United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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 No. 21-2476

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Willie J. Starr

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Estella Bland, ANP, Correct Care Solution

 Defendant

Sondra Parker, HSAA, Correct Care Solution; James Gibson, Deputy Warden, 

VSM, ADC; James Shipman, Deputy Warden, VSM, ADC; Brandon C. Carroll, 

Major, VSM, ADC; F. Washington, Classification Committee Member, VSM, 

ADC

 Defendants - Appellees

Aaron Smith, Doctor, Correct Care Solution

 Defendant

Amy Jones, LPN, VSM, ADC; S. Taylor, Captain, VSM, ADC

 Defendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central

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Submitted: March 4, 2022

Filed: March 10, 2022 

[Unpublished]

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Before BENTON, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Arkansas prisoner Willie Starr appeals the district court’s pre-service 

dismissal of his Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim brought against 

employees of the Arkansas Department of Corrections (ADC) in their official 

capacities.1

 We reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

“We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a prisoner’s claim under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, ‘accepting as true all of the factual allegations contained in the 

complaint and affording the plaintiff all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 

from those allegations.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 540–41 (8th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011)). “In evaluating 

whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro 

se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, . . . to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. at 541 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 

94 (2007) (per curiam)) (modifications in original). 

Liberally construing Starr’s complaint, we find that he has sufficiently 

pleaded a claim under Title II of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified 

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a 

public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). State prisons 

and prisoners are included within the coverage of Title II. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. 

1

Starr’s complaint also names employees of a medical contractor and brings 

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but on appeal, he challenges only the pre-service 

dismissal of the ADA claim against the ADC defendants in their official capacities. 

Starr’s complaint named the ADC defendants in their individual capacities as well, 

but he does not present meaningful argument on appeal as to any individual-capacity 

claims under the ADA. See Montin v. Moore, 846 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 2017) 

(claims not raised in the opening brief are waived). 
-3- 

Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209–10 (1998). To state a claim under Title II, an inmate 

must allege that he is a qualified individual with a disability and that because of his 

disability, he was excluded from participation in or denied benefits of the prison’s 

services, programs, or activities. Rinehart v. Weitzell, 964 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 

2020). 

Starr alleges that ADC employees failed to accommodate his disability 

resulting from degenerative disc disease and diabetic nerve pain that left him unable 

to stand or walk, and he was therefore unable to access recreation and visitation 

opportunities and toilet and shower facilities. These allegations are sufficient to state 

a claim under Title II. We therefore reverse the order of the district court dismissing 

Starr’s ADA claim against the ADC defendants in their official capacities and 

remand for further proceedings.

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