Filed 12/15/21 P. v. Love CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GLEN QUINTRELL LOVE,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B302725

(Super. Ct. No. YA040317)

(Los Angeles County)

Glen Quintrell Love appeals an order denying his

petition for resentencing (Pen. Code,

1 § 1170.95) of his first 

degree murder conviction. In 1999, he was convicted of second 

degree robbery (§ 211) and first degree murder with a robberymurder special circumstance finding. (§§ 187, 189, 190.2, subd. 

(a)(17)(A).)

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

In 2019, Love filed a petition for resentencing. The 

trial court issued an order to show cause on his section 1170.95 

petition and held an evidentiary hearing. It found Love was not 

entitled to resentencing because he was “a major participant and 

acted with reckless indifference” to human life. We conclude, 

among other things, that Love has not shown that the trial court 

erred by denying his petition. We affirm.

FACTS

Raymond Williams was fatally shot one night after 

he won money gambling. On the night of April 11, 1997, Chaka 

Thomas picked up Love and drove to a dice game in Hawthorne. 

Several other men were there, including Lamar Salone and 

Williams. Salone showed Thomas a semiautomatic pistol and 

said he was “strapped.” Love participated in the dice game and 

lost money.

Williams won his bets that evening and boasted 

about his luck to the others. He left the game and drove away in 

his van. Thomas left the game shortly after Williams departed 

and was joined by Love and Salone. According to Thomas, he 

decided to drive them home because he was nervous about Salone

having a gun.

When they reached the corner of 139th Street and 

Kornblum Avenue, Salone asked Thomas to stop the car so he 

could use the telephone. Thomas parked near a phone booth and 
3

Salone got out, followed by Love. A few moments later, Thomas 

heard four or five gunshots. Love ran back to the car and 

excitedly told Thomas, “Let’s go.” As they were driving away, 

Love told Thomas that Williams “started trippin so we had to 

knock him off.” He showed Thomas a roll of money and offered 

him some, which Thomas refused.

Williams was still breathing after being shot. He was 

alive when police and paramedics arrived, but he died after being 

taken to the hospital.

On the day after the shooting, Thomas and Salone 

drove to Love’s house, where they all discussed the crime and 

agreed on a story about Thomas giving Love a ride on the night of 

the dice game after Love’s car overheated. 

Herschel Houston attended the dice game on April 

11. He told police that he had a conversation with Love. Love 

described the robbery and shooting. Love said that he had 

“jacked” Williams and that Williams had been shot in the head;

Salone had fired the gun after Williams made a “funny” move.

Love was convicted of second degree robbery and first 

degree murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance 

finding. We affirmed his conviction. We ruled that the evidence 

was sufficient to support the robbery-murder special 

circumstance finding and that Love was a major participant in 

the robbery and he acted with reckless indifference to human life.
4

On January 4, 2019, Love filed a petition for 

resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court issued an 

order to show cause for an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing 

the court found Love was ineligible for resentencing under section 

1170.95. It found Love was “a major participant and acted with 

reckless indifference” to human life.2

DISCUSSION

Denying the Section 1170.95 Petition

Love contends the trial court erred by denying his

section 1170.95 petition. We disagree.

The origin of section 1170.95 was the Governor’s 

signing of Senate Bill No. 1437 in 2018. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, 

§ 4.) “Senate Bill 1437 ‘amend[s] the felony murder rule and the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to 

murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a 

person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to 

kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who 

acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. 

Gutierrez-Salazar (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 411, 417, italics added.)

A defendant convicted of felony murder may file a 

petition under section 1170.95 alleging he or she “could not be 

convicted of first or second degree murder” because of changes to 

the law required by Senate Bill No. 1437. (People v. Gutierrez2 We grant respondent’s request for judicial notice.
5

Salazar, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 417.) “A trial court receiving 

a petition under section 1170.95 ‘shall review the petition and 

determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that 

the petitioner falls within the provisions of this section.’

(§ 1170.95, subd (c).)” (Ibid.) “If the petitioner has made such a 

showing, the trial court ‘shall issue an order to show cause.’ ” 

(Ibid.) The trial court must then hold a hearing to determine 

whether to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the 

petitioner. (Ibid.)

Consequently, there are two stages involved in a 

section 1170.95 petition. If a prima facie showing is made for 

relief in the first stage, the trial court proceeds to the second 

stage and issues an order to show cause and the case proceeds to 

an evidentiary hearing. Where the prima facie showing is not 

made in the first stage, the court may deny the petition.

The Evidentiary Hearing

This case went to a second stage section 1170.95 

evidentiary hearing and we will review the trial court’s findings 

from the record of that proceeding. 

“At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner 

is entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the 

prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 

petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. If the prosecution fails to 

sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any 
6

allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be 

vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining 

charges. The prosecutor and the petitioner may rely on the record

of conviction or offer new or additional evidence to meet their

respective burdens.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3), italics added.) 

At the hearing, after the presentation of new 

evidence or the record of conviction, the trial court will weigh the 

evidence, draw inferences, and make credibility assessments. 

(People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 816.) “ ‘[I]f the 

record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts 

refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is 

justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the 

petitioner.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) We 

apply the substantial evidence standard of review on appeals 

from second stage section 1170.95 hearings. (People v. Lopez

(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 936, 954, review granted Feb. 10, 2021, 

S265974.)

Senate Bill No. 1437 does not provide resentencing

relief for a defendant convicted of murder who was “ ‘a major 

participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless 

indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez-Salazar, supra, 

38 Cal.App.5th at p. 417.) Here the trial court found Love was a 

major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human 
7

life. The People contend these findings are supported by the 

record.

After the trial court issued the order to show cause, 

the People elected to rely on the “record of conviction.” 

(§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) They attached the appellate decision 

that affirmed Love’s conviction and they relied on the statement 

of facts in that decision.

Love responded by filing a 43-page set of points and

authorities and a copy of a 2014 declaration by defendant Salone 

which had been prepared for a prior proceeding. In that 

declaration, Salone stated in conclusory terms, “Glen Love had 

nothing to do with the robbery or murder. I acted alone.” This

was not new evidence. The trial court had previously rejected 

claims based on that 2014 declaration. The court said, “I’m not 

going to retry that.” Moreover, the credibility of that declaration 

is a matter exclusively decided by the trial court at the section 

1170.95 evidentiary hearing. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th

at p. 971; People v. Duchine, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 816.)

At the hearing Love appeared with counsel. He had 

the opportunity to present new evidence to show his eligibility for 

section 1170.95 relief. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) But Love did not

testify. He did not summit a declaration. He did not call any 

witnesses. He did not present any evidence. His counsel simply 

made oral arguments. Most of those arguments related to facts 
8

in the record of conviction found in the decision that affirmed 

Love’s conviction. 

In that 2001 decision, we affirmed the special 

circumstances findings. We rejected Love’s claims that he was 

not a major participant in the robbery and that he did not act 

with reckless indifference to human life. We cited facts from the 

record of conviction to show why these claims lacked merit. We 

said: 1) Love “was riding in a car with Thomas and Salone, who 

was armed with a gun”; 2) “Love left the car with Salone, 

approached Williams, and, by his own later admission to 

Herschel Houston, ‘jacked’ Williams”; 3) “Salone shot Williams 

when Williams resisted, and Love took money from Williams’ 

pockets”; and 4) “Love had a motive to rob Williams because 

Williams had won money gambling that evening while Love had 

lost his bets.”

We also stated, “The jury could reasonably infer from 

this evidence that Love acted with reckless indifference to human 

life when he and an armed cohort approached Williams to rob 

him at gunpoint.” (Italics added.) We said the jury “could further 

infer that Love was a major participant in the robbery based on,” 

1) “his presence at the scene of the robbery and shooting,” 2) “his 

admission that he had ‘jacked’ Williams,” and 3) “his removal of 

the money from Williams’ pocket.” (Italics added.)
9

At the end of the second stage section 1170.95 

hearing, the trial court made the following findings: 1) “Mr. 

Salone was armed with a gun. Mr. Love left the car with Mr. 

Salone, or within seconds after Mr. Salone left, approached the 

victim”; 2) Love “admitted when he returned to the car that he 

jacked the victim”; 3) “four or five gunshots were heard”; 4) “Mr. 

Love had a motive to rob Mr. Williams because he had gambled 

with Mr. Williams, and lost money to Mr. Williams”; and 5) “Mr. 

Love returned to the car, and showed everyone a roll of money” 

and “admitted to jacking Mr. Williams” with “knowledge that Mr. 

Salone had fired the gun.” These findings are supported by the 

record.

Love contends there are inferences that may be 

drawn to support his section 1170.95 petition. But he did not 

take advantage of his opportunity to present evidence to support 

such inferences. Because the facts in the record support the trial 

court’s findings, Love may not claim that the court should have 

drawn different inferences based on claims that are not 

supported by evidence. The trial court may not draw inferences 

based on speculation.

Love claims the trial court’s findings and the jury’s 

prior special circumstances findings are not consistent with 

current legal standards involving findings involving major 

participants acting with reckless indifference to human life, and 
10

they consequently cannot be considered in denying a section 

1170.95 petition. We disagree.

Here there are unfavorable Scoggins, Banks, and

Clark factors for Love. Love had a motive to rob the victim. He

was physically present at the crime scene. He approached the 

victim with the killer. He had the opportunity to help the victim, 

but elected not to. (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677.) 

Under People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 621, Love failed to 

take “[e]fforts to [m]inimize the [r]isks of the [v]iolence [d]uring 

the [f]elony.” (Italics omitted.) A relevant factor under People v. 

Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803, is “[w]hat did the defendant do 

after lethal force was used?” Here Love took advantage of the 

injured victim and profited from the crime. Later he met with 

the killer and they all “agreed on a story” they could tell.

The People also claim Love makes the claim that he 

was not a “major” participant by omitting consideration of the six 

factors showing his active participation, including that Love: 1)

“rode in [the] car with Thomas and Salone,” 2) “left the car with 

Salone,” 3) “approached Williams,” 4) “admitted” he “ ‘jacked’

Williams,” 5) “took money from Williams’ pockets,” and 6) “had a 

motive to rob Williams.” 

In addition to these six factors the People highlight,

Love also made the incriminating admission, “we had to knock 
11

him off.” (Italics added.) The word “we” supports a finding of his 

joint participation in the crime.

The People also cite People v. Douglas (2020) 56 

Cal.App.5th 1 and claim it refutes Love’s claims that he did not 

act with reckless indifference to human life. In Douglas, after a 

victim was shot, the court noted that the defendant “displayed no 

interest in moderating violence or in aiding his bloody and 

suffering victim. Rather, [defendant] picked his pocket.” (Id. at 

p. 10, italics added.) This describes Love’s conduct. Love did not 

stop to help Williams; instead Love, like the defendant in 

Douglas, “picked his pocket.”

Trial Court’s Reliance on Inadmissible Evidence?

Love contends the facts in the appellate decision that 

affirmed his conviction are inadmissible at a second stage section 

1170.95 evidentiary hearing. He claims the trial court erred by

citing those facts. But our Supreme Court has rejected this 

claim. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)

Moreover, during that hearing the trial court asked 

Love’s counsel, “[T]he court is allowed to consider the record of 

conviction and the record of conviction contains the record of facts 

that the court of appeals relies on, does it not?” Love’s counsel: 

“It does.”

The statute provides, “The prosecutor and the 

petitioner may rely on the record of conviction . . . to meet their 
12

respective burdens.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3), italics added.) “ ‘A 

court of appeal opinion . . . is part of the appellant’s record of 

conviction.” (People v. Garcia (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 100, 111,

review granted Feb. 10, 2021, S265692; see also People v. Woodell

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 455.)

Love contends the trial court erred by relying on the 

facts in a petition for review to the California Supreme Court.

But the People correctly note that Love forfeited this 

claim because he “failed to lodge an objection in the trial court.” 

(People v. Brimmer (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 782, 799-800.) And on 

the merits, the result does not change.

The trial court mentioned that it had “looked at” the 

petition for review. But in making its findings it referred to the 

record of conviction. It said it considered what the Court of 

Appeal had “summarized” as the “evidence at trial.” The trial 

court’s statement that it had considered other documents does 

not show reversible error where its findings show it relied on 

admissible evidence. (People v. Lopez, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 954.)

We have reviewed Love’s remaining contentions and 

we conclude he has not shown grounds for reversal.
13

DISPOSITION

The order denying the section 1170.95 petition is 

affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

PERREN, J.
14

Laura C. Ellison, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Donna L. Harris, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E. 

Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan 

Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Allison H. 

Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.