UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

KATIE WIGGINS, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

FRANCISCAN PHYSICIAN 

MANAGEMENT CORP., 

 Defendant. 

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Case No. 3:16-CV-377 JD 

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Katie Wiggins filed this action alleging that she was discriminated and retaliated 

against by Franciscan Physician Management Corp., for which she worked as an ultrasound 

technician. Discovery closed and Franciscan moved for summary judgment. Ms. Wiggins, who is 

represented by counsel, sought and received an extension of time to respond to the motion, but 

never filed a response by that new deadline. Thus, evaluating the motion on the evidence before 

it, the Court concludes that Franciscan is entitled to summary judgment. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Upon the filing of a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving must present 

sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the 

burden at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Robin v. Espo Eng’g 

Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000). As some courts have put it, summary judgment is 

the “put up or shut up” moment in a lawsuit, when a plaintiff must “show what evidence [s]he 

has that would convince a trier of fact” to find in her favor on any disputed elements. Olendzki v. 

Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir. 2014). When a party fails to submit evidence in response to a 

motion for summary judgment, the Court can consider the facts set forth by the moving party to 
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be undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Accordingly, the Court deems the facts offered by 

Franciscan to be undisputed. Those facts are set forth in detail in Franciscan’s filings, but the 

Court offers a brief summary of the relevant facts below. 

Katie Wiggins (formerly Conerly), an African American woman, was hired by 

Franciscan as an ultrasound technician, and started in March 2015. Ms. Wiggins received a week 

of orientation, after which she began training with two experienced ultrasound technicians. Ms. 

Wiggins spent half days with each of those technicians. She began by observing the technicians, 

and then began performing ultrasounds herself under their supervision. This continued for about 

two months. After the first month, Ms. Wiggins met with a human resources representative for a 

30-day post-hire meeting. She said that she was “extremely satisfied” with her employment so 

far, that she felt welcomed by other employees, and that her training was “going good.” After 

about two months of working with the two technicians, Ms. Wiggins began performing 

ultrasounds herself, under the supervision of a doctor. The doctor provided verbal instructions 

and also reviewed Ms. Wiggins’ scans before they were submitted. That doctor concluded in 

early June that Ms. Wiggins was ready to begin performing ultrasounds on her own. 

Once Ms. Wiggins began performing ultrasounds on her own, however, multiple patients 

made complaints about her work. At least one of the doctors she worked with did as well. 

Accordingly, her supervisor and other medical staff met and decided to have another technician 

observe and review Ms. Wiggins’ work. Before that review occurred, Ms. Wiggins wrote a letter 

to her supervisor on June 22, 2015, in which she claimed to have been discriminated against and 

subjected to a hostile work environment. In the letter, Ms. Wiggins stated that she had not 

received adequate training, and that one of the doctors, Dr. Ramirez, had been disrespectful to 

her and had criticized her work. Franciscan’s human resources manager conducted an 
3 

investigation into Ms. Wiggins’ concerns. The investigation found that Ms. Wiggins had 

received proper training, and that while Dr. Ramirez had been rude on one occasion, that 

situation had already been addressed and Dr. Ramirez had apologized. The investigation also 

found no indication of racial discrimination or harassment. 

In July 2015, Ms. Wiggins’ work was observed by another technician, as had been 

previously decided. The review revealed a number of errors in Ms. Wiggins’ scans, and 

Franciscan determined that the patient complaints and physician concerns were substantiated. 

Ms. Wiggins was then placed on a performance improvement plan, which she successfully 

completed in late August or early September. At that time, Ms. Wiggins was moved from 

Franciscan’s Woman’s Clinic facility, where she completed her training, to its Premier facility, 

where she had been hired to work. At that facility, Ms. Wiggins no longer had regular contact 

with Dr. Ramirez, who worked in another building, and she did not encounter any more of the 

issues that she had raised in her June 22 letter. However, she submitted a letter of resignation on 

November 11, stating that she had “been treated in an unfavorable manner,” which took a toll on 

her health. No one at Franciscan had asked or encouraged her to resign. 

Ms. Wiggins later filed this action after receiving a right-to-sue letter. She asserted claims 

for racial discrimination under Title VII (Count 1) and § 1981 (Count 2); claims for a hostile 

work environment under Title VII (Count 3) and § 1983 (Count 4); and a retaliation claim 

(Count 5). After the close of discovery, Franciscan moved for summary judgment on December 

8, 2017. Ms. Wiggins, by counsel, sought an extension of time to respond to the motion. The 

Court granted that request, giving Ms. Wiggins until February 5, 2018 to respond. However, that 

date passed without any filing by Ms. Wiggins. Franciscan then filed a reply brief, citing Ms. 
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Wiggins’ failure to respond. Ms. Wiggins has not submitted any further filings. Accordingly, the 

motion for summary judgment is now ripe. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Summary judgment is proper when the movant shows that there “is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). A “material” fact is one identified by the substantive law as affecting the outcome of the 

suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “genuine issue” exists with 

respect to any material fact when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Where a factual record taken as a whole could not lead a 

rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial, and 

summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Servs. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). In 

determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this Court must construe all facts in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable 

inferences in that party’s favor. Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008); King v. 

Preferred Tech. Grp., 166 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1999). Ms. Wiggins’ failure to respond to the 

motion does not inevitably mean that it will be granted. Rather, the Court may “grant summary 

judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—

show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Ms. Wiggins has asserted claims for racial discrimination, for a hostile work 

environment, and for retaliation. Franciscan moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the 

Court considers them in turn. 
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A. Counts 1 and 2, Racial Discrimination 

In Counts 1 and 2, Ms. Wiggins alleges that she was discriminated against because of her 

race when she was denied training and when she was constructively discharged. Ms. Wiggins 

asserts these claims under both Title VII and § 1981, which are analyzed the same for these 

purposes. Williams v. Waste Mgmt. of Ill., 361 F.3d 1021, 1028 (7th Cir. 2004). A racial 

discrimination claim requires a plaintiff to show that she suffered an adverse employment action 

and that it was motivated by her race. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Franciscan argues that Ms. Wiggins cannot make either showing, as she neither suffered an 

adverse action, nor were any of the actions of which she complains connected to her race. The 

Court agrees in both respects. 

“[N]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” 

Stutler v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 263 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2001). “To be actionable, there must be 

a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 

reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant 

change in benefits. In other words, the adverse action must materially alter the terms and 

conditions of employment.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted); accord David v. Bd. 

of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 225 n.35 (7th Cir. 2017). 

First, Ms. Wiggins asserted in her complaint that she was constructively discharged when 

she resigned. If true, that would constitute an adverse action. Williams, 361 F.3d at 1032. 

However, the bar for establishing a constructive discharge is high: “Constructive discharge 

occurs when an employee’s job becomes so unbearable that a reasonable person in that 

employee’s position would be forced to quit.” Id.; EEOC v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 276 F.3d 

326, 331 (7th Cir. 2002). “Working conditions for constructive discharge must be even more 
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egregious than the high standard for hostile work environment because in the ordinary case an 

employee is expected to remain employed while seeking redress.” Williams, 361 F.3d at 1034. 

Ms. Wiggins has not met that standard here. At the time Ms. Wiggins resigned, she had 

been working at the Premier facility for about two months. There, she had little interaction with 

Dr. Ramirez, about whom she had previously complained, as Dr. Ramirez worked in a different 

building. And during the time she worked at the Premier facility, Ms. Wiggins did not encounter 

any of the issues that she alleged in her initial letter. Thus, Ms. Wiggins has not shown that her 

employment was so unbearable at the time she resigned that she could not be expected to 

continue working while she sought redress for any problems. In fact, there is no evidence that 

Ms. Wiggins faced any adversity in her employment at the time she resigned. Accordingly, the 

evidence does not support her claim that she was constructively discharged. 

Ms. Wiggins also asserted in her complaint that she was not given adequate training. 

However, the evidence before the Court at summary judgment does not suggest any deficiency in 

the training Franciscan provided. When Ms. Wiggins started, she was trained by two ultrasound 

technicians. She spent half days with each technician, first observing and then performing scans 

under their supervision. Ms. Wiggins had the assistance of one of the two trainers for at least the 

first month of her employment, and at a 30-day post-hire meeting with a human resources 

representative, Ms. Wiggins said her training was “going good” and she had “no complaints.” 

After her training with the two technicians, Ms. Wiggins also had a training period for about a 

month with one of the doctors, who provided verbal feedback and reviewed her scans before they 

were completed. Later, after receiving some negative feedback, Ms. Wiggins was observed by 

another technician, who provided feedback, and she was placed on a performance improvement 
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plan, which she successfully completed. Ms. Wiggins also received individual training from a 

GE representative. 

Ms. Wiggins alleged in her June 22 letter that the two technicians had refused to train her. 

The evidence does not support that charge, though. The basis for Ms. Wiggins’ allegation was 

that she heard that the two technicians had voiced concern about having to train a new employee, 

given their existing workloads. However, that occurred before Ms. Wiggins began her 

employment (and before the technicians were even aware of her race). Notwithstanding the 

concerns the technicians voiced at that time, they were directed to train Ms. Wiggins, and they 

did so. Ms. Wiggins conceded during her deposition that the technicians never refused to provide 

her any training during her employment. Ms. Wiggins also noted in her June 22 letter that her 

training was not the same as one of the other technicians. However, Ms. Wiggins actually 

received much more extensive training than that technician, whose training consisted only of 

shadowing for a week or two, as she had much more experience when she started.1

 Accordingly, 

Ms. Wiggins has not identified any shortcoming in her training, so she has not shown that she 

suffered an adverse action in that respect either. 

Ms. Wiggins has also failed to establish that any of these alleged adverse actions 

occurred because of her race. Simply put, there is no evidence that Ms. Wiggins’ race affected 

her employment in any manner. She does not suggest that anyone at Franciscan ever made any 

racial comments, and the evidence does not show that she was treated worse than any other 

employees of a different race. As to the incidents where Ms. Wiggins complained of being 

 

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 Ms. Wiggins also alleged in her complaint that Franciscan declined to send her to the GE 

Institute for training, but there is no evidence that Franciscan sent any other technicians to that 

training, nor is there any evidence that Franciscan’s failure to send Ms. Wiggins to that training 

had anything to do with her race.
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treated poorly, such as with Dr. Ramirez being disrespectful, there is no evidence that Ms. 

Wiggins’ race had anything to do with it. Accordingly, even if Ms. Wiggins had suffered an 

adverse action, her claims would fail because no evidence suggests those actions occurred 

because of her race. The Court therefore grants the motion for summary judgment as to these 

counts. 

B. Counts 3 and 4, Hostile Work Environment 

In Counts 3 and 4, Ms. Wiggins asserts claims under Title VII and § 1981 for a racially 

hostile work environment. Those claims each require a plaintiff to establish that: (1) their work 

environment was both subjectively and objectively offensive; (2) their race was the cause of the 

harassment; (3) the conduct was severe or pervasive; and (4) there is a basis for employer 

liability. Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 544 (7th Cir. 2011). In moving for 

summary judgment on these counts, Franciscan argues that Ms. Wiggins cannot establish any of 

these elements. 

To begin with, the evidence does not show that Ms. Wiggins’ work environment was 

offensive, or that any offending conduct was severe or pervasive. Ms. Wiggins alleged in her 

June 22 letter that Dr. Ramirez had been disrespectful on one occasion, and had criticized her 

work on other occasions. One instance of alleged disrespectful treatment and some written 

criticisms of the quality of Ms. Wiggins’ work (that, as far as the record shows, were accurate 

and well-founded) fall short of establishing an offensive environment so severe or pervasive as to 

alter the conditions of her employment. In addition, there is no evidence that any mistreatment 

occurred because of Ms. Wiggins’ race. “Although a connection between the harassment and the 

plaintiff’s protected class need not be explicit, ‘there must be some connection, for not every 

perceived unfairness in the workplace may be ascribed to discrimination motivation merely 

because the complaining employee belongs to a racial minority.’” Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. 
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Univ., 838 F.3d 888, 896 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Zayas v. Rockford Mem’l Hosp., 740 F.3d 

1154, 1159 (7th Cir. 2014)); Yancick, 653 F.3d at 544 (“To support a hostile work environment 

claim, the plaintiff need not show that the complained-of conduct was explicitly racial, but must 

show it had a racial character or purpose.”). Here, Ms. Wiggins has offered no reason to believe 

that her race had anything to do with how she was treated by anyone else during her 

employment. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment as to the hostile 

work environment claims. 

C. Count 5, Retaliation 

Finally, in Count 5, Ms. Wiggins asserts a claim for retaliation. Her complaint alleges 

that, after she complained of discrimination in her June 22 letter, Franciscan retaliated by placing 

her on a performance improvement plan. A retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to present 

evidence that (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially 

adverse action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the two. Carter v. Chicago St. Univ., 

778 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2015); Langenbach v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 761 F.3d 792, 799 (7th 

Cir. 2014). 

Ms. Wiggins’ claim fails at least because she has not shown that she suffered a materially 

adverse action. “In the retaliation context, determining whether an action is materially adverse 

means inquiring whether it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 

supporting a charge of discrimination.” Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 918 (7th Cir. 2016). Here, 

Ms. Wiggins’ claim is based on her placement on a performance improvement plan. However, 

the Seventh Circuit has held that being placed on a performance improvement plan is not a 

materially adverse action that can support a retaliation claim. Langenbach, 761 F.3d at 799; Cole 

v. Illinois, 562 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that “the adoption of the improvement plan 

did not constitute an adverse action” to support a retaliation claim); see also Boss, 816 F.3d at 
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919 (“As to [the plaintiff’s] placement on a [performance improvement plan], this Court has held 

that implementing such a plan is simply not materially adverse in the discrimination context.”). 

To the extent she intended to rely on any other actions, such as her alleged constructive 

discharge, she has failed to show that those constitute adverse actions for the reasons discussed 

above. And finally, though it’s not necessary to discuss further, Ms. Wiggins has offered no 

evidence from which a factfinder could find that any of the actions came in retaliation for her 

complaint of discrimination. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment as to this claim as 

well. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For those reasons, the Court GRANTS Franciscan’s motion for summary judgment. [DE 

34]. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: April 3, 2018 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court