NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0153n.06 No. 08-1641 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

FREDDI E McCOY, P lai nt iff–A ppe lla nt , v. STATE OF MI CHI GAN; MI CHI GAN DE PARTMENT OF CORREC TI ONS; J EANNE HI GGI NS; KENNETH ROMANOWSKI , WARDEN; G E RA LD C O N W A Y ; E D D IE CA RG OR ; K

AT HY WARN ER; JOHNJUNG L I

NG , a ll i n th e ir ind ivi du a l and

of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s, De fend ant s–

App e lle e s.

______________________________ _________ )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN
O P I N I O N

Be for e : M AR TIN , SI LER and M OORE, C ir c uitJudg e s. KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge. P l a i n t i f f

–A p p e l l an tF r e d d i e M c C o y, pr oc e e din g pr o s e , a

pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt of the De fe nd ants –App e lle e s’ mot ion to d ism iss his civil-rig hts complaint on the g rounds of re s judicata a nd sovere ign immuni ty . Be cause the district court er

red in findingthat res judicata bar red se vera l of McCoy ’s claims, we RE VE RSE , in part, the judg ment of the district cour t and REMAND fo r f

ur the r p ro c e e din g s in

a ccor dan c e wi th this opini on.2 I. BACKG ROUND AN D P ROCEDURAL HISTORY Mc Coy be g an h is e mpl oy

me nt at th e Mic hig an De pa rtme nt o f C or

re c tio ns (“ MD OC ” ) a s a Cor re c tio ns Of

fi c e r i n 1 98 9. Hi s te nure , h ow e ve r, wa s n ot w ith ou t c o nf lic t. D ur inghis e mpl oy

me nt, McCoy fi l ed n u m erous complaints of ge nder discr imination, race discrimination, and re taliation, both internally and with the appr opriate e x terna l ag encie s. McCoy also rec eived se vera l disciplinary

wr ite -u ps , r e pr ima

nd s, and su sp e ns ion s a s a

res ul t of hi s nume ro us MD OC -p oli c y vio la tio ns . Mc Coy wa s te rm inate d b y

the MD OC and

the n r e ins ta te d b y

an a rb itr a tor a t lea st twi c e . M os t rele vant to the instant c ase, how ever , is a serie s of eve nts that beg an on June 14, 2004. As alleg ed in his complaint, on that day , McCoy was wor king his a ssigne d shift when he r equeste d permission fr om D e fe nd ant Je ann e Hi g g ins to le a ve his po st fo r lun c h. Mc Coy a sse rt s th a t H ig g ins g ra

nte d h is reque st but that she later a ccuse d him of leaving his post without relief in violation of t wo MDOC policies and subseque ntly informed him that he would be subject to disciplinary action. Mc Coy c on tin ue d to wo rk

duri ngthe MD OC ’s inv e sti g a tio n o f his all eged i nf ra c tio ns . Following a hea

ring on September 13, 2004, the MDOC t er m i n at ed McCoy , citing his June 14 condu c t. M c Co y

a s s e rts h o w e v e r , th a t c o n tr ar y to M D O C’ s c la im , h is 2 0 0 4 te r mi n a ti o nw a s the pr od uc t of de lib e rate a nd

int e nti on a l r a c ia l di sc ri min a tio n a nd re ta liatio n f

or havin g en g a g e d in protec ted ac tivity . He f

iled the instant case in fede ral district cour t on Febr uary 24, 2006, asser

ting claims ag ainst th e State of Michig an, the MDO C, and sever al MDOC offic ers in both their individual and off icial ca pacities (collec tively “De fenda nts”). Specifica lly , McCoy alleg ed rac e discrimination and re taliatory

termination in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VI I ”); dispar ate treatment based on rac e and reta liatory discharg e in violation of t he S tate ofThe state- court filing s are not contained in the r ecor d on appea l. We are the ref ore f orce d 1 to rely on the uncontested portions of the parties’ descr iption of the state-c ourt claims as we ll as the de sc ri pti on s o f t

he state -c ourt

lit ig a tio n th a t th e pa

rt ie s p ro vid e d in

pr e vio us fe de ra l f

ili ng s. 3 Michig an’s Elliott-L arse n Civil Rights Act, Michiga n Compil ed L aws § 37.2201 e t seq., and violations of equal pr otection, due pr ocess, a nd the Fir st Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I n support of his various cla ims, McCoy asser ts as evidenc e the f

act that no Cauc asian

em p l o y ee had bee n disciplined previously for infr actions similar to his purported June 2004 violations and that it was custom within the MDOC to allow employ ees to take t h ei r lunch bre ak without relief. Mc Coy

has also alleg ed in his complaint that the Def endants “ deliberately

and int e nti on a lly

re ta liate d” a g a ins t hi m “f or hi s unio n a c tiv ity ,” Di st. Ct. Do c ke t ( “ Do c .” ) 1 (C omp l. ¶ 32), ha rasse d him because of his race , id. ¶ 33, and pr ovided him with “neg ative eva luations and

memo r an d

u ms [th a t] w e r e mo ti v a te d in w h o le o r in p art b e c a

u s e o f h is r a c e an d

h is p r o te c ted activity ,” id. ¶ 34. In support of these a lleg ations, McCoy cites, amongother e x amples, an inc ident in Aug ust 2004 where Def endant John J ung lin g informed Mc Coy that McCoy

was no long er permitted to bring various pape rs to work because McCoy “had made numerous complaints to the administration conce rning issues of ra ce a nd g ender discrimination.” Id. ¶ 31. Compli catingthe instant case is the fac t that this i s not the first time that McCoy has filed suit a g ainst the MDOC. Rather, this is the third suit that McCoy has filed in e ither state or fe dera l court a lleg ing disc riminatory treatment in his employ

ment. The fir st suit stemmed from MDOC’s te rm inatio n (a

nd ult ima te re ins ta te me nt) of Mc Coy in 19 97 a ft e r he ha d c omm itt e d a se ri e s o f r

ule infrac tions. Be lieving that he was disciplined in a discriminatory manner based o n h i s g ender , McCoy filed suit in Michiga

n state court on May

3, 1999 (“state -cour

t liti g ation”). The state c ourt

1 dis mis se d th e su it w ithpr e jud ic e on No ve mbe r 3 , 2 00 0, bu t it pr ov ide d M c Coy

wi th f if te e n d a y s to4

file an a mended complaint. Doc.12- 22 (Mich. C ir. Ct. Orde r 11/ 3/00 at 2). I nexpli cably , an orde r permitting Mc Coy

to file that amende d complaint was not ente red until J une 12, 2002. Me a nw hil e , o n O c tob e r 4 , 2 00 1, Mc Coy , p ro c e e din g pr o se, fi le d a sec on d la ws uit in t he U. S. District Court f

or the Easter

n District of Michig an alleg ing g ender and ra ce- based discr imination as well as re taliation. The De fenda nts filed a motion to dism iss on the g rounds of re s judicata, c iting the state-c ourt litigation. The f eder al suit was dismissed with prejudice following a hea ring pursuant to F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du re 12 (b )( 1) and 12 (b )( 6) on Ap ri l 4, 20 02 . D oc . 1 2- 23 (D ist . Ct

. Orde r 4/04/02). Undete rre d, McCoy filed a motion in state court to r eopen the state-c ourt litigation. I t is unclear f

rom the re cord w hen this motion was f iled or on what g rounds, and it is equally unclea r what cla ims McCoy

asser ted. On Nove mber 24, 2004, howe ver, a fter p re s umably reope ning Mc Coy ’s c a se , the state c ourt g ra nte d th e De fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary

dis po sit ion , th

us fi na lly

en d in g th e s tate
- c o u rt l it ig ati o n . D o c . 1 2

- 2 1 ( M ic h

. Ci r . Ct

. O r d e r 1 1 /2 4 /0 4 )

. T h is d is missal

occur red a pproxi mately

one month af

t er McCoy

was ter minated on the basis of his June 2004

c on du c t and

wh ile he wa s st ill a

pp e a lin g his te rm inatio n thr ou g h the a pp ro pr ia te g ri e va

nc e pr oc e ss,
a s r e qu ir e d b y

his c oll e c tiv e ba

rg a ini nga g re e me nt. O n F e b r u ar y 2 4 , 2 0 0 6 , M c Co y f

il e d th e in s ta

n t la w s u it in th e U
. S. D is tr ic t Co u rt f or the Easter n District of Michig an, see king only monetary

relief . The De fenda

nts arg ued bef

ore the district court, as they

do now on appe al, that McCoy ’s claims are barr ed by res judicata, qualified immunit y , and sovere ign immunit y . I n an Apr il 10, 2007 order, the district c ourt g rante d in part and denied in par

t the Def endants’ motion to dismiss , finding the re s judicata doctrine inapplicable but believing that some of McCoy ’s claims we re ba rre d by qualified and sovere ign immuni ty
. Doc. 18 (Dist. Ct. Order 4/10/07). On Ma rch 31, 2 0 0 8 , u p o n t he De fenda nts’ urg ing in a

motion for5

rec onsideration, the district cour t ultim ately

dismiss ed McCoy ’s ca se on the g rounds of re s judicata. Doc. 36 ( Dist. Ct. Order 3/31/08). McCoy timely appea led. II. AN AL YSI S A. Res Judicata Doe s Not Bar the Instant Ac tion The district cour

t dismi ssed McCoy ’s complaint on the g rounds that the state-c ourt litigation in Mc Co y v. M ichigan Departme nt of Corr ections , No. 99-90035-N Z (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 24, 2004), barr ed the i n s t an t action. “We re view de novo a district court’s a

pplication of the doc trine of r es judicata,” Bragg v. Flint Bd. of Educ. , 570 F.3d 775, 776 ( 6th Cir. 2009) , and we conclude that the district court er

red in a pply ing the doctrine to this case

. The F ull Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Cons tituti on and its implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, require f

eder al cour

ts to give pr eclusive e ffe ct to state-c ourt judgme nts. B eca use we “must g ive to a

s tate
- c o u rt j u d g me n t t

h e s a me p r e c lu s iv e e f

f e c t a s w o u ld

b e g iv e nth a t j u d g ment und e r th e la

w o f th e St a te in w h ic h th e ju d g e me n t w a s r e n d e r e d , ” w e lo o k to M ic higa n law g overningres judicata to deter mine its applicability

. Migra v. W arren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 46 5 U .S. 75 , 8 1 ( 19 84 ); see also Y oung v. Twp. of Green Oak, 471 F.3d 674, 680 ( 6th Cir. 2006). I n Michig an, re s judicata ba rs succe ssive actions “if (1) the prior a ction was de cided on the

me ri ts, (2 ) b oth

a c tio ns inv olv e the same pa rt ie s o r t he ir pr ivi e s, and (3 ) t

he ma tte r i n th e se c on d c a se was, or c ould h av e b ee n , resolved in the f irst.” Y oung , 471 F.3d at 680 (internal quotation mar ks omi tte d) ; se e als o W

as hin gto n v . S

ina i H os p. of G re ate r D e tro it , 733 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Mich. 2007). Mic hig an c ourt s take a

“ br oa d a pp ro a c h to the do c tr ine of re s ju dic a ta ,” and

the pr e se nc e of

the se thr e e e le me nts “ ba

rs no t on ly

c la ims alr e a dy

lit ig a te d, bu t a lso e ve ry

c la im a ri sin g fr om t

he same transaction that the par

ties, exercising rea son able dili g ence , could have raised but did not.”6

W ashington , 73 3 N. W.2 d a t 75 9 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also Y oung , 4 71 F .3 d at 68 0; Dubuc v . Gree n Oak Twp. , 31 2 F .3 d 7 36 , 7 47 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) ; Kat t v . D y k ho us e , 983 F.2d 690, 693 ( 6th Cir. 1992). T h i s ap p ro ac h has bee n labeled the “tra nsactional test.” W

ashington , 733 N.W.2d at 760. The Def endants be ar the “burde n of provingthe a p p l i ca b i l i t y of the doc trine of r es judicata .” Baraga County v. State Tax Comm’n , 645 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Mich. 2002). Turn ingto t

he fi rs t e le me nt, we a g re e wi th t he De fe nd ants tha

t the state -c ourt dis mis sa l w ith prejudice amounts to a decision on the m erits. See B rownridge v. Mich. M ut. Ins. Co. , 321 N.W.2d 798, 799 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). F urt h er m o re, the second r equire ment of re s judicata is satisfied beca use there is an identity

of par ties. First, the MDOC wa s a name d party in th e state- court lit ig a tio n. Mc Coy

a dd e d to the ins tant c a se De fe nd ants Jeann e Hi g g ins , K e nn e th R oma no ws ki, Ger ald Conway , Eddie Carg or, Kathy Warner, and J ohn J ung ling, a ll in their indivi dual and of ficial capa cities, as well as the State of Michig an. Unde r Michig an law, how ever , “a pe rfe ct identity of the par ties is not require d”; rathe r, the Michig an courts require “a substantial identity of intere sts and

a wor king f unctional re lationship in which the interests of the nonparty are prese nted and pr otected by the par ty in the litigation.” Adair v. Mic higan , 680 N.W.2d 386, 396, 397 (Mich. 2004) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). This test is met when the previous gover nmental-unit Def

endant ( here , the MDOC) a

nd the pre sent-ca se De fenda nts (here , the individually n am ed Def endants) ha

ve an employ er- employ ee r elationship, reg ardle ss of whethe r the c laims in the first suit we re br oug ht ag ainst the Def

endants in the same capa city as the c laims in the second. See Motuelle v. Ruffini , No. 244557, 2004 WL 1254304, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. June 8, 2004) (unpublished opinion). Th e qu e sti on of pr ivi ty be tw e e n the MD OC and the State of Mic hig a n is not alw ay s so e a sil y resolved, se e Ba raga Cou nty , 645 N.W.2d at 16–1 7 , b u t i n d eter mining that ther e is identity of7

parties he re, w e re ly

on the fa ct that the De fenda nts, including the State of Michig an, ar e asse rting res judicata def

ensively . I n Monat v. State Farm Insurance Co. , 677 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 2004), the Michig an Supreme Court held that mutuality was not re quired whe re the party i n v o ked collate ral estoppel defe nsively

. Id. at 850. The Michig an Court of Appe als extended this proposition t o case s involving claim prec lusion in Mo tue lle , concludingthat “mutuality is simi larly

not require d” in such instances. Mo tue lle , 2004 WL 1254304, at *4 n.3. Whether the De fenda

nts have met their bur den and e stablished the re maining e lement of the res judicata doctrine —i.e., that the instant claims re lating to Mc C o y ’s 2004 termination we re or
c ou ld h a ve be e n res ol ved in t he state -c ourt

lit ig a tio n b e c a

us e the y a mou nte d to the same “tra nsaction”—is t h e i s s ue upon which this ca se turns. Se e Ad air , 680 N.W.2d at 398 (“[T]he deter minative question is whether the claims in the instant case a rose a s part of the same tra nsaction as d id th e c la im s in [th e p r e v io u s li ti g a ti o n ]. ” )

. U n d e r M ic h ig an ’ s “ tr an s a c ti o n a l te s t, ” whether a particula r g roup of f

acts amounts to a singular “‘tra nsaction for

pu rp o s es o f re s judicata is to be deter mined prag matically , by

consideringwhe t h er the fa cts are related in time, space , orig in or motivation.’” Id. (quoting 46 Am. J ur. (Second) J udg ments) (emphasis omit ted). Courts employing the transa ctional test have g ener ally acknow ledg ed that “a new action will be permitted only wher e it r a ise s new and independe nt claims, not part of the previous transaction based on the new f acts.” Ha tc h v . B ou lde r To wn C ou nc il , 4 7 1 F. 3 d

1 1 4 2 , 1 1 5 0 (1 0 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Sto re yv . Ce llo Ho ldi ng s, L.L. C. , 347 F .3 d 370 , 384 (2 d Cir. 20 03 ) ( Sot oma y or , J.) ); se e als o 18 Moore’ s Federal Practice § 131.21[1] (3d ed. 2009) (“O f cour se, if the ne w fa cts establish a new claim sepa rate and distinct from the previous c laim, then claim pre clusion has no applica bility .”)Ag ain, as nei t h er p arty has provided this cour

t with filings from the state-c ourt litigation, 2 we rely solely on the undisputed char acte rization of McCoy ’s state-c ourt ac tion in deciding w hether the Def endants have met their bur den. 8 Acc ording to the evidenc e in t he re cord on a ppeal, the pr imary

issue in the 1999 state-c ourt litigation was Mc Coy ’s 1997 t ermination and the allege d discriminatory incidents both prior to and following that termination. As the De fenda nts char acte rized McCoy ’s claims in their 2002 fe dera l mot ion to d ism iss , in

the state -c ourt

lit ig a tio n M c Coy

a lle g e d “ that he wa s d isc ri min a te d a g a ins t beca use of his g ender

and bec ause of

reta liation” and “that the alleg ed discriminatory acts oc curr ed from Oc tober 8, 1999[,] until October 4, 2001.” (De f. B r. in Support of Mot. Dismiss 2/20/02, at 1, 5, filed in Mc Coy

v . M ic hig an De p’ t of Cor r. , No. 01-73785 (E .D. Mich. Apr. 4. 2002) ). 2 A pra g m at i c reading of McCoy ’s 2006 fe dera l complaint and the fa cts alleg ed ther ein, howeve r, make s plain that the instant case cente rs ar ound McCoy ’s 2004 termination and constitutes a wholly distinct “transac tion” from that involved in the state- court litigation, thus p re cludi ng the application of the res judicata doctrine. As an initial matter, the e vents in the state-c ourt litigation

are fa r r e mov e d te mpo ra lly fr om the fa c ts and c la ims a sse rt e d in the ins tant c a se . Th e De fe nd a nts descr ibed the state- court litigation as involving incidents from 1999 until 2001, while the complaint here inv o lv e s e v e n ts o c c u r r in g e n ti r e ly w it

h in 2 0 0 4

. A lt

h o u g h th e c o mp la in t me n ti o n s tha t from

“ 19 99 thr ou g h 2 00 3” Mc Coy “ wa s p e rs on a lly

inv olv e d in

fi lin g n umer ou s in te rn a l c omp la int s alleg ing r acia l discrimination,” Doc. 1 (Compl. ¶ 13), this statement cannot be r ead a s comprising the asser ted ca use of a ction; i t i s mere backg round information on the somewhat tumultuous

re la tio ns hip be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. Mo re imp o rt an t l y , h o w e v e r , a l t h o u g h t h e s t a t e - c o u rtl i t i g a t i o nan d t h e i n s t an tc a s e b o th involve claims of discrimination and r etaliation, they neither r esulted fr om nor are they tied to the9

same MDOC actions. The g rava men of McCoy ’s fe dera l complaint is that his 2004 t ermination and the ac tiviti es and c omplaints surrounding that t e r mi n a ti o n , which took place from June 2004 onward,

are , despite eve ry

thing that may

have oc curr ed pre viously , themselves ac tionable. I n essenc e, the orig in of t he two claims is simpl y not the same. Cf. Brownr idge , 32 1 N. W.2 d at 79 9 ( “ Sin c e bo th

a c tio ns aro se ou t of

the same dis c ha

rg e fr om e mpl oy

me nt, bo th a c tio ns aro se ou t of the same t ransaction, both actions involved points which proper ly belong ed to the subjec t of litigation, and bo th i nv olv e d th e same ma tte r i n issu e .” (a lte ratio n an d q uo ta tio n ma

rk s o mit te d) ); Y

oung , 471 F.3d

a t 68 1 ( ho ldi ngtha

t r e s ju dic a ta

pr op e rl y ba

rr e d c la ims ba se d o n a

n e mpl oy e r’ s d e c isi on

to t e rm inate

an e mpl oy e e be c a

us e the te rm inatio n “ wa s n ot a fr e sha c t of

dis c ri min a tio n” ; r a the r “i t wa s th e same decision” not to allow the e mploy ee to return to work that the employ ee had cha lleng ed pre viously); Cemer v . Marathon Oil Co. , 583 F.2d 830, 832 (6th Cir. 1978) (“B oth the first and sec ond suits seek to remedy a sing le alleg ed wr ong [, which was] the discharg e of Ceme r by Marathon.”). We are also not persua ded by the Def endants’ a

rg ument that the sing ularity of t he transac tions is evident by the fa ct that the district c ourt had y et to e nter judgme nt in the 1999 statecourt litigation at the time of McCoy ’s 2004 termination. Although Michig an employ s a broad vie w of re s judicata, we do not believe that the pr eclusion of claims that could have be en re solved in the previous litigation necessari ly includes newand indepe ndent claims that ar ise afte r the orig inal pleading in the first suit has been filed. See R awe v. Liberty Mut. Fire I ns. Co. , 462 F.3d 521, 530 (6th Cir. 2006) (re

jecting the argument that res judicata applies under the theory that t h e p l ai n tiff

“ c ou ld have a mended he r complaint” on the g rou n d s t h at “the opportunity to file a supplementa l complaint is not an obligation

. ” (inter nal quotation marks omitted)). Per haps if an a dditional

manif e statio n o f the ini tia l cla im that McCo y ha d ass e rt e d in the state -c ourt lit ig a tio n s ub se qu e ntl y10

had ar isen befor e the state-cour t litigation’s adjudication on the merits, McCoy may well have been “oblig ed to amend his .

. . initial complaint to add these new a lleg ations.” Dubuc , 312 F.3d at 750. But, a s discussed above , the fa cts alleg ed in his instant co m p laint revolve a round McCoy ’s 2004 termination and a

re not pa rt of t he same transac tion upon which the state-c ourt litigation wa s based. Cf. id. at 751 (“ When, as here , it is obvi ous that the alleg ed ong oing r etaliation i s ac t u ally the de fe nd ant c on tin

uin g on the same c ours e of c on du c t, wh ic h ha s pre vio us ly be e n f ound by a c ourt to be pr op e r, a

su bs e qu e nt c ourt

mus t c on c lud e that the pla int if f is s imp ly

tr y ingto r e lit ig a te the same
c la im. ” ); Doe v . Allied-Signal, Inc. , 985 F.2d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[E]ven if a plaintiff is awa re of the fa c tua l bas is fo r a sui t at the fi lin g of ano the r sui t, he or sh e is n ot o bli g a te d to br inga ll c la ims toge ther if they

do not arise out of the same tra nsaction.”)

. Moreove r, the De fenda

nts have not alleg ed that a par ticular Michig an joinder r ule re quired McCoy to add his new a

nd independe nt c laim to his a lrea dy pending state-c ourt litigation. Michig an Court Rule 2.203(A) provide s, in releva nt p art, that a pleading “must join every claim that the p l e a d e r h a s a g a i n s tt h a to p p o s i n g p art y a t th e ti m e o f s e r v in g the pleading , i f it arises out of the transaction or occurrenc e that is the subject matter of the ac tion.” (empha ses adde d). As esta blished above, the state-c ourt litigation and the 2004 fe dera l suit do not stem from the same transac tion, and Mc Coy did

no t ha ve his 20 04 -b a se d c la im unti l w e ll a ft e r h e fi le d h is s ta te -c ourt lit ig a tio n p le a din g s. The fa ct that McCoy

was a war e of a nd mentioned his 2004 termination when he filed his pro

se re sponse to the Def

endants’ motion to dismiss befor e the state cour t on November

17, 2004, does not persuade us that the state cour t actually litigated those issues raised in his most rece nt fede ral complaint. First, the rec ord does not c ontain a copy of the complaint McCoy filed in state cour

t, and there is no evidence that McCoy amende d or was require d to amend his state complaint to includeWe not e t h at an o rd er issued by a sing le judg e on Nove mber 18, 2008, de nied McCoy ’s 3 mot ion to p ro c e e d in

fo rm a pa up e ri s and

de te rm ine d that Mc Coy ’s a pp e a l w a s li ke ly

“ fr ivo lou s” beca use he “ could have soug ht to amend the 1999 complaint to incorpor ate the 2004 incidents.” McCoy v . Mi ch i

gan , No. 08-1641 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 2008) (unpublished orde r). That order, howeve r, fails to c onsider the impact of the Michig an Supreme Court’s decision in Ad air , which wa s 11 the c la ims re la te d to the 20 04 te rm inatio n. Se c on d, the state -c ourt jud g me nt d oe s n ot s ta te e xplic itl y whether or not it considere d the 2004 termination in g ranting the Def endants’ motion for summar y judgme nt. The state c ourt mere ly dismiss ed “f

or the re asons set for

th on the rec ord,” and, ag ain, the

rec ord has not bee n provided to this court on appe al. Doc. 12–21 ( State Ct. Order 11/24/04 at 2). Third, althoug h the district c ourt conclude d and the Def endants claim on appea l t h at McCoy “admitted that the 1999 law suit was connec ted to his 2004 termination,” Doc. 36 (Dist. Ct. Order 3/31/08 at 5), the record revea ls that the Defenda nts injected the 2004 termination into the substance of the 1 9 9 9 s t at e-c ourt suit by including a

n aff idavit relate d there to in their motion for summary judgme nt. McCoy ’s pro se filing me rely responde d to the Def

endants’ of

fer of proof . I t would be inequitable, at best, to hinge the resolution of t he res judicata issue on McCoy ’s purporte d admission in a pro se f

iling made in direc t response to the Defenda nts’ submissi on. The Defenda nts’ claim that M cC o y ra i s edt h e i s s u e i na s t at e- co u rt -l i t i gat i o np l ea d i n g i s m i s l ea d i n g. I n sum, we hold that McCoy ’s suit is not barred by res judicata beca

use the c laim upon which the suit is based cannot be said to constitute the s ame tra nsaction as that involved in the state -cour t litigation. McCoy ’s discrimination and re taliation claims relate d to his 2004 termination wer e not broug ht and wer e not re quired to ha ve bee n broug ht during the pende ncy of that state- court litigation beca use t he Defenda

nts have not shown that they are related i n time, space , orig in, or motivation. McCoy ’s pre sent complaint alleg es a ne w and indepe ndent claim based on new f acts. The district court e rre d in concluding otherwise. 3issued in 2004. Se e Ad air , 680 N.W.2d at 397. Mor eover , a single -judg e order does not invoke the law- of -t he -c a se do c tr ine and

pr e c lud e us fr om r e a c hin g the me ri ts of Mc Coy ’s a pp e a l. F e de ra l Ru le of Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure 27 (c ) p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt part , tha t “[a ] c ir c uit

jud g e . . . ma

y no t di smi ss or otherwise deter

mine an appea l or other proce eding ,” and “ [t ]he court may revie w the ac tion of a single judge .” Fed. R

. App. P

. 27(c)

. I f a merits panel were bound by a si ng le-judg e order deny ing a motion to procee d in forma pauper is on the grounds of frivolousness, t hen any subsequent appe al automatically

would be meritless and the single judge would be vested with a power that Rule 27(c) expressly prohibits. See Thomson v . Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. , 7 7 2 F
. 2 d 8 7 9 , 8 8 2 ( F e d

. C ir . 1 98 5) ; c f. Fr ie nd s o f E ar th v . R e ill

y , 96 6 F .2 d 69 0, 69 6 n .7 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 2) (e xpre ssi ngdo ub t th a t a “ sin g le judge actingon a motion fo r s t ay ca n b i nd a full pane l” and invoke the law-of -the-c ase doc trine); Locke v . Allstate Ins. Co. , 696 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a sing le-judg e orde r that was not a

ppeale d to a three -judg e panel unde r F eder al Rule of Appe llate Proce dure 27( c) w as nonbinding)

. 12 B. Q ual ifie d- Im m unit y D e fens e The De fenda

nts assert as a

n alternative g rou n d fo r re lief that they are entitled to qualified immunit y on McCoy ’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 c l ai m , y et they provide this court with no substantive analy sis of why

this mi g ht be the ca se other tha n the bar e asse rtion that “[t] he re co rd is clear that [McCoy ] has failed to alleg e or pr ove a violation of f eder al law.” Appellee Br
. at 22. I n the orde r pr e se ntl y on a

pp e a l, the dis tr ic t c ourt a lso fa ils to a dd re ss the De fe nd ants’ qu ali fi e d- immun ity defe nse. See Doc. 36 (Dist. Ct. Or der 03/31/08). Be cause “[i] t is the g ener al rule . . . that a fe dera l appellate court doe s not consider a n issue not passed upon below,” particula rly wher e the issue ha s not been br iefe d adequately , Kat t , 983 F.2d at 695 (internal quotation mar ks om i t t ed ), we decline to r e a c h th e me ri ts o f t

he qu a lif ie d- immun ity

de fe ns e on

a pp e a l. C. Sov e r e ign -I m m unit y D e fens e Finally , the Def

endants contend that sovere ign immunit y preve nts McCoy from maintaining his suit aga inst the St ate of Michig an, the MDOC, and the other named Def endants to the e x tent that they wer e sued in their of

ficial c apac ities. Whether i mmunity exis ts is a question of c onstitut ional law that we revie w de novo. S. J . v . H am ilt on Cou nty , 374 F.3d 416, 418 ( 6th Cir. 2004).We do not opine on the applicabilit y o f any immunit y

defe nse to McCoy ’s claims under 4 Mic hig an’ s E lli ott -L ars e n Ci vil Rig hts Ac t. 13 We a g re e wi th t

he dis tr ic t c ourt that the State of Mic hig an is e nti tle d to so ve re ig n im mun ity wi th r e sp e c t to Mc Coy ’s 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 c la im. Th e El e ve nth Am e ndme nt g e ne ra lly

ba rs a su it fo r m o n ey

d am age s b ro u gh ti nfe d er al co u rt aga i n s t a st at e un l es s t h e s t at e h as wa i v edi t s s o v er ei gn immunit y or conse nted to be sued, and the State of Michig an has not done so here

. See Kovace vich v. Kent State Univ. , 2 24 F .3 d 8 06 , 8 17 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) . B e c a us e so ve re ig n immunity

e xten ds to “state instrumenta lities,” Rege nts of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe , 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997), and the MDOC is “an a rm of the State of

Michig an,” the MDOC is entitled to sovereig n immunit y on the § 1983 claim as we ll, Tur

nb oe v . S te ga ll , 234 F.3d 1270 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished orde r). More over, the

name d D e fe nd ants , in

the ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s, are si mil arl y

e nti tle d to immun ity

wi th r e sp e c t to Mc Coy ’s § 198 3 cla im be c a us e “ a su it ag a ins t a stat e of fi c ia l in his or he r of

fi c ia l ca pa c ity is n ot a suit ag ainst the official but rathe r i s a sui t ag ainst the official’s office,” which i s “no differe nt from a suit ag ain s t t he State.” W ill v. Mich. De

p’t of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). McCoy ’s § 1983 claim ag ainst the Def endants i n t h ei r individual capac ities, however , is not barre d by

sovere ign immunity

. Se e J oh ns on v . U

niv . o f Cin c inn ati , 2 1 5 F
. 3 d 5 6 1 , 5 7 1 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 0 )

. L a s t l y, the ind ivi du a l D e fe nd ants are no t e nti tle d to sove re ig n immunit y wi th r e sp e c t to the Ti tle VI Ic la ims broug ht ag ainst them in their officia l c apac ities, but a suit a g ainst them as individuals is precluded

un de r T itl e VI Ibe c a

us e the y are no t a lle g e d to have be e n M c Coy ’s e mpl oy e rs . See id. 4 III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we RE VE RSE the district cour t’ s gr a nt o f the Def endants’ motion to d ism iss on the g ro un ds that it is n ot b arr e d b y the do c tr ine of

re s ju dic a ta ; AF F IRM the districtDuri ngthi s a pp e a l, M c Coy

fi le d w iththi s cou rt tw o a dd iti on a l mo tio ns : ( 1) a mot ion to 5 c omp e l th e pr od

uc tio n o f v ari ou s do c ume nts pe rt a ini ng to the ins tant a pp e a l th a t Mc Coy

ne e de d to pr e pa re his a pp e a l, a nd (2 ) a mot ion to “ qu a sh ” the dis tr ic t- c ourt order dis mis sin g his c omp la int

. I n li g ht o f o ur

re so lut ion

of the ins tant a

pp e a l, w e de ny

bo th m oti on s a s mo ot. 14 c ourt ’s c on c lus ion

that th e De fe nd ants , in the ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s, are e nti tle d to so ve re ig n im mun ity

on the § 1983 claims but not the Ti tle VI I claims; and REMAND the ca se to the district court f or further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. 5