PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________

No. 20-3214

_____________

JIM BOGNET, DONALD K. MILLER, DEBRA MILLER,

ALAN CLARK, JENNIFER CLARK,

 Appellants

v.

SECRETARY COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA;

ADAMS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 

ALLEGHENY COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 

ARMSTRONG COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 

BEAVER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BEDFORD 

COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BERKS COUNTY 

BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BLAIR COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; BRADFORD COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; BUCKS COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; BUTLER COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; CAMBRIA COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; CAMERON COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; CARBON COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; CENTRE COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; CHESTER COUNTY BOARD OF 
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ELECTIONS; CLARION COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; CLEARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; CLINTON COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; COLUMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; CRAWFORD COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; CUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; DAUPHIN COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; ELK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 

ERIE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; FAYETTE 

COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; FOREST COUNTY 

BOARD OF ELECTIONS; FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD 

OF ELECTIONS; FULTON COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; GREENE COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; HUNTINGDON COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; INDIANA COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; JUNIATA COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; LACKAWANNA COUNTY BOARD OF

ELECTIONS; LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; LAWRENCE COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; LEBANON COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; LEHIGH COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; LUZERNE COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; LYCOMING COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; MCKEAN COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; MERCER COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; MIFFLIN COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; MONTOUR COUNTY BOARD OF 
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ELECTIONS; NORTHAMPTON COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD 

OF ELECTIONS; PERRY COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; PHILADELPHIA COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; PIKE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 

POTTER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 

SCHUYLKILL COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 

SNYDER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 

SOMERSET COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 

SULLIVAN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 

SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 

TIOGA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; UNION 

COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; VENANGO 

COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; WARREN COUNTY 

BOARD OF ELECTIONS; WASHINGTON COUNTY 

BOARD OF ELECTIONS; WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; WESTMORELAND COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; WYOMING COUNTY BOARD OF 

ELECTIONS; YORK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE,

Intervenor

______________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 3-20-cv-00215

District Judge: Honorable Kim. R. Gibson

_______________________
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

November 9, 2020

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, SHWARTZ and SCIRICA, 

Circuit Judges

(Filed: November 13, 2020) 

Brian W. Barnes

Peter A. Patterson

David H. Thompson

Cooper & Kirk

1523 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel for Appellants

Mark A. Aronchick

Michele D. Hangley

Robert A. Wiygul 

Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller

One Logan Square

18th & Cherry Streets, 27th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

J. Bart DeLone

Sean A. Kirkpatrick

Keli M. Neary

Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania

Strawberry Square

Harrisburg, PA 17120
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Dimitrios Mavroudis

Jessica Rickabaugh

Joe H. Tucker, Jr.

Tucker Law Group

Ten Penn Center

1801 Market Street, Suite 2500

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel Secretary Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania

Elizabeth A. Dupuis

Molly E. Meachem

Babst Calland

330 Innovation Boulevard

Suite 302

State College, PA 16803

Counsel for Armstrong, Bedford, Blair, Centre

Columbia, Dauphin, Fayette, Huntingdon,

Indiana, Lackawanna, Lawrence, Northumberland,

Venango, and York County Boards of Elections

Christine D. Steere

Deasey Mahoney & Valentini

103 Chesley Drive

Lafayette Building, Suite 101

Media, PA 19063

Counsel for Berks County Board of Elections
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Edward D. Rogers

Elizabeth V. Wingfield

Ballard Spahr

1735 Market Street, 51st Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Delaware County Board of Elections

Stephen B. Edwards

Frank J. Lavery, Jr.

Andrew W. Norfleet

Lavery Law

225 Market Street

Suite 304, P.O. Box 1245

Harrisburg, PA 17108

Counsel for Franklin and Perry

County Boards of Elections

Thomas R. Shaffer

Glassmire & Shaffer Law Offices

5 East Third Street

P.O. Box 509

Coudersport, PA 16915

Counsel for Potter County Board of Elections

Marc E. Elias

Uzoma Nkwonta

Courtney A. Elgart

Perkins Coie

700 13th Street, N.W. Suite 800
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Washington, D.C. 20005

Counsel for Intervenor Democratic National 

Committee

_____________________

 OPINION OF THE COURT

_____________________ 

 

SMITH, Chief Judge.

A share in the sovereignty of the state, which is 

exercised by the citizens at large, in voting at 

elections is one of the most important rights of 

the subject, and in a republic ought to stand 

foremost in the estimation of the law.—

Alexander Hamilton1

The year 2020 has brought the country unprecedented 

challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic, which began early this 

year and continues today, has caused immense loss and vast 

disruption. As this is a presidential election year, the pandemic 

has also presented unique challenges regarding where and how 

citizens shall vote, as well as when and how their ballots shall

be tabulated. The appeal on which we now rule stems from the 

disruption COVID-19 has wrought on the national elections. 

We reach our decision, detailed below, having carefully 

1 Second Letter from Phocion (April 1784), reprinted in 3 The 

Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1782–1786, 530–58 (Harold C. 

Syrett ed., 1962).
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considered the full breadth of statutory law and constitutional 

authority applicable to this unique dispute over Pennsylvania 

election law. And we do so with commitment to a proposition 

indisputable in our democratic process: that the lawfully cast

vote of every citizen must count.

I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Elections and Presidential Electors Clause

The U.S. Constitution delegates to state 

“Legislature[s]” the authority to regulate the “Times, Places 

and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 

Representatives,” subject to Congress’s ability to “make or 

alter such Regulations.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. This 

provision is known as the “Elections Clause.” The Elections 

Clause effectively gives state governments the “default” 

authority to regulate the mechanics of federal elections, Foster 

v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997), with Congress retaining 

“exclusive control” to “make or alter” any state’s regulations,

Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946). Congress has 

not often wielded this power but, “[w]hen exercised, the action 

of Congress, so far as it extends and conflicts with the 

regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes them.” Ex 

Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 384, 399 (1879) (“[T]he 

Constitution and constitutional laws of the [United States] are 

. . . the supreme law of the land; and, when they conflict with 

the laws of the States, they are of paramount authority and 

obligation.”). By statute, Congress has set “[t]he Tuesday next 

after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered 

year,” as the day for the election. 2 U.S.C. § 7. 
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Much like the Elections Clause, the “Electors Clause”

of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[e]ach State shall 

appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, 

a Number of [Presidential] Electors.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, 

cl. 2. Congress can “determine the Time of chusing the 

Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; 

which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.” 

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. Congress has set the time for 

appointing electors as “the Tuesday next after the first Monday 

in November, in every fourth year succeeding every election 

of a President and Vice President.” 3 U.S.C. § 1. 

This year, both federal statutes dictate that the day for 

the election was to fall on Tuesday, November 3 (“Election 

Day”). 

B. Pennsylvania’s Election Code

In keeping with the Constitution’s otherwise broad 

delegation of authority to states to regulate the times, places, 

and manner of holding federal elections, the Pennsylvania 

General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive elections 

code. In 2019, the General Assembly passed Act 77, which 

(among other things) established “no-excuse” absentee voting 

in Pennsylvania2: all eligible voters in Pennsylvania may vote 

by mail without the need to show their absence from their 

voting district on the day of the election. 25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. 

Stat. §§ 3150.11–3150.17. Under Act 77, “[a]pplications for 

mail-in ballots shall be processed if received not later than five 

2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to absentee voting and 

mail-in voting interchangeably. 
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o’clock P.M. of the first Tuesday prior to the day of any 

primary or election.” Id. § 3150.12a(a). After Act 77, “a 

completed absentee [or mail-in] ballot must be received in the 

office of the county board of elections no later than eight 

o’clock P.M. on the day of the primary or election” for that 

vote to count. Id. §§ 3146.6(c), 3150.16(c). 

C. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Decision

Soon after Act 77’s passage, Donald J. Trump for 

President, Inc., the Republican National Committee (“RNC”), 

and several Republican congressional candidates and voters 

brought suit against Kathy Boockvar, Secretary of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and all of Pennsylvania’s 

county boards of elections. That suit, filed in the Western 

District of Pennsylvania, alleged that Act 77’s “no-excuse” 

mail-in voting regime violated both the federal and 

Pennsylvania constitutions. Donald J. Trump for Pres., Inc. v. 

Boockvar, No. 2:20-cv-966, 2020 WL 4920952, at *1 (W.D. 

Pa. Aug. 23, 2020). Meanwhile, the Pennsylvania Democratic 

Party and several Democratic elected officials and 

congressional candidates filed suit in Pennsylvania’s

Commonwealth Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive 

relief related to statutory-interpretation issues involving Act 77 

and the Pennsylvania Election Code. See Pa. Democratic 

Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 2020 WL 5554644, at *1 

(Pa. Sept. 17, 2020). Secretary Boockvar asked the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to exercise extraordinary 

jurisdiction to allow it to immediately consider the case, and 

her petition was granted without objection. Id. at *3.
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Pending resolution of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

case, Secretary Boockvar requested that the Western District 

of Pennsylvania stay the federal case. Trump for Pres. v. 

Boockvar, 2020 WL 4920952, at *1. The District Court 

obliged and concluded that it would abstain under Railroad

Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 

See Trump for Pres. v. Boockvar, 2020 WL 4920952, at *21. 

The RNC then filed a motion for limited preliminary injunctive 

relief asking that all mailed ballots be segregated, but the 

District Court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs’ 

harm had “not yet materialized in any actualized or imminent 

way.” Donald J. Trump for Pres., Inc. v. Boockvar, No. 2:20-

cv-966, 2020 WL 5407748, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2020).

With the federal case stayed, the state court matter 

proceeded. The Pennsylvania Democratic Party argued that a 

combination of the COVID-19 pandemic and U.S. Postal 

Service (“USPS”) mail-delivery delays made it difficult for 

absentee voters to timely return their ballots in the June 2020 

Pennsylvania primary election. Pa. Democratic Party, 2020 

WL 5554644, at *10. The Pennsylvania Democratic Party 

claimed that this voter disenfranchisement violated the 

Pennsylvania Constitution’s Free and Equal Elections Clause, 

art I., § 5,3and sought, among other things, a weeklong 

extension of the deadline for receipt of ballots cast by Election 

Day in the upcoming general election—the same deadline for 

the receipt of ballots cast by servicemembers residing overseas. 

3 The Free and Equal Elections Clause of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution provides: “Elections shall be free and equal; and 

no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent 

the free exercise of the right of suffrage.” Pa. Const. art. 1, § 5.
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Id. at *2. Secretary Boockvar originally opposed the extension 

deadline; she changed her position after receiving a letter from 

USPS General Counsel which stated that Pennsylvania’s ballot 

deadlines were “incongruous with the Postal Service’s delivery 

standards,” and that to ensure that a ballot in Pennsylvania 

would be received by 8:00 P.M. on Election Day, the voter 

would need to mail it a full week in advance, by October 27, 

which was also the deadline to apply for a mail-in ballot. Id.

at *13; 25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 3150.12a(a). Secretary 

Boockvar accordingly recommended a three-day extension to 

the received-by deadline. Pa. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 

5554644, at *12–13. 

In a September 17, 2020 decision, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court concluded that USPS’s existing delivery 

standards could not meet the timeline built into the Election 

Code and that circumstances beyond voters’ control should not 

lead to their disenfranchisement. Pa. Democratic Party, 2020 

WL 5554644, at *18. The Court accordingly held that the 

Pennsylvania Constitution’s Free and Equal Elections Clause 

required a three-day extension of the ballot-receipt deadline for 

the November 3 general election. Id. at *18, *31. All ballots 

postmarked by 8:00 P.M. on Election Day and received by 5:00 

P.M. on the Friday after Election Day, November 6, would be 

considered timely and counted (“Deadline Extension”). Id. at 

*31. Ballots postmarked or signed after Election Day, 

November 3, would be rejected. Id. If the postmark on a ballot 

received before the November 6 deadline was missing or 

illegible, the ballot would be presumed to be timely unless “a 

preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that it was mailed 

after Election Day” (“Presumption of Timeliness”). Id. 
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Shortly after the ruling, Pennsylvania voters were notified of 

the Deadline Extension and Presumption of Timeliness. 

D. Appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, and This 

Litigation

The Republican Party of Pennsylvania and several 

intervenors, including the President pro tempore of the 

Pennsylvania Senate, sought to challenge in the Supreme Court 

of the United States the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s ruling. Because the November election date 

was fast approaching, they filed an emergency application for 

a stay of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s order pending 

review on the merits. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the 

emergency stay request in a 4-4 decision. Republican Party of 

Pa. v. Boockvar, No. 20A54, 592 U.S. __, 2020 WL 6128193 

(Oct. 19, 2020); Scarnati v. Boockvar, No. 20A53, 592 U.S. 

__, 2020 WL 6128194 (Oct. 19, 2020). After denial of the stay, 

the petitioners moved for expedited consideration of their 

petition for certiorari. In denying that motion, Justice Alito 

noted that, per the Pennsylvania Attorney General, all county 

boards of elections would segregate ballots received during the 

Deadline Extension period from those received by 8:00 P.M. 

on Election Day. Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar, No. 

20-542, 592 U.S. __, 2020 WL 6304626, at *2 (Oct. 28, 2020) 

(Alito, J., statement). Justice Alito later issued an order 

requiring that all county boards of elections segregate such 

ballots and count them separately. Republican Party of Pa. v. 

Boockvar, No. 20A84, 2020 WL 6536912 (Mem.) (U.S. Nov. 

6, 2020) (Alito, J.). 
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In the meantime, on October 22, 2020, three days after 

the U.S. Supreme Court declined to stay the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s order, Plaintiffs herein filed this suit in the 

Western District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs are four registered 

voters from Somerset County, Pennsylvania, who planned to 

vote in person on Election Day (“Voter Plaintiffs”) and 

Pennsylvania congressional candidate Jim Bognet. 

Defendants are Secretary Boockvar and each Pennsylvania 

county’s board of elections.

Bognet, the congressional candidate, claimed that the 

Deadline Extension and Presumption of Timeliness “allow[] 

County Boards of Elections to accept votes . . . that would 

otherwise be unlawful” and “undermine[] his right to run in an 

election where Congress has paramount authority to set the 

‘times, places, and manner’” of Election Day. Bognet v. 

Boockvar, No. 3:20-cv-215, 2020 WL 6323121, at *2 (W.D. 

Pa. Oct. 28, 2020). The Voter Plaintiffs alleged that by voting 

in person, they had to comply with the single, uniform federal 

Election Day deadline, whereas mail-in voters could submit 

votes any time before 5:00 P.M. on November 6. Id. Thus, 

they alleged, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court treated them in 

an arbitrary and disparate way by elevating mail-in voters to a 

“preferred class of voters” in violation of the U.S. 

Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and the single, uniform, 

federal Election Day set by Congress. Id. The Voter Plaintiffs 

also asserted that counting ballots received after Election Day 

during the Deadline Extension period would unlawfully dilute 

their votes in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id.

All Plaintiffs sought to enjoin Defendants from 

counting ballots received during the Deadline Extension 
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period. Id. They also sought a declaration that the Deadline 

Extension and Presumption of Timeliness are unconstitutional 

under the Elections Clause and the Electors Clause as well as 

the Equal Protection Clause. Id. Because Plaintiffs filed their 

suit less than two weeks before Election Day, they moved for 

a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), expedited hearing, and 

preliminary injunction. Id.

The District Court commendably accommodated 

Plaintiffs’ request for an expedited hearing, then expeditiously 

issued a thoughtful memorandum order on October 28, 

denying the motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction. Id.

at *7. The District Court held that Bognet lacked standing 

because his claims were too speculative and not redressable. 

Id. at *3. Similarly, the District Court concluded that the Voter

Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their Equal Protection voter 

dilution claim because they alleged only a generalized 

grievance. Id. at *5. 

At the same time, the District Court held that the Voter

Plaintiffs had standing to pursue their Equal Protection 

arbitrary-and-disparate-treatment claim. But it found that the 

Deadline Extension did not engender arbitrary and disparate 

treatment because that provision did not extend the period for 

mail-in voters to actually cast their ballots; rather, the 

extension only directed that the timely cast ballots of mail-in 

voters be counted. Id. As to the Presumption of Timeliness, 

the District Court held that the Voter Plaintiffs were likely to 

succeed on the merits of their arbitrary-and-disparatetreatment challenge. Id. at *6. Still, the District Court declined 

to grant a TRO because the U.S. Supreme Court “has 

repeatedly emphasized that . . . federal courts should ordinarily 
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not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” Id. at *7 

(citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam)). 

The District Court concluded that with “less than two weeks 

before the election. . . . [g]ranting the relief Plaintiffs seek 

would result in significant voter confusion; precisely the kind 

of confusion that Purcell seeks to avoid.” Id.

Plaintiffs appealed the denial of their motion for a TRO

and preliminary injunction to this Court on October 29, less 

than a week before Election Day. Plaintiffs requested an 

expedited briefing schedule: specifically, their opening brief 

would be due on October 30 and the response briefs on

November 2. Notably, Plaintiffs sought to file a reply brief on 

November 3—Election Day. Appellants’ Emergency Mot. for 

Expedited Briefing, Dkt. No. 17. Defendants opposed the 

expedited briefing schedule, arguing that Plaintiffs’ own delay 

had caused the case to reach this Court mere days before the 

election. Sec’y Boockvar’s Opp. to Appellants’ Emergency 

Mot. for Expedited Briefing, Dkt. No. 33. Defendants also 

contended that Plaintiffs sought to punish voters by 

invalidating the very rules mail-in voters had relied on when

they cast their ballots. Defendants asked us to deny the motion 

for expedited briefing and offered to supply us with the actual 

numbers of mail-in ballots received during the Deadline 

Extension period together with an approximate count of how 

many of those mail-in ballots lacked legible postmarks. Id. 

Even had we granted Plaintiffs’ motion for expedited 

briefing, the schedule they proposed would have effectively 

foreclosed us from ruling on this appeal before Election Day. 

So we denied Plaintiffs’ motion and instead ordered that their 

opening brief be filed by November 6. Order, No. 20-3214, 
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Oct. 30, 2020, Dkt. No. 37. We directed Defendants to file

response briefs by November 9, forgoing receipt of a reply 

brief.

4

 Id. With the matter now fully briefed, we consider 

Plaintiffs’ appeal of the District Court’s denial of a TRO and 

preliminary injunction.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1331. We exercise jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1). 

Ordinarily, an order denying a TRO is not immediately 

appealable. Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 956 F.3d 156, 

159 (3d Cir. 2020). Here, although Bognet and the Voter 

Plaintiffs styled their motion as an Emergency Motion for a 

TRO and Preliminary Injunction, see Bognet v. Boockvar, No. 

3:20-cv-00215, Dkt. No. 5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2020), the 

District Court’s order plainly went beyond simply ruling on the 

TRO request. 

Plaintiffs filed their motion for a TRO and a preliminary 

injunction on October 22, along with a supporting brief. 

Defendants then filed briefs opposing the motion, with

Plaintiffs filing a reply in support of their motion. The District 

Court heard argument from the parties, remotely, during a 90-

minute hearing. The next day, the District Court ruled on the 

merits of the request for injunctive relief. Bognet, 2020 WL 

6323121, at *7. The District Court’s Memorandum Order 

4 Because we have received comprehensive briefing, and given 

the weighty public interest in a prompt ruling on the matter 

before us, we have elected to forgo oral argument.
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denied both Bognet and the Voter Plaintiffs the affirmative 

relief they sought to obtain prior to Election Day, confirming 

that the Commonwealth was to count mailed ballots received 

after the close of the polls on Election Day but before 5:00 P.M. 

on November 6. 

In determining whether Bognet and the Voter Plaintiffs 

had standing to sue, we resolve a legal issue that does not require resolution of any factual dispute. Our review is de novo. 

Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 266 (3d Cir. 

2014). “When reviewing a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, we review the court’s findings of fact for clear 

error, its conclusions of law de novo, and the ultimate decision 

. . . for an abuse of discretion.” Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 

858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Bimbo Bakeries 

USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 2010))

(cleaned up).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standing 

Derived from separation-of-powers principles, the law 

of standing “serves to prevent the judicial process from being 

used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” Clapper v. 

Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (citations 

omitted). Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests “[t]he 

judicial Power of the United States” in both the Supreme Court 

and “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 

time ordain and establish.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. But this 

“judicial Power” extends only to “Cases” and “Controversies.” 

Id. art. III, § 2; see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 
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1547 (2016). To ensure that judges avoid rendering impermissible advisory opinions, parties seeking to invoke federal 

judicial power must first establish their standing to do so. 

Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. 

Article III standing doctrine speaks in jargon, but the

gist of its meaning is plain enough. To bring suit, you—and 

you personally—must be injured, and you must be injured in a 

way that concretely impacts your own protected legal interests. 

If you are complaining about something that does not harm

you—and does not harm you in a way that is concrete—then 

you lack standing. And if the injury that you claim is an injury

that does no specific harm to you, or if it depends on a harm

that may never happen, then you lack an injury for which you 

may seek relief from a federal court. As we will explain below, 

Plaintiffs here have not suffered a concrete, particularized, and 

non-speculative injury necessary under the U.S. Constitution 

for them to bring this federal lawsuit. 

The familiar elements of Article III standing require a 

plaintiff to have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly 

traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) 

that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 

Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–

61 (1992); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. 

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)). To plead an injury 

in fact, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish 

three sub-elements: first, the “invasion of a legally protected 

interest”; second, that the injury is both “concrete and particularized”; and third, that the injury is “actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also Mielo v. Steak ’n 
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Shake Operations, 897 F.3d 467, 479 n.11 (3d Cir. 2018). The 

second sub-element requires that the injury “affect the plaintiff 

in a personal and individual way.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.

As for the third, when a plaintiff alleges future injury, such

injury must be “certainly impending.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 

409 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2). Allegations of 

“possible” future injury simply aren’t enough. Id. (quoting 

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). All elements of standing must exist at the time the complaint is filed. 

See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569 n.4.

With these guideposts in mind, we turn to whether 

Plaintiffs have pleaded an Article III injury. They bring several 

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting deprivation of their 

constitutional rights. They allege that Defendants’ implementation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Deadline 

Extension and Presumption of Timeliness violates the 

Elections Clause of Article I, the Electors Clause of Article II, 

and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Because Plaintiffs lack standing to assert these claims, we will 

affirm the District Court’s denial of injunctive relief. 

1. Plaintiffs lack standing under the Elections 

Clause and Electors Clause. 

Federal courts are not venues for plaintiffs to assert a 

bare right “to have the Government act in accordance with 

law.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984), abrogated on 

other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 

Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126–27 (2014). When the 

alleged injury is undifferentiated and common to all members 

of the public, courts routinely dismiss such cases as 
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“generalized grievances” that cannot support standing. United 

States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173–75 (1974). Such is 

the case here insofar as Plaintiffs, and specifically candidate 

Bognet, theorize their harm as the right to have government 

administered in compliance with the Elections Clause and

Electors Clause. 

To begin with, private plaintiffs lack standing to sue for 

alleged injuries attributable to a state government’s violations 

of the Elections Clause. For example, in Lance v. Coffman, 

549 U.S. 437 (2007) (per curiam), four private citizens 

challenged in federal district court a Colorado Supreme Court 

decision invalidating a redistricting plan passed by the state 

legislature and requiring use of a redistricting plan created by 

Colorado state courts. Id. at 438. The plaintiffs alleged that 

the Colorado Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Colorado 

Constitution violated the Elections Clause “by depriving the 

state legislature of its responsibility to draw congressional 

districts.” Id. at 441. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the 

plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they claimed 

harm only to their interest, and that of every citizen, in proper 

application of the Elections Clause. Id. at 442 (“The only 

injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the 

Elections Clause—has not been followed.”). Their relief 

would have no more directly benefitted them than the public at 

large. Id. The same is true here. If anything, Plaintiffs’ 

“interest in the State’s ability to ‘enforce its duly enacted 

laws’” is even less compelling because Pennsylvania’s 

“election officials support the challenged decree.” Republican

Nat’l Comm. v. Common Cause R.I., No. 20A28, 591 U.S. __, 

2020 WL 4680151 (Mem.), at *1 (Aug. 13, 2020) (quoting 

Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 n.17 (2018)). 
-22-

Because the Elections Clause and the Electors Clause 

have “considerable similarity,” Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. 

Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 839 (2015) 

(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing how Electors Clause 

similarly vests power to determine manner of appointing electors in “the Legislature” of each State), the same logic applies 

to Plaintiffs’ alleged injury stemming from the claimed violation of the Electors Clause. See also Foster, 522 U.S. at 69 

(characterizing Electors Clause as Elections Clause’s 

“counterpart for the Executive Branch”); U.S. Term Limits, 

Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 804–05 (1995) (noting that 

state’s “duty” under Elections Clause “parallels the duty” 

described by Electors Clause). 

Even a party that meets Article III standing requirements must ordinarily rest its claim for relief on violation of its 

own rights, not those of a third party. Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 

F.3d 354, 361–62 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs assert that the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Deadline Extension and 

Presumption of Timeliness usurped the General Assembly’s 

prerogative under the Elections Clause to prescribe “[t]he 

Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections.” U.S. Const. 

art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Elections Clause grants that right to “the 

Legislature” of “each State.” Id. Plaintiffs’ Elections Clause 

claims thus “belong, if they belong to anyone, only to the 

Pennsylvania General Assembly.” Corman v. Torres, 287 F.

Supp. 3d 558, 573 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (three-judge panel) (per 

curiam). Plaintiffs here are four individual voters and a candidate for federal office; they in no way constitute the General 

Assembly, nor can they be said to comprise any part of the lawmaking processes of Pennsylvania. Ariz. State Legislature, 
-23-

576 U.S. at 824.

5

 Because Plaintiffs are not the General 

Assembly, nor do they bear any conceivable relationship to 

state lawmaking processes, they lack standing to sue over the 

alleged usurpation of the General Assembly’s rights under the 

Elections and Electors Clauses. No member of the General 

Assembly is a party to this lawsuit. 

That said, prudential standing can suspend Article III’s 

general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s 

legal rights. Yet Plaintiffs don’t fit the bill. A plaintiff may 

assert the rights of another if he or she “has a ‘close’ relationship with the person who possesses the right” and “there is a 

‘hindrance’ to the possessor’s ability to protect his own 

interests.” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004) 

(citation omitted). Plaintiffs cannot invoke this exception to 

the rule against raising the rights of third parties because they 

enjoy no close relationship with the General Assembly, nor 

5 Bognet seeks to represent Pennsylvania in Congress, but even 

if he somehow had a relationship to state lawmaking processes, 

he would lack personal standing to sue for redress of the 

alleged “institutional injury (the diminution of legislative 

power), which necessarily damage[d] all Members of [the 

legislature] . . . equally.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 

(1997) (plaintiffs were six out of 535 members of Congress); 

see also Corman, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 568–69 (concluding that 

“two of 253 members of the Pennsylvania General Assembly” 

lacked standing to sue under Elections Clause for alleged 

“deprivation of ‘their legislative authority to apportion 

congressional districts’”); accord Va. House of Delegates v. 

Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1953 (2019). 
-24-

have they alleged any hindrance to the General Assembly’s 

ability to protect its own interests. See, e.g., Corman, 287 F. 

Supp. 3d at 573. Nor does Plaintiffs’ other theory of prudential 

standing, drawn from Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 

(2011), advance the ball. 

In Bond, the Supreme Court held that a litigant has prudential standing to challenge a federal law that allegedly 

impinges on the state’s police powers, “in contravention of 

constitutional principles of federalism” enshrined in the Tenth 

Amendment. Id. at 223–24. The defendant in Bond challenged 

her conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 229, which Congress enacted 

to comply with a chemical weapons treaty that the United 

States had entered. Id. at 214–15. Convicted under the statute

she sought to challenge, Bond satisfied Article III’s standing 

requirements. Id. at 217 (characterizing Bond’s sentence and 

incarceration as concrete, and redressable by invalidation of 

her conviction); id. at 224–25 (noting that Bond was subject to 

“[a] law,” “prosecution,” and “punishment” she might not have 

faced “if the matter were left for the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania to decide”). She argued that her conduct was 

“local in nature” such that § 229 usurped the Commonwealth’s 

reserved police powers. Id. Rejecting the Government’s 

contention that Bond was barred as a third party from asserting 

the rights of the Commonwealth, id. at 225, the Court held that 

“[t]he structural principles secured by the separation of powers 

protect the individual as well” as the State. Id. at 222

(“Federalism also protects the liberty of all persons within a 

State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated 

governmental power cannot direct or control their actions. . . . 

When government acts in excess of its lawful powers, that 

[personal] liberty is at stake.”). 
-25-

But the nub of Plaintiffs’ argument here is that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court intruded on the authority delegated to 

the Pennsylvania General Assembly under Articles I and II of 

the U.S. Constitution to regulate federal elections. They do not 

allege any violation of the Tenth Amendment, which provides 

that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 

Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 

the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. 

X. Nor could they. After all, states have no inherent or 

reserved power over federal elections. U.S. Term Limits, 514 

U.S. at 804–05. When “deciding issues raised under the 

Elections Clause,” courts “need not be concerned with 

preserving a ‘delicate balance’ between competing 

sovereigns.” Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 392 (9th Cir. 

2012). Either federal and state election law “operate 

harmoniously in a single procedural scheme,” or they don’t—

and the federal law preempts (“alter[s]”) state election law 

under the Elections Clause. Id. at 394. An assessment that the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court lacked the legislative authority 

under the state’s constitution necessary to comply with the 

Elections Clause (Appellants’ Br. 24–27) does not implicate 

Bond, the Tenth Amendment, or even Article VI’s Supremacy 

Clause.

6

 See Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 390–92 (contrasting 

6 Our conclusion departs from the recent decision of an Eighth 

Circuit panel which, over a dissent, concluded that candidates 

for the position of presidential elector had standing under Bond

to challenge a Minnesota state-court consent decree that 

effectively extended the receipt deadline for mailed ballots. 

See Carson v. Simon, No. 20-3139, 2020 WL 6335967, at *5 

(8th Cir. Oct. 29, 2020). The Carson court appears to have 
-26-

Elections Clause with Supremacy Clause and describing former as “unique,” containing “[an] unusual delegation of 

power,” and “unlike virtually all other provisions of the 

Constitution”). And, of course, third-party standing under 

Bond still presumes that the plaintiff otherwise meets the requirements of Article III; as discussed above, Plaintiffs do not. 

Plaintiff Bognet, a candidate for Congress who is 

currently a private citizen, does not plead a cognizable injury 

by alleging a “right to run in an election where Congress has 

paramount authority,” Compl. ¶ 69, or by pointing to a 

“threatened” reduction in the competitiveness of his election 

from counting absentee ballots received within three days after 

Election Day. Appellants’ Br. 21. Bognet does not explain 

how that “right to run” affects him in a particularized way 

when, in fact, all candidates in Pennsylvania, including 

Bognet’s opponent, are subject to the same rules. And Bognet 

does not explain how counting more timely cast votes would 

lead to a less competitive race, nor does he offer any evidence 

tending to show that a greater proportion of mailed ballots 

received after Election Day than on or before Election Day 

would be cast for Bognet’s opponent. What’s more, for Bognet 

to have standing to enjoin the counting of ballots arriving after 

Election Day, such votes would have to be sufficient in number 

to change the outcome of the election to Bognet’s detriment. 

See, e.g., Sibley v. Alexander, 916 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62 (D.D.C. 

cited language from Bond without considering the context—

specifically, the Tenth Amendment and the reserved police 

powers—in which the U.S. Supreme Court employed that 

language. There is no precedent for expanding Bond beyond 

this context, and the Carson court cited none. 
-27-

2013) (“[E]ven if the Court granted the requested relief,

[plaintiff] would still fail to satisfy the redressability element 

[of standing] because enjoining defendants from casting the . . 

. votes would not change the outcome of the election.” (citing 

Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(citations omitted)). Bognet does not allege as much, and such 

a prediction was inherently speculative when the complaint 

was filed. The same can be said for Bognet’s alleged 

wrongfully incurred expenditures and future expenditures. 

Any harm Bognet sought to avoid in making those 

expenditures was not “certainly impending”—he spent the 

money to avoid a speculative harm. See Donald J. Trump for 

Pres., Inc. v. Boockvar, No. 2:20-cv-966, 2020 WL 5997680, 

at *36 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2020). Nor are those expenditures 

“fairly traceable” under Article III to the actions that Bognet

challenges. See, e.g., Clapper, 568 U.S. at 402, 416 (rejecting 

argument that plaintiff can “manufacture standing by choosing 

to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is 

not certainly impending”).

7

 

Plaintiffs therefore lack Article III standing to challenge 

Defendants’ implementation of the Pennsylvania Supreme 

7 The alleged injury specific to Bognet does not implicate the 

Qualifications Clause or exclusion from Congress, Powell v. 

McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969), nor the standing of 

members of Congress to bring actions alleging separation-ofpowers violations. Moore v. U.S. House of Reps., 733 F.2d 

946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
-28-

Court’s Deadline Extension and Presumption of Timeliness

under the Elections Clause and Electors Clause. 

2. The Voter Plaintiffs lack standing under the 

Equal Protection Clause.

Stressing the “personal” nature of the right to vote, the 

Voter Plaintiffs assert two claims under the Equal Protection 

Clause.8 First, they contend that the influence of their votes, 

cast in person on Election Day, is “diluted” both by (a) mailed 

ballots cast on or before Election Day but received between 

Election Day and the Deadline Extension date, ballots which 

Plaintiffs assert cannot be lawfully counted; and (b) mailed 

ballots that were unlawfully cast (i.e., placed in the mail) after 

Election Day but are still counted because of the Presumption 

of Timeliness. Second, the Voter Plaintiffs allege that the 

Deadline Extension and the Presumption of Timeliness create 

a preferred class of voters based on “arbitrary and disparate 

treatment” that values “one person’s vote over that of another.” 

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000). The Voter 

Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to assert either injury. 

a. Vote Dilution 

As discussed above, the foremost element of standing is 

injury in fact, which requires the plaintiff to show a harm that 

is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, 

not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547–

48 (citation omitted). The Voter Plaintiffs lack standing to 

8 Only the Voter Plaintiffs bring the Equal Protection count in 

the Complaint; Bognet did not join that count. 
-29-

redress their alleged vote dilution because that alleged injury is 

not concrete as to votes counted under the Deadline Extension, 

nor is it particularized for Article III purposes as to votes 

counted under the Deadline Extension or the Presumption of 

Timeliness. 

i. No concrete injury from vote dilution 

attributable to the Deadline Extension. 

The Voter Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ 

implementation of the Deadline Extension violates the Equal 

Protection Clause because “unlawfully” counting ballots 

received within three days of Election Day dilutes their votes. 

But the source of this purported illegality is necessarily a 

matter of state law, which makes any alleged harm abstract for 

purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. And the purported

vote dilution is also not concrete because it would occur in 

equal proportion without the alleged procedural illegality—

that is, had the General Assembly enacted the Deadline 

Extension, which the Voter Plaintiffs do not challenge

substantively.

9

9 We exclude the Presumption of Timeliness from our

concreteness analysis. Plaintiffs allege that the federal statutes 

providing for a uniform election day, 3 U.S.C. § 1 and 2 U.S.C. 

§ 7, conflict with, and thus displace, any state law that would 

authorize voting after Election Day. They claim that the 

Presumption permits, theoretically at least, some voters whose 

ballots lack a legible postmark to vote after Election Day, in 

violation of these federal statutes. So unlike the Deadline 

Extension, Plaintiffs contend that the General Assembly could 
-30-

The concreteness of the Voter Plaintiffs’ alleged vote 

dilution stemming from the Deadline Extension turns on the 

federal and state laws applicable to voting procedures. Federal 

law does not provide for when or how ballot counting occurs. 

See, e.g., Trump for Pres., Inc. v. Way, No. 20-cv-01753, 2020 

WL 5912561, at *12 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2020) (“Plaintiffs direct 

the Court to no federal law regulating methods of determining 

the timeliness of mail-in ballots or requiring that mail-in ballots 

be postmarked.”); see also Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 

(1932) (noting that Elections Clause delegates to state 

lawmaking processes all authority to prescribe “procedure and 

safeguards” for “counting of votes”). Instead, the Elections 

Clause delegates to each state’s lawmaking function the 

authority to prescribe such procedural regulations applicable to 

federal elections. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 832–35 (“The 

Framers intended the Elections Clause to grant States authority 

to create procedural regulations . . . . [including] ‘whether the 

electors should vote by ballot or vivâ voce . . . .’” (quoting 

James Madison, 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 

at 240 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (cleaned up)); Smiley, 285 U.S. 

at 366 (describing state authority under Elections Clause “to 

provide a complete code for congressional elections . . . in 

not enact the Presumption consistent with the Constitution. 

This conceptualization of injury is thus more properly 

characterized as “concrete” than is the purported Deadline 

Extension injury attributable to voters having their timely 

voted ballots received and counted after Election Day. That 

said, we express no opinion about whether the Voter Plaintiffs 

have, in fact, alleged such a concrete injury for standing 

purposes. 
-31-

relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, 

protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, 

counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and 

making and publication of election returns”). That delegation 

of authority embraces all procedures “which experience shows 

are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right 

involved.” Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366. Congress exercises its 

power to “alter” state election regulations only if the state 

regime cannot “operate harmoniously” with federal election 

laws “in a single procedural scheme.” Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 

394. 

The Deadline Extension and federal laws setting the 

date for federal elections can, and indeed do, operate harmoniously. At least 19 other States and the District of Columbia 

have post-Election Day absentee ballot receipt deadlines.

10

10 See AS § 15.20.081(e) & (h) (Alaska – 10 days after Election 

Day if postmarked on or before Election Day); West’s Ann. 

Cal. Elec. Code § 3020(b) (California – three days after 

Election Day if postmarked on or before Election Day); DC ST 

§ 1-1001.05(a)(10A) (District of Columbia – seven days after 

the election if postmarked on or before Election Day); 10 ILCS 

5/19-8, 5/18A-15 (Illinois – 14 days after the election if 

postmarked on or before Election Day); K.S.A. 25-1132 

(Kansas – three days after the election if postmarked before the 

close of polls on Election Day); MD Code, Elec. Law, § 9-505 

(Maryland – the second Friday after Election Day if 

postmarked on or before Election Day); Miss. Code Ann. § 23-

15-637 (Mississippi – five business days after Election Day if 

postmarked on or before Election Day); NV Rev Stat § 293.317 

(Nevada – by 5:00 P.M. on the seventh day after Election Day 
-32-

And many States also accept absentee ballots mailed by overseas uniformed servicemembers that are received after Election 

Day, in accordance with the federal Uniformed and Overseas 

if postmarked by Election Day, and ballots with unclear 

postmarks must be received by 5:00 P.M. on the third day after 

Election Day); N.J.S.A. 19:63-22 (New Jersey – 48 hours after 

polls close if postmarked on or before Election Day); 

McKinney’s Elec. Law § 8-412 (New York – seven days after 

the election for mailed ballots postmarked on Election Day); 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-231(b)(2) and Wise v. Circosta, Nos. 20-

2104, 20-2107, 2020 WL 6156302, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 20, 

2020) (North Carolina – recognizing extension from three to 

nine days after the election the deadline for mail ballots 

postmarked on or before Election Day); Texas Elec. Code § 

86.007 (the day after the election by 5:00 P.M. if postmarked 

on or before Election Day); Va. Code 24.2-709 (Virginia – by 

noon on the third day after the election if postmarked on or 

before Election Day); West’s RCWA 29A.40.091 

(Washington – no receipt deadline for ballots postmarked on 

or before Election Day); W. Va. Code, §§ 3-3-5, 3-5-17 (West 

Virginia – five days after the election if postmarked on or 

before Election Day); see also Iowa Code § 53.17(2) (by noon 

the Monday following the election if postmarked by the day 

before Election Day); NDCC 16.1-07-09 (North Dakota –

before the canvass if postmarked the day before Election Day); 

R.C. § 3509.05 (Ohio – 10 days after the election if postmarked 

by the day before Election Day); Utah Code Ann. § 20A-3a204 (seven to 14 days after the election if postmarked the day 

before the election).
-33-

Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–20311. So 

the Voter Plaintiffs’ only cognizable basis for alleging dilution 

from the “unlawful” counting of invalid ballots is state law 

defining lawful and unlawful ballot counting practices. Cf.

Wise v. Circosta, Nos. 20-2104, 20-2107, 2020 WL 6156302, 

at *5 (4th Cir. Oct. 20, 2020) (“Whether ballots are illegally 

counted if they are received more than three days after Election 

Day depends on an issue of state law from which we must 

abstain.” (emphasis in original)), application for injunctive 

relief denied sub nom. Moore v. Circosta, No. 20A72, 592 U.S. 

__, 2020 WL 6305036 (Oct. 28, 2020). The Voter Plaintiffs

seem to admit as much, arguing “that counting votes that are 

unlawful under the General Assembly’s enactments will 

unconstitutionally dilute the lawful votes” cast by the Voter 

Plaintiffs. Appellants’ Br. 38; see also id. at 31. In other 

words, the Voter Plaintiffs say that the Election Day ballot 

receipt deadline in Pennsylvania’s codified election law 

renders the ballots untimely and therefore unlawful to count. 

Defendants, for their part, contend that the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s extension of that deadline under the Free and 

Equal Elections Clause of the state constitution renders them 

timely, and therefore lawful to count. 

This conceptualization of vote dilution—state actors 

counting ballots in violation of state election law—is not a 

concrete harm under the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Violation of state election laws by 

state officials or other unidentified third parties is not always 

amenable to a federal constitutional claim. See Shipley v.

Chicago Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 947 F.3d 1056, 1062 (7th

Cir. 2020) (“A deliberate violation of state election laws by 

state election officials does not transgress against the 
-34-

Constitution.”) (cleaned up); Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84, 88 

(2d Cir. 1970) (rejecting Equal Protection Clause claim arising 

from state’s erroneous counting of votes cast by voters 

unqualified to participate in closed primary). “It was not 

intended by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . that all matters 

formerly within the exclusive cognizance of the states should 

become matters of national concern.” Snowden v. Hughes, 321 

U.S. 1, 11 (1944). 

Contrary to the Voter Plaintiffs’ conceptualization, vote 

dilution under the Equal Protection Clause is concerned with 

votes being weighed differently. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 

139 S. Ct. 2484, 2501 (2019) (“‘[V]ote dilution’ in the oneperson, one-vote cases refers to the idea that each vote must 

carry equal weight.” (emphasis added)); cf. Baten v. McMaster, 

967 F.3d 345, 355 (4th Cir. 2020), as amended (July 27, 2020)

(“[N]o vote in the South Carolina system is diluted. Every 

qualified person gets one vote and each vote is counted equally 

in determining the final tally.”). As explained below, the Voter

Plaintiffs cannot analogize their Equal Protection claim to 

gerrymandering cases in which votes were weighted

differently. Instead, Plaintiffs advance an Equal Protection 

Clause argument based solely on state officials’ alleged 

violation of state law that does not cause unequal treatment. 

And if dilution of lawfully cast ballots by the “unlawful”

counting of invalidly cast ballots “were a true equal-protection 

problem, then it would transform every violation of state 

election law (and, actually, every violation of every law) into a 

potential federal equal-protection claim requiring scrutiny of 

the government’s ‘interest’ in failing to do more to stop the 

illegal activity.” Trump for Pres. v. Boockvar, 2020 WL 
-35-

5997680, at *45–46. That is not how the Equal Protection 

Clause works.

11

Even if we were to entertain an end-run around the 

Voter Plaintiffs’ lack of Elections Clause standing—by 

viewing the federal Elections Clause as the source of 

“unlawfulness” of Defendants’ vote counting—the alleged 

vote dilution would not be a concrete injury. Consider, as 

we’ve noted, that the Voter Plaintiffs take no issue with the 

content of the Deadline Extension; they concede that the 

General Assembly, as other state legislatures have done, could 

have enacted exactly the same Deadline Extension as a valid

“time[], place[], and manner” regulation consistent with the 

Elections Clause. Cf. Snowden, 321 U.S. at 8 (concluding that 

alleged “unlawful administration by state officers of a state 

statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to 

those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of 

equal protection” (emphasis added)); Powell, 436 F.2d at 88

(“Uneven or erroneous application of an otherwise valid statute 

constitutes a denial of equal protection only if it represents 

‘intentional or purposeful discrimination.’” (emphasis added) 

(quoting Snowden, 321 U.S. at 8)). Reduced to its essence, the 

11 Bush v. Gore does not require us to perform an Equal 

Protection Clause analysis of Pennsylvania election law as 

interpreted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See 531 U.S. 

at 109 (“Our consideration is limited to the present 

circumstances . . . .”); id. at 139–40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 

(discussing “[r]are[]” occasions when Supreme Court rejected 

state supreme court’s interpretation of state law, one of which 

was in 1813 and others occurred during Civil Rights 

Movement—and none decided federal equal protection issues). 
-36-

Voter Plaintiffs’ claimed vote dilution would rest on their

allegation that federal law required a different state organ to 

issue the Deadline Extension. The Voter Plaintiffs have not 

alleged, for example, that they were prevented from casting 

their votes, Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), nor 

that their votes were not counted, United States v. Mosley, 238 

U.S. 383 (1915). Any alleged harm of vote dilution that turns 

not on the proportional influence of votes, but solely on the 

federal illegality of the Deadline Extension, strikes us as 

quintessentially abstract in the election law context and 

“divorced from any concrete harm.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549

(citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 

(2009)). That the alleged violation here relates to election law 

and the U.S. Constitution, rather than the mine-run federal 

consumer privacy statute, does not abrogate the requirement 

that a concrete harm must flow from the procedural illegality. 

See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (“[T]here is absolutely no 

basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of 

the asserted right.”). 

The Voter Plaintiffs thus lack a concrete Equal 

Protection Clause injury for their alleged harm of vote dilution 

attributable to the Deadline Extension. 

ii. No particularized injury from votes counted 

under the Deadline Extension or the 

Presumption of Timeliness. 

The opposite of a “particularized” injury is a 

“generalized grievance,” where “the impact on plaintiff is 

plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the 

public.” Id. at 575 (cleaned up); see also Lance, 549 U.S. at 
-37-

439. The District Court correctly held that the Voter Plaintiffs’ 

“dilution” claim is a “paradigmatic generalized grievance that 

cannot support standing.” Bognet, 2020 WL 6323121, at *4 

(quoting Carson v. Simon, No. 20-cv-02030, 2020 WL 

6018957, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct. 12, 2020), rev’d on other 

grounds, No. 20-3139, 2020 WL 6335967 (8th Cir. Oct. 29, 

2020)). The Deadline Extension and Presumption of 

Timeliness, assuming they operate to allow the illegal counting 

of unlawful votes, “dilute” the influence of all voters in 

Pennsylvania equally and in an “undifferentiated” manner and 

do not dilute a certain group of voters particularly.12

Put another way, “[a] vote cast by fraud or mailed in by 

the wrong person through mistake,” or otherwise counted 

illegally, “has a mathematical impact on the final tally and thus 

on the proportional effect of every vote, but no single voter is 

specifically disadvantaged.” Martel v. Condos, No. 5:20-cv00131, 2020 WL 5755289, at *4 (D. Vt. Sept. 16, 2020). Such 

an alleged “dilution” is suffered equally by all voters and is not 

12 In their complaint, the Voter Plaintiffs alleged that they are 

all “residents of Somerset County, a county where voters are 

requesting absentee ballots at a rate far less than the state 

average” and thus, somehow, the Voter Plaintiffs’ votes “will 

be diluted to a greater degree than other voters.” Compl. ¶ 71 

(emphasis in original). Plaintiffs continue to advance this 

argument on appeal in support of standing, and it additionally 

suffers from being a conjectural or hypothetical injury under 

the framework discussed infra Section III.A.2.b.ii. It is purely 

hypothetical that counties where a greater percentage of voters 

request absentee ballots will more frequently have those ballots 

received after Election Day.
-38-

“particularized” for standing purposes. The courts to consider 

this issue are in accord. See id.; Carson, 2020 WL 6018957, 

at *7–8; Moore v. Circosta, Nos. 1:20-cv-00911, 1:20-cv00912, 2020 WL 6063332, at *14 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 14, 2020), 

emergency injunction pending appeal denied sub nom. Wise v. 

Circosta, Nos. 20-2104, 20-2017, 2020 WL 6156302 (4th Cir. 

Oct. 20, 2020), application for injunctive relief denied sub 

nom. Moore v. Circosta, No. 20A72 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2020); 

Paher v. Cegavske, 457 F. Supp. 3d 919, 926–27 (D. Nev. Apr. 

30, 2020).

But the Voter Plaintiffs argue that their purported “vote 

dilution” is an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing, and 

not a generalized grievance belonging to all voters, because the

Supreme Court has “long recognized that a person’s right to 

vote is ‘individual and personal in nature.’” Gill v. Whitford, 

138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 

U.S. 533, 561 (1964)). “Thus, ‘voters who allege facts 

showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals have 

standing to sue’ to remedy that disadvantage.” Id. (quoting 

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206 (1962)).

The Voter Plaintiffs’ reliance on this language from 

Baker and Reynolds is misplaced. In Baker, the plaintiffs 

challenged Tennessee’s apportionment of seats in its 

legislature as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. 369 U.S. at 193. The Supreme Court 

held that the plaintiffs did have standing under Article III 

because “[t]he injury which appellants assert is that this 

classification disfavors the voters in the counties in which they 

reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally 
-39-

unjustifiable inequality vis-à-vis voters in irrationally favored 

counties.” Id. at 207–08. 

Although the Baker Court did not decide the merits of 

the Equal Protection claim, the Court in a series of cases—

including Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), and 

Reynolds—made clear that the Equal Protection Clause 

prohibits a state from “diluti[ng] . . . the weight of the votes of 

certain . . . voters merely because of where they reside[],” just 

as it prevents a state from discriminating on the basis of the 

voter’s race or sex. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 557 (emphasis 

added). The Voter Plaintiffs consider it significant that the 

Court in Reynolds noted—though not in the context of 

standing—that “the right to vote” is “individual and personal 

in nature.” Id. at 561 (quoting United States v. Bathgate, 246 

U.S. 220, 227 (1918)). The Court then explained that a voter’s 

right to vote encompasses both the right to cast that vote and 

the right to have that vote counted without “debasement or 

dilution”:

The right to vote can neither be denied outright, 

Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 [(1915)], 

Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 [(1939)], nor 

destroyed by alteration of ballots, see United 

States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 [(1941)], nor 

diluted by ballot-box stuffing, Ex parte Siebold, 

100 U.S. 371 [(1880)], United States v. Saylor, 

322 U.S. 385 [(1944)]. As the Court stated in 

Classic, “Obviously included within the right to 

choose, secured by the Constitution, is the right 

of qualified voters within a state to cast their 
-40-

ballots and have them counted . . . .” 313 U.S., at 

315.

...

“The right to vote includes the right to have the 

ballot counted. . . . It also includes the right to 

have the vote counted at full value without 

dilution or discount. . . . That federally protected 

right suffers substantial dilution . . . [where a] 

favored group has full voting strength . . . [and] 

[t]he groups not in favor have their votes 

discounted.”

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 & n.29 (alterations in last paragraph 

in original) (quoting South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) 

(Douglas, J., dissenting)).

Still, it does not follow from the labeling of the right to 

vote as “personal” in Baker and Reynolds that any alleged 

illegality affecting voting rights rises to the level of an injury 

in fact. After all, the Court has observed that the harms 

underlying a racial gerrymandering claim under the Equal 

Protection Clause “are personal” in part because they include 

the harm of a voter “being personally subjected to a racial 

classification.” Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 

254, 263 (2015) (cleaned up). Yet a voter “who complains of 

gerrymandering, but who does not live in a gerrymandered 

district, ‘assert[s] only a generalized grievance against 

governmental conduct of which he or she does not approve.’” 

Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1930 (quoting United States v. Hayes, 515 

U.S. 737, 745 (1995)) (alteration in original). The key inquiry 
-41-

for standing is whether the alleged violation of the right to vote 

arises from an invidious classification—including those based 

on “race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a 

State,” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561—to which the plaintiff is 

subject and in which “the favored group has full voting 

strength and the groups not in favor have their votes 

discounted,” id. at 555 n.29 (cleaned up). In other words, 

“voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves” 

have standing to bring suit to remedy that disadvantage, Baker, 

369 U.S. at 206 (emphasis added), but a disadvantage to the 

plaintiff exists only when the plaintiff is part of a group of 

voters whose votes will be weighed differently compared to 

another group. Here, no Pennsylvania voter’s vote will count 

for less than that of any other voter as a result of the Deadline 

Extension and Presumption of Timeliness.13

13 Plaintiffs also rely on FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), for 

the proposition that a widespread injury—such as a mass tort 

injury or an injury “where large numbers of voters suffer 

interference with voting rights conferred by law”—does not 

become a “generalized grievance” just because many share 

it. Id. at 24–25. That’s true as far as it goes. But the Voter 

Plaintiffs have not alleged an injury like that at issue in 

Akins. There, the plaintiffs’ claimed injury was their inability 

to obtain information they alleged was required to be disclosed 

under the Federal Election Campaign Act. Id. at 21. The 

plaintiffs alleged a statutory right to obtain information and 

that the same information was being withheld. Here, the Voter 

Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is to their right under the Equal 

Protection Clause not to have their votes “diluted,” but the 
-42-

This conclusion cannot be avoided by describing one 

group of voters as “those . . . who lawfully vote in person and 

submit their ballots on time” and the other group of voters as 

those whose (mail-in) ballots arrive after Election Day and are 

counted because of the Deadline Extension and/or the 

Presumption of Timeliness. Appellants’ Br. 33 (emphasis in 

original). Although the former group, under Plaintiffs’ theory, 

should make up 100% of the total votes counted and the latter 

group 0%, there is simply no differential weighing of the votes. 

See Wise, 2020 WL 6156302, at *8 (Motz, J., concurring) 

(“But if the extension went into effect, plaintiffs’ votes would 

not count for less relative to other North Carolina voters. This 

is the core of an Equal Protection Clause challenge.” (emphasis 

in original)). Unlike the malapportionment or racial gerrymandering cases, a vote cast by a voter in the so-called “favored” 

group counts not one bit more than the same vote cast by the 

“disfavored” group—no matter what set of scales one might 

choose to employ. Cf. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 n.29. And,

however one tries to draw a contrast, this division is not based 

on a voter’s personal characteristics at all, let alone a person’s 

race, sex, economic status, or place of residence. Two voters 

could each have cast a mail-in ballot before Election Day at the 

same time, yet perhaps only one of their ballots arrived by 8:00 

P.M. on Election Day, given USPS’s mail delivery process. It 

is passing strange to assume that one of these voters would be 

denied “equal protection of the laws” were both votes counted. 

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 

Voter Plaintiffs have not alleged that their votes are less 

influential than any other vote.
-43-

The Voter Plaintiffs also emphasize language from 

Reynolds that “[t]he right to vote can neither be denied outright 

. . . nor diluted by ballot-box stuffing.” 377 U.S. at 555 (citing 

Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); United States v. Saylor, 

322 U.S. 385 (1944)). In the first place, casting a vote in 

accordance with a procedure approved by a state’s highest 

court—even assuming that approval violates the Elections 

Clause—is not equivalent to “ballot-box stuffing.” The 

Supreme Court has only addressed this “false”-tally type of 

dilution where the tally was false as a result of a scheme to cast 

falsified or fraudulent votes. See Saylor, 322 U.S. at 386. We 

are in uncharted territory when we are asked to declare that a 

tally that includes false or fraudulent votes is equivalent to a 

tally that includes votes that are or may be unlawful for nonfraudulent reasons, and so is more aptly described as 

“incorrect.” Cf. Gray, 372 U.S. at 386 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 

(“[I]t is hard to take seriously the argument that ‘dilution’ of a 

vote in consequence of a legislatively sanctioned electoral 

system can, without more, be analogized to an impairment of 

the political franchise by ballot box stuffing or other criminal 

activity.”). 

Yet even were this analogy less imperfect, it still would

not follow that every such “false” or incorrect tally is an injury 

in fact for purposes of an Equal Protection Clause claim. The 

Court’s cases that describe ballot-box stuffing as an injury to 

the right to vote have arisen from criminal prosecutions under 

statutes making it unlawful for anyone to injure the exercise of 

another’s constitutional right. See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 

U.S. at 373–74 (application for writ of habeas corpus); Saylor, 

322 U.S. at 385–86 (criminal appeal regarding whether statute 

prohibiting “conspir[ing] to injure . . . any citizen in the free 
-44-

exercise . . . of any right or privilege secured to him by the 

Constitution” applied to conspiracy to stuff ballot boxes); 

Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226 (1974) (criminal 

prosecution for conspiracy to stuff ballot boxes under 

successor to statute in Saylor). Standing was, of course, never 

an issue in those cases because the Government was enforcing 

its criminal laws. Here, the Voter Plaintiffs, who bear the 

burden to show standing, have presented no instance in which

an individual voter had Article III standing to claim an equal 

protection harm to his or her vote from the existence of an 

allegedly illegal vote cast by someone else in the same election.

Indeed, the logical conclusion of the Voter Plaintiffs’ 

theory is that whenever an elections board counts any ballot 

that deviates in some way from the requirements of a state’s 

legislatively enacted election code, there is a particularized

injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing on every 

other voter—provided the remainder of the standing analysis 

is satisfied. Allowing standing for such an injury strikes us as 

indistinguishable from the proposition that a plaintiff has 

Article III standing to assert a general interest in seeing the 

“proper application of the Constitution and laws”—a 

proposition that the Supreme Court has firmly rejected. Lujan, 

504 U.S. at 573–74. The Voter Plaintiffs thus lack standing to 

bring their Equal Protection vote dilution claim.

b. Arbitrary and Disparate Treatment

The Voter Plaintiffs also lack standing to allege an 

injury in the form of “arbitrary and disparate treatment” of a 

preferred class of voters because the Voter Plaintiffs have not 

alleged a legally cognizable “preferred class” for equal 
-45-

protection purposes, and because the alleged harm from votes 

counted solely due to the Presumption of Timeliness is 

hypothetical or conjectural.

i. No legally protected “preferred class.” 

The District Court held that the Presumption of 

Timeliness creates a “preferred class of voters” who are “able 

to cast their ballots after the congressionally established 

Election Day” because it “extends the date of the election by 

multiple days for a select group of mail-in voters whose ballots 

will be presumed to be timely in the absence of a verifiable 

postmark.”14 Bognet, 2020 WL 6323121, at *6. The District 

Court reasoned, then, that the differential treatment between 

groups of voters is by itself an injury for standing purposes. To 

the District Court, this supposed “unequal treatment of voters . 

. . harms the [Voter] Plaintiffs because, as in-person voters, 

they must vote by the end of the congressionally established 

Election Day in order to have their votes counted.” Id. The 

District Court cited no case law in support of its conclusion that 

the injury it identified gives rise to Article III standing.

The District Court’s analysis suffers from several flaws. 

First, the Deadline Extension and Presumption of Timeliness 

apply to all voters, not just a subset of “preferred” voters. It is 

an individual voter’s choice whether to vote by mail or in 

person, and thus whether to become a part of the so-called 

“preferred class” that the District Court identified. Whether to 

14 The District Court did not find that the Deadline Extension 

created such a preferred class. 
-46-

join the “preferred class” of mail-in voters was entirely up to 

the Voter Plaintiffs. 

Second, it is not clear that the mere creation of so-called 

“classes” of voters constitutes an injury in fact. An injury in

fact requires the “invasion of a legally protected interest.” 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. We doubt that the mere existence of 

groupings of voters qualifies as an injury per se. “An equal 

protection claim will not lie by ‘conflating all persons not 

injured into a preferred class receiving better treatment’ than 

the plaintiff.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 

1167 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Joyce v. Mavromatis, 783 F.2d 

56, 57 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also, e.g., Batra v. Bd. of Regents 

of Univ. of Neb., 79 F.3d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he 

relevant prerequisite is unlawful discrimination, not whether 

plaintiff is part of a victimized class.”). More importantly, the 

Voter Plaintiffs have shown no disadvantage to themselves that 

arises simply by being separated into groupings. For instance, 

there is no argument that it is inappropriate that some voters 

will vote in person and others will vote by mail. The existence 

of these two groups of voters, without more, simply does not 

constitute an injury in fact to in-person voters. 

Plaintiffs may believe that injury arises because of a 

preference shown for one class over another. But what, 

precisely, is the preference of which Plaintiffs complain? In 

Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court held that a State may not 

engage in arbitrary and disparate treatment that results in the 

valuation of one person’s vote over that of another. 531 U.S. 

at 104–05. Thus, “the right of suffrage can be denied by a 

debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as 

effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the 
-47-

franchise.” Id. at 105 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555)

(emphasis added). As we have already discussed, vote dilution 

is not an injury in fact here. 

What about the risk that some ballots placed in the mail 

after Election Day may still be counted? Recall that no voter—

whether in person or by mail—is permitted to vote after 

Election Day. Under Plaintiffs’ argument, it might

theoretically be easier for one group of voters—mail-in 

voters—to illegally cast late votes than it is for another group 

of voters—in-person voters. But even if that is the case, no 

group of voters has the right to vote after the deadline.15 We 

remember that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable 

interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” 

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (citations 

omitted). And “a plaintiff lacks standing to complain about his 

inability to commit crimes because no one has a right to 

commit a crime.” Citizen Ctr. v. Gessler, 770 F.3d 900, 910 

(10th Cir. 2014). Without a showing of discrimination or other 

intentionally unlawful conduct, or at least some burden on 

Plaintiffs’ own voting rights, we discern no basis on which they 

have standing to challenge the slim opportunity the 

Presumption of Timeliness conceivably affords wrongdoers to 

violate election law. Cf. Minn. Voters Alliance v. Ritchie, 720 

F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of claims 

15 Moreover, we cannot overlook that the mail-in voters 

potentially suffer a disadvantage relative to the in-person 

voters. Whereas in-person ballots that are timely cast will 

count, timely cast mail-in ballots may not count because, given 

mail delivery rates, they may not be received by 5:00 P.M. on 

November 6. 
-48-

“premised on potential harm in the form of vote dilution caused

by insufficient pre-election verification of [election day 

registrants’] voting eligibility and the absence of post-election 

ballot rescission procedures”).

ii. Speculative injury from ballots counted 

under the Presumption of Timeliness. 

Plaintiffs’ theory as to the Presumption of Timeliness 

focuses on the potential for some voters to vote after Election 

Day and still have their votes counted. This argument reveals 

that their alleged injury in fact attributable to the Presumption 

is “conjectural or hypothetical” instead of “actual or 

imminent.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547–48 (quoting Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 560). The Supreme Court has emphasized that a 

threatened injury must be “certainly impending” and not 

merely “possible” for it to constitute an injury in fact. Clapper, 

568 U.S. at 409 (emphasis in original) (quoting Whitmore v. 

Ark., 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). When determining Article III 

standing, our Court accepts allegations based on well-pleaded 

facts; but we do not credit bald assertions that rest on mere

supposition. Finkelman v. NFL, 810 F.3d 187, 201–02 (3d Cir. 

2016). The Supreme Court has also emphasized its “reluctance 

to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the 

decisions of independent actors.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414. A 

standing theory becomes even more speculative when it 

requires that independent actors make decisions to act 

unlawfully. See City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 & 

106 n.7 (1983) (rejecting Article III standing to seek injunction 

where party invoking federal jurisdiction would have to 

establish that he would unlawfully resist arrest or police 

officers would violate department orders in future).
-49-

Here, the Presumption of Timeliness could inflict injury 

on the Voter Plaintiffs only if: (1) another voter violates the 

law by casting an absentee ballot after Election Day; (2) the

illegally cast ballot does not bear a legible postmark, which is 

against USPS policy;16 (3) that same ballot still arrives within 

three days of Election Day, which is faster than USPS 

anticipates mail delivery will occur;

17 (4) the ballot lacks 

sufficient indicia of its untimeliness to overcome the 

Presumption of Timeliness; and (5) that same ballot is 

ultimately counted. See Donald J. Trump for Pres., Inc. v. 

Way, No. 20-cv-10753, 2020 WL 6204477, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 

22, 2020) (laying out similar “unlikely chain of events” 

required for vote dilution harm from postmark rule under New 

Jersey election law); see also Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 

F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding purported injury in fact was 

too conjectural where “we cannot now describe how 

Appellants will be injured in this case without beginning our 

explanation with the word ‘if’”). This parade of horribles “may 

never come to pass,” Trump for Pres. v. Boockvar, 2020 WL 

5997680, at *33, and we are especially reluctant to endorse 

such a speculative theory of injury given Pennsylvania’s “own 

mechanisms for deterring and prosecuting voter fraud,” 

16 See Defendant-Appellee’s Br. 30 (citing 39 C.F.R. § 

211.2(a)(2); Postal Operations Manual at 443.3).

17 See Pa. Democratic Party, 2020 WL 5554644, at *12 (noting 

“current two to five day delivery expectation of the USPS”). 
-50-

Donald J. Trump for Pres., Inc. v. Cegavske, No. 20-1445, 

2020 WL 5626974, at *6 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2020).18 

To date, the Secretary has reported that at least 655

ballots without a legible postmark have been collected within 

the Deadline Extension period.19 But it is mere speculation to 

say that any one of those ballots was cast after Election Day. 

We are reluctant to conclude that an independent actor—here, 

one of 655 voters—decided to mail his or her ballot after 

Election Day contrary to law. The Voter Plaintiffs have not 

provided any empirical evidence on the frequency of voter 

fraud or the speed of mail delivery that would establish a 

statistical likelihood or even the plausibility that any of the 655

18 Indeed, the conduct required of a voter to effectuate such a 

scheme may be punishable as a crime under Pennsylvania 

statutes that criminalize forging or “falsely mak[ing] the 

official endorsement on any ballot,” 25 Pa. Stat. & Cons. Stat.

§ 3517 (punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment); 

“willfully disobey[ing] any lawful instruction or order of any 

county board of elections,” id. § 3501 (punishable by up to one 

year’s imprisonment); or voting twice in one election, id. § 

3535 (punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment). 

19 As of the morning of November 12, Secretary Boockvar 

estimates that 655 of the 9383 ballots received between 8:00 

P.M. on Election Day and 5:00 P.M. on November 6 lack a 

legible postmark. See Dkt. No. 59. That estimate of 655 

ballots does not include totals from five of Pennsylvania’s 67 

counties: Lehigh, Northumberland, Tioga, Warren, and 

Wayne. Id. The 9383 ballots received, however, account for 

all of Pennsylvania’s counties. Id.
-51-

ballots was cast after Election Day. Any injury to the Voter 

Plaintiffs attributable to the Presumption of Timeliness is 

merely “possible,” not “actual or imminent,” and thus cannot

constitute an injury in fact.

B. Purcell

Even were we to conclude that Plaintiffs have standing, 

we could not say that the District Court abused its discretion in 

concluding on this record that the Supreme Court’s electionlaw jurisprudence counseled against injunctive relief. Unique 

and important equitable considerations, including voters’ 

reliance on the rules in place when they made their plans to 

vote and chose how to cast their ballots, support that 

disposition. Plaintiffs’ requested relief would have upended 

this status quo, which is generally disfavored under the “voter 

confusion” and election confidence rationales of Purcell v. 

Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006). One can assume for the sake 

of argument that aspects of the now-prevailing regime in 

Pennsylvania are unlawful as alleged and still recognize that, 

given the timing of Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, the 

electoral calendar was such that following it “one last time”

was the better of the choices available. Perez, 138 S. Ct. at 

2324 (“And if a [redistricting] plan is found to be unlawful very 

close to the election date, the only reasonable option may be to 

use the plan one last time.”). 

Here, less than two weeks before Election Day, 

Plaintiffs asked the District Court to enjoin a deadline 

established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on September 

17, a deadline that may have informed voters’ decisions about 

whether and when to request mail-in ballots as well as when 
-52-

and how they cast or intended to cast them. In such 

circumstances, the District Court was well within its discretion 

to give heed to Supreme Court decisions instructing that 

“federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on 

the eve of an election.” Republican Nat’l Comm. v. 

Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (per 

curiam) (citing Purcell, 549 U.S. at 1). 

In Purcell, an appeal from a federal court order 

enjoining the State of Arizona from enforcing its voter 

identification law, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 

“[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is 

essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.” 

549 U.S. at 4. In other words, “[c]ourt orders affecting 

elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result 

in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away 

from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will 

increase.” Id. at 4–5. Mindful of “the necessity for clear 

guidance to the State of Arizona” and “the imminence of the 

election,” the Court vacated the injunction. Id. at 5.

The principle announced in Purcell has very recently 

been reiterated. First, in Republican National Committee, the 

Supreme Court stayed on the eve of the April 7 Wisconsin 

primary a district court order that altered the State’s voting 

rules by extending certain deadlines applicable to absentee 

ballots. 140 S. Ct. at 1206. The Court noted that it was 

adhering to Purcell and had “repeatedly emphasized that lower 

federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on 

the eve of an election.” Id. at 1207 (citing Purcell, 549 U.S. at 

1). And just over two weeks ago, the Court denied an 

application to vacate a stay of a district court order that made 
-53-

similar changes to Wisconsin’s election rules six weeks before 

Election Day. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State 

Legislature, No. 20A66, 592 U.S. __, 2020 WL 6275871 (Oct. 

26, 2020) (denying application to vacate stay). Justice 

Kavanaugh explained that the injunction was improper for the 

“independent reason[]” that “the District Court changed 

Wisconsin’s election rules too close to the election, in 

contravention of this Court’s precedents.” Id. at *3 

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Purcell and a string20 of Supreme 

Court election-law decisions in 2020 “recognize a basic tenet 

of election law: When an election is close at hand, the rules of 

the road should be clear and settled.” Id. 

20 See, e.g., Andino v. Middleton, No. 20A55, 592 U.S. __, 

2020 WL 5887393, at *1 (Oct. 5, 2020) (Kavanaugh, J., 

concurring) (“By enjoining South Carolina’s witness 

requirement shortly before the election, the District Court 

defied [the Purcell] principle and this Court’s precedents.” 

(citations omitted)); Merrill v. People First of Ala., No. 

19A1063, 591 U.S. __, 2020 WL 3604049 (Mem.), at *1 (July 

2, 2020); Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207; see also

Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 2020 

WL 5951359, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 8, 2020) (per curiam) 

(holding that injunction issued six weeks before election 

violated Purcell); New Ga. Project v. Raffensperger, 976 F.3d 

1278, 1283 (11th Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (“[W]e are not on the eve 

of the election—we are in the middle of it, with absentee 

ballots already printed and mailed. An injunction here would 

thus violate Purcell’s well-known caution against federal 

courts mandating new election rules—especially at the last 

minute.” (citing Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–5)). 
-54-

The prevailing state election rule in Pennsylvania 

permitted voters to mail ballots up through 8:00 P.M. on 

Election Day so long as their ballots arrived by 5:00 P.M. on 

November 6. Whether that rule was wisely or properly put in 

place is not before us now. What matters for our purposes 

today is that Plaintiffs’ challenge to it was not filed until 

sufficiently close to the election to raise a reasonable concern 

in the District Court that more harm than good would come 

from an injunction changing the rule. In sum, the District 

Court’s justifiable reliance on Purcell constitutes an 

“alternative and independent reason[]” for concluding that an 

“injunction was unwarranted” here. Wis. State Legislature, 

2020 WL 6275871, at *3 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

IV. CONCLUSION

We do not decide today whether the Deadline Extension 

or the Presumption of Timeliness are proper exercises of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s lawmaking authority, 

delegated by the U.S. Constitution, to regulate federal 

elections. Nor do we evaluate the policy wisdom of those two 

features of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling. We hold 

only that when voters cast their ballots under a state’s facially 

lawful election rule and in accordance with instructions from 

the state’s election officials, private citizens lack Article III 

standing to enjoin the counting of those ballots on the grounds 

that the source of the rule was the wrong state organ or that 

doing so dilutes their votes or constitutes differential treatment 

of voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Further, 

and independent of our holding on standing, we hold that the 

District Court did not err in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for 

injunctive relief out of concern for the settled expectations of 
-55-

voters and election officials. We will affirm the District 

Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ emergency motion for a TRO or 

preliminary injunction.