United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 23-2639

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Camilo Andres Ramirez-Contreras

 Petitioner

v.

Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States

 Respondent

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Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

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Submitted: March 15, 2024

Filed: July 9, 2024

[Unpublished]

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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ERICKSON and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM. 

Camilo Andres Ramirez-Contreras is a lawful permanent resident who was 

convicted of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance under Minnesota law, 

Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1). The Department of Homeland Security charged 

him as removable because, as relevant here, he had been convicted of violating “any 

law or regulation of a State . . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined in 
-2- 

section 802 of title 21).” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The Board of Immigration 

Appeals agreed. Ramirez petitions for review, arguing that his conviction under 

Minnesota’s fifth-degree possession statute is not a controlled substance offense 

under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 

We review de novo whether a state drug conviction triggers removal under 

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Bannister v. Barr, 960 F.3d 492, 494 (8th Cir. 2020) (per 

curiam). To determine whether it does, we generally apply the categorical approach. 

See Martinez v. Sessions, 893 F.3d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 2018). That approach asks

us to decide whether the elements of the state offense fit within the removable 

offense. Id. at 1069–70. Things get trickier if the state statute is divisible. If it is, 

meaning that it “includes multiple, alternative elements that create several different 

crimes,” we apply the modified categorical approach instead. Rendon v. Barr, 952 

F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2020). Under that approach, we “determine, based on a 

limited class of judicial records,” the crime of conviction and whether the elements 

of that offense fit within the removable offense. Id. (citation omitted).

Minnesota’s fifth-degree possession statute is divisible because the identity of 

the substance possessed is an element of the offense. Id. Applying the modified 

categorical approach, we peek at Ramirez’s guilty plea petition and see that he 

pleaded guilty to felony fifth-degree possession of a trace amount of heroin. 

Fifth-degree possession of heroin under Minnesota law fits within any state 

law “relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21),” 

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Under § 802(6), a “controlled substance” is a “drug or other 

substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V.” Heroin 

is a schedule I controlled substance, § 812(c), sched. I(b)(10), so Ramirez’s 

conviction for possessing it is a removable offense. See Rendon, 952 F.3d at 969 

(conviction for “fifth degree possession of a controlled substance, specifically 

methamphetamine,” under Minn. Stat. § 152.025 is a removable offense because 

“[m]ethamphetamine is a federally controlled substance”).
-3- 

Ramirez resists, misguidedly arguing that Minnesota’s fifth-degree 

possession statute is broader than § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because the small quantity of 

heroin he possessed is not punishable as a felony under federal law. But 

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) says nothing about the quantity of controlled substances

possessed1

 or whether the state offense is a felony or misdemeanor. See Briscoe v. 

Att’y Gen., 751 F. App’x 329, 331 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (rejecting petitioner’s 

argument that he is not removable because the two grams of marijuana he possessed 

with intent to distribute is not punishable under the Controlled Substances Act, given 

that “whether such an offense is punishable under the CSA is not relevant” to

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)); cf. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 204 (2013) (“Any 

marijuana distribution offense, even a misdemeanor, will still render a noncitizen 

deportable as a controlled substances offender.” (citing § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i))). Section 

1227(a)(2)(B)(i) simply looks to whether the state offense relates to a controlled 

substance under § 802, and here it does.

We deny the petition for review.

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1

To be sure, § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) has a carve out for possession of small, 

personal use quantities of marijuana. But that carve out does not extend to other 

controlled substances. Id.