UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

SOUTH BEND DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 v. 

CURTIS JONES, III 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Case No. 3:16-CR-007 JD 

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant Curtis Jones, III was indicted on January 13, 2016, on one count of knowingly 

possessing a firearm having previously been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). After his arrest, he had a detention hearing on January 28, 2016 before the 

magistrate judge. After hearing proffers and arguments from the parties, the magistrate judge 

found that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the appearance of 

the defendant as required, so he ordered Mr. Jones detained pending trial. [DE 25]. Mr. Jones has 

now moved for review of his pretrial detention [DE 29], and the government has responded. [DE 

34]. The Court finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 

safety of the community, so it denies Mr. Jones’ motion and orders Mr. Jones detained pending 

trial. 

18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) permits a defendant to file a motion seeking review or revocation of 

a detention order when the defendant has been ordered detained by a magistrate judge. The 

standard of review for this Court’s review of a magistrate judge’s detention order is de novo.1

United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming the district court judge’s de novo 

review of the magistrate judge’s detention determination); United States v. Levine, 770 F. Supp. 

 

1

 A district court may conduct this review either by considering the hearing held before the 

magistrate judge or by holding a new hearing. United States v. Torres, 929 F.2d 291, 292 (7th 

Cir. 1991). Mr. Jones does not request a new hearing, so the Court has considered the parties’ 

proffers and arguments at the hearing before the magistrate judge and their filings on this motion.
2 

460, 465 (N.D. Ind. 1991). The Bail Reform Act limits the circumstances under which a district 

court may order pretrial detention. As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether 

release of a defendant on personal recognizance or an unsecured bond would either not 

reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or endanger the safety of any other 

person or the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). If such a release would not reasonably assure the 

Defendant’s appearance or the safety of the community, then the Court must consider whether 

there is some condition or combination of conditions that would so assure the Court. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142(c). “Pretrial detention is allowed only after the court holds a hearing and finds that ‘no 

condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as 

required and the safety of any other person and the community.’” Miller v. Hastings, 87 F. 

App’x 585, 586 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)). 

Because the offense with which Mr. Jones is charged involves the possession of a 

firearm, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(E), detention can be ordered for either a risk of 

flight or a risk of danger to the community. The government bears the burden of proving either 

ground for detention. Portes, 786 F.2d at 764–65. With respect to risk of flight, the United 

States bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 765. With respect to 

risk of danger, the United States must prove its allegations by clear and convincing evidence. 18 

U.S.C. § 3142(f); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Detention may be based on a 

showing of either dangerousness or risk of flight; proof of both is not required. Portes, 786 F.2d 

at 765; Daniels, 772 F.2d at 383. The factors to be considered by the Court in determining 

whether there are conditions that will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant and the 

safety of any other person and the community include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the 

offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a minor victim, 
3 

controlled substance, or firearm; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the 

defendant’s history and characteristics, including (A) his character, physical and mental 

condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, 

community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and 

record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and (B) whether, at the time of the current 

offense of arrest, the defendant was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, 

sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for another offense; and (4) the nature and 

seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s 

release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). 

Considering those factors here, the Court finds that there is no condition or combination 

of conditions that would reasonably assure the safety of the community if Mr. Jones were to be 

released. Mr. Jones is charged in this case with possessing a firearm as a felon, meaning this 

offense involved a firearm. According to the government’s proffer (which the defendant does not 

contest), the firearm was also stolen at the time Mr. Jones possessed it. Further, the government’s 

case appears quite strong, as the firearm was found in Mr. Jones’ home, and Mr. Jones admitted 

to officers that he purchased and possessed the firearm. Again, the defendant does not contest 

that proffer, and in fact noted at the hearing before the magistrate judge that Mr. Jones 

immediately spoke with the police when confronted and gave a complete statement that was 

corroborated by officers. Thus, the first two factors weigh in favor of detention, given that the 

charged offense involved a firearm and the defendant has given a statement admitting facts that 

would establish his guilt. 

Mr. Jones’ history and characteristics also weigh heavily in favor of detention. As 

reflected in the Pretrial Services Report, Mr. Jones has a previous federal conviction for 
4 

conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958, which is a very serious offense. According to the Pretrial Services 

Report, Mr. Jones had agreed to assist in the murder of two individuals. Moreover, Mr. Jones 

committed that offense while awaiting trial on two separate cases in state court: one for 

attempted murder of a police officer arising out of a shooting during which an officer was 

wounded, and one for auto theft. Defense counsel argued at the hearing before the magistrate 

judge that the state attempted-murder charges were for the same offense as the subsequent 

federal charges, but the record contradicts that assertion. The Pretrial Services Report states that 

the attempted-murder charges in state court arose out of a shooting that occurred on October 13, 

1998, while the federal murder-for-hire conspiracy charge occurred in January 2001. Moreover, 

the opinion by the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of one of Mr. Jones’ co-defendants 

in the federal case makes clear that the federal offense did not relate to an attempted murder of a 

police officer and did not begin until 1999 at the earliest. United States v. Richeson, 338 F.3d 

653 (7th Cir. 2003). Moreover, that opinion shows that the murder-for-hire conspiracy began 

while Mr. Jones was detained, and continued after he made bond and was released pending trial 

on those charges. Thus, the fact that Mr. Jones would commit such a serious federal offense 

while facing similarly serious charges in state court weighs heavily in favor of risk of danger. 

Granted, that conduct occurred over fifteen years ago. However, Mr. Jones was 

incarcerated for seven of those years pursuant to his federal conviction. And more recently, Mr. 

Jones committed multiple violations of the conditions of his supervised release, including by 

failing to obtain employment, failing to notify Probation of a change in residence, testing 
5 

positive multiple times for use of controlled substance,2

 associating with a person engaged in 

criminal activity, and failing to participate in drug testing and drug treatment. Those violations 

led to a revocation of Mr. Jones’ supervised release in 2011, for which he was sentenced to three 

additional months of imprisonment.3

 The Court also acknowledges that Mr. Jones is a life-long 

resident of Lake County, Indiana, that he is in a long-term relationship, and that he has a job 

available to him should he be released. However, in light of Mr. Jones’ criminal history, 

including the seriousness of his prior conviction, his commission of that offense while on pretrial 

release in another matter, and his violation of the conditions of post-release supervision, the 

Court finds that this factor weighs heavily in favor of detention. 

The Court also finds that the last factor, the nature and seriousness of the danger to any 

person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s release, weighs in favor of 

detention. Mr. Jones has admitted to unlawfully possessing a stolen firearm as a convicted felon. 

Those circumstances present a greater than usual risk that the firearm would be used for unlawful 

purposes, which would expose the community to a danger of violence. The seriousness of Mr. 

Jones’ prior conviction further heightens that potential for violence. Though the firearm 

underlying the present charges has presumably been seized, Mr. Jones’ acquisition of that 

firearm shows that he is willing and able to unlawfully acquire firearms, which gives rise to the 

potential danger to the community. 

 

2

 Mr. Jones nonetheless claimed in his interview for the Pretrial Services Report that he last used 

marijuana at the age of 21, even though he tested positive for marijuana on five occasions during 

his supervised release. [DE 20 p. 3].

3

 Contrary to the government’s assertion in its response [DE 34 p. 3], there is no indication in the 

record that Mr. Jones is currently on probation, as he was discharged from any further term of 

supervision following his revocation. [Case No. 2:01-CR-54, DE 175].
6 

In summary, Mr. Jones has a conviction for a murder-for-hire conspiracy; he committed 

that offense while facing attempted murder charges in state court; and after his release from 

imprisonment, he violated the terms of his supervision in multiple respects, leading to further 

imprisonment. That conduct gives the Court little reason to believe that any conditions of pretrial release can mitigate any danger Mr. Jones poses to the community. Further, Mr. Jones has 

admitted to unlawfully possessing a stolen firearm, meaning he still poses a risk of danger to the 

community and likely faces a term of imprisonment in this matter. Accordingly, the Court finds 

by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions would 

reasonably assure the safety of the community if Mr. Jones were to be released pending trial in 

this matter. 

The Court must therefore DENY Mr. Jones’ motion for review of the magistrate judge’s 

detention order. [DE 29]. Mr. Jones shall be detained pending trial. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED: February 24, 2016 

 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

 Judge 

 United States District Court