Opinion filed July 31, 2014

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

Nos. 11-12-00217-CR & 11-12-00218-CR

__________

JOHNNY DWIGHT HOUSTON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 104th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 17097B & 17098B

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant, Johnny Dwight Houston, appeals the trial court’s judgments

revoking his community supervision on two convictions for injury to a child. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(f) (West Supp. 2013). In three issues in each

appeal, he argues that (1) his due process rights have been violated by his inability 

to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the revocation of his 

community supervision, (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove that he 

absconded from a substance abuse felony punishment facility (SAFPF), as the 
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State alleged in its motion to revoke, and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered 

him to pay the fees of his court-appointed attorney. We affirm.

Background Facts

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant originally pleaded guilty to the 

offenses of injury to a child in trial court cause numbers 17097B and 17098B. For 

each conviction, the trial court sentenced Appellant to confinement in the 

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of ten 

years but then probated those sentences in order to place Appellant on community 

supervision for a term of ten years.

On April 25, 2012, the State filed a motion to revoke Appellant’s 

community supervision in each cause. The motions alleged that Appellant violated 

the terms and conditions of his community supervision in each case in at least 

sixteen different ways.1

At the hearing held on the motions to revoke, Appellant pleaded true to all of 

the State’s allegations except for the allegation that he absconded from the SAFPF 

on the night of March 1, 2012. The State presented evidence only on the allegation 

that Appellant absconded from the SAFPF. The State relied on Appellant’s plea of 

true with respect to the remaining allegations.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found all of the State’s 

allegations to be true. The trial court revoked Appellant’s community supervision

in both causes and ordered him to serve his original sentence of ten years 

confinement for each of his two convictions for injury to a child. The trial court 

ordered the sentences to run concurrently.

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These allegations included claims that Appellant used prohibited substances, failed to report to 

his supervision officer, failed to update his place of employment, failed to abide by his curfew, failed to 

avoid persons and places of disreputable character, failed to complete required community service, and 

failed to pay court costs and other fees.
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Analysis

In his first issue, Appellant argues that his due process rights were violated 

because the State was not required to present evidence beyond his plea of true to 

prove that he violated the terms of his community supervision. He contends that 

the statutory protections offered by Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure should be extended to revocation proceedings based on the similarity 

those proceedings have to criminal trials where a defendant pleads guilty. See

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15 (West 2005); Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 

9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“No trial court is authorized to render a conviction 

in a felony case, consistent with Article 1.15, based upon a plea of guilty ‘without 

sufficient evidence to support the same.’”).

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made it clear that the violation of 

a single condition of community supervision is a sufficient ground to support 

revocation of community supervision. Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1979). Furthermore, a defendant’s plea of true, standing alone, is 

sufficient to support the revocation of community supervision. Id. Thus, if a 

defendant pleads true to violating any condition of his community supervision, he 

cannot claim that the evidence is insufficient to support revocation. Mitchell v. 

State, 482 S.W.2d 221, 222–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Harris v. State, 160 

S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. struck). Consequently, Appellant 

is challenging the holdings of the Court of Criminal Appeals that a plea of true, 

standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation of community supervision.

We previously addressed the issue raised by Appellant in Johnson v. State, 

No. 11-11-00004-CR, 2012 WL 3891621, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 6, 

2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We held in Johnson

that the failure to present this due process contention in the trial court results in a 

waiver of the error on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) (stating that, as a 
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prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, a timely request, 

objection, or motion must be made and ruled upon by the trial court); Pena v. 

State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (finding that a due process 

complaint can be waived on appeal). Accordingly, Appellant waived his due 

process issue by failing to raise it in the trial court.

Moreover, our conclusion in Johnson demonstrates that Appellant’s due 

process complaint fails on the merits as well. Citing the opinion of our sister court 

in Godley v. State, No. 03-11-00083-CR, 2012 WL 1660613 (Tex. App.—Austin 

May 11, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication), we rejected 

the same argument that Appellant makes here. As it did in Johnson and Godley, 

binding precedent controls our decision in this case. Accordingly, a defendant who 

pleads true to violating conditions of community supervision cannot later claim 

that there is insufficient evidence to revoke that supervision. We overrule 

Appellant’s first issue in each appeal.

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it revoked his community supervision on the ground that he absconded from 

his SAFPF because the evidence was insufficient to support the allegation. A trial 

court’s decision to revoke community supervision is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The 

State has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

defendant committed a violation of the conditions of his community supervision. 

Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). If the State fails to 

meet its burden of proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in revoking the 

community supervision. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1984). The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and 

the weight given to their testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.
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Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). Proof of one violation of the terms of community 

supervision is sufficient to support revocation. Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 

871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). A defendant’s true plea provides the court with 

sufficient evidence to revoke his community supervision. Smith v. State, 286 

S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

In light of Appellant’s plea of true to fifteen other alleged violations of the 

terms and conditions of community supervision, we need not consider Appellant’s 

evidentiary contentions to a single alleged violation. When a trial court finds 

several violations of community supervision conditions, we affirm the revocation 

order if the proof of any single allegation is sufficient. See Hart v. State, 264 

S.W.3d 364, 367 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s community supervision because it had 

numerous other violations on which it could have based its decision. We overrule 

Appellant’s second issue in each appeal.

In his third issue, Appellant claims that a portion of the judgments in cause 

numbers 17097B and 17098B should be vacated because they incorrectly assessed

the fees of his court-appointed attorney against him. The State does not dispute 

Appellant’s indigent status but argues that the final judgments do not require 

Appellant to pay attorney’s fees. The State concedes that, if the evidence 

establishes that the judgments require Appellant to pay attorney’s fees, the fees 

should be deleted from the judgments.

The trial court’s original judgments placing Appellant on community 

supervision required Appellant to pay several fees as a term and condition of his 

community supervision, including the fees for his court-appointed attorney. The 

judgments did not set out a dollar amount owed for the attorney’s fees, but the 

judgments contained a notation indicating that the amount was to be determined 

later. The trial court later established the amount of the attorney’s fees to be paid 
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by Appellant in subsequent orders amending conditions of community supervision.2

The trial court’s subsequent judgments revoking Appellant’s community 

supervision did not specifically require Appellant to pay the assessed costs for 

attorney’s fees. However, they do provide that he is to be punished “in accordance 

with the judgment and sentence originally entered in this cause.” As noted 

previously, the original judgments required Appellant to pay attorney’s fees. 

Accordingly, the judgments revoking Appellant’s community supervision 

seemingly require him to pay the fees of his court-appointed attorney.

Under the authority of Wiley v. State, 410 S.W.3d 313, 318–19 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013), we conclude that Appellant has not preserved this issue for appellate 

review. The Court of Criminal Appeals recently held in Wiley that a defendant, 

whose community supervision had been revoked, forfeited his challenge to the 

imposition of court-appointed attorney’s fees by failing to bring such a claim in a 

direct appeal from the order originally imposing community supervision. As noted 

by the court, “[A]n appellant will not be permitted to raise on appeal from the 

revocation of his community supervision any claim that he could have brought on 

an appeal from the original imposition of that community supervision.” Wiley, 410 

S.W.3d at 319. As was the case in Wiley, the orders imposing the payment of 

attorney’s fees were the original judgments placing Appellant on community 

supervision. Under Wiley, Appellant was required to timely appeal these 

judgments in order to challenge the assessment of court-appointed attorney’s fees.

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 2

In its motions to revoke Appellant’s community supervision, the State listed Appellant’s failure 

to pay the attorney’s fees as one of the allegations against him. Appellant pleaded true to this allegation,

and the trial court implicitly found it to be true.

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We note that Appellant is challenging the imposition of any attorney’s fees against him rather 

than the amount of attorney’s fees assessed him. Accordingly, he potentially could have raised this claim 

in a direct appeal of the judgments imposing community supervision.
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The fact that Appellant specifically waived his right to appeal the judgments 

imposing community supervision does not change the result. Perez v. State, 424 

S.W.3d 81, 85–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“Appellant’s waiver of his right to 

appeal does not excuse his failure to appeal the assessment of court costs at the 

time of the original imposition of community supervision.”). Because Appellant 

did not challenge the assessment of attorney’s fees by a direct appeal from the 

original judgments imposing community supervision, he has waived the issue. We 

overrule Appellant’s third issue in each appeal.

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY

JUSTICE

July 31, 2014

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.