UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

TODD HUDSON, as personal representative ) 

of the Estate of WILLIAM HUDSON, Deceased, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Case No. 2:16-cv-41 

 ) 

ARCELORMITTAL BURNS HARBOR, ) 

LLC formerly known as ISG BURNS ) 

HARBOR, LLC, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the court on the Emergency Motion to Stay Expert Discovery, 

Compel Discovery Responses and for Leave to Conduct Additional Fact Discovery [DE 29] filed 

by the defendant, ArcelorMittal Burns Harbor, LLC, on April 26, 2017. For the following 

reasons, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

Background 

 William Hudson died while snowplowing at the ArcelorMittal facility on January 9, 

2014. The plaintiff, Todd Hudson as Personal Representative of the Estate of William Hudson, 

deceased, has alleged that the defendant, ArcelorMittal Burns Harbor, LLC, was negligent in 

failing to warn Hudson of a snow-covered manhole cover. Hudson unexpectedly hit the manhole 

cover triggering a cardiac event that led to his death. 

 On November 9, 2016, the parties filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Complete 

Discovery [DE 22]. In light of the parties’ agreement, the court set the following scheduling 

deadlines: all fact discovery completed by February 15, 2017; plaintiff’s expert witness 

disclosures and reports submitted by March 15, 2017; and defendant’s expert witness disclosures 
2 

and reports submitted by May 18, 2017. The plaintiff has indicated that fact discovery was 

completed timely and that there were no issues, complaints, objections, or outstanding matters 

raised by either party. On March 15, 2017, the plaintiff disclosed six expert witnesses and 

provided their reports to ArcelorMittal. The parties then scheduled dates for plaintiff’s experts 

to be deposed. The parties deposed three of the experts as scheduled, but following Coroner 

Chuck Harris’ deposition on April 19, 2017, ArcelorMittal filed this motion requesting that 

expert discovery be stayed and that fact discovery be reopened. The plaintiff’s remaining three 

experts have not been deposed. ArcelorMittal also has requested that the plaintiff supplement 

Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures and the response to Interrogatory No. 20. 

 ArcelorMittal did not file a separate Local Rule 37.1 certification along with its 

Emergency Motion to Stay Expert Discovery, Compel Discovery Responses and for Leave to 

Conduct Additional Fact Discovery [DE 29]. However, ArcelorMittal indicated in the motion 

that counsel had conferred telephonically with plaintiff’s counsel regarding the requested 

discovery extension. 

Discussion 

 “A party filing any discovery motion must file a separate certification that the party has 

conferred in good faith or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve 

the matter raised in the motion without court action.” N.D. Ind. L.R. 37-1(a). The certification 

must include the date, time, and place of any conference or attempted conference and the names 

of any participating parties. N.D. Ind. L.R. 37-1(a)(1) and (2). The court may deny any motion 

that failed to include the required certification. N.D. Ind. L.R. 37-1(b). 

 ArcelorMittal has indicated in the motion that it conferred with plaintiff’s counsel and 

that counsel objected to the request for a discovery extension. The court will address the 
3 

underlying issues rather than denying ArcelorMittal’s motion pursuant to Local Rule 37-1 and 

simply delaying a resolution of this dispute. See Felling v. Knight, 2001 WL 1782361, at *1 

(S.D. Ind. Dec. 21, 2001) (“[T]he briefs leave little doubt that the parties will not reach mutual 

agreement on the issues raised. Therefore, the court will address the underlying issues rather 

than deny the motion solely on the basis of a procedural shortcoming. To hold otherwise would 

do little other than delay resolution of these issues . . . .”). 

 ArcelorMittal has requested that the court stay expert discovery and that it reopen fact 

discovery for an additional 30 days. The court has incidental power to stay proceedings, which 

stems from its inherent power to manage its docket. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–

55, 57 S. Ct. 163, 166, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936); Tonn & Blank Constr., LLC v. Sebelius, 968 F. 

Supp. 2d 990, 992 (N.D. Ind. 2013). The decision to grant a stay is committed to the sound 

discretion of the court and must be exercised consistent with principles of fairness and judicial 

economy. Brooks v. Merck & Co., 443 F. Supp. 2d 994, 997 (S.D. Ill. 2006); Rutherford v. 

Merck & Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845 (S.D. Ill. 2006); Walker v. Monsanto Co. Pension Plan, 

472 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1054 (S.D. Ill. 2006). “Courts often consider the following factors when 

deciding whether to stay an action: (i) whether a stay will unduly prejudice or tactically 

disadvantage the non-moving party, (ii) whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and 

streamline the trial, and (iii) whether a stay will reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and 

on the court.” Abbott Labs. v. Matrix Labs., Inc., 2009 WL 3719214, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 

2009). “The general test for imposing a stay requires the court to ‘balance interests favoring a 

stay against interests frustrated by the action’ in light of the ‘court’s paramount obligation to 

exercise jurisdiction timely in cases properly before it.’” SanDisk Corp. v. Phison Elecs. Corp., 

538 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1066 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (citing Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United 
4 

States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed.Cir.1997)). The moving party must show good cause to stay 

discovery. Castrillon v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 2011 WL 4538089, at *1 

(S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2011) (applying Rule 26(c) good cause standard to motion to stay); DSM 

Desotech, Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp., 2008 WL 4812440, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct.28, 2008) (same). 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) provides that a schedule shall not be modified 

except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the court. See Campania Mgmt. Co., Inc. 

v. Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290 F.3d 843, 851 (7th Cir. 2002); Briesacher v. AMG Res., Inc., 2005 

WL 2105908, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2005). Good cause sufficient for altering discovery 

deadlines is demonstrated when a party shows that, “despite their diligence, the established 

timetable could not be met.” Tschantz v. McCann, 160 F.R.D. 568, 571 (N.D. Ind. 1995). 

 ArcelorMittal has requested that fact discovery be reopened for counsel to take the fact 

depositions of Dr. Dali and Deputy Coroner Dave Atkins. ArcelorMittal has indicated that it 

initially was reported that Dr. Dali had agreed to sign Hudson’s death certificate. Therefore, 

ArcelorMittal has argued that it is unclear what information was provided to Dr. Dali by 

plaintiff’s counsel or considered by him that later prompted him not to sign the death certificate. 

ArcelorMittal contends that the information considered by Dr. Dali was not disclosed in 

discovery, provided as foundational fact or data in his expert report, or included in the plaintiff’s 

Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures. The plaintiff contends that ArcelorMittal unilaterally canceled 

Dr. Dali’s deposition, and therefore it has not had the opportunity to question Dr. Dali regarding 

these issues. 

 ArcelorMittal requested in the Motion to Compel the Limited Non-Expert Medical 

Discovery Depositions of Coroner Harris and Dr. Sammi M. Dali, M.D. [DE 25] filed on 

December 2, 2016, that it depose Dr. Dali both in his non-expert capacity and as an expert. On 
5 

January 24, 2017, the court issued an Opinion and Order [DE 28] indicating that there was no 

reason for ArcelorMittal to take Dr. Dali’s deposition twice. The court reasoned that 

ArcelorMittal would have time to depose Dr. Dali, as well as have ample time to prepare its 

experts. ArcelorMittal has not indicated that there has been a significant change in the law or 

facts since it originally presented this issue to the court. 

 Next, ArcelorMittal has indicated that Harris testified to the involvement of an additional 

witness, Deputy Coroner Atkins, who assisted in the investigation of Hudson’s death. Atkins’ 

involvement in Hudson’s death investigation was disclosed in the Coroner’s Verdict, which was 

produced to ArcelorMittal’s counsel in plaintiff’s Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures. Therefore, 

ArcelorMittal should have been aware that Atkins was involved in Hudson’s death investigation 

since the beginning of this matter, and it had every opportunity to seek additional information 

from him during fact discovery. ArcelorMittal has not offered a legitimate reason for not 

deposing Atkins earlier or any new evidence to the contrary. ArcelorMittal has not demonstrated 

good cause that, “despite its diligence the established timetable could not be met.” Tschantz, 

160 F.R.D. at 571. Therefore, the court DENIES staying expert discovery and reopening fact 

discovery for the purpose of taking the depositions of Dr. Dali and Deputy Coroner Atkins. 

 A party may seek an order to compel discovery when an opposing party fails to respond 

to discovery requests or has provided evasive or incomplete responses. Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 37(a)(2)–(3). The burden “rests upon the objecting party to show why a particular 

discovery request is improper.” Gregg v. Local 305 Ibew, 2009 WL 1325103, at *8 (N.D. Ind. 

May 13, 2009) (citing Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 235 F.R.D. 447, 449–50 

(N.D. Ill. 2006)); McGrath v. Everest Nat. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 1325405, at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 

13, 2009) (internal citations omitted); Carlson Rests. Worldwide, Inc. v. Hammond Prof’l 
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Cleaning Servs., 2009 WL 692224, at *5 (N.D. Ind. March 12, 2009) (internal citations omitted). 

The objecting party must show with specificity that the request is improper. Cunningham v. 

Smithkline Beecham, 255 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (citing Graham v. Casey’s Gen. 

Stores, 206 F.R.D. 253, 254 (S.D. Ind. 2002)). The court, under its broad discretion, considers 

“the totality of the circumstances, weighing the value of material sought against the burden of 

providing it, and taking into account society’s interest in furthering the truth-seeking function in 

the particular case before the court.” Berning v. UAW Local 2209, 242 F.R.D. 510, 512 (N.D. 

Ind. 2007) (examining Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 2002)) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted); see Hunt v. DaVita, Inc., 680 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 

2012) (explaining that the district court has broad discretion in supervising discovery). 

 ArcelorMittal has requested that the plaintiff supplement the Rule 26(a)(1) initial 

disclosures. Without awaiting a discovery request, a party must provide to the other parties 

(i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number 

of each individual likely to have discoverable information—

along with the subjects of that information—that the 

disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, 

unless the use would be solely for impeachment; 

(ii) a copy—or a description by category and location—of all 

documents, electronically stored information, and tangible 

things that the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, 

or control and may use to support its claims or defenses, 

unless the use would be solely for impeachment . . . . 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). “A party must make the initial 

disclosures at or within 14 days after the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference unless a different time is 

set by stipulation or court order, or unless a party objects during the conference that initial 

disclosures are not appropriate . . . .” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(C). “A party 

must make its initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available to it . . .[and] 
7 

is not excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully investigated the case . . . .” 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(E). Additionally, a party has a duty to supplement or 

correct a Rule 26(a) disclosure. 

 A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)—or who has responded to an 

interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission—must supplement or correct its 

disclosure or response: 

(A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or 

response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information 

has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process 

or in writing; or 

(B) as ordered by the court. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(1)(A) and (B).

 ArcelorMittal has argued that the plaintiff failed to disclose Atkins as a witness in the 

Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures. However, the plaintiff has indicated that he does not intend to 

use Atkins as a witness to support his case and that there was no duty to disclose him under 

26(a)(1). See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 advisory committee’s notes (2000) (“A party 

is no longer obligated to disclose witnesses or documents, whether favorable or unfavorable, that 

it does not intend to use.”). 

 Next, ArcelorMittal has argued that plaintiff’s counsel was not identified in Rule 26(a)(1) 

initial disclosures despite having possessed discoverable information regarding the 

circumstances that prompted Hudson’s death investigation by the Porter County Coroner’s 

office. An attorney has an obligation to prepare a case and that includes interviewing witnesses. 

Defense counsel has no right to interview plaintiff’s counsel concerning his trial preparations, 

mental impressions, or conversations with potential witnesses. The court WARNS that such 

requests will be denied. 
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 Coroner Chuck Harris was deposed on April 19, 2017. ArcelorMittal has argued that 

Harris’ testimony revealed new information. First, ArcelorMittal has alleged that it was aware 

that Harris had received a letter from plaintiff’s counsel on January 16, 2014, regarding a 

possible coroner’s investigation. However, it contends that it was unaware that Harris had 

discussed the case with plaintiff’s counsel by telephone after receiving the letter. ArcelorMittal 

has alleged that after discussing the case with plaintiff’s counsel Harris then “agreed” to have an 

autopsy done if counsel arranged to have the body transported to Porter Regional Hospital. 

ArcelorMittal contends that it is unclear what information was provided to Harris that prompted 

him to perform an autopsy. ArcelorMittal has indicated that these interactions were not 

disclosed in an interrogatory that requested information about such conversations. It also has 

alleged that such conversations with Dr. Dali were not disclosed, as well. 

 Specifically, ArcelorMittal contends that the plaintiff’s answer to Interrogatory No. 20 

was evasive and inaccurate. Interrogatory No. 20 asked the following: 

Have you (or has anyone acting on your behalf) had any conversations with any 

person at any time with regard to the manner in which the occurrence complained 

of occurred, or have you overheard any statements made by any person at any 

time with regard to the injuries complained of by plaintiff or to the manner in 

which the occurrence complained of occurred? If the answer to this interrogatory 

is in the affirmative, state the date or dates of such conversations and/or 

statements; the matters and things stated by the person in the conversation and/or 

statements; whether the conversation was oral, written, and or recorded; and who 

has possession of the statements if written and/or recorded. 

The plaintiff responded, “No.” The plaintiff has represented that counsel was retained on 

January 14, 2014, and that no action was taken until that time. Therefore, any information 

obtained was during the course and scope of the investigation and in anticipation of litigation. 

The plaintiff contends that those communications were protected by the attorney work-product 

privilege. Despite the arguments made, the court in considering the totality of the circumstances 
9 

finds that Interrogatory No. 20 was overly broad and is therefore STRICKEN. The court will 

not compel the plaintiff to supplement a response to Interrogatory No. 20. 

 Next, ArcelorMittal has argued that it is entitled to know what facts and data plaintiff’s 

experts considered in forming their expert reports. First, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 26(a)(2)(A), parties must disclose the identity of any witness who may present 

evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705. A retained or specially employed 

expert witness must disclose a written report prepared and signed by the witness. Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B); see Banister v. Burton, 636 F.3d 828, 833 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(“[O]nly those witnesses ‘retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony’ must 

submit an expert report complying with Rule 26(a)(2)(B).” (citing Musser v. Gentiva Health 

Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 756–57 (7th Cir. 2004)). The expert report serves the purpose of putting 

the opposing party on notice of the expert’s proposed testimony, so the opposing party may form 

an appropriate response. Meyers v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 619 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 

2010); Musser, 356 F.3d at 757–58. 

 Following the 2010 amendments to Rule 26, Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) requires that the written 

report contain, among other things, “the facts or data considered by the witness.” The Advisory 

Committee Notes indicated that requiring the disclosure of “facts or data” was “meant to limit 

disclosure to material of a factual nature by excluding the theories or mental impressions of 

counsel” but at the same time should be “interpreted broadly to require disclosure of any material 

considered by the expert, from whatever source, that contains factual ingredients.” Rule 26, 

advisory committee notes (2010). Any “further communications about the potential relevance of 

the facts or data” that may have been provided to plaintiff’s experts are protected from discovery. 

Rule 26, advisory committee notes (2010). 
10 

 The plaintiff has argued that the communications are protected by the attorney workproduct privilege. The core of attorney work product consists of “the mental impressions, 

conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning 

the litigation.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(B). The Seventh Circuit held in 

Binks Mfg. Co. v. National Presto Industries, Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1119 (7th Cir. 1983) that 

“the test should be whether, in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the 

particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the 

prospect of litigation.” The work-product doctrine is designed to protect an attorney's thought 

processes and mental impressions against disclosure and to limit the circumstances in which 

attorneys may piggyback on the fact-finding investigation of their more diligent counterparts. 

Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 621–22 (7th Cir. 2010); See also

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385, 95 L. Ed. 451 (1947). If an attorney personally 

prepares a memorandum of an interview of a witness with an eye toward litigation, such 

memorandum qualifies as work product. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 

487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970). 

 However, work-product protection does not apply to communications that identify facts 

or data the attorney provided and the expert considered, or assumptions the attorney provided 

and the expert relied on. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(C)(ii) and (iii). The 

plaintiff is ORDERED to disclose any facts, data, or assumptions that plaintiff’s experts 

considered in forming their reports, even if derived from communication with plaintiff’s counsel. 

 The plaintiff has requested that the court enter sanctions against ArcelorMittal pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), which authorizes sanctions when “a party ... fails 

to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” The plaintiff has requested that ArcelorMittal 
11 

be precluded from deposing plaintiff’s remaining experts and be awarded costs and attorneys’ 

fees for responding to this motion. The court finds that an award of sanctions under the 

circumstances is unjust and will not preclude ArcelorMittal from taking the remaining 

depositions. 

 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Emergency Motion to Stay Expert Discovery, 

Compel Discovery Responses and for Leave to Conduct Additional Fact Discovery [DE 29] is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The court RESETS the deadline for ArcelorMittal 

to disclose expert witnesses and submit written reports to June 26, 2017. 

 ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2017. 

 /s/ Andrew P. Rodovich 

 United States Magistrate Judge