IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

STEPHEN ANTHONY BYRD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-351

)

JULIE LAWSON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

In his initial complaint, Stephen A. Byrd, a pro se prisoner,

named St. Joseph County Jail Warden Julie Lawson, Assistant Warden

Steven Richmond, Sgt. Melinda Fisher, and Sgt. Belinda Schroeder as

defendants. However, the only name that appeared in the body of his

complaint was Warden Lawson. He complained that Warden Lawson

denied him use of the law library and also communicated with the

state court judge presiding over Byrd’s criminal case. The court

found that he did not state a claim for which relief could be

granted, but Byrd was given leave to file an amended complaint in

the spirit of Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Byrd has now filed his amended complaint, along with a

supporting memorandum. ECF 17, 18. Byrd again names Warden Julie

Lawson, Assistant Warden Steven Richmond, Sgt. Melinda Fisher, and

Sgt. Belinda Schroeder as defendants. He seeks injunctive relief

and money damages.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a

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prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against

a defendant who is immune from such relief. Courts apply the same

standard under Section 1915A as when deciding a motion under FEDERAL

RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621,

624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state

a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v.

Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). In

determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court must

bear in mind that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally

construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must

be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). To state

a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege: “(1)

that defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and

(2) that the defendants acted under color of state law.” Savory v.

Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). 

First, Byrd renews his claim against Warden Lawson for having

communications with Judge Hurley of the St. Joseph County Court. He

asserts that Warden Lawson labeled Byrd as dangerous and these

conversations have tainted his state criminal proceedings. He asks

the federal court to intervene and order a change of venue and

judge. ECF 17 at 6. The Court has previously told him that these

allegations do not state a claim. ECF 13. Based on principles of

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federalism and comity concerns, a federal court cannot dismiss or

otherwise interfere with the state criminal charges pending against

Byrd. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971); In re

Campbell, 264 F.3d 730, 731 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, this Court

cannot order Warden Lawson to stop communicating with the state

court judge, nor can it order that his state criminal case be moved

to another venue or reassigned to another judge. Byrd must seek

that relief in the State court system. 

Next, Byrd brings suit against Steve Richmond, Melinda Fisher

and Belinda Schroeder.1 He seeks money damages for their role in

him wrongly being placed in segregation as a result of being found

guilty of “attempted or planning and escape,” and “conduct which

disrupts.” ECF 17 at pp. 5-6; ECF 17-1 at p. 2. Byrd believes he

was falsely convicted of these charges. However, this is not the

proper proceeding to challenge the prison disciplinary hearing

board’s finding because “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for

a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his

confinement . . ..” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994). 

1

It is unclear what role these defendants had in Byrd’s prison

disciplinary proceeding. Byrd alleges that these four are “heads of the

administration.” ECF 17 at p. 4. If these four did not personally participate

in the disciplinary proceedings, this could be fatal as “[a] plaintiff

bringing a civil rights action must prove that the defendant personally

participated in or caused the unconstitutional actions.” Grieveson v.

Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 776 (7th Cir. 2008). “[P]ublic employees are

responsible for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.” Burks v.

Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). There is no general respondeat

superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609

(7th Cir. 2007). That is to say, a supervisor is not responsible in a federal

civil rights lawsuit for the actions or omissions of his employees.

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In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the United States

Supreme Court made clear that the principles of Heck also apply to

prison disciplinary cases. 

In Heck, this Court held that a state prisoner’s claim

for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if

a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily

imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,

unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction

or sentence has previously been invalidated.

Edwards, 520 U.S. at 643 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Here, Byrd admits that he was found guilty of that offenses, and

has not alleged that the finding of guilt has since been

invalidated. Because a finding of liability in this case would

inherently undermine the validity of his disciplinary hearing, it

is futile to pursue his claim at this time. He may not proceed with

this claim against these defendants until that finding is

overturned on administrative appeal or in a habeas corpus

proceeding.

Although not directly raised in his complaint, it appears as

though Byrd also complains about his access to the jail’s law

library. Byrd explicitly raised this issue in his original

complaint. The Court informed him that his allegation failed to

state a claim because he had suffered no injury as a result of his

limited access to the law library. In his amended complaint, Byrd

simply refers to a jail grievance form, where he complains to

officials about his limited use of the law library. As the court

previously explained, inmates have a First Amendment right of

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access to the courts, but there is no “abstract free-standing

right” to a law library or to legal materials. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 351 (1996). In other words, “the mere denial of access to

a prison law library or to other legal materials is not itself a

violation of a prisoner’s rights; his right is to access the

courts,” and only if the defendants’ conduct prejudices a

potentially meritorious legal claim has the right been infringed.

Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, to

state a claim, an inmate must “spell out” the connection between

the denial of access to legal materials and the resulting prejudice

to a potentially meritorious legal claim. Id. The court must also

bear in mind that prison officials are afforded discretion in

regulating how and when inmates are given access to legal

materials. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-52; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 546 (1979). 

Here, though Byrd complains that he does not have access to

the law library, this alone does not give rise to an actionable

First Amendment claim. He must spell out some type of prejudice to

a potentially meritorious legal claim, and he has still not done

so. Byrd has not alleged any injury and therefore he “cannot

prevail on his access-to-courts claim.” Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d

664, 671 (7th Cir. 2009).

For the these reasons, the Court:

(1) DISMISSES without prejudice his claim regarding being

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found guilty in a jail disciplinary case;

(2) DISMISSES with prejudice all other claims; and

(3) DISMISSES this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

DATED: April 27, 2017 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United State District Court

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