NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

FLOYD R., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, S.R., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0357

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD528524

The Honorable Janice K. Crawford, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Gates Law Firm, LLC, Buckeye

By S. Marie Gates

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Daniel R. Huff

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
FLOYD R. v. DCS, S.R.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Maurice Portley1 joined.

O R O Z C O, Judge:

¶1 Floyd R. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his daughter, S.R. (the child). For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Sharon S. (Mother) are the parents of the child, 

born in 2006. In February 2015, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) filed 

a dependency petition alleging Father was unable to parent due to parental 

domestic violence. The petition alleged Father had tested positive for 

methamphetamine and was unable to parent due to substance abuse. The 

petition further asserted Father was currently homeless and had neglected 

the child’s medical and educational needs. Following a hearing in May 

2015, the court found the child dependent as to Father. 

¶3 On February 23, 2016, DCS filed a motion to terminate 

Father’s parental rights alleging, as amended, the grounds of chronic 

substance abuse under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 8-533.B.3,2

as well as nine- and fifteen-months out-of-home placement under § 8-

533.B.8.a and c.

¶4 The juvenile court held a contested severance hearing on

August 9, 2016. After taking the matter under advisement, on August 25, 

2016, the court issued its findings and ruling terminating Father’s parental 

 

1 The Honorable Patricia A. Orozco and the Honorable Maurice 

Portley, Retired Judges of the Court of Appeals, Division One have been 

authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the 

Arizona Constitution.

2 Absent material change since the date of relevant events, we cite to 

the current version of statutes. 
FLOYD R. v. DCS, S.R.

Decision of the Court

3

rights to the child on all grounds alleged. Father timely appealed and we 

have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235.A, 12-120.21.A.1, and 12-2101.A.1.

DISCUSSION3

¶5 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds 

one of the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence, and the

termination is in the child’s best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 

281–82, 288, ¶¶ 7, 41 (2005) (interpreting A.R.S. § 8–533.B). We review an 

order terminating parental rights for an abuse of discretion and will affirm 

the order if it is supported by sufficient evidence in the record. Calvin B. v. 

Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 296, ¶ 17 (App. 2013). We defer to the juvenile 

court’s determinations on conflicts in the evidence, as it “is in the best 

position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of 

witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). 

 

3 Father’s opening brief is deficient. The two-page cursory argument 

section contains no citations to legal authority and only a few references to 

the record. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A) (requiring “citations of legal authorities 

and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the 

appellant relies”); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 106(A) (applying ARCAP 13 to juvenile 

appeals). Rule 13(a)(7)(A) requires that the argument section must include 

“contentions concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting 

reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities . . . on which 

the appellant relies.” (Emphasis added). Father does not include citations 

to legal authority with his substantive arguments. Although we exercise 

our discretion to address the issues raised in this case because of the 

significant liberty interests involved, we caution counsel that failure to 

comply with these Rules can result in dismissal of an appeal. See Ritchie v. 

Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (holding the failure to comply 

with ARCAP 13 can constitute waiver of that claim).
FLOYD R. v. DCS, S.R.

Decision of the Court

4

I. Statutory Grounds

4

¶6 Father argues DCS failed to prove Father had an “ongoing 

substance abuse problem and that he is unable to appropriately parent.” 

Father also asserts DCS failed to provide him with appropriate services. To 

support a termination on the ground of chronic substance abuse, there must 

be evidence in the record that the parent is unable to discharge his parental 

responsibilities “because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous 

drugs, controlled substances or alcohol.” A.R.S. § 8-533.B.3. There must 

also be “reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for

a prolonged indeterminate period.” Id. Additionally, the juvenile court 

must also have found that DCS “made reasonable efforts to reunify the 

family or that such efforts would have been futile.” Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12 (App. 2005). Because we find sufficient 

evidence in the record supports termination based on the ground of chronic 

substance abuse, we need not address the other grounds alleged. See 

Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251, ¶ 27 (2000) (holding 

if reasonable evidence supports termination on any one statutory ground, 

the appellate court need not consider challenges pertaining to other 

grounds).

¶7 At the severance hearing, the DCS case manager testified that 

at the outset of this case DCS offered Father urinalysis testing, parent aid 

services, transportation, and a psychological consultation and evaluation. 

The evidence also shows DCS gave Father two referrals for substance abuse 

treatment at TERROS, one in March 2015 and the other in June 2015, both 

of which were closed due to nonparticipation. With regard to Father’s drug 

testing, the DCS reports in evidence indicate that between April 2015 and 

 

4 Father asserts DCS failed to establish his paternity of the child and 

that “this mishap is significant and warrants a reversal of the court’s 

decision.” Father cites no authority to support this argument. See ARCAP 

13(a)(7) (stating appellant’s brief shall include party’s contentions, reasons 

therefor, and necessary supporting citations); see also Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 

106(A) (applying Rule 13 to juvenile appeals). Further, Father does not cite, 

and we do not find, that Father challenged his paternity of the child at any 

time after the child was removed from the family home, at the dependency 

or as a defense to the termination action, before the superior court. See State 

v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 297 (1995) (holding appeals court will not consider 

arguments not raised below unless it is a matter of fundamental error). We 

therefore reject Father’s argument regarding paternity. 
FLOYD R. v. DCS, S.R.

Decision of the Court

5

June 2015, Father missed forty-three calls and seven required tests. The 

report further states that Father did not call in at all for testing between June 

2015 and January 2016. 

¶8 In December 2015, the child moved with her relative 

placement to Colorado. At some point after that, Father relocated to 

Colorado and, in March 2016, filed a motion requesting information 

regarding the child’s whereabouts in Colorado and stating that he “would 

like to move to the city/area” to be near her. Father argues the services 

DCS provided there were inadequate because the testing sites were too far 

from his home, DCS did not provide him transportation, and because the 

first time he arrived to test in Colorado he was charged a fee, which he 

could not afford. Yet, the record shows that even after relocating to 

Colorado, Father failed to substantially comply with services quite apart 

from the issues he now complains. 

¶9 DCS is required to provide a parent “the time and 

opportunity to participate in programs designed to help [him] become an 

effective parent.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS–501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 

353 (App. 1994). However, DCS is not required to provide every 

conceivable service, and a parent’s failure or refusal to participate in the 

services offered or recommended by DCS does not foreclose termination of 

the parent’s rights. Id. Additionally, DCS need not undertake futile 

rehabilitative measures, but only those that offer a reasonable possibility of 

success. Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 186-87, ¶ 1 

(App. 1999).

¶10 The case manager testified that she arranged for Father to be 

able to complete drug testing in Colorado and offered him another referral 

for substance abuse services, but he did not take advantage of the 

opportunity. There is also evidence showing Father was told in June 2016, 

after he moved from Denver to a smaller town in Colorado, that there were 

no services available in his town and that he would have to travel to Denver 

to participate in services. The case manager testified that she changed the

assigned testing site to the closest possible location to Father and that she 

corrected the issue regarding the fee as soon as she was made aware of it. 

She also testified that Father did not call or request transportation assistance

to drug test in Colorado. Further, Father only successfully tested once while 

in Colorado, which was positive for alcohol. 

¶11 The evidence shows that Father took one drug test at the 

beginning of this case in January 2015, which was positive for 

methamphetamine, and one test in July 2016, which was positive for 
FLOYD R. v. DCS, S.R.

Decision of the Court

6

alcohol. These were the only tests Father completed throughout the more 

than fifteen-month duration of this case. Father also failed to engage in any 

substance abuse treatment. The record supports the court’s findings that 

DCS made reasonable efforts to reunify Father with the child, but that 

Father failed to participate in the offered services.

¶12 There is also evidence in the record supporting the court’s 

finding that Father had a history of chronic substance abuse. The DCS 

report showed Father had a previous arrest for driving while intoxicated, 

admitted to drinking alcohol and tested positive for alcohol. Also, although 

Father denied using methamphetamine, he tested positive in January 2015

and was living with Mother, who admitted to using methamphetamine just 

days before the child was removed. 

¶13 Evidence also supports the court’s conclusion that Father’s 

substance abuse affects his ability to parent, as it coincides with a history of 

homelessness, domestic violence, and a failure to meet the child’s medical 

and educational needs. Evidence shows Father was homeless in Arizona 

after being evicted from Mother’s home and was homeless in Colorado after 

he moved there following the child’s move to Colorado. Further, the DCS 

reports detail a history of daily domestic violence between Mother and 

Father, including one instance where Father bloodied Mother’s nose. When 

the child came into care, she had significant untreated dental issues and had 

been suspended from school for not having updated immunization records. 

Given these facts, coupled with Father’s refusal to participate in substance 

abuse treatment or demonstrate sobriety, sufficient evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s finding that Father’s substance abuse will continue for a 

prolonged and indeterminate period.

II. Best Interests

¶14 Father also challenges the court’s finding that termination of 

his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. “To support a finding that 

termination is in the child’s best interests, [DCS] must prove that the child 

will affirmatively benefit from the termination.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004). This means that “a 

determination of the child’s best interest[s] must include a finding as to how 

the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation 

of the relationship.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS–500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5

(1990). The best interests requirement may be met if, for example, DCS 

proves that a current adoptive plan exists for the child, or even that the child 

is adoptable. Id. at 6. 
FLOYD R. v. DCS, S.R.

Decision of the Court

7

¶15 At the termination hearing, the DCS case manager testified 

that the child was placed with a relative who was willing to adopt her and 

her half-sibling. She further testified that the placement was meeting all of 

the child’s needs and that the child would benefit from the termination 

because it would allow her to have “a permanent, forever loving home.”

Therefore, we find sufficient evidence supports the court’s finding that

termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests. See 

Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 17 (App. 2016) (stating

“a child’s interest in permanency must prevail over a parent’s uncertain 

battle with drugs”).

CONCLUSION

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Father’s parental rights to the child.