COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE S AM G LASSCOCK III V ICE C HANCELLOR STATE OF DELAWARE C OURT OF C HANCERY C OURTHOUSE 34 T HE C IRCLE G EORGETOWN , D ELAWARE 19947
Date Submitted: December 15 , 2015 Date Decided: December 21 , 2015 Mary Rinnier 301 Feryn Farms Drive New Castle, DE 19720 Suzanne I. Seubert, Esquire Suzanne I. Seubert, P.A. 1328 King Street Wilmington, DE 19801 Somers S. Price, Esquire Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP 1313 N. Market Street, 6 th Floor Wilmington, DE 19899

Re: Mary L. Rinnier, Administratrix v. Gracelawn Memorial Park Inc., et al. Civil Action No. 6473

- ML
Dear Ms. Rinnier and Counsel: This matter involve s a petition by a mother to disinter the body of her daughter; the individual Respondent is the daughter’s widower , the Petitioner’s son

in

- law . The daughter lived and died in Florida but is buried in a Delaware cemetery. Simply put, the Petitioner, Ms. R innier, believes that the Res pondent murdered her daughter , Laura Bowdoin ; via the disinterment and a subsequent autopsy, she seeks evidence to substantiate this belief. The matter is before me on exceptions to the Master’s Final Report, which recommends denying Ms. Rinnier’s petition. Upon de2

novo review, 1 I find the exceptions untimely and unavailing, and deny the petition to disinter. My reasons follow.
I would imagine that, if there can be a pain sharper than that caused by the untimely loss of a chi ld, it is that arising from such a loss accompanied by the conviction that the loss resulted from unpunished foul play. Whatever the true facts here, it is clear to me that this is the pa in that Ms. Rinnier endures , and that she feels it a moral duty to p ursue the truth of her daughter’s death. That pursuit has led her a long chase, in the State of Florida and in Delaware. It s results, I imagine, go far beyo nd frustrating; they must be nigh unbearable. Wanting a legal outcome, no matter how deeply and s incerely, does not make it so, however. At stake h ere are the interests of others

— the Respondent and a child

— as well as the law of this jurisdiction with respect to exhumation of a body. Ms. Rinnier’s attempt to exhume her daugh ter’s body has run a foul of those other interests and that settled law. After a two

- day trial before Master Legrow, the Master issu ed a thoughtful and thorough 26

- page decision laying out her reasons for denying Ms. Rinnier’s request for an order permitting disinterment of her da ughter’s corpse. That Master’s Final Report issued on November 24, 2015. Ms. Rinnier has filed a Notice of Exceptions and the matter has be en referred to me

.

1 DiGiacobbe v. Sestak , 743 A.2d 180, 183

– 84 (Del. 1999) (“[T]he standard of review for a master’s findings

—

both factual and legal

— is de novo .”). Because the grounds for exception do not turn on witness credibility, the review may proceed on the paper record.3

Under Rule 144 of this Court, “ any party taking exception shall file a notice of exceptions wit hin eleven days of the date of the report. ” 2 Ms. Rinnier’s Notice of Exceptions was not file d until December 11, 2015, after the eleven

- day exceptions period had run. The Rule further provides that , [i] f a notice of exception to a final report is not ti mely filed, then the parties shall be deemed to have stipulated to the approval and entry of the report as an order of the Court. 3 The Respondent has objected to the untimely notice of exception, and Ms. Rinnier has offered no explanation that in equity excuse s the tardy filing. Because Ms. Rinnier did not take timely exception, she is deemed to have consented to the outcome recommended in the Report, and I do not require briefing or argument under Rule 144. More fundamentally, I have reviewed the recor d in this case together with the Final Repo rt. Ms. Rinnier takes exception to the Report on only two grounds. First, Ms. Rinnier argues that the record reflects that her daughter’s hyoid bone may be
interred along with her daughter’s body, and if so, it may show evidence of strangulation. According to Ms. Rinnier, this is sufficient to amount to a “reasonable certainty” that the exhumation , contrary to the findings of the Master, will provide pertinent evidence on the question of foul play. Second, Ms. Rinnier suggests that

2 Ct. Ch. R. 144(d)(1) (emphasis added). 3 Ct. Ch. R. 144(c).4

the Master improperly imposed a higher standard for exhumation because a prior autopsy had been conducted in this case. After de novo review, it is clear to me that these exceptions are without merit and that further proceedings befo re me would not result in a conclusion different from that reached by the Master, regardless of whether the exceptions were considered timely. As the Master correctly found, this jurisdiction follows the standard for exhumation orders set forth in McCullo ugh v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of
New York

. 4 That case recognizes that, as a general rule, notions of decency and respect for both the deceased and the living relatives of the deceased mean that an order of exhumation not be granted lightly. The McCullough Court indicated that a petitioner must demonstrate that the need for disinterment is not ascribable to fault on the part of the petitioner, and that it is “ reasonably certain that an exhumation of the body will reveal something bearing on the ri ghts of the parties which could not otherwise be discovered. ” 5 The Master found that Ms. Rinnier, as the movant here, had failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable certainty that pertinent evidence would be produced by the exhumation. Without rep eating the careful recitation of expert testimony that led the Master to that determination, I note that Ms. Rinnier provided the testimony of Dr. William Manion. It is Ms. Rinnier’s

4 109 F.2d 866 (4 th Cir. 1940) (cited with approval in Equitable Life Assuranc e Soc’y of U.S. v. Young & Revel Inc ., 250 A.2d 509, 510 (Del. 1969)). 5 McCullough , 109 F2d at 869

– 70 (emphasis added).5

theory that her daughter died , not as a result of the overdose of the drug Ambien found in her system, but that, while under the intoxication of Ambien, she was susceptible to , and was the victim of , strangu lation or suffocation . Dr. M anion said that, if the body were exhumed, he woul d like to pursue further toxicology to determine if Ambien use was chronic by Ms. Rinnier’s daughter, and that he would
like to x

- ray the hyoid bone and throat cartilage to see if a fracture had been missed by a prior autopsy in the c ase. Dr. Manion, howe ver, did not testify whether the hyoid bone had been returned to the Decedent’s body and buried with her after it was removed in the first autopsy. The Respondent offered the testimony of Dr. William Anderson, who testified that the original autopsy had b een “complete , ” and that the hyoid bone had been removed during the initial autopsy because that procedure revealed that “the thyroid cartilage bones [were] intact,” a determination
which could not have been made without removal of the hyoid bone. Ms. Rin nier argues that these combined testimonies do not establish that the hyoid bone was not reinterred with the body, and that by pointing this out, she has complied with the requirement that she demonstrate to a reasonable certainty that the autopsy would be ar on the issues her e , by providing relevant evidence. Ms. Rinnier is incorrect. First, the fact that no evidence indicates whether the hyoid bone is present with the body does not, to my mind, come close to demonstrating to a reasonable certainty that t he hyoid bone is present and able to be disintered . Second, the6

Master’s determination did not rest simply on the question of whether the hyoid bone existed; nor did the preponderance of the medical testimony, which indicate d that disinterment would not be fruitful, involve the hyoid bone. In fact, Dr. Anderson testified at length that other physical findings , fully described in the first autopsy , were inconsistent with the strangulation murder that Ms. Rinn ier alleges. In

a ddition, post trial, Dr. Anderson submitted an affidavit which disclosed that a complete dissection of neck in the original autopsy indicated no trauma. In short, Dr. Anderson testified that the initial autopsy ruled out Ms. Rinnier’s th eory of murder by strangulation. Ms. Rinnier’s expert, Dr. Manion, opined only that there was a possibility that an exhumation and s econd autopsy could support Ms. Rinnier’s theory , assuming it is true . Taking the evidence in toto , therefo re, Ms. Rinnier has fallen short of demonstrating that it is even more likely than not that the exhumation would provide useful evidence, let alone a reas onable certainty that information would result that would bear on the issues at hand . Therefore, Ms. Rinnier could not prevail on her first exception , regardless of timeliness

. With respect to her seco nd exception, Ms. Rinnier contends that the Master impermissibly change d the standard that Ms. Rinnier was required to meet in order

to r eceive the order she seeks. She contends that the Master increased the burden of proof, on the improper ground that a prior aut opsy had been conducted. Ms. Rinnier misinterprets the Final Report. In the Report, the Master, properly in my view,7

simply considered the fact that a prior autopsy had been per formed as pertinent to her analysis: it bore on the question of whether Ms. Rinnier had met the requisite standard by demonstrating to a “reasonable certainty ” that e xhumation will provide useful evidence not otherwise available

. The fact of a prior autop sy

— which both provides evidence itself not reliant on exhumation and which necessarily required removal of certain tissues, making the exhumation less likely to be valuable

— was certainly pertinent to the Master’s inquiry. The Master did not “alter the st andard” or otherwise commit legal error. A gain, even if timely, this exception could not prevail. Upon review of the record, it is clear that, despite a remarkable effort on her part, Ms. Rinnier has been un able to show that the exhumation of her daugh ter’s body is justified. There is no question that Ms. Rinnier is sincere in her beliefs and that she desperately wants to explore every avenue of learning the truth. It is also true that the interests and emotions of Ms. Rinnier’s son

- in

- law and her
gra nddaughter are at stake in this acti on, and that Ms. Rinnier has failed to meet the standard for exhumation, according to our case law: she has failed to demonstrate

to a reasonable certainty that disinterment will be o f utility. Application of that

stan dard is reasonable and equitable here. The evidence presented at trial convinces me that to the extent questions exist regarding the cause of decedent’s death, those same question would remain following exhumation and subsequent autopsy.8

Nothing in this Letter Opinion , I am sure, will satisfy Ms. Rinnier or bring her the sense that justice has prevailed . In the more than seven years since Laura Bowdoin died, Ms. Rinnier has pursued every possibility to vindicate what she sees

as a just result . She has p erformed every obligation that ties of love and blood can impose between mother and daughter. Sadly, however, there are some wounds that neither law nor equity can heal. For the foregoing reaso ns , and for all the reasons

state d in the Final Report , the e xceptions to Master LeG row’s November 24, 2015 Final Report are DENIED. The Petit ion to exhume the body of Laura Bowdoin is
DENIED. To the extent that the foregoing requires an order to effect, IT IS SO
ORDERED. Sincerely, /s/ Sam Glasscock III Sam Gla sscock III