UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD DUMAS, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. No. 14-3015 (D.C. No. 6:12-CV-01405-JWL) (D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , PORFILIO , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.
Richard Dumas, Jr., proceedin g pro se on appeal, seeks reversal of the district court’s judgment upholding the decision of an administrative la w judge (ALJ) to deny his application for social security disa bility benefits and su pplemental security income benefits. We have jurisdicti on under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 29, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - I. BACKGROUND Mr. Dumas alleged his disability be gan on November 1, 2007. At his administrative hearing on April 11, 2011, Mr. Dumas was repres ented by counsel. Mr. Dumas and a vocational e xpert (VE) testified. In her May 16, 2011 decision, the ALJ found Mr. Dumas suffered from “a mental impairment variously diagnosed to include depressive disorder, alcohol abuse/dependence in remission, cocaine a nd marijuana abuse in alleged remission, and borderline intellectual functioning, an d lumbar and right hip arthralgias, cephalgias, and Hepatitis C with liver fibrosis.” R. at 34. The ALJ also found these impairments did not meet or equal the listings for pr esumptive disability. The ALJ then concluded Mr. Dumas had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform his past relevant work as a line attendant. The ALJ further concluded Mr. Dumas could do his past work as he had performed it based on his counsel’s stipulation that the job description in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) 920.687-042 accurately depicted Mr . Dumas’s past line attendant job. Finally, the ALJ determined at step four of the controlling five-step sequential evaluation process, see Wall v. Astrue , 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining the five-step framework for dete rmining disability), that Mr. Dumas was not disabled under the So cial Security Act. The Appeals Council denied review. Again represented by counsel, Mr. Dumas appealed to the district court, which affirmed the agen cy’s denial of benefits.- 3 - II. LEGAL STANDARDS We review whether substantial evidence in the record supp orts the agency’s decision and whether the correct le gal standards were applied. Keyes-Zachary v.
Astrue , 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012). “S ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a re asonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Flaherty v. Astrue , 515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We examin e the record as a whole, but we do not reweigh the evidence. Id. We also do not “subs titute our judgment for that of the agency.” Bowman v. Astrue , 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation ma rks omitted). In this context, “disab ility” requires both an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” and a “physical or mental impairment, which provides reason for the inability.” Barnhart v. Walton , 535 U.S. 212, 217 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). We liberally construe Mr. Dumas’s pro se filings. See Ledbetter v. City of Topeka , 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). We do not, however, “take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
III. DISCUSSION On appeal, Mr. Dumas asserts his serious physical and mental conditions are- 4 - disabling. He alleges multip le errors in the ALJ decision and also attaches various documents to his appellate briefs.
A. Alleged Errors Mr. Dumas contends the ALJ decision is erroneous because (1) Dr. Fullard prescribed a walking cane on September 9, 200 9; (2) two of his phys icians stated he is unable to work; (3) the ALJ did not cons ider all of his disa bilities, including his “Mental disorder, Migraine headaches, Li ver failure, Kidney failure, hypertension, Degenerative arthritis in [his] back and hi p, Gallbladder, [and] Dislocated hip [sic, generally],” Addendum to Aplt. Opening Br.; (4) the ALJ did not properly assess his disabling pain that affected his concentration and physical movement; (5) the ALJ did not consider all of his medical reco rds; (6) the ALJ’s RFC determination and hypothetical question to the VE were impermissibly vague because the ALJ’s limitations included “few work place changes,” see R. at 37, but the ALJ did not define “few”; (7) the ALJ did not make th e required findings for the mental demands of his past job as a line at tendant; and (8) the ALJ did not properly evaluate whether he could perform his past job as a line attendant. Mr. Dumas, through counsel, raised only issues (7) and (8) to the district court and thus “deprived the distri ct court of the opportunity to analyze and rule on [the] issue[s] now raised . . . fo r the first time on appeal,” Wall , 561 F.3d at 1066 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Cons equently, he “failed to preserve th[ese] issue[s] for our review,” and they are waived. Id. Mr. Dumas’s pro se status on- 5 - appeal does not affect this conclusion. Cf. Garrett , 425 F.3d at 840 (stating allowances are made for pro se litigant’s fi lings, but pro se litigant must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern ot her litigants” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We consider the preserved claims c oncerning the mental demands of Mr. Dumas’s past work and his ability to perfo rm that work. “A claimant capable of performing past relevant work is not disa bled within the mean ing of the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) & 416.920 (e). The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her inability to perform pa st relevant work.” Andrade v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs. , 985 F.2d 1045, 1050 (10th Cir. 1993). The district court noted the issues were limited to whether Mr. Dumas had the RFC to perform his past work as a line attendant—specifically , whether he could meet the mental demands of the job. The court observed Mr. Dumas’s counsel had stipulated that the description of the line attendant job in the DOT dictionary accurately described Mr. Duma s’s past job. The ALJ therefore was not required to make specific findings as to the physical and mental demands of the job as Mr. Dumas actually performed it. And under the DOT descri ption, the mental demands of the line attendant job were within the me ntal limitations of the RFC that the ALJ assigned to Mr. Dumas, limitatio ns he did not challenge. The district court further stated that ev en if the ALJ erred in determining Mr. Dumas retained the RFC for the line attendant job as he had actually performed it,- 6 - any error was harmless because the ALJ also determined th at Mr. Dumas could return to the line attendant job as the job is gene rally performed in the national economy. “[C]laimant bears the burden of proving his inability to return to his particular former job and to his former occupation as that occupation is generally performed throughout the national economy.” Id. at 1051 (emphasis adde d). Accordingly, the court found that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s de cision to deny benefits to
Mr. Dumas. Based on our review of the record, we agree that substan tial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. For substantially the same reasons as stated by the district court, we affirm the dist rict court’s order.
B. Attached Records Mr. Dumas attached medica l records to his appellat e briefs, some of which were dated before the ALJ’ s decision and some after. A court may remand to the ALJ for additional proceedings “but only up on a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cau se for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Evidence is material if the [ALJ’s] deci sion might reasonably have b een different had the [new] evidence been before [her] when [h er] decision was rendered.” Wilson v. Astrue , 602 F.3d 1136, 1148 (10th Cir. 2010) (int ernal quotation marks omitted). We have reviewed these medical re cords and conclude they would not reasonably have changed the ALJ’s decision. None “pur port[s] to retroactively- 7 - diagnose a condition existing in the pe riod preceding the ALJ’s decision [or] indicate[s] any impaired functioni ng relating back to that period,” Krauser v. Astrue , 638 F.3d 1324, 1329 (10th Cir. 2011). 1 To the extent the records dated after the ALJ’s decision indicate a new condition, th is evidence is “relevant only to a new application for benefits commen cing after the ALJ’s decision,” id. ; but see id. (directing ALJ to consider evidence developed followi ng the agency’s decision because the case was remanded for further proceedings “in li ght of other error [that] extend[ed] the potential period of disability th rough the next date of decision”). The medical records attached to Mr. Dumas’s briefs do not warrant a remand for further consideration.
IV. CONCLUSION The judgment of the distri ct court is affirmed. ENTERED FOR THE COURT,

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge

1 One of the attachments is a form signed by Dr. M unns in June 2010, which indicated that Mr. Dumas was unable to wo rk until follow-up or fu rther notice. The ALJ addressed and discounted this form becau se the record did not contain any other records from Dr. Munns to support an ong oing work restricti on, and because Mr. Dumas had stated he was fe eling better one week afte r the form was signed. See R. at 40.