UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DAVID O'NEILL,

 Petitioner,

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v. No. 3:16 CV 597

SUPERINTENDENT,

 Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

David O’Neill, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the 

prison disciplinary hearing (MCF 15-07-331) held at the Miami Correctional Facility on 

August 13, 2015. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) found him guilty of 

Use/Possession of a Controlled Substance in violation of B-202 and sanctioned him with 

the loss of 30 days earned credit time. In the petition, O’Neill lists four grounds. 

In Ground One, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to have found him 

guilty because there is conflicting evidence about whether he signed an admission of guilt 

form. However, it is irrelevant whether he signed the form or not. “[T]he relevant 

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion 

reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). 

[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the support 

of some evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no more 

than a modicum of evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the 

record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary 

board were without support or otherwise arbitrary. Although some 

evidence is not much, it still must point to the accused’s guilt. It is not our 
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province to assess the comparative weight of the evidence underlying the 

disciplinary board’s decision. 

Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations, parenthesis, 

and ellipsis omitted). Even a Conduct Report alone can be sufficient evidence to support 

a finding of guilt. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). Such is the case 

here. The Conduct Report states that “O’Neil provided an adequate sample to be tested 

in the ICUP Testing Device. I, Sgt. King then applied the Redi Test Single Panel Dip Test 

for Suboxone. The test result was positive for Suboxone in the sample.” DE 1-1 at 1. That 

is some evidence that O’Neill was guilty of using a controlled substance. Therefore 

Ground One is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.

In Ground Two, he argues that he was denied evidence. Specifically he wanted 

paperwork from another inmate’s disciplinary hearing which contained his signature. In 

a prison disciplinary hearing, an inmate has a constitutional right to present relevant, 

exculpatory evidence. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Exculpatory in this 

context means evidence which “directly undermines the reliability of the evidence in the 

record pointing to [the prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996). 

O’Neill argues that he mistakenly signed a drug test form from another inmate’s test.

However, such paperwork would not have been exculpatory because it would have done 

nothing to undermine the reliability of his drug test results. Moreover, this paperwork 

was not withheld from him – it could not be found. Therefore even if the requested 

paperwork had been exculpatory, it could not have been produced at his hearing. Ground 

Two is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
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In Ground Three, he argues that he was denied due process because he was not 

given a copy of the drug test results in violation of prison policy. However, the violation 

of a prison policy is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 

(1991). (“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a 

conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Here, the 

DHO did consider the test results (DE 1-1 at 3), and “prison disciplinary boards are 

entitled to receive, and act on, information that is withheld from the prisoner and the 

public . . ..” White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the denial 

of evidence is harmless unless the prisoner shows that the evidence could have aided his 

defense. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, O’Neill does not argue 

that he passed the test. He only says that he wanted to see the paperwork showing that 

he failed. That would not have aided his defense. Therefore Ground Three is not a basis 

for habeas corpus relief. 

In Ground Four, he argues that there was a violation of the chain of custody 

because he signed the drug test form for another inmate. However, “[a]bsent some 

affirmative indication that a mistake may have been made, [the] hypothetical possibility 

of tampering does not render evidence inadmissible, but goes instead to the weight of the 

evidence.” Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, there is no indication 

that his urine sample was not the one that tested positive for Suboxone. There is only 

evidence that he mistakenly signed the wrong paperwork. That is not a basis for habeas 

corpus relief. 
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For these reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED. The clerk is DIRECTED

to enter judgment and close this case.

SO ORDERED.

Date: September 19, 2016

s/ James T. Moody _

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT