FllL 

138 Nev., Advance Opinion SD 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

YA-LING HUNG AND WEI-HSIANG No. 83197-COA 

HUNG, EACH INDIVIDUALLY, AS 

SURVIVING HEIRS, AND AS COADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE 

•OF TUNG-TSUNG HUNG AND PI-LING 

LEE HUNG, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

GENTING BERHAD; GENTING U.S. 

INTERACTIVE GAMING, INC.; 

GENTING NEVADA INTERACTIVE 

GAMING, LLC; AND RESORTS WORLD 

LAS VEGAS LLC, 

Respondents. 

Appeal from a district court order dismissing an amended 

complaint and denying a motion to amend in a tort action. Eighth Judicial 

District Court, Clark County; Nancy L. Allf, Judge. 

Affirrned. 

Law Offices of Kevin R. Hansen and Kevin R. Hansen and Amanda A. 

Harmon, Las Vegas, 

for Appellants. 

Greenberg Traurig, LLP, and Mark E. Ferrario, Christopher R. 

Miltenberger, and Elliot T. Anderson, Las Vegas, 

for Respondents. 

BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., TAO and BULLA, 

JJ. 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF 

NEVADA zi • 1074.'3 
OPINION 

By the Court, TAO, J.: 

The purpose of an appeal is to remedy an error, whether 

procedural or substantive, made during the proceedings in the district 

court. And appellate procedure is clear on the proper way to raise and brief 

those errors to the reviewing court. Somewhat less clear, however, is how 

this court will treat an appeal when the appellant only properly challenges 

a district court's order on a singular issue, even though the outcome of that 

order rests on multiple alternative grounds. For that narrow reason alone, 

we take this opportunity to clarify that when a district court provides 

alternative bases to support its ultimate ruling, and an appellant fails to 

challenge the validity of each alternative basis on appeal, this court will 

generally deem that failure a waiver of each such challenge and thus affirm 

the district court's judgment. 

The district court dismissed the operative complaint in the 

proceedings below on several alternative grounds and denied the 

appellants' motion to amend. But in their opening brief on appeal, the 

appellants failed to challenge each of the alternative grounds for dismissal, 

instead attempting to raise such arguments for the first time in their reply 

brief. Consequently, we conclude that the appellants waived each such 

challenge, thereby foreclosing their appeal as it concerns the district court's 

dismissal ruling. We further conclude that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying the motion to amend. Accordingly, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL II1STORY 

In 2017, an armed assailant walked into Resorts World Manila 

and set fire to furniture in the casino. Patrons of the hotel and casino ran 

for safety. Two of those patrons, Tung-Tsung Hung and Pi-Ling Lee Hung, 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF 

NEVADA 

2 

(0) /9471) 
sought refuge in their hotel room closet. While hiding in the closet, TungTsung Hung and Pi-Ling Lee Hung became trapped and died due to smoke 

inhalation. 

Almost two years later, acting individually and in their capacity 

as co-administrators of their parents' estate, Ya-Ling Hung and Wei Hsiang 

Hung filed a two-count complaint in Clark County, Nevada, alleging 

wrongful death and negligence, against Genting Berhad; Genting U.S. 

Interactive Gaming, Inc.; Genting Nevada Interactive Gaming, LLC; 

Genting Intellectual Property Pte. Ltd.; Resorts World Inc. Pte. Ltd.; 

Resorts World Las Vegas LLC; Resorts World Manila; and Kok Thay Lim. 

Shortly thereafter, the Hungs filed an amended complaint, which 

ultimately did not change the identity of the named defendants. 

Within a month of filing the amended complaint, the Hungs 

successfully served three of the defendants: Genting Nevada, Genting U.S., 

and Resorts World Las Vegas. The district court then approved two 

requests to extend the time to serve the remaining defendants: Genting 

Berhad, Genting Intellectual Property, Resorts World Inc., Resorts World 

Manila, and Kok Thay Lim. These defendants, however, were never served. 

Together, Genting Nevada, Genting U.S., and Resorts World 

Las Vegas, along with Genting Berhad, moved to dismiss the amended 

complaint, arguing that (1) under NRCP 12(b)(2), the district court could 

not exercise general or specific personal jurisdiction over the Genting 

defendants; (2) under NRCP 12(b)(5), the amended complaint did not state 

a claim upon which relief could be granted against Resorts World Las Vegas; 

(3) under NRCP 12(b)(6), because of the Hungs' failure to serve Resorts 

World Manila and others, the amended complaint failed to join necessary 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) t 94711 

3 
and indispensable parties; and (4) the complaint should be dismissed under 

the doctrine of forurn non conveniens. 

In opposing the motion to dismiss, the Hungs' only substantive 

argument was that the district court could exercise general personal 

jurisdiction over all the defendants listed in the amended complaint, 

whether served or unserved, because "Resorts World Las Vegas and Resorts 

World Manila are [ ] for all intents and purposes, one and the same, owned 

by the Genting entities." To remedy any other deficiency in the amended 

complaint, the Hungs moved to amend and submitted a proposed second 

amended complaint, which they stated would "narrow[ ] down the proposed 

parties and dismiss[ ] certain parties who . . . are not known to be directly 

involved." After holding a hearing on the motions, the district court 

dismissed the amended complaint under NRCP 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), 12(b)(6), 

and the doctrine of forurn non conveniens and denied the Hungs' motion to 

amend. 

The Hungs now appeal, arguing that reversal is warranted 

because the district court erred in determining that it could not exercise 

personal jurisdiction and abused its discretion in denying their motion to 

amend. But because the Hungs' appeal of the dismissal of the amended 

complaint suffers from a fatal procedural flaw, and because the district 

court was within its discretion in denying the motion to amend, we disagree. 

Therefore, we affirm the district court. 

ANALYSIS 

An appellant rnust challenge each of the alternative grounds supporting the 

district court's ultimate ruling in his or her opening brief 

It is well established in Nevada that "[a] point not urged in the 

trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have 

been waived and will not be considered on appeal." Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF 

NEVADA 

4 

(0) 194713 
Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981). It is equally well 

established that an appellant's failure to timely raise an issue in its briefing 

on appeal, even if it raised the issue before the district court, generally 

results in a waiver of that issue. See Kahn v. Morse & Mowbray, 121 Nev. 

464, 480 n.24, 117 P.3d 227, 238 n.24 (2005) (explaining that. issues that are 

not properly raised on appeal may be deemed waived); see also NRAP 28(a) 

(setting forth the required contents of an appellant's opening brief); NRAP 

28(c) (setting forth the required contents of an appellant's reply brief). 

A natural result of these fundamental waiver principles is that, 

when a district court provides independent alternative grounds in support 

of a decision later challenged on appeal, the appellant generally must 

successfully challenge all of those grounds in its appellate briefing to obtain 

a reversal.' See State u. Willis, 358 P.3d 107, 121 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015) 

("When a district court provides alternative bases to support its ultimate 

ruling on an issue and an appellant fails to challenge the validity of each 

alternative basis on appeal, an appellate court may decline to address the 

appellant's challenge to the district court's ultimate ruling."); 5 Arn. Jur. 2d 

Appellate Review § 718 (2022 update) ("[W]here a separate and independent 

ground from the one appealed supports the judgment made below, and is 

not challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm."). And when 

appellants fail to challenge the alternative grounds in their opening brief, 

'Many other appellate courts have reached the same conclusion. See, 

e.g., Hillis v. Heineman, 626 F.3d 1014, 1019 n.1 (9th Cir. 20:10); Utah ex 

rel. Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. United States, 528 F.3d 712, 724 

(10th Cir. 2008); Kellis v. Estate of Schnatz, 983 So. 2d 408, 413 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 2007); Navajo Nation. v. MacDonald, 885 P.2d 1104, 1112-13 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1994); Foxley v. Foxley, 939 P.2d 455, 459 (Colo. App. 1996); AED, Inc. 

v. KDC Invs., LLC, 307 P.3d 176, 181 (Idaho 2013); Salt Lake County v. 

Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp., 297 P.3d 38, 44 (Utah Ct. App. 2013). 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF 

NEVADA 

5 

10) I 947E3 
even if they later do so in the reply brief, the failure to raise those issues in 

the opening brief results in waiver.2 See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. 

Co., 739 F.3d 678, 682-83 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding the appellants had 

waived any challenge to the district court's alternative rulings, even though 

they presented arguments concerning those rulings in their reply brief, 

because "[t]hose arguments c[a]me too late"). 

In this case, the district court's order of dismissal rested on four 

independent alternative grounds: NRCP 12(b)(2), NRCP 12(b)(5), NRCP 

12(b)(6), and the doctrine of forum non conveniens. But the Hungs' opening 

brief challenged only the district court's determination regarding personal 

jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, the failure to properly challenge 

each of the district court's independent alternative grounds leaves them 

unchallenged and therefore intact, which results in a waiver of any 

assignment of error as to any of the independent alternative grounds.3 And 

2This is also in harmony with the general rule that arguments raised 

for the first time in an appellant's reply brief are deemed waived. See, e.g., 

NRAP 28(c); Khoury v. Seastrand, 132 Nev. 520, 530 n.2, 377 P.3d 81, 88 

n.2 (2016) (citing NRAP 28(c) and concluding that an issue raised for the 

first time in an appellant's reply brief was waived); Francis v. Wynn Las 

Vegas, LLC, 127 Nev. 657, 671 n.7, 262 P.3d 705, 715 n.7 (2011) (declining 

to consider an argument that the appellant "raised . . . for the first time in 

his reply brief, thereby depriving [the respondent] of a fair opportunity to 

respond"); Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 

P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011) ("Issues not raised in an appellant's opening brief 

are deemed waived."); Bongiovi v. Sullivan, 122 Nev. 556, 570 n.5, 138 P.3d 

433, 444 n.5 (2006) (declining to consider an argument that the appellant 

first raised in his reply brief, explaining that "reply briefs are limited to 

answering any matter set forth in the opposing brief'). 

3For example, the district court's application of the doctrine of forum 

non conveniens—which appellants did not properly challenge and which we 

therefore assume to be correct—is legally sufficient to sustain the dismissal 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF 

NEVADA 

6 

(0) 19,1711 

AMMO 
the Hungs have not demonstrated otherwise.4 This logically forecloses their 

appeal as it concerns the district court's dismissal of the amended 

complaint. 

Indeed, from a practical point of view, for us to reverse the 

district court's dismissal ruling, we would have to, first, raise challenges on 

the Hungs' behalf regarding NRCP 12(b)(5), NRCP 12(b)(6), and forum non 

conueniens; second, conceive of reasons to find fault with the district court's 

resolution of those issues; and then, third, use those reasons to reverse the 

district court's order. As another court persuasively reasoned in an 

analogous situation, "[s]uffice it to say, such an exercise of sua sponte 

judicial power would impermissibly place us in the role of advocate--far 

outside the boundaries of our traditional adjudicative duties." Johnson v. 

Commonwealth, 609 S.E.2d 58, 59-60 (Va. Ct. App. 2005); see Senjab v. 

Alhulaibi, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 64, 497 P.3d 618, 619 (2021) ("We will not 

supply an argument on a party's behalf but review only the issues the 

parties present"); see also Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 

as to all defendants. See Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, 

Inc., 131 Nev. 296, 303, 350 P.3d 392, 397 (2015) (providing that a court 

may properly dismiss an action for forum non conveniens without deciding 

the issue of personal jurisdiction). We further point out that dismissal is 

proper under NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6), assuming, as we must in 

the absence of a proper challenge by appellants, that the district court 

correctly applied those rules. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

125 Nev. 818, 823, 221 P.3d 1276, 1280 (2009) (stating the standard for 

dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5)); Olsen Family Tr. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 

Court, 110 Nev. 548, 553-54, 874 P.2d 778, 781-82 (1994) (explaining that 

failure to join a necessary and indispensable party to a case is fatal to the 

district court's ability to enter a judgment). 

4In fact, in their reply, the Hungs did not even attempt to dispute the 

extensive arguments made in the answering brief regarding waiver. 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF 

NEVADA 

7 

(O{ 194711 
1983) ("The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do 

not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially 

as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before 

them."). So applying this principle, because the Hungs did not challenge 

each and every one of the district court's independent alternative grounds 

for dismissal of the complaint, we summarily affirm based on the 

unchallenged grounds. 

The district court did not abuSe its discretion in denying the motion to amend 

NRCP 15(a)(2) states that after a party has amended its 

pleading once as a matter of course, "[the] party may amend its pleading 

only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." 

Although "[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires," id., 

it need not do so if the amendment would be futile. See Allum v. Valley 

Bank of Nev., 109 Nev. 280, 287, 849 P.2d 297, 302 (1993). On appeal, this 

court reviews the denial of leave to amend a pleading for an abuse of 

discretion. Connell v. Carl's Air Conditioning, 97 Nev. 436, 439, 634 P.2d 

673, 675 (1981). 

The Hungs' proposed second amended complaint contains no 

new factual allegations that remedy the deficiencies the district court found 

in the first amended complaint. Mainly, they did not plead the necessary 

elements of an alter-ego theory to impute Resorts World Manila's alleged 

wrongdoing onto Resorts World Las Vegas or any of the Genting defendants. 

See Lorenz v. Beltio, Ltd., 114 Nev. 795, 807, 963 P.2d 488, 496 (1998) 

(explaining that to state a claim for alter-ego liability in Nevada, a plaintiff 

must allege that: "(1) [t]he corporation [is] i.nfluenced and governed by the 

person asserted to be its alter ego[;] (2) [t]here [is] such unity of interest and 

ownership that one is inseparable from the other; and (3) [t]he facts [are] 

such that adherence to the fiction of separate entity would, under the 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF 

NEVADA 

8 

10) 19471i 
COURT OF APPEALS 

OF 

NEVADA 

circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote injustice" (third alteration in 

original)). Thus, because the Hungs' proposed amendment would have been 

futile, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion 

for leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION 

We clarify the basic appellate principle that when a district 

court provides independent alternative grounds to support its ultimate 

ruling on an issue, an appellant must properly challenge all those 

independent alternative grounds. Otherwise, affirmance is warranted on 

the unchallenged grounds. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order 

dismissing the amended complaint and denying the motion to amend. 

1 

Tao 

We concur: 

, J. 

Bulla 

9 

(0) 19471i