UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

THERESA J. SUESS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 4:13-CV-51-TLS

)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

 OPINION AND ORDER

Theresa J. Suess, a pro se Plaintiff, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF

No. 1]. She also filed an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit (in

forma pauperis) [ECF No. 2]. For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff’s Application is

DENIED, and the Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

DISCUSSION

Ordinarily, a plaintiff must pay a statutory filing fee of $350 to bring an action in federal

court. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,

provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts despite

their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319 (1989). To authorize a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must make two

determinations: first, whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); and second, whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
Under the first inquiry, an indigent party may commence an action in federal court,

without prepayment of costs and fees, upon submission of an affidavit asserting an inability “to

pay such costs or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Here, the Plaintiff contends that

she receives approximately $660 per month in disability payments. Based on this income

information, it appears that she is financially eligible for in forma pauperis status.

The inquiry does not end there, however. District courts have an obligation under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints before service on the defendants, and must dismiss

the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining whether the complaint

states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th

Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal under federal pleading standards,

[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 673 (2009). Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few

words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has

happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,

403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).

In evaluating whether a complaint is frivolous for purposes of the in forma pauperis

statute, the Court need not “accept without question the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). Instead, the statute “accords judges not only the

authority to dismiss a claim based on an undisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual

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power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose

factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. This includes allegations that

are “fantastic” or “delusional.” Id. at 328.

 Here, the Plaintiff alleges that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), along with other

governmental agencies and actors, including the President, have joined a conspiracy to torment

her, which began when she was a graduate student in Indianapolis in the late 1980s. The

conspiracy has allegedly continued to and including the present date, and includes among other

things, the CIA putting electrodes on her body, threatening to murder her, putting radio devices

in her pets, and hiring “20-something-year olds, mostly female,” who “interrupt my thinking,

[and] try to influence and disrupt my positive thoughts and behavior.” She indicates that mental

health professionals have diagnosed her with schizoaffective disorder, although she disagrees

with this diagnosis. Among other relief, she seeks $97 million in damages, and also requests that

the Court “reopen” a California family court case in which she lost custody of her daughter.

Upon review, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s allegations are implausible and

fantastical. Accordingly, the Complaint will be dismissed as frivolous. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at

325; Gladney v. Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of

complaint as frivolous where the plaintiff alleged that over a span of three years, multiple guards

at three different prisons left his cell door unlocked at night while he was sleeping so that other

inmates could come in his cell and assault him); see also Schottler v. Wisconsin, 388 F. App’x

547 (7th Cir. Jul. 28, 2010) (affirming dismissal of complaint as frivolous, where plaintiff

alleged that someone had inserted a metal pin in his head and various state officials and police

officers had purposely ignored his pleas for help); Lawrence v. Interstate Brands, 278 F. App’x

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681, 684 (7th Cir. May 22, 2008) (“Lawrence’s allegations—that the Illinois legal system is

controlled by the Ku Klux Klan and that a vast network composed of lawyers, judges, and his

former employers have conspired over the past 20 years to deny him equal protection of the

laws, harass him on the basis of his race, and defraud him—are frivolous under this standard.”).

The Court is mindful of the Seventh Circuit’s concern that when a complaint is dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), if there is no opportunity to amend “an IFP applicant’s case

could be tossed out of court without giving the applicant any timely notice or opportunity to be

heard to clarify, contest, or simply request leave to amend,” which negatively impacts “fair

access to the courts.” Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 11-1917, 2013 WL 3599156, at *6

(7th Cir. July 16, 2013). Here, however, there is no reason to believe that the frivolous factual

allegations could be remedied through more specific pleading; they are inherently frivolous.

Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. See, e.g.

Denton, 504 U.S. at 34 (recognizing that where it appears that frivolous factual allegations could

be remedied through more specific pleadings, a court of appeals should consider whether the

district court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice or without leave to

amend); Mathis v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that Denton

recognized that dismissals under materially identical predecessor to § 1915(e)(2)(B) on grounds

of frivolousness could be with prejudice); Holland v. City of Gary, 503 F. App’x 476, 477–78

(7th Cir. 2013) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding through a

screening of the plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) that the plaintiff’s

fantastic and delusional allegations lacked any arguable basis in fact and that an amendment

would be futile). 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed

Without Prepayment of Fees [ECF No. 2], and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the

Complaint [ECF No. 1] as factually frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Clerk

will enter judgment accordingly.

SO ORDERED on July 24, 2013.

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

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