UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

LaSANDRA NORMAN, )

 a/k/a Beyonc’e, )

)

Plaintiff )

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:16-CV-113 RLM 

)

B.E.T. TELEVISION; STEVEN HILL; )

DEBRA LEE; and WENDY WILLIAMS, )

)

Defendants )

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

LaSandra Norman, a/k/a Beyonc’e, has filed pro se claims against the

defendants on a form complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Based on a generous

reading of her complaint, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A

document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.”); Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d

742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (courts must “construe pro se complaints liberally”), Ms.

Norman appears to be asserting claims of “criminal behaviors” by the defendants,

claims for race and gender discrimination and/or sexual harassment, and a claim

for violation of federal copyright laws. Ms. Norman seeks $2 billion for her pain,

suffering, and medical bills.

Defendants Stephen Hill, Debra Lee, and Wendy (Hunter) Williams have filed

a motion to dismiss Ms. Norman’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(3) for improper venue, or, alternatively, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The

defendants maintain Ms. Norman’s claims don’t give rise to contacts with the

State of Indiana sufficient to create personal jurisdiction over them in this court,

venue is improper in the Northern District of Indiana, any possible claims Ms.

Norman is attempting to raise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for sexual harassment,

gender discrimination, and/or race discrimination must be dismissed, and her

complaint fails to state a claim for copyright infringement. Ms. Norman has filed

her response(s) to the defendants’ motion, and the defendants have filed their

reply. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the defendants’ motion

must be granted.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)

Because “jurisdiction is a threshold requirement that must be satisfied

before a court can pass judgment on the merits” of Ms. Norman’s complaint,

Rawlins v. Select Specialty Hosp. of Northwest Ind., Inc., No. 13 C 7557, 2014 WL

1647182, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2014) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)), the court must resolve the defendants’

jurisdictional argument first. A motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(2) is a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction over the defendants

that places the burden on the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction. Tamburo v.

Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2010). 

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Mr. Hill, Ms. Lee, and Ms. (Hunter) Williams have submitted affidavits

opposing jurisdiction, so Ms. Norman must go beyond the pleadings and submit

affirmative evidence supporting the exercise of jurisdiction. Purdue Research

Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 783 (7th Cir. 2003). When, as

here, the motion to dismiss is decided based on the submission of written

materials without an evidentiary hearing, Ms. Norman must “make out a prima

facie case of personal jurisdiction” through affidavits or other written materials

setting forth facts that if true would be sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the

non-resident defendants. Purdue Research Foundation v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A.,

338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). “[C]onclusory allegations unsupported by any

factual assertions will not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Novelty, Inc. v. RCB

Distributing, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-418, 2008 WL 2705532, at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 9,

2008).

Neither of the federal statutes that appear to serve as the basis for this

litigation – Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and

the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. – authorize nationwide service of

process or govern personal jurisdiction, see Philpot v. Mansion America, LLC, No.

1:14-cv-1357, 2015 WL 4715215, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 2015) (“[T]he

Copyright Act does not authorize nationwide service of process or govern personal

jurisdiction.”); Nathan v. Morgan Stanley Renewable Development Fund, LLC, No.

11 C 2231, 2012 WL 1886440, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2012) (“Title VII does not

provide for nationwide service of process.”), so whether jurisdiction over the out3
of-state defendants is proper involves two inquires: whether Indiana’s long-arm

statute allows jurisdiction, and whether assertion of personal jurisdiction would

violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Felland v. Clifton, 682

F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). Indiana’s long-arm statute, set forth in Indiana

Trial Rule 4.4(A), extends personal jurisdiction to the limits allowed under the Due

Process Clause, so the only question is whether the court’s exercise of personal

jurisdiction over Stephen Hill, Debra Lee, and Wendy (Hunter) Williams comports

with due process. See LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind. 2006)

(“The 2003 amendment to Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A) was intended to, and does,

reduce analysis of personal jurisdiction to the issue of whether the exercise of

personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Federal Due Process Clause.”).

Due process requires that to subject a non-resident defendant to personal

jurisdiction, the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum

state (here, Indiana) “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend

‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,

463 (1940)). Due process “protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being

subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no

meaningful contacts, ties, or relations. . . . A forum state’s courts may not exercise

personal jurisdiction over a nonconsenting, out-of-state defendant unless the

defendant has ‘certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the

suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”

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Northern Grain Marketing, LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2014)

(quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316). The Supreme

Court has defined the necessary minimum contacts as “some act by which the

defendant purposefully avails [himself or herself] of the privilege of conducting

activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its

laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

A defendant who doesn’t engage in business generally in the forum state,

but has transacted some business there, can still be subject to suit. Specific,

rather than general, jurisdiction over a defendant exists when the suit arises out

of or is related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Helicopteros Nacionales

de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). Ms. Norman makes no

allegation that Mr. Hill, Ms. Lee, or Ms. (Hunter) Williams has engaged in “the kind

of continuous and systematic general business contacts” that would be necessary

to support general jurisdiction. Thus, the court must determine if Ms. Norman has

established that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege

of conducting business in Indiana sufficient to subject them to specific jurisdiction

in this court. See Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2010)

(“Specific personal jurisdiction is appropriate where (1) the defendant has

purposefully directed his activities at the forum state or purposefully availed

himself of the privilege of conducting business in that state, and (2) the alleged

injury arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities.”). The defendants’

conduct and connection with Indiana “must be substantial enough to make it

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reasonable for [them] to anticipate that [they] could be haled into court []here.”

Northern Grain Marketing, LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Mr. Hill, Ms. Lee, and Ms. (Hunter) Williams maintain that their contacts

with the State of Indiana are insufficient to subject them to specific jurisdiction

in this court. In support of their motion to dismiss, they have submitted their

affidavits in which they report the following:

Stephen Hill – reports that he is a citizen and resident of the District

of Columbia; he is the president of programming for Black Entertainment

Television, LLC, and his work for B.E.T. is conducted primarily in

Washington, D.C. and New York City; he doesn’t own or rent any property

or have any assets in Indiana; he doesn’t have any bank accounts or

governmental licenses in Indiana; he doesn’t have a mailing address or any

employees or agents in Indiana; he hasn’t engaged in or conducted any

business in Indiana and has never been required to pay any taxes in

Indiana; he doesn’t maintain a place of business or have any business

relationships in Indiana; he hasn’t entered into any contracts or conducted

any financial transactions with any person or company in Indiana; he

hasn’t performed any work or services in Indiana; and, prior to learning of

this lawsuit, he had no knowledge of or contact with LaSandra Norman or

her alleged works. Deft. Memo., Exh. A (Hill Aff.), ¶¶ 1-16.

Debra Lee – reports that she is a citizen and resident of the District

of Columbia; she is the chairman and chief executive officer of B.E.T.

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Holdings, Inc., and her work for B.E.T. Holdings is conducted primarily in

Washington, D.C. and New York City; she doesn’t own or rent any property

or have any assets in Indiana; she doesn’t have any bank accounts or

governmental licenses in Indiana; she doesn’t have a mailing address or any

employees or agents in Indiana; she hasn’t engaged in or conducted any

business in Indiana and has never been required to pay any taxes in

Indiana; she doesn’t maintain a place of business or have any business

relationships in Indiana; she hasn’t entered into any contracts or financial

transactions with any person or company in Indiana; as chairman and CEO

of B.E.T. Holdings, Inc., she hasn’t performed any work or services in

Indiana; and, prior to learning of this lawsuit, she had no knowledge of or

contact with LaSandra Norman or her alleged works. Deft. Memo., Exh. B

(Lee Aff.), ¶¶ 1-17.

Wendy Hunter – reports that she is a citizen and resident of the State

of New York; using her professional name “Wendy Williams,” she is the host

of The Wendy Williams Show, a nationally syndicated talk show that is

filmed in New York City; she doesn’t own or rent any property or have any

assets in Indiana; she doesn’t have any bank accounts or governmental

licenses in Indiana; she doesn’t have a mailing address or any employees

or agents in Indiana; she has never made a television show or filmed a

motion picture in Indiana; she has never directed, targeted, or focused any

marketing activities or advertisements to Indiana in particular; she hasn’t

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performed any work or services in Indiana; The Wendy Williams Show has

never been filmed in Indiana; and, prior to learning of this lawsuit, she had

no knowledge of or contact with LaSandra Norman or her alleged works.

Deft. Memo., Exh. C (Hunter Aff.), ¶¶ 1-15.

The defendants conclude that because they have no connection to Indiana, any

exercise of personal jurisdiction over them in this court would offend the

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Ms. Norman hasn’t challenged the affidavit statements of Mr. Hill, Ms. Lee,

or Ms. (Hunter) Williams, and while Ms. Norman has filed more than one response

to the defendants’ motion, she hasn’t responded to the defendants’ arguments.

Ms. Norman complains that while the defendants want to claim lack of

jurisdiction, “they can get on an airplane to go to Los Angeles to further infringe.”

She maintains jurisdiction over her copyright infringement case “will always be

present . . . because [she] will never live in New York nor will they ever live in

Indiana.” Ms. Norman says, too, that jurisdiction could be waived by the

defendants “if they wanted to find out what’s really going on.” Ms. Norman,

though, hasn’t produced evidence or pointed to facts to establish that jurisdiction

over these defendants is proper in this court.

Ms. Norman hasn’t alleged, argued, or established that Mr. Hill, Ms. Lee, or

Ms. (Hunter) Williams has sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Indiana

to subject any of them to specific jurisdiction in this court, or that any of them

has “purposely established minimum contacts” with Indiana such that they

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“should reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in Indiana. Felland v.

Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Tile Unlimited, Inc. v. Blanke

Corp., 47 F. Supp. 3d 750, 757 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“The inquiry focuses on whether

the defendant has ‘purposely avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities

with the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’”). Ms.

Norman hasn’t alleged, argued, or established that the injury of which she

complains arises out of or relates to any actions Mr. Hill, Ms. Lee, or Ms. (Hunter)

Williams purposely directed at Indiana. Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d at 676; see

also be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] a defendant must

in some way target the forum state’s market.”). Thus, Ms. Norman hasn’t carried

her burden of establishing that Mr. Hill, Ms. Lee, or Ms. (Hunter) Williams had

sufficient minimum contacts with Indiana to support personal jurisdiction in this

court; the court needn’t “go further in the personal-jurisdiction analysis by, for

example, analyzing whether requiring [Mr. Hill, Ms. Lee, and Ms. (Hunter)

Williams] to defend the suit in [Indiana] offends ‘traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.’” Northern Grain Marketing, LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487,

496 (7th Cir. 2014). Dismissal of Ms. Norman’s claims against Mr. Hill, Ms. Lee,

and Ms. (Hunter) Williams is proper, and the court need not address the

defendants’ additional bases for dismissal.

The court GRANTS the motion of defendants Stephen Hill, Debra Lee, and

Wendy (Hunter) Williams to dismiss Ms. Norman’s claims against them for lack

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of personal jurisdiction [docket # 24]. Ms. Norman’s claims against defendant

B.E.T. Television remain pending.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: July 18, 2016 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge, United States District Court

cc: L. Norman

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