UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DANNY J. HORTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-315 RM

)

KATHY L. GRIFFIN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Danny J. Horton, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint alleging that a person on his

visitation list has been restricted from visiting the prison for six months. He alleges that

neither he nor that visitor were given a due process hearing. He alleges that he hasn’t been

disciplined or prevented from having other visitors. “A document filed pro se is to be

liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, the court must

review prisoner complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. “[T]o state a claim under [42

U.S.C.] § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants deprived him of a federal

constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law.” Savory v.

Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Though the defendants acted under color of state law, they haven’t deprived Mr.

Horton of a federal constitutional right. “The denial of prison access to a particular visitor

is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence, and
therefore is not independently protected by the Due Process Clause.” Kentucky Dep’t of

Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Mr.

Horton argues that the defendants violated prison policies, but “a prisoner’s liberty

interest, and incumbent entitlement to procedural due process protections, generally

extends only to freedom from deprivations that impose atypical and significant hardship

on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin [v. Conner], 515

U.S. [472,] 483 [1995]. In the absence of such atypical and significant deprivations, the

procedural protections of the Due Process Clause will not be triggered.” Lekas v. Briley,

405 F.3d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus the violation

of a prison policy related to visitation does not state a claim. See Billups v. Galassi, 2000 WL

6200, *1, (7th Cir. January 3, 2000) (“Thus, Jackson’s visiting privileges do not implicate a

constitutionally protected liberty interest, and a hearing, or any other due process

protection, was not required for Galassi to revoke that privilege.”)

Though it is usually necessary “to give pro se litigants one opportunity to amend

after dismissing a complaint[,] that’s unnecessary where, as here, it is certain from the face

of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted.”

Carpenter v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n, No. 15-2732, 633 Fed. Appx. 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2016)

(quotation marks omitted). See Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013) and

Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts have broad

discretion to deny leave to amend where . . . the amendment would be futile.”). Mr.

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Horton’s complaint fits that bill. Mr. Horton wasn’t entitled to due process before his

visitor was banned from the facility and he can’t state a claim based on these facts. 

For these reasons, this complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: May 26 , 2016 

 /s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr. 

Judge, 

United States District Court

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