UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

AMY L. EDMONDSON, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CIVIL NO. 1:16cv142

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

 Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court for judicial review of a final decision of the defendant

Commissioner of Social Security Administration denying Plaintiff's application for Disability

Insurance Benefits (DIB) as provided for in the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §416(I). Section

205(g) of the Act provides, inter alia, "[a]s part of his answer, the [Commissioner] shall file a

certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and

decision complained of are based. The court shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings

and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the

[Commissioner], with or without remanding the case for a rehearing." It also provides, "[t]he

findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be

conclusive. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §405(g).

The law provides that an applicant for disability insurance benefits must establish an

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

than 12 months. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §416(i)(1); 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental
impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological

abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(3). It is not enough for a plaintiff to establish that an

impairment exists. It must be shown that the impairment is severe enough to preclude the

plaintiff from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Gotshaw v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 840 (7th

Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963); Garcia v. Califano, 463 F.Supp. 1098 (N.D.Ill.

1979). It is well established that the burden of proving entitlement to disability insurance

benefits is on the plaintiff. See Jeralds v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1971); Kutchman v.

Cohen, 425 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1970).

Given the foregoing framework, "[t]he question before [this court] is whether the record

as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the [Commissioner’s] findings." Garfield v.

Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1984) citing Whitney v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 786

(7th Cir. 1982); 42 U.S.C. §405(g). "Substantial evidence is defined as 'more than a mere

scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.'" Rhoderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984) quoting

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1410, 1427 (1971); see Allen v. Weinberger,

552 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 1977). "If the record contains such support [it] must [be] affirmed,

42 U.S.C. §405(g), unless there has been an error of law." Garfield, supra at 607; see also

Schnoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1980).

In the present matter, after consideration of the entire record, the Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) made the following findings:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

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through December 31, 2013.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 27,

2008, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: obesity, bi-polar disorder,

post traumatic stress disorder status post childhood abuse, schizoaffective

disorder, left knee issue, and degenerative disc disease (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the

residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b), except the claimant could only occasionally climb ladders, ropes,

scaffolds, ramps or stairs, and could only occasionally balance, stoop, kneel,

crouch and crawl. Additionally, the claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to

moving machinery and exposure to unprotected heights. Moreover, the claimant

is limited to simple, routine and repetitive work performed in a work environment

free of fast-paced production requirements and only occasional interactions with

coworkers, but could work around coworkers throughout the day without any

tandem tasks. Additionally, work would need to be isolated from the general

public with only occasional interactions with supervisors. Finally the claimant

would need to sit or stand alternatively, but would not be off task more than 10%

of the work period.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).

7. The claimant was born on August 2, 1983, and was 24 years old, which is defined

as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date. The

claimant subsequently changed age category to closely approaching advanced age

(20 CFR 404.1563)

8. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English (20

CFR 404.1564).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding

that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable

job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

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functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,

from February 27, 2008, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).

(Tr. 20-35).

Based upon these findings, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. The ALJ’s decision became the final agency decision when the Appeals

Council denied review. This appeal followed. 

This case has a somewhat lengthy procedural history. In November 2010, Plaintiff

applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability since February 2008 (Tr. 118,

189-95). The agency denied her claim initially and on reconsideration (Tr. 121-24, 129-35). On

May 24, 2012, Plaintiff appeared with a non-attorney representative and testified at a hearing

before an ALJ (Tr. 42-117). On July 20, 2012, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application for

disability benefits, finding she was not disabled during any of the period from her alleged onset

date of February 27, 2008, through the date of the ALJ’s decision (Tr. 15-41). On August 30,

2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. 1-4). On October 24, 2013,

Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court, alleging that she was wrongfully denied disability

insurance benefits (Tr. 834-845). On November 6, 2013, Plaintiff protectively filed another

application for disability insurance benefits alleging disability since February 2008 (Tr. 866,

1038-39). The agency denied her claim initially and on reconsideration (Tr. 969-77, 979-985).

On October 28, 2014, this court remanded the case to the Commissioner for further

consideration of the frequency requirement for the sit/stand limitation and for further

consideration of the limitations in the mental residual functional capacity (RFC) finding (Tr.

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867-83). On August 4, 2015, the Appeals Council issued an order remanding Plaintiff’s

application to the ALJ consistent with this Court’s order. (Tr. 884-87). The Appeals Council also

ordered the ALJ to consolidate Plaintiff’s subsequent application dated November 6, 2013 with

the November 2010 application and issue a decision on the consolidated claims (Tr. 884-87).

On October 23, 2015, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified at a hearing before an

ALJ (Tr. 662-727). A vocational expert (VE) also testified. On January 5, 2016, the ALJ denied

Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits, finding she was not disabled during any of the

period from her alleged onset date of February 27, 2008, through December 31, 2013, the date

she last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act (Tr. 634-61). The ALJ’s

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of

the Commissioner’s decision.

Plaintiff filed her opening brief on November 11, 2016. On January 12, 2017, the

defendant filed a memorandum in support of the Commissioner’s decision. Plaintiff has declined

to file a reply. Upon full review of the record in this cause, this court is of the view that the

ALJ’s decision should be affirmed.

A five step test has been established to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See

Singleton v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 710, 711 (7th Cir. 1988); Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S.Ct. 2287,

2290-91 (1987). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has summarized

that test as follows:

The following steps are addressed in order: (1) Is the claimant

presently unemployed? (2) Is the claimant's impairment "severe"? 

(3) Does the impairment meet or exceed one of a list of specific

impairments? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his or her

former occupation? (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other

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work within the economy? An affirmative answer leads either to

the next step or, on steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is

disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step 3, stops

the inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not

disabled.

Nelson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 503, 504 n.2 (7th Cir. 1988); Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162

n.2 (7th Cir. 1985); accord Halvorsen v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1984). From the nature

of the ALJ's decision to deny benefits, it is clear that step five was the determinative inquiry. 

Plaintiff recites the following medical history regarding her orthopaedic problems. On

April 15, 2011, Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Lisa N. Booth, M.D., documented left knee

pain and noted that Plaintiff was ambulating with a cane. On April 18, 2011, x-rays revealed

minimal patellofemoral degenerative change. On May 12, 2011, an MRI revealed a small Baker’s

cyst and joint effusion. On May 18, 2011, Dr. Booth referred her to an orthopaedic physician,

Karl T. Wagner, M.D., for further evaluation. Dr. Wagner reviewed the MRI, found peripatellar

tenderness, and diagnosed patellar chondromalacia. In response, Dr. Wagner prescribed pain

medication (Ultram), an anti-inflammatory (Mobic), and physical therapy. Plaintiff pursued

physical therapy for her left knee issues from May 25, 2011 to June 22, 2011. On September 12,

2011, Dr. Booth revised the medication regimen to Flexeril, Vicodin, and Mobic. On November

8, 2011, Dr. Booth renewed the diagnosed of left knee pain and noted that some days Plaintiff

continued to have trouble ambulating. As a result, Dr. Booth maintained the Mobic prescription

and referred her back to Dr. Wagner. In April 2012, her physician diagnosed plantar fascial

fibromatosis which was still an active problem in 2015.

On May 22, 2009, Dr. Booth identified a keloid scar on Plaintiff’s neck. On July 20, 2009,

Dr. Booth noted that Plaintiff experienced neck pain and could not move her right arm. Dr.

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Booth then diagnosed cervicalgia, took her off work, and prescribed Naprosyn, Flexeril, and

Darvocet. On August 21, 2009, an MRI of the cervical spine showed mild posterior ligamentous

hypertrophy at C5-C6 and C6-C7. On August 21, 2009, an MRI of the thoracic spine showed

atypical hemangioma at T-1 or T-4, 28 and mild right posterior vertebral spurring at T-1 and T-2. 

On August 21, 2009, an MRI of the lumbar spine showed a broad-based central L4-L5 disk

protrusion with mild bilateral facet arthropathy, and an L5-S1 bulge with mild left-sided

foraminal stenosis and mild to moderate bilateral facet arthropathy. On August 28, 2009, Dr.

Booth again diagnosed cervicalgia and back pain.

On January 13, 2011, the consultative examiner identified lumbar range of motion

deficits in forward flexion and extension. On April 15, 2011, Dr. Booth renewed the diagnosis of

cervicalgia and back pain, and prescribed Naprosyn and Flexeril. On August 22, 2011, Dr. Booth

documented that Plaintiff’s low back pain radiated into both thighs. Dr. Booth also elicited a

positive straight leg raising test bilaterally and noted that pain limited Plaintiff’s range of motion.

Consequently, Dr. Booth ordered another lumbar MRI. On August 25, 2011, Plaintiff underwent a

lumbar MRI that revealed L4-L5 broad-based central disk protrusion with mild disk space

narrowing, a posterior tear of the annulus fibrosis, mild ventral impression of the thecal sac, and

mild bilateral degenerative facet arthropathy; L5-S1 broad-based disk bulge with mild left

foraminal stenosis, mild bilateral recess stenosis, and degenerative facet arthropathy. After

evaluating the MRI, Dr. Booth referred Plaintiff to Robert M. Shugart, M.D., an orthopaedic

surgeon. On September 9, 2011, Dr. Shugart examined Plaintiff, recommended conservative care,

and set up an L4-L5 epidural injection. On September 12, 2011, Dr. Booth renewed the Flexeril,

Vicodin, and Mobic prescriptions. On October 5, 2011, David S. Stensland, M.D., an orthopaedic

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surgeon, diagnosed a lumbar herniated nucleus pulpolsus and administered an L4-L5 interlaminar

epidural injection. On November 30, 2011, Dr. Stensland again diagnosed a lumbar herniated

nucleus pulpolsus and administered another L4-L5 interlaminar epidural injection. Plaintiff then

pursued physical therapy for her back issues from December 28, 2011 to March 5, 2012. The

condition of her spine and her pain continued to be problematic throughout the period 2012 to

2015. EMG revealed chronic L5 radiculopathy and she required a cane.

The following facts relate to Plaintiff’s morbid obesity. On March 10, 2005, a mental

health therapist advised Plaintiff that Seroquel could cause weight gain. On June 29, 2011, her

weight was 280lbs and her BMI was 41.34. On July 7, 2011, her weight was 281lbs. On August

22, 2011, Dr. Booth communicated to Plaintiff that weight loss would help with back and pain.

On September 9, 2011, her height was 5’7” and her weight was 265lbs. From 2012 through 2015,

physicians noted morbid obesity.

The following facts relate to Plaintiff’s mental health. On June 2, 2004, Northeastern

Center staff recorded bipolar disorder and acute stress disorder and assigned Plaintiff a Global

Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 50. From March 10, 2005 to April 27, 2006, Plaintiff

received mental health services from Saint Joseph County (Michigan) Community Mental Health

Services. During this treatment period, Plaintiff’s GAF scores ranged from 40 to 45. Her

psychiatrist variously diagnosed her with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), binge eating

disorder, major depressive disorder, and noted a history of alcohol abuse, history of sexual abuse,

and history of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The treatment regimen included

medication management and outpatient therapy. Her psychiatrist variously prescribed Zonegram,

Abilify, Seroquel, Paxil, and Lexapro. 

8
On December 23, 2008, consultative examiner, Vijay G. Kamineni, M.D., noted

generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder. From December 29, 2010 to April 5,

2012, Plaintiff received mental health services from Northeastern Center. During this treatment

period, Plaintiff’s GAF scores ranged from 38 to 52. Her psychiatrist, Sylvia Rutten, M.D.,

variously diagnosed her with PTSD, schizoaffective disorder, and avoidant personality disorder.

The treatment regimen included medication management, individual therapy, dialectical behavior

therapy, group therapy, and individual ADL training in the home. Her psychiatrist prescribed

Prazosin and Saphris.

On January 19, 2011, a consultative psychologist, Dan L. Boen, Ph.D., conducted a

Mental Status Examination. His diagnostic impressions encompassed major depressive disorder

and social phobia and a GAF score of 55.

On January 31, 2011, as a part of the “Psychiatric Review Technique”, a DDB

non-examining consultative psychologist, F. Kladder, Ph. D., diagnosed Plaintiff with major

depressive disorder and social phobia and identified moderate limitations in activities of daily

living, moderate limitations in maintaining social functioning, mild limitations in maintaining

concentration, persistence and pace, and no episodes of decompensation. This same consultative

psychologist also completed the Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (MRFCA),

which noted the following mental health functional deficits: moderate limitation in the ability to

understand and remember detailed instructions; moderate limitation in the ability to carry out

detailed instructions; moderate limitation in the ability to maintain attention and concentration for

extended periods; moderate limitation in the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek

without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; moderate limitation in the ability to

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perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; and

moderate limitation in the ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism

from supervisors.

On April 5, 2012, the treating psychiatrist, Dr. Rutten, completed a mental residual

functional capacity assessment and arrived at the following limitations: moderate limitation in the

ability to remember locations and work-like procedures; moderate limitation in the ability to

understand and remember detailed instructions; moderate limitation in the ability to carry out

detailed instructions; moderate limitation in the ability to sustain an ordinary routine without

special supervision; moderate limitation in the ability to work in coordination with or proximity

to others without being distracted by them; moderate limitation in the ability to make simple work

related decisions; moderate limitation in the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek

without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; moderate limitation in the ability to

perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; moderate

limitation in the ability to interact appropriately with the general public; moderate limitation in

the ability to ask simple questions or request assistance; moderate limitation in the ability to

accept instruction and to respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; moderate limitation

in the ability to get along with co-workers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting

behavioral extremes; moderate limitation in the ability to maintain socially appropriate behavior

and to adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness; moderate limitation in the ability to

respond to changes in work setting; moderate limitation in the ability to be aware of normal

hazards and take appropriate precautions; marked limitation in the ability to travel in unfamiliar

places or use public transportation; and moderate limitation in the ability to set realistic goals or

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make plans independent of others.

In 2013, Plaintiff’s psychiatrist diagnosed PTSD, avoidant personality disorder,

schizoaffective disorder, and pain disorder associated with psychological factors and general

medical condition.

In support of reversal or remand Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ denied her due process

by using a previously vacated ALJ decision as evidence. In particular, Plaintiff notes that the

ALJ stated that “The judge noted at the first hearing that the claimant was able to relate and

respond to all questions asked of her without any apparent issue” (Tr. 643). Pl. Br. 13. Plaintiff

contends the ALJ did not note this at the first hearing, but noted it in the decision, and the ALJ

erred in using the previous ALJ’s finding as evidence because the decision was vacated.

The Defendant admits that the ALJ discussed the finding from the vacated decision in

evaluation of Plaintiff’s difficulties in social functioning at step three of the sequential evaluation

process (Tr.643). The Defendant contends that the error is harmless because the ALJ adequately

considered other evidence in evaluating Plaintiff’s social functioning, including testimony during

the second hearing.

Errors, if harmless, do not require or permit reversal. Sanchez ex rel. Sanchez v. Barnhart,

467 F.3d 1081, 1082–83 (7th Cir. 2006). An error is harmless if the court “can predict with great

confidence that the result on remand would be the same.” Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 707

(7th Cir. 2013). In the present case, it is clear that the result would have been the same because

the ALJ considered other evidence in the evaluation of Plaintiff’s social functioning. For

example, the ALJ considered that function reports noted that Plaintiff was always a loner, that

she tended to isolate herself, and that she did not socialize often (Tr. 273-74, 643). She asserted

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some difficulty in getting along with others in the past, but she reported that she got along well

with her husband, mother, sister, and stepfather (Tr. 260, 264, 429, 643). She left her house

twice per week at least and had daily visits with her husband (Tr. 260, 262-63, 643). She Skyped

with her mother on the computer nearly every day, or they talked on the phone (Tr. 263, 643,

1066). She went to church once per week and was involved in worship studies (Tr. 263, 273,

643, 1066). She continued to work as a cashier at Kroger for two years after the alleged onset date

(Tr. 427, 643, 671). At the second hearing, Plaintiff testified that she was uncomfortable in

large groups of people, but that small groups did not bother her as much and that she was

bothered by loud noises (Tr. 643, 670). She was home schooled and did not feel that she did

well with other people (Tr. 643, 669). Clearly, the ALJ fully evaluated Plaintiff’s social

functioning. Moreover, this analysis was crystalized in the ALJ’s RFC finding which recognized

Plaintiff’s limitations in social functioning and public interactions.

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in not assigning controlling weight to her treating

psychiatrist’s opinion. To be entitled to controlling weight, a treating physician’s opinion must be

“well-supported” by objective medical evidence and “not inconsistent” with other record

evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96-2p; Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir.

2008).

In the present case, the ALJ considered that Dr. Sylvia Rutten completed a medical source

statement on April 5, 2012, wherein she opined that Plaintiff had only moderate restrictions in all

areas of social functioning (Tr. 609, 643). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had moderate

difficulties in social functioning and, as noted above, included some social limitations in

Plaintiff’s RFC (Tr. 643, 646). The ALJ considered that Dr. Rutten opined that Plaintiff had a

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moderate difficulty in the ability to carry out detailed instructions; the ability to sustain an

ordinary routine without special supervision; the ability to work in coordination with or proximity

to others without being distracted by them; the ability to make simple work-related decisions; and

the ability to complete a normal workday and work week without interruptions from

psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable

number and length of rest periods (Tr. 608-09, 644). 

The ALJ also noted that Dr. Rutten opined that Plaintiff did not have any

significant problem with carrying out very short and simple instructions; maintaining attention

and concentration for extended periods; and the ability to perform activities within a schedule,

maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances (Tr. 608-09, 644-45).

The ALJ found that Dr. Rutten’s opinion supports a finding of no more than moderate difficulty

in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, and that these limitations were reflected in the

RFC (Tr. 645). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had some moderate problems with sustaining

concentration, persistence, or pace that have been addressed by limiting her to simple unskilled

work and precluding more complex and detailed work activity (Tr. 649). The ALJ further noted

that this is consistent with Dr. Rutten’s opinion that Plaintiff’s ability to perform simple tasks

and to sustain attention was not limited, and other areas in particular social functioning had no

more than moderate limitations (Tr. 608-10, 649). The ALJ considered that the only area with a

marked limitation according to Dr. Rutten was an inability to travel to unfamiliar places, but that

is such a minimal limitation and it is not a part of most jobs. (Tr. 610, 649).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ mentioned Dr. Rutten’s opinion, but did not find that it was

entitled to controlling weight, and instead cherry picked limitations. This contention lacks merit

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because the ALJ adequately evaluated the opinion from Dr. Rutten. As previously discussed, the

ALJ noted that the limitations of simple unskilled work and the limitations on social functioning

were consistent with Dr. Rutten’s opinion. In addition, also as previously discussed, the ALJ

noted that the only area with a marked limitation according to Dr. Rutten was an inability to travel

to unfamiliar places, but that it was such a minimal limitation and was not a part of most jobs.

The ALJ did not cherry pick limitations, but rather evaluated the limitations assessed by Dr.

Rutten. Therefore, contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, the ALJ adequately evaluated Dr. Rutten’s

opinion.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding did not include Dr. Rutten’s opinion that

Plaintiff had a marked limitation in the ability to travel in unfamiliar places or use public

transportation. However, as previously discussed, the ALJ adequately explained why

this limitation was not included in the finding for the RFC, as the inability to travel is not a

problem with most jobs, especially simple unskilled work.. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding did not include Dr. Rutten’s opinion that

Plaintiff had moderate limitations in the ability to maintain socially appropriate behavior and to

adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness, and to accept instruction and to respond

appropriately to criticism from supervisors. However, this argument fails because the ALJ

adequately considered these limitations. These limitations opined by Dr. Rutten are related to

social functioning (Tr. 609). The ALJ discussed Dr. Rutten’s opinion that Plaintiff has moderate

restrictions in all areas of social functioning (Tr. 643). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had a

moderate difficulty in social functioning, and found that she could relate on a superficial basis on

an ongoing basis with coworkers and supervisors (Tr. 643, 646). The ALJ noted that the

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limitations in the RFC are intended to reduce Plaintiff’s anxiety as much as possible by limiting

her social contacts (Tr. 649). Therefore, the ALJ accounted for the moderate restrictions in social

functioning in the RFC finding. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not identified specific functional

limitations that should have been included in the RFC based on the opinion from Dr. Rutten.

Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding did not include Dr. Rutten’s opinion

that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in the ability to sustain an ordinary routine without special

supervision; complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from

psychologically based symptoms; and perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable

number and length of rest periods. Again, Plaintiff’s argument fails because the ALJ adequately

considered these limitations. These limitations opined by Dr. Rutten are related to concentration,

persistence, or pace (Tr. 608-09). The ALJ discussed the opinion from Dr. Rutten and noted that

the opinion supports a finding of no more than moderate difficulty in maintaining concentration,

persistence or pace (Tr. 645). The ALJ found that Plaintiff could understand, remember, and carry

out unskilled tasks, she could attend to tasks for a sufficient period of time to complete those

tasks, and she could otherwise manage the stresses involved with unskilled work (Tr. 646). The

ALJ noted that the limitations included in the finding for the RFC were intended to reduce

Plaintiff’s anxiety by limiting the complexity of the work itself (Tr. 649). Therefore, the ALJ

accounted for the moderate restrictions in concentration, persistence, or pace in the RFC finding.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has not identified specific functional limitations that should have been

included in the RFC based on the opinion from Dr. Rutten.

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Rutten’s opinion that she is moderately limited in the ability to

accept instruction and to respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors and that she is

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moderately limited in the ability to sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision

necessitate a disability finding. Plaintiff further argues that an employee cannot both be left alone

and specially supervised, but this is what Plaintiff requires. However, the record shows that Dr.

Rutten only indicated that Plaintiff has moderate difficulty in these areas, and did not preclude

Plaintiff entirely (Tr. 608-09). Furthermore, the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff’s difficulties with

supervision by finding that she could relate on a superficial basis on an ongoing basis with

supervisors (Tr. 646). This limitation adequately accounts for Plaintiff’s difficulties in interacting

with supervisors.

Next, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not properly evaluate her obesity. Social Security

Ruling (SSR) 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281, provides guidance on how to evaluate obesity in

disability claims at each step of the sequential evaluation process. SSR 02-1p advises the ALJ to

evaluate various factors in assessing the RFC including possible exertional functions that may be

affected by obesity, as well as the possible combined effects of obesity with other impairments.

Id. at *6.

In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s obesity was a severe impairment at step

two, and at step three, evaluated the potential impact her obesity may have on other body systems,

including the musculoskeletal system (Tr. 640-41). The ALJ considered that Plaintiff was obese

with a body mass index of about forty most of the time since the alleged onset date (Tr. 591, 641).

She was five feet, seven inches tall and weighed at least 265 pounds since the alleged onset date

(Tr. 526, 641). In evaluating the effects of Plaintiff’s obesity on her RFC, the ALJ cited to

Plaintiff’s testimony, treatment notes and consultative examinations (Tr. 647-48). The ALJ

conducted a thorough review of the evidence to support the RFC finding for light work with

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sitting, standing, and/or walking four hours each in an eight-hour workday, occasional climbing

ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling, no climbing ladders,

ropes, or scaffolds, and no concentrated exposure to unprotected heights and dangerous moving

machinery (Tr. 646).

Specifically, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s testimony that she still took care of her house,

did laundry, tried to walk thirty minutes per day for exercise or ride an exercise bike, and went

up and down stairs a few times every day (Tr. 647, 674-75, 681-82). The ALJ also considered

that Plaintiff’s weight ranged from 259 pounds to 280 pounds (Tr. 334, 393, 403, 423, 526, 591,

647). The ALJ considered that the combined effects of Plaintiff’s impairments, including

obesity, limited her to less than the full range of light exertion, but she could still lift and carry

up to twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently and make occasional postural

movements (Tr. 647). The ALJ considered that the consultative examination from Dr. Gautham

Gadiraju showed some decrease in range of motion of the lumbar back and obesity, but

otherwise showed normal motor strength, sensation, reflexes, and a normal gait (Tr. 433, 647).

There was full range of motion of the cervical spine, her grip strength was normal, she was able

to pick up coins and buttons, and there was no numbness or tingling (Tr. 423, 647).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff could sit, stand and/or walk four hours each per workday in

light of an EMG of the lower extremities that showed, chronic right L5 radiculopathy, the

evidence of plantar fascial disease, and increasing obesity (Tr. 648, 1135-36, 1138-39, 1150-51,

1213). The ALJ considered the opinion from Dr. Robert Shugart that Plaintiff could return to her

regular work (Tr. 345, 648). The ALJ gave this opinion partial weight and noted that Plaintiff

gained weight and developed knee pain and plantar fasciitis after the opinion was given (Tr.648).

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The ALJ noted that the additional conditions further reduced the length of time Plaintiff

could reasonably be expected to stand and/or walk to a total of four hours each per day (Tr. 648).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s obesity analysis is inadequate and cannot be meaningfully

reviewed. However, as previously discussed, the ALJ adequately evaluated Plaintiff’s obesity in

accordance with SSR 02-1p, and included limitations in the RFC that were supported by the

evidence. Accordingly, this court finds that the ALJ adequately accounted for Plaintiff’s obesity

in the RFC finding, citing to substantial evidence in the record to support the assessed limitations.

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her RFC. Plaintiff argues

that the ALJ’s sit/stand/walk limitation is defective because the limitation implies that sitting,

standing, and walking could occur simultaneously or in random sequence. Plaintiff also argues

that the ALJ’s sit/stand option does not enumerate the frequency of position changes. Contrary to

Plaintiff’s assertions, the ALJ’s finding for Plaintiff’s RFC does not include a specific sit/stand

option (Tr. 646). The RFC is the maximum that a Plaintiff can still do despite her limitations. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3), Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 675-76 (7th Cir 2008). The ALJ found

that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except

that she could sit, stand and/or walk four hours each in an eight-hour workday (Tr. 646). The ALJ

did not find a sit/stand option, but found that Plaintiff was capable of standing for four hours,

sitting for four hours, and walking for four hours total in an eight-hour workday (Tr. 646). The

ALJ simply identified the maximum amount of time Plaintiff was capable of performing each

activity in an eight-hour workday. The ALJ did need to enumerate position changes because the

RFC indicated that Plaintiff was capable of performing a job where some sitting was allowed.

Plaintiff’s argument that the limitation implies that sitting, standing, and walking could occur

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simultaneously or in random sequence is similarly without merit. The ALJ identified the

maximum amount of each activity that Plaintiff was capable of performing, and it would be

physically impossible to stand and walk at the same time. There is no indication that the ALJ

intended to find Plaintiff capable of sitting, standing, and walking simultaneously.

Additionally, the VE fully understood the parameters of the RFC the ALJ contemplated.

In response to a hypothetical question posed by the ALJ that was identical to the ALJ’s finding

for the RFC, the VE testified that there would still be thousands of unskilled light jobs available

that a person could perform (Tr. 646, 716-19). The VE testified that light jobs are traditionally

performed primarily standing or walking throughout the workday (Tr. 718). The VE further

testified that the hypothetical suggests that the person had to sit for some duration of the

workday, and the three jobs could accommodate that (Tr. 718-19). See Jens v. Barnhart, 347

F.3d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 2003) (the hypothetical question need only contain a description of

limitations supported by the medical record); Ehrhart v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 969

F.2d 534, 540-41 (7th Cir. 1992) (vocational expert testimony constitutes substantial evidence

for finding as to what jobs a claimant can perform with her particular limitations). Thus, this

court holds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC finding. 

Accordingly, for all the above reasons, the ALJ’s decision will be affirmed.

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Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing, the decision of the ALJ is hereby AFFIRMED.

 Entered: June 16, 2017.

 s/ William C. Lee 

 William C. Lee, Judge

 United States District Court

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