IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

SONIA MORENO-AVALOS, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:16-cv-172

 )

CITY OF HAMMOND INDIANA, )

et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed by Defendant, City of Hammond, Indiana, and

Kim Nordhoff, in her individual capacity, on July 24, 2017 (DE

#80). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED. The

regulatory taking claim is dismissed because it is barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the remaining claims against

Defendants, City of Hammond, Indiana and Kim Nordhoff, are

dismissed because they are barred by claim preclusion. The Clerk

is ORDERED to CLOSE this case. 

BACKGROUND

This case centers around the rental property at 551 Gostlin

Street in Hammond, Indiana, which was owned by Plaintiff, Sonia

Moreno-Avalos. The property lapsed into disrepair and became the
subject of municipal code violations. Over a five-year period,

Plaintiff disputed the code violations, and appeared in Hammond

City Court and the Hammond Board of Public Works and Safety (either

in person or by counsel), to challenge them. 

Plaintiff filed her first complaint on January 23, 2013,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in district court against “City Hall

of Hammond, Indiana, Kurt Koch, Kim Nordhoff, and Darren Taylor,”

under Case No. 2:13-cv-38-JVB-APR (Defs. Ex. H, the “038 Action”). 

In that complaint, she alleged she complained to the Mayor about

the conduct of Hammond Code Enforcement inspector Kim Nordhoff,

asserting Nordhoff stalked her and interfered with her landlordtenant relationships. (Id. ¶¶ 11-18, 21-26.) She also alleged Koch

retaliated against her by having her property declared an unsafe

building and making false statements. (Id. ¶ 4.) On August 21,

2013, Judge Van Bokkelen dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for lack

of personal jurisdiction due to failure to serve. (Ex. H at 5.)

Plaintiff filed another section 1983 action in district court

on September 26, 2013, against the same defendants plus Mr.

Dabertin and Mayor McDermott. That matter was assigned to Judge

Theresa Springmann under Case No. 2:13-cv-347-TLS-PRC (Ex. I, “347

Action”). Plaintiff brought many of the same allegations, including

her claim that defendants retaliated against her by ordering her

Gostlin Street property to be demolished, that she had been stalked

by Nordhoff, harassed by the other defendants in retaliation for

2
her report of Nordhoff’s alleged harassment, and that Koch made

false statements about the condition of her building. (Id. ¶¶ 32-

33, 19, 47.) While this action remained pending, Plaintiff filed

a third section 1983 complaint in district court against the

defendants, under Case No. 2:13-cv-00450-JTM-PRC (Ex. J, “450

Action”). Plaintiff reiterated her previous claims against the

same defendants, alleging harassment, false statements, tortious

interference with a business relationship, breach of contract, and

stalking. (Id.) Judge Springmann consolidated this action with

the 347 Action pending before her. (Ex. I, J.) 

On August 22, 2014, the defendants filed their motion for

judgment on the pleadings. Judge Springmann granted that motion

and entered judgment on the pleadings in Cases 347 and 450 (Ex. I). 

Plaintiff did not appeal the decision.

On May 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in this

case. She obtained counsel and was granted leave to file a Second

Amended Complaint on October 11, 2016 (DE #42-1). 

Defendants, Thomas McDermott, Tom Dabertin, Kim Nordhoff, Kurt

Koch, and Darren Taylor moved for partial dismissal for failure to

state a claim, and on January 4, 2017, this Court granted that

motion (DE #63). The case then remained pending against Defendant,

the City of Hammond, Indiana, and Counts IV, V, and VII remained

pending against Defendant Nordhoff in her individual capacity. 

The instant motion for summary judgment was filed by

3
Defendants, the City of Hammond and Kim Nordhoff, based upon

principles of res judicata/claim preclusion, the applicable statute

of limitations, the Monell doctrine, and qualified immunity. 

Undisputed Facts

The Court notes that Defendants have submitted a Statement of

Undisputed Material Facts, with citations to evidence in the

record, including several affidavits (authenticating the Hammond

Board of Public Works and Safety’s record concerning the several

board hearings held about the Gostlin St. property), and certified

copies of the court dockets. (DE #82-1, 82-2-34.) In response,

Plaintiff has failed to submit any Statement of Genuine Disputes,

and has failed to properly assert that Defendants’ facts are

genuinely disputed. 

Plaintiff attached as exhibits: an affidavit by Rodolfo

Herrera dated April 18, 2013, stating he signed a contract with

Plaintiff to put a new roof on her property, however, the Code

Enforcement Department refused to provide the requested building

permits(DE #84-3) (but Herrera does not say why he was denied a

building permit)1; an affidavit of Victoriano Pacheco, which states

he installed electrical and wiring service at the Gostlin Street

1 The Herrera affidavit was also attached to Plaintiff’s

previous complaint, considered by Judge Springmann in her earlier

opinion and order dated January 30, 2015. (DE #82-83 at 16, 41,

95.)

4
property in March of 2000 and that it was inspected and approved by

a Hammond inspector named Bob (10 years before Nordhoff’s

inspections), and that the property was “in a safe structural

condition” (DE #84-4); defendant’s response in opposition to

plaintiff’s motion to amend complaint (DE #84-1), the Court’s order

granting the motion to amend because “Plaintiff [who was previously

pro se] deserves a chance to plead her case with her lawyer’s help”

(DE #84-2); a Notice of Municipal Ordinance Violation dated May 14,

2010, in which Plaintiff has underlined the municipal requirement

that “[t]he roof is tight and has no defects which admit rain” (DE

#84-5), a bank loan statement (DE #84-6); a letter from Chase Bank

concerning insurance claims fund (DE #84-7); pictures of the

property (DE #84-8), and a portion of the Indiana Unsafe Building

statute (DE #84-10).

Local Rule 56-1 requires that a party opposing summary

judgment file a response brief within 28 days after being served

the motion and that the “response brief or its appendix must

include a section labeled ‘Statement of Genuine Disputes’ that

identifies the material facts that the party contends are genuinely

disputed so as to make a trial necessary.” N.D. IND. L.R. 56-

1.(b). Plaintiff has not done so. Instead, she filed an

“Objection to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts” (DE #85), in

which she lists her vague objections (without citations to any

evidence or anything in the record) to the completeness and

5
accuracy of Defendants’ statement of facts. This runs contrary to

the federal rules which provide that “[a] party asserting that a

fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion”

either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record”

or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence

or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot

produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). As this Court has noted before, “[i]t is within the Court’s

province to require parties to adhere to the local rules and strike

non-conforming filings.” Cunningham v. State Farm Ins. Co., No.

2:04-CV-62, 2005 WL 3279365, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 2, 2005) (citing

Schrott v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940 (7th Cir.

2005)). Defendants have not moved to strike Plaintiff’s response;

therefore, the Court will consider it. However, because Plaintiff

has failed to submit a proper Statement of Genuine Issues, and has

failed to properly controvert Defendants’ statement of undisputed

facts, the facts as set forth by Defendants will be deemed

admitted. See Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218-

19 (7th Cir. 2015); Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Servs., 368 F.3d 809,

818 (7th Cir. 2004). 

The undisputed facts as set forth by the Defendants are as

follows:

Sonia Moreno-Avalos owned a rental property at 551 Gostlin

Street in Hammond, Indiana. (See Affidavit of Kim Nordhoff,

6
attached as Exhibit A, ¶3.) On May 11, 2010, Hammond inspector Kim

Nordhoff inspected the 551 Gostlin property and took photographs of

the building’s exterior. (Ex. A, ¶2.) 

On May 14, 2010, a notice of municipal ordinance violation was

sent to Moreno-Avalos, notifying her that the condition of her

property violated several municipal ordinances, including lack of

a “tight” roof; and she was ordered to bring the property into

compliance with the ordinances by repairing the defects within ten

(10) days of the issuance of the notice. This matter was set for

hearing on June 16, 2010 in the Hammond City Court. (Ex. A, ¶4, and

Ex. A-1 attached thereto.) 

On June 28, 2010, the Hammond City Court ordered Moreno-Avalos

to appear on July 14, 2010 in connection with these ordinance

violations under cause No. 45H04-1005-OV-52851 (“City Court 851

Action”). (See certified Hammond City Court Docket for Cause No.

45H04-1005-OV-52851, attached as Exhibit E.) 

The matter was subsequently continued multiple times and

another order to appear was issued on August 16, 2010. (Ex. E, see

entries dated 7/16/2010, 8/16/2010, 9/13/2010, 9/20/2010.) On

October 15, 2010, a default judgment was entered against MorenoAvalos in Hammond City Court regarding the ordinance violations for

which she was cited. (Ex. E, entry of 10/15/2010.) 

On April 20, 2011, Moreno-Avalos was notified of municipal

ordinance violations regarding her property and was summoned to

7
court for a hearing on May 19, 2011 under Cause No. 45H04-1105-OV52897 (“City Court 897 Action”). (See certified Hammond City Court

Records for Cause No. 45H04-1105-OV-52897, attached as Exhibit F,

Bates stamped pp. 33-34, City of Hammond Notice of Municipal

Ordinance Violation Citation and Summons to Court.) 

 On May 17, 2011, Attorney David Weigle entered an appearance

for Moreno-Avalos and moved to set aside default judgment in the

City Court 851 Action on the basis of alleged lack of notice; and

on May 18, 2011, the Hammond City Court set aside the default

judgment. (See Affidavit of Kristina Kantar, attached as Exhibit D,

¶2 and Exhibit D-1 attached thereto; see also Exhibit E generally.)

On May 19, 2011, the Hammond City Court scheduled a hearing in the

City Court 897 Action for June 23, 2011. (Ex. F, p. 27.) 

On June 23, 2011, the Hammond City Court held a status

conference in the City Court 897 Action and set a trial date of

September 29, 2011, regarding Moreno-Avalos’s municipal ordinance

citations. (Ex. F, p. 28.) On July 11, 2011, inspector Kim Nordhoff

prepared a list of municipal ordinance violations based on her

previous inspections. (See Ex. A, ¶5, and Ex. A-2 attached

thereto.) On September 29, 2011, the trial in the City Court 897

Action was continued to November 3, 2011; and on November 3, 2011,

the trial was reset for December 8, 2011. (Ex. F, p. 2.) 

On December 7, 2011, a notice of violation was mailed to 

Moreno-Avalos notifying her that her property was inspected and

8
found to be an unsafe building in violation of Indiana Code 36-7-9

et seq. and Sections 150, 96, and 160 of the Hammond City Code. 

Moreno-Avalos was also notified of the City’s intention to demolish

the building within thirty days. (See Affidavit of Kevin C. Smith

attached as Exhibit C, ¶3 and Exhibit C-1 attached thereto.) A

hearing on the notice of intent to demolish was set for January 12,

2012 before the Hammond Board of Public Works and Safety (“Board”).

The notice provided that if Moreno-Avalos failed to appear for the

hearing, the notice would automatically be considered a demolition

order, subject to execution by the City. (Ex. C-1.) On December 8,

2011, the Hammond City Court trial in the 897 Action was vacated.

(Ex. F, p. 2.) 

On December 20, 2011, Attorney Weigle appeared for MorenoAvalos before the Board and requested that the hearing be continued

to February 23, 2012. (See Ex. C, ¶4 and Ex. C-2 attached thereto.) 

On January 23, 2012, Kevin Smith, attorney for the City of

Hammond, wrote to advise attorney Weigle that the Board hearing on

the proposal to demolish the Gostlin Street property was continued

to April 12, 2012. (See Ex. C, ¶5 and Ex. C-3 attached thereto.) 

On February 7, 2012, Moreno-Avalos filed for bankruptcy under

Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. (Case No. 12-04247,

“Bankruptcy Action”.) (See certified docket from U.S. Bankruptcy

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Case No. 12-04247,

attached as Exhibit G, pp. 1-2, DE #1.) 

9
On April 12, 2012, the Hammond Board of Public Works & Safety

(“Board”) continued the demolition hearing on the 551 Gostlin

property. (See Affidavit of Lynn Laviolette attached as Exhibit B,

and Exhibit B-1, pp. 3-4 attached thereto.) 

On May 2, 2012, the Hammond City Court continued the 897

Action for status. (Ex. F, p. 2.) On May 3, 2012, the City of

Hammond mailed Moreno-Avalos an order to appear for the May 30,

2012 status hearing in the City Court 897 action. (Ex. F, p. 21.) 

On May 23, 2012, attorney Wheeler (plaintiff’s bankruptcy

counsel) filed a motion for damages against the City of Hammond for

alleged violation of the stay in bankruptcy. (Ex. G, p. 5, D.E.

33.) On June 25, 2012, the City of Hammond filed a response to

Moreno-Avalos’s motion for damages in the bankruptcy action. (Ex.

G, p. 6, DE #40-41.) On July 26, 2012, the Board hearing was

continued to September 20, 2012, inasmuch as Moreno-Avalos’s

bankruptcy action remained pending. (Ex. B and Ex. B-2, p. 2

attached thereto). 

On July 30, 2012, attorney Smith wrote to advise attorney

Weigle that the hearing regarding the 551 Gostlin property was

continued to September 20, 2012. (See Ex. C, ¶6 and Ex. C-4

attached thereto.) 

An evidentiary hearing was held in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court

for the Northern District of Illinois on August 6, 2012, at which

Moreno-Avalos appeared in person and by counsel. Following that

10
hearing, the Court (Judge Timothy Barnes) determined that the

automatic stay did not foreclose the City’s regulatory actions; and

it denied plaintiff’s motion to recover monetary damages. (Ex. G,

pp. 6-7, DE #48-49.) 

On September 20, 2012, the Board hearing was continued to

January 24, 2013, for status, inasmuch as Moreno-Avalos’s

bankruptcy action remained pending. (Ex. B and Ex. B-3, pp. 2-3

attached thereto.) 

On January 23, 2013, Moreno-Avalos filed her first 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 complaint in U.S. District Court against City Hall of

Hammond, Indiana [City of Hammond], Kurt Koch, Kim Nordhoff, and

Darren Taylor, under Case No. 2:13-cv-038-JVB-APR (the “038

Action”). (See certified docket and selected filings from the 038

Action attached as Exhibit H, Bates stamped pp. 1-2.) 

In the January 23, 2013 complaint, Moreno-Avalos alleged that

she complained to Mayor McDermott and his assistant, Tom Dabertin,

about the conduct of Hammond inspector Kim Nordhoff, to-wit, that

Nordhoff had supposedly “stalked” her (Ex. H, p. 7, ¶ III); and

that Nordhoff had purportedly interfered in Moreno-Avalos’s

landlord-tenant relationship with existing tenants. (Ex. H, pp. 11-

12, ¶¶ 11-18, 21-26.) Moreno-Avalos also alleged that Mr. Koch had

“retaliated” against her by having her property declared an unsafe

building and by supposedly making “false statements” about her

having an unsafe building. (Ex. H, pp. 7-8, ¶ IV.) 

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On January 24, 2013, the Board hearing was continued to April

25, 2013, inasmuch as Moreno’s bankruptcy action remained pending.

(Ex. B and Ex. B-4, p. 2 attached thereto.) 

 On January 28, 2013, attorney Smith wrote to attorney Weigle

to advise that the Board hearing was continued to April 25, 2013.

(Ex. C, ¶7 and Ex. C-5 attached thereto.) On April 25, 2013, the

Board hearing was continued to June 27, 2013, inasmuch as MorenoAvalos’s bankruptcy action remained pending. (Ex. B and Ex. B-5, p.

4 attached thereto.) On April 29, 2013, attorney Smith wrote to

attorney Weigle to advise that the Board hearing was continued to

June 27, 2013. (Ex. C, ¶8 and Ex. C-6 attached thereto.) 

On August 21, 2013, Judge Van Bokkelen dismissed plaintiff’s

complaint against the Hammond Defendants in the 038 Action for lack

of personal jurisdiction because the defendants were not properly

served. (Ex. H, p. 5, DE #36.) On September 20, 2013, the

bankruptcy trustee filed a motion to dismiss Moreno-Avalos’s

bankruptcy action for her failure to make plan payments. (Ex. G, p.

7, DE #51.) 

On September 26, 2013, Moreno-Avalos filed a second § 1983

action in the district court against the same defendants, adding

Mr. Dabertin and Mayor McDermott as co-defendants (collectively

“Hammond Defendants”), under Case No. 2:13-cv-347-TLS-PRC (the “347

Action”). (See certified docket and selected filings in the 347

Action attached as Exhibit I, Bates stamped pp. 1-3.) In her second

12
complaint, Moreno-Avalos again asserted that defendants had

“retaliated” against her by ordering her Gostlin Street property

demolished (Ex. I, p. 24, ¶ I); that she had been stalked by Ms.

Nordhoff; that she had been harassed by Nordhoff and the other

defendants in “retaliation” for plaintiff’s report of Nordhoff’s

alleged harassment (Ex. I, p. 25, ¶ II; p. 27, ¶19; p. 30, ¶47);

and that Mr. Koch made “false statements” about the condition of

her building. (Ex. I, p. 25, ¶II; p. 28, ¶33; see also Complaint

generally, Ex. I, pp. 21-30.) 

On October 21, 2013, the bankruptcy court entered an order

dismissing Moreno-Avalos’s bankruptcy action for failure to make

plan payments and she was notified of the order dismissing the

bankruptcy action. (Ex. G, p. 8 DE #56-57.) 

On December 6, 2013, Moreno-Avalos filed another § 1983

complaint against defendants in federal court, under Case No. 2:13-

cv-00450-JTM-PRC (“the 450 Action”); and that matter was assigned

to Judge James T. Moody. (See certified docket and selected filings

in the 450 Action, attached as Exhibit J, pp. 1-2.) In the 450

action, Moreno-Avalos reiterated her previous claims against the

same defendants, including allegations of harassment, false

statements, tortious interference with a business relationship

(between her and her tenants); breach of contract; and stalking.

(Ex. J, pp. 7-12, ¶¶ I, III, XI, XII, XXV-XXVI; p. 14, ¶¶ 6-9.) 

On February 3, 2014, Judge Springmann entered an order

13
consolidating plaintiff’s 347 Action and 450 Action under Case No.

347. (See Ex. I, p. 5, D.E. #26; see also Ex. J, p. 4, D.E. 28.) 

On May 12, 2014, a Notice of Violation of the Hammond Housing

Code was mailed to Moreno-Avalos, notifying her that her property

was inspected and deemed an unsafe building, and that it was

subject to demolition. The notice further indicated that if 

Moreno-Avalos did not appear for the hearing on June 12, 2014, the

notice would automatically be considered a demolition order. (Ex.

C, ¶9 and Ex. C-7 attached thereto.) 

On May 28 and June 2, 2014, a notice of the June 12, 2014

demolition hearing was published in the Northwest Indiana Times

newspaper. (Ex. C, ¶10 and Exhibit C-8 attached thereto.) On June

12, 2014, Moreno-Avalos did not appear for the scheduled demolition

hearing. (Ex. C, ¶11.) The Board affirmed the Notice, which became

a demolition order. (Ex. B and Ex. B-7, p. 7, attached thereto.) On

June 16, 2014, the Board’s findings and order of June 12, 2014,

were filed with the Lake County Recorder’s office. (Ex. C, ¶12 and

Ex. C-9, attached thereto.) 

On June 23, 2014, the deadline passed for Moreno-Avalos to

file a verified complaint seeking judicial review of the Board’s

findings and demolition order under Ind. Code 36-7-9-8. MorenoAvalos did not file a complaint seeking judicial review. (Ex. D,

¶4.) 

On August 5, 2014, a notice of bid opening for the demolition

14
of 551 Gostlin was mailed to all interested persons via certified

mail. (See Ex. C, ¶13 and Ex. C-10, attached thereto.) 

On August 22, 2014, the Hammond Defendants filed their motion

for judgment on the pleadings and supporting brief in the 347

Action. (Ex. I, p. 6, DE #37-38.) On January 30, 2015, Judge

Springmann entered a final order granting the Hammond Defendants’

motion for judgment on the pleadings. A full and final judgment was

then entered in favor of the Hammond Defendants, including the City

of Hammond and Kim Nordhoff, and against Moreno-Avalos. (Ex. I, pp.

9-12.) 

On March 2, 2015, the deadline passed for Moreno-Avalos to

appeal the judgment entered in the 347 Action, pursuant to

Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(A). Moreno-Avalos did not appeal the decision.

(Ex. I, p. 8.) 

In May 2015, the 551 Gostlin Street property was demolished by

the City of Hammond. ( DE #45-1, p. 2, ¶7.) On May 25, 2016, the

City of Hammond filed its Unsafe Building Demolition Lien regarding

the 551 Gostlin Street property with the Lake County Recorder’s

Office. (See Ex. C, ¶14 and Ex. C-11 attached thereto.) 

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine

15
dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct.

2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Not every dispute between the

parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. To

determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the

Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s

favor. See Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). 

However, “a court may not make credibility determinations, weigh

the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts;

these are jobs for a factfinder.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767,

770 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 

A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion

may not rely on allegations in his own pleading but rather must

“marshal and present the court with the evidence [he] contends will

prove [his] case.” Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d

651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). “[I]nferences relying on mere

speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” Stephens v. Erickson,

569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an essential

element on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary

16
judgment is proper. See Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th

Cir. 2006). 

Claim Preclusion

Defendants first argue that claim preclusion bars the claims

against them in this action. The Supreme Court has defined the

doctrine as follows:

A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication,

embodied in the related doctrines of collateral

estoppel and res judicata, is that a “right,

question or fact distinctly put in issue and

directly determined by a court of competent

jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a

subsequent suit between the same parties or their

privies . . . Under res judicata, a final judgment

on the merits bars further claims by parties or

their privies based on the same cause of action.

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (quotations

omitted). 

The federal law of claim preclusion applies here because the

earlier judgment was rendered by a federal court. See Schor v.

Abbott Labs., 457 F.3d 608, 615 (7th Cir. 2006). The doctrine of

res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, has three

requirements under federal law: a final decision in the first suit,

a dispute arising from the same transaction (identified by its

“operative facts”), and the same litigants (directly or through

privity of interest). Czarniecki v. City of Chicago, 633 F.3d 545,

548 (7th Cir. 2011). 

The parties do not dispute that Judge Springmann’s decision on

the motion for judgment on the pleadings was a final decision. 

17
This court agrees, as the order directed the Clerk to “enter

judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff.” 

(Ex. I at 20.) Nor do the parties dispute whether it involved the

same parties or their privies. Again, this Court agrees, as

defendant Kim Nordhoff was a defendant in the 347 Action and the

450 Action, and City Hall of Hammond (which was a defendant in the

two previous actions as well) is in privity with the defendant in

this case, the City of Hammond, Indiana. Rather, the main question

here is whether the dispute arises from the same transaction or

events. 

Plaintiff argues that “the Plaintiff’s claims of regulatory

taking, first amendment violation, and 1983 violations were not

ripe until the city of Hammond took the Plaintiff’s property in May

of 2015.” (DE #84 at 4.) Certainly some of the disputes in this

case arose from the same transaction or events (and Plaintiff seems

to concede this, in only arguing that her claims of regulatory

taking (Count VI), First Amendment violation (Count I), and the

1983 violations (Counts I, II, and III), were not ripe until the

City of Hammond actually took the Plaintiff’s property in May of

2015). 

Indeed, at least two counts in the second amended complaint in

this case (Count IV for tortious interference with a commercial

contract, and Count VII for harassment) were already alleged by

18
Plaintiff in the 347 and 450 Actions. In the 347 Complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that Inspector Nordhoff was “stalking/harassing

Plaintiff” (347 Action, DE #1 at 5), and also alleged harassment in

the 450 Action (DE #1 at 4). Judge Springmann specifically found

“the Plaintiff’s ¶ 1983 claim for harassment must be dismissed on

the pleadings” (Ex. I at 16-17.) Plaintiff also previously alleged

in the 450 Action that defendants interfered with her tenants (450

Action, DE #1 at 10), which are the same facts she uses now to

allege tortious interference with contract. Moreover, the current

claim for emotional distress arose out of the same factual

allegations (that she was being harassed, unfairly issued

citations, and being retaliated against), and could have been

brought in the first two lawsuits that were consolidated. At the

time of the Judge Springmann actions, Plaintiff had already

received a notice of demolition (347 Action, DE #1 at 1), thus the

facts underlying the claim of emotional distress already existed,

and this claim could have been brought in the underlying federal

cases. Because these claims are all based on the same operative

facts, and the same event that was alleged in the first two federal

lawsuits consolidated in front of Judge Springmann, they are barred

by res judicata. See, e.g., Czarniekci, 633 F.3d at 549-50

(finding res judicata applicable where “the only differences

between the first lawsuit and the second lawsuit are the theories

19
of liability”); Barr v. Bd. of Trustees of Western Illinois Univ.,

796 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal on the basis

of res judicata where “[b]oth suits arise out of the same main

event”). 

That leaves the Court to analyze whether the regulatory taking

claim, First Amendment violation, and 1983 violations are covered

by claim preclusion. In other words, whether the claims arise

“from the same transaction or the same core of ‘operative facts’”

as the previous lawsuits. Czarniecki, 633 F.3d at 549. “Even if

the two claims are based on different legal theories, the ‘two

claims are one for purposes of res judicata if they are based on

the same, or nearly the same, factual allegations.’” Matrix IV,

Inc. v. American Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 649 F.3d 539,

547 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., 999

F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1993)). “This test is an outgrowth of the

rule that a party must allege in one proceeding all claims and/or

counterclaims for relief arising out of a single occurrence, or be

precluded from pursuing those claims in the future.” Bertstein v.

Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 227 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Regarding the First Amendment claim violation, the second

amended complaint in this case alleges that Inspector Kim Nordhoff

requested permission to enter Plaintiff’s property, Plaintiff

informed her it was owner occupied and she could not enter,

20
Nordhoff became angry with her, and several citations of building

code violations arrived after that. (Sec. Am. Compl. at 3-4.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that after she complained about the

inspector’s conduct to the Mayor, she received a letter ordering

the demolition of her property. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff made the

exact same factual allegations in the 450 Action (DE #1 in 450

Action, at 5). The facts underlying the First Amendment claim

therefore were in existence at the time of the previous lawsuits

(indeed, they are in the complaint), thus, considering the totality

of the circumstances, the First Amendment claim is based upon the

same factual allegations and is precluded by claim preclusion. 

Next, the Court looks to the section 1983 claims: Count I for

deprivation of right to freedom of speech under the color of law;

Count II for deprivation of equal protection rights under the color

of law; and Count III for deprivation of right to freedom of

contract under the color of law. The Court has already discussed

how the operative facts behind the right to freedom of speech and

freedom of contract are the same as the factual background in the

earlier lawsuits, and these claims either could have been, or

actually were, litigated by Judge Springmann. With regard to the

equal protection claim, Plaintiff again alleges that Nordhoff

declared “war on [her] because the Plaintiff had refused entry to

Inspector Kim Nordhoff and complained about her trumpet [sic] up

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building code violations to the Mayor.” (Sec. Am. Compl. at 6.) 

These factual allegations are the same as the ones already set

forth in the previous two lawsuits, and this claim is also barred

by claim preclusion.

The last claim is for regulatory taking (Count VI). Plaintiff

claims she could not have brought this claim earlier, because her

property was not demolished until May 2015 (four months after Judge

Springmann’s order). Plaintiff cites to cases involving standing,

claiming she could not have raised the regulatory taking issue

until she had an injury-in-fact, which was the actual demolition of

her property. (DE #84 at 4-5.) Defendants retort that at the time

of the previous cases, Plaintiff had already received a letter

stating that her property would be demolished, so she should have

already known what would happen; nevertheless, it was not until

after Judge Springmann’s opinion that the property was actually

razed. This is the strongest of Plaintiff’s arguments, as least as

far as claim preclusion goes. While it is true that “once a

transaction has caused injury, all claims arising from that

transaction must be brought in one suit or be lost” Andersen v.

Chrysler Corp., 99 F.3d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1996), “[t]raditional

principles of preclusion allow additional litigation if some new

wrong occurs.” Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage

Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1326 (7th Cir. 1992). Similarly, a party can

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assert a claim that “could not have been presented in the first

case . . . .” Id. Even assuming, arguendo, that the regulatory

taking claim is not barred by claim preclusion, it still fails. 

Regulatory Taking

Plaintiff alleges in this second amended complaint that the

City of Hammond “imposed regulations on Plaintiff that were so

harsh that it caused her a total loss of her property” and that the

“reckless imposition of the building code caused the Plaintiff to

loss [sic.] all use of her property.” (DE 42-1 at 10-11.) In her

memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff also argues that the City and

the government regulations go “too far” by condemning private

property without a specific safety reason, and that the statute is

ambiguous and arbitrarily applied to the Plaintiff’s property. (DE

#84 at 10-11.) These arguments fail. 

Regarding the regulations, Indiana Code 36-7-9-5 “allows for

the [municipality’s] enforcement authority to issue an order

requiring action relative to any unsafe premises, including removal

of an unsafe building.” 409 Land Trust v. City of South Bend, 709

N.E.2d 348, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). As Judge Tinder stated:

“Federal courts are not boards of zoning appeals.” 

River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d

164, 165 (7th Cir. 1994). So goes the opening line

of the frequently cited opinion authored by now

Chief Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook. In River

Park, the Seventh Circuit was critical of

litigation strategies adopted by those who, for

whatever reason, believe they stand a better chance

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of obtaining the local licenses, permits or zoning

categorization by attaching a “denial of due

process” moniker on their challenges to local

governmental actions and pursue the matter in

federal court.” “Labels do not matter. A person

contending that state or local regulation of the

use of land has gone overboard must repair to state

court.” Id. at 167.

Leonard’s Linen Service v. City of Bloomington, No. 1:06-cv-21-JDTWTL, 2007 WL 925546, at *1 (S.D. Mar. 26, 2007). 

While it is true that “constitutional infringement during

local land use proceedings can occur and redress in federal courts

is sometimes appropriate,” in this case, the exhibits Plaintiff has

submitted with its opposition to the summary judgment motion do not

set forth any material facts to create any genuine issues to

overcome summary judgment. Id. The Pacheco affidavit about the

electrical wiring being properly installed in 2000 is so far

removed in time, and the Herrera affidavit about being denied a

building permit for the roof installation in 2013 also does not

defeat summary judgment. As Judge Springmann previously noted in

her opinion, “the Plaintiff has not provided any information to

show that a contractor provided an opinion to the city about

whether proposed repairs would bring the roof into compliance with

city codes.” (Ex. I at 14.) 

Additionally, Defendants argue the regulatory taking claim

fails under the principles set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477, 489-90 (1994) (DE #86 at 10-11). Of course, Heck made clear

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that “a civil rights suit cannot be maintained by a prisoner if a

judgment in his favor would ‘necessarily imply’ that his conviction

had been invalid.” Moore v. Mahone, 652 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir.

2011). That line of reasoning does not fit in this case, where

Plaintiff is not a prisoner, and does not have a criminal

conviction. 

More fitting to this situation is the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

which prohibits federal district courts from reviewing state court

civil judgments, including all claims that are inextricably

intertwined with those judgments. See District of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is

based upon recognition of the fact that lower federal courts

generally do not have the power to exercise appellate review over

state court decisions. In Rooker, the Supreme Court held that even

if a state court decision was wrong, only the Supreme Court has the

power to reverse or modify that judgment, since the jurisdiction of

federal district courts is strictly original. Rooker, 263 U.S. at

415-16. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Feldman held that “a

United States District Court has no authority to review final

judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.” Feldman, 460

U.S. at 482. This circuit has consistently emphasized that

“[t]aken together, Rooker and Feldman stand for the proposition

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that lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to engage in appellate

review of state-court determinations.” Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d

750, 753 (7th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court

has noted, however, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been

construed too broadly by some federal courts. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005). PostExxon, the doctrine has been significantly narrowed and only

applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court

review and rejection of those judgments.” Kelley v. Med-1

Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations

omitted). 

“In order to determine the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, the fundamental and appropriate question to ask is

whether the alleged injury by the federal plaintiff resulted from

the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.” 

Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996). “A plaintiff

may not circumvent the effect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine simply

by casting [a] complaint in the form of a federal civil rights

action.” Maple Lanes, Inc. v. Messer, 186 F.3d 823, 825 (7th Cir.

1999). 

A Court may “look beyond the four corners of the complaint to

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discern the actual injury claimed by the plaintiff.” Crawford v.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2011)

(citing Johnson v. Orr, 551 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2008)). The

Seventh Circuit has further noted that, where a claim alleges an

independent ground for relief, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not

present a bar when the district court could fashion relief that

would not upset the state court’s determination. Id. at 647

(citing Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 998 (7th

Cir. 2005)). 

Here, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable. Plaintiff

complains of a regulatory taking of property, and that she suffered

a “total loss of her property” (Sec. Am. Compl. at 10) - something

which could not be undone without affecting the Hammond City Court

judgment, and an injury that was actually caused by that judgment. 

Moreover, the timing is right - the property was demolished before

this district court proceeding commenced, and the current lawsuit

invites the district court to review and reject that judgment. As

the Seventh Circuit has noted, if Plaintiff “was dissatisfied with

the state court’s decision or justifications, [her] remedy was to

appeal, not to start over with a new suit.” Berry v. Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A., 865 F.3d 880, 883 (7th Cir. 2017).

Because all of the claims against these defendants are barred

either by claim preclusion or by Rooker-Feldman, the Court need not

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reach the other arguments raised by Defendants, including qualified

immunity, the Monell doctrine, and the statute of limitations. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (DE #80) is GRANTED. The regulatory taking claim

is dismissed because it is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

and the remaining claims against Defendants, City of Hammond,

Indiana and Kim Nordhoff, are dismissed because they are barred by

claim preclusion. The Clerk is ORDERED to CLOSE this case. 

DATED: November 14, 2017 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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