THIRD DIVISION                                             September 30, 1996No.  1-93-3814CONCEPCION NOYOLA, et al.,              )    Appeal from the                                        )    Circuit Court of          Plaintiffs-Appellants,             )    Cook County.                                        )     v.                                 )                                        )THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF               )THE CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,            )    Honorable                                        )    Albert Green,          Defendants-Appellees.              )    Judge Presiding.     PRESIDING JUSTICE TULLY delivered the opinion of the court:     Plaintiffs, Concepcion Noyola, et al., filed their second amended complaint inthis class action suit against defendants, the Board of Education of the City ofChicago, School District 299, Richard Stephenson, interim superintendent, theChicago School Finance Authority, Martin Koldyke, chairman, the Illinois StateBoard of Education and Richard Leininger, superintendent, alleging that defendantsviolated the Federal and State constitutional guarantees of equal protection of law,42 U.S.C. � 1983 (1988) (hereinafter section 1983) and section 18-8 of the School Code(105 ILCS � 5/18-8 (West 1992)).  This is the second time this case is before thiscourt.  See Noyola v. Board of Education, 227 Ill. App. 3d 429 (1992).  On remand, thecircuit court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint under sections 2-615 and 2-619 of theCode of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 1992)).  It is from the circuitcourt's order of October 7, 1993, dismissing the action that plaintiffs now appeal tothis court pursuant to section 6 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, � 6) and Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301).     As a preliminary matter we address a procedural issue.  The Chicago SchoolFinance Authority has filed with this court a motion to dismiss itself as a party tothis appeal which we have taken with the case.  Sections 34A-401 through 34A-410of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34A-401-34A-410 (West 1994)), which are the onlysections of the School Code granting it any power to review or otherwise involve itselfin the budgets for Chicago public schools, have been suspended by the GeneralAssembly until July 1, 1999, pursuant to section 34A-411(c) of the School Code(S.H.A. 105 ILCS 5/34A-411 (West 1996)).  "It is a well-recognized principle of lawthat a reviewing court will decide only actual controversies in which the interests orrights of the parties to the litigation can be granted effectual relief.  [Citation.]  Anappeal becomes moot when a court can no longer effect the relief originally sought byan appellant or when the substantial question involved in the trial court no longerexists."  HealthChicago, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 252 Ill. App. 3d 608, 610 (1993). In the case sub judice, the Chicago School Finance Authority has absolutely no powerwith regard to the budgets for Chicago public schools.  Consequently, we can grantno effectual relief as between the Chicago School Finance Authority and plaintiffsand, therefore, as to the Chicago School Finance Authority this appeal is moot. Accordingly, we grant the motion to dismiss the Chicago School Finance Authorityfrom this action.  That said, we now turn to the substantive issues left between theremaining parties.     The pertinent facts are as follows: Section 18-8(i)(1) of the School Code providesState funds for the dual purpose of improving educational opportunities foreconomically disadvantaged children and attenuating the fiscal disparities of Illinois'school funding scheme which relies heavily on real estate taxation.  These Statemonies are commonly known as "chapter 1" funds.  The legislative scheme allocateschapter 1 monies to public schools according to a weighing factor based on thepercentage of students eligible for free or reduced price lunches under the FederalChild Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. � 1771 et seq. (1988)) and the Federal NationalSchool Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. � 1751 et seq. (1988)).  Thus, public schools with highconcentrations of low income students are entitled to significant amounts of chapter1 funds.     In order to make sure that these targeted funds ended up assisting low incomestudents the General Assembly mandated that chapter 1 funds could not becompensated for or contravened by adjustments of the total of other fundsappropriated to a school.  105 ILCS 5-18(A)(5)(i)(1)(a) (West 1992).  In other words,a school district cannot dip into chapter 1 funds to cover general costs; the monies areto be a purely supplemental grant to assist poor children with special supplementalprograms.  See 105 ILCS 5/18-8(A)(5)(i)(1)(c) (West 1992).  It is this legislativemandate that plaintiffs allege defendants have violated.     A 1988 study conducted by the Chicago Panel on Public School Policy andFinance concluded that the Board of Education of the City of Chicago used themajority of chapter 1 support, $166.3 million out of $238 million, to provide basicprograms to all Chicago schools, regardless of the proportion of enrolled qualifyinglow income students.  The study also concluded that a number of other misuses ofchapter 1 funds occurred in Chicago public schools.  Plaintiffs contend that suchmisuse of chapter 1 funds has been going on for well over a decade and continuestoday.  In December 1992, the Illinois State Board of Education promulgatedregulations dealing with chapter 1 funds which plaintiffs allege to be in violation ofsections 34A-401 through 34A-410 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34A-401-34A-410(West 1994)).  Accordingly, the second amended complaint also challenged these regulations.     On remand from the previous appeal, the circuit court dismissed plaintiffs'complaint holding that no private right of action can be implied  under the chapter1 statute and that plaintiffs' complaint was factually insufficient.  The trial court alsoruled that plaintiffs' Federal and State equal protection claims were invalid.  Theinstant appeal followed.     We note that the trial court's dismissal of this cause under sections 2-615 and2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 1992)) is subjectto our de novo review.  See Demos v. National Bank of Greece, 209 Ill. App. 3d 655(1991); Owens v. Midwest Tank & Manufacturing Co., 192 Ill. App. 3d 1039 (1989). Accordingly, for our analysis here we take all facts pled by plaintiffs as true and viewthem in a light most favorable to them.  Demos, 209 Ill. App. 3d 655; Owens, 192 Ill.App. 3d 1039.      Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in finding that the School Codeimplies no private right of action with regard to chapter 1 funds.  We agree.      Implication by statute of a private right of action is appropriate when: (1) aplaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit a piece of legislation was enacted;(2) it is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation; (3) a plaintiff'sinjury is one the legislation was designed to prevent; and (4) it is necessary to providean adequate remedy for violations of the legislation.  Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hospital,149 Ill. 2d 302, 308 (1992); Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296, 312-13 (1991); seealso Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corporation, 89 Ill. 2d 379 (1982).     With regard to the first part of the test, it is clear that in enacting sections34A-401 through 34A-410 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34A-401-34A-410 (West1994)) that the General Assembly intended to benefit economically disadvantagedchildren attending public schools.  Therefore, plaintiffs, parents in theirrepresentative capacity for their qualifying children, are surely the class of personsfor whose benefit the legislation was written.     As for the second part of the test, we believe it has been met.  The underlyingpurpose of chapter 1 funding is to provide economically disadvantaged students withan entitlement which supports supplemental educational programs for them. Chapter 1 monies have been allocated by the General Assembly to provide a moreequitable distribution of funds and to promote educational equal educationalopportunities through the financial support of educational programs designed to meettheir special needs.  Thus, implying a cause of action is consistent with theunderlying purpose of the legislation.     With respect to the third part of the test, it also has been met.  There is nodoubt that chapter 1 funding was designed to prevent children from low incomefamilies from being injured by the inherently unequal system of funding publicschools primarily through real estate taxation that is employed in Illinois.  Withoutchapter 1 and other additional Federal and State educational programs, funding ofpublic schools in inner city and rural areas, whose tax bases are not as great as moreaffluent suburban communities, would be even more disparate than it already is. Thus, we find the legislation was designed to prevent the particular injury alleged tohave been suffered by plaintiffs.     We find the fourth part of the test has been met.  While it is true that theSchool Code provides that, as a remedy, the Illinois State Board of Education canreject a proposed budget by the Board of Education of the City of Chicago thatproffers a misuse of chapter 1 funds, the legislation does remedy a situation such asis alleged in the case sub judice.  Under the alleged facts, both the Board ofEducation of the City of Chicago and the Illinois State Board of Education have andcontinue to permit the misuse of chapter 1 funds.  In this situation, where all theState and local entities charged with implementing the General Assembly's mandatehave been alleged to have been derelict in doing so, a private right of action is bothnecessary and proper to provide the school children with an adequate remedy. Therefore, we find, under these circumstances that a private right of action exists andthat plaintiffs are properly parties to this case and that the facts pled were sufficient. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court on this point.     Next, we address plaintiffs' contention that the remaining counts wereimproperly dismissed.  We disagree.     Initially, we note, as the trial court held, that plaintiffs abandoned theirAdministrative Review Act claim.  "The law is well settled that, to preserve an issuefor appellate review, a party must make the appropriate objections in the trial courtor the issue will be deemed waived.  ***  The purpose of the requirement that aspecific objection be made is to allow the court an opportunity to properly considerand rule upon it."  Gausselin v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 260 Ill. App. 3d 1068,1079 (1994).  During the trial court's explanation of its reasoning for dismissing thecause, the trial court held, without objection from plaintiffs, that they had abandonedthis claim.  Consequently, plaintiffs have waived this argument and this claim.     We briefly note that after a careful review of the record, we find plaintiffs'section 1983 claims and attendant equal protection claims as well as the Stateconstitutional claim under section 1 of article I of the 1970 constitution to be bothfactually and legally insufficient.  Accordingly, we find no error on the dismissal ofthese claims by the circuit court.  Thus, only plaintiffs' implied cause of action undersections 34A-401 through 34A-410 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34A-401-34A-410(West 1994)) remains.     In light of the foregoing, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand thiscause for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views contained herein.     Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.     CERDA and GREIMAN, JJ., concur.