[Cite as Guzzetta v. Guzzetta, 2024-Ohio-294.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

BUTLER COUNTY

SUSAN GUZZETTA, et al.,

Appellants,

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ROBERT GUZZETTA, et al.,

Appellees.

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CASE NOS. CA2023-06-064

 CA2023-07-084

O P I N I O N

1/29/2024

CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Case No. CV 2019 07 1397

Barron, Peck, Bennie & Schlemmer, LPA, and Steven C. Davis, Charles L. Hinegardner, 

and Sarah M. Houseman, for appellants Susan Guzzetta and Bryce Guzzetta.

Dickinson Wright PLLC, and Jonathan R. Secrest, David A. Lockshaw, Jr., and Manuel 

D. Cardona, for appellee Jackson National Life Insurance Company.

S. POWELL, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellants, Susan Guzzetta and Bryce Guzzetta, appeal the decision of the 

Butler County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, 

Jackson National Life Insurance Company ("Jackson"), in this case in which they allege 

an interference with their inheritance. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the trial 
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court's decision.

Introduction

{¶ 2} Susan and Bryce are descendants of Dr. Franklin H. Guzzetta, who passed 

away on March 3, 2019. Franklin, a long-time resident of Butler County, Ohio, was 85

years old at the time of his passing. Franklin was survived by his wife, Fay, as well as his 

two adult children, and his three adult grandchildren. Susan is one of Franklin's two 

surviving adult children, whereas Bryce is one of Franklin's three surviving adult 

grandchildren.1 There is no dispute that Franklin suffered from memory loss, late-stage 

dementia, and Alzheimer's disease in the approximate two years leading to his death. 

There is also no dispute that, prior to the onset of those conditions, a power of attorney 

was executed that included Franklin's notarized signature and driver's license naming his 

other surviving adult child, Susan's brother and Bryce's uncle, Robert Guzzetta, as his 

primary agent.

{¶ 3} During his lifetime, Franklin established five annuity accounts with 

Jackson.2 The five accounts Franklin established with Jackson were given the last four 

digits of 8529, 4991, 9876, 4501, and 5850. There is no dispute that, on the applications 

executed by Franklin to establish each of those five accounts, Franklin checked a box 

authorizing Jackson "to accept fund transfers/allocation changes via telephone, internet, 

or other electronic medium" from either himself or his then financial representative, Kevin 

Flynn, "subject to Jackson's administrative procedures." There is also no dispute that 

Jackson included on each of the five applications Franklin executed a provision that 

stated, in pertinent part, the following:

1. Susan is Bryce's mother.

2. Franklin applied for the five annuity accounts he ultimately established with Jackson in the approximately 

three-and-one-half years between December 4, 2009 and July 8, 2013.
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Jackson has administrative procedures that are designed to 

provide reasonable assurances that telephone/electronic 

authorizations are genuine. If Jackson fails to employ such 

procedures, it may be held liable for losses resulting from a 

failure to use such procedures.

{¶ 4} The record indicates that Susan and Bryce were, at one time or another, 

some of the intended beneficiaries of the five annuity accounts Franklin had established 

with Jackson. This case involves Susan's and Bryce's challenge to various asset 

transfers from those five accounts purportedly made by their brother and uncle, Robert.3 

Despite the record indicating Franklin had authorized Jackson to release account 

information to Robert some five years prior to his death, Susan and Bryce allege that the 

various asset transfers Robert supposedly made from Franklin's accounts were 

fraudulent and that Jackson was complicit in such fraud. This is because, as Susan and 

Bryce later alleged as part of their summary judgment motion, Jackson "recklessly 

ignored and disregarded their own policies and procedures," as well as Robert's "obvious 

forgeries, impersonations and countless red flags of impropriety," thereby allowing Robert 

to fraudulently receive over a million dollars in Franklin's assets despite Jackson being 

"appropriately situated to safeguard and protect the estates of their customers" against 

such acts.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 5} On September 30, 2021, Susan and Bryce (hereinafter, the "Guzzettas") 

filed a complaint naming Jackson as a defendant.4 The Guzzettas' complaint contained 

3. There are a total of 26 transfers at issue, 21 of which occurred during Franklin's lifetime, with the other 

five being triggered as a result of Franklin's death.

4. The complaint filed by the Guzzettas on September 30, 2021 was their second amended complaint and 

the first that named Jackson as a defendant. The filing contains 1,197 numbered paragraphs over 147 

pages, plus exhibits. For ease of discussion, we will refer to this filing within this opinion as "complaint" 

rather than "second amended complaint." 
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several causes of action spread across 18 separate counts. These causes of action 

included, but were not limited to, allegations of fraud, unjust enrichment, conversion, 

breach of contract, intentional spoliation of evidence, negligent misrepresentation, and 

theft. These claims, to the varying degrees in which they were pled, were brought against 

several different individuals and the numerous financial institutions Franklin had done 

business with prior to his death. Besides Jackson, this also included Susan's brother and 

Bryce's uncle, Robert, Robert's two adult children, John Guzzetta and Ann Sarah 

Guzzetta, as well as MidUSA Credit Union, JP Morgan Chase Bank, PNC Bank, 

Prudential Insurance, and Northwestern Mutual Insurance.

{¶ 6} Of those 18 separate counts, the Guzzettas set forth several causes of 

action targeting Jackson by name. This included Count 4, conversion, in paragraphs 

1001 through 1009, Count 14, negligence, in paragraphs 1116 through 1123, and Count 

18, a cause of action the Guzzettas' entitled "Bad Faith," in paragraphs 1171 through 

1176. The most significant of those causes of action, however, was set forth in Count 13,

breach of contract, which stated, in its entirety, the following:

 COUNT XIII

 (Breach of Contract)

1073. Plaintiffs reallege the above allegations as if fully 

rewritten herein.

1074. Franklin Guzzetta had five valid contracts with Jackson.

1075. Plaintiffs were intended beneficiaries of Franklin's 

Jackson Accounts.

1076. Jackson owed a duty of good faith and fair dealing to 

Franklin, Plaintiff, Susan Guzzetta, and Plaintiff, Bryce 

Guzzetta.

1077. Jackson breached this duty when it allowed an 

unauthorized user to make unauthorized transfers and 
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changes to Franklin's accounts, to Plaintiffs (sic) detriment.

1078. Plaintiffs incurred damages resulting proximately from 

Jackson's breaches.

{¶ 7} On December 15, 2021, Jackson filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss 

the Guzzettas' various claims levied against it, including the Guzzettas' breach of contract 

claim. That rule authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if the complaint fails to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. To support its motion, Jackson argued, among 

other things, that the Guzzettas had "failed to plead a sufficient breach of contract claim" 

anywhere within their complaint that would entitle the Guzzettas to relief. More precisely, 

Jackson argued that the Guzzettas had "failed to state a cognizable claim for breach of 

contract on a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing," thereby necessitating 

their complaint be dismissed given the lack of any specificity regarding what contractual 

provision(s) it had supposedly breached. Jackson supported this argument by claiming 

that, rather than a breach of contract, the Guzzettas' complaint did nothing more than 

make a general assertion that it had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by 

"allowing an unauthorized user to make unauthorized transfers and changes to Franklin 

Guzzetta's account" and "fail[ing] to have adequate policies or training to prevent Robert 

Guzzetta's transfers."

{¶ 8} On March 31, 2022, the trial court issued a decision that granted Jackson's 

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss all claims levied against it by the Guzzettas, "but for 

Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract." In so holding, the trial court determined that the 

Guzzettas had "set forth at least sufficient operative facts to support" a breach of contract 

claim against Jackson. The trial court determined this to be the case even though the 

Guzzettas had used "the duty of good faith and fair dealing" phrasing within their

complaint when setting forth that claim. In reaching this decision, the trial court stated, in 
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pertinent part, the following:

[T]he context clearly demonstrates that Plaintiffs were relying 

upon promises made by Jackson when Franklin opened his 

accounts, to wit: that "Jackson has administrative procedures 

that are designed to provide reasonable assurances that 

telephone/electronic authorizations are genuine. If Jackson 

fails to employ such procedures, it may be held liable for 

losses resulting from a failure to use such procedures..." 

When Plaintiffs further alleged Jackson breached its duty 

when it "allowed an unauthorized user to make unauthorized 

transfers and changes" to the accounts—although unartful—

they have undoubtedly set forth a claim for breach of contract, 

sufficiently enough that Jackson has notice of the actions for 

which Plaintiffs are seeking redress.

{¶ 9} On April 22, 2022, Jackson filed its answer as to the Guzzettas' breach of 

contract claim making a general, blanket denial of any wrongdoing. This included 

Jackson generally denying the Guzzettas' allegations set forth in Count 13 of their 

complaint reproduced above. Several weeks later, on May 10, 2022, Jackson moved the 

trial court to reconsider its decision to deny its Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. The trial 

court denied Jackson's motion for reconsideration in an entry dated June 2, 2022. In so 

doing, the trial court determined that, given the nature of the proceedings thus far, "any 

issues of liability" would be better suited for decision "in summary judgment proceedings 

as may be appropriate." 

{¶ 10} On April 3, 2023, the Guzzettas and Jackson filed competing motions for 

summary judgment in accordance with Civ.R. 56. Given what the trial court had 

previously held in its March 31, 2022 decision denying Jackson's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion 

to dismiss, these summary judgment motions were directed primarily towards the 

Guzzettas' breach of contract claim, with some ancillary discussion regarding the 

Guzzettas' other, subsumed claim alleging a breach of good faith and fair dealing. On 

June 12, 2023, the trial court issued a decision granting summary judgment in favor of 
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Jackson on the Guzzettas' breach of contract and a breach of good faith and fair dealing

claims. In so holding, the trial court determined that the Guzzettas' memorandum in 

opposition to Jackson's summary judgment motion had failed to "meet their burden of 

reciprocity" required by Civ.R. 56. 

{¶ 11} On June 15, 2023, the Guzzettas filed a notice of appeal from the trial 

court's June 12, 2023 decision. This appeal was assigned Case No. CA2023-06-064. 

Shortly thereafter, on June 23, 2023, the trial court issued an order transferring the case 

to the Butler County Probate Court for further proceedings. In so doing, the trial court 

explained that this transfer was done "for the express purpose of determining whether 

Plaintiffs have any adequate relief that must be exhausted in that forum as set forth 

herein," and, based upon that finding, "whether any part of this action should be 

concluded there, as well." 

{¶ 12} On June 28, 2023, the Guzzettas filed an affidavit of disqualification with the 

Ohio Supreme Court requesting a visiting judge be appointed to oversee the remainder 

of the case. The Guzzettas filed this affidavit due to the Butler County probate court judge 

having previously represented Susan's brother and Bryce's uncle, Robert, in this action 

prior to his election to the bench. Two days later, on June 30, 2023, the Ohio Supreme 

Court issued an entry that removed "any authority" of the probate court judge, and all 

other Butler County trial court judges, "to preside in the proceeding until the Chief Justice 

rules on the [Guzzettas' affidavit of disqualification]." That same day, also on June 30, 

2023, the trial court issued an amended nunc pro tunc decision to add Civ.R. 54(B) 

language certifying that there was no just reason for delay that it had "inadvertently" 

omitted from its decision.

{¶ 13} On July 21, 2023, the Guzettas filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's 
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June 30, 2023 amended nunc pro tunc decision. This appeal was assigned Case No. 

CA2023-07-084. This court subsequently issued an order on August 8, 2023, sua sponte 

consolidating the Guzzettas' two appeals upon finding "both appeals involve the same 

subject matter, and that judicial economy will be served by consolidation." Within that 

same order, this court also denied the Guzzettas' motions requesting this court remand 

the cases to the trial court due to an alleged lack of jurisdiction. In so doing, this court 

determined that, although presenting an interesting issue that may warrant further 

discussion, this court nevertheless had "jurisdiction over both of these appeals at the 

present time," thereby absolving any need for this court to remand the case "based upon 

lack of jurisdiction."

{¶ 14} On December 18, 2023, oral argument was held before this court. The 

Guzzettas' appeal now properly before this court for decision, the Guzzettas have raised 

one assignment of error for review.

The Guzzettas' Single Assignment of Error

{¶ 15} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS AMENDED NUNC PRO 

TUNC ENTRY DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO 

DEFENDANT JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND GRANTING 

DEFENDANT JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

{¶ 16} In their single assignment of error, the Guzzettas argue the trial court erred 

by granting summary judgment in favor of Jackson on their breach of contract and breach 

of good faith and fair dealing claims. 

Summary Judgment Standard of Review

{¶ 17} "Summary judgment is a procedural device used to terminate litigation when 
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there are no issues in a case requiring a formal trial." Franchas Holdings, LLC v. 

Dameron, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-09-073, 2016-Ohio-878, ¶ 16. "This court 

reviews a trial court's summary judgment decision under a de novo standard." Faith 

Lawley, LLC v. McKay, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-08-052, 2021-Ohio-2156, ¶ 26. 

This includes both the trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment, as 

well as the trial court's decision to deny a motion for summary judgment. Holtrey v. 

Wiedeman, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2023-01-011, 2023-Ohio-2440, ¶ 12. De novo 

review means that this court uses the same standard the trial court should have used. 

Brock v. Servpro, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2021-06-075, 2022-Ohio-158, ¶ 29. That is to 

say, "[i]n de novo review, we independently review trial court decisions and give them no 

deference." Frost v. Evenflo Co., 2d Dist. Miami No. 2022-CA-29, 2023-Ohio-4561, ¶ 29. 

When an error is found in a trial court's decision granting a summary judgment motion, 

the trial court's decision is generally reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court 

for further proceedings. See, e.g., Ginn v. Stonecreek Dental Care, 12th Dist. Fayette 

No. CA2016-10-014, 2017-Ohio-4370, ¶ 41 ("the judgment of the trial court granting 

summary judgment in favor of [defendant-appellee] is reversed, and the matter is 

remanded for further proceedings * * *").

Summary Judgment Review Pursuant to Civ.R. 56

{¶ 18} "Civ.R. 56 sets forth the summary judgment standard." State ex rel. Becker 

v. Faris, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-10-058, 2021-Ohio-1127, ¶ 14. "Pursuant to 

that rule, a court may grant summary judgment only when (1) there is no genuine issue 

of any material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and 

(3) the evidence submitted can only lead reasonable minds to a conclusion that is adverse 

to the nonmoving party." Spitzer v. Frish's Restaurants, Inc., 12th Dist. Butler No. 
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CA2020-12-128, 2021-Ohio-1913, ¶ 6. "An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." Abbuhl v. Orange Vill., 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82203, 2003-Ohio-4662, ¶ 14. "A material fact is one which would 

affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law." Hillstreet Fund III, 

L.P. v. Bloom, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-07-178, 2010-Ohio-2961, ¶ 9, citing 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986).

{¶ 19} "The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis 

for the motion and demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." 

Berkheimer v. REKM, LLC, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2022-03-026, 2023-Ohio-116, ¶ 18, 

citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). "Once this burden is met, the 

nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden to set forth specific facts showing there is some 

genuine issue of material fact yet remaining for the trier of fact to resolve." Sullivan v. 

Mercy Health, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2022-02-023, 2022-Ohio-4445, ¶ 21. That is to 

say, the nonmoving party may not simply rest on "the mere allegations or denials in its 

pleadings." Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Sexton, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-11-

288, 2010-Ohio-4802, ¶ 7, citing Civ.R. 56(E). "Summary judgment is proper if the 

nonmoving party fails to set forth such facts." Taylor v. Atrium Med. Ctr., 12th Dist. 

Warren No. CA2018-07-074, 2019-Ohio-447, ¶ 10. "In determining whether a genuine 

issue of material fact exists, the evidence must be construed in favor of the nonmoving 

party." Assured Admin., LLC v. Young, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2019-04-039, 2019-

Ohio-3953, ¶ 14.

The Guzzettas' Arguments and Analysis

{¶ 20} The Guzzettas raise a litany of issues in support of their single assignment 

of error. Among them, the Guzzettas argue that rather than the summary judgment 
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standard of review set forth above, this case instead calls for the standard of review 

generally reserved for motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). However, 

despite the Guzzettas' attempts to recast the relevant issues subject to this appeal, after 

a full and thorough review of the record, and when applying the necessary de novo 

standard of review to the case at bar, we find no error in the trial court's decision to grant 

summary judgment in favor of Jackson on the Guzzettas' breach of contract claim. This 

is because, as set forth more fully below, the trial court's decision was proper given the 

applicable Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment standard.

{¶ 21} In its summary judgment motion, Jackson argued that it was entitled to 

judgment on the Guzzettas' breach of contract claim because "there is simply no evidence 

to suggest the disbursements Jackson made breached any contractual obligations." This 

included, most notably, the contractual provision set forth above that:

Jackson has administrative procedures that are designed to 

provide reasonable assurances that telephone/electronic 

authorizations are genuine. If Jackson fails to employ such 

procedures, it may be held liable for losses resulting from a 

failure to use such procedures.

{¶ 22} To support this claim, Jackson argued that rather than creating a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether it had committed a breach of contract, the evidence 

instead clearly demonstrated that it was "obligated by contract to make disbursements 

requested by the contract holder," Franklin, many of which Jackson argued it had received 

directly from Franklin himself, either orally or in writing. This included several transactions 

that were accompanied by a medallion signature guarantee indicating the signature

purporting to be Franklin's was genuine.5 Jackson noted that the same was true as it 

5. "A medallion signature guaranty is similar to a notary." Nova Leasing, LLC v. McMillan, Dist. Ct. of 

Colorado, Denver County, 2017 Colo. Dist. LEXIS 737, *3 (Oct. 6, 2017). "Medallion signature guarantees 
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related to the various change in death benefits and beneficiary designations that Franklin 

had made to his accounts prior to his death. Therefore, because it was doing nothing 

more than following through on the requests that Franklin himself had made, something 

which it did after employing and/or using its administrative procedures designed to 

provide reasonable assurances that telephone/electronic authorizations from Franklin 

were, in fact, genuine, Jackson argued that, as a matter of law, it was entitled to judgment 

on the Guzzettas' breach of contract claim.

{¶ 23} The Guzzettas responded to Jackson's summary judgment motion by 

arguing that the oral and written authorizations Franklin had supposedly provided to 

Jackson were, in actuality, "largely the product of forgery and impersonation" by his son, 

Robert, and not "genuine and authentic" requests made by Franklin. However, even 

assuming this were true, the Guzzettas provided no evidence to demonstrate how this 

fact, standing alone, constituted a breach of contract on the part of Jackson that would 

entitle them to relief. That is to say, outside of their own speculation and conjecture as to 

what they believe Jackson should have done to combat against Robert's purported fraud, 

which, as set forth in their complaint, included Jackson conducting a full blown 

investigation into the area codes and IP addresses from which Franklin's telephone and 

internet activity had supposedly originated, the Guzzettas provided no evidence to 

indicate that Jackson had not employed and/or used the administrative procedures it had 

in place to provide reasonable assurances that the telephone/electronic authorizations it 

received from Franklin were genuine. That Jackson may have been wrong in its 

determination is immaterial, so long as Jackson acted in conformance with its contractual 

are used in the securities industry to verify the identity and authority of the owner or other transferor of stock 

certificates and stock powers." Id. at *3, fn. 2. A medallion signature guarantee "is an industry accepted 

guarantee intended to convey that the customer signature is authentic." Floyd v. Hill, 495 B.R. 646, 663, 

2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3308, *43 (Aug. 12, 2013).
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obligations, it cannot be said that Jackson committed a breach of contract. To the extent 

the Guzzettas claim otherwise, such an argument lacks merit.

{¶ 24} For these reasons, we find no error in the trial court's decision granting 

summary judgment to Jackson on the Guzzettas' breach of contract claim. Whether 

Robert may have engaged in fraud is a question of fact for the Guzzettas' claims against 

Robert, not Jackson. We also find no error in the trial court's decision granting summary 

judgment to Jackson on Guzzettas' claim alleging a breach of good faith and fair dealing. 

The duty of good faith and fair dealing is integral to any contract. Krukrubo v. Fifth Third 

Bank, 10th Dist. Franklin 07AP-270, 2007-Ohio-7007, ¶ 19. "Outside of the insurance 

context, the breach of this duty does not exist as a separate cause of action from a breach 

of contract claim." Ireton v. JTD Realty Invs., LLC, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2010-04-

023, 2011-Ohio-670, ¶ 51. "'Rather, the action arises from the duty of good faith and fair 

dealing inherent in every contract and cannot stand alone from the contract claim.'" 

Adena at Miami Bluffs Condo Owners' Assoc. v. Woodward, 12th Dist. Warren No. 

CA2020-08-044, 2021-Ohio-3872, ¶ 29, quoting Walton v. Residential Fin. Corp., 151 

Ohio Misc.2d 28, 2009-Ohio-1872, ¶ 10 (C.P.). Therefore, because the Guzzettas' 

breach of contract claim must fail, so too must the Guzzettas' claim alleging a breach of 

good faith and fair dealing. The Guzzettas' claim otherwise lacks merit.

The Guzzettas' Renewed Motions to Remand Their Appeals

{¶ 25} Within their appellate brief, the Guzzettas have requested this court revisit 

our August 8, 2023 decision denying their motions to remand their appeals to the trial 

court due to this court's alleged lack of jurisdiction for want of a final appealable order. 

We decline the Guzzettas' renewed request. We instead reiterate our previous decision 

and find, once again, that "[t]his court has jurisdiction over both of these appeals at the 
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present time and declines to remand them based upon lack of jurisdiction." The fact that 

the trial court issued its amended nunc pro tunc decision subject to this appeal after the 

Ohio Supreme Court filed its entry removing "any authority" of the Butler County probate 

court judge, and all other Butler County trial court judges, "to preside in the proceeding 

until the Chief Justice rules on the [Guzzettas' affidavit for disqualification]," is of no 

consequence.6 

{¶ 26} In reaching this decision, we note that it is well established that a trial court 

has inherent common law authority to correct errors, nunc pro tunc, so that the record 

speaks the truth. See Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Kohn, 133 Ohio St. 111, 113 (1937) ("courts 

possess inherent common-law power to enter judgments or orders nunc pro tunc in 

proper cases"). "Errors subject to correction by the court include a clerical error, mistake, 

or omission that is mechanical in nature and apparent on the record and do not involve a 

legal decision or judgment." Gauthier v. Gauthier, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2018-09-

098 and CA2018-09-099, ¶ 70, citing State v. Miller, 127 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio5705, ¶ 15. The record in this case is clear that the trial court's failure to include a Civ.R. 

54(B) language certifying that were was no just reason for delay within its original June 

12, 2023 decision was a clerical error. The trial court specifically stated as much in the 

amended nunc pro tunc decision filed on June 30, 2023. Therefore, because the trial 

court was doing nothing more than correcting a clerical error by issuing an amended nunc 

pro tunc decision in this case, the Guzzettas argument that this court lacks jurisdiction to 

rule on their appeals lacks merit.

Conclusion

6. The Ohio Supreme Court's entry and trial court's amended nunc pro tunc decision were both issued on 

the same day, June 30, 2023. Neither document, however, sets forth the exact time of day in which it was 

filed. Nevertheless, because it does not impact this court's decision, we will presume for the sake of 

argument that the trial court's amended nunc pro tunc decision was filed after the Ohio Supreme Court's 

entry.
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{¶ 27} For the reasons outlined above, and in conformance with this court's de 

novo standard of review, we overrule the Guzzettas' single assignment of error and affirm 

the trial court's decision granting summary judgment to Jackson.

{¶ 28} Judgment affirmed.

PIPER and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.