## In the



# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it
N o. 08

- 1071 L EONEL J IMENEZ -G ONZALEZ, P etitio ner, v. M ICHAEL B. M UKASE Y, U ni ted S tat es A tt or n ey G en er al, R es pond ent
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Pe tition fo r Review o f anOrd er o f the B o ard of Immigration App eals

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No . A42-914- 629
A RGUED S EPT EMBER10, 2008

— D ECIDED N OVE MBE R 21, 2008

Befo re C OFFEY, R IPPLE a nd M A NI ON, C ircu it Judges . R IPPLE, C ircu it Judge

. L e onelJ i m enez- Gonzal ez’ s peti ti on for rev iew p r e se n ts an iss u e o f firstim p re ss ion in t h is c i r c u i t : w h e th e rc r i mi n a lr e c k l e s s n e s s c o n s t i t ut e s a c r i me of v iole n c e u n d er 18 U .S.C . § 16 (b ). A lien s a re rem ov ab le und er8 U
. S. C. § 1 227( a) ( 2) (A )(iii ) i ftheyco m m i t a n agg ra vate d fe l ony. The d efiniti on o f“a ggr avat ed fel ony” i ncl ud es a convi cti on f or a “ cri m e o fvi ol ence [ ] as defined i n s e c t i o n 1 6 o fT i t l e 1 8 , ” f o rwh i c h th e t e r m o fi mpr i so n-2 N o. 08

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m en t is at least one yea r. 8 U
. S. C
. § 1101( a )( 43)(F). M r. J i m enez- Gonzal ez, a perm anent r esi dent, pl eaded gui l ty to cri m i nalr ec kl ess ness f orsho oting a fi re ar m i nto an i nhabi ted dw el l i ng in vi ol ati on ofIndi ana Code § 35- 42- 2- 2( c) ( 3)
. The Departm ent o fH om el and Secur i ty or dered M r. J i m enez- Gonzal ez re m ove d to h i s nat i ve M exi co f or havi ng co m m i tte d a cr i m e o fvi ol en c e. Because cri m es of viol en ce, as defined u nd er § 16(b), are l im ited to soc iety’s m ost ser i ou s o ffenses

— o ffe ns e s tha tdo n o ti nc l ud e re ckl ess o r acci dentalco nd uct

— w e gr ant M r. J i m enezGonzal ez’ s peti ti on f orr evi ew and hol d that c ri m i nal re ckl ess ness i s not a cri m e o fvi ol ence f ori m m i gr ati on pu rpos es.

I

B AC KGR OUND A . Facts Leo ne lJ i m en ez - Go n z a l ez , the y o ung es t o fe i g htc hi l dr en, c a me to the U ni t e d S t a t e s a s a s ma l lc h i l d i n 1 9 9 1
. He l i ve d wi thhi s m o th er, f athe ra nd s ev ens ibl i ng s i n v ar i o us ci ti es, ev entual l y s ett l i ng i n I nd i anapol i s. M r. J i m enezG on za lez an d h i s f a m ily b ec am e la w fu l p er m an en t re sidents, and, al though hi s par ents eve ntual l y chose to re tu rn t o M exi co, M r. J i m enez- Gonzal ez and his sibl i ngs set tl ed her e a s a du l ts. I n Octobe r 20 05 , M r. J i m enez- Gonzal ez ple aded gui l ty to tw o counts of cri m i nal re ckl ess ness, a Clas s C felon y. Clas s C cr i m i nalr eckl ess ness is defined i n I nd i ana a s f ol l ows:N o. 08

- 1071 3 ( b) A per so n who r ec k l essly, kno wi ng l y, o ri nt en ti o nally p er for m s: (1) a n ac t t h at cr e a t e s a su b st an tia l risk of bo d ily i nj ur y t o a no th erpe r so n

. . . com m i ts cri m i nalr eckl ess ness. ( c) The o ffense ofcr i m i nalr ec kl ess ness as defined i n subsec ti on (b) i s:

. . . (3) a C lass C felony if : ( A ) i t i s co m m i tte d by s hoot i ng a fi re ar m i nto an i nhabi ted dw el l i ng o r othe r bui l ding or p lace w he re peo p le are li kely to gather. I nd

. Code § 35- 42- 2- 2( b) ( 1) , ( c) ( 3)
. A ccord in g t o hi s pre se n te n c e re p or t, M r. Jim en ez -G on za lez h ad ad m itt ed in hi s pl ea agr eem ent t o com m i tting two co unts o fcr i m i nal re ckless n es s bysho oting a fi re ar m fro m hi s t ruck i nto a n a p a r t me n tl o c a t e d i n a re s i d e n t i a ln e i g hb o r h o o d

. He w as then s entence d to f our yea rs ’ i m pri sonm ent. Based o n this co nv i ct i o n the De par tmento fHomel an d Secu rity initiated rem oval proc eed ings agains t M r. J i m enez- Gonzal ez.
B. I m m i gr at i on Pro ceedi ngs W h en M r. Jim en ez -G on za lez a p p ea re d be for e a n Im m ig r at i o n J ud ge ( “IJ ”) , he a dm i tt ed th athe ha d b ee n c o nvi cted o fcr i m i nalr eckl ess ness and t est i fi ed that he di d not4 N o. 08

- 1071 have any fearthathe wou l d be har m ed orm i str eat ed i fr em ove d t o M exi co. The IJ adm i tte d evi dence d e t a i l i n gMr
. J i me n e z - G o n z a l e z ’ s c o n v i c t i o n s f o rc r i mi nalr eckl ess ness i ncl ud i ng the abs tr act ofj ud gm ent, pre sente nce r epor t a nd o ffi cer ’ s probabl e ca use a ffi davi t. M r. J i m enez- Gonzal ez then argued that c ri m i nalr eckl ess ne ss was no t a cr i m e o fviol ence a nd tha t, the r efo r e, he w as not re m ovabl e f or havi ng com m i tte d a n ag gr avated fel ony. T h e IJ d isa gr ee d an d h eld th at c rim in al re c kle ss n es s is a cr i m e o fvi ole nce be cause i t cr eat es a s ubstanti alr i sk that the a cto r i ntenti onal l y would use f or ce i n further ance of th e o f f e n s e. T h e B oa rd of Im m igr at ion A p p ea ls affi rm ed the IJ ’ s deci si on; it h el d that fel ony cri m i nal re ckl ess ness com m i tte d b y “ shoo ti ng a fi re ar m i nto an inh abited dw ell ing or o t h e r building or p lace w he re pe o pl e a r e l i k e l y t o g a the r ” i n v i o l a t i o n o fIndi a na Co de § 3 5-4 2-2 -2(c )(3) co n st itu te d a c rim e o f vio len c e. T h e B IA re aso ned th at shooting a gun i nto an apar tm ent ne cessa rily c au se d a su b st an tia l risk th at th e o ffen d er w ou ld u se p hysi calf or ce a gainst the per son orpro pertyo f anothe r du ring the co m m i ssi on o fthe offense.

II DI S C US S I ON I n hi s peti ti on fo r re vi ew , M r. Ji m enez- Gonzal ez ar gues that he i s no t s ubj ect to re m ova lbec ause cri m i nalr eckl ess ness i s no t a cr i m e ofvio l ence. A s rel evanth er e, “cri m e o f vi ol ence” i s defi ned i n 18 U
. S. C. § 1 6( b) as an o ffense “thatN o. 08

- 1071 5 i s a felon y and that, byi ts nature , i nvol ves a s ubstanti al ri sk that p hysi calf or ce a gainst the per son orpro pertyo f an o th ermay be us ed i n the cou rse o fc o m m i tt i ngthe offense. ” Seeals o Leocal v. Ashcroft, 5 43 U
. S. 1 , 1 0 n.7 (2004). Both part i es agr ee that M r. J i m enez- Gonzal ez’ s co nvi cti o ns wer e fel o ni es . W e r ev i ew de no vo whethe ra c o nviction qu ali fi es as a crim e of viol en ce un d er Sec tion 16(b). See La G uerre v. M uk a sey, 5 26 F.3d 103 7, 1039 ( 7th Cir. 2008). M r. J i m enez- Gonzal ez subm its thathi s co nvi cti on f orcr i m i nalr eckl ess ness cannot b e a c ri m e o fvi ol ence because S ecti on 1 6( b) r equi re s that a cr i m e o fvi ol ence h a v e a me n s r e a h i g h e rth a n r e c k l e s s n e s s . T h e S u p r e me Cou r t ex am ined th e sc o pe o fS ec ti o n 1 6(b) i n Le oc al v. A shcroft, h o l d in g t h at a c on vic tio n for d ru n k d riv in g d id not quali fy a s a cri m e ofvio l ence und erSecti on 16( b)

. 54 3 U .S. at 1 3. Inrea c h in g t h at co n c lu sio n, t h e C ou rth eld th at a c rim e b as ed on st ric t l i a b ility or n eg lige n c e c ou ld not be a cr i m e o f vi ol ence, bec ause “[ i ] nter preting § 16 to en co m pas s ac ci den ta lo rne g l i g en t co nduc t woul d b l ur the dist i ncti on between the ‘ vi ol ent’ cri m es Congr ess so ug htt o disti ng ui shf o rhe i g ht en ed puni sh m en t an d other c rim es. ” Id

. at11
. The Courtr ese rv ed f orano ther day the is su e whether re ckl ess cr i m es coul d quali fy a s c rim es o fv i o l e n c e. Id. at1 3 ( “T hi s ca se do es no t pr es en t us w i th the questi on wh ethera sta te orfedera lo ffen se that re quir es proo fo fthe reck less u se off or ce a gainst a perso n orpro pertyo fano therqual i fi es as a cr i m e o f viol en ce.”). I n th e w ake of Le oc al , fi ve othe r ci rcui ts have hel d that re ckl ess cr i m es cannot be c ri m es ofv iole nce under6 N o. 08

- 1071 Se c tio n 16 (b ). SeeU nite d States v. Z uniga-Soto , 527 F. 3d 1110 , 11 24 (10 thCi r . 2 00 8) ( ho l di ngtha t r ec k l es s as sa ul t o n a p olic e o ffice r w as n ota c rim e o f vio len c e); U ni t e d St at e s v. P orte la , 46 9 F
. 3d 496, 49 9 ( 6th Ci r. 2006) ( hol ding that r eckless veh icular hom ici d e w as no t crim e of viol en ce); Fern a nd ez-R uiz v. G o nz a les , 46 6 F
. 3d 1121 , 11 29- 31 ( 9th Cir
. 20 06) ( en banc) ( disc ussi ng Leocal and hol ding that reckless d om estic viol en ce w as no t a crim e of viol en c e ); G a rcia v. G o nz a l es , 45 5 F
. 3d 465, 46 8- 69 ( 4th Ci r. 20 06) (holdin g t ha t rec kless assau lt w as no t a crim e of viol en ce); O yeba nji v . Go nz a les , 41 8 F
. 3d 260, 2 63 -65 (3 d C i r. 20 05) ( hol ding that re ckl ess ve hi cular h om i ci de w as not a c r i me o fv i o l e nc e )
. T he s e c i r c ui t s h a v e i nt e r pr e t e d Le oc al to li m it the scop e o f S e c t ion 16(b) to cri m es th at req uire pu rpos eful conduct, ra ther than negl i gent or r eckl ess conduct. Today we j oi n oursi ste r ci rcui ts and h ol d that r eckl ess c r i me s a r e n o tc r i me s ofvi o l e n c e u n d e rS e c t i o n 1 6 ( b )
. As th e Thi r d Ci r cui t per su as i ve l y r ea s o n e d, “ [ t] he c o r ne r st o ne ofthe Le oc al Co ur t’ s r ea so ni ngw as tha t the c o nc epto fthe use o fphysi calf or ce a gainst the perso n o r proper ty of anothe r ‘ re quir es acti ve em plo ym ent’ and ‘ naturally su gg es ts a h igh er d eg re e of in te n t t h an n eg lige n t o r m er ely acci de nt al co nd uct. ’ ” O yebanji, 4 18 F
. 3d at2 63 ( quo ting Le oc al , 5 4 3 U. S
. a t9 ( e mph a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) )
. An d we be l i ev e th ata cc i den ta la nd re ck l es s cr i m es a r e no t th e type of “vi ol ent” cri m es Congre ss i ntended to distin gu ish as w o r t h y o f rem ov al. Se eLe oc al , 54 3 U.S
. at11 ; G arci a , 45 5 F
. 3d at 468- 69. A dd i ti onal l y, the S up re m e Cour t’ s hea vy re l i ance o n burgl ar y a s the pro totypi calexam ple o fa cri m e o fvi ol enceN o. 08

- 1071 7 supp or ts our hol ding that re ckl ess c rim es ar e no t cr i m es of vi ol ence. The Courtr eas oned thatburg l ar y was a crim e of viol en c e u n d er Section 16(b) “ notb ec au se the offense can be co m m i tte d i n a g en er allyr eckl ess way or because so m eo n e m ay be inj ured, but because burg l ar y, by its n at u re , i nvol ves a s ubstanti alr i sk that the b urgl ar w ill us e fo rc e a ga in s t a v ict im in c om p let in g t h e c rim e.” Le oc al , 5 43 U. S
. a t 10
. The ac t ofburg l ar y r equi re s i nt e nt i onal c o n d u c ta n d i n t e n t i o n a l l y b u r g l a r i z i n ga h o me ri sks having to use f or ce. By contr ast, cr i m i nalr eckl ess ness as defined by § 35

- 41- 2- 2 ofthe I nd i ana Code does not re quir e anypurposeful conduct. Fur ther m or e, cr i m i nal re ckl ess ness does not necess ar i l y c re ate a ri sk that f or ce m ay be use d as a m eans to an end d uri ng the co m m i ssi on o fth e o ffen se . U n like bu rg lar y, w h er e t h er e n ec es sa rily i s a r i sk offor ce b ei ng em plo yed i n a c onfr on tat i on i nsi de t he dw el l i ng, the offense ofcr i m i nalr eckl ess ness is c om p let e w h en th e g u n is fired

. Se eLe oc al , 54 3 U .S
. at 10 ; B eja ran o -U rrutia v. G o nz a les , 41 3 F.3d 4 44, 44 6- 47 ( 4th Cir
. 20 05) ( hol ding th at ri sk off or ce m ust be a “m eans to an en d ” in th e c om m iss ion of th e o ffe n s e); see also BazanRey e s v . INS , 2 5 6 F
. 3 d 6 0 0 , 6 1 2 ( 7 th C i r . 2 0 0 1 ) ( r e qui r i ng re ckl ess ness “w i th r esp ect to the r i sk that i ntenti onal phy si ca lf o r ce wi l lb e us ed i n the c o ur se ofc o m m i tt i ng th e offen se”). I n thi s ca se, al though the resul t s eem s, atfi rs t g l ance, c ou n te rin tu itiv e, w e m u st look atth e s t a tu te as a w h ole in order to d eterm ine w he th er the elem en ts of the un d erl yi ng o ffense cate gor i cal ly const i tute a cr i m e o fvi ol ence. See La G uerre, 526 F.3d at10 39 ; B a z a n-R eyes , 25 6 F. 3d at 612. I t i s im port ant t o re cogni ze that, under Ind i ana l aw , Cl ass8 N o. 08

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Cf

. Jo b so n v . A sh c ro

ft, 326 F. 3d 367, 373- 74 ( 2d C ir
. 2003) 1 ( holding tha t s econd-degree m ansl augh ter, w hich requir ed o n ly re ck le ss c o n d u ct, w a s n o t a cr im e o f v io le n ce ). C c r i mi n a l r e c k l e s s n e s s ma y b e c o mmi t t e d i n many differ ent ways, so m e o fwh i ch r equi re no i ntentional conduct at al l

. Becau se the e l em ents ofcr i m i nalr eckl ess ness can enco m pass bo th acc i de n tal and aggr ess i ve condu c t, it c annot be a cr i m e o fvi ol ence und er Section 16(b). The Go ve r nm en t ar g ue s, de spi te the d ec i si o ns o fo ur si ste r ci rcui ts, thatS ecti on 1 6( b) does notr equi re thata c rim e h av e a m e n s r ea h igh er th an rec kle ss n es s. O n ly tw o case s hav e hel d that a cr i m e invol vi ng r eckl ess beha vior i s a crim e of viol en ce u nd er Section 16(b). I m p ortantl y, in bo th o ftho se case s, the und er l yi ng cr i m es o fc o nv i c t i o n r e qu i r e d i nt e nt i onal c ond uct exhibi ti ng a reck less di sr eg ar d t o the li k el i ho o d o fi nj ur y . In Blakev. G o nz a les , 4 81 F
. 3d 15 2, 1 59- 63 ( 2d Ci r . 2 00 7) , the S ec o nd Ci r cui t he l d tha t a co nv i ct i o n fo rr ec k less a ss au l t an d batt er y ofa pol i ce o ffi cerwas a c ri m e o fvi ol ence be ca us e th e statut e r equi r ed an i nt e nt i onal as saul t o n an o ffi c e r wi th r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d t o th e l i k e l i h o o d th a tt he offic er m a y b e inju re d

. Sim ilar ly, th e F ifth C irc u it h eld 1 that f aci l i tat i on o fa dri ve -b y sh oo ti ng was a cri m e o f vi ol ence because the sta tute i n question r equi re d both ( 1) i ntenti onalfaci l i tat i on and (2) the i ntenti onaldi schar ge of a w ea p on by an ot h er oc c u p an t in th e c ar . Nguy e n v . A shcroft, 3 66 F
. 3d 38 6, 3 89 ( 5th Ci r . 2 00 4)
. Al th o ug h the al i eni n Ngu yen was m er el y reck less r eg ar d ing theN o. 08

- 1071 9 potenti alf ori nj ury, the al i en al so inte ntionallyco m m i tte d an actthat, byi ts nature , creat ed a s ubstanti all i kel i hood that f or ce w oul d b e us ed

. Id

. The c r i m es i n Blakea nd Ngu yen , unl i ke the c ri m e a t i ssue i n t hi s ca se, i nvol ved conduct thatwas not pu re l y r eckl ess . The Gover nm ent a l so re l i es up on a recentcas e fro m th is c irc u it, Q uez a da -Lu na v. G o nz a les , 43 9 F
. 3d 403, 40 6 ( 7th Cir
. 20 06)
. There , we re cogni zed thatthe act ofdi sc h ar ging a weapon i nto a ho m e “ describes conduct that pr es en ts a s ubs ta nt i alr i sktha t phy si ca lf o r ce a g ains t th e perso n or proper ty ofano therm ay be use d.” Q uezada- Lun a , how eve r, deal t with a c onvi cti on f orthe i nten tio nal disc harg e o fa w eapon into a ho m e, a cri m e that coul d not be c om m i tte d i n a m er el y r eckl ess o r acci den talway. Therefor e the Gove rnm ent’ s a rgum ents ar e no t per suasi ve because the author i ti es upon w hi ch i t r el i es al linvol ved pros cribed act i vi ty that necessar ily re quir ed the use o f f or ce. R ecen tly the Sup rem e C ou rt, and this cou r t, h a v e interpr et ed a si m i l ars tatute i n a manne rtha t ca st s a us eful c ro ss -ligh t o n th e in te rp re tiv e t as k b e f or e u s t od ay . In thos e ca ses , the sta tute at i ssue w as t h e Arm ed Caree r C rim inal A ct (“A C C A ”), 18 U. S
. C. § § 92 4( e) (1), 924(e)( 2)(B). The A ct defi nes a “vi ol ent fel ony” as one that “i s bur gl ar y, ar son, o r extor ti on, i nvol ves use o fexpl osi ves, o r othe rwis e invol ves conduct thatpre sents a ser i ous pot e nt i a lr i s ko fp hy s i c a li nj ur y to a no the r . ” 1 8 U. S
. C. § 92 4( e) ( 2) ( B) ( i i )
. Vi o l en t fel o ni es tha t ar e no t amongthe l i ste d offenses f al l und er the s eco nd o r “r esi du alcl ause” of th e se ct i o n. The S upr eme Co ur t r ec en tly he l d tha t dr unk10 N o. 08

- 1071

S ee al so R am i rez v. M u kasey, 52 0 F .3 d 4 7, 50 (1s t C ir . 20 0 8 ); 2 C an ada v . G o n zale s ; 44 8 F .3d 56 0 , 57 1 n .8 (2 d C ir . 20 0 6 ); U n i te d S tat es v. Saw yers , 40 9 F .3d 73 2 , 74 0 (6t h C ir . 20 0 5 ). dr i vingwas no t a vi o l en t fel o ny unde rtha t c lause o fthe A C C A bec au se dr unkdr i vingwas no t “s i m i l art o ” th e li sted offen ses in th a t it d id n ot “typ icall y i nv olve pu rposeful, vi ol ent, and agg re ssi ve cond u c t.” B ega y v . U nited Sta tes , ___ U
. S. ___, 128 S. C t. 1581 , 1586 (2008). The defini ti on ofa cri m e o fvi ol ence und erS ecti on 1 6( b) i s sli ght l y di ffer en t fr o m the r es i dualc l au se o fthe A CC A
. S ecti on 1 6( b) r equi re s a subst anti all i kel i hood that forc ewi l lb e us ed i n the c o m m i ss i o n o fthe o ffen se ; the re sid u al c lau se , by c on tr as t, re q u ir es a su b st an tia l likelih ood of ph ysic a l inju ry . Le oc al , 543 U .S. at 1 0 n .7; Ba zanR eyes , 2 56 F
. 3d at6 09

- 12. D espi te the s l i g ht l y di ffer en t 2 defi ni ti o ns , the S upr eme Co ur t’ s ho l di ngi n Bega y p er fec tly m i r r o r ed th e an aly si s i n Le oc al r eg ar di ngwhethe rdr unk d riv in g w as a c rim e o f vio len c e u n d er Sec tio n 16 (b ). In bo th Bega ya nd Le oc al , the Co ur t he l d tha t ne g l i g en ce a nd str i ct- l i abi l i ty cr i m es w er e no t v i ol ent c ri m es but decl i ned to deci de w hethercr i m es ofr eckl ess ness coul d be. A fter Bega y, we hel d that c ri m es ofr eckl ess ness ar e no t vi ol ent fel oni es und erthe A CC A
. U nite d States v. Sm ith ,

___ F
. 3 d

___, 2 0 0 8 W L 4 1 8 2 6 4 8 , a t * 4 ( 7 th Ci r . S ept. 12 , 2 0 0 8 )
. A n a l y z i n ga d i ffe r e n ts u b s e c t i o n o fth e s a me In d ian a re c kle ss n es s s ta tu te be for e u s t od ay , id

. at* 2, n. 2, we n o t e d th a tth e non - pur p o s e fu ln a t u r e o fth e D UI o ffense was the “ pr i m ary di st i nc ti o n” r el i ed o n b y the S upr eme Co ur t i n Bega y . Seeid

. at8; U nite d States v. Spell s ,N o. 08

- 1071 11 53 7 F
. 3d 74 3, 75 1- 52 ( 7th Ci r . 20 08 )
. S i g ni fi ca nt l y, the no np u rp ose ful nature o fthe DU Io ffense w as the s o l ef a c t or r el i ed o n b y the S up rem e C our t i n Le oc al w h en it h eld that drunk dri vi ng di d not qual i fy a s a cr i m e o fvi ol ence u n d er Sec tio n 16 (b ). Se eLe oc al , 543 U
. S. at 11- 12. Giv en tha tS e c t i o n 1 6 ( b ) a nd the r e s i du a lc l a us e o fthe ACCA con tain sim il ar l an gu age an d that the Su p rem e C ou rt appl i ed si m i l arl o g i c i n Le oc al a nd Bega y, we bel i eve that th e r ea so ni ngi n Sm i t h su p p orts the v i ew thatcr i m es w i th a m ens r ea ofr eckl ess ness ar e no t cr i m es ofvi ol ence un d er Section 16(b). F i na l l y, we no te tha t Con g r es s ha s r ec o g ni zed th e ser i ousness of fi re ar m s o ffenses i n a di ffer ent pr ovi si on o f the I m m i gr ati on a nd N ati onal i ty A ct. A n al i en wh o has been convi cted o f v iol ating anyfedera lo r sta te l aw that m ake s i t a cr i m e t o at tem pt to use any weapon “w h ich is a fire ar m or d es tr u c t ive d ev ice ” a s d efin ed in 18 U .S.C . § 9 21 (a) is rem ov ab le. 8 U .S.C . § 12 27 (a)( 2)(C ); see D ave v. Ashcroft, 36 3 F
. 3d 649, 650- 52 ( 7th Ci r. 20 04) ( denyin g a lie n’s p etition forreview of rem oval order w he re ali en w as con victed of reckless d ischa rge of a fir e arm ). The k ey di ffer en ce i s th at an al i en r emov ed for ha vi ng com m i tte d a cr i m e o f v iol ence i s per m anentl y b ar re d fro m ret u rn in g t o th e U n ite d Sta te s, b u t a n alien w h o is r e m ov e d b a s e d o n a fi r e a r ms c o nv i c t i o n un de r8 U. S
. C. § 1 227( a) ( 2) ( C) m ay apply f orreadm i ssi on aft erte n yea rs . Q uezada- Lun a , 4 3 9 F
. 3 d a t4 0 4
. As a r e vi e wi n gc o u r t, we cannot deny M r. J i m enez- Gonzal ez’ s p et itio n base d on a r at i o na l e th atnei th er th e BI A, no rthe IJ, r el i ed upo n. See SE C v. Che ne ry Corp. , 332 U
. S. 194, 196-97 (1947 ); G ebreeyes u s v. G o nz a les , 482 F.3d 952 , 955-56 (7th C ir.12 N o. 08

- 1071 2007 )
. Thus, bec ause M r. J i m enez- Go n zal ez w as not c h a r g e d a s r e m o v ab l e f o rh a v i n gc o m m i t t e d a fi r e a r ms offense

— and ther ef or e nei therthe IJ northe BIA rel i ed on th is ra tio n ale

— w e can not de ny M r. J im en ez-G onz alez’s peti ti on ba sed o n § 1 227( a) ( 2) ( C). Yet i n deci ding that re ckl ess - fi re ar m s o ffenses cannotbe cri m es ofvi ol ence unde rS ec ti o n 1 6(b) , we th i nki t pa rtic ul ar l y i m po r ta nt to note thatCongr ess has re cogn ized the pote nti al dan g eri nhe r en t i n the r ec k l es s us e o fa fi r ea r m a nd h as p ro vid ed a m ea n s fo r D H S to rem ov e i n d i v id u als w ho a re co nvi cted o fthes e g ra ve offenses .
Conclusi on F or the foregoing reason s, M r. J im en ez-G onz alez’s p etit io n for review i s grant ed , the j ud gm en t of th e B oard ofI m m i gr ati on Ap peal s is reve rs ed, and the case i s r em an ded f o rpr o ce eding s co ns i st en t wi ththi s o pi ni o n. T h e P et itio n er m ay rec ov er h is c os ts for th is a p p ea l. P ETITION FO R R EV I EW G RANTE D

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