UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

CRYSTAL MARIE MILTENBERGER, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. Case No. 3:15-CV-99 JVB 

 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration, 

 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff Crystal Marie Miltenberger seeks judicial review of the Social Security 

Administration’s decision denying her disability insurance benefits. She asks the Court to reverse 

the Administration or to remand the case. The Court affirms.

This Court has authority to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). The Court must ensure that the ALJ has built an “accurate and logical bridge” from 

evidence to conclusion. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court will 

uphold decisions that apply the correct legal standard and are supported by substantial evidence. 

Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). 

 The Commissioner follows a five-step inquiry in evaluating claims for disability benefits 

under the Social Security Act:

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether the claimant has a 

severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment is one that the 

Commissioner considers conclusively disabling; (4) if the claimant does not have 

a conclusively disabling impairment, whether he can perform his past relevant 

work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the 

national economy.
2 

Kastner v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2012).

 The claimant bears the burden of proof at every step except step five. Clifford v. Apfel, 

227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). 

 In applying for her disability insurance benefits, Plaintiff alleged that, among other 

things, various ailments related to her spine, as well as her depression and fibromyalgia, preclude 

her from working. The ALJ found that her impairments weren’t disabling, and Plaintiff is 

challenging those findings in this appeal. 

 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff claims that, in denying her application for benefits, the 

ALJ erred in relying on unsigned doctor reports. But her challenge is not that the ALJ relied 

upon the unsigned reports of consultative examiners, which the Regulations prohibit, see 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1519n(e); rather, she challenges the reports of the consultants who didn’t examine 

Plaintiff but reviewed the record as a whole, and who typed their names on the forms in the 

“signature boxes.” 

The Regulations are silent as to what kind of affirmation must be included in the 

consultant’s report. And that is the first downfall of Plaintiff’s argument. See Devries v. Colvin, 

No. 3:15-CV-188-PPS, 2016 WL 4409231, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 18, 2016). As in Devries so 

here: Plaintiff failed to “cite any authority explaining what does and does not constitute an 

electronic signature.” Id. Moreover, as Judge Simon observed in Devries, there is a 

provision in POMS that suggests such forms may (or must) be completed 

online and “signed” electronically: 

eForms, UniForms, and OMB approved forms incorporated in 

electronic tools, such as eCAT, are electronically signed using the 

“SIGN” button located in the signature field. The “SIGN” button 

produces an approved electronic signature, in an italicized font, of 

the user who is logged on to the workstation. Electronically signed 

eForms, UniForms, and forms incorporated into electronic tools, 

such as eCAT, do not require a handwritten signature. 
3 

DI 81020.105(C)(1). POMS appears to contemplate a form of approved 

electronic signature that may be what was used on the Lovko and Dobson 

forms.

Id.

 What is more, district courts in the Seventh Circuit “have affirmed ALJs reliance on 

reports signed using electronic signatures.” Id. (citing cases). 

 Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ erred in failing to assign weight to the medical opinions 

of her treating physicians—Drs. David Miller, Richard Silberman, Kamaljeet Girn, Michael 

Spence, Mohamad Rifai, and Daniel Cha—while wrongly assigning great weight to her treating 

psychiatrist, Dr. Linda Munson, and psychological consultant, Dr. Joyce Scully. She also 

disagrees with the ALJ giving Dr. Dean Shoucair’s consultative opinion “significant weight,” but 

only “minimal weight” to her examining physician, Dr. Daksha Vyas. As to Dr. Vyas, Plaintiff 

thinks that the ALJ should have assigned controlling weight to her opinion because Dr. Vyas was 

more familiar with Plaintiff’s condition than any other doctor in the record. 

 There are two problems with Plaintiff’s contentions. First, the ALJ does not need to 

mention every piece of medical evidence in his opinion, or identify every doctor by name,1

 or 

use magic words for indicating what weight he’s assigning to a medical opinion. Second, the 

Plaintiff picks from the doctors’ reports that which favors her and overlooks everything else. 

 While recognizing that some medical opinions may have “controlling weight,” the 

Regulations do not have specific levels of weight for all other opinions that do not fall into the 

“controlling weight” category. Rather, as with any kind of case where the weight of evidence 

needs to be considered, the weight designation of a medical opinion is an indication of how 

much significance is accorded to it. Therefore, the Court is not looking for just an adjective 

 

1

 Of course, for the sake of ease and clarity, it’s preferable that the ALJ names the doctors when considering their 

opinions. 
4 

before the word “weight” (such as “great,” “significant,” “minimal,” etc.) in the ALJ’s decision, 

but for something that allows the Court to determine to what extent the ALJ found the medical 

opinion reliable. 

 Here, the ALJ noted the objective findings from various tests Plaintiff underwent and 

compared the doctors’ opinions against that evidence. He also compared the doctors’ opinions 

against their own notes, diagnoses, and observations. Finally, the ALJ evaluated the medical 

opinions for consistency among all medical sources as a whole. And he did so within the 

parameters of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (examining relationship, treatment relationship, length of 

treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, nature and extent of the treatment 

relationship, etc.). In doing so, the ALJ found that Dr. Vyas’s medical opinion was inconsistent 

with her own treatment notes and the clinical records. (See R. at 23 (citing e.g., R. at 614–615, 

618, 628.) As for Drs. Miller, Silberman, Girn, Spence, Rafai, and Cha, while not always 

identifying them by name, the ALJ considered these doctors’ findings, as the Plaintiff herself 

acknowledges.2

 (See Pl.’s Op. Br., DE 20, at 18.) And there’s nothing in those records that 

undermines the substantial evidence upon which the ALJ’s opinion was based. Instead, the 

opinions of these doctors point to mild impairments as opposed to disabling conditions. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ assigned too much weight to Dr. Munson and misstated the 

record when “he indicates Dr. Munson’s ‘findings support [the ALJ’s] determination and 

illustrate the existence of nonsevere health impairment.’” (Pl.’s Op. Br., DE 20 at 18.) But Dr. 

Munson’s notes stated just that: during the exam Plaintiff was cooperative, had normal speech 

 

2

 The Court disagrees with Defendant’s contention that none of these doctors’ records constitute medical opinions. 

“Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect 

judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, 

what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. In 

light of this definition, only Dr. Girn’s record from late October 2011 doesn’t constitute a medical opinion because 

his notes only suggest to “consider a major depressive disorder,” as opposed to diagnosing Plaintiff with such a 

disorder. 
5 

and psychomotor behavior, and a logical goal-directed thought process. (R. at 603.) Other mental 

functioning was “normal/unremarkable.” (R. at 604.) While Plaintiff wants to discredit Dr. 

Munson’s conclusions because Dr. Munson glossed over Plaintiff’s admissions of marijuana use, 

Plaintiff hasn’t fully developed this argument. 

 Similarly to her contentions about Dr. Munson, Plaintiff believes that the ALJ’s 

attribution of great weight to the medical opinion of Dr. Scully was erroneous. In particular, she 

argues that the ALJ cherry-picked from Dr. Scully’s report and overlooked such things as 

Plaintiff not understanding the proverb that “the grass is always greener on the other side,” being 

unable to divide numbers, thinking that a volcano is a storm, and not knowing what an equator is. 

But Plaintiff does not paint the whole picture: Dr. Scully found that Plaintiff was fully oriented, 

made eye contact, and was cooperative, pleasant, and appropriately dressed; her mental 

examination revealed unremarkable results; as for the proverbs and math, Plaintiff understood 

two out of three proverbs and correctly added, subtracted, and multiplied numbers; furthermore, 

Plaintiff remembered three out of three objects after 25 minutes and recited three digits 

backwards. 

 Finally, Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s attribution of significant weight to Dr. Shoucair’s 

opinion. Dr. Shoucair examined Plaintiff in March 2012 and found that she had full range of 

motion in her spine, arms, and legs. She appeared in no apparent distress, got on and off the 

examination table without any issue, and had a good tandem gait. (R. at 500.) There was no 

evidence of swelling and Plaintiff had good muscle tone and strength in both arms and legs. (Id.) 

While Dr. Shoucair wasn’t a treating physician, that fact by itself doesn’t undermine her 

evaluation. And although Dr. Shoucair didn’t have the benefit of subsequent MRIs, those images 

showed no more than mild bulging while all other findings were unremarkable. (R. at 534–536.) 
6 

 For all these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ based his opinion upon substantial 

evidence and affirms his decision. 

SO ORDERED on September 30, 2016.

 S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE