1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

MARK ROBERT BURROWS, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) No. 4:13-CV-55 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social ) 

Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER

 

 This matter is before the Court for review of the Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying Disability 

Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income to Plaintiff, 

Mark Robert Burrows. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision is AFFIRMED. 

BACKGROUND 

 On September 6, 2011, Plaintiff, Mark Robert Burrows 

(“Burrows”), applied for Social Security Disability Benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 

section 401 et seq., and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), 

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1383 

et seq. In his application, Burrows alleges disability under the 
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Social Security Act since November 2010. The Social Security 

Administration denied his initial application and also denied his 

claim on reconsideration. Burrows requested a hearing, and on 

December 20, 2012, he appeared via video teleconference, 

represented by counsel, at an administrative hearing before 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) MaryJoan McNamara. Testimony was 

provided by Burrows and Dennis Conroy, a vocational expert (“VE”). 

On May 24, 2013, ALJ McNamara issued a decision denying Burrows’ 

claims and finding him not disabled because he retained the 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a significant 

number of unskilled, light level jobs in the national economy. 

 Burrows requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s 

decision, but this request was denied on July 16, 2013. 

Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final 

decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a) (2005). Burrows has 

initiated the instant action for judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 

405(g). 

DISCUSSION 

Facts 

 The basic facts of this case are not in dispute, and Burrows 

has not filed a reply brief. As such, the Court has borrowed 

liberally from Burrows’ recitation of the facts including his 
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description of the testimony and medical evidence, and any relevant 

additional facts will be noted in the body of this order. 

Burrows, who was born on October 11, 1958, testified that he 

has a twelve year old daughter with whom he spends time watching 

television, reading, and attending church. (TR 31, 46-47.) He 

testified that sometimes he tries to color with her, but he is 

unable to do so for long because hanging his head down causes him 

pain. (TR. 47.) 

Burrows reported that in November of 2010, he had an 

automobile accident where he was rear ended. (TR 34-35.) 

Approximately six months later, he worked for three weeks in 2011 

doing construction for Grand Industrial; however, he chose to quit 

that job because he was experiencing pain while working, and his 

request to perform light work had been denied. (TR 31-32.) 

Burrows also worked one day in 2011 for Wabash National Trailer 

Manufacturing Company as a welder, but when he was required to hit 

steel with a hammer, he reported that pain shot across his 

shoulders and up his neck which led him to believe that the work 

was not feasible. (TR 33.) Burrows also testified that he has 

headaches for which he takes pain medication. (TR 45-46.) 

Burrows stated that he stopped drinking in 1996 but that he 

still currently smokes a pack or less of cigarettes per day. (TR 

42.) 
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Burrows testified that he had spent the day before the hearing 

sitting in a chair watching television for eight hours. (Id.) He 

stated that he had gotten up only to use the bathroom, get coffee, 

and walk into his daughter’s room to check on her turtle. (Id.) 

Burrows testified that he can dress himself but needs help 

putting on his coat because of trouble reaching back with his arms 

and shoulders. (TR 43.) Burrows further testified that he does 

not take out the trash, that his daughter feeds the dog, and that 

he goes to the grocery store with his wife but that she picks up 

the groceries. (TR 44.) Burrows estimated that he can sit for 

between a half hour and an hour but not for longer than that 

because he gets sore in his lower back and rear end. (TR 49.) 

He stated he can stand for fifteen to twenty minutes at a time but 

that his head gets heavy after that and he needs something to lean 

back on because of his neck. (TR 49-50.) He believes that 

throughout an eight hour day, he can stand for ten to fifteen 

minutes out of every hour. (TR 50.) 

Burrows testified that there was a period of time that he did 

not take or receive pain medication because he did not have 

insurance. (Id.) He was eventually able to return to the doctor 

and begin taking pain medication again because he got on the 

Healthy Indiana Plan. (TR 51.) 

The medical evidence of record can be summarized as follows: 
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On August 8, 2011, Burrows saw Rene Gutierrez, MD (“Dr. 

Gutierrez”), for a checkup. The history of the present illness 

was noted to be neck pain new onset, acute worsening of chronic 

condition, midline, sharp, shooting, intermittent, worse with 

movement of head and worse with turning the neck. It was noted to 

be better with rest or after a chiropractic adjustment. On neck 

range of motion testing, Burrows had limited lateral bending and 

limited flexion and extension. He also had central vertebral C4-

7 tenderness and paraspinal muscle spasm was present bilaterally. 

Dr. Gutierrez diagnosed cervicalgia. (TR 226.) 

On August 11, 2011, Burrows underwent an MRI of the cervical 

spine, which found a slight accentuation of normal lordotic 

curvature at the C6 level and mildly heterogeneous marrow signal 

and partially bridging anterior osteophytes at multiple levels. 

The discs were also desiccated with disc space narrowing present 

in C4-5 through C6-7. The cord also had accentuated lordotic 

curvature following the inner contour of the spinal canal, which 

was narrowed. (TR 222.) 

Specifically, at C2-3, uncinate process hypertrophy produced 

moderately severe rightward foraminal stenosis. At C3-4, there 

was mild annular disc bulge that minimally effaced the ventral 

aspect of the thecal sac and the exit foramina were narrowed by 

uncinated process hypertrophy, minimally on the right and mild to 

moderately on the left. At C4-5, there was a broad-based bar of 
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osteophytic spur/hard disc that produced mild central stenosis and 

abutted the central surface of the cord. There was also uncinate 

process hypertrophy at C4-5 that produced bilateral, moderately 

severe foraminal stenosis. At C5-6, there was a broad-based bar 

of osteophytic spur/hard disc that produced moderate central 

stenosis and there was uncinate process hypertrophy that produced 

moderate leftward foraminal stenosis and moderately severe 

rightward foraminal stenosis. At C6-7, there was a broad-based 

annular disc bulge and small central subligamentous disc 

protrusion, disc-osteophyte complex posteriorly that produced 

moderate to severe central stenosis, and uncinate process 

hypertrophy that produced bilateral moderately severe foraminal 

stenosis. (TR 222-223.) 

The overall impression was moderately severe acquired central 

stenosis at C6-7 due to disc osteophyte complex and superimposed 

central subligamentous small broad-based protrusion; moderate 

acquired central stenosis at C5-6 due to disc-osteophyte complex; 

mild acquired central stenosis at C4-5 due to disc-osteophyte 

complex; and multilevel foraminal stenosis, moderately severe 

bilaterally at C4-5, C5-6 and C6-7. (TR 223.) 

On August 15, 2011, Burrows returned to Dr. Gutierrez. On 

exam, he had slight restriction on extension with neck range of 

motion testing, central C5-7 spine tenderness, and bilateral 

paraspinal muscle spasm at multiple levels. Dr. Gutierrez 
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diagnosed cervicalgia and spinal stenosis in the cervical region 

at multiple levels, and severe stenosis and disc herniation at C6-

7. (TR 224.) 

On August 29, 2011, Burrows saw Dr. Jeffrey L. Crecelius (“Dr. 

Crecelius”) at Goodman Campbell Brain and Spine. Burrows reported 

that he had been in a motor vehicle accident in November 2010. 

Shortly after the accident, he stated that he had developed some 

right arm pain that was sharp. He then developed some pain in the 

neck and down in the cervicothoracic area, as well as headaches. 

As this progressed, it was associated with sharp right scapular 

pain. Burrows reported that his pain was sometimes excruciating 

and interfered with his sleep. (TR 234.) 

On exam, Burrows had a positive foraminal closure sign and 

his reflexes were hypoactive. However, the examination was 

otherwise normal neurologically, including preserved muscle 

strength. Dr. Crecelius noted that previous AP and lateral plain 

films showed “some” degenerative change and that a cervical MRI 

showed degenerative change with severe stenosis at C6-7, moderate 

stenosis at C5-6 and mild stenosis at C4-5. His overall assessment 

was that Burrows was predominantly symptomatic from the C6-7 

segment but that the C5-6 segment may be bothersome as well. He 

also appeared to have degenerative disease which was exacerbated 

by the traumatic event reported. Dr. Crecelius “offered 

consideration” of a surgical disc removal and fusion but noted 
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that Burrows had indicated that “he had not reached a point where 

he wished to give any consideration to surgical intervention.” 

(TR 235.) 

On October 3, 2011, Burrows had a chiropractic appointment 

with William J. Misenheimer, DC, due to headaches and pain in his 

neck and upper back. He described the pain as sharp and achy. On 

exam, his cervical and thoracic range of motion was 

restricted/fixed, and he had vertebral subluxation/misalignment at 

C6 and T4. Dr. Wisenheimer noted that he had difficulty with 

changing positions, lifting and carrying. (TR 236.) 

On October 19, 2011, Burrows underwent a disability/internal 

medicine exam with Dr. William G. Terpstra (“Dr. Terpstra”). He 

alleged disability due to severe whiplash to his neck, headaches, 

and back pain. He reported that, since his accident in 2010, he 

had almost daily occipital headaches, posterior neck and upper 

back pain. On examination, Dr. Terpstra observed a slightly 

reduced range of motion of Burrows’ neck, full strength and muscle 

tone, a normal gait, and negative straight leg raising tests. He 

reported that Burrows could tandem walk, walk on tiptoes, and squat 

without difficulty. Dr. Terpstra diagnosed Burrows with 

degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine; however, he noted 

that Burrows was not having a “whole lot of pain necessitating 

much medication” and indicated that Burrows would be able to 

stand/walk for most if not all of an eight hour day and to use his 
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upper extremities for lifting/carrying less than ten pounds 

frequently and over ten pounds occasionally. Dr. Terpstra opined 

that he would not expect any impairment with respect to work 

related activities such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, 

carrying and handling objects. (TR 241-43.) 

 On October 28, 2011, DDS medical consultant M. Ruiz, MD (“Dr. 

Ruiz”), listed degenerative disc disease as Burrows’ primary 

diagnosis. Dr. Ruiz opined that Burrows had the ability to perform 

light exertional work with frequent posturals and only occasional 

ladders, ropes, and scaffolds and crawling, and limited to reaching 

in all directions. (TR 244-252.) 

On September 17, 2012, Burrows presented to Dr. Clinton 

Kauffman (“Dr. Kauffman”) complaining of chronic neck pain that 

increased with relatively minimal activity. He stated that he was 

unable to lift. Dr. Kauffman diagnosed cervical spinal stenosis. 

On October 22, 2012, he returned to Dr. Kauffman. It was noted 

that Burrows wanted to discuss a referral to an orthopedic 

specialist for his neck. It was also noted that he had seen 

neurosurgery in the past and had been recommended for surgery. 

Dr. Kauffman again diagnosed cervical spinal stenosis. (TR 261-

66.) 

On October 26, 2012, Dr. Kauffman filled out a Medical Source 

Statement of Ability To Do Work-Related Activities (“October 2012 

Disability Statement”). He opined that Burrows could never lift 
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and/or carry up to ten pounds or anything heavier. He could sit 

for one hour at a time without interruption for a total of five 

hours in an eight hour workday, stand for forty-five minutes at a 

time without interruption for a total of two hours in an eight 

hour workday, and walk fifteen minutes at one time without 

interruption for a total of one hour in an eight hour workday. 

(TR 267-68.) 

Dr. Kauffman further opined that Burrows could frequently 

handle and finger with either hand and continuously feel with 

either hand, but he could never push/pull with either hand and he 

could never reach overhead or do any other reaching with either 

hand. He could continuously operate foot controls with either 

foot. In addition, Burrows could never climb stairs, ramps, 

ladders or scaffolds, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. He 

could only occasionally operate a motor vehicle. He is unable to 

perform activities like shopping or walking a block at a reasonable 

pace on rough or uneven surfaces. (TR 269-72.) 

Review of Commissioner’s Decision 

 This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s 

decision to deny social security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any 

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . 

. . .” Id. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant 
11

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 

a decision.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In 

determining whether substantial evidence exists, the Court shall 

examine the record in its entirety but shall not substitute its 

own opinion for the ALJ’s by reconsidering the facts or re-weighing 

evidence. Jens v. Barnhart, 347, F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003). 

With that in mind, however, this Court reviews the ALJ’s findings 

of law de novo, and if the ALJ makes an error of law, the Court 

may reverse without regard to the volume of evidence in support of 

the factual findings. White v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 

1999). 

 As a threshold matter, for a claimant to be eligible for DIB 

under the Social Security Act, the claimant must establish that he 

is disabled. To qualify as disabled, the claimant must be unable 

“to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 

U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382(a)(1). To determine whether a 

claimant has satisfied this statutory definition, the ALJ performs 

a five step evaluation: 

Step 1: Is the claimant performing substantial gainful activity: 

If yes, the claim is disallowed; if no, the inquiry 

proceeds to Step 2. 

Step 2: Is the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments “severe” and expected to last at least 
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twelve months? If not, the claim is disallowed; if yes, 

the inquiry proceeds to Step 3. 

Step 3: Does the claimant have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or equals the severity of an 

impairment in the SSA’s Listing of Impairments, as 

described in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If yes, 

then claimant is automatically disabled; if not, then 

the inquiry proceeds to Step 4. 

Step 4: Is the claimant able to perform his past relevant work? 

If yes, the claim is denied; if no, the inquiry proceeds 

to Step 5, where the burden of proof shifts to the 

Commissioner. 

Step 5: Is the claimant able to perform any other work within 

his residual functional capacity in the national 

economy: If yes, the claim is denied; if no, the claimant 

is disabled. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). 

 In this case, the ALJ found, under 20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 

416.920(c) that Burrows suffers from the following severe 

impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine and 

headaches. (TR 16.) The ALJ further found, under 20 CFR Part 

404, Subpart P. Appendix 1, that Burrows’ impairments individually 

and in combination did not meet or medically equal one of the 

listed impairments. (Id.) The ALJ determined that Burrows has 

the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) 

and 416.967(b). (Id.) Based on Burrows’ RFC, the ALJ found that 

Burrows is not capable of performing his past relevant work as a 

welder or supervisor. (TR 20.) However, the ALJ did find that 

there are jobs that exist in significant number in the national 

economy that Burrows can perform. (TR 20-21.) In making this 
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determination, Burrows believes that the ALJ committed an error 

which requires reversal. 

The Weight Given to Burrows’ Treating Physician 

 Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-2p provides that a treating 

physician’s medical opinion must be given controlling weight if it 

is “well supported and not inconsistent with other substantial 

evidence in the case record.” Furthermore, SSR 96-2p requires 

that the ALJ’s “decision must contain specific reasons for the 

weight given to the treating source’s medical opinion, supported 

by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently 

specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the 

adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the 

reasons for that weight.” SSR 96-2p. Additionally, 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(d)(2) establishes six criteria that should be evaluated 

when determining the weight that should be given to a treating 

physician’s medical opinions. See Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 

1056 (7th Cir. 1999). The six criteria are: 

1) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; 

2) the degree to which the medical signs and laboratory 

findings support the opinion; 

3) the degree to which the opinion takes into account all of 

the pertinent evidence in the record; 

4) the persuasiveness of the opinion rendered; 

5) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; 

6) the specialization of the physician. 
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20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) and 416.927(a)-(d)). An ALJ must give a 

treating physician’s opinion controlling weight if it is well 

supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques and if it is consistent with other substantial evidence 

in the record. Hofslein v. Barnhardt, 439 F. 3d, 375, 376 (7th Cir. 

2000); Clifford v. Abfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000); 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); SSR 96-8p; SSR96-2p. Generally, ALJs weigh 

the opinions of a treating source more heavily because that source 

is more familiar with the claimant’s conditions and circumstances. 

Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). However, a 

claimant is not entitled to benefits merely because a treating 

physician labels her as disabled. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 

1171, 1177 (7th Cir. 2001). A medical opinion may be discounted if 

it is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other substantial 

evidence in the record. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870. While an ALJ 

is not required to award a treating physician controlling weight, 

the ALJ must articulate, at a minimum, his reasoning for not doing 

so. Hofslien, 439 F.3d at 376-77. Although an ALJ is required to 

consider and discuss a treating physician’s opinion, see 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.927(c)(2), the ALJ is not bound by conclusory statements of 

doctors or medical opinions that are unsupported or inconsistent 

with substantial evidence in the record. See Powers v. Apfel, 207 

F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000). “If the treating physician’s opinion 

is inconsistent with the consulting physician's opinion, internally 
15

inconsistent, or based solely on the patient’s subjective 

complaints, the ALJ may discount it.” Ketelboeter v. Astrue, 550 

F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ’s reasoning should be based 

on relevant factors applied to the medical opinions as stated above. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(6). 

 Burrows claims the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinion of 

Burrows’ treating physician, Dr. Kauffman, and erroneously 

rejecting that opinion for reasons unsupported in the record. 

Specifically, Burrows takes issue with the ALJ’s reference to the 

fact that ultimate determinations of disability are left to the 

Commissioner, and he also asserts that the ALJ erred when she 

discredited Dr. Kauffman’s opinion for reasons related to the 

length of treatment. 

 In her decision, the ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Kauffman had 

treated Burrows, but she noted that the record did not reflect a 

relationship of “supportability” or “longevity” at the time of Dr. 

Kauffmann’s October 2012 Disability Statement because such treatment 

had only begun in August of 2012. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ discussed the 

limitations described in Dr. Kauffman’s October 2012 Disability 

Statement on Burrows’ ability to do work-related activities. (Id.) 

The ALJ specifically cited to Dr. Kauffman’s opinion that Burrows 

was limited to never lifting or carrying up to ten pounds, that he 

could only stand up to two hours and walk up to one hour in an eight 

hour workday, and that he should never reach or push/pull, climb 
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ramps or stairs, climb ladders or scaffolds, balance, stoop, kneel, 

crouch, and crawl. (Id.) In giving these opinions little weight, 

the ALJ explained that the October 2012 Disability Statement was 

unsupported by and inconsistent with the medical evidence of record, 

including Dr. Kauffman’s own treatment notes. (Id.) The ALJ opined 

that Dr. Kauffman’s own treatment notes “clearly reflected that the 

claimant’s coordination, gait, extremities, and strength were all 

within normal limits and that the testing showed the claimant had 

no neurological problems.” (Id.) The ALJ directly referenced Dr. 

Kauffman’s September and October 2012 examinations, which were 

largely within normal limits. (Id.; TR 261-66.) The ALJ noted that 

Burrows had normal strength, tone, and range of motion without pain, 

and she cited to Dr. Kauffman’s assessment that he had a “full range 

of motion and [was] supple.” (Id.) As such, the ALJ opined that 

Dr. Kauffman’s limitations described above were “so restrictive as 

to defy plausibility compared to his notes or that of other sources.” 

(Id.) The ALJ also noted that Dr. Kauffman himself acknowledged 

that the October 2012 Disability Statement was based on Burrows’ 

own assessment of his ability rather than any formal limitation 

testing performed. (Id.; TR 261.) In closing her paragraph on Dr. 

Kauffman, the AlJ stated, “[m]oreover, determinations of disability 

are left to the Commissioner.” 
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 In support of her decision, the ALJ described the opinion of 

Dr. Crecelius,1 whose examination indicated that Burrows displayed 

largely normal strength and neurological results. (TR 18, 234-35.) 

The ALJ stated that while Dr. Crecelius’ testing and examination 

showed that Burrows had slowed reflexes, he had an otherwise normal 

neurological exam including preserved muscle strength. (Id.) The 

ALJ also noted that Dr. Crecelius had reviewed Burrows’ neck MRI 

that showed “some” degenerative changes with severe stenosis at C6-

7, moderate stenosis at C5-6, and mild stenosis as C4-5; however, 

she pointed out that Dr. Crecelius offered consideration of a 

surgical disc removal and fusion which Burrows refused because he 

had not reached a point where he wanted to consider surgical 

intervention. (Id.) 

 The ALJ also relied on Dr. Terpstra’s opinion and noted that 

the consultative examination of Burrows revealed that he was in no 

acute distress and had full muscle strength and tone, normal gait 

and station, straight leg testing which was negative bilaterally, 

and only a slightly reduced range of motion of the cervical spine. 

(TR 18, 241-43.) The ALJ stated that, despite degenerative disc 

findings on Burrows’ neck MRI, Dr. Terpstra had noted that Burrows 

was not having much pain and was not taking much medication at that 

point. (Id.) As such, the ALJ gave Dr. Terpstra’s opinion regarding 

                                                            

1 The ALJ incorrectly attributes these findings to Dr. Gutierrez to whom Dr. 

Crecelius addressed his report, but accurately states Dr. Crecelius’ 

findings. (Tr. 234-35.) 
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only slight limitations (that Burrows could stand/walk for most if 

not all of an eight hour day and use his upper extremities for 

lifting/carrying less than ten pounds frequently and over ten pounds 

occasionally) significant weight. (Id.) 

 Burrows contends that it was contradictory and confusing for 

the ALJ to discount Dr. Kauffman’s opinion based on a lack of 

treatment longevity when he gave significant weight to the 

consultative medical examiner, Dr. Terpstra, and the State agency 

medical consultant, Dr. Ruiz, whom had only examined Burrows once 

and never, respectively. Burrows argues that the ALJ failed to 

build a logical bridge for discrediting Burrows’ treating source in 

favor of those doctors who had little to no examining relationship 

with Burrows. 

 It is true that “[g]reat weight is assigned the more times the 

treating source has examined the claimant and the more knowledge 

the treating source has regarding the claimant’s conditions. Harder 

v. Astrue, No. 2:11-CV-00370, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4981 at *45 

(N.D. Ind. Jan. 11, 2013). And generally, a one-time examination 

should be afforded less weight when it is contradictory to the other 

evidence of record. Criner v. Barnhardt, 208 F. Supp. 2d, 937, 955 

(N.D. Ill. 2002). However, in discounting the opinion of Dr. 

Kauffman, the ALJ clearly articulated the inconsistencies between 

the opinion of Dr. Kauffman and the record as noted above; she 

stressed that Dr. Kauffman’s highly restrictive October 2012 
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Disability Statement was even inconsistent with his own treatment 

notes, and she pointed out that Dr. Kaufmann’s opinion was based on 

Burrows’ own assessment of his ability rather than any formal 

limitation testing performed. Conversely, the ALJ described the 

opinions of Dr. Terpstra and Dr. Ruiz as being consistent with the 

medical evidence, including Dr. Crecelius’s records and Dr. 

Kauffman’s own treatment notes. See Ketelboeter, 550 F.3d at 625 

(“If the treating physician’s opinion is inconsistent with the 

consulting physician's opinion, internally inconsistent, or based 

solely on the patient’s subjective complaints, the ALJ may discount 

it.”) Furthermore, immediately after noting that Burrows had only 

begun treating with Dr. Kauffman in August of 2012, the ALJ opined 

that Dr. Kauffman’s records, including the October 2012 Disability 

Statement, did “not reflect supportability or longevity.” Thus, 

she acknowledged that the length and type of treatment relationship 

was not of the kind that would automatically confer deferential 

status to Dr. Kauffman’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1502; see also Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 702-

03 (7th Cir. 2004) (“It would be exceedingly illogical to credit a 

doctor’s opinion because he is more likely to have a detailed and 

longitudinal view of the claimant's impairments when in fact, there 

is no detail or longitudinal view.”) (emphasis in original). 

Therefore, despite Burrows’ assertions to the contrary, the ALJ did 
20

adequately articulate her reasons for giving Dr. Kaufman’s opinion 

less weight than those of Dr. Terpstra and Dr. Ruiz. 

 Burrows also argues briefly that the ALJ erred when she 

discredited Dr. Kauffman’s opinion by making the point that 

determinations of disability are left to the Commissioner. Burrows 

asserts that Dr. Kauffman’s October 2012 Disability Statement should 

not be discredited “[m]erely because that opinion leads to a finding 

[of disability].” However, as described in detail above, the ALJ 

did not discount Dr. Kauffman’s opinion “merely” because it 

suggested a determination of disability; rather, she clearly 

articulated other reasons for doing so, and a passing reference to 

SSR 96-5p does not negate that analysis. 

 In sum, the ALJ’s decision provided specific reasons for not 

crediting Dr. Kauffman’s opinion (namely, that the October 2012 

Disability Statement was highly restrictive, implausible, and 

inconsistent with his own treatment notes and the other medical 

evidence of record and that Dr. Kauffman’s records did not reflect 

supportability or longevity). Those reasons are supported by 

evidence in the case record as a whole and are sufficiently specific 

to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight she gave to 

Dr. Kauffman’s opinion and the reasons for that weight. Thus, the 

Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is legally sound, supported by 

substantial evidence, and does not require reversal and remand. 
21

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner of Social 

Security’s final decision is AFFIRMED. 

 

DATED: September 30, 2015 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court