UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JAMES STONE, )

)

Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) Case No. 3:13-CV-853 JD

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

James Stone, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. (DE 1.) In ISP #13-02-0117, Stone was found

guilty of unauthorized possession of a cell phone. (DE 8-3 at 1.) The charge was initiated on

February 12, 2013, when Correctional Officer R. Westman prepared a conduct report stating as

follows:

On 2-12-13 at approx. 1:00 pm Ofc Wilson and myself Ofc Westman conducted a

shakedown of Offender Stone DOC # 865454 cell A221. During the shakedown I

found a LG cell phone under the sink in a plastic bag. I confiscated the phone and

turned it into IA. Other items confiscated were an extra gray box, black material

sheets, multiple pieces of wood. Photos were taken.

(DE 8-1 at 1.) Photographs of the phone and the area where it was found were included with the

conduct report. (Id. at 4-6.) On the same date, Correctional Officer K. Wilson provided the

following witness statement:

On 2-12-13 at approx 1300 I Ofc. Wilson and Ofc R. Westman went to a cell house

to conduct a standard cell search of ACH 221 (where Off Stones lives #865454).

While searching his cell we found a LG cell phone under his sink.

(Id. at 3.)
On February 14, 2013, Stone was formally notified of the charge and given a copy of the

conduct report. (DE 8-1 at 1; DE 8-2.) He pled not guilty and requested a lay advocate. (DE 8-2.)

As witnesses he requested Lieutenant T. Gordon, Sergeant McNeal (first name unknown) and

Ms. Roberts (first name unknown), all of whom could attest that he regularly used the house

phone in his cell block. (Id.) As physical evidence, he requested that prison staff “run numbers”

on the phone to show that none of the calls were made to his family or friends. (Id.)

On February 19, 2013, a hearing was held on the charge. (DE 8-3 at 1.) A statement from

Roberts was submitted, and she confirmed that Stone regularly used the house phone.1 (DE 1-1

at 7.) The hearing officer denied the requests for statements from Lieutenant Gordon and

Sergeant McNeal, finding that they would be duplicative. (DE 8-3 at 1.) The hearing officer also

denied Stone’s request for call records on the phone, finding that this evidence was irrelevant,

since Stone was charged with unauthorized possession of the phone, and it did not matter

whether he had actually used it. (Id. at 1-2.) In his defense, Stone stated that he did not know the

phone was under his sink.2

 (Id. at 1.) He also submitted a statement from Officer J. Nowacyzk,

his supervisor at his prison job, who stated that Stone had been an exemplary worker. (DE 8-1 at

7.) Officer Nowacyzk asked the hearing officer to consider imposing a punishment other than the

loss of his prison job. (Id.) Based on the evidence, the hearing officer found Stone guilty. (Id.)

1 For unknown reasons, the statement from Roberts was not included with the return; however, it was

submitted by Stone along with his petition. (DE 1-1 at 7.) The court trusts that the respondent will take greater care

in submitting the full and complete administrative record in future cases. However, there is no harm here since it is

undisputed that Roberts submitted a statement and that it was considered by the hearing officer in reaching her

decision. (See DE 8-3 at 1.)

2 He also submitted a written statement in which he asserted that if he had known the phone was under the

sink, “I surely would have sold it, to help out with my attorney fees.” (DE 8-1 at 8.)

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He lost 30 days of earned-time credits and lost phone privileges for 30 days. (DE 8-3 at 1.) His

administrative appeals were denied (DE 8-4 to 8-5), and he thereafter filed this petition.

 When a due process liberty interest is at stake in prison disciplinary hearings, the

Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prisoners certain procedural due process protections: (1)

advance written notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial

decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in

defense when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written

statement by the fact-finder of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be “some

evidence” in the record to support the disciplinary decision. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). 

In claims one and two, Stone argues that he was denied exculpatory evidence. A prisoner

has a limited right to present witnesses and evidence in his defense consistent with correctional

goals and safety. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. A hearing officer has considerable discretion with

respect to witness and evidence requests, and may deny requests that threaten institutional safety

or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003).

Furthermore, due process only requires access to witnesses and evidence that are exculpatory.

See Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). “Exculpatory” in this context

means evidence that “directly undermines the reliability of the evidence in the record pointing to

[the prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996). The denial of the

right to present evidence will be considered harmless, unless the prisoner shows that the

evidence could have aided his defense. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011). 

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Here, Stone requested statements from three witnesses to attest that he regularly used the

house phone in his cell block. (DE 8-2.) A statement was obtained from one of the witnesses,

Roberts, and she attested that Stone regularly used the house phone. (DE 1-1 at 7; DE 8-3 at 1.)

The hearing officer reasonably deemed the other two statements duplicative. Stone has not

explained how these witnesses would have provided any additional or different information than

what Roberts provided. Furthermore, additional statements showing that Stone regularly used the

house phone would not have exculpated him from the charge. Stone was charged with possession

of a cell phone. Whether he actually used the cell phone or some other phone to call his family

members was irrelevant. See Meeks, 81 F.3d at 721 (evidence is exculpatory only if it directly

undermines the evidence of guilt); Jones, 637 F.3d at 847 (no due process violation where

excluded witness would not have exculpated the petitioner from the charge). 

In a similar vein, Stone argues that the hearing officer should have gotten the call records

from the phone and cross-referenced them with those of his family and friends. The hearing

officer reasonably determined that this evidence was irrelevant. (DE 8-3 at 2.) Again, the issue

before the hearing officer was whether Stone was in possession of the phone. Whether he

actually used the phone to call his family and friends was not relevant. See Meeks, 81 F.3d at

721. As the hearing officer noted, Stone would be guilty of unauthorized possession of the phone

even if he was holding it for someone else. (See DE 8-3 at 2.) Therefore, Stone has not

established a violation of his due process rights. 

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Stone next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.3

 In assessing the sufficiency of the

evidence in the prison disciplinary context, the relevant standard is whether there is “some

evidence” to support the guilty finding. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. The court will not “conduct an

examination of the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence,

but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits

has some factual basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). A guilty

finding can be overturned for insufficient evidence only if “no reasonable adjudicator could have

found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence presented.” Henderson v.

United States Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, a hearing

officer is permitted to rely on circumstantial evidence to establish guilt. See Hamilton v.

O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1992).

Here, two officers reported that they found a cell phone in Stone’s cell under the sink.

Stone counters that he could not be found guilty because there was no direct evidence that he

used the phone or that it belonged to him. However, as discussed above, Stone was found guilty

of possessing a cell phone, not using or owning a phone. Furthermore, there is sufficient

evidence of constructive possession in this case. See Hamilton, 976 F.2d at 345-46 (evidence of

constructive possession was sufficient, since contraband was found in a location where only the

petitioner and three other inmates had access to it); see also Pigg v. Finnan, 289 Fed. Appx. 945,

947 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 2008) (“When only a few inmates have access to the place contraband is

3 He labels this claim as “Denial of Copy of Written Facts Found,” but it is clear from his supporting facts

that he is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. He argues that the “[r]ecord lacked any evidence that

supported Petitioner Stone was found using the phone, and no witness statements or physical evidence was presented

claiming to have actually found Petitioner in possession of the phone.” (DE 1 at 2.)

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found, constructive possession is ‘some evidence’ sufficient to sustain a disciplinary

conviction.”). 

Stone argues that the phone might have been left there by the prior occupant, who lived

there approximately five months earlier. This remote possibility does not render the evidence

constitutionally deficient. To be adequate, the evidence need not point to only one logical

conclusion; the issue is whether there is some evidence to support the determination made by the

hearing officer, and that standard is satisfied. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 (due process is satisfied

as long as “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board

were without support or otherwise arbitrary”); Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir.

2002) (witness statement constituted some evidence); McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (conduct

report alone provided some evidence to support disciplinary determination). Accordingly, this

claim is denied.

Next, Stone asserts that he was denied an impartial decisionmaker. In the prison

disciplinary context, adjudicators are “entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity,” and

“the constitutional standard for improper bias is high.” Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. Due process

prohibits a prison official who was substantially involved in the underlying incident from acting

as a decision-maker in the case. Id. However, due process is not violated simply because the

hearing officer knew the inmate, presided over a prior disciplinary case, or had some limited

involvement in the events underlying the charge. Id. 

Stone does not argue, nor is there any evidence in the record to suggest, that the hearing

officer was involved in any way in the events underlying the charge. Instead, he suggests that she

was biased because she improperly excluded his requested evidence. The exclusion of Stone’s

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evidence was considered above and, for the reasons stated, the court found nothing improper

about the hearing officer’s actions. To the extent Stone is arguing the hearing officer was biased

because she rejected his proffered defense, it was the hearing officer’s job to weigh the relative

credibility of the evidence. Her adverse ruling does not establish impermissible bias. See Liteky

v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994). Accordingly, this claim is denied.

Stone may also be claiming that the hearing officer’s written statement was inadequate.

Due process requires that an inmate subject to disciplinary action be provided with a written

statement “as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Wolff, 418

U.S. at 564-65. The written statement requirement “is not onerous,” however, and to satisfy due

process “[t]he statement need only illuminate the evidentiary basis and reasoning behind the

decision.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 940 (7th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, “the kind of

statements that will satisfy the constitutional minimum will vary from case to case depending on

the severity of the charges and the complexity of the factual circumstances and proof offered by

both sides.” Culbert v. Young, 834 F.2d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 1987).

This case did not involve complex factual or legal issues. The sole issue was whether

Stone was in possession of a cell phone. The hearing officer’s statement was brief, but it

adequately set forth the evidentiary basis for her decision and her reasoning, namely, that she

believed Stone to be responsible for the phone found in his cell. (DE 8-3 at 1-2.) In reaching this

determination, she obviously chose to disbelieve Stone’s claim that he did not know the phone

was there. “As there is no mystery about [the hearing officer’s] reasoning process,” her statement

was constitutionally adequate. Saenz v. Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987) (statement

was sufficient where it indicated reliance on officer’s statement, since it was clear the

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disciplinary board believed the officer and disbelieved the inmate); see also Culbert, 834 F.2d at

631 (brief statement was sufficient where the only issue to be decided was the relative credibility

of witness accounts, and it was clear whose account the disciplinary board had credited).

Accordingly, this claim is denied.

Finally, Stone asserts violations of Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”) policies.

Even if IDOC rules were violated, however, this would not entitle him to federal habeas relief.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (habeas relief is only available for a violation of

the U.S. Constitution or other federal laws); Hester v. McBride, 966 F. Supp. 765, 775 (N.D. Ind.

1997) (violation of IDOC policy in disciplinary proceeding could not support grant of habeas

relief, since federal habeas court “does not sit to correct any errors of state law”).

For these reasons, the petition (DE 1) is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: April 11, 2014 

 /s/ JON E. DEGUILIO 

Judge

United States District Court

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