IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–0948

Filed December 23, 2016

Amended February 27, 2017

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR JONES COUNTY,

Defendant.

Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Lars G. 

Anderson, Judge. 

Iowa Department of Corrections appeals district court’s ruling 

reversing agency decision requiring inmate convicted of domestic abuse 

assault to participate in sex offender treatment program. WRIT 

SUSTAINED AND CASE REMANDED. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John B. McCormally, 

Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff. 

Mark Smith, State Appellate Defender, and John Bishop, 

Cedar Rapids, until withdrawal, and then Anthony Burton Irvin pro se. 
2

WATERMAN, Justice.

In this appeal, we must decide whether the Iowa Department of 

Corrections (IDOC) violated an inmate’s rights by requiring him to 

participate in the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP). The inmate 

pled guilty to domestic abuse assault in a plea bargain that dismissed a 

related sex abuse charge. The IDOC initially relied on the dismissed sex

abuse charge and the victim’s detailed, written statement included in a 

police report to refer him for mandatory SOTP. An administrative law 

judge (ALJ) upheld that determination following an evidentiary hearing 

based on the inmate’s admission that he assaulted his girlfriend during 

oral sex and the victim’s statement. The district court reversed based on 

an unpublished, nonprecedential decision, Lindsey v. State, No. 13–

2042, 2015 WL 568560 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015), which held the 

IDOC cannot use unproven charges to require SOTP. We granted the 

IDOC’s request for a writ of certiorari. 

For the reasons explained below, we hold the IDOC may rely on the 

victim’s written statement in a police report for the initial classification 

requiring SOTP, provided the inmate is afforded due process, including 

an evidentiary hearing to challenge that classification. The ALJ, in turn, 

may uphold the classification based on the inmate’s own testimony 

admitting to a sexual component to the assault, along with other 

evidence, including hearsay such as the victim’s detailed account. 

Accordingly, we sustain the writ, reverse the judgment of the district 

court, and remand the case to reinstate the IDOC’s decision requiring 

this inmate’s participation in the treatment program. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

Anthony Irvin is an inmate at Anamosa State Penitentiary under 

the custody of the IDOC serving a prison sentence for domestic abuse 
3

assault following his guilty plea. The victim was his live-in girlfriend. 

The minutes of testimony, which incorporated by reference the police 

report with the victim’s detailed account, alleged that at 8:30 p.m. on 

October 28, 2012, Irvin became angry upon finding calls to another man 

made from his girlfriend’s phone. Irvin accused her of infidelity. When 

she attempted to explain, he grabbed her by the throat and threw her 

across the room. Irvin then began smoking crack cocaine and watching 

porn. About 1:30 a.m., he forced his girlfriend to smoke crack and 

perform oral sex on him. According to her statement, at around 3:30 

a.m., she told him she did not want to continue. Irvin ordered her to 

keep going. She stopped and pulled away. Irvin again grabbed her by 

the throat. She struggled, and Irvin put her in a headlock and strangled 

her until she passed out. When she awoke, she felt dizzy and found she 

had urinated on herself. She began sobbing, and Irvin threatened to kill 

her before she could call the police or neighbors. She laid in bed until 

morning, when she went to work. The police were contacted and came to 

her workplace. Her statement and photos of her injuries were taken that 

day. Police arrested Irvin at their home. 

The State charged Irvin with two counts: (1) domestic abuse 

assault by knowingly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the 

blood of another person in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(2)(d)

(2013); and (2) sexual abuse in the third degree for performing a sex act 

by force in violation of section 709.4. At that time, Irvin also had prior 

charges of domestic abuse assault and sexual abuse in the third degree 

pending for another incident with a different victim. 

On August 20, 2013, the State reached a plea agreement with 

Irvin, who pled guilty to two counts of domestic abuse assault in 

violation of section 708.2A(2)(d) in exchange for the dismissal of both 
4

charges of sexual abuse in the third degree. The court sentenced Irvin to 

an indeterminate period of incarceration not to exceed two years on each 

offense, to be served consecutively, and imposed a $625 fine. Irvin was 

also sentenced on two unrelated theft charges. Irvin’s cumulative 

sentence totaled six years. The sentencing order recommended that Irvin 

be enrolled in a batterer’s education treatment course. The district court 

made no finding that the crimes to which Irvin pled were sexually 

motivated and did not require Irvin to register as a sex offender. 

On October 14, shortly after Irvin arrived at the IDOC’s 

Mount Pleasant Correctional Facility (MPCF), his counselor, Kasey Bean, 

sent an email to Sean Crawford, the director of the SOTP. Bean’s email 

stated that based on Irvin’s original sexual abuse charge, she “believe[d] 

he may be eligible for SOTP.” Crawford responded a few weeks later, 

stating, “Offender’s file has been reviewed and it is my opinion there is a 

sexual component involved in his current conviction. DOC will require 

SOTP.” 

On December 16, the IDOC notified Irvin that he had been 

classified as an offender required to complete sex offender treatment. 

The notice stated the classification “may affect [his] future accrual of 

earned time and tentative discharge date pursuant to Iowa Code 

§ 903A.2(1)(a).” The notice set forth the reasons for his classification in 

a section entitled, “Classification Committee Justification/Evidence”: 

Offender Irvin is currently incarcerated on charges of 

domestic abuse and 3rd degree theft. Originally charged also 

with sex abuse 3rd, he ple[d] to the current charges. Along 

with beating his victim up, he forced the female to perform 

oral sex on him. Offender Irvin has never completed any 

type of sex offender treatment program and because of the 

sexual component to his crime the DOC/MPCF will require 

he do so. 
5

The notice listed the evidence relied upon by the IDOC for Irvin’s 

classification, including the (1) program records, (2) email by Sean 

Crawford, (3) trial information, (4) police report, and (5) minutes of 

testimony. The police report was attached to the minutes and noted that 

Irvin “beat his victim up” and “force[d] her to perform oral sex.” The 

police report quoted a detailed statement from the victim taken down the 

day after the assault. The victim’s account was also quoted in the 

minutes. Finally, the notice informed Irvin “that an in-person or 

telephonic hearing on your appeal of the sex offender treatment program 

requirements will be held on Wednesday, January 8,” before an ALJ. The 

notice stated that “[a]ll documents or other exhibits that you want 

considered at the hearing” must be submitted two business days before 

the hearing, and if Irvin did not appear, a judgment would be entered 

against him. At the bottom of the notice was a section an offender could 

sign to waive the hearing. On December 17, Irvin signed to waive the 

hearing. 

In February of 2014, Irvin was transferred from the MPCF to 

Anamosa State Penitentiary. On April 14, Irvin wrote a letter to John 

Baldwin, then director of the IDOC, and Jason Carlstrom, then chair of 

the Iowa Board of Parole. Irvin asserted that he should not be referred to 

SOTP because he “had never been convicted of a sex charge, only 

accused of one.” He alleged the prosecutor dismissed the sex counts 

because, during the course of trial preparation, the prosecutor 

determined those charges to be unfounded. Irvin noted neither the 

sentencing order nor the plea agreement recommended that he 

participate in SOTP, only that he participate in batterer’s education. 

Sheryl Dahm, then assistant deputy director at the IDOC, responded to 
6

Irvin’s letter on April 22, stating that Irvin’s classification was based on 

IDOC policy. 

In June, Irvin received another classification notice. The notice 

mentioned that, due to an error, Irvin’s accrual of earned time had not 

been halted since the first December classification notice. The June 

notice gave Irvin another opportunity for an ALJ hearing scheduled for 

July 16. Irvin acknowledged this notice, and this time did not waive the 

hearing. At the hearing, Irvin submitted his affidavit; a copy of the plea 

agreement; and a copy of Dykstra v. Iowa District Court, 783 N.W.2d 473 

(Iowa 2010). The hearing was unreported. 

On July 25, the ALJ affirmed the IDOC’s classification decision. 

The ALJ specifically found that due process requirements for the 

classification had been met: Irvin had been given notice of the hearing 

and presented evidence, the ALJ provided an explanation for the reasons 

behind the classification, and the ALJ “was not involved in the [initial] 

classification decision at issue, so he [could] be an impartial 

decisionmaker in this matter.” The ALJ examined the two domestic 

abuse convictions, one arising out of Irvin’s altercation with his girlfriend 

and the other arising from the separate incident with a different victim. 

The ALJ determined the allegations in the separate incident were “not 

sufficient to find that IRVIN needs SOTP” because the violence was 

unrelated to a sex act. The ALJ found the other charge involving Irvin’s 

girlfriend required SOTP because “[t]he evidence in the record indicates 

that IRVIN’s behavior shows that he currently suffers from a problem for 

which treatment is needed to rehabilitate him or that such treatment is 

needed to protect the community from him.” 

The ALJ determined that requiring SOTP would not violate Irvin’s 

plea agreement or sentencing order because both “were silent about 
7

SOTP” and the IDOC retains the authority to establish treatment 

program policies for offenders. The ALJ rejected Irvin’s claim that the 

prosecutor had dropped the sex charge as unsubstantiated. The ALJ 

noted Irvin produced no evidence to support that assertion, such as the 

deposition transcripts that he claimed existed. The ALJ observed the 

plea agreement stated that “charges could be brought back if IRVIN 

raised challenges to the plea agreement.” In the ALJ’s view, this showed 

the prosecutor “still believed the charges could reasonably be brought 

again if need be.” Finally, the ALJ weighed the victim’s detailed 

statement together with Irvin’s testimony on his version of events. The 

ALJ found the victim’s statement to be “credible” after testimony from 

Irvin that the victim “did not have to fabricate a story if she wanted him 

to leave because she could have simply told him to leave the house.” In 

the ALJ’s view, Irvin “indicate[d] that [the victim] did not have a reason to 

fabricate a story about what IRVIN did to her.” The ALJ also concluded 

that even under Irvin’s version of events, the conviction for domestic 

abuse still had a sexual component, and thus, Irvin should be required 

to complete SOTP: 

IRVIN’s version of events was that he pushed the 

victim away by the throat when she bit his penis while 

performing oral sex. As noted above, he pleaded guilty to 

“knowingly” impeding her airway. Thus, his plea indicated 

that he did not merely react, but purposely pushed her hard 

in the neck. According to IRVIN his action was because the 

sexual encounter he was having did not go as he expected. 

Reacting with violence during a sex act also raises the types 

of concerns that can properly be addressed in SOTP. The 

ALJ finds that even under IRVIN’s version of events (as 

modified by his guilty plea), he should still be required to 

take SOTP. 

On July 28, Irvin appealed the ALJ’s determination to the warden 

by completing the SOTP appeal form. See Iowa Code § 903A.3(2) (“The 
8

orders of the administrative law judge are subject to appeal to the 

superintendent or warden of the institution, . . . who may either affirm, 

modify, remand for correction of procedural errors, or reverse an order.”). 

Irvin claimed the SOTP classification violated his procedural due process 

rights. On August 4, the warden affirmed the decision of the ALJ, ruling 

due process had been followed and the ALJ “considered [Irvin’s] 

statement and the evidence when making this decision.” 

Irvin filed an application for postconviction relief under Iowa Code 

section 822.2(1)(f) and (g) in the Iowa district court. Irvin claimed he was 

denied due process and equal protection of the law because the ALJ 

relied on the unproven factual allegations. The district court held a 

hearing on April 15, 2015. On May 20, the district court found that it 

was error for the ALJ to rely on “unadmitted minutes of testimony and 

police reports in making its recommendation.” The district court relied 

on the unpublished decision of Lindsey, in which a divided Iowa Court of 

Appeals concluded the IDOC lacked authority to rely on unproven facts 

to require participation in SOTP. 2015 WL 568560, at *5. In addition, 

the district court relied on In re Detention of Stenzel, 827 N.W.2d 690, 

708–10 (Iowa 2013), which disallowed expert testimony in a district court 

civil commitment trial when the expert relied on unproven facts in the 

minutes of testimony to support his opinion that the individual was a 

sexually violent predator. The district court concluded because the IDOC 

had improperly relied on the minutes in making the initial 

recommendation, “[n]o hearing should have occurred in the first place.” 

The IDOC sought a writ of certiorari, which we granted. We 

retained the case. 
9

II. Standard of Review.

“We normally review certiorari actions for correction of errors at 

law.” State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 801 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Iowa 2011). 

“Generally, postconviction relief proceedings are reviewed for correction 

of errors at law.” Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 477. “We review questions of 

statutory construction, including . . . the proper interpretation of Iowa 

Code section 903A.2, for errors at law.” Id. We review de novo the 

evidence relevant to a constitutional claim. Iowa Dist. Ct., 801 N.W.2d at 

517. 

III. Analysis. 

We must decide two related questions: (1) whether the IDOC 

properly relied on the victim’s detailed statement to initially refer Irvin for 

SOTP; and (2) whether the IDOC properly required Irvin’s participation in 

SOTP based on the ALJ’s finding that he admitted at his evidentiary 

hearing to assaulting his girlfriend during a sex act and based on the 

victim’s statement, police report, and Irvin’s guilty plea. We first address 

the IDOC’s broad discretion to refer inmates to SOTP and require their 

participation. We next review the permissible uses by the IDOC of a 

victim’s statement in a police report. We conclude that the IDOC 

properly rejected Irvin’s challenges to his initial referral to SOTP and the 

decision to mandate his participation following an evidentiary hearing. 

A. The IDOC’s Broad Discretion to Require SOTP. “SOTP was 

established for bona fide rehabilitative purposes.” Id. at 519. 

There is a high rate of recidivism among untreated sex

offenders and a broad range of agreement among therapists 

and correctional officers that clinical rehabilitation programs 

“can enable sex offenders to manage their impulses and in 

this way reduce recidivism.” 
10

Id. at 519 (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 

2024, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47, 56–57 (2002)). 

Iowa Code chapter 903A allows an inmate to “earn a reduction of 

sentence” based on good conduct and satisfactory participation in 

treatment programs identified by the IDOC director: 

An inmate of an institution under the control of the 

department of corrections . . . is eligible for a reduction of 

sentence equal to one and two-tenths days for each day the 

inmate demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily 

participates in any program or placement status identified by 

the director to earn the reduction. The programs include but 

are not limited to the following: 

. . . . 

(4) A treatment program established by the director. 

Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)(a)(4). Sex offender treatment is specifically 

addressed as follows: “However, an inmate required to participate in a 

sex offender treatment program shall not be eligible for a reduction of 

sentence unless the inmate participates in and completes a sex offender

treatment program established by the director.” Id. § 903A.2(1)(a). An 

inmate who fails to participate in sex offender treatment required by the 

IDOC risks losing his or her ability to obtain an earlier release from 

prison by accumulating earned time. 

Iowa Code section 903A.4 authorizes the IDOC to develop policies 

and procedures to implement these treatment programs with earnedtime incentives: 

The director of the Iowa department of corrections 

shall develop policy and procedural rules to implement 

sections 903A.1 through 903A.3. The rules may specify 

disciplinary offenses which may result in the loss of earned 

time, and the amount of earned time which may be lost as a 

result of each disciplinary offense. The director shall 

establish rules as to what constitutes “satisfactory 

participation” for purposes of a reduction of sentence under 

section 903A.2, for programs that are available or 

unavailable. 
11

(Emphasis added.)

The IDOC promulgated a policy that requires the department to 

review and refer offenders to the SOTP director who “are not incarcerated 

for a Sex Crime but have a sexual component to their crime.” Iowa Dep’t 

of Corr., Policy & Procedure, Sex Offender Program Referrals, OP–SOP–08 

(2014). The director then reviews the “current conviction and 

circumstances of [the] offense” as well as the “minutes of 

testimony/court documents” and “prior arrests/convictions” to 

determine whether he or she will refer an offender to SOTP. Id. From 

there, if the inmate has not been convicted of a sex offense, the matter 

proceeds to a hearing before an ALJ. If the ALJ upholds the 

classification requiring SOTP, the “inmate will no longer accrue any 

earned time after refusing to attend SOTP, but will not lose any 

previously accrued earned time.” Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 478. 

The “legislative purpose of earned-time credits . . . is to encourage 

prisoners to follow prison rules and participate in rehabilitative 

programs.” Kolzow v. State, 813 N.W.2d 731, 738 (Iowa 2012). “[C]ourts 

are obliged to grant prison officials a wide berth in the execution of 

policies and practices needed to maintain prison discipline and security.” 

Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman v. Edwards, 825 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa 

2012) (quoting Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman v. Grossheim, 498 N.W.2d 

405, 407 (Iowa 1993)). We addressed the IDOC’s “broad discretion” to 

require SOTP for inmates convicted of nonsex offenses in Dykstra. 783 

N.W.2d at 479. John Dykstra pled guilty to a charge of simple assault 

after he was initially charged with third-degree sexual abuse. Id. at 476. 

The IDOC recommended Dykstra participate in SOTP based on the 

circumstances underlying the assault, as gleaned from the minutes of 

testimony attached to the charging information. Id. Because Dykstra 
12

refused to attend SOTP, the IDOC determined he was no longer eligible to 

receive earned-time credit. Id. at 477. Dykstra argued the IDOC lacked 

authority to require SOTP because he was not convicted of a sex offense. 

We disagreed, noting that “[t]he statute does not set criteria for which 

inmates will be ‘required to participate.’ ” Id. at 478–79 (quoting Iowa 

Code § 903A.2). We elaborated,

The broad discretion granted to IDOC does not limit 

application of section 903A.2 to inmates serving sentences 

for particular crimes or crimes labeled as “sex offenses.” 

There is no statutory limitation that would prevent IDOC 

from recommending SOTP for an inmate convicted of a crime 

that is not facially considered a sex offense where the factual 

circumstances of the crime are of a sexual nature. 

Id. at 479. We held that the IDOC had authority to stop all accrual of 

earned time for refusal to participate in SOTP, even on sentences that 

were not served for a sex-offense conviction. Id. (“Section 903A.2 does 

not require that the ‘sentence’ be one connected to the reason IDOC has 

required the inmate to attend SOTP.”). Thus, so long as SOTP was 

related to a “problem currently suffered” by the offender, the IDOC had 

statutory authority to require SOTP and halt the accrual of earned time. 

Id. at 479–80 (quoting State v. Valin, 724 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Iowa 2006)). 

We emphasized in Dykstra that the IDOC’s classification 

procedures must satisfy the Due Process Clauses of the Iowa and Federal 

Constitutions. See id. at 483. We acknowledged a liberty interest at 

stake in the initial SOTP classification because of “[t]he stigmatizing 

consequence of being labeled as a sex offender, the mandatory behavior 

modification treatment, and the revocation of the inmate’s ability to earn 

any time should he refuse to participate.” Id. We adopted the procedural 

protections set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 
13

41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974), as a prerequisite for mandating SOTP. Id. at 

482. 

In Wolff, the Supreme Court evaluated what process was due in a 

proceeding to forfeit an inmate’s good-time credits. 418 U.S. at 563–71, 

94 S. Ct. at 2978–82, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 955–59. In Dykstra, we 

summarized the Wolff requirements as follows: 

(1) advance written notice of the claimed violation, (2) a 

written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied 

upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken, (3) a 

hearing, at which the inmate must be allowed to call 

witnesses and present documentary evidence, as long as it 

would not be unduly hazardous, and (4) a sufficiently 

impartial decisionmaker. 

783 N.W.2d at 482. We concluded the due process required by Wolff was 

satisfied when the inmate had been tried and convicted of a sex offense. 

Id. at 484; see also Holm v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 767 N.W.2d 409, 418 (Iowa 

2009) (concluding mandatory SOTP did not violate due process when 

inmate was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse). However, for 

inmates who were not convicted of a sex crime, the IDOC must satisfy 

the Wolff procedural safeguards. Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 484. We held 

the IDOC violated Dykstra’s due process rights by requiring his 

participation in SOTP based on “unadmitted factual allegations that did 

not result in a sex-offense conviction” without the required procedural 

safeguards. Id. at 483. Specifically, Dykstra was not provided with 

“advance written notice, a written statement of reasons and findings by 

the factfinder, and a neutral factfinder.” Id.1 

1We applied Dykstra in the companion cases of Reilly v. Iowa District 

Court, 783 N.W.2d 490 (Iowa 2010), and Waters v. Iowa District Court, 783 

N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 2010). In Waters, we held that an inmate could be classified 

for SOTP even though at the time of classification he was only serving a 

sentence for operating while intoxicated (OWI) because he had “entered prison 

to serve two sentences: the five-year OWI sentence and a two-year sentence for 

 
14

In contrast, Irvin was provided with the procedural protections 

required by Dykstra. See id. Therefore, we turn to whether the IDOC 

may rely on the victim’s detailed statement in the police report to initially 

classify Irvin for SOTP and in the subsequent review by the ALJ. 

B. The IDOC’s Use of the Victim’s Statement. The district 

court, citing Lindsey, ruled the IDOC erroneously relied on unproven 

facts in the minutes of testimony when initially referring Irvin to SOTP. 

Donzell Lindsey was originally charged with first-degree burglary,

domestic assault, and third-degree sexual abuse. Lindsey, 2015 

WL 568560, at *1. He pled guilty under a plea agreement to domestic 

abuse and burglary, with the sexual abuse charge dismissed. Id. The 

IDOC classified Lindsey for SOTP, concluding there was a “sexual 

component” to his crimes based on the facts alleged in the minutes of 

testimony. Id. The district court vacated that decision and ordered the 

IDOC to restore his earned time. Id. A panel of the court of appeals 

affirmed over the dissent of one judge. Id. at *6. The majority held the 

IDOC lacked the authority to rely on the minutes of testimony when 

classifying offenders, stating, “Dykstra does not extend [IDOC’s] 

authority to promulgation of policies and rules permitting the 

consideration of unproven and unadmitted ‘facts.’ ” Id. at *3. The 

assault with intent to commit sexual abuse.” 783 N.W.2d at 489. In Reilly, we 

determined that removing an inmate from SOTP implicated a similar liberty 

interest—the right to accrue earned time. 783 N.W.2d at 495. However, we 

gave less weight to the inmate’s liberty interest because removal was “a 

discretionary decision by prison officials . . . whereas the initial inmate 

classification addressed in Dykstra amounts to a specific factual determination 

that the inmate has engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior.” Id. at 496. 

We decided that when “the inquiry draws more on the experience of prison 

administrators,” rather than “the search for specific facts,” “the full panoply of 

protections that would accompany a formal hearing” were unnecessary. Id. at 

496–97 (first quoting Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228–29, 125 S. Ct. 

2384, 2397, 162 L. Ed. 2d 174, 193 (2005)). 

_________________________
15

majority observed that “even district courts may not rely on these types 

of ‘facts’ ” and pointed to decisions excluding the minutes from 

consideration in sentencing decisions. Id. at *4. The dissenting judge 

stated, “I would conclude IDOC can rely on unadmitted-to facts when 

initially referring an inmate to SOTP, but, then, due process requires a 

hearing before an independent factfinder before participation in SOTP is 

required.” Id. at *6 (Vogel, P.J., dissenting). We now hold the IDOC’s use 

of the victim’s statement quoted in the police report did not exceed its 

statutory authority or violate Irvin’s due process rights. 

The court of appeals majority in Lindsey, and the district court in 

this case, erred by concluding the limitations on a district court’s use of 

minutes at trial or sentencing precluded an IDOC ALJ from relying on a 

detailed victim’s statement that happened to be attached to the minutes. 

The formal rules of evidence that govern trials in district court do not 

apply to hearings before an IDOC ALJ. See Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 485 

(“Prison proceedings ‘are sui generis, governed by neither the evidentiary 

rules of a civil trial, a criminal trial, nor an administrative hearing. The 

only limitations appear to be those imposed by due process, a statute, or 

administrative regulations.’ ” (quoting 2 Michael B. Mushlin, Rights of 

Prisoners § 9.20, at 208 (3d ed. 2002))); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 

94 S. Ct. at 2975, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951 (“Prison disciplinary proceedings 

are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due 

a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”); Dailey v. Neb. Dep’t of 

Corr. Servs., 578 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]he weight of 

authority in both federal and state cases is that the [formal] rules of 

evidence do not apply” in prison discipline proceedings.). Indeed, we 

have affirmed prison discipline decisions that were based on hearsay in 

written reports of confidential informants. See, e.g., James v. State, 541 
16

N.W.2d 864, 874 (Iowa 1995). “Under the ‘some evidence’ standard, ‘the 

relevant [legal] question is whether there is any evidence in the record’

that could support the committee’s decision.” Id. (alterations in original) 

(quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 

2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356, 365 (1985)). 

The minutes of testimony set forth the factual circumstances 

giving rise to the charges against Irvin. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.5(3) 

(providing minutes shall contain “the name and occupation of each 

witness upon whose expected testimony the information is based, and a 

full and fair statement of the witness’ expected testimony”). Minutes 

must “be approved by a district judge” who finds that the evidence 

contained in the minutes, “if unexplained, would warrant a conviction by 

the trial jury.” Id. r. 2.5(4). The minutes provide a description, both to 

the reviewing judge and to the offender, of the circumstances alleged by 

the State to support the charge. 

Use of minutes of testimony is limited in district court. District 

courts are not permitted to consider “additional, unproven, and 

unprosecuted charges” during sentencing, unless “the facts before the 

court show defendant committed those offenses or they are admitted by 

him.” State v. Messer, 306 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 1981).2 Similarly, 

2Nonetheless, facts set forth in the minutes can be relied upon in district 

court in certain instances. Courts may refer to the minutes of testimony to find 

a factual basis for a guilty plea. State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 57 (Iowa 2013) 

(assessing whether counsel had been ineffective in allowing defendant to plead 

guilty and relying on the “entire record,” including evidence provided in 

minutes). District courts may rely on the charging documents of unprosecuted 

offenses in determining conditions of release, in which “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense charged” is the first factor the statute instructs 

courts to consider. See Iowa Code § 811.2(2); State v. Fenton, 170 N.W.2d 678, 

679 (Iowa 1969) (setting bail based on defendant’s criminal history and “county 

attorney’s information” charging defendant with rape). At probation revocation 

hearings, we allow charged, but unconvicted, offenses to serve as the basis for 

 
17

minutes of testimony “are not evidence” at trial. State v. De Bont, 223 

Iowa 721, 723, 273 N.W. 873, 874 (1937). 

In Stenzel, when reviewing an appeal from a judgment committing 

the defendant as a sexually violent predator (SVP), we found expert 

testimony based on unproven facts in the minutes inadmissible as more 

prejudicial than probative. 827 N.W.2d at 710. Because the minutes are 

“a statement of what the prosecution expected (at one point) to prove,” we 

“question[ed] the basic fairness of the State’s using materials that it 

generated exclusively to prosecute Stenzel criminally as a factual ground 

for committing him as an SVP at the conclusion of his sentence.” Id.

Stenzel applied the rules of evidence governing trials in district court. 

Stenzel is distinguishable from the present case because it was not a 

prison classification proceeding, but a formal trial to determine whether 

the defendant would be civilly committed at the conclusion of his prison 

sentence. See id. at 692. Stenzel is further distinguishable because here 

the IDOC and ALJ relied upon the victim’s statement, not the allegations 

as drafted by a prosecutor. 

The district court misapplied Stenzel to the IDOC proceedings, in 

which use of hearsay is permitted. See Wilson v. Farrier, 372 N.W.2d 

499, 502 (Iowa 1985) (affirming prison-discipline decision that relied on 

informant’s confidential statement). Here, we must decide whether this 

detailed victim’s statement, quoted in the police report, may be used to 

support the IDOC classification. We conclude the IDOC did not err in 

relying on the victim’s statement, either in its initial referral to SOTP or 

revocation when the State can show the defendant violated the law by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Rheuport v. State, 238 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Iowa 

1976). 

_________________________
18

in the ALJ’s decision to require participation. We address each phase in 

turn. 

1. The IDOC’s initial referral to SOTP. First, we conclude the IDOC 

may rely on a victim’s account in a police report prepared nearly 

contemporaneously with the incident in classifying inmates for SOTP. 

The IDOC’s initial classification is just that—initial. No earned time is 

withheld for lack of participation by an inmate who was not convicted of 

a sex offense unless and until the inmate is provided with the Wolff due 

process protections, including an evidentiary hearing before an ALJ. 

It is instructive to contrast the requirements for SOTP in Iowa Code 

section 903A.4 to the statutory requirements for sex offender 

registration. Iowa Code section 692A.103 requires a person to register as 

a sex offender if the person has been convicted of a “tier I, tier II, or tier 

III offense.” For certain offenses, the legislature has expressly required a 

factual determination that the offense was “sexually motivated” in order 

to qualify as a tier I, II, or III offense. See, e.g., Iowa Code 

§ 692A.102(1)(c)(19). “Sexually motivated” means “one of the purposes 

for commission of a crime is the purpose of sexual gratification of the 

perpetrator of the crime.” Id. § 229A.2(9); see also id. § 692A.101(29). 

For certain convictions occurring after July 1, 2009, the statute 

expressly provides that a judge or jury must make a factual 

determination “beyond a reasonable doubt” that an offense was sexually 

motivated in order to require an individual to register. Id. § 692A.126(1). 

No analogous requirements exist for SOTP. Nowhere in chapter 

903A does the legislature require a judge or jury to make a factual 

finding that an offense was sexually motivated to refer an inmate to 

SOTP. “[L]egislative intent is expressed by omission as well as by 

inclusion of statutory terms.” Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank,
19

808 N.W.2d 186, 193 (Iowa 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Freedom Fin. Bank v. Estate of Boesen, 805 N.W.2d 802, 812 (Iowa 

2011)). When the legislature selectively places language in one section 

and avoids it in another, we presume it did so intentionally. Id. That the 

legislature expressly required a judge or jury to find sexual motivation 

beyond a reasonable doubt in chapter 692A but omitted such a 

requirement in chapter 903A tells us the legislature intended to allow the 

IDOC discretion to refer an inmate to SOTP without that level of proof. 

See Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 484–85 (“We note . . . the standard for prison 

administrative decisions is ‘some evidence’ as opposed to the ‘beyond a 

reasonable doubt’ required in criminal trials.”); see also Wilson, 372 

N.W.2d at 501 (“We hold that the requirements of due process are 

satisfied if some evidence supports the decisions by the prison

disciplinary board to revoke good time credits.”). 

Practical concerns also support allowing IDOC to refer to factual 

accounts such as victim statements in police reports when making its 

initial classification. Most criminal charges are resolved through plea 

bargains.3 The sex abuse charges may be dismissed to secure a 

conviction on lesser assault charges, as happened here. The IDOC and 

ALJ lacked access to sealed deposition transcripts and Irvin did not 

provide them. Inmates who need treatment would avoid SOTP if the 

information in the victim’s statement could not be used to trigger an 

evidentiary hearing. We conclude that the IDOC may refer an offender 

for SOTP based on a victim’s detailed account in a police report. 

3“An estimated ninety-five percent of convictions are secured through the 

plea-bargaining process.” State v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 161 n.1 (Iowa 2015) 

(quoting State v. Fannon, 799 N.W.2d 515, 520 n.2 (Iowa 2011)). 

 
20

2. The ALJ’s determination requiring SOTP. We next address Irvin’s 

hearing before the IDOC ALJ. An ALJ in a prison disciplinary proceeding 

is an independent, impartial adjudicator. See Edwards, 825 N.W.2d at 

16–17 (noting IDOC ALJs report to and are supervised by the IDOC’s 

general counsel rather than the warden). An ALJ’s decision in a 

disciplinary proceeding affecting earned-time credits will be affirmed so 

long as there is “some evidence” in the record to support it. Backstrom v. 

Iowa Dist. Ct., 508 N.W.2d 705, 710–11 (Iowa 1993) (“We further believe 

the federal constitution requires only that state prison disciplinary 

officials apply a ‘some evidence’ standard in their initial determination of 

disciplinary proceedings.”). 

In Hill, inmates challenged the decision of a prison disciplinary 

board finding them guilty of violating a prison rule prohibiting assault 

and revoking good-time credits. 472 U.S. at 448, 105 S. Ct. at 2770, 86 

L. Ed. 2d at 360. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, “[w]ithout deciding 

whether the appropriate standard of review [was] ‘some evidence’ or the 

stricter test of ‘substantial evidence,’ ” overturned the disciplinary court’s 

decision, finding the record failed to present even “some evidence . . .

[that] would rationally permit the board’s findings.” Id. at 449, 105 S. Ct. 

at 2770, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 360 (quoting Hill v. Superintendent, 466 N.E.2d 

818, 822 (Mass. 1984)). The United States Supreme Court addressed 

whether the “findings of a prison disciplinary board that result in the 

loss of good time credits must be supported by a certain amount of 

evidence in order to satisfy due process.” Id. at 453, 105 S. Ct. at 2773, 

86 L. Ed. 2d at 363. The Court noted its prior cases failed to specify 

what “quantum of evidence” was required “to support the factfinder’s 

decision” in a prison disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 454, 105 S. Ct. at 

2773, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 364. 
21

The Hill Court determined that the “requirements of due process 

are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the disciplinary 

board to revoke good time credits.” Id. at 455, 105 S. Ct. at 2774, 86 

L. Ed. 2d at 365. The Court “decline[d] to adopt a more stringent 

evidentiary standard as a constitutional requirement,” reasoning, 

Prison disciplinary proceedings take place in a highly 

charged atmosphere, and prison administrators must often 

act swiftly on the basis of evidence that might be insufficient 

in less exigent circumstances. The fundamental fairness 

guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require 

courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that 

have some basis in fact. Revocation of good time credits is 

not comparable to a criminal conviction, and neither the 

amount of evidence necessary to support such a conviction, 

nor any other standard greater than some evidence applies 

in this context. 

Id. at 456, 105 S. Ct. at 2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 365 (citations omitted). 

The Court determined the “some evidence” standard would “prevent 

arbitrary deprivations without threatening institutional interests or 

imposing undue administrative burdens.” Id. at 455, 105 S. Ct. at 2774, 

86 L. Ed. 2d at 364. Under this standard, the Court concluded that the 

prison board had been presented with sufficient evidence to find the 

inmates violated the disciplinary rule and revoke good-time credits. Id. 

at 456, 105 S. Ct. at 2774–75, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 365. The Court based its 

holding on testimony from the prison guard and evidence that no other 

inmates were in the area at the time of the assault. Id. 

In Farrier, we adopted the “some evidence” standard as the 

appropriate standard of judicial review for prison disciplinary 

proceedings. 372 N.W.2d at 501–02. An inmate charged with 

committing a murder during an uprising inside the Iowa State 

Penitentiary was acquitted in his district court criminal trial. Id. at 500. 

The prison disciplinary board, however, found him guilty of the offense 
22

and forfeited all of his earned time. Id. We adopted the “some evidence” 

standard followed by the Supreme Court and federal circuits and upheld 

the committee’s sanction. Id. at 502. 

Eight years later, in Backstrom, we concluded the “some evidence” 

standard applied to an IDOC ALJ’s factual findings. 508 N.W.2d at 710. 

An inmate challenged a disciplinary committee’s determination that he 

smuggled alcohol into the prison. Id. at 708. The disciplinary report was 

based on testimony from a confidential informant. Id. We concluded 

that the Supreme Court’s language in Hill “clearly refer[red] to the level of 

evidence used by prison administrators in their factual determinations,” 

not merely on judicial review. Id. at 711. “Although the ‘some evidence’

standard may seem harsh,” we noted it was sufficient to protect 

prisoners from retaliatory treatment. Id. Under that standard, we 

decided the ALJ had properly found Backstrom guilty of the offense. Id. 

We reaffirmed application of the “some evidence” standard a year later in 

Marshall v. State, 524 N.W.2d 150, 152 (Iowa 1994) (per curiam). Today, 

we reaffirm that the “some evidence” standard applies to making and 

reviewing factual findings in prison proceedings, including SOTP 

classification hearings. 

“The threshold for determining whether some evidence exists is 

low”; it can be satisfied by relying on hearsay statements, such as 

statements from officers or confidential informants. Johnson v. State, 

542 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995); see Mahers v. State, 437 N.W.2d 

565, 569–70 (Iowa 1989) (relying on a report from a correctional officer); 

Farrier, 372 N.W.2d at 502 (relying on statement from confidential 

informant). Still, the “some evidence” standard is not without teeth. 

When officials use hearsay statements from a confidential informant to 

meet the “some evidence” standard, the inmate’s “interest in a fair 
23

hearing requires that there be some indication of the confidential 

informant’s reliability.” James, 479 N.W.2d at 291. Specifically, “there 

must be sufficient information in the record to convince a reviewing 

authority that the [decision-maker] undertook such inquiry and correctly 

concluded that the confidential information was credible and reliable.” 

Id. We have recognized this standard can be satisfied by in camera

review of material documenting credibility or corroboration with other 

statements or evidence. See id. at 292 (concluding informants reliable 

because they incriminated themselves by providing information, and 

other evidence corroborated their account); Farrier, 372 N.W.2d at 502–

03 (concluding informant was credible based on examination of 

documents in camera). We have also found the standard satisfied when a 

court determined “the confidential information contain[ed] a great many 

details . . . [, and t]here appear[ed] to be no bias motivating the source.” 

Key v. State, 577 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 1998). Our precedent allows an 

IDOC ALJ to rely on hearsay reports of confidential informants so long as 

there is an indicia of reliability such that the ALJ can determine the 

information is reliable and credible. The same requirement applies to 

victim statements. 

We conclude that if the ALJ determines the victim’s statement from 

the underlying assault case to be reliable and credible, it may be used to 

satisfy the “some evidence” standard to classify the inmate for SOTP. 

See Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1219, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004) 

(rejecting inmate’s challenge to his classification as a sex offender by 

hearing panel that “relied on a detailed written account from the victim of 

the alleged sexual assault” denied by the inmate); Vondra v. Colo. Dep’t of 

Corr., 226 P.3d 1165, 1169–70 (Colo. App. 2009) (affirming prison 

hearing panel’s determination requiring sex offender treatment based on 
24

police reports and victim’s statements after offender was provided Wolff

due process protections). An ALJ may also use the inmate’s own 

testimony in the hearing, alone or as corroboration with the detailed 

victim statement, to decide whether SOTP should be required. 

We conclude the statement of Irvin’s victim bears a sufficient 

indicia of reliability. A police officer took the victim’s statement in Irvin’s 

underlying assault case on the morning after the incident; thus, it was a 

near-contemporaneous factual account of the events while the victim’s 

memory was fresh. It is a crime to file a false report with a police officer. 

See Iowa Code § 718.6(1) (“A person who reports or causes to be reported 

false information to . . . a law enforcement authority . . . knowing that 

the information is false . . . commits a serious misdemeanor . . . .”); id.

§ 903.1 (stating serious misdemeanors are punishable by a fine of at 

least $315 and imprisonment of up to a year). 

Police reporting documents such as citations have been relied 

upon in contested case administrative proceedings. Gaskey v. Iowa Dep’t 

of Transp., 537 N.W.2d 695, 696 (Iowa 1995) (relying upon “[t]he implied 

consent form, the notice of revocation, the request for hearing, a stay 

order, a computer printout of Gaskey’s driving record, and a copy of the 

citation issued to Gaskey” in license revocation proceeding before ALJ); 

see also Schmitz v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 461 N.W.2d 603, 607–08 

(Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (discussing use of hearsay evidence in 

administrative hearings). Iowa Code chapter 17A provides,

A finding shall be based upon the kind of evidence on which 

reasonably prudent persons are accustomed to rely for the 

conduct of their serious affairs, and may be based upon 

such evidence even if it would be inadmissible in a jury trial.

Iowa Code § 17A.14(1); see also Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 482 (“Generally, 

a person has a constitutional due process right to an evidentiary hearing 
25

in accordance with contested case procedures . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 

(quoting Brummer v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 661 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Iowa 

2003))). Irvin does not contend the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act

governs our review. Nevertheless, we conclude this victim’s statement

would be sufficiently credible and reliable to support the IDOC ALJ’s 

findings under section 17A.14(1) as well as the “some evidence”

standard. 

Moreover, Irvin’s testimony at the hearing corroborated the victim’s 

statement. Irvin admitted during the hearing that he pushed the victim 

away by the throat after she did not perform oral sex in the way that he 

expected. Irvin also testified at the hearing that the victim would not 

have to “fabricate a story if she wanted him to leave,” supporting the 

victim’s credibility. The ALJ properly relied on the victim’s statement set 

forth in the police report together with Irvin’s admissions and guilty plea, 

in which he acknowledged “knowingly” impeding his victim’s ability to 

breathe. We review that decision under the governing “some evidence” 

standard and uphold the ALJ’s factual findings that are supported by 

“any” evidence in the record. Key, 577 N.W.2d at 641. Applying that 

standard of review here, we uphold the ALJ’s finding of a sexual 

component to Irvin’s assault conviction. 

For all these reasons, we reject the reasoning in Lindsey. We hold 

the ALJ properly relied on the victim’s detailed statement and Irvin’s own 

testimony and guilty plea to require Irvin to complete SOTP. The IDOC 

properly upheld the ALJ’s decision. The district court erred by reversing 

the IDOC’s determination. 

C. Irvin’s Due Process Claim. We next address whether the use 

of the victim’s statement to classify an offender for SOTP violates due 

process. “Procedural due process ‘act[s] as a constraint on government 
26

action that infringes upon an individual’s liberty interest, such as the 

freedom from physical restraint.’ ” Holm, 767 N.W.2d at 417 (quoting 

State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 662 (Iowa 2005)). However, 

[p]risoners held in lawful confinement have their liberty 

curtailed by definition, so the procedural protections to 

which they are entitled are more limited than in cases where 

the right at stake is the right to be free from confinement at 

all. 

Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225, 125 S. Ct. at 2395, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 191; see 

also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S. Ct. at 2975, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951 (“[T]he 

fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way 

implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the 

nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed.”). 

“[T]he first step in any procedural due process inquiry is the 

determination of ‘whether a protected liberty or property interest is 

involved.’ ” Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 480 (quoting Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 

665). If a liberty interest is involved, we analyze the following three 

factors: 

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 

action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 

interest through the procedures used, and the probable 

value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 

safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including 

the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 

requirement[s] would entail. 

Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665 (quoting Bowers v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of 

Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 691 (Iowa 2002)). 

Irvin argues that IDOC failed to provide due process for the initial 

SOTP classification because the IDOC relied on the victim’s statement in 

its recommendation to the ALJ. In Dykstra, we recognized a liberty 

interest in the classification for SOTP based on the stigmatizing 
27

consequence of being labeled a sex offender, the mandatory treatment, 

and the revocation of earned time. Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 481. We also 

observed that when a factual inquiry outside “the face of the conviction” 

of the crime is necessary, “resort to some tribunal must be available to 

resolve disputes.” Id. (quoting Kruse v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 712 N.W.2d 695, 

700–01 (Iowa 2006)) (observing that to comply with due process tribunal 

must be available to resolve whether assault conviction required offender 

to register); Brummer, 661 N.W.2d at 172 (stating, if proceeding involves 

“adjudicative facts” particular to the parties, an evidentiary hearing is 

necessary). In Dykstra, the initial decision made by the IDOC regarding 

SOTP was also the final classification determination. 783 N.W.2d at 

482–83. Not so with Irvin. Rather, Irvin’s initial classification began the 

process. Irvin was then provided the opportunity to challenge that 

classification through an evidentiary hearing. 

The IDOC has a significant interest in rehabilitating sex offenders 

before their release. See McKune, 536 U.S at 32–33, 122 S. Ct. at 2024, 

153 L. Ed. 2d at 56–57. In Wolff, the Supreme Court stressed that for 

due process in prison discipline cases, “there must be mutual 

accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the 

provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.” 418 U.S.

at 556, 94 S. Ct. at 2975, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951. 

[T]here would be great unwisdom in encasing the 

disciplinary procedures in an inflexible constitutional 

straitjacket that would necessarily call for adversary 

proceedings typical of a criminal trial, very likely to raise the 

level of confrontation between staff and inmate, and make 

more difficult the utilization of the disciplinary process as a 

tool to advance the rehabilitative goals of the institution. 
28

Id. at 563, 94 S. Ct. at 2978, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 955. Irvin’s due process 

claim fails because the IDOC complied with the Wolff requirements. Id.

at 763–71, 94 S. Ct. at 2978–82, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 955–59. 

In Gwinn, a case directly on point, the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment dismissing 

an inmate’s due process claims against Colorado correctional officials. 

354 F.3d at 1221. The inmate in state court initially was charged with 

sexual assault, but that charge was dropped in a plea bargain resulting 

in his conviction for robbery. Id. at 1217. The presentence report 

included the victim’s detailed written account of the sexual assault. Id.

at 1217, 1219. The inmate was provided a hearing consistent with Wolff. 

Id. at 1218–19. He submitted a written denial of the victim’s allegations. 

Id. at 1219. The prison hearing panel upheld his classification requiring 

treatment based on the victim’s statement. Id. The federal district court 

upheld the classification and dismissed the inmate’s due process claims. 

Id. at 1221. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding the inmate “received 

the procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause” because 

he “was afforded notice of the evidence against him and an opportunity 

to present evidence in his own behalf, and he received a written 

decision.” Id. We reach the same conclusion as to Irvin. 

Irvin received advance notice of his hearing before the ALJ. At the

hearing, he presented a factual statement signed by him, caselaw 

supporting his position, and documents from his underlying trial. He 

was allowed to testify. The ALJ was impartial. See Edwards, 825 

N.W.2d at 16. The ALJ could find and did find Irvin’s version of events 

not credible in light of Irvin’s admissions and the victim’s detailed 

statement. The ALJ relied on Irvin’s own admissions and testimony 

rather than relying solely on unadmitted factual allegations. The ALJ’s 
29

factual findings of a sexual component to Irvin’s assault are clearly 

supported by “some evidence.” See Key, 577 N.W.2d at 641 (“On

appellate review of a prisoner’s challenge to the evidentiary support of a 

disciplinary matter, we ask whether the committee had ‘some evidence’

to support its decision.” (quoting Backstrom, 508 N.W.2d at 709). After 

the hearing, Irvin received a written decision from the ALJ detailing the 

reasons for the classification and was allowed to appeal that decision to 

the warden. We conclude Irvin received the due process to which he was 

entitled under Dykstra. 

IV. Disposition. 

For those reasons, we sustain the writ, vacate the district court’s 

ruling, and remand this case with instructions to reinstate the IDOC’s 

determination requiring SOTP for Irvin. 

WRIT SUSTAINED AND CASE REMANDED.