UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

 

BILL SNIDER, ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CAUSE NO.: 3:16-CV-149-TLS 

 ) 

SUPERINTENDENT, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER

 Bill Snider, a pro se prisoner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] 

challenging his conviction and 60-year sentence on May 11, 2004, in the St. Joseph County 

Superior Court under cause number 71D02-0205-FA-0028 for child molestation. The 

Respondent argues that the Petition must be dismissed because the claims are procedurally 

defaulted. 

BACKGROUND

 In May 2002, Snider was charged with child molesting. Ultimately, he was convicted by 

a jury in March 2004. On direct appeal, Snider challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The 

Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence, and Snider did not seek transfer 

to the Indiana Supreme Court. 

 On November 7, 2005, Snider filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which he later 

amended. On June 23, 2011, Snider filed a Federal Habeas Petition [ECF No. 5-6] in the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, claiming inordinate delay in the state 

post-conviction proceedings. On February 13, 2014, the state trial court held an evidentiary 

hearing and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law denying his post-conviction petition. 
2 

On September 2, 2014, Snider’s Federal Habeas Petition in the Southern District of Indiana was 

dismissed without prejudice because the post-conviction court ruled on his state post-conviction 

petition. 

 Snider appealed the denial of post-conviction relief, but the Indiana Court of Appeals 

affirmed the post-conviction court. Snider unsuccessfully petitioned the Indiana Court of 

Appeals for a rehearing. Snider did not seek transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court. On March 

14, 2016, Snider filed this Petition, claiming: (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him; 

(2) his appellate counsel was ineffective; and (3) there were numerous errors in the postconviction court’s proceedings. 

ANALYSIS

 The Respondent argues that Snider’s Petition should be dismissed because the claims are 

procedurally defaulted. “To avoid procedural default, a habeas petitioner must fully and fairly 

present his federal claims to the state courts.” Anderson v. Benik, 471 F.3d 811, 814–15 (7th Cir. 

2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Inherent in the habeas petitioner’s obligation to exhaust his state court remedies 

before seeking relief in habeas corpus is the duty to fairly present his federal 

claims to the state courts. Only if the state courts have had the first opportunity to 

hear the claim sought to be vindicated in the federal habeas proceeding does it 

make sense to speak of the exhaustion of state remedies. Fair presentment in turn 

requires the petitioner to assert his federal claim through one complete round of 

state-court review, either on direct appeal of his conviction or in post-conviction 

proceedings. This means that the petitioner must raise the issue at each and every 

level in the state court system, including levels at which review is discretionary 

rather than mandatory. 

Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025–1026 (7th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 
3 

 State court records show that Snider did not file a petition to transfer to the Indiana 

Supreme Court after his direct appeal or after appeal from the denial of his post-conviction 

proceedings. (See Appellate Case History Direct Appeal, ECF No. 5-2; Appellate Case History 

PCR, ECF No. 5-8.) Because Snider never raised any of his issues to the Indiana Supreme Court 

his claims are procedurally defaulted. 

 Nowhere in his Petition or accompanying 50-page Memorandum [ECF No. 1-1] does 

Snider address or acknowledge his procedural default. In his Traverse [ECF No. 18], Snider 

presents two arguments to excuse his procedural default. First, Snider argues that he is innocent. 

Procedural default can be excused “if the petitioner can . . . demonstrate that the district court’s 

failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Richardson v. 

Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 272 (7th Cir. 2014). In order to demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice, the petitioner must prove that “a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of 

one who is actually innocent of the crime.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). “[T]enable 

actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare: A petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement 

unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” McQuiggin v. 

Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A petitioner who 

asserts actual innocence “must demonstrate innocence; the burden is his, not the state’s . . . .” 

Buie v. McAdory, 341 F.3d 623, 626–27 (7th Cir. 2003). To do so, he must come forward “with 

new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 324 (1995). 
4 

 Here, Snider has not provided any new evidence. He merely argues that the evidence 

presented at trial was insufficient to prove that his victim was under the age of 14. This alone 

precludes finding that he has demonstrated actual innocence. Moreover, his insufficiency of the 

evidence argument is meritless because there was ample evidence presented during his trial 

which demonstrated that his victim was under 14. 

In 2001, Snider was renting a room in J.K.’s three bedroom house in South Bend, 

Indiana. J.K. also rented out a room to F.L. and F.L.’s minor daughter, B.A., born 

on July 19, 1989. During that time, J.K. resided with her daughter, M.W., and 

M.W.’s minor daughter, M.C., born on September 2, 1987. The record shows that 

M.W. and M.C. moved out of J.K.’s house but would frequently visit. For the 

times that M.C. was at J.K.’s house for a visit, she would spend time with B.A., 

and they became friends. 

According to M.W., in the spring of 2001, whenever she and M.C. visited J.K. in 

her Sound (sic) Bend home, she observed B.A. spending a significant amount of 

time in Snider’s room, both with the door open and closed. M.C. would often join 

B.A. and Snider in the room, but M.W. made sure the door was open at all times. 

In the summer of 2001, B.A.’s and M.C.’s relationship with Snider became 

sexual. Snider kissed B.A. and he also began touching her breasts and vagina, 

both over and under her clothes. Snider also performed oral sex on B.A., and B.A. 

discovered that Snider was not circumcised. These events partly occurred in 

Snider’s room, and in R.M.’s—Snider’s girlfriend—apartment in Mishawaka, 

Indiana. M.C. was often present when these events occurred. On one afternoon in 

his room at J.K.’s house, Snider performed oral sex on M.C. in front of B.A. In 

addition, M.C. performed oral sex on Snider after watching Snider perform oral 

sex on B.A. M.C. also fondled Snider’s penis until he ejaculated. When B.A. left 

the room, Snider threatened to kill M.C. if she disclosed to anyone what had 

transpired. 

After a 4th of July party at R.M.’s apartment, R.M. observed Snider kiss B.A. and 

also slap B.A. on her buttocks. R.M. informed Snider that she had seen him, and 

she reprimanded him for his inappropriate conduct with B.A. Snider responded by 

stating that it had been ongoing. On another occasion that summer, B.A. and M.C. 

went to R.M.’s apartment. R.M., at Snider’s directive, instructed B.A. and M.C. to 

put on lingerie. Once the girls were dressed, Snider performed oral sex on B.A. 

Snider then asked R.M. to perform oral sex on him, which she did. Snider also 

performed oral sex on M.C. Snider then asked B.A. to have intercourse, but B.A. 

refused. At some point, M.C. became uncomfortable and she tried calling for a 

ride home. Both Snider and R.M. seized the phone from M.C. and hid it. M.C. 

spent the night at R.M.’s apartment. 
5 

In the fall of 2001, B.A. moved to Elkhart, Indiana but soon returned to South 

Bend and her sexual relationship with Snider resumed. Snider continued to 

engage in oral sex with B.A. and Snider promised B.A. that he was going to 

marry her. In April of 2002, B.A. confided in F.L. about being molested by 

Snider. As a concerned mother, F.L. called M.W. and advised her to talk to M.C. 

When M.W. questioned M.C., M.C. began crying and said, “I don’t want to tell 

you.” (Tr. 481) The following day, M.W. contacted police. 

Snider v. State, No. 71D02-0511-PC-42, slip op. at *2–4 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2015).

 Second, without explanation, he claims that the Court should excuse his procedural 

default because the issues in his petition “consist of fundamental constitutional errors.” (Traverse 

2, ECF No. 18.) The simple fact that the issues Snider raises are constitutional in nature does not 

excuse his procedural default. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999). Instead, there are 

two ways a habeas petitioner can overcome a procedural default. As discussed above, a petitioner 

can do so by establishing that the court’s refusal to consider a defaulted claim would result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006). But the Court has 

already determined that no such result would exist here. Second, a petitioner can also overcome a 

procedural default by showing both cause for failing to abide by state procedural rules and a 

resulting prejudice. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977). Cause sufficient to excuse a 

procedural default is defined as “some objective factor external to the defense” which prevented 

the petitioner from pursuing a constitutional claim in state court. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 488 (1986). Here, Snider does not even attempt to argue cause or prejudice. Because Snider 

has not offered any meritorious basis for excusing his procedural default his claims cannot be 

reached on the merits. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

 Finally, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court must 

consider whether to grant a certificate of appealability. When a court dismisses a petition on 
6 

procedural grounds, the determination of whether a certificate of appealability should issue has 

two components. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484–85 (2000). First, the petitioner must 

show that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether the court was correct in its 

procedural ruling. Id. at 484. If the petitioner meets that requirement, then he must show that 

reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim for the denial 

of a constitutional right. Id. As previously explained, all of Snider’s claims are procedurally 

defaulted and there is no reason to encourage him to proceed further. Therefore, he will be 

denied a certificate of appealability. 

CONCLUSION

 For these reasons, the Court DENIES habeas corpus relief because the Petition [ECF 

No. 1] is procedurally defaulted and DENIES a certificate of appealability. 

SO ORDERED on April 13, 2017. 

 s/ Theresa L. Springmann 

 CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT