COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

JOHN RAYMOND LANGOWSKI 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1274-95-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 NOVEMBER 19, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge 

 Andrew G. Wiggin, Assistant Public Defender, 

for appellant. 

 Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; 

Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 John Raymond Langowski (defendant) was convicted by a jury 

for malicious wounding and petit larceny. On appeal, he contends 

that the trial court erroneously (1) permitted closing arguments 

during the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial, (2) required 

him to open the arguments, and (3) assured the Commonwealth a 

right to argue, even if defendant elected to waive a like 

opportunity. Finding no error, we affirm the convictions. 

 On April 1, 1994, defendant, suspected of stealing a 

microwave oven, shot a K-Mart security guard investigating the 

offense and was charged with malicious wounding, the related use 

of a firearm and petit larceny. During the sentencing phase of 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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the bifurcated trial for malicious wounding, defendant objected 

to the court "allowing any argument," reasoning that Code 

§ 19.2-295.1 made no mention of "argument at all." In overruling 

the objection, the court determined that "[e]ach side will be 

allowed an opportunity to argue sentencing with defense opening 

and the Commonwealth closing." Defendant then objected to the 

order of argument, complaining that he was not "the one to go 

second," and requested that the Commonwealth be precluded from 

argument should defendant elect to waive. Again, however, the 

objection was overruled and closing arguments proceeded in 

accordance with the court's ruling. 

 "On appeal, the judgment of the trial court is presumed 

correct. The burden is on the party who alleges reversible error 

to show by the record that reversal is the remedy to which he is 

entitled." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 391, 396, 404 

S.E.2d 384, 387 (1991) (citation omitted). The trial court 

exercises broad discretion in the supervision of closing 

arguments, and its rulings will be reversed on appeal only for an 

abuse of such discretion. O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 

703, 364 S.E.2d 491, 509, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988); 

Jordan v. Taylor, 209 Va. 43, 51, 161 S.E.2d 790, 795 (1968). 

 At oral argument, defendant conceded that our recent 

decision in Griffin v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 622, 472 S.E.2d 

285 (1996), resolves the first and third assignments of error in 
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favor of the Commonwealth.1

 Nevertheless, defendant persists in 

his contention that the court erroneously required him to first 

present his closing argument, thereby denying him "the last word 

to the jury." 

 As we observed in Griffin, "[i]n the normal course of a summation to the jury, of 

necessity, only one side may open. The other party 

then has the opportunity to reply to his opponents 

[sic] opening argument, and in turn make his own 

argument to the jury. The one who spoke first then has 

the opportunity to answer the argument of his opponent. 

 No new material should be injected into this final 

statement." 

Id. at 624, 472 S.E.2d at 287 (quoting People v. Caballero, 464 

N.E.2d 223, 235 (Ill.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984)). "In 

Virginia[,] the Commonwealth traditionally has been permitted to 

'combat the argument of defendant's counsel . . . both with 

respect to the guilt of the accused and a proper measure of 

punishment.'" Id. at 624, 472 S.E.2d at 286 (quoting Martinez v. 

Commonwealth, 241 Va. 557, 560, 403 S.E.2d 358, 359-60 (1991)). 

Guided by these well established principles, we are unable to 

conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in 

structuring the closing arguments in this instance. See O'Dell, 

234 Va. at 703, 364 S.E.2d at 509; Jordan, 209 Va. at 51, 161 

S.E.2d at 795; Griffin, 22 Va. App. at 624-25, 472 S.E.2d at 

286-87. 

 Moreover, defendant did not request leave to present 

 

 1Defendant filed his opening brief on May 30, 1996, and our 

decision in Griffin was released on June 25, 1996. 
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rebuttal following the Commonwealth's argument, but simply sought 

to "go second." Defendant, therefore, "failed to obtain a ruling 

from the court [on this issue]. . . . Because he was denied 

nothing by the trial court, there is no ruling for us to 

review."2

 Fisher v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 447, 454, 431 

S.E.2d 886, 890 (1993); see Rule 5A:18. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed.

 

 2Under such circumstances, we do not decide whether the 

refusal to allow rebuttal argument to a similarly situated 

accused would constitute an abuse of discretion. See Rule 5A:18.