United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted July 30, 2019*

Decided July 31, 2019 

Before 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 18-3646 

BECKY L. BISHOP, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

PETER BOSQUEZ, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 16-CV-1447 

William C. Griesbach, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R 

 Officers executing a warrant searched Becky Bishop’s property for maltreated 

horses. Bishop sued them, alleging that the warrant was invalid and that the officers 

used excessive force against her, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case proceeded in two phases. First, the district 

court entered summary judgment for the defendants on the claim challenging the 

warrant’s validity. Then, following some pretrial rulings, the excessive-force claims 

went to a bench trial, where the court found that the force was reasonable. Bishop now 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 18-3646 Page 2 

contests (1) summary judgment on the invalid-warrant claim; (2) the adverse pretrial 

rulings; and (3) the excessive-force finding. We affirm because, with deference to the 

warrant-issuing judge, the warrant was justified; the pretrial rulings fall comfortably 

within the trial judge’s discretion; and the finding of no unreasonable force was not 

clearly erroneous. 

I. Background 

 We recite the facts in the record, noting where the parties disagree.

a. The Search 

Peter Bosquez, a Waupaca County police officer, visited Bishop’s farm in 2013 to 

respond to a report that Bishop’s horses were malnourished. (Mistreating animals is a crime 

in Wisconsin.) He saw malnourished horses and fences and stables in disrepair. (Bishop 

counters that Bosquez never entered her barn.) Bosquez served Bishop with an 

administrative order requiring her to call a veterinarian for the horses and to repair her 

fencing. Bishop administratively appealed the order, but the county voted to uphold it. 

A month later, Bosquez saw that Bishop’s fence had not been repaired, so he 

obtained a search warrant. In the affidavit supporting the warrant, Bosquez attested to the 

mistreatment he had observed and that he had completed animal-welfare training. A state 

judge issued the warrant. It authorized a search of Bishop’s property for the seizure of 

malnourished horses and any paperwork or electronic files about their care. Bosquez, other 

officers, and Dr. Matt Koltz, a veterinarian, then went to Bishop’s home and served her with 

the warrant. She cracked the door open briefly, but quickly closed and locked it. Bosquez 

forced the door open and took Bishop to the living room. After assigning two officers to 

watch her, Bosquez and Dr. Koltz searched the property. They seized Bishop’s 22 horses 

and various documents. 

The officers assigned to watch Bishop during the search, Tim Wilz and Kevin 

Studzinski, ordered her to stay seated on the couch, but Bishop refused. A few times she 

tried to get up, use the phone and bathroom, and walk about living room, which was 

cluttered and might have concealed dangerous objects or weapons. The first time that 

Bishop refused to stay seated, Studzinski pushed her back onto the couch. Another 

time, Bishop thought that officers outside were aiming a gun at one of her sons (it was 

actually a taser). When she stood up again, she fought Studzinski’s attempt to seat her, 

so he and Wilz pushed Bishop facedown onto the couch and handcuffed her. 

A struggle to handcuff Bishop ensued. According to Studzinski, Bishop was 

swearing at him and punched him. As Bishop clashed with the officers, her pants 

became unbuttoned and partially fell down. Bishop says that the officers pulled them 

and her underwear down and touched her inappropriately. The officers responded that 
No. 18-3646 Page 3 

her pants came down inadvertently and that her underwear never came down. The 

police then led her from the house to a car outside, using force to lift her because she 

was “passively resisting.” As she resisted, Bishop’s pants began to fall down again. 

Studzinski states that he “hoist[ed]” them up while taking her to the police car. 

b. Litigation 

After the search, the State of Wisconsin prosecuted Bishop in state court for failing to 

lawfully care for her horses. During those proceedings, Bishop challenged the validity of 

the warrant. The state judge ruled that warrant was valid and sufficiently supported by 

Bosquez’s affidavit. After pleading no contest to the charges, the judge sentenced her to two 

years of probation. Bishop did not appeal. 

This suit followed. As relevant on appeal, Bishop sued Bosquez, and Dr. Koltz and 

his employer, alleging that the search and seizure were unreasonable and had violated state 

law. These defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted their 

motions. Regarding Bishop’s challenge to the warrant’s validity, it ruled that Bishop had 

not substantiated her assertion that Bosquez had lied to obtain the warrant. On the claims 

against Dr. Koltz and his employer, the district court determined that Bishop did not offer 

evidence suggesting that they contributed to an unlawful search. The court dismissed 

Bishop’s state-law claims against these defendants without prejudice. 

Bishop also sued Wilz and Studzinski for using unreasonable force during the 

search. Those claims survived summary judgment, leading to several pretrial rulings. 

The district judge granted the defendants’ motion to extend discovery to depose 

Bishop’s son because Bishop had not timely provided his contact information. Bishop 

filed two motions in limine on which the judge deferred ruling. The first sought to bar 

the defendants from questioning Bishop at trial about her horses. The judge advised 

Bishop that if he granted the motion, a jury might speculate—adversely to Bishop—

about the reason for the search warrant. The second motion sought to bar from trial a 

summary of the county’s investigation into Bishop’s administrative complaint against 

Studzinski and Wilz. The judge wanted more time to assess the summary’s relevance. 

Finally, citing factual disputes, the judge denied a third motion from Bishop in which 

she sought to tell the jury that she was not “under arrest” when the officers handcuffed 

her during the search. After these decisions, Bishop waived her right to a jury trial. 

At trial, the judge credited the officers’ testimony and ruled that they did not use 

unreasonable force. He bypassed the question whether Bishop was arrested and treated 

the case as if Bishop was not under arrest and was handcuffed only to facilitate the 

search. But the judge concluded that the officers used reasonable force because Bishop 

locked the door when she was served with the warrant, refused to stay on the couch 
No. 18-3646 Page 4 

when she was ordered to do so, and fought the officers when they tried to keep her 

there. It also rejected the claim that the officers intentionally pulled and left her pants 

down, finding that Studzinski pulled them up for her when they fell accidentally. The 

court entered judgment for all defendants and awarded costs. Bishop then filed a 

motion that the district court construed as a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 59, and the court denied it. 

II. Analysis 

First, a word about the scope of Bishop’s appeal: Bishop’s new-trial motion was 

still pending when she filed her notice of appeal. Under Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(i), the judgment became final and came within the scope of her 

earlier-filed notice once the district court ruled on Bishop’s new-trial motion. But we 

lack jurisdiction to consider Bishop’s challenge to that new-trial ruling because she did 

not file an amended notice to appeal that ruling. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). 

We similarly do not consider Bishop’s challenge (in her appellate brief) to the 

award of costs. Under the local rules, which even pro se litigants must follow, see, e.g.,

Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006), “[a] party may move for review of the 

Clerk of Court's decision taxing costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) within 7 days from 

taxation.” E.D. WIS. CIV. R. 54(c); see also Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. Edward E. Gillen Co., 

926 F.3d 318, 328 (7th Cir. 2019). A failure to do so prevents appellate review. Id. Bishop 

objected to the bill of costs, but she did not, as these rules require, ask the district court to 

review her objections once the Clerk taxed costs; nor did she appeal from the taxation of 

costs. 

a. Summary Judgment Regarding the Warrant’s Validity 

Bishop first argues that in two ways Bosquez lied to obtain the search warrant, 

rendering it invalid. First, in his affidavit supporting the warrant, he attested that he had 

completed training about animal treatment, but Bishop insists that he did not complete that 

training until after he first visited her property. Second, in that affidavit Bosquez also 

attested that Bishop had not called a veterinarian to examine her horses, but Bishop 

maintains that she scheduled a herd evaluation for the day before the search. We review 

de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, construing the undisputed facts 

in Bishop’s favor. White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary 

judgment is appropriate when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the 

moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); White, 

829 F.3d at 841. 

Bishop’s challenge to the warrant’s validity fails. First, the challenge is precluded 

because a state court already has upheld the warrant against Bishop’s previous 
No. 18-3646 Page 5 

challenge. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103–05 (1980). In any event, 

her challenge is meritless. We afford “great deference” to the decision of the judge who 

issued the warrant. United States v. McIntire, 516 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir 2008). And Bishop 

has offered no evidence showing that Bosquez lied to that judge, so the deference is intact. 

See Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2017). Even though Bosquez may not 

have completed his animal-welfare training until after he first visited Bishop’s property, in 

the warrant application he stated truthfully that he completed the training before seeking 

the warrant. And nothing in the record suggests that Bosquez knew that Bishop had 

scheduled a herd evaluation for the day before the search. 

Next, Bishop argues that Bosquez exceeded the warrant’s scope by (1) searching 

vehicles in which horses were never kept; and (2) searching a vehicle and seizing horses 

that belonged to her son. Though she arguably raised these contentions in her complaint, 

she did not present them at summary judgment, so we need not consider them. See Fednav 

Intern., Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834, 841 (7th Cir. 2010). But for two reasons, they 

are unavailing anyway. First, the warrant authorized a search of the property for animals 

and records of their treatment, and “officers are entitled to search anywhere the items to be 

seized might likely be discovered, so long as that is within the place authorized to be 

searched.” Archer, 870 F.3d at 617. Because the warrant empowered Bosquez to search the 

property for paperwork (including electronic files) about the horses’ care, he could look any 

place on the property where documents could have been, including vehicles. See United 

States v. Borotowski, 775 F.3d 851, 864–65 (7th Cir. 2014). Second, because Bishop “admitted 

that [s]he did not own the horses” or the son’s vehicle, she “lacked standing to sue” about 

those searches and seizures. Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Finally, Bishop challenges the district court’s decision to dismiss her state-law 

claims. But the court reasonably declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those 

claims when it decided Bishop’s federal claims against Bosquez at summary judgment. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c)(3); Coleman v. City of Peoria, 925 F.3d 336, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2019). 

b. Trial – Officers Tim Wilz and Kevin Studzinski 

i. Pretrial Motions 

Bishop contests three pretrial decisions. She first argues that by delaying ruling 

on two of her motions in limine until trial, the court “forced” her to waive her right to a 

jury because she feared that adverse rulings on these motions could prejudice the jury. 

District courts have broad discretion to make and alter pretrial evidentiary rulings 

before and during trial. Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 2013). A court 

that delays ruling on a motion in limine until trial might abuse its discretion if it did not 

prepare the parties for the ruling. See, e.g., Pena v. Leombruni, 200 F.3d 1031, 1034–35 

(7th Cir. 1999). But that is not the case here. The court reasonably deferred ruling on 
No. 18-3646 Page 6 

Bishop’s request to block questions about her horses because it advised her to consider 

if she wanted a jury to speculate about the basis for the search warrant. And the court 

properly delayed ruling on whether to admit the report of Bishop’s administrative 

complaint against Studzinski and Wilz because its relevance was uncertain. See Perry, 

733 F.3d at 252. Finally, the court reasonably left for trial the question whether Bishop 

was under arrest during the search: her “arrest” status was contested, and different 

standards govern the use of force for detentions incident to a search warrant and for 

those incident to an arrest. Compare Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98–100 (2005) (search 

warrant) with Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (arrest). 

Bishop also challenges the court’s decision to extend the discovery deadline so 

that the defendants could take her son’s deposition. But an extension was well within 

the court’s broad discretion over “matters of trial management,” Griffin v. Foley, 

542 F.3d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 2008), given that Bishop had refused to provide her son’s 

contact information earlier. 

ii. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Finally, Bishop argues that the evidence at trial compels the conclusion that 

Studizinski and Wilz used excessive force. She emphasizes that the officers admitted 

that her pants were partially down during the search and they would not let her pull 

them up, make any phone calls, go to the bathroom, or leave the couch after she 

thought that officers had drawn a gun on her son. We review for clear error the trial 

judge’s findings that the officers’ use of force was reasonable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6); 

Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004, 1006–07 (7th Cir. 2018). 

To determine whether police used excessive force when executing a search 

warrant on a civilian, a trier of fact examines “whether the officers’ actions were 

objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Flournoy v. City 

of Chicago, 829 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2016). The factfinder assesses reasonableness from 

the perspective of an officer on the scene, recognizing that officers often must make 

split-second decisions. Id. at 874. When a person forcefully and persistently refuses to 

comply with lawful orders to submit to a search, the police may use force reasonably 

calculated to achieve compliance. See Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98–100; Smith v. Ball State 

Univ., 295 F.3d 763, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2002). 

For several reasons, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the force 

applied to Bishop was reasonable. First, Bishop disobeyed lawful orders. She ignored 

orders to let the police in her home to execute the warrant and to remain seated during 

the search. Second, she used force: she locked the police out and punched them when 

they tried to seat her. Third, her resistance led them to worry understandably about 
No. 18-3646 Page 7 

their safety and the search. The clutter in Bishop’s living room might conceal a weapon 

that Bishop could use to harm them or interfere with the search, and this reasonable 

fear justified their use of force to handcuff her, even if that her kept her from using the 

phone or bathroom. See Los Angeles Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614–16 (2007); Muehler, 

544 U.S. at 98–100. Fourth, the police did not use force beyond that needed to handcuff 

her for their safety: the district court permissibly accepted as more credible the officers’ 

testimony that they did not deliberately pull her pants down and that they pulled the 

pants up as they moved her to the car. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 

(1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice 

between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). Finally, Bishop’s concern that the police 

held her son at gunpoint did not disable the police from keeping her immobilized for 

their safety and to complete the search. “When officers execute a valid warrant and act 

in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm ... the Fourth Amendment is 

not violated.” Rettele, 550 U.S. at 616. 

We have considered Bishop’s remaining arguments, and none has merit. 

We therefore AFFIRM the judgment.