UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

FORT WAYNE DIVISION 

JOSEPH KUBERSKI, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. CAUSE NO.: 1:15-CV-320-HAB 

ALLIED RECREATIONAL GROUP, 

INC., 

 Defendant. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

This is a lawsuit for violations of various consumer protection laws and breach of 

warranty in connection with the purchase of a recreational vehicle (RV). Plaintiff Joseph 

Kuberski purchased a Class A motorized Fleetwood RV from Defendant Allied 

Recreational Group, Inc.’s authorized dealer. Plaintiff alleges that the RV suffered from 

numerous defects and malfunctions that were not fixed within a reasonable amount of 

time or after a reasonable number of attempts. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint includes three separate Counts against Defendant. Plaintiff 

alleges breach of an express and/or implied warranty, violation of the Magnuson-Moss 

Warranty Act (MMWA), and violations of state consumer protection statutes based on 

the Defendant’s representations during the transaction, failing to remedy defects, failing 

to honor a request to take the RV back, and breach of warranty. Plaintiff seeks relief in 

the form of damages or, in the alternative, relief in the form of rescission of the contract. 
2 

This matter is now before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment [ECF No. 36]. Defendant maintains that it is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law on the MMWA claim because the undisputed facts reveal that the alleged concerns 

with the RV occurred outside of the one-year warranty period, were corrected within a 

reasonable number of attempts, or were chassis-related. Defendant also submits that 

neither Plaintiff, nor his expert, can opine about the alleged defects or damages sufficient 

to support his MMWA claim for breach of warranty.1

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

 On March 19, 2013, Plaintiff purchased a 2013 Fleetwood Storm model RV from 

Camping World R.V. Sales, located in Hope Mills, North Carolina. The day prior, 

Camping World had noted and remedied fourteen defects that existed when the RV 

arrived from the factory. 

A “Limited One-Year Warranty” applied to the house portion of the RV as follows: 

“Your new motor home, including the structure, plumbing, heating and electrical 

systems, all appliances and equipment installed by the manufacturer, is warranted under 

normal use to be free from manufacturing defects in material or workmanship, when first 

sold by an authorized Fleetwood dealership.” (ECF No. 37-1 at 64.) 

The warranty covers the first retail purchaser and all transferees during the 

warranty period when first sold by an authorized Fleetwood Dealership. 

The warranty begins on the date of original retail delivery or the date the 

motor home is first placed into service as a rental, commercial or 

demonstrator unit (whichever occurs first) “Start Date” and extends for the 

following periods: 

 

1 This assertion was also the subject of a Motion to Bar Plaintiff’s Expert (Phillip 

Grismer), which has been denied. 
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1. For non- structural defects, one (1) year from the Start Date or 

until the motor home reaches 15,000 total miles as determined 

by the mileage shown on the odometer, whichever occurs first. 

2. For structural defects, three (3) years from the Start Date or until 

the motor home reaches 45,000 total miles as determined by the 

mileage shown on the odometer, whichever occurs first. 

Structural defects are defined only as the motor home’s roof 

structure, sub-floor structure, and Vacubond® walls. 

(Id.) The limited warranty excludes from coverage “The automotive chassis system 

(including the chassis and drive train), tires and batteries, which are covered by the 

separate warranties of the respective manufacturers of these components.” (Id.) 

 About one month after taking delivery, Plaintiff returned the RV to the dealership 

in North Carolina for repair of defects, the most significant of which were that the front 

slide was not operable and the outside compartment door did not completely close. The 

work order from Camping World indicates that both defects were corrected. The first was 

corrected by replacing a blown fuse and the second by reinstalling the hinges so that the 

compartment door closed flush with the seal. An additional complaint was remedied a 

few weeks later. 

 On June 11, 2013, Plaintiff brought the RV to Camping World for additional 

service. Some of the complaints involved problems that had existed from the time of 

purchase. On November 21, 2013, the RV was again brought to Camping World for repair 

of numerous defects. Plaintiff instructed the dealership to keep the RV as long as 

necessary to complete the repairs because he was being deployed for military service. On 

March 19, 2014, Plaintiff returned to Camping World to pick up his RV. Plaintiff 

discovered that the RV still had unresolved defects, and another repair order was opened. 
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October 2014 was the last time that Plaintiff brought the RV to the dealership for repairs. 

He continued to experience new problems thereafter, as well as what appeared to be a 

continuation of others. Plaintiff declined an offer to have the RV sent to the manufacturer 

in Indiana for repair. 

ANALYSIS

 The MMWA is “a remedial statute designed to protect the purchases of consumer 

goods from deceptive warranty practices.” Miller v. Willow Creek Homes, Inc., 249 F.3d 629, 

630 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1981)). “[A] 

consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor 

to comply with any obligation under this [Act], or under a written warranty, implied 

warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable 

relief.” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). 

A. No Violation of Obligations Under MMWA 

 Plaintiff cites to § 2304 as the applicable portion of the MMWA that supports his 

claim for breach of warranty. He asserts that it imposes strict standards of compliance on 

warrantors. For example, he argues that it requires a warrantor to repair all defective or 

malfunctioning products within a reasonable time and without charge. (Pl.s’ Mem. 5, 7–

8 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a).) He contends that the same provision entitles the warrantor 

some opportunity to correct problems, but only a reasonable number of attempts or a 

reasonable amount of time. Then, if the warrantor cannot remedy the defects after a 

reasonable number of attempts or reasonable amount of time, the warrantor must permit 

the consumer to either elect a refund or replacement of the product. 
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 The section of the MMWA Plaintiff relies upon, § 2304, sets out the federal 

minimum standards for warranties. However, it only applies to full warranties. See, e.g., 

Schimmer v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 384 F.3d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that [t]here are 

two types of written warranties under the Act: full warranties and limited warranties”) 

(citing 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)). “If the written warranty meets the Federal minimum 

standards for warranty set forth in section 2304 of this title, then it shall be conspicuously 

designated a ‘full (statement of duration) warranty’.” 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(1). Section 

2303(a)(2) states that if a written warranty fails to meet the standards set forth under § 

2304, then the warranty must be conspicuously labeled as “limited.” 

 The written warranty at issue here is conspicuously labeled as a “limited” 

warranty. Therefore, the minimum standards provision does not apply to the warranty 

at issue in this case, and neither do the Act’s substantive remedies. See Schimmer, 384 F.3d 

at 405. Plaintiff has not identified any stand-alone claims that arise out of Defendant’s 

failure to comply with an obligation under the MMWA. However, as set forth below, that 

is not the end of the inquiry. 

B. Breach of Written or Implied Warranty 

 The MMWA “allows consumers to enforce written and implied warranties in 

federal court, borrowing state law causes of action.” Schimmer, 384 F.3d at 405 (citing 

Gardynski–Leschuck v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1998)). “[F]or all practical 

purposes, the MMWA operates as a gloss on . . . state law breach of warranty claims.” 

Anderson v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 662 F.3d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 2011). The disposition of the 

state law warranty claims determines the disposition of the MMWA claims. Schiesser v. 
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Ford Motor Co., 2016 WL 6395457, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2016) (“The ability to sustain a 

cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Act is dependent on the existence of an 

underlying viable state-law warranty claim.”) (citing In re Gen. Motors Corp. Dex-Cool 

Products Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 305, 315 (S.D. Ill. 2007) (“Although Plaintiffs bring this 

action pursuant not to state law but the Magnuson-Moss Act, state law nonetheless 

dominates this case due to the peculiar nature of the federal statute, which in numerous 

respects is essentially a vehicle for vindicating state-law warranty claims in federal 

court.”). When a MMWA breach of warranty claim is brought under state law, state law 

controls the nature of relief to which the consumer is entitled. 

 To correctly analyze Plaintiff’s breach of warranty claim, it must apply the laws of 

the state that properly govern the claim. A federal court sitting in diversity must apply 

the choice of law rules of the forum in which it sits. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 

313 U.S. 487 (1941). Indiana choice of law rules regarding actions sounding in contract 

requires application of the law of the forum with the most intimate contacts to the facts. 

Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Dana Corp., 690 N.E.2d 285, 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The 

following are representative of the factors to consider when the contract does not contain 

a choice of law provision: (a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the 

contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, 

and (e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of 

the parties. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971)). A court need 

only undergo the analysis above if there is a difference between the relevant laws of the 

different states. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 690 N.E.2d at 291 (“[B]efore entangling itself 
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in messy issues of conflict of laws a court ought to satisfy itself that there actually is a 

difference between the relevant laws of the different states.”) 

Reviewing the submissions in this case has reminded the Court that it is not 

“obliged to research and construct legal arguments for parties, especially when they are 

represented by counsel.” Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2011). Neither 

party has offered a choice of law analysis or otherwise indicated whether North Carolina 

or Indiana law applies. Defendant fails to cite a single case that would assist the Court in 

determining liability for breach of a written or implied warranty under either state’s laws. 

See, e.g., Thomas v. H & R Block E. Enters., Inc., 630 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that 

when a court is addressing a question of state law while sitting in diversity, its job is to 

ascertain the substantive content of state law as it has been determined by the highest 

court of the state, or as it would be by that court if the case were presented).2 Equally 

unhelpful, Plaintiff cites to cases from Illinois, Arizona, California, Florida, Maryland, 

Ohio, Mississippi, Arkansas, Connecticut, Minnesota, Oregon, Michigan, and New York. 

 “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 

‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 

with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

 

2 Defendant’s failure may be due to its reliance on the MMWA’s statutory requirement that, 

before bringing an action under § 2310(d)(1), the consumer must give the warrantor “a reasonable 

opportunity to cure” its failure to comply with “an obligation under any written or implied warranty.” § 

2310(e) (“No action . . . may be brought under subsection (d) . . . under any written or implied warranty 

or service contract . . . unless the [warrantor] . . . is afforded a reasonable opportunity to cure such failure 

to comply.”). However, it would not be appropriate to view this statutory language in isolation and 

without any analysis of state law. 
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of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is 

not proper unless the moving party has shown that it is entitled to “judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that are outcome determinative 

under the applicable law. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1997). Defendant has 

not established that, as a matter of law, it fulfilled its obligation to repair or replace 

defective parts and conditions of the RV under the limited written warranty or any 

implied warranty as those warranties would be enforced and interpreted under state law. 

 Aside from the source of the substantive law, too many issues remain unexplored 

and too many questions remain unanswered for this case to be amenable to summary 

judgment. Even a cursory review of the record appears to reveal genuine issues of 

material fact. The work repair records demonstrate that Plaintiff experienced, and 

complained of, various problems with the RV. The Plaintiff’s expert has confirmed the 

existence of these problems, some of which he maintains were ongoing and persisted 

despite repair attempts. Moreover, Plaintiff’s expert has opined as to what he believes are 

the causes of these problems, causes that may be covered by the Limited Warranty. The 

Defendant disagrees with the nature, the cause, and the point of Defendant’s resolution 

of the problems, and has its own evidence in support. A trial, not summary judgment, is 

the proper means to resolve this litigation. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment [ECF No. 36]. 

SO ORDERED on August 12, 2019. 
9 

 s/ Holly A. Brady 

JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT