IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

KAREN L. FISCHER, No. 49471-0-II

Respondent,

v.

BRUCE A. FISCHER, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

MELNICK, J. — Bruce Fischer appeals the trial court’s 2016 order that renewed and 

extended Karen Fischer’s protection order against him. We conclude that the trial court did not 

err in renewing and extending the order, but we remand for the trial court to issue a new order to 

specify all of the current terms of the order, including that the parties’ adult children are excluded 

from the order. We affirm. 

FACTS

Bruce and Karen married in 1992.1 In re Marriage of Fischer, noted at 151 Wn. App. 

1043, 2009 WL 2469282, at *1. They have two children, Christina and Ryan, who are now adults. 

In July 2006, when the parties separated, Karen obtained a temporary domestic violence 

protection order to restrain Bruce from contacting her or their minor children. Fischer, 2009 WL 

2469282, at *1. On August 11, the court reissued the order but modified it to allow Bruce to have 

weekly supervised visitation with the children. 

 

1 Because the parties have the same last name, we use their first names for ease of reading. We 

intend no disrespect.

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

June 20, 2017
49471-0-II

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On August 18, the trial court entered a one-year protection order, restraining Bruce from 

contacting Karen or their children, but allowing weekly supervised visitation. The court also 

ordered Bruce to complete domestic violence treatment. 

In October 2007, after a five-day trial, the trial court dissolved the parties’ marriage and 

entered a final parenting plan. Fischer, 2009 WL 2469282, *1-2. The court found that Bruce had 

a history of domestic violence and ordered him to complete domestic violence treatment. Fischer, 

2009 WL 2469282, at *2-3.

Bruce appealed and we affirmed the trial court’s rulings. Fischer, 2009 WL 2469282, at 

*5.

Since entering the August 18, 2006 protection order, the trial court has renewed it every 

year, and has modified and amended it several times. Renewals pertinent to this appeal are 

addressed below. 

In July 2014, at a hearing on Karen’s petition for renewal, the trial court found that Bruce 

did not complete his domestic violence treatment and granted the renewal. The order stated:

The terms of the Order for Protection entered on 08/18/2006 (and any 

modifications thereof) and renewed and shall expire on 7/30/2015 as to the 

Petitioner and minor child, Ryan Michael Fischer (Christina Fischer has 

turned 18 and is no longer subject to this Order).

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 580. 

In July 2016, Karen again filed a petition to renew the protection order. The petition stated 

that she wanted to renew the order because Bruce “chose not to complete domestic violent 

treatment as required by the court” and made “no progress in trying to obtain the treatment

required.” CP at 593. She also stated that Bruce did not “acknowledge responsibility.” CP at 593. 

She marked the box on the petition indicating, “I want this order to remain effective longer than 
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one year because the respondent is likely to resume acts of domestic violence if the order expires 

in a year.” CP at 593. 

Bruce responded that over a decade had passed without incident since the first temporary 

order was entered “based on no verifiable acts, facts, evidence or history.” CP at 595. He also 

stated that he had no desire to contact Karen. Bruce added that he refused to attend any domestic 

violence treatment “simply to appease a grudge filled ex wife.” CP at 596. He asked the court to 

specify in the order that there were no longer minor children subject to the order. 

On July 29, the trial court granted Karen’s petition for renewal and extended it 20 years. 

The order stated:

The terms of the Order for Protection entered on 8/18/2006 are renewed and shall 

expire on July 29, 2036. If the duration of this order exceeds one year, the court 

finds that an order of less than one year will be insufficient to prevent further acts 

of domestic violence. 

Order on renewal of order for protection attached to Notice of appeal filed Aug. 4, 2016. The 

order required that a copy be forwarded to Pierce County Sheriff’s Office to be entered into its 

computer system used to list outstanding warrants. 

Bruce appeals the July 29, 2016 order. 

ANALYSIS

I. INCORRECT ORDER RENEWED 

Bruce argues that the trial court erred by renewing the protection order because it was not 

the most current order of record and because it erroneously includes the parties’ two adult children. 

Karen understood that the renewed protection order covered only herself, not their adult children. 

We conclude that the trial court did not err, but remand to clarify the order.

When a minor child covered under a protection order turns 18 years old, the order no longer 

applies to him or her. Muma v. Muma, 115 Wn. App. 1, 3 n.1, 60 P.3d 592 (2002). The trial court 
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clearly understood this tenet when it renewed the protection order in 2014. That renewal order 

expressly stated that the adult children were no longer covered.

Any confusion that may arise is because the July 2016 order stated that the trial court was 

renewing the protection order entered on August 18, 2006. It does not mention that the original 

order had been amended and modified numerous times. However, it is clear to us and to Karen 

that the July 2016 order only applies to Karen, not the parties’ adult children.

We conclude that the trial court did not err by renewing the protection order. Nevertheless, 

because a copy of the order is forwarded to law enforcement and because we wish to avoid any 

confusion, we remand to the trial court to clarify the specific terms of the order to expressly exclude 

the parties’ adult children. 

II. “LEGAL JEOPARDY”

Bruce next argues that there has never been a basis for a finding of domestic violence in 

this case and that the trial court erred by continuing to put him in “legal jeopardy.” Br. of Appellant 

at 8. He seems to argue that by ordering him to domestic violence treatment, the trial court violated 

his Fifth Amendment rights, and implicated his rights under the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 

Bruce also asserts that Thurston County Superior Court “has demonstrated a determination 

of creating one and only one result despite the evidence provided to the court over the last decade.” 

Br. of Appellant at 9. He argues that Karen’s confidential address puts him in “legal peril and 

jeopardy” because there is no way to know when he could possibly violate the protection order. 

Br. of Appellant at 10. 

We do not consider these issues. In general, self-represented litigants (SRL’s) are held to 

the same standard and rules of procedure as attorneys. In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 
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626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). We are, therefore, not required to search the record to locate the portions 

relevant to a litigant’s arguments. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 819, 

828 P.2d 549 (1992). Nor are we required to consider issues unsupported by legal authority or 

substantive argument. RAP 10.3(a)(6); In re Marriage of Fahey, 164 Wn. App. 42, 59, 262 P.3d 

128 (2011).

Bruce asserts a number of constitutional violations, but provides no legal authority or 

substantive argument. Nor does he provide citations to relevant portions of the record that support 

his arguments. The citations to the record he does provide are not on point with his assertions, and 

one directs this court to materials outside the record. Accordingly, we do not consider these 

arguments.

III. RENEWAL AND EXTENSION OF THE PROTECTION ORDER

Bruce next argues that the trial court erred by renewing the protection order by ignoring 

substantial changes in circumstances between the parties and by refusing to apply In re Marriage 

of Freeman, 169 Wn.2d 664, 239 P.3d 557 (2010), in its determination. He also argues that the 

trial court misapplied other statutes because turning Karen’s temporary order into a permanent 20-

year order “criminaliz[es]” him. Br. of Appellant at 15. 

Regarding his argument that extending the protection order criminalizes him, Bruce cites 

to no legal authority, other than the RCW on renewing protection orders. Therefore, we do not 

consider it. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Fahey, 164 Wn. App. at 59.

As to the other issues Bruce raises, we conclude that he conflates the law on renewing 

versus terminating protection orders, and that the trial court did not err when it renewed and 

extended the order.
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A. RENEWAL AND EXTENSION WAS PROPER

We review an order renewing or extending a protection order for an abuse of discretion. 

Barber v. Barber, 136 Wn. App. 512, 516, 150 P.3d 124 (2007). A trial court abuses its discretion 

if its decision was exercised on untenable grounds or untenable reasons, or if its decision was 

reached by applying the wrong legal standard. Juarez v. Juarez, 195 Wn. App. 880, 890, 382 P.3d 

13 (2016). 

Provisions in RCW 26.50.060 govern renewals and extensions of protection orders. In a 

petition to renew or extend a domestic violence protection order, the petitioner must state the 

reasons for seeking a renewal. RCW 26.50.060(3). Although the statute does not require a new 

act of violence, the petitioner must show past abuse and present fear. Barber, 136 Wn. App. at 

516. 

When the petitioner meets these requirements, the statute requires the trial court to grant 

the petition for renewal “unless the respondent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

respondent will not resume acts of domestic violence against the petitioner . . . when the order 

expires.” RCW 26.50.060(3). The court may decide to renew the protection order for another 

fixed period of time or enter a permanent protection order. RCW 26.50.060(3). 

In her July 2016 petition, Karen stated that she wanted to renew her protection order 

because Bruce had not completed or tried to obtain court ordered domestic violence treatment and 

because he refused to acknowledge responsibility. She asked the court to extend the order because 

Bruce was “likely to resume acts of domestic violence if the order expires in a year.” CP at 593. 

Karen’s renewal motion referenced Bruce’s ongoing refusal to obtain domestic violence 

treatment and her belief that he would likely resume acts of domestic violence if the order expired 

in a year. This demonstrates past abuse and present fear. 
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Bruce did not appear for the hearing, but did submit a written response. However, Bruce 

did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not resume acts of domestic 

violence against Karen when the one-year protection order expired. Instead, he denied the trial 

court’s findings that he committed acts of domestic violence and blatantly ignored the courtordered requirement of domestic violence treatment.

The record is clear as to the trial court’s findings regarding Bruce’s history of domestic 

violence and that Bruce has not yet completed court-ordered treatment. Therefore, we conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it renewed and extended the protection order.

B. FREEMAN AND RCW 26.50.130 DO NOT APPLY

As to Bruce’s argument that we should consider the language in RCW 26.50.130 regarding 

“substantial changes in circumstances,” Bruce conflates the law concerning protection order 

renewals and permanent protection order terminations. Br. of Appellant at 11. 

RCW 26.50.130 applies to a trial court’s decision to modify or terminate a permanent 

protection order, not to renew or extend a protection order. The statute provides that “[u]pon a 

motion with notice to all parties and after a hearing, the court may modify the terms of an existing 

order for protection or may terminate an existing order for protection.” RCW 26.50.130(1). A 

trial court may not terminate a permanent protection order upon a motion unless the respondent 

provides, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a “substantial change in 

circumstances such that the respondent is not likely to resume acts of domestic violence against 

the petitioner.” RCW 26.50.130(3)(a).

Bruce also argues that Freeman should be applied in this case. But Freeman concerned a 

trial court’s denial of a respondent’s motion to modify or terminate a permanent protection order. 

169 Wn.2d at 667. In that case, the respondent filed a motion to modify or terminate a permanent 
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protection order that had been in place for eight years. Freeman, 169 Wn.2d at 668-69. Freeman 

outlined 11 factors to guide a trial court’s decision to terminate a permanent protection order. 169 

Wn.2d at 673.

Here, RCW 26.50.130 and Freeman do not apply because Bruce never filed a motion to 

terminate the permanent protection order.2 Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

renewing and extending the protection order, and because RCW 26.50.130 and Freeman are 

inapplicable to this case, we conclude that the trial court did not err.

IV. VIOLATION OF U.S. & WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONS

Bruce next argues that the trial court erred by ignoring the U.S. and Washington State 

Constitutions and by failing to honor its oath of office and judicial canons when it renewed the 

protection order. He argues that the order unduly limits his rights and freedoms because it is being 

used as a punitive mechanism to “compel false admissions and participation in” the domestic 

violence treatment program, and because it requires him to be included in a law enforcement 

database. Br. of Appellant at 17. He also argues that the trial court violated his due process rights 

when it did not publish “special proceeding” rules. Br. of Appellant at 19. 

We do not consider the issues. Bruce references Article 1 § 3 of the Washington State 

Constitution, but otherwise provides no citations to legal authority or substantive arguments 

regarding his assertions that the trial court violated the U.S. and Washington Constitutions and that 

the order unduly limits his rights and freedoms. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Fahey, 164 Wn. App. at 59. 

 

2 Even if Bruce did file such a motion and provide notice, our record is insufficient to determine 

the issue because no one filed the necessary and relevant transcripts of the hearing with this court. 

RAP 9.2; Favors v. Matzke, 53 Wn. App. 789, 794, 770 P.2d 686 (1989). 
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Regarding Bruce’s argument that the trial court did not publish special proceeding rules 

thereby violating his due process rights, Bruce cites to Scheib v. Crosby, 160 Wn. App. 345, 249 

P.3d 184 (2011), and S. Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Voris, 190 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1951). But neither 

case is relevant nor supportive of his argument.

Schieb provided that protection orders obtained pursuant to the Domestic Violence

Prevention Act (DVPA) are considered “special proceedings,” therefore, the trial court retained 

inherent authority and discretion to decide the nature and extent of any discovery under the DVPA. 

160 Wn. App. at 352–53. S. Stevedoring Co. provided that administrative agencies are relieved 

from adhering to strict common law rules of evidence, but that their hearings must be conducted 

consistent with due process of law. 190 F.2d at 277. 

Neither case has bearing on Bruce’s assertion. Additionally, Bruce has not provided a 

factual record to support his argument. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not err.

V. VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW

Lastly, Bruce assigns error to the trial court’s alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil 

action for deprivation of rights) and 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy against rights). 

Bruce cites to and quotes the federal law he references, but provides no citation to the 

record and no substantive argument as to how the trial court violated these laws by renewing and

extending Karen’s protection order. As discussed above, we are not required to search the record 

to locate the portions relevant to a litigant’s arguments, and it should decline to do so here. 

Cowiche, 118 Wn.2d at 819. Nor are we required to consider issues unsupported by legal authority 

or substantive argument. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Fahey, 164 Wn. App. at 59. 

Because Bruce fails to provide substantive argument, citations to supporting legal 

authority, and citations to relevant portions of the record, we do not consider the issue.
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We affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Melnick, J.

We concur: 

Johanson, P.J.

Sutton, J.