IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

KWAME RAY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:16-CV-139

) 

CLERK OF THE INDIANA SUPREME ) 

COURT OF APPEALS, and )

METHODIST HOSPITAL SOUTH )

LAKE CAMPUS, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION and ORDER

This matter is before the Court on: (1) the Amended Complaint

filed on August 25, 2016 (DE #6); (2) a Petition to Proceed without

Pre-payment of Fees and Costs filed by Thomas J. Ray on August 25,

2016 (DE #5); and (3) an application to proceed in forma pauperis

filed by Kwame J. Ray on August 25, 2016 (DE #7). For the reasons

explained below, Thomas J. Ray’s request to proceed in forma

pauperis is DENIED AS MOOT, Kwame J. Ray’s request to proceed in

forma pauperis is DENIED, and the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE as to the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court of

Appeals, and WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Methodist Hospital South Lake

Campus. 

On August 3, 2016, this Court outlined (for a second time) the

shortcomings of the complaints pending at that time, consolidated
the three related cases, dismissed each of the complaints, and

permitted Thomas J. Ray and Kwame J. Ray another opportunity to

file an amended complaint that complied with the requirements of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Thomas J. Ray and Kwame J. Ray

were also given another opportunity to seek in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) status. They were cautioned that, “if an amended compliant

is filed that again fails to state a claim, the action will be

dismissed with prejudice.” (DE #4).

An Amended Complaint was filed on August 25, 2016, listing

only Kwame J. Ray as a plaintiff, and listing only Methodist

Hospital South Lake Campus (“Methodist”) as a defendant in the

caption. (DE #6). The body of the complaint, however, also lists

the Clerk of the Indiana Court of Appeals as a defendant. (DE #6

at 2). Although only Kwame Ray is listed as a plaintiff, IFP

petitions were filed by both Kwame J. Ray and Thomas J. Ray. 

Because Thomas J. Ray is not a plaintiff to the Amended Complaint,

his IFP petition is DENIED AS MOOT.

With regard to Kwame J. Ray’s (hereinafter “Plaintiff”)

request to proceed IFP, the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1915,

allows an indigent plaintiff to commence a civil action without

prepaying the administrative costs (e.g. filing fee) of the action.

See 28 U.S.C. section 1915(a)(1); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504

U.S. 25, 27 (1992). When presented with an IFP application, the

district court makes two determinations: (1) whether the suit has

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sufficient merit; and (2) whether the plaintiff’s poverty level

justifies IFP status. See 28 U.S.C. section 1915(e)(2); Denton,

504 U.S. at 27; Smith-Bey v. Hosp. Adm’r, 841 F.2d 751, 757 (7th

Cir. 1988). If a court finds that the suit lacks sufficient merit

or that an inadequate showing of poverty exists, the court must

deny the IFP application. See Smith-Bey, 841 F.2d at 757.

District courts have the power under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

to screen complaints before service of the complaint on the

defendants, and must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a

claim. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999). Courts

apply the same standard under section 1915(e)(2)(B) as when

addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d

1014, 1018, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, the financial prong has

been met; however, the Court finds the suit does not have

sufficient merit to continue.

A plaintiff is required to include allegations in the

complaint that “plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to

relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level’” and,

“if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court.” 

E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th

Cir. 2007) (quoting in part Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n. 14 (2007)).

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the

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allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks, ellipsis, citations and

footnote omitted). Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting

a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader,

might suggest that something has happened to her that might be

redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,

403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).

The Court notes that Plaintiff is appearing pro se in this

matter. Generally, although “pro se litigants are masters of their

own complaints” and “[d]istrict judges have no obligation to act as

counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants,” Myles v. United States,

416 F.3d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005), a document filed pro se is to be

liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007). However, even pro se plaintiffs must “make their pleadings

straightforward so that judges and adverse parties need not try to

fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.” United States ex rel.

Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003). 

They must “be presented with clarity sufficient to avoid requiring

a district court or opposing party to forever sift through its

pages . . . .” Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir.

1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that

complaints contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Vicom, Inc.

v. Harbridge Merchant Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir.

1994) (“A complaint that is prolix and/or confusing makes it

difficult for the defendant to file a responsive pleading and makes

it difficult for the trial court to conduct orderly litigation.”).

In sum, Rule 8 requires a complaint to be presented with

“intelligibility sufficient for a court or opposing party to

understand whether a valid claim is alleged and if so what it is.” 

Vicom, 20 F.3d at 775. 

In this case, the Amended Complaint, like earlier complaints,

alleges that the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court of Appeals

violated Plaintiff’s rights under the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 10th

Amendments of the United States Constitution. It has added

violations of additional provisions too: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and

14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. The factual

recitations of earlier complaints are no longer included. The

current complaint is completely lacking of factual allegations

against the Clerk of the Indiana Court of Appeals. Plaintiff has

not satisfied the federal notice pleading standards in accordance

with Rule 8. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

against the Clerk of the Indiana Court of Appeals, and th3e Clerk

of the Indiana Court of Appeals is dismissed with prejudice. 

With regard to Methodist, the Amended Complaint alleges that

one of Methodist’s employees interviewed Plaintiff’s children and,

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as a result of that interview, the department of child and family

services became involved. The Amended Complaint indicates that,

“to the best of my knowledge this is a Medical Malpractice Law Sue

[sic] Complaint.” (DE #6 at 4). Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief

and money damages because Methodist caused him to “stop being a

Father.” (Id.). 

This Court has an obligation to ensure that it has proper

subject matter jurisdiction over each lawsuit that is brought in

this Court. Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781

F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986). This Court is a court of limited

jurisdiction, and in the absence of either diversity jurisdiction

or federal question jurisdiction, the case must be dismissed. See

Bovee v. Broom, 732 F.3d 743, 744 (7th Cir. 2013).

 For this Court to have diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

claim against Methodist, the amount in controversy must exceed

$75,000, and there must be diversity of citizenship between

plaintiff and defendant. The complaint must allege the amount in

controversy and the citizenship of all parties. Guaranty Nat’l

Title Company, Inc. v. J.E.G. Associates, 101 F.3d 57, 58 (7th Cir.

1996); Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Kimball International Mfg.,

Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 764, 767 (E.D. Ill. 2000). The Amended

Complaint does not allege the amount in controversy or the

citizenship of the parties. Plaintiff has not alleged diversity

jurisdiction and nothing in the Amended Complaint suggests that

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there is diversity of citizenship between the parties. 

 Federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section

1331, requires that the action arise “under the Constitution, laws,

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “Ordinarily,

the basis for federal-question jurisdiction must be apparent from

the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.” Crosby v.

Cooper B-Line, Inc., 725 F.3d 795, 800 (7th Cir. 2013); see also

Northeastern Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power

Association, 707 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff has cited to

no federal statute or law in reference to his claims against

Methodist. The Amended Complaint is brought using a form for

claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[e]very

person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law ....” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To establish a claim under § 1983,

a plaintiff must show both that a constitutional right has been violated

and that the alleged wrongdoer acted under color of state law. West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1987). Plaintiff cannot state a claim against

Methodist under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 because Methodist is not a state

actor. Accordingly, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s claim against Methodist.

Even if this Court had subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s case, the factual allegations still fail to state a

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claim for which relief could be granted. The Amended Complaint

contains no facts from which it can be concluded that Methodist is

liable to Plaintiff for medical malpractice or any other cause of

action. The Amended Complaint does not contain sufficient factual

matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

Because this suit is lacking in merit, Kwame J. Ray’s request

to proceed IFP is DENIED. Any effort to amend the complaint would

be futile. Carpenter v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n, No. 15-2732, __ Fed.

Appx. __, __, 2016 WL 412839, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 3, 2016)

(quotation marks omitted). See Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014

(7th Cir. 2013) and Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432

(7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to

amend where . . . the amendment would be futile.”). Accordingly,

the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice as to the Clerk

of the Indiana Court of Appeals, and WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to

Methodist. 

DATED: November 28, 2016 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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