UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

KEVIN MILLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CAUSE NO.: 2:15-CV-384-TLS

v. )

)

NANETTE RADUENZ, )

individually and in her capacity as )

Magistrate Judge of the Lake County )

Superior Court, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

On October 5, 2015, Kevin Miller, a pro se plaintiff, filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Petition to Proceed Without Pre-payment of Fees and Costs 

(in forma pauperis) [ECF No. 2]. For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff’s Petition is 

denied, and the Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

DISCUSSION

Ordinarily, a plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee to bring an action in federal court. 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, provides 

indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts despite their inability 

to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 

(1989). To authorize a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must make two 

determinations: (1) whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action, 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); and (2) whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
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upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

The Plaintiff appears to qualify for in forma pauperis status, but the claim cannot proceed 

because he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Plaintiff is seeking 

injunctive and declaratory relief against the Defendant, a state court judge, for a harm suffered

when the Defendant presided over the Plaintiff’s divorce. While acting in her judicial capacity, 

the Defendant approved the Final Property Settlement Agreement that merged into the

Dissolution of Marriage Decree. The Final Property Settlement Agreement states that Miller 

“shall sign a Quit Claim Deed removing his name from the property located at 1204 E. 

Cleveland Ave., Hobart, Indiana 46342.” (Compl. 10, ECF No. 1.) The Complaint alleges that 

the house went into foreclosure when the Plaintiff’s ex-wife failed to make timely mortgage 

payments, and even though the Defendant “said if [Plaintiff’s ex-wife] made one more late 

payment she would give me the house back,” the Defendant “wouldn’t give me the house back” 

and “[t]he house was foreclosed on in 2014.” (Compl. 2.)

The Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is barred by federal statute. In 1996, Congress 

amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to read that “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in an action 

brought against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity 

. . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” The Plaintiff 

is seeking relief for acts that the Defendant carried out in her official capacity while she was 

presiding over the Plaintiff’s divorce proceeding, placing her actions within the statute’s 

protections. Further, the Complaint provides no indication that the exception has been met. Thus, 

the claim for injunctive relief is barred.
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Alternatively, and to the extent the Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief remains, this 

case turns on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 

(1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). This doctrine establishes 

that “the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts in civil 

cases.” Gilbert v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2010). “This jurisdictional 

bar applies even though ‘the state court judgment might be erroneous or even unconstitutional’” 

because only the Supreme Court has the power to engage in appellate review of a state court 

judgment. Id. (quoting Kamilewicz v. Bank of Bos. Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1996)).

The Plaintiff’s alleged injury derives directly from a state court judgment, and he is 

essentially asking this Court to set aside that judgment by undoing the Final Property Settlement 

Agreement that merged into the Dissolution of Marriage Decree. Haas v. Wisconsin, 109 Fed. 

App’x 107, 110–11 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying Rooker-Feldman to bar the plaintiff’s § 1983 

claim, which asserted that the state court violated his due process rights by entering judgment 

when it lacked jurisdiction). The Plaintiff’s relief, if any, lies in state court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s Petition to Proceed Without 

Pre-payment of Fees and Costs (in forma pauperis) [ECF No. 2] and DISMISSES the Complaint 

[ECF No. 1] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

SO ORDERED on January 25, 2016. 

s/ Theresa L. Springmann

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FORT WAYNE DIVISION