Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 41A05-1702-CR-296 | June 29, 2017 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jennifer D. Wilson Reagan

Wilson & Wilson

Greenwood, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Laura R. Anderson

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Brianna C. Petrarca,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 29, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

41A05-1702-CR-296

Appeal from the Johnson Circuit 

Court

The Honorable K. Mark Loyd, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

41C01-1511-F4-69

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 41A05-1702-CR-296 | June 29, 2017 Page 2 of 6

Statement of the Case

[1] Brianna C. Petrarca (“Petrarca”) appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court 

following her guilty plea to two counts of Level 4 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine.

1

 Petrarca argues that her aggregate sentence of eight (8) 

years with seven (7) years executed and one (1) year suspended on probation is 

inappropriate. Petrarca’s plea agreement contained a provision that she was 

waiving her right to appeal her sentence so long as the trial court sentenced her 

within the terms of her plea agreement. Because the trial court sentenced 

Petrarca within the terms of her plea agreement, we conclude that she has 

waived her right to appeal her sentence. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. 

[2] We dismiss.

Issue

Whether Petrarca has waived her right to appeal her sentence 

pursuant to her written plea agreement.

Facts

[3] On August 25, 2015, and, one week later, on August 31, 2015, Petrarca 

knowingly or intentionally delivered methamphetamine, which had a weight 

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-48-4-1.1. We note that, since the time of Petrarca’s offense, the dealing in 

methamphetamine statute has been twice amended, with effective dates of July 1, 2016, and July 1, 2017. 

These amendments have no effect on this appeal. 
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between one and five grams. Thereafter, the State charged Petrarca with two 

counts of Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine. 

[4] In November 2016, Petrarca entered into a written plea agreement. The terms 

of the agreement required her to plead guilty as charged. In exchange, the State

would recommend that the sentences on the two charges be served 

concurrently. Finally, a cap of eight years would be placed on any executed 

time, with any additional time to be suspended. Petrarca’s plea agreement also 

contained a provision, which provided, in relevant part, as follows:

17. I acknowledge that I may have the right to challenge this 

agreement and the resulting conviction and sentence. By 

entering into this plea agreement I hereby waive any right to 

appeal the conviction and/or sentence in this cause by direct 

appeal so long as the Judge sentences me within the terms of my 

plea agreement.

(App. Vol. 2 at 19) (emphasis added). During the plea hearing, the trial court 

established that Petrarca had read the plea agreement and had reviewed it with 

her attorney. Additionally, the trial court confirmed that Petrarca had signed 

the plea agreement with the understanding that she was “[w]aiv[ing] [her] rights 

and entitlements as contained throughout and entering into the plea based on 

the prosecutor’s [sentencing] recommendation[.]” (Tr. 6).

[5] For each conviction, the trial court sentenced Petrarca to a term of eight (8) 

years with seven (7) years executed and one (1) year on probation, and it 

ordered these sentences to be served concurrently. Thus, the trial court 

sentenced Petrarca within the terms of her plea agreement. The trial court also 
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recommended that Petrarca be placed in Purposeful Incarceration, and it noted 

that it would consider a modification of her executed sentenced if she 

successfully completed a Therapeutic Community Program. Petrarca now 

attempts to appeal her sentence.

2

Decision

[6] Petrarca argues that her aggregate sentence of eight (8) years with seven (7) 

years executed and one (1) year on probation for her two Level 4 felony dealing 

in methamphetamine convictions was inappropriate. 

[7] Our Indiana Supreme Court has held that “a defendant may waive the right to 

appellate review of his sentence as part of a written plea agreement.” Creech v. 

State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ind. 2008). The Creech Court adopted the view of the 

Seventh Circuit “that defendants ‘may waive their right to appeal as part of a 

written plea agreement . . . as long as the record clearly demonstrates that it was 

made knowingly and voluntarily.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 184 

F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1999)). The Creech Court also noted the benefit of such 

a waiver:

[D]efendants are free to waive their rights, to exchange them for 

other things that they value more highly. They exchange jury 

trials for lower sentences—and there is no reason why defendants 

cannot do the same with rights to appeal. An appeal requires the 

 

2 The trial court did not inform Petrarca that she had a right to appeal her sentence. Petrarca filed a petition 

seeking permission to file a belated notice of appeal. Prior to receiving a response from the State, the trial 

court granted the petition. 
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prosecutor’s office to spend time researching the record, writing a 

brief, and attending oral argument. All of this time could be 

devoted to other prosecutions; and a promise that frees up time 

may induce a prosecutor to offer concessions. A defendant who 

values these concessions will waive his rights in order to obtain 

them. The process makes both society and the defendant better 

off. To make a given right ineligible for waiver would stifle this 

process and imprison the defendant in his privileges.

Id. (quoting United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 2001)). The Creech

Court held that a trial court is not required to make an “express finding” that a 

defendant has waived his appellate rights and that “[a]cceptance of the plea 

agreement containing the waiver provision is sufficient to indicate that, in the 

trial court’s view, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the 

waiver.” Id. at 77. 

[8] Here, Petrarca’s written plea agreement contained a recommendation from the 

State that the sentences for the charges to which she was pleading guilty be 

served concurrently and have a cap of eight years on any executed time. Her 

plea agreement contained a specific provision that she was waiving her right to 

appeal her sentence “so long as the Judge sentence[d] [her] within the terms of 

[her] plea agreement.” (App. Vol. 2 at 19). The trial court sentenced 

Petrarca—within the terms of her plea agreement—to a term of eight (8) years 

with seven (7) years executed and one (1) year on probation, and it ordered 

these sentences to be served concurrently. 

[9] Based upon the language in the plea agreement and the fact that the trial court 

sentenced Petrarca according to the terms of her plea agreement, we conclude 
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that Petrarca has waived her right to appeal her sentence. See Creech, 887 

N.E.2d at 74-75 (holding the defendant had waived his right to appeal his 

sentence, including his claim that his sentence was inappropriate, pursuant to 

the express language in his written plea agreement stating that he waived his 

right to appeal his sentence “so long as the Judge sentence[d] [him] within the 

terms of [his] plea agreement”); Starcher v. State, 66 N.E.3d 621, 623 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2016) (dismissing the defendant’s appeal of his sentence based on the 

provision in his guilty plea waiving appellate review “so long as the Judge 

sentences him . . . within the terms of []his agreement”), trans. denied. 

Accordingly, we will not address Petrarca’s argument that her sentence was 

inappropriate, and we dismiss this appeal.

[10] Dismissed.

May, J., concurs in result.

Brown, J., concurs.