United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-2628

 

United States of America, *

*

 Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United

States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Juvenile L.B.G., *

*

Appellant. *

 

Submitted: November 18, 1997

 Filed:

December 23, 1997

 

Before BEAM, HEANEY, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

 

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

L.B.G., a Native-American juvenile, challenges the

evidence supporting the district court’s adjudication

that he is a delinquent. Because the district court did

not commit clear error and because substantial evidence

supports the adjudication of delinquency, we affirm.
At the adjudicatory hearing, L.B.G. pleaded guilty to Count II, and he does not 1

raise it as a subject of this appeal.

2

I.

An information filed on February 20, 1997, charged

L.B.G. with the December 26, 1996 robbery of a Taco John’s

restaurant in Pine Ridge, South Dakota. Also on February

20, 1997, the United States Attorney filed a certificate

for juvenile proceedings. On March 19, 1997, a

superseding information was filed which contained the

original robbery charge as Count I and a charge of

assaulting, resisting or impeding a federal officer as

Count II. 

1

On April 24, 1997, the district court held an

adjudicatory hearing on the matter. At the hearing,

government witnesses testified that two males robbed the

restaurant between 9:15 and 9:20 p.m. One of the males

was wearing a black, inside-out “Starter” jacket. The

other male was wearing a stocking cap and a blue and white

jacket. The males entered the restaurant, made a large

order, and then demanded money from the cashier. During

the course of the robbery, the male in the stocking cap

indicated that he had a gun. Witnesses described the

males as sixteen or seventeen years old. At the time of

the robbery, three Taco John’s employees were on the

premises. Two of the employees, Chris Janis and Pricilla
3

Cummings, later identified L.B.G. as the robber in the

stocking cap. The remaining employee, C.W., was unable to

identify L.B.G. as one of the robbers. In his defense,

L.B.G. challenged the eyewitness testimony and produced

alibi testimony suggesting that he was in Rapid City

between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on the day of the robbery; that

heavy snow was falling
At the time of sentencing, L.B.G. was seventeen years old. 2

4

that evening, which would have made driving difficult; and

that L.B.G. did not have access to a car to make the

approximately 100-mile trip from Rapid City to Pine Ridge.

After making findings of fact and credibility

determinations, the district court adjudicated L.B.G. a

delinquent. On May 22, 1997, L.B.G. was sentenced to a

two-year term of imprisonment and placed on probation

until he reached the age of twenty-one. L.B.G. appeals. 2

II.

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting

a criminal conviction, “we look at the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict and accept as

established all reasonable inferences supporting the

verdict.” United States v. Black Cloud, 101 F.3d 1258,

1263 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). We adopt the

same standard to review the sufficiency of evidence

supporting an adjudication of delinquency. See, e.g.,

United States v. De Leon, 768 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.

1985) (“We agree with . . . every other circuit that has

passed on the question, that the standard of review for

sufficiency of the evidence in an appeal from a federal

juvenile adjudication is identical to that in federal

criminal appeals . . . .”) (citations omitted). The
5

evidence supporting L.B.G.’s adjudication as a delinquent,

then, “need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of

innocence, but simply be sufficient to convince the

[factfinder] beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

is guilty.” United States v. McGuire, 45 F.3d 1177, 1186

(8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 
6

In his brief, L.B.G. argues that no reasonable

factfinder could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. He alleges that the dubious nature of eyewitness

testimony identifying him as one of the robbers, C.W.’s

failure to positively identify him as one of the robbers

at trial, and alibi testimony raise a reasonable doubt

that L.B.G. was one of the robbers.

L.B.G. suggests that eyewitness testimony identifying

him as one of the robbers was not credible. For example,

Janis did not identify L.B.G. as one of the robbers until

more than a month after the robbery occurred. Janis had

also unsuccessfully attempted to convince C.W. that L.B.G.

was one of the robbers. L.B.G. points out that Cummings

initially expressed doubt as to whether she would be able

to identify either of the robbers. Nevertheless, Cummings

was able to identify L.B.G. as one of the robbers for the

first time at the hearing.

At the hearing, Janis and Cummings both testified, in

no uncertain terms, that L.B.G. was the robber who wore

the stocking cap. As the factfinder, the district court

was persuaded by this testimony and found that L.B.G. had

robbed the Taco John’s. We review a district court’s

factual findings for clear error and accord deference to

its credibility determinations. Hadley v. Groose, 97 F.3d

1131, 1134 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). While we

are concerned about the problems of eyewitness
7

misidentification, United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770,

784 (8th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted), we will reverse

a district court’s factual finding only if, after

reviewing the record, we are “left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,

395 (1948). Having carefully reviewed the record, we have

no such conviction.
8

L.B.G. suggests that C.W.’s inability to positively

identify him as one of the robbers at the adjudicatory

hearing raises reasonable doubt as to whether L.B.G. was

one of the robbers. We disagree. “It is well established

that the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness may

be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Dodge, 538 F.2d

at 783 (citations omitted). In this case, two

eyewitnesses testified that L.B.G. was one of the robbers.

Additionally, we note that while C.W. did not positively

identify L.B.G. as one of the robbers, she did not rule

him out as one of the robbers either. The district court

did not err in concluding that L.B.G. was one of the

robbers in light of C.W.’s inability to identify him as

such at the hearing.

At the hearing, L.B.G. elicited alibi testimony from

his grandmother, mother, older brother, older brother’s

girlfriend, and older brother’s friend. In summary, these

witnesses testified that in late November, L.B.G. had gone

to live with his older brother in Rapid City,

approximately 100 miles from Pine Ridge; that L.B.G. was

at his brother’s apartment on December 26, 1996, the day

of the robbery, until approximately 6:00 or 7:00 p.m.;

that on that day, it was snowing heavily, which would have

made driving difficult; and that L.B.G. did not drive or

have access to a car to make the approximately 100-mile

trip to Pine Ridge. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

district court found that neither L.B.G.’s mother nor
9

grandmother provided substantive testimony that would

support an alibi defense. As to L.B.G.’s remaining three

alibi witnesses, the district court found that all three

lacked credibility. According the district court the

proper deference in making its credibility determinations,

we cannot say that it erred in discrediting the alibi

testimony.
10

III. 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the

district court did not commit clear error and that

substantial evidence supports the district court’s

adjudication of L.B.G. as a delinquent. Accordingly, we

affirm.

A true copy.

Attest.

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.