COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Humphreys , Huff and Senior Judge C lements

DOROTHY MARIA STILLEY MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 1686

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- 1 PER CURIAM JANUARY 31, 2012 NEWPORT NEWS DEPARTMENT

OF HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT C OURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS H. Vincent Conway, Jr. , Judge ( Charles E. Haden , on brief), for appellant. ( Shannon M. Manning, Assistant City Attorney ; Michael P. Jones , Guardian ad litem for the minor child , on brief), for appellee.

On July 28, 2011 , the trial court terminated the residual parental rights of Dorothy Maria Stilley (appellant) to her child, M.S. , pursuant to Code § 16.1

- 283(C)(2) and § 16.1

- 283(E)(i) . On appeal of this decision, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidenc e to support the termination. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule
5A:27

. On appeal, we view the evidence in the “‘light most favorable’ to the prevailing party in the circuit court and grant to that party the benefit of ‘all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767 (2005) (quoting L ogan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). When reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, we presume the

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1

- 413, this o pinion is not designated for publication.- 2

- circuit court “‘thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirement s, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.’” Id. at 265

- 66, 616 S.E.2d at 769 (quoting Fields v. Dinwiddie County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005)). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evi dence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. at 266, 616 S.E.2d at 769 (quoting Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted)). “In its capacity as factfinder, ther efore, the circuit court retains ‘broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.’” Id. (quoting Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 7 95 (1990)). When M.S. was born on December 2, 2009 , one month prematurely, the hospital notified the Newport News Department of Human Services (DHS) because appellant’s residual parent rights to M.S.’s half

- brother, O.S., had been involuntarily terminated on May 13, 2008. 1 After a

one - month stay in the h ospital, M.S. was taken into custody by DHS and placed in a foster home

. M.S. had medical issues resulting from her premature birth. Moreover, M.S. had to undergo testing and take medications because appellant had tested positive ly for both hepatitis C a nd
HIV. Appellant was arrested upon a probation violation and a charge of grand larceny on January 7, 2010 . S he remained incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing on July 28,
2011. After taking custody of M.S., DHS explored the suitability of se veral individuals appellant had named as possible guardians for M.S. However, none of them was both willing and able to serve as a foster parent for M.S. under DHS’s guidelines.

1 Appellant’s parental rights to O.S. were terminated as a result of her ongoing drug abuse and incarceration.- 3

- In September 2010 M.S. was placed in the same foster home as O.S. , who was th en ten years old. M.S. had adjusted well to the home , appeared healthy and happy, and had developed a secure relationship with O.S. She had bonded with the other children in the home, as well as the foster parents. Th e foster family plann ed to adopt bot h O.S. and M.S. At the July 28, 2011 termination hearing, appellant testified that she anticipated she would be released from jail on August 1, 2011. Appellant testified that she was a drug addict and did not care about parenting when her rights to O.S. w ere terminated. She claimed that, while in jail, she had abstained from drugs and alcohol. She said her attitude toward parenting had changed, she loved M.S., and wanted to be the child’s mother. Termination of residual parental rights under Code § 16.1

- 283(E)(i) requires clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child and that “the residual parental rights of the parent regarding a sibling of the child have previously been involuntarily terminated[.]” Appellant conc edes that her parental rights to O.S., a sibling of M.S. , were involuntarily terminated, but claims termination of her parental rights to M.S. was not in the child’s best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, t his Court has s tated: a court must evaluate and consider many factors, including the age and physical and mental condition of the child or children; the age and physical and mental condition of the parents; the relationship existing between each parent and each child; th e needs of the child or children; the role which each parent has played, and will play in the future, in the upbringing and care of the child or children; and such other factors as are necessary in determining the best interests of the child or children. B arkey v. Commonwealth , 2 Va. App. 662, 66 8, 347 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986). Clear and convincing evidence proved that termination of appellant’s parental rights was in the best interests of M.S. At the time of the termination, appellant had had no contact wi th M.S. for eighteen months, since shortly after the child’s birth. In the meantime, M.S. had been- 4

- placed in a foster home with O.S. M.S. was thriving, and the family planned to adopt both children. Appellant remained incarcerated at the time of the ter mination hearing. Although appellant claim ed she w ould be able to provide a suitable home for M.S. upon her release , she provided the trial court with no evidence of permanent plans with regard to h er

care. Appellant had a history of drug abuse and failu re to care for M.S.’s sibling. In this regard, appellant’s “‘past actions .

. . over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Winfield v. Urquhart , 25 Va. App. 688, 695

- 96 , 492 S.E.2d 464, 467 (1997) (quo ting Linkous v. Kingery , 10 Va. App. 45, 46 , 390 S.E.2d 188, 1 9 4 (1990)). We recognize that “‘[t]he termination of [residual] parental rights is a grave, drastic and irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28

- 2 9 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Dep’t of Public Welfare of Richmond , 231 Va. 277, 280, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)). However, “[i]t is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10
Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Appellant also contends the trial court erred in terminating h er residual p ar ental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1

- 283(C)(2). However, b ecause we conclude the trial court’s decision terminating appellant’s parental ri ghts was warranted under Code § 16.1

- 283( E )( i ), we need not reach this issue. When a trial court’ s judgment is ma de on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court and, if we so find, need not address the other grounds. See Fields , 46 Va. App. at 8, 614 S.E.2d- 5

- at 659 (termin ation of parental rights upheld under one subsection of Code § 16.1

- 283 forecloses need to consider termination under alternative subsections). Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is affirmed. Affirmed.