UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

LAKESHA L. NORINGTON, )

)

Petitioner, )

) CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-474 JM 

v. )

)

SUPERINTENDENT, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION and ORDER

Lakesha L. Norington, a pro se prisoner, is an abusive litigator who is generally

restricted from filing civil litigation in this court. See Norington v. Levenhagen, 3:14-CV661 (N.D. Ind., filed March 31, 2014). An exception to that restriction is a habeas corpus

case such as this one. Here, Norington is challenging the prison disciplinary hearing

(WCU 15-06-283) that was held at the Westfield Correctional Facility on June 23, 2015.

The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) found her guilty of counterfeiting in violation

of B230 and sanctioned her with the loss of 21 days earned credit time. The Conduct

Report explains that an “informal grievance that was filled out by offender Norington

to me was also answered by offender Norington who signed my name and wrote the

response pretending to be me.” (DE # 1-2 at 7.) Norington has presented three

arguments in the two numbered grounds set forth in her petition. 

She argues that she was improperly prevented from presenting evidence during

her hearing when she was removed because she was disruptive. She argues that she

was not disruptive. Prisoners have the right to present relevant, exculpatory evidence.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). However, prisoners do not have the right to

be disruptive (if she was) nor to present evidence which “would be irrelevant,

repetitive, or unnecessary.” Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 2002). Here,

the evidence she wanted to present was not exculpatory – it was a confession. (See DE

# 1-2 at 17.) The statement that Norington wanted to present admits that she wrote the

response on her informal grievance and included the prison employee’s name on the

signature line of the form. She also admits that she sent it to another prison employee as

a part of her grievance appeal. Though the statement attempts to explain that she did

not intend to deceive anyone, “lack of specific intent is not a valid defense . . . in the

context of a prison disciplinary action.” Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011). 

Norington argues that there was insufficient evidence from which she could

have been found guilty. However, in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the

court “need look no further than one key piece of evidence: [her] confession.” Scruggs v.

Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 940 (7th Cir. 2007). As noted, Norington admits that she wrote the

staff response on the form, placed a prison employee’s name on the signature line, and

forwarded the document to another prison employee. 

Finally, she argues that the conduct report was fabricated. This is a difficult

argument to understand given that she admitted to writing the response, putting the

prison employee’s name on it, and sending it to another prison employee. Nevertheless,

“even assuming fraudulent conduct on the part of prison officials, the protection from

such arbitrary action is found in the procedures mandated by due process.” McPherson

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v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1999). That is to say, alleging that the conduct

report is false is merely another way of arguing that there is insufficient evidence to

support the finding of guilt. As previously explained, the evidence here is sufficient and

there is no basis for habeas corpus relief in this case. 

For these reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED pursuant to Section

2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4. This case is DISMISSED. 

SO ORDERED.

Date: November 19, 2015

 s/James T. Moody

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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