J-A05040-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MEGAN S. RODGERS, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RYAN J. MURPHY,

Appellant No. 2018 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered June 11, 2014,

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Domestic Relations at No(s): DR NO. 13-09976 PACSES NO. 945114108

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and ALLEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MARCH 31, 2015

Ryan J. Murphy (“Father”) appeals from the order setting the amount 

of monthly child support he is obligated to pay to Megan S. Rodgers 

(“Mother”). We affirm.

We summarize the facts of this case as follows. Mother and Father 

married in April of 2011. Thereafter, Mother gave birth to Son. Mother and 

Father separated in February of 2013. In July of 2013, Mother filed for 

divorce. On July 22, 2013, Mother filed a complaint for child support.

A hearing was held before a Master on December 9, 2013.1 On 

April 4, 2014, the Master issued a proposed order of child support. The 

____________________________________________

1

 At the time of the hearing, Mother was thirty-two years old, possessed a 

master’s degree, was employed as an autistic support teacher, and lived 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Master estimated Father’s earning capacity to be $30,000.00 per year, and 

proposed that Father pay Mother $741.00 per month for support, plus 

$34.00 per month for arrears, for a total child support payment of $775.00 

per month. That amount also included a contribution by Father towards the 

total sum of $245.00 that Mother spent for weekly childcare expenses at a 

daycare facility. Father timely filed exceptions to the proposed order. The 

trial court held argument on Father’s exceptions, relied on the Master’s 

findings of credibility, and denied Father’s exceptions. Father filed this 

timely appeal. Father and the trial court complied with the requirements of 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Father presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the Trial Court err in confirming the Master’s assignment 

to Father of an earning capacity of $30,000.00 per year, as that 

earning capacity was inconsistent with his earnings history, his 

education and current and recent income experience, and 

disregarded his efforts at obtaining higher-paying full-time 

employment, which were limited by his familial responsibilities to 

his ailing father, and the potential for higher earnings with the 

company in the future?

2. Did the Trial Court err in confirming the Master’s acceptance 

and allocation of the childcare expense of $245.00 per week, for 

a choice of daycare on which Father was not consulted and 

where Father could provide alternate and far less expensive 

childcare, and the child primarily resides with Mother and her 

parents who, with Father and Father’s mother, had previously 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

with Son at the home of Mother’s parents. Father was thirty-nine years old, 

had a high school diploma, had served a few years in the United States 

military, was employed as a taxi driver, and lived in an apartment with his 

mother.
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shared childcare responsibilities particularly where the expense 

constitutes [an] unreasonable burden on Father?

3. Did the Trial Court and the Master err in failing to consider 

that, while Father rented an apartment and financially assisted 

his elderly mother who resided with him, Mother lives with her 

parents in their home and has no expenses with regard to rent, 

maintenance or utilities and hence deviate from the guideline 

support as provided by the Rules?

Father’s Brief at 2-3.

Father first argues that the trial court erred in confirming the Master’s 

assignment of a $30,000.00 annual earning capacity to Father. Father 

claims that the earning capacity attributed to him is inconsistent with his 

recent earnings history, education, training and income experience.

We address this issue mindful of the following standard of review:

When evaluating a support order, this Court may only 

reverse the trial court’s determination where the order cannot be 

sustained on any valid ground. We will not interfere with the 

broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the 

discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. 

An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in 

reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, 

or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either 

manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill will, discretion has been abused.

R.C. v. J.S., 957 A.2d 759, 761 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting Belcher v. 

Belcher, 887 A.2d 253 (Pa. Super. 2005)) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). A finding of an abuse of discretion is not lightly made but must be 

based only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. Christianson 

v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003).
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[T]he duty to support one’s child is absolute, and the 

purpose of child support is to promote the child’s best interests. 

The principal goal in child support matters is to serve the best 

interests of the child through provision of reasonable expenses. 

The duty of child support, as every other duty encompassed in 

the role of parenthood, is the equal responsibility of both mother 

and father. That duty is absolute.

R.C., 957 A.2d at 763 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

In Pennsylvania, an award of child support is based upon the Child 

Support Guidelines promulgated by our Supreme Court. The guidelines were 

enacted to ensure “that persons similarly situated shall be treated similarly.” 

23 Pa.C.S. § 4322(a). “In determining the . . . ability of the obligor to 

provide support, the guidelines shall place primary emphasis on the net 

incomes and earning capacities of the parties, with allowable deviations for 

unusual needs, extraordinary expenses and other factors, such as the 

parties’ assets, as warrant special attention.” Id.

A person’s earning capacity is defined not as the amount which the 

person could theoretically earn, but as that amount which the person could 

realistically earn under the circumstances, considering his or her age, health, 

mental and physical condition and training. Gephart v. Gephart, 764 A.2d 

613, 614-615 (Pa. Super. 2000). This Court has held that where a parent 

has not voluntarily reduced income to avoid more lucrative career 

opportunities, but has consistently performed a lower paying job from before 

the birth of a child, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in calculating 
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earning capacity based upon the lower paying job. Dennis v. Whitney, 844

A.2d 1267, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2004).

The trial court offered the following analysis pertinent to Father’s claim 

regarding the assignment of his earning capacity:

[Father] contends that the trial court erred in confirming the 

Master’s assignment of an earning capacity of $30,000 per year 

to [Father]. . . . The assessment of an earning capacity in 

support matters is governed by Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4), 

which provides that, “If the trier of fact determines that a party 

to a support action has willfully failed to obtain or maintain 

appropriate employment, the trier of fact may impute to that 

party an income equal to the party’s earning capacity.” The Rule 

further provides that the factors to be considered in determining 

an earning capacity are “age, education, training, health, work 

experience, earnings history and child care responsibilities.” Id.

In the instant case, the Master took special note in her 

Report of the fact that [Father] has been “unable to maintain 

long term employment in the various fields that he has 

experience since 2010.” (See Report of Master in Support for 

child support, p. 6), (“Report for child support”). Accordingly, 

the Master was not convinced “that [Father] is diligently working 

towards finding appropriate and consistent employment and 

instead is looking for opportunities that will afford him with large 

pay-outs, status or the ability to be his own boss.” (See Report 

for child support, p. 6).

Having made the determination that [Father] willfully 

failed to obtain appropriate employment, the Master next took 

into consideration the relevant factors pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 

1910.16-2(d)(4) in order to determine an earning capacity. 

Given that [Father] is thirty-nine years old and in good health, 

the Master took into consideration [Father’s] various jobs, the 

longest having lasted five or six years when he was employed in 

the mortgage finance industry in Arizona in 2003 (N.T.[, 

12/9/13,] at 74, 77-78), and his employment for an estate 

service as a contractor doing clean outs for one and one-half to 

two years. (See Report for child support, p. 5) (N.T. at 38-39). 

At the time of the hearing, [Father] had been employed as an 

independent contractor for a limousine service for six (6) weeks, 
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but had also interviewed for a job with a commercial lending 

institution and had been offered a sales management job. (See 

Report for child support, p. 5). The Master noted in her Report 

that when questioned about the job offer in sales management, 

[Father] did not know the name of the company or the salary 

range for the job. (See Report for child support, p. 5), (N.T. at 

74-76). The only income information provided by [Father] was 

his 2012 federal tax return which showed W-2 wages of $10,577 

while employed as an assistant to a real estate agent[.] (See 

Ex. H-2 to Report for child support), (N.T. at 71-72). The Master 

took note of the fact that [Father] stated that he had additional 

income in 2012 from his work with Dan Donohue Estate Service, 

but that this income was not reflected on his 2012 tax return as 

he was paid under the table on a cash basis. (Report for child 

support, p. 5), (N.T. at 57, 71-72). Based on the inconsistencies 

of [Father’s] testimony and the evidence of record of [Father’s] 

employment history, the Master arrived at an earning capacity 

assessment of $30,000 annually or $576.92 per week.

We find the Master’s determination that [Father] has 

willfully failed to obtain appropriate employment and the 

Master’s assessment of an earning capacity of $30,000 annually 

for [Father] to be supported by the record. The Master 

specifically determined that [Father] lacked credibility with 

regard to his willingness to seek employment commensurate 

with his job experience. This court will not disturb the credibility 

determination of the Master who had the opportunity to observe 

the demeanor of the parties and where the record provides 

ample support. Further, we find the earning capacity assessed 

by the Master to be within a range that [Father] could 

realistically earn as it is based on his past work experience. A 

review of the record of the Master’s hearing shows that [Father] 

earned $500 to $800 a week working in his past job for Dan 

Donohue Estate Services[.] (N.T. at 37). He testified that he 

had earned a total of $5,665.72 for a six week period at his 

current job as a limousine driver[.] (Id. at 61-62) (See also 

Exhibit H-1, Report for child support). In 2003, he had earned 

$5000 to $6000 per month working for Wells Fargo as a 

mortgage loan officer[.] (N.T. at 66-67). In spite of the fact 

that [Father] was less than candid about his past and current 

employment ventures, this Court finds that the Master did not 

err in her assessment of [Father’s] earning capacity.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/22/14, at 5-8.
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Our review of the certified record reflects ample support for the 

Master’s and the trial court’s ultimate determination of a $30,000.00 earning 

capacity for Father. Indeed, based upon Father’s previous earnings and 

work experience, the assignment of a $30,000.00 earning capacity to Father 

is conservative. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this 

regard. Accordingly, Father’s contrary claim lacks merit.

In his second issue, Father argues that the Master and the trial court 

erred in accepting, without sufficient documentation, Mother’s claim that she 

expends a total of $245.00 per week in childcare expense. Father further 

contends that Mother enrolled Child in daycare without consulting Father or 

obtaining his consent, alleging that family members could provide daycare 

for several days per week at no cost.

Again, we observe that our review is limited to ascertaining whether 

there is sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s order and whether 

there has been an abuse of discretion. Mooney v. Doutt, 766 A.2d 1271, 

1276 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citing Stredny v. Gray, 510 A.2d 359 (Pa. Super. 

1986)). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.16-6 addresses 

adjustments to support obligations and provides in relevant part as follows:

Rule 1910.16-6. Support Guidelines. Adjustments to the 

Basic Support Obligation. Allocation of Additional 

Expenses

Additional expenses permitted pursuant to this Rule 

1910.16-6 may be allocated between the parties even if the 

parties incomes do not justify an order of basic support.
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(a) Child care expenses. Reasonable child care 

expenses paid by either parent, if necessary to maintain 

employment or appropriate education and pursuit of income, 

shall be allocated between the parties in proportion to their net 

incomes and added to his and her basic support obligation.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(a).

Our review of the record reflects that Mother testified that she pays 

$245.00 per week in child care expenses. N.T., 12/9/13, at 14. In addition, 

Mother presented documentation from Son’s daycare service provider 

reflecting that tuition for a two-year-old child is $245.00 per week. Report 

of Master in Support, 4/4/14, at W-2 (Docket Entry 5). Thus, we conclude 

that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the determination 

of the weekly child care expense of $245.00, and that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in this regard.

Concerning Father’s allegation that the child care expense is 

unnecessary because Son’s grandmothers could provide child care for Son, 

and that Mother enrolled Son in daycare without consulting Father, our 

review of the record reflects otherwise. The record indicates that Son 

attended daycare prior to the parties’ separation. Specifically, the parties 

separated in February of 2013, and Son had been enrolled in daycare since 

August of 2012. N.T., 12/9/13, at 5, 152-153. The record further reveals 

that, although prior to August of 2012 the grandmothers did babysit Son for 

several days of the week, the task had become too difficult for the 

grandparents, and the decision was made by the parties prior to August of 
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2012 to enroll Son in a daycare program. Id. at 146-152. Therefore, we 

conclude that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the 

determination that the child care expense was necessary, and that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, Father’s challenge to the 

award of child care expenses lacks merit.

In his final issue, Father argues that the trial court and the Master 

erred in failing to deviate downward from the support guidelines based upon 

the parties’ actual living expenses. Father claims that Mother lacks 

household expenses because she lives with her parents, yet Father lives with 

his mother and expends a significant portion of his income towards their 

housing expenses.

In addressing this claim, we are cognizant that the overarching 

purpose of child support is to promote the child’s best interest. Arbet v. 

Arbet, 863 A.2d 34, 39 (Pa. Super. 2004). Moreover, the appropriate 

award for child support

shall be determined in accordance with the support guidelines 

which consist of the guidelines expressed as the child support 

schedule set forth in rule 1910.16-3, the formula set forth in 

1910.16-4 and the operation of the guidelines as set forth in 

these rules.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1(b). The child support schedule provides a table 

indicating the appropriate amount of support depending upon the parties’ 

combined income and the number of children. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-3. The 
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formula establishes what percentage of the total support determined from 

the schedule for which each party will be responsible. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4.

The guidelines were established to bring more predictability to 

discretionary aspects of child support determinations:

[T]he support guidelines are the Legislature’s response to the 

Federal Government’s mandate that States establish mandatory 

guidelines for determining child support. See Introduction to the 

1998 Explanatory Comment, Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1, 42 Pa.C.S.A.; 

42 U.S.C. § 667(a). This statute replaced a discretionary system 

and was enacted to create greater uniformity, predictability and 

equity in determining child support awards, while at the same 

time maintaining a degree of judicial discretion necessary to 

address unique circumstances. See Explanatory Comment-1998 

to Rule 1910.16-1 (stating purpose of guidelines is to promote 

“(1) similar treatment of persons similarly situated, (2) a more 

equitable distribution of the financial responsibility for raising 

children, (3) settlement of support matters without court 

involvement, and (4) more efficient hearings where they are 

necessary.”)

L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 879 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citing Colonna v. 

Colonna, 788 A.2d 430 (Pa. Super. 2001)). Further, the guidelines are 

presumed to be correct, as evidenced by the following:

(d) Rebuttable Presumption. If it has been determined that 

there is an obligation to pay support, there shall be a rebuttable 

presumption that the amount of the award determined from the 

guidelines is the correct amount of support to be awarded. The 

support guidelines are a rebuttable presumption and must be 

applied taking into consideration the special needs and 

obligations of the parties. The trier of fact must consider the 

factors set forth in Rule 1910.16-5. The presumption shall be 

rebutted if the trier of fact makes a written finding, or a specific 

finding on the record, that an award in the amount determined 

from the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate.
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Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1(d). Thus, the support determined under the guidelines 

is a rebuttable presumption, from which the trier of fact may deviate under 

certain circumstances. Arbet, 863 A.2d at 42.

“As these rules and the prevailing case law make clear, a court 

generally has reasonable discretion to deviate from the guidelines if the 

record supports the deviation.” Silver v. Pinskey, 981 A.2d 284, 296 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (citing Ricco v. Novitski, 874 A.2d 75 (Pa. Super. 2005)). As 

we stated previously, “In determining the . . . ability of the obligor to 

provide support, the guidelines shall place primary emphasis on the net 

incomes and earning capacities of the parties, with allowable deviations for 

unusual needs, extraordinary expenses and other factors, such as 

the parties’ assets, as warrant special attention.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 4322(a) (emphasis added).

Regarding deviation, Pa.R.C.P. 1910-5 provides as follows:

(a) Deviation. If the amount of support deviates from the 

amount of support determined by the guidelines, the trier of fact 

shall specify, in writing or on the record, the guideline amount of 

support, and the reasons for, and findings of fact justifying, the 

amount of deviation.

(b) Factors. In deciding whether to deviate from the amount of 

support determined by the guidelines, the trier of fact shall 

consider:

(1) unusual needs and unusual fixed obligations;

(2) other support obligations of the parties;

(3) other income in the household;
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(4) ages of the children;

(5) the relative assets and liabilities of the parties;

(6) medical expenses not covered by insurance;

(7) standard of living of the parties and their 

children;

(8) in a spousal support or alimony pendent lite 

case, the duration of the marriage from the 

date of marriage to the date of final 

separation; and

(9) other relevant and appropriate factors, 

including the best interests of the child or 

children.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910-5.

In addressing Father’s claim that a downward deviation of his support 

obligation was required and concluding that the requested deviation was not 

appropriate, the trial court offered the following analysis:

[Father] . . . avers that both the trial court and the Master 

erred in failing to consider that while [Father] pays rent for an 

apartment and cares for his elderly mother who resides with 

him, [Mother] lives with her parents and has no housing or utility 

expenses. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5 sets forth the factors allowing 

for deviation from the presumptive amount under the support 

guidelines. The Master properly determined that [Father’s] 

expenses and debts are not so unusual or extraordinary as to 

warrant a deviation from the guidelines. (See Report for child 

support, p. 6). During the Master’s hearing, [Father] testified 

that his Mother lives with him and contributes to the monthly 

rent of $930 and that his portion of the monthly rent is $400-

$500. (N.T. at 42). [Father] further testified that his total 

monthly household expenditures are approximately $800. (Id. 

at 42-43). In addition, [Father] testified that he had no debts or 

obligations other than a private loan in the amount of $8,663 

towards which he makes payments when he can afford to [pay]. 
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(Id. at 43-44). Based on the testimony and evidence of record, 

we concur with the Master’s finding.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/22/14, at 8-9.

Our review of the record reflects ample support for the trial court’s 

determination that Father failed to rebut the presumption that the guideline 

amounts were appropriate. Indeed, Father’s own testimony before the 

Master indicated that at the time of the hearing he was living in an 

apartment with his mother and they shared living expenses. N.T., 12/9/13, 

at 42. The only residents of the household were Father and his mother. Id. 

When asked how much he was contributing toward the household, Father 

replied:

Ah, I’m paying – let’s see – the rent is 930, I’m paying about 

four to five of that, plus electric, cable – ah – so, I’m probably 

spending, roughly, about six hundred a month.

Id. Father then offered the following clarification of his household expenses:

[FATHER]: Oh – oh, excuse me, a question, am I supposed to 

include food and everything like that, ma’am?

THE MASTER: Yes.

[FATHER]: Oh, yeah, I take care of all the groceries and 

everything else in the household, so then, that would take it up, 

probably, close to – I’d say, probably eight – all the prescriptions 

– all everything.

My mother doesn’t have very much and my father just 

passed away in June and I’m trying to catch up on everything 

and so, she’s my responsibility as well as all my other ones.

Id. at 42-43. Thus, Father offered testimony that his contribution for 

household expenses was approximately $800.00 per month. Father also 
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indicated that he has no other children under the age of eighteen, has no 

credit card debt, and has no student loans. Id. at 43. In addition, Father 

testified that he has an obligation in the form of a private loan in the amount 

of $8,663.00, and he makes payments on the loan based upon what he can 

afford to pay. Id. at 44. In light of this testimony presented by Father, we 

cannot conclude that his stated monthly expenses amount to unusual needs 

or extraordinary expenses such that they would rebut the presumption that 

the support guidelines are applicable. Likewise, Father has not established 

that other factors, such as the parties’ assets, would warrant special 

attention. Hence, it is our determination that the trial court did not err in 

refusing to deviate downward from the support guidelines in this matter. 

Accordingly, Father’s contrary claim fails.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/31/2015