UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

BRIAN NORRIS, SR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Cause No. 3:15-cv-466 RLM-MGG

)

MYERS SPRING COMPANY INC., )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

I. BACKGROUND

On or about March 15, 2013 while on a jobsite in Collegeville, 

Pennsylvania, plaintiff Brian Norris was elevated about four and one-half feet on 

a scaffolding when it allegedly collapsed. On March 10, 2015, Mr. Norris brought 

a products liability action against Myers Spring in the Court of Common Pleas 

of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. Mr. Norris argues there were defects in 

the design of the scaffolding and manufacture of the spring. The focus of Mr. 

Norris’ claim is the condition of a latch for the scaffolding and the latch’s spring 

component at the time of the accident. Myers Spring manufactured the spring to 

Sonny Scaffolding’s specifications and incorporated it into the product’s latch 

system. It is undisputed this design, manufacture and assembly occurred 

entirely within Indiana. 

Myers Spring removed the case to the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania and moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
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12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the motion and

transferred the case to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Norris v. Myers Spring 

Company, et al., No. 5:15-cv-2687 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2015). Myers Spring now 

asks this court to determine which state’s substantive law that should apply to 

this case under Indiana’s choice-of-law principles. For the reasons stated below, 

Pennsylvania laws apply. 

II. DISCUSSION

In resolving a conflict of laws question, a federal court sitting in diversity 

generally applies the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon Co. 

v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The situation is more 

complicated when the federal court deciding the question has had the case 

transferred to it from another federal court. When a case is transferred to cure a 

lack of jurisdiction, the transferee forum’s law must apply, lest plaintiffs from 

enjoying choice-of-law advantages to which they wouldn’t have been entitled in 

the proper forum. W. Smelting & Metals, Inc. v. Slater Steel, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 

578, 581–582 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (citing Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 593 

n.1 (7th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)). This conclusion is supported by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1631. If a case is transferred because of a want of jurisdiction, the action “shall 

proceed as if it had been filed in . . . the court to which it is transferred . . . .” 28 

U.S.C. § 1631. Accordingly, this court will apply Indiana’s choice-of-law rules.

Indiana’s choice-of-law analysis involves multiple inquiries in tort cases. 

As a preliminary matter, the court first determines whether the differences 
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between the laws of the states are “important enough to affect the outcome of 

the litigation.” Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d at 804–805 (citing Hubbard

Mfg. Co., v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (7th Cir. 1987). If so, the 

presumption is that the traditional lex loci delicti rule (the place of the wrong) will 

apply. Hubbard v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d at 1073. Under this rule, the court 

applies the substantive laws of “the state where the last event necessary to make 

an actor liable for the alleged wrong takes place.” Id. This presumption can be 

overcome if the court is persuaded that “the place of the tort ‘bears little 

connection’ to this legal action.” Id. at 1074.

If the location of the tort is insignificant to the action, the court considers

other contacts that might be more relevant, such as: where the conduct causing 

the injury occurred; the residence or place of business of the parties; and where 

the relationship is centered. Hubbard v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d at 1073 (citing 

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2) (1971)). These factors aren’t 

an exclusive list, nor are they necessarily relevant in every case. All contacts 

“should be evaluated according to their relative importance to the particular 

issues being litigated.” Hubbard v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d at 1074. 

The parties agree that Indiana’s choice-of-law rule under Hubbard v. 

Greeson and Simon v. United States governs whether Indiana or Pennsylvania

substantive law is applicable to Mr. Norris’ claims. The parties also agree the 

differences between Indiana and Pennsylvania law would affect the outcome of 

this case. The remaining issue is whether the place of the injury—

Pennsylvania—is insignificant.
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Myers Spring argues that Pennsylvania, where Mr. Norris was injured, 

bears little connection to this case. Myers Spring argues the record doesn’t reflect 

any evidence suggesting the scaffolding and/or spring was designed, 

manufactured, or assembled in Pennsylvania. So, Myers Spring says, 

Pennsylvania bears little connection to this case as “the most important relevant 

factor is where the conduct causing the injury occurred” because “an individual’s 

actions and the recovery available to others as a result of those actions should 

be governed by the law of the state in which he acts.” Simon v. United States, 

805 N.E. 2d at 807-808. The tortious conduct, as Myers Spring sees it, occurred 

in Indiana, and the sale of the scaffolding to Mr. Norris’ Pennsylvania employer 

was merely fortuitous.

Myers Spring also cites to several cases to support its argument that 

Pennsylvania law is insignificant. First, in Large v Mobile Tool Intern, Inc., the 

defendant’s subsidiary MTI Insulated Products, Inc. was an Indiana corporation. 

The plaintiff Large was a North Carolina citizen employed in Virginia. The 

accident occurred along a roadside in Virginia. Mr. Large's employer was a 

Virginia corporation. The aerial lift which was the subject of the suit was 

designed (and apparently manufactured) in Indiana. After Mr. Large's accident, 

Mobile Tool called the truck back to Fort Wayne, Indiana for evaluation and 

reconditioning, and it was apparently in Fort Wayne where parts of the lift were 

scrapped. This court held that Virginia law was insignificant, because “this case 

is about the aerial lift, the design of the aerial lift, and the destruction of parts 

of the aerial lift.” These were all Indiana issues, and so the law of Indiana applied. 
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Large v. Mobile Tool Int'l, Inc., No. CIV 102CV177, 2007 WL 2187106, at *3 (N.D. 

Ind. July 27, 2007).

In Hubbard v. Greeson, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action in 

Indiana on behalf of her husband, who was killed while using an aerial lift in 

Illinois. Hubbard v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d at 1072. The Indiana Supreme Court 

held the use of lex loci deliciti was too harsh, and Indiana law should apply. Id.

at 1073. The court acknowledged that the decedent died in Illinois, the coroner’s 

inquest was held in Illinois, and the surviving family received workers’ 

compensation benefits under Illinois law. Id. at 1074. Still, the court held that 

Illinois bore little connection to the action, and Indiana law applied, reasoning

that, among other things, “[t]he plaintiff’s two theories of recovery relate to the 

manufacture of the lift in Indiana . . . , ” and that the “parties’ relationship was 

centered therein.” Id.

This court disagrees with Myers Spring’s analysis. The court of appeals 

didn’t consider the second prong of Indiana’s choice-of-law analysis in Land v. 

Yamaha Motor Corp., because the place of injury wasn’t insignificant. Land v. 

Yamaha Motor Corp., 272 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 2001). Charles Land had been 

injured while operating the WaveRunner boat in Indiana. He was a resident of 

Indiana, the owner of the boat was a resident of Indiana, and the boat had been 

garaged and serviced in Indiana for a decade before it caused Mr. Land's injury. 

Land v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 272 F.3d at 517.

The Lands argued that California, where the Yamaha was incorporated 

and where Yamaha’s allegedly tortious conduct occurred, had greater relevance. 
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The Lands cited to several cases in which courts have found the place of injury 

to be insignificant. But nothing in the record indicated that the WaveRunner had 

ever been used outside of Indiana. The court of appeals reasoned: “it was not 

mere fortuity that the injury occurred in Indiana, as the Lands suggested by 

comparing this choice-of-law determination with those involving pass-through 

automobile or airplane accidents in which the place of the injury is given little 

weight, and the argument that Indiana's contacts have little or no relevance to 

the legal action simply cannot withstand scrutiny.” The choice-of law analysis 

ended with step one. Land v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 272 F.3d at 517.

The Land v. Yamaha court also addressed the second prong as it relates 

to the Hubbard decision: “Indiana does not adhere to the most significant 

relationship analysis, however, and [Indiana] has not signaled that it intends to 

overrule Hubbard. Although Hubbard does note some discomfort with the rigid 

place of injury, or lex loci delicti, approach, it still adheres to an analysis that 

uses the place of injury as a baseline.” Land v. Yamaha, 272 F.3d at 517; (citing 

Hubbard v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d at 1073–1074). The court explained that if the 

place of injury is not insignificant, courts must apply its law regardless of the 

greater interest another state may have. Land v. Yamaha, 272 F.3d at 517.

The cases Myers Spring cites would be helpful if today’s decision reached 

the second prong in the choice of law analysis. But the second prong can be 

considered only if the place of the wrong—Pennsylvania—is insignificant. Large 

v. Mobile Tool Intern and Hubbard v. Greeson involved “pass through” accidents 

in which the courts would give the place of injury little weight, as described in 
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Land v. Yamaha. Myers Spring says the evidence doesn’t show where the 

scaffolding was shipped after its manufacture in Indiana, but there’s no doubt 

that the scaffolding made it to Pennsylvania by 2005. Nothing in record suggests 

the scaffold ever left Pennsylvania or that Myers Spring serviced the defective 

spring at any time before or after Mr. Norris’s accident. 

Pennsylvania’s contacts satisfy the lex loci delicti baseline. Myers Spring, 

an Indiana corporation, manufactured and sold the allegedly defective spring in 

Indiana. The spring was then shipped to Sonny Scaffolding in Indiana, which 

incorporated the spring into the scaffolding there. Following the manufacture 

and assembly of the scaffolding in Indiana, Sonny Scaffolding sold and shipped 

the scaffold to Pennsylvania. It’s also undisputed that Mr. Norris, a Pennsylvania 

resident, purchased the scaffold from his employer United, a Pennsylvania 

company. Mr. Norris was working for United at the time of the accident. The 

scaffolding was in Pennsylvania since 2005. Indiana’s contacts might be found 

to be more significant if the court reached the second prong of the choice of law 

analysis, but it can’t be said that Pennsylvania’s contacts are insignificant as 

Indiana’s modified lex loci delicti rule uses that term. It wasn’t merely fortuitous 

that the injury occurred in Pennsylvania, see Land v. Yamaha, 272 F.3d at 517, 

so the analysis ends at step one. Pennsylvania law provides the rule of decision 

in this case. The transfer of this case under § 1631 gave Myers Spring the benefit 

of the forum’s choice of law rules, but not the forum’s law itself.
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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to determine applicable substantive 

law is GRANTED, and the law of Pennsylvania provides the rule of decision. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: October 19, 2017

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.

Judge

United States District Court