UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4524

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

YAHYA WATSON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior 

District Judge. (1:07-cr-00396-CMH-1) 

Submitted: February 25, 2009 Decided: March 23, 2009 

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Matthew A. Wartel, LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW A. WARTEL, PLLC, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United 

States Attorney; Stephen Sola, Kristin A. Taylor, Special 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Yahya Watson appeals from a 324-month sentence imposed 

after his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). Watson argues that 

the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea, on the basis that he was informed at his plea 

hearing that he faced a statutory minimum sentence of ten years, 

whereas he actually faced a statutory minimum sentence of twenty 

years. Watson cited United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400 (4th 

Cir. 1995), in support of his motion to withdraw. Because we 

hold that the error was harmless and did not affect Watson’s 

substantial rights, we affirm. 

 This court generally reviews the adequacy of a guilty 

plea proceeding de novo. See United States v. Damon, 191 F.3d 

561, 564 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Goins, 51 

F.3d 400, 402 (4th Cir. 1995)). Rule 11 violations, however, 

are reviewed under a harmless error standard. See id. The 

court ultimately asks whether the error likely affected the 

defendant’s decision to plead guilty. Id. Any variance from 

the Rule 11 requirements that does not affect the substantial 

rights of the defendant is disregarded. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(h); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 117 (4th Cir. 

1991). 

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 Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B), Watson needed to 

provide the court a “fair and just reason” for withdrawal. The 

court evaluates the proffered reason in light of whether the 

plea was knowing and voluntary; the defendant has credibly 

asserted his legal innocence; the length of delay between the 

entry of the plea and the filing of the motion to withdraw; 

whether the defendant had close assistance of competent counsel; 

whether withdrawal will prejudice the government; and whether 

withdrawal will inconvenience the court or waste judicial 

resources. See United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th 

Cir. 1991). Denial of a motion to withdraw is proper if the 

first four factors all weigh against the movant, as the last two 

factors are counterbalancing considerations. Id. 

 In Goins, this court found that the district court 

erred when it failed to advise the appellant of the mandatory 

minimum sentence of five years, above the then-mandatory 

guidelines range of 33 to 41 months. 51 F.3d at 404. In 

addition, the court found that the error was not harmless 

because Goins was not otherwise aware of the mandatory minimum 

and Goins’ counsel was not aware of the mandatory minimum. Id.

at 404-05. Thus, the court vacated Goins’ conviction and 

remanded so that Goins could replead. Id. 

 Unlike Goins, Watson faced a guidelines imprisonment 

range well above the statutory minimum, and he was aware of his 

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expected guidelines range, as evidenced by a letter sent to him 

by counsel who represented him when he pled guilty, discussing 

the possibility of his sentence being reduced from thirty years 

to twenty-four years. Although the letter discusses the 

possibility of further reduction in Watson’s sentence through 

cooperation with the Government, that possibility would not 

necessarily have been foreclosed by the statutory minimum. 

Watson’s ultimate sentence of 324 months is well above the 

statutory minimum, so his sentence was not affected by the 

statutory enhancement. In addition, Watson has not argued that 

he would not have pled guilty if he had known of the statutory 

minimum sentence. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED