UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

LAVONYA ROLLINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:16 CV 410

) 

BON-TON DEPARTMENT STORES, d/b/a )

CARSON PIRIE SCOTT, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION and ORDER

I. BACKGROUND 1

Plaintiff Lavonya Rollins was an employee at the Carson Pirie Scott store in

Merrillville, Indiana, in November and December of 2015. During her employment, she

was pregnant. One day, Rollins wore a shirt that made her pregnancy visible. The

Assistant Store Manager, Angel Scott, said to Rollins: “Wow, you’re ready to go. When

are you due.” (Pl. Dep. 69:1-18.) Later that same day, Scott refused to allow Rollins to

take a break. She also changed Rollins’ schedule from mornings to nights. On another

occasion, Scott approached a register where Rollins was working and asked who was

working the other register; when Rollins said she did not know, Scott moved her to the

cosmetics department. Rollins felt uncomfortable after these events occurred.

Rollins claims that on November 14, 2015, she purchased a hat and scarf set from

the store. (Pl. Dep. 83:20-23.) Defendant claims that it observed on security footage that

1

 The following facts are undisputed, and taken in a light most favorable to

plaintiff, unless otherwise described.
another associate named Richelle Bellman rang up the sale for Rollins, giving her

discounts, and that Rollins used a debit card to make the purchase, in violation of

company policies. (DE # 23 at 9.) Defendant also claims that, on November 16, 2015, it

observed Rollins and Bellman scanning items and inputting changes into the register so

that Bellman could take certain items without paying. (Id.)

On November 24, 2015, Rollins was told to go into a room with Scott and another

man, whom defendant identifies in its briefing as Regional Investigations and Support

Coordinator Armando Martinez. (DE # 23 at 9.) Rollins claims she was questioned

about the hat and scarf purchase. Rollins asked Scott to use the washroom several times,

and was denied each time. Rollins claims she was convinced to write an inaccurate

statement about her purchase. Scott informed Rollins that she was being suspended

pending a final determination. At some point, Rollins was granted permission to use the

washroom, and when she stood up, she urinated on herself. (Pl. Dep. 106:22-25; DE # 1

¶ 11.) Rollins was allowed to leave and proceeded to the emergency room, where it was

determined she had gone into labor.

Scott forwarded her notes from the meeting to Human Resources Director Steve

Shimp. Shimp determined that termination of both Bellman and Rollins was

appropriate, in light of company policy violations, and terminated plaintiff on

December 3, 2015. Plaintiff claims that, after the incident, Shimp offered (presumably on

the company’s behalf) to pay Rollins’ hospital bills and some additional money. (Pl.

Dep. 185:10-16.)

2
Rollins filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”), alleging discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and one of its amendments, the Pregnancy

Discrimination Act (“PDA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (DE # 1 ¶ 3.) The EEOC issued a

right to sue letter on June 30, 2016. Rollins filed the present lawsuit on September 26,

2016, alleging that her termination amounted to discrimination on the basis of

pregnancy. (DE # 1.)

Defendant moved for summary judgment on Rollins’ complaint. (DE # 23.)

Rollins responded (DE # 24), defendant replied (DE # 25), and the motion is ripe for

ruling.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires the entry of summary judgment, after

adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986). In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must

identify specific facts establishing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 595

(7th Cir. 2003). In doing so, the non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone,

but must present fresh proof in support of its position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;

Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). A dispute about a material

3
fact is genuine only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If no reasonable jury could find for

the non-moving party, then there is no “genuine” dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

380 (2007). 

The court’s role in deciding a summary judgment motion is not to evaluate the

truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable

fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th

Cir. 1994). In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court

must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all

legitimate inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of that party. NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom

Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995).

III. DISCUSSION

In this case, plaintiff claims that defendant discriminated against her on the basis

of her pregnancy in violation of Title VII and the PDA. The PDA “made clear that, for

all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face,

discrimination because of her sex.” Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,

462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983). Thus, plaintiff’s claim for pregnancy discrimination

is a claim for gender discrimination, warranting the same analysis as any gender

discrimination claim. Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 547 (7th Cir. 2011).

Both parties rely on the well-known burden-shifting method of proof outlined in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), so the court does the same in this

4
opinion. This method involves a three-phase analysis, beginning with the prima facie

case. During this phase, the burden is on plaintiff to demonstrate that: (1) she was

pregnant and her employer knew she was pregnant; (2) she was performing her duties

satisfactorily; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated

non-pregnant employees were treated more favorably. Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of

Chi., 637 F.3d 729, 736 (7th Cir. 2011). Next, defendant must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for the employment decision. Finally, plaintiff must

demonstrate that the articulated rationale was actually pretextual. Id. 

The parties appear largely in agreement that Rollins can establish a prima facie

case; indeed, defendant does not even address the prima facie case in its motion. (DE #

23 at 12.) Nor do the parties quibble over the legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale

articulated by defendant for the firing (specifically, Rollins’ failure to follow company

policies with regard to employee purchases). As with most discrimination cases, this

case comes down to whether there is evidence that raises a question of fact regarding

whether the articulated rationale was pretextual.

In this case, Rollins cannot demonstrate pretext because she points to no

evidence that her pregnancy actually played a role in the employment action. Rollins’

only evidence related to her pregnancy, at all, is Scott’s comment that she was “ready to

go” and the subsequent question regarding her due date. She further states that her

shift was changed, she was moved to a different department, and she felt

“uncomfortable.” But Scott’s comment reveals no bias, and an employer’s mere

5
reference to a pregnancy does not necessarily create a cause of action for discrimination.

See Venturelli v. ARC Cmty. Servs. Inc., 350 F.3d 592, 599 (7th Cir. 2003) (offer of

employment to pregnant woman beginning some time after she delivered her baby did

not prove that employer would have hired her immediately, but for her pregnancy).

Further, the subsequent change in assignments and “uncomfortable” feelings

experienced by Rollins are relatively subtle job-related changes which, while perhaps

not desirable to Rollins, are not so significant that they raise a question of fact regarding

pretext or the ultimate question of discrimination. In short, Rollins does not point to

evidence from which a reasonable juror might conclude that Scott (or anyone at the

company) possessed discriminatory animus against plaintiff on the basis of her

pregnancy. Cf. Stanton v. Tower Ambulance Serv., Inc., No. 93 C 7495, 1994 WL 424127, at

*2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 1994) (supervisor’s comment that he did not need to accommodate

requests for alternative assignment because plaintiff had become pregnant “on her

own” precluded summary judgment for employer).

Rollins emphasizes that she did not know she was breaking the rules when she

purchased the hat and scarf and was not adequately trained. However, the Seventh

Circuit has articulated “countless times” that “the question in a discrimination case is

not whether the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory ground for the action of which the

plaintiff is complaining is correct but whether it is the true ground of the employer’s

action rather than being a pretext for a decision based on some other, undisclosed

ground. If it is the true ground and not a pretext, the case is over.” Forrester v.

6
Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 417 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see also Ptasznik

v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 696 (7th Cir. 2006) (the pretext inquiry must focus on

whether the employer’s stated reason is honest, not whether it is well-reasoned, wise or

accurate). As the Seventh Circuit aptly stated in Millbrook v. IBP, Inc.:

[A] court’s role is to prevent unlawful hiring practices, not to

act as a super personnel department that second-guesses

employers’ business judgments. As we have stated, no matter

how medieval a firm’s practices, no matter how high-handed

its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm’s

managers, [anti-discrimination law] does not interfere.

280 F.3d 1169, 1181 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations

omitted); see also Blise v. Antaramian, 409 F.3d 861, 867-68 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Blise may be

right—she may be more qualified than Davis, and Davis may not be qualified at

all—but so long as Kenosha genuinely believed differently (and Blise offers us no

evidence that its agents did not), it is entitled to act on that belief.”). 

Thus, even if Rollins truly did not know that she was breaking store rules, it does

not follow that defendant’s stated rationale for firing Rollins — that she broke the store

rules — was a lie to cover up for the fact that defendant harbored animus against her

because she was pregnant. Rollins has provided little more than her own suspicions

that the reason stated for her termination was not genuinely believed by defendant’s

employees, and her own suspicions are not good enough. Uhl v. Zalk Josephs Fabricators,

Inc., 121 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Facts, not an employee’s perceptions and

feelings, are required to support a discrimination claim.”). In sum, Rollins cannot

7
demonstrate an issue of fact regarding pretext, and as such she cannot rely on the

McDonnell Douglas method to save her claim from summary judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment (DE # 23)

is GRANTED. Because no claims remain against any parties in this case, the Clerk is

now ordered to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT in this case, stating that judgment is

entered in favor of defendant The Bon-Ton Department Stores, Inc. d/b/a Carson Pirie

Scott; and against plaintiff Lavonya Rollins, who shall take nothing by way of her

complaint.

SO ORDERED.

Date: September 4, 2018

 s/ James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8