UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) Cause No.: 2:15-CR-39-JVB-JEM

)

MARCUS LOVELL JENKINS, et al., )

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Bill of Particulars as to Counts 3 and 4 of the

Indictment [DE 38], filed by Defendant Jenkins on September 21, 2015. The Government filed a

Response opposing the Motion on October 1, 2015. 

Defendant Jenkins is currently charged with the murder of Kemond Coleman. In Counts 3

and 4 of the Superceding Indictment, Defendant Jenkins is charged with Murder in Aid of

Racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(1) and (2) and Use of a Firearm in Relation to a

Crime of Violence Resulting in Death in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), (g), and (j), and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2. The Government alleges that Defendants Jenkins committed and aided and abetted the murder1

for the purpose of gaining entrance to and maintaining and increasing position in the TWO SIX, an

alleged street gang engaged in racketeering. The Government further alleges Defendant Jenkins

accomplished the killing through the use of a firearm. Defendant Jenkins argues that a bill of

particulars is necessary as to Counts 3 and 4 because the Superceding Indictment lack specific facts

regarding his alleged involvement in the murder and TWO SIX and the factual information

identifying the conduct upon which the Government intends to base its case is lacking. 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 provides that the court may direct the government to

1 Defendant Jenkins allegedly aided and abetted co-Defendant Julio Ivan Cartagena in the murder of Kemond

Coleman. 
file a bill of particulars. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f). The decision whether to require a bill of particulars

lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. United States. v. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d 440, 446 (7th

Cir. 2003); United States. v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 949 (7th Cir. 1991). The purposes of a bill of

particulars include: (1) allowing a defendant to avoid double jeopardy in the event of a subsequent

prosecution for the same offense; (2) avoiding prejudicial surprise at trial; and (3) providing a

defendant with information sufficient for him to prepare his defense. See United States v. Roman,

728 F.2d 846, 856 (7th Cir. 1984).

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ “bill-of-particulars analysis is similar to its

constitutional sufficiency-of-the-indictment analysis; ‘in both cases, the key question is whether the

defendant was sufficiently apprised of the charges against him in order to enable adequate trial

preparation.”’ United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 927 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States

v. Blanchard, 542 F.3d 1133, 1140 (7th Cir. 2008)). A bill of particulars is “unnecessary where the

indictment sets forth the elements of the charged offenses and provides sufficient notice of the

charges to enable the defendant to prepare his defense.” United States v. Hernandez, 330 F.3d 964,

975 (7th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 135 (7th Cir.1981). “A

defendant is not entitled to know all the evidence the government intends to produce, but only the

theory of the government's case.” Vaughn, 722 F.3d at 927. “[A]n indictment that includes each of

the elements of the charged offense, the time and place of the accused's allegedly criminal conduct,

and a citation to the applicable statute or statutes is sufficient to meet that standard.” Fassnacht, 332

F.3d at 446.

Defendant Jenkins requests a bill of particulars seeking responses from the Government

regarding whether: 

1. [Defendant Jenkins was] a member or associate of the organization known as
“TWO SIX NATION” ? [sic] If an associate, what was the nature and length of his

association?

2. How did his [Defendant Jenkins] intentionally murdering Kemond

 Coleman gain him entrance to or maintain or increase his position in 

the TWO SIX?

3. If the government argues that he aided, abetted, counselled [sic], commanded,

induced, or caused another to commit the murder of Kemond Coleman, what specific

activity aided, abetted, counselled [sic], commanded, induced, or caused another to

commit the murder of Kemond Coleman?

 The Murder in Aid of Racketeering statute under which Defendant Jenkins is charged in

Count 3 provides, in relevant part, that: 

Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for

a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an

enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of

gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in an

enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, murders, kidnaps, maims,

assaults with a dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in

serious bodily injury upon, or threatens to commit a crime of violence

against any individual . . . shall be punished.

18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) (2015). The Government’s burden under this statute with respect to Defendant

Jenkins is to demonstrate (1) that the TWO SIX was an enterprise engaged in, or the activities of

which, affected interstate commerce or foreign commerce; (2) that the TWO SIX engaged in

racketeering activity; (3) that Defendant Jenkins committed a specific violent crime under Indiana

Law; and (4) that Defendant Jenkins committed the violent crime for the purpose of gaining entrance

to or maintaining or increasing position in the TWO SIX. See United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d

829, 845 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Count 3 of the Superceding Indictment places Defendant Jenkins on notice of how the
Government intends to satisfy its burden. Count 3 alleges (1) that the TWO SIX constituted an

enterprise engaged in activity which affected, interstate and foreign commerce; (2) that the TWO

SIX was engaged in racketeering activity, principally narcotics trafficking; (3) that on July 26, 2014,

Defendant Jenkins intentionally murdered Kemond Coleman in Lake County, Indiana, for the

purpose of gaining entrance to and maintaining and increasing position in the TWO SIX; (4) and that

he did so in violation of Indiana Penal Code §§ 35-42-1-1 and 35-41-2-4. 

Defendant Jenkins argues that the Superceding Indictment lacks specific facts and 

information identifying the conduct upon which the Government intends to base its case; however,

at this stage Defendant Jenkins is entitled only to a general theory of the Government’s case-inchief. Vaughn, 722 F.3d at 927. The Government is not required to proffer the specific facts in the

Superceding Indictment on which it intends to base its prosecution. Id. Although the information

requested by Defendant Jenkins regarding the scope of his alleged affiliation with the TWO SIX 

may be useful to his defense, the Government has provided sufficient factual details to enable

Defendant Jenkins to avoid prejudicial surprise and adequately prepare for his defense. See Roman,

728 F.2d at 856. 

As to Count 4, Defendant is charged with Use of a Firearm in Relation to a Crime of

Violence Resulting in Death in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (g), and (j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The

law, in relevant part, provides enhanced punishment for: 

any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or

drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug

trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if

committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for

which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,

uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime,

possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for

such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2015). Count 4 of the Superceding Indictment provides the elements of Use of
a Firearm in Relation to a Crime of Violence Resulting in Death insofar as the Government alleges 

that a firearm was used by Defendant Jenkins in relation to and during the predicate crime of

violence: the murder of Kemond Coleman. Moreover, the Superceding Indictment provides

Defendant Jenkins with notice of his enhanced sentencing exposure under the law. Again, although

useful, the information sought by Defendant through a bill of particulars is not required because the

information provided by the Government in Count 4 of the Superceding Indictment sufficiently

apprises him of the charge and enables adequate trial preparation. See Vaughn, 722 F.3d at 927. 

Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES the Motion for Bill of Particulars [DE 38].

SO ORDERED this 5th day of November, 2015.

s/ John E. Martin 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record