Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 

Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 

CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT 

OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

v. Record No. 952224 

 November 1, 1996 

JOYE ANNETTE COMPTON-WALDROP, DECEASED 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this appeal, we decide whether a person, at the time she 

was killed, was an employee of the City of Virginia Beach within 

the definition of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Code 

§ 65.2-100 et seq. (the Act), and thus entitled to benefits. 

 I 

 Joye Annette Compton-Waldrop was killed while rendering 

assistance at the scene of an automobile accident. Her estate 

filed a workers' compensation claim for death benefits against 

the City of Virginia Beach Police Department (the Department). 

The Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission) denied the 

claim, concluding that Compton-Waldrop was not an employee of the 

Department when she was killed. The Court of Appeals, however, 

reversed the Commission's decision and remanded the claim to the 

Commission. Compton-Waldrop v. Virginia Beach Police, 21 Va. 

App. 255, 463 S.E.2d 675 (1995). In doing so, the Court of 

Appeals held that, "because the City of Virginia Beach had passed 

a resolution extending its workers' compensation coverage to 

members of its auxiliary police force, when Compton-Waldrop was 

required to assist [a City] auxiliary police officer in [a] 

rescue, she became an ad hoc member of the [City's] auxiliary 

police force and thereby became an `employee' under the Act." 21 
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Va. App. at 258, 463 S.E.2d at 676. 

 Having determined that the decision involves a matter of 

significant precedential value, Code § 17-116.07(B), we awarded 

the Department an appeal. 

 II 

 The facts are undisputed. In the early morning of August 

31, 1991, Compton-Waldrop and a co-worker, Martin John Egert, 

III, left their employment at a restaurant. While travelling 

eastbound along Route 44 in the City of Virginia Beach, they 

witnessed a serious, two-car collision. Egert, the driver, 

stopped his vehicle at the accident scene, and he and ComptonWaldrop began to render assistance to the injured. While they 

were doing so, George W. Starr, a City auxiliary police officer, 

arrived and "took charge" of the accident scene. Although Starr 

was not on duty, he was in uniform and displayed his badge. 

 At first, Starr ordered everyone to the side of the highway. 

 Shortly thereafter, however, he asked Egert to turn his vehicle 

around to face oncoming traffic and to shine the vehicle's 

headlights on the accident scene. Starr also asked Egert to take 

a flashlight and a reflective vest in order to alert oncoming 

drivers. Egert complied with Starr's requests. 

 Starr, saying, "Ma'am, come here, I need some help with this 

man," then engaged Compton-Waldrop to assist him with an injured 

man lying in the highway. As Compton-Waldrop responded by 

entering the highway, a vehicle approached the accident scene at 
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high speed. The vehicle struck and killed both Compton-Waldrop 

and Starr. 

 III 

 In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals made two 

holdings to which the Department has assigned error. First, the 

Court held that, by virtue of Code § 18.2-4631

 and the doctrine 

of posse comitatus, Compton-Waldrop "became an ad hoc member of 

the [City's] auxiliary police force." 21 Va. App. at 260, 463 

S.E.2d at 677-78. The Court also held that Compton-Waldrop, as 

an auxiliary police officer, was an "employee" under the Act, 

and, therefore, her estate is entitled to workers' compensation 

benefits. Id. at 262-63, 463 S.E.2d at 678-79. 

 As the Court of Appeals aptly noted, in the context of the 

present case, "[w]hether a person is an `employee' depends upon 

whether the person meets the definition under the Act, not 

whether the person satisfies a common-law definition of masterservant as a result of Code § 18.2-463 or the doctrine of posse

comitatus." 21 Va. App. at 261, 463 S.E.2d at 678. Therefore, 

we need not express an opinion with respect to the Court's first 

holding. 

 

 1Code § 18.2-463 provides as follows: 

 If any person on being required by any sheriff or 

other officer refuse or neglect to assist him: (1) in 

the execution of his office in a criminal case, (2) in 

the preservation of the peace, (3) in the apprehending 

or securing of any person for a breach of the peace, or 

(4) in any case of escape or rescue, he shall be guilty 

of a Class 2 misdemeanor. 
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 IV 

 In holding that Compton-Waldrop was an employee under the 

Act,2

 the Court of Appeals relied upon subsection (1)(l) of the 

definition of "employee" set forth in Code § 65.2-101. Id. at 

261-62, 463 S.E.2d at 678. Subsection (1)(l) provides that the 

Act shall apply to "volunteer firefighters . . . [and] auxiliary 

or reserve police . . . if the governing body of [the] political 

subdivision . . . has adopted a resolution acknowledging" that 

coverage under the Act shall be extended to such persons. Thus, 

subsection (1)(l) empowers local governing bodies to extend 

workers' compensation benefits to persons who serve without 

compensation, such as members of volunteer fire departments and 

auxiliary police forces. 

 The City's council has adopted such a resolution. City Code 

§ 2-4 states, in pertinent part, the following: 

 In gratitude to and in recognition of the valuable 

and necessary services performed by police, fire 

companies and rescue squads and the individual members 

thereof, both professional and volunteer, which service 

the city, the following police agencies and chartered 

fire companies and rescue squads are recognized and 

acknowledged to be an integral part of the official 

public safety program of the city, and the volunteer 

members of these police, and chartered and nonchartered 

fire companies and rescue squads, shall be deemed 

employees for the purposes of the Virginia Worker[s'] 

Compensation Act: 

 . . . 

 

 2The Court of Appeals also held that Compton-Waldrop was not 

an "employee" under the Act based upon an implied contract for 

hire because she neither received nor expected to receive payment 

for her services. 21 Va. App. at 261, 463 S.E.2d at 678. 

Compton-Waldrop has not assigned cross-error to this ruling. 
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 Virginia Beach Auxiliary Police 

(Emphasis added.) 

 The Court of Appeals concluded that, because the City had 

extended workers' compensation benefits to members of the City's 

auxiliary police force, Compton-Waldrop was an "employee" under 

the Act and, thus, entitled to workers' compensation benefits. 

Id. at 263, 463 S.E.2d at 679. We do not agree. 

 The City, in Code § 27-4, set forth how one becomes an 

auxiliary police officer. Code § 27-4 provides that 

 [t]he chief of police is hereby authorized to appoint 

auxiliary police officers as he deems necessary, not to 

exceed one hundred (100) in number. The chief of 

police, with the approval of the city manager, shall 

make rules and regulations concerning the operation of 

the auxiliary police officers, their uniforms, arms, 

other equipment and training. Such rules and 

regulations shall be subject to ratification by the 

council. 

 We think that Compton-Waldrop, not having been appointed an 

auxiliary police officer by the City's chief of police, was not a 

member of the City's auxiliary police force within the City Code 

and, thus, had not been extended workers' compensation benefits 

under the City Code. Therefore, she did not meet the definition 

of "employee" under the Act, and the Court of Appeals erred in 

holding otherwise and in remanding Compton-Waldrop's claim to the 

Commission for entry of an award under the Act. 

 V 

 Consequently, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals and enter final judgment for the Department dismissing 
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the application for workers' compensation benefits. 

Reversed and final judgment.