UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

JAMES A. ESLICK and SHARON K. ESLICK, 

 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. Case No. 3:13-CV-740 JVB-CAN 

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 On July 24, 2013, Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, filed a confusing complaint1

 against 

Defendants,2 essentially alleging wrongful foreclosure of their home. Since then, all Defendants 

have either filed or joined motions to dismiss due to numerous problems with the complaint. As 

a result, three motions to dismiss are now before the Court. (DE 31, 65, 67.) After carefully 

 

1

 The complaint is difficult to decipher for a number of reasons. For example, the caption begins by stating 

“ACTION OF TRESPASS, AND TRESPASS ON THE CASE.” The text of the complaint is single-spaced and 

italicized and bolded in certain areas. The complaint references persons not named as parties, and cites entire 

portions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Furthermore, the complaint refers to statements by professors discussing 

and interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code. Most problematic, however, the complaint fails to clearly allege 

any facts that would permit this Court to conclude that it has jurisdiction to hear this case. 

2

 The named defendants in this case include: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the company that foreclosed on Plaintiffs’ 

mortgage; LaPorte County Superior Court Judge Richard Stalbrink, who presided over the foreclosure action; the 

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; the law firm of Unterburg & Associates, which represented Wells Fargo 

in the foreclosure action; attorneys Brian Berger and Kristin Durianski, who worked for Unterburg & Associates; 

Josh Weidermann, a Wells Fargo employee who submitted an affidavit in the state court action attesting to the 

Eslicks’ default and the amount owed; and Shawn and Jennifer Fuller, who currently own the Eslicks’ former 

residence. 
2 

reviewing the record, the Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint.3

Accordingly, the complaint is DISMISSED. 

A. Background 

 Plaintiffs bought a house in Wanatah, Indiana, in 1997, using funds that were borrowed 

from First Union Home Equity Bank, N.A.4 (DE 1-1, at 3.) At the time of purchase, Plaintiffs 

signed a promissory note that was secured with a mortgage on the property. (Id.) Plaintiffs 

defaulted on the note in 2009. (Id.) In June 2010, Wells Fargo filed a complaint in the LaPorte 

County Superior Court to foreclose on the mortgage. (Id.) Judge Richard Stalbrink entered 

summary judgment against Plaintiffs in April 2011, granted an in rem judgment to Wells Fargo 

against Plaintiffs’ home, and foreclosed the mortgage. (Id. at 4.) As a result of the foreclosure, 

the property was sold in December 2011, and Plaintiffs left the property in February 2012. (DE1, 

¶¶ 16–17.) 

In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he Judgment signed on April 18, 2010,5

 is a 

void judgment” (DE 1, ¶ 47), that they continue to own the property, and that Wells Fargo “is 

administrating [the] property without any right and without [their] consent.” (Id. ¶ 48.) The 

alleged basis for this claim is an IRS Form 1099A that Plaintiffs received in 2011, identifying the 

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation as a lender with an interest in the property. (Id. ¶¶ 

 

3

 The Court has reviewed all the filings in this case, including Plaintiffs’ November 15, 2013, motion (DE 87.) 

This motion is similar to the earlier filings, as it continues to challenge the state court’s jurisdiction over the 

foreclosure action. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiffs asset that this Court is a “common law” court, and therefore, the 

statutory constraints on this Court’s original jurisdiction do not apply. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ 

counsel is unauthorized to practice law in Indiana—a meritless argument, as a check of the Indiana Roll of 

Attorneys reveals that Mr. Carl Greci is a licensed Indiana attorney in good standing with the bar. 

4

 First Union Home Equity Bank, N.A. later merged into Wachovia Bank of Deleware, N.A., and ultimately into 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (DE 1-1, at 5.) 

5

 This date is incorrect. Judge Stalbrink signed the judgment on April 18, 2011. (DE 1-2, at 5.) 
3 

18–19.) From this document, Plaintiffs infer that Freddie Mac had acquired the promissory note 

prior to the foreclosure suit, and therefore, Wells Fargo was no longer entitled to enforce the 

note. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 26–27, 46.) According to Plaintiffs, this means that the affidavits in support of 

the foreclosure judgment, which attested to the fact that Wells Fargo held the note, were 

fraudulent. (Id. ¶¶ 23–25.) Plaintiffs allege that they have been injured by this fraud and seek 

damages resulting from the foreclosure action, as well as to have the mortgage and promissory 

note declared void. (Id. ¶¶ 152–162.) 

B. Standard of Review 

 Federal law provides district courts original jurisdiction over claims in limited situations. 

“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must 

dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Unlike other defenses, subject matter jurisdiction 

cannot be waived or forfeited. Moore v. Olson, 368 F.3d 757, 759 (7th Cir. 2004). A court is 

required to dismiss the action if it finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of 

whether a party files a motion. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). The party 

asserting federal jurisdiction has the burden of proving its existence. Golemine, Inc. v. Town of 

Merrillville, Ind., 652 F. Supp. 2d 977, 981 (N.D. Ind. 2009). Moreover, “[a] federal court must 

presume that it lacks jurisdiction unless the record affirmatively indicates that it in fact has 

jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
4 

C. Analysis

In their motions to dismiss, Defendants point out several flaws present in Plaintiffs’ 

complaint. As an initial matter, however, Defendants note that the claims alleged by Plaintiffs all 

arise out of the earlier state foreclosure action, which raises serious jurisdictional concerns. 

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts do not have subject matter 

jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments. Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 

182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 

(1923); D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–86 (1983)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

is jurisdictional in nature and its applicability must be determined before considering any 

alternative arguments. Long, 182 F.3d at 554–55; see also Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 

(7th Cir. 1996) (“Where Rooker-Feldman applies, lower federal courts have no power to address 

other affirmative defenses, including res judicata.”). In applying Rooker-Feldman, the primary 

question is “whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court 

judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.” Garry, 82 F.3d at 1365. “If the injury alleged 

resulted from the state court judgment itself, Rooker-Feldman directs that the lower federal 

courts lack jurisdiction.” Id.

 In this case, Plaintiffs are asking the federal district court to review the state judicial 

proceeding and have not asserted any independent basis for federal jurisdiction. This is the type 

of claim expressly barred by Rooker-Feldman. Therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction. 

Plaintiffs must pursue further relief in the Indiana state court system and not in the federal 

district courts. 
5 

D. Conclusion 

 This Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ complaint. Accordingly, the 

complaint is DISMISSED. 

SO ORDERED on December 12, 2013. 

 /s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen 

 JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE