmas as binding precedent and apply the test enunciated 

by a majority of the court in that case just two years ago. Westmas 

v. Creekside Tree Service, Inc., 2018 WI 12, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 

N.W.2d 68. 
No. 2017AP2510.rfd

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¶77 This case involves a question of statutory 

interpretation regarding a single word in Wis. Stat. § 895.52: 

"agent." We recently interpreted the term "agent" in the 

recreational immunity context in Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471. In 

Westmas, the plaintiff was walking on a public path on property 

owned by Conference Point when she was struck and killed by a tree 

branch trimmed by Creekside Tree Service. Id., ¶13. Conference 

Point had contracted with Creekside for pruning and removal of 

trees overhanging the path. Id., ¶8. Creekside sought immunity 

under the recreational immunity statute as an "agent" of Conference 

Point, the statutory "owner." Id., ¶25. After examining agency 

law in other contexts, most notably the governmental immunity 

statute, the Westmas court concluded: "an agent is one who acts 

on behalf of and is subject to reasonably precise control by the 

principal for the tasks the person performs within the scope of 

the agency. Whether an independent contractor is an agent is a 

fact-specific inquiry." Id., ¶36 (emphasis added). Applying this 

test to the undisputed facts, the Westmas court determined that 

"Creekside was not an agent of Conference Point because Conference 

Point had neither control of, nor the right to control, the details 

of Creekside's work, including the acts that caused injury to [the 

plaintiff]." Id., ¶3.

¶78 The lead opinion here purports to apply Westmas, but its 

analysis misses the mark. In distinguishing Westmas, the lead 

opinion asserts that the placement of cords is a "simple task" for 

which no reasonably precise specifications need be given and that 

"both the written contract and the testimony of [Frank] Miller 
No. 2017AP2510.rfd

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showed that the Lions Club had a right to control how the cords 

were placed and whether mats were used to cover them." Lead op., 

¶36. The concurrence would overturn Westmas, but similarly finds, 

in conclusory fashion, that the "language of [the] contract 

establishes Lions Club's right to control . . . ." Concurrence, 

¶67. 

¶79 Neither the contract nor Miller's testimony, however, 

support the conclusion of the lead opinion or the concurrence. 

The contract does not say that the Lions Club had "the right to" 

control the sound setup. Instead, it says the exact opposite: 

"Sounds and lights by band." Miller's deposition further confirms 

this understanding: "The sound companies who were providing 

services to the bands weren't contracted by us, so we did not get 

involved in how they set up their equipment." This evidence 

demonstrates the contract left the "means and methods" for setting 

up the band's sound to the band. This is no different from Westmas, 

where the landowner left the "means and methods" of tree-trimming 

to the tree trimmer as demonstrated by the lack of "reasonably 

precise" specifications for how the work was to be performed. See

Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶¶36, 40. 

¶80 The lead opinion attempts to circumvent Westmas's 

requirement of reasonably precise specifications by contending 

that laying cords is a "simple task" for which no reasonably 
No. 2017AP2510.rfd

5

precise specifications are necessary.3 See lead op., ¶¶36, 57. 

Such a rule is really no rule at all. Its amorphous nature gives 

no clarity to courts and litigants moving forward and will 

inevitably generate more litigation. By contrast, the rule set 

forth in Westmas is clear: whether the principal provided 

reasonably precise specifications for the task. In this case, the 

rule set forth in Westmas dictates a result contrary to that 

reached by a majority of this court because no specifications were 

given for Fryed Audio's work, much less reasonably precise ones.

¶81 Simply saying that the Lions Club retained the right to 

control everything at the festival, whether it exercised that 

control or not, results in the extension of broad immunity not 

contemplated by the recreational immunity statute. The lead 

opinion and the concurrence, by phrasing their conclusions in this 

expansive way, nullify the "fact-specific" and "fact-bound" 

inquiry required by Westmas. 

¶82 In addition to nullifying Westmas's fact-specific 

inquiry, a majority of this court extends immunity outside of the 

confines of Wis. Stat. § 895.52. The lead opinion creates immunity

not only for an owner and its officers, employees, and agents, as 

provided by the statute, but also for "subagents," a formulation 

 

3 The lead opinion initially claims that "[i]t does not matter 

whether the conduct that caused the injury is complex or simple," 

lead op., ¶30, but quickly reverses course by holding that "whether 

the injury-causing task is simple or requires some degree of 

specific knowledge . . . affects the weight we give to the absence 

or presence of 'reasonably precise specifications,'" lead op., 

¶35. The lead opinion's undoing of Westmas's reasonably precise 

specifications requirement relies entirely on its amorphous 

simple-complex distinction.
No. 2017AP2510.rfd

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not briefed or argued by any party. That is, not an agent of an 

owner, but an agent of an agent of an owner. Under both the lead 

opinion's formulation of "subagency" and the concurrence's 

definition of "right to control," nearly every person associated 

with the festival would be entitled to immunity. The Lions Club 

has the broad "right to control" what goes on at its festival, so 

everyone from the president of the Lions Club to a delivery driver 

supplying cotton candy supplies to a food truck would likely enjoy 

recreational immunity under the new standards offered by a majority 

of this court.4

¶83 Further, the lead opinion's discussion of subagency is 

premised on secondary sources and foreign cases. The precious 

little support for the lead opinion's discussion on Wisconsin law 

comes from century-old cases that do not perform any in-depth 

exploration of the topic. See lead op., ¶40 n.5 (citing Estes v. 

Crosby, 171 Wis. 73, 79, 175 N.W. 933 (1920)); id., ¶42 (citing 

McKinnon v. Vollmar, 75 Wis. 82, 89, 43 N.W. 800 (1889)). But the 

authority that the lead opinion cites makes one thing clear: 

agency and subagency are two separate and distinct legal concepts. 

And to the extent the law recognizes this distinct category of 

subagent, it is not included in the discrete list of "officer, 

employee or agent of an owner" provided in Wis. Stat. 

§ 895.52(2)(b). We must presume that the legislature "'carefully 

and precisely' chooses statutory language to express a desired 

meaning." Indus. to Indus., Inc. v. Hillsman Modular Molding, 

 

4 After all, the Lions Club could control what route the 

delivery driver takes when driving on the property.
No. 2017AP2510.rfd

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Inc., 2002 WI 51, ¶19 n.5, 252 Wis. 2d 544, 644 N.W.2d 236 (quoted 

source omitted). Implementing this principle, we must conclude 

that the legislature knew what it was doing when it included 

"agents" but not "subagents" within its grant of recreational 

immunity in § 895.52(2)(b).

¶84 Essentially, the majority of this court is telling 

members of the public that when they enter any community festival, 

they do so at their own risk. This result is far afield from the 

immunity necessitated to achieve the stated purpose of the 

recreational immunity statute——to encourage property owners to 

open their lands to the public to engage in recreational 

activities. Fryed Audio played no part in opening the land and 

its liability here would not deter the Lions Club from hosting its 

festival again, yet the majority of this court extends to it 

immunity. This conclusion is contrary to the plain language of 

Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b) and a faithful application of our 

precedent to the record in this case. 

¶85 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

¶86 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY 

joins this dissent.
No. 2017AP2510.bh

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¶87 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J. (dissenting). An agency 

relationship is not the same as a contract for services. The 

outcome in this case takes us further from that principle. The 

key question in agency law is whether the principal has the right 

to control the agent's activities——that is, the means and manner 

of the agent's work. Underlying this case, however, is an injury 

arising from a particular type of activity: negligent physical 

conduct. Our law has long distinguished between the physical 

conduct of the two types of agents——independent contractors and 

servants. An independent contractor is one whose physical conduct 

is not subject to the control of another, while a servant's 

physical conduct is.

¶88 Wisconsin's recreational immunity statute includes 

within its grant of immunity "agents" of an owner. Wis. Stat. 

§ 895.52(2) (2017-18).1 This of course doesn't apply to "agents" 

not acting within the scope of their agency. That is, for immunity 

to be granted to an agent, the physical conduct that caused the 

injury must be within the scope of any agency relationship. By 

definition, the physical conduct of independent contractors is not 

within the scope of any independent contractor agency 

relationship. This means the only kind of agency relationship 

that includes within its scope negligent physical conduct that 

causes injury is a master-servant relationship, where the physical 

conduct of the servant is always under the control of and 

attributable to the master. See Restatement (Second) of Agency 

 

1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 

the 2017-18 version.
No. 2017AP2510.bh

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§ 250 (1958) (stating the general rule that a "principal is not 

liable for physical harm caused by the negligent physical conduct 

of a non-servant agent").

¶89 Thus, the question of whether Fryed Audio, LLC was acting 

as an agent of the Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc. when 

carrying out the injury-causing conduct is premised on whether the 

Lions Club and Fryed Audio were in a master-servant relationship. 

Under our law, no such relationship was present here. Fryed Audio 

was therefore not acting within the scope of any agency 

relationship when laying the cords and is not entitled to immunity 

under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2). I respectfully dissent.

I

¶90 We have adopted and applied the definition of agency 

from the Restatement (Second) of Agency: "Agency is the fiduciary 

relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one 

person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and 

subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." 

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1); see, e.g., Strupp v. Farmers 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 14 Wis. 2d 158, 167, 109 N.W.2d 660 (1961). 

"It is well established that the most important factor in 

determining whether a person is an agent is the extent of the 

control retained over the details of the work." Kablitz v. Hoeft, 

25 Wis. 2d 518, 521, 131 N.W.2d 346 (1964).

¶91 Our law has distinguished between two types of agents. 

Agents may be either servants or independent contractors.
No. 2017AP2510.bh

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¶92 All servants are agents, but agents of a particular kind. 

Saunders v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 85 Wis. 2d 70, 77 & n.1, 270 

N.W.2d 176 (1978). "A servant is one employed to perform service 

for another in his affairs and who, with respect to his physical 

conduct in the performance of the service, is subject to the 

other's control or right to control." Heims v. Hanke, 5 

Wis. 2d 465, 468, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958), overruled in part by Butzow 

v. Wausau Mem'l Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d 281, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971). The 

typical example is the employee-employer relationship. Romero v. 

W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 WI App 59, ¶39, 371 Wis. 2d 478, 885 

N.W.2d 591. When employees are acting within the scope of their 

employment, they are acting as agents of the employer. Kerl v. 

Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 2004 WI 86, ¶23, 273 Wis. 2d 106, 682 

N.W.2d 328; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219. Masters have 

the right to control, and are therefore liable for, the physical 

conduct of their servants. This is true whether masters exercise 

that control, whether it is spelled out in a contract, or whether 

reasonably precise specifications have been prescribed. The 

nature of the right to control the physical conduct necessary to 

establish a master-servant relationship has a broader body of law 

to guide us. That will be discussed below.

¶93 Independent contractors, in contrast, may or may not be 

agents. Saunders, 85 Wis. 2d at 77 & n.1; Restatement (Second) of

Agency § 2(3). Sometimes independent contractors are simply hired 

to perform a service. The contract may contain reasonably precise 

specifications or other performance and quality-oriented details. 

It also may not. But none of that is key to whether the independent 
No. 2017AP2510.bh

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contractor is acting as an agent with respect to the independent 

contractor's physical activities.

¶94 While an independent contractor may enter into a 

contractual relationship to do something for another, the 

independent contractor "is not controlled by the other nor subject 

to the other's right to control with respect to his physical 

conduct." Romero, 371 Wis. 2d 478, ¶40 (quoting Restatement 

(Second) of Agency § 2(3)). In other words, one who engages an 

independent contractor, whether an agent or not, does not have the 

right to control the physical conduct of the independent 

contractor. Even a contract that requires certain outcomes or 

appears to retain control over certain areas does not, with respect 

to the physical conduct of the independent contractor, constitute 

the right to control necessary to establish a fiduciary agency 

relationship. Hence, even an independent contractor agent is, 

with respect to his physical conduct, not acting within the scope 

of the agency relationship.

¶95 By way of example, if I pay a lawn company to mow my 

lawn, I could demand control over certain things or require 

specific results——cut once per week and no higher than 1.5 inches, 

and remove sticks ahead of time. Suppose the lawn company missed 

a stick, and it was flung into a passerby, causing injury. Now I 

certainly could have gone out and told the company, "You missed a 

stick over there; go pick it up." In that respect, one might 

describe that as a right to control. But with respect to the 

negligent physical conduct causing the injury, the lawn company is 

not acting as my agent. I do not have the type of relationship 
No. 2017AP2510.bh

5

where the lawn company is acting as a fiduciary on my behalf, and 

with my consent. This is merely an independent contractor hired 

to perform a contract for services. See generally Restatement 

(Second) of Agency § 14N (describing non-agent and agent 

independent contractors). A results-oriented contract, whether 

detailed or not, does not mean the lawn company is acting as my 

agent in carrying out these physical activities.

¶96 An inverse example comes by way of our 1983 decision in 

Giese, where we concluded that a son cutting the lawn at the 

direction of his father was an agent. Giese v. Montgomery Ward, 

Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 416-17, 331 N.W.2d 585 (1983). But there, 

we explained that in order for the father to be liable for the 

physical harm to third persons caused by the tortious conduct of 

his son, "the master-servant relationship must exist." Id. at

415. This is because physical harm to third persons caused by the 

physical conduct of independent contractors is, by definition, not 

attributable to the principal. The kind of agency that would 

ascribe liability to the father must instead be rooted in a masterservant relationship. And we ultimately concluded the son was 

acting as his father's servant——that was the basis for liability. 

Id. at 416.

¶97 Another example helps illustrate the distinction. If I 

hire an attorney from a law firm to represent me in a case, I have 

hired an independent contractor. For purposes of the attorney's 

representation, the attorney acts as my agent——having the 

authority to act on my behalf with my consent, and subject to my 

control. However, I have no control over the attorney's physical 
No. 2017AP2510.bh

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conduct. Therefore, an attorney who negligently injures another 

while driving to represent me in a deposition is not acting on my 

behalf. I am not liable for that conduct. See Restatement 

(Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. e ("The salesman of a real estate 

broker, while driving T, a prospective customer, to view a house, 

negligently injures him. The broker, but not the broker's 

principal, is subject to liability to T."); Restatement (Second) 

of Agency § 250 cmts. a & b ("[T]he principal is not liable for 

the negligent physical conduct of an attorney, a broker, a factor, 

or a rental agent, as such."; "There is no inference that because 

a principal has authorized an act to be done which would be nontortious if done carefully, he is liable for the act of a nonservant if the latter was negligent in his performance.").

¶98 A 1978 decision of this court shows why the difference 

between independent contractors and servants is key to this case. 

In Arsand v. City of Franklin, the surviving spouse and estate 

representative of Mr. Arsand sued the City after an airplane 

accident caused his death. 83 Wis. 2d 40, 42-43, 264 N.W.2d 579 

(1978). They argued the pilot, whose negligence the parties 

stipulated to, was acting as the City's agent. Id. at 43. The 

jury instructions framed the question accordingly, and the jury 

agreed the pilot was an agent. Id. at 43-45. We reversed, 

however. The question, we said, is not whether an agency 

relationship exists. Id. at 49. Because this was an injury 

arising from the physical conduct of the pilot, the determination 

of an agency relationship was insufficient to answer the question. 

Id. Since agency encompasses independent contractor agents, and 
No. 2017AP2510.bh

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principals are not responsible for the physical conduct of 

independent contractors, the jury instruction did not sufficiently 

establish liability. Id. at 49-50. The real question, and what 

the jury should have been asked, is whether the pilot was a servant 

of the City. Id. at 50. Therefore, we reversed and remanded. 

Id. at 57.

¶99 With this distinction in mind, we examine the 

relationship between Lions Club and Fryed Audio.

II

¶100 Because this case involves an injury to a third party 

due to the negligent physical conduct of Fryed Audio, the key 

question is whether Fryed Audio was a servant of the Lions Club. 

If Fryed Audio was an independent contractor of the Lions Club (or 

something less), then by definition its physical conduct was not 

within the scope of any agency relationship, regardless of any 

contractual control or specifications. On the other hand, if Fryed 

Audio was a servant of the Lions Club, it was acting as an agent 

with respect to its physical conduct——the conduct that caused the 

injury.

¶101 While, "[t]he right to control is the dominant test in 

determining whether an individual is a servant," we have affirmed 

that other factors inform the analysis. Pamperin v. Trinity Mem'l 

Hosp., 144 Wis. 2d 188, 199, 423 N.W.2d 848 (1988). These include: 

"the place of work, the time of the employment, the method of 

payment, the nature of the business or occupation, which party 

furnishes the instrumentalities or tools, the intent of the parties 
No. 2017AP2510.bh

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to the contract, and the right of summary discharge of employees." 

Id.

¶102 The Restatement (Second) of Agency, which we have cited 

and approved with regularity in this area, similarly provides this 

framework: 

In determining whether one acting for another is a 

servant or an independent contractor, the following 

matters of fact, among others, are considered: 

(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the 

master may exercise over the details of the work;

(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a 

distinct occupation or business;

(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, 

in the locality, the work is usually done under the 

direction of the employer or by a specialist without 

supervision;

(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;

(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 

instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the 

person doing the work;

(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;

(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the 

job;

(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular 

business of the employer;

(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating 

the relation of master and servant; and

(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2).

¶103 As these factors reflect, though an employment 

relationship is not the only type of master-servant relationship 

that can be created, it is paradigmatic. The Restatement (Second) 
No. 2017AP2510.bh

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of Agency notes that most statutes used the word "employee" in

lieu of "servant," and that in general, the term "is synonymous 

with servant." Id. at cmt. g. The Restatement (Third) of Agency 

goes even further. It eliminates the use of "master" and 

"servant," replacing it with a determination of whether the actor 

is an "employee" acting within the scope of his or her employment. 

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.04 & cmt. a (2006).

¶104 The relationship between Fryed Audio and the Lions Club 

looks nothing like a master-servant relationship. At the outset, 

there is no formal relationship between Fryed Audio and the Lions 

Club at all. There is no contractual relationship between these 

two entities establishing the Lions Club's authority to determine 

how Fryed Audio carried out the means and manner of its sound 

system set-up responsibilities. As one court helpfully explained: 

The most common language used to flesh out the right of 

control, however, typically references the principal's 

power to determine the "means and details" of the agent's 

work. Thus, the right of control "includes not only the 

right to assign tasks, but also the right to dictate the 

means and details of the process by which an agent will 

accomplish the task."

Cardinal Health Sols., Inc. v. Valley Baptist Med. Ctr., 643 

F. Supp. 2d 883, 888 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (quoted source omitted). No 

contractual language of this kind exists here. Nothing else in 

the record suggests the Lions Club had the right to control the 

means and manner of how Fryed Audio set up the sound system. Id.

("A right of control requires more than a general right to order 

the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or receive 

reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not 

necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations. . . . There 
No. 2017AP2510.bh

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must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the 

contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way.").

¶105 None of the other related indicia of a master-servant 

relationship are found here either. The Lions Club does not

purport to have told Fryed Audio when to do its job. Setting up 

band sound systems was not a normal part of the Lions Club 

operations, nor did it furnish equipment or training or expertise 

for such a task. This was a one-time job orchestrated by a 

different entity——Rhythm Method, LLC. Moreover, the Lions Club 

didn't even have an obligation to pay Fryed Audio. Pamperin, 144 

Wis. 2d at 201–02 ("[F]actors which indicate a master-servant 

relationship, e.g., a fixed monthly salary and withholding of taxes 

and social security, are not present in this case."). The Lions 

Club had no contractual right to fire Fryed Audio. There was no 

agreement for fees, no sharing of offices or billing, no shared or 

mandated insurance, and no oversight by the Lions Club in 

determining who Fryed Audio could serve. See id. at 201 (examining 

factors including maintaining separate offices, billing and 

collection responsibility, authority to establish fees, 

responsibility for malpractice insurance, and permission to work 

for others).

¶106 While some limited kinds of control may have been present 

here by virtue of Fryed Audio doing work at an event Lions Club 

was organizing, this comes nowhere close to a master-servant 

relationship. Because that is the only kind of relationship where 

agency would extend to control of Fryed Audio's physical conduct 

by the Lions Club——the kind of conduct that caused the injury——
No. 2017AP2510.bh

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Fryed Audio was not acting as the agent of the Lions Club by laying 

down the cords.

III

¶107 The key question in agency is the right to control. But 

this means more than a contractual agreement for services 

establishing some types of control. It means the right to control 

the means and manner of accomplishing the work performed or at 

issue. Only masters have the requisite right to control the 

physical conduct of their servants. Independent contractors are 

not, with respect to their physical conduct, acting within the 

scope of any agency relationship that might exist. Because Fryed 

Audio was not in a master-servant relationship with the Lions Club, 

its negligent physical conduct cannot be said to be within any 

agency relationship. Therefore, Fryed Audio is not entitled to 

immunity under the recreational immunity statute.
No. 2017AP2510.bh

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