UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ANTRONE L. CROCKETT,

Petitioner,

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v. CAUSE NO. 3:16-cv-526 JEM

SUPERINTENDENT,

Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Antrone 

L. Crockett, a pro se prisoner, on August 12, 2016. Crockett challenges the prison disciplinary 

hearing (ISO 16-05-23) where a disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) found him guilty of engaging 

in unauthorized financial transactions in violation of Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) 

policy B-220. Def. Resp. at 1 [DE 15-11]. As a result, he was sanctioned with the loss of 30 days 

earned credit time. Id. 

The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate 

Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. 

Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Much of Crockett’s petition is premised on the argument that IDOC failed to follow its 

internal policies in imposing his discipline. Id. However, the IDOC’s failure to follow its own 

policy does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 

(1991) (“state-law violations provide no basis for federal habeas relief”). Nevertheless, the court 

will analyze Crockett’s claims to determine whether he has identified any violations of his federal

rights. See id. at 67-68 (“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether 
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a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”).

Crockett claims that he was denied a fair and impartial hearing officer. [DE 1] at 5. 

According to Crockett, he worked as a subordinate of the DHO in his role as a lay advocate. Id. 

Crockett claims that in light of their existing work relationship, the DHO should have appointed 

someone else to hear his disciplinary case. Id. It is true that prisoners are entitled to an impartial 

decision-maker. Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003). However, in the prison 

disciplinary context, adjudicators are “entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity,” and “the 

constitutional standard for improper bias is high.” Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. Due process prohibits 

a prison official who was personally and substantially involved in the underlying incident from 

acting as a decision-maker in the case. Id. However, due process is not violated simply because 

the hearing officer knew the inmate or presided over a prior disciplinary case. Id. Here, Crockett 

merely argues that he had a preexisting relationship with the DHO. This is not sufficient to 

establish bias. See id.

Crockett also claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty finding. The 

imposition of prison discipline will be upheld so long as there is some evidence to support the 

finding. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). “[T]he relevant question is whether 

there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary 

board.” Id. “In reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are not required to conduct an 

examination of the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence, 

but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits 

has some factual basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation 

marks omitted).

[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the 

support of some evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, 
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requiring no more than a modicum of evidence. Even meager proof 

will suffice, so long as the record is not so devoid of evidence that 

the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or 

otherwise arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still 

must point to the accused’s guilt. It is not our province to assess the 

comparative weight of the evidence underlying the disciplinary 

board’s decision. 

Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations, parenthesis, and 

ellipsis omitted). 

An inmate violates IDOC B-220 by “[e]ngaging in or possessing materials used for 

unauthorized financial transactions. This includes, but is not limited to, the use or possession of 

identifying information of credit cards, debit cards, or any other card used to complete a financial 

transaction.” Adult Disciplinary Process, Appendix I. http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-

101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf.

The DHO had sufficient evidence to find Crockett guilty. The Conduct Report states: 

On 05/14/16 at approximately 8:15 PM I, Officer Crawford, started 

to shake down Offender Crockett’s DOC #946070 ISO West 2 Row 

8 bed 7 bunk area. I, Officer Crawford, discovered a white envelope 

containing Paypal and credit card numbers, stuck to the top, of the 

inside, of the first blue cabinet. Offender Crockett, was using this 

cabinet to hold magazines, paperwork, jumpsuits, towels and books.

Petition at 8 [DE 1]. The DHO reviewed staff reports, Crockett’s statement, witness statements, 

photographs of the evidence discovered in the locker, Crockett’s phone list, Crockett’s account 

balance history, and video camera evidence. The DHO also compared Crockett’s phone list and 

account balance, against the confiscated documents. Resp. Br. Ex. 11 at 1 [DE 15-11]. The DHO 

noted that the documents were found in Crockett’s bed area, and no other offender was assigned 

to that living space. Id. Based this evidence, the DHO’s finding was not unreasonable or arbitrary. 

Crockett argues that he requested that the DHO conduct an analysis of the information in 

his personal accounts compared against the names and transactions listed on the accounts 
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confiscated from the locker. However, the record shows that the DHO did review and compare 

those documents. Resp. Br. Ex. 11 at 2 [DE 15-11]. To the extent that Crocket is arguing that the 

DHO should have come to a different decision, it is not for this court to reweigh the evidence. 

McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d at 786.

Crockett also argues that the DHO improperly failed to conduct the handwriting analysis 

he requested. While prisoners have the right to request evidence, this right is limited to evidence 

that already exists. Prisoners are not entitled to demand the creation of new evidence. See Freitas

v. Auger, 837 F.2d 806, 812 n.13 (8th Cir. 1988) (“Freitas was not entitled to a polygraph 

examination . . .”); Rhatigan v. Ward, 187 Fed. Appx. 889, 890-891 (10th Cir. 2006); Arthur v. 

Ayers, 43 Fed. Appx. 56, 57 (9th Cir. 2002) (inmates not entitled to laboratory testing of 

substances). Therefore this is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.

Finally, Crockett argues that his due process rights were violated when he was held in prehearing segregation for 13 days. He claims that his pre-hearing confinement was unwarranted and 

punitive. Crockett appears to be under the mistaken belief that prison officials may only place him 

in segregation for disciplinary purposes. However, prisons are granted wide latitude in imposing 

both disciplinary and discretionary segregation. Prisoners generally have no due process rights 

attached to their placement in discretionary segregation. See e.g., Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 

765, 771 (7th Cir. 2008) (“inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to discretionary 

segregation-that is, segregation imposed for administrative, protective, or investigative purposes”). 

Crockett’s short-term, pre-hearing confinement in segregation amounted to discretionary 

segregation and did not violate any of his due process rights.

If Crockett wants to appeal this order, he does not need a certificate of appealability because 

he is challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. See Evans v. Circuit Court, 569 F.3d 665, 666 
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(7th Cir. 2009). However, he may not proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) an appeal in this case could not be taken in good faith. 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus [DE 1] and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case. The Court DENIES Petitioner 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

SO ORDERED this 5th day of July, 2017.

s/ John E. Martin 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

cc: All counsel of record

Petitioner, pro se