UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

JASON SANFORD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 1:16-CV-128-TLS

)

THOR INDUSTRIES, INC., and DS CORP., )

d/b/a/ CROSSROADS RV, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 25] 

filed by Defendants Thor Industries, Inc., and DS Corp., d/b/a/ Crossroads RV (“the

Defendants”). The Plaintiff, Jason Sanford, filed his Complaint [ECF No. 1] on April 13, 2016, 

asserting claims for failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(ADA), wrongful termination, retaliation in violation of the ADA and Title VII, and intentional 

and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress.

1 The Plaintiff responded to the Defendants’ 

Motion on December 20, 2017 [ECF No. 29], and the Defendants replied on January 3, 2018 

[ECF No. 31]. This matter is now fully briefed and ripe for review.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff began working for Crossroads, a recreational vehicle (RV) manufacturer, in 

May 2013. Initially, the Plaintiff assisted in assembling the floors of RV units, including 

 1 The Plaintiff admits that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on his claims for intentional 

and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Court, therefore, will not address these claims.
2

installing wiring, connecting tanks, laying carpeting, and installing linoleum. The Plaintiff later 

became a “midline reworker” and eventually a trimmer. As a trimmer, the Plaintiff primarily 

installed trim above and inside cabinets and around the door casing, which required the Plaintiff 

to hold the trim with one hand and install it with the other hand. The Plaintiff would have to 

carry a ladder between units, “nailers” for securing the trim, and bundles of trim.

On October 3, 2013, the Plaintiff was injured while installing trim around a door casing 

when another employee kicked open the door, smashing the Plaintiff’s wrist. The Plaintiff filed a 

worker’s compensation occupational injury report and claim the day of the injury. According to 

the Plaintiff, his supervisor forced him to work for the remainder of the day. The Plaintiff also 

claims that, upon returning to work the next day, his supervisor threatened to fire him if he went 

to the plant manager to seek medical attention.

The Plaintiff was treated at Parkview Total Health on October 4, 2013, where he received 

medical restrictions that did not allow any use of his right arm or hand. The Plaintiff visited a 

doctor on October 8, 2013, where his wrist was placed in a splint for two weeks. Eventually the

Plaintiff scheduled surgery for his wrist on November 20, 2013.

Prior to his surgery, the Plaintiff returned to Crossroads where he was given light duty 

work such as cleaning bathrooms, picking up screws around the facility, and taking off electrical 

outlets, receptacles, and door casings; however, the Plaintiff insisted that he was unable to 

complete any of these duties due to his medical restrictions. While taking off receptacles and 

door casings, multiple wood doors fell on top of him, which, the Plaintiff asserts, further 

exacerbated his wrist injury.

On November 20, 2013, the Plaintiff underwent an arthroscopic debridement surgery on 

his wrist. He was not permitted to return to work until December 2, 2013, and he was not 
3

permitted to use his right arm, hand, or wrist. At that time, the Plaintiff was given light duty 

office work, which involved preparing new-hire packets, putting stickers on those packets, and 

stuffing envelopes. According to the Plaintiff, when he expressed concern with his ability to 

perform this work, he was met with sarcastic comments and threats of termination. This work

assignment lasted until December 20, 2013, which was the last day the Plaintiff performed any 

work for Crossroads and went on medical leave. Thereafter, the Plaintiff claims he was subjected 

to verbal abuse when he went to pick up his paychecks.

On February 20, 2014, the Plaintiff’s physician determined that the Plaintiff was not 

progressing with therapy, his pain was increasing, and his functionality was decreasing. The 

Plaintiff underwent a second surgery on June 27, 2014, at which point he was told he could not 

return to work until July 7, 2014, and that it could be one to three years before he could return to 

work. As of October 1, 2014, the Plaintiff’s physician still had not released him to return to 

work, and the physician’s notes indicated that the Plaintiff’s “right grip/grasp was nonfunctional 

and task could not be progressed.” A Work Rehab Progress Report dated October 28, 2014, 

reflected the same.

Although there was communication between Crossroads and the Plaintiff regarding the 

status of his medical condition, there was no discussion about any potential accommodations that 

would allow the Plaintiff to return to work with his medical restrictions. On January 7, 2015, the 

medical case management firm overseeing the Plaintiff’s medical leave issued a closure report 

stating that the Plaintiff’s treating physician concluded that the Plaintiff had reached maximum 

medical improvement and assigned him permanent restrictions. The Plaintiff was terminated that 

same day.
4

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper where the evidence of record shows that there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden 

of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record it 

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then 

shifts to the non-movant to “go beyond the pleadings” to cite evidence of a genuine factual 

dispute precluding summary judgment. Id. at 324. “[A] court has one task and one task only: to 

decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that 

requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Heochst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). If the nonmovant does not come forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to 

find in its favor on a material issue, then the Court must enter summary judgment against it. Id.

ANALYSIS

A. Failure to Accommodate

The Plaintiff argues that Crossroads failed to accommodate his disability, in violation of 

the ADA. To state a claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA, “a plaintiff must show 

that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer was aware of [his] 

disability; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the disability.” Bunn v. 

Khoury Enter., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 682 (7th Cir. 2014). The parties do not dispute that 

Crossroads was aware of the Plaintiff’s disability. The parties do, however, dispute whether the 

Plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability and, if he does so qualify, whether the 

Defendant reasonably accommodated his disability as required by the ADA.
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1. Qualified Individual with a Disability

It is well-established that the ADA protects only a qualified individual with a disability.

See Basith v. Cook Cty., 241 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2001). “To determine whether someone is a 

‘qualified individual with a disability,’ we apply a two-step test.” Id. “First, we consider whether 

‘the individual satisfies the prerequisites for the position, such as possessing the appropriate 

educational background, employment experience, skills, licenses, etc.’” Id. (quoting Bombard v. 

Fort Wayne Newspaper, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996)). “If he does, then we must 

consider ‘whether or not the individual can perform the essential functions of the position held or 

desired, with or without reasonable accommodation.’” Id. (quoting Bombard, 92 F.3d at 563). 

The parties do not appear to dispute that the Plaintiff satisfied the prerequisites for the trimmer

position. Rather, the dispute centers on whether the Plaintiff could perform the essential 

functions of the trimmer position.

“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment 

position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). “The 

employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and [courts] will not second-guess 

that decision.” Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 2009). “The term 

‘essential functions’ does not include the marginal functions of the position.” Nicholas v. Acuity 

Lighting Group, Inc., No. 1:03CV1005, 2005 WL 280341, at *9 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (quoting 29 

C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)). “While the amount of time spent performing a task is but one factor to 

consider, a duty is ‘not essential if it [is] so small a part that it could be reassigned to other 

employees at negligible cost to the employer.” Shell v. Smith, 789 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Kauffman v. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC, 769 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2014)).
6

The Plaintiff asserts that with reasonable accommodation, he could still perform the 

trimmer position. The parties dispute which functions are essential to the trimmer position. 

Crossroads claims that the essential functions of the position include pushing and pulling for two 

hours every shift and lifting zero to five pounds for two hours every shift. The lifting 

requirements include lifting a nailer, a ladder or step stool, and bundles of trim. The nailers at 

issue weigh up to four pounds, the ladders and step stools weigh up to eight pounds, and the 

typical bundle of trim weighs up to ten pounds. The Plaintiff’s permanent medical restrictions 

limit him to lifting two pounds with his right hand.

The Plaintiff argues that he would have been able to perform the trimmer job with 

reasonable accommodation. For example, he argues that he could have used his left hand to 

handle much of the pushing, pulling, and lifting requirements. He asserts that he could use his 

right hand to hold up a piece of trim, which weighed about 10 ounces, and use the nailer with his 

left hand. He argues that another member of his team could carry the ladders and step stools for 

him. Further, the amount of trim an employee carried at any given time was up to that employee, 

so the Plaintiff could simply make more trips with lighter loads.

However, the Plaintiff testified, under oath, that he could not perform this job in light of 

his permanent lifting restriction. When asked which jobs he thought he could perform, the 

Plaintiff did not mention the trimmer position and, more importantly, stated that with his 

restrictions, he could not use a nailer and “wouldn’t be able to replace trim and stuff like that.” 

(Sanford Dep. 113:19–114:4, ECF No. 31-1.) Undoubtedly, using a nailer and replacing trim are 

essential functions of the trimmer position. The Plaintiff cannot now contradict that testimony to 

withstand summary judgment.

2 A party cannot create an issue of fact on summary judgment by 

 2 The Plaintiff argues that he did not admit he could not perform the trimmer position because the relevant 

questions during his deposition referred to whether he could perform his past job, which included other 
7

submitting an affidavit that flatly contradicts prior sworn testimony. See, e.g., Russell v. AcmeEvans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 67–68 (7th Cir. 1995). In the instant case, the Plaintiff does not even 

offer an affidavit; he asserts these arguments in his summary judgment brief and offers no 

support for them whatsoever. Thus, as a matter of law, the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he is 

a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA for the trimmer position.

2. Reasonable Accommodation

The ADA defines “reasonable accommodation” as “job restructuring, part-time or 

modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,” and other types of 

accommodations not relevant here. See Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 

(7th Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)). The Plaintiff asserts that he could perform other 

existing positions even with his medical restrictions. Specifically, the Plaintiff claims that he 

would have been able to work as a puttier, inspector, reworker, cabinetmaker, forklift driver, or 

group leader. Thus, the Plaintiff argues, Crossroads could have reassigned him to a position he 

could perform, and because Crossroads failed to do so, it failed to reasonably accommodate him.

The duty to reassign is not without limits. Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 

667, 678 (7th Cir. 1998). For example, “an employer has no duty to ‘bump’ an incumbent from a 

position just to accommodate the request of a disabled employee.” Id. And, “[n]othing in the 

ADA requires an employer to abandon its legitimate, nondiscriminatory company policies 

defining job qualifications, prerequisites, and entitlements to intra-company transfers.” Id. “An 

employer need not create a new job or strip a current job of its principal duties to accommodate a 

 

responsibilities that he could not perform with his medical restrictions. Regardless of the context of the 

line of questioning the Plaintiff references, elsewhere in his deposition he specifically testified that he 

would be unable to use a nailer or replace trim.
8

disabled employee. Nor is there any duty to reassign an employee to a permanent light duty 

position.” Gratzl v. Office of Chief Judges of 12th, 18th, 19th, & 22nd Judicial Cirs., 601 F.3d 

674, 680 (7th Cir. 2010).

The Plaintiff argues that, had Crossroads engaged in the requisite interactive process to 

explore possible accommodations, it could have identified vacancies in the positions he asserts 

he could perform. “To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary 

for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a 

disability in need of the accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). The parties dispute whether 

Crossroads adequately initiated such an interactive process. There is no dispute that Crossroads

regularly communicated with the Plaintiff while he was on leave. There also appears to be no 

dispute that Crossroads and the Plaintiff never discussed his possible return to work in an 

alternate position.

However, even if the Plaintiff proved that Crossroads failed to engage in the interactive 

process, that is not sufficient to recover under the ADA. He must also show that Crossroads’ 

“failure to engage in an interactive process resulted in a failure to identify an appropriate 

accommodation.” Rehling v. City of Chi., 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000)). “It is the 

plaintiff’s burden to show that a vacant position exists for which he was qualified” Ozlowski v. 

Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Rehling, 207 F.3d at 1015), and the 

Plaintiff has not come forward with any such evidence. The Plaintiff argues that it is reasonable 

to infer that a position that would reasonably accommodate the Plaintiff would have become 

available within a reasonable period of time. He bases this “reasonable inference” on the fact that

turnover in the industry was between thirty and forty percent, production jobs were available in 

January 2014, and new employees were being hired weekly. However, this is only speculation.
9

“A party must present more than mere speculation or conjecture to defeat a summary judgment 

motion.” Liu v. T&H Machine, Inc., 191 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Sybron Transition 

Corp. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 107 F.3d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1997)). “Summary judgment is 

not a time to be coy: ‘[c]onclusory statements not grounded in specific facts’ are not enough.” 

Sommerfield v. City of Chi., 863 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bordelon v. Bd. of Educ. of 

the City of Chi., 811 F.3d 984, 989 (7th Cir. 2016)).

Regardless, whether a position would have opened up in a reasonable amount of time is 

not the question. The question is whether there was available position at the time the Plaintiff 

was terminated. See McCreary v. Libbey-Ownes-Ford Co., 132 F.3d 1159, 1165 (7th Cir. 1997) 

(“[The plaintiff] needed to show that a vacant position . . . was available at the time [the 

defendant] fired him.”); Mazzacone v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1027 

(N.D. Ind. 2016) (noting that “the Plaintiff must produce evidence that such positions were 

vacant at the pertinent time”) (citing Dalton, 141 F.3d at 678); see also Mullon v. Horseshoe 

Hammond, Inc., No. 2:01-CV-270, 2005 WL 2007154, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 18, 2005) (finding 

that the plaintiff failed to “establish that a full time position . . . was available at the time she 

became disabled”). The Plaintiff argues that Crossroads’ “self-serving statement . . . that no 

production jobs were vacant at the time [the Plaintiff’s] restrictions were placed cannot establish 

the lack of a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.” (Def. Resp. Br. 17, ECF No. 29.) 

This argument misses the mark. First, “self-serving statements” can be sufficient on summary 

judgment if they are supported by facts in the record and “meet[] the usual requirements for 

evidence on summary judgment.” See Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 

2004). Additionally, Crossroads does not need to establish that there were no vacancies at the 

time of the Plaintiff’s termination; it is the Plaintiff’s burden to prove that vacancies existed. See 
10

Ozlowski, 237 F.3d at 840. And, the Plaintiff has not shown at the time of his termination that 

there were any vacancies in the positions that he asserts he could have performed. See Novak v. 

Nicholson, 231 F. App’x 489, 492 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Although [the plaintiff] pointed to several 

positions in which he was interested, he did not present any evidence that there were vacancies in 

those positions.”). The Plaintiff also faults Crossroads for failing even to consider reassigning 

him to a vacant position. “[Crossroads’] failure to consider reassignment to a qualifying vacant 

position would tend to prove that [Crossroads] failed to reasonably accommodate [the Plaintiff’s] 

disability if such a vacant position existed, but it does nothing to prove that one did.” Walter v. 

Wal-Mart Stores Inc., No. 4:09-CV-15, 2011 WL 4537931, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2011). 

Therefore, the Court will grant the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s 

claim for failure to accommodate in violation of the ADA.

B. Wrongful Discharge

Under Indiana law, an employee has a cause of action against his employer if he is 

discharged in retaliation for exercising his statutorily-conferred right to seek worker’s 

compensation benefits. Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas. Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973). “To 

survive a motion for summary judgment in a Frampton case, an employee must show more than 

a filing of a worker’s compensation claim and the discharge itself.” Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 

776 N.E.2d 1251, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “The employee must present evidence that the 

employer’s asserted lawful reason for discharge is a pretext.” Id. That is, the Plaintiff must show 

“‘rapidity and proximity in time’ between the employee’s filing for benefits and the discharge 

. . . or . . . evidence that the employer’s proffered reason for the discharge is ‘patently 

inconsistent with the evidence before the Court.’” Mack v. Great Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d 776, 
11

784 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Markley Enters., Inc. v. Grover, 716 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1999)).

1. Rapidity and Proximity in Time

The Plaintiff filed his worker’s compensation occupational injury report and claim on 

October 3, 2013, and he was terminated over a year later in January of 2015. Courts “uniformly 

hold that the temporal proximity must be very close.” Tungjunyatham v. Johanns, No. 1:06-cv1764, 2009 WL 3823920, at *17 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that “[i]t has been held that . . . less 

than three months is sufficiently close,” but “longer periods are too attenuated to support the 

inference”). In fact, a year-long lapse “tends to negate, rather than support, an inference of 

causation.” Mack, 308 F.3d at 784 (citing Goetze v. Ferro Corp., 280 F.3d 766, 774 (7th Cir. 

2002) (applying Indiana law)). The Plaintiff argues that he has shown a close temporal proximity 

because he was terminated on the day his worker’s compensation claim closed. The Seventh 

Circuit rejected a similar argument in Mack. In Mack, the plaintiff “attempt[ed] to shorten the 

relevant time lapse by asserting that he ‘was fired on the very day his employer discovered the 

fact that [the plaintiff] was going to end his worker’s compensation claim’—that is, when [the 

defendant] received [the physician’s] report suggesting that [the plaintiff’s] injury would not 

likely improve and that his work limitations would be permanent . . . .” Id. The filing of a 

worker’s compensation claim, not its closure, determines temporal proximity under Indiana law. 

In this case, more than a year passed between such a filing and the Plaintiff’s termination. 

Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot establish temporal proximity.
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2. Consistency with the Evidence

The Plaintiff may establish pretext through another avenue under Indiana law. To show 

pretext, the Plaintiff may also show that Crossroads’ proffered reason for his termination is 

patently inconsistent with the evidence before the Court. Crossroads has offered a 

nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action, namely that the Plaintiff could not perform the 

essential functions of the trimmer position or of any other then-vacant position for which the 

Plaintiff was qualified. Crossroads received numerous reports over the course of the Plaintiff’s 

leave that the Plaintiff could not return to work in any capacity and may not have been able to 

return to work for one to three years. When the Plaintiff’s worker’s compensation claim was 

finally closed, the Plaintiff had a permanent restriction that Crossroads believed precluded the 

Plaintiff from returning to his position as a trimmer, and Crossroads testified that there were no 

vacant positions available that it believed the Plaintiff could perform with that permanent 

restriction. The plant manager testified that at the time of the Plaintiff’s termination, he was 

under the impression that the Plaintiff was unable to use his right arm or hand at all.

The burden is therefore on the Plaintiff to produce evidence that this reason is merely 

pretextual and that a discriminatory motive was the determining factor. The Plaintiff’s opinion 

with respect to his ability to perform the essential function of any position, even if true in all 

respects, is insufficient to establish pretext because whether Crossroads’ decision was objective, 

wise, fair, or even correct is not relevant. See Powdertech, 776 N.E.2d at 1260 (“[T]he issue of 

pretext does not address the correctness or desirability of reasons offered for employment 

decisions.”); Smeigh v. Johns Manville, Inc., 643 F.3d 554, 561 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The focus of a 

pretext inquiry is whether the employer’s stated reason was honest, not whether it was accurate, 

wise or well-considered.”); Harley v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1997) 
13

(“Plaintiffs lose if the company honestly believed in the nondiscriminatory reasons it offered, 

even if the reasons are foolish or trivial or even baseless.”).

The Plaintiff has not come forward with evidence that demonstrates that Crossroads did 

not honestly believe these reasons warranted the Plaintiff’s termination. As noted above, the 

Plaintiff admitted he could not perform the essential functions of the trimmer position. Further, 

the Plaintiff is unable to meet his burden to show that at the time of his termination, there were 

vacant positions for which he was qualified and for which he could perform the essential 

functions.

Courts do “not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business 

decision.” Powdertech, 776 N.E.2d at 1260. “Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the 

employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). That 

Crossroads decided to terminate the Plaintiff after the determination that he had reached 

maximum medical improvement is not “patently inconsistent with the evidence before the 

Court,” and the Plaintiff has not produced evidence to the contrary. See Mack, 308 F.3d at 784 

(quoting Markley Enter., 716 N.E.2d at 565). Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment 

as to the Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim.

C. Retaliation Claims

The Plaintiff alleges that Crossroads retaliated against him in violation of both the ADA 

and Title VII. Retaliation claims under the ADA and Title VII are analyzed under the same 

standard. See Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2016). The standard “is 

simply whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s 

race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse 
14

employment action.” Ortiz v. Werner Enter., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). A prima facie 

case of retaliation under the ADA or Title VII requires the Plaintiff to show that: (1) he was 

engaged in activity protected by the ADA or Title VII; (2) he suffered an adverse employment 

action; and (3) there exists a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 

employment action.3 See Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 765 (7th Cir. 2001).

1. Retaliation Under Title VII

Title VII protects an employee from discrimination when “he has opposed any practice 

made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter . . . . “ 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-3(a). The 

Plaintiff argues that he had a “reasonable belief that the Defendants’ conduct constituted an 

unlawful employment practice and that voicing a complaint about such a practice invoked the 

protection of Section 2000(e)-3(a) (1982) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 

amended.” (Compl. ¶ 74.) The alleged unlawful conduct the Plaintiff references is the failure to 

change working conditions and provide the Plaintiff with proper FMLA forms and disability 

applications. (Id. at ¶ 75.) The Plaintiff asserts that, in retaliation, the Defendants falsified 

documents, violated his work restrictions, and eventually terminated him. (Id. at ¶¶ 73, 76.)

The Court first examines whether the Plaintiff engaged in activity protected by Title VII 

when he complained about the violation of his work restrictions and failure to receive FMLA 

forms. The Plaintiff’s expressed concerns centered around his disability and violation of his work 

 3 This is known as the “direct” method of proof. A plaintiff may also show retaliation using the “indirect” 

method of proof, which requires a plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim to demonstrate that (1) he 

“engaged in statutorily protected activity”; (2) he “was performing his job satisfactorily” and (3) he “was 

singled out for an adverse employment action that similarly situated employees who did not engage in 

protected activity did not suffer.” Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. Of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 

601–02 (7th Cir. 2011). However, neither party has argued the indirect method, so the Court will not 

address it.
15

restrictions. However, Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on disability. Thus, 

the Plaintiff has no recourse under Title VII.

2. Retaliation Under the ADA

The Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong of the retaliation framework under the ADA. 

“The ADA prohibits a person from discriminating against any individual because such individual 

has ‘opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA].’” Albiero v. Town of Goodland, 

No. 4:11-CV-45, 2012 WL 523714, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 16, 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12203(a)). Requests for accommodation are protected activity under the ADA. See Preddie v. 

Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 806, 814–815 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Mobley v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 549 (7th Cir. 2008)). Therefore, drawing all inferences in favor 

of the Plaintiff, his voiced complaints regarding his ability to do the tasks assigned to him with 

his medical restrictions were protected activity.

The Court next addresses whether the Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. 

The Plaintiff appears to argue that he suffered multiple adverse employment actions, including 

being subjected to derogatory and offensive conduct, ridiculed, and eventually terminated. “A 

cognizable adverse employment action is a ‘significant change in employment status, such as 

hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a 

decision causing a significant change in benefits.’” Chaudhry v. Nucor Steel-Ind., 546 F.3d 832, 

838 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir. 2000)). The Plaintiff was 

terminated from his position, which is an adverse employment action within the meaning of the 

ADA.
16

However, the Court’s analysis does not end there. The Plaintiff must also show a causal 

connection between his protected activity and his termination. “A plaintiff demonstrates a causal 

connection by showing that the defendant ‘would not have taken the adverse . . . action but for 

[his] protected activity.’” Baines v. Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting 

Greengrass v. Int’l Monetary Sys Ltd., 776 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 2015)). As discussed above, 

the length of time that passed between the alleged protected activity and the adverse action—

over a year—does not tend to show causality; Crossroads has offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the Plaintiff’s termination, namely that he could no longer perform the 

essential functions of the trimmer position; and the Plaintiff has not come forward with any 

evidence suggesting that Crossroads’ reason is pretextual.

Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment as to the Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment [ECF No.25]. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the 

Defendants and against the Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED on February 9, 2018.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT