THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BARBARA JOAQUIN, : : Plaintiff, : : Civil Action No.: 14-1119 (RC) v. : : Re Document No.: 24 FRIENDSHIP PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL, : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
G RANTING IN P ART AND D ENYING IN P ART P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION FOR F EES AND C OSTS I. INTRODUCTION In this action, Plaintiff Barbar a Joaquin seeks from Defendant Friendship Public Charter School (“FPCS”) an award of the attorneys’ fees and costs under the Individuals wit h Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) , 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482. Ms. Joaquin ar gues that she was the prevailing party and that her re quested fees and costs are reas onable. See Pl.’s Mot. Fees & Costs at 4–15, ECF No. 24 (“Pl.’s Mot.”); see also Pl.’s Reply Opp’n Mot. Fees & Costs at 1, ECF No. 26 (“Pl.’s Reply”) (seeki ng the “total sum” of amounts identified in her itemized exhibits); Pl.’s Reply Ex. 1 at 27 (seeking $119,636.31 in fees and costs). FPCS disputes Ms. Joaquin’s prevailing party sta tus as well as the reasonable ness of the fees she seeks. See Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Fees & Costs , ECF No. 25 (“Def.’s Opp’n”). T he Court concludes that Ms. Joaquin was the prevailing pa rty, but that only some of Ms. Joaquin’s requested fees are reasonable. Accordingly, the C ourt will grant in part and denyin part her motion for fees and

costs.2 II. BACKGROUND In January 2014, Ms. Joaquin file d an administrative due proces s complaint alleging that FPCS had denied her son, G.H., a f ree appropriate public educat ion (“FAPE”) in violation of the
IDEA. Joaquin v. Friendship Pub. Charter Sch. , No. 14-1119, 2015 WL 5175885, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2015); Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1. Ms. Joaquin alleged tha t FPCS had failed to implement G.H.’s individualized education p rogram (“IEP”) or, in the alte rnative, that FPCS had failed to provide or develop an appr opriate IEP for G.H. Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *2. After an administrative hearing, a hear ing officer rejected Ms. Joaquin’ s claims and denied all her requests for relief. See Compl. ¶ 3. In June 2014, Ms. Joaquin appealed to this Court. Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *3. Her federal complaint asked this Court to (1) declare that FPCS denied G.H. a FAPE in violation of the IDEA; (2) order FPCS t o provide G.H. with comprehensive psychological, functional, behavioral, vocational, and other assessments; (3) order FPCS t o convene an IEP team meeting to review and revise G.H.’s IEP ; and (4) mandate compensatory e ducation. See Compl. at 3. After reviewing the administrat ive record, this Court found tha t FPCS denied G.H. a FAPE and violated the IDEA by failing t o provide G.H. with any of his IE P-mandated transition services.
See Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *10. The Court remanded the case to the administrative hearing officer to allow the hear ing officer (1) to determine w hether Ms. Joaquin’s requested compensatory education would be pe rtinent to G.H.’s wrongfully denied transition services, and (2) if yes, to develop a reasonabl y calculated award of compens atory education. See id

. On remand, the parties reache d an agreement on an appropriate a ward of compensatory education, and the hearing officer i ssued a consent order that reflected their agreement. See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 12 at 2, ECF No. 24-12. The consent order required FP CS to provide Ms. Joaquin with3 funding, to a maximum amount of $1 950, for third-party transiti on services of Ms. Joaquin’s choosing. Id. After the hearing officer dismi ssed Ms. Joaquin’s administrat ive case, id. , Ms. Joaquin filed a motion for f ees and costs, which is before the Court now. See Pl.’s Mot.
III. LEGAL STANDARD Under the IDEA, this Court may a ward “reasonable attorneys’ fee s” to a prevailing party who is the parent of a chil d with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 14 15(i)(3)(B). In doing so, the Court follows a two-step inquiry: first, the court must determine whe ther the party seeking attorneys’ fees is the prevailing party; s econd, the court must determine whether the requested fees are reasonable. See McAllister v. District of Columbia , 21 F. Supp. 3d 94, 99 (D.D.C. 2014); Jackson v. District of Columbia , 696 F. Supp. 2d 97, 101 (D.D.C. 2010). A “prevailing party” is one “who ha s been awarded some relief b y the court.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001); see also Alegria v. District of Columbia , 391 F.3d 262, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (applying
Buckhannon ’s prevailing party analy sis in the IDEA cont ext). Specifically, “plaintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieve s some of the benefit the part ies sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted) ( quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe , 581 F.2d 275, 278–79 (1st Cir. 1978)); see also Artis ex rel. S.A. v. District of Columbia , 543 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that “[a]lthougha hearing officer may make a prevailing party dete rmination, it is the province o f the district court to make the ultimate decision as to who prevailed in an IDEA action”). To determine whether the party moving for fees is a prevailing pa rty, courts in this circuit a pply a three-part tes t: “(1) there must be a ‘court-ordered change in t he legal relati onship’ of the parties; (2) the j udgment must be in4 favor of the party seeking the f ees; and (3) the judicial prono uncement must be accompanied by judicial relief.” District of Columbia v. Straus , 590 F.3d 898, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Thomas v. Nat’l Sci. Found. , 330 F.3d 486, 492–93 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); accord Arthur v. District of Columbia , 106 F. Supp. 3d 230, 234 (D.D.C. 2015). If the Court determines that a plaintiff is a “prevailing party ,” the court must then determine whether the fees s ought are reasonable. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). A reasonable fee is calculated by multiplying “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; see also Jackson, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 101 (applying Hensley in the IDEA context). The plai ntiff bears the burden of estab lishing the reasonableness of any fee request s, and, specifically, whether both the hourly rate and the number of hours spent on any part icular task are reasonable. See Eley v. District of Columbia , 793 F.3d 97, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Jackson , 696 F. Supp. 2d at 101 (citing In re North , 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). A plaintiff may do so by submittin g evidence of “the attorneys’ billing practices; the attorneys’ skill, experience, and reputa tion; and the prevailing market rates of the relevant community.” McAllister , 21 F. Supp. 3d at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Covington v. District of Columbia , 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Once the plaintiff has provided that evidence, the Court presum es that the number of hours billed is reasonable, and the burden shi fts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s showing. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109–10; Blackman v. District of Columbia , 677 F. Supp. 2d 169, 172 (D.D.C. 2010). However, if both parties fail t o present satisfactory evidence demonstrating that their proposed5 hourly rates are reasonable, the court may determine a reasonab le hourly rate by reference to the Laffey Matrix. See Brown v. District of Columbia , 80 F. Supp. 3d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 2015). 1
IV. ANALYSIS A. Prevailing Party FPCS argues that Ms. Joaquin is not a prevaili ng party because the relief she obtained was not what she originally sought. See Def.’s Opp’n at 5–9. Ms. Joaquin argues that she is a prevailing party because “[i]n this Court’s decision and the [a dministrative] remand decision together, Ms. Joaquin obtained t he declaration that [FPCS] had denied her son FAPE and compensatory education.” Pl.’s Mot. at 4.

1 The Laffey Matrix is a fee schedule used by s ome courts to determine reaso nable hourly rates for legal work. See generally Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc. 572 F. Supp. 354, 371–75 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds , 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds , Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel , 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) (establishing the first Laffey fee matrix, in the context of a longstanding employment discrimination class action). The United States Attorney’s Off ice for the District of Columbia prepares the matrix for use in cases in which a “fee-shifting” statute allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover their attorneys’ fees. See Eley , 793 F.3d at 101; see also, e.g. , Laffey Matrix -- 2014- 2015 , Civil Div. of the U.S. Attorney ’s Office for D.C., https://ww w.justice.gov/sites/default/ files/usao-dc/legacy/201 4/07/14/Laffey%20Matrix_2014-2015.pdf ( last visited May 27, 2016). Updated Laffey Matrix rates are available thr ough the U.S. Attorney’s Office’ s website. See Civil Division , U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C., https://www.justice.gov/usao -dc/civil-division (last updated Dec. 1, 2015) (publishing links to Laffey matrices at the botto m of the webpage). Until the 2015–2016 year, the Laffey Matrix was adjusted for inf lation by reference to the overall cost of living in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan ar ea. See Eley , 793 F.3d at 101; Laffey Matrix -- 2014-2015 , supra , at 1 n.2. The 2015–2016 Laffey Matrix, however, uses a revised methodology, which adjusts for inflation by reference t o changes in lawyers’ hourly rates in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. See USAO Attorney’s Fees Matrix – 2015 – 2016 , Civil Div. of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C., https://www. justice.gov/usao-dc/file/796471/ download (last visited May 27, 2016). A competing matrix, sometimes called the “LSI Laffey Matrix,” “adjusts for the increases in costs for legal services only,” but by reference to “the national rate of change in the cost of legal services.” Eley , 793 F.3d at 101–02.6 To be considered a “prevailing part y,” Ms. Joaquin must have: ( 1) experienced a court-ordered change in her lega l relationship with FPCS, (2) o btained a favorable judgment, and (3) received a judicial pronouncement accompanied by some judic ial relief. See Straus , 590 F.3d at 901 (articulating the three-part test for determining prevai ling party status). A party need not succeed on every claim to be a prevailing party, because a court has discretion to consider the extent to which a party prevail s on various issues when calcula ting fee awards. See Hensley , 461
U.S. at 433–37 (explaining that if a party enjoys limited success on the merit s, a court may reduce an award accordingly). “The touchstone of the prevailin g party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal r elationship of the parties ina manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute.” Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist. , 489 U.S. 782, 792–93 (1989). Here, Ms. Joaquin has experience d a material alteration of her legal relationship with FPCS through a court-ordered chan ge, and so she satisfies the f irst prong of the three-part test for determining prevailing-party status. See Straus , 590 F.3d at 901. A consent order, like a consent decree, works as a court-ordered change. See, e.g. , Buckhannon , 532 U.S. at 604 (“[S]ettlement agreements enforced through a cons ent decree may serve as the b asis for an award of attorneys’ fees. . . . [They are] a court-orde red ‘chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant.’” (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n , 489 U.S. at 792)); Arthur v. District of
Columbia , 106 F. Supp. 3d 230, 234–35 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding that an ad ministrative consent order sufficed to establish the pl aintiff’s prevailing-party st atus). Because Ms. Joaquin brought suit against FPCS, and because of the resulting consent order o n remand, FPCS must fund transition services for G.H. See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 12 at 2. The consent order required FPCS to “modify[] [its] behavior in a wa y that directly be nefits the pl aintiff,” and it thereby materially7 altered the legal relationshi p between Ms. Joaquin and FPCS. See Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992). FPCS’s arguments to the contrary do not change the Court’s view . FPCS argues that no material alteration occurred because Ms. Joaquin did not receiv e most of the substantive relief which she originally sought. See Def.’s Opp’n at 5–9. But “the degree of the plaintiff’s success in relation to the other goals of the lawsuit is a factor criti cal to the determination of the size of a reasonable fee, not to eligibil ity for a fee award at all.” Tex. State Teachers Ass’n , 489 U.S. at 790 (emphasis added); accord Arthur , 106 F. Supp. 3d at 235–36. Thus, “[w]hile partial versus complete success is a consi deration in assessing the amount of fees, the critical question in evaluating the availability of fees ‘is whether f ee claimants have re ceived any benefit at all.’” Grano v. Barry , 783 F.2d 1104, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (emphases added) (quotin g Miller v.
Staats , 70 F.2d 336, 341 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Even if Ms. Joaquin achieved only partial success, she still experienced a m aterial alteration in her leg al relationship with FPCS. Nor does FPCS change the Court’s determination on the first pro ng of the prevailing party test by citing to E.S. ex rel. R.S. v. Skidmore Tynan Independent School District , No. 06-0360, 2007 WL 81794 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2007). 2 In that case, the plaintiffs were denied prevailing party status because their complaint did not explici tly seek the relief they ultimately received. E.S. ex rel. R.S. , 2007 WL 81794, at *4–6. FPCS app ears to analogize to E.S. by arguing that (1) at her admini strative heari ng, Ms. Joaquin did not personally allege that G.H. did

2 FPCS incorrectly cites this case as E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 196 Rosemount-Apple Valley , 135 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 1998), a case with facts that do not m atch the facts FPCS recounts. Compare Def.’s Opp’n at 9 (describing E.S. as a case in which “the District Court determined that a parent demanding a designa ted aide for her child’s toile ting needs was not a prevailing party”), with E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 135 F.3d at 567–69 (finding that E.S., a student who suffered from dyslexia, “was rece iving a free appropriate publi c education,” but omitting any discussion of who was the prevailing party).8 not receive transition services , so (2) Ms. Joaquin did not ori ginally seek relief in the form of transition services. See Def.’s Opp’n at 8–9 (arguing tha t Ms. Joaquin’s “evidence pres ented at the Due Process hearing clearl y established that the violation for which she was requesting compensatory education was notin any way connected to transiti on services”). But Ms. Joaquin’s administrative complaint did allege FPCS’s “[f]ai lure to appropria tely implement [G.H.’s] IEP,” see Due Process Compl. Notice at 1, A dministrative R. at 3, ECF No . 12-1 (alleging FPCS’s failure to implement G.H.’s IEP), and FPCS doe s not dispute the fact that G.H.’s IEP included a provision r equiring transition services, see Def.’s Opp’n at 8–9 (conceding that Ms. Joaquin’s administrative due process complaint “broadl y pled” FPCS’s failure to provide transition services); I EP at 17–18, Administrative R. a t 445–46, ECF No. 12-3 (including transition services in G.H.’s IEP). Transition serv ices for G.H. were, therefore, part of the relief Ms. Joaquin orig inally sought. Thus, aside from being merely persuasive authority from another jurisdiction, E.S. does not apply to Ms. Joaquin’s fees motion because it address es different facts. The other two prongs of the prevailing party test are easily satisfied and FPCS does not argue otherwise. With respect t o the second prong, Ms. Joaquinreceived a judgment in her favor because the Court, contrary to the hearing officer’s decision i n the administrative proceeding, found that FPCS denied G.H a FAP E and remanded the case to allo w the hearing officer to determine an appropriate remedy. See Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *10; see also McCrary v. District of Columbia , 791 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197–98 (finding the second prong of the prevailing party test satisfied because the Hearing Officer determined tha t the District of Columbia denied the student a FAPE). With r espect to the third prong, the hear ing officer’s consent order granted Ms. Joaquin judicial relief. See generally Buckhannon , 532 U.S at 606 (contrasting judicial9 relief, obtained by adjudicative orde r, with extrajudicial alte ration of circumstances). 3 Because Ms. Joaquin satisfies all three prongs of the prevailing-party test, the Court finds that Ms. Joaquin was a prevailing party in this case and presumes th at she should receive an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). B. Reasonableness of Fees Requested 1. Hours Worked a. Reduction of Ms. Joaquin’s Award to Account for Limited Success FPCS argues that even if the Court finds that Ms. Joaquin preva iled, the Court should nonetheless deny or reduce her fee award to account for Ms. Joa quin’s de minimis or limited

success. See Def.’s Opp’n at 10–13. The Court may reduce an attorneys’ fee award to account for limited success on the merits. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434–36. Because Ms. Joaquin received less than all of the relief s he sought, reducing her fee award is justifiable. See, e.g. , Dickens v. Friendship–Edison P.C.S. , 724 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121–22 (D.D.C. 2010) (imposing a reducti on on a fee award with respect to one c hild’s claims, because the pla intiffs received some but not all of

3 Consent orders, unlike private se ttlements, satisfy the third prong of the prevailing party test because “court-approved settlements and consent decrees . . . [are] at least the product of, and bear[] the sanction of, judici al action in the lawsuit.” Buckhannon , 532 U.S. at 618 (Scalia, J. concurring) (emphasis omitted); see also, e.g. , Arthur , 106 F. Supp. 3d at 235–36 (holding that an administrative consent orde r can effect a change in the part ies’ legal relationship and thereby render plaintiffs prevailing part ies entitled to recover reason able attorneys’ fees under the IDEA). Additionally, “an impartial he aring officer’s decision on the m erits, while not ‘judicial,’ still gives rise to prevailing party status because it changes ‘the legal relationship between the parties’ and is ‘enforceable’ either by the hearing officer or a court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Arthur , 106 F. Supp. 3d at 234 (quoting A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ. , 407 F.3d 65, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2005)); accord El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R. , 591 F.3d 417, 422–23 n.4 (5th Cir. 2009); P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ. , 442 F.3d 848, 854 (3d Cir. 2006).10 the relief they requested w ith respect to that child). 4 However, an outright denial of attorneys’ fees is not warranted on these gr ounds. When, as here, monetary damages accompany declaratory relief, the prevail ing party is typically entitled to some amount of attorneys’ fees.
See Thomas , 330 F.3d at 494 (naming “the payment of damages” as judicial relief that warrants a fee award under the Equal Acce ss to Justice Act (quoting Hewitt v. Helms , 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987))). Compare Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 12 at 2 (awardi ng Ms. Joaquin $1950 in funding to remedy FPCS’s failure to provide G.H. w ith transition services), with Farrar , 506 U.S. at 115 (noting, as an example of a plaintiff who pr evails but should receive no attorneys’ fees, “[a] plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages but receives no more than nominal da mages”). FPCS’s discussion of T.G. ex rel. T.G. v. Midland School District 7 , 848 F. Supp. 2d 902 (C.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Giosta v. Midland Sch. Dist. 7 , 542 F. App’x 523 (7th Cir. 2013), does not change this conclusion. See Def.’s Opp’n at 10–11 (discussing T.G. , a case in which the

4 Ms. Joaquin contends that the Court should not reduce her fee award because Ms. Joaquin obtained “total success.” Pl.’s Reply Opp’n Mot. F ees & Costs at 3–5 (“Pl.’s Reply”). But Ms. Joaquin’s posi tion is incorrect for two reaso ns. First, Ms. Joaquin improperly r elies on FPCS’s voluntary conduc t as a sign of her success. See id. at 3–4. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected “[a] defenda nt’s voluntary change in conduct” as grounds for an award of attorneys’ fees. See Buckhannon , 532 U.S. at 605. In doing so, the Supreme Court explained that the defenda nt’s voluntary change in conduct “lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur ” necessary to alter the part ies’ legal relationship. Id. Second, Ms. Joaquin bases her cl aim of “total success” on unper suasive assertions that (1) only her compensatory educat ion request was outstanding by the time the parties filed summary judgment motions and (2) she subsequently received an a ward of compensatory education. See Pl.’s Reply at 4. Her assertions misconstrue the litigating p osition she took in her summary judgment motion, in which she sought compensatory educa tion for multiple alleged deviations from G.H.’s IEP, and notjust compensatory educationfor FPCS’s failure to provide G.H. with transition services. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 8–14, ECF No. 10 (seeking, among other things, “funding for three c ourses” that would include “t he cost of the online courses . . . plus the cost of 20 hours tutoring for each class”). Having ob tained only compensatory education relating to FPCS’s fa ilure to provide G.H. with trans ition services, Ms. Joaquin cannot claim that she obtained “total success” on her IDEA claims agai nst FPCS. See Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *10.11 plaintiffs obtained limited compensatory education because the school district pa rtially denied the child a FAPE, but in which t he plaintiffs nonetheless achie ved only a de minimis victory that did not entitle them to an awar d of attorneys’ fees). To be sure, “[i]n some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally ‘prev ails’ . . . should receive no attorney’s fees at all.” Farrar , 506 U.S. at 115. But in this district, “[w ]hen a hearing officer [or th e Court] finds tha t a student was denied access to a free appropr iate public education, the stude nt may usually recover reasonable attorney’s fees as the prevailing party because a denial of a f ree appropriate public education is a direct violation of the statute.” Artis ex. rel. S.A. v. District of Columbia , 543 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22 (D.D.C. 2008); cf. Genrette v. Options Pub. Charter Sch. , 926 F. Supp. 2d 364, 366–67 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that the plaintiff’s de minimis relief did not support an a ward of attorneys’ fees when “the Hearing Officer did not conclude that [the plainti ff] was denied a FAPE”); Bush ex rel. A.H. v. District of Columbia , 579 F. Supp. 2d 22, 33 (D.D.C. 2008) (fi nding that one plaint iff should not receive an award of attorneys’ fees because, having obtained an order granting only her request for the scheduling of an IEP meeting but not an ord er declaring that her daughter was denied a FAPE, her success was de minimis ). To the extent that T.G. holds otherwise, that decision is from the District Court for the Central District of Illinois and therefore is not binding on th is Court. Additionally, its underlying procedural posture differs from Ms. Joaquin’s here. In T.G. , an IDEA case in which the plaintiffs appealed a hearing o fficer’s determinations about a student’s seventh through ninth grade years, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion f or summary judgment in full with a comprehensive opinion. See T.G. , 848 F. Supp. 2d at 909–34. In doing so, the court noted the plaintiffs’ ambitious goals: Plaintiffs sought a finding that Defendant denied the parents’ procedural rights, a finding that T.G.’s IEPs for each of three school years were bo th inadequate and12 improperly implemented, a findi ng that Defendant failed to prov ide both specially designed instruction and appropria te related services, reimburs ement for four private evaluations, and an orde r of substantially more compens atory education. What they received was an order that, for one school year, Defe ndant failed to provide a FAPE in three areas , and a specifically-tailored orde r of compensatory education limited to addressing that deficiency. Id. at 933. The court specifically no ted that the plaintiffs purs ued these goals “in their due process complaint and their appeal” before the district court. Id. (emphasis added). Here, although Ms. Joaquin also r eceived less relief than she i nitially sought, she narrowed the issues in contenti on as her case progressed. By t he time this Court considered her motion for summary judgment on t he hearing officer’s determinat ion below, Ms. Joaquin alleged only four discrete ways in whic h she believed FPCS had denied G .H. a FAPE. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 8–13. Ms. Joaquin achieved success on one of those allegations: the allegation that “FPCS’s failure to provide transi tion services was a material d eparture from G.H.’s IEP amounting to the denial of a fr ee appropriate pub lic education. ” Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *8. Because Ms. Joaquin narrowed the scope of her appeal and h ence reduced the number of attorney hours spent litigati ng her appeal, her fee request, un like the plaintiffs’ fee request in
T.G. , is more likely to be “reasonabl e in relation to the success a chieved.” Hensley , 461 U.S. at 436. Given the different procedural postures presented in T.G. and in Ms. Joaquin’s case here, the Court declines to follow T.G. and will not deny Ms. Joaqui n a reasonable fee award. See generally id. (“There is no precise rule or f ormula for making [fee] determi nations. . . . The court necessarily has discretion in mak ing this equitable judgment.”)

. The Court will nonetheless redu ce Ms. Joaquin’s fee award to ac count for Ms. Joaquin’s limited success. See id. (explaining that, when plainti ffs prevail on only some of thei r claims, “a fee award based on the [total] c laimed hours” would be “excessi ve”). The Court may reduce fees in a number of ways, such a s by eliminating specific hours or reducing the award as a13 whole. Id. at 436–37. When determining how to re duce fee awards for parti ally successful plaintiffs, the court must analy ze the relations hips between th e successful and unsuccessful claims. See id. at 434–35 (explaining that the more closely related the claims, the more difficult it will be to divide the hours on a claim-by-claim basis). If the plaintiff presented “disti nctly different claims for rel ief that are based on different facts and legal theories,” the n “counsel’s work on one claim wi ll be unrelated to his work on another claim.” Id. In cases with such “distinctl y different claims,” “no fee maybe awarded for services on [any] unsuccessful claim[s].” Id. But if the plaintiff’s claims “ involve a common core of facts,” or are based on “related legal theories,” “[m]uch of counsel’s time will be devoted gene rally to the litigat ion as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by- claim basis.” Id . at 435. In cases with interrelated claims, the c ourt should “focus on the signif icance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours that counsel reasonab ly expended on the litigation.” Id

. After review of the record, the Court finds that Ms. Joaquin’s claims derive from a “common core of facts,” id. , and hence the Court cannot easil y divide, claim-by-claim, her counsel’s hours expended. Overall, Ms. Joaquin’s case involves her assertion that FPCS failed to implement G.H.’s IEP. See Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *3, *5 n.5; Compl. ¶ 11. That IEP included plans not just for the transition services that FPCS f ailed to provide, but also for other educational services for whic h Ms. Joaquin sought an award of c ompensatory education. See Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *1, *5; Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 8–14. Hen ce, Ms. Joaquin’s successful claim (about FPCS’s failure to provide transition se rvices) and her unsuccessful claims (about FPCS’s failure to pr ovide other edu cation service s) share a common core of facts, all relating to the central issue of whether FPCS implemented G .H.’s IEP. Indeed, the Court’s14 summary judgment opinion expressl y noted how facts about the ap propriateness of G.H.’s school placement were related to FPCS’ s failure to provide transition services. See Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *9 (discussing how “the pr eponderance of the eviden ce shows that G.H. was deprived of transition services w hile he was at Options,” the s chool where Ms. Joaquin alleged G.H. was inappropriately placed). Accordingly, because Ms. Joa quin’s claims were based on interrelated facts, the Court w ill not reduce her counsel’s hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis, but will instead re duce her overall fee award. See Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434–37. 5 The Court believes it appropriate to reduce Ms. Joaquin’s total award by fifty percent. On appeal to this Court, Ms. Joa quin alleged FPCS denied G.H. aFAPE in four ways: (1) by failing to provide G.H. with the hours of specialized instructi on required by G.H.’s IEP, (2) by failing to provide G.H. with trans ition services, (3) by failin g to follow G.H.’s behavior intervention plan, and (4) by failing to provide G.H. with an a ppropriate school placement. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 8–13; see also Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *5–10 (discussing each of Ms. Joaquin’s four allegations in turn). Ms. Joaquin prevailed on only one of those four allegations. See Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *5–10. In lightof Ms. Joaquin’s limited degree of success, a fee award based on all of Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys ’ claimed hours would be “excessive.” Hensley , 461 U.S. at 436. But the Court r ecognizes that a reduction o f seventy-five percent would be inappropriate, b ecause Ms. Joaquin’s claims we re interrelated and her attorneys therefore devoted some of their claimed hours to developing her claims as a whole. See id. at

5 Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys’ invoi ce also supports the Court’s dec ision to reduce Ms. Joaquin’s overall award, inst ead of awarding her only those fees related to her successful claim about transition services. Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys have itemized their invoices without reference to Ms. Joaquin’s spec ific assertions about how FPCS f ailed to implement G.H.’s IEP. See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 1. Their invoices thus show that they spent the ir time in furtherance of Ms. Joaquin’s case as a whole, w ithout dividing their time betw een Ms. Joaquin’s discrete claims about G.H.’s IEP.15 435 n.11 (disapproving of “a mathematical approach comparing th e total number of issues in the case with those actually preva iled upon” (internal quotation ma rks omitted) (quoting the district court’s opinion)). Accordingly, t he Court finds that a fifty p ercent reduction equitably reflects “the significance of the overa ll relief obtained by [Ms. Joaqui n] in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id. at 435. 6 b. Specific Time Entries FPCS urges the Court to strike certain time entries from Ms. Jo aquin’s attorneys’ invoice: (1) entries that predate when Ms. Joaquin filed her administrat ive due process complaint, Def.’s Opp’n at 13; (2) entries that i nvolve communications between Ms . Joaquin’s attorneys, id. at 15; (3) entries that relate to IEP meetings, id. at 14; and (4) entries that are irrelevant to this case, id. at 13–14, 17. 7 In response, Ms. Joaquin has volun tarily removed certain entr ies from her attorneys’ invoice. See Pl.’s Reply at 5. The Court addr esses each of FPCS’s four cate gories of contested entries in turn. First, the Court finds that, c ontrary to FPCS’s contentions, Ms . Joaquin’s attorneys’ entries predating the administrative due process complaint are eligible for an attorneys’ fee award. “A court may reduce an award of attorneys’ fees if the plaintiffs incurred charges that predate the administrative h earing by such an extended period o f time that they lack ‘a

6 The Court’s decision also takes into account the Supreme Court ’s statement that “Congress has not authorized an a ward of fees whenever it was r easonable for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit or whenever conscien tious counsel tried the case withdevotion and skill.” Hensley , 461 U.S. at 436. “[T]he product of hours reasonably expended o n the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rat e may be an excessi ve amount . . . even where the plaintiff’s claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith.” Id. In light of all these considerations, the Court finds that a fifty-per cent reduction is appropriate.
7 FPCS also asserts that the Court should not award fees for work performed “on the issue of [the] appropriateness of [G.H. ’s] placement.” Def.’s Opp’n at 13, 16. But because the Court will not reduce Ms. Joaquin’s fee award on a claim-by-claim bas is, see supra Part IV.B.1.a, the Court does not consider the prec ise issues to which Ms. Joaquin ’s attorneys’ hours correspond.16 meaningful relationship with that hearing.’” Santamaria v. District of Columbia , 875 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Czarniewy v. District of Columbia , 2005 WL 692081, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2005)). But “courts in this district have found that ‘a year in advance of a hearing “is an entirely reasona ble window of time to be engagin g in productive work that will result in a favorable adminis trative decision” based on a showi ng by the plaintiff that each charge was tied to a p articular hearing.’” Rapu v. D.C. Pub. Sch. , 793 F. Supp. 2d 419, 427 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Gray v. District of Columbia , 779 F. Supp. 2d 68, 76 (D.D.C. 2011)). Here, work completed up to four months before Ms. Joaquin filed her administrative due process complaint falls within that “entirely reasonable window of time ,” and her attorneys’ itemized invoice show how each charge with in that time period was tied t o Ms. Joaquin’s administrative due process complaint (file d on January 17, 2014) and her admin istrative heari ng (held on March 7, 2014 and March 10, 2014). See Pl.’s Reply Ex. 1 at 1–4 (listi ng Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys’ annotated time entries betw een September 24, 2013 and January 1 7, 2014). See generally Due Process Compl. Notice at 1, Adm inistrative R. at 3, ECF No. 12- 1; Hr’g Officer Determination at 1, Administrative R. at 730, ECF No. 12-5 (noting the dates of Ms. Joaquin’s administrative hearing). The Court therefore de clines to strike the billing e ntries predating the date when Ms. Joaquin filed her administra tive due process complaint. Second, the Court also will not strike time entries reflecting communications between Ms. Joaquin’s two attorneys. Time spent in consultations with co-counsel in an IDEA case is compensable. See, e.g. , Taylor v. District of Columbia , 134 F. Supp. 3d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2015). To be sure, such communications c an sometimes be excessive and warrant a reduction in any later fee award. See, e.g. , Alfonso v. District of Columbia , 464 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4–5 (D.D.C. 2006). But here, the communications between Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys we re, in general, brief. See, e.g. ,17 Pl.’s Reply Ex. 1 at 14–15 (listing time entries for discussion s and emails between Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys that, in general, did not exceed 0.3 hours). When co mmunications between her attorneys were more lengthy, the y typically involved discussion of weightier topics, such as “potential issues to appeal” fr om Ms. Joaquin’s administrative case, arguments to be made in court filings, and the ramificat ions of a potential settlement. See, e.g. , id. at 15, 16, 24–26. FPCS has not attacked specific ti me entries or alleged that the attorneys’ communications, apart from being large in number, were substantively unreasonable. See Def.’s Opp’n at 15. Without more reason to find entries for c ommunications between Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys unreasonable, the Court declines to strike a ny entries relating to those communications. Third, the Court agrees with FPCS’s contention that Ms. Joaquincannot receive a fee award for any time entries relati ng to meetings of G.H.’s IEP t eam. Under the IDEA, work “relating to any meeting of the IEP Team” is not compensable un less “such meeting is convened as a result of an administrativ e proceeding or judicial action, or, at the discretion of the state, for a mediation [held in accordance with IDEA procedures].” 20 U.S .C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). Accordingly, Ms. Joaquin has voluntarily removed a time entry r elating to an IEP meeting held on February 27, 2014. See Pl.’s Reply at 5 (“Friendship c orrectly notes th at the 02/27/1 4 entries regarding the IEP meeting should n ot be included; Ms. Joaquin h as removed them.”); id. Ex. 1 at 11, 12 (noting “N[o] C[harge]” for the “2/27/2014” time entries relating to G.H.’s meeting “at his current school”). The parties disagree about whether Ms. Joaquin may receive an a ward of attorney’s fees for time entries relating to meetings held on October 22, 2013 and October 25, 2013. See Def.’s Opp’n at 14 (contending that those meetings were IEP meetings); Pl.’s Reply at 5–6 (contending that those meetings were “placement meeting[s]”). Upon examina tion of the record and the18 IDEA itself, the Court conclude s that FPCS is correct and that time entries relating to the two October 2013 meetings are not c ompensable. Although the record does not clearly state whether those meetings were IEP meeti ngs, notes from the October 25, 20 13 meeting state that “[t]he IEP

team determined that a non-public placement[] was warranted.” See Change of Placement Meeting for [G.H.], Administr ative R. at 578–79, ECF No. 12-4 ( emphasis added). Nor does Ms. Joaquin allege that the memb ers of the October meetings wer e not members of G.H.’s IEP

team. See Pl.’s Reply at 5–6. 8 And because the IDEA precludes a fee award for work relating to “any meeting of the IEP team,” without regard to the subject-ma tter of that meeting, whether the work performed for the October 201 3 meetings was “related to th is case” is irrelevant. See Pl.’s Reply 5–6 (discussing the content of the October 2013 meetings, not their membership); Ostrem V.S. ¶ 4, Pl.’s Reply Ex. 2, ECF N o. 26-1 (same). Given that M s. Joaquin has the burden to demonstrate that her claimed fees are reasonable, see Hensley , 461 U.S. at 437, the Court finds that Ms. Joaquin has failed to s how that the October 2013 meeti ngs were not meetings of G.H.’s
IEP team. 9 The Court will therefore str ike Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys’ 0.7- hour time entry for the October 22, 2013 meeting, their 1-ho ur time entry for the Octob er 25, 2013 meeting, and their

8 Indeed, the October 25, 2013 mee ting participants fit the stat utory requirements of an “IEP Team.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B), (C); Change of Placement Meeting fo r [G.H.], Administrative R. at 578–79, ECF No. 12-4.
9 Because Ms. Joaquin has not argued or submitted evidence to sh ow that the October 2013 meetings were “convened as a result of an administrative p roceeding or judicial action, or . . . for a mediation” (and there by eligible for a fee award ), see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii), the Court deems any such arguments waived. See Johnson v. Panetta , 953 F. Supp. 2d 244, 250 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[U]ndeveloped arguments . . . are deemed waived .”). In any event, because Ms. Joaquin filed her administra tive complaint on January 17, 2 014, see Due Process Compl. Notice at 1, Administrative R . at 3, ECF No. 12-1, meetings hel d in 2013 could not have been convened “as a result of an admin istrative proceeding or judici al action,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii).19 1.5-hour time entry for travel to and from the October 25, 2013 meeting. See Pl.’s Reply Ex. 1 at 2–3 (listing the relevant time entries). Fourth, the Court finds that Ms. J oaquin has adequately resolve d the concerns that FPCS raised over work that allegedl y “had nothing to do with the iss ues in this case.” Def.’s Opp’n at 14; see also id. at 17. Of the time entries FPCS found objectionable for this reason, Ms. Joaquin has voluntarily removed several of them. See Pl.’s Reply at 5 (noting that Ms. Joaquin removed time entries for work done “on 12/09/13, 12/10/13, and 01/07/14 regarding ‘truancy court’ and a ‘PINS proceeding’”); id. Ex. 1 at 3–4 (noting “N[o] C[harge] ” for the relevant time entries). And, in response to FPCS’s c ontention that a March 6, 2014 time entry was for an unrelated

case, see Def.’s Opp’n at 14 & n.*, Ms. Joaqui n has clarified that her a ttorney “inadvertently” referred to FPCS as “DCPS” “because the District of Columbia Pu blic Schools is the defendant in the large majority of [his] I DEA cases,” Pl.’s Reply at 6; O strem V.S. ¶ 7, Pl.’s Reply Ex. 2, ECF No. 26-1. The Court has no reason to doubt this narrative and thus declines to address the March 6, 2014 issue further. Lastl y, where Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys’ invoice lists time entries for work performed after the heari ng officer issued the October 30, 2015 consent order dismissing Ms. Joaquin’s case, the Court finds the time entries to be reas onable and related to this case. See Pl.’s Reply Ex. 1 at 21–24, 26. To t he extent FPCS objects tha t those time entries are for preparation of the a ttorneys’ invoice, see Def.’s Opp’n at 17, FPCS’ s objection lacks merit because “our general rule is that the court may award additiona l fees for ‘time reasonably devoted to obtaining att orney’s fees.’” Kaseman v. District of Columbia , 444 F.3d 637, 640 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA , 672 F.2d 42, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Taking into account the Court’s fi fty percent reduction for lim ited success, see supra Part IV.B.1.a, the Court determin es that Ms. Joaquin is entitle d an award of one-half of fees20 corresponding to the entries tha t remain on her attorneys’ invo ice and that do not relate to meetings of G.H.’s IEP team. 10 2. Hourly Rates The Court now considers the appropriate hourly rate to use whencalculating Ms. Joaquin’s fee award. Ms. Joa quin urges the Court to use ra tes found in a version of the Laffey Matrix, described by the D.C . Circuit as the “LSI Laffey Matrix,” which “uses the Legal Services Index of the Bureau of L abor Statistics to adjust for inflation.” Eley , 973 F.3d at 101;

see Pl.’s Mot. at 5–6; id. Ex. 2, ECF No. 24-2 (reproducing Ms . Joaquin’s proposed matrix , printed from “laffeymatrix.com”); id. Ex. 3, ¶¶ 7–10, ECF No. 24-3 (explaining how Mr. Kavanaugh, an economist, used the Legal Services Index to a djust the original Laffey matrix). 11 FPCS argues that rates in the LSI Laffey Matrix are not reasonable and that the Court

10 Accordingly, the Court calculate s compensable hours for Mr. Os trem, Ms. Joaquin’s administrative counsel, as follows: 92.8 hours for legal work a nd 3 hours for travel between June 1, 2013 and May 31, 2014, see Pl.’s Reply Ex. 1 at 1–15; 9.7 hours for legal work between Ju ne 1, 2014 and May 31, 2015, see id. at 15–16; and 26.8 hours for le gal work between June 1 2015 and May 31, 2016, see id. at 16–24. The Court calculates work and travel hours separate ly because, in this circuit, travel time is compensated at half of the attorney’s appropriate hourly rate. See McAllister , 21 F. Supp. 3d at 106. The Court calculates compensable hours for Mr. Tyrka, Ms. Joaqu in’s counsel in this Court, as follows: 1.5 hours fo r legal work between June 1, 201 3 and May 31, 2014, see id. at 25; 29.75 hours for legal work between June 1, 2014 and May 31, 2015, see id. at 25–26; and 32.75 hours for legal work be tween June 1 2015 and May 31, 2016 , see id. at 26.
11 Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys’ invoi ce indicates that Ms. Joaquin se eks an hourly rate of $586 for Ms. Joaquin’s administ rative counsel and an hourly rat e of $661 for Ms. Joaquin’s counsel in this Court. See Pl.’s Reply Ex. 1, ECF No. 26-1. These rates correspond to 2015–2016 hourly rates that the LSI Laffey Matrix lists for attorneys who are eight to ten years and eleven to nineteen years out of law school, respectively. See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 2 at 1, ECF No. 24-2. The Court notes that, even if the LSI Laffey Matrix did prescribe reasonable hourly rates for Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys, Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys would not be eligible for 2015–2016 hourly rates for allof their work performed on Ms. J oaquin’s case. Her attorneys performed much of the work on her case before J une 1, 2015, which is the date on which 2015–2016 rates took effect. See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 2 at 1 (showing “6/ 01/14-5/31/16” as the date r ange to which21 should follow Wilhite v. District of Columbia , 110 F. Supp. 3d 77, 91 (D.D.C. 2015) (Kay, Mag. J.), and use hourly rates “calculated at 75% of the Laffey Matrix.” Def.’s Opp’n at 17–18. Before deciding which party has th e better view, the Court brie fly summarizes the law governing this issue. a. Governing Principles “Whether an hourly rate is reas onable turns on three sub-elemen ts: (1) ‘the attorney’s billing practices,’ (2) ‘the attorney’s skill, experience, and reputation’ and (3) ‘the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.’” Eley , 793 F.3d at 100 (brackets omitted) (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1107). Because the plaintiff bears the burden of j ustifying the reasonableness of her attorneys’ requested hourly rate, she mus t “produce satisfactory evidence— in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits —that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawye rs of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Id. at 100, 104 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). To that end, if an IDEA plain tiff wishes to base her fee on the LSI Laffey Matrix, she must provide “evidence that her ‘r equested rates are in line wi th those prevailing in the community for similar services ,’ i.e. , IDEA litigation.” Id. at 104 (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109). That evidence may be found in “[1] surveys [that] updat e [the matrix]; [2] affidavits reciting the precise fees that a ttorneys with similar qualifica tions have received from fee-paying clients in comparable cases; a nd [3] evidence of recent fees aw arded by the courts or through

Ms. Joaquin’s preferred rates correspond); Pl.’s Reply Ex. 1 at 1–16, 25–26 (listing work done before June 1, 2015); see also infra note 16 (declining to award c urrent hourly rates, even under the Laffey Matrix, because Ms. Joaquin did not meet her burden to show th at current hourly rates, as opposed to historical hourly rates, would be reasonab le in this case).22 settlement to attorneys with com parable qualifications handling similar cases.” Id. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitte d) (emphasis added) (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109). As the D.C. Circuit has made clear, a version of the Laffey Matrix “should not be the default rate for fees awarded pursuant to [the] IDEA.” Snead v. District of Columbia , No. 15-0376, 2015 WL 5921901, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 2015); see Eley , 793 F.3d at 105 (finding tha t the district court abused its discretion by “concludi ng that ‘some version of the Laffey matrix is presumptively reasonable[]’” (quoting Eley v. District of Columbia , 999 F. Supp. 2d 137, 159 (D.D.C. 2013))).
b. LSI Laffey Matrix Rates Not Appropriate The Court now applies these prin ciples to Ms. Joaquin’s case an d the evidence she submitted in support of her fee motion. See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 11, ECF No. 24-11 (reproducing a billing survey of various law firms); id. Exs. 4–10, ECF Nos. 24-4–24-10 (including seven affidavits from IDEA attorneys ); Pl.’s Mot. 12 (noting court de cisions adopting LSI Laffey Matrix rates). Although Ms. Joa quin supports her requested hou rly rates with evidence from each of the three relevant categor ies of evidence (surveys, aff idavits, and recent fee awards), see Eley , 793 F.3d at 101, Ms. Joaquin’s ev idence does not demonstrate that the LSI Laffey Matrix provides reasonable hourly rates f or her case. The Court discu sses each category of evidence in

turn. First, Ms. Joaquin has produced “a separate survey” in support of the rates in the LSI Laffey Matrix. See Pl.’s Mot. at 6; Pl.’s Mot. E x. 11. But this survey lacks the regional and subject-matter specific ity to show that the LSI Laffey Matrix rates “are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services .” Eley , 793 F

. 3d at 104 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109). Because the survey canvasses billing rates of partners at law firms nati onwide, and not those of attorneys practicing in the Washington,23 D.C. region, see Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 11, it is not evidence of rates “prevailing in the community,” Eley , 793 F.3d at 104 (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109). Likewise, the survey does not specify whether its reported rat es correspond to legal services rendered in IDEA cases. See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 11. Indeed, the survey does not even specify whether it queried litigators, as opposed to transactional attorneys. See id. The survey therefore does notprovide evidence of rates “prevailing in the community for similar services ,” Eley , 793 F

. 3d at 104 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109), and the Court disr egards it in considering whether LSI Laffey Matrix rates are reasonable here. Second, Ms. Joaquin relies on her two attorneys’ affidavits, as well as five additional affidavits from local practitione rs specializing in special edu cation cases, to support her view that
LSI Laffey Matrix fees are reasonable in this case. See Pl.’s Mot. 6; Pl.’s Mot. Exs. 4–10. But these affidavits do not “recit[e] the precise fees that attorne ys with similar qualifications have
received from fee-paying clients in comparable cases.” Eley , 793 F

. 3d at 101 (emphasis added) (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109). They therefo re do not justify Ms. Joaquin’ s assertion that
LSI Laffey Matrix fees are a reasonable hourl y rate for her attorneys in this case. For instance, Mr. Tyrka, one of Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys, states that his firm “has been retained at [LSI Laffey Matrix] rates within the las t six months.” Tyrka V.S. ¶ 9, Pl .’s Mot. Ex. 5, ECF No. 24-5. Similarly, Mr. O strem, Ms. Joaquin’s othe r attorney, states that his law firm “has always matched its hourl y rates” to those in the LSI Laffey Matrix, but he does not address whether he receives paym ent at those rates. Ostrem V.S . ¶ 8, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4, ECF No. 24-4. Both Mr. Tyrka’s and Mr. O strem’s affidavits lack an y recitation of the “precise fees” that they have “received,” Eley , 793 F

. 3d at 101 (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109); they focus instead on the fees they charged . Another affidavit Ms. Joaquin provided suffers from the24 same problem. See Moran V.S. ¶¶ 9–12, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 7, ECF No. 24-7. And her o ther affidavits state neither the prec ise hourly rate the declarant- attorneys use nor whether the attorneys match their rates to those in the LSI Laffey Matrix. See Savit V.S. ¶¶ 12–14, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 6, ECF No. 24-6; Hill V.S. ¶¶ 8–9, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 8, ECF No . 24-8; Mendoza V.S. ¶¶ 7–11, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 9, ECF No. 24-9; Hec ht V.S. ¶¶ 9–10, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 10, ECF No. 24-10. Without evidence of the precise fees Ms . Joaquin’s atto rneys and other IDEA attorneys have received, the Court cannot determin e whether the LSI Laffey Matrix rates she requests here “are in line with those prevailing in the community.” Eley , 793 F

. 3d at 104 (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109). To be sure, two of Ms. Joaquin’s affidavits do assert that the declarant-attorneys have been paid at LSI Laffey Matrix rates. See Tyrka V.S. ¶ 9 (noting “seve ral clients” who pay LSI Laffey Matrix rates); Moran V.S. ¶ 12 (st ating that thos e rates “are r egularly paid”). But those affidavits do not specify, out of t he hundreds of IDEA cases th at the two attorneys handle, how many of the lawyers’ clients pay the LSI Laffey Matrix rates. Compare Tyrka V.S. ¶ 14 (stating that Mr. Tyrka’s law firm “has litigated hundreds of IDEA cases in the District”) ; Moran V.S. ¶ 4 (“I have litigated approximate ly more than 500 IDEA cases.”), with Tyrka V.S. ¶ 9 (omitting any number describing how many clients pay Mr. Tyrka’s law firm at LSI Laffey Matrix rates); Moran V.S. ¶ 12 (same, for Mr. Mor an’s law firm). As a result, the Court cannot determine whether the LSI Laffey Matrix rates are the lawyers’ st andard rates, or whether they receive payment at those rates from outlier clients only. As a whole, Ms. Joaquin’s affidavits do not substantiate her argument th at “IDEA lawyers earn [LSI Laffey Matrix] rates on the market.” Pl.’s Mot. 13. 12

12 The Court notes that the declar ant-attorneys in Ms. Joaquin’s affidavits state that their practices are struggling and that they look for relief in the f orm of full Laffey Matrix rates and LSI Laffey Matrix rates. See, e.g. , Moran V.S. ¶ 13 (“[F]ees equali ng 75% of the USAO version25 Third, Ms. Joaquin cites several cases decided in this district , as well as settlements Mr. Tyrka negotiated with the Dis trict of Columbia Public Schoo ls (“DCPS”), to support her requested rates. See Pl.’s Mot. 12, 14–15; Tyrka V.S. ¶¶ 27, 29. But, with respectto the cases she cites, most of them are notIDEA cases, and thus are not “e vidence of recent fees award . . . to attorneys . . . handling similar cases .” Eley , 793 F.3d at 101 (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109); see CREW v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice , 80 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2–3 (D.D.C. 2015) (adopting the LSI Laffey Matrix rates, but in a Freedom of Information Act case); Salazar v. District of Columbia , 991 F. Supp. 2d 39, 47, 52–55 (D.D.C. 2014) (same, in a cas e involving non-IDEA civil r ights claims against the District of Columbia); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. , 426 F.3d 694, 699, 708–10 (3d Cir. 2005) (same, in an environmental law case); see also Eley , 793 F.3d at 104 (finding citations to non-IDEA cases insufficient to s how requested rates’ reasonable ness). The D.C. Circuit vacated the one IDEA case Ms. Joaquin cites, Eley v. District of Columbia , 999 F. Supp. 2d 137, 154–56 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated , 793 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and that case has not yet reach ed its conclusion on remand. See Civil Docket, Eley v. District of Columbia , No. 11-0309 (D.D.C.) (last updated Apr. 25, 2016). 13 Because the “recent fees award ed by courts” in these cases we re

of the Laffey matrix . . . are too little to k eep a firm in business . . . . ”). But, to the extent that the attorneys rely on a public interes t in granting them larger fee awards, see, e.g. , Tyrka V.S. ¶¶ 54–59 (explaining that, because of irregular fee awards, “ID EA administrative cases from non-paying clients [receive] the lowest priority,” even though “the students of indigent parents tend to have much greater need of h elp”), another public intere st favors smaller fee awards: public education itself. “[I]nflat ed fee awards are far from h armless; they produce windfalls to attorneys at the expens e of public education.” Price v. District of Columbia , 792 F.3d 112, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Brown, J., concurri ng). Inflated fees can, i n this manner, harm “the very children IDEA seeks to protect.” Id. at 118. 13 The district court in Eley may very well decline on remand to adopt LSI Laffey Matrix rates. In that case, the Unite d States has filed a Statement o f Interest opposing any fee award based on the LSI Laffey Matrix rates. See Statement of Interest of United States at 2–16, Eley v. District of Columbia , No. 11-0309 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2015).26 not awarded in “similar cases,” they do not support Ms. Joaquin ’s assertion that LSI Laffey Matrix rates are reasonable for this case. Nor do Mr. Tyrka’s settlements with DCPS render the LSI Laffey Matrix rates reasonable. Although Mr. Tyrka’s a ffidavit does indicate that the settlements compensated his law firm at rates close to LSI Laffey Matrix rates, see Tyrka V.S. ¶¶ 9–13, the DCPS settlements appear to apply to cases litigated between 2006 and 2008, see id. ¶ 10. Because Mr. Tyrka’s law firm completed work for those cas es between eight and ten years ago, settlements from that time period are not “evidence of recent fees awarded . . . through settlement.” Eley , 793 F.3d at 101 (emphasis added) (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109). Even if the LSI Laffey Matrix tracks legal services prices in the Washington, D.C. area over time, see Kavanaugh Decl. ¶ 7, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 3, ECF No. 24-3, it is fully possi ble that changes in preva iling hourly rates for IDEA cases did not keep pace with changes in legal services prices general ly. Thus, fees paid in IDEA cases eight to ten years ago are not e vidence of fees prevailing in t he community for IDEA cases now, even if both sets of fees derive from the LSI Laffey Matrix. Ms. Joaquin has presented no evidence to the contrary. 14 Like Ms. Joaquin’s citations to non-IDEA cases, her attorney affidavits, and her survey of atto rney billing rates, the DCPS settlements do not show that the
LSI Laffey Matrix rates set rea sonable hourly rates for her attorneys’ wo rk on her case.

14 Given that a fee cap applied to s ome of Mr. Tyrka’s settlement s, their persuasive value here is questionable, even as evidence that LSI Laffey Matrix rates were reas onable at the time of those settlements. See Tyrka V.S. ¶¶ 12, 29 & nn.1, 2 (expl aining that, on two occasi ons in which “DCPS settled large groups of Tyrka & Associates[’] bills ,” “federal law prohibited the District of Columbia from paying a ttorneys’ fees for IDEA cases in excess of $4,000 per case”). Given the fee cap, DCPS may have l acked incentive to insist on a lower rate, which means that Mr. Tyrka’s settlements may not ha ve reflected prevailing rates in the community for IDEA litigation, even at the time he ne gotiated those settlements. See also Rooths v. District of Columbia, 802 F. Supp. 2d 56, 62 (D.D.C. 2011) (reasoning, in a case in w hich the plaintiff cited similar settlements, that “the amount of fees that the Districtagrees to pay an attorney as part of a bulk settlement is not determined by market forces”).27 Accordingly, the Court will not a ward Ms. Joaquin attorneys’ fe es based on LSI Laffey Matrix

rates.

c. Laffey Matrix Rates Not Appropriate Based on the evidence provided, Ms. Joaquin has failed to meet her burden to show that her requested rates are reasonable. See generally Eley , 793 F.3d at 104 (indica ting that the plaintiff has the burden to show the reasonableness of her requ ested rates). Having decided that Ms. Joaquin should receive a fee award, however, see supra Parts IV.A, IV.B.1.a, the Court must still determine reasonable hour ly rates to use in calculating h er fee award. The Court may typically do so by reference to the Laffey Matrix prepared by the Unite d States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. See Brown , 80 F. Supp. 3d at 96 & n.2. But FPCS contends that reasonabl e hourly rates for this case sh ould actually be seventy-five percent of the relevant Laffey Matrix rates, becaus e the issues in this case “were not novel or complex.” See Def.’s Opp’n at 17–18. Ms. Joaquin disagrees. See Pl.’s Reply at
8–10. 15 The parties’ disagreement cen ters on whether this case is “co mplex” enough (or deals with issues “complex” enough) to merit Laffey Matrix rates. See Def.’s Opp’n at 17–18; Pl.’s Reply at 8–10. But, at this point i n the development of this d istrict’s case law on IDEA fees, the Court finds complexity comparisons unhelpful in determining a r easonable hourly rate for IDEA

15 Apart from arguing against FPCS’ s assertion that this case is not complex, Ms. Joaquin also asserts that FPCS did not “[m ]eet [i]ts [b]urden” to rebutMs. Joaquin’s evidence in support of her requested hourly rates. P l.’s Reply at 10–11. However, because the Court has determined that Ms. Joaquin did not meet her burden to demonstrate her request ed rates’ reasonableness in the first instance, FPCS does nothave the burden to rebut any showing of reasonableness. See Brown , 80 F. Supp. 3d at 95–96 (explaining th at “the burden shifts t o the defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s showing” only after “the plaintiff provides suffici ent and convincing evidence” about “the attorney’s billi ng practices, skill , experience, and reput ation, as well as the prevailing market rates in the relevant co mmunity”). The Court accordingl y addresses Ms. Joaquin’s burden-shifting argument no further.28 fees, at least to the extent Ms . Joaquin compares her case to n on-IDEA cases. See, e.g. , Pl.’s Reply at 9–10. The Court’s task he re is to determine the “rate s prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding a rose for the kind and quality o f services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). Given the number of IDEA fee opinions that co urts in this dist rict have issued, the Court can arrive at the “rat es prevailing in the community, ” id. , without comparing this case
to non-IDEA cases. In this district, “the vast num ber of . . . cases awarding IDEAfees” adopt rates equivalent to seventy-five percent of Laffey Matrix rates. Reed v. District of Columbia , 134 F. Supp. 3d 122, 131 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed , No. 15-7119 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 28, 2015). The Court therefore finds that the prevai ling rates in the community for IDEA litigation are those equivalent to seventy-five percent of Laffey Matrix rates. See also McNeil , 2015 WL 9484460, at *6 (reaching the same conclusion); Reed , 134 F. Supp. 3d at 131 (collecting cases). This status quo has not changed after the D.C . Circuit issued its opinion in Eley on July 10, 2015. See Eley , 793 F.3d at 97 (decided July 10, 2015); McNeil , 2015 WL 9484460, at *1,*5 (signed Dec. 29, 2015);
Snead , 2015 WL 5921901, at *5 (si gned Oct. 7, 2015); Reed , 134 F. Supp. 3d at 122, 131 (signed Sept. 28, 2015). As the Court has previously not ed, however, “in unusual cases, an IDEA plaintiff might be able to ‘establish the applicability of [the] Laffey [matrix] by proffering evidence that their IDEA proceeding was unusually complex.’” McNeil , 2015 WL 9484460, at *6 (alterations in original) (quoting Snead , 2015 WL 5921901, at *4). But here , Ms. Joaquin has not asserted that her case was particularly compl ex when compared to a typical ID EA case. See Pl.’s Reply at 8–10. Indeed, Ms. Joaquin argue s that the Court should not focus on individual case complexity at all in determining a rea sonable hourly rate. See id. And to the extent that Ms. Joaquin asserts29 complexity based on (1) the fact t hat “the parties litigated anentire substantive federal case,” (2) Ms. Joaquin’s two-day admin istrative hearing, and (3) the e ight-hundred-page record, id. at 8, those facts do not render Ms. Joa quin’s case any more complex t han other IDEA cases in which this Court has awarded fees using rates equivalent to seventy-f ive percent of Laffey Matrix rates. See, e.g. , Cook v. District of Columbia , 115 F. Supp. 3d 98, 100–01, 103–04 (D.D.C. 2015) (using rates equivalent to seventy-five percent of Laffey Matrix rates, for a substantive case litigated in federal court); Wood v. District of Columbia , 72 F. Supp. 3d 13, 24 (D.D.C. 2014) (same, for a case involving a two -day administrative hearing); McClam v. District of Columbia , 808 F. Supp. 2d 184, 190 (D.D.C. 2011) (declining to award “ Laffey high-end rates” for a case involving a three-day administr ative hearing). Lacking evidenc e that Ms. Joaquin’s case was unusually complex, the Court will award Ms. Joaquin attorneys’ fees using the prevailing rates in the community for IDEA litigation: rates equivalent to seventy- five percent of Laffey Matrix

rates. 16

16 In adopting rates equivalent t o seventy-five percent of Laffey Matrix rates, the Court declines to use only the current Laffey Matrix rates. Contra Pl.’s Mot. at 15 (“This Court should award current hourly rates.”). I t is true that, outside of the IDEA context, some courts have acknowledged that applying current rates when calculating attorneys’ fees may be proper. See Missouri v. Jenkins ex rel. Agyei , 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989) (“An adjustment for delay in payment is . . . an appropriate f actor in the determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee under [42 U.S.C.] § 1988.”); Copeland v. Marshall , 641 F.2d 880, 893 & n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (obser ving, in a Title VII case, tha t “[a] percentage adjustment to reflect the delay in receipt of payment . . . may be appropriat e,” and could be based on “present hourly rates”). But here, in arguing for current rates, Ms. Joaquin does not ex plain why current rates are appropriate in her case specifica lly, nor does she provide exam ples of courts applying current hourly rates for fee awards i n other recent IDEA cases. See Pl.’s Mot. at 15 (citing only Jenkins ex rel. Agyei and Copeland , both non-IDEA civil rights cases). See generally McAllister v. District of Columbia , 53 F. Supp. 3d 55, 58 n.2 (D.D.C. 2014) (“In general, compens ation for a delay in payment may be more pert inent in [non-IDEA] civil righ ts matters given the lengthy duration of most civil rights li tigation, as compared to the re latively transient nature of IDEA litigation.”). Ms. Joaquin has th erefore failed to meet her bu rden to show that current hourly rates are “in line wi th those prevailing i n the community for s imilar services.” Eley , 793 F.3d at30 C. Total Fees and Costs The Court calculates Ms. Joaqui n’s total atto rneys’ fees by fir st adopting the Laffey Matrix rates. 17 The Court then reduces the rat es by one-quarter to reflect th e prevailing rate in the community for IDEA litigation. See supra Part IV.B.2.c. 18 After calculating these rates, the Court then further reduces the rates by one-half to account for Ms. Joaquin’s limited success.
See supra Part IV.B.1.a. 19 The Court then multiplies those hourly rates by Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys’ compensable hours t o determine her total fee award. See supra note 10 (listing

104 (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109). The Court will therefore use rates equival ent to seventy-five percent of historical Laffey Matrix rates, following the practice adopted in other recent IDEA cases. See, e.g. , McAllister , No. 11-2173, 2016 WL 614363, at *3–4 & n.1 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2016), appeal docketed , No. 16-7035 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 2016); Reed , 134 F. Supp. 3d at 131; Salmeron v. District of Columbia , 77 F. Supp. 3d 201, 210 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated on other grounds , 113 F. Supp. 3d 263 (D.D.C. 2015); McAllister , 53 F. Supp. 3d at 57–58.
17 See USAO Attorney’s Fees Matrix – 2015 – 2016 , Civil Div. of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C., https://www.jus tice.gov/usao-dc/ file/796471/do wnload (last visited May 27, 2016); Laffey Matrix -- 2014-2015 , Civil Div. of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C., https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-d c/legacy/2014 /07/14/Laffey%20Matrix_2014- 2015.pdf (last visited May 27, 2016); Laffey Matrix -- 2003-2014 , Civil Div. of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C., http s://www.justice.gov/sites/defau lt/files/usao-dc/legacy/2013/09/ 09/Laffey_Matrix%202014.pdf ( last visited May 27, 2016). During the time period he worke d on Ms. Joaquin’s case, Mr. Ost rem had five years of experience (2013–2014), six years of experience (2014–2015), an d seven years of experience (2015–2016) practicing law. See Ostrem V.S. ¶ 10 (indicating th at Mr. Ostrem graduated from law school in May 2008). Mr. Tyrka had fifteen years of experi ence (2013–2014), sixteen years of experience (2014–2015), and seven teen years of experience (2 015–2016) practicing law. See Tyrka V.S. ¶ 16 (indicating that Mr. Tyrka graduated from law s chool in June 1998). Accordingly, Laffey Matrix hourly rates for Ms. Joaqui n’s attorneys are as follows : Mr. Ostrem: $295 (2013–2014), $300 (2014–2015), and $332 (2015–2016); Mr. T yrka: $450 (2013–2014), $460 (2014–2015), and $504 (2015–2016).
18 Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys’ reduc ed hourly rates are as follows: Mr. Ostrem: $221.25 (2013–2014), $225.00 (2014–2015), and $249.00 (2015–2016); Mr. Tyrka: $337.50 (2013–2014), $345.00 (2014–2015), and $378.00 (2015–2016).
19 The hourly rates reflecting Ms. Joaquin’s limited success, rou nded to the nearest cent, are as follows: Mr. Ostrem: $110.63 (2013–2014), $112.50 (2014– 2015), and $124.50 (2015–2016); Mr. Tyrka: $168.75 (2013–2014), $172.50 (2014–2015 ), and $189.00 (2015–2016).31 Ms. Joaquin’s attorneys’ compensable hours). 20 On the basis of these calculations, the Court will award Ms. Joaquin $26,435.00 in attorn eys’ fees. The Court wil l also award Ms. Joaquin $798.36 in costs, an amount that FPCS did not challenge. See Def.’s Opp’n at 5–19; Pl.’s Reply Ex. 1 at 24–25, 27. 21
V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Joaquin’s Motion for Fees and Co sts (ECF No. 24) shall be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART . An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: May 27, 2016 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

20 The Court’s calculated fee amounts, listed by year and rounded to the nearest cent, are as follows: Mr. Ostrem: $10,266.46 for 2013–2014 (92.8 hours at $110.63 per hour), $165.93 for 2013–2014 travel (3 hours at $55.31 per hour), $1091.25 for 201 4–2015 (9.7 hours at $112.50 per hour), and $3336.60 for 2015–2016 (26.8 hours at $124.50 pe r hour); Mr. Tyrka: $263.13 for 2013–2014 (1.5 hours at $168.75 per hour), $5131.88 for 2014–20 15 (29.75 hours at $172.50 per hour), and $6189.75 for 2015–2016 (32.75 hours at $189.00 per h our). Mr. Ostrem’s hourly rate for travel is half of his hour ly rate for legal work. See McAllister , 21 F. Supp. 3d at 106; supra note 10.
21 $382.36 of Ms. Joaquin’s award of c osts corresponds to costs i ncurred by Mr. Ostrem. See Pl.’s Reply Ex. 1 at 24–25. $416.00 of Ms. Joaquin’s award of costs corresponds to costs incurred by Mr. Tyrka. See id. at 27.