UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

KENN ETH JAMES NEILS ON, P la in t if f, v. Ci vilAc ti on N o. 08 -2 05 9 ( JD B) UNITED STAT ES, et al., De fend ant s.

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION Plaintiff Kenneth James Neilson, proce edingpro se, br ings this ac tion ag ainst the United States, the Interna l Revenue Ser vice ( "I RS"), and I RS S pecia l Ag ent Merc edes Ma nzur in her officia l capa city , pursuant to the Administrative Proce dure A ct, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, and the Right to Fina

ncial Privac y

Act (" RFPA" ), 12 U.S.C. §§ 3416 and 3418. Plaintiff alleg es that defe ndants unlawfully

issued third-par

ty summonses to seven financ ial instit utions requesting their re cords in conne ction with him, and he re quests an injunction prohibiting de fenda nts from using r ecor ds obtained throug h the summonses and a de clar ation that defe ndants have violated his rights. In response , defe ndants contend that plaintiff has fa iled to follow statutory proce dures for se ekingrelief

from the summonses. They also contend that the Court otherwise lac ks jurisdiction to gra

nt the relief

reque sted. Henc e, def

endants have filed a

motion to di smiss for lack of subject matter jur isdiction and failure to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d. Upon consider ation of def endants' motion, plainti ff' s opposition, and the entire re cord, the Court will gr ant def

endants' motion. BACK GR OUND Th e sp e c ia l pr oc e dure s a

pp lic a ble to t hir d- pa rt y I RS summo ns e s a

re se t f or th at 26 U. S.C.2

§ 7609. "G ener ally

speaking , the I RS m ay

issue a summons to any

third-par ty rec ordkee per requiringthe produc tion of rec ords and doc uments relatingto a spec ific taxpay er' s financia l activities, with notice of the summons to be g iven to the taxpay er." See McCammon v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 2d 78, 80 (D.D.C. 2008) ( internal c itations and quotation marks omitted). Section 7609 also authorizes the taxpay er ide ntified in the summons to file a petition to quash the summons in an appropriate judicial district. See 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b), (h) . In this case, plaintiff has chose n to challeng e the va lidity of the I RS t hird-par

ty summonses under the Administrative Procedur e Ac t and the Rig ht to Financia l Privacy Act, appa

rently choosingto foreg o the petition to quash proce ss under § 7609. Be tween D ece mber 15, 2006, a nd Marc h 2, 2007, Merc edes Ma nzur, a Special Ag ent wi th t he I RS Cr imi na l Inv e sti g atio n D ivi sio n, iss ue d s e ve n a dmi nis tr ativ e summo ns e s to re qu e st information conc erningplaintiff' s tax liabiliti es for the tax periods endingDec ember 31, 1995, throug h Dec ember

31, 2005. Compl. ¶¶ 1-3 & Ex . A; Manzur Dec l. ¶¶ 1-5. The summonses

we re iss ue d to Am e ri c a

F ir st C re dit

Un ion , Ch arl e s Sc hw a

b & Co. , Inc ., Wel ls F arg o B ank /We lls Fa rg o Ba nk N.A., Mer

rill L y nch, F ar West B ank, Z ion's F irst National B ank, and U S Bank N .A.. Compl. ¶ 2. Manzur did not provide advanc e notice of the summonses to plaintiff, but did send copies of the summonses to plainti ff on or about the same dates a s they wer e mailed to the third parties. I d. ¶ 20; Manzur Dec l. ¶¶ 6-13. Th e summo ns e s w e re signe d b y Ma nzur, but di d n ot b e ar t

he signatur e of

a se pa rate "A pprovingOffic er." Compl. ¶¶ 4-5, 10-11. The summonses also did not contain a ce rtification of complianc e with the Rig ht to Financia l Privacy Act, nor did the c opy

of the summonses mailed to plaintiff contain the RF PA notice set for th at 12 U.S.C. § 3405(2). I d. ¶¶ 35- 36. Ba sed on the for eg oing e vents, plaintiff alleg es four cause s of ac tion. Count s One a nd3

Three alleg e that Manzur wa s without authority to issue the summonses and that they wer e issued without authorization from an approvingoffice r in violation of the Interna l Revenue Ma nual and Deleg ation Orde r No. 4. Count Two alleg es that Manzur fa iled to provide plaintiff a n advanc e notice of intent to conta ct third parties, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7602(c) . Count Four alleg es that th e summo ns e s w e re iss ue d in vio latio n o f t

he c e rt if ic atio n a nd no tic e re qu ir e me nts se t f or th in the Right to Fina

ncial Privac y

Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3403 and 3405. B ased on the fore g oing alleg ed violations, plaintiff seeks a n injunction ag ainst defe ndants' use of a ny information about him ob ta ine d thro ug h th e summo ns e s a nd an in jun c tio n r e qu ir ingde fe nd ants to c omp ly wi th a ll

su bs tanti ve and

pr oc e du ra l r e qu ir e me nts of

the int e rn a l r e ve nu e laws . Pl a int if f a lso se e ks a decla ration that def

endants violated those la

ws and the U .S. Const itution. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW "[I ]n passing on a motion to dismis s, whether on the g round of lac k of jurisdiction over the su bje c t matte r o r f

or fa ilure to s tate a

c a us e of a c tio n, the a lle g atio ns of the c omp la int

sh ou ld be construe d favor ably

to the pleade r." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see L eathe rman v. Ta

rra nt Cty . Nar cotics and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Phi llips

v. B ur e a u o f P ri so ns , 5 91 F .2 d 9 66 , 9 68 (D .C. Cir . 1 97 9) . T he re fo re , th e fa c tua l a lle g atio ns mus t be pre sumed true, a

nd plaintiff must be g iven eve ry favor able infe renc e that may be dra wn from the alleg ations of fa ct. Scheue r, 416 U.S. at 236; Sparrowv. United Air L ines, Inc., 216 F .3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Howe ver, the Court need not ac cept a s true " a leg al conc lusion couche d as a f

actua l alleg ation," nor

infere nces that are unsupported by the fa cts set out in the complaint. Trudea

u v. Fe dera l Trade Comm'n, 456 F .3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. A llain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Under Rule 12(b)(1) , the par

ty seekingto invoke the jurisdiction of a fe dera l court --4

p l a i n t i f f h e r e - - b e ar s th e b ur d e no f e s t a b l i s h i n gth atth e c o urth a s j ur i s d i c t i o n . S e e U S E c o l o g y, Inc. v. U.S. Dep' t of Interior, 231 F .3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see a lso Grand L odg e of F rate rnal Orde r of Police v. Ashc roft, 185 F . Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001) (a court ha s an " aff

irmative obligation to ensure that it is actingwithin the scope of its jurisdictional authority .") ; Pit ney Bo we s , In c. v . Un i t edS t at es P o s t al S erv . , 2 7 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 5 , 1 9 (D

. D. C

. 1 9 9 8 ). "'[ P ] l ai n t i ff 's fac tual alleg ations in the complaint . . . will bear c loser scr utiny in resolvinga 12(b) (1) motion' than in resolvinga 12(b) (6) motion for f ailure to state a

claim." Gra

nd L odg e, 185 F . Supp. 2d at 13-14 (quoting5A Charles A lan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, F eder al Prac tice and Proc edure § 1350 (2d ed. 1987) ). Additionally , a cour t may consider material other

than the alleg ations of the c omp la int

in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r i t ha s juri sd ic tio n to he ar t he c a se , a s lo nga s it

sti ll a c c e pts the fa ctual alleg ations in the complaint as true. See J erome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. F DA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253- 54 (D.C. Cir. 2005); EEOC v. St. Fra ncis Xavie r Paroc hial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624-25 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1997); He rber t v. Nat' l Acad. of

Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In r e vie wi nga

mot ion to d ism iss purs ua

nt t o Ru le 12 (b )( 6) , th e Court is m ind fu l th at a ll that th e F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure re qu ir e of a c omp la int

is t hat it c on ta in "' a short and plain statement of the c laim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief,' in order to ' g ive the de fe nd ant f

a ir no tic e of wh at th e . . . c la im i s a

nd the g ro un ds up on

wh ic h it re sts .' " B e ll A tl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) ; acc ord Eric kson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (pe r cur iam). Althoug h "de tailed fac tual alleg ations" a

re not ne cessa

ry to withstand a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss, to provide the " g rounds" of " entitle[m ent] to relief," a plaintiff must furnish " more than la bels and

c on c lus ion s" or

" a fo rm ula ic re c itatio n o f t

he e le me nts of

a c a us e of a c tio n. " Tw omb ly , 5 50 U. S.

at 55 5- 56 ; se e a lso Pa

pa san v . A lla in, 47 8 U .S. 26 5, 28 6 ( 19 86 ). " To surv ive a mot ion to5

dis mis s, a c omp la int

mus t c on ta in s uf

fi c ie nt f a c tua l matte r, a c c e pte d a s tr ue , to ' state a

c la im t o relief that is plausible on its face.' " A shcrof t v. I qbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct . 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570); Atherton v. District of Columbi a Of

fice of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 ( D.C. Cir. 2009). A complaint is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff ple ads fa c tua l c on te nt t

hat a llo ws the c ourt

to d ra w the re a so na

ble inf e re nc e that th e de fe nd ant i s li a ble for the misconduc t alleg ed." I qbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. DI SCU SSIO N I. Injun ctive Relief Def endants c ontend that injunctive re lief is not available to plaintiff unde r the Ad min istrativ e Pr oc e dure Ac t be c a us e the lim ite d w a ive r o f s ov e re ig n immun ity wi th r e sp e c t to a lawsuit cha lleng ing a

n I RS sum mons at 26 U.S.C. § 7609 precludes r ecour se under the APA. In response , plaintiff contends that the APA g rants a c ause of action to any

"' person suff

ering le g a l w ro ngbe c a

us e of a g e nc y a c tio n, ' " and

that th e APAe xpre ssl y

a uth or ize s a

c ourt to " ' ho ld unlawful a

nd set aside a g ency

action . . . found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority , or limitations.'" Pl.'s Opp' n at 1-2 (quoting5 U.S.C. §§ 702 and 706(2)). H ence , he contends he may

seek r elief unde r the APA for the I RS actions underlying the alleg edly improper iss ua nc e of summo ns e s. Plaintiff is corre ct that the APA g ener ally authorizes challeng es to final ag ency action, but he fa ils to acknowledg e the r estrictions in § 702(2). This provision states that " [n] othing he re in .

. . c on fe rs a

uth or ity to gra nt r e lie f i f a

ny oth e r s tatut e that g ra

nts c on se nt t o s uit

e xpre ssl y or impliedly

forbids the re lief which is soug ht." 5 U.S.C. § 702(2). With respec t to an I RS t hirdpa rt y summo ns , 2 6 U .S. C. § 76 09 c on sti tut e s th e Un ite d St ate s' s li mit e d c on se nt t o a laws uit challeng ing its leg al authority to issue the summons. McCammon, 569 F. Supp. 2d at 80-81The Anti-Injunction Act contains limited exceptions not applicable her e. The se ar e 26 1 U.S.C. §§ 6015(e), 6212(a ) and ( c), 6213( a), 6225( b), 6246(b) , 6330(e) (1), 6331( i), 6672(c) , 66 94 (c ), 74 26 (a ) a

nd (b )( 1) , 7 42 9( b) , a

nd 74 36 . Se e 26 U. S.C. § 7 42 1( a ). No ne of the se pr ov isi on s are c ite d in

pla int if f' s c omp la int

. Some district courts have g one fur ther a nd held that § 7609 provides " the exclusive 2 me tho d b y

wh ic h a taxpay e r c an c ha lle ng e a summo ns iss ue d b y

the I RS to a

thi rd -p art

y rec ordkee per." See L oppnow v. United States, No. 08-MC-661, 2009 WL1383099, at *2 (E.D. Mo. May 14, 2009); ac cord V iewtec h, Inc. v. United States, No. 09c v1606, 2009 WL3378990, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2009) . Def endants have not made that argument here . Be cause the Court has ruled on other

g rounds, it will not reach the broade r issue of whe ther § 7609 is an exclusive remedy

that prec ludes relief

under a ny other fe dera l law. 6 (" courts interpr eting26 U.S.C. § 7609(h) have repe atedly conclude d that it lim its feder al district courts' subject matter jur isdiction to hear petitions to quash I RS sum monses") ; Yocum v. United State s, 58 6 F . Su

pp . 3 17 , 3 18 (N .D . Ind . 1 98 4) (n oti ngthat un de r § 76 09 , " the Un ite d St ate s is

c on se nti ngto w a ive its so ve re ig n immun ity fr om s uit in t he are a of iss ua nc e of thi rd pa rt y I RS summonses"). T his provision alone impliedly forbids see king r elief instea d under the APA. But ther e is more. The Ant-Injunction Act expressly prohibits injunctive relief pe rtaining to t he a sse ssm e nt o r c oll e c tio n o f a ny tax -- a pr oh ibi tio n whic h a

pp lie s e qu a lly

to a c tio ns to enjoin I RS i nvestig ative ac tions. Taylor v. United States, 292 Fe d. Appx. 383, 388 (5th C ir. 1 2008); Hobson v. Fisc hbeck, 758 F .2d 579, 580-81 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Stewart v. United State s, 57 8 F . Su

pp . 2 d 3 0, 36 (D .D .C. 20 08 ) ( re je c tin gpla int if

f' s r e qu e st f

or " an o rd e r b ro a dly enjoining the I RS from violating the Interna l Revenue Code," explaining that the Anti-Injunction Act pre cludes such a

n action). In light of the limit ed wa iver of sove reig n immunit y in § 7609 for challeng es to I RS sum monses, and the pr ohibition aga inst inj unctive re lief set for th in the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court conc ludes that other statutes " expressly or impliedly

forbid[] the relief soug ht" within the mea

ning of § 702(2) of

the APA , and he nce pla intiff is preclude d from seekinginjunctive relief

under the APA. 27

II. Dec larator y Relief To the extent that plaintiff seeks de clar atory relief with respec t to the I RS sum monses, the Dec laratory

J udg ment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, bars his claim. Section 2201(a ) authorizes a c ourt of the United States to " decla re the rig hts and other leg al re lations of any interested pa

rty ," but

e xpre ssl y e xclu de s c a se s " wi th r e sp e c t to F e de ra l taxes, " su bje c t to on e e xce pti on

no t a pp lic a ble here . See B ob J ones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 732-33 n.7 (1974) (" The c ong ressional

anti pathy fo r p re matur e int e rf

e re nc e wi th t

he a sse ssm e nt o r c oll e c tio n o f a ny fe de ra l tax als o extends to declaratory

judgme nts. . . . [ T]he fede ral tax ex ception to the De clar atory J udg ment Act is at lea st as broad a s the Anti-Injunction Act." ); Murphy v. United States, 493 F.3d 170, 174 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holdingin the context of a plaintiff' s suit to recover income taxes that

" Con g re ss h a s p re se rv e d th e immun ity of the Un ite d St ate s f

ro m de c larator

y . . . r e lie f w ith respe ct to all tax controversies except those pe rtainingto the classification of org anizations under § 501(c) of the [I nterna l Revenue Code]" ); Tay lor, 292 Fe d. Appx. at 388 (holding that plaintiffs seekingto quash I RS sum monses wer e pre cluded f rom obtainingdecla

ratory relief beca use the Dec laratory

J udg ment Act " bars c laims with respec t to a dispute over f eder al taxes"). In any event, plaintiff' s claim in Counts One and Thre e that def endants' issuance of

the summonses violated I RS st atutes and r egulations is plainly without merit. Defe ndants have submitt ed the c urre nt version of De leg ation Orde r No. 4 (Re v. 23, signe d August 16, 2002) wh ic h e sta

bli sh e s th at, a s a

" Spe c ia l A g e nt, " Ma

nzur w a s a

uth or ize d to iss ue the thi rd -p art y summonses. See Def

.' s Mem. at 3-4; De f.' s Reply , Ex . A. Dele g ation Orde r No. 4, on its fac e, deleg ates the a

uthority to issue summonses to "Assistant Reg ional Inspectors ( Interna l Security ), Direc tor, Off

ice of Investig ations and Tec hnology , Special Ag ents, and Gr oup Manag ers (includinglarg e ca se mana g ers) in District Coll ection, Examination, and Employ ee Plans a nd Ex empt Org anizations." De f.' s Reply , Ex . A (e mphasis added) . Plaintiff's r eliance on a priorPlaintiff makes much of the absenc e of a signature on the line la

beled " Approving 3 Offic er ( if applica

ble)." Be cause Manzur was a uthorized to iss ue the summonses under Deleg ation Orde r No. 4, the sig nature of a se parate " ApprovingOffic er" was not nec essar y . " I f, on a mot ion un de r R ule 12 (b )( 6)

. . . , matte rs outsi de the ple a din g s a re pr e se nte d to 4 and not excluded by

the cour t, the motion mus t be treated as one for summary judgme nt under Rule 56." F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 8 version of the Deleg ation Orde r -- "Re v. 21" issued in 1991 ( Compl., Ex . B) -- is of no moment in light of this more re cent de leg ation. 3 Count T wo fa

re s n o b e tte r. Th e re , p la int if f c on te nd s th at de fe nd ants we re re qu ir e d to pr ov ide a dv anc e no tic e of the summo ns e s p ur su ant t o 2 6 U .S. C. § 76 02 (c ). Ho we ve r, thi s section conta ins an exception where the summons is i ssued " with respec t to any pendingcriminal investigation." I d. § 7602(c) (3)( C). The c omplaint acknowledg es that the summonses wer e issued as par

t of a c riminal investigation ag ainst plaintiff, and Manzur' s decla ration conf

irms this. See Compl. ¶ 4; Manzur Decl. ¶ ¶ 3-5. The ref

ore, de fenda

nts were not require d to provide advanc e notice of

the summonses to plaintiff under § 7602( c). I n short, assuming a

rguendo that the Court could consider

the merits of Counts One, Two, a nd Three , defe ndants would be e ntitled to s umm ary

jud g me nt o n th os e c la ims

. 4 III. Right to F inan cial P rivacy Ac t Def endants move to dismiss plaintiff's se parate claim under the Right to F inancial Privacy Act (Count Four) on the g round that I RS sum monses are exempted from its provisions. De fs .' Me m. a

t 3. De fe nd ants re ly

on 12 U. S.C. § 3 41 3( c ), wh ic h p ro vid e s th at " [n]othin gin t his chapte r prohibits the disclosure of financ ial rec ords in acc ordanc e with the proc edure s authorized by Title 26." Title 26 is, of c ourse, a ref ere nce to the I

nterna l Revenue Code, a

nd includes the summons provision at is sue in this case, 26 U .S.C. § 7609. I n response , plaintiff contends that the RF PA e xce pti on

fo r d isc los ur e s " a

uth or ize d b y

Ti tle 26 " do e s n ot a

pp ly he re be c a

us ePla int if f r e lie s o n N e e c e v. I RS, 9 6 F .3 d 4 60 (1 0th Cir . 1 99 6) , f

or the pr op os iti on

that a 5 plaintiff may

seek r elief unde r the RFPA notwithstanding12 U.S.C. § 3413(c). In Nee ce, ho we ve r, the RF PA c la im w a s a llo we d to pr oc e e d b e c a us e " the fi na

nc ia l in sti tut ion

vo luntari ly cho[se] t o allow the I RS" to examine the tax pay er' s financia l rec ords, without the issuance of a summons. 96 F.3d at 462 (e mphasis added) . Nothing in Ne ece sug g ests than a RF PA claim may proce ed whe re a

n I RS sum mons has been issued unde r § 7609. 9 defe ndants violated Title 26 when the y failed to obtain the sig nature of an " approvingoffice r." Pl.'s Opp' n at 10-11. F ir st, un de r t

he pla in l angua g e of

12 U. S.C. § 3 41 3( c ), the RF PA d oe s n ot a pp ly to summonses issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7609 because , to state the obvious, they are summonses "in ac corda

nce w ith the proce dures a uthorized by

Title 26." See Gra

nt v. I RS, No. 06-CV-402-JMH, 2007 WL 2174731, at *4 (E.D. K y . J uly 27, 2007) (holdingthat under the pla in l angua g e of

§ 3 41 3( c ), " the RF PA' s n oti c e re qu ir e me nts
. . . s imp ly do no t a pp ly to I .R. S. subpoenas," ref

err ing to a

summons is sued to a ba

nk under 26 U .S.C. § 7609); Bell v. United State s, 52 1 F . Su

pp . 2 d 4 56 , 4 60 -6 1 ( D. Md . 2 00 7) (h old ingthat th e I RS w a s n ot r e qu ir e d to pr ov ide a " c e rt if ic ate of c omp lia nc e " wi th t

he RF PA u

nd e r 1 2 U .S. C. § 34 03 (b ) w ithre sp e c t to issuance of

summonses, based on the e x clusion set forth at12 U.S.C. § 3413(c) ), af f' d, 275 Fe d. Appx. 221 (4th C ir. 2008) (pe r cur iam). Plaintiff seeks to over come the § 3413( c) e x clusion of Title 26 summonses from the RFPA by arguing that the exclusion does not apply beca use the summonses at issue ar e not "a uthorized by

Title 26" in lig ht of the abse nce of the sig nature of an a

pprovingoffice r. B ut the Court alrea dy

has re jected pla intiff' s claims that the summonses were not authorized by Title 26, h o l d i n g th atn ei th er

an ad d i t i o n al s i gn ature n o r a dv an ce n o t i ce wa s re qu i re d

. He n ce , th e R FP A's

e xclu sio n o f f

ina nc ia l r e c or ds dis c los e d " in a c c or da nc e wi th t he pr oc e dure s a

uth or ize d b y

Ti tle 26" a pplies here , and plaintiff is pre cluded f rom seekingrelief

under the RFPA. 5De fe nd ants a lso c on te nd that a pe tit ion to q ua shc ann ot b e he ard

in t his dis tr ic t be c a

us e 6 such petitions must be filed in the judicial district "within which the pe rson to be summoned resides or is found," c iting 26 U.S.C. § 7609(h). How ever , the cur rent re cord doe s not provide sufficie nt information as to whethe r any of the seve n financ ial instit utions may be conside red "f ound" in the D istrict of Columbia; hence, the Court de clines to rule on this g round. 10 IV. P etition to Quash S um m onses Under 26 U.S.C. § 7609 Finally , defe ndants contend that, in the event that the c omplaint is construed as a pe tition to quash the summonses under 26 U .S.C. § 7609, t he cla im mustbe dismissed as time-bar red. The Court agree s. Sections 7609(b) and ( h) provide a taxpay er w ith the rig ht to intervene a nd fi le a pe tit ion to q ua shan I RS summo ns in t he a pp ro pr iate U. S. d ist

ri c t c ourt . T he taxpay e r m us t beg in the proce eding"not late r than the 20th da y afte r the da

y such notice is g iven." 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)( 2)(A) . I t is undisput ed that the I RS m ailed the summonses at issue be tween D ece mber 15, 2006 and Mar ch 2, 2007. See Compl. ¶ 1; Manzur Dec l. ¶ 5. The 20- day period e x pired, then, at the late st, on March 22, 2007. Plaintiff did not file his complaint until Dece mber 1, 20 08 , o ve r 2 0 mo nth s late r. Ac c or din g ly , th e c omp la int , to the e xtent it c an b e c on str

ue d a s a petition to quash the summonses, is t ime-bar red. 6 CO NC LU SION Fo r t h e f o re go i n g re as o n s , th e C o urtwi l l gra n td ef en d an t s ' m o t i o nt o d i s m i s s . P l ai n t i ff 's cl ai m s fo r i n

j un ct i v e r el i ef

wi l l b e d i s m i s s edfo r l ac k o f s u b j ec tm at t er

j uri s d i ct i o n . P l ai n t i ff

's

rema ining c laims will be dismi ssed for f ailure to state a

claim upon which r elief c an be grante d.

/ s / J OHN D. B ATES Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge Dated: De cembe r 17, 2009