1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 

HAMMOND DIVISION 

ANTHONY RHODES, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CAUSE NO: 2:16-CV-93 

 ) 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF ) 

INVESTIGATION, ) 

 ) 

Defendant. ) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on the Complaint (DE #1), the 

Petition to Proceed Without Pre-Payment of Fees and Costs (DE #2), 

and the Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Preparation of a Vaughn Index 

(DE #3), all filed by Plaintiff, Anthony Rhodes, on March 15, 2016. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court: 

(1) DISMISSES the complaint (DE #1); 

(2) DENIES the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(DE #2); 

(3) DENIES the motion to compel as MOOT (DE #3); 

(4) GRANTS Plaintiff to and including April 17, 2017, to 

file an amended complaint in accordance with this order 

and either pay the filing fee or refile his in forma 

pauperis petition, making sure that all information is up 

to date as of the time of filing; and 
2

(5) CAUTIONS Plaintiff that if he does not respond by the 

deadline, this action is subject to termination without 

further notice. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff, Anthony Rhodes (“Rhodes”), initiated this case by 

filing a pro se complaint (DE #1) and a petition to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”) (DE #2) on March 15 2016. That same day, 

he also filed a motion to compel the “[p]reparation of a Vaughn 

Index.” (DE #3.) In his complaint, Rhodes lists one defendant, 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). (DE #1.) Rhodes 

asserts that he is suing the FBI on ten legal theories “because 

they have performed a number of illegal acts against [his] person 

during the years of 2004 (to my knowledge) to this current date.” 

(Id. at 2.) The specific causes of action with supporting facts, 

in full, as listed in Rhodes’ complaint are as follows: 

1. Obstruction of Justice- It is my assertion 

that the [FBI] did knowingly and willingly use 

the E7 exclusion of the Freedom of Information 

Act to obstruct justice, by purposely placing 

information which would clearly reveal their 

wrongdoing within it; thereby preventing my 

access to such records upon my Freedom of 

Information Act requests dated August 2, 2006 

and November 22, 2015. 

2. Privacy Invasion- It is my assertion that 

the [FBI] did knowingly and willingly use 

agents and/or others to harass me during the 

years of 2004 (to my knowledge) to present. 
3

3. Harassment- It is my assertion that the 

[FBI] did knowingly and willingly use agents 

and/or others to invade my privacy during the 

years of 2004 (to my knowledge) to present. 

4. Torture- It is my assertion that the [FBI] 

did knowingly and willingly use agents and/or 

others to use directed energy weapons to 

torture me during the years of 2004 (to my 

knowledge) to present. 

5. Theft- It is my assertion that the [FBI] 

did knowingly and willingly use agents and/or 

others to steal my personal and intellectual 

property during the years of 2004 (to my 

knowledge) to 2015. 

6. Destruction of Property- It is my assertion 

that the [FBI] did knowingly and willingly use 

agents and/or others to destroy my personal 

property during the years of 2004 (to my 

knowledge) to 2014. 

7. Defamation- It is my assertion that the 

[FBI] did knowingly and willingly use agents 

and/or others to defame my character during 

the years of 2004 (to my knowledge) to 

present. 

8. Civil Rights Violation- It is my assertion 

that the [FBI] did knowingly and willingly use 

agents and/or others to violate my civil 

rights during the years of 2004 (to my 

knowledge) to present. 

9. Attempted Murder- It is my assertion that 

the [FBI] did knowingly and willingly use 

agents and/or others to attempt to murder me 

(by forced suicide) during the years of 2004 

(to my knowledge) to present. 

10. Official Misconduct- It is my assertion 

that as a result of these acts, the [FBI] was 

both improper and illegal in its duty to act 

in the public good. 
4

(Id. at 2-3.) Rhodes has requested “assistance” in “compel[ling] 

delivery of the records” and compensation in the amount of 

$250,000,000.00 in “punitive damages” for the FBI’s allegedly 

“heinous and illegal acts.” (Id. at 3.) 

ANALYSIS 

 The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, allows an indigent 

plaintiff to commence a civil action without prepaying the 

administrative costs (e.g. filing fee) of the lawsuit. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 

27 (1992). When presented with an IFP application, the district 

court makes two determinations: (1) whether the suit has 

sufficient merit; and (2) whether the plaintiff’s poverty level 

justifies IFP status. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 27; Smith-Bey v. 

Hosp. Adm’r, 841 F.2d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 1988). The screening 

court must dismiss the complaint if (a) the allegation of poverty 

is untrue, (b) the action is frivolous or malicious, (c) the action 

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (d) 

the action seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e) (2). 

 An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either 

in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 

A claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit” 

is considered frivolous. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th 
5

Cir. 2000). To determine whether the suit states a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii), 

a court applies the same standard as it would to a motion to 

dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

Dewalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 611 (7th Cir. 2000). In deciding 

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(6), a court must accept all 

well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view them in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Luevano v. WalMart Stores, Inc.,

722 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013). To survive dismissal, a 

“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff “must plead some facts 

that suggest a right to relief that is beyond the ‘speculative 

level.’” Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 

2011). “This means that the complaint must contain allegations 

plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) an entitlement 

to relief.” Lavalais v. Village of Melrose Park, 734 F.3d 629, 

632-33 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

 In this case, while Rhodes’ poverty level justifies IFP 

status, the suit as drafted cannot proceed. In general, “[a]bsent 

a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and 

its agencies from suit.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 
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(1994) (citing Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988)). Here, 

Rhodes has attempted to bring his claims against the FBI pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action 

for violations of the constitution by “any person” acting under 

color of state law. While municipalities and other local 

government entities have been deemed “persons” for purposes of 

section 1983 liability, states and state agencies have not and 

remain immune from suits under the Eleventh Amendment. See Quern 

v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 

of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). It is equally 

clear that section 1983 does not waive the federal government’s 

sovereign immunity. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 522 F. Supp. 140, 

147 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (“[P]laintiffs cite no case, and we find none, 

in which Monell has been extended to governmental bodies other 

than local governments. We thus reject plaintiffs’ argument that 

we have jurisdiction over the United States under s[ection] 1983 

on the basis of Monell . . . .”); see also Askew v. Bloemker, 548 

F.2d 673, 676–77 (7th Cir. 1976) (“[n]o claim lies under s[ection] 

1983 . . . for actions taken under color of federal law.”)). 

Rhodes cannot use section 1983 as a vehicle to sue the FBI. 

 Furthermore, while the Supreme Court recognized an implied 

cause of action for monetary damages against federal agents sued 

as individuals for constitutional violations in Bivens v. Six 

Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
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389–91 (1971), it has declined to imply a similar cause of action 

directly against federal agencies. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 473; see 

also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71–72 (2001) 

(refusing to extend Bivens and noting that, with respect to 

constitutional violations, the “only remedy lies against the 

individual” and not against the individual’s employer, the federal 

agency, or the United States). Because Rhodes has named only the 

FBI as a defendant and has not listed any individual agents in 

either the caption or body of his complaint, it would be improper 

to allow this complaint to proceed as a viable Bivens action. See 

Myles v. U.S., 416 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 2005) (It is 

“unacceptable for a court to add litigants on its own motion. 

Selecting defendants is a task for the plaintiff, not the 

judge.”).1 

                                                            

1 Even if Rhodes had named individual defendants in his complaint, the Court 

notes that he has failed to state a Bivens claim. To establish such a claim, 

a plaintiff must allege that a constitutional violation has occurred. 

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-97. “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to 

Bivens . . . suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official 

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Here, Rhodes’ complaint sets forth 

only sketchy, implausible, and threadbare conclusory statements. For 

example, Rhodes alleges “civil rights violations” in that the FBI “did 

knowingly and willingly use agents and/or others to violate [his] civil 

rights during the years of 2004 . . . to present.” (DE #1, p. 3.) He also 

alleges that the FBI tortured him by “knowingly and willingly us[ing] agent 

and/or others to use directed energy weapons to torture me during the years 

of 2004 . . . to present.” (Id.) Although the Court is obligated to accept 

factual allegations as true, “some factual allegations [are] so sketchy or 

implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice . . . of the 

plaintiff's claim.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Furthermore, the Court may “not accept as adequate abstract recitations of 

the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. Even 

taking Rhodes’ pro se status into consideration, his allegations are 
8

 It is possible that Rhodes is attempting to sue the FBI under 

the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) which provides a limited 

waiver of sovereign immunity for some tort claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1346(b), 2671–2680. However, the “only proper defendant in an 

FTCA action is the United States.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 

688, 693 (7th Cir. 2008); Hughes v. U.S., 701 F.2d 56, 58 (7th 

Cir. 1982) (“Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a governmental 

agency cannot be sued in its own name; the action must be brought 

against the United States.”). As noted above, Rhodes has only 

sued the FBI, and this Court will not substitute parties for him 

sua sponte. Myles, 416 F.3d at 553.2

                                                            

insufficient to state a Bivens claim, and what few facts he does provide 

(i.e. that the FBI used “directed energy weapons” to torture him and 

attempted to murder him by “forced suicide”) are frivolous. See Gladney v. 

Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 2002) (sometimes a suit 

may be dismissed because “the facts alleged in the complaint are so nutty 

(‘delusional’ is the polite word) that they’re unbelievable, even though 

there has been no evidentiary hearing to determine their truth or falsity.”). 

2 Furthermore, even assuming that Rhodes had named the United States as a 

defendant, his complaint as drafted suffers from numerous problems. First, 

the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for constitutional torts, so any 

such potential claims are not cognizable. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Meyer, 510 

U.S. at 477-78; Russ v. U.S., 62 F.3d 201, 204 (7th Cir. 1995) 

(“constitutional wrongs cannot be remedied through the FTCA”). Second, while 

the United States can be found liable in some instances for common law torts 

under the FTCA to the same extent as a private person would be under 

applicable state law provisions, Rhodes has not adequately pled any such 

claims. His allegations of obstruction of justice, invasion of privacy, 

harassment, torture, theft, destruction of property, defamation, attempted 

murder, and official misconduct (see DE #1, p. 3) are either not recognized 

as valid tort claims under Indiana law and/or are simply threadbare, 

conclusory allegations that fail to state a claim. Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581. 

Moreover, the FTCA requires claimants to exhaust certain administrative 

remedies prior to suing the federal government in tort; a federal court does 

not have jurisdiction to entertain suits brought pursuant to the FTCA before 

such remedies are exhausted. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Charlton v. U.S., 743 F.2d 

557, 558–60 (7th Cir. 1984). Here, there is no allegation that Rhodes ever 

pursued any administrative remedies under the FTCA. Finally, the only 

monetary damages Rhodes has requested are in the form of $250,000,000.00 in 
9

 To the extent that Rhodes has requested “assistance” in 

compelling delivery of records that the FBI has allegedly refused 

to provide him with, it is possible that Rhodes may have intended 

to bring suit pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). 

As explained by the Supreme Court: 

FOIA represents a carefully balanced scheme of 

public rights and agency obligations designed 

to foster greater access to agency records 

than existed prior to its enactment. That 

statutory scheme authorizes federal courts to 

ensure private access to requested materials 

when three requirements have been met. Under 

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) federal jurisdiction 

is dependent upon a showing that an agency has 

(1) ‘improperly’; (2) ‘withheld’; (3) ‘agency 

records.’ Judicial authority to devise 

remedies and enjoin agencies can only be 

invoked, under the jurisdictional grant 

conferred by § 552, if the agency has 

contravened all three components of this 

obligation. 

Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 

136, 150 (1980). Upon a proper request, an agency must disclose 

the records unless they are subject to one of the exemptions listed 

in the statute. Enviro Tech Intern., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 371 

F.3d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), (b)). 

FOIA exemptions must be construed narrowly in favor of disclosure. 

Patterson v. I.R.S., 56 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1995). That said, 

the statute itself mandates that the request must “reasonably 

                                                            

punitive damages. However, the United States cannot be held liable for 

punitive damages under the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
10

describe[]” the records sought. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3). Courts 

have held that vague, unspecified requests are not proper and need 

not trigger mandatory agency disclosure. See e.g. Marks v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Justice, 578 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1978) (“broad, 

sweeping requests lacking specificity are not permissible”); Mason 

v. Callaway, 554 F.2d 129, 131 (4th Cir. 1977) (seeking disclosure 

of “all correspondence, documents, memoranda, tape recordings, 

notes, and any other material pertaining to the atrocities 

committed against plaintiffs . . . typifies the lack of specificity 

that Congress sought to preclude”). In an unpublished decision 

citing to both Marks and Calloway, the Seventh Circuit Court of 

Appeals acknowledged, in dicta, that dismissal of a FOIA complaint 

is warranted if a claim rests entirely on such overly broad or 

unspecific requests that the facts pled “cannot result in any 

plausible relief.” Moore v. F.B.I., 283 Fed. App’x 397, 399 (7th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Segal v. Geisha NYC LLC, 517 F.3d 501, 505 

(7th Cir. 2008)); see also Burr v. Huff, 112 Fed. App’x 537, 537-

38 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of a FOIA complaint for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff requested 

“any records the agency might have relating to either her or to a 

bomb-threat investigation purportedly initiated by a NFL player” 

because the allegations in the complaint were “so frivolous as to 

be insubstantial”). 
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Here, Rhodes alleges that the FBI used the “E 7 Exclusion”3

to obstruct justice by “purposefully placing information which 

would clearly reveal their wrongdoing within it” and prevented him 

from receiving records related to FOIA requests dated August 2, 

2006, and November 22, 2015. (DE #1, p. 2.) He has not described 

the contents of these FOIA requests in the body of his complaint 

in any way (nor has he appended the actual FOIA requests or agency 

denial letters to his complaint). Simply put, the complaint does 

not allege that Rhodes made any sufficiently specific requests for 

information to the FBI that were then improperly withheld by the 

FBI.4 Such vague and conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual 

details, do not provide fair notice of his claims. Brooks, 578 

F.3d at 581; EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 

776 (7th Cir. 2007). Moreover, the remainder of Rhodes’ complaint, 

which references unspecified actions allegedly taken by 

                                                            

3 Although it is not entirely clear, the Court assumes that Rhodes is 

referring to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) which provides an exclusion for “records 

or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” that would “disclose 

techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, 

or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 

prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 

circumvention of the law.” 

4 Rhodes’ “Motion to Compel Preparation of a Vaughn Index” does nothing to 

shed light on his allegations. In it, Rhodes simply requests “an itemized, 

indexed inventory of every agency record or portion thereof responsive to 

[his] request which [the FBI] asserts to be exempt from disclosure . . . .” 

(DE #3.) Furthermore, as an aside, the Court notes that the government is 

not obligated to create a Vaughn index in every FOIA case, and it is 

inappropriate to compel the production of one in the initial stages of 

litigation. Bassiouni v. C.I.A., 248 F. Supp. 2d 795, 797 (N.D. Ill. 2003) 

(citing Wright v. OSHA, 822 F.2d 642, 645-46 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also 

Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C.Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 

977 (1974). 
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unidentified FBI agents related to harassment, torture (using 

“directed energy weapons”), theft, destruction of property, 

defamation, civil rights violations, attempted murder (“by forced 

suicide”), and misconduct, suggests that any FOIA claims regarding 

these allegations are frivolous because “the facts alleged rise to 

the level of the irrational or wholly incredible.” Alston v. 

DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 

Thus, Rhodes’ potential FOIA claims as currently drafted are so 

insubstantial that dismissal is warranted. 

In sum, Rhodes has not alleged any cognizable section 1983, 

Bivens, or FTCA claims against the FBI that would support a waiver 

of its sovereign immunity, so the Court lacks jurisdiction to 

proceed on these claims. And, to the extent that he intended to 

bring a FOIA action against the FBI, he has failed to properly do 

so. 

However, he will be permitted to amend his complaint to 

clarify his claims. Should he choose to amend his complaint, he 

should clearly identify who he is intending to sue, and he must 

provide sufficient factual details related to each claim that 

explains what each defendant did (or did not do) which makes that 

defendant liable to him. He needs to provide the facts on which 

his claims are based, and he needs to describe what injuries he 

has suffered as a result of each claim. 
13

[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ 

requires more than labels and conclusions, and 

a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do. Factual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level, on the 

assumption that all the allegations in the 

complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation 

marks, ellipsis, citations and footnote omitted). Furthermore, 

the Court cautions Rhodes that he should comply with the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure including Rules 18(a)5 and 20(a).6 Though 

it is possible to join more than one claim and more than one 

defendant in a single lawsuit, “[u]nrelated claims against 

different defendants belong in different suits . . . .” George v. 

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Rhodes should proceed 

accordingly. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 

(1) DISMISSES the complaint (DE #1); 

                                                            

5 “A party asserting a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim 

may join, as independent or alternate claims, as many claims as it has 

against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). 

6 “Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: (A) they assert any right 

to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or 

arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 

occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs 

will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
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(2) DENIES the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(DE #2); 

(3) DENIES the motion to compel as MOOT (DE #3);

(4) GRANTS Plaintiff to and including April 17, 2017, to 

file an amended complaint in accordance with this order 

and either pay the filing fee or refile his in forma 

pauperis petition, making sure that all information is up 

to date as of the time of filing; and 

(5) CAUTIONS Plaintiff that if he does not respond by the 

deadline, this action is subject to termination without 

further notice. 

DATED: March 16, 2017 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge 

 United States District Court