[Cite as State v. Graham, 2013-Ohio-1534.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

GUERNSEY COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- : 

 : Case No. 2012-CA-18 

JOSEPH GRAHAM : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Cambridge Municipal 

Court, Case No. 12-CRB00750 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: April 15, 2013 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: 

 

WILLIAM H. FERGUSON JOSEPH GRAHAM PRO SE 

Cambridge Law Director 601 Southgate Parkway 

150 Highland Avenue, Ste.2 Cambridge, OH 43725 

Cambridge, OH 43725 

 
[Cite as State v. Graham, 2013-Ohio-1534.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant Joseph M. Graham (“Graham”) appeals from the August 2, 2012 

judgment entry of the Cambridge Municipal Court, Guernsey County, Ohio convicting 

him of assault. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} On June 15, 2012, a complaint was filed against Graham for one count of 

assault, a misdemeanor of the first degree, a violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 

2903.13. He was arrested on that date. 

{¶3} Graham appeared for arraignment in the Cambridge Municipal Court on 

June 19, 2012. He tendered a plea of not guilty and bond was set at $50,000.00. The 

case was then scheduled for trial to the court for July 10, 2012. 

{¶4} On June 21, 2012, Graham filed a notice with the court that he intended to 

proceed pro se. He also requested discovery and a bill of particulars be provided by 

the state. 

{¶5} On June 25, 2012, Graham filed a request for a jury trial. On June 27, 

2012, the state filed a response to Graham’s discovery request. 

{¶6} On June 28, 2012, Graham filed a notice of alibi. 

{¶7} By Judgment Entry filed June 29, 2012, the courts set a hearing for July 2, 

2012 on whether Graham intended to waive his right to retained or appointed counsel 

and proceed pro se. 

{¶8} On July 2, 2012, Graham appeared by video conference and waived his 

right to counsel. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 2012-CA-18 3 

{¶9} By Judgment entry filed July 3, 2012, the trial court addressed Graham’s 

motions and further set the case for a jury trial on July 19, 2012 stating that this date “is 

the very next available date for a jury trial, given the Court’s schedule.” 

{¶10} On July 3, 2012, the state finally filed a bill of particulars. 

{¶11} On July 13, 2012, Graham sent a letter to the court stating that he had not 

received discovery from the state. Interpreting this as a motion to compel discovery, the 

court scheduled a hearing for July 19, 2012. The court also continued the jury trial date 

to August 2, 2012. 

{¶12} On July 18 and 19, 2012, Graham filed motions to dismiss alleging that his 

right to a speedy trial had been violated and that he was not be given access to a law 

library necessary to prepare his defense. 

{¶13} The Court considered all of Graham’s motions at the hearing held on July 

19, 2012. By entry filed July 20, 2012, the trial Court denied Graham’s motion to dismiss 

for speedy trial and ordered the County Jail to confirm that all documents had been 

provided to Graham. In addition, the trial Court amended Graham’s bond to a personal 

recognizance bond. 

{¶14} Attorney Eric J. Allen faxed a notice of appearance as counsel for Graham 

on July 26, 2012. Attorney Allen represented Defendant-Appellant at trial. 

{¶15} The case proceeded to trial by jury in the Cambridge Municipal Court on 

August 2, 2012. Graham was found guilty of the charge of assault and a sentence of six 

months incarceration was imposed. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 2012-CA-18 4 

{¶16} On August 23, 2012, the trial Court filed an entry indicating that Graham 

had filed a motion for a new trial. By entry, the trial court denied Graham’s motion for 

new trial. 

Assignments of Error 

{¶17} Graham raises two assignments of error: 

{¶18} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANTAPPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATION. 

{¶19} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO REQUIRE THE 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO BE PROVIDED WITH A LAW BOOK.” 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶20} This case comes to us on the accelerated calendar. App. R. 11.1, which 

governs accelerated calendar cases, provides, in pertinent part: 

 (E) Determination and judgment on appeal. The appeal will be 

determined as provided by App. R. 11. 1. It shall be in sufficient 

compliance with App. R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason for the 

court's decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary form. The 

decision may be by judgment entry in which case it will not be published in 

any form. 

{¶21} One of the important purposes of the accelerated calendar is to enable an 

appellate court to render a brief and conclusionary decision more quickly than in a case 

on the regular calendar where the briefs, facts and legal issues are more complicated. 

Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn., 11 Ohio App.3d 158, 463 N.E.2d 655 (10th 
Guernsey County, Case No. 2012-CA-18 5 

Dist. 1983). This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned 

rule. 

I. 

{¶22} In his first assignment of error, Graham contends the trial court erred and 

violated his statutory and constitutional rights by denying his speedy trial motion to 

dismiss. 

{¶23} A person charged with a first degree misdemeanor shall be brought to trial 

within ninety days after the person's arrest or the service of summons.” R.C. 

2945.71(B)(2). Each day an accused is held in jail shall be counted as 3 days. R.C. 

2945.71(E). 

{¶24} “Upon motion made at or prior to the commencement of trial, a person 

charged with an offense shall be discharged if he is not brought to trial within the time 

required by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2945.73(B). 

“[S]uch discharge is a bar to any further criminal proceedings against him based on the 

same conduct.” R.C. 2945.73(D). 

{¶25} R.C. 2945.72 provides for a tolling of the time limitations under certain 

circumstances, 

 The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, or, in the 

case of felony, to preliminary hearing and trial, may be extended only by 

the following: 

 (A) Any period during which the accused is unavailable for hearing 

or trial, by reason of other criminal proceedings against him, within or 

outside the state, by reason of his confinement in another state, or by 
Guernsey County, Case No. 2012-CA-18 6 

reason of the pendency of extradition proceedings, provided that the 

prosecution exercises reasonable diligence to secure his availability; 

 (B) Any period during which the accused is mentally incompetent to 

stand trial or during which his mental competence to stand trial is being 

determined, or any period during which the accused is physically 

incapable of standing trial; 

 (C) Any period of delay necessitated by the accused's lack of 

counsel, provided that such delay is not occasioned by any lack of 

diligence in providing counsel to an indigent accused upon his request as 

required by law; 

 (D) Any period of delay occasioned by the neglect or improper act 

of the accused; 

 (E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or 

abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the 

accused; 

 (F) Any period of delay necessitated by a removal or change of 

venue pursuant to law; 

 (G) Any period during which trial is stayed pursuant to an express 

statutory requirement, or pursuant to an order of another court competent 

to issue such order; 

 (H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused's own 

motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than 

upon the accused's own motion; 
Guernsey County, Case No. 2012-CA-18 7 

 (I) Any period during which an appeal filed pursuant to section 

2945.67 of the Revised Code is pending. 

{¶26} A speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. 

Larkin, 5th Dist. No. 2004-CA-103, 2005-Ohio-3122. As an appellate court, we must 

accept as true any facts found by the trial court and supported by competent, credible 

evidence. With regard to the legal issues, however, we apply a de novo standard of 

review and thus freely review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts. Id. 

When reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy-trial claim, we must strictly 

construe the relevant statutes against the state. 

{¶27} Graham was arrested on June 15, 2012 and held in jail. Thus, the state 

had thirty days to bring him to trial if he remained in jail solely on the pending charges. 

Thirty days would be July 15, 2012; however because that date was a Sunday, time is 

extended to July 16, 2012. Crim. R. 45(A). 

{¶28} On June 21, 2012, Graham filed a notice with the trial court that he 

intended to represent himself. A motion to waive counsel and represent oneself tolls the 

running of the statutory speedy trial period under R.C. 2945.72(E). State v. Taylor, 98 

Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-7017, 781 N.E.2d 72, ¶36. 

{¶29} Thus, the eleven days between June 21, 2012 when Graham made his 

request to waive counsel and July 2, 2012 when the trial court accepted his written 

waiver do not count against the state for speedy trial purposes. See, Crim.R. 45(A). 

{¶30} Time commenced to run again on July 2, 2012 and ran at credit for three 

days until Graham was released from jail on July 19, 2012. Thus, the time to bring 

Graham to trial is calculated: 
Guernsey County, Case No. 2012-CA-18 8 

06.15.12 to 06.21.12 6 days 

06.21.12 to 07.02.12 tolled 

07.02.12 to 07.19.12 17 days 

Total: 23 days expired at 3 for 1 

{¶31} At the time the motion to dismiss was made and at the time the trial court 

ruled upon it, the time to bring Graham to trial had not expired. Because Graham was 

released from jail, he was no longer entitled to count each day as three days. R.C. 

2945.71(E). 

{¶32} The trial court continued the trial date from July 19, 2012 reasoning that 

Graham’s motion to compel discovery would toll the time for trial. However, at the 

hearing on July 19, 2012, the trial court discovered that the motion to compel was 

necessitated by the failure of the prosecutor or the jail personnel to serve Graham with 

the state’s discovery response that had been filed. The court ordered, “Sergeant Stoney 

at the County Jail find those documents and make sure that they are given to the 

defendant.” 

{¶33} In State v. McDaniel, the court noted, 

 [I]f the defendant's motion to compel discovery is necessitated by 

prosecutorial misconduct in refusing to comply with a discovery request, 

then any delay caused by the motion is not chargeable to the defense and 

does not toll the statutory speedy trial time. State v. Timson (May 25, 

1989), Franklin App. No. 87AP-1212, unreported; State v. Collins (Sept. 

30, 1988), Butler App. No. 88-02-021, unreported; State v. Cox (April 1, 

1987), Holmes App. No. CA-367, unreported. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 2012-CA-18 9 

2nd Dist. No. 93-CA-38, 1994 WL 371229, at note 5 (July 13, 1994). Accord, State v. 

Knight, 2nd Dist. No. 03-CA-014, 2005 WL 1490364(June 24, 2005), ¶19. 

{¶34} In the case at bar, it would work an injustice to the incarcerated accused 

to charge time against him when the state failed to insure that he timely received the 

discovery. However, as of the date of the trial court’s ruling, the time to bring Graham 

had not expired. 

{¶35} On July 26, 2012, counsel filed a notice of appearance on Graham’s 

behalf. Counsel thereafter represented Graham. Graham did not renew his motion to 

dismiss on or after July 26, 2012. 

{¶36} Graham's failure to file a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds after 

the time had expired and pursuant to R.C. 2945.73(B) prevents him from raising the 

issue on appeal. See State v. Thompson, 97 Ohio App.3d 183, 186-187, 646 N.E.2d 

499(1994). State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-7017, 781 N.E.2d 72(2002), 

¶37. 

{¶37} Graham’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶38} We understand that Graham has filed this appeal pro se. Nevertheless, 

“like members of the bar, pro se litigants are required to comply with rules of practice 

and procedure.” Hardy v. Belmont Correctional Inst., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-116, 2006-

Ohio-3316, ¶ 9. See, also, State v. Hall, 11th Dist. No. 2007-T-0022, 2008-Ohio-2128, 

¶11. We also understand that “an appellate court will ordinarily indulge a pro se litigant 

where there is some semblance of compliance with the appellate rules.” State v. 

Richard, 8th Dist. No. 86154, 2005-Ohio-6494, ¶4 (internal quotation omitted). 
Guernsey County, Case No. 2012-CA-18 10 

{¶39} After reviewing Graham’s brief including his contentions, we have 

interpreted Graham’s second assignment of error in the following manner: the trial court 

erred in not dismissing the case because the Court failed to provide him with a law book 

or sufficient materials to properly prepare for trial. 

{¶40} In the case at bar, counsel represented Graham from July 26, 2012 

through the conclusion of the jury trial. 

{¶41} We must be mindful of the “ * * * elementary proposition of law that an 

appellant, in order to secure reversal of a judgment against him, must not only show 

some error but must also show that that error was prejudicial to him.” See Smith v. 

Flesher, 12 Ohio St. 2d 107, 233 N.E. 2d 137(1967); State v. Stanton, 15 Ohio St.2d 

215, 217, 239 N.E.2d 92, 94(1968); Wachovia Mtg. Corp. v Aleshire, Licking App. No. 

09 CA 4, 2009-Ohio-5097, ¶16. See, also, App.R. 12(D). 

{¶42} Graham has cited no clearly established Supreme Court law that requires 

the state to supply a defendant who voluntarily waives his right to counsel access to a 

law library. Cf. State ex rel. Greene v. Enright, 63 Ohio St.3d 729, 731-732, 590 N.E.2d 

1257(1991); Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S.Ct. 407, 163 L.Ed. 2d 10 

(2005). In addition, Graham has not demonstrated prejudice, and we do not find any 

from a thorough review of the record filed with this appeal. 

{¶43} Graham’s second assignment of error is denied. 
Guernsey County, Case No. 2012-CA-18 11 

{¶44} Accordingly, the judgment of the Cambridge Municipal Court, Guernsey 

County, Ohio is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Delaney, J., and 

Baldwin, J., concur 

 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN 

WSG:clw 0319 
[Cite as State v. Graham, 2013-Ohio-1534.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR GUERNSEY COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

JOSEPH GRAHAM : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2012-CA-18 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of 

the Cambridge Municipal Court, Guernsey County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to appellant. 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN