Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3099 | June 21, 2019 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark S. Lenyo

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lauren A. Jacobsen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jackie Pratt,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 21, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-3099

Appeal from the St. Joseph Circuit 

Court

The Honorable John E. Broden, 

Judge

The Honorable Andre B. 

Gammage, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

71C01-1302-FC-9

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3099 | June 21, 2019 Page 2 of 9

Statement of the Case

[1] Jackie Pratt appeals the trial court’s restitution order and his sentence following 

his conviction for nonsupport of a dependent child, as a Class C felony. Pratt 

presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

ordered him to pay $66,059.46 in restitution for his child 

support arrearage.

2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offense and his character.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In February 2013, the State charged Pratt with nonsupport of a dependent 

child, as a Class C felony. The charging information alleged that, between 

August 29, 2000, and January 31, 2013, Pratt had failed to provide child 

support for two of his dependent children in an amount that was at least 

$15,000. The probable cause affidavit stated that Pratt’s arrearage for those 

dates was $39,188.66. In January 2018, the State amended the information and 

alleged that the dates of Pratt’s nonpayment of child support were August 29, 

2000, through August 3, 2010, in an amount that was at least $15,000.

[4] On July 18, Pratt pleaded guilty as charged without an agreement. The trial 

court accepted Pratt’s plea. At sentencing, Pratt disputed the amount of his 

child support arrearage, stating that he thought he owed approximately 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3099 | June 21, 2019 Page 3 of 9

$20,000. The State argued, but did not submit evidence, that Pratt owed 

$66,059.46 in child support. In its order dated December 12, the trial court 

ordered Pratt to pay restitution in the amount of $66,059.46, and the court 

sentenced Pratt to six years, with three years suspended to probation. On 

December 14, Pratt filed with the trial court an objection to the restitution 

amount, and he stated that the correct amount should be approximately 

$26,500. The trial court denied that objection. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Restitution Order

[5] Pratt contends that the State presented no evidence to support the amount of 

restitution ordered by the trial court. “The purpose of a restitution order is to 

impress upon the criminal defendant the magnitude of the loss he has caused 

and to defray costs to the victims caused by the offense.” Bennett v. State, 862 

N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). It is within the trial court’s discretion 

to order restitution, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Id.

An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the trial court 

misinterprets or misapplies the law. Id.

[6] Indiana Code Section 35-50-5-3(a) provides that, in addition to any sentence 

imposed for a felony or misdemeanor, a court may order the payment of 

restitution to the victim of the crime. A trial court’s restitution order must be 

supported by sufficient evidence of actual loss sustained by the victim of a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3099 | June 21, 2019 Page 4 of 9

crime. Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. 

“‘The amount of actual loss is a factual matter that can be determined only 

upon the presentation of evidence.’” Id. (quoting Bennett, 862 N.E.2d at 1286).

[7] The State concedes that it did not present any evidence of Pratt’s child support 

arrearage at the sentencing hearing. But the State maintains that the trial court 

had authority to take judicial notice of the amount Pratt owes. In particular, 

the State asserts that it “did present and discussion [sic] a substantial amount of 

information from the civil case, and provided the court with [Pratt’s] ISETS[1]

number. This was enough for the court to take judicial notice of the support 

orders and arrearage amount.” Appellee’s Br. at 9.

[8] We cannot agree that “this was enough.” While the trial court’s order refers to 

the ISETS database, the court did not state that it took judicial notice of any 

court records or identify those records. Evidence is required for appellate 

review of a restitution order. We do not have access to the civil case or to 

ISETS. Without any evidence in the record on appeal to support the restitution 

order, our review is significantly hindered.

[9] Our Supreme Court recently addressed whether a trial court that takes judicial 

notice of facts not in evidence should enter supporting documentation in the 

record to aid appellate review. The Court stated as follows:

 

1

 ISETS stands for the Indiana Support Enforcement Tracking System.
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Indiana Rule of Evidence 201 permits courts to take judicial 

notice of certain material, including facts “not subject to 

reasonable dispute” and facts “readily determined from sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” For years, 

Rule 201 did not permit a trial court to take judicial notice of 

court records, even if they were “its own records in another case 

previously before the court on a related subject with related 

parties.” Gray v. State, 871 N.E.2d 408, 413 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) 

(emphasis omitted), trans. denied. Effective January 1, 2010, 

amended Rule 201(b)(5) now permits courts to take judicial 

notice of “records of a court of this state,” precisely as the trial 

court did here. But that Rule is silent on whether a court must 

enter that document into the record.

On one hand, it is vital for the parties to know the exact 

evidentiary basis on which the judgment turned—and for 

appellate courts to know likewise to facilitate review. On the 

other hand, the ultimate purpose of judicial notice is efficient 

consideration of uncontroversial facts, see Baran v. State, 639 

N.E.2d 642, 647 (Ind. 1994)—efficiency that would be 

undermined to the point of uselessness for judicial records if 

simply “tak[ing] judicial notice of the court’s own records . . . [in] 

the 0201-CM-195 case” obligated the court to physically 

incorporate that entire file into the record in the present case. 

Judicial notice “encompasses facts ascertainable from sources 

that cannot reasonably be questioned, and presumably court 

records are such sources,” in the absence of evidence tending to 

rebut that presumption. Brown v. Jones, 804 N.E.2d 1197, 1202 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (addressing judicial notice of the court’s file 

in the same proceeding, before enactment of Evidence Rule 

201(b)(5), for similar notice of other court records), trans. denied.

But as the Court of Appeals has emphasized, failing to 

incorporate noticed court records into the record on appeal 

hinders appellate review. In Graham v. State, 947 N.E.2d 962 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011), a post-conviction court took judicial notice 

of the record in the underlying criminal trial but did not make it 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3099 | June 21, 2019 Page 6 of 9

part of the post-conviction record on appeal. The Court of 

Appeals noted,

[I]f a PCR court purports to take judicial notice of 

other court records and relies upon those records in 

ruling upon a PCR petition, but those records are not 

made part of the PCR record, it places a substantial 

burden upon this court on appeal to either track 

down those records and have them transmitted to this 

court, or to attempt to decide the case without benefit 

of those records.

Graham, 947 N.E.2d at 965. . . .

Horton v. State, 51 N.E.2d 1154, 1160-61 (Ind. 2016).

[10] Here, again, we do not have access to either the child support orders in the civil 

case, which are not available on Odyssey, or to Pratt’s case information through

the ISETS database. Further, the State did not ask the trial court to take 

judicial notice of the amount of Pratt’s arrearage, and nothing in the record or 

in the court’s order indicates that the trial court in fact took judicial notice of 

this verifiable information.

[11] Given the record on appeal, we are obliged to say that the evidence is 

insufficient to support the restitution order. Accordingly, we reverse and 

remand to the trial court for further proceedings on this issue. The parties may 

submit evidence to the trial court to support their arguments regarding the 

amount of Pratt’s arrearage, or the trial court may take judicial notice of the 

amount of the arrearage, providing documentation to aid our appellate review 

should Pratt seek review after remand.
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Issue Two: Sentence

[12] Pratt also contends that his six-year sentence, with three years suspended, is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence 

authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the 

Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and the character of the offender.” This Court has recently held that “[t]he 

advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an 

appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 

844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). And the Indiana Supreme Court has explained that:

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to 

leaven the outliers . . . but not achieve a perceived “correct” 

result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 

2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the 

sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. [Anglemyer, 

868 N.E.2d at 494].

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).

[13] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate 

sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should 

receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we 

regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of 

the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to 

others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. 

The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3099 | June 21, 2019 Page 8 of 9

whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 

268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless 

overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the 

offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the 

defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples 

of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[14] Where, as here, the offense was committed before July 1, 2014, the sentencing

range for a Class C felony is two years to eight years, with an advisory sentence 

of four years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6. Pratt asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in 

light of the nature of the offense because the reason “his child support arrearage 

got out of control” was because he “had not worked for about ten (10) years 

due to health problems.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. But at the time of sentencing, 

despite his persistent health issues, Pratt was employed. That he could now 

work despite his health issues undermines his contention that he should be 

excused for having not paid child support for ten years because of his health 

issues. And, even if Pratt’s assertions are correct, his proper remedy was to 

timely request a modification of his child support obligation, not to simply 

disregard that obligation. We cannot say that Pratt’s three-year executed 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense.

[15] Pratt contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character because 

his criminal history is minor and remote in time and because he pleaded guilty. 

However, we agree with the State that Pratt’s criminal history, while relatively 

insignificant, still reflects his poor character. And, in any event, Pratt has not 
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presented evidence of “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good 

character” to justify a revised sentence. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. 

Moreover, Pratt’s guilty plea came more than five years after the initial 

charging information, and we cannot say as a matter of law that such a plea 

requires mitigating weight. Thus, we cannot say that Pratt’s sentence is 

inappropriate in light of his character.

[16] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.