FYI: An Update on Emerging Issues in Banking 

Scenarios for the Next U.S. Recession 

March 24, 2006 

Notwithstanding a slowdown in the fourth quarter of 2005, U.S. economic activity has grown at a stable, 

robust pace for most of the last three years. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew at a real annualized rate of at 

least 3.3 percent in every quarter between March 2003 and September 2005 before sliding to a rate of 1.6 

percent in the final quarter of last year. Meanwhile, FDIC-insured institutions turned in a fifth-consecutive 

year of record earnings in 2005, posting net income of $134.2 billion. In addition, today marks the 636th day 

since the FDIC last provided assistance to a failed or failing bank—the longest such streak in the history of 

the Corporation. 

This string of positive reports on the U.S. economy and banking industry paradoxically has led some analysts 

to ask a somewhat pessimistic question: How long can these good times last? Experience teaches us that 

economic expansions do not last forever and that some types of economic disruptions can be associated with 

financial distress for banking organizations. While forecasting recessions is, at best, a hazardous business, it 

makes sense from a risk management perspective to explore various weak-economy scenarios to better 

prepare for adversity down the road. 

With this in mind, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation recently hosted a panel discussion to gain 

insights into scenarios for the next recession. The event was moderated by FDIC Chief Economist Richard 

Brown, and the panelists included Kathleen Camilli, Chief Economist and Director of Camilli Economics; 

Arthur McMahon, Director of Economic Outlook and Bank Condition for the Office of the Comptroller of 

the Currency (OCC); and Meredith Whitney, Executive Director for CIBC World Markets, a subsidiary of 

the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce in New York. 

Rich Brown Kathleen Camilli Art McMahon Meridth Whitney 

FDIC Camilli Economics OCC CIBC World Markets 

This issue of FYI addresses many of the themes presented at that forum, discussing recent economic trends 

and potential areas of weakness that could pose problems for banks in the next recession. This issue also 

looks at the historical performance of the banking industry across business cycles and how well the industry 

is positioned to effectively manage the risks and challenges that may be associated with the next recession. 

The Economy Is Strong 

There can be little debate about the fact that U.S. economic performance has been strong. The steady growth 

in real GDP noted above can be attributed to several sources. For one, business investment has risen at a 

double-digit pace during the past two years, fueled by several years of double-digit corporate profit growth. 

In addition, home prices have boomed, acting to support consumer spending despite less-than-stellar gains in 

average real wages and an easing in real median family income since the late 1990s. Finally, fiscal and 

monetary policies have been favorable with reduced tax rates, increased government spending, and steady, 
d

clearly telegraphed interest-rate increases supporting economic growth while limiting near-term policy 

uncertainty. 

Despite the overall strong appraisal, real GDP growth decelerated sharply, to a 1.6 percent annualized rate 

during fourth quarter 2005. This slowdown had been expected by many forecasters, including one of the 

FDIC roundtable panelists, Kathleen Camilli. She introduced the notion that the U.S. economy might have 

experienced a mid-cycle growth slowdown in late 2005. These slowdowns have a precedent, as they have 

occurred during expansions in both the 1980s and 1990s (see Chart 1). Ms. Camilli also noted that the recent 

historical pattern of real GDP growth points to recessions occurring near the start of every decade. On that 

basis, the U.S. economy may have a few more years of expansion ahead of it before entering the next 

recession. The link below provies Ms. Camilli's full presentation. 

(http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/2006_economic_outlook/camilli.html). 

Although fourth quarter GDP growth was weak, recent signs point to a resurgence early in 2006. For 

instance, job growth has picked up and the unemployment rate fell to 4.8 percent as of February. The 

economy added an average of 228,000 net nonfarm positions per month between November and February, 

almost double the average 125,000 per month gain from July through October. During January and February, 

average weekly initial unemployment claims ran below 300,000, a decrease from the 330,000 average in 

fourth quarter 2005. After a slow start, business investment surged late in the fourth quarter. Shipments of 

nondefense, nonaircraft capital goods jumped 3.8 percent in December following much weaker monthly 

gains in October and November. These shipments again advanced modestly in January. Meanwhile, monthly 

surveys of purchasing managers indicated robust growth in both the manufacturing and services sectors 

during February. As of early March, many forecasters were expecting annualized quarterly real GDP growth 

of over 4 percent during the first three months of 2006 and over 3 percent for all of 2006. 

Three Key Economic and Banking Risk Concerns 

Despite a favorable outlook, there are at least three widely acknowledged areas of near-term concern that 

could pose risks to the economy going forward: a spike in energy prices, a decline in home prices, and a 

retrenchment in consumer spending arising from record consumer indebtedness. The consequences that any 

of these developments might have for economic growth could range from modest to severe, depending on 

how events play out over the next few years. It should be noted that these three areas are by no means the 

only potential sources of risk. Financial market panics, natural disasters, terrorism, war, and even changes to 

policy are among many other potential sources of disruption to the currently benign economic and banking 

environment. It is difficult to assess many of these risks before they occur, but in 2005 the FDIC did examine 

so-called “stroke-of-the-pen” risk, or risk that arises when tax, monetary, accounting and other policy 

changes produce unintended consequences for the economy and banking.1 
Energy Shock 

Because global excess crude oil production and refining capacity are limited, the risk of supply-side energy 

shocks remains high. Strong global growth in energy demand in recent years, coupled with decades of limited 

new international investment in energy production capacity, have left the United States and the world 

exposed to increased energy risks. Although the U.S. economy is less reliant on energy today than in the 

1970s, it can still suffer from energy supply disruptions that result in spiking oil, gas, and gasoline prices. 

Given historically mild January weather, natural gas prices fell by roughly half from their elevated early 

winter levels. Crude oil and gasoline prices have also come down from their late summer peak because of an 

increase in imports and the gradual return of damaged production capacity following the summer hurricane 

season. Even so, oil prices remained 29 percent above year-earlier levels in February, and gasoline prices 

were 19 percent higher. 

With time the economy should be able to adjust to higher energy prices, but in the short run, any supplydisrupting events, including labor strikes, severe weather, or terrorism, may cause energy prices to jump. By 

varying degrees, these spikes would be likely to weigh on overall economic growth while adding volatility to 

the outlook. Moreover, this risk is likely to stay in play for several more years, given the long lags required to 

add new energy production capacity and expectations for continued global growth in energy demand. 

Housing 

The risk of a housing slowdown is another area of concern going forward. The recent housing boom has been 

unprecedented in modern U.S. history.2

 It has been suggested by many analysts that the housing boom has 

been a significant contributor to gains in consumer spending in recent years. Indeed, a number of the FDIC 

roundtable panelists pointed to the apparent connection between rising real estate wealth during the past four 

years and the sustained strength in consumer spending during that period. Because consumer spending 

accounts for over two-thirds of U.S. economic activity, any shock to consumer spending, such as that which 

might be caused by a housing slowdown, is a concern to overall economic growth. 

It is very likely that housing wealth has been a significant factor behind growth in consumer spending. 

Through the use of cash-out refinancing, increased mortgage balances, and greater use of home equity lines 

of credit, as well as through owners selling homes outright and cashing in on their accumulated equity, it is 

estimated that anywhere from $444 billion to $600 billion was liquidated from housing wealth during 2005.3 

Whichever estimate one uses, the total almost surely eclipses the $375 billion gain in after-tax income for the 

year. While probably not all of the home equity liquidated during 2005 fed consumption spending (much of it 

was invested into other assets, including second or vacation homes), these statistics illustrate how important 

home equity has become as a source of household liquidity. 

There are concerns, however, that changes in the structure of mortgage lending could pose new risks to 

housing. These changes are most evident in the rising popularity of interest-only and payment-option 

mortgages, which allow borrowers to afford more expensive homes relative to their income, but which also 

increase variability in borrower payments and loan balances. To the extent that some borrowers with these 

innovative mortgages may not fully understand the potential variability in their payments over time, the credit 

risk associated with these instruments could be difficult to evaluate. In addition, the degree of effective 

leverage in home-purchase loans has risen in recent years with the advent of so-called “piggy-back” 

mortgage structures that substitute a second-lien mortgage for some or all of the traditional down payment. 

Meredith Whitney noted at the roundtable that the recent use of revolving home equity lines of credit in lieu 

of down payments has enabled an increasing number of first-time buyers to qualify for homes that they 

otherwise could not afford. Link to the complete text of Ms. Whitney’s remarks in the transcript 

(https://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/2006_economic_outlook/whitney.html). 

Overall, Ms. Whitney’s research suggests that a group that includes approximately 10 percent of U.S. 

households may be at heightened risk of credit problems in the current environment. This group mainly 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

d

includes households that gained access to mortgage credit for the first time during the recent expansion of 

subprime and innovative mortgage loan programs. Not only do many borrowers in this group have preexisting credit problems, they may also be more vulnerable than other groups to rising interest rates because 

of their reliance on interest-only and payment-option mortgages. These types of mortgages have the potential 

for significant payment shock that occurs when low introductory interest rates expire, when index rates rise, 

or when these loans eventually begin to require regular amortization of principal including any deferred 

interest that has accrued (see Chart 2). 

Because of the importance of mortgage lending to bank and thrift earnings, the large-scale changes that have taken 

place in this sector will clearly have implications for the banking outlook. Bank exposure to mortgage and home equity 

lending is now at peak levels. As reported in the FDIC’s latest Quarterly Banking Profile 

(https://www.fdic.gov/qbp/index.html), 1-4 family residential mortgages and home equity lines of credit accounted for a 

combined 38 percent of total loans and leases in fourth quarter 2005, well above the roughly one-third share 

maintained at the beginning of the decade. 

Housing analysts are in disagreement as to whether or not recent signs point to a moderation in housing activity or the 

beginning of a more significant correction. Currently, inventories of unsold homes and sales volumes are among the 

indicators pointing to a housing slowdown. Inventories of unsold existing homes rose from under four months of supply 

at current sales volume in early 2005 to 5.3 months of supply as of January 2006. Meanwhile, the pace of existing 

home sales has been trending lower since last summer. A clear trend in the direction of home sales and prices may not 

be evident until the completion of the peak spring and summer selling season later this year. 

Many analysts argue that home prices in the hottest coastal markets, especially in the Northeast and California, could 

be poised to decline in the near future. For example, PMI Mortgage Insurance Company analysts place essentially 

even odds that home prices will decline during the next two years in a dozen cities in California and the Northeast.4 

Should home prices either stop rising or begin to fall in these areas, local banks and thrifts would need to look to nonresidential loans to support revenue growth. 

Art McMahon of the OCC outlined the banking industry’s reliance on mortgage lending during his remarks at the FDIC 

roundtable. Link to the full text of Mr. McMahon’s remarks in the transcript 

(https://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/2006_economic_outlook/artmc.html .) Mr. McMahon acknowledged that 

previous historical episodes of large metro-area home price declines were generally the result of severe local economic 

distress.5

 Should some regional housing market downturns occur, banks may be hard-pressed to generate nonresidential loans in great volume. Historically, regional housing price declines have tended to be associated with a 

slowdown in small business activity, with banks making fewer commercial and industrial loans in addition to suffering 

mortgage and consumer portfolio stress. 

Consumer Debt and Lack of Saving 

A large, long-term increase in consumer indebtedness has raised concerns that the next U.S. recession could originate 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

in the household sector. The housing boom of recent years has resulted in a surge in new consumer debt, most of it in 

the form of mortgages. Historically, recessions have provided an opportunity for households and businesses to retrench 

and rebuild balance sheets that might have become strained late in the previous expansion. The response of 

businesses during the 2001 recession provides a classic example in this regard as investment, spending, and hiring 

activities were curtailed sharply from their heady, late-1990s pace. In part because of the wealth-offset provided by 

housing, however, the long “jobless recovery” following the 2001 recession did not weigh heavily on the consumer 

sector. Consumers did slow their pace of spending growth in 2001 and 2002, but spending growth never fell below a 1 

percent annual pace in any quarter—and in no quarter did it actually decline. By contrast, during the early 1990s 

recession, consumer spending declined for two straight quarters. At this point in time, however, the consumer sector 

has not experienced a real recession in 15 years. 

In some sense, this long recession hiatus itself raises concerns. Consumers have gradually become more indebted 

over time—so much so that they are now spending more in aggregate than they earn, resulting in the much-lamented 

negative personal savings rate.6

 The personal savings rate may turn out to be a bit of a statistical anachronism in an 

economy where so much spending is driven by the accumulation of wealth rather than current income. Even so, home 

prices will not boom forever. Even a moderation in home-price growth would reduce the amount of new home equity 

added to the economy each year. This slower accumulation of wealth, coupled with rising interest rates that increase 

the cost of tapping that wealth, could soon begin to curtail the pace of U.S. consumer spending growth. Just as there 

has been a positive wealth effect from soaring home prices in recent years, the concern is that an end to the housing 

boom could result in a slowdown in consumer spending growth. However, it is important to keep in mind that such an 

outcome would likely play out over several years, as happened during the boom. 

The risk posed by a slower rate of home equity growth was also discussed by the FDIC roundtable panel. It should be 

noted that in only the first six years of this decade, the value of net housing wealth (or owners’ equity) held by U.S. 

households has risen by over $5 trillion. Keep in mind that this is the net gain, after allowing for a record increase in 

mortgage debt. Moreover, the increase in net housing wealth during the first half of this decade alone was two to three 

times as large as the gains posted during each of the prior two decades. Although some new buyers have put very little 

down on their home and thus have accumulated little equity, many longtime homeowners have accumulated significant 

additional equity that remains untapped. At the FDIC roundtable event, panelist Kathleen Camilli noted this untapped 

wealth as a potential area of support for consumer spending going forward. History supports Ms. Camilli’s stance. 

During the past 50 years, the nominal value of U.S. housing wealth has declined only once in a meaningful way—in 

1990, in the midst of the bi-coastal residential real estate bust. Although falling home prices might take a dent out of 

wealth and spending, it would take some time to totally neutralize the effects of a $5 trillion wealth gain. 

The Banking Industry Appears Well Positioned for the Next Recession 

Historically, the fortunes of the banking business have varied with economic cycles, but the worst of times in recent 

memory were not predominantly the result of recession. During the roundtable discussion, FDIC Chief Economist 

Richard Brown pointed out that, as one would expect, loan growth tends to decline and charge-offs tend to rise during 

recessions. Even so, the industry has seen its biggest swings outside of the U.S. business cycle. As an example, Mr. 

Brown pointed to the “100-year flood” of losses in the banking and thrift industries, or the failure of over 2,500 federallyinsured banks and thrifts between 1980 and 1993. Chart 3 shows that while there have been increases in bank failures 

during and immediately after recessions, these increases are dwarfed by the episodic surge in failures between 1980 

and 1993. This wave of failures took place during a period that included two U.S. recessions and a seven-and-a-halfyear economic expansion. During this period, according to Brown, the U.S. economy experienced a rolling regional 

recession that moved from the farm belt to the oil patch to the Northeast to Southern California. This rolling regional 

recession featured some significant regional boom and bust cycles in real estate. These real estate busts were partly 

due to the 1986 amendment to federal tax laws on real estate investments. This tax policy change essentially 

dampened demand for commercial real estate investment and put downward pressure on real estate prices.7

 Poor risk 

management practices and fraud also were common factors in the episodic wave of bank and thrift failures. Link to the 

complete text of Mr. Brown’s remarks in the transcript 

(https:/www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/2006_economic_outlook/mrbrown.html.) The lesson of this episode appears to 

be that the business cycle is not necessarily the dominant factor in explaining banking industry performance—and 

failures, in particular—in the modern period. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

d

The first half of this decade provides another example of how the fortunes of the banking industry need not directly 

follow the performance of the U.S. economy. During and just after the 2001 recession, the U.S. economy experienced 

the loss of trillions of dollars in stock market wealth and the failure of hundreds of publicly traded companies, including 

Enron and WorldCom. Associated with this corporate turmoil was a significant credit event for large banks that had 

made loans to corporate borrowers. Between 2000 and 2002, the annual loan loss provisions for FDIC-insured 

institutions rose by $18 billion—a 61 percent increase. Meanwhile, job growth recovered very slowly, with payroll 

employment not reaching its pre-recession level until early 2005. Despite this adversity, FDIC-insured institutions 

posted record earnings every year between 2001 and 2005. 

Part of the reason that the banking industry has been able to produce such strong financial results amid economic 

adversity was the response of monetary policy to the recession itself. Between 2000 and 2002—as the corporate credit 

event was boosting the industry’s provision expenses—low nominal interest rates and a steep yield curve were helping 

to boost net interest income by some $33 billion, while the industry was also able to realize gains on the sale of 

securities of $11 billion. These offsetting factors were more than double the increase in credit losses. 

Given its strong current financial position, the banking industry appears to be generally well positioned to meet the 

challenges of the next recession. At the January roundtable, both Brown and McMahon pointed to the banking 

industry’s historically strong earnings, reserves, and capital as significant buffers against future economic downturns. 

That said, as always, risk management practices will play a crucial role in determining how economic adversity might 

affect the industry’s bottom line. Strong underwriting practices, effective management of loan concentrations, proper 

servicing procedures, and well-designed policies to hedge against market volatility were all cited as essential risk 

management tools for the industry. The true test of these industry practices will occur down the road when the 

recession scenario finally becomes a reality. 

To access the complete transcript of the 2006 FDIC Economic Outlook proceedings, 

https://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/2006_economic_outlook/index.html. 

Endnotes

1 See: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, In Focus This Quarter: Stroke-of-the-Pen Risk, FDIC Outlook, Fall 2005, 

https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/. 

2 In February and May 2005, the FDIC published two FYI reports on the topic of “U.S. Home Prices: Does Bust Always 

Follow Boom?” See: http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/index.html. 

3 The more conservative $444 billion estimate is the sum of Freddie Mac’s estimates for cash-out refinancings and 

increased loan balances from mortgage consolidation ($279 billion in 2005) plus the $165 billion gain in home equity 
 

 

 

lines of credit during 2005. The bigger estimate calculated by some analysts takes the $1,067 billion growth in total 

residential mortgages in 2005 and subtracts the $467 billion in new residential construction put in place last year. 

4 For more information, see: PMI Mortgage Insurance Co., “Economic and Real Estate Trends,” Winter 2006, 

http://www.pmigroup.com/lenders/media_lenders/pmi_eret06v1s.pdf. 

5 For additional information, see: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “U.S. Home Prices: Does Bust Always Follow 

Boom?” FYI, February 10, 2005 (revised April 8, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/index.html. 

6 According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the savings of U.S. households in 2005 totaled a negative $34 billion, 

or -0.4 percent of total disposable personal income for the year. Although the personal savings rate has trended 

consistently lower over the last 20 years, 2005 marks the first year since the Great Depression for which the ratio fell 

below zero. 

7 For more information, see: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, History of the Eighties—Lessons for the Future, 

Chapter 3, “Commercial Real Estate Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s, ” 

https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/index.html . 

Disclaimer

The views expressed in FYI are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal 

Deposit Insurance Corporation. Some of the information used in the preparation of this publication was obtained from 

publicly available sources that are considered reliable. However, the use of this information does not constitute an 

endorsement of its accuracy by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 

Last Updated 12/03/2018 
Chart 1

Recent history points to decade-long economic expansions 

punctuated by brief mid-cycle slowdowns.

Year/Qtr

Real Gross Domestic 

Product (SAAR, 

Bil.Chn.2000$) 

% Change - Year to 

Year

real GDP yr yr %

19791 6.55% 6.553779912

19792 2.61% 2.610929658

19793 2.34% 2.340899679

19794 1.31% 1.310001168

19801 1.44% 1.435676264

19802 -0.71% -0.706480601

19803 -1.58% -1.58014414

19804 -0.05% -0.049954849

19811 1.65% 1.650929845

19812 2.94% 2.9359448

19813 4.35% 4.354466069

19814 1.18% 1.178370274

19821 -2.46% -2.456900612

19822 -1.16% -1.162150358

19823 -2.71% -2.713047394

19824 -1.40% -1.398335677

19831 1.48% 1.481524406

19832 3.22% 3.216200119

19833 5.65% 5.654555273

19834 7.72% 7.720914101

19841 8.49% 8.489093608

19842 7.92% 7.922119018

19843 6.86% 6.861492407

19844 5.58% 5.579107414

19851 4.51% 4.510684585

19852 3.62% 3.620276307

19853 4.23% 4.225953573

19854 4.17% 4.171184603

19861 4.21% 4.205207407

19862 3.73% 3.731815307

19863 3.11% 3.113886294

19864 2.84% 2.842923592

19871 2.54% 2.538905178

19872 3.26% 3.257381258
19873 3.21% 3.20581083

19874 4.48% 4.481766138

19881 4.31% 4.306362922

19882 4.48% 4.483294483

19883 4.10% 4.096467182

19884 3.66% 3.659865593

19891 4.20% 4.202376828

19892 3.57% 3.569569421

19893 3.75% 3.753291712

19894 2.66% 2.661857898

19901 2.80% 2.804238158

19902 2.40% 2.395347167

19903 1.68% 1.678287776

19904 0.65% 0.65425479

19911-1.00%-1.002516838

19912-0.61%-0.614279904

19913-0.14%-0.141639087

19914 1.09% 1.090873122

19921 2.66% 2.66162936

19922 2.98% 2.983136951

19923 3.49% 3.494038507

19924 4.15% 4.145874394

19931 3.20% 3.202733737

19932 2.74% 2.735033366

19933 2.26% 2.259312029

19934 2.51% 2.505804824

19941 3.42% 3.423730177

19942 4.24% 4.24408136

19943 4.29% 4.292728238

19944 4.11% 4.113965486

19951 3.35% 3.351868414

19952 2.20% 2.204537022

19953 2.46% 2.463261022

19954 2.02% 2.017204085

19961 2.45% 2.451810326

19962 3.94% 3.944667001

19963 3.97% 3.968658032

19964 4.42% 4.42061144

19971 4.49% 4.491259854

19972 4.37% 4.368248004

19973 4.79% 4.789374993
19974 4.34% 4.342077303

19981 4.69% 4.687152212

19982 3.80% 3.802303307

19983 3.71% 3.706532022

19984 4.51% 4.510997466

19991 4.24% 4.244533471

19992 4.42% 4.41675097

19993 4.43% 4.432403917

19994 4.70% 4.698444317

20001 4.08% 4.08029628

20002 4.85% 4.847433086

20003 3.52% 3.519185031

20004 2.24% 2.2396625

20011 1.86% 1.856512232

20012 0.59% 0.588958052

20013 0.35% 0.350730944

20014 0.23% 0.225532733

20021 1.03% 1.029810847

20022 1.27% 1.268940732

20023 2.22% 2.224676075

20024 1.87% 1.874873865

20031 1.62% 1.616669841

20032 1.98% 1.981737709

20033 3.17% 3.173218905

20034 4.03% 4.029398364

20041 4.67% 4.674215375

20042 4.63% 4.630317485

20043 3.82% 3.822916367

20044 3.76% 3.756212747

20051 3.64% 3.644758539

20052 3.60% 3.597686868

20053 3.64% 3.639593298

20054 3.22% 3.216452084

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
Chart 2

Ten percent of U.S. consumers could experience a 

"recession" in the next 24 months.

Year Home Ownership Rate

1980 65.6

1981 65.4

1982 64.8

1983 64.6

1984 64.5

1985 63.9

1986 63.8

1987 64.0

1988 63.8

1989 63.9

1990 63.9

1991 64.1

1992 64.1

1993 64.0

1994 64.0

1995 64.7

1996 65.4

1997 65.7

1998 66.3

1999 66.8

2000 67.4

2001 67.8

2002 67.9

2003 68.3

2004 69.0

1Q05 69.1

2Q05 68.6

3Q05 68.8

Source: US Census Bureau, Federal Reserve, and CIBC World Markets
Chart 3 

The wave of bank and thrift failures during the 1980s and 

early 1990s dwarfs all other episodes of financial institution 

distress since the 1930s.

Year

Annual Number of 

Bank and Thrift 

Failures

Includes all FSLICand FDIC-insured 

institutions

1960 2 Recession Shading

1961 6

1962 2

1963 3

1964 8

1965 6

1966 8

1967 5

1968 4

1969 10

1970 7 Recession Shading

1971 7

1972 2

1973 6

1974 4 Recession Shading

1975 13 Recession Shading

1976 17

1977 6

1978 7

1979 10

1980 22 Recession Shading

1981 40

1982 119 Recession Shading

1983 99

1984 106

1985 180

1986 204

1987 263
1988 470

1989 534

1990 382 Recession Shading

1991 271

1992 181

1993 50

1994 15

1995 8

1996 6

1997 1

1998 3

1999 8

2000 7

2001 4 Recession Shading

2002 11

2003 3

2004 4

Source: FDIC