1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

DONALD HUTTLE, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Case No. 2:16-cv-377-JVB-JPK

 ) 

PORTER HOSPITAL, LLC, ) 

D/B/A PORTER REGIONAL HOSPITAL, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 

OPINION AND ORDER

 Defendant-employer Porter Hospital, LLC, moves for summary judgment against 

Plaintiff-employee Donald Huttle on his age-discrimination claim. For the reasons below, this 

Court denies Defendant’s motion.

A. Overview of the Case

In 2011, Plaintiff began working full-time as a security officer for Defendant. (DE 43-2 at 

2.) He served under supervisors Robert O’Dea and Rick Owens. (Id. at 3.) Four years later, in 

2015, Defendant placed its security department under the command of Christian Goss, the 

director of engineering. (Id. at 4; DE 43-3 at 4.) On June 18, 2015, Plaintiff was escorted to a 

meeting with Mr. Goss and some members of human resources. (Id. at 15.) At that meeting, 

Defendant terminated Plaintiff as part of a reduction in force (the “Reduction”). (Id. at 15–16.) 

Defendant did not explain the reason for Plaintiff’s termination, but assured Plaintiff that it was 

not performance related. (Id. at 16.) 

 Defendant put Mr. Goss in charge of determining who would be let go as part of the 
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Reduction. (DE 43-3 at 15.) To facilitate this process, Mr. Goss completed a form (the 

“Evaluation”) in which he rated employees on the basis of certain categories, including relevant 

job experience and attendance. (DE 43-5.) Mr. Goss remained ultimately responsible for the 

information on the Evaluation, which played a significant role in deciding who would be let go. 

(Id. at 17, 20.) Overall, the Reduction claimed ten security officers, two of whom were full-time. 

(DE 43-5.) Plaintiff was one of those two. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff, then 64 years old, was among the bottom two full-time security officers 

according to the Evaluation. (Id.) On the other hand, Justin Thomas, a then-28-year-old full-time 

security officer who survived the Reduction, had the second-highest score. (Id.) Plaintiff claims 

that Mr. Goss terminated him on the basis of his age and points to Mr. Thomas as a similarlysituated younger employee who received more favorable treatment.

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 (DE 47 at 8.) As for the 

Evaluation, Plaintiff paints it as a “sham.” (Id. at 12.) Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an agediscrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (DE 43-

7.) The EEOC, being unable to conclude that Defendant committed a violation, sent Plaintiff a 

notice of right to sue. (DE 43-9.) Plaintiff then timely filed the instant complaint. (DE 1.) 

B. Standard of Review 

To succeed on summary judgment, Defendant must “show[] that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact” and that Defendant “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Defendant can meet this burden by “identify[ing] those portions of the 

record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Johnson v. City of Fort 

Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the issue 

 

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 Plaintiff, in his deposition, also claimed he was let go because he was a white male who lacked political influence. 

(DE 43-2 at 21.) However, Plaintiff’s complaint only alleges age discrimination. 
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underlying the complaint, “he must then go beyond the pleadings and affirmatively demonstrate 

a genuine issue of material fact for trial” by “demonstrat[ing] that the record, taken as a whole, 

could permit a rational finder of fact to rule in favor of” Plaintiff. Id. As the non-moving party, 

Plaintiff is entitled to “the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and any reasonable inferences in 

[his] favor.” Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 700 (7th Cir. 2013). 

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) prohibits employers from 

“discharg[ing] any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). To 

survive summary judgment without direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff must first 

establish a prima facie case by showing that “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he 

reasonably performed his job to his employer’s expectations; (3) he was subject to an adverse 

employment action; and (4) other similarly situated employees who were substantially younger 

than him were treated more favorably.” Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617 (7th 

Cir. 2000). The employer must then “articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 

discharging” the plaintiff. Id. If the employer does so, the plaintiff needs to show that the given 

reason is mere pretext, or else the employer wins on summary judgment. Collier v. Budd Co., 66 

F.3d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1995). To establish pretext, “a plaintiff must show that [the] employer is 

lying, not merely that [the] employer is wrong.” Collins v. Am. Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 1000 

(7th Cir. 2013). The ultimate question, however, is “whether a reasonable jury could infer 

prohibited discrimination.” Perez, 731 F.3d at 703. 

C. Analysis

 Defendant concedes that Plaintiff was in a protected class (over age 40), was performing 

to Defendant’s legitimate expectation, and was discharged. However, Defendant disputes 
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whether similarly situated younger employees were treated more favorably. For his part, Plaintiff 

contends that the Evaluation, which constituted a reason for his discharge, is mere pretext and is 

thus invalid. Because Defendant’s attack on Plaintiff’s prima facie case is based in large part on 

the validity of the Evaluation, this Court addresses the pretext component first. 

(1) A Reasonable Jury Could Find that the Evaluation Is Mere Pretext 

 At the outset, the ADEA does not turn this Court into a human-resources appeals council. 

Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986) (“This Court does not sit as a 

super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.”). Hence, Plaintiff 

cannot survive summary judgment by merely disagreeing with the Evaluation. Anderson v. 

Stauffer Chem. Co., 965 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1992). Nor will a supervisor’s assurances of 

Plaintiff’s quality create a genuine issue of material fact. Dey v. Colt Const. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 

1446, 1460 (7th Cir. 1994). Here, however, Plaintiff has gone further by unleashing a full-on 

factual assault on the Evaluation, which, if fully credited, destroys any credibility the Evaluation 

may have had. Cf. id. at 1460–61 (“A detailed refutation of events which underlie the employer’s 

negative performance assessment demonstrates that the employer may not have honestly relied 

on the identified deficiencies in making its decision.”). In other words, Plaintiff’s evidence 

suggests that the Evaluation itself may be a lie. 

(a) Plaintiff’s Evidence Questions the Validity of the Evaluation Scores

 Mr. Goss gave Mr. Thomas very high marks on the Evaluation, but Plaintiff vigorously 

disputes those scores with specific factual allegations. For instance, Mr. Thomas scored 65/65 on 

“Attendance/reliability.” (DE 43-5.) However, in the two years preceding the Reduction, Mr. 
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Thomas accumulated two write-ups, one for tardiness and one for attendance issues. (DR 47-11 

at 15.) His 2013 employee evaluation contained multiple notations of poor attendance. (Id. at 16–

22.) True, his next evaluation credited him with “com[ing] in early on multiple occasions or 

stay[ing] late to help cover busy shifts.” (Id. at 10.) But Mr. Owens testified in a deposition that 

Mr. Thomas was “continuously calling off” (cancelling his shifts) and leaving his post to chat 

with nurses. (DE 47-5 at 24.) Mr. Owens explained that when he would inform Mr. Goss of these 

problems, Mr. Goss would simply respond, “Just leave [the employee] alone.” (Id. at 22.) Mr. 

O’Dea also confirmed that Mr. Thomas “would constantly hang around the ER even when he 

had assigned duties elsewhere.” (DE 47-4 at 4.) Mr. O’Dea additionally recounted experiences of 

attempting to discipline employees, only to be told by Mr. Goss “not to talk to anyone about 

doing anything like that.” (Id. at 3.) 

 With respect to the category of “Relevant job experience and training for targeted 

position,” Mr. Goss explained in his deposition that being a police officer would give an 

employee relevant job experience unless “they were a police officer for contracted services over 

in Iran . . . or over in a third world country where they had to shoot people all the time, [which] 

would have been the wrong type of experience.” (DE 43-3 at 21.) Mr. Thomas came from the 

Navy. (DE 47-11 at 82.) As far as the value of Navy experience in a hospital-security setting is 

concerned, Mr. Thomas completed two employee follow-up questionnaires in 2011, in which he 

was asked, “Is there anything your previously employer did that we could learn from?” (DE 47-

11 at 73–74.) He stated that it was “hard to compare” and that he did not think his previous 

experience was “applicable.” (Id.) When asked the same question in 2016, he gave an 

unambiguous answer: “Nothing, what so ever.” (Id. at 76.) Despite this, Mr. Thomas scored 

65/65 in relevant job experience. (DE 47-5.) 
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 On the other hand, Plaintiff scored 20/65 on attendance. Defendant faults Plaintiff for 

complaining about others’ attendance failures while “ignor[ing] evidence from his own 

personnel file of similar issues. (DE 52 at 13.) However, Defendant does not cite any of this 

evidence, and the only “personnel file” in the record is Plaintiff’s 2013 employee evaluation, 

which makes no mention of any attendance issues. (See DE 47-7.) Additionally, Plaintiff has 

experience both in the military and in the Lake County police department. (DE 43-2 at 17, 24.) In 

other words, Plaintiff, unlike Mr. Thomas, had the additional benefit of having been a police 

officer where he did not have to shoot people all the time. Yet, he scored only 20/65 on relevant 

job experience. (DE 43-5.) 

 In summary, this evidence would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Goss 

deliberately ignored relevant information to rig the Evaluation scores in favor of Mr. Thomas 

and against Plaintiff. Cf. Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 429 (7th Cir. 2000) 

(“The record was full of objective evidence . . . suggesting that . . . in the comparative ratings 

that are required in a [reduction in force, the plaintiffs] could have survived had the criteria been 

age-neutral.”). Whether Mr. Goss actually did this—and if he did, whether it was due to age—is 

for a jury to decide. 

(b) Mr. O’Dea’s Specific Criticisms Are Relevant

 Mr. O’Dea completed an affidavit detailing his many disagreements with the Evaluation 

scores. Defendant argues that Mr. O’Dea’s criticisms are irrelevant because Mr. O’Dea was not 

in charge of preparing the Evaluation. (DE 52 at 4.) Specifically, Defendant attacks the 

“corrected” Evaluation that Mr. O’Dea completed as an immaterial difference in opinion. (Id.) 

As an initial matter, whether Mr. Goss incompetently completed the Evaluation is of no moment, 
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for the ADEA only prohibits discriminatory decisions; it does not care about boneheaded moves. 

See Aungst v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 937 F.2d 1216, 1226 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The ADEA . . . 

is not about good employees, it is not about wise employment decisions, it is not about 35 years 

of loyalty to one company.”) And had Mr. O’Dea said nothing more than that Mr. Goss got it 

wrong, this Court would be inclined to agree with Defendant. Cf. Forrester v. Rauland-Borg 

Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006) (“An honest mistake, however dumb, is not [pretext].”). 

Here, however, Mr. O’Dea recounted specific instances of Mr. Goss receiving, but deliberately 

disregarding, information critical to completing the Evaluation. These stories—which this Court 

must take at face value because Plaintiff is the non-moving party—suggest that the Evaluation 

scores were not only wrong, but false. Thus, while Mr. O’Dea’s general disdain for the 

Evaluation may be of no value, his specific criticisms of it are relevant. 

(2) The Evidence Suggests that Mr. Thomas Was Treated More Favorably 

 In a discrimination action, the battles over pretext and improper favorable treatment often 

intertwine. Valentino v. Vill. of S. Chi. Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 673 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Often, the 

same evidence used to establish the prima facie case is sufficient to allow a jury to determine that 

a defendant’s stated reason for terminating a plaintiff was a mere front for an ulterior, unlawful 

motive.”). Such is the case here. Plaintiff argues that Mr. Thomas, a similarly situated younger 

employee, was treated more favorably. (DE 47 at 8.) Defendant’s response is that Plaintiff 

should look to the Evaluation, which shows that Plaintiff cannot compare himself to Mr. Thomas 

and his much higher scores.2

 (DE 52 at 11–13.) But if the Evaluation is mere pretext—and 

 

2

 The parties additionally argued over whether Defendant replaced Plaintiff with a younger employee, which is 

another way to establish favorable treatment. Because Plaintiff’s claim survives summary judgment anyway, this 

Court will not address that matter here. 
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especially if Mr. Goss fudged the numbers to give Mr. Thomas higher scores and Plaintiff lower 

scores—then any argument relying on it falls by the wayside. 

 Defendant also comes armed with statistics: the EEOC, in dismissing the charge, noted 

that “the average [age] of the group [of security officers] only changed by 1.5 years” and that 

employees older than Plaintiff were retained. (DE 43-8.)3 For starters, statistics do not tell the 

whole story. For instance, the average age of those who fell to the Reduction is over three years 

higher than the average age of those who survived it, and over 70% of employees eligible for 

termination who were outside the protected age group survived the Reduction. (See DE 43-5.) 

Second, an employer cannot immunize itself from age-discrimination claims merely by retaining 

the oldest employee. Cf. Collier, 66 F.3d at 891 (finding a prima facie case even though an 

employee older than the plaintiff was retained). Third, the question is not whether Defendant 

discriminated against older employees in general, but whether Defendant discriminated against a 

specific older employee. Granted, the statistics have value, but given Plaintiff’s evidence, 

genuine issues of material facts still remain. 

 Defendant’s remaining argument—that other similarly situated younger employees failed 

to survive the Reduction and thus were not treated more favorably—suffers from the same flaw. 

Defendant notes that two employees, aged 33 and 36 at the time, were also terminated. Yet, 

Plaintiff need not prove that every single similarly situated younger employee was treated more 

favorably. Cf. Adams, 231 F.3d at 419 (summary judgment inappropriate even though over 30% 

of the laid off employees were outside the protected age group). Defendant’s argument could win 

the day in front of a jury, but summary judgment demands more. 

 

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 The EEOC was “unable to conclude that the information obtained establishe[d] violations of the [relevant] 

statutes.” (DE 43-9.) 
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D. Conclusion

Plaintiff has provided enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether Mr. Goss intentionally falsified the Evaluation scores to give Mr. Thomas, a similarlysituated younger employee, a better chance than Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment is DENIED.

SO ORDERED on July 17, 2019.

 S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE