Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

Statement of ALITO, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEATTLE’S UNION GOSPEL MISSION v. 

MATTHEW S. WOODS 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 

COURT OF WASHINGTON 

No. 21–144. Decided March 21, 2022 

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 

Statement of JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE 

THOMAS joins, respecting the denial of certiorari. 

The First Amendment gives “special solicitude to the 

rights of religious organizations” to operate according to

their faith without government interference. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 

U. S. 171, 189 (2012). In certain contexts, this autonomy

requires courts to “stay out of employment disputes involving those holding certain important positions with churches

and other religious institutions.” Our Lady of Guadalupe 

School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip 

op., at 11). Consistent with this constitutional principle,

Congress has long exempted religious employers from federal employment laws that would otherwise interfere with 

their ability “to define and carry out their religious missions” by imposing “potential liability” for hiring practices 

that favor co-religionists. Corporation of Presiding Bishop 

of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 

U. S. 327, 335–336 (1987); see also id., at 342–343 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“a religious organization should be

able to require that only members of its community perform

those activities” that “constitute part of a religious community’s practice”). 

Because of such federal statutory exemptions and their

state analogs, we have yet to confront whether freedom for 
 

2 SEATTLE’S UNION GOSPEL MISSION v. WOODS 

Statement of ALITO, J. 

religious employers to hire their co-religionists is constitutionally required, though the courts of appeals have generally protected the autonomy of religious organization to hire 

personnel who share their beliefs. See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 

929 F. 2d 944 (CA3 1991); Kennedy v. St. Joseph’s Ministries, Inc., 657 F. 3d 189 (CA4 2011); EEOC v. Mississippi 

College, 626 F. 2d 447 (CA5 1980); Hall v. Baptist Mem. 

Health Care Corp., 215 F. 3d 618 (CA6 2000); Killinger v. 

Samford Univ., 113 F. 3d 196 (CA11 1997).

But in this case the confrontation may be inevitable, as it

involves an employment dispute between a religious employer and an applicant who was not hired because he disagreed with that employer’s religious views. The Washington Supreme Court expressly declined to apply its state 

employment law exemption for religious entities to this dispute. Instead, it held that if that state exemption applied 

to employment decisions beyond those involving church 

ministers, such an exemption would violate the Washington 

State Constitution’s protection for other individual rights

and could become a “license to discriminate.” Because of 

the interlocutory posture of this case, I concur in the denial

of certiorari at this time. But the day may soon come when 

we must decide whether the autonomy guaranteed by the 

First Amendment protects religious organizations’ freedom 

to hire co-religionists without state or judicial interference. 

I 

Petitioner Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission (Mission) was 

founded in 1932 to care for those suffering from the economic hardships attending the Great Depression. App. to

Pet. for Cert. 159a. The Mission is a tax-exempt community 

categorized as a church equivalent by the Internal Revenue 

Service under 26 U. S. C. §170(b)(1)(A)(i). It requires its 

paid staff to affirm its statement of faith, which declares 

“the Bible is the inspired, infallible, authoritative Word of

God.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 153a. Its employee handbook 
Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Statement of ALITO, J. 

also requires staff to abide by the Mission’s understanding 

of the Bible by refraining from “[a]cts or language which are 

considered immoral or indecent according to traditional biblical standards,” including “extra-marital affairs, sex outside of marriage, [and] homosexual behavior.” Id., at 160a, 

162a. 

In 2016, respondent Matthew Woods, a former summer 

intern and volunteer for the Mission, saw a job posting for 

a staff attorney position in the Mission’s legal aid clinic. He 

disclosed to the legal aid clinic’s staff that he identified as

bisexual and was in a same-sex relationship, and he asked 

whether that would pose an obstacle to employment with 

the Mission. Id., at 181a–182a, 200a–201a. The clinic’s director quoted the employee handbook and explained that

Woods was not “able to apply,” but the director wished him 

well and later sent Woods a secular legal aid clinic’s job 

posting. Id., at 122a, 184a, 197a–198a. 

Woods nevertheless applied for the Mission’s staff attorney position to “protest” the Mission’s employment policy. 

Id., at 127a. His application also disclosed that Woods was

not an active member of a local church and could not provide a pastor’s name and contact information, as the application requested. Woods’s cover letter asked the Mission to 

“change” its religious practices. Id., at 195a. 

After he applied, the clinic’s director met Woods for lunch 

and confirmed that the Mission could not change its theology. Id., at 147a. He explained that Woods’s employment 

application was not viable because he did not comply with 

the Mission’s religious lifestyle requirements, did not actively attend church, and did not exhibit a passion for helping clients develop a personal relationship with Jesus. The 

Mission hired a co-religionist candidate instead. 

In 2017, Woods filed suit against the Mission in the Superior Court of King County. He alleged that the Mission

violated Washington’s Law Against Discrimination 
 

4 SEATTLE’S UNION GOSPEL MISSION v. WOODS 

Statement of ALITO, J. 

(WLAD), which forbids discrimination against sexual orientation in employment decisions. The Mission answered 

that entertaining the suit would violate the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses. The Mission also argued that it

fell into an express statutory exemption from the WLAD, 

which excludes “any religious or sectarian organization not 

organized for private profit” from its definition of “employer.” Wash. Rev. Code §49.60.040(11) (2020). The 

Washington state trial court agreed, noting that the Mission “put applicants on notice” that employees must “accept

the Mission’s Statement of Faith” and that the staff attorney’s duties would “extend beyond legal advice to include 

spiritual guidance and praying with the clients.” App. to

Pet. for Cert. 64a–65a. The trial court thus dismissed the 

suit based on the WLAD’s statutory exemption. 

The Washington Supreme Court granted Woods’s petition for direct review and reversed. The court held that as 

applied to Woods’s lawsuit, the WLAD’s religious exemption would violate protections for sexual orientation and 

same-sex marriage implicit in the Washington Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. I, §12, unless 

the court narrowed the scope of the WLAD religious exemption. It thus reasoned that the State Constitution would 

not be “offended if WLAD’s exception for religious organizations is applied concerning the claims of a ‘minister’ as defined by Our Lady of Guadalupe and Hosanna-Tabor.” 197 

Wash. 2d 231, 250, 481 P. 3d 1060, 1069 (2021). 

Rather than enter a final judgment, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that a “material question of fact remains concerning whether the [Mission] staff attorneys

qualify as ministers.” Id., at 252, 481 P. 3d, at 1070. It thus 

remanded for “the trial court to determine whether staff attorneys can qualify as ministers.” Ibid. 

II 

The Washington Supreme Court’s reasoning presumes 
 

Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

Statement of ALITO, J. 

that the guarantee of church autonomy in the Constitution’s Religion Clauses protects only a religious organization’s employment decisions regarding formal ministers. 

But our precedents suggest that the guarantee of church 

autonomy is not so narrowly confined. As early as 1872, our 

church-autonomy cases explained that “civil courts exercise

no jurisdiction” over matters involving “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the 

conformity of the members of the church to the standard of 

morals required of them.” Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 

733 (1872). That is so because the Constitution protects religious organizations “from secular control or manipulation.” Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U. S. 94, 116 (1952).

The religious organizations protected include churches, religious schools, and religious organizations engaged in

charitable practices, like operating homeless shelters, hospitals, soup kitchens, and religious legal-aid clinics similar 

to the Mission’s—among many others. 

Such religious groups’ “very existence is dedicated to the

collective expression and propagation of shared religious

ideals,” and “there can be no doubt that the messenger matters” in that religious expression. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 

U. S., at 200–201 (ALITO, J., concurring). To force religious 

organizations to hire messengers and other personnel who

do not share their religious views would undermine not only 

the autonomy of many religious organizations but also their 

continued viability. If States could compel religious organizations to hire employees who fundamentally disagree 

with them, many religious non-profits would be extinguished from participation in public life—perhaps by those 

who disagree with their theological views most vigorously. 

Driving such organizations from the public square would 

not just infringe on their rights to freely exercise religion

but would greatly impoverish our Nation’s civic and religious life. 
 

6 SEATTLE’S UNION GOSPEL MISSION v. WOODS 

Statement of ALITO, J. 

This case illustrates that serious risk. Woods applied for

a position with the Mission not to embrace and further its

religious views but to protest and fundamentally change

them. The Washington Legislature sought to prevent its

employment laws from being used in such a way by exempting “any religious or sectarian organization not organized 

for private profit” from its definition of a covered “employer.” Wash. Rev. Code §49.60.040(11); see Brief for 20

Current and Former Washington State Legislators as 

Amici Curiae 4–5. The Washington Supreme Court’s decision to narrowly construe that religious exemption to avoid 

conflict with the Washington Constitution may, however,

have created a conflict with the Federal Constitution. 

III 

The Washington Supreme Court’s decision may warrant 

our review in the future, but threshold issues would make 

it difficult for us to review this case in this posture. The 

state court did not address whether applying state employment law to require the Mission to hire someone who is not

a co-religionist would infringe the First Amendment. Further, respondent claims that the Washington Supreme

Court’s decision is not a final judgment because of its interlocutory nature, see 28 U. S. C. §1257(a), while petitioner 

contends that we have jurisdiction under Cox Broadcasting 

Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 477 (1975). Given respondent’s admission that “there is no prospect that this Court

would be precluded from reviewing” these First Amendment questions “once there is a final state judgment,” Brief 

in Opposition 21–22, I concur in the denial of certiorari.