IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-60598

Summary Calendar

RAUL PRASAI,

Petitioner

v.

LORETTA LYNCH, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A205 358 912

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Raul Prasai, a citizen of Nepal, petitions for review of the decision of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), dismissing his appeal from the 

immigration judge’s (IJ’s) decision denying his application for withholding of 

removal. Although Prasai also filed applications for asylum and relief under 

the Convention Against Torture, his brief does not raise any cognizable 

contentions of error with respect to the denial of those applications. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 20, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Accordingly, they are deemed waived. See Thuri v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 788, 793 

(5th Cir. 2004). 

Where, as here, the BIA issues its own opinion, agreeing with the IJ’s 

decision and emphasizing particular aspects of that reasoning, this court 

reviews the IJ’s decision to the extent that it impacted the BIA’s decision. See 

Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2009). We may not reverse an 

immigration court’s factual findings unless the evidence is “so compelling that 

no reasonable factfinder could conclude against it.” Id. at 537. 

Under the REAL ID Act, an alien may sustain his burden of proof 

without corroboration, however, his testimony must be credible, persuasive, 

and refer to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate eligibility for relief. 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). A trier of fact may base a credibility determination 

on (1) the consistency between the applicant’s written and oral statements, (2) 

the internal consistency of each such statement, (3) the consistency of such 

statements with other evidence, and (4) the inaccuracies or falsehoods in such 

statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency goes to the heart of 

the applicant’s claim. See § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii)). This court will defer to the 

agency’s adverse credibility determination “unless, from the totality of the 

circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an 

adverse credibility ruling.” Wang, 569 F.3d at 538 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Under this standard, reversal is improper unless the 

evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Zhang v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 344

(5th Cir. 2005). 

Prasai argues that the BIA’s adverse credibility determination was 

erroneous and that the inconsistencies cited by the IJ resulted from aggressive 

and rushed questioning. However, he does not cite any specific instance 

wherein the IJ’s actions caused him to be vague and hesitant, nor has he shown 

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how any of the inconsistencies cited by the IJ were attributable to aggressive 

questioning. Further, he has made no showing that the inconsistencies and 

discrepancies found by the IJ and cited by the BIA were erroneous. He thus 

has not met his burden of showing that the record compels us to reverse the 

IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Zhang, 432 F.3d at 344. 

Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED.

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