[Cite as In re B.C., 2022-Ohio-1298.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

WASHINGTON COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF: :

:

B.C., : Case No. 21CA18

: 

Adjudicated Delinquent Child. : 

:

: DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

: ENTRY

APPEARANCES:

Lauren Hammersmith, Assistant State Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for 

Appellant.

Kelsey R. Riffle, Washington County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 

Marietta, Ohio, for Appellee.

Smith, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant, B.C., appeals the trial court’s decision that (1) 

committed him to the legal custody of the Department of Youth Services

(DYS) for a minimum period of 12 months and a maximum period not to 

exceed his attainment of the age of 21, and (2) placed him on probation as a 

community control condition. Appellant raises three assignments of error. 

First, Appellant argues that the juvenile court imposed a void dispositional 

order. Appellant alleges that the juvenile statutes do not allow juvenile 

courts to enter a dispositional order that both commits a child to DYS and 
Washington App. No. 21CA18 2

that places the child on court supervised probation as a community control 

condition. Alternatively, Appellant contends that the trial court plainly erred 

by committing him to DYS and by placing him on probation as a community 

control condition. Appellant asserts that the trial court plainly erred by 

determining that the juvenile dispositional statutes permitted it to impose 

both a DYS commitment and a term of court supervised probation as a 

community control condition. Last, Appellant argues that he did not receive 

the effective assistance of counsel. Appellant claims that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to the court’s dispositional order that 

imposed both a DYS commitment and a term of court supervised probation 

as a community control condition. After our review of the record, we do not 

agree with any of Appellant’s arguments. Accordingly, we overrule 

Appellant’s three assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

FACTS

{¶2} On June 24, 2021, a complaint was filed that alleged Appellant

to be a delinquent child for engaging in conduct that would constitute the

following criminal offenses, if committed by an adult: (1) rape, in violation

of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), a first-degree felony; (2) rape, in violation of R.C.

2907.02(A)(1)(b), a first-degree felony; and (3) gross sexual imposition, in

violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 3

{¶3} Appellant later admitted the allegations of the second count of

the complaint, rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), and the trial court

dismissed the two remaining counts. 

{¶4} On September 23, 2021, the court held a dispositional hearing. 

At the start, the probation officer stated that he believes that committing 

Appellant to DYS for one year with a recommendation that he receive 

treatment at Paint Creek “is probably the best disposition” to rehabilitate 

Appellant. The state likewise asked the court to commit Appellant to DYS 

and stated that it “would support the recommendation that [Appellant] go to 

Paint Creek as well.” Appellant’s counsel indicated that he did not “have 

anything to add.” Additionally, neither Appellant’s father nor Appellant 

stated that they had anything to say. 

{¶5} The court then stated: “Well, the Court in this matter, having 

discussed it along the way at the various hearings with counsel for the state 

and defense, is going to honor the agreement that was reached prior to 

[Appellant] entering an admission to count two.” The court announced that 

it would commit Appellant to DYS for a minimum period of one year and a 

maximum period not to exceed the age of 21. The court additionally 

recommended that Appellant be placed in a sex offender rehabilitation 

program at Paint Creek. The court informed Appellant that the treatment 
Washington App. No. 21CA18 4

program ranges from 12 to 18 months and that Appellant’s release date 

would depend upon his treatment progress. The court further stated that it 

will place Appellant “on community control including probation” upon his 

release. The court explained that it will “place him on it now, but it won’t 

be in effect really until you’re released.” The court advised Appellant that 

when he is released, Appellant will “have a parole officer and a probation 

officer assigned to you, to monitor you, make sure you’re following the 

rules, and staying out of trouble.” 

{¶6} The court asked the parties whether they had anything further to 

add, and Appellant’s counsel, Appellant, and Appellant’s father stated that 

they did not have anything to add or any questions to ask.

{¶7} The court subsequently journalized its dispositional order that

committed Appellant to DYS’s legal custody for an indefinite term

consisting of a minimum period of 12 months and a maximum period not to

exceed the age of 21. The court also placed Appellant on community

control by placing him “on probation until further order of the Court subject

to the general supervision and control of the Washington County Juvenile

Probation Department.” The court further recommended and “approve[d]”

Appellant for the “sex offender program at Paint Creek.” This appeal

followed.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 5

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. THE JUVENILE COURT EXCEEDED ITS 

STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND UNDERMINED 

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHEN IT COMMITTED 

B.C. TO DYS AND PLACED HIM ON A TERM OF 

COURT PROBATION FOR THE SAME CHARGE.

II. A CONFLICT EXISTS BETWEEN THE 

DISPOSITIONAL OPTIONS IN R.C. 2152.19(A) AND 

2152.22(A), BUT THE SPECIFIC PROVISION IN R.C. 

2152.22(A) PREVAILS, AND THE JUVENILE COURT 

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY COMMITTING B.C. 

TO DYS AND PLACING HIM ON PROBATION FOR 

THE SAME OFFENSE.

III. B.C. WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL.

ANALYSIS

FIRST AND SECOND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶8} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error involve related

issues. For ease of discussion, we consider them together.

{¶9} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial

court erred as a matter of law by committing him to the legal custody of

DYS and by placing him on court-supervised probation. Appellant contends

that after a juvenile court commits a delinquent child to the legal custody of

DYS, the juvenile court “relinquishes control with respect to the child except

for granting judicial release or juvenile sex offender classification.” 

Appellant asserts that after a child completes the prescribed minimum
Washington App. No. 21CA18 6

commitment, a juvenile court can only “grant the child judicial release to

DYS supervision, not court supervision.” Appellant thus claims that a

juvenile court cannot commit a child to the legal custody of DYS and order

the child to serve a term of court-supervised probation. Appellant therefore

alleges that the trial court’s dispositional order is void. 

{¶10} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues that the

trial court abused its discretion by committing him to DYS and by placing

him on probation. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by failing to “abide by the rules of statutory interpretation when

imposing [its] disposition.” Appellant asserts that committing the child to

DYS, as R.C. 2152.16 permits, and placing the child on probation, as R.C.

2152.19(A)(4)(a) permits, create a conflict. 

{¶11} Appellant claims that a conflict exists because when a juvenile

court commits a child to DYS under R.C. 2152.16, R.C. 2152.22 limits the

court’s authority to impose additional orders. Appellant argues that R.C.

2152.22 does not allow a trial court to impose a term of probation upon a

child who is committed to the legal custody of DYS. Appellant therefore

contends that R.C. 2152.22 conflicts with R.C. 2152.19(A)(4). Appellant

asserts that when two statutes conflict, courts must apply the specific

provision over the general provision. Appellant contends that R.C. 2152.22
Washington App. No. 21CA18 7

is the specific provision that prevails over the general provision, R.C.

2152.19(A)(4).

{¶12} Appellant claims that once the trial court committed him to the

legal custody of DYS, the court relinquished “authority and jurisdiction to

DYS to care and provide for the child’s rehabilitation.” Appellant thus

argues that the trial court had no authority to impose a term of probation as a

community control condition under R.C. 2152.19(A)(4).

{¶13} The state asserts that Appellant failed to raise any of these

issues during the trial court proceedings and that he, therefore, forfeited the

right to raise them on appeal. The state additionally contends that Appellant

agreed to the disposition that the trial court imposed as part of a negotiated

plea deal. The state thus claims that Appellant invited any error that may

have occurred.

{¶14} The state further argues that even if Appellant had preserved

the issues for appeal, his arguments lack merit. The state notes that juvenile

courts have broad discretion when choosing among the dispositional options

and that R.C. 2152.19(A) gives juvenile courts authority to impose probation

as a term of community control, “in addition to any other disposition

authorized or required by” R.C. Chapter 2152. R.C. 2152.19(A)(4)(a). The

state therefore claims that the juvenile statutes do not prevent trial courts
Washington App. No. 21CA18 8

from ordering a delinquent child to serve both a commitment to DYS and a

term of probation for a delinquency adjudication.

VOID VS. VOIDABLE

{¶15} We initially observe that Appellant asserts that the trial court’s 

dispositional order is void under void sentence doctrine. However, in 2020, 

the Ohio Supreme Court overruled its sentencing cases that had held that a 

sentence is void when a trial court lacks statutory authority to impose it. 

State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776; 

State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, 

¶ 42. Therefore, reviewing courts no longer recognize sentences as void 

when imposed without statutory authority. Rather, “[a] sentence is void only 

if the sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case 

or personal jurisdiction over the accused.” Henderson at ¶ 27. Any other 

error in sentencing, including an error in applying the sentencing statutes, 

renders the sentence voidable, not void. Id. 

{¶16} Consequently, we summarily reject Appellant’s assertion that 

the trial court’s dispositional order is void for allegedly failing to comply 

with the juvenile dispositional statutes. We may, however, review whether 

the court’s dispositional order is voidable. 
Washington App. No. 21CA18 9

PLAIN ERROR

{¶17} We note, as does Appellee, that Appellant did not raise any 

objection to the court’s decision to commit Appellant to DYS and to impose 

probation as a community control condition.1 Thus, during the trial court 

proceedings, Appellant did not argue that the juvenile statutes prohibited the 

trial court from imposing this disposition.

{¶18} It is well-settled that a party may not raise any new issues or 

legal theories for the first time on appeal. Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland, 41 

Ohio St.2d 41, 43, 322 N.E.2d 629 (1975). Thus, a litigant who fails to raise 

an argument before the trial court forfeits the right to raise that issue on 

appeal. Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga Cty. Executive, 142 Ohio 

St.3d 125, 2014-Ohio-4650, 28 N.E.3d 1182, ¶ 30 (stating that “an appellant 

generally may not raise an argument on appeal that the appellant has not 

raised in the lower courts”); State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-

Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 21 (explaining that defendant forfeited his

constitutional challenge by failing to raise it during trial court proceedings); 

Gibson v. Meadow Gold Dairy, 88 Ohio St.3d 201, 204, 724, N.E.2d 787 

1 We note that the state also argues that Appellant invited any error associated with the dual disposition by negotiating an agreement 

with the state and by agreeing to the disposition. The dispositional hearing transcript suggests that the parties and the court engaged in 

some off-the-record discussions regarding the disposition of the case. The record does not clearly indicate, however, whether 

Appellant agreed to the DYS commitment with the sex-offender treatment recommendation plus the probation term, or whether 

Appellant only agreed to the DYS commitment with the sex-offender treatment recommendation. For this reason, we do not consider 

whether the invited error doctrine prevents Appellant from challenging the trial court’s dispositional order.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 10

(2000) (concluding that party waived arguments for purposes of appeal 

when party failed to raise those arguments during trial court proceedings); 

State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 175, 

177, 602 N.E.2d 622 (1992) (explaining that an appellant cannot “present * 

* * new arguments for the first time on appeal”). Accord State ex rel. Jeffers 

v. Athens Cty. Commrs., 4th Dist. Athens No. 15CA27, 2016-Ohio-8119, 

fn.3 (stating that “[i]t is well-settled that failure to raise an argument in the 

trial court results in waiver of the argument for purposes of appeal”); State v.

Anderson, 4th Dist. Washington No. 15CA28, 2016-Ohio-2704, ¶ 24 

(explaining that “arguments not presented in the trial court are deemed to be 

waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal”).

{¶19} When an adjudicated delinquent child “forfeits the right to 

assert an error on appeal by failing to bring it to the trial court’s attention in 

the first instance, an appellate court applies plain error review.” State v.

Jones, 160 Ohio St.3d 314, 2020-Ohio-3051, 156 N.E.3d 872, ¶ 17, 

citing State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, 

¶ 21-22; State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, 103 N.E.3d 

784, ¶ 49 (determining that criminal plain error standard also applies to 

juvenile delinquency appeals); State v. Perry, 4th Dist. Pike No. 16CA863, 

2017-Ohio-69, ¶ 14 (failure to object to during trial court proceedings
Washington App. No. 21CA18 11

forfeits sentencing issues absent plain error). Under the plain error standard 

of review, an appellant must demonstrate each of the following: (1) an error 

occurred; (2) the error was “ ‘an “obvious” defect in the trial proceedings’ ”;

and (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, i.e., a reasonable 

probability exists that the error affected the outcome of the trial court 

proceedings. State v. LaRosa, 165 Ohio St.3d 346, 2021-Ohio-4060, 179 

N.E.3d 89, ¶ 40 (noting that appellant bears burden to demonstrate plain 

error); State v. Kirkland, 160 Ohio St.3d 389, 2020-Ohio-4079, 157 N.E.3d 

716, ¶ 71 and ¶ 72, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 

N.E.2d 1240 (2002) (stating that a “plain” error is an “obvious” error); State

v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22

(concluding that error affects substantial rights when reasonable probability 

exists that error affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings). 

{¶20} Even when an appellant establishes all of the elements 

necessary to demonstrate plain error, appellate courts are not required to 

correct the error. Rogers at ¶ 23. Instead, appellate courts have discretion 

when deciding whether to correct plain error. Jones at ¶ 17. The Ohio 

Supreme Court has “admonished [appellate] courts to notice plain error

‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to 

prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27, 
Washington App. No. 21CA18 12

quoting State v. Long 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph 

three of the syllabus. 

{¶21} In the case at bar, we do not believe that Appellant has 

established that the circumstances require us to correct a plain error. First, 

Appellant has not shown that an obvious error occurred. Appellant has not 

cited any previous cases that have held that a juvenile court cannot impose 

both a DYS commitment and a term of community control consisting of 

court supervised probation that takes effect upon the child’s release from 

DYS. In fact, the Third District Court of Appeals has rejected the same 

arguments that Appellant raises in this appeal. In re A.F., 3rd Dist. Defiance 

No. 4-20-06, 2020-Ohio-4622, ¶ 39, appeal not allowed, 161 Ohio St.3d 

1410, 2021-Ohio-106, 161 N.E.3d 694; In re L.R. 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-

19-19, 2020-Ohio-2990, ¶ 10 (rejecting argument that trial court’s 

dispositional order that imposed a five-year term of court probation and 

committing him to DYS was “contradictory” and created “a conflict within 

the juvenile code”). 

{¶22} Moreover, we do not believe that the juvenile statutes 

obviously prohibit juvenile courts from committing a child to DYS’s legal 

custody and imposing community control in the form of court supervised 

probation. Juvenile courts have broad discretion to craft dispositions in 
Washington App. No. 21CA18 13

order to ensure that the child is rehabilitated. In re D.S., 148 Ohio St.3d 390, 

2016-Ohio-7369, 71 N.E.3d 223, ¶ 20 (“A judge enjoys a great deal 

of discretion in sentencing, particularly a juvenile court judge in fashioning a 

rehabilitative disposition.”); In re Caldwell, 76 Ohio St.3d 156, 159, 666 

N.E.2d 1367 (1996) (noting that predecessor statute to R.C. 2152.19(A)(8) 

gave juvenile court “discretion to take ‘any’ steps * * * necessary to fully 

and completely implement the rehabilitative disposition of a juvenile”). 

Indeed, “[t]he principle underlying the juvenile justice system is to ‘combine 

flexible decision-making with individualized intervention to treat and 

rehabilitate offenders rather than to punish offenses.’ ” In re Anderson, 92 

Ohio St.3d 63, 65, 748 N.E.2d 67 (2001), quoting Rossum, Holding

Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America’s ‘Juvenile Injustice System’, 22 

Pepperdine L.Rev. 907, 912 (1995).”

{¶23} To that end, R.C. 2152.19(A) gives juvenile courts broad 

authority to impose “any” of the dispositional orders listed in the statute, “in 

addition to any other disposition authorized or required.” R.C. 

2152.19(A)(4)(a) and (b) allow a court to impose basic or intensive 

probation, respectively, as a community control condition. In addition, R.C. 

2152.16 grants juvenile courts the authority to commit a child to DYS. 

Nothing in R.C. 2152.19(A) nor R.C. 2152.16 prohibits a juvenile court 
Washington App. No. 21CA18 14

from imposing both a DYS commitment and one of the dispositional 

alternatives listed in R.C. 2152.19(A), such as probation as a community

control condition.

{¶24} We recognize Appellant’s argument that R.C. 2152.22 limits a 

juvenile court’s authority over a child when the court commits the child to 

DYS’s legal custody. Appellant asserts that after a court commits a child to 

DYS’s legal custody, any release made after the prescribed minimum 

commitment is to be subject to DYS, not court, supervision. However, we 

do not agree with Appellant that R.C. 2152.22 obviously prevented the trial 

court from committing Appellant to DYS and also subjecting him to court

supervised probation upon his release.

{¶25} R.C. 2152.22(A) begins by stating that “[w]hen a child is 

committed to the legal custody of the department of youth services under 

this chapter, the juvenile court relinquishes control with respect to the child 

so committed, except as provided in divisions (B), (C), (D), and (H) of this 

section or in sections 2152.82 to 2152.86 of the Revised Code.” Divisions 

(B), (C), (D), and (H) specify the conditions under which the court may 

release a child from DYS. R.C. 2152.82 to 2152.86 contain the statutes 

regulating juvenile sex offender classifications.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 15

{¶26} The next paragraph of R.C. 2152.22(A) prevents DYS from 

releasing or discharging a child before the prescribed minimum term of 

commitment expires or before “the child’s attainment of 21 years of age, 

except upon the order of a court pursuant to division (B), (C), or (D) of this 

section or in accordance with section 5139.54 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 

5139.54 contains provisions that authorize a medical release from DYS.

{¶27} R.C. 2152.22(B)(1) governs judicial release during the first half 

of a child’s prescribed minimum term or, if the court committed the child to 

DYS until the child reaches the age of 21, during the first half of the 

commitment beginning on the child’s first day of commitment and ending on 

the child’s 21st birthday. The statute provides:

Unless the court grants judicial release under division 

(D)(1)(b) of this section, the court that commits a 

delinquent child to the department of youth services may 

grant judicial release of the child to court supervision 

under this division during the first half of the prescribed 

minimum term for which the child was committed to the 

department or, if the child was committed to the 

department until the child attains twenty-one years of age, 

during the first half of the prescribed period of 

commitment that begins on the first day of commitment 

and ends on the child's twenty-first birthday, provided any 

commitment imposed under division (A), (B), (C), or (D) 

of section 2152.17 of the Revised Code has ended.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 16

{¶28} R.C. 2152.22(C)(1) applies when a court grants judicial release 

during the second half of a child’s DYS commitment. The statute reads as 

follows:

Unless the court grants judicial release under division 

(D)(1)(b) of this section, the court that commits a 

delinquent child to the department of youth services may 

grant judicial release of the child to department of youth 

services supervision under this division during the second 

half of the prescribed minimum term for which the child 

was committed to the department or, if the child was 

committed to the department until the child attains twentyone years of age, during the second half of the prescribed 

period of commitment that begins on the first day of 

commitment and ends on the child’s twenty-first birthday, 

provided any commitment imposed under division (A), 

(B), (C), or (D) of section 2152.17 of the Revised Code 

has ended.

{¶29} R.C. 2152.22(D)(1) contains additional provisions that allow a 

court to grant a child judicial release from DYS. The statute provides that 

the court:

may grant judicial release of the child under this division 

at any time after the expiration of one of the following 

periods of time:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (D)(1)(b) of 

this section, if the child was committed to the department 

for a prescribed minimum period and a maximum period 

not to exceed the child’s attainment of twenty-one years, 

the court may grant judicial release of the child at any time 

after the expiration of the prescribed minimum term for 

which the child was committed to the department.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 17

(b) If the child was committed to the department for both 

one or more definite periods under division (A), (B), (C), 

or (D) of section 2152.17 of the Revised Code and a period 

of the type described in division (D)(1)(a) of this section, 

all of the prescribed minimum periods of commitment 

imposed under division (A), (B), (C), or (D) of section 

2152.17 of the Revised Code and the prescribed period of 

commitment of the type described in division (D)(1)(a) of 

this section shall be aggregated for purposes of this 

division, and the court may grant judicial release of the 

child at any time after the expiration of one year after the 

child begins serving the aggregate period of commitment.

(2) If a court grants a judicial release of a child under 

division (D)(1) of this section, the release shall be a 

judicial release to department of youth services 

supervision, if the release is granted during a period 

described in division (C)(1) of this section, and the second 

and third paragraphs of division (C)(3) of this section 

apply regarding the release. In all other cases, the release 

shall be a judicial release to court supervision, and the 

second paragraph of division (B)(3) of this section applies 

regarding the release.

{¶30} While little case law exists explaining the precise contours of 

R.C. 2152.22(D), the author of Ohio Juvenile Law states that judicial release 

following the expiration of the prescribed minimum term ordinarily “is to 

court supervision.” Salvador, Ohio Juvenile Law, Section 22:4 (2021). The 

statutory language contained in R.C. 2152.22(D)(2) supports the author’s 

assertion. As written, the statute states:

If a court grants a judicial release of a child under division 

(D)(1) of this section, the release shall be a judicial 

release to department of youth services supervision, if the 

release is granted during a period described in division 
Washington App. No. 21CA18 18

(C)(1) of this section, and the second and third paragraphs 

of division (C)(3) of this section apply regarding the 

release. In all other cases, the release shall be a judicial 

release to court supervision, and the second paragraph of 

division (B)(3) of this section applies regarding the 

release. 

(Emphasis added.)

{¶31} Reading the statute in proper context shows that the judicial 

release is to DYS if the court grants the child release during the period 

defined in R.C. 2152.22(C)(1). If the court does not grant judicial release 

during the period defined in R.C. 2152.22(C)(1) ― i.e., “[i]n all other cases”

― then “the release shall be a judicial release to court supervision.” As 

indicated above, R.C. 2152.22(C)(1) governs judicial release during the 

second half of confinement. 

{¶32} In the case at bar, the trial court did not grant Appellant judicial 

release during the second half of his confinement. Instead, the court 

committed Appellant to DYS for a minimum term of one year to a maximum 

period not to exceed the age of 21. The court also indicated that upon 

Appellant’s release from DYS, Appellant would be subject to court 

supervision. R.C. 2152.22(D)(2) permits a court to order a child to be 

subject to court supervision upon release from DYS when the child’s release 

occurs after the period of minimum confinement has expired. Here, the 

court ordered Appellant to be subject to court supervision at a yet-to-be-
Washington App. No. 21CA18 19

determined time after the period of his minimum commitment expires. 

Thus, Appellant’s assertion that R.C. 2152.22(D) prohibited the juvenile 

court from placing him on court supervised probation is without merit. 

Instead, as outlined above, the statute authorizes a juvenile court to release a 

child from DYS subject to court supervision if the release occurs after the 

child’s minimum period of confinement expires. We therefore are unable to 

find that the trial court plainly erred by imposing a DYS commitment 

followed by a period of court supervised probation after his release from 

DYS.

{¶33} Furthermore, even if we agreed with Appellant that the trial 

court plainly erred by not ordering that he be released to DYS supervision 

after his prescribed minimum commitment, we are unable to conclude that 

the error results in a manifest injustice. Instead, the court’s disposition 

appears designed to fulfill the overall goal of the juvenile code: “the goal of 

the juvenile code is to rehabilitate, not to punish, while protecting society 

from criminal and delinquent acts during rehabilitation.” Caldwell, 76 Ohio 

St.3d at 158; accord R.C. 2152.01(A) (stating that the overriding purposes 

for juvenile dispositions “are to provide for the care, protection, and mental 

and physical development of children subject to this chapter, protect the 

public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender’s 
Washington App. No. 21CA18 20

actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender”). We do not 

believe that the court’s decision to commit Appellant to DYS, followed by a 

period of court supervised probation, is manifestly unjust. Rather, the 

juvenile court reasonably could have determined that this type of disposition 

would have the best chance of rehabilitating Appellant while protecting 

society from additional delinquent acts during rehabilitation. Given the 

rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile system, we are unable to conclude that 

any error the trial court may have committed would result in a manifest 

injustice. 

{¶34} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule 

Appellant’s first and second assignments of error.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶35} In his third assignment of error, Appellant contends that he did

not receive effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Appellant asserts 

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s 

dispositional order that committed him to DYS and that placed Appellant on

probation as a community control condition. Appellant contends that if trial 

counsel had objected, then the trial court would have chosen to impose either 

a DYS commitment or a community control sanction rather than imposing 

both.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 21

{¶36} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

delinquent child must establish (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., 

performance falling below an objective standard of reasonable 

representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See 

e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Allen, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 19CA31, 2021-

Ohio-648, ¶ 21. “In employing this standard we apply ‘a strong presumption 

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.’ ” State v. Day, 149 N.E.3d 122, 2019-Ohio-4816, ¶ 27 (4th 

Dist.), quoting Strickland at 689. “The benchmark for judging any claim of 

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 

having produced a just result.” Strickland at 689.

{¶37} Moreover, when addressing an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, the reviewing court should not consider what, in hindsight, may have 

been a more appropriate course of action. State v. Mammone, 139 Ohio 

St.3d 467, 2014-Ohio-1942, 13 N.E.3d 1051, ¶ 153; State v. McKnight, 4th 

Dist. Vinton No. 07CA665, 2008-Ohio-2435, ¶ 70. Rather, the reviewing 

court “must be highly deferential.” Strickland at 689. As the Strickland
Washington App. No. 21CA18 22

court stated, the party challenging counsel’s effectiveness “must overcome 

the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might 

be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id. at 689.

{¶38} In the case at bar, we do not believe that Appellant has 

demonstrated that trial counsel performed deficiently or that any deficient 

performance affected the outcome of the proceedings. As we stated in our 

discussion of Appellant’s first and second assignments of error, the juvenile 

statutes gave the trial court broad discretion to craft an appropriate 

disposition aimed at rehabilitation. We further determined that the trial 

court’s disposition does not contravene the governing statutes. Therefore, 

even if counsel had objected, the trial court still may have determined to 

impose both a DYS commitment and a term of court supervision as a 

community control condition. Consequently, even if counsel’s failure to 

object constituted deficient performance, Appellant cannot establish that 

counsel’s failure to object affected the outcome of the proceedings.

{¶39} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule 

Appellant’s third assignment of error.

CONCLUSION

{¶40} Having overruled Appellant’s three assignments of error, we 

affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 23

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Washington App. No. 21CA18 24

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED. Appellee shall 

recover any costs from Appellant.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing 

the Washington County Common Pleas Court – Juvenile Division, to carry 

this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Hess, J. and Wilkin, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

_________________________

Jason P. Smith

Presiding Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from 

the date of filing with the clerk.