UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

CHASSANDRA RENA JONES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:16-CV-338

)

BRIDGEPOINT EDUCATION, INC., )

d/b/a ASHFORD UNIVERSITY LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Partial Motion to Dismiss Count Two of Plaintiff’s

Complaint (and brief in support) filed by Defendant Bridgepoint Education (DE 13 and 14).

Plaintiff Chassandra Jones filed a response brief in opposition (DE 16) and Bridgepoint filed a

reply brief (DE 18). For the reasons discussed below, the motion (DE 13) is GRANTED and 1

Plaintiff’s claim under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is granted 14 days from the date of this Opinion and Order in which to

file an amended complaint to re-plead her claim. If she does not do so the claim will be

dismissed WITH PREJUDICE without further proceedings and this case will proceed on

 Bridgepoint’s reply brief was filed on November 29, 2016. Bridgepoint later filed two 1

Notices of Supplemental Authority in support of its motion–the first on March 3, 2017 (DE 26)

and the second on May 9, 2017 (DE 29). Jones did not respond to these supplemental “briefs,”

and so the matter is ripe for resolution and the Court will consider the supplemental authorities

submitted by Bridgepoint. Also, when this case was filed it was assigned to Judge Joseph Van

Bokkelen in the Hammond Division under a case assignment procedure that has been superseded

by the Northern District’s General Order 2017-4, which reassigned cases to a judicial officer

sitting in the Division in which the case was originally filed. Pursuant to General Order 2017-4,

which became effective on May 1, 2017, Chief Judge Theresa Springmann reassigned this case to

this Division and this judicial officer for all further proceedings. Order Reassigning Case (DE

27). 
Plaintiff’s federal claim under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. This matter will be set

for a telephone scheduling conference by separate entry once Bridgepoint files its Answer to

Jones’ Complaint (or Amended Complaint, as the case may be). 

BACKGROUND

Chassandra Jones filed her Complaint on September 21, 2016 (DE 1), asserting two

claims against Bridgepoint. Count I alleges a claim under the Telephone Consumer Protection

Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. Complaint, pp. 5-6. More specifically, Jones alleges in Count I that

Bridgepoint violated § 227(b)(1)(iii) of the TCPA, which prohibits solicitors from calling people

“on their cellular phone using an automatic telephone dialing system (‘ATDS’) without their

consent.” Id., p. 5. Jones alleges that representatives of Bridgepoint did just that on numerous

occasions even though she repeatedly asked them to stop. In Count II of her Complaint, Jones

asserts that Bridgepoint violated the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, “I.C. 24-5-0.5-

35-3(a) and (b)(19) by engaging in an unfair, abusive and deceptive practice through its

systematic solicitation of Plaintiff.” Id., p. 6. It is this second count that Bridgepoint is asking the

Court to dismiss (the motion does not challenge Count I–the federal TCPA claim). Bridgepoint

argues that Jones fails to state a cognizable claim under the IDCSA and that the claim must be

dismissed under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant’s Brief, generally.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint that fails to “state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and

draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th

2
Cir. 2008). The complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the

Supreme Court explained that the complaint must allege facts that are “enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Stated differently, the

complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). To be facially plausible, the complaint must allow “the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

DISCUSSION

Bridgepoint does not deny (at least for present purposes) that its representatives made

calls to Jones for the purpose of selling its online education programs. Still, Bridgepoint argues 2

that “Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint, for violation of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales

Act . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be dismissed because

Plaintiff has not alleged that she complied with the statutory requirements of the [Act].”

Defendant’s Brief, p. 1. Specifically, Bridgepoint contends that Jones failed to provide written

notice of her complaints prior to filing suit and that her Complaint fails to establish (or even

allege) that “any of Bridgepoint’s alleged conduct [was] incurable.” Id. (The word “incurable” is

a legal term of art in this context, as discussed below.) Absent evidence that Jones complied with

the statutory pre-suit notice requirements, or evidence that Bridgepoint’s conduct was incurable

 Bridgepoint states that it “is an accredited online university offering programs across 2

many industries and fields including business, education, health, and liberal arts.” Defendant’s

Brief in Support, p. 2. 

3
(which would provide Jones with an exception from the written notice requirement), her state

law claim has no legal foundation, according to Bridgepoint. Id. This argument regarding the

written notice requirement is rendered moot though, since Jones concedes in her response brief

that she “has clearly and properly plead that [Bridgepoint] committed an incurable deceptive act

under the IDCSA. As such, Plaintiff is not required to give Defendant any notice, whether written

or otherwise, before commencing the instant proceedings.” Plaintiff’s Response, p. 2 (italics in

original). Consequently, the only issue before the Court is whether Jones pleaded sufficient facts

to state a plausible claim against Bridgepoint for having committed an incurable deceptive act as

that term is defined in the statute and applied in applicable case law. The Court agrees with

Bridgepoint that Jones’ Complaint fails to state such a claim and must be dismissed.

The recent cases cited by Bridgepoint in its two notices of supplemental authority are on

point and illustrate why Jones’ state law IDCSA claim must be dismissed. First, the applicable

law, which was summarized by the district court in Davis v. Contactability.com:

The IDCSA “provides remedies to consumers and the attorney general for

practices that the General Assembly deemed deceptive in consumer transactions.”

McKinney v. State, 693 N.E.2d 65, 67 (Ind. 1998). The IDCSA “provides for two

kinds of actionable deceptive acts: ‘uncured’ deceptive acts and ‘incurable’

deceptive acts.” Id. at 68. To bring a claim for an uncured deceptive act under the

IDCSA, a plaintiff must provide “not only a complete description of the actual

damage suffered, but also a description of the alleged deceptive act . . . so that the

supplier has an opportunity to correct the problem.” A.B.C. Home & Real Estate

Inspection, Inc. v. Plummer, 500 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Ind.Ct.App. 1986). See also

Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-5(a). Davis admits that she seeks redress only for alleged

incurable deceptive acts. . . . 

An incurable act is done “as part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to

defraud or mislead.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(8). “Intent to defraud or mislead is

thus clearly an element of an incurable deceptive act.” McKinney, 693 N.E.2d at

68. The allegedly deceptive act “may be committed where the facts evince an

intent to mislead. That is misleading which tends to lead astray or into error; to

4
guide wrongly.” McCormick Piano & Organ Co., Inc. v. Geiger, 412 N.E.2d 842,

849 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Davis v. Contactability.com, LLC, 2017 WL 413290, at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 31, 2017). The court

then examined Davis’ complaint and held as follows:

Contactability argues that Davis’ IDCSA claim fails to allege an intent to defraud

or mislead and therefore cannot be considered an incurable act. The Court agrees.

Davis does not allege that Contactability attempted to defraud or mislead her in

the sale of insurance or that she was somehow misinformed about the services that

Contactability attempted to offer her. Rather, her Complaint describes the calls as

frustrating and constituting harassment. . . . This is not sufficient to state a claim

under the IDCSA.

Davis claims that Contactability’s method of calling individuals through an

automated system violates the TCPA, which by itself is considered a deceptive act

under the IDCSA. See Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3(b)(19). But Davis ignores the

prerequisite language in determining a deceptive act: “the following acts, and the

following representations as to the subject matter of a consumer transaction, made

orally, in writing, or by electronic communication, by a supplier, are deceptive

acts: ... (19) The violation by a supplier of [the TCPA].” Id. In the instant case,

Davis has not alleged any oral or written representations made by Contactability.

Cf. Berghausen v. Microsoft Corp., 765 N.E.2d 592, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)

(plaintiff’s failure to allege oral or written representations by the defendant results

in dismissal of IDCSA claim). The IDCSA “was enacted to prevent those who

regularly engage in consumer sales from making false or misleading statements

about their goods or services.” Captain & Co. v. Stenberg, 505 N.E.2d 88, 94

(Ind.Ct.App. 1987). Davis has failed to make any claim regarding products offered

by Contactability, let alone allege how such statements lead her “astray or into

error.” McCormick, 412 N.E.2d at 849 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because Davis does not plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that Contactability’s

phone calls were made with an intent to defraud, her IDCSA claim must fail. 

Id. at *3. The result was the same in Eha v. Bridgepoint Education, Inc., the case cited in

Bridgepoint’s second notice of supplemental authority, in which the court held as follows: 

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that Bridgepoint intended to defraud or mislead her

in any way. But even if she did, her Complaint lacks the requisite particularity of

[Fed.] Rule 9(b). Jasper v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 834 F.Supp.2d 766, 773 (N.D. Ill.

2011) (dismissing IDCSA claim for an incurable deceptive act because the

plaintiff’s complaint ‘does not satisfy the who, what, where, and when of the

5
alleged fraud”). Specifically, Plaintiff does not allege who she spoke with, what

was specifically said, and how she relied on those representations. Instead, she

describes the calls as harassing. . . . Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim under the

IDCSA must be dismissed.

Eha v. Bridgepoint Education, Inc., 1:17-CV-96 (S.D. Ind. May 3, 2017), p. 3.

Bridgepoint is correct that Jones’ IDCSA claim fails for the same reasons discussed in

Davis and Eha, at least as it is currently presented in her Complaint. Jones makes the following

relevant statements and assertions:

1) “Starting in approximately November 2015, Plaintiff started receiving phone calls from

Defendant to her cellular phone[,]” that “continued . . . throughout 2016.” Complaint, pp. 2-3.

2) Bridgepoint was “attempting to solicit [Jones] to attend Ashford[,]” even though she told them

“that she was not interested . . . as she was already pursuing her degree in criminal justice

through Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana.” Id., p. 3.

3) Despite Jones’ repeated requests to be removed from Bridgepoint’s call list, “Defendant

continued regularly calling Plaintiff’s cellular phone for the purpose of soliciting her to further

her education through Ashford.” Id.

4) Jones changed her cell phone number but the calls continued on her new cellular phone line.

Id.

5) That “[o]n or around September 13, 2016, Plaintiff received a call from a male representative

of Defendant named Jacob” who promised to remove Jones’ name from the company’s call list

but, according to Jones, never did so. Id., p. 4. 

6) That “Defendant engaged in unfair, abusive and deceptive behavior in its transactions with

Plaintiff. Through systematic harassment, Defendant used an ATDS to relentlessly contact

6
Plaintiff. . . . Placing numerous calls within a short window was abusive to Plaintiff. Defendant

intended to harass Plaintiff into submission by causing her phone to ring repeatedly. In violating

the TCPA, Defendant engaged in illegal behavior during its solicitation towards Plaintiff.

Defendant intended that Plaintiff rely on its illegal behavior.” Id., p. 7.

These factual assertions are insufficient to state a claim under the IDCSA for two reasons.

First, Jones’ factual assertions, like those presented by the plaintiffs in Davis and Eha, constitute

a complaint for harassing phone calls in violation of the TCPA but not a deceptive or fraudulent

act in violation of the IDCSA. Just like Davis and Eha, Jones fails to even allege the “who, what,

where, and when of the alleged fraud.” She does not state any facts at all that demonstrate that

she expressly relied, to her detriment, on any statements or representations made by

Bridgepoint’s phone solicitors. Not only that, but the only such assertion she makes in that regard

is assumptive and conclusory. She claims that Bridgepoint “intended to harass Plaintiff into

submission . . .” and “engaged in illegal behavior during its solicitation[s.]” (italics added).

Jones cannot base a claim on her subjective belief about Bridgepoint’s intent or her conclusory

statement that its conduct was illegal. A plaintiff asserting a claim for an incurable deceptive act

under the IDCSA must present facts to show what the fraudulent or deceptive act was, when and

how it was committed, and how plaintiff relied on said deceptive act to her detriment. Jones’

Complaint does none of that and must be dismissed as a result. See Lyons v. Leatt Corp., 2015

WL 7016469, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 2015) (“Because an incurable deceptive act requires an

intent to defraud, the Plaintiff must satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 9(b).”); Jasper v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 834 F.Supp.2d 766, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2011)

(“Without actual written notice . . . [plaintiff] may only recover . . . for an incurable deceptive

7
act, which requires that she satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard.”). In the context of

Rule 12(b)(6), Jones’ allegations regarding her IDCSA claim fail “to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

One final point. In both the Davis case and the Eha case the courts dismissed the

plaintiffs’ state law claim without prejudice and afforded the plaintiffs 14 days to file an

amended complaint; if no amended complaint was forthcoming, the state law claim would be

dismissed with prejudice. See Davis, 2017 WL 413290, at *3; Eha, p. 3. In Davis, the plaintiff

did amend her complaint to re-plead her claim under the IDCSA, but the case settled a few days

later. In Eha, the plaintiff did not attempt to amend her complaint and that case remains pending

only on the plaintiff’s federal TCPA claim. The Court also notes that in both Davis and Eha, the

plaintiffs were represented by the same attorneys representing Jones in this case (and

Bridgepoint’s counsel defended the Davis case). This Court will do likewise and afford Jones an

opportunity to amend her Complaint to state a claim under the IDCSA. If she chooses not to do

so within 14 days of the date of this Opinion and Order her state claim will be dismissed with

prejudice without further notice and this case will proceed only on Jones’ federal TCPA claim.

Lyons v. Leatt Corp., 2015 WL 7016469, at *4 (citing Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 584 (7th

Cir. 2008) (“District courts routinely do not terminate a case at the same time that they grant a

motion to dismiss; rather, they generally dismiss claims without prejudice and give the plaintiff

at least one opportunity to amend her complaint.”); Barry Aviation Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Mun.

Airport Comm’n, 377 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the general rule is that “the

district court should grant leave to amend after granting a motion to dismiss”)).

8
CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Partial Motion to Dismiss Count Two of Plaintiff’s

Complaint filed by Defendant Bridgepoint Education, Inc. (DE 13) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s

claim under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is granted 14 days from the date of this Opinion and Order in which to

file an amended complaint to re-plead her claim. If she does not do so the claim will be

dismissed WITH PREJUDICE without further proceedings and this case will proceed on

Plaintiff’s federal claim under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. This matter will be set

for a telephone scheduling conference by separate entry once Bridgepoint files its Answer to

Jones’ Complaint (or Amended Complaint, as the case may be). 

Date: June 5 , 2017.

 /s/ William C. Lee 

William C. Lee, Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of Indiana

9