NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ROBERT CARRILLO, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0764

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-142035-001

The Honorable George H. Foster, Jr., Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Robert A. Walsh

Counsel for Appellee

Gallagher & Kennedy, P.A., Phoenix

By Woody Thompson, Hannah H. Porter

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 1-16-2020
STATE v. CARRILLO

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Robert Carrillo appeals from his convictions and sentences for 

seven counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. For the following reasons, 

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 Carrillo’s adult step-daughter, P.Z., discovered images of 

partially clothed and naked children on Carrillo’s Sony laptop. P.Z. told 

her mother, P.C., about the images and showed some of them to her before 

P.C. eventually informed her doctor “she had seen images of young 

children wearing little or no clothing . . . [on] a computer that was under 

the control of Robert Carrillo.” The doctor reported P.C.’s comment to the 

Phoenix Police Department, and Detective Angel then interviewed P.C. and 

P.Z.

¶3 While police officers surveilled Carrillo’s home, Detective 

Angel secured a warrant to search the residence for digital evidence of 

sexual exploitation of minors. Detective Angel’s affidavit for the search 

warrant included information he obtained through the interviews with P.C.

and P.Z. During the subsequent search, the officers seized, among other 

items, a Sony Vaio laptop2 and a PNY thumb drive that contained such 

evidence. A forensic examination of the laptop later revealed 

approximately 1,000 images of children being sexually abused or exploited. 

Carrillo was alone in the home during the search and for almost two hours 

before officers served the warrant.

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the jury’s

verdicts. State v. Stroud, 209 Ariz. 410, 412, ¶ 6 (2005).

2 As Carrillo notes, P.C. mistakenly referred to the Sony laptop as an 

“HP” laptop during her interview with Detective Angel.
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¶4 The State charged Carrillo with ten counts of sexual 

exploitation of a minor, Class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against 

children. Counts 1 through 7 were based on images found in the Sony 

laptop’s temporary internet folder that were created when Carrillo was 

alone in the home prior to the search. Counts 8 through 10 referred to 

images found on the PNY thumb drive that were created or downloaded 

between July 28, 2012, and August 29, 2014.

¶5 Before trial, Carrillo moved to suppress the evidence police 

obtained when they searched Carrillo’s home, arguing Detective Angel’s 

affidavit for the warrant “purposefully misled and kept relevant facts from 

the judge granting the warrant.” Specifically, Carrillo pointed to the 

following facts omitted from the affidavit: (1) P.C. thought P.Z. was “a liar”; 

(2) when P.C. looked for the images on the Sony again after P.Z. initially 

showed them to her, P.C. could not find them; (3) P.C. described the images 

as not exploitive and merely said they were “inappropriate” because they 

depicted females, and she and Carrillo were married; (4) P.C. believed P.Z. 

could have placed the images on the computer as retribution for Carrillo’s 

failure to give P.Z. money; and (5) P.Z. did not specifically refer to the

children in the images as “LS Models,” a term Detective Angel referenced 

in the affidavit. Carrillo also claimed Detective Angel included the 

following misstatements in the affidavit: (1) P.Z. was a “documented victim 

of child sex abuse”; (2) Carrillo was the only user of the Sony laptop; and 

(3) P.C. described the children in the images as unclothed.

¶6 The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion

to suppress at the conclusion of which the court denied the motion. In 

doing so, the court found “there were no ‘false statements or material 

omissions’ contained in the search warrant affidavit that would have 

deterred a neutral magistrate from finding probable cause to believe that 

the computer in question contained the images described.”

¶7 Also, before trial and over Carrillo’s objection, the State 

moved to admit under Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 404(b) evidence 

of uncharged acts of sexual exploitation of minors. The other-act evidence 

consisted of 44,506 relevant electronic files, including additional digital 

images found on thumb drives, and indicia that websites commonly 

associated with child pornography were accessed on Carrillo’s laptops—

the Sony laptop and a Compaq. The superior court granted the motion after 

conducting a two-day evidentiary hearing.

¶8 Trial commenced, and the superior court granted in part 

Carrillo’s motion for judgment of acquittal, finding the evidence was 
STATE v. CARRILLO

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4

insufficient to allow the jury to consider Counts 8 through 10. See Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 20. The jury found Carrillo guilty of the remaining counts, and the 

court imposed consecutive ten-year terms of imprisonment. This timely 

appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under the Arizona Constitution 

Article 6, Section 9, and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-

120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A).

ANALYSIS

¶9 Carrillo raises two general issues. First, he challenges the 

superior court’s denial of the motion to suppress that challenged the search 

warrant. Second, Carrillo argues the court did not comport with Rule 404

when it granted the State’s motion to admit other-act evidence.

¶10 We review the court’s ultimate rulings for an abuse of 

discretion, but we review de novo the court’s legal decisions such as whether 

probable cause supports a search warrant affidavit or whether to admit 

other-acts evidence. State v. Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. 116, 118 (1996); 

State v. Buccini, 167 Ariz. 550, 555 (1991); State v. Carter, 145 Ariz. 101, 110 

(1985); State v. Connor, 215 Ariz. 553, 563, ¶ 32 (App. 2007).

I. The Search Warrant

¶11 Carrillo argues Detective Angel recklessly omitted material 

facts in his search warrant affidavit and thereby misled the magistrate into 

finding probable cause existed to support issuance of the warrant.

¶12 A search warrant may be voided if the defendant shows by a 

preponderance of evidence that (1) the affidavit contained a false statement 

made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly by the affiant; and (2) the false 

statement was necessary to a finding of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware,

438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). If a defendant establishes the first prong of the 

test, the superior court must set aside the false information. Buccini, 167 

Ariz. at 554. The court must then view the affidavit’s remaining content to 

determine whether it establishes probable cause. Id. If not, the search 

warrant is void and anything obtained from the search must be excluded. 

Id.

¶13 Search warrants are presumed valid and the defendant has 

the burden to prove otherwise. State v. Crowley, 202 Ariz. 80, 83, ¶ 7 (App. 

2002). In determining whether to issue a search warrant, a magistrate must 

“make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
STATE v. CARRILLO

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particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The superior

court’s duty is “to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for 

. . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.” Id. at 238-39 (alteration in 

original) (citation omitted).

¶14 The relevant statute states in pertinent part, “[a] person 

commits sexual exploitation of a minor by knowingly . . . receiving . . . [or]

possessing . . . any visual depiction in which a minor is engaged in exploitive 

exhibition or other sexual conduct.” A.R.S. § 13-3553(A)(2) (emphasis 

added). “‘Exploitive exhibition’ means the actual or simulated exhibition 

of the genitals or pubic or rectal areas of any person for the purpose of 

sexual stimulation of the viewer.” A.R.S. § 13-3551(5).

¶15 The evidence at the suppression hearing revealed that during 

her interview with Detective Angel, P.Z. said she located images of 

children, ages “of like two, three years old” to “probably about 10, 11,” in 

“various . . . awkward, very sexual poses . . . in women’s lingerie” in the 

recycle bin of Carrillo’s laptop. Detective Angel also recounted that P.Z. 

said “some of the focus was on the genitalia of the children.” See State v. 

Blackmore, 186 Ariz. 630, 631 (1996) (stating that when reviewing the denial 

of a motion to suppress, we review only the evidence submitted at the 

suppression hearing). This description of the images, which Detective 

Angel substantively included in the affidavit, is by itself sufficient to 

support a determination that evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor

probably existed on Carrillo’s computer. See State v. Harris, 131 Ariz. 488, 

490 (App. 1982) (“[A] non-professional citizen informant is presumed to be 

reliable.”).

¶16 Attacking the sufficiency of P.Z.’s description, Carrillo argues 

Detective Angel improperly omitted various material facts from the 

affidavit. First, Carrillo argues Detective Angel should have included P.C.’s 

description of the images she observed, which was relatively benign as 

compared to P.Z.’s description of the images. The record from the 

suppression hearing, however, confirms that P.C. did not see as many of 

the images as P.Z. Indeed, Detective Angel testified at the hearing that, 

based on his experience, having seen “millions” of sexually exploitive 

images of children during his five-year tenure with the Internet Crimes 

Against Children Task Force, the description P.Z. provided was consistent 

with an image series known as “LS Models,” which involves a progression 

from images of clothed minors to, ultimately, pornographic images 

depicting those children in “exploitive exhibition” poses or even engaged 

in sexual conduct. Detective Angel also testified that when P.Z. showed the 

images to P.C., she “flipp[ed] through them pretty quick, and that [P.C.] 
STATE v. CARRILLO

Decision of the Court

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only saw a certain number of images.” Finally, Detective Angel explained 

he interviewed P.Z. after interviewing P.C. because he did not have 

probable cause based on P.C.’s statements alone. This too confirms P.C. did 

not observe all the images—namely the exploitive ones—viewed and later 

described by P.Z. and that in turn supported the probable cause finding.3

Accordingly, omitting P.C.’s description of the images that were

inconsistent with P.Z.’s description was not a material omission.

¶17 Carrillo also asserts that Detective Angel omitted from the 

affidavit P.C.’s statement that P.Z. was a “good actress” who had lied

before. Carrillo additionally argues Detective Angel improperly omitted 

P.C.’s stated belief that P.Z. may have downloaded the images “to get back” 

at Carrillo for his failure to give her money. But P.C.’s opinion as to P.Z.’s 

veracity related to a previous unspecified and unknown event, an opinion

Detective Angel learned about before he spoke to P.Z., did not amount to a

material factual dispute as to what P.Z. observed on Carrillo’s computer.

Similarly, as the superior court correctly noted, any possible motive P.Z. 

may have had to “put the images” on Carrillo’s computer were not material

to the charged crime, which, as relevant here, also prohibits possessing 

unlawful images. And, in any event, Detective Angel testified he had no 

factual basis to suspect that P.Z. had “put the images on the laptop.” He

left the interview with P.C. to immediately locate and interview P.Z., armed 

with information that P.C. questioned P.Z.’s veracity and that P.Z. had 

previously used the computer in question. Detective Angel testified that 

the interview with P.C. did not yield probable cause for a search warrant, 

but that he had probable cause after he interviewed P.Z. and presumably 

explored why P.Z. would have alerted her mother to the images on the 

laptop.

¶18 Carrillo next argues Detective Angel withheld from the 

affidavit P.C.’s statement that she could not find the images on the 

computer at some point after P.Z. first showed her the pictures. This is not 

a material omission. P.C.’s inability to later “find” the images does not 

3 We therefore reject Carrillo’s argument that probable cause did not 

exist because the images were merely lawful child erotica. Even assuming 

P.C. only saw images depicting child erotica, P.Z. described sexually 

exploitive images of children. Supra, ¶ 15. Further, Carrillo incorrectly 

implies an image must depict “full nudity or physical contact” under A.R.S.

§ 13-3553(A)(2) to qualify as sexual exploitation.
STATE v. CARRILLO

Decision of the Court

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necessarily mean the images were not located on the computer either when 

she first viewed them or when she was later unable to find them.4

¶19 In addition to the purported material omissions from the 

warrant’s affidavit, Carrillo argues Detective Angel recklessly provided 

false material information. Carrillo first points to the affidavit’s references

to the Sony laptop being “solely” used by Carrillo. Although this reference 

incorrectly indicated Carrillo as the only user of the laptop, his guilt was 

not a necessary focus of the investigation at the time the warrant was 

obtained. Rather, police intended to gather evidence that the crime of 

sexual exploitation of a minor had been committed by someone. See United 

States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding probable 

cause for a search warrant existed when “affidavit clearly set forth the 

existence of criminal activity” and “a reasonable inference from the 

affidavit’s facts suggested that incriminating evidence or contraband 

related to the crimes under investigation would likely be located there”). 

Thus, as the superior court concluded, if Carrillo’s “sole” use of the laptop 

was excised from the affidavit and replaced with P.C.’s or P.Z.’s statements

that: (1) Carrillo was the primary user of the computer; (2) P.C. had not used 

the laptop in years; and (3) P.Z. used the computer twice—the one time 

when she discovered the images and the second time when she showed 

them to P.C., “the amendment would not deter a neutral magistrate from 

finding probable cause.” Accordingly, Carrillo’s sole use of the laptop was 

not a material misrepresentation.

¶20 Carrillo challenges Detective Angel’s use of the term 

“pornography” in the affidavit and at the hearing when recounting P.Z.’s 

description of the images she discovered on Carrillo’s laptop. We reject this 

argument. Detective Angel’s use of the term did not materially 

misrepresent P.Z.’s verbatim description of the images, supra ¶ 15, and if it 

did, replacing “pornography” with P.Z.’s description would not require a 

finding that probable cause did not exist.

¶21 Finally, Carrillo argues the “cumulative effect” of the 

omissions and misrepresentations requires concluding probable cause did 

4 For this latter reason, we reject Carrillo’s argument that the warrant 

lacked probable cause because P.C. and P.Z. only observed the digital 

images five months before Detective Angel obtained the search warrant. 

Carrillo’s “staleness” argument also lacks merit as a matter of law. See 

United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 522 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he same time 

limitations that have been applied to more fleeting crimes do not control 

the staleness inquiry for child pornography.”).
STATE v. CARRILLO

Decision of the Court

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not support the search warrant. The cumulative error doctrine, however, 

only applies to claims of prosecutorial misconduct, and Carrillo provides 

no authority to the contrary. See State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 78-79, ¶ 25 

(1998). The superior court did not err by failing to address the cumulative 

effects of the alleged omissions and misrepresentations reflected in the 

affidavit.

¶22 Given the record, we conclude sufficient evidence existed to 

support a finding of probable cause, and the superior court therefore did 

not abuse its discretion by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained from 

the search.

II. Other-Act Evidence

¶23 Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of other acts “to prove the 

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith” but 

allows such evidence “for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident.” Other-act evidence is admissible if: (1) the evidence 

is admitted for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence is relevant; (3) the 

evidence is not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403; and (4) the judge gives 

an appropriate limiting instruction if one is requested. State v. Terrazas, 189 

Ariz. 580, 583 (1997). To be admissible, the State must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the other act occurred, and that the defendant 

committed the act. Id. at 584.

¶24 Carrillo posited that he was not the one to put the images on 

the computer and that he did not know the images were on the computer. 

At the evidentiary hearing, Carrillo’s attorney stated that “[o]ur position is 

other people could have easily committed these other acts, and other people 

had motive to commit these other acts.” His defense suggested that a 

computer virus or another person accessed and downloaded the illicit 

images. To counter Carrillo’s argument, the State sought to introduce 

other-acts evidence consisting of search history on two laptops between 

August 2002 through June 2004, and January 2012 through August 2014, 

and 44,506 files depicting child pornography or child erotica. The court 

permitted the other-acts evidence, which contradicted Carrillo’s argument 

that a virus caused the charged illicit images to download on to the laptop 

when he was using it.

¶25 Carrillo argues the State failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that Carrillo possessed the uncharged sexually 

exploitive material because the superior court should not have afforded
STATE v. CARRILLO

Decision of the Court

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P.C.’s and P.Z.’s “unreliable hearsay” statements evidentiary weight when 

granting the State’s Rule 404(b) motion. Carrillo challenges the witnesses’ 

statements regarding Carrillo as the primary user of the devices on which 

the criminal images were located. However, as Carrillo concedes, a court 

may consider hearsay statements to determine the admissibility of 

evidence. The weight to be afforded such evidence does not impact 

admissibility, State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 416 (1999), and is a matter 

that rests solely with the superior court as the fact finder, not this court. See 

State v. Anderson, 20 Ariz. App. 309, 313 (1973). Thus, we will not reverse 

on this basis.

¶26 Disregarding the purported lack of evidentiary value of P.C.’s 

and P.Z.’s statements regarding Carrillo’s use of the devices, Carrillo argues 

the State nonetheless failed to clearly and convincingly prove Carrillo 

possessed the uncharged sexually exploitive materials. At the evidentiary 

hearing, a Phoenix Police Department digital forensics and computer 

examiner testified to “indicia of use” found on the two laptops containing 

other-acts evidence. The examiner testified that computer files and online 

account access indicating Carrillo used the laptops corresponded with the 

timeframes in which websites associated with child pornography were 

accessed and illicit images were saved to thumb drives. The court relied on 

this testimony in finding Carrillo was the “primary user of the computers” 

when internet searches for the images occurred and the images were 

downloaded. This evidence supports the court’s determination that the 

State clearly and convincingly proved Carrillo possessed the uncharged 

materials; we find no error.

¶27 Carrillo also contends the superior court’s reliance on P.C.’s 

and P.Z.’s statements at the 404(b) hearing violated his confrontation rights. 

Carrillo failed to raise this issue in superior court, and, noting the State did 

not offer P.C.’s and P.Z.’s statements at trial because they asserted their 

rights under the Fifth Amendment, Carrillo provides no authority to 

support his contention that the statements’ admission at the evidentiary 

hearing violated his confrontation rights. We therefore decline to find 

reversible error.

¶28 Carrillo also claims evidence of the other acts presented at 

trial was unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. Evidence creates unfair 

prejudice if it “has an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper 

basis,” but “[n]ot all harmful evidence . . . is unfairly prejudicial.” State v. 

Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 545-46 (1997). Here, Carrillo’s defense that a virus or 

another person caused the illicit images to be accessed and downloaded 

tipped the balance of the probative value to outweigh potential prejudice to 
STATE v. CARRILLO

Decision of the Court

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him at trial. See State v. Valles, 162 Ariz. 1, 6 (1989). Further, the jury did 

not see images from the other-acts evidence, and the court issued a limiting 

instruction to the jury regarding the use of the other-acts evidence.

¶29 There was no error, let alone prejudicial error. The 

uncontroverted trial evidence establishes Carrillo was alone when he 

turned on the Sony laptop, to which the seven sexually exploitive files were 

soon thereafter downloaded before police executed the warrant. The trial 

evidence also established that, although Carrillo’s expert discovered 

viruses on the Sony, he did not discover any virus that automatically 

download sexually exploitive images. The seven images resulting in the 

guilty verdicts were also discovered in the computer’s temporary internet 

folder, thus indicating Carrillo directly navigated to websites containing 

“key phrases and combinations of words often associated with child 

pornography and sexual exploitation of minors” that displayed the 

unlawful images; therefore, Carrillo knowingly received the images. See 

State v. Jensen, 217 Ariz. 345, 351, ¶ 14 (App. 2008).

CONCLUSION

¶30 For the foregoing reasons, Carrillo’s convictions and 

sentences are affirmed.