Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Joiner v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2017 IL App (1st) 161866WC

Appellate Court 

Caption

ALFRED JOINER, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS’

COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Ceco Concrete

Construction, Inc., Brill & Fishel, P.C., Sostrin & Sostrin P.C., and 

Leonard Law Group, Appellees).

District & No. First District, Workers’ Compensation Commission Division

Docket No. 1-16-1866WC

Filed September 29, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 16-L-50142; the 

Hon. Alexander P. White, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Mark Whiteside, of Chicago, for appellant.

Francine R. Fishel, of Brill & Fishel, P.C., of Chicago, for appellees.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the 

court, with opinion.

Justices Hoffman, Hudson, Harris, and Moore concurred in the 

judgment and opinion. 
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 The claimant, Alfred Joiner, filed an application for adjustment of claim under the 

Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2008)), seeking benefits for 

various injuries he allegedly sustained while working for respondent Ceco Concrete 

Construction, Inc. (employer). The claimant also filed a common law claim related to the same 

accident against the employer and a third-party defendant in the circuit court of Cook County 

(civil action). The parties entered into a global settlement agreement in the civil action, which 

purported to settle both the claimant’s workers’ compensation claim and the civil action. The 

employer submitted the settlement agreement to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation 

Commission (Commission) for approval. The arbitrator approved the parties’ settlement 

agreement and ordered the claimant to pay attorney fees to the three attorneys who had 

represented him at various times during the Commission proceedings. 

¶ 2 The claimant appealed the arbitrator’s award of attorney fees to Commission, which 

unanimously affirmed the arbitrator’s decision. 

¶ 3 The claimant then sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the circuit court 

of Cook County. The claimant did not post an appeal bond when filing his petition for judicial 

review. The claimant’s former workers’ compensation counsel filed a motion to quash 

summons and to dismiss the claimant’s petition for judicial review, arguing that the claimant’s 

failure to post an appeal bond as required by section 19(f)(2) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) 

(West 2016)) deprived the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction to review the 

Commission’s order. The circuit court granted the claimant’s counsels’ motion and dismissed 

the claimant’s petition for judicial review with prejudice. 

¶ 4 This appeal followed. 

¶ 5 FACTS 

¶ 6 The claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim on November 21, 2008, seeking 

benefits under the Act for injuries he allegedly sustained while working for the employer when 

he tripped and fell at a construction site. At the time, attorney Neal Wishnick of Sostrin & 

Sostrin, P.C. (Sostrin) represented the claimant in connection with his workers’ compensation 

claim. On June 24, 2010, the claimant discharged Sostrin and retained Andrew Leonard of the 

Leonard Law Group (Leonard). One week later, Sostrin filed a petition for attorney fees and 

costs. The arbitrator continued the hearing on Sostrin’s fee petition until disposition of the 

case. 

¶ 7 On September 9, 2014, the claimant filed a stipulation to substitute attorneys. The 

stipulation discharged Leonard and indicated that the claimant would now be represented by 

Francine Fishel of Brill & Fishel, P.C. (Fishel). Leonard filed a petition for attorney fees, 

which the arbitrator deferred until the disposition of the case. 

¶ 8 On June 29, 2015, Fishel received a settlement offer of $290,000 from the employer. Fishel 

conveyed the settlement offer to the claimant. On July 9, 2015, the claimant terminated Fishel. 

That same day, Fishel filed a petition for attorney fees with the arbitrator. 

¶ 9 While his Commission proceeding was pending, the claimant filed a civil action in the 

circuit court of Cook County, seeking damages for the injuries he sustained in the same 

accident that was the subject of the workers’ compensation proceeding. The civil action 
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included several defendants, including the employer. Thomas Plouff of Costello, McMahon, 

Burke & Murphy, Ltd. (Plouff), represented the claimant in the civil action. 

¶ 10 On July 21, 2015, nine days after the claimant had discharged Fishel as his workers’ 

compensation counsel, the claimant entered into a “Global Settlement Agreement and 

Release” in the civil action (global settlement agreement). The global settlement agreement 

purported to resolve the civil action for $750,000, with $430,000 to be paid by the third-party 

defendant and $320,000 to be paid by the employer. The global settlement agreement also 

purported to resolve the claimant’s pending workers’ compensation claim for one dollar. In the 

global settlement agreement, the claimant agreed to “execute a lump sum settlement contract” 

(settlement contract) “in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A,” which purported to settle the 

claimant’s pending workers’ compensation claim for the sum of one dollar. The global 

settlement agreement provided that the claimant and the employer “acknowledge[d] that the 

settlement contract must be approved by the [Commission] and that this settlement agreement 

is void unless and until the [Commission] approves the lump sum settlement contract.” The 

global settlement agreement further provided that the claimant “acknowledged that he must 

resolve all attorney fee petitions and issues” and that “[n]o additional sums will be paid by [the 

defendants] for attorney fees which are solely [the claimant’s] responsibility.” The global 

settlement agreement further stated that, “as set forth in the settlement contract,” the employer 

agreed to waive its workers’ compensation lien against the claimant. In exchange for the 

employer’s lien waiver and settlement payment to the claimant, the claimant agreed to (1) 

“hold harmless and indemnify” the employer and the other defendants from “all claims, 

damages, costs, expenses, attorney’s fees, demands, liens, actions, subrogation or suit” 

brought by the claimant or by anyone on the claimant’s behalf and (2) “pay his own attorney’s 

fees in this matter.” The global settlement agreement was attached to, and made part of, the 

settlement contract, which the employer’s counsel subsequently submitted to the arbitrator for 

approval. 

¶ 11 Also, on July 21, 2015, Plouff sent a letter to Fishel regarding the settlement contract and 

global settlement agreement, as well as Fishel’s attorney fees. In the letter, Plouff stated that it 

was in the claimant’s “best interests to settle the workers compensation case for $1.00, with a 

lien waiver.” Plouff then asserted that, under the terms of a fee agreement that Fishel had 

previously executed with the claimant, Fishel “would be entitled to 20% of $1.00.” Plouff also 

informed Fishel that the employer’s counsel “will appear this Friday at 9:00 a.m.” before the 

arbitrator to obtain approval of a “lump sum settlement contract for $1.00, with a hearing at a 

later date on filed fee petitions.” Plouff stated that, although Fishel was legally entitled to 

collect only twenty cents in attorney fees, Plouff would offer to pay Fishel and her firm 

$10,000 in attorney fees out of the attorney fees Plouff collected in the civil action as a 

“professional courtesy.” Plouff offered this amount “in full satisfaction of any attorney fees 

[Fishel] claim[ed] because of working for [the claimant].” Plouff stated that his offer would 

expire at 5 p.m. on July 23, 2015, and that, should Fishel decline the offer, the claimant would 

argue before the arbitrator that Fishel’s attorney fee should be limited to twenty cents. 

¶ 12 On July 24, 2015, the arbitrator held a hearing on the settlement contract submitted by the 

employer’s counsel and on the fee petitions filed by the claimant’s former attorneys. The 

claimant appeared at the hearing pro se. The employer’s counsel and each of the claimant’s 

former workers’ compensation attorneys also appeared. The employer’s counsel informed the 

arbitrator that, “pursuant to the settlement agreement, we are actually paying a dollar for 
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workers’ compensation; but part of the overall settlement agreement in the civil case, which 

totaled $750,000, included a $320,000 contribution from Workers’ Comp” (i.e., from the 

employer’s workers’ compensation insurer). The arbitrator ruled that the award of attorney 

fees would be determined on the basis of the $320,000 workers’ compensation payment. The 

arbitrator further stated that he had spoken with the claimant off the record before the hearing 

began and asked him whether he was “in agreement with the settlement contract and the fees 

and the division of fees” and that the claimant had indicated that he was “in agreement.” The 

claimant acknowledged that the arbitrator’s statement on this matter was correct. 

¶ 13 During questioning by Fishel, the claimant testified that (1) he was responsible to pay the 

attorney fees in his workers’ compensation case, (2) he had signed a fee agreement with each 

of his prior workers’ compensation attorneys (Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel) in which he had 

agreed to pay “20 percent of the recovery” as attorney fees, and (3) 20% of $320,000 is 

$64,000. 

¶ 14 The parties then went off the record to discuss the terms of a proposed order regarding the 

payment and distribution of attorney fees in the workers’ compensation matter. When the 

parties came back on the record, the claimant agreed to pay Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel 

attorney fees “as set forth in the [arbitrator’s] order” upon receipt of the settlement payment. 

The arbitrator noted that, because the circuit court’s order in the civil action required the 

employer to pay the settlement directly to Plouff and the claimant, the arbitrator could not 

order the employer to pay Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel directly. Accordingly, the arbitrator 

noted that he had changed his prior proposed order to reflect that the claimant and Plouff must 

pay the attorney fees to Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel as set forth in the arbitrator’s order upon 

receipt of the settlement payment from the employer’s counsel. Both the claimant and the 

employer explicitly agreed with this change. 

¶ 15 The arbitrator then approved the settlement contract and issued a written order directing the 

claimant and Plouff to pay Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel $21,333.33 each within 30 days of 

receipt of the settlement proceeds. The arbitrator’s Order expressly found that (1) the employer 

had “tendered $320,000 on the settlement at mediation to resolve their liability” in the instant 

workers’ compensation action and (2) the claimant’s prior workers’ compensation attorneys 

were entitled to attorney fees in the amount of 20% of the amount tendered, or $64,000 

(collectively), for their efforts in the workers’ compensation matter. 

¶ 16 Despite the entry of the approved settlement and the agreed attorney fee order, the claimant 

retained a new workers’ compensation attorney and filed a petition for review of the 

arbitrator’s order with the Commission. The claimant appealed only the arbitrator’s award of 

attorney fees; he did not otherwise challenge the arbitrator’s approval of the settlement. In 

response, Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel filed a motion to vacate the settlement contract 

approved by the arbitrator, and Fishel filed a petition for penalties and fees. 

¶ 17 The Commission affirmed the arbitrator’s order and denied Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel’s 

motion to vacate the approved settlement agreement. After reviewing the arbitrator’s order and 

the settlement contract, the Commission noted that “while the total amount of settlement is 

listed as $1.00 on one page of the Lump Sum Settlement and Order, the Terms of the 

Settlement are listed on the Lump Sum Settlement and Order as totaling $750,000.00, 

$430,000.00 of which was paid by [the third-party defendant] and $320,000.00 of which was 

paid by *** [the employer] in the workers’ compensation claim.” The Commission further 

noted that the $320,000 paid by the employer “was paid by [the employer’s] workers’ 
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compensation insurer for the settlement of the claimant’s workers’ compensation claim, which 

was verified both at the July 24, 2015 hearing and at oral argument by [the employer’s] 

counsel.” The Commission concluded that “[t]he Terms of Settlement and the Global 

Agreement, both of which are within the “four corners” of the Lump Sum Settlement and 

Order, and the actions of [the employer] and its workers’ compensation carrier indicate that the 

workers’ compensation claim was settled for $320,000.00 and not $1.00.” 

¶ 18 Moreover, the Commission rejected what it called “[the claimant’s] attempts to renege on 

the contract he entered into on July 24, 2015 before [the arbitrator] when he agreed to pay 

[Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel] upon receipt of the settlement proceeds as set forth in [the 

arbitrator’s] order.” The Commission noted that, during the arbitration hearing, the claimant 

“agreed that he was responsible for attorney’s fees regarding his workers’ compensation case, 

that he had signed three separate fee agreements with his three prior attorneys in the workers’ 

compensation claim and that he agreed with the Settlement Contract, the attorney’s fees, and 

the division of attorney’s fees”; however, “now that the settlement monies have been paid, [the 

claimant] has decided to question the order that was entered based on his declarations at 

hearing and under oath.” The Commission further noted that the claimant had signed the 

settlement contract, including the global settlement agreement, which provided that the 

claimant “was responsible for and agreed to pay all of his attorney’s fees.” The Commission 

stressed that the arbitrator “made it very clear that he was approving the Settlement Contract 

based on [the claimant’s] agreement to pay the attorneys’ fees,” and “at no point during the 

hearing did [the claimant] indicate that he did not *** understand or that he was confused.” 

The Commission found it “wholly disingenuous” for the claimant to claim that he did not 

understand what he was agreeing to now.” Further, the Commission found that the claimant 

was barred from claiming that he is not required to pay the attorneys’ fees per the arbitrator’s 

order under the doctrine of estoppel because such a claim contradicts the claimant’s prior 

testimony that he was required to and would pay those fees and because the arbitrator relied 

upon the claimant’s prior testimony in approving the settlement. 1

 The Commission 

characterized the claimant’s current argument as “buyer’s remorse” which was “[a]t best *** 

disingenuous and at worst *** a fraud upon the Commission.” The Commission concluded 

that, if it were to ratify the claimant’s actions, “it would result in a miscarriage of justice and 

allow [the claimant’s] greed to absolve him of his legal responsibilities.” 

¶ 19 The Commission found that, although evidence established that the claimant’s workers’ 

compensation claim was settled for $320,000 and that the claimant agreed to pay Sostrin, 

Leonard, and Fishel $21,333.33 each within 30 days of receipt of the settlement proceeds, the 

settlement contract was “inartfully drafted to show two settlement amounts.” Accordingly, the 

Commission amended the Settlement Contract Lump Sum Petition and Order approved by the 

arbitrator to reflect that the workers’ compensation claim was settled for $320,000 and that the 

claimant shall pay Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel $21,333.33 each, for a total of $64,000 in 

attorney fees. 

 

1The Commission found that the settlement contract and the arbitrator’s attorney fee order “are so 

inextricably intertwined that they are in fact one in the same document” and that “[n]either the 

settlement contract nor the fee Order would have been entered and approved by the arbitrator without 

the other.” 
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¶ 20 The claimant sought judicial review of the Commission’s order in the circuit court of Cook 

County. When filing its petition for review and request for summons, the claimant did not file 

an appeal bond pursuant to section 19(f)(2) of the Act. Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel filed a 

motion to quash summons and to dismiss the claimant’s petition for judicial review, arguing 

that the claimant’s failure to post an appeal bond as required by section 19(f)(2) of the Act 

deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction to review the Commission’s order. The circuit court 

granted the claimant’s counsels’ motion and dismissed the claimant’s petition for judicial 

review with prejudice. 

¶ 21 This appeal followed. 

¶ 22 ANALYSIS 

¶ 23 Before addressing the issues raised by the claimant in this appeal, we note that the claimant 

failed to file a brief in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 342(a). That rule provides, 

in relevant part, that 

“[t]he appellant’s brief shall include, as an appendix, *** a copy of the judgment 

appealed from, [and] any opinion, memorandum, or findings of fact filed or entered by 

the trial judge or by any administrative agency or its officers ***. 

 * * *

In addition, in cases involving proceedings to review orders of the Illinois Workers’ 

Compensation Commission, the appellant’s brief shall also include as part of the 

appendix copies of decisions of the arbitrator and the Commission.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 342(a) 

(eff. Jan.1, 2005). 

¶ 24 Although the claimant included a copy of the circuit court’s order in his appendix, he failed 

to include copies of the decisions of the arbitrator and the Commission, in violation of Rule 

342(a). This court may summarily dismiss an appeal for failure to comply with Rule 342. 

Pecyna v. Industrial Comm’n, 149 Ill. App. 3d 97, 101 (1986). However, absent aggravating 

circumstances, a harsh construction of the rule is to be avoided. Id. Because we find no such 

aggravating circumstances here, we will not dismiss the claimant’s appeal. However, we 

admonish the claimant and all appellants to ensure that their briefs on appeal are in full 

compliance with Rule 342(a). 

¶ 25 Turning to the merits, the claimant argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that it lacked 

jurisdiction to consider the claimant’s petition for judicial review of the Commission’ s order 

because the claimant did not file an appeal bond as required by section 19(f)(2) of the Act. For 

reasons addressed in detail below, the claimant maintains that section 19(f)(2)’s bond 

requirement does not apply to him. 

¶ 26 Whether a court has jurisdiction to review an administrative decision presents a question of 

law that we review de novo. Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation 

Comm’n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 13. De novo review is also appropriate in this case because 

resolution of the jurisdictional question turns solely on the construction of section 19(f) of the 

Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2012)), and statutory construction is likewise a question of 

law. Illinois State Treasurer, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 13; see also People ex rel. Director of 

Corrections v. Booth, 215 Ill. 2d 416, 423 (2005). 

¶ 27 Judicial review of decisions by the Commission is governed by section 19(f)(2) of the Act 

(820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2016)). Section 19(f)(2) provides that no summons authorizing 
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a circuit court to review a decision issued by the Commission shall issue “unless the one 

against whom the Commission shall have rendered an award for the payment of money shall 

upon the filing of his written request for such summons file with the clerk of the court a bond 

conditioned that if he shall not successfully prosecute the review, he will pay the award and the 

costs of the proceedings in the courts.” 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2012). This requirement 

is jurisdictional. Berryman Equipment v. Industrial Comm’n, 276 Ill. App. 3d 76, 78-79 (1995) 

(noting that because the bond requirement is statutory, strict compliance is required to vest 

subject-matter jurisdiction in the circuit court); see also Residential Carpentry, Inc. v. 

Kennedy, 377 Ill. App. 3d 499, 502-03 (2007); Illinois State Treasurer, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 15 

(ruling that “in order to vest the courts with jurisdiction to review Commission decisions, strict 

compliance with the provisions of the Act is necessary and must affirmatively appear in the 

record”). “[F]iling a bond as set forth in section 19(f)(2) *** is a prerequisite to invoking the 

reviewing court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,” and “[i]n the absence of a bond which conforms 

to the statute’s requirements, the [circuit] court has no jurisdiction to review the Commission’s 

decision.” Illinois State Treasurer, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 18. 

¶ 28 As noted, section 19(f)(2) requires a party “against whom the Commission [has] rendered 

an award for the payment of money” to file an appeal bond in order to invoke the circuit court’s 

jurisdiction to review the Commission’s decision. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2016). In this 

case, the Commission entered an award for the payment of money against the claimant. 

Specifically, the Commission ordered the claimant to pay $64,000 in attorney fees to his three 

prior workers’ compensation attorneys upon receipt of the settlement proceeds from the 

employer’s counsel. The Commission did not order the employer to pay a portion of its 

settlement payment to Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel as attorney fees.2 Rather, it ordered the 

claimant to pay the attorney fees. In his brief on appeal, the claimant acknowledged that the 

Commission ordered him to pay the $64,000 attorney fee award “from his personal assets to 

[his] three former workers compensation attorneys.” Thus, by its plain terms, section 19(f)(2)’s 

bond requirement applies to the claimant in this case because he was seeking judicial review of 

a Commission decision ordering him to pay money to another party. 

¶ 29 The claimant argues that section 19(f)(2)’s appeal bond requirement does not apply to him 

for several reasons. First, relying upon our decision in Celeste v. Industrial Comm’n, 205 Ill. 

App. 3d 423 (1990), the claimant argues that he was not required to file an appeal bond 

because he was an employee, not an employer. In Celeste, the claimant filed a motion for 

interest on remand before the Commission which was not heard prior to the time the employer 

paid the compensation award. Id. at 424. Included in the sum tendered by the employer and 

accepted by the claimant was an amount specifically designated to cover interest. Id. 

Nevertheless, the Commission subsequently ruled that the claimant was not entitled to interest. 

Id. The claimant filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission’s ruling on the interest 

issue, but did not file an appeal bond. On the employer’s motion, the circuit court quashed the 

summons because of the claimant’s failure to file an appeal bond as required by section 

19(f)(2). Id. 

 

2As the arbitrator noted, the Commission could not order the employer to pay the attorney fees to 

the claimant’s workers’ compensation counsel because the circuit court presiding over the civil action 

had already ordered the employer to pay the entire $750,000 global settlement amount directly to the 

claimant and Plouff, the claimant’s counsel in the civil action. 
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¶ 30 We reversed the circuit court’s decision. We ruled that, “[b]y the express terms of [section 

19(f)(2)], an employee is not one against whom an award of money has been rendered.” Id. at 

426. Reasoning that “[t]he bond protects the employee from having to execute against an 

employer’s assets” and protects employers from having their assets encumbered by “liens of 

potentially indefinite duration,” we concluded that the bond requirements apply “only to those 

employers against whom liability for payment of a compensation judgment may attach.” Id. at 

427. Because “[e]mployees are not within that class,” we held that the circuit court erred in 

quashing the summons. Id. 

¶ 31 This case is distinguishable from Celeste in material respects. In Celeste, the only “order 

for the payment of money” issued by the Commission was the compensation award. Thus, the 

employer was the only party that was ordered to pay any money. The claimant in Celeste 

appealed only the Commission’s determination that he was not entitled to interest. The 

claimant did not appeal an order requiring him to pay money to another party; rather, he argued 

that he was entitled to receive more compensation than the Commission had ordered. Here, by 

contrast, the Commission entered an order requiring the claimant to pay money to his former 

workers’ compensation attorneys, and the claimant sought judicial review of that order. Thus, 

by the plain terms of section 19(f)(2), the claimant was required to post an appeal bond. 

¶ 32 We acknowledge that, when taken out of context, some of the statements we made in 

Celeste might appear to suggest that section 19(f)(2)’s bond requirement applies only to 

employers and that employees are categorically exempted from the bond requirement. The 

claimant relies upon those statements in arguing that employees are never subject to the bond 

requirement, even when they appeal a Commission order requiring them to pay money to other 

parties. However, as noted above, Celeste’s actual holding does not require or support such a 

narrow construction of section 19(f)(2)’s bond requirement. 

¶ 33 More importantly, the plain language of section 19(f)(2) does not bear such a construction. 

Section 19(f)(2) provides that “the one against whom the Commission shall have rendered an 

award for the payment of money” must file an appeal bond. (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 

305/19(f)(2) (West 2016). It does not state that only employers ordered to pay money must file 

a bond. “[A] statute must be enforced as written, and a court may not depart from the statute’s 

plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the 

legislature.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, 

Inc., 2012 IL App (3d) 100495, ¶ 28. Our supreme court recently rejected the argument that the 

bond requirement applied only to employers or insurers because the plain terms of section 

19(b)(2) contain no such limitation. As our supreme court explained, 

“[t]he terms employer and insurer are used throughout the Act, including section 19. 

Had the legislature intended to confine the bond requirement in section 19(f)(2) to 

those two specific groups, it could easily have done so by using those same terms. But 

that is not the language it chose. Instead, it drafted the law more broadly to specify that, 

except for the particular government entities enumerated in the law, bond must be 

posted by ‘the one against whom the Commission shall have rendered an award for the 

payment of money’ as a prerequisite to issuance of summons and invocation of the 

court’s jurisdiction. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2012).” Illinois State Treasurer, 

2015 IL 117418, ¶ 27. 

Our supreme court’s holding in Illinois State Treasurer precludes any argument that section 

19(f)(2)’s bond requirement is limited to employers because the plain language of section 
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19(f)(2) contains no such limitation. For the same reason, it would be equally inappropriate to 

read into section 19(f)(2) a categorical exemption for employees. By its plain terms, section 

19(f)(2) applies to all individuals or entities “against whom the Commission shall have 

rendered an award for the payment of money” (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2016)); it does 

not exempt employees ordered to pay money by the Commission from having to file an appeal 

bond. Accordingly, we may not read any such exemption into section 19(f)(2)’s unambiguous 

terms. 

¶ 34 The claimant also argues that section 19(f)(2)’s bond requirement does not apply to him 

because the Commission’s order requiring him to pay attorney fees cannot be classified as an 

“award of money.” Relying on our supreme court’s decision in Illinois Graphics Co. v. 

Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469 (1994), the claimant maintains that only compensation awards

constitute “awards” or “decisions” under the Act. Accordingly, the claimant argues that only 

parties who have been ordered to pay compensation benefits must file an appeal bond under 

section 19(f)(2). 

¶ 35 We disagree. The claimant misreads Nickum, which does not support his position. In 

Nickum, the claimant filed a workers’ compensation claim and the employer began paying her 

temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The arbitrator later found that the claimant had 

failed to prove a compensable claim. Id. at 473. The Commission affirmed and stated that the 

employer “ ‘shall have credit for all amounts paid’ ” “ ‘on account of [the alleged] accidental 

injury.’ ” Id. at 474. However, the claimant later refused to reimburse the employer for the 

TTD benefits the employer had paid her. Id. The employer then filed a complaint in the circuit 

court asking the court to enter a judgment in accordance with the Commission’s decision 

pursuant to section 19(g) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2016)). Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d at 

474. The circuit court granted the claimant’s motion to dismiss the employer’s complaint with 

prejudice because it found that no “award” capable of being reduced to judgment had been 

entered by the Commission. Id. at 475. We affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. Id. at 475-76.

¶ 36 Our supreme court reversed because it found that the employer had stated a common law 

cause of action for the recovery of the voluntary TTD payments due to a mistake of fact. Id. at 

484-98. However, our supreme court agreed that the Commission’s statement purporting to 

grant the employer a “credit” for the TTD benefits it had paid to the claimant was incapable of 

being reduced to a judgment under section 19(g) of the Act. Id. at 479-83. The supreme court 

based this conclusion on the “plain language of section 19(g),” which states that the 

Commission’s “decision,” on which any judgment is based, must be one “ ‘providing for the

payment of compensation according to this act.’ ” (Emphases in original.) Id. at 480. Because 

the Commission decision at issue did not provide for the payment of workers’ compensation 

benefits, it could not be reduced to judgment under section 19(g). Moreover, the supreme court 

noted that the granting of credit for benefits paid “make[s] sense only if an award ha[s] been 

granted based on the arbitrator’s finding of a compensable injury,” which did not occur in the 

case before it. Id. at 478. Thus, the supreme court noted that the Commission’s statement 

concerning a credit appeared to be an “inadvertency” rather than an “adjudication of liabilities” 

that would be capable of being reduced to judgment under section 19(g). Id. at 479. 

¶ 37 Nickum is distinguishable from this case. Nickum did not address the bond requirement 

under section 19(f)(2). Rather, it addressed a different section of the Act (section 19(g)), a 

section which expressly applies only to Commission awards “providing for the payment of 

compensation” under the Act. 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2016). Section 19(f)(2)’s bond 
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requirement, by contrast, contains no such limitation. As noted, the bond requirement applies 

to all parties against whom the Commission has entered an “award for the payment of money.” 

820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2016). Thus, Nickum does not support the claimant’s argument. 

¶ 38 To the contrary, Nickum undermines the claimant’s position. As Nickum notes, the 

legislature explicitly limited section 19(g) to awards providing for the payment of 

compensation. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d at 480. The fact that the legislature chose not to include a 

similar express limitation in section 19(f)(2) strongly suggests that no such limitation was 

intended. Illinois State Treasurer, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 28 (“Where *** the legislature uses 

certain language in some instances and wholly different language in another, settled rules of 

statutory construction require us to assume different meanings or results were intended.”). No 

rule of statutory construction authorizes us to declare that the legislature did not mean what the 

plain language of the statute imports, and we may not rewrite a statute to add provisions or 

limitations the legislature did not include. Id. That is particularly true in cases involving 

statutory jurisdiction, for which the provisions must be strictly adhered to and may not be 

extended by implication. Id. Nickum confirms that, absent a patent ambiguity, reviewing courts 

must confine themselves to the plain language of the relevant statute. The plain, unambiguous 

terms of section 19(f)(2) do not limit the bond requirement to parties against whom an award of 

“compensation” has been entered. Thus, neither may we. 

¶ 39 The claimant also argues that the Commission’s order regarding attorney fees is “void” for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The claimant maintains that the Act caps a claimant’s 

attorney fees at 20% of the settlement award and that the Commission exceeded its statutory 

jurisdiction by awarding attorney fees of $64,000 on an agreed settlement award of one dollar. 

The claimant contends that, under the Act, the Commission had no jurisdiction to award 

attorney fees of more than 20 cents. He argues that any legal responsibilities that the claimant 

has to his former workers’ compensation attorneys “can be resolved in a court of general 

jurisdiction that has subject-matter jurisdiction over any potential equitable attorneys’ fees 

owed.” (For example, the claimant suggests that Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel could file claims 

for attorney fees based on quantum meruit in the circuit court.) However, the claimant 

contends that, unlike a court of general jurisdiction, the Commission’s jurisdiction to award 

attorney fees was limited by the Act, which capped attorney fees at 20 cents on a settlement 

award of $1. 

¶ 40 The claimant’s jurisdictional argument is predicated on his assertions that (1) the parties 

agreed to settle the workers’ compensation claim for $1 and (2) the Commission misconstrued 

the parties’ settlement contract and erred by concluding that the parties had agreed to settle the 

workers’ compensation claim for $320,000. However, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

consider these challenges to the Commission’s decision because the claimant failed to file an 

appeal bond. Thus, we need not address the claimant’s arguments. 

¶ 41 Although we do not decide the issue, we note that the Commission’s award of $64,000 in 

attorney fees might well have been within its statutory jurisdiction. The Act authorizes the 

Commission to award attorney fees and to resolve fee disputes. For example, section 16 of the 

Act provides that “[t]he Commission shall have the power to determine the reasonableness and 

fix the amount of any fee of compensation charged by any person, including attorneys, *** for 

any service performed in connection with this Act, or for which payment is to be made under 

this Act or rendered in securing any right under this Act.” 820 ILCS 305/16 (West 2016); see 

also Alvarado v. Industrial Comm’n, 216 Ill. 2d 547, 554 (2005). Although the Act generally 
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limits a claimant’s attorney fees to 20% of the compensation award (820 ILCS 305/16a(B) 

(West 2016)), the Commission may award additional fees following a hearing under certain 

circumstances (id.). Here, with the express assent of both the employer and the claimant, the 

arbitrator awarded Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel 20% of the amount the employer’s workers’ 

compensation carrier had paid pursuant to the global settlement agreement. In affirming the 

arbitrator’s attorney fees award, the Commission held that the parties had settled the claimant’s 

workers’ compensation claim for $320,000 and awarded Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel 20% of 

that amount as attorney fees. It is far from clear that the Commission exceeded its statutory 

jurisdiction in issuing this attorney fee award. 

¶ 42 Moreover, section 16a(J) of the act provides that 

“[a]ny and all disputes regarding attorneys’ fees, whether such disputes relate to which 

one or more attorneys represents the claimant or claimants or is entitled to the 

attorneys’ fees, or a division of attorneys’ fees where the claimant or claimants are or 

have been represented by more than one attorney, or any other disputes concerning 

attorneys’ fees or contracts for attorneys’ fees, shall be heard and determined by the 

Commission after reasonable notice to all interested parties and attorneys.” 820 ILCS 

305/16a(J) (West 2016). 

Thus, contrary to the claimant’s argument, the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to 

resolve disputes as to attorney fees arising out of the representation of a claimant in a workers’ 

compensation case. Muller v. Jones, 243 Ill. App. 3d 711, 713-14 (1993). If the Commission 

did not resolve the attorney fees issue in this case, Sostrin, Leonard, and Fishel would have 

been unable to obtain a judgment for reasonable attorney fees in any other forum. 

¶ 43 CONCLUSION 

¶ 44 For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook 

County dismissing the claimant’s petition for judicial review for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. 

¶ 45 Affirmed.