IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DAMON QUARLES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-843

)

MARK SEVIER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a complaint filed by Damon

Quarles, a pro se prisoner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE #1.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) GRANTS Plaintiff

leave to proceed against Jason Kochensparger and Danny Oaks in

their individual capacities for monetary damages for failing to

protect him from an attack by another inmate; (2) GRANTS Plaintiff

leave to proceed against Sherry Townsend and Doree Yocum in their

individual capacities for monetary damages for failing to provide

him with adequate medical care following the attack; (3) DISMISSES

Mark Sevier as a defendant;(4) DISMISSES any and all other claims

contained in the complaint; and (5) ORDERS Jason Kochensparger,

Danny Oaks, Sherry Townsend, and Doree Yocum to respond on or

before September 27, 2013, to the claims on which Plaintiff has

been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
BACKGROUND

Damon Quarles, a pro se prisoner, filed this action in Miami

County Superior Court on June 17, 2013, against Mark Sevier, Jason

Kochensparger, Danny Oaks, Sherry Townsend, and Doree Yocum. (DE

#1.) The defendants timely removed the action to this court on

August 16, 2013. (DE #2.) 

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a

prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In determining whether the

complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard as

when deciding a motion to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir.

2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ.

Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. The

court must bear in mind, however, that “[a] document filed pro se

is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

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inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007). 

Here, Quarles alleges that correctional staff failed to

protect him from an attack by another inmate. According to the

complaint and attachments, beginning in October 2012, Quarles and

his cellmate, Paul Trice, began to have serious problems getting

along. Quarles claims Trice was an “angry man” who was “mad at the

world.” He further claims that Trice had a higher security

classification than him, and he did not feel they should be housed

together.

On or about October 11, 2012, the two men got into an argument

over some minor issue and Trice punched Quarles in the face. That

same day, Quarles told Kochensparger and Oaks, both correctional

sergeants, several times that either he or Trice needed to be

moved, and that they “could not be in that room together.” He

claims the officers were also aware of the fight that had occurred. 

Nevertheless, he was told that since it was a Friday, he would have

to wait until Monday to get a new cell assignment, and that there

was nothing they could do unless “someone got hurt.” That evening,

Quarles was returning to his cell after his prison work assignment,

when Trice and two of his “Vice Lord” friends “jumped” Quarles,

hitting him repeatedly in the head with a makeshift weapon

consisting of a padlock inside a sock. As a result, Quarles

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suffered considerable pain and received 10-14 stitches to close a

head wound. He also claims to suffer ongoing pain, blurry vision,

and lack of feeling on one side of his face due to the attack. 

Quarles also sues Yocum and Townsend, both nurses at the

prison, claiming that they failed to provide him with proper

medical care after the attack. He claims they treated his injuries

as merely a superficial wound instead of taking him to a hospital

for outside treatment for his head injury. He claims that the

prison doctor told him after these events that the nurses should

have sent him for outside treatment given the serious nature of his

injuries. He alleges that because his injury was not properly

treated, he is suffering permanent effects from the attack.

Under the Eighth Amendment, correctional officials have a

constitutional duty to protect inmates “from violence at the hand

of other inmates.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th

Cir. 2008). However, as the Seventh Circuit has observed:

“[P]risons are dangerous places. Inmates get there by violent acts,

and many prisoners have a propensity to commit more.” Id.

Therefore, a failure to protect claim cannot be predicated “merely

on knowledge of general risks of violence in a detention facility.” 

Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 913 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, a prison

official will be held liable for failing to protect an inmate only

if deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s welfare “effectively

condones the attack by allowing it to happen.” Santiago v. Wells,

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599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). To state a claim, the plaintiff

must “allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant had actual

knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so that a

conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred

from the defendant’s failure to prevent it.” Id.

Here, Quarles alleges that he told the officers about a

specific threat of harm posed by Trice, and asked to be separated

from him. They reportedly told him he would have to wait until the

following week, and that there was nothing they could do unless

someone got hurt first. Thereafter, Quarles was viciously attacked

by Trice and suffered serious injuries. Giving Quarles the

inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged

enough to proceed against Kochensparger and Oaks. 

Quarles also sues Sevier, the superintendent of the facility,

but he is not alleged to have any personal involvement in these

events. “A plaintiff bringing a civil rights action must prove

that the defendant personally participated in or caused the

unconstitutional actions.” Alejo v. Heller, 328 F.3d 930, 936 (7th

Cir. 2003). Quarles may be trying to hold Sevier liable as the

official who supervises the individual staff involved, but there is

no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Quarles also does not allege, nor can it be plausibly inferred,

that Sevier maintained an unconstitutional official practice or

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policy that caused his injury. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Instead, Quarles alleges

that prison staff violated prison policy in housing he and Trice

together, and in failing to separate them when he alerted them

there was a problem. For these reasons, Sevier will be dismissed

as a defendant. 

That leaves his claim against the two nurses. Inmates are

entitled to adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish

liability, a prisoner must show: (1) his medical need was

objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to his health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994). For a medical professional to be held liable for

deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, he or she

must make a decision that represents “such a substantial departure

from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the

decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697

(7th Cir. 2008). A delay in providing medical treatment can

constitute deliberate indifference where it causes unnecessary

pain. Grieveson, 538 F.3d at 779. 

Here, Quarles alleges that he suffered a serious head injury,

which the nurses treated like a superficial wound. He alleges that

a prison physician told him the nurses’ treatment was improper and

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that he should have been sent to the hospital. He further alleges

that as a result of this improper treatment he is suffering

permanent effects of his injuries. Giving him the inferences to

which he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged enough to

proceed further against the two nurses.

Accordingly, Quarles will be granted leave to proceed against

defendants Kochensparger, Oaks, Townsend, and Yocum. These

defendants have already filed appearances in this removed case, and

so personal service by the U.S. Marshal is unnecessary. These

defendants will be ordered to respond to the complaint by the

deadline set below.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 

(1) GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed against Jason

Kochensparger and Danny Oaks in their individual capacities for

monetary damages for failing to protect him from an attack by

another inmate; 

(2) GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed against Sherry Townsend

and Doree Yocum in their individual capacities for monetary damages

for failing to provide him with adequate medical care following the

attack;

(3) DISMISSES Mark Sevier as a defendant;

(4) DISMISSES any and all other claims contained in the

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complaint;

(5) ORDERS Jason Kochensparger, Danny Oaks, Sherry Townsend,

and Doree Yocum to respond on or before September 27, 2013, to the

claims on which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in

this screening order.

DATED: August 27, 2013 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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