UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER SCRUGGS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 3:13-CV-815 JD

v. )

)

CAPT. PAYEN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Christopher Scruggs, a pro se prisoner, filed a motion seeking emergency medical attention

which was used to open this new civil rights lawsuit. This one page document states that he has been

on a hunger strike since July 23, 2013, and that his left leg has turned blue. He states that he is

unable to obtain medical attention and asks for emergency injunctive relief. 

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers

. . ..” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this court must

review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. “In order to state a claim

under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants deprived him of a federal

constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469

F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). 

In medical cases, the Constitution is violated only when a defendant was deliberately

indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir.

1997). A medical need is serious if it is one that a physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment,

or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention, and if untreated could result in further significant injury or unnecessary pain, and that

significantly affects the person’s daily activities or features chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez

v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). “[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the

official has acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have

known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to

prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham,

394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Though

prisoners are “not entitled to demand specific care [nor] entitled to the best care possible” Forbes

v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir.1997), the Eighth Amendment requires that they receive

adequate treatment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Here, Scruggs alleges that

he has been told that he will die before he can obtain medical attention. Though he does not say who

said this nor when, giving him the benefit of the inferences to which he is entitled at the pleading

stage of this proceeding, he has stated a claim. 

Scruggs names three defendants: Capt. Payen, Medical, and IDOC/WCU. Though Medical

and IDOC/WCU must be dismissed, neither are necessary to his injunctive relief claim. Medical is

a department within IDOC/WCU, which is the prison where Scruggs is housed. Though the Eleventh

Amendment permits injunctive relief claims against state officials (such as Capt. Payen), it prohibits

lawsuits against a State and its agencies. See Idaho v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269

(1997). 

Given that Scruggs has titled his motion as one for emergency medical attention, the court

construes his request as one for both immediate as well as permanent injunctive relief. A temporary

restraining order without notice is an exceptional remedy. Both our adversarial system of justice and

simple notions of fairness require that a defendant generally be notified and afforded the opportunity

to respond before being enjoined. As the Supreme Court of the United States has made clear, 

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Ex parte temporary restraining orders are no doubt necessary in certain

circumstances, but under federal law they should be restricted to serving their

underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just

so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974) (citations

omitted). Moreover, “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy; it is never

awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-690 (2008)(quotation marks and citations

omitted). 

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely

to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence

of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an

injunction is in the public interest. 

Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “These considerations are interdependent: the greater

the likelihood of success on the merits, the less net harm the injunction must prevent in order for

preliminary relief to be warranted.” Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010). 

In each case, courts must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider

the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief. In

exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for

the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.

Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, it is not entirely clear what medical attention Scruggs needs. He states that he is on a

hunger strike, which is a self imposed condition, albeit one that prison officials are not permitted to

ignore. See Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2006) (“It does not follow from anything

we have said, however, that a prison can allow a prisoner to starve himself to death, or even starve

himself to the point at which he seriously impairs his health . . ..”) He also states that his left leg has

turned blue. 

Certainly there are significant equitable and public policy concerns which weigh against

issuing an injunction based on only the assertions of an inmate who could easily exaggerate his

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condition. Even if misrepresentations are not intentional, it is still not “for the limited competence

of federal judges to micromanage prisons.” Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1988). 

Federal judges must always be circumspect in imposing their ideas about civilized

and effective prison administration on state prison officials. The Constitution does

not speak with precision to the issue of prison conditions (that is an understatement);

federal judges know little about the management of prisons; managerial judgments

generally are the province of other branches of government than the judicial; and it

is unseemly for federal courts to tell a state how to run its prison system.

Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 976-77 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). It

would not be reasonable for a doctor, much less a federal judge, to dictate specific medical treatment

based only the one sentence description of a blue leg. However, given the nature of the claim, it is

not unreasonable to require that a prison doctor promptly examine Scruggs left leg and provide

whatever emergency medical treatment is deemed appropriate within the doctor’s professional

judgment – then to promptly report the medical findings to the court. 

Several other items also need to be noted. First, Scruggs has not yet filed a complaint.

Therefore the clerk will send him a complaint form so that he can fully set forth his claims. Second,

it is unclear whether Scruggs exhausted his administrative remedies before he filed this lawsuit. 

Exhaustion is explicitly required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a), and there is no exception for prisoners who allege “imminent danger” in

order to be excused from having to pay the entire filing fee at the time the suit is

brought. Imminent danger excuses only that, and not the duty to exhaust as well.

Fletcher v. Menard Corr. Ctr., 623 F.3d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Third,

though Scruggs named Capt. Payen, it seem likely that he may have meant Captain Payne. Because

of this possibility, the court will order service on either Captain Payen or Payne at the Westville

Control Unit. Finally, because of the possible medical urgency involved here, a copy of this order

will be faxed to the Superintendent of the Westville Correctional Facility and the Indiana Attorney

General. Given that notice, it is hoped that counsel will promptly enter an appearance and waive

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service, thereby avoiding unneeded expense and delay. However, if necessary, the court will order

the United States Marshals Service personally serve Captain Payen or Payne. 

For the foregoing reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS Christopher Scruggs leave to proceed against Captain Payen or Payne in his

official capacity for injunctive relief to obtain medical treatment for his left leg; 

(2) DISMISSES Medical and IDOC/WCU;

(3) DIRECTS the clerk to place this cause number on a blank Prisoner Complaint 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 form and send it to Christopher Scruggs;

(4) GRANTS Christopher Scruggs until September 5, 2013, to file an amended complaint;

(5) DIRECTS the clerk to fax a copy of this order and the motion (DE 1) to the

Superintendent of the Westville Correctional Facility and the Indiana Attorney General; and

(6) ORDERS Captain Payen or Payne to enter an appearance by August 9, 2013, to have a

doctor promptly examine Christopher Scruggs’ left leg and provide whatever emergency medical

treatment is deemed appropriate within the doctor’s professional judgment, and to file a medical

report by August 15, 2013. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: August 7, 2013 

 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

Judge

United States District Court

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