IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-50576

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

FEDERICO SALDANA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:14-CR-371-1

Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Federico Saldana entered a conditional guilty plea 

to possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 

was sentenced to 120 months in prison. Saldana now exercises the right he 

reserved to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered 

following a traffic stop.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 13, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 15-50576

When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review

factual findings for clear error and the ultimate constitutionality of law 

enforcement action de novo. United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir.

2010). The legality of an investigatory traffic stop is examined under the twopronged analysis described in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). United States 

v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004). First, we determine whether 

the initial traffic stop was justified. Id. Here, the initial traffic stop of 

Saldana’s vehicle was legally justified by objectively reasonable suspicion, viz.,

that Saldana committed several traffic violations in the presence of officers. 

See United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005).

Under the second prong of Terry, we determine whether the officers’

subsequent actions were “reasonably related to the circumstances that 

justified the stop, or to dispelling [the] reasonable suspicion developed during 

the stop.” Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507. Following the initial stop of the vehicle, 

the officers’ questioning of Saldana and their observations gave rise to 

reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity, specifically narcotics 

trafficking, warranting Saldana’s continued detention. Id. These included, 

inter alia, Saldana’s nervous behavior, his inconclusive or vague explanation 

for the purpose of his trip, his prior criminal history, and the overall 

appearance of the truck and trailer he was driving. See United States v. 

Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 

627, 632 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Sanchez, 507 F.3d 877, 882 (5th Cir. 

2007), vacated on other grounds, 553 U.S. 1029 (2008).

Saldana additionally contends that there were no intervening 

circumstances to break the causal chain between his alleged illegal detention 

and his consent to search. Because Saldana’s consent was not preceded by an 

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No. 15-50576

illegal detention, his argument cannot succeed. See United States v. 

Khanalizadeh, 493 F.3d 479, 484 (5th Cir. 2007).

Lastly, Saldana argues that, even if he voluntarily consented to the 

search, its scope exceeded the consent he provided. Not so: Saldana twice gave 

his consent to the search and placed no limits on its scope, so he has failed to 

show any error, much less plain error. United States v. Baker, 538 F.3d 324, 

332 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 506-08 (5th Cir. 1993). 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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