UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

ANA L. RODRIGUEZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:14 CV 169

)

NEWTON COUNTY SHERIFF’S )

DEPARTMENT, et al., )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION and ORDER

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ana L. Rodriguez was involved in a rather unfortunate mix-up. Her

troubles began on August 24, 2012, when she went to the Newton County Jail in Order

to post bond for a friend in custody. (DE # 51-3 at 1.) Upon identifying herself to jail

personnel, she was advised that there was an active warrant for an individual named

Ana R. Rodriguez. (Id.) Plaintiff pointed out that her name and date of birth did not

match the individual named in the warrant. (Id.) Nevertheless, she was taken into

custody at the Newton County Jail and held for transfer to Lake County, which had

originated the warrant. (Id.)

Plaintiff would spend the next three days in the Newton County Jail before being

transferred to the Lake County Jail on Monday, August 27, 2012, at 11:15 AM. (Id.; DE

# 43-2.) At intake, she repeatedly advised Lake County Jail staff of the mix-up and

pointed out the discrepancies with the warrant. (DE # 51–3 at 1.) Plaintiff claims that

Lake County Jail staff ignored this information and processed her into custody. (Id.) She
was ultimately held in custody for another eight hours before posting $1,000 bond. (Id.

at 2; DE # 43-4.) 

Defendants Lake County Jail and Lake County Sheriff’s Department claim that, 1

at intake, Jail staff consulted a computer database called the “Wanted Person Table.”

(DE # 42 at 2.) On that date and time, the information in the Wanted Person Table

matched plaintiff’s name and date of birth. (DE # 43-7.) Neither party offers any

explanation for why the information in the Wanted Person Table did not match the

information contained in the original warrant. Lake County defendants otherwise agree

that they did not make any attempt to verify plaintiff’s claims regarding the mix-up.

(DE # 42 at 2-3.)

The charges for which the warrant was issued were eventually dismissed against

plaintiff on May 15, 2013. (DE # 51-3 at 2.) On September 8, 2013 plaintiff served a

Notice of Tort Claim on Lake County Defendants as well as Newton County Jail and the

Newton County Sheriff’s Department (“Newton County Defendants”). (DE # 43-3.)

Plaintiff then filed the instant suit against Lake County and Newton County

defendants. In her second amended complaint (DE # 28), she brings four counts: (1) a

state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (2) state law tort

claim for false arrest; (3) a federal claim for deprivation of privileges and immunities in

violation the 14th Amendment; and (4) a federal claim for deprivation of liberty without

due process in violation of the 14th Amendment. 

The court will collectively refer to the Lake County Jail and Lake County 1

Sheriff’s Department defendants as “Lake County defendants.” Where necessary, the

parties will be separately referred to as “Jail defendants” and “Sheriff’s defendants.”
Plaintiff and Newton County defendants have amicably resolved these claims

and accordingly filed a stipulation of dismissal. (DE # 33.) The remaining defendants,

Lake County Jail and the Lake County Sheriff’s Department have filed a motion for

summary judgment as to all claims. (DE # 41.) The motion has been fully briefed and is

ripe for ruling. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants have moved for summary judgment. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE 56 requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for

discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate–in fact, is mandated–where there are no disputed

issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other words,

the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.”

Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that these

requirements have been met. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, Ill., 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th

Cir. 2010). “[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’–that is,

pointing out to the district court–that there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has met his

burden, the non-moving party must identify specific facts establishing that there is a
genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986);

Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).

In doing so, the non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must present

fresh proof in support of its position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Donovan v. City of

Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). In viewing the facts presented on a motion

for summary judgment, the court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the

non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Chmiel v. JC

Penney Life Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1998).

III. DISCUSSION

A. State Law Claims

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s state

law claims (Counts 1 &2) because she has failed to comply with the requirements of the

Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”). (DE # 42 at 4.) Plaintiff does not dispute that these

two counts are subject to the ITCA’s requirements but argues that she has nonetheless

satisfied these requirements. (DE # 51 at 2-3.)

Tort claims brought under Indiana law are subject to the ITCA’s procedural and

substantive requirements. Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 648 (citing

Bienz v. Bloom, 674 N.E..2d 998, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“[O]ur supreme court has

held that the Act applies to all torts.”)). Compliance with the ITCA is a prerequisite to

pursuing a tort claim against a government entity regardless of whether the suit is filed

in state or federal court. Id. One of the ITCA’s requirements is that the plaintiff must

provide notice of tort claims to the defendant’s government body within 180 days after
the alleged loss occurs. Id. at 648-49 (citing Kelly v. City of Michigan City, 300 F.Supp.2d

682, 689 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (granting summary judgment against plaintiff who failed to

file tort claims notice within 180 days of the alleged violation)); Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8(a);

§ 34-6-2-110(7). Failure to timely file a notice of tort claim is a jurisdictional bar to the

claimants action and provides immunity from liability. Doe v. Lance, 3:95-CV-736, 1996

WL 663147, at *5 (N.D. Ind. July 15, 1996). 

Defendants argue that, at the very latest, plaintiff’s loss occurred when she was

released from custody on August 27, 2012. (DE # 42 at 6.) Thus, they contend her state

law claims are barred because she did not file her notice until September 8, 2013 which

is 377 days later. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that her loss was an ongoing event that only

ended on May 15, 2013, when the underlying criminal charges against her were

dismissed. (DE # 51 at 3.) Counting from this date, her notice was filed only 116 days

later--within the 180-day window of the ITCA. (Id.) In support of using this later date,

she argues that it was an ongoing tort and that, had she been convicted of the

underlying charges, her claims would likely be barred. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477 (1994). Plaintiff’s argument is simply incorrect. 

For an individual who remains in custody, a claim for false arrest or false

imprisonment accrues at the time the individual is brought before a magistrate or

arraigned on charges. Parish v. City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing

Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384 (2007)). If an individual posts bond, or is otherwise released

from custody, the claim accrues at the time of release. Bedree v. Estate of Lebamoff, No.

1:04-CV-427, 2008 WL 756161, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2008) (plaintiff’s false
imprisonment claim accrued on the date that she posted bond and was released);

Finwall v. City of Chicago, 490 F.Supp.2d 918, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2007)(“[F]alse imprisonment

claims accrue on the date the plaintiff is arraigned or released from custody before

being charged.”)(citing Wallace 549 U.S. at 389). Given that plaintiff’s IIED claim arises

out of the same conduct as the false imprisonment claim, it also accrues upon her

release from custody. Todd v. Lake County Sheriff’s Dept., No. 2:08-CV-314, 2013 WL

2156470, at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 17, 2013). 

Plaintiff’s reliance on the “doctrine of continuing wrong” is likewise misplaced.

Under this doctrine, statutory limitations periods may be tolled where the injury is

caused by a continuing course of wrongful conduct. Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 591

(7th Cir. 2013); Parish v. City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff has not

made any allegations that the defendants played any role in the prosecution of the

underlying criminal case, nor has she alleged that they undertook any acts that would

constitute an ongoing course of conduct. As such, the continuing wrong doctrine does

not apply. Furthermore because she did not timely file notice her state law claims are

procedurally barred by the ITCA. See Kelly, 300 F.Supp.2d at 689. 

B. Federal Claims

Plaintiff also brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983,

a plaintiff must prove that (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person

acting under color of state law; and (2) this conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Parrat v. Taylor,451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327 (1986). Claims brought against government entities are covered under the

standard set forth in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658

(1978). Under Monell, a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury

caused solely by its employees or agents. Id. at 694. Rather, “a plaintiff must show the

existence of an “official policy” or other governmental custom that not only causes but

is the “moving force” behind the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Teesdale v. City of

Chicago, 690 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Estate of Sims v. Cty of Bureau, 506 F.3d

509, 514 (7th Cir. 2007)). 

The first question under Monell is whether plaintiff can demonstrate some injury

to her constitutionally-protected interests. Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 424 (7th

Cir. 2014) (“[I]f no constitutional violation occurred in the first places, a Monell claim

cannot be supported.”). Plaintiff claims that defendants deprived her of her 14th

Amendment rights by mistakenly detaining her and failing to investigate or verify her

claims of innocence. Claims that are based on the continued detention of individuals

after they have been arrested on a valid warrant are governed by the Due Process

Clause. Panfil v. City of Chicago, 45 F. App’x 528, 532-33 (7th Cir. 2002); Baker v. McCollan,

443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (“mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of

repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive

the accused of liberty without due process of law.”) (internal citation and quotation

marks omitted).

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Baker is instructive on the issue of whether the

facts at hand constitute a due process violation. See Panfil v. City of Chicago, 45 F. App’x
528, 533 (7th Cur. 2002). In Baker, the Supreme Court held that a three-day period of

detention in a case of mistaken identity did not give rise to a due process violation

under the 14th Amendment. 443 U.S. at 45. Courts in the Seventh Circuit have since

used Baker as a benchmark to determine the length of time after which a custodian is

obligated to investigate claims of innocence based on mistaken identity. See Brown v.

Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 169 (7th Cir. 1987) (detention of wrong individual for twentyfour hours did not amount to due process violation); Panfil, 45 F. App’x at 534 (finding

no due process violation where plaintiff was held in jail for three days); Johnson v. City of

Chicago, 711 F.Supp 1465, 1470 (six days of mistaken incarceration was sufficient to state

a claim); Hernandez v. City of Chicago, No. 99 C 6441, 2001 WL 128246, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb.

9, 2001) (15-day detention was sufficient to state a claim); Griffin v. Sheahan, No. 98 C

2398, 1999 WL 342400, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1999), opinion clarified on denial of

reconsideration, No. 98 C 2398, 1999 WL 417342 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1999) (finding five

days sufficient to state a claim). 

Turning to the facts in this case, the Newton County defendants have already

been dismissed from this action and thus the first three days of plaintiff’s detention are

not at issue. Rather, plaintiff’s claims against Lake County defendants only concern the

period of time covering her arrival at the jail up until she posted bond that evening. At

a mere eight hours, the duration of incarceration is far less than the three days which

the Supreme Court determined did not give rise to a due process violation in Baker.

Based on this precedent, plaintiff’s claims against Lake County do not amount to a

violation of her due process rights. Because she cannot establish a violation of her
constitutional rights, she cannot establish § 1983 liability under Monell and these claims

also fail. See Brown, 823 F.2d at 169; Panfil, 45 F. App’x at 534.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (DE

# 41) is GRANTED. Because no claims remain against any defendants in this case, the

clerk is to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of the defendants stating that plaintiff

Ana L. Rodriguez shall take nothing by way of her complaint. 

SO ORDERED.

Date: September 30, 2016

s/James T. Moody 

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT